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      History of the war in the Peninsula, Vol. 6 of 6 | Project Gutenberg
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<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 69964 ***</div>


<div class="transnote">
<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p>

<p>Footnote anchors are denoted by <span class="fnanchor">[number]</span>, and the footnotes have been
placed at the end of the book.</p>

<p class="customcover">The cover image was created by the transcriber
and is placed in the public domain.</p>

<p>This is volume 6 of 6. Similar to volumes 4 and 5, this volume had a
date (Year. Month) as a margin header on most pages. This information
about the chronology of the narrative has been preserved as a Sidenote
to the relevant paragraph on that page, whenever the header date
changed.</p>

<p>With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings
of names have not been changed.</p>

<p>Some minor changes to the text are noted at the <a href="#TN">end of the book</a>.</p>

<p>
<span class="pad4">Volume 1 of this series can be found at</span><br>
<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318</span><br>
<span class="pad4">Volume 2 of this series can be found at</span><br>
<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554</span><br>
<span class="pad4">Volume 3 of this series can be found at</span><br>
<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68187</span><br>
<span class="pad4">Volume 4 of this series can be found at</span><br>
<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68536</span><br>
<span class="pad4">Volume 5 of this series can be found at</span><br>
<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/69220</span><br>
</p>
</div>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<h1>
<span class="lsp2 bold">HISTORY</span><br>
<span class="fs50">OF THE</span><br>
<span class="fs120">WAR IN THE PENINSULA</span></h1>
</div>

<p class="pfs80">AND IN THE</p>

<p class="p1 pfs135">SOUTH OF FRANCE,</p>

<p class="p1 pfs90">FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.</p>

<p class="p2 pfs70">BY</p>

<p class="pfs120">W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.</p>

<p class="pfs60 lht"><em>COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH<br>
ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.</em></p>

<p class="p1 pfs120">VOL. VI.</p>

<hr class="r10">

<p class="p2 pfs60">PREFIXED TO WHICH ARE</p>

<p class="p1 pfs80">SEVERAL JUSTIFICATORY PIECES</p>

<p class="p1 pfs60">IN REPLY TO</p>

<p class="pfs80">COLONEL GURWOOD, MR. ALISON, SIR WALTER SCOTT,</p>
<p class="pfs80">LORD BERESFORD, <span class="allsmcap">AND</span> THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.</p>

<hr class="r30">

<p class="p2 pfs100">LONDON:</p>
<p class="pfs90">THOMAS &amp; WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.</p>

<hr class="r10">

<p class="pfs70 lsp3">MDCCCXL.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p class="p10 pfs80">LONDON:</p>

<p class="p1 pfs60">MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.</p>
</div>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">TABLE OF CONTENTS.</h2>
</div>

<hr class="r20">

<table class="autotable fs80">
<tr>
<td class="tdlx"><a href="#NOTICE">Notice and Justification, &amp;c., &amp;c.</a></td>
<td class="tdrb">Page&#160;i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs135" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XXI">BOOK XXI.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_I">CHAPTER I.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Lord Wellington blockades Pampeluna, besieges St. Sebastian—Operations on the eastern coast of Spain—General Elio’s
                 misconduct—Sir John Murray sails to attack Taragona—Colonel Prevot takes St. Felippe de Balaguer—Second siege of
                 Taragona—Suchet and Maurice Mathieu endeavour to relieve the place—Sir John Murray raises the siege—Embarks with the loss
                 of his guns—Disembarks again at St. Felippe de Balaguer—Lord William Bentinck arrives—Sir John Murray’s trial—Observations</td>
<td class="tdrb">Page&#160;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_II">CHAP. II.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Danger of Sicily—Averted by Murat’s secret defection from the emperor—Lord William Bentinck re-embarks—His design of
                 attacking the city of Valencia frustrated—Del Parque is defeated on the Xucar—The Anglo-Sicilians disembark at Alicant—Suchet
                 prepares to attack the allies—Prevented by the battle of Vittoria—Abandons Valencia—Marches towards Zaragoza—Clauzel retreats
                 to France—Paris evacuates Zaragoza—Suchet retires to Taragona—Mines the walls—Lord William Bentinck passes the Ebro—Secures
                 the Col de Balaguer—Invests Taragona—Partial insurrection in Upper Catalonia—Combat of Salud—Del Parque joins lord William
                 Bentinck who projects an attack upon Suchet’s cantonments—Suchet concentrates his army—Is joined by Decaen—Advances—The
                 allies retreat to the mountains—Del Parque invests Tortoza—His rear-guard attacked by the garrison while passing the
                 Ebro—Suchet blows up the walls of Taragona—Lord William desires to besiege Tortoza—Hears that Suchet has detached troops—Sends
                 Del Parque’s army to join lord Wellington—Advances to Villa Franca—Combat of Ordal—The allies retreat—Lord Frederick Bentinck
                 fights with the French general Myers and wounds him—Lord William returns to Sicily—Observations</td>
<td class="tdrb">33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_III">CHAP. III.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Siege of Sebastian—Convent of Bartolomeo stormed—Assault on the place fails—Causes thereof—Siege turned into a blockade, and
                 the guns embarked at Passages—French make a successful sally</td>
<td class="tdrb">65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Soult appointed the emperor’s lieutenant—Arrives at Bayonne—Joseph goes to Paris—Sketch of Napoleon’s political and military
                 situation—His greatness of mind—Soult’s activity—Theatre of operations described—Soult resolves to succour Pampeluna—Relative
                 positions and numbers of the contending armies described</td>
<td class="tdrb">86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_V">CHAP. V.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Soult attacks the right of the allies—Combat of Roncesvalles—Combat of Linzoain—Count D’Erlon attacks the allies’ right
                 centre—Combat of Maya—General Hill takes a position at Irueta—General Picton and Cole retreat down the Val de Zubiri—They
                 turn at Huarte and offer battle—Lord Wellington arrives—Combat of the 27th—First battle of Sauroren—Various movements—D’Erlon
                 joins Soult who attacks general Hill—Second battle of Sauroren—Foy is cut off from the main army—Night march of the light
                 division—Soult retreats—Combat of Doña Maria—Dangerous position of the French at San Estevan—Soult marches down the
                 Bidassoa—Forced march of the light division—Terrible scene near the bridge of Yanzi—Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly—Narrow
                 escape of lord Wellington—Observations</td>
<td class="tdrb">109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs135" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XXII">BOOK XXII.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_I">CHAP. I.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">New positions of the armies—Lord Melville’s mismanagement of the naval co-operation—Siege of St. Sebastian—Progress of the
                 second attack</td>
<td class="tdrb">179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_II">CHAP. II.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Storming of St. Sebastian—Lord Wellington calls for volunteers from the first fourth and light divisions—The place is
                 assaulted and taken—The town burned—The castle is bombarded and surrenders—Observations</td>
<td class="tdrb">197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_III">CHAP. III.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Soult’s views and positions during the siege described—He endeavours to succour the place—Attacks lord Wellington—Combats
                 of San Marcial and Vera—The French are repulsed the same day that San Sebastian is stormed—Soult resolves to adopt a
                 defensive system—Observations</td>
<td class="tdrb">218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">The duke of Berri proposes to invade France promising the aid of twenty thousand insurgents—Lord Wellington’s views on this
                 subject—His personal acrimony against Napoleon—That monarch’s policy and character defended—Dangerous state of affairs in
                 Catalonia—Lord Wellington designs to go there himself, but at the desire of the allied sovereigns and the English government
                 resolves to establish a part of his army in France—His plans retarded by accidents and bad weather—Soult unable to divine his
                 project—Passage of the Bidassoa—Second combat of Vera—Colonel Colborne’s great presence of mind—Gallant action of lieutenant
                 Havelock—The French lose the redoubt of Sarre and abandon the great Rhune—Observations</td>
<td class="tdrb">239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_V">CHAP. V.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Soult retakes the redoubt of Sarre—Wellington organizes the army in three great divisions under sir Rowland Hill, marshal
                 Beresford, and sir John Hope—Disinterested conduct of the last-named officer—Soult’s immense entrenchments described—His
                 correspondence with Suchet—Proposes to retake the offensive and unite their armies in Aragon—Suchet will not accede to his
                 views and makes inaccurate statements—Lord Wellington, hearing of advantages gained by the allied sovereigns in Germany,
                 resolves to invade France—Blockade and fall of Pampeluna—Lord Wellington organizes a brigade under lord Aylmer to besiege
                 Santona, but afterwards changes his design</td>
<td class="tdrb">271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Political state of Portugal—Violence, ingratitude, and folly of the government of that country—Political state of Spain—Various
                 factions described, their violence, insolence, and folly—Scandalous scenes at Cadiz—Several Spanish generals desire a
                 revolution—Lord Wellington describes the miserable state of the country—Anticipates the necessity of putting down the Cortez
                 by force—Resigns his command of the Spanish armies—The English ministers propose to remove him to Germany—The new Cortez
                 reinstate him as generalissimo on his own terms—He expresses his fears that the cause will finally fail and advises the
                 English ministers to withdraw the British army</td>
<td class="tdrb">295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs135" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XXIII">BOOK XXIII.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_I">CHAP. I.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">War in the south of France—Soult’s political difficulties—Privations of the allied troops—Lord Wellington appeals to their
                 military honour with effect—Averse to offensive operations, but when Napoleon’s disasters in Germany became known, again
                 yields to the wishes of the allied sovereigns—His dispositions of attack retarded—They are described—Battle of the
                 Nivelle—Observations—Deaths and characters of Mr. Edward Freer and colonel Thomas Lloyd</td>
<td class="tdrb">326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_II">CHAP. II.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Soult occupies the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and the line of the Nive river—Lord Wellington unable to pursue his victory
                 from the state of the roads—Bridge-head of Cambo abandoned by the French—Excesses of the Spanish troops—Lord Wellington’s
                 indignation—He sends them back to Spain—Various skirmishes in front of Bayonne—The generals J. Wilson and Vandeleur are
                 wounded—Mina plunders the Val de Baygorry—Is beaten by the national guards—Passage of the Nive and battles in front of
                 Bayonne—Combat of the 10th—Combat of the 11th—Combat of the 12th—Battle of St. Pierre—Observations</td>
<td class="tdrb">363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_III">CHAP. III.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Respective situations and views of lord Wellington and Soult—Partizan warfare—The Basques of the Val de Baygorry excited to
                 arms by the excesses of Mina’s troops—General Harispe takes the command of the insurgents—Clauzel advances beyond the Bidouze
                 river—General movements—Partizan combats—Excesses committed by the Spaniards—Lord Wellington reproaches their generals—His
                 vigorous and resolute conduct—He menaces the French insurgents of the valleys with fire and sword and the insurrection
                 subsides—Soult <ins class="corr" id="tn-toc" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'hemns the allies'">
                 hems the allies</ins> right closely—Partizan combats continued—Remarkable instances of the habits established
                 between the French and British soldiers of the light division—Shipwrecks on the coast</td>
<td class="tdrb">410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Political state of Portugal—Political state of Spain—Lord Wellington advises the English government to prepare for a war
                 with Spain and to seize St. Sebastian as a security for the withdrawal of the British and Portuguese troops—The seat of
                 government and the new Cortez are removed to Madrid—The duke of San Carlos arrives secretly with the treaty of Valençay—It
                 is rejected by the Spanish regency and Cortez—Lord Wellington’s views on the subject</td>
<td class="tdrb">425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_V">CHAP. V.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Political state of Napoleon—Guileful policy of the allied sovereigns—M. de St. Aignan—General reflections—Unsettled policy
                 of the English ministers—They neglect lord Wellington—He remonstrates and exposes the denuded state of his army</td>
<td class="tdrb">440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Continuation of the war in the eastern provinces—Suchet’s erroneous statements—Sir William Clinton repairs Taragona—Advances
                 to Villa Franca—Suchet endeavours to surprise him—Fails—The French cavalry cut off an English detachment at Ordal—The duke
                 of San Carlos passes through the French posts—Copons favourable to his mission—Clinton and Manso endeavour to cut off the
                 French troops at Molino del Rey—They fail through the misconduct of Copons—Napoleon recalls a great body of Suchet’s
                 troops—Whereupon he reinforces the garrison of Barcelona and retires to Gerona—Van Halen—He endeavours to beguile the
                 governor of Tortoza—Fails—Succeeds at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon—Sketch of the siege of Monzon—It is defended by the
                 Italian soldier St. Jaques for one hundred and forty days—Clinton and Copons invest Barcelona—The beguiled garrisons of
                 Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, arrive at Martorel—Are surrounded and surrender on terms—Capitulation violated by Copons—King
                 Ferdinand returns to Spain—His character—Clinton breaks up his army—His conduct eulogised—Lamentable sally from Barcelona—The
                 French garrisons beyond the Ebro return to France and Habert evacuates Barcelona—Fate of the prince of Conti and the duchess
                 of Bourbon—Siege of Santona</td>
<td class="tdrb">475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs135" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XXIV">BOOK XXIV.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_I">CHAP. I.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Napoleon recalls several divisions of infantry and cavalry from Soult’s army—Embarrassments of that marshal—Mr. Batbedat a
                 banker of Bayonne offers to aid the allies secretly with money and provisions—La Roche Jacquelin and other Bourbon partizans
                 arrive at the allies’ head-quarter—The duke of Angoulême arrives there—Lord Wellington’s political views—General
                 reflections—Soult embarrassed by the hostility of the French people—Lord Wellington embarrassed by the hostility of the
                 Spaniards—Soult’s remarkable project for the defence of France—Napoleon’s reasons for neglecting it put hypothetically—Lord
                 Wellington’s situation suddenly ameliorated—His wise policy, foresight, and diligence—Resolves to throw a bridge over the
                 Adour below Bayonne, and to drive Soult from that river—Soult’s system of defence—Numbers of the contending armies—Passage
                 of the Gaves—Combat of Garris—Lord Wellington forces the line of the Bidouze and Gave of Mauleon—Soult takes the line of the
                 Gave de Oleron and resolves to change his system of operation</td>
<td class="tdrb">505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_II">CHAP. II.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Lord Wellington arrests his movements and returns in person to St. Jean de Luz to throw his bridge over the Adour—Is
                 prevented by bad weather and returns to the Gave of Mauleon—Passage of the Adour by sir John Hope—Difficulty of the
                 operation—The flotilla passes the bar and enters the river—The French sally from Bayonne but are repulsed and the stupendous
                 bridge is cast—Citadel invested after a severe action—Lord Wellington passes the Gave of Oleron and invests Navarrens—Soult
                 concentrates his army at Orthes—Beresford passes the Gave de Pau near Pereyhorade—Battle of Orthes—Soult changes his line of
                 operations—Combat of Aire—Observations</td>
<td class="tdrb">536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_III">CHAP. III.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Soult’s perilous situation—He falls back to Tarbes—Napoleon sends him a plan of operations—His reply and views stated—Lord
                 Wellington’s embarrassments—Soult’s proclamation—Observations upon it—Lord Wellington calls up Freyre’s Gallicians and
                 detaches Beresford against Bordeaux—The mayor of that city revolts from Napoleon—Beresford enters Bordeaux and is followed
                 by the duke of Angoulême—Fears of a reaction—The mayor issues a false proclamation—Lord Wellington expresses his
                 indignation—Rebukes the duke of Angoulême—Recalls Beresford but leaves lord Dalhousie with the seventh division and some
                 cavalry—Decaen commences the organization of the army of the Gironde—Admiral Penrose enters the Garonne—Remarkable exploit
                 of the commissary Ogilvie—Lord Dalhousie passes the Garonne and the Dordogne and defeats L’Huillier at Etauliers—Admiral
                 Penrose destroys the French flotilla—The French set fire to their ships of war—The British seamen and marines land and
                 destroy all the French batteries from Blaye to the mouth of the Garonne</td>
<td class="tdrb">580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Wellington’s and Soult’s situations and forces described—Folly of the English ministers—Freyre’s Gallicians and Ponsonby’s
                 heavy cavalry join lord Wellington—He orders Giron’s Andalusians and Del Parque’s army to enter France—Soult suddenly takes
                 the offensive—Combats of cavalry—Partizan expedition of Captain Dania—Wellington menaces the peasantry with fire and sword
                 if they take up arms—Soult retires—Lord Wellington advances—Combat of Vic Bigorre—Death and character of colonel Henry
                 Sturgeon—Daring exploit of captain William Light<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>—Combat
                 of Tarbes—Soult retreats by forced marches to Toulouse—Wellington
                 follows more slowly—Cavalry combat at St. Gaudens—The allies arrive in front of Toulouse—Reflections</td>
<td class="tdrb">603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_V">CHAP. V.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Views of the commanders on each side—Wellington designs to throw a bridge over the Garonne at Portet above Toulouse, but
                 below the confluence of the Arriege and Garonne—The river is found too wide for the pontoons—He changes his design—Cavalry
                 action at St. Martyn de Touch—General Hill passes the Garonne at Pensaguel above the confluence of the Arriege—Marches upon
                 Cintegabelle—Crosses the Arriege—Finds the country too deep for his artillery and returns to Pensaguel—Recrosses the
                 Garonne—Soult fortifies Toulouse and the Mont Rave—Lord Wellington sends his pontoons down the Garonne—Passes that river at
                 Grenade fifteen miles below Toulouse with twenty thousand men—The river floods and his bridge is taken up—The waters
                 subside—The bridge is again laid—The Spaniards pass—Lord Wellington advances up the right bank to Fenouilhet—Combat of
                 cavalry—The eighteenth hussars win the bridge of Croix d’Orade—Lord Wellington resolves to attack Soult on the 9th of
                 April—Orders the pontoons to be taken up and relaid higher up the Garonne at Seilth in the night of the 8th—Time is lost in
                 the execution and the attack is deferred—The light division cross at Seilth on the morning of the 10th—Battle of Toulouse</td>
<td class="tdrb">624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">General observations and reflections</td>
<td class="tdrb">657</td>
</tr>
</table>

<hr class="r30">


<div class="chapter">
<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_APPENDIX">LIST OF APPENDIX.</h2>
</div>

<table class="autotable fs80">
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_I">No. I.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Lord William Bentinck’s correspondence with sir Edward Pellew and lord Wellington about Sicily</td>
<td class="tdrb">691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_II">No. II.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">General Nugent’s and Mr. King’s correspondence with lord William Bentinck about Italy</td>
<td class="tdrb">693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_III">No. III.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Extracts from the correspondence of sir H. Wellesley, Mr. Vaughan, and Mr. Stuart upon Spanish and Portuguese affairs</td>
<td class="tdrb">699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Justificatory pieces relating to the combats of Maya and Roncesvalles</td>
<td class="tdrb">701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_V">No. V.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Ditto <span class="pad7">ditto</span> <span class="pad6">of Ordal</span></td>
<td class="tdrb">703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VI">No. VI.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Official States of the allied army in Catalonia</td>
<td class="tdrb">704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VII">No. VII.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Ditto <span class="pad4">of the Anglo-Portuguese at different epochs</span></td>
<td class="tdrb">705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VIII">No. VIII.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Ditto <span class="pad4">of the French armies at different epochs</span></td>
<td class="tdrb">707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_IX">No. IX.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlx">Extract from lord Wellington’s order of movements for the battle of Toulouse</td>
<td class="tdrb">709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_X">No. X.</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Note and morning state of the Anglo-Portuguese on the 10th of April, 1814</td>
<td class="tdrb">710</td>
</tr>
</table>

<hr class="r30">


<div class="chapter">
<h2 class="nobreak" id="PLATES">PLATES.</h2>
</div>

<table class="autotable fs80">
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_01">No. 1.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory of the Catalonian Operations and plan of Position at Cape Salud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_02">2.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory of Soult’s Operations to relieve Pampeluna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_03">3.</a></td>
<td class="tdlx">Combats of Maya and Roncesvalles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_04">4.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Assault of St. Sebastian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_05">5.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of Soult’s and lord Wellington’s Passage of the Bidassoa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_06">6.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of the Nivelle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_07">7.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Operations round Bayonne, and of the Battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_08">8.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of the Nive, and Battle of St. Pierre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_09">9.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of Orthes, and the Retreat of Soult to Aire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_10">10.</a></td>
<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Operations against Tarbes, and the Battle of Toulouse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt"></td>
<td class="tdcx"><em>To follow Page 689.</em></td>
</tr>
</table>


<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">

<div class="chapter">
<h2 class="nobreak" id="NOTICE">NOTICE.</h2>
</div>

<hr class="r20">

<p class="noindent">This volume was nearly printed when my attention was called to
a passage in an article upon the duke of Wellington’s despatches,
published in the last number of the “British and Foreign Quarterly
Review.”</p>

<p>After describing colonel Gurwood’s proceedings to procure the
publication of the despatches the reviewer says,</p>

<p>“<em>We here distinctly state</em>, that no other person ever had
access to <em>any</em> documents of the duke, by his grace’s permission,
for any historical or other purpose, and that all inferential pretensions
to such privilege are not founded in fact.”</p>

<p>This assertion, which if not wholly directed against my history
certainly includes it with others, <em>I distinctly state to be untrue</em>.</p>

<p>For firstly, the duke of Wellington gave me access to the
original morning states of his army for the use of my history;
he permitted me to take them into my possession, and I still have
possession of them.</p>

<p>Secondly. The duke of Wellington voluntarily directed me to
apply to sir George Murray for the “<em>orders of movements</em>.” That
is to say the orders of battle issued by him to the different generals
previous to every great action. Sir George Murray thought proper,
as the reader will see in the justificatory pieces of this volume,
to deny all knowledge of these “<em>orders of movements</em>.” I have
since obtained some of them from others, but the permission to get
them all was given to me at Strathfieldsaye, in the presence of lord
Fitzroy Somerset, who was at the same time directed to give me
the morning states and he did do so. These were documents of no
ordinary importance for a history of the war.</p>

<p>Thirdly. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, with the consent of the duke
of Wellington, put into my hands king Joseph’s portfolio, taken at
Vittoria and containing that monarch’s correspondence with the
emperor, with the French minister of war, and with the marshals
and generals who at different periods were employed in the
Peninsula. These also were documents of no slight importance
for a history of the war, and they are still in my possession.</p>

<p>When I first resolved to write this History, I applied verbally to
the duke of Wellington to give me papers in aid of my undertaking.
His answer in substance was, that he had arranged all
his own papers with a view to publication himself—that he had
not decided in what form they should be given to the world, or
when, probably not during his lifetime, but he thought his plan
would be to “<em>write a plain didactic history</em>” to be published
after his death—that he was resolved never to publish anything
unless he could tell the whole truth, but at that time he
could not tell the whole truth without wounding the feelings of
many worthy men, without doing mischief: adding in a laughing
way “<em>I should do as much mischief as Buonaparte</em>.” Then
expatiating upon the subject he related to me many anecdotes
illustrative of this observation, shewing errors committed by
generals and others acting with him, or under him, especially
at Waterloo; errors so materially affecting his operations that
he could not do justice to himself if he suppressed them, and
yet by giving them publicity he would ungraciously affect the
fame of many worthy men whose only fault was dulness.</p>

<p>For these reasons he would not, he said, give me his own
private papers, but he gave me the documents I have already
noticed, and told me he would then, and always, answer any
questions as to facts which I might in the course of my work
think necessary to put. And he has fulfilled that promise rigidly,
for I did then put many questions to him verbally and took notes of
his answers, and many of the facts in my History which have been
most cavilled at and denied by my critics have been related by
me solely upon his authority. Moreover I have since at various
times sent to the duke a number of questions in writing, and
always they have been fully and carefully answered without
delay, though often put when his mind must have been harassed
and his attention deeply occupied by momentous affairs.</p>

<p>But though the duke of Wellington denied me access to his
own peculiar documents, the greatest part of those documents
existed in duplicate; they were in other persons’ hands, and in
two instances were voluntarily transferred with other interesting
papers to mine. Of this truth the reader may easily satisfy himself
by referring to my five first volumes, some of which were published
years before colonel Gurwood’s compilation appeared. He
will find in those volumes frequent allusions to the substance of the
duke’s private communications with the governments he served;
and in the Appendix a number of his letters, printed precisely
as they have since been given by colonel Gurwood. I could
have greatly augmented the number if I had been disposed so to
swell my work. Another proof will be found in the Justificatory
Pieces of this volume, where I have restored the whole reading
of a remarkable letter of the duke’s which has been garbled in
colonel Gurwood’s compilation, and this not from any unworthy
desire to promulgate what the duke of Wellington desired to suppress,
but that having long before attributed, on the strength of
that passage, certain strong opinions to his grace, I was bound
in defence of my own probity as an historian to reproduce my
authority.</p>

<p class="right">
W. F. P. NAPIER.<br>
</p>

<p class="fs80"><em>March 28th, 1840.</em></p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_i"></a>[Pg i]</span></p>

<h2 class="nobreak" id="JUSTIFICATORY_NOTES">JUSTIFICATORY NOTES.</h2>
</div>

<hr class="r20">

<p class="noindent">Having in my former volumes printed several controversial
papers relating to this History, I now complete them,
thus giving the reader all that I think necessary to offer in
the way of answer to those who have assailed me. The
Letter to marshal Beresford and the continuation of my
Reply to the Quarterly Review have been published before,
the first as a pamphlet, the second in the London and
Westminster Review. And the former is here reproduced,
not with any design to provoke the renewal of a controversy
which has been at rest for some years, but to complete
the justification of a work which, written honestly
and in good faith from excellent materials, has cost me
sixteen years of incessant labour. The other papers being
new shall be placed first in order and must speak for
themselves.</p>

<hr class="r20">


<h3>ALISON.</h3>

<p>Some extracts from Alison’s History of the French Revolution
reflecting upon the conduct of sir John Moore
have been shewn to me by a friend. In one of them I find,
in reference to the magazines at Lugo, a false quotation
from my own work, not from carelessness but to sustain a
miserable censure of that great man. This requires no
further notice, but the following specimen of disingenuous
writing shall not pass with impunity.</p>

<p>Speaking of the prevalent opinion that England was
unable to succeed in military operations on the continent,
Mr. Alison says:—</p>

<p>“In sir John Moore’s case this universal and perhaps
unavoidable error was greatly enhanced by his connection
with the opposition party, by whom the military strength
of England had been always underrated, the system of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ii"></a>[ii]</span>
continental operations uniformly decried, and the power
and capacity of the French emperor, great as they were,
unworthily magnified.”</p>

<p>Mr. Alison here proves himself to be one of those enemies
to sir John Moore who draw upon their imaginations
for facts and upon their malice for conclusions.</p>

<p>Sir John Moore never had any connection with any political
party, but during the short time he was in parliament
he voted with the government. He may in
society have met with some of the leading men of opposition
thus grossly assailed by Mr. Alison, yet it is doubtful
if he ever conversed with any of them, unless perhaps
Mr. Wyndham, with whom, when the latter was secretary
at war, he had a dispute upon a military subject. He was
however the intimate friend of Mr. Pitt and of Mr.
Pitt’s family. It is untrue that sir John Moore entertained
or even leaned towards exaggerated notions of
French prowess; his experience and his natural spirit and
greatness of mind swayed him the other way. How indeed
could the man who stormed the forts of Fiorenza and the
breach of Calvi in Corsica, he who led the disembarkation
at Aboukir Bay, the advance to Alexandria on the 13th,
and defended the ruins of the camp of Cæsar on the 21st
of March, he who had never been personally foiled in any
military exploit feel otherwise than confident in arms?
Mr. Alison may calumniate but he cannot hurt sir John
Moore.</p>

<hr class="r20">


<h3>SIR WALTER SCOTT.</h3>

<p>In the last volume of sir Walter Scott’s life by Mr.
Lockhart, page 143, the following passage from sir Walter’s
diary occurs:—</p>

<p>“He (Napier) has however given a bad sample of accuracy
in the case of lord Strangford, <em>where</em> his pointed
affirmation has been as pointedly repelled.”</p>

<p>This peremptory decision is false in respect of grammar,
of logic, and of fact.</p>

<p>Of grammar because <em>where</em>, an adverb of place, has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iii"></a>[iii]</span>
no proper antecedent. Of logic, because a truth may
be pointedly repelled without ceasing to be a truth. Of
fact because lord Strangford did not repel but admitted
the essential parts of my affirmation, namely, that he had
falsified the date and place of writing his dispatch, and
attributed to himself the chief merit of causing the royal
emigration from Lisbon. Lord Strangford indeed, published
two pamphlets to prove that the merit really attached
to him, but the hollowness of his pretensions
was exposed in my reply to his <em>first pamphlet</em>; the<span class="sidenote">Vide Times, Morning Chronicle, Sun, &amp;c. 1828.</span>
accuracy of my statement was supported by the testimony
of disinterested persons, and moreover many writers,
professing to know the facts, did, at the time, in the
newspapers, contradict lord Strangford’s statements.</p>

<p>The chief point of his <em>second pamphlet</em>, was the reiterated
assertion that he accompanied the prince regent over
the bar of Lisbon.</p>

<p>To this I could have replied, 1º. That I had seen a
letter, written at the time by Mr. Smith the naval officer
commanding the boat which conveyed lord Strangford
from Lisbon to the prince’s ship, and in that letter it was
distinctly stated, <em>that they did not reach that vessel until
after she had passed the bar</em>. 2º. That I possessed
letters from other persons present at the emigration of
the same tenor, and that between the writers of those letters
and the writer of the Bruton-street dispatch, to decide
which were the better testimony, offered no difficulty.</p>

<p>Why did I not so reply? For a reason twice before
published, namely, that Mr. Justice Bailey had done it
for me. Sir Walter takes no notice of the judge’s answer,
neither does Mr. Lockhart; and yet it was the most important
point of the case. Let the reader judge.</p>

<p>The editor of the Sun newspaper after quoting an
article from the Times upon the subject of my controversy
with lord Strangford, remarked, that his lordship “<em>would<span class="sidenote">Vide Sun newspaper 28th Nov. 1828.</span>
hardly be believed upon his oath, certainly not upon his
honour at the Old Bailey</em>.”</p>

<p>Lord Strangford obtained a rule to shew cause why a
criminal information should not be filed against the editor
for a libel. The present lord Brougham appeared for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iv"></a>[iv]</span>
defence and justified the offensive passage by references to
lord Strangford’s own admissions in his controversy with
me. The judges thinking the justification good, discharged
the rule by the mouth of lord Tenterden.</p>

<p>During the proceedings in court the attorney-general,
on the part of lord Strangford, referring to that nobleman’s
dispatch which, though purporting to be written on
the 29th November from H.M.S. Hibernia off the Tagus
was really written the 29th of December in Bruton-street,
said, “Every body knew that in diplomacy there were two<span class="sidenote">Report in the Sun newspaper</span>
copies prepared of all documents, No. 1 for the minister’s
inspection, No. 2 for the public.”</p>

<p>Mr. Justice Bayley shook his head in disapprobation.</p>

<p>Attorney-general—“Well, my lord, it is the practice of
these departments and may be justified by necessity.”</p>

<p>Mr. Justice Bayley—“<em>I like honesty in all places, Mr.
Attorney</em>.”</p>

<p>And so do I, wherefore I recommend this pointed repeller
to Mr. Lockhart when he publishes another edition
of his father-in-law’s life.</p>

<hr class="r20">


<h3>COLONEL GURWOOD.</h3>

<p>In the eighth volume of the Duke of Wellington’s Despatches
page 531, colonel Gurwood has inserted the following
note:—</p>

<p>“Lieutenant Gurwood fifty-second regiment led the
“forlorn hope” of the light division in the assault of the
lesser breach. He afterwards took the French governor
general Barrié in the citadel; and from the hands of lord
Wellington on the breach by which he had entered, he received
the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded
by the duke of Wellington to compile this work has doubtless
been one of the distinguished consequences resulting
from this service, and lieutenant Gurwood feels pride as a
soldier of fortune in here offering himself as an encouraging
example to the subaltern in future wars.”—“The
detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the
lesser breach is of too little importance except to those<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v"></a>[v]</span>
who served in it to become a matter of history. The
compiler however takes this opportunity of observing
that colonel William Napier has been misinformed respecting
the conduct of the “forlorn hope,” in the
account given of it by him as it appears in the Appendix
of the fourth volume of his History of the Peninsular War.
A correct statement and proofs of it have been since furnished
to colonel William Napier for any future edition of
his book which will render any further notice of it <em>here</em>
unnecessary.”</p>

<p>My account is not to be disposed of in this summary
manner, and this note, though put forth as it were with
the weight of the duke of Wellington’s name by being inserted
amongst his Despatches, shall have an answer.</p>

<p>Colonel Gurwood sent me what in the above note he
calls “<em>a correct statement and proofs of it</em>.” I know of no
<em>proofs</em>, and the correctness of his statement depends on his
own recollections which the wound he received in the head
at this time seems to have rendered extremely confused,
at least the following recollections of other officers are directly
at variance with his. Colonel Gurwood in his
“<em>correct statement</em>” says, “When I first went up the
breach there were still some of the enemy in it, it was
very steep and on my arrival at the top of it under the gun
I was knocked down either by a shot or stone thrown at
me. I can assure you that not a lock was snapped as you
describe, but finding it impossible that the breach from its
steepness and narrowness could be carried by the bayonet
I ordered the men to load, certainly before the arrival of
the storming party, and having placed some of the men on
each side of the breach I went up the middle with the remainder,
and when in the act of climbing over the disabled
gun at the top of the breach which you describe, I was
wounded in the head by a musquet shot fired so close to
me that it blew my cap to pieces, and I was tumbled over
senseless from the top to the bottom of the breach. When
I recovered my senses I found myself close to George,<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> who
was sitting on a stone with his arm broken, I asked him
how the thing was going on, &amp;c. &amp;c.”</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi"></a>[vi]</span></p>

<p>Now to the above statement I oppose the following
letters from the authors of the statements given in the
Appendix to my fourth volume.</p>


<p class="p1 center">Major-General Sir <span class="smcap">George Napier</span> to Colonel
<span class="smcap">William Napier</span>.</p>

<p>“I am sorry our gallant friend Gurwood is not satisfied
with and disputes the accuracy of your account of the
assault of the lesser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo as detailed
in your fourth volume. I can only say, that account was
principally, if not wholly taken from colonel Fergusson’s, he
being one of my storming captains, and my own narrative
of that transaction up to the period when we were each of
us wounded. <em>I adhere to the correctness of all I stated to
you</em>, and beg further to say that my friend colonel Mitchell,
who was also one of my captains in the storming party,
told me the last time I saw him at the commander-in-chief’s
levee, that my statement was “<em>perfectly correct</em>.” And both
he and colonel Fergusson recollected the circumstance of
my not permitting the party to load, and also that upon
being checked, when nearly two-thirds up the breach, by
the enemy’s fire, the men forgetting their pieces were not
loaded snapped them off, but I called to them and reminded
them of my orders to force their way with the bayonet
alone! It was at that moment I was wounded and fell, and
I never either spoke to or saw Gurwood afterwards during
that night, as he rushed on with the other officers of the
party to the top of the breach. Upon looking over a small
manuscript of the various events of my life as a soldier,
written many years ago, I find all I stated to you corroborated
in every particular. Of course as colonel Gurwood
tells you he was <em>twice</em> at the top of the breach, before any
of the storming party entered it, I cannot take upon myself
to contradict him, but I certainly do not conceive how it
was possible, as he and myself jumped into the ditch together,
I saw him wounded, and spoke to him <em>after</em> having
mounted the faussbraye with him, and <em>before</em> we rushed
up the breach in the body of the place. I never saw him
or spoke to him after I was struck down, the whole affair
did not last above twenty-five or thirty minutes, but as I
fell when about two-thirds up the breach I can only answer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii"></a>[vii]</span>
for the correctness of my account to that period, as soon
after I was assisted to get down the breach by the Prince
of Orange (who kindly gave his sash to tie up my shattered
arm and which sash is now in my possession) by the present
duke of Richmond and lord Fitzroy Somerset, all three of
whom I believe were actively engaged in the assault. Our
friend Gurwood did his duty like a gallant and active soldier,
but I cannot admit of his having been <em>twice in the
breach before the other officers of the storming party and
myself</em>!</p>

<p>“I believe yourself and every man in the army with whom
I have the honor to be acquainted will acquit me of any
wish or intention to deprive a gallant comrade and brother-officer
of the credit and honor due to his bravery, more particularly
one with whom I have long been on terms of intimate
friendship, and whose abilities I admire as much as
I respect and esteem his conduct as a soldier; therefore
this statement can or ought only to be attributed to my
sense <em>of what is due</em> to the other gallant officers and soldiers
who were under my command in the assault of the
lesser breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, and not to any <em>wish</em> or
<em>intention</em> on my part to detract from the distinguished services
of, or the laurels gained by colonel Gurwood on that
occasion. Of course you are at liberty to refer to me if
necessary and to make what use you please of this letter
privately or publicly either now or at any future period, as
<em>I steadily adhere to all I have ever stated to you or any one
else</em> and I am &amp;c. &amp;c.</p>

<p class="right">“<span class="smcap">George Napier.</span>”</p>


<p class="p1 negin2">Extract of a letter from colonel <span class="smcap">James Fergusson</span>, fifty-second
regiment (formerly a captain of the forty-third
and one of the storming party.) Addressed to
Sir <span class="smcap">George Napier</span>.</p>

<p>“I send you a memorandum I made some time back
from memory and in consequence of having seen various
accounts respecting our assault. You are perfectly correct
as to Gurwood and your description of the way we carried
the breach is accurate; and now I have seen your memorandum
I recollect the circumstance of the men’s arms not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii"></a>[viii]</span>
being loaded and the snapping of the firelocks.”—“I was
not certain when you were wounded but your description of
the scene on the breach and the way in which it was carried
is perfectly accurate.”</p>


<p class="p1 center">Extract of a letter from colonel <span class="smcap">Fergusson</span> to colonel
<span class="smcap">William Napier</span>.</p>

<p>“I think the account you give in your fourth volume of
the attack of the little breach at Ciudad Rodrigo is as
favorable to Gurwood as he has any right to expect, and
agrees perfectly both with your brother George’s recollections
of that attack and with mine. Our late friend Alexander
Steele who was one of my officers declared he was with
Gurwood the whole of the time, for a great part of the
storming party of the forty-third joined Gurwood’s party
who were placing the ladders against the work, and it was
the engineer officer calling out that they were wrong and
pointing out the way to the breach in the fausse braye that
directed our attention to it. Jonathan Wyld<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> of the forty-third
was the first man that run up the fausse braye, and
we made directly for the little breach which was defended
<em>exactly as you describe</em>. We were on the breach some little
time and when we collected about thirty men (some of the
third battalion rifle brigade in the number) we made a
simultaneous rush, cheered, and run in, so that positively no
claim could be made as to the first who entered the breach.
I do not want to dispute with Gurwood but I again say (in
which your brother agrees) that some of the storming party
were <em>before</em> the forlorn hope. I do not dispute that Gurwood
and some of his party were among the number that
rushed in at the breach, but as to his having twice mounted
the breach before us, <em>I cannot understand it</em>, and Steele
always <em>positively denied it</em>.”</p>

<hr class="r20">

<p>Having thus justified myself from the charge of writing
upon bad information about the assault of the little breach
I shall add something about that of the great breach.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix"></a>[ix]</span></p>

<p>Colonel Gurwood offers himself as an encouraging
example for the subalterns of the British army in future
wars; but the following extract from a statement of the late
major Mackie, so well known for his bravery worth and
modesty, and who as a subaltern led the forlorn hope at the
great breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, denies colonel Gurwood’s
claim to the particular merit upon which he seems inclined
to found his good fortune in after life.</p>


<p class="p1 center">Extracts from a memoir addressed by the late Major
<span class="smcap">Mackie</span> to Colonel <span class="smcap">Napier</span>. October 1838.</p>

<p>“The troops being immediately ordered to advance were
soon across the ditch, and upon the breach at the same
instant with the ninety-fourth who had advanced along the
ditch. To mount under the fire of the defenders was the
work of a moment, but when there difficulties of a formidable
nature presented themselves; on each flank a deep
trench was cut across the rampart isolating the breach,
which was enfiladed with cannon and musquetry, while in
front, from the rampart into the streets of the town, was a
perpendicular fall of ten or twelve feet; the whole preventing
the soldiers from making that bold and rapid onset so
effective in facilitating the success of such an enterprize.
The great body of the fire of defence being from the houses
and from an open space in front of the breach, in the first
impulse of the moment I dropt from the rampart into the
town. Finding myself here quite alone and no one following,
I discovered that the trench upon the right of the
breach was cut across the whole length of the rampart, thereby
opening a free access to our troops and rendering what
was intended by the enemy as a defence completely the
reverse. By this opening I again mounted to the top of
the breach and led the men down into the town. The
enemy’s fire which I have stated had been, after we gained
the summit of the wall, confined to the houses and open
space alluded to, now began to slacken, and ultimately
they abandoned the defence. Being at this time in advance
of the whole of the third division, I led what men I could
collect along the street, leading in a direct line from the
great breach into the centre of the town, by which street<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x"></a>[x]</span>
the great body of the enemy were precipitately retiring.
Having advanced considerably and passed across a street
running to the left, a body of the enemy came suddenly
from that street, rushed through our ranks and escaped.
In pursuit of this body, which after passing us held their
course to the right, I urged the party forwards in that
direction until we reached the citadel, where the governor
and garrison had taken refuge. The outer gate of the
enclosure being open, I entered at the head of the party
composed of men of different regiments who by this time
had joined the advance. Immediately on entering I was
hailed by a French officer asking for an English general
to whom they might surrender. Pointing to my epaulets
in token of their security, the door of the keep or stronghold
of the place was opened and a sword presented to me
in token of surrender, which sword I accordingly received.
This I had scarcely done when two of their officers laid
hold of me for protection, one on each arm, and <em>it was
while I was thus situated that lieutenant Gurwood came
up and obtained the sword of the governor</em>.</p>

<p>“In this way, the governor, with lieutenant Gurwood and
the two officers I have mentioned still clinging to my arms,
the whole party moved towards the rampart. Having
found when there, that in the confusion incident to such a
scene I had lost as it were by accident that prize which was
actually within my reach, and which I had justly considered
as my own, in the chagrin of the moment I turned
upon my heel and left the spot. The following day, in
company with captain Lindsay of the eighty-eighth regiment
I waited upon colonel Pakenham, then assistant
adjutant-general to the third division, to know if my name
had been mentioned by general Picton as having led the
advance of the right brigade. He told me that it had and
I therefore took no further notice of the circumstance,
feeling assured that I should be mentioned in the way of
which all officers in similar circumstances must be so ambitious.
My chagrin and disappointment may be easily
imagined when lord Wellington’s dispatches reached the
army from England to find my name altogether omitted,
and the right brigade deprived of their just meed of praise.”—“Sir,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi"></a>[xi]</span>
it is evident that the tendency of this note”
(colonel Gurwood’s note quoted from the Despatches)
“is unavoidably, though I do him the justice to believe
by no means intentionally upon colonel Gurwood’s part,
to impress the public with the belief that he was himself
the first British officer that entered the <ins class="corr" id="tn-xi" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'citadel of Ciuded'">
citadel of Ciudad</ins> Rodrigo, consequently the one to whom its
garrison surrendered. This impression the language
he employs is the more likely to convey, inasmuch as to
his exertions and good fortune in this particular instance he
refers the whole of his professional success, to which he
points the attention of the future aspirant as a pledge of
the rewards to be expected from similar efforts to deserve
them. To obviate this impression and in bare justice to
the right brigade of the third division and, as a member of
it, to myself, I feel called on to declare that though I do not
claim for that brigade exclusively the credit of forcing the
defences of the great breach, the left brigade having
joined in it contrary to the intention of lord Wellington
under the circumstances stated, yet I do declare on the
word of a man of honour, that <em>I was the first individual
who effected the descent from the main breach into the
streets of the town, that I preceded the advance into the
body of the place, that I was the first who entered the
citadel, and that the enemy there assembled had surrendered
to myself and party before lieutenant Gurwood came up</em>.
Referring to the inference which colonel Gurwood has
been pleased to draw from his own good fortune as to the
certainty and value of the rewards awaiting the exertions
of the British soldier, permit me, sir, in bare justice to myself
to say that at the time I volunteered the forlorn hope on
this occasion, I was senior lieutenant of my own regiment
consequently the first for promotion. Having as such
succeeded so immediately after to a company, I could
scarcely expect nor did I ask further promotion at the
time, but after many years of additional service, I did still
conceive and do still maintain, that I was entitled to bring
forward my services on that day as a ground for asking
that step of rank which every officer leading a forlorn hope
had received with the exception of myself.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii"></a>[xii]</span></p>

<p>“May I, sir, appeal to your sense of justice in lending me
your aid to prevent my being deprived of the only reward
I had hitherto enjoyed, in the satisfaction of thinking that
the services which I am now compelled most reluctantly
to bring in some way to the notice of the public,
had during the period that has since elapsed, never once
been called in question. It was certainly hard enough
that a service of this nature should have been productive
of no advantage to me in my military life. I feel it however
infinitely more annoying that I should now find myself
in danger of being stript of any credit to which it might
entitle me, by the looseness of the manner in which
colonel Gurwood words his statement. I need not say
that this danger is only the more imminent from his statement
appearing in a work which as being published under
the auspices of the duke of Wellington as well as of the
Horse Guards, has at least the appearance of coming in
the guise of an official authority,” “I agree most cordially
with colonel Gurwood in the opinion he has expressed
in his note, that he is himself an instance where
reward and merit have gone hand in hand. I feel compelled
however, for the reasons given to differ from him materially
as to the precise ground on which he considers the
honours and advantages that have followed his deserts to
be not only the distinguished but the just and natural
consequences of his achievements on that day. <em>I allude
to the claim advanced by colonel Gurwood to be considered
the individual by whom the governor of Ciudad
Rodrigo was made prisoner of war.</em> It could scarcely be
expected that at such a moment I could be aware that the
sword which I received was not the governor’s being in
fact that of one of his aide-de-camps. I repeat however
that before lieutenant Gurwood and his party came up, the
enemy had expressed their wish to surrender, that a sword
was presented by them in token of submission and received
by me as a pledge, on the honour of a British officer,
that according to the laws of war, I held myself responsible
for their safety as prisoners under the protection of
the British arms. Not a shadow of resistance was afterwards
made and I appeal to every impartial mind in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiii"></a>[xiii]</span>
least degree acquainted with the rules of modern warfare,
if under these circumstances I am not justified in asserting
that before, and at the time lieutenant Gurwood arrived,
the whole of the enemy’s garrison within the walls of the
citadel, governor included, were both <i lang="la">de jure</i> and <i lang="la">de facto</i>
prisoners to myself. In so far, therefore, as he being the
individual who made its owner captive, could give either of
us a claim to receive that sword to which colonel Gurwood
ascribes such magic influence in the furthering of his
after fortunes, I do maintain that at the time it became
<i lang="la">de facto</i> his, it was <i lang="la">de jure</i> mine.”</p>


<p>Something still remains to set colonel Gurwood right
upon matters which he has apparently touched upon without
due consideration. In a note appended to that part of
the duke of Wellington’s Despatches which relate to the
storming of Ciudad Rodrigo he says that the late captain
Dobbs of the fifty-second at Sabugal “recovered the
howitzer, taken by the forty-third regiment but retaken
by the enemy.” This is totally incorrect. The howitzer
was taken by the forty-third and retained by the forty-third.
The fifty-second regiment never even knew of its
capture until the action was over. Captain Dobbs was a
brave officer and a very generous-minded man, he was
more likely to keep his own just claims to distinction in
the back-ground than to appropriate the merit of others
to himself. I am therefore quite at a loss to know upon
what authority colonel Gurwood has stated a fact inaccurate
itself and unsupported by the duke of Wellington’s
dispatch about the battle of Sabugal, which distinctly says
the howitzer was taken by the forty-third regiment, as in
truth it was, and it was kept by that regiment also.</p>

<p>While upon the subject of colonel Gurwood’s compilation
I must observe that in my fifth volume, when treating
of general Hill’s enterprise against the French forts at Almaraz
I make lord Wellington complain to the ministers
that his generals were so fearful of responsibility the
slightest movements of the enemy deprived them of their
judgment. Trusting that the despatches then in progress of
publication would bear me out, I did not give my authority<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv"></a>[xiv]</span>
at large in the Appendix; since then, the letter on
which I relied has indeed been published by colonel Gurwood
in the Despatches, but purged of the passage to
which I allude and without any indication of its being so
garbled. This omission might hereafter give a handle to
accuse me of bad faith, wherefore I now give the letter
in full, the Italics marking the restored passage:—</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>From lord Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Fuente Guinaldo, May 28th, 1812.</em></p>

<p><span class="smcap">My dear lord</span>,</p>

<p>You will be as well pleased as I am at general Hill’s
success, which certainly would have been still more satisfactory
if he had taken the garrison of Mirabete; which
he would have done if general Chowne had got on a little
better in the night of the 16th, and if sir William Erskine
had not very unnecessarily alarmed him, by informing him
that Soult’s whole army were in movement, and in Estremadura.
Sir Rowland therefore according to his instructions
came back on the 21st, whereas if he had staid a
day or two he would have brought his heavy howitzers to
bear on the castle and he would either have stormed it
under his fire or the garrison would have surrendered.
<em>But notwithstanding all that has passed I cannot prevail
upon the general officers to feel a little confidence in their
situation. They take alarm at the least movement of the
enemy and then spread the alarm, and interrupt every
thing, and the extraordinary circumstance is, that if they
are not in command they are as stout as any private soldiers
in the army.</em> Your lordship will observe that I have
marked some passages in Hill’s report not to be published.
My opinion is that the enemy must evacuate the tower of
Mirabete and indeed it is useless to keep that post, unless
they have another bridge which I doubt. But if they see
that we entertain a favourable opinion of the strength of
Mirabete, they will keep their garrison there, which might
be inconvenient to us hereafter, if we should wish to
establish there our own bridge. I enclose a Madrid<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xv"></a>[xv]</span>
Gazette in which you will see a curious description of the
state of king Joseph’s authority and his affairs in general,
from the most authentic sources.</p>

<p class="right">
<span class="padr4">Ever, my dear lord, &amp;c. &amp;c.</span><br>
<span class="smcap">Wellington</span>.<br>
</p>

<hr class="r20">


<h3>VILLA MURIEL.</h3>

<p>The following statement of the operations of the fifth
division at the combat of Muriel 25th October, 1812, is
inserted at the desire of sir John Oswald. It proves that I
have erroneously attributed to him the first and as it
appeared to me unskilful disposition of the troops; but with
respect to the other portions of his statement, without denying
or admitting the accuracy of his recollections, I
shall give the authority I chiefly followed, first printing his
statement.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Affair of Villa Muriel.</em></p>

<p>On the morning 25th of October 1812 major-general
Oswald joined and assumed the command of the fifth
division at Villa Muriel on the Carion. Major-general
Pringle had already posted the troops, and the greater
portion of the division were admirably disposed of about
the village as also in the dry bed of a canal running in its
rear, in some places parallel to the Carion. Certain of the
corps were formed in columns of attack supported by reserves,
ready to fall upon the enemy if in consequence of
the mine failing he should venture to push a column along
the narrow bridge. The river had at some points been
reported fordable, but these were said to be at all times
difficult and in the then rise of water as they proved
hardly practicable. As the enemy closed towards the
bridge, he opened a heavy fire of artillery on the village.
At that moment lord Wellington entered it and passed the
formed columns well sheltered both from fire and observation.
His lordship approved of the manner the post was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvi"></a>[xvi]</span>
occupied and of the advantage taken of the <em>canal and
village</em> to mask the troops. The French supported by a
heavy and superior fire rushed gallantly on the bridge, the
mine not exploding and destroying the arch till the leading
section had almost reached the spot. Shortly after, the
main body retired, leaving only a few light troops. Immediately
previous to this an orderly officer announced to lord
Wellington that Palencia and its bridges were gained by
the foe. He ordered the main body of the division immediately
to ascend the heights in its rear, and along the
plateau to move towards Palencia in order to meet an
attack from that quarter. Whilst the division was in the
act of ascending, a report was made by major Hill of the
eighth caçadores that the ford had been won, passed by a
body of cavalry causing the caçadores to fall back on the
broken ground. The enemy, it appears, were from the
first, acquainted with these fords, for his push to them was
nearly simultaneous with his assault on the bridge. The
division moved on the heights towards Palencia, it had not
however proceeded far, before an order came directing it
to retire and form on the right of the Spaniards, and when
collected to remain on the heights till further orders.
About this time the cavalry repassed the river, nor had
either infantry or artillery passed by the ford to aid in the
attack, but in consequence of the troops being withdrawn
from the village and canal a partial repair was given to the
bridge, and small bodies of infantry were passed over
skirmishing with the Spaniards whose post on the heights
was directly in front of Villa Muriel. No serious attack
from that quarter was to be apprehended until an
advance from Palencia. It was on that point therefore
that attention was fixed. Day was closing when lord
Wellington came upon the heights and said all was quiet
at Palencia and that the enemy must now be driven from
the right bank. General Oswald enquired if after clearing
the village the division was to remain there for the
night. His lordship replied, the village was to be occupied
in force and held by the division till it was withdrawn,
which would probably be very early in the morning. He
directed the first brigade under brigadier-general Barnes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvii"></a>[xvii]</span>
to attack the enemy’s flank, the second under Pringle to
advance in support extending to the left so as to succour
the Spaniards who were unsuccessfully contending with
the enemy in their front. The casualties in the division
were not numerous especially when the fire it was exposed
to is considered. The enemy sustained a comparative
heavy loss. The troops were by a rapid advance of the
first brigade cut off from the bridge and forced into the
river where many were drowned. The allies fell back in
the morning unmolested.</p>

<p class="right"><span class="smcap">John Oswald</span>, &amp;c. &amp;c. &amp;c.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Memoir on the combat of Muriel by captain Hopkins,
fourth regiment.</em></p>

<p>As we approached Villa Muriel the face of the country
upon our left flank as we were then retrograding appeared
open, in our front ran the river Carrion, and immediately
on the opposite side of the river and parallel to it there
was a broad deep dry canal. On our passing the bridge at
Villa Muriel we had that village on our left, from the
margin of the canal the ground sloped gradually up into
heights, the summit forming a fine plateau. Villa Muriel
was occupied by the brigadier Pringle with a <em>small</em> detachment
of infantry but at the time we considered that it
required a larger force, as its maintenance appeared of the
utmost importance to the army, we were aware that the
enemy had passed the Carrion with cavalry and also that
Hill’s caçadores had given way at another part of the
river. Our engineers had partly destroyed the bridge of
Villa Muriel, the enemy attacked the village, at the time
the brigadier and his staff were there,<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> passing the ruins
of the bridge by means of ladders, &amp;c. The enemy in
driving the detachment from the village made some prisoners.
We retired to the plateau of the heights, under a
fire of musquetry and artillery, where we halted in close
column; the enemy strengthened the village.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington arrived with his staff on the plateau,
and immediately reconnoitred the enemy whose reinforcements<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xviii"></a>[xviii]</span>
had arrived and were forming strong columns on
the other side of the river. Lord Wellington immediately
ordered some artillery to be opened on the enemy. I happened
to be close to the head-quarter staff and heard lord
Wellington say to an aide-de-camp, “Tell Oswald I want
him.” On sir John Oswald arriving he said, “Oswald, you
will get the division under arms and drive the enemy from
the village and retain possession of it.” He replied, “My
lord, if the village should be taken I do not consider it as
tenable.” Wellington then said, “It is my orders,
general.” Oswald replied, “My lord as it is your orders
they shall be obeyed.” Wellington then gave orders to
him “that he should take the second brigade of the division
and attack in line, that the first brigade should in
column first descend the heights on the right of the
second, enter the canal and assist in clearing it of the
enemy,” and saying, “I will tell you what I will do,
Oswald. I will give you the Spaniards and Alava into the
bargain, headed by a company of the ninth regiment upon
your left.” The attack was made accordingly, the second
battalion of the fourth regiment being left in reserve in
column on the slope of the hill exposed to a severe cannonade
which for a short time caused them some confusion.
The enemy were driven from the canal and village,
and the prisoners which they made in the morning were
retaken. The enemy lost some men in this affair, but
general Alava was wounded, the officer commanding the
company of Brunswickers killed, and several of the division
killed and wounded. During the attack lord Wellington
sent the prince of Orange under a heavy fire for
the purpose of preventing the troops exposing themselves
at the canal, two companies defended the bridge with a
detachment just arrived from England. The possession of
the village proved of the utmost importance, as the retrograde
movement we made that night could not have been
effected with safety had the enemy been on our side of the
river, as it was we were enabled to pass along the river
with all arms in the most perfect security.</p>

<hr class="tb">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xix"></a>[xix]</span><br></p>


<h3 class="pfs120 lsp2">A LETTER</h3>
<p class="pfs60">TO</p>
<p class="pfs100">GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,</p>
<p class="pfs60">BEING</p>
<p class="pfs90"><em>An Answer to his Lordships Assumed Refutation</em></p>
<p class="pfs60">OF</p>
<p class="pfs80">COL. NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.</p>

<hr class="r20">

<p><span class="pad1 smcap">My Lord</span>,</p>

<p class="noindent">You have at last appeared in print without any disguise.
Had you done so at first it might have spared us both
some trouble. I should have paid more deference to your
argument and would willingly have corrected any error
fairly pointed out. Now having virtually acknowledged
yourself the author of the two publications entitled “<em>Strictures</em>”
and “<em>Further Strictures</em>,” <em>&amp;c.</em> I will not suffer
you to have the advantage of using two kinds of weapons,
without making you also feel their inconvenience. I will
treat your present publication as a mere continuation of
your former two, and then my lord, how will you stand in
this controversy?</p>

<p>Starting anonymously you wrote with all the scurrility
that bad taste and mortified vanity could suggest to damage
an opponent, because in the fair exercise of his judgement
he had ventured to deny your claim to the title of a great
commander: and you coupled this with such fulsome adulation
of yourself that even in a dependent’s mouth it would
have been sickening. Now when you have suffered defeat,
when all the errors misquotations and misrepresentations
of your anonymous publications have been detected and
exposed, you come forward in your own name as if a new
and unexceptionable party had appeared, and you expect
to be allowed all the advantage of fresh statements and
arguments and fresh assertions, without the least reference
to your former damaged evidence. You expect that I
should have that deference for you, which your age, your
rank, your services, and your authority under other circumstances
might have fairly claimed at my hands; that I
should acknowledge by my silence how much I was in
error, or that I should defend myself by another tedious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xx"></a>[xx]</span>
dissection and exposition of your production. My lord,
you will be disappointed. I have neither time nor inclination
to enter for the third time upon such a task; and yet
I will not suffer you to claim a victory which you have not
gained. I deny the strength of your arguments, I will
expose some prominent inconsistencies, and as an answer to
those which I do not notice I will refer to your former
publications to show, that in this controversy, I am now
entitled to disregard any thing you may choose to advance,
and that I am in justice exonerated from the necessity of
producing any more proofs.</p>

<p>You have published above six hundred pages at three
different periods, and you have taken above a year to digest
and arrange the arguments and evidence contained in your
present work; a few lines will suffice for the answer. The
object of your literary labours is to convince the world that
at Campo Mayor you proved yourself an excellent general,
and that at Albuera you were superlatively great! Greater
even than Cæsar! My lord, the duke of Wellington did
not take a much longer time to establish his European
reputation by driving the French from the Peninsula; and
methinks if your exploits vouch not for themselves your
writings will scarcely do it for them. At all events, a plain
simple statement at first, having your name affixed, would
have been more effectual with the public, and would certainly
have been more dignified than the anonymous
publications with which you endeavoured to feel your way.
Why should not all the main points contained in the
laboured pleadings of your Further Strictures, and the still
more laboured pleadings of your present work, have been
condensed and published at once with your name? if
indeed it was necessary to publish at all! Was it that by
anonymous abuse of your opponent and anonymous praise
of yourself you hoped to create a favourable impression on
the public before you appeared in person? This, my lord,
seems very like a consciousness of weakness. And then
how is it that so few of the arguments and evidences now
adduced should have been thought of before? It is a
strange thing that in the first defence of your generalship,
for one short campaign, you should have neglected proofs<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxi"></a>[xxi]</span>
and arguments sufficient to form a second defence of two
hundred pages.</p>

<p>You tell us, that you disdained to notice my “<em>Reply to
various Opponents</em>,” because you knew the good sense of
the public would never be misled by a production containing
such numerous contradictions and palpable inconsistencies,
and that your friends’ advice confirmed you in this
view of the matter. There were nevertheless some things
in that work which required an answer even though the
greatest part of it had been weak; and it is a pity your
friends did not tell you that an affected contempt for an
adversary who has hit hard only makes the bystanders
laugh. Having condescended to an anonymous attack it
would have been wiser to refute the proofs offered of
your own inaccuracy than to shrink with mock grandeur
from a contest which you had yourself provoked. My
friends, my lord, gave me the same advice with respect to
your anonymous publications, and with more reason,
because they were anonymous; but I had the proofs of
your weakness in my hands, I preferred writing an answer,
and if you had been provided in the same manner you
would like me have neglected your friends’ advice.</p>

<p>My lord, I shall now proceed with my task in the
manner I have before alluded to. You have indeed left
me no room for that refined courtesy with which I could
have wished to soften the asperities of this controversy,
but I must request of you to be assured, and I say it in
all sincerity, that I attribute the errors to which I must
revert, not to any wilful perversion or wilful suppression
of facts, but entirely to a natural weakness of memory,
and the irritation of a mind confused by the working of
wounded vanity. I acknowledge that it is a hard trial
to have long-settled habits of self satisfaction suddenly
disturbed,—</p>

<div class="poetry-container">
<div class="poetry">
    <div class="verse indentq">“Cursed be my harp and broke be every chord,</div>
    <div class="verse indent0">If I forget thy worth, <em>victorious Beresford</em>.”</div>
</div>
</div>

<p class="noindent">It was thus the flattering muse of poetry lulled you with
her sweet strains into a happy dream of glory, and none
can wonder at your irritation when the muse of history
awakened you with the solemn clangour of her trumpet to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxii"></a>[xxii]</span>
the painful reality that you were only an ordinary person.
My lord, it would have been wiser to have preserved
your equanimity, there would have been some greatness
in that.</p>

<p>In your first Strictures you began by asserting that I
knew nothing whatever of you or your services; and that
I was actuated entirely by vulgar political rancour when I
denied your talents as a general. To this I replied that I
was not ignorant of your exploits. That I knew something
of your proceedings at Buenos Ayres, at Madeira, and at
Coruña; and in proof thereof I offered to enter into the
details of the first, if you desired it. To this I have
received no answer.</p>

<p>You affirmed that your perfect knowledge of the Portuguese
language was one of your principal claims to be
commander of the Portuguese army. In reply I quoted from
your own letter to lord Wellington, your confession, that,
such was your ignorance of that language at the time you
could not even read the communication from the regency,
relative to your own appointment.</p>

<p>You asserted that no officer, save sir John Murray,
objected at the first moment to your sudden elevation of
rank. In answer I published sir John Sherbroke’s letter
to sir J. Cradock complaining of it.</p>

<p>You said the stores (which the Cabildo of Ciudad
Rodrigo refused to let you have in 1809) had not been
formed by lord Wellington. In reply I published lord
Wellington’s declaration that they had been formed by him.</p>

<p>You denied that you had ever written a letter to the
junta of Badajos, and this not doubtfully or hastily, but
positively and accompanied with much scorn and ridicule
of my assertion to that effect. You harped upon the new
and surprising information I had obtained relative to your
actions, and were, in truth, very facetious upon the subject.
In answer I published your own letter to that junta!
So much for your first Strictures.</p>

<p>In your second publication (page 42) you asserted that
colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action at
Campo Mayor; and now in your third publication (page
48) you show very clearly that he took an active part in
those operations.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxiii"></a>[xxiii]</span></p>

<p>You called the distance from Campo Mayor to Merida
<em>two marches</em>, and now you say it is <em>four marches</em>.</p>

<p>Again, in your first “<em>Strictures</em>,” you declared that the
extent of the intrigues against you in Portugal were exaggerated
by me; and you were very indignant that I should
have supposed you either needed, or had the support and
protection of the duke of Wellington while in command
of the Portuguese army. In my third and fourth volumes,
published since, I have shown what the extent of those
intrigues was: and I have still something in reserve to
add when time shall be fitting. Meanwhile I will stay
your lordship’s appetite by two extracts bearing upon this
subject, and upon the support which you derived from the
duke of Wellington.</p>

<p>1º. Mr. Stuart, writing to lord Wellesley, in 1810, after
noticing the violence of the Souza faction relative to the
fall of Almeida, says,—“I could have borne all this with
patience if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the
fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, and that the
regency should send an order to marshal Beresford to dismiss
his quarter-master-general and military secretary;
followed by reflections on the persons composing the family
of that officer, and by hints to the same purport respecting
the Portuguese who are attached to lord Wellington.”</p>

<p>2º. Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beira
by marshal Beresford, and dated 6th September, 1810.—“However,
as I mentioned, I have no great desire to hold
my situation beyond the period lord Wellington retains his
situation, or after active operations have ceased in this
country, even should things turn out favourably, of which
I really at this instant have better hopes than I ever had
though I have been usually sanguine. But in regard to
myself, though I do not pretend to say the situation I hold
is not at all times desirable to hold, yet I am fully persuaded
that if tranquillity is ever restored to this country
under its legal government, that I should be too much
vexed and thwarted by intrigues of all sorts to reconcile
either my temper or my conscience to what would then be
my situation.”</p>

<p>For the further exposition of the other numerous errors
and failures of your two first publications, I must refer the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxiv"></a>[xxiv]</span>
reader to my “<em>Reply</em>” and “<em>Justification</em>,” but the points
above noticed it was necessary to fix attention upon, because
they give me the right to call upon the public to
disregard your present work. And this right I cannot relinquish.
I happened fortunately to have the means of
repelling your reckless assaults in the instances above
mentioned, but I cannot always be provided with your
own letters to disprove your own assertions. The combat
is not equal my lord, I cannot contend with such odds
and must therefore, although reluctantly, use the advantages
which by the detection of such errors I have already
obtained.</p>

<p>These then are strong proofs of an unsound memory
upon essential points, and they deprive your present work
of all weight as an authority in this controversy. Yet the
strangest part of your new book (see page 135) is, that
you avow an admiration for what you call the <em>generous principle</em>
which leads French authors to <em><ins class="corr" id="tn-xxiv" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'mistate facts for'">
misstate facts for</ins> the honour of their country</em>; and not only you do this but
sneer at me very openly for not doing the same! you sneer
at me, my lord, for not falsifying facts to pander to the
morbid vanity of my countrymen, and at the same time,
with a preposterous inconsistency you condemn me for
being an inaccurate historian! My lord, I have indeed
yet to learn that the <em>honour</em> of my country either requires
to be or can be supported by deliberate historical falsehoods.
Your lordship’s personal experience in the field
may perhaps have led you to a different conclusion but
I will not be your historian: and coupling this, your expressed
sentiment, with your forgetfulness on the points
which I have before noticed, I am undoubtedly entitled to
laugh at your mode of attacking others. What, my lord?
like Banquo’s ghost you rise, “with twenty mortal murthers
on your crown to push us from our stools.” You
have indeed a most awful and ghost-like way of arguing:
all your oracular sentences are to be implicitly believed,
and all my witnesses to facts sound and substantial, are to
be discarded for your airy nothings.</p>

<p>Captain Squire! heed him not, he was a dissatisfied,
talking, self-sufficient, ignorant officer.</p>

<p>The officer of dragoons who charged at Campo Mayor!<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxv"></a>[xxv]</span>
He is nameless, his narrative teems with misrepresentations,
he cannot tell whether he charged or not.</p>

<p>Colonel Light! spunge him out, he was only a subaltern.</p>

<p>Captain Gregory! believe him not, his statement cannot
be correct, he is too minute, and has no diffidence.</p>

<p>Sir Julius Hartman, Colonel Wildman, Colonel Leighton!
Oh! very honourable men, but they know nothing of the
fact they speak of, all their evidence put together is worth
nothing! But, my lord, it is very exactly corroborated
by additional evidence contained in Mr. Long’s publication.
Aye! aye! all are wrong; their eyes, their ears, their
recollections, all deceived them. They were not competent
to judge. But they speak to single facts! no matter!</p>

<p>Well, then, my lord, I push to you your own despatch!
Away with it! It is worthless, bad evidence, not to be
trusted! Nothing more likely, my lord, but what then,
and who is to be trusted? Nobody who contradicts me:
every body who coincides with me, nay, the same person
is to be believed or disbelieved exactly as he supports
or opposes my assertion; even those French authors,
whose generous principles lead them to write falsehoods
for the <em>honour of their country</em>. Such, my lord, after a
year’s labour of cogitation, is nearly the extent of your
“<em>Refutation</em>.”</p>

<p>In your first publication you said that I should
have excluded all hearsay evidence, and have confined
myself to what could be proved in a court of justice; and
now when I bring you testimony which no court of justice
could refuse, with a lawyer’s coolness you tell the
jury that none of it is worthy of credit; that my witnesses,
being generally of a low rank in the army, are not
to be regarded, that they were not competent to judge.
My lord, this is a little too much: there would be some
shew of reason if these subalterns’ opinions had been
given upon the general dispositions of the campaign, but
they are all witnesses to facts which came under their
personal observation. What! hath not a subaltern eyes?
Hath he not ears? Hath he not understanding? You
were once a subaltern yourself, and you cannot blind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxvi"></a>[xxvi]</span>
the world by such arrogant pride of station, such overweening
contempt for men’s capacity because they happen
to be of lower rank than yourself. Long habits of imperious
command may have so vitiated your mind that you
cannot dispossess yourself of such injurious feelings, yet,
believe me it would be much more dignified to avoid this
indecent display of them.</p>

<p>I shall now, my lord, proceed to remark upon such
parts of your new publication as I think necessary for the
further support of my history, that is, where new proofs,
or apparent proofs, are brought forward. For I am, as I
have already shewn, exonerated by your former inaccuracies
from noticing any part of your “<em>Refutation</em>” save
where new evidence is brought forward; and that only in
deference to those gentlemen who, being unmixed with your
former works, have a right either to my acquiescence in the
weight of their testimony, or my reasons for declining to accept
it. I have however on my hands a much more important
labour than contending with your lordship, and I shall
therefore leave the greatest part of your book to those who
choose to take the trouble to compare your pretended Refutation
with my original Justification in combination with
this letter, being satisfied that in so doing I shall suffer
nothing by their award.</p>

<p>1st. With respect to the death of the lieutenant-governor
of Almeida, you still harp upon my phrase that it was the
<em>only</em> evidence. The expression is common amongst persons
when speaking of trials; it is said the prisoner was condemned
by such or such a person’s evidence, never meaning
that there was no other testimony, but that in default of
that particular evidence he would not have been condemned.
Now you say that there was other evidence, yet
you do not venture to affirm that Cox’s letter was not <em>the
testimony</em> upon which the lieutenant-governor was condemned,
while the extract from lord Stuart’s letter, quoted
by me, says it was. And, my lord, his lordship’s letter to you,
in answer to your enquiry, neither contradicts nor is intended
to contradict my statement; nor yet does it in any manner
deny the authenticity of my extracts, which indeed were
copied verbatim from his letter to lord Castlereagh.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxvii"></a>[xxvii]</span></p>

<p>Lord Stuart says, that extract is the only thing bearing
on the question <em>which he can find</em>. Were there nothing
more it would be quite sufficient, but his papers are very
voluminous, more than fifty large volumes, and he would
naturally only have looked for his letter of the 25th July,
1812, to which you drew his attention. However, in my
notes and extracts taken from his documents, I find, under
the date of August, 1812, the following passage:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>“The lieutenant-governor of Almeida was executed by
Beresford’s order, he, Beresford, having full powers, and
the government none, to interfere. Great interest was
made to save him, but in vain. The sentence and trial
were published before being carried into execution and
were much criticized. Both the evidence and the choice
of officers were blamed; and moreover the time chosen
was one of triumph just after the battle of Salamanca,
and the place Lisbon.”</p>
</div>

<p>This passage I have not marked in my book of notes as
being lord Stuart’s words; it must therefore be only taken
as an abstract of the contents of one of his papers; but
comparing it with the former passage, and with the facts
that your lordship’s words are still very vague and uncertain
as to the main point in question, namely, the evidence
on which this man was really condemned, I see no reason
to doubt the substantial accuracy of the statement in my
first edition, nor the perfect accuracy of it as amended in
the second edition of my third volume, published many
months ago. You will find that I have there expunged the
word “<em>only</em>,” and made the sentence exactly to accord with
the extract from lord Stuart’s letter. You will also observe,
my lord, that I never did do more than mention the simple
fact, for which I had such good authority; and that so far
from imputing blame to you for the execution of the sentence
I expressly stated that the man richly deserved death.</p>

<p>Passing now to the subject of the eighth Portuguese
regiment, I will first observe, that when I said the eighth
Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces I imputed no
blame to it. No regiment in the world could have stemmed
the first fury of that French column which attacked the
mountain where the eighth was posted. If the eighth was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxviii"></a>[xxviii]</span>
not broken by it, as sir James Douglas’s letter would
seem to imply, what was it doing while the enemy by their
flank movement gained the crest of the position in such
numbers as to make it a most daring exploit of the ninth
British regiment to attack them there. It is a strange
thing that a heavy column of French who were resolute
to gain the crest of such a position should have made
“<em>a flank movement</em>,” to avoid one wing of a regiment of
Portuguese conscripts. I should rather imagine, with all
deference, that it was the conscripts who made the flank
movement, and that some optical deception had taken
place, like that which induces children while travelling in a
carriage to think the trees and rocks are moving instead of
themselves. However, with this I have nothing to do, I have
given my authority, namely, the statement of major Waller,
a staff-officer present, and the statement of colonel Taylor
(for he is my nameless eye-witness) of the ninth, the very
regiment to which sir James Douglas appeals for support
of his account. These are my authorities, and if their
recollections are irreconcilable with that of sir James Douglas
it only shows how vain it is to expect perfect accuracy
of detail. I knew not of sir James Douglas’s negative testimony,
but I had two positive testimonies to my statement,
and as I have still two to one, I am within the rules of the
courts of justice to which your lordship would refer all matter
of history; moreover, some grains of allowance must be
made for the natural partiality of every officer for his own
regiment. The following extract from sir James Leith’s
report on the occasion is also good circumstantial evidence
in favour of my side of the question.</p>

<p>“The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different
aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant, <em>having
dispersed or driven every thing there opposed to him</em>, was
in possession of the rocky eminence of the sierra at this
part of major-general Picton’s position <em>without a shot being
fired at him</em>. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general
Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the
bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment,
which had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in
columns in order to gain the most advantageous ground<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxix"></a>[xxix]</span>
for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did
with the greatest promptitude accuracy and coolness
under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed
on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the
back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time
also perceived the British brigade under him. Major
general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth, second
battalion, should have moved on in the rear and to the left
of the ninth regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond
the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards
the rear of the sierra, while the ninth should have gained
the ridge on the right of the rocky height, the royals to
have been posted (as they were) in reserve; but the enemy
<em>having driven every thing before them in that quarter</em>,
afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky
ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible
for the British brigade to have reached that position, although
not a moment had been lost in marching to support
the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a
rapid movement of more than two miles without halting
and frequently in double quick time.”</p>

<p>Here we have nothing of flank movements to avoid a
wing of Portuguese conscripts, but the plain and distinct
assertion <ins class="corr" id="tn-xxix" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'twice over, tbat'">
twice over, that</ins> <em>every thing in front was dispersed
or driven away</em>—and that not even a shot was fired at the
enemy. Where then was the eighth Portuguese? Did
the French column turn aside merely at the menacing looks
of these conscripts? If so, what a pity the latter had not
been placed to keep the crest of the position. There is
also another difficulty. Sir James Douglas says he was
with the royals in the attack, and sir James Leith says
that the royals were held in reserve while the ninth drove
away the enemy; besides which, the eighth Portuguese
might have been broke by the enemy when the latter were
mounting the hill and yet have rallied and joined in the
pursuit when the ninth had broken the French. Moreover,
my lord, as you affirm that both yourself and the duke of
Wellington <em>saw</em> all the operations of the eighth Portuguese
on this occasion, I will extend my former extract from
colonel Taylor’s letter, wherein you will perceive something<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxx"></a>[xxx]</span>
which may perhaps lead you to doubt the accuracy of your
recollection on that head.</p>

<p>“No doubt general Leith’s letter to the duke was intended
to describe the aspect of affairs in so critical a
situation, and where the duke himself could not <em>possibly</em>
have made his observations; and also Leith wished to have
due credit given to his brigade, which was not done in the
despatches. On the contrary, their exertions were made
light of, and the eighth Portuguese regiment was extolled,
which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding
officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside; but he and
they were amongst the very foremost ranks of the ninth
British.”—“General Leith’s correspondence would be an
interesting document to colonel Napier, as throwing considerable
light upon the operations at Busaco, between
Picton and Hill’s corps, a very considerable extent of
position <em>which could not of possibility be overlooked from
any other part of the field</em>.”</p>

<p><em>Charge of the nineteenth Portuguese.</em> Your lordship
has here gained an advantage; I cannot indeed understand
some of general M‘Bean’s expressions, but it is impossible
for me to doubt his positive statement; I believe therefore
that he was in front of the convent wall and that he
charged some body of the enemy. It is however necessary
to restore the question at issue between your lordship and
myself to its true bearing. You accused me of a desire to
damage the reputation of the Portuguese army, and you
asked why I did not speak of a particular charge made
by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment at Busaco. This
charge you described as being against one of <em>Ney’s attacking
columns</em>, which had, you said, <em>gained the ascent
of the position, and then forming advanced on the plain
above</em> before it was charged by the nineteenth regiment.
As this description was certainly wrong I treated the whole
as a magniloquent allusion to an advance which I had observed
to have been made by a Portuguese regiment
posted on the mountain to the right. (General M‘Bean
is mistaken when he quotes me as saying that his line
was never nearer to the enemy’s lines than a hundred
yards. I spoke of <em>a Portuguese regiment, which might<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxi"></a>[xxxi]</span>
possibly be the nineteenth</em>.) I never denied that any charge
had been made, but that a charge <em>such as described
by you</em> had taken place, and in fact general M‘Bean’s
letter while it confirms the truth of your general description,
by implication denies the accuracy of the particulars.
Certainly Ney’s columns never passed the front of
the light division nor advanced on the plain behind it.</p>

<p>The difficulty I have to reconcile general M‘Bean’s statement
with my own recollections and with the ground and
position of the light division, may perhaps arise from the
general’s meaning to use certain terms in a less precise
sense than I take them. Thus he says he was posted in
front of the convent-wall, and also on the right of the light
division; but the light division was half a mile in front of
the convent-wall, and hence I suppose he does not mean
as his words might imply immediately under the wall. He
speaks also of the light division as being to his left, but
unless he speaks of the line of battle with reference to the
sinuosities of the ground, the light division was with respect
to the enemy and the convent in his front; and if he does
speak with regard to those sinuosities, his front would
have been nearly at right angles to the front of the fifty-second
and forty-third, which I suppose to be really the
case. Again he says that he charged and drove the French
from <em>their position</em> down to the bottom of the ravine; but
the enemy’s position, properly so called, was on the opposite
side of the great ravine, and as all his artillery and
cavalry, all the eighth corps and the reserves of the sixth
corps, were in order of battle there, ten regiments, much
less one, dared not to have crossed the ravine which was
of such depth that it was difficult to distinguish troops
at the bottom. I conclude therefore, general M‘Bean
here means by the word position some accidental ground
on which the enemy had formed. Taking this to be
so, I will now endeavour to reconcile general M‘Bean’s
statement with my own recollection; because certainly I
do still hold my description of the action at that part to
be accurate as to all the main points.</p>

<p>The edge of the table-land or tongue on which the
light division stood was very abrupt, and formed a salient<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxii"></a>[xxxii]</span>
angle, behind the apex of which the forty-third and fifty-second
were drawn up in a line, the right of the one and
the left of the other resting on the very edges; the artillery
was at the apex looking down the descent, and far
below the Caçadores and the ninety-fifth were spread on
the mountain side as skirmishers. Ney employed only
two columns of attack. The one came straight against
the light division; the head of it striking the right company
of the fifty-second and the left company of the
forty-third was broken as against a wall; and at the
same time the wings of those regiments reinforced by the
skirmishers of the ninety-fifth, who had retired on the
right of the forty-third, advanced and lapped over the
broken column on both sides. No other troops fought
with them at that point. In this I cannot be mistaken,
because my company was in the right wing of the forty-third,
we followed the enemy down to the first village
which was several hundred yards below the edge, and we
returned leisurely; the ground was open to the view on
the right and on the left, we saw no other column, and
heard of none save that which we were pursuing.</p>

<p>When we returned from this pursuit the light division
had been reformed on the little plain above, and some
time after several German battalions, coming from under
the convent wall, passed through our ranks and commenced
skirmishing with Ney’s reserve in the woods
below.</p>

<p>General M‘Bean says he saw no German infantry,
and hence it is clear that it was not at this point his charge
had place. But it is also certain Ney had only two
columns of attack. Now his second, under the command
of general Marchand, moved up the hollow curve of the
great mountain to the right of the light division, and
having reached a pine-wood, which however was far below
the height on which the light division stood, he sent
skirmishers out against Pack’s brigade which was in his
front. A part of Ross’s troops of artillery under the direction
of lieutenant, now colonel M‘Donald, played very
sharply upon this column in the pine-wood. I was standing
in company with captain Loyd of my own regiment,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxiii"></a>[xxxiii]</span>
close to the guns watching their effect, and it was then
I saw the advance of the Portuguese regiment to which
I have alluded; but general M‘Bean again assures
me that the nineteenth regiment was not there. Two
suppositions therefore present themselves. The enemy’s
skirmishers from this column were very numerous. Some
of them might have passed the left flank of Pack’s skirmishers,
and gathering in a body have reached the edge
of the hill on which the light division were posted, and then
rising behind it have been attacked by general M‘Bean;
or, what is more likely, the skirmishers, or a small flanking
detachment from the column which attacked the light division,
might have passed under the edge of the descent
on the right of the light division, and gathering in a like
manner have risen under general M‘Bean’s line.</p>

<p>Either of these suppositions, and especially the last,
would render the matter clear to me in all points save
that of attacking the enemy’s position, which as I have
before observed, may be only a loose expression of the
general’s to denote the ground which the French opposed
to him had attained on our position. This second supposition
seems also to be confirmed by a fact mentioned
by general M‘Bean, namely, that the enemy’s guns
opened on him immediately after his charge. The French
guns did open also on that part of the light division which
followed the enemy down the hill to the first village, thus the
time that the nineteenth charged seems marked, and as I
was one of those who went to the village, it also accounts
for my not seeing that charge. However considering all
things, I must admit that I was so far in error that I
really did not, nor do I now possess any clear recollection
of this exploit of the nineteenth regiment; and in proof
of the difficulty of attaining strict accuracy on such occasions,
I can here adduce the observation of general
M‘Bean viz. that he saw no Germans save the artillery;
yet there was a whole brigade of that nation near the
convent wall, and they advanced and skirmished sharply
with the enemy soon after the charge of the nineteenth
would appear to have taken place. Very often also,
things appear greater to those who perform them than to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxiv"></a>[xxxiv]</span>
the bye-standers, and I would therefore ask how many
men the nineteenth lost in the charge, how many prisoners
it took, and how many French were opposed to it?
for I still maintain that neither by the nineteenth Portuguese,
nor by any other regiment, save those of the
light division, was any charge made which called for particular
notice on my part as a general historian. I am not
bound to relate all the minor occurrences of a great
battle; “those things belong to the history of regiments,” is
the just observation of Napoleon. Yet general M‘Bean
may be assured that no desire to underrate either his services
or the gallantry of the Portuguese soldiers <ins class="corr" id="tn-xxxiv" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'ever acuated me'">
ever actuated me</ins>, and to prove it, if my third volume should
ever come to a third edition, I will take his letter as my
ground for noticing this charge, although I will not
promise to make it appear so prominent as your lordship
would have me to do.</p>

<p>Your lordship closes this subject by the following
observation. “As colonel Napier represents himself as
having been an eye-witness of a gallant movement made
by a certain Portuguese regiment,—which regiment he
does not profess to know,—but which movement took
place a mile distant from the position given to the nineteenth
regiment, it is evident he could not also have been
an eye-witness of what was passing a mile to the left.
Nor can he therefore negative what is said to have occurred
there. It is extraordinary that the historian should not
have perceived the predicament in which he has placed himself.”
Now your lordship does not say that the two events
occurred at the <em>same time</em>, wherefore your conclusion is
what the renowned Partridge calls a “<i lang="la">non sequitur</i>;” and as
general M‘Bean expressly affirms his charge to have taken
place on the <em>right</em> of the light division, it was not absolutely
necessary that I should look to the <em>left</em> in order to
see the said charge. Hence the predicament in which I
am placed, is that of being obliged to remark your lordship’s
inability to reason upon your own materials.</p>

<p>Your next subject is captain Squire, but I will pass over
that matter as having been I think sufficiently discussed
before, and I am well assured that the memory of that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxv"></a>[xxxv]</span>
very gallant and able officer will never suffer from your
lordship’s angry epithets. Campo Mayor follows. In
your “<em>Further Strictures</em>” you said that colonel Colborne
was not near the scene of action; you now show in detail
that he was actively engaged in it. You denied also that
he was in support of the advanced guard, and yet quote his
own report explaining how he happened to be separated
from the advanced guard just before the action, thus
proving that he was marching in support of it. You refuse
any credit to the statements of captain Gregory and colonel
Light; and you endeavour to discredit and trample upon
the evidence of the officer of the thirteenth dragoons who
was an actor in the charge of that regiment, but with
respect to him a few remarks are necessary.</p>

<p>1º. The accuracy of that gentleman’s narrative concerns
my Justification very little, except in one part. I published
it whole as he gave it to me, because I thought it threw
light upon the subject. I think so still, and I see nothing
in your lordship’s observation to make me doubt its
general correctness. But it was only the part which I
printed in italics that concerned me. I had described a
remarkable combat of cavalry, wherein the hostile squadrons
<em>had twice passed through each other</em>, and then the
British put the French to flight. Your lordship ridiculed
this as a nursery tale; you called my description of it a
“<em>country dance</em>,” and you still call it my “<em>scenic effect</em>.”
Did the hostile masses meet twice, and did the British then
put their opponents to flight? These were the real questions.
The unusual fact of two cavalry bodies charging through
each other, was the point in dispute; it is scenic, but
is it true? Now my first authority, whom I have designated
as an “<em>eye-witness</em>,” was colonel Colborne; my second
authority colonel Dogherty of the thirteenth dragoons,
an <em>actor</em>; and when your lordship so coolly says the latter’s
statement does not afford “the slightest support to my
scenic description,” I must take the liberty of laughing at
you. Why, my lord, you really seem disposed to treat common
sense as if it were a subaltern. Colonel Dogherty
bears me out even to the letter; for as the second charge
took place with the same violence that the third did, if the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxvi"></a>[xxxvi]</span>
hostile bodies had not passed through to their original position,
the French must have fled towards the allied army; but
they fled towards Badajos. The English must therefore
have passed through and turned, and it was then that in
the personal conflict with the sabre which followed the
second charge the thirteenth dragoons defeated the
French.</p>

<p>My lord, you will never by such special pleading, I
know of no other term by which I can properly designate
your argument, you will never, I say, by such special
pleading, hide your bad generalship at Campo Mayor.
The proofs of your errors there are too many and too clear;
the errors themselves too glaring too gross to leave you
the least hope; the same confusion of head which prevented
you from seizing the advantages then offered to you
seems to prevail in your writing; and yet while impeaching
every person’s credit where their statements militate
against your object, you demand the most implicit confidence
in your own contradictory assertions and preposterous
arguments. My lord, you only fatigue yourself and
your readers by your unwieldy floundering, you are heavy
and throw much mud about; like one of those fine
Andalusian horses so much admired in the Peninsula,
you prance and curvet and foam and labour in your paces
but you never get on. At Campo Mayor you had an
enormous superiority of troops, the enemy were taken by
surprize, they were in a plain, their cavalry were beaten,
their artillery-drivers cut down, their infantry, hemmed in
by your horsemen and under the play of your guns, were
ready to surrender; yet you suffered them to escape and
to carry off their captured artillery and then you blamed
your gallant troops. The enemy escaped from you, my
lord, but you cannot escape from the opinion of the world
by denying the truth of all statements which militate
against you.</p>

<p><em>The march by Merida.</em> If you had said at once that
the duke of Wellington forbade you to go by Merida,
there would have been an end of all my arguments
against your skill; yet it by no means follows that these
arguments would be futile in themselves, though not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxvii"></a>[xxxvii]</span>
applicable to you personally. New combinations were
presented, and the duke of Wellington might very probably
have changed his instructions had he been present
on the spot. But, why was this your justification
withheld until now? why was so plain, so clear, so decisive
a defence of yourself never thought of before? and
why is it now smothered with such a heap of arguments as
you have added, to prove that you ought not to have gone
by Merida? Have you found out that I am not such a bad
reasoner upon military affairs as you were pleased to style
me in your former publication? Have you found out that
pleading high rank is not a sufficient answer to plain and
well supported statements? It is good however that you
have at last condescended to adopt a different mode of
proceeding. I applaud you for it, and with the exception
of two points I will leave you in the full enjoyment of any
triumph which the force of your arguments may procure
you; always, however, retaining my right to assume that
your lordship’s memory with respect to the duke of Wellington’s
negative, may have been as treacherous as it was
about your own letter to the junta of Badajos.</p>

<p>I have therefore nothing to add to the arguments I
have already used in my Justification, and in my History,
in favour of the march to Merida; if I am wrong the
world will so judge me. But the two points I have reserved
are, 1º. That you assert now, in direct contradiction
to your former avowal, that the march to Merida
would have been one of <em>four</em> days instead of <em>two</em>; and
that the road by Albuquerque was the only one which you
could use. In answer to this last part I observe, that the
French before, and the Spaniards then, marched by the
road of Montigo; and that a year after, when lord Hill’s
expedition against Almaraz took place, the whole of his
battering and pontoon train, with all the ammunition belonging
to it, moved with great facility in three days from
Elvas, by this very road of Montigo, to Merida; and Elvas
as your Lordship knows is rather further than Campo
Mayor from Merida.</p>

<p>The second point is that mode of conducting a controversy
which I have so often had occasion to expose in your<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxviii"></a>[xxxviii]</span>
former publications, viz. mis-stating my arguments to suit
your own reasoning. I never said that you should have
attempted, or could have succeeded in a “<i lang="fr">coup de main</i>”
against Badajos; I never even said you should have commenced
the siege immediately. What I did say was, that
by the march through Merida you could have placed your
army at once between Badajos and the French army, and
so have thrown the former upon its own resources at a
most inconvenient time; that in this situation you could
have more readily thrown your bridge at Jerumenha, and
proceeded at your convenience.</p>

<p>Further than this I do not think it necessary to dissect
and expose your new fallacies and contradictions; it
requires too much time. You have written upwards of
six hundred pages, four hundred of them I have before
demolished; but my own volumes are rather thick and
to me at least much more important than yours; your
lordship must therefore spare me the other two hundred,
or at least permit me to treat them lightly. I will leave
the whole siege of Badajos to you, it is matter of opinion
and I will not follow your example in overloading what is
already clear by superfluity of argument. I will only
expose one error into which you have been led by
colonel La Marre’s work. On his authority you say the
garrison on the 10th of April had three months’ provisions;
but the following extract from a letter of marshal
Soult’s to the prince of Wagram will prove that La Marre
is wrong:—</p>


<p class="right"><em>“Seville, 18th April.</em></p>

<p>“From the 11th of this month the place was provisioned,
according to the report of general Phillipon, for
<em>two months and some days</em> as to subsistence; and there
are 100 milliers of powder,” &amp;c. &amp;c.</p>


<p class="p1">Let us now come to the <em>battle of Albuera</em>.</p>

<p>You still doubt that the position as I explained it is four
miles long, and you rest upon the superior accuracy of
major Mitchell’s plan, on which you have measured the
distance with your compasses. I also am in possession
of one of major Mitchell’s plans, and I find by the aid of
my pair of compasses, that even from the left of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxix"></a>[xxxix]</span>
Portuguese <em>infantry</em> (without noticing Otway’s squadron of
cavalry) to the right of the Spanish line, as placed at the
termination of the battle, is exactly four miles; and every
body knows that a line over the actual ground will from
the latter’s rises and falls exceed the line on paper.
Wherefore as my measurement does not coincide with
your lordship’s, and as we are both Irishmen, I conclude
that either your compasses are too short or that mine are
too long.</p>

<p>Your grand cheval de bataille is, however, the numbers
of the armies on each side. Thirty-eight long pages
you give us, to prove what cannot be proved, namely,
that my estimate is wrong and yours right; and at the end
you are just where you began. All is uncertain, there are
no returns, no proof! the whole matter is one of guess
upon probabilities as to the allies, and until lately was so
also with respect to the French.</p>

<p>Mine was a very plain statement. I named a certain
number as the nearest approximation I could make, and
when my estimate was questioned by you I explained as
briefly as possible the foundation of that estimate. You
give in refutation thirty-eight pages of most confused calculations,
and what is the result? why that the numbers
of the allies on your own shewing still remain uncertain;
and your estimate of the French, as I will shew by the bye,
is quite erroneous.</p>

<p>I said in my History, you had more than two thousand
cavalry in the field, and in my Justification I gave
reasons for believing you had nearly three thousand; you
now acknowledge two thousand; my history then is not
far wrong. But your lordship does not seem to know the
composition of your own divisions. General Long’s morning
states, now before me, do not include general Madden’s
cavalry. That officer’s regiments were the fifth and
eighth, and if I mistake not the sixth and ninth also
were under him; those in general Long’s division are the
first and seventh. I find from general Madden’s own
account of his services, given in the Military Calendar,
that a part of his brigade, namely, the eighth regiment,
under colonel Windham, was in the battle of Albuera.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xl"></a>[xl]</span>
Now taking the eighth to be between two hundred and
seventy and two hundred and eighty-one troopers, which
were the respective strengths of the first and seventh
regiments in Long’s Division on the 29th of May, I have
above eighteen hundred troopers, namely, fifteen hundred
and eighty-seven in Long’s division, and two hundred and
seventy-five in the eighth regiment, and to these I add
about two hundred and fifty officers and sergeants, making
in all more than two thousand sabres. In general Long’s
states of the 8th of May, those two Portuguese regiments
had indeed fewer under arms than on the 29th, but then
six hundred and eighty-nine men and forty-four serjeants
and trumpeters were on command, of which more than
four hundred belonged to those two Portuguese regiments.
Many of these men must surely have joined before the
battle, because such an unusual number on command
could only be temporary. Again I find in the state of
the 29th of May, one hundred and fifteen serjeants trumpeters
and troopers returned as prisoners of war; and
when the killed and wounded in the battle are added, we
may fairly call the British and Portuguese cavalry above
two thousand. Your lordship admits the Spaniards to
have had seven hundred and fifty; but I will for clearness
place this in a tabular form:</p>


<p class="p2 pfs80">GENERAL LONG’S STATES.</p>

<table class="autotable fs90">
<tr>
<td class="tdc">8th May.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc">Serjeants, trumpeters, and troopers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Present under arms</td>
<td class="tdrx">1576</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">On command</td>
<td class="tdrx">733</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Prisoners of war</td>
<td class="tdrx">115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">2424</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx">29th May.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Present</td>
<td class="tdrx">1739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Command</td>
<td class="tdrx">522</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Prisoners of war</td>
<td class="tdrx">127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">2388</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcx" colspan="3"><ins class="corr" id="tn-xli" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Medium estimate'">
Median estimate</ins> for the 16th of May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Present 8th May</td>
<td class="tdrx">1576</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Ditto 29th May</td>
<td class="tdrx">1739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">2)3315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdr">1657½</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">270</td>
<td class="tdl">8th Portuguese regt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">1927</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">127</td>
<td class="tdl">Prisoners of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">2054</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">750</td>
<td class="tdl">Spaniards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">2804</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Deduct prisoners on the 8th</td>
<td class="tdrx">115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc">Total</td>
<td class="tdrx">2689</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrx">——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="noindent">To which are to be added the killed and wounded of the
Anglo-Portuguese, and the men rejoined from command.</p>

<p>Thus, the statements in my History and in my Justification
are both borne out; for the numbers are above
two thousand as set down in the first, and nearly three
thousand as stated in the last. Moreover, a general
historian is not blameable for small inaccuracies. If he
has reasonably good authority for any fact he cannot
be justly censured for stating that fact, and you should
make a distinction between that which is stated in my
History and that which is stated in my controversial
writings. All mistakes in the latter however trifling are
fair; but to cavil at trifles in the former rather hurts yourself.
Now with respect to the artillery there is an example
of this cavilling, and also an illustration of your
lordship’s mode of raising a very confused argument on a
very plain fact. I said there were so many guns in the
field, and that so many were nine-pounders; you accused
me of arbitrarily deciding upon their calibre. In reply I
shewed you that I took the <em>number</em> on the report of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlii"></a>[xlii]</span>
colonel Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery, the
<em>calibre</em> upon the authority of your own witness and quarter-master-general,
sir Benjamin D’Urban. The latter was
wrong and there the matter should have ended. Your
lordship, however, requires me, as a mark of ingenuousness,
to acknowledge as my mistake that which is the mistake
of sir Benjamin D’Urban, and you give a grand table,
with the gross number of pounds of iron as if the affair
had been between two ships. You set down in your
columns the statements of the writer of a note upon your
Strictures, the statement of the Strictures themselves, and
my statement; and then come on with your own observations
as if there were three witnesses on your side.
But the author of the note is again your witness D’Urban,
who thus shews himself incorrect both as to number and
weight; and the author of the Strictures is yourself. This
is not an <em>ingenuous</em>, though it is an <em>ingenious</em> mode of
multiplying testimony. In your Further Strictures also
you first called in sir B. D’Urban in person, you then
used his original memoir, you also caused him to write
anonymously a running commentary upon yours and his
own statements, and now you comment in your own name
upon your own anonymous statements, thus making five
testimonies out of two.</p>

<p>The answer is simple and plain. When I took sir
Benjamin D’Urban as a guide he led me wrong; and you
instead of visiting his error upon his own head visit it
upon mine, and require me and your readers to follow him
implicitly upon all points while to do so avails for your
defence, but not when they contradict it. From sir B.
D’Urban I took the <em>calibre</em> of the allies’ guns employed in
the battle of Albuera, and he was wrong! From him, if I
had not possessed sir A. Dickson’s official return, I should
also have taken the <em>number</em> of guns, and I should have
been wrong, because he calls them thirty-four instead of
thirty-eight. He also (see page 26 of the Appendix to
your Further Strictures) says that the Spaniards had six
guns, whereas Dickson says, they had but four; and if
his six guns were reckoned there would have been forty
pieces of artillery, which he however reduced to thirty-four<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xliii"></a>[xliii]</span>
by another error, namely, leaving out a whole brigade of
German artillery. On sir Benjamin’s authority I called
major Dickson the commander of the artillery, and this
also was wrong. From sir Benjamin D’Urban’s Memoir,
I took the statement that the fourth division arrived
on the field of battle at <em>six o’clock in the morning</em>, and
yet I am assured that they did not arrive until nine o’clock,
and after the action had commenced. And this last is a
very serious error because it gives the appearance of skill
to your lordship’s combinations for battle and to sir Benjamin’s
arrangements for the execution, which they do
not merit, if, as I now believe, that division arrived at
nine o’clock. But the latter hour would be quite in keeping
with the story of the cavalry going to forage, and both
together would confirm another report very current, namely,
that your lordship did not anticipate any battle on the
16th of May. Setting this however aside, I know not
why, in the face of all these glaring errors and a multitude
of smaller ones, I am to take sir Benjamin D’Urban’s
authority upon any disputed point.</p>

<p>I will now, my lord, admit one complete triumph
which you have attained in your dissertation upon the
numbers of the troops. I did say that from the 20th of
March to the 16th of May, was only twenty days, and
though the oversight is so palpably one that could not
be meant to deceive, I will not deny your right to ridicule
and to laugh at it. I have laughed at so many of your
lordship’s oversights that it would be unfair to deny you
this opportunity for retaliation, which I also admit you
have used moderately.</p>

<p>I have since I wrote my Justification procured some
proofs about the French numbers, you will find them in
the following extracts from the duke of Dalmatia’s correspondence
of that time. They are worth your attention.
They throw some light upon the numbers of the allies,
and one of them shows unquestionably that my estimate
of the French numbers was, as I have before said, too
high instead of too low. I give the translations to avoid
the trouble and expense of printing in two languages, and
I beg your lordship to observe that these extracts are not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xliv"></a>[xliv]</span>
liable to the praise of that generous patriotism which you
alluded to in speaking of French authors, because they
were written before the action and for the emperor’s information,
and because it was the then interest of the
writer rather to exaggerate than to lessen his own numbers,
in order to give his sovereign an idea of his activity
and zeal.</p>


<p class="p1 center">Extract of a letter from <span class="smcap">Marshal Soult</span> to the <span class="smcap">Prince</span>
of <span class="smcap">Wagram</span>.</p>

<p class="p1 right"><em>Seville, 22d April, 1811.</em></p>

<p>“General Latour Maubourg announces to me that
general Beresford commanding the Anglo-Portuguese
army, and the Spanish generals Castaños and Ballesteros
with the remains of the corps of their nation are united at
Zafra, and I am assured that the whole of their forces is
twenty-five thousand men, of which three thousand are
cavalry.”</p>

<p>“Colonel Quennot of the ninth regiment of dragoons,
who commands upon the line of the Tinto and observes
the movements on that side as far as Ayamonte, informs
me that on the 18th and 19th, general Blake disembarked
ten thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry between
the mouths of the Piedra and the Guadiana. These
troops come from Cadiz, they have cannon, and Blake
can unite in that part fifteen thousand men.”</p>


<p class="p1 center">Ditto to Ditto.</p>

<p class="p1 right">“<em>May 4th, 1811.</em></p>

<p>“Cordova is menaced by a corps of English Portuguese
and Spaniards, many troops are concentrated in
Estremadura, Badajos is invested, Blake <em>has</em> united
on the Odiel an army of fifteen to sixteen thousand men.”
“I depart in four days with <em>twenty thousand men</em>, <em>three
thousand horses</em>, <em>and thirty pieces of cannon</em> to drive across
the Guadiana the enemy’s corps which are spread in
Estremadura, to disengage Badajos and to facilitate the
arrival of count D’Erlon. If the troops which that general
brings can unite with mine, and if the troops coming from
the armies of the north and centre, and which I have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlv"></a>[xlv]</span>
already in part arranged, arrive in time, I shall have in
Estremadura, thirty-five thousand men five thousand
horses and forty pieces of artillery.”</p>


<p>Now, my lord, I find by the imperial returns that count
D’Erlon marched towards Andalusia with twelve thousand
men present under arms, and that he did not arrive until
the 14th June. There remain three thousand men as
coming from the armies of the north and centre, to make
up the thirty-five thousand men mentioned by Soult, and
I find the following passage in his letter to the prince of
Wagram, dated the 9th of May.</p>

<p>“The 12th, I shall be at Fuente Cantos, general
Bron commands there, he brings with him the first reinforcement
coming from the armies of the north and centre,
and I shall employ him in the expedition.”</p>

<p>Hence, if we take the first reinforcement at half of the
whole number expected, we add one thousand five hundred
men and five guns to the twenty thousand, making a total
for the battle of Albuera of twenty-one thousand five hundred
men of all arms, and thirty-five guns. From these
must be deducted the detachments left at Villalba, stragglers
on the march, and some hussars sent to scout on
the flanks, for I find in general Madden’s narrative of his
services, that he was watched by part of the enemy’s
cavalry on the day of the battle.</p>

<p>I have now, my lord, given you positive and undeniable
testimony that the French numbers were overrated instead
of being underrated by me, and I have given you
corroborative evidence, that the number of the allies was
as great as I have stated it to be; for we find in the above
extracts Soult giving Blake fifteen thousand men, of which,
at least, seven hundred are cavalry, <em>before</em> the battle, and
twenty-five thousand, of which three thousand are cavalry,
to your lordship, Castaños, &amp;c. We find the French
general’s information, taking into consideration the troops
which joined Blake in the Niebla, not differing essentially
from Mr. Henry Wellesley’s report of the numbers of
Blake’s army, namely twelve thousand, of which one
thousand one hundred were cavalry; and we find both
in some manner confirmed by lord Wellington’s repeated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlvi"></a>[xlvi]</span>
statements of the forces of Blake’s army after the battle,
that is to say, making a reasonable allowance for the
numbers lost in the action. Soult and Mr. Wellesley also
agree in making out the Spanish cavalry more numerous
than your lordship will admit of. Blake alone had from
seven to eleven hundred cavalry, following the statement
of these persons, and there was in addition the corps of
Penne Villemur, which, as I have said in my Justification,
was not less than five hundred.</p>

<p>In closing your calculation of numbers you exultingly
observe that it is the first time you ever heard of a general’s
being censured for keeping one-third of his force in
reserve and <em>beating the enemy with the other two</em>. Aye—but
this involves the very pith of the question. At
Albuera the <em>general</em> did not beat the enemy. My lord, you
have bestowed great pains on your argument about the
battle of Albuera, and far be it from me to endeavour to
deprive you of any addition to your reputation which you
may thus obtain. I have no desire to rob you of any
well-earned laurels, my observations were directed against
what appeared to me your bad generalship; if I have
not succeeded in pointing that out to the satisfaction of
the public I have nothing further to offer in fairness and certainly
will not by any vile sophistry endeavour to damage
your fame. But do not think that I acknowledge the
force of your present arguments. If I do not take the
trouble to dissect them for reasons before mentioned, be
assured it is not from any want of points to fasten upon;
indeed, my lord, your book is very weak, there are many
failures in it, and a few more I will touch upon that you
may estimate my forbearance at its proper value. I will
begin with your observations on captain Gregory’s testimony,
not in defence of that gentleman’s credit, for in
truth, as his and the other officers’ evidence is given to
facts of which they were personally cognizant I cannot
pay the slightest regard to your confused arguments in
opposition to their honour. I am aware that you do not
mean to impeach anything but their memory; but if I
were to attempt to defend them from your observations it
would appear as if I thought otherwise. My lord, you<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlvii"></a>[xlvii]</span>
have missed captain Gregory, but you have hit yourself
very hard.</p>

<p>Behold the proof.</p>

<p>At page 167 you say, “I will now point out the gross
and palpable errors of captain Gregory’s narrative.”—“He
says, that on receiving the intelligence from an
orderly of the thirteenth dragoons who came in from a
picquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was
crossing the river, general Long galloped off.” I conclude
to the right, “and found half the army across,” and to the
right. <em>Why, every other authority has stated that the
enemy’s first movement was from the wood along the right
bank of the Albuera upon our left</em>; and that we were not
at all aware of their intention to cross above our right and
there make an attack, till after their first movement
was considerably advanced and the action had actually
commenced with Godinot’s corps on the opposite side of
the river to our left. It is quite surprising that colonel
Napier should have overlooked a blunder so gross as to
destroy the value of the whole of his friend’s testimony.</p>

<p>Now, my lord, compare the passage marked by italics
(pardon me the italics) in the above, with the following
extract from your own despatch.</p>

<p>“The enemy on the 16th did not long delay his
attack: at eight o’clock” (the very time mentioned by
captain Gregory,) “he was observed to be in movement,
and his cavalry were seen passing the rivulet of Albuera
considerably <em>above our right, and shortly after</em>, he marched,
out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry
and two heavy columns of infantry, posting them to our
front, <em>as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera</em>.
During this time he was filing the principal body of his
infantry over the river <em>beyond our right</em>, and it was not
long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by
that flank.” Your lordship has, indeed in another part
discarded the authority of your despatch, as appears most
necessary in treating of this battle, but is rather hard
measure to attack me so fiercely for having had some
faith in it.</p>

<p>With respect to sir Wm. Lumley’s letter I cannot but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlviii"></a>[xlviii]</span>
admire his remembrance of the exact numbers of the
British cavalry. A recollection of twenty-three years,
founded on a few hasty words spoken on a field of battle
is certainly a rare thing; yet I was not quite unprepared
for such precision, for if I do not greatly mistake, sir
William was the general, who at Santarem edified the
head-quarters by a report, that “<em>the enemy were certainly
going to move either to their right or to their left, to their
front or to their rear</em>.” One would suppose that so exact
a person could never be in error; and yet the following
extract from general Harvey’s journal would lead me to
suppose that his memory was not quite so clear and
powerful as he imagines. Sir William Lumley says, that
to the best of his recollection he was not aware of the advance
of the fuzileers and Harvey’s brigade until they had
passed his left flank; that they then came under his eye;
that as the rain and smoke cleared away he saw them as
one body moving to engage, and although they had become
so oblique, relative to the point where he stood, that
he could not well speak as to their actual distance from
one another, there did not appear any improper interval
between them.</p>

<p>Now hear general Harvey!</p>

<p>“The twenty-third and one battalion of the seventh
fuzileers were in line. The other battalion at quarter distance,
forming square, at every halt to cover the right
which the cavalry continued to menace. <em>Major-general
Lumley, with the British cavalry, was also in column of
half squadrons in rear of our right and moved with us,
being too weak to advance against the enemy’s cavalry.</em>”</p>

<p>There, my lord, you see that generals as well as doctors
differ. Sir W. Lumley, twenty-three years after the event,
recollects seeing the fuzileers and Harvey’s brigade at
such a distance, and so obliquely, that he could not speak
to their actual distance from one another. General Harvey
writing the day after the event, says, sir William
Lumley had his cavalry in half squadrons close in
rear of these very brigades, and was moving with them!
This should convince your lordship that it is not wise to
cry out and cavil at every step in the detail of a battle.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlix"></a>[xlix]</span></p>

<p>As to the term <em>gap</em>, I used the word without the mark
of quotation, because it was my own and it expressed
mine and your meaning very well. You feared that the
cavalry of the French would overpower ours, and break in
on your rear and flank when the support of the fuzileers
was taken away. I told you that general Cole had placed
Harvey’s brigade in the <em>gap</em>, that is, in such a situation
that the French could not break in. I knew very well
that Harvey’s brigade followed in support of the attack
of the fuzileers because he says so in his journal; but
he also says, that both ours and the enemy’s cavalry
made a corresponding movement. Thus the fear of the
latter breaking in was chimerical, especially as during the
march Harvey halted, formed, received and beat off a
charge of the French horsemen.</p>

<p>But I have not yet done with sir W. Lumley’s numbers.
How curious it is that brigade-major Holmes’s verbal
report on the field of battle, as recollected by sir William,
should give the third dragoon guards and the fourth dragoons,
forming the heavy brigade, the exact number of
five hundred and sixty men, when the same brigade-major
Holmes in his written morning state of the 8th of May,
one week before the battle, gives to those regiments seven
hundred and fifty-two troopers present under arms, and
one hundred and eighty-three on command. What became
of the others in the interval? Again, on the 29th of May,
thirteen days after the battle, he writes down these regiments
six hundred and ninety-five troopers present under
arms, one hundred and eighty-two on command, and
thirty-two prisoners of war. In both cases also the sergeants,
trumpeters, &amp;c. are to be added; and I mark this
circumstance, because in the French returns all persons from
the highest officer to the conductors of carriages are included
in the strength of men. I imagine neither of the distinguished
regiments alluded to will be willing to admit that
their ranks were full before and after, but empty on the
day of battle. It is contrary to the English custom.
Your lordship, also, in a parenthesis (page 125) says that
the thirteenth dragoons had not three hundred men at this
time to produce; but this perverse brigade-major Holmes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_l"></a>[l]</span>
writes that regiment down also on the 8th of May, at three
hundred and fifty-seven troopers present under arms, and
sixty-three on command; and on the 29th of May, three
hundred and forty-one present seventy-nine on command,
eighty-two prisoners-of-war. Staff-officers are notoriously
troublesome people.</p>

<p>One point more, and I have done.</p>

<p>You accuse me of having placed sir A. Dickson in a
position where he never was, and you give a letter from
that officer to prove the fact. You also deny the correctness
of sir Julius Hartman’s statement, and you observe
that even were it accurate, he does not speak of an order
to retreat, but an order to cover a retreat. Now to say
that I place Dickson in a wrong position is scarcely fair,
because I only use sir Julius Hartman’s words, and that
in my Justification; whereas in my History, I have placed
colonel Dickson’s guns exactly in the position where he
himself says they were. If your lordship refers to my work
you will see that it is so; and surely it is something akin
to quibbling, to deny, that artillery posted to defend a
bridge was not at the bridge because its long range enabled
it to effect its object from a distance.</p>

<p>You tell me also that I had your quarter-master general’s
evidence to counteract sir Julius Hartman’s relative to
this retreat. But sir Benjamin D’Urban had already
misled me more than once; and why, my lord, did you
garble sir A Dickson’s communication? I will answer
for you. It contained positive evidence that <em>a retreat was
ordered</em>. Your lordship may ask how I know this. I
will tell you that also. Sir Alexander Dickson at my
request sent me the substance of his communication
to you at the same time. You are now I hope, convinced
that it is not weakness which induces me to neglect
a complete analysis of your work. I do assure you it is
very weak in every part.</p>

<p>My lord, you have mentioned several other letters which
you have received from different officers, colonel Arbuthnot,
colonel Colborne, &amp;c. as confirming your statements,
but you have not, as in the cases of sir James Douglas and
general M‘Bean, where they were wholly on your own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_li"></a>[li]</span>
side, given these letters in full; wherefore, seeing the gloss
you have put upon lord Stuart’s communication, and this
garbling of sir A. Dickson’s letter, I have a right to suppose
that the others do not bear up your case very strongly,—probably
they contradict it on some points as sir
Alexander Dickson’s does. I shall now give the latter
entire.</p>

<p>“The Portuguese artillery under my command (twelve
guns) attached to general Hamilton’s division was posted
on favourable ground about 750 or 800 yards from the
bridge, and at least 700 yards S. W. of the village of
Albuera, their fire bore effectually upon the bridge and the
road from it to the bridge, and I received my orders to take
this position from lord Beresford when the enemy threatened
their main attack at the bridge. At a certain period
of the day, I should judge it to have been about the time
the fourth division moved to attack, <em>I received a verbal
order in English from Don Jose Luiz de Souza</em> (now Conde
de Villa Real, an aid-de-camp of lord Beresford) <em>to retire
by the Valverde road, or upon the Valverde road, I am not
sure which</em>; to this I strongly expressed words of doubt, and
he then rode off towards Albuera; as, however, I could see
no reason for falling back, and the infantry my guns belonged
to being at hand, I continued in action, and though
I believe I limbered up once or twice previous to the receipt
of this message and moved a little to improve my
position, I never did so to retire. Soon after Don Jose left
me, seeing lord Beresford and some of his staff to my
right, I rode across to satisfy myself that I was acting correctly,
but perceiving that the French were giving way I
did not mention the order I had received, and as soon as
lord Beresford saw me, he asked what state my guns were
in, and then ordered me to proceed as quickly as I could
with my nine-pounders to the right, which I did in time to
bring them into action against the retiring masses of the
enemy. The foregoing is the substance of an explanation
given to lord Beresford which he lately requested.”</p>

<p>Thus you have the whole of what sir Alexander Dickson
(as he tells me) wrote to you; and here therefore I
might stop, my lord, to enjoy your confusion. I might<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lii"></a>[lii]</span>
harp upon this fact, as being so formidable a bar to your
lordship’s argument, that rather than give it publicity, you
garbled your own correspondent’s letter. But my object
is not to gain a triumph over you, it is to establish the
truth, and I will not follow your example by suppressing
what may tend to serve your argument and weaken mine.
It is of no consequence to me whether you gave orders for
a retreat or not. I said in my History that you did not do
so, thinking the weight of testimony to be on that side,
and it was only when your anonymous publications called
forth new evidence that I began to doubt the correctness
of my first statement.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> But if the following observation
in sir Alexander Dickson’s letter can serve your argument,
you are welcome to it, although it is not contained in
the substance of what he wrote to you; and here also I
beg of you to remember that this letter of sir Alexander’s
was written to me <em>after my Justification</em> was printed.</p>

<p>“I had never mentioned the matter to any one, except
to Hartman, with whom I was on the greatest habits of
intimacy, and indeed I was from the first induced to
attribute Souza’s message to some mistake, as neither in
my conversation with lord Beresford was there any allusion
to it, nor did any thing occur to indicate to me that he was
aware of my having received such an order.”</p>

<p>Your lordship will no doubt deny that the Count of
Villa Real had any authority from you to order this retreat,
so be it; but then you call upon me and others to accept
this Count of Villa Real’s evidence upon other points, and
you attempt to discredit some of my witnesses, because
their testimony is opposed to the testimony of the Count of
Villa Real; if you deny him at Albuera, you cannot have
him at Campo Mayor. And behold, my lord, another difficulty
you thus fall into. Your publications are intended
to prove your talent as a general, and yet we find you
acknowledging, that in the most critical period of this great
and awful battle of Albuera, your own staff had so little<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_liii"></a>[liii]</span>
confidence in your ability, that sir Henry Hardinge took
upon himself to win it for you, while the Conde de Villa
Real took upon himself to lose it; the one ordering an
advance, which gained the day; the other ordering a
retreat, which would have ruined all. My lord, be assured
that such liberties are never taken by the staff of great
commanders.</p>

<p>In ancient times it was reckoned a worthy action to hold
the mirror of truth up to men placed in high stations, when
the partiality of friends, the flattery of dependents, and
their own human vanity had given them too exalted notions
of their importance. You, my lord, are a man in a high
station, and you have evidently made a false estimate of
your importance, or you would not treat men of inferior
rank with so much disdain as you have expressed in these
your publications; wherefore it may be useful, and certainly
will be just, to let you know the judgment which
others have formed of your talents. The following character
was sketched about two months after the battle of
Albuera. The author was a man of great ability, used to
public affairs, experienced in the study of mankind, opposed
to you by no personal interest, and withal had excellent
opportunities of observing your disposition; and surely his
acuteness will not be denied by those who have read your
three publications in this controversy.</p>

<p>“Marshal Beresford appears to possess a great deal of
information upon all subjects connected with the military
establishments of the kingdom, the departments attached
to the army, and the resources of the country. But
nothing appears to be well arranged and digested in his
head; he never fixes upon a point, but deviates from his
subject, and overwhelms a very slender thread of argument
by a profusion of illustrations, stories, and anecdotes, most
of which relate to himself. He is captious and obstinate,
and difficult to be pleased. He appears to grasp at every
thing for his own party, without considering what it would
be fair, and reasonable, and decent to expect from the
other party.”</p>

<p>I now take leave of you, my lord, and notwithstanding
all that has passed, I take leave of you with respect, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_liv"></a>[liv]</span>
I think you to be a brave soldier, and even an able
organizer of an army. I know that you have served your
country long, I firmly believe to the utmost of your ability,
and I admit that ability to have been very considerable;
but history, my lord, deals with very great men, and you
sink in the comparison. She will speak of you as a
general far above mediocrity, as one who has done much
and a great deal of it well, yet when she looks at Campo
Mayor and Albuera she will not rank you amongst great
commanders, and if she should ever cast her penetrating
eyes upon this your present publication, she will not class
you amongst great writers.</p>

<hr class="tb">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lv"></a>[lv]</span><br></p>


<h3 class="pfs150 lsp3">REPLY</h3>

<p class="pfs60">TO THE</p>
<p class="pfs90"><em>Third Article in the Quarterly Review</em></p>
<p class="pfs60">ON</p>
<p class="pfs80">COL. NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.</p>

<hr class="r30">

<p class="pfs80">‘Now there are two of them; and one has been called <em>Crawley</em>, and the
other is <em>Honest Iago</em>.’—<span class="smcap">Old Play.</span></p>

<p class="noindent">This article is the third of its family, and like its predecessors
is only remarkable for malignant imbecility and
systematic violation of truth. The malice is apparent to
all; it remains to show the imbecility and falseness.</p>

<p>The writer complains of my ill-breeding, and with that
valour which belongs to the <i lang="la">incognito</i> menaces me with his
literary vengeance for my former comments. His vengeance!
Bah! The ass’ ears peep too far beyond the
lion’s hide. He shall now learn that I always adapt my
manners to the level of the person I am addressing; and
though his petty industry indicates a mind utterly incapable
of taking an enlarged view of any subject he shall feel
that chastisement awaits his malevolence. And first with
respect to the small sketches in my work which he pronounces
to be the very worst <em>plans</em> possible. It is expressly
stated on the face of each that they are only ‘<em>Explanatory
Sketches</em>,’ his observations therefore are a mere ebullition
of contemptible spleen; but I will now show my readers
why they are only sketches and not accurate plans.</p>

<p>When I first commenced my work, amongst the many
persons from whom I sought information was sir George
Murray, and this in consequence of a message from him,
delivered to me by sir John Colborne, to the effect, that if
I would call upon him he would answer any question I put
to him on the subject of the Peninsular War. The interview
took place, but sir George Murray, far from giving me
information seemed intent upon persuading me to abandon
my design; repeating continually that it was his intention to
write the History of the War himself. He appeared also<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lvi"></a>[lvi]</span>
desirous of learning what sources of information I had
access to. I took occasion to tell him that the duke of
Wellington had desired me to ask him particularly for the
‘<em>Order of Movements</em>,’ as essentially necessary to a right
understanding of the campaign and the saving of trouble;
because otherwise I should have to search out the different
movements through a variety of documents. Sir George
replied that he knew of no such orders, that he did not
understand me. To this I could only reply that I spoke as
the duke had desired me, and knew no more.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> I then
asked his permission to have reduced plans made from
captain Mitchell’s fine drawings, informing him that officer
was desirous so to assist me. His reply was uncourteously
vehement—‘No! certainly not!’ I proposed to be allowed
to inspect those drawings if I were at any time at a loss
about ground. The answer was still ‘No!’ And as sir
George then intimated to me that my work could only be a
momentary affair for the booksellers and would not require
plans I took my leave. I afterwards discovered that he
had immediately caused captain Mitchell’s drawings to be
locked up and sealed.</p>

<p>I afterwards waited on sir Willoughby Gordon, the
quarter-master-general, who treated me with great kindness,
and sent me to the chief of the plan department in
his office with an order to have access to everything which
might be useful. From that officer I received every attention;
but he told me that sir George Murray had been
there the day before to borrow all the best plans relating
to the Peninsular War, and that consequently little help
could be given to me. Now Captain Mitchell’s drawings
were made by him after the war, by order of the government,
and at the public expense. He remained in the
Peninsula for more than two years with pay as a staff-officer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lvii"></a>[lvii]</span>
his extra expenses were also paid:<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> he was attended
constantly by two Spanish dragoons as a protection and the
whole mission was costly. Never was money better laid
out, for I believe no topographical drawings, whether they
be considered for accuracy of detail, perfection of manner,
or beauty of execution, ever exceeded Mitchell’s. But
those drawings belong to the public and were merely
placed in sir George Murray’s official keeping. I believe
they are still in his possession and it would be well if
some member of parliament were to ask why they are thus
made the property of a private man?<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p>

<p>Here I cannot refrain from observing that, in the course
of my labours, I have asked information of many persons
of various nations, even of Spaniards, after my first
volume was published, and when the unfavourable view I
took of their exertions was known. And from Spaniards,
Portuguese, English, French, and Germans, whether of
high or low rank, I have invariably met with the greatest
kindness, and found an eager desire to aid me. Sir George
Murray only has thrown obstacles in my way; and if I am
rightly informed of the following circumstance, his opposition
has not been confined to what I have stated above.
Mr. Murray, the bookseller, purchased my first volume
with the right of refusal for the second volume. When the
latter was nearly ready a friend informed me that he did
not think Murray would purchase, because he had heard
him say that sir George Murray had declared it was not
‘<em>The Book</em>.’ He did not point out any particular error;
but it was not ‘<em>The Book</em>;’ meaning doubtless that his
own production, when it appeared, would be ‘<em>The Book</em>.’
My friend’s prognostic was good. I was offered just half
of the sum given for the first volume. I declined it, and
published on my own account; and certainly I have
had no reason to regret that Mr. Murray waited for
‘<em>The Book</em>:’ indeed he has since told me very frankly that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lviii"></a>[lviii]</span>
he had mistaken his own interest. Now whether three
articles in ‘The Quarterly,’ and a promise of more,<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> be a
tribute paid to the importance of ‘<em>My Book</em>,’ or whether
they be the puff preliminary to ‘<em>The Book</em>,’ I know not;
but I am equally bound to Mr. Editor Lockhart for the
distinction, and only wish he had not hired such a stumbling
sore-backed hackney for the work. Quitting this
digression, I return to the Review.</p>

<p>My topographical ignorance is a favourite point with the
writer, and he mentions three remarkable examples on the
present occasion:—1. That I have said Oporto is built in
a hollow; 2. That I have placed the Barca de Avintas
only three miles from the Serra Convent, instead of nine
miles; 3. That I have described a ridge of land near
Medellin where no such ridge exists.</p>

<p>These assertions are all hazarded in the hope that they
will pass current with those who know no better, and will
be unnoticed by those who do. But first a town may be
<em>on</em> a hill and yet <em>in</em> a hollow. If the reader will look at
lieutenant Godwin’s Atlas,<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> or at Gage’s Plan of Oporto,
or at Avlis’ Plan of that city—all three published by
Mr. Wylde of Charing Cross—he will find that Oporto,
which by the way is situated very much like the hot-wells
at Bristol, is built partly on the slopes of certain heights
partly on the banks of the river; that it is surrounded on
every side by superior heights; and that consequently my
description of it, having relation to the Bishop’s lines
of defence and the attack of the French army, is militarily
correct. Again, if the reader will take his compasses and
any or all of the three maps above-mentioned, he will find
that the Barca de Avintas is, as I have said, just three
miles from the Serra Convent, and not nine miles as the
reviewer asserts. Lord Wellington’s despatch called it four
miles <em>from Oporto</em>, but there is a bend in the river which
makes the distance greater on that side.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lix"></a>[lix]</span></p>

<p>Such being the accuracy of this very correct topographical
critic upon two or three examples, let us see how he
stands with respect to the third.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from marshal Victors Official Report and Register
of the Battle of Medellin.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Medellin is situated upon the left bank of the Guadiana. To
arrive there, a handsome stone-bridge is passed. On the left of
the town is a very high hill (<i lang="fr">mamelon tres elévé</i>), which commands
all the plain; on the right is a ridge or steppe (<i lang="fr">rideau</i>),
which <em>forms the basin of the Guadiana</em>. Two roads or openings
(<i lang="fr">débouchés</i>) present themselves on quitting Medellin; the one
conducts to Mingrabil, the other to Don Benito. They traverse
a vast plain, bounded by a ridge (<i lang="fr">rideau</i>), which, from the right
of the Ortigosa, is prolonged in the direction of Don Benito, and
Villa Neuva de la Serena.’... ‘The ridge which confines
the plain of Medellin has many rises and falls (<i lang="fr">movemens de
terrain</i>) more or less apparent. <em>It completely commands (domine
parfaitement) the valley of the Guadiana</em>; and it was
at the foot of this ridge the enemy’s cavalry was posted. Not an
infantry man was to be seen; but the presence of the cavalry
made us believe that the enemy’s army was <em>masked behind this
ridge</em> of Don Benito.’... ‘Favoured by <em>this ridge</em>, <em>he
could manœuvre his troops</em>, and carry them upon any point of
the line he pleased <em>without being seen by us</em>.’</p>
</div>

<p>Now ‘<i lang="fr">rideau</i>’ can only be rendered, with respect to
ground, a <em>steppe</em> or a <em>ridge</em>; but, in this case, it could not
mean a <em>steppe</em>, since the Spanish army was hidden <em>behind
it</em>, and on a steppe it would have been seen. Again, it
must have been a <em>high ridge</em>, because it not only <em>perfectly
commanded the basin</em> of the Guadiana, overlooking the
<em>steppe</em> which formed that basin, but was itself not overlooked
by the very high hill on the left of Medellin. What
is my description of the ground?—‘The plain on the side
of Don Benito was bounded by <em>a high ridge of land</em>, mark,
reader, not a mountain ridge, behind which Cuesta kept
the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry
and guns in advance.’ Here then we have another measure
of value for the reviewer’s topographical pretensions.</p>

<p>The reference to French military reports and registers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lx"></a>[lx]</span>
has not been so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer;
and yet he rests the main part of his criticisms upon such
documents. Thus, having got hold of the divisional register
of general Heudelet, which register was taken, very
much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto, he is
so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles
over it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in
my possession the general report and register of Soult’s
army, which enables me to show what a very little callow
bird his treasure is. And first, as he accuses <em>me</em> of painting
the wretched state of Soult’s army at St. Jago, previous
to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of giving
a false colouring to the campaign, I will extract Soult’s
own account, and the account of <i lang="fr">Le Noble</i>, historian of the
campaign, and <i lang="fr">ordonnateur en chef</i> or comptroller of the
civil administration of the army.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s Official Journal of the Expedition to
Portugal, dated Lugo, 30th May, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most
difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be surmounted,
the <em>shattered and exhausted state</em> (“<span lang="fr">delabrement et epuisement</span>”)
of the “<i lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>,” and the insufficiency of the means of
which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it was necessary
to obey.’... ‘The march was directed upon St.
Jago, where the troops took the first repose it had been possible
to give them since they quitted the Carion River in Castile.’...
‘Marshal Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed
some shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the
horses shod; the parc which since the Carion had not been seen
now came up, and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared
at Coruña), together with various detachments that the
previous hardships and the exhaustion of the men had caused to
remain behind. He would have prolonged his stay until the end
of February because he could not hide from himself that his
troops had the most urgent need of it; but his operations were
connected with the duke of Belluno’s, &amp;c. &amp;c., and he thought it
his duty to go on without regard to time or difficulties.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Le Noble’s History.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The army was without money, without provision, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxi"></a>[lxi]</span>
clothing, without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to
the latter, not even ordinarily complete, when they should have
been doubled to profit from the feeble resources of the country.’</p>
</div>

<p>Who now is the false colourist? But what can be expected
from a writer so shameless in his statements as this
reviewer? Let the reader look to the effrontery with which
he asserts that I have <em>celebrated marshal Soult</em> for the
reduction of two fortresses, Ferrol and Coruña, which were
not even defended, whereas my whole passage is a censure
upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and without
one word of praise towards the French marshal.</p>

<p>To return to general Heudelet’s register. The first notable
discovery from this document is, that it makes no mention
of an action described by me as happening on the 17th
of February at Ribadavia; and therefore the reviewer says
no such action happened, though I have been so particular
as to mention the strength of the Spaniards’ position, their
probable numbers, and the curious fact that twenty priests
were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he
contradicts. Now this is only the old story of ‘<em>the big
book which contains all that sir George does not know</em>.’
For, first, Heudelet’s register, being only divisional, would
not, as a matter of course, take notice of an action in which
other troops were also engaged, and where the commander-in-chief
was present. But that the action did take place, as I
have described it, and on the 17th February, the following
extracts will prove, and also the futility of the reviewer’s
other objections. And I request the reader, both now and
always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the
work itself, and not trust the garbled extracts of the reviewer,
or he will have a very false notion of my meaning.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s General Report.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist,
and the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the
approach of La Romana’s corps, organized itself in the province of
Orense.</p>

<p>‘The insurrection of the province of Orense, directed by the
monks and by officers, became each day more enterprising, and
extended itself to the quarters of general La Houssaye at Salvaterra.
<em>It was said the corps of Romana was at Orense</em> (on disait<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxii"></a>[lxii]</span>
le corps de Romana à Orense), and his advanced guard at
Ribadavia.</p>

<p>‘The 16th of February the troops commenced their march
upon Ribadavia.</p>

<p>‘The left column, under general Heudelet, found the route
intercepted by barricades on the bridges between Franquiera and
Canizar; and defended besides by a party of insurgents eight
hundred strong. The brigade Graindorge, arriving in the night,
overthrew them <em>in the morning of the 17th</em>, and pursued them
to the heights of Ribadavia, where they united themselves with a
body <em>far more numerous</em>. General Heudelet having come up
with the rest of his division, and being sustained by Maransin’s
brigade of dragoons, overthrew the enemy and killed many.
<em>Twenty monks at the least perished, and the town was entered
fighting.</em></p>

<p>‘The 18th, general Heudelet scoured all the valley of the Avia,
where <em>three or four thousand insurgents had thrown themselves</em>,
Maransin followed the route of Rosamunde chasing all that was
before him.’</p>
</div>

<p>The reviewer further says that, with my habitual inaccuracy
as to dates, I have concentrated all Soult’s division
at Orense on the 20th. But Soult himself says,
‘The 19th, Franceschi and Heudelet marched upon Orense,
and seized the bridge. <em>The 20th, the other divisions followed
the movement upon Orense.</em>’ Here then, besides increasing
the bulk of the book, containing what sir George
<em>does not know</em>, the reviewer has only proved his own habitual
want of truth.</p>

<p>In the above extracts nothing is said of the ‘<em>eight or
ten thousand</em> Spaniards;’ nothing of the ‘<em>strong rugged
hill</em>’ on which they were posted; nothing of ‘<em>Soult’s
presence in the action</em>.’ But the reader will find all these
particulars in the Appendix to the ‘<span lang="fr">Victoires et Conquêtes
des Français</span>,’ and in ‘Le Noble’s History of Soult’s Campaign.’
The writers in each work were present, and the
latter, notwithstanding the reviewer’s sneers, and what is
of more consequence, notwithstanding many serious errors
as to the projects and numbers of his enemies, is highly
esteemed by his countrymen, and therefore good authority
for those operations on his own side which he witnessed.
Well, Le Noble says there were 15,000 or 20,000 insurgents<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxiii"></a>[lxiii]</span>
and some regular troops in position, and he describes
that position as very rugged and strong, which I
can confirm, having marched over it only a few weeks
before. Nevertheless, as this estimate was not borne out
by Soult’s report, I set the Spaniards down at 8,000 or
10,000, grounding my estimate on the following data:
1st. Soult says that 800 men fell back on a body <em>far more
numerous</em>. 2d. It required a considerable body of troops
and several combinations to dislodge them from an extensive
position. 3d. <em>‘Three or four thousand fugitives went
off by one road only.’</em> Finally, the expression <em>eight or ten
thousand</em> showed that I had doubts.</p>

<p>Let us proceed with Heudelet’s register. In my history
it is said that Soult softened the people’s feelings by kindness
and by enforcing strict discipline. To disprove this
the reviewer quotes, from Heudelet’s register, statements
of certain excesses, committed principally by the light
cavalry, and while in actual pursuit of the enemy—excesses,
however, which he admits that count Heudelet
blamed and rigorously repressed, thus proving the truth
of my statement instead of his own, for verily the slow-worm
is strong within him. Yet I will not rely upon this
curious stupidity of the reviewer. I will give absolute
authority for the fact that Soult succeeded in soothing the
people’s feelings, begging the reader to observe that both
Heudelet and my history speak of Soult’s stay at Orense
immediately after the action at Ribadavia.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s General Report.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘At this period the <em>prisoners of Romana’s corps</em> (note, the
reviewer says none of Romana’s corps were there) had all demanded
to take the oath of fidelity, and to serve king Joseph.
The Spanish general himself was far off (<i lang="fr">fort éloigné</i>). The
inhabitants of the province of Orense were returning to their
houses, breaking their arms, and cursing the excitement and the
revolt which Romana had fomented. The priests even encouraged
their submission, and offered themselves as sureties. These circumstances
appeared favourable for the invasion of Portugal.’</p>
</div>

<p>Animated by a disgraceful anxiety which has always
distinguished the Quarterly Review to pander to the bad
feelings of mankind by making the vituperation of an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxiv"></a>[lxiv]</span>
enemy the test of patriotism, this critic accuses me of an
unnatural bias, and an inclination to do injustice to the
Spaniards, because I have not made the report of some
outrages, committed by Soult’s cavalry, the ground of a
false and infamous charge against the whole French army
and French nation. Those outrages he admits himself
were vigorously repressed, and they were committed by
troops in a country where all the inhabitants were in arms,
where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by
torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived
from day to day on what they could take in the country.
I shall now put this sort of logic to a severe test, and
leave the Reviewer’s patriots to settle the matter as they
can. That is, I shall give from lord Wellington’s despatches,
through a series of years, extracts touching the
conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula,
where they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated,
tortured, and assassinated, but well provided and
kindly treated.</p>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir A. Wellesley to Mr. Villiers.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p><em>Extract, May 1, 1809.</em>—‘I have long been of opinion that a
British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have
had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its
branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army.
They have plundered the country most terribly.’—‘They have
plundered the people of bullocks, amongst other property, for
what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand
is their practice, to sell them to the people again.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, May 31, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot
bear success more than sir John Moore’s army could bear failure.
I am endeavouring to tame them but if I should not succeed I
shall make an official complaint of them and send one or two
corps home in disgrace; they plunder in all directions.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, June 13, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded;
it is probable that all three have been put to death by the peasantry
of Martede; I am sorry to say that from the conduct of
the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants
may have had some provocation for their animosity against
the soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and the general, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxv"></a>[lxv]</span>
these effects of their animosity must be discouraged and even
punished, otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the peasantry
of the country in general as well as to the army.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to colonel Donkin, June, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the
greatest pain, I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters
of the disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of
the —— and —— regiments.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages
committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight
of their officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the
commanding officers of the regiments and the general officers
of the army, that outrages are not committed.’... ‘Not a post or
a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the
army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by
the soldiers who have been left behind on the march. <em>There is
not an outrage of any description which has not been committed
on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers
who never yet for one moment</em> suffered the slightest want
or the smallest privation.’... ‘It is most difficult to convict any
prisoner before a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to say that
soldiers have little regard to the oath administered to them; and
the officers who are sworn, “well and truly to try and determine
<em>according to evidence</em>, the matter before them,” have too much
regard to the strict letter of that administered to them.’...
‘There ought to be in the British army a regular provost establishment.’...
‘All the foreign armies have such an establishment.
The French <i lang="fr">gendarmerie nationale</i> to the amount of forty or fifty
with each corps. The Spaniards have their police militia to a still
larger amount. <em>While we who require such an aid more, I
am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe</em>, have nothing
of the kind.’</p>

<p>‘We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies
must depend upon the diligence of regimental officers, particularly
subalterns. I may order what I please, but if they do not execute
what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect
that British soldiers will be orderly or regular.’... ‘I believe I
should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this description
of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be
tried by others probably guilty of the same offence,’... ‘We are
an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, <em>but we are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxvi"></a>[lxvi]</span>
worse than an enemy in a country</em>, and take my word for it that
either defeat or success would dissolve us.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, July, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of
criminal outrages of British officers and soldiers.’... ‘As matters
are now conducted, the government and myself stand complimenting
each other while no notice is taken of the murderer.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur to lord Wellesley, August, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers
lose their discipline and spirit; they plunder even in the presence
of their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as
bad as the men.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, September, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct
of detachments, they are only a repetition of others which I receive
every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal and I can only
lament my inability to apply any remedy. In the first place, our
law is not what it ought to be and I cannot prevail upon Government
even to look at a remedy; secondly, our military courts
having been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military
discipline, and with the same wisdom which has marked all our
proceedings of late years we have obliged the officers to swear to
decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we have
obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath, the witnesses
being in almost every instance common soldiers whose
conduct this tribunal was constituted to controul; <em>the consequence
is, that perjury is almost as common an offence as drunkenness
and plunder</em>.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, January, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I am concerned to tell you, that notwithstanding the pains
taken by the general and other officers of the army the conduct of
the soldiers is infamous.’... ‘At this moment there are three
general courts-martial sitting in Portugal for the trial of soldiers
guilty of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been
killed by them since we returned to Portugal), robberies, thefts,
robbing convoys under their charge, &amp;c. &amp;c. Perjury is as common
as robbery and murder.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to the adjutant-general of the forces, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘It is proper I should inform the commander-in-chief that desertion
is not the only crime of which the soldiers of the army
have been guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom
marches, particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxvii"></a>[lxvii]</span>
officer (which rarely happens,) that a murder or a highway
robbery, or some act of outrage, is not committed by the
British soldiers composing it: they have killed eight people since
the army returned to Portugal.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Several soldiers have lately been convicted before a general
court-martial and have been executed.’... ‘I am still apprehensive
of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation
before the enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder
or wine is within reach.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to sir S. Cotton, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I have read complaints from different quarters of the conduct
of the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country.’...
‘It has gone so far, that they (the people) have inquired whether
they might kill the Germans in our service as well as in the service
of the French.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, May, 1812.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so
<em>enormous</em>, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the
people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so
injurious to the army itself, that I request your Lordship’s early
attention to the subject.’</p>
</div>

<p>Many more extracts I could give, but let us now see
what was the conduct of the French towards men who did
not murder and mutilate prisoners:—</p>


<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, August, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have
always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made
prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous
instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I
have had for this conduct has been, that they might treat our officers
and soldiers well who might fall into their hands; and I must
do the French the justice to say that they have been universally
well treated, and in recent instances <em>the wounded prisoners of
the British army have been taken care of before the wounded
of the French army</em>.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to admiral Berkeley, October, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners
whom they take from us and <ins class="corr" id="tn-lxvii" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the Portuguse treat'">
the Portuguese treat</ins> their prisoners
exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer an
arrangement, by which prisoners who have once come into the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxviii"></a>[lxviii]</span>
hands of the provost marshal of the British army should avoid
falling under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government.’</p>
</div>

<p>Having thus displayed the conduct of the British
army, as described by its own general through a series of
years; and having also from the same authority, shown
the humane treatment English officers and soldiers, when
they happened to be made prisoners, experienced from the
French, I demand of any man with a particle of honour,
truth or conscience in his composition,—of any man,
in fine, who is not at once knave and fool, whether these
outrages perpetrated by British troops upon a friendly
people can be suppressed, and the outrages of French
soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged upon with
justice? Whether it is right and decent to impute relentless
ferocity, atrocious villainy, to the whole French
army, and stigmatize the whole French nation for the excesses
of some bad soldiers, prating at the same time of
the virtue of England and the excellent conduct of her
troops; and this too in the face of Wellington’s testimony
to the kindness with which they treated our men, and in
the face also of his express declaration (see letter to lord
Wellesley, 26th January, 1811), that the majority of the
French soldiers were ‘<em>sober, well disposed, amenable to
order, and in some degree educated</em>.’ But what intolerable
injustice it would be to stigmatise either nation for military
excesses which are common to all armies and to all wars;
and when I know that the general characteristic of the
British and French troops alike, is generosity, bravery, humanity,
and honour.</p>

<p>And am I to be accused of an unnatural bias against the
Spaniards because I do not laud them for running away in
battle; because I do not express my admiration of their
honour in assassinating men whom they dared not face in
fight; because I do not commend their humanity for mutilating,
torturing, and murdering their prisoners. I have
indeed heard of a British staff-officer, high in rank, who,
after the battle of Talavera, looked on with apparent satisfaction
at a Spaniard beating a wounded Frenchman’s
brains out with a stone, and even sneered at the indignant
emotion and instant interference of my informant. Such<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxix"></a>[lxix]</span>
an adventure I have heard of, yet there are few such cold-blooded
men in the British army. But what have I said to
the disparagement of the Spaniards in my history without
sustaining it by irrefragable testimony? Nothing, absolutely
nothing! I have quoted the deliberate judgment of
every person of note, French and English, who had to deal
with them; nay, I have in some instances supported my
opinion by the declaration even of Spanish generals. I
have brought forward the testimony of sir Hew Dalrymple,
of sir John Moore, of sir John Craddock, of Mr. Stuart, of
Mr. Frere, of general Graham, of lord William Bentinck,
of sir Edward Pellew, of lord Collingwood, of sir Edward
Codrington, and of Mr. Sydenham, and a crowd of officers
of inferior rank. Lastly, I have produced the testimony
of the duke of Wellington; and I will now add more
proofs that his opinion of the Spanish character coincides
with that expressed in my history.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration.’...
‘That is the frequent, I ought to say constant and
shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy:
we in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have
heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and twenty actions of
the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo.’... ‘In
the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very
trifling exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away
their arms and ran off <em>in my presence</em> when they were neither
attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe
by their own fire.’... ‘I have found, upon inquiry, and from
experience, the instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish
troops to be so numerous and those of their good behaviour to be
so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to
be depended upon.’</p>

<p>‘The Spanish cavalry are I believe nearly entirely without
discipline; they are in general well clothed armed and accoutred,
and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition;
but I never heard anybody pretend that in one instance
they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an
enemy.’... ‘In respect to that great body of all armies—I
mean the infantry—it is lamentable to see how bad that of the
Spaniards is.’... ‘It is said that sometimes they behave well;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxx"></a>[lxx]</span>
though I acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise
than ill.’... ‘Nothing can be worse than the officers of the
Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has
devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures it has
adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in
any one branch of the military profession by any individual.’...
‘I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be done,
with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state
of nature.’</p>

<p>‘The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline,
bravery or arrangement to carry on the contest.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards
are of a disposition too sanguine; they have invariably expected
only success in objects for the attainment of which they had
adopted no measures; they have never looked to or prepared for
a lengthened contest; and all those, or nearly all who have had
anything to do with them, have imbibed the same spirit and the
same sentiments.’</p>

<p>‘Those who see the difficulties attending all communications
with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence
can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon
us for everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as
I have I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this
country.’</p>

<p>‘The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout
the war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid
plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to
the enemy by which their situation might be gradually improved.
The leading people amongst them have invariably deceived the
lower orders; and instead of making them acquainted with their
real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and
sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have
amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary
plans of offensive operations which those who offer them
for consideration know that they have not the means of executing,
and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by
some unlooked-for good. The consequence is, that no event is
provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people
will at last become fatigued with the succession of their disasters
which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would
have prevented.’</p>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxi"></a>[lxxi]</span></p>


<p class="right"><em>Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I
enclose you a report which sir William Beresford has received
from general Madden the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese
cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not
one word in this letter that is not true. <em>Yet these are the soldiers
who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!</em></p>

<p>‘There is no remedy for these evils excepting a vigorous system
of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other
can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in which
discipline can be established. <em>It is nonsense to talk of rooting
out the French, or of carrying on the war in any other
manner.</em> Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the Guerillas
and by the Spanish armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining
the French armies, are calculated, it will be obvious that
it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or
100,000 regular troops in the field.</p>

<p>‘But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to
produce an effect at a future period. <em>Their courage, and even
their activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon
them by the necessity of their circumstances and is never a
matter of choice nor of foresight.</em>’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Wellington to lord Wellesley, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army
either amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted
(as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either.
It has in my opinion been the cause of the <em>dastardly conduct</em>
which we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and
<em>they have become odious to the country</em>. <em>The peaceable inhabitants,
much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost
wish for the establishment of Joseph’s government to be protected
from the outrages of their own troops.</em>’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, Dec. 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet.
It is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having
been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained
no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should
now be depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon
having one or two, more or less, British regiments;
and that after having been shut in for ten months, they
have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding
the repeated remonstrances of general Graham and
the British officers on the danger of omitting them.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxii"></a>[lxxii]</span></p>

<p>‘The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as
great a degree as the other authorities—<em>that is, boasting of the
strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously
convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down
quietly and indulging their national indolence</em>.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Wellington to general Graham, 1811.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition
(Barrosa) <em>is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be</em>.
They march the troops night and day without provisions or rest,
and abuse everybody who proposes a moment’s delay to afford
either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the
enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or
to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus,
when the moment of action arrives they are totally incapable of
movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and
afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported,
exertions to which human nature is not equal.’<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p>
</div>

<p>So much for Wellington’s opinion of the Spanish soldiers
and statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish
generals:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>1809. ‘Although the Duque de Albuquerque is <i lang="fr">proné</i> by many,
amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out.
I think the marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the
Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is
certainly a sensible man and has seen much of the world.’</p>
</div>

<p>Now reader, the following is the character given to
Romana in my history; compare it with the above:—</p>

<p>‘Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information,
but disqualified by nature for military command.’
And again, speaking of his death, I say, ‘He was a
worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in
military talent. His death was a great loss.’ If the expressions
are more positive than Wellington’s, it is because
this was the duke’s first notion of the marquis; he was
more positive afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown
to him, and after circumstances known to him,
gave me a right to be more decided. The following additional<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxiii"></a>[lxxiii]</span>
proofs, joined to those already given in my former
reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one
of his letters, says, ‘<em>I am sorry to find that Romana is a
shuffler</em>.’ And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about
the same period to general Doyle to urge the advance
of Palafox and Infantado, says, ‘<em>I know that Romana
has not supported the British as he ought to have done,
and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported
it with a tolerably efficient force</em>.’</p>

<p>In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham,
expressing lord Wellington’s opinions, after saying that
Wellington declared he had never met with a really able
man in Spain, while in Portugal he had found several,
proceeds thus—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘It is indeed clear to any person who is acquainted with the
present state of Spain, that <em>the Spaniards are incapable of
forming either a good government or a good army</em>.’...
‘With respect to the army there are certainly in Spain abundant
materials for good common soldiers. But where is one general
of even moderate skill and talents? I know nothing of Lacy and
Sarzfield, but assuredly a good general is not to be found amongst
Castaños, Ballesteros, Palacios, Mendizabal, Santocildes, Abadia,
Duque del Parque, La Pena, Elio, Mahy, or Joseph O’Donnel.’...
‘<em>You cannot make good officers in Spain.</em>’</p>
</div>

<p>If to this the reader will add what I have set forth
in my history about Vives, Imas, Contreras, Campo Verde,
Cuesta, and Areyasaga, and that he is not yet satisfied,
I can still administer to his craving. In 1809 Wellington
speaks with dread of ‘<em>Romana’s cormorants flying into
Portugal</em>,’ and says, ‘that <em>foolish fellow the Duque del
Parque</em> has been endeavouring to get his corps destroyed
on the frontier.’ Again—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The Duque del Parque has advanced, because, whatever may
be the consequences, the Spaniards always think it necessary to
advance when their front is clear of an enemy.’</p>

<p>‘There never was anything like the <em>madness</em>, the <em>imprudence</em>,
and the <em>presumption</em> of the <em>Spanish officers</em> in the way they risk
their corps, knowing that the <em>national vanity</em> will prevent them
from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that if
attacked they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxiv"></a>[lxxiv]</span>
chance of safety for the Duque del Parque’s corps; but instead
of making it he calls upon you for cavalry.’... ‘I have
ordered magazines to be prepared on the Douro and Mondego
to assist in providing <em>these vagabonds</em> if they should retire into
Portugal, which I hope they will do as their only chance of salvation.’</p>
</div>

<p>Again in 1811, defending himself from an accusation,
made by the Spaniards, that he had caused the loss of
Valencia, he says, ‘the misfortunes of Valencia are to be
attributed to <em>Blake’s ignorance of his profession and to
Mahy’s cowardice and treachery</em>.’</p>

<p>Now if any passage in my history can be pointed out
more disparaging to the Spaniards than the expressions of
lord Wellington and the other persons quoted above, I
am content to be charged with an ‘unnatural bias’ against
that people. But if this cannot be done, it is clear that
the reviewer has proved, not my unnatural bias to the
French but his own natural bias to calumny. He has
indeed a wonderful aversion to truth, for close under his
eye, in my second volume which he was then reviewing,
was the following passage; and there are many of a like
tendency in my work relative to the Spaniards which he
leaves unnoticed.</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Under such a system it was impossible that the peasantry
could be rendered energetic soldiers, and they certainly were not
active supporters of their country’s cause; but <em>with a wonderful
constancy they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness,
nakedness and famine with patience, and displaying in all
their actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful
national character</em>. <em>This constancy and the iniquity of
the usurpation, hallowed their efforts in despite of their ferocity
and merits respect</em>, though the vices and folly of the juntas
and the leading men rendered the effects nugatory.’—<cite>History</cite>,
vol. ii. chap. 1.</p>
</div>

<p>I would stop here, but the interests of truth and justice,
and the interests of society require that I should thoroughly
expose this reviewer. Let the reader therefore
mark his reasoning upon Soult’s government of Oporto
and the intrigue of the <em>Anti-Braganza</em> party. Let him
however look first at the whole statement of these matters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxv"></a>[lxxv]</span>
in <em>my book</em>, and not trust the garbled extracts made by
the reviewer. Let him observe how Heudelet’s expedition
to Tuy is by this shameless writer, at one time made to
appear as if it took place <em>after</em> Soult had received the deputations
and addresses calling for a change of dynasty;
and this to show that no beneficial effect had been produced
in the temper of the people, as I had asserted, and
of which I shall presently give ample proof. How at
another time this same expedition of Heudelet is used as
happening <em>before</em> the arrival of the addresses and deputations,
with a view to show that Soult had laboured to
procure those addresses, a fact which, far from denying,
I had carefully noticed. Let him mark how an expression
in my history, namely, that Soult was <em>unprepared</em> for one
effect of his own vigorous conduct, has been perverted,
for the purpose of deceit; and all this with a spirit at once
so malignant and stupid, that the reviewer is unable to
see that the garbled extracts he gives from Heudelet’s and
Riccard’s Registers, not only do not contradict but absolutely
confirm the essential point of my statement.</p>

<p>Certainly Soult was not unprepared for the submission
of the Portuguese to the French arms because it was the
object and bent of his invasion to make them so submit.
But there is a great difference between that submission of
which Heudelet and Riccard speak, and the proposal
coming from the Portuguese for the establishment of a
<em>new and independent dynasty</em>; a still greater difference
between that and <em>offering the crown to Soult himself</em>; and
it was this last which the word <em>unprepared</em> referred to in
my history. So far from thinking or saying that Soult
was unprepared for the deputations and addresses, I have
expressly said, that he ‘<em>encouraged the design</em>,’ that he
‘<em>acted with great dexterity</em>,’ and I called the whole affair
an ‘<em>intrigue</em>.’ But if I had said that he was unprepared
for the whole affair it would have been correct in one
sense. He was unprepared to accede to the extent of the
<em>Anti-Braganza</em> party’s views. He had only received
authority from his sovereign to conquer Portugal, not to
establish a new and independent dynasty, placing a French
prince upon the throne; still less to accept that throne for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxvi"></a>[lxxvi]</span>
himself. These were dangerous matters to meddle with
under such a monarch as Napoleon; but the weakness of
Soult’s military position made it absolutely necessary to
catch at every aid, and it would have been a proof that
the duke of Dalmatia was only a common man and unsuited
for the great affairs confided to his charge if he
had rejected such a powerful auxiliary to his military
operations: wisely, therefore, and even magnanimously did
he encourage the <em>Anti-Braganza</em> party, drawing all the
military benefit possible from it, and trusting to Napoleon’s
sagacity and grandeur of soul for his justification.
Nor was he mistaken in either. Yet I am ready to admit
that all this must appear very strange to Quarterly Reviewers
and parasites, whose knowledge of the human
mind is confined to an accurate measure of the sentiments
of patrons, rich and powerful, but equally with themselves
incapable of true greatness and therefore always
ready to ridicule it.</p>

<p>The facts then stand thus. Heudelet’s expedition through
the <i lang="pt">Entre Minho e Douro</i> took place between the 5th of
April and the 27th of that month, and the country people
being then in a state of exasperation opposed him vehemently;
in my history the combats he sustained are mentioned,
and it is said that previous to the <em>Anti-Braganza</em>
intrigue the horrible warfare of assassinations had been
carried on with infinite activity. But the intrigue of the
malcontents was not completed until the end of April,
and the good effect of it on the military operations was not
apparent until May, consequently could not have been felt
by Heudelet in the beginning of April. In my history the
difference of time in these two affairs is expressly marked,
inasmuch as I say that in treating of the intrigue I have
anticipated the chronological order of events. Truly if
Mr. Lockhart has paid for this part of the Review as criticism
Mr. Murray should disallow the unfair charge in his
accounts.</p>

<p>I shall now give two extracts from Soult’s general report,
before quoted, in confimation of my statements:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Marshal Soult was led by necessity to favour the party of the
malcontents, which he found already formed in Portugal when he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxvii"></a>[lxxvii]</span>
arrived. He encouraged them, and soon that party thought itself
strong enough in the province of <i lang="pt">Entre Minho e Douro</i>, to propose
to the marshal to approve of the people declaring for the deposition
of the house of Braganza, and that the emperor of the French
should be asked to name a prince of his family to reign in Portugal.
In a political view, marshal Soult could not without express
authority, permit such a proceeding, and he could not ask for such
authority having lost his own communication with France, and
being without news of the operations of any of the other corps
which were to aid him; but considered in a military point of view
the proposition took another character. Marshal Soult there saw
the means of escaping from his embarrassments, and he seized
them eagerly, certain that whatever irregularity there was in his
proceedings ultimate justice would be done to him.’</p>

<p>‘These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity
was re-established, and the confidence was such, that in the province
(Entre Minho e Douro) all the inhabitants returned to their
labours, supplied the markets and familiarized themselves with the
idea of an approaching change.’... ‘Marshal Soult received numerous
deputations of the clergy to thank him for the attentions
he paid them, and for the order which he had restored. Before
this no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and
killed. The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful
to God to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated
the most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell
into their hands.’</p>
</div>

<p>It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to
continue thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore,
neglecting his farrago about the principles of war,
and his application of them to show how I am wrong in
my statement, that, in a <em>strategic point of view it was better
to attack Victor, but that especial circumstances</em> led sir
Arthur to fall upon Soult, I hold it sufficient to place
sir Arthur’s own statement before the reader and leave
him to compare it with mine.</p>


<p class="right">‘<em>Lisbon, April 24, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I intend to move towards Soult and attack him, if I should
be able to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes
which can give me any security for the safety of this place during
my absence to the northward.</p>

<p>‘I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more good<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxviii"></a>[lxxviii]</span>
to the general cause by combining with general Cuesta in an operation
against Victor; and I believe I should prefer the last if Soult
was not in possession of a part of this country very fertile in resources,
and of the town of Oporto, and if to concert the operations
with Cuesta would not take time which might be profitably
employed in operations against Soult. I think it probable, however,
that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego.
If he does I shall attack him. <em>If he should retire, I am
convinced that it would be most advantageous for the common
cause that we should remain upon the defensive in the north of
Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with Cuesta
against Victor.</em></p>

<p>‘An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages—if
successful it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in case
affairs should take such a turn as to enable the King’s ministers
to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the corps under
my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a distance
from the scene of operation as to render its co-operation impossible;
and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort made by
a combined and concentrated force.’</p>
</div>

<p>The assertion of the reviewer that I have underrated
Cuesta’s force, inasmuch as it was only 19,000 infantry
and 1,500 cavalry, instead of 30,000 infantry and 6,000
cavalry, as I have stated it to be, and that consequently
the greatest numbers could not be brought to bear on
Victor, is one of those curious examples of elaborate misrepresentation
in which this writer abounds. For first, admitting
that Cuesta had only 20,000 men, sir Arthur
would have brought 24,000 to aid him, and Victor had
only 30,000. The allies would then have had double
the number opposed to Soult. But the pith of the misrepresentation
lies in this, that the reviewer has taken
Cuesta’s account of his actual force on the 23d of April,
and suppresses the facts, that reinforcements were continually
pouring into him at that time, and that he actually
did advance against Victor with rather greater numbers
than those stated by me.</p>


<p class="p1 pfs80">PROOFS.</p>

<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur to lord Castlereagh, April 24, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which it is said
will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.’</p>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxix"></a>[lxxix]</span></p>


<p class="right"><em>To general Mackenzie, May 1, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘They (Victor’s troops) have in their front a Spanish army with
general Cuesta at Llerena, which army was defeated in the month
of March, and has since been reinforced to the amount of <em>twenty
thousand men</em>.’... ‘They will be attacked by Cuesta, who
is <em>receiving reinforcements</em>.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Mr. Frere to sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, May 4.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘We have here 3,000 cavalry, considered as part of the army
of Estremadura (under Cuesta). Cuesta has with him 4,000
cavalry.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June 17, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘We had every reason to believe that the French army consisted
of about 27,000, of which 7,000 were cavalry; and the combined
British and Portuguese force which I was in hopes I should
have enabled to march upon this expedition would have amounted
to about 24,000 men.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>To lord Wellesley, August 8, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The army of Cuesta, which crossed the Tagus <em>thirty-six or
thirty-eight thousand strong</em>, does not now consist of 30,000.’</p>
</div>


<p class="right"><em>Extract from a Memoir by sir A. Wellesley, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The Spanish army under General Cuesta had been <em>reinforced
with cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary
celerity after the action of Medellin</em>.’</p>
</div>

<p>All the reviewer’s remarks about Cuesta’s numbers, and
about the unfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction
of misrepresentations and objections before exposed and
refuted by me in my controversy with marshal Beresford;
but as it is now attempted to support them by garbled extracts
from better authorities, I will again and completely
expose and crush them. This will however be more conveniently
done farther on. Meanwhile I repeat, that the
Tagus is only unfordable during the winter, and not then
if there is a few days dry weather; that six months of the
year it is always fordable in many places, and as low
down as Salvaterra near Lisbon; finally, that my expression,
‘<em>a river fordable at almost every season</em>,’ is strictly
correct, and is indeed not mine but lord Wellington’s expression.
To proceed with the rest:—</p>

<p>Without offering any proof beyond his own assertion, the
reviewer charges me with having <em>exaggerated the importance
of D’Argenton’s conspiracy for the sole purpose of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxx"></a>[lxxx]</span>
excusing Soult’s remissness in guarding the Douro</em>. But
my account of that conspiracy was compiled from the
duke of Wellington’s letters—some public, some private
addressed to me; and from a narrative of the conspiracy
<ins class="corr" id="tn-lxxx" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'witten expressly'">
written expressly</ins> for my guidance by major-general sir James
Douglas, who was the officer employed to meet and conduct
D’Argenton to and from the English army;—from
Soult’s own official report; from Le Noble’s history; and
from secret information which I received from a French
officer who was himself one of the principal movers—not
of that particular conspiracy—but of a general one of
which the one at Oporto was but a branch.</p>

<p>Again, the reviewer denies that I am correct in saying,
that Soult thought Hill’s division had been disembarked
from the ocean; that he expected the vessels would come to
the mouth of the Douro; and that considering that river
secure above the town his personal attention was directed
to the line below Oporto. Let Soult and Le Noble answer
this.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s General Report.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘In the night of the 9th and 10th the enemy made a <em>considerable
disembarkation at Aveiro, and another at Ovar</em>. The 10th,
at daybreak, they attacked the right flank of general Franceschi,
while the <em>column coming from Lisbon by Coimbra</em> attacked him
in front.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Le Noble.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The house occupied by the general-in-chief was situated beyond
the town on the road to the sea. The site was very high,
and from thence he could observe the left bank of the Douro from
the convent to the sea. His orders, given on the 8th, to scour the
left bank of the river, those which he had expedited in the morning,
and the position of his troops, rendered him confident that no
passage would take place above Oporto; <em>he believed that the
enemy, master of the sea, would try a disembarkation near the
mouth of the Douro</em>.’</p>
</div>

<p>Such is the value of this carping disingenuous critic’s
observations on this point; and I shall now demolish his
other misstatements about the passage of the Douro.</p>

<p>1st. The poor barber’s share in the transaction is quite
true; my authority is major-general sir John Waters who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxi"></a>[lxxxi]</span>
was the companion of the barber in the daring exploit of
bringing over the boats. And if Waters had recollected
his name, it is not the despicable aristocratic sneer of the
reviewer about the ‘<em>Plebeian</em>’ that would have prevented
me from giving it. 2d. <em>The Barca de Avintas</em>, where
sir John Murray crossed, has already been shown by a reference
to the maps and to lord Wellington’s despatch, to
be not nine miles from the Serra Convent as the reviewer
says, but three miles as I have stated: moreover, two
Portuguese leagues would not make nine English miles.
But to quit these minor points, the reviewer asks, ‘<em>Why
colonel Napier departed from the account of the events
given in the despatch of sir Arthur Wellesley?</em>’ This is the
only decent passage in the whole review, and it shall have
a satisfactory answer.</p>

<p>Public despatches, written in the hurry of the moment,
immediately after the events and before accurate information
can be obtained, are very subject to errors of detail, and
are certainly not what a judicious historian would rely upon
for details without endeavouring to obtain other information.
In this case I discovered several discrepancies between
the despatch and the accounts of eye-witnesses and
actors written long afterwards and deliberately. I knew
also, that the passage of the Douro, though apparently a
very rash action and little considered in England, was a very
remarkable exploit, prudent skilful and daring. Anxious
to know the true secret of the success, I wrote to the duke
of Wellington, putting a variety of questions relative to the
whole expeditions. In return I received from him distinct
answers, with a small diagram of the seminary and ground
about it to render the explanation clear. Being thus put
in possession of all the leading points relative to the passage
of the Douro by the commanders on each side, for I had
before got Soult’s, I turned to the written and printed statements
of several officers engaged in the action for those
details which the generals had not touched upon.</p>

<p>Now the principal objections of the reviewer to my
statement are,—1st. That I have given too many troops
to sir John Murray. 2d. That I have unjustly accused<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxii"></a>[lxxxii]</span>
him of want of military hardihood. 3d. That I have
erroneously described the cause of the loss sustained by
the fourteenth dragoons in retiring from their charge. In
reply I quote my authorities; and first, as to the numbers
with Murray.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from lord Wellington’s answers to colonel Napier’s
questions.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘<em>The right</em> of the troops which passed over to the seminary,
which in fact made an admirable <i lang="fr">tête de pont</i>, was protected
by the passage of the Douro higher up by lieut.-general <em>sir
John Murray and the king’s German legion, supported by
other troops</em>.’</p>
</div>

<p>Armed with this authority, I did set aside the despatch,
because, though it said that Murray was <em>sent</em> with a battalion
and a squadron, it <em>did not say</em> that he was not followed
by others. And in lord Londonderry’s narrative I found
the following passage:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘General Murray, too, who had been detached with <em>his division</em>
to a ferry higher up, was fortunate enough to gain possession
of as many boats as enabled him to pass over with <em>two
battalions of Germans and two squadrons of the fourteenth
dragoons</em>.’</p>
</div>

<p>And his lordship, further on, says, that he himself
charged several times and with advantage at the head of
those squadrons. His expression is ‘<em>the dragoons from
Murray’s corps</em>.’</p>

<p>With respect to the loss of the dragoons sustained by
having to fight their way back again, I find the following
account in the narrative of sir James Douglas, written,
as I have before said, expressly for my guidance:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Young soldiers like young greyhounds run headlong on their
prey; while experience makes old dogs of all sorts run cunning.
Here <em>two squadrons</em> actually rode over the <em>whole rear French
guard</em>, which laid down upon the road; and was, to use their own
terms, <i lang="fr">passé sur le ventre</i>: but no support to the dragoons being
at hand no great execution was done; and the <em>two squadrons
themselves suffered severely in getting back again through the
infantry</em>.’</p>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxiii"></a>[lxxxiii]</span></p>

<p>Thus, even in this small matter, the reviewer is not
right. And now with the above facts fixed I shall proceed
to rebut the charge of having calumniated sir John
Murray.</p>

<p>First, the reviewers assertion, that Murray’s troops
were never within several miles of the seminary, and that
they would have been crushed by Soult if they had attacked
the enemy, is evidently false from the following
facts. Lord Wellington expressly says, in his answer to
my questions quoted before,—That the <em>right</em> of the troops
in the seminary <em>was protected</em> by the troops under Murray;
which could not be if the latter were several miles
off. Again, if the dragoons of Murray’s corps could
charge repeatedly with advantage, the infantry and guns
of that corps might have followed up the attack without
danger upon a confused, flying, panic-stricken body of
men who had been surprised and were at the same time
taken both in flank and rear. But if Murray dared not
with any prudence even approach the enemy,—if it were
absolutely necessary for him to retire as he did,—what
brought him there at all? Is the duke of Wellington a
general to throw his troops wantonly into such a situation,—and
on ground which his elevated post at the Serra
Convent enabled him to command perfectly, and where
the men and movements of both sides were as much beneath
his eye as the men and movements on a chess-board?
Bah!</p>

<p>But the fact is that a part of the Germans under Murray,
aye!—a very small part! did actually engage the
enemy with success. Major Beamish, in his ‘History of
the German Legion,’ on the authority of one of the German
officers’ journals, writes thus:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The skirmishers of the first line under lieutenant Von Hölle,
and two companies of the same regiment under ensign Hodenberg,
were alone brought into fire. The skirmishers made several
prisoners, and one rifleman (Henry Hauer) was lucky enough to
capture a French lieutenant-colonel. Seven of the legion were
wounded.’</p>
</div>

<p>Murray wanted hardihood. And it is no answer to say<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxiv"></a>[lxxxiv]</span>
lord Wellington did not take notice of his conduct. A
commander-in-chief is guided by many circumstances distinct
from the mere military facts, and it might be, that,
on this occasion he did not choose to judge rashly or
harshly a man, who had other good qualities, for an error
into which, perhaps, a very bold and able man might have
fallen by accident. And neither would I have thus judged
sir John Murray from this fact alone, although the whole
army were disgusted at the time by his want of daring
and openly expressed an unfavourable opinion of his military
vigour. But when I find that the same want of
hardihood was again apparent in him at Castalla, as I
have shown in my fifth volume, and still more glaringly
displayed by him at Taragona, as I shall show in my sixth
volume, the matter became quite different, and the duty of
the historian is to speak the truth even of a general, strange
as that may and I have no doubt does appear to this reviewer.</p>

<p>Having disposed of this matter, I shall now set down
some passages evincing the babbling shallowness and self-conceit
of the critic, and beneath them my authorities,
whereby it will appear that the big book containing all sir
George does not know is increasing in bulk:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Sir Arthur Wellesley was detained at Oporto neither by the
instructions of the English Cabinet nor by his own want of generalship,
<em>but simply by the want of provisions</em>.’—<cite>Review.</cite></p>
</div>

<p>Indeed! Reader, mark the following question to, and
answer from the duke of Wellington.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Question to the duke of Wellington by colonel Napier.</em></p>

<p>Why did the duke halt the next day after the passage
of the Douro?</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p><em>Answer.</em>—‘The halt was made next day,—first, because the
whole army had not crossed the Douro and none of its supplies
and baggage had crossed. Secondly, on account of the great
exertion and fatigue of the preceding days particularly the last.
Thirdly, because we had no account of lord Beresford being in
possession of Amarante, or even across the Douro; we having, in
fact, out-marched everything. Fourthly, the horses and animals
required a day’s rest as well as the men.’</p>
</div>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxv"></a>[lxxxv]</span></p>

<p>And, in the answer to another question, the following
observation occurs:—‘The relative numbers and the nature
of the troops must be considered in all these things;
<em>and this fact moreover, that excepting to attain a very
great object we could not risk the loss of a corps</em>.’</p>

<p>I pass over the reviewer’s comments upon my description
of Soult’s retreat, because a simple reference to my
work will at once show their folly and falseness; but I
beg to inform this acute and profound historical critic that
the first field-marshal captured by an English general was
marshal Tallard, and that the English general who captured
him was called John, duke of Marlborough. And,
with respect to his sneers about the ‘<em>little river of Ruivaens</em>;’
‘<em>Soult’s theatrical speech</em>;’ ‘<em>the use of the twenty-five
horsemen</em>;’ ‘<em>the non-repairs of the Ponte Nova</em>;’
and the ‘<em>Romance composed by colonel Napier and Le
Noble</em>;’ I shall, in answer, only offer the following authorities,
none of which, the reader will observe, are taken from
Le Noble.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s General Report.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The 15th, in the morning, the enemy appeared one league
from Braga; our column was entangled in the defile; the rain
came down in torrents; and the wind was frightful. On reaching
Salamanca we learned that <em>the bridge of Ruivaens, over the
little river</em> (ruisseau) <em>of that name was cut, and the passage
guarded by 1,200 men with cannon</em>. It was known also that
the <em>Ponte Nova on the route of Montelegre</em>, which they had
begun to destroy, was feebly guarded; and the marshal gave to
major Dulong the command of 100 brave men, of his own
choice, to carry it. The valiant Dulong under cover of the
night reached the bridge, passed it notwithstanding the cuts in
it, surprised the guard, and put to the sword those who could not
escape. <em>In four hours the bridge was repaired</em>; general
Loison passed it and marched upon the bridge of Misserella, near
Villa da Ponte, where 800 Portuguese <em>well retrenched</em> defended
the passage. <em>A battalion and some brave men, again led by the
intrepid Dulong, forced the abbatis entered the entrenchments
and seized the bridge.</em>’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from the ‘<span lang="fr">Victoires et Conquêtes des Français</span>’.</em></p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxvi"></a>[lxxxvi]</span></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The marshal held a council, at the end of which he called
major Dulong. It was nine o’clock in the evening. “I have
selected you from the army, he said to that brave officer, to seize
the bridge of Ponte Nova which the enemy are now cutting:
you must endeavour to surprise them. The time is favourable.
Attack, vigorously with the bayonet you will succeed or you will
die. I want no news save that of your success, send me no
other report, your silence will be sufficient in a contrary case.
Take a hundred men at your choice; they will be sufficient; add
<em>twenty-five dragoons</em>, <em>and kill their horses to make a rampart,
if it be necessary, on the middle of the bridge to sustain yourself
and remain master of the passage</em>.”’</p>

<p>‘The major departed with determined soldiers and a Portuguese
guide who was tied with the leather slings of the muskets.
Arrived within pistol-shot of the bridge he saw the enemy <em>cutting
the last beam</em>. It was then one o’clock the rain fell
heavily and the enemy’s labourers being fatigued thought they
might take some repose before they finished their work. The
torrents descending from the mountains and the cavado itself
made such a noise that the march of the French was not heard,
the sentinel at the bridge was killed without giving any alarm, and
<em>Dulong with twenty-five grenadiers passed crawling on the
beam, one of them fell into the cavado but happily his fall
produced no effect</em>. The enemy’s advanced post of twenty-four
men was destroyed, &amp;c. &amp;c. The marshal, informed of this
happy event, came up in haste with the first troops he could find
<em>to defend the bridge and accelerate the passage of the army</em>;
<em>but the repairing was neither sufficiently prompt or solid to
prevent many brave soldiers perishing</em>. The marshal embraced
major Dulong, saying to him, “I thank you in the name
of France brave major; you have saved the army.”’</p>
</div>

<p>Then follows a detailed account of the Misserella bridge,
or Saltador, and its abbatis and other obstacles; of
Dulong’s attack; of his being twice repulsed; and of his
carrying of the bridge, the Leaper as it was called, at the
third assault, falling dreadfully wounded at the moment of
victory; finally, of the care and devotion with which his
soldiers carried him on their shoulders during the rest of the
retreat. And the reader will observe that this account is not
a mere description in the body of the work, but a separate
paper in the Appendix, written by some officer evidently
well acquainted with all the facts, perhaps Dulong himself,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxvii"></a>[lxxxvii]</span>
and for the express purpose of correcting the errors of detail
in the body of that work. Theatrical to the critic, and
even ridiculous it may likely enough appear. The noble
courage and self-devotion of such a soldier as Dulong is
a subject which no person will ever expect a Quarterly
viewer to understand.</p>

<p>In the foregoing comments I have followed the stream
of my own thoughts, rather than the order of the reviewer’s
criticisms; I must therefore retrace my steps to notice
some points which have been passed over. His observations
about Zaragoza have been already disposed of in my
reply to his first articles published in my fifth volume, but
his comments upon Catalonian affairs shall now be noticed.</p>

<p>The assertion that lord Collingwood was incapable of
judging of the efforts of the Catalans, although he was in
daily intercourse with their chiefs, co-operating with their
armies and supplying them with arms and stores, <em>because
he was a seaman</em>, is certainly ingenious. It has just so much
of pertness in it as an Admiralty clerk of the Melville
school might be supposed to acquire by a long habit of
official insolence to naval officers, whose want of parliamentary
interest exposed them to the mortification of having
intercourse with him. And it has just so much of cunning
wisdom as to place it upon a par with that which dictated
the inquiry which we have heard was sent out to
sir John Warren during the late American war, namely,
“whether <em>light</em>—<em>very light</em> frigates, could not sail up the St.
Lawrence to Lake Ontario?” And with that surprising
providence, which did send out birch-brooms and tanks to
hold <em>fresh water</em> for the use of the ships on the said lake of
Ontario. But quitting these matters, the reviewer insinuates
what is absolutely untrue, namely, that I have only
quoted lord Collingwood as authority for my statements
about Catalonia. The readers of my work know that I
have adduced in testimony the Spanish generals themselves,
namely, Contreras, Lacy, and Rovira; the testimony
of sir Edward Codrington, of sir Edward Pellew, of
colonel Doyle, and of other Englishmen. That I have
referred to St. Cyr, Suchet, Lafaille, and other French
writers; that I have quoted Vacani and Cabane’s Histories,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxviii"></a>[lxxxviii]</span>
the first an Italian serving with the French army in Catalonia,
the last a Spaniard and chief of the staff to the Catalan
army: and now, to complete the reviewer’s discomfiture,
I will add the duke of Wellington, who is a landsman
and therefore according to this reviewer’s doctrine,
entitled to judge:—</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Letter to lord Liverpool, 19th Dec. 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘In Catalonia the resistance is more general and regular; but
still the people are of a description with which your armies could
not co-operate with any prospect of success, or even of safety.
You see what Burghersh says of the Somatenes; <em>and it is notorious
that the Catalans have at all times been the most irregular,
and the least to be depended upon of any of the Spaniards</em>.’</p>
</div>

<p>So much for light frigates, birch-brooms, fresh-water
tanks, and Collingwood’s incapacity to judge of the Catalans,
<em>because he was a seaman</em>; and as for Reding’s complaints
of the Spaniards when dying, they must go to sir
George’s big book with this marginal note, that St. Cyr
is not the authority. But for the grand flourish, the threat
to prove at another time, ‘<em>from Wellington’s despatches</em>,’
that the Spaniards gave excellent intelligence and made
<em>no false reports</em>, let the reader take the following testimony
in anticipation:—</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence, 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘At present I have no intelligence whatever, excepting the nonsense
I receive occasionally from ——; <em>as the Spaniards have
defeated all my attempts to obtain any by stopping those whom
I sent out to make inquiries</em>.’</p>

<p>‘I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed
8,000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and you have been made acquainted
with the exact extent of it, <em>because</em>, the Duque del Albuquerque,
who is appointed to command it, <em>is interested in making
known the truth</em>; but they have <em>lied</em> about the cavalry ordered to
the Duque del Parque.’</p>

<p>‘It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at
Seville <em>with their own false intelligence</em>.’</p>

<p>‘It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads,
or any local circumstances, which must be considered in the decisions
to be formed respecting the march of troops.’</p>

<p>1810. ‘We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxix"></a>[lxxxix]</span>
efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that
we know is the movement of troops at the moment, or probably
after it is made.’</p>

<p>‘I have had accounts from the marquis de la Romana: he
tells me that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23d, <em>which
cannot be true</em>.’</p>

<p>‘I believe there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection
at Madrid.’</p>

<p>‘There is so far a foundation for the report of O’Donnel’s action,
as that it appears that Suchet’s advanced guard was at Lerida
on the 11th of April. It is doubtful, however, <em>according to my
experience of Spanish reports</em>, whether O’Donnel was beaten or
gained a victory.’</p>

<p>‘I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution
in respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the marquis de la
Romana, <em>and all the Spanish officers</em>. It is obvious there is nothing
they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their operations.
This is evident both from the letters of the marquis himself,
and from the <em>false reports</em> made to lieutenant Heathcote of the
firing heard from Badajos at Albuquerque.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810. Cartaxo.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The circumstances which I have related above will show your
Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not
much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate
operations with a corps so ill-organised, <em>in possession of so
little intelligence</em>, and upon whose actions no reliance can be
placed. It will scarcely be credited that <em>the first intelligence
which general Mendizabal received of the assembling of the
enemy’s troops at Seville was from hence</em>.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Mendizabal, &amp;c. &amp;c., have sent us so many <em>false reports</em> that
I cannot make out what the French are doing.’</p>

<p>‘This is a part of the system on which <em>all the Spanish authorities
have been acting</em>, to induce us to take a part in the desultory
operations which they are carrying on. <em>False reports
and deceptions of every description are tried</em>, and then popular
insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct.’</p>

<p>‘The Spaniards take such bad care of their posts, and have so
little intelligence, that it is difficult to say by what troops the blow
has been struck.’</p>

<p>‘It is strange that the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo should have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xc"></a>[xc]</span>
no intelligence of the enemy’s movements near his garrison, of
which we have received so many accounts.’</p>

<p>‘We hear also a great deal of Blake’s army in the Alpujarras,
and of a corps from Valencia operating upon the enemy’s communications
with Madrid; but I conclude that there is as little foundation
for this intelligence as for that relating to the insurrection
of Ronda.’</p>

<p>‘I enclose a letter from General Carrera, in which I have requested
him to communicate with you. I beg you to observe,
however, that very little reliance can be placed on the report made
to you <em>by any Spanish general at the head of a body of
troops</em>. They generally exaggerate on one side or the other; and
<em>make no scruple of communicating supposed intelligence, in order
to induce those to whom they communicate it to adopt a
certain line of conduct</em>.’</p>
</div>

<p class="noindent">The reader must be now somewhat tired of quotations; let
us therefore turn for relaxation to the reviewer’s observations
about light troops,—of which he seems indeed to
know as much as the wise gentleman of the Admiralty did
about the facility of sailing up the St. Lawrence to Lake
Ontario; but though that wise gentleman did not know
much about sailing-craft, the reviewer knows something of
another kind of craft, namely misrepresentation. Thus he
quotes a passage from captain Kincaid’s amusing and clever
work as if it told in his favour; whereas it in no
manner supports his foolish insinuation—namely, that
the 43d and 52d regiments of the light division were not
light troops, never acted as such, and never skirmished!
Were he to say as much to the lowest bugler of these
corps, he would give him the fittest answer for his folly—that
is to say, laugh in his face.</p>

<p>‘There are but two kinds of soldiers in the world’ said
Napoleon, ‘the good and the bad.’</p>

<p>Now, the light division were not only good but, I will
say it fearlessly, the best soldiers in the world. The three
British regiments composing it had been formed by sir
John Moore precisely upon the same system. There was
no difference save in the colour of the riflemen’s jackets
and the weapons which they carried. Captain Kincaid’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xci"></a>[xci]</span>
observation, quoted by the reviewer, merely says, what is
quite true, that the riflemen fought in skirmishing order
more frequently than the 43d and 52d did. Certainly
they did, and for this very sufficient reason—their arms,
the rifle and sword, did not suit any other formation; it is
a defect in the weapon, which is inferior to the musket
and bayonet, fitted alike for close or open order. Napoleon
knew this so well that he had no riflemen in his army,
strange as it may appear to those persons who have read
so much about French riflemen. The riflemen of the
light division could form line, columns, and squares—could
move as a heavy body—could do, and did do everything
that the best soldiers in the world ought to do; and
in like manner the 52d and 43d regiments skirmished and
performed all the duties of light troops with the same facility
as the riflemen; but the difference of the weapon
made it advisable to use the latter nearly always in open
order: I do not, indeed, remember ever to have seen them
act against the enemy either in line or square. Captain
Kincaid is too sensible and too good a soldier, and far too
honest a man, to serve the purpose of this snarling blockhead,
who dogmatizes in defiance of facts and with a plenitude
of pompous absurdity that would raise the bile of
an alderman. Thus, after quoting from my work the numbers
of the French army, he thus proceeds:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘Notwithstanding that this enormous force was <em>pressing</em> upon
the <em>now unaided</em> Spanish people with <em>all its weight</em>, and acting
against them with its <em>utmost energy</em>, it proved wholly unable to
put down resistance.’—<cite>Review</cite>, page 497.</p>
</div>

<p>Now this relates to the period following sir John Moore’s
death, which was on the 16th of January. That general’s
fine movement upon Sahagun, and his subsequent retreat,
had drawn the great bulk of the French forces towards
Gallicia, and had paralyzed many corps. The war with
Austria had drawn Napoleon himself and the imperial
guards away from the Peninsula. Joseph was establishing
his court at Madrid; Victor remained very inactive in
Estremadura; Soult marched into Portugal;—in fine, this
was precisely the period of the whole war in which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcii"></a>[xcii]</span>
French army were most insert. Napoleon has fixed upon
the four months of February, March, April, and May, 1809,
as the period in which the King let the Peninsula slip
from his feeble hands.</p>

<p>Let us see then what the Spaniards did during that
time. And first it is false to say that they were unaided.
They were aided against Victor by the vicinity of sir John
Craddock’s troops; they were aided on the Gallician coast
by an English squadron; they were aided on the Beira
frontier, against Lapisse, by the Portuguese troops under
sir Robert Wilson; they were aided on the Catalonian
coast by lord Collingwood’s fleet; they were aided at
Cadiz by the presence of general M‘Kenzie’s troops, sent
from Lisbon; and they were aided everywhere by enormous
supplies of money arms and ammunition sent from England.
Finally, they were aided, and most powerfully so, by
sir John Moore’s generalship, which had enabled them to
rally and keep several considerable armies on foot in the
southern parts of the country. What did these armies—these
invincible Spaniards—do? They lost Zaragoza,
Monzon, and Jaca, in the east; the fortresses of Ferrol and
Coruña, and their fleet, in the north; they lost Estremadura,
La Mancha, Aragon, the Asturias, and Gallicia; they
lost the battles of Ucles and of Valls; the battle of
Monterrey, that of Ciudid Real, and the battle of Medellin.
They won nothing! they did not save themselves, it was
the <em>British army and the indolence and errors of the French
that saved them</em>.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Napoleon’s Memoirs.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘After the embarkation of the English army, the king of Spain
did nothing; <em>he lost four months</em>; he ought to have marched
upon Cadiz, upon Valencia, upon Lisbon; political means would
have done the rest.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence. 1809.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘It is obvious that the longer, and the more intimately we become
acquainted with the affairs of Spain, the less prospect do
they hold out of anything like a glorious result. The great extent
of the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an
enemy, and the enmity of the people towards the French may
spin out the war into length, and at last the French may find it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xciii"></a>[xciii]</span>
impossible to establish a government in the country; but there is
no prospect of a glorious termination to the contest.’</p>

<p>‘After the perusal of these details, and of Soult’s letters, can
any one doubt that the evacuation of Gallicia was occasioned by
the operations of the British troops in Portugal?’</p>

<p>‘The fact is, that the British army <em>has saved Spain and Portugal</em>
during this year.’</p>
</div>

<p>The reviewer is not only a great critic, he is a great
general also. He has discovered that there are no positions
in the mountains of Portugal; nay, he will scarcely
allow that there are mountains at all; and he insists that
they offer no defence against an invader, but that the rivers
do—that the Douro defends the <em>eastern</em> frontier of Beira,
and that the frontier of Portugal generally is very compact
and strong for defence, and well suited for a weak army to
fight superior numbers;—that the weak army cannot be
turned and cut off from Lisbon, and the strong army must
invade in mass and by one line.</p>

<p>Now, first, it so happened, unluckily for this lucid military
notion of Portugal, that in Massena’s invasion lord
Wellington stopped to fight on the mountain of Busaco, and
stopped Massena altogether at the mountains of Alhandra,
Aruda, Sobral, and Torres Vedras—in other words at the
lines, and that he did not once stop him or attempt to stop
him by defending a river. That Massena, in his retreat,
stopped lord Wellington on the mountain of Santarem,
attempted to stop him on the mountains of Cazal Nova,
Moita, and Guarda, but never attempted to stop him by
defending a river, save at Sabugal, and then he was instantly
beaten. Oh, certainly, ’tis a most noble general,
and a very acute critic! Nevertheless, I must support my
own opinions about the frontier of Portugal, the non-necessity
of invading this country in one mass, and the unfordable
nature of the Tagus, by the testimony of two generals
as distinguished as honest Iago.</p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract of a letter from sir John Moore.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I am not prepared at this moment to answer minutely your
lordship’s question respecting the defence of Portugal; but I can
say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xciv"></a>[xciv]</span>
against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged,
but all equally to be penetrated.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will
probably make his attack by <em>two distinct lines</em>, the one north the
other south of the Tagus; and the system of defence must be
founded upon this general basis. In the summer season, however,
the <em>Tagus being fordable</em>, &amp;c. &amp;c., care must be taken that the
enemy does not by his attack directed from the south of the Tagus
and by the passage of that river, <em>cut off from Lisbon the British
army engaged in operations to the north of the Tagus</em>.’</p>

<p>‘The line of frontier to Portugal is so long in proportion to the
extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains
separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it
is so open in many parts, that it would be <em>impossible for an army
acting upon the defensive to carry on its operations upon the
frontier without being cut off from the capital</em>.’</p>

<p>‘In the summer it is probable as I have before stated that the
enemy will make his attacks in two principal corps, and that he
will also push on through the mountains between Castello Branco
and Abrantes. His object will be by means of his corps, <em>south
of the Tagus</em>, to turn the positions which might be taken in his
front on the north of that river; <em>to cut off from Lisbon the corps
opposed to him</em>; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear
at the same time. This can be avoided only <em>by the retreat of
the right centre and left of the allies, and their junction at a
point, at which from the state of the river they cannot be
turned by the passage of the Tagus by the enemy’s left</em>. The
first point of defence which presents itself below that at which
the Tagus ceases to be fordable, is the river Castenheira close to
the lines.’</p>
</div>

<p>In the above extracts, the fordable nature of the Tagus
has been pretty clearly shown, but I will continue my proofs
upon that fact to satiety.</p>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Lord Wellington to Charles Stuart, Esq.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘The line of operations which we are obliged to adopt for the
defence of Lisbon and for our own embarkation necessarily
throws us back as far as below Salvaterra on the Tagus, to which
place, and I believe lower, <em>the Tagus is fordable during the
summer</em>; and we should be liable to be turned or cut off from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcv"></a>[xcv]</span>
Lisbon and the Tagus if we were to take our line of defence higher
upon the river.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Lord Wellington to general Hill, August.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might
<em>move across the fords of the Tagus at Vilha Velha</em> and thus
turn your right.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Lord Wellington to general Hill, October.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘If there are no boats, send them (the sick and encumbrances)
<em>across the Tagus by the ford</em> (at Santarem).’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to general Hill.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have,
<em>with some of the fords of the Tagus</em> marked upon it, but I believe
<em>the whole river from Barquina to Santarem is fordable</em>.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to marshal Beresford.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘I enclose a letter which colonel Fletcher has given me, <em>which
affords but a bad prospect of a defence for the Tagus</em>. I think
that if captain Chapman’s facts are true his arguments are unanswerable,
and that it is very doubtful whether any heavy ordnance
should be placed in the batteries on the upper Tagus.’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to admiral Berkeley.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘But if the invasion should be made in summer, <em>when the
Tagus is fordable in many places</em>.’... ‘In the event of the
attack being made <em>between the months of June and November</em>,
when the <em>Tagus is fordable, at least as low down as Salvaterra</em>
(near the lines).’</p>
</div>


<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir John Craddock to lord Castlereagh, April.</em></p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘There is a ferry at Salvaterra, near Alcantara, and another up
the left bank of the Tagus in the Alemtejo, <em>where there is also a
ford</em>, and the river may be easily passed.’</p>
</div>


<div class="blockquot">

<p><em>Extract from a Memoir by sir B. D’Urban, quarter-master-general
to Beresford’s army</em>:—‘<em>The Tagus</em>, between
Golegao and Rio Moinhos was <em>known to offer several fords after
a few days’ dry weather</em>.’<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p>
</div>

<p>Thus we see that, in nearly every month in the year, this
unfordable Tagus of the reviewer is fordable in many places,
and that in fact it is no barrier except in very heavy rains.
But to render this still clearer I will here give one more
and conclusive proof. In an elaborate manuscript memoir
upon the defence of Portugal, drawn up by the celebrated
general Dumourier for the duke of Wellington, that officer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcvi"></a>[xcvi]</span>
argues like this reviewer, that the Tagus is unfordable and
a strong barrier. But a marginal note in Wellington’s
hand-writing runs thus:—‘<em>He (Dumourier) does not seem
to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season</em>.’</p>

<p>What can I say more? Nothing upon this head, but
much upon others. I can call upon the reader to trace the
deceitful mode in which the reviewer perverts or falsifies
my expressions throughout. How he represents the Spaniards
at one moment so formidable as to resist successfully
the utmost efforts of more than 300,000 soldiers, the next
breath calls them a poor unarmed horde of peasants incapable
of making any resistance at all. How he quotes me
as stating that the ministers had unbounded confidence in
the success of the struggle in Spain; whereas my words
are, that the ministers <em>professed</em> unbounded confidence.
How he represents me as saying, the <em>Cabinet</em> were too
much dazzled to analyse the real causes of the Spanish Revolution;
whereas it was the <em>nation</em> not the <em>Cabinet</em> of
which I spoke. And this could not be mistaken, because I
had described the ministers as only anxious to pursue a
warlike system necessary to their own existence, and that
they were actuated by a personal hatred of Napoleon.
Again, how he misrepresents me as wishing the British to
<em>seize</em> Cadiz, and speaks of a <em>mob</em> in that city, when I have
spoken only of the <em>people</em> (oh, true Tory!); and never
proposed to seize Cadiz at all, and have also given the unexceptionable
authority of Mr. Stuart, general M‘Kenzie,
and sir George Smith, for my statement. And here I will
notice a fine specimen of this reviewer’s mode of getting up
a case. Having undertaken to prove that every river in
Portugal is a barrier, except the Zezere which I had fixed
upon as being an important line, he gives an extract of a
letter from lord Wellington to a general <em>Smith</em>, to the
effect that, as the Zezere might be <em>turned at that season</em>
in so many ways, he did not wish to construct works to
defend it then. Now, first, it is necessary to inform the
reader that there is no letter to general Smith. The letter
in question was to general Leith, and the <em>mistake</em> was not
without its object, namely, to prevent any curious person
from discovering that the very next sentence is as follows:—‘If,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcvii"></a>[xcvii]</span>
however, this work can be performed, either by the
peasantry or by the troops, without any great inconvenience,
<em>the line of the Zezere may, hereafter, become of very great
importance</em>.’</p>

<p>All this is very pitiful, and looks like extreme soreness
in the reviewer; but the effrontery with which he perverts
my statements about the Austrian war surpasses all his
other efforts in that line, and deserves a more elaborate
exposure.</p>

<p>In my history it is stated, that some obscure intrigues
of the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies
on the continent, emanating from patrician sources, excited
the sympathy, and nourished certain <em>distempered feelings</em>
in the English ministers, <em>which feeling</em> made them see
only weakness and disaffection in France. This I stated,
because I knew that those intrigues were, in fact, a conspiracy
concocted, with Talleyrand’s connivance, for the
dethronement of Napoleon; and the English ministers
neglected Spain and every other part of their foreign affairs
for the moment, so intent were they upon this foolish
scheme and so sanguine of success. These facts are not
known to many, but they are true.</p>

<p>In the same paragraph of my history it is said, the <em>warlike
preparations of Austria</em>, and the reputation of the
archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed
Napoleon’s, <em>had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions</em>;
meaning, as would be evident to any persons not
wilfully blind, had awakened that dormant spirit in the
English ministers.</p>

<p>Now reader, mark the candour and simplicity of the reviewer.
He says that I condemned these ministers, ‘for
nourishing their distempered feelings <em>by combining the
efforts of a German monarch in favour of national independence</em>.’
As if it were the <em>Austrian war</em>, and not the
<em>obscure intrigues for dethroning Napoleon</em> that the expression
of <em>distempered feelings</em> applied to. As if the awakening
the <em>dormant spirit of coalitions</em>, instead of being
a reference to the sentiments of the English ministers,
meant the exciting the Austrians and other nations to war,
and the forming of a vast plan of action by those ministers!<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcviii"></a>[xcviii]</span>
And for fear any mistake on that head should
arise, it is so asserted in another part of the review in
the following terms:—</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>‘<em>To have “awakened the dormant spirit”</em> of <em>coalitions</em>, is
another of the crimes which the British ministers are charged
with, as if it would have been a proof of wisdom to have abstained
from <em>forming a combination of those states of Europe which
still retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to
resist a conqueror</em>,’ &amp;c. &amp;c.—<cite>Review.</cite></p>
</div>

<p>The Quarterly’s attention to Spanish affairs seems to
have rendered it very intimate with the works of Ferdinand
Mendez Pinto. But since it has thus claimed the Austrian
war as the work of its former patrons, the ministers of
1809, I will throw some new light upon the history of that
period, which, though they should prove little satisfactory
to the Quarterly, may, as the details are really curious,
in some measure repay the reader for his patience in wading
through the tedious exposition of this silly and unscrupulous
writer’s misrepresentations.</p>

<p>After the conference of Erfurth, the Austrian count
Stadion, a man of ability and energy, either believing, or
affecting to believe, that Napoleon was determined to destroy
Austria and only waited until Spain was conquered,
resolved to employ the whole force of the German empire
against the French monarch in a war of destruction for one
or other of the contending states. With this view his
first efforts were directed to change the opinions of the
archduke Charles and those immediately about him who
were averse to a war; and though he was long and vigorously
resisted by general Grün, an able man and the
archduke’s confidant, he finally succeeded. Some time
before this France had insisted upon a reduction of the
Austrian forces, and being asked if she would do the same
for the sake of peace, replied that she would maintain no
more troops in Germany than should be found necessary;
but the army of the Confederation must be kept up as a
constitutional force, and it was impossible during the war
with England to reduce the French troops in other quarters.
To this succeeded an attempt at a triple treaty, by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcix"></a>[xcix]</span>
which the territories of Austria, Russia, and France, were
to be mutually guaranteed. Champagny and Romanzow
suggested this plan, but the Austrian minister did not conceive
Russia strong enough to guarantee Austria against
France. Stadion’s project was more agreeable, and a note
of a declaration of war was sent to Metternich, then at
Paris, to deliver to the French government. The archduke
Charles set off for the army, and was followed by the
emperor.</p>

<p>When the war was thus resolved upon, it remained to
settle whether it should be carried on for the sole benefit
of Austria, or in such a manner as to interest other nations.
Contrary to her usual policy Austria decided for
the latter, and contrary to her usual parsimony she was
extremely liberal to her general officers and spies. It was
determined that the war should be one of restitution, and
in that view secret agents had gone to Italy, and were
said to have made great progress in exciting the people;
officers had been also sent to Sicily and Sardinia to urge
those courts to attempt their own restoration to the continental
thrones. The complete restoration of Naples, of
Tuscany, and the Pope’s dominions, and large additions
to the old kingdom of Piedmont were proposed, and
Austria herself only demanded a secure frontier, namely,
the Tyrol, the river Po, and the Chiusa, which was not
much more than the peace of Campo Formio had left
her.</p>

<p>Such were her views in the south where kings were to
be her coadjutors, but in the north she was intent upon a
different plan. There she expected help from the people,
who were discontented at being parcelled out by Napoleon.
Treaties were entered into with the elector of Hesse, the
dukes of Brunswick and Oels, and it was understood that
the people there and in the provinces taken from Prussia,
were ready to rise on the first appearance of an Austrian
soldier. Hanover was to be restored to England; but
Austria was so discontented with the Prussian king, that
the restoration of the Prussian provinces, especially the
duchy of Warsaw, was to depend upon his conduct in
the war.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_c"></a>[c]</span></p>

<p>The means of effecting this mighty project were the
great resources which Stadion had found or created; they
were greater than Austria had ever before produced and
the enthusiasm of her people was in proportion. The
landwehr levy had been calculated at only 150 battalions;
it produced 300 battalions, besides the Hungarian insurrection.
The regular army was complete in everything, and
the cavalry good, though not equal to what it had been in
former wars. There were nine ‘<i lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>.’ The
archduke Ferdinand with one was to strike a blow in the
duchy of Warsaw. The archduke Charles commanded
in chief. Marching with six corps, containing 160,000
regular troops besides the landwehr attached to them, he
was to cross the frontier and fall on the French army, supposed
to be only 40,000. That is to say, the first corps,
under Belgarde and Klenau, were to march by Peterwalde
and Dresden against Bernadotte who was in that quarter.
The second corps, under Kollowrath and Brady, were to
march by Eger upon Bareith and Wurzburg, to prevent
the union of Davoust and Bernadotte. The third corps,
under prince Rosenberg, was to move by Waldmunchen,
in the Upper Palatinate, and after beating Wrede at
Straubingen, to join the archduke Charles near Munich.
The archduke himself was to proceed against that
city with the reserves of prince John of Lichtenstein,
Hiller’s corps, Stipchitz, and those of Hohenzollern’s, and
the archduke Louis’. The archduke John was to attack
Italy; and the different corps, exclusive of landwehr,
amounted to not less than 260,000 men.</p>

<p>The project was gigantic, the force prodigious, and
though the quarter-master-general Meyer, seeing the vice
of the military plan, resigned his situation, and that
Meerfelt quarrelled with the archduke Charles, the general
feeling was high and sanguine; and the princes of the
empire were, with the exception of Wirtemberg and Westphalia,
thought to be rather favourable towards the
Austrians. But all the contributions were in kind;
Austria had only a depreciated paper currency which
would not serve her beyond her own frontiers; wherefore
England, at that time the paymaster of all Europe,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ci"></a>[ci]</span>
was looked to. England, however, had no ambassador,
no regular accredited agent at Vienna; all this mighty
armament and plan were carried on without her aid,
almost without her knowledge; and a despatch from the
Foreign Office, dated the 8th of December, but which
only arrived the 10th of March, <em>refused all aid whatsoever!
and even endeavoured to prove that Austria could not
want, and England was not in a situation to grant</em>. Yet
this was the period in which such lavish grants had been
made to Spain without any condition—so lavish, that,
in Cadiz, nearly four hundred thousand pounds, received
from England, was lying untouched by the Spaniards.
They were absolutely glutted with specie, for they
had, at that moment, of their own money, and lying idle
in their treasury, <em>fourteen millions of dollars</em>, and <em>ten
millions more were on the way from Vera Cruz and Buenes
Ayres</em>. Such was the wisdom, such the providence of the
English ministers! heaping money upon money at Cadiz,
where it was not wanted, and if it had been wanted, ill
bestowed; but refusing it to Austria to forward the
explosion of the enormous mine prepared against Napoleon
in Germany and Italy. Their agent, Mr. Frere, absolutely
refused even to ask for a loan of some of this money from
the Spaniards. This is what the reviewer, wilfully perverting
my expression, namely, ‘<em>awakened the dormant
spirit of coalitions</em>,’ calls ‘<em>the forming a combination of
the states of Europe</em>!’ The English ministers were
treated as mere purse-bearers, to be bullied or cajoled as
the case might be; and in these two instances, not without
reason, for they neither know how to give nor how to
refuse in the right time or place. Nor were their military
dispositions better arranged, as we shall presently see.</p>

<p>To proceed with our narrative. Stadion, to prevent the
mischief which this despatch from England might have
produced, by encouraging the peace-party at the court,
and discouraging the others, only imparted it to the
emperor and his secret council, but hid it from those
members of the cabinet who were wavering. Even this
was like to have cost him his place; and some members
of the council actually proposed to reduce one-third of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_cii"></a>[cii]</span>
army. In fine, a cry was arising against the war, but the
emperor declared himself on Stadion’s side, and the cabinet
awaited the result of count Walmoden’s mission to London.
That nobleman had been despatched with full powers to
conclude a treaty of alliance and subsidy with England,
and to learn the feeling of the English cabinet upon an
extraordinary measure which Austria had resorted to; for
being utterly unable to pay her way at the outset, and
trusting to the importance of the crisis, and not a little to
the known facility with which the English ministers
lavished their subsidies, she had resolved to raise, through
the principal bankers in Vienna, £150,000 a month, by
making drafts through Holland upon their correspondents
in London, <em>to be repaid from the subsidy</em> <span class="allsmcap">TO BE</span> granted by
England! Prince Staremberg was sent at the same time
with a special mission to London, to arrange a definite
treaty for money, and a convention regulating the future
object and conduct of the war—a very curious proceeding—because
Staremberg had been recalled before for conduct
offensive to the English cabinet; but he was well
acquainted with London, and the emperor wished to get
him away lest he should put himself at the head of the
peace-party in Vienna. Thus the English ministers continued
so to conduct their affairs, that, while they gave
their money to Spain and their advice to Austria, and
both unprofitably, they only excited the contempt of both
countries.</p>

<p>From the conference of Erfurth, France had been
earnest with Russia to take an active part, according to
treaty, against Austria; and Romanzow, who was an
enemy of England, increased Alexander’s asperity toward
that country, but nothing was done against Austria; and
when Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at Petersburg,
became clamorous, Alexander pretended to take the
Austrian ambassador Swartzenberg to task for the measures
of his court, but really gave him encouragement,
by repairing immediately afterwards to Finland without
inviting Caulaincourt. A contemporaneous official note,
from Romanzow to Austria, was indeed couched in terms
to render the intention of Alexander apparently doubtful,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ciii"></a>[ciii]</span>
but this was only a blind for Napoleon. There was no
doubt of the favourable wishes and feelings of the court,
the Russian troops in Poland did not stir, and Stadion,
far from having any dread of them, calculated upon their
assistance in case of any marked success in the outset.
The emperor Alexander was, however, far from inattentive
to his own interests, for he sent general Hitroff at this
time to Turkey to demand Moldavia and Wallachia as the
price of a treaty, hoping thus to snatch these countries
during the general commotion. He was foiled by the
Austrian cabinet, which secretly directed the Turks sent
to meet Hitroff, to assume a high tone and agree to no
negociation in which England was not a party: hence,
when the Russians demanded the dismissal of Mr. Adair
from Constantinople Hitroff was himself sent away.</p>

<p>While the affairs with Russia were in this state, the
present king of Holland arrived, incognito, at Vienna, to
offer his services either as heir to the stadtholdership, as a
prince of the German empire, or as a near and confidential
connection of the house of Brandenberg; but it was only
in the latter view he could be useful, and it was evident
he expected the Austrian court would make their policy in
the north coincide with that of the Prussian court. He
said the secret voyage of the royal family to Petersburg
had exposed them to mortifications and slights which
had changed the sentiments of both the king and queen
towards France, and the queen, bowed down by misfortune,
dreaded new reverses and depressed the spirit of
the king. They stood alone in their court, ministers
and officers alike openly maintained opinions diametrically
opposed to the sovereign, and at a grand
council held in Koningsberg every minister had voted for
war with Napoleon. The king assented, but the next day
the queen induced him to retract. However, the voice of
the people and of the army was for war, and any order to
join the troops to those of the Rhenish confederation was
sure to produce an explosion. There were between 30,000
and 40,000 regular troops under arms, and Austria was
assured, that if any Austrian force approached the frontier,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_civ"></a>[civ]</span>
the Prussian soldiers would, bag and baggage, join it,
despite of king or queen.</p>

<p>In this state of affairs, and when a quarrel had arisen
between Bernadotte and the Saxon king (for the people of
that country were ill-disposed towards the French), it is
evident that a large English army appearing in the north
of Germany would have gathered around it all the people
and armies of the north, and accordingly Stadion proposed
a landing in the Weser and the Elbe. Now England had
at that time the great armament which went to Walcheren,
the army under Wellington in the Peninsula, and that
under sir John Stuart in Sicily, that is to say, she had
about 80,000 or 90,000 men disposable; and yet so contriving
were the ministers, that they kept Wellington too
weak in Spain, Stuart too strong in Sicily; and instead of
acting in the north of Germany where such a great combination
awaited them, they sent their most powerful force
to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, where the only
diversion they caused was the bringing together a few
thousand national guards from the nearest French departments.
And this the reviewer calls ‘<em>the forming a combination
of those states in Europe which still retained some
degree of independence and magnanimity to resist the ambition
of a conqueror</em>.’ What a profound, modest, and, to
use a Morning Post compound, not-at-all-a-flagitious
writer this reviewer is.</p>

<p>Well, notwithstanding this grand ‘<em>combination</em>,’ things
did not turn out well. The Austrians changed their first
plan of campaign in several particulars. Napoleon suddenly
and unexpectedly appeared at the head of his army,
which, greatly inferior in number, and composed principally
of German contingents, was not very well disposed
towards him; and yet, such was the stupendous power of
this man’s genius and bravery, he in a few days by a
series of movements unequalled in skill by any movement
known in military records, broke through the Austrian
power, separated her armies, drove them in disorder before
him, and seized Vienna; and but for an accident, one of
those minor accidents so frequent in war, which enabled<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_cv"></a>[cv]</span>
the archduke Charles to escape over the Danube at
Ratisbon, he would have terminated this gigantic contest
in ten days. The failure there led to the battle of Esling,
where the sudden swell of the Danube again baffled him
and produced another crisis, which might have been turned
to his hurt if the English army had been in the north of
Germany; but it was then perishing amongst the stagnant
ditches of Walcheren, and the only combination of the
English ministers to be discovered was a combination of
folly, arrogance, and conceit. I have now done with the
review. Had all the objections contained in it been true,
it would have evinced the petty industry of a malicious
mind more than any just or generous interest in the cause
of truth; but being, as I have demonstrated, false even
in the minutest particular, I justly stigmatise it as remarkable
only for malignant imbecility and systematic violation
of truth.</p>

<hr class="r20">

<p>The reviewers having asserted that I picked out of Foy’s
history the charge against lord Melville of saying “the
worst men made the best soldiers,” I replied that I drew
for it on my own clear recollection of the fact.</p>

<p>Since then a friend has sent me the report of lord Melville’s
speech, extracted from the Annual Register (Baldwin’s)
1808, p. 112, and the following passage extracted
from his lordship’s speech bears out my assertion and
proves the effrontery with which the reviewers deny facts.</p>

<div class="blockquot">

<p>“What was meant by a better sort of men? Was it that they
should be taller or shorter, broader or thinner? This might be
intelligible, but it was not the fact. The men that had hitherto
formed the British armies were men of stout hearts and habits;
men of spirit and courage; lovers of bold enterprize. These
were the materials of which an army must be composed. Give
him such men though not of the better description. <em>The worse
men were the fittest for soldiers.</em> Keep the better sort at home.”</p>
</div>


<hr class="p4 chap x-ebookmaker-drop">

<div class="chapter"></div>
<p class="p6 pfs150">HISTORY</p>

<p class="p3 pfs70">OF THE</p>

<p class="p1 p4b pfs180">WAR IN THE PENINSULA.</p>


<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">

<div class="chapter"></div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1"></a>[Pg 1]</span><br></p>

<p class="pfs150 lsp3 bold" id="HISTORY">HISTORY</p>

<p class="p3 pfs70">OF THE</p>

<p class="p1 pfs180 lsp2">PENINSULAR WAR.</p>


<hr class="r30">

<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XXI">BOOK XXI.</h2>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_I">CHAPTER I.</h3>


<p class="noindent">The fate of Spain was decided at Vittoria, but on<span class="sidenote9">1813. June.</span>
the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon’s genius
restored the general balance, and the negociations
which followed those victories affected the war in
the Peninsula.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington’s first intention was to reduce
Pampeluna by force, and the sudden fall of the
Pancorbo forts, which opened the great Madrid
road was a favourable event; but Portugal being
relinquished as a place of arms, a new base of
operations was required, lest a change of fortune
should force the allies to return to that country
when all the great military establishments were
broken up, when the opposition of the native
government to British influence was become rancorous,
and the public sentiment quite averse to
English supremacy. The Western Pyrenees, in
conjunction with the ocean, offered such a base,
yet the harbours were few, and the English general
desired to secure a convenient one, near the new<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2"></a>[2]</span>
positions of the army; wherefore to reduce San
Sebastian was of more immediate importance than
to reduce Pampeluna; and it was essential to effect
this during the fine season because the coast was
iron-bound and very dangerous in winter.</p>

<p>Pampeluna was strong. A regular attack required
three weeks for the bringing up of ordnance and
stores, five or six weeks more for the attack, and
from fifteen to twenty thousand of the best men,
because British soldiers were wanted for the
assault; but an investment could be maintained by
fewer and inferior troops, Spaniards and Portuguese,
and the enemy’s magazines were likely to
fail under blockade sooner than his ramparts would
crumble under fire. Moreover on the eastern coast
misfortune and disgrace had befallen the English
arms. Sir John Murray had failed at Taragona.
He had lost the honoured battering-train intrusted to
his charge, and his artillery equipage was supposed
to be ruined. The French fortresses in Catalonia
and Valencia were numerous, the Anglo-Sicilian
army could neither undertake an important siege,
nor seriously menace the enemy without obtaining
some strong place as a base. Suchet was therefore
free to march on Zaragoza, and uniting with
Clauzel and Paris, to operate with a powerful mass
against the right flank of the allies. For these
reasons Wellington finally concluded to blockade
Pampeluna and besiege San Sebastian, and the
troops, as they returned from the pursuit of Clauzel,<span class="sidenote7">July.</span>
marched to form a covering army in the mountains.
The peasantry of the vicinity were then employed
on the works of the blockade which was ultimately
intrusted to O’Donnel’s Andalusian reserve.</p>

<p>Confidently did the English general expect the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3"></a>[3]</span>
immediate fall of San Sebastian, and he was intent
to have it before the negociations for the armistice
in Germany should terminate; but mighty pains
and difficulties awaited him, and ere these can be
treated of, the progress of the war in other parts,
during his victorious march from Portugal to the
Pyrenees, must be treated of.</p>


<h4>CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE
EASTERN COAST.</h4>

<p>It will be remembered that the duke Del Parque<span class="sidenote9">Vol. V. p. 512.</span>
was to move from the Sierra Morena, by Almanza,
to join Elio, whose army had been reinforced from
Minorca; the united troops were then to act against
Suchet, on the Xucar, while sir John Murray
sailed to attack Taragona. Del Parque received
his orders the 24th of April, he had long known
of the project and the march was one of twelve
days, yet he did not reach his destination until the
end of May. This delay resulted, partly from the
bad state of his army, partly from the usual procrastination
of Spaniards, partly from the conduct
of Elio, whose proceedings, though probably
springing from a dislike to serve under Del Parque,
created doubts of his own fidelity.</p>

<p>It has been already shewn, how, contrary to his
agreement with Murray, Elio withdrew his cavalry<span class="sidenote9">Vol. V. p. 460.</span>
when Mijares was at Yecla, whence sprung that
general’s misfortune; how he placed the regiment
of Velez Malaga in Villena, a helpless prey for
Suchet; how he left the Anglo-Sicilian army to
fight the battle of Castalla unaided. He now
persuaded Del Parque to move towards Utiel
instead of Almanza, and to send a detachment
under Mijares to Requeña, thereby threatening<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4"></a>[4]</span>
Suchet’s right, but exposing the Spanish army to a
sudden blow, and disobeying his instructions which
prescribed a march by Almanza.</p>

<p>This false movement Elio represented as Del<span class="sidenote7">May.</span>
Parque’s own, but the latter, when Murray remonstrated,
quickly approached Castalla by Jumilla,
declaring his earnest desire to obey Wellington’s
orders. The divergence of his former march had,
however, already placed him in danger; his left
flank was so exposed, while coming by Jumilla,
that Murray postponed his own embarkation to
concert with Elio a combined operation, from Biar
and Sax, against Fuente de la Higuera where
Suchet’s troops were lying in wait. Previous to
this epoch Elio had earnestly urged the English
general, to disregard Del Parque altogether and
embark at once for Taragona, undertaking himself
to secure the junction with his fellow-commander.
And now, after agreeing to co-operate with Murray
he secretly withdrew his cavalry from Sax, sent
Whittingham in a false direction, placed Roche
without support at Alcoy, retired himself to the
city of Murcia, and at the same time one of his
regiments quartered at Alicant fired upon a British
guard. Roche was attacked and lost eighty men, and
Del Parque’s flank was menaced from Fuente de la
Higuera, but the British cavalry, assembling at
Biar, secured his communication with Murray on
the 25th, and the 27th the Anglo-Sicilians broke
up from their quarters to embark at Alicant.</p>

<p>The French were now very strong. Suchet unmolested
for forty days after the battle of Castalla,
had improved his defensive works, chased the
bands from his rear, called up his reinforcements,
rehorsed his cavalry and artillery, and prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5"></a>[5]</span>
for new operations, without losing the advantage
of foraging the fertile districts immediately in front
of the Xucar. On the other hand lord William
Bentinck, alarmed by intelligence of an intended
descent upon Sicily, had recalled more British
troops; and as Whittingham’s cavalry, and Roche’s
division, were left at Alicant, the force actually
embarked to attack Taragona, including a fresh
English regiment from Carthagena, scarcely exceeded
fourteen thousand present under arms. Of<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6.</a></span>
these, less than eight thousand were British or
German, and the horsemen were only seven hundred.
Yet the armament was formidable, for the
battering train was complete and powerful, the materials
for gabions and fascines previously collected at
Ivica, and the naval squadron, under admiral Hallowel,
consisted of several line-of-battle ships, frigates,
bomb-vessels and gun-boats, besides the transports.
There was however no cordiality between general
Clinton and Murray, nor between the latter and his
quarter-master-general Donkin, nor between Donkin
and the admiral; subordinate officers also, in both
services, adopting false notions, some from vanity,
some from hearsay, added to the uneasy feeling
which prevailed amongst the chiefs. Neither
admiral nor general seem to have had sanguine
hopes of success even at the moment of embarkation,
and there was in no quarter a clear understanding
of lord Wellington’s able plan for the
operations.</p>

<p>While Del Parque’s army was yet in march,
Suchet, if he had no secret understanding with Elio
or any of his officers, must have been doubtful of
the allies’ intentions, although the strength of the
battering-train at Alicant indicated some siege of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6"></a>[6]</span>
importance. He however recalled Pannetier’s brigade
from the frontier of Aragon, and placed it on
the road to Tortoza; and at the same time, knowing
Clauzel was then warring down the partidas
in Navarre, he judged Aragon safe, and drew Severoli’s
Italian brigade from thence, leaving only
the garrisons, and a few thousand men under
general Paris as a reserve at Zaragoza: and this
was the reason the army of Aragon did not co-operate
to crush Mina after his defeat by Clauzel<span class="sidenote9">Vol. V. p. 495.</span>
in the valley of Roncal. Decaen also sent some
reinforcements, wherefore, after completing his garrisons,
Suchet could furnish the drafts required by
Napoleon, and yet bring twenty thousand men into
the field. He was however very unquiet, and notwithstanding
Clauzel’s operations, in fear for his
troops in Aragon, where Paris had been attacked
by Goyan, even in Zaragoza; moreover now, for
the first time since its subjugation, an unfriendly
feeling was perceptible in Valencia.</p>

<p>On the 31st of May Murray sailed from Alicant.
Suchet immediately ordered Pannetier’s brigade to
close towards Tortoza, but kept his own positions
in front of Valencia until the fleet was seen to pass
the Grāo with a fair wind. Then feeling assured
the expedition aimed at Catalonia, he prepared to
aid that principality; but the column of succour
being drawn principally from the camp of Xativa,
forty miles from Valencia, he could not quit the
latter before the 7th of June. He took with him<span class="sidenote7">June.</span>
nine thousand men of all arms, leaving Harispe on
the Xucar, with seven thousand infantry and cavalry,
exclusive of Severoli’s troops which were
in full march from Teruel. Meanwhile sir John
Murray’s armament, having very favourable weather,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7"></a>[7]</span>
anchored on the evening of the 2d in the bay of
Taragona, whence five ships of war under captain
Adam, and two battalions of infantry with some guns
under colonel Prevot, were detached to attack San
Felippe de Balaguer.</p>

<p>The strength and value of this fort arose from its
peculiar position. The works, garrisoned by a
hundred men, were only sixty feet square, but the
site was a steep isolated rock, standing in the
very gorge of a pass, and blocking the only carriageway
from Tortoza to Taragona. The mountains on
either hand, although commanding the fort, were
nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labour was
required to form the batteries.</p>

<p>Prevot, landing on the 3d, was joined by a
Spanish brigade of Copons’ army, and in concert
with the navy immediately commenced operations
by placing two six-pounders on the heights south
of the pass, from whence at six or seven hundred
yards distance they threw shrapnel-shells; but this
projectile is, when used with guns of small calibre,
insignificant save as a round shot.</p>

<p>On the 4th two twelve-pounders, and a howitzer,
being brought to the same point by the sailors,
opened their fire, and at night the seamen with extraordinary
exertions dragged up five twenty-four-pounders
and their stores. The troops then constructed
one battery, for two howitzers, on the
slope of the grand ridge to the northward of the
pass, and a second, for four heavy guns, on the
rock where the fort stood at a distance of one
hundred and fifty yards. To form these batteries
earth was carried from below, and every thing
else, even water, brought from the ships, though the
landing place was more than a mile and a half off.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8"></a>[8]</span>
Hence, as time was valuable, favourable terms
were offered to the garrison, but the offer was refused.
The 5th the fire was continued, but with
slight success, the howitzer battery on the great
ridge was relinquished, and at night a very violent
storm retarded the construction of the breaching
batteries. Previous to this colonel Prevot had
warned Murray, that his means were insufficient,
and a second Spanish brigade was sent to him.
Yet the breaching batteries were still incomplete
on the 6th, so severe was the labour of carrying
up the guns, and out of three, already mounted, one
was disabled by a shot from the fort.</p>

<p>Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortoza,
had ordered the governor of that place to succour
San Felippe. He tried, and would undoubtedly
have succeeded, if captain Peyton, of the Thames
frigate, had not previously obtained from admiral
Hallowel two eight-inch mortars, which, being<span class="sidenote">Notes by sir Henry Peyton, R.N. MSS.</span>
placed just under the fort and worked by Mr.
James of the marine artillery, commencing at day-break
on the 7th, soon exploded a small magazine in
the fort, whereupon the garrison surrendered. The
besiegers who had lost about fifty men and officers
then occupied the place, and meanwhile sir John
Murray had commenced the</p>


<h4>SECOND SIEGE OF TARAGONA.</h4>

<p>Although the fleet cast anchor in the bay on the
evening of the 2d, the surf prevented the disembarkation
of the troops until the next day. The
rampart of the lower town had been destroyed by
Suchet, but Fort Royal remained and though in bad
condition served, together with the ruins of the San
Carlos bastion, to cover the western front which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9"></a>[9]</span>
was the weakest line of defence. The governor
Bertoletti, an Italian, was supposed by Murray to
be disaffected, but he proved himself a loyal and
energetic officer; and his garrison sixteen hundred
strong, five hundred being privateer seamen and
Franco-Spaniards, served him well.</p>

<p>The Olivo, and Loretto heights were occupied
the first day by Clinton’s and Whittingham’s divisions,
the other troops remaining on the low ground
about the Francoli river; the town was then bombarded
during the night by the navy, but the fire
was sharply returned and the flotilla suffered the most.
The next day two batteries were commenced six
hundred yards from San Carlos, and nine hundred
yards from Fort Royal. They opened the 6th, but
being too distant to produce much effect, a third
was commenced six hundred yards from Fort
Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in
that outwork, yet the assault was deferred, and
some pieces removed to play from the Olivo; whereupon
the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired
the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences.
The subsequent proceedings cannot be
understood without an accurate knowledge of the
relative positions of the French and allied armies.</p>

<p>Taragona though situated on one of a cluster of
heights, which terminate a range descending from
the northward to the sea, is, with the exception of
that range, surrounded by an open country called<span class="sidenote9">Plan, No. 1.</span>
the <em>Campo de Taragona</em>, which is again environed
by very rugged mountains, through which the several
roads descend into the plain.</p>

<p>Westward there were only two carriage ways,
one direct, by the Col de Balaguer to Taragona;
the other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet, Momblanch<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10"></a>[10]</span>
and Reus. The first was blocked by the
taking of San Felippe; the second, although used
by Suchet for his convoys during the French siege
of Taragona, was now in bad order, and at best
only available for small mountain-guns.</p>

<p>Northward there was a carriage way, leading
from Lerida, which united with that from Falcet
at Momblanch.</p>

<p>Eastward there was the royal causeway, coming
from Barcelona, through Villa Franca, Arbos, Vendrills,
and Torredembarra; this road after passing
Villa Franca sends off two branches to the right,
one passing through the Col de Cristina, the other
through Masarbones and Col de Leibra, leading
upon Braffin and Valls. It was by the latter
branch that M‘Donald passed to Reus in 1810; he
had, however, no guns or carriages, and his whole
army laboured to make the way practicable.</p>

<p>Between these various roads the mountains were
too rugged to permit any direct cross communications;
and troops, coming from different sides, could
only unite in the Campo de Taragona now occupied
by the allies. Wherefore, as Murray had,
including sergeants, above fifteen thousand fighting
men, and Copons, reinforced with two regiments
sent by sea from Coruña, was at Reus with six
thousand regulars besides the irregular division of
Manso, twenty-five thousand combatants were in
possession of the French point of junction.</p>

<p>The Catalans, after Lacy’s departure, had, with
the aid of captain Adam’s ship, destroyed two
small forts at Perillo and Ampolla, and Eroles had
blockaded San Felippe de Balaguer for thirty-six
days, but it was then succoured by Maurice Mathieu;
and the success at Perillo was more than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11"></a>[11]</span>
balanced by a check which Sarzfield received on
the 3d of April from some of Pannetier’s troops.
The partida warfare had, however, been more active
in Upper Catalonia, and Copons claimed two considerable
victories, one gained by himself on the 17th
of May, at La Bispal near the Col de Cristina, where
he boasted to have beaten six thousand French with
half their numbers, destroying six hundred, as they
returned from succouring San Felippe de Balaguer.
In the other, won by colonel Lander near Olot
on the 7th of May, it was said twelve hundred
of Lamarque’s men fell. These exploits are by
French writers called skirmishes, and the following
description of the Catalan army, given to sir John
Murray by Cabanes, the chief of Copons’ staff,
renders the French version the most credible.</p>

<p>“<em>We do not</em>,” said that officer, “<em>exceed nine or
ten thousand men, extended on different points of a
line running from the <ins class="corr" id="tn-11" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'neigbourhood of Reus'">
neighbourhood of Reus</ins> along the high mountains to the vicinity of Olot. The
soldiers are brave, but without discipline, without
subordination, without clothing, without artillery,
without ammunition, without magazines, without
money, and without means of transport!</em>”</p>

<p>Copons himself, when he came down to the
Campo, very frankly told Murray, that as his
troops could only fight in position, he would not join
in any operation which endangered his retreat into
the high mountains. However, with the exception
of twelve hundred men left at Vich under Eroles,
all his forces, the best perhaps in Spain, were now
at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to intercept
the communications of the different French
corps, and to harass their marches if they should
descend into the Campo. Murray could also calculate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12"></a>[12]</span>
upon seven or eight hundred seamen and
marines to aid him in pushing on the works of the
siege, or in a battle near the shore; and he expected
three thousand additional troops from Sicily. Sir
Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean
fleet, had promised to divert the attention
of the French troops by a descent eastward of
Barcelona, and the armies of Del Parque and
Elio were to make a like diversion westward of
Tortoza. Finally, a general rising of the Somatenes
might have been effected, and those mountaineers
were all at Murray’s disposal, to procure
intelligence, to give timely notice of the enemy’s
approach, or to impede his march by breaking up
the roads.</p>

<p>On the French side there was greater but more
scattered power. Suchet had marched with nine
thousand men from Valencia, and what with Pannetier’s
brigade and some spare troops from Tortoza,
eleven or twelve thousand men with artillery,
might have come to the succour of Taragona from
that side, if the sudden fall of San Felippe de
Balaguer had not barred the only carriage way on
the westward. A movement by Mora, Falcet, and
Momblanch, remained open, yet it would have
been tedious, and the disposable troops at Lerida
were few. To the eastward therefore the garrison
looked for the first succour. Maurice Mathieu,
reinforced with a brigade from Upper Catalonia,
could bring seven thousand men with artillery from
Barcelona, and Decaen could move from the Ampurdam
with an equal number, hence twenty-five
thousand men might finally bear upon the allied army.</p>

<p>But Suchet, measuring from the Xucar, had
more than one hundred and sixty miles to march;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13"></a>[13]</span>
Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from
various places and march seventy miles after
Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at all,
until Taragona was actually besieged, lest the allies
should reimbark and attack Barcelona. Decaen
had in like manner to look to the security of the
Ampurdam, and he was one hundred and thirty
miles distant. Wherefore, however active the
French generals might be, the English general
could calculate upon ten days’ clear operations,
after investment, before even the heads of the enemy’s
columns, coming from different quarters, could
issue from the hills bordering the Campo.</p>

<p>Some expectation also he might have, that Suchet
would endeavour to cripple Del Parque,
before he marched to the succour of Taragona;
and it was in his favour, that eastward and westward,
the royal causeway was in places exposed
to the fire of the naval squadron. The experience
of captain Codrington during the first siege of
Taragona, had proved indeed, that an army could
not be stopped by this fire, yet it was an impediment
not to be left out of the calculation. Thus,
the advantage of a central position, the possession
of the enemy’s point of junction, the initial movement,
the good will of the people, and the aid of
powerful flank diversions, belonged to Murray;
superior numbers and a better army to the French,
since the allies, brave, and formidable to fight in
a position, were not well constituted for general
operations.</p>

<p>Taragona, if the resources for an internal defence
be disregarded, was a weak place. A simple
revetment three feet and a half thick, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14"></a>[14]</span>
ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the
two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight
obstacles at best, were not armed, nor even repaired
until after the investment, and the garrison,
too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed
with labour. Here then, time being precious to
both sides, ordinary rules should have been set
aside and daring operations adopted. Lord Wellington<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6.</a></span>
had judged ten thousand men sufficient to
take Taragona. Murray brought seventeen thousand,
of which fourteen thousand were effective.
To do this he had, he said, so reduced his equipments,
stores, and means of land transport, that
his army could not move from the shipping; he
was yet so unready for the siege, that Fort Royal
was not stormed on the 8th, because the engineer
was unprepared to profit from a successful assault.</p>

<p>This excuse, founded on the scarcity of stores, was
not however borne out by facts. The equipments
left behind, were only draft animals and commissariat
field-stores; the thing wanting was vigour in the
general, and this was made manifest in various
ways. Copons, like all regular Spanish officers, was
averse to calling out the Somatenes, and Murray
did not press the matter. Suchet took San Felippe
de Balaguer by escalade. Murray attacked in form,
and without sufficient means; for if captain Peyton
had not brought up the mortars, which was an afterthought,
extraneous to the general’s arrangements,
the fort could not have been reduced before succour
arrived from Tortoza. Indeed the surrender was
scarcely creditable to the French commandant, for
his works were uninjured, and only a small part of
his powder destroyed. It is also said, I believe<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15"></a>[15]</span>
truly, that one of the officers employed to regulate the
capitulation had in his pocket, an order from Murray
to raise the siege and embark, spiking the guns!
At Taragona, the troops on the low ground, did
not approach so near, by three hundred yards, as
they might have done; and the outworks should have
been stormed at once, as Wellington stormed Fort
Francisco at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Francisco
was a good outwork and complete. The outworks
of Taragona were incomplete, ill-flanked, without
palisades or casements, and their fall would have
enabled the besiegers to form a parallel against the
body of the place as Suchet had done in the former
siege; a few hours’ firing would then have brought
down the wall and a general assault might have
been delivered. The French had stormed a similar
breach in that front, although defended by eight
thousand Spanish troops, and the allies opposed by
only sixteen hundred French and Italians, soldiers
and seamen, were in some measure bound by honour
to follow that example, since colonel Skerrett, at the
former siege, refused to commit twelve hundred
British troops in the place, on the special ground
that it was indefensible, though so strongly garrisoned.
Murray’s troops were brave, they had
been acting together for nearly a year; and after
the fight at Castalla had become so eager, that an
Italian regiment, which at Alicant, was ready to go
over bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead
the assault on Fort Royal. This confidence was
not shared by their general. Even at the moment
of victory, he had resolved, if Suchet advanced a
second time, to relinquish the position of Castalla
and retire to Alicant!</p>

<p>It is clear, that, up to the 8th, sir John Murray’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16"></a>[16]</span>
proceedings were ill-judged, and his after operations,
were more injudicious.</p>

<p>As early as the 5th, false reports had made Suchet
reach Tortoza, and had put two thousand French in
movement from Lerida. Murray then openly avowed
his alarm and his regret at having left Alicant; yet
he proceeded to construct two heavy counter-batteries
near the Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls in
observation of the Lerida road, and desired Manso
to watch that of Barcelona.</p>

<p>On the 9th his emissaries said the French were
coming from the east, and from the west; and
would, when united, exceed twenty thousand.
Murray immediately sought an interview with the
admiral, declaring his intention to raise the siege;
his views were changed during the conference but
he was discontented; and the two commanders
were now evidently at variance, for Hallowel refused
to join in a summons to the governor, and his flotilla
again bombarded the place.</p>

<p>The 10th the spies in Barcelona gave notice that
eight or ten thousand French with fourteen guns,
would march from that city the next day. Copons
immediately joined Manso, and Murray, as if he
now disdained his enemy, continued to disembark
stores, landed several mortars, armed the batteries
at the Olivo, and on the 11th opened their fire, in
concert with that from the ships of war.</p>

<p>This was the first serious attack, and the English
general, professing a wish to fight the column
coming from Barcelona, sent the cavalry under lord
Frederick Bentinck to Altafalla, and in person
sought a position of battle to the eastward. He left
orders to storm the outworks that night, but returned,
before the hour appointed, extremely disturbed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17"></a>[17]</span>
by intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at Villa
Franca with eight thousand combatants, and Suchet
closing upon the Col de Balaguer. The infirmity
of his mind was now apparent to the whole army.
At eight o’clock he repeated his order to assault
the outworks; at ten o’clock the storming party
was in the dry bed of the Francoli, awaiting the
signal, when a countermand arrived; the siege was
then to be raised and the guns removed immediately
from the Olivo; the commander of the artillery remonstrated,
and the general then promised to hold
the batteries until the next night. Meanwhile the
detachment at Valls and the cavalry at Altafalla
were called in, without any notice to general Copons,
though he depended on their support.</p>

<p>The parc and all the heavy guns of the batteries
on the low grounds were removed to the beach for
embarkation on the morning of the 12th, and at
twelve o’clock lord Frederick Bentinck arrived
from Altafalla with the cavalry. It is said he was
ordered to shoot his horses, but refused to obey, and
moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The detachment
from Valls arrived next, and the infantry
marched to Cape Salou to embark, but the horsemen
followed lord Frederick, and were themselves followed
by fourteen pieces of artillery; each body moved independently,
and all was confused, incoherent, afflicting,
and dishonorable to the British arms.</p>

<p>While the seamen were embarking the guns, the
quarter-master-general came down to the beach,
with orders to abandon that business and collect
boats for the reception of troops, the enemy being
supposed close at hand; and notwithstanding
Murray’s promise to hold the Olivo until nightfall,
fresh directions were given to spike the guns there,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18"></a>[18]</span>
and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose
on every side, and from both services; army and
navy were alike indignant, and so excited, that it is
said personal insult was offered to the general.
Three staff-officers repaired in a body to Murray’s
quarters, to offer plans and opinions, and the admiral
who it would appear did not object to raising
the siege but to the manner of doing it, would not
suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation of
artillery. He even urged an attack upon the column
coming from Barcelona, and opposed the order to
spike the guns at the Olivo, offering to be responsible
for carrying all clear off during the night.</p>

<p>Thus pressed, Murray again wavered. Denying
that he had ordered the battering pieces to be
spiked, he sent counter-orders, and directed a
part of Clinton’s troops to advance towards the
Gaya river. Yet a few hours afterwards he reverted
to his former resolution, and peremptorily renewed
the order for the artillery to spike the guns on the
Olivo, and burn the carriages. Nor was even this
unhappy action performed without confusion. The
different orders received by Clinton in the course of
the day had indicated the extraordinary vacillation
of the commander-in-chief, and Clinton himself,
forgetful of his own arrangements, with an obsolete
courtesy took off his hat to salute an enemy’s
battery which had fired upon him; but this waving
of his hat from that particular spot was also the conventional
signal for the artillery to spike the guns, and
they were thus spiked prematurely. The troops were
however all embarked in the night of the 12th, and
many of the stores and horses were shipped on the 13th
without the slightest interruption from the enemy;
but eighteen or nineteen battering pieces, whose carriages<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19"></a>[19]</span>
had been burnt, were, with all the platforms,
fascines, gabions, and small ammunition, in view of
the fleet and army, triumphantly carried into the
fortress. Sir J. Murray meanwhile seemingly unaffected<span class="sidenote">Admiral Hallowel’s evidence on the trial.</span>
by this misfortune, shipped himself on the
evening of the 12th and took his usual repose in bed.</p>

<p>While the English general was thus precipitately
abandoning the siege, the French generals, unable
to surmount the obstacles opposed to their junction,
unable even to communicate by their emissaries,
were despairing of the safety of Taragona. Suchet
did not reach Tortoza before the 10th, but a detachment
from the garrison, had on the 8th attempted
to succour San Felipe, and nearly captured
the naval captain Adam, colonel Prevot, and
other officers, who were examining the country.
On the other side Maurice Mathieu, having gathered
troops from various places, reached Villa Franca
early on the 10th, and deceiving even his own people<span class="sidenote">Laffaille Campagne de Catalonia.</span>
as to his numbers, gave out that Decaen, who he
really expected, was close behind with a powerful
force. To give effect to this policy, he drove Copons
from Arbos on the 11th, and his scouting parties
entered Vendrills, as if he was resolved singly to
attack Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had however
landed his marines at Rosas, which arrested
Decaen’s march; and Maurice Mathieu alarmed at
the cessation of fire about Taragona, knowing nothing
of Suchet’s movements, and too weak to fight
the allies alone, fell back in the night of the 12th
to the Llobregat, his main body never having
passed Villa Franca.</p>

<p>Suchet’s operations to the westward were even
less decisive. His advanced guard under Panettier,
reached Perillo the 10th. The 11th not hearing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20"></a>[20]</span>
from his spies, he caused Panettier to pass by his
left over the mountains through Valdillos to some
heights which terminate abruptly on the Campo,
above Monroig. The 12th that officer reached the
extreme verge of the hills, being then about twenty-five
miles from Taragona. His patroles descending
into the plains, met with lord Frederick Bentinck’s
troopers reported that Murray’s whole army
was at hand, wherefore he would not enter the
Campo, but at night he kindled large fires to encourage
the garrison of Taragona. These signals
were however unobserved, the country people had
disappeared, no intelligence could be procured,
and Suchet could not follow him with a large force
into those wild desert hills, where there was no water.
Thus on both sides of Taragona the succouring
armies were quite baffled at the moment chosen by
Murray for flight.</p>

<p>Suchet now received alarming intelligence from
Valencia, yet still anxious for Taragona, he pushed,
on the 14th, along the coast-road towards San
Felippe de Balaguer, thinking to find Prevôt’s division
alone; but the head of his column was suddenly
cannonaded by the Thames frigate, and he
was wonderfully surprised to see the whole British
fleet anchored off San Felippe, and disembarking
troops. Murray’s operations were indeed as irregular
as those of a partizan, yet without partizan
vigour. He had heard in the night of the 12th,
from colonel Prevôt, of Panettier’s march to Monroig,
and to protect the cavalry and guns under
lord Frederick Bentinck, sent Mackenzie’s division
by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with
the whole army on the 14th. Mackenzie drove
back the French posts on both sides of the pass, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21"></a>[21]</span>
embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then commenced,
and Suchet, still uncertain if Taragona
had fallen, moved towards Valdillos to bring off
Panettier.</p>

<p>At this precise period, Murray heard that Maurice
Mathieu’s column, which he always erroneously
supposed to be under Decaen, had retired to the
Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and that
Taragona had not been reinforced. Elated by this
information, he revolved various projects in his
mind, at one time thinking to fall upon Suchet, at
another to cut off Panettier, now resolving to
march upon Cambrills, and even to menace Taragona
again by land; then he was for sending a
detachment by sea to surprise the latter, but finally
he disembarked his whole force on the 15th, and
being ignorant of Suchet’s last movement decided
to strike at Panettier. In this view, he detached<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_01">See Plan, No. 1.</a></span>
Mackenzie, by a rugged valley leading from the
eastward to Valdillos, and that officer reached it on
the 16th, but Suchet had already carried off Panettier’s
brigade, and the next day the British
detachment was recalled by Murray, who now only
thought of re-embarking.</p>

<p>This determination was caused by a fresh alarm
from the eastward, for Maurice Mathieu, whose
whole proceedings evinced both skill and vigour,
hearing that the siege of Taragona was raised, and
the allies re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, retraced
his steps and boldly entered Cambrills the 17th.
On that day, however, Mackenzie returned, and
Murray’s whole army was thus concentrated in the
pass. Suchet was then behind Perillo, Copons at
Reus, having come there at Murray’s desire to
attack Maurice Mathieu, and the latter would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22"></a>[22]</span>
suffered, if the English general had been capable of
a vigorous stroke. On the other hand it was fortunate
for Mackenzie, that Suchet, too anxious for
Valencia, disregarded his movement upon Valdillos;
but, taught by the disembarkation of the whole English
army that the fate of Taragona, whether for
good or evil, was decided, he had sent an emissary
to Maurice Mathieu on the 16th, and then retired
to Perillo and Amposta. He reached the latter
place the 17th, attentive only to the movement of
the fleet, and meanwhile Maurice Mathieu endeavoured
to surprize the Catalans at Reus.</p>

<p>Copons was led into this danger by sir John
Murray, who had desired him to harass Maurice
Mathieu’s rear, with a view to a general attack, and
then changed his plan without giving the Spanish
general any notice. However he escaped. The
French moved upon Taragona, and Murray was left
free to embark or to remain at the Col de Balaguer.
He called a council of war, and it was concluded to
re-embark, but at that moment, the great Mediterranean
fleet appeared in the offing, and admiral
Hallowel, observing a signal announcing lord
William Bentinck’s arrival, answered with more
promptitude than propriety, “<em>we are all delighted</em>.”</p>

<p>Sir John Murray’s command having thus terminated,
the general discontent rendered it impossible
to avoid a public investigation, yet the difficulty of
holding a court in Spain, and some disposition at
home to shield him, caused great delay. He was
at last tried in England. Acquitted of two charges,
on the third he was declared guilty of an error in
judgement, and sentenced to be admonished; but
even that slight mortification was not inflicted.</p>

<p>This decision does not preclude the judgement of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23"></a>[23]</span>
history, nor will it sway that of posterity. The
court-martial was assembled twenty months after the
event, when the war being happily terminated,
men’s minds were little disposed to treat past failures
with severity. There were two distinct prosecutors,
having different views; the proceedings
were conducted at a distance from the scene of
action, defects of memory could not be remedied by
references to localities, and a door was opened for
contradiction and doubt upon important points.
There was no indication that the members of the
court were unanimous in their verdict; they were
confined to specific charges, restricted by legal rules
of evidence, and deprived of the testimony of all
the Spanish officers, who were certainly discontented
with Murray’s conduct, and whose absence caused
the serious charge of abandoning Copons’ army
to be suppressed. Moreover the warmth of temper
displayed by the principal prosecutor, admiral
Hallowel, together with his signal on lord William
Bentinck’s arrival, whereby, to the detriment of discipline,
he manifested his contempt for the general
with whom he was acting, gave Murray an advantage
which he improved skilfully, for he was a man
sufficiently acute and prompt when not at the head
of an army. He charged the admiral with deceit,
factious dealings, and disregard of the service;
described him as a man of a passionate overweening,
busy disposition, troubled with excess of vanity,
meddling with everything, and thinking himself
competent to manage both troops and ships.</p>

<p>Nevertheless sir John Murray had signally failed,
both as an independent general, and as a lieutenant
acting under superior orders. On his trial,
blending these different capacities together, with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24"></a>[24]</span>
expert sophistry he pleaded his instructions in
excuse for his errors as a free commander, and his
discretionary power in mitigation of his disobedience
as a lieutenant; but his operations were indefensible
in both capacities. Lord Wellington’s instructions,
precise, and founded upon the advantages
offered by a command of the sea, prescribed
an attack upon Taragona, with a definite object,
namely, to deliver Valencia.</p>

<p>“<em>You tell me</em>,” said he, “<em>that the line of the
Xucar, which covers Valencia, is too strong to force;
turn it then by the ocean, assail the rear of the
enemy, and he will weaken his strong line to protect
his communication; or, he will give you an opportunity
to establish a new base of operations behind
him.</em>”</p>

<p>This plan however demanded promptness and
energy, and Murray professed neither. The weather
was so favourable, that a voyage which might
have consumed nine or ten days was performed in
two, the Spanish troops punctually effected their
junction, the initial operations were secured, Fort
Balaguer fell, the French moved from all sides to
the succour of Taragona, the line of the Xucar was
weakened, the diversion was complete. In the
night of the 12th the bulk of Murray’s army was
again afloat, a few hours would have sufficed to
embark the cavalry at the Col de Balaguer, and
the whole might have sailed for the city of Valencia,
while Suchet’s advanced guard was still on the
hills above Monroig, and he, still uncertain as to
the fate of Taragona, one hundred and fifty miles
from the Xucar. In fine Murray had failed to
attain the first object pointed out by Wellington’s
instructions, but the second was within his reach;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25"></a>[25]</span>
instead of grasping it he loitered about the Col de
Balaguer, and gave Suchet, as we shall find, time
to reach Valencia again.</p>

<p>Now whether the letter or the spirit of Wellington’s
instructions be considered, there was here a
manifest dereliction on the part of Murray. What
was that officer’s defence? That no specific period
being named for his return to Valencia, he was
entitled to exercise his discretion! Did he then
as an independent general perform any useful or
brilliant action to justify his delay? No! his tale
was one of loss and dishonour! The improvident
arrangements for the siege of San Felippe de Balaguer,
and the unexpected fortune which saved him
from the shame of abandoning his guns there also
have been noted; and it has been shown, that when
the gain of time was the great element of success,
he neither urged Copons to break up the roads, nor
pushed the siege of Taragona with vigour. The
feeble formality of this latter operation has indeed<span class="sidenote">Defence of sir J. Murray in Phillipart’s Military Calendar.</span>
been imputed to the engineer major Thackary,
yet unjustly so. It was the part of that officer to
form a plan of attack agreeable to the rules of art,
it might be a bold or a cautious plan, and many
persons did think Taragona was treated by him with
too much respect; but it was the part of the commander-in-chief,
to decide, if the general scheme
of operations required a deviation from the regular
course. The untrammelled engineer could then
have displayed his genius. Sir John Murray made
no sign. His instructions and his ultimate views
were withheld alike, from his naval colleague, from
his second in command, and from his quarter-master-general;
and while the last-named functionary
was quite shut out from the confidence of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26"></a>[26]</span>
his commander, the admiral, and many others,
both of the army and navy, imagined him to be
the secret author of the proceedings which were
hourly exciting their indignation. Murray however
declared on his trial, that he had rejected
general Donkin’s advice, an avowal consonant to
facts, since that officer urged him to raise the siege
on the 9th and had even told him where four hundred
draught bullocks were to be had, to transport
his heavy artillery. On the 12th he opposed the
spiking of the guns, and urged Murray to drag
them to Cape Salou, of which place he had given
as early as the third day of the siege, a military
plan, marking a position, strong in itself, covering
several landing places, and capable of being flanked<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_01">See Plan, No. 1.</a></span>
on both sides by the ships of war: it had no drawback
save a scarcity of water, yet there were some
springs, and the fleet would have supplied the
deficiency.</p>

<p>It is true that Donkin, unacquainted with Wellington’s
instructions, and having at Castalla seen
no reason to rely on sir John Murray’s military
vigour, was averse to the enterprize against Taragona.
He thought the allies should have worked
Suchet out of Valencia by operating on his right
flank. And so Wellington would have thought,
if he had only looked at their numbers and not at
their quality; he had even sketched such a plan<span class="sidenote9">Vol. V. p. 512.</span>
for Murray, if the attack upon Taragona should be
found impracticable. But he knew the Spaniards
too well, to like such combinations for an army,
two-thirds of which were of that nation, and not
even under one head; an army ill-equipped, and
with the exception of Del Parque’s troops, unused
to active field operations. Wherefore, calculating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27"></a>[27]</span>
their power with remarkable nicety, he preferred
the sea-flank, and the aid of an English fleet.</p>

<p>Here it may be observed, that Napoleon’s plan
of invasion did not embrace the coast-lines where
they could be avoided. It was an obvious disadvantage
to give the British navy opportunities of
acting against his communications. The French
indeed, seized Santona and Santander in the Bay of
Biscay, because, these being the only good ports on
that coast, the English ships were thus in a manner
shut out from the north of Spain. They likewise
worked their invasion by the Catalonian and Valencian
coast, because the only roads practicable for
artillery run along that sea-line; but their general
scheme was to hold, with large masses, the interior
of the country, and keep their communications
aloof from the danger of combined operations by
sea and land. The providence of the plan was
proved by Suchet’s peril on this occasion.</p>

<p>Sir John Murray, when tried, grounded his justification
on the following points. 1º. That he did
not know with any certainty until the night of the
11th that Suchet was near. 2º. That the fall of
Taragona being the principal object, and the drawing
of the French from Valencia the accessary, he
persisted in the siege, because he expected reinforcements
from Sicily, and desired to profit from
the accidents of war. 3º. That looking only to the
second object, the diversion would have been incomplete,
if the siege had been raised sooner, or
even relaxed; hence the landing of guns and stores
after he despaired of success. 4º. That he dared
not risk a battle to save his battering train, because
Wellington would not pardon a defeat. Now had
he adopted a vigorous plan, or persisted until the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28"></a>[28]</span>
danger of losing his army was apparent, and then
made a quick return to Valencia, this defence would
have been plausible, though inconclusive. But
when every order, every movement, every expression,
discovered his infirmity of purpose, his pleading
can only be regarded as the subtle tale of an
advocate.</p>

<p>The fault was not so much in the raising of the
siege as in the manner of doing it, and in the feebleness
of the attack. For first, however numerous
the chances of war are, fortresses expecting succour
do not surrender without being vigorously assailed.
The arrival of reinforcements from Sicily was too
uncertain for reasonable calculation, and it was
scarcely possible for the governor of Taragona,
while closely invested, to discover that no fresh
stores or guns were being landed; still less could
he judge so timeously of Murray’s final intention
by that fact, as to advertize Suchet that Taragona
was in no danger. Neither were the spies, if any
were in the allies’ camp, more capable of drawing
such conclusions, seeing that sufficient artillery
and stores for the siege were landed the first week.
And the landing of more guns could not have deceived
them, when the feeble operations of the
general, and the universal discontent, furnished
surer guides for their reports.</p>

<p>Murray designed to raise the siege as early as
the 9th and only deferred it, after seeing the
admiral, from his natural vacillation. It was therefore
mere casuistry to say, that he first obtained
certain information of Suchet’s advance on the
night of the 11th. On the 8th and 10th through
various channels he knew the French marshal was
in march for Tortoza, and that his advanced guard<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29"></a>[29]</span>
menaced the Col de Balaguer. The approach of
Maurice Mathieu on the other side was also known;
he should therefore have been prepared to raise the
siege without the loss of his guns on the 12th.
Why were they lost at all? They could not be
saved, he said, without risking a battle in a bad
position, and Wellington had declared he would
not pardon a defeat! This was the after-thought of
a sophister, and not warranted by Wellington’s instructions,
which on that head, referred only to the
duke Del Parque and Elio.</p>

<p>But was it necessary to fight a battle in a bad
position to save the guns? All persons admitted
that they could have been embarked before mid-day
on the 13th. Panettier was then at Monroig,
Suchet still behind Perillo, Maurice Mathieu
falling back from Villa Franca. The French on
each side were therefore respectively thirty-six and
thirty-four miles distant on the night of the 12th,
and their point of junction was Reus. Yet how
form that junction? The road from Villa Franca by
the Col de Cristina was partially broken up by
Copons, the road from Perillo to Reus was always
impracticable for artillery, and from the latter place
to Taragona was six miles of very rugged country.
The allies were in possession of the point of junction,
Maurice Mathieu was retiring, not advancing.
And if the French could have marched thirty-four
and thirty-six miles, through the mountains in one
night, and been disposed to attack in the morning
without artillery, they must still have ascertained
the situation of Murray’s army; they must have
made arrangements to watch Copons, Manso, and
Prevôt, who would have been on their rear and
flanks; they must have formed an order of battle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30"></a>[30]</span>
and decided upon the mode of attack before they
advanced. It is true that their junction at Reus
would have forced Murray to suspend his embarkation
to fight; but not, as he said, in a bad position,
with his back to the beach, where the ships’
guns could not aid him, and where he might expect
a dangerous surf for days. The naval officers
denied the danger from surf at that season of the
year; and it was not right to destroy the guns and
stores when the enemy was not even in march for
Reus. Coolness and consideration would have
enabled Murray to see that there was no danger.
In fact no emissaries escaped from the town, and
the enemy had no spies in the camp, since no communication
took place between the French columns
until the 17th. On the 15th Suchet knew nothing
of the fate of Taragona.</p>

<p>The above reasoning leaves out the possibility of
profiting from a central position to fall with superior
forces upon one of the French columns. It
supposes however that accurate information was
possessed by the French generals; that Maurice
Mathieu was as strong as he pretended to be,
Suchet eager and resolute to form a junction with
him. But in truth Suchet knew not what to do
after the fall of Fort Balaguer, Maurice Mathieu
had less than seven thousand men of all arms, he
was not followed by Decaen, and he imagined the
allies to have twenty thousand men, exclusive of
the Catalans. Besides which the position at Cape
Salou was only six miles distant, and Murray might
with the aid of the draft bullocks discovered by
Donkin, have dragged all his heavy guns there,
still maintaining the investment; he might have
shipped his battery train, and when the enemy approached<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31"></a>[31]</span>
Reus, have marched to the Col de Balaguer,
where he could, as he afterwards did, embark
or disembark in the presence of the enemy. The
danger of a flank march, Suchet being at Reus,
could not have deterred him, because he did send
his cavalry and field artillery by that very road on
the 12th, when the French advanced guard was at
Monroig and actually skirmished with lord Frederick
Bentinck. Finally he could have embarked
his main body, leaving a small corps with some
cavalry to keep the garrison in check and bring off
his guns. Such a detachment, together with the
heavy guns, would have been afloat in a couple of<span class="sidenote">Naval evidence on the trial.</span>
hours and on board the ships in four hours; it
could have embarked on the open beach, or, if
fearful of being molested by the garrison, might
have marched to Cape Salou, or to the Col de
Balaguer; and if the guns had thus been lost, the
necessity would have been apparent, and the dishonour
lessened. It is clear therefore that there
was no military need to sacrifice the battery pieces.
And those were the guns that shook the bloody
ramparts of Badajos!</p>

<p>Wellington felt their loss keenly, sir John Murray
spoke of them lightly. “<em>They were of small value, old
iron! he attached little importance to the sacrifice of
artillery, it was his principle, he had approved of colonel
Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also desired
colonel Prevôt, if pressed, to abandon his battering
train before the Fort of Balaguer.</em>” “<em>Such doctrine
might appear strange to a British army, but it was
the rule with the continental armies and the French
owed much of their successes to the adoption of it.</em>”</p>

<p>Strange indeed! Great commanders have risked
their own lives, and sacrificed their bravest men,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32"></a>[32]</span>
charging desperately in person, to retrieve even a
single piece of cannon in a battle. They knew the
value of moral force in war, and that of all the
various springs and levers on which it depends
military honour is the most powerful. No! it was
not to the adoption of such a doctrine, that the
French owed their great successes. It was to the
care with which Napoleon fostered and cherished a
contrary feeling. Sir John Murray’s argument
would have been more pungent, more complete, if
he had lost his colours, and pleaded that they were
only wooden staves, bearing old pieces of silk!</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33"></a>[33]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_II">CHAPTER II.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">Lord William Bentinck arrived without troops, for,<span class="sidenote9">1813. June.</span>
having removed the queen from Sicily, he feared
internal dissension and Napoleon had directed
Murat to invade the island with twenty thousand
men, the Toulon squadron being to act in concert.
Sir Edward Pellew admitted that the latter might
easily gain twenty-four hours’ start of his fleet, and
lord William judged that ten thousand invaders
would suffice to conquer. Murat however, opened
a secret negociation, and thus, that monarch, Bernadotte,
and the emperor Francis endeavoured to
destroy a hero connected with them by marriage
and to whom they all owed their crowns either by
gift or clemency!</p>

<p>This early defection of Murat is certain, and his<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_I">Appendix, No. 1.</a></span>
declaration that he had instructions to invade Sicily
was corroborated by a rumour, rife in the French
camps before the battle of Vittoria, that the Toulon
fleet had sailed and the descent actually made.
Nevertheless there is some obscurity about the
matter. The negociation was never completed,
Murat left Italy to command Napoleon’s cavalry and
at the battle of Dresden contributed much to the
success of that day. Now it is conceivable that he
should mask his plans by joining the grand army,
and that his fiery spirit should in the battle forget
everything except victory. But to disobey Napoleon’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34"></a>[34]</span>
orders as to the invasion of Sicily and dare to
face that monarch immediately after, was so unlikely
as to indicate rather a paper demonstration to alarm
lord Wellington than a real attack. And it would
seem from the short observation of the latter in
answer to lord William Bentinck’s detailed communication
on this subject, namely “<em>Sicily is in no
danger</em>,” that he viewed it so, or thought it put forward
by Murat to give more value to his defection.
However it sufficed to hinder reinforcements going
to Murray.</p>

<p>Lord William Bentinck on landing was informed
that Suchet was at Tortoza with from eight to twelve
thousand men, Maurice Mathieu with seven thousand
at Cambrils. To drive the latter back and
re-invest Taragona was easy, and the place would
have fallen because the garrison had exhausted all
their powder in the first siege; but this lord William
did not know, and to renew the attack vigorously
was impossible, because all the howitzers and platforms
and fascines had been lost, and the animals
and general equipment of the army were too much
deteriorated by continual embarkations, and disembarkations,
to keep the field in Catalonia. Wherefore
he resolved to return to Alicant, not without
hope still to fulfil Wellington’s instructions by
landing at Valencia between Suchet and Harispe.
The re-embarkation was unmolested, the fort of
Balaguer was destroyed, and one regiment of Whittingham’s
division, destined to reinforce Copons’
army, being detached to effect a landing northward
of Barcelona, the fleet put to sea; but misfortune
continued to pursue this unhappy armament.
A violent tempest impeded the voyage, fourteen
sail of transports struck upon the sands off the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35"></a>[35]</span>
mouth of the Ebro, and the army was not entirely
disembarked at Alicant before the 27th. Meanwhile
marshal Suchet, seeing the English fleet under sail
and taught by the destruction of the fort of Balaguer,
that the allies had relinquished operations in Lower
Catalonia, marched with such extraordinary diligence
as to reach Valencia in forty-eight hours
after quitting Tortoza, thus frustrating lord William’s
project of landing at Valencia.</p>

<p>During his absence Harispe had again proved
the weakness of the Spanish armies, and demonstrated
the sagacity and prudence of lord Wellington.
That great man’s warning about defeat was
distinctly addressed to the Spanish generals, because
the chief object of the operations was not to defeat
Suchet but to keep him from aiding the French
armies in the north. Pitched battles were therefore
to be avoided their issue being always doubtful,
and the presence of a numerous and increasing
force on the front and flank of the French was more
sure to obtain the end in view. But all Spanish
generals desired to fight great battles, soothing their
national pride by attributing defeats to want of
cavalry. It was at first doubtful if Murray could
transport his horsemen to Taragona, and if left
behind they would have been under Elio and Del
Parque, whereby those officers would have been
encouraged to fight. Hence the English general’s
menacing intimation. And he also considered that
as the army of Del Parque had been for three
years in continued activity under Ballesteros without
being actually dispersed, it must be more capable
than Elio’s in the dodging warfare suitable for
Spaniards. Moreover Elio was best acquainted
with the country between the Xucar and Alicant.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36"></a>[36]</span>
Wherefore Del Parque was directed to turn the
enemy’s right flank by Requeña, Elio to menace
the front, which, adverting to the support and protection
furnished by Alicant and the mountains
behind Castalla, was the least dangerous operation.</p>

<p>But to trust Spanish generals was to trust the
winds and the clouds. General Elio persuaded the
duke Del Parque to adopt the front attack, took
the flank line himself, and detached general Mijares
to fall upon Requeña. And though Suchet had
weakened his line on the 2d of June, Del Parque
was not ready until the 9th, thus giving the French
a week for the relief of Taragona, and for the
arrival of Severoli at Liria.</p>

<p>At this time Harispe had about eight thousand men
of all arms in front of the Xucar. The Spaniards,
including Roche’s and Mijares’ divisions and Whittingham’s
cavalry, were twenty-five thousand strong;
and the Empecinado, Villa Campa, and the Frayle,
Nebot, waited in the Cuenca and Albaracyn mountains
to operate on the French rear. Notwithstanding
this disproportion, the contest was short,
and for the Spaniards, disastrous. They advanced
in three columns. Elio, by the pass of Almanza;
Del Parque by Villena and Fuente de la Higuera
menacing Moxente; Roche and the prince of Anglona
from Alcoy, by Onteniente and the pass of
Albayda, menacing San Felippe de Xativa and
turning Moxente.</p>

<p>Harispe abandoned those camps on the 11th,
and took the line of the Xucar, occupying the entrenchments
in front of his bridges at Alcira and
Barca del Rey, near Alberique; and during this retrograde
movement general Mesclop, commanding the
rear-guard, being pressed by the Spanish horsemen,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37"></a>[37]</span>
wheeled round and drove them in great confusion
upon the infantry.</p>

<p>On the 15th Mijares took the fort of Requeña,
thus turning the line of the Xucar, and securing
the defiles of Cabrillas through which the Cuenca
road leads to Valencia. Villa Campa immediately
joined him thereby preventing Severoli from uniting
with Harispe, and meanwhile Del Parque, after
razing the French works at Moxente and San Felippe,
advanced towards Alcira in two columns, the
one moving by the road of Cargagente, the other
by the road of Gandia. General Habert overthrew
the first with one shock, took five hundred prisoners,
and marched to attack the other, but it was already
routed by general Gudin. After this contest Del
Parque and Harispe maintained their respective
positions, while Elio joined Mijares at Requeña.
Villa Campa then descended to Chiva, and Harispe’s
position was becoming critical, when on the
23d the head of Suchet’s column coming from the
Ebro entered Valencia, and on the 24th Del
Parque resumed the position of Castalla.</p>

<p>Thus in despite of Wellington’s precautions
every thing turned contrary to his designs. Elio
had operated by the flank, Del Parque by the front,
and the latter was defeated because he attacked the
enemy in an entrenched position. Murray had
failed entirely. His precipitancy at Taragona and
his delays at Balaguer were alike hurtful, and
would have caused the destruction of one or both
of the Spanish armies but for the battle of Vittoria.
For Suchet, having first detached general Musnier
to recover the fort of Requeña and drive back Villa
Campa, had assembled the bulk of his forces in his
old positions, of San Felippe and Moxente, before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38"></a>[38]</span>
the return of the Anglo-Sicilian troops; and as
Elio, unable to subsist at Utiel, had then returned
towards his former quarters, the French marshal
was upon the point of striking a fatal blow against
him, or Del Parque, or both, when the news of
Wellington’s victory averted the danger.</p>

<p>Here the firmness, the activity and coolness of
Suchet, may be contrasted with the infirmity of
purpose displayed by Murray. Slow in attack,
precipitate in retreat, the English commander always
mistimed his movements; the French marshal doubled
his force by rapidity. The latter was isolated
by the operations of lord Wellington; his communication
with Aragon was interrupted, and that province
placed in imminent danger; the communication
between Valencia and Catalonia was exposed
to the attacks of the Anglo-Sicilian army and the
fleet; nearly thirty thousand Spaniards menaced
him on the Xucar in front; Villa Campa, the Frayle
and the Empecinado could bring ten thousand men
on his right flank; yet he did not hesitate to leave
Harispe with only seven or eight thousand men to
oppose the Spaniards, while with the remainder of
his army he relieved Taragona and yet returned in
time to save Valencia.</p>

<p>Such was the state of affairs when lord William
Bentinck brought the Anglo-Sicilian troops once
more to Alicant. His first care was to re-organize
the means of transport for the commissariat and
artillery, but this was a matter of difficulty. Sir
John Murray, with a mischievous economy, and
strange disregard of that part of Wellington’s instructions,
which proscribed active field operations
in Valencia if he should be forced to return from
Catalonia, had discharged six hundred mules, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39"></a>[39]</span>
two hundred country carts, that is to say five-sixths
of the whole field equipment, before he sailed for
Taragona. The army was thus crippled, while
Suchet gathered strong in front, and Musnier’s division
retaking Requeña forced the Spaniards to
retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del
Parque to advance meanwhile from Castalla, but he
had not means of carrying even one day’s biscuit,
and at the same time Elio pressed by famine went
off towards Cuenca. It was not until the 1st of
July that the Anglo-Sicilian troops could even
advance towards Alcoy.</p>

<p>Lord William Bentinck commanded the Spanish<span class="sidenote7">July.</span>
armies as well as his own, and letters passed between
him and lord Wellington relative to further operations.
The latter, keeping to his original views,
advised a renewed attack on Taragona or on Tortoza,
if the ordnance still in possession of the army
would admit of such a measure; but supposing this
could not be, he recommended a general advance
to seize the open country of Valencia, the British
keeping close to the sea and in constant communication
with the fleet.</p>

<p>Lord William’s views were different. He found
the Spanish soldiers robust and active, but their
regimental officers bad, and their organization generally
so deficient that they could not stand against
even a small French force, as proved by their recent
defeat at Alcira. The generals however pleased
him at first, especially Del Parque, that is, like all
Spaniards, they had fair words at command, and
lord William Bentinck without scanning very nicely
their deeds, thought he could safely undertake a
grand stragetic operation in conjunction with them.</p>

<p>To force the line of the Xucar he deemed unadvisable,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40"></a>[40]</span>
inasmuch as there were only two carriage
roads, both of which led to Suchet’s entrenched
bridges; and though the river was fordable the enemy’s
bank was so favourable for defence as to render
the passage by force dangerous. The Anglo-Sicilians<span class="sidenote">Lord William Bentinck’s Correspondence, MSS.</span>
were unaccustomed to great tactical movements,
the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore,
relinquishing an attack in front, lord William
proposed to move the allied armies in one mass and
turn the enemy’s right flank either by Utiel and
Requeña, or, by a wider march, to reach Cuenca
and from thence gaining the Madrid road to Zaragoza,
communicate with Wellington’s army and
operate down the Ebro. In either case it was
necessary to cross the Albaracyn mountains and
there were no carriage roads, save those of Utiel
and Cuenca. But the passes near Utiel were
strongly fortified by the French, and a movement
on that line would necessarily lead to an attack
upon Suchet which was to be avoided. The line
of Cuenca was preferable though longer, and being
in the harvest season provisions he said would not
fail. The allies would thus force Suchet to cross
the Ebro, or attack him in a chosen position where
Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and
in the event of a defeat they could retire for shelter
upon his army.</p>

<p>Wellington, better acquainted with Spanish warfare,
and the nature of Spanish co-operation, told
him, provisions would fail on the march to Cuenca,
even in harvest time, and without money he would
get nothing; moreover by separating himself from
the fleet, he would be unable to return suddenly to
Sicily if that island should be really exposed to
any imminent danger.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41"></a>[41]</span></p>

<p>While these letters were being exchanged the
Anglo-Sicilians marched towards Villena on Del
Parque’s left, and Suchet was preparing to attack
when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching
both parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs.
The French general instantly abandoned Valencia,
and lord William entered that city.</p>

<p>Suchet knew that Clauzel was at Zaragoza,
and desirous of maintaining himself there to secure
a point of junction for the army of Aragon
with the king’s army, if the latter should re-enter
Spain. It was possible therefore, by abandoning all
the fortresses in Valencia and some of those in Catalonia,
to have concentrated more than thirty thousand
men with which to join Clauzel, and the latter
having carried off several small garrisons during his
retreat, had fifteen thousand. Lord Wellington’s
position would then have been critical, since forty-five
thousand good troops, having many supporting
fortresses, would have menaced his right flank at
the moment when his front was assailed by a new
general and a powerful army. But if this junction
with Clauzel invited Suchet on the one hand, on the
other, with a view of influencing the general negociations
during the armistice in Germany, it was
important to appear strong in Spain. On such
occasions men generally endeavour to reconcile both
objects and obtain neither. Suchet resolved to
march upon Zaragoza and at the same time retain
his grasp upon Valencia by keeping large garrisons
in the fortresses. This reduced his field force, a
great error, it was so proved by the result. But if
the war in the north of Spain and in Germany had
taken a different turn, his foresight and prudence
would have been applauded.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42"></a>[42]</span></p>

<p>The army of Aragon now counted thirty-two thousand
effective men. Four thousand were in Zaragoza,
two thousand in Mequinenza, Venasque, Monzons,
Ayerbe, Jaca, and some smaller posts. Twenty-six
thousand remained. Of these one hundred and
ten were left in Denia, with provisions for eight
months; twelve hundred and fifty in Saguntum,
where there were immense stores, eight months’
provisions for the garrison, and two months’ subsistence<span class="sidenote9">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span>
for the whole army; four hundred with
provisions for a year, were in Peniscola, and in
Morella one hundred and twenty with magazines
for six months. Into Tortoza, where there was
a large artillery parc, Suchet threw a garrison of
nearly five thousand men and then destroying the
bridges on the Xucar, marched from Valencia
on the 5th of July, taking the coast road for
Tortoza.</p>

<p>The inhabitants, grateful for the discipline he
had maintained, were even friendly, and while the
main body thus moved, Musnier retreated from
Requeña across the mountains towards Caspe, the
point of concentration for the whole army: but ere
it could reach that point, Clauzel’s flight to Jaca,
unnecessary for he was only pursued from Tudela
by Mina, became known, and the effect was fatal.
All the Partidas immediately united and menaced
Zaragoza, whereupon Suchet ordered Paris to retire
upon Caspe, and pressed forward himself to Favara.
Musnier, meanwhile, reached the former town,
having on the march picked up Severoli’s brigade
and the garrisons of Teruel and Alcanitz. Thus
on the 12th the whole army was in military communication
but extended along the Ebro from Tortoza
to Caspe. Mina had, however, seized the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43"></a>[43]</span>
Monte Torrero on the 8th, and general Paris evacuated
Zaragoza in the night of the 9th, leaving
five hundred men in the castle with much ordnance.
Encumbered with a great train of carriages
he got entangled in the defiles of Alcubiere, and
being attacked lost many men and all his baggage
and artillery. Instead of joining Suchet he fled to
Huesca, where he rallied the garrison of Ayerbe
and then made for Jaca, reaching it on the 14th at
the moment when Clauzel, after another ineffectual
attempt to join the king, had returned to that
place. Duran then invested the castle of Zaragoza,
and the fort of Daroca. The first surrendered on
the 30th, but Daroca did not fall until the 11th of
August.</p>

<p>This sudden and total loss of Aragon made Suchet
think it no longer possible to fix a base in that
province, nor to rally Clauzel’s troops on his own.
He could not remain on the right bank of the Ebro,
neither could he feed his army permanently in the
sterile country about Tortoza while Aragon was in
possession of the enemy. Moreover, the allies
having the command of the sea, might land troops,
and seize the passes of the hills behind him, wherefore
fixing upon the fertile country about Taragona
for his position, he passed the Ebro at Tortoza,
Mora, and Mequinenza, on the 14th and 15th,
detaching Isidore Lamarque to fetch off the garrisons
of Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, and Bujarola, and bring
the whole to Lerida. Meanwhile the bulk of the
army moving on the road from Tortoza to Taragona,
although cannonaded by the English fleet, reached
Taragona with little hurt and the walls were mined
for destruction, but the place was still held with a
view to field operations.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44"></a>[44]</span></p>

<p>The general state of the war seems to have been
too little considered by Suchet at this time, or he
would have made a more vigorous effort to establish
himself in Aragon. Had he persisted to march on
Zaragoza he would have raised the siege of the
castle, perchance have given a blow to Mina whose
orders were to retire upon Tudela where Wellington
designed to offer battle; but Suchet might
have avoided this, and to have appeared upon Wellington’s
flank were it only for a fortnight, would,
as shall be hereafter shewn, have changed the
aspect of the campaign. Suchet’s previous rapidity
and excellent arrangements had left the allies in
Valencia far behind, they could not have gathered
in force soon enough to meddle with him, and their
pursuit now to be described, was not so cautiously
conducted but that he might have turned and defeated
them.</p>

<p>The 9th of July, four days after the French
abandoned Valencia, lord William Bentinck entered
that city and made it his place of arms instead of
Alicant. On the 16th, marching by the coast road,
in communication with the fleet and masking Peniscola,
a fortress now of little importance, he followed
the enemy; but Suchet had on that day
completed the passage of the Ebro, he might have
been close to Zaragoza, and Del Parque’s army was
still near Alicant in a very disorderly condition.
And though Elio and Roche were at Valencia, the
occupation of that town, and the blockades of
Denia and Murviedro, proved more than a sufficient
task for them: the garrison of the latter place
received provisions continually, and were so confident
as to assemble in order of battle on the glacis
when the allies marched past.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45"></a>[45]</span></p>

<p>The 20th lord William entered Vinaros and remained
there until the 26th. Suchet might then
have been at Tudela or Sanguessa, and it shall be
shewn that Wellington could not have met him at
the former place as he designed.</p>

<p>During this period various reports were received.
“<em>The French had vainly endeavoured to regain
France by Zaragoza.</em>” “<em>Taragona was destroyed.</em>”
“<em>The evacuation of Spain was certain.</em>” “<em>A
large detachment had already quitted Catalonia.</em>”
The English general, who had little time
to spare from the pressure of Sicilian affairs, became
eager to advance. He threw a flying bridge
over the Ebro at Amposta, and having before embarked
Clinton’s division with a view to seize the
Col de Balaguer, resolved to follow Suchet with
the remainder of his army, which now included
Whittingham’s cavalry. A detachment from Tortoza
menaced his bridge on the 25th, but the troops
were reinforced and the passage of the Ebro
completed on the 27th. The next day Villa Campa
arrived with four thousand men and meanwhile
the Col de Balaguer was secured.</p>

<p>On the 29th the cavalry being in march was
threatened by infantry from Tortoza, near the Col
de Alba, but the movements generally were unopposed,
and the army got possession of the mountains
beyond the Ebro.</p>

<p>Suchet was at this time inspecting the defences of
Lerida and Mequinenza, and his escort was necessarily
large because Copons was hanging on his
flanks in the mountains about Manresa; but his
position about Villa Franca was exceedingly strong.
Taragona and Tortoza covered the front; Barcelona,
the rear; the communication with Decaen was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46"></a>[46]</span>
secure, and on the right flank stood Lerida, to
which the small forts of Mequinenza and Monzon
served as outposts.</p>

<p>The Anglo-Sicilian troops reinforced with Whittingham’s
cavalry did not exceed ten thousand
effective men, of which one division was on board
ship from the 22d to the 26th. Elio and Roche
were at Valencia in a destitute condition. Del
Parque’s army thirteen thousand strong, including
Whittingham’s infantry, was several marches in the
rear, it was paid from the British subsidy but very
ill-provided and the duke himself disinclined to
obedience. Villa Campa did not join until the
28th, and Copons was in the mountains above Vich.
Lord William therefore remained with ten thousand
men and a large train of carriages, for ten days without
any position of battle behind him nearer than
the hills about Saguntum. His bridge over the
Ebro was thrown within ten miles of Tortoza where
there was a garrison of five thousand men, detachments
from which could approach unperceived
through the rugged mountains near the fortress;
and Suchet’s well-organised experienced army was
within two marches. That marshal however, expecting
a sharp warfare, was visiting his fortresses in
person, and his troops quartered for the facility of
feeding were unprepared to strike a sudden blow;
moreover, judging his enemy’s strength in offence
what it might have been rather than what it was,
he awaited the arrival of Decaen’s force from Upper
Catalonia before he offered battle.</p>

<p>But Decaen was himself pressed. The great English
fleet menacing Rosas and Palamos had encouraged
a partial insurrection of the Somatenes, which
was supported by the divisions of Eroles, Manso, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47"></a>[47]</span>
Villamiel. Several minor combats took place on the
side of Besala and Olot, Eroles invested Bañolas, and
though beaten there in a sharp action by Lamarque
on the 23d of June the insurrection spread. To
quell it Decaen combined a double operation from
the side of Gerona upon Vich, which was generally
the Catalan head-quarters. Designing to attack by
the south himself, he sent Maximilian Lamarque,
with fifteen hundred French troops and some Miguelets,
by the mountain paths of San Felice de
Pallarols and Amias. On the 8th of July that
officer gained the heights of Salud, seized the road
from Olot and descended from the north upon Roda
and Manlieu, in the expectation of seeing Decaen
attacking from the other side. He perceived below
him a heavy body in march, and at the same time
heard the sound of cannon and musquetry about
Vich. Concluding this was Decaen he advanced
confidently against the troops in his front, although
very numerous, thinking they were in retreat, but
they fought him until dark without advantage on
either side.</p>

<p>In the night an officer came with intelligence,
that Decaen’s attack had been relinquished in consequence
of Suchet’s orders to move to the Llobregat,
and it then appeared that a previous despatch
had been intercepted, that the whole Catalan force
to the amount of six or seven thousand combatants
was upon Lamarque’s hands, and the firing heard at
Vich was a rejoicing for lord Wellington’s victories
in Navarre. A retreat was imperative. The
Spaniards followed at daylight, and Lamarque getting
entangled in difficult ground near Salud was forced
to deliver battle. The fight lasted many hours, all
his ammunition was expended, he lost four hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48"></a>[48]</span>
men and was upon the point of destruction, when
general Beurmann came to his succour with four
fresh battalions, and the Catalans were finally defeated
with great loss. After this vigorous action
Decaen marched to join Suchet, and the Catalans,
moving by the mountains in separate divisions,
approached lord William Bentinck.</p>

<p>The allies having thus passed the Ebro several
officers of both nations conceived the siege of Tortoza
would be the best operation. Nearly forty
thousand men, that is to say, Villa Campa’s, Copons’,
Del Parque’s, Whittingham’s, some of Elio’s
forces and the Anglo-Sicilians, could be united for
the siege, and the defiles of the mountains on the
left bank of the Ebro would enable them to resist
Suchet’s attempts to succour the place on that side,
and force him to move by the circuitous route of
Lerida. Wellington also leaned towards this operation,
but lord William Bentinck resolved to push at
once for Taragona, and even looked to an attack
upon Barcelona; certainly a rash proceeding, inasmuch
as Suchet awaited his approach with an army
every way superior. It does not however follow
that to besiege Tortoza would have been advisable,
for though the battering train, much larger than
Murray’s losses gave reason at first to expect, was
equal to the reduction of the place, the formal siege
of such a fortress was a great undertaking. The
vicinity was unhealthy and it would have been difficult
to feed the Spanish troops. They were quite
inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be long,
not sure to be successful, and Suchet seeing the
allies engaged in such a difficult operation might
have marched at once to Aragon.</p>

<p>It would seem lord William Bentinck was at this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49"></a>[49]</span>
time misled, partly by the reports of the Catalans,
partly by lord Wellington’s great successes, into a
belief that the French were going to abandon Catalonia.
His mind <ins class="corr" id="tn-49" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'also run upon'">
also ran upon</ins> Italian affairs, and
he did not perceive that Suchet judiciously posted
and able to draw reinforcements from Decaen was in
fact much stronger than all the allies united. The
two armies of Aragon and Catalonia, numbered<span class="sidenote12">Imperial Muster-rolls.</span>
sixty-seven thousand men. Of these, about twenty-seven
thousand, including Paris’ division then at
Jaca, were in garrison, five thousand were sick, the
remainder in the field. In Catalonia the allies were
not principals, they were accessories. They were to
keep Suchet from operating on the flank of the
allies in Navarre and their defeat would have been
a great disaster. So entirely was this lord Wellington’s
view, that the duke Del Parque’s army was to
make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should
either move himself or detach largely towards
Aragon. Lord William after passing the Ebro
could have secured the defiles of the mountains with
his own and Villa Campa’s troops, that is to say,
with twenty thousand men including Whittingham’s
division. He could have insulted the garrison of
Tortoza, and commenced the making of gabions and
fascines, which would have placed Suchet in doubt
as to his ulterior objects while he awaited the
junction of del Parque’s, Copons’, and the rest of
Elio’s troops. Thus forty thousand men, three
thousand being cavalry and attended by a fleet,
could have descended into the Campo, still leaving
a detachment to watch Tortoza. If Suchet then
came to the succour of Taragona the allies superior
in numbers could have fought in a position chosen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50"></a>[50]</span>
beforehand. Still it is very doubtful if all these
corps would, or could have kept together.</p>

<p>Lord William Bentinck’s operations were headlong.
He had prepared platforms and fascines for
a siege in the island of Yvica, and on the 30th quitting
the mountains suddenly invested Taragona with
less than six thousand men, occupying ground three
hundred yards nearer to the walls the first day than
Murray had ever done. He thus prevented the garrison
from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed,
they had that intention; yet the fortress could not
be besieged because of Suchet’s vicinity and the
dissemination of the allies. The 31st the bridge at
Amposta was accidentally broken, three hundred
bullocks were drowned, and the head of Del Parque’s
army, being on the left of the Ebro, fell back a day’s
march. However Whittingham’s division and the
cavalry came up, and on the 3rd, the bridge being
restored, Del Parque also joined the investing army.
Copons then promised to bring up his Catalans, Sarzfield’s
division now belonging to the second army
arrived, and Elio had been ordered to reinforce it
with three additional battalions while Villa Campa
observed Tortoza. Meanwhile lord William seeing
that Suchet’s troops were scattered and the marshal
himself at Barcelona, thought of surprizing his posts
and seizing the mountain line of the Llobregat; but
Elio sent no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications
between the English general and Eroles,
was slow, the garrison of Tortoza burned the bridge
at Amposta, and Suchet taking alarm suddenly
returned from Barcelona and concentrated his army.</p>

<p>Up to this time the Spaniards giving copious but
false information to lord William, and no information<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51"></a>[51]</span>
at all to Suchet, had induced a series of faults on
both sides balancing each other, a circumstance
not uncommon in war, which demands all the
faculties of the greatest minds. The Englishman
thinking his enemy retreating had pressed rashly
forward. The Frenchman deeming from the other’s
boldness the whole of the allies were at hand,
thought himself too weak, and awaited the arrival of
Decaen, whose junction was retarded as we have
seen by the combined operations of the Catalan
army and the English fleet.</p>

<p>In this state of affairs Suchet heard of new and<span class="sidenote7">August.</span>
important successes gained in Navarre by lord Wellington,
one of his Italian battalions was at the
same time cut off at San Sadurni by Manso, and
lord William Bentinck took a position of battle
beyond the Gaya. His left, composed of Whittingham’s
division, occupied Braffin, the Col de Liebra,
and Col de Christina, his right covered the great
coast-road. These were the only carriage ways
by which the enemy could approach, but they were
ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham
thought himself too weak to defend the passes
alone; hence, when Suchet, reinforced by Decaen
with eight thousand sabres and bayonets, finally
advanced, lord William who had landed neither
guns nor stores decided to refuse battle. For such
a resolute officer, this must have been a painful
decision. He had now nearly thirty thousand fighting
men, including a thousand marines which had
been landed to join the advanced guard at Altafalla;
he had assumed the offensive, invested Taragona
where the military honour of England had suffered
twice before, in fine provoked the action which he
now declined. But Suchet had equal numbers of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52"></a>[52]</span>
better quality; the banks of the Gaya were rugged
to pass in retreat if the fight should be lost; much
must have been left to the general officers at different
points; Del Parque’s was an uneasy coadjutor, and
if any part was forced the whole line would have
been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however
manifest, for though he expected the enemy
on the 9th he did not send his field artillery and
baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day on which
Decaen reached Villa Franca.</p>

<p>The French general dreading the fire of the fleet
endeavoured by false attacks on the coast road to
draw the allies from the defiles beyond Braffin,
towards which he finally carried his whole army, and
those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his
Memoirs state because of these demonstrations, but
because lord William had previously determined to
retreat. On the 16th finding the passes unguarded,
he poured through and advanced upon Valls thus
turning the allies, but he had lost time and the
latter were in full retreat towards the mountains,
the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrills.
The march of the former was covered by lord
Frederick Bentinck who leading the British and German
cavalry defeated the fourth French hussars
with a loss of forty or fifty men; and it is said that
either general Habert or Harispe was taken but
escaped in the confusion.</p>

<p>The Anglo-Sicilians and Whittingham’s division
now entrenched themselves near the Col de Balaguer,
and Del Parque marched with his own and
Sarzfield’s troops to invest Tortoza, but the garrison
fell upon his rear while passing the Ebro and some
loss was sustained. Meanwhile Suchet, more swayed
by the remembrance of Castalla than by his recent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53"></a>[53]</span>
success, would not again prove the courage of the
British troops on a mountain position. Contrary to
the wishes of his army he returned to Taragona and
destroyed the ancient walls, which from the extreme
hardness of the Roman cement proved a tedious and
difficult matter: then resuming his old positions
about Villa Franca and on the Llobregat he sent
Decaen to Upper Catalonia. This terminated lord
William Bentinck’s first effort and the general
result was favourable. He had risked much on insufficient
grounds, yet his enemy made no profit
and lost Taragona with its fertile Campo, Tortoza was
invested, and Suchet was kept away from Navarre.</p>

<p>It is strange that this renowned French general
suffered his large force to be thus paralyzed at such
a crisis. Above twenty-seven thousand of his soldiers
if we include the isolated division of Paris<span class="sidenote12">Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.</span>
were shut up in garrison, but thirty-two thousand
remained with which he marched to and fro in
Catalonia while the war was being decided in
Navarre. Had he moved to that province by Aragon
before the end of July lord Wellington would have
been overpowered. What was to be feared? That
lord William Bentinck would follow, or attack one
of his fortresses? If the French were successful in
Navarre the loss of a fortress in Catalonia would
have been a trifle, it was not certain that any would
have fallen, and lord William could not abandon the
coast. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned
Catalonia; but to invade France, guarded
as she was by her great military reputation, and to
do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of Valencia
and Catalonia the latter barring all the carriage
roads was chimerical. Success in Navarre
would have made an invasion by sea pass as a partizan<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54"></a>[54]</span>
descent, and moreover France, wanting Suchet’s
troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded
by Wellington and in a far more formidable
manner. This question shall however be treated
more largely in another place, it is sufficient to
observe here, that Clarke the minister of war, a man
without genius or attachment to the emperor’s
cause, discouraged any great combined plan of
action, and Napoleon absorbed by his own immense
operations did not interpose.</p>

<p>Lord William now intent upon the siege of Tortoza
wished lord Wellington to attack Mequinenza
with a detachment of his army; but this the situation
of affairs in Navarre and Guipuscoa did not admit
of, and he soon discovered that to assail Tortoza was
an undertaking beyond his own means. Elio when
desired to gather provisions and assist in the operations
demanded three weeks for preparation; all
the Spanish troops were in want, Roche’s division,
blockading Murviedro, although so close to Valencia
was on half rations; and the siege of Tortoza was necessarily
relinquished, because no great or sustained
operation could be conducted in concert with such
generals and such armies. Suchet’s fear of them
was an illustration of Napoleon’s maxim, that war is
an affair of discrimination. It is more essential to
know the quality than the quantity of enemies.</p>

<p>It was difficult for lord William Bentinck to
apply his mind vigorously to the campaign he was
conducting, because fresh changes injurious to the
British policy in Sicily called him to that island,
and his thoughts were running upon the invasion of
Italy; but as the Spaniards, deceived by the movements
of escorts and convoys, reported that Suchet
had marched with twelve thousand men to join<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55"></a>[55]</span>
Soult, he once more fixed his head-quarters at
Taragona, and, following lord Wellington’s instructions,
detached Del Parque’s troops by forced
marches upon Tudela.</p>

<p>On the 5th of September the army entered Villa<span class="sidenote9">September.</span>
Franca, and the 12th, detachments of Calabrese,
Swiss, German, and British infantry, a squadron
of cavalry and one battery, in all about twelve
hundred men under colonel Adam, occupied the
heights of Ordal. At this place, ten miles in advance
of Villa Franca, being joined by three of Sarzfield’s
battalions and a Spanish squadron they took
a position; but it now appeared that very few
French troops had been detached; that Suchet had
concentrated his whole force on the Llobregat; and
that his army was very superior in numbers, because
the allies, reduced by the loss of Del Parque’s troops,
had also left Whittingham’s division at Reus and
Valls to procure food. Sarzfield’s division was feeding
on the British supplies, and lord William again
looked to a retreat, yet thinking the enemy disinclined
to advance desired to preserve his forward
position as long as possible.</p>

<p>He had only two lines of operation to watch.
The one menacing his front from Molino del
Rey by the main road, which colonel Adam
blocked by his position at Ordal; the other
from Martorel, by San Sadurni, menacing his
left; but on this route, a difficult one, he had
pushed the Catalans under Eroles and Manso
reinforcing them with some Calabrese; there was
indeed a third line by Avionet on his right, but it
was little better than a goat-path. He had designed
to place his main body close up to the Ordal
on the evening of the 12th, yet from some slight<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56"></a>[56]</span>
cause delayed it until the next day. Meanwhile
he viewed the country in advance of that defile
without discovering an enemy. His confidential
emissaries assured him the French were not going
to advance, and he returned, satisfied that Adam’s
detachment was safe, and so expressed himself
to that officer. A report of a contrary tendency
was indeed made by colonel Reeves of the twenty-seventh,
on the authority of a Spanish woman
who had before proved her accuracy and ability as
a spy; she was now however disbelieved, and this incredulity
was unfortunate. For Suchet thus braved,
and his communication with Lerida threatened by
Manso on the side of Martorel, was already in
march to attack Ordal with the army of Aragon,
while Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, moving with
the army of Catalonia from Martorel by San Sardurni,
turned the left of the allies.</p>


<h4>COMBAT OF ORDAL.</h4>

<p>The heights occupied by colonel Adam although
rugged rose gradually from a magnificent bridge,
by which the main road was carried over a very
deep and impracticable ravine. The second
battalion of the twenty-seventh British regiment
was posted on the right, the Germans and De Roll’s
Swiss with the artillery, defended an old Spanish
fort commanding the main road; the Spaniards
were in the centre, the Calabrese on the left; and
the cavalry were in reserve. A bright moonlight
facilitated the movements of the French, and a
little before midnight, their leading column under
general Mesclop passing the bridge without let or
hindrance, mounted the heights with a rapid pace
and driving back the picquets gave the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57"></a>[57]</span>
alarm. The allied troops lying on their arms in
order of battle were ready instantly and the fight
commenced. The first effort was against the twenty-seventh,
then the Germans and the Spanish battalions
were vigorously assailed in succession as the
French columns got free of the bridge, but the Calabrese
were too far on the left to take a share in
the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate.
Harispe who commanded the French constantly outflanked
the right of the allies, and at the same time
pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought
gallantly.</p>

<p>Colonel Adam was wounded very early, the
command devolved upon colonel Reeves, and that
officer seeing his flank turned and his men falling
fast, in short, finding himself engaged with a whole
army on a position of which colonel Adam had lost
the key by neglecting the bridge, resolved to retreat.
In this view he first ordered the guns to fall back,
and to cover the movement charged a column of
the enemy which was pressing forward on the high
road, but he was severely wounded in this attack
and there was no recognized commander on the spot
to succeed him. Then the affair became confused.
For though the order to retreat was given the
Spaniards were fighting desperately, and the twenty-seventh
thought it shame to abandon them; wherefore
the Germans and De Roll’s regiment still held
the old fort and the guns came back. The action
was thus continued with great fury. Colonel Carey
now brought the Calabrese into line from the left,
and menaced the right flank of the French, but he
was too late; the Spaniards overwhelmed in the
centre were broken, the right was completely turned,
the old fort was lost, the enemy’s skirmishers got into<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58"></a>[58]</span>
the allies’ rear, and at three o’clock the whole dispersed,
the most part in flight; the Spanish cavalry
were then overthrown on the main road by the French
hussars and four guns were taken in the tumult.</p>

<p>Captain Waldron, with the twenty-seventh reduced
to eighty men, and captain Müller with
about the same number of Germans and Swiss,
breaking through several small parties of the enemy
effected their retreat in good order by the hills on
each side of the road. Colonel Carey endeavoured
at first to gain the road of Sadurni on the left, but
meeting with Decaen’s people on that side he retraced
his steps, and crossing the field of battle in the
rear of Suchet’s columns made for Villa Nueva de
Sitjes. There he finally embarked without loss, save
a few stragglers who fell into the hands of a flanking
battalion of French infantry which had moved
through the mountains by Begas and Avionet. The
overthrow was complete and the prisoners were at
first very numerous, but the darkness enabled many
to escape, and two thousand men reached Manso
and Eroles.</p>

<p>Suchet pursuing his march came up with lord
William about eight o’clock. The latter retired
skirmishing and with excellent order beyond Villa
Franca, followed by the French horsemen some of
which assailed his rear-guard while others edged to
their right to secure the communication with Decaen.
The latter was looked for by both parties with great
anxiety, but he had been delayed by the resistance
of Manso and Eroles in the rugged country between
Martorel and San Sadurni. Suchet’s cavalry and
artillery continued however to infest the rear of the
retreating army until it reached a deep baranco,
near the Venta de Monjos, where the passage being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59"></a>[59]</span>
dangerous and the French horseman importunate,
that brave and honest soldier, lord Frederick Bentinck,
charged their right, and fighting hand to hand with
the enemy’s general Myers wounded him and overthrew
his light cavalry; they rallied upon their
dragoons and advanced again, endeavouring to turn
the flank, but were stopped by the fire of two guns
which general Clinton opened upon them. Meanwhile
the cuirassiers, on the left, pressed the Brunswick
hussars and menaced the infantry yet they
were finally checked by the fire of the tenth regiment.
This cavalry action was vigorous, the
twentieth and the Germans although few in numbers
lost more than ninety men. The baranco was however
safely passed and about three o’clock the army
having reached Arbos the pursuit ceased. The
Catalans meanwhile had retreated towards Igualada
and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to Taragona.</p>

<p>It was now thought Suchet would make a movement
to carry off the garrisons of Lerida and Tortoza,
but this did not happen, and lord William
went to Sicily, leaving the command of the army
to sir William Clinton.</p>


<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4>

<p>1º. Lord William Bentinck committed errors,
yet he has been censured without discrimination.
“<em>He advanced rashly.</em>” “<em>He was undecided.</em>”
“<em>He exposed his advanced guard without support.</em>”
Such were the opinions expressed at the time.
Their justness may be disputed. His first object
was to retain all the French force in Catalonia;
his second, to profit from Suchet’s weakness if he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60"></a>[60]</span>
detached largely. He could do neither by remaining
inactive on the barren hills behind Hospitalet,
because the Spaniards would have dispersed for
want of provisions and the siege of Tortoza was
found to be impracticable. It was therefore the
part of a bold and skilful general to menace his
enemy, if he could be sure of retreating again
without danger or dishonour. The position at Villa
Franca fulfilled this condition. It was strong in
itself and offensive; sir Edward Pellew’s fleet was
in movement to create diversions in Upper Catalonia,
and all the emissaries and Spanish correspondents
concurred in declaring, though falsely, that
the French general had detached twelve thousand
men.</p>

<p>It is indeed one of the tests of a sagacious general
to detect false intelligence, yet the greatest
are at times deceived, and all must act, if they
act at all, upon what appears at the time to be
true. Lord William’s advance was founded on
erroneous data, but his position in front of Villa
Franca was well chosen. It enabled him to feed
Whittingham’s division in the fertile country about
Reus and Valls, and there were short and easy communications
from Villa Franca to the sea-coast.
The army could only be seriously assailed on two
lines. In front, by the main road, which though
broad was from Molino del Rey to the heights of
Ordal one continued defile. On the left by San
Sardurni, a road still more rugged and difficult than
the other. And the Catalans were launched on this
side as their natural line of operations, because,
without losing their hold of the mountains they
protected the left of the allies, menacing at the
same time the right of the enemy and his communications<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61"></a>[61]</span>
with Lerida. Half a march to the rear
would bring the army to Vendrills, beyond which
the enemy could not follow without getting under
the fire of the ships; neither could he forestall this
movement by a march through the Liebra and
Cristina defiles, because the Catalans falling back
on Whittingham’s division could hold him in
check.</p>

<p>2º. Ordal and San Sadurni were the keys of the
position. The last was well secured, the first not
so, and there was the real error of lord William
Bentinck. It was none however to push an advanced
guard of three thousand five hundred men,
with cavalry and artillery, to a distance of ten
miles for a few hours. He had a right to expect
the commander of such a force would maintain his
post until supported, or at least retreat without disaster.
An officer of capacity would have done so.
But whoever relies upon the capacity of sir Frederick
Adam either in peace or war will be disappointed.</p>

<p>In 1810 lord Wellington detached general Robert
Craufurd with two or three thousand men to a
much greater distance, not for one night but for
many weeks. And that excellent officer, though
close to Massena’s immense army the very cavalry
of which was double his whole numbers; though
he had the long line of the Agueda a fordable river
to guard; though he was in an open country and
continually skirmishing, never lost so much as a
patrole and always remained master of his movements
for his combat on the Coa was a studied
and wilful error. It was no fault therefore to push
colonel Adam’s detachment to Ordal, but it was a
fault that lord William, having determined to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62"></a>[62]</span>
follow with his whole force, should have delayed
doing so for one night, or that delaying he did not
send some supporting troops forward. It was a
fault not to do so because there was good reason
to do so, and to delay was to tempt fortune. There
was good reason to do so as well to profit of the
advantage of the position as to support Adam.
Had lord William Bentinck been at hand with his
main body when the attack on Ordal commenced,
the head of Suchet’s force which was kept at bay
for three hours by a detachment so ill commanded
would have been driven into the ravine behind, and
the victorious allies would still have had time to
march against Decaen by the road along which
colonel Cary endeavoured to join Manso. In fine,
Suchet’s dispositions were vicious in principle and
ought not to have succeeded. He operated on two
distinct lines having no cross communications, and
before an enemy in possession of a central position
with good communications.</p>

<p>3º. It was another fault that lord William Bentinck
disregarded the Spanish woman’s report to
colonel Reeves; his observations made in front of
the bridge of Ordal on the evening of the 12th
accorded indeed with the reports of his own emissaries,
but the safe side should always be the rule
of precaution. He also, although on the spot,
overlooked the unmilitary dispositions of colonel
Adam on the heights of Ordal. The summit could
not be defended against superior numbers with a
small corps, and that officer had nevertheless extended
the Calabrese so far on the left that they
could take no share in the action, and yet could not
retreat without great difficulty. A commander who
understood his business, would have blocked up the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63"></a>[63]</span>
bridge in front of the heights, and defended it by
a strong detachment, supporting that detachment
by others placed in succession on the heights behind,
but keeping his main body always in hand,
ready either to fall on the head of the enemy’s
column of attack, or to rally the advanced detachments
and retreat in order. There were plenty of
trees and stones to block the bridge, its own parapet
would have supplied materials, and the ravine
was so deep and rugged, that the enemy could not
have crossed it on the flanks in the dark.</p>

<p>It is no defence to say colonel Adam only took
his ground in the evening after a march; that he
expected the main body up the next morning and
that lord William assured him he was safe from
attack. Every officer is responsible for the security
of his own troops, and the precautions prescribed
by the rules of war should never be dispensed
with or delayed at an outpost. Now it does
not appear that colonel Adam ever placed an infantry
picquet on the bridge, or sent a cavalry
patrole beyond it; and I have been informed by a
French soldier, one of a party sent to explore the
position, that they reached the crest of the heights
without opposition and returned safely, whereupon
Mesclop’s brigade instantly crossed the bridge and
attacked.</p>

<p>4º. Ordal might be called a surprize with respect
to the general-in-chief, yet the troops engaged
were not surprised; they were beaten and dispersed
because colonel Adam was unskilful. The French
general’s victory was complete; but he has in his
Memoirs exaggerated his difficulties and the importance
of his success, his private report to the emperor
was more accurate. The Memoirs state that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64"></a>[64]</span>
the English grenadiers defended certain works
which commanded the ascent of the main road,
and in the accompanying atlas a perspective view
of well-conditioned redoubts with colours flying,
is given. The reader is thus led to imagine these
were regular forts of a fresh construction defended
by select troops; but in the private report they
are correctly designated as ancient retrenchments,<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_V">Appendix, No. 5.</a></span>
being in fact the ruins of some old Spanish field-works
and of no more advantage to the allies than
any natural inequality of ground. Again in the
Memoirs the attack of the French cavalry near
Villa Franca is represented as quite successful; but
the private report only says the rear was harassed
by repeated charges, which is true, and moreover
those charges were vigorously repulsed. The whole
French loss was about three hundred men, that of
the allies, heavy at Ordal, was lightened by escape
of prisoners during the night and ultimately did
not exceed a thousand men including Spaniards.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65"></a>[65]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_III">CHAPTER III.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">Turning from the war in Catalonia to the operations<span class="sidenote9">1813. June.</span>
in Navarre and Guipuscoa, we shall find lord
Wellington’s indomitable energy overcoming every
difficulty. It has been already shown how, changing
his first views, he disposed the Anglo-Portuguese
divisions to cover the siege of San Sebastian and
the blockade of Pampeluna, at the same time attacking
with the Spanish divisions Santona on the coast,
and the castles of Daroca, Morella, Zaragoza, and
the forts of Pancorbo in the interior. These operations
required many men, but the early fall of Pancorbo
enabled O’Donnel’s reserve to blockade Pampeluna,
and Don Carlos D’España’s division, four
thousand strong, which had remained at Miranda
del Castanar to improve its organization when lord
Wellington advanced to the Ebro, was approaching
to reinforce him.</p>

<p>The harbour of Passages was the only port near
the scene of operations suited for the supply of the
army. Yet it had this defect, that being situated
between the covering and the besieging army, the
stores and guns once landed were in danger from
every movement of the enemy. The Deba river,
between San Sebastian and Bilbaō, was unfit for
large vessels, and hence no permanent depôt could
be established nearer than Bilbaō. At that port
therefore, and at St. Ander and Coruña, the great
depôts of the army were fixed, the stores being transported<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66"></a>[66]</span>
to them from the establishments in Portugal;
but the French held Santona, and their privateers
interrupted the communication along the coast of
Spain while American privateers did the same
between Lisbon and Coruña. On the other hand
the intercourse between San Sebastian and the ports
of France was scarcely molested, and the most urgent
remonstrances failed to procure a sufficient naval
force on the coast of Biscay. It was in these circumstances
Wellington commenced</p>


<h4>THE SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN.</h4>

<p>This place was built on a low sandy isthmus
formed by the harbour on one side and the river
Urumea on the other. Behind it rose the Monte
Orgullo, a rugged cone nearly four hundred feet
high, washed by the ocean and crowned with the
small castle of La Mota. Its southern face overlooking
the town, was yet cut off from it by a line of
defensive works and covered with batteries; but La
Mota itself was commanded, at a distance of thirteen
hundred yards, by the Monte Olia on the other side
of the Urumea.</p>

<p>The land front of San Sebastian was three hundred
and fifty yards wide, stretching quite across the
isthmus. It consisted of a high curtain or rampart,
very solid, strengthened by a lofty casemated flat
bastion or cavalier placed in the centre, and by half
bastions at either end. A regular horn-work was
pushed out from this front, and six hundred yards
beyond the horn-work the isthmus was closed by
the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the foot of which
stood the suburb of San Martin.</p>

<p>On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain
sandy hills called the <em>Chofres</em>, through which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67"></a>[67]</span>
road from Passages passed to the wooden bridge
over the river, and thence, by the suburb of Santa
Catalina, along the top of a sea-wall which formed a
<i lang="fr">fausse braye</i> for the horn-work.</p>

<p>The flanks of the town were protected by simple
ramparts. The one was washed by the water of the
harbour, the other by the Urumea which at high
tide covered four of the twenty-seven feet comprised
in its elevation. This was the weak side of
the fortress, for though covered by the river there
was only a single wall ill-flanked by two old
towers, and by the half bastion of San Elmo
which was situated at the extremity of the rampart
close under the Monte Orgullo. There
was no ditch, no counter-scarp, or glacis, the wall
could be seen to its base from the Chofre hills at
distances varying from five hundred to a thousand
yards, and when the tide was out the Urumea left a
dry strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo.
However the guns from the batteries at Monte Orgullo
especially that called the Mirador, could see
this strand.</p>

<p>The other flank of the town was secured by the
harbour, in the mouth of which was a rocky island,
called Santa Clara, where the French had established
a post of twenty-five men.</p>

<p>When the battle of Vittoria happened San Sebastian
was nearly dismantled; many of the guns had
been removed to form battering trains or to arm
smaller ports on the coast, there were no bomb-proofs
nor pallisades nor outworks, the wells were
foul and the place was supplied with water by a
single aqueduct. Joseph’s defeat restored its importance
as a fortress. General Emanuel Rey
entered it the 22d of June, bringing with him the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68"></a>[68]</span>
escort of the convoy which had quitted Vittoria the
day before the battle. The town was thus filled with
emigrant Spanish families, with the ministers and
other persons attached to the court; the population ordinarily
eight thousand was increased to sixteen thousand
and disorder and confusion were predominant.
Rey, pushed by necessity, immediately forced all<span class="sidenote">Bellas’ Journal of French Sieges in Spain.</span>
persons not residents to march at once to France
granting them only a guard of one hundred men;
the people of quality went by sea, the others by land,
and fortunately all arrived safely for the Partidas
would have given them no quarter.</p>

<p>On the 27th general Foy while retreating before
sir Thomas Graham threw a reinforcement into the
place. The next day Mendizabal’s Spaniards appeared
on the hills behind the ridge of San Bartolomeo
and on the Chofres, whereupon general Rey
burned the wooden bridge and both the suburbs,
and commenced fortifying the heights of San Bartolomeo.
The 29th the Spaniards slightly attacked
San Bartolomeo, and were repulsed.</p>

<p>The 1st of July the governor of Gueteria abandoned<span class="sidenote7">July.</span>
that place, and with detestable ferocity secretly<span class="sidenote">Sir G. Collier’s Despatch.</span>
left a lighted train which exploded the magazine
and destroyed many of the inhabitants. His troops
three hundred in number entered San Sebastian,
and at the same time a vessel from St. Jean de Luz
arrived with fifty-six cannoneers and some workmen;
the garrison was thus increased to three thousand
men and all persons not able to provide subsistence for
themselves in advance were ordered to quit the place.
Meanwhile Mendizabal, having cut off the aqueduct,
made some approaches towards the head of the
burned bridge on the right of the Urumea and
molested the workmen on the heights of Bartolomeo.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69"></a>[69]</span></p>

<p>On the 3d, the Surveillante frigate and a sloop
with some small craft arrived to blockade the harbour,
yet the French vessels from St. Jean de Luz
continued to enter by night. The same day the
governor made a sally with eleven hundred men in
three columns to obtain news, and after some hours’
skirmishing returned with a few prisoners.</p>

<p>The 6th some French vessels with a detachment of
troops and a considerable convoy of provisions
came from St. Jean de Luz.</p>

<p>The 7th Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set
fire to the convent of San Bartolomeo.</p>

<p>On the 9th sir Thomas Graham arrived with a
corps of British and Portuguese troops, and on the
13th the Spaniards marched, some to reinforce the
force blockading Santona, the remainder to rejoin
the fourth army on the Bidassoa.</p>

<p>At this time general Reille held the entrances to
the Bastan by Vera and Echallar, but Wellington
drove him thence on the 15th and established the
seventh and light divisions there, thus covering the
passes over the Peña de Haya by which the siege
might have been interrupted.</p>

<p>Before general Graham arrived the French had
constructed a redoubt on the heights of San Bartolomeo,
and connected it with the convent of that
name which they also fortified. These outworks
were supported by posts in the ruined houses of the
suburb of San Martin behind, and by a low circular
redoubt, formed of casks on the main road, half-way
between the convent and the horn-work. Hence
to reduce the place, working along the isthmus, it
was necessary to carry in succession three lines of
defence covering the town, and a fourth at the foot
of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70"></a>[70]</span>
could be assailed. Seventy-six pieces of artillery
were mounted upon these works and others were
afterwards obtained from France by sea.</p>

<p>The besieging army consisted of the fifth division
under general Oswald, and the independent Portuguese
brigades of J. Wilson and Bradford reinforced
by detachments from the first division. Thus, including
the artillery-men some seamen commanded
by lieutenant O’Reilly of the Surveillante and one
hundred regular sappers and miners, now for the
first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula, nearly
ten thousand men were employed. The guns available
for the attack, in the first instance, were a new
battering train originally prepared for the siege of
Burgos, consisting of fourteen iron twenty-four<span class="sidenote">Jones’s Journal of British Sieges.</span>
pounders, six eight-inch brass howitzers, four sixty-eight-pound
iron carronades, and four iron ten-inch
mortars. To these were added six twenty-four
pounders lent by the ships of war, and six eighteen
pounders which had moved with the army from Portugal,
making altogether forty pieces commanded
by colonel Dickson. The distance from the depôt
of siege at Passages to the Chofre sand-hills was
one mile and a half of good road, and a pontoon
bridge was laid over the Urumea river above the
Chofres, but from thence to the height of Bartolomeo
was more than five miles of very bad road.</p>

<p>Early in July the fortress had been twice closely
examined by Major Smith, the engineer who had
so ably defended Tarifa. He proposed a plan of siege
founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofre
hills to destroy the flanks, rake the principal front
and form a breach with the same batteries, the works
being at the same time secured, except at low
water, by the Urumea. Counter-batteries, to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71"></a>[71]</span>
constructed on the left of that river, were to rake
the line of defence in which the breach was to be
formed; and against the castle and its outworks he
relied principally upon vertical fire, instancing the
reduction of Fort Bourbon in the West Indies in
proof of its efficacy. This plan would probably
have reduced San Sebastian in a reasonable time
without any remarkable loss of men, and lord Wellington
approving of it, though he doubted the efficacy
of the vertical fire, ordered the siege to be
commenced. He renewed his approval afterwards
when he had examined the works in person, and all
his orders were in the same spirit; but neither
the plan nor his orders were followed, the siege,
which should have been an ordinary event of war
has obtained a mournful celebrity, and lord Wellington
has been unjustly charged with a contempt
for the maxims of the great masters of the art.
Anxious he was no doubt to save time, yet he did
not for that urge the engineer beyond the rules.
<em>Take the place in the quickest manner, yet do not
from over speed fail to take it</em>, was the sense of his
instructions; but sir Thomas Graham, one of England’s
best soldiers, appears to have been endowed
with a genius for war intuitive rather than reflective;
and this joined to his natural modesty and a
certain easiness of temper, caused him at times to
abandon his own correct conceptions, for the less
judicious counsels of those about him who advised
deviations from the original plan.</p>

<p>Active operations were commenced on the night
of the 10th by the construction of two batteries
against the convent and redoubt of San Bartolomeo.
And on the night of the 13th four batteries to contain
twenty of the heaviest guns and four eight-inch<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72"></a>[72]</span>
howitzers, were marked out on the Chofre sand-hills,
at distances varying from six hundred to thirteen hundred
yards from the eastern rampart of the town.
The river was supposed to be unfordable, wherefore
no parallel of support was made, yet good trenches
of communications, and subsequently regular approaches
were formed. Two attacks were thus
established. One on the right bank of the Urumea entrusted
to the unattached Portuguese brigades; one
on the left bank to the fifth division; but most of
the troops were at first encamped on the right
bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army
in the event of a general battle.</p>

<p>On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour
with supplies, and the batteries of the left attack,
under the direction of the German major Hartman,
opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing hot shot
into that building. The besieged responded with
musquetry from the redoubt, with heavy guns from
the town, and with a field-piece which they had
mounted on the belfry of the convent itself.</p>

<p>The 15th of July sir Richard Fletcher took the chief
command of the engineers, but major Smith retained
the direction of the attack from the Chofre Hills and
lord Wellington’s orders continued to pass through
his hands. This day the batteries of the left attack,
aided by some howitzers from the right of the
Urumea, set the convent on fire, silenced the musquetry
of the besieged, and so damaged the defences
that the Portuguese troops attached to the fifth division
were ordered to feel the enemy’s post. They
were however repulsed with great loss, the French
sallied, and the firing did not cease until nightfall.</p>

<p>A battery for seven additional guns to play
against Bartolomeo was now commenced on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73"></a>[73]</span>
right of the Urumea, and the original batteries set
fire to the convent several times, but the flames were
extinguished by the garrison.</p>

<p>In the night of the 16th general Rey sounded the
Urumea as high as Santa Catalina, designing to pass
over and storm the batteries on the Chofres; but
the fords discovered were shifting, and the difficulty
of execution deterred him from this project.</p>

<p>The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, the
assault was ordered without waiting for the effect of
the new battery raised on the other side of the
Urumea. The storming party was formed in two
columns. Detachments from Wilson’s Portuguese,
supported by the light company of the ninth British
regiment and three companies of the royals, composed
the right, which under the direction of general
Hay was destined to assail the redoubt. General
Bradford directed the left which being composed of
Portuguese, supported by three companies of the
ninth British regiment under colonel Cameron, was
ordered to assail the convent.</p>


<h4>ASSAULT OF SAN BARTOLOMEO.</h4>

<p>At ten o’clock in the morning two heavy six-pounders
opened against the redoubt; and a sharp
fire of musquetry in return from the French, who
had been reinforced and occupied the suburb of
San Martin, announced their resolution to fight.
The allied troops were assembled behind the crest
of the hill overlooking the convent, and the first
signal was given, but the Portuguese advanced
slowly at both attacks, and the supporting companies
of the ninth regiment on each side, passing
through them fell upon the enemy with the usual
impetuosity of British soldiers. Colonel Cameron<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74"></a>[74]</span>
while leading his grenadiers down the face of the hill
was exposed to a heavy cannonade from the horn-work,
but he soon gained the cover of a wall fifty
yards from the convent and there awaited the second
signal. However his rapid advance, which threatened
to cut off the garrison from the suburb, joined
to the fire of the two six-pounders and that of some
other field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea,
caused the French to abandon the redoubt. Seeing
this, Cameron jumped over the wall and assaulted both
the convent and the houses of the suburb. At the
latter a fierce struggle ensued and captain Woodman
of the ninth was killed in the upper room of a house
after fighting <ins class="corr" id="tn-74" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'his way p from'">
his way up from</ins> below; but the grenadiers
carried the convent with such rapidity that the
French, unable to explode some small mines they
had prepared, hastily joined the troops in the suburb.
There however the fighting continued and colonel
Cameron’s force being very much reduced the affair
was becoming doubtful, when the remaining companies
of his regiment, which he had sent for after
the attack commenced, arrived, and the suburb was
with much fighting entirely won. At the right
attack the company of the ninth, although retarded
by a ravine by a thick hedge by the slowness of
the Portuguese and by a heavy fire, entered the
abandoned redoubt with little loss, but the troops
were then rashly led against the cask redoubt, contrary
to general Oswald’s orders, and were beaten
back by the enemy.</p>

<p>The loss of the French was two hundred and<span class="sidenote">Bellas <span lang="fr">Journaux des Sièges</span>.</span>
forty men, that of the allies considerable; the companies
of the ninth under colonel Cameron, alone,
had seven officers and sixty men killed or wounded,
and the operation although successful was an error.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75"></a>[75]</span>
The battery erected on the right bank of the Urumea
was not opened, wherefore, either the assault was
precipitated or the battery not necessary; but the
loss justified the conception of the battery.</p>

<p>When the action ceased the engineers made a
lodgement in the redoubt, and commenced two batteries
for eight pieces to rake the horn-work and the
eastern rampart of the place. Two other batteries to
contain four sixty-eight-pound carronades and four
ten-inch mortars were also commenced on the right
bank of the Urumea.</p>

<p>The 18th the besieged threw up traverses on
the land front to meet the raking fire of the besiegers,
and the latter dragged four pieces up
the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and
other batteries on the Monte Orgullo. In the night
a lodgement was made on the ruins of San Martin,
the two batteries at the right attack were armed,
and two additional mortars dragged up the Monte
Olia.</p>

<p>The 19th all the batteries at both attacks were
armed, and in the night two approaches being commenced
from the suburb of San Martin towards the
cask redoubt the French were driven from that
small work.</p>

<p>On the 20th the whole of the batteries opened
their fire, the greatest part being directed to form
the breach.</p>

<p>Major Smith’s plan was similar to that followed
by marshal Berwick a century before. He proposed
a lodgement on the horn-work before the breach
should be assailed, but he had not then read the<span class="sidenote">Notes of the Siege by sir C. Smith, MSS.</span>
description of that siege and therefore unknowingly
fixed the breaching-point precisely where the wall
had been most strongly rebuilt after Berwick’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76"></a>[76]</span>
attack. This was the first fault, yet a slight one
because the wall did not resist the batteries very
long, but it was a serious matter that sir Thomas
Graham at the suggestion of the commander of the
artillery began his operations by breaching. Major
Smith objected to it, and sir R. Fletcher acquiesced
reluctantly on the understanding that the ruining
of the defences was only postponed, an understanding
afterwards unhappily forgotten.</p>

<p>The result of the first day’s attack was not satisfactory,
the weather proved bad, the guns mounted
on ship carriages failed, one twenty-four pounder
was rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another
became useless from an accident, a captain of
engineers was killed, and the besiegers’ shot had
little effect upon the solid wall. In the night however
the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages,
and a parallel across the isthmus was projected;
but the greatest part of the workmen, to avoid a
tempest, sought shelter in the suburb of San Martin
and when day broke only one-third of the work was
performed.</p>

<p>The 21st the besiegers’ batteries ceased firing to
allow of a summons, but the governor refused to
receive the letter and the firing was resumed. The
main wall still resisted yet the parapets and embrazures
crumbled away fast, and the batteries on
Monte Olia plunged into the horn-work, although
at sixteen hundred yards distance, with such effect,
that the besieged having no bomb-proofs were forced
to dig trenches to protect themselves. The counter-fire
directed solely against the breaching batteries
was feeble, but at midnight a shell thrown from the
castle into the bay gave the signal for a sally, and
during the firing which ensued several French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77"></a>[77]</span>
vessels with supplies entered the harbour. This
night also the besieged isolated the breach by cuts
in the rampart and other defences. On the other
hand the besiegers’ parallel across the isthmus was
completed, and in its progress laid bare the mouth
of a drain, four feet high and three feet wide, containing
the pipe of the aqueduct cut off by the
Spaniards. Through this dangerous opening lieutenant
Reid of the engineers, a young and zealous
officer, crept even to the counterscarp of the horn-work,
and finding the passage there closed by a
door returned without an accident. Thirty barrels
of powder were placed in this drain, and eight feet
was stopped with sand-bags, thus forming a globe
of compression designed to blow, as through a tube,
so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill
the narrow ditch of the horn-work.</p>

<p>On the 22d the fire from the batteries, unexampled
from its rapidity and accuracy, opened what appeared
a practicable breach in the eastern flank
wall, between the towers of Los Hornos and Las<span class="sidenote7">Plan 3.</span>
Mesquitas. The counter-fire of the besieged now
slackened, but the descent into the town behind the
breach was more than twelve feet perpendicular,
and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently
working at the interior defences to receive
the assault: they added also another gun to the
battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador battery,
to flank the front attack. On the other hand
the besiegers had placed four sixty-eight pound
carronades in battery to play on the defences of the
breach, but the fire on both sides slackened because
the guns were greatly enlarged at the vents with
constant practice.</p>

<p>On the 23d the sea blockade being null the French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78"></a>[78]</span>
vessels returned to France with the badly wounded
men. This day the besiegers judging the breach
between the towers quite practicable turned the
guns, at the suggestion of general Oswald, to break
the wall on the right of the main breach. Major
Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage
would be gained by making a second opening to
get at which the troops must first pass the great
breach; that time would be thus uselessly lost to
the besiegers, and that there was a manifest objection
on account of the tide and depth of water at the
new point attacked. His counsel was overruled,
and in the course of the day, the wall being thin
the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach thirty
feet wide was rendered practicable.</p>

<p>The defensive fire of the besieged being now
much diminished, the ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight
pound carronades were turned upon the defences
of the great breach, and upon a stockade
which separated the high curtain on the land front,
from the lower works of the flank against which the
attack was conducted. The houses near the breach
were soon in flames which spread rapidly, destroyed
some of the defences of the besieged and menacing
the whole town with destruction. The assault was
ordered for the next morning. But when the troops
assembled in the trenches the burning houses appeared
so formidable that the attack was deferred
and the batteries again opened, partly against the
second breach, partly against the defences, partly to
break the wall in a third place between the half
bastion of St. John on the land front and the main
breach.</p>

<p>During the night the vigilant governor expecting
the assault mounted two field-pieces on the cavalier,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79"></a>[79]</span>
in the centre of the land front, which being fifteen
feet above the other defences commanded the high
curtain, and they still had on the horn-work a light
piece, and two casemated guns on the flank of the
cavalier. Two other field-pieces were mounted on
an entrenchment which crossing the ditch of the
land front bore on the approaches to the main
breach; a twenty-four pounder looked from the tower
of Las Mesquitas, between the main breach and
where the third opening was being made and consequently
flanking both; two four-pounders were
in the tower of Hornos; two heavy guns were on
the flank of St. Elmo, and two others, placed on the<span class="sidenote12">Bellas, &amp;c.</span>
right of the Mirador, could play upon the breaches
from within the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus
fourteen pieces were still available for defence, the
retaining sea-wall or <i lang="fr">fausse braye</i> which strengthened
the flank of the horn-work, and between which and
the river the storming parties must necessarily advance,
was covered with live shells to roll over on
the columns, and behind the flaming houses near
the breach other edifices were loop-holed and filled
with musqueteers. However the fire extending
rapidly and fiercely greatly injured the defences,
the French to save their guns withdrew them until
the moment of attack, and the British artillery
officers were confident that in daylight they could
silence the enemy’s guns and keep the parapet clear
of men; wherefore sir Thomas Graham renewed
the order for</p>


<h4>THE ASSAULT.</h4>

<p>In the night of the 24th two thousand men of
the fifth division filed into the trenches on the
isthmus. This force was composed of the third<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80"></a>[80]</span>
battalion of the royals under major Frazer, destined
to storm the great breach; the thirty-eighth regiment
under colonel Greville, designed to assail the
lesser and most distant breach; the ninth regiment
under colonel Cameron, appointed to support the
royals; finally a detachment, selected from the
light companies of all those battalions, was placed in
the centre of the royals under the command of lieutenant
Campbell of the ninth regiment. This chosen
detachment, accompanied by the engineer Machel
with a ladder party, was intended to sweep the
high curtain after the breach should be won.</p>

<p>The distance from the trenches to the points of
attack was more than three hundred yards along
the contracted space lying between the retaining
wall of the horn-work and the river; the ground
was strewed with rocks covered by slippery sea-weeds;
the tide had left large and deep pools of
water; the parapet of the horn-work was entire as
well as the retaining wall; the parapets of the other
works and the two towers, which closely flanked
the breach, although injured were far from being
ruined, and every place was thickly garnished with
musqueteers. The difficulties of the attack were
obvious, and a detachment of Portuguese placed in
a trench opened beyond the parallel on the isthmus,
within sixty yards of the ramparts, was ordered to
quell if possible the fire of the horn-work.</p>

<p>While it was still dark the storming columns
moved out of the trenches, and the globe of compression
in the drain was exploded with great effect
against the counterscarp and glacis of the horn-work.
The garrison astonished by the unlooked-for event
abandoned the flanking parapet, and the troops
rushed onwards, the stormers for the main breach<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81"></a>[81]</span>
leading and suffering more from the fire of their
own batteries on the right of the Urumea than from
the enemy. Major Frazer and the engineer Harry
Jones first reached the breach. The enemy had
fallen back in confusion behind the ruins of the
still burning houses, and those brave officers rushed
up expecting that their troops would follow, but
not many followed, for it was extremely dark,
the natural difficulties of the way had contracted
the front and disordered the column in its whole
length, and the soldiers, straggling and out of wind,
arrived in small disconnected parties at the foot of
the breach. The foremost gathered near their gallant
leaders, but the depth of the descent into the town
and the volumes of flames and smoke which still
issued from the burning houses behind awed the
stoutest; and more than two-thirds of the storming
column, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had
broken off at the demi-bastion to commence a
musquetry battle with the enemy on the rampart.
Meanwhile the shells from the Monte Orgullo fell
rapidly, the defenders of the breach rallied and
with a smashing musquetry from the ruins and
loopholed houses smote the head of the column,
while the men in the towers smote them on the
flanks; and from every quarter came showers of
grape and hand-grenades tearing the ranks in a
dreadful manner.</p>

<p>Major Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the
intrepid Jones stood there awhile longer amidst a
few heroic soldiers, hoping for aid, but none came
and he and those with him were struck down. The
engineer Machel had been killed early and the men
bearing ladders fell or were dispersed. Thus the
rear of the column was in absolute confusion before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82"></a>[82]</span>
the head was beaten. It was in vain that colonel
Greville of the thirty-eighth, colonel Cameron of
the ninth, captain Archimbeau of the royals, and
many other regimental officers exerted themselves to
rally their discomfited troops and refill the breach;
it was in vain that lieutenant Campbell, breaking
through the tumultuous crowd with the survivors of
his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins; twice he
ascended, twice he was wounded, and all around
him died. The royals endeavouring to retire got
intermixed with the thirty-eighth, and with some
companies of the ninth which had unsuccessfully
endeavoured to pass them and get to the lesser
breach. Then swayed by different impulses and
pent up in the narrow way between the horn-work
and the river, the mass reeling to and fro could
neither advance nor go back until the shells and
musquetry, constantly plied both in front and flank,
had thinned the concourse and the trenches were
regained in confusion. At daylight a truce was
agreed to for an hour, during which the French,
who had already humanely removed the gallant
Jones and the other wounded men from the breach,
now carried off the more distant sufferers lest they
should be drowned by the rising of the tide.</p>

<p>Five officers of engineers including sir Richard
Fletcher, and forty-four officers of the line with
five hundred and twenty men, had been killed,
wounded, or made prisoners in this assault the
failure of which was signal, yet the causes were
obvious and may be classed thus.</p>

<p>1º. Deviation from the original project of siege
and from lord Wellington’s instructions.</p>

<p>2º. Bad arrangements of detail.</p>

<p>3º. Want of vigour in the execution.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83"></a>[83]</span></p>

<p>In respect of the first, lord Wellington having
visited the Chofre trenches on the 22d confirmed
his former approval of Smith’s plan, and gave that
officer final directions for the attack finishing thus,
“<em>Fair daylight must be taken for the assault</em>.”
These instructions and their emphatic termination
were repeated by major Smith in the proper quarter,
but they were not followed, no lodgement was made
on the horn-work, the defences were nearly entire
both in front and flank, and the assault was made in
darkness. Major Smith had also, by calculation
and by consultations with the fishermen, ascertained
that the ebb of tide would serve exactly at day-break
on the 24th; but the assault was made the
25th, and then before daylight, when the water
being too high contracted the ground, increased the
obstacles, and forced the assaulting column to
march on a narrow front and a long line, making
an uneasy progress and trickling onwards instead
of dashing with a broad surge against the breach.
In fine the rules of art being neglected and no extraordinary
resource substituted the operation failed.</p>

<p>The troops filed out of the long narrow trenches
in the night, a tedious operation, and were immediately<span class="sidenote">Notes on the siege, by sir C. Smith, MSS.</span>
exposed to a fire of grape from their own
batteries on the Chofres. This fire, intended to
keep down that of the enemy, should have ceased
when the globe of compression was sprung in the
drain, but owing to the darkness and the noise
the explosion could neither be seen nor heard. The
effect of it however drove the enemy from the horn-work,
the Portuguese on that side advanced to the
ditch, and a vigorous escalade would probably have
succeeded but they had no ladders. Again the
stormers of the great breach marched first, filling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84"></a>[84]</span>
up the way and rendering the second breach, as
major Smith had foretold, useless, and the ladder-bearers
never got to their destination. The attack
was certainly ill-digested, and there was a neglect
of moral influence followed by its natural consequence
want of vigour in execution.</p>

<p>The deferring of the assault from the 24th to the
25th expressly because the breach was too difficult
rendered the troops uneasy, they suspected some
hidden danger, and in this mood emerging from the
trenches they were struck by the fire of their own
batteries; then wading through deep pools of water,
or staggering in the dark over slippery rocks, and
close under the enemy’s flanking works whence
every shot told with fatal effect, how could they
manifest their natural conquering energy? It is
possible that a second and more vigorous assault on
the great breach might have been effected by a
recognized leader, but no general or staff officer
went out of the trenches with the troops, and the
isolated exertions of the regimental officers were
unavailing. Nor were there wanting other sinister
influences. General Oswald had in the councils
earnestly and justly urged the dangers arising from
the irregular mode of attack, but this anticipation
of ill success, in which other officers of rank joined,
was freely expressed out of council, and it said even
in the hearing of the troops abating that daring
confidence which victory loves.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington repaired immediately to St.
Sebastian. The causes of the failure were apparent
and he would have renewed the attack, but wanting
ammunition, deferred it until the powder and additional
ordnance which he had written for to England
as early as the 26th of June should arrive.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85"></a>[85]</span>
The next day other events caused him to resort to a
blockade and the battering train was transported to
Passages, two guns and two howitzers only being
retained on the Chofres and the Monte Olia. This
operation was completed in the night of the 26th,
but at day-break the garrison made a sally from the
horn-work, surprised the trenches and swept off
two hundred Portuguese and thirty British soldiers.
To avoid a repetition of this disaster the guards of
the trenches were concentrated in the left parallel,
and patroles only were sent out, yet one of those
also was cut off on the 1st of August. Thus
terminated the first part of the siege of San Sebastian
in which the allies lost thirteen hundred soldiers
and seamen, exclusive of Spaniards during Mendizabal’s
blockade.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86"></a>[86]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">The battle of Vittoria was fought on the 21st of
June.</p>

<p>The 1st of July marshal Soult, under a decree<span class="sidenote9">1813. July.</span>
issued at Dresden, succeeded Joseph as lieutenant
to the emperor, who thus shewed how little his mind
had been affected by his brother’s accusations.</p>

<p>The 12th, Soult, travelling with surprising expedition,
assumed the command of the armies of the
“<em>north</em>,” the “<em>centre</em>” and the “<em>south</em>” now reorganised
in one body, called “<em>the army of Spain</em>.”
And he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly
aside if necessary, but that monarch voluntarily
retired from the army.</p>

<p>At this period general Paris remained at Jaca,
as belonging to Suchet’s command, but Clauzel had
entered France, and the “<em>army of Spain</em>,” reinforced
from the interior, was composed of nine
divisions of infantry, a reserve, and two regular
divisions of cavalry besides the light horsemen
attached to the infantry. Following the imperial
muster-rolls this army, including the garrisons and
thirteen German Italian and Spanish battalions not
belonging to the organisation, amounted to one<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix, No. 8.</a></span>
hundred and fourteen thousand men; and as the
armies of Catalonia and of Aragon numbered at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87"></a>[87]</span>
the same period above sixty-six thousand, the whole
force still employed against Spain exceeded one
hundred and eighty thousand men with twenty
thousand horses; and of this number one hundred
and fifty-six thousand were present under arms,
while in Germany and Poland above seven hundred
thousand French soldiers were in activity.</p>

<p>Such great forces, guided by Napoleon, seemed
sufficient to defy the world, but moral power which
he has himself described as constituting three-fourths
of military strength, that power which
puny essayists declaiming for their hour against
the genius of warriors, are unable to comprehend
although by far the most important part of the art
which they decry, was wanting. One half of this
force, organized in peace and setting forth in hope
at the beginning of a war, would have enabled Napoleon
to conquer; but now, near the close of a terrible
struggle, with a declining fate and the national
confidence in his fortune and genius shaken, although
that genius was never more surpassingly displayed,
his military power was a vast but unsound machine.
The public mind was bewildered by the intricacy
and greatness of combinations the full scope of
which he alone could see clearly, and generals and
ministers doubted and feared when they should
have supported him, neglecting their duty or coldly
executing his orders when their zeal should have
redoubled. The unity of impulse so essential to
success was thus lost, and his numerous armies
carried not with them proportionate strength. To
have struggled with hope under such astounding
difficulties was scarcely to be expected from the
greatest minds, but like the emperor, to calculate
and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88"></a>[88]</span>
and accuracy, to seize every favourable chance
with unerring rapidity, to sustain every reverse
with undisturbed constancy, never urged to rashness
by despair yet enterprizing to the utmost verge
of daring consistent with reason, was a display of
intellectual greatness so surpassing, that it is not
without justice Napoleon has been called, in reference
as well to past ages as to the present, the
foremost of mankind.</p>

<p>The suddenness, as well as the completeness, of
the destruction caused by the snows of Russia,
had shattered the emperor’s military and political
system, and the broken parts of the former, scattered
widely, were useless until he could again
bind them together. To effect this he rushed with
a raw army into the midst of Germany, for his
hope was to obtain by celerity a rallying point for
his veterans, who having survived the Russian
winter and the succeeding pestilence were widely
dispersed. His first effort was successful, but
without good cavalry victory cannot be pushed
far, and the practised horsemen of France had nearly
disappeared; their successors badly mounted and
less skilful were too few and too weak, and thus
extraordinary exertion was required from soldiers,
whose youth and inexperience rendered them unfit
even for the ordinary hardships of war.</p>

<p>The measure of value for Wellington’s campaign
is thus attained, for if Joseph had opposed him
with only moderate ability and had avoided a great
battle, not less than fifty thousand veterans could
have been drawn off to reinforce and give stability
to the young soldiers in Germany. On the side of
Spain those veterans were indeed still numerous,
but the spirit of the French people behind them<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89"></a>[89]</span>
almost worn out by victory, was now abashed by
defeat, and even the military men who had acquired
grandeur and riches beyond their hopes, were with
few exceptions averse to further toil. Napoleon’s
astonishing firmness of mind was understood by
few in high stations, shared by fewer; and many
were the traitors to him and to France and to the
glories of both. However his power was still enormous,
and wherever he led in person his brave
and faithful soldiers, fighting with the true instinct
of patriotism, conquered. Where he was not their
iron hardihood abated.</p>

<p>Marshal Soult was one of the few men whose
indefatigable energy rendered them worthy lieutenants
of the emperor; and with singular zeal,
vigour and ability he now served. His troops, nominally
above one hundred thousand men ninety-seven
thousand being present under arms with
eighty-six pieces of artillery, were not all available
for field operations. The garrisons of Pampeluna,
San Sebastian, Santona, and Bayonne, together
with the foreign battalions, absorbed seventeen
thousand; and most of the latter had orders to
regain their own countries with a view to form the
new levies. The permanent “<em>army of Spain</em>” furnished
therefore only seventy-seven thousand five
hundred men present under arms, seven thousand of
which were cavalry, and its condition was not satisfactory.
The people on the frontier were flying
from the allies, the military administration was disorganized,
and the recent disasters had discouraged
the soldiers and deteriorated their discipline. Under
these circumstances Soult was desirous of some
delay to secure his base and restore order ere he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90"></a>[90]</span>
attempted to regain the offensive, but his instructions
on that point were imperative.</p>

<p>Napoleon’s system was perfectly adapted for great
efforts, civil or military; but so rapid had been
lord Wellington’s advance from Portugal, so decisive
his operations that the resources of France
were in a certain degree paralyzed, and the army
still reeled and rocked from the blows it had received.
Bayonne, a fortress of no great strength
in itself, had been entirely neglected, and the arming
and provisioning that and other places was
indispensible. The restoration of an entrenched
camp originally traced by Vauban to cover Bayonne
followed, and the enforcement of discipline,
the removal of the immense train of Spanish families,
civil administrators, and other wasteful followers
of Joseph’s court, the arrangement of a general
system for supply of money and provisions, aided
by judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities
and excite the national spirit, were amongst the
first indications that a great commander was in the
field. The soldiers’ confidence soon revived and
some leading merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded
the general; but the people of the south
were generally more inclined to avoid the burthen
of defending their country than to answer appeals
to their patriotism.</p>

<p>On the 14th Soult examined the line of military
positions, and ordered Reille, who then occupied
the passes of Vera and Echallar, to prepare pontoons
for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at
Biriatou. That general as we have seen was driven
from those passes the next day, but he prepared his
bridges; and such was Soult’s activity that on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91"></a>[91]</span>
16th all the combinations for a gigantic offensive
movement were digested, the means of executing
it rapidly advancing, and orders were issued for
the preliminary dispositions.</p>

<p>At this time the French army was divided into
three corps of battle, and a reserve. Clauzel commanding
the left wing was at St. Jean Pied de Port
and in communication, by the French frontier, with
general Paris at Jaca. Drouet, count D’Erlon,<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
commanding the centre, occupied the heights near
Espelette and Ainhoa, with an advanced guard
behind Urdax. General Reille commanding the
right wing was in position on the mountains overlooking
Vera from the side of France. The reserve
under Villatte, comprising a separate body of light
horsemen and the foreign battalions, guarded the
banks of the Bidassoa from the mouth upwards to
Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed.
The division of heavy cavalry under
Trielhard, and that of light cavalry under Pierre
Soult, the Marshal’s brother, were on the banks of
the Nive and the Adour.</p>

<p>The counter-disposition of the allies was as
follows.</p>

<p>Byng’s brigade of British infantry, detached from
the second division and reinforced by Morillo’s Spaniards,
was on the extreme right. These troops had
early in June driven the French from the village
of Valcarlos in the valley of that name, and had
foraged the French territory, but finding no good
permanent position, retreated again to the rocks in
front of the passes of Roncesvalles and Ibañeta.</p>

<p>On the left of Byng, Campbell’s brigade detached
from Hamilton’s Portuguese division, was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92"></a>[92]</span>
posted in the Alduides and supported by general
Cole, who was with the fourth division at Viscayret
in the valley of Urroz.</p>

<p>On the left of Campbell general Hill defended
the Bastan with the remainder of the second division,
and with Hamilton’s Portuguese, now commanded
by Sylveira, Conde D’Amarante. Picton,
with the third division, was stationed at Olague as
a reserve to those troops and to Cole.</p>

<p>On the left of Hill the seventh and light divisions
occupied a chain of mountains running by
Echallar to Vera, and behind them at the town of
San Estevan was posted the sixth division.</p>

<p>Longa’s Spaniards continued the line of defence
from Vera to general Giron’s position, which extending
along the mountains bordering the Bidassoa
to the sea, crossed the great road of Irun.
Behind Giron was the besieging army under sir
Thomas Graham.</p>

<p>Thirty-six pieces of field artillery, and some regiments
of British and Portuguese cavalry, were
with the right wing and centre, but the bulk of the
horsemen and the heavy guns were behind the
mountains, chiefly about Tafalla. The great hospitals
were in Vittoria, the commissariat depôts were
principally on the coast, and to supply the troops
in the mountains was exceedingly difficult and
onerous.</p>

<p>Henry O’Donnel, Conde de la Bispal, blockaded
Pampeluna with the Andalusian army of reserve,
and Carlos D’España’s division was on the march
to join him. Mina, Julian Sanchez, Duran, Empecinado,
Goyan and some smaller bands, were on
the side of Zaragoza and Daroca, cutting the communication<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93"></a>[93]</span>
between Soult and Suchet, and the
latter, thinking Aragon lost, was, as we have seen,
falling back upon Catalonia.</p>

<p>The whole force under lord Wellington’s immediate
command, that is to say in Navarre and Guipuscoa,
was certainly above one hundred thousand
men, of which the Anglo-Portuguese furnished
fifty-seven thousand present under arms, seven<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix, 7.</a></span>
thousand being cavalry; but the Spanish regulars
under Giron, Labispal and Carlos D’España, including
Longa’s division and some of Mendizabal’s<span class="sidenote">Notes by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.</span>
army, scarcely amounted to twenty-five thousand.
According to the respective muster-rolls, the troops
in line actually under arms and facing each
other, were, of the allies, about eighty-two thousand,
of the French about seventy-eight thousand;
but as the rolls of the latter include every man and
officer of all arms belonging to the organization,
and the British and Portuguese rolls so quoted,
would furnish between ten and twelve thousand
additional combatants, the French force must be
reduced, or the allies augmented in that proportion.
This surplus was however now compensated by the
foreign battalions temporarily attached to Soult’s
army, and by the numerous national guards, <ins class="corr" id="tn-93" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'all amountaineers'">
all mountaineers</ins>, fierce warlike and very useful as
guides. In other respects lord Wellington stood at
a disadvantage.</p>

<p>The theatre of operations was a trapezoid, with
sides from forty to sixty miles in length, and having
Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, St. Sebastian and
Pampeluna, all fortresses, in possession of the French
at the angles. The interior, broken and tormented
by dreadful mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep
water-courses, precipices and forests, would at first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94"></a>[94]</span>
sight appear a wilderness which no military combinations
could embrace, and susceptible only of irregular
and partizan operations. But the great spinal
ridge of the Pyrenees furnishes a clue to the labyrinth
of hills and valleys. Running diagonally
across the quadrilateral, it separated Bayonne St.
Jean Pied de Port and San Sebastian from Pampeluna,
and thus the portion of the allied army which
more especially belonged to the blockade of Pampeluna,
was in a manner cut off from that which
belonged to the siege of San Sebastian. They
were distinct armies, each having its particular
object, and the only direct communication between
them was the great road running behind the mountains
from Toloza, by Irurzun, to Pampeluna.
The centre of the allies was indeed an army of
succour and connection, but of necessity very much
scattered, and with lateral communications so few,
difficult and indirect as to prevent any unity of
movement; nor could general Hill’s corps move at
all until an attack was decidedly pronounced against
one of the extremities, lest the most direct gun-road
to Pampeluna which it covered should be
unwarily opened to the enemy. In short the French
general, taking the offensive, could by beaten roads
concentrate against any part of the English general’s
line, which, necessarily a passively defensive one,
followed an irregular trace of more than fifty miles
of mountains.</p>

<p>Wellington having his battering train and stores
about San Sebastian, which was also nearer and
more accessible to the enemy than Pampeluna, made
his army lean towards that side. His left wing, including
the army of siege, was twenty-one thousand
strong with singularly strong positions of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95"></a>[95]</span>
defence, and the centre, about twenty-four thousand
strong, could in two marches unite with the left
wing to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of
an enemy advancing by the high road of Irun; but
three days or more were required by those troops
to concentrate for the security of the blockade on
the right. Soult however judged that no decisive
result would attend a direct movement upon San
Sebastian; because Guipuscoa was exhausted of
provisions, and the centre of the allies could fall on
his flank before he reached Ernani, which, his attack
in front failing, would place him in a dangerous
position. Moreover by means of his sea communication
he knew that San Sebastian was not in extremity;
but he had no communication with Pampeluna
and feared its fall. Wherefore he resolved
to operate by his left.</p>

<p>Profiting by the roads leading to St. Jean Pied
de Port, and covering his movement by the Nivelle
and Nive rivers and by the positions of his centre,
he hoped to gather on Wellington’s right quicker
than that general could gather to oppose him, and
thus compensating by numbers the disadvantage of
assailing mountain positions force a way to Pampeluna.
That fortress once succoured, he designed to
seize the road of Irurzun, and keeping in mass
either fall upon the separated divisions of the centre
in detail as they descended from the hills, or operate
on the rear of the force besieging San Sebastian,
while a corps of observation, which he proposed to
leave on the Lower Bidassoa, menaced it in front
and followed it in retreat. The siege of San Sebastian,
the blockade of Pampeluna and probably that
of Santona, would be thus raised, and the French
army united in an abundant country, and its communication<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96"></a>[96]</span>
with Suchet secured, would be free
either to co-operate with that marshal or to press
its own attack.</p>

<p>In this view, and to mislead lord Wellington by
vexing his right simultaneously with the construction
of the bridges against his left, Soult wrote to
general Paris, desiring him to march when time
suited from Jaca by the higher valleys towards
Aviz or Sanguessa, to drive the partizans from that
side and join the left of the army when it should
have reached Pampeluna. Meanwhile Clauzel was
directed to repair the roads in his own front, to push
the heads of his columns towards the passes of Roncesvalles,
and by sending a strong detachment into the
Val de Baygorry, towards the lateral pass of Yspegui,
to menace Hill’s flank which was at that pass, and the
front of Campbell’s brigade in the Alduides.</p>

<p>On the 20th Reille’s troops on the heights above
Vera and Sarre, being cautiously relieved by Villatte,
marched through Cambo towards St. Jean Pied de
Port. They were to reach the latter early on the 22d,
and on that day also the two divisions of cavalry and
the park of artillery were to be concentrated at the
same place. D’Erlon with the centre meanwhile
still held his positions at Espelette, Ainhoüe or
Ainhoa, and Urdax, thus covering and masking the
great movements taking place behind.</p>

<p>Villatte who including the foreign battalions had
eighteen thousand troops on the rolls, furnishing
about fifteen thousand sabres and bayonets, remained
in observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened by
superior forces he was to retire slowly and in mass
upon the entrenched camp commenced at Bayonne,
yet halting successively on the positions of Bordegain
in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the heights<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97"></a>[97]</span>
of Bidart in rear of that town. He was especially
directed to shew only French troops at the advanced
posts, and if the assailants made a point with a
small corps, to drive them vigorously over the
Bidassoa again. But if the allies should in consequence
of Soult’s operations against their right retire,
Villatte was to relieve San Sebastian and to
follow them briskly by Tolosa.</p>

<p>Rapidity was of vital importance to the French
general, but heavy and continued rains swelled the
streams, and ruined the roads in the deep country
between Bayonne and the hills; the head-quarters,
which should have arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port
on the 20th, only reached Olhonce, a few miles<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
short of that place, the 21st; and Reille’s troops
unable to make way at all by Cambo took the
longer road of Bayonne. The cavalry was retarded
in like manner, and the whole army, men and
horses, were worn down by the severity of the
marches. Two days were thus lost, but on the 24th
more than sixty thousand fighting men including
cavalry national guards and <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span>, with sixty-six
pieces of artillery, were assembled to force the
passes of Roncesvalles and Maya. The main road
leading to the former was repaired, three hundred
sets of bullocks were provided to draw the guns up
the mountain, and the national guards of the frontier
on the left were ordered to assemble in the
night on the heights of Yropil, to be reinforced on
the morning of the 25th by detachments of regular
troops with a view to vex and turn the right of the
allies which extended to the foundry of Orbaiceta.</p>

<p>Such were Soult’s first dispositions, but as mountain
warfare is complicated in the extreme, it will
be well to consider more in detail the relative positions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98"></a>[98]</span>
and objects of the hostile forces and the nature
of the country.</p>

<p>It has been already stated that the great spine of
the hills, trending westward, run diagonally across
the theatre of operations. From this spine huge
ridges shot out on either hand, and the communications
between the valleys thus formed on both sides
of the main chain passed over certain comparatively
low places called “<i lang="fr">cols</i>” by the French, and <i lang="es">puertos</i>
by the Spaniards. The Bastan, the Val Carlos,
and the Val de Baygorry the upper part of which
is divided into the Alduides and the Val de Ayra,
were on the French side of the great chain; on the
Spanish side were the valleys of Ahescoa or Orbaiceta,
the valley of Iscua or Roncesvalles, the valley
of Urros, the Val de Zubiri, and the valley of Lanz,
the two latter leading down directly upon Pampeluna
which stands within two miles of the junction
of their waters. Such being the relative situations
of the valleys, the disposition, and force, of the armies,
shall now be traced from left to right of the French,
and from right to left of the allies. But first it must be
observed that the main chain, throwing as it were a
shoulder forward from Roncesvalles towards St.
Jean Pied de Port, placed the entrance to the Spanish
valley of Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, in the power
of Soult, who could thus by Yropil turn the extreme
right of his adversary with detachments, although
not with an army.</p>

<p><em>Val Carlos.</em>—Two issues led from this valley over
the main chain, namely the Ibañeta and Mendichuri
passes; and there was also the lateral pass of Atalosti
leading into the Alduides, all comprised within
a space of two or three miles.</p>

<p>The high road from St. Jean Pied de Port to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99"></a>[99]</span>
Pampeluna, ascending the left-hand ridge or boundary
of Val Carlos, runs along the crest until it
joins the superior chain of mountains, and then
along the summit of that also until it reaches the
pass of Ibañeta, whence it descends to Roncesvalles.
Ibañeta may therefore be called the Spanish end of
the pass; but it is also a pass in itself, because a
narrow road, leading through Arnegui and the
village of Val Carlos, ascends directly to Ibañeta
and falls into the main road behind it.</p>

<p>Clauzel’s three divisions of infantry, all the artillery
and the cavalry were formed in two columns in front
of St. Jean Pied de Port. The head of one was
placed on some heights above Arnegui about two
miles from the village of Val Carlos; the head
of the other at the Venta de Orrisson, on the main
road and within two miles of the remarkable rocks
of Chateau Piñon, a little beyond which one narrow
way descended on the right to the village of Val
Carlos, and another on the left to the foundry of
Orbaiceta.</p>

<p>On the right-hand boundary of Val Carlos, near
the rock of Ayrola, Reille’s divisions were concentrated,
with orders to ascend that rock at daylight,
and march by the crest of the ridge towards a culminant
point of the great chain called the Lindouz,
which gained, Reille was to push detachments
through the passes of Ibañeta and Mendichuri to
the villages of Roncesvalles and Espinal. He was,
at the same time, to seize the passes of Sahorgain
and Urtiaga immediately on his right, and even approach
the more distant passes of Renecabal and
Bellate, thus closing the issues from the Alduides,
and menacing those from the Bastan.</p>

<p><em>Val de Ayra.</em> <em>The Alduides.</em> <em>Val de Baygorry.</em><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100"></a>[100]</span>
The ridge of Ayrola, at the foot of which Reille’s<span class="sidenote7">Plan, No. 2.</span>
troops were posted, separates Val Carlos from these
valleys which must be designated by the general
name of the Alduides for the upper part, and the
Val de Baygorry for the lower. The issues from
the Alduides over the great chain towards Spain
were the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga; and there
was also a road running from the village of Alduides
through the Atalosti pass to Ibañeta a distance of
eight miles, by which general Campbell’s brigade
communicated with and could join Byng and
Morillo.</p>

<p><em>Bastan.</em> This district, including the valley of
Lerins and the Cinco Villas, is separated from the
Alduides and Val de Baygorry by the lofty mountain
of La Houssa, on which the national guards of
the Val de Baygorry and the Alduides were ordered
to assemble on the night of the 24th, and to light
fires so as to make it appear a great body was menacing
the Bastan by that flank. The Bastan
however does not belong to the same geographical
system as the other valleys. Instead of opening to
the French territory it is entirely enclosed with
high mountains, and while the waters of the Val
Carlos, the Alduides, and Val de Baygorry run off
northward by the Nive, those of the Bastan run off
westward by the Bidassoa, from which they are
separated by the Mandale, Commissari, La Rhune,
Santa Barbara, Ivantelly, Atchiola and other mountains.</p>

<p>The entrances to the Bastan with reference to
the position of the French army, were by the passes
of Vera and Echallar on its right; by the Col de
Maya and Arietta passes in the centre; and on the
left by the lateral passes of Yspegui, Lorrieta, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101"></a>[101]</span>
Berderez, which lead from the Val de Baygorry
and the Alduides. The issues over the principal
chain of the Pyrenees in the direct line from the
Maya entrances, were the passes of Renecabal and
Bellate; the first leading into the valley of Zubiri,
the second into the valley of Lanz. There was also
the pass of Artesiaga leading into the Val de Zubiri,
but it was nearly impracticable, and all the roads
through the Bastan were crossed by strong positions
dangerous to assail.</p>

<p>The Col de Maya comprised several passages in
a space of four miles, all of which were menaced by
D’Erlon from Espelete and Urdax; and he had
twenty-one thousand men, furnishing about eighteen
thousand bayonets. His communications with
Soult were maintained by cavalry posts through the
Val de Baygorry, and his orders were to attack the
allies when the combinations in the Val Carlos and
on the Houssa mountain should cause them to
abandon the passes at Maya; but he was especially
directed to operate by his left, so as to secure the
passes leading towards Reille with a view to the
concentration of the whole army. Thus if Hill retreated
by the pass of Bellate D’Erlon was to move
by Berderez and the Alduides; but if Hill retired
upon San Estevan D’Erlon was to move by the
pass of Bellate. Such being the dispositions of the
French general, those of the allies shall now be
traced.</p>

<p>General Byng and Morillo guarded the passes
in front of Roncesvalles. Their combined force<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Morning States.</span>
consisted of sixteen hundred British and from
three to four thousand Spaniards. Byng’s brigade
and two Spanish battalions occupied the rocks of
Altobiscar on the high road facing Chateau Piñon;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102"></a>[102]</span>
one Spanish battalion was at the foundry in the
valley of Orbaiceta on their right; Morillo with the
remainder of the Spaniards occupied the heights of
Iroulepe, on the left of the road leading to the
village of Val Carlos and overlooking the nearest
houses of that straggling place.</p>

<p>These positions, distant only four and five miles
from the French columns assembled at Venta de
Orrisson and Arnegui, were insecure. The ground
was indeed steep and difficult of access but too extensive;
moreover, although the passes led into the
Roncesvalles that valley did not lead direct to
Pampeluna; the high road after descending a few
miles turned to the right, and crossing two ridges
and the intervening valley of Urros entered the
valley of Zubiri, down which it was conducted to
Pampeluna: wherefore after passing Ibañeta in retreat
the allied troops could not avoid lending their
right flank to Reille’s divisions as far as Viscayret
in the valley of Urroz. It was partly to obviate
this danger, partly to support O’Donnel while
Clauzel’s force was in the vicinity of Jaca, that the<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Morning States.</span>
fourth division, about six thousand strong, occupied
Viscayret, six miles from the pass of Ibañeta, ten
miles from Morillo’s position, and twelve miles from
Byng’s position. But when Clauzel retired to
France, general Cole was directed to observe the
roads leading over the main chain from the Alduides
district, and to form a rallying point and reserve for
Campbell, Byng, and Morillo, his instructions being
to maintain the Roncesvalles passes against a front
attack, but not to commit his troops in a desperate
battle if the flanks were insecure.</p>

<p>On the left of Byng and Morillo, Campbell’s<span class="sidenote7">Ibid.</span>
Portuguese, about two thousand strong, were encamped<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103"></a>[103]</span>
above the village of Alduides on a mountain
called Mizpira. They observed the national
guards of the Val de Baygorry, preserved the communication
between Byng and Hill, and in some
measure covered the right flank of the latter.
From the Alduides Campbell could retreat through
the pass of Sahorgain upon Viscayret in the valley
of Urroz, and through the passes of Urtiaga and
Renacabal upon Eugui in the Val de Zubiri; finally
by the lateral pass of Atalosti he could join Byng
and the fourth division. The communication between
all these posts was maintained by Long’s
cavalry.</p>

<p>Continuing the line of positions to the left, general
Hill occupied the Bastan with the second British
division, Sylveira’s Portuguese, and some squadrons
of horse, but Byng’s and Campbell’s brigades being
detached, he had not more than nine thousand
sabres and bayonets. His two British brigades under<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s States.</span>
general William Stewart guarded the Col de Maya;
Sylveira’s Portuguese were at Erazu, on the right of
Stewart, observing the passes of Arrieta, Yspegui
and Elliorita; of which the two former were occupied
by Major Brotherton’s cavalry and by the
sixth Caçadores. The direct line of retreat and
point of concentration for all these troops was
Elizondo.</p>

<p>From Elizondo the route of Pampeluna over the
great chain was by the pass of Bellate and the
valley of Lanz. The latter running nearly parallel
with the valley of Zubiri is separated from it by a
wooded and rugged ridge, and between them there
were but three communications: the one high up,
leading from Lanz to Eugui, and prolonged from
thence to Viscayret in the valley of Urros; the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104"></a>[104]</span>
other two lower down, leading from Ostiz and
Olague to the village of Zubiri. At Olague the
third division, furnishing four thousand three hundred
bayonets under Picton, was posted ready to
support Cole or Hill as occasion required.</p>

<p>Continuing the front line from the left of Stewart’s
position at the Col de Maya, the trace run along
the mountains forming the French boundary of
the Bastan. It comprized the passes of Echallar
and Vera, guarded by the seventh division under
lord Dalhousie, and by the light division under
general Charles Alten. The former furnishing four<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Morning States.</span>
thousand seven hundred bayonets communicated
with general Stewart by a narrow road over the
Atchiola mountain, and the eighty-second regiment
was encamped at its junction with the Elizondo road,
about three miles behind the pass of Maya. The
light division, four thousand strong, was at Vera,
guarding the roads which led behind the mountains
through Sumbilla and San Estevan to Elizondo.</p>

<p>These two divisions being only observed by the
left wing of Villatte’s reserve were available for the
succour of either wing, and behind them, at the
town of San Estevan, was the sixth division of six<span class="sidenote7">Ibid.</span>
thousand bayonets, now under general Pack. Placed
at equal distances from Vera and Maya, having
free communication with both and a direct line of
march to Pampeluna over the main chain of the
Pyrenees by the <em>Puerto de Arraiz</em>, sometimes called
the pass of <em>Doña Maria</em>, this division was available
for any object and could not have been better
posted.</p>

<p>Around Pampeluna, the point to which all the
lines of march converged, the Spanish troops
under O’Donnel maintained the blockade, and they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105"></a>[105]</span>
were afterwards joined by Carlos D’España’s division
at a very critical moment. Thus reinforced
they amounted to eleven thousand, of which seven
thousand could be brought into action without
abandoning the works of blockade.</p>

<p>Head-quarters were at Lesaca, and the line of
correspondence with the left wing was over the
Peña de Haya, that with the right wing by San
Estevan, Elizondo and the Alduides. The line of
correspondence between sir Thomas Graham and
Pampeluna was by Goizueta and the high road of
Irurzun.</p>

<p>As the French were almost in contact with the
allies’ positions at Roncesvalles, which was also the
point of defence nearest to Pampeluna, it followed
that on the rapidity or slowness with which Soult
overcame resistance in that quarter depended his
success; and a comparative estimate of numbers
and distances will give the measure of his chances.</p>

<p>Clauzel’s three divisions furnished about sixteen
thousand bayonets, besides the cavalry, the artillery,
and the national guards menacing the valley of
Orbaiceta. Byng and Morillo were therefore with
five thousand infantry, to sustain the assault of sixteen
thousand until Cole could reinforce them;
but Cole being twelve miles distant could not come
up in fighting order under four or five hours. And
as Reille’s divisions, of equal strength with Clauzel’s,
could before that time seize the Lindouz and turn
the left, it was clear the allied troops, although increased
to eleven thousand by the junction of the
fourth division, must finally abandon their ground
to seek a new field of battle where the third division
could join them from the valley of Lanz, and
Campbell’s brigade from the Alduides. Thus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106"></a>[106]</span>
raised to seventeen or eighteen thousand bayonets
with some guns, they might on strong ground oppose
Clauzel and Reille’s thirty thousand; but as
Picton’s position at Olague was more than a day’s
march from Byng’s position at Altobiscar, their junction
could only be made in the valley of the Zubiri
and not very distant from Pampeluna. And when
seven thousand Spaniards from the blockade, and
two or three thousand cavalry from the side of the
Ebro are added, we have the full measure of the
allies’ strength in this quarter.</p>

<p>General Hill, menaced by D’Erlon with a very
superior force, and having the pass of Maya, half
a day’s march further from Pampeluna than the
passes of Roncesvalles, to defend, could not give
ready help. If he retreated rapidly D’Erlon could
follow as rapidly, and though Picton and Cole
would thus be reinforced with ten thousand men
Soult would gain eighteen thousand. Hill could
not however move until he knew that Byng and
Cole were driven from the Roncesvalles passes;
in fine he could not avoid a dilemma. For if he
maintained the passes at Maya and affairs went
wrong near Pampeluna, his own situation would be
imminently dangerous; if he maintained Irrueta,
his next position, the same danger was to be
dreaded; and the passes of Maya once abandoned,
D’Erlon, moving by his own left towards the Alduides,
could join Soult in the valley of Zubiri
before Hill could join Cole and Picton by the valley
of Lanz. But if Hill did not maintain the position
of Irrueta D’Erlon could follow and cut the sixth
and seventh divisions off from the valley of Lanz.
The extent and power of Soult’s combinations are
thus evinced. Hill forced to await orders and hampered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107"></a>[107]</span>
by the operations of D’Erlon, required, it
might be three days to get into line near Pampeluna;
but D’Erlon after gaining Maya could in one
day and a half, by the passes of Berderez and Urtiaga,
join Soult in the Val de Zubiri. Meanwhile
Byng, Morillo, Cole, Campbell, and Picton would
be exposed to the operations of double their own
numbers; and however firm and able individually
those generals might be, they could not when suddenly
brought together be expected to seize the
whole system of operations and act with that decision
and nicety of judgment which the occasion
demanded. It was clear therefore that Hill’s force
must be in some measure paralyzed at first, and
finally thrown with the sixth, seventh, and light
divisions, upon an external line of operations while
the French moved upon internal lines.</p>

<p>On the other hand it is also clear that the corps
of Byng, Morillo, Campbell, Cole, Picton, and
Hill were only pieces of resistance on lord Wellington’s
board, and that the sixth, seventh, and
light divisions were those with which he meant to
win his game. There was however a great difference
in their value. The light division and the
seventh, especially the former, being at the greatest
distance from Pampeluna, having enemies close in
front and certain points to guard, were, the seventh
division a day, the light division two days, behind
the sixth division, which was quite free to move at
an instant’s notice and was, the drag of D’Erlon’s
corps considered, a day nearer to Pampeluna than
Hill. Wherefore upon the rapid handling of this
well-placed body the fate of the allies depended.
If it arrived in time, nearly thirty thousand infantry<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108"></a>[108]</span>
with sufficient cavalry and artillery would
be established, under the immediate command of
the general-in-chief, on a position of strength to
check the enemy until the rest of the army arrived.
Where that position was and how the troops were
there gathered and fought shall now be shown.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109"></a>[109]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_V">CHAPTER V.</h3>
</div>

<h4>BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.</h4>


<p class="noindent"><em>Combat of Roncesvalles.</em>—On the 23d Soult issued<span class="sidenote9">1813. July.</span>
an order of the day remarkable for its force and
frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the leading<span class="sidenote7">Plan 3.</span>
events of the past campaign, he shewed that the
disasters sprung from the incapacity of the king,
not from the weakness of the soldiers whose military
virtue he justly extolled, and whose haughty
courage he inflamed by allusions to former glories.
He has been, by writers who disgrace English literature
with unfounded aspersions of a courageous
enemy, accused of unseemly boasting as to his
ultimate operations at this time, but the calumny
is refuted by the following passage from his dispatch
to the minister at war.</p>

<p>“<em>I shall move directly upon Pampeluna, and if
I succeed in relieving it I will operate towards my
right to embarrass the enemy’s troops in Guipuscoa,
Biscay, and Alava, and to enable the reserve to join
me, which will relieve St. Sebastian and Santona. If
this should happen I will then consider what is to be
done, either to push my own attack or to help the
army of Aragon, but to look so far ahead would
now be temerity.</em>”</p>

<p>It is true that conscious of superior abilities he
did not suppress the sentiment of his own worth as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110"></a>[110]</span>
a commander, but he was too proud to depreciate
brave adversaries on the eve of battle.</p>

<p>“<em>Let us not</em>,” he said, “<em>defraud the enemy of
the praise which is due to him. The dispositions of
the general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive,
the valour and steadiness of his troops have
been praiseworthy</em>.”</p>

<p>Having thus stimulated the ardour of his troops
he put himself at the head of Clauzel’s divisions,
and on the 25th at daylight led them up against
the rocks of Altobiscar.</p>

<p>General Byng, warned the evening before that
danger was near, and jealous of some hostile indications
towards the village of Val Carlos, had
sent the fifty-seventh regiment down there but kept
the rest of his men well in hand and gave notice
to general Cole who had made a new disposition of
his troops. Ross’s brigade was now at Espinal
two miles in advance of Viscayret, six miles from
the pass of Ibañeta, and eleven from Byng’s position,
but somewhat nearer to Morillo. Anson’s brigade
was close behind Ross, Stubbs’ Portuguese behind
Anson, and the artillery was at Linzoain.</p>

<p>Such was the exact state of affairs when Soult,
throwing out a multitude of skirmishers and pushing
forward his supporting columns and guns as
fast as the steepness of the road and difficult nature
of the ground would permit, endeavoured to force
Byng’s position; but the British general, undismayed
at the multitude of assailants, fought
strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and
their rolling musketry pealed in vain for hours
along that cloudy field of battle elevated five thousand
feet above the level of the plains. Their
numbers however continually increased in front,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111"></a>[111]</span>
and the national guards from Yropil, reinforced by
Clauzel’s detachments, skirmished with the Spanish
battalions at the foundry of Orbaiceta and threatened
to turn the right. The Val Carlos was at the
same time menaced from Arnegui, and Reille’s
divisions ascending the rock of Airola turned Morillo’s
left.</p>

<p>About mid-day general Cole arrived at Altobiscar,
but his brigades were still distant, and the
French renewing their attack neglected the Val
Carlos to gather more thickly on the front of Byng.
He resisted all their efforts, but Reille made progress
along the summit of the Airola ridge. Morillo
then fell back towards Ibañeta, and the French were
already nearer to that pass than the troops at Altobiscar
were, when Ross’s brigade, coming up the
pass of Mendichuri, suddenly appeared on the
Lindouz, at the instant when the head of Reille’s
column being close to Atalosti was upon the point
of cutting the communication with Campbell. This
officer’s picquets had been attacked early in the
morning by the national guards of the Val de Baygorry,
but he soon discovered that it was only a feint
and therefore moved by his right towards Atalosti
when he heard the firing on that side. His march
was secured by the Val d’Ayra which separated him
from the ridge of Airola along which Reille was
advancing, but noting that general’s strength, and
at the same time seeing Ross’s brigade labouring up
the steep ridge of Mendichuri, Campbell judged that
the latter was ignorant of what was going on above.
Wherefore sending advice of the enemy’s proximity
and strength to Cole, he offered to pass the Atalosti
and join in the battle if he could be furnished with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112"></a>[112]</span>
transport for his sick, and provisions on the new
line of operations.</p>

<p>Before this message could reach Cole, the head
of Ross’s column, composed of a wing of the twentieth
regiment and a company of Brunswickers, was
on the summit of the Lindouz, where most unexpectedly
it encountered Reille’s advanced guard.
The moment was critical, but Ross an eager hardy
soldier called aloud to charge, and captain Tovey
of the twentieth running forward with his company
crossed a slight wooded hollow and full against the
front of the sixth French light infantry dashed with
the bayonet. Brave men fell by that weapon on<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3.</a></span>
both sides, but numbers prevailing these daring
soldiers were pushed back again by the French,
Ross however gained his object, the remainder of
his brigade had come up and the pass of Atalosti
was secured, yet with a loss of one hundred and
forty men of the twentieth regiment and forty-one
of the Brunswickers.</p>

<p>Previous to this vigorous action general Cole
seeing the French in the Val Carlos and in the
valley of Orbaiceta, that is to say on both flanks
of Byng whose front was not the less pressed, had
ordered Anson to reinforce the Spaniards at the
foundry, and Stubbs to enter the Val Carlos in support
of the fifty-seventh. He now recalled Anson to
assist in defence of the Lindouz, and learning from
Campbell how strong Reille was, caused Byng,
with a view to a final retreat, to relinquish his advanced
position at Altobiscar and take a second
nearer the Ibañeta. This movement uncovered the
road leading down to the foundry of Orbaiceta,
but it concentrated all the troops, and at the same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113"></a>[113]</span>
time general Campbell, although he could not enter
the line of battle, because Cole was unable to supply
his demands, made so skilful a display of his
Portuguese as to impress Reille with the notion
that their numbers were considerable.</p>

<p>During these movements the skirmishing of the
light troops continued, but a thick fog coming up
the valley prevented Soult from making dispositions
for a general attack with his six divisions, and
when night fell general Cole still held the great
chain of the mountains with a loss of only three
hundred and eighty men killed and wounded. His
right was however turned by Orbaiceta, he had
but ten or eleven thousand bayonets to oppose to
thirty thousand, and his line of retreat being for
four or five miles down hill and flanked all the
way by the Lindouz, was uneasy and unfavourable.
Wherefore putting the troops silently in march after
dark, he threaded the passes and gained the valley
of Urros. His rear-guard composed of Anson’s
brigade followed in the morning, general Campbell
retired from the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga to
Eugui in the valley of Zubiri, and the Spanish battalion
retreating from the foundry of Orbaiceta by
the narrow way of Navala rejoined Morillo near
Espinal. The great chain was thus abandoned, but
the result of the day’s operation was unsatisfactory
to the French general; he acknowledged a loss of
four hundred men, he had not gained ten miles,
and from the passes now abandoned, to Pampeluna,
the distance was not less than twenty-two miles,
with strong defensive positions in the way where
increasing numbers of intrepid enemies were to be
expected.</p>

<p>Soult’s combinations, contrived for greater success,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114"></a>[114]</span>
had been thwarted, partly by fortune, partly
by errors of execution the like of which all generals
must expect, and the most experienced are the most
resigned as knowing them to be inevitable. The
interference of fortune was felt in the fog which
rose at the moment when he was ready to thrust
forward his heavy masses of troops entire. The
failure in execution was Reille’s tardy movement.
His orders were to gain with all expedition the
Lindouz, that is to say the knot tying the heads of
the Alduides, the Val Carlos, the Roncesvalles, and
the valley of Urroz. From that position he would
have commanded the Mendichuri, Atalosti, Ibañeta
and Sahorgain passes, and by moving along the crest
of the hills could menace the Urtiaga, Renacabal,
and Bellate passes, thus endangering Campbell’s
and Hill’s lines of retreat. But when he should have
ascended the rocks of Airola he halted to incorporate<span class="sidenote">Pellot, <span lang="fr">Mémoires des Campagnes des Pyrennées</span>.</span>
two newly arrived conscript battalions and
to issue provisions, and the hours thus lost would
have sufficed to seize the Lindouz before general
Ross got through the pass of Mendichuri. The
fog would still have stopped the spread of the
French columns to the extent designed by Soult,
but fifteen or sixteen thousand men, placed on the
flank and rear of Byng and Morillo, would have
separated them from the fourth division, and
forced the latter to retreat beyond Viscayret.</p>

<p>Soult however overrated the force opposed to
him, supposing it to consist of two British divisions,<span class="sidenote">Official Despatch to the Minister of war, MSS.</span>
besides Byng’s brigade and Morillo’s Spaniards.
He was probably deceived by the wounded men,
who hastily questioned on the field would declare
they belonged to the second and fourth divisions,
because Byng’s brigade was part of the former;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115"></a>[115]</span>
but that general and the Spaniards had without aid
sustained Soult’s first efforts, and even when the
fourth division came up, less than eleven thousand
men, exclusive of sergeants and officers, were present
in the fight. Campbell’s Portuguese never
entered the line at all, the remainder of the second
division was in the Bastan, and the third division
was at Olague in the valley of Lanz.</p>

<p>On the 26th the French general put Clauzel’s
wing on the track of Cole, and ordered Reille to
follow the crest of the mountains and seize the
passes leading from the Bastan in Hill’s rear while
D’Erlon pressed him in front. That general would
thus, Soult hoped, be crushed or thrown on the
side of San Estevan; D’Erlon could then reach
his proper place in the valley of Zubiri, while the
right descended the valley of Lanz and prevented
Picton quitting it to aid Cole. A retreat by those
generals and on separate lines would thus be inevitable,
and the French army could issue forth in
a compact order of battle from the mouths of the
two valleys against Pampeluna.</p>


<h4>COMBAT OF LINZOAIN.</h4>

<p>All the columns were in movement at day-break,
but every hour brought its obstacle. The fog still
hung heavy on the mountain-tops, Reille’s guides,
bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the
crests, and at ten o’clock having no other resource
he marched down the pass of Mendichuri upon
Espinal, and fell into the rear of the cavalry and
artillery following Clauzel’s divisions. Meanwhile
Soult, although retarded also by the fog and the
difficulties of the ground, overtook Cole’s rear-guard
in front of Viscayret. The leading troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116"></a>[116]</span>
struck hotly upon some British light companies incorporated
under the command of colonel Wilson
of the forty-eighth, and a French squadron passing
round their flank fell on the rear; but Wilson
facing about, drove off these horsemen and thus
fighting, Cole, about two o’clock, reached the
heights of Linzoain a mile beyond Viscayret, where
general Picton met him with intelligence that
Campbell had reached Eugui from the Alduides,
and that the third division having crossed the hills
from Olague was at Zubiri. The junction of all
these troops was thus secured, the loss of the
day was less than two hundred, and neither wounded
men nor baggage had been left behind. However
the French gathered in front and at four o’clock
seized some heights on the allies’ left which endangered
their position, wherefore again falling
back a mile, Cole offered battle on the ridge
separating the valley of Urroz from that of Zubiri.
During this skirmish Campbell coming from Eugui
shewed his Portuguese on the ridges above the right
flank of the French, but they were distant, Picton’s
troops were still at Zubiri, and there was light
for an action. Soult however disturbed with intelligence
received from D’Erlon, and perhaps doubtful
what Campbell’s troops might be, put off the
attack until next morning, and after dark the junction
of all the allies was effected.</p>

<p>This delay on the part of the French general
seems injudicious. Cole was alone for five hours.
Every action, by increasing the number of wounded
men and creating confusion in the rear, would have
augmented the difficulties of the retreat; and the
troops were fatigued with incessant fighting and
marching for two days and one night. Moreover<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117"></a>[117]</span>
the alteration of Reille’s march, occasioned by the
fog, had reduced the chances dependant on the
primary combinations to the operations of D’Erlon’s
corps, but the evening reports brought the
mortifying conviction that he also had gone wrong,
and by rough fighting only could Soult now attain
his object. It is said that his expressions discovered<span class="sidenote">Edouard de LaPene Campagne 1813, 1814.</span>
a secret anticipation of failure, if so, his temper
was too stedfast to yield for he gave the signal
to march the next day, and more strongly renewed
his orders to D’Erlon whose operations must now
be noticed.</p>

<p>That general had three divisions of infantry,
furnishing twenty-one thousand men of which
about eighteen thousand were combatants. Early
on the morning of the 25th he assembled two of
them behind some heights near the passes of Maya,
having caused the national guards of Baygorry to
make previous demonstrations towards the passes of
Arriette, Yspeguy, and Lorietta. No change had
been made in the disposition of general Hill’s force,
but general Stewart, deceived by the movements of
the national guards, looked towards Sylveira’s posts
on the right rather than to his own front; his division,
consisting of two British brigades, was consequently
neither posted as it should be nor otherwise
prepared for an attack. The ground to be
defended was indeed very strong, but however
rugged a mountain position may be, if it is too extensive
for the troops or those troops are not disposed
with judgment, the very inequalities constituting
its defensive strength become advantageous
to an assailant.</p>

<p>There were three passes to defend. Aretesque
on the right, Lessessa in the centre, Maya on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118"></a>[118]</span>
left, and from these entrances two ways led to
Elisondo in parallel directions; one down the
valley through the town of Maya, receiving in its
course the Erazu road; the other along the Atchiola
mountain. General Pringle’s brigade was charged to
defend the Aretesque, and colonel Cameron’s brigade
the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col itself was
broad on the summit, about three miles long, and on
each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above another;
those on the right blending with the Goramendi
mountains, those on the left with the Atchiola, near
the summit of which the eighty-second regiment
belonging to the seventh division was posted.</p>

<p>Cameron’s brigade, encamped on the left, had a
clear view of troops coming from Urdax; but at
Aretesque a great round hill, one mile in front,
masked the movements of an enemy coming from
Espelette. This hill was not occupied at night,
nor in the daytime save by some Portuguese cavalry
videttes, and the next guard was an infantry
piquet posted on that slope of the Col which
fronted the great hill. Behind this piquet of eighty
men there was no immediate support, but four
light companies were encamped one mile down the
reverse slope which was more rugged and difficult
of access than that towards the enemy. The rest
of general Pringle’s brigade was disposed at various
distances from two to three miles in the rear, and
the signal for assembling on the position was to be
the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks
above the Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments
furnishing more than three thousand fighting
men, half only were in line of battle, and those
chiefly massed on the left of a position, wide open
and of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119"></a>[119]</span>
their general, Stewart, quite deceived as to the
real state of affairs, was at Elisondo when about
mid-day D’Erlon commenced the battle.</p>


<h4>COMBAT OF MAYA.</h4>

<p>Captain Moyle Sherer, the officer commanding
the picquet at the Aretesque pass, was told by his<span class="sidenote7">Plan 3.</span>
predecessor, that at dawn a glimpse had been obtained
of cavalry and infantry in movement along
the hills in front, some peasants also announced the
approach of the French, and at nine o’clock major
Thorne, a staff-officer, having patroled round the
great hill in front of the pass discovered sufficient
to make him order up the light companies to support
the picquet. These companies had just formed
on the ridge with their left at the rock of Aretesque,
when D’Armagnac’s division coming from Espelette
mounted the great hill in front, Abbé followed, and
general Maransin with a third division advanced
from Ainhoa and Urdax against the Maya pass,
meaning also to turn it by a narrow way leading up
the Atchiola mountain.</p>

<p>D’Armagnac’s men pushed forwards at once in
several columns, and forced the picquet back with
great loss upon the light companies, who sustained
his vehement assault with infinite difficulty. The
alarm guns were now heard from the Maya pass, and
general Pringle hastened to the front, but his regiments
moving hurriedly from different camps were
necessarily brought into action one after the other.
The thirty-fourth came up first at a running pace,
yet by companies not in mass and breathless from
the length and ruggedness of the ascent; the thirty-ninth
and twenty-eighth followed, but not immediately
nor together, and meanwhile D’Armagnac,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120"></a>[120]</span>
closely supported by Abbé, with domineering numbers
and valour combined, maugre the desperate
fighting of the picquet of the light companies
and of the thirty-fourth, had established his columns
on the broad ridge of the position.</p>

<p>Colonel Cameron then sent the fiftieth from the
left to the assistance of the overmatched troops,
and that fierce and formidable old regiment charging
the head of an advancing column drove it clear out
of the pass of Lessessa in the centre. Yet the
French were so many that, checked at one point,
they assembled with increased force at another; nor
could general Pringle restore the battle with the
thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments, which,
cut off from the others were though fighting desperately
forced back to a second and lower ridge
crossing the main road to Elizondo. They were
followed by D’Armagnac, but Abbé continued to
press the fiftieth and thirty-fourth whose natural
line of retreat was towards the Atchiola road on
the left, because the position trended backward
from Aretesque towards that point, and because
Cameron’s brigade was there. And that officer,
still holding the pass of Maya with the left wings
of the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments,
brought their right wings and the Portuguese guns
into action and thus maintained the fight; but so
dreadful was the slaughter, especially of the ninety-second,
that it is said the advancing enemy was
actually stopped by the heaped mass of dead and<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3.</a></span>
dying; and then the left wing of that noble regiment
coming down from the higher ground smote wounded
friends and exulting foes alike, as mingled together
they stood or crawled before its fire.</p>

<p>It was in this state of affairs that general Stewart,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121"></a>[121]</span>
returning from Elizondo by the mountain road,
reached the field of battle. The passes of Lessessa
and Aretesque were lost, that of Maya was still held
by the left wing of the seventy-first, but Stewart seeing
Maransin’s men gathered thickly on one side and
Abbé’s men on the other, abandoned it to take a
new position on the first rocky ridge covering the road
over the Atchiola; and he called down the eighty-second
regiment from the highest part of that mountain
and sent messengers to demand further aid from
the seventh division. Meanwhile although wounded
himself he made a strenuous resistance, for he was
a very gallant man; but during the retrograde
movement, Maransin no longer seeking to turn the
position, suddenly thrust the head of his division
across the front of the British line and connected
his left with Abbé, throwing as he passed a destructive
fire into the wasted remnant of the ninety-second,
which even then sullenly gave way, for the
men fell until two-thirds of the whole had gone to
the ground. Still the survivors fought, and the
left wing of the seventy-first came into action, but,
one after the other all the regiments were forced
back, and the first position was lost together with
the Portuguese guns.</p>

<p>Abbé’s division now followed D’Armagnac on the
road to the town of Maya, leaving Maransin to deal
with Stewart’s new position, and notwithstanding
its extreme strength the French gained ground
until six o’clock, for the British, shrunk in numbers,
also wanted ammunition, and a part of the eighty-second
under major Fitzgerald were forced to roll
down stones to defend the rocks on which they were
posted. In this desperate condition Stewart was
upon the point of abandoning the mountain entirely,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122"></a>[122]</span>
when a brigade of the seventh division, commanded
by general Barnes, arrived from Echallar, and that
officer charging at the head of the sixth regiment
drove the French back to the Maya ridge. Stewart
thus remained master of the Atchiola, and the count
D’Erlon who probably thought greater reinforcements
had come up, recalled his other divisions from the<span class="sidenote">French official report, MSS.</span>
Maya road and reunited his whole corps on the <em>Col</em>.
He had lost fifteen hundred men and a general; but<span class="sidenote">British official return.</span>
he took four guns, and fourteen hundred British
soldiers were killed or wounded.</p>

<p>Such was the fight of Maya, a disaster, yet one
much exaggerated by French writers, and by an
English author misrepresented as a surprise caused<span class="sidenote12">Southey.</span>
by the negligence of the cavalry. General Stewart
was surprised, his troops were not, and never did
soldiers fight better, seldom so well. The stern
valour of the ninety-second, principally composed of
Irishmen, would have graced Thermopylæ. The
Portuguese cavalry patroles, if any went out which
is uncertain, might have neglected their duty, and
doubtless the front should have been scoured in a
more military manner; but the infantry picquets,
and the light companies so happily ordered up by
major Thorne, were ready, and no man wondered
to see the French columns crown the great hill in
front of the pass. Stewart expecting no attack at
Maya, had gone to Elisondo leaving orders for the soldiers<span class="sidenote">General Stewart’s Official Report.</span>
to cook; from his erroneous views therefore the
misfortune sprung and from no other source. Having
deceived himself as to the true point of attack he
did not take proper military precautions on his own
front; his position was only half occupied, his troops
brought into action wildly, and finally he caused<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Despatches.</span>
the loss of his guns by a misdirection as to the road.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123"></a>[123]</span>
General Stewart was a brave, energetic, zealous,
indefatigable man and of a magnanimous spirit,
but he possessed neither the calm reflective judgment
nor the intuitive genius which belongs to
nature’s generals.</p>

<p>It is difficult to understand count D’Erlon’s operations.
Why, when he had carried the right of
the position, did he follow two weak regiments with
two divisions, and leave only one division to attack
five regiments, posted on the strongest ground and
having hopes of succour from Echallar? Certainly
if Abbé’s division had acted with Maransin’s,
Stewart who was so hardly pressed by the
latter alone, must have passed the road from
Echallar in retreat before general Barnes’s brigade
arrived. On the other hand, Soult’s orders directed<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Despatch, MSS.</span>
D’Erlon to operate by his left, with the view of
connecting the whole army on the summit of the
great chain of the Pyrenees. He should therefore
either have used his whole force to crush the
troops on the Atchiola before they could be succoured
from Echallar; or, leaving Maransin there,
have marched by the Maya road upon Ariscun to
cut Sylveira’s line of retreat; instead of this he
remained inactive upon the Col de Maya for
twenty hours after the battle! And general Hill concentrating
his whole force, now augmented by Barnes’s
brigade, would probably have fallen upon him from
the commanding rocks of Atchiola the next day, if
intelligence of Cole’s retreat from the Roncesvalles
passes had not come through the Alduides. This
rendered the recovery of the Col de Maya useless,
and Hill withdrawing all his troops during the
night, posted the British brigades which had been
engaged, together with one Portuguese brigade of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124"></a>[124]</span>
infantry and a Portuguese battery, on the heights
in rear of Irueta, fifteen miles from the scene of
action. The other Portuguese brigade he left in
front of Elizondo, thus covering the road of San
Estevan on his left, that of Berderez on his right,
and the pass of Vellate in his rear.</p>

<p>Such was the commencement of Soult’s operations
to restore the fortunes of France. Three considerable
actions fought on the same day had each
been favourable. At St. Sebastian the allies were
repulsed; at Roncesvalles they abandoned the
passes; at Maya they were defeated; but the
decisive blow had not yet been struck.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on
his way back from St. Sebastian, but with the false
addition that D’Erlon was beaten. As early as the
22d he had known that Soult was preparing a great
offensive movement, but the immovable attitude of
the French centre, the skilful disposition of their
reserve which was twice as strong as he at first
supposed, together with the preparations made to
throw bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriatou, were
all calculated to mislead and did mislead him.</p>

<p>Soult’s complicated combinations to bring D’Erlon’s
divisions finally into line on the crest of the
great chain were impenetrable, and the English
general could not believe his adversary would
throw himself with only thirty thousand men into
the valley of the Ebro unless sure of aid from
Suchet, and that general’s movements indicated a
determination to remain in Catalonia; moreover
Wellington, in contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna
was not in extremity, and before the failure
of the assault thought that San Sebastian was.
Hence the operations against his right, their full<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125"></a>[125]</span>
extent not known, appeared a feint, and he judged
the real effort would be to throw bridges over the
Bidassoa and raise the siege of San Sebastian. But
in the night correct intelligence of the Maya and
Roncesvalles affairs arrived, Soult’s object was then
scarcely doubtful, and sir T. Graham was ordered
to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark his
guns and stores, and hold all his spare troops in
hand to join Giron, on a position of battle marked
out near the Bidassoa. General Cotton was ordered
to move the cavalry up to Pampeluna, and O’Donnel
was instructed to hold some of his Spanish troops
ready to act in advance. This done Wellington
arranged his lines of correspondence and proceeded
to San Estevan, which he reached early in the
morning.</p>

<p>While the embarkation of the guns and stores
was going on it was essential to hold the posts at
Vera and Echallar, because D’Erlon’s object was
not pronounced, and an enemy in possession of
those places could approach San Sebastian by the
roads leading over the Pena de Haya, a rocky
mountain behind Lesaca, or by the defiles of Zubietta
leading round that mountain from the valley of
Lerins. Wherefore in passing through Estevan on
the morning of the 26th, Wellington merely directed
general Pack to guard the bridges over the
Bidassoa. But when he reached Irueta, saw the
reduced state of Stewart’s division, and heard that
Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all
the troops within his power upon Pampeluna; and
to prevent mistakes indicated the valley of Lanz as<span class="sidenote">Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.</span>
the general line of movement. Of Picton’s exact
position or of his intentions nothing positive was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126"></a>[126]</span>
known, but supposing him to have joined Cole at
Linzoain, as indeed he had, Wellington judged that
their combined forces would be sufficient to check
the enemy until assistance could reach them from
the centre or from Pampeluna, and he so advised
Picton on the evening of the 26th.</p>

<p>In consequence of these orders the seventh division
abandoned Echallar in the night of the 26th, the
sixth division quitted San Estevan at daylight on
the 27th, and general Hill concentrating his own
troops and Barnes’s brigade on the heights of Irueta,
halted until the evening of the 27th but
marched during the night through the pass of Vellate
upon the town of Lanz. Meanwhile the light
division quitting Vera also on the 27th retired by
Lesaca to the summit of the Santa Cruz mountain,
overlooking the valley of Lerins, and there
halted, apparently to cover the pass of Zubieta
until Longa’s Spaniards should take post to block
the roads leading over the Pena de Haya and protect
the embarkation of the guns on that flank.
That object being effected it was to thread the passes
and descend upon Lecumberri on the great road of
Irurzun, thus securing sir Thomas Graham’s communication
with the army round Pampeluna. These
various movements spread fear and confusion far
and wide. All the narrow valleys and roads were
crowded with baggage, commissariat stores, artillery
and fugitive families; reports of the most
alarming nature were as usual rife; each division,
ignorant of what had really happened to the other,
dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes
related might be true; none knew what to expect or
where they were to meet the enemy, and one universal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127"></a>[127]</span>
hubbub filled the wild regions through which
the French army was now working its fiery path
towards Pampeluna.</p>

<p>D’Erlon’s inactivity gave great uneasiness to
Soult, who repeated the order to push forward by
his left whatever might be the force opposed, and
thus stimulated he advanced to Elizondo on the
27th, but thinking the sixth division was still at
San Estevan, again halted, and it was not until the
morning of the 28th, when general Hill’s retreat
had opened the way, that he followed through the
pass of Vellate. His further progress belongs to
other combinations arising from Soult’s direct operations
which are now to be continued.</p>

<p>General Picton, having assumed the command
of all the troops in the valley of Zubiri on the
evening of the 26th, recommenced the retreat before
dawn on the 27th, and without the hope or intention
of covering Pampeluna. Soult followed in
the morning, having first sent scouts towards the
ridges where Campbell’s troops had appeared the
evening before. Reille marched by the left bank
of the Guy river, Clauzel by the right bank, the
cavalry and artillery closed the rear and as the
whole moved in compact order the narrow valley
was overgorged with troops, a hasty bicker of
musketry alone marking the separation of the hostile
forces. Meanwhile the garrison of Pampeluna
made a sally and O’Donnel in great alarm spiked
some of his guns, destroyed his magazines, and
would have suffered a disaster, if Carlos D’España
had not fortunately arrived with his division and
checked the garrison. Nevertheless the danger was
imminent, for general Cole, first emerging from
the valley of Zubiri, had passed Villalba, only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128"></a>[128]</span>
three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat; Picton,
following close, was at Huarte, and O’Donnel’s
Spaniards were in confusion; in fine Soult was all
but successful when Picton, feeling the importance
of the crisis, suddenly turned on some steep ridges,
which, stretching under the names of San Miguel
Mont Escava and San Cristoval quite across the
mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys, screen Pampeluna.</p>

<p>Posting the third division on the right of Huarte
he prolonged his line to the left with Morillo’s Spaniards,
called upon O’Donnel to support him, and
directed Cole to occupy some heights between Oricain
and Arletta. But that general having with
a surer eye observed a salient hill near Zabaldica,
one mile in advance and commanding the road to
Huarte, demanded and obtained permission to occupy
it instead of the heights first appointed.
Two Spanish regiments belonging to the blockading
troops were still posted there, and towards them
Cole directed his course. Soult had also marked
this hill, a French detachment issuing from the
mouth of the Val de Zubiri was in full career to
seize it, and the hostile masses were rapidly approaching
the summit on either side when the
Spaniards, seeing the British so close, vindicated
their own post by a sudden charge. This was for
Soult the stroke of fate. His double columns just
then emerging, exultant, from the narrow valley,
were arrested at the sight of ten thousand men
which under Cole crowned the summit of the
mountain in opposition; and two miles further back
stood Picton with a greater number, for O’Donnel
had now taken post on Morillo’s left. To advance
by the Huarte road was impossible, and to stand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129"></a>[129]</span>
still was dangerous, because the French army contracted
to a span in front was cleft in its whole
length by the river Guy, and compressed on each
side by the mountains which in that part narrowed
the valley to a quarter of a mile. Soult however,
like a great and ready commander, at once shot the
head of Clauzel’s columns to his right across the
mountain which separated the Val de Zubiri from
the Val de Lanz, and at the same time threw one
of Reille’s divisions of infantry and a body of cavalry<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
across the mountains on his left, beyond the
Guy river, as far as the village of Elcano, to
menace the front and right flank of Picton’s
position at Huarte. The other two divisions of infantry
he established at the village of Zabaldica in
the Val de Zubiri, close under Cole’s right, and
meanwhile Clauzel seized the village of Sauroren
close under that general’s left.</p>

<p>While the French general thus formed his line
of battle, lord Wellington who had quitted sir
Rowland Hill’s quarters in the Bastan very early
on the 27th, crossed the main ridge and descended
the valley of Lanz without having been able to<span class="sidenote">Notes by Lord Wellington, MSS.</span>
learn any thing of Picton’s movements or position,
and in this state of uncertainty reached Ostiz, a
few miles from Sauroren, where he found general
Long with the brigade of light cavalry which had
furnished the posts of correspondence in the mountains.
Here learning that Picton having abandoned
the heights of Linzoain was moving on
Huarte, he left his quarter-master-general with instructions
to stop all the troops coming down the
valley of Lanz until the state of affairs at Huarte
should be ascertained. Then at racing speed he
made for Sauroren. As he entered that village<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130"></a>[130]</span>
he saw Clauzel’s divisions moving from Zabaldica
along the crest of the mountain, and it was clear
that the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were
intercepted, wherefore pulling up his horse he
wrote on the parapet of the bridge of Sauroren
fresh instructions to turn every thing from that
valley to the right, by a road which led through
Lizasso and Marcalain behind the hills to the village
of Oricain, that is to say, in rear of the position
now occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset,
the only staff-officer who had kept up with
him, galloped with these orders out of Sauroren
by one road, the French light cavalry dashed in by
another, and the English general rode alone up the
mountain to reach his troops. One of Campbell’s
Portuguese battalions first descried him and raised
a cry of joy, and the shrill clamour caught up by
the next regiments swelled as it run along the line
into that stern and appalling shout which the British
soldier is wont to give upon the edge of battle,
and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. Lord
Wellington suddenly stopped in a conspicuous place,
he desired that both armies should know he was
there, and a double spy who was present pointed
out Soult, then so near that his features could
be plainly distinguished. The English general, it
is said, fixed his eyes attentively upon this formidable
man, and speaking as if to himself, said,
“<em>Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious
one and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause
of these cheers; that will give time for the sixth
division to arrive and I shall beat him.</em>” And certain
it is that the French general made no serious
attack that day.</p>

<p>The position adopted by Cole was the summit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131"></a>[131]</span>
of a mountain mass which filled all the space between
the Guy and the Lanz rivers as far back as
Huarte and Villalba. It was highest in the centre,
and boldly defined towards the enemy, but the trace
was irregular, the right being thrown back towards
the village of Arletta so as to flank the high road
to Huarte. This road was also swept by some guns
placed on a lower range, or neck, connecting the
right of Cole with Picton and Morillo.</p>

<p>Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river was
the bulging hill vindicated by the Spaniards; it
was a distinct point on the right of the fourth division,
dependent upon the centre of the position
but considerably lower. The left of the position
also abating in height was yet extremely rugged
and steep overlooking the Lanz river and the
road to Villalba. General Ross’s brigade of the
fourth division was posted on that side, having a
Portuguese battalion, whose flank rested on a small
chapel, in his front. General Campbell was on the
right of Ross. General Anson was on the highest
ground, partly behind, and partly on the right of
Campbell. General Byng’s brigade was on a second
mass of hills in reserve, and the Spanish hill
was reinforced by a battalion of the fourth Portuguese
regiment.</p>

<p>The front of battle being less than two miles was
well filled, and the Lanz and Guy river washed
the flanks. Those torrents continuing their course
break by narrow passages through the steep ridges
of San Miguel and Cristoval, and then flowing
past Huarte and Villalba meet behind those places
to form the Arga river. On the ridges thus cleft
by the waters the second line was posted, that is to
say, at the distance of two miles from, and nearly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132"></a>[132]</span>
parallel to the first position, but on a more extended
front. Picton’s left was at Huarte, his
right strengthened with a battery stretched to the
village of Goraitz, covering more than a mile of
ground on that flank. Morillo prolonged Picton’s
left along the crest of San Miguel to Villalba,
and O’Donnel continued the line to San Cristoval;
Carlos D’España’s division maintained the blockade
behind these ridges, and the British cavalry under
General Cotton, coming up from Tafalla and Olite,
took post, the heavy brigades on some open ground
behind Picton, the hussar brigade on his right.
This second line being on a wider trace than the
first and equally well filled with troops, entirely
barred the openings of the two valleys leading down
to Pampeluna.</p>

<p>Soult’s position was also a mountain filling the
space between the two rivers. It was even more
rugged than the allies’ mountain and they were only
separated by a deep narrow valley. Clauzel’s three
divisions leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren,
which was quite down in the valley of Lanz
and close under the chapel height where the left of
the fourth division was posted. His left was prolonged
by two of Reille’s divisions, which also occupied
the village of Zabaldica quite down in the
valley of Zubiri under the right of the allies. The
remaining division of this wing and a division of
cavalry, were, as I have before stated, thrown forward
on the mountains at the other side of the Guy river,
menacing Picton and seeking for an opportunity
to communicate with the garrison of Pampeluna.
Some guns were pushed in front of Zabaldica, but
the elevation required to send the shot upward rendered
their fire ineffectual and the greatest part of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133"></a>[133]</span>
the artillery remained therefore in the narrow valley
of Zubiri.</p>

<p><em>Combat of the 27th.</em> Soult’s first effort was to
gain the Spaniards’ hill and establish himself near
the centre of the allies’ line of battle. The attack
was vigorous but the French were valiantly repulsed
about the time lord Wellington arrived, and he immediately
reinforced that post with the fortieth
British regiment. There was then a general skirmish
along the front, under cover of which Soult carefully
examined the whole position, and the firing
continued on the mountain side until evening, when
a terrible storm, the usual precursor of English
battles in the Peninsula, brought on premature darkness
and terminated the dispute. This was the
state of affairs at day-break on the 28th, but a signal
alteration had place before the great battle of
that day commenced, and the movements of the
wandering divisions by which this change was
effected must now be traced.</p>

<p>It has been shewn that the Lanz covered the left
of the allies and the right of the French. Nevertheless
the heights occupied by either army were
prolonged beyond that river, the continuation of the
allies’ ridge sweeping forward so as to look into the
rear of Sauroren, while the continuation of the
French heights fell back in a direction nearly
parallel to the forward inclination of the opposing
ridge. They were both steep and high, yet lower
and less rugged than the heights on which the
armies stood opposed, for the latter were mountains
where rocks piled on rocks stood out like castles,
difficult to approach and so dangerous to assail
that the hardened veterans of the Peninsula only
would have dared the trial. Now the road by which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134"></a>[134]</span>
the sixth division marched on the 27th, after clearing
the pass of Doña Maria, sends one branch to
Lanz, another to Ostiz, a third through Lizasso and
Marcalain; the first and second fall into the road
from Bellate and descend the valley of Lanz to
Sauroren; the third passing behind the ridges, just
described as prolonging the positions of the armies,
also falls into the valley of Lanz, but at the village
of Oricain, that is to say one mile behind the ground
occupied by general Cole’s left.</p>

<p>It was by this road of Marcalain that Wellington
now expected the sixth and seventh divisions, but
the rapidity with which Soult seized Sauroren
caused a delay of eighteen hours. For the sixth
division, having reached Olague in the valley of
Lanz about one o’clock on the 27th, halted there
until four, and then following the orders brought
by lord Fitzroy Somerset marched by Lizasso to
gain the Marcalain road; but the great length of
these mountain marches, and the heavy storm which
had terminated the action at Zabaldica sweeping
with equal violence in this direction, prevented the
division from passing Lizasso that night. However
the march was renewed at daylight on the 28th,
and meanwhile general Hill, having quitted the
Bastan on the evening of the 27th, reached the
town of Lanz on the morning of the 28th, and rallying
general Long’s cavalry and his own artillery,
which were in that valley, moved likewise upon
Lizasso. At that place he met the seventh division
coming from San Estevan, and having restored
general Barnes’s brigade to lord Dalhousie, took a
position on a ridge covering the road to Marcalain.
The seventh division being on his right, was in military
communication with the sixth division, and thus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135"></a>[135]</span>
lord Wellington’s left was prolonged, and covered
the great road leading from Pampeluna by Irurzun
to Tolosa. And during these important movements,
which were not completed until the evening of the
28th, which brought six thousand men into the
allies’ line of battle, and fifteen thousand more into
military communication with their left, D’Erlon
remained planted in his position of observation near
Elizondo!</p>

<p>The near approach of the sixth division early on
the morning of the 28th and the certainty of Hill’s
junction, made Wellington imagine that Soult would
not venture an attack, and certainly that marshal,
disquieted about D’Erlon of whom he only knew
that he had not followed his instructions, viewed the
strong position of his adversary with uneasy anticipations.
Again with anxious eyes he took cognizance
of all its rugged strength, and seemed dubious
and distrustful of his fortune. He could not operate
with advantage by his own left beyond the Guy
river, because the mountains there were rough, and
Wellington having shorter lines of movement could
meet him with all arms combined; and meanwhile
the French artillery, unable to emerge from the Val
de Zubiri except by the Huarte road, would have
been exposed to a counter-attack. He crossed the
Lanz river and ascended the prolongation of the
allies’ ridge, which, as he had possession of the
bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own
ground. From this height he could see all the left
and rear of Cole’s position, looking down the valley
of Lanz as far as Villalba, but the country beyond
the ridge towards Marcalain was so broken that he<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Correspondence, MSS.</span>
could not discern the march of the sixth division;
he knew however from the deserters, that Wellington<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136"></a>[136]</span>
expected four fresh divisions from that side, that
is to say, the second, sixth, and seventh British, and
Sylviera’s Portuguese division which always marched
with Hill. This information and the nature of the
ground decided the plan of attack. The valley of Lanz
growing wider as it descended, offered the means of
assailing the allies’ left in front and rear at one moment,
and the same combination would cut off the
reinforcements expected from the side of Marcalain.</p>

<p>One of Clauzel’s divisions already occupied Sauroren,
and the other two coming from the mountain
took post upon each side of that village. The division
on the right hand was ordered to throw some flankers
on the ridge from whence Soult was taking his
observations, and upon a signal given to move in one
body to a convenient distance down the valley and
then, wheeling to its left, assail the rear of the allies’
left flank while the other two divisions advancing
from their respective positions near Sauroren assailed
the front. Cole’s left, which did not exceed five
thousand men, would thus be enveloped by sixteen
thousand, and Soult expected to crush it notwithstanding
the strength of the ground. Meanwhile
Reille’s two divisions advancing from the mountain
on the side of Zabaldica, were each to send a brigade
against the hill occupied by the fortieth regiment;
the right of this attack was to be connected
with the left of Clauzel, the remaining brigades
were closely to support the assailing masses, the
divisions beyond the Guy were to keep Picton in
check, and Soult who had no time to lose ordered
his lieutenants to throw their troops frankly and at
once into action.</p>

<p><em>First battle of Sauroren.</em>—It was fought on the
fourth anniversary of the battle of Talavera.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137"></a>[137]</span></p>

<p>About mid-day the French gathered at the foot
of the position and their skirmishers rushing forward
spread over the face of the mountain, working upward
like a conflagration; but the columns of attack were
not all prepared when Clauzel’s division in the valley
of Lanz, too impatient to await the general signal of
battle, threw out its flankers on the ridge beyond the
river and pushed down the valley in one mass.
With a rapid pace it turned Cole’s left and was preparing
to wheel up on his rear, when a Portuguese
brigade of the sixth division, suddenly appearing on
the crest of the ridge beyond the river, drove the
French flankers back and instantly descended with
a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the column
in the valley. And almost at the same instant, the
main body of the sixth division emerging from
behind the same ridge, near the village of Oricain,
formed in order of battle across the front. It was
the counter-stroke of Salamanca! The French,
striving to encompass the left of the allies were themselves
encompassed, for two brigades of the fourth
division turned and smote them from the left, the
Portuguese smote them from the right; and while
thus scathed on both flanks with fire, they were
violently shocked and pushed back with a mighty
force by the sixth division, yet not in flight, but
fighting fiercely and strewing the ground with their
enemies’ bodies as well as with their own.</p>

<p>Clauzel’s second division, seeing this dire conflict,
with a hurried movement assailed the chapel height
to draw off the fire from the troops in the valley, and
gallantly did the French soldiers throng up the
craggy steep, but the general unity of the attack was
ruined; neither their third division nor Reille’s brigades
had yet received the signal, and their attacks<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138"></a>[138]</span>
instead of being simultaneous were made in succession,
running from right to left as the necessity of
aiding the others became apparent. It was however
a terrible battle and well fought. One column darting
out of the village of Sauroren, silently, sternly,
without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel under
a tempest of bullets which swept away whole ranks
without abating the speed and power of the mass.
The seventh Caçadores shrunk abashed and that part
of the position was won. Soon however they rallied
upon general Ross’s British brigade, and the whole
running forward charged the French with a loud
shout and dashed them down the hill. Heavily
stricken they were, yet undismayed, and recovering
their ranks again, they ascended in the same manner
to be again broken and overturned. But the other
columns of attack were now bearing upwards through
the smoke and flame with which the skirmishers had
covered the face of the mountain, and the tenth
Portuguese regiment fighting on the right of Ross’s
brigade yielded to their fury; a heavy body crowned
the heights and wheeling against the exposed flank
of Ross forced that gallant officer also to go back.
His ground was instantly occupied by the enemies
with whom he had been engaged in front, and the
fight raged close and desperate on the crest of the
position, charge succeeded charge and each side
yielded and recovered by turns; yet this astounding
effort of French valour was of little avail. Lord Wellington
brought Byng’s brigade forward at a running
pace, and sent the twenty-seventh and forty-eighth
British regiments belonging to Anson’s brigade down
from the higher ground in the centre against the
crowded masses, rolling them backward in disorder and
throwing them one after the other violently down the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139"></a>[139]</span>
mountain side; and with no child’s play; the two
British regiments fell upon the enemy three separate
times with the bayonet and lost more than half their
own numbers.</p>

<p>During this battle on the mountain-top, the British
brigades of the sixth division strengthened by a
battery of guns, gained ground in the valley of Lanz
and arrived on the same front with the left of the
victorious troops about the chapel. Lord Wellington
then seeing the momentary disorder of the enemy
ordered Madden’s Portuguese brigade, which had
never ceased its fire against the right flank of the
French column, to assail the village of Sauroren in the
rear, but the state of the action in other parts and
the exhaustion of the troops soon induced him to
countermand this movement. Meanwhile Reille’s
brigades, connecting their right with the left of Clauzel’s
third division, had environed the Spanish hill,
ascended it unchecked, and at the moment when the
fourth division was so hardly pressed made the regiment
of El Pravia give way on the left of the fortieth.
A Portuguese battalion rushing forward covered
the flank of that invincible regiment, which waited
in stern silence until the French set their feet upon
the broad summit; but when their glittering arms
appeared over the brow of the mountain the charging
cry was heard, the crowded mass was broken to
pieces and a tempest of bullets followed its flight.
Four times this assault was renewed, and the French
officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the
belts, so fierce and resolute they were to win. It was
however the labour of Sysiphus. The vehement shout
and shock of the British soldier always prevailed, and
at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, hearts fainting,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140"></a>[140]</span>
and hopeless from repeated failures, they were so
abashed that three British companies sufficed to
bear down a whole brigade.</p>

<p>While the battle was thus being fought on the
height the French cavalry beyond the Guy river,
passed a rivulet, and with a fire of carbines forced the
tenth hussars to yield some rocky ground on Picton’s
right, but the eighteenth hussars having better firearms
than the tenth renewed the combat, killed two
officers, and finally drove the French over the rivulet
again.</p>

<p>Such were the leading events of this sanguinary
struggle, which lord Wellington fresh from the fight
with homely emphasis called “<em>bludgeon work</em>.” Two
generals and eighteen hundred men had been killed
or wounded on the French side, following their official
reports, a number far below the estimate made at the
time by the allies whose loss amounted to two thousand
six hundred. These discrepancies between hostile
calculations ever occur, and there is little wisdom
in disputing where proof is unattainable; but the
numbers actually engaged were, of French, twenty-five
thousand, of the allies twelve thousand, and if
the strength of the latter’s position did not save them
from the greater loss their stedfast courage is to be
the more admired.</p>

<p>The 29th the armies rested in position without
firing a shot, but the wandering divisions on both
sides were now entering the line.</p>

<p>General Hill, having sent all his baggage artillery
and wounded men to Berioplano behind the
Cristoval ridge, still occupied his strong ground
between Lizasso and Arestegui, covering the Marcalain
and Irurzun roads, and menacing that leading<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141"></a>[141]</span>
from Lizasso to Olague in rear of Soult’s right.
His communication with Oricain was maintained by
the seventh division, and the light division was approaching
his left. Thus on Wellington’s side
the crisis was over. He had vindicated his position
with only sixteen thousand combatants, and now,
including the troops still maintaining the blockade,
he had fifty thousand, twenty thousand being British,
in close military combination. Thirty thousand
flushed with recent success were in hand, and
Hill’s troops were well-placed for retaking the
offensive.</p>

<p>Soult’s situation was proportionably difficult.
Finding that he could not force the allies’ position
in front, he had sent his artillery part of his cavalry
and his wounded men back to France immediately
after the battle, ordering the two former to
join Villatte on the Lower Bidassoa and there
await further instructions. Having shaken off this
burthen he awaited D’Erlon’s arrival by the valley
of Lanz, and that general reached Ostiz a few
miles above Sauroren at mid-day on the 29th,
bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his
march, that general Graham had retired from the
Bidassoa and Villatte had crossed that river. This
gave Soult a hope that his first movements had disengaged
San Sebastian, and he instantly conceived
a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed yet
conformable to the critical state of his affairs.</p>

<p>No success was to be expected from another
attack, yet he could not at the moment of being
reinforced with eighteen thousand men, retire by
the road he came without <ins class="corr" id="tn-141" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'some hishonour'">
some dishonour</ins>; nor
could he remain where he was, because his supplies<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142"></a>[142]</span>
of provisions and ammunition derived from distant
magazines by slow and small convoys was unequal
to the consumption. Two-thirds of the British<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
troops, the greatest part of the Portuguese, and all
the Spaniards were, as he supposed, assembled in
his front under Wellington, or on his right flank
under Hill, and it was probable that other reinforcements
were on the march; wherefore he resolved
to prolong his right with D’Erlon’s corps,
and then cautiously drawing off the rest of his
army place himself between the allies and the Bastan,
in military connection with his reserve and
closer to his frontier magazines. Thus posted and
able to combine all his troops in one operation, he
expected to relieve San Sebastian entirely and profit
from the new state of affairs.</p>

<p>In the evening of the 29th the second division of
cavalry, which was in the valley of Zubiri, passed over
the position to the valley of Lanz, and joined D’Erlon,
who was ordered to march early on the 30th by
Etulain upon Lizasso, sending out strong scouting
parties to his left on all the roads leading upon
Pampeluna, and also towards Letassa and Irurzun.
During the night the first division of cavalry and
La Martiniere’s division of infantry, both at Elcano
on the extreme left of the French army, retired over<span class="sidenote7">Plan 2.</span>
the mountains by Illurdos to Eugui, in the upper
part of the valley of the Zubiri, having orders to
cross the separating ridge enter the valley of Lanz
and join D’Erlon. The remainder of Reille’s wing
was at the same time to march by the crest of the
position from Zabaldica to the village of Sauroren,
and gradually relieve Clauzel’s troops which
were then to assemble behind Sauroren, that is to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143"></a>[143]</span>
say towards Ostiz, and thus following the march of
D’Erlon were to be themselves followed in like manner
by Reille’s troops. To cover these last movements
Clauzel detached two regiments to occupy the
French heights beyond the Lanz river, and they
were also to maintain his connection with D’Erlon
whose line of operations was just beyond those
heights. He was however to hold by Reille rather
than by D’Erlon until the former had perfected
his dangerous march across Wellington’s front.</p>

<p>In the night of the 29th Soult heard from the
deserters that three divisions were to make an offensive
movement towards Lizasso on the 30th, and
when daylight came he was convinced the men
spoke truly, because from a point beyond Sauroren
he discerned certain columns descending the ridge
of Cristoval and the heights above Oricain, while
others were in march on a wide sweep apparently
to turn Clauzel’s right flank. These columns were
Morillo’s Spaniards, Campbell’s Portuguese, and
the seventh division, the former rejoining Hill <ins class="corr" id="tn-143" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'to whse corps'">
to whose corps</ins> they properly belonged, the others
adapting themselves to a new disposition of Wellington’s
line of battle which shall be presently
explained.</p>

<p>At six o’clock in the morning Foy’s division of
Reille’s wing was in march along the crest of the
mountain from Zabaldica towards Sauroren, where
Maucune’s division had already relieved Conroux’s;
the latter, belonging to Clauzel’s wing, was
moving up the valley of Lanz to rejoin that general,
who had, with exception of the two flanking regiments
before mentioned, concentrated his remaining
divisions between Olabe and Ostiz. In this state of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144"></a>[144]</span>
affairs Wellington opening his batteries from the
chapel height sent skirmishers against Sauroren,
and the fire spreading to the allies’ right became
brisk between Cole and Foy. It subsided however
at Sauroren, and Soult, relying on the strength of
the position, ordered Reille to maintain it until nightfall
unless hardly pressed, and went off himself at a
gallop to join D’Erlon, for his design was to fall<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
upon the division attempting to turn his right and
crush them with superior numbers: a daring project,
well and quickly conceived, but he had to deal
with a man whose rapid perception and rough
stroke rendered sleight of hand dangerous. The
marshal overtook D’Erlon at the moment when that
general, having entered the valley of Ulzema with
three divisions of infantry and two divisions of
heavy cavalry, was making dispositions to assail
Hill who was between Buenza and Arestegui.</p>

<p><em>Combat of Buenza.</em> The allies who were about
ten thousand fighting men, including Long’s brigade
of light cavalry, occupied a very extensive mountain
ridge. Their right was strongly posted on rugged
ground, but the left prolonged towards Buenza
was insecure, and D’Erlon who including his two
divisions of heavy cavalry had not less than twenty
thousand sabres and bayonets, was followed by La
Martiniere’s division of infantry now coming from
Lanz. Soult’s combination was therefore extremely
powerful. The light troops were already engaged
when he arrived, and the same soldiers on both
sides who had so strenuously combated at Maya on
the 25th were again opposed to each other.</p>

<p>D’Armagnac’s division was directed to make a
false attack upon Hill’s right; Abbé’s division,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145"></a>[145]</span>
emerging by Lizasso, endeavoured to turn the
allies’ left and gain the summit of the ridge in the
direction of Buenza; Maranzin followed Abbé, and
the divisions of cavalry entering the line supported
and connected the two attacks. The action
was brisk at both points, but D’Armagnac pushing
his feint too far became seriously engaged, and was
beaten by Da Costa and Ashworth’s Portuguese
aided by a part of the twenty-eighth British regiment.
Nor were the French at first more successful on the
other flank, being repeatedly repulsed, until Abbé,
turning that wing gained the summit of the mountain
and rendered the position untenable. General
Hill who had lost about four hundred men then
retired to the heights of Equaros behind Arestegui
and Berasin, thus drawing towards Marcalain with
his right and throwing back his left. Here being
joined by Campbell and Morillo he again offered
battle, but Soult whose principal loss was in D’Armagnac’s
division had now gained his main object;
he had turned Hill’s left, secured a fresh line of
retreat, a shorter communication with Villatte by
the pass of Donna Maria, and withal, the great
Irurzun road to Toloza distant only one league and
a half was in his power. His first thought was to<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official despatch, MS.</span>
seize it and march through Lecumberri either upon
Toloza, or Andoain and Ernani. There was nothing
to oppose except the light division whose movements
shall be noticed hereafter, but neither the
French marshal nor general Hill knew of its presence,
and the former thought himself strong
enough to force his way to San Sebastian and there
unite with Villatte, and his artillery which following
his previous orders was now on the Lower
Bidassoa.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146"></a>[146]</span></p>

<p>This project was feasible. Lamartiniere’s division,
of Reille’s wing, coming from Lanz, was not
far off. Clauzel’s three divisions were momentarily
expected, and Reille’s during the night. On the
31st therefore, Soult with at least fifty thousand
men would have broken into Guipuscoa, thrusting
aside the light division in his march, and menacing
sir Thomas Graham’s position in reverse while
Villatte’s reserve attacked it in front. The country
about Lecumberri was however very strong for defence
and lord Wellington would have followed,
yet scarcely in time, for he did not suspect his
views and was ignorant of his strength, thinking
D’Erlon’s force, to be originally two divisions of
infantry and now only reinforced with a third division,
whereas that general had three divisions
originally and was now reinforced by a fourth
division of infantry and two of cavalry. This error
however did not prevent him from seizing with the
rapidity of a great commander, the decisive point
of operation, and giving a counter-stroke which
Soult trusting to the strength of Reille’s position
little expected.</p>

<p>When Wellington saw that La Martiniere’s divisions
and the cavalry had abandoned the mountains
above Elcano, and that Zabaldica was evacuated,
he ordered Picton, reinforced with two squadrons
of cavalry and a battery of artillery, to enter the
valley of Zubiri and turn the French left; the
seventh division was directed to sweep over the hills
beyond the Lanz river upon the French right; the
march of Campbell and Morillo insured the communication
with Hill; and that general was to
point his columns upon Olague and Lanz threatening
the French rear, but meeting as we have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147"></a>[147]</span>
seen with D’Erlon was forced back to Eguaros.
The fourth division was to assail Foy’s position,
but respecting its great strength the attack was to
be measured according to the effect produced on
the flanks. Meanwhile Byng’s brigade and the
sixth division, the latter having a battery of guns
and some squadrons of cavalry, were combined to
assault Sauroren. La Bispal’s Spaniards followed
the sixth division. Fane’s horsemen were stationed
at Berioplano with a detachment pushed to Irurzun,
the heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte, and
Carlos D’España maintained the blockade.</p>

<p><em>Second battle of Sauroren.</em>—These movements
began at daylight. Picton’s advance was rapid.
He gained the valley of Zubiri and threw his skirmishers
at once on Foy’s flank, and about the same
time general Inglis, one of those veterans who
purchase every step of promotion with their blood,
advancing with only five hundred men of the seventh
division, broke at one shock the two French regiments
covering Clauzel’s right, and drove them
down into the valley of Lanz. He lost indeed one-third
of his own men, but instantly spreading the
remainder in skirmishing order along the descent,
opened a biting fire upon the flank of Conroux’s
division, which was then moving up the valley
from Sauroren, sorely amazed and disordered by
this sudden fall of two regiments from the top of
the mountain into the midst of the column.</p>

<p>Foy’s division, marching to support Conroux and
Maucune, was on the crest of the mountains between
Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of
attack, but too far off to give aid, and his own light
troops were engaged with the skirmishers of the
fourth division; and Inglis had been so sudden and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148"></a>[148]</span>
vigorous, that before the evil could be well perceived
it was past remedy. For Wellington instantly
pushed the sixth division, now commanded
by general Pakenham Pack having been wounded
on the 28th, to the left of Sauroren, and shoved
Byng’s brigade headlong down from the chapel
height against that village, which was defended by
Maucune’s division. Byng’s vigorous assault was
simultaneously enforced from the opposite direction
by Madden’s Portuguese of the sixth division, and
at the same time the battery near the chapel sent
its bullets crashing through the houses, and booming
up the valley towards Conroux’s column, which
Inglis never ceased to vex and he was closely supported
by the remainder of the seventh division.</p>

<p>The village and bridge of Sauroren and the
straits beyond were now covered with a pall of
smoke, the musquetry pealed frequent and loud, and
the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to
mountain filled all the valley. Byng with hard
fighting carried the village of Sauroren, and fourteen
hundred prisoners were made, for the two
French divisions thus vehemently assailed in the
front and flank were entirely broken. Part retreated
along the valley towards Clauzel’s other divisions
which were now beyond Ostiz; part fled up the
mountain side to seek a refuge with Foy, who had
remained on the summit a helpless spectator of this
rout; but though he rallied the fugitives in great
numbers, he had soon to look to himself, for by this
time his skirmishers had been driven up the mountain
by those of the fourth division, and his left was
infested by Picton’s detachments. Thus pressed,
he abandoned his strong position, and fell back
along the summit of the mountain between the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149"></a>[149]</span>
valley of Zubiri and valley of Lanz, and the woods
enabled him to effect his retreat without much loss;
but he dared not descend into either valley, and thinking
himself entirely cut off, sent advice of his situation
to Soult and then retired into the Alduides by
the pass of Urtiaga. Meanwhile Wellington pressing
up the valley of Lanz drove Clauzel as far as
Olague, and the latter now joined by La Martiniere’s
division took a position in the evening covering
the roads of Lanz and Lizasso. The English
general whose pursuit had been damped by hearing
of Hill’s action also halted near Ostiz.</p>

<p>The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed and
wounded, or taken, in the two battles of this day,
and of these nearly twelve hundred were Portuguese,
the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt of
both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous.
Conroux’s and Maucune’s divisions were
completely disorganized; Foy with eight thousand
men, including the fugitives he had rallied, was
entirely separated from the main body; two thousand
men at the lowest computation had been
killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the
woods and ravines, and three thousand prisoners were
taken. This blow joined to former losses reduced
Soult’s fighting men to thirty-five thousand, of
which the fifteen thousand under Clauzel and Reille
were dispirited by defeat, and the whole were
placed in a most critical situation. Hill’s force now
increased to fifteen thousand men by the junction
of Morillo and Campbell was in front, and
thirty thousand were on the rear in the valley of
Lanz, or on the hills at each side; for the third division
finding no more enemies in the valley of Zubiri,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150"></a>[150]</span>
had crowned the heights in conjunction with the
fourth division.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington had detached some of La Bispal’s
Spaniards to Marcalain when he heard of Hill’s
action, but he was not yet aware of the true state of
affairs on that side. His operations were founded
upon the notion that Soult was in retreat towards
the Bastan. He designed to follow closely pushing
his own left forward to support sir Thomas Graham
on the Bidassoa, but always underrating D’Erlon’s
troops he thought La Martiniere’s division had retreated
by the Roncesvalles road; and as Foy’s
column was numerous and two divisions had been
broken at Sauroren, he judged the force immediately
under Soult to be weak and made dispositions accordingly.
The sixth division and the thirteenth
light dragoons were to march by Eugui to join the
third division, which was directed upon Linzoain and
Roncesvalles. The fourth division was to descend
into the valley of Lanz. General Hill, supported
by the Spaniards at Marcalain, was to press Soult
closely, always turning his right but directing his
own march upon Lanz, from whence he was to
send Campbell’s brigade to the Alduides. The
seventh division which had halted on the ridges
between Hill and Wellington, was to suffer the
former to cross its front and then march for the
pass of Doña Maria.</p>

<p>It appears from these arrangements, that Wellington
expecting Soult would rejoin Clauzel and make
for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate, intended to
confine and press him closely in that district. But
the French marshal was in a worse position than his
adversary imagined, being too far advanced towards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151"></a>[151]</span>
Buenza to return to Lanz; in fine he was between
two fires and without a retreat save by the pass of
Doña Maria upon San Estevan. Wherefore calling
in Clauzel, and giving D’Erlon whose divisions,
hitherto successful were in good order and undismayed,
the rear-guard, he commenced his march
soon after midnight towards the pass. But mischief
was thickening around him.</p>

<p>Sir Thomas Graham having only the blockade
of San Sebastian to maintain was at the head of
twenty thousand men, ready to make a forward
movement, and there remained besides the light
division under Charles Alten of whose operations
it is time to speak. That general, as we have seen,
took post on the mountain of Santa Cruz the 27th.
From thence on the evening of the 28th he marched
to gain Lecumberri on the great road of Irurzun; but
whether by orders from sir Thomas Graham or in
default of orders, the difficulty of communication
being extreme in those wild regions, I know not,
he commenced his descent into the valley of Lerins
very late. His leading brigade, getting down
with some difficulty, reached Leyza beyond the
great chain by the pass of Goriti or Zubieta, but
darkness caught the other brigade and the troops
dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and
precipices. Many made faggot torches waving
them as signals, and thus moving about, the lights
served indeed to assist those who carried them but
misled and bewildered others who saw them at a
distance. The heights and the ravines were alike
studded with these small fires, and the soldiers
calling to each other for directions filled the whole
region with their clamour. Thus they continued to
rove and shout until morning shewed the face of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152"></a>[152]</span>
mountain covered with tired and scattered men and
animals who had not gained half a league of ground
beyond their starting place, and it was many hours,
ere they could be collected to join the other brigade
at Leyza.</p>

<p>General Alten, who had now been separated for
three days from the army, sent mounted officers in
various directions to obtain tidings, and at six
o’clock in the evening renewed his march. At
Areysa he halted for some time without suffering
fires to be lighted, for he knew nothing of the
enemy and was fearful of discovering his situation,
but at night he again moved and finally established
his bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th.
The noise of Hill’s battle at Buenza was clearly
heard in the course of the day, and the light division
was thus again comprized in the immediate
system of operations directed by Wellington in
person. Had Soult continued his march upon Guipuscoa
Alten would have been in great danger, but
the French general being forced to retreat, the light
division was a new power thrown into his opponent’s
hands, the value of which will be seen by a
reference to the peculiarity of the country through
which the French general was now to move.</p>

<p>It has been shewn that Foy cut off from the main
army was driven towards the Alduides; that the
French artillery and part of the cavalry were again
on the Bidassoa, whence Villatte, contrary to the
intelligence received by Soult, had not advanced,
though he had skirmished with Longa, leaving the latter
however in possession of heights above Lesaca.
The troops under Soult’s immediate command were
therefore completely isolated, and had no resources
save what his ability and their own courage could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153"></a>[153]</span>
supply. His single line of retreat by the pass of
Doña Maria was secure as far as San Estevan, and
from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to
Elizondo and so gain France by the Col de Maya,
or down the same river towards Vera by Sumbilla
and Yanzi, from both of which places roads branching
off to the right lead over the mountains to the
passes of Echallar. There was also a third mountain-road
leading direct from Estevan to Zagaramurdi
and Urdax, but it was too steep and rugged
for his wounded men and baggage.</p>

<p>The road to Elizondo was very good, but that
down the Bidassoa was a long and terrible defile,
and so contracted about the bridges of Yanzi and
Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast.
This then Soult had to dread; that Wellington
who by the pass of Vellate could reach Elizondo
before him would block his passage on that side;
that Graham would occupy the rocks about Yanzi,
blocking the passage there and by detachments
cut off his line of march upon Echallar. Then,
confined to the narrow mountain-way from San
Estevan to Zagaramurdi, he would be followed hard
by general Hill, exposed to attacks in rear and
flank during his march, and perhaps be headed at
Urdax by the allied troops moving through Vellate
Elizondo and the Col de Maya. In this state,
his first object being to get through the pass of Doña
Maria, he commenced his retreat as we have seen
in the night of the 30th, and Wellington still deceived
as to the real state of affairs did not take the
most fitting measures to stop his march, that is to
say, he continued in his first design, halting in the
valley of Lanz while Hill passed his front to enter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154"></a>[154]</span>
the Bastan, into which district he sent Byng’s
brigade as belonging to the second division. But
early on the 31st, when Soult’s real strength became
known, he directed the seventh division to aid Hill,
followed Byng through the pass of Vellate with the
remainder of his forces, and thinking the light division
might be at Zubieta in the valley of Lerins,
sent Alten orders to head the French if possible at San
Estevan, or at Sumbilla, in fine to cut in upon their
line of march somewhere; Longa also was ordered
to come down to the defiles at Yanzi, thus aiding
the light division to block the way on that side, and
sir Thomas Graham was advertised to hold his army
in readiness to move in the same view, and it would
appear that the route of the sixth and third divisions
were also changed for a time.</p>

<p><em>Combat of Doña Maria.</em>—At ten o’clock in the
morning of the 31st, general Hill overtook Soult’s
rear-guard between Lizasso and the Puerto. The
seventh division, coming from the hills above Olague,
was already ascending the mountain on his right,
and the French only gained a wood on the summit
of the pass under the fire of Hill’s guns. There,
however, they turned and throwing out their skirmishers
made strong battle. General Stewart,
leading the attack of the second division, now for
the third time engaged with D’Erlon’s troops, was
again wounded and his first brigade was repulsed,
but general Pringle who succeeded to the command,
renewed the attack with the second brigade, and the
thirty-fourth regiment leading, broke the enemy at
the moment that the seventh division did the same on
the right. Some prisoners were taken, but a thick
fog prevented further pursuit, and the loss of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155"></a>[155]</span>
French in the action is unknown, probably less than
that of the allies which was something short of four
hundred men.</p>

<p>The seventh division remained on the mountain,
but Hill fell back to Lizasso, and then, following
his orders, moved by a short but rugged way, leading
between the passes of Doña Maria and Vellate over
the great chain to Almandoz, to join Wellington,
who had during the combat descended into the
Bastan by the pass of Vellate. Meanwhile Byng
reached Elizondo, and captured a large convoy of
provisions and ammunition left there under guard
of a battalion by D’Erlon on the 29th; he made
several hundred prisoners also after a sharp skirmish
and then pushed forward to the pass of Maya.
Wellington now occupied the hills through which
the road leads from Elizondo to San Estevan, and
full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow; for
Soult, not being pursued after passing Doña Maria,
had halted in San Estevan, although by his scouts
he knew that the convoy had been taken at Elizondo.
He was in a deep narrow valley, and three
British divisions with one of Spaniards were behind
the mountains overlooking the town; the seventh
division was on the mountain of Doña Maria; the
light division and sir Thomas Graham’s Spaniards
were marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits
from the valley; Byng was already at Maya, and
Hill was moving by Almandoz just behind Wellington’s
own position. A few hours gained and
the French must surrender or disperse. Wellington
gave strict orders to prevent the lighting of fires
the straggling of soldiers or any other indication of
the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156"></a>[156]</span>
some rocks at a commanding point from whence he
could observe every movement of the enemy. Soult
seemed tranquil, and four of his “<i lang="fr">gensd’armes</i>”
were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner.
Some of the staff proposed to cut them off; the
English general whose object was to hide his own<span class="sidenote">Notes by the duke of Wellington, MSS.</span>
presence, would not suffer it, but the next moment
three marauding English soldiers entered the valley
and were instantly carried off by the horsemen.
Half an hour afterwards the French drums beat to
arms and their columns began to move out of San
Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience
of three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name
of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander of
the most splendid success, and saved another from
the most terrible disaster.</p>

<p>The captives walked from their prison but their
chains hung upon them. The way was narrow, the
multitude great, and the baggage, and wounded
men borne on their comrades’ shoulders, filed with
such long procession, that Clauzel’s divisions forming
the rear-guard were still about San Estevan on
the morning of the 1st of August, and scarcely had
they marched a league of ground, when the skirmishers
of the fourth division and the Spaniards
thronging along the heights on the right flank
opened a fire to which little reply could be made.
The troops and baggage then got mixed with an
extreme disorder, numbers of the former fled up the
hills, and the commanding energy of Soult whose
personal exertions were conspicuous could scarcely
prevent a general dispersion. However prisoners
and baggage fell at every step into the hands of the
pursuers, the boldest were dismayed at the peril,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157"></a>[157]</span>
and worse would have awaited them in front, if
Wellington had been on other points well seconded
by his subordinate generals.</p>

<p>The head of the French column instead of taking
the first road leading from Sumbilla to Echallar,
had passed onward towards that leading from the
bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere
cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa
was on their left, and there was a tributary torrent
to cross, the bridge of which was defended by a
battalion of Spanish Caçadores detached to that
point from the heights of Vera by general Barceñas.
The front was now as much disordered as the rear,
and had Longa or Barceñas reinforced the Caçadores,
those only of the French who being near
Sumbilla could take the road from that place to
Echallar would have escaped; but the Spanish
generals kept aloof and D’Erlon won the defile.
However Reille’s divisions were still to pass, and
when they came up a new enemy had appeared.</p>

<p>It will be remembered that the light division was<span class="sidenote7">August.</span>
directed to head the French army at San Estevan,
or Sumbilla. This order was received on the evening
of the 31st, and the division, repassing the
defiles of the Zubieta, descended the deep valley
of Lerins and reached Elgoriaga about mid-day on
the 1st of August, having then marched twenty-four
miles and being little more than a league
from Estevan and about the same distance from
Sumbilla. The movement of the French along the
Bidassoa was soon discovered, but the division instead
of moving on Sumbilla turned to the left,
clambered up the great mountain of Santa Cruz
and made for the bridge of Yanzi. The weather
was exceedingly sultry, the mountain steep and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158"></a>[158]</span>
hard to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed
and frothing at the mouth, while others
whose spirit and strength had never before been
quelled, leaned on their muskets and muttered in
sullen tones that they yielded for the first time.</p>

<p>Towards evening, after marching for nineteen
consecutive hours over forty miles of mountain
roads, the head of the exhausted column reached
the edge of a precipice near the bridge of Yanzi.
Below, within pistol-shot, Reille’s divisions were
seen hurrying forward along the horrid defile in
which they were pent up, and a fire of musketry
commenced, slightly from the British on the high
rock, more vigorously from some low ground near
the bridge of Yanzi, where the riflemen had ensconced
themselves in the brushwood. The scene
which followed is thus described by an eye-witness.</p>

<p>“We overlooked the enemy at stone’s throw, and<span class="sidenote">Captain Cooke’s Memoirs.</span>
from the summit of a tremendous precipice. The
river separated us, but the French were wedged in
a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side
and the river on the other. Confusion impossible
to describe followed, the wounded were thrown
down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry
drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up
the pass of Echallar, but the infantry beat them
back, and several, horses and all, were precipitated
into the river; some fired vertically at us, the
wounded called out for quarter, while others pointed
to them, supported as they were on branches of
trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted
with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different
habitations to aid the sufferers.”</p>

<p>On these miserable supplicants brave men could
not fire, and so piteous was the spectacle that it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159"></a>[159]</span>
was with averted or doubtful aim they shot at the
others, although the latter rapidly plied their muskets
in passing, and some in their veteran hardihood
even dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to make
a counter-attack. It was a soldier-like but a vain
effort! the night found the British in possession of
the bridge, and though the great body of the enemy
escaped by the road to Echallar, the baggage was
cut off and fell, together with many prisoners, into
the hands of the light troops which were still hanging
on the rear in pursuit from San Estevan.</p>

<p>The loss of the French this day was very great,
that of the allies about a hundred men, of which
sixty-five were British, principally of the fourth
division. Nevertheless lord Wellington was justly
discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor
general Alten had fulfilled their mission. The
former excused himself as being too feeble to oppose
the mass Soult led down the valley; but the
rocks were so precipitous that the French could not
have reached him, and the resistance made by the
Spanish caçadores was Longa’s condemnation. A
lamentable fatuity prevailed in many quarters. If
Barceñas had sent his whole brigade instead of a
weak battalion, the small torrent could not have
been forced by D’Erlon; and if Longa had been
near the bridge of Yanzi the French must have
surrendered, for the perpendicular rocks on their
right forbade even an escape by dispersion. Finally
if the light division instead of marching down the
valley of Lerins as far as Elgoriaga, had crossed
the Santa Cruz mountain by the road used the
night of the 28th, it would have arrived much earlier
at the bridge of Yanzi, and then belike Longa
and Barceñas would also have come down. Alten’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160"></a>[160]</span>
instructions indeed prescribed Sumbilla and San
Estevan as the first points to head the French army,
but judging them too strong at Sumbilla he marched
as we have seen upon Yanzi; and if he had passed
the bridge there and seized the road to Echallar
with one brigade, while the other plied the flank
with fire from the left of the Bidassoa, he would
have struck a great blow. It was for that the soldiers
had made such a prodigious exertion, yet the
prize was thrown away.</p>

<p>During the night Soult rallied his divisions about
Echallar, and on the morning of the 2d occupied
the “<i>Puerto</i>” of that name. His left was placed
at the rocks of Zagaramurdi; his right at the rock
of Ivantelly communicating with the left of Villatte’s
reserve, which was in position on the ridges
between Soult’s right and the head of the great
Rhune mountain. Meanwhile Clauzel’s three divisions,
now reduced to six thousand men, took post
on a strong hill between the “<i>Puerto</i>” and town
of Echallar. This position was momentarily adopted
by Soult to save time, to examine the country, and
to make Wellington discover his final object, but
that general would not suffer the affront. He had
sent the third and sixth divisions to reoccupy the
passes of Roncesvalles and the Alduides; Hill had
reached the Col de Maya, and Byng was at Urdax;
the fourth, seventh, and light divisions remained in
hand, and with these he resolved to fall upon
Clauzel whose position was dangerously advanced.</p>

<p><i>Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly.</i>—The light
division held the road running from the bridge of
Yanzi to Echallar until relieved by the fourth division,
and then marched by Lesaca to Santa
Barbara, thus turning Clauzel’s right. The fourth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161"></a>[161]</span>
division marched from Yanzi upon Echallar to
attack his front, and the seventh moved from Sumbilla
against his left; but Barnes’s brigade, contrary
to lord Wellington’s intention, arrived unsupported
before the fourth and light divisions were either
seen or felt, and without awaiting the arrival of
more troops assailed Clauzel’s strong position. The
fire became vehement, but neither the steepness of
the mountain nor the overshadowing multitude of
the enemy clustering above in support of their skirmishers
could arrest the assailants, and then was
seen the astonishing spectacle of fifteen hundred
men driving, by sheer valour and force of arms, six
thousand good troops from a position, so rugged
that there would have been little to boast of if the
numbers had been reversed and the defence made
good. It is true that the fourth division arrived
towards the end of the action, that the French had
fulfilled their mission as a rear-guard, that they
were worn with fatigue and ill-provided with ammunition,
having exhausted all their reserve stores
during the retreat, but the real cause of their inferiority
belongs to the highest part of war.</p>

<p>The British soldiers, their natural fierceness stimulated
by the remarkable personal daring of their
general, Barnes, were excited by the pride of success;
and the French divisions were those which
had failed in the attack on the 28th, which had
been utterly defeated on the 30th, and which had
suffered so severely the day before about Sumbilla.
Such then is the preponderance of moral power.
The men who had assailed the terrible rocks above
Sauroren, with a force and energy that all the
valour of the hardiest British veterans scarcely
sufficed to repel, were now, only five days afterwards,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162"></a>[162]</span>
although posted so strongly, unable to sustain
the shock of one-fourth of their own numbers.
And at this very time eighty British soldiers, the
comrades and equals of those who achieved this
wonderful exploit, having wandered to plunder
surrendered to some French peasants, who lord
Wellington truly observed, “<i>they would under
other circumstances have eat up!</i>” What gross
ignorance of human nature then do those writers
display who assert, that the employing of brute
force is the highest qualification of a general!</p>

<p>Clauzel, thus dispossessed of the mountain, fell
back fighting to a strong ridge beyond the pass of
Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly
mountain which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile
the light division emerging by Lesaca from
the narrow valley of the Bidassoa, ascended the
broad heights of Santa Barbara without opposition,
and halted there until the operations of the fourth
and seventh divisions were far enough advanced to
render it advisable to attack the Ivantelly. This
lofty mountain lifted its head on the right, rising as
it were out of the Santa Barbara heights, and separating
them from the ridges through which the
French troops beaten at Echallar were now retiring.
Evening was coming on, a thick mist
capped the crowning rocks which contained a
strong French regiment, the British soldiers besides
their long and terrible march the previous
day had been for two days without sustenance, and
were leaning, weak and fainting, on their arms,
when the advancing fire of Barnes’s action about
Echallar indicated the necessity of dislodging the
enemy from Ivantelly. Colonel Andrew Barnard
instantly led five companies of his riflemen to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163"></a>[163]</span>
attack, and four companies of the forty-third followed
in support. The misty cloud had descended,
and the riflemen were soon lost to the view, but the
sharp clang of their weapons heard in distinct reply
to the more sonorous rolling musketry of the
French, told what work was going on. For some
time the echoes rendered it doubtful how the action
went, but the following companies of the forty-third
could find no trace of an enemy save the killed and
wounded. Barnard had fought his way unaided
and without a check to the summit, where his dark-clothed
swarthy veterans raised their victorious
shout from the highest peak, just as the coming night
shewed the long ridges of the mountains beyond
sparkling with the last musket-flashes from Clauzel’s
troops retiring in disorder from Echallar.</p>

<p>This day’s fighting cost the British four hundred
men, and lord Wellington narrowly escaped the
enemy’s hands. He had carried with him towards
Echallar half a company of the forty-third as an escort,
and placed a serjeant named Blood with a party
to watch in front while he examined his maps. The
French who were close at hand sent a detachment
to cut the party off; and such was the nature of the
ground that their troops, rushing on at speed, would
infallibly have fallen unawares upon lord Wellington,
if Blood a young intelligent man, seeing
the danger, had not with surprising activity, leaping
rather than running down the precipitous rocks
he was posted on, given the general notice, and as
it was the French arrived in time to send a volley
of shot after him as he galloped away.</p>

<p>Soult now caused count D’Erlon to re-occupy
the hills about Ainhoa, Clauzel to take post on
the heights in advance of Sarre, and Reille to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164"></a>[164]</span>
carry his two divisions to St. Jean de Luz in
second line behind Villatte’s reserve. Foy, who
had rashly uncovered St. Jean Pied de Port by
descending upon Cambo, was ordered to return
and reinforce his troops with all that he could
collect of national guards and detachments.</p>

<p>Wellington had on the 1st directed general
Graham to collect his forces and bring up pontoons
for crossing the Bidassoa, but he finally abandoned
this design, and the two armies therefore
rested quiet in their respective positions, after nine
days of continual movement during which they had
fought ten serious actions. Of the allies, including
the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred officers
and soldiers had been killed wounded or taken,
and many were dispersed from fatigue or to
plunder. On the French side the loss was terrible
and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate.
Nevertheless a close approximation may
be made. Lord Wellington at first called it twelve
thousand, but hearing that the French officers admitted
more he raised his estimate to fifteen thousand.
The engineer, <i>Belmas</i>, in his Journals of
Sieges, compiled from official documents by order
of the French government, sets down above thirteen
thousand. Soult in his dispatches at the time,
stated fifteen hundred as the loss at Maya, four
hundred at Roncesvalles, two hundred on the
27th, and eighteen hundred on the 28th, after
which he speaks no more of losses by battle. There
remains therefore to be added the killed and
wounded at the combats of Linzoain on the 26th,
the double battles of Sauroren and Buenza on the
30th, the combats of the 31st, and those of the 1st
and 2d of August; finally, four thousand unwounded<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165"></a>[165]</span>
prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to
sound the stream of blood in all its horrid depths.</p>


<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4>

<p>1º. The allies’ line of defence was weak. Was
it therefore injudiciously adopted?</p>

<p>The French beaten at Vittoria were disorganized
and retreated without artillery or baggage on
excentric lines; Foy by Guipuscoa, Clauzel by
Zaragoza, Reille by San Estevan, the King by
Pampeluna. There was no reserve to rally upon,
the people fled from the frontier, Bayonne and
St. Jean Pied de Port if not defenceless were certainly
in a very neglected state, and the English
general might have undertaken any operation,
assumed any position, offensive or defensive, which
seemed good to him. Why then did he not establish
the Anglo-Portuguese beyond the mountains, leaving
the Spaniards to blockade the fortresses behind
him? The answer to this question involves the
difference between the practice and the theory of
war.</p>

<p>“<i>The soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Dispatches.</span>
themselves after the battle dispersed in the night
to plunder, and were so fatigued that when the rain
came on the next day they were incapable of marching
and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy.
Eighteen days after the victory twelve thousand five
hundred men, chiefly British, were absent, most of
them marauding in the mountains.</i>”</p>

<p>Such were the reasons assigned by the English
general for his slack pursuit after the battle of
Vittoria, yet he had commanded that army for six<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166"></a>[166]</span>
years! Was he then deficient in the first qualification
of a general, the art of disciplining and
inspiring troops, or was the English military system
defective? It is certain that he always exacted the
confidence of his soldiers as a leader. It is not so
certain that he ever gained their affections. The
barbarity of the English military code excited public
horror, the inequality of promotion created public
discontent; yet the general complained he had no
adequate power to reward or punish, and he condemned
alike the system and the soldiers it produced.
The latter “<i>were detestable for every thing
but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the men</i>.”
The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent
with his celebrated observation, subsequently made,
namely, “that he thought he could go any where
and do any thing with the army that fought on the
Pyrenees,” and although it cannot be denied that
his complaints were generally too well-founded,
there were thousands of true and noble soldiers,
and zealous worthy officers, who served their country
honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough
that they have been since neglected, exactly in
proportion to their want of that corrupt aristocratic
influence which produced the evils complained of.</p>

<p>2º. When the misconduct of the troops had thus
weakened the effect of victory, the question of
following Joseph at once into France assumed a
new aspect. Wellington’s system of warfare had
never varied after the battle of Talavera. Rejecting
dangerous enterprize, it rested on profound calculation
both as to time and resources for the accomplishment
of a particular object, namely, the
gradual liberation of Spain by the Anglo-Portuguese
army. Not that he held it impossible to attain that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167"></a>[167]</span>
object suddenly, and his battles in India, the passage
of the Douro, the advance to Talavera, prove
that by nature he was inclined to daring operations;
but such efforts, however glorious, could not be
adopted by a commander who feared even the loss
of a brigade lest the government he served should
put an end to the war. Neither was it suitable to
the state of his relations with the Portuguese and
Spaniards; their ignorance jealousy and passionate
pride, fierce in proportion to their weakness and
improvidence, would have enhanced every danger.</p>

<p>No man could have anticipated the extraordinary
errors of the French in 1813. Wellington did not
expect to cross the Ebro before the end of the
campaign, and his battering train was prepared for
the siege of Burgos not for that of Bayonne. A
sudden invasion of France her military reputation
considered, was therefore quite out of the pale of
his methodized system of warfare, which was
founded upon political as well as military considerations;
and of the most complicated nature, seeing
that he had at all times to deal with the personal
and factious interests and passions, as well as the
great state interests of three distinct nations two
of which abhorred each other. At this moment
also, the uncertain state of affairs in Germany
strongly influenced his views. An armistice which
might end in a separate peace excluding England,
would have brought Napoleon’s whole force to the
Pyrenees, and Wellington held cheap both the
military and political proceedings of the coalesced
powers. “<i>I would not move a corporal’s guard in
reliance upon such a system</i>,” was the significant
phrase he employed to express his contempt.</p>

<p>These considerations justified his caution as to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168"></a>[168]</span>
invading France, but there were local military
reasons equally cogent. 1º. He could not dispense
with a secure harbour, because the fortresses still
in possession of the French, namely, Santona, Pancorbo,
Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, interrupted
his communications with the interior of Spain;
hence the siege of the latter place. 2º. He had to
guard against the union of Suchet and Clauzel on
his right flank; hence his efforts to cut off the last-named
general; hence also the blockade of Pampeluna
in preference to siege and the launching of
Mina and the bands on the side of Zaragoza.</p>

<p>3º. After Vittoria the nature of the campaign
depended upon Suchet’s operations, which were
rendered more important by Murray’s misconduct.
The allied force on the eastern coast was badly
organized, it did not advance from Valencia as we
have seen until the 16th, and then only partially
and by the coast, whereas Suchet had assembled
more than twenty thousand excellent troops on the
Ebro as early as the 12th of July; and had he
continued his march upon Zaragoza he would have
saved the castle of that place with its stores. Then
rallying Paris’ division, he could have menaced
Wellington’s flank with twenty-five thousand men
exclusive of Clauzel’s force, and if that general
joined him with forty thousand.</p>

<p>On the 16th, the day lord William Bentinck
quitted Valencia, Suchet might have marched from
Zaragoza on Tudela or Sanguessa, and Soult’s preparations
originally made as we have seen to attack
on the 23d instead of the 25th, would have naturally
been hastened. How difficult it would then
have been for the allies to maintain themselves
beyond the Ebro is evident, much more so to hold<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169"></a>[169]</span>
a forward position in France. That Wellington
feared an operation of this nature is clear from his
instructions to lord William Bentinck and to Mina;
and because Picton’s and Cole’s divisions instead
of occupying the passes were kept behind the
mountains solely to watch Clauzel; when the latter
had regained the frontier of France Cole was permitted
to join Byng and Morillo. It follows that
the operations after the battle of Vittoria were well
considered and consonant to lord Wellington’s
general system. Their wisdom would have been
proved if Suchet had seized the advantages within
his reach.</p>

<p>4º. A general’s capacity is sometimes more taxed
to profit from a victory than to gain one. Wellington,
master of all Spain, Catalonia excepted, desired
to establish himself solidly in the Pyrenees, lest a
separate peace in Germany should enable Napoleon
to turn his whole force against the allies. In this
expectation, with astonishing exertion of body and
mind, he had in three days achieved a rigorous
examination of the whole mass of the Western
Pyrenees, and concluded that if Pampeluna and
San Sebastian fell, a defensive position as strong as
that of Portugal, and a much stronger one than
could be found behind the Ebro, might be established.
But to invest those places and maintain so difficult
a covering line was a greater task than to win the
battle of Vittoria. However, the early fall of San
Sebastian he expected, because the errors of execution
in that siege could not be foreseen, and also
for gain of time he counted upon the disorganized
state of the French army, upon Joseph’s want of
military capacity, and upon the moral ascendancy
which his own troops had acquired over the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170"></a>[170]</span>
by their victories. He could not anticipate the
expeditious journey, the sudden arrival of Soult,
whose rapid reorganization of the French army,
and whose vigorous operations contrasted with
Joseph’s abandonment of Spain, illustrated the old
Greek saying, that a herd of deer led by a lion are
more dangerous than a herd of lions led by a deer.</p>

<p>5º. The duke of Dalmatia was little beholden to
fortune at the commencement of his movements.
Her first contradiction was the bad weather, which
breaking up the roads delayed the concentration of
his army at St. Jean Pied de Port for two days;
all officers know the effect which heavy rain and
hard marches have upon the vigour and confidence
of soldiers who are going to attack. If Soult had
commenced on the 23d instead of the 25th the surprise
would have been more complete his army more
brisk; and as no conscript battalions would have
arrived to delay Reille, that general would probably
have been more ready in his attack, and might possibly
have escaped the fog which on the 26th stopped
his march along the superior crest of the mountain
towards Vellate. On the other hand the allies would
have been spared the unsuccessful assault on San
Sebastian, and the pass of Maya might have been
better furnished with troops. However Soult’s combinations
were so well knit that more than one error
in execution, and more than one accident of fortune,
were necessary to baffle him. Had count D’Erlon
followed his instructions even on the 26th general
Hill would probably have been shouldered off the
valley of Lanz, and Soult would have had twenty
thousand additional troops in the combats of the
27th and 28th. Such failures however generally
attend extensively combined movements, and it is by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171"></a>[171]</span>
no means certain that the count would have been
able to carry the position of the Col de Maya on the
25th, if all general Stewart’s forces had been posted
there. It would therefore perhaps have been more
strictly within the rules of art, if D’Erlon had been
directed to leave one of his three divisions to menace
the Col de Maya while he marched with the other
two by St. Etienne de Baygorry up the Alduides.
This movement, covered by the national guards who
occupied the mountain of La Houssa, could not
have been stopped by Campbell’s Portuguese brigade,
and would have dislodged Hill from the Bastan
while it secured the junction of D’Erlon with Soult
on the crest of the superior chain.</p>

<p>6º. The intrepid constancy with which Byng and
Ross defended their several positions on the 25th,
the able and clean retreat made by general Cole as
far as the heights of Linzoain, gave full effect to the
errors of Reille and D’Erlon, and would probably
have baffled Soult at an early period if general
Picton had truly comprehended the importance of
his position. Lord Wellington says that the concentration
of the army would have been effected on
the 27th if that officer and general Cole had not
agreed in thinking it impossible to make a stand
behind Linzoain; and surely the necessity of retreating
on that day may be questioned. For if Cole with
ten thousand men maintained the position in front
of Altobiscar, Ibañeta, and Atalosti, Picton might
have maintained the more contracted one behind
Linzoain and Erro with twenty thousand. And that
number he could have assembled, because Campbell’s
Portuguese reached Eugui long before the evening
of the 26th, and lord Wellington had directed
O’Donnel to keep three thousand five hundred of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172"></a>[172]</span>
the blockading troops in readiness to act in advance,
of which Picton could not have been ignorant. It
was impossible to turn him by the valley of Urroz
that line being too rugged for the march of an army
and not leading directly upon Pampeluna. The
only roads into the Val de Zubiri were by Erro
and Linzoain, lying close together and both
leading upon the village of Zubiri over the ridges
which Picton occupied, and the strength of which
was evident from Soult’s declining an attack on the
evening of the 26th when Cole only was before him.
To abandon this ground so hastily when the concentration
of the army depended upon keeping it,
appears therefore an error, aggravated by the neglect
of sending timely information to the commander-in-chief,<span class="sidenote">Original Note by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.</span>
for lord Wellington did not know of the retreat
until the morning of the 27th and then only from
general Long. It might be that Picton’s messenger
failed, but many should have been sent when a retrograde
movement involving the fate of Pampeluna
was contemplated.</p>

<p>It has been said that general Cole was the adviser
of this retreat which if completed would have ruined
lord Wellington’s campaign. This is incorrect,
Picton was not a man to be guided by others.
General Cole indeed gave him a report, drawn up
by colonel Bell one of the ablest staff-officers of the
army, which stated that no position suitable for a<span class="sidenote">Note by General Cole, MSS.</span>
very inferior force existed between Zubiri and Pampeluna,
and this was true in the sense of the report,
which had reference only to a division not to an
army; moreover, although the actual battle of Sauroren
was fought by inferior numbers, the whole
position, including the ridges of the second line occupied
by Picton and the Spaniards, was only maintained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173"></a>[173]</span>
by equal numbers; and if Soult had made
the attack of the 28th on the evening of the 27th
before the sixth division arrived, the position would
have been carried. However there is no doubt that<span class="sidenote7">Ibid.</span>
colonel Bell’s report influenced Picton, and it was
only when his troops had reached Huarte and Villalba
that he suddenly resolved on battle. That was
a military resolution, vigorous and prompt; and not
the less worthy of praise that he so readily adopted
Cole’s saving proposition to regain the more forward
heights above Zabaldica.</p>

<p>7º. Marshal Soult appeared unwilling to attack
on the evenings of the 26th and 27th. Yet success
depended upon forestalling the allies at their point
of concentration; and it is somewhat inexplicable
that on the 28th, having possession of the ridge
beyond the Lanz river and plenty of cavalry, he
should have known so little of the sixth division’s
movements. The general conception of his scheme
on the 30th has also been blamed by some of his
own countrymen, apparently from ignorance of the
facts and because it failed. Crowned with success
it would have been cited as a fine illustration of the
art of war. To have retired at once by the two
valleys of Zubiri and Lanz after being reinforced
with twenty thousand men would have given great
importance to his repulse on the 28th; his reputation
as a general capable of restoring the French
affairs would have vanished, and mischief only have
accrued, even though he should have effected his
retreat safely, which, regard being had to the narrowness
of the valleys the position of general Hill on
his right and the boldness of his adversary, was not
certain. To abandon the valley of Zubiri and secure
that of Lanz; to obtain another and shorter line of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174"></a>[174]</span>
retreat by the Doña Maria pass; to crush general
Hill with superior numbers, and thus gaining the
Irurzun road to succour San Sebastian, or failing of
that, to secure the union of the whole army and give
to his retreat the appearance of an able offensive
movement; to combine all these chances by one
operation immediately after a severe check was
Soult’s plan, it was not impracticable and was surely
the conception of a great commander.</p>

<p>To succeed however it was essential either to beat
general Hill off-hand and thus draw Wellington to
that side by the way of Marcalain, or to secure the
defence of the French left in such a solid manner
that no efforts against it should prevail to the detriment
of the offensive movement on the right: neither
was effected. The French general indeed brought
an overwhelming force to bear upon Hill, and drove
him from the road of Irurzun, but he did not crush
him, because that general fought so strongly and
retired with such good order, that beyond the loss
of the position no injury was sustained. Meanwhile
the left wing of the French was completely beaten,
and thus the advantage gained on the right was
more than nullified. Soult trusted to the remarkable
defensive strength of the ground occupied by
his left, and he had reason to do so, for it was nearly
impregnable. Lord Wellington turned it on both
flanks at the same time, but neither Picton’s advance
into the valley of Zubiri on Foy’s left, nor Cole’s
front attack on that general, nor Byng’s assault
upon the village of Sauroren, would have seriously
damaged the French without the sudden and complete
success of general Inglis beyond the Lanz.
The other attacks would indeed have forced the
French to retire somewhat hastily up the valley of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175"></a>[175]</span>
the Lanz, yet they could have held together in mass
secure of their junction with Soult. But when the
ridges running between them and the right wing of
the French army were carried by Inglis, and the
whole of the seventh division was thrown upon their
flank and rear, the front attack became decisive.
It is clear therefore that the key of the defence was
on the ridge beyond the Lanz, and instead of two
regiments Clauzel should have placed two divisions
there.</p>

<p>8º. Lord Wellington’s quick perception and vigorous
stroke on the 30th were to be expected from
such a consummate commander, yet he certainly
was not master of all the bearings of the French
general’s operations; he knew neither the extent of
Hill’s danger nor the difficulties of Soult, otherwise
it is probable that he would have put stronger
columns in motion, and at an earlier hour, towards
the pass of Doña Maria on the morning of the 31st.
Hill did not commence his march that day until
8 o’clock, and it has been shewn that even with the
help of the seventh division he was too weak against
the heavy mass of the retreating French army. The
faults and accidents which baffled Wellington’s after
operations have been sufficiently touched upon in
the narrative, but he halted in the midst of his victorious
career, when Soult’s army was broken and
flying, when Suchet had retired into Catalonia, and
all things seemed favourable for the invasion of
France.</p>

<p>His motives for this were strong. He knew the
armistice in Germany had been renewed with a view
to peace, and he had therefore reason to expect
Soult would be reinforced. A forward position in
France would have lent his right to the enemy who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176"></a>[176]</span>
pivotted upon St. Jean Pied de Port could operate
against his flank. His arrangements for supply,
and intercourse with his depôts and hospitals, would
have been more difficult and complicated, and as
the enemy possessed all the French and Spanish
fortresses commanding the great roads, his need to
gain one, at least, before the season closed, was
absolute if he would not resign his communications
with the interior of Spain. Then long marches and
frequent combats had fatigued his troops destroyed
their shoes and used up their musquet ammunition;
and the loss of men had been great, especially of
British in the second division where their proportion
to foreign troops was become too small. The
difficulty of re-equipping the troops would have
been increased by entering an enemy’s state, because
the English system did not make war support war
and his communications would have been lengthened.
Finally it was France that was to be invaded, France
in which every person was a soldier, where the
whole population was armed and organised under
men, not as in other countries inexperienced in war
but who had all served more or less. Beyond the
Adour the army could not advance, and if a separate
peace was made by the northern powers, if any misfortune
befel the allies in Catalonia so as to leave
Suchet at liberty to operate towards Pampeluna, or
if Soult profiting from the possession of San Jean
Pied de Port should turn the right flank of the new
position, a retreat into Spain would become necessary,
and however short would be dangerous from
the hostility and warlike disposition of the people
directed in a military manner.</p>

<p>These reasons joined to the fact, that a forward
position, although offering better communications<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177"></a>[177]</span>
from right to left, would have given the enemy
greater facilities for operating against an army
which must until the fortresses fell hold a defensive
and somewhat extended line, were conclusive
as to the rashness of an invasion; but they do not
appear so conclusive as to the necessity of stopping
short after the action of the 2d of August. The
questions were distinct. The one was a great measure
involving vast political and military conditions, the
other was simply whether Wellington should profit
of his own victory and the enemy’s distresses; and
in this view the objections above-mentioned, save
the want of shoes the scarcity of ammunition and
the fatigue of the troops, are inapplicable. But in
the two last particulars the allies were not so badly
off as the enemy, and in the first not so deficient as
to cripple the army, wherefore if the advantage to
be gained was worth the effort it was an error to
halt.</p>

<p>The solution of this problem is to be found in the
comparative condition of the armies. Soult had
recovered his reserve his cavalry and artillery, but
Wellington was reinforced by general Graham’s
corps which was more numerous and powerful than
Villate’s reserve. The new chances then were for
the allies, and the action of the 2d of August
demonstrated that their opponents however strongly
posted could not stand before them; one more victory
would have gone nigh to destroy the French
force altogether; for such was the disorder that
Maucune’s division had on the 2d only one thousand<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
men left out of more than five thousand, and
on the 6th it had still a thousand stragglers besides
killed and wounded: Conroux’s and La Martinière’s
divisions were scarcely in better plight, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178"></a>[178]</span>
losses of the other divisions although less remarkable
were great. It must also be remembered that
general Foy with eight thousand men was cut off
from the main body; and the Nivelle, the sources of
which were in the allies’ power, was behind the
French. With their left pressed from the pass of
Maya, and their front vigorously assailed by the
main body of the allies, they could hardly have kept<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
together, since more than twenty-one thousand men
exclusive of Foy’s troops were then absent from
their colours. And as late as the 12th of August
Soult warned the minister of war that he was
indeed preparing to assail his enemy again, but he
had not the means of resisting a counter-attack,
although he held a different language to his army<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_IV">Appendix, 4.</a></span>
and to the people of the country.</p>

<p>Had Cæsar halted because his soldiers were
fatigued, Pharsalia would have been but a common
battle.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179"></a>[179]</span><br></p>

<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XXII">BOOK XXII.</h2>
</div>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3>


<p class="noindent">After the combat of Echallar Soult adopted a permanent<span class="sidenote12">1813. August.</span>
position and reorganized his army. The left
wing under D’Erlon occupied the hills of Ainhoa,
with an advanced guard on the heights overlooking
Urdax and Zuguramurdi. The centre under Clauzel
was in advance of Sarre guarding the issues
from Vera and Echallar, his right resting on the
greatest of the Rhune mountains. The right wing
under Reille composed of Maucune’s and La Martinière’s<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
divisions extended along the Lower Bidassoa
to the sea; Villatte’s reserve was encamped behind
the Nivelle near Serres, and Reille’s third division,
under Foy, covered in conjunction with the national
guards, St. Jean Pied de Port and the roads leading
into France on that side. The cavalry for the convenience
of forage were quartered, one division
between the Nive and the Nivelle rivers, the other
as far back as Dax.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington occupied his old positions from
the pass of Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa,
but the disposition of his troops was different. Sir
Rowland Hill, reinforced by Morillo, held the Roncesvalles
and Alduides throwing up field-works at
the former. The third and sixth divisions were in
the Bastan guarding the Puerto de Maya, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180"></a>[180]</span>
seventh division, reinforced by O’Donnel’s army of
reserve, occupied the passes at Echallar and Zugaramurdi.
The light division was posted on the
Santa Barbara heights having picquets in the
town of Vera; their left rested on the Bidassoa,
their right on the Ivantelly rock, round which a
bridle communication with Echallar was now made
by the labour of the soldiers. Longa’s troops were
beyond the Bidassoa on the left of the light division;
the fourth division was in reserve behind him, near
Lesaca; the fourth Spanish army, now commanded
by general Freyre, prolonged the line from the left
of Longa to the sea; it crossed the royal causeway
occupied Irun and Fontarabia and guarded the
Jaizquibel mountain. The first division was in reserve
behind these Spaniards; the fifth division was
destined to resume the siege of San Sebastian; the
blockade of Pampeluna was maintained by Carlos
D’España’s troops.</p>

<p>This disposition, made with increased means, was
more powerful for defence than the former occupation
of the same ground. A strong corps under a
single command was well entrenched at Roncesvalles;
and in the Bastan two British divisions
admonished by Stewart’s error were more than
sufficient to defend the Puerto de Maya. The
Echallar mountains were with the aid of O’Donnel’s
Spaniards equally secure, and the reserve instead of
occupying San Estevan was posted near Lesaca in
support of the left, now become the most important
part of the line.</p>

<p>The castles of Zaragoza and Daroca had fallen,
the Empecinado was directed upon Alcanitz and he
maintained the communication between the Catalan
army, and Mina. The latter now joined by Duran<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181"></a>[181]</span>
was gathering near Jaca from whence his line of
retreat was by Sanguessa upon Pampeluna; in this
position he menaced general Paris, who marched
after a slight engagement on the 11th into France,
leaving eight hundred men in the town and castle.
At this time lord William Bentinck having crossed
the Ebro was investing Taragona, and thus the
allies, acting on the offensive, were in direct military
communication from the Mediteranean to the Bay
of Biscay, while Suchet though holding the fortresses
could only communicate with Soult through
France.</p>

<p>This last-named marshal, being strongly posted,
did not much expect a front attack, but the augmentation
of the allies on the side of Roncesvalles and
Maya gave him uneasiness, lest they should force
him to abandon his position by operating along the
Nive river. To meet this danger general Paris took
post at Oleron in second line to Foy, and the fortresses
of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navareins were
put in a state of defence as pivots of operation on
that side, while Bayonne served a like purpose on
the other flank of the army. But with great diligence
the French general fortified his line from the
mouth of the Bidassoa to the rocks of Mondarain
and the Nive.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington, whose reasons for not invading
France at this period have been already noticed, and
who had now little to fear from any renewal of the
French operations against his right wing, turned his
whole attention to the reduction of San Sebastian.
In this object he was however crossed in a manner
to prove that the English ministers were the very
counterparts of the Spanish and Portuguese statesmen.
Lord Melville was at the head of the board<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182"></a>[182]</span>
of admiralty; under his rule the navy of England
for the first time met with disasters in battle, and
his neglect of the general’s demands for maritime
aid went nigh to fasten the like misfortunes
upon the army. This neglect combined with the
cabinet scheme of employing lord Wellington in
Germany, would seem to prove that experience had
taught the English ministers nothing as to the nature
of the Peninsular war, or that elated with the array
of sovereigns against Napoleon they were now careless
of a cause so mixed up with democracy. Still
it would be incredible that lord Melville, a man of
ordinary capacity, should have been suffered to retard
the great designs and endanger the final success
of a general, whose sure judgement and extraordinary
merit were authenticated by exploits
unparalleled in English warfare, if lord Wellington’s
correspondence and that of Mr. Stuart did not
establish the following facts.</p>

<p>1º. Desertion from the enemy was stopped, chiefly
because the Admiralty, of which lord Melville was
the head, refused to let the ships of war carry
deserters or prisoners to England; they were thus
heaped up by hundreds at Lisbon and maltreated
by the Portuguese government, which checked all
desire in the French troops to come over.</p>

<p>2º. When the disputes with America commenced,
Mr. Stuart’s efforts to obtain flour for the army were
most vexatiously thwarted by the board of admiralty,
which permitted if it did not encourage the English
ships of war to capture American vessels trading
under the secret licenses.</p>

<p>3º. The refusal of the admiralty to establish certain
cruisers along the coast, as recommended by
lord Wellington, caused the loss of many store-ships<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183"></a>[183]</span>
and merchantmen, to the great detriment of the
army before it quitted Portugal. Fifteen were taken
off Oporto, and one close to the bar of Lisbon in
May. And afterwards, the Mediterranean packet<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_I">Appendix, No. 1.</a></span>
bearing despatches from lord William Bentinck
was captured, which led to lamentable consequences;
for the papers were not in cypher, and contained
detailed accounts of plots against the French in
Italy, with the names of the principal persons engaged.</p>

<p>4º. A like neglect of the coast of Spain caused
ships containing money, shoes, and other indispensable
stores to delay in port, or risk the being taken
on the passage by cruizers issuing from Santona,
Bayonne, and Bordeaux. And while the communications<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Despatches, MSS.</span>
of the allies were thus intercepted, the
French coasting vessels supplied their army and
fortresses without difficulty.</p>

<p>5º. After the battle of Vittoria lord Wellington
was forced to use French ammunition, though too
small for the English muskets, because the ordnance
store-ships which he had ordered from Lisbon to
Santander could not sail for want of convoy. When
the troops were in the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of
five thousand men was kept at Gibraltar and Lisbon
waiting for ships of war, and the transports employed
to convey them were thus withdrawn from
the service of carrying home wounded men, at a
time when the Spanish authorities at Bilbao refused
even for payment to concede public buildings for
hospitals.</p>

<p>6º. When snow was falling on the Pyrenees the
soldiers were without proper clothing, because the
ship containing their great coats, though ready to
sail in August, was detained at Oporto until November<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184"></a>[184]</span>
waiting for convoy. When the victories of
July were to be turned to profit ere the fitting
season for the siege of San Sebastian should pass
away, the attack of that fortress was retarded sixteen
days because a battering train and ammunition,
demanded several months before by lord Wellington,
had not yet arrived from England.</p>

<p>7º. During the siege the sea communication with
Bayonne was free. “Any thing in the shape of a
naval force,” said lord Wellington, “would drive
away sir George Collier’s squadron.” The garrison
received reinforcements artillery ammunition and
all necessary stores for its defence, sending away
the sick and wounded men in empty vessels. The
Spanish general blockading Santona complained at
the same time that the exertions of his troops were
useless, because the French succoured the place by
sea when they pleased; and after the battle of Vittoria
not less than five vessels laden with stores and
provisions, and one transport having British soldiers
and clothing on board, were taken by cruizers
issuing out of that port. The great advantage of
attacking San Sebastian by water as well as by
land was foregone for want of naval means, and
from the same cause British soldiers were withdrawn
from their own service to unload store-ships;
the gun-boats employed in the blockade were Spanish
vessels manned by Spanish soldiers withdrawn
from the army, and the store-boats were navigated
by Spanish women.</p>

<p>8º. The coasting trade between Bordeaux and
Bayonne being quite free, the French, whose military
means of transport had been so crippled by
their losses at Vittoria that they could scarcely have
collected magazines with land carriage only, received<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185"></a>[185]</span>
their supplies by water, and were thus saved trouble
and expense and the unpopularity attending forced
requisitions.</p>

<p>Between April and August, more than twenty
applications and remonstrances, were addressed by
lord Wellington to the government upon these points
without producing the slightest attention to his
demands. Mr. Croker, the under-secretary of the
Admiralty, of whose conduct he particularly complained,
was indeed permitted to write an offensive
official letter to him, but his demands and the dangers
to be apprehended from neglecting them were
disregarded, and to use his own words, “<i>since
Great Britain had been a naval power a British
army had never before been left in such a situation
at a most important moment</i>.”</p>

<p>Nor is it easy to determine whether negligence
and incapacity or a grovelling sense of national
honour prevailed most in the cabinet, when we
find this renowned general complaining that the
government, ignorant even to ridicule of military
operations, seemed to know nothing of the nature
of the element with which England was surrounded,
and lord Melville so insensible to the
glorious toils of the Peninsula as to tell him that
his army was the last thing to be attended to.</p>


<h4>RENEWED SIEGE OF SEBASTIAN.</h4>

<p>Villatte’s demonstration against Longa on the
28th of July had caused the ships laden with the
battering train to put to sea, but on the 5th of
August the guns were re-landed and the works
against the fortress resumed. On the 8th, a notion
having spread that the enemy was mining under
the cask redoubt, the engineers seized the occasion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186"></a>[186]</span>
to exercise their inexperienced miners by sinking a
shaft and driving a gallery. The men soon acquired
expertness, and as the water rose in the
shaft at twelve feet, the work was discontinued when
the gallery had attained eighty feet. Meanwhile
the old trenches were repaired, the heights of San
Bartolomeo were strengthened, and the convent of
Antigua, built on a rock to the left of those heights,
was fortified and armed with two guns to scour
the open beach and sweep the bay. The siege
however languished for want of ammunition;
and during this forced inactivity the garrison received
supplies and reinforcements by sea, their
damaged works were repaired, new defences constructed,
the magazines filled, and sixty-seven
pieces of artillery put in a condition to play. Eight
hundred and fifty men had been killed and wounded
since the commencement of the attack in July, but
as fresh men came by sea, more than two thousand
six hundred good soldiers were still present under
arms. And to show that their confidence was unabated
they celebrated the Emperor’s birthday by
crowning the castle with a splendid illumination;
encircling it with a fiery legend to his honour in
characters so large as to be distinctly read by the
besiegers.</p>

<p>On the 19th of August, that is to say after a
delay of sixteen days, the battering train arrived
from England, and in the night of the 22d fifteen
heavy pieces were placed in battery, eight at the
right attack and seven at the left. A second battering
train came on the 23d, augmenting the number
of pieces of various kinds to a hundred and
seventeen, including a large Spanish mortar; but
with characteristic negligence this enormous armament<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187"></a>[187]</span>
had been sent out from England with no more
shot and shells than would suffice for one day’s
consumption!</p>

<p>In the night of the 23d the batteries on the
Chofre sand-hills were reinforced with four long
pieces and four sixty-eight pound carronades, and
the left attack with six additional guns. Ninety
sappers and miners had come with the train from
England, the seamen under Mr. O’Reilly were again
attached to the batteries, and part of the field artillerymen
were brought to the siege.</p>

<p>On the 24th the attack was recommenced with
activity. The Chofre batteries were enlarged to
contain forty-eight pieces, and two batteries for
thirteen pieces were begun on the heights of Bartolomeo,
designed to breach at seven hundred yards
distance the faces of the left demi-bastion of the
horn-work, that of St. John on the main front, and
the end of the high curtain, for these works rising
in gradation one above another were in the same
line of shot. The approaches on the isthmus were
now also pushed forward by the sap, but the old
trenches were still imperfect, and before daylight
on the 25th the French coming from the horn-work
swept the left of the parallel, injured the sap,
and made some prisoners before they were repulsed.</p>

<p>On the night of the 25th the batteries were all
armed on both sides of the Urumea, and on the
26th fifty-seven pieces opened with a general salvo,
and continued to play with astounding noise and
rapidity until evening. The firing from the Chofre
hills destroyed the <span lang="fr">revêtement</span> of the demi-bastion
of St. John, and nearly ruined the towers near the
old breach together with the wall connecting them;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188"></a>[188]</span>
but at the isthmus, the batteries although they
injured the horn-work made little impression on the
main front from which they were too distant.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington, present at this attack and discontented
with the operation, now ordered a battery
for six guns to be constructed amongst some ruined
houses on the right of the parallel, only three hundred
yards from the main front, and two shafts were
sunk with a view to drive galleries for the protection
of this new battery against the enemy’s mines, but
the work was slow because of the sandy nature of
the soil.</p>

<p>At 3 o’clock in the morning of the 27th the boats
of the squadron, commanded by lieut. Arbuthnot of
the Surveillante and carrying a hundred soldiers of
the ninth regiment under captain Cameron, pulled
to attack the island of Santa Clara. A heavy fire
was opened on them, and the troops landed with
some difficulty, but the island was then easily taken
and a lodgement made with the loss of only twenty-eight
men and officers, of which eighteen were
seamen.</p>

<p>In the night of the 27th, about 3 o’clock, the
French sallied against the new battery on the isthmus,
but as colonel Cameron of the ninth regiment
met them on the very edge of the trenches with
the bayonet the attempt failed, yet it delayed the
arming of the battery. At day-break the renewed
fire of the besiegers, especially that from the Chofres
sand-hills, was extremely heavy, and the shrapnel
shells were supposed to be very destructive; nevertheless
the practice with that missile was very
uncertain, the bullets frequently flew amongst the
guards in the parallel and one struck the field-officer.
In the course of the day another sally was commenced,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189"></a>[189]</span>
but the enemy being discovered and fired upon did
not persist. The trenches were now furnished with
banquettes and parapets as fast as the quantity of
gabions and fascines would permit, yet the work
was slow, because the Spanish authorities of Guipuscoa,
like those in every other part of Spain,
neglected to provide carts to convey the materials
from the woods, and this hard labour was performed
by the Portuguese soldiers. It would seem however
an error not to have prepared all the materials of
this nature during the blockade.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington again visited the works this
day, and in the night the advanced battery, which,
at the desire of sir Richard Fletcher had been constructed
for only four guns, was armed. The 29th
it opened, but an accident had prevented the arrival
of one gun, and the fire of the enemy soon dismounted
another, so that only two instead of six
guns as lord Wellington had designed, smote at
short range the face of the demi-bastion of St. John
and the end of the high curtain; however the
general firing was severe both upon the castle and
the town-works and great damage was done to the
defences. By this time the French guns were nearly
silenced and as additional mortars were mounted on
the Chofre batteries, making in all sixty-three pieces
of which twenty-nine threw shells or spherical
case-shot, the superiority of the besiegers was
established.</p>

<p>The Urumea was now discovered to be fordable.
Captain Alexander Macdonald of the artillery, without
orders, waded across in the night passed close
under the works to the breach and returned safely.
Wherefore as a few minutes would suffice to bring
the enemy into the Chofre batteries, to save the guns<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190"></a>[190]</span>
from being spiked their vents were covered with
iron plates fastened by chains; and this was also
done at the advanced battery on the isthmus.</p>

<p>This day the materials and ordnance for a battery
of six pieces, to take the defences of the Monte
Orgullo in reverse, were sent to the island of Santa
Clara; and several guns in the Chofre batteries
were turned upon the retaining wall of the horn-work,
in the hope of shaking down any mines
the enemy might have prepared there, without
destroying the wall itself which offered cover for
the troops advancing to the assault.</p>

<p>The trenches leading from the parallel on the
isthmus were now very wide and good, the sap was
pushed on the right close to the demi-bastion of the
horn-work, and the sea-wall supporting the high
road into the town, which had increased the march
and cramped the formation of the columns in the
first assault, was broken through to give access to
the strand and shorten the approach to the breaches.
The crisis was at hand and in the night of the 29th
a false attack was ordered to make the enemy spring
his mines; a desperate service and bravely executed
by lieutenant Macadam of the ninth regiment. The
order was sudden, no volunteers were demanded, no
rewards offered, no means of excitement resorted
to; yet such is the inherent bravery of British
soldiers, that seventeen men of the royals, the
nearest at hand, immediately leaped forth ready and
willing to encounter what seemed certain death.
With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries playing
hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach
unperceived, and then mounted in extended order
shouting and firing; but the French were too steady
to be imposed upon and their musquetry laid the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191"></a>[191]</span>
whole party low with the exception of their commander,
who returned alone to the trenches.</p>

<p>On the 30th the sea-flank of the place being
opened from the half-bastion of St. John on the
right to the most distant of the old breaches, that is
to say, for five hundred feet, the batteries on the
Chofres were turned against the castle and other
defences of the Monte Orgullo, while the advanced
battery on the isthmus, now containing three guns,
demolished, in conjunction with the fire from the
Chofres, the face of the half-bastion of St. John’s
and the end of the high curtain above it. The
whole of that quarter was in ruins, and at the same
time the batteries on San Bartolomeo broke the face
of the demi-bastion of the horn-work and cut away
the palisades.</p>

<p>The 30th the batteries continued their fire, and
about three o’clock lord Wellington after examining
the enemy’s defence resolved to make a lodgement
on the breach, and in that view ordered the assault
to be made the next day at eleven o’clock when the
ebb of tide would leave full space between the horn-work
and the water.</p>

<p>The galleries in front of the advanced battery on
the isthmus were now pushed close up to the sea
wall, under which three mines were formed with
the double view of opening a short and easy way
for the troops to reach the strand, and rendering
useless any subterranean works the enemy might
have made in that part. At two o’clock in the
morning of the 31st they were sprung, and opened
three wide passages which were immediately connected,
and a traverse of gabions, six feet high, was
run across the mouth of the main trench on the
left, to screen the opening from the grape-shot of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192"></a>[192]</span>
the castle. Everything was now ready for the
assault, but before describing that terrible event it
will be fitting to shew the exact state of the besieged
in defence.</p>

<p>Sir Thomas Graham had been before the place
for fifty-two days, during thirty of which the attack
was suspended. All this time the garrison had
laboured incessantly, and though the heavy fire of
the besiegers since the 26th appeared to have ruined
the defences of the enormous breach in the sea
flank, it was not so. A perpendicular fall behind
of more than twenty feet barred progress, and
beyond that, amongst the ruins of the burned
houses, was a strong counter-wall fifteen feet high,
loopholed for musquetry, and extending in a parallel
direction with the breaches, which were also
cut off from the sound part of the rampart by traverses
at the extremities. The only really practicable
road into the town was by the narrow end
of the high curtain above the half bastion of St.
John.</p>

<p>In front of the counter-wall, about the middle
of the great breach, stood the tower of Los
Hornos still capable of some defence, and beneath
it a mine charged with twelve hundred
weight of powder. The streets were all trenched,
and furnished with traverses to dispute the passage
and to cover a retreat to the Monte Orgullo;
but before the assailants could reach the main breach
it was necessary either to form a lodgment in the
horn-work, or to pass as in the former assault under
a flanking fire of musquetry for a distance of nearly
two hundred yards. And the first step was close
under the sea-wall covering the salient angle of the
covered way, where two mines charged with eight<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193"></a>[193]</span>
hundred pounds of powder were prepared to overwhelm
the advancing columns.</p>

<p>To support this system of retrenchments and
mines the French had still some artillery in reserve.
One sixteen-pounder mounted at St. Elmo flanked
the left of the breaches on the river face; a twelve
and an eight-pounder preserved in the casemates of
the Cavalier were ready to flank the land face of
the half-bastion of St. John; many guns from the
Monte Orgullo especially those of the Mirador<span class="sidenote9">Belmas.</span>
could play upon the columns, and there was a four-pounder
hidden on the horn-work to be brought
into action when the assault commenced. Neither
the resolution of the governor nor the courage of
the garrison were abated, but the overwhelming fire
of the last few days had reduced the number of
fighting men; General Rey had only two hundred
and fifty men in reserve, and he demanded of Soult
whether his brave garrison should be exposed to
another assault. “The army would endeavour to
succour him” was the reply, and he abided his fate.</p>

<p>Napoleon’s ordinance, which forbade the surrender
of a fortress without having stood at least
one assault, has been strongly censured by English
writers upon slender grounds. The obstinate defences
made by French governors in the Peninsula
were the results, and to condemn an enemy’s system
from which we have ourselves suffered will scarcely
bring it into disrepute. But the argument runs,
that the besiegers working by the rules of art must
make a way into the place, and to risk an assault
for the sake of military glory or to augment the
loss of the enemy is to sacrifice brave men uselessly;
that capitulation always followed a certain advance
of the besiegers in Louis the Fourteenth’s time, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194"></a>[194]</span>
to suppose Napoleon’s upstart generals possessed
of superior courage or sense of military honour to
the high-minded nobility of that age was quite
inadmissible; and it has been rather whimsically
added that obedience to the emperor’s orders might
suit a predestinarian Turk but could not be tolerated
by a reflecting Christian. From this it would seem,
that certain nice distinctions as to the extent and
manner reconcile human slaughter with Christianity,
and that the true standard of military honour
was fixed by the intriguing, depraved and insolent
court of Louis the Fourteenth. It may however be
reasonably supposed, that as the achievements of
Napoleon’s soldiers far exceeded the exploits of
Louis’s cringing courtiers they possessed greater
military virtues.</p>

<p>But the whole argument seems to rest upon false
grounds. To inflict loss upon an enemy is the very
essence of war, and as the bravest men and officers
will always be foremost in an assault, the loss thus
occasioned may be of the utmost importance. To
resist when nothing can be gained or saved is an
act of barbarous courage which reason spurns at;
but how seldom does that crisis happen in war?
Napoleon wisely insisted upon a resistance which
should make it dangerous for the besiegers to hasten
a siege beyond the rules of art, he would not have
a weak governor yield to a simulation of force not
really existing; he desired that military honour
should rest upon the courage and resources of men
rather than upon the strength of walls: in fine he
made a practical application of the proverb that
necessity is the mother of invention.</p>

<p>Granted that a siege artfully conducted and with
sufficient means must reduce the fortress attacked;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195"></a>[195]</span>
still there will be some opportunity for a governor
to display his resources of mind. Vauban admits
of one assault and several retrenchments, after a
lodgment is made on the body of the place;
Napoleon only insisted that every effort which
courage and genius could dictate should be exhausted
before a surrender, and those efforts can
never be defined or bounded before-hand. Tarifa is
a happy example. To be consistent, any attack
which deviates from the rules of art must also be
denounced as barbarous; yet how seldom has a
general all the necessary means at his disposal.
In Spain not one siege could be conducted by the
British army according to the rules. And there is
a manifest weakness in praising the Spanish defence
of Zaragoza, and condemning Napoleon because
he demanded from regular troops a devotion similar
to that displayed by peasants and artizans. What
governor was ever in a more desperate situation
than general Bizanet at Bergen-op-Zoom, when sir
Thomas Graham, with a hardihood and daring
which would alone place him amongst the foremost
men of enterprize which Europe can boast of, threw
more than two thousand men upon the ramparts of
that almost impregnable fortress. The young soldiers
of the garrison frightened by a surprise in the
night, were dispersed, were flying. The assailants
had possession of the walls for several hours, yet
some cool and brave officers rallying the men towards
morning, charged up the narrow ramps and
drove the assailants over the parapets into the ditch.
They who could not at first defend their works were
now able to retake them, and so completely successful
and illustrative of Napoleon’s principle was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196"></a>[196]</span>
this counter-attack that the number of prisoners
equalled that of the garrison. There are no rules
to limit energy and genius, and no man knew better
than Napoleon how to call those qualities forth; he
possessed them himself in the utmost perfection
and created them in others.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197"></a>[197]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3>
</div>

<h4>STORMING OF SAN SEBASTIAN.</h4>


<p class="noindent">To assault the breaches without having destroyed<span class="sidenote9">1813. August.</span>
the enemy’s defences or established a lodgment on
the horn-work, was, notwithstanding the increased
fire and great facilities of the besiegers, obviously
a repetition of the former fatal error. And the same
generals who had before so indiscreetly made their
disapproval of such operations public, now even
more freely and imprudently dealt out censures,
which not ill-founded in themselves were most
ill-timed, since there is much danger when doubts
come down from the commanders to the soldiers.
Lord Wellington thought the fifth division had been
thus discouraged, and incensed at the cause, demanded
fifty volunteers from each of the fifteen
regiments composing the first, fourth, and light
divisions, “<i>men who could shew other troops how to
mount a breach</i>.” This was the phrase employed,
and seven hundred and fifty gallant soldiers instantly
marched to San Sebastian in answer to the appeal.
Colonel Cooke and major Robertson led the guards
and Germans of the first division, major Rose commanded
the men of the fourth division, and colonel
Hunt, a daring officer who had already won his
promotion at former assaults, was at the head of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198"></a>[198]</span>
fierce rugged veterans of the light division, yet
there were good officers and brave soldiers in the
fifth division.</p>

<p>It being at first supposed that lord Wellington
merely designed a simple lodgment on the great
breach, the volunteers and one brigade of the fifth
division only were ordered to be ready; but in a
council held at night major Smith maintained that
the orders were misunderstood, as no lodgment
could be formed unless the high curtain was gained.
General Oswald being called to the council was of
the same opinion, whereupon the remainder of the
fifth division was brought to the trenches, and general
Bradford having offered the services of his
Portuguese brigade, was told he might ford the
Urumea and assail the farthest breach if he judged
it advisable.</p>

<p>Sir James Leith had resumed the command of
the fifth division, and being assisted by general
Oswald directed the attack from the isthmus. He
was extremely offended by the arrival of the volunteers
and would not suffer them to lead the assault;
some he spread along the trenches to keep
down the fire of the horn-work, the remainder were
held as a reserve along with general Hay’s British
and Sprye’s Portuguese brigades of the fifth division.
To general Robinson’s brigade the assault
was confided. It was formed in two columns, one
to assault the old breach between the towers, the
other to storm the bastion of St. John and the end
of the high curtain. The small breach on the extreme
right was left for general Bradford’s Portuguese
who were drawn up on the Chofre hills;
some large boats filled with troops, were directed
to make a demonstration against the sea-line of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199"></a>[199]</span>
Monte Orgullo, and sir Thomas Graham overlooked
the whole operations from the right bank of the
river.</p>

<p>The morning of the 31st broke heavily, a thick fog
hid every object, and the besiegers’ batteries could
not open until eight o’clock. From that hour a
constant shower of heavy missiles was poured upon
the besieged until eleven, when Robinson’s brigade
getting out of the trenches passed through the
openings in the sea-wall and was launched bodily
against the breaches. While the head of the column
was still gathering on the strand, about thirty
yards from the salient angle of the horn-work,
twelve men, commanded by a serjeant whose heroic
death has not sufficed to preserve his name, running
violently forward leaped upon the covered way with
intent to cut the sausage of the enemy’s mines. The
French startled by this sudden assault fired the
train prematurely, and though the serjeant and his
brave followers were all destroyed and the high sea-wall
was thrown with a dreadful crash upon the
head of the advancing column, not more than forty
men were crushed by the ruins and the rush of the
troops was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope
had already passed beyond the play of the mine,
and now speeded along the strand amidst a shower
of grape and shells, the leader lieutenant Macguire
of the fourth regiment, conspicuous from his long<span class="sidenote">Memoirs of Captain Cooke.</span>
white plume his fine figure and his swiftness,
bounded far ahead of his men in all the pride of
youthful strength and courage, but at the foot of
the great breach he fell dead, and the stormers went
sweeping like a dark surge over his body; many
died however with him and the trickling of
wounded men to the rear was incessant.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200"></a>[200]</span></p>

<p>This time there was a broad strand left by the
retreating tide and the sun had dried the rocks,
yet they disturbed the order and closeness of the
formation, the distance to the main breach was
still nearly two hundred yards, and the French,
seeing the first mass of assailants pass the horn-work
regardless of its broken bastion, immediately
abandoned the front and crowding on the river face
of that work, poured their musketry into the flank
of the second column as it rushed along a few
yards below them; but the soldiers still running
forward towards the breach returned this fire without
slackening their speed. The batteries of the
Monte Orgullo and the St. Elmo now sent their
showers of shot and shells, the two pieces on the
cavalier swept the face of the breach in the bastion
of St. John, and the four-pounder in the horn-work
being suddenly mounted on the broken bastion
poured grape-shot into their rear.</p>

<p>Thus scourged with fire from all sides, the
stormers, their array broken alike by the shot and
by the rocks they passed over, reached their destinations,
and the head of the first column gained the
top of the great breach; but the unexpected gulf
below could only be passed at a few places where
meagre parcels of the burned houses were still attached
to the rampart, and the deadly clatter of the
French musquets from the loop-holed wall beyond
soon strewed the narrow crest of the ruins with
dead. In vain the following multitude covered the
ascent seeking an entrance at every part; to advance
was impossible and the mass of assailants,
slowly sinking downwards remained stubborn and
immoveable on the lower part of the breach. Here
they were covered from the musquetry in front, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201"></a>[201]</span>
from several isolated points, especially the tower of
Las Hornos under which the great mine was placed,
the French still smote them with small arms, and
the artillery from the Monte Orgullo poured shells
and grape without intermission.</p>

<p>Such was the state of affairs at the great breach,
and at the half bastion of St. John it was even
worse. The access to the top of the high curtain
being quite practicable, the efforts to force a way
were more persevering and constant, and the
slaughter was in proportion; for the traverse on the
flank, cutting it off from the cavalier, was defended
by French grenadiers who would not yield; the two
pieces on the cavalier itself swept along the front
face of the opening, and the four-pounder and the
musquetry from the horn-work, swept in like
manner along the river face. In the midst of this
destruction some sappers and a working party attached
to the assaulting columns endeavoured to
form a lodgement, but no artificial materials had
been provided, and most of the labourers were
killed before they could raise the loose rocky fragments
into a cover.</p>

<p>During this time the besiegers’ artillery kept up
a constant counter-fire which killed many of the
French, and the reserve brigades of the fifth division
were pushed on by degrees to feed the attack
until the left wing of the ninth regiment only remained
in the trenches. The volunteers also who
had been with difficulty restrained in the trenches,
“calling out to know, why they had been brought
there if they were not to lead the assault,” these
men, whose presence had given such offence to
general Leith that he would have kept them altogether
from the assault, being now let loose went like<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202"></a>[202]</span>
a whirlwind to the breaches, and again the crowded
masses swarmed up the face of the ruins, but
reaching the crest line they came down like a
falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to
mount, to totter, and to sink, the deadly French
fire was unabated, the smoke floated away, and the
crest of the breach bore no living man.</p>

<p>Sir Thomas Graham, standing on the nearest of
the Chofre batteries, beheld this frightful destruction
with a stern resolution to win at any cost; and
he was a man to have put himself at the head of
the last company and died sword in hand upon the
breach rather than sustain a second defeat, but
neither his confidence nor his resources were yet
exhausted. He directed an attempt to be made on
the horn-work, and turned all the Chofre batteries
and one on the Isthmus, that is to say the concentrated
fire of fifty heavy pieces upon the high curtain.
The shot ranged over the heads of the troops
who now were gathered at the foot of the breach,
and the stream of missiles thus poured along the
upper surface of the high curtain broke down the
traverses, and in its fearful course shattering all
things strewed the rampart with the mangled limbs
of the defenders. When this flight of bullets first<span class="sidenote">Manuscript Memoir by colonel Hunt.</span>
swept over the heads of the soldiers a cry arose,
from some inexperienced people, “to retire because
the batteries were firing on the stormers;” but the
veterans of the light division under Hunt being at
that point were not to be so disturbed, and in the
very heat and fury of the cannonade effected a solid
lodgement in some ruins of houses actually within
the rampart on the right of the great breach.</p>

<p>For half an hour this horrid tempest smote upon
the works and the houses behind, and then suddenly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203"></a>[203]</span>
ceasing the small clatter of the French musquets
shewed that the assailants were again in activity;
and at the same time the thirteenth Portuguese
regiment led by Major Snodgrass and followed by
a detachment of the twenty-fourth under colonel
Macbean entered the river from the Chofres. The
ford was deep the water rose above the waist, and
when the soldiers reached the middle of the stream
which was two hundred yards wide, a heavy gun
struck on the head of the column with a shower of
grape; the havoc was fearful but the survivors
closed and moved on. A second discharge from the
same piece tore the ranks from front to rear, still
the regiment moved on, and amidst a confused fire
of musquetry from the ramparts, and of artillery
from St. Elmo, from the castle, and from the Mirador,
landed on the left bank and rushed against
the third breach. Macbean’s men who had followed
with equal bravery then reinforced the great
breach, about eighty yards to the left of the other
although the line of ruins seemed to extend the
whole way. The fighting now became fierce and
obstinate again at all the breaches, but the French
musquetry still rolled with deadly effect, the heaps of
slain increased, and once more the great mass of
stormers sunk to the foot of the ruins unable to win;
the living sheltered themselves as they could, but
the dead and wounded lay so thickly that hardly
could it be judged whether the hurt or unhurt were
most numerous.</p>

<p>It was now evident that the assault must fail
unless some accident intervened, for the tide was
rising, the reserves all engaged, and no greater
effort could be expected from men whose courage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204"></a>[204]</span>
had been already pushed to the verge of madness.
In this crisis fortune interfered. A number of powder
barrels, live shells, and combustible materials which
the French had accumulated behind the traverses
for their defence caught fire, a bright consuming
flame wrapped the whole of the high curtain, a succession
of loud explosions were heard, hundreds of
the French grenadiers were destroyed, the rest were
thrown into confusion, and while the ramparts were
still involved with suffocating eddies of smoke the
British soldiers broke in at the first traverse. The
defenders bewildered by this terrible disaster yielded
for a moment, yet soon rallied, and a close desperate
struggle took place along the summit of the high
curtain, but the fury of the stormers whose numbers
increased every moment could not be stemmed.
The French colours on the cavalier were torn away
by lieutenant Gethin of the eleventh regiment. The
horn-work and the land front below the curtain, and
the loop-holed wall behind the great breach were
all abandoned; the light division soldiers who had
already established themselves in the ruins on the
French left, immediately penetrated to the streets,
and at the same moment the Portuguese at the small
breach, mixed with British who had wandered to that
point seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side.</p>

<p>Five hours the dreadful battle had lasted at the
walls and now the stream of war went pouring into
the town. The undaunted governor still disputed
the victory for a short time with the aid of his barricades,
but several hundreds of his men being cut
off and taken in the horn-work, his garrison was so
reduced that even to effect a retreat behind the line
of defences which separated the town from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205"></a>[205]</span>
Monte Orgullo was difficult. Many of his troops
flying from the horn-work along the harbour flank
of the town broke through a body of the British
who had reached the vicinity of the fortified convent
of Santa Téresa before them, and this post was
the only one retained by the French in the town. It
was thought by some distinguished officers engaged
in the action that Monte Orgullo might have been
carried on this day, if a commander of sufficient rank
to direct the troops had been at hand; but whether
from wounds or accident no general entered the
place until long after the breach had been won, the
commanders of battalions were embarrassed for
want of orders, and a thunder-storm, which came
down from the mountains with unbounded fury immediately
after the place was carried, added to the
confusion of the fight.</p>

<p>This storm seemed to be the signal of hell for the
perpetration of villainy which would have shamed
the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At
Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been
the principal object; at Badajos lust and murder
were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San
Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting cruelty was
added to the catalogue of crimes. One atrocity of
which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers
the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable
barbarity. Some order was at first maintained, but
the resolution of the troops to throw off discipline
was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer
was pursued with a volley of small arms and escaped
with difficulty from men who mistook him for the
provost-martial of the fifth division; a Portuguese
adjutant, who endeavoured to prevent some atrocity,
was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206"></a>[206]</span>
violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately
by a number of English soldiers. Many officers
exerted themselves to preserve order, many men were
well conducted, but the rapine and violence commenced
by villains soon spread, the camp-followers
crowded into the place, and the disorder continued
until the flames following the steps of the plunderer
put an end to his ferocity by destroying the
whole town.</p>

<p>Three generals, Leith, Oswald, and Robinson, had
been hurt in the trenches, sir Richard Fletcher the
chief engineer, a brave man who had served his
country honorably was killed, and colonel Burgoyne
the next in command of that arm was wounded.</p>

<p>The carnage at the breaches was appalling. The
volunteers, although brought late into the action, had
nearly half their number struck down, most of the
regiments of the fifth division suffered in the same
proportion, and the whole loss since the renewal of
the siege exceeded two thousand five hundred men
and officers.</p>

<p>The town being thus taken, the Monte Orgullo
was to be attacked, but it was very steep and difficult
to assail. The castle served as a citadel and
just below it four batteries connected with masonry
stretched across the face of the hill. From the
Mirador and Queen’s batteries at the extremities of
this line, ramps, protected by redans, led to the convent
of Santa Teresa which was the most salient
part of the defence. On the side of Santa Clara
and behind the mountain were some sea batteries,
and if all these works had been of good construction,
the troops fresh and well supplied, the siege would
have been long and difficult; but the garrison was
shattered by the recent assault, most of the engineers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207"></a>[207]</span>
and leaders killed, the governor and many others
wounded, five hundred men were sick or hurt, the
soldiers fit for duty did not exceed thirteen hundred,
and they had four hundred prisoners to guard. The
castle was small, the bomb-proofs scarcely sufficed
to protect the ammunition and provisions, and only
ten guns remained in a condition for service, three
of which were on the sea line. There was very
little water and the troops were forced to lie out on
the naked rock exposed to the fire of the besiegers,
or only covered by the asperities of ground. General
Rey and his brave garrison were however still resolute
to fight, and they received nightly by sea supplies
of ammunition though in small quantities.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington arrived the day after the assault.<span class="sidenote9">September.</span>
Regular approaches could not be carried up the
steep naked rock, he doubted the power of vertical
fire, and ordered batteries to be formed on the captured
works of the town, intending to breach the
enemy’s remaining lines of defence and then storm
the Orgullo. And as the convent of Santa Teresa
would enable the French to sally by the rampart on
the left of the allies’ position in the town, he composed
his first line with a few troops strongly barricaded,
placing a supporting body in the market-place,
and strong reserves on the high curtain and
flank ramparts. Meanwhile from the convent, which
being actually in the town might have been easily
taken at first, the enemy killed many of the besiegers,
and when after several days it was assaulted, they
set the lower parts on fire and retired by a communication
made from the roof to a ramp on the hill
behind. All this time the flames were destroying
the town, and the Orgullo was overwhelmed with
shells shot upward from the besiegers’ batteries.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208"></a>[208]</span></p>

<p>On the 3d of September, the governor being summoned
to surrender demanded terms inadmissible, his
resolution was not to be shaken, and the vertical fire
was therefore continued day and night, though the
British prisoners suffered as well as the enemy; for
the officer commanding in the castle, irritated by<span class="sidenote12">Jones’ Sieges.</span>
the misery of the garrison cruelly refused to let the
unfortunate captives make trenches to cover themselves.
The French on the other hand complain<span class="sidenote12">Bellas’ Sieges.</span>
that their wounded and sick men, although placed
in an empty magazine with a black flag flying, were
fired upon by the besiegers, although the English
prisoners in their red uniforms were placed around
it to strengthen the claim of humanity.</p>

<p>The new breaching batteries were now commenced,
one for three pieces on the isthmus, the other for
seventeen pieces on the land front of the horn-work.
These guns were brought from the Chofres at low
water across the Urumea, at first in the night, but
the difficulty of labouring in the water during darkness
induced the artillery officers to transport the
remainder in daylight, and within reach of the
enemy’s batteries, which did not fire a shot. In the
town the besiegers’ labours were impeded by the
flaming houses, but near the foot of the hill the
ruins furnished shelter for the musqueteers employed
to gall the garrison, and the guns on the
island of Santa Clara being reinforced were actively
worked by the seamen. The besieged replied but
little, their ammunition was scarce and the horrible
vertical fire subdued their energy. In this manner
the action was prolonged until the 8th of September
when fifty-nine heavy battering pieces opened at once
from the island the isthmus the horn-work and the
Chofres. In two hours both the Mirador and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209"></a>[209]</span>
Queen’s battery were broken, the fire of the besieged
was entirely extinguished, and the summit and face
of the hill torn and furrowed in a frightful manner;
the bread-ovens were destroyed, a magazine exploded,
and the castle, small and crowded with men,
was overlaid with the descending shells. Then the
governor proudly bending to his fate surrendered.
On the 9th this brave man and his heroic garrison,
reduced to one-third of their original number and
leaving five hundred wounded behind them in the
hospital, marched out with the honours of war.
The Spanish flag was hoisted under a salute of
twenty-one guns, and the siege terminated after
sixty-three days open trenches, precisely when the
tempestuous season, beginning to vex the coast,
would have rendered a continuance of the sea blockade
impossible.</p>


<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4>

<p>1º. San Sebastian a third-rate fortress and in bad
condition when first invested, resisted a besieging
army, possessing an enormous battering train, for
sixty-three days. This is to be attributed partly to
the errors of the besiegers, principally to obstructions
extraneous to the military operations. Amongst
the last are to be reckoned the misconduct of the
Admiralty, and the negligence of the government
relative to the battering train and supply of ammunition;
the latter retarded the second siege for
sixteen days; the former enabled the garrison to
keep up and even increase its means as the siege
proceeded.</p>

<p>Next, in order and importance, was the failure of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210"></a>[210]</span>
the Spanish authorities, who neglected to supply
carts and boats from the country, and even refused
the use of their public buildings for hospitals. Thus
between the sea and the shore, receiving aid from
neither, lord Wellington had to conduct an operation
of war which more than any other depends for
success upon labour and provident care. It was
probably the first time that an important siege was
maintained by women’s exertions; the stores of the
besiegers were landed from boats rowed by Spanish
girls!</p>

<p>Another impediment was Soult’s advance towards
Pampeluna, but the positive effect of this
was slight since the want of ammunition would have
equally delayed the attack. The true measure of
the English government’s negligence is thus obtained.
It was more mischievous than the operations
of sixty thousand men under a great general.</p>

<p>2º. The errors of execution having been before
touched upon need no further illustration. The
greatest difference between the first and second part
of the siege preceding the assaults, was that in the
latter, the approaches near the isthmus being carried
further on and openings made in the sea-wall, the
troops more easily and rapidly extricated themselves
from the trenches, the distance to the breach was
shortened, and the French fire bearing on the fronts
of attack was somewhat less powerful. These advantages
were considerable, but not proportionate
to the enormous increase of the besiegers’ means;
and it is quite clear from the terrible effects of the
cannonade during the assault, that the whole of the
defences might have been ruined, even those of the
castle, if this overwhelming fire had in compliance
with the rules of art been first employed to silence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211"></a>[211]</span>
the enemy’s fire. A lodgement in the horn-work
could then have been made with little difficulty,
and the breach attacked without much danger.</p>

<p>3º. As the faults leading to failure in the first
part of the siege were repeated in the second,
while the enemy’s resources had increased by the
gain of time, and because his intercourse with
France by sea never was cut off, it follows that
there was no reasonable security for success; not
even to make a lodgement on the breach, since no
artificial materials were prepared and the workmen
failed to effect that object. But the first arrangement
and the change adopted in the council of war,
the option given to general Bradford, the remarkable
fact, that the simultaneous attack on the horn-work
was only thought of when the first efforts against
the breach had failed, all prove, that the enemy’s
defensive means were underrated, and the extent of
the success exceeded the preparations to obtain it.</p>

<p>The place was won by accident. For first the
explosion of the great mine under the tower of Los
Hornos, was only prevented by a happy shot which
cut the sausage of the train during the fight, and
this was followed by the ignition of the French
powder-barrels and shells along the high curtain,
which alone opened the way into the town. Sir
Thomas Graham’s firmness and perseverance in the
assault, and the judicious usage of his artillery
against the high curtain during the action, an operation
however which only belonged to daylight,
were no mean helps to the victory. It was on such
sudden occasions that his prompt genius shone conspicuously,
yet it was nothing wonderful that heavy
guns at short distances, the range being perfectly
known, should strike with certainty along a line of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212"></a>[212]</span>
rampart more than twenty-seven feet above the
heads of the troops. Such practice was to be expected
from British artillery, and Graham’s genius
was more evinced by the promptness of the thought
and the trust he put in the valour of his soldiers.
It was far more extraordinary that the stormers did not
relinquish their attack when thus exposed to their own
guns, for it is a mistake to say that no mischief occurred;
a serjeant of the ninth regiment was killed
by the batteries close to his commanding officer, and
it is probable that other casualties also had place.</p>

<p>4º. The explosion on the ramparts is generally
supposed to have been caused by the cannonade from
the Chofre batteries, yet a cool and careful observer,
whose account I have adopted, because he was a<span class="sidenote">Captain Cooke, forty-third regiment. Vide his Memoirs.</span>
spectator in perfect safety and undisturbed by
having to give or receive orders, affirms that the
cannonade ceased before colonel Snodgrass forded
the river, whereas the great explosion did not happen
until half an hour after that event. By some persons
that intrepid exploit of the Portuguese was thought
one of the principal causes of success, and it appears
certain that an entrance was made at the small
breach by several soldiers, British and Portuguese,
many of the former having wandered from the great
breach and got mixed with the latter, before the explosion
happened on the high curtain. Whether
those men would have been followed by greater
numbers is doubtful, but the lodgement made by
the light division volunteers within the great breach
was solid and could have been maintained. The
French call the Portuguese attack a feint. Sir<span class="sidenote9">Bellas.</span>
Thomas Graham certainly did not found much
upon it. He gave general Bradford the option to
attack or remain tranquil, and colonel M‘Bean<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213"></a>[213]</span>
actually received counter-orders when his column
was already in the river and too far advanced to be
withdrawn.</p>

<p>5º. When the destruction of San Sebastian became
known, it was used by the anti-British party at
Cadiz to excite the people against England. The
political chief of Guipuscoa publicly accused sir
Thomas Graham, “that he sacked and burned
the place because it had formerly traded entirely
with France,” his generals were said to have excited
the furious soldiers to the horrid work, and his inferior
officers to have boasted of it afterwards. A
newspaper, edited by an agent of the Spanish
government, repeating these accusations, called upon
the people to avenge the injury upon the British
army, and the Spanish minister of war, designated
by lord Wellington as the abettor and even the
writer of this and other malignant libels published
at Cadiz, officially demanded explanations.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington addressed a letter of indignant
denial and remonstrance to sir Henry Wellesley.
“It was absurd,” he said, “to suppose the officers
of the army would have risked the loss of all their
labours and gallantry, by encouraging the dispersion
of the men while the enemy still held the castle.
To him the town was of the utmost value as a secure
place for magazines and hospitals. He had refused
to bombard it when advised to do so, as he had previously
refused to bombard Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos,
because the injury would fall on the inhabitants
and not upon the enemy; yet nothing could have
been more easy, or less suspicious than this method
of destroying the town if he had been so minded.
It was the enemy who set fire to the houses, it was
part of the defence; the British officers strove to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214"></a>[214]</span>
extinguish the flames, some in doing so lost their
lives by the French musquetry from the castle, and
the difficulty of communicating and working through
the fire was so great, that he had been on the point
of withdrawing the troops altogether. He admitted
the plunder, observing, that he knew not whether
that or the libels made him most angry; he had
taken measures to stop it, but when two-thirds of
the officers had been killed or wounded in the action,
and when many of the inhabitants taking part with
the enemy fired upon the troops, to prevent it was
impossible. Moreover he was for several days unable
from other circumstances to send fresh men to
replace the stormers.”</p>

<p>This was a solid reply to the scandalous libels
circulated, but the broad facts remained. San
Sebastian was a heap of smoking ruins, and atrocities
degrading to human nature had been perpetrated
by the troops. Of these crimes, the municipal and
ecclesiastic bodies the consuls and principal persons
of San Sebastian, afterwards published a detailed
statement, solemnly affirming the truth of each case;
and if Spanish declarations on this occasion are not
to be heeded, four-fifths of the excesses attributed
to the French armies must be effaced as resting on
a like foundation. That the town was first set on
fire behind the breaches during the operations, and
that it spread in the tumult following the assault
is undoubted; yet it is not improbable that plunderers,
to forward their own views increased it, and
certainly the great destruction did not befall until
long after the town was in possession of the allies.
I have been assured by a surgeon, that he was
lodged the third day after the assault at a house
well furnished, and in a street then untouched by fire<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215"></a>[215]</span>
or plunderers, but house and street were afterwards
plundered and burned. The inhabitants could only
have fired upon the allies the first day, and it might
well have been in self-defence for they were barbarously
treated. The abhorrent case alluded to was
notorious, so were many others. I have myself heard
around the picquet fires, when soldiers as every
experienced officer knows, speak without reserve of
their past deeds and feelings, the abominable actions
mentioned by the municipality related with
little variation long before that narrative was published;
told however with sorrow for the sufferers
and indignation against the perpetrators, for these
last were not so numerous as might be supposed
from the extent of the calamities they inflicted.</p>

<p>It is a common but shallow and mischievous
notion, that a villain makes never the worse soldier
for an assault, because the appetite for plunder supplies
the place of honour; as if the compatability of
vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and
courage unnecessary in warlike matters. In all the
host which stormed San Sebastian there was not a
man who being sane would for plunder only have
encountered the danger of that assault, yet under
the spell of discipline all rushed eagerly to meet it.
Discipline however has its root in patriotism, or how
could armed men be controuled at all, and it would
be wise and far from difficult to graft moderation
and humanity upon such a noble stock. The modern
soldier is not necessarily the stern bloody-handed
man the ancient soldier was, there is as much difference
between them as between the sportsman and
the butcher; the ancient warrior, fighting with the
sword and reaping his harvest of death when the
enemy was in flight, became habituated to the act<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216"></a>[216]</span>
of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his
bayonet, sees not his peculiar victim fall, and exults
not over mangled limbs as proofs of personal
prowess. Hence preserving his original feelings,
his natural abhorrence of murder and crimes of
violence, he differs not from other men unless often
engaged in the assault of towns, where rapacity,
lust, and inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of
discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said
that no soldier can be restrained after storming a
town, and a British soldier least of all, because he
is brutish and insensible to honor! Shame on such
calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as
no other soldier ever fights? His pay! Soldiers of all
nations receive pay. At the period of this assault,
a serjeant of the twenty-eighth regiment, named<span class="sidenote">Colonel Cadell’s Memoirs.</span>
Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from
Roncesvalles, to make purchases for his officers.
He placed the money he was entrusted with, two
thousand dollars, in the hands of a commissary and
having secured a receipt persuaded his party to
join in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the
money, made his purchases, and returned to his
regiment. And these are the men, these the spirits
who are called too brutish to work upon except by
fear. It is precisely fear to which they are most
insensible.</p>

<p>Undoubtedly if soldiers hear and read, that it is
impossible to restrain their violence they will not
be restrained. But let the plunder of a town after
an assault, be expressly made criminal by the articles
of war, with a due punishment attached; let it
be constantly impressed upon the troops that such
conduct is as much opposed to military honour and
discipline as it is to morality; let a select permanent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217"></a>[217]</span>
body of men receiving higher pay form a part
of the army, and be charged to follow storming
columns to aid in preserving order, and with power
to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be
necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary
valour should keep pace with chastisement for crimes
committed under such temptation, it would be fitting
that money, apportioned to the danger and importance
of the service, should be insured to the successful
troops and always paid without delay. This
money might be taken as ransom from enemies, but
if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor, government
should furnish the amount. With such regulations
the storming of towns would not produce
more military disorders than the gaining of battles
in the field.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218"></a>[218]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_III">CHAPTER III.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">While San Sebastian was being stormed Soult<span class="sidenote9">1813. August.</span>
fought a battle with the covering force, not willingly
nor with much hope of success, but he was averse
to let San Sebastian fall without another effort, and
thought a bold demeanour would best hide his real
weakness. Guided however by the progress of the
siege, which he knew perfectly through his sea
communication, he awaited the last moment of
action, striving meanwhile to improve his resources
and to revive the confidence of the army and of the
people. Of his dispersed soldiers eight thousand
had rejoined their regiments by the 12th of August,
and he was promised a reinforcement of thirty thousand
conscripts; these last were however yet to be
enrolled, and neither the progress of the siege, nor
the general panic along the frontier which recurred
with increased violence after the late battles, would
suffer him to remain inactive.</p>

<p>He was in no manner deceived as to his enemy’s
superior strength of position number and military
confidence; but his former efforts on the side of
Pampeluna had interrupted the attack of San Sebastian,
and another offensive movement would necessarily
produce a like effect; wherefore he hoped
by repeating the disturbance, as long as a free intercourse
by sea enabled him to reinforce and supply<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219"></a>[219]</span>
the garrison, to render the siege a wasting operation
for the allies. To renew the movement against
Pampeluna was most advantageous, but it required
fifty thousand infantry for the attack, and twenty
thousand as a corps of observation on the Lower
Bidassoa, and he had not such numbers to dispose
of. The subsistence of his troops also was uncertain,
because the loss of all the military carriages
at Vittoria was still felt, and the resources of the
country were reluctantly yielded by the people. To
act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port was therefore
impracticable. And to attack the allies’ centre, at
Vera, Echallar, and the Bastan, was unpromising,
seeing that two mountain-chains were to be forced
before the movement could seriously affect lord
Wellington: moreover, the ways being impracticable
for artillery, success if such should befall,
would lead to no decisive result. It only remained
to attack the left of the allies by the great road of
Irun.</p>

<p>Against that quarter Soult could bring more than
forty thousand infantry, but the positions were of
perilous strength. The Upper Bidassoa was in
Wellington’s power, because the light division,
occupying Vera and the heights of Santa Barbara
on the right bank, covered all the bridges; but the
Lower Bidassoa flowing from Vera with a bend to
the left separated the hostile armies, and against
this front about nine miles wide Soult’s operations
were necessarily directed. On his right, that is to
say, from the broken bridge of Behobia in front of
Irun to the sea, the river, broad and tidal, offered
no apparent facility for a passage; and between
the fords of Biriatu and those of Vera, a distance of
three miles, there was only the one passage of Andarlassa<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220"></a>[220]</span>
about two miles below Vera; along this
space also the banks of the river, steep craggy
mountain ridges without roads, forbade any great
operations. Thus the points of attack were restricted
to Vera and the fords between Biriatu and
the broken bridge of Behobia.</p>

<p>To raise the siege it was only necessary to force<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span>
a way to Oyarzun, a small town about seven or
eight miles beyond the Bidassoa, from thence the
assailants could march at once upon Passages and
upon the Urumea. To gain Oyarzun was therefore
the object of the French marshal’s combinations.
The royal road led directly to it by the broad valley
which separates the Peña de Haya from the Jaizquibel
mountain. The latter was on the sea-coast,
but the Peña de Haya, commonly called the four-crowned
mountain, filled with its dependent ridges
all the space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun and Oyarzun.
Its staring head bound with a rocky diadem
was impassable, but from the bridges of Vera and
Lesaca, several roads, one of them not absolutely
impracticable for guns, passed over its enormous
flanks to Irun at one side and to Oyarzun on the
other, falling into the royal road at both places.
Soult’s first design was to unite Clauzel’s and
D’Erlon’s troops, drive the light division from the
heights of Santa Barbara, and then using the bridges
of Lesaca and Vera force a passage over the Peña
de Haya on the left of its summit, and push the
heads of columns towards Oyarzun and the Upper
Urumea; meanwhile Reille and Villatte, passing the
Bidassoa at Biriatu, were to fight their way also
to Oyarzun by the royal road. He foresaw that<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
Wellington might during this time collect his right
wing and seek to envelope the French army, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221"></a>[221]</span>
march upon Bayonne; but he thought the general
state of his affairs required bold measures, and the
progress of the besiegers at San Sebastian soon
drove him into action.</p>

<p>On the 29th Foy, marching by the road of Lohoussoa,
crossed the Nive at Cambo and reached
Espelette, leaving behind him six hundred men, and
the national guards who were very numerous, with
orders to watch the roads and valleys leading upon
St. Jean Pied de Port. If pressed by superior
forces, this corps of observation was to fall back
upon that fortress, and it was supported with a
brigade of light cavalry stationed at St. Palais.</p>

<p>In the night two of D’Erlon’s divisions were
secretly drawn from Ainhoa, Foy continued his
march through Espelette, by the bridges of Amotz
and Serres to San Jean de Luz, from whence the
reserve moved forward, and thus in the morning of
the 30th two strong French columns of attack were
assembled on the Lower Bidassoa.</p>

<p>The first, under Clauzel, consisted of four divisions,
furnishing twenty thousand men with twenty
pieces of artillery. It was concentrated in the woods
behind the Commissary and Bayonette mountains,
above Vera.</p>

<p>The second, commanded by general Reille, was
composed of two divisions and Villatte’s reserve
in all eighteen thousand men; but Foy’s division
and some light cavalry were in rear ready to
augment this column to about twenty-five thousand,
and there were thirty-six pieces of artillery
and two bridge equipages collected behind the
camp of Urogne on the royal road.</p>

<p>Reille’s troops were secreted, partly behind the
Croix des Bouquets mountain, partly behind that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222"></a>[222]</span>
of Louis XIV. and the lower ridges of the Mandale
near Biriatu. Meanwhile D’Erlon, having Conroux’s
and Abbé’s divisions and twenty pieces of
artillery under his command, held the camps in
advance of Sarre and Ainhoa. If the allies in his
front marched to reinforce their own left on the
crowned mountain, he was to vex and retard their
movements, always however avoiding a serious
engagement, and feeling to his right to secure his
connection with Clauzel’s column; that is to say,
he was with Abbé’s division, moving from Ainhoa,
to menace the allies towards Zagaramurdi and the
Puerto de Echallar; and with Conroux’s division,
then in front of Sarre, to menace the light division,
to seize the rock of Ivantelly if it was abandoned,
and be ready to join Clauzel if occasion offered.
On the other hand, should the allies assemble a
large force and operate offensively by the Nive and
Nivelle rivers, D’Erlon, without losing his connection
with the main army, was to concentrate on
the slopes descending from the Rhune mountains
towards San Pé. Finally, if the attack on the Lower
Bidassoa succeeded, he was to join Clauzel, either
by Vera, or by the heights of Echallar and the
bridge of Lesaca. Soult also desired to support
D’Erlon with the two divisions of heavy cavalry,
but forage could only be obtained for the artillery
horses, two regiments of light horsemen, six
chosen troops of dragoons and two or three hundred
<span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span>, which were all assembled on the royal
road behind Reille’s column.</p>

<p>It was the French marshal’s intention to attack at
daybreak on the 30th, but his preparations being
incomplete he deferred it until the 31st, and took
rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence passing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223"></a>[223]</span>
over to the allies’ camps. Nevertheless Wellington’s
emissaries advised him of the movements in
the night of the 29th, the augmentation of troops
in front of Irun was observed in the morning of
the 30th, and in the evening the bridge equipage
and the artillery were descried on the royal road
beyond the Bidassoa. Thus warned he prepared
for battle with little anxiety. For the brigade of
English foot-guards, left at Oporto when the campaign
commenced, was now come up; most of the
marauders and men wounded at Vittoria had rejoined;
and three regiments just arrived from England
formed a new brigade under lord Aylmer,
making the total augmentation of British troops in
this quarter little less than five thousand men.</p>

<p>The extreme left was on the Jaizquibel. This<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span>
narrow mountain ridge, seventeen hundred feet
high, runs along the coast, abutting at one end
upon the Passages harbour and at the other upon
the navigable mouth of the Bidassoa. Offering no
mark for an attack it was only guarded by a
flanking detachment of Spaniards, and at its foot
the small fort of Figueras commanding the
entrance of the river was garrisoned by seamen
from the naval squadron. Fuenterabia a walled
place, also at its base, was occupied, and the low
ground between that town and Irun defended by a
chain of eight large field redoubts, which connected
the position of Jaizquibel with the heights
covering the royal road to Oyarzun.</p>

<p>On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the
burned bridge of Behobia, there was a sudden
bend in the river, the concave towards the French,
and their positions commanded the passage of the
fords below; but opposed to them was the exceedingly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224"></a>[224]</span>
stiff and lofty ridge, called San Marcial, terminating
one of the great flanks of the Pena de
Haya. The water flowed round the left of this
ridge, confining the road leading from the bridge
of Behobia to Irun, a distance of one mile, to the
narrow space between its channel and the foot
of the height, and Irun itself, strongly occupied
and defended by a field-work, blocked this way.
It followed that the French, after forcing the passage
of the river, must of necessity win San Marcial
before their army could use the great road.</p>

<p>About six thousand men of the fourth Spanish
army now under general Freyre, were established
on the crest of San Marcial, which was strengthened
by abbattis and temporary field-works.</p>

<p>Behind Irun the first British division, under
general Howard, was posted, and lord Aylmer’s
brigade was pushed somewhat in advance of Howard’s
right to support the left of the Spaniards.</p>

<p>The right of San Marcial falling back from the
river was, although distinct as a position, connected
with the Pena de Haya, and in some degree exposed
to an enemy passing the river above Biriatu,
wherefore Longa’s Spaniards were drawn off from
those slopes of the Pena de Haya which descended
towards Vera, to be posted on those descending towards
Biriatu. In this situation he protected and
supported the right of San Marcial.</p>

<p>Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus directly
opposed to the progress of the enemy, and the fourth
division quartered near Lesaca was still disposable.
From this body a Portuguese brigade had been
detached, to replace Longa on the heights opposite
Vera, and to cover the roads leading from the
bridge and fords of that place over the flanks of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225"></a>[225]</span>
the Pena de Haya. Meanwhile the British brigades
of the division were stationed up the mountain,
close under the foundry of San Antonio and
commanding the intersection of the roads coming
from Vera and Lesaca; thus furnishing a reserve to
the Portuguese brigade to Longa and to Freyre, they
tied the whole together. The Portuguese brigade
was however somewhat exposed, and too weak to
guard the enormous slopes on which it was placed,
wherefore Wellington drew general Inglis’s brigade
of the seventh division from Echallar to reinforce it,
and even then the flanks of the Pena de Haya were
so rough and vast that the troops seemed sprinkled
here and there with little coherence. The English
general aware that his positions were too extensive
had commenced the construction of several large
redoubts on commanding points of the mountain,
and had traced out a second fortified camp on a
strong range of heights, which immediately in
front of Oyarzun connected the Haya with the
Jaizquibel, but these works were unfinished.</p>

<p>During the night of the 30th Soult garnished
with artillery all the points commanding the fords
of Biriatu, the descent to the broken bridge and
the banks below it, called the Bas de Behobia.
This was partly to cover the passage of the fords
and the formation of his bridges, partly to stop
gun-boats coming up to molest the troops in crossing,
and in this view also he spread Casa Palacio’s<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
brigade of Joseph’s Spanish guards along the river
as far down as Andaya, fronting Fuenterabia.</p>

<p>General Reille, commanding La Martiniere’s, Maucune’s,
and Villatte’s divisions, directed the attack.
His orders were to storm the camp of San Marcial,
and leaving there a strong reserve to keep in check<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226"></a>[226]</span>
any reinforcement coming from the side of Vera
or descending from the Pena de Haya, to drive the
allies with the remainder of his force from ridge to
ridge, until he gained that flank of the great mountain
which descends upon Oyarzun. The royal
road being thus opened, Foy’s division with the<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span>
cavalry and artillery in one column, was to cross
by bridges to be laid during the attack on San
Marcial. And it was Soult’s intention under any
circumstances to retain this last-named ridge, and
to fortify it as a bridge-head with a view to subsequent
operations.</p>

<p>To aid Reille’s progress and to provide for the
concentration of the whole army at Oyarzun, Clauzel
was directed to make a simultaneous attack from
Vera, not as at first designed by driving the allies
from Santa Barbara and seizing the bridges, but
leaving one division and his guns on the ridges
above Vera to keep the light division in check,
to cross the river by two fords just below the town
of Vera with the rest of his troops, and assail that
slope of the Pena de Haya where the Portuguese
brigade and the troops under general Inglis were
posted. Then forcing his way upwards to the forge
of San Antonio, which commanded the intersection
of the roads leading round the head of the mountain,
he could aid Reille directly by falling on
the rear of San Marcial, or meet him at Oyarzun
by turning the rocky summit of the Pena de
Haya.</p>

<p><i>Combat of San Marcial.</i> At daylight on the<span class="sidenote7">August.</span>
31st, Reille, under protection of the French guns,
forded the river above Biriatu with two divisions
and two pieces of artillery. He quickly seized a detached
ridge of inferior height just under San Marcial,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227"></a>[227]</span>
and leaving there one brigade as a reserve detached
another to attack the Spanish left by a slope
which descended in that quarter to the river.
Meanwhile with La Martiniere’s division he assailed
their right. But the side of the mountain was
covered with brushwood and remarkably steep, the<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
French troops being ill-managed preserved no
order, the supports and the skirmishers mixing in
one mass got into confusion, and when two-thirds
of the height were gained the Spaniards charged
in columns and drove the assailants headlong
down.</p>

<p>During this action two bridges were thrown,
partly on trestles partly on boats, below the fords,
and the head of Villatte’s reserve crossing ascended
the ridge and renewed the fight more vigorously;
one brigade even reached the chapel of San
Marcial and the left of the Spanish line was
shaken, but the eighty-fifth regiment belonging to
lord Aylmer’s brigade advanced a little way to
support it, and at that moment lord Wellington
rode up with his staff. Then the Spaniards who
cared so little for their own officers, with that noble
instinct which never abandons the poor people of
any country acknowledged real greatness without
reference to nation, and shouting aloud dashed
their adversaries down with so much violence that
many were driven into the river, and some of the
French pontoon boats coming to their succour were
overloaded and sunk. It was several hours before
the broken and confused masses could be rallied
and the bridges, which had been broken up to
let the boats save the drowning men, repaired.
When this was effected, Soult who overlooked the
action from the summit of the mountain Louis XIV.,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228"></a>[228]</span>
sent the remainder of Villatte’s reserve over the
river, and calling up Foy’s division prepared a more
formidable and better arranged attack; and he
expected greater success, inasmuch as the operation
from the side of Vera, of which it is time to
treat, was now making considerable progress up the
Pena de Haya on the allies’ right.</p>

<p><i>Combat of Vera.</i> General Clauzel had descended
the Bayonette and Commissari mountains immediately
after day-break, under cover of a thick fog,
but at seven o’clock the weather cleared, and three
divisions formed in heavy columns were seen, by
the troops on Santa Barbara, making for the fords
below Vera in the direction of two hamlets called
the Salinas and the Bario de Lesaca. A fourth
division and the guns remained stationary on the
slopes of the mountain, and the artillery opened
now and then upon the little town of Vera, from
which the picquets of the light division were
recalled with exception of one post in a fortified
house commanding the bridge.</p>

<p>About eight o’clock the enemy’s columns began
to pass the fords covered by the fire of their artillery,
but the first shells thrown fell into the midst of
their own ranks and the British troops on Santa
Barbara cheered the French battery with a derisive
shout. Their march was however sure, and a battalion
of chosen light troops, without knapsacks,
quickly commenced the battle on the left bank<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Correspondence, MSS.</span>
of the river, with the Portuguese brigade, and by
their extreme activity and rapid fire forced the
latter to retire up the slopes of the mountain.
General Inglis then reinforced the line of skirmishers<span class="sidenote">Manuscript Memoir by general Inglis.</span>
and the whole of his brigade was soon afterwards
engaged, but Clauzel menaced his left flank from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229"></a>[229]</span>
the lower ford, and the French troops still forced
their way upwards in front without a check,
until the whole mass disappeared fighting amidst
the asperities of the Pena de la Haya. Inglis lost
two hundred and seventy men and twenty-two
officers, but he finally halted on a ridge commanding
the intersection of the roads leading from Vera
and Lesaca to Irun and Oyarzun. That is to say
somewhat below the foundry of Antonio, where
the fourth division, having now recovered its Portuguese
brigade, was, in conjunction with Longa’s
Spaniards, so placed as to support and protect
equally the left of Inglis and the right of Freyre
on San Marcial.</p>

<p>These operations, from the great height and
asperity of the mountain, occupied many hours,
and it was past two o’clock before even the head of
Clauzel’s columns reached this point. Meanwhile
as the French troops left in front of Santa Barbara
made no movement, and lord Wellington had before
directed the light division to aid general Inglis, a
wing of the forty-third and three companies of the
riflemen from general Kempt’s brigade, with three
weak Spanish battalions drawn from O’Donnel’s
Andalusians at Echallar, crossed the Bidassoa by
the Lesaca bridge, and marched towards some lower
slopes on the right of Inglis where they covered
another knot of minor communications coming from
Lesaca and Vera. They were followed by the
remainder of Kempt’s brigade which occupied
Lesaca itself, and thus the chain of connection and
defence between Santa Barbara and the positions of
the fourth division on the Pena de la Haya was
completed.</p>

<p>Clauzel seeing these movements, and thinking<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230"></a>[230]</span>
the allies at Echallar and Santa Barbara were<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
only awaiting the proper moment to take him in
flank and rear, by the bridges of Vera and Lesaca,
if he engaged further up the mountain, now abated
his battle and sent notice of his situation and
views to Soult. This opinion was well-founded;
lord Wellington was not a general to let half his
army be paralyzed by D’Erlon’s divisions. On the
30th, when he observed Soult’s first preparations in
front of San Marcial, he had ordered attacks to be
made upon D’Erlon from the Puerto of Echallar
Zagaramurdi and Maya; general Hill was also
directed to shew the heads of columns towards
St. Jean Pied de Port. And on the 31st when the
force and direction of Clauzel’s columns were known,
he ordered lord Dalhousie to bring the remainder
of the seventh division by Lesaca to aid Inglis.</p>

<p>Following these orders Giron, who commanded
the Spaniards O’Donnel being sick, slightly skirmished
on the 30th with Conroux’s advanced posts
in front of Sarre, and on the 31st at day-break the
whole of the French line was assailed. That is to
say, Giron again fought with Conroux, feebly as
before, but two Portuguese brigades of the sixth
and seventh divisions, directed by lord Dalhousie
and general Colville from the passes of Zagaramurdi
and Maya, drove the French from their camp
behind Urdax and burned it. Abbé who commanded
there being thus pressed, collected his
whole force in front of Ainhoa on an entrenched
position, and making strong battle repulsed the
allies with some loss of men by the sixth division.
Thus five combats were fought in one day at
different points of the general line, and D’Erlon,
who had lost three or four hundred men, seeing a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231"></a>[231]</span>
fresh column coming from Maya as if to turn his
left, judged that a great movement against Bayonne
was in progress and sent notice to Soult. He was
mistaken. Lord Wellington being entirely on the
defensive, only sought by these demonstrations to
disturb the plan of attack, and the seventh division,
following the second order sent to lord Dalhousie,
marched towards Lesaca; but the fighting at Urdax
having lasted until mid-day the movement was not
completed that evening.</p>

<p>D’Erlon’s despatch reached Soult at the same
time that Clauzel’s report arrived. All his arrangements
for a final attack on San Marcial were then
completed, but these reports and the ominous cannonade
at San Sebastian, plainly heard during the
morning, induced him to abandon this object and
hold his army ready for a general battle on the
Nivelle. In this view he sent Foy’s division which
had not yet crossed the Bidassoa to the heights of
Serres, behind the Nivelle, as a support to D’Erlon,
and caused six chosen troops of dragoons to march
upon San Pé higher up on that river. Clauzel received
orders to arrest his attack and repass the Bidassoa
in the night. He was to leave Maransin’s
division upon the Bayonette mountain and the Col
de Bera, and with the other three divisions to march
by Ascain and join Foy on the heights of Serres.</p>

<p>Notwithstanding these movements Soult kept
Reille’s troops beyond the Bidassoa, and the battle
went on sharply, for the Spaniards continually
detached men from the ridge, endeavouring to drive
the French from the lower positions into the river,
until about four o’clock when their hardihood
abating they desired to be relieved; but Wellington
careful of their glory seeing the French attacks<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232"></a>[232]</span>
were exhausted and thinking it a good opportunity
to fix the military spirit of his allies, refused to
relieve or to aid them; yet it would not be just to
measure their valour by this fact. The English
general blushed while he called upon them to fight,
knowing that they had been previously famished by
their vile government, and that there were no hospitals
to receive no care for them when wounded.
The battle was however arrested by a tempest
which commencing in the mountains about three
o’clock, raged for several hours with wonderful
violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees
and whirled through the air like feathers on the
howling winds, while the thinnest streams swelling
into torrents dashed down the mountains, rolling
innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter.
Amidst this turmoil and under cover of night the
French re-crossed the river, and the head-quarters
were fixed at St. Jean de Luz.</p>

<p>Clauzel’s retreat was more unhappy. Having
received the order to retire early in the evening
when the storm had already put an end to all fighting,
he repassed the fords in person and before dark
at the head of two brigades, ordering general Vandermaesen
to follow with the remainder of his divisions.
It would appear that he expected no difficulty, since
he did not take possession of the bridge of Vera
nor of the fortified house covering it; and apparently
ignorant of the state of his own troops on the<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
other bank of the river occupied himself with suggesting
new projects displeasing to Soult. Meanwhile
Vandermaesen’s situation became critical.
Many of his soldiers attempting to cross were
drowned by the rising waters, and finally, unable
to effect a passage at the fords, that general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233"></a>[233]</span>
marched up the stream to seize the bridge of Vera.
His advanced guard surprising a corporal’s
picquet rushed over, but was driven back by
a rifle company posted in the fortified house.
This happened about three o’clock in the morning
and the riflemen defended the passage until daylight
when a second company and some Portuguese
Caçadores came to their aid. But the French
reserve left at Vera seeing how matters stood
opened a fire of guns against the fortified house
from a high rock just above the town, and their
skirmishers approached it on the right bank while
Vandermaesen plied his musquetry from the left
bank. The two rifle captains and many men fell
under this cross fire, and the passage was forced,
but Vandermaesen urging the attack in person was
killed, and more than two hundred of his soldiers
were hurt.</p>

<p>Soult now learning from D’Erlon that all offensive<span class="sidenote9">September</span>
movements on the side of Maya had ceased at
twelve o’clock on the 31st, contemplated another
attack on San Marcial, but in the course of the day
general Rey’s report of the assault on San Sebastian<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
reached him, and at the same time he heard that
general Hill was in movement on the side of St.
Jean Pied de Port. This state of affairs brought
reflection. San Sebastian was lost, a fresh attempt
to carry off the wasted garrison from the castle
would cost five or six thousand good soldiers, and
the safety of the whole army would be endangered
by pushing headlong amongst the terrible asperities
of the crowned mountain. For Wellington could
throw his right wing and centre, forming a mass of
at least thirty-five thousand men, upon the French
left during the action, and he would be nearer to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234"></a>[234]</span>
Bayonne than the French right when once the
battle was engaged beyond the Lower Bidassoa.
The army had lost in the recent actions three
thousand six hundred men. General Vandermaesen
had been killed, and four others, La Martiniere,
Menne, Remond, and Guy, wounded, the first
mortally; all the superior officers agreed that a
fresh attempt would be most dangerous, and serious
losses might draw on an immediate invasion of
France before the necessary defensive measures
were completed.</p>

<p>Yielding to these reasons he resolved to recover
his former positions and thenceforward remain
entirely on the defensive, for which his vast knowledge
of war, his foresight, his talent for methodical
arrangement and his firmness of character,
peculiarly fitted him. Twelve battles or combats
fought in seven weeks, bore testimony that he had
strived hard to regain the offensive for the French
army, and willing still to strive if it might be so, he
had called upon Suchet to aid him and demanded
fresh orders from the emperor; but Suchet helped
him not, and Napoleon’s answer indicated at once his
own difficulties and his reliance upon the duke of
Dalmatia’s capacity and fidelity.</p>

<p>“<i>I have given you my confidence and can add
neither to your means nor to your instructions.</i>”</p>

<p>The loss of the allies was one thousand Anglo-Portuguese,
and sixteen hundred Spaniards. Wherefore
the cost of men on this day, including the
storming of San Sebastian, exceeded five thousand,
but the battle in no manner disturbed the siege.
The French army was powerless against such strong
positions. Soult had brought forty-five thousand
men to bear in two columns upon a square of less<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235"></a>[235]</span>
than five miles, and the thirty thousand French
actually engaged, were repulsed by ten thousand,
for that number only of the allies fought.</p>

<p>But the battle was a half measure and ill-judged on
Soult’s part. Lord Wellington’s experience of French
warfare, his determined character, coolness and
thorough acquaintance with the principles of his
art, left no hope that he would suffer two-thirds of
his army to be kept in check by D’Erlon’s two divisions;
and accordingly, the moment D’Erlon was
menaced Soult stopped his own attack to make a
counter-movement and deliver a decisive battle on
favourable ground. Perhaps his secret hope was
to draw his opponent to such a conclusion, but if so,
the combat of San Marcial was too dear a price to
pay for the chance.</p>

<p>A general who had made up his mind to force a
way to San Sebastian, would have organized his
rear so that no serious embarrassment could arise
from any partial incursions towards Bayonne; he
would have concentrated his whole army, and have
calculated his attack so as to be felt at San Sebastian
before his adversary’s counter-movement could
be felt towards Bayonne. In this view D’Erlon’s
two divisions should have come in the night of
the 30th to Vera, which without weakening the
reserve opposed to the light division would have
augmented Clauzel’s force by ten thousand men;
and on the most important line, because San Marcial
offered no front for the action of great numbers,
and the secret of mountain warfare is, by surprise or
the power of overwhelming numbers, to seize such
commanding points as shall force an enemy either
to abandon his strong position, or become the assailant
to recover those he has thus lost. Now the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236"></a>[236]</span>
difficulty of defending the crowned mountain was
evinced by the rapid manner in which Clauzel at once
gained the ridges as far as the foundry of San Antonio;
with ten thousand additional men he might
have gained a commanding position on the rear and
left flank of San Marcial, and forced the allies to
abandon it. That lord Wellington thought himself
weak on the Haya mountain is proved by his calling
up the seventh division from Echallar, and by his
orders to the light division.</p>

<p>Soult’s object was to raise the siege, but his plan
involved the risk of having thirty-five thousand of
the allies interposed during his attack between
him and Bayonne, clearly a more decisive operation
than the raising of the siege, therefore the
enterprise may be pronounced injudicious. He admitted
indeed, that excited to the enterprise, partly<span class="sidenote">Correspondence with the minister of war, MSS.</span>
by insinuations, whether from the minister of war or
his own lieutenants does not appear, partly by a
generous repugnance to abandon the brave garrison,
he was too precipitate, acting contrary to his judgment;
but he was probably tempted by the hope of
obtaining at least the camp of San Marcial as a
bridge-head, and thus securing a favourable point for
after combinations.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington having resolved not to invade
France at this time, was unprepared for so great an
operation as throwing his right and centre upon
Soult’s left; and it is obvious also that on the
30th he expected only a partial attack at San
Marcial. The order he first gave to assail D’Erlon’s
position, and then the counter-order for the seventh
division to come to Lesaca, prove this, because the
latter was issued after Clauzel’s numbers and the
direction of his attack were ascertained. The efforts<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237"></a>[237]</span>
of two Portuguese brigades against D’Erlon sufficed
therefore to render null the duke of Dalmatia’s great
combinations, and his extreme sensitiveness to their
operations marks the vice of his own. Here it may
be observed, that the movement of the forty-third the
rifle companies and the Spaniards, to secure the
right flank of Inglis, was ill-arranged. Dispatched
by different roads without knowing precisely the
point they were to concentrate at, each fell in with
the enemy at different places; the Spaniards got
under fire and were forced to alter their route; the
forty-third companies stumbling on a French division
had to fall back half a mile; it was only by thus
feeling the enemy at different points that the destined
position was at last found, and a disaster was
scarcely prevented by the fury of the tempest. Nevertheless
those detachments were finally well placed
to have struck a blow the next morning, because
their post was only half an hour’s march from the
high ground behind Vandermaesen’s column when
he forced the bridge at Vera, and the firing would
have served as a guide. The remainder of Kempt’s
brigade could also have moved upon the same point
from Lesaca. It is however very difficult to seize
such occasions in mountain warfare where so little
can be seen of the general state of affairs.</p>

<p>A more obvious advantage was neglected by general
Skerrit. The defence of the bridge at Vera by a
single company of rifles lasted more than an hour,
and four brigades of the enemy, crossing in a tumultuous
manner, could not have cleared the narrow
passage after it was won in a moment. Lord Wellington’s
despatch erroneously describes the French
as passing under the fire of great part of general
Skerrit’s brigade, whereas that officer remained in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238"></a>[238]</span>
order of battle on the lower slopes of Santa Barbara,
half a mile distant, and allowed the enemy to
escape. It is true that a large mass of French
troops were on the counter slopes of the Bayonette
mountain, beyond Vera, but the seventh division,
being then close to San Barbara, would have prevented
any serious disaster if the blow had failed.
A great opportunity was certainly lost, but war in
rough mountains is generally a series of errors.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239"></a>[239]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">Soult, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of<span class="sidenote9">1813. September.</span>
an attack along the Nive, that his uneasy movements
made the allies think he was again preparing for
offensive operations. This double misunderstanding
did not however last long, and each army resumed
its former position.</p>

<p>The fall of San Sebastian had given lord Wellington
a new port and point of support, had
increased the value of Passages as a depôt, and let
loose a considerable body of troops for field operations;
the armistice in Germany was at an end,
Austria had joined the allies, and it seemed therefore
certain that he would immediately invade France.
The English cabinet had promised the continental
sovereigns that it should be so when the French
were expelled from Spain, meaning Navarre and
Guipuscoa; and the newspaper editors were, as
usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries
by their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions.
Meanwhile the partizans of the Bourbons
were secretly endeavouring to form a conspiracy in
the south, and the duke of Berri desired to join the
British army, pretending that twenty thousand
Frenchmen were already armed and organized at
the head of which he would place himself. In fine
all was exultation and extravagance. But lord<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240"></a>[240]</span>
Wellington, well understanding the inflated nature
of such hopes and promises, while affecting to
rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the
opportunity to check similar folly in higher places,
by observing, “<i>that if he had done all that was expected
he should have been before that period in the
moon</i>.”</p>

<p>With respect to the duke of Berri’s views, it was
for the sovereigns he said to decide whether the
restoration of the Bourbons should form part of their
policy, but as yet no fixed line of conduct on that or
any other political points was declared. It was for
their interest to get rid of Napoleon, and there could
be no question of the advantage or propriety of
accepting the aid of a Bourbon party without
pledging themselves to dethrone the emperor. The
Bourbons might indeed decline, in default of such
a pledge, to involve their partizans in rebellion, and
he advised them to do so, because Napoleon’s power
rested internally upon the most extensive and expensive
system of corruption ever established in any
country, externally upon his military force which
was supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions;
once confined to the limits of France he
would be unable to bear the double expense of his
government and army, the reduction of either would
be fatal to him, and the object of the Bourbons would
thus be obtained without risk. But, if they did not
concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of
Europe must declare they would dethrone Napoleon
before the duke of Berri should be allowed to join
the army; and the British government must make
up its mind upon the question.</p>

<p>This reasoning put an end to the project, because
neither the English cabinet nor the allied sovereigns<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241"></a>[241]</span>
were ready to adopt a decisive open line of policy.
The ministers exulting at the progress of aristocratic
domination, had no thought save that of wasting
England’s substance by extravagant subsidies
and supplies, taken without gratitude by the continental
powers who held themselves no-ways bound
thereby to uphold the common cause, which each
secretly designed to make available for peculiar
interests. Moreover they all still trembled before
the conqueror and none would pledge themselves to
a decided policy. Lord Wellington alone moved
with a firm composure, the result of profound and
well-understood calculations; yet his mind, naturally
so dispassionate, was strangely clouded at this time
by personal hatred of Napoleon.</p>

<p>Where is the proof, or even probability, of that
great man’s system of government being internally
dependent upon “<i>the most extensive corruption ever
established in any country</i>”?</p>

<p>The annual expenditure of France was scarcely
half that of England, and Napoleon rejected public
loans which are the very life-blood of state corruption.
He left no debt. Under him no man devoured
the public substance in idleness merely
because he was of a privileged class; the state
servants were largely paid but they were made to
labour effectually for the state. They did not eat
their bread and sleep. His system of public accounts,
remarkable for its exactness simplicity and
comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public
fraud, and therefore extremely unfavourable to
corruption. Napoleon’s power was supported in
France by that deep sense of his goodness as a
sovereign, and that admiration for his genius which
pervaded the poorer and middle classes of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242"></a>[242]</span>
people; by the love which they bore towards him,
and still bear for his memory because he cherished
the principles of a just equality. They loved him
also for his incessant activity in the public service,
his freedom from all private vices, and because
his public works, wondrous for their number their
utility and grandeur, never stood still; under him
the poor man never wanted work. To France he
gave noble institutions, a comparatively just code
of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the
Romans. His <cite lang="fr">Cadastre</cite>, more extensive and perfect
than the Doomsday Book, that monument of the
wisdom and greatness of our Norman Conqueror,
was alone sufficient to endear him to the nation.
Rapidly advancing under his vigorous superintendence,
it registered and taught every man the true
value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities
public or private. It was designed and most
ably adapted to fix and secure titles to property, to
prevent frauds, to abate litigation, to apportion the
weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the
insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the
revenue, and to secure the sacred freedom of the
poor man’s home. The French <cite lang="fr">Cadastre</cite>, although
not original, would from its comprehensiveness,
have been when completed the greatest boon ever
conferred upon a civilized nation by a statesman.</p>

<p>To say that the emperor was supported by his
soldiers, is to say that he was supported by the
people; because the law of conscription, that
mighty staff on which France leaned when all
Europe attempted to push her down, the conscription,
without which she could never have sustained
the dreadful war of antagonist principles entailed
upon her by the revolution; that energetic law,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243"></a>[243]</span>
which he did not establish but which he freed from
abuse, and rendered great, national, and endurable
by causing it to strike equally on all classes, the
conscription made the soldiers the real representatives
of the people. The troops idolized Napoleon,
well they might, and to assert that their attachment
commenced only when they became soldiers, is to
acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness
of mind turned hatred into devotion the moment
he was approached. But Napoleon never
was hated by the people of France; he was their
own creation and they loved him so as never monarch
was loved before. His march from Cannes
to Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of
poor men, who were not soldiers, can never be
effaced or even disfigured. For six weeks, at any
moment, a single assassin might by a single shot
have acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide, and
obtained vast rewards besides from the trembling
monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who scrupled
not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many
there were base enough to undertake but none so
hardy as to execute the crime, and Napoleon,
guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed
to a throne from whence it required a million of
foreign bayonets to drive him again. From the
throne they drove him, but not from the thoughts
and hearts of men.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington having shaken off the weight
of the continental policy, proceeded to consider the
question of invading France simply as a military
operation, which might conduce to or militate
against the security of the Peninsula while Napoleon’s
power was weakened by the war in Germany;
and such was his inflexible probity of character,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244"></a>[244]</span>
that no secret ambitious promptings, no facility
of gaining personal reputation, diverted him
from this object, all the renown of which he already
enjoyed, the embarrassments mortifications and difficulties,
enormous, although to the surface-seeing
public there appeared none, alone remaining.</p>

<p>The rupture of the congress of Prague, Austria’s
accession to the coalition, and the fall of San Sebastian
were favourable circumstances; but he
relied not much on the military skill of the banded
sovereigns, and a great defeat might at any moment
dissolve their alliance. Napoleon could then reinforce
Soult and drive the allies back upon Spain,
where the French still possessed the fortresses of
Santona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon,
Fraga, Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich,
Barcelona, Tortoza, Morella, Peniscola,
Saguntum and Denia. Meanwhile lord William
Bentinck, misled by false information, had committed
a serious error in sending Del Parque’s army
to Tudela, because the Ordal disaster and subsequent
retreat shewed that Suchet was strong
enough, if it so pleased him, to drive the Anglo-Sicilian
army back even to the Xucar and recover
all his strong places. In fine the affairs of Catalonia
were in the same unsatisfactory state they
had been in from the first. It was not even certain
that a British army would remain there at all, for
lord William assured of Murat’s defection was intent
upon invading Italy; and the ministers seemed
to have leaned towards the project, since Wellington
now seriously desired to know whether the Anglo-Sicilians
were to go or stay in Spain.</p>

<p>Lord William himself had quitted that army,
making the seventh change in fifteen months;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245"></a>[245]</span>
this alone was sufficient to account for its misfortunes,
and the Spanish generals, who had been
placed under the English commander, ridiculed the
latter’s ill success and spoke vauntingly of themselves.
Strenuously did lord Wellington urge the
appointment of some commander for the Anglo-Sicilian
troops who would devote his whole attention
to his business, observing that at no period of
the war would he have quitted his own army even
for a few days without danger to its interests. But
the English minister’s ignorance of every thing relating
to war was profound, and at this time he
was himself being stript of generals. Graham,
Picton, Leith, lord Dalhousie, H. Clinton, and
Skerrit, had gone or were going to England on
account of ill health wounds or private business;
and marshal Beresford was at Lisbon, where dangerous
intrigues to be noticed hereafter menaced
the existence of the Portuguese army. Castaños
and Giron had been removed by the Spanish regency
from their commands, and O’Donnel, described
as an able officer but of the most impracticable
temper, being denied the chief command of
Elio’s, Copons’, and Del Parque’s troops, quitted<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Dispatches, MSS.</span>
the army under pretext that his old wounds had
broken out; whereupon, Giron was placed at the
head of the Andalusians. The operations in Catalonia
were however so important, that lord Wellington
thought of going there himself; and he
would have done so, if the after misfortunes of Napoleon
in Germany, had not rendered it impossible
for that monarch to reinforce his troops on the
Spanish frontier.</p>

<p>These general reasons for desiring to operate on
the side of Catalonia were strengthened also by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246"></a>[246]</span>
consideration, that the country, immediately beyond
the Bidassoa, being sterile, the difficulty of feeding
the army in winter would be increased; and the
twenty-five thousand half-starved Spaniards in his
army, would certainly plunder for subsistence and
incense the people of France. Moreover Soult’s
actual position was strong, his troops still numerous,
and his entrenched camp furnished a
secure retreat. Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de
Port were so placed that no serious invasion could
be made until one or both were taken, or blockaded,
which, during the tempestuous season and while
the admiralty refused to furnish sufficient naval
means, was scarcely possible; even to get at those
fortresses would be a work of time difficult against
Soult alone, impracticable if Suchet, as he well
might, came to the other’s support. Towards Catalonia
therefore lord Wellington desired to turn
when the frontier of the western Pyrenees should
be secured by the fall of Pampeluna. Yet he
thought it not amiss meanwhile to yield something
to the allied sovereigns, and give a spur to public
feeling by occupying a menacing position within
the French territory. A simple thing this seemed
but the English general made no slight concession
when he thus bent his military judgment to political
considerations.</p>

<p>The French position was the base of a triangle
of which Bayonne was the apex, and the great
roads leading from thence to Irun and St. Jean
Pied de Port, were the sides. A rugged mass of
mountains intervened between the left and centre,
but nearly all the valleys and communications,
coming from Spain beyond the Nive, centred at
St. Jean Pied de Port and were embraced by an entrenched<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247"></a>[247]</span>
camp which Foy occupied in front of that
fortress. That general could, without calling upon
Paris who was at Oleron, bring fifteen thousand
men including the national guards into action, and
serious dispositions were necessary to dislodge him;
but these could not be made secretly, and Soult calculated
upon having time to aid him and deliver a
general battle on chosen ground. Meanwhile Foy
barred any movement along the right bank of the
Nive, and he could, either by the great road leading
to Bayonne or by shorter communications through
Bidaray, reach the bridge of Cambo on the Nive and
so gain Espelette behind the camps of Ainhoa.
From thence, passing the Nivelle by the bridges at
Amotz and Serres he could reach St. Jean de Luz,
and it was by this route he moved to aid in the
attack of San Marcial. However, the allies marching
from the Alduides and the Bastan could also penetrate
by St. Martin D’Arosa and the Gorospil
mountain to Bidaray, that is to say, between Foy’s
and D’Erlon’s positions. Yet the roads were very
difficult, and as the French sent out <ins class="corr" id="tn-247" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'frequent scouring'">
frequent scouting</ins> detachments and the bridge of Cambo was
secured by works, Foy could not be easily cut off
from the rest of the army.</p>

<p>D’Erlon’s advanced camps were near Urdax, and
on the Mondarain and Choupera mountains, but his
main position was a broad ridge behind Ainhoa, the<span class="sidenote7">Plans 5 and 6.</span>
right covering the bridge of Amotz. Beyond that
bridge Clauzel’s position extended along a range of
strong hills, trending towards Ascain and Serres,
and as the Nivelle swept with a curve quite round
his rear his right flank rested on that river also.
The redoubts of San Barbe and the camp of Sarre,
barring the roads leading from Vera and the Puerto<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248"></a>[248]</span>
de Echallar, were in advance of his left, and the
greater Rhune, whose bare rocky head lifted two
thousand eight hundred feet above the sea level
overtopped all the neighbouring mountains, formed,
in conjunction with its dependants the Commissary
and Bayonette, a mask for his right.</p>

<p>From the Bayonette the French position run along
the summit of the Mandale or Sulcogain mountain,
on a single line, but from thence to the sea the
ridges suddenly abated and there were two lines of
defence; the first along the Bidassoa, the second
commencing near St. Jean de Luz stretched from
the heights of Bordegain towards Ascain, having
the camps of Urogne and the Sans Culottes in
advance. Reille’s divisions guarded these lines, and
the second was connected with Clauzel’s position
by Villatte’s reserve which was posted at Ascain.
Finally the whole system of defence was tied to
that of St. Jean Pied de Port, by the double
bridge-head at Cambo which secured the junction
of Foy with the rest of the army.</p>

<p>The French worked diligently on their entrenchments,
yet they were but little advanced when the
castle of San Sebastian surrendered, and Wellington
had even then matured a plan of attack as
daring as any undertaken during the whole war.
This was to seize the great Rhune mountain and its
dependents, and at the same time to force the passage
of the Lower Bidassoa and establish his left
wing in the French territory. He would thus bring
the Rhune Commissary and Bayonette mountains,
forming a salient menacing point of great altitude
and strength towards the French centre, within his
own system, and shorten his communications by
gaining the command of the road running along<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249"></a>[249]</span>
the river from Irun to Vera. Thus also he would
obtain the port of Fuentarabia, which, though bad
in winter, was some advantage to a general whose
supplies came from the ocean, and who with scanty
means of land-transport had to encounter the perverse
negligence and even opposition of the Spanish
authorities. Moreover Passages, his nearest port,
was restricted in its anchorage-ground, hard to
make from the sea and dangerous when full of
vessels.</p>

<p>He designed this operation for the middle of
September, immediately after the castle of San
Sebastian fell and before the French works acquired
strength, but some error retarded the arrival
of his pontoons, the weather became bad, and the
attack, which depended as we shall find upon the
state of the tides and fords, was of necessity deferred
until the 7th of October. Meanwhile to
mislead Soult, to ascertain Foy’s true position
about St. Jean Pied de Port, and to strengthen his
own right, he brought part of Del Parque’s force
up from Tudela to Pampeluna. The Andalusian
division which had remained at the blockade after
the battle of Sauroren then rejoined Giron at
Echallar, and at the same time Mina’s troops
gathered in the neighbourhood of Roncesvalles.
Wellington himself repaired to that quarter on the
1st of October, and in his way, passing through<span class="sidenote9">October.</span>
the Alduides, he caused general Campbell to surprize
some isolated posts on the rock of Airola,<span class="sidenote">Foy’s report to Soult, 2d October, MSS.</span>
a French scouting detachment was also cut off near
the foundry of Baygorry, and two thousand sheep
were swept from the valley.</p>

<p>These affairs awaked Soult’s jealousy. He was
in daily expectation of an attack without being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250"></a>[250]</span>
able to ascertain on what quarter the blow would
fall, and at first, deceived by false information that
the fourth division had reinforced Hill, he thought
the march of Mina’s troops and the Andalusians
was intended to mask an offensive movement by<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of light cavalry
in the Bastan, lord Wellington’s presence at
Roncesvalles, and the loss of the post at Airola
seemed to confirm this; but he knew the pontoons
were at Oyarzun, and some deserters told him that
the real object of the allies was to gain the great
Rhune. On the other hand a French commissary,
taken at San Sebastian and exchanged after remaining
twelve days at Lesaca, assured him, that
nothing at Wellington’s head-quarters indicated a
serious attack, although the officers spoke of one
and there were many movements of troops; and
this weighed much with the French general, because
the slow march of the pontoons and the wet
weather had caused a delay contradictory to the
reports of the spies and deserters. It was also
beyond calculation that Wellington should, against
his military judgment, push his left wing into
France merely to meet the wishes of the allied
sovereigns in Germany, and as the most obvious
line for a permanent invasion was by his right and
centre, there was no apparent cause for deferring
his operations.</p>

<p>The true reason of the procrastination, namely
the state of the tides and fords on the Lower Bidassoa,
was necessarily hidden from Soult, who
finally inclined to the notion that Wellington only
designed to secure his blockade at Pampeluna from
interruption by menacing the French and impeding
their labours, the results of which were now<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251"></a>[251]</span>
becoming visible. However, as all the deserters
and spies came with the same story he recommended
increased vigilance along the whole line.
And yet so little did he anticipate the nature of
his opponent’s project, that on the 6th he reviewed
D’Erlon’s divisions at Ainhoa, and remained that
night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended
and no way suspecting that it would be
against his right. But Wellington could not diminish
his troops on the side of Roncesvalles and
the Alduides, lest Foy and Paris and the light
cavalry under Pierre Soult should unite at St. Jean
Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna;
the troops at Maya were already posted offensively,
menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle,
and it was therefore only with his left wing and
left centre, and against the French right that he
could act.</p>

<p>Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred
British soldiers arrived from England. Mina
was then in the Ahescoa, on the right of general
Hill, who was thus enabled to relieve Campbell’s
Portuguese in the Alduides; and the latter marching
to Maya replaced the third division, which,
shifting to its left occupied the heights above
Zagaramurdi, to enable the seventh division to
relieve Giron’s Andalusians in the Puerto de
Echallar.</p>

<p>These dispositions were made with a view to the
attack of the great Rhune and its dependents, the
arrangements for which shall now be described.</p>

<p>Giron, moving with his Andalusians from the
Ivantelly, was to assail a lofty ridge or saddle,
uniting the Commissari and the great Rhune. A<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252"></a>[252]</span>
battalion, stealing up the slopes and hollows on his
right flank, was to seize the rocky head of the last-named
mountain, and after placing detachments
there in observation of the roads leading round it<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.</span>
from Sarre and Ascain, was to descend upon the
saddle and menace the rear of the enemy’s position
at the Puerto de Vera. Meanwhile the principal<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span>
attack was to be made in two columns, but
to protect the right and rear against a counter-attack
from Sarre, the Spanish general was to leave
one brigade in the narrow pass leading from Vera,
between the Ivantelly and the Rhune to that
place.</p>

<p>On the left of Giron the light division was to
assail the Bayonette mountain and the Puerto de
Vera, connecting its right with Giron’s left by skirmishers.</p>

<p>Longa, who had resumed his old positions above
the Salinas de Lesaca, was to move in two columns
across the Bidassoa. One passing by the
ford of Salinas was to aid the left wing of the
light division in its attack on the Bayonette; the
other passing by the bridge of Vera, was to move
up the ravine separating the slopes of the Bayonette
from the Puerto de Vera, and thus connect
the two attacks of the light division. During these
operations Longa was also to send some men over
the river at Andarlasa, to seize a telegraph which
the French used to communicate between the left
and centre of their line.</p>

<p>Behind the light division general Cole was to
take post with the fourth division on Santa Barbara,
pushing forward detachments to secure the
commanding points gained by the fighting troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253"></a>[253]</span>
in front. The sixth division was meanwhile to
make a demonstration on the right by Urdax and
Zagaramurdi, against D’Erlon’s advanced posts.
Thus without weakening his line between Roncesvalles
and Echallar lord Wellington put nearly
twenty thousand men in motion against the Rhune
mountain and its dependents, and he had still
twenty-four thousand disposable to force the passage
of the Lower Bidassoa.</p>

<p>It has been already shewn that between Andarlasa
and Biriatu, a distance of three miles, there
were neither roads nor fords nor bridges. The
French trusting to this difficulty of approach, and
to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the
Mandale, had collected their troops principally,
where the Bildox or green mountain, and the entrenched
camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords.
Against these points Wellington directed general
Freyre’s Spaniards, who were to descend from San
Marcial, cross the upper fords of Biriatu, assail
the Bildox and Mandale mountains, and turn the
left of that part of the enemy’s line which being
prolonged from Biriatu crossed the royal road and
passed behind the town of Andaya.</p>

<p>Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points
of defence were the mountain of <em>Louis</em> XIV., the
ridge called the <em>Caffé Republicain</em>, and the town
of Andaya. Behind these the <em>Calvaire d’Urogne</em>,
the <em>Croix des Bouquets</em>, and the camp of the <em>Sans
Culottes</em>, served as rallying posts.</p>

<p>For the assault on these positions Wellington
designed to employ the first and fifth divisions and
the unattached brigades of Wilson and lord Aylmer,
in all about fifteen thousand men. By the
help of Spanish fishermen he had secretly discovered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254"></a>[254]</span>
three fords, practicable at low water, <ins class="corr" id="tn-254" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'between the brige'">
between the bridge</ins> of Behobia and the sea, and his
intent was to pass his column at the old fords above,
and at the new fords below the bridge, and this
though the tides rose sixteen feet, leaving at the
ebb open heavy sands not less than half a mile
broad. The left bank of the river also was completely
exposed to observation from the enemy’s
hills, which though low in comparison of the mountains
above the bridge, were nevertheless strong
ridges of defence; but relying on his previous
measures to deceive the enemy the English general
disdained these dangers, and his anticipations were
not belied by the result.</p>

<p>The unlikelihood that a commander, having a
better line of operations, would pass such a river
as the Bidassoa at its mouth, deceived the French
general. Meanwhile his lieutenants were negligent.
Of Reille’s two divisions La Martiniere’s, now
commanded by general Boyer, was at the camp of
Urogne, and on the morning of the seventh was
dispersed as usual to labour at the works; Villatte’s
reserve was at Ascain and Serres; the five thousand
men composing Maucune’s division were indeed on
the first line but unexpectant of an attack, and
though the works on the Mandale were finished and
those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter
to the sea they were scarcely commenced.</p>

<p><em>Passage of the Bidassoa.</em> The night set in heavily.
A sullen thunder-storm gathering about the
craggy summit of the Pena de Haya came slowly
down its flanks, and towards morning rolling over
the Bidassoa fell in its greatest violence upon the
French positions. During this turmoil Wellington
whose pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255"></a>[255]</span>
disposed a number of guns and howitzers along
the crest of San Marcial, and his columns attained
their respective stations along the banks of the
river. Freyre’s Spaniards one brigade of the
guards and Wilson’s Portuguese, stretching from
the Biriatu fords to that near the broken bridge of
Behobia, were ensconced behind the detached ridge
which the French had first seized in the attack of
the 31st. The second brigade of guards and the
Germans of the first division were concealed near
Irun, close to a ford below the bridge of Behobia
called the great Jonco. The British brigades of
the fifth division covered themselves behind a large<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span>
river embankment opposite Andaya; Sprye’s Portuguese
and lord Aylmer’s brigade were posted in
the ditch of Fuenterabia.</p>

<p>As all the tents were left standing in the camps
of the allies, the enemy could perceive no change
on the morning of the 7th, but at seven o’clock,
the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade emerging
from their concealment took the sands in two
columns, that on the left pointing against the
French camp of the Sans Culottes, that on the
right against the ridge of Andaya. No shot was
fired, but when they had passed the fords of the
low-water channel a rocket was sent up from the
steeple of Fuenterabia as a signal. Then the guns
and howitzers opened from San Marcial, the troops
near Irun, covered by the fire of a battery, made
for the Jonco ford, and the passage above the
bridge also commenced. From the crest of San
Marcial seven columns could be seen at once, attacking
on a line of five miles, those above the
bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest,
those below it appearing in the distance like huge<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256"></a>[256]</span>
sullen snakes winding over the heavy sands. The
Germans missing the Jonco ford got into deep
water but quickly recovered the true line, and the
French, completely surprised, permitted even the
brigades of the fifth division to gain the right
bank and form their lines before a hostile musket
flashed.</p>

<p>The cannonade from San Marcial was heard by
Soult at Espelette, and at the same time the sixth
division, advancing beyond Urdax and Zagaramurdi,
made a false attack on D’Erlon’s positions; the
Portuguese brigade under colonel Douglas, were
however pushed too far and repulsed with the loss
of one hundred and fifty men, and the French marshal
instantly detecting the true nature of this attack
hurried to his right, but his camps on the
Bidassoa were lost before he arrived.</p>

<p>When the British artillery first opened, Maucune’s
troops had assembled at their different posts of
defence, and the French guns, established principally
near the mountain of Louis XIV. and the
Caffé Republicain, commenced firing. The alarm
spread, and Boyer’s marched from the second line
behind Urogne to support Maucune without waiting
for the junction of the working parties; but his brigades
moved separately as they could collect, and
before the first came into action, Sprye’s Portuguese,
forming the extreme left of the allies, menaced the
camp of the Sans Culottes; thither therefore one
of Boyer’s regiments was ordered, while the others
advanced by the royal road towards the Croix des
Bouquets. But Andaya, guarded only by a piquet,
was abandoned, and Reille thinking the camp of the
Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer’s men
reached it, sent a battalion there from the centre,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257"></a>[257]</span>
thus weakening his force at the chief point of attack;
for the British brigades of the fifth division, were now
advancing left in front from Andaya, and bearing
under a sharp fire of artillery and musquetry towards
the Croix des Bouquets.</p>

<p>By this time the columns of the first division had
passed the river, one above the bridge, preceded by
Wilson’s Portuguese, one below, preceded by Colin
Halkett’s German light troops, who aided by the
fire of the guns on San Marcial, drove back the
enemy’s advanced posts, won the Caffé Republicain,
the mountain of Louis XIV. and drove the French
from those heights to the Croix des Bouquets: this
was the key of the position, and towards it guns and
troops were now hastening from every side. The
Germans who had lost many men in the previous
attacks were here brought to a check, for the heights
were very strong, and Boyer’s leading battalions were
now close at hand; but at this critical moment
colonel Cameron arrived with the ninth regiment of
the fifth division, and passing through the German
skirmishers rushed with great vehemence to the summit
of the first height. The French infantry instantly
opened their ranks to let their guns retire, and then
retreated themselves at full speed to a second ridge,
somewhat lower but where they could only be
approached on a narrow front. Cameron as quickly
threw his men into a single column and bore against
this new position, which curving inwards enabled
the French to pour a concentrated fire upon his regiment;
nor did his violent course seem to dismay
them until he was within ten yards, when appalled
by the furious shout and charge of the ninth they
gave way, and the ridges of the Croix des Bouquets
were won as far as the royal road. The British<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258"></a>[258]</span>
regiment however lost many men and officers, and
during the fight the French artillery and scattered
troops, coming from different points and rallying on
Boyer’s battalions, were gathered on the ridges to
the French left of the road.</p>

<p>The entrenched camp above Biriatu and the
Bildox, had been meanwhile defended with success
in front, but Freyre turned them with his right wing,
which being opposed only by a single battalion soon
won the Mandale mountain, and the French fell
back from that quarter to the Calvaire d’Urogne
and Jollimont. Reille thus beaten at the Croix des
Bouquets, and his flanks turned, the left by the
Spaniards on the Mandale, the right by the allies
along the sea-coast, retreated in great disorder along
the royal causeway and the old road of Bayonne.
He passed through the village of Urogne and the
British skirmishers at first entered it in pursuit, but
they were beaten out again by the second brigade of
Boyer’s division, for Soult now arrived with part of
Villatte’s reserve and many guns, and by his presence
and activity restored order and revived the
courage of the troops at the moment when the
retreat was degenerating into a flight.</p>

<p>Reille lost eight pieces of artillery and about four
hundred men, the allies did not lose more than six
hundred of which half were Spaniards, so slight
and easy had the skill of the general rendered this
stupendous operation. But if the French commander
penetrating Wellington’s design, and avoiding
the surprize, had opposed all his troops, amounting
with what Villatte could spare to sixteen
thousand, instead of the five thousand actually
engaged, the passage could scarcely have been
forced; and a check would have been tantamount<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259"></a>[259]</span>
to a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning
tide would have come with a swallowing flood
upon the rear.</p>

<p>Equally unprepared and equally unsuccessful
were the French on the side of Vera, although the
struggle there proved more fierce and constant.</p>

<p>At day-break Giron had descended from the
Ivantelly rocks and general Alten from Santa Barbara;
the first to the gorge of the pass leading from
Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where
he was joined by half of Longa’s force.</p>

<p>One brigade, consisting of the forty-third the
seventeenth Portuguese regiment of the line and the
first and third battalions of riflemen, drew up in
column on an open space to the right of Vera. The
other brigade under colonel Colborne, consisting of
the fifty-second two battalions of Caçadores and a
battalion of British riflemen, was disposed on the left
of Vera. Half of Longa’s division was between these
brigades, the other half after crossing the ford of
Salinas drew up on Colborne’s left. The whole of
the narrow vale of Vera was thus filled with
troops ready to ascend the mountains, and general
Cole displaying his force to advantage on the
heights of Santa Barbara presented a formidable
reserve.</p>

<p>Taupin’s division guarded the enormous positions
in front of the allies. His right was on the Bayonette,
from whence a single slope descended to a
small plain about two parts down the mountain.<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span>
From this platform three distinct tongues shot into
the valley below, each was defended by an advanced
post, and the platform itself secured by a star
redoubt, behind which, about half-way up the single
slope, there was a second retrenchment with abbatis.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260"></a>[260]</span>
Another large redoubt and an unfinished breast-work
on the superior crest completed the system of defence
for the Bayonette.</p>

<p>The Commissari, which is a continuation of the
Bayonette towards the great Rhune, was covered by
a profound gulf thickly wooded and defended with
skirmishers, and between this gulf and another of
the same nature the main road, leading from Vera
over the Puerto, pierced the centre of the French
position. Rugged and ascending with short abrupt
turns this road was blocked at every uncovered
point with abbatis and small retrenchments; each
obstacle was commanded, at half musquet shot, by
small detachments placed on all the projecting parts
overlooking the ascent, and a regiment, entrenched
above on the Puerto itself, connected the troops on
the crest of the Bayonette and Commissari with
those on the saddle-ridge, against which Giron’s
attack was directed.</p>

<p>But between Alten’s right and Giron’s left was
an isolated ridge called by the soldiers the <em>Boar’s
back</em>, the summit of which, about half a mile long
and rounded at each end, was occupied by four
French companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as
it were into the gulf to cover the Puerto and saddle
ridges, although of mean height in comparison of
the towering ranges behind, was yet so great that the
few warning shots fired from the summit by the enemy,
reached the allies at its base with that slow singing
sound which marks the dying force of a musquet-ball.
It was essential to take the Boar’s back before
the general attack commenced, and five companies
of British riflemen, supported by the seventeenth
Portuguese regiment, were ordered to assail it at the
Vera end, while a battalion of Giron’s Spaniards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261"></a>[261]</span>
preceded by a detached company of the forty-third
attacked it on the other.</p>

<p>At four o’clock in the morning Clauzel had received
intelligence that the Bayonette was to be assaulted
that day or the next, and at seven o’clock he heard
from Conroux, who commanded at Sarre, that Giron’s<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
camps were abandoned although the tents of the
seventh division were still standing; at the same time
the sound of musquetry was heard on the side of
Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun, and then
came Taupin’s report that the vale of Vera was filled
with troops. To this last quarter Clauzel hurried.
The Spaniards had already driven Conroux’s outposts
from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment
was creeping up towards the unguarded head
of the great Rhune. He immediately ordered four
regiments of Conroux’s division to occupy the summit
the front and the flanks of that mountain, and
he formed a reserve of two other regiments behind.
With these troops he designed to secure the mountain
and support Taupin, but ere they could reach
their destination that general’s fate was decided.</p>

<p><em>Second Combat of Vera.</em>—Soon after seven o’clock
a few cannon-shot from some mountain-guns, of
which each side had a battery, were followed by
the Spanish musquetry on the right, and the next
moment the “<em>Boars back</em>” was simultaneously assailed
at both ends. The riflemen on the Vera side
ascended to a small pine-wood two-thirds of the<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span>
way up and there rested, but soon resuming their
movement with a scornful gallantry they swept the
French off the top, disdaining to use their rifles
beyond a few shots down the reverse side, to show
that they were masters of the ridge. This was the
signal for the general attack. The seventeenth Portuguese<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262"></a>[262]</span>
followed the victorious sharp-shooters, the
forty-third, preceded by their own skirmishers and
by the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing,
plunged into the rugged pass, Longa’s troops entered
the gloomy wood of the ravine on the left,
and beyond them Colborne’s brigade moving by
narrow paths and throwing out skirmishers assailed
the Bayonette, the fifty-second took the middle
tongue, the Caçadores and riflemen the two outermost
and all bore with a concentric movement
against the star redoubt on the platform above.
Longa’s second brigade should have flanked the left
of this attack with a wide skirting movement, but
neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of
such warfare, and therefore quietly followed the
riflemen in reserve.</p>

<p>Soon the open slopes of the mountains were
covered with men and with fire, a heavy confused
sound of mingled shouts and musquetry filled the
deep hollows between, and the white smoke came
curling up above the dark forest trees which covered
their gloomy recesses. The French compared with
their assailants seemed few and scattered on the
mountain side, and Kempt’s brigade soon forced its
way without a check through all the retrenchments
on the main pass, his skirmishers spreading wider
and breaking into small detachments of support as
the depth of the ravine lessened and the slopes melted
into the higher ridges. When about half-way up
an open platform gave a clear view over the Bayonette
slopes, and all eyes were turned that way.
Longa’s right brigade, fighting in the gulf between,
seemed labouring and overmatched, but
beyond, on the broad open space in front of the
star fort, the Caçadores and riflemen of Colborne’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263"></a>[263]</span>
brigade, were seen coming out, in small bodies,
from a forest which covered the three tongues of
land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire
was sharp, their pace rapid, and in a few moments
they closed upon the redoubt in a mass as if resolved
to storm it. The fifty-second were not then
in sight, and the French thinking from the dark
clothing that all were Portuguese rushed in close
order out of the entrenchment; they were numerous
and very sudden; the rifle as a weapon is overmatched
by the musket and bayonet, and this
rough charge sent the scattered assailants back over
the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill cries
the French followed, but just then the fifty-second
appeared, partly in line partly in column, on the
platform, and raising their shout rushed forward.
The red uniform and full career of this regiment
startled the hitherto adventurous French, they
stopped short, wavered, and then turning fled to
their entrenchment; the fifty-second following hard
entered the works with them, the riflemen and
Caçadores who had meanwhile rallied passed it on
both flanks, and for a few moments every thing was
hidden by a dense volume of smoke. Soon however
the British shout pealed again and the whole
mass emerged on the other side, the French, now
the fewer, flying the others pursuing, until the second
entrenchment, half-way up the parent slope,
enabled the retreating troops to make another
stand.</p>

<p>The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt’s
brigade now echoed along the mountain side, and
with renewed vigour the men continued to scale the
craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to
the top of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne after<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264"></a>[264]</span>
having carried the second entrenchment above the
star fort, was brought to a check by the works on
the very crest of the mountain, from whence the
French not only plied his troops with musquetry at
a great advantage, but rolled huge stones down the
steep.</p>

<p>These works were extensive well lined with men
and strengthened by a large redoubt on the right,
but the defenders soon faltered, for their left flank
was turned by Kempt and the effects of lord Wellington’s
skilful combinations were now felt in another
quarter. Freyre’s Spaniards after carrying
the Mandale mountain, between Biriatu and the
Bayonette, had pushed to a road leading from the
latter by Jollimont to St. Jean de Luz, and this<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span>
was the line of retreat from the crest of the
Bayonette for Taupin’s right wing; but Freyre’s
Spaniards got there first, and if Longa’s brigade
instead of slowly following Colborne had spread
out widely on the left, a military line would have
been completed from Giron to Freyre. Still Taupin’s
right was cut off on that side, and he was
forced to file it under fire along the crest of the
Bayonette to reach the Puerto de Vera road, where
he was joined by his centre. He effected this but
lost his mountain battery and three hundred men.
These last, apparently the garrison of the large
fort on the extreme right of the Bayonette crest,
were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner.
Accompanied by only one of his staff and half-a-dozen
riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly,
and with great presence of mind and intrepidity
ordered them to lay down their arms, an order which
they thinking themselves entirely cut off obeyed.
Meanwhile the French skirmishers in the deep<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265"></a>[265]</span>
ravine, between the two lines of attack, being
feebly pushed by Longa’s troops, retreated too
slowly and getting amongst some rocks from whence
there was no escape surrendered to Kempt’s brigade.</p>

<p>The right and centre of Taupin’s division being
now completely beaten fled down the side of the
mountain towards Olette, they were pursued by a
part of the allies until they rallied upon Villatte’s
reserve, which was in order of battle on a ridge
extending across the gorge of Olette between
Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonette and Commissari,
with the Puerto de Vera, were thus won
after five hours’ incessant fighting and toiling up
their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle was
still maintained by the French troops on the Rhune.</p>

<p>Giron after driving Conroux’s advanced post from
the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre had, following
his orders, pushed a battalion from that side towards
the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve
in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack
which Conroux might make. And when his
left wing was rendered free to move by the capture
of the “<em>Boar’s back</em>” he fought his way up abreast
with the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a
little to his own right of the Puerto. There however
he was arrested by a strong line of abbattis from
behind which two French regiments poured a heavy
fire. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer
Downie, now a Spanish general, encouraged
them with his voice and they kept their ranks,
they seemed irresolute and did not advance. There
happened to be present an officer of the forty-third
regiment named Havelock, who being attached to
general Alten’s staff was sent to ascertain Giron’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266"></a>[266]</span>
progress. His fiery temper could not brook the
check. He took off his hat, he called upon the
Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his
horse, at one bound cleared the abbattis and went
headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers,
shouting for “<i lang="es">El chico bianco</i>” “<em>the fair boy</em>” so they
called him, for he was very young and had light
hair, with one shock broke through the French, and
this at the very moment when their centre was
flying under the fire of Kempt’s skirmishers from
the Puerto de Vera.</p>

<p>The two regiments thus defeated by the Spaniards
retired by their left along the saddle-ridge to the
flanks of the Rhune, so that Clauzel had now eight
regiments concentrated on this great mountain. Two
occupied the crest including the highest rock called
the Hermitage; four were on the flanks, descending
towards Ascain on one hand, and towards Sarre
on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower
and parallel crest behind called the small Rhune.
In this situation they were attacked at four o’clock
by Giron’s right wing. The Spaniards first dislodged
a small body from a detached pile of crags
about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed
the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage itself,
endeavouring at the same time to turn it by their
right. In both objects they were defeated with
loss. The Hermitage was impregnable, the French
rolled down stones large enough to sweep away
a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted
to a distant musketry which lasted until night.
This day’s fighting cost Taupin’s division two generals
and four hundred men killed and wounded,
and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the allies
was nearly a thousand, of which about five hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267"></a>[267]</span>
were Spaniards, and the success was not complete,
for while the French kept possession of the
summit of the Rhune the allies’ new position was
insecure.</p>

<p>The front and the right flank of that great mountain
were impregnable, but lord Wellington observing
that the left flank, descending towards
Sarre, was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards
on that side on the 8th, designing a combined
attack against the mountain itself, and against
the camp of Sarre. At three o’clock in the afternoon
the rocks which studded the lower parts of
the Rhune slope were assailed by the Spaniards,
and at the same time detachments of the seventh
division descended from the Puerto de Echallar
upon the fort of San Barbe, and other outworks
covering the advanced French camp of Sarre. The
Andalusians soon won the rocks and an entrenched
height that commanded the camp, for Clauzel, too
easily alarmed at some slight demonstrations made
by the sixth division towards the bridge of Amotz in<span class="sidenote7">Plan 6.</span>
rear of his left, thought he should be cut off from
his great camp, and very suddenly abandoned not
only the slope of the mountain but all his advanced
works in the basin below, including the fort of San
Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the
height behind Sarre still holding with their right
the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his
error were soon made apparent. Wellington immediately
established a strong body of the Spanish
troops close up to the rocks of the Hermitage, and
the two French regiments there, seeing the lower
slopes and the fort of San Barbe given up, imagined
they also would be cut off, and without orders
abandoned the impregnable rocks of the Hermitage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268"></a>[268]</span>
and retired in the night to the smaller Rhune. The
next morning some of the seventh division rashly
pushed into the village of Sarre, but they were
quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and
works taken the day before if the Spaniards had not
succoured them.</p>

<p>The whole loss on the three days of fighting was
about fourteen hundred French and sixteen hundred
of the allies, one half being Spaniards, but many
of the wounded were not brought in until the third
day after the actions, and several perished miserably
where they fell, it being impossible to discover
them in those vast solitudes. Some men were also
lost from want of discipline; having descended into
the French villages they got drunk and were taken
the next day by the enemy. Nor was the number
small of those who plundered in defiance of lord
Wellington’s proclamation; for he thought it necessary
to arrest and send to England several officers,
and renewed his proclamation, observing that if he
had five times as many men he could not venture
to invade France unless marauding was prevented.
It is remarkable that the French troops on the same
day acted towards their own countrymen in the
same manner, but Soult also checked the mischief
with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some
reputation to be shot as an example, for having
suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre during
the action.</p>

<p>With exception of the slight checks sustained at
Sarre and Ainhoa, the course of these operations
had been eminently successful, and surely the bravery
of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous
positions must be admired. To them the
unfinished state of the French works was not visible.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269"></a>[269]</span>
Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment
had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast
slopes of mountains which were scarcely accessible
from their natural steepness and asperity. This
they could see, yet cared neither for the growing
strength of the works, the height of the mountains,
nor the breadth of the river with its heavy sands,
and its mighty rushing tide; all were despised, and
while they marched with this confident valour, it
was observed that the French fought in defence of
their dizzy steeps with far less fierceness than,
when, striving against insurmountable obstacles,
they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren.
Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the
feebleness of the defence on this occasion may be
traced to another cause. It was a general’s not a
soldier’s battle. Wellington had with overmastering
combinations overwhelmed each point of attack.
Taupin’s and Maucune’s divisions were each less
than five thousand strong, and they were separately
assailed, the first by eighteen the second by fifteen
thousand men, and at neither point were Reille and
Clauzel able to bring their reserves into action
before the positions were won.</p>

<p>Soult complained that he had repeatedly told
his lieutenants an attack was to be expected, and<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence with the Minister of War, MSS.</span>
recommended extreme vigilance; yet they were
quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of
the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of
the 5th and again on the night of the 6th. The
passage of the river he said had commenced at
seven o’clock, long after daylight, the allies’ masses
were then clearly to be seen forming on the banks,
and there was full time for Boyer’s division to arrive
before the Croix des Bouquets was lost. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270"></a>[270]</span>
battle was fought in disorder with less than five
thousand men, instead of with ten thousand in good
order, and supported by a part of Villatte’s reserve.
To this negligence the generals added also discouragement.
They had so little confidence in the
strength of their positions, that if the allies had
pushed vigorously forward before the marshal’s
arrival from Espelette, they would have entered St.
Jean de Luz, turned the right of the second position
and forced the French army back upon the Nive
and the Adour.</p>

<p>This reasoning of Soult was correct, but such a
stroke did not belong to lord Wellington’s system.
He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted
whether he could even maintain his army during
the winter in the position he had already gained,
and he was averse to the experiment, while Pampeluna
held out and the war in Germany bore an
undecided aspect.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271"></a>[271]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_V">CHAPTER V.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">Soult was apprehensive for some days that lord<span class="sidenote9">1813. October.</span>
Wellington would push his offensive operations
further, but when he knew by Foy’s reports, and<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
by the numbers of the allies assembled on his right,
that there was no design of attacking his left, he
resumed his labours to advance the works covering
St. Jean de Luz. He also kept a vigilant watch
from his centre, holding his divisions in readiness to
concentrate towards Sarre, and when he saw the
heavy masses in his front disperse by degrees into
different camps, he directed Clauzel to recover the
fort of San Barbe. This work was constructed on
a comparatively low ridge barring issue from the
gorge leading out of the vale of Vera to Sarre, and
it defended the narrow ground between the Rhunes
and the Nivelle river. Abandoned on the 8th
without reason by the French, since it did not naturally
belong to the position of the allies, it was now
occupied by a Spanish picquet of forty men. Some
battalions were also encamped in a small wood close
behind; but many officers and men slept in the fort,
and on the night of the 12th, about eleven o’clock,
three battalions of Conroux’s division reached the
platform on which the fort stood without being perceived.
The work was then escaladed, the troops
behind it went off in confusion at the first alarm,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272"></a>[272]</span>
and two hundred soldiers with fifteen officers were
made prisoners. The Spaniards ashamed of the
surprize made a vigorous effort to recover the fort
at daylight, they were repulsed, and repeated the
attempt with five battalions, but Clauzel brought
up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in
the wood which lasted for several hours, the French
endeavouring to regain the whole of their old entrenchments
and the Spaniards to recover the fort.
Neither succeeded and San Barbe, too near the
enemy’s position to be safely held, was resigned
with a loss of two hundred men by the French and
five hundred by the Spaniards. Soon after this
isolated action a French sloop freighted with stores
for Santona attempted to run from St. Jean de Luz,
and being chased by three English brigs and cut
off from the open sea, her crew after exchanging a
few distant shots with one of the brigs, set her on
fire and escaped in their boats to the Adour.</p>

<p>Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the
allied army was organized in three grand divisions.
The right having Mina’s and Morillo’s battalions
attached to it was commanded by sir Rowland Hill,
and extended from Roncesvalles to the Bastan. The
centre occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune, and
Bayonette mountains, was given to marshal Beresford.
The left extending from the Mandale mountain
to the sea was under sir John Hope. This
officer succeeded Graham who had returned to
England. Commanding in chief at Coruña after
sir John Moore’s death, he was superior in rank to
lord Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular
war, but when the latter obtained the baton
of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope with a patriotism
and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273"></a>[273]</span>
the friend and comrade of Moore offered to serve as
second in command, and lord Wellington joyfully
accepted him, observing that he was the “<em>ablest
officer in the army</em>.”</p>

<p>The positions of the right and centre were offensive
and menacing, but the left was still on the
defensive, and the Bidassoa, impassable at high
water below the bridge, was close behind. However
the ridges were strong, a powerful artillery
was established on the right bank, field-works were
constructed, and although the fords below Behobia
furnished but a dangerous retreat even at low water,
those above were always available, and a pontoon
bridge laid down for the passage of the guns during
the action was a sure resource. The front was
along the heights of the Croix des Bouquets facing
Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes, and
there was a reserve in an entrenched camp above
Andaya. The right of the line rested on the Mandale,
and from that mountain and the Bayonette
the allies could descend upon the flank of an attacking
army.</p>

<p>Soult had however no intention of renewing the
offensive. He had now lost many thousand men in
battle, and the old soldiers remaining did not exceed
seventy-nine thousand present under arms including
officers and artillery-men. Of this number
the garrisons absorbed about thirteen thousand,
leaving sixty-six thousand in the field, whereas the
allies, counting Mina’s and Del Parque’s troops,
now at Tudela, Pampeluna, and the Val de Irati,
exceeded one hundred thousand, seventy-three<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix 7</a>, sect. 2.</span>
thousand, including officers, sergeants, and artillery-men,
being British and Portuguese. And this was
below the calculation of the French general, for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274"></a>[274]</span>
deceived by the exaggerated reports which the
Spaniards always made of their forces, he thought
Del Parque had brought up twenty thousand men
and that there were one hundred and forty thousand
combatants in his front. But it was not so, and
as conscripts of a good description were now
joining the French army rapidly, and the national
guards of the Pyrenees were many, it was in the
number of soldiers rather than of men, that the
English general had the advantage.</p>

<p>In this state of affairs Soult’s policy was to
maintain a strict defensive, under cover of which the
spirit of the troops might be revived, the country in
the rear organized, and the conscripts disciplined
and hardened to war. The loss of the Lower Bidassoa
was in a political view mischievous to him, it had
an injurious effect upon the spirit of the frontier
departments, and gave encouragement to the secret
partizans of the Bourbons; but in a military view
it was a relief. The great development of the
mountains bordering the Bidassoa had rendered
their defence difficult; while holding them he
had continual fear that his line would be pierced
and his army suddenly driven beyond the Adour.
His position was now more concentrated.</p>

<p>The right, under Reille, formed two lines. One
across the royal road on the fortified heights of
Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes; the
other in the entrenched camps of Bourdegain and<span class="sidenote7">Plan 6.</span>
Belchena, covering St. Jean de Luz and barring the
gorges of Olhette and Jollimont.</p>

<p>The centre under Clauzel was posted on the
ridges between Ascain and Amotz holding the
smaller Rhune in advance; but one division was
retained by Soult in the camp of Serres on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275"></a>[275]</span>
right of the Nivelle, overhanging Ascain. To replace
it one of D’Erlon’s divisions crossed to the left of
the Nivelle and reinforced Clauzel’s left flank above
Sarre.</p>

<p>Villatte’s reserve was about St. Jean de Luz but
having the Italian brigade in the camp of Serres.</p>

<p>D’Erlon’s remaining divisions continued in their
old position, the right connected with Clauzel’s line
by the bridge of Amotz; the left, holding the Choupera
and Mondarin mountains, bordered on the Nive.</p>

<p>Behind Clauzel and D’Erlon Soult had commenced
a second chain of entrenched camps, prolonged
from the camp of Serres up the right bank
of the Nivelle to San Pé, thence by Suraide to the
double bridge-head of Cambo on the Nive, and
beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain, covering
the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de
Port. He had also called general Paris up from
Oleron to the defence of the latter fortress and its
entrenched camp, and now drew Foy down the
Nive to Bidarray half-way between St. Jean Pied
de Port and Cambo. There watching the issues
from the Val de Baygorry he was ready to occupy
the Ursouia mountain on the right of the Nive, or,
moving by Cambo, to reinforce the great position
on the left of that river according to circumstances.</p>

<p>To complete these immense entrenchments, which
between the Nive and the sea were double and on
an opening of sixteen miles, the whole army
laboured incessantly, and all the resources of the
country whether of materials or working men
were called out by requisition. Nevertheless this
defensive warfare was justly regarded by the duke
of Dalmatia as unsuitable to the general state of
affairs. Offensive operations were most consonant<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276"></a>[276]</span>
to the character of the French soldiers, and to the
exigencies of the time. Recent experience had
shown the impregnable nature of the allies’ positions
against a front attack, and he was too weak singly
to change the theatre of operations. But when he
looked at the strength of the armies appropriated
by the emperor to the Spanish contest, he thought
France would be ill-served if her generals could not
resume the offensive successfully. Suchet had just
proved his power at Ordal against lord William
Bentinck, and that nobleman’s successor, with
inferior rank and power, with an army unpaid
and feeding on salt meat from the ships, with
jealous and disputing colleagues amongst the
Spanish generals, none of whom were willing to
act cordially with him upon a fixed and well-considered
plan, was in no condition to menace the
French seriously. And that he was permitted at
this important crisis to paralyze from fifty to sixty
thousand excellent French troops possessing all the
strong places of the country, was one of the most
singular errors of the war.</p>

<p>Exclusive of national guards and detachments of
the line, disposed along the whole frontier to guard
the passes of the Pyrenees against sudden marauding
excursions, the French armies counted at this
time about one hundred and seventy thousand men
and seventeen thousand horses. Of these one hundred<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix 8</a>, sect. 2.</span>
and thirty-eight thousand were present under
arms, and thirty thousand conscripts were in march
to join them. They held all the fortresses of Valencia
and Catalonia, and most of those in Aragon
Navarre and Guipuscoa, and they could unite
behind the Pyrenees for a combined effort in safety.
Lord Wellington could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277"></a>[277]</span>
and all the Spaniards in arms on the
eastern coast, bring into line one hundred and fifty
thousand men; he had several sieges on his hands,
and to unite his forces at any point required great
dispositions to avoid an attack during a flank march.
Suchet had above thirty thousand disposable men,
he could increase them to forty thousand by relinquishing
some unimportant posts, his means in
artillery were immense, and distributed in all his
strong places, so that he could furnish himself from
almost any point. It is no exaggeration therefore
to say that two hundred pieces of artillery and
ninety thousand old soldiers might have united at
this period upon the flank of lord Wellington, still
leaving thirty thousand conscripts and the national
guards of the frontier, supported by the fortresses
and entrenched camps of Bayonne and St. Jean
Pied de Port, the castles of Navarens and Jaca on
one side, and the numerous garrisons of the fortresses
in Catalonia on the other, to cover France
from invasion.</p>

<p>To make this great power bear in a right direction
was the duke of Dalmatia’s object, and his
plans were large, and worthy of his reputation.
Yet he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his
projects, and that marshal’s resistance would appear
to have sprung from personal dislike contracted
during Soult’s sojourn near Valencia in
1812. It has been already shown how lightly he
abandoned Aragon and confined himself to Catalonia
after quitting Valencia. He did not indeed
then know that Soult had assumed the command of
the army of Spain and was preparing for his great
effort to relieve Pampeluna; but he was aware that
Clauzel and Paris were on the side of Jaca, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278"></a>[278]</span>
he was too good a general not to know that operating
on the allies’ flank was the best mode of
palliating the defeat of Vittoria. He might have
saved both his garrison and castle of Zaragoza;
the guns and other materials of a very large field-artillery
equipment were deposited there, and from
thence, by Jaca, he could have opened a sure and
short communication with Soult, obtained information
of that general’s projects, and saved Pampeluna.</p>

<p>It may be asked why the duke of Dalmatia did
not endeavour to communicate with Suchet. The
reason was simple. The former quitted Dresden
suddenly on the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the
12th, and on the 20th his troops were in full march
towards St. Jean Pied de Port, and it was during this
very rapid journey that the other marshal abandoned
Valencia. Soult therefore knew neither Suchet’s plans
nor the force of his army, nor his movements, nor his
actual position, and there was no time to wait for
accurate information. However between the 6th
and the 16th of August, that is to say, immediately
after his own retreat from Sauroren, he
earnestly prayed that the army of Aragon should
march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by
Jaca, and thus drawing off some of Wellington’s
forces facilitate the efforts of the army of Spain to
relieve San Sebastian. In this communication he
stated, that his recent operations had caused troops
actually in march under general Hill towards Catalonia
to be recalled. This was an error. His
emissaries were deceived by the movements, and
counter-movements in pursuit of Clauzel immediately
after the battle of Vittoria, and by the
change in Wellington’s plans as to the siege of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279"></a>[279]</span>
Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia,
but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham,
and the Conde de La Bispal were all mentioned, in
this correspondence between Soult and Suchet, as
being actually in Catalonia, or on the march, the
three first having been really sounded as to taking
the command in that quarter, and the last having
demanded it himself.</p>

<p>Suchet treated Soult’s proposal as chimerical. His
movable troops he said did not exceed eleven
thousand, and a march upon Zaragoza with so few
men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen,
unless he could fly into France by Venasque where
he had a garrison. An extraordinary view of affairs
which he supported by statements still more extraordinary!</p>

<p>“<em>General Hill had joined lord William Bentinck
with twenty-four thousand men.</em>” “<em>La Bispal had
arrived with fifteen thousand.</em>” “<em>There were more
than two hundred thousand men on the Ebro.</em>”
“<em>The Spanish insurrection was general and strongly
organized.</em>” “<em>He had recovered the garrison of
Taragona and destroyed the works, and <ins class="corr" id="tn-279" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'he must revitual'">
he must revictual</ins> Barcelona and then withdraw to the vicinity
of Gerona and remain on the defensive</em>”!</p>

<p>This letter was written on the 23d of August,
when lord William Bentinck had just retreated from
the Gaya into the mountains above Hospitalet. The
imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of
Catalonia and Aragon, both under his command,<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix 8</a>, Sect. 2.</span>
exceeded sixty-five thousand men, fifty-six thousand
being present under arms. Thirty thousand
were united in the field when he received Soult’s
letter. There was nothing to prevent him marching
upon Tortoza, except lord William Bentinck’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280"></a>[280]</span>
army which had just acknowledged by a
retreat its inability to cope with him; there was
nothing at all to prevent him marching to Lerida.
The count of Bispal had thrown up his command
from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on
the Echallar mountains. Sir Rowland Hill was at
Roncesvalles, and not a man had moved from Wellington’s
army. Elio and Roche were near Valencia
in a starving condition. The Anglo-Sicilian
troops only fourteen thousand strong including
Whittingham’s division, were on the barren mountains
above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army
could remain; Del Parque’s troops and Sarzfield’s
division had gone over the Ebro, and Copons’ Catalans
had taken refuge in the mountains of Cervera.
In fine not two hundred thousand but less
than thirty-five thousand men, half-organized ill-fed
and scattered from Vich to Vinaros were
opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different
views and different lines of operations. The Anglo-Sicilians
could not abandon the coast, Copons could
not abandon the mountains. Del Parque’s troops
soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and to use
lord Wellington’s phrase there was nothing to prevent
Suchet “<em>tumbling lord William Bentinck back
even to the Xucar</em>.” The true nature of the great
insurrection which the French general pretended to
dread shall be shown when the political condition
of Spain is treated of.</p>

<p>Suchet’s errors respecting the allies were easily
detected by Soult, those touching the French in
Catalonia he could not suspect and acquiesced
in the objections to his first plan; but fertile of
resource he immediately proposed another, akin to
that which he had urged Joseph to adopt in 1812<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281"></a>[281]</span>
after the battle of Salamanca, namely, to change
the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would
he said, inevitably fall before the allies in succession
if the French armies remained on the defensive,
and the only mode of rendering offensive
operations successful was a general concentration
of means and unity of action. The levy of conscripts
under an imperial decree, issued in August,
would furnish, in conjunction with the depôts of
the interior, a reinforcement of forty thousand men.
Ten thousand would form a sufficient corps of observation
about Gerona. The armies of Aragon and
Catalonia could, he hoped, by sacrificing some
posts produce twenty thousand infantry in the field.
The imperial muster-rolls prove that they could
have produced forty thousand, but Soult misled by
Suchet’s erroneous statements assumed only twenty
thousand, and he calculated that he could himself
bring thirty-five or forty thousand good infantry
and all his cavalry to a given point of junction for
the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen
thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to
be directed on that place, and thus seventy or
seventy-five thousand infantry all the cavalry of
both armies and one hundred guns, would be suddenly
assembled, to thread the narrow pass of Jaca
and descend upon Aragon. Once in that kingdom
they could attack the allied troops in Navarre if
the latter were dispersed, and if they were united
retire upon Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and
deliver a general battle upon the new line of operations.
Meanwhile the fifteen thousand unappropriated
conscripts might reinforce the twenty
or twenty-five thousand old soldiers left to cover
Bayonne.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282"></a>[282]</span></p>

<p>An army so great and strongly constituted appearing
in Aragon would, Soult argued, necessarily
raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca,
Fraga, and Monzon, the two last being now
menaced by the bands, and it was probable that
Tortoza and even Saguntum would be relieved.
The great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca,
yet he was resolved to try, even though he should
convey them upon trucks to be made in Paris and
sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious
inconvenience from the union of the troops in
France since Suchet had already declared his intention
of retiring towards Gerona; and on the
Bayonne side the army to be left there could dispute
the entrenched line between Cambo and St.
Jean de Luz. If driven from thence it could take
a flanking position behind the Nive, the right resting
upon the entrenched camp of Bayonne, the left
upon the works at Cambo and holding communication
by the fortified mountain of Ursouia with St.
Jean Pied de Port. But there could be little fear
for this secondary force when the great army was
once in Aragon. That which he most dreaded was
delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected
after the middle of October, would entirely
close the pass of Jaca.</p>

<p>This proposition written the 2d of September,
immediately after the battle of San Marcial,
reached Suchet the 11th and was peremptorily
rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia discouragement,
he said, would spread, desertion would
commence, and France be immediately invaded by
lord William Bentinck at the head of fifty thousand
men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable and the
power of man could not open it for carriages under<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283"></a>[283]</span>
a year’s labour. His wish was to act on the defensive,
but if an offensive movement was absolutely
necessary, he offered a counter-project; that
is, he would first make the English in his front
re-embark at Taragona, or he would drive them
over the Ebro and then march with one hundred
guns and thirty thousand men by Lerida to the
Gallego river near Zaragoza. Soult’s army, coming
by Jaca without guns, might there meet him, and
the united forces could then do what was fitting.
But to effect this he required a reinforcement of
conscripts, and to have Paris’s division and the
artillery-men and draft horses of Soult’s army sent
to Catalonia; he demanded also that two thousand
bullocks for the subsistence of his troops should
be provided to meet him on the Gallego. Then
touching upon the difficulties of the road from
Sanguessa to Pampeluna, he declared, that after
forcing Wellington across the Ebro, he would return
to Catalonia to revictual his fortresses and
prevent an invasion of France. This plan he
judged far less dangerous than Soult’s, yet he
enlarged upon its difficulties and its dangers if the
combined movements were not exactly executed.
In fine, he continued, “The French armies are
entangled amongst rocks, and the emperor should
direct a third army upon Spain, to act between the
Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the
army of Spain sixty thousand strong and that of
Aragon thirty thousand strong operate on the
flanks. Thus <em>the reputation of the English army,
too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will
be abated</em>.”</p>

<p>This illiberal remark combined with the defects
of his project, proves that the duke of Albufera<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284"></a>[284]</span>
was far below the duke of Dalmatia’s standard both
in magnanimity and in capacity. The one giving
his adversary just praise, thought the force already
supplied by the emperor sufficient to dispute for
victory; the other, with an unseemly boast, desired
overwhelming numbers.</p>

<p>Soult’s letter reached Suchet the day before the
combat of Ordal, and in pursuance of his own plan
he should have driven lord William Bentinck over
the Ebro, as he could well have done, because the
Catalan troops there separated from the Anglo-Sicilians.
In his former letters he had estimated
the enemies in his front at two hundred thousand
fighting men, and affirmed that his own disposable
force was only eleven thousand, giving that as a
reason why he could not march to Aragon. Now,
forgetful of his previous objections and estimates,
he admitted that he had thirty thousand disposable
troops, and proposed the very movement which he
had rejected as madness when suggested by the
duke of Dalmatia. And the futility of his arguments
relative to the general discouragement, the
desertion of his soldiers, and the temptation to an
invasion of France if he adopted Soult’s plan, is
apparent; for these things could only happen on
the supposition that he was retreating from weakness,
a notion which would have effectually covered
the real design until the great movement in advance
should change the public opinion. Soult’s
plan was surer better imagined and grander than
his; it was less dangerous in the event of failure
and more conformable to military principles. Suchet’s
project involved double lines of operation
without any sure communications, and consequently
without any certainty of just co-operation;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285"></a>[285]</span>
his point of junction was within the enemy’s power,
and the principal army was to be deprived of its
artillery. There was no solidity in this design;
a failure would have left no resource. But in
Soult’s project the armies were to be united at a
point beyond the enemy’s reach, and to operate
afterwards in mass with all arms complete, which
was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet
indeed averred the impracticability of moving the
guns by Jaca, yet Soult’s counter-opinion claims
more respect. Clauzel and Paris who had lately
passed with troops through that defile were in his
camp, he had besides made very exact inquiries of
the country people, had caused the civil engineers
of roads and bridges on the frontiers to examine
the route, and from their reports he judged the difficulty
to be not insurmountable.</p>

<p>Neither the inconsistency, nor the exaggerations
of Suchet’s statements, escaped Soult’s observation,
but anxious to effect something while Pampeluna
still held out, and the season permitted operations
in the mountains he frankly accepted the other’s
modification, and adopted every stipulation, save
that of sending the artillery-men and horses of his
army to Catalonia which he considered dangerous.
Moreover he doubted not to pass his own guns by
Jaca. The preparations for this great movement
were therefore immediately commenced, and Suchet
on his part seemed equally earnest although he
complained of increasing difficulties, pretended
that Longa’s and Morillo’s divisions had arrived in
Catalonia, that general Graham was also in march
with troops to that quarter, and deplored the loss
of Fraga from whence the Empecinado had just
driven his garrison. This post commanded indeed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286"></a>[286]</span>
a bridge over the Cinca a river lying in his way
and dangerous from its sudden and great floods but
he still possessed the bridge of Monzon.</p>

<p>During this correspondence between the French
marshals, Napoleon remained silent, yet at a later
period he expressed his discontent at Suchet’s inactivity,
and indirectly approved of Soult’s plans
by recommending a movement towards Zaragoza
which Suchet however did not execute. It would
appear that the emperor having given all the reinforcements
he could spare, and full powers to both
marshals to act as they judged fitting for his service,
would not, at a distance and while engaged in such
vast operations as those he was carrying on at Dresden,
decide so important a question. The vigorous
execution essential to success was not to be expected
if either marshal acted under constraint and against
his own opinion; Soult had adopted Suchet’s
modification and it would have been unwise to substitute
a new plan which would have probably displeased
both commanders. Meanwhile Wellington
passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet’s project was annulled
by the approach of winter and by the further
operations of the allies.</p>

<p>If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon
had been happily achieved, it would certainly
have forced Wellington to repass the Ebro
or fight a great battle with an army much
less strongly constituted than the French army.
If he chose the latter, victory would have profited
him little, because his enemy strong in
cavalry could have easily retired on the fortresses
of Catalonia. If he received a check he must have
gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to Portugal, and
the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287"></a>[287]</span>
and Valencia. It is not probable however that such
a great operation could have been conducted without
being discovered in time by Wellington. It has
been already indicated in this History, that besides
the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence
employed by all generals, he had secret
emissaries amongst Joseph’s courtiers, and even
amongst French officers of rank; and it has been
shown that Soult vainly endeavoured to surprise him
on the 31st of August when the combinations were
only two days old. It is true that the retreat of
Suchet from Catalonia and his junction with Soult
in France at the moment when Napoleon was pressed
in Germany, together with the known difficulty of
passing guns by Jaca, would naturally have led to
the belief that it was a movement of retreat and
fear; nevertheless the secret must have been known
to more than one person about each marshal, and
the English general certainly had agents who were
little suspected. Soult would however still have
had the power of returning to his old positions, and,
with his numbers increased by Suchet’s troops,
could have repeated his former attack by the Roncesvalles.
It might be that his secret design was
thus to involve that marshal in his operations, and
being disappointed he was not very eager to
adopt the modified plan of the latter, which the
approach of the bad season, and the menacing
position of Wellington, rendered each day less promising.
His own project was hardy, and dangerous
for the allies, and well did it prove lord Wellington’s
profound acquaintance with his art. For he had
entered France only in compliance with the wishes
of the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely
for Suchet, averring that the true military line of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288"></a>[288]</span>
operations was towards Aragon and Catalonia.
Being now however actually established in France,
and the war in Germany having taken a favourable
turn for the allies, he resolved to continue the operations
on his actual front awaiting only the</p>


<h4>FALL OF PAMPELUNA.</h4>

<p>This event was produced by a long blockade,<span class="sidenote9">September.</span>
less fertile of incident than the siege of San Sebastian
yet very honourable to the firmness of the
governor general Cassan.</p>

<p>The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants,
stood on a bold table-land on which a number of
valleys opened, and where the great roads, coming
from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguessa, Tudela,
Estella, Vittoria, and Irurzun, were concentrated.
The northern and eastern fronts of the fortress were
covered by the Arga, and the defences there consisted
of simple walls edging the perpendicular
rocky bank of the river, but the other fronts were
regularly fortified with ditches, covered way, and
half-moons. Two bad unfinished outworks were
constructed on the south front, but the citadel which
stood on the south west was a regular pentagon,
with bomb-proofs and magazines, vaulted barracks
for a thousand men, and a complete system of
mines.</p>

<p>Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by
Mina for eighteen months previous to the battle of
Vittoria, and when Joseph arrived after the action,
the place was badly provisioned. The stragglers
of his army increased the garrison to something
more than three thousand five hundred men of all
arms, who were immediately invested by the allies.
Many of the inhabitants went off during the short<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289"></a>[289]</span>
interval between the king’s arrival and departure,
and general Cassan, finding his troops too few for
action and yet too many for the food, abandoned <ins class="corr" id="tn-289" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the two outwarks'">
the two outworks</ins> on the south, demolished everything
which could interfere with his defence outside, and
commenced such works as he deemed necessary
to improve it inside. Moreover <ins class="corr" id="tn-289a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'forseeing that the'">
foreseeing that the</ins> French army might possibly make a sudden march
without guns to succour the garrison, he prepared
a field-train of forty pieces to meet the occasion.</p>

<p>It has been already shown that Wellington,<span class="sidenote7">July.</span>
although at first inclined to besiege Pampeluna,
finally established a blockade and ordered works of
contravallation to be constructed. Cassan’s chief
object was then to obtain provisions, and on the
28th and 30th of June he sustained actions outside
the place to cover his foragers. On the 1st of July
he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the
river Arga, and forced many inhabitants to quit the
place before the blockaders’ works were completed.
Skirmishes now occurred almost daily, the French
always seeking to gather the grain, and vegetables
which were ripe and abundant beyond the walls,
and the allies endeavouring to set fire to the standing
corn within range of the guns of the fortress.</p>

<p>On the 14th of July, O’Donnel’s Andalusians
were permanently established as the blockading
force, and the next day the garrison made a successful
forage on the south side of the town. This
operation was repeated towards the east beyond the
Arga on the 19th, when a sharp engagement of
cavalry took place, during which the remainder of
the garrison carried away a great deal of corn.</p>

<p>The 26th the sound of Soult’s artillery reached
the place, and Cassan, judging rightly that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290"></a>[290]</span>
marshal was in march to succour Pampeluna, made
a sally in the night by the Roncesvalles road; he
was driven back, but the next morning he came out
again with eleven hundred men and two guns, overthrew
the Spanish outguards, and advanced towards
Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling
back with the third and fourth divisions. Then
O’Donnel, as I have before related, evacuated some
of the entrenchments, destroyed a great deal of
ammunition, spiked a number of guns, and but for
the timely arrival of Carlos D’España’s division, and
the stand made by Picton at Huarte, would have
abandoned the blockade altogether.</p>

<p>Soon the battle on the mountains of Oricain commenced,
the smoke rose over the intervening heights
of Escava and San Miguel, the French cavalry
appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the baggage
of the allies was seen filing in the opposite direction
by Berioplano along the road of Irurzun. The
garrison thought deliverance sure, and having reaped
a good harvest withdrew into the place. The
bivouac fires of the French army cheered them
during the night, and the next morning a fresh
sally being made with the greatest confidence,
a great deal of corn was gathered with little loss of
men. Several deserters from the foreign regiments
in the English service also came over with intelligence
exaggerated and coloured after the manner
of such men, and the French re-entered the place
elated with hope; but in the evening the sound of
the conflict ceased and the silence of the next day
shewed that the battle was not to the advantage of
Soult. However the governor losing no time made
another sally and again obtained provisions from the
south side.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_291"></a>[291]</span></p>

<p>The 30th the battle recommenced but the retreating
fire of the French told how the conflict was
decided and the spirit of the soldiers fell. Nevertheless
their indefatigable officers led another
sally on the south side, whence they carried off
grain and some ammunition which had been left in
one of the abandoned outworks.</p>

<p>On the 31st Carlos D’España’s troops and two
thousand of O’Donnel’s Andalusians, in all about
seven thousand men, resumed the blockade, and
maintained it until the middle of September, when<span class="sidenote9">September.</span>
the Prince of Anglona’s division of Del Parque’s
army, relieved the Andalusians who rejoined their
own corps near Echallar. The allies’ works of contravallation
were now augmented, and when Paris
retired into France from Jaca, part of Mina’s troops
occupied the valleys leading from the side of Sanguessa
to Pampeluna and made entrenchments to
bar the escape of the garrison that way.</p>

<p>In October Cassan put his fighting men upon
rations of horse-flesh, four ounces to each, with
some rice, and he turned more families out of the
town, but this time they were fired upon by their
countrymen and forced to re-enter.</p>

<p>On the 9th of September baron Maucune, who
had conducted most of the sallies during the
blockade, attacked and carried some fortified houses
on the east side of the place; he was immediately
assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them
and pursued the fugitives close to Villalba. Carlos
D’España then advanced to their aid in person with
a greater body and the French were driven in with
the loss of eighty men, yet the Spaniards lost a far
greater number, Carlos D’España himself was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292"></a>[292]</span>
wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn which
was their principal object.</p>

<p>The soldiers were now feeding on rats and other
disgusting animals; seeking also for roots beyond
the walls many in their hunger poisoned themselves
with hemlock, and a number of others unable to
bear their misery deserted. In this state Cassan<span class="sidenote9">October.</span>
made a general sally on the 10th of October, to
ascertain the strength of the lines around him, with
a view to breaking through, but after some fighting,
his troops were driven in with the loss of seventy
men and all hope of escape vanished. Yet he still
spoke of attempting it, and the public manner in
which he increased the mines under the citadel
induced Wellington to reinforce the blockade, and
to bring up his cavalry into the vicinity of Pampeluna.</p>

<p>The scurvy now invaded the garrison. One thousand
men were sick, eight hundred had been
wounded, the deaths by battle and disease exceeded
four hundred, one hundred and twenty had deserted,
and the governor moved by the great misery, offered
on the 26th to surrender if he was allowed to retire
into France with his troops and six pieces of cannon.
This being refused he proposed to yield on condition
of not serving for a year and a day, which being
also denied, he broke off the negociation, giving
out that he would blow up the works of the fortress
and break through the blockade. To deter him a
menacing letter was thrown to his outposts, and
lord Wellington being informed of his design denounced
it as contrary to the laws of war, and
directed Carlos D’España to put him, all his officers
and non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293"></a>[293]</span>
soldiers to death when the place should be taken
if any damage were done to the works.</p>

<p>Cassan’s object being merely to obtain better
terms this order remained dormant, and happily so,
for the execution would never have borne the test
of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna
and break through the blockading force, as
Brennier did at Almeida, would have been a very
noble exploit, and a useful one for the French army
if Soult’s plan of changing the theatre of war by
descending into Aragon had been followed. There
could therefore be nothing contrary to the laws of
war in a resolute action of that nature. On the
other hand if the governor, having no chance whatever
of success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence
for destroying a great fortress belonging to
the Spaniards and depriving the allies of the fruits
of their long blockade and glorious battles, the
conquerors might have justly exercised that severe
but undoubted right of war, refusing quarter to an
enemy. But lord Wellington’s <ins class="corr" id="tn-293" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'letter to España'">
letter to D’España</ins> involved another question, namely the putting of
prisoners to death. For the soldiers could not be
decimated until captured, and their crime would
have been only obedience to orders in a matter of
which they dared not judge. This would have been
quite contrary to the usages of civilized nations, and
the threat must undoubtedly be considered only as
a device to save the works of Pampeluna and to
avoid the odium of refusing quarter.</p>

<p>A few days longer the governor and garrison
endured their distress and then capitulated, having
defended themselves more than four months with
great constancy. The officers and soldiers became
prisoners of war. The first were allowed to keep<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294"></a>[294]</span>
their arms and baggage, the second their knapsacks,
expressly on the ground that they had treated the
inhabitants well during the investment. This compliment
was honourable to both sides, but there was
another article, <ins class="corr" id="tn-294" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'enforced by España'">
enforced by D’España</ins> without being
accepted by the garrison, for which it is difficult to
assign any motive but the vindictive ferocity of the
Spanish character. No person of either sex was
permitted to follow the French troops, and women’s
affections were thus barbarously brought under the
action of the sword.</p>

<p>There was no stronghold now retained by the
French in the north of Spain except Santona, and
as the blockade of that place had been exceedingly
tedious, lord Wellington, whose sea communications
were interrupted by the privateers from
thence, formed a small British corps under lord
Aylmer with a view to attack Laredo, which being
on the opposite point of the harbour to Santona
commanded the anchorage. Accidental circumstances
however prevented this body from proceeding
to its destination and Santona remained in the
enemy’s possession. With this exception the contest
in the northern parts of Spain was terminated and
the south of France was now to be invaded; but it
is fitting first to show with what great political
labour Wellington brought the war to this state,
what contemptible actions and sentiments, what a
faithless alliance, and what vile governments his
dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295"></a>[295]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent"><em>Political state of Portugal.</em> In this country the<span class="sidenote7">1813.</span>
national jealousy which had been compressed by
the force of invasion expanded again with violence
as danger receded, and the influence of England
sunk precisely in the measure that her army
assured the safety of Portugal. When Wellington
crossed the Ebro, the Souza faction, always opposed
in the council to the British policy, became
elate; and those members of the government who
had hitherto cherished the British ascendancy
because it sustained them against the Brazilian
court intrigues, now sought popularity by taking
an opposite direction. Each person of the regency
had his own line of opposition marked out.
Noguera vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial
and financial operations; the Principal
Souza wrangled more fiercely and insolently at the
council-board; the Patriarch fomented ill-will at<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span>
Lisbon and in the northern provinces; Forjas, ambitious
to command the national troops, became
the organ of discontent upon military matters.
The return of the prince-regent, the treaty of
commerce, the Oporto company, the privileges of
the British factory merchants, the mode of paying
the subsidy, the means of military transport, the
convention with Spain relative to the supply of the
Portuguese troops in that country, the recruiting,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296"></a>[296]</span>
the organization, the command of the national
army, and the honours due to it, all furnished occasions
for factious proceedings, which were conducted
with the ignoble subtlety that invariably
characterizes the politics of the Peninsula. Moreover
the expenditure of the British army had been
immense, the trade and commerce dependent upon
it, now removed to the Spanish ports, enormous.
Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal
taxes carelessly or partially enforced were vexatious
to the people without being profitable to the government.
Nine-tenths of the revenue accrued
from duties upon British trade, and the sudden
cessation of markets and of employment, the absence
of ready money, the loss of profit, public
and private, occasioned by the departure of the
army while the contributions and other exactions
remained the same, galled all classes, and the
whole nation was ready to shake off the burthen
of gratitude.</p>

<p>In this state of feeling emissaries were employed
to promulgate in various directions tales, some
true some false, of the disorders perpetrated by
the military detachments on the lines of communication,
adding that they were the result of secret
orders from Wellington to satisfy his personal hatred
of Portugal! At the same time discourses
and writings against the British influence abounded
in Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed
or surpassed by the London newspapers, whose
statements overflowing of falsehood could be
traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital.
It was asserted that England intending to retain
her power in Portugal opposed the return of the
prince-regent; that the war itself being removed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297"></a>[297]</span>
to the frontier of France was become wholly a
Spanish cause; that it was not for Portugal to levy
troops, and exhaust her resources to help a nation
whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner
or later to resist.</p>

<p>Mr. Stuart’s diplomatic intercourse with the government
always difficult was now a continual remonstrance
and dispute; his complaints were met
with insolence or subterfuge, and illegal violence
against the persons and property of British subjects
was pushed so far, that Mr. Sloane, an English
gentleman upon whom no suspicion rested,
was cast into prison for three months because he
had come to Lisbon without a passport. The
rights of the English factory were invaded, and
the Oporto company which had been established
as its rival in violation of treaty was openly cherished.
Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious
company robbed every body, and the
prince-regent promising either to reform or totally
abolish it ordered a preparatory investigation, but
to use the words of Mr. Stuart, the regency acted
on the occasion no less unfairly by their sovereign
than unjustly by their ally.</p>

<p>Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants
were another cause of disquiet. They pretended
to exemption from certain taxes, and from
billets, and that a fixed number of their clerks
domestics and cattle should be exonerated of military
service. These pretensions were disputed.
The one touching servants and cattle, doubtful at
best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to
billets unfounded; but the taxes were justly resisted,
and the merchants offered a voluntary contribution
to the same amount. The government<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298"></a>[298]</span>
rudely refused this offer, seized their property,
imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to
transport supplies that never reached the troops,
and made soldiers of their clerks and servants
without any intention of reinforcing the army.
Mr. Stuart immediately deducted from the subsidy
the amount of the property thus forcibly taken,
and repaid the sufferers. The regency then commenced
a dispute upon the fourth article of the
treaty of commerce, and the prince, though he
openly ordered it to be executed, secretly permitted
count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain
in London as ambassador until the disputes
arising upon this treaty generally were arranged.
Funchal who disliked to quit London took care to
interpose many obstacles to a final decision, always
advising delay under pretence of rendering ultimate
concession of value in other negociations then depending.</p>

<p>When the battle of Vittoria became known, the
regency proposed to entreat the return of the prince
from the Brazils, hoping thereby to excite the opposition
of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to
their expectations, approved of the proposal they
deferred the execution. The British cabinet which
had long neglected Wellington’s suggestions on this
head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro, and
Funchal who had been at first averse now urged
it warmly, fearing that if the prince remained he
could no longer defer going to the Brazils. However
few of the Portuguese nobles desired the
return of the royal family, and when the thing was
proposed to the regent he discovered no inclination
for the voyage.</p>

<p>But the most important subject of discord was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299"></a>[299]</span>
the army. The absence of the sovereign and the
intrigues which ruled the court of Rio Janeiro had
virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an
oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government
formed for mischief. The whole course
of this history has shewn that all Wellington’s
energy and ability, aided by the sagacity and firmness
of Mr. Stuart and by the influence of England’s
power and riches, were scarcely sufficient to
meet the evils flowing from this foul source. Even
while the French armies were menacing the capital
the regency was split into factions, the financial
resources were neglected or wasted, the public
servants were insolent incapable and corrupt, the
poorer people oppressed, and the military force for
want of sustenance was at the end of 1812 on the
point of dissolving together. The strenuous interference
of the English general and envoy, seconded
by the extraordinary exertions of the British officers
in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the
efficiency of the army, and in the campaign of
1813 the spirit of the troops was surpassing. Even
the militia-men, who had been deprived of their
colours and drafted into the line to punish their
bad conduct at Guarda under general Trant in
1812, nobly regained their standards on the Pyrenees.</p>

<p>But this state of affairs acting upon the naturally
sanguine temperament and vanity of the Portuguese,
created a very exaggerated notion of their
military prowess and importance, and withal a<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span>
morbid sensitiveness to praise or neglect. General
Picton had thrown some slur upon the conduct of
a regiment at Vittoria, and marshal Beresford complained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300"></a>[300]</span>
that full justice had not been done to their
merits. The eulogiums passed in the English parliament
and in the despatches upon the conduct
of the British and Spanish troops, but not extended
to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation, and
the remarks and omissions of the London newspapers
were as wormwood.</p>

<p>Meanwhile the regency, under pretext of a dispute
with Spain relative to a breach of the military
convention of supply, neglected the subsistence
of the army altogether; and at the same time so
many obstacles to the recruiting were raised, that
the depôts, which ought to have furnished twelve
thousand men to replace the losses sustained in the
campaign, only contained four thousand, who were
also without the means of taking the field. This
matter became so serious that Beresford quitting
the army in October came to Lisbon, to propose a
new regulation which should disregard the exemptions
claimed by the nobles the clergy and the
English merchants for their servants and followers.
On his arrival Forjas urged the public discontent
at the political position of the Portuguese troops.
They were, he said, generally incorporated with
the British divisions, commanded by British officers,
and having no distinct recognized existence
their services were unnoticed and the glory of the
country suffered. The world at large knew not
how many men Portugal furnished for the war.
It was known indeed that there were Portuguese
soldiers, as it was known that there were Brunswickers
and Hanoverians, but as a national army
nothing was known of them; their exertions, their
courage, only went to swell the general triumph of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301"></a>[301]</span>
England, while the Spaniards, inferior in numbers,
and far inferior in all military qualities, were flattered,
praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the
English newspapers, and in the discourses and
votes of the British parliament. He proposed
therefore to have the Portuguese formed into a distinct
army acting under lord Wellington.</p>

<p>It was objected that the brigades incorporated
with the British divisions were fed by the British
commissariat the cost being deducted from the
subsidy, an advantage the loss of which the Portuguese
could not sustain. Forjas rejoined that
they could feed their own troops cheaper if the
subsidy was paid in money, but Beresford referred
him to his scanty means of transport, so scanty
that the few stores they were then bound to furnish
for the unattached brigades depending upon the
Portuguese commissariat were not forwarded.
Foiled on this point Forjas proposed gradually to
withdraw the best brigades from the English divisions,
to incorporate them with the unattached
brigades of native troops and so form an auxiliary
corps; but the same objection of transport still
applied and this matter dropped for the moment.
The regency then agreed to reduce the legal age
of men liable to the conscription for the army, but
the islands, which ought to have given three hundred
men yearly, were exempt from their controul,
and the governors supported by the prince-regent
refused to permit any levies in their jurisdictions,
and even granted asylums to all those who wished to
avoid the levy in Portugal. In the islands also the
persons so unjustly and cruelly imprisoned in 1810
were still kept in durance, although the regency yielding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302"></a>[302]</span>
to the persevering remonstrances of Mr. Stuart
and lord Wellington had released those at Lisbon.</p>

<p>Soon after this Beresford desired to go to England,
and the occasion was seized by Forjas to
renew his complaints and his proposition for a separate
army which he designed to command himself.
General Sylveira’s claim to that honour was
however supported by the Souzas, to whose faction
he belonged, and the only matter in which all
agreed was the display of ill-will towards England.
Lord Wellington became indignant. The English
newspapers, he said, did much mischief by their
assertions, but he never suspected they could by
their omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and
government. The latter complained that their
troops were not praised in parliament, nothing
could be more different from a debate within the
house than the representation of it in the newspapers.
The latter seldom stated an event or
transaction as it really occurred, unless when they
absolutely copied what was written for them; and
even then their observations branched out so far
from the text, that they appeared absolutely incapable
of understanding much less of stating the
truth upon any subject. The Portuguese people
should therefore be cautious of taking English
newspapers as a test of the estimation in which
the Portuguese army was held in England, where
its character stood high and was rising daily.
“Mr. Forjas is,” said lord Wellington, “the ablest
man of business I have met with in the Peninsula,
it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have
the folly to alter a successful military system. I
understand something of the organization and feeding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303"></a>[303]</span>
of troops, and I assure him that separated
from the British, the Portuguese army could not
keep the field in a good state although their government
were to incur ten times the expense under
the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting
state for the field they can gain no honour, they
must suffer dishonour! The vexatious disputes
with Spain are increasing daily, and if the omissions
or assertions of newspapers are to be the
causes of disagreement with the Portuguese <em>I will
quit the Peninsula for ever</em>”!</p>

<p>This remonstrance being read to the regency,
Forjas replied officially.</p>

<p>“The Portuguese government demanded nothing
unreasonable. The happy campaign of 1813 was
not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its
means. It had a right to expect greater exertions
from Spain, which was more interested than Portugal
in the actual operations since the safety of
the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a
solid peace, she did not expect increase of territory,
nor any advantage save the consideration
and influence which the services and gallantry of
her troops would give her amongst European nations,
and which, unhappily, she would probably
require in her future intercourse with Spain. The
English prince-regent his ministers and his generals,
had rendered full justice to her military services
in the official reports, but that did not suffice
to give them weight in Europe. Official reports
did not remove this inconvenience. It was only
the public expressions of the English prince and
his ministers that could do justice. The Portuguese
army was commanded by Marshal Beresford,
Marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304"></a>[304]</span>
so considered and thanked accordingly for its exploits,
and with as much form and solemnity by
the English parliament and general as was used
towards the Spanish army. The more so that the
Portuguese had sacrificed their national pride to
the common good, whereas the Spanish pride had
retarded the success of the cause and the liberty
of Europe. It was necessary also to form good
native generals to be of use after the war; but
putting that question aside, it was only demanded
to have the divisions separated by degrees and
given to Portuguese officers. Nevertheless such
grave objections being advanced they were willing,
he said, to drop the matter altogether.”</p>

<p>The discontent however remained, for the argument
had weight, and if any native officers’ reputation
had been sufficient to make the proceeding
plausible, the British officers would have been
driven from the Portuguese service, the armies
separated, and both ruined. As it was, the regency
terminated the discussion from inability to
succeed; from fear not from reason. The persons
who pretended to the command were Forjas
and Sylveira; but the English officers who were
as yet well-liked by the troops, would not have
served under the former, and Wellington objected
strongly to the latter, having by experience discovered
that he was an incapable officer seeking
a base and pernicious popularity by encouraging
the views of the soldiers. Beresford then relinquished
his intention of going to England, and the
justice of the complaint relative to the reputation
of the Portuguese army being obvious, the general
orders became more marked in favour of the
troops. But the most effectual check to the project<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305"></a>[305]</span>
of the regency was the significant intimation
of Mr. Stuart, that England, being bound by no
conditions in the payment of the subsidy, had a
right if it was not applied in the manner most
agreeable to her, to withdraw it altogether.</p>

<p>To have this subsidy in specie and to supply
their own troops continued to be the cry of the
regency, until their inability to effect the latter
became at last so apparent that they gave the matter
up in despair. Indeed Forjas was too able a man
ever to have supposed, that the badly organized
administration of Portugal, was capable of supporting
an efficient army in the field five hundred miles
from its own country; the real object was to shake
off the British influence if possible without losing
the subsidy. For the honour of the army or the
welfare of the soldiers neither the regency nor the
prince himself had any care. While the former
were thus disputing for the command, they suffered
their subordinates to ruin an establishment at Ruña,
the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated soldiers,
and turned the helpless veterans adrift. And the
prince while he lavished honours upon the dependents
and creatures of his court at Rio Janeiro,
placed those officers whose fidelity and hard fighting
had preserved his throne in Portugal at the
bottom of the list, amongst the menial servants of
the palace who were decorated with the same ribands!
Honour, justice, humanity, were alike
despised by the ruling men and lord Wellington
thus expressed his strong disgust.</p>

<p>“<em>The British army which I have the honour to
command has met with nothing but ingratitude from
the government and authorities in Portugal for
their services, every thing that could be done has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_306"></a>[306]</span>
been done by the civil authorities lately to oppress
the officers and soldiers on every occasion in
which it has by any accident been in their power.
I hope however that we have seen the last of Portugal</em>”!</p>

<p>Such were the relations of the Portuguese government
with England, and with Spain they were
not more friendly. Seven envoys from that country
had succeeded each other at Lisbon in three years.
The Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic
opinions which had obtained ground in Spain, and
the leading party in the Cortez were intent to
spread those opinions over the whole Peninsula.
The only bond of sympathy between the two governments
was hatred of the English who had
saved both. On all other points they differed. The
exiled bishop of Orense, from his asylum on the
frontier of Portugal, excited the Gallicians against
the Cortez so vigorously, that his expulsion from
Portugal, or at least his removal from the northern
frontier, was specially demanded by the Spanish
minister; but though a long and angry discussion
followed the bishop was only civilly requested by
the Portuguese government to abstain from acts
disagreeable to the Spanish regency. The latter
then demanded that he should be delivered up as a
delinquent, whereupon the Portuguese quoted a
decree of the Cortez which deprived the bishop of
his rights as a Spanish citizen and denaturalized
him. However he was removed twenty leagues
from the frontier, nor was the Portuguese government
itself quite free from ecclesiastic troubles.
The bishop of Braganza preached doctrines which
were offensive to the patriarch and the government;
he was confined but soon released and an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307"></a>[307]</span>
ecclesiastical sentence pronounced against him,
which only increased his followers and extended
the influence of his doctrines.</p>

<p>Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period,
was the return of Ballesteros from his exile at
Ceuta. He had been permitted towards the end of
1813, and as lord Wellington thought with no
good intent, to reside at Fregenal. The Portuguese
regency, fearing that he would rally round him
other discontented persons, set agents to watch his
proceedings, and under pretence of putting down
robbers who abounded on that frontier, established
a line of cavalry and called out the militia, thus
making it manifest that but a little was wanting to
kindle a war between the two countries.</p>

<p><em>Political state of Spain.</em> Lord Wellington’s victories
had put an end to the intercourse between
Joseph and the Spaniards who desired to make
terms with the French; but those people not losing
hope, formed a strong anti-English party and
watched to profit by the disputes between the two
great factions at Cadiz, which had now become
most rancorous and dangerous to the common
cause. The serviles extremely bigoted both in
religion and politics had the whole body of the
clergy on their side. They were the most numerous
in the Cortez and their views were generally
in accord with the feelings of the people
beyond the Isla de Leon, although their doctrines
were comprised in two sentences—<em>An absolute king,
An intolerant church</em>. The liberals supported and
instigated by all ardent innovators, by the commercial
body and populace of Cadiz, had also partizans
beyond the Isla; and taking as guides the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308"></a>[308]</span>
revolutionary writings of the French philosophers
were hastening onwards to a democracy, without
regard to ancient usages or feelings, and without
practical ability to carry their theories into execution.
There was also a fourth faction in the
Cortez, formed by the American deputies, who
were secretly labouring for the independence of the
colonies; they sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes
the serviles, as it suited their purposes, and
thus often produced anomalous results, because
they were numerous enough to turn the scale in
favour of the side which they espoused. Jealousy
of England was however common to all, and
“<i lang="es">Inglesismo</i>” was used as a term of contempt.
Posterity will scarcely believe, that when lord Wellington
was commencing the campaign of 1813 the
Cortez was with difficulty, and by threats rather
than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding
foreign troops to enter a Spanish fortress.
Alicant, Tarifa, Cadiz itself where they held their
sittings, had been preserved; Ciudad Rodrigo,
Badajos, had been retaken for them by British
valour; English money had restored their broken
walls and replenished their exhausted magazines;
English and Portuguese blood still smoked from
their ramparts; but the men from whose veins that
blood had flowed, were to be denied entrance at
gates which they could not approach, without
treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades
who had sacrificed their lives to procure for this
sordid ungrateful assembly the power to offer the
insult.</p>

<p>The subjection of the bishops and other clergy,
who had in Gallicia openly opposed the abolition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309"></a>[309]</span>
of the inquisition and excited the people to resistance,
was an object of prominent interest with an
active section of the liberals called the Jacobins.
And this section generally ruled the Cortez, because
the Americanos leaned strongly towards their
doctrines, and the interest of the anti-English, or
French party, was to produce dissensions which
could be best effected by supporting the most violent
public men. A fierce and obstinate faction
they were, and they compelled the churchmen to
submit for the time, but not until the dispute became
so serious that lord Wellington when in the
Pyrenees expected a civil war on his communications,
and thought the clergy and the peasantry
would take part with the French. This notion
which gives his measure for the patriotism of both
parties, proved however unfounded; his extreme
discontent at the progress of liberal doctrines had
somewhat warped his judgment; the people were
less attached to the church than he imagined, the
clergy of Gallicia, meeting with no solid support,
submitted to the Cortez, and the archbishop of Santiago
fled to Portugal.</p>

<p>Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed
the moving spring of the English tories’
policy. Napoleon was warred against, not as they
pretended because he was a tyrant and usurper,
for he was neither; not because his invasion of
Spain was unjust, but because he was the powerful
and successful enemy of aristocratic privileges.
The happiness and independence of the Peninsula
were words without meaning in their state-papers
and speeches, and their anger and mortification
were extreme when they found success against the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_310"></a>[310]</span>
emperor had fostered that democracy it was their
object to destroy. They were indeed only prevented
by the superior prudence and sagacity of
their general, from interfering with the internal
government of Spain in so arrogant and injudicious
a manner, that an open rupture wherein the Spaniards
would have had all appearance of justice,
must have ensued. This folly was however stifled
by Wellington, who desired to wait until the blow
could be given with some effect, and he was quite
willing to deal it himself; yet the conduct of the
Cortez, and that of the executive government
which acted under its controul, was so injurious
to Spain and to his military operations, and so
unjust to him personally, that the warmest friends
of freedom cannot blame his enmity. Rather
should his moderation be admired, when we find
his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution
exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by
Vegas, a considerable member of the Cortez and
perfectly acquainted with the subject.</p>

<p>Speaking of the “<i lang="es">Afrancesados</i>” or French
party, more numerous than was supposed and active
to increase their numbers, he says, “The thing<span class="sidenote">Original Letter, MSS.</span>
which they most enforced and which made most
progress was the diminution of the English influence.”
Amongst the serviles they gained proselytes,
by objecting the English religion and constitution
which restricted the power of the sovereign.
With the liberals, they said the same constitution
gave the sovereign too much power; and
the Spanish constitution having brought the king’s
authority under that of the Cortez was an object
of jealousy to the English cabinet and aristocracy,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_311"></a>[311]</span>
who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers
of England, were resolved that the Spanish
constitution should not stand. To the Americans
they observed that lord Wellington opposed them,
because he did not help them and permitted expeditions
to be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans
who wished to retain the colonies and
exclude foreign trade, they represented the English
as fomenters and sustainers of the colonial
rebellion, because they did not join their forces
with Spain to put it down. To the honest patriots
of all parties they said, that every concession to
the English general was an offence against the
dignity and independence of the nation. If he
was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate
Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was
careful in preparation, his delay was to enable
the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in
urging the government to useful measures, his
design was to impose his own laws; if he neglected
the Spanish armies, he desired they should
be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it
was to gain the soldiers turn the army against the
country and thus render Spain dependent on
England. And these perfidious insinuations were
effectual because they flattered the national pride,
as proving that the Spaniards could do every thing
for themselves without the aid of foreigners.
Finally that nothing could stop the spread of such
dangerous doctrines but new victories, which would
bring the simple honesty and gratitude of the
people at large into activity. Those victories
came and did indeed stifle the French party in
Spain, but many of their arguments were too well
founded to be stifled with their party.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_312"></a>[312]</span></p>

<p>The change of government which had place
in the beginning of the year, gave hope that the
democratic violence of the Cortez would decline
under the control of the cardinal Bourbon; but that
prince, who was not of true royal blood in the
estimation of the Spaniards, because his father had
married without the consent of the king, was from
age, and infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The
new regency became therefore more the slaves of
the Cortez than their predecessors, and the Cadiz
editors of newspapers, pre-eminent in falsehood
and wickedness even amongst their unprincipled
European brotherhood, being the champions of the
Jacobins directed the populace of that city as they
pleased. And always the serviles yielded under
the dread of personal violence. Their own crimes
had become their punishment. They had taught
the people at the commencement of the contest that
murder was patriotism, and now their spirit sunk
and quailed, because at every step to use the
terribly significant expression of Wellington, “<em>The
ghost of Solano was staring them in the face</em>.”</p>

<p>The principal points of the Jacobins’ policy in
support of their crude constitution, which they
considered as perfect as an emanation from the
Deity, were, 1º. The abolition of the Inquisition,
the arrest and punishment of the Gallician bishops,
and the consequent warfare with the clergy. 2º. The
putting aside the claim of Carlotta to the regency.
3º. The appointment of captain-generals and other
officers to suit their factious purposes. 4º. The
obtaining of money for their necessities, without
including therein the nourishment of the armies.
5º. The control of the elections for a new Cortez
so as to procure an assembly of their own way of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_313"></a>[313]</span>
thinking, or to prevent its assembling at the legal
period in October.</p>

<p>The matter of the bishops as we have seen nearly
involved them in a national war with Portugal, and
a civil war with Gallicia. The affair of the princess
was less serious, but she had never ceased intriguing,
and her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British
ministers and general while the army was cooped
up in Portugal, were, although she was a declared
enemy to the English alliance, now rather favoured
by sir Henry Wellesley as a mode of checking the
spread of democracy. Lord Wellington however
still held aloof, observing that if appointed according
to the constitution, she would not be less a
slave to the Cortez than her predecessors, and
England would have the discredit of giving power
to the “worst woman in existence.”</p>

<p>To remove the seat of government from the
influence of the Cadiz populace was one mode of
abating the power of the democratic party, and the
yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing
of the general Cortez in September, had apparently
given the executive government some freedom of
action, and seemed to furnish a favourable opportunity
for the English ambassador to effect its
removal. The regency, dreading the epidemic,
suddenly resolved to proceed to Madrid, telling
sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer
pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their
sole motive. They had secretly formed this resolution
at night and proposed to commence the journey
next day, but a disturbance arose in the city and
the alarmed regents convoked the extraordinary
Cortez; the ministers were immediately called before
it and bending in fear before their masters, declared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_314"></a>[314]</span>
with a scandalous disregard of truth, that there
was no intention to quit the Isla without consulting
the Cortez. Certain deputies were thereupon appointed<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, No. 2.</a></span>
to inquire if there was any fever, and a few
cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently
to shield the regents, recommended that they should
remove to Port St. Mary.</p>

<p>This did not satisfy the assembly. The government
was commanded to remain at Cadiz until the new
general Cortez should be installed, and a committee
was appointed to probe the whole affair or rather
to pacify the populace, who were so offended with
the report of the first deputation, that the speech
of Arguelles on presenting it was hissed from the
galleries, although he was the most popular and
eloquent member of the Cortez. The more moderate
liberals thus discovered that they were equally with
the serviles the slaves of the newspaper writers.
Nevertheless the inherent excellence of freedom,
though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble
shapes, was involuntarily admitted by lord Wellington
when he declared, that wherever the Cortez and
government should fix themselves the press would
follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada,
or Madrid, would become as bad as the people of
Cadiz.</p>

<p>The composition of the new Cortez was naturally
an object of hope and fear to all factions, and the
result being uncertain, the existing assembly took
such measures to prolong its own power that it was
expected two Cortez would be established, the one
at Cadiz, the other at Seville, each striving for
mastery in the nation. However the new body
after many delays was installed at Cadiz in November,
and the Jacobins, strong in the violence of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_315"></a>[315]</span>
populace, still swayed the assembly, and kept the
seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid spread
of the fever brought a stronger fear into action.
Then the resolution to repair to Madrid was
adopted, and the sessions in the Isla closed on the
29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For
the general belief being, that no person could take
the sickness twice, and almost every resident family
had already suffered from former visitations, the
merchants with an infamous cupidity declaring that<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, No. 2.</a></span>
there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously
to issue clean bills of health to ships leaving
the port, and endeavoured by intimidation to keep
the regency and Cortez in the city.</p>

<p>An exact and copious account of these factions
and disputes, and of the permanent influence which
these discussions of the principles of government,
this constant collision of opposite doctrines, had
upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously
traced, form a lesson of the highest interest
for nations. But to treat the subject largely would
be to write a political history of the Spanish revolution,
and it is only the effect upon the military
operations which properly appertains to a history
of the war. That effect was one of unmitigated
evil, but it must be observed that this did not
necessarily spring from the democratic system, since
precisely the same mischiefs were to be traced in
Portugal, where arbitrary power, called legitimate
government, was prevalent. In both cases alike,
the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes
of factious politicians.</p>

<p>It has been shewn in a former volume, that one
Spanish regency contracted an engagement with
lord Wellington on the faith of which he took the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_316"></a>[316]</span>
command of their armies in 1813. It was scrupulously
adhered to by him, but systematically violated
by the new regency and minister of war, almost
as soon as it was concluded. His recommendations
for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders
were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and
changes were made in the commands and in the
destinations of the troops without his concurrence,
and without passing through him as generalissimo.
Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños,
captain-general of Gallicia, Estremadura, and Castile,
was disgracefully removed from his government
under pretence of calling him to assist in the council
of state. His nephew general Giron was at the
same time deprived of his command over the Gallician
army, although both he and Castaños had
been largely commended for their conduct by lord
Wellington. General Frere, appointed captain-general
of Castile and Estremadura, succeeded
Giron in command of the troops, and the infamous
Lacy replaced Castaños in Gallicia, chosen, it was
believed, as a fitter tool to work out the measures
of the Jacobins against the clergy in that kingdom.
Nor was the sagacity of that faction at
fault, for Castaños would, according to lord Wellington,
have turned his arms against the Cortez
if an opportunity had offered. He and others were
now menaced with death, and the Cortez contemplated
an attack upon the tithes, upon the
feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates of the
grandees. All except the last very fitting to do if
the times and circumstances had been favourable
for a peaceful arrangement; but most insane when
the nation generally was averse, and there was an
invader in the country to whom the discontented<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_317"></a>[317]</span>
could turn. The clergy were at open warfare with
the government, many generals were dissatisfied,
and menacing in their communications with the
superior civil authorities, the soldiers were starving
and the people tired of their miseries only desired
to get rid of the invaders, and to avoid the burthen
of supplying the troops of either side. The
English cabinet, after having gorged Spain with
gold and flattery was totally without influence. A
terrible convulsion was at hand if the French could
have maintained the war with any vigour in Spain
itself; and the following passages, from Wellington’s
letters to the ministers, prove, that even he contemplated
a forcible change in the government and
constitution.</p>

<p>“If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads
from shoulders as the newspapers have threatened
Castaños, and the assembly seize upon landed property
to supply their necessities, I am afraid we
must do something more than discountenance them.”—“It
is quite impossible such a system can last.
What I regret is that I am the person that maintains
it. If I was out of the way there are
plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros
positively intended it, and I am much
mistaken if O’Donnel and even Castaños, and probably
others are not equally ready. If the king
should return he also will overturn the whole fabric
if he has any spirit.”—“I wish you would let me
know whether if I should find a fair opportunity of
striking at the democracy the government would
approve of my doing it.” And in another letter he
seriously treated the question of withdrawing from
the contest altogether. “The government were
the best judges,” he said, “of whether they could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_318"></a>[318]</span>
or ought to withdraw,” but he did not believe that
Spain could be a useful ally, or at all in alliance
with England, if the republican system was not put
down. Meanwhile he recommended to the English
government and to his brother, to take no part
either for or against the princess of Brazil, to discountenance
the democratical principles and measures
of the Cortez, and if their opinion was
asked regarding the formation of a new regency,
to recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution
which lodged all power with the Cortez,
and to give instead, some authority to the executive
government whether in the hands of king or regent.
To fill the latter office one of royal blood uniting
the strongest claims of birth with the best capacity
should he thought be selected, but if capacity
was wanting in the royal race then to choose the
Spaniard who was most deserving in the public
estimation! Thus necessity teaches privilege to
bend before merit.</p>

<p>The whole force of Spain in arms was at this period
about one hundred and sixty thousand men. Of this
number not more than fifty thousand were available
for operations in the field, and those only because
they were paid clothed and armed by England,
and kept together by the ability and vigour of the
English general. He had proposed when at Cadiz
an arrangement for the civil and political government
of the provinces rescued from the French,
with a view to the supply of the armies, but his
plan was rejected and his repeated representations
of the misery the army and the people endured
under the system of the Spanish government were
unheeded. Certain districts were allotted for the
support of each army, yet, with a jealous fear<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_319"></a>[319]</span>
of military domination, the government refused
the captain-generals of those districts the necessary
powers to draw forth the resources of the
country, powers which lord Wellington recommended
that they should have, and wanting which
the whole system was sure to become a nullity.
Each branch of administration was thus conducted<span class="sidenote">Letter to the Spanish <ins class="corr" id="tn-319" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'minis- of war'">
minister of war</ins>, 30th Aug. 1813.</span>
by chiefs independent in their attributes, yet each
too restricted in authority, generally at variance
with one another, and all of them neglectful of
their duty. The evil effect upon the troops was
thus described by the English general as early as
August.</p>

<p>“More than half of Spain has been cleared of
the enemy above a year, and the whole of Spain
excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon
since the months of May and June last. The most
abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of
the country; millions of money spent by the contending
armies are circulating every where, and
yet your armies however weak in numbers are
literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese
armies under my command have been subsisted,
particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon
the magazines imported by sea, and I am concerned
to inform your excellency, that besides money for
the pay of all the armies, which has been given
from the military chest of the British army and has
been received from no other quarter, the British
magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to
all the Spanish armies in order to enable them to
remain in the field at all. And notwithstanding
this assistance I have had the mortification of seeing
the Spanish troops on the outposts, obliged to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_320"></a>[320]</span>
plunder the nut and apple-trees for subsistence, and
to know that the Spanish troops, employed in the
blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving
upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy
whom they were blockading were at the same time
receiving their full allowance. The system then is
insufficient to procure supplies for the army and at
the same time I assure your excellency that it is the
most oppressive and injurious to the country that
could be devised. It cannot be pretended that the
country does not produce the means of maintaining
the men necessary for its defence; those means are
undoubtedly superabundant, and the enemy has
proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at
the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger
than are necessary for its defence.”</p>

<p>These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the
public servants, and to their overwhelming numbers,
that certain sign of an unprosperous state; to the
disgraceful negligence and disregard of public duties,
and to there being no power in the country for
enforcing the law; the collection of the revenue
cost in several branches seventy and eighty per cent.
Meanwhile no Spanish officers capable of commanding
a large body of troops or keeping it in an
efficient state had yet appeared, no efficient staff,
no system of military administration had been
formed, and no shame for these deficiencies, no
exertions to amend were visible.</p>

<p>From this picture two conclusions are to be
drawn, 1º. that the provinces, thus described as
superabounding in resources, having been for
several years occupied by the French armies, the
warfare of the latter could not have been so devastating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_321"></a>[321]</span>
and barbarous as it was represented.
2º. That Spain, being now towards the end as
helpless as she had been at the beginning and all
through the war, was quite unequal to her own deliverance
either by arms or policy; that it was
English valour English steel, directed by the genius
of an English general, which rising superior to
all obstacles, whether presented by his own or
the peninsular governments or by the perversity of
national character, worked out her independence.
So utterly inefficient were the Spaniards themselves,
that now, at the end of six years’ war, lord
Wellington declared thirty thousand of their troops
could not be trusted to act separately; they were
only useful when mixed in the line with larger
numbers of other nations. And yet all men in authority
to the lowest alcalde were as presumptuous
as arrogant and as perverse as ever. Seeming to be
rendered callous to public misery by the desperate
state of affairs, they were reckless of the consequences
of their actions and never suffered prudential
considerations or national honour to check the
execution of any project. The generals from repeated
failures had become insensible to misfortunes,
and without any remarkable display of personal
daring, were always ready to deliver battle
on slight occasions, as if that were a common matter
instead of being the great event of war.</p>

<p>The government agents were corrupt, and the
government itself was as it had ever been tyrannical
faithless mean and equivocating to the lowest degree.
In 1812 a Spaniard of known and active
patriotism thus commenced an elaborate plan of
defence for the provinces. “Catalonia abhors France
as her oppressor but she abhors still more the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_322"></a>[322]</span>
despotism which has been carried on in all the
branches of her administration since the beginning
of the war.” In fine there was no healthy action in
any part of the body politic, every thing was rotten
except the hearts of the poorer people. Even at
Cadiz Spanish writers compared the state to a
vessel in a hurricane without captain, pilot, compass,
chart sails or rudder, and advised the crew
to cry to heaven as their sole resource. But they
only blasphemed.</p>

<p>When Wellington, indignant at the systematic
breach of his engagement, remonstrated, he was answered
that the actual regency did not hold itself
bound by the contracts of the former government.
Hence it was plain no considerations of truth, for
they had themselves also accepted the contract, nor
of honest policy, nor the usages of civilized states
with respect to national faith, had any influence on
their conduct. Enraged at this scandalous subterfuge,
he was yet conscious how essential it was
he should retain his command. And seeing all
Spanish generals more or less engaged in political
intrigues, none capable of co-operating with
him, and that no Spanish army could possibly
subsist as a military body under the neglect and
bad arrangement of the Spanish authorities, conscious
also that public opinion in Spain would,
better than the menaces of the English government,
enable him to obtain a counterpoise to the democratic
party, he tendered indeed his resignation if
the government engagement was not fulfilled, but
earnestly endeavoured by a due mixture of mildness
argument and reproof to reduce the ruling authorities
to reason. Nevertheless there were, he told
them, limits to his forbearance to his submission<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_323"></a>[323]</span>
under injury, and he had been already most unworthily
treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish
government.</p>

<p>From the world these quarrels were covered by
an appearance of the utmost respect and honour.
He was made a grandee of the first class, and the estate
of Soto de Roma in Grenada, of which the much-maligned
and miserable Prince of Peace had been
despoiled, was settled upon him. He accepted the
gift, but, as he had before done with his Portuguese
and Spanish pay, transferred the proceeds to
the public treasury during the war. The regents
however, under the pressure of the Jacobins, and
apparently bearing some personal enmity, although
one of them, Ciscar, had been instrumental in procuring
him the command of the Spanish army, were
now intent to drive him from it; and the excesses
committed at San Sebastian served their factious
writers as a topic for exciting the people not only
to demand his resignation, but to commence a warfare
of assassination against the British soldiers.
Moreover, combining extreme folly with wickedness,
they pretended amongst other absurdities that the
nobility had offered, if he would change his religion,
to make him king of Spain. This tale was
eagerly adopted by the English newspapers, and
three Spanish grandees thought it necessary to
declare that they were not among the nobles who
made the proposition. His resignation was accepted
in the latter end of September, and he held the
command only until the assembling of the new
Cortez, but the attempt to render him odious failed
even at Cadiz, owing chiefly to the personal ascendancy
which all great minds so surely attain over<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_324"></a>[324]</span>
the masses in troubled times. Both the people and
the soldiers respected him more than they did their
own government, and the Spanish officers had
generally yielded as ready obedience to his wishes
before he was appointed generalissimo, as they did
to his orders when holding that high office. It was
this ascendancy which enabled him to maintain the
war with such troublesome allies; and yet so little
were the English ministers capable of appreciating
its importance, that after the battle of Vittoria they
entertained the design of removing him from Spain
to take part in the German operations. His answer
was short and modest, but full of wisdom.</p>

<p>“Many might be found to conduct matters as
well as I can both here and in Germany, but nobody
would enjoy the same advantages here, and I should
be no better than another in Germany.”</p>

<p>The egregious folly which dictated this proposition
was thus checked, and in December the new
Cortez decided that he should retain the command
of the armies and the regency be bound to fulfil
its predecessor’s engagements. Nevertheless so
deeply had he been offended by the libels relative
to San Sebastian that a private letter to his brother
terminated thus:—“<em>It will rest with the king’s
government to determine what they will do upon a
consideration of all the circumstances of the case,
but if I was to decide I would not keep the army in
Spain for one hour.</em>” And to many other persons at
different times he expressed his fears and conviction
that the cause was lost and that he should fail at
last. It was under these, and other enormous difficulties
he carried on his military operations. It was
with an enemy at his back more to be dreaded than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_325"></a>[325]</span>
the foe in his front that he invaded the south of
France; and that is the answer to those French
writers who have described him as being at the head
of more than two hundred thousand well-furnished
soldiers, supported by a well-organized insurrection
of the Spanish people, unembarrassed in his movements,
and luxuriously rioting in all the resources
of the Peninsula and of England.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_326"></a>[326]</span><br></p>

<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XXIII">BOOK XXIII.</h2>
</div>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3>

<h4>WAR IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.</h4>


<p class="noindent">While Pampeluna held out, Soult laboured to<span class="sidenote9">1813. November.</span>
complete his works of defence, especially the entrenched
camp of St. Jean Pied de Port, that he
might be free to change the theatre of war to
Aragon. He pretended to entertain this project as
late as November; but he must have secretly
renounced all hope before that period, because the
snows of an early and severe winter had rendered
even the passes of the Lower Pyrenees impracticable
in October. Meanwhile his political difficulties
were not less than lord Wellington’s, all his
efforts to draw forth the resources of France were
met with apathy, or secret hostility, and there
was no money in the military chest to answer the
common daily expenses. A junta of the leading
merchants in Bayonne voluntarily provided for the
most pressing necessities of the troops, but their
means were limited and Soult vainly urged the
merchants of Bordeaux and Toulouse to follow the
patriotic example. It required therefore all his
firmness of character to support the crisis; and if
the English naval force had been sufficient to intercept
the coasting vessels between Bordeaux and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_327"></a>[327]</span>
Bayonne, the French army must have retired beyond
the Adour. As it was, the greatest part of
the field artillery and all the cavalry were sent so
far to the rear for forage, that they could not be
counted a part of the fighting troops; and the infantry,
in addition to their immense labours, were
forced to carry their own provisions from the
navigable points of the rivers to the top of the
mountains.</p>

<p>Soult was strongly affected. “<em>Tell the emperor</em>,”
he wrote to the minister of war, “<em>tell him when you
make your next report that on the very soil of France,
this is the situation of the army destined to defend
the southern provinces from invasion; tell him also
that the unheard-of contradictions and obstacles I
meet with shall not make me fail in my duty</em>.”</p>

<p>The French troops suffered much, but the privations
of the allies were perhaps greater, for being on
higher mountains, more extended, more dependent
upon the sea, their distress was in proportion to
their distance from the coast. A much shorter line
had been indeed gained for the supply of the centre,
and a bridge was laid down at Andarlassa which
gave access to the roots of the Bayonette mountain,
yet the troops were fed with difficulty; and
so scantily, that lord Wellington in amends reduced
the usual stoppage of pay, and invoked the army
by its military honour to sustain with firmness the
unavoidable pressure. The effect was striking.
The murmurs, loud in the camps before, were
hushed instantly, although the soldiers knew that
some commissaries leaguing with the speculators
upon the coast, secretly loaded the provision mules
with condiments and other luxuries, to sell on the
mountains at enormous profit. The desertion was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_328"></a>[328]</span>
however great, more than twelve hundred men went
over to the enemy in less than four months; and
they were all Germans, Englishmen or Spaniards,
for the Portuguese who abandoned their colours invariably
went back to their own country.</p>

<p>This difficulty of feeding the Anglo-Portuguese,
the extreme distress of the Spaniards and the certainty
that they would plunder in France and so
raise the people in arms, together with the uneasy
state of the political affairs in the Peninsula, rendered
lord Wellington very averse to further offensive
operations while Napoleon so tenaciously
maintained his positions on the Elbe against the
allied sovereigns. It was impossible to make a
formidable and sustained invasion of France with
the Anglo-Portuguese alone, and he had neither
money nor means of transport to feed the Spaniards,
even if policy warranted such a measure. The
nature of the country also forbad a decisive victory,
and hence an advance was attended with the risk
of returning to Spain again during the winter,
when a retreat would be dangerous and dishonouring.
But on the 20th of October a letter from the
governor of Pampeluna was intercepted, and lord
Fitzroy Somerset, observing that the compliment of
ceremony at the beginning was also in numerals,
ingeniously followed the cue and made out the
whole. It announced that the place could not hold
out more than a week, and as intelligence of Napoleon’s
disasters in Germany became known at the
same time, lord Wellington was induced to yield
once more to the wishes of the allied sovereigns and
the English ministers, who were earnest that he
should invade France.</p>

<p>His intent was to attack Soult’s entrenched camp<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_329"></a>[329]</span>
on the 29th, thinking Pampeluna would fall before
that period. In this he was mistaken; and bad
weather stopped his movements, for in the passes
above Roncesvalles the troops were knee-deep in
snow. The preparations however continued and
strict precautions were taken to baffle the enemy’s
emissaries. Soult was nevertheless perfectly informed
by the deserters of the original design and the
cause of the delay; and he likewise obtained from
a serjeant-major of artillery who losing his road was
taken on the 29th, certain letters and orders indicating
an attack in the direction of the bridge of Amotz,
between D’Erlon’s right and Clauzel’s left. Some
French peasants also who had been allowed to pass
the allied outposts declared they had been closely
questioned about that bridge and the roads leading
to it. The defences there were therefore augmented
with new redoubts and abbatis, and Soult
having thus as he judged, sufficiently provided for
its safety, and being in no pain for his right, nor
for Clauzel’s position, covered as the latter was by
the smaller Rhune, turned his attention towards
Foy’s corps.</p>

<p>That general had been posted at Bidarray, half
way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo, to
watch certain roads, which leading to the Nive from
Val Baigorry by St. Martin d’Arosa, and from the
Bastan by Yspegui and the Gorospil mountain, gave
Soult anxiety for his left; but now expecting the principal
attack at the bridge of Amotz, and not by these
roads, nor by St. Jean Pied de Port, as he at first
supposed and as lord Wellington had at one time
designed, he resolved to use Foy’s division offensively.
In this view on the 3d of November he
instructed him if St. Jean Pied de Port should be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_330"></a>[330]</span>
only slightly attacked, to draw all the troops he
could possibly spare from its defence to Bidarray,
and when the allies assailed D’Erlon, he was to
seize the Gorospil mountain and fall upon their
right as they descended from the Puerto de Maya.
If on the other hand he was himself assailed by
those lines, he was to call in all his detached troops
from St. Jean Pied de Port, repass the Nive by the
bridge of Bidarray, make the best defence possible
behind that river, and open a communication with
Pierre Soult and Trielhard, whose divisions of cavalry
were at St. Palais and Orthes.</p>

<p>On the 6th Foy, thinking the Gorospil difficult
to pass, proposed to seize the Col de Yspegui from
the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and so descend
into the Bastan. Soult however preferred Bidarray
as a safer point and more united with the main body
of the army; but he gave Foy a discretionary
power to march along the left of the Nive upon
Itzatzu and Espelette, if he judged it fitting to
reinforce D’Erlon’s left rather than to attack the
enemy.</p>

<p>Having thus arranged his regular defence, the
French general directed the prefect of the Lower
Pyrenees to post the organized national guards at
the issues of all the valleys about St. Jean Pied de
Port, but to keep the mass of the people quiet until
the allies penetrating into the country should at
once provoke and offer facilities for an irregular
warfare.</p>

<p>On the 9th, being still uneasy about the San
Martin d’Arosa and Gorospil roads, he brought up
his brother’s cavalry from St. Palais to the heights
above Cambo, and the next day the long-expected
storm burst.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_331"></a>[331]</span></p>

<p>Allured by some fine weather on the 6th and 7th
of November, lord Wellington had moved sir Rowland
Hill’s troops from the Roncesvalles to the Bastan
with a view to attack Soult, leaving Mina on
the position of Altobiscar and in the Alduides.
The other corps had also received their orders, and
the battle was to commence on the 8th, but general
Freyre suddenly declared, that unable to subsist on
the mountains he must withdraw a part of his
troops. This was a scheme to obtain provisions
from the English magazines, and it was successful,
for the projected attack could not be made without
his aid. Forty thousand rations of flour with a
formal intimation that if he did not co-operate the
whole army must retire again into Spain, contented
Freyre for the moment; but the extravagant abuses
of the Spanish commissariat were plainly exposed
when the chief of the staff declared that the flour
would only suffice for two days, although there were
less than ten thousand soldiers in the field. Spain
therefore furnished at the rate of two rations for
every fighting man and yet her troops were starving!</p>

<p>When this difficulty was surmounted heavy
rain caused the attack to be again deferred, but
on the 10th ninety thousand combatants of all<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix, 7</a>, No. 3.</span>
arms and ranks above seventy-four thousand being
Anglo-Portuguese, descended to the battle, and
with them went ninety-five pieces of artillery, which
under the command of colonel Dickson were all
with inconceivable vigour and activity thrown into
action. Nor in this host do I reckon four thousand
five hundred cavalry, nor the Spaniards of the blockading
division which remained in reserve. On the
other hand the French numbers were now increased
by the new levy of conscripts, but many had deserted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_332"></a>[332]</span>
again into the interior, and the fighting men
did not exceed seventy-nine thousand including the
garrisons. Six thousand of these were cavalry, and<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix, No. 8.</a></span>
as Foy’s operations were extraneous to the line of
defence scarcely sixty thousand infantry and artillery
were opposed to the allies.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington seeing that the right of Soult’s
line could not be forced without great loss, resolved
to hold it in check while he turned it by forcing the
centre and left, pushing down the Nivelle to San
Pé. In this view the second and sixth British
division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, Morillo’s Spaniards,
four of Mina’s battalions, and Grant’s brigade of
light cavalry, in all twenty-six thousand fighting
men and officers with nine guns, were collected
under general Hill in the Bastan to attack D’Erlon.
The position of Roncesvalles was meanwhile occupied
by the remainder of Mina’s troops supported
by the blockading force under Carlos D’España.</p>

<p>The third fourth and seventh divisions, and<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.</span>
Giron’s Andalusians, the whole under the command
of marshal Beresford, were disposed about Zagaramurdi,
the Puerto de Echallar, and the lower parts
of those slopes of the greater Rhune which descended
upon Sarre. On the left of this body the
light division and Longa’s Spaniards, both under
Charles Alten, were disposed on those slopes of the
greater Rhune which led down towards Ascain.
Victor Alten’s brigade of light cavalry and three
British batteries, were placed on the road to Sarre,
and six mountain-guns followed Giron’s and Charles
Alten’s troops. Thus thirty-six thousand fighting
men and officers, with twenty-four guns, were concentrated
in this quarter to attack Clauzel.</p>

<p>General Freyre’s Spaniards, about nine thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_333"></a>[333]</span>
strong, with six guns, were disposed on Alten’s left,<span class="sidenote7">Plan 6.</span>
at the fort of Calvary and towards Jollimont, ready
to fall upon any troops which might be detached
from the camp of Serres by the bridge of Ascain,
to support Clauzel.</p>

<p>General Hope having the first and fifth divisions,
Wilson’s, Bradford’s, and lord Aylmer’s brigades of
infantry, Vandeleur’s brigade of light dragoons, and
the heavy German cavalry, in all about nineteen
thousand men and officers with fifty-four guns, was
opposed to Soult’s right wing; and the naval squadron
hovering on Hope’s left flank was to aid the
land operations.</p>

<p>On the French side each lieutenant-general had
a special position to defend. D’Erlon’s first line,
its left resting on the fortified rocks of Mondarin
which could not be turned, run from thence along
the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains by the
forge of Urdax to the Nivelle. This range was
strongly entrenched and occupied by one of Abbé’s
and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades, Espelette being
behind the former and Ainhoa behind the latter.
The second line or main position was several miles
distant on a broad ridge, behind Ainhoa, and it was
occupied by the remaining brigades of the two
divisions. The left did not extend beyond the
centre of the first line, but the right reaching to
the bridge of Amotz stretched with a wider flank,
because the Nivelle flowing in a slanting direction
towards the French gave greater space as their
positions receded. Three great redoubts were constructed
in a line on this ridge, and a fourth had
been commenced close to the bridge.</p>

<p>On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to
say beyond the bridge of Amotz, Clauzel’s position<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_334"></a>[334]</span>
extended to Ascain, also along a strong range of
heights fortified with many redoubts trenches and
abbatis, and as the Nivelle after passing Amotz
swept in a curve completely round the range to
Ascain, both flanks rested alike upon that river,
having communication by the bridges of Amotz and
Ascain on the right and left, and a retreat by the
bridges of San Pé and Harastagui which were in
rear of the centre. Two of Clauzel’s divisions
reinforced by one of D’Erlon’s under general Maransin
were here posted. In front of the left were
the redoubts of St. Barbe and Grenada covering
the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the
right was the smaller Rhune which was fortified
and occupied by a brigade of Maransin’s division.
A new redoubt with abbatis was also commenced to
cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz.</p>

<p>On the right of this line beyond the bridge of
Ascain, Daricau’s division belonging to Clauzel’s
corps, and the Italian brigade of San Pol drawn
from Villatte’s reserve, were posted to hold the
entrenched camp of Serres and to connect Clauzel’s
position with Villatte’s, which was as I have before
said on a ridge crossing the gorges of Olette and
Jollimont. The French right wing under Reille,
strongly fortified on the lower ground and partially
covered by inundations, was nearly impregnable.</p>

<p>Soult’s weakest point of general defence was
certainly the opening between the Rhune mountains
and the Nivelle. Gradually narrowing as it
approached the bridge of Amotz this space was the
most open, the least fortified, and the Nivelle being
fordable above that bridge could not hamper the
allies’ movements. Wherefore a powerful force acting
in this direction could pass by D’Erlon’s first line<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_335"></a>[335]</span>
and breaking in upon the main position, between
the right of that general’s second line and Clauzel’s
left, turn both by the same attack.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington thus designed his battle. General
Hill, leaving Minas four battalions on the
Gorospil mountain facing the rocks of Mondarin,
moved in the night by the different passes of
the Puerto de Maya, Morillo’s Spaniards being to
menace the French on the Choupera and Atchuleguy
mountains, the second division to attack Ainhoa
and Urdax. The sixth division and Hamilton’s
Portuguese were to assault the works covering the
bridge of Amotz, either on the right or left bank
of the Nivelle according to circumstances. Thus
the action of twenty-six thousand men was combined
against D’Erlon’s position, and on their left
Beresford’s corps was assembled. The third division
under general Colville, descending from Zagaramurdi,
was to move against the unfinished redoubts
and entrenchments covering the approaches to the
bridge of Amotz on the left bank of the Nivelle,
thus turning D’Erlon’s right at the moment when it
was attacked in front by Hill’s corps. On the left
of the third division, the seventh, descending from
the mouth of the Echallar pass, was to storm the
Grenada redoubt, and then passing the village of
Sarre assail Clauzel’s main position abreast with
the attack of the third division. On the left of the
seventh, the fourth division, assembling on the lower
slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon
the redoubt of San Barbe, and then moving through
Sarre also to assail Clauzel’s main position abreast
with the seventh division. On the left of the fourth
division, Giron’s Spaniards, gathered higher up on
the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_336"></a>[336]</span>
with the others leaving Sarre on their right. They
were to drive the enemy from the lower slopes of
the smaller Rhune and then in concert with the rest
attack Clauzel’s main position. In this way Hill’s
and Beresford’s corps, forming a mass of more than
forty thousand infantry were to be thrust, on both
sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clauzel and
D’Erlon to break their line of battle.</p>

<p>Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s
Spaniards, furnishing together about eight thousand
men, was likewise to attack Clauzel’s line on the
left of Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians approached
the bridge of Ascain to prevent reinforcements
coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten
could assail Clauzel’s right the smaller Rhune which
covered it was to be stormed. This mountain outwork
was a hog’s-back ridge rising abruptly out of
table-land and parallel with the greater Rhune. It
was inaccessible along its front, which was precipitous
and from fifty to two hundred feet high;
but on the enemy’s left these rocks gradually decreased,
descending by a long slope to the valley
of Sarre, and about two-thirds of the way down
the thirty-fourth French regiment was placed, with
an advanced post on some isolated crags situated
in the hollow between the two Rhunes. On the
enemy’s right the hog’s-back sunk by degrees into
the plain or platform. It was however covered at
that point by a marsh scarcely passable, and the
attacking troops were therefore first to move up
against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to
file to their left under fire, between the marsh and
the lower crags, until they gained an accessible
point from whence they could fight their way along
the narrow ridge of the hog’s-back But the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_337"></a>[337]</span>
bristles of the latter were huge perpendicular crags
connected with walls of loose stones so as to form
several small forts or castles communicating with
each other by narrow foot-ways, and rising one
above another until the culminant point was attained.
The table-land beyond this ridge was extensive and
terminated in a very deep ravine on every side,
save a narrow space on the right of the marsh,
where the enemy had drawn a traverse of loose
stones, running perpendicularly from behind the
hog’s-back and ending in a star fort which overhung
the edge of the ravine.</p>

<p>This rampart and fort, and the hog’s-back itself,
were defended by Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s
division, and the line of retreat was towards a low
narrow neck of land, which bridging the deep ravine
linked the Rhune to Clauzel’s main position: a
reserve was placed here, partly to sustain the thirty-fourth
French regiment posted on the slope of the
mountain towards Sarre, partly to protect the neck
of land on the side of that village. As this neck
was the only approach to the French position in that
part, to storm the smaller Rhune was a necessary
preliminary to the general battle, wherefore Alten,
filing his troops after dark on the 9th from the Hermitage,
the Commissary mountain, and the Puerto
de Vera, collected them at midnight on that slope
of the greater Rhune which descended towards
Ascain. The main body of the light division,
turning the marsh by the left, was to assail the
stone traverse and lap over the star fort by the
ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on
the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether;
and the forty-third regiment supported by the seventeenth
Portuguese was to assail the hog’s-back.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_338"></a>[338]</span>
One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns
were however left on the summit of the greater
Rhune, with orders to assail the craggy post between
the Rhunes and connect Alten’s attack with that
of Giron’s Spaniards. All these troops gained their
respective stations so secretly that the enemy had
no suspicion of their presence, although for several
hours the columns were lying within half musket-shot
of the works. Towards morning indeed five or
six guns, fired in a hurried manner from the low
ground near the sea, broke the stillness, but the
French on the Rhune remained quiet, and the
British troops awaited the rising of the sun when
three guns fired from the Atchubia mountain were
to give the signal of attack.</p>


<h4>BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE.</h4>

<p>The day broke with great splendour, and as the
first ray of light played on the summit of the lofty
Atchubia the signal-guns were fired in rapid succession
from its summit. The soldiers instantly
leaped up, and the French beheld with astonishment
several columns rushing forward from the flank of
the great Rhune. Running to their defences with
much tumult they opened a few pieces, which were
answered from the top of the greater Rhune by the
mountain-artillery, and at the same moment two
companies of the forty-third were detached to cross
the marsh if possible, and keep down the enemy’s
fire from the lower part of the hog’s-back. The
action being thus commenced the remainder of the
regiment, formed partly in line partly in a column
of reserve, turned the marsh by the right and advanced
against the high rocks. From these crags
the French shot fast and thickly, but the quick<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_339"></a>[339]</span>
even movement of the British line deceived their
aim, and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly
though the ground was rough, turned suddenly
between the rocks and the marsh, and were immediately
joined by the two companies which had passed
that obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all
together jumped into the lower works, but the men
exhausted by their exertions, for they had passed
over half a mile of very difficult ground with a wonderful
speed, remained for a few minutes inactive
within half pistol-shot of the first stone castle from
whence came a sharp and biting musketry. When
they had recovered breath they arose and with a
stern shout commenced the assault.</p>

<p>The defenders were as numerous as the assailants,
and for six weeks they had been labouring on their
well-contrived castles; but strong and valiant in arms
must the soldiers have been who stood in that hour
before the veterans of the forty-third. One French
grenadier officer only dared to sustain the rush.
Standing alone on the high wall of the first castle and
flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble
figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men
shrinking on each side sought safety among the rocks
on his flanks. Close and confused then was the action,
man met man at every turn, but with a rattling fire
of musketry, sometimes struggling in the intricate
narrow paths sometimes climbing the loose stone
walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way
until they had carried the second castle, called by
the French the place of arms, and the magpie’s nest,
because of a lofty pillar of rock which rose above
it and on which a few marksmen were perched.
From these points the defenders were driven into
their last castle, which being higher and larger<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_340"></a>[340]</span>
than the others and covered by a natural ditch or
cleft in the rocks, fifteen feet deep, was called the
Donjon. Here they made a stand, and the assailants,
having advanced so far as to look into the rear
of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below,
suspended the vehement throng of their attack for
a while, partly to gather a head for storming the
Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy beneath them,
who were now warmly engaged with the two
battalions of riflemen, the Portuguese Caçadores,
and the seventeenth Portuguese. This last regiment
was to have followed the forty-third but seeing
how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the
rocks, had moved at once against the traverse on
the other side of the marsh; and very soon the
French defending the rampart, being thus pressed
in front, and warned by the direction of the fire
that they were turned on the ridge above, seeing
also the fifty-second, forming the extreme left of
the division, now emerging from the deep ravine
beyond the star fort on the other flank, abandoned
their works. Then the forty-third gathering a
strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped
with a shout down the deep cleft in the rock,
others turned it by the narrow paths on each flank,
and the enemy abandoned the loose walls at the
moment they were being scaled. Thus in twenty
minutes six hundred old soldiers were hustled out
of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the
victors lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men.</p>

<p>The whole mountain was now cleared of the
French, for the riflemen dropping perpendicularly
down from the greater Rhune upon the post of
crags in the hollow between the Rhunes seized it
with small loss; but they were ill-seconded by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_341"></a>[341]</span>
Giron’s Spaniards and were hardly handled by the
thirty-fourth French regiment, which maintaining
its post on the slope, covered the flight of the
confused crowd which came rushing down the mountain
behind them towards the neck of land leading
to the main position. At that point they all rallied
and seemed inclined to renew the action, but after
some hesitation continued their retreat. This favourable
moment for a decisive stroke had been
looked for by the commander of the forty-third, but
the officer entrusted with the reserve companies of
the regiment had thrown them needlessly into the
fight, thus rendering it impossible to collect a body
strong enough to assail such a heavy mass.</p>

<p>The contest at the stone rampart and star fort,
being shortened by the rapid success on the hog’s-back,
was not very severe, but general Kempt, always
conspicuous for his valour, was severely wounded,
nevertheless he did not quit the field and soon reformed
his brigade on the platform he had thus so
gallantly won. Meanwhile the fifty-second having
turned the position by the ravine was now approaching
the enemy’s line of retreat, when general
Alten, following his instructions, halted the division
partly in the ravine itself to the left of the neck,
partly on the table-land, and during this action
Longa’s Spaniards having got near Ascain were in
connection with Freyre’s Gallicians. In this position
with the enemy now and then cannonading
Longa’s people and the troops in the ravine, Alten
awaited the progress of the army on his right, for
the columns there had a long way to march and it
was essential to regulate the movements.</p>

<p>The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent
the light division against the Rhune, had also put<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_342"></a>[342]</span>
the fourth and seventh divisions in movement against
the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada. Eighteen
guns were immediately placed in battery against
the former, and while they poured their stream of
shot the troops advanced with scaling ladders and
the skirmishers of the fourth division got into the
rear of the work, whereupon the French leaped out
and fled. Ross’s battery of horse artillery galloping
to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada
fort drove the enemy from there also, and then the
fourth and seventh divisions carried the village of
Sarre and the position beyond it and advanced to the
attack of Clauzel’s main position.</p>

<p>It was now eight o’clock and from the smaller
Rhune a splendid spectacle of war opened upon the
view. On one hand the ships of war slowly sailing to
and fro were exchanging shots with the fort of Socoa;
Hope menacing all the French lines in the low ground
sent the sound of a hundred pieces of artillery
bellowing up the rocks, and they were answered by
nearly as many from the tops of the mountains.
On the other hand the summit of the great Atchubia
was just lighted by the rising sun, and fifty
thousand men rushing down its enormous slopes
with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding
shadows into the deep valley. The plains of France
so long overlooked from the towering crags of the
Pyrenees were to be the prize of battle, and the half-famished
soldiers in their fury, broke through the
iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a
screen of reeds.</p>

<p>The principal action was on a space of seven or
eight miles, but the skirts of battle spread wide,
and in no point had the combinations failed. Far
on the right general Hill after a long and difficult<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_343"></a>[343]</span>
night march had got within reach of the enemy a
little before seven o’clock. Opposing Morillo’s and
Mina’s Spaniards to Abbé’s troops on the Mondarain
and Atchuleguy rocks, he directed the second division
against D’Armagnac’s brigade and brushed it
back from the forge of Urdax and the village of
Ainhoa. Meanwhile the aid of the sixth division
and Hamilton’s Portuguese being demanded by him,
they passed the Nivelle lower down and bent their
march along the right bank towards the bridge of
Amotz. Thus while Mina’s battalion and Morillo’s
division kept Abbé in check on the mountains, the
three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, marching left
flank in advance, approached D’Erlon’s second position,
but the country being very rugged it was
eleven o’clock before they got within cannon-shot of
the French redoubts. Each of these contained five
hundred men, and they were placed along the summit
of a high ridge which being thickly clothed
with bushes, and covered by a deep ravine was
very difficult to attack. However general Clinton,
leading the sixth division on the extreme left, turned
this ravine and drove the enemy from the works
covering the approaches to the bridge, after which
wheeling to his right he advanced against the nearest
redoubt, and the garrison not daring to await
the assault abandoned it. Then the Portuguese
division passing the ravine and marching on the right
of the sixth menaced the second redoubt, and the
second division in like manner approached the third
redoubt. D’Armagnac’s troops now set fire to their
hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda
behind San Pé, pursued by the sixth division. Abbé’s
second brigade forming the French left was separated
by a ravine from D’Armagnac’s ground, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_344"></a>[344]</span>
he also after some hesitation retreated towards Espelette
and Cambo, where his other brigade, which
had meanwhile fallen back from the Mondarain
before Morillo, rejoined him.</p>

<p>It was the progress of the battle on the left of
the Nive that rendered D’Erlon’s defence so feeble.
After the fall of the St. Barbe and Grenada redoubts
Conroux’s right and centre endeavoured to
defend the village and heights of Sarre; but while
the fourth and seventh divisions, aided by the ninety-fourth
regiment detached from the third division, attacked
and carried those points, the third division
being on their right and less opposed pushed rapidly
towards the bridge of Amotz, forming in conjunction
with the sixth division the narrow end of the wedge
into which Beresford’s and Hill’s corps were now
thrown. The French were thus driven from all their
new unfinished works covering the approaches to that
bridge on both sides of the Nivelle, and Conroux’s
division, spreading from Sarre to Amotz, was broken
by superior numbers at every point. That general
indeed vigorously defended the old works around
the bridge itself, but he soon fell mortally wounded,
his troops were again broken, and the third division
seized the bridge and established itself on the
heights between that structure and the redoubt of
Louis the XIV. which having been also lately commenced
was unfinished. This happened about eleven
o’clock and D’Erlon fearing to be cut off from
St. Pé yielded as we have seen at once to the
attack of the sixth division, and at the same time the
remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back in disorder
from Sarre, closely pursued by the fourth and
seventh divisions, which were immediately established
on the left of the third. Thus the communication<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_345"></a>[345]</span>
between Clauzel and D’Erlon was cut,
the left flank of one and the right flank of the other
broken, and a direct communication between Hill
and Beresford secured by the same blow.</p>

<p>D’Erlon abandoned his position, but Clauzel
stood firm with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions.
The latter now completed by the return of Barbot’s
brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt
of Louis the XIV. and supported with eight
field-pieces attempted to cover the flight of Conroux’s
troops. The guns opened briskly but they
were silenced by Ross’s battery of horse artillery,
the only one which had surmounted the difficulties
of the ground after passing Sarre, the infantry
were then assailed, in front by the fourth and seventh
divisions, in flank by the third division, the
redoubt of Louis XIV. was stormed, the garrison
bayonetted, Conroux’s men continued to fly,
Maransin’s after a stiff combat were cast headlong
into the ravines behind their position, and Maransin
himself was taken but escaped in the confusion.
Giron’s Spaniards now came up on the left of the
fourth division, somewhat late however, and after
having abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes
of the smaller Rhune.</p>

<p>On the French side Taupin’s division and a large
body of conscripts forming Clauzel’s right wing
still remained to fight. The left rested on a large
work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery
but overlooked the whole position; the right
was covered by two redoubts overhanging a ravine
which separated them from the camp of Serres, and
some works in the ravine itself protected the communication
by the bridge of Ascain. Behind the signal
redoubt, on a ridge crossing the road to San Pé and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_346"></a>[346]</span>
along which Maransin and Conroux’s beaten divisions
were now flying in disorder, there was another
work called the redoubt of Harastaguia, and Clauzel
thinking he might still dispute the victory, if his
reserve division, posted in the camp of Serres,
could come to his aid, drew the thirty-first French
regiment from Taupin, and posted it in front of
this redoubt of Harastaguia. His object was to
rally Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops there and so
form a new line, the left on the Harastaguia, the
right on the signal redoubt, into which last he threw
six hundred of the eighty-eighth regiment. In this
position having a retreat by the bridge of Ascain
he resolved to renew the battle, but his plan failed
at the moment of conception, because Taupin could
not stand before the light division which was now
again in full action.</p>

<p>About half-past nine, general Alten, seeing the
whole of the columns on his right, as far as the eye
could reach, well engaged with the enemy, had
crossed the low neck of land in his front. It was
first passed by the fifty-second regiment with a
rapid pace and a very narrow front, under a destructive
cannonade and fire of musketry from the
entrenchments which covered the side of the opposite
mountain; a road coming from Ascain by the
ravine led up the position, and as the fifty-second
pushed their attack along it the enemy abandoned
his entrenchments on each side, and forsook even
his crowning works above. This formidable regiment
was followed by the remainder of Alten’s troops,
and Taupin, though his division was weak from its
losses on the 7th of October and now still further
diminished by the absence of the thirty-first regiment,
awaited the assault above, being supported<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_347"></a>[347]</span>
by the conscripts drawn up in his rear. But at
this time Longa, having turned the smaller Rhune,
approached Ascain, and being joined by part of
Freyre’s troops their skirmishers opened a distant<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Official Report to Soult, MSS.</span>
musketry against the works covering that bridge
on Taupin’s right; a panic immediately seized the
French, the seventieth regiment abandoned the two<span class="sidenote">Taupin’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
redoubts above, and the conscripts were withdrawn.
Clauzel ordered Taupin to retake the forts but this
only added to the disorder, the seventieth regiment
instead of facing about disbanded entirely and
were not reassembled until next day. There remained
only four regiments unbroken, one, the
eighty-eighth, was in the signal redoubt, two under
Taupin in person kept together in rear of the
works on the right, and the thirty-first covered the
fort of Harastaguia now the only line of retreat.</p>

<p>In this emergency, Clauzel, anxious to bring off
the eighty-eighth regiment, ordered Taupin to
charge on one side of the signal redoubt, intending
to do the same himself on the other at the head of
the thirty-first regiment; but the latter was now
vigorously attacked by the Portuguese of the seventh
division, and the fourth division was rapidly interposing
between that regiment and the signal
redoubt. Moreover Alten previous to this had
directed the forty-third, preceded by Barnard’s
riflemen, to turn at the distance of musquet shot
the right flank of the signal redoubt, wherefore
Taupin instead of charging, was himself charged in
front by the riflemen, and being menaced at the
same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated,
closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer
fell dangerously wounded. During this struggle
the seventh division broke the thirty-first, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_348"></a>[348]</span>
rout was complete; the French fled to the different
bridges over the Nivelle and the signal redoubt
was left to its fate.</p>

<p>This formidable work barred the way of the
light division, but it was of no value to the defence
when the forts on its flanks were abandoned.
Colborne approached it in front with the fifty-second
regiment, Giron’s Spaniards menaced it on
Colborne’s right, the fourth division was passing to
its rear, and Kempt’s brigade was as we have seen
turning it on the left. Colborne whose military
judgment was seldom at fault, halted under the
brow of the conical hill on which the work was
situated, but some of Giron’s Spaniards making a
vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking
it on his right were beaten back, and at that moment
a staff-officer without warrant, for general Alten on
the spot assured the Author of this History that he
sent no such order, rode up and directed Colborne
to advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance
and his troops covered by the steepness of the hill
reached the flat top which was about forty yards
across to the redoubt; then they made their rush,
but a wide ditch, thirty feet deep well fraised and
pallisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of the
enemy stretched all the foremost men dead. The
intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously for he was
always at the head and on horseback, immediately
led the regiment under cover of the brow to another
point, and thinking to take the French unawares made
another rush, yet with the same result. At three
different places did he rise to the surface in this
manner, and each time the French fire swept away the
head of his column. Resorting then to persuasion
he held out a white handkerchief and summoned the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_349"></a>[349]</span>
commandant, pointing out to him how his work was
surrounded and how hopeless his defence, whereupon
the garrison yielded having had only one man
killed, whereas on the British side there fell two
hundred soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in
arms since arms were first borne by men.</p>

<p>During this affair Clauzel’s divisions had crossed
the Nivelle in great disorder, Maransin’s and
Conroux’s troops near San Pé, the thirty-first
regiment at Harastaguia, Taupin between that
place and the bridge of Serres. They were pursued
by the third and seventh divisions, and the
skirmishers of the former crossing by Amotz and a
bridge above San Pé entered that place while the
French were in the act of passing the river below.
It was now past two o’clock, Conroux’s troops
pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position
on the road from San Pé to Bayonne, where
they were joined by Taupin and by D’Erlon with
D’Armagnac’s division, but Clauzel rallied Maransin’s
men and took post on some heights immediately
above San Pé. Meanwhile Soult had
hurried from St. Jean de Luz to the camp
of Serres with all his reserve artillery and spare
troops to menace the allies’ left flank by Ascain, and
Wellington thereupon halted the fourth and light
divisions, and Giron’s Spaniards, on the reverse
slopes of Clauzel’s original position, facing the
camp of Serres, waiting until the sixth division,
then following D’Armagnac’s retreat on the right of
the Nivelle, was well advanced. When he was
assured of Clinton’s progress he crossed the Nivelle
with the third and seventh divisions and drove Maransin
from his new position after a hard struggle,
in which general Inglis was wounded and the fifty-first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_350"></a>[350]</span>
and sixty-eighth regiments handled very roughly.
This ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was
coming on and the troops were exhausted, especially
the sixth division which had been marching or
fighting for twenty-four hours. However three divisions
were firmly established in rear of Soult’s right
wing of whose operations it is now time to treat.</p>

<p>In front of Reille’s entrenchments were two advanced
positions, the camp of the Sans Culottes on
the right, the Bons Secours in the centre covering
Urogne. The first had been attacked and carried
early in the morning by the fifth division, which
advanced to the inundation covering the heights of
Bordegain and Ciboure. The second after a short
cannonade was taken by Halket’s Germans and the
guards, and immediately afterwards the eighty-fifth
regiment, of lord Aylmer’s brigade, drove a French
battalion out of Urogne. The first division, being
on the right, then menaced the camp of Belchena,
and the German skirmishers passed a small stream
covering this part of the line, but they were driven
back by the enemy whose musketry and cannonade
were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile
Freyre, advancing in two columns from Jollimont
and the Calvaire on the right of the first division,
placed eight guns in battery against the Nassau
redoubt, a large work constructed on the ridge
occupied by Villate to cover the approaches to Ascain.
The Spaniards were here opposed by their own
countrymen under Casa Palacio who commanded
the remains of Joseph’s Spanish guards, and during
the fight general Freyre’s skirmishers on the right
united with Longa’s men. Thus a kind of false
battle was maintained along the whole line to the
sea until nightfall, with equal loss of men but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_351"></a>[351]</span>
great advantage to the allies, because it entirely
occupied Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s
reserve, and prevented the troops in the camp of
Serres from passing by the bridge of Ascain to aid
Clauzel, who was thus overpowered. When that
event happened and lord Wellington had passed the
Nivelle at San Pé, Daricau and the Italian brigade
withdrew from Serres, and Villatte’s reserve occupied
it, whereupon Freyre and Longa entered the
town of Ascain. Villatte however held the camp
above until Reille had withdrawn into St. Jean de
Luz and destroyed all the bridges on the Lower
Nivelle; when that was effected the whole retired
and at daybreak reached the heights of Bidart on
the road to Bayonne.</p>

<p>During the night the allies halted on the position
they had gained in the centre, but an accidental
conflagration catching a wood completely separated
the picquets towards Ascain from the main body,
and spreading far and wide over the heath lighted
up all the hills, a blazing sign of war to France.</p>

<p>On the 11th the army advanced in order of
battle. Sir John Hope on the left, forded the
river above St. Jean de Luz with his infantry, and
marched on Bidart. Marshal Beresford in the
centre moved by the roads leading upon Arbonne.
General Hill, communicating by his right with
Morillo who was on the rocks of Mondarain,
brought his left forward into communication with
Beresford, and with his centre <ins class="corr" id="tn-351" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'took possesion of'">
took possession of</ins> Suraide and Espelette facing towards Cambo. The
time required to restore the bridges for the artillery
at Ciboure, and the change of front on the right
rendered these movements slow, and gave the duke
of Dalmatia time to rally his army upon a third<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_352"></a>[352]</span>
line of fortified camps which he had previously
commenced, the right resting on the coast at Bidart,
the centre at Helbacen Borda, the left at Ustaritz
on the Nive. This front was about eight miles, but
the works were only slightly advanced and Soult
dreading a second battle on so wide a field drew
back his centre and left to Arbonne and Arauntz,
broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and
at two o’clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the
allies in the centre, closed the day’s proceedings.
The next morning the French retired to the ridge
of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet
and their left in the entrenched camp of Bayonne
near Marac. During this movement a dense fog
arrested the allies, but when the day cleared sir John
Hope took post at Bidart on the left, and Beresford
occupied Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe,
in the centre. General Hill endeavoured to pass
the fords and restore the broken bridges of Ustaritz
and he also made a demonstration against the works
at Cambo, but the rain which fell heavily in the
mountains on the 11th rendered the fords impassable
and both points were defended successfully by Foy
whose operations had been distinct from the rest.</p>

<p>In the night of the 9th D’Erlon, mistrusting the
strength of his own position, had sent that general
orders to march from Bidaray to Espelette, but the
messenger did not arrive in time and on the morning
of the 10th about eleven o’clock Foy, following
Soult’s previous instructions, drove Mina’s battalions
from the Gorospil mountain; then pressing
against the flank of Morillo he forced him also back
fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However D’Erlon’s
battle was at this period receding fast, and Foy
fearing to be cut off retired with the loss of a colonel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_353"></a>[353]</span>
and one hundred and fifty men, having however
taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners.
Continuing his retreat all night he reached
Cambo and Ustaritz on the 11th, just in time to
relieve Abbé’s division at those posts, and on the
12th defended them against general Hill. Such
were the principal circumstances of the battle of
the Nivelle, whereby Soult was driven from a mountain
position which he had been fortifying for three
months. He lost four thousand two hundred and
sixty-five men and officers including twelve or fourteen
hundred prisoners, and one general was killed.
His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz and Espelette
fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one
pieces of artillery were taken, the greater
part having been abandoned in the redoubts of the
low country to sir John Hope. The allies had two
generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost
two thousand six hundred and ninety-four men and
officers.</p>


<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4>

<p>1º. Soult fared in this battle as most generals
will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want
of numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against
rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers lines
may avail, seldom against accomplished generals,
never when the assailants are the better soldiers.
Cæsar at Alesia resisted the Gauls, but his lines
served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey.
Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus, and in
modern times the duke of Marlborough broke
through all the French lines in Flanders. If Wellington<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_354"></a>[354]</span>
triumphed at Torres Vedras it was perhaps
because his lines were not attacked, and, it may be,
Soult was seduced by that example. His works
were almost as gigantic and upon the same plan,
that is to say a river on one flank, the ocean on the
other, and the front upon mountains covered with
redoubts and partially protected by inundations.
But the duke of Dalmatia had only three months to
complete his system, his labours were under the
gaze of his enemy, his troops, twice defeated during
the execution, were inferior in confidence and numbers
to the assailants. Lord Wellington’s lines at
Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year.
Massena only knew of them when they stopped his
progress, and his army inferior in numbers had
been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco.</p>

<p>It is not meant by this to decry entrenched
camps within compass, and around which an
active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or
avoiding battle according to circumstances. The
objection applies only to those extensive covering
lines by which soldiers are taught to consider themselves
inferior in strength and courage to their
enemies. A general is thus precluded from shewing
himself at important points and at critical periods;
he is unable to encourage his troops or to correct
errors; his sudden resources and the combinations
of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering
to the works, while the assailants may make whatever
dispositions they like, menace every point
and select where to break through. The defenders,
seeing large masses directed against them and unable
to draw confidence from a like display of numbers,
become fearful, knowing there must be some
weak point which is the measure of strength for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_355"></a>[355]</span>
whole. The assailants fall on with that heat
and vehemence which belongs to those who act
voluntarily and on the offensive; each mass strives
to outdo those on its right and left, and failure is
only a repulse, whereas the assailed having no resource
but victory look to their flanks, and are more
anxious about their neighbours’ fighting than their
own.</p>

<p>All these disadvantages were experienced at the
battle of the Nivelle. D’Erlon attributed his defeat
to the loss of the bridge of Amotz by Conroux’s
division, and to this cause also Maransin traced his
misfortunes. Taupin laid his defeat at Maransin’s
door, but Clauzel on the other hand ascribed it<span class="sidenote">Official Reports of the French generals to Soult, MSS.</span>
at once to want of firmness in the troops, although
he also asserted that if Daricau’s division had come
to his aid from the camp of Serres, he would have
maintained his ground. Soult however traced
Clauzel’s defeat to injudicious measures. That general<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report to the Minister of War, MSS.</span>
he said attempted to defend the village of Sarre
after the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada were
carried, whereby Conroux’s division was overwhelmed
in detail and driven back in flight to Amotz. Clauzel
should rather have assembled his three divisions at
once in the main position which was his battleground,
and there, covered by the smaller Rhune,
ought to have been victorious. It was scarcely
credible he observed that such entrenchments as
Clauzel’s and D’Erlon’s should have been carried.
For his part he relied on their strength so confidently
as to think the allies must sacrifice twenty-five
thousand men to force them and perhaps fail
then. He had been on the right when the battle
began, no reports came to him, he could judge of
events only by the fire, and when he reached the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_356"></a>[356]</span>
camp of Serres with his reserve troops and
artillery Clauzel’s works were lost! His arrival
had however paralyzed the march of three divisions.
This was true, yet there seems some
foundation for Clauzel’s complaint, namely, that he
had for five hours fought on his main position, and
during that time no help had come, although the
camp of Serres was close at hand, the distance
from St. Jean de Luz to that place only four miles,
and the attack in the low ground evidently a feint.
This then was Soult’s error. He suffered sir John
Hope to hold in play twenty-five thousand men in
the low ground, while fifteen thousand under
Clauzel lost the battle on the hills.</p>

<p>2º. The French army was inferior in numbers
and many of the works were unfinished; and yet two
strong divisions, Daricau’s and Foy’s, were quite
thrown out of the fight, for the slight offensive
movement made by the latter produced no effect
whatever. Vigorous counter-attacks are no doubt
essential to a good defence, and it was in allusion
to this that Napoleon, speaking of Joseph’s position
behind the Ebro in the beginning of the war, said,
“if a river were as broad and rapid as the Danube
it would be nothing without secure points for passing
to the offensive.” The same maxim applies to
lines, and Soult grandly conceived and applied this
principle when he proposed the descent upon
Aragon to Suchet. But he conceived it meanly
and poorly when he ordered Foy to attack by the
Gorospil mountain. That general’s numbers were
too few, and the direction of the march false; one
regiment in the field of battle at the decisive moment
would have been worth three on a distant and secondary
point. Foy’s retreat was inevitable if<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_357"></a>[357]</span>
D’Erlon failed, and wanting the other’s aid he did
fail. What success could Foy obtain? He might
have driven Mina’s battalions over the Puerto de
Maya and quite through the Bastan; he might have
defeated Morillo and perhaps have taken general
Hill’s baggage; yet all this would have weighed
little against the allies’ success at Amotz; and the
deeper he penetrated the more difficult would
have been his retreat. The incursion into the Bastan
by Yspegui proposed by him on the 6th, although
properly rejected by Soult would probably
have produced greater effects than the one executed
by Gorospil on the 10th. A surprise on the 6th,
Hill’s troops being then in march by brigades
through the Alduides, might have brought some
advantages to the French, and perhaps delayed the
general attack beyond the 10th, when the heavy
rains which set in on the 11th would have rendered
it difficult to attack at all: Soult would thus have
had time to complete his works.</p>

<p>3º. It has been observed that a minor cause of
defeat was the drawing up of the French troops in
front instead of in rear of the redoubts. This may
possibly have happened in some places from error
and confusion, not by design, for Clauzel’s report
expressly states that Maransin was directed to form
in rear of the redoubts and charge the allies when
they were between the works and the abbatis. It
is however needless to pry closely into these matters
when the true cause lies broad on the surface.
Lord Wellington directed superior numbers with
superior skill. The following analysis will prove
this, but it must be remembered that the conscripts
are not included in the enumeration of the French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_358"></a>[358]</span>
force: being quite undisciplined they were kept in
masses behind and never engaged.</p>

<p>Abbé’s division, furnishing five thousand old
soldiers, was posted in two lines one behind the
other, and they were both paralyzed by the position
of Morillo’s division and Mina’s battalions. Foy’s
division was entirely occupied by the same troops.
Six thousand of Wellington’s worst soldiers therefore
sufficed to employ twelve thousand of Soult’s
best troops during the whole day. Meanwhile Hill
fell upon the decisive point where there was only
D’Armagnac’s division to oppose him, that is to say,
five thousand against twenty thousand. And while
the battle was secured on the right of the Nivelle
by this disproportion, Beresford on the other bank
thrust twenty-four thousand against the ten thousand
composing Conroux’s and Maransin’s divisions.
Moreover as Hill and Beresford, advancing, the one
from his left the other from his right, formed a
wedge towards the bridge of Amotz, forty-four
thousand men composing the six divisions under
those generals, fell upon the fifteen thousand composing
the divisions of D’Armagnac Conroux and
Maransin; and these last were also attacked in
detail, because part of Conroux’s troops were defeated
near Sarre, and Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s
corps was beaten on the Rhune by the light division
before the main position was attacked. Finally
Alten with eight thousand men, having first defeated
Barbot’s brigade, fell upon Taupin who had only
three thousand while the rest of the French army
was held in check by Freyre and Hope. Thus
more than fifty thousand troops full of confidence from
repeated victories were suddenly thrown upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_359"></a>[359]</span>
decisive point where there were only eighteen thousand
dispirited by previous reverses to oppose them.
Against such a thunderbolt there was no defence in
the French works. Was it then a simple matter
for Wellington so to combine his battle? The
mountains on whose huge flanks he gathered his
fierce soldiers, the roads he opened, the horrid
crags he surmounted, the headlong steeps he descended,
the wild regions through which he poured
the destructive fire of more than ninety guns, these
and the reputation of the French commander furnish
the everlasting reply.</p>

<p>And yet he did not compass all that he designed.
The French right escaped, because when he passed
the Nivelle at San Pé he had only two divisions in
hand, the sixth had not come up, three were in
observation of the camp at Serres, and before he
could assemble enough men to descend upon the
enemy in the low ground the day had closed. The
great object of the battle was therefore unattained,
and it may be a question, seeing the shortness of
the days and the difficulty of the roads were not
unexpected obstacles, whether the combinations
would not have been surer if the principal attack
had been directed entirely against Clauzel’s position.
Carlos D’España’s force and the remainder
of Mina’s battalions could have reinforced Morillo’s
division with five thousand men to occupy D’Erlon’s
attention; it was not essential to defeat him, for
though he attributed his retreat to Clauzel’s reverse
that general did not complain that D’Erlon’s retreat
endangered his position. This arrangement would
have enabled the rest of Hill’s troops to reinforce
Beresford and have given lord Wellington three<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_360"></a>[360]</span>
additional divisions in hand with which to cross the
Nivelle before two o’clock. Soult’s right wing
could not then have escaped.</p>

<p>4º. In the report of the battle lord Wellington
from some oversight did but scant and tardy justice
to the light division. Acting alone, for Longa’s
Spaniards went off towards Ascain and scarcely
fired a shot, this division furnishing only four thousand
seven hundred men and officers, first carried
the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s brigade,
and then beat Taupin’s division from the main
position, thus driving superior numbers from the
strongest works. In fine being less than one-sixth
of the whole force employed against Clauzel, they
defeated one-third of that general’s corps. Many
brave men they lost, and of two who fell in this
battle I will speak.</p>

<p>The first, low in rank for he was but a lieutenant,
rich in honour for he bore many scars, was young
of days. He was only nineteen. But he had
seen more combats and sieges than he could
count years. So slight in person, and of such
surpassing and delicate beauty that the Spaniards
often thought him a girl disguised in man’s clothing,
he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that
the most daring and experienced veterans watched
his looks on the field of battle, and implicitly
following where he led, would like children obey his
slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His
education was incomplete, yet were his natural
powers so happy, the keenest and best-furnished intellects
shrunk from an encounter of wit, and every
thought and aspiration was proud and noble, indicating
future greatness if destiny had so willed it.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_361"></a>[361]</span>
Such was Edward Freer of the forty-third one of
three brothers who covered with wounds have all
died in the service. Assailed the night before the
battle with that strange anticipation of coming
death so often felt by military men, he was pierced
with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune
rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment
wept even in the middle of the fight when they
heard of his fate.</p>

<p>On the same day and at the same hour was killed
colonel Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a
long time in the forty-third. Under him Freer had
learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the
course of the war promotion placed Lloyd at the
head of the ninety-fourth, and it was leading that
regiment he fell. In him also were combined
mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind.
A graceful symmetry combined with Herculean
strength, and a countenance at once frank and
majestic gave the true index of his nature, for his
capacity was great and commanding, and his military
knowledge extensive both from experience and
study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the
army, I will not dwell, save to remark, that he used
the latter without offence, yet so as to increase his
ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse,
for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious,
and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He
like Freer was prescient of, and predicted his
own fall, yet with no abatement of courage. When
he received the mortal wound, a most painful one,
he would not suffer himself to be moved but
remained watching the battle and making observations
upon the changes in it until death came. It
was thus at the age of thirty, that the good the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_362"></a>[362]</span>
brave the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to his<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Despatches.</span>
merit have been published by lord Wellington and
by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and
by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine, let<span class="sidenote">The Eventful Life of a Sergeant.</span>
those who served on equal terms with him say
whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_363"></a>[363]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">Soult having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to<span class="sidenote9">1813. November.</span>
leave part of his forces in the entrenched camp of
Bayonne, and with the remainder take a flanking
position behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne
and St. Jean Pied de Port, securing his left by the
entrenched mountain of Ursouia, and his right on
the heights above Cambo, the bridge-head of which
would give him the power of making offensive
movements. He could thus keep his troops together
and restore their confidence, while he confined the
allies to a small sterile district of France between
the river and the sea, and rendered their situation
very uneasy during the winter if they did not retire.
However he soon modified this plan. The works of
the Bayonne camp were not complete and his
presence was necessary to urge their progress. The
camp on the Ursouia mountain had been neglected
contrary to his orders, and the bridge-head at
Cambo was only commenced on the right bank.
On the left it was indeed complete but constructed
on a bad trace. Moreover he found that the Nive
in dry weather was fordable at Ustaritz below
Cambo, and at many places above that point.
Remaining therefore at Bayonne himself with six
divisions and Villatte’s reserve, he sent D’Erlon with
three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo. Yet
neither D’Erlon’s divisions nor Soult’s whole army
could have stopped lord Wellington at this time if<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_364"></a>[364]</span>
other circumstances had permitted the latter to
follow up his victory as he designed.</p>

<p>The hardships and privations endured on the
mountains by the Anglo-Portuguese troops had
been beneficial to them as an army. The fine air
and the impossibility of the soldiers committing
their usual excesses in drink had rendered them
unusually healthy, while the facility of enforcing a
strict discipline, and their natural impatience to
win the fair plains spread out before them, had
raised their moral and physical qualities in a wonderful
degree. Danger was their sport, and their
experienced general in the prime and vigour of
life was as impatient for action as his soldiers. Neither
the works of the Bayonne camp nor the barrier
of the Nive, suddenly manned by a beaten and
dispirited army, could have long withstood the progress
of such a fiery host, and if Wellington could
have let their strength and fury loose in the first
days succeeding the battle of the Nivelle France
would have felt his conquering footsteps to her
centre. But the country at the foot of the Pyrenees
is a deep clay, quite impassable after rain
except by the royal road near the coast and that
of St. Jean Pied de Port, both of which were in
the power of the French. On the bye-roads the
infantry sunk to the mid leg, the cavalry above the
horses’ knees, and even to the saddle-girths in some
places. The artillery could not move at all. The
rain had commenced on the 11th, the mist in the
early part of the 12th had given Soult time to
regain his camp and secure the high road to St.
Jean Pied de Port, by which his troops easily
gained their proper posts on the Nive, while his
adversary fixed in the swamps could only make the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_365"></a>[365]</span>
ineffectual demonstration at Ustaritz and Cambo
already noticed.</p>

<p>Wellington uneasy for his right flank while
the French commanded the Cambo passage across
the Nive directed general Hill to menace it
again on the 16th. Foy had received orders to
preserve the bridge-head on the right bank in any
circumstances, but he was permitted to abandon the
work on the left bank in the event of a general
attack; however at Hill’s approach the officer placed
there in command destroyed all the works and the
bridge itself. This was a great cross to Soult, and
the allies’ flank being thus secured they were put into
cantonments to avoid the rain, which fell heavily.
The bad weather was however not the only obstacle
to the English general’s operations. On the
very day of the battle Freyre’s and Longa’s soldiers
entering Ascain pillaged it and murdered
several persons; the next day the whole of the
Spanish troops continued these excesses in various
places, and on the right Mina’s battalions, some of
whom were also in a state of mutiny, made a
plundering and murdering incursion from the
mountains towards Hellette. The Portuguese and
British soldiers of the left wing had commenced
the like outrages and two French persons were
killed in one town, however the adjutant-general Pakenham
arriving at the moment saw and instantly put
the perpetrators to death thus nipping this wickedness
in the bud, but at his own risk for legally he had
not that power. This general whose generosity humanity
and chivalric spirit excited the admiration
of every honourable person who approached him, is
the man who afterwards fell at New Orleans and
who has been so foully traduced by American<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_366"></a>[366]</span>
writers. He who was pre-eminently distinguished
by his detestation of inhumanity and outrage has
been with astounding falsehood represented as instigating
his troops to the most infamous excesses.
But from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings
in the most horrible slavery while they prate
and vaunt of liberty until all men turn with loathing
from the sickening folly, what can be expected?</p>

<p>Terrified by these excesses the French people
fled even from the larger towns, but Wellington
quickly relieved their terror. On the 12th, although
expecting a battle, he put to death all the
Spanish marauders he could take in the act, and
then with many reproaches and despite of the discontent
of their generals, forced the whole to withdraw
into their own country. He disarmed the
insubordinate battalions under Mina, quartered Giron’s
Andalusians in the Bastan where O’Donnel
resumed the command; sent Freyre’s Gallicians to
the district between Irun and Ernani, and Longa
over the Ebro. Morillo’s division alone remained
with the army. These decisive proceedings marking
the lofty character of the man proved not less
politic than resolute. The French people immediately
returned, and finding the strictest discipline
preserved and all things paid for adopted an amicable
intercourse with the invaders. However the
loss of such a mass of troops and the effects of
weather on the roads reduced the army for the
moment to a state of inactivity; the head-quarters
were suddenly fixed at St. Jean de Luz, and the
troops were established in permanent cantonments
with the following line of battle.</p>

<p>The left wing occupied a broad ridge on both<span class="sidenote7">Plan 7.</span>
sides of the great road beyond Bidart, the principal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_367"></a>[367]</span>
post being at a mansion belonging to the mayor of
Biaritz. The front was covered by a small stream
spreading here and there into large ponds or tanks
between which the road was conducted. The
centre posted partly on the continuation of this
ridge in front of Arcangues, partly on the hill of
San Barbe, extended by Arrauntz to Ustaritz, the
right being thrown back to face count D’Erlon’s
position, extended by Cambo to Itzassu. From
this position which might stretch about six miles
on the front and eight miles on the flank, strong
picquets were pushed forwards to several points,
and the infantry occupied all the villages and towns
behind as far back as Espelette, Suraide, Ainhoa,
San Pé, Sarre, and Ascain. One regiment of Vandeleur’s
cavalry was with the advanced post on the
left, the remainder were sent to Andaya and Urogne,
Victor Alten’s horsemen were about San Pé, and
the heavy cavalry remained in Spain.</p>

<p>In this state of affairs the establishment of the
different posts in front led to several skirmishes.
In one on the 18th, general John Wilson and general
Vandeleur were wounded; but on the same day
Beresford drove the French from the bridge of Urdains,
near the junction of the Ustaritz and San
Pé roads, and though attacked in force the next
day he maintained his acquisition. A more serious
action occurred on the 23d in front of
Arcangues. This village held by the picquets of the
light division was two or three miles in front of
Arbonne where the nearest support was cantoned.
It is built on the centre of a crescent-shaped ridge,
and the sentries of both armies were so close that
the reliefs and patroles actually passed each other in
their rounds, so that a surprise was inevitable if it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_368"></a>[368]</span>
suited either side to attempt it. Lord Wellington
visited this post and the field-officer on duty made
known to him its disadvantages, and the means of
remedying them by taking entire possession of the
village, pushing picquets along the horns of the
crescent, and establishing a chain of posts across the
valley between them. He appeared satisfied with
this project, and two days afterwards the forty-third
and some of the riflemen were employed to effect
it, the greatest part of the division being brought up
in support. The French after a few shots abandoned
Arcangues, Bussussary, and both horns of
the crescent, retiring before the picquets to a large
fortified house situated at the mouth of the valley.
The project suggested by the field-officer was thus
executed with the loss of only five men wounded
and the action should have ceased, but the picquets
of the forty-third suddenly received orders to attack
the fortified house, and the columns of support
were shewn at several points of the semicircle; the
French then conceiving they were going to be seriously
assailed reinforced their post; a sharp skirmish
ensued and the picquets were finally withdrawn
to the ground they had originally gained and
beyond which they should never have been pushed.
This ill-managed affair cost eighty-eight men and
officers of which eighty were of the forty-third.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington, whose powerful artillery and
cavalry, the former consisting of nearly one hundred
field-pieces and the latter furnishing more than
eight thousand six hundred sabres, were paralysed<span class="sidenote">Original Morning States, MSS.</span>
in the contracted space he occupied, was now anxious
to pass the Nive, but the rain which continued
to fall baffled him, and meanwhile Mina’s Spaniards
descending once more from the Alduides to plunder<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_369"></a>[369]</span>
Baigorry were beaten by the national guards of
that valley. However early in December the weather<span class="sidenote9">December.</span>
amended, forty or fifty pieces of artillery were
brought up, and other preparations made to surprize
or force the passage of the Nive at Cambo
and Ustaritz. And as this operation led to sanguinary
battles it is fitting first to describe the
exact position of the French.</p>

<p>Bayonne situated at the confluence of the Nive<span class="sidenote7">Plans 7 and 8.</span>
and the Adour commands the passage of both. A
weak fortress of the third order its importance was
in its position, and its entrenched camp, exceedingly
strong and commanded by the fortress could not
be safely attacked in front, wherefore Soult kept
only six divisions there. His right composed of
Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s reserve touched
on the Lower Adour where there was a flotilla of
gun-boats. It was covered by a swamp and artificial
inundation, through which the royal road led
to St. Jean de Luz, and the advanced posts, well
entrenched, were pushed forward beyond Anglet on
this causeway. His left under Clauzel, composed
of three divisions, extended from Anglet to the
Nive; it was covered partly by the swamp, partly
by the large fortified house which the light division
assailed on the 23d, partly by an inundation spreading
below Urdains towards the Nive. Thus entrenched
the fortified outposts may be called the
front of battle, the entrenched camp the second
line, and the fortress the citadel. The country in
front a deep clay soil, enclosed and covered with
small wood and farm-houses, was very difficult to
move in.</p>

<p>Beyond the Nive the entrenched camp stretching<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_370"></a>[370]</span>
from that river to the Adour was called the front of
Mousseroles. It was in the keeping of D’Erlon’s
four divisions, which were also extended up the
right bank of the Nive; that is to say, D’Armagnac’s
troops was in front of Ustaritz, and Foy prolonged
the line to Cambo. The remainder of D’Erlon’s
corps was in reserve, occupying a strong range
of heights about two miles in front of Mousseroles,
the right at Villefranque on the Nive, the left at
Old Moguerre towards the Adour. D’Erlon’s communications
with the rest of the army were double,
one circuitous through Bayonne, the other direct
by a bridge of boats thrown above that place.</p>

<p>After the battle of the Nivelle Soult brought
general Paris’s division from St. Jean Pied de Port to
Lahoussoa close under the Ursouia mountain, where
it was in connection with Foy’s left, communicating
by the great road to St. Jean Pied de Port which
ran in a parallel direction to the river.</p>

<p>The Nive, the Adour, and the Gave de Pau which
falls into the latter many miles above Bayonne, were
all navigable, the first as far as Ustaritz, the second to
Dax, the third to Peyrehorade, and the great French
magazines were collected at the two latter places.
But the army was fed with difficulty, and hence
to restrain Soult from the country beyond the
Nive, to intercept his communications with St. Jean
Pied de Port, to bring a powerful cavalry into activity,
and to obtain secret intelligence from the
interior of Spain were Wellington’s inducements to
force a passage over the Nive. Yet to place the
troops on both sides of a navigable river with communications
bad at all times and subject to entire
interruptions from rain; to do this in face of an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_371"></a>[371]</span>
army possessing short communications good roads
and entrenched camps for retreat, was a delicate
and dangerous operation.</p>

<p>On the 7th orders were issued for forcing the
passage on the 9th. On that day sir John Hope
and Charles Alten, with the first, fifth, and light
divisions, the unattached brigades of infantry, Vandeleur’s<span class="sidenote">Original States, MSS.</span>
cavalry and twelve guns, in all about twenty-four
thousand combatants, were to drive back the
French advanced posts along the whole front of the
entrenched camp between the Nive and the sea. This
movement was partly to examine the course of the
Lower Adour with a view to subsequent operations,
but principally to make Soult discover his dispositions
of defence on that side, and to keep his troops
in check while Beresford and Hill crossed the Nive.
To support this double operation the fourth and
seventh divisions were secretly brought up from
Ascain and Espelette on the 8th, the latter to the
hill of St. Barbe, from whence it detached one
brigade to relieve the posts of the third division.
There remained the second the third and the sixth
divisions, Hamilton’s Portuguese, and Morillo’s
Spaniards, for the passage. Beresford leading the
third and sixth reinforced with six guns and a
squadron of cavalry, was to cross at Ustaritz with
pontoons, Hill having the second division, Hamilton’s
Portuguese, Vivian’s and Victor Alten’s cavalry,
and fourteen guns, was to ford the river at
Cambo and Larressore. Both generals were then
to repair the bridges at these respective points
with materials prepared beforehand; and to cover
Hill’s movement on the right and protect the valley
of the Nive from Paris, who being at Lahoussoa
might have penetrated to the rear of the army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_372"></a>[372]</span>
during the operations, Morillo’s Spaniards were to
cross at Itzassu. At this time Foy’s division was
extended from Halzou in front of Larressore, to the
fords above Cambo, the Ursouia mountain being between
his left and Paris. The rest of D’Erlon’s
troops remained on the heights of Moguerre in front
of Mousserolles.</p>


<h4>PASSAGE OF THE NIVE<br>
AND<br>
BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE.</h4>

<p>At Ustaritz the French had broken both bridges,
but the island connecting them was in possession of
the British. Beresford laid his pontoons down on<span class="sidenote7">Plans 7 and 8.</span>
the hither side in the night of the 8th and in the
morning of the 9th a beacon lighted on the heights
above Cambo gave the signal of attack. The
passage was immediately forced under the fire of
the artillery, the second bridge was laid, and D’Armagnac’s
brigade was driven back by the sixth
division; but the swampy nature of the country
between the river and the high road retarded the
allies’ march and gave the French time to retreat
with little loss. At the same time Hill’s troops,
also covered by the fire of artillery, forced the
passage in three columns above and below Cambo
with slight resistance, though the fords were so deep
that several horsemen were drowned, and the French
strongly posted, especially at Halzou where there
was a deep and strong mill-race to cross as well
as the river.</p>

<p>Foy seeing, by the direction of Beresford’s fire,
that his retreat was endangered, retired hastily with
his left leaving his right wing under general
Berlier at Halzou without orders. Hence when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_373"></a>[373]</span>
general Pringle attacked the latter from Larressore,
the sixth division was already on the high road
between Foy and Berlier, who escaped by cross roads
towards Hasparen, but did not rejoin his division
until two o’clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile
Morillo crossed at Itzassu, and Paris retired to
Hellette where he was joined by a regiment of light
cavalry belonging to Pierre Soult who was then on
the Bidouse river. Morillo followed, and in one
village near Hellette his troops killed fifteen peasants,
amongst them several women and children.</p>

<p>General Hill having won the passage, placed a
brigade of infantry at Urcurray to cover the bridge
of Cambo, and to support the cavalry which he
despatched to scour the roads towards Lahoussoa,
St. Jean Pied de Port, and Hasparen, and to observe
Paris and Pierre Soult. With the rest of his troops
he marched to the heights of Lormenthoa in front
of the hills of Moguerre and Villefranque, and was
there joined by the sixth division, the third remaining
to cover the bridge of Ustaritz. It was now
about one o’clock, and Soult, coming hastily from
Bayonne, approved of the disposition made by
D’Erlon, and offered battle, his line being extended
so as to bar the high road. D’Armagnac’s
brigade which had retired from Ustaritz was now in
advance at Villefranque and a heavy cannonade
and skirmish ensued along the front, but no general
attack was made because the deep roads had retarded
the rear of Hill’s columns. However the
Portuguese of the sixth division, descending from
Lormenthoa about three o’clock, drove D’Armagnac’s
brigade with sharp fighting and after one repulse
out of Villefranque. A brigade of the second
division was then established in advance connecting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_374"></a>[374]</span>
Hill’s corps with the troops in Villefranque. Thus
three divisions of infantry, wanting the brigade
left at Urcurray, hemmed up four French divisions;
and as the latter, notwithstanding their superiority
of numbers, made no advantage of the broken movements
of the allies caused by the deep roads, the
passage of the Nive may be judged a surprize. Wellington
thus far overreached his able adversary, yet
he had not trusted to this uncertain chance alone.</p>

<p>The French masses falling upon the heads of
his columns at Lormenthoa while the rear was still
labouring in the deep roads, might have caused
some disorder, but could not have driven either Hill
or Beresford over the river again, because the third
division was close at hand to reinforce the sixth, and
the brigade of the seventh, left at San Barbe, could
have followed by the bridge of Ustaritz, thus giving
the allies the superiority of numbers. The greatest
danger was, that Paris, reinforced by Pierre Soult’s
cavalry, should have returned and fallen either upon
Morillo or the brigade left at Urcurray in the rear,
while Soult, reinforcing D’Erlon with fresh divisions
brought from the other side of the Nive, attacked
Hill and Beresford in front. It was to prevent this
that Hope and Alten whose operations are now to be
related pressed the enemy on the left bank.</p>

<p>The first-named general having twelve miles to
march from St. Jean de Luz before he could reach
the French works, put his troops in motion during
the night, and about eight o’clock passed between
the tanks in front of Barrouilhet with his right,
while his left descended from the platform of Bidart
and crossed the valley towards Biaritz. The French
outposts retired fighting, and Hope sweeping with
a half circle to his right, and being preceded by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_375"></a>[375]</span>
the fire of his guns and many skirmishers, arrived
in front of the entrenched camp about one o’clock.
His left then rested on the Lower Adour, his centre
menaced a very strong advanced work on the ridge
of Beyris beyond Anglet, and his right was in communication
with Alten. That general having a
shorter distance to move, halted about Bussussary
and Arcangues until Hope’s fiery crescent was
closing on the French camp, and then he also advanced,
but with the exception of a slight skirmish
at the fortified house there was no resistance. Three
divisions, some cavalry, and the unattached brigades,
equal to a fourth division, sufficed therefore to keep
six French divisions in check on this side.</p>

<p>When evening closed the allies fell back towards
their original positions, but under heavy rain, and
with great fatigue to Hope’s wing, for even the
royal road was knee-deep of mud and his troops
were twenty-four hours under arms. The whole
day’s fighting cost about eight hundred men for each
side, the loss of the allies being rather greater on
the left bank of the Nive than on the right.</p>

<p>Wellington’s wings being now divided by the
Nive the French general resolved to fall upon one
of them with the whole of his forces united; and
misled by the prisoners who assured him that the
third and fourth divisions were both on the heights
of Lormenthoa, he resolved, being able to assemble
his troops with greater facility on the left of the
Nive where also the allies’ front was most extended,
to choose that side for his counter-stroke. The garrison
of Bayonne was eight thousand strong, partly
troops of the line partly national guards, with which
he ordered the governor to occupy the entrenched
camp of Mousserolles; then stationing ten gun-boats
on the Upper Adour to watch that river as high<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_376"></a>[376]</span>
as the confluence of the Gave de Pau, he made D’Erlon
file his four divisions over the bridge of boats
between the fortress and Mousserolles, directing him
to gain the camp of Marac and take post behind
Clauzel’s corps on the other side of the river. He thus
concentrated nine divisions of infantry and Villatte’s<span class="sidenote">Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.</span>
reserve, a brigade of cavalry and forty guns, furnishing
in all about sixty thousand combatants,
including conscripts, to assail a quarter where the
allies, although stronger by one division than the<span class="sidenote">Original Morning States.</span>
French general imagined, had yet only thirty thousand
infantry with twenty-four pieces of cannon.</p>

<p>The French marshal’s first design was to burst
with his whole army on the table-land of Bussussary<span class="sidenote">Correspondence with the minister of war, MSS.</span>
and Arcangues, and then to act as circumstances
should dictate; and he judged so well of his position
that he desired the minister of war to expect
good news for the next day. Indeed the situation of
the allies although better than he knew of gave him
some right to anticipate success. On no point was
there any expectation of this formidable counter-attack.
Lord Wellington was on the left of the
Nive preparing to assault the heights where he
had last seen the French the evening before.
Hope’s troops, with the exception of Wilson’s Portuguese
now commanded by general Campbell and
posted at Barrouilhet, had retired to their cantonments;
the first division was at St. Jean de Luz
and Ciboure more than six miles distant from the
outposts; the fifth division was between those
places and Bidart, and all exceedingly fatigued.
The light division had orders to retire from Bussussary
to Arbonne a distance of four miles, and part
of the second brigade had already marched, when
fortunately general Kempt, somewhat suspicious of
the enemy’s movements, delayed obedience until he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_377"></a>[377]</span>
could see what was going on in his front, he thus
as the event proved saved the position.</p>

<p>The extraordinary difficulty of moving through
the country even for single horsemen, the numerous
enclosures and copses which denied any distinct
view, the easy success of the operation to cross the
Nive, and a certain haughty confidence the sure
attendant of a long course of victory, seems to have
rendered the English general at this time somewhat
negligent of his own security. Undoubtedly the
troops were not disposed as if a battle was expected.
The general position, composed of two distinct parts
was indeed very strong; the ridge of Barrouilhet
could only be attacked along the royal road on a
narrow front between the tanks, and he had directed
entrenchments to be made; but there was only one
brigade there, and a road made with difficulty by the
engineers supplied a bad flank communication with
the light division. This Barrouilhet ridge was prolonged
to the platform of Bussussary, but in its
winding bulged out too near the enemy’s works in
the centre to be safely occupied in force, and behind
it there was a deep valley or basin extending to
Arbonne.</p>

<p>The ridge of Arcangues on the other side of
this basin was the position of battle for the centre.
Three tongues of land shot out from this part
to the front, and the valleys between them as
well as their slopes were covered with copse-woods
almost impenetrable. The church of Arcangues,
a gentleman’s house, and parts of the village,
furnished rallying points of defence for the picquets,
which were necessarily numerous because
of the extent of front. At this time the left-hand
ridge or tongue of land was occupied by the fifty-second<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_378"></a>[378]</span>
regiment which had also posts in the great
basin separating the Arcangues position from that
of Barrouilhet; the central tongue was held by the
picquets of the forty-third with supporting companies
placed in succession towards Bussussary, where
was an open common across which troops in retreat
would have to pass to the church of Arcangues.
The third tongue was guarded, partly by the forty-third,
partly by the riflemen, but the valley between
was not occupied, and the picquets on the extreme
right extended to an inundation, across a narrow
part of which, near the house of the senator Garrat,
there was a bridge: the facility for attack was there
however small.</p>

<p>One brigade of the seventh division continued
this line of posts to the Nive, holding the bridge
of Urdains, the rest of the division was behind
San Barbe and belonged rather to Ustaritz than to
this front. The fourth division was several miles
behind the right of the light division.</p>

<p>In this state of affairs if Soult had, as he first
designed, burst with his whole army upon Bussussary
and Arcangues it would have been impossible
for the light division, scattered as it was over such
an extent of difficult ground, to have stopped him
for half an hour; and there was no support within
several miles, no superior officer to direct the concentration
of the different divisions. Lord Wellington
had indeed ordered all the line to be entrenched,
but the works were commenced on a great scale,
and, as is common when danger does not spur, the
soldiers had laboured so carelessly that beyond a
few abbatis, the tracing of some lines and redoubts,
and the opening of a road of communication, the
ground remained in its natural state. The French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_379"></a>[379]</span>
general would therefore quickly have gained the
broad open hills beyond Arcangues, separated the
fourth and seventh divisions from the light division,
and cut them off from Hope. Soult however, in
the course of the night, for reasons which I do not
find stated, changed his project, and at day-break
Reille marched with Boyer’s and Maucune’s divisions,
Sparre’s cavalry and from twenty to thirty
guns against Hope by the main road. He was
followed by Foy and Villatte, but Clauzel assembled
his troops under cover of the ridges near the
fortified house in front of Bussussary, and one of
D’Erlon’s divisions approached the bridge of
Urdains.</p>

<p><em>Combat of the 10th.</em>—A heavy rain fell in the
night yet the morning broke fair, and soon after
dawn the French infantry were observed by the
picquets of the forty-third pushing each other about
as if at gambols, yet lining by degrees the nearest
ditches; a general officer was also seen behind a farm-house
close to the sentinels, and at the same time the
heads of columns could be perceived in the rear.
Thus warned some companies of the forty-third
were thrown on the right into the basin to prevent
the enemy from penetrating that way to the small
plain between Bussussary and Arcangues. General
Kempt was with the picquets, and his foresight in
delaying his march to Arbonne now saved the
position, for he immediately placed the reserves of
his brigade in the church and mansion-house of
Arcangues. Meanwhile the French breaking forth
with loud cries, and a rattling musquetry, fell at
a running pace upon the picquets of the forty-third
both on the tongue and in the basin, and a
cloud of skirmishers descending on their left, penetrating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_380"></a>[380]</span>
between them and the fifty-second regiment,
sought to turn both. The right tongue was in like
manner assailed and at the same time the picquets
at the bridge near Garrat’s house were driven back.</p>

<p>The assault was so strong and rapid, the enemy
so numerous, and the ground so extensive, that it
would have been impossible to have reached the
small plain beyond Bussussary in time to regain the
church of Arcangues if any serious resistance had
been attempted; wherefore delivering their fire at
pistol-shot distance the picquets fell back in succession,
and never were the steadiness and intelligence
of veteran soldiers more eminently displayed;
for though it was necessary to run at full speed to
gain the small plain before the enemy, who was
constantly outflanking the line of posts by the
basin, though the ways were so deep and narrow
that no formation could be preserved, though the
fire of the French was thick and close, and their
cries vehement as they rushed on in pursuit, the
instant the open ground at Bussussary was attained,
the apparently disordered crowd of fugitives became
a compact and well-formed body defying and deriding
the fruitless efforts of their adversaries.</p>

<p>The fifty-second being about half a mile to the
left, though only slightly assailed fell back also to the
main ridge, for though the closeness of the country did
not permit colonel Colborne to observe the strength
of the enemy he could see the rapid retreat of
the forty-third, and thence judging how serious the
affair was, so well did the regiments of the light
division understand each other’s qualities, withdrew
his outposts to secure the main position. And in
good time he did so.</p>

<p>On the right-hand tongue the troops were not so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_381"></a>[381]</span>
fortunate, for whether they delayed their retreat too
long, or that the country was more intricate, the
enemy moving by the basin, reached Bussussary
before the rear arrived, and about a hundred of the
forty-third and riflemen were thus intercepted. The
French were in a hollow road and careless, never
doubting that the officer of the forty-third, ensign
Campbell, a youth scarcely eighteen years of age,
would surrender; but he with a shout broke into
their column sword in hand, and though the struggle
was severe and twenty of the forty-third and thirty
of the riflemen with their officer remained prisoners,
reached the church with the rest.</p>

<p>D’Armagnac’s division of D’Erlon’s corps now
pushed close up to the bridge of Urdains, and
Clauzel assembled his three divisions by degrees
at Bussussary, opening meanwhile a sharp fire of
musquetry. The position was however safe. The
mansion-house on the right, covered by abbatis and
not easily accessible, was defended by a rifle battalion
and the Portuguese. The church and church-yard
were occupied by the forty-third who were supported
with two mountain-guns, their front being
covered by a declivity of thick copse-wood, filled with
riflemen, and only to be turned by narrow hollow
roads leading on each side to the church. On the
left the fifty-second now supported by the remainder
of the division, spread as far as the great basin
which separated the right wing from the ridge of
Barrouilhet, towards which some small posts were
pushed, but there was still a great interval between
Alten’s and Hope’s positions.</p>

<p>The skirmishing fire grew hot, Clauzel brought
up twelve guns to the ridge of Bussussary,
with which he threw shot and shells into the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_382"></a>[382]</span>
church-yard of Arcangues, and four or five hundred
infantry then made a rush forwards, but a heavy
fire from the forty-third sent them back over the
ridge where their guns were posted. Yet the practice
of the latter, well directed at first, would have been
murderous if this musquetry from the church-yard
had not made the French gunners withdraw their
pieces a little behind the ridge, which caused their
shot to fly wild and high. General Kempt thinking
the distance too great, was at first inclined to stop
this fire, but the moment it lulled the French gunners
pushed their pieces forwards again and their shells
knocked down eight men in an instant. The small
arms then recommenced and the shells again flew
high. The French were in like manner kept at
bay by the riflemen in the village and mansion-house,
and the action, hottest where the fifty-second
fought, continued all day. It was not very severe
but it has been noticed in detail because both
French and English writers, misled perhaps by an
inaccurate phrase in the public despatch, have
represented it as a desperate attack by which the
light division was driven into its entrenchments,
whereas it was the picquets only that were forced
back, there were no entrenchments save those made
on the spur of the moment by the soldiers in the
church-yard, and the French can hardly be said to
have attacked at all. The real battle was at Barrouilhet.</p>

<p>On that side Reille advancing with two divisions
about nine o’clock, drove Campbell’s Portuguese
from Anglet, and Sparre’s cavalry charging during
the fight cut down a great many men. The French
infantry then assailed the ridge at Barrouilhet, but
moving along a narrow ridge and confined on each<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_383"></a>[383]</span>
flank by the tanks, only two brigades could get into
action by the main road, and the rain of the preceding
night had rendered all the bye-roads so deep
that it was mid-day before the French line of battle
was filled. This delay saved the allies, for the
attack here also was so unexpected, that the first
division and lord Aylmer’s brigade were at rest in
St. Jean de Luz and Bidart when the action commenced.
The latter did not reach the position
before eleven o’clock; the foot-guards did not
march from St. Jean until after twelve, and only
arrived at three o’clock in the afternoon when the
fight was done; all the troops were exceedingly fatigued,
only ten guns could be brought into play,
and from some negligence part of the infantry were
at first without ammunition.</p>

<p>Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division first arrived
to support Campbell’s Portuguese, and fight
the battle. The French spread their skirmishers
along the whole valley in front of Biaritz, but their
principal effort was directed by the great road and
against the platform of Barrouilhet about the
mayor’s house, where the ground was so thick of
hedges and coppice-wood that a most confused fight
took place. The assailants cutting ways through
the hedges poured on in smaller or larger bodies as
the openings allowed, and were immediately engaged
with the defenders; at some points they were
successful at others beaten back, and few knew
what was going on to the right or left of where they
stood. By degrees Reille engaged both his divisions,
and some of Villatte’s reserve also entered
the fight, and then Bradford’s Portuguese and lord
Aylmer’s brigade arrived on the allies’ side, which
enabled colonel Greville’s brigade of the fifth division,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_384"></a>[384]</span>
hitherto kept in reserve, to relieve Robinson’s;
that general was however dangerously wounded
and his troops suffered severely.</p>

<p>And now a very notable action was performed
by the ninth regiment under colonel Cameron.
This officer was on the extreme left of Greville’s
brigade, Robinson’s being then shifted in second
line and towards the right, Bradford’s brigade was
at the mayor’s house some distance to the left of the
ninth regiment, and the space between was occupied
by a Portuguese battalion. There was in
front of Greville’s brigade a thick hedge, but immediately
opposite the ninth was a coppice-wood
possessed by the enemy, whose skirmishers were
continually gathering in masses and rushing out as
if to assail the line, they were as often driven
back, yet the ground was so broken that nothing
could be seen beyond the flanks and when some
time had passed in this manner, Cameron, who had
received no orders, heard a sudden firing along the
main road close to his left. His adjutant was sent
to look out and returned immediately with intelligence
that there was little fighting on the road,
but a French regiment, which must have passed
unseen in small bodies through the Portuguese between
the ninth and the mayor’s house, was rapidly
filing into line on the rear. The fourth British<span class="sidenote">Manuscript note by lieutenant-general sir John Cameron.</span>
regiment was then in close column at a short distance,
and its commander colonel Piper was directed
by Cameron to face about, march to the rear, and
then bring up his left shoulder when he would
infallibly fall in with the French regiment. Piper
marched, but whether he misunderstood the order,
took a wrong direction, or mistook the enemy for
Portuguese, he passed them. No firing was heard,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_385"></a>[385]</span>
the adjutant again hurried to the rear, and returned
with intelligence that the fourth regiment was not
to be seen, but the enemy’s line was nearly formed.
Cameron leaving fifty men to answer the skirmishing
fire which now increased from the copse,
immediately faced about and marched in line
against the new enemy, who was about his own
strength, as fast as the rough nature of the ground
would permit. The French fire, slow at first, increased
vehemently as the distance lessened, but
when the ninth, coming close up, sprung forwards to
the charge the adverse line broke and fled to the
flanks in the utmost disorder. Those who made for
their own right brushed the left of Greville’s brigade,
and even carried off an officer of the royals in
their rush, yet the greatest number were made prisoners,
and the ninth having lost about eighty men
and officers resumed their old ground.</p>

<p>The final result of the battle at Barrouilhet was
the repulse of Reille’s divisions, but Villatte still
menaced the right flank, and Foy, taking possession
of the narrow ridge connecting Bussussary with the
platform of Barrouilhet, threw his skirmishers into
the great basin leading to Arbonne, and connecting
his right with Reille’s left menaced Hope’s flank
at Barrouilhet. This was about two o’clock,
Soult, whose columns were now all in hand gave
orders to renew the battle, and his masses were beginning
to move when Clauzel reported that a large
body of fresh troops, apparently coming from the
other side of the Nive, was menacing D’Armagnac’s
division from the heights above Urdains. Unable
to account for this, Soult, who saw the guards and
Germans moving up fast from St. Jean de Luz and
all the unattached brigades already in line, hesitated,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_386"></a>[386]</span>
suspended his own attack, and ordered D’Erlon,<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
who had two divisions in reserve, to detach one to
the support of D’Armagnac: before this disposition
could be completed the night fell.</p>

<p>The fresh troops seen by Clauzel were the third
fourth sixth and seventh divisions, whose movements
during the battle it is time to notice. When lord
Wellington, who remained on the right of the Nive
during the night of the 9th, discovered at daybreak,
that the French had abandoned the heights in
Hill’s front, he directed that officer to occupy them,
and push parties close up to the entrenched camp of
Mousseroles while his cavalry spread beyond Hasparen
and up the Adour. Meanwhile, the cannonade
on the left bank of the Nive being heard, he repaired
in person to that side, first making the third
and sixth divisions repass the river, and directing
Beresford to lay another bridge of communication
lower down the Nive, near Villefranque, to shorten
the line of movement. When he reached the left
of the Nive and saw how the battle stood, he made
the seventh division close to the left from the hill of
San Barbe, placed the third division at Urdains,
and brought up the fourth division to an open
heathy ridge on a hill about a mile behind the
church of Arcangues. From this point general
Cole sent Ross’s brigade down into the basin on the
left of Colborne, to cover Arbonne, being prepared
himself to march with his whole division if the
enemy attempted to penetrate in force between
Hope and Alten. These dispositions were for the
most part completed about two o’clock, and thus
Clauzel was held in check at Bussussary, and the
renewed attack by Foy, Villatte, and Reille’s divisions
on Barrouilhet prevented.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_387"></a>[387]</span></p>

<p>This day’s battle cost the Anglo-Portuguese more
than twelve hundred men killed and wounded, two
generals were amongst the latter and about three
hundred men were made prisoners. The French
had one general, Villatte, wounded, and lost about
two thousand men, but when the action terminated
two regiments of Nassau and one of Frankfort, the
whole under the command of a colonel Kruse, came
over to the allies. These men were not deserters.
Their prince having abandoned Napoleon in Germany
sent secret instructions to his troops to do so likewise,
and in good time, for orders to disarm them
reached Soult the next morning. The generals on
each side, the one hoping to profit the other to
prevent mischief, immediately transmitted notice of
the event to Catalonia where several regiments of
the same nations were serving. Lord Wellington
failed for reasons to be hereafter mentioned, but
Suchet disarmed his Germans with reluctance
thinking they could be trusted, and the Nassau
troops at Bayonne were perhaps less influenced by
patriotism than by an old quarrel; for when belonging
to the army of the centre they had forcibly
foraged Soult’s district early in the year, and carried
off the spoil in defiance of his authority, which gave
rise to bitter disputes at the time and was probably
not forgotten by him.</p>

<p><em>Combat of the 11th.</em>—In the night of the 10th
Reille withdrew behind the tanks as far as Pucho,
Foy and Villatte likewise drew back along the connecting
ridge towards Bussussary, thus uniting with
Clauzel’s left and D’Erlon’s reserve, so that on the
morning of the 11th the French army, with the
exception of D’Armagnac’s division which remained
in front of Urdains, was concentrated, for Soult<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_388"></a>[388]</span>
feared a counter-attack. The French deserters
indeed declared that Clauzel had formed a body of
two thousand choice grenadiers to assault the village
and church of Arcangues, but the day passed without
any event in that quarter save a slight skirmish
in which a few men were wounded. Not so on
the side of Barrouilhet. There was a thick fog,
and lord Wellington, desirous to ascertain what the
French were about, directed the ninth regiment
about ten o’clock to open a skirmish beyond the tanks
towards Pucho, and to push the action if the French
augmented their force. Cameron did so and the
fight was becoming warm, when colonel Delancy, a
staff-officer, rashly directed the ninth to enter the village.
The error was soon and sharply corrected, for
the fog cleared up, and Soult, who had twenty-four
thousand men at that point, observing the ninth unsupported,
ordered a counter-attack which was so
strong and sudden that Cameron only saved his
regiment with the aid of some Portuguese troops
hastily brought up by sir John Hope. The fighting
then ceased and lord Wellington went to the right,
leaving Hope with orders to push back the French
picquets and re-establish his former outposts on the
connecting ridge towards Bussussary.</p>

<p>Soult had hitherto appeared undecided, but roused
by this second insult, he ordered Darricau’s division
to attack Barrouilhet along the connecting ridge,
while Boyer’s division fell on by the main road between
the tanks. This was about two o’clock and
the allies expecting no battle had dispersed to
gather fuel, for the time was wet and cold. In an
instant the French penetrated in all directions, they
outflanked the right, they passed the tanks, seized
the out-buildings of the mayor’s house, and occupied<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_389"></a>[389]</span>
the coppice in front of it; they were indeed
quickly driven from the out-buildings by the royals,
but the tumult was great and the coppice was filled
with men of all nations intermixed and fighting in
a perilous manner. Robinson’s brigade was very
hardly handled, the officer commanding it was
wounded, a squadron of French cavalry suddenly
cut down some of the Portuguese near the wood, and
on the right the colonel of the eighty-fourth having
unwisely engaged his regiment in a hollow road
where the French possessed the high bank, was
killed with a great number of men. However the
ninth regiment posted on the main road plied Boyer’s
flank with fire, the eighty-fifth regiment of lord
Aylmer’s brigade came into action, and sir John Hope
conspicuous from his gigantic stature and heroic
courage, was seen wherever danger pressed rallying
and encouraging the troops; at one time he was in
the midst of the enemy, his clothes were pierced
with bullets, and he received a severe wound in the
ankle, yet he would not quit the field and by his
great presence of mind and calm intrepidity restored
the battle. The French were finally beaten back from
the position of Barrouilhet yet they had recovered
their original posts, and continued to gall the allies
with a fire of shot and shells until the fall of night.
The total loss in this fight was about six hundred
men of a side, and as the fifth division was now considerably
reduced in numbers the first division took
its place on the front line. Meanwhile Soult sent
his cavalry over the Nive to Mousseroles to check
the incursions of Hill’s horsemen.</p>

<p><em>Combat of the 12th.</em>—The rain fell heavily in the
night, and though the morning broke fair neither
side seemed inclined to recommence hostilities. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_390"></a>[390]</span>
advanced posts were however very close to each
other and about ten o’clock a misunderstanding
arose. The French general observing the fresh regiments<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Despatches, MSS.</span>
of the first division close to his posts, imagined
the allies were going to attack him and immediately
reinforced his front; this movement causing
an English battery to fall into a like error it opened
upon the advancing French troops, and in an instant
the whole line of posts was engaged. Soult then
brought up a number of guns, the firing continued
without an object for many hours, and three or four
hundred men of a side were killed and wounded,
but the great body of the French army remained
concentrated and quiet on the ridge between Barrouilhet
and Bussussary.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington as early as the 10th had expected
Soult would abandon this attack to fall upon
Hill, and therefore had given Beresford orders to
carry the sixth division to that general’s assistance
by the new bridge and the seventh division by
Ustaritz, without waiting for further instructions, if
Hill was assailed; now observing Soult’s tenacity
at Barrouilhet he drew the seventh division towards
Arbonne. Beresford had however made a movement
towards the Nive, and this with the march of
the seventh division and some changes in the position
of the fourth division, caused Soult to believe
the allies were gathering with a view to attack his
centre on the morning of the 13th; and it is remarkable
that the deserters at this early period told
him the Spaniards had re-entered France although
orders to that effect were not as we shall find given
until the next day. Convinced then that his bolt
was shot on the left of the Nive, he left two divisions
and Villatte’s reserve in the entrenched camp,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_391"></a>[391]</span>
and marched with the other seven to Mousseroles
intending to fall upon Hill.</p>

<p>That general had pushed his scouting parties to
the Gambouri, and when general Sparre’s horsemen
arrived at Mousseroles on the 12th, Pierre Soult
advanced from the Bidouze with all the light cavalry.
He was supported by the infantry of general Paris
and drove the allies’ posts from Hasparen. Colonel
Vivian, who commanded there, immediately ordered
major Brotherton to charge with the fourteenth dragoons
across the bridge, but it was an ill-judged
order, and the impossibility of succeeding so manifest,
that when Brotherton, noted throughout the
army for his daring, galloped forward, only two
men and one subaltern, lieutenant Southwell, passed
the narrow bridge with him, and they were all
taken. Vivian then seeing his error charged with
his whole brigade to rescue them, yet in vain, he
was forced to fall back upon Urcuray where Morillo’s
Spaniards had relieved the British infantry brigade
on the 11th. This threatening movement induced
general Hill to put the British brigade in march
again for Urcuray on the 12th, but he recalled it at
sunset, having then discovered Soult’s columns passing
the Nive by the boat-bridge above Bayonne.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington now feeling the want of numbers,
brought forward a division of Gallicians to St. Jean
de Luz, and one of Andalusians from the Bastan to
Itzassu, and to prevent their plundering fed them
from the British magazines. The Gallicians were to
support Hope, the Andalusians to watch the upper
valley of the Nive and protect the rear of the army
from Paris and Pierre Soult, who could easily be
reinforced with a strong body of national guards.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_392"></a>[392]</span>
Meanwhile Hill had taken a position of battle on a
front of two miles.</p>

<p>His left, composed of the twenty-eighth, thirty-fourth,
and thirty-ninth regiments under general
Pringle, occupied a wooded and broken range
crowned by the chateau of Villefranque; it covered
the new pontoon bridge of communication, which was
a mile and a half higher up the river, but it was
separated from the centre by a small stream forming
a chain of ponds in a very deep and marshy
valley.</p>

<p>The centre placed on both sides of the high road
near the hamlet of St. Pierre, occupied a crescent-shaped<span class="sidenote7">Plan 8.</span>
height, broken with rocks and close brushwood
on the left hand, and on the right hand enclosed
with high and thick hedges, one of which, covering,
at the distance of a hundred yards, part of the line,
was nearly impassable. Here Ashworth’s Portuguese
and Barnes’s British brigade of the second division
were posted. The seventy-first regiment was on the
left, the fiftieth in the centre, the ninety-second on
the right. Ashworth’s Portuguese were posted in
advance immediately in front of St. Pierre, and
their skirmishers occupied a small wood covering
their right. Twelve guns under the colonels Ross
and Tullock were concentrated in front of the centre,
looking down the great road, and half a mile
in rear of this point Lecor’s Portuguese division
was stationed with two guns as a reserve.</p>

<p>The right under Byng was composed of the third,
fifty-seventh, thirty-first, and sixty-sixth. One of
these regiments, the third, was posted on a height
running nearly parallel with the Adour called
the ridge of Partouhiria, or Old Moguerre, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_393"></a>[393]</span>
a village of that name was situated upon the summit.
This regiment was pushed in advance to a point
where it could only be approached by crossing the
lower part of a narrow swampy valley which separated
Moguerre from the heights of St. Pierre. The
upper part of this valley was held by Byng with the
remainder of his brigade, and his post was well
covered by a mill-pond leading towards the enemy
and nearly filling all the valley.</p>

<p>One mile in front of St. Pierre was a range of
counter heights belonging to the French, but the
basin between was broad open and commanded in
every part by the fire of the allies, and in all parts
the country was too heavy and too much enclosed
for the action of cavalry. Nor could the enemy
approach in force, except on a narrow front of battle
and by the high road, until within cannon-shot,
when two narrow difficult lanes branched off to the
right and left, and crossing the swampy valleys on
each side, led, the one to the height where the third
regiment was posted on the extreme right of the
allies, the other to general Pringle’s position on the
left.</p>

<p>In the night of the 12th the rain swelled the Nive
and carried away the allies’ bridge of communication.
It was soon restored, but on the morning of
the 13th general Hill was completely cut off from
the rest of the army; and while seven French divisions
of infantry, furnishing at least thirty-five thousand
combatants, approached him in front, an eighth
under general Paris and the cavalry division of
Pierre Soult menaced him in rear. To meet the<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix 7</a>, sect. 4.</span>
French in his front he had less than fourteen
thousand, men and officers with fourteen guns in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_394"></a>[394]</span>
position; and there were only four thousand
Spaniards with Vivian’s cavalry at Urcuray.</p>

<p><em>Battle of St. Pierre.</em>—The morning broke with a<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_08"><ins class="corr" id="tn-394" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'See plan.'">
See Plan 8.</ins></a></span>
heavy mist under cover of which Soult formed his
order of battle. D’Erlon, having D’Armagnac’s
Abbé’s and Daricau’s divisions of infantry, Sparre’s
cavalry and twenty-two guns, marched in front; he
was followed by Foy and Maransin, but the remainder
of the French army was in reserve, for the roads
would not allow of any other order. The mist hung
heavily and the French masses, at one moment
quite shrouded in vapour, at another dimly seen or
looming sudden and large and dark at different
points, appeared like thunder-clouds gathering before
the storm. At half-past eight Soult pushed back
the British picquets in the centre, the sun burst out
at that moment, the sparkling fire of the light troops
spread wide in the valley, and crept up the hills on
either flank, while the bellowing of forty pieces of
artillery shook the banks of the Nive and the Adour.
Darricau marching on the French right was directed
against general Pringle. D’Armagnac, moving on
their left and taking Old Moguerre as the point of
direction, was ordered to force Byng’s right. Abbé
assailed the centre at St. Pierre, where general
Stewart commanded, for sir Rowland Hill had taken
his station on a commanding mount in the rear, from
whence he could see the whole battle and direct the
movements.</p>

<p>Abbé, a man noted for vigour, pushed his attack
with great violence and gained ground so rapidly
with his light troops, on the left of Ashworth’s Portuguese,
that Stewart sent the seventy-first regiment
and two guns from St. Pierre to the latter’s aid; the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_395"></a>[395]</span>
French skirmishers likewise won the small wood on
Ashworth’s right, and half of the fiftieth regiment
was also detached from St. Pierre to that quarter.
The wood was thus retaken, and the flanks of Stewart’s
position secured, but his centre was very much
weakened, and the fire of the French artillery was
concentrated against it. Abbé then pushed on a
column of attack there with such a power that in
despite of the play of musquetry on his flanks and
a crashing cannonade in his front, he gained the top
of the position, and drove back the remainder of
Ashworth’s Portuguese and the other half of the
fiftieth regiment which had remained in reserve.</p>

<p>General Barnes who had still the ninety-second
regiment in hand behind St. Pierre, immediately
brought it on with a strong counter-attack. The
French skirmishers fell back on each side leaving
two regiments composing the column to meet the
charge of the ninety-second; it was rough and
pushed home, the French mass wavered and gave
way. Abbé immediately replaced it and Soult
redoubling the heavy play of his guns from the height
he occupied, sent forward a battery of horse artillery
which galloping down into the valley opened its
fire close to the allies with most destructive activity.
The cannonade and musquetry rolled like a prolonged
peal of thunder, and the second French
column, regardless of Ross’s guns, though they tore
the ranks in a horrible manner, advanced so steadily
up the high road that the ninety-second yielding to
the tempest slowly regained its old position behind
St. Pierre. The Portuguese guns, their British commanding
officer having fallen wounded, then limbered
up to retire and the French skirmishers reached the
impenetrable hedge in front of Ashworth’s right.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_396"></a>[396]</span>
General Barnes now seeing that hard fighting only
could save the position, made the Portuguese guns
resume their fire, and the wing of the fiftieth and
the Caçadores gallantly held the small wood on the
right; but Barnes was soon wounded, the greatest
part of his and general Stewart’s staff were hurt, and
the matter seemed desperate. For the light troops
overpowered by numbers were all driven in except
those in the wood, the artillerymen were falling at
the guns, Ashworth’s line of Portuguese crumbled
away rapidly before the musquetry and cannonade,
the ground was strewed with the dead in front, and
the wounded crawling to the rear were many.</p>

<p>If the French light troops could then have penetrated
through the thick hedge in front of the Portuguese,
defeat would have been inevitable on this
point, for the main column of attack still steadily
advanced up the main road, and a second column
launched on its right was already victorious, because
the colonel of the seventy-first had shamefully withdrawn
that gallant regiment out of action and abandoned
the Portuguese. Pringle was indeed fighting
strongly against Daricau’s superior numbers on the
hill of Villefranque, but on the extreme right the
colonel of the third regiment had also abandoned his
strong post to D’Armagnac, whose leading brigade
was thus rapidly turning Byng’s other regiments on
that side. And now Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions,
hitherto retarded by the deep roads, were coming into
line ready to support Abbé, and this at the moment
when the troops opposed to him were deprived of
their reserve. For when general Hill beheld the
retreat of the third and seventy-first regiments he
descended in haste from his mount, met, and turned
the latter back to renew the fight, and then in person<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_397"></a>[397]</span>
leading one brigade of Le Cor’s reserve division to
the same quarter sent the other against D’Armagnac
on the hill of Old Moguerre. Thus at the decisive
moment of the battle the French reserve was augmented
and that of the allies thrown as a last resource
into action. However the right wing of the
fiftieth and Ashworth’s Caçadores, both spread as
skirmishers, never lost the small wood in front, upholding
the fight there and towards the high road
with such unflinching courage that the ninety-second
regiment had time to reform behind the hamlet of
St. Pierre. Then its gallant colonel Cameron once
more led it down the road with colours flying and
music playing resolved to give the shock to whatever
stood in the way. At this sight the British
skirmishers on the flanks, suddenly changing from
retreat to attack, rushed forward and drove those of
the enemy back on each side; yet the battle seemed
hopeless for Ashworth was badly wounded, his line
was shattered to atoms, and Barnes who had not
quitted the field for his former hurt was now shot
through the body.</p>

<p>The ninety-second was but a small body compared<span class="sidenote">Published Memoir on the battle by captain Pringle, engineers.</span>
with the heavy mass in its front, and the French
soldiers seemed willing enough to close with the
bayonet; but an officer riding at their head suddenly
turned his horse waved his sword and appeared to
order a retreat, then they faced about and immediately
retired across the valley to their original position,
in good order however and scarcely pursued by the
allies, so exhausted were the victors. This retrograde
movement, for there was no panic or disorder,
was produced partly by the gallant advance of the
ninety-second and the returning rush of the skirmishers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_398"></a>[398]</span>
partly by the state of affairs immediately on
the right of the French column. For the seventy-first
indignant at their colonel’s conduct had returned
to the fight with such alacrity, and were so well
aided by Le Cor’s Portuguese, generals Hill and
Stewart each in person leading an attack, that the
hitherto victorious French were overthrown there
also in the very moment when the ninety-second
came with such a brave shew down the main road:
Le Cor was however wounded.</p>

<p>This double action in the centre being seen from
the hill of Villefranque, Daricau’s division, already
roughly handled by Pringle, fell back in confusion;
and meantime on the right, Buchan’s Portuguese,
detached by Hill to recover the Moguerre or Partouhiria
ridge, crossed the valley, and ascending
under a heavy flank fire from Soult’s guns rallied
the third regiment; in happy time, for D’Armagnac’s
first brigade having already passed the
flank of Byng’s regiments at the mill-pond was
actually in rear of the allies’ lines. It was now
twelve o’clock, and while the fire of the light troops
in the front and the cannonade in the centre continued
the contending generals restored their respective
orders of battle. Soult’s right wing had
been quite repulsed by Pringle, his left was giving
way before Buchan, and the difficult ground forbad
his sending immediate succour to either; moreover
in the exigency of the moment he had called
D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to sustain Abbé’s
retiring columns. However that brigade and Foy’s
and Maransin’s divisions were in hand to renew the
fight in the centre, and the allies could not, unsuccoured,
have sustained a fresh assault; for their ranks<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_399"></a>[399]</span>
were wasted with fire, nearly all the staff had been
killed or wounded, and three generals had quitted
the field badly hurt.</p>

<p>In this crisis general Hill seeing that Buchan
was now well and successfully engaged on the Partouhiria
ridge, and that Byng’s regiments were quite
masters of their ground in the valley of the mill-pond,
drew the fifty-seventh regiment from the
latter place to reinforce his centre. At the same
time the bridge above Villefranque having been
restored, the sixth division, which had been marching
since daybreak, appeared in order of battle on
the mount from whence Hill had descended to rally
the seventy-first. It was soon followed by the
fourth division, and that again by the brigades
of the third division; two other brigades of the
seventh division were likewise in march. With the
first of these troops came lord Wellington who had
hurried from Barrouilhet when the first sound of
the cannon reached him, yet he arrived only to
witness the close of the battle, the crisis was past,
Hill’s day of glory was complete. Soult had,
according to the French method, made indeed another
attack, or rather demonstration, against the centre,
to cover his new dispositions, an effort easily repulsed,
but at the same moment Buchan drove D’Armagnac
headlong off the Partouhiria ridge. The sixth division
then appeared on the commanding mount in the
rear of St. Pierre, and though the French masses
still maintained a menacing position on the high
road, and on a hillock rising between the road and
the mill-pond, they were quickly dispossessed. For
the English general being now supported by the
sixth division, sent Byng with two battalions against
the hillock, and some troops from the centre against<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_400"></a>[400]</span>
those on the high road. At this last point the
generals and staff had been so cut down that colonel
Currie, the aid-de-camp who brought the order, could
find no superior officer to deliver it to and led the
troops himself to the attack, but both charges were successful;
and two guns of the light battery sent down
in the early part of the fight by Soult, and which had
played without ceasing up to this moment, were taken.</p>

<p>The battle now abated to a skirmish of light
troops, under cover of which the French endeavoured
to carry off their wounded and rally their stragglers,
but at two o’clock lord Wellington commanded a
general advance of the whole line. Then the
French retreated fighting, and the allies following
close on the side of the Nive plied them with musquetry
until dark. Yet they maintained their line
towards the Adour, for Sparre’s cavalry passing
out that way rejoined Pierre Soult on the side of
Hasparen. This last-named general and Paris had
during the day menaced Morillo and Vivian’s cavalry
at Urcuray, however not more than thirty men of
a side were hurt, and when Soult’s ill success became
known the French retired to Bonloc.</p>

<p>In this bloody action Soult had designed to employ
seven divisions of infantry with one brigade of
cavalry on the front, and one brigade of infantry
with a division of cavalry on the rear; but the state
of the roads and the narrow front he was forced to
move upon did not permit more than five divisions
to act at St. Pierre, and only half of those were
seriously engaged. His loss was certainly three
thousand, making a total on the five days’ fighting
of six thousand men with two generals, Villatte and
Maucomble, wounded. The estimate made by the
British at the time far exceeded this number, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_401"></a>[401]</span>
one French writer makes their loss ten thousand
including probably the Nassau and Frankfort regiments.
The same writer however estimates the loss
of the allies at sixteen thousand! Whereas Hill<span class="sidenote9">Lapene.</span>
had only three generals and about fifteen hundred
men killed and wounded on the 13th and Morillo
lost but twenty-six men at Urcuray. The real
loss of the allies in the whole five days’ fighting
was only five thousand and nineteen, including
however five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes,
Lecor, and Ashworth. Of this number five hundred
were prisoners.</p>

<p>The duke of Dalmatia, baffled by the unexpected
result of the battle of St. Pierre, left D’Erlon’s
three divisions in front of the camp of Mousseroles,
sent two others over the Nive to Marac, and
passing the Adour himself during the night with
Foy’s division, spread it along the right bank of
that river as far as the confluence of the Gave de
Pau.</p>


<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4>

<p>1º. The French general’s plan was conceived
with genius but the execution offers a great contrast
to the conception. What a difference between the
sudden concentration of his whole army on the
platforms of Arcangues and Bussussary, where
there were only a few picquets to withstand him,
and from whence he could have fallen with the roll
of an avalanche upon any point of the allies’ line!
what a difference between that and the petty attack
of Clauzel, which a thousand men of the light division
sufficed to arrest at the village and church of
Arcangues. There beyond question was the weak<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_402"></a>[402]</span>
part of the English general’s cuirass. The spear
pushed home there would have drawn blood. For the
disposition and movements of the third fourth and
seventh divisions, were made more with reference to
the support of Hill than to sustain an attack from
Soult’s army, and it is evident that Wellington,
trusting to the effect of his victory on the 10th of
November, had treated the French general and
his troops, more contemptuously than he could
have justified by arms without the aid of fortune.
I know not what induced marshal Soult to
direct his main attack by Anglet and the connecting
ridge of Bussussary, against Barrouilhet, instead of
assailing Arcangues as he at first proposed; but
this is certain, that for three hours after Clauzel first
attacked the picquets at the latter place, there were
not troops enough to stop three French divisions,
much less a whole army. And this point being
nearer to the bridge by which D’Erlon passed the
Nive, the concentration of the French troops could
have been made sooner than at Barrouilhet, where
the want of unity in the attack caused by the difficulty
of the roads ruined the French combinations.</p>

<p>The allies were so unexpectant of an attack, that
the battle at Barrouilhet which might have been
fought with seventeen thousand men, was actually
fought by ten thousand. And those were not
brought into action at once, for Robinson’s brigade
and Campbell’s Portuguese, favoured by the narrow
opening between the tanks, resisted Reille’s divisions
for two hours, and gave time for the rest of the
fifth division and Bradford’s brigade to arrive. But
if Foy’s division and Villatte’s reserve had been
able to assail the flank at the same time, by the
ridge coming from Bussussary, the battle would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_403"></a>[403]</span>
have been won by the French; and meanwhile three
divisions under Clauzel and two under D’Erlon
remained hesitating before Urdains and Arcangues,
for the cannonade and skirmishing at the latter
place were the very marks and signs of indecision.</p>

<p>2º. On the 11th the inactivity of the French
during the morning may be easily accounted for.
The defection of the German regiments, the necessity
of disarming and removing those that remained,
the care of the wounded, and the time required to
re-examine the allies’ position and ascertain what
changes had taken place during the night, must
have given ample employment to the French general.
His attack in the afternoon also was well judged
because already he must have seen from the increase
of troops in his front, from the intrenched
battery and other works rapidly constructed at the
church of Arcangues, that no decisive success
could be expected on the left of the Nive, and that
his best chance was to change his line of attack
again to the right bank. To do this with effect,
it was necessary, not only to draw all lord Wellington’s
reserves from the right of the Nive but to be
certain that they had come, and this could only be
done by repeating the attacks at Barrouilhet. The
same cause operated on the 12th, for it was not
until the fourth and seventh divisions were seen by
him on the side of Arbonne that he knew his wile
had succeeded. Yet again the execution was
below the conception, for first, the bivouac fires on
the ridge of Bussussary were extinguished in the
evening, and then others were lighted on the side of
Mousseroles, thus plainly indicating the march,
which was also begun too early, because the leading<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_404"></a>[404]</span>
division was by Hill seen to pass the bridge of
boats before sun-set.</p>

<p>These were serious errors yet the duke of Dalmatia’s
generalship cannot be thus fairly tested.
There are many circumstances which combine to
prove, that when he complained to the emperor of
the contradictions and obstacles he had to encounter
he alluded to military as well as to political and
financial difficulties. It is a part of human nature
to dislike any disturbance of previous habits, and
soldiers are never pleased at first with a general,
who introduces and rigorously exacts a system of
discipline differing from what they have been accustomed
to. Its utility must be proved and confirmed
by habit ere it will find favour in their eyes.
Now Soult suddenly assumed the command of
troops, who had been long serving under various
generals and were used to much license in Spain.
They were therefore, men and officers, uneasy at
being suddenly subjected to the austere and resolute
command of one who, from natural character
as well as the exigency of the times, the war being
now in his own country, demanded a ready and
exact obedience, and a regularity which long habits
of a different kind rendered onerous. Hence we
find in all the French writers, and in Soult’s own
reports, manifest proofs that his designs were frequently
thwarted or disregarded by his subordinates
when circumstances promised impunity. His greatest
and ablest military combinations were certainly
rendered abortive by the errors of his lieutenants in
the first operations to relieve Pampeluna, and on
the 31st of August a manifest negligence of his
earnest recommendations to vigilance led to serious
danger and loss at the passage of the Lower<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_405"></a>[405]</span>
Bidassoa. Complaint and recrimination were rife
in all quarters about the defeat on the 10th of November,
and on the 19th the bridge-head of Cambo
was destroyed contrary to the spirit of his instructions.
These things, joined to the acknowledged
jealousy and disputes prevalent amongst the French
generals employed in Spain, would indicate that
the discrepancy between the conception and execution
of the operations in front of Bayonne was not
the error of the commander-in-chief. Perhaps king
Joseph’s faction, so inimical to the duke of Dalmatia,
was still powerful in the army and difficult
to deal with.</p>

<p>3º. Lord Wellington has been blamed for putting
his troops in a false position, and no doubt he
under-valued, it was not the first time, the military
genius and resources of his able adversary, when he
exposed Hill’s troops on the left of the Nive to a
species of surprize. But the passage of the Nive
itself, the rapidity with which he moved his divisions
from bank to bank, and the confidence with
which he relied upon the valour of his troops, so
far from justifying the censures which have been
passed upon him by French writers, emphatically
mark his mastery in the art. The stern justice of
sending the Spaniards back into Spain after the
battle of the Nivelle is apparent, but the magnanimity
of that measure can only be understood by
considering lord Wellington’s military situation at
the time. The battle of the Nivelle was delivered
on political grounds, but of what avail would his
gaining it have been if he had remained enclosed
as it were in a net between the Nive and the sea,
Bayonne and the Pyrenees, unable to open communications
with the disaffected in France, and having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_406"></a>[406]</span>
the beaten army absolutely forbidding him to
forage or even to look beyond the river on his right.
The invasion of France was not his own operation,
it was the project of the English cabinet and
the allied sovereigns; both were naturally urging
him to complete it, and to pass the Nive and free
his flanks was indispensable if he would draw any
profit from his victory of the 10th of November.
But he could not pass it with his whole army unless
he resigned the sea-coast and his communications
with Spain. He was therefore to operate
with a portion only of his force and consequently
required all the men he could gather to ensure
success. Yet at that crisis he divested himself of
twenty-five thousand Spanish soldiers!</p>

<p>Was this done in ignorance of the military glory
awaiting him beyond the spot where he stood?</p>

<p>“<em>If I had twenty thousand Spaniards paid and
fed</em>,” he wrote to lord Bathurst, “<em>I should have
Bayonne. If I had forty thousand I do not know
where I should stop. Now I have both the twenty
thousand and the forty thousand, but I have not the
means of paying and supplying them, and if they
plunder they will ruin all.</em>”</p>

<p>Requisitions which the French expected as a part
of war would have enabled him to run this career,
but he looked further; he had promised the people
protection and his greatness of mind was disclosed
in a single sentence. “<em>I must tell your lordship that
our success and every thing depends upon our moderation
and justice.</em>” Rather than infringe on either,
he sent the Spaniards to the rear and passed the
Nive with the British and Portuguese only, thus
violating the military rule which forbids a general
to disseminate his troops before an enemy who remains<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_407"></a>[407]</span>
in mass lest he should be beaten in detail.
But genius begins where rules end. A great general
always seeks moral power in preference to physical
force. Wellington’s choice here was between
a shameful inactivity or a dangerous enterprise.
Trusting to the influence of his reputation, to his
previous victories, and to the ascendancy of his
troops in the field, he chose the latter, and the result,
though he committed some errors of execution, justified
his boldness. He surprised the passage of
the Nive, laid his bridges of communication, and
but for the rain of the night before, which ruined
the roads and retarded the march of Hill’s columns,
he would have won the heights of St. Pierre the
same day. Soult could not then have withdrawn
his divisions from the right bank without being observed.
Still it was an error to have the troops on
the left bank so unprepared for the battle of the
10th. It was perhaps another error not to have occupied
the valley or basin between Hope and Alten,
and surely it was negligence not to entrench Hill’s
position on the 10th, 11th, and 12th. Yet with all
this so brave so hardy so unconquerable were his
soldiers that he was successful at every point, and
that is the justification of his generalship. Hannibal
crossed the Alps and descended upon Italy, not in
madness but because he knew himself and his troops.</p>

<p>4º. It is agreed by French and English that the
battle of St. Pierre was one of the most desperate of
the whole war. Lord Wellington declared that he
had never seen a field so thickly strewn with dead,
nor can the vigour of the combatants be well denied
where five thousand men were killed or wounded in
three hours upon a space of one mile square. How
then did it happen, valour being so conspicuous on
both sides, that six English and Portuguese brigades,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_408"></a>[408]</span>
furnishing less than fourteen thousand men
and officers with fourteen guns, were enabled to<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix 7</a>, Sect. 4.</span>
withstand seven French divisions, certainly furnishing
thirty-five thousand men and officers with twenty-two
guns? The analysis of this fact shows upon
what nice calculations and accidents war depends.</p>

<p>If Hill had not observed the French passing
their bridge on the evening of the 12th, and their
bivouac fires in the night, Barnes’s brigade, with
which he saved the day, would have been at Urcuray,
and Soult could not have been stopped. But
the French general could only bring five divisions
into action, and those only in succession, so that in
fact three divisions or about sixteen thousand men
with twenty-two guns actually fought the battle.
Foy’s and Maransin’s troops did not engage until
after the crisis had passed. On the other hand the
proceedings of colonel Peacocke of the seventy-first,
and colonel Bunbury of the third, for which they
were both obliged to quit the service, forced general
Hill to carry his reserve away from the decisive
point at that critical period which always occurs in a
well-disputed field and which every great general
watches for with the utmost anxiety. This was no
error, it was a necessity, and the superior military
quality of the British troops rendered it successful.</p>

<p>The French officer who rode at the head of the
second attacking column might be a brave man,
doubtless he was; he might be an able man, but
he had not the instinct of a general. On his right
flank indeed Hill’s vigorous counter-attack was
successful, but the battle was to be won in the centre;
his column was heavy, undismayed, and
only one weak battalion, the ninety-second, was
before it; a short exhortation, a decided gesture,
a daring example, and it would have overborne<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_409"></a>[409]</span>
the small body in its front, Foy’s, Maransin’s,
and the half of D’Armagnac’s divisions would then
have followed in the path thus marked out.
Instead of this he weighed chances and retreated.
How different was the conduct of the British generals,
two of whom and nearly all their staff fell at
this point, resolute not to yield a step at such a critical
period; how desperately did the fiftieth and<span class="sidenote">Published Memoir by Captain Pringle of the Royal Engineers.</span>
Portuguese fight to give time for the ninety-second
to rally and reform behind St. Pierre; how gloriously
did that regiment come forth again to charge
with their colours flying and their national music
playing as if going to a review. This was to understand
war. The man who in that moment and immediately
after a repulse thought of such military
pomp was by nature a soldier.</p>

<p>I have said that sir Rowland Hill’s employment
of his reserve was no error, it was indeed worthy of
all praise. From the commanding mount on which
he stood, he saw at once, that the misconduct of the
two colonels would cause the loss of his position
more surely than any direct attack upon it, and
with a promptness and decision truly military he
descended at once to the spot, playing the soldier
as well as the general, rallying the seventy-first and
leading the reserve himself; trusting meanwhile with
a noble and well-placed confidence to the courage
of the ninety-second and the fiftieth to sustain the
fight at St. Pierre. He knew indeed that the sixth
division was then close at hand and that the battle
might be fought over again, but like a thorough
soldier he was resolved to win his own fight with
his own troops if he could. And he did so after a
manner that in less eventful times would have rendered
him the hero of a nation.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_410"></a>[410]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_III">CHAPTER III.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">To understand all the importance of the battle of<span class="sidenote9">1813. December.</span>
St. Pierre, the nature of the country and the relative
positions of the opposing generals before and after
that action must be considered. Bayonne although
a mean fortress in itself was at this period truly designated
by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks
of France. Covered by its entrenched camp, which
the inundations and the deep country rendered impregnable
while there was an army to defend it, this
place could not be assailed until that army was
drawn away, and it was obviously impossible to pass
it and leave the enemy to act upon the communications
with Spain and the sea-coast. To force
the French army to abandon Bayonne was therefore
lord Wellington’s object, and his first step was the
passage of the Nive; he thus cut Soult’s direct
communication with St. Jean Pied de Port, obtained
an intercourse with the malcontents in France,
opened a large tract of fertile country for his cavalry,
and menaced the navigation of the Adour so
as to render it difficult for the French general to receive
supplies. This was however but a first step,
because the country beyond the Nive was still the
same deep clayey soil with bad roads; and it was traversed
by many rivers more or less considerable,
which flooding with every shower in the mountains,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_411"></a>[411]</span>
formed in their concentric courses towards the
Adour a number of successive barriers, behind which
Soult could maintain himself on lord Wellington’s
right and hold communication with St. Jean Pied de
Port. He could thus still hem in the allies as
before; upon a more extended scale however and
with less effect, for he was thrown more on the
defensive, his line was now the longest, and his
adversary possessed the central position.</p>

<p>On the other hand, Wellington could not, in that
deep impracticable country, carry on the wide operations
necessary to pass the rivers on his right, and
render the French position at Bayonne untenable,
until fine weather hardened the roads, and the winter
of 1813 was peculiarly wet and inclement.</p>

<p>From this exposition it is obvious that to nourish
their own armies and circumvent their adversaries
in that respect were the objects of both generals,
Soult aimed to make Wellington retire into Spain,
Wellington to make Soult abandon Bayonne entirely,
or so reduce his force in the entrenched
camp that the works might be stormed. The
French general’s recent losses forbad him to maintain
his extended positions except during the wet
season; three days’ fine weather made him tremble;
and the works of his camp were still too unfinished
to leave a small force there. The difficulty of the
roads and want of military transport threw his army
almost entirely upon water-carriage for subsistence,
and his great magazines were therefore established
at Dax on the Adour, and at Peyrehorade on the
Gave of Pau, the latter being about twenty-four
miles from Bayonne. These places he fortified to
resist sudden incursions, and he threw a bridge
across the Adour at the port of Landes, just above<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_412"></a>[412]</span>
its confluence with the Gave de Pau. But the navigation
of the Adour below that point, especially
at Urt, the stream being confined there, could be
interrupted by the allies who were now on the left
bank. To remedy this Soult ordered Foy to pass
the Adour at Urt and construct a bridge with a
head of works, but the movement was foreseen by
Wellington, and Foy, menaced with a superior force,
recrossed the river. The navigation was then carried
on at night by stealth, or guarded by the
French gun-boats and exposed to the fire of the
allies. Thus provisions became scarce, and the
supply would have been quite unequal to the demand
if the French coasting trade, now revived
between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been interrupted
by the navy, but lord Wellington’s representations
on this head were still unheeded.</p>

<p>Soult was embarrassed by Foy’s failure at Urt.
He reinforced him with Boyer’s and D’Armagnac’s
divisions, which were extended to the Port de
Lannes; then leaving Reille with four divisions
to guard the entrenched camp and to finish the
works, he completed the garrison of Bayonne and
transferred his head-quarters to Peyrehorade.
Clauzel with two divisions of infantry and the light
cavalry now took post on the Bidouze, being supported
with Trielhard’s heavy dragoons, and having
his left in communication with Paris and with St.
Jean Pied de Port where there was a garrison of
eighteen hundred men besides national guards. He
soon pushed his advanced posts to the Joyeuse
or Gambouri, and the Aran, streams which unite to
fall into the Adour near Urt, and he also occupied
Hellette, Mendionde, Bonloc, and the Bastide de
Clerence. A bridge-head was constructed at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_413"></a>[413]</span>
Peyrehorade, Hastingues was fortified on the Gave
de Pau, Guiche, Bidache and Came, on the Bidouze,
and the works of Navarens were augmented.
In fine Soult with equal activity and intelligence
profited from the rain which stopped the allies’
operations in that deep country.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington also made some changes of position.
Having increased his works at Barrouilhet he
was enabled to shift some of Hope’s troops towards
Arcangues, and he placed the sixth division on the
heights of Villefranque, which permitted general
Hill to extend his right up the Adour to Urt. The
third division was posted near Urcuray, the light
cavalry on the Joyeuse facing Clauzel’s outposts, and
a chain of telegraphs was established from the
right of the Nive by the hill of San Barbe to St.
Jean de Luz. Freyre’s Gallicians were placed in
reserve about St. Pé, and Morillo was withdrawn to
Itzassu where supported by the Andalusian division
and by Freyre, he guarded the valley of the Upper
Nive and watched general Paris beyond the Ursouia
mountain. Such was the state of affairs in<span class="sidenote9">1814. January.</span>
the beginning of January, but some minor actions
happened before these arrangements were completed.</p>

<p>In December the allies seized the island of Holriague
near La Honce on the Adour, which gave
them a better command of that river, but Foy kept
possession of the islands of Berens and Broc above
Holriague. The allies’ bridges of communication
on the Nive were now carried away by floods which
occasioned some embarrassment, and meanwhile,
without any orders from lord Wellington, probably
with a view to plunder, for his troops were exceedingly
licentious, Morillo obtained from Victor Alten<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_414"></a>[414]</span>
two squadrons of the eighteenth hussars, under pretence
of exploring the enemy’s position towards
Mendionde and Maccaye. Their commander, major
Hughes, having with difficulty ascertained that he
was to form an advanced guard in a close wooded
country, demanded the aid of some Spanish Caçadores,
and then moving forwards drove in the
picquets, crossed the bridge of Mendionde and
commenced a skirmish. But during this action
Morillo withdrew his division without giving any
notice, and at the same time the Caçadores fled in
a shameful manner from the left, the cavalry were
thus turned and escaped with difficulty, having had
one captain killed, two other captains and a lieutenant,
and Hughes himself, badly wounded. The
unfortunate issue of this skirmish was attributed at
the time to the bad conduct of the eighteenth hussars,
against whom lord Wellington was by malicious
misrepresentation previously prejudiced; for
at Vittoria they were unjustly accused of being more
licentious than others in plundering the captured
property on the field, whereas they had fought well
and plundered less than many who were praised for
their orderly demeanour.</p>

<p>About the same time that this disaster occurred
at Mendionde, Mina, acting independently, and
being pressed for provisions in the mountains, invaded
the Val de Baigorry and the Val des Osses,
where his men committed the greatest enormities,
plundering and burning, and murdering men women
and children without distinction. The people of
these valleys, distinguished amongst the Basques for
their warlike qualities, immediately took arms under
the command of one of their principal men, named
Etchevery, and being reinforced with two hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_415"></a>[415]</span>
and fifty men from St. Jean Pied de Port, surprised
one of Mina’s battalions, and attacked the rest with
great vigour. This event gave Soult hopes of exciting
the Basques to commence such a war as they
had carried on at the commencement of the French
revolution. His efforts to accomplish it were unceasing,
and he had for two months been expecting
the arrival of general Harispe an officer whose
courage and talents have been frequently noticed
in this History, and who being the head of an ancient
Basque family had great local influence,
which was increased by his military reputation. It
was thought that if he had come when first expected,
about November, lord Wellington’s strict
discipline being then unknown to the people, he
would have raised a formidable partizan war in the
mountains. But now the English general’s attention
to all complaints, his proclamation, and the
proof he gave of his sincerity by sending the Spaniards
back when they misconducted themselves,
had, in conjunction with the love of gain that
master passion with all mountaineers, tamed the
Basque spirit and disinclined them to exchange
ease and profit for turbulence and ravage. Nevertheless
this incursion by Mina and the licentious
conduct of Morillo’s troops, awakened the warlike
propensities of the Val de Baygorry Basques, and
Harispe was enabled to make a levy with which he
immediately commenced active operations, and was
supported by general Paris.</p>

<p>Soult with a view to aid Harispe, to extend his
own cantonments, and to restrict those of the allies,
now resolved to drive the latter’s detachments altogether<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Official Reports and Orders MSS.</span>
from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and
fix Clauzel’s left at Hellette, the culminant point of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_416"></a>[416]</span>
the great road to that fortress. To effect this, on
the 3d of January, he caused Clauzel to establish two<span class="sidenote7">Plan 9.</span>
divisions of infantry at the heights of La Costa, near
the Bastide de Clerence and beyond the Joyeuse
river. Buchan’s Portuguese brigade, placed in observation
there, was thus forced to retreat upon
Briscons, and at the same time Paris advancing to
Bonloc connected his right with Clauzel’s left at
Ayherre, while the light cavalry menaced all the
allies’ line of outposts. Informed of this movement
by telegraph, Wellington, thinking Soult was
seeking a general battle on the side of Hasparen,
made the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade
relieve the light division which marched to
Arauntz; the fourth division then passed the Nive
at Ustaritz, and the sixth division made ready to
march from Villefranque, by the high road of St.
Jean Pied de Port, towards Hasparen, as a reserve
to the third fourth and seventh divisions. The
latter were concentrated beyond Urcuray on the
4th, their left in communication with Hill’s right at
Briscons, and their right, supported by Morillo,
who advanced from Itzassu for this purpose.</p>

<p>The English general’s intent was to fall upon the
enemy at once, but the swelling of the small rivers
prevented him. However on the 5th having ascertained
the true object and dispositions of the French
general, and having twenty-four thousand infantry
in hand with a division of cavalry and four or five
brigades of artillery, he resolved to attack Clauzel’s
divisions on the heights of La Costa. In this view
Le Cor’s Portuguese marched against the French
right, the fourth division marched against their
centre, the third division supported by cavalry
against their left; the remainder of the cavalry and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_417"></a>[417]</span>
the seventh division, the whole under Stapleton
Cotton, were posted at Hasparen to watch Paris on
the side of Bonloc. Soult was in person at the
Bastide de Clerence and a general battle seemed
inevitable, but the intention of the English general
was merely to drive back the enemy from the
Joyeuse, and the French general, thinking the whole
allied army was in movement resolved to act on the
defensive, and directed the troops at La Costa to
retire fighting upon the Bidouze: the affair terminated
therefore with a slight skirmish on the
evening of the 6th. The allies then resumed their old
positions on the right of the Nive, the Andalusians
were ordered back to the Bastan, and <ins class="corr" id="tn-417" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Carlos D’Españo'">
Carlos D’España</ins>’s Gallicians were brought up to Ascain in
their place.</p>

<p>When Clauzel saw that nothing serious was designed
he sent his horsemen to drive away general
Hill’s detachments, which had taken advantage of
the great movements to forage on the lower parts
of the Joyeuse and Aran rivers. Meanwhile Soult
observing how sensitive his adversary was to any
demonstration beyond the Bidouze resolved to maintain
the line of those two rivers. In this view he
reduced his defence of the Adour to a line
drawn from the confluence of the Aran to Bayonne,
which enabled him to reinforce Clauzel with Foy’s
division and all the light cavalry. Meantime general
Harispe having the division of Paris and the brigade
of general Dauture placed under his orders
to support his mountaineers, fixed his quarters
at Hellette and commenced an active partizan warfare.
On the 8th he fell upon Mina in the Val des
Osses and drove him with loss into Baygorry. On
the 10th returning to Hellette he surprised Morillo’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_418"></a>[418]</span>
foragers with some English dragoons on the side of
Maccaye, and took a few prisoners. On the 12th
he again attacked Mina and drove him up into the
Alduides. During these affairs at the outposts
lord Wellington might have stormed the entrenched
camp in front of Bayonne, but he could not hold it
except under the fire of the fortress, and not being
prepared for a siege avoided that operation. Nor
would the weather, which was again become terrible,
permit him to make a general movement to drive
Harispe from his position in the upper country;
wherefore he preferred leaving that general in quiet
possession to irritating the mountaineers by a counter-warfare.
He endeavoured however to launch
some armed boats on the Adour above Bayonne,
where Soult had increased the flotilla to twenty
gun-boats for the protection of his convoys, which
were notwithstanding forced to run past Urt under
the fire of a battery constructed by general Hill.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington now dreading the bad effect
which the excesses committed by Mina’s and Morillo’s
men were likely to produce, for the Basques
were already beginning to speak of vengeance, put
forth his authority in repression. Rebuking Morillo
for his unauthorized and disastrous advance upon
Mendionde, and for the excesses of his troops, he
ordered him to keep the latter constantly under arms.
This was resented generally by the Spanish officers,
and especially by Morillo whose savage untractable
and bloody disposition, since so horribly displayed in
South America, prompted him to encourage violence.
He asserted falsely that his troops were starving,
declared that a settled design to ill-use the Spaniards
existed, and that the British soldiers were
suffered to commit every crime with impunity. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_419"></a>[419]</span>
English general in reply explained himself both to
Morillo, and to Freyre, who had alluded to the
libels about San Sebastian, with a clearness and
resolution that showed how hopeless it would be to
strive against him.</p>

<p>“He had not,” he said, “lost thousands of men
to pillage and ill-treat the French peasantry, he
preferred a small army obedient to a large one disobedient
and undisciplined. If his measures to
enforce good order deprived him of the Spanish
troops the fault would rest with those who suffered
their soldiers to commit disorders. Professions
without corresponding actions would not do, he
was determined to enforce obedience one way or
another and would not command insubordinate
troops. The question between them was whether
they should or should not pillage the French peasants.
His measures were taken to prevent it and
the conduct which called them forth was more dishonouring
to the Spaniards than the measures
themselves. For libels he cared not, he was used
to them and he did not believe the union of the
two nations depended upon such things; but if it
did he desired no union founded upon such an infamous
interest as pillage. He had not lost twenty
thousand men in the campaign to enable Morillo to
plunder and he would not permit it. If the Spaniards
were resolved to do so let them march their
great armies into France under their own generals,
he would meanwhile cover Spain itself and they
would find they could not remain in France for
fifteen days. They had neither money nor magazines,
nothing to maintain an army in the field, the
country behind was incapable of supporting them
and were he scoundrel enough to permit pillage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_420"></a>[420]</span>
France rich as it was could not sustain the burthen.
Even with a view to living on the enemy by contributions
it would be essential to prevent plunder; and
yet in defiance of all these reasons he was called
an enemy by the Spanish generals because he opposed
such conduct, and his measures to prevent it
were considered dishonouring!</p>

<p>“Something also he could say against it in a political
point of view, but it was unnecessary because
careless whether he commanded a large or a small
army he was resolved that it should obey him and
should not pillage.</p>

<p>“General Morillo expressed doubts of his right
to interfere with the Spaniards. It was his right
and his duty, and never before did he hear that to
put soldiers under arms was a disgrace. It was a
measure to prevent evil and misfortunes. Mina
could tell by recent experience what a warfare the
French peasants could carry on, and Morillo was
openly menaced with a like trial. It was in vain
for that general to palliate or deny the plundering
of his division, after having acknowledged to general
Hill that it was impossible to prevent it because
the officers and soldiers received by every post
letters from their friends, congratulating them upon
their good luck in entering France and urging
them to seize the opportunity of making fortunes.
General Morillo asserted that the British troops
were allowed to commit crimes with impunity.
Neither he nor any other man could produce an
instance of injury done where proof being adduced
the perpetrators had escaped punishment. Let him
enquire how many soldiers had been hanged, how
many stricken with minor chastisements and made to
pay for damages done. But had the English troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_421"></a>[421]</span>
no cause of complaint against the Spaniards? Officers
and soldiers were frequently shot and robbed
on the high roads and a soldier had been lately
murdered between Oyarzun and Lesaca; the English
stores and convoys were plundered by the
Spanish soldiers, a British officer had been put to
death at Vittoria and others were ill-treated at
Santander.”</p>

<p>A sullen obedience followed this correspondence
for the moment, but the plundering system was soon
renewed, and this with the mischief already done
was sufficient to rouse the inhabitants of Bidarray
as well as those of the Val de Baygorry into action.
They commenced and continued a partizan warfare
until lord Wellington, incensed by their
activity, issued a proclamation calling upon them
to take arms openly and join Soult or stay peaceably
at home, declaring that he would otherwise
burn their villages and hang all the inhabitants.
Thus it appeared that notwithstanding all the outcries
made against the French for resorting to this
system of repressing the warfare of peasants in
Spain, it was considered by the English general
both justifiable and necessary. However the threat
was sufficient for this occasion. The Basques set
the pecuniary advantages to be derived from the
friendship of the British and Portuguese troops and
the misery of an avenging warfare against the evils
of Spanish plunder, and generally disregarded
Harispe’s appeals to their patriotism.</p>

<p>Meanwhile Soult who expected reinforcements
seeing that little was to be gained by insurrection
and being desirous to resume the offensive, ordered
Harispe to leave only the troops absolutely necessary
for the defence of St. Jean Pied de Port and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_422"></a>[422]</span>
its entrenched camp with a few Basques as scouts
in the valleys, and to concentrate the remainder of
his force at Mendionde, Hellette and La Houssoa,
thus closely hemming in the right of the allies’ line
with a view to making incursions beyond the
Upper Nive. This was on the 14th, on the 23rd
Harispe, getting information that Morillo was to
forage in force on the side of Bidarray, endeavoured
to cut him off, the supporting troops consisting
of Spanish infantry and some English hussars
repulsed his first attack, but they were finally
pushed back with some loss in horses and mules.
About the same time one of Hill’s posts near the
confluence of the Aran with the Adour was surprised
by some French companies who remained
in advance until fresh troops detached from Urt
forced them to repass the river again. This affair
was a retaliation for the surprise of a French post a
few days before by the sixth division, which was
attended with some circumstances repugnant to the
friendly habits long established between the French
and British troops at the outposts. The value of
such a generous intercourse old soldiers well
understand, and some illustrations of it at this period
may be quoted.</p>

<p>On the 9th of December, the forty-third was assembled
in column on an open space within twenty
yards of the enemy’s out-sentry, yet the latter continued
to walk his beat for an hour without concern,
relying so confidently on the customary system that
he placed his knapsack on the ground to ease his
shoulders. When at last the order to advance was
given, one of the British soldiers stepping out told
him to go away and helped him to replace his pack,
the firing then commenced; the next morning the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_423"></a>[423]</span>
French in like manner warned a forty-third sentry to
retire. But the most remarkable instance happened
on the occasion of lord Wellington’s being desirous
of getting to the top of a hill occupied by the
enemy near Bayonne. He ordered the riflemen
who escorted him to drive the French away, and
seeing the former stealing up, as he thought too
close, called out to commence firing; with a
loud voice one of those old soldiers replied “<em>no
firing!</em>” and then holding up the butt of his rifle
towards the French, tapped it in a peculiar way.
At the well-understood signal which meaned “<em>we
must have the hill for a short time</em>,” the French
who though they could not maintain would not have
relinquished the post without a fight if they had
been fired upon, quietly retired. And this signal
would never have been made if the post had been
one capable of a permanent defence, so well do
veterans understand war and its proprieties.</p>

<p>The English general now only waited until the
roads were practicable, to take the offensive with an
army superior in every point of view to Soult’s.
That general’s numbers were also about to be reduced.
His conscripts were deserting fast, and the
inclemency of the weather was filling his hospitals,
while the bronzed veterans of Wellington’s army
impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, fierce in
execution, were free from serious maladies, ready
and able to plant their colours wherever their
general listed. At this time however the country was
a vast quagmire; it was with difficulty that provisions
or even orders could be conveyed to the
different quarters, and a Portuguese brigade on the
right of the Nive, was several days without food
from the swelling of the rivulets which stopped the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_424"></a>[424]</span>
commissariat mules. At the sea-side the troops
were better off, yet with a horrible counterpoise,
for on that iron-bound coast storms and shipwrecks
were so frequent, that scarcely a day passed but
some vessel, sometimes many together, were seen
embayed and drifting towards the reefs which shoot
out like needles for several miles. Once in this
situation there was no human help! a faint cry
might be heard at intervals, but the tall ship
floated slowly and solemnly onwards until the first
rock arrested her, a roaring surge then dashed her
to pieces and the shore was strewed with broken
timbers and dead bodies. December and January
were thus passed by the allies, but February saw
Wellington break into France the successful invader
of that mighty country. Yet neither his nor Soult’s
military operations can be understood without a
previous description of political affairs which shall
be given in the next chapter.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_425"></a>[425]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent"><em>Portugal.</em>—It has been shewn that marshal<span class="sidenote7">1814.</span>
Beresford’s arrival at Lisbon put a momentary
check upon the intrigues of the regency relative to
the command of the troops, when he rejoined the
army the vexatious conduct of the government was
renewed with greater violence, and its ill-will was
vented upon the English residents, whose goods
were arbitrarily seized and their persons imprisoned
without regard to justice or international law. The
supply and reinforcing of the army were the pretences
for these exactions, yet the army was neither
supplied nor recruited, for though the new regulations<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span>
had produced nine thousand trained soldiers,
they were, in contempt of the subsidizing treaty,
retained in the depôts. At first this was attributed
to the want of transport to enable them to march
through Spain, but though lord Wellington obtained
in the beginning of 1814 shipping to convey them
to the army, the Portuguese government still withheld
the greatest number, alleging in excuse the
ill-conduct of the Spaniards relative to the military
convention established between the two countries.</p>

<p>This convention had been concluded in 1812 to
enable the Portuguese troops to establish hospitals
and to draw certain resources from Spain upon
fixed conditions. One of these was that all supplies<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_426"></a>[426]</span>
might be purchased, half with ready money
half with bills on the Portuguese treasury; nevertheless
in December 1813 the Spanish envoy at
Lisbon informed the Portuguese government, that to
give up the shells of certain public buildings for
hospitals was the only effect they would give to the
convention. Wherefore as neither troops nor horses
could march through Spain, and the supply of
those already with the army became nearly impossible,
the regency detained the reinforcements. Lord
Wellington strongly reproached the Spanish government
for this foul conduct, yet observed with great
force to the Portuguese regency, that the treaty by
which a certain number of soldiers were to be constantly
in the field was made with England, not
with Spain; and as the government of the former
country continued to pay the subsidy and provided
ships for the transport of the troops there was no
excuse for retaining them in Portugal.</p>

<p>His remonstrances, Beresford’s orders, and Mr.
Stuart’s exertions although backed by the menaces
of lord Castlereagh, were however alike powerless;
the regency embarked only three thousand men out
of nine thousand, and those not until the month of
March when the war was on the point of terminating.
Thus instead of thirty thousand Portuguese
under arms lord Wellington had less than
twenty thousand, and yet Mr. Stuart affirmed that
by doing away with the militia and introducing
the Prussian system of granting furloughs, one
hundred thousand troops of the line might have
been furnished and supported by Portugal, without
pressing more severely on the finances of the country
than the actual system which supplied these twenty
thousand. The regency were now more than usually<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_427"></a>[427]</span>
importunate to have the subsidy paid in specie in
which case their army would have disappeared
altogether. Mr. Stuart firmly opposed this, knowing
the money would be misapplied if it fell into their
hands, and thinking their importunity peculiarly
ill-timed when their quota of troops was withheld,
and when lord Wellington, forced to pay ready
money for his supplies in France, wanted all the
specie that could be procured for the military chest.
Such was the countenance assumed by Portugal
towards England in return for the independence
which the latter had secured for her; and it is obvious
that if the war had not terminated immediately
afterwards the alliance could not have continued.
The British army deserted by Portugal
and treated hostilely, as we shall find, by the Spaniards,
must then have abandoned the Peninsula.</p>

<p><em>Spain.</em>—The malice evinced towards lord Wellington
by the Spanish government, the libels upon
him and upon the Anglo-Portuguese army, the vices
of the system by which the Spanish troops were
supplied, and their own evil propensities fostered
by long and cruel neglect and suffering, the activity
of those intriguing politicians who were inimical to
the British alliance, the insolence and duplicity of
the minister of war, the growing enmity between
Spain and Portugal, the virulence of all parties
and the absolute hostility of the local authorities
towards the British army, the officers and soldiers
of which were on all occasions treated as if they
were invaders rather than friends, drove lord Wellington
in the latter end of November to extremity.
He judged the general disposition of the
Spanish people to be still favourable to the English
alliance, and with the aid of the serviles hoped to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_428"></a>[428]</span>
put down the liberals; but an open rupture with
the government he thought inevitable, and if the
liberal influence should prove most powerful with
the people he might be unable to effect a retreat
into Portugal. Wherefore he recommended the
British ministers to take measures with a view to a
war against Spain! And this at the very moment
when, victorious in every battle, he seemed to have
placed the cause he supported beyond the power of
fortune. Who when Napoleon was defeated at
Leipsic, when all Europe and even part of Asia
were pouring their armed hordes into the northern
and eastern parts of France, when Soult was unable
to defend the western frontier; who then looking
only on the surface could have supposed that Wellington,
the long-enduring general, whose profound
calculations and untiring vigour in war had brought
the affairs of the Peninsula to their apparently
prosperous state, that he the victorious commander
could with truth thus describe his own uneasy situation
to his government?</p>

<p>“Matters are becoming so bad between us and
the Spaniards that I think it necessary to draw
your attention seriously to the subject. You will
have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which I
know were written and published by an officer of
the war department and I believe under the direction
of the minister at war Don Juan O’Donoju.
Advantage has been taken of the impression made
by these libels to circulate others in which the old
stories are repeated about the outrages committed
by sir John Moore’s army in Gallicia, and endeavours
are made to irritate the public mind about
our still keeping garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagena,
and particularly in Ceuta. They exaggerate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_429"></a>[429]</span>
the conduct of our traders in South America, and
every little concern of a master of a ship who may
behave ill in a Spanish port is represented as an
attack upon the sovereignty of the Spanish nation.
I believe these libels all proceed from the same
source, the government and their immediate servants
and officers; and although I have no reason
to believe that they have as yet made any impression
on the nation at large they certainly have upon
the officers of the government, and even upon the
principal officers of the army. These persons must
see that if the libels are not written or encouraged
by the government they are at least not discouraged,
they know that we are odious to the government
and they treat us accordingly. The Spanish
troops plunder every thing they approach, neither
their own nor our magazines are sacred. Until recently
there was some semblance of inquiry and
of a desire to punish offenders, lately these acts of
disorder have been left entirely unnoticed, unless
when I have interfered with my authority as commander-in-chief
of the Spanish army. The civil
magistrates in the country have not only refused us
assistance but have particularly ordered the inhabitants
not to give it for payment, and when robberies
have been discovered and the property proved to
belong to the commissariat the law has been violated
and possession withheld. This was the case
lately at Tolosa.</p>

<p>“Then what is more extraordinary and more difficult
to understand is a transaction which occurred
lately at Fuenterabia. It was settled that the
British and Portuguese hospitals should go to that
town. There is a building there which has been a
Spanish hospital, and the Spanish authority who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_430"></a>[430]</span>
gave it over wanted to carry off, in order to burn as
fire-wood, the beds, that our soldiers might not have
the use of them; and these are people to whom
we have given medicines instruments and other aids,
who when wounded and sick we have taken into our
hospitals, and to whom we have rendered every
service in our power after having recovered their
country from the enemy! These are not the people
of Spain but the officers of government, who would
not dare to conduct themselves in this manner if
they did not know that their conduct was agreeable
to their employers. If this spirit is not checked,
if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury
done to our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly
nature of such proceedings, we must expect
that the people at large will soon behave towards
us in the same manner, and that we shall have no
friend or none who will dare to avow him as such in
Spain. Consider what will be the consequence of
this state of affairs if any reverse should happen,
or if an aggravation of the insults and injuries or
any other cause should cause the English army to
be withdrawn. I think I should experience great
difficulty, the Spanish people being hostile, in retiring
through Spain into Portugal from the peculiar
nature of our equipments, and I think I might
be able to embark the army at Passages in spite of
all the French and Spanish armies united. But I
should be much more certain of getting clear off
as we ought if we had possession of San Sebastian,
and this view of the subject is the motive for the
advice I am about to give you as the remedy for
the evils with which I have made you acquainted.</p>

<p>“First then I recommend to you to alter the nature
of your political relations with Spain and to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_431"></a>[431]</span>
have nothing there but a “<i lang="fr">chargé d’affaires</i>.” Secondly
to complain seriously of the conduct of the government
and their servants, to remind them that
Cadiz, Carthagena, and I believe, Ceuta, were garrisoned
by British troops at their earnest request,
and that the troops were not sent to the two former
till the government agreed to certain conditions. If
we had not garrisoned the last it would before now
have fallen into the hands of the Moors. Thirdly
to demand, as security for the safety of the king’s
troops against the criminal disposition of the government
and of those in authority under them,
that a British garrison should be admitted into San
Sebastian, giving notice that unless this demand
was complied with the troops should be withdrawn.
Fourthly. To withdraw the troops if this demand
be not complied with, be the consequences what
they may, and to be prepared accordingly. You
may rely upon this, that if you take a firm decided
line and shew your determination to go through
with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you,
and will bring the government to their senses, and
you will put an end at once to all the petty cabals
and counter-action existing at the present moment,
and you will not be under the necessity of bringing
matters to extremities; if you take any other than
a decided line and one which in its consequences
will involve them in ruin you may depend upon it
you will gain nothing and will only make matters
worse. I recommend these measures whatever may
be the decision respecting my command of the
army. They are probably the more necessary if I
should keep my command. The truth is that a
crisis is approaching in our connection with Spain
and if you do not bring the government and nation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_432"></a>[432]</span>
to their senses before they go too far, you will
inevitably lose all the advantages which you might
expect from services rendered to them.”</p>

<p>Thus it appears that lord Wellington at the end
of the war described the Spaniards precisely as sir
John Moore described them at the beginning. But
the seat of government was now transferred to
Madrid and the new Cortez, as I have already
noticed, decided, against the wishes of the regency,
that the English general should keep the
command of the Spanish armies. The liberals indeed
with great diligence had previously sought to
establish a system of controul over the Cortez by
means of the populace of Madrid as they had done
at Cadiz, and they were so active and created so
much alarm by their apparent success, that the serviles,
backed by the Americans, were ready to make
the princess Carlotta sole regent as the only resource
for stemming the progress of democracy.
However when they had proved their strength upon
the question of lord Wellington’s command, they
deferred the princess’s affair and resolved to oppose
their adversaries more vigorously in the assembly.
They were encouraged also by a tumult which happened
at Madrid, where the populace instigated
by their agents, or disliking the new constitution,
for the measures of the democratic party were generally
considered evil in the great towns beyond the
Isla, rose and forced the authorities to imprison a
number of obnoxious persons; the new Cortez then
arrived, the serviles got the upper hand and being
resolved to change the regency took as their ground
of attack its conduct towards the English general.
Pursuing this scheme of opposition with ardour
they caused the minister of war to be dismissed, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_433"></a>[433]</span>
were ready to attack the regency itself, expecting
full success, when to their amazement and extreme
anger lord Wellington, far from desiring to have his
personal enemies thus thrust out of power, expressed
his earnest desire to keep them in their stations.</p>

<p>To men who were alike devoid of patriotism or
principle, and whose only rule of action was the
momentary impulse of passion, such a proceeding
was incomprehensible; yet it was a wise and well-considered
political change on his part, shewing that
private feelings were never the guides of his conduct
in public matters, and that he ever seemed to
bear in mind the maxim which Sophocles has put
into the mouth of Ajax, “<em>carrying himself towards
his friends as if they might one day become enemies
and treating his foes as men who might become
friends</em>.” The new spirit had given him no hopes
of any general alteration of the system, nor was he
less convinced that sooner or later he must come to
extremities with the Spaniards; but he was averse
to any appearance of disunion becoming public at
the moment he was invading France, lest it should
check his projects of raising an anti-Napoleon party
in that country. He therefore advised the British
government to keep his hostile propositions in abeyance,
leaving it to him and to his brother to put
them in execution or not as events might dictate.
Meanwhile he sent orders to evacuate Cadiz and
Carthagena, and opposed the projected change in
the Spanish government, observing that “the minister
of war being dismissed, the most obnoxious
opponent of military arrangement was gone; that the
mob of Madrid, being worked upon by the same press
in the hands of the same people who had made the
mob of Cadiz so ungovernable, would become as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_434"></a>[434]</span>
bad as these last, and though the mercantile interest
would not have so much power in the capital they
would not want partizans when desirous of carrying
a question by violence. The grandees were too poor
to retain their former natural influence, and the constitution
gave them no political power. The only
chance which the serviles had was to conduct
themselves with prudence, and when in the right
with a firm contempt for the efforts of the press and
the mob; but this was what no person in Spain
ever did and the smaller party being wiser bolder
and more active would soon govern the Cortez at
Madrid as they did that at Cadiz.”</p>

<p>No permanent change for the better could be
expected, and meanwhile the actual government,
alarmed by the tumults in the capital, by the
strength of the serviles in the Cortez, by the rebukes
and remonstrances of the English general
and ministers, and by the evident danger of an open
rupture with England, displayed, according to lord
Wellington, the utmost prudence and fairness in a
most important affair which occurred at this time.
That is to say, their own views and interests coinciding
with those of the English commander and
government there was a momentary agreement, and
Wellington wisely preferred this opening for conciliation
to the more dangerous mode he had before
recommended.</p>

<p>The event which called forth his approval of their
conduct was the secret arrival of the duke of San
Carlos at Madrid in December. He brought with
him a treaty of peace, proposed by Napoleon and
accepted by Ferdinand, called the treaty of Valençay.
It acknowledged Ferdinand as king of
Spain and the Indies, and the integrity of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_435"></a>[435]</span>
Spanish empire was recognized. He was in return
to make the English evacuate Spain, and the French
troops were to abandon the country at the same
time. The contracting powers were to maintain
their respective maritime rights as they had been
stipulated by the treaty of Utrecht and observed
until 1792. The sales of the national domains made
by Joseph were to be confirmed; all the Spaniards
who had attached themselves to the French
cause were to be reinstated in their dignities and
property, those who chose to quit Spain were
to have ten years to dispose of their possessions.
Prisoners, including all those delivered up by Spain
to the English, were to be sent home on both sides.
The king was to pay annually thirty millions of
reals to his father Charles IV., and two millions to
his widow; a treaty of commerce was to be arranged.</p>

<p>Ferdinand being entirely devoid of principle acted
with that cunning which marked his infamous career
through life. He gave the duke of San Carlos secret
instructions to tell the serviles, if he found them all-powerful
in the Cortez, to ratify this treaty with a
secret resolution to break it when time served; but
if the Jacobins were strongest San Carlos was merely
to ask them to ratify it, Ferdinand in that case reserving
to himself the task of violating it on his own
authority. These instructions were made known to
the English ministers and the English general, but
they, putting no trust in such a negociator, and
thinking his intention was rather to deceive the
allies than Napoleon, thwarted him as much as they
could, and in this they were joined by the Portuguese<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span>
government. The British authorities were
naturally little pleased with the prospect of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_436"></a>[436]</span>
forced to abandon Spain under a treaty, which would
necessarily give Napoleon great influence over that
country in after times, and for the present enable
him to concentrate all the old troops on the eastern
frontier of his empire; nor was the Jacobinical
Spanish government more content to have a master.
Wherefore, all parties being agreed, the regency,
keeping the matter secret, dismissed San Carlos
on the 8th of January with a copy of the decree
passed by the Cortez, which rendered null and void
all acts of Ferdinand while a prisoner, and forbad
negociation for peace while a French army remained
in the Peninsula. And that the king might
fully understand them, they told him “<em>the monster
despotism had been driven from the throne of Spain</em>.”
Meanwhile Joseph Palafox, who had been a prisoner
ever since the siege of Zaragoza, was by the French
emperor first sent to Valençay, after which he
was to follow San Carlos and he arrived at Madrid
four days after the latter’s departure. But
his negociations were equally fruitless with the
regency, and in the secret sittings of the Cortez
measures were discussed for watching the king’s
movements and forcing him to swear to the constitution
and to the Cortez before he passed the
frontier.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington was alarmed at the treaty of
Valençay. He had, he said, long suspected Napoleon
would adopt such an expedient and if he
had shewn less pride and more common sense it
would have succeeded. This sarcasm was perhaps
well applied to the measure as it appeared at the
time, but the emperor’s real proceedings he was unacquainted
with, and this splenetic ebullition only
indicated his own vexation at approaching mischief,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_437"></a>[437]</span>
for he was forced to acknowledge that the project
was not unlikely even then to succeed, because the
misery of Spain was so great and so clearly to be
traced to the views of the government and of the
new constitution, that many persons must have been
desirous to put an end to the general suffering
under the sanction of this treaty. “If Napoleon,”
he said, “had withdrawn the garrisons
from Catalonia and Valencia and sent Ferdinand
who must be <em>as useless a person in France as he
would probably be in Spain</em> at once to the frontier,
or into the Peninsula, peace would have been made
or the war at least rendered so difficult as to be
almost impracticable and without hope of great
success.” Now this was precisely what Napoleon
had designed, and it seems nearly certain that he
contemplated the treaty of Valençay and the restoration
of Ferdinand as early as the period of the
battle of Vittoria, if not before.</p>

<p>The scheme was one which demanded the utmost
secrecy, that it might be too sudden for the English
influence to defeat it; the emperor had therefore
arranged that Ferdinand should enter Spain early
in November, that is at the very moment when it
would have been most injurious to the English
interest, because then the disputes in the Cortez
between the serviles and Jacobins were most rancorous,
and the hostility of the regencies both in
Portugal and Spain towards the English general
and English influence undisguised. Suchet had
then also proved his superiority to the allies in
Catalonia, and Soult’s gigantic lines being unessayed
seemed impregnable. But in Napoleon’s
council were persons seeking only to betray him.
It was the great misfortune of his life to have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_438"></a>[438]</span>
driven by circumstances to suffer such men as Talleyrand
and Fouché, whose innate treachery has
become proverbial, to meddle in his affairs or even
to approach his court. Mischief of this kind,
however, necessarily awaits men who like Napoleon
and Oliver Cromwell have the courage to attempt
after great convulsions and civil wars the rebuilding
of the social edifice without spilling blood. Either
to create universal abhorrence by their cruelty, or
to employ the basest of men, the Talleyrands,
Fouchés, and Monks, of revolutions, is their inevitable
fate; and never can they escape the opposition,
more dangerous still, of honest and resolute
men, who unable to comprehend the necessity of the
times see nothing but tyranny in the vigour which
prevents anarchy.</p>

<p>The treaty of Valençay was too important a
measure to escape the sagacity of the traitors
around Napoleon, and when their opposition in the
council and their secret insinuations proved unavailing
to dissuade him from it, they divulged the
secret to the partizans of the Bourbons. Taking advantage
of the troubled state of public affairs which
occupied the emperor’s time and distracted his
attention, they contrived that Ferdinand’s emissaries
should precede him to Madrid, and delayed his
own departure until March when the struggle was
at an end. Nevertheless the chances of success for
this scheme, even in its imperfect execution, were
so many and so alarming that lord Wellington’s
sudden change from fierce enmity to a warm
support of the regency, when he found it resolute
and frank in its rejection of the treaty, although it
created so much surprize and anger at the moment,
cannot be judged otherwise than as the wise and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_439"></a>[439]</span>
prudent proceeding of a consummate statesman.
Nor did he fail to point out to his own government
the more distant as well as the immediate danger to
England and Spain involved in this singularly
complicated and important affair.</p>

<p>The evils as affecting the war and English alliance
with Spain were obvious, but the two articles relating
to the provision for Ferdinand’s father and
mother, and to the future state of the Spaniards who
had joined the French involved great interests. It
was essential, he said, that the Spanish government
should explicitly declare its intentions. Negociations
for a general peace were said to be commenced,
of that he knew nothing, but he supposed
such being the case that a basis would be
embodied in a preliminary treaty which all the
belligerents would ratify, each power then to
arrange its own peculiar treaty with France under
protection of the general confederation. Napoleon
would necessarily put forward his treaty
with Ferdinand. It could be got rid of by the
statement that the latter was a prisoner when negociating;
but new articles would then have to be
framed and therefore the Spanish government
should be called upon previously to declare what
their intentions were as to the two articles in the
treaty of Valençay. His objections to them were
that the allowance to Charles IV. was beyond the
financial means of Spain, and were it not so, Napoleon
should not be allowed to stipulate for any
provision for him. Neither should he be suffered
to embody or establish a permanent French party
in Spain, under protection of a treaty, an article of
which provided for the restoration of the Spaniards
who had taken part with the French. It would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_440"></a>[440]</span>
give him the right, which he would not fail to
exercise, of interfering in their favour in every
question of property, or other interest, and the
Spanish government would be involved in perpetual
disputes with France. It was probable the allied
sovereigns would be desirous of getting rid of this
question and would think it desirable that Spain
should pardon her rebellious subjects. For this
reason he had before advised the Spanish government
to publish a general amnesty, with the view of
removing the difficulty when a general peace should
come to be negociated, and this difficulty and danger
be enhanced, if not before provided for, by the
desire which each of the allied powers would feel,
when negociating on their separate grounds, to save
their finances by disbanding their armies.</p>

<p>This suggestion of an amnesty, made ten days
before the battle of Vittoria, illustrates Wellington’s
sagacity, his long and provident reach of mind, his
discriminating and magnanimous mode of viewing
the errors and weaknesses of human nature. Let it
be remembered that in the full tide of success, after
having passed the Douro, and when Joseph surprised
and bewildered was flying before him, that he
who had been called the iron duke in the midst of
his bivouac fires, found time to consider, and had
sufficient humanity and grandeur of mind thus to
address the Spanish government on this subject.</p>

<p>“A large number of Spaniards who have taken
the side of the French are now with the enemy’s
army, many of these are highly meritorious and have
rendered most essential service to the cause even
during the period in which they have been in the
service of the enemy. It is also a known fact that
fear, the misery and distress which they suffered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_441"></a>[441]</span>
during the contest, and despair of the result, were
the motives which induced many of these unfortunate
persons to take the part which they have taken,
and I would suggest for consideration whether it is
expedient to involve the country in all the consequences
of a rigid adherence to the existing law in
order to punish such persons. I am the last man
who will be found to diminish the merit of those
Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the
country during the severe trial which I hope has
passed, particularly of those, who, having remained
amongst the enemy without entering their service,
have served their country at the risk of their lives.
But at the same time that I can appreciate the
merits of these individuals and of the nation at large
I can forgive the weakness of those who have been
induced by terror by distress or by despair to pursue
a different line of conduct.</p>

<p>“I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances
of the commencement and of the different
stages of this eventful contest, and to the numerous
occasions in which all men must have imagined that
it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula,
although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the
colossal power by which they were assailed and
nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness
of the country at the commencement of the
contest, upon the numerous and almost invariable
disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and disorganization
that followed, and let them decide
whether those who were witnesses of these events
are guilty because they could not foresee what has
since occurred. The majority are certainly not
guilty in any other manner, and many now deemed
guilty in the eye of the law as having served the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_442"></a>[442]</span>
pretended king have by that very act acquired the
means of serving and have rendered important services
to their country. It is my opinion that the
policy of Spain should lead the government and the
Cortez to grant a general amnesty with certain
exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in
the two views of failing or succeeding in freeing the
country from its oppressors. If the effort fail the
enemy will by an amnesty be deprived of the principal
means now in his hands of oppressing the
country in which his armies will be stationed; he
will see clearly that he can place no reliance on
any partizans in Spain, and he will not have even a
pretence for supposing that the country is divided
in opinion. If the effort succeed the object of the
government should be to pacify the country and to
heal the divisions which the contest has unavoidably
occasioned. It is impossible to accomplish this
object while there exists a great body of the
Spanish nation, some possessing the largest property
in the country and others endowed with
considerable talents, who are proscribed for their
conduct during the contest, conduct which has been
caused by the misfortunes to which I have above
adverted. These persons their friends and relations
will if persecuted naturally endeavour to perpetuate
the divisions in the country in the hope at some
time to take advantage of them, and adverting to
their number and to that power which they must
derive from their property and connections it must
be feared that they will be too successful.</p>

<p>“But there are other important views of this
question. First should the effort to free the country
from its oppressors succeed, at some time or other
approaches to peace must be made between the two<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_443"></a>[443]</span>
nations and the amnesty to the persons above
described will remove the greatest difficulty in the
way of such an arrangement. Secondly, should
even Spain be at peace with France and the proscription
against these persons be continued, they
will remain in France a perpetual instrument in the
hands of that restless power to disturb the internal
tranquillity of Spain; and in case of a renewal of
the war, which will be their wish and object, they
will be the most mischievous and most inveterate
enemies of their country, of that country which
with mistaken severity aggravates her misfortunes
by casting off from her thousands of her useful
subjects. On every ground then it is desirable that
the measure should be adopted and the present
moment should be seized for adopting it.”</p>

<p>Then pointing out with great accuracy and justice
those who should be exempted from an amnesty
he thus terminated this record of his own true
greatness, and of the littleness of the people to whom
it was fruitlessly addressed.</p>

<p>“In bringing this subject under the consideration
of the government I am perhaps intruding my
opinion on a subject in which as a stranger I have
no concern, but having had an advantage enjoyed
by few of being acquainted with the concerns of
the country since the commencement of the contest,
and having been sensible both in the last and present
campaign of the disadvantages suffered by
Spain from the want of a measure of this description,
I have thought it proper as a well-wisher to
the cause to bring it under the consideration of the
government assuring them at the same time that I
have never had the slightest communication on the
subject with the government of my country, nor do<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_444"></a>[444]</span>
I believe that they have ever turned their attention
to it. What I have above stated are my own
opinions to which I may attribute more weight than
they merit but they are founded upon a sincere devotion
to the interests of the country.”</p>

<p>Such was the general political state of the Peninsula
as bearing upon the military operations at the
close of the year 1813, and the state of England
and France shall be shewn in the next chapters.
But however hateful and injurious to England the
conduct of the Peninsular government appears, and
however just and well-founded were the greatest
part of lord Wellingtons complaints, it is not
to be assumed that the Spanish government and
Cortez were totally without excuse for their
hostility or ingratitude. It was not solely upon
military grounds that they were obnoxious to the
English general. He united heartily with the
English government in hatred of democratic institutions
as opposed to aristocratic domination. Spain
with the former seemed scarcely worth saving from
France, and in a letter written about that period to
the Conde de la Bispal, who it would appear proposed
some immediate stroke of violence against
the regency, he openly avows that he was inimical
to the constitution, because it admitted a free press
and refused to property any political influence
beyond what naturally belonged to it. That is, it
refused to heap undue honours privileges and power
upon those who already possessed all the luxury
and happiness which riches can bestow; it refused
to admit the principle that those who have much
should have more, that the indolence corruption and
insolence naturally attendant upon wealth should
be supported and increased by irresponsible power;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_445"></a>[445]</span>
that those who laboured and produced all things
should enjoy nothing, that the rich should be
tyrants and the poor slaves. But these essential
principles of aristocratic government have never yet
been, and never will be quietly received and submitted
to by any thinking people: where they
prevail there is no real freedom. Property inevitably
confers power on its possessors, and far from
adding to that natural power by political privileges
it should be the object of all men who love liberty
to balance it by raising the poorer classes to political
importance: the influence and insolence of riches
ought to be tamed and subdued instead of being
inflated and excited by political institutions. This
was the guiding principle of the most celebrated
Greek legislators, the opposite principle produced
the domestic dissensions of the Romans, and was
the ruin of Carthage. It was the cause also of the
French revolution. But after many years of darkness,
the light of reason is now breaking forth again, and
that ancient principle of justice which places the
right of man in himself, above the right of property,
is beginning to be understood. A clear perception
of it has produced the American republic. France
and Spain have admitted it and England ripens for
its adoption. Yet pure and bright and beautiful
and healthful as the light of freedom is in itself, it
fell at this time on such foul and stagnant pools,
such horrid repulsive objects, that millions turned
at first from its radiance with disgust and wished
for darkness again.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_446"></a>[446]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_V">CHAPTER V.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">The force and energy of Napoleon’s system of<span class="sidenote7">1813.</span>
government was evinced in a marvellous manner
by the rapidity with which he returned to Germany,
at the head of an enormous army, before his enemies
had time even to understand the extent of his misfortunes
in the Russian campaign. The victories
of Lutzen and Bautzen then seemed to reinstate
him as the arbiter of Europe. But those battles
were fought with the heads of columns the rear of
which were still filing out of France. They were
fought also with young troops. Wherefore the emperor
when he had given himself a fixed and menacing
position in Germany more readily listened to the
fraudful negociations of his trembling opponents,
partly in hopes of attaining his object without
further appeal to arms, partly to obtain time to
organize and discipline his soldiers, confident in his
own unmatched skill in directing them if war was
finally to decide his fate. He counted also upon
the family ties between him and Austria, and believed
that power willing to mediate sincerely.
Not that he was so weak as to imagine the hope of
regaining some of its former power and possessions
was not uppermost, nor was he unprepared to make
concessions; but he seems to have been quite unsuspecting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_447"></a>[447]</span>
of the long course of treachery and
deceit followed by the Austrian politicians.</p>

<p>It has been already shewn that while negociating
with France an offensive and defensive treaty in<span class="sidenote9">Vol. v. p. 49</span>
1812, the Austrian cabinet was cognizant of, and
secretly aiding the plan of a vast insurrection extending
from the Tyrol to Calabria and the Illyrian
provinces. The management of this scheme was
entrusted by the English cabinet to general Nugent
and Mr. King who were at Vienna; their agents
went from thence to Italy and the Illyrian coast,
many Austrian officers were engaged in the project;
and Italians of great families entered into commercial<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_I">Appendix, No. 1.</a></span>
houses to enable them with more facility to
carry on this plan. Moreover Austria while actually
signing the treaty with Napoleon was with unceasing
importunity urging Prussia to join the
Russians in opposition to him. The feeble operations
of Prince Swartzenberg, the manner in which
he uncovered the emperor’s right flank and permitted
Tchitchagoff to move to the Beresina in the
Russian campaign, were but continuations of
this deceitful policy. And it was openly advanced
as a merit by the Austrian cabinet that her offer of
mediation after the battle of Bautzen was made
solely with the view of gaining time to organize
the army which was to join the Russians and
Prussians. Finally the armistice itself was violated,
hostilities being commenced before its termination,
to enable the Russian troops safely to join the
Austrians in Bohemia.</p>

<p>Nevertheless Napoleon’s genius triumphed at
Dresden over the unskilful operations of the allies,
directed by Swartzenberg, whose incapacity as a
commander was made manifest in this campaign.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_448"></a>[448]</span>
Nor would the after misfortunes of Vandamme and
Marshal Macdonald, or the defeat of Oudinot and
Ney have prevented the emperor’s final success but
for the continuation of a treachery, which seemed
at the time to be considered a virtue by sovereigns
who were unceasingly accusing their more noble
adversary of the very baseness that they were
practising so unblushingly. He had conceived a
project so vast so original so hardy, so far above
the imaginations of his contemporary generals, that
even Wellington’s sagacity failed to pierce it, and he
censured the emperor’s long stay on the Elbe as an
obstinacy unwarranted by the rules of art. But
Napoleon had more profoundly judged his own
situation. The large forces he left at Dresden at
Torgau, and Wittemberg, for which he has been so
much blamed by shallow military critics as lessening
his numbers on the field of Leipsic, were essential
parts of his gigantic plan. He quitted Dresden,
apparently in retreat, to deceive his enemies, but
with the intention of marching down the Elbe, recrossing
that river and throwing his opponents into
a false position. Then he would have seized Berlin
and reopening his communications with his garrisons
both on the Elbe and the Oder have operated
between those rivers; and with an army much augmented
in power, because he would have recovered
many thousand old soldiers cooped up in the garrisons;
an army more compact and firmly established
also, because he would have been in direct
communication with the Danes and with Davoust’s
force at Hamburgh, and both his flanks would have
been secured by his chains of fortresses on the two
rivers. Already had Blucher and the Swedes felt
his first stroke, the next would have taught the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_449"></a>[449]</span>
allies that the lion was still abroad in his strength,
if at the very moment of execution without any
previous declaration the Bavarians, upon whose
operations he depended for keeping the Austrians
in the valley of the Danube in check, had not formed
common cause with his opponents and the whole
marched together towards the Rhine. The battle
of Leipsic followed, the well-known treason of the
Saxon troops led to the victory gained there by the
allies, and Napoleon, now the prey of misfortune,
reached France with only one-third of his army,
having on the way however trampled in the dust
the Bavarian Wrede who attempted to stop his
passage at Hannau.</p>

<p>Meanwhile the allied sovereigns, by giving hopes
to their subjects that constitutional liberty would
be the reward of the prodigious popular exertions
against France, hopes which with the most
detestable baseness they had previously resolved to
defraud, assembled greater forces than they were
able to wield, and prepared to pass the Rhine.
But distrusting even their immense superiority of
numbers they still pursued their faithless system.
When Napoleon in consequence of the Bavarian
defection marched to Leipsic, he sent orders to
Gouvion St. Cyr to abandon Dresden and unite
with the garrisons on the Lower Elbe, the messengers
were intercepted, and St. Cyr, too little
enterprising to execute such a plan of his own
accord, surrendered on condition of being allowed
to regain France. The capitulation was broken
and general and soldiers remained prisoners.</p>

<p>After <ins class="corr" id="tn-449" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the Lepsic battle'">
the Leipsic battle</ins>, Napoleon’s adherents fell
away by nations. Murat the husband of his sister
joined Austria and thus forced prince Eugene to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_450"></a>[450]</span>
abandon his position on the Adige. A successful
insurrection in favour of the prince of Orange broke
out in Holland. The neutrality of Switzerland was
violated, and more than half a million of armed
men were poured across the frontiers of France in
all the violence of brute force, for their military
combinations were contemptible and their course
marked by murder and devastation. But previous
to this the allies gave one more notable example of
their faithless cunning.</p>

<p>St. Aignan the French resident minister at Gotha
had been taken at Leipsic and treated at first as a
prisoner of war. He remonstrated and being known
to entertain a desire for peace was judged a good
tool with which to practise deception. Napoleon
had offered on the field of battle at Leipsic to negociate,
no notice was taken of it at the time, but
now the Austrian Metternich and the Russian Nesselrode
had an interview with St. Aignan at Frankfort,
and they assured him the Prussian minister
agreed in all things with them. They had previously
arranged that lord Aberdeen should come in
during the conference as if by accident; nothing
was put down in writing, yet St. Aignan was
suffered to make minutes of their proposals in reply
to the emperor’s offer to negociate. These were
generally that the alliance of the sovereigns was
indissoluble—that they would have only a general
peace—that France was to be confined to her natural<span class="sidenote">Diplomatic Correspondence, MSS.</span>
limits, viz. the Alps the Rhine and the Pyrenees—that
the independence of Germany was a
thing not to be disputed—that the Spanish Peninsula
should be free and the Bourbon dynasty be
restored—that Austria must have a frontier in Italy
the line of which could be afterwards discussed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_451"></a>[451]</span>
but Italy itself was to be independent of any preponderating
power—that Holland was also to be
independent and her frontier to be matter for after
discussion—that England was ready to make great
sacrifices for peace upon these bases and would acknowledge
that freedom of commerce and of navigation
which France had a right to pretend to. St.
Aignan here observed that Napoleon believed England
was resolved to restrict France to the possession
of thirty sail of the line, lord Aberdeen replied that
it was not true.</p>

<p>This conference had place at the emperor of
Austria’s head-quarters on the 10th of November,
and lord Aberdeen inclosed the account of it in a
despatch dated at Smalcalde the 16th of November.
He had objected verbally to the passage relating to
the maritime question with England, nevertheless he
permitted it to remain in St. Aignan’s minutes. It
was decided also that the military operations should
go on notwithstanding the negociation, and in truth
the allies had not the slightest design to make peace.
They thought Napoleon would refuse the basis
proposed, which would give them an opportunity
to declare he was opposed to all reasonable modes
of putting an end to the war and thus work upon
the French people. This is proved by what followed.
For when contrary to their expectations the
emperor’s minister signified, on the 16th of November,
that he accepted the propositions, observing
that the independence of all nations at sea as well
as by land had been always Napoleon’s object,
Metternich in his reply, on the 25th of November,
pretended to consider this answer as avoiding the
acceptation of the basis. The emperor however
put that obstacle aside, on the 2d of December, by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_452"></a>[452]</span>
accepting explicitly the basis, generally and summarily,
such as it had been presented to him,
adding, that France would make great sacrifices
but the emperor was content if by like sacrifices on
the part of England, that general peace which was
the declared object of the allies could be obtained.
Metternich thus driven from his subterfuge required
Napoleon to send a like declaration to each of the
allies separately when negociations might, he said,
commence.</p>

<p>Meanwhile lord Aberdeen, who had permitted
St. Aignan to retain the article relating to maritime
rights in his minutes of conference, presented to
Metternich on the 27th of November a note declaring
that England would not admit the turn
given by France to her share of the negociation;
that she was ready to yield all the rights of commerce
and navigation which France had a right to
pretend to, but the question would turn upon what
that right was. England would never permit her
navigation laws to be discussed at a congress, it
was a matter essentially foreign to the object of
such an assembly, and England would never depart
from the great principle thereby announced as to
her maritime rights. Metternich approved of lord
Aberdeen’s views, saying they were his own and
those of his court, thus proving that the negociation
had been a deceit from the beginning. This
fact was however placed beyond doubt by lord
Castlereagh’s simultaneous proceedings in London.</p>

<p>In a note dated the 30th November that minister
told lord Aberdeen England admitted as a basis,
that the Alps the Rhine and the Pyrenees should
be the frontier of France, subject to such modifications
as might be necessary to give a secure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_453"></a>[453]</span>
frontier to Holland, and to Switzerland also, although
the latter had not been mentioned in the proposals
given by St. Aignan. He applauded the resolution
to pursue military operations notwithstanding the
negociations, and he approved of demanding nothing
but what they were resolved to have. Nevertheless
he said that any sacrifice to be made by England
was only to secure the independence of Holland
and Switzerland, and the former having already
declared for the house of Nassau was now out of
the pale of discussion. Finally he recommended
that any unnecessary delay or equivocation on the
part of the enemy should be considered as tantamount
to a rejection of the basis, and that the allies
<em>should then put forward the offer of peace to show
that it was not they but France that opposed an
honourable termination of the war</em>. Having thus
thrown fresh obstacles in the way of that peace
which the allies pretended to have so much at
heart, he, on the 21st December, sent notes to the
different ambassadors of the allied powers then in
London demanding explicit answers about the intentions
of their courts as to England’s maritime code.
To this they all responded that their cabinets would
not suffer any question relative to that code to be
entertained at a congress in which England was
represented, and this on the express ground that it
would mar the great object of peace.</p>

<p>Lord Castlereagh thus provided, declared that
France should be informed of their resolutions
before negociations commenced, but twenty days
before this Napoleon having decreed a fresh levy
of three hundred thousand conscripts the allies had
published a manifesto treating this measure, so
essentially a defensive one since they would not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_454"></a>[454]</span>
suspend their military operations, as a fresh provocation
on his part, because the motives assigned for
the conscription contained a just and powerful
description of their past deceits and violence with
a view to rouse the national spirit of France. Thus
having first by a pretended desire for peace and a
willingness on the part of England to consent to an
arrangement about her maritime code, inveigled the
French emperor into negociations and thereby ascertained
that the maritime question was uppermost in
his mind and the only obstacle to peace, they declared
that vital question should not even be discussed.
And when by this subtlety they had
rendered peace impossible proclaimed that Napoleon
alone resisted the desire of the world for tranquillity.
And at this very moment Austria was secretly
endeavouring to obtain England’s consent to her
seizing upon Alsace a project which was stopped
by lord Wellington who forcibly pointed out the
danger of rousing France to a general insurrection
by such a proceeding.</p>

<p>The contrast between these wiles to gain a momentary
advantage, and the manly, vigorous policy of
lord Wellington must make honest men of all nations
blush for the cunning which diplomatists call policy.
On one side the arts of guileful negociation masked
with fair protestations but accompanied by a savage
and revolting system of warfare; on the other a
broad open hostility declared on manly and just
grounds followed up with a strict regard to humanity
and good faith; nothing put forward with
an equivocal meaning and the actions true to the
word. On the eastern frontier the Cossack let
loose to ravage with all the barbarity of Asiatic
warfare. On the western frontier the Spaniards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_455"></a>[455]</span>
turned back into their own country in the very
midst of triumph, for daring to pass the bounds of
discipline prescribed by the wise and generous
policy of their commander. Terror and desolation
and the insurrection of a people rendered frantic by
the cruelty of the invaders marked the progress of
the ferocious multitudes who crossed the Rhine.
Order and tranquillity, profound even on the very
edge of the battle-field, attended the march of the
civilized army which passed the Bidassoa. And
what were the military actions? Napoleon rising
even above himself hurtled against the armed
myriads opposed to him with such a terrible energy
that though ten times his number they were rolled
back on every side in confusion and dismay. But
Wellington advanced without a check, victorious in
every battle, although one half of the veterans opposed
to him would have decided the campaign
on the eastern frontier. Nor can this be gainsaid,
since Napoleon’s career in this campaign was only
stayed by the defection of his brother-in-law Murat,
and by the sickening treachery of two marshals to
whom he had been prodigal of benefits. It is
undeniable that lord Wellington with sixty thousand
Anglo-Portuguese acting in the south, effected more
than half a million of the allies were able to effect
on the opposite side of France; and yet Soult’s army
on the 10th of November was stronger than that
with which Napoleon fought the battle of Brienne.</p>

<p>That great man was never personally deceived by
the allies’ pretended negociations. He joined issue
with them to satisfy the French people that he was
not averse to peace, but his instructions dated the
4th of January and addressed to Caulaincourt prove
at once his sagacity and firmness. “I think,” he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_456"></a>[456]</span>
said, “that both the allies good faith and the wish
of England to make peace is doubtful; for my part
I desire peace but it must be solid and honourable.
I have accepted the basis proposed at Frankfort yet
it is more than probable the allies have other notions.
These propositions are but a mask, the negociations
are placed under the influence of the
military operations and it is easy to foresee what
the consequences of such a system must be. It is
necessary therefore to listen to and observe every
thing. It is not certain even that you will be admitted
to the head-quarters of the allies. The
Russians and the English watch to prevent any
opening for explanation and reconciliation with the
emperor of Austria. You must therefore endeavour
to ascertain the real views of the allies and let me
know day by day what you learn that I may frame
instructions for which at present I have no sure
grounds.”</p>

<p>The internal state of France was more disquieting
to his mind than foreign negociations or the number
of invaders. The sincere republicans were
naturally averse to him as the restorer of monarchy,
yet they should have felt that the sovereign whose
ruin was so eagerly sought by the legitimate kings
and nobles of Europe could not be really opposed to
liberty. Meanwhile the advocates of legitimacy
shrunk from him as an usurper, and all those tired
of war, and they were a majority of the nation,
judging from the stupendous power <ins class="corr" id="tn-456" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'of his genins'">
of his genius</ins> that he had only to will peace to attain it with
security, blamed his tardiness in negociation. An unexpected
opposition to his wishes was also displayed
in the legislative body, and the partizans of the Bourbons
were endeavouring to form a great conspiracy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_457"></a>[457]</span>
in favour of that house. There were many traitors
likewise to him and to their country, men devoid of
principle, patriotism, or honour, who with instinctive
hatred of a failing cause plotted to thwart his projects
for the defence of the nation. In fine the men
of action and the men of theories were alike combined
for mischief. Nor is this outbreak of passion
to be wondered at when it is considered how
recently Napoleon had stopped the anarchy of the
revolution and rebuilt the social and political structure
in France. But of all who by their untimely
opposition to the emperor hurt their country, the
most pernicious were those silly politicians, whom
he so felicitously described as “<em>discussing abstract
systems of government when the battering ram was
at the gates</em>.”</p>

<p>Such however has been in all ages the conduct
of excited and disturbed nations, and it seems to be
inherent in human nature, because a saving policy
can only be understood and worked to good by
master-spirits, and they are few and far between,
their time on earth short, their task immense. They
have not time to teach, they must command although
they know that pride and ignorance and even
honesty will carp at the despotism which brings
general safety. It was this vain short-sighted
impatience that drove Hannibal into exile, caused
the assassination of Cæsar, and strewed thorns
beneath the gigantic footsteps of Oliver Cromwell.
It raged fiercely in Spain against lord Wellington,
and in France against Napoleon, and always with
the most grievous injury to the several nations.
Time only hallows human institutions. Under that
guarantee men will yield implicit obedience and
respect to the wildest caprices of the most stupid<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_458"></a>[458]</span>
tyrant that ever disgraced a throne, and wanting it
they will cavil at and reject the wisest measures of
the most sublime genius. The painful notion is
thus excited, that if governments are conducted
with just the degree of stability and tranquillity
which they deserve and no more, the people of all
nations, much as they may be oppressed, enjoy upon
an average of years precisely the degree of liberty
they are fitted for. National discontents mark,
according to their bitterness and constancy, not so
much the oppression of the rulers as the real progress
of the ruled in civilization and its attendant
political knowledge. When from peculiar circumstances
those discontents explode in violent revolutions,
shattering the fabric of society and giving
free vent and activity to all the passions and follies
of mankind, fortunate is the nation which possesses
a Napoleon or an Oliver Cromwell “<em>to step into
their state of dominion with spirit to controul and
capacity to subdue the factions of the hour and reconstruct
the frame of reasonable government</em>.”</p>

<p>For great as these two men were in the field of
battle, especially the former, they were infinitely
greater when they placed themselves in the seat of
power, and put forth the gigantic despotism of genius
essential to the completion of their holy work.
Nor do I hold the conduct of Washington to be
comparable to either of those men. His situation
was one of infinitely less difficulty, and there is no
reason to believe that his capacity would have been
equal to the emergencies of a more formidable
crisis than he had to deal with. Washington could
not have made himself master of all had it been
necessary and he so inclined, for he was neither the
foremost general nor the foremost statesman of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_459"></a>[459]</span>
nation. His forbearance was a matter of necessity,
and his love of liberty did not prevent him from
bequeathing his black slaves to his widow.</p>

<p>Such was Napoleon’s situation, and as he read the
signs of the times truly he knew that in his military
skill and the rage of the peasants at the ravages of
the enemy he must find the means to extricate himself
from his difficulties, or rather to extricate his
country, for self had no place in his policy save as his
personal glory was identified with France and her
prosperity. Never before did the world see a man,
soaring so high and devoid of all selfish ambition.
Let those who honestly seeking truth doubt this,
study Napoleon carefully; let them read the record
of his second abdication published by his brother
Lucien, that stern republican who refused kingdoms
as the price of his principles, and they will doubt
no longer. It is not however with these matters
that this History has to deal but with the emperor’s
measures affecting his lieutenants on the Spanish
frontier of France. There disaffection to his government
was extensive but principally from local
causes. The conscription was peculiarly hateful
to the wild mountaineers, who like most borderers
cherish very independent notions. The war with
England had ruined the foreign commerce of their
great towns, and the advantage of increased traffic
by land on the east was less directly felt in the
south. There also the recollection of the Vendean
struggle still lingered and the partizans of the
Bourbons had many connections. But the chief
danger arose from the just and politic conduct
of lord Wellington which, offering no cause of
anger and very much of private advantage to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_460"></a>[460]</span>
people, gave little or no hope of insurrection from
sufferings.</p>

<p>While France was in this state England presented
a scene of universal exultation. Tory politics
were triumphant, opposition in the parliament was
nearly crushed by events, the press was either subdued
by persecution or in the pay of the ministers,
and the latter with undisguised joy hailed the
coming moment when aristocratic tyranny was to be
firmly established in England. The most enormous
subsidies and military supplies were poured into
the continent, and an act was passed to enable
three-fourths of the militia to serve abroad. They
were not however very forward to volunteer, and a
new army which ought to have reinforced Wellington
was sent, under the command of general
Graham, to support the insurrection of Holland,
where it was of necessity engaged in trifling or
unsuccessful operations in no manner affecting the
great objects of the war. Meanwhile the importance
of lord Wellington’s army and views was quite
overlooked or misunderstood. The ministers persevered
in the foolish plan of removing him to another
quarter of Europe, and at the same time, instigated
by the ambassadors of the allied sovereigns,
were continually urging him to push his
operations with more vigour in France. As if he
was the man who had done least!</p>

<p>His letters were filled with strong and well-founded
complaints that his army was neglected.
Let his real position be borne in mind. He had,
not as a military man but with a political view
and to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns
backed by the importunities of his own government,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_461"></a>[461]</span>
placed himself in a confined and difficult district
of France, where his operations were cramped by
rivers and fortresses and by a powerful army occupying
strong positions on his front and flanks. In
this situation, unable to act at all in wet weather,
he was necessarily dependent upon the ocean for
supplies and reinforcements, and upon the Spanish
authorities for his hospitals, depôts, and communications.
Numbers were requisite to balance the
advantages derived by the enemy from the peculiar
conformation of the country and the position of the
fortresses. Money also was wanted to procure
supplies which he could not carry with him, and
must pay for exactly, if he would avoid a general
insurrection and the consequent ruin of the political
object for which he had adopted such critical military
operations. But though he had undertaken
the invasion of France at the express desire of the
government the latter seemed to be alike ignorant
of its importance and of the means to accomplish
it, at one moment urging progress beyond reason,
at another ready to change lightly what they had
proposed ignorantly. Their unsettled policy proved
their incapacity even to comprehend the nature of
the great tide of events on which they floated rather
than sailed. Lord Wellington was forced day by
day to teach them the value of their own schemes,
and to show them how small their knowledge was
of the true bearing of the political and military
affairs they pretended to direct.</p>

<p>“Assure,” he wrote on the 21st of December to
lord Bathurst, in reply to one of their ill-founded
remonstrances, “Assure the Russian ambassador
there is nothing I can do to forward the general
interest that I will not do. What do they require?<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_462"></a>[462]</span>
I am already further advanced on the French territory
than any of the allied powers, and better prepared
to take advantage of any opportunities which
might offer as a consequence of my own situation
or of their proceedings.”—“In military operations
there are some things which can not be done, and
one is to move troops in this country during or immediately
after a violent fall of rain. To attempt
it will be to lose more men than can be replaced, a
guilty waste of life.”</p>

<p>“The proper scene of action for the army was undoubtedly
a question for the government to decide,
but with thirty thousand men in the Peninsula, he
had for five years held two hundred thousand of
Napoleon’s best soldiers in check, since it was ridiculous
to suppose that the Spaniards and Portuguese
could have resisted for a moment if the
British troops had been withdrawn. The French
armies actually employed against him could not be
less than one hundred thousand men, more if he
included garrisons, and the French newspapers
spoke of orders to form a fresh reserve of one hundred
thousand at Bordeaux. Was there any man
weak enough to suppose one-third of the number
first mentioned would be employed against the
Spaniards and Portuguese if the British were withdrawn?
They would if it were an object with
Buonaparte to conquer the Peninsula and he would
in that case succeed; but he was more likely to
give peace to the Peninsula and turn against the
allied sovereigns his two hundred thousand men of
which one hundred thousand were such troops as
their armies had not yet dealt with. The war every
day offered a crisis the result of which might affect
the world for ages, and to change the scene of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_463"></a>[463]</span>
operations for the British army would render it
incapable of fighting for four months, even if the
scene were Holland, and it would even then be a
deteriorated machine.”</p>

<p>“The ministers might reasonably ask how by remaining
where he was he could induce Napoleon
to make peace. The answer was ready. He held a
commanding situation on the most vulnerable frontier
of France, probably the only vulnerable one, and if
he could put twenty thousand Spaniards in activity,
and he could do it if he had money and was properly
supported by the fleet, Bayonne the only fortress on
the frontier, if it could be called a fortress, would
fall to him in a short time. If he could put forty
thousand Spaniards in motion his posts would soon
be on the Garonne, and did any man believe that
Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position
more than he would feel thirty or forty thousand
British troops laying siege to one of his fortresses in
Holland? The resources in men and money of which
the emperor would be thus deprived, and the loss
of reputation would do ten times more to procure
peace than ten armies on the side of Flanders. But
if he was right in believing a strong Bourbon party
existed in France and that it preponderated in the
south, what mischief would not an advance to the
Garonne do Napoleon! What sacrifices would he
not make to get rid of the danger!”</p>

<p>“It was for the government not for him to dispose
of the nation’s resources, he had no right to give an
opinion upon the subject, but military operations in
Holland and in the Peninsula could not be maintained
at the same time with British troops; one or
other must be given up, the British military establishment
was not equal to maintain two armies in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_464"></a>[464]</span>
the field. He had begun the recent campaign with
seventy thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and if the men
got from the English militia, and the Portuguese
recruits which he expected, had been added to his
force, even though the Germans were removed from
his army according to the ministers’ plan, he might
have taken the field early in 1814 with eighty thousand
men. That was now impossible. The formation
of a Hanoverian army was the most reasonable plan
of acting on the continent but the withdrawal of the
Germans would reduce his force to fifty thousand
men unless he received real and efficient assistance
to bring up the Portuguese recruits. This would
increase his numbers to fifty-five or even sixty thousand
if his own wounded recovered well and he had
no more battles, but he would even then be twenty
thousand less than he had calculated upon, and it
was certain that if the government extended their
operations to other countries new means must be put
in activity or the war must be stinted on the old
stage. He did not desire to complain but every
branch of the service in the Peninsula was already
stinted especially in what concerned the navy and
the supplies which came directly from England!”</p>

<p>While thus combating the false views of the
English cabinet as to the general state of affairs he
had also to struggle with its negligence and even
opposition to his measures in details.</p>

<p>The general clothing of the Spanish troops and
the great coats of the British soldiers for 1813, were
not ready in January 1814, because the inferior departments
could not comprehend that the opening
of new scenes of exertion required new means, and
the soldiers had to brave the winter half naked, first
on the snowy mountains, then in the more chilling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_465"></a>[465]</span>
damps of the low country about Bayonne. The
clothing of the British soldiers for 1814 should
have arrived in the end of 1813 when the army
lying inactive near the coast by reason of the bad
weather could have received and fitted it without
difficulty. It did not however arrive until the
troops were in progress towards the interior of France,
wherefore, there being no means of transporting it
by land, many of the best regiments were obliged to
return to the coast to receive it, and the army as we
shall find had to fight a critical battle without them.</p>

<p>He had upon commencing the invasion of France
issued a proclamation promising protection to persons
and property. This was construed by the
French to cover their vessels in the Nivelle when
the battle of that name gave the allies St. Jean de
Luz. Lord Wellington sacrificing personal profit to
the good of the service admitted this claim as tending
to render the people amicable, but it clashed with
the prize-money pretensions of lord Keith who commanded
the fleet of which Collier’s squadron formed
a detached portion. The serious evils endured by
the army in default of sufficient naval assistance had
been treated as of very slight importance, the object
of a trifling personal gain for the navy excited
a marvellous activity, and vigorous interference on
the part of the government. Upon these subjects,
and others of a like vexatious nature affecting his
operations, lord Wellington repeatedly and forcibly
declared his discontent during the months of December,
January, and February.</p>

<p>“As to the naval affairs,” he said, “the reports of
the number of ships on the stations striking off those
coming out and going home would shew whether he
had just ground of complaint, and whatever their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_466"></a>[466]</span>
numbers there remained the right of complaint because
they did not perform the service required.
The French had recommenced their coast navigation
from Bordeaux to Bayonne, and if the blockade of
Santona had been maintained the place would have
been forced to surrender at an early period. The proclamation
of protection which he had issued, and
the licenses which he had granted to French vessels,
every act of that description, and two-thirds of the
acts which he performed every day could not he
knew be considered of any avail as affecting the
king’s government, unless approved of and confirmed
by the prince regent; and he knew that no power
short of the regent’s could save the property of
French subjects on the seas from the British navy.
For that reason he had requested the sanction of the
government to the sea passports which he had
granted. His proclamation of protection had been
construed whether rightfully or wrongfully to protect
the French ships in the rivers; his personal
interest, greater than others, would lead him to deny
this, but he sacrificed his profit to the general good.</p>

<p>“Were lord Keith and sir George Collier because
the latter happened to have a brig or two cruizing
off the coast, to claim as prizes all the vessels lying
in every river which the army might pass in its
operations? and this to the detriment of the cause
which required the strictest respect for private property.
For the last five years he had been acting
in the confidence that his conduct would be approved
of and supported, and he concluded it would be so
still; but he was placed in a novel situation and
asked for legal advice to determine, whether lord
Keith and the channel fleet, were to be considered
as engaged in a conjoint expedition with the army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_467"></a>[467]</span>
under his command against the subjects of France,
neither having any specific instructions from government,
and the fleet having nothing to do with the
operations by land. He only required that fleet to
give him a free communication with the coast of
Spain, and prevent the enemy’s sea communication
between the Garonne and the Adour, and this last
was a part of its duty before the army arrived. Was
his proclamation of protection to hold good as regarded
the ships in the rivers? He desired to have it sanctioned
by the prince regent, or that he might be permitted
to issue another declaring that it was of no value.”</p>

<p>This remonstrance produced so much effect that
lord Keith relinquished his claims, and admiral Penrose
was sent to command upon the station instead
of sir George Collier. The immediate intercourse of
lord Wellington with the navy was thus ameliorated
by the superior power of this officer, who was remarkable
for his suavity. Yet the licenses given
to French vessels were strongly condemned by the
government, and rendered null, for we find him
again complaining that “he had granted them
only in hopes of drawing money and supplies
from France, and of interesting the French mercantile
men to aid the army; but he feared the government
were not aware of, and did not feel the
difficulties in which he was placed at all times for
want of money, and judged his measures without
adverting to the necessity which occasioned them;
hence their frequent disapprobation of what he did.”</p>

<p>Strange this may sound to those who seeing the
duke of Wellington in the fulness of his glory have
been accustomed to regard him as the star of
England’s greatness; but those who at that period
frequented the society of ministers know well that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_468"></a>[468]</span>
he was then looked upon by those self-sufficient men
as a person whose views were wild and visionary,
requiring the corroboration of older and wiser heads
before they could be assented to. Yea! even thus
at the eleventh hour was the giant Wellington
measured by the political dwarfs.</p>

<p>Although he gained something by making San
Jean de Luz a free port for all nations not at war
with France, his financial situation was nearly intolerable,
and at the moment of greatest pressure
colonel Bunbury, under-secretary of state, was sent
out to protest against his expenses. One hundred
thousand pounds a month was the maximum in specie
which the government would consent to supply, a
sum quite inadequate to his wants. And this
remonstrance was addressed to this victorious
commander at the very crisis of his stupendous
struggle, when he was overwhelmed with debts and
could scarcely stir out of his quarters on account of
the multitude of creditors waiting at his door for
payment of just claims.</p>


<p>“Some of his muleteers he said were twenty-six<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Despatches.</span>
months in arrears, and recently, instigated
by British merchants, they had become so clamorous
that rather than lose their services he had
given them bills on the treasury for a part of
their claims, though he knew they would sell these
bills at a discount to the <em>sharks</em>, who had urged
them to be thus importunate and who were waiting
at the ports to take advantage of the public
distresses. A dangerous measure which he desired
not to repeat.</p>

<p>“It might be true that the supply of one hundred
thousand pounds a month had been even
exceeded for some time past, but it was incontestible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_469"></a>[469]</span>
that the English army and all its departments,
and the Spanish and Portuguese armies
were at the moment paralyzed for want of money.
The arrears of pay to the soldiers was entering
the seventh month, the debt was immense, and
the king’s engagements with the Spanish and Portuguese
governments were not fulfilled. Indebted
in every part of Spain he was becoming so in
France, the price of all commodities was increasing
in proportion to the delay of payment, to the difficulty
of getting food at all, and the want of credit
into which all the departments of the army had
fallen. Of two hundred thousand dollars given to
marshal Beresford for the pay of his troops on
account of the Portuguese subsidy he had been
forced to take back fifty thousand to keep the
Spaniards together, and was even then forced to
withhold ten thousand to prevent the British cavalry
from perishing. Money to pay the Spaniards had
sailed from Cadiz, but the vessel conveying it, and
another containing the soldiers’ great coats, were by
the admiralty arrangements obliged to go first to
Corunna, and neither had arrived there in January
although the money had been ready in October.
But the ship of war designed to carry it did not
arrive at Cadiz until the end of December. Sixteen
thousand Spanish troops were thus rendered useless
because without pay they could not be trusted in
France.”</p>

<p>“The commissary-in-chief in England had been
regularly informed of the state of the supplies of
the military chest and of the wants and prospects of
the army, but those wants were not attended to.
The monthly hundred thousand pounds spoken of
as the maximum, even if it had been given regularly,
would not cover the ordinary expenses of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_470"></a>[470]</span>
troops, and there were besides the subsidies other
outlays requiring ready money, such as meat for the
soldiers, hospital expenses, commissariat labourers,
and a variety of minor engagements. The Portuguese
government had been reduced to a monthly
sum of two hundred thousand dollars out of a subsidy
of two millions sterling. The Spanish government
got what they could out of a subsidy of one
million. And when money was obtained for the
government in the markets of Lisbon and Cadiz, it
came not in due time, because, such were the admiralty
arrangements, there were no ships to convey
the treasure to the north coast of Spain. The whole
sum which had passed through the military chest
during the past year was scarcely more than two
millions four hundred thousand pounds, out of
which part of the subsidies had been paid. This
was quite inadequate, the Government had desired
him to push his operations to the Garonne during
the winter, he was prepared to do so in every point
excepting money, and he knew the greatest advantages
would accrue from such a movement but
he could not stir. His posts were already so distant
from the coast that his means of transport were
daily destroyed by the journeys, he had not a
shilling to pay for any thing in the country and
his credit was gone. He had been obliged privately
to borrow the expense of a single courier sent to
general Clinton. It was not his duty to suggest
the fitting measures for relief, but it was obvious
that an immediate and large supply from England
was necessary and that ships should be provided
to convey that which was obtained at Lisbon and
Cadiz to the army.”</p>

<p>Such was the denuded state of the victorious
Wellington at a time when millions, and the worth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_471"></a>[471]</span>
of more millions were being poured by the English
ministers into the continent; when every petty German
sovereign, partizan, or robber, who raised a
band, or a cry against Napoleon, was supplied to
satiety. And all this time there was not in England
one public salary reduced, one contract checked, one
abuse corrected, one public servant rebuked for
negligence; not a writer dared to expose the mischief
lest he should be crushed by persecution; no
minister ceased to claim and to receive the boasting
congratulations of the tories, no whig had sense to
discover or spirit to denounce the iniquitous system,
no voice of reprehension was heard from that selfish
faction unless it were in sneering contempt
of the general whose mighty genius sustained England
under this load of folly.</p>

<p>Nor were these difficulties all that lord Wellington
had to contend with. We have seen that the
Portuguese regency withheld his reinforcements
even when he had provided transports for their conveyance.
The duke of York meanwhile insisted
upon withdrawing his provisional battalions, which
being all composed of old soldiers, the remains of
regiments reduced by the casualties of war, were
of more value in a winter campaign than three
times their numbers of new men. With respect to
the English militia regiments, he had no desire for
them, because they possessed, he said, all the worst
faults of the regulars and some peculiar to themselves
besides. What he desired was that eight or
ten thousand men should be drafted from them to
fill up his ranks, he could then without much injury
let his foreign battalions be taken away to reform a
Hanoverian army on the continent; and this plan
he was inclined to, because the Germans, brave and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_472"></a>[472]</span>
strong soldiers, were yet extremely addicted to
desertion and in that particular set a bad example
to the British: this suggestion was however disregarded,
and other reinforcements were promised to
him.</p>

<p>But the most serious of all the secondary
vexations he endured sprung from the conduct of
the Spanish authorities. His hospitals and depôts
were for the most part necessarily in the Spanish
territories and principally at Santander. To avoid
inconvenience to the inhabitants he had caused portable
wooden houses to be brought from England in
which to shelter his sick and wounded men; and he
paid extravagantly and regularly for every aid demanded
from the natives. Nevertheless the natural
arrogance or ill-will which produced the libels
about St. Sebastian the insolence of the minister of
war and the sullen insubordination of Morillo and
other generals broke out here also. After much
underhand and irritating conduct at different times,
the municipality, resolute to drive the hospitals
from their town, suddenly, and under the false pretext
that there was a contagious fever, placed all the
British hospitals with their officers and attendants
under quarantine. This was in the middle of
January. Thirty thousand men had been wounded
since June in the service of Spain, and the return
was to make those wounded men close prisoners
and drive their general to the necessity of fixing his
hospitals in England. Vessels coming from Santander
were thus rendered objects of dread, and the
municipalities of the other ports, either really
fearing or pretending to fear the contagion, would
not suffer them to enter their waters. To such a
height did this cowardice and villainy attain that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_473"></a>[473]</span>
the political chief of Guipuscoa, without giving any
notice to lord Wellington, shut all the ports of that
province against vessels coming from Santander, and
the alcalde of Fuenterabia endeavoured to prevent
a Portuguese military officer from assisting an
English vessel which was about to be and was
afterwards actually cast away, because she came
from Santander.</p>

<p>Now in consequence of the difficulties and dangers
of navigating the Bay of Biscay in the winter
and the badness of the ports near the positions of
the army, all the stores and provisions coming by
sea went in the first instance to Santander, the only
good port, there to wait until favourable opportunities
occurred for reaching the more eastern harbours.
Moreover all the provision magazines of the Spanish
army were there, but this blow cut them off, the
army was reduced to the smaller magazines at Passages
which could only last for a few days, and when
that supply was expended lord Wellington would
have had no resource but to withdraw across the
Pyrenees! “<em>Here,” he exclaimed, “here are the
consequences of the system by which these provinces
are governed! Duties of the highest description,
military operations, political interests, and the salvation
of the state, are made to depend upon the
caprices of a few ignorant individuals, who have
adopted a measure unnecessary and harsh without
adverting to its objects or consequences, and merely
with a view to their personal interests and convenience.</em>”</p>

<p>They carried it into execution also with the
utmost hardness caprice and injustice, regardless of
the loss of ships and lives which must follow, and
finally desired lord Wellington to relinquish the harbour<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_474"></a>[474]</span>
and town of Santander altogether as a depôt!
However his vigorous remonstrances stopped this
nefarious proceeding in time to avert the danger
which it menaced.</p>

<p>Be it remembered now, that these dangers and
difficulties, and vexations, although related in
succession, happened, not one after another, but
altogether; that it was when crossing the Bidassoa,
breaking through the mountain fortifications
of Soult, passing the Nive, fighting the battles
in front of Bayonne, and when still greater
and more intricate combinations were to be arranged,
that all these vials of folly and enmity were poured
upon his head. Who then shall refuse to admire
the undaunted firmness, the unwearied temper and
vigilance, the piercing judgement with which he
steered his gallant vessel and with a flowing sail,
unhurt through this howling storm of passion this
tumultuous sea of folly.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_475"></a>[475]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3>
</div>

<h4>CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN THE EASTERN PARTS OF SPAIN.</h4>


<p class="noindent">When general Clinton succeeded lord William<span class="sidenote9">1813. September.</span>
Bentinck, his whole force, composed of the Anglo-Sicilians,
Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s Spaniards,
and two battalions of Roche’s division, did not
furnish quite nineteen thousand men under arms.
Copons, blockading Mequinenza Lerida and Monzon<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix 6.</a></span>
and having garrisons in Cardona and the Seo
d’Urgel, the only places in his possession, could
not bring more than nine thousand men into the
field. Elio had nominally twenty-five thousand,
but this included Sarzfield’s and Roche’s troops the
greater part of which were with Clinton. It included
likewise the bands of Villa Campa Duran
and the Empecinado, all scattered in Castile Aragon
and Valencia, and acting according to the caprices
of their chiefs. His force, daily diminishing also
from the extreme unhealthiness of the country about
Tortoza, was scarcely sufficient to maintain the
blockades of the French fortresses beyond the Ebro.</p>

<p>Copons’ army having no base but the mountains
about Vich and Monserrat, having no magazines or
depôts or place of arms, having very little artillery
and scarcely any cavalry, lived as it could from day
to day; in like manner lived Sarzfield’s and Whittingham’s
troops, and Clinton’s army was chiefly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_476"></a>[476]</span>
fed on salt provisions from the ships. The two
former having no means of transport were unable
to make even one day’s march with ease, they were
continually upon the point of starvation and could
never be reckoned as a moveable force. Nor indeed
could the Anglo-Sicilians, owing to their scanty
means of transport, make above two or three marches
from the sea; and they were at this time more than
usually hampered, being without pay and shut out
from their principal depôts at Gibraltar and Malta,
by plague at the first and yellow fever at the second
place. In fine, the courage and discipline of the
British and Germans set aside, it would be difficult
to find armies less efficient for an offensive campaign
than those of the allies in Catalonia. Moreover
lord William Bentinck had been invested with the
command of all the Spanish armies, but Clinton had
only Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s troops under
him, and notwithstanding his constant endeavours to
conciliate Copons, the indolence and incapacity of
that general impeded or baffled all useful operations:
and to these disqualifications he added an
extreme jealousy of Eroles and Manso, men designated
by the public voice as the most worthy of
command.</p>

<p>This analysis shows that Elio being entirely
engaged in Valencia, and Sarzfield and Whittingham
unprovided with the means of movement, the
army of Copons and the Anglo-Sicilians, together
furnishing, when the posts and escorts and the
labourers employed on the fortifications of Taragona
were deducted, not more than eighteen thousand
men in line of battle, were the only troops to be
counted on to oppose Suchet, who having sixty-five
thousand men, of which fifty-six thousand were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_477"></a>[477]</span>
present under arms, could without drawing a man
from his garrisons attack them with thirty thousand.
But Copons and Clinton could not act together
above a few days because their bases and lines of
retreat were on different sides. The Spaniard
depended upon the mountains and plains of the
interior for security and subsistence, the Englishman’s
base was Taragona and the fleet. Hence the
only mode of combining on a single line was to
make Valencia a common base, and throwing bridges
over the Ebro construct works on both sides to
defend them. This was strongly recommended by
lord Wellington to lord William and to Clinton;
but the former had several times lost his bridges
partly from the rapidity of the stream, partly from
the activity of the garrison of Tortoza. And for
general Clinton the difficulty was enhanced by distance,
because Taragona, where all his materials
were deposited was sixty miles from Amposta, and
all his artificers were required to restore the defences
of the former place. The blockade of Tortoza was
therefore always liable to be raised, and the troops
employed there exposed to a sudden and fatal
attack, since Suchet, sure to separate the Anglo-Sicilians
from Copons when he advanced, could
penetrate between them; and while the former
rallied at Taragona and the latter at Igualada his
march would be direct upon Tortoza. He could
thus either carry off his strong garrison, or passing
the Ebro by the bridge of the fortress, move without
let or hindrance upon Peniscola, Saguntum, and
Valencia, and driving Elio back upon Alicant collect
his garrisons and return too powerful to be
meddled with.</p>

<p>In these circumstances lord Wellington’s opinion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_478"></a>[478]</span>
was, that the blockade of Tortoza should be given
up and the two armies acting on their own peculiar
lines, the one from Taragona the other from the
mountains, harass in concert the enemy’s flanks and
rear, alternately if he attacked either, but together
if he moved upon Tortoza. To besiege or blockade
that place with safety it was necessary to throw two
bridges over the Ebro below, to enable the armies
to avoid Suchet, by either bank when he should
succour the place, as he was sure to do. But it
was essential that Copons should not abandon
Catalonia and difficult for him to do so, wherefore
it would be advisable to make Taragona the point
of retreat for both armies in the first instance, after
which they could separate and infest the French
rear.</p>

<p>The difficulties of besieging Tortoza he thought
insuperable, and he especially recommended that
they should be well considered before-hand, and if
it was invested, that the troops should be entrenched
around it. In fine all his instructions tended
towards defence and were founded upon his conviction
of the weak and dangerous position of the
allies, yet he believed them to have more resources
than they really had, and to be superior in number
to the French, a great error as I have already shewn.
Nothing therefore could be more preposterous than
Suchet’s alarm for the frontier of France at this
time, and it is unquestionable that his personal
reluctance was the only bar to aiding Soult either
indirectly by marching on Tortoza and Valencia,
or directly by adopting that marshal’s great project
of uniting the two armies in Aragon. So certain
indeed is this that general Clinton, seeing the
difficulties of his own situation, only retained the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_479"></a>[479]</span>
command from a strong sense of duty, and lord
Wellington despairing of any advantage in Catalonia
recommended that the Anglo-Sicilian army should
be broken up and employed in other places. The
French general’s inactivity was the more injurious
to the interests of his sovereign, because any
reverse or appearance of reverse to the allies would
at this time have gone nigh to destroy the alliance
between Spain and England; but personal jealousy,
the preference given to local and momentary interests
before general considerations, hurt the French cause
at all periods in the Peninsula and enabled the
allies to conquer.</p>

<p>General Clinton had no thoughts of besieging
Tortoza, his efforts were directed to the obtaining
a secure place of arms, yet, despite of his intrinsic
weakness, he resolved to show a confident front,
hoping thus to keep Suchet at arm’s length. In
this view he endeavoured to render Taragona
once more defensible notwithstanding the nineteen
breaches which had been broken in its walls; the
progress of the work was however tedious and vexatious
because he depended for his materials upon
the Spanish authorities. Thus immersed in difficulties
of all kinds he could make little change
in his positions which were generally about the
Campo, Sarzfield’s division only being pushed to
Villafranca. Suchet meanwhile held the line of the
Llobregat, and apparently to colour his refusal to
join Soult, grounded on the great strength of the
allies in Catalonia, he suffered general Clinton to
remain in tranquillity.</p>

<p>Towards the end of October reports that the<span class="sidenote9">October.</span>
French were concentrating, for what purpose was
not known, caused the English general, although<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_480"></a>[480]</span>
Taragona was still indefensible to make a forward
movement. He dared not indeed provoke a battle,
but unwilling to yield the resources which Villafranca
and other districts occupied by the allies still
offered, he adopted the resolution of pushing an
advanced guard to the former place. He even
fixed his head-quarters there, appearing ready to
fight, yet his troops were so disposed in succession
at Arbos, Vendrills and Torredembarra that he
could retreat without dishonour if the French advanced
in force, or could concentrate at Villafranca
in time to harass their flank and rear if they attempted
to carry off their garrisons on the Segre.
In this state of affairs Suchet made several demonstrations,
sometimes against Copons sometimes
against Clinton, but the latter maintained his offensive
attitude with firmness, and even in opposition
to lord Wellington’s implied opinion that the line
of the Ebro was the most suitable to his weakness;
for he liked not to abandon Taragona the repairs of
which were now advancing though slowly to completion.
His perseverance was crowned with success;
he preserved the few resources left for the
support of the Spanish troops, and furnished Suchet
with that semblance of excuse which he desired for
keeping aloof from Soult.</p>

<p>In this manner October and November were
passed, but on the 1st of December the French<span class="sidenote9">December.</span>
general attempted to surprise the allies’ cantonments
at Villafranca, as he had before surprised
them at Ordal. He moved in the same order. One
column marched by San Sadurni on his right,
another by Bejer and Avionet on his left, and the
main body kept the great road. But he did not
find colonel Adam there. Clinton had blocked the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_481"></a>[481]</span>
Ordal so as to render a night surprise impossible,
and the natural difficulties of the other roads delayed
the flanking columns. Hence when the
French reached Villafranca, Sarzfield was in full
march for Igualada, and the Anglo-Sicilians, who
had only three men wounded at one of the advanced
posts, were on the strong ground about Arbos,
where being joined by the supporting divisions they
offered battle; but Suchet retired to the Llobregat
apparently so mortified by his failure that he has
not even mentioned it in his Memoirs.</p>

<p>Clinton now resumed his former ground, yet his
embarrassments increased, and though he transferred
two of Whittingham’s regiments to Copons
and sent Roche’s battalions back to Valencia, the
country was so exhausted that the enduring constancy
of the Spanish soldiers under privations
alone enabled Sarzfield to remain in the field: more
than once, that general, a man of undoubted firmness
and courage, was upon the point of re-crossing
the Ebro to save his soldiers from perishing of
famine. Here as in other parts, the Spanish
government not only starved their troops but would
not even provide a piece of ordnance or any stores
for the defence of Taragona, now, by the exertions of
the English general, rendered defensible. Nay! when
admiral Hallowell in conjunction with Quesada the
Spanish commodore at Port Mahon, brought some
ship-guns from that place to the fortress, the minister
of war, O’Donoju, expressed his disapprobation, observing
with a sneer that the English might provide
the guns wanting from the Spanish ordnance moved
into Gibraltar by general Campbell when he destroyed
the lines of San Roque!</p>

<p>The 9th Suchet pushed a small corps by Bejer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_482"></a>[482]</span>
between the Ordal and Sitjes, and on the 10th surprised
at the Ostel of Ordal an officer and thirty
men of the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry. This disaster
was the result of negligence. The detachment after
patroling to the front had dismounted without
examining the buildings of the inn, and some
French troopers who were concealed within immediately
seized the horses and captured the whole
party.</p>

<p>On the 17th, French troops appeared at Martorel,
the Ordal, and Bejer, with a view to mask the march
of a large convoy coming from Upper Catalonia to
Barcelona; they then resumed their former positions,
and at the same time Soult’s and lord Wellington’s
respective letters announcing the defection of the
Nassau battalions in front of Bayonne arrived.
Lord Wellington’s came first, and enclosed a communication
from colonel Kruse to his countryman,
colonel Meder, who was serving in Barcelona and
as Kruse supposed willing to abandon the French.
But when Clinton by the aid of Manso transmitted
the letter to Meder, that officer handed it to general
Habert who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the
command of the city. All the German regiments,
principally cavalry, were immediately disarmed and
sent to France. Severoli’s Italians were at the same
time recalled to Italy and a number of French soldiers,
selected to fill the wasted ranks of the imperial
guards, marched with them; two thousand
officers and soldiers were likewise detached to the
depôts of the interior to organize the conscripts of
the new levy destined to reinforce the army of
Catalonia. Besides these drafts a thousand <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span>
hitherto employed on the Spanish frontier
in aid of the regular troops were withdrawn; Suchet<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_483"></a>[483]</span>
thus lost seven thousand veterans, yet he had still
an overwhelming power compared to the allies.</p>

<p>It was in this state of affairs that the duke of
San Carlos, bearing the treaty of Valençay, arrived
secretly at the French head-quarters on his <ins class="corr" id="tn-483" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'way ot Madrid'">
way to Madrid</ins>. Copons knew this, and it seems certain was
only deterred from openly acceding to the views of
the French emperor and concluding a military convention,
by the decided conduct of the Cortez, and
the ascendancy which lord Wellington had obtained
over him in common with the other Spanish
officers: an ascendancy which had not escaped
Soult’s sagacity, for he early warned the French
minister that nothing could be expected from them
while under the powerful spell of the English
general. Meanwhile Clinton, getting information
that the French troops were diminished in numbers,
especially in front of Barcelona and on the Llobregat,
proposed to pass that river and invest Barcelona
if Copons, who was in the mountains, would undertake
to provision Sarzfield’s division and keep the
French troops between Barcelona and Gerona in
check. For this purpose he offered him the aid of
a Spanish regiment of cavalry which Elio had lent
for the operations in Catalonia; but Copons,
whether influenced by San Carlos’ mission and his
secret wishes for its success, or knowing that the
enemy were really stronger than Clinton imagined,
declared that he was unable to hold the French
troops between Gerona and Barcelona in check, and
that he could not provision either Sarzfield’s division
or the regiment of cavalry. He suggested instead of
Clinton’s plan, a combined attack upon some of
Suchet’s posts on the Llobregat, promising to send
Manso to Villafranca to confer upon the execution.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_484"></a>[484]</span>
Clinton’s proposal was made early in January yet
it was the middle of that month before Copons
replied, and then he only sent Manso to offer the
aid of his brigade in a combined attack upon two
thousand French who were at Molino del Rey. It
was however at last arranged that Manso should at
day-break on the 16th seize the high ground above
Molino, on the left of the Llobregat, to intercept
the enemy’s retreat upon Barcelona, while the
Anglo-Sicilians fell upon them from the right bank.</p>

<p>Success depended upon Clinton’s remaining quiet<span class="sidenote9">1814. January.</span>
until the moment of execution, wherefore he could
only use the troops immediately in hand about Villafranca,
in all six thousand men with three pieces
of artillery; but with these he made a night march
of eighteen miles, and was close to the ford of San
Vicente about two miles below the fortified bridge
of Molino del Rey before daylight. The French
were tranquil and unsuspicious, and he anxiously
but vainly awaited the signal of Manso’s arrival.
When the day broke, the French piquets at
San Vicente descrying his troops commenced a
skirmish, and at the same time a column with
a piece of artillery, coming from Molino, advanced
to attack him thinking there was only a patroling
detachment to deal with, for he had concealed his
main body. Thus pressed he opened his guns per
force and crippled the French piece, whereupon
the reinforcements retired hastily to the entrenchments
at Molino; he could then easily have forced
the passage at the ford and attacked the enemy’s
works in the rear, but this would not have ensured
the capture of their troops, wherefore he still
awaited Manso’s arrival relying on that partizan’s
zeal and knowledge of the country. He appeared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_485"></a>[485]</span>
at last, not, as agreed upon, at St. Filieu, between
Molino and Barcelona, but at Papiol above Molino,
and the French immediately retreated by San Filieu.
Sarzfield, and the cavalry, which Clinton now detached
across the Llobregat, followed them hard,
but the country was difficult, the distance short,
and they soon gained a second entrenched camp
above San Filieu. A small garrison remained
in the masonry-works at Molino, general Clinton
endeavoured to reduce them but his guns were not
of a calibre to break the walls and the enemy was
strongly reinforced towards evening from Barcelona;
whereupon Manso went off to the mountains, and
Clinton returned to Villafranca having killed and
wounded about one hundred and eighty French,
and lost only sixty-four men, all Spaniards.</p>

<p>Manso’s failure surprized the English general,
because that officer, unlike the generality of his
countrymen, was zealous, skilful, vigilant, modest,
and humane, and a sincere co-operator with the
British officers. He however soon cleared himself
of blame, assuring Clinton that Copons, contrary to
his previous declarations, had joined him with four
thousand men, and taking the controul of his troops
not only commenced the march two hours too late, but
without any reason halted for three hours on the
way. Nor did that general offer any excuse or
explanation of his conduct, merely observing, that
the plan having failed nothing more could be done
and he must return to his mountainous asylum
about Vich. A man of any other nation would
have been accused of treachery, but with the
Spaniards there is no limit to absurdity, and from
their actions no conclusion can be drawn as to their
motives.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_486"></a>[486]</span></p>

<p>The great events of the general war were now
beginning to affect the struggle in Catalonia. Suchet
finding that Copons dared not agree to the
military convention dependent upon the treaty of
Valençay, resigned all thoughts of carrying off his
garrisons beyond the Ebro, and secretly instructed
the governor of Tortoza, that when his provisions,
calculated to last until April, were exhausted, he
should march upon Mequinenza and Lerida, unite
the garrisons there to his own, and make way by
Venasque into France. Meanwhile he increased
the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men
and prepared to take the line of the Fluvia; for
the allied sovereigns were in France and Napoleon
had recalled more of his cavalry and infantry, in
all ten thousand men with eighty pieces of artillery,
from Catalonia, desiring that they should march
as soon as the results expected from the mission of
San Carlos were felt by the allies. Suchet prepared
the troops but proposed that instead of waiting
for the uncertain result of San Carlos’ mission,
Ferdinand should himself be sent to Spain through
Catalonia and be trusted on his faith to restore the
garrisons in Valencia. Then he said he could
march with his whole army to Lyons which
would be more efficacious than sending detachments.
The restoration of Ferdinand was the Emperor’s
great object, but this plausible proposition
can only be viewed as a colourable counter-project
to Soult’s plan for a junction of the two
armies in Bearn, since the Emperor was undoubtedly
the best judge of what was required for the
warfare immediately under his own direction.</p>

<p>It was in the midst of these operations that Clinton
attacked Molino del Rey and as we have seen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_487"></a>[487]</span>
would but for the interference of Copons have
stricken a great blow, which was however soon inflicted
in another manner.</p>

<p>There was at this time in the French service a
Spaniard of Flemish descent called Van Halen.
This man, of fair complexion, handsome person,
and a natural genius for desperate treasons, appears<span class="sidenote">Memoir by Sir Wm. Clinton, MSS.</span>
to have been at first attached to Joseph’s court.
After that monarch’s retreat from Spain he was
placed by the duke de Feltre on Suchet’s staff;
but the French party was now a failing one and
Van Halen only sought by some notable treachery
to make his peace with his country. Through the
medium of a young widow, who followed him without
suffering their connection to appear, he informed
Eroles of his object. He transmitted
through the same channel regular returns of Suchet’s
force and other matters of interest, and at last
having secretly opened Suchet’s portfolio he copied
the key of his cypher, and transmitted that also,
with an intimation that he would now soon pass
over and endeavour to perform some other service
at the same time. The opportunity soon offered.
Suchet went to Gerona to meet the duke of San
Carlos, leaving Van Halen at Barcelona, and the
latter immediately taking an escort of three hussars
went to Granollers where the cuirassiers were
quartered. Using the marshal’s name he ordered
them to escort him to the Spanish outposts, which
being in the mountains could only be approached
by a long and narrow pass where cavalry would be
helpless. In this pass he ordered the troops to
bivouac for the night, and when their colonel expressed
his uneasiness, Van Halen quieted him and
made a solitary mill their common quarters. He<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_488"></a>[488]</span>
had before this, however, sent the widow to give
Eroles information of the situation into which he
would bring the troops and now with anxiety
awaited his attack; but the Spanish general failed
to come and at daybreak Van Halen, still pretending
he carried a flag of truce from Suchet, rode off
with his first escort of hussars and a trumpeter to
the Spanish lines. There he ascertained that the
widow had been detained by the outposts and immediately
delivered over his escort to their enemies,
giving notice also of the situation of the cuirassiers
with a view to their destruction, but they
escaped the danger.</p>

<p>Van Halen and Eroles now forged Suchet’s signature,
and the former addressed letters in cypher
to the governors of Tortoza, Lerida, Mequinenza,
and Monzon, telling them that the emperor in consequence
of his reverses required large drafts of
men from Catalonia, and had given Suchet orders
to negotiate a convention by which the garrisons
south of the Llobregat were to join the army with
arms and baggage and followers. The result was
uncertain, but if the treaty could not be effected
the governors were to join the army by force, and
they were therefore immediately to mine their principal
bastions and be prepared to sally forth at an
appointed time. The marches and points of junction
were all given in detail, yet they were told
that if the convention took place the marshal would
immediately send an officer of his staff to them,
with such verbal instructions as might be necessary.
The document finished with deploring the
necessity which called for the sacrifice of conquests
achieved by the valour of the troops.</p>

<p>Spies and emissaries who act for both sides are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_489"></a>[489]</span>
common in all wars, but in the Peninsula so many
pretended to serve the French and were yet true to
the Spaniards, that to avoid the danger of betrayal
Suchet had recourse to the ingenious artifice of
placing a very small piece of light-coloured hair in
the cyphered paper, the latter was then enclosed in a
quill sealed and wrapped in lead. When received,
the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of
white paper and if the hair was discovered the
communication was good, if not, the treachery was
apparent because the hair would escape the vigilance
of uninitiated persons and be lost by any
intermediate examination. Van Halen knew this
secret also, and when his emissaries had returned
after delivering the preparatory communication, he
proceeded in person with a forged convention, first
to Tortoza, for Suchet has erroneously stated in his
Memoirs that the primary attempts were made at
Lerida and Mequinenza. He was accompanied by
several Spanish officers and by some French deserters
dressed in the uniforms of the hussars he
had betrayed to the Spanish outposts. The
governor Robert though a vigilant officer was deceived
and prepared to evacuate the place. During
the night however a true emissary arrived with a
letter from Suchet of later date than the forged
convention. Robert then endeavoured to entice
Van Halen into the fortress, but the other was too
wary and proceeded at once to Mequinenza and
Lerida where he completely overreached the governors
and then went to Monzon.</p>

<p>This small fortress had now been besieged since
the 28th of September 1813, by detachments from
the Catalan army and the bands from Aragon. Its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_490"></a>[490]</span>
means of defence were slight, but there was within
a man of resolution and genius called St. Jacques.
He was a Piedmontese by birth and only a private
soldier of engineers, but the commandant appreciating
his worth was so modest and prudent as to
yield the direction of the defence entirely to him.
Abounding in resources, he met, and at every point
baffled the besiegers who worked principally by
mines, and being as brave as he was ingenious
always led the numerous counter-attacks which he
contrived to check the approaches above and below
ground. The siege continued until the 18th
of February when the subtle Van Halen arrived,
and by his Spanish wiles obtained in a few hours
what Spanish courage and perseverance had vainly
strived to gain for one hundred and forty days.
The commandant was suspicious at first, but when
Van Halen suffered him to send an officer to ascertain
that Lerida and Mequinenza were evacuated,
he was beguiled like the others and marched to join
the garrisons of those places.</p>

<p>Sir William Clinton had been informed of this
project by Eroles as early as the 22d of January
and though he did not expect any French general
would be so egregiously misled, readily promised
the assistance of his army to capture the garrisons
on their march. But Suchet was now falling back
upon the Fluvia, and Clinton, seeing the fortified
line of the Llobregat weakened and being uncertain
of Suchet’s real strength and designs, renewed
his former proposal to Copons for a combined attack
which should force the French general to discover
his real situation and projects. Ere he could
obtain an answer, the want of forage obliged him to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_491"></a>[491]</span>
refuse the assistance of the Spanish cavalry lent to
him by Elio, and Sarzfield’s division was reduced to
its last ration. The French thus made their retreat
unmolested, for Clinton’s project necessarily involved
the investment of Barcelona after passing
the Llobregat, and the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry, being
mounted on small Egyptian animals the greatest
part of which were foundered or unserviceable from
sand-cracks, a disease very common amongst the
horses of that country, were too weak to act without
the aid of Elio’s horsemen. Moreover as a division
of infantry was left at Taragona awaiting the
effect of Van Halen’s wiles against Tortoza the aid
of Sarzfield’s troops was indispensable.</p>

<p>Copons accepted the proposition towards the end
of the month, the Spanish cavalry was then
gone to the rear, but Sarzfield having with great
difficulty obtained some provisions the army was<span class="sidenote9">February.</span>
put in movement on the 3d of February, and as
Suchet was now near Gerona, it passed the Llobregat
at the bridge of Molino del Rey without resistance.
On the 5th Sarzfield’s picquets were vigorously
attacked at San Filieu by the garrison of
Barcelona, he however supported them with his whole
division and being reinforced with some cavalry
repulsed the French and pursued them to the walls.
On the 7th the city was invested on the land
side by Copons who was soon aided by Manso; on
the sea-board by admiral Hallowell, who following
the movements of the army with the fleet blockaded
the harbour with the Castor frigate, and anchored
the Fame a seventy-four off Mataro. On the 8th
intelligence arrived of Van Halen’s failure at Tortoza,
but the blockade of Barcelona continued uninterrupted
until the 16th when Clinton was informed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_492"></a>[492]</span>
by Copons of the success at Lerida, Mequinenza,
and Monzon. The garrisons, he said, would march
upon Igualada, and Eroles who, under pretence of
causing the convention to be observed by the
Somatenes, was to follow in their rear, proposed to
undeceive and disarm them at that place. On the
17th however he sent notice that Martorel had been
fixed upon in preference to Igualada for undeceiving
and disarming the French, and as they would be at
the former place that evening general Clinton was
desired to send some of his troops there to ensure
the success of the project.</p>

<p>This change of plan and the short warning, for
Martorel was a long march from Barcelona, together
with the doubts and embarrassments which Copons’
conduct always caused, inclined the English general
to avoid meddling with the matter at all; yet
fearing that it would fail in the Spaniard’s hands
he finally drafted a strong division of troops and
marched in person to Martorel. There he met
Copons who now told him that the French would
not pass Esparaguera that night, that Eroles
was close in their rear, and another division of the
Catalan army at Bispal blocking the bridge of Martorel.
Clinton immediately undertook to pass the
Llobregat, meet the French column, and block the
road of San Sadurni; and he arranged with Copons
the necessary precautions and signals.</p>

<p>About nine o’clock general Isidore La Marque
arrived with the garrisons at Martorel, followed
at a short distance by Eroles. No other troops
were to be seen and after a short halt the French
continued their march on the right bank of the
Llobregat, where the Barcelona road enters a narrow
pass between the river and a precipitous hill. When<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_493"></a>[493]</span>
they were completely entangled Clinton sent an
officer to forbid their further progress and referred
them to Copons who was at Martorel for an explanation,
then giving the signal all the heights around
were instantly covered with armed men. It was in
vain to offer resistance, and two generals, having
two thousand six hundred men, four guns, and a
rich military chest, capitulated, but upon conditions,
which were granted and immediately violated with
circumstances of great harshness and insult to the
prisoners. The odium of this baseness which was
quite gratuitous, since the French helpless in the
defile must have submitted to any terms, attaches
entirely to the Spaniards. Clinton refused to meddle
in any manner with the convention, he had not
been a party to Van Halen’s deceit, he appeared
only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in
the field which the Spaniards could not have subdued
without his aid, he refused even to be present
at any consultation previous to the capitulation,
and notwithstanding an assertion to the contrary in
Suchet’s Memoirs no appeal on the subject from
that marshal ever reached him.</p>

<p>During the whole of these transactions the infatuation
of the French leaders was extreme. The
chief of one of the battalions more sagacious than
his general told Lamarque in the night of the 16th
at Igualada that he was betrayed, at the same time
urging him vainly to abandon his artillery and
baggage and march in the direction of Vich, to
which place they could force their way in despite
of the Spaniards. It is remarkable also that Robert
when he had detected the imposture and failed to
entice Van Halen into Tortoza did not make a sudden<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_494"></a>[494]</span>
sally upon him and the Spanish officers who
were with him, all close to the works. And still
more notable is it that the other governors, the
more especially as Van Halen was a foreigner, did
not insist upon the bearer of such a convention
remaining to accompany their march. It has
been well observed by Suchet that Van Halen’s
refusal to enter the gates was alone sufficient to
prove his treachery.</p>

<p>The detachment recalled by Napoleon now moved
into France, and in March was followed by a
second column of equal force which was at first
directed upon Lyons, but the arrival of lord Wellington’s
troops on the Garonne caused, as we
shall hereafter find, a change in its destination.
Meanwhile by order of the minister at war Suchet
entered into a fresh negociation with Copons, to
deliver up all the fortresses held by his troops
except Figueras and Rosas, provided the garrisons
were allowed to rejoin the army. The Spanish
commander assented and the authorities generally
were anxious to adopt the proposal, but the regency
referred the matter to lord Wellington who rejected
it without hesitation, as tending to increase the force
immediately opposed to him. Thus baffled and overreached
at all points, Suchet destroyed the works
of Olot, Besalu, Bascara and Palamos, dismantled
Gerona and Rosas, and concentrated his forces at
Figueras. He was followed by Copons, but though
he still had twelve thousand veterans besides the
national guards and depôts of the French departments,
he continued most obstinately to refuse any
aid to Soult, and yet remained inactive himself. The
blockade of Barcelona was therefore maintained by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_495"></a>[495]</span>
the allies without difficulty or danger save what
arose from their commissariat embarrassments and
the efforts of the garrison.</p>

<p>On the 23d of February Habert made a
sally with six battalions, thinking to surprize Sarzfield,
he was however beaten, and colonel Meder the
Nassau officer who had before shewn his attachment
to the French cause was killed. The blockade<span class="sidenote7">March.</span>
was thus continued until the 12th of March when
Clinton received orders from lord Wellington to
break up his army, send the foreign troops to lord
William Bentinck in Sicily, and march with the
British battalions by Tudela to join the great army
in France. Clinton at first prepared to obey but
Suchet was still in strength, Copons appeared
to be provoking a collision though he was quite
unable to oppose the French in the field; and to
maintain the blockade of Barcelona in addition,
after the Anglo-Sicilians should depart, was quite
impossible. The latter therefore remained and on
the 19th of March king Ferdinand reached the
French frontier.</p>

<p>This event, which happening five or even three
months before would probably have changed the
fate of the war, was now of little consequence.
Suchet first proposed to Copons to escort Ferdinand
with the French army to Barcelona and put him in
possession of that place, but this the Spanish general
dared not assent to, for he feared lord Wellington
and his own regency, and was closely watched
by colonel Coffin who had been placed near him by
sir William Clinton. The French general then
proposed to the king a convention for the recovery
of his garrisons, to which Ferdinand agreed with the
facility of a false heart. His great anxiety was to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_496"></a>[496]</span>
reach Valencia, because the determination of the
Cortez to bind him to conditions before he recovered
his throne was evident, the Spanish generals were
apparently faithful to the Cortez, and the British
influence was sure to be opposed to him while he
was burthened with French engagements.</p>

<p>Suchet had been ordered to demand securities
for the restoration of his garrisons previous to Ferdinand’s
entry into Spain, but time was precious
and he determined to escort him at once with the
whole French army to the Fluvia, having first received
a promise to restore the garrisons. He also
retained his brother Don Carlos as a hostage for<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span>
their return, but even this security he relinquished
when the king in a second letter written from Gerona
solemnly confirmed his first promise. On the 24th
therefore in presence of the Catalan and French
armies, ranged in order of battle on either bank of the
Fluvia, Ferdinand passed that river and became once
more king of Spain. He had been a rebellious son in
the palace, a plotting traitor at Aranjuez, a dastard at
Bayonne, an effeminate superstitious fawning slave at
Valençay, and now after six years’ captivity he returned
to his own country an ungrateful and cruel
tyrant. He would have been the most odious and
contemptible of princes if his favourite brother
Don Carlos had not existed. Reaching the camp
at Barcelona on the 30th he dined with sir William
Clinton, reviewed the allied troops and then proceeded
first to Zaragoza and finally to Valencia.
Marshal Suchet says the honours of war were paid<span class="sidenote">Memoirs by sir Wm. Clinton, MSS.</span>
to him by all the French garrisons but this was not
the case at Barcelona: no man appeared, even on
the walls. After this event the French marshal
repassed the Pyrenees leaving only one division at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_497"></a>[497]</span>
Figueras and Clinton proceeded to break up his
army, but was again stopped by the vexatious conduct
of Copons who would not relieve the Anglo-Sicilians
at the blockade, nor indeed take any notice
of the English general’s communications on the
subject before the 11th of April. On the 14th
however the troops marched, part to embark at
Taragona, part to join lord Wellington. Copons
then became terrified lest general Robert,
abandoning Tortoza, should join Habert at Barcelona,
and enclose him between them and the division
at Figueras, wherefore Clinton once more
halted to protect the Spaniards.</p>

<p>Copons had indeed some reason to fear, for<span class="sidenote7">April.</span>
Habert about this time received, and transmitted to
Robert, the emperor’s orders to break out of Tortoza
and gain Barcelona instead of passing by the
valley of Venasque as Suchet had before prescribed:
the twelve thousand men thus united were then to
push into France. This letter was intercepted, copied,
and sent on to Robert, whose answer being
likewise intercepted shewed that he was not prepared
and had no inclination for the enterprise.
This seen Clinton continued his embarkation and thus
completed his honourable but difficult task. With a
force weak in numbers, and nearly destitute of every
thing that constitutes strength in the field, he had
maintained a forward and dangerous position for
eight months; and though Copons’ incapacity and
ill-will, and other circumstances beyond control, did
not permit him to perform any brilliant actions, he
occupied the attention of a very superior army,
suffered no disaster and gained some advantages.</p>

<p>While his troops were embarking, Habert, in furtherance
of the emperor’s project, made a vigorous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_498"></a>[498]</span>
sally on the 18th, and though repulsed with loss
he killed or wounded eight hundred Spaniards.
This was a lamentable combat. The war had terminated
long before, yet intelligence of the cessation
of hostilities only arrived four days later.
Habert was now repeatedly ordered by Suchet
and the duke of Feltre to give up Barcelona, but
warned by the breach of former conventions he held
it until he was assured that all the French garrisons<span class="sidenote9">Lafaille.</span>
in Valencia had returned safely to France, which
did not happen until the 28th of May, when he
yielded up the town and marched to his own
country. This event, the last operation of the
whole war, released the duchess of Bourbon. She
and the old prince of Conti had been retained
prisoners in the city during the Spanish struggle,
the prince died early in 1814, the duchess survived,
and now returned to France.</p>

<p>How strong Napoleon’s hold of the Peninsula had
been, how little the Spaniards were able of their own
strength to shake him off, was now apparent to all
the world. For notwithstanding lord Wellington’s
great victories, notwithstanding the invasion of
France, six fortresses, Figueras, Barcelona, Tortoza,
Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia were recovered,
not by arms but by the general peace.
And but for the deceits of Van Halen there would
have been three others similarly situated in the eastern
parts alone, while in the north Santona was recovered
in the same manner; for neither the long
blockade nor the active operations against that
place, of which some account shall now be given,
caused it to surrender.</p>

<p>The site of Santona is one of those promontories
frequent on the coast of Spain which connected by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_499"></a>[499]</span>
low sandy necks with the main land offer good harbours.
Its waters deep and capacious furnished
two bays. The outer one or roadstead was commanded
by the works of Santona itself, and by
those of Laredo, a considerable town lying at the
foot of a mountain on the opposite point of the
harbour. A narrow entrance to the inner port
was between a spit of land, called the Puntal, and
the low isthmus on which the town of Santona is
built. The natural strength of the ground was
very great, but the importance of Santona arose
from its peculiar situation as a harbour and fort of
support in the Montaña de Santander. By holding
it the French shut out the British shipping from
the only place which being defensible on the land
side furnished a good harbour between San Sebastian
and Coruña; they thus protected the sea-flank
of their long line of invasion, obtained a port of
refuge for their own coasting vessels, and a post of
support for the moveable columns sent to chase the
partidas which abounded in that rough district.
And when the battle of Vittoria placed the allies
on the Bidassoa, from Santona issued forth a
number of privateers who, as we have seen, intercepted
lord Wellington’s supplies and interrupted
his communication with Coruña, Oporto, Lisbon,
and even with England.</p>

<p>The advantages of possessing Santona were felt<span class="sidenote12">Vol. 3. Book XI. Chapter V.</span>
early by both parties; the French seized it at once
and although the Spaniards recovered possession of
it in 1810 they were driven out again immediately.
The English ministers then commenced deliberating
and concocting extensive and for that reason injudicious
and impracticable plans of offensive operations,<span class="sidenote12">Ibid. Book XII. Chapter I.</span>
to be based upon the possession of Santona;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_500"></a>[500]</span>
meanwhile Napoleon fortified it and kept it to the
end of the war. In August 1812 its importance
was better understood by the Spaniards, and it was
continually menaced by the numerous bands of
Biscay, the Asturias and the Montaña. Fourteen
hundred men, including the crew of a corvette,
then formed its garrison, the works were not very
strong and only forty pieces of artillery were
mounted. Napoleon however, foreseeing the disasters
which Marmont was provoking, sent general
Lameth, a chosen officer, to take charge of the
defence. He immediately augmented the works
and constructed advanced redoubts on two hills,
called the Gromo and the Brusco, which like San
Bartolomeo at San Sebastian closed the isthmus
inland. He also erected a strong redoubt and
blockhouse on the Puntal to command the straits,
and to sweep the roadstead in conjunction with the
fort of Laredo which he repaired. This done he
formed several minor batteries and cast a chain to
secure the narrow entrance to the inner harbour,
and then covered the rocky promontory of Santona
itself with defensive works.</p>

<p>Some dismounted guns remained in the arsenal,
others which had been thrown into the sea by the
Spaniards when they took the place in 1810 were
fished up, and the garrison felling trees in the vicinity
made carriages for them; by these means a
hundred and twenty guns were finally placed in
battery and there was abundance of ammunition.
The corvette was not sea-worthy, but the governor
established a flotilla of gun-boats, and other small
craft, which sallied forth whenever the signal-posts
on the head-land gave notice of the approach of
vessels liable to attack, or of French coasters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_501"></a>[501]</span>
bringing provisions and stores. The garrison had
previously lost many men, killed in a barbarous
manner by the partidas, and in revenge they never
gave quarter to their enemies. Lameth shocked
at their inhumanity resolutely forbad under pain of
death any farther reprisals, rewarded those men
who brought in prisoners and treated the latter
with gentleness: the Spaniards discovering this
also changed their system and civilization resumed
its rights. From this time military operations were
incessant, the garrison sometimes made sallies,
sometimes sustained partial attacks, sometimes aided
the moveable columns employed by the different
generals of the army of the north to put down
the partizan warfare, which was seldom even lulled
in the Montaña.</p>

<p>After the battle of Vittoria Santona being left to
its own resources was invested on the land side by a
part of the troops composing the Gallician or fourth
Spanish army. It was blockaded on the sea-board
by the English ships of war, but only nominally,
for the garrison received supplies, and the flotilla
vexed lord Wellington’s communications, took
many of his store-ships and other vessels, delayed
his convoys, and added greatly to the difficulties
of his situation. The land blockade thus also became
a nullity and the Spanish officers complained
with reason that they suffered privations and endured
hardships without an object. These complaints
and his own embarassments, caused by lord
Melville’s neglect, induced lord Wellington in
October, 1813, when he could ill spare troops, to
employ a British brigade under lord Aylmer in the
attack of Santona; the project for reasons already
mentioned was not executed, but an English engineer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_502"></a>[502]</span>
captain Wells, was sent with some sappers
and miners to quicken the operations of the
Spanish officers, and his small detachment has<span class="sidenote"><span lang="fr">Victoires et Conquêtes</span>.</span>
been by a French writer magnified into a whole
battalion.</p>

<p>Captain Wells remained six months, for the
Spanish generals though brave and willing were
tainted with the national defect of procrastination.
The siege made no progress until the 13th of<span class="sidenote9">1814. February.</span>
February 1814 when general Barco the Spanish
commander carried the fort of Puntal in the night
by escalade, killing thirty men and taking twenty-three
prisoners, yet the fort being under the heavy
fire of the Santona works was necessarily dismantled
and abandoned the next morning. A picquet was
however left there and the French opened their batteries,
but as this did not dislodge the Spaniards
Lameth embarked a detachment and recovered his
fort. However in the night of the 21st general
Barco ordered an attack to be made with a part of
his force upon the outposts of El Grumo and Brusco,
on the Santona side of the harbour, and led the remainder
of his troops in person to storm the fort and
town of Laredo. He carried the latter and also some
outer defences of the fort, which being on a rock
was only to be approached by an isthmus so narrow
as to be closed by a single fortified house. In the
assault of the body of this fort Barco was killed
and the attack ceased, but the troops retained
what they had won and established themselves at
the foot of the rock where they were covered from
fire. The attack on the other side, conducted by
colonel Llorente, was successful; he carried the
smallest of the two outworks on the Brusco, and
closely invested the largest after an ineffectual attempt<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_503"></a>[503]</span>
by mine and assault to take it. A large
breach was however made and the commandant
seeing he could no longer defend his post, valiantly
broke through the investment and gained the work
of the Grumo. He was however aided by the appearance
on the isthmus of a strong column which sallied
at the same time from the works on the Santona
promontory, and the next day the Grumo itself was
abandoned by the French.</p>

<p>Captain Wells, who had been wounded at the
Puntal escalade, now strenuously urged the Spaniards
to crown the counter-scarp of the fort at
Laredo and attack vigorously, but they preferred
establishing four field-pieces to batter it in form at
the distance of six hundred yards. These guns as
might be expected were dismounted the moment
they began to fire, and thus corrected, the Spanish
generals committed the direction of the attack to
Wells. He immediately opened a heavy musquetry<span class="sidenote">Professional papers by the royal engineers.</span>
fire on the fort to stifle the noise of his workmen,
then pushing trenches up the hill close to the
counterscarp in the night, he was proceeding to burst
open the gate with a few field-pieces and to cut down
the pallisades, when the Italian garrison, whose musquets
from constant use had become so foul that few
would go off, mutinied against their commander and
making him a prisoner surrendered the place. This
event gave the allies the command of the entrance<span class="sidenote7">April.</span>
to the harbour, and Lameth offered to capitulate in
April upon condition of returning to France with
his garrison. Lord Wellington refused the condition,
Santona therefore remained a few days longer in
possession of the enemy, and was finally evacuated
at the general cessation of hostilities.</p>

<p>Having now terminated the narrative of all military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_504"></a>[504]</span>
and political events which happened in the
Peninsula, the reader will henceforth be enabled to
follow without interruption the events of the war
in the south of France which shall be continued
in the next book.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_505"></a>[505]</span><br></p>

<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XXIV">BOOK XXIV.</h2>
</div>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_I">CHAPTER I.</h3>


<p class="noindent">Lord Wellington’s difficulties have been described.<span class="sidenote9">1814. January.</span>
Those of his adversary were even more embarrassing
because the evil was at the root; it was not
misapplication of power but the want of power
itself which paralyzed Soult’s operations. Napoleon
trusted much to the effect of his treaty with Ferdinand
who, following his intentions, should have
entered Spain in November, but the intrigues to
retard his journey continued, and though Napoleon,
when the refusal of the treaty by the Spanish government
became known, permitted him to return without
any conditions, as thinking his presence would
alone embarrass and perhaps break the English
alliance with Spain, he did not as we have seen
arrive until March. How the emperor’s views were
frustrated by his secret enemies is one of the obscure
parts of French history, at this period, which time
may possibly clear but probably only with a feeble
and uncertain light. For truth can never be expected
in the memoirs, if any should appear, of such
men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other politicians of
their stamp, whose plots rendered his supernatural
efforts to rescue France from her invaders abortive.
Meanwhile there is nothing to check and expose the
political and literary empirics who never fail on
such occasions to poison the sources of history.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_506"></a>[506]</span></p>

<p>Relying upon the effect which the expected
journey of Ferdinand would produce, and pressed
by the necessity of augmenting his own weak army,
Napoleon gave notice to Soult that he must ultimately
take from him, two divisions of infantry and
one of cavalry. The undecided nature of his first
battle at Brienne caused him to enforce this notice
in the beginning of February, but he had previously
sent imperial commissaries to the different departments
of France, with instructions to hasten the new
conscription, to form national and urban guards, to draw
forth all the resources of the country, and to aid the
operations of the armies by the action of the people.
These measures however failed generally in the
south. The urban cohorts were indeed readily
formed as a means of police, and the conscription
was successful, but the people remained sullen and
apathetic; and the civil commissaries are said to<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Despatches, MSS.</span>
have been, with some exceptions, pompous, declamatory,
and affecting great state and dignity without
energy and activity. Ill-will was also produced by
the vexatious and corrupt conduct of the subordinate
government agents, who seeing in the general
distress and confusion a good opportunity to forward
their personal interests, oppressed the people for
their own profit. This it was easy to do, because
the extreme want of money rendered requisitions
unavoidable, and under the confused direction of
civilians, partly ignorant and unused to difficult
times, partly corrupt, and partly disaffected to the
emperor, the abuses inevitably attendant upon such
a system were numerous; and to the people so offensive,
that numbers to avoid them passed with their
carts and utensils into the lines of the allies. An
official letter written from Bayonne at this period<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_507"></a>[507]</span>
run thus: “The English general’s policy and the
good discipline he maintains does us more harm than
ten battles. Every peasant wishes to be under his
protection.”</p>

<p>Another source of anger was Soult’s works near
Bayonne, where the richer inhabitants could not
bear to have their country villas and gardens destroyed
by the engineer, he who spares not for
beauty or for pleasure where his military traces are
crossed. The merchants, a class nearly alike in all
nations, with whom profit stands for country,
had been with a few exceptions long averse to
Napoleon’s policy which from necessity interfered
with their commerce. And this feeling must have
been very strong in Bayonne and Bordeaux, for one
Batbedat, a banker of the former place, having obtained
leave to go to St. Jean de Luz under pretence
of settling the accounts of English officers, prisoners
of war, to whom he had advanced money, offered lord
Wellington to supply his army with various commodities
and even provide money for bills on the
English treasury. In return he demanded licenses
for twenty vessels to go from Bordeaux, Rochelle
and Mants, to St. Jean de Luz, and they were given
on condition that he should not carry back colonial
produce. The English navy however shewed so
little inclination to respect them that the banker and
his coadjutors hesitated to risk their vessels, and
thus saved them, for the English ministers refused to
sanction the licenses and rebuked their general.</p>

<p>During these events the partizans of the Bourbons,<span class="sidenote9">February.</span>
coming from Brittany and La Vendée, spread themselves
all over the south of France and entered into
direct communication with lord Wellington. One
of the celebrated family of La Roche Jacquelin<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_508"></a>[508]</span>
arrived at his head-quarters, Bernadotte sent an
agent to those parts, and the count of Grammont,
then serving as a captain in the British cavalry, was
at the desire of the marquis de Mailhos, another of
the malcontents, sent to England to call the princes
of the house of Bourbon forward. Finally the duke
of Angoulême arrived suddenly at the head-quarters,
and he was received with respect in private though
not suffered to attend the movements of the army.
The English general indeed, being persuaded that
the great body of the French people especially in
the south, were inimical to Napoleon’s government,
was sanguine as to the utility of encouraging a
Bourbon party. Yet he held his judgment in
abeyance, sagaciously observing that he could not
come to a safe conclusion merely from the feelings
of some people in one corner of France; and as the
allied sovereigns seemed backward to take the
matter in hand unless some positive general movement
in favour of the Bourbons was made, and there
were negociations for peace actually going on, it
would be, he observed, unwise and ungenerous to
precipitate the partizans of the fallen house into a
premature outbreak and then leave them to the
vengeance of the enemy.</p>

<p>That lord Wellington should have been convinced
the prevailing opinion was against Napoleon is not
surprising, because every appearance at the time
would seem to prove it so; and certain it is that a
very strong Bourbon party and one still stronger
averse to the continuation of war existed. But in
civil commotions nothing is more dangerous, nothing
more deceitful, than the outward show and declarations
on such occasions. The great mass of men
in all nations are only endowed with moderate capacity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_509"></a>[509]</span>
and spirit, and as their thoughts are intent
upon the preservation of their families and property
they must bend to circumstances; thus fear and
suspicion, ignorance baseness and good feeling, all
combine to urge men in troubled times to put on
the mask of enthusiasm for the most powerful, while
selfish knaves ever shout with the loudest. Let the
scene change and the multitude will turn with the
facility of a weathercock. Lord Wellington soon
discovered that the count of Viel Chastel, Bernadotte’s
agent, while pretending to aid the Bourbons
was playing a double part, and only one year after
this period Napoleon returned from Elba, and
neither the presence of the duke of Angoulême, nor
the energy of the duchess, nor all the activity of
their partizans, could raise in this very country more
than the semblance of an opposition to him. The
tricolor was every where hoisted and the Bourbon
party vanished. And this was the true test of national
feeling, because in 1814 the white colours
were supported by foreign armies, and misfortune
had bowed the great democratic chief to the earth;
but when rising again in his wondrous might he
came back alone from Elba, the poorer people, with
whom only patriotism is ever really to be found, and
that because they are poor and therefore unsophisticated,
crowded to meet and hail him as a father.
Not because they held him entirely blameless. Who
born of woman is? They demanded redress of grievances
even while they clung instinctively to him as
their stay and protection against the locust tyranny
of aristocracy.</p>

<p>There was however at this period in France<span class="sidenote9">January.</span>
enough of discontent passion and intrigue, enough
of treason, and enough of grovelling spirit in adversity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_510"></a>[510]</span>
added to the natural desire of escaping the
ravages of war, a desire so carefully fostered by the
admirable policy of the English general, as to render
the French general’s position extremely difficult
and dangerous. Nor is it the least remarkable circumstance
of this remarkable period, that while Soult
expected relief by the Spaniards falling away from
the English alliance, lord Wellington received from
the French secret and earnest warnings to beware of
some great act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards.
It was at this period also that Morillo and
other generals encouraged their soldiers’ licentiousness,
and displayed their own ill-will by sullen discontent
and captious complaints, while the civil
authorities disturbed the communications and made
war in their fashion against the hospitals and
magazines.</p>

<p>His apprehensions and vigilance are plainly to be
traced in his correspondence. Writing about general
Copons he says, “his conduct is quite unjustifiable
both in concealing what he knew of the duke de
San Carlos’ arrival and the nature of his mission.”
In another letter he observes, that the Spanish military
people about himself desired peace with Napoleon
according to the treaty of Valençay; that they
all had some notion of what had occurred and yet
had been quite silent about it; that he had repeated
intelligence from the French of some act of treachery
meditated by the Spaniards; that several persons
of that nation had come from Bayonne to circulate
reports of peace, and charges against the British
which he knew would be well received on that
frontier; that he had arrested a man calling himself
an agent of and actually bearing a letter of credence
from Ferdinand.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_511"></a>[511]</span></p>

<p>But the most striking proof of the alarm he felt
was his great satisfaction at the conduct of the
Spanish government in rejecting the treaty brought
by San Carlos and Palafox. Sacrificing all his
former great and just resentment he changed at
once from an enemy to a friend of the regency, supported
the members of it even against the serviles,
spoke of the matter as being the most important
concern of all that had engaged his attention, and
when the count of La Bispal, the deadly enemy
of the regency, proposed some violent and decided
action of hostility which a few weeks before would
have been received with pleasure, he checked and
softened him, observing, that the conduct of the
government about the treaty should content every
Spaniard, that it was not possible to act with more
frankness and loyalty, and that they had procured
honour for themselves and for their nation not only
in England but all over Europe. Such is the light
mode in which words are applied by public men,
even by the noblest and greatest, when their wishes
are fulfilled. This glorious and honourable conduct
of the regency was simply a resolution to uphold
their personal power and that of their faction, both
of which would have been destroyed by the arrival
of the king.</p>

<p>Napoleon hoping much from the effect of these
machinations not only intimated to Soult, as I have
already shewn, that he would require ten thousand
of his infantry immediately, but that twice that
number with a division of cavalry would be called
away if the Spaniards fell off from the English
alliance. The duke of Dalmatia then foreseeing the
ultimate result of his own operations against Wellington,
conceived a vast general plan of action which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_512"></a>[512]</span>
showed how capable a man he was to treat the
greatest questions of military policy.</p>

<p>“Neither his numbers nor means of supply after
Wellington had gained the banks of the Adour above
Bayonne would, he said, suffice to maintain his positions
covering that fortress and menacing the allies’
right flank; the time therefore approached when he
must, even without a reduction of force, abandon
Bayonne to its own resources and fight his battles
on the numerous rivers which run with concentric
courses from the Pyrenees to the Adour. Leval’s
and Boyer’s divisions of infantry were to join the
grand army on the eastern frontier, Abbé’s division
was to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne and
its camp to fourteen thousand men, but he considered
this force too great for a simple general
of division and wished to give it to general Reille
whose corps would be broken up by the departure
of the detachments. That officer was however
altogether averse, and as an unwilling commander
would be half beaten before the battle
commenced he desired that count D’Erlon should
be appointed in Reille’s place.</p>

<p>“The active army remaining could not then be
expected to fight the allies in pitched battles, and he
therefore recommended the throwing it as a great
partizan corps on the left, touching always upon the
Pyrenees and ready to fall upon lord Wellington’s
flank and rear if he should penetrate into France.
Clauzel a native of those parts and speaking the
country language was by his military qualities and
knowledge the most suitable person to command.
General Reille could then march with the troops
called to the great army, and as there would be
nothing left for him, Soult, to do in these parts he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_513"></a>[513]</span>
desired to be employed where he could aid the emperor
with more effect. This he pressed urgently
because, notwithstanding the refusal of the Cortez
to receive the treaty of Valençay, it was probable
the war on the eastern frontier would oblige the
emperor to recall all the troops designated. It
would then become imperative to change from a regular
to an irregular warfare, in which a numerous corps
of partizans would be more valuable than the shadow
of a regular army without value or confidence, and
likely to be destroyed in the first great battle. For
these partizans it was necessary to have a central
power and director. Clauzel was the man most fitted
for the task. He ought to have under his orders
all the generals who were in command in the military
departments between the Garonne and the
Pyrenees, with power to force all the inhabitants to
take arms and act under his directions.</p>

<p>“I am sensible,” he continued, “that this system,
one of the least unhappy consequences of which
would be to leave the enemy apparently master of
all the country between the mountains and the
Garonne, can only be justified by the necessity of
forming an army in the centre of France sufficiently
powerful to fend off the multitude of our enemies
from the capital; but if Paris falls all will be lost,
whereas if it be saved the loss of a few large towns
in the south can be repaired. I propose then to
form a great army in front of Paris by a union of
all the disposable troops of the armies on the
different frontiers, and at the same time to spread
what remains of the latter as partizans wherever the
enemy penetrates or threatens to penetrate. All the
marshals of France the generals and other officers,
either in activity or in retirement, who shall not be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_514"></a>[514]</span>
attached to the great central army, should then
repair to their departments to organize the partizan
corps and bring those not actively useful as such
up to the great point of union, and they should have
military power to make all men able to bear arms,
find them at their own expense.” “This measure
is revolutionary but will infallibly produce important
results, while none or at least a very feeble effect
will be caused by the majority of the imperial commissioners
already sent to the military divisions.
They are grand persons, they temporize, make proclamations
and treat every thing as civilians instead
of acting with vigour to obtain promptly a result
which would astonish the world; for notwithstanding
the cry to the contrary, the resources of France
are not exhausted, what is wanted is to make those
who possess resources use them for the defence of the
throne and the emperor.”</p>

<p>Having thus explained his views, he again requested
to be recalled to Paris to serve near the emperor, but
declared that he was ready to obey any order and
serve in any manner; all he demanded was clear instructions
with reference to the events that might
occur. 1º. What he should do if the treaty arrangements
with Ferdinand had no effect and the
Spanish troops remained with lord Wellington.
2º. If those troops retired and the British seeing
the French weakened by detachments should alone
penetrate into France. 3º. If the changes in Spain
should cause the allies to retire altogether.</p>

<p>Such was Soult’s plan of action but his great
project was not adopted and the emperor’s reasons
for neglecting it have not been made known. Nor
can the workings of that capacious mind be judged
of without a knowledge of all the objects and conditions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_515"></a>[515]</span>
of his combinations. Yet it is not improbable
that at this period he did not despair of
rejecting the allies beyond the Rhine either by
force of arms, by negociation, or by working upon
the family pride of the emperor of Austria. With
this hope he would be naturally averse to incur the
risk of a civil war by placing France under martial
law, or of reviving the devouring fire of revolution
which it had been his object for so many years to
quell; and this is the more probable because it
seems nearly certain, that one of his reasons for replacing
Ferdinand on the Spanish throne was his
fear lest the republican doctrines which had gained
ground in Spain should spread to France. Was he
wrong? The fierce democrat will answer Yes! But
the man who thinks that real liberty was never
attained under a single unmixed form of government
giving no natural vent to the swelling pride of
honour birth or riches; those who measure the
weakness of pure republicanism by the miserable
state of France at home and abroad when Napoleon
by assuming power saved her; those who saw
America with all her militia and her licentious
liberty unable to prevent three thousand British
soldiers from passing three thousand miles of
ocean and burning her capital, will hesitate to condemn
him. And this without detriment to the democratic
principle which in substance may and
should always govern under judicious forms. Napoleon
early judged, and the event has proved he
judged truly, that the democratic spirit of France
however violent was unable to overbear the aristocratic
and monarchic tendencies of Europe; wisely
therefore while he preserved the essence of the
first by fostering equality, he endeavoured to blend<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_516"></a>[516]</span>
it with the other two; thus satisfying as far as the
nature of human institutions would permit the conditions
of the great problem he had undertaken to
solve. His object was the reconstruction of the
social fabric which had been shattered by the
French revolution, mixing with the new materials
all that remained of the old sufficiently unbroken
to build with again. If he failed to render his
structure stable it was because his design was
misunderstood, and the terrible passions let loose
by the previous stupendous explosion were too
mighty even for him to compress.</p>

<p>To have accepted Soult’s project would have
been to endanger his work, to save himself at the
expense of his system, and probably to plunge
France again into the anarchy from which he had
with so much care and labour drawn her. But as I
have before said, and it is true, Napoleon’s ambition
was for the greatness and prosperity of France, for
the regeneration of Europe, for the stability of the
system which he had formed with that end, never
for himself personally; and hence it is that the multitudes
of many nations instinctively revere his memory.
And neither the monarch nor the aristocrat,
dominant though they be by his fall, feel themselves
so easy in their high places as to rejoice much
in their victory.</p>

<p>Whatever Napoleon’s motive was he did not
adopt Soult’s project, and in February two divisions
of infantry and Trielhard’s cavalry with many batteries
were withdrawn. Two thousand of the best
soldiers were also selected to join the imperial
guards, and all the <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> were sent to the interior.
The total number of old soldiers left, did
not, including the division of General Paris, exceed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_517"></a>[517]</span>
forty thousand exclusive of the garrison of
Bayonne and other posts, and the conscripts, beardless
youths, were for the most part unfit to enter
the line nor were there enough of musquets in the
arsenals to arm them. It is remarkable also, as
shewing how easily military operations may be
affected by distant operations, that Soult expected
and dreaded at this time the descent of a great
English army upon the coast of La Vendée, led
thereto by intelligence of an expedition preparing
in England, under sir Thomas Graham, really to aid
the Dutch revolt.</p>

<p>While the French general’s power was thus diminished,
lord Wellington’s situation was as suddenly
ameliorated. First by the arrival of reinforcements,
next by the security he felt from the rejection of the
treaty of Valençay, lastly by the approach of better
weather, and the acquisition of a very large sum in
gold which enabled him not only to put his Anglo-Portuguese
in activity but also to bring the Spaniards
again into line with less danger of their
plundering the country. During the forced cessation
of operations he had been actively engaged
preparing the means to enter France with power
and security, sending before him the fame of a just
discipline and a wise consideration for the people
who were likely to fall under his power, for there
was nothing he so much dreaded as the partizan and
insurgent warfare proposed by Soult. The peasants
of Baygorry and Bidarray had done him more mischief
than the French army, and his terrible menace
of destroying their villages, and hanging all the population
he could lay his hands upon if they ceased
not their hostility, marks his apprehensions in the
strongest manner. Yet he left all the local authorities<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_518"></a>[518]</span>
free to carry on the internal government, to
draw their salaries, and raise the necessary taxes
in the same mode and with as much tranquillity as
if perfect peace prevailed; he opened the ports and
drew a large commerce which served to support his
own army and engage the mercantile interests in his
favour; he established many sure channels for intelligence
political and military, and would have extended
his policy further and to more advantage if
the English ministers had not so abruptly and
ignorantly interfered with his proceedings. Finally
foreseeing that the money he might receive would,
being in foreign coin, create embarrassment, he
adopted an expedient which he had before practised
in India to obviate this. Knowing that in a British
army a wonderful variety of knowledge and vocations
good and bad may be found, he secretly caused
the coiners and die-sinkers amongst the soldiers to
be sought out, and once assured that no mischief was
intended them, it was not difficult to persuade them
to acknowledge their peculiar talents. With these
men he established a secret mint at which he coined
gold Napoleons, marking them with a private stamp
and carefully preserving their just fineness and
weight with a view of enabling the French government
when peace should be established to call them
in again. He thus avoided all the difficulties of
exchange, and removed a very fruitful source of
quarrels and ill-will between the troops and the
country people and shopkeepers; for the latter
are always fastidious in taking and desirous of
abating the current worth of strange coin, and the
former attribute to fraud any declination from the
value at which they receive their money. This
sudden increase of the current coin tended also<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_519"></a>[519]</span>
to diminish the pressure necessarily attendant upon
troubled times.</p>

<p>Nor was his provident sagacity less eminently
displayed in purely military matters than in his
administrative and political operations. During the
bad weather he had formed large magazines at the
ports, examined the course of the Adour, and carefully
meditated upon his future plans. To penetrate
into France and rally a great Bourbon party under
the protection of his army was the system he desired
to follow; and though the last point depended upon
the political proceedings and successes of the allied
sovereigns the military operations most suitable at
the moment did not clash with it. To drive the
French army from Bayonne and either blockade or
besiege that place were the first steps in either case.
But this required extensive and daring combinations.
For the fortress and its citadel, comprising in their
circuit the confluence of the Nive and the Adour,
could not be safely invested with less than three
times the number necessary to resist the garrison at
any one point, because the communications of the invested
being short internal and secure, those of the
investers external difficult and unsafe, it behoved that
each division should be able to resist a sally of the
whole garrison. Hence, though reduced to the lowest
point, the whole must be so numerous as seriously
to weaken the forces operating towards the interior.</p>

<p>How and where to cross the Adour with a view
to the investment was also a subject of solicitude.
It was a great river with a strong current and well
guarded by troops and gun-boats above Bayonne;
still greater was it below the town; there the ebb
tide run seven miles an hour, there also there were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_520"></a>[520]</span>
gun-boats, a sloop of war, and several merchant-vessels
which could be armed and employed to interrupt
the passage. The number of pontoons or
other boats required to bridge the stream across
either above or below, and the carriage of them, an
immense operation in itself, would inevitably give
notice of the design and render it abortive, unless
the French army were first driven away, and even
then the garrison of Bayonne nearly fifteen thousand
strong might be sufficient to baffle the attempt.
Nevertheless in the face of these difficulties he resolved
to pass, the means adopted being proportionate
to the greatness of the design.</p>

<p>He considered, that, besides the difficulty of bringing
the materials across the Nive and through the
deep country on each side of that river, he could not
throw his bridge above Bayonne without first driving
Soult entirely from the confluents of the Adour and
from the Adour itself; that when he had effected
this his own communications between the bridge and
his magazines at the sea-ports would still be difficult
and unsafe, because his convoys would have a flank
march, passing the Nive as well as the Adour and
liable to interruption from the overflowing of those
rivers; finally, that his means of transport would be
unequal to the wear and tear of the deep roads and
be interrupted by rain. But throwing his bridge
below the town he would have the Adour itself as a
harbour, while his land convoys used the royal causeway
leading close to the river and not liable to
be interrupted by weather. His line of retreat also
would then be more secure if any unforeseen misfortune
should render it necessary to break up the investment.
He had no fear that Soult, while retiring
before the active force he intended to employ against<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_521"></a>[521]</span>
him on the upper parts of the rivers, would take his
line of retreat by the great Bordeaux road and fall
upon the investing force: that road led behind
Bayonne through the sandy wilderness called the
Landes, into which the French general would not
care to throw himself, lest his opponent’s operations
along the edge of the desert should prevent him
from ever getting out. To draw the attention of the
French army by an attack on their left near the
roots of the Pyrenees would be sure to keep the
lower Adour free from any formidable defensive
force, because the rapidity and breadth of the stream
there denied the use of common pontoons, and the
mouth, about six miles below Bayonne, was so
barred with sand, so beaten by surges, and so difficult
of navigation even with the help of the landmarks,
some of which had been removed, that the
French would never expect small vessels fit for
constructing a bridge could enter that way. Yet it
was thus lord Wellington designed to achieve his
object. He had collected forty large sailing boats
of from fifteen to thirty tons burthen, called <i lang="fr">chasse
marées</i>, as if for the commissariat service, but he
secretly loaded them with planks and other materials
for his bridge. These and some gun-boats he
designed, with the aid of the navy, to run up the
Adour to a certain point upon which he meant also
to direct the troops and artillery, and then with
hawsers, and pontoons formed into rafts, to throw
over a covering body and destroy a small battery
near the mouth of the river. He trusted to the
greatness and danger of the attempt for success and
in this he was favoured by fortune.</p>

<p>The French trading vessels in the Adour had
offered secretly to come out upon licenses and enter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_522"></a>[522]</span>
the service of his commissariat, but he was obliged
to forego the advantage because of the former interference
and dissent of the English ministers about
the passports he had previously granted. This
added greatly to the difficulty of the enterprize.
He was thus forced to maltreat men willing to be
friends, to prepare grates for heating shot, and a
battery of Congreve rockets with which to burn
their vessels and the sloop of war, or at least to drive
them up the river, after which he proposed to protect
his bridge with the gun-boats and a boom.</p>

<p>While he was thus preparing for offensive
operations the French general was active in defensive
measures. He had fortified all the main
passes of the rivers by the great roads leading
against his left, but the diminution of his force in
January obliged him to withdraw his outposts from
Anglet, which enabled lord Wellington to examine
the whole course of the Adour below Bayonne
and arrange for the passage with more facility.
Soult then in pursuance of Napoleon’s system of
warfare, which always prescribed a recourse to
moral force to cover physical weakness, immediately
concentrated his left wing against the allies’ right
beyond the Nive, and redoubled that harassing
partizan warfare which I have already noticed,
endeavouring to throw his adversary entirely upon
the defensive. Thus on the 26th of January, Morillo
having taken possession of an advanced post
near Mendionde not properly belonging to him,
Soult, who desired to ascertain the feelings of the
Spaniards about the English alliance, caused Harispe
under pretence of remonstrating to sound him;
he did not respond and Harispe then drove him,
not without a vigorous resistance, from the post.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_523"></a>[523]</span></p>

<p>The French marshal had however no hope of checking
the allies long by these means. He judged justly
that Wellington was resolved to obtain Bordeaux
and the line of the Garonne, and foreseeing that his
own line of retreat must ultimately be in a parallel
direction with the Pyrenees, he desired to organize
in time a strong defensive system in the country
behind him and to cover Bordeaux if possible. In
this view he sent general Darricau a native of the
Landes to prepare an insurgent levy in that wilderness,
and directed Maransin to the High Pyrenees
to extend the insurrection of the mountaineers already
commenced in the Lower Pyrenees by Harispe.
The castle of Jaca was still held by eight hundred
men but they were starving, and a convoy collected
at Navarrens being stopped by the snow in
the mountain-passes made a surrender inevitable.
Better would it have been to have withdrawn
the troops at an early period; for though the
Spaniards would thus have gained access to the
rear of the French army and perhaps ravaged a part
of the frontier, they could have done no essential
mischief to the army; and their excesses would have
disposed the people of those parts who had not yet
felt the benefit of lord Wellington’s politic discipline
to insurrection.</p>

<p>At Bordeaux there was a small reserve commanded<span class="sidenote9">February.</span>
by general La Huillier, Soult urged the minister of
war to increase it with conscripts from the interior.
Meanwhile he sent artillery-men from Bayonne,
ordered fifteen hundred national guards to be
selected as a garrison for the citadel of Blaye, and
desired that the Médoc and Paté forts and the batteries
along the banks of the Garonne should be put
in a state of defence. The vessels in that river fit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_524"></a>[524]</span>
for the purpose he desired might be armed, and a
flotilla of fifty gun-boats established below Bordeaux,
with a like number to navigate that river
above the city as far as Toulouse. But these orders
were feebly carried into execution or entirely neglected,
for there was no public spirit, and treason
and disaffection were rife in the city.</p>

<p>On the side of the Lower Pyrenees Soult enlarged
and improved the works of Navarrens and designed
to commence an entrenched camp in front of it. The
castle of Lourdes in the High Pyrenees was already
defensible, and he gave orders to fortify the castle
of Pau, thus providing a number of supporting
points for the retreat which he foresaw. At Mauleon
he put on foot some partizan corps, and the imperial
commissary Caffarelli gave him hopes of being able
to form a reserve of seven or eight thousand national
guards, <i lang="fr">gensd’armes</i>, and artillery-men, at Tarbes.
Dax containing his principal depôts was already
being fortified, and the communication with it was
maintained across the rivers by the bridges and
bridge-heads at Port de Lannes, Hastingues, Pereyhorade,
and Sauveterre; but the floods in the
beginning of February carried away his bridge at
the Port de Lannes, and the communication between
Bayonne and the left of the army was thus interrupted
until he established a flying bridge in place of the
one carried away.</p>

<p>Such was the situation of the French general
when lord Wellington advanced, and as the former
supposed with one hundred and twenty thousand infantry
and fifteen thousand cavalry, for he knew
nothing of the various political and financial difficulties
which had reduced the English general’s
power and prevented all the reinforcements he expected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_525"></a>[525]</span>
from joining him. His emissaries told him
that Clinton’s force was actually broken up, and the
British part in march to join Wellington; that the
garrisons of Carthagena Cadiz and Ceuta were on
the point of arriving and that reinforcements were
coming from England and Portugal. This information
made him conclude that there was no intention
of pressing the war in Catalonia and that all
the allied troops would be united and march against
him; wherefore with more earnestness than before
he urged that Suchet should be ordered to join him
that their united forces might form a “dike against
the torrent” which threatened to overwhelm the
south of France. The real power opposed to him
was however very much below his calculations.
The twenty thousand British and Portuguese reinforcements
promised had not arrived, Clinton’s army
was still in Catalonia; and though it is impossible to
fix the exact numbers of the Spaniards, their regular
forces available, and that only partially and with
great caution on account of their licentious conduct,
did not exceed the following approximation.</p>

<p>Twelve thousand Gallicians under Freyre including
Carlos D’España’s division; four thousand
under Morillo; six thousand Andalusians under
O’Donnel; eight thousand of Del Parque’s troops
under the prince of Anglona. In all thirty thousand.
The Anglo-Portuguese present under arms were by
the morning states on the 13th of February, the day
on which the advance commenced, about seventy
thousand men and officers of all arms, nearly ten
thousand being cavalry. The whole force, exclusive
of Mina’s bands which were spread as we have seen
from Navarre to the borders of Catalonia, was therefore,
one hundred thousand men and officers, with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_526"></a>[526]</span>
one hundred pieces of field-artillery of which ninety-five
were Anglo-Portuguese.</p>

<p>It is difficult to fix with precision the number of
the French army at this period, because the imperial
muster-rolls, owing to the troubled state of the
emperor’s affairs were either not continued beyond
December 1813 or have been lost. But from Soult’s
correspondence and other documents it would appear,
that exclusive of his garrisons, his reserves
and detachments at Bordeaux and in the department
of the High Pyrenees, exclusive also of the conscripts
of the second levy which were now beginning
to arrive, he could place in line of battle about
thirty-five thousand soldiers of all arms, three thousand
being cavalry, with forty pieces of artillery.
But Bayonne alone without reckoning the fortresses
of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navarrens occupied
twenty-eight thousand of the allies; and by this and
other drains lord Wellington’s superiority in the
field was so reduced, that his penetrating into
France, that France which had made all Europe
tremble at her arms, must be viewed as a surprising
example of courage and fine conduct, military and
political.</p>


<h4>PASSAGE OF THE GAVES.</h4>

<p>In the second week of February the weather set
in with a strong frost, the roads became practicable
and the English general, eagerly seizing the long-expected
opportunity, advanced at the moment when
general Paris had again marched with the convoy
from Navarrens to make a last effort for the relief of
Jaca. But the troops were at this time receiving the
clothing which had been so long delayed in England,
and the regiments wanting the means of carriage,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_527"></a>[527]</span>
marched to the stores; the English general’s first
design was therefore merely to threaten the French
left and turn it by the sources of the rivers with
Hill’s corps, which was to march by the roots of the
Pyrenees, while Beresford kept the centre in check
upon the lower parts of the same rivers. Soult’s attention
would thus he hoped be drawn to that side while
the passage of the Adour was being made below
Bayonne. And it would seem that uncertain if he
should be able to force the passage of the tributary
rivers with his right, he intended, if his bridge was
happily thrown, to push his main operations on that
side and thus turn the Gaves by the right bank of
the Adour: a fine conception by which his superiority
of numbers would have best availed him to
seize Dax and the Port de Landes and cut Soult off
from Bordeaux.</p>

<p>On the 12th and 13th Hill’s corps, which including
Picton’s division and five regiments of cavalry
furnished twenty thousand combatants with sixteen
guns, being relieved by the sixth and seventh divisions
in front of Mousseroles and on the Adour, was
concentrated about Urcurray and Hasparen. The
14th it marched in two columns. One by Bonloc<span class="sidenote7">Plan 9.</span>
to drive the French posts beyond the Joyeuse; another
by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port
against Harispe who was at Hellette. This second
column had the Ursouia mountain on the right, and
a third, composed of Morillo’s Spaniards, having
that mountain on its left marched from La Houssoa
against the same point. Harispe who had only three
brigades, principally conscripts, retired skirmishing
in the direction of St. Palais and took a position for
the night at Meharin. Not more than thirty men
on each side were hurt but the line of the Joyeuse<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_528"></a>[528]</span>
was turned by the allies, the direct communication
with St. Jean Pied de Port cut, and that place was
immediately invested by Mina’s battalions.</p>

<p>On the 15th Hill, leaving the fifty-seventh regiment
at Hellette to observe the road to St. Jean
Pied de Port, marched through Meharin upon Garris,
eleven miles distant, but that road being impracticable
for artillery the guns moved by Armendaritz
more to the right. Harispe’s rear-guard was overtaken
and pushed back fighting, and meanwhile lord
Wellington directed Beresford to send a brigade of
the seventh division from the heights of La Costa
across the Gamboury to the Bastide de Clerence.
The front being thus extended from Urt by Briscons,
the Bastide and Isturitz, towards Garris, a distance
of more than twenty miles, was too attenuated;
wherefore he caused the fourth division to occupy
La Costa in support of the troops at the Bastide.
At the same time learning that the French had
weakened their force at Mousseroles, and thinking
that might be to concentrate on the heights of Anglet,
which would have frustrated his plan for throwing
a bridge over the Adour, he directed Hope secretly
to occupy the back of those heights in force and
prevent any intercourse between Bayonne and the
country.</p>

<p>Soult knew of the intended operations against
his left on the 12th, but hearing the allies had collected
boats and constructed a fresh battery near
Urt on the Upper Adour, and that the pontoons had
reached Urcurray, he thought lord Wellington designed
to turn his left with Hill’s corps, to press
him on the Bidouze with Beresford’s, and to keep
the garrison of Bayonne in check with the Spaniards
while Hope crossed the Adour above that fortress.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_529"></a>[529]</span>
Wherefore, on the 14th, when Hill’s movement commenced,
he repaired to Passarou near the Bastide
de Clerence and made his dispositions to dispute
the passage, first of the Bidouze and the Soissons or
Gave of Mauleon, and then of the Gave of Oleron.
He had four divisions in hand with which he occupied
a position on the 15th along the Bidouze; and he<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.</span>
recalled general Paris, posting him on the road between
St. Palais and St. Jean Pied de Port, with a
view to watch Mina’s battalions which he supposed to
be more numerous than they really were. Jaca thus
abandoned capitulated on the 17th, the garrison returning
to France on condition of not serving until
exchanged. This part of the capitulation it appears
was broken by the French, but the recent violation
by the Spaniards of the convention made with the
deluded garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon,
furnished a reply.</p>

<p>Harispe, having Paris under his command and
being supported by Pierre Soult with a brigade of
light cavalry, now covered the road from St. Jean
Pied de Port with his left, and the upper line of the
Bidouze with his right. Lower down that river,
Villatte occupied Ilharre, Taupin was on the heights
of Bergoney below Villatte, and Foy guarded the
banks of the river from Came to its confluence with
the Adour. The rest of the army remained under
D’Erlon on the right of the latter river.</p>

<p><em>Combat of Garris.</em>—Harispe had just taken a position
in advance of the Bidouze, on a height called
the Garris mountain which stretched to St. Palais,
when his rear-guard came plunging into a deep
ravine in his front closely followed by the light
troops of the second division. Upon the parallel
counter-ridge thus gained by the allies general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_530"></a>[530]</span>
Hill’s corps was immediately established, and
though the evening was beginning to close the
skirmishers descended into the ravine, and two guns
played over it upon Harispe’s troops. These last
to the number of four thousand were drawn up on
the opposite mountain, and in this state of affairs
Wellington arrived. He was anxious to turn the
line of the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen
himself there, and seeing that the communication
with general Paris by St. Palais was not well maintained,
sent Morillo by a flank march along the
ridge now occupied by the allies towards that place;
then menacing the enemy’s centre with Le Cor’s
Portuguese division he at the same time directed
the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments forming
Pringle’s brigade to attack, observing with a
concise energy, “<em>you must take the hill before
dark</em>.”</p>

<p>The expression caught the attention of the<span class="sidenote">Memoir of the action published in the United Service Journal.</span>
troops, and it was repeated by colonel O’Callaghan
as he and general Pringle placed themselves at the
head of the thirty-ninth, which, followed by the
twenty-eighth, rushed with loud and prolonged
shouts into the ravine. The French fire was violent,
Pringle fell wounded and most of the mounted
officers had their horses killed, but the troops covered
by the thick wood gained with little loss the
summit of the Garris mountain, on the right of the
enemy who thought from the shouting that a larger
force was coming against them and retreated. The
thirty-ninth then wheeled to their own right intending
to sweep the summit, but soon the French
discovering their error came back at a charging
pace, and receiving a volley without flinching tried
the bayonet. Colonel O’Callaghan distinguished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_531"></a>[531]</span>
by his strength and courage received two strokes of
that weapon but repaid them with fatal power in
each instance, and the French, nearly all conscripts,
were beaten off. Twice however they came back
and fought until the fire of the twenty-eighth was
beginning to be felt, when Harispe seeing the remainder
of the second division ready to support the
attack, Le Cor’s Portuguese advancing against the
centre, and the Spaniards in march towards St.
Palais, retreated to that town and calling in Paris<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_09"><ins class="corr" id="tn-531" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'See Plan.'">
See Plan 9.</ins></a></span>
from the side of Mauleon immediately broke down
the bridges over the Bidouze. He lost on this day
nearly five hundred men, of whom two hundred
were prisoners, and he would hardly have escaped
if Morillo had not been slow. The allies lost only
one hundred and sixty of whom not more than fifty
fell at Garris, and these chiefly in the bayonet contest,
for the trees and the darkness screened them at
first.</p>

<p>During these operations at Garris Picton moved
from Bonloc to Oreque, on Hill’s left, menacing
Villatte, but though Beresford’s scouting parties,
acting on the left of Picton, approached the Bidouze
facing Taupin and Foy, his principal force
remained on the Gamboury, the pivot upon which
Wellington’s line hinged while the right sweeping
forward turned the French positions. Foy however
though in retreat observed the movement of the
fourth and seventh divisions on the heights between
the Nive and the Adour, pointing their march as he
thought towards the French left, and his reports to
that effect reached Soult at the moment that general
Blondeau gave notice of the investment of St. Jean
Pied de Port. The French general being thus convinced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_532"></a>[532]</span>
that lord Wellington’s design was not to pass
the Adour above Bayonne, but to gain the line of
that river by constantly turning the French left,
made new dispositions.</p>

<p>The line of the Bidouze was strong, if he could
have supported Harispe at St. Palais, and guarded
at the same time the passage of the Soissons at
Mauleon; but this would have extended his front,
already too wide, wherefore he resolved to abandon
both the Bidouze and the Soissons and take the line
of the Gave d’Oleron, placing his right at Peyrehorade
and his left at Navarrens. In this view
D’Erlon was ordered to pass the Adour by the
flying bridge at the Port de Landes and take post
on the left bank of that river, while Harispe, having
Paris’ infantry still attached to his division, defended
the Gave de Mauleon and pushed parties on<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report.</span>
his left towards the town of that name. Villatte
occupied Sauveterre, where the bridge was fortified
with a head on the left bank, and from thence
Taupin lined the right bank to Sordes near the
confluence of the Gave de Pau. Foy occupied the
works of the bridge-head at Peyrehorade and Hastingues
guarding that river to its confluence with
the Adour; this line was prolonged by D’Erlon
towards Dax, but Soult still kept advanced parties
on the lower Bidouze at the different entrenched
passages of that river. One brigade of cavalry
was in reserve at Sauveterre, another distributed
along the line. Head-quarters were transported to
Orthes, and the parc of artillery to Aire. The
principal magazines of ammunition were however
at Bayonne, Navarrens, and Dax, and the French
general seeing that his communications with all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_533"></a>[533]</span>
these places were likely to be intercepted before he
could remove his stores, anticipated distress and
wrote to the minister of war to form new depôts.</p>

<p>On the 16th lord Wellington repaired the broken
bridges of St. Palais, after a skirmish in which a
few men were wounded. Hill then crossed the
Bidouze, the cavalry and artillery by the repaired
bridge, the infantry by the fords, but the day
being spent in the operation the head of the column
only marched beyond St. Palais. Meanwhile
the fourth and part of the seventh divisions occupied
the Bastide de Clerence on the right of the
Joyeuse, and the light division came up in support
to the heights of La Costa on the left bank of that
river.</p>

<p>The 17th Hill, marching at eight o’clock, passed
through Domenzain towards the Soissons, while the
third division advancing from Oreque on his left
passed by Masparraute to the heights of Somberraute,
both corps converging upon general Paris, who
was in position at Arriveriete to defend the Soissons
above its confluence with the Gave d’Oleron. The
French outposts were immediately driven across
the Gave. General Paris attempted to destroy the
bridge of Arriveriete but lord Wellington was too
quick; the ninety-second regiment covered by the
fire of some guns crossed at a ford above the
bridge, and beating two French battalions from the
village secured the passage. The allies then halted
for the day near Arriveriete having marched only
five miles and lost one man killed with twenty-three
wounded. Paris relinquished the Soissons but remained
between the two rivers during the night
and retired on the morning of the 18th. The allies
then seized the great road, which here runs from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_534"></a>[534]</span>
Sauveterre to Navarrens up the left bank of the
Oleron Gave.</p>

<p>Harispe, Villatte, and Paris, supported by a brigade<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
of cavalry were now at Sauveterre occupying
the bridge-head on the left bank, Taupin’s division
was opposite the Bastide de Bearn lower down on
the right, Foy on the right of Taupin, and D’Erlon
on the left of the Adour above its confluence with
the Gave de Pau. Meanwhile the fourth division
advanced to Bidache on the Bidouze, and the light
division followed in support to the Bastide de Clerence,
the seventh division remaining as before,
partly in that vicinity partly extended on the left to
the Adour. The cavalry of the centre, under sir
Stapleton Cotton, arrived also on the banks of the
Bidouze connecting the fourth with the third division
at Somberraute. In this state of affairs Hill
sent Morillo up the Soissons to guard the fords as
high as Nabas, then spreading Fane’s cavalry and
the British and Portuguese infantry between that
river and the Gave d’Oleron, he occupied all the
villages along the road to Navarrens and at the
same time cannonaded the bridge-head of Sauveterre.</p>

<p>Soult thrown from the commencement of the
operations entirely upon the defensive was now at a
loss to discover his adversary’s object. The situation
of the seventh division, and the march of the
fourth and light divisions, led him to think his
works at Hastingues and Peyrehorade would be
assailed. The weakness of his line, he having only
Taupin’s division to guard the river between
Sauveterre and Sordes a distance of ten miles,
made him fear the passage of the Gave would be
forced near the Bastide de Bearn, to which post<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_535"></a>[535]</span>
there was a good road from Came and Bidache.
On the other hand the prolongation of Hill’s line
up the Gave towards Navarrens indicated a design
to march on Pau, or it might be to keep him in
check on the Gaves while the camp at Bayonne was
assaulted. In this uncertainty he sent Pierre Soult,
with a cavalry brigade and two battalions of infantry
to act between Oleron and Pau, and keep
open a communication with the partizan corps forming
at Mauleon. That done he decided to hold the
Gaves as long as he could, and when they were
forced, to abandon the defensive concentrate his
whole force at Orthes and fall suddenly upon the
first of the allies’ converging columns that approached
him.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_536"></a>[536]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_II">CHAPTER II.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">The French general’s various conjectures embraced<span class="sidenote9">1814. February.</span>
every project but the true one of the English general.
The latter did indeed design to keep him in
check upon the rivers, not to obtain an opportunity
of assaulting the camp of Bayonne but to throw
his stupendous bridge over the Adour; yet were
his combinations so made that failing in that he
could still pursue his operations on the Gaves.
When therefore he had established his offensive
line strongly beyond the Soissons and the Bidouze,
and knew that his pontoon train was well advanced
towards Garris, he on the 19th returned rapidly to
St. Jean de Luz. Everything there depending on
man was ready, but the weather was boisterous
with snow for two days, and Wellington, fearful of
letting Soult strengthen himself on the Gave of
Oleron, returned on the 21st to Garris, having decided
to press his operations on that side in person
and leave to sir John Hope and admiral Penrose
the charge of effecting</p>


<h4>THE PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR.</h4>

<p>The heights of Anglet had been occupied since
the 15th by the guards and Germans, small parties
were cautiously pushed towards the river through
the pine-forest called the wood of Bayonne, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_537"></a>[537]</span>
fifth division, now commanded by general Colville,
occupied Bussussary and the bridge of Urdains.
On the 21st Colville relieved the sixth division in
the blockade of Mousseroles on the right of the Nive.
To replace these troops at Bussussary, Freyre’s
Spaniards passed the Bidassoa, but the Andalusians
and Del Parque’s troops and the heavy
British and Portuguese cavalry were still retained
within the frontiers of Spain. Sir John Hope had
therefore only two British and two Spanish divisions,
three independent brigades of Anglo-Portuguese<span class="sidenote">Original Morning States, MSS.</span>
infantry and Vandeleur’s brigade of cavalry,
furnishing altogether about twenty-eight thousand
men and officers with twenty pieces of artillery.
There were however two regiments which had been
sent to the rear sick and several others expected
from England destined to join him.</p>

<p>In the night of the 22d the first division, six
eighteen pounders, and the rocket battery, were
cautiously filed from the causeway near Anglet
towards the Adour, but the road was deep and
heavy and one of the guns falling into a ditch
delayed the march. Nevertheless at daybreak the
whole reached some sand-downs which extended<span class="sidenote7">Plan 7.</span>
behind the pine-forest to the river. The French
picquets were then driven into the entrenched camp
at Beyris, the pontoon train and the field-artillery
were brought down to the Adour opposite to the
village of Boucaut, and the eighteen-pounders were
placed in battery on the bank. The light troops
meanwhile closed to the edge of the marsh which
covered the right of the French camp, and Carlos
España’s division taking post on the heights of
Anglet, in concert with the independent brigades,
which were at Arcangues and the bridge of Urdains,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_538"></a>[538]</span>
attracted the enemy’s attention by false attacks
which were prolonged beyond the Nive by the fifth
division.</p>

<p>It was intended that the arrival of the gun-boats
and <span lang="fr">chasse-marées</span> at the mouth of the Adour
should have been simultaneous with that of the
troops, but the wind having continued contrary
none were to be seen, and sir John Hope whose
firmness no untoward event could ever shake resolved
to attempt the passage with the army alone.
The French flotilla opened its fire on his columns
about nine o’clock, his artillery and rockets retorted
upon the French gun-boats and the sloop of
war so fiercely, that three of the former were destroyed
and the sloop so hardly handled that about
one o’clock the whole took refuge higher up the
river. Meanwhile sixty men of the guards were
rowed in a pontoon across the mouth of the river in
the face of a French picquet, which, seemingly bewildered,
retired without firing. A raft was then
formed with the remainder of the pontoons and a
hawser being stretched across, six hundred of the
guards and the sixtieth regiment, with a part of the
rocket battery, the whole under colonel Stopford,
passed, yet slowly, and at slack water only, for the
tide run strongly and the waters were wide.</p>

<p>During this operation general Thouvenot deceived
by spies and prisoners thought that the light
division was with Hope as well as the first division,
and that fifteen thousand men were embarked at<span class="sidenote">Thouvenot’s Official Report</span>
St. Jean de Luz to land between Cape Breton and
the Adour. Wherefore fearing to endanger his
garrison by sending a strong force to any distance
down the river, when he heard Stopford’s detachment
was on the right bank, he detached only two<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_539"></a>[539]</span>
battalions under general Macomble to ascertain the
state of affairs, for the pine-forest and a great bending
of the river prevented him from obtaining any
view from Bayonne. Macomble made a show of
attacking Stopford, but the latter, flanked by the
field-artillery from the left bank, received him with
a discharge of rockets, projectiles which like the
elephants in ancient warfare often turn upon their
own side. This time however, amenable to their
directors they smote the French column and it fled,
amazed, and with a loss of thirty wounded. It is
nevertheless obvious that if Thouvenot had kept
strong guards, with a field-battery, on the right bank
of the Adour, sir John Hope could not have passed
over the troops in pontoons, nor could any vessels
have crossed the bar; no resource save that of disembarking
troops between the river and Cape Breton
would then have remained. This error was fatal to
the French. The British continued to pass all night,
and until twelve o’clock on the 24th, when the flotilla
was seen under a press of sail making with a
strong breeze for the mouth of the river.</p>

<p>To enter the Adour is from the flatness of the
coast never an easy task, it was now most difficult,
because the high winds of the preceding days
had raised a great sea and the enemy had removed
one of the guiding flag-staves by which the navigation
was ordinarily directed. In front of the flotilla
came the boats of the men-of-war, and ahead of all,
the naval captain, O’Reilly, run his craft, a chosen
Spanish vessel, into the midst of the breakers, which
rolling in a frightful manner over the bar dashed
her on to the beach. That brave officer stretched
senseless on the shore would have perished with his
crew but for the ready succour of the soldiers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_540"></a>[540]</span>
however a few only were drowned and the remainder
with an intrepid spirit launched their boat again
to aid the passage of the troops which was still
going on. O’Reilly was followed and successfully
by lieutenant Debenham in a six-oared cutter, but
the tide was falling, wherefore the remainder of the
boats, the impossibility of passing until high water
being evident drew off, and a pilot was landed to
direct the line of navigation by concerted signals.</p>

<p>When the water rose again the crews were promised
rewards in proportion to their successful
daring and the whole flotilla approached in close
order, but with it came black clouds and a
driving gale which covered the whole line of coast
with a rough tumbling sea, dashing and foaming
without an interval of dark water to mark the
entrance of the river. The men-of-war’s boats first
drew near this terrible line of surge and Mr. Bloye
of the Lyra, having the chief pilot with him, heroically
led into it, but in an instant his barge was
engulphed and he and all with him were drowned.
The Lyra’s boat thus swallowed up the following
vessels swerved in their course, and shooting up to
the right and left kept hovering undecided on the
edge of the tormented waters. Suddenly lieutenant
Cheyne of the Woodlark pulled ahead, and striking
the right line, with courage and fortune combined
safely passed the bar. The wind then lulled, the
waves as if conquered abated somewhat of their
rage, and the <span lang="fr">chasse-marées</span>, manned with Spanish
seamen but having an engineer officer with a party
of sappers in each who compelled them to follow
the men-of-war’s boats, came plunging one after
another through the huge breakers and reached the
point designed for the bridge. Thus was achieved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_541"></a>[541]</span>
this perilous and glorious exploit, but captain
Elliot of the Martial with his launch and crew and
three transports’ boats, perished close to the shore
in despite of the most violent efforts made by the
troops to save them; three other vessels cast on the
beach lost part of their crews; and one large <span lang="fr">chasse-marée</span>,
full of men, after passing the line of surf
safely was overtaken by a swift bellying wave
which breaking on her deck dashed her to pieces.</p>

<p>The whole of the first division and Bradford’s
Portuguese, in all eight thousand men, being now
on the right bank took post on the sand-hills for
the night. The next morning, sweeping in a half
circle round the citadel and its entrenchments,
they placed their left on the Adour above the fortress,
and their right on the same river below the place;
for the water here made such a bend in their
favour that their front was little more than two
miles wide, and for the most part covered by a
marshy ravine. This nice operation was effected
without opposition because the entrenched camps,
menaced by the troops on the other side of the
Adour, were so enormous that Thouvenot’s force
was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. Meanwhile
the bridge was constructed, about three miles
below Bayonne, at a place where the river was contracted
to eight hundred feet by strong retaining
walls, built with the view of sweeping away the
bar by increasing the force of the current. The
plan of the bridge and boom were the conception
of colonel Sturgeon and major Todd, but the
execution was confided entirely to the latter, who,
with a mind less brilliant than Sturgeon’s but more
indefatigable, very ably and usefully served his
country throughout this war.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_542"></a>[542]</span></p>

<p>Twenty-six of the <span lang="fr">chasse-marées</span> moored head
and stern at distances of forty feet, reckoning from
centre to centre, were bound together with ropes,
two thick cables were then carried loosely across
their decks, and the ends being cast over the walls
on each bank were strained and fastened in various
modes to the sands. They were sufficiently slack to
meet the spring-tides which rose fourteen feet, and
planks were laid upon them without any supporting
beams. The boom, moored with anchors above and
below, was a double line of masts connected with
chains and cables, so as to form a succession of
squares, in the design that if a vessel broke through
the outside, it should by the shock turn round in the
square and become entangled with the floating
wrecks of the line through which it had broken.
Gun-boats, with aiding batteries on the banks,
were then stationed to protect the boom, and to
keep off fire-vessels, many row-boats were furnished
with grappling irons. The whole was by the united
labour of seamen and soldiers finished on the 26th.
And contrary to the general opinion on such matters,
major Todd assured the Author of this History that
he found the soldiers, with minds quickened by the
wider range and variety of knowledge attendant on
their service, more ready of resource and their
efforts, combined by a more regular discipline, of
more avail, with less loss of time, than the irregular
activity of the seamen.</p>

<p>The agitation of the water in the river from the
force of the tides was generally so great that to
maintain a pontoon bridge on it was impossible.
A knowledge of this had rendered the French officers
too careless of watch and defence, and this year the
shifting sands had given the course of the Adour<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_543"></a>[543]</span>
such a slanting direction towards the west that it
run for some distance almost parallel to the shore;
the outer bank thus acting as a breakwater lessened
the agitation within and enabled the large two-masted
boats employed, to ride safely and support
the heaviest artillery and carriages. Nevertheless
this fortune, the errors of the enemy, the matchless
skill and daring of the British seamen, and the discipline
and intrepidity of the British soldiers, all
combined by the genius of Wellington, were necessary
to the success of this stupendous undertaking
which must always rank amongst the prodigies of
war.</p>

<p>When the bridge was finished sir John Hope
resolved to contract his line of investment round
the citadel. This was a serious affair. The position
of the French outside that fort was exceedingly
strong, for the flanks were protected by ravines the
sides of which were covered with fortified villas;
and in the centre a ridge, along which the great
roads from Bordeaux and Peyrehorade led into
Bayonne, was occupied by the village and church of
St. Etienne, both situated on rising points of ground
strongly entrenched and under the fire of the citadel
guns. The allies advanced in three converging columns
covered by skirmishers. Their wings easily
attained the edges of the ravines at either side, resting
their flanks on the Adour above and below the
town, at about nine hundred yards from the enemy’s
works. But a severe action took place in the centre.
The assailing body composed of Germans and a
brigade of guards was divided into three parts
which should have attacked simultaneously, the
guards on the left, the light battalions of Germans
on the right, and their heavy infantry in the centre.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_544"></a>[544]</span>
The flanks were retarded by some accident and the
centre first attacked the heights of St. Etienne. The
French guns immediately opened from the citadel
and the skirmishing fire became heavy, but the Germans
stormed church and village, forced the entrenched
line of houses, and took a gun, which however
they could not carry off under the close fire
from the citadel. The wings then gained their
positions and the action ceased for a time, but the
people of Bayonne were in such consternation that
Thouvenot to re-assure them sallied at the head
of the troops. He charged the Germans twice and
fought well but was wounded and finally lost his gun
and the position of St. Etienne. There is no return
of the allies’ loss, it could not have been less than
five hundred men and officers of which four hundred
were Germans, and the latter were dissatisfied
that their conduct was unnoticed in the despatch:
an omission somewhat remarkable because their
conduct was by sir John Hope always spoken of
with great commendation.</p>

<p>The new position thus gained was defended by
ravines on each flank, and the centre being close
to the enemy’s works on the ridge of St. Etienne
was entrenched. Preparations for besieging the
citadel were then commenced under the direction
of the German colonel Hartmann, a code of
signals was established, and infinite pains taken to
protect the bridge and to secure a unity of action
between the three investing bodies. The communications
however required complicated arrangements,
for the ground on the right bank of the river
being low was overflowed every tide, and would
have occasioned great difficulty but for the retaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_545"></a>[545]</span>
wall which being four feet thick was made use of
as a carriage road.</p>

<p>While these events were in progress at Bayonne
lord Wellington pushed his operations on the Gaves
with great vigour. On the 21st he returned as we
have seen to Garris, the pontoons had already
reached that place and on the 23d they were carried
beyond the Gave de Mauleon. During his
absence the sixth and light divisions had come up,
and thus six divisions of infantry and two brigades
of cavalry were concentrated beyond that river on
the Gave d’Oleron, between Sauveterre and Navarrens.
Beresford meanwhile held the line of the
Bidouze down to its confluence with the Adour,<span class="sidenote">French Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
and apparently to distract the enemy threw a battalion
over the latter river near Urt, and collected
boats as if to form a bridge there. In the evening
he recalled this detachment, yet continued the
appearance of preparations for a bridge until late in
the 23d, when he moved forward and drove Foy’s
posts from the works at Oeyergave and Hastingues,
on the lower parts of the Oleron Gave, into the
entrenchments of the bridge-head at Peyrehorade.
The allies lost fifty men, principally Portuguese, but
Soult’s right and centre were thus held in check,
for Beresford having the fourth and seventh divisions
and Vivian’s cavalry was strong enough for
Foy at Peyrehorade and Taupin at the Bastide of
Beam. The rest of the French army was distributed
at Orthes and Sauveterre, feeling towards
Navarrens, and on the 24th Wellington put his troops
in motion to pass the Gave d’Oleron.</p>

<p>During the previous days his movements and the
arrival of his reinforcements had again deceived the
French general, who seems to have known nothing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_546"></a>[546]</span>
of the presence of the light division, and imagined
the first division was at Came on the 22d as well as
the fourth and seventh divisions. However his
dispositions remained the same, he did not expect
to hold the Gave and looked to a final concentration
at Orthes.</p>

<p>On the 24th Morillo reinforced with a strong detachment
of cavalry moved to the Laussette, a small
river running in front of Navarrens, where rough
ground concealed his real force, while his scouters
beat back the French outposts, and a battalion
marching higher up menaced the fords of the Gave
at Doguen, with a view to draw the attention of the
garrison of Navarrens from the ford of Ville Nave.
This ford about three miles below Doguen was the
point where lord Wellington designed really to
pass, and a great concentric movement was now in
progress towards it. Le Cor’s Portuguese division
marched from Gestas, the light division from Aroue
crossing the Soissons at Nabas; the second division,
three batteries of artillery, the pontoons, and
four regiments of cavalry moved from other points.
Favoured by the hilly nature of the country the
columns were well concealed from the enemy, and
at the same time the sixth division advanced towards
the fords of Montfort about three miles below that
of Ville Nave. A battalion of the second division
was sent to menace the ford of Barraute below
Monfort, while the third division, reinforced with a
brigade of hussars and the batteries of the second
division, marched by Osserain and Arriveriette
against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, with orders
to make a feint of forcing a passage there. The
bulk of the light cavalry remained in reserve under
Cotton, but Vivian’s hussars coming up from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_547"></a>[547]</span>
Beresford’s right, threatened all the fords between
Picton’s left and the Bastide of Beam; and below
this Bastide some detachments were directed upon
the fords of Sindos Castagnhede and Hauterive.
During this movement Beresford keeping Foy in
check at Peyrehorade with the seventh division,
sent the fourth towards Sordes and Leren above the
confluence of the Gaves to seek a fit place to throw
a bridge. Thus the whole of the French front was
menaced on a line of twenty-five miles, but the great
force was above Sauveterre.</p>

<p>The first operations were not happily executed.
The columns directed on the side of Sindos missed
the fords. Picton opened a cannonade against
the bridge-head of Sauveterre and made four
companies of Keane’s brigade and some cavalry
pass the Gave in the vicinity of the bridge; they
were immediately assailed by a French regiment
and driven across the river again with a loss of
ninety men and officers, of whom some were drowned
and thirty were made prisoners, whereupon the
cavalry returned to the left bank and the cannonade
ceased. Nevertheless the diversion was complete
and the general operations were successful. Soult
on the first alarm drew Harispe from Sauveterre and
placed him on the road to Orthes at Monstrueig,
where a range of hills running parallel to the Gave
of Oleron separates it from that of Pau; thus only
a division of infantry and Berton’s cavalry remained
under Villatte at Sauveterre, and that general, notwithstanding
his success against the four companies,
alarmed by the vigour of Picton’s demonstrations,
abandoned his works on the left bank and
destroyed the bridge. Meanwhile the sixth division
passed without opposition at Montfort above Sauveterre,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_548"></a>[548]</span>
and at the same time the great body of the
other troops coming down upon the ford of Villenave
met only with a small cavalry picquet and
crossed with no more loss than two men drowned:
a happy circumstance for the waters were deep and
rapid, the cold intense, and the ford so narrow that
the passage was not completed before dark. To
have forced it in face of an enemy would have been
exceedingly difficult and dangerous, and it is remarkable
that Soult who was with Harispe, only
five miles from Montfort and about seven from Villenave,
should not have sent that general down to
oppose the passage. The heads of the allies’ columns
immediately pushed forward to the range of
hills before spoken of, the right being established
near Loubeing, the left towards Sauveterre, from
whence Villatte and Berton had been withdrawn
by Clauzel, who commanding at this part seems to
have kept a bad watch when Clinton passed at
Montfort.</p>

<p>The French divisions now took a position to give
time for Taupin to retire from the lower parts of
the Gave of Oleron, towards the bridge of Berenx
on the Gave of Pau, for both he and Foy had received
orders to march upon Orthes and break down
all the bridges as they passed. When the night
fell Soult sent Harispe’s division also over the bridge
of Orthes and D’Erlon was already established in
that town, but general Clauzel remained until the
morning at Orion to cover the movement. Meanwhile
Pierre Soult, posted beyond Navarrens with
his cavalry and two battalions of infantry to watch
the road to Pau, was pressed by Morillo, and being
cut off from the army by the passage of the allies
at Villenave was forced to retreat by Monein.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_549"></a>[549]</span></p>

<p>On the 25th at daylight, lord Wellington with
some cavalry and guns pushed Clauzel’s rear-guard
from Magret into the suburb of Orthes, which
covered the bridge of that place on the left bank.
He also cannonaded the French troops beyond the
river, and the Portuguese of the light division, skirmishing
with the French in the houses to prevent
the destruction of the bridge, lost twenty-five men.</p>

<p>The second sixth and light divisions, Hamilton’s
Portuguese, five regiments of cavalry, and three
batteries were now massed in front of Orthes; the
third division and a brigade of cavalry was in front
of the broken bridge of Berenx about five miles
lower down the Gave; the fourth and seventh
divisions with Vivian’s cavalry were in front of
Peyrehorade, from whence Foy retired by the great
Bayonne road to Orthes. Affairs being in this state
Morillo was directed to invest Navarrens. And as
Mina’s battalions were no sure guarantee against
the combined efforts of the garrison of St. Jean
Pied de Port and the warlike inhabitants of Baygorry,
five British regiments, which had gone to the
rear for clothing and were now coming up separately,
were ordered to halt at St. Palais in observation,
relieving each other in succession as they arrived at
that place.</p>

<p>On the morning of the 26th, Beresford, finding
that Foy had abandoned the French works at Peyrehorade,
passed the Gave, partly by a pontoon bridge
partly by a ford, where the current <ins class="corr" id="tn-549" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'run so strong'">
ran so strong</ins> that a column of the seventh division was like to
have been carried away bodily. He had previously
detached the eighteenth hussars to find another ford
higher up, and this being effected under the guidance
of a miller, the hussars gained the high road about<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_550"></a>[550]</span>
half-way between Peyrehorade and Orthes, and
drove some French cavalry through Puyoo and
Ramous. The French rallying upon their reserves<span class="sidenote">Memoir by colonel Hughes, eighteenth hussars, MSS.</span>
turned and beat back the foremost of the pursuers,
but they would not await the shock of the main
body now reinforced by Vivian’s brigade and commanded
by Beresford in person. In this affair major
Sewell, an officer of the staff, who had frequently
distinguished himself by his personal prowess, happening
to be without a sword, pulled a large stake
from a hedge and with that weapon overthrew two
hussars in succession, and only relinquished the
combat when a third had cut his club in twain.</p>

<p>Beresford now threw out a detachment to Habas
on his left to intercept the enemy’s communication
with Dax, and lord Wellington immediately ordered
lord Edward Somerset’s cavalry and the third division
to cross the Gave by fords below the broken
bridge of Berenx. Then directing Beresford to
take a position for the night on some heights near
the village of Baïghts he proceeded to throw a pontoon
bridge at Berenx, and thus after a circuitous
march of more than fifty miles with his right wing
he again united it with his centre and secured a
direct communication with Hope.</p>

<p>During the 25th and 26th he had carefully
examined Soult’s position. The bridge of Orthes
could not be easily forced. That ancient and beautiful
structure consisted of several irregular arches,
with a high tower in the centre the gateway of
which was built up by the French, the principal
arch in front of the tower was mined, and the
houses on both sides contributed to the defence.
The river above and below was deep and full of tall
pointed rocks, but above the town the water spreading<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_551"></a>[551]</span>
wide with flat banks presented the means of
crossing. Lord Wellington’s first design was to pass
there with Hill’s troops and the light division, but
when he heard that Beresford had crossed the Gave
he suddenly changed his design, and as we have seen
passed the third division over and threw his bridge
at Berenx. This operation was covered by Beresford,
while Soult’s attention was diverted by the continual
skirmish at the suburbs of Orthes, by the
appearance of Hill’s columns above, and by Wellington’s
taking cognizance of the position near the
bridge so openly as to draw a cannonade.</p>

<p>The English general did not expect Soult would,
when he found Beresford and Picton were over the
Gave, await a battle, and his emissaries reported
that the French army was already in retreat, a
circumstance to be borne in mind because the next
day’s operation required success to justify it. Hope’s
happy passage of the Adour being now known that
officer was instructed to establish a line of communication
to the port of Lannes, where a permanent
bridge was to be formed with boats brought
up from Urt. A direct line of intercourse was
thus secured with the army at Bayonne. But lord
Wellington felt that he was pushing his operations
beyond his strength if Suchet should send reinforcements
to Soult; wherefore he called up Freyre’s
Spaniards, ordering that general to cross the Adour
below Bayonne, with two of his divisions and a
brigade of Portuguese nine-pounders, and join him
by the port of Lannes. O’Donnel’s Andalusians
and the prince of Anglona’s troops were also
directed to be in readiness to enter France.</p>

<p>These orders were given with the greatest reluctance.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_552"></a>[552]</span></p>

<p>The feeble resistance made by the French in the
difficult country already passed, left him without
much uneasiness as to the power of Soult’s army in
the field, but his disquietude was extreme about
the danger of an insurgent warfare. “Maintain
the strictest discipline, <em>without that we are lost</em>,”
was his expression to general Freyre, and he issued
a proclamation authorizing the people of the districts
he had overrun to arm themselves for the
preservation of order under the direction of their
mayors. He invited them to arrest all straggling
soldiers and followers of the army, and all plunderers
and evil-doers and convey them to head-quarters
with proof of their crimes, promising to punish the
culpable and to pay for all damages. At the same
time he confirmed all the local authorities who
chose to retain their offices, on the sole condition
of having no political or military intercourse with
the countries still possessed by the French army.
Nor was his proclamation a dead letter, for in the
night of the 25th the inhabitants of a village,
situated near the road leading from Sauveterre to
Orthes, shot one English soldier dead and wounded
a second who had come with others to plunder.
Lord Wellington caused the wounded man to be
hung as an example, and he also forced an English
colonel to quit the army for suffering his soldiers
to destroy the municipal archives of a small town.</p>

<p>Soult had no thought of retreating. His previous
retrograde movements had been effected with order,
his army was concentrated with its front to the Gave,
and every bridge, except the noble structure at
Orthes the ancient masonry of which resisted his
mines, had been destroyed. One regiment of<span class="sidenote">Official Report, MSS.</span>
cavalry was detached on the right to watch the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_553"></a>[553]</span>
fords as far as Peyrehorade, three others with two
battalions of infantry under Pierre Soult watched
those between Orthes and Pau, and a body of horsemen<span class="sidenote">Memoir by general Berton, MSS.</span>
and <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> covered the latter town from
Morillo’s incursions. Two regiments of cavalry remained
with the army, and the French general’s
intention was to fall upon the head of the first
column which should cross the Gave. But the negligence<span class="sidenote"><span lang="fr">Canevas de faits par general Reille et colonel de la Chasse</span>, MS.</span>
of the officer stationed at Puyoo, who had
suffered Vivian’s hussars, as we have seen, to pass on
the 26th without opposition and without making
any report of the event, enabled Beresford to make
his movement in safety when otherwise he would
have been assailed by at least two-thirds of the
French army. It was not until three o’clock in the
evening that Soult received intelligence of his march,
and his columns were then close to Baïghts on the
right flank of the French army, his scouters were
on the Dax road in its rear, and at the same time
the sixth and light divisions were seen descending
by different roads from the heights beyond the river
pointing towards Berenx.</p>

<p>In this crisis the French marshal hesitated whether
to fall upon Beresford and Picton while the latter
was still passing the river, or take a defensive position,
but finally judging that he had not time to form
his columns of attack he decided upon the latter.
Wherefore under cover of a skirmish, sustained<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
near Baïghts by a battalion of infantry which
coming from the bridge of Berenx was joined by
the light cavalry from Puyoo, he hastily threw D’Erlon’s
and Reille’s divisions on a new line across the
road from Peyrehorade. The right extended to the
heights of San Boës along which run the road
from Orthes to Dax, and this line was prolonged by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_554"></a>[554]</span>
Clauzel’s troops to Castetarbe a village close to the
Gave. Having thus opposed a temporary front to
Beresford he made his dispositions to receive battle
the next morning, bringing Villatte’s infantry and
Pierre Soult’s cavalry from the other side of Orthes
through that town, and it was this movement that
led lord Wellington’s emissaries to report that the
army was retiring.</p>

<p>Soult’s new line was on a ridge of hills partly
wooded partly naked.</p>

<p>In the centre was an open rounded hill from
whence long narrow tongues were pushed out, on
the French left towards the high road of Peyrehorade,
on their right by St. Boës towards the high
church of Baïghts, the whole presenting a concave
to the allies.</p>

<p>The front was generally covered by a deep and
marshy ravine broken by two short tongues of land
which jutted out from the principal hill.</p>

<p>The road from Orthes to Dax passed behind the
front to the village of St. Boës and thence along
the ridge forming the right flank.</p>

<p>Behind the centre a succession of undulating
bare heathy hills trended for several miles to the rear,
but behind the right the country was low and deep.</p>

<p>The town of Orthes, receding from the river up
the slope of a steep hill and terminating with an
ancient tower, was behind the left wing.</p>

<p>General Reille, having Taupin’s, Roguet’s, and
Paris’s divisions under him, commanded on the right,
and occupied all the ground from the village of St.
Boës to the centre of the position.</p>

<p>Count D’Erlon, commanding Foy’s and D’Armagnac’s
divisions, was on the left of Reille. He placed
the first along a ridge extending towards the road of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_555"></a>[555]</span>
Peyrehorade, the second in reserve. In rear of
this last Villatte’s division and the cavalry were<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
posted above the village of Rontun, that is to say,
on the open hills behind the main position. In this
situation with the right overlooking the low country
beyond St. Boës, and the left extended towards
Orthes this division furnished a reserve to both
D’Erlon and Reille.</p>

<p>Harispe, whose troops as well as Villatte’s were
under Clauzel, occupied Orthes and the bridge, having
a regiment near the ford of Souars above the town.
Thus the French army extended from St. Boës to
Orthes, but the great mass was disposed towards the
centre. Twelve guns were attached to general Harispe’s
troops, twelve were upon the round hill in the
centre, sweeping in their range the ground beyond
St. Boës, and sixteen were in reserve on the Dax road.</p>

<p>The 27th at day-break the sixth and light divisions,
having passed the Gave near Berenx by the
pontoon bridge thrown in the night, wound up a
narrow way between high rocks to the great road
of Peyrehorade. The third division and lord Edward
Somerset’s cavalry were already established there
in columns of march with skirmishers pushed forwards
to the edge of the wooded height occupied by
D’Erlon’s left, and Beresford with the fourth and seventh
divisions and Vivian’s cavalry had meanwhile
gained the ridge of St. Boës and approached the
Dax road beyond. Hill remained with the second
British, and Le Cor’s Portuguese divisions
menacing the bridge of Orthes and the ford of
Souars. Between Beresford and Picton, a distance
of a mile and a half, there were no troops; but
about half-way, exactly in front of the French
centre, was a Roman camp crowning an isolated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_556"></a>[556]</span>
peering hill of singular appearance and nearly as
lofty as the centre of Soult’s position.</p>

<p>On this camp, now covered with vineyards, but
then open and grassy with a few trees, lord Wellington,
after viewing the country on Beresford’s left,
stopped for an hour or more to examine the enemy’s
disposition for battle. During this time the two
divisions were coming up from the river, but so
hemmed in by rocks that only a few men could
march abreast, and their point of union with the
third division was little more than cannon-shot from
the enemy’s position. The moment was critical,
Picton did not conceal his disquietude, but Wellington
undisturbed as the deep sea continued his
observations without seeming to notice the dangerous
position of his troops. When they had reached
the main road he reinforced Picton with the sixth,
and drew the light division by cross roads behind
the Roman camp, thus connecting his wings and
forming a central reserve. From this point bye-ways
led, on the left to the high church of Baïghts
and the Dax road, on the right to the Peyrehorade
road; and two others led straight across the marsh
to the French position.</p>

<p>This marsh, the open hill about which Soult’s
guns and reserves were principally gathered, the form
and nature of the ridges on the flanks, all combined
to forbid an attack in front, and the flanks were
scarcely more promising. The extremity of the
French left sunk indeed to a gentle undulation in
crossing the Peyrehorade road, yet it would have
been useless to push troops on that line towards
Orthes, between D’Erlon and Caste Tarbe, for the
town was strongly occupied by Harispe and was
there covered by an ancient wall and the bed of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_557"></a>[557]</span>
torrent. It was equally difficult to turn the St.
Boës flank because of the low marshy country into
which the troops must have descended beyond the
Dax road; and the brows of the hills trending
backwards from the centre of the French position
would have enabled Soult to oppose a new and
formidable front at right angles to his actual position.
The whole of the allied army must therefore
have made a circuitous flank movement within
gun-shot and through a most difficult country, or
Beresford’s left must have been dangerously extended
and the whole line weakened. Nor could
the movement be hidden, because the hills although
only moderately high were abrupt on that side, affording
a full view of the low country, and Soult’s
cavalry detachments were in observation on every
brow.</p>

<p>It only remained to assail the French flanks along
the ridges, making the principal efforts on the side
of St. Boës, with intent if successful to overlap
the French right beyond, and seize the road of
St. Sever while Hill passed the Gave at Souars
and cut off the road to Pau, thus enclosing the
beaten army in Orthes. This was however no
slight affair. On Picton’s side it was easy to obtain
a footing on the flank ridge near the high road, but
beyond that the ground rose rapidly and the French
were gathered thickly with a narrow front and
plenty of guns. On Beresford’s side they could
only be assailed along the summit of the St. Boës
ridge, advancing from the high church of Baïghts
and the Dax road. But the village of St. Boës was
strongly occupied, the ground immediately behind it
was strangled to a narrow pass by the ravine, and the
French reserve of sixteen guns, placed on the Dax<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_558"></a>[558]</span>
road, behind the hill in the centre of Soult’s line,
and well covered from counter-fire, was in readiness
to crush the head of any column which should
emerge from the gorge of St. Boës.</p>


<h4>BATTLE OF ORTHES.</h4>

<p>During the whole morning a slight skirmish with
now and then a cannon-shot had been going on
with the third division on the right, and the French
cavalry at times pushed parties forward on each
flank, but at nine o’clock Wellington commenced
the real attack. The third and sixth divisions won
without difficulty the lower part of the ridges opposed
to them, and endeavoured to extend their left
along the French front with a sharp fire of musquetry;
but the main battle was on the other flank.
There general Cole, keeping Anson’s brigade of
the fourth division in reserve, assailed St. Boës
with Ross’s British brigade and Vasconcellos’ Portuguese;
his object was to get on to the open
ground beyond it, but fierce and slaughtering was
the struggle. Five times breaking through the
scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the
wider space beyond; yet ever as the troops issued
forth the French guns from the open hill smote
them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax
road swept through them with grape from flank to
flank. And then Taupin’s supporting masses rushed
forwards with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks
with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on
either hand, forced the shattered columns back into
the village. It was in vain that with desperate
valour the allies time after time broke through the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_559"></a>[559]</span>
narrow way and struggled to spread a front beyond,
Ross fell dangerously wounded, and Taupin, whose troops
were clustered thickly and well supported
defied their utmost efforts. Nor was Soult less happy
on the other side. The nature of the ground
would not permit the third and sixth divisions to
engage many men at once, so that no progress was
made; and one small detachment which Picton extended
to his left, having made an attempt to gain
the smaller tongue jutting out from the central hill,
was suddenly charged, as it neared the summit, by
Foy, and driven down again in confusion, losing several
prisoners.</p>

<p>When the combat had thus continued with unabated
fury on the side of St. Boës for about three
hours, lord Wellington sent a caçadore regiment of
the light division from the Roman camp to protect
the right flank of Ross’s brigade against the French
skirmishers; but this was of no avail, for Vasconcellos’
Portuguese, unable to sustain the violence
of the enemy any longer, gave way in disorder,
and the French pouring on, the British troops retreated
through St. Boës with difficulty. As this
happened at the moment when the detachment on
Picton’s left was repulsed, victory seemed to declare
for the French, and Soult, conspicuous on his commanding
open hill, the knot of all his combinations,
seeing his enemies thus broken and thrown backwards
on each side put all his reserves in movement
to complete the success. It is said that in the exultation
of the moment he smote his thigh exclaiming,
“<em>At last I have him</em>.” Whether this be so or
not it was no vain-glorious speech, for the moment
was most dangerous. There was however a small
black cloud rising just beneath him, unheeded at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_560"></a>[560]</span>
first amidst the thundering din and tumult that
now shook the field of battle, but which soon burst
with irresistible violence. Wellington seeing that
St. Boës was inexpugnable had suddenly changed
his plan of battle. Supporting Ross with Anson’s
brigade which had not hitherto been engaged, he
backed both with the seventh division and Vivian’s
cavalry now forming one heavy body towards the
Dax road. Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions
to be thrown in mass upon Foy’s left flank,
and at the same time sent the fifty-second regiment
down from the Roman camp with instructions
to cross the marsh in front, to mount the French
ridge beyond, and to assail the flank and rear of the
troops engaged with the fourth division at St. Boës.</p>

<p>Colonel Colborne, so often distinguished in this war,
immediately led the fifty-second down and crossed
the marsh under fire, the men sinking at every step
above the knees, in some places to the middle, but
still pressing forwards with that stern resolution and
order to be expected from the veterans of the light
division, soldiers who had never yet met their match
in the field. They soon obtained footing on firm
land and ascended the heights in line at the moment
that Taupin was pushing vigorously through
St. Boës, Foy and D’Armagnac, hitherto more than
masters of their positions, being at the same time
seriously assailed on the other flank by the third and
sixth divisions. With a mighty shout and a rolling
fire the fifty-second soldiers dashed forwards between
Foy and Taupin, beating down a French battalion in
their course and throwing everything before them
into disorder. General Bechaud was killed in Taupin’s
division, Foy was dangerously wounded, and
his troops, discouraged by his fall and by this sudden<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_561"></a>[561]</span>
burst from a quarter where no enemy was expected,
for the march of the fifty-second had been
hardly perceived save by the skirmishers, got into
confusion, and the disorder spreading to Reille’s wing<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.</span>
he also was forced to fall back and take a new position
to restore his line of battle. The narrow pass behind
St. Boës was thus opened, and Wellington seizing
the critical moment thrust the fourth and seventh
divisions, Vivian’s cavalry, and two batteries of artillery
through, and spread a front beyond.</p>

<p>The victory was thus secured. For the third and
sixth divisions had now won D’Armagnac’s position
and established a battery of guns on a knoll, from
whence their shot ploughed through the French
masses from one flank to another. Suddenly a
squadron of French chasseurs came at a hard gallop
down the main road of Orthes to charge these guns,
and sweeping to their right they rode over some of
the sixth division which had advanced too far; but
pushing this charge too madly got into a hollow
lane and were nearly all destroyed. The third and
seventh divisions then continued to advance and the
wings of the army were united. The French general
rallied all his forces on the open hills beyond the
Dax road, and with Taupin’s, Roguet’s, Paris’, and
D’Armagnac’s divisions made strong battle to cover
the reformation of Foy’s disordered troops, but
his foes were not all in front. This part of the
battle was fought with only two-thirds of the
allied army. Hill who had remained with twelve
thousand combatants, cavalry and infantry, before
the bridge of Orthes, received orders, when Wellington
changed his plan of attack, to force the passage
of the Gave, partly in the view of preventing Harispe
from falling upon the flank of the sixth division,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_562"></a>[562]</span>
partly in the hope of a successful issue to the attempt:
and so it happened. Hill though unable to
force the bridge, forded the river above at Souars,
and driving back the troops posted there seized the
heights above, cut off the French from the road to
Pau, and turned the town of Orthes. He thus
menaced Soult’s only line of retreat by Salespice, on
the road to St. Sever, at the very moment when the
fifty-second having opened the defile of St. Boës
the junction of the allies’ wings was effected on the
French position.</p>

<p>Clauzel immediately ordered Harispe to abandon
Orthes and close towards Villatte on the heights
above Rontun, leaving however some conscript battalions
on a rising point beyond the road of St. Sever
called the “<em>Motte de Turenne</em>.” Meanwhile in person
he endeavoured to keep general Hill in check
by the menacing action of two cavalry regiments
and a brigade of infantry; but Soult arrived at the
moment and seeing that the loss of Souars had rendered
his whole position untenable, gave orders for
a general retreat.</p>

<p>This was a perilous matter. The heathy hills
upon which he was now fighting, although for a
short distance they furnished a succession of parallel
positions favourable enough for defence, soon resolved
themselves into a low ridge running to the
rear on a line parallel with the road to St. Sever;
and on the opposite side of that road about cannon-shot
distance was a corresponding ridge along which
general Hill, judging by the firing how matters went,
was now rapidly advancing. Five miles distant was
the <em>Luy de Bearn</em>, and four miles beyond that the
<em>Luy de France</em>, two rivers deep and with difficult
banks. Behind these the Lutz, the Gabas, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_563"></a>[563]</span>
Adour, crossed the line, and though once beyond
the wooden bridge of Sault de Navailles on the <em>Luy
de Bearn</em>, these streams would necessarily cover the
retreat, to carry off by one road and one bridge a
defeated army still closely engaged in front seemed
impossible. Nevertheless Soult did so. For Paris
sustained the fight on his right until Foy and Taupin’s
troops rallied, and when the impetuous assault of the
fifty-second and the rush of the fourth and seventh
divisions drove Paris back, D’Armagnac interposed
to cover him until the union of the allies’ wings was
completed, then both retired, being covered in turn
by Villatte. In this manner the French yielded,
step by step and without confusion, the allies advancing
with an incessant deafening musketry and
cannonade, yet losing many men especially on the
right where the third division were very strongly
opposed. However as the danger of being cut off
at Salespice by Hill became more imminent the
retrograde movements were more hurried and confused;
Hill seeing this, quickened his pace until
at last both sides began to run violently, and so many
men broke from the French ranks making across the
fields towards the fords, and such a rush was necessarily
made by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de
Navailles, that the whole country was covered with
scattered bands. Sir Stapleton Cotton then breaking
with lord Edward Somerset’s hussars through a
small covering body opposed to him by Harispe
sabred two or three hundred men, and the seventh
hussars cut off about two thousand who threw down
their arms in an enclosed field; yet some confusion
or mismanagement occurring the greatest part recovering
their weapons escaped, and the pursuit
ceased at the Luy of Bearn.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_564"></a>[564]</span></p>

<p>The French army appeared to be entirely dispersed,
but it was more disordered in appearance
than reality, for Soult passed the Luy of Bearn and
destroyed the bridge with the loss of only six guns
and less than four thousand men killed wounded
and prisoners. Many thousands of conscripts however
threw away their arms, and we shall find one
month afterwards the stragglers still amounting to
three thousand. Nor would the passage of the river
have been effected so happily if lord Wellington had
not been struck by a musket-ball just above the
thigh, which caused him to ride with difficulty,
whereby the vigour and unity of the pursuit was
necessarily abated. The loss of the allies was two
thousand three hundred, of which fifty with three
officers were taken, but among the wounded were
lord Wellington, general Walker, general Ross, and
the duke of Richmond, then lord March. He had
served on lord Wellington’s personal staff during the
whole war without a hurt, but being made a captain
in the fifty-second, like a good soldier joined his regiment
the night before the battle. He was shot
through the chest a few hours afterwards, thus learning
by experience, the difference between the labours
and dangers of staff and regimental officers, which
are generally in the inverse ratio to their promotions.</p>

<p>General Berton, stationed between Pau and Orthes<span class="sidenote">Memoir by general Berton, MSS.</span>
during the battle, had been cut off by Hill’s
movement, yet skirting that general’s march he retreated
by Mant and Samadet with his cavalry,
picking up two battalions of conscripts on the road.
Meanwhile Soult having no position to rally upon,
continued his retreat in the night to St. Sever, breaking
down all the bridges behind him. Lord Wellington
pursued at daylight in three columns, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_565"></a>[565]</span>
right by Lacadée and St. Medard to Samadet, the
centre by the main road, the left by St. Cricq. At
St. Sever he hoped to find the enemy still in confusion,
but he was too late; the French were across
the river, the bridge was broken, and the army halted.
The result of the battle was however soon made
known far and wide, and Darricau who with a few
hundred soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent
levy at Dax, the works of which were incomplete
and still unarmed, immediately destroyed part
of the stores, the rest had been removed to Mont
Marsan, and retreated through the Landes to Langon
on the Garonne.</p>

<p>From St. Sever which offered no position Soult
turned short to the right and moved upon Barcelona
higher up the Adour; but he left D’Erlon with
two divisions of infantry some cavalry and four guns
at Caceres on the right bank, and sent Clauzel to
occupy Aire on the other side of the river. He thus
abandoned his magazines at Mont Marsan and left
open the direct road to Bordeaux, but holding
Caceres with his right he commanded another road
by Rocquefort to that city, while his left being at
Aire protected the magazines and artillery parc at
that place and covered the road to Pau. Meanwhile
the main body at Barcelona equally supported
Clauzel and D’Erlon, and covered the great roads
leading to Agen and Toulouse on the Garonne, and
to the mountains by Tarbes.</p>

<p>In this situation it was difficult to judge what
line of operations he meant to adopt. Wellington
however passed the Adour about one o’clock, partly
by the repaired bridge of St. Sever partly by a deep
ford below, and immediately detached Beresford
with the light division and Vivian’s cavalry to seize<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_566"></a>[566]</span>
the magazines at Mont Marsan; at the same time
he pushed the head of a column towards Caceres
where a cannonade and charge of cavalry had place,
and a few men and officers were hurt on both
sides. The next day Hill’s corps marching from
Samadet reached the Adour between St. Sever
and Aire, and D’Erlon was again assailed on the
right bank and driven back skirmishing to Barcelona.
This event proved that Soult had abandoned
Bordeaux, but the English general could not push
the pursuit more vigorously, because every bridge
was broken and a violent storm on the evening of
the 1st had filled the smaller rivers and torrents,
carried away the pontoon bridges, and cut off all
communication between the troops and the supplies.</p>

<p>The bulk of the army was now necessarily halted<span class="sidenote7">March.</span>
on the right bank of the Adour until the bridges
could be repaired, but Hill who was on the left bank
marched to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in
two columns from St. Savin and St. Gillies on the
2d, he reached his destination about three o’clock
with two divisions of infantry a brigade of cavalry
and a battery of horse-artillery; he expected no
serious opposition, but general Clauzel had arrived
a few hours before and was in order of battle covering
the town with Villatte’s and Harispe’s divisions
and some guns. The French occupied a steep ridge
in front of Aire, high and wooded on the right
where it overlooked the river, but merging on the
left into a wide table-land over which the great road
led to Pau. The position was strong for battle yet
it could be readily outflanked on the left by the
table-land, and was an uneasy one for retreat on the
right where the ridge was narrow, the ravine behind
steep and rugged with a mill-stream at the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_567"></a>[567]</span>
bottom between it and the town. A branch of the
Adour also flowing behind Aire cut it off from Barcelona,
while behind the left wing was the greater
Lees a river with steep banks and only one bridge.</p>


<h4>COMBAT OF AIRE.</h4>

<p>General Hill arriving about two o’clock attacked
without hesitation. General Stewart with
two British brigades fell on the French right, a
Portuguese brigade assailed their centre, and the
other brigades followed in columns of march. The
action was however very sudden, the Portuguese
were pushed forward in a slovenly manner by
general Da Costa, a man of no ability, and the
French under Harispe met them on the flat summit
of the height with so rough a charge that they gave
way in flight. The rear of the allies’ column being
still in march the battle was like to be lost, but
general Stewart having by this time won the
heights on the French right, where Villatte, fearing
to be enclosed made but a feeble resistance, immediately
detached general Barnes with the fiftieth and
ninety-second regiments to the aid of the Portuguese.
The vehement charge of these troops turned the
stream of battle, the French were broken in turn and
thrown back on their reserves, yet they rallied and
renewed the action with great courage, fighting
obstinately until General Byng’s British brigade
came up, when Harispe was driven towards the
river Lees, and Villate quite through the town of
Aire into the space between the two branches of
the Adour behind.</p>

<p>General Reille who was at Barcelona when the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_568"></a>[568]</span>
action began, brought up Roguet’s division to support
Villatte, the combat was thus continued until
night at that point, meanwhile Harispe crossed
the Lees and broke the bridge, but the French lost
many men. Two generals, Dauture and Gasquet,
were wounded, a colonel of engineers was killed, a
hundred prisoners were taken, many of Harispe’s
conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their
homes, and the magazines fell into the conqueror’s
hands. The loss of the British troops was one hundred
and fifty, general Barnes was wounded and
colonel Hood killed. The loss of the Portuguese was
never officially stated, yet it could not have been
less than that of the British, and the vigour of the
action proved that the French courage was very
little abated by the battle of Orthes. Soult immediately
retreated up the Adour by both banks towards
Maubourget and Marciac, and he was not
followed for new combinations were now opened
to the generals on both sides.</p>


<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4>

<p>1º. On the 14th of February the passage of the
Gaves was commenced, by Hill’s attack on Harispe
at Hellette. On the 2d of March the first series of
operations was terminated by the combat at Aire.
In these sixteen days lord Wellington traversed
with his right wing eighty miles, passed five large
and several small rivers, forced the enemy to abandon
two fortified bridge-heads and many minor
works, gained one great battle and two combats,
captured six guns and about a thousand prisoners,
seized the magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_569"></a>[569]</span>
Aire, forced Soult to abandon Bayonne and cut him
off from Bordeaux. And in this time he also threw
his stupendous bridge below Bayonne and closely
invested that fortress after a sharp and bloody
action. Success in war like charity in religion
covers a multitude of sins; but success often belongs
to fortune as much as skill, and the combinations
of Wellington, profound and sagacious, might
in this manner be confounded with the lucky operations
of the allies on the other side of France, where
the presumption and the vacillation of ignorance
alternately predominated.</p>

<p>2º. Soult attributed the loss of his positions to the
superior forces of the allies. Is this well-founded?
The French general’s numbers cannot be determined
exactly, but after all his losses in December, after
the detachments made by the emperor’s order in
January, and after completing the garrison of
Bayonne to fourteen thousand men, he informed the<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
minister of war that thirty thousand infantry, three
thousand cavalry and forty pieces of artillery were
in line. This did not include the conscripts of the
new levy, all youths indeed and hastily sent to the
army by battalions as they could be armed, but brave
and about eight thousand of them might have joined
before the battle of Orthes. Wherefore deducting
the detachments of cavalry and infantry under
Berton on the side of Pau, and under Daricau on
the side of Dax, it may be said that forty thousand
combatants of all arms were engaged in that action.
Thirty-five thousand were very excellent soldiers, for
the conscripts of the old levy who joined before the
battle of the Nivelle were stout men; their vigorous
fighting at Garris and Aire proved it, for of them
was Harispe’s division composed.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_570"></a>[570]</span></p>

<p>Now lord Wellington commenced his operations
with the second third fourth and seventh British
divisions, the independent Portuguese division under
Le Cor, Morillo’s Spaniards, forty-eight pieces of
artillery, and only four brigades of light cavalry,
for Vandaleur’s brigade remained with Hope and all
the heavy cavalry and the Portuguese were left in
Spain. Following the morning states of the army,
this would furnish, exclusive of Morillo’s Spaniards,
something more than forty thousand fighting men
and officers of all arms, of which four thousand were
horsemen. But five regiments of infantry, and
amongst them two of the strongest British regiments
of the light division, were absent to receive their
clothing; deduct these and we have about thirty-seven
thousand Anglo-Portuguese combatants. It
is true that Mina’s battalions and Morillo’s aided in
the commencement of the operations, but the first
immediately invested St. Jean Pied de Port and the
latter invested Navarrens. Lord Wellington was
therefore in the battle superior by a thousand horsemen
and eight guns, but Soult outnumbered him in
infantry by four or five thousand, conscripts it is
true, yet useful. Why then was the passage of the
Gaves so feebly disputed? Because the French
general remained entirely on the defensive in positions
too extended for his numbers.</p>

<p>3º. <em>Offensive operations must be the basis of a good
defensive system.</em> Let Soult’s operations be tried by
this rule. On the 12th he knew that the allies were
in motion for some great operation and he judged
rightly that it was to drive him from the Gaves.
From the 14th to the 18th his left was continually
assailed by very superior numbers, but during part
of that time Beresford could only oppose to his right<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_571"></a>[571]</span>
and centre, the fourth and a portion of the seventh
divisions with some cavalry; and those not in a
body and at once but parcelled and extended, for
it was not until the 16th that the fourth seventh
and light divisions were so closed towards the Bidouze
as to act in one mass. On the 15th lord Wellington
admitted that his troops were too extended,
Villatte’s, Taupin’s, and Foy’s divisions, were never
menaced until the 18th, and there was nothing to
prevent D’Erlon’s divisions which only crossed the
Adour on the 17th from being on the Bidouze the
15th. Soult might therefore by rapid and well-digested
combinations have united four divisions of
infantry and a brigade of cavalry to attack Beresford
on the 15th or 16th between the Nive and the
Adour. If successful the defeated troops, pushed
back upon the sixth division, must have fought for
life with the rivers on their flanks, Soult in front,
and the garrison of Bayonne issuing from the works
of Mousseroles on their rear. If unsuccessful the
French retreat behind the Gave of Oleron could not
have been prevented.</p>

<p>It is however to be pleaded that Soult was not
exactly informed of the numbers and situation of
his opponents. He thought Beresford had the first<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.</span>
division also on the Lower Bidouze; he knew that
Wellington had large reserves to employ, and, that
general’s design of passing the Adour below Bayonne
being unknown to him, he naturally supposed
they would be used to support the operations on the
Gaves: he therefore remained on the defensive. It
might possibly also have been difficult to bring
D’Erlon’s division across the Adour by the Port de
Lannes before the 17th, because the regular bridge
had been carried away and the communications interrupted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_572"></a>[572]</span>
a few days before by the floods. In fine
there are many matters of detail in war known only
to a general-in-chief which forbid the best combinations,
and this it is that makes the art so difficult
and uncertain. Great captains worship Fortune.</p>

<p>On the 24th the passage of the Gave d’Oleron
was effected. Soult then recognised his error and
concentrated his troops at Orthes to retake the offensive.
It was a fine movement and effected with ability,
but he suffered another favourable opportunity
of giving a counter-blow to escape him. The infantry
under Villatte, Harispe, and Paris, supported
by a brigade of cavalry, were about Sauveterre, that
is to say, four miles from Montfort and only seven
from Villenave, where the principal passage was
effected, where the ford was deep, the stream rapid,
and the left bank although favourable for the passage
not entirely commanding the right bank. How
then did it happen that the operation was effected
without opposition? Amongst the allies it was
rumoured at the time that Soult complained of the
negligence of a general who had orders to march
against the passing troops. The position of Harispe’s
division at Monstrueig, forming a reserve at
equal distances from Sauveterre and Villenave, would
seem to have been adopted with that view, but I
find no confirmation of the report in Soult’s correspondence,
and it is certain he thought Picton’s
demonstrations at Sauveterre was a real attack.</p>

<p>4º. The position adopted by the French general
at Orthes was excellent for offence. It was not so
for defence, when Beresford and Picton had crossed
the Gave below in force. Lord Wellington could
then throw his whole army on that side, and secure
his communication with Hope, after which outflanking<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_573"></a>[573]</span>
the right of the French he could seize the
defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from
their magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan and Aire,
and force them to retreat by the Pau road leaving
open the way to Bordeaux. To await this
attack was therefore an error, but Soult’s original<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
design was to assail the head of the first column
which should come near him and Beresford’s approach
to Baïghts on the 26th furnished the opportunity.
It is true that the French light cavalry
gave intelligence of that general’s march too late
and marred the combination, but there was still time
to fall on the head of the column while the third
division was in the act of passing the river and entangled
in the narrow way leading from the ford to<span class="sidenote">Notes by general Reille and colonel De la Chasse, MSS.</span>
the Peyrehorade road: it is said the French marshal
appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally
took a defensive position in which to receive battle.</p>

<p>However when the morning came he neglected
another opportunity. For two hours the third division
and the hussars remained close to him, covering
the march of the sixth and light divisions through the
narrow ways leading from the bridge of Berenx up
to the main road; the infantry had no defined position,
the cavalry had no room to extend, and there
were no troops between them and Beresford who
was then in march by the heights of Baïghts to the
Dax road. If the French general had pushed a
column across the marsh to seize the Roman camp
he would have separated the wings of the allies; then
pouring down the Peyrehorade road with Foy’s, D’Armagnac’s
and Villatte’s divisions he would probably
have overwhelmed the third division before the other
two could have extricated themselves from the defiles.
Picton therefore had grounds for uneasiness.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_574"></a>[574]</span></p>

<p>With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of
battle at Orthes, fiercely and strongly did he fight,
and wonderfully did he effect his retreat across the
Luy of Bearn, but twice in twenty-four hours he
had neglected those happy occasions which in war
take birth and flight at the same instant; and as
the value of his position, essentially an offensive one,
was thereby lost, a slowness to strike may be objected
to his generalship. Yet there is no commander,
unless a Hannibal or a Napoleon surpassing
the human proportions, but will abate something of
his confidence and hesitate after repeated defeats,
Soult in this campaign as in many others proved
himself a hardy captain full of resources.</p>

<p>5º. Lord Wellington with a vastness of conception
and a capacity for arrangement and combination
equal to his opponent, possessed in a high degree
that daring promptness of action, that faculty
of inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole
campaigns with which Napoleon was endowed beyond
all mankind. It is this which especially constitutes
military genius. For so vast so complicated
are the combinations of war, so easily and by such
slight causes are they affected, that the best generals
do but grope in the dark, and they acknowledge the
humiliating truth. By the number and extent of
their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors,
the merit of commanders is to be measured.</p>

<p>In this campaign lord Wellington designed to
penetrate France, not with a hasty incursion but
solidly, to force Soult over the Garonne, and if possible
in the direction of Bordeaux, because it was
the direct line, because the citizens were inimical
to the emperor, and the town, lying on the left bank
of the river, could not be defended; because a junction<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_575"></a>[575]</span>
with Suchet would thus be prevented. Finally
if by operating against Soult’s left he could throw
the French army into the Landes, where his own
superior cavalry could act, it would probably be
destroyed.</p>

<p>To operate against Soult’s left in the direction of
Pau was the most obvious method of preventing a
junction with Suchet, and rendering the positions
which the French general had fortified on the Gaves
useless. But the investment of Bayonne required a
large force, which was yet weak against an outer
attack because separated in three parts by the rivers;
hence if lord Wellington had made a wide movement
on Pau, Soult might have placed the Adour
between him and the main army and then fallen upon
Hope’s troops on the right side of that river. The
English general was thus reduced to act upon a
more contracted line, and to cross all the Gaves.
To effect this he collected his principal mass on his
right by the help of the great road leading to St.
Jean Pied de Port, then by rapid marches and reiterated
attacks he forced the passage of the rivers
above the points which Soult had fortified for defence,
and so turned that general’s left with the view
of finally cutting him off from Suchet and driving
him into the wilderness of the Landes. During these
marches he left Beresford on the lower parts of the
rivers to occupy the enemy’s attention and cover the
troops blockading Mousseroles. Meanwhile by the
collection of boats at Urt and other demonstrations
indicating a design of throwing a bridge over the
Adour above Bayonne, he diverted attention from
the point chosen below the fortress for that operation,
and at the same time provided the means of
throwing another bridge at the Port de Lannes to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_576"></a>[576]</span>
secure the communication with Hope by the right
bank whenever Soult should be forced to abandon
the Gaves. These were fine combinations.</p>

<p>I have shown that Beresford’s corps was so weak
at first that Soult might have struck a counter-blow.
Lord Wellington admitted the error. Writing
on the 15th he says, “If the enemy stand upon
the Bidouze I am not so strong as I ought to
be,” and he ordered up the fourth and light divisions;
but this excepted, his movements were conformable
to the principles of war. He chose the
best strategic line of operations, his main attack
was made with heavy masses against the enemy’s
weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and
daring. His conduct was conformable also to his
peculiar situation. He had two distinct operations
in hand, namely to throw his bridge below Bayonne
and to force the Gaves. He had the numbers required
to obtain these objects but dared not use
them lest he should put the Spanish troops into
contact with the French people; yet he could not entirely
dispense with them; wherefore bringing Freyre
up to Bayonne, Morillo to Navarrens, and Mina to
St. Jean Pied de Port, he seemed to put his whole
army in motion, thus gaining the appearance of
military strength with as little political danger as
possible. Nevertheless so terrible had the Spaniards
already made themselves by their cruel lawless
habits that their mere return across the frontier
threw the whole country into consternation.</p>

<p>6º. When in front of Orthes it would at first sight
appear as if lord Wellington had changed his plan
of driving the enemy upon the Landes, but it was
not so. He did not expect a battle on the 27th.
This is proved by his letter to sir John Hope in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_577"></a>[577]</span>
which he tells that general that he anticipated no
difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau, that on the
evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring, and
that he designed to visit the position at Bayonne.
To pass the Gave in the quickest and surest manner,
to re-establish the direct communications with Hope
and to unite with Beresford, were his immediate
objects; if he finally worked by his left it was a
sudden act and extraneous to the general design,
which was certainly to operate with Hill’s corps and
the light division by the right.</p>

<p>It was after passing the Gave at Berenx on the
morning of the 27th lord Wellington first discovered
Soult’s intention to fight, and that consequently
he was himself in a false position. Had he
shewn any hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured
to take a defensive position with either
Beresford’s or Picton’s troops, he would inevitably
have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous
situation. Instead of this, judging that
Soult would not on the instant change from the
defensive to the offensive, he confidently pushed
Picton’s skirmishers forward as if to assail the left
of the French position, and put Beresford in movement
against their right, and this with all the
coolness imaginable. The success was complete.
Soult who supposed the allies stronger than they
really were, naturally imagined the wings would not
be so bold unless well supported in the centre where
the Roman camp could hide a multitude. He therefore
held fast to his position until the movement
was more developed, and in two hours the sixth
and light divisions were up and the battle commenced.
It was well fought on both sides but the
crisis was decided by the fifty-second, and when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_578"></a>[578]</span>
that regiment was put in movement only a single
Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the
Roman camp: upon such nice combinations of time
and place does the fate of battles turn.</p>

<p>7º. Soult certainly committed an error in receiving
battle at Orthes, and it has been said that lord
Wellington’s wound at the most critical period of
the retreat alone saved the hostile army. Nevertheless
the clear manner in which the French general
carried his troops away, his prompt judgement,
shown in the sudden change of his line of
retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which
he halted and showed front again at Caceres, Barcelonne,
and Aire, were all proofs of no common
ability. It was Wellington’s aim to drive the French
on to the Landes, Soult’s to avoid this, he therefore
shifted from the Bordeaux line to that of Toulouse,
not in confusion but with the resolution of a
man ready to dispute every foot of ground. The
loss of the magazines at Mont Marsan was no fault<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
of his; he had given orders for transporting them
towards the Toulouse side fifteen days before, but
the matter depending upon the civil authorities was
neglected. He was blamed by some of his officers
for fighting at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover
the magazines there, and essential to his design of
keeping up the courage of the soldiers under the
adverse circumstances which he anticipated. And
here the palm of generalship remained with him,
for certainly the battle of Orthes was less decisive
than it should have been. I speak not of the pursuit
to Sault de Navailles, nor of the next day’s
march upon St. Sever, but of Hill’s march on the
right. That general halted near Samade the 28th,
reached St. Savin on the Adour the 1st and fought<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_579"></a>[579]</span>
the battle of Aire on the evening of the 2d of March.
But from Samadet to Aire is not longer than from
Samadet to St. Savin where he was on the 1st. He
could therefore, if his orders had prescribed it so,
have seized Aire on the 1st before Clauzel arrived,
and thus spared the obstinate combat at that place.
It may also be observed that his attack did not
receive a right direction. It should have been
towards the French left, because they were more
weakly posted there, and the ridge held by their
right was so difficult to retire from, that no troops
would stay on it if any progress was made on the
left. This was however an accident of war, general
Hill had no time to examine the ground, his orders
were to attack, and to fall without hesitation upon
a retiring enemy after such a defeat as Orthes was
undoubtedly the right thing to do; but it cannot
be said that lord Wellington pushed the pursuit
with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm on the
evening of the 1st he could have reinforced Hill
and should not have given the French army time to
recover from their recent defeat. “The secret of
war,” says Napoleon, “is to march twelve leagues,
fight a battle and march twelve more in pursuit.”</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_580"></a>[580]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_III">CHAPTER III.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">Extremely perilous and disheartening was the<span class="sidenote9">1814. March.</span>
situation of the French general. His army was
greatly reduced by his losses in battle and by the
desertion of the conscripts, and three thousand
stragglers, old soldiers who ought to have rejoined
their eagles, were collected by different generals, into
whose districts they had wandered, and employed to
strengthen detached corps instead of being restored
to the army. All his magazines were taken, discontent
the natural offspring of misfortune prevailed
amongst his officers, a powerful enemy was in front,
no certain resources of men or money behind, and
his efforts were ill-seconded by the civil authorities.
The troops indignant at the people’s apathy
behaved with so much violence and insolence,
especially during the retreat from St. Sever, that
Soult, who wanted officers very badly, proposed to<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
fill the vacancies from the national guards that
he might have “men who would respect property.”
On the other hand the people comparing the conduct
of their own army with the discipline of the
Anglo-Portuguese, and contrasting the requisitions
necessarily imposed by their countrymen with the
ready and copious disbursements in gold made by
their enemies, for now one commissary preceded each
division to order rations for the troops and another
followed to arrange and pay on the spot, were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_581"></a>[581]</span>
become so absolutely averse to the French army
that Soult writing to the minister of war thus
expressed himself. “If the population of the departments
of the Landes of Gers, and the Lower
Pyrenees, were animated with a good spirit, this is
the moment to make the enemy suffer by carrying
off his convoys and prisoners, but they appear more
disposed to favour the invaders than to second the
army. It is scarcely possible to obtain a carriage
for transport and I shall not be surprised to find in
a short time these inhabitants taking arms against
us.” Soult was however a man formed by nature
and by experience to struggle against difficulties,
always appearing greater when in a desperate condition
than when more happily circumstanced. At
Genoa under Massena, at Oporto, and in Andalusia,
he had been inured to military distress, and probably
for that reason the emperor selected him to
sustain this dangerous contest in preference to
others accounted more ready tacticians on a field of
battle.</p>

<p>On the 3d and 4th he retreated by Plaissance
and Madiran to Rabastens, Marciac, and Maubourget
where he halted, covering Tarbes, for his
design was to keep in mass and await the development
of the allies’ plans. In this view he called in
the detachments of cavalry and infantry which had
been left on the side of Pau before the battle of
Orthes, and hearing that Darricau was at Langon
with a thousand men he ordered him to march by
Agen and join the army immediately. He likewise
put the national guards and <i lang="fr">gensd’armes</i> in activity
on the side of the Pyrenees, and directed the
commanders of the military districts in his rear to
keep their old soldiers, of which there were many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_582"></a>[582]</span>
scattered through the country, in readiness to aid
the army.</p>

<p>While thus acting he received from the minister
of war a note dictated by the emperor.</p>

<p>“Fortresses,” said Napoleon, “are nothing in
themselves when the enemy having the command of
the sea can collect as many shells and bullets and
guns as he pleases to crush them. Leave therefore
only a few troops in Bayonne, the way to prevent
the siege is to keep the army close to the place.
Resume the offensive, fall upon one or other of the
enemy’s wings, and though you should have but
twenty thousand men if you seize the proper moment
and attack hardily you ought to gain some advantage.
You have enough talent to understand my meaning.”</p>

<p>This note came fourteen days too late. But what
if it had come before? Lord Wellington after winning
the battle of St. Pierre the 13th of December
was firmly established on the Adour above Bayonne,
and able to interrupt the French convoys as they
descended from the Port de Landes. It was evident
then that when dry weather enabled the allies to
move Soult must abandon Bayonne to defend the
passage of the Gaves, or risk being turned and
driven upon the Landes from whence it would be
difficult for him to escape. Napoleon however
desired him to leave only a few men in Bayonne,
another division would thus have been added to his
field army, and this diminution of the garrison
would not have increased lord Wellington’s active
forces, because the investment of Bayonne
would still have required three separate corps:
moreover until the bridge-head at Peyrehorade was
abandoned to concentrate at Orthes, Bayonne was
not rigorously speaking left to its own defence.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_583"></a>[583]</span></p>

<p>To the emperor’s observations Soult therefore
replied, that several months before, he had told the
minister of war Bayonne was incapable of sustaining
fifteen days open trenches unless the entrenched
camp was well occupied, and he had been by the
minister authorised so to occupy it. Taking that as
his base he had left a garrison of thirteen thousand
five hundred men, and now that he knew the emperor’s
wishes it was no longer in his power to
withdraw them. With respect to keeping close to
the place he had done so as long as he could without
endangering the safety of the army; but lord
Wellington’s operations had forced him to abandon
it, and he had only changed his line of operations
at St. Sever when he was being pushed back upon
Bordeaux with little prospect of being able to
pass the Garonne in time. He had for several
months thought of establishing a pivot of support
for his movements at Dax, in the design of still
holding by Bayonne, and with that view had ordered
the old works of the former place to be repaired
and a camp to be fortified; but from poverty of
means even the body of the place was not completed
or armed at the moment when the battle of
Orthes forced him to relinquish it. Moreover the
insurgent levy of the Landes upon which he depended
to man the works had failed, not more than
two hundred men had come forward. Neither was
he very confident of the advantage of such a position,
because Wellington with superior numbers
would probably have turned his left and forced him
to retire precipitately towards Bordeaux by the
desert of the greater Landes.</p>

<p>The emperor ordered him to take the offensive
were it only with twenty thousand men. He would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_584"></a>[584]</span>
obey with this observation, that from the 14th of
February to that moment he had had no power to
take the initiatory movement, having been constantly
attacked by infinitely superior numbers. He
had defended himself as he could, but had not expected
to succeed against the enormous disproportion
of force. It being thus impossible, even though
he sacrificed his last man in the attempt, to stop the
enemy, he now sought to prolong the war as much
as possible on the frontier, and by defending every
position to keep the invaders in check and prevent
them from attacking Bordeaux or Toulouse, save by
detachments. He had taken his line of operations
by the road of Tarbes, St. Gaudens, and Toulouse,
that is to say, by the roots of the Pyrenees, calculating
that if lord Wellington sent small detachments
against Bordeaux or Toulouse, the generals commanding
at those places would be able if the national
guards would fight for their country to defend them.</p>

<p>If the enemy made large detachments, an attack
in front while he was thus weakened would bring
them back again. If he marched with his whole
army upon Bordeaux he could be followed and
forced to face about. If he attempted to march by
Auch against Toulouse he might be stopped by an
attack in flank. If he remained stationary he should
be provoked by an advance <ins class="corr" id="tn-584" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'to develope his'">
to develop his</ins> objects.
But if, as was to be expected, the French army
was itself attacked it would defend its position
vigorously, and then retreating by St. Gaudens draw
the allies into a difficult mountain country, where
the ground might be disputed step by step the
war be kept still on the frontier and the passage
of the Garonne be delayed. He had meditated
deeply upon his task and could find no better mode.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_585"></a>[585]</span>
But his army was weakened by combats, still more
by desertion; the conscripts went off so fast that of
five battalions lately called up from Toulouse two-thirds
were already gone without having seen an
enemy.</p>

<p>Soult was mistaken as to the real force of the
allies in the recent operations. In other respects
he displayed clear views and great activity. He
reorganized his army in six divisions, called in his
detachments, urged the imperial commissioners and
local authorities to hasten the levies and restore
deserters, and he prepared a plan of action for the
partizans which had been organized towards the
mountains. Nevertheless his difficulties increased.
The conscripts who did arrive were for the most
part unarmed and he had none to spare. The
imperial commissary Cornudet, and the prefect of
the Gironde, quitted Bordeaux, and when general
L’Huillier attempted to remove the military stores
belonging to the army from Langon, Podensac, and
Bordeaux, the inferior authorities opposed him.
There was no money they said to pay the expense,
but in truth Bordeaux was the focus of Bourbon
conspiracy, and the mayor, count Lynch, was eager
to betray his sovereign.</p>

<p>Nor was Wellington without embarrassments.
The storms prevented him following up his victory
while the French army was in confusion. Now it
was reorganized on a new line and could retreat for
many days in a direction parallel to the Pyrenees
with strong defensive positions. Should he press it
closely? His army weakened at every step would
have to move between the mountains and the Garonne
exposing its flanks and rear to the operations of any
force which the French might be able to collect on
those boundaries; that is to say all the power of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_586"></a>[586]</span>
France beyond the Garonne. It was essential to
find some counterpoise, and to increase his field
army. To establish a Bourbon party at Bordeaux
was an obvious mode of attaining the first object.
Should he then seize that city by a detachment?
He must employ twelve thousand men and remain
with twenty-six thousand to oppose Soult, who he
erroneously believed was being joined by the ten
thousand men which Suchet had sent to Lyons. The
five regiments detached for their clothing had rejoined
the army and all the reserves of cavalry and
artillery were now called up, but the reinforcements
from England and Portugal, amounting to twenty
thousand men, upon which he had calculated were
detained by the respective governments. Wherefore,
driven by necessity he directed Freyre to
join him by the Port de Landes with two divisions of
the Gallician army, a measure which was instantly
followed by innumerable complaints of outrages and
excesses, although the Spaniards were entirely provided
from the English military chest. Now also
Clinton was ordered to send the British and Germans
of the Anglo-Sicilian army to St. Jean de
Luz. This done he determined to seize Bordeaux.
Meanwhile he repaired the destroyed bridges,
brought up one of Morillo’s brigades from Navarrens
to the vicinity of Aire, sent Campbell’s
Portuguese dragoons to Rocquefort, general Fane
with two regiments of cavalry and a brigade of
infantry to Pau, and pushed posts towards Tarbes
and Vic Bigorre.</p>

<p>Soult, now fearing the general apathy and ill-will
of the people would become fatal to him, endeavoured
to arouse the energies of the people and
the army by the following proclamation which has
been unreasonably railed at by several English<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_587"></a>[587]</span>
writers, for it was a judicious well-timed and powerful
address.</p>

<p>“Soldiers, at the battle of Orthes you did your
duty, the enemy’s losses surpassed yours, his
blood moistened all the ground he gained. You
may consider that feat of arms as an advantage.
Other combats are at hand, no repose for us until
his army, formed of such extraordinary elements,
shall evacuate the French territory or be annihilated.
Its numbers and progress may be great, but at hand
are unexpected perils. Time will teach the enemy’s
general that French honour is not to be outraged
with impunity.</p>

<p>“Soldiers, he has had the indecency to provoke
you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition,
he speaks of peace but firebrands of discord follow
him! He speaks of peace and excites the French to
a civil war! Thanks be to him for making known
his projects, our forces are thereby centupled; and
he himself rallies round the imperial eagles all those
who deceived by appearances believed our enemies
would make a loyal war. No peace with the disloyal
and perfidious nation! no peace with the
English and their auxiliaries until they quit the
French territory! they have dared to insult the national
honour, the infamy to incite Frenchmen to
become perjured towards the emperor. Revenge the
offence in blood. To arms! Let this cry resound
through the south of France, the Frenchman that
hesitates abjures his country and belongs to her
enemies.</p>

<p>“Yet a few days and those who believe in
English delicacy and sincerity will learn to their
cost that cunning promises are made to abate their
courage and subjugate them. They will learn also
that if the English pay to-day and are generous,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_588"></a>[588]</span>
they will to-morrow retake and with interest in contributions
what they disburse. Let the pusillanimous
beings who calculate the cost of saving their country
remember that the English have in view to reduce
Frenchmen to the same servitude as the Spaniards
Portuguese and Sicilians who groan under their domination.
Past history will recall to those unworthy
Frenchmen who prefer momentary enjoyment to
the safety of the great family, the English making
Frenchmen kill Frenchmen at Quiberon; it will
show them at the head of all conspiracies, all odious
political intrigues plots and assassinations, aiming
to overthrow all principles, to destroy all grand
establishments of trade to satisfy their immeasurable
ambition, their insatiable cupidity. Does there
exist upon the face of the globe a point known to
the English where they have not destroyed <ins class="corr" id="tn-588" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'by sedidions and'">
by seditions and</ins> violence all manufactures which could
rival their own? Thus they will do to the French
establishments if they prevail.</p>

<p>“Devote then to opprobrium and execration all
Frenchmen who favour their insidious projects,
aye! even those who are under his power if they
seek not to hurt him. Devote to opprobrium and
reject as Frenchmen those who think under specious
pretexts to avoid serving their country; and
those also who from corruption or indolence hide
deserters instead of driving them back to their
colours. With such men we have nothing in common,
and history will pass their names with execrations
to posterity. As to us soldiers our duty
is clear. Honour and fidelity. This is our motto
and we will fight to the last the enemies of our
emperor and France. Respect persons and property.
Grieve for those who have momentarily
fallen under the enemy’s yoke, and hasten the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_589"></a>[589]</span>
moment of their deliverance. Be obedient and
disciplined, and bear implacable hatred towards
traitors and enemies of the French name! War to
death against those who would divide us to destroy
us; and to those cowards who desert the imperial
eagles to range themselves under another banner.
Remember always that fifteen ages of glory, triumphs
innumerable, have illustrated our country.
Contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great
sovereign, his signal victories which immortalize
the French name. Let us be worthy of him and
we can then bequeath without a taint to our posterity
the inheritance we hold from our fathers.
Be in fine Frenchmen and die arms in hand sooner
than survive dishonour.”</p>

<p>Let the time and the occasion of this proclamation
be considered. Let it be remembered that no
English writer orator or politician, had for many
years used milder terms than robbers, murderers,
atheists, and tyrant, when speaking of Frenchmen
and their sovereign, that lord Wellington even at
this time refused that sovereign his title of emperor,
calling him Buonaparte; that on entering
France he had published an order of the day accusing
the French commanders of authorising and
encouraging the cruelties of their soldiers in Spain;
finally that for six years the Spanish Portuguese
and English state papers were filled with most
offensive ribald abuse of Napoleon his ministers
and commanders. Let all this be remembered and
the acrimony of Soult’s proclamation cannot be
justly blamed, while the noble energy, the loyalty
of the sentiments, the exciting passionate feeling
of patriotism which pervades it must be admired.
Was he, sprung from the ranks, a soldier of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_590"></a>[590]</span>
republic, a general of the empire, after fighting
thirty years under the tri-colour, to be tame and
measured to squeamishness in his phrases when he
saw his country invaded by foreigners, and a pretender
to the throne stalking behind their bayonets
beckoning his soldiers to desert their eagles, inviting
his countrymen to betray their sovereign and
dishonour their nation! Why the man was surrounded
by traitors, and proud and scornful of
danger was his spirit to strive so mightily against
defeat and treason combined.</p>

<p>It has been said in condemnation of him that
the English general did not encourage the Bourbon
party. Is that true? Did it so appear to the French
general? Had not the duke of Angoulême come to
the English head-quarters with mystery, and following
the invading army and protected by its arms
assemble round him all the ancient partizans of
his house, sending forth agents, scattering proclamations
even in Soult’s camp, endeavouring to
debauch his soldiers and to aid strangers to subjugate
France. Soult not only knew this but was
suffering under the effects. On every side he met
with opposition and discontent from the civil authorities,
his movements were made known to the
enemy and his measures thwarted in all directions.
At Bordeaux a party were calling aloud with
open arms to the invaders. At Tarbes the fear of
provoking an action near the town had caused the
dispersion of the insurrectional levy organized by
the imperial commissioner Caffarelli. At Pau the
aristocracy had secretly assembled to offer homage
to the duke of Angoulême, and there was a rumour
that he was to be crowned at the castle of Henry IV.
Was the French general to disregard these facts<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_591"></a>[591]</span>
and symptoms because his opponent had avoided
any public declaration in favour of the Bourbon
family? Lord Wellington would have been the first
to laugh at his simplicity if he had.</p>

<p>And what was the reason that the English general
did not openly call upon the Bourbon partizans
to raise the standard of revolt? Simply that Napoleon’s
astounding genius had so baffled the
banded sovereigns and their innumerable hordes
that a peace seemed inevitable to avoid fatal disasters;
and therefore lord Wellington, who had instructions
from his government not to embarrass<span class="sidenote">Secret instructions from Lord Bathurst, MSS.</span>
any negociation for peace by pledges to a Bourbon
party, acting as an honest statesman and commander,
would not excite men to their own ruin
for a momentary advantage. But so far from discouraging
treason to Napoleon on any other ground<span class="sidenote">Published Despatches.</span>
he avowed his anxious desire for it, and his readiness
to encourage every enemy of that monarch.
He had seen and consulted with La Roche Jacquelin,
with de Mailhos and other vehement partizans
for an immediate insurrection; and also with Viel
Castel an agent of Bernadotte’s until he found
him intriguing against the Bourbons. He advised
the duke of Angoulême to form regular battalions,
promised him arms and actually collected eighty
thousand stand, to arm the insurgents. Finally he
rebuked the timid policy of the English ministers
who having such an opportunity of assailing Napoleon
refrained from doing it. Before Soult’s proclamation
appeared he thus wrote to lord Bathurst.</p>

<p>“I find the sentiment as we advance in the
country still more strong against the Buonaparte
dynasty and in favour of the Bourbons, but I am<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_592"></a>[592]</span>
quite certain there will be no declaration on the
part of the people if the allies do not in some
manner declare themselves.” “<em>I cannot discover the
policy of not hitting one’s enemy as hard as one can
and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that
he would not so act by us, he would certainly overturn
the British authority in Ireland if it were in
his power.</em>”</p>

<p>Soult and Wellington acted and wrote, each in
the manner most suitable to their situation, but it
was not a little remarkable that Ireland should so
readily occur to the latter as a parallel case.</p>

<p>It was in this state of affairs that the English
general detached Beresford with twelve thousand
men against Bordeaux, giving him instructions to
occupy that city and acquire the Garonne as a port
for the allies, but to make the French authorities
declare whether they would or would not continue
to exercise their functions under the conditions
announced by proclamation. For hitherto lord
Wellington had governed the country as he advanced
in this public manner, thus nullifying the
misrepresentations of political intriguers, obviating
the dangers of false reports and rumours of his
projects, making his justice and moderation known
to the poorest peasant, and securing the French
local authorities who continued to act under him
from any false and unjust representation of their
conduct to the imperial government if peace should
be made with Napoleon. This expedition against
Bordeaux however involved political as well as military
interests. Beresford was instructed that there
were many partizans of the Bourbons in that city
who might propose to hoist the white standard and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_593"></a>[593]</span>
proclaim Louis the Eighteenth under protection of
the troops. They were to be told that the British
nation and its allies wished well to their cause, and
while public tranquillity was maintained in the
districts occupied by the troops there would be no
hindrance to their political proceedings: they or
any party opposed to Napoleon would receive
assistance. Nevertheless, as the allied sovereigns
were negociating with the French emperor, however
well inclined the English general might be to
support a party against the latter during war, he
could give no help if peace were concluded, and
this they must weigh well before they revolted.
Beresford was therefore not to meddle with any
declaration in favour of Louis the Eighteenth; but
he was not to oppose it, and if revolt took place
he was to supply the revolters with the arms and
ammunition collected at Dax.</p>

<p>On the 8th Beresford marched towards Langon
with the fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian’s
horsemen, and some guns; he was joined on the
road by some of Vandeleur’s cavalry from Bayonne,
and he had orders to observe the enemy’s
movements towards Agen, for it was still in Soult’s
power by a forced march on that side to cross the
Garonne and enter Bordeaux before him. La
Roche Jacquelin preceded the troops and the duke
of Angoulême followed closely, but his partizans in
the city frightened at the danger of their enterprize
now besought Beresford to delay his march.
La Roche Jacquelin vehemently condemned their
hesitation, and his influence supported by the consternation
which the battle of Orthes had created
amongst the Napoleonists decided the question in
favour of revolt.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_594"></a>[594]</span></p>

<p>Long before this epoch, Soult, foreseeing that the
probable course of the war would endanger Bordeaux,
had given orders to place the forts in a state
of defence, to arm the flotilla and to organize the
national guards and the urban legions; he had
urged these measures again when the imperial commissioner
Cornudet first arrived, but according to the
usual habits of civilians who have to meddle with
military affairs every thing was promised and nothing
done. Cornudet and the prefect quitted the city as
early as the 4th, first burning with a silly affectation
of vigour some ships of war upon the stocks; general
L’Huillier, unable to oppose the allies, then destroyed
the fort of Médoc on the left bank of the
Garonne, disarmed some of the river batteries, and
passing in the night of the 11th to the right bank
occupied the fortress of Blaye, the Paté and other
points. Meanwhile Beresford who reached Langon
the 10th, left lord Dalhousie there with the bulk of
the forces and advanced with eight hundred cavalry.</p>

<p>Entering Bordeaux the 12th, he met the municipality
and a great body of Bourbonists, at the
head of whom was the mayor count Lynch, decorated
with the scarf of his office and the legion of honour,
both conferred upon him, and probably at his own
solicitation, by the sovereign he was then going to
betray. After some formal discourse in which
Beresford explicitly made known his instructions
Lynch very justly tore the tricolor, the emblem of
his country’s glory, from his own shoulders, the white
flag was then displayed and the allies took peaceable
possession of the city. The duke of Angoulême
arrived on the same day and Louis the Eighteenth
was formally proclaimed. This event, the act of a
party, was not generally approved, and the mayor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_595"></a>[595]</span>
conscious of weakness immediately issued with the
connivance of the duke of Angoulême a proclamation,
in which he asserted, that “the British Portuguese
and Spanish armies were united in the south,
as the other nations were united in the north, solely
to destroy Napoleon and replace him by a Bourbon
king who was conducted thither by these generous
allies, and only by accepting that king could the
French appease the resentment of the Spaniards.”
At the same time the duke of Angoulême, as if
quite master of the country, appointed prefects and
other authorities in districts beyond the limits of
Bordeaux.</p>

<p>Both the duke and the mayor soon repented of
their precipitancy. The English fleet which should
have acted simultaneously with the troops had not arrived;
the Regulus a French seventy-four with several
inferior vessels of war were anchored below Blaye, and
Beresford was recalled with the fourth division and Vivian’s
cavalry. Lord Dalhousie remained with only
the seventh division and three squadrons to oppose
L’Huillier’s troops and other French corps which were
now on the Garonne. He could not guard the river
below Bordeaux, and some French troops recrossing
again took possession of the fort of Grave near the
mouth; a new army was forming under general Decaen
beyond the Garonne, the Napoleonists recovering from
their first stupor began to stir themselves, and a partizan
officer coming down to St. Macaire on the 18th
surprised fifty men which lord Dalhousie had sent
across the Garonne from Langon to take possession
of a French magazine. In the Landes the peasants
forming bands burned the houses of the gentlemen
who had joined the white standard, and in Bordeaux<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_596"></a>[596]</span>
itself a counter-insurrection was preparing whenever
Decaen should be ready to advance.</p>

<p>The prince frightened at these symptoms of reaction
desired lord Dalhousie to bring his troops into
Bordeaux to awe the Napoleonists, and meanwhile
each party strove to outvie the other in idle rumours
and falsehoods relating to the emperor. Victories
and defeats were invented or exaggerated, Napoleon
was dead from illness, had committed suicide,
was poisoned, stabbed; and all these things were
related as certain with most circumstantial details.
Meanwhile Wellington, writing to the duke of Angoulême,
denied the veracity of the mayor’s proclamation
and expressed his trust that the prince
was not a party to such a mendacious document.
The latter however with some excuses about hurry
and confusion avowed his participation in its publication,
and defended the mayor’s conduct. He also
forwarded a statement of the danger his party was
exposed to and demanded aid of men and money,
supporting his application by a note of council in
which with more ingenuity than justice, it was argued,
that as civil government could not be conducted
without executive power, and as lord Wellington had
suffered the duke of Angoulême to assume the civil
government at Bordeaux without an adequate executive
force, he was bound to supply the deficiency
from his army, and even to furnish money until
taxes could be levied under the protection of the
soldiers.</p>

<p>The English general was not a man to bear with
such sophistry in excuse for a breach of faith.
Sorry he was he said to find that the principle by
which he regulated his conduct towards the Bourbon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_597"></a>[597]</span>
party, though often stated, had made so little
impression that the duke could not perceive how
inconsistent it was with the mayor’s proclamation.
Most cautious therefore must be his future conduct,
seeing that as the chief of an army and the confidential
agent of three independent nations, he could not
permit his views to be misrepresented upon such an
important question. He had occupied Bordeaux as
a military point, but certain persons contrary to his
advice and opinion thought proper to proclaim Louis
the Eighteenth. Those persons made no exertions,
subscribed not a shilling, raised not a soldier, yet
because he would not extend the posts of his army
beyond what was proper and convenient, merely to
protect their families and property, exposed to danger,
not on account of their exertions for they had
made none, but on account of their premature declaration
contrary to his advice, they took him to
task in a document delivered to lord Dalhousie by
the prince himself. The writer of that paper and
all such persons however might be assured that
nothing should make him swerve from what he
thought his duty to the sovereigns who employed
him, he would not risk even a company of infantry
to save properties and families placed in a state of
danger contrary to his advice. The duke had better
then conduct his policy and compose his manifestos
in such a manner as not to force a public
contradiction of them. His royal highness was free
to act as he pleased for himself, but he was not free
to adduce the name and authority of the allied
governments in support of his measures when they
had not been consulted, nor of their general when
he had been consulted but had given his opinion
against those measures.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_598"></a>[598]</span></p>

<p>He had told him that if any great town or extensive
district declared in favour of the Bourbons he
would not interfere with the government of that
town or district, and if there was a general declaration
in favour of his house he would deliver the civil
government of all the country overrun by the army
into his hands, but the fact was that even at Bordeaux
the movement in favour of the Bourbons was
not unanimous. The spirit had not spread elsewhere,
not even to La Vendée, nor in any part occupied
by the army. The events contemplated had
not therefore occurred, and it would be a great
breach of duty towards the allied sovereigns and
cruel to the inhabitants if he were to deliver them
over to his royal highness prematurely or against
their inclinations. He advised him therefore to
withdraw his prefects and confine his government to
Bordeaux. He could give him no money and after
what had passed he was doubtful if he should afford
him any countenance or protection. The argument
of the note of council, affirming that he was bound
to support the civil government of his royal highness,
only rendered it more incumbent upon him to
beware how he gave farther encouragement, or to
speak plainly, <em>permission</em> to the Bourbonists to declare
themselves. It was disagreeable to take any
step which should publicly mark a want of good
understanding between himself and the duke, but
count Lynch had not treated him with common fairness
or with truth, wherefore as he could not allow
the character of the allied sovereigns or his own to
be doubted, if his royal highness did not within ten
days contradict the objectionable parts of the mayor’s
proclamation he would do so himself.</p>

<p>Thus it appeared that with the French as with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_599"></a>[599]</span>
Spaniards and Portuguese neither enthusiastic declarations
nor actual insurrection offered any guarantee
for sense truth or exertion; and most surely
all generals and politicians of every country who
trust to sudden popular commotions will find that
noisy declamations, vehement demonstrations of feeling,
idle rumours and boasting, the life-blood of
such affairs, are essentially opposed to useful public
exertions.</p>

<p>When Beresford marched to rejoin the army the
line of occupation was too extensive for lord Dalhousie
and lord Wellington ordered him to keep
clear of the city and hold his troops together, observing
that his own projected operations on the
Upper Garonne would keep matters quiet on the
lower part of that river. Nevertheless if the war
had continued for a month that officer’s situation
would have been critical. For when Napoleon
knew that Bordeaux had fallen he sent Decaen by<span class="sidenote">Official Reports and Correspondence of general Decaen
                                                upon the formation of the army of the Gironde, 1814, MSS.</span>
post to Libourne to form the “<em>army of the Gironde</em>.”
For this object general Despeaux acting under Soult’s
orders collected a body of <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> custom-house
officers and national guards on the Upper
Garonne, between Agen and La Reolle, and it was
one of his detachments that surprised lord Dalhousie’s
men at St. Macaire on the 18th. A battery
of eight guns was sent down from Narbonne,
other batteries were despatched from Paris to arrive
at Perigueux on the 11th of April, and three or four
hundred cavalry coming from the side of Rochelle
joined Le Huillier who with a thousand infantry was
in position at St. André de Cubsac beyond the Dordogne.
Behind these troops all the national guards
custom-house officers and <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> of five departments
were ordered to assemble, and march to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_600"></a>[600]</span>
the Dordogne; but the formidable part of the intended
army was a body of Suchet’s veterans, six
thousand in number under general Beurman, who
had been turned from the road of Lyons and directed
upon Libourne.</p>

<p>Decaen entered Mucidan on the 1st of April but
Beurman’s troops had not then reached Perigeaux,
and lord Dalhousie’s cavalry were in Libourne between
him and L’Huillier. The power of concentration
was thus denied to the French and meanwhile
admiral Penrose had secured the command
of the Garonne. It appears lord Wellington<span class="sidenote">Published despatches.</span>
thought this officer dilatory, but on the 27th he
arrived with a seventy-four and two frigates, whereupon
the Regulus, and other French vessels then at
Royan, made sail up the river and were chased to
the shoal of Talmont, but they escaped through the
narrow channel on the north side and cast anchor
under some batteries. Previous to this event Mr.
Ogilvie a commissary, being on the river in a boat<span class="sidenote">Official Report by Mr. Ogilvie, MSS.</span>
manned with Frenchmen, discovered the Requin
sloop, half French half American, pierced for
twenty-two guns, lying at anchor not far below
Bordeaux, at the same time he saw a sailor leap
hastily into a boat above him and row for the vessel.
This man being taken proved to be the armourer
of the Requin, he said there were not many men
on board, and Mr. Ogilvie observing his alarm
and judging that the crew would also be fearful,
with ready resolution bore down upon the Requin,
boarded, and took her without any opposition either
from her crew or that of his own boat, although
she had fourteen guns mounted and eleven men
with two officers on board.</p>

<p>The naval co-operation being thus assured lord<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_601"></a>[601]</span>
Dalhousie crossed the Garonne above the city, drove<span class="sidenote7">April.</span>
the French posts beyond the Dordogne, pushed
scouring parties to La Reolle and Marmande, and
sending his cavalry over the Dordogne intercepted
Decaen’s and La Huilhier’s communications; the
former was thus forced to remain at Mucidan with
two hundred and fifty <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> awaiting the
arrival of Beurman, and he found neither arms nor
ammunition nor a willing spirit to enable him to
organize the national guards.</p>

<p>The English horsemen repassed the Dordogne
on the 2d of April, but on the 4th lord Dalhousie
crossed it again lower down, near St. André de
Cubzac, with about three thousand men, intending
to march upon Blaye, but hearing that L’Huillier
had halted at Etauliers he turned suddenly upon
him. The French general formed his line on an
open common occupying some woods in front with
his detachments. Overmatched in infantry he had
three hundred cavalry opposed to one weak squadron,
and yet his troops would not stand the shock
of the battle. The allied infantry cleared the
woods in a moment, the artillery then opened
upon the main body which retired in disorder,
horsemen and infantry together, through Etauliers,
leaving behind several scattered bodies upon whom
the British cavalry galloped and made two or three
hundred men and thirty officers prisoners.</p>

<p>If the six thousand old troops under Beurman
had, according to Napoleon’s orders, arrived at this
time in lord Dalhousie’s rear, his position would
have been embarrassing but they were delayed on
the road until the 10th. Meanwhile admiral
Penrose, having on the 2d observed the French
flotilla, consisting of fifteen armed vessels and gun-boats,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_602"></a>[602]</span>
coming down from Blaye to join the Regulus
at Talmont sent the boats of his fleet to attack
them, whereupon the French vessels run on shore
and the crews aided by two hundred soldiers from
Blaye lined the beach to protect them. Lieutenant
Dunlop who commanded the English boats landing
all his seamen and marines, beat these troops
and carried off or destroyed the whole flotilla with
a loss to himself of only six men wounded and
missing. This operation completed and the action
at Etauliers known, the admiral, now reinforced
with a second ship of the line, resolved to attack
the French squadron and the shore batteries, but in
the night of the 6th the enemy set fire to their vessels.
Captain Harris of the Belle Poule frigate
then landed with six hundred seamen and marines
and destroyed the batteries and forts on the right
bank from Talmont to the Courbe point. Blaye
still held out, but at Paris treason had done its
work and Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity
known for good, was overthrown to make room for
despots, who with minds enlarged only to cruelty
avarice and dissoluteness, were at the very moment
of triumph intent to defraud the people, by whose
strength and suffering they had conquered, of the
only reward they demanded, <em>just government</em>. The
war was virtually over, but on the side of Toulouse,
Bayonne, and Barcelona, the armies ignorant of this
great event were still battling with unabated fury.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_603"></a>[603]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">While Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux<span class="sidenote7">1814. March.</span>
Soult and Wellington remained in observation,
each thinking the other stronger than himself. For
the English general having intelligence of Beurman’s
march, believed that his troops were intended
to reinforce and had actually joined Soult. On the
other hand that marshal, who knew not of Beresford’s
march until the 13th, concluded Wellington
still had the twelve thousand men detached
to Bordeaux. The numbers on each side were
however nearly equal. The French army was
thirty-one thousand, infantry and cavalry, yet three
thousand being stragglers detained by the generals
of the military districts, Soult could only put
into line, exclusive of conscripts without arms,
twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets with
thirty-eight pieces of artillery. On the allies’ side<span class="sidenote">Official Report, MSS.</span>
twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets were
under arms, with forty-two guns, but from this
number detachments had been sent to Pau on one
side, Roquefort on the other, and the cavalry scouts
were pushed into the Landes and to the Upper
Garonne.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington expecting Soult would retreat
upon Auch and designing to follow him, had caused<span class="sidenote7">April.</span>
Beresford to keep the bulk of his troops towards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_604"></a>[604]</span>
the Upper Garonne that he might the sooner rejoin
the army; but the French general having early fixed
his line of retreat by St. Guadens was only prevented
from retaking the offensive on the 9th or
10th by the loss of his magazines, which forced
him first to organize a system of requisition for
the subsistence of his army. Meanwhile his
equality of force passed away, for on the 13th
Freyre came up with eight thousand Spanish infantry,
and the next day Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry arrived.
Lord Wellington was then the strongest, yet
he still awaited Beresford’s troops, and was uneasy
about his own situation. He dreaded the junction<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_VI">Chap. VI., Book XXIII.</a></span>
of Suchet’s army, for it was at this time the Spanish
regency referred the convention, proposed by that
marshal for the evacuation of the fortresses, to his
decision. He gave a peremptory negative, observing
that it would furnish twenty thousand veterans
for Soult while the retention of Rosas and
Figueras would bar the action of the Spanish armies
of Catalonia in his favour. But his anxiety was great
because he foresaw that Ferdinand’s return and
his engagement with Suchet, already related, together
with the evident desire of Copons that the garrisons
should be admitted to a convention would
finally render that measure inevitable. Meanwhile
the number of his own army was likely to decrease.
The English cabinet, less considerate even than the
Spanish government, had sent the militia, permitted
by the recent act of parliament to volunteer for
foreign service, to Holland, and with them the
other reinforcements originally promised for the
army in France: two or three regiments of militia
only came to the Garonne when the war was over.
To make amends the ministers proposed that lord<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_605"></a>[605]</span>
William Bentinck should send four thousand men
from Sicily to land at Rosas, or some point in
France, and so join lord Wellington, who was
thus expected to extend his weakened force from
the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean in order to
cover the junction of this uncertain reinforcement.
In fine experience had taught the English statesmen
so little that we find their general thus addressing
them only one week previous to the
termination of the war.</p>

<p>Having before declared that he should be, contrary
to his wishes, forced to bring more Spaniards
into France, he says:—</p>

<p>“There are limits to the numbers with which
this army can contend and I am convinced your
lordship would not wish to see the safety and honour
of this handful of brave men depend upon the
doubtful exertions and discipline of an undue proportion
of Spanish troops.”—“The service in Holland
may doubtless be more important to the
national interest than that in this country, but I
hope it will be considered that that which is most
important of all is not <em>to lose</em> the brave army which
has struggled through its difficulties for nearly six
years.”</p>

<p>The French infantry was now re-organized in six
divisions commanded by Darricau, D’Armagnac,
Taupin, Maransin, Villatte and Harispe; general
Paris’ troops hitherto acting as an unattached<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
body were thus absorbed, the cavalry composed of
Berton’s and Vial’s brigades was commanded
by Pierre Soult, and there was a reserve division
of seven thousand conscripts, infantry under
general Travot. The division into wings and a
centre, each commanded by a lieutenant-general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_606"></a>[606]</span>
continued, yet this distinction was not attended to
in the movements. Reille though commanding the
right wing was at Maubourget on the left of the
line of battle; D’Erlon commanding the centre was
at Marsiac on the right covering the road to Auch;
Clauzel was at Rabastens forming a reserve to
both. The advanced guards were towards Plaissance
on the right, Madiran in the centre, and
Lembege on the left. Soult thus covered Tarbes,
and could move on a direct line by good roads
either to Auch or Pau.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington driven by necessity now sent<span class="sidenote7">March.</span>
orders to Giron’s Andalusians and Del Parque’s
troops to enter France from the Bastan, although
Freyre’s soldiers had by their outrages already
created a wide-spread consternation. His head-quarters
were fixed at Aire, his army was in position
on each side of the Adour, he had repaired all the
bridges behind him, restored that over the Lees in
his front, and dispersed some small bands which
had appeared upon his left flank and rear: Soult
had however organized a more powerful system of
partizans towards the mountains and only wanted
money to put them in activity. The main bodies
of the two armies were a long day’s march asunder,
but their advanced posts were not very distant, the
regular cavalry had frequent encounters and both
generals claimed the superiority though neither
made any particular report.</p>

<p>On the night of the 7th Soult thinking to find
only some weak parties at Pau sent a strong detachment
there to arrest the nobles who had assembled
to welcome the duke of Angoulême, but
general Fane getting there before him with a brigade
of infantry and two regiments of cavalry the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_607"></a>[607]</span>
stroke failed; however the French returning by
another road made prisoners of an officer and four
or five English dragoons. Meanwhile a second detachment
penetrating between Pau and Aire carried
off a post of correspondence; and two days after,
when Fane had quitted Pau, a French officer
accompanied by only four hussars captured there
thirty-four Portuguese with their commander and
ten loaded mules. The French general having by
these excursions obtained exact intelligence of
Beresford’s march to Bordeaux resolved to attack
the allies, and the more readily that Napoleon had
recently sent him instructions to draw the war to
the side of Pau keeping his left resting on the
Pyrenees, which accorded with his own designs.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington’s main body was now concentrated
round <ins class="corr" id="tn-607" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Aire and Barcelone'">
Aire and Barcelona</ins>, yet divided by
the Adour and the advanced guards were pushed to
Garlin, Conchez, Viella, Riscle and Pouydraguien,<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_10">See plan 10.</a></span>
that is to say, on a semicircle to the front and
about half a march in advance. Soult therefore
thought to strike a good blow, and gathering his
divisions on the side of Maubourget the 12th,
marched on the 13th, designing to throw himself
upon the high tabular land between Pau and Aire,
and then act according to circumstances.</p>

<p>The country was suited to the action of all arms,
offering a number of long and nearly parallel ridges
of moderate height, the sides of which were sometimes
covered with vineyards, but the summits
commonly so open that troops could move along
them without much difficulty, and between these
ranges a number of small rivers and muddy
fords descended from the Pyrenees to the
Adour. This conformation determined the order of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_608"></a>[608]</span>
the French general’s march which followed the
courses of these rivers. Leaving one regiment of
cavalry to watch the valley of the Adour he moved
with the rest of his army by Lembege upon
Conchez down the smaller Lees. Clauzel thus seized
the high land of Daisse and pushed troops to Portet;
Reille supported him at Conchez; D’Erlon remained
behind that place in reserve. In this
position the head of the columns, pointing direct
upon Aire, separated Viella from Garlin which was
the right of general Hill’s position, and menaced that
general’s posts on the great Lees. Meanwhile Pierre
Soult marching with three regiments of cavalry
along the high land between the two Lees, reached
Mascaras and the castle of Sault, he thus covered
the left flank of the French army and pushed
Fane’s cavalry posts back with the loss of two
officers taken and a few men wounded. During this
movement Berton advancing from Madiran with
two regiments of cavalry towards Viella, on the
right flank of the French army, endeavoured to<span class="sidenote">Memoirs by general Berton, MSS.</span>
cross the Saye river at a difficult muddy ford near
the broken bridge. Sir John Campbell leading a
squadron of the fourth Portuguese cavalry overthrew<span class="sidenote">Note by sir John Campbell, MSS.</span>
the head of his column, but the Portuguese
horsemen were too few to dispute the passage
and Berton finally getting a regiment over higher
up, gained the table-land above, and charging the
rear of the retiring troops in a narrow way leading to
the Aire road killed several and took some prisoners,
amongst them Bernardo de Sà the since well-known
count of Bandeira.</p>

<p>This terminated the French operations for the
day, and lord Wellington imagining the arrival of
Suchet’s troops had made Soult thus bold, resolved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_609"></a>[609]</span>
to keep on the defensive until his reinforcements
and detachments could come up. Hill however
passed the greater Lees partly to support his posts
partly to make out the force and true direction of
the French movement, but he recrossed that river
during the night and finally occupied the strong
platform between Aire and Garlin which Soult
had designed to seize. Lord Wellington immediately
brought the third and sixth division and
the heavy cavalry over the Adour to his support,
leaving the light division with the hussar brigade
still on the right bank. The bulk of the army thus
occupied a strong position parallel with the Pau
road. The right was at Garlin, the left at Aire, the
front covered by the greater Lees a river difficult
to pass; Fane’s cavalry was extended along the
Pau road as far as Boelho, and on the left of the
Adour the hussars pushed the French cavalry
regiment left there back upon Plaissance.</p>

<p>On the morning of the 14th Soult intending to
fall on Hill, whose columns he had seen the evening
before on the right of the Lees, drove in the advanced
posts which had been left to cover the
retrograde movement, and then examined the allies’
new position; but these operations wasted the day,
and towards evening he disposed his army on the
heights between the two Lees, placing Clauzel and
D’Erlon at Castle Pugon opposite Garlin, and
Reille in reserve at Portet. Meanwhile Pierre
Soult carried three regiments of cavalry to Clarac,
on the Pau road, to intercept the communications
with that town and to menace the right flank of the
allies, against which the whole French army was
now pointing. Fane’s outposts being thus assailed
retired with some loss at first but they were soon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_610"></a>[610]</span>
supported and drove the French horsemen in disorder
clear off the Pau road to Carere.</p>

<p>Soult now seeing the strength of the position
above Aire, and hearing from the peasants that
forty or fifty thousand men were concentrated there,
feared to attack, but changing his plan resolved to
hover about the right flank of the allies in the hopes
of enticing them from their vantage-ground. Lord
Wellington on the other hand drew his cavalry
posts down the valley of the Adour, and keeping
close on that side massed his forces on the right in
expectation of an attack. In fine each general acting
upon false intelligence of the other’s strength was
afraid to strike. The English commander’s error
as to the junction of Suchet’s troops was encouraged
by Soult, who had formed his battalions upon two
ranks instead of three to give himself an appearance
of strength, and in the same view had caused his
reserve of conscripts to move in rear of his line of
battle. And he also judged the allies’ strength by
what it might have been rather than by what it
was; for though Freyre’s Spaniards and Ponsonby’s<span class="sidenote">Morning States, MSS.</span>
dragoons were now up, the whole force did not
exceed thirty-six thousand men, including the light
division and the hussars who were on the right
bank of the Adour. This number was however
increasing every hour by the arrival of detachments
and reserves; and it behoved Soult, who was entangled
in a country extremely difficult if rain
should fall, to watch that Wellington while holding
the French in check with his right wing did not
strike with his left by Maubourget and Tarbes, and
thus cast them upon the mountains about Lourdes.</p>

<p>This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of
the fall of Bordeaux, induced the French general to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_611"></a>[611]</span>
retire before day on the 16th to Lembege and Simacourbe,
where he occupied both sides of the two
branches of the Lees and the heights between them;
however his outposts remained at Conchez, and
Pierre Soult again getting upon the Pau road detached
a hundred chosen troopers against the allies’
communication with Orthes. Captain Dania commanding
these men making a forced march reached
Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised six officers and
eight medical men with their baggage, made a
number of other prisoners and returned on the
evening of the 18th. This enterprize extended to
such a distance from the army was supposed to be
executed by the bands, and seemed to indicate a
disposition for insurrection; wherefore lord Wellington
to check it seized the civil authorities at
Hagetnau, and declared that he would hang all the
peasants caught in arms and burn their villages.</p>

<p>The offensive movement of the French general
had now terminated, he sent his conscripts at once
to Toulouse and prepared for a rapid retreat on that
place. His recent operations had been commenced
too late, he should have been on the Lees the 10th
or 11th when there were not more than twenty
thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred
cavalry to oppose him between Aire and Garlin.
On the other hand the passive state of Wellington,
which had been too much prolonged, was now also at
an end, all his reinforcements and detachments were
either up or close at hand, and he could put in motion
six Anglo-Portuguese and three Spanish divisions
of infantry, furnishing forty thousand bayonets,<span class="sidenote">Morning States, MSS.</span>
with five brigades of cavalry, furnishing nearly six
thousand sabres, and from fifty to sixty pieces of
artillery.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_612"></a>[612]</span></p>

<p>On the evening of the 17th, the English general
pushed the hussars up the valley of the Adour, towards
Plaissance, supporting them with the light
division, which was followed at the distance of
half a march by the fourth division coming from
the side of Roquefort, on its return from Langon.</p>

<p>The 18th at daylight the whole army was in
movement, the hussars with the light and the fourth
division, forming the left, marched upon Plaissance;
Hill’s troops forming the right marched from Garlin
upon Conchez, keeping a detachment on the road to
Pau in observation of Pierre Soult’s cavalry. The<span class="sidenote7">Plan 10.</span>
main body moved in the centre, under Wellington
in person, to Viella, by the high road leading from
Aire to Maubourget. The French right was thus
turned by the valley of the Adour, while general
Hill with a sharp skirmish, in which about eighty
British and Germans were killed and wounded,
drove back their outposts upon Lembege.</p>

<p>Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge
having a small river with rugged banks, called the
Laiza, in his front, and his right under D’Erlon was
extended towards Vic Bigorre on the great road of
Tarbes. Meanwhile Berton’s cavalry, one regiment<span class="sidenote">Berton’s Memoir, MSS.</span>
of which retreating from Viella on the 16th disengaged
itself with some difficulty and loss, reached
Maubourget, and took post in column behind that
place, the road being confined on each side by deep
and wide ditches. In this situation pressed by Bock’s
cavalry, which preceded the centre column of the
allies, the French horsemen suddenly charged the
Germans, at first with success, taking an officer and
some men, but finally they were beaten and retreated
through Vic Bigorre. Soult thinking a flanking column
only was on this side in the valley of the Adour,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_613"></a>[613]</span>
resolved to fall upon it with his whole army; but he
recognised the skill of his opponent when he found
that the whole of the allies’ centre, moving by Madiran,<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span>
had been thrown on to the Tarbes road while
he was retiring from Lembege. This heavy mass was
now approaching Vic Bigorre, the light division, coming
from Plaissance up the right bank of the Adour,
were already near Auriebat, pointing to Rabastens,
upon which place the hussars had already driven
the French cavalry left in observation when the
army first advanced: Vic Bigorre was thus turned,
Berton’s horsemen had passed it in retreat and the
danger was imminent. The French general immediately
ordered Berton to support the cavalry regiment
at Rabastens and cover that road to Tarbes.
Then directing D’Erlon to take post at Vic Bigorre
and check the allies on the main road, he marched,
in person and in all haste, with Clauzel’s and
Reille’s divisions to Tarbes by a circuitous road
leading through Ger-sur-landes.</p>

<p>D’Erlon not seeming to comprehend the crisis
moved slowly, with his baggage in front, and having
the river Lechez to cross, rode on before his troops
expecting to find Berton at Vic Bigorre, but he
met the German cavalry there. Then indeed he
hurried his march yet he had only time to place
Darricau’s division, now under general Paris,
amongst some vineyards, two miles in front of Vic
Bigorre, when hither came Picton to the support of
the cavalry and fell upon him.</p>

<p><em>Combat of Vic Bigorre.</em>—The French left flank
was secured by the Lechez river, but their right,
extending towards the Adour, being loose was menaced
by the German cavalry while the front was
attacked by Picton. The action commenced about<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_614"></a>[614]</span>
two o’clock, and Paris was soon driven back in disorder,
but then D’Armagnac’s division entered the
line and extending to the Adour renewed the fight,
which lasted until D’Erlon, after losing many men,
saw his right turned, beyond the Adour, by the light
division and by the hussars who were now close to
Rabastens, whereupon he likewise fell back behind
Vic Bigorre, and took post for the night. The
action was vigorous. About two hundred and fifty
Anglo-Portuguese, men and officers, fell, and
amongst them died colonel Henry Sturgeon so often
mentioned in this history. Skilled to excellence in
almost every branch of war and possessing a variety
of accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently for
himself and so usefully for the service that envy
offered no bar to admiration, and the whole army
felt painfully mortified that his merits were passed
unnoticed in the public despatches.</p>

<p>Soult’s march through the deep sandy plain of
Ger was harassing, and would have been dangerous
if lord Wellington had sent Hill’s cavalry, now reinforced
by two regiments of heavy dragoons, in pursuit;
but the country was unfavorable for quick observation
and the French covered their movements
with rear-guards whose real numbers it was difficult
to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted on a
hill the end of which abutted on the high road, the
slope being clothed with trees and defended by skirmishers.
Lord Wellington was desirous to know
whether a small or a large force thus barred his
way, but all who endeavoured to ascertain the fact
were stopped by the fire of the enemy. At last
captain William Light, distinguished by the variety
of his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist,
seaman, and soldier, made the trial. He rode forward<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_615"></a>[615]</span>
as if he would force his way through the
French skirmishers, but when in the wood dropt his
reins and leaned back as if badly wounded; his
horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of
the enemy’s light troops, and they thinking him
mortally hurt ceased their fire and took no further
notice. He thus passed unobserved through the
wood to the other side of the hill, where there were
no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit
above, put spurs to his horse and galloped along
the French main line counting their regiments as he
passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress,
his daring confidence and his speed, made the
French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots
only were discharged, while he, dashing down the
opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the
very skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed
in front. Reaching the spot where lord Wellington
stood he told him there were but five battalions on
the hill.</p>

<p>Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse
by St. Gaudens was inevitable, yet determined to
dispute every position which offered the least advantage,
his army was on the morning of the 20th
again in line of battle on the heights of Oleac, two
or three miles behind Tarbes, and covering Tournay
on the road to St. Gaudens: however he still held
Tarbes with Clauzel’s corps, which was extended on
the right towards Trie, as if to retain a power of
retreat by that road to Toulouse. The plain of
Tarbes although apparently open was full of deep
ditches which forbad the action of horsemen, wherefore
he sent his brother with five regiments of
cavalry to the Trie road, with orders to cover the
right flank and observe the route to Auch, for he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_616"></a>[616]</span>
feared lest Wellington should intercept his retreat
by that line.</p>

<p>At day-break the allies again advanced in two
columns. The right under Hill moved along the
high road. The left under Wellington in person
was composed of the light division and hussars,
Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry, the sixth division and
Freyre’s Spaniards. It marched by the road from
Rabastens, and general Cole still making forced
marches with the fourth division and Vivian’s
cavalry, followed from Beaumarchez and La Deveze,
sending detachments through Marciac to watch
Pierre Soult on the side of Trie.</p>

<p><em>Combat of Tarbes.</em>—The Adour separated Wellington’s
columns, but when the left approached
Tarbes, the light division and the hussars bringing<span class="sidenote7">Plan 10.</span>
up their right shoulders attacked the centre of
Harispe’s division, which occupied the heights of
Orliex and commanded the road from Rabastens
with two guns. Under cover of this attack general
Clinton made a flank movement to his left through
the village of Dours, and opening a cannonade
against Harispe’s right endeavoured to get between
that general and Soult’s main position at
Oleac. Meanwhile general Hill moving by the
other bank of the Adour assailed the town and
bridge of Tarbes, which was defended by Villatte’s
division. These operations were designed to envelope
and crush Clauzel’s two divisions, which seemed
the more easy because there appeared to be only a
fine plain, fit for the action of all the cavalry, between
him and Soult. The latter however, having sent
his baggage and encumbrances off during the night,
saw the movement without alarm, he was better
acquainted with the nature of the plain behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_617"></a>[617]</span>
Harispe and had made roads to enable him to retreat
upon the second position without passing
through Tarbes. Nevertheless Clauzel was in
some danger, for while Hill menaced his left at
Tarbes, the light division supported with cavalry
and guns fell upon his centre at Orleix, and general
Clinton opening a brisk cannonade passed through
the villages of Oleat and Boulin, penetrated between
Harispe and Pierre Soult, and cut the latter off from
the army.</p>

<p>The action was begun about twelve o’clock.
Hill’s artillery thundered on the right, Clinton’s
answered it on the left, and Alten threw the light
division in mass upon the centre where Harispe’s
left brigade posted on a strong hill was suddenly
assailed by the three rifle battalions. Here the fight
was short yet wonderfully fierce and violent, for the
French, probably thinking their opponents to be
Portuguese on account of their green dress, charged
with great hardiness, and being encountered by
men not accustomed to yield, they fought muzzle
to muzzle, and it was difficult to judge at first who
would win. At last the French gave way, and
Harispe’s centre being thus suddenly overthrown
he retired rapidly through the fields, by the ways
previously opened, before Clinton could get into
his rear. Meanwhile Hill forced the passage of
the Adour at Tarbes and Villatte also retreated
along the high road to Tournay, but under a continued
cannonade. The flat country was now
covered with confused masses of pursuers and pursued,
all moving precipitately with an eager musquetry,
the French guns also replying as they
could to the allies’ artillery. The situation of the
retreating troops seemed desperate, but as Soult<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_618"></a>[618]</span>
had foreseen, the deep ditches and enclosures and
the small copses, villages, and farm-houses, prevented
the British cavalry from acting; Clauzel
therefore extricating his troops with great ability
from their dangerous situation, finally gained the
main position, where four fresh divisions were drawn
up in order of battle and immediately opened all
their batteries on the allies. The pursuit was thus
checked, and before lord Wellington could make
arrangements for a new attack darkness came on
and the army halted on the banks of the Larret and
Larros rivers. The loss of the French is unknown,
that of the allies did not exceed one hundred and
twenty, but of that number twelve officers and
eighty men were of the rifle battalions.</p>

<p>During the night Soult retreated in two columns,<span class="sidenote">Official Report, MSS.</span>
one by the main road, the other on the left of it,
guided by fires lighted on different hills as points
of direction. The next day he reached St. Gaudens
with D’Erlon’s and Reille’s corps, while Clauzel,<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Orders, MSS.</span>
who had retreated across the fields, halted at
Monrejean and was there rejoined by Pierre
Soult’s cavalry. This march of more than thirty
miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in
the most rapid manner. For the French general,
having now seen nearly all Wellington’s infantry
and his five thousand horsemen, and hearing from
his brother that the fourth division and Vivian’s
cavalry were pointing towards Mielan on his right,
feared that the allies would by Trie and Castlenau
suddenly gain the plains of Muret and intercept
his retreat upon Toulouse, which was his great depôt,
the knot of all his future combinations, and the only
position where he could hope to make a successful
stand with his small army.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_619"></a>[619]</span></p>

<p>The allies pursued in three columns by St. Gaudens,
Galan, and Trie, but their marches were short.</p>

<p>On the 21st Beresford who had assumed the
command of the left column was at Castlenau,
Hill in the vicinity of Lannemezan, Wellington at
Tournay.</p>

<p>The 22d Beresford was at Castlenau, Wellington
at Galan, Hill at Monrejean, and Fane’s horsemen
pushed forwards to St. Gaudens. Here four squadrons
of French cavalry were drawn up in front of
the town. Overthrown by two squadrons of the thirteenth
dragoons at the first shock, they galloped in
disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the
other side and were again broken and pursued for
two miles, many being sabred and above a hundred
taken prisoners. In this action the veteran major
Dogherty of the thirteenth was seen charging between
his two sons at the head of the leading squadron.</p>

<p>On the 23d Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford
at Puymauren, Wellington at Boulogne.</p>

<p>The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in
Lombez, Wellington at Isle en Dodon.</p>

<p>The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached
St. Foy, and Wellington was at Samatan.</p>

<p>The 26th Beresford entered St. Lys and marching
in order of battle by his left, while his cavalry
skirmished on the right, took post on the Auch
road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the
French army, which was on the Touch covering
Toulouse. The allies thus took seven days to march
what Soult had done in four.</p>

<p>This tardiness, idly characterized by French military
writers as the sign of timidity and indecision of
character, has been by English writers excused on
the score of wet weather and the encumbrance of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_620"></a>[620]</span>
a large train of artillery and pontoons; yet the
rain equally affected the French, and the pontoons
might have been as usefully waited for on the Garonne
after the French army had been pressed in its
retreat of ninety miles. It is more probable that
the English general, not exactly informed of Soult’s
real numbers nor of his true line of retreat, nor
perfectly acquainted with the country, was cautious;
because being then acrimoniously disputing with
the duke of Angoulême he was also uneasy as to
the state of the country behind him and on his
flanks. The partizans were beginning to stir, his
reinforcements from England and Portugal were
stopped, and admiral Penrose had not yet entered
the Garonne. On the other hand Ferdinand had entered
Spain and formed that engagement with Suchet
about the garrisons already mentioned. In fine,
lord Wellington found himself with about forty-five
thousand men composed of different nations,
the Spaniards being almost as dangerous as useful
to him, opposed to an able and obstinate enemy,
and engaged on a line of operations running more
than a hundred and fifty miles along the French
frontier. His right flank was likely to be vexed by
the partizans forming in the Pyrenees, his left
flank by those behind the Garonne on the right
bank of which a considerable regular force was
also collecting, while the generals commanding the
military districts beyond Toulouse were forming
corps of volunteers national guards and old soldiers
of the regular depôts: and ever he expected
Suchet to arrive on his front and overmatch him
in numbers. He was careful therefore to keep his
troops well in hand, and to spare them fatigue that
the hospitals might not increase. In battle their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_621"></a>[621]</span>
bravery would he knew bring him through any
crisis, but if wearing down their numbers by
forced marches he should cover the country with
small posts and hospital stations, the French people
would be tempted to rise against him. So little
therefore was his caution allied to timidity that it
was no slight indication of daring to have advanced
at all.</p>

<p>It does seem however that with an overwhelming
cavalry, and great superiority of artillery he
should not have suffered the French general so to
escape his hands. It must be admitted also that
Soult proved himself a very able commander. His
halting on the Adour, his success in reviving the
courage of his army, and the front he shewed in
hopes to prevent his adversary from detaching
troops against Bordeaux, were proofs not only of a
firm unyielding temper but of a clear and ready
judgment. For though, contrary to his hopes, lord
Wellington did send Beresford against Bordeaux, it
was not on military grounds but because treason
was there to aid him. Meanwhile he was forced to
keep his army for fifteen days passive within a few
miles of an army he had just defeated, permitting
his adversary to reorganize and restore the discipline
and courage of the old troops, to rally the
dispersed conscripts, to prepare the means of a
partizan warfare, to send off all his encumbrances
and sick to Toulouse, and to begin fortifying that
city as a final and secure retreat: for the works
there were commenced on the 3d or 4th of March,
and at this time the entrenchments covering the
bridge and suburb of St. Cyprien were nearly completed.
The French general was even the first to
retake the offensive after Orthes, too late indeed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_622"></a>[622]</span>
and he struck no important blow, and twice placed
his army in dangerous situations; but his delay
was a matter of necessity arising from the loss of
his magazines, and if he got into difficulties they
were inseparable from his operations and he extricated
himself again.</p>

<p>That he gained no advantages in fight is rather
argument for lord Wellington than against Soult.
The latter sought but did not find a favourable opportunity
to strike, and it would have been unwise,
because his adversary gave him no opening, to have
fallen desperately upon superior numbers in a
strong position with an army so recently defeated,
and whose restored confidence it was so essential
not to shake again by a repulse. He increased
that confidence by appearing to insult the allied
army with an inferior force, and in combination
with his energetic proclamation encouraged the
Napoleonists and alarmed the Bourbonists; lastly,
by his rapid retreat from Tarbes he gained two
days to establish and strengthen himself on his
grand position at Toulouse. And certainly he deceived
his adversary, no common general and at
the head of no common army; for so little did
Wellington expect him to make a determined stand
there, that in a letter written on the 26th to sir
John Hope, he says, “I fear the Garonne is too
full and large for our bridge, if not we shall be in
that town (Toulouse) I hope immediately.”</p>

<p>The French general’s firmness and the extent of
his views cannot however be fairly judged by
merely considering his movements in the field.
Having early proved the power of his adversary,
he had never deceived himself about the ultimate
course of the campaign and therefore struggled<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_623"></a>[623]</span>
without hope, a hard and distressing task; yet he
showed no faintness, fighting continually, and always
for delay as thinking Suchet would finally
cast personal feelings aside and strike for his
country. Nor did he forbear importuning that
marshal to do so. Notwithstanding his previous<span class="sidenote9">Choumara.</span>
disappointments he wrote to him again on the 9th
of February, urging the danger of the crisis, the
certainty that the allies would make the greatest
effort on the western frontier, and praying him to
abandon Catalonia and come with the bulk of his
troops to Bearn: in the same strain he wrote to
the minister of war, and his letters reached their
destinations on the 13th. Suchet, having no orders
to the contrary, could therefore have joined him with
thirteen thousand men before the battle of Orthes;
but that marshal giving a deceptive statement of
his forces in reply, coldly observed, that if he
marched anywhere it would be to join the emperor
and not the duke of Dalmatia. The latter continued
notwithstanding to inform him of all his
battles and his movements, and his accumulating
distresses, yet in vain, and Suchet’s apathy would
be incredible but for the unequivocal proofs of it
furnished in the work of the French engineer
Choumara.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_624"></a>[624]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_V">CHAPTER V.</h3>
</div>


<p class="noindent">The two armies being now once more in presence of<span class="sidenote7">1814. March.</span>
each other and with an equal resolution to fight, it is
fitting to show the peculiar calculations upon which
the generals founded their respective combinations.
Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country and
chose Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient
capital of the south contained fifty thousand
inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the
Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads
on both sides of that river, and the chief military
arsenal of the south of France. Here he could most
easily feed his troops, assemble arm and discipline
the conscripts, controul and urge the civil authorities,
and counteract the machinations of the discontented.
Posted at Toulouse he was master of
various lines of operations. He could retire upon
Suchet by Carcassone, or towards Lyons by Alby.
He could take a new position behind the Tarn and
prolong the contest by defending successively that
river and the Lot, retreating if necessary upon Decaen’s
army of the Gironde, and thus drawing the
allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had
before drawn them up the left bank, being well
assured that lord Wellington must follow him, and
with weakened forces as it would be necessary to
leave troops in observation of Suchet.</p>

<p>His first care was to place a considerable body of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_625"></a>[625]</span>
troops, collected from the depôts and other parts of
the interior at Montauban, under the command of
general Loverdo, with orders to construct a bridge-head
on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that
river, and a strong point of retreat and assembly for all
the detachments sent to observe the Garonne below
Toulouse, was thus secured, and withal the command
of a number of great roads leading to the interior of
France, consequently the power of making fresh
combinations. To maintain himself as long as possible
in Toulouse was however a great political object.
It was the last point which connected him at
once with Suchet and with Decaen; and while he
held it, both the latter general and the partizans
in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on
their own side, against the long lines of communications
maintained by Wellington with Bordeaux and
Bayonne. Suchet also could do the same, either by
marching with his whole force or sending a detachment
through the Arriege department to the Upper
Garonne, where general Lafitte having seven or eight
hundred men, national guards and other troops, was
already in activity. These operations Soult now
strongly urged Suchet to adopt, but the latter treated
the proposition, as he had done all those before made
from the same quarter, with contempt.</p>

<p>Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of
battle.</p>

<p>The Garonne, flowing on the west, presented to the
allies a deep loop, at the bottom of which was the
bridge, completely covered by the suburb of St.
Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall
three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers:
these defences Soult had improved and he added a
line of exterior entrenchments.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_626"></a>[626]</span></p>

<p>Beyond the Garonne was the city, surrounded by<span class="sidenote7">Plan 10.</span>
an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to
admit sixteen and twenty-four pound guns.</p>

<p>The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the
Garonne a few miles below the town, wound for the
most part within point-blank shot of the walls, covering
them on the north and east as the Garonne
and St. Cyprien did on the west.</p>

<p>The suburbs of St. Stephen and Guillermerie,
built on both sides of this canal, furnished outworks
on the west, for they were entrenched and connected
with and covered by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon,
also entrenched and flanking the approaches to
the canal both above and below these suburbs.</p>

<p>Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong
ridge, called the Mont Rave, run nearly parallel
with the canal, its outer slope was exceedingly
rugged and overlooked a marshy plain through
which the Ers river flowed.</p>

<p>The south side of the town opened on a plain, but
the suburb of St. Michel lying there, between the
Garonne and the canal, furnished another advanced
defence, and at some distance beyond, a range of
heights called the Pech David commenced, trending
up the Garonne in a direction nearly parallel to
that river.</p>

<p>Such being the French general’s position, he calculated,
that as lord Wellington could not force the
passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an
enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the
flanks above or below Toulouse, and leave a sufficient
force to blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having
the French army issue on that side against his communications.
If he passed the Garonne above its
confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_627"></a>[627]</span>
that river also, which could not be effected nearer
than Cintegabelle, one march higher up. Then he
must come down by the right of the Arriege, an
operation not to be feared in a country which
the recent rains had rendered impracticable for
guns. If the allies passed the Garonne below the
confluence of the Arriege, Soult judged that he
could from the Pech David, and its continuation,
overlook their movements, and that he should be in
position to fall upon the head of their column while
in the disorder of passing the river: if he failed in
this he had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont
Rave to retire upon, where he could fight again,
his retreat being secure upon Montauban.</p>

<p>For these reasons the passage of the Garonne
above Toulouse would lead to no decisive result and
he did not fear it, but a passage below the city was
a different matter. Lord Wellington could thus cut
him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from
the northern and eastern quarters; and if the French
then lost the battle they could only retreat by Carcassonne
to form a junction with Suchet in Roussillon,
where having their backs to the mountains and
the allies between them and France they could not
exist. Hence feeling certain the attack would finally
be on that side, Soult lined the left bank of the Garonne
with his cavalry as far as the confluence of
the Tarn, and called up general Despeaux’s troops
from Agen in the view of confining the allies to the
space between the Tarn and the Garonne: for his
first design was to attack them there rather than
lose his communication with Montauban.</p>

<p>On the other hand lord Wellington whether from
error from necessity or for the reasons I have before
touched upon, having suffered the French army to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_628"></a>[628]</span>
gain three days’ march in the retreat from Tarbes,
had now little choice of operations. He could not
halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops
should join him from the Bastan, without giving
Soult all the time necessary to strengthen himself
and organize his plan of defence, nor without appearing
fearful and weak in the eyes of the French
people, which would have been most dangerous.
Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He
had taken the offensive and could not resume the
defensive with safety, the invasion of France once
begun it was imperative to push it to a conclusion.
Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers
his business was to bring his adversary to battle
as soon as possible, and as he could not force his
way through St. Cyprien in face of the whole French
army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne
above or below Toulouse.</p>

<p>It has been already shown that in a strategic view
this passage should have been made below that
town, but seeing that the south side of the city was
the most open to attack, the English general resolved
to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above
Toulouse, designing to throw his right wing suddenly<span class="sidenote">Manuscript notes by the duke of Wellington.</span>
into the open country between the Garonne
and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre
and left he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien. With
this object, at eight o’clock in the evening of the 27th,
one of Hill’s brigades marched up from Muret, some
men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced,
the remainder of that general’s troops being to pass
at midnight. But when the river was measured the
width was found too great for the pontoons and
there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore
this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_629"></a>[629]</span>
some considerable advantage would probably<span class="sidenote">French Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
have been gained, since it does not appear that Soult
knew of the attempt until two days later, and then
only by his emissaries, not by his scouts.</p>

<p>Wellington thus baffled tried another scheme, he
drove the enemy from the Touch river on the 28th,
and collected the infantry of his left and centre
about Portet, masking the movement with his cavalry.
In the course of the operation a single squadron of
the eighteenth hussars, under major Hughes, being
inconsiderately pushed by colonel Vivian across the
bridge of St. Martyn de la Touch, suddenly came upon<span class="sidenote">Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.</span>
a whole regiment of French cavalry; the rashness of
the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety
of the British, for the enemy thinking that a strong
support must be at hand discharged their carbines
and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the
speed of both sides increased, and as the nature of
the road did not admit of any egress to the sides, this
great body of French horsemen was pushed headlong
by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.</p>

<p>During these movements Hill’s troops were withdrawn
to St. Roques, but in the night of the 30th a
new bridge being laid near Pensaguel, two miles
above the confluence of the Arriege, that general
passed the Garonne with two divisions of infantry,
Morillo’s Spaniards, Gardiner’s and Maxwell’s artillery,
and Fane’s cavalry, in all thirteen thousand
sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket
brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition
by the great road, having orders to seize
the stone bridge of Cintegabelle, fifteen miles up the
Arriege, and, on the march, to secure a ferry-boat
known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the
troops followed, the intent being to pass the Arriege<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_630"></a>[630]</span>
river hastily at Cintegabelle, and so come down the
right bank to attack Toulouse on the south while
lord Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march
was to have been made privily in the night, but the
bridge, though ordered for the evening of the 30th,
was not finished until five o’clock in the morning of
the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the enterprise in
time to observe from the heights of Old Toulouse
the strength of the column, and to ascertain that the
great body of the army still remained in front of
St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the country on
the right of the Arriege was known to him, and the
suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in
a state to resist a partial attack, the matter appeared
a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse
while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne
passed below the city. In this persuasion he kept<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
his infantry in hand, and sent only his cavalry up
the right bank of the Arriege to observe the march
of the allies; but he directed general Lafitte, who
had collected some regular horsemen and the national
guards of the department, to hang upon their
skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet’s army.
He was however somewhat disquieted, because the
baggage, which to avoid encumbering the march had
been sent up the Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being
seen by his scouts, was reported to be a second
column, increasing Hill’s force to eighteen thousand
men.</p>

<p>While in this uncertainty he heard of the measurement
of the river made at Portet on the night of
the 27th, and that many guns were still collected
there, wherefore, being ignorant of the cause why the
bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a
design to cross there also when Hill should descend<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_631"></a>[631]</span>
the Arriege. To meet this danger, he put four<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
divisions under Clauzel, with orders to fall upon the
head of the allies if they should attempt the
passage before Hill came down, resolving in the
contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse
and on the Mont-Rave, because the positions on the
right of the Arriege were all favourable to the
assailants. He was however soon relieved from
anxiety. General Hill effected indeed the passage
of the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry
towards Villefranche and Nailloux, but his artillery
were quite unable to move in the deep country
there, and as success and safety alike depended on
rapidity he returned during the night to Pinsaguel,
recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons
left only a flying bridge with a small guard of
infantry and cavalry on the right bank. His retreat
was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen who picked up
a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred,
and Soult remained well pleased that his
adversary had thus lost three or four important
days.</p>

<p>The French general was now sure the next attempt<span class="sidenote7">April.</span>
would be below Toulouse, yet he changed his design
of marching down the Garonne to fight between
that river and the Tarn rather than lose his communications
with Montauban. Having completed
his works of defence for the city and the suburbs,
and fortified all the bridges over the canal, he concluded
not to abandon Toulouse under any circumstances,
and therefore set his whole army and all
the working population to entrench the Mont
Rave, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking
he might thus securely meet the shock of battle let
it come on which side it would. Meanwhile the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_632"></a>[632]</span>
Garonne continued so full and rapid that lord Wellington
was forced to remain inactive before St.
Cyprien until the evening of the 3d; then the
waters falling, the pontoons were carried in the night
to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse, where
the bridge was at last thrown and thirty guns
placed in battery on the left bank to protect it.
The third fourth and sixth divisions of infantry
and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford,
immediately passed, and the cavalry being
pushed out two leagues on the front and flanks
captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the
French army. But now the river again swelled so
fast, that the light division and the Spaniards were
unable to follow, the bridge got damaged and the
pontoons were taken up.</p>

<p>This passage was made known to Soult immediately
by his cavalry scouts, yet he knew not the
exact force which had crossed, and as Morillo’s
Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, had taken
the outposts in front of St. Cyprien he imagined
Hill also had moved to Grenade, and that the greatest
part of the allied army was over the Garonne.
Wherefore merely observing Beresford with his
cavalry he continued to strengthen his field of battle
about Toulouse, his resolution to keep that city
being confirmed by hearing on the 7th that the
allied sovereigns had entered Paris.</p>

<p>On the 8th the waters subsided, the allies’ bridge
was again laid down, Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese
artillery crossed, and lord Wellington taking
the command in person advanced to the heights of
Fenoulhiet within five miles of Toulouse. Marching
up both banks of the Ers his columns were separated
by that river, which was impassable without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_633"></a>[633]</span>
pontoons, and it was essential to secure as soon as
possible one of the stone bridges. Hence when his
left approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the
great road of Alby, Vivian’s horsemen drove Berton’s
cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the
bridge of Bordes, and the eighteenth hussars descended
towards that of Croix d’Orade. The latter was
defended by Vial’s dragoons, and after some skirmishing
the eighteenth was suddenly menaced by a
regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite
bank of the river being lined with dismounted carbineers.
The two parties stood facing each other,
hesitating to begin, until the approach of some
British infantry, when both sides sounded a charge
at the same moment, but the English horses were
so quick the French were in an instant jammed up
on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and
the mass breaking away to the rear went off in
disorder, leaving many killed and wounded and
above a hundred prisoners in the hands of the
victors. They were pursued through the village of
Croix d’Orade, but beyond it they rallied on the
rest of their brigade and advanced again, the hussars
then recrossed the bridge, which was now defended
by the British infantry whose fire stopped the
French cavalry. The communication between the
allied columns was thus secured.</p>

<p>The credit of this brilliant action was given to
Colonel Vivian in the despatch, incorrectly, for
that officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous
to the charge at the bridge: the attack was conceived
and conducted entirely by major Hughes
of the eighteenth.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington from the heights of Kirie Eleison,
carefully examined the French general’s position<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_634"></a>[634]</span>
and resolved to attack on the 9th. Meanwhile
to shorten his communications with general Hill he
directed the pontoons to be removed from Grenade
and relaid higher up at Seilh. The light division
were to cross at the latter place at daybreak, but the
bridge was not relaid until late in the day, and the
English general extremely incensed at the failure
was forced to defer his battle until the 10th.</p>

<p>Soult’s combinations were now crowned with
success. He had by means of his fortresses, his
battles, the sudden change of his line of operations
after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his
clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next
point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary
to an equality with his own. He had gained
seventeen days for preparation, had brought the
allies to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted
for defence, and well fortified; where one-third of
their force was separated by a great river from the
rest, where they could derive no advantage from
their numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in
artillery notwithstanding their previous superiority
in that arm.</p>

<p>His position covered three sides of Toulouse.
Defending St. Cyprien on the west with his left, he
guarded the canal on the north with his centre,
and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east.
His reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of
Toulouse, and the urban guards while maintaining
tranquillity aided to transport the artillery and
ammunition to different posts. Hill was opposed to
his left, but while the latter, well fortified at St. Cyprien,
had short and direct communication with the
centre by the great bridge of Toulouse, the former
could only communicate with the main body under<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_635"></a>[635]</span>
Wellington by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit
of ten or twelve miles.</p>

<p>The English general was advancing from the
north, but his intent was still to assail the city on
the south side, where it was weakest in defence.
With this design he had caused the country on the
left of the Ers to be carefully examined, in the view
of making, under cover of that river, a flank march
round the eastern front and thus gaining the open
ground which he had formerly endeavoured to reach
by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. But again he
was baffled by the deep country, which he could
not master so as to pass the Ers by force, because
all the bridges with the exception of that at Croix
d’Orade were mined or destroyed by Soult, and
the whole of the pontoons were on the Garonne.
There was then no choice save to attack from the
northern and eastern sides. The first, open and flat,
and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban
and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence,
because the canal, the bridges over which were
strongly defended by works, was under the fire of
the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part
within musquet-shot. Here then, as at St. Cyprien,
it was a fortress and not a position which was
opposed to him, and his field of battle was necessarily
confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.</p>

<p>This range of heights, naturally strong and
rugged, and covered by the Ers river, which as we
have seen <ins class="corr" id="tn-635" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'was not be forded'">
was not to be forded</ins>, presented two distinct
platforms, that of Calvinet, and that of St. Sypiere
on which the extreme right of the French was
posted. Between them, where the ground dipped a
little, two roads leading from Lavaur and Caraman
were conducted to Toulouse, passing the canal behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_636"></a>[636]</span>
the ridge at the suburbs of Guillemerie and
St. Etienne.</p>

<p>The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme
left with a species of horn-work, consisting of several
open retrenchments and small works, supported by
two large redoubts, one of which flanked the approaches
to the canal on the north: a range of
abbatis was also formed there by felling the trees
on the Alby road. Continuing this line to the
right, two other large forts, called the Calvinet
and the Colombette redoubts, terminated the works
on this platform.</p>

<p>On that of St. Sypiere there were also two redoubts,
one on the extreme right called St. Sypiere,
the other without a name nearer to the road of
Caraman.</p>

<p>The whole range of heights occupied was
about two miles long, and an army attacking in
front would have to cross the Ers under fire, advance
through ground, naturally steep and marshy, and
now rendered almost impassable by means of artificial
inundations, to the assault of the ridge and the
works on the summit; and if the assailants should even
force between the two platforms, they would, while
their flanks were battered by the redoubts above,
come upon the works of Cambon and Saccarin. If
these fell the suburbs of Guillemerie and St.
Steven, the canal, and finally the ramparts of
the town, would still have to be carried in succession.
But it was not practicable to pass the
Ers except by the bridge of Croix d’Orade which
had been seized so happily on the 8th. Lord Wellington
was therefore reduced to make a flank march<span class="sidenote">Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.</span>
under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and
then to carry the latter with a view of crossing the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_637"></a>[637]</span>
canal above the suburb of Guillemerie, and establishing
his army on the south side of Toulouse,
where only the city could be assailed with any hope
of success.</p>

<p>To impose this march upon him all Soult’s dispositions
had been directed. For this he had mined
all the bridges on the Ers, save only that of Croix
d’Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the
Ers and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond
that river by sending half his cavalry over to
dispute the passage of the numerous streams in the
deep country on the right bank. His army was
now disposed in the following order. General Reille
defended the suburb of St. Cyprien with Taupin’s
and Maransin’s divisions. Daricau’s division lined
the canal on the north from its junction with the
Garonne to the road of Alby, defending with his
left the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the
Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge
with his right. Harispe’s division was established
in the works on the Mont-Rave. His right at St.
Sypiere looked towards the bridge of Bordes, his
centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which
Vial’s horsemen were also collected; his left looked
down the road of Alby towards the bridge of Croix
d’Orade. On this side a detached eminence
within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, was
occupied by St. Pol’s brigade, drawn from Villatte’s
division. The two remaining divisions of infantry<span class="sidenote7">Plan 10.</span>
were formed in columns at certain points behind the
Mont Rave, and Travot’s reserve continued to man
the walls of Toulouse behind the canal. This line
of battle presented an angle towards the Croix
d’Orade, each side about two miles in length and
the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_638"></a>[638]</span></p>

<p>Wellington having well observed the ground on
the 8th and 9th, made the following disposition of
attack for the 10th. General Hill was to menace
St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to
draw the enemy’s attention according to the progress
of the battle on the right of the Garonne, which he
could easily discern. The third and light divisions
and Freyre’s Spaniards, being already on the left of
the Ers, were to advance against the northern front
of Toulouse. The two first supported by Bock’s
German cavalry were to make demonstrations
against the line of canal defended by Daricau. That
is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux
and the convent of the Minimes, while Alten
maintained the communication between him and
Freyre who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery,
was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover
Beresford’s column of march. This last composed
of the fourth and sixth division with three batteries
was, after passing the bridge of Croix d’Orade, to
move round the left of the Pugade and along the
low ground between the French heights and the
Ers, until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur,
when the two divisions were to wheel into line and
attack the platform of St. Sypiere. Freyre was
then to assail that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons
following close were to connect that general’s
left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile lord Edward
Somerset’s hussars were to move up the left of
the Ers, while Vivian’s cavalry moved up the right
of that river, each destined to observe Berton’s
cavalry, which, having possession of the bridges of
Bordes and Montaudran higher up, could pass from
the right bank to the left, and destroying the bridge fall
upon the head of Beresford’s troops while in march.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_639"></a>[639]</span></p>


<h4>BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.</h4>

<p>The 10th of April at two o’clock in the
morning the light division passed the Garonne
by the bridge at Seilh, and about six o’clock
the whole army moved forwards in the order
assigned for the different columns. Picton and
Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced
posts behind the works at the bridge over the
canal. Freyre’s columns, marching along the Alby
road, were cannonaded by St. Pol with two guns
until they had passed a small stream by the help of
some temporary bridges, when the French general
following his instructions retired to the horn-work
on the Calvinet platform. The Spaniards were thus
established on the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese
guns under major Arentschild opened a
heavy cannonade against Calvinet. Meanwhile
Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from
Croix d’Orade in three columns abreast. Passing
behind the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc,
he entered the marshy ground between the
Ers river and the Mont Rave, but he left his artillery
at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep
and difficult country under the fire of the enemy.
Beyond the Ers on his left, Vivian’s cavalry, now
under colonel Arentschild, drove Berton’s horsemen<span class="sidenote">Memoir by general Berton, MSS.</span>
back with loss, and nearly seized the bridge of
Bordes which the French general passed and destroyed
with difficulty at the last moment. However
the German hussars succeeded in gaining the
bridge of Montaudran higher up, though it was
barricaded, and defended by a detachment of cavalry<span class="sidenote">Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.</span>
sent there by Berton who remained himself in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_640"></a>[640]</span>
position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down
the left of the Ers.</p>

<p>While these operations were in progress, general
Freyre who had asked as a favour to lead the battle
at Calvinet, whether from error or impatience assailed
the horn-work on that platform about eleven
o’clock and while Beresford was still in march. The
Spaniards, nine thousand strong, moved in two lines
and a reserve, and advanced with great resolution
at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as to
embrace the end of the Calvinet hill. The French
musquetry and great guns thinned the ranks at
every step, yet closing upon their centre they still
ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were
exposed to increasing in violence until their right
wing, which was also raked from the bridge of Matabiau,
unable to endure the torment wavered.
The leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped
for shelter into a hollow road, twenty-five feet
deep in parts, and covering this part of the French
entrenchments; but the left wing and the second line
run back in great disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers
under colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining
their ground under cover of a bank which protected
them. Then the French came leaping out of
their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of
the hollow road poured an incessant stream of shot
upon the helpless crowds entangled in the gulph
below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau,
constructed to rake this opening, sent its
bullets from flank to flank hissing through the quivering
mass of flesh and bones.</p>

<p>The Spanish generals rallying the troops who
had fled, led them back again to the brink of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_641"></a>[641]</span>
fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage below and
the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror.
Again they fled, and again the French bounding
from their trenches pursued, while several battalions
sallying from the bridge of Matabiau and from
behind the Calvinet followed hard along the road of
Alby. The country was now covered with fugitives
whose headlong flight could not be restrained,
and with pursuers whose numbers and vehemence
increased, until lord Wellington, who was at that
point, covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby’s
cavalry, and the reserve artillery which
opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the Portuguese
guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a
brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left,
menaced the flank of the victorious French who
immediately retired to their entrenchments on Calvinet:
but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards
had been killed or wounded and their defeat was
not the only misfortune.</p>

<p>General Picton, regardless of his orders, which,
his temper on such occasions being known were especially
given, had turned his false attack into a
real one against the bridge of Jumeaux, and the
enemy fighting from a work too high to be forced
without ladders and approachable only along an
open flat, repulsed him with a loss of nearly four
hundred men and officers: amongst the latter
colonel Forbes of the forty-fifth was killed, and
general Brisbane who commanded the brigade was
wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to the
Garonne the French had completely vindicated
their position, the allies had suffered enormously,
and beyond the Garonne, although general Hill
had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_642"></a>[642]</span>
St. Cyprien and was menacing the second
line, the latter being much more contracted and
very strongly fortified could not be stormed.
The musquetry battle therefore subsided for a time,
but a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the
whole of the French line, and on the allies’ side
from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery
left by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the
Portuguese guns on the Pugade, poured its shot incessantly
against the works on the Calvinet platform:
injudiciously it has been said because the
ammunition thus used for a secondary object was
afterwards wanted when a vital advantage might
have been gained.</p>

<p>It was now evident that the victory must be won
or lost by Beresford, and yet from Picton’s error
lord Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision;
for the light division and the heavy cavalry
only remained in hand, and these troops were
necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the
Spaniards, and to protect the artillery employed to
keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore
approached with all happy promise to the French
general. The repulse of Picton, the utter dispersion
of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second
line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled
him to draw, first Taupin’s whole division, and then
one of Maransin’s brigades from that quarter, to
reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus
three divisions and his cavalry, that is to say nearly
fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for an
offensive movement without in any manner weakening
the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on
the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon<span class="sidenote">Morning States, MSS.</span>
Beresford, whose force, originally less than thirteen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_643"></a>[643]</span>
thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced as it made
slow and difficult way for two miles through a deep
marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses.
For sometimes moving in mass, sometimes
filing under the French musquetry, and always
under the fire of their artillery from the Mont Rave,
without a gun to reply, the length of the column
had augmented so much at every step from the
difficulty of the way that frequent halts were necessary
to close up the ranks.</p>

<p>The flat miry ground between the river and the
heights became narrower and deeper as the troops
advanced, Berton’s cavalry was ahead, an impassable
river was on the left, and three French
divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed
the right flank! Fortune came to their
aid. Soult always eyeing their march, had, when
the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin’s division
to the platform of St. Sypiere, and supporting
it with a brigade of D’Armagnac’s division disposed
the whole about the redoubts. From thence
after a short hortative to act vigorously he ordered
Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the
same time directing a regiment of Vial’s cavalry to
descend the heights by the Lavaur road and intercept
the line of retreat, while Berton’s horsemen
assailed the other flank from the side of the bridge
of Bordes. But this was not half of the force
which the French general might have employed.
Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still in
the streets of Toulouse, and that general instead
of attacking at once took ground to his right,
waiting until Beresford having completed his flank
march had wheeled into lines at the foot of the
heights.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_644"></a>[644]</span></p>

<p>Taupin’s infantry, unskilfully arranged for action
it is said, at last poured down the hill, but
some rockets discharged in good time ravaged the
ranks and with their noise and terrible appearance,
unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers;
then the British skirmishers running forwards plied
them with a biting fire, and Lambert’s brigade of
the sixth division, aided by Anson’s brigade and
some provisional battalions of the fourth division,
for it is an error to say the sixth division alone repulsed
this attack, Lambert’s brigade I say, rushed
forwards with a terrible shout, and the French turning
fled back to the upper ground. Vial’s horsemen
trotting down the Lavaur road now charged
on the right flank, but the second and third lines of
the sixth division being thrown into squares repulsed
them, and on the other flank general Cole
had been so sudden in his advance up the heights,
that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity to charge.
Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry
in his front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of
brigade, and without a check won the summit of
the platform, his skirmishers even descended in pursuit
on the reverse slope, and meanwhile, on his
left, general Cole meeting with less resistance had
still more rapidly gained the height at that side:
so complete was the rout that the two redoubts
were abandoned from panic, and the French with the
utmost disorder sought shelter in the works of Sacarin
and Cambon.</p>

<p>Soult astonished at this weakness in troops from
whom he had expected so much, and who had but
just before given him assurances of their resolution
and confidence, was in fear that Beresford pushing
his success would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_645"></a>[645]</span>
on the canal. Wherefore, covering the flight
as he could with the remainder of Vial’s cavalry, he
hastily led D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to the
works of Sacarin, checked the foremost British skirmishers
and rallied the fugitives; Taupin’s guns
arrived from the town at the same moment, and the
mischief being stayed a part of Travot’s reserve
immediately moved to defend the bridge of the
Demoiselles. A fresh order of battle was thus organized,
but the indomitable courage of the British
soldiers overcoming all obstacles and all opposition,
had decided the first great crisis of the fight.</p>

<p>Lambert’s brigade immediately wheeled to its
right across the platform on the line of the Lavaur
road, menacing the flank of the French on the
Calvinet platform, while Pack’s Scotch brigade
and Douglas’s Portuguese, composing the second
and third lines of the sixth division, were disposed
on the right with a view to march against the Colombette
redoubts on the original front of the enemy.
And now also the eighteenth and German hussars,
having forced the bridge of Montaudran on the
Ers river, came round the south end of the Mont
Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers of
the fourth division they menaced the bridge of the
Demoiselles, from whence and from the works of
Cambon and Sacarin the enemy’s guns played
incessantly.</p>

<p>The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely
changed. The French thrown entirely on the
defensive occupied three sides of a square. Their
right, extending from the works of Sacarin to the redoubts
of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced
by Lambert, who was solidly posted on the platform
of St. Sypiere while the redoubts themselves<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_646"></a>[646]</span>
were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French
left thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau
awaited the renewed attack of the Spaniards, and
the whole position was very strong, not exceeding
a thousand yards on each side with the angles all
defended by formidable works. The canal and city
of Toulouse, its walls and entrenched suburbs,
offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while the
Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the
other, insured the power of retreat.</p>

<p>In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s
cavalry, the whole of Villatte’s division, one brigade
of Maransin’s, another of D’Armagnac’s, and with
the exception of the regiment driven from the St.
Sypiere redoubt the whole of Harispe’s division.
On the allies’ side therefore defeat had been staved
off, but victory was still to be contended for, and
with apparently inadequate means; for Picton
being successfully opposed by Darricau was so far
paralyzed, the Spaniards rallying slowly were not
to be depended upon for another attack, and there
remained only the heavy cavalry and the light
division, which lord Wellington could not venture
to thrust into the action under pain of being left
without any reserve in the event of a repulse. The
final stroke therefore was still to be made on the
left, and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert’s
brigade and the fourth division were necessarily
employed to keep in check the French troops
at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon and Sacarin.
This heavy mass, comprising one brigade of
Travot’s reserve, the half of D’Armagnac’s division
and all of Taupin’s, together with the regiment belonging
to Harispe which had abandoned the forts
of St. Sypiere, was commanded by general Clauzel,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_647"></a>[647]</span>
who disposed the greater part in advance of the
entrenchments as if to retake the offensive.</p>

<p>Such was the state of affairs about half-past two
o’clock, when Beresford renewed the action with
Pack’s Scotch brigade, and the Portuguese of the
sixth division under colonel Douglas. These
troops, ensconced in the hollow Lavaur road on
Lambert’s right, had been hitherto well protected from
the fire of the French works, but now scrambling
up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to
their left by wings of regiments as they could get
out, and ascending the heights by the slope facing
the Ers, under a wasting fire of cannon and musquetry
carried all the French breast-works, and the
Colombette, and Calvinet redoubts. It was a surprising
action when the loose disorderly nature of the
attack imposed by the difficulty of the ground is
considered; but the French although they yielded
at first to the thronging rush of the British troops
soon rallied and came back with a reflux. Their
cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and
the struggle became terrible. For Harispe, who
commanded in person at this part, and under whom
the French seemed always to fight with redoubled
vigour, brought up fresh men, and surrounding the
two redoubts with a surging multitude absolutely
broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths
of the forty-second, and drove the rest out.
The British troops were however supported by the
seventy-first and ninety-first, and the whole clinging
to the brow of the hill fought with a wonderful
courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen
that their order of battle was reduced to a thin line
of skirmishers. Some of the British cavalry then
rode up from the low ground and attempted a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_648"></a>[648]</span>
charge, but they were stopped by a deep hollow
road, of which there were many, and some of the
foremost troopers tumbling headlong in perished.
Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued
fiercely, the French from their numbers had
certainly the advantage, but they never retook the
Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents
down from the brow of the hill. At last when the
whole of the sixth division had rallied and again
assailed them, flank and front, when their generals
Harispe and Baurot had fallen dangerously wounded
and the Colombette was retaken by the seventy-ninth,
the battle turned, and the French finally
abandoned the platform, falling back partly by their
right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the
bridge of Matabiau.</p>

<p>It was now about four o’clock. The Spaniards
during this contest had once more partially attacked,
but they were again put to flight, and the French
thus remained masters of their entrenchments in
that quarter; for the sixth division had been very
hardly handled, and Beresford halted to reform
his order of battle and receive his artillery: it
came to him indeed about this time, yet with great
difficulty and with little ammunition in consequence
of the heavy cannonade it had previously furnished
from Montblanc. However Soult seeing that the
Spaniards, supported by the light division, had
rallied a fourth time, that Picton again menaced the
bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while
Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave,
was now advancing along the summit, deemed farther
resistance useless and relinquished the northern
end of the Calvinet platform also. About five o’clock
he withdrew his whole army behind the canal,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_649"></a>[649]</span>
still however holding the advanced works of Sacarin
and Cambon. Lord Wellington then established
the Spaniards in the abandoned works and so
became master of the Mont Rave in all its extent.
Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The French
had five generals, and perhaps three thousand men
killed or wounded and they lost one piece of
artillery. The allies lost four generals and four
thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men and
officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards.
A lamentable spilling of blood, and a useless, for
before this period Napoleon had abdicated the
throne of France and a provisional government was
constituted at Paris.</p>

<p>During the night the French general, defeated
but undismayed, replaced the ammunition expended
in the action, re-organized and augmented his field
artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made
dispositions for fighting the next morning behind
the canal. Yet looking to the final necessity of a
retreat he wrote to Suchet to inform him of the
result of the contest and proposed a combined plan
of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity
of his temper. “March,” said he, “with
the whole of your forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne,
I will meet you there with my army, we can
then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the
seat of war to the Upper Garonne, and holding on
by the mountains oblige the enemy to recall his
troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to
recover that city and make a diversion in our
favour.”</p>

<p>On the morning of the 11th he was again ready
to fight, but the English general was not. The
French position, within musquet-shot of the walls<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_650"></a>[650]</span>
of Toulouse, was still inexpugnable on the northern
and eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave
was only a preliminary step to the passage of
the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles and other
points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon,
with the view of throwing the army as originally
designed on to the south side of the town. But this
was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions,
and a fresh provision of ammunition only to be obtained
from the parc on the other side of the Garonne.
Hence to accelerate the preparations, to
ascertain the state of general Hill’s position, and to
give that general farther instructions, lord Wellington
repaired on the 11th to St. Cyprien; but
though he had shortened his communications by
removing the pontoon bridge from Grenade to
Seilh, the day was spent before the ammunition
arrived and the final arrangements for the passage
of the canal could be completed. The attack was
therefore deferred until daylight on the 12th.</p>

<p>Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the
canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet
and menace Soult’s retreat by the road leading to
Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen
on the heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together
with the preparations in his front, taught
Soult that he could no longer delay if he would not
be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated
all his arrangements, he left eight pieces of
heavy artillery, two generals, the gallant Harispe
being one, and sixteen hundred men whose wounds
were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors;
then filing out of the city with surprising order and
ability, he made a forced march of twenty-two miles,
cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_651"></a>[651]</span>
Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche.
On the same day general Hill’s troops
were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit, and
the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur,
beat the French with the loss of twenty-five men,
and cut off a like number of <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> on the
side of Revel.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph,
the white flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux,
a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon
colours, but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had
retired with the French army. The British general,
true to his honest line of policy, did not fail to warn
the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement
must be at their own risk, but in the afternoon two
officers, the English colonel Cooke, and the French
colonel St. Simon, arrived from Paris. Charged to
make known to the armies the abdication of Napoleon
they had been detained near Blois by the officiousness
of the police attending the court of the empress
Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave
men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence.
Nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to the
war. When St. Simon in pursuance of his mission
reached Soult’s quarters on the 13th, that marshal,
not without just cause, demurred to his authority,
and proposed to suspend hostilities until
authentic information could be obtained from the
ministers of the emperor: then sending all his
incumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he
took a position of observation at Castelnaudary
and awaited the progress of events. Lord Wellington
refused to accede to his proposal, and
as general Loverdo, commanding at Montauban,
acknowledged the authority of the provincial<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_652"></a>[652]</span>
government and readily concluded an armistice,
he judged that Soult designed to make a civil
war and therefore marched against him. The 17th
the outposts were on the point of engaging when
the duke of Dalmatia, who had now received official
information from the chief of the emperor’s staff,
notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs
in France: and with this honourable distinction
that he had faithfully sustained the cause of his
great monarch until the very last moment.</p>

<p>A convention which included Suchet’s army was
immediately agreed upon, but that marshal had
previously adopted the white colours of his own
motion, and lord Wellington instantly transmitted
the intelligence to general Clinton in Catalonia and
to the troops at Bayonne. Too late it came for both
and useless battles were fought. That at Barcelona
has been already described, but at Bayonne misfortune
and suffering had fallen upon one of the
brightest soldiers of the British army.</p>


<h4>SALLY FROM BAYONNE.</h4>

<p>During the progress of the main army in the interior
sir John Hope conducted the investment of
Bayonne, with all the zeal the intelligence and unremitting
vigilance and activity which the difficult
nature of the operation required. He had gathered
great stores of gabions and fascines and platforms,
and was ready to attack the citadel when rumours
of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly
and without any official character to warrant a formal
communication to the garrison without lord Wellington’s
authority. These rumours were however<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_653"></a>[653]</span>
made known at the outposts, and perhaps lulled
the vigilance of the besiegers, but to such irregular
communications which might be intended to deceive
the governor naturally paid little attention.</p>

<p>The piquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were
at this time furnished by a brigade of the fifth division,
but from thence to the extreme right the
guards had charge of the line, and they had also one
company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber’s
German brigade was encamped as a support to the
left, the remainder of the first division was encamped
in the rear, towards Boucaut. In this state, about
one o’clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter,
coming over to general Hay who commanded the
outposts that night, gave an exact account of the
projected sally. The general not able to speak<span class="sidenote">Beamish’s History of the German Legion.</span>
French sent him to general Hinuber, who immediately
interpreting the man’s story to general Hay,
assembled his own troops under arms, and transmitted
the intelligence to sir John Hope. It would appear
that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s story,
took no additional precautions, and it is probable
that neither the German brigade nor the reserves of
the guards would have been put under arms but
for the activity of general Hinuber. However at
three o’clock the French, commencing with a false
attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured
suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three
thousand combatants. They surprised the piquets,
and with loud shouts breaking through the chain
of posts at various points, carried with one rush the
church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne
with exception of a fortified house which was defended
by captain Forster of the thirty-eighth regiment.
Masters of every other part and overthrowing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_654"></a>[654]</span>
all who stood before them they drove the picquets
and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road,
killed general Hay, took colonel Townsend of the
guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing
troops, and passing in rear of the right threw the
whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber,
having his Germans well in hand, moved up
on the side of St. Etienne, rallied some of the fifth
division, and being joined by a battalion of general
Bradford’s Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit
bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and
regained the village and church.</p>

<p>The combat on the right was at first even more
disastrous than in the centre, neither the piquets
nor the reserves were able to sustain the fury of the
assault and the battle was most confused and terrible;
for on both sides the troops, broken into small
bodies by the enclosures and unable to recover
their order, came dashing together in the darkness,
fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes
friends encountered sometimes foes: all was tumult
and horror. The guns of the citadel vaguely guided
by the flashes of the musquetry sent their shot and
shells booming at random through the lines of
fight, and the gun-boats dropping down the river
opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting
columns, which being put in motion by sir John
Hope on the first alarm were now coming up from
the side of Boucaut. Thus nearly one hundred
pieces of artillery were in full play at once, and the
shells having set fire to the fascine depôts and to
several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over
the striving masses.</p>

<p>Amidst this confusion sir John Hope suddenly
disappeared, none knew how or wherefore at the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_655"></a>[655]</span>
time, but it afterwards appeared, that having
brought up the reserves on the right, to stem the
torrent in that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by
a hollow road which led close behind the line of
picquets; the French had however lined both banks,
and when he endeavoured to return a shot struck
him in the arm, while his horse, a large one as was
necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, received
eight bullets and fell upon his leg. His followers
had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of
them, captain Herries, and Mr. Moore a nephew of
sir John Moore, seeing his helpless state turned
back and alighting endeavoured amidst the heavy
fire of the enemy to draw him from beneath the
horse. While thus engaged they were both struck
down with dangerous wounds, the French carried
them all off, and sir John Hope was again
severely hurt in the foot by an English bullet before
they gained the citadel.</p>

<p>The day was now beginning to break and the
allies were enabled to act with more unity and
effect. The Germans were in possession of St.
Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards,
being properly disposed, by general Howard who
had succeeded to the command, suddenly raised a
loud shout, and running in upon the French drove
them back into the works with such slaughter
that their own writers admit a loss of one general
and more than nine hundred men. But on the British
side general Stopford was wounded, and the whole
loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers.
Of these more than two hundred were taken, besides
the commander-in-chief; and it is generally acknowledged
that captain Forster’s firm defence of the
fortified house first, and next the readiness and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_656"></a>[656]</span>
gallantry with which general Hinuber and his Germans
retook St. Etienne, saved the allies from a
very terrible disaster.</p>

<p>A few days after this piteous event the convention
made with Soult became known and hostilities
ceased.</p>

<p>All the French troops in the south were now reorganized
in one body under the command of
Suchet, but they were so little inclined to acquiesce
in the revolution, that prince Polignac, acting for
the duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general
Kennedy for a sum of money to
quiet them.</p>

<p>The Portuguese army returned to Portugal. The
Spanish army to Spain, the generals being it is said
inclined at first to declare for the Cortez against the
king, but they were diverted from their purpose by
the influence and authority of lord Wellington.</p>

<p>The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some
for America, some for England, and the cavalry
marching through France took shipping at Boulogne.</p>

<p>Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance
of the veteran’s services.</p>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_657"></a>[657]</span><br></p>

<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3>
</div>

<h4>GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.</h4>


<p class="noindent">Marshal Soult and General Thouvenot have<span class="sidenote7">1814.</span>
been accused of fighting with a full knowledge of
Napoleon’s abdication. This charge circulated originally
by the Bourbon party is utterly unfounded.
The extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot
through the advanced posts has been already
noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to induce
sir John Hope to make a formal communication,
and the governor could only treat it as an idle story
to insult or to deceive him, and baffle his defence
by retarding his counter-operations while the works
for the siege were advancing. For how unlikely,
nay impossible, must it not have appeared, that the
emperor Napoleon, whose victories at Mont-Mirail
and Champaubert were known before the close investment
of Bayonne, should have been deprived
of his crown in the space of a few weeks, and the
stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts
without any relaxation in the preparations for the
siege.</p>

<p>As false and unsubstantial is the charge against
Soult.</p>

<p>The acute remark of an English military writer,<span class="sidenote">Memoirs of captain Kincaid.</span>
that if the duke of Dalmatia had known of the
peace before he fought, he would certainly have announced
it after the battle, were it only to maintain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_658"></a>[658]</span>
himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable:
but there are direct proofs of the falsehood of
the accusation. How was the intelligence to reach
him? It was not until the 7th that the provisional
government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer
could not have reached Toulouse under three days
even by the most direct way, which was through
Montauban. Now the allies were in possession of
that road on the 4th, and on the 9th the French
army was actually invested. The intelligence from
Paris must therefore have reached the allies first, as
in fact it did, and it was not Soult, it was lord
Wellington who commenced the battle. The charge
would therefore bear more against the English general,
who would yet have been the most insane as
well as the wickedest of men to have risked his
army and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles
seemed to deny success. He also was the person
of all others called upon, by honour, gratitude,
justice and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter
of his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the
punishment of his inhuman adversary.</p>

<p>Did he ever by word or deed countenance the
calumny?</p>

<p>Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English
reform bill, repeated the accusation in the house of
lords and reviled the minister for being on amicable
political terms with a man capable of such a crime.
Lord Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically
declared that marshal Soult did not know, and that
it was impossible he could know of the emperor’s
abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable
distinction of sporting with men’s lives by wholesale
attaches to no general on the records of history
save the Orange William, the murderer of Glencoe.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_659"></a>[659]</span>
And though marshal Soult had known of the emperor’s
abdication he could not for that have been
justly placed beside that cold-blooded prince, who
fought at St. Denis with the peace of Nimeguen in
his pocket, because “<em>he would not deny himself a safe
lesson in his trade</em>.”</p>

<p>The French marshal was at the head of a brave
army and it was impossible to know whether Napoleon
had abdicated voluntarily or been constrained.
The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché,
and other intriguers, forming a provisional government,
self-instituted and under the protection of
foreign bayonets, demanded no respect from Soult.
He had even the right of denying the emperor’s
legal power to abdicate. He had the right, if he
thought himself strong enough, to declare, that he
would not suffer the throne to become the plaything
of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France
even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine
it was a question of patriotism and of calculation,
a national question which the general of an army
had a right to decide for himself, having reference
always to the real will and desire of the people at
large.</p>

<p>It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter,
even after the battle and when he had seen colonel
St. Simon.</p>

<p>Writing to Talleyrand on the 22d, he says, “The<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span>
circumstances which preceded my act of adhesion
are so extraordinary as to create astonishment. The
7th the provisional government informed me of the
events which had happened since the 1st of April.
The 6th and 7th, count Dupont wrote to me on the
same subject. On the 8th the duke of Feltre, in his
quality of war minister, gave me notice, that having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_660"></a>[660]</span>
left the military cipher at Paris he would immediately
forward to me another. The 9th the prince
Berthier vice-constable and major-general, wrote to
me from Fontainbleau, transmitting the copy of a
convention and armistice which had been arranged
at Paris with the allied powers; he demanded at the
same time a state of the force and condition of my
army; but neither the prince nor the duke of Feltre
mentioned events, we had then only knowledge of a
proclamation of the empress, dated the 3rd, <em>which
forbade us to recognize any thing coming from Paris</em>.</p>

<p>“The 10th I was attacked near Toulouse by the
whole allied army under the orders of lord Wellington.
This vigorous action, where the French army
the weakest by half showed all its worth, cost the
allies from eight to ten thousand men: lord Wellington
might perhaps have dispensed with it.</p>

<p>“The 12th I received through the English the first
hint of the events at Paris. I proposed an armistice,
it was refused, I renewed the demand it was again
refused. At last I sent count Gazan to Toulouse,
and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms
was accepted and signed the 18th, the armies being
then in presence of each other. The 19th I ratified
this convention and gave my adhesion to the re-establishment
of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject
I ought to declare that I sought to obtain a suspension
of arms before I manifested my sentiments
in order that my will and that of the army should be
free. <em>That neither France nor posterity should have
power to say it was torn from us by force of arms. To
follow only the will of the nation was a homage I
owed to my country</em>.”</p>

<p>The reader will observe in the above letter certain
assertions, relative to the numbers of the contending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_661"></a>[661]</span>
armies and the loss of the allies, which are at variance
with the statements in this History; and this loose
but common mode of assuming the state of an adverse
force has been the ground-work for great exaggeration
by some French writers, who strangely
enough claim a victory for the French army although
the French general himself made no such claim at
the time, and so far as appears has not done so
since.</p>

<p><em>Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences.</em>
By this test we shall know who won the
battle of Toulouse.</p>

<p>Now all persons, French and English, who have
treated the subject, including the generals on both
sides, are agreed, that Soult fortified Toulouse the
canal and the Mont Rave as positions of battle;
that he was attacked, that Taupin’s division was
beaten, that the Mont Rave with all its redoubts
and entrenchments fell into the allies’ power.
Finally that the French army abandoned Toulouse,
leaving there three wounded generals, sixteen hundred
men, several guns and a quantity of stores at
the discretion of their adversaries: and this without
any fresh forces having joined the allies, or any remarkable
event affecting the operations happening
elsewhere.</p>

<p>Was Toulouse worth preserving? Was the abandonment
of it forced or voluntary? Let the French
general speak! “I have entrenched the suburb of<span class="sidenote">Soult to Suchet, 29th March.</span>
St. Cyprien which forms a good bridge-head. The
enemy will not I think attack me there unless he
desires to lose a part of his army. Two nights ago
he made a demonstration of passing the Garonne
two leagues above the city, but he will probably try
to pass it below, in which case I will attack him<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_662"></a>[662]</span>
whatever his force may be, because it is of the utmost
importance to me not to be cut off from Montauban
where I have made a bridge-head.”—“I
think the enemy will not move on your side <em>unless I
move that way first, and I am determined to avoid
that as long as I can</em>.”—“If I could remain a month
on the Garonne I should be able to put six or eight
thousand conscripts into the ranks who now embarass
me, and who want arms which I expect with
great impatience from Perpignan.”—“I am resolved
to deliver battle near Toulouse whatever may be the<span class="sidenote">Soult to Suchet, 7th April.</span>
superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified
a <em>position</em>, which, <em>supported by the town and the
canal</em>, furnishes me with a retrenched camp susceptible
of defence.”—“I have received the unhappy
news of the enemy’s entrance into Paris. This misfortune
strengthens my determination to defend
Toulouse whatever may happen. The preservation
of the place which contains establishments of all
kinds is of the utmost importance to us, but if unhappily
I am forced to quit it, my movements will
naturally bring me nearer to you. In that case you
cannot sustain yourself at Perpignan because the
enemy will inevitably follow me.”—“The enemy
appears astonished at the determination I have taken
to defend Toulouse, four days ago he passed the
Garonne and has done nothing since, perhaps the
bad weather is the cause.”</p>

<p>From these extracts it is clear that Soult resolved
if possible not to fall back upon Suchet, and was
determined even to fight for the preservation of his
communications with Montauban; yet he finally
resigned this important object for the more important
one of defending Toulouse. And so intent
upon its preservation was he, that having on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_663"></a>[663]</span>
25th of March ordered all the stores and artillery<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Orders.</span>
not of immediate utility, to be sent away, he on the
2d of April forbade further progress in that work
and even had those things already removed brought
back. Moreover he very clearly marks that to abandon<span class="sidenote9">Choumara.</span>
the city and retreat towards Suchet will be the
signs and consequences of defeat.</p>

<p>These points being fixed, we find him on the evening
of the 10th writing to the same general thus.</p>

<p>“The battle which I announced to you took place
to-day, the enemy has been horribly maltreated, but
he succeeded in <em>establishing himself upon a position
which I occupied to the right of Toulouse</em>. The general
of division Taupin has been killed, general Harispe
has lost his foot by a cannon-ball, and three
generals of brigade are wounded. I am prepared
to recommence to-morrow if the enemy attacks, but
<em>I do not believe I can stay in Toulouse, it might even
happen that I shall be forced to open a passage to get
out</em>.”</p>

<p>On the 11th of April he writes again:</p>

<p>“As I told you in my letter of yesterday I am in
the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear
being obliged to fight my way at Baziege where the
enemy is directing a column to cut my communications.
To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche,
because I have good hope that this obstacle
will not prevent my passing.”</p>

<p>To the minister of war he also writes on the
10th.</p>

<p>“To-day I rest in position. If the enemy attacks
me I will defend myself. I have great need to replenish
my means before I put the army in march,
yet I believe that in the coming night I shall be
forced to abandon Toulouse, and it is probable I<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_664"></a>[664]</span>
shall direct my movements so as to rally upon the
troops of the duke of Albufera.”</p>

<p>Soult lays no claim here to victory. He admits
that all the events previously indicated by him as
the consequences of defeat were fulfilled to the
letter. That is to say, the loss of the position of
battle, the consequent evacuation of the city, and
the march to join Suchet. On the other hand lord
Wellington clearly obtained all that he sought.
He desired to pass the Garonne and he did pass it;
he desired to win the position and works of Mont
Rave and he did win them; he desired to enter
Toulouse and he did enter it as a conqueror at the
head of his troops.</p>

<p>Amongst the French writers who without denying
these facts lay claim to a victory Choumara is
most deserving of notice. This gentleman, known
as an able engineer, with a praise-worthy desire to
render justice to the great capacity of marshal
Soult, shews very clearly that his genius would
have shone in this campaign with far greater lustre
if marshal Suchet had adopted his plans and supported
him in a cordial manner. But Mr. Choumara
heated by his subject completes the picture
by a crowning victory at Toulouse which the marshal
himself appears not to recognize. The work
is a very valuable historical document with respect
to the disputes between Soult and Suchet, but
with respect to the battle of Toulouse it contains
grave errors as to facts, and the inferences are untenable
though the premises were admitted.</p>

<p>The substance of Mr. Choumara’s argument is,
that the position of Toulouse was of the nature of
a fortress. That the canal was the real position of
battle, the Mont Rave an outwork, the loss of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_665"></a>[665]</span>
which weighed little in the balance, because the
French army was victorious at Calvinet against the
Spaniards, at the convent of the Minimes against
the light division, at the bridge of Jumeaux against
Picton, at St. Cyprien against General Hill. Finally
that the French general certainly won the
victory because he offered battle the next day and
did not retreat from Toulouse until the following
night.</p>

<p>Now admitting that all these facts were established,
the fortress was still taken.</p>

<p>But the facts are surprisingly incorrect. For
first marshal Soult himself tells Suchet that the
Mont Rave was his <em>position of battle</em>, and that the
town and the canal <em>supported it</em>. Nothing could
be more accurate than this description. For when
he lost the Mont Rave, the town and the canal
enabled him to rally his army and take measures
for a retreat. But the loss of the Mont Rave rendered
the canal untenable, why else was Toulouse
abandoned? That the line of the canal was a
more formidable one to attack in front than the
Mont Rave is true, yet that did not constitute it
a position; it was not necessary to attack it, except
partially at Sacarin and Cambon and the bridge
of the Demoiselles; those points once forced the
canal would, with the aid of the Mont Rave, have
helped to keep the French in Toulouse as it had
before helped to keep the allies out. Lord Wellington
once established on the south side of the
city and holding the Pech David could have removed
the bridge from Seilh to Portet, above
Toulouse, thus shortening and securing his communication
with Hill; the French army must then
have surrendered, or broken out, no easy matter in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_666"></a>[666]</span>
such a difficult and strangled country. The Mont
Rave was therefore not only the position of battle,
it was also the key of the position behind the canal,
and Mr. de Choumara is placed in this dilemma.
He must admit the allies won the fight, or confess
the main position was so badly chosen that a slight
reverse at an outwork was sufficient to make the
French army abandon it at every other point.</p>

<p>But were the French victorious at every other
point? Against the Spaniards they were, and
Picton also was repulsed. The order of movements
for the battle proves indeed that this general’s
attack was intended to be a false one; he disobeyed<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_IX">Appendix, No. 9.</a></span>
his orders however, and one of his brigades
was repulsed; but to check one brigade with a loss
of three or four hundred men, is a small matter
in a battle where more than eighty thousand combatants
were engaged.</p>

<p>The light division made a demonstration against
the convent of the Minimes and nothing more.
Its loss on the whole day was only fifty-six men
and officers, and no French veteran of the Peninsula<span class="sidenote">Official Returns.</span>
but would laugh at the notion that a real
attack by that matchless division could be so
stopped.</p>

<p>It is said the exterior line of entrenchments at
St. Cyprien was occupied with a view to offensive
movements, and to prevent the allies from establishing
batteries to rake the line of the canal from
that side of the Garonne; but whatever may have
been the object, General Hill got possession of it,
and was so far victorious. He was ordered not to
assail the second line seriously and he did not, for
his whole loss scarcely exceeded eighty men and<span class="sidenote7">Ibid.</span>
officers.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_667"></a>[667]</span></p>

<p>From these undeniable facts, it is clear that the
French gained an advantage against Picton, and
a marked success against the Spaniards; but Beresford’s
attack was so decisive as to counterbalance
these failures and even to put the defeated Spaniards
in possession of the height they had originally
contended for in vain.</p>

<p>Mr. Choumara attributes Beresford’s success to
Taupin’s errors and to a vast superiority of numbers
on the side of the allies. “Fifty-three thousand
infantry, more than eight thousand cavalry,
and a reserve of eighteen thousand men of all arms,
opposed to twenty-five thousand French infantry,
two thousand five hundred cavalry, and a reserve
of seven thousand conscripts three thousand of
which were unarmed.” Such is the enormous
disproportion assumed on the authority of general
Vaudoncourt.</p>

<p>Now the errors of Taupin may have been great,
and his countrymen are the best judges of his demerit;
but the numbers here assumed are most
inaccurate. The imperial muster-rolls are not of a
later date than December 1813, yet an official table
of the organization of Soult’s army, published by<span class="sidenote">Kock’s Campaign of 1814.</span>
the French military historian Kock, gives thirty-six
thousand six hundred and thirty-five combatants on
the 10th of March. Of these, in round numbers,
twenty-eight thousand six hundred were infantry,
two thousand seven hundred cavalry, and five thousand
seven hundred were artillery-men, engineers,
miners, sappers, <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span>, and military workmen.
Nothing is said of the reserve division of conscripts
commanded by general Travot, but general
Vaudoncourt’s table of the same army on the 1st
of April, adopted by Choumara, supplies the deficiency.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_668"></a>[668]</span>
The conscripts are there set down seven
thousand two hundred and sixty-seven, and this
cipher being added to Kock’s, gives a total of
forty-three thousand nine hundred fighting men.
The loss in combats and marches from the 10th of
March to the 1st of April must be deducted, but
on the other hand we find Soult informing the
minister of war, on the 7th of March, that three
thousand soldiers dispersed by the battle of Orthes
were still wandering behind the army: the
greatest part must have joined before the battle of
Toulouse. There was also the regular garrison of
that city, composed of the depôts of several regiments
and the urban guards, all under Travot.
Thus little less than fifty thousand men were at
Soult’s disposal.</p>

<p>Let twelve thousand be deducted for, 1º. the
urban guard which was only employed to maintain
the police of the town, 2º. the unarmed conscripts,
3º. the military workmen not brought into action,
4º. the detachments employed on the flanks to communicate
with La Fitte in the Arriege, and to reinforce
general Loverdo at Montauban. There will
remain thirty-eight thousand fighting men of all
arms. And with a very powerful artillery; for we
find Soult after the action, directing seven field-batteries
of eight pieces each to attend the army;
and the French writers mention, besides this field-train,
1º. fifteen pieces which were transferred
during the battle from the exterior line of St. Cyprien
to the northern and eastern fronts. 2º. Four
twenty-four pounders and several sixteen-pounders
mounted on the walls of the city. 3º. The armaments
of the bridge-heads, the works on Calvinet
and those at Saccarin and Cambon. Wherefore<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_669"></a>[669]</span>
not less than eighty, or perhaps ninety, pieces of
French artillery were engaged.</p>

<p>An approximation to the strength of the French
army being thus made it remains to show the number
of the allies, and with respect to the Anglo-Portuguese
troops that can be done very exactly,
not by approximative estimates but positively from
the original returns.</p>

<p>The morning state delivered to lord Wellington<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#end-app">note at the end of the Appendix.</a></span>
on the 10th of April bears forty-three thousand
seven hundred and forty-four British and Germans,
and twenty thousand seven hundred and ninety-three
Portuguese, in all sixty-four thousand five
hundred and thirty-seven soldiers and officers present
under arms, exclusive of artillery-men. Of this
number nearly ten thousand were cavalry, eleven
hundred and eighty-eight being Portuguese.</p>

<p>The Spanish auxiliaries, exclusive of Mina’s
bands investing St. Jean Pied de Port, were 1º.
Giron’s Andalusians and the third army under
O’Donnel, fifteen thousand. 2º. The Gallicians
under general Freyre, fourteen thousand. 3º. Three
thousand Gallicians under Morillo and as many more
under Longa, making with the Anglo-Portuguese a
total of ninety thousand combatants with somewhat
more than a hundred pieces of field-artillery.</p>

<p>Of this force, O’Donnel’s troops were in the valley
of the Bastan, Longa’s on the Upper Ebro; one
division of Freyre’s Gallicians was under <ins class="corr" id="tn-669" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Carlos D’Espagne'">
Carlos D’España</ins> in front of Bayonne; one half of Morillo’s
division was blockading Navarens, the other half
and the nine thousand Gallicians remaining under
Freyre, were in front of Toulouse. Of the Anglo-Portuguese,
the first and fifth divisions, and three
unattached brigades of infantry with one brigade of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_670"></a>[670]</span>
cavalry, were with sir John Hope at Bayonne; the
seventh division was at Bordeaux; the household
brigade of heavy cavalry was on the march from the
Ebro where it had passed the winter; the Portuguese
horsemen were partly employed on the communications
in the rear, partly near Agen, where sir<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#end-app">note at the end of the Appendix.</a></span>
John Campbell commanding the fourth regiment
had an engagement on the 11th with the celebrated
partizan Florian. The second, third, fourth, sixth,<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix 7</a>, sections 6 and 7.</span>
and light divisions of infantry, and Le Cor’s Portuguese,
called the unattached division, were with lord
Wellington, who had also Bock’s, Ponsonby’s, Fane’s,
Vivian’s, and lord E. Somerset’s brigades of cavalry.</p>

<p>These troops on the morning of the 10th mustered
under arms, in round numbers, thirty-one
thousand infantry, of which four thousand three hundred
were officers sergeants and drummers, leaving
twenty-six thousand and six hundred bayonets.
Add twelve thousand Spaniards under Freyre and
Morillo, and we have a total of forty-three thousand
five hundred infantry. The cavalry amounted to
seven thousand, and there were sixty-four pieces of
artillery. Hence about fifty-two thousand of all
ranks and arms were in line to fight thirty-eight
thousand French with more than eighty pieces of
artillery, some being of the largest calibre.</p>

<p>But of the allies only twenty-four thousand men
with fifty-two guns can be said to have been seriously
engaged. Thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets
with eighteen guns were on the left of the Garonne
under general Hill. Neither the light division nor
Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry, nor Bock’s Germans were
really engaged. Wherefore twelve thousand six
hundred sabres and bayonets under Beresford, nine
thousand bayonets under Freyre, and two thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_671"></a>[671]</span>
five hundred of Picton’s division really fought the
battle. Thus the enormous disproportion assumed
by the French writers disappears entirely; for if the
allies had the advantage of numbers it was chiefly in
cavalry, and horsemen were of little avail against
the entrenched position and preponderating artillery
of the French general.</p>

<p>The duke of Dalmatia’s claim to the admiration
of his countrymen is well-founded and requires no
vain assumption to prop it up. Vast combinations,
inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment,
unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties,
unwavering fidelity to his sovereign and his country,
are what no man can justly deny him. In this celebrated
campaign of only nine months, although
counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of
his countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works
of five strong places and entrenched five great
camps with such works as Marius himself would not
have disdained; once he changed his line of operations
and either attacking or defending delivered
twenty-four battles and combats. Defeated in all
he yet fought the last as fiercely as the first, remaining
unconquered in mind, and still intent upon
renewing the struggle when peace came to put a
stop to his prodigious efforts. Those efforts were
fruitless because Suchet renounced him, because the
people of the south were apathetic and fortune was
adverse; because he was opposed to one of the
greatest generals of the world at the head of unconquerable
troops. For what Alexander’s Macedonians
were at Arbela, Hannibal’s Africans at Cannæ,
Cæsar’s Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon’s guards at
Austerlitz, such were Wellington’s British soldiers
at this period. The same men who had fought at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_672"></a>[672]</span>
Vimiera and Talavera contended at Orthes and Toulouse.
Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted
on their natural strength and fierceness a
confidence which rendered them invincible. It is
by this measure Soult’s firmness and the constancy
of his army is to be valued, and the equality to which
he reduced his great adversary at Toulouse is a
proof of ability which a judicious friend would put
forward rather than suppress.</p>

<p>Was he not a great general who being originally
opposed on the Adour by nearly double his own
numbers, for such was the proportion after the great
detachments were withdrawn from the French army
by the emperor in January, did yet by the aid of his
fortresses, by his able marches and combinations,
oblige his adversary to employ so many troops for
blockades sieges and detached posts, that at Toulouse
his army was scarcely more numerous than the
French? Was it nothing to have drawn Wellington
from such a distance along the frontier, and force
him at last, either to fight a battle under the most
astonishing disadvantages or to retreat with dishonour.
And this not because the English general
had committed any fault, but by the force of combinations
which embracing all the advantages offered
by the country left him no option.</p>

<p>That Soult made some mistakes is true, and perhaps
the most important was that which the emperor
warned him against, though too late, the
leaving so many men in Bayonne. He did so he
says because the place could not hold out fifteen
days without the entrenched camp, and the latter
required men; but the result proved Napoleon’s
sagacity, for the allies made no attempt to try the
strength of the camp, and on the 18th of March lord<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_673"></a>[673]</span>
Wellington knew not the real force of the garrison.
Up to that period sir John Hope was inclined to
blockade the place only, and from the difficulty of
gathering the necessary stores and ammunition on
the right bank of the Adour, the siege though resolved
upon was not even commenced on the 14th
of April when that bloody and most lamentable
sally was made. Hence the citadel could not even
with a weaker garrison have been taken before the
end of April, and Soult might have had Abbé’s division
of six thousand good troops in the battles of
Orthes and Toulouse. Had Suchet joined him, his
army would have been numerous enough to bar lord
Wellington’s progress altogether, especially in the
latter position. Here it is impossible not to admire
the sagacity of the English general, who from the
first was averse to entering France and only did so
for a political object, under the promise of great reinforcements
and in the expectation that he should
be allowed to organize a Bourbon army. What
could he have done if Soult had retained the twenty
thousand men drafted in January, or if Suchet had
joined, or the people had taken arms?</p>

<p>How well Soult chose his ground at Toulouse,
how confidently he trusted that his adversary would
eventually pass the Garonne below and not above
the city, with what foresight he constructed the
bridge-head at Montauban, and prepared the difficulties
lord Wellington had to encounter have been
already touched upon. But Mr. Choumara has
assumed that the English general’s reason for relinquishing
the passage of the Garonne at Portet on
the night of the 27th, was not the want of pontoons
but the fear of being attacked during the operation,
adducing in proof Soult’s orders to assail the heads<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_674"></a>[674]</span>
of his columns. Those orders are however dated
the 31st, three days after the attempt of which
Soult appears to have known nothing at the time:
they were given in the supposition that lord Wellington
wished to effect a second passage at that
point to aid general Hill while descending the Arriege.
And what reason has any man to suppose
that the same general and troops who passed the
Nive and defeated a like counter-attack near Bayonne,
would be deterred by the fear of a battle from
attempting it on the Garonne? The passage of the
Nive was clearly more dangerous, because the communication
with the rest of the army was more difficult,
Soult’s disposable force larger, his counter-movements
more easily hidden until the moment of
execution. At Portet the passage, designed for the
night season, would have been a surprise, and the
whole army, drawn close to that side could have
been thrown over in three or four hours with the
exception of the divisions destined to keep the French
in check at St. Cyprien. Soult’s orders did not
embrace such an operation. They directed Clauzel
to fall upon the head of the troops and crush them
while in the disorder of a later passage which was
expected and watched for.</p>

<p>General Clauzel having four divisions in hand
was no doubt a formidable enemy, and Soult’s notion
of defending the river by a counter-attack was
excellent in principle; but to conceive is one thing
to execute is another. His orders were, as I have
said, only issued on the 31st, when Hill was across
both the Garonne and the Arriege. Lord Wellington’s
design was then not to force a passage at
Portet, but to menace that point, and really attack
St. Cyprien when Hill should have descended the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_675"></a>[675]</span>
Arriege. Nor did Soult himself much expect
Clauzel would have any opportunity to attack, for
in his letter to the minister of war he said, the positions
between the Arriege and the canal were all
disadvantageous to the French and his intention
was to fight in Toulouse if the allies approached
from the south; yet he still believed Hill’s movement
to be only a blind and that lord Wellington
would finally attempt the passage below Toulouse.</p>

<p>The French general’s views and measures were
profoundly reasoned but extremely simple. His
first care on arriving at Toulouse was to secure the
only bridge over the Garonne by completing the
works of St. Cyprien, which he had begun while
the army was still at Tarbes. He thus gained time,
and as he felt sure that the allies could not act in
the Arriege district, he next directed his attention
to the bridge-head of Montauban to secure a retreat
behind the Tarn and the power of establishing
a fresh line of operations. Meanwhile contrary to
his expectation lord Wellington did attempt to act
on the Arriege, and the French general, turning of
necessity in observation to that side, entrenched a
position on the south; soon however he had proof
that his first notion was well-founded, that his adversary
after losing much time must at last pass below
Toulouse; wherefore he proceeded with prodigious
activity to fortify the Mont Rave and prepare a field
of battle on the northern and eastern fronts of the
city. These works advanced so rapidly, while the
wet weather by keeping the rivers flooded reduced
lord Wellington to inactivity, that Soult became confident
in their strength, and being influenced also by
the news from Paris, relinquished his first design of
opposing the passage of the Garonne and preserving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_676"></a>[676]</span>
the line of operations by Montauban. To hold
Toulouse then became his great object, nor was he
diverted from this by the accident which befel lord
Wellington’s bridge at Grenade. Most writers,
French and English, have blamed him for letting
slip that opportunity of attacking Beresford. It
is said that general Reille first informed him of<span class="sidenote">Notes by general Berton, MSS.</span>
the rupture of the bridge, and strongly advised him
to attack the troops on the right bank; but Choumara
has well defended him on that point; the
distance was fifteen miles, the event uncertain, the
works on the Mount Rave would have stood still
meanwhile, and the allies might perhaps have
stormed St. Cyprien.</p>

<p>Lord Wellington was however under no alarm for
Beresford, or rather for himself, because each day
he passed the river in a boat and remained on
that side. His force was not less than twenty thousand<span class="sidenote">Morning State of lord Wellington, 4th of April, MSS.</span>
including sergeants and officers, principally
British; his position was on a gentle range the
flanks covered by the Ers and the Garonne; he had
eighteen guns in battery on his front, which was
likewise flanked by thirty other pieces placed on
the left of the Garonne. Nor was he without retreat.
He could cross the Ers, and Soult dared not
have followed to any distance lest the river should
subside and the rest of the army pass on his rear,
unless, reverting to his original design of operating
by Montauban, he lightly abandoned his now matured
plan of defending Toulouse. Wisely therefore
he continued to strengthen his position round
that city, his combinations being all directed to
force the allies to attack him between the Ers
and the Mount Rave where it seemed scarcely possible
to succeed.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_677"></a>[677]</span></p>

<p>He has been also charged with this fault, that he
did not entrench the Hill of Pugade. Choumara
holds that troops placed there would have been endangered
without adequate advantage. This does
not seem conclusive. The hill was under the shot
of the main height, it might have been entrenched
with works open to the rear, and St. Pol’s brigade
would thus have incurred no more danger than
when placed there without any entrenchments. Beresford
could not have moved up the left bank of
the Ers until these works were carried, and this
would have cost men. It is therefore probable that
want of time caused Soult to neglect this advantage.
He committed a graver error during the battle by
falling upon Beresford with Taupin’s division only
when he could have employed D’Armagnac’s and
Villatte’s likewise in that attack. He should have
fallen on him also while in the deep country below,
and before he had formed his lines at the foot of
the heights. What hindered him? Picton was repulsed,
Freyre was defeated, the light division was
protecting the fugitives, and one of Maransin’s brigades
withdrawn from St. Cyprien had reinforced
the victorious troops on the extreme left of the Calvinet
platform. Beresford’s column entangled in
the marshy ground, without artillery and menaced
both front and rear by cavalry, could not have resisted
such an overwhelming mass, and lord Wellington
can scarcely escape criticism for placing
him in that predicament.</p>

<p>A commander is not indeed to refrain from
high attempts because of their perilous nature, the
greatest have ever been the most daring, and the
English general who could not remain inactive
before Toulouse was not deterred by danger or difficulty:
twice he passed the broad and rapid Garonne<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_678"></a>[678]</span>
and reckless of his enemy’s strength and
skill worked his way to a crowning victory. This
was hardihood, greatness. But in Beresford’s particular
attack he did not overstep the rules of art,
he hurtled against them, and that he was not damaged
by the shock is owing to his good fortune
the fierceness of his soldiers and the errors of his
adversary. What if Beresford had been overthrown
on the Ers? Wellington must have repassed the
Garonne, happy if by rapidity he could reunite in
time with Hill on the left bank. Beresford’s failure
would have been absolute ruin and that alone
refutes the French claim to a victory. Was there
no other mode of attack? That can hardly be said.
Beresford passed the Lavaur road to assail the platform
of St. Sypiere, and he was probably so ordered
to avoid an attack in flank by the Lavaur road, and
because the platform of Calvinet on the side of the
Ers river was more strongly entrenched than that
of St. Sypiere. But for this gain it was too
much to throw his column into the deep ground
without guns, and quite separated from the rest of
the army seeing that the cavalry intended to maintain
the connection were unable to act in that miry
labyrinth of water-courses. If the Spaniards were
judged capable of carrying the strongest part of the
Calvinet platform, Beresford’s fine Anglo-Portuguese
divisions were surely equal to attacking this
same platform on the immediate left of the Spaniards,
and an advanced guard would have sufficed
to protect the left flank. The assault would then
have been made with unity, by a great mass and on
the most important point: for the conquest of St.
Sypiere was but a step towards that of Calvinet,
but the conquest of Calvinet would have rendered
St. Sypiere untenable. It is however to be observed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_679"></a>[679]</span>
that the Spaniards attacked too soon and their
dispersion exceeded all reasonable calculation: so
panic-stricken they were as to draw from lord Wellington
at the time the bitter observation, that he
had seen many curious spectacles but never before
saw ten thousand men running a race.</p>

<p>Soult’s retreat from Toulouse, a model of order
and regularity, was made in the night. This
proves the difficulty of his situation. Nevertheless
it was not desperate; nor was it owing to his adversary’s
generous forbearance that he passed unmolested
under the allies’ guns as an English writer
has erroneously assumed. For first those guns had
no ammunition, and this was one reason why lord
Wellington though eager to fall upon him on the
11th could not do so. On the 12th Soult was gone,
and his march covered by the great canal could
scarcely have been molested, because the nearest
point occupied by the allies was more than a mile
and a half distant. Nor do I believe that Soult, as
some other writers have imagined, ever designed to
hold Toulouse to the last. It would have been an
avowal of military insolvency to which his proposal,
that Suchet should join him at Carcassone and retake
the offensive, written on the night of the 11th, is
quite opposed. Neither was it in the spirit of
French warfare. The impetuous valour and susceptibility
of that people are ill-suited for stern
Numantian despair. Place an attainable object of
war before the French soldier and he will make
supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing he becomes
proportionally discouraged. Let some new
chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to
his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward
again with unbounded energy: the fear of death
never checks him he will attempt anything. But<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_680"></a>[680]</span>
the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance
wears his fury out; it was so proved in the
Peninsula, where the sudden deafening shout, rolling
over a field of battle more full and terrible than
that of any other nation, and followed by the strong
unwavering charge, often startled and appalled a
French column before whose fierce and vehement
assault any other troops would have given way.</p>

<p>Napoleon’s system of war was admirably adapted
to draw forth and augment the military excellence
and to strengthen the weakness of the national character.
His discipline, severe but appealing to the
feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick
temperament of the French soldiers to patience
under hardships and strong endurance under fire;
he taught the generals to rely on their own talents,
to look to the country wherein they made war for
resources, and to dare every thing even with the
smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of
France might have full play: hence the violence of
their attacks. But he also taught them to combine
all arms together, and to keep strong reserves that
sudden disorders might be repaired and the discouraged
troops have time to rally and recover their
pristine spirit, certain that they would then renew
the battle with the same confidence as before. He
thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature
had put a bar to that in the character of the British
soldier, but so terrible and sure in war that the
number and greatness of their exploits surpassed
those of all other nations: the Romans not excepted
if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor
the Macedonians if the quality of their opponents
be considered.</p>

<p>Let their amazing toils in the Peninsular war
alone, which though so great and important was but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_681"></a>[681]</span>
an episode in their military history, be considered.
“<em>In Spain large armies will starve and small armies
will be beaten</em>” was the saying of Henry IV. of
France, and this was no light phrase of an indolent
monarch but the profound conclusion of a sagacious
general. Yet Napoleon’s enormous armies were so
wonderfully organized that they existed and fought
in Spain for six years, and without cessation, for to
them winters and summers were alike. Their large
armies endured incredible toils and privations but
were not starved out, nor were their small armies
beaten by the Spaniards. And for their daring and
resource a single fact recorded by lord Wellington
will suffice. They captured more than one strong
place in Spain without any provision of bullets save
those fired at them by their enemies, having trusted
to that chance when they formed the siege! Before
the British troops they fell, but how terrible was
the struggle! how many defeats they recovered
from, how many brave men they slew, what changes
and interpositions of fortune occurred before they
could be rolled back upon their own frontiers! And
this is the glory of England, that her soldiers and
hers only were capable of overthrowing them in
equal battle. I seek not to defraud the Portuguese
of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard
the merit of his constancy. England could not
alone have triumphed in the struggle, but for her
share in the deliverance of the Peninsula let this
brief summary speak.</p>

<p>She expended more than one hundred millions
sterling on her own operations, she subsidised Spain
and Portugal besides, and with her supplies of
clothing arms and ammunition maintained the
armies of both even to the guerillas. From thirty up<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_682"></a>[682]</span>
to seventy thousand British troops were employed
by her constantly, and while her naval squadrons
continually harassed the French with descents upon
the coasts, her land forces fought and won nineteen
pitched battles and innumerable combats; they
made or sustained ten sieges, took four great fortresses,
twice expelled the French from Portugal,
preserved Alicant, Carthagena, Cadiz, Lisbon; they
killed wounded and took about two hundred thousand
enemies, and the bones of forty thousand
British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and
mountains of the Peninsula.</p>

<p>Finally, for Portugal she re-organized a native
army and supplied officers who led it to victory, and
to the whole Peninsula she gave a general whose
like has seldom gone forth to conquer. And all
this and more was necessary to redeem the Peninsula
from France!</p>

<p>The duke of Wellington’s campaigns furnish
lessons for generals of all nations, but they must
always be peculiarly models for British commanders
in future continental wars, because he
modified and reconciled the great principles of art
with the peculiar difficulties which attend generals
controlled by politicians who depending upon
private intrigue prefer parliamentary to national
interests. An English commander must not trust
his fortune. He dare not risk much however conscious
he may be of personal resources when one
disaster will be his ruin at home. His measures
must therefore be subordinate to this primary consideration.
Lord Wellington’s caution, springing
from that source, has led friends and foes alike into
wrong conclusions as to his system of war. The
French call it want of enterprize, timidity; the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_683"></a>[683]</span>
English have denominated it the Fabian system.
These are mere phrases. His system was the same
as that of all great generals. He held his army in
hand, keeping it with unmitigated labour always
in a fit state to march or to fight; and thus prepared
he acted indifferently as occasion offered on the
offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete
mastery of his art. Sometimes he was indebted to
fortune, sometimes to his natural genius, but always
to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically a
pains-taking man.</p>

<p>That he was less vast in his designs, less daring
in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a
commander as Napoleon must be admitted, and
being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed
that he learned something of the art from that
greatest of all masters; yet something besides the
difference of genius must be allowed for the difference
of situation; Napoleon was never even in his
first campaign of Italy so harassed by the French as
Wellington was by the English Spanish and Portuguese
governments. Their systems of war were
however alike in principle, their operations being
necessarily modified by their different political
positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness,
exact combinations to protect their flanks
and communications without scattering their forces,
these were common to both. In defence firm, cool,
enduring; in attack fierce and obstinate; daring
when daring was politic, but always operating by
the flanks in preference to the front: in these things
they were alike, but in following up a victory the
English general fell short of the French emperor.
The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a
battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_684"></a>[684]</span>
battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a
mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded and
the roaring flood poured onwards covering all.</p>

<p>Yet was there nothing of timidity or natural
want of enterprize to be discerned in the English
general’s campaigns. Neither was he of the Fabian
school. He recommended that commander’s system
to the Spaniards, but he did not follow it himself.
His military policy more resembled that of Scipio
Africanus. Fabius dreading Hannibal’s veterans, red
with the blood of four consular armies, hovered on
the mountains, refused battle, and to the unmatched
skill and valour of the great Carthaginian opposed
the almost inexhaustible military resources of Rome.
Lord Wellington was never loath to fight when there
was any equality of numbers. He landed in Portugal
with only nine thousand men, with intent to attack
Junot who had twenty-four thousand. At Roliça
he was the assailant, at Vimiera he was assailed,
but he would have changed to the offensive during
the battle if others had not interfered. At Oporto
he was again the daring and successful assailant.
In the Talavera campaign he took the initiatory
movements, although in the battle itself he sustained
the shock. His campaign of 1810 in Portugal was
entirely defensive, because the Portuguese army
was young and untried, but his pursuit of Massena
in 1811 was as entirely aggressive although cautiously
so, as well knowing that in mountain warfare
those who attack labour at a disadvantage.
The operations of the following campaign, including
the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera the first
siege of Badajos and the combat of Guinaldo, were
of a mixed character; so was the campaign of Salamanca;
but the campaign of Vittoria and that in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_685"></a>[685]</span>
the south of France were entirely and eminently
offensive.</p>

<p>Slight therefore is the resemblance to the Fabian
warfare. And for the Englishman’s hardiness
and enterprise bear witness the passage of the
Douro at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo,
the storming of Badajos, the surprise of the forts
at Mirabete, the march to Vittoria, the passage of
the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle, the passage
of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthes,
the crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he
committed faults is only to say that he made war;
but to deny him the qualities of a great commander
is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want of
light. How few of his combinations failed. How
many battles he fought, victorious in all! Iron
hardihood of body, a quick and sure vision, a
grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the
habit of laborious minute investigation and arrangement;
all these qualities he possessed, and with
them that most rare faculty of coming to prompt
and sure conclusions on sudden emergencies. This
is the certain mark of a master spirit in war, without
it a commander may be distinguished, he may
be a great man, but he cannot be a great captain:
where troops nearly alike in arms and knowledge
are opposed the battle generally turns upon the
decision of the moment.</p>

<p>At the Somosierra, Napoleon’s sudden and what
to those about him appeared an insensate order,
sent the Polish cavalry successfully charging up
the mountain when more studied arrangements
with ten times that force might have failed. At
Talavera, if Joseph had not yielded to the imprudent
heat of Victor, the fate of the allies would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_686"></a>[686]</span>
been sealed. At the Coa, Montbrun’s refusal to
charge with his cavalry saved general Craufurd’s
division, the loss of which would have gone far
towards producing the evacuation of Portugal. At
Busaco, Massena would not suffer Ney to attack the
first day, and thus lost the only favourable opportunity
for assailing that formidable position. At
Fuentes Onoro, the same Massena suddenly suspended
his attack when a powerful effort would
probably have been decisive. At Albuera, Soult’s
column of attack instead of pushing forward halted
to fire from the first height they had gained on
Beresford’s right, which saved that general from an
early and total defeat; again at a later period of
that battle the unpremeditated attack of the
fusileers decided the contest. At Barosa, general
Graham with a wonderful promptitude snatched
the victory at the very moment when a terrible
defeat seemed inevitable. At Sabugal, not even
the astonishing fighting of the light division could
have saved it if general Reynier had possessed this
essential quality of a general. At El Bodon, Marmont
failed to seize the most favourable opportunity
which occurred during the whole war for
crushing the allies. At Orthes, Soult let slip two
opportunities of falling upon the allies with advantage,
and at Toulouse he failed to crush Beresford.</p>

<p>At Vimiera, lord Wellington was debarred by
Burrard from giving a signal illustration of this
intuitive generalship, but at Busaco and the heights
of San Cristoval, near Salamanca, he suffered Massena
and Marmont to commit glaring faults unpunished.
On the other hand he has furnished
many examples of that successful improvisation in
which Napoleon seems to have <ins class="corr" id="tn-686" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'surpassed a  mankind'">
surpassed all mankind</ins>.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_687"></a>[687]</span>
His sudden retreat from Oropesa across the
Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo; his passage of
the Douro in 1809; his halt at Guinaldo in the
face of Marmont’s overwhelming numbers; the
battle of Salamanca; his sudden rush with the
third division to seize the hill of Arinez at Vittoria;
his counter-stroke with the sixth division at Sauroren;
his battle of the 30th two days afterwards;
his sudden passage of the Gave below Orthes.
Add to these his wonderful battle of Assye, and the
proofs are complete that he possesses in an eminent
degree that intuitive perception which distinguishes
the greatest generals.</p>

<p>Fortune however always asserts her supremacy
in war, and often from a slight mistake such disastrous
consequences flow that in every age and every
nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial.
Napoleon’s march upon Madrid in 1808 before he
knew the exact situation of the British army is an
example. By that march he lent his flank to his
enemy. Sir John Moore seized the advantage and
though the French emperor repaired the error for
the moment by his astonishing march from Madrid
to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula was then decided.
If he had not been forced to turn against
Moore, Lisbon would have fallen, Portugal could
not have been organized for resistance, and the
jealousy of the Spaniards would never have suffered
Wellington to establish a solid base at Cadiz: that
general’s after-successes would then have been with
the things that are unborn. It was not so ordained.
Wellington was victorious, the great conqueror
was overthrown. England stood the most triumphant
nation of the world. But with an enormous
debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_688"></a>[688]</span>
without tranquillity, greatness without intrinsic
strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark
and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of
her arms! And it is a stirring sound! War is the
condition of this world. From man to the smallest
insect all are at strife, and the glory of arms which
cannot be obtained without the exercise of honour,
fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty and temperance,
excites the brave man’s patriotism and is
a chastening corrective for the rich man’s pride. It
is yet no security for power. Napoleon the greatest
man of whom history makes mention, Napoleon the
most wonderful commander, the most sagacious
politician, the most profound statesman, lost by
arms, Poland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and
France. Fortune, that name for the unknown combinations
of infinite power, was wanting to him, and
without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles
on a troubled ocean.</p>
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<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_01" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p2 fs60"><em>Nº. 1. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_01.jpg" alt="Map of Catalonian Operations">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_01-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
 </div>
<figcaption class="caption">
<em>Explanatory</em><br>
Sketch<br>
<em>of the</em><br>
CATALONIAN OPERATIONS<br>
1813-14<br>
<em>with the Plan of a</em><br>
position at<br>
CAPE SALOU<br>
<em>proposed by</em><br>
GEN<sup>L</sup>. DONKIN<br>
<em>to</em><br>
SIR S. MURRAY.<br>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_02" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 2. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_02.jpg" alt="Map of Soult’s Operations">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_02-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
 </div>
<figcaption class="caption">
<em>Explanatory</em><br>
Sketch of<br>
SOULT’S OPERATIONS<br>
<em>to relieve</em><br>
PAMPELUNA<br>
July 1813<br>
<br>
BATTLE OF THE 28<sup>th</sup>.<br>
Enlarged<br>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_03" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 3. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_03.jpg" alt="Map of combat at Maya and Roncesvalles">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_03-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
 </div>
<figcaption class="caption">
Combat of<br>
MAYA<br>
July 25<sup>th</sup>.<br>
1813.<br>
<br>
Combat of<br>
RONCESVALLES<br>
July 25<sup>th</sup>.<br>
1813.<br>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_04" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 4. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_04.jpg" alt="Map of Assault on St Sebastian">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_04-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
</div>
<figcaption class="caption">
<em>Explanatory</em><br>
Sketch<br>
<em>of the</em><br>
ASSAULT <span class="allsmcap">OF</span> S<sup>T</sup>. SEBASTIAN<br>
August 31<sup>st</sup>.<br>
1813.<br>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_05" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 5. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_05.jpg" alt="Map of crossing of Bidassoa">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_05-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
 </div>
<figcaption class="caption">
Explanatory Sketch<br>
of<br>
Soult’s passage of the<br>
Bidassoa,<br>
Aug<sup>t</sup>. 31<sup>st</sup>.<br>
<em>And</em><br>
Lord Wellington’s<br>
Passage <em>of that</em> River<br>
October 7<sup>th</sup>.<br>
1813.<br>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_06" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 6. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_06.jpg" alt="Map of battle of Nivelle">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_06-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
</div>
<figcaption class="caption">
Explanatory Sketch<br>
of<br>
The Battle of the Nivelle,<br>
Nov<sup>r</sup>. 10<sup>th</sup>.<br>
1813.<br>
<p>Centre Attack</p>
<p>Right Attack</p>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_07" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 7. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_07.jpg" alt="Map of Bayonne Operations">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_07-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
 </div>
<figcaption class="caption">
Explanatory Sketch<br>
<em>of the</em><br>
Operations round<br>
Bayonne<br>
in<br>
Dec<sup>r</sup>. &amp; Feb<sup>y</sup>.<br>
1813-1814.<br>
<br>
Battle of the<br>
10<sup>th</sup>. Dec<sup>r</sup>.<br>
1813.<br>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_08" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 8. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_08.jpg" alt="Map of passage of Nive, battle of St Pierre">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_08-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
 </div>
<figcaption class="caption">
Explanatory<br>
Sketch<br>
<em>of the</em><br>
Passage of the Nive,<br>
And<br>
Battle of S<sup>t</sup>. Pierre;<br>
December<br>
9<sup>th</sup>. and 13<sup>th</sup>.<br>
1813.<br>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_09" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 9. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_09.jpg" alt="Map of battle of Orthez">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_09-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
 </div>
<figcaption class="caption">
Explanatory Sketch<br>
of the Battle<br>
of Orthez;<br>
And the Retreat of Soult,<br>
To Aire:<br>
1814.<br>
<br>
<em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em> &#160;&#160; <em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter"></div>
<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_10" style="max-width: 25em;">
<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 10. Vol. 6.</em></p>
 <div class="bbox">
  <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_10.jpg" alt="Map of battle of Toulouse">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_10-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
 </div>
<figcaption class="caption">
Explanatory Sketch<br>
<em>of the</em><br>
operations<br>
<em>about</em><br>
Tarbes,<br>
<em>and the</em><br>
Battle of Toulouse.<br>
<br>
<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. &amp; W. BOONE, 1840.</em> &#160;&#160; <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">


<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_689"></a>[689]</span><br>
   <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_690"></a>[690]</span></p>

<h2 class="p4 p4b nobreak" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX.</h2>
</div>


<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">

<div class="chapter">
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_691"></a>[691]</span><br></p>

<p class="p4 pfs150">APPENDIX.</p>
</div>

<hr class="r20">

<h3 id="No_I">No. I.</h3>

<p class="p1 pfs120">JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Lord William Bentinck to sir E. Pellew.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>At sea, June 18th, 1813.</em></p>

<p><span class="smcap pad1">Sir</span>,</p>

<p>Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected
attack upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet.
It seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon,
should reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land
them in Sicily, or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of
Naples, if the intention be, as in the last instance, to transport
them to Sicily in the tonnage and small craft of the country.—The
most important question is, whether this can be effected by
the enemy.—I have no difficulty in saying on my part, that in the
present disposition of the Neapolitan army in Sicily, and in the
non-existence of any national force, and the imperfect composition
of the British force, if half the number intended for this expedition
should land in Sicily the island would be conquered.</p>

<p class="right">(Signed)&#160; &#160; &#160; <span class="smcap">W. Bentinck</span>.</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Sir E. Pellew to lord W. Bentinck.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>H. M. S. Caledonia, June 19th, 1813.</em></p>

<p><span class="smcap pad1">My lord</span>,</p>

<p>I feel it my duty to state to your lordship that in my judgment
the Toulon fleet may evade mine without difficulty under a strong
N. W. wind to carry them through the passage of the Hieres
islands, without the possibility of my interrupting them, and that
they may have from twelve to twenty-four hours’ start of me in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_692"></a>[692]</span>
chasing them. When blown off the coast, my look-out ships
would certainly bring me such information as would enable me to
follow them immediately to the Bay of Naples. Your lordship is
most competent to judge whether in the interval of their arrival
and my pursuit, the French admiral would be able to embark
Murat’s army artillery and stores, and land them on the coast of
Sicily before I came up with them.—The facility of communication
by telegraph along the whole coast of Toulon would certainly
apprize Murat of their sailing at a very short notice, but for my
own part, I should entertain very sanguine hopes of overtaking
them either in the Bay of Naples or on the coast of Sicily before
they could make good their landing.</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Lord Wm. Bentinck to lord Wellington.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>At sea, June 20th, 1813.</em></p>

<p><span class="smcap pad1">My lord</span>,</p>

<p>By the perusal of the accompanying despatch to lord Castlereagh,
your lordship will perceive that Murat has opened a
negociation with us, the object of which is friendship with us and
hostility to Buonaparte. You will observe in one of the conversations
with Murat’s agent, that he informed me that Buonaparte
had ordered Murat to hold twenty thousand men in readiness for
the invasion of Sicily in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. I enclose
the copy of a letter I have in consequence addressed to Sir
E. Pellew, together with his answer, upon the practicability of the
Toulon fleet sailing without the knowledge of the blockading fleet.
Your lordship will have received my letter of the 21st of May
enclosing a copy of my dispatch to Lord Bathurst, relative to the
discontent of the Neapolitan troops in Sicily and the consequent
state of weakness if not of danger resulting from it to that island.
I stated also that this circumstance had induced me to detain in
Sicily the two battalions which had been withdrawn from Spain.</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Lord Wellington to lord William Bentinck.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Huarte, July 1st, 1813.</em></p>

<p><span class="smcap pad1">My lord</span>,</p>

<p>In answer to your lordship’s despatch, I have to observe, that I
conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger
whatever.</p>


<hr class="r20">
<div class="chapter"></div>
<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_693"></a>[693]</span></p>

<h3 id="No_II">No. II.</h3>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Letter from general Nugent to lord William Bentinck.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Vienna, January 24th, 1812.</em></p>

<p><span class="smcap pad1">My dear lord William</span>,</p>

<p>I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you shortly after
my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his
departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his
letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result it
would have and the manner it would be considered by the emperor
and the government here, and then to settle again the manner
of sending officers down to the Mediterranean, for some of those
then destined to be sent were implicated. All these circumstances
caused the delay of the present which otherwise you would have
had much sooner. Another cause of the delay was that I wanted
to inform you of the answer which would be given by this house
to the speculations that I was commissioned by the prince-regent
to propose relative to the arch-duke. There was no decisive answer
given, and the only manner of forming an opinion upon that
subject was by observing and getting information of their true intentions.
I am now firmly convinced that these are such as we
could wish, and that it is only fear of being committed that prevents
them to speak in a more positive manner. Their whole conduct
proves this, more particularly in La Tour’s affair which has
produced no change whatsoever nor led to any discovery of views
or connexions. There is even now less difficulty than ever for
officers going to the Mediterranean. They get passports from
government here without its inquiring or seeming to know the
real object. As it can do nothing else but connive, to which this
conduct answers, I think a more explicit declaration is not even
requisite and I am convinced that when the thing is once done
they will gladly agree. This is likewise King’s and Hardenberg’s
and Johnson’s opinion upon the subject, and as such they desire
me to express it to you, and to observe that the situation of things
here makes the forwarding of the measures you may think expedient
in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic the more desirable.</p>

<p>They are here extremely satisfied with the conduct of government
in England, and by the accounts we have the latter is much
pleased with the conduct of this country, particularly relative to
the affairs of Prussia. These are however not decided yet. But<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_694"></a>[694]</span>
whatever the consequence may be and whatever this country may
do for the present, I am convinced that your measures will ultimately
contribute much to the result. I am happy to perceive by
the last information from England that every thing seems to have
been settled there by you. The recruiting business of major
Burke is going on rapidly. As it was not begun at the time of
my departure I can only attribute it to your presence. The letters
contain likewise that government is come to the most favorable
resolutions relative to the arch-duke, and I hope the formation of
the troops will soon be effectuated. The dispositions of the
Adriatic coasts and the Tyrol are as good as can be, but all depends
upon establishing a basis and without that all partial exertions
would be useless or destructive. At the same time that some
regiments would be formed, I think it would be very expedient, to
form at the same place a Dalmatian or a Croat regiment, particularly
as in the present state of things it will be much easier even than
the other. The men could be easily recruited in Bosnia, and sent
from Durazzo to the place you should appoint. The bearer will
give you every information upon the subject, and at all events, I
should propose to you to send him immediately back to Durazzo,
and, should you adopt the above, to give him the necessary orders
and the commission for recruiting and sending the men to the
place of formation. No person can be better qualified than he
is. He knows the languages, the country, and the character of
the people, and understands every thing that relates to commercial
affairs. As to the place of formation, I think I already proposed
Cephalonia to you. Lissa or one of the nearer islands would
give too much jealousy in the beginning in those parts, until our
capital increases so as to undertake an important enterprise, at all
events it is important to form a noyau of the three nations; it is
then that we may hope to be joined by the whole of Dalmatia and
Croatia after a short time. Major and other officers will shortly
proceed to the Mediterranean. They will be directed to Messina
where I request you will send orders for them. It would be very
useful and saving to provide means for transporting them to that
place from Durazzo, and if possible to establish a more frequent
and regular intercourse between you and the latter. Johnson who
soon sets off from here will in the meantime establish a communication
across Bosnia to Durazzo. His presence in those parts will
be productive of many good effects. You will find that he is an
able active and zealous man and will certainly be very useful in
forwarding your views. I can answer for his being worthy of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_695"></a>[695]</span>
your full confidence, should you adopt the proposition relative to
the recruiting it would be necessary to put at his disposal the
requisite funds.</p>

<p>You will judge by the account the bearer of this will give you
whether cloth &amp;c. can be had at a cheaper rate from this country
or where you are, and he will bring back your directions for this
object. Allow me to observe that it would be highly useful to
have clothes for a considerable number of men prepared beforehand.
Many important reasons have prevented me hitherto from
proceeding to the Mediterranean as speedily as I wished. I
hope however not to be detained much longer and soon to have
removed every obstacle. I think to set off from here in the beginning
of March, and request you will be so kind as to provide
with the return of the bearer to Durazzo the means of my passage
from thence, where I shall come with a feigned name. I hope he
will be back there by the time of my arrival. I shall endeavour
to hasten my journey as I have important information in every
respect. By that time we shall know the decision relative to the
north. King has informed you of the reasons which made an alteration
necessary in regard to Frozzi’s journey. Part of your
object is in fact fulfilled already, and there are agents in Italy
&amp;c. As to the other and principal part relative to connections in
the army, and the gaining an exact knowledge of it and of the
government in Italy, with other circumstances, I expect soon to
have a person of sufficient consequence and ability to execute
your instructions, and he will go to Milan &amp;c. as soon as it can
be done with safety. His permanent residence in that country seems
to be necessary, that he may be able to accomplish fully the object,
and as the sum you have assigned for this purpose is sufficient for
a considerable time, you can determine whether he is to remain
there permanently or not. Frozzi will bring you an exact account
of what has been arranged relative to this business, and will himself
be a very proper person for communications between you
and Italy or this country. He will for that purpose go back to
Italy, the obstacle that opposed it hitherto being now no more. I
cannot but repeat the importance of giving all possible extent to
the arch-duke’s establishment, and particularly the raising of as
much troops as possible, for all will depend upon having the
means of landing. We are then sure of augmenting very speedily,
and finding the greatest assistance. The place for beginning cannot
be determined on exactly, but there is much to be expected
in Dalmatia and Croatia where we could be joined by the inhabitants<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_696"></a>[696]</span>
and troops. The lower part would be best adapted in
case we begin with a small force. I shall send and bring officers
particularly acquainted with the country and provide every
other assistance such as plans &amp;c. and I think it would be expedient
to prevent for the present any enterprize in that country
that would alarm them. Since I began my letter a courier has
arrived from Paris.</p>

<p>The contingent of the Rhenish confederacy have got orders to
be ready for marching. Reinforcements are sending from France
to the north and every preparation is making for war. Buonaparte
told to Swartzenburg that he would begin in April and all
circumstances seem to agree with this. On the other side Russia
is very slow in making peace with Turkey. He entirely neglects
Prussia, and for this reason it is to be feared that the latter will
place his capital with Buonaparte notwithstanding that this cabinet
is endeavouring to prevent it. I should be then very much afraid for
the conduct of this house well inclined as the emperor is. Proposals
were made by France but no resolution has been taken until
it is known how things turn out. The worst is that Romanzow
is still in credit with Alexander, which prevents all confidence in
other houses and makes Russia adopt half measures. This sketch
of the situation will give you some idea of the wavering and uncertain
state people are in. There is no calculation to be made
as to the conduct of government, nor must we be surprised at any
thing they may do. On the other side our speculations are not
built upon them, but upon the disposition of the people; and
whatever may happen I am convinced that this is a good foundation
if the measures are taken and the means prepared. A principal
object of mine in these parts has been to prepare the measures
for the case that it comes here to the very worst. The most important
thing is the augmenting in every possible manner the force
at your disposition. The accounts we have to-day of your return
and the powers I hope you have give me the best hopes of your
overcoming every difficulty. I must yet observe that as Johnson’s
proceedings are entirely subordinate to, and make a part of your
plans and operations in general, and that he cannot of course depend
upon King, you will be so good as to give him decisive instructions
to that purpose, and assign him the means and powers
for acting in consequence. I shall combine with him in my passage
through Bosnia every thing in the hopes that you will approve
of this.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_697"></a>[697]</span></p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Letter from Mr. King to lord William Bentinck.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Vienna, January 24th, 1812.</em></p>

<p><span class="smcap pad1">My lord</span>,</p>

<p>I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship’s
letter of the 25th of August, which was delivered to me towards
the latter end of October by captain Frizzi whom I should immediately
have furnished with the means of proceeding to Italy for
the purpose of carrying your lordship’s instructions into effect, had
it not appeared to me that the measures which I had taken on my
arrival here had already in a great degree anticipated your lordship’s
intentions. As a confirmation of this, I beg leave to
transmit for your lordship’s perusal the reports (marked A) of
three messengers whom I sent to the north of Italy for the purpose
of ascertaining the state of the public mind, particularly in the
ci-devant Venetian territories and adjacent districts. These reports
confirm in a very satisfactory manner the assurances, which
I have received through various other channels, that the inhabitants
of those countries are ready and determined to avail themselves
of the first opportunity to shake off a yoke which is become
insupportable. I have also the honour to transmit to your lordship
the copy of a letter from count Montgelas, the minister of
foreign affairs in Bavaria, to the commissary-general at Nimpten,
from which it appears that the Bavarian government is not altogether
ignorant of the intentions of the Swiss and Tyroleze, but I
am happy to have it in my power to inform your lordship that the
persons who seem to have excited the suspicions of the Bavarian
government do not enjoy the confidence of our friends in Switzerland,
and have not been made acquainted with their intentions; it
is nevertheless indispensably necessary that we should act with the
greatest possible caution in the employment of emissaries, lest the
French and Bavarian governments should take the alarm and
adopt measures which would defeat our projects or at least occasion
a premature explosion. On these grounds (having previously
consulted with general N. to whom captain Frizzi was particularly
addressed and who entirely coincides in my opinion) I think it
eligible to send this officer back to Sicily and I trust that in so
doing I shall meet with your lordship’s approbation. I beg leave
to observe that the only service captain Frizzi could render in
Italy at the present moment would be to ascertain the number and
distribution of the French forces in this country, but as these
undergo continual changes I think it will be sufficient to despatch<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_698"></a>[698]</span>
a confidential agent to your lordship with the latest intelligence
from Italy, at a period when the northern war and consequent
occupation of the French troops will enable your lordship to derive
advantage from such intelligence.</p>

<p>The general opinion is that hostilities will commence between
France and Russia in the month of April at which period the
preparations of the French government will be completed, and there
is little reason to hope that the Russians will avail themselves of
the interval, either to annihilate the army of the duchy of
Warsaw or to advance to the assistance of the king of Prussia,
who will in all probability ally himself with France notwithstanding
his former declarations to the contrary. The latest intelligence
from Berlin states that count St. Marsan had presented the ultimatum
of his government, which demands an unconditional surrender
of all the Prussian fortresses, and insists on the military
force and resources of Prussia being placed at the disposal of
French generals. It is positively asserted that the king is inclined
to submit to these humiliating proposals, but nothing has
been as yet definitively concluded. I am sorry to inform your
lordship that the aspect of affairs in this country is highly discouraging;
the injudicial financial measures which count Wallis
has thought proper to adopt have rendered it impossible for government
to place the army on a respectable footing, and have considerably
increased the discontent of the people, who however still
retain their characteristic aversion to the French. The government
is determined to maintain a strict neutrality during the
approaching crisis if possible.</p>

<p>In my former letter I mentioned to your lordship my intention
of establishing a person at Durazzo in order to forward messengers
&amp;c. &amp;c. and to transmit to me occasionally intelligence of the
state of things in the Adriatic. But having received of late
repeated assurances of the increasing discontent of the inhabitants
of those parts of the coast who have the misfortune to be under
the dominion of the French, and of their willingness to make every
effort to shake off the yoke, and being aware how important it is
at the present moment not to neglect an object of this nature I
have desired Mr. Johnson to proceed thither in order to form
connections in Albania, Dalmatia, and to avail himself in every
possible manner of the spirit of discontent which has so decidedly
manifested itself. Mr. Johnson who has been employed on the
continent for some years past as an agent of government, and who
has given proofs of his zeal and abilities, will repair to Durazzo, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_699"></a>[699]</span>
according to circumstances to some other town in the neighbourhood
of the Adriatic and will there reside as agent of the British
government. He will communicate his arrival to your lordship
with as little delay as possible.</p>

<p>By the following piece of information which I have derived
from an authentic source your lordship will perceive that the
French and Swedish governments are far from being on friendly
terms. An alliance has been proposed by the former to the
latter and instantaneously rejected. The terms of the alliance
were as follows, viz. 1st, a body of 30,000 Swedes to be placed
at the disposal of France. 2nd, 3000 seamen to be furnished to
the French marine, and 3rd, a regiment of Swedes to be raised
for the service of France as was the case before the French revolution.
I transmit this letter to your lordship by captain Steinberg
and ensign Ferandi, two officers who have served creditably in the
Austrian army. The former has connections and local knowledge
in his native country which may become particularly useful. I
fear it will not be in my power to send 50 subaltern officers to
Sicily as your lordship desired. I shall however occasionally
despatch some intelligent officers who will I think be extremely
useful in the formation of new corps.</p>


<hr class="r20">
<div class="chapter"></div>

<h3 id="No_III">No. III.</h3>

<p class="p2 center"><em>Extracts from the correspondence of sir Henry Wellesley,
sir Charles Stuart, and Mr. Vaughan.</em></p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Vaughan to sir Charles Stuart.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Cadiz, August 3d, 1813.</em></p>

<p>“The Spanish troops in Catalonia and elsewhere are starving,
and the government are feeding them with proclamations to
intendants. Since I have known Spain I have never known the
seat of government in a worse state. There is a strong feeling
against the English and a miserable jacobin party which is violent
beyond measure.”</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Chichana, Nov. 2d, 1813.</em></p>

<p>“Never was any thing so disgraceful in the annals of the
world as the conduct of all the Spanish authorities on the occasion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_700"></a>[700]</span>
of the sickness breaking out. It is believed that no persons have
the sickness twice, and as almost every family in Cadiz has passed
the epidemic of the fever the interested merchants would not allow
it to be said that the epidemic existed, they have continued to issue
clear bills of health to vessels leaving the port in the height of the
mortality and did all they could to intimidate the government and
Cortez into remaining amongst them.”</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Sir Henry Wellesley to lord Wellington.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Sept. 13th, 1813.</em></p>

<p>“A curious scene has been passing here lately. The permanent
deputation<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> having been appointed the Cortez closed their
session on the 14th. There had been for some days reports of the
prevalence of the yellow fever which had excited alarm. On the
16th in the evening, I received an official note from the ministers
of state apprizing me of the intention of the government to proceed
to Madrid on the following day, but without assigning any reason
for so sudden a resolution. At night I went to the regency,
thinking this was an occasion when it would be right to offer them
some pecuniary assistance. I found Agar and Ciscar together,
the cardinal being ill of the gout. They told me that the prevalence
of the disorder was the sole cause of their determination to
leave Cadiz; and Ciscar particularly dwelt upon the necessity of
removing, saying he had seen the fatal effects of delay at Carthagena.
They then told me that there was disturbance in the town,
in consequence of which they determined on summoning the
extraordinary Cortez. I went from the regency to the Cortez.
A motion was made for summoning the ministers to account for
the proceedings of the regency. Never was I witness to so disgraceful
a scene of lying and prevarication. The ministers insisted
that it was not the intention of the regency to leave Cadiz
until the Cortez had been consulted, although I had in my pocket
the official note announcing their intention to do so, and had been
told by Ciscar that the extraordinary Cortez was assembled for no
other reason than because there were disturbances in the town.”</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Cadiz, Dec. 10th, 1813.</em></p>

<p>“The party for placing the princess at the head of the Spanish
regency is gaining strength, and I should not be surprised if that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_701"></a>[701]</span>
measure were to be adopted soon after our arrival at Madrid,
unless a peace and the return of Ferdinand should put an end to
all such projects.”</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Mr. Stuart to lord Wellington.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>June 11th, 1813.</em></p>

<p>“The repugnance of the Admiralty to adopt the measures suggested
by your lordship at the commencement of the American
war for the protection of the coast, has been followed by events
which have fully justified your opinion. <em>Fifteen merchantmen
have been taken off Oporto in a fortnight and a valuable
Portuguese homeward-bound merchant ship was captured three
days ago close to the bar of Lisbon.</em>”</p>


<hr class="r20">
<div class="chapter"></div>

<h3 id="No_IV">No. IV.</h3>

<p class="p2 center"><em>Extract from a manuscript memoir by captain Norton,
thirty-fourth regiment.</em></p>


<h4>COMBAT OF MAYA.</h4>

<p>The thirty-ninth regiment, commanded by the hon. col. O’Callaghan,
then immediately engaged with the French and after a
severe contest also retired, the fiftieth was next in succession and
they also after a gallant stand retired, making way for the ninety-second
which met the advancing French column first with its
right wing drawn up in line, and after a most destructive fire and
heavy loss on both sides the remnant of the right wing retired,
leaving a line of killed and wounded that appeared to have no
interval; the French column advanced up to this line and then
halted, the killed and wounded of the ninety-second forming a
sort of rampart, the left wing then opened its fire on the column,
and as I was but a little to the right of the ninety-second I could
not help reflecting painfully how many of the wounded of their
right wing must have unavoidably suffered from the fire of their
comrades. The left wing after doing good service and sustaining
a loss equal to the first line retired.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_702"></a>[702]</span></p>


<h4>COMBAT OF RONCESVALLES.</h4>

<p class="p1 center"><span class="smcap">Extracts from general Cole’s and marshal Soult’s
Official Reports, MSS.</span></p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>General Cole to lord Wellington.</em></p>

<p class="right"><em>Heights in front of Pampeluna, July 27th, 1813.</em></p>

<p>——“The enemy having in the course of the night turned
those posts, were now perceived moving in very considerable
force along the ridge leading to the Puerto de Mendichurri. I
therefore proceeded in that direction and found that their advance
had nearly reached the road leading from Roncesvalles pass to
Los Alduides, from which it is separated by a small wooded valley.
Owing to the difficulty of the communications the head of major-general
Ross’s brigade could not arrive there sooner; the major-general
however, with great decision, attacked them with the
Brunswick company and three companies of the twentieth, all he
had time to form; these actually closed with the enemy and
bayonetted several in the ranks. They were however forced to
yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley, the
enemy attempted to follow them but were repulsed with loss, the
remainder of the brigade having come up.”</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Marshal Soult to the Minister of War.</em></p>

<p class="right"><i lang="fr">“Linzoin, 26 Juiller, 1813.</i></p>

<p lang="fr">“Leurs pertes ont également été considérables, soit à l’attaque
du Lindouz par le général Reille ou le 20<sup>me</sup> regiment a été presque
détruit à la suite d’une charge à la bayonnette executée par un
bataillon du 6<sup>me</sup> leger, division Foy, soit à l’attaque d’Altobiscar
par le général Clauzel.”</p>


<p class="p2 center"><em>Extract from the correspondence of the duke of Dalmatia with
the Minister of War.</em></p>

<p class="right"><i lang="fr">Ascain, 12 Août, 1813.</i></p>

<p lang="fr">“Dés a présent V. E. voit la situation de l’armée, elle connait
ses forces, celles de l’ennemi, et elle se fait sans doute une idée
de ses projets, et d’avance elle peut apprécier ce qu’il est en notre
pouvoir de faire; je ne charge point le tableau, je dis ma pensée
sans détour, et j’avoue que si l’ennemi emploie tous ses moyens,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_703"></a>[703]</span>
ainsi que probablement il le fera, ceux que nous pourrons en ce
moment lui opposer etant de beaucoup inferieurs, nous ne pourrons
pas empêcher qu’ils ne fasse beaucoup de mal. Mon devoir est
de le dire à V. E. quoique je tienne une autre language aux
troupes et au pays, et que d’ailleurs je ne néglige aucun moyen
pour remplir de mon mieux la tache qui m’est imposée.”</p>


<hr class="r20">
<div class="chapter"></div>

<h3 id="No_V">No. V.</h3>

<p class="p2 center"><span class="smcap">Extracted from the Imperial Muster-Rolls.</span></p>


<p class="p1 center"><em>Report of the movements of the army of Arragon during the
first fifteen days of September, 1813.</em></p>

<p lang="fr">“Le 12<sup>eme</sup> toute l’armée d’Aragon se reunit a Molino del Rey;
partie de celle de Catalonia et la garrison de Barcelonne se
placent a droite a Ollessa et Martorel, pour partir tous ensemble a
8 heures du soir et se porter le droite par San Sadurni, le rest
par le grande route d’Ordal sur Villa Franca, ou l’armée Anglaise
etait rasemble. General Harispe rencontré a onze heures du soir
un fort advant garde au Col d’Ordal <i lang="fr">dans les anciens ratranchemens</i>.
Un combat de plus vif s’engagea sous les ordres du
general de l’avant garde Mesclop. Le 7<sup>eme</sup> et 44<sup>eme</sup> reg<sup>ns.</sup> montrerent
une haute valeur, ainsi qu’une partie d’116<sup>eme</sup>. Les positions
sont prise et reprise, et nous restent enfin, couvert des morts
et de blesses Anglais. Dans la pursuite le 4<sup>eme</sup> houssards se
saissirent des 4 pieces de cannon Anglais, &amp;c. avec trois ou
quatre cents prisoniers, presque tous de la 27<sup>eme</sup> reg<sup>n.</sup> Anglais.
Le droit, ayant rencontrer des obstacles et quelques troupes ennemis
a combattre dans les passages, est retarde dans sa marche, et
n’arriva pas avec le jour au rendezvouz entre L’Ongat et Grenada.
Un battalion de 117<sup>eme</sup> venant à gauche, par Bejas sur Avionet,
rejoint l’armée en position, avec des prisoniers.</p>

<p lang="fr">“Le marechal Suchet directé une movement de cavalrie et de
l’artillerie qui tenaient la tête pour donner le tems à l’infanterie
d’entrer en ligne. Les Anglais etaient en battaile sur trois lignes
en avant de Villa Franca, ils commencerent aussitot leur retraite
en bon ordre. On les poursuiverent et on les harcelerent, la cavalrie
fit plusieurs charges assez vive. Ils opposerent de la resistance,
essuyerent des pertes, surtout en cavalrie, precipiterent leur<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_704"></a>[704]</span>
marche, brulerent un pont et s’eloignerent vers Arbos et Vendrils,
laissant plus que 150 hommes pris et beaucoup des morts et des
blesses, surtout des houssards de Brunswick. Nôtre avant garde
va ce soir à Vendrils et plusieurs certaines de deserteurs sont
ramassé.”</p>


<hr class="r20">
<div class="chapter"></div>

<h3 id="No_VI">No. VI.</h3>


<p class="negin1">No. 1.—Extract from the official state of the allied army, commanded by
lieutenant-general sir John Murray, at the Col de Balaguer, 17th June,
1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdc">Present<br>fit for duty.</td>
<td class="tdc">&#160;&#160;Sick.</td>
<td class="tdc">Command.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td class="tdc">Mules.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrq">739</td>
<td class="tdrq">12</td>
<td class="tdrq">6</td>
<td class="tdrq">733</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British Portuguese and Sicilian artillery</td>
<td class="tdrq">783</td>
<td class="tdrq">8</td>
<td class="tdrq">199</td>
<td class="tdrq">362</td>
<td class="tdrq">604</td>
<td class="tdrq">990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British engineers and staff corps</td>
<td class="tdrq">78</td>
<td class="tdrq">5</td>
<td class="tdrq">36</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">7,226</td>
<td class="tdrq">830</td>
<td class="tdrq">637</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">8,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Whittingham’s infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,370</td>
<td class="tdrq">503</td>
<td class="tdrq">316</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Sicilian infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">985</td>
<td class="tdrq">121</td>
<td class="tdrq">272</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">General Total</td>
<td class="tdrq">14,181</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,479</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,466</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,095</td>
<td class="tdrq">604</td>
<td class="tdrq">17,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 negin1">No. 2.—Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian
force, commanded by lieutenant-general sir William Clinton. Head-quarters,
Taragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants,
and drummers.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdc">Present<br>fit for duty.</td>
<td class="tdc">&#160;&#160;Sick.</td>
<td class="tdc">Command.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td class="tdc">Mules.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrq">663</td>
<td class="tdrq">61</td>
<td class="tdrq">215</td>
<td class="tdrq">875</td>
<td class="tdrq">40</td>
<td class="tdrq">939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Artillery, engineers, and staff corps</td>
<td class="tdrq">997</td>
<td class="tdrq">67</td>
<td class="tdrq">58</td>
<td class="tdrq">507</td>
<td class="tdrq">896</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">9,124</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,390</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,019</td>
<td class="tdrq">115</td>
<td class="tdrq">429</td>
<td class="tdrq">11,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">General Total</td>
<td class="tdrq">10,784</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,518</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,292</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,497</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,465</td>
<td class="tdrq">13,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 negin1">No. 3.—Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division
(Whittingham’s.) Taragona, 15th of December, 1813.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdc">Under arms.</td>
<td class="tdc">&#160;&#160;Sick.</td>
<td class="tdc">Command.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td class="tdc">Mules.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,014</td>
<td class="tdrq">400</td>
<td class="tdrq">627</td>
<td class="tdrq">110</td>
<td class="tdrq">21</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,041</td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 negin1">No. 4.—Extract from the original state of the first army commanded by
the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Copons et Navia. Head-quarters,
Vich, 1st of August, 1813.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrq">Under arms.</td>
<td class="tdrq">&#160;&#160;Sick.</td>
<td class="tdrq">Command.</td>
<td class="tdrq">Horses.</td>
<td class="tdrq">Mules.</td>
<td class="tdrq">Total men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Infantry disposable</td>
<td class="tdrq">10,219</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,535</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,207</td>
<td class="tdrq">586</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">13,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">In Cardona</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,182</td>
<td class="tdrq">115</td>
<td class="tdrq">398</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Seo d’Urgel</td>
<td class="tdrq">984</td>
<td class="tdrq">172</td>
<td class="tdrq">144</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Artillery, &amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdrq">877</td>
<td class="tdrq">7</td>
<td class="tdrq">59</td>
<td class="tdrq">6</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">Grand total</td>
<td class="tdrq">13,262</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,829</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,808</td>
<td class="tdrq">592</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdrq">18,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_705"></a>[705]</span></p>

<p class="p2 negin1">No. 5.—Extract from the original state of the second army commanded
by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Xavier Elio. Vinaros, 19th September,
1833.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdr">Present under arms.</td>
<td class="tdr">&#160;&#160;Sick.</td>
<td class="tdr">Command.</td>
<td class="tdr">Total of men.</td>
<td class="tdr">Horses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Total of all arms</td>
<td class="tdr">26,835</td>
<td class="tdr">3,181</td>
<td class="tdr">7,454</td>
<td class="tdr">37,470</td>
<td class="tdr">4,073</td>
</tr>
</table>

<p class="p1 fs80"><em>Note.</em>—This state includes Villa Campa’s, Sarzfield’s, Duran’s, the
Empecinado’s, and Roche’s divisions, besides the troops immediately
under Elio himself.</p>


<hr class="r20">
<div class="chapter"></div>

<h3 id="No_VII">No. VII.</h3>

<p class="negin1">No. 1.—Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the marquis of
Wellington’s command. Extracted from the original morning state for
the 24th of July, 1813.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Officers,</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Sergeants, &amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">916</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">5,894</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">6,750</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">5,834</td>
<td class="tdl" rowspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Present under arms</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Ditto infantry</td>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,665</td>
<td class="tdrq">29,926</td>
<td class="tdrq">34,581</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdl"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese cavalry</td>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrq">251</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,241</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,492</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,178</td>
<td class="tdl"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Ditto infantry</td>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrq">2,594</td>
<td class="tdrq">20,565</td>
<td class="tdrq">23,459</td>
<td class="tdrq">”</td>
<td class="tdl"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="4"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr">Grand Total, exclusive of</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">8,726</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">57,566</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">66,282</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">7,012</td>
<td class="tdl">{Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr">sick and absent on command</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td class="tdl">{and&#160;cavalry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="4"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc tdlh" colspan="7">The artillerymen, &amp;c. were about 4,000.</td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 negin1">No. 2.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning
state, 15th of October, 1813.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Officers,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Sergeants,&amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry<br>and infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">5,859</td>
<td class="tdrq">37,250</td>
<td class="tdrq">43,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese ditto</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,253</td>
<td class="tdrq">21,274</td>
<td class="tdrq">25,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr">&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;Grand Total, exclusive of sick,</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">10,112</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">58,524</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">68,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr">absent on command. &amp;c. &amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc tdlh" colspan="4">The artillerymen and drivers about</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="bb"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td class="tdc">Total</td>
<td class="tdrq">72,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="bb"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 negin1">No. 3.—Anglo-Portuguese force, from the original morning state,
9th November, 1813.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Officers,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Sergeants,&amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry<br>and infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">5,356</td>
<td class="tdrq">39,687</td>
<td class="tdrq">45,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese ditto</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">2,990</td>
<td class="tdrq">22,237</td>
<td class="tdrq">25,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr">&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;Grand Total, exclusive of sick,</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">8,346</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">61,924</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">70,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr">absent on command. &amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc tdlh" colspan="4">The artillerymen &amp;c. &amp;c. about</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="bb"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td class="tdc">Total</td>
<td class="tdrq">74,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="bb"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_706"></a>[706]</span></p>

<p class="p2 negin1">No. 4.—Sir Rowland Hill’s force at the battle of St. Pierre. Extracted
from the original morning state, 13th December, 1813.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Officers,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Sergeants, &amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">Second division</td>
<td class="tdl">{British</td>
<td class="tdrq">802</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,371</td>
<td class="tdrq">6,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">{Portuguese</td>
<td class="tdrq">277</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,331</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Lecor’s Portuguese division</td>
<td class="tdrq">507</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,163</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">Total under arms, exclusive of artillerymen</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,586</td>
<td class="tdrq">11,865</td>
<td class="tdrq">13,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 negin1">No. 5.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning
state, 13th February, 1814.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Officers,</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Sergeants, &amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total.</td>
<td class="tdc">Cavalry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,093</td>
<td class="tdrq">7,315</td>
<td class="tdrq">8,408}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">9,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrq">280</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,210</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,490}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="tdr">Infantry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,853</td>
<td class="tdrq">29,714</td>
<td class="tdrq">34,567}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">56,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,828</td>
<td class="tdrq">18,911</td>
<td class="tdrq">21,739}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="bb"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">General Total, present under arms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">66,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="bb"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="3">Artillerymen, &amp;c. about</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,000</td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 negin1">No. 6.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning
state, 10th of April, 1814.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Officers,</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Sergeants, &amp;c.</td>
<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,159</td>
<td class="tdrq">7,640</td>
<td class="tdrq">8,799}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">9,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrq">230</td>
<td class="tdrq">958</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,188}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">British and German infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,946</td>
<td class="tdrq">29,999</td>
<td class="tdrq">34,945}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">54,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese infantry</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,622</td>
<td class="tdrq">16,983</td>
<td class="tdrq">19,605}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="bb"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">General Total, present under arms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">64,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="bb"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="3">The artillerymen, &amp;c. about</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,000</td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 negin1">No. 7.—Actual strength of the infantry divisions engaged in the battle
of Toulouse. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April,
1814.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Officers,</td>
<td>&#160;&#160;</td>
<td class="tdc">&#160; Rank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">Infantry, present under arms.</td>
<td class="tdl">Sergeants,&#160;&amp;c.</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr">and&#160;file.</td>
<td class="tdr">Total.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Second division,</td>
<td class="tdl">British</td>
<td class="tdrq">715</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,123}&#160;</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">6,940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td>
<td class="tdrq">235</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,867}&#160;</td>
<td class="tdl">Grand Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Third division,</td>
<td class="tdl">British</td>
<td class="tdrq">529</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">2,741&#160;}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">4,679</td>
<td class="tdl">infantry,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td>
<td class="tdrq">226</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,183&#160;}</td>
<td class="tdl">officers&#160;and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Fourth division,</td>
<td class="tdl">British</td>
<td class="tdrq">531</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">3,028}&#160;</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">5,383</td>
<td class="tdl">soldiers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td>
<td class="tdrq">239</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,585}&#160;</td>
<td class="tdl">present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Sixth division,</td>
<td class="tdl">British</td>
<td class="tdrq">558</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">3,233&#160;}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">5,681</td>
<td class="tdl">under&#160;arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td>
<td class="tdrq">246</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,644&#160;}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Light division,</td>
<td class="tdl">British</td>
<td class="tdrq">378</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">2,469}&#160;</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">4,318</td>
<td class="tdl pad3">30,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td>
<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td>
<td class="tdrq">231</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,240}&#160;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Lecor’s Portuguese division</td>
<td class="tdrq">455</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">3,507&#160;&#160;&#160;</td>
<td class="tdrq">3,962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,343</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">26,620&#160;&#160;&#160;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p1 fs80"><em>Note.</em>—There is no separate state for the cavalry on the 10th of April,
but on the 15th of May, 1814, they stood as follows.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_707"></a>[707]</span></p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Officers,</td>
<td>&#160;&#160;</td>
<td class="tdc">Rank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">Cavalry, present under arms.</td>
<td class="tdc">Sergeants,&#160;&amp;c.</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">and&#160;file.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Bock’s brigade of Germans</td>
<td class="tdrq">112</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">694</td>
<td class="tdl">Total&#160;cavalry,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Ponsonby’s brigade of British</td>
<td class="tdrq">188</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,921</td>
<td class="tdc">present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Fane’s brigade of British</td>
<td class="tdrq">240</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,506</td>
<td class="tdc">under arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Vivian’s brigade of British</td>
<td class="tdrq">128</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Lord Edw. Somerset’s brigade of British</td>
<td class="tdrq">214</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,691</td>
<td class="tdrq">6,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">882</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">6,072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="4">Total of Anglo-Portuguese cavalry and infantry, present under arms</td>
<td class="tdrq">37,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="4">Add the Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, together said to be</td>
<td class="tdrq">14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="tdrq">51,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc">Artillerymen, &amp;c.</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="3">General Total</td>
<td class="tdrq">53,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td class="tdrq tdlha">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
</tr>
</table>

<p class="p1 fs80"><em>Note.</em>—My authority for the number of guns employed during this
campaign are copies of the returns given to me by sir Alexander Dickson
who commanded that arm. The number of artillerymen is not borne on
the morning states, but in the original weekly state of the 15th of May,
1814, I find the artillerymen, engineers, drivers, and waggon-train,
amounted to four thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, with five
thousand and thirty horses and mules. This may be taken as the average
strength during the campaign, but more than half were with sir John
Hope and some with lord Dalhousie. Wherefore, the number at the
battle of Toulouse could not have exceeded fifteen hundred, making a
total of all ranks and arms of fifty-three thousand combatants.</p>


<hr class="r20">
<div class="chapter"></div>

<h3 id="No_VIII">No. VIII.</h3>

<p class="negin1">No. 1.—General state of the French armies under Soult and Suchet. Extracted
from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July 1813. The armies of the
north centre and south being by an imperial decree reorganised in one
body, taking the title of the army of Spain.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td>
<td class="tdc">Hosp-</td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td class="tdc">itals</td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Army of Spain</td>
<td class="tdrq">97,983</td>
<td class="tdrq">12,676</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,110</td>
<td class="tdrq">392</td>
<td class="tdrq">14,074</td>
<td class="tdrq">114,167</td>
<td class="tdrq">13,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad5">Arragon</td>
<td class="tdrq">32,362</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,919</td>
<td class="tdrq">3,621</td>
<td class="tdrq">551</td>
<td class="tdrq">3,201</td>
<td class="tdrq">39,184</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad5">Catalonia</td>
<td class="tdrq">25,910</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,869</td>
<td class="tdrq">168</td>
<td class="tdrq">” &#160;</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,379</td>
<td class="tdrq">27,457</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad3">General Total</td>
<td class="tdrq">156,255</td>
<td class="tdrq">19,464</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,899</td>
<td class="tdrq">943</td>
<td class="tdrq">18,654</td>
<td class="tdrq">180,808</td>
<td class="tdrq">20,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 pfs80">No. 2.—15th of September, 1813.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Army of Spain</td>
<td class="tdrq">81,351</td>
<td class="tdrq">11,159</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,004</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,438</td>
<td class="tdrq">22,488</td>
<td class="tdrq">107,843</td>
<td class="tdrq">11,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad5">Arragon</td>
<td class="tdrq">32,476</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,447</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,721</td>
<td class="tdrq">320</td>
<td class="tdrq">3,616</td>
<td class="tdrq">38,813</td>
<td class="tdrq">6,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad5">Catalonia</td>
<td class="tdrq">24,026</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,670</td>
<td class="tdrq">120</td>
<td class="tdrq">” &#160;</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,137</td>
<td class="tdrq">26,283</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad3">General Total</td>
<td class="tdrq">137,853</td>
<td class="tdrq">17,276</td>
<td class="tdrq">6,845</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,758</td>
<td class="tdrq">28,241</td>
<td class="tdrq">172,939</td>
<td class="tdrq">20,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td>
</tr>
</table>



<p class="p1 fs80"><em>Note.</em>—The garrison of San Sebastian though captive is borne on
this state.</p>

<p class="fs80">This is the last general state of the French army in my possession
but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls.</p>

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_708"></a>[708]</span></p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdl">“Army of Spain,</td>
<td class="tdl">16th November, 1813.—</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">102 battalions.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">74 squadrons, without garrisons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="4">74,152 men present under arms.
    <span class="pad3">100,212 effectives.</span></td>
<td class="tdl">17,206 horses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">18,230 Hospital.</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">&#160; 8,555 Troop horses.</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">&#160; 1,809 Officers’ horses.</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">&#160; 5,384 Horses of draft.</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="6">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">“Army of Spain,</td>
<td class="tdl">1st December.—</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">93 battalions.</td>
<td class="tdl">74 squadrons.</td>
<td class="tdl">17,989 horses.”</td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 pfs80">No. 3.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, July 1813, when Soult took
the command.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Effective and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">Right wing.—Lieutenant-general Reille.</td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">non-effective.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">First division,</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Foy, 9 battalions</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,922</td>
<td class="tdrq">189 }</td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms,</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 6,784 }</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Seventh ditto,</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Maucune, 7 ditto</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,186</td>
<td class="tdrq">110 }</td>
<td class="tdrq">17,235</td>
<td class="tdrq">450</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 5,676 }</td>
<td class="tdrq">21,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Ninth ditto,</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">La Martiniere, 11 ditto</td>
<td class="tdrq">7,127</td>
<td class="tdrq">151 }</td>
<td class="tdc">men.</td>
<td class="tdc">horses.</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 8,906 }</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl tdlh" colspan="6">Centre.—Drouet, Count D’Erlon.</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Second division,</td>
<td class="tdl">D’Armagnac,</td>
<td class="tdl">8 batt.</td>
<td class="tdrq">6,961</td>
<td class="tdrq">116 }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 8,580 }</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Third ditto,</td>
<td class="tdl">Abbé,</td>
<td class="tdl">9 ditto</td>
<td class="tdrq">8,030</td>
<td class="tdrq">285 }</td>
<td class="tdrq">20,957</td>
<td class="tdrq">624</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 8,723 }</td>
<td class="tdrq">23,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Sixth ditto,</td>
<td class="tdl">Daricau,</td>
<td class="tdl">8 ditto</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,966</td>
<td class="tdrq">223 }</td>
<td class="tdc">men.</td>
<td class="tdc">horses.</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 6,627 }</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl tdlh" colspan="6">Left wing.—Lieut.-general Clauzel.</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Fourth division,</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Conroux, 9 battalions</td>
<td class="tdrq">7,056</td>
<td class="tdrq">150 }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 7,477 }</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Fifth ditto,</td>
<td class="tdl">Vandermaesen,</td>
<td class="tdl">7 ditto</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,181</td>
<td class="tdrq">141 }</td>
<td class="tdrq">17,218</td>
<td class="tdrq">432</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 5,201 }</td>
<td class="tdrq">20,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Eighth ditto,</td>
<td class="tdl">Taupin,</td>
<td class="tdl">10 ditto</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,981</td>
<td class="tdrq">141 }</td>
<td class="tdc">men.</td>
<td class="tdc">horses.</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 7,587 }</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl tdlh pad4" colspan="6">Reserve, General Villatte.</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">French</td>
<td class="tdl"></td>
<td class="tdrq">14,959</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">17,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">Foreign</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="7">4 battalions of the Rhine, strength not given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">4 ditto</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">Italians, general St. Pol, ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">4 ditto</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">Spaniards, general Casabianca, ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl tdlh pad4" colspan="6">Cavalry, Pierre Soult.</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Effective and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">non-effective.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">22 squadrons</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,723</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,416}</td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 5,098 }</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">7,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Trielhard</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,358</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,275}</td>
<td class="tdrq">7,081</td>
<td class="tdrq">6,691</td>
<td class="tdrq">{ 2,523 }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdc">men.</td>
<td class="tdc">horses.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="5">Total according to the organization, but }</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">77,450</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">91,086 &#160;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="5">exclusive of the foreign battalions }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</table>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Men under arms.</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Troops not in the organization</td>
<td class="tdrq">14,938</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">16,946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Generals {Garrison of St. Sebastian, 1st July</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2"><span class="fs150">}</span> 2,731</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">3,086</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="4">Rey &#160; &#160; &#160;{forming part of this number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="4">Cassan.— &#160; Ditto of Pampeluna, 1st July</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,951</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">3,121</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="4">Lameth.—Ditto of Santona, 1st May</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,465</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,674</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Second reserve, not in the above</td>
<td class="tdrq">5,595</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">6,105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="9">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="3">Effective and non-effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">Men.</td>
<td class="tdc">Horses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4" colspan="3">General Total</td>
<td class="tdrq">97,983</td>
<td class="tdrq">12,676.</td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">&#160;Present under arms.&#160;</td>
<td class="tdrq">114,167</td>
<td class="tdrq">13,028</td>
</tr>
</table>


<p class="p2 pfs80">No. 4.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, 16th of September, 1813.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Effective and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td class="tdc">Men. &#160;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">non-effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Foy</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">5,002 }</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc">present</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Right wing</td>
<td class="tdl">{ Maucune</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,166 }</td>
<td class="tdr">14,875</td>
<td class="tdc">under arms.</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Menne</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">5,707 }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdrq">Men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlha" colspan="6">&#160;</td>
<td class="tdlha tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ D’Armagnac</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,353 }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Centre.</td>
<td class="tdl">{ Abbé</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">5,903 }</td>
<td class="tdr">15,098</td>
<td class="tdc">ditto</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdrq">45,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Maranzin</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,842 }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlha" colspan="6">&#160;</td>
<td class="tdlha tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Conroux</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">4,736 }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Left wing.</td>
<td class="tdl">{ Roguet</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">5,982 }</td>
<td class="tdr">15,789</td>
<td class="tdc">ditto</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Taupin</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">5,071 }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlha" colspan="8">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Reserve.</td>
<td class="tdl pad2">Villatte</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdr">8,256 &#160; }</td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Provisional troops of the</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">The Italian brigade,</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">right wing, destined</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdr">2,168 &#160; }</td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">about 2,000</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdrq">10,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">to reinforce the</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">ordered to Milan.</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">garrison of Bayonne</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td class="tdr">}</td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_709"></a>[709]</span></p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdrq">Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">Men.</td>
<td class="tdr">Horses.</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">Men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Cavalry.—</td>
<td class="tdl">Pierre Soult</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,456</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,617</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Ditto</td>
<td class="tdl">Trielhard</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,368</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,583</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">8,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">Gensd’armes</td>
<td class="tdl">{ mounted</td>
<td class="tdrq">291</td>
<td class="tdrq">247</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">{ <ins class="corr" id="tn-709" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'dismountned'">dismounted</ins></td>
<td class="tdrq">1,210</td>
<td class="tdrq">” &#160;</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlha" colspan="6">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Parc</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">895</td>
<td class="tdrq">885</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">1,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">504</td>
<td class="tdrq">127</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlha" colspan="6">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Pampeluna</td>
<td class="tdrq">3,805</td>
<td class="tdrq">191</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ San Sebastian</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,366</td>
<td class="tdr">prisoners of war.</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Santona</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,633</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Garrisons.</td>
<td class="tdl">{ Bayonne</td>
<td class="tdrq">4,631</td>
<td class="tdrq">137</td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td class="tdrq">15,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ St. Jean Pied de Port</td>
<td class="tdrq">1,786</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Navarens</td>
<td class="tdrq">842</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">{ Castle of Lourdes</td>
<td class="tdrq">107</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdl">}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdrq">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdrq">81,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="5">Deduct garrison of San Sebastian</td>
<td class="tdrq">2,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdrq">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total, present under arms</td>
<td></td>
<td class="tdrq">78,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdrq">&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;</td>
</tr>
</table>



<hr class="r20">

<h3 id="No_IX">No. IX.</h3>


<p class="negin1 fs100"><em>Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the
attack of the enemy’s fortified position in front of Toulouse
for to-morrow, 1st April, 1814. Published in the United
Service Journal, October 1838.</em></p>

<p class="p1 center">(<span class="smcap">Extract.</span>)</p>

<p class="right">“<em>St. Jory, 9th April, 1814.</em></p>

<p>“The front attack of the third division is to extend from the
river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of
La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban) inclusive of
that road.</p>

<p>“The light division will be immediately on the left of the third
division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road
above-mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of
the Spanish troops.</p>

<p>“The operations of these two divisions are meant, however,
more as diversions than as real attacks; it not being expected
that they will be able to force any of the passes of the canal
which covers Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened
chiefly at the bridges and at the locks or any other points where
the form of the ground, or other circumstances most favour the
advance of the troops. A considerable part both of the third and
of the light divisions must be kept in reserve.”</p>


<p class="fs80" id="end-app"><em>Note.</em>—The analysis of the allied army on the 10th of April, given in
Appendix VII. Sections 6 and 7, has been very carefully made and
faithfully set down; but as the real number of the allies has lately become
a point of dispute between French and English writers, I here give
the Morning State of the whole army, accurately printed from the original
document delivered by the adjutant-general to lord Wellington on the
morning of the 10th of April, 1814. The reader will thus be enabled,
with the help of my text, to trace each division in its course and ascertain
its true numbers.</p>


<hr class="r20">

<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_710"></a>[710]</span></p>

<h3 id="No_X">No. X.</h3>

<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="state" style="max-width: 102em;">
  <img class="w100" src="images/state.jpg" alt="Table of state of forces">
  <a rel="nofollow" href="images/state-large.jpg">
  <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a>
</figure>


<div class="chapter"></div>
<p class="p1 pfs80">MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the PENINSULA, under the Command of HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD-MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON, K.G. Head-Quarters, St. Jory, 10th April, 1814.</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2"><span class="transnote">(Part 1 of 3)</span> &#160; KEY:</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AA = Colonels.</td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">KEY:</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BA = Quarter-Masters of Cavalry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AB = Lieut.-Colonels.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BB = Present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AC = Majors.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BC = Present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AD = Captains.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BD = Absent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AE = Lieutenants.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BE = Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AF = Cornets or Ensigns.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BF = Prs. of War & Missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AG = Staff.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BG = Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="16">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="16"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc">Date of</td>
<td class="tdcl br" rowspan="3">DIVISIONS.</td>
<td class="tdcl" colspan="7">OFFICERS</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdcl br" colspan="6">SERGEANTS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc">last State</td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="tdcl bt" colspan="2">Sick.</td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdc">received.</td>
<td class="tdrl">AA</td>
<td class="tdrl">AB</td>
<td class="tdrl">AC</td>
<td class="tdrl">AD</td>
<td class="tdrl">AE</td>
<td class="tdrl">AF</td>
<td class="tdrl">AG</td>
<td class="tdrl">BA</td>
<td class="tdrl">BB</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">BC</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">BD</td>
<td class="tdrl">BE</td>
<td class="tdrl">BF</td>
<td class="tdrl br">BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="16"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdcl">BRITISH.</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">7th Apr.</td>
<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">13</td>
<td class="tdrl">17</td>
<td class="tdrl">106</td>
<td class="tdrl">189</td>
<td class="tdrl">25</td>
<td class="tdrl">94</td>
<td class="tdrl">25</td>
<td class="tdrl">581</td>
<td class="tdrl">9</td>
<td class="tdrl">17</td>
<td class="tdrl">68</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl br">682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq"> ” &#160; Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">1st Dn. Infantry</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">16</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">64</td>
<td class="tdrl">53</td>
<td class="tdrl">56</td>
<td class="tdrl">48</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">433</td>
<td class="tdrl">13</td>
<td class="tdrl">40</td>
<td class="tdrl">38</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl br">528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">9th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">2d</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">45</td>
<td class="tdrl">123</td>
<td class="tdrl">29</td>
<td class="tdrl">41</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">320</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">89</td>
<td class="tdrl">68</td>
<td class="tdrl">18</td>
<td class="tdrl br">500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq"> ” &#160; Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">3d</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">38</td>
<td class="tdrl">69</td>
<td class="tdrl">30</td>
<td class="tdrl">32</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">231</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">82</td>
<td class="tdrl">47</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl br">368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">6th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">4th</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">9</td>
<td class="tdrl">42</td>
<td class="tdrl">86</td>
<td class="tdrl">27</td>
<td class="tdrl">30</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">232</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">76</td>
<td class="tdrl">56</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl br">371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">7th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">5th</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">35</td>
<td class="tdrl">82</td>
<td class="tdrl">39</td>
<td class="tdrl">38</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">245</td>
<td class="tdrl">28</td>
<td class="tdrl">63</td>
<td class="tdrl">30</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl br">376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">8th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">6th</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">9</td>
<td class="tdrl">41</td>
<td class="tdrl">102</td>
<td class="tdrl">41</td>
<td class="tdrl">25</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">236</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">59</td>
<td class="tdrl">41</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl br">341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">5th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">7th</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">38</td>
<td class="tdrl">74</td>
<td class="tdrl">31</td>
<td class="tdrl">31</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">187</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">62</td>
<td class="tdrl">42</td>
<td class="tdrl">16</td>
<td class="tdrl br">312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">9th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">Lt.</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">24</td>
<td class="tdrl">68</td>
<td class="tdrl">13</td>
<td class="tdrl">19</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">182</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">39</td>
<td class="tdrl">21</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl br">245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">7th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">37</td>
<td class="tdrl">74</td>
<td class="tdrl">19</td>
<td class="tdrl">26</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">188</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">8</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdcl">TOTAL</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdcl">--------</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdcl pad1">PORTUGUESE.</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">7th Apr.</td>
<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">17</td>
<td class="tdrl">39</td>
<td class="tdrl">15</td>
<td class="tdrl">41</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">64</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">28</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">9th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">2d Dn. Infantry</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">16</td>
<td class="tdrl">16</td>
<td class="tdrl">28</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">122</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">19</td>
<td class="tdrl">32</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq"> ” &#160; Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">3d</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">9</td>
<td class="tdrl">17</td>
<td class="tdrl">23</td>
<td class="tdrl">14</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">101</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">20</td>
<td class="tdrl">39</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">6th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">4th</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">12</td>
<td class="tdrl">24</td>
<td class="tdrl">51</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">103</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">27</td>
<td class="tdrl">23</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">7th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">5th</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">13</td>
<td class="tdrl">12</td>
<td class="tdrl">22</td>
<td class="tdrl">49</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">105</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">25</td>
<td class="tdrl">18</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">8th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">6th</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">12</td>
<td class="tdrl">13</td>
<td class="tdrl">16</td>
<td class="tdrl">47</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">119</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">12</td>
<td class="tdrl">20</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">5th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">7th</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">17</td>
<td class="tdrl">18</td>
<td class="tdrl">27</td>
<td class="tdrl">43</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">110</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">12</td>
<td class="tdrl">23</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">9th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">Lt.</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">13</td>
<td class="tdrl">11</td>
<td class="tdrl">26</td>
<td class="tdrl">29</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">101</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">27</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">7th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">Unattached Dn.</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">25</td>
<td class="tdrl">22</td>
<td class="tdrl">51</td>
<td class="tdrl">80</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">197</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">47</td>
<td class="tdrl">26</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl br">278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq">8th Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">1st Brigade</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">9</td>
<td class="tdrl">12</td>
<td class="tdrl">27</td>
<td class="tdrl">16</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">137</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">20</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrq"> ” &#160; Do.</td>
<td class="tdll">10th</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">18</td>
<td class="tdrl">14</td>
<td class="tdrl">23</td>
<td class="tdrl">38</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">124</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">15</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdll">Total Portuguese</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td class="tdll">Total British</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdlh">&#160;</td>
<td class="tdll">Grand Total</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="16"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<div class="chapter"></div>
<table class="p2 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2"><span class="transnote">(Part 2 of 3)</span> &#160; &#160; KEY:</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">CA = Present.</td>
<td class="tdr">KEY:</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DA = Present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CB = Present.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DB = Present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CC = Absent.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DC = Absent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CD = Command.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DD = Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CE = Prs. of War & Missing.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DE = Prs. of War & Missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CF = Total.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DF = Total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="13">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl" rowspan="3">DIVISIONS.</td>
<td class="tdcl" colspan="6">TRUMPETERS OR DRUMMERS.</td>
<td class="tdcl br" colspan="6">RANK AND FILE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="tdcl bt" colspan="2">Sick.</td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="tdcl bt" colspan="2">Sick.</td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrl">CA</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">CB</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">CC</td>
<td class="tdrl">CD</td>
<td class="tdrl">CE</td>
<td class="tdrl">CF</td>
<td class="tdrl">DA</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">DB</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">DC</td>
<td class="tdrl">DD</td>
<td class="tdrl">DE</td>
<td class="tdrl br">DF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl">BRITISH.</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrl">108</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">8</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">122</td>
<td class="tdrl">7640</td>
<td class="tdrl">106</td>
<td class="tdrl">406</td>
<td class="tdrl">1071</td>
<td class="tdrl">233</td>
<td class="tdrl br">9456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">1st Dn. Infantry</td>
<td class="tdrl">142</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">152</td>
<td class="tdrl">5894</td>
<td class="tdrl">244</td>
<td class="tdrl">632</td>
<td class="tdrl">200</td>
<td class="tdrl">185</td>
<td class="tdrl br">7155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">2d</td>
<td class="tdrl">143</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">23</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">8</td>
<td class="tdrl">178</td>
<td class="tdrl">4123</td>
<td class="tdrl">112</td>
<td class="tdrl">2251</td>
<td class="tdrl">474</td>
<td class="tdrl">716</td>
<td class="tdrl br">7676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">3d</td>
<td class="tdrl">114</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">20</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">145</td>
<td class="tdrl">2741</td>
<td class="tdrl">75</td>
<td class="tdrl">1352</td>
<td class="tdrl">297</td>
<td class="tdrl">229</td>
<td class="tdrl br">4694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">4th</td>
<td class="tdrl">102</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">15</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">129</td>
<td class="tdrl">3028</td>
<td class="tdrl">44</td>
<td class="tdrl">1700</td>
<td class="tdrl">279</td>
<td class="tdrl">201</td>
<td class="tdrl br">5252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">5th</td>
<td class="tdrl">99</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">8</td>
<td class="tdrl">130</td>
<td class="tdrl">3277</td>
<td class="tdrl">363</td>
<td class="tdrl">1075</td>
<td class="tdrl">224</td>
<td class="tdrl">315</td>
<td class="tdrl br">5254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">6th</td>
<td class="tdrl">101</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">19</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">124</td>
<td class="tdrl">3233</td>
<td class="tdrl">54</td>
<td class="tdrl">1223</td>
<td class="tdrl">309</td>
<td class="tdrl">103</td>
<td class="tdrl br">4922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">7th</td>
<td class="tdrl">92</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">8</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">11</td>
<td class="tdrl">117</td>
<td class="tdrl">2738</td>
<td class="tdrl">114</td>
<td class="tdrl">1074</td>
<td class="tdrl">391</td>
<td class="tdrl">673</td>
<td class="tdrl br">4990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Lt.</td>
<td class="tdrl">66</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">73</td>
<td class="tdrl">2469</td>
<td class="tdrl">77</td>
<td class="tdrl">696</td>
<td class="tdrl">131</td>
<td class="tdrl">146</td>
<td class="tdrl br">3519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.</td>
<td class="tdrl">72</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">77</td>
<td class="tdrl">2496</td>
<td class="tdrl">212</td>
<td class="tdrl">312</td>
<td class="tdrl">92</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">3112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl">TOTAL</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl bt">37639</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">1401</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">10721</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">3468</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">2801</td>
<td class="tdrl bt br">56030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl">-------</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl pad1">PORTUGUESE.</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrl">40</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">50</td>
<td class="tdrl">958</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">73</td>
<td class="tdrl">598</td>
<td class="tdrl">16</td>
<td class="tdrl br">1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">2d Dn. Infantry</td>
<td class="tdrl">39</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">44</td>
<td class="tdrl">1867</td>
<td class="tdrl">71</td>
<td class="tdrl">472</td>
<td class="tdrl">101</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">2511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">3d</td>
<td class="tdrl">58</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">71</td>
<td class="tdrl">1183</td>
<td class="tdrl">105</td>
<td class="tdrl">598</td>
<td class="tdrl">383</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">2269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">4th</td>
<td class="tdrl">36</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">47</td>
<td class="tdrl">1585</td>
<td class="tdrl">30</td>
<td class="tdrl">635</td>
<td class="tdrl">199</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">2449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">5th</td>
<td class="tdrl">34</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">40</td>
<td class="tdrl">1161</td>
<td class="tdrl">13</td>
<td class="tdrl">550</td>
<td class="tdrl">176</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">6th</td>
<td class="tdrl">33</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">42</td>
<td class="tdrl">1644</td>
<td class="tdrl">44</td>
<td class="tdrl">469</td>
<td class="tdrl">151</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">2308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">7th</td>
<td class="tdrl">33</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">38</td>
<td class="tdrl">1736</td>
<td class="tdrl">48</td>
<td class="tdrl">228</td>
<td class="tdrl">211</td>
<td class="tdrl">48</td>
<td class="tdrl br">2271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Lt.</td>
<td class="tdrl">51</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">7</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">63</td>
<td class="tdrl">1240</td>
<td class="tdrl">54</td>
<td class="tdrl">237</td>
<td class="tdrl">394</td>
<td class="tdrl">11</td>
<td class="tdrl br">1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Unattached Dn.</td>
<td class="tdrl">67</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">85</td>
<td class="tdrl">3507</td>
<td class="tdrl">215</td>
<td class="tdrl">835</td>
<td class="tdrl">219</td>
<td class="tdrl">76</td>
<td class="tdrl br">4852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">1st Brigade</td>
<td class="tdrl">64</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">72</td>
<td class="tdrl">1510</td>
<td class="tdrl">68</td>
<td class="tdrl">328</td>
<td class="tdrl">146</td>
<td class="tdrl">213</td>
<td class="tdrl br">2265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">10th</td>
<td class="tdrl">31</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">5</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">39</td>
<td class="tdrl">1550</td>
<td class="tdrl">115</td>
<td class="tdrl">351</td>
<td class="tdrl">82</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl br">2102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Total Portuguese</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl bt">17941</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">768</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">4776</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">2660</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">368</td>
<td class="tdrl bt br">26513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Total British</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll tdlh">Grand Total</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td>
</tr>
</table>


<div class="chapter"></div>
<table class="p2 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2"><span class="transnote">(Part 3 of 3)</span> &#160; KEY:</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="3">EA = Present.</td>
<td class="tdr" colspan="2">KEY:</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FA = Joined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">EB = Sick.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FB = Dead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">EC = Command.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FC = Discharged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="5">ED = Total.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FD = Deserted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FE = Transferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FF = Promoted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FG = Reduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FH = Effective Rank and File,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td colspan="7"></td>
<td class="tdl pad1" colspan="5">Portuguese included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="13">&#160;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl" rowspan="3">DIVISIONS.</td>
<td class="tdcl" colspan="4">HORSES.</td>
<td class="tdcl" colspan="7">ALTERATIONS.</td>
<td class="tdcl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="bl bt"></td>
<td class="tdcl bt" colspan="7">Men.</td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrl">EA</td>
<td class="tdrl">EB</td>
<td class="tdrl">EC</td>
<td class="tdrl">ED</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">FA</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">FB</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">FC</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">FD</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">FE</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">FF</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">FG</td>
<td class="tdrl br">FH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl">BRITISH.</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrl">7289</td>
<td class="tdrl">611</td>
<td class="tdrl">602</td>
<td class="tdrl">8502</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">8144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl">{b}</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl">{c}</td>
<td class="tdrl">{c}</td>
<td class="tdrl">{d}</td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">1st Dn. Infantry</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">6</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">10</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl br">5894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">2d</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">11</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">4</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">5990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl">{a}</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl">{a}</td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">3d</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl br">3924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">4th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">4613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl">{a}</td>
<td class="tdrl">{e}</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">5th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">17</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">4438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">6th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">4877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">7th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">4474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl">{a}</td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Lt.</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl br">3709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">2496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl">TOTAL</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">7289</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">611</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">602</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">8502</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">5</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">24</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">..</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">6</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">33</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">4</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">6</td>
<td class="tdrl bt br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl">-------</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl pad1">PORTUGUESE.</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td>
<td class="tdrl">855</td>
<td class="tdrl">114</td>
<td class="tdrl">404</td>
<td class="tdrl">1373</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">2d Dn. Infantry</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="tdrl">{e}</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">3d</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">4th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">5th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">69</td>
<td class="tdrl">3</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">2</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">6th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">7th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Lt.</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Unattached Dn.</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">3507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">1st Brigade</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">1</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">1510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">10th</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl">..</td>
<td class="tdrl br">1550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdcl">-------</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Total Portuguese</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">855</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">114</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">404</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">1373</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">70</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">5</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">1</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">..</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">2</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">1</td>
<td class="tdrl bt">..</td>
<td class="tdrl bt br">..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll">Total British</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdll tdlh">Grand Total</td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl"></td>
<td class="bl br"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="8">3 Men deserted 2d Line Bn. K.G.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="8">1 Do. ” 1st Line Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="8">1 Do. ” 47th Foot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="8">1 Do. ” 4th Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td class="tdl tdlh" colspan="10">The Men transferred are Invalids sent home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl tdlh pad3" colspan="13">_Note._—The figures belonging to the
grand total are wanting in the original.</td>
</tr>
</table>

<div class="transnote">
<p class="noindent pad6">This table has five table-note anchors indicated in this etext by {a} to {e}.<br>
They were printed as one or more asterisks in the original book;<br>
however there is no explanation of their meaning.</p>
</div>


<div class="chapter"></div>
<div class="footnotes">

<h2 class="nobreak" id="FOOTNOTES">FOOTNOTES:</h2>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> Since colonel and surveyor-general of South Australia.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> The present major-general sir George Napier.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> A splendid soldier.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> A false stopping here misled me about the bridge. I made the
allies pass by ladders instead of the French.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> Since the first publication of this Letter I have learned from excellent
authority that marshal Beresford did actually in person order general
sir Colin Halket to retreat from the bridge, and rebuked him for being
slow to obey.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> I have since obtained from other sources many of those orders of
movements signed, George Murray, and addressed to the generals commanding
divisions. Had they been given to me according to the duke of
Wellington’s desire when I first commenced my Work they would have
saved me much time much expense and much labour; but I repeat that
from sir George Murray and from him only I have met with hostility. He
has not been able to hurt me but I take the will for the deed.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Above five thousand pounds.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> Since this was written Mr. Leader did put the question in the house
when sir George Murray’s conduct was strongly animadverted upon by
lord Howick and his lordship’s observations were loudly cheered. Sir
George is now publishing these maps, but they belong to the public.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> Another has appeared since but I have not read it being informed
that it was precisely like its predecessors.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[10]</a> This work has been since discontinued by lieutenant Godwin in
consequence as he told me of foul play in a high quarter where he least
expected it.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[11]</a> That very successful Spanish general and very temperate English
politician, sir De Lacy Evans, pronounces all such animadversions upon
the Spanish armies to be “<em>a most deplorable defect in a historian, and
the result of violent partialities</em>.” I dare to say the Spaniards will agree
with him.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[12]</a> This was in February.</p>

</div>

<div class="footnote">

<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[13]</a> Called the Extraordinary Cortez.</p>

</div>
</div>

<hr class="full">


<div class="chapter"></div>
<p class="center">
<span class="fs60">PUBLISHED BY</span><br>
<span class="smcap fs120 lsp2">T. and W. BOONE,</span><br>
<span class="fs60"><em>29, New Bond-Street</em>.</span><br>
</p>

<hr class="r65">

<p class="center">
COLONEL NAPIER’S<br>
HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA<br>
<span class="fs60">AND</span><br>
THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.<br>
<span class="fs80">Illustrated with numerous Plans, 6 vols. 8vo. price £6.<br>
The Third Editions, vols. 1, 2, 3, and vols. 4, 5, and 6, may be had separately,
Price 20s. each.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">

<p class="center">
A REPLY<br>
TO LORD STRANGFORD’S “OBSERVATIONS,”<br>
<span class="fs60">ON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN
THE PENINSULA.</span><br>
BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.<br>
<span class="fs80">Second Edition, 8vo. price 1s.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
A REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,<br>
<span class="fs60">PARTICULARLY TO</span><br>
“Strictures on Colonel Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula.”<br>
<span class="fs60">TOGETHER WITH<br>
OBSERVATIONS ILLUSTRATING SIR JOHN MOORE’S CAMPAIGN.</span><br>
BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.<br>
<span class="fs80">8vo. price 2s.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
COLONEL NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS
THIRD VOLUME.<br>
<span class="fs60">FORMING</span><br>
A SEQUEL TO HIS REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,<br>
<span class="fs60">AND CONTAINING SOME NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO</span><br>
THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.<br>
<span class="fs80">8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
A LETTER<br>
TO GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,<br>
<span class="fs60">BEING AN ANSWER TO HIS LORDSHIP’S ASSUMED REFUTATION OF COLONEL
NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.</span><br>
BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.<br>
<span class="fs80">In 8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
COUNTER-REMARKS<br>
TO MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S REMARKS<br>
<span class="fs60">UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME
OF HIS HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">In 8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<em>Preparing for immediate publication.</em></p>
<hr class="r10a">


<p class="center">
LAWRENCE’S PORTRAIT<br>
<span class="fs90">OF HIS GRACE</span><br>
<span class="fs120">THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.</span><br>
Engraved the full Size of Life, for the first Time, thus giving a fac-simile of
the Features of this illustrious Hero.<br>
<span class="smcap">By F.C. LEWIS, Esq.</span><br>
<span class="fs70">FROM THE ORIGINAL DRAWING BY SIR THOMAS LAWRENCE, P.R.A.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>This very exquisite Drawing was so highly esteemed by the late Sir Thomas
Lawrence that during his life he never could be persuaded to part with it, and
from it he commenced all his pictures of the Duke. After his decease, it was
sold with his other Drawings, and the Publishers have now placed it in the hands
of Mr. <span class="smcap">F. C. Lewis</span>, to enable all the admirers of the late President to possess a
fac-simile of this very interesting Drawing of <span class="smcap">His Grace the Duke of Wellington</span>.</p>
</div>
<hr class="r10a">
<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">Prints £1 : 1. India Proofs, with Autograph £2 : 2.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">
<p class="center">
<span class="fs90">LONDON: PUBLISHED BY HODGSON &amp; GRAVES, 6, PALL-MALL,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">AND</span><br>
<span class="fs80">SUBSCRIBERS’ NAMES ALSO RECEIVED BY T. AND W. BOONE,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">29, NEW BOND STREET.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">In one volume, 8vo. price 7s. boards,</span><br>
<span class="fs120">REMARKS ON MILITARY LAW</span><br>
<span class="fs60">AND</span><br>
THE PUNISHMENT OF FLOGGING.<br>
<span class="fs60">BY</span><br>
<span class="fs80">MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, K.C.B.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">
<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“Every newspaper puts forth its attacks upon Commanders of Regiments,
filled with unjust and false assertions. I have endeavoured, perhaps erroneously
and unsuccessfully, to clear the question from the rubbish with which it
has been loaded, and exhibit it to the view in its general bearings. In the
performance of this task, I am not conscious of any influence but that of the
desire to speak the truth.”—<em>Vide Preface.</em></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">In 8vo. price 2s.</span><br>
<span class="fs120"><span class="lsp2">PRUSSIA IN</span> 1833;</span><br>
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF PRUSSIA,<br>
<span class="fs90">AND HER CIVIL INSTITUTIONS.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">Translated from the French by M. de Chambray. With an Appendix
by General de Caraman.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“We would recommend to military readers in general, and especially to the
authorities who have the destiny of the army in their hands, an attentive perusal
of this work. The public will learn from it that the army in Prussia,
hitherto supposed to be the worst paid force, is, in fact, better dealt with than
is the case ‘<em>with the best paid army in Europe</em>.’”—<cite>United Service Journal.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs120">COLONIZATION:</span><br>
<span class="fs60">PARTICULARLY</span><br>
<span class="lsp2">IN SOUTHERN AUSTRALIA,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">WITH SOME</span><br>
REMARKS ON SMALL FARMS AND OVER POPULATION,<br>
<span class="fs90 smcap">By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, K.C.B.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">Author of “The Colonies; particularly the Ionian Islands.”<br>
In one vol. 8vo. price 7s. boards.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“We earnestly recommend the book to all who feel an interest in the welfare
of the people.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">In foolscap 8vo. price 1s.</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp2">THE NURSERY GOVERNESS:</span><br>
BY ELIZABETH NAPIER.<br>
<span class="fs80"><em>Published after her Death by her Husband, Col. C. J. Napier, C.B.</em></span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“Hear the instructions of thy father, and forsake not the law of thy mother.” <em>Proverbs</em>, c. i. v. 8.<br></p>

<p>“This is an admirable little book.”—<cite>True Sun.</cite></p>

<p>“The excellent instructions laid down by Mrs. Napier will, we have no
doubt, prove a ‘rich legacy,’ not only to her own children, but to those in
many a nursery.”—<cite>Liverpool Chronicle.</cite></p>

<p>“Not only the nursery governess, but the mother and daughter, especially in
the higher walks of life, may read it with advantage.”—<cite>Atlas.</cite></p>

<p>“We are so convinced of its utility, that we would strongly recommend it
to the diligent study of every female who has the care of a family, either as
a mother or a governess.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">In Two Volumes, post 8vo. price 21s.</span><br>
ADMIRAL NAPIER’S<br>
<span class="fs120">ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN PORTUGAL,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">BETWEEN</span><br>
DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL;<br>
<span class="fs60">WITH</span><br>
<span class="fs80">PLAN OF HIS ACTIONS OFF CAPE ST. VINCENT.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“An excellent and spirit-stirring book—plain, honest, and straight-forward—the
very stuff of which the web of history alone should be composed. This is
indeed an honest, fair, and impartial history.”—<cite>Morning Chronicle.</cite></p>

<p>“In spirit and in keeping, from beginning to end, Admiral Napier’s ‘War in
Portugal,’ is the happiest picture we could conceive of the hero of the battle off
Cape St. Vincent—its especial excellence consisting in a regardless bluntness of
manner and language that is quite admirable and delightful.”—<cite>Monthly Review.</cite></p>

<p>“It is Cæsar’s Commentaries in the first person.”—<cite>Spectator.</cite></p>

<p>“Candid to a degree, and sincere as a sailor’s will. This is the very stuff
of which history should be composed.”—<cite>Bell’s Messenger.</cite></p>

<p>“If Admiral Napier be not distinguished by the common-place facilities of
authorship, he possesses the higher qualities of truth, discretion, and clear-sightedness,
in no slight degree.”—<cite>Atlas.</cite></p>

<p>“In speaking of himself and his deeds, he has hit the just and difficult medium—shewing
his real feelings, yet steering clear of affected modesty on the
one hand, and of overweening modesty on the other.”—<cite>Tait’s Magazine.</cite></p>

<p>“This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant author
figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of Napier.”—<cite>News.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80"><span class="smcap">The Second Edition</span> of</span><br>
<span class="fs120">ADVENTURES IN THE RIFLE BRIGADE</span><br>
<span class="fs60">IN THE</span><br>
<span class="fs100 lsp">PENINSULA, FRANCE, AND THE NETHERLANDS,</span><br>
<span class="fs90">From the Year 1809 to 1815.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">By CAPTAIN JOHN KINCAID, <span class="smcap">First Battalion</span>.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">One vol. post 8vo. price 10s. 6d. boards.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“An admirable little book.”—<cite>Quarterly Review.</cite></p>

<p>“To those who are unacquainted with John Kincaid of the Rifles,—and few,
we trow, of the old Peninsula bands are in this ignorant predicament, and to
those who know him, we equally recommend the perusal of his book: it is a
fac-simile of the man,—a perfect reflection of his image, <i lang="la">veluti in speculo</i>. A
capital soldier, a pithy and graphic narrator, and a fellow of infinite jest. Captain
Kincaid has given us, in this modest volume, the impress of his qualities,
the <i lang="fr">beau ideal</i> of a thorough-going Soldier of Service, and the faithful and witty
history of some six years’ honest and triumphant fighting.</p>

<p>“There is nothing extant in a Soldier’s Journal, which, with so little pretension,
paints with such truth and raciness the ‘domestic economy’ of campaigning,
and the downright business of handling the enemy.</p>

<p>“But we cannot follow further;—recommending every one of our readers to
pursue the Author himself to his crowning scene of Waterloo, where they will
find him as quaint and original as at his <i lang="fr">debut</i>. We assure them, it is not possible,
by isolated extracts, to give a suitable impression of the spirit and
originality which never flag from beginning to end of Captain Kincaid’s volume;
in every page of which he throws out flashes of native humour, a tithe of which
would make the fortune of a Grub-street Bookmaker.”—<cite>United Service Journal.</cite></p>

<p>“His book has one fault, the rarest fault in books, it is too short.”—<cite>Monthly Magazine, April.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="r30a">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">Also, by the same Author, in one vol. post 8vo. price 10s. 6d.</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp2">RANDOM SHOTS</span><br>
<span class="fs80">FROM A RIFLEMAN.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“It is one of the most pithy, witty, soldier-like, and pleasant books in
existence.”—<cite>United Service Journal.</cite></p>

<p>“The present volume is to the full as pleasant, and what is still more strange,
as <em>original</em> as the last. Criticism would become a sinecure if many such volumes
were written: all left for us is to admire and recommend.”—<cite>New Monthly Magazine.</cite></p>

<p>“The present volume is likely to add to his reputation. It is a useful
appendix to the larger works of Napier and other military commentators. It
is never dull, tedious, technical, or intricate.”—<cite>Times.</cite></p>

<p>“Those who have read Captain Kincaid’s Adventures in the Rifle Brigade
will seize this volume with avidity, and having dashed through it, will lay it
down with only one feeling of regret—that it is not longer.”—<cite>News.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">In post 8vo. price 5s.</span><br>
<span class="fs120">RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS</span><br>
<span class="fs60">RELATIVE TO THE<br>
DUTIES OF TROOPS COMPOSING THE ADVANCED CORPS OF THE ARMY,</span><br>
<span class="smcap">By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL I. LEACH, C.B.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">Late of the Rifle Brigade.<br>
Author of “Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier.”</span></p>
<hr class="r30a">

<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">Also, by the same Author,</span><br>
<span class="lsp2">A SKETCH OF THE</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp2">SERVICES OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">FROM ITS FORMATION TO THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">In 8vo. price 2s. 6d. boards.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
MEMOIR BY<br>
<span class="fs120">GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, <span class="smcap">Bart.</span></span><br>
<span class="fs60">OF HIS<br>
PROCEEDINGS AS CONNECTED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN,<br>
AND THE</span><br>
COMMENCEMENT OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.<br>
<span class="fs80">In one vol. post 8vo. price 9s. boards.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“The care bestowed upon this subject by Sir Hew Dalrymple is evident
in the publication before us, which is unquestionably the most dignified,
clear, and satisfactory vindication of Sir Hew’s motives and conduct, and
forms, with the documents in the Appendix, a very valuable and authentic
addition to the materials for the history of the period in question. Without a
participation in the facts it discloses, the records of the war, as far as regards
this particular subject, are, in fact, incomplete or distorted.”—<cite>United Service
Journal.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs120">SKETCHES IN SPAIN,</span><br>
<span class="fs90">DURING THE YEARS <span class="fs90 smcap">1829-30-31 and 32;</span></span><br>
<span class="fs60">CONTAINING NOTICES OF SOME DISTRICTS VERY LITTLE KNOWN;<br>
OF THE MANNERS OF THE PEOPLE, GOVERNMENT, RECENT CHANGE,<br>
COMMERCE, NATURAL HISTORY, AND FINE ARTS;</span><br>
<span class="fs80"><em>With Lives of Spanish Painters</em>.</span><br>
<span class="fs90">BY CAPTAIN S. E. COOK, R.N., K.T.S., F.G.S.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">Two volumes, 8vo. price 21s.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>This work contains a very full account of the present seat of War in Spain.</p>

<p>“Volumes of great value and attraction: we would say, in a word, they
afford us the most complete account of Spain in every respect which has issued
from the press.”—<cite>Literary Gazette.</cite></p>

<p>“The value of the book is in its matter and its facts. If written upon any
country it would have been useful, but treating of one like Spain, about which
we know almost nothing, but of which it is desirable to know so much, Captain
Cook’s Sketches must be considered an acquisition to the library.”—<cite>Spectator.</cite></p>

<p>“These volumes comprise every point worthy of notice, and the whole is so interspersed
with lively adventure and description; so imbued with a kindly spirit
of good nature, courting and acknowledging attention, as to render it attractive
reading.”—<cite>United Service Gazette.</cite></p>

<p>“No one could either pretend to write or converse upon this subject without
preparing himself by a previous perusal of this instructive work.”—<cite>Metropolitan.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs60">AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF</span><br>
<span class="fs120">MILITARY BRIDGES,</span><br>
<span class="fs90"><em>And the Passage of Rivers in Military Operations</em>.</span><br>
<span class="fs90">BY GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART. K.S.C. &amp;c. &amp;c.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">The Second Edition, containing much additional Matter and Plates,<br>
8vo. price 20s. boards.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“Of this valuable work we expressed a very high opinion when it was first
published; and now that the able author has added much important new matter
to it, we need only say that it is worthy of his own high reputation as a tactician
and Military Engineer; and that no soldier in Europe can know his
business thoroughly without consulting it.”—<cite>Literary Gazette.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs120">THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN LEGION,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">FROM THE PERIOD OF ITS ORGANIZATION IN 1803, TO THAT OF ITS<br>
DISSOLUTION IN 1816.</span><br>
<span class="fs70"><em>Compiled from Manuscript Documents.</em></span><br>
<span class="fs90 smcap">By N. LUDLOW BEAMISH, Esq. F.R.S late Major unattached</span>.<br>
<span class="fs80">Two Vols. 8vo. complete, with Plans and Coloured Plates of Costumes,
price £1 10s.<br>
The second volume sold separately, price 10s.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“The work is not like others we could name—a mere compilation from newspapers
and magazines. Major Beamish has left no source of information unexplored;
and the access he obtained to manuscript journals has enabled him to
intersperse his general narrative with interesting personal anecdotes, that render
this volume as delightful for those who read for amusement, as those who read
for profit.”—<cite>Athenæum.</cite></p>

<p>“We are altogether much pleased with the volume, and heartily recommend
it to the British public.”—<cite>Literary Gazette.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">Elegantly bound in the Uniform of the Regiment, 1 vol. post 8vo. price 10s. 6d.</span><br>
THE ADVENTURES OF<br>
<span class="fs120 lsp">MAJOR JOHN PATTERSON,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">(AUTHOR OF “CAMP AND QUARTERS,”)</span><br>
<span class="fs80"><em>With Notices of the Officers, &amp;c. of the 50th, or Queen’s Own Regiment</em>.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">FROM 1807 TO 1821.</span><br>
<span class="fs60">DEDICATED BY PERMISSION TO QUEEN ADELAIDE.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“This volume contains a well-written, yet unvarnished narrative, of the adventures
of the 50th foot, (better known as the ‘Dirty Half-hundred,’ from their
black facings,’) during the Peninsular war. It argues well for the bravery, as
well as modesty, of Major Patterson, that throughout his work we have but
little of himself, and much of his brother-officers.”—<cite>Bell’s Messenger.</cite></p>

<p>“Major Patterson’s Adventures are the record of a brave soldier—of a
dashing, high-minded British officer, who never fears a rival, and never knew
what it was to have an enemy, or to hate any man. His descriptions are remarkable
for their vividness and accuracy, and his anecdotes will bear repetition
once a week for life.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p>

<p>“Major Patterson is one of the pleasantest of the numerous tribe of gallant
officers who has done so much credit to the British name, by fighting and writing
with equal spirit.”—<cite>Constitutional.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">In One Volume, post 8vo. price 10s. 6d. boards,</span><br>
<span class="fs90">NARRATIVE OF</span><br>
<span class="fs120">EVENTS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE,</span><br>
<span class="fs80"><em>AND OF THE ATTACK ON NEW ORLEANS IN 1814 AND 1815</em>.</span><br>
<span class="fs80"><span class="smcap">By</span> MAJOR I. H. COOKE, 43d Regiment.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“This clever and fearless account of the attack on New Orleans is penned
by one of the ‘occupation;’ whose soldier-like view and keen observation
during the period of the stirring events he so well relates, has enabled him to
bring before the public the ablest account that has yet been given of that
ill-fated and disgraceful expedition, and also to rescue the troops who were
employed on it from those degrading reflections which have hitherto unjustly
been insinuated against them.”—<cite>Gentleman’s Magazine.</cite></p>

<p>“We wish earnestly to call the attention of military men to the campaign
before New Orleans. It is fraught with a fearful interest, and fixes upon the
mind reflections of almost every hue. Major Cooke’s relation is vivid; every
evolution is made as clear to the eye as if we had been present, and the remarks,
we think, are eminently judicious. The book must be generally read,” &amp;c.—<cite>Metropolitan.</cite></p>

<p>“It is full of good feeling, and it abounds with sketches of the service.”—<cite>Sunday Herald.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs120">A TREATISE ON THE GAME OF WHIST;</span><br>
<span class="fs60">BY THE LATE</span><br>
ADMIRAL CHARLES BURNEY,<br>
<span class="fs80">Author of “Voyages and Discoveries in the Pacific,” &amp;c.<br>
Second Edition. 18mo. price 2s.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“The kind of play recommended in this Treatise is on the most plain, and
what the Author considers the most safe principles. I have limited my endeavours
to the most necessary instructions, classing them as much as the subject
enabled me, under separate heads, to facilitate their being rightly comprehended
and easily remembered. For the greater encouragement of the learner, I have
studied brevity; but not in a degree to have prevented my endeavouring more
to make the principles of the game, and the rationality of them intelligible,
than to furnish a young player with a set of rules to get by rote, that he might
go blindly right.”</p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">One vol. post 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 5s. Only 250 copies printed.</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp">THE TOUR</span><br>
<span class="fs90">OF THE FRENCH TRAVELLER,</span><br>
M. DE LA BOULLAYE LE GOUZ, <span class="smcap">in IRELAND, a.d. 1644.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">Edited by T. CROFTON CROKER,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS, CONTRIBUTED BY</span></p>

<p class="fs80 pad8 noindent">
<span class="smcap">James Roche</span>, Esq. of Cork.<br>
The Rev. <span class="smcap">Francis Mahony</span>.<br>
<span class="smcap">Thos. Wright</span>, Esq. B.A. Trin. Coll. Camb.<br>
And the <span class="smcap">Editor</span>.</p>

<div class="poetry-container">
<div class="poetry">
  <div class="stanza antiqua">
    <div class="verse indentq">“To treate of Ireland’s toile </div>
    <div class="verse indent2">And tell the troubles now,</div>
    <div class="verse indent0">And paint you out in prose or vers</div>
    <div class="verse indent2">The Countries sorowe thorowe.</div>
  </div>
  <div class="stanza">
    <div class="verse antiqua indentq">“The greef so common is</div>
    <div class="verse antiqua indent2">That each one bears a peece,</div>
    <div class="verse antiqua indent0">And God he knows who licks the fatte</div>
    <div class="verse antiqua indent2">And shears awaie the flece.”</div>
    <div class="verse indent10"><span class="smcap">Churchyard’s</span> <cite>Unquietnes of Ireland</cite>, 1579.</div>
  </div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">VOYAGE PITTORESQUE ET ARCHEOLOGIQUE</span><br>
<span class="fs60">DANS</span><br>
<span class="fs120">LA PROVINCE D’YUCATAN</span><br>
<span class="fs60">(AMERIQUE CENTRALE),</span><br>
<span class="lsp2">PENDANT LES ANNEES 1834 ET 1836,</span><br>
<span class="fs80">PAR FREDERIC DE WALDECK,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">DEDIE<br>
A LA MEMOIRE DU VICOMTE KINGSBOROUGH.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<p class="fs80 pad6">Priz de l’ouvrage, grand en folio, figures noires <span class="pad8">£5.</span><br>
<span class="pad2">”</span><span class="pad3">”</span><span class="pad5">coloriées, sous la direction de l’auteur &#160; &#160; &#160; £6 : 6.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<p class="pfs60">LISTE DES PLANCHES QUI SERONT CONTENUES DANS LE VOLUME:</p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">Pl.&#160;1.</td>
<td class="tdl wd40">Carte générale de l’Yucatan avec Walis.</td>
<td class="tdr">Pl.&#160;12.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Plan du grand carré des 4 temples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">2.</td>
<td class="tdl">Costume des femmes de Campêche.</td>
<td class="tdr">13.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Façade du temple aux deux serpents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">3.</td>
<td class="tdl">Costume des soldats de la milice.</td>
<td class="tdr">14.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Façade du temple aux asterismes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">4.</td>
<td class="tdl">Costume des Mestices de Mérida.</td>
<td class="tdr">15.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Façade du temple du soleil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">5.</td>
<td class="tdl">Indien contrebandier de l’intérieur.</td>
<td class="tdr">16.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Etude d’une partie du temple du soleil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">6.</td>
<td class="tdl">Manière de voyager dans l’Yucatan.</td>
<td class="tdr">17.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Etude d’une partie du templenaux asterismes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">7.</td>
<td class="tdl">Costume de majordome des fermes.</td>
<td class="tdr">18.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Planche de détails de l’édifice aux deux serpents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">8.</td>
<td class="tdl">Carte et plan d’une partie des ruines d’Ytzalane.</td>
<td class="tdr">19.</td>
<td class="tdl">{</td>
<td class="tdl" rowspan="3">Ces trois planches sont des terres cuites trouvées
                            dans les ruines de l’antique ville de Tulhà ou
                            Ocozingo à 32 lieues des ruines de Palenqué.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">9.</td>
<td class="tdl">Plan de la pyramide de Kingsborough.</td>
<td class="tdr">20.</td>
<td class="tdl">{</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">10.</td>
<td class="tdl">Elévation de la pyramide de Kingsborough.</td>
<td class="tdr">21.</td>
<td class="tdl">{</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdrt">11.</td>
<td class="tdl">Etude d’une partie de cet édifice, coupe des pierres.</td>
<td class="tdr">22.</td>
<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Bas relief Astronomique des ruines de Palenqué.</td>
</tr>
</table>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">BAMPTON LECTURES.—One volume 8vo. price 15s.</span><br>
<span class="fs120">THE ANALOGY OF REVELATION AND SCIENCE,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">ESTABLISHED IN A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY
OF OXFORD, IN THE YEAR 1833.</span><br>
<span class="fs80"><em>On the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton.</em></span><br>
<span class="fs90">BY FREDERICK NOLAN, LL.D. F.R.S.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">Vicar of Prittlewell, Essex, and formerly Student <ins class="corr" id="tn-cat" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'of Exter College'">
of Exeter College</ins>, Oxford.</span><br>
<span class="fs60">ALSO, ALL THE OTHER WORKS OF THE SAME AUTHOR.</span></p>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs60">IN CONTINUATION OF THE CATHEDRAL ANTIQUITIES OF ENGLAND.</span><br>
<span class="fs80">THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp2">CARLISLE CATHEDRAL,</span><br>
<span class="fs80">BY ROBERT WILLIAM BILLINGS,</span><br>
<span class="fs60"><em>Author of the Illustrations of the Temple Church, London</em>.</span></p>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>This work is printed uniform with Britton’s Cathedral Antiquities of England,
and contains Forty-five Engravings of Plans, Elevations, Sections, Details, and
Perspective Views; with an Historical and Architectural Account.</p>

<p>In illustrating Carlisle Cathedral, the aim has been to give such a series of
careful measurements and details, that any portion, or the whole building,
might be completely restored in the event of accident or decay.</p>

<p>The historical and descriptive letter-press will be presented <i lang="la">gratis</i>.</p>
</div>

<table class="p1 autotable fs70">
<tr>
<td class="tdc" colspan="2">PRICE,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Medium Quarto</td>
<td class="tdl">Three Guineas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Imperial Quarto, limited to 115 copies</td>
<td class="tdl">Four Guineas and a Half.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">Imperial Quarto, with Proofs of the Plates on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad4">India Paper, limited to Ten Copies</td>
<td class="tdl">Seven Guineas and a Half.</td>
</tr>
</table>

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>It is the intention of the Proprietors to publish the remaining Cathedrals in
the same manner, viz. Chester, Chichester, Ely, Lincoln, Manchester, Rippon,
and Rochester.</p>

<p><em>Durham</em> will be proceeded with immediately, to which Subscribers’ names
are respectfully solicited.</p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">Just published, uniformly with Britton’s Cathedrals,</span><br>
<span class="fs80">ARCHITECTURAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp2">THE TEMPLE CHURCH, LONDON;</span><br>
<span class="fs60">DRAWN AND ENGRAVED BY</span><br>
<span class="fs80">ROBERT WILLIAM BILLINGS,</span><br>
<span class="fs60"><em>Associate of the Institute of British Architects</em>.</span></p>

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>This work contains Thirty-one Engravings, principally in Outline, embracing
Plans, Elevations, Sections, Details, and perspective Views of this interesting
Church; also a short historical and descriptive Account: and an Essay on the
Symbolic Evidences of the Temple Church, by <span class="smcap">Edward Clarkson</span>, Esq.</p>

<p>Price Two Guineas in Medium Quarto, and Three Guineas Imperial Quarto.</p>
</div>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“Thirty-one plates illustrate this volume, the first that has ever attempted to
do justice to one of the most interesting ecclesiastical structures in the metropolis
or the country. They reflect great credit on Mr. Billings’ perseverance and
skill; and the whole is a welcome contribution to the antiquarian and architectural
library.”—<cite>Lit. Gaz.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">Just published,</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp2">WILL PAPERS,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">(TO BE USED AFTER THE 31ST OF DECEMBER, 1837,)</span></p>

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>Being Papers on which Testators may write their Wills as on common writing-paper,
but containing printed Marginal Directions for the due execution of
Wills under the new Statute. To be had of two sizes. Large size, price 4<em>d.</em>
Small ditto, 2<em>d.</em> Also, <span class="smcap">Codicil Papers</span>, of the same description.</p>

<p>“This is an excellent form for testators, and will save an infinity of manuscript. It
also furnishes whatever legal advice or reference may be necessary, and is of equal
service indeed to the solicitor as his client.”—<cite>Conservative Journal.</cite></p>

<p>“So simple and plain are they that any person may make his own Will, without
either the expense or the delay of professional assistance.”—<cite>Weekly Chronicle.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">The Fourth Edition, 18mo. price 1s.</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp">HINTS TO THE CHARITABLE,</span><br>
<span class="fs90">Being Practical Observations on the proper Distribution of Private Charity.</span><br>
<span class="fs90">BY THE HON. AND REV. S. G. OSBORNE.</span><br>
<span class="fs60">CONTAINING LETTERS ON</span></p>

<table class="p1 autotable fs80">
<tr>
<td class="tdl">The “Coal Fund,”</td>
<td class="tdl">The “Benefit Society,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">The “Wife’s Society,”</td>
<td class="tdl">The “Loan Fund,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl">The “Penny Club,”</td>
<td class="tdl">The “Children’s Benevolent Society,” &amp;c.</td>
</tr>
</table>
<hr class="r10a">

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“It is impossible that this plain, familiar, and engaging exposition (price,
a trifle), will not be generally sought after, and earnestly perused, the moment
that some of its excellencies and contents are understood.”—<cite>Monthly Review.</cite></p>

<p>“This little work is addressed to those beneficent spirits who delight in doing
good, and who, in accordance with true Christian feelings, wish to see mankind
happy. Its principal aim is to promote economy and industry among the poorer
classes, and show how they can be made comfortable with very little. We would
like to see the plans of the benevolent author carried into effect in every village
of Great Britain. We hope all those who look with eyes of Christian feeling on
the miseries of their fellow-creatures will carefully look over the plans laid down
in this little volume. How much good can be done with a little rightly bestowed!”—<cite>Polyglot
Mag. Sept. 1, 1838.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">By the same Author, the Third Edition, 18mo. price 1s.</span><br>
<span class="fs120 lsp">HINTS FOR THE AMELIORATION</span><br>
<span class="fs80">OF THE MORAL CONDITION OF</span><br>
<span class="fs100 lsp">A VILLAGE POPULATION.</span><br>
<span class="fs60">CONTAINING CHAPTERS</span></p>

<table class="autotable fs80">
<tr>
<td class="tdl wd35">1 &amp; 2 Introductory.</td>
<td class="tdl wd35">5 The Tradesman.</td>
<td class="tdl">7 The Labourer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad3">&#160;3 The Squire.</td>
<td class="tdl">6 Keepers of the</td>
<td class="tdl">8 Female Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tdl pad3">&#160;4 The Farmer.</td>
<td class="tdl pad3">Public Houses.</td>
<td class="tdl">9 Education.</td>
</tr>
</table>

<div class="blockquotx">

<p>“The following pages contain, with some few alterations and additions, the
substance of a series of Letters, published in a local periodical, under the signature
of “Pastor.” Believing as I do, that there are few rural parishes that
have not within them the elements of sound Moral Government, I am induced
to give these “Hints” the chance of a more general circulation; in the hope
that they may be useful, in exciting some of those who may have the opportunity,
to the importance of aiding the moral amelioration of their neighbourhood, both
by personal example and a judicious exercise of personal effort.”—<cite>Preface.</cite></p>
</div>
<hr class="fulla">


<p class="center">
<span class="fs80">Also, by the same author,</span><br>
<span class="fs120">A HAND-BILL FOR THE COTTAGE WALL,</span><br>
<span class="fs60">CONTAINING</span><br>
<span class="fs90">“ABOUT GOD AND YOUR SOUL,”<br>
“HOW TO MAKE THE BEST OF YOUR SITUATION IN LIFE,”<br>
“A WORD ABOUT HEALTH.”</span><br>
<span class="fs80">On one large sheet, containing five Wood Engravings, price Threepence each,
or 20s. per 100.</span></p>

<hr class="fulla">


<div class="chapter"></div>
<div class="p4 transnote" id="TN">
<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p>

<p>Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.</p>

<p>Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
when a predominant preference was found in the original book.</p>

<p>Some occurrences of upper-case titles (such as Lord, Sir, Colonel)
have been made lower-case for consistency.</p>

<p>The names d’España and d’Amarante have been changed to D’España
and D’Amarante, for consistency.</p>

<p>In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents,
incorrect grammar, spelling and accents have been left unchanged.</p>

<p>The table at the end of the original book (<a href="#No_X">page 710</a>) was very large,
about 240 characters in width. For this etext it has been split into
three parts. The second column ‘DIVISIONS’ has been replicated in each
part, for readability.</p>

<p>This table has five table-note anchors indicated in this etext by {a}
to {e}. They were printed as one or more asterisks in the original
book; however there is no explanation of their meaning.</p>

<p>Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.</p>

<p>
<a href="#tn-toc">TOC:</a> ‘hemns the allies’ replaced by ‘hems the allies’.<br>
<a href="#tn-xi">Pg xi:</a> ‘citadel of Ciuded’ replaced by ‘citadel of Ciudad’.<br>
<a href="#tn-xxiv">Pg xxiv:</a> ‘mistate facts for’ replaced by ‘misstate facts for’.<br>
<a href="#tn-xxix">Pg xxix:</a> ‘twice over, tbat’ replaced by ‘twice over, that’.<br>
<a href="#tn-xxxiv">Pg xxxiv:</a> ‘ever acuated me’ replaced by ‘ever actuated me’.<br>
<a href="#tn-xli">Pg xli:</a> ‘Medium estimate’ replaced by ‘Median estimate’.<br>
<a href="#tn-lxvii">Pg lxvii:</a> ‘the Portuguse treat’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese treat’.<br>
<a href="#tn-lxxx">Pg lxxx:</a> ‘witten expressly’ replaced by ‘written expressly’.<br>
<a href="#tn-11">Pg 11:</a> ‘neigbourhood of Reus’ replaced by ‘neighbourhood of Reus’.<br>
<a href="#tn-49">Pg 49:</a> ‘also run upon’ replaced by ‘also ran upon’.<br>
<a href="#tn-74">Pg 74:</a> ‘his way p from’ replaced by ‘his way up from’.<br>
<a href="#tn-93">Pg 93:</a> ‘all amountaineers’ replaced by ‘all mountaineers’.<br>
<a href="#tn-141">Pg 141:</a> ‘some hishonour’ replaced by ‘some dishonour’.<br>
<a href="#tn-143">Pg 143:</a> ‘to whse corps’ replaced by ‘to whose corps’.<br>
<a href="#tn-247">Pg 247:</a> ‘frequent scouring’ replaced by ‘frequent scouting’.<br>
<a href="#tn-254">Pg 254:</a> ‘between the brige’ replaced by ‘between the bridge’.<br>
<a href="#tn-279">Pg 279:</a> ‘he must revitual’ replaced by ‘he must revictual’.<br>
<a href="#tn-289">Pg 289:</a> ‘the two outwarks’ replaced by ‘the two outworks’.<br>
<a href="#tn-289a">Pg 289:</a> ‘forseeing that the’ replaced by ‘foreseeing that the’.<br>
<a href="#tn-293">Pg 293:</a> ‘letter to España’ replaced by ‘letter to D’España’.<br>
<a href="#tn-294">Pg 294:</a> ‘enforced by España’ replaced by ‘enforced by D’España’.<br>
<a href="#tn-319">Pg 319:</a> (Sidenote) ‘minis- of war’ replaced by ‘minister of war’.<br>
<a href="#tn-351">Pg 351:</a> ‘took possesion of’ replaced by ‘took possession of’.<br>
<a href="#tn-394">Pg 394:</a> (Sidenote) ‘See plan.’ replaced by ‘See Plan 8.’.<br>
<a href="#tn-417">Pg 417:</a> ‘Carlos D’Españo’ replaced by ‘Carlos D’España’.<br>
<a href="#tn-449">Pg 449:</a> ‘the Lepsic battle’ replaced by ‘the Leipsic battle’.<br>
<a href="#tn-456">Pg 456:</a> ‘of his genins’ replaced by ‘of his genius’.<br>
<a href="#tn-483">Pg 483:</a> ‘way ot Madrid’ replaced by ‘way to Madrid’.<br>
<a href="#tn-531">Pg 531:</a> (Sidenote) ‘See Plan.’ replaced by ‘See Plan 9.’.<br>
<a href="#tn-549">Pg 549:</a> ‘current run so’ replaced by ‘current ran so’.<br>
<a href="#tn-584">Pg 584:</a> ‘to develope his’ replaced by ‘to develop his’.<br>
<a href="#tn-588">Pg 588:</a> ‘by sedidions and’ replaced by ‘by seditions and’.<br>
<a href="#tn-607">Pg 607:</a> ‘Aire and Barcelone’ replaced by ‘Aire and Barcelona’.<br>
<a href="#tn-635">Pg 635:</a> ‘was not be forded’ replaced by ‘was not to be forded’.<br>
<a href="#tn-669">Pg 669:</a> ‘Carlos D’Espagne’ replaced by ‘Carlos D’España’.<br>
<a href="#tn-686">Pg 686:</a> ‘surpassed a mankind’ replaced by ‘surpassed all mankind’.<br>
<a href="#tn-709">Pg 709:</a> ‘dismountned’ replaced by ‘dismounted’.<br>
<a href="#tn-cat">Catalog:</a> ‘of Exter College’ replaced by ‘of Exeter College’.<br>
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<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 69964 ***</div>
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