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font-size: 80%} -.poetry .stanza {margin: 1em auto;} -.poetry .verse {text-indent: -3em; padding-left: 3em;} -.poetry .indentq {text-indent: -3.5em;} - -/* large inline blocks don't split well on paged devices */ -.x-ebookmaker .poetry {display: block; margin-left: 4.5em;} - - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size: small; - padding: .5em .7em .2em .7em; - margin-bottom: 0em; - font-family: sans-serif, serif;} - -.transnote p {text-indent: 0em;} - - -/* custom cover (cover.jpg) */ -.customcover {visibility: hidden; display: none;} -.x-ebookmaker .customcover {visibility: visible; display: block;} - -/* Poetry indents */ -.poetry .indent0 {text-indent: -3em;} -.poetry .indent2 {text-indent: -2em;} - -/* Illustration classes */ -.illowp100 {width: 100%;} -.illowp50 {width: 50%;} -.poetry .indent10 {text-indent: 2em;} - - </style> -</head> -<body> -<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France: from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 6 (of 6), by William Francis Patrick Napier</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France: from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 6 (of 6)</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: William Francis Patrick Napier</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: February 6, 2023 [eBook #69964]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE: FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 6 (OF 6) ***</div> - - -<div class="transnote"> -<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p> - -<p>Footnote anchors are denoted by <span class="fnanchor">[number]</span>, and the footnotes have been -placed at the end of the book.</p> - -<p class="customcover">The cover image was created by the transcriber -and is placed in the public domain.</p> - -<p>This is volume 6 of 6. Similar to volumes 4 and 5, this volume had a -date (Year. Month) as a margin header on most pages. This information -about the chronology of the narrative has been preserved as a Sidenote -to the relevant paragraph on that page, whenever the header date -changed.</p> - -<p>With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings -of names have not been changed.</p> - -<p>Some minor changes to the text are noted at the <a href="#TN">end of the book</a>.</p> - -<p> -<span class="pad4">Volume 1 of this series can be found at</span><br> -<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318</span><br> -<span class="pad4">Volume 2 of this series can be found at</span><br> -<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554</span><br> -<span class="pad4">Volume 3 of this series can be found at</span><br> -<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68187</span><br> -<span class="pad4">Volume 4 of this series can be found at</span><br> -<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68536</span><br> -<span class="pad4">Volume 5 of this series can be found at</span><br> -<span class="pad7">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/69220</span><br> -</p> -</div> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h1> -<span class="lsp2 bold">HISTORY</span><br> -<span class="fs50">OF THE</span><br> -<span class="fs120">WAR IN THE PENINSULA</span></h1> -</div> - -<p class="pfs80">AND IN THE</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs135">SOUTH OF FRANCE,</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs90">FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">BY</p> - -<p class="pfs120">W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.</p> - -<p class="pfs60 lht"><em>COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH<br> -ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 pfs120">VOL. VI.</p> - -<hr class="r10"> - -<p class="p2 pfs60">PREFIXED TO WHICH ARE</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs80">SEVERAL JUSTIFICATORY PIECES</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs60">IN REPLY TO</p> - -<p class="pfs80">COLONEL GURWOOD, MR. ALISON, SIR WALTER SCOTT,</p> -<p class="pfs80">LORD BERESFORD, <span class="allsmcap">AND</span> THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.</p> - -<hr class="r30"> - -<p class="p2 pfs100">LONDON:</p> -<p class="pfs90">THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.</p> - -<hr class="r10"> - -<p class="pfs70 lsp3">MDCCCXL.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p class="p10 pfs80">LONDON:</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs60">MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.</p> -</div> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">TABLE OF CONTENTS.</h2> -</div> - -<hr class="r20"> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><a href="#NOTICE">Notice and Justification, &c., &c.</a></td> -<td class="tdrb">Page i</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs135" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XXI">BOOK XXI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_I">CHAPTER I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Lord Wellington blockades Pampeluna, besieges St. Sebastian—Operations on the eastern coast of Spain—General Elio’s - misconduct—Sir John Murray sails to attack Taragona—Colonel Prevot takes St. Felippe de Balaguer—Second siege of - Taragona—Suchet and Maurice Mathieu endeavour to relieve the place—Sir John Murray raises the siege—Embarks with the loss - of his guns—Disembarks again at St. Felippe de Balaguer—Lord William Bentinck arrives—Sir John Murray’s trial—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">Page 1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_II">CHAP. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Danger of Sicily—Averted by Murat’s secret defection from the emperor—Lord William Bentinck re-embarks—His design of - attacking the city of Valencia frustrated—Del Parque is defeated on the Xucar—The Anglo-Sicilians disembark at Alicant—Suchet - prepares to attack the allies—Prevented by the battle of Vittoria—Abandons Valencia—Marches towards Zaragoza—Clauzel retreats - to France—Paris evacuates Zaragoza—Suchet retires to Taragona—Mines the walls—Lord William Bentinck passes the Ebro—Secures - the Col de Balaguer—Invests Taragona—Partial insurrection in Upper Catalonia—Combat of Salud—Del Parque joins lord William - Bentinck who projects an attack upon Suchet’s cantonments—Suchet concentrates his army—Is joined by Decaen—Advances—The - allies retreat to the mountains—Del Parque invests Tortoza—His rear-guard attacked by the garrison while passing the - Ebro—Suchet blows up the walls of Taragona—Lord William desires to besiege Tortoza—Hears that Suchet has detached troops—Sends - Del Parque’s army to join lord Wellington—Advances to Villa Franca—Combat of Ordal—The allies retreat—Lord Frederick Bentinck - fights with the French general Myers and wounds him—Lord William returns to Sicily—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">33</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_III">CHAP. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Siege of Sebastian—Convent of Bartolomeo stormed—Assault on the place fails—Causes thereof—Siege turned into a blockade, and - the guns embarked at Passages—French make a successful sally</td> -<td class="tdrb">65</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Soult appointed the emperor’s lieutenant—Arrives at Bayonne—Joseph goes to Paris—Sketch of Napoleon’s political and military - situation—His greatness of mind—Soult’s activity—Theatre of operations described—Soult resolves to succour Pampeluna—Relative - positions and numbers of the contending armies described</td> -<td class="tdrb">86</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXI_V">CHAP. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Soult attacks the right of the allies—Combat of Roncesvalles—Combat of Linzoain—Count D’Erlon attacks the allies’ right - centre—Combat of Maya—General Hill takes a position at Irueta—General Picton and Cole retreat down the Val de Zubiri—They - turn at Huarte and offer battle—Lord Wellington arrives—Combat of the 27th—First battle of Sauroren—Various movements—D’Erlon - joins Soult who attacks general Hill—Second battle of Sauroren—Foy is cut off from the main army—Night march of the light - division—Soult retreats—Combat of Doña Maria—Dangerous position of the French at San Estevan—Soult marches down the - Bidassoa—Forced march of the light division—Terrible scene near the bridge of Yanzi—Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly—Narrow - escape of lord Wellington—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">109</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs135" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XXII">BOOK XXII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_I">CHAP. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">New positions of the armies—Lord Melville’s mismanagement of the naval co-operation—Siege of St. Sebastian—Progress of the - second attack</td> -<td class="tdrb">179</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_II">CHAP. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Storming of St. Sebastian—Lord Wellington calls for volunteers from the first fourth and light divisions—The place is - assaulted and taken—The town burned—The castle is bombarded and surrenders—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">197</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_III">CHAP. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Soult’s views and positions during the siege described—He endeavours to succour the place—Attacks lord Wellington—Combats - of San Marcial and Vera—The French are repulsed the same day that San Sebastian is stormed—Soult resolves to adopt a - defensive system—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">218</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">The duke of Berri proposes to invade France promising the aid of twenty thousand insurgents—Lord Wellington’s views on this - subject—His personal acrimony against Napoleon—That monarch’s policy and character defended—Dangerous state of affairs in - Catalonia—Lord Wellington designs to go there himself, but at the desire of the allied sovereigns and the English government - resolves to establish a part of his army in France—His plans retarded by accidents and bad weather—Soult unable to divine his - project—Passage of the Bidassoa—Second combat of Vera—Colonel Colborne’s great presence of mind—Gallant action of lieutenant - Havelock—The French lose the redoubt of Sarre and abandon the great Rhune—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">239</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_V">CHAP. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Soult retakes the redoubt of Sarre—Wellington organizes the army in three great divisions under sir Rowland Hill, marshal - Beresford, and sir John Hope—Disinterested conduct of the last-named officer—Soult’s immense entrenchments described—His - correspondence with Suchet—Proposes to retake the offensive and unite their armies in Aragon—Suchet will not accede to his - views and makes inaccurate statements—Lord Wellington, hearing of advantages gained by the allied sovereigns in Germany, - resolves to invade France—Blockade and fall of Pampeluna—Lord Wellington organizes a brigade under lord Aylmer to besiege - Santona, but afterwards changes his design</td> -<td class="tdrb">271</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXII_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Political state of Portugal—Violence, ingratitude, and folly of the government of that country—Political state of Spain—Various - factions described, their violence, insolence, and folly—Scandalous scenes at Cadiz—Several Spanish generals desire a - revolution—Lord Wellington describes the miserable state of the country—Anticipates the necessity of putting down the Cortez - by force—Resigns his command of the Spanish armies—The English ministers propose to remove him to Germany—The new Cortez - reinstate him as generalissimo on his own terms—He expresses his fears that the cause will finally fail and advises the - English ministers to withdraw the British army</td> -<td class="tdrb">295</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs135" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XXIII">BOOK XXIII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_I">CHAP. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">War in the south of France—Soult’s political difficulties—Privations of the allied troops—Lord Wellington appeals to their - military honour with effect—Averse to offensive operations, but when Napoleon’s disasters in Germany became known, again - yields to the wishes of the allied sovereigns—His dispositions of attack retarded—They are described—Battle of the - Nivelle—Observations—Deaths and characters of Mr. Edward Freer and colonel Thomas Lloyd</td> -<td class="tdrb">326</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_II">CHAP. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Soult occupies the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and the line of the Nive river—Lord Wellington unable to pursue his victory - from the state of the roads—Bridge-head of Cambo abandoned by the French—Excesses of the Spanish troops—Lord Wellington’s - indignation—He sends them back to Spain—Various skirmishes in front of Bayonne—The generals J. Wilson and Vandeleur are - wounded—Mina plunders the Val de Baygorry—Is beaten by the national guards—Passage of the Nive and battles in front of - Bayonne—Combat of the 10th—Combat of the 11th—Combat of the 12th—Battle of St. Pierre—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">363</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_III">CHAP. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Respective situations and views of lord Wellington and Soult—Partizan warfare—The Basques of the Val de Baygorry excited to - arms by the excesses of Mina’s troops—General Harispe takes the command of the insurgents—Clauzel advances beyond the Bidouze - river—General movements—Partizan combats—Excesses committed by the Spaniards—Lord Wellington reproaches their generals—His - vigorous and resolute conduct—He menaces the French insurgents of the valleys with fire and sword and the insurrection - subsides—Soult <ins class="corr" id="tn-toc" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'hemns the allies'"> - hems the allies</ins> right closely—Partizan combats continued—Remarkable instances of the habits established - between the French and British soldiers of the light division—Shipwrecks on the coast</td> -<td class="tdrb">410</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Political state of Portugal—Political state of Spain—Lord Wellington advises the English government to prepare for a war - with Spain and to seize St. Sebastian as a security for the withdrawal of the British and Portuguese troops—The seat of - government and the new Cortez are removed to Madrid—The duke of San Carlos arrives secretly with the treaty of Valençay—It - is rejected by the Spanish regency and Cortez—Lord Wellington’s views on the subject</td> -<td class="tdrb">425</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_V">CHAP. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Political state of Napoleon—Guileful policy of the allied sovereigns—M. de St. Aignan—General reflections—Unsettled policy - of the English ministers—They neglect lord Wellington—He remonstrates and exposes the denuded state of his army</td> -<td class="tdrb">440</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Continuation of the war in the eastern provinces—Suchet’s erroneous statements—Sir William Clinton repairs Taragona—Advances - to Villa Franca—Suchet endeavours to surprise him—Fails—The French cavalry cut off an English detachment at Ordal—The duke - of San Carlos passes through the French posts—Copons favourable to his mission—Clinton and Manso endeavour to cut off the - French troops at Molino del Rey—They fail through the misconduct of Copons—Napoleon recalls a great body of Suchet’s - troops—Whereupon he reinforces the garrison of Barcelona and retires to Gerona—Van Halen—He endeavours to beguile the - governor of Tortoza—Fails—Succeeds at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon—Sketch of the siege of Monzon—It is defended by the - Italian soldier St. Jaques for one hundred and forty days—Clinton and Copons invest Barcelona—The beguiled garrisons of - Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, arrive at Martorel—Are surrounded and surrender on terms—Capitulation violated by Copons—King - Ferdinand returns to Spain—His character—Clinton breaks up his army—His conduct eulogised—Lamentable sally from Barcelona—The - French garrisons beyond the Ebro return to France and Habert evacuates Barcelona—Fate of the prince of Conti and the duchess - of Bourbon—Siege of Santona</td> -<td class="tdrb">475</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs135" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XXIV">BOOK XXIV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_I">CHAP. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Napoleon recalls several divisions of infantry and cavalry from Soult’s army—Embarrassments of that marshal—Mr. Batbedat a - banker of Bayonne offers to aid the allies secretly with money and provisions—La Roche Jacquelin and other Bourbon partizans - arrive at the allies’ head-quarter—The duke of Angoulême arrives there—Lord Wellington’s political views—General - reflections—Soult embarrassed by the hostility of the French people—Lord Wellington embarrassed by the hostility of the - Spaniards—Soult’s remarkable project for the defence of France—Napoleon’s reasons for neglecting it put hypothetically—Lord - Wellington’s situation suddenly ameliorated—His wise policy, foresight, and diligence—Resolves to throw a bridge over the - Adour below Bayonne, and to drive Soult from that river—Soult’s system of defence—Numbers of the contending armies—Passage - of the Gaves—Combat of Garris—Lord Wellington forces the line of the Bidouze and Gave of Mauleon—Soult takes the line of the - Gave de Oleron and resolves to change his system of operation</td> -<td class="tdrb">505</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_II">CHAP. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Lord Wellington arrests his movements and returns in person to St. Jean de Luz to throw his bridge over the Adour—Is - prevented by bad weather and returns to the Gave of Mauleon—Passage of the Adour by sir John Hope—Difficulty of the - operation—The flotilla passes the bar and enters the river—The French sally from Bayonne but are repulsed and the stupendous - bridge is cast—Citadel invested after a severe action—Lord Wellington passes the Gave of Oleron and invests Navarrens—Soult - concentrates his army at Orthes—Beresford passes the Gave de Pau near Pereyhorade—Battle of Orthes—Soult changes his line of - operations—Combat of Aire—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">536</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_III">CHAP. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Soult’s perilous situation—He falls back to Tarbes—Napoleon sends him a plan of operations—His reply and views stated—Lord - Wellington’s embarrassments—Soult’s proclamation—Observations upon it—Lord Wellington calls up Freyre’s Gallicians and - detaches Beresford against Bordeaux—The mayor of that city revolts from Napoleon—Beresford enters Bordeaux and is followed - by the duke of Angoulême—Fears of a reaction—The mayor issues a false proclamation—Lord Wellington expresses his - indignation—Rebukes the duke of Angoulême—Recalls Beresford but leaves lord Dalhousie with the seventh division and some - cavalry—Decaen commences the organization of the army of the Gironde—Admiral Penrose enters the Garonne—Remarkable exploit - of the commissary Ogilvie—Lord Dalhousie passes the Garonne and the Dordogne and defeats L’Huillier at Etauliers—Admiral - Penrose destroys the French flotilla—The French set fire to their ships of war—The British seamen and marines land and - destroy all the French batteries from Blaye to the mouth of the Garonne</td> -<td class="tdrb">580</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Wellington’s and Soult’s situations and forces described—Folly of the English ministers—Freyre’s Gallicians and Ponsonby’s - heavy cavalry join lord Wellington—He orders Giron’s Andalusians and Del Parque’s army to enter France—Soult suddenly takes - the offensive—Combats of cavalry—Partizan expedition of Captain Dania—Wellington menaces the peasantry with fire and sword - if they take up arms—Soult retires—Lord Wellington advances—Combat of Vic Bigorre—Death and character of colonel Henry - Sturgeon—Daring exploit of captain William Light<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>—Combat - of Tarbes—Soult retreats by forced marches to Toulouse—Wellington - follows more slowly—Cavalry combat at St. Gaudens—The allies arrive in front of Toulouse—Reflections</td> -<td class="tdrb">603</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_V">CHAP. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Views of the commanders on each side—Wellington designs to throw a bridge over the Garonne at Portet above Toulouse, but - below the confluence of the Arriege and Garonne—The river is found too wide for the pontoons—He changes his design—Cavalry - action at St. Martyn de Touch—General Hill passes the Garonne at Pensaguel above the confluence of the Arriege—Marches upon - Cintegabelle—Crosses the Arriege—Finds the country too deep for his artillery and returns to Pensaguel—Recrosses the - Garonne—Soult fortifies Toulouse and the Mont Rave—Lord Wellington sends his pontoons down the Garonne—Passes that river at - Grenade fifteen miles below Toulouse with twenty thousand men—The river floods and his bridge is taken up—The waters - subside—The bridge is again laid—The Spaniards pass—Lord Wellington advances up the right bank to Fenouilhet—Combat of - cavalry—The eighteenth hussars win the bridge of Croix d’Orade—Lord Wellington resolves to attack Soult on the 9th of - April—Orders the pontoons to be taken up and relaid higher up the Garonne at Seilth in the night of the 8th—Time is lost in - the execution and the attack is deferred—The light division cross at Seilth on the morning of the 10th—Battle of Toulouse</td> -<td class="tdrb">624</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs100 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIV_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">General observations and reflections</td> -<td class="tdrb">657</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<hr class="r30"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_APPENDIX">LIST OF APPENDIX.</h2> -</div> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_I">No. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Lord William Bentinck’s correspondence with sir Edward Pellew and lord Wellington about Sicily</td> -<td class="tdrb">691</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_II">No. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">General Nugent’s and Mr. King’s correspondence with lord William Bentinck about Italy</td> -<td class="tdrb">693</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_III">No. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts from the correspondence of sir H. Wellesley, Mr. Vaughan, and Mr. Stuart upon Spanish and Portuguese affairs</td> -<td class="tdrb">699</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_IV">No. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Justificatory pieces relating to the combats of Maya and Roncesvalles</td> -<td class="tdrb">701</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_V">No. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto <span class="pad7">ditto</span> <span class="pad6">of Ordal</span></td> -<td class="tdrb">703</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VI">No. VI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Official States of the allied army in Catalonia</td> -<td class="tdrb">704</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VII">No. VII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto <span class="pad4">of the Anglo-Portuguese at different epochs</span></td> -<td class="tdrb">705</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_VIII">No. VIII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto <span class="pad4">of the French armies at different epochs</span></td> -<td class="tdrb">707</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_IX">No. IX.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extract from lord Wellington’s order of movements for the battle of Toulouse</td> -<td class="tdrb">709</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#No_X">No. X.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Note and morning state of the Anglo-Portuguese on the 10th of April, 1814</td> -<td class="tdrb">710</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<hr class="r30"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="PLATES">PLATES.</h2> -</div> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_01">No. 1.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory of the Catalonian Operations and plan of Position at Cape Salud.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_02">2.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory of Soult’s Operations to relieve Pampeluna.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_03">3.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Combats of Maya and Roncesvalles.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_04">4.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Assault of St. Sebastian.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_05">5.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of Soult’s and lord Wellington’s Passage of the Bidassoa.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_06">6.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of the Nivelle.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_07">7.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Operations round Bayonne, and of the Battle.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_08">8.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of the Nive, and Battle of St. Pierre.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_09">9.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of Orthes, and the Retreat of Soult to Aire.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_688fp_10">10.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Operations against Tarbes, and the Battle of Toulouse.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"></td> -<td class="tdcx"><em>To follow Page 689.</em></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="NOTICE">NOTICE.</h2> -</div> - -<hr class="r20"> - -<p class="noindent">This volume was nearly printed when my attention was called to -a passage in an article upon the duke of Wellington’s despatches, -published in the last number of the “British and Foreign Quarterly -Review.”</p> - -<p>After describing colonel Gurwood’s proceedings to procure the -publication of the despatches the reviewer says,</p> - -<p>“<em>We here distinctly state</em>, that no other person ever had -access to <em>any</em> documents of the duke, by his grace’s permission, -for any historical or other purpose, and that all inferential pretensions -to such privilege are not founded in fact.”</p> - -<p>This assertion, which if not wholly directed against my history -certainly includes it with others, <em>I distinctly state to be untrue</em>.</p> - -<p>For firstly, the duke of Wellington gave me access to the -original morning states of his army for the use of my history; -he permitted me to take them into my possession, and I still have -possession of them.</p> - -<p>Secondly. The duke of Wellington voluntarily directed me to -apply to sir George Murray for the “<em>orders of movements</em>.” That -is to say the orders of battle issued by him to the different generals -previous to every great action. Sir George Murray thought proper, -as the reader will see in the justificatory pieces of this volume, -to deny all knowledge of these “<em>orders of movements</em>.” I have -since obtained some of them from others, but the permission to get -them all was given to me at Strathfieldsaye, in the presence of lord -Fitzroy Somerset, who was at the same time directed to give me -the morning states and he did do so. These were documents of no -ordinary importance for a history of the war.</p> - -<p>Thirdly. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, with the consent of the duke -of Wellington, put into my hands king Joseph’s portfolio, taken at -Vittoria and containing that monarch’s correspondence with the -emperor, with the French minister of war, and with the marshals -and generals who at different periods were employed in the -Peninsula. These also were documents of no slight importance -for a history of the war, and they are still in my possession.</p> - -<p>When I first resolved to write this History, I applied verbally to -the duke of Wellington to give me papers in aid of my undertaking. -His answer in substance was, that he had arranged all -his own papers with a view to publication himself—that he had -not decided in what form they should be given to the world, or -when, probably not during his lifetime, but he thought his plan -would be to “<em>write a plain didactic history</em>” to be published -after his death—that he was resolved never to publish anything -unless he could tell the whole truth, but at that time he -could not tell the whole truth without wounding the feelings of -many worthy men, without doing mischief: adding in a laughing -way “<em>I should do as much mischief as Buonaparte</em>.” Then -expatiating upon the subject he related to me many anecdotes -illustrative of this observation, shewing errors committed by -generals and others acting with him, or under him, especially -at Waterloo; errors so materially affecting his operations that -he could not do justice to himself if he suppressed them, and -yet by giving them publicity he would ungraciously affect the -fame of many worthy men whose only fault was dulness.</p> - -<p>For these reasons he would not, he said, give me his own -private papers, but he gave me the documents I have already -noticed, and told me he would then, and always, answer any -questions as to facts which I might in the course of my work -think necessary to put. And he has fulfilled that promise rigidly, -for I did then put many questions to him verbally and took notes of -his answers, and many of the facts in my History which have been -most cavilled at and denied by my critics have been related by -me solely upon his authority. Moreover I have since at various -times sent to the duke a number of questions in writing, and -always they have been fully and carefully answered without -delay, though often put when his mind must have been harassed -and his attention deeply occupied by momentous affairs.</p> - -<p>But though the duke of Wellington denied me access to his -own peculiar documents, the greatest part of those documents -existed in duplicate; they were in other persons’ hands, and in -two instances were voluntarily transferred with other interesting -papers to mine. Of this truth the reader may easily satisfy himself -by referring to my five first volumes, some of which were published -years before colonel Gurwood’s compilation appeared. He -will find in those volumes frequent allusions to the substance of the -duke’s private communications with the governments he served; -and in the Appendix a number of his letters, printed precisely -as they have since been given by colonel Gurwood. I could -have greatly augmented the number if I had been disposed so to -swell my work. Another proof will be found in the Justificatory -Pieces of this volume, where I have restored the whole reading -of a remarkable letter of the duke’s which has been garbled in -colonel Gurwood’s compilation, and this not from any unworthy -desire to promulgate what the duke of Wellington desired to suppress, -but that having long before attributed, on the strength of -that passage, certain strong opinions to his grace, I was bound -in defence of my own probity as an historian to reproduce my -authority.</p> - -<p class="right"> -W. F. P. NAPIER.<br> -</p> - -<p class="fs80"><em>March 28th, 1840.</em></p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_i"></a>[Pg i]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="JUSTIFICATORY_NOTES">JUSTIFICATORY NOTES.</h2> -</div> - -<hr class="r20"> - -<p class="noindent">Having in my former volumes printed several controversial -papers relating to this History, I now complete them, -thus giving the reader all that I think necessary to offer in -the way of answer to those who have assailed me. The -Letter to marshal Beresford and the continuation of my -Reply to the Quarterly Review have been published before, -the first as a pamphlet, the second in the London and -Westminster Review. And the former is here reproduced, -not with any design to provoke the renewal of a controversy -which has been at rest for some years, but to complete -the justification of a work which, written honestly -and in good faith from excellent materials, has cost me -sixteen years of incessant labour. The other papers being -new shall be placed first in order and must speak for -themselves.</p> - -<hr class="r20"> - - -<h3>ALISON.</h3> - -<p>Some extracts from Alison’s History of the French Revolution -reflecting upon the conduct of sir John Moore -have been shewn to me by a friend. In one of them I find, -in reference to the magazines at Lugo, a false quotation -from my own work, not from carelessness but to sustain a -miserable censure of that great man. This requires no -further notice, but the following specimen of disingenuous -writing shall not pass with impunity.</p> - -<p>Speaking of the prevalent opinion that England was -unable to succeed in military operations on the continent, -Mr. Alison says:—</p> - -<p>“In sir John Moore’s case this universal and perhaps -unavoidable error was greatly enhanced by his connection -with the opposition party, by whom the military strength -of England had been always underrated, the system of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ii"></a>[ii]</span> -continental operations uniformly decried, and the power -and capacity of the French emperor, great as they were, -unworthily magnified.”</p> - -<p>Mr. Alison here proves himself to be one of those enemies -to sir John Moore who draw upon their imaginations -for facts and upon their malice for conclusions.</p> - -<p>Sir John Moore never had any connection with any political -party, but during the short time he was in parliament -he voted with the government. He may in -society have met with some of the leading men of opposition -thus grossly assailed by Mr. Alison, yet it is doubtful -if he ever conversed with any of them, unless perhaps -Mr. Wyndham, with whom, when the latter was secretary -at war, he had a dispute upon a military subject. He was -however the intimate friend of Mr. Pitt and of Mr. -Pitt’s family. It is untrue that sir John Moore entertained -or even leaned towards exaggerated notions of -French prowess; his experience and his natural spirit and -greatness of mind swayed him the other way. How indeed -could the man who stormed the forts of Fiorenza and the -breach of Calvi in Corsica, he who led the disembarkation -at Aboukir Bay, the advance to Alexandria on the 13th, -and defended the ruins of the camp of Cæsar on the 21st -of March, he who had never been personally foiled in any -military exploit feel otherwise than confident in arms? -Mr. Alison may calumniate but he cannot hurt sir John -Moore.</p> - -<hr class="r20"> - - -<h3>SIR WALTER SCOTT.</h3> - -<p>In the last volume of sir Walter Scott’s life by Mr. -Lockhart, page 143, the following passage from sir Walter’s -diary occurs:—</p> - -<p>“He (Napier) has however given a bad sample of accuracy -in the case of lord Strangford, <em>where</em> his pointed -affirmation has been as pointedly repelled.”</p> - -<p>This peremptory decision is false in respect of grammar, -of logic, and of fact.</p> - -<p>Of grammar because <em>where</em>, an adverb of place, has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iii"></a>[iii]</span> -no proper antecedent. Of logic, because a truth may -be pointedly repelled without ceasing to be a truth. Of -fact because lord Strangford did not repel but admitted -the essential parts of my affirmation, namely, that he had -falsified the date and place of writing his dispatch, and -attributed to himself the chief merit of causing the royal -emigration from Lisbon. Lord Strangford indeed, published -two pamphlets to prove that the merit really attached -to him, but the hollowness of his pretensions -was exposed in my reply to his <em>first pamphlet</em>; the<span class="sidenote">Vide Times, Morning Chronicle, Sun, &c. 1828.</span> -accuracy of my statement was supported by the testimony -of disinterested persons, and moreover many writers, -professing to know the facts, did, at the time, in the -newspapers, contradict lord Strangford’s statements.</p> - -<p>The chief point of his <em>second pamphlet</em>, was the reiterated -assertion that he accompanied the prince regent over -the bar of Lisbon.</p> - -<p>To this I could have replied, 1º. That I had seen a -letter, written at the time by Mr. Smith the naval officer -commanding the boat which conveyed lord Strangford -from Lisbon to the prince’s ship, and in that letter it was -distinctly stated, <em>that they did not reach that vessel until -after she had passed the bar</em>. 2º. That I possessed -letters from other persons present at the emigration of -the same tenor, and that between the writers of those letters -and the writer of the Bruton-street dispatch, to decide -which were the better testimony, offered no difficulty.</p> - -<p>Why did I not so reply? For a reason twice before -published, namely, that Mr. Justice Bailey had done it -for me. Sir Walter takes no notice of the judge’s answer, -neither does Mr. Lockhart; and yet it was the most important -point of the case. Let the reader judge.</p> - -<p>The editor of the Sun newspaper after quoting an -article from the Times upon the subject of my controversy -with lord Strangford, remarked, that his lordship “<em>would<span class="sidenote">Vide Sun newspaper 28th Nov. 1828.</span> -hardly be believed upon his oath, certainly not upon his -honour at the Old Bailey</em>.”</p> - -<p>Lord Strangford obtained a rule to shew cause why a -criminal information should not be filed against the editor -for a libel. The present lord Brougham appeared for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iv"></a>[iv]</span> -defence and justified the offensive passage by references to -lord Strangford’s own admissions in his controversy with -me. The judges thinking the justification good, discharged -the rule by the mouth of lord Tenterden.</p> - -<p>During the proceedings in court the attorney-general, -on the part of lord Strangford, referring to that nobleman’s -dispatch which, though purporting to be written on -the 29th November from H.M.S. Hibernia off the Tagus -was really written the 29th of December in Bruton-street, -said, “Every body knew that in diplomacy there were two<span class="sidenote">Report in the Sun newspaper</span> -copies prepared of all documents, No. 1 for the minister’s -inspection, No. 2 for the public.”</p> - -<p>Mr. Justice Bayley shook his head in disapprobation.</p> - -<p>Attorney-general—“Well, my lord, it is the practice of -these departments and may be justified by necessity.”</p> - -<p>Mr. Justice Bayley—“<em>I like honesty in all places, Mr. -Attorney</em>.”</p> - -<p>And so do I, wherefore I recommend this pointed repeller -to Mr. Lockhart when he publishes another edition -of his father-in-law’s life.</p> - -<hr class="r20"> - - -<h3>COLONEL GURWOOD.</h3> - -<p>In the eighth volume of the Duke of Wellington’s Despatches -page 531, colonel Gurwood has inserted the following -note:—</p> - -<p>“Lieutenant Gurwood fifty-second regiment led the -“forlorn hope” of the light division in the assault of the -lesser breach. He afterwards took the French governor -general Barrié in the citadel; and from the hands of lord -Wellington on the breach by which he had entered, he received -the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded -by the duke of Wellington to compile this work has doubtless -been one of the distinguished consequences resulting -from this service, and lieutenant Gurwood feels pride as a -soldier of fortune in here offering himself as an encouraging -example to the subaltern in future wars.”—“The -detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the -lesser breach is of too little importance except to those<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v"></a>[v]</span> -who served in it to become a matter of history. The -compiler however takes this opportunity of observing -that colonel William Napier has been misinformed respecting -the conduct of the “forlorn hope,” in the -account given of it by him as it appears in the Appendix -of the fourth volume of his History of the Peninsular War. -A correct statement and proofs of it have been since furnished -to colonel William Napier for any future edition of -his book which will render any further notice of it <em>here</em> -unnecessary.”</p> - -<p>My account is not to be disposed of in this summary -manner, and this note, though put forth as it were with -the weight of the duke of Wellington’s name by being inserted -amongst his Despatches, shall have an answer.</p> - -<p>Colonel Gurwood sent me what in the above note he -calls “<em>a correct statement and proofs of it</em>.” I know of no -<em>proofs</em>, and the correctness of his statement depends on his -own recollections which the wound he received in the head -at this time seems to have rendered extremely confused, -at least the following recollections of other officers are directly -at variance with his. Colonel Gurwood in his -“<em>correct statement</em>” says, “When I first went up the -breach there were still some of the enemy in it, it was -very steep and on my arrival at the top of it under the gun -I was knocked down either by a shot or stone thrown at -me. I can assure you that not a lock was snapped as you -describe, but finding it impossible that the breach from its -steepness and narrowness could be carried by the bayonet -I ordered the men to load, certainly before the arrival of -the storming party, and having placed some of the men on -each side of the breach I went up the middle with the remainder, -and when in the act of climbing over the disabled -gun at the top of the breach which you describe, I was -wounded in the head by a musquet shot fired so close to -me that it blew my cap to pieces, and I was tumbled over -senseless from the top to the bottom of the breach. When -I recovered my senses I found myself close to George,<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> who -was sitting on a stone with his arm broken, I asked him -how the thing was going on, &c. &c.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi"></a>[vi]</span></p> - -<p>Now to the above statement I oppose the following -letters from the authors of the statements given in the -Appendix to my fourth volume.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center">Major-General Sir <span class="smcap">George Napier</span> to Colonel -<span class="smcap">William Napier</span>.</p> - -<p>“I am sorry our gallant friend Gurwood is not satisfied -with and disputes the accuracy of your account of the -assault of the lesser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo as detailed -in your fourth volume. I can only say, that account was -principally, if not wholly taken from colonel Fergusson’s, he -being one of my storming captains, and my own narrative -of that transaction up to the period when we were each of -us wounded. <em>I adhere to the correctness of all I stated to -you</em>, and beg further to say that my friend colonel Mitchell, -who was also one of my captains in the storming party, -told me the last time I saw him at the commander-in-chief’s -levee, that my statement was “<em>perfectly correct</em>.” And both -he and colonel Fergusson recollected the circumstance of -my not permitting the party to load, and also that upon -being checked, when nearly two-thirds up the breach, by -the enemy’s fire, the men forgetting their pieces were not -loaded snapped them off, but I called to them and reminded -them of my orders to force their way with the bayonet -alone! It was at that moment I was wounded and fell, and -I never either spoke to or saw Gurwood afterwards during -that night, as he rushed on with the other officers of the -party to the top of the breach. Upon looking over a small -manuscript of the various events of my life as a soldier, -written many years ago, I find all I stated to you corroborated -in every particular. Of course as colonel Gurwood -tells you he was <em>twice</em> at the top of the breach, before any -of the storming party entered it, I cannot take upon myself -to contradict him, but I certainly do not conceive how it -was possible, as he and myself jumped into the ditch together, -I saw him wounded, and spoke to him <em>after</em> having -mounted the faussbraye with him, and <em>before</em> we rushed -up the breach in the body of the place. I never saw him -or spoke to him after I was struck down, the whole affair -did not last above twenty-five or thirty minutes, but as I -fell when about two-thirds up the breach I can only answer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii"></a>[vii]</span> -for the correctness of my account to that period, as soon -after I was assisted to get down the breach by the Prince -of Orange (who kindly gave his sash to tie up my shattered -arm and which sash is now in my possession) by the present -duke of Richmond and lord Fitzroy Somerset, all three of -whom I believe were actively engaged in the assault. Our -friend Gurwood did his duty like a gallant and active soldier, -but I cannot admit of his having been <em>twice in the -breach before the other officers of the storming party and -myself</em>!</p> - -<p>“I believe yourself and every man in the army with whom -I have the honor to be acquainted will acquit me of any -wish or intention to deprive a gallant comrade and brother-officer -of the credit and honor due to his bravery, more particularly -one with whom I have long been on terms of intimate -friendship, and whose abilities I admire as much as -I respect and esteem his conduct as a soldier; therefore -this statement can or ought only to be attributed to my -sense <em>of what is due</em> to the other gallant officers and soldiers -who were under my command in the assault of the -lesser breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, and not to any <em>wish</em> or -<em>intention</em> on my part to detract from the distinguished services -of, or the laurels gained by colonel Gurwood on that -occasion. Of course you are at liberty to refer to me if -necessary and to make what use you please of this letter -privately or publicly either now or at any future period, as -<em>I steadily adhere to all I have ever stated to you or any one -else</em> and I am &c. &c.</p> - -<p class="right">“<span class="smcap">George Napier.</span>”</p> - - -<p class="p1 negin2">Extract of a letter from colonel <span class="smcap">James Fergusson</span>, fifty-second -regiment (formerly a captain of the forty-third -and one of the storming party.) Addressed to -Sir <span class="smcap">George Napier</span>.</p> - -<p>“I send you a memorandum I made some time back -from memory and in consequence of having seen various -accounts respecting our assault. You are perfectly correct -as to Gurwood and your description of the way we carried -the breach is accurate; and now I have seen your memorandum -I recollect the circumstance of the men’s arms not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii"></a>[viii]</span> -being loaded and the snapping of the firelocks.”—“I was -not certain when you were wounded but your description of -the scene on the breach and the way in which it was carried -is perfectly accurate.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center">Extract of a letter from colonel <span class="smcap">Fergusson</span> to colonel -<span class="smcap">William Napier</span>.</p> - -<p>“I think the account you give in your fourth volume of -the attack of the little breach at Ciudad Rodrigo is as -favorable to Gurwood as he has any right to expect, and -agrees perfectly both with your brother George’s recollections -of that attack and with mine. Our late friend Alexander -Steele who was one of my officers declared he was with -Gurwood the whole of the time, for a great part of the -storming party of the forty-third joined Gurwood’s party -who were placing the ladders against the work, and it was -the engineer officer calling out that they were wrong and -pointing out the way to the breach in the fausse braye that -directed our attention to it. Jonathan Wyld<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> of the forty-third -was the first man that run up the fausse braye, and -we made directly for the little breach which was defended -<em>exactly as you describe</em>. We were on the breach some little -time and when we collected about thirty men (some of the -third battalion rifle brigade in the number) we made a -simultaneous rush, cheered, and run in, so that positively no -claim could be made as to the first who entered the breach. -I do not want to dispute with Gurwood but I again say (in -which your brother agrees) that some of the storming party -were <em>before</em> the forlorn hope. I do not dispute that Gurwood -and some of his party were among the number that -rushed in at the breach, but as to his having twice mounted -the breach before us, <em>I cannot understand it</em>, and Steele -always <em>positively denied it</em>.”</p> - -<hr class="r20"> - -<p>Having thus justified myself from the charge of writing -upon bad information about the assault of the little breach -I shall add something about that of the great breach.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix"></a>[ix]</span></p> - -<p>Colonel Gurwood offers himself as an encouraging -example for the subalterns of the British army in future -wars; but the following extract from a statement of the late -major Mackie, so well known for his bravery worth and -modesty, and who as a subaltern led the forlorn hope at the -great breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, denies colonel Gurwood’s -claim to the particular merit upon which he seems inclined -to found his good fortune in after life.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center">Extracts from a memoir addressed by the late Major -<span class="smcap">Mackie</span> to Colonel <span class="smcap">Napier</span>. October 1838.</p> - -<p>“The troops being immediately ordered to advance were -soon across the ditch, and upon the breach at the same -instant with the ninety-fourth who had advanced along the -ditch. To mount under the fire of the defenders was the -work of a moment, but when there difficulties of a formidable -nature presented themselves; on each flank a deep -trench was cut across the rampart isolating the breach, -which was enfiladed with cannon and musquetry, while in -front, from the rampart into the streets of the town, was a -perpendicular fall of ten or twelve feet; the whole preventing -the soldiers from making that bold and rapid onset so -effective in facilitating the success of such an enterprize. -The great body of the fire of defence being from the houses -and from an open space in front of the breach, in the first -impulse of the moment I dropt from the rampart into the -town. Finding myself here quite alone and no one following, -I discovered that the trench upon the right of the -breach was cut across the whole length of the rampart, thereby -opening a free access to our troops and rendering what -was intended by the enemy as a defence completely the -reverse. By this opening I again mounted to the top of -the breach and led the men down into the town. The -enemy’s fire which I have stated had been, after we gained -the summit of the wall, confined to the houses and open -space alluded to, now began to slacken, and ultimately -they abandoned the defence. Being at this time in advance -of the whole of the third division, I led what men I could -collect along the street, leading in a direct line from the -great breach into the centre of the town, by which street<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x"></a>[x]</span> -the great body of the enemy were precipitately retiring. -Having advanced considerably and passed across a street -running to the left, a body of the enemy came suddenly -from that street, rushed through our ranks and escaped. -In pursuit of this body, which after passing us held their -course to the right, I urged the party forwards in that -direction until we reached the citadel, where the governor -and garrison had taken refuge. The outer gate of the -enclosure being open, I entered at the head of the party -composed of men of different regiments who by this time -had joined the advance. Immediately on entering I was -hailed by a French officer asking for an English general -to whom they might surrender. Pointing to my epaulets -in token of their security, the door of the keep or stronghold -of the place was opened and a sword presented to me -in token of surrender, which sword I accordingly received. -This I had scarcely done when two of their officers laid -hold of me for protection, one on each arm, and <em>it was -while I was thus situated that lieutenant Gurwood came -up and obtained the sword of the governor</em>.</p> - -<p>“In this way, the governor, with lieutenant Gurwood and -the two officers I have mentioned still clinging to my arms, -the whole party moved towards the rampart. Having -found when there, that in the confusion incident to such a -scene I had lost as it were by accident that prize which was -actually within my reach, and which I had justly considered -as my own, in the chagrin of the moment I turned -upon my heel and left the spot. The following day, in -company with captain Lindsay of the eighty-eighth regiment -I waited upon colonel Pakenham, then assistant -adjutant-general to the third division, to know if my name -had been mentioned by general Picton as having led the -advance of the right brigade. He told me that it had and -I therefore took no further notice of the circumstance, -feeling assured that I should be mentioned in the way of -which all officers in similar circumstances must be so ambitious. -My chagrin and disappointment may be easily -imagined when lord Wellington’s dispatches reached the -army from England to find my name altogether omitted, -and the right brigade deprived of their just meed of praise.”—“Sir,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi"></a>[xi]</span> -it is evident that the tendency of this note” -(colonel Gurwood’s note quoted from the Despatches) -“is unavoidably, though I do him the justice to believe -by no means intentionally upon colonel Gurwood’s part, -to impress the public with the belief that he was himself -the first British officer that entered the <ins class="corr" id="tn-xi" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'citadel of Ciuded'"> -citadel of Ciudad</ins> Rodrigo, consequently the one to whom its -garrison surrendered. This impression the language -he employs is the more likely to convey, inasmuch as to -his exertions and good fortune in this particular instance he -refers the whole of his professional success, to which he -points the attention of the future aspirant as a pledge of -the rewards to be expected from similar efforts to deserve -them. To obviate this impression and in bare justice to -the right brigade of the third division and, as a member of -it, to myself, I feel called on to declare that though I do not -claim for that brigade exclusively the credit of forcing the -defences of the great breach, the left brigade having -joined in it contrary to the intention of lord Wellington -under the circumstances stated, yet I do declare on the -word of a man of honour, that <em>I was the first individual -who effected the descent from the main breach into the -streets of the town, that I preceded the advance into the -body of the place, that I was the first who entered the -citadel, and that the enemy there assembled had surrendered -to myself and party before lieutenant Gurwood came up</em>. -Referring to the inference which colonel Gurwood has -been pleased to draw from his own good fortune as to the -certainty and value of the rewards awaiting the exertions -of the British soldier, permit me, sir, in bare justice to myself -to say that at the time I volunteered the forlorn hope on -this occasion, I was senior lieutenant of my own regiment -consequently the first for promotion. Having as such -succeeded so immediately after to a company, I could -scarcely expect nor did I ask further promotion at the -time, but after many years of additional service, I did still -conceive and do still maintain, that I was entitled to bring -forward my services on that day as a ground for asking -that step of rank which every officer leading a forlorn hope -had received with the exception of myself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii"></a>[xii]</span></p> - -<p>“May I, sir, appeal to your sense of justice in lending me -your aid to prevent my being deprived of the only reward -I had hitherto enjoyed, in the satisfaction of thinking that -the services which I am now compelled most reluctantly -to bring in some way to the notice of the public, -had during the period that has since elapsed, never once -been called in question. It was certainly hard enough -that a service of this nature should have been productive -of no advantage to me in my military life. I feel it however -infinitely more annoying that I should now find myself -in danger of being stript of any credit to which it might -entitle me, by the looseness of the manner in which -colonel Gurwood words his statement. I need not say -that this danger is only the more imminent from his statement -appearing in a work which as being published under -the auspices of the duke of Wellington as well as of the -Horse Guards, has at least the appearance of coming in -the guise of an official authority,” “I agree most cordially -with colonel Gurwood in the opinion he has expressed -in his note, that he is himself an instance where -reward and merit have gone hand in hand. I feel compelled -however, for the reasons given to differ from him materially -as to the precise ground on which he considers the -honours and advantages that have followed his deserts to -be not only the distinguished but the just and natural -consequences of his achievements on that day. <em>I allude -to the claim advanced by colonel Gurwood to be considered -the individual by whom the governor of Ciudad -Rodrigo was made prisoner of war.</em> It could scarcely be -expected that at such a moment I could be aware that the -sword which I received was not the governor’s being in -fact that of one of his aide-de-camps. I repeat however -that before lieutenant Gurwood and his party came up, the -enemy had expressed their wish to surrender, that a sword -was presented by them in token of submission and received -by me as a pledge, on the honour of a British officer, -that according to the laws of war, I held myself responsible -for their safety as prisoners under the protection of -the British arms. Not a shadow of resistance was afterwards -made and I appeal to every impartial mind in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiii"></a>[xiii]</span> -least degree acquainted with the rules of modern warfare, -if under these circumstances I am not justified in asserting -that before, and at the time lieutenant Gurwood arrived, -the whole of the enemy’s garrison within the walls of the -citadel, governor included, were both <i lang="la">de jure</i> and <i lang="la">de facto</i> -prisoners to myself. In so far, therefore, as he being the -individual who made its owner captive, could give either of -us a claim to receive that sword to which colonel Gurwood -ascribes such magic influence in the furthering of his -after fortunes, I do maintain that at the time it became -<i lang="la">de facto</i> his, it was <i lang="la">de jure</i> mine.”</p> - - -<p>Something still remains to set colonel Gurwood right -upon matters which he has apparently touched upon without -due consideration. In a note appended to that part of -the duke of Wellington’s Despatches which relate to the -storming of Ciudad Rodrigo he says that the late captain -Dobbs of the fifty-second at Sabugal “recovered the -howitzer, taken by the forty-third regiment but retaken -by the enemy.” This is totally incorrect. The howitzer -was taken by the forty-third and retained by the forty-third. -The fifty-second regiment never even knew of its -capture until the action was over. Captain Dobbs was a -brave officer and a very generous-minded man, he was -more likely to keep his own just claims to distinction in -the back-ground than to appropriate the merit of others -to himself. I am therefore quite at a loss to know upon -what authority colonel Gurwood has stated a fact inaccurate -itself and unsupported by the duke of Wellington’s -dispatch about the battle of Sabugal, which distinctly says -the howitzer was taken by the forty-third regiment, as in -truth it was, and it was kept by that regiment also.</p> - -<p>While upon the subject of colonel Gurwood’s compilation -I must observe that in my fifth volume, when treating -of general Hill’s enterprise against the French forts at Almaraz -I make lord Wellington complain to the ministers -that his generals were so fearful of responsibility the -slightest movements of the enemy deprived them of their -judgment. Trusting that the despatches then in progress of -publication would bear me out, I did not give my authority<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv"></a>[xiv]</span> -at large in the Appendix; since then, the letter on -which I relied has indeed been published by colonel Gurwood -in the Despatches, but purged of the passage to -which I allude and without any indication of its being so -garbled. This omission might hereafter give a handle to -accuse me of bad faith, wherefore I now give the letter -in full, the Italics marking the restored passage:—</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>From lord Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Fuente Guinaldo, May 28th, 1812.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">My dear lord</span>,</p> - -<p>You will be as well pleased as I am at general Hill’s -success, which certainly would have been still more satisfactory -if he had taken the garrison of Mirabete; which -he would have done if general Chowne had got on a little -better in the night of the 16th, and if sir William Erskine -had not very unnecessarily alarmed him, by informing him -that Soult’s whole army were in movement, and in Estremadura. -Sir Rowland therefore according to his instructions -came back on the 21st, whereas if he had staid a -day or two he would have brought his heavy howitzers to -bear on the castle and he would either have stormed it -under his fire or the garrison would have surrendered. -<em>But notwithstanding all that has passed I cannot prevail -upon the general officers to feel a little confidence in their -situation. They take alarm at the least movement of the -enemy and then spread the alarm, and interrupt every -thing, and the extraordinary circumstance is, that if they -are not in command they are as stout as any private soldiers -in the army.</em> Your lordship will observe that I have -marked some passages in Hill’s report not to be published. -My opinion is that the enemy must evacuate the tower of -Mirabete and indeed it is useless to keep that post, unless -they have another bridge which I doubt. But if they see -that we entertain a favourable opinion of the strength of -Mirabete, they will keep their garrison there, which might -be inconvenient to us hereafter, if we should wish to -establish there our own bridge. I enclose a Madrid<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xv"></a>[xv]</span> -Gazette in which you will see a curious description of the -state of king Joseph’s authority and his affairs in general, -from the most authentic sources.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">Ever, my dear lord, &c. &c.</span><br> -<span class="smcap">Wellington</span>.<br> -</p> - -<hr class="r20"> - - -<h3>VILLA MURIEL.</h3> - -<p>The following statement of the operations of the fifth -division at the combat of Muriel 25th October, 1812, is -inserted at the desire of sir John Oswald. It proves that I -have erroneously attributed to him the first and as it -appeared to me unskilful disposition of the troops; but with -respect to the other portions of his statement, without denying -or admitting the accuracy of his recollections, I -shall give the authority I chiefly followed, first printing his -statement.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Affair of Villa Muriel.</em></p> - -<p>On the morning 25th of October 1812 major-general -Oswald joined and assumed the command of the fifth -division at Villa Muriel on the Carion. Major-general -Pringle had already posted the troops, and the greater -portion of the division were admirably disposed of about -the village as also in the dry bed of a canal running in its -rear, in some places parallel to the Carion. Certain of the -corps were formed in columns of attack supported by reserves, -ready to fall upon the enemy if in consequence of -the mine failing he should venture to push a column along -the narrow bridge. The river had at some points been -reported fordable, but these were said to be at all times -difficult and in the then rise of water as they proved -hardly practicable. As the enemy closed towards the -bridge, he opened a heavy fire of artillery on the village. -At that moment lord Wellington entered it and passed the -formed columns well sheltered both from fire and observation. -His lordship approved of the manner the post was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvi"></a>[xvi]</span> -occupied and of the advantage taken of the <em>canal and -village</em> to mask the troops. The French supported by a -heavy and superior fire rushed gallantly on the bridge, the -mine not exploding and destroying the arch till the leading -section had almost reached the spot. Shortly after, the -main body retired, leaving only a few light troops. Immediately -previous to this an orderly officer announced to lord -Wellington that Palencia and its bridges were gained by -the foe. He ordered the main body of the division immediately -to ascend the heights in its rear, and along the -plateau to move towards Palencia in order to meet an -attack from that quarter. Whilst the division was in the -act of ascending, a report was made by major Hill of the -eighth caçadores that the ford had been won, passed by a -body of cavalry causing the caçadores to fall back on the -broken ground. The enemy, it appears, were from the -first, acquainted with these fords, for his push to them was -nearly simultaneous with his assault on the bridge. The -division moved on the heights towards Palencia, it had not -however proceeded far, before an order came directing it -to retire and form on the right of the Spaniards, and when -collected to remain on the heights till further orders. -About this time the cavalry repassed the river, nor had -either infantry or artillery passed by the ford to aid in the -attack, but in consequence of the troops being withdrawn -from the village and canal a partial repair was given to the -bridge, and small bodies of infantry were passed over -skirmishing with the Spaniards whose post on the heights -was directly in front of Villa Muriel. No serious attack -from that quarter was to be apprehended until an -advance from Palencia. It was on that point therefore -that attention was fixed. Day was closing when lord -Wellington came upon the heights and said all was quiet -at Palencia and that the enemy must now be driven from -the right bank. General Oswald enquired if after clearing -the village the division was to remain there for the -night. His lordship replied, the village was to be occupied -in force and held by the division till it was withdrawn, -which would probably be very early in the morning. He -directed the first brigade under brigadier-general Barnes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvii"></a>[xvii]</span> -to attack the enemy’s flank, the second under Pringle to -advance in support extending to the left so as to succour -the Spaniards who were unsuccessfully contending with -the enemy in their front. The casualties in the division -were not numerous especially when the fire it was exposed -to is considered. The enemy sustained a comparative -heavy loss. The troops were by a rapid advance of the -first brigade cut off from the bridge and forced into the -river where many were drowned. The allies fell back in -the morning unmolested.</p> - -<p class="right"><span class="smcap">John Oswald</span>, &c. &c. &c.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Memoir on the combat of Muriel by captain Hopkins, -fourth regiment.</em></p> - -<p>As we approached Villa Muriel the face of the country -upon our left flank as we were then retrograding appeared -open, in our front ran the river Carrion, and immediately -on the opposite side of the river and parallel to it there -was a broad deep dry canal. On our passing the bridge at -Villa Muriel we had that village on our left, from the -margin of the canal the ground sloped gradually up into -heights, the summit forming a fine plateau. Villa Muriel -was occupied by the brigadier Pringle with a <em>small</em> detachment -of infantry but at the time we considered that it -required a larger force, as its maintenance appeared of the -utmost importance to the army, we were aware that the -enemy had passed the Carrion with cavalry and also that -Hill’s caçadores had given way at another part of the -river. Our engineers had partly destroyed the bridge of -Villa Muriel, the enemy attacked the village, at the time -the brigadier and his staff were there,<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> passing the ruins -of the bridge by means of ladders, &c. The enemy in -driving the detachment from the village made some prisoners. -We retired to the plateau of the heights, under a -fire of musquetry and artillery, where we halted in close -column; the enemy strengthened the village.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington arrived with his staff on the plateau, -and immediately reconnoitred the enemy whose reinforcements<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xviii"></a>[xviii]</span> -had arrived and were forming strong columns on -the other side of the river. Lord Wellington immediately -ordered some artillery to be opened on the enemy. I happened -to be close to the head-quarter staff and heard lord -Wellington say to an aide-de-camp, “Tell Oswald I want -him.” On sir John Oswald arriving he said, “Oswald, you -will get the division under arms and drive the enemy from -the village and retain possession of it.” He replied, “My -lord, if the village should be taken I do not consider it as -tenable.” Wellington then said, “It is my orders, -general.” Oswald replied, “My lord as it is your orders -they shall be obeyed.” Wellington then gave orders to -him “that he should take the second brigade of the division -and attack in line, that the first brigade should in -column first descend the heights on the right of the -second, enter the canal and assist in clearing it of the -enemy,” and saying, “I will tell you what I will do, -Oswald. I will give you the Spaniards and Alava into the -bargain, headed by a company of the ninth regiment upon -your left.” The attack was made accordingly, the second -battalion of the fourth regiment being left in reserve in -column on the slope of the hill exposed to a severe cannonade -which for a short time caused them some confusion. -The enemy were driven from the canal and village, -and the prisoners which they made in the morning were -retaken. The enemy lost some men in this affair, but -general Alava was wounded, the officer commanding the -company of Brunswickers killed, and several of the division -killed and wounded. During the attack lord Wellington -sent the prince of Orange under a heavy fire for -the purpose of preventing the troops exposing themselves -at the canal, two companies defended the bridge with a -detachment just arrived from England. The possession of -the village proved of the utmost importance, as the retrograde -movement we made that night could not have been -effected with safety had the enemy been on our side of the -river, as it was we were enabled to pass along the river -with all arms in the most perfect security.</p> - -<hr class="tb"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xix"></a>[xix]</span><br></p> - - -<h3 class="pfs120 lsp2">A LETTER</h3> -<p class="pfs60">TO</p> -<p class="pfs100">GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,</p> -<p class="pfs60">BEING</p> -<p class="pfs90"><em>An Answer to his Lordships Assumed Refutation</em></p> -<p class="pfs60">OF</p> -<p class="pfs80">COL. NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.</p> - -<hr class="r20"> - -<p><span class="pad1 smcap">My Lord</span>,</p> - -<p class="noindent">You have at last appeared in print without any disguise. -Had you done so at first it might have spared us both -some trouble. I should have paid more deference to your -argument and would willingly have corrected any error -fairly pointed out. Now having virtually acknowledged -yourself the author of the two publications entitled “<em>Strictures</em>” -and “<em>Further Strictures</em>,” <em>&c.</em> I will not suffer -you to have the advantage of using two kinds of weapons, -without making you also feel their inconvenience. I will -treat your present publication as a mere continuation of -your former two, and then my lord, how will you stand in -this controversy?</p> - -<p>Starting anonymously you wrote with all the scurrility -that bad taste and mortified vanity could suggest to damage -an opponent, because in the fair exercise of his judgement -he had ventured to deny your claim to the title of a great -commander: and you coupled this with such fulsome adulation -of yourself that even in a dependent’s mouth it would -have been sickening. Now when you have suffered defeat, -when all the errors misquotations and misrepresentations -of your anonymous publications have been detected and -exposed, you come forward in your own name as if a new -and unexceptionable party had appeared, and you expect -to be allowed all the advantage of fresh statements and -arguments and fresh assertions, without the least reference -to your former damaged evidence. You expect that I -should have that deference for you, which your age, your -rank, your services, and your authority under other circumstances -might have fairly claimed at my hands; that I -should acknowledge by my silence how much I was in -error, or that I should defend myself by another tedious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xx"></a>[xx]</span> -dissection and exposition of your production. My lord, -you will be disappointed. I have neither time nor inclination -to enter for the third time upon such a task; and yet -I will not suffer you to claim a victory which you have not -gained. I deny the strength of your arguments, I will -expose some prominent inconsistencies, and as an answer to -those which I do not notice I will refer to your former -publications to show, that in this controversy, I am now -entitled to disregard any thing you may choose to advance, -and that I am in justice exonerated from the necessity of -producing any more proofs.</p> - -<p>You have published above six hundred pages at three -different periods, and you have taken above a year to digest -and arrange the arguments and evidence contained in your -present work; a few lines will suffice for the answer. The -object of your literary labours is to convince the world that -at Campo Mayor you proved yourself an excellent general, -and that at Albuera you were superlatively great! Greater -even than Cæsar! My lord, the duke of Wellington did -not take a much longer time to establish his European -reputation by driving the French from the Peninsula; and -methinks if your exploits vouch not for themselves your -writings will scarcely do it for them. At all events, a plain -simple statement at first, having your name affixed, would -have been more effectual with the public, and would certainly -have been more dignified than the anonymous -publications with which you endeavoured to feel your way. -Why should not all the main points contained in the -laboured pleadings of your Further Strictures, and the still -more laboured pleadings of your present work, have been -condensed and published at once with your name? if -indeed it was necessary to publish at all! Was it that by -anonymous abuse of your opponent and anonymous praise -of yourself you hoped to create a favourable impression on -the public before you appeared in person? This, my lord, -seems very like a consciousness of weakness. And then -how is it that so few of the arguments and evidences now -adduced should have been thought of before? It is a -strange thing that in the first defence of your generalship, -for one short campaign, you should have neglected proofs<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxi"></a>[xxi]</span> -and arguments sufficient to form a second defence of two -hundred pages.</p> - -<p>You tell us, that you disdained to notice my “<em>Reply to -various Opponents</em>,” because you knew the good sense of -the public would never be misled by a production containing -such numerous contradictions and palpable inconsistencies, -and that your friends’ advice confirmed you in this -view of the matter. There were nevertheless some things -in that work which required an answer even though the -greatest part of it had been weak; and it is a pity your -friends did not tell you that an affected contempt for an -adversary who has hit hard only makes the bystanders -laugh. Having condescended to an anonymous attack it -would have been wiser to refute the proofs offered of -your own inaccuracy than to shrink with mock grandeur -from a contest which you had yourself provoked. My -friends, my lord, gave me the same advice with respect to -your anonymous publications, and with more reason, -because they were anonymous; but I had the proofs of -your weakness in my hands, I preferred writing an answer, -and if you had been provided in the same manner you -would like me have neglected your friends’ advice.</p> - -<p>My lord, I shall now proceed with my task in the -manner I have before alluded to. You have indeed left -me no room for that refined courtesy with which I could -have wished to soften the asperities of this controversy, -but I must request of you to be assured, and I say it in -all sincerity, that I attribute the errors to which I must -revert, not to any wilful perversion or wilful suppression -of facts, but entirely to a natural weakness of memory, -and the irritation of a mind confused by the working of -wounded vanity. I acknowledge that it is a hard trial -to have long-settled habits of self satisfaction suddenly -disturbed,—</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"> - <div class="verse indentq">“Cursed be my harp and broke be every chord,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">If I forget thy worth, <em>victorious Beresford</em>.”</div> -</div> -</div> - -<p class="noindent">It was thus the flattering muse of poetry lulled you with -her sweet strains into a happy dream of glory, and none -can wonder at your irritation when the muse of history -awakened you with the solemn clangour of her trumpet to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxii"></a>[xxii]</span> -the painful reality that you were only an ordinary person. -My lord, it would have been wiser to have preserved -your equanimity, there would have been some greatness -in that.</p> - -<p>In your first Strictures you began by asserting that I -knew nothing whatever of you or your services; and that -I was actuated entirely by vulgar political rancour when I -denied your talents as a general. To this I replied that I -was not ignorant of your exploits. That I knew something -of your proceedings at Buenos Ayres, at Madeira, and at -Coruña; and in proof thereof I offered to enter into the -details of the first, if you desired it. To this I have -received no answer.</p> - -<p>You affirmed that your perfect knowledge of the Portuguese -language was one of your principal claims to be -commander of the Portuguese army. In reply I quoted from -your own letter to lord Wellington, your confession, that, -such was your ignorance of that language at the time you -could not even read the communication from the regency, -relative to your own appointment.</p> - -<p>You asserted that no officer, save sir John Murray, -objected at the first moment to your sudden elevation of -rank. In answer I published sir John Sherbroke’s letter -to sir J. Cradock complaining of it.</p> - -<p>You said the stores (which the Cabildo of Ciudad -Rodrigo refused to let you have in 1809) had not been -formed by lord Wellington. In reply I published lord -Wellington’s declaration that they had been formed by him.</p> - -<p>You denied that you had ever written a letter to the -junta of Badajos, and this not doubtfully or hastily, but -positively and accompanied with much scorn and ridicule -of my assertion to that effect. You harped upon the new -and surprising information I had obtained relative to your -actions, and were, in truth, very facetious upon the subject. -In answer I published your own letter to that junta! -So much for your first Strictures.</p> - -<p>In your second publication (page 42) you asserted that -colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action at -Campo Mayor; and now in your third publication (page -48) you show very clearly that he took an active part in -those operations.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxiii"></a>[xxiii]</span></p> - -<p>You called the distance from Campo Mayor to Merida -<em>two marches</em>, and now you say it is <em>four marches</em>.</p> - -<p>Again, in your first “<em>Strictures</em>,” you declared that the -extent of the intrigues against you in Portugal were exaggerated -by me; and you were very indignant that I should -have supposed you either needed, or had the support and -protection of the duke of Wellington while in command -of the Portuguese army. In my third and fourth volumes, -published since, I have shown what the extent of those -intrigues was: and I have still something in reserve to -add when time shall be fitting. Meanwhile I will stay -your lordship’s appetite by two extracts bearing upon this -subject, and upon the support which you derived from the -duke of Wellington.</p> - -<p>1º. Mr. Stuart, writing to lord Wellesley, in 1810, after -noticing the violence of the Souza faction relative to the -fall of Almeida, says,—“I could have borne all this with -patience if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the -fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, and that the -regency should send an order to marshal Beresford to dismiss -his quarter-master-general and military secretary; -followed by reflections on the persons composing the family -of that officer, and by hints to the same purport respecting -the Portuguese who are attached to lord Wellington.”</p> - -<p>2º. Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beira -by marshal Beresford, and dated 6th September, 1810.—“However, -as I mentioned, I have no great desire to hold -my situation beyond the period lord Wellington retains his -situation, or after active operations have ceased in this -country, even should things turn out favourably, of which -I really at this instant have better hopes than I ever had -though I have been usually sanguine. But in regard to -myself, though I do not pretend to say the situation I hold -is not at all times desirable to hold, yet I am fully persuaded -that if tranquillity is ever restored to this country -under its legal government, that I should be too much -vexed and thwarted by intrigues of all sorts to reconcile -either my temper or my conscience to what would then be -my situation.”</p> - -<p>For the further exposition of the other numerous errors -and failures of your two first publications, I must refer the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxiv"></a>[xxiv]</span> -reader to my “<em>Reply</em>” and “<em>Justification</em>,” but the points -above noticed it was necessary to fix attention upon, because -they give me the right to call upon the public to -disregard your present work. And this right I cannot relinquish. -I happened fortunately to have the means of -repelling your reckless assaults in the instances above -mentioned, but I cannot always be provided with your -own letters to disprove your own assertions. The combat -is not equal my lord, I cannot contend with such odds -and must therefore, although reluctantly, use the advantages -which by the detection of such errors I have already -obtained.</p> - -<p>These then are strong proofs of an unsound memory -upon essential points, and they deprive your present work -of all weight as an authority in this controversy. Yet the -strangest part of your new book (see page 135) is, that -you avow an admiration for what you call the <em>generous principle</em> -which leads French authors to <em><ins class="corr" id="tn-xxiv" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'mistate facts for'"> -misstate facts for</ins> the honour of their country</em>; and not only you do this but -sneer at me very openly for not doing the same! you sneer -at me, my lord, for not falsifying facts to pander to the -morbid vanity of my countrymen, and at the same time, -with a preposterous inconsistency you condemn me for -being an inaccurate historian! My lord, I have indeed -yet to learn that the <em>honour</em> of my country either requires -to be or can be supported by deliberate historical falsehoods. -Your lordship’s personal experience in the field -may perhaps have led you to a different conclusion but -I will not be your historian: and coupling this, your expressed -sentiment, with your forgetfulness on the points -which I have before noticed, I am undoubtedly entitled to -laugh at your mode of attacking others. What, my lord? -like Banquo’s ghost you rise, “with twenty mortal murthers -on your crown to push us from our stools.” You -have indeed a most awful and ghost-like way of arguing: -all your oracular sentences are to be implicitly believed, -and all my witnesses to facts sound and substantial, are to -be discarded for your airy nothings.</p> - -<p>Captain Squire! heed him not, he was a dissatisfied, -talking, self-sufficient, ignorant officer.</p> - -<p>The officer of dragoons who charged at Campo Mayor!<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxv"></a>[xxv]</span> -He is nameless, his narrative teems with misrepresentations, -he cannot tell whether he charged or not.</p> - -<p>Colonel Light! spunge him out, he was only a subaltern.</p> - -<p>Captain Gregory! believe him not, his statement cannot -be correct, he is too minute, and has no diffidence.</p> - -<p>Sir Julius Hartman, Colonel Wildman, Colonel Leighton! -Oh! very honourable men, but they know nothing of the -fact they speak of, all their evidence put together is worth -nothing! But, my lord, it is very exactly corroborated -by additional evidence contained in Mr. Long’s publication. -Aye! aye! all are wrong; their eyes, their ears, their -recollections, all deceived them. They were not competent -to judge. But they speak to single facts! no matter!</p> - -<p>Well, then, my lord, I push to you your own despatch! -Away with it! It is worthless, bad evidence, not to be -trusted! Nothing more likely, my lord, but what then, -and who is to be trusted? Nobody who contradicts me: -every body who coincides with me, nay, the same person -is to be believed or disbelieved exactly as he supports -or opposes my assertion; even those French authors, -whose generous principles lead them to write falsehoods -for the <em>honour of their country</em>. Such, my lord, after a -year’s labour of cogitation, is nearly the extent of your -“<em>Refutation</em>.”</p> - -<p>In your first publication you said that I should -have excluded all hearsay evidence, and have confined -myself to what could be proved in a court of justice; and -now when I bring you testimony which no court of justice -could refuse, with a lawyer’s coolness you tell the -jury that none of it is worthy of credit; that my witnesses, -being generally of a low rank in the army, are not -to be regarded, that they were not competent to judge. -My lord, this is a little too much: there would be some -shew of reason if these subalterns’ opinions had been -given upon the general dispositions of the campaign, but -they are all witnesses to facts which came under their -personal observation. What! hath not a subaltern eyes? -Hath he not ears? Hath he not understanding? You -were once a subaltern yourself, and you cannot blind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxvi"></a>[xxvi]</span> -the world by such arrogant pride of station, such overweening -contempt for men’s capacity because they happen -to be of lower rank than yourself. Long habits of imperious -command may have so vitiated your mind that you -cannot dispossess yourself of such injurious feelings, yet, -believe me it would be much more dignified to avoid this -indecent display of them.</p> - -<p>I shall now, my lord, proceed to remark upon such -parts of your new publication as I think necessary for the -further support of my history, that is, where new proofs, -or apparent proofs, are brought forward. For I am, as I -have already shewn, exonerated by your former inaccuracies -from noticing any part of your “<em>Refutation</em>” save -where new evidence is brought forward; and that only in -deference to those gentlemen who, being unmixed with your -former works, have a right either to my acquiescence in the -weight of their testimony, or my reasons for declining to accept -it. I have however on my hands a much more important -labour than contending with your lordship, and I shall -therefore leave the greatest part of your book to those who -choose to take the trouble to compare your pretended Refutation -with my original Justification in combination with -this letter, being satisfied that in so doing I shall suffer -nothing by their award.</p> - -<p>1st. With respect to the death of the lieutenant-governor -of Almeida, you still harp upon my phrase that it was the -<em>only</em> evidence. The expression is common amongst persons -when speaking of trials; it is said the prisoner was condemned -by such or such a person’s evidence, never meaning -that there was no other testimony, but that in default of -that particular evidence he would not have been condemned. -Now you say that there was other evidence, yet -you do not venture to affirm that Cox’s letter was not <em>the -testimony</em> upon which the lieutenant-governor was condemned, -while the extract from lord Stuart’s letter, quoted -by me, says it was. And, my lord, his lordship’s letter to you, -in answer to your enquiry, neither contradicts nor is intended -to contradict my statement; nor yet does it in any manner -deny the authenticity of my extracts, which indeed were -copied verbatim from his letter to lord Castlereagh.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxvii"></a>[xxvii]</span></p> - -<p>Lord Stuart says, that extract is the only thing bearing -on the question <em>which he can find</em>. Were there nothing -more it would be quite sufficient, but his papers are very -voluminous, more than fifty large volumes, and he would -naturally only have looked for his letter of the 25th July, -1812, to which you drew his attention. However, in my -notes and extracts taken from his documents, I find, under -the date of August, 1812, the following passage:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“The lieutenant-governor of Almeida was executed by -Beresford’s order, he, Beresford, having full powers, and -the government none, to interfere. Great interest was -made to save him, but in vain. The sentence and trial -were published before being carried into execution and -were much criticized. Both the evidence and the choice -of officers were blamed; and moreover the time chosen -was one of triumph just after the battle of Salamanca, -and the place Lisbon.”</p> -</div> - -<p>This passage I have not marked in my book of notes as -being lord Stuart’s words; it must therefore be only taken -as an abstract of the contents of one of his papers; but -comparing it with the former passage, and with the facts -that your lordship’s words are still very vague and uncertain -as to the main point in question, namely, the evidence -on which this man was really condemned, I see no reason -to doubt the substantial accuracy of the statement in my -first edition, nor the perfect accuracy of it as amended in -the second edition of my third volume, published many -months ago. You will find that I have there expunged the -word “<em>only</em>,” and made the sentence exactly to accord with -the extract from lord Stuart’s letter. You will also observe, -my lord, that I never did do more than mention the simple -fact, for which I had such good authority; and that so far -from imputing blame to you for the execution of the sentence -I expressly stated that the man richly deserved death.</p> - -<p>Passing now to the subject of the eighth Portuguese -regiment, I will first observe, that when I said the eighth -Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces I imputed no -blame to it. No regiment in the world could have stemmed -the first fury of that French column which attacked the -mountain where the eighth was posted. If the eighth was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxviii"></a>[xxviii]</span> -not broken by it, as sir James Douglas’s letter would -seem to imply, what was it doing while the enemy by their -flank movement gained the crest of the position in such -numbers as to make it a most daring exploit of the ninth -British regiment to attack them there. It is a strange -thing that a heavy column of French who were resolute -to gain the crest of such a position should have made -“<em>a flank movement</em>,” to avoid one wing of a regiment of -Portuguese conscripts. I should rather imagine, with all -deference, that it was the conscripts who made the flank -movement, and that some optical deception had taken -place, like that which induces children while travelling in a -carriage to think the trees and rocks are moving instead of -themselves. However, with this I have nothing to do, I have -given my authority, namely, the statement of major Waller, -a staff-officer present, and the statement of colonel Taylor -(for he is my nameless eye-witness) of the ninth, the very -regiment to which sir James Douglas appeals for support -of his account. These are my authorities, and if their -recollections are irreconcilable with that of sir James Douglas -it only shows how vain it is to expect perfect accuracy -of detail. I knew not of sir James Douglas’s negative testimony, -but I had two positive testimonies to my statement, -and as I have still two to one, I am within the rules of the -courts of justice to which your lordship would refer all matter -of history; moreover, some grains of allowance must be -made for the natural partiality of every officer for his own -regiment. The following extract from sir James Leith’s -report on the occasion is also good circumstantial evidence -in favour of my side of the question.</p> - -<p>“The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different -aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant, <em>having -dispersed or driven every thing there opposed to him</em>, was -in possession of the rocky eminence of the sierra at this -part of major-general Picton’s position <em>without a shot being -fired at him</em>. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general -Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the -bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, -which had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in -columns in order to gain the most advantageous ground<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxix"></a>[xxix]</span> -for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did -with the greatest promptitude accuracy and coolness -under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed -on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the -back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time -also perceived the British brigade under him. Major -general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth, second -battalion, should have moved on in the rear and to the left -of the ninth regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond -the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards -the rear of the sierra, while the ninth should have gained -the ridge on the right of the rocky height, the royals to -have been posted (as they were) in reserve; but the enemy -<em>having driven every thing before them in that quarter</em>, -afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky -ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible -for the British brigade to have reached that position, although -not a moment had been lost in marching to support -the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a -rapid movement of more than two miles without halting -and frequently in double quick time.”</p> - -<p>Here we have nothing of flank movements to avoid a -wing of Portuguese conscripts, but the plain and distinct -assertion <ins class="corr" id="tn-xxix" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'twice over, tbat'"> -twice over, that</ins> <em>every thing in front was dispersed -or driven away</em>—and that not even a shot was fired at the -enemy. Where then was the eighth Portuguese? Did -the French column turn aside merely at the menacing looks -of these conscripts? If so, what a pity the latter had not -been placed to keep the crest of the position. There is -also another difficulty. Sir James Douglas says he was -with the royals in the attack, and sir James Leith says -that the royals were held in reserve while the ninth drove -away the enemy; besides which, the eighth Portuguese -might have been broke by the enemy when the latter were -mounting the hill and yet have rallied and joined in the -pursuit when the ninth had broken the French. Moreover, -my lord, as you affirm that both yourself and the duke of -Wellington <em>saw</em> all the operations of the eighth Portuguese -on this occasion, I will extend my former extract from -colonel Taylor’s letter, wherein you will perceive something<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxx"></a>[xxx]</span> -which may perhaps lead you to doubt the accuracy of your -recollection on that head.</p> - -<p>“No doubt general Leith’s letter to the duke was intended -to describe the aspect of affairs in so critical a -situation, and where the duke himself could not <em>possibly</em> -have made his observations; and also Leith wished to have -due credit given to his brigade, which was not done in the -despatches. On the contrary, their exertions were made -light of, and the eighth Portuguese regiment was extolled, -which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding -officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside; but he and -they were amongst the very foremost ranks of the ninth -British.”—“General Leith’s correspondence would be an -interesting document to colonel Napier, as throwing considerable -light upon the operations at Busaco, between -Picton and Hill’s corps, a very considerable extent of -position <em>which could not of possibility be overlooked from -any other part of the field</em>.”</p> - -<p><em>Charge of the nineteenth Portuguese.</em> Your lordship -has here gained an advantage; I cannot indeed understand -some of general M‘Bean’s expressions, but it is impossible -for me to doubt his positive statement; I believe therefore -that he was in front of the convent wall and that he -charged some body of the enemy. It is however necessary -to restore the question at issue between your lordship and -myself to its true bearing. You accused me of a desire to -damage the reputation of the Portuguese army, and you -asked why I did not speak of a particular charge made -by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment at Busaco. This -charge you described as being against one of <em>Ney’s attacking -columns</em>, which had, you said, <em>gained the ascent -of the position, and then forming advanced on the plain -above</em> before it was charged by the nineteenth regiment. -As this description was certainly wrong I treated the whole -as a magniloquent allusion to an advance which I had observed -to have been made by a Portuguese regiment -posted on the mountain to the right. (General M‘Bean -is mistaken when he quotes me as saying that his line -was never nearer to the enemy’s lines than a hundred -yards. I spoke of <em>a Portuguese regiment, which might<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxi"></a>[xxxi]</span> -possibly be the nineteenth</em>.) I never denied that any charge -had been made, but that a charge <em>such as described -by you</em> had taken place, and in fact general M‘Bean’s -letter while it confirms the truth of your general description, -by implication denies the accuracy of the particulars. -Certainly Ney’s columns never passed the front of -the light division nor advanced on the plain behind it.</p> - -<p>The difficulty I have to reconcile general M‘Bean’s statement -with my own recollections and with the ground and -position of the light division, may perhaps arise from the -general’s meaning to use certain terms in a less precise -sense than I take them. Thus he says he was posted in -front of the convent-wall, and also on the right of the light -division; but the light division was half a mile in front of -the convent-wall, and hence I suppose he does not mean -as his words might imply immediately under the wall. He -speaks also of the light division as being to his left, but -unless he speaks of the line of battle with reference to the -sinuosities of the ground, the light division was with respect -to the enemy and the convent in his front; and if he does -speak with regard to those sinuosities, his front would -have been nearly at right angles to the front of the fifty-second -and forty-third, which I suppose to be really the -case. Again he says that he charged and drove the French -from <em>their position</em> down to the bottom of the ravine; but -the enemy’s position, properly so called, was on the opposite -side of the great ravine, and as all his artillery and -cavalry, all the eighth corps and the reserves of the sixth -corps, were in order of battle there, ten regiments, much -less one, dared not to have crossed the ravine which was -of such depth that it was difficult to distinguish troops -at the bottom. I conclude therefore, general M‘Bean -here means by the word position some accidental ground -on which the enemy had formed. Taking this to be -so, I will now endeavour to reconcile general M‘Bean’s -statement with my own recollection; because certainly I -do still hold my description of the action at that part to -be accurate as to all the main points.</p> - -<p>The edge of the table-land or tongue on which the -light division stood was very abrupt, and formed a salient<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxii"></a>[xxxii]</span> -angle, behind the apex of which the forty-third and fifty-second -were drawn up in a line, the right of the one and -the left of the other resting on the very edges; the artillery -was at the apex looking down the descent, and far -below the Caçadores and the ninety-fifth were spread on -the mountain side as skirmishers. Ney employed only -two columns of attack. The one came straight against -the light division; the head of it striking the right company -of the fifty-second and the left company of the -forty-third was broken as against a wall; and at the -same time the wings of those regiments reinforced by the -skirmishers of the ninety-fifth, who had retired on the -right of the forty-third, advanced and lapped over the -broken column on both sides. No other troops fought -with them at that point. In this I cannot be mistaken, -because my company was in the right wing of the forty-third, -we followed the enemy down to the first village -which was several hundred yards below the edge, and we -returned leisurely; the ground was open to the view on -the right and on the left, we saw no other column, and -heard of none save that which we were pursuing.</p> - -<p>When we returned from this pursuit the light division -had been reformed on the little plain above, and some -time after several German battalions, coming from under -the convent wall, passed through our ranks and commenced -skirmishing with Ney’s reserve in the woods -below.</p> - -<p>General M‘Bean says he saw no German infantry, -and hence it is clear that it was not at this point his charge -had place. But it is also certain Ney had only two -columns of attack. Now his second, under the command -of general Marchand, moved up the hollow curve of the -great mountain to the right of the light division, and -having reached a pine-wood, which however was far below -the height on which the light division stood, he sent -skirmishers out against Pack’s brigade which was in his -front. A part of Ross’s troops of artillery under the direction -of lieutenant, now colonel M‘Donald, played very -sharply upon this column in the pine-wood. I was standing -in company with captain Loyd of my own regiment,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxiii"></a>[xxxiii]</span> -close to the guns watching their effect, and it was then -I saw the advance of the Portuguese regiment to which -I have alluded; but general M‘Bean again assures -me that the nineteenth regiment was not there. Two -suppositions therefore present themselves. The enemy’s -skirmishers from this column were very numerous. Some -of them might have passed the left flank of Pack’s skirmishers, -and gathering in a body have reached the edge -of the hill on which the light division were posted, and then -rising behind it have been attacked by general M‘Bean; -or, what is more likely, the skirmishers, or a small flanking -detachment from the column which attacked the light division, -might have passed under the edge of the descent -on the right of the light division, and gathering in a like -manner have risen under general M‘Bean’s line.</p> - -<p>Either of these suppositions, and especially the last, -would render the matter clear to me in all points save -that of attacking the enemy’s position, which as I have -before observed, may be only a loose expression of the -general’s to denote the ground which the French opposed -to him had attained on our position. This second supposition -seems also to be confirmed by a fact mentioned -by general M‘Bean, namely, that the enemy’s guns -opened on him immediately after his charge. The French -guns did open also on that part of the light division which -followed the enemy down the hill to the first village, thus the -time that the nineteenth charged seems marked, and as I -was one of those who went to the village, it also accounts -for my not seeing that charge. However considering all -things, I must admit that I was so far in error that I -really did not, nor do I now possess any clear recollection -of this exploit of the nineteenth regiment; and in proof -of the difficulty of attaining strict accuracy on such occasions, -I can here adduce the observation of general -M‘Bean viz. that he saw no Germans save the artillery; -yet there was a whole brigade of that nation near the -convent wall, and they advanced and skirmished sharply -with the enemy soon after the charge of the nineteenth -would appear to have taken place. Very often also, -things appear greater to those who perform them than to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxiv"></a>[xxxiv]</span> -the bye-standers, and I would therefore ask how many -men the nineteenth lost in the charge, how many prisoners -it took, and how many French were opposed to it? -for I still maintain that neither by the nineteenth Portuguese, -nor by any other regiment, save those of the -light division, was any charge made which called for particular -notice on my part as a general historian. I am not -bound to relate all the minor occurrences of a great -battle; “those things belong to the history of regiments,” is -the just observation of Napoleon. Yet general M‘Bean -may be assured that no desire to underrate either his services -or the gallantry of the Portuguese soldiers <ins class="corr" id="tn-xxxiv" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'ever acuated me'"> -ever actuated me</ins>, and to prove it, if my third volume should -ever come to a third edition, I will take his letter as my -ground for noticing this charge, although I will not -promise to make it appear so prominent as your lordship -would have me to do.</p> - -<p>Your lordship closes this subject by the following -observation. “As colonel Napier represents himself as -having been an eye-witness of a gallant movement made -by a certain Portuguese regiment,—which regiment he -does not profess to know,—but which movement took -place a mile distant from the position given to the nineteenth -regiment, it is evident he could not also have been -an eye-witness of what was passing a mile to the left. -Nor can he therefore negative what is said to have occurred -there. It is extraordinary that the historian should not -have perceived the predicament in which he has placed himself.” -Now your lordship does not say that the two events -occurred at the <em>same time</em>, wherefore your conclusion is -what the renowned Partridge calls a “<i lang="la">non sequitur</i>;” and as -general M‘Bean expressly affirms his charge to have taken -place on the <em>right</em> of the light division, it was not absolutely -necessary that I should look to the <em>left</em> in order to -see the said charge. Hence the predicament in which I -am placed, is that of being obliged to remark your lordship’s -inability to reason upon your own materials.</p> - -<p>Your next subject is captain Squire, but I will pass over -that matter as having been I think sufficiently discussed -before, and I am well assured that the memory of that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxv"></a>[xxxv]</span> -very gallant and able officer will never suffer from your -lordship’s angry epithets. Campo Mayor follows. In -your “<em>Further Strictures</em>” you said that colonel Colborne -was not near the scene of action; you now show in detail -that he was actively engaged in it. You denied also that -he was in support of the advanced guard, and yet quote his -own report explaining how he happened to be separated -from the advanced guard just before the action, thus -proving that he was marching in support of it. You refuse -any credit to the statements of captain Gregory and colonel -Light; and you endeavour to discredit and trample upon -the evidence of the officer of the thirteenth dragoons who -was an actor in the charge of that regiment, but with -respect to him a few remarks are necessary.</p> - -<p>1º. The accuracy of that gentleman’s narrative concerns -my Justification very little, except in one part. I published -it whole as he gave it to me, because I thought it threw -light upon the subject. I think so still, and I see nothing -in your lordship’s observation to make me doubt its -general correctness. But it was only the part which I -printed in italics that concerned me. I had described a -remarkable combat of cavalry, wherein the hostile squadrons -<em>had twice passed through each other</em>, and then the -British put the French to flight. Your lordship ridiculed -this as a nursery tale; you called my description of it a -“<em>country dance</em>,” and you still call it my “<em>scenic effect</em>.” -Did the hostile masses meet twice, and did the British then -put their opponents to flight? These were the real questions. -The unusual fact of two cavalry bodies charging through -each other, was the point in dispute; it is scenic, but -is it true? Now my first authority, whom I have designated -as an “<em>eye-witness</em>,” was colonel Colborne; my second -authority colonel Dogherty of the thirteenth dragoons, -an <em>actor</em>; and when your lordship so coolly says the latter’s -statement does not afford “the slightest support to my -scenic description,” I must take the liberty of laughing at -you. Why, my lord, you really seem disposed to treat common -sense as if it were a subaltern. Colonel Dogherty -bears me out even to the letter; for as the second charge -took place with the same violence that the third did, if the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxvi"></a>[xxxvi]</span> -hostile bodies had not passed through to their original position, -the French must have fled towards the allied army; but -they fled towards Badajos. The English must therefore -have passed through and turned, and it was then that in -the personal conflict with the sabre which followed the -second charge the thirteenth dragoons defeated the -French.</p> - -<p>My lord, you will never by such special pleading, I -know of no other term by which I can properly designate -your argument, you will never, I say, by such special -pleading, hide your bad generalship at Campo Mayor. -The proofs of your errors there are too many and too clear; -the errors themselves too glaring too gross to leave you -the least hope; the same confusion of head which prevented -you from seizing the advantages then offered to you -seems to prevail in your writing; and yet while impeaching -every person’s credit where their statements militate -against your object, you demand the most implicit confidence -in your own contradictory assertions and preposterous -arguments. My lord, you only fatigue yourself and -your readers by your unwieldy floundering, you are heavy -and throw much mud about; like one of those fine -Andalusian horses so much admired in the Peninsula, -you prance and curvet and foam and labour in your paces -but you never get on. At Campo Mayor you had an -enormous superiority of troops, the enemy were taken by -surprize, they were in a plain, their cavalry were beaten, -their artillery-drivers cut down, their infantry, hemmed in -by your horsemen and under the play of your guns, were -ready to surrender; yet you suffered them to escape and -to carry off their captured artillery and then you blamed -your gallant troops. The enemy escaped from you, my -lord, but you cannot escape from the opinion of the world -by denying the truth of all statements which militate -against you.</p> - -<p><em>The march by Merida.</em> If you had said at once that -the duke of Wellington forbade you to go by Merida, -there would have been an end of all my arguments -against your skill; yet it by no means follows that these -arguments would be futile in themselves, though not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxvii"></a>[xxxvii]</span> -applicable to you personally. New combinations were -presented, and the duke of Wellington might very probably -have changed his instructions had he been present -on the spot. But, why was this your justification -withheld until now? why was so plain, so clear, so decisive -a defence of yourself never thought of before? and -why is it now smothered with such a heap of arguments as -you have added, to prove that you ought not to have gone -by Merida? Have you found out that I am not such a bad -reasoner upon military affairs as you were pleased to style -me in your former publication? Have you found out that -pleading high rank is not a sufficient answer to plain and -well supported statements? It is good however that you -have at last condescended to adopt a different mode of -proceeding. I applaud you for it, and with the exception -of two points I will leave you in the full enjoyment of any -triumph which the force of your arguments may procure -you; always, however, retaining my right to assume that -your lordship’s memory with respect to the duke of Wellington’s -negative, may have been as treacherous as it was -about your own letter to the junta of Badajos.</p> - -<p>I have therefore nothing to add to the arguments I -have already used in my Justification, and in my History, -in favour of the march to Merida; if I am wrong the -world will so judge me. But the two points I have reserved -are, 1º. That you assert now, in direct contradiction -to your former avowal, that the march to Merida -would have been one of <em>four</em> days instead of <em>two</em>; and -that the road by Albuquerque was the only one which you -could use. In answer to this last part I observe, that the -French before, and the Spaniards then, marched by the -road of Montigo; and that a year after, when lord Hill’s -expedition against Almaraz took place, the whole of his -battering and pontoon train, with all the ammunition belonging -to it, moved with great facility in three days from -Elvas, by this very road of Montigo, to Merida; and Elvas -as your Lordship knows is rather further than Campo -Mayor from Merida.</p> - -<p>The second point is that mode of conducting a controversy -which I have so often had occasion to expose in your<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxviii"></a>[xxxviii]</span> -former publications, viz. mis-stating my arguments to suit -your own reasoning. I never said that you should have -attempted, or could have succeeded in a “<i lang="fr">coup de main</i>” -against Badajos; I never even said you should have commenced -the siege immediately. What I did say was, that -by the march through Merida you could have placed your -army at once between Badajos and the French army, and -so have thrown the former upon its own resources at a -most inconvenient time; that in this situation you could -have more readily thrown your bridge at Jerumenha, and -proceeded at your convenience.</p> - -<p>Further than this I do not think it necessary to dissect -and expose your new fallacies and contradictions; it -requires too much time. You have written upwards of -six hundred pages, four hundred of them I have before -demolished; but my own volumes are rather thick and -to me at least much more important than yours; your -lordship must therefore spare me the other two hundred, -or at least permit me to treat them lightly. I will leave -the whole siege of Badajos to you, it is matter of opinion -and I will not follow your example in overloading what is -already clear by superfluity of argument. I will only -expose one error into which you have been led by -colonel La Marre’s work. On his authority you say the -garrison on the 10th of April had three months’ provisions; -but the following extract from a letter of marshal -Soult’s to the prince of Wagram will prove that La Marre -is wrong:—</p> - - -<p class="right"><em>“Seville, 18th April.</em></p> - -<p>“From the 11th of this month the place was provisioned, -according to the report of general Phillipon, for -<em>two months and some days</em> as to subsistence; and there -are 100 milliers of powder,” &c. &c.</p> - - -<p class="p1">Let us now come to the <em>battle of Albuera</em>.</p> - -<p>You still doubt that the position as I explained it is four -miles long, and you rest upon the superior accuracy of -major Mitchell’s plan, on which you have measured the -distance with your compasses. I also am in possession -of one of major Mitchell’s plans, and I find by the aid of -my pair of compasses, that even from the left of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxix"></a>[xxxix]</span> -Portuguese <em>infantry</em> (without noticing Otway’s squadron of -cavalry) to the right of the Spanish line, as placed at the -termination of the battle, is exactly four miles; and every -body knows that a line over the actual ground will from -the latter’s rises and falls exceed the line on paper. -Wherefore as my measurement does not coincide with -your lordship’s, and as we are both Irishmen, I conclude -that either your compasses are too short or that mine are -too long.</p> - -<p>Your grand cheval de bataille is, however, the numbers -of the armies on each side. Thirty-eight long pages -you give us, to prove what cannot be proved, namely, -that my estimate is wrong and yours right; and at the end -you are just where you began. All is uncertain, there are -no returns, no proof! the whole matter is one of guess -upon probabilities as to the allies, and until lately was so -also with respect to the French.</p> - -<p>Mine was a very plain statement. I named a certain -number as the nearest approximation I could make, and -when my estimate was questioned by you I explained as -briefly as possible the foundation of that estimate. You -give in refutation thirty-eight pages of most confused calculations, -and what is the result? why that the numbers -of the allies on your own shewing still remain uncertain; -and your estimate of the French, as I will shew by the bye, -is quite erroneous.</p> - -<p>I said in my History, you had more than two thousand -cavalry in the field, and in my Justification I gave -reasons for believing you had nearly three thousand; you -now acknowledge two thousand; my history then is not -far wrong. But your lordship does not seem to know the -composition of your own divisions. General Long’s morning -states, now before me, do not include general Madden’s -cavalry. That officer’s regiments were the fifth and -eighth, and if I mistake not the sixth and ninth also -were under him; those in general Long’s division are the -first and seventh. I find from general Madden’s own -account of his services, given in the Military Calendar, -that a part of his brigade, namely, the eighth regiment, -under colonel Windham, was in the battle of Albuera.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xl"></a>[xl]</span> -Now taking the eighth to be between two hundred and -seventy and two hundred and eighty-one troopers, which -were the respective strengths of the first and seventh -regiments in Long’s Division on the 29th of May, I have -above eighteen hundred troopers, namely, fifteen hundred -and eighty-seven in Long’s division, and two hundred and -seventy-five in the eighth regiment, and to these I add -about two hundred and fifty officers and sergeants, making -in all more than two thousand sabres. In general Long’s -states of the 8th of May, those two Portuguese regiments -had indeed fewer under arms than on the 29th, but then -six hundred and eighty-nine men and forty-four serjeants -and trumpeters were on command, of which more than -four hundred belonged to those two Portuguese regiments. -Many of these men must surely have joined before the -battle, because such an unusual number on command -could only be temporary. Again I find in the state of -the 29th of May, one hundred and fifteen serjeants trumpeters -and troopers returned as prisoners of war; and -when the killed and wounded in the battle are added, we -may fairly call the British and Portuguese cavalry above -two thousand. Your lordship admits the Spaniards to -have had seven hundred and fifty; but I will for clearness -place this in a tabular form:</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs80">GENERAL LONG’S STATES.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs90"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">8th May.</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Serjeants, trumpeters, and troopers.</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Present under arms</td> -<td class="tdrx">1576</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">On command</td> -<td class="tdrx">733</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Prisoners of war</td> -<td class="tdrx">115</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">2424</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx">29th May.</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Present</td> -<td class="tdrx">1739</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Command</td> -<td class="tdrx">522</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Prisoners of war</td> -<td class="tdrx">127</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">2388</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="3"><ins class="corr" id="tn-xli" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Medium estimate'"> -Median estimate</ins> for the 16th of May.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Present 8th May</td> -<td class="tdrx">1576</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Ditto 29th May</td> -<td class="tdrx">1739</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">2)3315</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">1657½</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">270</td> -<td class="tdl">8th Portuguese regt.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">1927</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">127</td> -<td class="tdl">Prisoners of war.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">2054</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">750</td> -<td class="tdl">Spaniards.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">2804</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Deduct prisoners on the 8th</td> -<td class="tdrx">115</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Total</td> -<td class="tdrx">2689</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrx">——</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="noindent">To which are to be added the killed and wounded of the -Anglo-Portuguese, and the men rejoined from command.</p> - -<p>Thus, the statements in my History and in my Justification -are both borne out; for the numbers are above -two thousand as set down in the first, and nearly three -thousand as stated in the last. Moreover, a general -historian is not blameable for small inaccuracies. If he -has reasonably good authority for any fact he cannot -be justly censured for stating that fact, and you should -make a distinction between that which is stated in my -History and that which is stated in my controversial -writings. All mistakes in the latter however trifling are -fair; but to cavil at trifles in the former rather hurts yourself. -Now with respect to the artillery there is an example -of this cavilling, and also an illustration of your -lordship’s mode of raising a very confused argument on a -very plain fact. I said there were so many guns in the -field, and that so many were nine-pounders; you accused -me of arbitrarily deciding upon their calibre. In reply I -shewed you that I took the <em>number</em> on the report of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlii"></a>[xlii]</span> -colonel Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery, the -<em>calibre</em> upon the authority of your own witness and quarter-master-general, -sir Benjamin D’Urban. The latter was -wrong and there the matter should have ended. Your -lordship, however, requires me, as a mark of ingenuousness, -to acknowledge as my mistake that which is the mistake -of sir Benjamin D’Urban, and you give a grand table, -with the gross number of pounds of iron as if the affair -had been between two ships. You set down in your -columns the statements of the writer of a note upon your -Strictures, the statement of the Strictures themselves, and -my statement; and then come on with your own observations -as if there were three witnesses on your side. -But the author of the note is again your witness D’Urban, -who thus shews himself incorrect both as to number and -weight; and the author of the Strictures is yourself. This -is not an <em>ingenuous</em>, though it is an <em>ingenious</em> mode of -multiplying testimony. In your Further Strictures also -you first called in sir B. D’Urban in person, you then -used his original memoir, you also caused him to write -anonymously a running commentary upon yours and his -own statements, and now you comment in your own name -upon your own anonymous statements, thus making five -testimonies out of two.</p> - -<p>The answer is simple and plain. When I took sir -Benjamin D’Urban as a guide he led me wrong; and you -instead of visiting his error upon his own head visit it -upon mine, and require me and your readers to follow him -implicitly upon all points while to do so avails for your -defence, but not when they contradict it. From sir B. -D’Urban I took the <em>calibre</em> of the allies’ guns employed in -the battle of Albuera, and he was wrong! From him, if I -had not possessed sir A. Dickson’s official return, I should -also have taken the <em>number</em> of guns, and I should have -been wrong, because he calls them thirty-four instead of -thirty-eight. He also (see page 26 of the Appendix to -your Further Strictures) says that the Spaniards had six -guns, whereas Dickson says, they had but four; and if -his six guns were reckoned there would have been forty -pieces of artillery, which he however reduced to thirty-four<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xliii"></a>[xliii]</span> -by another error, namely, leaving out a whole brigade of -German artillery. On sir Benjamin’s authority I called -major Dickson the commander of the artillery, and this -also was wrong. From sir Benjamin D’Urban’s Memoir, -I took the statement that the fourth division arrived -on the field of battle at <em>six o’clock in the morning</em>, and -yet I am assured that they did not arrive until nine o’clock, -and after the action had commenced. And this last is a -very serious error because it gives the appearance of skill -to your lordship’s combinations for battle and to sir Benjamin’s -arrangements for the execution, which they do -not merit, if, as I now believe, that division arrived at -nine o’clock. But the latter hour would be quite in keeping -with the story of the cavalry going to forage, and both -together would confirm another report very current, namely, -that your lordship did not anticipate any battle on the -16th of May. Setting this however aside, I know not -why, in the face of all these glaring errors and a multitude -of smaller ones, I am to take sir Benjamin D’Urban’s -authority upon any disputed point.</p> - -<p>I will now, my lord, admit one complete triumph -which you have attained in your dissertation upon the -numbers of the troops. I did say that from the 20th of -March to the 16th of May, was only twenty days, and -though the oversight is so palpably one that could not -be meant to deceive, I will not deny your right to ridicule -and to laugh at it. I have laughed at so many of your -lordship’s oversights that it would be unfair to deny you -this opportunity for retaliation, which I also admit you -have used moderately.</p> - -<p>I have since I wrote my Justification procured some -proofs about the French numbers, you will find them in -the following extracts from the duke of Dalmatia’s correspondence -of that time. They are worth your attention. -They throw some light upon the numbers of the allies, -and one of them shows unquestionably that my estimate -of the French numbers was, as I have before said, too -high instead of too low. I give the translations to avoid -the trouble and expense of printing in two languages, and -I beg your lordship to observe that these extracts are not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xliv"></a>[xliv]</span> -liable to the praise of that generous patriotism which you -alluded to in speaking of French authors, because they -were written before the action and for the emperor’s information, -and because it was the then interest of the -writer rather to exaggerate than to lessen his own numbers, -in order to give his sovereign an idea of his activity -and zeal.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center">Extract of a letter from <span class="smcap">Marshal Soult</span> to the <span class="smcap">Prince</span> -of <span class="smcap">Wagram</span>.</p> - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Seville, 22d April, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“General Latour Maubourg announces to me that -general Beresford commanding the Anglo-Portuguese -army, and the Spanish generals Castaños and Ballesteros -with the remains of the corps of their nation are united at -Zafra, and I am assured that the whole of their forces is -twenty-five thousand men, of which three thousand are -cavalry.”</p> - -<p>“Colonel Quennot of the ninth regiment of dragoons, -who commands upon the line of the Tinto and observes -the movements on that side as far as Ayamonte, informs -me that on the 18th and 19th, general Blake disembarked -ten thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry between -the mouths of the Piedra and the Guadiana. These -troops come from Cadiz, they have cannon, and Blake -can unite in that part fifteen thousand men.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center">Ditto to Ditto.</p> - -<p class="p1 right">“<em>May 4th, 1811.</em></p> - -<p>“Cordova is menaced by a corps of English Portuguese -and Spaniards, many troops are concentrated in -Estremadura, Badajos is invested, Blake <em>has</em> united -on the Odiel an army of fifteen to sixteen thousand men.” -“I depart in four days with <em>twenty thousand men</em>, <em>three -thousand horses</em>, <em>and thirty pieces of cannon</em> to drive across -the Guadiana the enemy’s corps which are spread in -Estremadura, to disengage Badajos and to facilitate the -arrival of count D’Erlon. If the troops which that general -brings can unite with mine, and if the troops coming from -the armies of the north and centre, and which I have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlv"></a>[xlv]</span> -already in part arranged, arrive in time, I shall have in -Estremadura, thirty-five thousand men five thousand -horses and forty pieces of artillery.”</p> - - -<p>Now, my lord, I find by the imperial returns that count -D’Erlon marched towards Andalusia with twelve thousand -men present under arms, and that he did not arrive until -the 14th June. There remain three thousand men as -coming from the armies of the north and centre, to make -up the thirty-five thousand men mentioned by Soult, and -I find the following passage in his letter to the prince of -Wagram, dated the 9th of May.</p> - -<p>“The 12th, I shall be at Fuente Cantos, general -Bron commands there, he brings with him the first reinforcement -coming from the armies of the north and centre, -and I shall employ him in the expedition.”</p> - -<p>Hence, if we take the first reinforcement at half of the -whole number expected, we add one thousand five hundred -men and five guns to the twenty thousand, making a total -for the battle of Albuera of twenty-one thousand five hundred -men of all arms, and thirty-five guns. From these -must be deducted the detachments left at Villalba, stragglers -on the march, and some hussars sent to scout on -the flanks, for I find in general Madden’s narrative of his -services, that he was watched by part of the enemy’s -cavalry on the day of the battle.</p> - -<p>I have now, my lord, given you positive and undeniable -testimony that the French numbers were overrated instead -of being underrated by me, and I have given you -corroborative evidence, that the number of the allies was -as great as I have stated it to be; for we find in the above -extracts Soult giving Blake fifteen thousand men, of which, -at least, seven hundred are cavalry, <em>before</em> the battle, and -twenty-five thousand, of which three thousand are cavalry, -to your lordship, Castaños, &c. We find the French -general’s information, taking into consideration the troops -which joined Blake in the Niebla, not differing essentially -from Mr. Henry Wellesley’s report of the numbers of -Blake’s army, namely twelve thousand, of which one -thousand one hundred were cavalry; and we find both -in some manner confirmed by lord Wellington’s repeated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlvi"></a>[xlvi]</span> -statements of the forces of Blake’s army after the battle, -that is to say, making a reasonable allowance for the -numbers lost in the action. Soult and Mr. Wellesley also -agree in making out the Spanish cavalry more numerous -than your lordship will admit of. Blake alone had from -seven to eleven hundred cavalry, following the statement -of these persons, and there was in addition the corps of -Penne Villemur, which, as I have said in my Justification, -was not less than five hundred.</p> - -<p>In closing your calculation of numbers you exultingly -observe that it is the first time you ever heard of a general’s -being censured for keeping one-third of his force in -reserve and <em>beating the enemy with the other two</em>. Aye—but -this involves the very pith of the question. At -Albuera the <em>general</em> did not beat the enemy. My lord, you -have bestowed great pains on your argument about the -battle of Albuera, and far be it from me to endeavour to -deprive you of any addition to your reputation which you -may thus obtain. I have no desire to rob you of any -well-earned laurels, my observations were directed against -what appeared to me your bad generalship; if I have -not succeeded in pointing that out to the satisfaction of -the public I have nothing further to offer in fairness and certainly -will not by any vile sophistry endeavour to damage -your fame. But do not think that I acknowledge the -force of your present arguments. If I do not take the -trouble to dissect them for reasons before mentioned, be -assured it is not from any want of points to fasten upon; -indeed, my lord, your book is very weak, there are many -failures in it, and a few more I will touch upon that you -may estimate my forbearance at its proper value. I will -begin with your observations on captain Gregory’s testimony, -not in defence of that gentleman’s credit, for in -truth, as his and the other officers’ evidence is given to -facts of which they were personally cognizant I cannot -pay the slightest regard to your confused arguments in -opposition to their honour. I am aware that you do not -mean to impeach anything but their memory; but if I -were to attempt to defend them from your observations it -would appear as if I thought otherwise. My lord, you<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlvii"></a>[xlvii]</span> -have missed captain Gregory, but you have hit yourself -very hard.</p> - -<p>Behold the proof.</p> - -<p>At page 167 you say, “I will now point out the gross -and palpable errors of captain Gregory’s narrative.”—“He -says, that on receiving the intelligence from an -orderly of the thirteenth dragoons who came in from a -picquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was -crossing the river, general Long galloped off.” I conclude -to the right, “and found half the army across,” and to the -right. <em>Why, every other authority has stated that the -enemy’s first movement was from the wood along the right -bank of the Albuera upon our left</em>; and that we were not -at all aware of their intention to cross above our right and -there make an attack, till after their first movement -was considerably advanced and the action had actually -commenced with Godinot’s corps on the opposite side of -the river to our left. It is quite surprising that colonel -Napier should have overlooked a blunder so gross as to -destroy the value of the whole of his friend’s testimony.</p> - -<p>Now, my lord, compare the passage marked by italics -(pardon me the italics) in the above, with the following -extract from your own despatch.</p> - -<p>“The enemy on the 16th did not long delay his -attack: at eight o’clock” (the very time mentioned by -captain Gregory,) “he was observed to be in movement, -and his cavalry were seen passing the rivulet of Albuera -considerably <em>above our right, and shortly after</em>, he marched, -out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry -and two heavy columns of infantry, posting them to our -front, <em>as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera</em>. -During this time he was filing the principal body of his -infantry over the river <em>beyond our right</em>, and it was not -long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by -that flank.” Your lordship has, indeed in another part -discarded the authority of your despatch, as appears most -necessary in treating of this battle, but is rather hard -measure to attack me so fiercely for having had some -faith in it.</p> - -<p>With respect to sir Wm. Lumley’s letter I cannot but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlviii"></a>[xlviii]</span> -admire his remembrance of the exact numbers of the -British cavalry. A recollection of twenty-three years, -founded on a few hasty words spoken on a field of battle -is certainly a rare thing; yet I was not quite unprepared -for such precision, for if I do not greatly mistake, sir -William was the general, who at Santarem edified the -head-quarters by a report, that “<em>the enemy were certainly -going to move either to their right or to their left, to their -front or to their rear</em>.” One would suppose that so exact -a person could never be in error; and yet the following -extract from general Harvey’s journal would lead me to -suppose that his memory was not quite so clear and -powerful as he imagines. Sir William Lumley says, that -to the best of his recollection he was not aware of the advance -of the fuzileers and Harvey’s brigade until they had -passed his left flank; that they then came under his eye; -that as the rain and smoke cleared away he saw them as -one body moving to engage, and although they had become -so oblique, relative to the point where he stood, that -he could not well speak as to their actual distance from -one another, there did not appear any improper interval -between them.</p> - -<p>Now hear general Harvey!</p> - -<p>“The twenty-third and one battalion of the seventh -fuzileers were in line. The other battalion at quarter distance, -forming square, at every halt to cover the right -which the cavalry continued to menace. <em>Major-general -Lumley, with the British cavalry, was also in column of -half squadrons in rear of our right and moved with us, -being too weak to advance against the enemy’s cavalry.</em>”</p> - -<p>There, my lord, you see that generals as well as doctors -differ. Sir W. Lumley, twenty-three years after the event, -recollects seeing the fuzileers and Harvey’s brigade at -such a distance, and so obliquely, that he could not speak -to their actual distance from one another. General Harvey -writing the day after the event, says, sir William -Lumley had his cavalry in half squadrons close in -rear of these very brigades, and was moving with them! -This should convince your lordship that it is not wise to -cry out and cavil at every step in the detail of a battle.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlix"></a>[xlix]</span></p> - -<p>As to the term <em>gap</em>, I used the word without the mark -of quotation, because it was my own and it expressed -mine and your meaning very well. You feared that the -cavalry of the French would overpower ours, and break in -on your rear and flank when the support of the fuzileers -was taken away. I told you that general Cole had placed -Harvey’s brigade in the <em>gap</em>, that is, in such a situation -that the French could not break in. I knew very well -that Harvey’s brigade followed in support of the attack -of the fuzileers because he says so in his journal; but -he also says, that both ours and the enemy’s cavalry -made a corresponding movement. Thus the fear of the -latter breaking in was chimerical, especially as during the -march Harvey halted, formed, received and beat off a -charge of the French horsemen.</p> - -<p>But I have not yet done with sir W. Lumley’s numbers. -How curious it is that brigade-major Holmes’s verbal -report on the field of battle, as recollected by sir William, -should give the third dragoon guards and the fourth dragoons, -forming the heavy brigade, the exact number of -five hundred and sixty men, when the same brigade-major -Holmes in his written morning state of the 8th of May, -one week before the battle, gives to those regiments seven -hundred and fifty-two troopers present under arms, and -one hundred and eighty-three on command. What became -of the others in the interval? Again, on the 29th of May, -thirteen days after the battle, he writes down these regiments -six hundred and ninety-five troopers present under -arms, one hundred and eighty-two on command, and -thirty-two prisoners of war. In both cases also the sergeants, -trumpeters, &c. are to be added; and I mark this -circumstance, because in the French returns all persons from -the highest officer to the conductors of carriages are included -in the strength of men. I imagine neither of the distinguished -regiments alluded to will be willing to admit that -their ranks were full before and after, but empty on the -day of battle. It is contrary to the English custom. -Your lordship, also, in a parenthesis (page 125) says that -the thirteenth dragoons had not three hundred men at this -time to produce; but this perverse brigade-major Holmes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_l"></a>[l]</span> -writes that regiment down also on the 8th of May, at three -hundred and fifty-seven troopers present under arms, and -sixty-three on command; and on the 29th of May, three -hundred and forty-one present seventy-nine on command, -eighty-two prisoners-of-war. Staff-officers are notoriously -troublesome people.</p> - -<p>One point more, and I have done.</p> - -<p>You accuse me of having placed sir A. Dickson in a -position where he never was, and you give a letter from -that officer to prove the fact. You also deny the correctness -of sir Julius Hartman’s statement, and you observe -that even were it accurate, he does not speak of an order -to retreat, but an order to cover a retreat. Now to say -that I place Dickson in a wrong position is scarcely fair, -because I only use sir Julius Hartman’s words, and that -in my Justification; whereas in my History, I have placed -colonel Dickson’s guns exactly in the position where he -himself says they were. If your lordship refers to my work -you will see that it is so; and surely it is something akin -to quibbling, to deny, that artillery posted to defend a -bridge was not at the bridge because its long range enabled -it to effect its object from a distance.</p> - -<p>You tell me also that I had your quarter-master general’s -evidence to counteract sir Julius Hartman’s relative to -this retreat. But sir Benjamin D’Urban had already -misled me more than once; and why, my lord, did you -garble sir A Dickson’s communication? I will answer -for you. It contained positive evidence that <em>a retreat was -ordered</em>. Your lordship may ask how I know this. I -will tell you that also. Sir Alexander Dickson at my -request sent me the substance of his communication -to you at the same time. You are now I hope, convinced -that it is not weakness which induces me to neglect -a complete analysis of your work. I do assure you it is -very weak in every part.</p> - -<p>My lord, you have mentioned several other letters which -you have received from different officers, colonel Arbuthnot, -colonel Colborne, &c. as confirming your statements, -but you have not, as in the cases of sir James Douglas and -general M‘Bean, where they were wholly on your own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_li"></a>[li]</span> -side, given these letters in full; wherefore, seeing the gloss -you have put upon lord Stuart’s communication, and this -garbling of sir A. Dickson’s letter, I have a right to suppose -that the others do not bear up your case very strongly,—probably -they contradict it on some points as sir -Alexander Dickson’s does. I shall now give the latter -entire.</p> - -<p>“The Portuguese artillery under my command (twelve -guns) attached to general Hamilton’s division was posted -on favourable ground about 750 or 800 yards from the -bridge, and at least 700 yards S. W. of the village of -Albuera, their fire bore effectually upon the bridge and the -road from it to the bridge, and I received my orders to take -this position from lord Beresford when the enemy threatened -their main attack at the bridge. At a certain period -of the day, I should judge it to have been about the time -the fourth division moved to attack, <em>I received a verbal -order in English from Don Jose Luiz de Souza</em> (now Conde -de Villa Real, an aid-de-camp of lord Beresford) <em>to retire -by the Valverde road, or upon the Valverde road, I am not -sure which</em>; to this I strongly expressed words of doubt, and -he then rode off towards Albuera; as, however, I could see -no reason for falling back, and the infantry my guns belonged -to being at hand, I continued in action, and though -I believe I limbered up once or twice previous to the receipt -of this message and moved a little to improve my -position, I never did so to retire. Soon after Don Jose left -me, seeing lord Beresford and some of his staff to my -right, I rode across to satisfy myself that I was acting correctly, -but perceiving that the French were giving way I -did not mention the order I had received, and as soon as -lord Beresford saw me, he asked what state my guns were -in, and then ordered me to proceed as quickly as I could -with my nine-pounders to the right, which I did in time to -bring them into action against the retiring masses of the -enemy. The foregoing is the substance of an explanation -given to lord Beresford which he lately requested.”</p> - -<p>Thus you have the whole of what sir Alexander Dickson -(as he tells me) wrote to you; and here therefore I -might stop, my lord, to enjoy your confusion. I might<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lii"></a>[lii]</span> -harp upon this fact, as being so formidable a bar to your -lordship’s argument, that rather than give it publicity, you -garbled your own correspondent’s letter. But my object -is not to gain a triumph over you, it is to establish the -truth, and I will not follow your example by suppressing -what may tend to serve your argument and weaken mine. -It is of no consequence to me whether you gave orders for -a retreat or not. I said in my History that you did not do -so, thinking the weight of testimony to be on that side, -and it was only when your anonymous publications called -forth new evidence that I began to doubt the correctness -of my first statement.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> But if the following observation -in sir Alexander Dickson’s letter can serve your argument, -you are welcome to it, although it is not contained in -the substance of what he wrote to you; and here also I -beg of you to remember that this letter of sir Alexander’s -was written to me <em>after my Justification</em> was printed.</p> - -<p>“I had never mentioned the matter to any one, except -to Hartman, with whom I was on the greatest habits of -intimacy, and indeed I was from the first induced to -attribute Souza’s message to some mistake, as neither in -my conversation with lord Beresford was there any allusion -to it, nor did any thing occur to indicate to me that he was -aware of my having received such an order.”</p> - -<p>Your lordship will no doubt deny that the Count of -Villa Real had any authority from you to order this retreat, -so be it; but then you call upon me and others to accept -this Count of Villa Real’s evidence upon other points, and -you attempt to discredit some of my witnesses, because -their testimony is opposed to the testimony of the Count of -Villa Real; if you deny him at Albuera, you cannot have -him at Campo Mayor. And behold, my lord, another difficulty -you thus fall into. Your publications are intended -to prove your talent as a general, and yet we find you -acknowledging, that in the most critical period of this great -and awful battle of Albuera, your own staff had so little<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_liii"></a>[liii]</span> -confidence in your ability, that sir Henry Hardinge took -upon himself to win it for you, while the Conde de Villa -Real took upon himself to lose it; the one ordering an -advance, which gained the day; the other ordering a -retreat, which would have ruined all. My lord, be assured -that such liberties are never taken by the staff of great -commanders.</p> - -<p>In ancient times it was reckoned a worthy action to hold -the mirror of truth up to men placed in high stations, when -the partiality of friends, the flattery of dependents, and -their own human vanity had given them too exalted notions -of their importance. You, my lord, are a man in a high -station, and you have evidently made a false estimate of -your importance, or you would not treat men of inferior -rank with so much disdain as you have expressed in these -your publications; wherefore it may be useful, and certainly -will be just, to let you know the judgment which -others have formed of your talents. The following character -was sketched about two months after the battle of -Albuera. The author was a man of great ability, used to -public affairs, experienced in the study of mankind, opposed -to you by no personal interest, and withal had excellent -opportunities of observing your disposition; and surely his -acuteness will not be denied by those who have read your -three publications in this controversy.</p> - -<p>“Marshal Beresford appears to possess a great deal of -information upon all subjects connected with the military -establishments of the kingdom, the departments attached -to the army, and the resources of the country. But -nothing appears to be well arranged and digested in his -head; he never fixes upon a point, but deviates from his -subject, and overwhelms a very slender thread of argument -by a profusion of illustrations, stories, and anecdotes, most -of which relate to himself. He is captious and obstinate, -and difficult to be pleased. He appears to grasp at every -thing for his own party, without considering what it would -be fair, and reasonable, and decent to expect from the -other party.”</p> - -<p>I now take leave of you, my lord, and notwithstanding -all that has passed, I take leave of you with respect, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_liv"></a>[liv]</span> -I think you to be a brave soldier, and even an able -organizer of an army. I know that you have served your -country long, I firmly believe to the utmost of your ability, -and I admit that ability to have been very considerable; -but history, my lord, deals with very great men, and you -sink in the comparison. She will speak of you as a -general far above mediocrity, as one who has done much -and a great deal of it well, yet when she looks at Campo -Mayor and Albuera she will not rank you amongst great -commanders, and if she should ever cast her penetrating -eyes upon this your present publication, she will not class -you amongst great writers.</p> - -<hr class="tb"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lv"></a>[lv]</span><br></p> - - -<h3 class="pfs150 lsp3">REPLY</h3> - -<p class="pfs60">TO THE</p> -<p class="pfs90"><em>Third Article in the Quarterly Review</em></p> -<p class="pfs60">ON</p> -<p class="pfs80">COL. NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.</p> - -<hr class="r30"> - -<p class="pfs80">‘Now there are two of them; and one has been called <em>Crawley</em>, and the -other is <em>Honest Iago</em>.’—<span class="smcap">Old Play.</span></p> - -<p class="noindent">This article is the third of its family, and like its predecessors -is only remarkable for malignant imbecility and -systematic violation of truth. The malice is apparent to -all; it remains to show the imbecility and falseness.</p> - -<p>The writer complains of my ill-breeding, and with that -valour which belongs to the <i lang="la">incognito</i> menaces me with his -literary vengeance for my former comments. His vengeance! -Bah! The ass’ ears peep too far beyond the -lion’s hide. He shall now learn that I always adapt my -manners to the level of the person I am addressing; and -though his petty industry indicates a mind utterly incapable -of taking an enlarged view of any subject he shall feel -that chastisement awaits his malevolence. And first with -respect to the small sketches in my work which he pronounces -to be the very worst <em>plans</em> possible. It is expressly -stated on the face of each that they are only ‘<em>Explanatory -Sketches</em>,’ his observations therefore are a mere ebullition -of contemptible spleen; but I will now show my readers -why they are only sketches and not accurate plans.</p> - -<p>When I first commenced my work, amongst the many -persons from whom I sought information was sir George -Murray, and this in consequence of a message from him, -delivered to me by sir John Colborne, to the effect, that if -I would call upon him he would answer any question I put -to him on the subject of the Peninsular War. The interview -took place, but sir George Murray, far from giving me -information seemed intent upon persuading me to abandon -my design; repeating continually that it was his intention to -write the History of the War himself. He appeared also<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lvi"></a>[lvi]</span> -desirous of learning what sources of information I had -access to. I took occasion to tell him that the duke of -Wellington had desired me to ask him particularly for the -‘<em>Order of Movements</em>,’ as essentially necessary to a right -understanding of the campaign and the saving of trouble; -because otherwise I should have to search out the different -movements through a variety of documents. Sir George -replied that he knew of no such orders, that he did not -understand me. To this I could only reply that I spoke as -the duke had desired me, and knew no more.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> I then -asked his permission to have reduced plans made from -captain Mitchell’s fine drawings, informing him that officer -was desirous so to assist me. His reply was uncourteously -vehement—‘No! certainly not!’ I proposed to be allowed -to inspect those drawings if I were at any time at a loss -about ground. The answer was still ‘No!’ And as sir -George then intimated to me that my work could only be a -momentary affair for the booksellers and would not require -plans I took my leave. I afterwards discovered that he -had immediately caused captain Mitchell’s drawings to be -locked up and sealed.</p> - -<p>I afterwards waited on sir Willoughby Gordon, the -quarter-master-general, who treated me with great kindness, -and sent me to the chief of the plan department in -his office with an order to have access to everything which -might be useful. From that officer I received every attention; -but he told me that sir George Murray had been -there the day before to borrow all the best plans relating -to the Peninsular War, and that consequently little help -could be given to me. Now Captain Mitchell’s drawings -were made by him after the war, by order of the government, -and at the public expense. He remained in the -Peninsula for more than two years with pay as a staff-officer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lvii"></a>[lvii]</span> -his extra expenses were also paid:<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> he was attended -constantly by two Spanish dragoons as a protection and the -whole mission was costly. Never was money better laid -out, for I believe no topographical drawings, whether they -be considered for accuracy of detail, perfection of manner, -or beauty of execution, ever exceeded Mitchell’s. But -those drawings belong to the public and were merely -placed in sir George Murray’s official keeping. I believe -they are still in his possession and it would be well if -some member of parliament were to ask why they are thus -made the property of a private man?<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<p>Here I cannot refrain from observing that, in the course -of my labours, I have asked information of many persons -of various nations, even of Spaniards, after my first -volume was published, and when the unfavourable view I -took of their exertions was known. And from Spaniards, -Portuguese, English, French, and Germans, whether of -high or low rank, I have invariably met with the greatest -kindness, and found an eager desire to aid me. Sir George -Murray only has thrown obstacles in my way; and if I am -rightly informed of the following circumstance, his opposition -has not been confined to what I have stated above. -Mr. Murray, the bookseller, purchased my first volume -with the right of refusal for the second volume. When the -latter was nearly ready a friend informed me that he did -not think Murray would purchase, because he had heard -him say that sir George Murray had declared it was not -‘<em>The Book</em>.’ He did not point out any particular error; -but it was not ‘<em>The Book</em>;’ meaning doubtless that his -own production, when it appeared, would be ‘<em>The Book</em>.’ -My friend’s prognostic was good. I was offered just half -of the sum given for the first volume. I declined it, and -published on my own account; and certainly I have -had no reason to regret that Mr. Murray waited for -‘<em>The Book</em>:’ indeed he has since told me very frankly that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lviii"></a>[lviii]</span> -he had mistaken his own interest. Now whether three -articles in ‘The Quarterly,’ and a promise of more,<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> be a -tribute paid to the importance of ‘<em>My Book</em>,’ or whether -they be the puff preliminary to ‘<em>The Book</em>,’ I know not; -but I am equally bound to Mr. Editor Lockhart for the -distinction, and only wish he had not hired such a stumbling -sore-backed hackney for the work. Quitting this -digression, I return to the Review.</p> - -<p>My topographical ignorance is a favourite point with the -writer, and he mentions three remarkable examples on the -present occasion:—1. That I have said Oporto is built in -a hollow; 2. That I have placed the Barca de Avintas -only three miles from the Serra Convent, instead of nine -miles; 3. That I have described a ridge of land near -Medellin where no such ridge exists.</p> - -<p>These assertions are all hazarded in the hope that they -will pass current with those who know no better, and will -be unnoticed by those who do. But first a town may be -<em>on</em> a hill and yet <em>in</em> a hollow. If the reader will look at -lieutenant Godwin’s Atlas,<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> or at Gage’s Plan of Oporto, -or at Avlis’ Plan of that city—all three published by -Mr. Wylde of Charing Cross—he will find that Oporto, -which by the way is situated very much like the hot-wells -at Bristol, is built partly on the slopes of certain heights -partly on the banks of the river; that it is surrounded on -every side by superior heights; and that consequently my -description of it, having relation to the Bishop’s lines -of defence and the attack of the French army, is militarily -correct. Again, if the reader will take his compasses and -any or all of the three maps above-mentioned, he will find -that the Barca de Avintas is, as I have said, just three -miles from the Serra Convent, and not nine miles as the -reviewer asserts. Lord Wellington’s despatch called it four -miles <em>from Oporto</em>, but there is a bend in the river which -makes the distance greater on that side.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lix"></a>[lix]</span></p> - -<p>Such being the accuracy of this very correct topographical -critic upon two or three examples, let us see how he -stands with respect to the third.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from marshal Victors Official Report and Register -of the Battle of Medellin.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Medellin is situated upon the left bank of the Guadiana. To -arrive there, a handsome stone-bridge is passed. On the left of -the town is a very high hill (<i lang="fr">mamelon tres elévé</i>), which commands -all the plain; on the right is a ridge or steppe (<i lang="fr">rideau</i>), -which <em>forms the basin of the Guadiana</em>. Two roads or openings -(<i lang="fr">débouchés</i>) present themselves on quitting Medellin; the one -conducts to Mingrabil, the other to Don Benito. They traverse -a vast plain, bounded by a ridge (<i lang="fr">rideau</i>), which, from the right -of the Ortigosa, is prolonged in the direction of Don Benito, and -Villa Neuva de la Serena.’... ‘The ridge which confines -the plain of Medellin has many rises and falls (<i lang="fr">movemens de -terrain</i>) more or less apparent. <em>It completely commands (domine -parfaitement) the valley of the Guadiana</em>; and it was -at the foot of this ridge the enemy’s cavalry was posted. Not an -infantry man was to be seen; but the presence of the cavalry -made us believe that the enemy’s army was <em>masked behind this -ridge</em> of Don Benito.’... ‘Favoured by <em>this ridge</em>, <em>he -could manœuvre his troops</em>, and carry them upon any point of -the line he pleased <em>without being seen by us</em>.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Now ‘<i lang="fr">rideau</i>’ can only be rendered, with respect to -ground, a <em>steppe</em> or a <em>ridge</em>; but, in this case, it could not -mean a <em>steppe</em>, since the Spanish army was hidden <em>behind -it</em>, and on a steppe it would have been seen. Again, it -must have been a <em>high ridge</em>, because it not only <em>perfectly -commanded the basin</em> of the Guadiana, overlooking the -<em>steppe</em> which formed that basin, but was itself not overlooked -by the very high hill on the left of Medellin. What -is my description of the ground?—‘The plain on the side -of Don Benito was bounded by <em>a high ridge of land</em>, mark, -reader, not a mountain ridge, behind which Cuesta kept -the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry -and guns in advance.’ Here then we have another measure -of value for the reviewer’s topographical pretensions.</p> - -<p>The reference to French military reports and registers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lx"></a>[lx]</span> -has not been so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer; -and yet he rests the main part of his criticisms upon such -documents. Thus, having got hold of the divisional register -of general Heudelet, which register was taken, very -much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto, he is -so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles -over it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in -my possession the general report and register of Soult’s -army, which enables me to show what a very little callow -bird his treasure is. And first, as he accuses <em>me</em> of painting -the wretched state of Soult’s army at St. Jago, previous -to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of giving -a false colouring to the campaign, I will extract Soult’s -own account, and the account of <i lang="fr">Le Noble</i>, historian of the -campaign, and <i lang="fr">ordonnateur en chef</i> or comptroller of the -civil administration of the army.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s Official Journal of the Expedition to -Portugal, dated Lugo, 30th May, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most -difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be surmounted, -the <em>shattered and exhausted state</em> (“<span lang="fr">delabrement et epuisement</span>”) -of the “<i lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>,” and the insufficiency of the means of -which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it was necessary -to obey.’... ‘The march was directed upon St. -Jago, where the troops took the first repose it had been possible -to give them since they quitted the Carion River in Castile.’... -‘Marshal Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed -some shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the -horses shod; the parc which since the Carion had not been seen -now came up, and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared -at Coruña), together with various detachments that the -previous hardships and the exhaustion of the men had caused to -remain behind. He would have prolonged his stay until the end -of February because he could not hide from himself that his -troops had the most urgent need of it; but his operations were -connected with the duke of Belluno’s, &c. &c., and he thought it -his duty to go on without regard to time or difficulties.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Le Noble’s History.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The army was without money, without provision, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxi"></a>[lxi]</span> -clothing, without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to -the latter, not even ordinarily complete, when they should have -been doubled to profit from the feeble resources of the country.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Who now is the false colourist? But what can be expected -from a writer so shameless in his statements as this -reviewer? Let the reader look to the effrontery with which -he asserts that I have <em>celebrated marshal Soult</em> for the -reduction of two fortresses, Ferrol and Coruña, which were -not even defended, whereas my whole passage is a censure -upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and without -one word of praise towards the French marshal.</p> - -<p>To return to general Heudelet’s register. The first notable -discovery from this document is, that it makes no mention -of an action described by me as happening on the 17th -of February at Ribadavia; and therefore the reviewer says -no such action happened, though I have been so particular -as to mention the strength of the Spaniards’ position, their -probable numbers, and the curious fact that twenty priests -were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he -contradicts. Now this is only the old story of ‘<em>the big -book which contains all that sir George does not know</em>.’ -For, first, Heudelet’s register, being only divisional, would -not, as a matter of course, take notice of an action in which -other troops were also engaged, and where the commander-in-chief -was present. But that the action did take place, as I -have described it, and on the 17th February, the following -extracts will prove, and also the futility of the reviewer’s -other objections. And I request the reader, both now and -always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the -work itself, and not trust the garbled extracts of the reviewer, -or he will have a very false notion of my meaning.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s General Report.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist, -and the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the -approach of La Romana’s corps, organized itself in the province of -Orense.</p> - -<p>‘The insurrection of the province of Orense, directed by the -monks and by officers, became each day more enterprising, and -extended itself to the quarters of general La Houssaye at Salvaterra. -<em>It was said the corps of Romana was at Orense</em> (on disait<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxii"></a>[lxii]</span> -le corps de Romana à Orense), and his advanced guard at -Ribadavia.</p> - -<p>‘The 16th of February the troops commenced their march -upon Ribadavia.</p> - -<p>‘The left column, under general Heudelet, found the route -intercepted by barricades on the bridges between Franquiera and -Canizar; and defended besides by a party of insurgents eight -hundred strong. The brigade Graindorge, arriving in the night, -overthrew them <em>in the morning of the 17th</em>, and pursued them -to the heights of Ribadavia, where they united themselves with a -body <em>far more numerous</em>. General Heudelet having come up -with the rest of his division, and being sustained by Maransin’s -brigade of dragoons, overthrew the enemy and killed many. -<em>Twenty monks at the least perished, and the town was entered -fighting.</em></p> - -<p>‘The 18th, general Heudelet scoured all the valley of the Avia, -where <em>three or four thousand insurgents had thrown themselves</em>, -Maransin followed the route of Rosamunde chasing all that was -before him.’</p> -</div> - -<p>The reviewer further says that, with my habitual inaccuracy -as to dates, I have concentrated all Soult’s division -at Orense on the 20th. But Soult himself says, -‘The 19th, Franceschi and Heudelet marched upon Orense, -and seized the bridge. <em>The 20th, the other divisions followed -the movement upon Orense.</em>’ Here then, besides increasing -the bulk of the book, containing what sir George -<em>does not know</em>, the reviewer has only proved his own habitual -want of truth.</p> - -<p>In the above extracts nothing is said of the ‘<em>eight or -ten thousand</em> Spaniards;’ nothing of the ‘<em>strong rugged -hill</em>’ on which they were posted; nothing of ‘<em>Soult’s -presence in the action</em>.’ But the reader will find all these -particulars in the Appendix to the ‘<span lang="fr">Victoires et Conquêtes -des Français</span>,’ and in ‘Le Noble’s History of Soult’s Campaign.’ -The writers in each work were present, and the -latter, notwithstanding the reviewer’s sneers, and what is -of more consequence, notwithstanding many serious errors -as to the projects and numbers of his enemies, is highly -esteemed by his countrymen, and therefore good authority -for those operations on his own side which he witnessed. -Well, Le Noble says there were 15,000 or 20,000 insurgents<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxiii"></a>[lxiii]</span> -and some regular troops in position, and he describes -that position as very rugged and strong, which I -can confirm, having marched over it only a few weeks -before. Nevertheless, as this estimate was not borne out -by Soult’s report, I set the Spaniards down at 8,000 or -10,000, grounding my estimate on the following data: -1st. Soult says that 800 men fell back on a body <em>far more -numerous</em>. 2d. It required a considerable body of troops -and several combinations to dislodge them from an extensive -position. 3d. <em>‘Three or four thousand fugitives went -off by one road only.’</em> Finally, the expression <em>eight or ten -thousand</em> showed that I had doubts.</p> - -<p>Let us proceed with Heudelet’s register. In my history -it is said that Soult softened the people’s feelings by kindness -and by enforcing strict discipline. To disprove this -the reviewer quotes, from Heudelet’s register, statements -of certain excesses, committed principally by the light -cavalry, and while in actual pursuit of the enemy—excesses, -however, which he admits that count Heudelet -blamed and rigorously repressed, thus proving the truth -of my statement instead of his own, for verily the slow-worm -is strong within him. Yet I will not rely upon this -curious stupidity of the reviewer. I will give absolute -authority for the fact that Soult succeeded in soothing the -people’s feelings, begging the reader to observe that both -Heudelet and my history speak of Soult’s stay at Orense -immediately after the action at Ribadavia.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s General Report.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘At this period the <em>prisoners of Romana’s corps</em> (note, the -reviewer says none of Romana’s corps were there) had all demanded -to take the oath of fidelity, and to serve king Joseph. -The Spanish general himself was far off (<i lang="fr">fort éloigné</i>). The -inhabitants of the province of Orense were returning to their -houses, breaking their arms, and cursing the excitement and the -revolt which Romana had fomented. The priests even encouraged -their submission, and offered themselves as sureties. These circumstances -appeared favourable for the invasion of Portugal.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Animated by a disgraceful anxiety which has always -distinguished the Quarterly Review to pander to the bad -feelings of mankind by making the vituperation of an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxiv"></a>[lxiv]</span> -enemy the test of patriotism, this critic accuses me of an -unnatural bias, and an inclination to do injustice to the -Spaniards, because I have not made the report of some -outrages, committed by Soult’s cavalry, the ground of a -false and infamous charge against the whole French army -and French nation. Those outrages he admits himself -were vigorously repressed, and they were committed by -troops in a country where all the inhabitants were in arms, -where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by -torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived -from day to day on what they could take in the country. -I shall now put this sort of logic to a severe test, and -leave the Reviewer’s patriots to settle the matter as they -can. That is, I shall give from lord Wellington’s despatches, -through a series of years, extracts touching the -conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula, -where they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated, -tortured, and assassinated, but well provided and -kindly treated.</p> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir A. Wellesley to Mr. Villiers.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><em>Extract, May 1, 1809.</em>—‘I have long been of opinion that a -British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have -had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its -branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. -They have plundered the country most terribly.’—‘They have -plundered the people of bullocks, amongst other property, for -what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand -is their practice, to sell them to the people again.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, May 31, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot -bear success more than sir John Moore’s army could bear failure. -I am endeavouring to tame them but if I should not succeed I -shall make an official complaint of them and send one or two -corps home in disgrace; they plunder in all directions.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, June 13, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded; -it is probable that all three have been put to death by the peasantry -of Martede; I am sorry to say that from the conduct of -the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants -may have had some provocation for their animosity against -the soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and the general, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxv"></a>[lxv]</span> -these effects of their animosity must be discouraged and even -punished, otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the peasantry -of the country in general as well as to the army.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to colonel Donkin, June, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the -greatest pain, I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters -of the disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of -the —— and —— regiments.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages -committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight -of their officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the -commanding officers of the regiments and the general officers -of the army, that outrages are not committed.’... ‘Not a post or -a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the -army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by -the soldiers who have been left behind on the march. <em>There is -not an outrage of any description which has not been committed -on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers -who never yet for one moment</em> suffered the slightest want -or the smallest privation.’... ‘It is most difficult to convict any -prisoner before a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to say that -soldiers have little regard to the oath administered to them; and -the officers who are sworn, “well and truly to try and determine -<em>according to evidence</em>, the matter before them,” have too much -regard to the strict letter of that administered to them.’... -‘There ought to be in the British army a regular provost establishment.’... -‘All the foreign armies have such an establishment. -The French <i lang="fr">gendarmerie nationale</i> to the amount of forty or fifty -with each corps. The Spaniards have their police militia to a still -larger amount. <em>While we who require such an aid more, I -am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe</em>, have nothing -of the kind.’</p> - -<p>‘We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies -must depend upon the diligence of regimental officers, particularly -subalterns. I may order what I please, but if they do not execute -what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect -that British soldiers will be orderly or regular.’... ‘I believe I -should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this description -of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be -tried by others probably guilty of the same offence,’... ‘We are -an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, <em>but we are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxvi"></a>[lxvi]</span> -worse than an enemy in a country</em>, and take my word for it that -either defeat or success would dissolve us.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, July, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of -criminal outrages of British officers and soldiers.’... ‘As matters -are now conducted, the government and myself stand complimenting -each other while no notice is taken of the murderer.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur to lord Wellesley, August, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers -lose their discipline and spirit; they plunder even in the presence -of their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as -bad as the men.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, September, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct -of detachments, they are only a repetition of others which I receive -every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal and I can only -lament my inability to apply any remedy. In the first place, our -law is not what it ought to be and I cannot prevail upon Government -even to look at a remedy; secondly, our military courts -having been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military -discipline, and with the same wisdom which has marked all our -proceedings of late years we have obliged the officers to swear to -decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we have -obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath, the witnesses -being in almost every instance common soldiers whose -conduct this tribunal was constituted to controul; <em>the consequence -is, that perjury is almost as common an offence as drunkenness -and plunder</em>.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, January, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I am concerned to tell you, that notwithstanding the pains -taken by the general and other officers of the army the conduct of -the soldiers is infamous.’... ‘At this moment there are three -general courts-martial sitting in Portugal for the trial of soldiers -guilty of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been -killed by them since we returned to Portugal), robberies, thefts, -robbing convoys under their charge, &c. &c. Perjury is as common -as robbery and murder.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to the adjutant-general of the forces, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘It is proper I should inform the commander-in-chief that desertion -is not the only crime of which the soldiers of the army -have been guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom -marches, particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxvii"></a>[lxvii]</span> -officer (which rarely happens,) that a murder or a highway -robbery, or some act of outrage, is not committed by the -British soldiers composing it: they have killed eight people since -the army returned to Portugal.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Several soldiers have lately been convicted before a general -court-martial and have been executed.’... ‘I am still apprehensive -of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation -before the enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder -or wine is within reach.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to sir S. Cotton, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I have read complaints from different quarters of the conduct -of the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country.’... -‘It has gone so far, that they (the people) have inquired whether -they might kill the Germans in our service as well as in the service -of the French.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, May, 1812.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so -<em>enormous</em>, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the -people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so -injurious to the army itself, that I request your Lordship’s early -attention to the subject.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Many more extracts I could give, but let us now see -what was the conduct of the French towards men who did -not murder and mutilate prisoners:—</p> - - -<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, August, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have -always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made -prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous -instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I -have had for this conduct has been, that they might treat our officers -and soldiers well who might fall into their hands; and I must -do the French the justice to say that they have been universally -well treated, and in recent instances <em>the wounded prisoners of -the British army have been taken care of before the wounded -of the French army</em>.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Lord Wellington to admiral Berkeley, October, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners -whom they take from us and <ins class="corr" id="tn-lxvii" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the Portuguse treat'"> -the Portuguese treat</ins> their prisoners -exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer an -arrangement, by which prisoners who have once come into the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxviii"></a>[lxviii]</span> -hands of the provost marshal of the British army should avoid -falling under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Having thus displayed the conduct of the British -army, as described by its own general through a series of -years; and having also from the same authority, shown -the humane treatment English officers and soldiers, when -they happened to be made prisoners, experienced from the -French, I demand of any man with a particle of honour, -truth or conscience in his composition,—of any man, -in fine, who is not at once knave and fool, whether these -outrages perpetrated by British troops upon a friendly -people can be suppressed, and the outrages of French -soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged upon with -justice? Whether it is right and decent to impute relentless -ferocity, atrocious villainy, to the whole French -army, and stigmatize the whole French nation for the excesses -of some bad soldiers, prating at the same time of -the virtue of England and the excellent conduct of her -troops; and this too in the face of Wellington’s testimony -to the kindness with which they treated our men, and in -the face also of his express declaration (see letter to lord -Wellesley, 26th January, 1811), that the majority of the -French soldiers were ‘<em>sober, well disposed, amenable to -order, and in some degree educated</em>.’ But what intolerable -injustice it would be to stigmatise either nation for military -excesses which are common to all armies and to all wars; -and when I know that the general characteristic of the -British and French troops alike, is generosity, bravery, humanity, -and honour.</p> - -<p>And am I to be accused of an unnatural bias against the -Spaniards because I do not laud them for running away in -battle; because I do not express my admiration of their -honour in assassinating men whom they dared not face in -fight; because I do not commend their humanity for mutilating, -torturing, and murdering their prisoners. I have -indeed heard of a British staff-officer, high in rank, who, -after the battle of Talavera, looked on with apparent satisfaction -at a Spaniard beating a wounded Frenchman’s -brains out with a stone, and even sneered at the indignant -emotion and instant interference of my informant. Such<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxix"></a>[lxix]</span> -an adventure I have heard of, yet there are few such cold-blooded -men in the British army. But what have I said to -the disparagement of the Spaniards in my history without -sustaining it by irrefragable testimony? Nothing, absolutely -nothing! I have quoted the deliberate judgment of -every person of note, French and English, who had to deal -with them; nay, I have in some instances supported my -opinion by the declaration even of Spanish generals. I -have brought forward the testimony of sir Hew Dalrymple, -of sir John Moore, of sir John Craddock, of Mr. Stuart, of -Mr. Frere, of general Graham, of lord William Bentinck, -of sir Edward Pellew, of lord Collingwood, of sir Edward -Codrington, and of Mr. Sydenham, and a crowd of officers -of inferior rank. Lastly, I have produced the testimony -of the duke of Wellington; and I will now add more -proofs that his opinion of the Spanish character coincides -with that expressed in my history.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration.’... -‘That is the frequent, I ought to say constant and -shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy: -we in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have -heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and twenty actions of -the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo.’... ‘In -the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very -trifling exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away -their arms and ran off <em>in my presence</em> when they were neither -attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe -by their own fire.’... ‘I have found, upon inquiry, and from -experience, the instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish -troops to be so numerous and those of their good behaviour to be -so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to -be depended upon.’</p> - -<p>‘The Spanish cavalry are I believe nearly entirely without -discipline; they are in general well clothed armed and accoutred, -and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition; -but I never heard anybody pretend that in one instance -they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an -enemy.’... ‘In respect to that great body of all armies—I -mean the infantry—it is lamentable to see how bad that of the -Spaniards is.’... ‘It is said that sometimes they behave well;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxx"></a>[lxx]</span> -though I acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise -than ill.’... ‘Nothing can be worse than the officers of the -Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has -devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures it has -adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in -any one branch of the military profession by any individual.’... -‘I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be done, -with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state -of nature.’</p> - -<p>‘The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, -bravery or arrangement to carry on the contest.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards -are of a disposition too sanguine; they have invariably expected -only success in objects for the attainment of which they had -adopted no measures; they have never looked to or prepared for -a lengthened contest; and all those, or nearly all who have had -anything to do with them, have imbibed the same spirit and the -same sentiments.’</p> - -<p>‘Those who see the difficulties attending all communications -with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence -can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon -us for everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as -I have I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this -country.’</p> - -<p>‘The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout -the war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid -plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to -the enemy by which their situation might be gradually improved. -The leading people amongst them have invariably deceived the -lower orders; and instead of making them acquainted with their -real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and -sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have -amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary -plans of offensive operations which those who offer them -for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, -and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by -some unlooked-for good. The consequence is, that no event is -provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people -will at last become fatigued with the succession of their disasters -which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would -have prevented.’</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxi"></a>[lxxi]</span></p> - - -<p class="right"><em>Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I -enclose you a report which sir William Beresford has received -from general Madden the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese -cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not -one word in this letter that is not true. <em>Yet these are the soldiers -who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!</em></p> - -<p>‘There is no remedy for these evils excepting a vigorous system -of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other -can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in which -discipline can be established. <em>It is nonsense to talk of rooting -out the French, or of carrying on the war in any other -manner.</em> Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the Guerillas -and by the Spanish armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining -the French armies, are calculated, it will be obvious that -it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or -100,000 regular troops in the field.</p> - -<p>‘But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to -produce an effect at a future period. <em>Their courage, and even -their activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon -them by the necessity of their circumstances and is never a -matter of choice nor of foresight.</em>’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Wellington to lord Wellesley, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army -either amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted -(as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. -It has in my opinion been the cause of the <em>dastardly conduct</em> -which we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and -<em>they have become odious to the country</em>. <em>The peaceable inhabitants, -much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost -wish for the establishment of Joseph’s government to be protected -from the outrages of their own troops.</em>’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, Dec. 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. -It is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having -been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained -no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should -now be depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon -having one or two, more or less, British regiments; -and that after having been shut in for ten months, they -have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding -the repeated remonstrances of general Graham and -the British officers on the danger of omitting them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxii"></a>[lxxii]</span></p> - -<p>‘The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as -great a degree as the other authorities—<em>that is, boasting of the -strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously -convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down -quietly and indulging their national indolence</em>.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Wellington to general Graham, 1811.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition -(Barrosa) <em>is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be</em>. -They march the troops night and day without provisions or rest, -and abuse everybody who proposes a moment’s delay to afford -either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the -enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or -to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus, -when the moment of action arrives they are totally incapable of -movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and -afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, -exertions to which human nature is not equal.’<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> -</div> - -<p>So much for Wellington’s opinion of the Spanish soldiers -and statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish -generals:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>1809. ‘Although the Duque de Albuquerque is <i lang="fr">proné</i> by many, -amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out. -I think the marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the -Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is -certainly a sensible man and has seen much of the world.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Now reader, the following is the character given to -Romana in my history; compare it with the above:—</p> - -<p>‘Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information, -but disqualified by nature for military command.’ -And again, speaking of his death, I say, ‘He was a -worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in -military talent. His death was a great loss.’ If the expressions -are more positive than Wellington’s, it is because -this was the duke’s first notion of the marquis; he was -more positive afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown -to him, and after circumstances known to him, -gave me a right to be more decided. The following additional<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxiii"></a>[lxxiii]</span> -proofs, joined to those already given in my former -reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one -of his letters, says, ‘<em>I am sorry to find that Romana is a -shuffler</em>.’ And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about -the same period to general Doyle to urge the advance -of Palafox and Infantado, says, ‘<em>I know that Romana -has not supported the British as he ought to have done, -and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported -it with a tolerably efficient force</em>.’</p> - -<p>In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham, -expressing lord Wellington’s opinions, after saying that -Wellington declared he had never met with a really able -man in Spain, while in Portugal he had found several, -proceeds thus—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘It is indeed clear to any person who is acquainted with the -present state of Spain, that <em>the Spaniards are incapable of -forming either a good government or a good army</em>.’... -‘With respect to the army there are certainly in Spain abundant -materials for good common soldiers. But where is one general -of even moderate skill and talents? I know nothing of Lacy and -Sarzfield, but assuredly a good general is not to be found amongst -Castaños, Ballesteros, Palacios, Mendizabal, Santocildes, Abadia, -Duque del Parque, La Pena, Elio, Mahy, or Joseph O’Donnel.’... -‘<em>You cannot make good officers in Spain.</em>’</p> -</div> - -<p>If to this the reader will add what I have set forth -in my history about Vives, Imas, Contreras, Campo Verde, -Cuesta, and Areyasaga, and that he is not yet satisfied, -I can still administer to his craving. In 1809 Wellington -speaks with dread of ‘<em>Romana’s cormorants flying into -Portugal</em>,’ and says, ‘that <em>foolish fellow the Duque del -Parque</em> has been endeavouring to get his corps destroyed -on the frontier.’ Again—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The Duque del Parque has advanced, because, whatever may -be the consequences, the Spaniards always think it necessary to -advance when their front is clear of an enemy.’</p> - -<p>‘There never was anything like the <em>madness</em>, the <em>imprudence</em>, -and the <em>presumption</em> of the <em>Spanish officers</em> in the way they risk -their corps, knowing that the <em>national vanity</em> will prevent them -from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that if -attacked they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxiv"></a>[lxxiv]</span> -chance of safety for the Duque del Parque’s corps; but instead -of making it he calls upon you for cavalry.’... ‘I have -ordered magazines to be prepared on the Douro and Mondego -to assist in providing <em>these vagabonds</em> if they should retire into -Portugal, which I hope they will do as their only chance of salvation.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Again in 1811, defending himself from an accusation, -made by the Spaniards, that he had caused the loss of -Valencia, he says, ‘the misfortunes of Valencia are to be -attributed to <em>Blake’s ignorance of his profession and to -Mahy’s cowardice and treachery</em>.’</p> - -<p>Now if any passage in my history can be pointed out -more disparaging to the Spaniards than the expressions of -lord Wellington and the other persons quoted above, I -am content to be charged with an ‘unnatural bias’ against -that people. But if this cannot be done, it is clear that -the reviewer has proved, not my unnatural bias to the -French but his own natural bias to calumny. He has -indeed a wonderful aversion to truth, for close under his -eye, in my second volume which he was then reviewing, -was the following passage; and there are many of a like -tendency in my work relative to the Spaniards which he -leaves unnoticed.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Under such a system it was impossible that the peasantry -could be rendered energetic soldiers, and they certainly were not -active supporters of their country’s cause; but <em>with a wonderful -constancy they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, -nakedness and famine with patience, and displaying in all -their actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful -national character</em>. <em>This constancy and the iniquity of -the usurpation, hallowed their efforts in despite of their ferocity -and merits respect</em>, though the vices and folly of the juntas -and the leading men rendered the effects nugatory.’—<cite>History</cite>, -vol. ii. chap. 1.</p> -</div> - -<p>I would stop here, but the interests of truth and justice, -and the interests of society require that I should thoroughly -expose this reviewer. Let the reader therefore -mark his reasoning upon Soult’s government of Oporto -and the intrigue of the <em>Anti-Braganza</em> party. Let him -however look first at the whole statement of these matters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxv"></a>[lxxv]</span> -in <em>my book</em>, and not trust the garbled extracts made by -the reviewer. Let him observe how Heudelet’s expedition -to Tuy is by this shameless writer, at one time made to -appear as if it took place <em>after</em> Soult had received the deputations -and addresses calling for a change of dynasty; -and this to show that no beneficial effect had been produced -in the temper of the people, as I had asserted, and -of which I shall presently give ample proof. How at -another time this same expedition of Heudelet is used as -happening <em>before</em> the arrival of the addresses and deputations, -with a view to show that Soult had laboured to -procure those addresses, a fact which, far from denying, -I had carefully noticed. Let him mark how an expression -in my history, namely, that Soult was <em>unprepared</em> for one -effect of his own vigorous conduct, has been perverted, -for the purpose of deceit; and all this with a spirit at once -so malignant and stupid, that the reviewer is unable to -see that the garbled extracts he gives from Heudelet’s and -Riccard’s Registers, not only do not contradict but absolutely -confirm the essential point of my statement.</p> - -<p>Certainly Soult was not unprepared for the submission -of the Portuguese to the French arms because it was the -object and bent of his invasion to make them so submit. -But there is a great difference between that submission of -which Heudelet and Riccard speak, and the proposal -coming from the Portuguese for the establishment of a -<em>new and independent dynasty</em>; a still greater difference -between that and <em>offering the crown to Soult himself</em>; and -it was this last which the word <em>unprepared</em> referred to in -my history. So far from thinking or saying that Soult -was unprepared for the deputations and addresses, I have -expressly said, that he ‘<em>encouraged the design</em>,’ that he -‘<em>acted with great dexterity</em>,’ and I called the whole affair -an ‘<em>intrigue</em>.’ But if I had said that he was unprepared -for the whole affair it would have been correct in one -sense. He was unprepared to accede to the extent of the -<em>Anti-Braganza</em> party’s views. He had only received -authority from his sovereign to conquer Portugal, not to -establish a new and independent dynasty, placing a French -prince upon the throne; still less to accept that throne for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxvi"></a>[lxxvi]</span> -himself. These were dangerous matters to meddle with -under such a monarch as Napoleon; but the weakness of -Soult’s military position made it absolutely necessary to -catch at every aid, and it would have been a proof that -the duke of Dalmatia was only a common man and unsuited -for the great affairs confided to his charge if he -had rejected such a powerful auxiliary to his military -operations: wisely, therefore, and even magnanimously did -he encourage the <em>Anti-Braganza</em> party, drawing all the -military benefit possible from it, and trusting to Napoleon’s -sagacity and grandeur of soul for his justification. -Nor was he mistaken in either. Yet I am ready to admit -that all this must appear very strange to Quarterly Reviewers -and parasites, whose knowledge of the human -mind is confined to an accurate measure of the sentiments -of patrons, rich and powerful, but equally with themselves -incapable of true greatness and therefore always -ready to ridicule it.</p> - -<p>The facts then stand thus. Heudelet’s expedition through -the <i lang="pt">Entre Minho e Douro</i> took place between the 5th of -April and the 27th of that month, and the country people -being then in a state of exasperation opposed him vehemently; -in my history the combats he sustained are mentioned, -and it is said that previous to the <em>Anti-Braganza</em> -intrigue the horrible warfare of assassinations had been -carried on with infinite activity. But the intrigue of the -malcontents was not completed until the end of April, -and the good effect of it on the military operations was not -apparent until May, consequently could not have been felt -by Heudelet in the beginning of April. In my history the -difference of time in these two affairs is expressly marked, -inasmuch as I say that in treating of the intrigue I have -anticipated the chronological order of events. Truly if -Mr. Lockhart has paid for this part of the Review as criticism -Mr. Murray should disallow the unfair charge in his -accounts.</p> - -<p>I shall now give two extracts from Soult’s general report, -before quoted, in confimation of my statements:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Marshal Soult was led by necessity to favour the party of the -malcontents, which he found already formed in Portugal when he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxvii"></a>[lxxvii]</span> -arrived. He encouraged them, and soon that party thought itself -strong enough in the province of <i lang="pt">Entre Minho e Douro</i>, to propose -to the marshal to approve of the people declaring for the deposition -of the house of Braganza, and that the emperor of the French -should be asked to name a prince of his family to reign in Portugal. -In a political view, marshal Soult could not without express -authority, permit such a proceeding, and he could not ask for such -authority having lost his own communication with France, and -being without news of the operations of any of the other corps -which were to aid him; but considered in a military point of view -the proposition took another character. Marshal Soult there saw -the means of escaping from his embarrassments, and he seized -them eagerly, certain that whatever irregularity there was in his -proceedings ultimate justice would be done to him.’</p> - -<p>‘These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity -was re-established, and the confidence was such, that in the province -(Entre Minho e Douro) all the inhabitants returned to their -labours, supplied the markets and familiarized themselves with the -idea of an approaching change.’... ‘Marshal Soult received numerous -deputations of the clergy to thank him for the attentions -he paid them, and for the order which he had restored. Before -this no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and -killed. The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful -to God to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated -the most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell -into their hands.’</p> -</div> - -<p>It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to -continue thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore, -neglecting his farrago about the principles of war, -and his application of them to show how I am wrong in -my statement, that, in a <em>strategic point of view it was better -to attack Victor, but that especial circumstances</em> led sir -Arthur to fall upon Soult, I hold it sufficient to place -sir Arthur’s own statement before the reader and leave -him to compare it with mine.</p> - - -<p class="right">‘<em>Lisbon, April 24, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I intend to move towards Soult and attack him, if I should -be able to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes -which can give me any security for the safety of this place during -my absence to the northward.</p> - -<p>‘I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more good<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxviii"></a>[lxxviii]</span> -to the general cause by combining with general Cuesta in an operation -against Victor; and I believe I should prefer the last if Soult -was not in possession of a part of this country very fertile in resources, -and of the town of Oporto, and if to concert the operations -with Cuesta would not take time which might be profitably -employed in operations against Soult. I think it probable, however, -that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego. -If he does I shall attack him. <em>If he should retire, I am -convinced that it would be most advantageous for the common -cause that we should remain upon the defensive in the north of -Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with Cuesta -against Victor.</em></p> - -<p>‘An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages—if -successful it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in case -affairs should take such a turn as to enable the King’s ministers -to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the corps under -my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a distance -from the scene of operation as to render its co-operation impossible; -and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort made by -a combined and concentrated force.’</p> -</div> - -<p>The assertion of the reviewer that I have underrated -Cuesta’s force, inasmuch as it was only 19,000 infantry -and 1,500 cavalry, instead of 30,000 infantry and 6,000 -cavalry, as I have stated it to be, and that consequently -the greatest numbers could not be brought to bear on -Victor, is one of those curious examples of elaborate misrepresentation -in which this writer abounds. For first, admitting -that Cuesta had only 20,000 men, sir Arthur -would have brought 24,000 to aid him, and Victor had -only 30,000. The allies would then have had double -the number opposed to Soult. But the pith of the misrepresentation -lies in this, that the reviewer has taken -Cuesta’s account of his actual force on the 23d of April, -and suppresses the facts, that reinforcements were continually -pouring into him at that time, and that he actually -did advance against Victor with rather greater numbers -than those stated by me.</p> - - -<p class="p1 pfs80">PROOFS.</p> - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur to lord Castlereagh, April 24, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which it is said -will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.’</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxix"></a>[lxxix]</span></p> - - -<p class="right"><em>To general Mackenzie, May 1, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘They (Victor’s troops) have in their front a Spanish army with -general Cuesta at Llerena, which army was defeated in the month -of March, and has since been reinforced to the amount of <em>twenty -thousand men</em>.’... ‘They will be attacked by Cuesta, who -is <em>receiving reinforcements</em>.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Mr. Frere to sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, May 4.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘We have here 3,000 cavalry, considered as part of the army -of Estremadura (under Cuesta). Cuesta has with him 4,000 -cavalry.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June 17, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘We had every reason to believe that the French army consisted -of about 27,000, of which 7,000 were cavalry; and the combined -British and Portuguese force which I was in hopes I should -have enabled to march upon this expedition would have amounted -to about 24,000 men.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>To lord Wellesley, August 8, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The army of Cuesta, which crossed the Tagus <em>thirty-six or -thirty-eight thousand strong</em>, does not now consist of 30,000.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="right"><em>Extract from a Memoir by sir A. Wellesley, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The Spanish army under General Cuesta had been <em>reinforced -with cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary -celerity after the action of Medellin</em>.’</p> -</div> - -<p>All the reviewer’s remarks about Cuesta’s numbers, and -about the unfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction -of misrepresentations and objections before exposed and -refuted by me in my controversy with marshal Beresford; -but as it is now attempted to support them by garbled extracts -from better authorities, I will again and completely -expose and crush them. This will however be more conveniently -done farther on. Meanwhile I repeat, that the -Tagus is only unfordable during the winter, and not then -if there is a few days dry weather; that six months of the -year it is always fordable in many places, and as low -down as Salvaterra near Lisbon; finally, that my expression, -‘<em>a river fordable at almost every season</em>,’ is strictly -correct, and is indeed not mine but lord Wellington’s expression. -To proceed with the rest:—</p> - -<p>Without offering any proof beyond his own assertion, the -reviewer charges me with having <em>exaggerated the importance -of D’Argenton’s conspiracy for the sole purpose of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxx"></a>[lxxx]</span> -excusing Soult’s remissness in guarding the Douro</em>. But -my account of that conspiracy was compiled from the -duke of Wellington’s letters—some public, some private -addressed to me; and from a narrative of the conspiracy -<ins class="corr" id="tn-lxxx" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'witten expressly'"> -written expressly</ins> for my guidance by major-general sir James -Douglas, who was the officer employed to meet and conduct -D’Argenton to and from the English army;—from -Soult’s own official report; from Le Noble’s history; and -from secret information which I received from a French -officer who was himself one of the principal movers—not -of that particular conspiracy—but of a general one of -which the one at Oporto was but a branch.</p> - -<p>Again, the reviewer denies that I am correct in saying, -that Soult thought Hill’s division had been disembarked -from the ocean; that he expected the vessels would come to -the mouth of the Douro; and that considering that river -secure above the town his personal attention was directed -to the line below Oporto. Let Soult and Le Noble answer -this.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s General Report.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘In the night of the 9th and 10th the enemy made a <em>considerable -disembarkation at Aveiro, and another at Ovar</em>. The 10th, -at daybreak, they attacked the right flank of general Franceschi, -while the <em>column coming from Lisbon by Coimbra</em> attacked him -in front.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Le Noble.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The house occupied by the general-in-chief was situated beyond -the town on the road to the sea. The site was very high, -and from thence he could observe the left bank of the Douro from -the convent to the sea. His orders, given on the 8th, to scour the -left bank of the river, those which he had expedited in the morning, -and the position of his troops, rendered him confident that no -passage would take place above Oporto; <em>he believed that the -enemy, master of the sea, would try a disembarkation near the -mouth of the Douro</em>.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Such is the value of this carping disingenuous critic’s -observations on this point; and I shall now demolish his -other misstatements about the passage of the Douro.</p> - -<p>1st. The poor barber’s share in the transaction is quite -true; my authority is major-general sir John Waters who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxi"></a>[lxxxi]</span> -was the companion of the barber in the daring exploit of -bringing over the boats. And if Waters had recollected -his name, it is not the despicable aristocratic sneer of the -reviewer about the ‘<em>Plebeian</em>’ that would have prevented -me from giving it. 2d. <em>The Barca de Avintas</em>, where -sir John Murray crossed, has already been shown by a reference -to the maps and to lord Wellington’s despatch, to -be not nine miles from the Serra Convent as the reviewer -says, but three miles as I have stated: moreover, two -Portuguese leagues would not make nine English miles. -But to quit these minor points, the reviewer asks, ‘<em>Why -colonel Napier departed from the account of the events -given in the despatch of sir Arthur Wellesley?</em>’ This is the -only decent passage in the whole review, and it shall have -a satisfactory answer.</p> - -<p>Public despatches, written in the hurry of the moment, -immediately after the events and before accurate information -can be obtained, are very subject to errors of detail, and -are certainly not what a judicious historian would rely upon -for details without endeavouring to obtain other information. -In this case I discovered several discrepancies between -the despatch and the accounts of eye-witnesses and -actors written long afterwards and deliberately. I knew -also, that the passage of the Douro, though apparently a -very rash action and little considered in England, was a very -remarkable exploit, prudent skilful and daring. Anxious -to know the true secret of the success, I wrote to the duke -of Wellington, putting a variety of questions relative to the -whole expeditions. In return I received from him distinct -answers, with a small diagram of the seminary and ground -about it to render the explanation clear. Being thus put -in possession of all the leading points relative to the passage -of the Douro by the commanders on each side, for I had -before got Soult’s, I turned to the written and printed statements -of several officers engaged in the action for those -details which the generals had not touched upon.</p> - -<p>Now the principal objections of the reviewer to my -statement are,—1st. That I have given too many troops -to sir John Murray. 2d. That I have unjustly accused<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxii"></a>[lxxxii]</span> -him of want of military hardihood. 3d. That I have -erroneously described the cause of the loss sustained by -the fourteenth dragoons in retiring from their charge. In -reply I quote my authorities; and first, as to the numbers -with Murray.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from lord Wellington’s answers to colonel Napier’s -questions.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘<em>The right</em> of the troops which passed over to the seminary, -which in fact made an admirable <i lang="fr">tête de pont</i>, was protected -by the passage of the Douro higher up by lieut.-general <em>sir -John Murray and the king’s German legion, supported by -other troops</em>.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Armed with this authority, I did set aside the despatch, -because, though it said that Murray was <em>sent</em> with a battalion -and a squadron, it <em>did not say</em> that he was not followed -by others. And in lord Londonderry’s narrative I found -the following passage:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘General Murray, too, who had been detached with <em>his division</em> -to a ferry higher up, was fortunate enough to gain possession -of as many boats as enabled him to pass over with <em>two -battalions of Germans and two squadrons of the fourteenth -dragoons</em>.’</p> -</div> - -<p>And his lordship, further on, says, that he himself -charged several times and with advantage at the head of -those squadrons. His expression is ‘<em>the dragoons from -Murray’s corps</em>.’</p> - -<p>With respect to the loss of the dragoons sustained by -having to fight their way back again, I find the following -account in the narrative of sir James Douglas, written, -as I have before said, expressly for my guidance:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Young soldiers like young greyhounds run headlong on their -prey; while experience makes old dogs of all sorts run cunning. -Here <em>two squadrons</em> actually rode over the <em>whole rear French -guard</em>, which laid down upon the road; and was, to use their own -terms, <i lang="fr">passé sur le ventre</i>: but no support to the dragoons being -at hand no great execution was done; and the <em>two squadrons -themselves suffered severely in getting back again through the -infantry</em>.’</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxiii"></a>[lxxxiii]</span></p> - -<p>Thus, even in this small matter, the reviewer is not -right. And now with the above facts fixed I shall proceed -to rebut the charge of having calumniated sir John -Murray.</p> - -<p>First, the reviewers assertion, that Murray’s troops -were never within several miles of the seminary, and that -they would have been crushed by Soult if they had attacked -the enemy, is evidently false from the following -facts. Lord Wellington expressly says, in his answer to -my questions quoted before,—That the <em>right</em> of the troops -in the seminary <em>was protected</em> by the troops under Murray; -which could not be if the latter were several miles -off. Again, if the dragoons of Murray’s corps could -charge repeatedly with advantage, the infantry and guns -of that corps might have followed up the attack without -danger upon a confused, flying, panic-stricken body of -men who had been surprised and were at the same time -taken both in flank and rear. But if Murray dared not -with any prudence even approach the enemy,—if it were -absolutely necessary for him to retire as he did,—what -brought him there at all? Is the duke of Wellington a -general to throw his troops wantonly into such a situation,—and -on ground which his elevated post at the Serra -Convent enabled him to command perfectly, and where -the men and movements of both sides were as much beneath -his eye as the men and movements on a chess-board? -Bah!</p> - -<p>But the fact is that a part of the Germans under Murray, -aye!—a very small part! did actually engage the -enemy with success. Major Beamish, in his ‘History of -the German Legion,’ on the authority of one of the German -officers’ journals, writes thus:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The skirmishers of the first line under lieutenant Von Hölle, -and two companies of the same regiment under ensign Hodenberg, -were alone brought into fire. The skirmishers made several -prisoners, and one rifleman (Henry Hauer) was lucky enough to -capture a French lieutenant-colonel. Seven of the legion were -wounded.’</p> -</div> - -<p>Murray wanted hardihood. And it is no answer to say<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxiv"></a>[lxxxiv]</span> -lord Wellington did not take notice of his conduct. A -commander-in-chief is guided by many circumstances distinct -from the mere military facts, and it might be, that, -on this occasion he did not choose to judge rashly or -harshly a man, who had other good qualities, for an error -into which, perhaps, a very bold and able man might have -fallen by accident. And neither would I have thus judged -sir John Murray from this fact alone, although the whole -army were disgusted at the time by his want of daring -and openly expressed an unfavourable opinion of his military -vigour. But when I find that the same want of -hardihood was again apparent in him at Castalla, as I -have shown in my fifth volume, and still more glaringly -displayed by him at Taragona, as I shall show in my sixth -volume, the matter became quite different, and the duty of -the historian is to speak the truth even of a general, strange -as that may and I have no doubt does appear to this reviewer.</p> - -<p>Having disposed of this matter, I shall now set down -some passages evincing the babbling shallowness and self-conceit -of the critic, and beneath them my authorities, -whereby it will appear that the big book containing all sir -George does not know is increasing in bulk:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Sir Arthur Wellesley was detained at Oporto neither by the -instructions of the English Cabinet nor by his own want of generalship, -<em>but simply by the want of provisions</em>.’—<cite>Review.</cite></p> -</div> - -<p>Indeed! Reader, mark the following question to, and -answer from the duke of Wellington.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Question to the duke of Wellington by colonel Napier.</em></p> - -<p>Why did the duke halt the next day after the passage -of the Douro?</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><em>Answer.</em>—‘The halt was made next day,—first, because the -whole army had not crossed the Douro and none of its supplies -and baggage had crossed. Secondly, on account of the great -exertion and fatigue of the preceding days particularly the last. -Thirdly, because we had no account of lord Beresford being in -possession of Amarante, or even across the Douro; we having, in -fact, out-marched everything. Fourthly, the horses and animals -required a day’s rest as well as the men.’</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxv"></a>[lxxxv]</span></p> - -<p>And, in the answer to another question, the following -observation occurs:—‘The relative numbers and the nature -of the troops must be considered in all these things; -<em>and this fact moreover, that excepting to attain a very -great object we could not risk the loss of a corps</em>.’</p> - -<p>I pass over the reviewer’s comments upon my description -of Soult’s retreat, because a simple reference to my -work will at once show their folly and falseness; but I -beg to inform this acute and profound historical critic that -the first field-marshal captured by an English general was -marshal Tallard, and that the English general who captured -him was called John, duke of Marlborough. And, -with respect to his sneers about the ‘<em>little river of Ruivaens</em>;’ -‘<em>Soult’s theatrical speech</em>;’ ‘<em>the use of the twenty-five -horsemen</em>;’ ‘<em>the non-repairs of the Ponte Nova</em>;’ -and the ‘<em>Romance composed by colonel Napier and Le -Noble</em>;’ I shall, in answer, only offer the following authorities, -none of which, the reader will observe, are taken from -Le Noble.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s General Report.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The 15th, in the morning, the enemy appeared one league -from Braga; our column was entangled in the defile; the rain -came down in torrents; and the wind was frightful. On reaching -Salamanca we learned that <em>the bridge of Ruivaens, over the -little river</em> (ruisseau) <em>of that name was cut, and the passage -guarded by 1,200 men with cannon</em>. It was known also that -the <em>Ponte Nova on the route of Montelegre</em>, which they had -begun to destroy, was feebly guarded; and the marshal gave to -major Dulong the command of 100 brave men, of his own -choice, to carry it. The valiant Dulong under cover of the -night reached the bridge, passed it notwithstanding the cuts in -it, surprised the guard, and put to the sword those who could not -escape. <em>In four hours the bridge was repaired</em>; general -Loison passed it and marched upon the bridge of Misserella, near -Villa da Ponte, where 800 Portuguese <em>well retrenched</em> defended -the passage. <em>A battalion and some brave men, again led by the -intrepid Dulong, forced the abbatis entered the entrenchments -and seized the bridge.</em>’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from the ‘<span lang="fr">Victoires et Conquêtes des Français</span>’.</em></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxvi"></a>[lxxxvi]</span></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The marshal held a council, at the end of which he called -major Dulong. It was nine o’clock in the evening. “I have -selected you from the army, he said to that brave officer, to seize -the bridge of Ponte Nova which the enemy are now cutting: -you must endeavour to surprise them. The time is favourable. -Attack, vigorously with the bayonet you will succeed or you will -die. I want no news save that of your success, send me no -other report, your silence will be sufficient in a contrary case. -Take a hundred men at your choice; they will be sufficient; add -<em>twenty-five dragoons</em>, <em>and kill their horses to make a rampart, -if it be necessary, on the middle of the bridge to sustain yourself -and remain master of the passage</em>.”’</p> - -<p>‘The major departed with determined soldiers and a Portuguese -guide who was tied with the leather slings of the muskets. -Arrived within pistol-shot of the bridge he saw the enemy <em>cutting -the last beam</em>. It was then one o’clock the rain fell -heavily and the enemy’s labourers being fatigued thought they -might take some repose before they finished their work. The -torrents descending from the mountains and the cavado itself -made such a noise that the march of the French was not heard, -the sentinel at the bridge was killed without giving any alarm, and -<em>Dulong with twenty-five grenadiers passed crawling on the -beam, one of them fell into the cavado but happily his fall -produced no effect</em>. The enemy’s advanced post of twenty-four -men was destroyed, &c. &c. The marshal, informed of this -happy event, came up in haste with the first troops he could find -<em>to defend the bridge and accelerate the passage of the army</em>; -<em>but the repairing was neither sufficiently prompt or solid to -prevent many brave soldiers perishing</em>. The marshal embraced -major Dulong, saying to him, “I thank you in the name -of France brave major; you have saved the army.”’</p> -</div> - -<p>Then follows a detailed account of the Misserella bridge, -or Saltador, and its abbatis and other obstacles; of -Dulong’s attack; of his being twice repulsed; and of his -carrying of the bridge, the Leaper as it was called, at the -third assault, falling dreadfully wounded at the moment of -victory; finally, of the care and devotion with which his -soldiers carried him on their shoulders during the rest of the -retreat. And the reader will observe that this account is not -a mere description in the body of the work, but a separate -paper in the Appendix, written by some officer evidently -well acquainted with all the facts, perhaps Dulong himself,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxvii"></a>[lxxxvii]</span> -and for the express purpose of correcting the errors of detail -in the body of that work. Theatrical to the critic, and -even ridiculous it may likely enough appear. The noble -courage and self-devotion of such a soldier as Dulong is -a subject which no person will ever expect a Quarterly -viewer to understand.</p> - -<p>In the foregoing comments I have followed the stream -of my own thoughts, rather than the order of the reviewer’s -criticisms; I must therefore retrace my steps to notice -some points which have been passed over. His observations -about Zaragoza have been already disposed of in my -reply to his first articles published in my fifth volume, but -his comments upon Catalonian affairs shall now be noticed.</p> - -<p>The assertion that lord Collingwood was incapable of -judging of the efforts of the Catalans, although he was in -daily intercourse with their chiefs, co-operating with their -armies and supplying them with arms and stores, <em>because -he was a seaman</em>, is certainly ingenious. It has just so much -of pertness in it as an Admiralty clerk of the Melville -school might be supposed to acquire by a long habit of -official insolence to naval officers, whose want of parliamentary -interest exposed them to the mortification of having -intercourse with him. And it has just so much of cunning -wisdom as to place it upon a par with that which dictated -the inquiry which we have heard was sent out to -sir John Warren during the late American war, namely, -“whether <em>light</em>—<em>very light</em> frigates, could not sail up the St. -Lawrence to Lake Ontario?” And with that surprising -providence, which did send out birch-brooms and tanks to -hold <em>fresh water</em> for the use of the ships on the said lake of -Ontario. But quitting these matters, the reviewer insinuates -what is absolutely untrue, namely, that I have only -quoted lord Collingwood as authority for my statements -about Catalonia. The readers of my work know that I -have adduced in testimony the Spanish generals themselves, -namely, Contreras, Lacy, and Rovira; the testimony -of sir Edward Codrington, of sir Edward Pellew, of -colonel Doyle, and of other Englishmen. That I have -referred to St. Cyr, Suchet, Lafaille, and other French -writers; that I have quoted Vacani and Cabane’s Histories,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxviii"></a>[lxxxviii]</span> -the first an Italian serving with the French army in Catalonia, -the last a Spaniard and chief of the staff to the Catalan -army: and now, to complete the reviewer’s discomfiture, -I will add the duke of Wellington, who is a landsman -and therefore according to this reviewer’s doctrine, -entitled to judge:—</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Letter to lord Liverpool, 19th Dec. 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘In Catalonia the resistance is more general and regular; but -still the people are of a description with which your armies could -not co-operate with any prospect of success, or even of safety. -You see what Burghersh says of the Somatenes; <em>and it is notorious -that the Catalans have at all times been the most irregular, -and the least to be depended upon of any of the Spaniards</em>.’</p> -</div> - -<p>So much for light frigates, birch-brooms, fresh-water -tanks, and Collingwood’s incapacity to judge of the Catalans, -<em>because he was a seaman</em>; and as for Reding’s complaints -of the Spaniards when dying, they must go to sir -George’s big book with this marginal note, that St. Cyr -is not the authority. But for the grand flourish, the threat -to prove at another time, ‘<em>from Wellington’s despatches</em>,’ -that the Spaniards gave excellent intelligence and made -<em>no false reports</em>, let the reader take the following testimony -in anticipation:—</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence, 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘At present I have no intelligence whatever, excepting the nonsense -I receive occasionally from ——; <em>as the Spaniards have -defeated all my attempts to obtain any by stopping those whom -I sent out to make inquiries</em>.’</p> - -<p>‘I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed -8,000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and you have been made acquainted -with the exact extent of it, <em>because</em>, the Duque del Albuquerque, -who is appointed to command it, <em>is interested in making -known the truth</em>; but they have <em>lied</em> about the cavalry ordered to -the Duque del Parque.’</p> - -<p>‘It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at -Seville <em>with their own false intelligence</em>.’</p> - -<p>‘It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads, -or any local circumstances, which must be considered in the decisions -to be formed respecting the march of troops.’</p> - -<p>1810. ‘We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxix"></a>[lxxxix]</span> -efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that -we know is the movement of troops at the moment, or probably -after it is made.’</p> - -<p>‘I have had accounts from the marquis de la Romana: he -tells me that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23d, <em>which -cannot be true</em>.’</p> - -<p>‘I believe there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection -at Madrid.’</p> - -<p>‘There is so far a foundation for the report of O’Donnel’s action, -as that it appears that Suchet’s advanced guard was at Lerida -on the 11th of April. It is doubtful, however, <em>according to my -experience of Spanish reports</em>, whether O’Donnel was beaten or -gained a victory.’</p> - -<p>‘I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution -in respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the marquis de la -Romana, <em>and all the Spanish officers</em>. It is obvious there is nothing -they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their operations. -This is evident both from the letters of the marquis himself, -and from the <em>false reports</em> made to lieutenant Heathcote of the -firing heard from Badajos at Albuquerque.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810. Cartaxo.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The circumstances which I have related above will show your -Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not -much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate -operations with a corps so ill-organised, <em>in possession of so -little intelligence</em>, and upon whose actions no reliance can be -placed. It will scarcely be credited that <em>the first intelligence -which general Mendizabal received of the assembling of the -enemy’s troops at Seville was from hence</em>.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Mendizabal, &c. &c., have sent us so many <em>false reports</em> that -I cannot make out what the French are doing.’</p> - -<p>‘This is a part of the system on which <em>all the Spanish authorities -have been acting</em>, to induce us to take a part in the desultory -operations which they are carrying on. <em>False reports -and deceptions of every description are tried</em>, and then popular -insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct.’</p> - -<p>‘The Spaniards take such bad care of their posts, and have so -little intelligence, that it is difficult to say by what troops the blow -has been struck.’</p> - -<p>‘It is strange that the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo should have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xc"></a>[xc]</span> -no intelligence of the enemy’s movements near his garrison, of -which we have received so many accounts.’</p> - -<p>‘We hear also a great deal of Blake’s army in the Alpujarras, -and of a corps from Valencia operating upon the enemy’s communications -with Madrid; but I conclude that there is as little foundation -for this intelligence as for that relating to the insurrection -of Ronda.’</p> - -<p>‘I enclose a letter from General Carrera, in which I have requested -him to communicate with you. I beg you to observe, -however, that very little reliance can be placed on the report made -to you <em>by any Spanish general at the head of a body of -troops</em>. They generally exaggerate on one side or the other; and -<em>make no scruple of communicating supposed intelligence, in order -to induce those to whom they communicate it to adopt a -certain line of conduct</em>.’</p> -</div> - -<p class="noindent">The reader must be now somewhat tired of quotations; let -us therefore turn for relaxation to the reviewer’s observations -about light troops,—of which he seems indeed to -know as much as the wise gentleman of the Admiralty did -about the facility of sailing up the St. Lawrence to Lake -Ontario; but though that wise gentleman did not know -much about sailing-craft, the reviewer knows something of -another kind of craft, namely misrepresentation. Thus he -quotes a passage from captain Kincaid’s amusing and clever -work as if it told in his favour; whereas it in no -manner supports his foolish insinuation—namely, that -the 43d and 52d regiments of the light division were not -light troops, never acted as such, and never skirmished! -Were he to say as much to the lowest bugler of these -corps, he would give him the fittest answer for his folly—that -is to say, laugh in his face.</p> - -<p>‘There are but two kinds of soldiers in the world’ said -Napoleon, ‘the good and the bad.’</p> - -<p>Now, the light division were not only good but, I will -say it fearlessly, the best soldiers in the world. The three -British regiments composing it had been formed by sir -John Moore precisely upon the same system. There was -no difference save in the colour of the riflemen’s jackets -and the weapons which they carried. Captain Kincaid’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xci"></a>[xci]</span> -observation, quoted by the reviewer, merely says, what is -quite true, that the riflemen fought in skirmishing order -more frequently than the 43d and 52d did. Certainly -they did, and for this very sufficient reason—their arms, -the rifle and sword, did not suit any other formation; it is -a defect in the weapon, which is inferior to the musket -and bayonet, fitted alike for close or open order. Napoleon -knew this so well that he had no riflemen in his army, -strange as it may appear to those persons who have read -so much about French riflemen. The riflemen of the -light division could form line, columns, and squares—could -move as a heavy body—could do, and did do everything -that the best soldiers in the world ought to do; and -in like manner the 52d and 43d regiments skirmished and -performed all the duties of light troops with the same facility -as the riflemen; but the difference of the weapon -made it advisable to use the latter nearly always in open -order: I do not, indeed, remember ever to have seen them -act against the enemy either in line or square. Captain -Kincaid is too sensible and too good a soldier, and far too -honest a man, to serve the purpose of this snarling blockhead, -who dogmatizes in defiance of facts and with a plenitude -of pompous absurdity that would raise the bile of -an alderman. Thus, after quoting from my work the numbers -of the French army, he thus proceeds:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘Notwithstanding that this enormous force was <em>pressing</em> upon -the <em>now unaided</em> Spanish people with <em>all its weight</em>, and acting -against them with its <em>utmost energy</em>, it proved wholly unable to -put down resistance.’—<cite>Review</cite>, page 497.</p> -</div> - -<p>Now this relates to the period following sir John Moore’s -death, which was on the 16th of January. That general’s -fine movement upon Sahagun, and his subsequent retreat, -had drawn the great bulk of the French forces towards -Gallicia, and had paralyzed many corps. The war with -Austria had drawn Napoleon himself and the imperial -guards away from the Peninsula. Joseph was establishing -his court at Madrid; Victor remained very inactive in -Estremadura; Soult marched into Portugal;—in fine, this -was precisely the period of the whole war in which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcii"></a>[xcii]</span> -French army were most insert. Napoleon has fixed upon -the four months of February, March, April, and May, 1809, -as the period in which the King let the Peninsula slip -from his feeble hands.</p> - -<p>Let us see then what the Spaniards did during that -time. And first it is false to say that they were unaided. -They were aided against Victor by the vicinity of sir John -Craddock’s troops; they were aided on the Gallician coast -by an English squadron; they were aided on the Beira -frontier, against Lapisse, by the Portuguese troops under -sir Robert Wilson; they were aided on the Catalonian -coast by lord Collingwood’s fleet; they were aided at -Cadiz by the presence of general M‘Kenzie’s troops, sent -from Lisbon; and they were aided everywhere by enormous -supplies of money arms and ammunition sent from England. -Finally, they were aided, and most powerfully so, by -sir John Moore’s generalship, which had enabled them to -rally and keep several considerable armies on foot in the -southern parts of the country. What did these armies—these -invincible Spaniards—do? They lost Zaragoza, -Monzon, and Jaca, in the east; the fortresses of Ferrol and -Coruña, and their fleet, in the north; they lost Estremadura, -La Mancha, Aragon, the Asturias, and Gallicia; they -lost the battles of Ucles and of Valls; the battle of -Monterrey, that of Ciudid Real, and the battle of Medellin. -They won nothing! they did not save themselves, it was -the <em>British army and the indolence and errors of the French -that saved them</em>.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Napoleon’s Memoirs.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘After the embarkation of the English army, the king of Spain -did nothing; <em>he lost four months</em>; he ought to have marched -upon Cadiz, upon Valencia, upon Lisbon; political means would -have done the rest.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence. 1809.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘It is obvious that the longer, and the more intimately we become -acquainted with the affairs of Spain, the less prospect do -they hold out of anything like a glorious result. The great extent -of the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an -enemy, and the enmity of the people towards the French may -spin out the war into length, and at last the French may find it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xciii"></a>[xciii]</span> -impossible to establish a government in the country; but there is -no prospect of a glorious termination to the contest.’</p> - -<p>‘After the perusal of these details, and of Soult’s letters, can -any one doubt that the evacuation of Gallicia was occasioned by -the operations of the British troops in Portugal?’</p> - -<p>‘The fact is, that the British army <em>has saved Spain and Portugal</em> -during this year.’</p> -</div> - -<p>The reviewer is not only a great critic, he is a great -general also. He has discovered that there are no positions -in the mountains of Portugal; nay, he will scarcely -allow that there are mountains at all; and he insists that -they offer no defence against an invader, but that the rivers -do—that the Douro defends the <em>eastern</em> frontier of Beira, -and that the frontier of Portugal generally is very compact -and strong for defence, and well suited for a weak army to -fight superior numbers;—that the weak army cannot be -turned and cut off from Lisbon, and the strong army must -invade in mass and by one line.</p> - -<p>Now, first, it so happened, unluckily for this lucid military -notion of Portugal, that in Massena’s invasion lord -Wellington stopped to fight on the mountain of Busaco, and -stopped Massena altogether at the mountains of Alhandra, -Aruda, Sobral, and Torres Vedras—in other words at the -lines, and that he did not once stop him or attempt to stop -him by defending a river. That Massena, in his retreat, -stopped lord Wellington on the mountain of Santarem, -attempted to stop him on the mountains of Cazal Nova, -Moita, and Guarda, but never attempted to stop him by -defending a river, save at Sabugal, and then he was instantly -beaten. Oh, certainly, ’tis a most noble general, -and a very acute critic! Nevertheless, I must support my -own opinions about the frontier of Portugal, the non-necessity -of invading this country in one mass, and the unfordable -nature of the Tagus, by the testimony of two generals -as distinguished as honest Iago.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract of a letter from sir John Moore.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I am not prepared at this moment to answer minutely your -lordship’s question respecting the defence of Portugal; but I can -say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xciv"></a>[xciv]</span> -against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, -but all equally to be penetrated.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will -probably make his attack by <em>two distinct lines</em>, the one north the -other south of the Tagus; and the system of defence must be -founded upon this general basis. In the summer season, however, -the <em>Tagus being fordable</em>, &c. &c., care must be taken that the -enemy does not by his attack directed from the south of the Tagus -and by the passage of that river, <em>cut off from Lisbon the British -army engaged in operations to the north of the Tagus</em>.’</p> - -<p>‘The line of frontier to Portugal is so long in proportion to the -extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains -separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it -is so open in many parts, that it would be <em>impossible for an army -acting upon the defensive to carry on its operations upon the -frontier without being cut off from the capital</em>.’</p> - -<p>‘In the summer it is probable as I have before stated that the -enemy will make his attacks in two principal corps, and that he -will also push on through the mountains between Castello Branco -and Abrantes. His object will be by means of his corps, <em>south -of the Tagus</em>, to turn the positions which might be taken in his -front on the north of that river; <em>to cut off from Lisbon the corps -opposed to him</em>; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear -at the same time. This can be avoided only <em>by the retreat of -the right centre and left of the allies, and their junction at a -point, at which from the state of the river they cannot be -turned by the passage of the Tagus by the enemy’s left</em>. The -first point of defence which presents itself below that at which -the Tagus ceases to be fordable, is the river Castenheira close to -the lines.’</p> -</div> - -<p>In the above extracts, the fordable nature of the Tagus -has been pretty clearly shown, but I will continue my proofs -upon that fact to satiety.</p> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Lord Wellington to Charles Stuart, Esq.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘The line of operations which we are obliged to adopt for the -defence of Lisbon and for our own embarkation necessarily -throws us back as far as below Salvaterra on the Tagus, to which -place, and I believe lower, <em>the Tagus is fordable during the -summer</em>; and we should be liable to be turned or cut off from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcv"></a>[xcv]</span> -Lisbon and the Tagus if we were to take our line of defence higher -upon the river.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Lord Wellington to general Hill, August.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might -<em>move across the fords of the Tagus at Vilha Velha</em> and thus -turn your right.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Lord Wellington to general Hill, October.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘If there are no boats, send them (the sick and encumbrances) -<em>across the Tagus by the ford</em> (at Santarem).’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to general Hill.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have, -<em>with some of the fords of the Tagus</em> marked upon it, but I believe -<em>the whole river from Barquina to Santarem is fordable</em>.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to marshal Beresford.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘I enclose a letter which colonel Fletcher has given me, <em>which -affords but a bad prospect of a defence for the Tagus</em>. I think -that if captain Chapman’s facts are true his arguments are unanswerable, -and that it is very doubtful whether any heavy ordnance -should be placed in the batteries on the upper Tagus.’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to admiral Berkeley.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘But if the invasion should be made in summer, <em>when the -Tagus is fordable in many places</em>.’... ‘In the event of the -attack being made <em>between the months of June and November</em>, -when the <em>Tagus is fordable, at least as low down as Salvaterra</em> -(near the lines).’</p> -</div> - - -<p class="p1 right"><em>Sir John Craddock to lord Castlereagh, April.</em></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘There is a ferry at Salvaterra, near Alcantara, and another up -the left bank of the Tagus in the Alemtejo, <em>where there is also a -ford</em>, and the river may be easily passed.’</p> -</div> - - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p><em>Extract from a Memoir by sir B. D’Urban, quarter-master-general -to Beresford’s army</em>:—‘<em>The Tagus</em>, between -Golegao and Rio Moinhos was <em>known to offer several fords after -a few days’ dry weather</em>.’<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> -</div> - -<p>Thus we see that, in nearly every month in the year, this -unfordable Tagus of the reviewer is fordable in many places, -and that in fact it is no barrier except in very heavy rains. -But to render this still clearer I will here give one more -and conclusive proof. In an elaborate manuscript memoir -upon the defence of Portugal, drawn up by the celebrated -general Dumourier for the duke of Wellington, that officer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcvi"></a>[xcvi]</span> -argues like this reviewer, that the Tagus is unfordable and -a strong barrier. But a marginal note in Wellington’s -hand-writing runs thus:—‘<em>He (Dumourier) does not seem -to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season</em>.’</p> - -<p>What can I say more? Nothing upon this head, but -much upon others. I can call upon the reader to trace the -deceitful mode in which the reviewer perverts or falsifies -my expressions throughout. How he represents the Spaniards -at one moment so formidable as to resist successfully -the utmost efforts of more than 300,000 soldiers, the next -breath calls them a poor unarmed horde of peasants incapable -of making any resistance at all. How he quotes me -as stating that the ministers had unbounded confidence in -the success of the struggle in Spain; whereas my words -are, that the ministers <em>professed</em> unbounded confidence. -How he represents me as saying, the <em>Cabinet</em> were too -much dazzled to analyse the real causes of the Spanish Revolution; -whereas it was the <em>nation</em> not the <em>Cabinet</em> of -which I spoke. And this could not be mistaken, because I -had described the ministers as only anxious to pursue a -warlike system necessary to their own existence, and that -they were actuated by a personal hatred of Napoleon. -Again, how he misrepresents me as wishing the British to -<em>seize</em> Cadiz, and speaks of a <em>mob</em> in that city, when I have -spoken only of the <em>people</em> (oh, true Tory!); and never -proposed to seize Cadiz at all, and have also given the unexceptionable -authority of Mr. Stuart, general M‘Kenzie, -and sir George Smith, for my statement. And here I will -notice a fine specimen of this reviewer’s mode of getting up -a case. Having undertaken to prove that every river in -Portugal is a barrier, except the Zezere which I had fixed -upon as being an important line, he gives an extract of a -letter from lord Wellington to a general <em>Smith</em>, to the -effect that, as the Zezere might be <em>turned at that season</em> -in so many ways, he did not wish to construct works to -defend it then. Now, first, it is necessary to inform the -reader that there is no letter to general Smith. The letter -in question was to general Leith, and the <em>mistake</em> was not -without its object, namely, to prevent any curious person -from discovering that the very next sentence is as follows:—‘If,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcvii"></a>[xcvii]</span> -however, this work can be performed, either by the -peasantry or by the troops, without any great inconvenience, -<em>the line of the Zezere may, hereafter, become of very great -importance</em>.’</p> - -<p>All this is very pitiful, and looks like extreme soreness -in the reviewer; but the effrontery with which he perverts -my statements about the Austrian war surpasses all his -other efforts in that line, and deserves a more elaborate -exposure.</p> - -<p>In my history it is stated, that some obscure intrigues -of the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies -on the continent, emanating from patrician sources, excited -the sympathy, and nourished certain <em>distempered feelings</em> -in the English ministers, <em>which feeling</em> made them see -only weakness and disaffection in France. This I stated, -because I knew that those intrigues were, in fact, a conspiracy -concocted, with Talleyrand’s connivance, for the -dethronement of Napoleon; and the English ministers -neglected Spain and every other part of their foreign affairs -for the moment, so intent were they upon this foolish -scheme and so sanguine of success. These facts are not -known to many, but they are true.</p> - -<p>In the same paragraph of my history it is said, the <em>warlike -preparations of Austria</em>, and the reputation of the -archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed -Napoleon’s, <em>had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions</em>; -meaning, as would be evident to any persons not -wilfully blind, had awakened that dormant spirit in the -English ministers.</p> - -<p>Now reader, mark the candour and simplicity of the reviewer. -He says that I condemned these ministers, ‘for -nourishing their distempered feelings <em>by combining the -efforts of a German monarch in favour of national independence</em>.’ -As if it were the <em>Austrian war</em>, and not the -<em>obscure intrigues for dethroning Napoleon</em> that the expression -of <em>distempered feelings</em> applied to. As if the awakening -the <em>dormant spirit of coalitions</em>, instead of being -a reference to the sentiments of the English ministers, -meant the exciting the Austrians and other nations to war, -and the forming of a vast plan of action by those ministers!<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcviii"></a>[xcviii]</span> -And for fear any mistake on that head should -arise, it is so asserted in another part of the review in -the following terms:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>‘<em>To have “awakened the dormant spirit”</em> of <em>coalitions</em>, is -another of the crimes which the British ministers are charged -with, as if it would have been a proof of wisdom to have abstained -from <em>forming a combination of those states of Europe which -still retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to -resist a conqueror</em>,’ &c. &c.—<cite>Review.</cite></p> -</div> - -<p>The Quarterly’s attention to Spanish affairs seems to -have rendered it very intimate with the works of Ferdinand -Mendez Pinto. But since it has thus claimed the Austrian -war as the work of its former patrons, the ministers of -1809, I will throw some new light upon the history of that -period, which, though they should prove little satisfactory -to the Quarterly, may, as the details are really curious, -in some measure repay the reader for his patience in wading -through the tedious exposition of this silly and unscrupulous -writer’s misrepresentations.</p> - -<p>After the conference of Erfurth, the Austrian count -Stadion, a man of ability and energy, either believing, or -affecting to believe, that Napoleon was determined to destroy -Austria and only waited until Spain was conquered, -resolved to employ the whole force of the German empire -against the French monarch in a war of destruction for one -or other of the contending states. With this view his -first efforts were directed to change the opinions of the -archduke Charles and those immediately about him who -were averse to a war; and though he was long and vigorously -resisted by general Grün, an able man and the -archduke’s confidant, he finally succeeded. Some time -before this France had insisted upon a reduction of the -Austrian forces, and being asked if she would do the same -for the sake of peace, replied that she would maintain no -more troops in Germany than should be found necessary; -but the army of the Confederation must be kept up as a -constitutional force, and it was impossible during the war -with England to reduce the French troops in other quarters. -To this succeeded an attempt at a triple treaty, by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xcix"></a>[xcix]</span> -which the territories of Austria, Russia, and France, were -to be mutually guaranteed. Champagny and Romanzow -suggested this plan, but the Austrian minister did not conceive -Russia strong enough to guarantee Austria against -France. Stadion’s project was more agreeable, and a note -of a declaration of war was sent to Metternich, then at -Paris, to deliver to the French government. The archduke -Charles set off for the army, and was followed by the -emperor.</p> - -<p>When the war was thus resolved upon, it remained to -settle whether it should be carried on for the sole benefit -of Austria, or in such a manner as to interest other nations. -Contrary to her usual policy Austria decided for -the latter, and contrary to her usual parsimony she was -extremely liberal to her general officers and spies. It was -determined that the war should be one of restitution, and -in that view secret agents had gone to Italy, and were -said to have made great progress in exciting the people; -officers had been also sent to Sicily and Sardinia to urge -those courts to attempt their own restoration to the continental -thrones. The complete restoration of Naples, of -Tuscany, and the Pope’s dominions, and large additions -to the old kingdom of Piedmont were proposed, and -Austria herself only demanded a secure frontier, namely, -the Tyrol, the river Po, and the Chiusa, which was not -much more than the peace of Campo Formio had left -her.</p> - -<p>Such were her views in the south where kings were to -be her coadjutors, but in the north she was intent upon a -different plan. There she expected help from the people, -who were discontented at being parcelled out by Napoleon. -Treaties were entered into with the elector of Hesse, the -dukes of Brunswick and Oels, and it was understood that -the people there and in the provinces taken from Prussia, -were ready to rise on the first appearance of an Austrian -soldier. Hanover was to be restored to England; but -Austria was so discontented with the Prussian king, that -the restoration of the Prussian provinces, especially the -duchy of Warsaw, was to depend upon his conduct in -the war.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_c"></a>[c]</span></p> - -<p>The means of effecting this mighty project were the -great resources which Stadion had found or created; they -were greater than Austria had ever before produced and -the enthusiasm of her people was in proportion. The -landwehr levy had been calculated at only 150 battalions; -it produced 300 battalions, besides the Hungarian insurrection. -The regular army was complete in everything, and -the cavalry good, though not equal to what it had been in -former wars. There were nine ‘<i lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>.’ The -archduke Ferdinand with one was to strike a blow in the -duchy of Warsaw. The archduke Charles commanded -in chief. Marching with six corps, containing 160,000 -regular troops besides the landwehr attached to them, he -was to cross the frontier and fall on the French army, supposed -to be only 40,000. That is to say, the first corps, -under Belgarde and Klenau, were to march by Peterwalde -and Dresden against Bernadotte who was in that quarter. -The second corps, under Kollowrath and Brady, were to -march by Eger upon Bareith and Wurzburg, to prevent -the union of Davoust and Bernadotte. The third corps, -under prince Rosenberg, was to move by Waldmunchen, -in the Upper Palatinate, and after beating Wrede at -Straubingen, to join the archduke Charles near Munich. -The archduke himself was to proceed against that -city with the reserves of prince John of Lichtenstein, -Hiller’s corps, Stipchitz, and those of Hohenzollern’s, and -the archduke Louis’. The archduke John was to attack -Italy; and the different corps, exclusive of landwehr, -amounted to not less than 260,000 men.</p> - -<p>The project was gigantic, the force prodigious, and -though the quarter-master-general Meyer, seeing the vice -of the military plan, resigned his situation, and that -Meerfelt quarrelled with the archduke Charles, the general -feeling was high and sanguine; and the princes of the -empire were, with the exception of Wirtemberg and Westphalia, -thought to be rather favourable towards the -Austrians. But all the contributions were in kind; -Austria had only a depreciated paper currency which -would not serve her beyond her own frontiers; wherefore -England, at that time the paymaster of all Europe,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ci"></a>[ci]</span> -was looked to. England, however, had no ambassador, -no regular accredited agent at Vienna; all this mighty -armament and plan were carried on without her aid, -almost without her knowledge; and a despatch from the -Foreign Office, dated the 8th of December, but which -only arrived the 10th of March, <em>refused all aid whatsoever! -and even endeavoured to prove that Austria could not -want, and England was not in a situation to grant</em>. Yet -this was the period in which such lavish grants had been -made to Spain without any condition—so lavish, that, -in Cadiz, nearly four hundred thousand pounds, received -from England, was lying untouched by the Spaniards. -They were absolutely glutted with specie, for they -had, at that moment, of their own money, and lying idle -in their treasury, <em>fourteen millions of dollars</em>, and <em>ten -millions more were on the way from Vera Cruz and Buenes -Ayres</em>. Such was the wisdom, such the providence of the -English ministers! heaping money upon money at Cadiz, -where it was not wanted, and if it had been wanted, ill -bestowed; but refusing it to Austria to forward the -explosion of the enormous mine prepared against Napoleon -in Germany and Italy. Their agent, Mr. Frere, absolutely -refused even to ask for a loan of some of this money from -the Spaniards. This is what the reviewer, wilfully perverting -my expression, namely, ‘<em>awakened the dormant -spirit of coalitions</em>,’ calls ‘<em>the forming a combination of -the states of Europe</em>!’ The English ministers were -treated as mere purse-bearers, to be bullied or cajoled as -the case might be; and in these two instances, not without -reason, for they neither know how to give nor how to -refuse in the right time or place. Nor were their military -dispositions better arranged, as we shall presently see.</p> - -<p>To proceed with our narrative. Stadion, to prevent the -mischief which this despatch from England might have -produced, by encouraging the peace-party at the court, -and discouraging the others, only imparted it to the -emperor and his secret council, but hid it from those -members of the cabinet who were wavering. Even this -was like to have cost him his place; and some members -of the council actually proposed to reduce one-third of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_cii"></a>[cii]</span> -army. In fine, a cry was arising against the war, but the -emperor declared himself on Stadion’s side, and the cabinet -awaited the result of count Walmoden’s mission to London. -That nobleman had been despatched with full powers to -conclude a treaty of alliance and subsidy with England, -and to learn the feeling of the English cabinet upon an -extraordinary measure which Austria had resorted to; for -being utterly unable to pay her way at the outset, and -trusting to the importance of the crisis, and not a little to -the known facility with which the English ministers -lavished their subsidies, she had resolved to raise, through -the principal bankers in Vienna, £150,000 a month, by -making drafts through Holland upon their correspondents -in London, <em>to be repaid from the subsidy</em> <span class="allsmcap">TO BE</span> granted by -England! Prince Staremberg was sent at the same time -with a special mission to London, to arrange a definite -treaty for money, and a convention regulating the future -object and conduct of the war—a very curious proceeding—because -Staremberg had been recalled before for conduct -offensive to the English cabinet; but he was well -acquainted with London, and the emperor wished to get -him away lest he should put himself at the head of the -peace-party in Vienna. Thus the English ministers continued -so to conduct their affairs, that, while they gave -their money to Spain and their advice to Austria, and -both unprofitably, they only excited the contempt of both -countries.</p> - -<p>From the conference of Erfurth, France had been -earnest with Russia to take an active part, according to -treaty, against Austria; and Romanzow, who was an -enemy of England, increased Alexander’s asperity toward -that country, but nothing was done against Austria; and -when Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at Petersburg, -became clamorous, Alexander pretended to take the -Austrian ambassador Swartzenberg to task for the measures -of his court, but really gave him encouragement, -by repairing immediately afterwards to Finland without -inviting Caulaincourt. A contemporaneous official note, -from Romanzow to Austria, was indeed couched in terms -to render the intention of Alexander apparently doubtful,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ciii"></a>[ciii]</span> -but this was only a blind for Napoleon. There was no -doubt of the favourable wishes and feelings of the court, -the Russian troops in Poland did not stir, and Stadion, -far from having any dread of them, calculated upon their -assistance in case of any marked success in the outset. -The emperor Alexander was, however, far from inattentive -to his own interests, for he sent general Hitroff at this -time to Turkey to demand Moldavia and Wallachia as the -price of a treaty, hoping thus to snatch these countries -during the general commotion. He was foiled by the -Austrian cabinet, which secretly directed the Turks sent -to meet Hitroff, to assume a high tone and agree to no -negociation in which England was not a party: hence, -when the Russians demanded the dismissal of Mr. Adair -from Constantinople Hitroff was himself sent away.</p> - -<p>While the affairs with Russia were in this state, the -present king of Holland arrived, incognito, at Vienna, to -offer his services either as heir to the stadtholdership, as a -prince of the German empire, or as a near and confidential -connection of the house of Brandenberg; but it was only -in the latter view he could be useful, and it was evident -he expected the Austrian court would make their policy in -the north coincide with that of the Prussian court. He -said the secret voyage of the royal family to Petersburg -had exposed them to mortifications and slights which -had changed the sentiments of both the king and queen -towards France, and the queen, bowed down by misfortune, -dreaded new reverses and depressed the spirit of -the king. They stood alone in their court, ministers -and officers alike openly maintained opinions diametrically -opposed to the sovereign, and at a grand -council held in Koningsberg every minister had voted for -war with Napoleon. The king assented, but the next day -the queen induced him to retract. However, the voice of -the people and of the army was for war, and any order to -join the troops to those of the Rhenish confederation was -sure to produce an explosion. There were between 30,000 -and 40,000 regular troops under arms, and Austria was -assured, that if any Austrian force approached the frontier,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_civ"></a>[civ]</span> -the Prussian soldiers would, bag and baggage, join it, -despite of king or queen.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs, and when a quarrel had arisen -between Bernadotte and the Saxon king (for the people of -that country were ill-disposed towards the French), it is -evident that a large English army appearing in the north -of Germany would have gathered around it all the people -and armies of the north, and accordingly Stadion proposed -a landing in the Weser and the Elbe. Now England had -at that time the great armament which went to Walcheren, -the army under Wellington in the Peninsula, and that -under sir John Stuart in Sicily, that is to say, she had -about 80,000 or 90,000 men disposable; and yet so contriving -were the ministers, that they kept Wellington too -weak in Spain, Stuart too strong in Sicily; and instead of -acting in the north of Germany where such a great combination -awaited them, they sent their most powerful force -to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, where the only -diversion they caused was the bringing together a few -thousand national guards from the nearest French departments. -And this the reviewer calls ‘<em>the forming a combination -of those states in Europe which still retained some -degree of independence and magnanimity to resist the ambition -of a conqueror</em>.’ What a profound, modest, and, to -use a Morning Post compound, not-at-all-a-flagitious -writer this reviewer is.</p> - -<p>Well, notwithstanding this grand ‘<em>combination</em>,’ things -did not turn out well. The Austrians changed their first -plan of campaign in several particulars. Napoleon suddenly -and unexpectedly appeared at the head of his army, -which, greatly inferior in number, and composed principally -of German contingents, was not very well disposed -towards him; and yet, such was the stupendous power of -this man’s genius and bravery, he in a few days by a -series of movements unequalled in skill by any movement -known in military records, broke through the Austrian -power, separated her armies, drove them in disorder before -him, and seized Vienna; and but for an accident, one of -those minor accidents so frequent in war, which enabled<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_cv"></a>[cv]</span> -the archduke Charles to escape over the Danube at -Ratisbon, he would have terminated this gigantic contest -in ten days. The failure there led to the battle of Esling, -where the sudden swell of the Danube again baffled him -and produced another crisis, which might have been turned -to his hurt if the English army had been in the north of -Germany; but it was then perishing amongst the stagnant -ditches of Walcheren, and the only combination of the -English ministers to be discovered was a combination of -folly, arrogance, and conceit. I have now done with the -review. Had all the objections contained in it been true, -it would have evinced the petty industry of a malicious -mind more than any just or generous interest in the cause -of truth; but being, as I have demonstrated, false even -in the minutest particular, I justly stigmatise it as remarkable -only for malignant imbecility and systematic violation -of truth.</p> - -<hr class="r20"> - -<p>The reviewers having asserted that I picked out of Foy’s -history the charge against lord Melville of saying “the -worst men made the best soldiers,” I replied that I drew -for it on my own clear recollection of the fact.</p> - -<p>Since then a friend has sent me the report of lord Melville’s -speech, extracted from the Annual Register (Baldwin’s) -1808, p. 112, and the following passage extracted -from his lordship’s speech bears out my assertion and -proves the effrontery with which the reviewers deny facts.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“What was meant by a better sort of men? Was it that they -should be taller or shorter, broader or thinner? This might be -intelligible, but it was not the fact. The men that had hitherto -formed the British armies were men of stout hearts and habits; -men of spirit and courage; lovers of bold enterprize. These -were the materials of which an army must be composed. Give -him such men though not of the better description. <em>The worse -men were the fittest for soldiers.</em> Keep the better sort at home.”</p> -</div> - - -<hr class="p4 chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p6 pfs150">HISTORY</p> - -<p class="p3 pfs70">OF THE</p> - -<p class="p1 p4b pfs180">WAR IN THE PENINSULA.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1"></a>[Pg 1]</span><br></p> - -<p class="pfs150 lsp3 bold" id="HISTORY">HISTORY</p> - -<p class="p3 pfs70">OF THE</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs180 lsp2">PENINSULAR WAR.</p> - - -<hr class="r30"> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XXI">BOOK XXI.</h2> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p class="noindent">The fate of Spain was decided at Vittoria, but on<span class="sidenote9">1813. June.</span> -the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon’s genius -restored the general balance, and the negociations -which followed those victories affected the war in -the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington’s first intention was to reduce -Pampeluna by force, and the sudden fall of the -Pancorbo forts, which opened the great Madrid -road was a favourable event; but Portugal being -relinquished as a place of arms, a new base of -operations was required, lest a change of fortune -should force the allies to return to that country -when all the great military establishments were -broken up, when the opposition of the native -government to British influence was become rancorous, -and the public sentiment quite averse to -English supremacy. The Western Pyrenees, in -conjunction with the ocean, offered such a base, -yet the harbours were few, and the English general -desired to secure a convenient one, near the new<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2"></a>[2]</span> -positions of the army; wherefore to reduce San -Sebastian was of more immediate importance than -to reduce Pampeluna; and it was essential to effect -this during the fine season because the coast was -iron-bound and very dangerous in winter.</p> - -<p>Pampeluna was strong. A regular attack required -three weeks for the bringing up of ordnance and -stores, five or six weeks more for the attack, and -from fifteen to twenty thousand of the best men, -because British soldiers were wanted for the -assault; but an investment could be maintained by -fewer and inferior troops, Spaniards and Portuguese, -and the enemy’s magazines were likely to -fail under blockade sooner than his ramparts would -crumble under fire. Moreover on the eastern coast -misfortune and disgrace had befallen the English -arms. Sir John Murray had failed at Taragona. -He had lost the honoured battering-train intrusted to -his charge, and his artillery equipage was supposed -to be ruined. The French fortresses in Catalonia -and Valencia were numerous, the Anglo-Sicilian -army could neither undertake an important siege, -nor seriously menace the enemy without obtaining -some strong place as a base. Suchet was therefore -free to march on Zaragoza, and uniting with -Clauzel and Paris, to operate with a powerful mass -against the right flank of the allies. For these -reasons Wellington finally concluded to blockade -Pampeluna and besiege San Sebastian, and the -troops, as they returned from the pursuit of Clauzel,<span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -marched to form a covering army in the mountains. -The peasantry of the vicinity were then employed -on the works of the blockade which was ultimately -intrusted to O’Donnel’s Andalusian reserve.</p> - -<p>Confidently did the English general expect the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3"></a>[3]</span> -immediate fall of San Sebastian, and he was intent -to have it before the negociations for the armistice -in Germany should terminate; but mighty pains -and difficulties awaited him, and ere these can be -treated of, the progress of the war in other parts, -during his victorious march from Portugal to the -Pyrenees, must be treated of.</p> - - -<h4>CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE -EASTERN COAST.</h4> - -<p>It will be remembered that the duke Del Parque<span class="sidenote9">Vol. V. p. 512.</span> -was to move from the Sierra Morena, by Almanza, -to join Elio, whose army had been reinforced from -Minorca; the united troops were then to act against -Suchet, on the Xucar, while sir John Murray -sailed to attack Taragona. Del Parque received -his orders the 24th of April, he had long known -of the project and the march was one of twelve -days, yet he did not reach his destination until the -end of May. This delay resulted, partly from the -bad state of his army, partly from the usual procrastination -of Spaniards, partly from the conduct -of Elio, whose proceedings, though probably -springing from a dislike to serve under Del Parque, -created doubts of his own fidelity.</p> - -<p>It has been already shewn, how, contrary to his -agreement with Murray, Elio withdrew his cavalry<span class="sidenote9">Vol. V. p. 460.</span> -when Mijares was at Yecla, whence sprung that -general’s misfortune; how he placed the regiment -of Velez Malaga in Villena, a helpless prey for -Suchet; how he left the Anglo-Sicilian army to -fight the battle of Castalla unaided. He now -persuaded Del Parque to move towards Utiel -instead of Almanza, and to send a detachment -under Mijares to Requeña, thereby threatening<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4"></a>[4]</span> -Suchet’s right, but exposing the Spanish army to a -sudden blow, and disobeying his instructions which -prescribed a march by Almanza.</p> - -<p>This false movement Elio represented as Del<span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -Parque’s own, but the latter, when Murray remonstrated, -quickly approached Castalla by Jumilla, -declaring his earnest desire to obey Wellington’s -orders. The divergence of his former march had, -however, already placed him in danger; his left -flank was so exposed, while coming by Jumilla, -that Murray postponed his own embarkation to -concert with Elio a combined operation, from Biar -and Sax, against Fuente de la Higuera where -Suchet’s troops were lying in wait. Previous to -this epoch Elio had earnestly urged the English -general, to disregard Del Parque altogether and -embark at once for Taragona, undertaking himself -to secure the junction with his fellow-commander. -And now, after agreeing to co-operate with Murray -he secretly withdrew his cavalry from Sax, sent -Whittingham in a false direction, placed Roche -without support at Alcoy, retired himself to the -city of Murcia, and at the same time one of his -regiments quartered at Alicant fired upon a British -guard. Roche was attacked and lost eighty men, and -Del Parque’s flank was menaced from Fuente de la -Higuera, but the British cavalry, assembling at -Biar, secured his communication with Murray on -the 25th, and the 27th the Anglo-Sicilians broke -up from their quarters to embark at Alicant.</p> - -<p>The French were now very strong. Suchet unmolested -for forty days after the battle of Castalla, -had improved his defensive works, chased the -bands from his rear, called up his reinforcements, -rehorsed his cavalry and artillery, and prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5"></a>[5]</span> -for new operations, without losing the advantage -of foraging the fertile districts immediately in front -of the Xucar. On the other hand lord William -Bentinck, alarmed by intelligence of an intended -descent upon Sicily, had recalled more British -troops; and as Whittingham’s cavalry, and Roche’s -division, were left at Alicant, the force actually -embarked to attack Taragona, including a fresh -English regiment from Carthagena, scarcely exceeded -fourteen thousand present under arms. Of<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6.</a></span> -these, less than eight thousand were British or -German, and the horsemen were only seven hundred. -Yet the armament was formidable, for the -battering train was complete and powerful, the materials -for gabions and fascines previously collected at -Ivica, and the naval squadron, under admiral Hallowel, -consisted of several line-of-battle ships, frigates, -bomb-vessels and gun-boats, besides the transports. -There was however no cordiality between general -Clinton and Murray, nor between the latter and his -quarter-master-general Donkin, nor between Donkin -and the admiral; subordinate officers also, in both -services, adopting false notions, some from vanity, -some from hearsay, added to the uneasy feeling -which prevailed amongst the chiefs. Neither -admiral nor general seem to have had sanguine -hopes of success even at the moment of embarkation, -and there was in no quarter a clear understanding -of lord Wellington’s able plan for the -operations.</p> - -<p>While Del Parque’s army was yet in march, -Suchet, if he had no secret understanding with Elio -or any of his officers, must have been doubtful of -the allies’ intentions, although the strength of the -battering-train at Alicant indicated some siege of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6"></a>[6]</span> -importance. He however recalled Pannetier’s brigade -from the frontier of Aragon, and placed it on -the road to Tortoza; and at the same time, knowing -Clauzel was then warring down the partidas -in Navarre, he judged Aragon safe, and drew Severoli’s -Italian brigade from thence, leaving only -the garrisons, and a few thousand men under -general Paris as a reserve at Zaragoza: and this -was the reason the army of Aragon did not co-operate -to crush Mina after his defeat by Clauzel<span class="sidenote9">Vol. V. p. 495.</span> -in the valley of Roncal. Decaen also sent some -reinforcements, wherefore, after completing his garrisons, -Suchet could furnish the drafts required by -Napoleon, and yet bring twenty thousand men into -the field. He was however very unquiet, and notwithstanding -Clauzel’s operations, in fear for his -troops in Aragon, where Paris had been attacked -by Goyan, even in Zaragoza; moreover now, for -the first time since its subjugation, an unfriendly -feeling was perceptible in Valencia.</p> - -<p>On the 31st of May Murray sailed from Alicant. -Suchet immediately ordered Pannetier’s brigade to -close towards Tortoza, but kept his own positions -in front of Valencia until the fleet was seen to pass -the Grāo with a fair wind. Then feeling assured -the expedition aimed at Catalonia, he prepared to -aid that principality; but the column of succour -being drawn principally from the camp of Xativa, -forty miles from Valencia, he could not quit the -latter before the 7th of June. He took with him<span class="sidenote7">June.</span> -nine thousand men of all arms, leaving Harispe on -the Xucar, with seven thousand infantry and cavalry, -exclusive of Severoli’s troops which were -in full march from Teruel. Meanwhile sir John -Murray’s armament, having very favourable weather,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7"></a>[7]</span> -anchored on the evening of the 2d in the bay of -Taragona, whence five ships of war under captain -Adam, and two battalions of infantry with some guns -under colonel Prevot, were detached to attack San -Felippe de Balaguer.</p> - -<p>The strength and value of this fort arose from its -peculiar position. The works, garrisoned by a -hundred men, were only sixty feet square, but the -site was a steep isolated rock, standing in the -very gorge of a pass, and blocking the only carriageway -from Tortoza to Taragona. The mountains on -either hand, although commanding the fort, were -nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labour was -required to form the batteries.</p> - -<p>Prevot, landing on the 3d, was joined by a -Spanish brigade of Copons’ army, and in concert -with the navy immediately commenced operations -by placing two six-pounders on the heights south -of the pass, from whence at six or seven hundred -yards distance they threw shrapnel-shells; but this -projectile is, when used with guns of small calibre, -insignificant save as a round shot.</p> - -<p>On the 4th two twelve-pounders, and a howitzer, -being brought to the same point by the sailors, -opened their fire, and at night the seamen with extraordinary -exertions dragged up five twenty-four-pounders -and their stores. The troops then constructed -one battery, for two howitzers, on the -slope of the grand ridge to the northward of the -pass, and a second, for four heavy guns, on the -rock where the fort stood at a distance of one -hundred and fifty yards. To form these batteries -earth was carried from below, and every thing -else, even water, brought from the ships, though the -landing place was more than a mile and a half off.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8"></a>[8]</span> -Hence, as time was valuable, favourable terms -were offered to the garrison, but the offer was refused. -The 5th the fire was continued, but with -slight success, the howitzer battery on the great -ridge was relinquished, and at night a very violent -storm retarded the construction of the breaching -batteries. Previous to this colonel Prevot had -warned Murray, that his means were insufficient, -and a second Spanish brigade was sent to him. -Yet the breaching batteries were still incomplete -on the 6th, so severe was the labour of carrying -up the guns, and out of three, already mounted, one -was disabled by a shot from the fort.</p> - -<p>Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortoza, -had ordered the governor of that place to succour -San Felippe. He tried, and would undoubtedly -have succeeded, if captain Peyton, of the Thames -frigate, had not previously obtained from admiral -Hallowel two eight-inch mortars, which, being<span class="sidenote">Notes by sir Henry Peyton, R.N. MSS.</span> -placed just under the fort and worked by Mr. -James of the marine artillery, commencing at day-break -on the 7th, soon exploded a small magazine in -the fort, whereupon the garrison surrendered. The -besiegers who had lost about fifty men and officers -then occupied the place, and meanwhile sir John -Murray had commenced the</p> - - -<h4>SECOND SIEGE OF TARAGONA.</h4> - -<p>Although the fleet cast anchor in the bay on the -evening of the 2d, the surf prevented the disembarkation -of the troops until the next day. The -rampart of the lower town had been destroyed by -Suchet, but Fort Royal remained and though in bad -condition served, together with the ruins of the San -Carlos bastion, to cover the western front which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9"></a>[9]</span> -was the weakest line of defence. The governor -Bertoletti, an Italian, was supposed by Murray to -be disaffected, but he proved himself a loyal and -energetic officer; and his garrison sixteen hundred -strong, five hundred being privateer seamen and -Franco-Spaniards, served him well.</p> - -<p>The Olivo, and Loretto heights were occupied -the first day by Clinton’s and Whittingham’s divisions, -the other troops remaining on the low ground -about the Francoli river; the town was then bombarded -during the night by the navy, but the fire -was sharply returned and the flotilla suffered the most. -The next day two batteries were commenced six -hundred yards from San Carlos, and nine hundred -yards from Fort Royal. They opened the 6th, but -being too distant to produce much effect, a third -was commenced six hundred yards from Fort -Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in -that outwork, yet the assault was deferred, and -some pieces removed to play from the Olivo; whereupon -the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired -the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. -The subsequent proceedings cannot be -understood without an accurate knowledge of the -relative positions of the French and allied armies.</p> - -<p>Taragona though situated on one of a cluster of -heights, which terminate a range descending from -the northward to the sea, is, with the exception of -that range, surrounded by an open country called<span class="sidenote9">Plan, No. 1.</span> -the <em>Campo de Taragona</em>, which is again environed -by very rugged mountains, through which the several -roads descend into the plain.</p> - -<p>Westward there were only two carriage ways, -one direct, by the Col de Balaguer to Taragona; -the other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet, Momblanch<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10"></a>[10]</span> -and Reus. The first was blocked by the -taking of San Felippe; the second, although used -by Suchet for his convoys during the French siege -of Taragona, was now in bad order, and at best -only available for small mountain-guns.</p> - -<p>Northward there was a carriage way, leading -from Lerida, which united with that from Falcet -at Momblanch.</p> - -<p>Eastward there was the royal causeway, coming -from Barcelona, through Villa Franca, Arbos, Vendrills, -and Torredembarra; this road after passing -Villa Franca sends off two branches to the right, -one passing through the Col de Cristina, the other -through Masarbones and Col de Leibra, leading -upon Braffin and Valls. It was by the latter -branch that M‘Donald passed to Reus in 1810; he -had, however, no guns or carriages, and his whole -army laboured to make the way practicable.</p> - -<p>Between these various roads the mountains were -too rugged to permit any direct cross communications; -and troops, coming from different sides, could -only unite in the Campo de Taragona now occupied -by the allies. Wherefore, as Murray had, -including sergeants, above fifteen thousand fighting -men, and Copons, reinforced with two regiments -sent by sea from Coruña, was at Reus with six -thousand regulars besides the irregular division of -Manso, twenty-five thousand combatants were in -possession of the French point of junction.</p> - -<p>The Catalans, after Lacy’s departure, had, with -the aid of captain Adam’s ship, destroyed two -small forts at Perillo and Ampolla, and Eroles had -blockaded San Felippe de Balaguer for thirty-six -days, but it was then succoured by Maurice Mathieu; -and the success at Perillo was more than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11"></a>[11]</span> -balanced by a check which Sarzfield received on -the 3d of April from some of Pannetier’s troops. -The partida warfare had, however, been more active -in Upper Catalonia, and Copons claimed two considerable -victories, one gained by himself on the 17th -of May, at La Bispal near the Col de Cristina, where -he boasted to have beaten six thousand French with -half their numbers, destroying six hundred, as they -returned from succouring San Felippe de Balaguer. -In the other, won by colonel Lander near Olot -on the 7th of May, it was said twelve hundred -of Lamarque’s men fell. These exploits are by -French writers called skirmishes, and the following -description of the Catalan army, given to sir John -Murray by Cabanes, the chief of Copons’ staff, -renders the French version the most credible.</p> - -<p>“<em>We do not</em>,” said that officer, “<em>exceed nine or -ten thousand men, extended on different points of a -line running from the <ins class="corr" id="tn-11" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'neigbourhood of Reus'"> -neighbourhood of Reus</ins> along the high mountains to the vicinity of Olot. The -soldiers are brave, but without discipline, without -subordination, without clothing, without artillery, -without ammunition, without magazines, without -money, and without means of transport!</em>”</p> - -<p>Copons himself, when he came down to the -Campo, very frankly told Murray, that as his -troops could only fight in position, he would not join -in any operation which endangered his retreat into -the high mountains. However, with the exception -of twelve hundred men left at Vich under Eroles, -all his forces, the best perhaps in Spain, were now -at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to intercept -the communications of the different French -corps, and to harass their marches if they should -descend into the Campo. Murray could also calculate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12"></a>[12]</span> -upon seven or eight hundred seamen and -marines to aid him in pushing on the works of the -siege, or in a battle near the shore; and he expected -three thousand additional troops from Sicily. Sir -Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean -fleet, had promised to divert the attention -of the French troops by a descent eastward of -Barcelona, and the armies of Del Parque and -Elio were to make a like diversion westward of -Tortoza. Finally, a general rising of the Somatenes -might have been effected, and those mountaineers -were all at Murray’s disposal, to procure -intelligence, to give timely notice of the enemy’s -approach, or to impede his march by breaking up -the roads.</p> - -<p>On the French side there was greater but more -scattered power. Suchet had marched with nine -thousand men from Valencia, and what with Pannetier’s -brigade and some spare troops from Tortoza, -eleven or twelve thousand men with artillery, -might have come to the succour of Taragona from -that side, if the sudden fall of San Felippe de -Balaguer had not barred the only carriage way on -the westward. A movement by Mora, Falcet, and -Momblanch, remained open, yet it would have -been tedious, and the disposable troops at Lerida -were few. To the eastward therefore the garrison -looked for the first succour. Maurice Mathieu, -reinforced with a brigade from Upper Catalonia, -could bring seven thousand men with artillery from -Barcelona, and Decaen could move from the Ampurdam -with an equal number, hence twenty-five -thousand men might finally bear upon the allied army.</p> - -<p>But Suchet, measuring from the Xucar, had -more than one hundred and sixty miles to march;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13"></a>[13]</span> -Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from -various places and march seventy miles after -Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at all, -until Taragona was actually besieged, lest the allies -should reimbark and attack Barcelona. Decaen -had in like manner to look to the security of the -Ampurdam, and he was one hundred and thirty -miles distant. Wherefore, however active the -French generals might be, the English general -could calculate upon ten days’ clear operations, -after investment, before even the heads of the enemy’s -columns, coming from different quarters, could -issue from the hills bordering the Campo.</p> - -<p>Some expectation also he might have, that Suchet -would endeavour to cripple Del Parque, -before he marched to the succour of Taragona; -and it was in his favour, that eastward and westward, -the royal causeway was in places exposed -to the fire of the naval squadron. The experience -of captain Codrington during the first siege of -Taragona, had proved indeed, that an army could -not be stopped by this fire, yet it was an impediment -not to be left out of the calculation. Thus, -the advantage of a central position, the possession -of the enemy’s point of junction, the initial movement, -the good will of the people, and the aid of -powerful flank diversions, belonged to Murray; -superior numbers and a better army to the French, -since the allies, brave, and formidable to fight in -a position, were not well constituted for general -operations.</p> - -<p>Taragona, if the resources for an internal defence -be disregarded, was a weak place. A simple -revetment three feet and a half thick, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14"></a>[14]</span> -ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the -two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight -obstacles at best, were not armed, nor even repaired -until after the investment, and the garrison, -too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed -with labour. Here then, time being precious to -both sides, ordinary rules should have been set -aside and daring operations adopted. Lord Wellington<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6.</a></span> -had judged ten thousand men sufficient to -take Taragona. Murray brought seventeen thousand, -of which fourteen thousand were effective. -To do this he had, he said, so reduced his equipments, -stores, and means of land transport, that -his army could not move from the shipping; he -was yet so unready for the siege, that Fort Royal -was not stormed on the 8th, because the engineer -was unprepared to profit from a successful assault.</p> - -<p>This excuse, founded on the scarcity of stores, was -not however borne out by facts. The equipments -left behind, were only draft animals and commissariat -field-stores; the thing wanting was vigour in the -general, and this was made manifest in various -ways. Copons, like all regular Spanish officers, was -averse to calling out the Somatenes, and Murray -did not press the matter. Suchet took San Felippe -de Balaguer by escalade. Murray attacked in form, -and without sufficient means; for if captain Peyton -had not brought up the mortars, which was an afterthought, -extraneous to the general’s arrangements, -the fort could not have been reduced before succour -arrived from Tortoza. Indeed the surrender was -scarcely creditable to the French commandant, for -his works were uninjured, and only a small part of -his powder destroyed. It is also said, I believe<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15"></a>[15]</span> -truly, that one of the officers employed to regulate the -capitulation had in his pocket, an order from Murray -to raise the siege and embark, spiking the guns! -At Taragona, the troops on the low ground, did -not approach so near, by three hundred yards, as -they might have done; and the outworks should have -been stormed at once, as Wellington stormed Fort -Francisco at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Francisco -was a good outwork and complete. The outworks -of Taragona were incomplete, ill-flanked, without -palisades or casements, and their fall would have -enabled the besiegers to form a parallel against the -body of the place as Suchet had done in the former -siege; a few hours’ firing would then have brought -down the wall and a general assault might have -been delivered. The French had stormed a similar -breach in that front, although defended by eight -thousand Spanish troops, and the allies opposed by -only sixteen hundred French and Italians, soldiers -and seamen, were in some measure bound by honour -to follow that example, since colonel Skerrett, at the -former siege, refused to commit twelve hundred -British troops in the place, on the special ground -that it was indefensible, though so strongly garrisoned. -Murray’s troops were brave, they had -been acting together for nearly a year; and after -the fight at Castalla had become so eager, that an -Italian regiment, which at Alicant, was ready to go -over bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead -the assault on Fort Royal. This confidence was -not shared by their general. Even at the moment -of victory, he had resolved, if Suchet advanced a -second time, to relinquish the position of Castalla -and retire to Alicant!</p> - -<p>It is clear, that, up to the 8th, sir John Murray’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16"></a>[16]</span> -proceedings were ill-judged, and his after operations, -were more injudicious.</p> - -<p>As early as the 5th, false reports had made Suchet -reach Tortoza, and had put two thousand French in -movement from Lerida. Murray then openly avowed -his alarm and his regret at having left Alicant; yet -he proceeded to construct two heavy counter-batteries -near the Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls in -observation of the Lerida road, and desired Manso -to watch that of Barcelona.</p> - -<p>On the 9th his emissaries said the French were -coming from the east, and from the west; and -would, when united, exceed twenty thousand. -Murray immediately sought an interview with the -admiral, declaring his intention to raise the siege; -his views were changed during the conference but -he was discontented; and the two commanders -were now evidently at variance, for Hallowel refused -to join in a summons to the governor, and his flotilla -again bombarded the place.</p> - -<p>The 10th the spies in Barcelona gave notice that -eight or ten thousand French with fourteen guns, -would march from that city the next day. Copons -immediately joined Manso, and Murray, as if he -now disdained his enemy, continued to disembark -stores, landed several mortars, armed the batteries -at the Olivo, and on the 11th opened their fire, in -concert with that from the ships of war.</p> - -<p>This was the first serious attack, and the English -general, professing a wish to fight the column -coming from Barcelona, sent the cavalry under lord -Frederick Bentinck to Altafalla, and in person -sought a position of battle to the eastward. He left -orders to storm the outworks that night, but returned, -before the hour appointed, extremely disturbed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17"></a>[17]</span> -by intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at Villa -Franca with eight thousand combatants, and Suchet -closing upon the Col de Balaguer. The infirmity -of his mind was now apparent to the whole army. -At eight o’clock he repeated his order to assault -the outworks; at ten o’clock the storming party -was in the dry bed of the Francoli, awaiting the -signal, when a countermand arrived; the siege was -then to be raised and the guns removed immediately -from the Olivo; the commander of the artillery remonstrated, -and the general then promised to hold -the batteries until the next night. Meanwhile the -detachment at Valls and the cavalry at Altafalla -were called in, without any notice to general Copons, -though he depended on their support.</p> - -<p>The parc and all the heavy guns of the batteries -on the low grounds were removed to the beach for -embarkation on the morning of the 12th, and at -twelve o’clock lord Frederick Bentinck arrived -from Altafalla with the cavalry. It is said he was -ordered to shoot his horses, but refused to obey, and -moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The detachment -from Valls arrived next, and the infantry -marched to Cape Salou to embark, but the horsemen -followed lord Frederick, and were themselves followed -by fourteen pieces of artillery; each body moved independently, -and all was confused, incoherent, afflicting, -and dishonorable to the British arms.</p> - -<p>While the seamen were embarking the guns, the -quarter-master-general came down to the beach, -with orders to abandon that business and collect -boats for the reception of troops, the enemy being -supposed close at hand; and notwithstanding -Murray’s promise to hold the Olivo until nightfall, -fresh directions were given to spike the guns there,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18"></a>[18]</span> -and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose -on every side, and from both services; army and -navy were alike indignant, and so excited, that it is -said personal insult was offered to the general. -Three staff-officers repaired in a body to Murray’s -quarters, to offer plans and opinions, and the admiral -who it would appear did not object to raising -the siege but to the manner of doing it, would not -suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation of -artillery. He even urged an attack upon the column -coming from Barcelona, and opposed the order to -spike the guns at the Olivo, offering to be responsible -for carrying all clear off during the night.</p> - -<p>Thus pressed, Murray again wavered. Denying -that he had ordered the battering pieces to be -spiked, he sent counter-orders, and directed a -part of Clinton’s troops to advance towards the -Gaya river. Yet a few hours afterwards he reverted -to his former resolution, and peremptorily renewed -the order for the artillery to spike the guns on the -Olivo, and burn the carriages. Nor was even this -unhappy action performed without confusion. The -different orders received by Clinton in the course of -the day had indicated the extraordinary vacillation -of the commander-in-chief, and Clinton himself, -forgetful of his own arrangements, with an obsolete -courtesy took off his hat to salute an enemy’s -battery which had fired upon him; but this waving -of his hat from that particular spot was also the conventional -signal for the artillery to spike the guns, and -they were thus spiked prematurely. The troops were -however all embarked in the night of the 12th, and -many of the stores and horses were shipped on the 13th -without the slightest interruption from the enemy; -but eighteen or nineteen battering pieces, whose carriages<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19"></a>[19]</span> -had been burnt, were, with all the platforms, -fascines, gabions, and small ammunition, in view of -the fleet and army, triumphantly carried into the -fortress. Sir J. Murray meanwhile seemingly unaffected<span class="sidenote">Admiral Hallowel’s evidence on the trial.</span> -by this misfortune, shipped himself on the -evening of the 12th and took his usual repose in bed.</p> - -<p>While the English general was thus precipitately -abandoning the siege, the French generals, unable -to surmount the obstacles opposed to their junction, -unable even to communicate by their emissaries, -were despairing of the safety of Taragona. Suchet -did not reach Tortoza before the 10th, but a detachment -from the garrison, had on the 8th attempted -to succour San Felipe, and nearly captured -the naval captain Adam, colonel Prevot, and -other officers, who were examining the country. -On the other side Maurice Mathieu, having gathered -troops from various places, reached Villa Franca -early on the 10th, and deceiving even his own people<span class="sidenote">Laffaille Campagne de Catalonia.</span> -as to his numbers, gave out that Decaen, who he -really expected, was close behind with a powerful -force. To give effect to this policy, he drove Copons -from Arbos on the 11th, and his scouting parties -entered Vendrills, as if he was resolved singly to -attack Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had however -landed his marines at Rosas, which arrested -Decaen’s march; and Maurice Mathieu alarmed at -the cessation of fire about Taragona, knowing nothing -of Suchet’s movements, and too weak to fight -the allies alone, fell back in the night of the 12th -to the Llobregat, his main body never having -passed Villa Franca.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s operations to the westward were even -less decisive. His advanced guard under Panettier, -reached Perillo the 10th. The 11th not hearing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20"></a>[20]</span> -from his spies, he caused Panettier to pass by his -left over the mountains through Valdillos to some -heights which terminate abruptly on the Campo, -above Monroig. The 12th that officer reached the -extreme verge of the hills, being then about twenty-five -miles from Taragona. His patroles descending -into the plains, met with lord Frederick Bentinck’s -troopers reported that Murray’s whole army -was at hand, wherefore he would not enter the -Campo, but at night he kindled large fires to encourage -the garrison of Taragona. These signals -were however unobserved, the country people had -disappeared, no intelligence could be procured, -and Suchet could not follow him with a large force -into those wild desert hills, where there was no water. -Thus on both sides of Taragona the succouring -armies were quite baffled at the moment chosen by -Murray for flight.</p> - -<p>Suchet now received alarming intelligence from -Valencia, yet still anxious for Taragona, he pushed, -on the 14th, along the coast-road towards San -Felippe de Balaguer, thinking to find Prevôt’s division -alone; but the head of his column was suddenly -cannonaded by the Thames frigate, and he -was wonderfully surprised to see the whole British -fleet anchored off San Felippe, and disembarking -troops. Murray’s operations were indeed as irregular -as those of a partizan, yet without partizan -vigour. He had heard in the night of the 12th, -from colonel Prevôt, of Panettier’s march to Monroig, -and to protect the cavalry and guns under -lord Frederick Bentinck, sent Mackenzie’s division -by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with -the whole army on the 14th. Mackenzie drove -back the French posts on both sides of the pass, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21"></a>[21]</span> -embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then commenced, -and Suchet, still uncertain if Taragona -had fallen, moved towards Valdillos to bring off -Panettier.</p> - -<p>At this precise period, Murray heard that Maurice -Mathieu’s column, which he always erroneously -supposed to be under Decaen, had retired to the -Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and that -Taragona had not been reinforced. Elated by this -information, he revolved various projects in his -mind, at one time thinking to fall upon Suchet, at -another to cut off Panettier, now resolving to -march upon Cambrills, and even to menace Taragona -again by land; then he was for sending a -detachment by sea to surprise the latter, but finally -he disembarked his whole force on the 15th, and -being ignorant of Suchet’s last movement decided -to strike at Panettier. In this view, he detached<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_01">See Plan, No. 1.</a></span> -Mackenzie, by a rugged valley leading from the -eastward to Valdillos, and that officer reached it on -the 16th, but Suchet had already carried off Panettier’s -brigade, and the next day the British -detachment was recalled by Murray, who now only -thought of re-embarking.</p> - -<p>This determination was caused by a fresh alarm -from the eastward, for Maurice Mathieu, whose -whole proceedings evinced both skill and vigour, -hearing that the siege of Taragona was raised, and -the allies re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, retraced -his steps and boldly entered Cambrills the 17th. -On that day, however, Mackenzie returned, and -Murray’s whole army was thus concentrated in the -pass. Suchet was then behind Perillo, Copons at -Reus, having come there at Murray’s desire to -attack Maurice Mathieu, and the latter would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22"></a>[22]</span> -suffered, if the English general had been capable of -a vigorous stroke. On the other hand it was fortunate -for Mackenzie, that Suchet, too anxious for -Valencia, disregarded his movement upon Valdillos; -but, taught by the disembarkation of the whole English -army that the fate of Taragona, whether for -good or evil, was decided, he had sent an emissary -to Maurice Mathieu on the 16th, and then retired -to Perillo and Amposta. He reached the latter -place the 17th, attentive only to the movement of -the fleet, and meanwhile Maurice Mathieu endeavoured -to surprize the Catalans at Reus.</p> - -<p>Copons was led into this danger by sir John -Murray, who had desired him to harass Maurice -Mathieu’s rear, with a view to a general attack, and -then changed his plan without giving the Spanish -general any notice. However he escaped. The -French moved upon Taragona, and Murray was left -free to embark or to remain at the Col de Balaguer. -He called a council of war, and it was concluded to -re-embark, but at that moment, the great Mediterranean -fleet appeared in the offing, and admiral -Hallowel, observing a signal announcing lord -William Bentinck’s arrival, answered with more -promptitude than propriety, “<em>we are all delighted</em>.”</p> - -<p>Sir John Murray’s command having thus terminated, -the general discontent rendered it impossible -to avoid a public investigation, yet the difficulty of -holding a court in Spain, and some disposition at -home to shield him, caused great delay. He was -at last tried in England. Acquitted of two charges, -on the third he was declared guilty of an error in -judgement, and sentenced to be admonished; but -even that slight mortification was not inflicted.</p> - -<p>This decision does not preclude the judgement of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23"></a>[23]</span> -history, nor will it sway that of posterity. The -court-martial was assembled twenty months after the -event, when the war being happily terminated, -men’s minds were little disposed to treat past failures -with severity. There were two distinct prosecutors, -having different views; the proceedings -were conducted at a distance from the scene of -action, defects of memory could not be remedied by -references to localities, and a door was opened for -contradiction and doubt upon important points. -There was no indication that the members of the -court were unanimous in their verdict; they were -confined to specific charges, restricted by legal rules -of evidence, and deprived of the testimony of all -the Spanish officers, who were certainly discontented -with Murray’s conduct, and whose absence caused -the serious charge of abandoning Copons’ army -to be suppressed. Moreover the warmth of temper -displayed by the principal prosecutor, admiral -Hallowel, together with his signal on lord William -Bentinck’s arrival, whereby, to the detriment of discipline, -he manifested his contempt for the general -with whom he was acting, gave Murray an advantage -which he improved skilfully, for he was a man -sufficiently acute and prompt when not at the head -of an army. He charged the admiral with deceit, -factious dealings, and disregard of the service; -described him as a man of a passionate overweening, -busy disposition, troubled with excess of vanity, -meddling with everything, and thinking himself -competent to manage both troops and ships.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless sir John Murray had signally failed, -both as an independent general, and as a lieutenant -acting under superior orders. On his trial, -blending these different capacities together, with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24"></a>[24]</span> -expert sophistry he pleaded his instructions in -excuse for his errors as a free commander, and his -discretionary power in mitigation of his disobedience -as a lieutenant; but his operations were indefensible -in both capacities. Lord Wellington’s instructions, -precise, and founded upon the advantages -offered by a command of the sea, prescribed -an attack upon Taragona, with a definite object, -namely, to deliver Valencia.</p> - -<p>“<em>You tell me</em>,” said he, “<em>that the line of the -Xucar, which covers Valencia, is too strong to force; -turn it then by the ocean, assail the rear of the -enemy, and he will weaken his strong line to protect -his communication; or, he will give you an opportunity -to establish a new base of operations behind -him.</em>”</p> - -<p>This plan however demanded promptness and -energy, and Murray professed neither. The weather -was so favourable, that a voyage which might -have consumed nine or ten days was performed in -two, the Spanish troops punctually effected their -junction, the initial operations were secured, Fort -Balaguer fell, the French moved from all sides to -the succour of Taragona, the line of the Xucar was -weakened, the diversion was complete. In the -night of the 12th the bulk of Murray’s army was -again afloat, a few hours would have sufficed to -embark the cavalry at the Col de Balaguer, and -the whole might have sailed for the city of Valencia, -while Suchet’s advanced guard was still on the -hills above Monroig, and he, still uncertain as to -the fate of Taragona, one hundred and fifty miles -from the Xucar. In fine Murray had failed to -attain the first object pointed out by Wellington’s -instructions, but the second was within his reach;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25"></a>[25]</span> -instead of grasping it he loitered about the Col de -Balaguer, and gave Suchet, as we shall find, time -to reach Valencia again.</p> - -<p>Now whether the letter or the spirit of Wellington’s -instructions be considered, there was here a -manifest dereliction on the part of Murray. What -was that officer’s defence? That no specific period -being named for his return to Valencia, he was -entitled to exercise his discretion! Did he then -as an independent general perform any useful or -brilliant action to justify his delay? No! his tale -was one of loss and dishonour! The improvident -arrangements for the siege of San Felippe de Balaguer, -and the unexpected fortune which saved him -from the shame of abandoning his guns there also -have been noted; and it has been shown, that when -the gain of time was the great element of success, -he neither urged Copons to break up the roads, nor -pushed the siege of Taragona with vigour. The -feeble formality of this latter operation has indeed<span class="sidenote">Defence of sir J. Murray in Phillipart’s Military Calendar.</span> -been imputed to the engineer major Thackary, -yet unjustly so. It was the part of that officer to -form a plan of attack agreeable to the rules of art, -it might be a bold or a cautious plan, and many -persons did think Taragona was treated by him with -too much respect; but it was the part of the commander-in-chief, -to decide, if the general scheme -of operations required a deviation from the regular -course. The untrammelled engineer could then -have displayed his genius. Sir John Murray made -no sign. His instructions and his ultimate views -were withheld alike, from his naval colleague, from -his second in command, and from his quarter-master-general; -and while the last-named functionary -was quite shut out from the confidence of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26"></a>[26]</span> -his commander, the admiral, and many others, -both of the army and navy, imagined him to be -the secret author of the proceedings which were -hourly exciting their indignation. Murray however -declared on his trial, that he had rejected -general Donkin’s advice, an avowal consonant to -facts, since that officer urged him to raise the siege -on the 9th and had even told him where four hundred -draught bullocks were to be had, to transport -his heavy artillery. On the 12th he opposed the -spiking of the guns, and urged Murray to drag -them to Cape Salou, of which place he had given -as early as the third day of the siege, a military -plan, marking a position, strong in itself, covering -several landing places, and capable of being flanked<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_01">See Plan, No. 1.</a></span> -on both sides by the ships of war: it had no drawback -save a scarcity of water, yet there were some -springs, and the fleet would have supplied the -deficiency.</p> - -<p>It is true that Donkin, unacquainted with Wellington’s -instructions, and having at Castalla seen -no reason to rely on sir John Murray’s military -vigour, was averse to the enterprize against Taragona. -He thought the allies should have worked -Suchet out of Valencia by operating on his right -flank. And so Wellington would have thought, -if he had only looked at their numbers and not at -their quality; he had even sketched such a plan<span class="sidenote9">Vol. V. p. 512.</span> -for Murray, if the attack upon Taragona should be -found impracticable. But he knew the Spaniards -too well, to like such combinations for an army, -two-thirds of which were of that nation, and not -even under one head; an army ill-equipped, and -with the exception of Del Parque’s troops, unused -to active field operations. Wherefore, calculating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27"></a>[27]</span> -their power with remarkable nicety, he preferred -the sea-flank, and the aid of an English fleet.</p> - -<p>Here it may be observed, that Napoleon’s plan -of invasion did not embrace the coast-lines where -they could be avoided. It was an obvious disadvantage -to give the British navy opportunities of -acting against his communications. The French -indeed, seized Santona and Santander in the Bay of -Biscay, because, these being the only good ports on -that coast, the English ships were thus in a manner -shut out from the north of Spain. They likewise -worked their invasion by the Catalonian and Valencian -coast, because the only roads practicable for -artillery run along that sea-line; but their general -scheme was to hold, with large masses, the interior -of the country, and keep their communications -aloof from the danger of combined operations by -sea and land. The providence of the plan was -proved by Suchet’s peril on this occasion.</p> - -<p>Sir John Murray, when tried, grounded his justification -on the following points. 1º. That he did -not know with any certainty until the night of the -11th that Suchet was near. 2º. That the fall of -Taragona being the principal object, and the drawing -of the French from Valencia the accessary, he -persisted in the siege, because he expected reinforcements -from Sicily, and desired to profit from -the accidents of war. 3º. That looking only to the -second object, the diversion would have been incomplete, -if the siege had been raised sooner, or -even relaxed; hence the landing of guns and stores -after he despaired of success. 4º. That he dared -not risk a battle to save his battering train, because -Wellington would not pardon a defeat. Now had -he adopted a vigorous plan, or persisted until the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28"></a>[28]</span> -danger of losing his army was apparent, and then -made a quick return to Valencia, this defence would -have been plausible, though inconclusive. But -when every order, every movement, every expression, -discovered his infirmity of purpose, his pleading -can only be regarded as the subtle tale of an -advocate.</p> - -<p>The fault was not so much in the raising of the -siege as in the manner of doing it, and in the feebleness -of the attack. For first, however numerous -the chances of war are, fortresses expecting succour -do not surrender without being vigorously assailed. -The arrival of reinforcements from Sicily was too -uncertain for reasonable calculation, and it was -scarcely possible for the governor of Taragona, -while closely invested, to discover that no fresh -stores or guns were being landed; still less could -he judge so timeously of Murray’s final intention -by that fact, as to advertize Suchet that Taragona -was in no danger. Neither were the spies, if any -were in the allies’ camp, more capable of drawing -such conclusions, seeing that sufficient artillery -and stores for the siege were landed the first week. -And the landing of more guns could not have deceived -them, when the feeble operations of the -general, and the universal discontent, furnished -surer guides for their reports.</p> - -<p>Murray designed to raise the siege as early as -the 9th and only deferred it, after seeing the -admiral, from his natural vacillation. It was therefore -mere casuistry to say, that he first obtained -certain information of Suchet’s advance on the -night of the 11th. On the 8th and 10th through -various channels he knew the French marshal was -in march for Tortoza, and that his advanced guard<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29"></a>[29]</span> -menaced the Col de Balaguer. The approach of -Maurice Mathieu on the other side was also known; -he should therefore have been prepared to raise the -siege without the loss of his guns on the 12th. -Why were they lost at all? They could not be -saved, he said, without risking a battle in a bad -position, and Wellington had declared he would -not pardon a defeat! This was the after-thought of -a sophister, and not warranted by Wellington’s instructions, -which on that head, referred only to the -duke Del Parque and Elio.</p> - -<p>But was it necessary to fight a battle in a bad -position to save the guns? All persons admitted -that they could have been embarked before mid-day -on the 13th. Panettier was then at Monroig, -Suchet still behind Perillo, Maurice Mathieu -falling back from Villa Franca. The French on -each side were therefore respectively thirty-six and -thirty-four miles distant on the night of the 12th, -and their point of junction was Reus. Yet how -form that junction? The road from Villa Franca by -the Col de Cristina was partially broken up by -Copons, the road from Perillo to Reus was always -impracticable for artillery, and from the latter place -to Taragona was six miles of very rugged country. -The allies were in possession of the point of junction, -Maurice Mathieu was retiring, not advancing. -And if the French could have marched thirty-four -and thirty-six miles, through the mountains in one -night, and been disposed to attack in the morning -without artillery, they must still have ascertained -the situation of Murray’s army; they must have -made arrangements to watch Copons, Manso, and -Prevôt, who would have been on their rear and -flanks; they must have formed an order of battle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30"></a>[30]</span> -and decided upon the mode of attack before they -advanced. It is true that their junction at Reus -would have forced Murray to suspend his embarkation -to fight; but not, as he said, in a bad position, -with his back to the beach, where the ships’ -guns could not aid him, and where he might expect -a dangerous surf for days. The naval officers -denied the danger from surf at that season of the -year; and it was not right to destroy the guns and -stores when the enemy was not even in march for -Reus. Coolness and consideration would have -enabled Murray to see that there was no danger. -In fact no emissaries escaped from the town, and -the enemy had no spies in the camp, since no communication -took place between the French columns -until the 17th. On the 15th Suchet knew nothing -of the fate of Taragona.</p> - -<p>The above reasoning leaves out the possibility of -profiting from a central position to fall with superior -forces upon one of the French columns. It -supposes however that accurate information was -possessed by the French generals; that Maurice -Mathieu was as strong as he pretended to be, -Suchet eager and resolute to form a junction with -him. But in truth Suchet knew not what to do -after the fall of Fort Balaguer, Maurice Mathieu -had less than seven thousand men of all arms, he -was not followed by Decaen, and he imagined the -allies to have twenty thousand men, exclusive of -the Catalans. Besides which the position at Cape -Salou was only six miles distant, and Murray might -with the aid of the draft bullocks discovered by -Donkin, have dragged all his heavy guns there, -still maintaining the investment; he might have -shipped his battery train, and when the enemy approached<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31"></a>[31]</span> -Reus, have marched to the Col de Balaguer, -where he could, as he afterwards did, embark -or disembark in the presence of the enemy. The -danger of a flank march, Suchet being at Reus, -could not have deterred him, because he did send -his cavalry and field artillery by that very road on -the 12th, when the French advanced guard was at -Monroig and actually skirmished with lord Frederick -Bentinck. Finally he could have embarked -his main body, leaving a small corps with some -cavalry to keep the garrison in check and bring off -his guns. Such a detachment, together with the -heavy guns, would have been afloat in a couple of<span class="sidenote">Naval evidence on the trial.</span> -hours and on board the ships in four hours; it -could have embarked on the open beach, or, if -fearful of being molested by the garrison, might -have marched to Cape Salou, or to the Col de -Balaguer; and if the guns had thus been lost, the -necessity would have been apparent, and the dishonour -lessened. It is clear therefore that there -was no military need to sacrifice the battery pieces. -And those were the guns that shook the bloody -ramparts of Badajos!</p> - -<p>Wellington felt their loss keenly, sir John Murray -spoke of them lightly. “<em>They were of small value, old -iron! he attached little importance to the sacrifice of -artillery, it was his principle, he had approved of colonel -Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also desired -colonel Prevôt, if pressed, to abandon his battering -train before the Fort of Balaguer.</em>” “<em>Such doctrine -might appear strange to a British army, but it was -the rule with the continental armies and the French -owed much of their successes to the adoption of it.</em>”</p> - -<p>Strange indeed! Great commanders have risked -their own lives, and sacrificed their bravest men,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32"></a>[32]</span> -charging desperately in person, to retrieve even a -single piece of cannon in a battle. They knew the -value of moral force in war, and that of all the -various springs and levers on which it depends -military honour is the most powerful. No! it was -not to the adoption of such a doctrine, that the -French owed their great successes. It was to the -care with which Napoleon fostered and cherished a -contrary feeling. Sir John Murray’s argument -would have been more pungent, more complete, if -he had lost his colours, and pleaded that they were -only wooden staves, bearing old pieces of silk!</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33"></a>[33]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">Lord William Bentinck arrived without troops, for,<span class="sidenote9">1813. June.</span> -having removed the queen from Sicily, he feared -internal dissension and Napoleon had directed -Murat to invade the island with twenty thousand -men, the Toulon squadron being to act in concert. -Sir Edward Pellew admitted that the latter might -easily gain twenty-four hours’ start of his fleet, and -lord William judged that ten thousand invaders -would suffice to conquer. Murat however, opened -a secret negociation, and thus, that monarch, Bernadotte, -and the emperor Francis endeavoured to -destroy a hero connected with them by marriage -and to whom they all owed their crowns either by -gift or clemency!</p> - -<p>This early defection of Murat is certain, and his<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_I">Appendix, No. 1.</a></span> -declaration that he had instructions to invade Sicily -was corroborated by a rumour, rife in the French -camps before the battle of Vittoria, that the Toulon -fleet had sailed and the descent actually made. -Nevertheless there is some obscurity about the -matter. The negociation was never completed, -Murat left Italy to command Napoleon’s cavalry and -at the battle of Dresden contributed much to the -success of that day. Now it is conceivable that he -should mask his plans by joining the grand army, -and that his fiery spirit should in the battle forget -everything except victory. But to disobey Napoleon’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34"></a>[34]</span> -orders as to the invasion of Sicily and dare to -face that monarch immediately after, was so unlikely -as to indicate rather a paper demonstration to alarm -lord Wellington than a real attack. And it would -seem from the short observation of the latter in -answer to lord William Bentinck’s detailed communication -on this subject, namely “<em>Sicily is in no -danger</em>,” that he viewed it so, or thought it put forward -by Murat to give more value to his defection. -However it sufficed to hinder reinforcements going -to Murray.</p> - -<p>Lord William Bentinck on landing was informed -that Suchet was at Tortoza with from eight to twelve -thousand men, Maurice Mathieu with seven thousand -at Cambrils. To drive the latter back and -re-invest Taragona was easy, and the place would -have fallen because the garrison had exhausted all -their powder in the first siege; but this lord William -did not know, and to renew the attack vigorously -was impossible, because all the howitzers and platforms -and fascines had been lost, and the animals -and general equipment of the army were too much -deteriorated by continual embarkations, and disembarkations, -to keep the field in Catalonia. Wherefore -he resolved to return to Alicant, not without -hope still to fulfil Wellington’s instructions by -landing at Valencia between Suchet and Harispe. -The re-embarkation was unmolested, the fort of -Balaguer was destroyed, and one regiment of Whittingham’s -division, destined to reinforce Copons’ -army, being detached to effect a landing northward -of Barcelona, the fleet put to sea; but misfortune -continued to pursue this unhappy armament. -A violent tempest impeded the voyage, fourteen -sail of transports struck upon the sands off the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35"></a>[35]</span> -mouth of the Ebro, and the army was not entirely -disembarked at Alicant before the 27th. Meanwhile -marshal Suchet, seeing the English fleet under sail -and taught by the destruction of the fort of Balaguer, -that the allies had relinquished operations in Lower -Catalonia, marched with such extraordinary diligence -as to reach Valencia in forty-eight hours -after quitting Tortoza, thus frustrating lord William’s -project of landing at Valencia.</p> - -<p>During his absence Harispe had again proved -the weakness of the Spanish armies, and demonstrated -the sagacity and prudence of lord Wellington. -That great man’s warning about defeat was -distinctly addressed to the Spanish generals, because -the chief object of the operations was not to defeat -Suchet but to keep him from aiding the French -armies in the north. Pitched battles were therefore -to be avoided their issue being always doubtful, -and the presence of a numerous and increasing -force on the front and flank of the French was more -sure to obtain the end in view. But all Spanish -generals desired to fight great battles, soothing their -national pride by attributing defeats to want of -cavalry. It was at first doubtful if Murray could -transport his horsemen to Taragona, and if left -behind they would have been under Elio and Del -Parque, whereby those officers would have been -encouraged to fight. Hence the English general’s -menacing intimation. And he also considered that -as the army of Del Parque had been for three -years in continued activity under Ballesteros without -being actually dispersed, it must be more capable -than Elio’s in the dodging warfare suitable for -Spaniards. Moreover Elio was best acquainted -with the country between the Xucar and Alicant.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36"></a>[36]</span> -Wherefore Del Parque was directed to turn the -enemy’s right flank by Requeña, Elio to menace -the front, which, adverting to the support and protection -furnished by Alicant and the mountains -behind Castalla, was the least dangerous operation.</p> - -<p>But to trust Spanish generals was to trust the -winds and the clouds. General Elio persuaded the -duke Del Parque to adopt the front attack, took -the flank line himself, and detached general Mijares -to fall upon Requeña. And though Suchet had -weakened his line on the 2d of June, Del Parque -was not ready until the 9th, thus giving the French -a week for the relief of Taragona, and for the -arrival of Severoli at Liria.</p> - -<p>At this time Harispe had about eight thousand men -of all arms in front of the Xucar. The Spaniards, -including Roche’s and Mijares’ divisions and Whittingham’s -cavalry, were twenty-five thousand strong; -and the Empecinado, Villa Campa, and the Frayle, -Nebot, waited in the Cuenca and Albaracyn mountains -to operate on the French rear. Notwithstanding -this disproportion, the contest was short, -and for the Spaniards, disastrous. They advanced -in three columns. Elio, by the pass of Almanza; -Del Parque by Villena and Fuente de la Higuera -menacing Moxente; Roche and the prince of Anglona -from Alcoy, by Onteniente and the pass of -Albayda, menacing San Felippe de Xativa and -turning Moxente.</p> - -<p>Harispe abandoned those camps on the 11th, -and took the line of the Xucar, occupying the entrenchments -in front of his bridges at Alcira and -Barca del Rey, near Alberique; and during this retrograde -movement general Mesclop, commanding the -rear-guard, being pressed by the Spanish horsemen,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37"></a>[37]</span> -wheeled round and drove them in great confusion -upon the infantry.</p> - -<p>On the 15th Mijares took the fort of Requeña, -thus turning the line of the Xucar, and securing -the defiles of Cabrillas through which the Cuenca -road leads to Valencia. Villa Campa immediately -joined him thereby preventing Severoli from uniting -with Harispe, and meanwhile Del Parque, after -razing the French works at Moxente and San Felippe, -advanced towards Alcira in two columns, the -one moving by the road of Cargagente, the other -by the road of Gandia. General Habert overthrew -the first with one shock, took five hundred prisoners, -and marched to attack the other, but it was already -routed by general Gudin. After this contest Del -Parque and Harispe maintained their respective -positions, while Elio joined Mijares at Requeña. -Villa Campa then descended to Chiva, and Harispe’s -position was becoming critical, when on the -23d the head of Suchet’s column coming from the -Ebro entered Valencia, and on the 24th Del -Parque resumed the position of Castalla.</p> - -<p>Thus in despite of Wellington’s precautions -every thing turned contrary to his designs. Elio -had operated by the flank, Del Parque by the front, -and the latter was defeated because he attacked the -enemy in an entrenched position. Murray had -failed entirely. His precipitancy at Taragona and -his delays at Balaguer were alike hurtful, and -would have caused the destruction of one or both -of the Spanish armies but for the battle of Vittoria. -For Suchet, having first detached general Musnier -to recover the fort of Requeña and drive back Villa -Campa, had assembled the bulk of his forces in his -old positions, of San Felippe and Moxente, before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38"></a>[38]</span> -the return of the Anglo-Sicilian troops; and as -Elio, unable to subsist at Utiel, had then returned -towards his former quarters, the French marshal -was upon the point of striking a fatal blow against -him, or Del Parque, or both, when the news of -Wellington’s victory averted the danger.</p> - -<p>Here the firmness, the activity and coolness of -Suchet, may be contrasted with the infirmity of -purpose displayed by Murray. Slow in attack, -precipitate in retreat, the English commander always -mistimed his movements; the French marshal doubled -his force by rapidity. The latter was isolated -by the operations of lord Wellington; his communication -with Aragon was interrupted, and that province -placed in imminent danger; the communication -between Valencia and Catalonia was exposed -to the attacks of the Anglo-Sicilian army and the -fleet; nearly thirty thousand Spaniards menaced -him on the Xucar in front; Villa Campa, the Frayle -and the Empecinado could bring ten thousand men -on his right flank; yet he did not hesitate to leave -Harispe with only seven or eight thousand men to -oppose the Spaniards, while with the remainder of -his army he relieved Taragona and yet returned in -time to save Valencia.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs when lord William -Bentinck brought the Anglo-Sicilian troops once -more to Alicant. His first care was to re-organize -the means of transport for the commissariat and -artillery, but this was a matter of difficulty. Sir -John Murray, with a mischievous economy, and -strange disregard of that part of Wellington’s instructions, -which proscribed active field operations -in Valencia if he should be forced to return from -Catalonia, had discharged six hundred mules, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39"></a>[39]</span> -two hundred country carts, that is to say five-sixths -of the whole field equipment, before he sailed for -Taragona. The army was thus crippled, while -Suchet gathered strong in front, and Musnier’s division -retaking Requeña forced the Spaniards to -retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del -Parque to advance meanwhile from Castalla, but he -had not means of carrying even one day’s biscuit, -and at the same time Elio pressed by famine went -off towards Cuenca. It was not until the 1st of -July that the Anglo-Sicilian troops could even -advance towards Alcoy.</p> - -<p>Lord William Bentinck commanded the Spanish<span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -armies as well as his own, and letters passed between -him and lord Wellington relative to further operations. -The latter, keeping to his original views, -advised a renewed attack on Taragona or on Tortoza, -if the ordnance still in possession of the army -would admit of such a measure; but supposing this -could not be, he recommended a general advance -to seize the open country of Valencia, the British -keeping close to the sea and in constant communication -with the fleet.</p> - -<p>Lord William’s views were different. He found -the Spanish soldiers robust and active, but their -regimental officers bad, and their organization generally -so deficient that they could not stand against -even a small French force, as proved by their recent -defeat at Alcira. The generals however pleased -him at first, especially Del Parque, that is, like all -Spaniards, they had fair words at command, and -lord William Bentinck without scanning very nicely -their deeds, thought he could safely undertake a -grand stragetic operation in conjunction with them.</p> - -<p>To force the line of the Xucar he deemed unadvisable,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40"></a>[40]</span> -inasmuch as there were only two carriage -roads, both of which led to Suchet’s entrenched -bridges; and though the river was fordable the enemy’s -bank was so favourable for defence as to render -the passage by force dangerous. The Anglo-Sicilians<span class="sidenote">Lord William Bentinck’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -were unaccustomed to great tactical movements, -the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore, -relinquishing an attack in front, lord William -proposed to move the allied armies in one mass and -turn the enemy’s right flank either by Utiel and -Requeña, or, by a wider march, to reach Cuenca -and from thence gaining the Madrid road to Zaragoza, -communicate with Wellington’s army and -operate down the Ebro. In either case it was -necessary to cross the Albaracyn mountains and -there were no carriage roads, save those of Utiel -and Cuenca. But the passes near Utiel were -strongly fortified by the French, and a movement -on that line would necessarily lead to an attack -upon Suchet which was to be avoided. The line -of Cuenca was preferable though longer, and being -in the harvest season provisions he said would not -fail. The allies would thus force Suchet to cross -the Ebro, or attack him in a chosen position where -Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and -in the event of a defeat they could retire for shelter -upon his army.</p> - -<p>Wellington, better acquainted with Spanish warfare, -and the nature of Spanish co-operation, told -him, provisions would fail on the march to Cuenca, -even in harvest time, and without money he would -get nothing; moreover by separating himself from -the fleet, he would be unable to return suddenly to -Sicily if that island should be really exposed to -any imminent danger.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41"></a>[41]</span></p> - -<p>While these letters were being exchanged the -Anglo-Sicilians marched towards Villena on Del -Parque’s left, and Suchet was preparing to attack -when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching -both parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs. -The French general instantly abandoned Valencia, -and lord William entered that city.</p> - -<p>Suchet knew that Clauzel was at Zaragoza, -and desirous of maintaining himself there to secure -a point of junction for the army of Aragon -with the king’s army, if the latter should re-enter -Spain. It was possible therefore, by abandoning all -the fortresses in Valencia and some of those in Catalonia, -to have concentrated more than thirty thousand -men with which to join Clauzel, and the latter -having carried off several small garrisons during his -retreat, had fifteen thousand. Lord Wellington’s -position would then have been critical, since forty-five -thousand good troops, having many supporting -fortresses, would have menaced his right flank at -the moment when his front was assailed by a new -general and a powerful army. But if this junction -with Clauzel invited Suchet on the one hand, on the -other, with a view of influencing the general negociations -during the armistice in Germany, it was -important to appear strong in Spain. On such -occasions men generally endeavour to reconcile both -objects and obtain neither. Suchet resolved to -march upon Zaragoza and at the same time retain -his grasp upon Valencia by keeping large garrisons -in the fortresses. This reduced his field force, a -great error, it was so proved by the result. But if -the war in the north of Spain and in Germany had -taken a different turn, his foresight and prudence -would have been applauded.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42"></a>[42]</span></p> - -<p>The army of Aragon now counted thirty-two thousand -effective men. Four thousand were in Zaragoza, -two thousand in Mequinenza, Venasque, Monzons, -Ayerbe, Jaca, and some smaller posts. Twenty-six -thousand remained. Of these one hundred and -ten were left in Denia, with provisions for eight -months; twelve hundred and fifty in Saguntum, -where there were immense stores, eight months’ -provisions for the garrison, and two months’ subsistence<span class="sidenote9">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span> -for the whole army; four hundred with -provisions for a year, were in Peniscola, and in -Morella one hundred and twenty with magazines -for six months. Into Tortoza, where there was -a large artillery parc, Suchet threw a garrison of -nearly five thousand men and then destroying the -bridges on the Xucar, marched from Valencia -on the 5th of July, taking the coast road for -Tortoza.</p> - -<p>The inhabitants, grateful for the discipline he -had maintained, were even friendly, and while the -main body thus moved, Musnier retreated from -Requeña across the mountains towards Caspe, the -point of concentration for the whole army: but ere -it could reach that point, Clauzel’s flight to Jaca, -unnecessary for he was only pursued from Tudela -by Mina, became known, and the effect was fatal. -All the Partidas immediately united and menaced -Zaragoza, whereupon Suchet ordered Paris to retire -upon Caspe, and pressed forward himself to Favara. -Musnier, meanwhile, reached the former town, -having on the march picked up Severoli’s brigade -and the garrisons of Teruel and Alcanitz. Thus -on the 12th the whole army was in military communication -but extended along the Ebro from Tortoza -to Caspe. Mina had, however, seized the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43"></a>[43]</span> -Monte Torrero on the 8th, and general Paris evacuated -Zaragoza in the night of the 9th, leaving -five hundred men in the castle with much ordnance. -Encumbered with a great train of carriages -he got entangled in the defiles of Alcubiere, and -being attacked lost many men and all his baggage -and artillery. Instead of joining Suchet he fled to -Huesca, where he rallied the garrison of Ayerbe -and then made for Jaca, reaching it on the 14th at -the moment when Clauzel, after another ineffectual -attempt to join the king, had returned to that -place. Duran then invested the castle of Zaragoza, -and the fort of Daroca. The first surrendered on -the 30th, but Daroca did not fall until the 11th of -August.</p> - -<p>This sudden and total loss of Aragon made Suchet -think it no longer possible to fix a base in that -province, nor to rally Clauzel’s troops on his own. -He could not remain on the right bank of the Ebro, -neither could he feed his army permanently in the -sterile country about Tortoza while Aragon was in -possession of the enemy. Moreover, the allies -having the command of the sea, might land troops, -and seize the passes of the hills behind him, wherefore -fixing upon the fertile country about Taragona -for his position, he passed the Ebro at Tortoza, -Mora, and Mequinenza, on the 14th and 15th, -detaching Isidore Lamarque to fetch off the garrisons -of Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, and Bujarola, and bring -the whole to Lerida. Meanwhile the bulk of the -army moving on the road from Tortoza to Taragona, -although cannonaded by the English fleet, reached -Taragona with little hurt and the walls were mined -for destruction, but the place was still held with a -view to field operations.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44"></a>[44]</span></p> - -<p>The general state of the war seems to have been -too little considered by Suchet at this time, or he -would have made a more vigorous effort to establish -himself in Aragon. Had he persisted to march on -Zaragoza he would have raised the siege of the -castle, perchance have given a blow to Mina whose -orders were to retire upon Tudela where Wellington -designed to offer battle; but Suchet might -have avoided this, and to have appeared upon Wellington’s -flank were it only for a fortnight, would, -as shall be hereafter shewn, have changed the -aspect of the campaign. Suchet’s previous rapidity -and excellent arrangements had left the allies in -Valencia far behind, they could not have gathered -in force soon enough to meddle with him, and their -pursuit now to be described, was not so cautiously -conducted but that he might have turned and defeated -them.</p> - -<p>The 9th of July, four days after the French -abandoned Valencia, lord William Bentinck entered -that city and made it his place of arms instead of -Alicant. On the 16th, marching by the coast road, -in communication with the fleet and masking Peniscola, -a fortress now of little importance, he followed -the enemy; but Suchet had on that day -completed the passage of the Ebro, he might have -been close to Zaragoza, and Del Parque’s army was -still near Alicant in a very disorderly condition. -And though Elio and Roche were at Valencia, the -occupation of that town, and the blockades of -Denia and Murviedro, proved more than a sufficient -task for them: the garrison of the latter place -received provisions continually, and were so confident -as to assemble in order of battle on the glacis -when the allies marched past.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45"></a>[45]</span></p> - -<p>The 20th lord William entered Vinaros and remained -there until the 26th. Suchet might then -have been at Tudela or Sanguessa, and it shall be -shewn that Wellington could not have met him at -the former place as he designed.</p> - -<p>During this period various reports were received. -“<em>The French had vainly endeavoured to regain -France by Zaragoza.</em>” “<em>Taragona was destroyed.</em>” -“<em>The evacuation of Spain was certain.</em>” “<em>A -large detachment had already quitted Catalonia.</em>” -The English general, who had little time -to spare from the pressure of Sicilian affairs, became -eager to advance. He threw a flying bridge -over the Ebro at Amposta, and having before embarked -Clinton’s division with a view to seize the -Col de Balaguer, resolved to follow Suchet with -the remainder of his army, which now included -Whittingham’s cavalry. A detachment from Tortoza -menaced his bridge on the 25th, but the troops -were reinforced and the passage of the Ebro -completed on the 27th. The next day Villa Campa -arrived with four thousand men and meanwhile -the Col de Balaguer was secured.</p> - -<p>On the 29th the cavalry being in march was -threatened by infantry from Tortoza, near the Col -de Alba, but the movements generally were unopposed, -and the army got possession of the mountains -beyond the Ebro.</p> - -<p>Suchet was at this time inspecting the defences of -Lerida and Mequinenza, and his escort was necessarily -large because Copons was hanging on his -flanks in the mountains about Manresa; but his -position about Villa Franca was exceedingly strong. -Taragona and Tortoza covered the front; Barcelona, -the rear; the communication with Decaen was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46"></a>[46]</span> -secure, and on the right flank stood Lerida, to -which the small forts of Mequinenza and Monzon -served as outposts.</p> - -<p>The Anglo-Sicilian troops reinforced with Whittingham’s -cavalry did not exceed ten thousand -effective men, of which one division was on board -ship from the 22d to the 26th. Elio and Roche -were at Valencia in a destitute condition. Del -Parque’s army thirteen thousand strong, including -Whittingham’s infantry, was several marches in the -rear, it was paid from the British subsidy but very -ill-provided and the duke himself disinclined to -obedience. Villa Campa did not join until the -28th, and Copons was in the mountains above Vich. -Lord William therefore remained with ten thousand -men and a large train of carriages, for ten days without -any position of battle behind him nearer than -the hills about Saguntum. His bridge over the -Ebro was thrown within ten miles of Tortoza where -there was a garrison of five thousand men, detachments -from which could approach unperceived -through the rugged mountains near the fortress; -and Suchet’s well-organised experienced army was -within two marches. That marshal however, expecting -a sharp warfare, was visiting his fortresses in -person, and his troops quartered for the facility of -feeding were unprepared to strike a sudden blow; -moreover, judging his enemy’s strength in offence -what it might have been rather than what it was, -he awaited the arrival of Decaen’s force from Upper -Catalonia before he offered battle.</p> - -<p>But Decaen was himself pressed. The great English -fleet menacing Rosas and Palamos had encouraged -a partial insurrection of the Somatenes, which -was supported by the divisions of Eroles, Manso, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47"></a>[47]</span> -Villamiel. Several minor combats took place on the -side of Besala and Olot, Eroles invested Bañolas, and -though beaten there in a sharp action by Lamarque -on the 23d of June the insurrection spread. To -quell it Decaen combined a double operation from -the side of Gerona upon Vich, which was generally -the Catalan head-quarters. Designing to attack by -the south himself, he sent Maximilian Lamarque, -with fifteen hundred French troops and some Miguelets, -by the mountain paths of San Felice de -Pallarols and Amias. On the 8th of July that -officer gained the heights of Salud, seized the road -from Olot and descended from the north upon Roda -and Manlieu, in the expectation of seeing Decaen -attacking from the other side. He perceived below -him a heavy body in march, and at the same time -heard the sound of cannon and musquetry about -Vich. Concluding this was Decaen he advanced -confidently against the troops in his front, although -very numerous, thinking they were in retreat, but -they fought him until dark without advantage on -either side.</p> - -<p>In the night an officer came with intelligence, -that Decaen’s attack had been relinquished in consequence -of Suchet’s orders to move to the Llobregat, -and it then appeared that a previous despatch -had been intercepted, that the whole Catalan force -to the amount of six or seven thousand combatants -was upon Lamarque’s hands, and the firing heard at -Vich was a rejoicing for lord Wellington’s victories -in Navarre. A retreat was imperative. The -Spaniards followed at daylight, and Lamarque getting -entangled in difficult ground near Salud was forced -to deliver battle. The fight lasted many hours, all -his ammunition was expended, he lost four hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48"></a>[48]</span> -men and was upon the point of destruction, when -general Beurmann came to his succour with four -fresh battalions, and the Catalans were finally defeated -with great loss. After this vigorous action -Decaen marched to join Suchet, and the Catalans, -moving by the mountains in separate divisions, -approached lord William Bentinck.</p> - -<p>The allies having thus passed the Ebro several -officers of both nations conceived the siege of Tortoza -would be the best operation. Nearly forty -thousand men, that is to say, Villa Campa’s, Copons’, -Del Parque’s, Whittingham’s, some of Elio’s -forces and the Anglo-Sicilians, could be united for -the siege, and the defiles of the mountains on the -left bank of the Ebro would enable them to resist -Suchet’s attempts to succour the place on that side, -and force him to move by the circuitous route of -Lerida. Wellington also leaned towards this operation, -but lord William Bentinck resolved to push at -once for Taragona, and even looked to an attack -upon Barcelona; certainly a rash proceeding, inasmuch -as Suchet awaited his approach with an army -every way superior. It does not however follow -that to besiege Tortoza would have been advisable, -for though the battering train, much larger than -Murray’s losses gave reason at first to expect, was -equal to the reduction of the place, the formal siege -of such a fortress was a great undertaking. The -vicinity was unhealthy and it would have been difficult -to feed the Spanish troops. They were quite -inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be long, -not sure to be successful, and Suchet seeing the -allies engaged in such a difficult operation might -have marched at once to Aragon.</p> - -<p>It would seem lord William Bentinck was at this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49"></a>[49]</span> -time misled, partly by the reports of the Catalans, -partly by lord Wellington’s great successes, into a -belief that the French were going to abandon Catalonia. -His mind <ins class="corr" id="tn-49" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'also run upon'"> -also ran upon</ins> Italian affairs, and -he did not perceive that Suchet judiciously posted -and able to draw reinforcements from Decaen was in -fact much stronger than all the allies united. The -two armies of Aragon and Catalonia, numbered<span class="sidenote12">Imperial Muster-rolls.</span> -sixty-seven thousand men. Of these, about twenty-seven -thousand, including Paris’ division then at -Jaca, were in garrison, five thousand were sick, the -remainder in the field. In Catalonia the allies were -not principals, they were accessories. They were to -keep Suchet from operating on the flank of the -allies in Navarre and their defeat would have been -a great disaster. So entirely was this lord Wellington’s -view, that the duke Del Parque’s army was to -make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should -either move himself or detach largely towards -Aragon. Lord William after passing the Ebro -could have secured the defiles of the mountains with -his own and Villa Campa’s troops, that is to say, -with twenty thousand men including Whittingham’s -division. He could have insulted the garrison of -Tortoza, and commenced the making of gabions and -fascines, which would have placed Suchet in doubt -as to his ulterior objects while he awaited the -junction of del Parque’s, Copons’, and the rest of -Elio’s troops. Thus forty thousand men, three -thousand being cavalry and attended by a fleet, -could have descended into the Campo, still leaving -a detachment to watch Tortoza. If Suchet then -came to the succour of Taragona the allies superior -in numbers could have fought in a position chosen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50"></a>[50]</span> -beforehand. Still it is very doubtful if all these -corps would, or could have kept together.</p> - -<p>Lord William Bentinck’s operations were headlong. -He had prepared platforms and fascines for -a siege in the island of Yvica, and on the 30th quitting -the mountains suddenly invested Taragona with -less than six thousand men, occupying ground three -hundred yards nearer to the walls the first day than -Murray had ever done. He thus prevented the garrison -from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed, -they had that intention; yet the fortress could not -be besieged because of Suchet’s vicinity and the -dissemination of the allies. The 31st the bridge at -Amposta was accidentally broken, three hundred -bullocks were drowned, and the head of Del Parque’s -army, being on the left of the Ebro, fell back a day’s -march. However Whittingham’s division and the -cavalry came up, and on the 3rd, the bridge being -restored, Del Parque also joined the investing army. -Copons then promised to bring up his Catalans, Sarzfield’s -division now belonging to the second army -arrived, and Elio had been ordered to reinforce it -with three additional battalions while Villa Campa -observed Tortoza. Meanwhile lord William seeing -that Suchet’s troops were scattered and the marshal -himself at Barcelona, thought of surprizing his posts -and seizing the mountain line of the Llobregat; but -Elio sent no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications -between the English general and Eroles, -was slow, the garrison of Tortoza burned the bridge -at Amposta, and Suchet taking alarm suddenly -returned from Barcelona and concentrated his army.</p> - -<p>Up to this time the Spaniards giving copious but -false information to lord William, and no information<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51"></a>[51]</span> -at all to Suchet, had induced a series of faults on -both sides balancing each other, a circumstance -not uncommon in war, which demands all the -faculties of the greatest minds. The Englishman -thinking his enemy retreating had pressed rashly -forward. The Frenchman deeming from the other’s -boldness the whole of the allies were at hand, -thought himself too weak, and awaited the arrival of -Decaen, whose junction was retarded as we have -seen by the combined operations of the Catalan -army and the English fleet.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs Suchet heard of new and<span class="sidenote7">August.</span> -important successes gained in Navarre by lord Wellington, -one of his Italian battalions was at the -same time cut off at San Sadurni by Manso, and -lord William Bentinck took a position of battle -beyond the Gaya. His left, composed of Whittingham’s -division, occupied Braffin, the Col de Liebra, -and Col de Christina, his right covered the great -coast-road. These were the only carriage ways -by which the enemy could approach, but they were -ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham -thought himself too weak to defend the passes -alone; hence, when Suchet, reinforced by Decaen -with eight thousand sabres and bayonets, finally -advanced, lord William who had landed neither -guns nor stores decided to refuse battle. For such -a resolute officer, this must have been a painful -decision. He had now nearly thirty thousand fighting -men, including a thousand marines which had -been landed to join the advanced guard at Altafalla; -he had assumed the offensive, invested Taragona -where the military honour of England had suffered -twice before, in fine provoked the action which he -now declined. But Suchet had equal numbers of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52"></a>[52]</span> -better quality; the banks of the Gaya were rugged -to pass in retreat if the fight should be lost; much -must have been left to the general officers at different -points; Del Parque’s was an uneasy coadjutor, and -if any part was forced the whole line would have -been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however -manifest, for though he expected the enemy -on the 9th he did not send his field artillery and -baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day on which -Decaen reached Villa Franca.</p> - -<p>The French general dreading the fire of the fleet -endeavoured by false attacks on the coast road to -draw the allies from the defiles beyond Braffin, -towards which he finally carried his whole army, and -those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his -Memoirs state because of these demonstrations, but -because lord William had previously determined to -retreat. On the 16th finding the passes unguarded, -he poured through and advanced upon Valls thus -turning the allies, but he had lost time and the -latter were in full retreat towards the mountains, -the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrills. -The march of the former was covered by lord -Frederick Bentinck who leading the British and German -cavalry defeated the fourth French hussars -with a loss of forty or fifty men; and it is said that -either general Habert or Harispe was taken but -escaped in the confusion.</p> - -<p>The Anglo-Sicilians and Whittingham’s division -now entrenched themselves near the Col de Balaguer, -and Del Parque marched with his own and -Sarzfield’s troops to invest Tortoza, but the garrison -fell upon his rear while passing the Ebro and some -loss was sustained. Meanwhile Suchet, more swayed -by the remembrance of Castalla than by his recent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53"></a>[53]</span> -success, would not again prove the courage of the -British troops on a mountain position. Contrary to -the wishes of his army he returned to Taragona and -destroyed the ancient walls, which from the extreme -hardness of the Roman cement proved a tedious and -difficult matter: then resuming his old positions -about Villa Franca and on the Llobregat he sent -Decaen to Upper Catalonia. This terminated lord -William Bentinck’s first effort and the general -result was favourable. He had risked much on insufficient -grounds, yet his enemy made no profit -and lost Taragona with its fertile Campo, Tortoza was -invested, and Suchet was kept away from Navarre.</p> - -<p>It is strange that this renowned French general -suffered his large force to be thus paralyzed at such -a crisis. Above twenty-seven thousand of his soldiers -if we include the isolated division of Paris<span class="sidenote12">Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.</span> -were shut up in garrison, but thirty-two thousand -remained with which he marched to and fro in -Catalonia while the war was being decided in -Navarre. Had he moved to that province by Aragon -before the end of July lord Wellington would have -been overpowered. What was to be feared? That -lord William Bentinck would follow, or attack one -of his fortresses? If the French were successful in -Navarre the loss of a fortress in Catalonia would -have been a trifle, it was not certain that any would -have fallen, and lord William could not abandon the -coast. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned -Catalonia; but to invade France, guarded -as she was by her great military reputation, and to -do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of Valencia -and Catalonia the latter barring all the carriage -roads was chimerical. Success in Navarre -would have made an invasion by sea pass as a partizan<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54"></a>[54]</span> -descent, and moreover France, wanting Suchet’s -troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded -by Wellington and in a far more formidable -manner. This question shall however be treated -more largely in another place, it is sufficient to -observe here, that Clarke the minister of war, a man -without genius or attachment to the emperor’s -cause, discouraged any great combined plan of -action, and Napoleon absorbed by his own immense -operations did not interpose.</p> - -<p>Lord William now intent upon the siege of Tortoza -wished lord Wellington to attack Mequinenza -with a detachment of his army; but this the situation -of affairs in Navarre and Guipuscoa did not admit -of, and he soon discovered that to assail Tortoza was -an undertaking beyond his own means. Elio when -desired to gather provisions and assist in the operations -demanded three weeks for preparation; all -the Spanish troops were in want, Roche’s division, -blockading Murviedro, although so close to Valencia -was on half rations; and the siege of Tortoza was necessarily -relinquished, because no great or sustained -operation could be conducted in concert with such -generals and such armies. Suchet’s fear of them -was an illustration of Napoleon’s maxim, that war is -an affair of discrimination. It is more essential to -know the quality than the quantity of enemies.</p> - -<p>It was difficult for lord William Bentinck to -apply his mind vigorously to the campaign he was -conducting, because fresh changes injurious to the -British policy in Sicily called him to that island, -and his thoughts were running upon the invasion of -Italy; but as the Spaniards, deceived by the movements -of escorts and convoys, reported that Suchet -had marched with twelve thousand men to join<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55"></a>[55]</span> -Soult, he once more fixed his head-quarters at -Taragona, and, following lord Wellington’s instructions, -detached Del Parque’s troops by forced -marches upon Tudela.</p> - -<p>On the 5th of September the army entered Villa<span class="sidenote9">September.</span> -Franca, and the 12th, detachments of Calabrese, -Swiss, German, and British infantry, a squadron -of cavalry and one battery, in all about twelve -hundred men under colonel Adam, occupied the -heights of Ordal. At this place, ten miles in advance -of Villa Franca, being joined by three of Sarzfield’s -battalions and a Spanish squadron they took -a position; but it now appeared that very few -French troops had been detached; that Suchet had -concentrated his whole force on the Llobregat; and -that his army was very superior in numbers, because -the allies, reduced by the loss of Del Parque’s troops, -had also left Whittingham’s division at Reus and -Valls to procure food. Sarzfield’s division was feeding -on the British supplies, and lord William again -looked to a retreat, yet thinking the enemy disinclined -to advance desired to preserve his forward -position as long as possible.</p> - -<p>He had only two lines of operation to watch. -The one menacing his front from Molino del -Rey by the main road, which colonel Adam -blocked by his position at Ordal; the other -from Martorel, by San Sadurni, menacing his -left; but on this route, a difficult one, he had -pushed the Catalans under Eroles and Manso -reinforcing them with some Calabrese; there was -indeed a third line by Avionet on his right, but it -was little better than a goat-path. He had designed -to place his main body close up to the Ordal -on the evening of the 12th, yet from some slight<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56"></a>[56]</span> -cause delayed it until the next day. Meanwhile -he viewed the country in advance of that defile -without discovering an enemy. His confidential -emissaries assured him the French were not going -to advance, and he returned, satisfied that Adam’s -detachment was safe, and so expressed himself -to that officer. A report of a contrary tendency -was indeed made by colonel Reeves of the twenty-seventh, -on the authority of a Spanish woman -who had before proved her accuracy and ability as -a spy; she was now however disbelieved, and this incredulity -was unfortunate. For Suchet thus braved, -and his communication with Lerida threatened by -Manso on the side of Martorel, was already in -march to attack Ordal with the army of Aragon, -while Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, moving with -the army of Catalonia from Martorel by San Sardurni, -turned the left of the allies.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF ORDAL.</h4> - -<p>The heights occupied by colonel Adam although -rugged rose gradually from a magnificent bridge, -by which the main road was carried over a very -deep and impracticable ravine. The second -battalion of the twenty-seventh British regiment -was posted on the right, the Germans and De Roll’s -Swiss with the artillery, defended an old Spanish -fort commanding the main road; the Spaniards -were in the centre, the Calabrese on the left; and -the cavalry were in reserve. A bright moonlight -facilitated the movements of the French, and a -little before midnight, their leading column under -general Mesclop passing the bridge without let or -hindrance, mounted the heights with a rapid pace -and driving back the picquets gave the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57"></a>[57]</span> -alarm. The allied troops lying on their arms in -order of battle were ready instantly and the fight -commenced. The first effort was against the twenty-seventh, -then the Germans and the Spanish battalions -were vigorously assailed in succession as the -French columns got free of the bridge, but the Calabrese -were too far on the left to take a share in -the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate. -Harispe who commanded the French constantly outflanked -the right of the allies, and at the same time -pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought -gallantly.</p> - -<p>Colonel Adam was wounded very early, the -command devolved upon colonel Reeves, and that -officer seeing his flank turned and his men falling -fast, in short, finding himself engaged with a whole -army on a position of which colonel Adam had lost -the key by neglecting the bridge, resolved to retreat. -In this view he first ordered the guns to fall back, -and to cover the movement charged a column of -the enemy which was pressing forward on the high -road, but he was severely wounded in this attack -and there was no recognized commander on the spot -to succeed him. Then the affair became confused. -For though the order to retreat was given the -Spaniards were fighting desperately, and the twenty-seventh -thought it shame to abandon them; wherefore -the Germans and De Roll’s regiment still held -the old fort and the guns came back. The action -was thus continued with great fury. Colonel Carey -now brought the Calabrese into line from the left, -and menaced the right flank of the French, but he -was too late; the Spaniards overwhelmed in the -centre were broken, the right was completely turned, -the old fort was lost, the enemy’s skirmishers got into<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58"></a>[58]</span> -the allies’ rear, and at three o’clock the whole dispersed, -the most part in flight; the Spanish cavalry -were then overthrown on the main road by the French -hussars and four guns were taken in the tumult.</p> - -<p>Captain Waldron, with the twenty-seventh reduced -to eighty men, and captain Müller with -about the same number of Germans and Swiss, -breaking through several small parties of the enemy -effected their retreat in good order by the hills on -each side of the road. Colonel Carey endeavoured -at first to gain the road of Sadurni on the left, but -meeting with Decaen’s people on that side he retraced -his steps, and crossing the field of battle in the -rear of Suchet’s columns made for Villa Nueva de -Sitjes. There he finally embarked without loss, save -a few stragglers who fell into the hands of a flanking -battalion of French infantry which had moved -through the mountains by Begas and Avionet. The -overthrow was complete and the prisoners were at -first very numerous, but the darkness enabled many -to escape, and two thousand men reached Manso -and Eroles.</p> - -<p>Suchet pursuing his march came up with lord -William about eight o’clock. The latter retired -skirmishing and with excellent order beyond Villa -Franca, followed by the French horsemen some of -which assailed his rear-guard while others edged to -their right to secure the communication with Decaen. -The latter was looked for by both parties with great -anxiety, but he had been delayed by the resistance -of Manso and Eroles in the rugged country between -Martorel and San Sadurni. Suchet’s cavalry and -artillery continued however to infest the rear of the -retreating army until it reached a deep baranco, -near the Venta de Monjos, where the passage being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59"></a>[59]</span> -dangerous and the French horseman importunate, -that brave and honest soldier, lord Frederick Bentinck, -charged their right, and fighting hand to hand with -the enemy’s general Myers wounded him and overthrew -his light cavalry; they rallied upon their -dragoons and advanced again, endeavouring to turn -the flank, but were stopped by the fire of two guns -which general Clinton opened upon them. Meanwhile -the cuirassiers, on the left, pressed the Brunswick -hussars and menaced the infantry yet they -were finally checked by the fire of the tenth regiment. -This cavalry action was vigorous, the -twentieth and the Germans although few in numbers -lost more than ninety men. The baranco was however -safely passed and about three o’clock the army -having reached Arbos the pursuit ceased. The -Catalans meanwhile had retreated towards Igualada -and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to Taragona.</p> - -<p>It was now thought Suchet would make a movement -to carry off the garrisons of Lerida and Tortoza, -but this did not happen, and lord William -went to Sicily, leaving the command of the army -to sir William Clinton.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. Lord William Bentinck committed errors, -yet he has been censured without discrimination. -“<em>He advanced rashly.</em>” “<em>He was undecided.</em>” -“<em>He exposed his advanced guard without support.</em>” -Such were the opinions expressed at the time. -Their justness may be disputed. His first object -was to retain all the French force in Catalonia; -his second, to profit from Suchet’s weakness if he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60"></a>[60]</span> -detached largely. He could do neither by remaining -inactive on the barren hills behind Hospitalet, -because the Spaniards would have dispersed for -want of provisions and the siege of Tortoza was -found to be impracticable. It was therefore the -part of a bold and skilful general to menace his -enemy, if he could be sure of retreating again -without danger or dishonour. The position at Villa -Franca fulfilled this condition. It was strong in -itself and offensive; sir Edward Pellew’s fleet was -in movement to create diversions in Upper Catalonia, -and all the emissaries and Spanish correspondents -concurred in declaring, though falsely, that -the French general had detached twelve thousand -men.</p> - -<p>It is indeed one of the tests of a sagacious general -to detect false intelligence, yet the greatest -are at times deceived, and all must act, if they -act at all, upon what appears at the time to be -true. Lord William’s advance was founded on -erroneous data, but his position in front of Villa -Franca was well chosen. It enabled him to feed -Whittingham’s division in the fertile country about -Reus and Valls, and there were short and easy communications -from Villa Franca to the sea-coast. -The army could only be seriously assailed on two -lines. In front, by the main road, which though -broad was from Molino del Rey to the heights of -Ordal one continued defile. On the left by San -Sardurni, a road still more rugged and difficult than -the other. And the Catalans were launched on this -side as their natural line of operations, because, -without losing their hold of the mountains they -protected the left of the allies, menacing at the -same time the right of the enemy and his communications<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61"></a>[61]</span> -with Lerida. Half a march to the rear -would bring the army to Vendrills, beyond which -the enemy could not follow without getting under -the fire of the ships; neither could he forestall this -movement by a march through the Liebra and -Cristina defiles, because the Catalans falling back -on Whittingham’s division could hold him in -check.</p> - -<p>2º. Ordal and San Sadurni were the keys of the -position. The last was well secured, the first not -so, and there was the real error of lord William -Bentinck. It was none however to push an advanced -guard of three thousand five hundred men, -with cavalry and artillery, to a distance of ten -miles for a few hours. He had a right to expect -the commander of such a force would maintain his -post until supported, or at least retreat without disaster. -An officer of capacity would have done so. -But whoever relies upon the capacity of sir Frederick -Adam either in peace or war will be disappointed.</p> - -<p>In 1810 lord Wellington detached general Robert -Craufurd with two or three thousand men to a -much greater distance, not for one night but for -many weeks. And that excellent officer, though -close to Massena’s immense army the very cavalry -of which was double his whole numbers; though -he had the long line of the Agueda a fordable river -to guard; though he was in an open country and -continually skirmishing, never lost so much as a -patrole and always remained master of his movements -for his combat on the Coa was a studied -and wilful error. It was no fault therefore to push -colonel Adam’s detachment to Ordal, but it was a -fault that lord William, having determined to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62"></a>[62]</span> -follow with his whole force, should have delayed -doing so for one night, or that delaying he did not -send some supporting troops forward. It was a -fault not to do so because there was good reason -to do so, and to delay was to tempt fortune. There -was good reason to do so as well to profit of the -advantage of the position as to support Adam. -Had lord William Bentinck been at hand with his -main body when the attack on Ordal commenced, -the head of Suchet’s force which was kept at bay -for three hours by a detachment so ill commanded -would have been driven into the ravine behind, and -the victorious allies would still have had time to -march against Decaen by the road along which -colonel Cary endeavoured to join Manso. In fine, -Suchet’s dispositions were vicious in principle and -ought not to have succeeded. He operated on two -distinct lines having no cross communications, and -before an enemy in possession of a central position -with good communications.</p> - -<p>3º. It was another fault that lord William Bentinck -disregarded the Spanish woman’s report to -colonel Reeves; his observations made in front of -the bridge of Ordal on the evening of the 12th -accorded indeed with the reports of his own emissaries, -but the safe side should always be the rule -of precaution. He also, although on the spot, -overlooked the unmilitary dispositions of colonel -Adam on the heights of Ordal. The summit could -not be defended against superior numbers with a -small corps, and that officer had nevertheless extended -the Calabrese so far on the left that they -could take no share in the action, and yet could not -retreat without great difficulty. A commander who -understood his business, would have blocked up the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63"></a>[63]</span> -bridge in front of the heights, and defended it by -a strong detachment, supporting that detachment -by others placed in succession on the heights behind, -but keeping his main body always in hand, -ready either to fall on the head of the enemy’s -column of attack, or to rally the advanced detachments -and retreat in order. There were plenty of -trees and stones to block the bridge, its own parapet -would have supplied materials, and the ravine -was so deep and rugged, that the enemy could not -have crossed it on the flanks in the dark.</p> - -<p>It is no defence to say colonel Adam only took -his ground in the evening after a march; that he -expected the main body up the next morning and -that lord William assured him he was safe from -attack. Every officer is responsible for the security -of his own troops, and the precautions prescribed -by the rules of war should never be dispensed -with or delayed at an outpost. Now it does -not appear that colonel Adam ever placed an infantry -picquet on the bridge, or sent a cavalry -patrole beyond it; and I have been informed by a -French soldier, one of a party sent to explore the -position, that they reached the crest of the heights -without opposition and returned safely, whereupon -Mesclop’s brigade instantly crossed the bridge and -attacked.</p> - -<p>4º. Ordal might be called a surprize with respect -to the general-in-chief, yet the troops engaged -were not surprised; they were beaten and dispersed -because colonel Adam was unskilful. The French -general’s victory was complete; but he has in his -Memoirs exaggerated his difficulties and the importance -of his success, his private report to the emperor -was more accurate. The Memoirs state that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64"></a>[64]</span> -the English grenadiers defended certain works -which commanded the ascent of the main road, -and in the accompanying atlas a perspective view -of well-conditioned redoubts with colours flying, -is given. The reader is thus led to imagine these -were regular forts of a fresh construction defended -by select troops; but in the private report they -are correctly designated as ancient retrenchments,<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_V">Appendix, No. 5.</a></span> -being in fact the ruins of some old Spanish field-works -and of no more advantage to the allies than -any natural inequality of ground. Again in the -Memoirs the attack of the French cavalry near -Villa Franca is represented as quite successful; but -the private report only says the rear was harassed -by repeated charges, which is true, and moreover -those charges were vigorously repulsed. The whole -French loss was about three hundred men, that of -the allies, heavy at Ordal, was lightened by escape -of prisoners during the night and ultimately did -not exceed a thousand men including Spaniards.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65"></a>[65]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">Turning from the war in Catalonia to the operations<span class="sidenote9">1813. June.</span> -in Navarre and Guipuscoa, we shall find lord -Wellington’s indomitable energy overcoming every -difficulty. It has been already shown how, changing -his first views, he disposed the Anglo-Portuguese -divisions to cover the siege of San Sebastian and -the blockade of Pampeluna, at the same time attacking -with the Spanish divisions Santona on the coast, -and the castles of Daroca, Morella, Zaragoza, and -the forts of Pancorbo in the interior. These operations -required many men, but the early fall of Pancorbo -enabled O’Donnel’s reserve to blockade Pampeluna, -and Don Carlos D’España’s division, four -thousand strong, which had remained at Miranda -del Castanar to improve its organization when lord -Wellington advanced to the Ebro, was approaching -to reinforce him.</p> - -<p>The harbour of Passages was the only port near -the scene of operations suited for the supply of the -army. Yet it had this defect, that being situated -between the covering and the besieging army, the -stores and guns once landed were in danger from -every movement of the enemy. The Deba river, -between San Sebastian and Bilbaō, was unfit for -large vessels, and hence no permanent depôt could -be established nearer than Bilbaō. At that port -therefore, and at St. Ander and Coruña, the great -depôts of the army were fixed, the stores being transported<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66"></a>[66]</span> -to them from the establishments in Portugal; -but the French held Santona, and their privateers -interrupted the communication along the coast of -Spain while American privateers did the same -between Lisbon and Coruña. On the other hand -the intercourse between San Sebastian and the ports -of France was scarcely molested, and the most urgent -remonstrances failed to procure a sufficient naval -force on the coast of Biscay. It was in these circumstances -Wellington commenced</p> - - -<h4>THE SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN.</h4> - -<p>This place was built on a low sandy isthmus -formed by the harbour on one side and the river -Urumea on the other. Behind it rose the Monte -Orgullo, a rugged cone nearly four hundred feet -high, washed by the ocean and crowned with the -small castle of La Mota. Its southern face overlooking -the town, was yet cut off from it by a line of -defensive works and covered with batteries; but La -Mota itself was commanded, at a distance of thirteen -hundred yards, by the Monte Olia on the other side -of the Urumea.</p> - -<p>The land front of San Sebastian was three hundred -and fifty yards wide, stretching quite across the -isthmus. It consisted of a high curtain or rampart, -very solid, strengthened by a lofty casemated flat -bastion or cavalier placed in the centre, and by half -bastions at either end. A regular horn-work was -pushed out from this front, and six hundred yards -beyond the horn-work the isthmus was closed by -the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the foot of which -stood the suburb of San Martin.</p> - -<p>On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain -sandy hills called the <em>Chofres</em>, through which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67"></a>[67]</span> -road from Passages passed to the wooden bridge -over the river, and thence, by the suburb of Santa -Catalina, along the top of a sea-wall which formed a -<i lang="fr">fausse braye</i> for the horn-work.</p> - -<p>The flanks of the town were protected by simple -ramparts. The one was washed by the water of the -harbour, the other by the Urumea which at high -tide covered four of the twenty-seven feet comprised -in its elevation. This was the weak side of -the fortress, for though covered by the river there -was only a single wall ill-flanked by two old -towers, and by the half bastion of San Elmo -which was situated at the extremity of the rampart -close under the Monte Orgullo. There -was no ditch, no counter-scarp, or glacis, the wall -could be seen to its base from the Chofre hills at -distances varying from five hundred to a thousand -yards, and when the tide was out the Urumea left a -dry strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo. -However the guns from the batteries at Monte Orgullo -especially that called the Mirador, could see -this strand.</p> - -<p>The other flank of the town was secured by the -harbour, in the mouth of which was a rocky island, -called Santa Clara, where the French had established -a post of twenty-five men.</p> - -<p>When the battle of Vittoria happened San Sebastian -was nearly dismantled; many of the guns had -been removed to form battering trains or to arm -smaller ports on the coast, there were no bomb-proofs -nor pallisades nor outworks, the wells were -foul and the place was supplied with water by a -single aqueduct. Joseph’s defeat restored its importance -as a fortress. General Emanuel Rey -entered it the 22d of June, bringing with him the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68"></a>[68]</span> -escort of the convoy which had quitted Vittoria the -day before the battle. The town was thus filled with -emigrant Spanish families, with the ministers and -other persons attached to the court; the population ordinarily -eight thousand was increased to sixteen thousand -and disorder and confusion were predominant. -Rey, pushed by necessity, immediately forced all<span class="sidenote">Bellas’ Journal of French Sieges in Spain.</span> -persons not residents to march at once to France -granting them only a guard of one hundred men; -the people of quality went by sea, the others by land, -and fortunately all arrived safely for the Partidas -would have given them no quarter.</p> - -<p>On the 27th general Foy while retreating before -sir Thomas Graham threw a reinforcement into the -place. The next day Mendizabal’s Spaniards appeared -on the hills behind the ridge of San Bartolomeo -and on the Chofres, whereupon general Rey -burned the wooden bridge and both the suburbs, -and commenced fortifying the heights of San Bartolomeo. -The 29th the Spaniards slightly attacked -San Bartolomeo, and were repulsed.</p> - -<p>The 1st of July the governor of Gueteria abandoned<span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -that place, and with detestable ferocity secretly<span class="sidenote">Sir G. Collier’s Despatch.</span> -left a lighted train which exploded the magazine -and destroyed many of the inhabitants. His troops -three hundred in number entered San Sebastian, -and at the same time a vessel from St. Jean de Luz -arrived with fifty-six cannoneers and some workmen; -the garrison was thus increased to three thousand -men and all persons not able to provide subsistence for -themselves in advance were ordered to quit the place. -Meanwhile Mendizabal, having cut off the aqueduct, -made some approaches towards the head of the -burned bridge on the right of the Urumea and -molested the workmen on the heights of Bartolomeo.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69"></a>[69]</span></p> - -<p>On the 3d, the Surveillante frigate and a sloop -with some small craft arrived to blockade the harbour, -yet the French vessels from St. Jean de Luz -continued to enter by night. The same day the -governor made a sally with eleven hundred men in -three columns to obtain news, and after some hours’ -skirmishing returned with a few prisoners.</p> - -<p>The 6th some French vessels with a detachment of -troops and a considerable convoy of provisions -came from St. Jean de Luz.</p> - -<p>The 7th Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set -fire to the convent of San Bartolomeo.</p> - -<p>On the 9th sir Thomas Graham arrived with a -corps of British and Portuguese troops, and on the -13th the Spaniards marched, some to reinforce the -force blockading Santona, the remainder to rejoin -the fourth army on the Bidassoa.</p> - -<p>At this time general Reille held the entrances to -the Bastan by Vera and Echallar, but Wellington -drove him thence on the 15th and established the -seventh and light divisions there, thus covering the -passes over the Peña de Haya by which the siege -might have been interrupted.</p> - -<p>Before general Graham arrived the French had -constructed a redoubt on the heights of San Bartolomeo, -and connected it with the convent of that -name which they also fortified. These outworks -were supported by posts in the ruined houses of the -suburb of San Martin behind, and by a low circular -redoubt, formed of casks on the main road, half-way -between the convent and the horn-work. Hence -to reduce the place, working along the isthmus, it -was necessary to carry in succession three lines of -defence covering the town, and a fourth at the foot -of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70"></a>[70]</span> -could be assailed. Seventy-six pieces of artillery -were mounted upon these works and others were -afterwards obtained from France by sea.</p> - -<p>The besieging army consisted of the fifth division -under general Oswald, and the independent Portuguese -brigades of J. Wilson and Bradford reinforced -by detachments from the first division. Thus, including -the artillery-men some seamen commanded -by lieutenant O’Reilly of the Surveillante and one -hundred regular sappers and miners, now for the -first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula, nearly -ten thousand men were employed. The guns available -for the attack, in the first instance, were a new -battering train originally prepared for the siege of -Burgos, consisting of fourteen iron twenty-four<span class="sidenote">Jones’s Journal of British Sieges.</span> -pounders, six eight-inch brass howitzers, four sixty-eight-pound -iron carronades, and four iron ten-inch -mortars. To these were added six twenty-four -pounders lent by the ships of war, and six eighteen -pounders which had moved with the army from Portugal, -making altogether forty pieces commanded -by colonel Dickson. The distance from the depôt -of siege at Passages to the Chofre sand-hills was -one mile and a half of good road, and a pontoon -bridge was laid over the Urumea river above the -Chofres, but from thence to the height of Bartolomeo -was more than five miles of very bad road.</p> - -<p>Early in July the fortress had been twice closely -examined by Major Smith, the engineer who had -so ably defended Tarifa. He proposed a plan of siege -founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofre -hills to destroy the flanks, rake the principal front -and form a breach with the same batteries, the works -being at the same time secured, except at low -water, by the Urumea. Counter-batteries, to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71"></a>[71]</span> -constructed on the left of that river, were to rake -the line of defence in which the breach was to be -formed; and against the castle and its outworks he -relied principally upon vertical fire, instancing the -reduction of Fort Bourbon in the West Indies in -proof of its efficacy. This plan would probably -have reduced San Sebastian in a reasonable time -without any remarkable loss of men, and lord Wellington -approving of it, though he doubted the efficacy -of the vertical fire, ordered the siege to be -commenced. He renewed his approval afterwards -when he had examined the works in person, and all -his orders were in the same spirit; but neither -the plan nor his orders were followed, the siege, -which should have been an ordinary event of war -has obtained a mournful celebrity, and lord Wellington -has been unjustly charged with a contempt -for the maxims of the great masters of the art. -Anxious he was no doubt to save time, yet he did -not for that urge the engineer beyond the rules. -<em>Take the place in the quickest manner, yet do not -from over speed fail to take it</em>, was the sense of his -instructions; but sir Thomas Graham, one of England’s -best soldiers, appears to have been endowed -with a genius for war intuitive rather than reflective; -and this joined to his natural modesty and a -certain easiness of temper, caused him at times to -abandon his own correct conceptions, for the less -judicious counsels of those about him who advised -deviations from the original plan.</p> - -<p>Active operations were commenced on the night -of the 10th by the construction of two batteries -against the convent and redoubt of San Bartolomeo. -And on the night of the 13th four batteries to contain -twenty of the heaviest guns and four eight-inch<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72"></a>[72]</span> -howitzers, were marked out on the Chofre sand-hills, -at distances varying from six hundred to thirteen hundred -yards from the eastern rampart of the town. -The river was supposed to be unfordable, wherefore -no parallel of support was made, yet good trenches -of communications, and subsequently regular approaches -were formed. Two attacks were thus -established. One on the right bank of the Urumea entrusted -to the unattached Portuguese brigades; one -on the left bank to the fifth division; but most of -the troops were at first encamped on the right -bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army -in the event of a general battle.</p> - -<p>On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour -with supplies, and the batteries of the left attack, -under the direction of the German major Hartman, -opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing hot shot -into that building. The besieged responded with -musquetry from the redoubt, with heavy guns from -the town, and with a field-piece which they had -mounted on the belfry of the convent itself.</p> - -<p>The 15th of July sir Richard Fletcher took the chief -command of the engineers, but major Smith retained -the direction of the attack from the Chofre Hills and -lord Wellington’s orders continued to pass through -his hands. This day the batteries of the left attack, -aided by some howitzers from the right of the -Urumea, set the convent on fire, silenced the musquetry -of the besieged, and so damaged the defences -that the Portuguese troops attached to the fifth division -were ordered to feel the enemy’s post. They -were however repulsed with great loss, the French -sallied, and the firing did not cease until nightfall.</p> - -<p>A battery for seven additional guns to play -against Bartolomeo was now commenced on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73"></a>[73]</span> -right of the Urumea, and the original batteries set -fire to the convent several times, but the flames were -extinguished by the garrison.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 16th general Rey sounded the -Urumea as high as Santa Catalina, designing to pass -over and storm the batteries on the Chofres; but -the fords discovered were shifting, and the difficulty -of execution deterred him from this project.</p> - -<p>The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, the -assault was ordered without waiting for the effect of -the new battery raised on the other side of the -Urumea. The storming party was formed in two -columns. Detachments from Wilson’s Portuguese, -supported by the light company of the ninth British -regiment and three companies of the royals, composed -the right, which under the direction of general -Hay was destined to assail the redoubt. General -Bradford directed the left which being composed of -Portuguese, supported by three companies of the -ninth British regiment under colonel Cameron, was -ordered to assail the convent.</p> - - -<h4>ASSAULT OF SAN BARTOLOMEO.</h4> - -<p>At ten o’clock in the morning two heavy six-pounders -opened against the redoubt; and a sharp -fire of musquetry in return from the French, who -had been reinforced and occupied the suburb of -San Martin, announced their resolution to fight. -The allied troops were assembled behind the crest -of the hill overlooking the convent, and the first -signal was given, but the Portuguese advanced -slowly at both attacks, and the supporting companies -of the ninth regiment on each side, passing -through them fell upon the enemy with the usual -impetuosity of British soldiers. Colonel Cameron<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74"></a>[74]</span> -while leading his grenadiers down the face of the hill -was exposed to a heavy cannonade from the horn-work, -but he soon gained the cover of a wall fifty -yards from the convent and there awaited the second -signal. However his rapid advance, which threatened -to cut off the garrison from the suburb, joined -to the fire of the two six-pounders and that of some -other field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea, -caused the French to abandon the redoubt. Seeing -this, Cameron jumped over the wall and assaulted both -the convent and the houses of the suburb. At the -latter a fierce struggle ensued and captain Woodman -of the ninth was killed in the upper room of a house -after fighting <ins class="corr" id="tn-74" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'his way p from'"> -his way up from</ins> below; but the grenadiers -carried the convent with such rapidity that the -French, unable to explode some small mines they -had prepared, hastily joined the troops in the suburb. -There however the fighting continued and colonel -Cameron’s force being very much reduced the affair -was becoming doubtful, when the remaining companies -of his regiment, which he had sent for after -the attack commenced, arrived, and the suburb was -with much fighting entirely won. At the right -attack the company of the ninth, although retarded -by a ravine by a thick hedge by the slowness of -the Portuguese and by a heavy fire, entered the -abandoned redoubt with little loss, but the troops -were then rashly led against the cask redoubt, contrary -to general Oswald’s orders, and were beaten -back by the enemy.</p> - -<p>The loss of the French was two hundred and<span class="sidenote">Bellas <span lang="fr">Journaux des Sièges</span>.</span> -forty men, that of the allies considerable; the companies -of the ninth under colonel Cameron, alone, -had seven officers and sixty men killed or wounded, -and the operation although successful was an error.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75"></a>[75]</span> -The battery erected on the right bank of the Urumea -was not opened, wherefore, either the assault was -precipitated or the battery not necessary; but the -loss justified the conception of the battery.</p> - -<p>When the action ceased the engineers made a -lodgement in the redoubt, and commenced two batteries -for eight pieces to rake the horn-work and the -eastern rampart of the place. Two other batteries to -contain four sixty-eight-pound carronades and four -ten-inch mortars were also commenced on the right -bank of the Urumea.</p> - -<p>The 18th the besieged threw up traverses on -the land front to meet the raking fire of the besiegers, -and the latter dragged four pieces up -the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and -other batteries on the Monte Orgullo. In the night -a lodgement was made on the ruins of San Martin, -the two batteries at the right attack were armed, -and two additional mortars dragged up the Monte -Olia.</p> - -<p>The 19th all the batteries at both attacks were -armed, and in the night two approaches being commenced -from the suburb of San Martin towards the -cask redoubt the French were driven from that -small work.</p> - -<p>On the 20th the whole of the batteries opened -their fire, the greatest part being directed to form -the breach.</p> - -<p>Major Smith’s plan was similar to that followed -by marshal Berwick a century before. He proposed -a lodgement on the horn-work before the breach -should be assailed, but he had not then read the<span class="sidenote">Notes of the Siege by sir C. Smith, MSS.</span> -description of that siege and therefore unknowingly -fixed the breaching-point precisely where the wall -had been most strongly rebuilt after Berwick’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76"></a>[76]</span> -attack. This was the first fault, yet a slight one -because the wall did not resist the batteries very -long, but it was a serious matter that sir Thomas -Graham at the suggestion of the commander of the -artillery began his operations by breaching. Major -Smith objected to it, and sir R. Fletcher acquiesced -reluctantly on the understanding that the ruining -of the defences was only postponed, an understanding -afterwards unhappily forgotten.</p> - -<p>The result of the first day’s attack was not satisfactory, -the weather proved bad, the guns mounted -on ship carriages failed, one twenty-four pounder -was rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another -became useless from an accident, a captain of -engineers was killed, and the besiegers’ shot had -little effect upon the solid wall. In the night however -the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages, -and a parallel across the isthmus was projected; -but the greatest part of the workmen, to avoid a -tempest, sought shelter in the suburb of San Martin -and when day broke only one-third of the work was -performed.</p> - -<p>The 21st the besiegers’ batteries ceased firing to -allow of a summons, but the governor refused to -receive the letter and the firing was resumed. The -main wall still resisted yet the parapets and embrazures -crumbled away fast, and the batteries on -Monte Olia plunged into the horn-work, although -at sixteen hundred yards distance, with such effect, -that the besieged having no bomb-proofs were forced -to dig trenches to protect themselves. The counter-fire -directed solely against the breaching batteries -was feeble, but at midnight a shell thrown from the -castle into the bay gave the signal for a sally, and -during the firing which ensued several French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77"></a>[77]</span> -vessels with supplies entered the harbour. This -night also the besieged isolated the breach by cuts -in the rampart and other defences. On the other -hand the besiegers’ parallel across the isthmus was -completed, and in its progress laid bare the mouth -of a drain, four feet high and three feet wide, containing -the pipe of the aqueduct cut off by the -Spaniards. Through this dangerous opening lieutenant -Reid of the engineers, a young and zealous -officer, crept even to the counterscarp of the horn-work, -and finding the passage there closed by a -door returned without an accident. Thirty barrels -of powder were placed in this drain, and eight feet -was stopped with sand-bags, thus forming a globe -of compression designed to blow, as through a tube, -so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill -the narrow ditch of the horn-work.</p> - -<p>On the 22d the fire from the batteries, unexampled -from its rapidity and accuracy, opened what appeared -a practicable breach in the eastern flank -wall, between the towers of Los Hornos and Las<span class="sidenote7">Plan 3.</span> -Mesquitas. The counter-fire of the besieged now -slackened, but the descent into the town behind the -breach was more than twelve feet perpendicular, -and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently -working at the interior defences to receive -the assault: they added also another gun to the -battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador battery, -to flank the front attack. On the other hand -the besiegers had placed four sixty-eight pound -carronades in battery to play on the defences of the -breach, but the fire on both sides slackened because -the guns were greatly enlarged at the vents with -constant practice.</p> - -<p>On the 23d the sea blockade being null the French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78"></a>[78]</span> -vessels returned to France with the badly wounded -men. This day the besiegers judging the breach -between the towers quite practicable turned the -guns, at the suggestion of general Oswald, to break -the wall on the right of the main breach. Major -Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage -would be gained by making a second opening to -get at which the troops must first pass the great -breach; that time would be thus uselessly lost to -the besiegers, and that there was a manifest objection -on account of the tide and depth of water at the -new point attacked. His counsel was overruled, -and in the course of the day, the wall being thin -the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach thirty -feet wide was rendered practicable.</p> - -<p>The defensive fire of the besieged being now -much diminished, the ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight -pound carronades were turned upon the defences -of the great breach, and upon a stockade -which separated the high curtain on the land front, -from the lower works of the flank against which the -attack was conducted. The houses near the breach -were soon in flames which spread rapidly, destroyed -some of the defences of the besieged and menacing -the whole town with destruction. The assault was -ordered for the next morning. But when the troops -assembled in the trenches the burning houses appeared -so formidable that the attack was deferred -and the batteries again opened, partly against the -second breach, partly against the defences, partly to -break the wall in a third place between the half -bastion of St. John on the land front and the main -breach.</p> - -<p>During the night the vigilant governor expecting -the assault mounted two field-pieces on the cavalier,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79"></a>[79]</span> -in the centre of the land front, which being fifteen -feet above the other defences commanded the high -curtain, and they still had on the horn-work a light -piece, and two casemated guns on the flank of the -cavalier. Two other field-pieces were mounted on -an entrenchment which crossing the ditch of the -land front bore on the approaches to the main -breach; a twenty-four pounder looked from the tower -of Las Mesquitas, between the main breach and -where the third opening was being made and consequently -flanking both; two four-pounders were -in the tower of Hornos; two heavy guns were on -the flank of St. Elmo, and two others, placed on the<span class="sidenote12">Bellas, &c.</span> -right of the Mirador, could play upon the breaches -from within the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus -fourteen pieces were still available for defence, the -retaining sea-wall or <i lang="fr">fausse braye</i> which strengthened -the flank of the horn-work, and between which and -the river the storming parties must necessarily advance, -was covered with live shells to roll over on -the columns, and behind the flaming houses near -the breach other edifices were loop-holed and filled -with musqueteers. However the fire extending -rapidly and fiercely greatly injured the defences, -the French to save their guns withdrew them until -the moment of attack, and the British artillery -officers were confident that in daylight they could -silence the enemy’s guns and keep the parapet clear -of men; wherefore sir Thomas Graham renewed -the order for</p> - - -<h4>THE ASSAULT.</h4> - -<p>In the night of the 24th two thousand men of -the fifth division filed into the trenches on the -isthmus. This force was composed of the third<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80"></a>[80]</span> -battalion of the royals under major Frazer, destined -to storm the great breach; the thirty-eighth regiment -under colonel Greville, designed to assail the -lesser and most distant breach; the ninth regiment -under colonel Cameron, appointed to support the -royals; finally a detachment, selected from the -light companies of all those battalions, was placed in -the centre of the royals under the command of lieutenant -Campbell of the ninth regiment. This chosen -detachment, accompanied by the engineer Machel -with a ladder party, was intended to sweep the -high curtain after the breach should be won.</p> - -<p>The distance from the trenches to the points of -attack was more than three hundred yards along -the contracted space lying between the retaining -wall of the horn-work and the river; the ground -was strewed with rocks covered by slippery sea-weeds; -the tide had left large and deep pools of -water; the parapet of the horn-work was entire as -well as the retaining wall; the parapets of the other -works and the two towers, which closely flanked -the breach, although injured were far from being -ruined, and every place was thickly garnished with -musqueteers. The difficulties of the attack were -obvious, and a detachment of Portuguese placed in -a trench opened beyond the parallel on the isthmus, -within sixty yards of the ramparts, was ordered to -quell if possible the fire of the horn-work.</p> - -<p>While it was still dark the storming columns -moved out of the trenches, and the globe of compression -in the drain was exploded with great effect -against the counterscarp and glacis of the horn-work. -The garrison astonished by the unlooked-for event -abandoned the flanking parapet, and the troops -rushed onwards, the stormers for the main breach<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81"></a>[81]</span> -leading and suffering more from the fire of their -own batteries on the right of the Urumea than from -the enemy. Major Frazer and the engineer Harry -Jones first reached the breach. The enemy had -fallen back in confusion behind the ruins of the -still burning houses, and those brave officers rushed -up expecting that their troops would follow, but -not many followed, for it was extremely dark, -the natural difficulties of the way had contracted -the front and disordered the column in its whole -length, and the soldiers, straggling and out of wind, -arrived in small disconnected parties at the foot of -the breach. The foremost gathered near their gallant -leaders, but the depth of the descent into the town -and the volumes of flames and smoke which still -issued from the burning houses behind awed the -stoutest; and more than two-thirds of the storming -column, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had -broken off at the demi-bastion to commence a -musquetry battle with the enemy on the rampart. -Meanwhile the shells from the Monte Orgullo fell -rapidly, the defenders of the breach rallied and -with a smashing musquetry from the ruins and -loopholed houses smote the head of the column, -while the men in the towers smote them on the -flanks; and from every quarter came showers of -grape and hand-grenades tearing the ranks in a -dreadful manner.</p> - -<p>Major Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the -intrepid Jones stood there awhile longer amidst a -few heroic soldiers, hoping for aid, but none came -and he and those with him were struck down. The -engineer Machel had been killed early and the men -bearing ladders fell or were dispersed. Thus the -rear of the column was in absolute confusion before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82"></a>[82]</span> -the head was beaten. It was in vain that colonel -Greville of the thirty-eighth, colonel Cameron of -the ninth, captain Archimbeau of the royals, and -many other regimental officers exerted themselves to -rally their discomfited troops and refill the breach; -it was in vain that lieutenant Campbell, breaking -through the tumultuous crowd with the survivors of -his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins; twice he -ascended, twice he was wounded, and all around -him died. The royals endeavouring to retire got -intermixed with the thirty-eighth, and with some -companies of the ninth which had unsuccessfully -endeavoured to pass them and get to the lesser -breach. Then swayed by different impulses and -pent up in the narrow way between the horn-work -and the river, the mass reeling to and fro could -neither advance nor go back until the shells and -musquetry, constantly plied both in front and flank, -had thinned the concourse and the trenches were -regained in confusion. At daylight a truce was -agreed to for an hour, during which the French, -who had already humanely removed the gallant -Jones and the other wounded men from the breach, -now carried off the more distant sufferers lest they -should be drowned by the rising of the tide.</p> - -<p>Five officers of engineers including sir Richard -Fletcher, and forty-four officers of the line with -five hundred and twenty men, had been killed, -wounded, or made prisoners in this assault the -failure of which was signal, yet the causes were -obvious and may be classed thus.</p> - -<p>1º. Deviation from the original project of siege -and from lord Wellington’s instructions.</p> - -<p>2º. Bad arrangements of detail.</p> - -<p>3º. Want of vigour in the execution.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83"></a>[83]</span></p> - -<p>In respect of the first, lord Wellington having -visited the Chofre trenches on the 22d confirmed -his former approval of Smith’s plan, and gave that -officer final directions for the attack finishing thus, -“<em>Fair daylight must be taken for the assault</em>.” -These instructions and their emphatic termination -were repeated by major Smith in the proper quarter, -but they were not followed, no lodgement was made -on the horn-work, the defences were nearly entire -both in front and flank, and the assault was made in -darkness. Major Smith had also, by calculation -and by consultations with the fishermen, ascertained -that the ebb of tide would serve exactly at day-break -on the 24th; but the assault was made the -25th, and then before daylight, when the water -being too high contracted the ground, increased the -obstacles, and forced the assaulting column to -march on a narrow front and a long line, making -an uneasy progress and trickling onwards instead -of dashing with a broad surge against the breach. -In fine the rules of art being neglected and no extraordinary -resource substituted the operation failed.</p> - -<p>The troops filed out of the long narrow trenches -in the night, a tedious operation, and were immediately<span class="sidenote">Notes on the siege, by sir C. Smith, MSS.</span> -exposed to a fire of grape from their own -batteries on the Chofres. This fire, intended to -keep down that of the enemy, should have ceased -when the globe of compression was sprung in the -drain, but owing to the darkness and the noise -the explosion could neither be seen nor heard. The -effect of it however drove the enemy from the horn-work, -the Portuguese on that side advanced to the -ditch, and a vigorous escalade would probably have -succeeded but they had no ladders. Again the -stormers of the great breach marched first, filling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84"></a>[84]</span> -up the way and rendering the second breach, as -major Smith had foretold, useless, and the ladder-bearers -never got to their destination. The attack -was certainly ill-digested, and there was a neglect -of moral influence followed by its natural consequence -want of vigour in execution.</p> - -<p>The deferring of the assault from the 24th to the -25th expressly because the breach was too difficult -rendered the troops uneasy, they suspected some -hidden danger, and in this mood emerging from the -trenches they were struck by the fire of their own -batteries; then wading through deep pools of water, -or staggering in the dark over slippery rocks, and -close under the enemy’s flanking works whence -every shot told with fatal effect, how could they -manifest their natural conquering energy? It is -possible that a second and more vigorous assault on -the great breach might have been effected by a -recognized leader, but no general or staff officer -went out of the trenches with the troops, and the -isolated exertions of the regimental officers were -unavailing. Nor were there wanting other sinister -influences. General Oswald had in the councils -earnestly and justly urged the dangers arising from -the irregular mode of attack, but this anticipation -of ill success, in which other officers of rank joined, -was freely expressed out of council, and it said even -in the hearing of the troops abating that daring -confidence which victory loves.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington repaired immediately to St. -Sebastian. The causes of the failure were apparent -and he would have renewed the attack, but wanting -ammunition, deferred it until the powder and additional -ordnance which he had written for to England -as early as the 26th of June should arrive.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85"></a>[85]</span> -The next day other events caused him to resort to a -blockade and the battering train was transported to -Passages, two guns and two howitzers only being -retained on the Chofres and the Monte Olia. This -operation was completed in the night of the 26th, -but at day-break the garrison made a sally from the -horn-work, surprised the trenches and swept off -two hundred Portuguese and thirty British soldiers. -To avoid a repetition of this disaster the guards of -the trenches were concentrated in the left parallel, -and patroles only were sent out, yet one of those -also was cut off on the 1st of August. Thus -terminated the first part of the siege of San Sebastian -in which the allies lost thirteen hundred soldiers -and seamen, exclusive of Spaniards during Mendizabal’s -blockade.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86"></a>[86]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">The battle of Vittoria was fought on the 21st of -June.</p> - -<p>The 1st of July marshal Soult, under a decree<span class="sidenote9">1813. July.</span> -issued at Dresden, succeeded Joseph as lieutenant -to the emperor, who thus shewed how little his mind -had been affected by his brother’s accusations.</p> - -<p>The 12th, Soult, travelling with surprising expedition, -assumed the command of the armies of the -“<em>north</em>,” the “<em>centre</em>” and the “<em>south</em>” now reorganised -in one body, called “<em>the army of Spain</em>.” -And he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly -aside if necessary, but that monarch voluntarily -retired from the army.</p> - -<p>At this period general Paris remained at Jaca, -as belonging to Suchet’s command, but Clauzel had -entered France, and the “<em>army of Spain</em>,” reinforced -from the interior, was composed of nine -divisions of infantry, a reserve, and two regular -divisions of cavalry besides the light horsemen -attached to the infantry. Following the imperial -muster-rolls this army, including the garrisons and -thirteen German Italian and Spanish battalions not -belonging to the organisation, amounted to one<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix, No. 8.</a></span> -hundred and fourteen thousand men; and as the -armies of Catalonia and of Aragon numbered at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87"></a>[87]</span> -the same period above sixty-six thousand, the whole -force still employed against Spain exceeded one -hundred and eighty thousand men with twenty -thousand horses; and of this number one hundred -and fifty-six thousand were present under arms, -while in Germany and Poland above seven hundred -thousand French soldiers were in activity.</p> - -<p>Such great forces, guided by Napoleon, seemed -sufficient to defy the world, but moral power which -he has himself described as constituting three-fourths -of military strength, that power which -puny essayists declaiming for their hour against -the genius of warriors, are unable to comprehend -although by far the most important part of the art -which they decry, was wanting. One half of this -force, organized in peace and setting forth in hope -at the beginning of a war, would have enabled Napoleon -to conquer; but now, near the close of a terrible -struggle, with a declining fate and the national -confidence in his fortune and genius shaken, although -that genius was never more surpassingly displayed, -his military power was a vast but unsound machine. -The public mind was bewildered by the intricacy -and greatness of combinations the full scope of -which he alone could see clearly, and generals and -ministers doubted and feared when they should -have supported him, neglecting their duty or coldly -executing his orders when their zeal should have -redoubled. The unity of impulse so essential to -success was thus lost, and his numerous armies -carried not with them proportionate strength. To -have struggled with hope under such astounding -difficulties was scarcely to be expected from the -greatest minds, but like the emperor, to calculate -and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88"></a>[88]</span> -and accuracy, to seize every favourable chance -with unerring rapidity, to sustain every reverse -with undisturbed constancy, never urged to rashness -by despair yet enterprizing to the utmost verge -of daring consistent with reason, was a display of -intellectual greatness so surpassing, that it is not -without justice Napoleon has been called, in reference -as well to past ages as to the present, the -foremost of mankind.</p> - -<p>The suddenness, as well as the completeness, of -the destruction caused by the snows of Russia, -had shattered the emperor’s military and political -system, and the broken parts of the former, scattered -widely, were useless until he could again -bind them together. To effect this he rushed with -a raw army into the midst of Germany, for his -hope was to obtain by celerity a rallying point for -his veterans, who having survived the Russian -winter and the succeeding pestilence were widely -dispersed. His first effort was successful, but -without good cavalry victory cannot be pushed -far, and the practised horsemen of France had nearly -disappeared; their successors badly mounted and -less skilful were too few and too weak, and thus -extraordinary exertion was required from soldiers, -whose youth and inexperience rendered them unfit -even for the ordinary hardships of war.</p> - -<p>The measure of value for Wellington’s campaign -is thus attained, for if Joseph had opposed him -with only moderate ability and had avoided a great -battle, not less than fifty thousand veterans could -have been drawn off to reinforce and give stability -to the young soldiers in Germany. On the side of -Spain those veterans were indeed still numerous, -but the spirit of the French people behind them<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89"></a>[89]</span> -almost worn out by victory, was now abashed by -defeat, and even the military men who had acquired -grandeur and riches beyond their hopes, were with -few exceptions averse to further toil. Napoleon’s -astonishing firmness of mind was understood by -few in high stations, shared by fewer; and many -were the traitors to him and to France and to the -glories of both. However his power was still enormous, -and wherever he led in person his brave -and faithful soldiers, fighting with the true instinct -of patriotism, conquered. Where he was not their -iron hardihood abated.</p> - -<p>Marshal Soult was one of the few men whose -indefatigable energy rendered them worthy lieutenants -of the emperor; and with singular zeal, -vigour and ability he now served. His troops, nominally -above one hundred thousand men ninety-seven -thousand being present under arms with -eighty-six pieces of artillery, were not all available -for field operations. The garrisons of Pampeluna, -San Sebastian, Santona, and Bayonne, together -with the foreign battalions, absorbed seventeen -thousand; and most of the latter had orders to -regain their own countries with a view to form the -new levies. The permanent “<em>army of Spain</em>” furnished -therefore only seventy-seven thousand five -hundred men present under arms, seven thousand of -which were cavalry, and its condition was not satisfactory. -The people on the frontier were flying -from the allies, the military administration was disorganized, -and the recent disasters had discouraged -the soldiers and deteriorated their discipline. Under -these circumstances Soult was desirous of some -delay to secure his base and restore order ere he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90"></a>[90]</span> -attempted to regain the offensive, but his instructions -on that point were imperative.</p> - -<p>Napoleon’s system was perfectly adapted for great -efforts, civil or military; but so rapid had been -lord Wellington’s advance from Portugal, so decisive -his operations that the resources of France -were in a certain degree paralyzed, and the army -still reeled and rocked from the blows it had received. -Bayonne, a fortress of no great strength -in itself, had been entirely neglected, and the arming -and provisioning that and other places was -indispensible. The restoration of an entrenched -camp originally traced by Vauban to cover Bayonne -followed, and the enforcement of discipline, -the removal of the immense train of Spanish families, -civil administrators, and other wasteful followers -of Joseph’s court, the arrangement of a general -system for supply of money and provisions, aided -by judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities -and excite the national spirit, were amongst the -first indications that a great commander was in the -field. The soldiers’ confidence soon revived and -some leading merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded -the general; but the people of the south -were generally more inclined to avoid the burthen -of defending their country than to answer appeals -to their patriotism.</p> - -<p>On the 14th Soult examined the line of military -positions, and ordered Reille, who then occupied -the passes of Vera and Echallar, to prepare pontoons -for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at -Biriatou. That general as we have seen was driven -from those passes the next day, but he prepared his -bridges; and such was Soult’s activity that on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91"></a>[91]</span> -16th all the combinations for a gigantic offensive -movement were digested, the means of executing -it rapidly advancing, and orders were issued for -the preliminary dispositions.</p> - -<p>At this time the French army was divided into -three corps of battle, and a reserve. Clauzel commanding -the left wing was at St. Jean Pied de Port -and in communication, by the French frontier, with -general Paris at Jaca. Drouet, count D’Erlon,<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -commanding the centre, occupied the heights near -Espelette and Ainhoa, with an advanced guard -behind Urdax. General Reille commanding the -right wing was in position on the mountains overlooking -Vera from the side of France. The reserve -under Villatte, comprising a separate body of light -horsemen and the foreign battalions, guarded the -banks of the Bidassoa from the mouth upwards to -Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed. -The division of heavy cavalry under -Trielhard, and that of light cavalry under Pierre -Soult, the Marshal’s brother, were on the banks of -the Nive and the Adour.</p> - -<p>The counter-disposition of the allies was as -follows.</p> - -<p>Byng’s brigade of British infantry, detached from -the second division and reinforced by Morillo’s Spaniards, -was on the extreme right. These troops had -early in June driven the French from the village -of Valcarlos in the valley of that name, and had -foraged the French territory, but finding no good -permanent position, retreated again to the rocks in -front of the passes of Roncesvalles and Ibañeta.</p> - -<p>On the left of Byng, Campbell’s brigade detached -from Hamilton’s Portuguese division, was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92"></a>[92]</span> -posted in the Alduides and supported by general -Cole, who was with the fourth division at Viscayret -in the valley of Urroz.</p> - -<p>On the left of Campbell general Hill defended -the Bastan with the remainder of the second division, -and with Hamilton’s Portuguese, now commanded -by Sylveira, Conde D’Amarante. Picton, -with the third division, was stationed at Olague as -a reserve to those troops and to Cole.</p> - -<p>On the left of Hill the seventh and light divisions -occupied a chain of mountains running by -Echallar to Vera, and behind them at the town of -San Estevan was posted the sixth division.</p> - -<p>Longa’s Spaniards continued the line of defence -from Vera to general Giron’s position, which extending -along the mountains bordering the Bidassoa -to the sea, crossed the great road of Irun. -Behind Giron was the besieging army under sir -Thomas Graham.</p> - -<p>Thirty-six pieces of field artillery, and some regiments -of British and Portuguese cavalry, were -with the right wing and centre, but the bulk of the -horsemen and the heavy guns were behind the -mountains, chiefly about Tafalla. The great hospitals -were in Vittoria, the commissariat depôts were -principally on the coast, and to supply the troops -in the mountains was exceedingly difficult and -onerous.</p> - -<p>Henry O’Donnel, Conde de la Bispal, blockaded -Pampeluna with the Andalusian army of reserve, -and Carlos D’España’s division was on the march -to join him. Mina, Julian Sanchez, Duran, Empecinado, -Goyan and some smaller bands, were on -the side of Zaragoza and Daroca, cutting the communication<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93"></a>[93]</span> -between Soult and Suchet, and the -latter, thinking Aragon lost, was, as we have seen, -falling back upon Catalonia.</p> - -<p>The whole force under lord Wellington’s immediate -command, that is to say in Navarre and Guipuscoa, -was certainly above one hundred thousand -men, of which the Anglo-Portuguese furnished -fifty-seven thousand present under arms, seven<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix, 7.</a></span> -thousand being cavalry; but the Spanish regulars -under Giron, Labispal and Carlos D’España, including -Longa’s division and some of Mendizabal’s<span class="sidenote">Notes by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.</span> -army, scarcely amounted to twenty-five thousand. -According to the respective muster-rolls, the troops -in line actually under arms and facing each -other, were, of the allies, about eighty-two thousand, -of the French about seventy-eight thousand; -but as the rolls of the latter include every man and -officer of all arms belonging to the organization, -and the British and Portuguese rolls so quoted, -would furnish between ten and twelve thousand -additional combatants, the French force must be -reduced, or the allies augmented in that proportion. -This surplus was however now compensated by the -foreign battalions temporarily attached to Soult’s -army, and by the numerous national guards, <ins class="corr" id="tn-93" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'all amountaineers'"> -all mountaineers</ins>, fierce warlike and very useful as -guides. In other respects lord Wellington stood at -a disadvantage.</p> - -<p>The theatre of operations was a trapezoid, with -sides from forty to sixty miles in length, and having -Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, St. Sebastian and -Pampeluna, all fortresses, in possession of the French -at the angles. The interior, broken and tormented -by dreadful mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep -water-courses, precipices and forests, would at first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94"></a>[94]</span> -sight appear a wilderness which no military combinations -could embrace, and susceptible only of irregular -and partizan operations. But the great spinal -ridge of the Pyrenees furnishes a clue to the labyrinth -of hills and valleys. Running diagonally -across the quadrilateral, it separated Bayonne St. -Jean Pied de Port and San Sebastian from Pampeluna, -and thus the portion of the allied army which -more especially belonged to the blockade of Pampeluna, -was in a manner cut off from that which -belonged to the siege of San Sebastian. They -were distinct armies, each having its particular -object, and the only direct communication between -them was the great road running behind the mountains -from Toloza, by Irurzun, to Pampeluna. -The centre of the allies was indeed an army of -succour and connection, but of necessity very much -scattered, and with lateral communications so few, -difficult and indirect as to prevent any unity of -movement; nor could general Hill’s corps move at -all until an attack was decidedly pronounced against -one of the extremities, lest the most direct gun-road -to Pampeluna which it covered should be -unwarily opened to the enemy. In short the French -general, taking the offensive, could by beaten roads -concentrate against any part of the English general’s -line, which, necessarily a passively defensive one, -followed an irregular trace of more than fifty miles -of mountains.</p> - -<p>Wellington having his battering train and stores -about San Sebastian, which was also nearer and -more accessible to the enemy than Pampeluna, made -his army lean towards that side. His left wing, including -the army of siege, was twenty-one thousand -strong with singularly strong positions of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95"></a>[95]</span> -defence, and the centre, about twenty-four thousand -strong, could in two marches unite with the left -wing to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of -an enemy advancing by the high road of Irun; but -three days or more were required by those troops -to concentrate for the security of the blockade on -the right. Soult however judged that no decisive -result would attend a direct movement upon San -Sebastian; because Guipuscoa was exhausted of -provisions, and the centre of the allies could fall on -his flank before he reached Ernani, which, his attack -in front failing, would place him in a dangerous -position. Moreover by means of his sea communication -he knew that San Sebastian was not in extremity; -but he had no communication with Pampeluna -and feared its fall. Wherefore he resolved -to operate by his left.</p> - -<p>Profiting by the roads leading to St. Jean Pied -de Port, and covering his movement by the Nivelle -and Nive rivers and by the positions of his centre, -he hoped to gather on Wellington’s right quicker -than that general could gather to oppose him, and -thus compensating by numbers the disadvantage of -assailing mountain positions force a way to Pampeluna. -That fortress once succoured, he designed to -seize the road of Irurzun, and keeping in mass -either fall upon the separated divisions of the centre -in detail as they descended from the hills, or operate -on the rear of the force besieging San Sebastian, -while a corps of observation, which he proposed to -leave on the Lower Bidassoa, menaced it in front -and followed it in retreat. The siege of San Sebastian, -the blockade of Pampeluna and probably that -of Santona, would be thus raised, and the French -army united in an abundant country, and its communication<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96"></a>[96]</span> -with Suchet secured, would be free -either to co-operate with that marshal or to press -its own attack.</p> - -<p>In this view, and to mislead lord Wellington by -vexing his right simultaneously with the construction -of the bridges against his left, Soult wrote to -general Paris, desiring him to march when time -suited from Jaca by the higher valleys towards -Aviz or Sanguessa, to drive the partizans from that -side and join the left of the army when it should -have reached Pampeluna. Meanwhile Clauzel was -directed to repair the roads in his own front, to push -the heads of his columns towards the passes of Roncesvalles, -and by sending a strong detachment into the -Val de Baygorry, towards the lateral pass of Yspegui, -to menace Hill’s flank which was at that pass, and the -front of Campbell’s brigade in the Alduides.</p> - -<p>On the 20th Reille’s troops on the heights above -Vera and Sarre, being cautiously relieved by Villatte, -marched through Cambo towards St. Jean Pied de -Port. They were to reach the latter early on the 22d, -and on that day also the two divisions of cavalry and -the park of artillery were to be concentrated at the -same place. D’Erlon with the centre meanwhile -still held his positions at Espelette, Ainhoüe or -Ainhoa, and Urdax, thus covering and masking the -great movements taking place behind.</p> - -<p>Villatte who including the foreign battalions had -eighteen thousand troops on the rolls, furnishing -about fifteen thousand sabres and bayonets, remained -in observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened by -superior forces he was to retire slowly and in mass -upon the entrenched camp commenced at Bayonne, -yet halting successively on the positions of Bordegain -in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the heights<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97"></a>[97]</span> -of Bidart in rear of that town. He was especially -directed to shew only French troops at the advanced -posts, and if the assailants made a point with a -small corps, to drive them vigorously over the -Bidassoa again. But if the allies should in consequence -of Soult’s operations against their right retire, -Villatte was to relieve San Sebastian and to -follow them briskly by Tolosa.</p> - -<p>Rapidity was of vital importance to the French -general, but heavy and continued rains swelled the -streams, and ruined the roads in the deep country -between Bayonne and the hills; the head-quarters, -which should have arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port -on the 20th, only reached Olhonce, a few miles<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -short of that place, the 21st; and Reille’s troops -unable to make way at all by Cambo took the -longer road of Bayonne. The cavalry was retarded -in like manner, and the whole army, men and -horses, were worn down by the severity of the -marches. Two days were thus lost, but on the 24th -more than sixty thousand fighting men including -cavalry national guards and <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span>, with sixty-six -pieces of artillery, were assembled to force the -passes of Roncesvalles and Maya. The main road -leading to the former was repaired, three hundred -sets of bullocks were provided to draw the guns up -the mountain, and the national guards of the frontier -on the left were ordered to assemble in the -night on the heights of Yropil, to be reinforced on -the morning of the 25th by detachments of regular -troops with a view to vex and turn the right of the -allies which extended to the foundry of Orbaiceta.</p> - -<p>Such were Soult’s first dispositions, but as mountain -warfare is complicated in the extreme, it will -be well to consider more in detail the relative positions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98"></a>[98]</span> -and objects of the hostile forces and the nature -of the country.</p> - -<p>It has been already stated that the great spine of -the hills, trending westward, run diagonally across -the theatre of operations. From this spine huge -ridges shot out on either hand, and the communications -between the valleys thus formed on both sides -of the main chain passed over certain comparatively -low places called “<i lang="fr">cols</i>” by the French, and <i lang="es">puertos</i> -by the Spaniards. The Bastan, the Val Carlos, -and the Val de Baygorry the upper part of which -is divided into the Alduides and the Val de Ayra, -were on the French side of the great chain; on the -Spanish side were the valleys of Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, -the valley of Iscua or Roncesvalles, the valley -of Urros, the Val de Zubiri, and the valley of Lanz, -the two latter leading down directly upon Pampeluna -which stands within two miles of the junction -of their waters. Such being the relative situations -of the valleys, the disposition, and force, of the armies, -shall now be traced from left to right of the French, -and from right to left of the allies. But first it must be -observed that the main chain, throwing as it were a -shoulder forward from Roncesvalles towards St. -Jean Pied de Port, placed the entrance to the Spanish -valley of Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, in the power -of Soult, who could thus by Yropil turn the extreme -right of his adversary with detachments, although -not with an army.</p> - -<p><em>Val Carlos.</em>—Two issues led from this valley over -the main chain, namely the Ibañeta and Mendichuri -passes; and there was also the lateral pass of Atalosti -leading into the Alduides, all comprised within -a space of two or three miles.</p> - -<p>The high road from St. Jean Pied de Port to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99"></a>[99]</span> -Pampeluna, ascending the left-hand ridge or boundary -of Val Carlos, runs along the crest until it -joins the superior chain of mountains, and then -along the summit of that also until it reaches the -pass of Ibañeta, whence it descends to Roncesvalles. -Ibañeta may therefore be called the Spanish end of -the pass; but it is also a pass in itself, because a -narrow road, leading through Arnegui and the -village of Val Carlos, ascends directly to Ibañeta -and falls into the main road behind it.</p> - -<p>Clauzel’s three divisions of infantry, all the artillery -and the cavalry were formed in two columns in front -of St. Jean Pied de Port. The head of one was -placed on some heights above Arnegui about two -miles from the village of Val Carlos; the head -of the other at the Venta de Orrisson, on the main -road and within two miles of the remarkable rocks -of Chateau Piñon, a little beyond which one narrow -way descended on the right to the village of Val -Carlos, and another on the left to the foundry of -Orbaiceta.</p> - -<p>On the right-hand boundary of Val Carlos, near -the rock of Ayrola, Reille’s divisions were concentrated, -with orders to ascend that rock at daylight, -and march by the crest of the ridge towards a culminant -point of the great chain called the Lindouz, -which gained, Reille was to push detachments -through the passes of Ibañeta and Mendichuri to -the villages of Roncesvalles and Espinal. He was, -at the same time, to seize the passes of Sahorgain -and Urtiaga immediately on his right, and even approach -the more distant passes of Renecabal and -Bellate, thus closing the issues from the Alduides, -and menacing those from the Bastan.</p> - -<p><em>Val de Ayra.</em> <em>The Alduides.</em> <em>Val de Baygorry.</em><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100"></a>[100]</span> -The ridge of Ayrola, at the foot of which Reille’s<span class="sidenote7">Plan, No. 2.</span> -troops were posted, separates Val Carlos from these -valleys which must be designated by the general -name of the Alduides for the upper part, and the -Val de Baygorry for the lower. The issues from -the Alduides over the great chain towards Spain -were the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga; and there -was also a road running from the village of Alduides -through the Atalosti pass to Ibañeta a distance of -eight miles, by which general Campbell’s brigade -communicated with and could join Byng and -Morillo.</p> - -<p><em>Bastan.</em> This district, including the valley of -Lerins and the Cinco Villas, is separated from the -Alduides and Val de Baygorry by the lofty mountain -of La Houssa, on which the national guards of -the Val de Baygorry and the Alduides were ordered -to assemble on the night of the 24th, and to light -fires so as to make it appear a great body was menacing -the Bastan by that flank. The Bastan -however does not belong to the same geographical -system as the other valleys. Instead of opening to -the French territory it is entirely enclosed with -high mountains, and while the waters of the Val -Carlos, the Alduides, and Val de Baygorry run off -northward by the Nive, those of the Bastan run off -westward by the Bidassoa, from which they are -separated by the Mandale, Commissari, La Rhune, -Santa Barbara, Ivantelly, Atchiola and other mountains.</p> - -<p>The entrances to the Bastan with reference to -the position of the French army, were by the passes -of Vera and Echallar on its right; by the Col de -Maya and Arietta passes in the centre; and on the -left by the lateral passes of Yspegui, Lorrieta, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101"></a>[101]</span> -Berderez, which lead from the Val de Baygorry -and the Alduides. The issues over the principal -chain of the Pyrenees in the direct line from the -Maya entrances, were the passes of Renecabal and -Bellate; the first leading into the valley of Zubiri, -the second into the valley of Lanz. There was also -the pass of Artesiaga leading into the Val de Zubiri, -but it was nearly impracticable, and all the roads -through the Bastan were crossed by strong positions -dangerous to assail.</p> - -<p>The Col de Maya comprised several passages in -a space of four miles, all of which were menaced by -D’Erlon from Espelete and Urdax; and he had -twenty-one thousand men, furnishing about eighteen -thousand bayonets. His communications with -Soult were maintained by cavalry posts through the -Val de Baygorry, and his orders were to attack the -allies when the combinations in the Val Carlos and -on the Houssa mountain should cause them to -abandon the passes at Maya; but he was especially -directed to operate by his left, so as to secure the -passes leading towards Reille with a view to the -concentration of the whole army. Thus if Hill retreated -by the pass of Bellate D’Erlon was to move -by Berderez and the Alduides; but if Hill retired -upon San Estevan D’Erlon was to move by the -pass of Bellate. Such being the dispositions of the -French general, those of the allies shall now be -traced.</p> - -<p>General Byng and Morillo guarded the passes -in front of Roncesvalles. Their combined force<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Morning States.</span> -consisted of sixteen hundred British and from -three to four thousand Spaniards. Byng’s brigade -and two Spanish battalions occupied the rocks of -Altobiscar on the high road facing Chateau Piñon;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102"></a>[102]</span> -one Spanish battalion was at the foundry in the -valley of Orbaiceta on their right; Morillo with the -remainder of the Spaniards occupied the heights of -Iroulepe, on the left of the road leading to the -village of Val Carlos and overlooking the nearest -houses of that straggling place.</p> - -<p>These positions, distant only four and five miles -from the French columns assembled at Venta de -Orrisson and Arnegui, were insecure. The ground -was indeed steep and difficult of access but too extensive; -moreover, although the passes led into the -Roncesvalles that valley did not lead direct to -Pampeluna; the high road after descending a few -miles turned to the right, and crossing two ridges -and the intervening valley of Urros entered the -valley of Zubiri, down which it was conducted to -Pampeluna: wherefore after passing Ibañeta in retreat -the allied troops could not avoid lending their -right flank to Reille’s divisions as far as Viscayret -in the valley of Urroz. It was partly to obviate -this danger, partly to support O’Donnel while -Clauzel’s force was in the vicinity of Jaca, that the<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Morning States.</span> -fourth division, about six thousand strong, occupied -Viscayret, six miles from the pass of Ibañeta, ten -miles from Morillo’s position, and twelve miles from -Byng’s position. But when Clauzel retired to -France, general Cole was directed to observe the -roads leading over the main chain from the Alduides -district, and to form a rallying point and reserve for -Campbell, Byng, and Morillo, his instructions being -to maintain the Roncesvalles passes against a front -attack, but not to commit his troops in a desperate -battle if the flanks were insecure.</p> - -<p>On the left of Byng and Morillo, Campbell’s<span class="sidenote7">Ibid.</span> -Portuguese, about two thousand strong, were encamped<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103"></a>[103]</span> -above the village of Alduides on a mountain -called Mizpira. They observed the national -guards of the Val de Baygorry, preserved the communication -between Byng and Hill, and in some -measure covered the right flank of the latter. -From the Alduides Campbell could retreat through -the pass of Sahorgain upon Viscayret in the valley -of Urroz, and through the passes of Urtiaga and -Renacabal upon Eugui in the Val de Zubiri; finally -by the lateral pass of Atalosti he could join Byng -and the fourth division. The communication between -all these posts was maintained by Long’s -cavalry.</p> - -<p>Continuing the line of positions to the left, general -Hill occupied the Bastan with the second British -division, Sylveira’s Portuguese, and some squadrons -of horse, but Byng’s and Campbell’s brigades being -detached, he had not more than nine thousand -sabres and bayonets. His two British brigades under<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s States.</span> -general William Stewart guarded the Col de Maya; -Sylveira’s Portuguese were at Erazu, on the right of -Stewart, observing the passes of Arrieta, Yspegui -and Elliorita; of which the two former were occupied -by Major Brotherton’s cavalry and by the -sixth Caçadores. The direct line of retreat and -point of concentration for all these troops was -Elizondo.</p> - -<p>From Elizondo the route of Pampeluna over the -great chain was by the pass of Bellate and the -valley of Lanz. The latter running nearly parallel -with the valley of Zubiri is separated from it by a -wooded and rugged ridge, and between them there -were but three communications: the one high up, -leading from Lanz to Eugui, and prolonged from -thence to Viscayret in the valley of Urros; the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104"></a>[104]</span> -other two lower down, leading from Ostiz and -Olague to the village of Zubiri. At Olague the -third division, furnishing four thousand three hundred -bayonets under Picton, was posted ready to -support Cole or Hill as occasion required.</p> - -<p>Continuing the front line from the left of Stewart’s -position at the Col de Maya, the trace run along -the mountains forming the French boundary of -the Bastan. It comprized the passes of Echallar -and Vera, guarded by the seventh division under -lord Dalhousie, and by the light division under -general Charles Alten. The former furnishing four<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Morning States.</span> -thousand seven hundred bayonets communicated -with general Stewart by a narrow road over the -Atchiola mountain, and the eighty-second regiment -was encamped at its junction with the Elizondo road, -about three miles behind the pass of Maya. The -light division, four thousand strong, was at Vera, -guarding the roads which led behind the mountains -through Sumbilla and San Estevan to Elizondo.</p> - -<p>These two divisions being only observed by the -left wing of Villatte’s reserve were available for the -succour of either wing, and behind them, at the -town of San Estevan, was the sixth division of six<span class="sidenote7">Ibid.</span> -thousand bayonets, now under general Pack. Placed -at equal distances from Vera and Maya, having -free communication with both and a direct line of -march to Pampeluna over the main chain of the -Pyrenees by the <em>Puerto de Arraiz</em>, sometimes called -the pass of <em>Doña Maria</em>, this division was available -for any object and could not have been better -posted.</p> - -<p>Around Pampeluna, the point to which all the -lines of march converged, the Spanish troops -under O’Donnel maintained the blockade, and they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105"></a>[105]</span> -were afterwards joined by Carlos D’España’s division -at a very critical moment. Thus reinforced -they amounted to eleven thousand, of which seven -thousand could be brought into action without -abandoning the works of blockade.</p> - -<p>Head-quarters were at Lesaca, and the line of -correspondence with the left wing was over the -Peña de Haya, that with the right wing by San -Estevan, Elizondo and the Alduides. The line of -correspondence between sir Thomas Graham and -Pampeluna was by Goizueta and the high road of -Irurzun.</p> - -<p>As the French were almost in contact with the -allies’ positions at Roncesvalles, which was also the -point of defence nearest to Pampeluna, it followed -that on the rapidity or slowness with which Soult -overcame resistance in that quarter depended his -success; and a comparative estimate of numbers -and distances will give the measure of his chances.</p> - -<p>Clauzel’s three divisions furnished about sixteen -thousand bayonets, besides the cavalry, the artillery, -and the national guards menacing the valley of -Orbaiceta. Byng and Morillo were therefore with -five thousand infantry, to sustain the assault of sixteen -thousand until Cole could reinforce them; -but Cole being twelve miles distant could not come -up in fighting order under four or five hours. And -as Reille’s divisions, of equal strength with Clauzel’s, -could before that time seize the Lindouz and turn -the left, it was clear the allied troops, although increased -to eleven thousand by the junction of the -fourth division, must finally abandon their ground -to seek a new field of battle where the third division -could join them from the valley of Lanz, and -Campbell’s brigade from the Alduides. Thus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106"></a>[106]</span> -raised to seventeen or eighteen thousand bayonets -with some guns, they might on strong ground oppose -Clauzel and Reille’s thirty thousand; but as -Picton’s position at Olague was more than a day’s -march from Byng’s position at Altobiscar, their junction -could only be made in the valley of the Zubiri -and not very distant from Pampeluna. And when -seven thousand Spaniards from the blockade, and -two or three thousand cavalry from the side of the -Ebro are added, we have the full measure of the -allies’ strength in this quarter.</p> - -<p>General Hill, menaced by D’Erlon with a very -superior force, and having the pass of Maya, half -a day’s march further from Pampeluna than the -passes of Roncesvalles, to defend, could not give -ready help. If he retreated rapidly D’Erlon could -follow as rapidly, and though Picton and Cole -would thus be reinforced with ten thousand men -Soult would gain eighteen thousand. Hill could -not however move until he knew that Byng and -Cole were driven from the Roncesvalles passes; -in fine he could not avoid a dilemma. For if he -maintained the passes at Maya and affairs went -wrong near Pampeluna, his own situation would be -imminently dangerous; if he maintained Irrueta, -his next position, the same danger was to be -dreaded; and the passes of Maya once abandoned, -D’Erlon, moving by his own left towards the Alduides, -could join Soult in the valley of Zubiri -before Hill could join Cole and Picton by the valley -of Lanz. But if Hill did not maintain the position -of Irrueta D’Erlon could follow and cut the sixth -and seventh divisions off from the valley of Lanz. -The extent and power of Soult’s combinations are -thus evinced. Hill forced to await orders and hampered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107"></a>[107]</span> -by the operations of D’Erlon, required, it -might be three days to get into line near Pampeluna; -but D’Erlon after gaining Maya could in one -day and a half, by the passes of Berderez and Urtiaga, -join Soult in the Val de Zubiri. Meanwhile -Byng, Morillo, Cole, Campbell, and Picton would -be exposed to the operations of double their own -numbers; and however firm and able individually -those generals might be, they could not when suddenly -brought together be expected to seize the -whole system of operations and act with that decision -and nicety of judgment which the occasion -demanded. It was clear therefore that Hill’s force -must be in some measure paralyzed at first, and -finally thrown with the sixth, seventh, and light -divisions, upon an external line of operations while -the French moved upon internal lines.</p> - -<p>On the other hand it is also clear that the corps -of Byng, Morillo, Campbell, Cole, Picton, and -Hill were only pieces of resistance on lord Wellington’s -board, and that the sixth, seventh, and -light divisions were those with which he meant to -win his game. There was however a great difference -in their value. The light division and the -seventh, especially the former, being at the greatest -distance from Pampeluna, having enemies close in -front and certain points to guard, were, the seventh -division a day, the light division two days, behind -the sixth division, which was quite free to move at -an instant’s notice and was, the drag of D’Erlon’s -corps considered, a day nearer to Pampeluna than -Hill. Wherefore upon the rapid handling of this -well-placed body the fate of the allies depended. -If it arrived in time, nearly thirty thousand infantry<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108"></a>[108]</span> -with sufficient cavalry and artillery would -be established, under the immediate command of -the general-in-chief, on a position of strength to -check the enemy until the rest of the army arrived. -Where that position was and how the troops were -there gathered and fought shall now be shown.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109"></a>[109]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXI_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><em>Combat of Roncesvalles.</em>—On the 23d Soult issued<span class="sidenote9">1813. July.</span> -an order of the day remarkable for its force and -frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the leading<span class="sidenote7">Plan 3.</span> -events of the past campaign, he shewed that the -disasters sprung from the incapacity of the king, -not from the weakness of the soldiers whose military -virtue he justly extolled, and whose haughty -courage he inflamed by allusions to former glories. -He has been, by writers who disgrace English literature -with unfounded aspersions of a courageous -enemy, accused of unseemly boasting as to his -ultimate operations at this time, but the calumny -is refuted by the following passage from his dispatch -to the minister at war.</p> - -<p>“<em>I shall move directly upon Pampeluna, and if -I succeed in relieving it I will operate towards my -right to embarrass the enemy’s troops in Guipuscoa, -Biscay, and Alava, and to enable the reserve to join -me, which will relieve St. Sebastian and Santona. If -this should happen I will then consider what is to be -done, either to push my own attack or to help the -army of Aragon, but to look so far ahead would -now be temerity.</em>”</p> - -<p>It is true that conscious of superior abilities he -did not suppress the sentiment of his own worth as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110"></a>[110]</span> -a commander, but he was too proud to depreciate -brave adversaries on the eve of battle.</p> - -<p>“<em>Let us not</em>,” he said, “<em>defraud the enemy of -the praise which is due to him. The dispositions of -the general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive, -the valour and steadiness of his troops have -been praiseworthy</em>.”</p> - -<p>Having thus stimulated the ardour of his troops -he put himself at the head of Clauzel’s divisions, -and on the 25th at daylight led them up against -the rocks of Altobiscar.</p> - -<p>General Byng, warned the evening before that -danger was near, and jealous of some hostile indications -towards the village of Val Carlos, had -sent the fifty-seventh regiment down there but kept -the rest of his men well in hand and gave notice -to general Cole who had made a new disposition of -his troops. Ross’s brigade was now at Espinal -two miles in advance of Viscayret, six miles from -the pass of Ibañeta, and eleven from Byng’s position, -but somewhat nearer to Morillo. Anson’s brigade -was close behind Ross, Stubbs’ Portuguese behind -Anson, and the artillery was at Linzoain.</p> - -<p>Such was the exact state of affairs when Soult, -throwing out a multitude of skirmishers and pushing -forward his supporting columns and guns as -fast as the steepness of the road and difficult nature -of the ground would permit, endeavoured to force -Byng’s position; but the British general, undismayed -at the multitude of assailants, fought -strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and -their rolling musketry pealed in vain for hours -along that cloudy field of battle elevated five thousand -feet above the level of the plains. Their -numbers however continually increased in front,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111"></a>[111]</span> -and the national guards from Yropil, reinforced by -Clauzel’s detachments, skirmished with the Spanish -battalions at the foundry of Orbaiceta and threatened -to turn the right. The Val Carlos was at the -same time menaced from Arnegui, and Reille’s -divisions ascending the rock of Airola turned Morillo’s -left.</p> - -<p>About mid-day general Cole arrived at Altobiscar, -but his brigades were still distant, and the -French renewing their attack neglected the Val -Carlos to gather more thickly on the front of Byng. -He resisted all their efforts, but Reille made progress -along the summit of the Airola ridge. Morillo -then fell back towards Ibañeta, and the French were -already nearer to that pass than the troops at Altobiscar -were, when Ross’s brigade, coming up the -pass of Mendichuri, suddenly appeared on the -Lindouz, at the instant when the head of Reille’s -column being close to Atalosti was upon the point -of cutting the communication with Campbell. This -officer’s picquets had been attacked early in the -morning by the national guards of the Val de Baygorry, -but he soon discovered that it was only a feint -and therefore moved by his right towards Atalosti -when he heard the firing on that side. His march -was secured by the Val d’Ayra which separated him -from the ridge of Airola along which Reille was -advancing, but noting that general’s strength, and -at the same time seeing Ross’s brigade labouring up -the steep ridge of Mendichuri, Campbell judged that -the latter was ignorant of what was going on above. -Wherefore sending advice of the enemy’s proximity -and strength to Cole, he offered to pass the Atalosti -and join in the battle if he could be furnished with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112"></a>[112]</span> -transport for his sick, and provisions on the new -line of operations.</p> - -<p>Before this message could reach Cole, the head -of Ross’s column, composed of a wing of the twentieth -regiment and a company of Brunswickers, was -on the summit of the Lindouz, where most unexpectedly -it encountered Reille’s advanced guard. -The moment was critical, but Ross an eager hardy -soldier called aloud to charge, and captain Tovey -of the twentieth running forward with his company -crossed a slight wooded hollow and full against the -front of the sixth French light infantry dashed with -the bayonet. Brave men fell by that weapon on<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3.</a></span> -both sides, but numbers prevailing these daring -soldiers were pushed back again by the French, -Ross however gained his object, the remainder of -his brigade had come up and the pass of Atalosti -was secured, yet with a loss of one hundred and -forty men of the twentieth regiment and forty-one -of the Brunswickers.</p> - -<p>Previous to this vigorous action general Cole -seeing the French in the Val Carlos and in the -valley of Orbaiceta, that is to say on both flanks -of Byng whose front was not the less pressed, had -ordered Anson to reinforce the Spaniards at the -foundry, and Stubbs to enter the Val Carlos in support -of the fifty-seventh. He now recalled Anson to -assist in defence of the Lindouz, and learning from -Campbell how strong Reille was, caused Byng, -with a view to a final retreat, to relinquish his advanced -position at Altobiscar and take a second -nearer the Ibañeta. This movement uncovered the -road leading down to the foundry of Orbaiceta, -but it concentrated all the troops, and at the same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113"></a>[113]</span> -time general Campbell, although he could not enter -the line of battle, because Cole was unable to supply -his demands, made so skilful a display of his -Portuguese as to impress Reille with the notion -that their numbers were considerable.</p> - -<p>During these movements the skirmishing of the -light troops continued, but a thick fog coming up -the valley prevented Soult from making dispositions -for a general attack with his six divisions, and -when night fell general Cole still held the great -chain of the mountains with a loss of only three -hundred and eighty men killed and wounded. His -right was however turned by Orbaiceta, he had -but ten or eleven thousand bayonets to oppose to -thirty thousand, and his line of retreat being for -four or five miles down hill and flanked all the -way by the Lindouz, was uneasy and unfavourable. -Wherefore putting the troops silently in march after -dark, he threaded the passes and gained the valley -of Urros. His rear-guard composed of Anson’s -brigade followed in the morning, general Campbell -retired from the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga to -Eugui in the valley of Zubiri, and the Spanish battalion -retreating from the foundry of Orbaiceta by -the narrow way of Navala rejoined Morillo near -Espinal. The great chain was thus abandoned, but -the result of the day’s operation was unsatisfactory -to the French general; he acknowledged a loss of -four hundred men, he had not gained ten miles, -and from the passes now abandoned, to Pampeluna, -the distance was not less than twenty-two miles, -with strong defensive positions in the way where -increasing numbers of intrepid enemies were to be -expected.</p> - -<p>Soult’s combinations, contrived for greater success,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114"></a>[114]</span> -had been thwarted, partly by fortune, partly -by errors of execution the like of which all generals -must expect, and the most experienced are the most -resigned as knowing them to be inevitable. The -interference of fortune was felt in the fog which -rose at the moment when he was ready to thrust -forward his heavy masses of troops entire. The -failure in execution was Reille’s tardy movement. -His orders were to gain with all expedition the -Lindouz, that is to say the knot tying the heads of -the Alduides, the Val Carlos, the Roncesvalles, and -the valley of Urroz. From that position he would -have commanded the Mendichuri, Atalosti, Ibañeta -and Sahorgain passes, and by moving along the crest -of the hills could menace the Urtiaga, Renacabal, -and Bellate passes, thus endangering Campbell’s -and Hill’s lines of retreat. But when he should have -ascended the rocks of Airola he halted to incorporate<span class="sidenote">Pellot, <span lang="fr">Mémoires des Campagnes des Pyrennées</span>.</span> -two newly arrived conscript battalions and -to issue provisions, and the hours thus lost would -have sufficed to seize the Lindouz before general -Ross got through the pass of Mendichuri. The -fog would still have stopped the spread of the -French columns to the extent designed by Soult, -but fifteen or sixteen thousand men, placed on the -flank and rear of Byng and Morillo, would have -separated them from the fourth division, and -forced the latter to retreat beyond Viscayret.</p> - -<p>Soult however overrated the force opposed to -him, supposing it to consist of two British divisions,<span class="sidenote">Official Despatch to the Minister of war, MSS.</span> -besides Byng’s brigade and Morillo’s Spaniards. -He was probably deceived by the wounded men, -who hastily questioned on the field would declare -they belonged to the second and fourth divisions, -because Byng’s brigade was part of the former;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115"></a>[115]</span> -but that general and the Spaniards had without aid -sustained Soult’s first efforts, and even when the -fourth division came up, less than eleven thousand -men, exclusive of sergeants and officers, were present -in the fight. Campbell’s Portuguese never -entered the line at all, the remainder of the second -division was in the Bastan, and the third division -was at Olague in the valley of Lanz.</p> - -<p>On the 26th the French general put Clauzel’s -wing on the track of Cole, and ordered Reille to -follow the crest of the mountains and seize the -passes leading from the Bastan in Hill’s rear while -D’Erlon pressed him in front. That general would -thus, Soult hoped, be crushed or thrown on the -side of San Estevan; D’Erlon could then reach -his proper place in the valley of Zubiri, while the -right descended the valley of Lanz and prevented -Picton quitting it to aid Cole. A retreat by those -generals and on separate lines would thus be inevitable, -and the French army could issue forth in -a compact order of battle from the mouths of the -two valleys against Pampeluna.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF LINZOAIN.</h4> - -<p>All the columns were in movement at day-break, -but every hour brought its obstacle. The fog still -hung heavy on the mountain-tops, Reille’s guides, -bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the -crests, and at ten o’clock having no other resource -he marched down the pass of Mendichuri upon -Espinal, and fell into the rear of the cavalry and -artillery following Clauzel’s divisions. Meanwhile -Soult, although retarded also by the fog and the -difficulties of the ground, overtook Cole’s rear-guard -in front of Viscayret. The leading troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116"></a>[116]</span> -struck hotly upon some British light companies incorporated -under the command of colonel Wilson -of the forty-eighth, and a French squadron passing -round their flank fell on the rear; but Wilson -facing about, drove off these horsemen and thus -fighting, Cole, about two o’clock, reached the -heights of Linzoain a mile beyond Viscayret, where -general Picton met him with intelligence that -Campbell had reached Eugui from the Alduides, -and that the third division having crossed the hills -from Olague was at Zubiri. The junction of all -these troops was thus secured, the loss of the -day was less than two hundred, and neither wounded -men nor baggage had been left behind. However -the French gathered in front and at four o’clock -seized some heights on the allies’ left which endangered -their position, wherefore again falling -back a mile, Cole offered battle on the ridge -separating the valley of Urroz from that of Zubiri. -During this skirmish Campbell coming from Eugui -shewed his Portuguese on the ridges above the right -flank of the French, but they were distant, Picton’s -troops were still at Zubiri, and there was light -for an action. Soult however disturbed with intelligence -received from D’Erlon, and perhaps doubtful -what Campbell’s troops might be, put off the -attack until next morning, and after dark the junction -of all the allies was effected.</p> - -<p>This delay on the part of the French general -seems injudicious. Cole was alone for five hours. -Every action, by increasing the number of wounded -men and creating confusion in the rear, would have -augmented the difficulties of the retreat; and the -troops were fatigued with incessant fighting and -marching for two days and one night. Moreover<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117"></a>[117]</span> -the alteration of Reille’s march, occasioned by the -fog, had reduced the chances dependant on the -primary combinations to the operations of D’Erlon’s -corps, but the evening reports brought the -mortifying conviction that he also had gone wrong, -and by rough fighting only could Soult now attain -his object. It is said that his expressions discovered<span class="sidenote">Edouard de LaPene Campagne 1813, 1814.</span> -a secret anticipation of failure, if so, his temper -was too stedfast to yield for he gave the signal -to march the next day, and more strongly renewed -his orders to D’Erlon whose operations must now -be noticed.</p> - -<p>That general had three divisions of infantry, -furnishing twenty-one thousand men of which -about eighteen thousand were combatants. Early -on the morning of the 25th he assembled two of -them behind some heights near the passes of Maya, -having caused the national guards of Baygorry to -make previous demonstrations towards the passes of -Arriette, Yspeguy, and Lorietta. No change had -been made in the disposition of general Hill’s force, -but general Stewart, deceived by the movements of -the national guards, looked towards Sylveira’s posts -on the right rather than to his own front; his division, -consisting of two British brigades, was consequently -neither posted as it should be nor otherwise -prepared for an attack. The ground to be -defended was indeed very strong, but however -rugged a mountain position may be, if it is too extensive -for the troops or those troops are not disposed -with judgment, the very inequalities constituting -its defensive strength become advantageous -to an assailant.</p> - -<p>There were three passes to defend. Aretesque -on the right, Lessessa in the centre, Maya on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118"></a>[118]</span> -left, and from these entrances two ways led to -Elisondo in parallel directions; one down the -valley through the town of Maya, receiving in its -course the Erazu road; the other along the Atchiola -mountain. General Pringle’s brigade was charged to -defend the Aretesque, and colonel Cameron’s brigade -the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col itself was -broad on the summit, about three miles long, and on -each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above another; -those on the right blending with the Goramendi -mountains, those on the left with the Atchiola, near -the summit of which the eighty-second regiment -belonging to the seventh division was posted.</p> - -<p>Cameron’s brigade, encamped on the left, had a -clear view of troops coming from Urdax; but at -Aretesque a great round hill, one mile in front, -masked the movements of an enemy coming from -Espelette. This hill was not occupied at night, -nor in the daytime save by some Portuguese cavalry -videttes, and the next guard was an infantry -piquet posted on that slope of the Col which -fronted the great hill. Behind this piquet of eighty -men there was no immediate support, but four -light companies were encamped one mile down the -reverse slope which was more rugged and difficult -of access than that towards the enemy. The rest -of general Pringle’s brigade was disposed at various -distances from two to three miles in the rear, and -the signal for assembling on the position was to be -the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks -above the Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments -furnishing more than three thousand fighting -men, half only were in line of battle, and those -chiefly massed on the left of a position, wide open -and of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119"></a>[119]</span> -their general, Stewart, quite deceived as to the -real state of affairs, was at Elisondo when about -mid-day D’Erlon commenced the battle.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF MAYA.</h4> - -<p>Captain Moyle Sherer, the officer commanding -the picquet at the Aretesque pass, was told by his<span class="sidenote7">Plan 3.</span> -predecessor, that at dawn a glimpse had been obtained -of cavalry and infantry in movement along -the hills in front, some peasants also announced the -approach of the French, and at nine o’clock major -Thorne, a staff-officer, having patroled round the -great hill in front of the pass discovered sufficient -to make him order up the light companies to support -the picquet. These companies had just formed -on the ridge with their left at the rock of Aretesque, -when D’Armagnac’s division coming from Espelette -mounted the great hill in front, Abbé followed, and -general Maransin with a third division advanced -from Ainhoa and Urdax against the Maya pass, -meaning also to turn it by a narrow way leading up -the Atchiola mountain.</p> - -<p>D’Armagnac’s men pushed forwards at once in -several columns, and forced the picquet back with -great loss upon the light companies, who sustained -his vehement assault with infinite difficulty. The -alarm guns were now heard from the Maya pass, and -general Pringle hastened to the front, but his regiments -moving hurriedly from different camps were -necessarily brought into action one after the other. -The thirty-fourth came up first at a running pace, -yet by companies not in mass and breathless from -the length and ruggedness of the ascent; the thirty-ninth -and twenty-eighth followed, but not immediately -nor together, and meanwhile D’Armagnac,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120"></a>[120]</span> -closely supported by Abbé, with domineering numbers -and valour combined, maugre the desperate -fighting of the picquet of the light companies -and of the thirty-fourth, had established his columns -on the broad ridge of the position.</p> - -<p>Colonel Cameron then sent the fiftieth from the -left to the assistance of the overmatched troops, -and that fierce and formidable old regiment charging -the head of an advancing column drove it clear out -of the pass of Lessessa in the centre. Yet the -French were so many that, checked at one point, -they assembled with increased force at another; nor -could general Pringle restore the battle with the -thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments, which, -cut off from the others were though fighting desperately -forced back to a second and lower ridge -crossing the main road to Elizondo. They were -followed by D’Armagnac, but Abbé continued to -press the fiftieth and thirty-fourth whose natural -line of retreat was towards the Atchiola road on -the left, because the position trended backward -from Aretesque towards that point, and because -Cameron’s brigade was there. And that officer, -still holding the pass of Maya with the left wings -of the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments, -brought their right wings and the Portuguese guns -into action and thus maintained the fight; but so -dreadful was the slaughter, especially of the ninety-second, -that it is said the advancing enemy was -actually stopped by the heaped mass of dead and<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3.</a></span> -dying; and then the left wing of that noble regiment -coming down from the higher ground smote wounded -friends and exulting foes alike, as mingled together -they stood or crawled before its fire.</p> - -<p>It was in this state of affairs that general Stewart,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121"></a>[121]</span> -returning from Elizondo by the mountain road, -reached the field of battle. The passes of Lessessa -and Aretesque were lost, that of Maya was still held -by the left wing of the seventy-first, but Stewart seeing -Maransin’s men gathered thickly on one side and -Abbé’s men on the other, abandoned it to take a -new position on the first rocky ridge covering the road -over the Atchiola; and he called down the eighty-second -regiment from the highest part of that mountain -and sent messengers to demand further aid from -the seventh division. Meanwhile although wounded -himself he made a strenuous resistance, for he was -a very gallant man; but during the retrograde -movement, Maransin no longer seeking to turn the -position, suddenly thrust the head of his division -across the front of the British line and connected -his left with Abbé, throwing as he passed a destructive -fire into the wasted remnant of the ninety-second, -which even then sullenly gave way, for the -men fell until two-thirds of the whole had gone to -the ground. Still the survivors fought, and the -left wing of the seventy-first came into action, but, -one after the other all the regiments were forced -back, and the first position was lost together with -the Portuguese guns.</p> - -<p>Abbé’s division now followed D’Armagnac on the -road to the town of Maya, leaving Maransin to deal -with Stewart’s new position, and notwithstanding -its extreme strength the French gained ground -until six o’clock, for the British, shrunk in numbers, -also wanted ammunition, and a part of the eighty-second -under major Fitzgerald were forced to roll -down stones to defend the rocks on which they were -posted. In this desperate condition Stewart was -upon the point of abandoning the mountain entirely,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122"></a>[122]</span> -when a brigade of the seventh division, commanded -by general Barnes, arrived from Echallar, and that -officer charging at the head of the sixth regiment -drove the French back to the Maya ridge. Stewart -thus remained master of the Atchiola, and the count -D’Erlon who probably thought greater reinforcements -had come up, recalled his other divisions from the<span class="sidenote">French official report, MSS.</span> -Maya road and reunited his whole corps on the <em>Col</em>. -He had lost fifteen hundred men and a general; but<span class="sidenote">British official return.</span> -he took four guns, and fourteen hundred British -soldiers were killed or wounded.</p> - -<p>Such was the fight of Maya, a disaster, yet one -much exaggerated by French writers, and by an -English author misrepresented as a surprise caused<span class="sidenote12">Southey.</span> -by the negligence of the cavalry. General Stewart -was surprised, his troops were not, and never did -soldiers fight better, seldom so well. The stern -valour of the ninety-second, principally composed of -Irishmen, would have graced Thermopylæ. The -Portuguese cavalry patroles, if any went out which -is uncertain, might have neglected their duty, and -doubtless the front should have been scoured in a -more military manner; but the infantry picquets, -and the light companies so happily ordered up by -major Thorne, were ready, and no man wondered -to see the French columns crown the great hill in -front of the pass. Stewart expecting no attack at -Maya, had gone to Elisondo leaving orders for the soldiers<span class="sidenote">General Stewart’s Official Report.</span> -to cook; from his erroneous views therefore the -misfortune sprung and from no other source. Having -deceived himself as to the true point of attack he -did not take proper military precautions on his own -front; his position was only half occupied, his troops -brought into action wildly, and finally he caused<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Despatches.</span> -the loss of his guns by a misdirection as to the road.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123"></a>[123]</span> -General Stewart was a brave, energetic, zealous, -indefatigable man and of a magnanimous spirit, -but he possessed neither the calm reflective judgment -nor the intuitive genius which belongs to -nature’s generals.</p> - -<p>It is difficult to understand count D’Erlon’s operations. -Why, when he had carried the right of -the position, did he follow two weak regiments with -two divisions, and leave only one division to attack -five regiments, posted on the strongest ground and -having hopes of succour from Echallar? Certainly -if Abbé’s division had acted with Maransin’s, -Stewart who was so hardly pressed by the -latter alone, must have passed the road from -Echallar in retreat before general Barnes’s brigade -arrived. On the other hand, Soult’s orders directed<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Despatch, MSS.</span> -D’Erlon to operate by his left, with the view of -connecting the whole army on the summit of the -great chain of the Pyrenees. He should therefore -either have used his whole force to crush the -troops on the Atchiola before they could be succoured -from Echallar; or, leaving Maransin there, -have marched by the Maya road upon Ariscun to -cut Sylveira’s line of retreat; instead of this he -remained inactive upon the Col de Maya for -twenty hours after the battle! And general Hill concentrating -his whole force, now augmented by Barnes’s -brigade, would probably have fallen upon him from -the commanding rocks of Atchiola the next day, if -intelligence of Cole’s retreat from the Roncesvalles -passes had not come through the Alduides. This -rendered the recovery of the Col de Maya useless, -and Hill withdrawing all his troops during the -night, posted the British brigades which had been -engaged, together with one Portuguese brigade of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124"></a>[124]</span> -infantry and a Portuguese battery, on the heights -in rear of Irueta, fifteen miles from the scene of -action. The other Portuguese brigade he left in -front of Elizondo, thus covering the road of San -Estevan on his left, that of Berderez on his right, -and the pass of Vellate in his rear.</p> - -<p>Such was the commencement of Soult’s operations -to restore the fortunes of France. Three considerable -actions fought on the same day had each -been favourable. At St. Sebastian the allies were -repulsed; at Roncesvalles they abandoned the -passes; at Maya they were defeated; but the -decisive blow had not yet been struck.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on -his way back from St. Sebastian, but with the false -addition that D’Erlon was beaten. As early as the -22d he had known that Soult was preparing a great -offensive movement, but the immovable attitude of -the French centre, the skilful disposition of their -reserve which was twice as strong as he at first -supposed, together with the preparations made to -throw bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriatou, were -all calculated to mislead and did mislead him.</p> - -<p>Soult’s complicated combinations to bring D’Erlon’s -divisions finally into line on the crest of the -great chain were impenetrable, and the English -general could not believe his adversary would -throw himself with only thirty thousand men into -the valley of the Ebro unless sure of aid from -Suchet, and that general’s movements indicated a -determination to remain in Catalonia; moreover -Wellington, in contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna -was not in extremity, and before the failure -of the assault thought that San Sebastian was. -Hence the operations against his right, their full<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125"></a>[125]</span> -extent not known, appeared a feint, and he judged -the real effort would be to throw bridges over the -Bidassoa and raise the siege of San Sebastian. But -in the night correct intelligence of the Maya and -Roncesvalles affairs arrived, Soult’s object was then -scarcely doubtful, and sir T. Graham was ordered -to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark his -guns and stores, and hold all his spare troops in -hand to join Giron, on a position of battle marked -out near the Bidassoa. General Cotton was ordered -to move the cavalry up to Pampeluna, and O’Donnel -was instructed to hold some of his Spanish troops -ready to act in advance. This done Wellington -arranged his lines of correspondence and proceeded -to San Estevan, which he reached early in the -morning.</p> - -<p>While the embarkation of the guns and stores -was going on it was essential to hold the posts at -Vera and Echallar, because D’Erlon’s object was -not pronounced, and an enemy in possession of -those places could approach San Sebastian by the -roads leading over the Pena de Haya, a rocky -mountain behind Lesaca, or by the defiles of Zubietta -leading round that mountain from the valley of -Lerins. Wherefore in passing through Estevan on -the morning of the 26th, Wellington merely directed -general Pack to guard the bridges over the -Bidassoa. But when he reached Irueta, saw the -reduced state of Stewart’s division, and heard that -Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all -the troops within his power upon Pampeluna; and -to prevent mistakes indicated the valley of Lanz as<span class="sidenote">Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.</span> -the general line of movement. Of Picton’s exact -position or of his intentions nothing positive was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126"></a>[126]</span> -known, but supposing him to have joined Cole at -Linzoain, as indeed he had, Wellington judged that -their combined forces would be sufficient to check -the enemy until assistance could reach them from -the centre or from Pampeluna, and he so advised -Picton on the evening of the 26th.</p> - -<p>In consequence of these orders the seventh division -abandoned Echallar in the night of the 26th, the -sixth division quitted San Estevan at daylight on -the 27th, and general Hill concentrating his own -troops and Barnes’s brigade on the heights of Irueta, -halted until the evening of the 27th but -marched during the night through the pass of Vellate -upon the town of Lanz. Meanwhile the light -division quitting Vera also on the 27th retired by -Lesaca to the summit of the Santa Cruz mountain, -overlooking the valley of Lerins, and there -halted, apparently to cover the pass of Zubieta -until Longa’s Spaniards should take post to block -the roads leading over the Pena de Haya and protect -the embarkation of the guns on that flank. -That object being effected it was to thread the passes -and descend upon Lecumberri on the great road of -Irurzun, thus securing sir Thomas Graham’s communication -with the army round Pampeluna. These -various movements spread fear and confusion far -and wide. All the narrow valleys and roads were -crowded with baggage, commissariat stores, artillery -and fugitive families; reports of the most -alarming nature were as usual rife; each division, -ignorant of what had really happened to the other, -dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes -related might be true; none knew what to expect or -where they were to meet the enemy, and one universal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127"></a>[127]</span> -hubbub filled the wild regions through which -the French army was now working its fiery path -towards Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon’s inactivity gave great uneasiness to -Soult, who repeated the order to push forward by -his left whatever might be the force opposed, and -thus stimulated he advanced to Elizondo on the -27th, but thinking the sixth division was still at -San Estevan, again halted, and it was not until the -morning of the 28th, when general Hill’s retreat -had opened the way, that he followed through the -pass of Vellate. His further progress belongs to -other combinations arising from Soult’s direct operations -which are now to be continued.</p> - -<p>General Picton, having assumed the command -of all the troops in the valley of Zubiri on the -evening of the 26th, recommenced the retreat before -dawn on the 27th, and without the hope or intention -of covering Pampeluna. Soult followed in -the morning, having first sent scouts towards the -ridges where Campbell’s troops had appeared the -evening before. Reille marched by the left bank -of the Guy river, Clauzel by the right bank, the -cavalry and artillery closed the rear and as the -whole moved in compact order the narrow valley -was overgorged with troops, a hasty bicker of -musketry alone marking the separation of the hostile -forces. Meanwhile the garrison of Pampeluna -made a sally and O’Donnel in great alarm spiked -some of his guns, destroyed his magazines, and -would have suffered a disaster, if Carlos D’España -had not fortunately arrived with his division and -checked the garrison. Nevertheless the danger was -imminent, for general Cole, first emerging from -the valley of Zubiri, had passed Villalba, only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128"></a>[128]</span> -three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat; Picton, -following close, was at Huarte, and O’Donnel’s -Spaniards were in confusion; in fine Soult was all -but successful when Picton, feeling the importance -of the crisis, suddenly turned on some steep ridges, -which, stretching under the names of San Miguel -Mont Escava and San Cristoval quite across the -mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys, screen Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>Posting the third division on the right of Huarte -he prolonged his line to the left with Morillo’s Spaniards, -called upon O’Donnel to support him, and -directed Cole to occupy some heights between Oricain -and Arletta. But that general having with -a surer eye observed a salient hill near Zabaldica, -one mile in advance and commanding the road to -Huarte, demanded and obtained permission to occupy -it instead of the heights first appointed. -Two Spanish regiments belonging to the blockading -troops were still posted there, and towards them -Cole directed his course. Soult had also marked -this hill, a French detachment issuing from the -mouth of the Val de Zubiri was in full career to -seize it, and the hostile masses were rapidly approaching -the summit on either side when the -Spaniards, seeing the British so close, vindicated -their own post by a sudden charge. This was for -Soult the stroke of fate. His double columns just -then emerging, exultant, from the narrow valley, -were arrested at the sight of ten thousand men -which under Cole crowned the summit of the -mountain in opposition; and two miles further back -stood Picton with a greater number, for O’Donnel -had now taken post on Morillo’s left. To advance -by the Huarte road was impossible, and to stand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129"></a>[129]</span> -still was dangerous, because the French army contracted -to a span in front was cleft in its whole -length by the river Guy, and compressed on each -side by the mountains which in that part narrowed -the valley to a quarter of a mile. Soult however, -like a great and ready commander, at once shot the -head of Clauzel’s columns to his right across the -mountain which separated the Val de Zubiri from -the Val de Lanz, and at the same time threw one -of Reille’s divisions of infantry and a body of cavalry<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -across the mountains on his left, beyond the -Guy river, as far as the village of Elcano, to -menace the front and right flank of Picton’s -position at Huarte. The other two divisions of infantry -he established at the village of Zabaldica in -the Val de Zubiri, close under Cole’s right, and -meanwhile Clauzel seized the village of Sauroren -close under that general’s left.</p> - -<p>While the French general thus formed his line -of battle, lord Wellington who had quitted sir -Rowland Hill’s quarters in the Bastan very early -on the 27th, crossed the main ridge and descended -the valley of Lanz without having been able to<span class="sidenote">Notes by Lord Wellington, MSS.</span> -learn any thing of Picton’s movements or position, -and in this state of uncertainty reached Ostiz, a -few miles from Sauroren, where he found general -Long with the brigade of light cavalry which had -furnished the posts of correspondence in the mountains. -Here learning that Picton having abandoned -the heights of Linzoain was moving on -Huarte, he left his quarter-master-general with instructions -to stop all the troops coming down the -valley of Lanz until the state of affairs at Huarte -should be ascertained. Then at racing speed he -made for Sauroren. As he entered that village<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130"></a>[130]</span> -he saw Clauzel’s divisions moving from Zabaldica -along the crest of the mountain, and it was clear -that the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were -intercepted, wherefore pulling up his horse he -wrote on the parapet of the bridge of Sauroren -fresh instructions to turn every thing from that -valley to the right, by a road which led through -Lizasso and Marcalain behind the hills to the village -of Oricain, that is to say, in rear of the position -now occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, -the only staff-officer who had kept up with -him, galloped with these orders out of Sauroren -by one road, the French light cavalry dashed in by -another, and the English general rode alone up the -mountain to reach his troops. One of Campbell’s -Portuguese battalions first descried him and raised -a cry of joy, and the shrill clamour caught up by -the next regiments swelled as it run along the line -into that stern and appalling shout which the British -soldier is wont to give upon the edge of battle, -and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. Lord -Wellington suddenly stopped in a conspicuous place, -he desired that both armies should know he was -there, and a double spy who was present pointed -out Soult, then so near that his features could -be plainly distinguished. The English general, it -is said, fixed his eyes attentively upon this formidable -man, and speaking as if to himself, said, -“<em>Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious -one and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause -of these cheers; that will give time for the sixth -division to arrive and I shall beat him.</em>” And certain -it is that the French general made no serious -attack that day.</p> - -<p>The position adopted by Cole was the summit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131"></a>[131]</span> -of a mountain mass which filled all the space between -the Guy and the Lanz rivers as far back as -Huarte and Villalba. It was highest in the centre, -and boldly defined towards the enemy, but the trace -was irregular, the right being thrown back towards -the village of Arletta so as to flank the high road -to Huarte. This road was also swept by some guns -placed on a lower range, or neck, connecting the -right of Cole with Picton and Morillo.</p> - -<p>Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river was -the bulging hill vindicated by the Spaniards; it -was a distinct point on the right of the fourth division, -dependent upon the centre of the position -but considerably lower. The left of the position -also abating in height was yet extremely rugged -and steep overlooking the Lanz river and the -road to Villalba. General Ross’s brigade of the -fourth division was posted on that side, having a -Portuguese battalion, whose flank rested on a small -chapel, in his front. General Campbell was on the -right of Ross. General Anson was on the highest -ground, partly behind, and partly on the right of -Campbell. General Byng’s brigade was on a second -mass of hills in reserve, and the Spanish hill -was reinforced by a battalion of the fourth Portuguese -regiment.</p> - -<p>The front of battle being less than two miles was -well filled, and the Lanz and Guy river washed -the flanks. Those torrents continuing their course -break by narrow passages through the steep ridges -of San Miguel and Cristoval, and then flowing -past Huarte and Villalba meet behind those places -to form the Arga river. On the ridges thus cleft -by the waters the second line was posted, that is to -say, at the distance of two miles from, and nearly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132"></a>[132]</span> -parallel to the first position, but on a more extended -front. Picton’s left was at Huarte, his -right strengthened with a battery stretched to the -village of Goraitz, covering more than a mile of -ground on that flank. Morillo prolonged Picton’s -left along the crest of San Miguel to Villalba, -and O’Donnel continued the line to San Cristoval; -Carlos D’España’s division maintained the blockade -behind these ridges, and the British cavalry under -General Cotton, coming up from Tafalla and Olite, -took post, the heavy brigades on some open ground -behind Picton, the hussar brigade on his right. -This second line being on a wider trace than the -first and equally well filled with troops, entirely -barred the openings of the two valleys leading down -to Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>Soult’s position was also a mountain filling the -space between the two rivers. It was even more -rugged than the allies’ mountain and they were only -separated by a deep narrow valley. Clauzel’s three -divisions leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren, -which was quite down in the valley of Lanz -and close under the chapel height where the left of -the fourth division was posted. His left was prolonged -by two of Reille’s divisions, which also occupied -the village of Zabaldica quite down in the -valley of Zubiri under the right of the allies. The -remaining division of this wing and a division of -cavalry, were, as I have before stated, thrown forward -on the mountains at the other side of the Guy river, -menacing Picton and seeking for an opportunity -to communicate with the garrison of Pampeluna. -Some guns were pushed in front of Zabaldica, but -the elevation required to send the shot upward rendered -their fire ineffectual and the greatest part of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133"></a>[133]</span> -the artillery remained therefore in the narrow valley -of Zubiri.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of the 27th.</em> Soult’s first effort was to -gain the Spaniards’ hill and establish himself near -the centre of the allies’ line of battle. The attack -was vigorous but the French were valiantly repulsed -about the time lord Wellington arrived, and he immediately -reinforced that post with the fortieth -British regiment. There was then a general skirmish -along the front, under cover of which Soult carefully -examined the whole position, and the firing -continued on the mountain side until evening, when -a terrible storm, the usual precursor of English -battles in the Peninsula, brought on premature darkness -and terminated the dispute. This was the -state of affairs at day-break on the 28th, but a signal -alteration had place before the great battle of -that day commenced, and the movements of the -wandering divisions by which this change was -effected must now be traced.</p> - -<p>It has been shewn that the Lanz covered the left -of the allies and the right of the French. Nevertheless -the heights occupied by either army were -prolonged beyond that river, the continuation of the -allies’ ridge sweeping forward so as to look into the -rear of Sauroren, while the continuation of the -French heights fell back in a direction nearly -parallel to the forward inclination of the opposing -ridge. They were both steep and high, yet lower -and less rugged than the heights on which the -armies stood opposed, for the latter were mountains -where rocks piled on rocks stood out like castles, -difficult to approach and so dangerous to assail -that the hardened veterans of the Peninsula only -would have dared the trial. Now the road by which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134"></a>[134]</span> -the sixth division marched on the 27th, after clearing -the pass of Doña Maria, sends one branch to -Lanz, another to Ostiz, a third through Lizasso and -Marcalain; the first and second fall into the road -from Bellate and descend the valley of Lanz to -Sauroren; the third passing behind the ridges, just -described as prolonging the positions of the armies, -also falls into the valley of Lanz, but at the village -of Oricain, that is to say one mile behind the ground -occupied by general Cole’s left.</p> - -<p>It was by this road of Marcalain that Wellington -now expected the sixth and seventh divisions, but -the rapidity with which Soult seized Sauroren -caused a delay of eighteen hours. For the sixth -division, having reached Olague in the valley of -Lanz about one o’clock on the 27th, halted there -until four, and then following the orders brought -by lord Fitzroy Somerset marched by Lizasso to -gain the Marcalain road; but the great length of -these mountain marches, and the heavy storm which -had terminated the action at Zabaldica sweeping -with equal violence in this direction, prevented the -division from passing Lizasso that night. However -the march was renewed at daylight on the 28th, -and meanwhile general Hill, having quitted the -Bastan on the evening of the 27th, reached the -town of Lanz on the morning of the 28th, and rallying -general Long’s cavalry and his own artillery, -which were in that valley, moved likewise upon -Lizasso. At that place he met the seventh division -coming from San Estevan, and having restored -general Barnes’s brigade to lord Dalhousie, took a -position on a ridge covering the road to Marcalain. -The seventh division being on his right, was in military -communication with the sixth division, and thus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135"></a>[135]</span> -lord Wellington’s left was prolonged, and covered -the great road leading from Pampeluna by Irurzun -to Tolosa. And during these important movements, -which were not completed until the evening of the -28th, which brought six thousand men into the -allies’ line of battle, and fifteen thousand more into -military communication with their left, D’Erlon -remained planted in his position of observation near -Elizondo!</p> - -<p>The near approach of the sixth division early on -the morning of the 28th and the certainty of Hill’s -junction, made Wellington imagine that Soult would -not venture an attack, and certainly that marshal, -disquieted about D’Erlon of whom he only knew -that he had not followed his instructions, viewed the -strong position of his adversary with uneasy anticipations. -Again with anxious eyes he took cognizance -of all its rugged strength, and seemed dubious -and distrustful of his fortune. He could not operate -with advantage by his own left beyond the Guy -river, because the mountains there were rough, and -Wellington having shorter lines of movement could -meet him with all arms combined; and meanwhile -the French artillery, unable to emerge from the Val -de Zubiri except by the Huarte road, would have -been exposed to a counter-attack. He crossed the -Lanz river and ascended the prolongation of the -allies’ ridge, which, as he had possession of the -bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own -ground. From this height he could see all the left -and rear of Cole’s position, looking down the valley -of Lanz as far as Villalba, but the country beyond -the ridge towards Marcalain was so broken that he<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -could not discern the march of the sixth division; -he knew however from the deserters, that Wellington<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136"></a>[136]</span> -expected four fresh divisions from that side, that -is to say, the second, sixth, and seventh British, and -Sylviera’s Portuguese division which always marched -with Hill. This information and the nature of the -ground decided the plan of attack. The valley of Lanz -growing wider as it descended, offered the means of -assailing the allies’ left in front and rear at one moment, -and the same combination would cut off the -reinforcements expected from the side of Marcalain.</p> - -<p>One of Clauzel’s divisions already occupied Sauroren, -and the other two coming from the mountain -took post upon each side of that village. The division -on the right hand was ordered to throw some flankers -on the ridge from whence Soult was taking his -observations, and upon a signal given to move in one -body to a convenient distance down the valley and -then, wheeling to its left, assail the rear of the allies’ -left flank while the other two divisions advancing -from their respective positions near Sauroren assailed -the front. Cole’s left, which did not exceed five -thousand men, would thus be enveloped by sixteen -thousand, and Soult expected to crush it notwithstanding -the strength of the ground. Meanwhile -Reille’s two divisions advancing from the mountain -on the side of Zabaldica, were each to send a brigade -against the hill occupied by the fortieth regiment; -the right of this attack was to be connected -with the left of Clauzel, the remaining brigades -were closely to support the assailing masses, the -divisions beyond the Guy were to keep Picton in -check, and Soult who had no time to lose ordered -his lieutenants to throw their troops frankly and at -once into action.</p> - -<p><em>First battle of Sauroren.</em>—It was fought on the -fourth anniversary of the battle of Talavera.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137"></a>[137]</span></p> - -<p>About mid-day the French gathered at the foot -of the position and their skirmishers rushing forward -spread over the face of the mountain, working upward -like a conflagration; but the columns of attack were -not all prepared when Clauzel’s division in the valley -of Lanz, too impatient to await the general signal of -battle, threw out its flankers on the ridge beyond the -river and pushed down the valley in one mass. -With a rapid pace it turned Cole’s left and was preparing -to wheel up on his rear, when a Portuguese -brigade of the sixth division, suddenly appearing on -the crest of the ridge beyond the river, drove the -French flankers back and instantly descended with -a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the column -in the valley. And almost at the same instant, the -main body of the sixth division emerging from -behind the same ridge, near the village of Oricain, -formed in order of battle across the front. It was -the counter-stroke of Salamanca! The French, -striving to encompass the left of the allies were themselves -encompassed, for two brigades of the fourth -division turned and smote them from the left, the -Portuguese smote them from the right; and while -thus scathed on both flanks with fire, they were -violently shocked and pushed back with a mighty -force by the sixth division, yet not in flight, but -fighting fiercely and strewing the ground with their -enemies’ bodies as well as with their own.</p> - -<p>Clauzel’s second division, seeing this dire conflict, -with a hurried movement assailed the chapel height -to draw off the fire from the troops in the valley, and -gallantly did the French soldiers throng up the -craggy steep, but the general unity of the attack was -ruined; neither their third division nor Reille’s brigades -had yet received the signal, and their attacks<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138"></a>[138]</span> -instead of being simultaneous were made in succession, -running from right to left as the necessity of -aiding the others became apparent. It was however -a terrible battle and well fought. One column darting -out of the village of Sauroren, silently, sternly, -without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel under -a tempest of bullets which swept away whole ranks -without abating the speed and power of the mass. -The seventh Caçadores shrunk abashed and that part -of the position was won. Soon however they rallied -upon general Ross’s British brigade, and the whole -running forward charged the French with a loud -shout and dashed them down the hill. Heavily -stricken they were, yet undismayed, and recovering -their ranks again, they ascended in the same manner -to be again broken and overturned. But the other -columns of attack were now bearing upwards through -the smoke and flame with which the skirmishers had -covered the face of the mountain, and the tenth -Portuguese regiment fighting on the right of Ross’s -brigade yielded to their fury; a heavy body crowned -the heights and wheeling against the exposed flank -of Ross forced that gallant officer also to go back. -His ground was instantly occupied by the enemies -with whom he had been engaged in front, and the -fight raged close and desperate on the crest of the -position, charge succeeded charge and each side -yielded and recovered by turns; yet this astounding -effort of French valour was of little avail. Lord Wellington -brought Byng’s brigade forward at a running -pace, and sent the twenty-seventh and forty-eighth -British regiments belonging to Anson’s brigade down -from the higher ground in the centre against the -crowded masses, rolling them backward in disorder and -throwing them one after the other violently down the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139"></a>[139]</span> -mountain side; and with no child’s play; the two -British regiments fell upon the enemy three separate -times with the bayonet and lost more than half their -own numbers.</p> - -<p>During this battle on the mountain-top, the British -brigades of the sixth division strengthened by a -battery of guns, gained ground in the valley of Lanz -and arrived on the same front with the left of the -victorious troops about the chapel. Lord Wellington -then seeing the momentary disorder of the enemy -ordered Madden’s Portuguese brigade, which had -never ceased its fire against the right flank of the -French column, to assail the village of Sauroren in the -rear, but the state of the action in other parts and -the exhaustion of the troops soon induced him to -countermand this movement. Meanwhile Reille’s -brigades, connecting their right with the left of Clauzel’s -third division, had environed the Spanish hill, -ascended it unchecked, and at the moment when the -fourth division was so hardly pressed made the regiment -of El Pravia give way on the left of the fortieth. -A Portuguese battalion rushing forward covered -the flank of that invincible regiment, which waited -in stern silence until the French set their feet upon -the broad summit; but when their glittering arms -appeared over the brow of the mountain the charging -cry was heard, the crowded mass was broken to -pieces and a tempest of bullets followed its flight. -Four times this assault was renewed, and the French -officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the -belts, so fierce and resolute they were to win. It was -however the labour of Sysiphus. The vehement shout -and shock of the British soldier always prevailed, and -at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, hearts fainting,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140"></a>[140]</span> -and hopeless from repeated failures, they were so -abashed that three British companies sufficed to -bear down a whole brigade.</p> - -<p>While the battle was thus being fought on the -height the French cavalry beyond the Guy river, -passed a rivulet, and with a fire of carbines forced the -tenth hussars to yield some rocky ground on Picton’s -right, but the eighteenth hussars having better firearms -than the tenth renewed the combat, killed two -officers, and finally drove the French over the rivulet -again.</p> - -<p>Such were the leading events of this sanguinary -struggle, which lord Wellington fresh from the fight -with homely emphasis called “<em>bludgeon work</em>.” Two -generals and eighteen hundred men had been killed -or wounded on the French side, following their official -reports, a number far below the estimate made at the -time by the allies whose loss amounted to two thousand -six hundred. These discrepancies between hostile -calculations ever occur, and there is little wisdom -in disputing where proof is unattainable; but the -numbers actually engaged were, of French, twenty-five -thousand, of the allies twelve thousand, and if -the strength of the latter’s position did not save them -from the greater loss their stedfast courage is to be -the more admired.</p> - -<p>The 29th the armies rested in position without -firing a shot, but the wandering divisions on both -sides were now entering the line.</p> - -<p>General Hill, having sent all his baggage artillery -and wounded men to Berioplano behind the -Cristoval ridge, still occupied his strong ground -between Lizasso and Arestegui, covering the Marcalain -and Irurzun roads, and menacing that leading<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141"></a>[141]</span> -from Lizasso to Olague in rear of Soult’s right. -His communication with Oricain was maintained by -the seventh division, and the light division was approaching -his left. Thus on Wellington’s side -the crisis was over. He had vindicated his position -with only sixteen thousand combatants, and now, -including the troops still maintaining the blockade, -he had fifty thousand, twenty thousand being British, -in close military combination. Thirty thousand -flushed with recent success were in hand, and -Hill’s troops were well-placed for retaking the -offensive.</p> - -<p>Soult’s situation was proportionably difficult. -Finding that he could not force the allies’ position -in front, he had sent his artillery part of his cavalry -and his wounded men back to France immediately -after the battle, ordering the two former to -join Villatte on the Lower Bidassoa and there -await further instructions. Having shaken off this -burthen he awaited D’Erlon’s arrival by the valley -of Lanz, and that general reached Ostiz a few -miles above Sauroren at mid-day on the 29th, -bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his -march, that general Graham had retired from the -Bidassoa and Villatte had crossed that river. This -gave Soult a hope that his first movements had disengaged -San Sebastian, and he instantly conceived -a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed yet -conformable to the critical state of his affairs.</p> - -<p>No success was to be expected from another -attack, yet he could not at the moment of being -reinforced with eighteen thousand men, retire by -the road he came without <ins class="corr" id="tn-141" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'some hishonour'"> -some dishonour</ins>; nor -could he remain where he was, because his supplies<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142"></a>[142]</span> -of provisions and ammunition derived from distant -magazines by slow and small convoys was unequal -to the consumption. Two-thirds of the British<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -troops, the greatest part of the Portuguese, and all -the Spaniards were, as he supposed, assembled in -his front under Wellington, or on his right flank -under Hill, and it was probable that other reinforcements -were on the march; wherefore he resolved -to prolong his right with D’Erlon’s corps, -and then cautiously drawing off the rest of his -army place himself between the allies and the Bastan, -in military connection with his reserve and -closer to his frontier magazines. Thus posted and -able to combine all his troops in one operation, he -expected to relieve San Sebastian entirely and profit -from the new state of affairs.</p> - -<p>In the evening of the 29th the second division of -cavalry, which was in the valley of Zubiri, passed over -the position to the valley of Lanz, and joined D’Erlon, -who was ordered to march early on the 30th by -Etulain upon Lizasso, sending out strong scouting -parties to his left on all the roads leading upon -Pampeluna, and also towards Letassa and Irurzun. -During the night the first division of cavalry and -La Martiniere’s division of infantry, both at Elcano -on the extreme left of the French army, retired over<span class="sidenote7">Plan 2.</span> -the mountains by Illurdos to Eugui, in the upper -part of the valley of the Zubiri, having orders to -cross the separating ridge enter the valley of Lanz -and join D’Erlon. The remainder of Reille’s wing -was at the same time to march by the crest of the -position from Zabaldica to the village of Sauroren, -and gradually relieve Clauzel’s troops which -were then to assemble behind Sauroren, that is to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143"></a>[143]</span> -say towards Ostiz, and thus following the march of -D’Erlon were to be themselves followed in like manner -by Reille’s troops. To cover these last movements -Clauzel detached two regiments to occupy the -French heights beyond the Lanz river, and they -were also to maintain his connection with D’Erlon -whose line of operations was just beyond those -heights. He was however to hold by Reille rather -than by D’Erlon until the former had perfected -his dangerous march across Wellington’s front.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 29th Soult heard from the -deserters that three divisions were to make an offensive -movement towards Lizasso on the 30th, and -when daylight came he was convinced the men -spoke truly, because from a point beyond Sauroren -he discerned certain columns descending the ridge -of Cristoval and the heights above Oricain, while -others were in march on a wide sweep apparently -to turn Clauzel’s right flank. These columns were -Morillo’s Spaniards, Campbell’s Portuguese, and -the seventh division, the former rejoining Hill <ins class="corr" id="tn-143" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'to whse corps'"> -to whose corps</ins> they properly belonged, the others -adapting themselves to a new disposition of Wellington’s -line of battle which shall be presently -explained.</p> - -<p>At six o’clock in the morning Foy’s division of -Reille’s wing was in march along the crest of the -mountain from Zabaldica towards Sauroren, where -Maucune’s division had already relieved Conroux’s; -the latter, belonging to Clauzel’s wing, was -moving up the valley of Lanz to rejoin that general, -who had, with exception of the two flanking regiments -before mentioned, concentrated his remaining -divisions between Olabe and Ostiz. In this state of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144"></a>[144]</span> -affairs Wellington opening his batteries from the -chapel height sent skirmishers against Sauroren, -and the fire spreading to the allies’ right became -brisk between Cole and Foy. It subsided however -at Sauroren, and Soult, relying on the strength of -the position, ordered Reille to maintain it until nightfall -unless hardly pressed, and went off himself at a -gallop to join D’Erlon, for his design was to fall<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -upon the division attempting to turn his right and -crush them with superior numbers: a daring project, -well and quickly conceived, but he had to deal -with a man whose rapid perception and rough -stroke rendered sleight of hand dangerous. The -marshal overtook D’Erlon at the moment when that -general, having entered the valley of Ulzema with -three divisions of infantry and two divisions of -heavy cavalry, was making dispositions to assail -Hill who was between Buenza and Arestegui.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of Buenza.</em> The allies who were about -ten thousand fighting men, including Long’s brigade -of light cavalry, occupied a very extensive mountain -ridge. Their right was strongly posted on rugged -ground, but the left prolonged towards Buenza -was insecure, and D’Erlon who including his two -divisions of heavy cavalry had not less than twenty -thousand sabres and bayonets, was followed by La -Martiniere’s division of infantry now coming from -Lanz. Soult’s combination was therefore extremely -powerful. The light troops were already engaged -when he arrived, and the same soldiers on both -sides who had so strenuously combated at Maya on -the 25th were again opposed to each other.</p> - -<p>D’Armagnac’s division was directed to make a -false attack upon Hill’s right; Abbé’s division,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145"></a>[145]</span> -emerging by Lizasso, endeavoured to turn the -allies’ left and gain the summit of the ridge in the -direction of Buenza; Maranzin followed Abbé, and -the divisions of cavalry entering the line supported -and connected the two attacks. The action -was brisk at both points, but D’Armagnac pushing -his feint too far became seriously engaged, and was -beaten by Da Costa and Ashworth’s Portuguese -aided by a part of the twenty-eighth British regiment. -Nor were the French at first more successful on the -other flank, being repeatedly repulsed, until Abbé, -turning that wing gained the summit of the mountain -and rendered the position untenable. General -Hill who had lost about four hundred men then -retired to the heights of Equaros behind Arestegui -and Berasin, thus drawing towards Marcalain with -his right and throwing back his left. Here being -joined by Campbell and Morillo he again offered -battle, but Soult whose principal loss was in D’Armagnac’s -division had now gained his main object; -he had turned Hill’s left, secured a fresh line of -retreat, a shorter communication with Villatte by -the pass of Donna Maria, and withal, the great -Irurzun road to Toloza distant only one league and -a half was in his power. His first thought was to<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official despatch, MS.</span> -seize it and march through Lecumberri either upon -Toloza, or Andoain and Ernani. There was nothing -to oppose except the light division whose movements -shall be noticed hereafter, but neither the -French marshal nor general Hill knew of its presence, -and the former thought himself strong -enough to force his way to San Sebastian and there -unite with Villatte, and his artillery which following -his previous orders was now on the Lower -Bidassoa.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146"></a>[146]</span></p> - -<p>This project was feasible. Lamartiniere’s division, -of Reille’s wing, coming from Lanz, was not -far off. Clauzel’s three divisions were momentarily -expected, and Reille’s during the night. On the -31st therefore, Soult with at least fifty thousand -men would have broken into Guipuscoa, thrusting -aside the light division in his march, and menacing -sir Thomas Graham’s position in reverse while -Villatte’s reserve attacked it in front. The country -about Lecumberri was however very strong for defence -and lord Wellington would have followed, -yet scarcely in time, for he did not suspect his -views and was ignorant of his strength, thinking -D’Erlon’s force, to be originally two divisions of -infantry and now only reinforced with a third division, -whereas that general had three divisions -originally and was now reinforced by a fourth -division of infantry and two of cavalry. This error -however did not prevent him from seizing with the -rapidity of a great commander, the decisive point -of operation, and giving a counter-stroke which -Soult trusting to the strength of Reille’s position -little expected.</p> - -<p>When Wellington saw that La Martiniere’s divisions -and the cavalry had abandoned the mountains -above Elcano, and that Zabaldica was evacuated, -he ordered Picton, reinforced with two squadrons -of cavalry and a battery of artillery, to enter the -valley of Zubiri and turn the French left; the -seventh division was directed to sweep over the hills -beyond the Lanz river upon the French right; the -march of Campbell and Morillo insured the communication -with Hill; and that general was to -point his columns upon Olague and Lanz threatening -the French rear, but meeting as we have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147"></a>[147]</span> -seen with D’Erlon was forced back to Eguaros. -The fourth division was to assail Foy’s position, -but respecting its great strength the attack was to -be measured according to the effect produced on -the flanks. Meanwhile Byng’s brigade and the -sixth division, the latter having a battery of guns -and some squadrons of cavalry, were combined to -assault Sauroren. La Bispal’s Spaniards followed -the sixth division. Fane’s horsemen were stationed -at Berioplano with a detachment pushed to Irurzun, -the heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte, and -Carlos D’España maintained the blockade.</p> - -<p><em>Second battle of Sauroren.</em>—These movements -began at daylight. Picton’s advance was rapid. -He gained the valley of Zubiri and threw his skirmishers -at once on Foy’s flank, and about the same -time general Inglis, one of those veterans who -purchase every step of promotion with their blood, -advancing with only five hundred men of the seventh -division, broke at one shock the two French regiments -covering Clauzel’s right, and drove them -down into the valley of Lanz. He lost indeed one-third -of his own men, but instantly spreading the -remainder in skirmishing order along the descent, -opened a biting fire upon the flank of Conroux’s -division, which was then moving up the valley -from Sauroren, sorely amazed and disordered by -this sudden fall of two regiments from the top of -the mountain into the midst of the column.</p> - -<p>Foy’s division, marching to support Conroux and -Maucune, was on the crest of the mountains between -Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of -attack, but too far off to give aid, and his own light -troops were engaged with the skirmishers of the -fourth division; and Inglis had been so sudden and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148"></a>[148]</span> -vigorous, that before the evil could be well perceived -it was past remedy. For Wellington instantly -pushed the sixth division, now commanded -by general Pakenham Pack having been wounded -on the 28th, to the left of Sauroren, and shoved -Byng’s brigade headlong down from the chapel -height against that village, which was defended by -Maucune’s division. Byng’s vigorous assault was -simultaneously enforced from the opposite direction -by Madden’s Portuguese of the sixth division, and -at the same time the battery near the chapel sent -its bullets crashing through the houses, and booming -up the valley towards Conroux’s column, which -Inglis never ceased to vex and he was closely supported -by the remainder of the seventh division.</p> - -<p>The village and bridge of Sauroren and the -straits beyond were now covered with a pall of -smoke, the musquetry pealed frequent and loud, and -the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to -mountain filled all the valley. Byng with hard -fighting carried the village of Sauroren, and fourteen -hundred prisoners were made, for the two -French divisions thus vehemently assailed in the -front and flank were entirely broken. Part retreated -along the valley towards Clauzel’s other divisions -which were now beyond Ostiz; part fled up the -mountain side to seek a refuge with Foy, who had -remained on the summit a helpless spectator of this -rout; but though he rallied the fugitives in great -numbers, he had soon to look to himself, for by this -time his skirmishers had been driven up the mountain -by those of the fourth division, and his left was -infested by Picton’s detachments. Thus pressed, -he abandoned his strong position, and fell back -along the summit of the mountain between the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149"></a>[149]</span> -valley of Zubiri and valley of Lanz, and the woods -enabled him to effect his retreat without much loss; -but he dared not descend into either valley, and thinking -himself entirely cut off, sent advice of his situation -to Soult and then retired into the Alduides by -the pass of Urtiaga. Meanwhile Wellington pressing -up the valley of Lanz drove Clauzel as far as -Olague, and the latter now joined by La Martiniere’s -division took a position in the evening covering -the roads of Lanz and Lizasso. The English -general whose pursuit had been damped by hearing -of Hill’s action also halted near Ostiz.</p> - -<p>The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed and -wounded, or taken, in the two battles of this day, -and of these nearly twelve hundred were Portuguese, -the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt of -both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous. -Conroux’s and Maucune’s divisions were -completely disorganized; Foy with eight thousand -men, including the fugitives he had rallied, was -entirely separated from the main body; two thousand -men at the lowest computation had been -killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the -woods and ravines, and three thousand prisoners were -taken. This blow joined to former losses reduced -Soult’s fighting men to thirty-five thousand, of -which the fifteen thousand under Clauzel and Reille -were dispirited by defeat, and the whole were -placed in a most critical situation. Hill’s force now -increased to fifteen thousand men by the junction -of Morillo and Campbell was in front, and -thirty thousand were on the rear in the valley of -Lanz, or on the hills at each side; for the third division -finding no more enemies in the valley of Zubiri,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150"></a>[150]</span> -had crowned the heights in conjunction with the -fourth division.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington had detached some of La Bispal’s -Spaniards to Marcalain when he heard of Hill’s -action, but he was not yet aware of the true state of -affairs on that side. His operations were founded -upon the notion that Soult was in retreat towards -the Bastan. He designed to follow closely pushing -his own left forward to support sir Thomas Graham -on the Bidassoa, but always underrating D’Erlon’s -troops he thought La Martiniere’s division had retreated -by the Roncesvalles road; and as Foy’s -column was numerous and two divisions had been -broken at Sauroren, he judged the force immediately -under Soult to be weak and made dispositions accordingly. -The sixth division and the thirteenth -light dragoons were to march by Eugui to join the -third division, which was directed upon Linzoain and -Roncesvalles. The fourth division was to descend -into the valley of Lanz. General Hill, supported -by the Spaniards at Marcalain, was to press Soult -closely, always turning his right but directing his -own march upon Lanz, from whence he was to -send Campbell’s brigade to the Alduides. The -seventh division which had halted on the ridges -between Hill and Wellington, was to suffer the -former to cross its front and then march for the -pass of Doña Maria.</p> - -<p>It appears from these arrangements, that Wellington -expecting Soult would rejoin Clauzel and make -for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate, intended to -confine and press him closely in that district. But -the French marshal was in a worse position than his -adversary imagined, being too far advanced towards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151"></a>[151]</span> -Buenza to return to Lanz; in fine he was between -two fires and without a retreat save by the pass of -Doña Maria upon San Estevan. Wherefore calling -in Clauzel, and giving D’Erlon whose divisions, -hitherto successful were in good order and undismayed, -the rear-guard, he commenced his march -soon after midnight towards the pass. But mischief -was thickening around him.</p> - -<p>Sir Thomas Graham having only the blockade -of San Sebastian to maintain was at the head of -twenty thousand men, ready to make a forward -movement, and there remained besides the light -division under Charles Alten of whose operations -it is time to speak. That general, as we have seen, -took post on the mountain of Santa Cruz the 27th. -From thence on the evening of the 28th he marched -to gain Lecumberri on the great road of Irurzun; but -whether by orders from sir Thomas Graham or in -default of orders, the difficulty of communication -being extreme in those wild regions, I know not, -he commenced his descent into the valley of Lerins -very late. His leading brigade, getting down -with some difficulty, reached Leyza beyond the -great chain by the pass of Goriti or Zubieta, but -darkness caught the other brigade and the troops -dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and -precipices. Many made faggot torches waving -them as signals, and thus moving about, the lights -served indeed to assist those who carried them but -misled and bewildered others who saw them at a -distance. The heights and the ravines were alike -studded with these small fires, and the soldiers -calling to each other for directions filled the whole -region with their clamour. Thus they continued to -rove and shout until morning shewed the face of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152"></a>[152]</span> -mountain covered with tired and scattered men and -animals who had not gained half a league of ground -beyond their starting place, and it was many hours, -ere they could be collected to join the other brigade -at Leyza.</p> - -<p>General Alten, who had now been separated for -three days from the army, sent mounted officers in -various directions to obtain tidings, and at six -o’clock in the evening renewed his march. At -Areysa he halted for some time without suffering -fires to be lighted, for he knew nothing of the -enemy and was fearful of discovering his situation, -but at night he again moved and finally established -his bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th. -The noise of Hill’s battle at Buenza was clearly -heard in the course of the day, and the light division -was thus again comprized in the immediate -system of operations directed by Wellington in -person. Had Soult continued his march upon Guipuscoa -Alten would have been in great danger, but -the French general being forced to retreat, the light -division was a new power thrown into his opponent’s -hands, the value of which will be seen by a -reference to the peculiarity of the country through -which the French general was now to move.</p> - -<p>It has been shewn that Foy cut off from the main -army was driven towards the Alduides; that the -French artillery and part of the cavalry were again -on the Bidassoa, whence Villatte, contrary to the -intelligence received by Soult, had not advanced, -though he had skirmished with Longa, leaving the latter -however in possession of heights above Lesaca. -The troops under Soult’s immediate command were -therefore completely isolated, and had no resources -save what his ability and their own courage could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153"></a>[153]</span> -supply. His single line of retreat by the pass of -Doña Maria was secure as far as San Estevan, and -from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to -Elizondo and so gain France by the Col de Maya, -or down the same river towards Vera by Sumbilla -and Yanzi, from both of which places roads branching -off to the right lead over the mountains to the -passes of Echallar. There was also a third mountain-road -leading direct from Estevan to Zagaramurdi -and Urdax, but it was too steep and rugged -for his wounded men and baggage.</p> - -<p>The road to Elizondo was very good, but that -down the Bidassoa was a long and terrible defile, -and so contracted about the bridges of Yanzi and -Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast. -This then Soult had to dread; that Wellington -who by the pass of Vellate could reach Elizondo -before him would block his passage on that side; -that Graham would occupy the rocks about Yanzi, -blocking the passage there and by detachments -cut off his line of march upon Echallar. Then, -confined to the narrow mountain-way from San -Estevan to Zagaramurdi, he would be followed hard -by general Hill, exposed to attacks in rear and -flank during his march, and perhaps be headed at -Urdax by the allied troops moving through Vellate -Elizondo and the Col de Maya. In this state, -his first object being to get through the pass of Doña -Maria, he commenced his retreat as we have seen -in the night of the 30th, and Wellington still deceived -as to the real state of affairs did not take the -most fitting measures to stop his march, that is to -say, he continued in his first design, halting in the -valley of Lanz while Hill passed his front to enter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154"></a>[154]</span> -the Bastan, into which district he sent Byng’s -brigade as belonging to the second division. But -early on the 31st, when Soult’s real strength became -known, he directed the seventh division to aid Hill, -followed Byng through the pass of Vellate with the -remainder of his forces, and thinking the light division -might be at Zubieta in the valley of Lerins, -sent Alten orders to head the French if possible at San -Estevan, or at Sumbilla, in fine to cut in upon their -line of march somewhere; Longa also was ordered -to come down to the defiles at Yanzi, thus aiding -the light division to block the way on that side, and -sir Thomas Graham was advertised to hold his army -in readiness to move in the same view, and it would -appear that the route of the sixth and third divisions -were also changed for a time.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of Doña Maria.</em>—At ten o’clock in the -morning of the 31st, general Hill overtook Soult’s -rear-guard between Lizasso and the Puerto. The -seventh division, coming from the hills above Olague, -was already ascending the mountain on his right, -and the French only gained a wood on the summit -of the pass under the fire of Hill’s guns. There, -however, they turned and throwing out their skirmishers -made strong battle. General Stewart, -leading the attack of the second division, now for -the third time engaged with D’Erlon’s troops, was -again wounded and his first brigade was repulsed, -but general Pringle who succeeded to the command, -renewed the attack with the second brigade, and the -thirty-fourth regiment leading, broke the enemy at -the moment that the seventh division did the same on -the right. Some prisoners were taken, but a thick -fog prevented further pursuit, and the loss of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155"></a>[155]</span> -French in the action is unknown, probably less than -that of the allies which was something short of four -hundred men.</p> - -<p>The seventh division remained on the mountain, -but Hill fell back to Lizasso, and then, following -his orders, moved by a short but rugged way, leading -between the passes of Doña Maria and Vellate over -the great chain to Almandoz, to join Wellington, -who had during the combat descended into the -Bastan by the pass of Vellate. Meanwhile Byng -reached Elizondo, and captured a large convoy of -provisions and ammunition left there under guard -of a battalion by D’Erlon on the 29th; he made -several hundred prisoners also after a sharp skirmish -and then pushed forward to the pass of Maya. -Wellington now occupied the hills through which -the road leads from Elizondo to San Estevan, and -full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow; for -Soult, not being pursued after passing Doña Maria, -had halted in San Estevan, although by his scouts -he knew that the convoy had been taken at Elizondo. -He was in a deep narrow valley, and three -British divisions with one of Spaniards were behind -the mountains overlooking the town; the seventh -division was on the mountain of Doña Maria; the -light division and sir Thomas Graham’s Spaniards -were marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits -from the valley; Byng was already at Maya, and -Hill was moving by Almandoz just behind Wellington’s -own position. A few hours gained and -the French must surrender or disperse. Wellington -gave strict orders to prevent the lighting of fires -the straggling of soldiers or any other indication of -the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156"></a>[156]</span> -some rocks at a commanding point from whence he -could observe every movement of the enemy. Soult -seemed tranquil, and four of his “<i lang="fr">gensd’armes</i>” -were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. -Some of the staff proposed to cut them off; the -English general whose object was to hide his own<span class="sidenote">Notes by the duke of Wellington, MSS.</span> -presence, would not suffer it, but the next moment -three marauding English soldiers entered the valley -and were instantly carried off by the horsemen. -Half an hour afterwards the French drums beat to -arms and their columns began to move out of San -Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience -of three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name -of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander of -the most splendid success, and saved another from -the most terrible disaster.</p> - -<p>The captives walked from their prison but their -chains hung upon them. The way was narrow, the -multitude great, and the baggage, and wounded -men borne on their comrades’ shoulders, filed with -such long procession, that Clauzel’s divisions forming -the rear-guard were still about San Estevan on -the morning of the 1st of August, and scarcely had -they marched a league of ground, when the skirmishers -of the fourth division and the Spaniards -thronging along the heights on the right flank -opened a fire to which little reply could be made. -The troops and baggage then got mixed with an -extreme disorder, numbers of the former fled up the -hills, and the commanding energy of Soult whose -personal exertions were conspicuous could scarcely -prevent a general dispersion. However prisoners -and baggage fell at every step into the hands of the -pursuers, the boldest were dismayed at the peril,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157"></a>[157]</span> -and worse would have awaited them in front, if -Wellington had been on other points well seconded -by his subordinate generals.</p> - -<p>The head of the French column instead of taking -the first road leading from Sumbilla to Echallar, -had passed onward towards that leading from the -bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere -cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa -was on their left, and there was a tributary torrent -to cross, the bridge of which was defended by a -battalion of Spanish Caçadores detached to that -point from the heights of Vera by general Barceñas. -The front was now as much disordered as the rear, -and had Longa or Barceñas reinforced the Caçadores, -those only of the French who being near -Sumbilla could take the road from that place to -Echallar would have escaped; but the Spanish -generals kept aloof and D’Erlon won the defile. -However Reille’s divisions were still to pass, and -when they came up a new enemy had appeared.</p> - -<p>It will be remembered that the light division was<span class="sidenote7">August.</span> -directed to head the French army at San Estevan, -or Sumbilla. This order was received on the evening -of the 31st, and the division, repassing the -defiles of the Zubieta, descended the deep valley -of Lerins and reached Elgoriaga about mid-day on -the 1st of August, having then marched twenty-four -miles and being little more than a league -from Estevan and about the same distance from -Sumbilla. The movement of the French along the -Bidassoa was soon discovered, but the division instead -of moving on Sumbilla turned to the left, -clambered up the great mountain of Santa Cruz -and made for the bridge of Yanzi. The weather -was exceedingly sultry, the mountain steep and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158"></a>[158]</span> -hard to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed -and frothing at the mouth, while others -whose spirit and strength had never before been -quelled, leaned on their muskets and muttered in -sullen tones that they yielded for the first time.</p> - -<p>Towards evening, after marching for nineteen -consecutive hours over forty miles of mountain -roads, the head of the exhausted column reached -the edge of a precipice near the bridge of Yanzi. -Below, within pistol-shot, Reille’s divisions were -seen hurrying forward along the horrid defile in -which they were pent up, and a fire of musketry -commenced, slightly from the British on the high -rock, more vigorously from some low ground near -the bridge of Yanzi, where the riflemen had ensconced -themselves in the brushwood. The scene -which followed is thus described by an eye-witness.</p> - -<p>“We overlooked the enemy at stone’s throw, and<span class="sidenote">Captain Cooke’s Memoirs.</span> -from the summit of a tremendous precipice. The -river separated us, but the French were wedged in -a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side -and the river on the other. Confusion impossible -to describe followed, the wounded were thrown -down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry -drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up -the pass of Echallar, but the infantry beat them -back, and several, horses and all, were precipitated -into the river; some fired vertically at us, the -wounded called out for quarter, while others pointed -to them, supported as they were on branches of -trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted -with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different -habitations to aid the sufferers.”</p> - -<p>On these miserable supplicants brave men could -not fire, and so piteous was the spectacle that it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159"></a>[159]</span> -was with averted or doubtful aim they shot at the -others, although the latter rapidly plied their muskets -in passing, and some in their veteran hardihood -even dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to make -a counter-attack. It was a soldier-like but a vain -effort! the night found the British in possession of -the bridge, and though the great body of the enemy -escaped by the road to Echallar, the baggage was -cut off and fell, together with many prisoners, into -the hands of the light troops which were still hanging -on the rear in pursuit from San Estevan.</p> - -<p>The loss of the French this day was very great, -that of the allies about a hundred men, of which -sixty-five were British, principally of the fourth -division. Nevertheless lord Wellington was justly -discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor -general Alten had fulfilled their mission. The -former excused himself as being too feeble to oppose -the mass Soult led down the valley; but the -rocks were so precipitous that the French could not -have reached him, and the resistance made by the -Spanish caçadores was Longa’s condemnation. A -lamentable fatuity prevailed in many quarters. If -Barceñas had sent his whole brigade instead of a -weak battalion, the small torrent could not have -been forced by D’Erlon; and if Longa had been -near the bridge of Yanzi the French must have -surrendered, for the perpendicular rocks on their -right forbade even an escape by dispersion. Finally -if the light division instead of marching down the -valley of Lerins as far as Elgoriaga, had crossed -the Santa Cruz mountain by the road used the -night of the 28th, it would have arrived much earlier -at the bridge of Yanzi, and then belike Longa -and Barceñas would also have come down. Alten’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160"></a>[160]</span> -instructions indeed prescribed Sumbilla and San -Estevan as the first points to head the French army, -but judging them too strong at Sumbilla he marched -as we have seen upon Yanzi; and if he had passed -the bridge there and seized the road to Echallar -with one brigade, while the other plied the flank -with fire from the left of the Bidassoa, he would -have struck a great blow. It was for that the soldiers -had made such a prodigious exertion, yet the -prize was thrown away.</p> - -<p>During the night Soult rallied his divisions about -Echallar, and on the morning of the 2d occupied -the “<i>Puerto</i>” of that name. His left was placed -at the rocks of Zagaramurdi; his right at the rock -of Ivantelly communicating with the left of Villatte’s -reserve, which was in position on the ridges -between Soult’s right and the head of the great -Rhune mountain. Meanwhile Clauzel’s three divisions, -now reduced to six thousand men, took post -on a strong hill between the “<i>Puerto</i>” and town -of Echallar. This position was momentarily adopted -by Soult to save time, to examine the country, and -to make Wellington discover his final object, but -that general would not suffer the affront. He had -sent the third and sixth divisions to reoccupy the -passes of Roncesvalles and the Alduides; Hill had -reached the Col de Maya, and Byng was at Urdax; -the fourth, seventh, and light divisions remained in -hand, and with these he resolved to fall upon -Clauzel whose position was dangerously advanced.</p> - -<p><i>Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly.</i>—The light -division held the road running from the bridge of -Yanzi to Echallar until relieved by the fourth division, -and then marched by Lesaca to Santa -Barbara, thus turning Clauzel’s right. The fourth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161"></a>[161]</span> -division marched from Yanzi upon Echallar to -attack his front, and the seventh moved from Sumbilla -against his left; but Barnes’s brigade, contrary -to lord Wellington’s intention, arrived unsupported -before the fourth and light divisions were either -seen or felt, and without awaiting the arrival of -more troops assailed Clauzel’s strong position. The -fire became vehement, but neither the steepness of -the mountain nor the overshadowing multitude of -the enemy clustering above in support of their skirmishers -could arrest the assailants, and then was -seen the astonishing spectacle of fifteen hundred -men driving, by sheer valour and force of arms, six -thousand good troops from a position, so rugged -that there would have been little to boast of if the -numbers had been reversed and the defence made -good. It is true that the fourth division arrived -towards the end of the action, that the French had -fulfilled their mission as a rear-guard, that they -were worn with fatigue and ill-provided with ammunition, -having exhausted all their reserve stores -during the retreat, but the real cause of their inferiority -belongs to the highest part of war.</p> - -<p>The British soldiers, their natural fierceness stimulated -by the remarkable personal daring of their -general, Barnes, were excited by the pride of success; -and the French divisions were those which -had failed in the attack on the 28th, which had -been utterly defeated on the 30th, and which had -suffered so severely the day before about Sumbilla. -Such then is the preponderance of moral power. -The men who had assailed the terrible rocks above -Sauroren, with a force and energy that all the -valour of the hardiest British veterans scarcely -sufficed to repel, were now, only five days afterwards,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162"></a>[162]</span> -although posted so strongly, unable to sustain -the shock of one-fourth of their own numbers. -And at this very time eighty British soldiers, the -comrades and equals of those who achieved this -wonderful exploit, having wandered to plunder -surrendered to some French peasants, who lord -Wellington truly observed, “<i>they would under -other circumstances have eat up!</i>” What gross -ignorance of human nature then do those writers -display who assert, that the employing of brute -force is the highest qualification of a general!</p> - -<p>Clauzel, thus dispossessed of the mountain, fell -back fighting to a strong ridge beyond the pass of -Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly -mountain which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile -the light division emerging by Lesaca from -the narrow valley of the Bidassoa, ascended the -broad heights of Santa Barbara without opposition, -and halted there until the operations of the fourth -and seventh divisions were far enough advanced to -render it advisable to attack the Ivantelly. This -lofty mountain lifted its head on the right, rising as -it were out of the Santa Barbara heights, and separating -them from the ridges through which the -French troops beaten at Echallar were now retiring. -Evening was coming on, a thick mist -capped the crowning rocks which contained a -strong French regiment, the British soldiers besides -their long and terrible march the previous -day had been for two days without sustenance, and -were leaning, weak and fainting, on their arms, -when the advancing fire of Barnes’s action about -Echallar indicated the necessity of dislodging the -enemy from Ivantelly. Colonel Andrew Barnard -instantly led five companies of his riflemen to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163"></a>[163]</span> -attack, and four companies of the forty-third followed -in support. The misty cloud had descended, -and the riflemen were soon lost to the view, but the -sharp clang of their weapons heard in distinct reply -to the more sonorous rolling musketry of the -French, told what work was going on. For some -time the echoes rendered it doubtful how the action -went, but the following companies of the forty-third -could find no trace of an enemy save the killed and -wounded. Barnard had fought his way unaided -and without a check to the summit, where his dark-clothed -swarthy veterans raised their victorious -shout from the highest peak, just as the coming night -shewed the long ridges of the mountains beyond -sparkling with the last musket-flashes from Clauzel’s -troops retiring in disorder from Echallar.</p> - -<p>This day’s fighting cost the British four hundred -men, and lord Wellington narrowly escaped the -enemy’s hands. He had carried with him towards -Echallar half a company of the forty-third as an escort, -and placed a serjeant named Blood with a party -to watch in front while he examined his maps. The -French who were close at hand sent a detachment -to cut the party off; and such was the nature of the -ground that their troops, rushing on at speed, would -infallibly have fallen unawares upon lord Wellington, -if Blood a young intelligent man, seeing -the danger, had not with surprising activity, leaping -rather than running down the precipitous rocks -he was posted on, given the general notice, and as -it was the French arrived in time to send a volley -of shot after him as he galloped away.</p> - -<p>Soult now caused count D’Erlon to re-occupy -the hills about Ainhoa, Clauzel to take post on -the heights in advance of Sarre, and Reille to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164"></a>[164]</span> -carry his two divisions to St. Jean de Luz in -second line behind Villatte’s reserve. Foy, who -had rashly uncovered St. Jean Pied de Port by -descending upon Cambo, was ordered to return -and reinforce his troops with all that he could -collect of national guards and detachments.</p> - -<p>Wellington had on the 1st directed general -Graham to collect his forces and bring up pontoons -for crossing the Bidassoa, but he finally abandoned -this design, and the two armies therefore -rested quiet in their respective positions, after nine -days of continual movement during which they had -fought ten serious actions. Of the allies, including -the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred officers -and soldiers had been killed wounded or taken, -and many were dispersed from fatigue or to -plunder. On the French side the loss was terrible -and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate. -Nevertheless a close approximation may -be made. Lord Wellington at first called it twelve -thousand, but hearing that the French officers admitted -more he raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. -The engineer, <i>Belmas</i>, in his Journals of -Sieges, compiled from official documents by order -of the French government, sets down above thirteen -thousand. Soult in his dispatches at the time, -stated fifteen hundred as the loss at Maya, four -hundred at Roncesvalles, two hundred on the -27th, and eighteen hundred on the 28th, after -which he speaks no more of losses by battle. There -remains therefore to be added the killed and -wounded at the combats of Linzoain on the 26th, -the double battles of Sauroren and Buenza on the -30th, the combats of the 31st, and those of the 1st -and 2d of August; finally, four thousand unwounded<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165"></a>[165]</span> -prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to -sound the stream of blood in all its horrid depths.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. The allies’ line of defence was weak. Was -it therefore injudiciously adopted?</p> - -<p>The French beaten at Vittoria were disorganized -and retreated without artillery or baggage on -excentric lines; Foy by Guipuscoa, Clauzel by -Zaragoza, Reille by San Estevan, the King by -Pampeluna. There was no reserve to rally upon, -the people fled from the frontier, Bayonne and -St. Jean Pied de Port if not defenceless were certainly -in a very neglected state, and the English -general might have undertaken any operation, -assumed any position, offensive or defensive, which -seemed good to him. Why then did he not establish -the Anglo-Portuguese beyond the mountains, leaving -the Spaniards to blockade the fortresses behind -him? The answer to this question involves the -difference between the practice and the theory of -war.</p> - -<p>“<i>The soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Dispatches.</span> -themselves after the battle dispersed in the night -to plunder, and were so fatigued that when the rain -came on the next day they were incapable of marching -and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy. -Eighteen days after the victory twelve thousand five -hundred men, chiefly British, were absent, most of -them marauding in the mountains.</i>”</p> - -<p>Such were the reasons assigned by the English -general for his slack pursuit after the battle of -Vittoria, yet he had commanded that army for six<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166"></a>[166]</span> -years! Was he then deficient in the first qualification -of a general, the art of disciplining and -inspiring troops, or was the English military system -defective? It is certain that he always exacted the -confidence of his soldiers as a leader. It is not so -certain that he ever gained their affections. The -barbarity of the English military code excited public -horror, the inequality of promotion created public -discontent; yet the general complained he had no -adequate power to reward or punish, and he condemned -alike the system and the soldiers it produced. -The latter “<i>were detestable for every thing -but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the men</i>.” -The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent -with his celebrated observation, subsequently made, -namely, “that he thought he could go any where -and do any thing with the army that fought on the -Pyrenees,” and although it cannot be denied that -his complaints were generally too well-founded, -there were thousands of true and noble soldiers, -and zealous worthy officers, who served their country -honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough -that they have been since neglected, exactly in -proportion to their want of that corrupt aristocratic -influence which produced the evils complained of.</p> - -<p>2º. When the misconduct of the troops had thus -weakened the effect of victory, the question of -following Joseph at once into France assumed a -new aspect. Wellington’s system of warfare had -never varied after the battle of Talavera. Rejecting -dangerous enterprize, it rested on profound calculation -both as to time and resources for the accomplishment -of a particular object, namely, the -gradual liberation of Spain by the Anglo-Portuguese -army. Not that he held it impossible to attain that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167"></a>[167]</span> -object suddenly, and his battles in India, the passage -of the Douro, the advance to Talavera, prove -that by nature he was inclined to daring operations; -but such efforts, however glorious, could not be -adopted by a commander who feared even the loss -of a brigade lest the government he served should -put an end to the war. Neither was it suitable to -the state of his relations with the Portuguese and -Spaniards; their ignorance jealousy and passionate -pride, fierce in proportion to their weakness and -improvidence, would have enhanced every danger.</p> - -<p>No man could have anticipated the extraordinary -errors of the French in 1813. Wellington did not -expect to cross the Ebro before the end of the -campaign, and his battering train was prepared for -the siege of Burgos not for that of Bayonne. A -sudden invasion of France her military reputation -considered, was therefore quite out of the pale of -his methodized system of warfare, which was -founded upon political as well as military considerations; -and of the most complicated nature, seeing -that he had at all times to deal with the personal -and factious interests and passions, as well as the -great state interests of three distinct nations two -of which abhorred each other. At this moment -also, the uncertain state of affairs in Germany -strongly influenced his views. An armistice which -might end in a separate peace excluding England, -would have brought Napoleon’s whole force to the -Pyrenees, and Wellington held cheap both the -military and political proceedings of the coalesced -powers. “<i>I would not move a corporal’s guard in -reliance upon such a system</i>,” was the significant -phrase he employed to express his contempt.</p> - -<p>These considerations justified his caution as to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168"></a>[168]</span> -invading France, but there were local military -reasons equally cogent. 1º. He could not dispense -with a secure harbour, because the fortresses still -in possession of the French, namely, Santona, Pancorbo, -Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, interrupted -his communications with the interior of Spain; -hence the siege of the latter place. 2º. He had to -guard against the union of Suchet and Clauzel on -his right flank; hence his efforts to cut off the last-named -general; hence also the blockade of Pampeluna -in preference to siege and the launching of -Mina and the bands on the side of Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>3º. After Vittoria the nature of the campaign -depended upon Suchet’s operations, which were -rendered more important by Murray’s misconduct. -The allied force on the eastern coast was badly -organized, it did not advance from Valencia as we -have seen until the 16th, and then only partially -and by the coast, whereas Suchet had assembled -more than twenty thousand excellent troops on the -Ebro as early as the 12th of July; and had he -continued his march upon Zaragoza he would have -saved the castle of that place with its stores. Then -rallying Paris’ division, he could have menaced -Wellington’s flank with twenty-five thousand men -exclusive of Clauzel’s force, and if that general -joined him with forty thousand.</p> - -<p>On the 16th, the day lord William Bentinck -quitted Valencia, Suchet might have marched from -Zaragoza on Tudela or Sanguessa, and Soult’s preparations -originally made as we have seen to attack -on the 23d instead of the 25th, would have naturally -been hastened. How difficult it would then -have been for the allies to maintain themselves -beyond the Ebro is evident, much more so to hold<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169"></a>[169]</span> -a forward position in France. That Wellington -feared an operation of this nature is clear from his -instructions to lord William Bentinck and to Mina; -and because Picton’s and Cole’s divisions instead -of occupying the passes were kept behind the -mountains solely to watch Clauzel; when the latter -had regained the frontier of France Cole was permitted -to join Byng and Morillo. It follows that -the operations after the battle of Vittoria were well -considered and consonant to lord Wellington’s -general system. Their wisdom would have been -proved if Suchet had seized the advantages within -his reach.</p> - -<p>4º. A general’s capacity is sometimes more taxed -to profit from a victory than to gain one. Wellington, -master of all Spain, Catalonia excepted, desired -to establish himself solidly in the Pyrenees, lest a -separate peace in Germany should enable Napoleon -to turn his whole force against the allies. In this -expectation, with astonishing exertion of body and -mind, he had in three days achieved a rigorous -examination of the whole mass of the Western -Pyrenees, and concluded that if Pampeluna and -San Sebastian fell, a defensive position as strong as -that of Portugal, and a much stronger one than -could be found behind the Ebro, might be established. -But to invest those places and maintain so difficult -a covering line was a greater task than to win the -battle of Vittoria. However, the early fall of San -Sebastian he expected, because the errors of execution -in that siege could not be foreseen, and also -for gain of time he counted upon the disorganized -state of the French army, upon Joseph’s want of -military capacity, and upon the moral ascendancy -which his own troops had acquired over the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170"></a>[170]</span> -by their victories. He could not anticipate the -expeditious journey, the sudden arrival of Soult, -whose rapid reorganization of the French army, -and whose vigorous operations contrasted with -Joseph’s abandonment of Spain, illustrated the old -Greek saying, that a herd of deer led by a lion are -more dangerous than a herd of lions led by a deer.</p> - -<p>5º. The duke of Dalmatia was little beholden to -fortune at the commencement of his movements. -Her first contradiction was the bad weather, which -breaking up the roads delayed the concentration of -his army at St. Jean Pied de Port for two days; -all officers know the effect which heavy rain and -hard marches have upon the vigour and confidence -of soldiers who are going to attack. If Soult had -commenced on the 23d instead of the 25th the surprise -would have been more complete his army more -brisk; and as no conscript battalions would have -arrived to delay Reille, that general would probably -have been more ready in his attack, and might possibly -have escaped the fog which on the 26th stopped -his march along the superior crest of the mountain -towards Vellate. On the other hand the allies would -have been spared the unsuccessful assault on San -Sebastian, and the pass of Maya might have been -better furnished with troops. However Soult’s combinations -were so well knit that more than one error -in execution, and more than one accident of fortune, -were necessary to baffle him. Had count D’Erlon -followed his instructions even on the 26th general -Hill would probably have been shouldered off the -valley of Lanz, and Soult would have had twenty -thousand additional troops in the combats of the -27th and 28th. Such failures however generally -attend extensively combined movements, and it is by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171"></a>[171]</span> -no means certain that the count would have been -able to carry the position of the Col de Maya on the -25th, if all general Stewart’s forces had been posted -there. It would therefore perhaps have been more -strictly within the rules of art, if D’Erlon had been -directed to leave one of his three divisions to menace -the Col de Maya while he marched with the other -two by St. Etienne de Baygorry up the Alduides. -This movement, covered by the national guards who -occupied the mountain of La Houssa, could not -have been stopped by Campbell’s Portuguese brigade, -and would have dislodged Hill from the Bastan -while it secured the junction of D’Erlon with Soult -on the crest of the superior chain.</p> - -<p>6º. The intrepid constancy with which Byng and -Ross defended their several positions on the 25th, -the able and clean retreat made by general Cole as -far as the heights of Linzoain, gave full effect to the -errors of Reille and D’Erlon, and would probably -have baffled Soult at an early period if general -Picton had truly comprehended the importance of -his position. Lord Wellington says that the concentration -of the army would have been effected on -the 27th if that officer and general Cole had not -agreed in thinking it impossible to make a stand -behind Linzoain; and surely the necessity of retreating -on that day may be questioned. For if Cole with -ten thousand men maintained the position in front -of Altobiscar, Ibañeta, and Atalosti, Picton might -have maintained the more contracted one behind -Linzoain and Erro with twenty thousand. And that -number he could have assembled, because Campbell’s -Portuguese reached Eugui long before the evening -of the 26th, and lord Wellington had directed -O’Donnel to keep three thousand five hundred of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172"></a>[172]</span> -the blockading troops in readiness to act in advance, -of which Picton could not have been ignorant. It -was impossible to turn him by the valley of Urroz -that line being too rugged for the march of an army -and not leading directly upon Pampeluna. The -only roads into the Val de Zubiri were by Erro -and Linzoain, lying close together and both -leading upon the village of Zubiri over the ridges -which Picton occupied, and the strength of which -was evident from Soult’s declining an attack on the -evening of the 26th when Cole only was before him. -To abandon this ground so hastily when the concentration -of the army depended upon keeping it, -appears therefore an error, aggravated by the neglect -of sending timely information to the commander-in-chief,<span class="sidenote">Original Note by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.</span> -for lord Wellington did not know of the retreat -until the morning of the 27th and then only from -general Long. It might be that Picton’s messenger -failed, but many should have been sent when a retrograde -movement involving the fate of Pampeluna -was contemplated.</p> - -<p>It has been said that general Cole was the adviser -of this retreat which if completed would have ruined -lord Wellington’s campaign. This is incorrect, -Picton was not a man to be guided by others. -General Cole indeed gave him a report, drawn up -by colonel Bell one of the ablest staff-officers of the -army, which stated that no position suitable for a<span class="sidenote">Note by General Cole, MSS.</span> -very inferior force existed between Zubiri and Pampeluna, -and this was true in the sense of the report, -which had reference only to a division not to an -army; moreover, although the actual battle of Sauroren -was fought by inferior numbers, the whole -position, including the ridges of the second line occupied -by Picton and the Spaniards, was only maintained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173"></a>[173]</span> -by equal numbers; and if Soult had made -the attack of the 28th on the evening of the 27th -before the sixth division arrived, the position would -have been carried. However there is no doubt that<span class="sidenote7">Ibid.</span> -colonel Bell’s report influenced Picton, and it was -only when his troops had reached Huarte and Villalba -that he suddenly resolved on battle. That was -a military resolution, vigorous and prompt; and not -the less worthy of praise that he so readily adopted -Cole’s saving proposition to regain the more forward -heights above Zabaldica.</p> - -<p>7º. Marshal Soult appeared unwilling to attack -on the evenings of the 26th and 27th. Yet success -depended upon forestalling the allies at their point -of concentration; and it is somewhat inexplicable -that on the 28th, having possession of the ridge -beyond the Lanz river and plenty of cavalry, he -should have known so little of the sixth division’s -movements. The general conception of his scheme -on the 30th has also been blamed by some of his -own countrymen, apparently from ignorance of the -facts and because it failed. Crowned with success -it would have been cited as a fine illustration of the -art of war. To have retired at once by the two -valleys of Zubiri and Lanz after being reinforced -with twenty thousand men would have given great -importance to his repulse on the 28th; his reputation -as a general capable of restoring the French -affairs would have vanished, and mischief only have -accrued, even though he should have effected his -retreat safely, which, regard being had to the narrowness -of the valleys the position of general Hill on -his right and the boldness of his adversary, was not -certain. To abandon the valley of Zubiri and secure -that of Lanz; to obtain another and shorter line of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174"></a>[174]</span> -retreat by the Doña Maria pass; to crush general -Hill with superior numbers, and thus gaining the -Irurzun road to succour San Sebastian, or failing of -that, to secure the union of the whole army and give -to his retreat the appearance of an able offensive -movement; to combine all these chances by one -operation immediately after a severe check was -Soult’s plan, it was not impracticable and was surely -the conception of a great commander.</p> - -<p>To succeed however it was essential either to beat -general Hill off-hand and thus draw Wellington to -that side by the way of Marcalain, or to secure the -defence of the French left in such a solid manner -that no efforts against it should prevail to the detriment -of the offensive movement on the right: neither -was effected. The French general indeed brought -an overwhelming force to bear upon Hill, and drove -him from the road of Irurzun, but he did not crush -him, because that general fought so strongly and -retired with such good order, that beyond the loss -of the position no injury was sustained. Meanwhile -the left wing of the French was completely beaten, -and thus the advantage gained on the right was -more than nullified. Soult trusted to the remarkable -defensive strength of the ground occupied by -his left, and he had reason to do so, for it was nearly -impregnable. Lord Wellington turned it on both -flanks at the same time, but neither Picton’s advance -into the valley of Zubiri on Foy’s left, nor Cole’s -front attack on that general, nor Byng’s assault -upon the village of Sauroren, would have seriously -damaged the French without the sudden and complete -success of general Inglis beyond the Lanz. -The other attacks would indeed have forced the -French to retire somewhat hastily up the valley of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175"></a>[175]</span> -the Lanz, yet they could have held together in mass -secure of their junction with Soult. But when the -ridges running between them and the right wing of -the French army were carried by Inglis, and the -whole of the seventh division was thrown upon their -flank and rear, the front attack became decisive. -It is clear therefore that the key of the defence was -on the ridge beyond the Lanz, and instead of two -regiments Clauzel should have placed two divisions -there.</p> - -<p>8º. Lord Wellington’s quick perception and vigorous -stroke on the 30th were to be expected from -such a consummate commander, yet he certainly -was not master of all the bearings of the French -general’s operations; he knew neither the extent of -Hill’s danger nor the difficulties of Soult, otherwise -it is probable that he would have put stronger -columns in motion, and at an earlier hour, towards -the pass of Doña Maria on the morning of the 31st. -Hill did not commence his march that day until -8 o’clock, and it has been shewn that even with the -help of the seventh division he was too weak against -the heavy mass of the retreating French army. The -faults and accidents which baffled Wellington’s after -operations have been sufficiently touched upon in -the narrative, but he halted in the midst of his victorious -career, when Soult’s army was broken and -flying, when Suchet had retired into Catalonia, and -all things seemed favourable for the invasion of -France.</p> - -<p>His motives for this were strong. He knew the -armistice in Germany had been renewed with a view -to peace, and he had therefore reason to expect -Soult would be reinforced. A forward position in -France would have lent his right to the enemy who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176"></a>[176]</span> -pivotted upon St. Jean Pied de Port could operate -against his flank. His arrangements for supply, -and intercourse with his depôts and hospitals, would -have been more difficult and complicated, and as -the enemy possessed all the French and Spanish -fortresses commanding the great roads, his need to -gain one, at least, before the season closed, was -absolute if he would not resign his communications -with the interior of Spain. Then long marches and -frequent combats had fatigued his troops destroyed -their shoes and used up their musquet ammunition; -and the loss of men had been great, especially of -British in the second division where their proportion -to foreign troops was become too small. The -difficulty of re-equipping the troops would have -been increased by entering an enemy’s state, because -the English system did not make war support war -and his communications would have been lengthened. -Finally it was France that was to be invaded, France -in which every person was a soldier, where the -whole population was armed and organised under -men, not as in other countries inexperienced in war -but who had all served more or less. Beyond the -Adour the army could not advance, and if a separate -peace was made by the northern powers, if any misfortune -befel the allies in Catalonia so as to leave -Suchet at liberty to operate towards Pampeluna, or -if Soult profiting from the possession of San Jean -Pied de Port should turn the right flank of the new -position, a retreat into Spain would become necessary, -and however short would be dangerous from -the hostility and warlike disposition of the people -directed in a military manner.</p> - -<p>These reasons joined to the fact, that a forward -position, although offering better communications<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177"></a>[177]</span> -from right to left, would have given the enemy -greater facilities for operating against an army -which must until the fortresses fell hold a defensive -and somewhat extended line, were conclusive -as to the rashness of an invasion; but they do not -appear so conclusive as to the necessity of stopping -short after the action of the 2d of August. The -questions were distinct. The one was a great measure -involving vast political and military conditions, the -other was simply whether Wellington should profit -of his own victory and the enemy’s distresses; and -in this view the objections above-mentioned, save -the want of shoes the scarcity of ammunition and -the fatigue of the troops, are inapplicable. But in -the two last particulars the allies were not so badly -off as the enemy, and in the first not so deficient as -to cripple the army, wherefore if the advantage to -be gained was worth the effort it was an error to -halt.</p> - -<p>The solution of this problem is to be found in the -comparative condition of the armies. Soult had -recovered his reserve his cavalry and artillery, but -Wellington was reinforced by general Graham’s -corps which was more numerous and powerful than -Villate’s reserve. The new chances then were for -the allies, and the action of the 2d of August -demonstrated that their opponents however strongly -posted could not stand before them; one more victory -would have gone nigh to destroy the French -force altogether; for such was the disorder that -Maucune’s division had on the 2d only one thousand<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -men left out of more than five thousand, and -on the 6th it had still a thousand stragglers besides -killed and wounded: Conroux’s and La Martinière’s -divisions were scarcely in better plight, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178"></a>[178]</span> -losses of the other divisions although less remarkable -were great. It must also be remembered that -general Foy with eight thousand men was cut off -from the main body; and the Nivelle, the sources of -which were in the allies’ power, was behind the -French. With their left pressed from the pass of -Maya, and their front vigorously assailed by the -main body of the allies, they could hardly have kept<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -together, since more than twenty-one thousand men -exclusive of Foy’s troops were then absent from -their colours. And as late as the 12th of August -Soult warned the minister of war that he was -indeed preparing to assail his enemy again, but he -had not the means of resisting a counter-attack, -although he held a different language to his army<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_IV">Appendix, 4.</a></span> -and to the people of the country.</p> - -<p>Had Cæsar halted because his soldiers were -fatigued, Pharsalia would have been but a common -battle.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179"></a>[179]</span><br></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XXII">BOOK XXII.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p class="noindent">After the combat of Echallar Soult adopted a permanent<span class="sidenote12">1813. August.</span> -position and reorganized his army. The left -wing under D’Erlon occupied the hills of Ainhoa, -with an advanced guard on the heights overlooking -Urdax and Zuguramurdi. The centre under Clauzel -was in advance of Sarre guarding the issues -from Vera and Echallar, his right resting on the -greatest of the Rhune mountains. The right wing -under Reille composed of Maucune’s and La Martinière’s<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -divisions extended along the Lower Bidassoa -to the sea; Villatte’s reserve was encamped behind -the Nivelle near Serres, and Reille’s third division, -under Foy, covered in conjunction with the national -guards, St. Jean Pied de Port and the roads leading -into France on that side. The cavalry for the convenience -of forage were quartered, one division -between the Nive and the Nivelle rivers, the other -as far back as Dax.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington occupied his old positions from -the pass of Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa, -but the disposition of his troops was different. Sir -Rowland Hill, reinforced by Morillo, held the Roncesvalles -and Alduides throwing up field-works at -the former. The third and sixth divisions were in -the Bastan guarding the Puerto de Maya, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180"></a>[180]</span> -seventh division, reinforced by O’Donnel’s army of -reserve, occupied the passes at Echallar and Zugaramurdi. -The light division was posted on the -Santa Barbara heights having picquets in the -town of Vera; their left rested on the Bidassoa, -their right on the Ivantelly rock, round which a -bridle communication with Echallar was now made -by the labour of the soldiers. Longa’s troops were -beyond the Bidassoa on the left of the light division; -the fourth division was in reserve behind him, near -Lesaca; the fourth Spanish army, now commanded -by general Freyre, prolonged the line from the left -of Longa to the sea; it crossed the royal causeway -occupied Irun and Fontarabia and guarded the -Jaizquibel mountain. The first division was in reserve -behind these Spaniards; the fifth division was -destined to resume the siege of San Sebastian; the -blockade of Pampeluna was maintained by Carlos -D’España’s troops.</p> - -<p>This disposition, made with increased means, was -more powerful for defence than the former occupation -of the same ground. A strong corps under a -single command was well entrenched at Roncesvalles; -and in the Bastan two British divisions -admonished by Stewart’s error were more than -sufficient to defend the Puerto de Maya. The -Echallar mountains were with the aid of O’Donnel’s -Spaniards equally secure, and the reserve instead of -occupying San Estevan was posted near Lesaca in -support of the left, now become the most important -part of the line.</p> - -<p>The castles of Zaragoza and Daroca had fallen, -the Empecinado was directed upon Alcanitz and he -maintained the communication between the Catalan -army, and Mina. The latter now joined by Duran<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181"></a>[181]</span> -was gathering near Jaca from whence his line of -retreat was by Sanguessa upon Pampeluna; in this -position he menaced general Paris, who marched -after a slight engagement on the 11th into France, -leaving eight hundred men in the town and castle. -At this time lord William Bentinck having crossed -the Ebro was investing Taragona, and thus the -allies, acting on the offensive, were in direct military -communication from the Mediteranean to the Bay -of Biscay, while Suchet though holding the fortresses -could only communicate with Soult through -France.</p> - -<p>This last-named marshal, being strongly posted, -did not much expect a front attack, but the augmentation -of the allies on the side of Roncesvalles and -Maya gave him uneasiness, lest they should force -him to abandon his position by operating along the -Nive river. To meet this danger general Paris took -post at Oleron in second line to Foy, and the fortresses -of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navareins were -put in a state of defence as pivots of operation on -that side, while Bayonne served a like purpose on -the other flank of the army. But with great diligence -the French general fortified his line from the -mouth of the Bidassoa to the rocks of Mondarain -and the Nive.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington, whose reasons for not invading -France at this period have been already noticed, and -who had now little to fear from any renewal of the -French operations against his right wing, turned his -whole attention to the reduction of San Sebastian. -In this object he was however crossed in a manner -to prove that the English ministers were the very -counterparts of the Spanish and Portuguese statesmen. -Lord Melville was at the head of the board<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182"></a>[182]</span> -of admiralty; under his rule the navy of England -for the first time met with disasters in battle, and -his neglect of the general’s demands for maritime -aid went nigh to fasten the like misfortunes -upon the army. This neglect combined with the -cabinet scheme of employing lord Wellington in -Germany, would seem to prove that experience had -taught the English ministers nothing as to the nature -of the Peninsular war, or that elated with the array -of sovereigns against Napoleon they were now careless -of a cause so mixed up with democracy. Still -it would be incredible that lord Melville, a man of -ordinary capacity, should have been suffered to retard -the great designs and endanger the final success -of a general, whose sure judgement and extraordinary -merit were authenticated by exploits -unparalleled in English warfare, if lord Wellington’s -correspondence and that of Mr. Stuart did not -establish the following facts.</p> - -<p>1º. Desertion from the enemy was stopped, chiefly -because the Admiralty, of which lord Melville was -the head, refused to let the ships of war carry -deserters or prisoners to England; they were thus -heaped up by hundreds at Lisbon and maltreated -by the Portuguese government, which checked all -desire in the French troops to come over.</p> - -<p>2º. When the disputes with America commenced, -Mr. Stuart’s efforts to obtain flour for the army were -most vexatiously thwarted by the board of admiralty, -which permitted if it did not encourage the English -ships of war to capture American vessels trading -under the secret licenses.</p> - -<p>3º. The refusal of the admiralty to establish certain -cruisers along the coast, as recommended by -lord Wellington, caused the loss of many store-ships<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183"></a>[183]</span> -and merchantmen, to the great detriment of the -army before it quitted Portugal. Fifteen were taken -off Oporto, and one close to the bar of Lisbon in -May. And afterwards, the Mediterranean packet<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_I">Appendix, No. 1.</a></span> -bearing despatches from lord William Bentinck -was captured, which led to lamentable consequences; -for the papers were not in cypher, and contained -detailed accounts of plots against the French in -Italy, with the names of the principal persons engaged.</p> - -<p>4º. A like neglect of the coast of Spain caused -ships containing money, shoes, and other indispensable -stores to delay in port, or risk the being taken -on the passage by cruizers issuing from Santona, -Bayonne, and Bordeaux. And while the communications<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Despatches, MSS.</span> -of the allies were thus intercepted, the -French coasting vessels supplied their army and -fortresses without difficulty.</p> - -<p>5º. After the battle of Vittoria lord Wellington -was forced to use French ammunition, though too -small for the English muskets, because the ordnance -store-ships which he had ordered from Lisbon to -Santander could not sail for want of convoy. When -the troops were in the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of -five thousand men was kept at Gibraltar and Lisbon -waiting for ships of war, and the transports employed -to convey them were thus withdrawn from -the service of carrying home wounded men, at a -time when the Spanish authorities at Bilbao refused -even for payment to concede public buildings for -hospitals.</p> - -<p>6º. When snow was falling on the Pyrenees the -soldiers were without proper clothing, because the -ship containing their great coats, though ready to -sail in August, was detained at Oporto until November<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184"></a>[184]</span> -waiting for convoy. When the victories of -July were to be turned to profit ere the fitting -season for the siege of San Sebastian should pass -away, the attack of that fortress was retarded sixteen -days because a battering train and ammunition, -demanded several months before by lord Wellington, -had not yet arrived from England.</p> - -<p>7º. During the siege the sea communication with -Bayonne was free. “Any thing in the shape of a -naval force,” said lord Wellington, “would drive -away sir George Collier’s squadron.” The garrison -received reinforcements artillery ammunition and -all necessary stores for its defence, sending away -the sick and wounded men in empty vessels. The -Spanish general blockading Santona complained at -the same time that the exertions of his troops were -useless, because the French succoured the place by -sea when they pleased; and after the battle of Vittoria -not less than five vessels laden with stores and -provisions, and one transport having British soldiers -and clothing on board, were taken by cruizers -issuing out of that port. The great advantage of -attacking San Sebastian by water as well as by -land was foregone for want of naval means, and -from the same cause British soldiers were withdrawn -from their own service to unload store-ships; -the gun-boats employed in the blockade were Spanish -vessels manned by Spanish soldiers withdrawn -from the army, and the store-boats were navigated -by Spanish women.</p> - -<p>8º. The coasting trade between Bordeaux and -Bayonne being quite free, the French, whose military -means of transport had been so crippled by -their losses at Vittoria that they could scarcely have -collected magazines with land carriage only, received<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185"></a>[185]</span> -their supplies by water, and were thus saved trouble -and expense and the unpopularity attending forced -requisitions.</p> - -<p>Between April and August, more than twenty -applications and remonstrances, were addressed by -lord Wellington to the government upon these points -without producing the slightest attention to his -demands. Mr. Croker, the under-secretary of the -Admiralty, of whose conduct he particularly complained, -was indeed permitted to write an offensive -official letter to him, but his demands and the dangers -to be apprehended from neglecting them were -disregarded, and to use his own words, “<i>since -Great Britain had been a naval power a British -army had never before been left in such a situation -at a most important moment</i>.”</p> - -<p>Nor is it easy to determine whether negligence -and incapacity or a grovelling sense of national -honour prevailed most in the cabinet, when we -find this renowned general complaining that the -government, ignorant even to ridicule of military -operations, seemed to know nothing of the nature -of the element with which England was surrounded, -and lord Melville so insensible to the -glorious toils of the Peninsula as to tell him that -his army was the last thing to be attended to.</p> - - -<h4>RENEWED SIEGE OF SEBASTIAN.</h4> - -<p>Villatte’s demonstration against Longa on the -28th of July had caused the ships laden with the -battering train to put to sea, but on the 5th of -August the guns were re-landed and the works -against the fortress resumed. On the 8th, a notion -having spread that the enemy was mining under -the cask redoubt, the engineers seized the occasion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186"></a>[186]</span> -to exercise their inexperienced miners by sinking a -shaft and driving a gallery. The men soon acquired -expertness, and as the water rose in the -shaft at twelve feet, the work was discontinued when -the gallery had attained eighty feet. Meanwhile -the old trenches were repaired, the heights of San -Bartolomeo were strengthened, and the convent of -Antigua, built on a rock to the left of those heights, -was fortified and armed with two guns to scour -the open beach and sweep the bay. The siege -however languished for want of ammunition; -and during this forced inactivity the garrison received -supplies and reinforcements by sea, their -damaged works were repaired, new defences constructed, -the magazines filled, and sixty-seven -pieces of artillery put in a condition to play. Eight -hundred and fifty men had been killed and wounded -since the commencement of the attack in July, but -as fresh men came by sea, more than two thousand -six hundred good soldiers were still present under -arms. And to show that their confidence was unabated -they celebrated the Emperor’s birthday by -crowning the castle with a splendid illumination; -encircling it with a fiery legend to his honour in -characters so large as to be distinctly read by the -besiegers.</p> - -<p>On the 19th of August, that is to say after a -delay of sixteen days, the battering train arrived -from England, and in the night of the 22d fifteen -heavy pieces were placed in battery, eight at the -right attack and seven at the left. A second battering -train came on the 23d, augmenting the number -of pieces of various kinds to a hundred and -seventeen, including a large Spanish mortar; but -with characteristic negligence this enormous armament<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187"></a>[187]</span> -had been sent out from England with no more -shot and shells than would suffice for one day’s -consumption!</p> - -<p>In the night of the 23d the batteries on the -Chofre sand-hills were reinforced with four long -pieces and four sixty-eight pound carronades, and -the left attack with six additional guns. Ninety -sappers and miners had come with the train from -England, the seamen under Mr. O’Reilly were again -attached to the batteries, and part of the field artillerymen -were brought to the siege.</p> - -<p>On the 24th the attack was recommenced with -activity. The Chofre batteries were enlarged to -contain forty-eight pieces, and two batteries for -thirteen pieces were begun on the heights of Bartolomeo, -designed to breach at seven hundred yards -distance the faces of the left demi-bastion of the -horn-work, that of St. John on the main front, and -the end of the high curtain, for these works rising -in gradation one above another were in the same -line of shot. The approaches on the isthmus were -now also pushed forward by the sap, but the old -trenches were still imperfect, and before daylight -on the 25th the French coming from the horn-work -swept the left of the parallel, injured the sap, -and made some prisoners before they were repulsed.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 25th the batteries were all -armed on both sides of the Urumea, and on the -26th fifty-seven pieces opened with a general salvo, -and continued to play with astounding noise and -rapidity until evening. The firing from the Chofre -hills destroyed the <span lang="fr">revêtement</span> of the demi-bastion -of St. John, and nearly ruined the towers near the -old breach together with the wall connecting them;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188"></a>[188]</span> -but at the isthmus, the batteries although they -injured the horn-work made little impression on the -main front from which they were too distant.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington, present at this attack and discontented -with the operation, now ordered a battery -for six guns to be constructed amongst some ruined -houses on the right of the parallel, only three hundred -yards from the main front, and two shafts were -sunk with a view to drive galleries for the protection -of this new battery against the enemy’s mines, but -the work was slow because of the sandy nature of -the soil.</p> - -<p>At 3 o’clock in the morning of the 27th the boats -of the squadron, commanded by lieut. Arbuthnot of -the Surveillante and carrying a hundred soldiers of -the ninth regiment under captain Cameron, pulled -to attack the island of Santa Clara. A heavy fire -was opened on them, and the troops landed with -some difficulty, but the island was then easily taken -and a lodgement made with the loss of only twenty-eight -men and officers, of which eighteen were -seamen.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 27th, about 3 o’clock, the -French sallied against the new battery on the isthmus, -but as colonel Cameron of the ninth regiment -met them on the very edge of the trenches with -the bayonet the attempt failed, yet it delayed the -arming of the battery. At day-break the renewed -fire of the besiegers, especially that from the Chofres -sand-hills, was extremely heavy, and the shrapnel -shells were supposed to be very destructive; nevertheless -the practice with that missile was very -uncertain, the bullets frequently flew amongst the -guards in the parallel and one struck the field-officer. -In the course of the day another sally was commenced,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189"></a>[189]</span> -but the enemy being discovered and fired upon did -not persist. The trenches were now furnished with -banquettes and parapets as fast as the quantity of -gabions and fascines would permit, yet the work -was slow, because the Spanish authorities of Guipuscoa, -like those in every other part of Spain, -neglected to provide carts to convey the materials -from the woods, and this hard labour was performed -by the Portuguese soldiers. It would seem however -an error not to have prepared all the materials of -this nature during the blockade.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington again visited the works this -day, and in the night the advanced battery, which, -at the desire of sir Richard Fletcher had been constructed -for only four guns, was armed. The 29th -it opened, but an accident had prevented the arrival -of one gun, and the fire of the enemy soon dismounted -another, so that only two instead of six -guns as lord Wellington had designed, smote at -short range the face of the demi-bastion of St. John -and the end of the high curtain; however the -general firing was severe both upon the castle and -the town-works and great damage was done to the -defences. By this time the French guns were nearly -silenced and as additional mortars were mounted on -the Chofre batteries, making in all sixty-three pieces -of which twenty-nine threw shells or spherical -case-shot, the superiority of the besiegers was -established.</p> - -<p>The Urumea was now discovered to be fordable. -Captain Alexander Macdonald of the artillery, without -orders, waded across in the night passed close -under the works to the breach and returned safely. -Wherefore as a few minutes would suffice to bring -the enemy into the Chofre batteries, to save the guns<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190"></a>[190]</span> -from being spiked their vents were covered with -iron plates fastened by chains; and this was also -done at the advanced battery on the isthmus.</p> - -<p>This day the materials and ordnance for a battery -of six pieces, to take the defences of the Monte -Orgullo in reverse, were sent to the island of Santa -Clara; and several guns in the Chofre batteries -were turned upon the retaining wall of the horn-work, -in the hope of shaking down any mines -the enemy might have prepared there, without -destroying the wall itself which offered cover for -the troops advancing to the assault.</p> - -<p>The trenches leading from the parallel on the -isthmus were now very wide and good, the sap was -pushed on the right close to the demi-bastion of the -horn-work, and the sea-wall supporting the high -road into the town, which had increased the march -and cramped the formation of the columns in the -first assault, was broken through to give access to -the strand and shorten the approach to the breaches. -The crisis was at hand and in the night of the 29th -a false attack was ordered to make the enemy spring -his mines; a desperate service and bravely executed -by lieutenant Macadam of the ninth regiment. The -order was sudden, no volunteers were demanded, no -rewards offered, no means of excitement resorted -to; yet such is the inherent bravery of British -soldiers, that seventeen men of the royals, the -nearest at hand, immediately leaped forth ready and -willing to encounter what seemed certain death. -With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries playing -hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach -unperceived, and then mounted in extended order -shouting and firing; but the French were too steady -to be imposed upon and their musquetry laid the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191"></a>[191]</span> -whole party low with the exception of their commander, -who returned alone to the trenches.</p> - -<p>On the 30th the sea-flank of the place being -opened from the half-bastion of St. John on the -right to the most distant of the old breaches, that is -to say, for five hundred feet, the batteries on the -Chofres were turned against the castle and other -defences of the Monte Orgullo, while the advanced -battery on the isthmus, now containing three guns, -demolished, in conjunction with the fire from the -Chofres, the face of the half-bastion of St. John’s -and the end of the high curtain above it. The -whole of that quarter was in ruins, and at the same -time the batteries on San Bartolomeo broke the face -of the demi-bastion of the horn-work and cut away -the palisades.</p> - -<p>The 30th the batteries continued their fire, and -about three o’clock lord Wellington after examining -the enemy’s defence resolved to make a lodgement -on the breach, and in that view ordered the assault -to be made the next day at eleven o’clock when the -ebb of tide would leave full space between the horn-work -and the water.</p> - -<p>The galleries in front of the advanced battery on -the isthmus were now pushed close up to the sea -wall, under which three mines were formed with -the double view of opening a short and easy way -for the troops to reach the strand, and rendering -useless any subterranean works the enemy might -have made in that part. At two o’clock in the -morning of the 31st they were sprung, and opened -three wide passages which were immediately connected, -and a traverse of gabions, six feet high, was -run across the mouth of the main trench on the -left, to screen the opening from the grape-shot of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192"></a>[192]</span> -the castle. Everything was now ready for the -assault, but before describing that terrible event it -will be fitting to shew the exact state of the besieged -in defence.</p> - -<p>Sir Thomas Graham had been before the place -for fifty-two days, during thirty of which the attack -was suspended. All this time the garrison had -laboured incessantly, and though the heavy fire of -the besiegers since the 26th appeared to have ruined -the defences of the enormous breach in the sea -flank, it was not so. A perpendicular fall behind -of more than twenty feet barred progress, and -beyond that, amongst the ruins of the burned -houses, was a strong counter-wall fifteen feet high, -loopholed for musquetry, and extending in a parallel -direction with the breaches, which were also -cut off from the sound part of the rampart by traverses -at the extremities. The only really practicable -road into the town was by the narrow end -of the high curtain above the half bastion of St. -John.</p> - -<p>In front of the counter-wall, about the middle -of the great breach, stood the tower of Los -Hornos still capable of some defence, and beneath -it a mine charged with twelve hundred -weight of powder. The streets were all trenched, -and furnished with traverses to dispute the passage -and to cover a retreat to the Monte Orgullo; -but before the assailants could reach the main breach -it was necessary either to form a lodgment in the -horn-work, or to pass as in the former assault under -a flanking fire of musquetry for a distance of nearly -two hundred yards. And the first step was close -under the sea-wall covering the salient angle of the -covered way, where two mines charged with eight<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193"></a>[193]</span> -hundred pounds of powder were prepared to overwhelm -the advancing columns.</p> - -<p>To support this system of retrenchments and -mines the French had still some artillery in reserve. -One sixteen-pounder mounted at St. Elmo flanked -the left of the breaches on the river face; a twelve -and an eight-pounder preserved in the casemates of -the Cavalier were ready to flank the land face of -the half-bastion of St. John; many guns from the -Monte Orgullo especially those of the Mirador<span class="sidenote9">Belmas.</span> -could play upon the columns, and there was a four-pounder -hidden on the horn-work to be brought -into action when the assault commenced. Neither -the resolution of the governor nor the courage of -the garrison were abated, but the overwhelming fire -of the last few days had reduced the number of -fighting men; General Rey had only two hundred -and fifty men in reserve, and he demanded of Soult -whether his brave garrison should be exposed to -another assault. “The army would endeavour to -succour him” was the reply, and he abided his fate.</p> - -<p>Napoleon’s ordinance, which forbade the surrender -of a fortress without having stood at least -one assault, has been strongly censured by English -writers upon slender grounds. The obstinate defences -made by French governors in the Peninsula -were the results, and to condemn an enemy’s system -from which we have ourselves suffered will scarcely -bring it into disrepute. But the argument runs, -that the besiegers working by the rules of art must -make a way into the place, and to risk an assault -for the sake of military glory or to augment the -loss of the enemy is to sacrifice brave men uselessly; -that capitulation always followed a certain advance -of the besiegers in Louis the Fourteenth’s time, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194"></a>[194]</span> -to suppose Napoleon’s upstart generals possessed -of superior courage or sense of military honour to -the high-minded nobility of that age was quite -inadmissible; and it has been rather whimsically -added that obedience to the emperor’s orders might -suit a predestinarian Turk but could not be tolerated -by a reflecting Christian. From this it would seem, -that certain nice distinctions as to the extent and -manner reconcile human slaughter with Christianity, -and that the true standard of military honour -was fixed by the intriguing, depraved and insolent -court of Louis the Fourteenth. It may however be -reasonably supposed, that as the achievements of -Napoleon’s soldiers far exceeded the exploits of -Louis’s cringing courtiers they possessed greater -military virtues.</p> - -<p>But the whole argument seems to rest upon false -grounds. To inflict loss upon an enemy is the very -essence of war, and as the bravest men and officers -will always be foremost in an assault, the loss thus -occasioned may be of the utmost importance. To -resist when nothing can be gained or saved is an -act of barbarous courage which reason spurns at; -but how seldom does that crisis happen in war? -Napoleon wisely insisted upon a resistance which -should make it dangerous for the besiegers to hasten -a siege beyond the rules of art, he would not have -a weak governor yield to a simulation of force not -really existing; he desired that military honour -should rest upon the courage and resources of men -rather than upon the strength of walls: in fine he -made a practical application of the proverb that -necessity is the mother of invention.</p> - -<p>Granted that a siege artfully conducted and with -sufficient means must reduce the fortress attacked;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195"></a>[195]</span> -still there will be some opportunity for a governor -to display his resources of mind. Vauban admits -of one assault and several retrenchments, after a -lodgment is made on the body of the place; -Napoleon only insisted that every effort which -courage and genius could dictate should be exhausted -before a surrender, and those efforts can -never be defined or bounded before-hand. Tarifa is -a happy example. To be consistent, any attack -which deviates from the rules of art must also be -denounced as barbarous; yet how seldom has a -general all the necessary means at his disposal. -In Spain not one siege could be conducted by the -British army according to the rules. And there is -a manifest weakness in praising the Spanish defence -of Zaragoza, and condemning Napoleon because -he demanded from regular troops a devotion similar -to that displayed by peasants and artizans. What -governor was ever in a more desperate situation -than general Bizanet at Bergen-op-Zoom, when sir -Thomas Graham, with a hardihood and daring -which would alone place him amongst the foremost -men of enterprize which Europe can boast of, threw -more than two thousand men upon the ramparts of -that almost impregnable fortress. The young soldiers -of the garrison frightened by a surprise in the -night, were dispersed, were flying. The assailants -had possession of the walls for several hours, yet -some cool and brave officers rallying the men towards -morning, charged up the narrow ramps and -drove the assailants over the parapets into the ditch. -They who could not at first defend their works were -now able to retake them, and so completely successful -and illustrative of Napoleon’s principle was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196"></a>[196]</span> -this counter-attack that the number of prisoners -equalled that of the garrison. There are no rules -to limit energy and genius, and no man knew better -than Napoleon how to call those qualities forth; he -possessed them himself in the utmost perfection -and created them in others.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197"></a>[197]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>STORMING OF SAN SEBASTIAN.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent">To assault the breaches without having destroyed<span class="sidenote9">1813. August.</span> -the enemy’s defences or established a lodgment on -the horn-work, was, notwithstanding the increased -fire and great facilities of the besiegers, obviously -a repetition of the former fatal error. And the same -generals who had before so indiscreetly made their -disapproval of such operations public, now even -more freely and imprudently dealt out censures, -which not ill-founded in themselves were most -ill-timed, since there is much danger when doubts -come down from the commanders to the soldiers. -Lord Wellington thought the fifth division had been -thus discouraged, and incensed at the cause, demanded -fifty volunteers from each of the fifteen -regiments composing the first, fourth, and light -divisions, “<i>men who could shew other troops how to -mount a breach</i>.” This was the phrase employed, -and seven hundred and fifty gallant soldiers instantly -marched to San Sebastian in answer to the appeal. -Colonel Cooke and major Robertson led the guards -and Germans of the first division, major Rose commanded -the men of the fourth division, and colonel -Hunt, a daring officer who had already won his -promotion at former assaults, was at the head of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198"></a>[198]</span> -fierce rugged veterans of the light division, yet -there were good officers and brave soldiers in the -fifth division.</p> - -<p>It being at first supposed that lord Wellington -merely designed a simple lodgment on the great -breach, the volunteers and one brigade of the fifth -division only were ordered to be ready; but in a -council held at night major Smith maintained that -the orders were misunderstood, as no lodgment -could be formed unless the high curtain was gained. -General Oswald being called to the council was of -the same opinion, whereupon the remainder of the -fifth division was brought to the trenches, and general -Bradford having offered the services of his -Portuguese brigade, was told he might ford the -Urumea and assail the farthest breach if he judged -it advisable.</p> - -<p>Sir James Leith had resumed the command of -the fifth division, and being assisted by general -Oswald directed the attack from the isthmus. He -was extremely offended by the arrival of the volunteers -and would not suffer them to lead the assault; -some he spread along the trenches to keep -down the fire of the horn-work, the remainder were -held as a reserve along with general Hay’s British -and Sprye’s Portuguese brigades of the fifth division. -To general Robinson’s brigade the assault -was confided. It was formed in two columns, one -to assault the old breach between the towers, the -other to storm the bastion of St. John and the end -of the high curtain. The small breach on the extreme -right was left for general Bradford’s Portuguese -who were drawn up on the Chofre hills; -some large boats filled with troops, were directed -to make a demonstration against the sea-line of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199"></a>[199]</span> -Monte Orgullo, and sir Thomas Graham overlooked -the whole operations from the right bank of the -river.</p> - -<p>The morning of the 31st broke heavily, a thick fog -hid every object, and the besiegers’ batteries could -not open until eight o’clock. From that hour a -constant shower of heavy missiles was poured upon -the besieged until eleven, when Robinson’s brigade -getting out of the trenches passed through the -openings in the sea-wall and was launched bodily -against the breaches. While the head of the column -was still gathering on the strand, about thirty -yards from the salient angle of the horn-work, -twelve men, commanded by a serjeant whose heroic -death has not sufficed to preserve his name, running -violently forward leaped upon the covered way with -intent to cut the sausage of the enemy’s mines. The -French startled by this sudden assault fired the -train prematurely, and though the serjeant and his -brave followers were all destroyed and the high sea-wall -was thrown with a dreadful crash upon the -head of the advancing column, not more than forty -men were crushed by the ruins and the rush of the -troops was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope -had already passed beyond the play of the mine, -and now speeded along the strand amidst a shower -of grape and shells, the leader lieutenant Macguire -of the fourth regiment, conspicuous from his long<span class="sidenote">Memoirs of Captain Cooke.</span> -white plume his fine figure and his swiftness, -bounded far ahead of his men in all the pride of -youthful strength and courage, but at the foot of -the great breach he fell dead, and the stormers went -sweeping like a dark surge over his body; many -died however with him and the trickling of -wounded men to the rear was incessant.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200"></a>[200]</span></p> - -<p>This time there was a broad strand left by the -retreating tide and the sun had dried the rocks, -yet they disturbed the order and closeness of the -formation, the distance to the main breach was -still nearly two hundred yards, and the French, -seeing the first mass of assailants pass the horn-work -regardless of its broken bastion, immediately -abandoned the front and crowding on the river face -of that work, poured their musketry into the flank -of the second column as it rushed along a few -yards below them; but the soldiers still running -forward towards the breach returned this fire without -slackening their speed. The batteries of the -Monte Orgullo and the St. Elmo now sent their -showers of shot and shells, the two pieces on the -cavalier swept the face of the breach in the bastion -of St. John, and the four-pounder in the horn-work -being suddenly mounted on the broken bastion -poured grape-shot into their rear.</p> - -<p>Thus scourged with fire from all sides, the -stormers, their array broken alike by the shot and -by the rocks they passed over, reached their destinations, -and the head of the first column gained the -top of the great breach; but the unexpected gulf -below could only be passed at a few places where -meagre parcels of the burned houses were still attached -to the rampart, and the deadly clatter of the -French musquets from the loop-holed wall beyond -soon strewed the narrow crest of the ruins with -dead. In vain the following multitude covered the -ascent seeking an entrance at every part; to advance -was impossible and the mass of assailants, -slowly sinking downwards remained stubborn and -immoveable on the lower part of the breach. Here -they were covered from the musquetry in front, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201"></a>[201]</span> -from several isolated points, especially the tower of -Las Hornos under which the great mine was placed, -the French still smote them with small arms, and -the artillery from the Monte Orgullo poured shells -and grape without intermission.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs at the great breach, -and at the half bastion of St. John it was even -worse. The access to the top of the high curtain -being quite practicable, the efforts to force a way -were more persevering and constant, and the -slaughter was in proportion; for the traverse on the -flank, cutting it off from the cavalier, was defended -by French grenadiers who would not yield; the two -pieces on the cavalier itself swept along the front -face of the opening, and the four-pounder and the -musquetry from the horn-work, swept in like -manner along the river face. In the midst of this -destruction some sappers and a working party attached -to the assaulting columns endeavoured to -form a lodgement, but no artificial materials had -been provided, and most of the labourers were -killed before they could raise the loose rocky fragments -into a cover.</p> - -<p>During this time the besiegers’ artillery kept up -a constant counter-fire which killed many of the -French, and the reserve brigades of the fifth division -were pushed on by degrees to feed the attack -until the left wing of the ninth regiment only remained -in the trenches. The volunteers also who -had been with difficulty restrained in the trenches, -“calling out to know, why they had been brought -there if they were not to lead the assault,” these -men, whose presence had given such offence to -general Leith that he would have kept them altogether -from the assault, being now let loose went like<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202"></a>[202]</span> -a whirlwind to the breaches, and again the crowded -masses swarmed up the face of the ruins, but -reaching the crest line they came down like a -falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to -mount, to totter, and to sink, the deadly French -fire was unabated, the smoke floated away, and the -crest of the breach bore no living man.</p> - -<p>Sir Thomas Graham, standing on the nearest of -the Chofre batteries, beheld this frightful destruction -with a stern resolution to win at any cost; and -he was a man to have put himself at the head of -the last company and died sword in hand upon the -breach rather than sustain a second defeat, but -neither his confidence nor his resources were yet -exhausted. He directed an attempt to be made on -the horn-work, and turned all the Chofre batteries -and one on the Isthmus, that is to say the concentrated -fire of fifty heavy pieces upon the high curtain. -The shot ranged over the heads of the troops -who now were gathered at the foot of the breach, -and the stream of missiles thus poured along the -upper surface of the high curtain broke down the -traverses, and in its fearful course shattering all -things strewed the rampart with the mangled limbs -of the defenders. When this flight of bullets first<span class="sidenote">Manuscript Memoir by colonel Hunt.</span> -swept over the heads of the soldiers a cry arose, -from some inexperienced people, “to retire because -the batteries were firing on the stormers;” but the -veterans of the light division under Hunt being at -that point were not to be so disturbed, and in the -very heat and fury of the cannonade effected a solid -lodgement in some ruins of houses actually within -the rampart on the right of the great breach.</p> - -<p>For half an hour this horrid tempest smote upon -the works and the houses behind, and then suddenly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203"></a>[203]</span> -ceasing the small clatter of the French musquets -shewed that the assailants were again in activity; -and at the same time the thirteenth Portuguese -regiment led by Major Snodgrass and followed by -a detachment of the twenty-fourth under colonel -Macbean entered the river from the Chofres. The -ford was deep the water rose above the waist, and -when the soldiers reached the middle of the stream -which was two hundred yards wide, a heavy gun -struck on the head of the column with a shower of -grape; the havoc was fearful but the survivors -closed and moved on. A second discharge from the -same piece tore the ranks from front to rear, still -the regiment moved on, and amidst a confused fire -of musquetry from the ramparts, and of artillery -from St. Elmo, from the castle, and from the Mirador, -landed on the left bank and rushed against -the third breach. Macbean’s men who had followed -with equal bravery then reinforced the great -breach, about eighty yards to the left of the other -although the line of ruins seemed to extend the -whole way. The fighting now became fierce and -obstinate again at all the breaches, but the French -musquetry still rolled with deadly effect, the heaps of -slain increased, and once more the great mass of -stormers sunk to the foot of the ruins unable to win; -the living sheltered themselves as they could, but -the dead and wounded lay so thickly that hardly -could it be judged whether the hurt or unhurt were -most numerous.</p> - -<p>It was now evident that the assault must fail -unless some accident intervened, for the tide was -rising, the reserves all engaged, and no greater -effort could be expected from men whose courage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204"></a>[204]</span> -had been already pushed to the verge of madness. -In this crisis fortune interfered. A number of powder -barrels, live shells, and combustible materials which -the French had accumulated behind the traverses -for their defence caught fire, a bright consuming -flame wrapped the whole of the high curtain, a succession -of loud explosions were heard, hundreds of -the French grenadiers were destroyed, the rest were -thrown into confusion, and while the ramparts were -still involved with suffocating eddies of smoke the -British soldiers broke in at the first traverse. The -defenders bewildered by this terrible disaster yielded -for a moment, yet soon rallied, and a close desperate -struggle took place along the summit of the high -curtain, but the fury of the stormers whose numbers -increased every moment could not be stemmed. -The French colours on the cavalier were torn away -by lieutenant Gethin of the eleventh regiment. The -horn-work and the land front below the curtain, and -the loop-holed wall behind the great breach were -all abandoned; the light division soldiers who had -already established themselves in the ruins on the -French left, immediately penetrated to the streets, -and at the same moment the Portuguese at the small -breach, mixed with British who had wandered to that -point seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side.</p> - -<p>Five hours the dreadful battle had lasted at the -walls and now the stream of war went pouring into -the town. The undaunted governor still disputed -the victory for a short time with the aid of his barricades, -but several hundreds of his men being cut -off and taken in the horn-work, his garrison was so -reduced that even to effect a retreat behind the line -of defences which separated the town from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205"></a>[205]</span> -Monte Orgullo was difficult. Many of his troops -flying from the horn-work along the harbour flank -of the town broke through a body of the British -who had reached the vicinity of the fortified convent -of Santa Téresa before them, and this post was -the only one retained by the French in the town. It -was thought by some distinguished officers engaged -in the action that Monte Orgullo might have been -carried on this day, if a commander of sufficient rank -to direct the troops had been at hand; but whether -from wounds or accident no general entered the -place until long after the breach had been won, the -commanders of battalions were embarrassed for -want of orders, and a thunder-storm, which came -down from the mountains with unbounded fury immediately -after the place was carried, added to the -confusion of the fight.</p> - -<p>This storm seemed to be the signal of hell for the -perpetration of villainy which would have shamed -the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At -Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been -the principal object; at Badajos lust and murder -were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San -Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting cruelty was -added to the catalogue of crimes. One atrocity of -which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers -the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable -barbarity. Some order was at first maintained, but -the resolution of the troops to throw off discipline -was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer -was pursued with a volley of small arms and escaped -with difficulty from men who mistook him for the -provost-martial of the fifth division; a Portuguese -adjutant, who endeavoured to prevent some atrocity, -was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206"></a>[206]</span> -violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately -by a number of English soldiers. Many officers -exerted themselves to preserve order, many men were -well conducted, but the rapine and violence commenced -by villains soon spread, the camp-followers -crowded into the place, and the disorder continued -until the flames following the steps of the plunderer -put an end to his ferocity by destroying the -whole town.</p> - -<p>Three generals, Leith, Oswald, and Robinson, had -been hurt in the trenches, sir Richard Fletcher the -chief engineer, a brave man who had served his -country honorably was killed, and colonel Burgoyne -the next in command of that arm was wounded.</p> - -<p>The carnage at the breaches was appalling. The -volunteers, although brought late into the action, had -nearly half their number struck down, most of the -regiments of the fifth division suffered in the same -proportion, and the whole loss since the renewal of -the siege exceeded two thousand five hundred men -and officers.</p> - -<p>The town being thus taken, the Monte Orgullo -was to be attacked, but it was very steep and difficult -to assail. The castle served as a citadel and -just below it four batteries connected with masonry -stretched across the face of the hill. From the -Mirador and Queen’s batteries at the extremities of -this line, ramps, protected by redans, led to the convent -of Santa Teresa which was the most salient -part of the defence. On the side of Santa Clara -and behind the mountain were some sea batteries, -and if all these works had been of good construction, -the troops fresh and well supplied, the siege would -have been long and difficult; but the garrison was -shattered by the recent assault, most of the engineers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207"></a>[207]</span> -and leaders killed, the governor and many others -wounded, five hundred men were sick or hurt, the -soldiers fit for duty did not exceed thirteen hundred, -and they had four hundred prisoners to guard. The -castle was small, the bomb-proofs scarcely sufficed -to protect the ammunition and provisions, and only -ten guns remained in a condition for service, three -of which were on the sea line. There was very -little water and the troops were forced to lie out on -the naked rock exposed to the fire of the besiegers, -or only covered by the asperities of ground. General -Rey and his brave garrison were however still resolute -to fight, and they received nightly by sea supplies -of ammunition though in small quantities.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington arrived the day after the assault.<span class="sidenote9">September.</span> -Regular approaches could not be carried up the -steep naked rock, he doubted the power of vertical -fire, and ordered batteries to be formed on the captured -works of the town, intending to breach the -enemy’s remaining lines of defence and then storm -the Orgullo. And as the convent of Santa Teresa -would enable the French to sally by the rampart on -the left of the allies’ position in the town, he composed -his first line with a few troops strongly barricaded, -placing a supporting body in the market-place, -and strong reserves on the high curtain and -flank ramparts. Meanwhile from the convent, which -being actually in the town might have been easily -taken at first, the enemy killed many of the besiegers, -and when after several days it was assaulted, they -set the lower parts on fire and retired by a communication -made from the roof to a ramp on the hill -behind. All this time the flames were destroying -the town, and the Orgullo was overwhelmed with -shells shot upward from the besiegers’ batteries.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208"></a>[208]</span></p> - -<p>On the 3d of September, the governor being summoned -to surrender demanded terms inadmissible, his -resolution was not to be shaken, and the vertical fire -was therefore continued day and night, though the -British prisoners suffered as well as the enemy; for -the officer commanding in the castle, irritated by<span class="sidenote12">Jones’ Sieges.</span> -the misery of the garrison cruelly refused to let the -unfortunate captives make trenches to cover themselves. -The French on the other hand complain<span class="sidenote12">Bellas’ Sieges.</span> -that their wounded and sick men, although placed -in an empty magazine with a black flag flying, were -fired upon by the besiegers, although the English -prisoners in their red uniforms were placed around -it to strengthen the claim of humanity.</p> - -<p>The new breaching batteries were now commenced, -one for three pieces on the isthmus, the other for -seventeen pieces on the land front of the horn-work. -These guns were brought from the Chofres at low -water across the Urumea, at first in the night, but -the difficulty of labouring in the water during darkness -induced the artillery officers to transport the -remainder in daylight, and within reach of the -enemy’s batteries, which did not fire a shot. In the -town the besiegers’ labours were impeded by the -flaming houses, but near the foot of the hill the -ruins furnished shelter for the musqueteers employed -to gall the garrison, and the guns on the -island of Santa Clara being reinforced were actively -worked by the seamen. The besieged replied but -little, their ammunition was scarce and the horrible -vertical fire subdued their energy. In this manner -the action was prolonged until the 8th of September -when fifty-nine heavy battering pieces opened at once -from the island the isthmus the horn-work and the -Chofres. In two hours both the Mirador and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209"></a>[209]</span> -Queen’s battery were broken, the fire of the besieged -was entirely extinguished, and the summit and face -of the hill torn and furrowed in a frightful manner; -the bread-ovens were destroyed, a magazine exploded, -and the castle, small and crowded with men, -was overlaid with the descending shells. Then the -governor proudly bending to his fate surrendered. -On the 9th this brave man and his heroic garrison, -reduced to one-third of their original number and -leaving five hundred wounded behind them in the -hospital, marched out with the honours of war. -The Spanish flag was hoisted under a salute of -twenty-one guns, and the siege terminated after -sixty-three days open trenches, precisely when the -tempestuous season, beginning to vex the coast, -would have rendered a continuance of the sea blockade -impossible.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. San Sebastian a third-rate fortress and in bad -condition when first invested, resisted a besieging -army, possessing an enormous battering train, for -sixty-three days. This is to be attributed partly to -the errors of the besiegers, principally to obstructions -extraneous to the military operations. Amongst -the last are to be reckoned the misconduct of the -Admiralty, and the negligence of the government -relative to the battering train and supply of ammunition; -the latter retarded the second siege for -sixteen days; the former enabled the garrison to -keep up and even increase its means as the siege -proceeded.</p> - -<p>Next, in order and importance, was the failure of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210"></a>[210]</span> -the Spanish authorities, who neglected to supply -carts and boats from the country, and even refused -the use of their public buildings for hospitals. Thus -between the sea and the shore, receiving aid from -neither, lord Wellington had to conduct an operation -of war which more than any other depends for -success upon labour and provident care. It was -probably the first time that an important siege was -maintained by women’s exertions; the stores of the -besiegers were landed from boats rowed by Spanish -girls!</p> - -<p>Another impediment was Soult’s advance towards -Pampeluna, but the positive effect of this -was slight since the want of ammunition would have -equally delayed the attack. The true measure of -the English government’s negligence is thus obtained. -It was more mischievous than the operations -of sixty thousand men under a great general.</p> - -<p>2º. The errors of execution having been before -touched upon need no further illustration. The -greatest difference between the first and second part -of the siege preceding the assaults, was that in the -latter, the approaches near the isthmus being carried -further on and openings made in the sea-wall, the -troops more easily and rapidly extricated themselves -from the trenches, the distance to the breach was -shortened, and the French fire bearing on the fronts -of attack was somewhat less powerful. These advantages -were considerable, but not proportionate -to the enormous increase of the besiegers’ means; -and it is quite clear from the terrible effects of the -cannonade during the assault, that the whole of the -defences might have been ruined, even those of the -castle, if this overwhelming fire had in compliance -with the rules of art been first employed to silence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211"></a>[211]</span> -the enemy’s fire. A lodgement in the horn-work -could then have been made with little difficulty, -and the breach attacked without much danger.</p> - -<p>3º. As the faults leading to failure in the first -part of the siege were repeated in the second, -while the enemy’s resources had increased by the -gain of time, and because his intercourse with -France by sea never was cut off, it follows that -there was no reasonable security for success; not -even to make a lodgement on the breach, since no -artificial materials were prepared and the workmen -failed to effect that object. But the first arrangement -and the change adopted in the council of war, -the option given to general Bradford, the remarkable -fact, that the simultaneous attack on the horn-work -was only thought of when the first efforts against -the breach had failed, all prove, that the enemy’s -defensive means were underrated, and the extent of -the success exceeded the preparations to obtain it.</p> - -<p>The place was won by accident. For first the -explosion of the great mine under the tower of Los -Hornos, was only prevented by a happy shot which -cut the sausage of the train during the fight, and -this was followed by the ignition of the French -powder-barrels and shells along the high curtain, -which alone opened the way into the town. Sir -Thomas Graham’s firmness and perseverance in the -assault, and the judicious usage of his artillery -against the high curtain during the action, an operation -however which only belonged to daylight, -were no mean helps to the victory. It was on such -sudden occasions that his prompt genius shone conspicuously, -yet it was nothing wonderful that heavy -guns at short distances, the range being perfectly -known, should strike with certainty along a line of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212"></a>[212]</span> -rampart more than twenty-seven feet above the -heads of the troops. Such practice was to be expected -from British artillery, and Graham’s genius -was more evinced by the promptness of the thought -and the trust he put in the valour of his soldiers. -It was far more extraordinary that the stormers did not -relinquish their attack when thus exposed to their own -guns, for it is a mistake to say that no mischief occurred; -a serjeant of the ninth regiment was killed -by the batteries close to his commanding officer, and -it is probable that other casualties also had place.</p> - -<p>4º. The explosion on the ramparts is generally -supposed to have been caused by the cannonade from -the Chofre batteries, yet a cool and careful observer, -whose account I have adopted, because he was a<span class="sidenote">Captain Cooke, forty-third regiment. Vide his Memoirs.</span> -spectator in perfect safety and undisturbed by -having to give or receive orders, affirms that the -cannonade ceased before colonel Snodgrass forded -the river, whereas the great explosion did not happen -until half an hour after that event. By some persons -that intrepid exploit of the Portuguese was thought -one of the principal causes of success, and it appears -certain that an entrance was made at the small -breach by several soldiers, British and Portuguese, -many of the former having wandered from the great -breach and got mixed with the latter, before the explosion -happened on the high curtain. Whether -those men would have been followed by greater -numbers is doubtful, but the lodgement made by -the light division volunteers within the great breach -was solid and could have been maintained. The -French call the Portuguese attack a feint. Sir<span class="sidenote9">Bellas.</span> -Thomas Graham certainly did not found much -upon it. He gave general Bradford the option to -attack or remain tranquil, and colonel M‘Bean<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213"></a>[213]</span> -actually received counter-orders when his column -was already in the river and too far advanced to be -withdrawn.</p> - -<p>5º. When the destruction of San Sebastian became -known, it was used by the anti-British party at -Cadiz to excite the people against England. The -political chief of Guipuscoa publicly accused sir -Thomas Graham, “that he sacked and burned -the place because it had formerly traded entirely -with France,” his generals were said to have excited -the furious soldiers to the horrid work, and his inferior -officers to have boasted of it afterwards. A -newspaper, edited by an agent of the Spanish -government, repeating these accusations, called upon -the people to avenge the injury upon the British -army, and the Spanish minister of war, designated -by lord Wellington as the abettor and even the -writer of this and other malignant libels published -at Cadiz, officially demanded explanations.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington addressed a letter of indignant -denial and remonstrance to sir Henry Wellesley. -“It was absurd,” he said, “to suppose the officers -of the army would have risked the loss of all their -labours and gallantry, by encouraging the dispersion -of the men while the enemy still held the castle. -To him the town was of the utmost value as a secure -place for magazines and hospitals. He had refused -to bombard it when advised to do so, as he had previously -refused to bombard Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, -because the injury would fall on the inhabitants -and not upon the enemy; yet nothing could have -been more easy, or less suspicious than this method -of destroying the town if he had been so minded. -It was the enemy who set fire to the houses, it was -part of the defence; the British officers strove to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214"></a>[214]</span> -extinguish the flames, some in doing so lost their -lives by the French musquetry from the castle, and -the difficulty of communicating and working through -the fire was so great, that he had been on the point -of withdrawing the troops altogether. He admitted -the plunder, observing, that he knew not whether -that or the libels made him most angry; he had -taken measures to stop it, but when two-thirds of -the officers had been killed or wounded in the action, -and when many of the inhabitants taking part with -the enemy fired upon the troops, to prevent it was -impossible. Moreover he was for several days unable -from other circumstances to send fresh men to -replace the stormers.”</p> - -<p>This was a solid reply to the scandalous libels -circulated, but the broad facts remained. San -Sebastian was a heap of smoking ruins, and atrocities -degrading to human nature had been perpetrated -by the troops. Of these crimes, the municipal and -ecclesiastic bodies the consuls and principal persons -of San Sebastian, afterwards published a detailed -statement, solemnly affirming the truth of each case; -and if Spanish declarations on this occasion are not -to be heeded, four-fifths of the excesses attributed -to the French armies must be effaced as resting on -a like foundation. That the town was first set on -fire behind the breaches during the operations, and -that it spread in the tumult following the assault -is undoubted; yet it is not improbable that plunderers, -to forward their own views increased it, and -certainly the great destruction did not befall until -long after the town was in possession of the allies. -I have been assured by a surgeon, that he was -lodged the third day after the assault at a house -well furnished, and in a street then untouched by fire<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215"></a>[215]</span> -or plunderers, but house and street were afterwards -plundered and burned. The inhabitants could only -have fired upon the allies the first day, and it might -well have been in self-defence for they were barbarously -treated. The abhorrent case alluded to was -notorious, so were many others. I have myself heard -around the picquet fires, when soldiers as every -experienced officer knows, speak without reserve of -their past deeds and feelings, the abominable actions -mentioned by the municipality related with -little variation long before that narrative was published; -told however with sorrow for the sufferers -and indignation against the perpetrators, for these -last were not so numerous as might be supposed -from the extent of the calamities they inflicted.</p> - -<p>It is a common but shallow and mischievous -notion, that a villain makes never the worse soldier -for an assault, because the appetite for plunder supplies -the place of honour; as if the compatability of -vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and -courage unnecessary in warlike matters. In all the -host which stormed San Sebastian there was not a -man who being sane would for plunder only have -encountered the danger of that assault, yet under -the spell of discipline all rushed eagerly to meet it. -Discipline however has its root in patriotism, or how -could armed men be controuled at all, and it would -be wise and far from difficult to graft moderation -and humanity upon such a noble stock. The modern -soldier is not necessarily the stern bloody-handed -man the ancient soldier was, there is as much difference -between them as between the sportsman and -the butcher; the ancient warrior, fighting with the -sword and reaping his harvest of death when the -enemy was in flight, became habituated to the act<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216"></a>[216]</span> -of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his -bayonet, sees not his peculiar victim fall, and exults -not over mangled limbs as proofs of personal -prowess. Hence preserving his original feelings, -his natural abhorrence of murder and crimes of -violence, he differs not from other men unless often -engaged in the assault of towns, where rapacity, -lust, and inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of -discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said -that no soldier can be restrained after storming a -town, and a British soldier least of all, because he -is brutish and insensible to honor! Shame on such -calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as -no other soldier ever fights? His pay! Soldiers of all -nations receive pay. At the period of this assault, -a serjeant of the twenty-eighth regiment, named<span class="sidenote">Colonel Cadell’s Memoirs.</span> -Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from -Roncesvalles, to make purchases for his officers. -He placed the money he was entrusted with, two -thousand dollars, in the hands of a commissary and -having secured a receipt persuaded his party to -join in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the -money, made his purchases, and returned to his -regiment. And these are the men, these the spirits -who are called too brutish to work upon except by -fear. It is precisely fear to which they are most -insensible.</p> - -<p>Undoubtedly if soldiers hear and read, that it is -impossible to restrain their violence they will not -be restrained. But let the plunder of a town after -an assault, be expressly made criminal by the articles -of war, with a due punishment attached; let it -be constantly impressed upon the troops that such -conduct is as much opposed to military honour and -discipline as it is to morality; let a select permanent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217"></a>[217]</span> -body of men receiving higher pay form a part -of the army, and be charged to follow storming -columns to aid in preserving order, and with power -to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be -necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary -valour should keep pace with chastisement for crimes -committed under such temptation, it would be fitting -that money, apportioned to the danger and importance -of the service, should be insured to the successful -troops and always paid without delay. This -money might be taken as ransom from enemies, but -if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor, government -should furnish the amount. With such regulations -the storming of towns would not produce -more military disorders than the gaining of battles -in the field.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218"></a>[218]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">While San Sebastian was being stormed Soult<span class="sidenote9">1813. August.</span> -fought a battle with the covering force, not willingly -nor with much hope of success, but he was averse -to let San Sebastian fall without another effort, and -thought a bold demeanour would best hide his real -weakness. Guided however by the progress of the -siege, which he knew perfectly through his sea -communication, he awaited the last moment of -action, striving meanwhile to improve his resources -and to revive the confidence of the army and of the -people. Of his dispersed soldiers eight thousand -had rejoined their regiments by the 12th of August, -and he was promised a reinforcement of thirty thousand -conscripts; these last were however yet to be -enrolled, and neither the progress of the siege, nor -the general panic along the frontier which recurred -with increased violence after the late battles, would -suffer him to remain inactive.</p> - -<p>He was in no manner deceived as to his enemy’s -superior strength of position number and military -confidence; but his former efforts on the side of -Pampeluna had interrupted the attack of San Sebastian, -and another offensive movement would necessarily -produce a like effect; wherefore he hoped -by repeating the disturbance, as long as a free intercourse -by sea enabled him to reinforce and supply<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219"></a>[219]</span> -the garrison, to render the siege a wasting operation -for the allies. To renew the movement against -Pampeluna was most advantageous, but it required -fifty thousand infantry for the attack, and twenty -thousand as a corps of observation on the Lower -Bidassoa, and he had not such numbers to dispose -of. The subsistence of his troops also was uncertain, -because the loss of all the military carriages -at Vittoria was still felt, and the resources of the -country were reluctantly yielded by the people. To -act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port was therefore -impracticable. And to attack the allies’ centre, at -Vera, Echallar, and the Bastan, was unpromising, -seeing that two mountain-chains were to be forced -before the movement could seriously affect lord -Wellington: moreover, the ways being impracticable -for artillery, success if such should befall, -would lead to no decisive result. It only remained -to attack the left of the allies by the great road of -Irun.</p> - -<p>Against that quarter Soult could bring more than -forty thousand infantry, but the positions were of -perilous strength. The Upper Bidassoa was in -Wellington’s power, because the light division, -occupying Vera and the heights of Santa Barbara -on the right bank, covered all the bridges; but the -Lower Bidassoa flowing from Vera with a bend to -the left separated the hostile armies, and against -this front about nine miles wide Soult’s operations -were necessarily directed. On his right, that is to -say, from the broken bridge of Behobia in front of -Irun to the sea, the river, broad and tidal, offered -no apparent facility for a passage; and between -the fords of Biriatu and those of Vera, a distance of -three miles, there was only the one passage of Andarlassa<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220"></a>[220]</span> -about two miles below Vera; along this -space also the banks of the river, steep craggy -mountain ridges without roads, forbade any great -operations. Thus the points of attack were restricted -to Vera and the fords between Biriatu and -the broken bridge of Behobia.</p> - -<p>To raise the siege it was only necessary to force<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span> -a way to Oyarzun, a small town about seven or -eight miles beyond the Bidassoa, from thence the -assailants could march at once upon Passages and -upon the Urumea. To gain Oyarzun was therefore -the object of the French marshal’s combinations. -The royal road led directly to it by the broad valley -which separates the Peña de Haya from the Jaizquibel -mountain. The latter was on the sea-coast, -but the Peña de Haya, commonly called the four-crowned -mountain, filled with its dependent ridges -all the space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun and Oyarzun. -Its staring head bound with a rocky diadem -was impassable, but from the bridges of Vera and -Lesaca, several roads, one of them not absolutely -impracticable for guns, passed over its enormous -flanks to Irun at one side and to Oyarzun on the -other, falling into the royal road at both places. -Soult’s first design was to unite Clauzel’s and -D’Erlon’s troops, drive the light division from the -heights of Santa Barbara, and then using the bridges -of Lesaca and Vera force a passage over the Peña -de Haya on the left of its summit, and push the -heads of columns towards Oyarzun and the Upper -Urumea; meanwhile Reille and Villatte, passing the -Bidassoa at Biriatu, were to fight their way also -to Oyarzun by the royal road. He foresaw that<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -Wellington might during this time collect his right -wing and seek to envelope the French army, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221"></a>[221]</span> -march upon Bayonne; but he thought the general -state of his affairs required bold measures, and the -progress of the besiegers at San Sebastian soon -drove him into action.</p> - -<p>On the 29th Foy, marching by the road of Lohoussoa, -crossed the Nive at Cambo and reached -Espelette, leaving behind him six hundred men, and -the national guards who were very numerous, with -orders to watch the roads and valleys leading upon -St. Jean Pied de Port. If pressed by superior -forces, this corps of observation was to fall back -upon that fortress, and it was supported with a -brigade of light cavalry stationed at St. Palais.</p> - -<p>In the night two of D’Erlon’s divisions were -secretly drawn from Ainhoa, Foy continued his -march through Espelette, by the bridges of Amotz -and Serres to San Jean de Luz, from whence the -reserve moved forward, and thus in the morning of -the 30th two strong French columns of attack were -assembled on the Lower Bidassoa.</p> - -<p>The first, under Clauzel, consisted of four divisions, -furnishing twenty thousand men with twenty -pieces of artillery. It was concentrated in the woods -behind the Commissary and Bayonette mountains, -above Vera.</p> - -<p>The second, commanded by general Reille, was -composed of two divisions and Villatte’s reserve -in all eighteen thousand men; but Foy’s division -and some light cavalry were in rear ready to -augment this column to about twenty-five thousand, -and there were thirty-six pieces of artillery -and two bridge equipages collected behind the -camp of Urogne on the royal road.</p> - -<p>Reille’s troops were secreted, partly behind the -Croix des Bouquets mountain, partly behind that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222"></a>[222]</span> -of Louis XIV. and the lower ridges of the Mandale -near Biriatu. Meanwhile D’Erlon, having Conroux’s -and Abbé’s divisions and twenty pieces of -artillery under his command, held the camps in -advance of Sarre and Ainhoa. If the allies in his -front marched to reinforce their own left on the -crowned mountain, he was to vex and retard their -movements, always however avoiding a serious -engagement, and feeling to his right to secure his -connection with Clauzel’s column; that is to say, -he was with Abbé’s division, moving from Ainhoa, -to menace the allies towards Zagaramurdi and the -Puerto de Echallar; and with Conroux’s division, -then in front of Sarre, to menace the light division, -to seize the rock of Ivantelly if it was abandoned, -and be ready to join Clauzel if occasion offered. -On the other hand, should the allies assemble a -large force and operate offensively by the Nive and -Nivelle rivers, D’Erlon, without losing his connection -with the main army, was to concentrate on -the slopes descending from the Rhune mountains -towards San Pé. Finally, if the attack on the Lower -Bidassoa succeeded, he was to join Clauzel, either -by Vera, or by the heights of Echallar and the -bridge of Lesaca. Soult also desired to support -D’Erlon with the two divisions of heavy cavalry, -but forage could only be obtained for the artillery -horses, two regiments of light horsemen, six -chosen troops of dragoons and two or three hundred -<span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span>, which were all assembled on the royal -road behind Reille’s column.</p> - -<p>It was the French marshal’s intention to attack at -daybreak on the 30th, but his preparations being -incomplete he deferred it until the 31st, and took -rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence passing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223"></a>[223]</span> -over to the allies’ camps. Nevertheless Wellington’s -emissaries advised him of the movements in -the night of the 29th, the augmentation of troops -in front of Irun was observed in the morning of -the 30th, and in the evening the bridge equipage -and the artillery were descried on the royal road -beyond the Bidassoa. Thus warned he prepared -for battle with little anxiety. For the brigade of -English foot-guards, left at Oporto when the campaign -commenced, was now come up; most of the -marauders and men wounded at Vittoria had rejoined; -and three regiments just arrived from England -formed a new brigade under lord Aylmer, -making the total augmentation of British troops in -this quarter little less than five thousand men.</p> - -<p>The extreme left was on the Jaizquibel. This<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span> -narrow mountain ridge, seventeen hundred feet -high, runs along the coast, abutting at one end -upon the Passages harbour and at the other upon -the navigable mouth of the Bidassoa. Offering no -mark for an attack it was only guarded by a -flanking detachment of Spaniards, and at its foot -the small fort of Figueras commanding the -entrance of the river was garrisoned by seamen -from the naval squadron. Fuenterabia a walled -place, also at its base, was occupied, and the low -ground between that town and Irun defended by a -chain of eight large field redoubts, which connected -the position of Jaizquibel with the heights -covering the royal road to Oyarzun.</p> - -<p>On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the -burned bridge of Behobia, there was a sudden -bend in the river, the concave towards the French, -and their positions commanded the passage of the -fords below; but opposed to them was the exceedingly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224"></a>[224]</span> -stiff and lofty ridge, called San Marcial, terminating -one of the great flanks of the Pena de -Haya. The water flowed round the left of this -ridge, confining the road leading from the bridge -of Behobia to Irun, a distance of one mile, to the -narrow space between its channel and the foot -of the height, and Irun itself, strongly occupied -and defended by a field-work, blocked this way. -It followed that the French, after forcing the passage -of the river, must of necessity win San Marcial -before their army could use the great road.</p> - -<p>About six thousand men of the fourth Spanish -army now under general Freyre, were established -on the crest of San Marcial, which was strengthened -by abbattis and temporary field-works.</p> - -<p>Behind Irun the first British division, under -general Howard, was posted, and lord Aylmer’s -brigade was pushed somewhat in advance of Howard’s -right to support the left of the Spaniards.</p> - -<p>The right of San Marcial falling back from the -river was, although distinct as a position, connected -with the Pena de Haya, and in some degree exposed -to an enemy passing the river above Biriatu, -wherefore Longa’s Spaniards were drawn off from -those slopes of the Pena de Haya which descended -towards Vera, to be posted on those descending towards -Biriatu. In this situation he protected and -supported the right of San Marcial.</p> - -<p>Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus directly -opposed to the progress of the enemy, and the fourth -division quartered near Lesaca was still disposable. -From this body a Portuguese brigade had been -detached, to replace Longa on the heights opposite -Vera, and to cover the roads leading from the -bridge and fords of that place over the flanks of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225"></a>[225]</span> -the Pena de Haya. Meanwhile the British brigades -of the division were stationed up the mountain, -close under the foundry of San Antonio and -commanding the intersection of the roads coming -from Vera and Lesaca; thus furnishing a reserve to -the Portuguese brigade to Longa and to Freyre, they -tied the whole together. The Portuguese brigade -was however somewhat exposed, and too weak to -guard the enormous slopes on which it was placed, -wherefore Wellington drew general Inglis’s brigade -of the seventh division from Echallar to reinforce it, -and even then the flanks of the Pena de Haya were -so rough and vast that the troops seemed sprinkled -here and there with little coherence. The English -general aware that his positions were too extensive -had commenced the construction of several large -redoubts on commanding points of the mountain, -and had traced out a second fortified camp on a -strong range of heights, which immediately in -front of Oyarzun connected the Haya with the -Jaizquibel, but these works were unfinished.</p> - -<p>During the night of the 30th Soult garnished -with artillery all the points commanding the fords -of Biriatu, the descent to the broken bridge and -the banks below it, called the Bas de Behobia. -This was partly to cover the passage of the fords -and the formation of his bridges, partly to stop -gun-boats coming up to molest the troops in crossing, -and in this view also he spread Casa Palacio’s<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -brigade of Joseph’s Spanish guards along the river -as far down as Andaya, fronting Fuenterabia.</p> - -<p>General Reille, commanding La Martiniere’s, Maucune’s, -and Villatte’s divisions, directed the attack. -His orders were to storm the camp of San Marcial, -and leaving there a strong reserve to keep in check<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226"></a>[226]</span> -any reinforcement coming from the side of Vera -or descending from the Pena de Haya, to drive the -allies with the remainder of his force from ridge to -ridge, until he gained that flank of the great mountain -which descends upon Oyarzun. The royal -road being thus opened, Foy’s division with the<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span> -cavalry and artillery in one column, was to cross -by bridges to be laid during the attack on San -Marcial. And it was Soult’s intention under any -circumstances to retain this last-named ridge, and -to fortify it as a bridge-head with a view to subsequent -operations.</p> - -<p>To aid Reille’s progress and to provide for the -concentration of the whole army at Oyarzun, Clauzel -was directed to make a simultaneous attack from -Vera, not as at first designed by driving the allies -from Santa Barbara and seizing the bridges, but -leaving one division and his guns on the ridges -above Vera to keep the light division in check, -to cross the river by two fords just below the town -of Vera with the rest of his troops, and assail that -slope of the Pena de Haya where the Portuguese -brigade and the troops under general Inglis were -posted. Then forcing his way upwards to the forge -of San Antonio, which commanded the intersection -of the roads leading round the head of the mountain, -he could aid Reille directly by falling on -the rear of San Marcial, or meet him at Oyarzun -by turning the rocky summit of the Pena de -Haya.</p> - -<p><i>Combat of San Marcial.</i> At daylight on the<span class="sidenote7">August.</span> -31st, Reille, under protection of the French guns, -forded the river above Biriatu with two divisions -and two pieces of artillery. He quickly seized a detached -ridge of inferior height just under San Marcial,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227"></a>[227]</span> -and leaving there one brigade as a reserve detached -another to attack the Spanish left by a slope -which descended in that quarter to the river. -Meanwhile with La Martiniere’s division he assailed -their right. But the side of the mountain was -covered with brushwood and remarkably steep, the<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -French troops being ill-managed preserved no -order, the supports and the skirmishers mixing in -one mass got into confusion, and when two-thirds -of the height were gained the Spaniards charged -in columns and drove the assailants headlong -down.</p> - -<p>During this action two bridges were thrown, -partly on trestles partly on boats, below the fords, -and the head of Villatte’s reserve crossing ascended -the ridge and renewed the fight more vigorously; -one brigade even reached the chapel of San -Marcial and the left of the Spanish line was -shaken, but the eighty-fifth regiment belonging to -lord Aylmer’s brigade advanced a little way to -support it, and at that moment lord Wellington -rode up with his staff. Then the Spaniards who -cared so little for their own officers, with that noble -instinct which never abandons the poor people of -any country acknowledged real greatness without -reference to nation, and shouting aloud dashed -their adversaries down with so much violence that -many were driven into the river, and some of the -French pontoon boats coming to their succour were -overloaded and sunk. It was several hours before -the broken and confused masses could be rallied -and the bridges, which had been broken up to -let the boats save the drowning men, repaired. -When this was effected, Soult who overlooked the -action from the summit of the mountain Louis XIV.,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228"></a>[228]</span> -sent the remainder of Villatte’s reserve over the -river, and calling up Foy’s division prepared a more -formidable and better arranged attack; and he -expected greater success, inasmuch as the operation -from the side of Vera, of which it is time to -treat, was now making considerable progress up the -Pena de Haya on the allies’ right.</p> - -<p><i>Combat of Vera.</i> General Clauzel had descended -the Bayonette and Commissari mountains immediately -after day-break, under cover of a thick fog, -but at seven o’clock the weather cleared, and three -divisions formed in heavy columns were seen, by -the troops on Santa Barbara, making for the fords -below Vera in the direction of two hamlets called -the Salinas and the Bario de Lesaca. A fourth -division and the guns remained stationary on the -slopes of the mountain, and the artillery opened -now and then upon the little town of Vera, from -which the picquets of the light division were -recalled with exception of one post in a fortified -house commanding the bridge.</p> - -<p>About eight o’clock the enemy’s columns began -to pass the fords covered by the fire of their artillery, -but the first shells thrown fell into the midst of -their own ranks and the British troops on Santa -Barbara cheered the French battery with a derisive -shout. Their march was however sure, and a battalion -of chosen light troops, without knapsacks, -quickly commenced the battle on the left bank<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -of the river, with the Portuguese brigade, and by -their extreme activity and rapid fire forced the -latter to retire up the slopes of the mountain. -General Inglis then reinforced the line of skirmishers<span class="sidenote">Manuscript Memoir by general Inglis.</span> -and the whole of his brigade was soon afterwards -engaged, but Clauzel menaced his left flank from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229"></a>[229]</span> -the lower ford, and the French troops still forced -their way upwards in front without a check, -until the whole mass disappeared fighting amidst -the asperities of the Pena de la Haya. Inglis lost -two hundred and seventy men and twenty-two -officers, but he finally halted on a ridge commanding -the intersection of the roads leading from Vera -and Lesaca to Irun and Oyarzun. That is to say -somewhat below the foundry of Antonio, where -the fourth division, having now recovered its Portuguese -brigade, was, in conjunction with Longa’s -Spaniards, so placed as to support and protect -equally the left of Inglis and the right of Freyre -on San Marcial.</p> - -<p>These operations, from the great height and -asperity of the mountain, occupied many hours, -and it was past two o’clock before even the head of -Clauzel’s columns reached this point. Meanwhile -as the French troops left in front of Santa Barbara -made no movement, and lord Wellington had before -directed the light division to aid general Inglis, a -wing of the forty-third and three companies of the -riflemen from general Kempt’s brigade, with three -weak Spanish battalions drawn from O’Donnel’s -Andalusians at Echallar, crossed the Bidassoa by -the Lesaca bridge, and marched towards some lower -slopes on the right of Inglis where they covered -another knot of minor communications coming from -Lesaca and Vera. They were followed by the -remainder of Kempt’s brigade which occupied -Lesaca itself, and thus the chain of connection and -defence between Santa Barbara and the positions of -the fourth division on the Pena de la Haya was -completed.</p> - -<p>Clauzel seeing these movements, and thinking<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230"></a>[230]</span> -the allies at Echallar and Santa Barbara were<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -only awaiting the proper moment to take him in -flank and rear, by the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, -if he engaged further up the mountain, now abated -his battle and sent notice of his situation and -views to Soult. This opinion was well-founded; -lord Wellington was not a general to let half his -army be paralyzed by D’Erlon’s divisions. On the -30th, when he observed Soult’s first preparations in -front of San Marcial, he had ordered attacks to be -made upon D’Erlon from the Puerto of Echallar -Zagaramurdi and Maya; general Hill was also -directed to shew the heads of columns towards -St. Jean Pied de Port. And on the 31st when the -force and direction of Clauzel’s columns were known, -he ordered lord Dalhousie to bring the remainder -of the seventh division by Lesaca to aid Inglis.</p> - -<p>Following these orders Giron, who commanded -the Spaniards O’Donnel being sick, slightly skirmished -on the 30th with Conroux’s advanced posts -in front of Sarre, and on the 31st at day-break the -whole of the French line was assailed. That is to -say, Giron again fought with Conroux, feebly as -before, but two Portuguese brigades of the sixth -and seventh divisions, directed by lord Dalhousie -and general Colville from the passes of Zagaramurdi -and Maya, drove the French from their camp -behind Urdax and burned it. Abbé who commanded -there being thus pressed, collected his -whole force in front of Ainhoa on an entrenched -position, and making strong battle repulsed the -allies with some loss of men by the sixth division. -Thus five combats were fought in one day at -different points of the general line, and D’Erlon, -who had lost three or four hundred men, seeing a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231"></a>[231]</span> -fresh column coming from Maya as if to turn his -left, judged that a great movement against Bayonne -was in progress and sent notice to Soult. He was -mistaken. Lord Wellington being entirely on the -defensive, only sought by these demonstrations to -disturb the plan of attack, and the seventh division, -following the second order sent to lord Dalhousie, -marched towards Lesaca; but the fighting at Urdax -having lasted until mid-day the movement was not -completed that evening.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon’s despatch reached Soult at the same -time that Clauzel’s report arrived. All his arrangements -for a final attack on San Marcial were then -completed, but these reports and the ominous cannonade -at San Sebastian, plainly heard during the -morning, induced him to abandon this object and -hold his army ready for a general battle on the -Nivelle. In this view he sent Foy’s division which -had not yet crossed the Bidassoa to the heights of -Serres, behind the Nivelle, as a support to D’Erlon, -and caused six chosen troops of dragoons to march -upon San Pé higher up on that river. Clauzel received -orders to arrest his attack and repass the Bidassoa -in the night. He was to leave Maransin’s -division upon the Bayonette mountain and the Col -de Bera, and with the other three divisions to march -by Ascain and join Foy on the heights of Serres.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding these movements Soult kept -Reille’s troops beyond the Bidassoa, and the battle -went on sharply, for the Spaniards continually -detached men from the ridge, endeavouring to drive -the French from the lower positions into the river, -until about four o’clock when their hardihood -abating they desired to be relieved; but Wellington -careful of their glory seeing the French attacks<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232"></a>[232]</span> -were exhausted and thinking it a good opportunity -to fix the military spirit of his allies, refused to -relieve or to aid them; yet it would not be just to -measure their valour by this fact. The English -general blushed while he called upon them to fight, -knowing that they had been previously famished by -their vile government, and that there were no hospitals -to receive no care for them when wounded. -The battle was however arrested by a tempest -which commencing in the mountains about three -o’clock, raged for several hours with wonderful -violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees -and whirled through the air like feathers on the -howling winds, while the thinnest streams swelling -into torrents dashed down the mountains, rolling -innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. -Amidst this turmoil and under cover of night the -French re-crossed the river, and the head-quarters -were fixed at St. Jean de Luz.</p> - -<p>Clauzel’s retreat was more unhappy. Having -received the order to retire early in the evening -when the storm had already put an end to all fighting, -he repassed the fords in person and before dark -at the head of two brigades, ordering general Vandermaesen -to follow with the remainder of his divisions. -It would appear that he expected no difficulty, since -he did not take possession of the bridge of Vera -nor of the fortified house covering it; and apparently -ignorant of the state of his own troops on the<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -other bank of the river occupied himself with suggesting -new projects displeasing to Soult. Meanwhile -Vandermaesen’s situation became critical. -Many of his soldiers attempting to cross were -drowned by the rising waters, and finally, unable -to effect a passage at the fords, that general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233"></a>[233]</span> -marched up the stream to seize the bridge of Vera. -His advanced guard surprising a corporal’s -picquet rushed over, but was driven back by -a rifle company posted in the fortified house. -This happened about three o’clock in the morning -and the riflemen defended the passage until daylight -when a second company and some Portuguese -Caçadores came to their aid. But the French -reserve left at Vera seeing how matters stood -opened a fire of guns against the fortified house -from a high rock just above the town, and their -skirmishers approached it on the right bank while -Vandermaesen plied his musquetry from the left -bank. The two rifle captains and many men fell -under this cross fire, and the passage was forced, -but Vandermaesen urging the attack in person was -killed, and more than two hundred of his soldiers -were hurt.</p> - -<p>Soult now learning from D’Erlon that all offensive<span class="sidenote9">September</span> -movements on the side of Maya had ceased at -twelve o’clock on the 31st, contemplated another -attack on San Marcial, but in the course of the day -general Rey’s report of the assault on San Sebastian<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -reached him, and at the same time he heard that -general Hill was in movement on the side of St. -Jean Pied de Port. This state of affairs brought -reflection. San Sebastian was lost, a fresh attempt -to carry off the wasted garrison from the castle -would cost five or six thousand good soldiers, and -the safety of the whole army would be endangered -by pushing headlong amongst the terrible asperities -of the crowned mountain. For Wellington could -throw his right wing and centre, forming a mass of -at least thirty-five thousand men, upon the French -left during the action, and he would be nearer to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234"></a>[234]</span> -Bayonne than the French right when once the -battle was engaged beyond the Lower Bidassoa. -The army had lost in the recent actions three -thousand six hundred men. General Vandermaesen -had been killed, and four others, La Martiniere, -Menne, Remond, and Guy, wounded, the first -mortally; all the superior officers agreed that a -fresh attempt would be most dangerous, and serious -losses might draw on an immediate invasion of -France before the necessary defensive measures -were completed.</p> - -<p>Yielding to these reasons he resolved to recover -his former positions and thenceforward remain -entirely on the defensive, for which his vast knowledge -of war, his foresight, his talent for methodical -arrangement and his firmness of character, -peculiarly fitted him. Twelve battles or combats -fought in seven weeks, bore testimony that he had -strived hard to regain the offensive for the French -army, and willing still to strive if it might be so, he -had called upon Suchet to aid him and demanded -fresh orders from the emperor; but Suchet helped -him not, and Napoleon’s answer indicated at once his -own difficulties and his reliance upon the duke of -Dalmatia’s capacity and fidelity.</p> - -<p>“<i>I have given you my confidence and can add -neither to your means nor to your instructions.</i>”</p> - -<p>The loss of the allies was one thousand Anglo-Portuguese, -and sixteen hundred Spaniards. Wherefore -the cost of men on this day, including the -storming of San Sebastian, exceeded five thousand, -but the battle in no manner disturbed the siege. -The French army was powerless against such strong -positions. Soult had brought forty-five thousand -men to bear in two columns upon a square of less<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235"></a>[235]</span> -than five miles, and the thirty thousand French -actually engaged, were repulsed by ten thousand, -for that number only of the allies fought.</p> - -<p>But the battle was a half measure and ill-judged on -Soult’s part. Lord Wellington’s experience of French -warfare, his determined character, coolness and -thorough acquaintance with the principles of his -art, left no hope that he would suffer two-thirds of -his army to be kept in check by D’Erlon’s two divisions; -and accordingly, the moment D’Erlon was -menaced Soult stopped his own attack to make a -counter-movement and deliver a decisive battle on -favourable ground. Perhaps his secret hope was -to draw his opponent to such a conclusion, but if so, -the combat of San Marcial was too dear a price to -pay for the chance.</p> - -<p>A general who had made up his mind to force a -way to San Sebastian, would have organized his -rear so that no serious embarrassment could arise -from any partial incursions towards Bayonne; he -would have concentrated his whole army, and have -calculated his attack so as to be felt at San Sebastian -before his adversary’s counter-movement could -be felt towards Bayonne. In this view D’Erlon’s -two divisions should have come in the night of -the 30th to Vera, which without weakening the -reserve opposed to the light division would have -augmented Clauzel’s force by ten thousand men; -and on the most important line, because San Marcial -offered no front for the action of great numbers, -and the secret of mountain warfare is, by surprise or -the power of overwhelming numbers, to seize such -commanding points as shall force an enemy either -to abandon his strong position, or become the assailant -to recover those he has thus lost. Now the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236"></a>[236]</span> -difficulty of defending the crowned mountain was -evinced by the rapid manner in which Clauzel at once -gained the ridges as far as the foundry of San Antonio; -with ten thousand additional men he might -have gained a commanding position on the rear and -left flank of San Marcial, and forced the allies to -abandon it. That lord Wellington thought himself -weak on the Haya mountain is proved by his calling -up the seventh division from Echallar, and by his -orders to the light division.</p> - -<p>Soult’s object was to raise the siege, but his plan -involved the risk of having thirty-five thousand of -the allies interposed during his attack between -him and Bayonne, clearly a more decisive operation -than the raising of the siege, therefore the -enterprise may be pronounced injudicious. He admitted -indeed, that excited to the enterprise, partly<span class="sidenote">Correspondence with the minister of war, MSS.</span> -by insinuations, whether from the minister of war or -his own lieutenants does not appear, partly by a -generous repugnance to abandon the brave garrison, -he was too precipitate, acting contrary to his judgment; -but he was probably tempted by the hope of -obtaining at least the camp of San Marcial as a -bridge-head, and thus securing a favourable point for -after combinations.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington having resolved not to invade -France at this time, was unprepared for so great an -operation as throwing his right and centre upon -Soult’s left; and it is obvious also that on the -30th he expected only a partial attack at San -Marcial. The order he first gave to assail D’Erlon’s -position, and then the counter-order for the seventh -division to come to Lesaca, prove this, because the -latter was issued after Clauzel’s numbers and the -direction of his attack were ascertained. The efforts<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237"></a>[237]</span> -of two Portuguese brigades against D’Erlon sufficed -therefore to render null the duke of Dalmatia’s great -combinations, and his extreme sensitiveness to their -operations marks the vice of his own. Here it may -be observed, that the movement of the forty-third the -rifle companies and the Spaniards, to secure the -right flank of Inglis, was ill-arranged. Dispatched -by different roads without knowing precisely the -point they were to concentrate at, each fell in with -the enemy at different places; the Spaniards got -under fire and were forced to alter their route; the -forty-third companies stumbling on a French division -had to fall back half a mile; it was only by thus -feeling the enemy at different points that the destined -position was at last found, and a disaster was -scarcely prevented by the fury of the tempest. Nevertheless -those detachments were finally well placed -to have struck a blow the next morning, because -their post was only half an hour’s march from the -high ground behind Vandermaesen’s column when -he forced the bridge at Vera, and the firing would -have served as a guide. The remainder of Kempt’s -brigade could also have moved upon the same point -from Lesaca. It is however very difficult to seize -such occasions in mountain warfare where so little -can be seen of the general state of affairs.</p> - -<p>A more obvious advantage was neglected by general -Skerrit. The defence of the bridge at Vera by a -single company of rifles lasted more than an hour, -and four brigades of the enemy, crossing in a tumultuous -manner, could not have cleared the narrow -passage after it was won in a moment. Lord Wellington’s -despatch erroneously describes the French -as passing under the fire of great part of general -Skerrit’s brigade, whereas that officer remained in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238"></a>[238]</span> -order of battle on the lower slopes of Santa Barbara, -half a mile distant, and allowed the enemy to -escape. It is true that a large mass of French -troops were on the counter slopes of the Bayonette -mountain, beyond Vera, but the seventh division, -being then close to San Barbara, would have prevented -any serious disaster if the blow had failed. -A great opportunity was certainly lost, but war in -rough mountains is generally a series of errors.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239"></a>[239]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">Soult, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of<span class="sidenote9">1813. September.</span> -an attack along the Nive, that his uneasy movements -made the allies think he was again preparing for -offensive operations. This double misunderstanding -did not however last long, and each army resumed -its former position.</p> - -<p>The fall of San Sebastian had given lord Wellington -a new port and point of support, had -increased the value of Passages as a depôt, and let -loose a considerable body of troops for field operations; -the armistice in Germany was at an end, -Austria had joined the allies, and it seemed therefore -certain that he would immediately invade France. -The English cabinet had promised the continental -sovereigns that it should be so when the French -were expelled from Spain, meaning Navarre and -Guipuscoa; and the newspaper editors were, as -usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries -by their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions. -Meanwhile the partizans of the Bourbons -were secretly endeavouring to form a conspiracy in -the south, and the duke of Berri desired to join the -British army, pretending that twenty thousand -Frenchmen were already armed and organized at -the head of which he would place himself. In fine -all was exultation and extravagance. But lord<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240"></a>[240]</span> -Wellington, well understanding the inflated nature -of such hopes and promises, while affecting to -rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the -opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, -by observing, “<i>that if he had done all that was expected -he should have been before that period in the -moon</i>.”</p> - -<p>With respect to the duke of Berri’s views, it was -for the sovereigns he said to decide whether the -restoration of the Bourbons should form part of their -policy, but as yet no fixed line of conduct on that or -any other political points was declared. It was for -their interest to get rid of Napoleon, and there could -be no question of the advantage or propriety of -accepting the aid of a Bourbon party without -pledging themselves to dethrone the emperor. The -Bourbons might indeed decline, in default of such -a pledge, to involve their partizans in rebellion, and -he advised them to do so, because Napoleon’s power -rested internally upon the most extensive and expensive -system of corruption ever established in any -country, externally upon his military force which -was supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions; -once confined to the limits of France he -would be unable to bear the double expense of his -government and army, the reduction of either would -be fatal to him, and the object of the Bourbons would -thus be obtained without risk. But, if they did not -concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of -Europe must declare they would dethrone Napoleon -before the duke of Berri should be allowed to join -the army; and the British government must make -up its mind upon the question.</p> - -<p>This reasoning put an end to the project, because -neither the English cabinet nor the allied sovereigns<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241"></a>[241]</span> -were ready to adopt a decisive open line of policy. -The ministers exulting at the progress of aristocratic -domination, had no thought save that of wasting -England’s substance by extravagant subsidies -and supplies, taken without gratitude by the continental -powers who held themselves no-ways bound -thereby to uphold the common cause, which each -secretly designed to make available for peculiar -interests. Moreover they all still trembled before -the conqueror and none would pledge themselves to -a decided policy. Lord Wellington alone moved -with a firm composure, the result of profound and -well-understood calculations; yet his mind, naturally -so dispassionate, was strangely clouded at this time -by personal hatred of Napoleon.</p> - -<p>Where is the proof, or even probability, of that -great man’s system of government being internally -dependent upon “<i>the most extensive corruption ever -established in any country</i>”?</p> - -<p>The annual expenditure of France was scarcely -half that of England, and Napoleon rejected public -loans which are the very life-blood of state corruption. -He left no debt. Under him no man devoured -the public substance in idleness merely -because he was of a privileged class; the state -servants were largely paid but they were made to -labour effectually for the state. They did not eat -their bread and sleep. His system of public accounts, -remarkable for its exactness simplicity and -comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public -fraud, and therefore extremely unfavourable to -corruption. Napoleon’s power was supported in -France by that deep sense of his goodness as a -sovereign, and that admiration for his genius which -pervaded the poorer and middle classes of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242"></a>[242]</span> -people; by the love which they bore towards him, -and still bear for his memory because he cherished -the principles of a just equality. They loved him -also for his incessant activity in the public service, -his freedom from all private vices, and because -his public works, wondrous for their number their -utility and grandeur, never stood still; under him -the poor man never wanted work. To France he -gave noble institutions, a comparatively just code -of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the -Romans. His <cite lang="fr">Cadastre</cite>, more extensive and perfect -than the Doomsday Book, that monument of the -wisdom and greatness of our Norman Conqueror, -was alone sufficient to endear him to the nation. -Rapidly advancing under his vigorous superintendence, -it registered and taught every man the true -value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities -public or private. It was designed and most -ably adapted to fix and secure titles to property, to -prevent frauds, to abate litigation, to apportion the -weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the -insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the -revenue, and to secure the sacred freedom of the -poor man’s home. The French <cite lang="fr">Cadastre</cite>, although -not original, would from its comprehensiveness, -have been when completed the greatest boon ever -conferred upon a civilized nation by a statesman.</p> - -<p>To say that the emperor was supported by his -soldiers, is to say that he was supported by the -people; because the law of conscription, that -mighty staff on which France leaned when all -Europe attempted to push her down, the conscription, -without which she could never have sustained -the dreadful war of antagonist principles entailed -upon her by the revolution; that energetic law,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243"></a>[243]</span> -which he did not establish but which he freed from -abuse, and rendered great, national, and endurable -by causing it to strike equally on all classes, the -conscription made the soldiers the real representatives -of the people. The troops idolized Napoleon, -well they might, and to assert that their attachment -commenced only when they became soldiers, is to -acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness -of mind turned hatred into devotion the moment -he was approached. But Napoleon never -was hated by the people of France; he was their -own creation and they loved him so as never monarch -was loved before. His march from Cannes -to Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of -poor men, who were not soldiers, can never be -effaced or even disfigured. For six weeks, at any -moment, a single assassin might by a single shot -have acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide, and -obtained vast rewards besides from the trembling -monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who scrupled -not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many -there were base enough to undertake but none so -hardy as to execute the crime, and Napoleon, -guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed -to a throne from whence it required a million of -foreign bayonets to drive him again. From the -throne they drove him, but not from the thoughts -and hearts of men.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington having shaken off the weight -of the continental policy, proceeded to consider the -question of invading France simply as a military -operation, which might conduce to or militate -against the security of the Peninsula while Napoleon’s -power was weakened by the war in Germany; -and such was his inflexible probity of character,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244"></a>[244]</span> -that no secret ambitious promptings, no facility -of gaining personal reputation, diverted him -from this object, all the renown of which he already -enjoyed, the embarrassments mortifications and difficulties, -enormous, although to the surface-seeing -public there appeared none, alone remaining.</p> - -<p>The rupture of the congress of Prague, Austria’s -accession to the coalition, and the fall of San Sebastian -were favourable circumstances; but he -relied not much on the military skill of the banded -sovereigns, and a great defeat might at any moment -dissolve their alliance. Napoleon could then reinforce -Soult and drive the allies back upon Spain, -where the French still possessed the fortresses of -Santona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon, -Fraga, Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, -Barcelona, Tortoza, Morella, Peniscola, -Saguntum and Denia. Meanwhile lord William -Bentinck, misled by false information, had committed -a serious error in sending Del Parque’s army -to Tudela, because the Ordal disaster and subsequent -retreat shewed that Suchet was strong -enough, if it so pleased him, to drive the Anglo-Sicilian -army back even to the Xucar and recover -all his strong places. In fine the affairs of Catalonia -were in the same unsatisfactory state they -had been in from the first. It was not even certain -that a British army would remain there at all, for -lord William assured of Murat’s defection was intent -upon invading Italy; and the ministers seemed -to have leaned towards the project, since Wellington -now seriously desired to know whether the Anglo-Sicilians -were to go or stay in Spain.</p> - -<p>Lord William himself had quitted that army, -making the seventh change in fifteen months;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245"></a>[245]</span> -this alone was sufficient to account for its misfortunes, -and the Spanish generals, who had been -placed under the English commander, ridiculed the -latter’s ill success and spoke vauntingly of themselves. -Strenuously did lord Wellington urge the -appointment of some commander for the Anglo-Sicilian -troops who would devote his whole attention -to his business, observing that at no period of -the war would he have quitted his own army even -for a few days without danger to its interests. But -the English minister’s ignorance of every thing relating -to war was profound, and at this time he -was himself being stript of generals. Graham, -Picton, Leith, lord Dalhousie, H. Clinton, and -Skerrit, had gone or were going to England on -account of ill health wounds or private business; -and marshal Beresford was at Lisbon, where dangerous -intrigues to be noticed hereafter menaced -the existence of the Portuguese army. Castaños -and Giron had been removed by the Spanish regency -from their commands, and O’Donnel, described -as an able officer but of the most impracticable -temper, being denied the chief command of -Elio’s, Copons’, and Del Parque’s troops, quitted<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Dispatches, MSS.</span> -the army under pretext that his old wounds had -broken out; whereupon, Giron was placed at the -head of the Andalusians. The operations in Catalonia -were however so important, that lord Wellington -thought of going there himself; and he -would have done so, if the after misfortunes of Napoleon -in Germany, had not rendered it impossible -for that monarch to reinforce his troops on the -Spanish frontier.</p> - -<p>These general reasons for desiring to operate on -the side of Catalonia were strengthened also by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246"></a>[246]</span> -consideration, that the country, immediately beyond -the Bidassoa, being sterile, the difficulty of feeding -the army in winter would be increased; and the -twenty-five thousand half-starved Spaniards in his -army, would certainly plunder for subsistence and -incense the people of France. Moreover Soult’s -actual position was strong, his troops still numerous, -and his entrenched camp furnished a -secure retreat. Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de -Port were so placed that no serious invasion could -be made until one or both were taken, or blockaded, -which, during the tempestuous season and while -the admiralty refused to furnish sufficient naval -means, was scarcely possible; even to get at those -fortresses would be a work of time difficult against -Soult alone, impracticable if Suchet, as he well -might, came to the other’s support. Towards Catalonia -therefore lord Wellington desired to turn -when the frontier of the western Pyrenees should -be secured by the fall of Pampeluna. Yet he -thought it not amiss meanwhile to yield something -to the allied sovereigns, and give a spur to public -feeling by occupying a menacing position within -the French territory. A simple thing this seemed -but the English general made no slight concession -when he thus bent his military judgment to political -considerations.</p> - -<p>The French position was the base of a triangle -of which Bayonne was the apex, and the great -roads leading from thence to Irun and St. Jean -Pied de Port, were the sides. A rugged mass of -mountains intervened between the left and centre, -but nearly all the valleys and communications, -coming from Spain beyond the Nive, centred at -St. Jean Pied de Port and were embraced by an entrenched<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247"></a>[247]</span> -camp which Foy occupied in front of that -fortress. That general could, without calling upon -Paris who was at Oleron, bring fifteen thousand -men including the national guards into action, and -serious dispositions were necessary to dislodge him; -but these could not be made secretly, and Soult calculated -upon having time to aid him and deliver a -general battle on chosen ground. Meanwhile Foy -barred any movement along the right bank of the -Nive, and he could, either by the great road leading -to Bayonne or by shorter communications through -Bidaray, reach the bridge of Cambo on the Nive and -so gain Espelette behind the camps of Ainhoa. -From thence, passing the Nivelle by the bridges at -Amotz and Serres he could reach St. Jean de Luz, -and it was by this route he moved to aid in the -attack of San Marcial. However, the allies marching -from the Alduides and the Bastan could also penetrate -by St. Martin D’Arosa and the Gorospil -mountain to Bidaray, that is to say, between Foy’s -and D’Erlon’s positions. Yet the roads were very -difficult, and as the French sent out <ins class="corr" id="tn-247" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'frequent scouring'"> -frequent scouting</ins> detachments and the bridge of Cambo was -secured by works, Foy could not be easily cut off -from the rest of the army.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon’s advanced camps were near Urdax, and -on the Mondarain and Choupera mountains, but his -main position was a broad ridge behind Ainhoa, the<span class="sidenote7">Plans 5 and 6.</span> -right covering the bridge of Amotz. Beyond that -bridge Clauzel’s position extended along a range of -strong hills, trending towards Ascain and Serres, -and as the Nivelle swept with a curve quite round -his rear his right flank rested on that river also. -The redoubts of San Barbe and the camp of Sarre, -barring the roads leading from Vera and the Puerto<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248"></a>[248]</span> -de Echallar, were in advance of his left, and the -greater Rhune, whose bare rocky head lifted two -thousand eight hundred feet above the sea level -overtopped all the neighbouring mountains, formed, -in conjunction with its dependants the Commissary -and Bayonette, a mask for his right.</p> - -<p>From the Bayonette the French position run along -the summit of the Mandale or Sulcogain mountain, -on a single line, but from thence to the sea the -ridges suddenly abated and there were two lines of -defence; the first along the Bidassoa, the second -commencing near St. Jean de Luz stretched from -the heights of Bordegain towards Ascain, having -the camps of Urogne and the Sans Culottes in -advance. Reille’s divisions guarded these lines, and -the second was connected with Clauzel’s position -by Villatte’s reserve which was posted at Ascain. -Finally the whole system of defence was tied to -that of St. Jean Pied de Port, by the double -bridge-head at Cambo which secured the junction -of Foy with the rest of the army.</p> - -<p>The French worked diligently on their entrenchments, -yet they were but little advanced when the -castle of San Sebastian surrendered, and Wellington -had even then matured a plan of attack as -daring as any undertaken during the whole war. -This was to seize the great Rhune mountain and its -dependents, and at the same time to force the passage -of the Lower Bidassoa and establish his left -wing in the French territory. He would thus bring -the Rhune Commissary and Bayonette mountains, -forming a salient menacing point of great altitude -and strength towards the French centre, within his -own system, and shorten his communications by -gaining the command of the road running along<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249"></a>[249]</span> -the river from Irun to Vera. Thus also he would -obtain the port of Fuentarabia, which, though bad -in winter, was some advantage to a general whose -supplies came from the ocean, and who with scanty -means of land-transport had to encounter the perverse -negligence and even opposition of the Spanish -authorities. Moreover Passages, his nearest port, -was restricted in its anchorage-ground, hard to -make from the sea and dangerous when full of -vessels.</p> - -<p>He designed this operation for the middle of -September, immediately after the castle of San -Sebastian fell and before the French works acquired -strength, but some error retarded the arrival -of his pontoons, the weather became bad, and the -attack, which depended as we shall find upon the -state of the tides and fords, was of necessity deferred -until the 7th of October. Meanwhile to -mislead Soult, to ascertain Foy’s true position -about St. Jean Pied de Port, and to strengthen his -own right, he brought part of Del Parque’s force -up from Tudela to Pampeluna. The Andalusian -division which had remained at the blockade after -the battle of Sauroren then rejoined Giron at -Echallar, and at the same time Mina’s troops -gathered in the neighbourhood of Roncesvalles. -Wellington himself repaired to that quarter on the -1st of October, and in his way, passing through<span class="sidenote9">October.</span> -the Alduides, he caused general Campbell to surprize -some isolated posts on the rock of Airola,<span class="sidenote">Foy’s report to Soult, 2d October, MSS.</span> -a French scouting detachment was also cut off near -the foundry of Baygorry, and two thousand sheep -were swept from the valley.</p> - -<p>These affairs awaked Soult’s jealousy. He was -in daily expectation of an attack without being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250"></a>[250]</span> -able to ascertain on what quarter the blow would -fall, and at first, deceived by false information that -the fourth division had reinforced Hill, he thought -the march of Mina’s troops and the Andalusians -was intended to mask an offensive movement by<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of light cavalry -in the Bastan, lord Wellington’s presence at -Roncesvalles, and the loss of the post at Airola -seemed to confirm this; but he knew the pontoons -were at Oyarzun, and some deserters told him that -the real object of the allies was to gain the great -Rhune. On the other hand a French commissary, -taken at San Sebastian and exchanged after remaining -twelve days at Lesaca, assured him, that -nothing at Wellington’s head-quarters indicated a -serious attack, although the officers spoke of one -and there were many movements of troops; and -this weighed much with the French general, because -the slow march of the pontoons and the wet -weather had caused a delay contradictory to the -reports of the spies and deserters. It was also -beyond calculation that Wellington should, against -his military judgment, push his left wing into -France merely to meet the wishes of the allied -sovereigns in Germany, and as the most obvious -line for a permanent invasion was by his right and -centre, there was no apparent cause for deferring -his operations.</p> - -<p>The true reason of the procrastination, namely -the state of the tides and fords on the Lower Bidassoa, -was necessarily hidden from Soult, who -finally inclined to the notion that Wellington only -designed to secure his blockade at Pampeluna from -interruption by menacing the French and impeding -their labours, the results of which were now<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251"></a>[251]</span> -becoming visible. However, as all the deserters -and spies came with the same story he recommended -increased vigilance along the whole line. -And yet so little did he anticipate the nature of -his opponent’s project, that on the 6th he reviewed -D’Erlon’s divisions at Ainhoa, and remained that -night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended -and no way suspecting that it would be -against his right. But Wellington could not diminish -his troops on the side of Roncesvalles and -the Alduides, lest Foy and Paris and the light -cavalry under Pierre Soult should unite at St. Jean -Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna; -the troops at Maya were already posted offensively, -menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle, -and it was therefore only with his left wing and -left centre, and against the French right that he -could act.</p> - -<p>Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred -British soldiers arrived from England. Mina -was then in the Ahescoa, on the right of general -Hill, who was thus enabled to relieve Campbell’s -Portuguese in the Alduides; and the latter marching -to Maya replaced the third division, which, -shifting to its left occupied the heights above -Zagaramurdi, to enable the seventh division to -relieve Giron’s Andalusians in the Puerto de -Echallar.</p> - -<p>These dispositions were made with a view to the -attack of the great Rhune and its dependents, the -arrangements for which shall now be described.</p> - -<p>Giron, moving with his Andalusians from the -Ivantelly, was to assail a lofty ridge or saddle, -uniting the Commissari and the great Rhune. A<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252"></a>[252]</span> -battalion, stealing up the slopes and hollows on his -right flank, was to seize the rocky head of the last-named -mountain, and after placing detachments -there in observation of the roads leading round it<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.</span> -from Sarre and Ascain, was to descend upon the -saddle and menace the rear of the enemy’s position -at the Puerto de Vera. Meanwhile the principal<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span> -attack was to be made in two columns, but -to protect the right and rear against a counter-attack -from Sarre, the Spanish general was to leave -one brigade in the narrow pass leading from Vera, -between the Ivantelly and the Rhune to that -place.</p> - -<p>On the left of Giron the light division was to -assail the Bayonette mountain and the Puerto de -Vera, connecting its right with Giron’s left by skirmishers.</p> - -<p>Longa, who had resumed his old positions above -the Salinas de Lesaca, was to move in two columns -across the Bidassoa. One passing by the -ford of Salinas was to aid the left wing of the -light division in its attack on the Bayonette; the -other passing by the bridge of Vera, was to move -up the ravine separating the slopes of the Bayonette -from the Puerto de Vera, and thus connect -the two attacks of the light division. During these -operations Longa was also to send some men over -the river at Andarlasa, to seize a telegraph which -the French used to communicate between the left -and centre of their line.</p> - -<p>Behind the light division general Cole was to -take post with the fourth division on Santa Barbara, -pushing forward detachments to secure the -commanding points gained by the fighting troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253"></a>[253]</span> -in front. The sixth division was meanwhile to -make a demonstration on the right by Urdax and -Zagaramurdi, against D’Erlon’s advanced posts. -Thus without weakening his line between Roncesvalles -and Echallar lord Wellington put nearly -twenty thousand men in motion against the Rhune -mountain and its dependents, and he had still -twenty-four thousand disposable to force the passage -of the Lower Bidassoa.</p> - -<p>It has been already shewn that between Andarlasa -and Biriatu, a distance of three miles, there -were neither roads nor fords nor bridges. The -French trusting to this difficulty of approach, and -to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the -Mandale, had collected their troops principally, -where the Bildox or green mountain, and the entrenched -camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords. -Against these points Wellington directed general -Freyre’s Spaniards, who were to descend from San -Marcial, cross the upper fords of Biriatu, assail -the Bildox and Mandale mountains, and turn the -left of that part of the enemy’s line which being -prolonged from Biriatu crossed the royal road and -passed behind the town of Andaya.</p> - -<p>Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points -of defence were the mountain of <em>Louis</em> XIV., the -ridge called the <em>Caffé Republicain</em>, and the town -of Andaya. Behind these the <em>Calvaire d’Urogne</em>, -the <em>Croix des Bouquets</em>, and the camp of the <em>Sans -Culottes</em>, served as rallying posts.</p> - -<p>For the assault on these positions Wellington -designed to employ the first and fifth divisions and -the unattached brigades of Wilson and lord Aylmer, -in all about fifteen thousand men. By the -help of Spanish fishermen he had secretly discovered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254"></a>[254]</span> -three fords, practicable at low water, <ins class="corr" id="tn-254" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'between the brige'"> -between the bridge</ins> of Behobia and the sea, and his -intent was to pass his column at the old fords above, -and at the new fords below the bridge, and this -though the tides rose sixteen feet, leaving at the -ebb open heavy sands not less than half a mile -broad. The left bank of the river also was completely -exposed to observation from the enemy’s -hills, which though low in comparison of the mountains -above the bridge, were nevertheless strong -ridges of defence; but relying on his previous -measures to deceive the enemy the English general -disdained these dangers, and his anticipations were -not belied by the result.</p> - -<p>The unlikelihood that a commander, having a -better line of operations, would pass such a river -as the Bidassoa at its mouth, deceived the French -general. Meanwhile his lieutenants were negligent. -Of Reille’s two divisions La Martiniere’s, now -commanded by general Boyer, was at the camp of -Urogne, and on the morning of the seventh was -dispersed as usual to labour at the works; Villatte’s -reserve was at Ascain and Serres; the five thousand -men composing Maucune’s division were indeed on -the first line but unexpectant of an attack, and -though the works on the Mandale were finished and -those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter -to the sea they were scarcely commenced.</p> - -<p><em>Passage of the Bidassoa.</em> The night set in heavily. -A sullen thunder-storm gathering about the -craggy summit of the Pena de Haya came slowly -down its flanks, and towards morning rolling over -the Bidassoa fell in its greatest violence upon the -French positions. During this turmoil Wellington -whose pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255"></a>[255]</span> -disposed a number of guns and howitzers along -the crest of San Marcial, and his columns attained -their respective stations along the banks of the -river. Freyre’s Spaniards one brigade of the -guards and Wilson’s Portuguese, stretching from -the Biriatu fords to that near the broken bridge of -Behobia, were ensconced behind the detached ridge -which the French had first seized in the attack of -the 31st. The second brigade of guards and the -Germans of the first division were concealed near -Irun, close to a ford below the bridge of Behobia -called the great Jonco. The British brigades of -the fifth division covered themselves behind a large<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span> -river embankment opposite Andaya; Sprye’s Portuguese -and lord Aylmer’s brigade were posted in -the ditch of Fuenterabia.</p> - -<p>As all the tents were left standing in the camps -of the allies, the enemy could perceive no change -on the morning of the 7th, but at seven o’clock, -the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade emerging -from their concealment took the sands in two -columns, that on the left pointing against the -French camp of the Sans Culottes, that on the -right against the ridge of Andaya. No shot was -fired, but when they had passed the fords of the -low-water channel a rocket was sent up from the -steeple of Fuenterabia as a signal. Then the guns -and howitzers opened from San Marcial, the troops -near Irun, covered by the fire of a battery, made -for the Jonco ford, and the passage above the -bridge also commenced. From the crest of San -Marcial seven columns could be seen at once, attacking -on a line of five miles, those above the -bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest, -those below it appearing in the distance like huge<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256"></a>[256]</span> -sullen snakes winding over the heavy sands. The -Germans missing the Jonco ford got into deep -water but quickly recovered the true line, and the -French, completely surprised, permitted even the -brigades of the fifth division to gain the right -bank and form their lines before a hostile musket -flashed.</p> - -<p>The cannonade from San Marcial was heard by -Soult at Espelette, and at the same time the sixth -division, advancing beyond Urdax and Zagaramurdi, -made a false attack on D’Erlon’s positions; the -Portuguese brigade under colonel Douglas, were -however pushed too far and repulsed with the loss -of one hundred and fifty men, and the French marshal -instantly detecting the true nature of this attack -hurried to his right, but his camps on the -Bidassoa were lost before he arrived.</p> - -<p>When the British artillery first opened, Maucune’s -troops had assembled at their different posts of -defence, and the French guns, established principally -near the mountain of Louis XIV. and the -Caffé Republicain, commenced firing. The alarm -spread, and Boyer’s marched from the second line -behind Urogne to support Maucune without waiting -for the junction of the working parties; but his brigades -moved separately as they could collect, and -before the first came into action, Sprye’s Portuguese, -forming the extreme left of the allies, menaced the -camp of the Sans Culottes; thither therefore one -of Boyer’s regiments was ordered, while the others -advanced by the royal road towards the Croix des -Bouquets. But Andaya, guarded only by a piquet, -was abandoned, and Reille thinking the camp of the -Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer’s men -reached it, sent a battalion there from the centre,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257"></a>[257]</span> -thus weakening his force at the chief point of attack; -for the British brigades of the fifth division, were now -advancing left in front from Andaya, and bearing -under a sharp fire of artillery and musquetry towards -the Croix des Bouquets.</p> - -<p>By this time the columns of the first division had -passed the river, one above the bridge, preceded by -Wilson’s Portuguese, one below, preceded by Colin -Halkett’s German light troops, who aided by the -fire of the guns on San Marcial, drove back the -enemy’s advanced posts, won the Caffé Republicain, -the mountain of Louis XIV. and drove the French -from those heights to the Croix des Bouquets: this -was the key of the position, and towards it guns and -troops were now hastening from every side. The -Germans who had lost many men in the previous -attacks were here brought to a check, for the heights -were very strong, and Boyer’s leading battalions were -now close at hand; but at this critical moment -colonel Cameron arrived with the ninth regiment of -the fifth division, and passing through the German -skirmishers rushed with great vehemence to the summit -of the first height. The French infantry instantly -opened their ranks to let their guns retire, and then -retreated themselves at full speed to a second ridge, -somewhat lower but where they could only be -approached on a narrow front. Cameron as quickly -threw his men into a single column and bore against -this new position, which curving inwards enabled -the French to pour a concentrated fire upon his regiment; -nor did his violent course seem to dismay -them until he was within ten yards, when appalled -by the furious shout and charge of the ninth they -gave way, and the ridges of the Croix des Bouquets -were won as far as the royal road. The British<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258"></a>[258]</span> -regiment however lost many men and officers, and -during the fight the French artillery and scattered -troops, coming from different points and rallying on -Boyer’s battalions, were gathered on the ridges to -the French left of the road.</p> - -<p>The entrenched camp above Biriatu and the -Bildox, had been meanwhile defended with success -in front, but Freyre turned them with his right wing, -which being opposed only by a single battalion soon -won the Mandale mountain, and the French fell -back from that quarter to the Calvaire d’Urogne -and Jollimont. Reille thus beaten at the Croix des -Bouquets, and his flanks turned, the left by the -Spaniards on the Mandale, the right by the allies -along the sea-coast, retreated in great disorder along -the royal causeway and the old road of Bayonne. -He passed through the village of Urogne and the -British skirmishers at first entered it in pursuit, but -they were beaten out again by the second brigade of -Boyer’s division, for Soult now arrived with part of -Villatte’s reserve and many guns, and by his presence -and activity restored order and revived the -courage of the troops at the moment when the -retreat was degenerating into a flight.</p> - -<p>Reille lost eight pieces of artillery and about four -hundred men, the allies did not lose more than six -hundred of which half were Spaniards, so slight -and easy had the skill of the general rendered this -stupendous operation. But if the French commander -penetrating Wellington’s design, and avoiding -the surprize, had opposed all his troops, amounting -with what Villatte could spare to sixteen -thousand, instead of the five thousand actually -engaged, the passage could scarcely have been -forced; and a check would have been tantamount<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259"></a>[259]</span> -to a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning -tide would have come with a swallowing flood -upon the rear.</p> - -<p>Equally unprepared and equally unsuccessful -were the French on the side of Vera, although the -struggle there proved more fierce and constant.</p> - -<p>At day-break Giron had descended from the -Ivantelly rocks and general Alten from Santa Barbara; -the first to the gorge of the pass leading from -Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where -he was joined by half of Longa’s force.</p> - -<p>One brigade, consisting of the forty-third the -seventeenth Portuguese regiment of the line and the -first and third battalions of riflemen, drew up in -column on an open space to the right of Vera. The -other brigade under colonel Colborne, consisting of -the fifty-second two battalions of Caçadores and a -battalion of British riflemen, was disposed on the left -of Vera. Half of Longa’s division was between these -brigades, the other half after crossing the ford of -Salinas drew up on Colborne’s left. The whole of -the narrow vale of Vera was thus filled with -troops ready to ascend the mountains, and general -Cole displaying his force to advantage on the -heights of Santa Barbara presented a formidable -reserve.</p> - -<p>Taupin’s division guarded the enormous positions -in front of the allies. His right was on the Bayonette, -from whence a single slope descended to a -small plain about two parts down the mountain.<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span> -From this platform three distinct tongues shot into -the valley below, each was defended by an advanced -post, and the platform itself secured by a star -redoubt, behind which, about half-way up the single -slope, there was a second retrenchment with abbatis.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260"></a>[260]</span> -Another large redoubt and an unfinished breast-work -on the superior crest completed the system of defence -for the Bayonette.</p> - -<p>The Commissari, which is a continuation of the -Bayonette towards the great Rhune, was covered by -a profound gulf thickly wooded and defended with -skirmishers, and between this gulf and another of -the same nature the main road, leading from Vera -over the Puerto, pierced the centre of the French -position. Rugged and ascending with short abrupt -turns this road was blocked at every uncovered -point with abbatis and small retrenchments; each -obstacle was commanded, at half musquet shot, by -small detachments placed on all the projecting parts -overlooking the ascent, and a regiment, entrenched -above on the Puerto itself, connected the troops on -the crest of the Bayonette and Commissari with -those on the saddle-ridge, against which Giron’s -attack was directed.</p> - -<p>But between Alten’s right and Giron’s left was -an isolated ridge called by the soldiers the <em>Boar’s -back</em>, the summit of which, about half a mile long -and rounded at each end, was occupied by four -French companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as -it were into the gulf to cover the Puerto and saddle -ridges, although of mean height in comparison of -the towering ranges behind, was yet so great that the -few warning shots fired from the summit by the enemy, -reached the allies at its base with that slow singing -sound which marks the dying force of a musquet-ball. -It was essential to take the Boar’s back before -the general attack commenced, and five companies -of British riflemen, supported by the seventeenth -Portuguese regiment, were ordered to assail it at the -Vera end, while a battalion of Giron’s Spaniards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261"></a>[261]</span> -preceded by a detached company of the forty-third -attacked it on the other.</p> - -<p>At four o’clock in the morning Clauzel had received -intelligence that the Bayonette was to be assaulted -that day or the next, and at seven o’clock he heard -from Conroux, who commanded at Sarre, that Giron’s<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -camps were abandoned although the tents of the -seventh division were still standing; at the same time -the sound of musquetry was heard on the side of -Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun, and then -came Taupin’s report that the vale of Vera was filled -with troops. To this last quarter Clauzel hurried. -The Spaniards had already driven Conroux’s outposts -from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment -was creeping up towards the unguarded head -of the great Rhune. He immediately ordered four -regiments of Conroux’s division to occupy the summit -the front and the flanks of that mountain, and -he formed a reserve of two other regiments behind. -With these troops he designed to secure the mountain -and support Taupin, but ere they could reach -their destination that general’s fate was decided.</p> - -<p><em>Second Combat of Vera.</em>—Soon after seven o’clock -a few cannon-shot from some mountain-guns, of -which each side had a battery, were followed by -the Spanish musquetry on the right, and the next -moment the “<em>Boars back</em>” was simultaneously assailed -at both ends. The riflemen on the Vera side -ascended to a small pine-wood two-thirds of the<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span> -way up and there rested, but soon resuming their -movement with a scornful gallantry they swept the -French off the top, disdaining to use their rifles -beyond a few shots down the reverse side, to show -that they were masters of the ridge. This was the -signal for the general attack. The seventeenth Portuguese<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262"></a>[262]</span> -followed the victorious sharp-shooters, the -forty-third, preceded by their own skirmishers and -by the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, -plunged into the rugged pass, Longa’s troops entered -the gloomy wood of the ravine on the left, -and beyond them Colborne’s brigade moving by -narrow paths and throwing out skirmishers assailed -the Bayonette, the fifty-second took the middle -tongue, the Caçadores and riflemen the two outermost -and all bore with a concentric movement -against the star redoubt on the platform above. -Longa’s second brigade should have flanked the left -of this attack with a wide skirting movement, but -neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of -such warfare, and therefore quietly followed the -riflemen in reserve.</p> - -<p>Soon the open slopes of the mountains were -covered with men and with fire, a heavy confused -sound of mingled shouts and musquetry filled the -deep hollows between, and the white smoke came -curling up above the dark forest trees which covered -their gloomy recesses. The French compared with -their assailants seemed few and scattered on the -mountain side, and Kempt’s brigade soon forced its -way without a check through all the retrenchments -on the main pass, his skirmishers spreading wider -and breaking into small detachments of support as -the depth of the ravine lessened and the slopes melted -into the higher ridges. When about half-way up -an open platform gave a clear view over the Bayonette -slopes, and all eyes were turned that way. -Longa’s right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, -seemed labouring and overmatched, but -beyond, on the broad open space in front of the -star fort, the Caçadores and riflemen of Colborne’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263"></a>[263]</span> -brigade, were seen coming out, in small bodies, -from a forest which covered the three tongues of -land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire -was sharp, their pace rapid, and in a few moments -they closed upon the redoubt in a mass as if resolved -to storm it. The fifty-second were not then -in sight, and the French thinking from the dark -clothing that all were Portuguese rushed in close -order out of the entrenchment; they were numerous -and very sudden; the rifle as a weapon is overmatched -by the musket and bayonet, and this -rough charge sent the scattered assailants back over -the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill cries -the French followed, but just then the fifty-second -appeared, partly in line partly in column, on the -platform, and raising their shout rushed forward. -The red uniform and full career of this regiment -startled the hitherto adventurous French, they -stopped short, wavered, and then turning fled to -their entrenchment; the fifty-second following hard -entered the works with them, the riflemen and -Caçadores who had meanwhile rallied passed it on -both flanks, and for a few moments every thing was -hidden by a dense volume of smoke. Soon however -the British shout pealed again and the whole -mass emerged on the other side, the French, now -the fewer, flying the others pursuing, until the second -entrenchment, half-way up the parent slope, -enabled the retreating troops to make another -stand.</p> - -<p>The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt’s -brigade now echoed along the mountain side, and -with renewed vigour the men continued to scale the -craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to -the top of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne after<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264"></a>[264]</span> -having carried the second entrenchment above the -star fort, was brought to a check by the works on -the very crest of the mountain, from whence the -French not only plied his troops with musquetry at -a great advantage, but rolled huge stones down the -steep.</p> - -<p>These works were extensive well lined with men -and strengthened by a large redoubt on the right, -but the defenders soon faltered, for their left flank -was turned by Kempt and the effects of lord Wellington’s -skilful combinations were now felt in another -quarter. Freyre’s Spaniards after carrying -the Mandale mountain, between Biriatu and the -Bayonette, had pushed to a road leading from the -latter by Jollimont to St. Jean de Luz, and this<span class="sidenote7">Plan 5.</span> -was the line of retreat from the crest of the -Bayonette for Taupin’s right wing; but Freyre’s -Spaniards got there first, and if Longa’s brigade -instead of slowly following Colborne had spread -out widely on the left, a military line would have -been completed from Giron to Freyre. Still Taupin’s -right was cut off on that side, and he was -forced to file it under fire along the crest of the -Bayonette to reach the Puerto de Vera road, where -he was joined by his centre. He effected this but -lost his mountain battery and three hundred men. -These last, apparently the garrison of the large -fort on the extreme right of the Bayonette crest, -were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner. -Accompanied by only one of his staff and half-a-dozen -riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly, -and with great presence of mind and intrepidity -ordered them to lay down their arms, an order which -they thinking themselves entirely cut off obeyed. -Meanwhile the French skirmishers in the deep<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265"></a>[265]</span> -ravine, between the two lines of attack, being -feebly pushed by Longa’s troops, retreated too -slowly and getting amongst some rocks from whence -there was no escape surrendered to Kempt’s brigade.</p> - -<p>The right and centre of Taupin’s division being -now completely beaten fled down the side of the -mountain towards Olette, they were pursued by a -part of the allies until they rallied upon Villatte’s -reserve, which was in order of battle on a ridge -extending across the gorge of Olette between -Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonette and Commissari, -with the Puerto de Vera, were thus won -after five hours’ incessant fighting and toiling up -their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle was -still maintained by the French troops on the Rhune.</p> - -<p>Giron after driving Conroux’s advanced post from -the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre had, following -his orders, pushed a battalion from that side towards -the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve -in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack -which Conroux might make. And when his -left wing was rendered free to move by the capture -of the “<em>Boar’s back</em>” he fought his way up abreast -with the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a -little to his own right of the Puerto. There however -he was arrested by a strong line of abbattis from -behind which two French regiments poured a heavy -fire. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer -Downie, now a Spanish general, encouraged -them with his voice and they kept their ranks, -they seemed irresolute and did not advance. There -happened to be present an officer of the forty-third -regiment named Havelock, who being attached to -general Alten’s staff was sent to ascertain Giron’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266"></a>[266]</span> -progress. His fiery temper could not brook the -check. He took off his hat, he called upon the -Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his -horse, at one bound cleared the abbattis and went -headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, -shouting for “<i lang="es">El chico bianco</i>” “<em>the fair boy</em>” so they -called him, for he was very young and had light -hair, with one shock broke through the French, and -this at the very moment when their centre was -flying under the fire of Kempt’s skirmishers from -the Puerto de Vera.</p> - -<p>The two regiments thus defeated by the Spaniards -retired by their left along the saddle-ridge to the -flanks of the Rhune, so that Clauzel had now eight -regiments concentrated on this great mountain. Two -occupied the crest including the highest rock called -the Hermitage; four were on the flanks, descending -towards Ascain on one hand, and towards Sarre -on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower -and parallel crest behind called the small Rhune. -In this situation they were attacked at four o’clock -by Giron’s right wing. The Spaniards first dislodged -a small body from a detached pile of crags -about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed -the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage itself, -endeavouring at the same time to turn it by their -right. In both objects they were defeated with -loss. The Hermitage was impregnable, the French -rolled down stones large enough to sweep away -a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted -to a distant musketry which lasted until night. -This day’s fighting cost Taupin’s division two generals -and four hundred men killed and wounded, -and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the allies -was nearly a thousand, of which about five hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267"></a>[267]</span> -were Spaniards, and the success was not complete, -for while the French kept possession of the -summit of the Rhune the allies’ new position was -insecure.</p> - -<p>The front and the right flank of that great mountain -were impregnable, but lord Wellington observing -that the left flank, descending towards -Sarre, was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards -on that side on the 8th, designing a combined -attack against the mountain itself, and against -the camp of Sarre. At three o’clock in the afternoon -the rocks which studded the lower parts of -the Rhune slope were assailed by the Spaniards, -and at the same time detachments of the seventh -division descended from the Puerto de Echallar -upon the fort of San Barbe, and other outworks -covering the advanced French camp of Sarre. The -Andalusians soon won the rocks and an entrenched -height that commanded the camp, for Clauzel, too -easily alarmed at some slight demonstrations made -by the sixth division towards the bridge of Amotz in<span class="sidenote7">Plan 6.</span> -rear of his left, thought he should be cut off from -his great camp, and very suddenly abandoned not -only the slope of the mountain but all his advanced -works in the basin below, including the fort of San -Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the -height behind Sarre still holding with their right -the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his -error were soon made apparent. Wellington immediately -established a strong body of the Spanish -troops close up to the rocks of the Hermitage, and -the two French regiments there, seeing the lower -slopes and the fort of San Barbe given up, imagined -they also would be cut off, and without orders -abandoned the impregnable rocks of the Hermitage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268"></a>[268]</span> -and retired in the night to the smaller Rhune. The -next morning some of the seventh division rashly -pushed into the village of Sarre, but they were -quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and -works taken the day before if the Spaniards had not -succoured them.</p> - -<p>The whole loss on the three days of fighting was -about fourteen hundred French and sixteen hundred -of the allies, one half being Spaniards, but many -of the wounded were not brought in until the third -day after the actions, and several perished miserably -where they fell, it being impossible to discover -them in those vast solitudes. Some men were also -lost from want of discipline; having descended into -the French villages they got drunk and were taken -the next day by the enemy. Nor was the number -small of those who plundered in defiance of lord -Wellington’s proclamation; for he thought it necessary -to arrest and send to England several officers, -and renewed his proclamation, observing that if he -had five times as many men he could not venture -to invade France unless marauding was prevented. -It is remarkable that the French troops on the same -day acted towards their own countrymen in the -same manner, but Soult also checked the mischief -with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some -reputation to be shot as an example, for having -suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre during -the action.</p> - -<p>With exception of the slight checks sustained at -Sarre and Ainhoa, the course of these operations -had been eminently successful, and surely the bravery -of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous -positions must be admired. To them the -unfinished state of the French works was not visible.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269"></a>[269]</span> -Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment -had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast -slopes of mountains which were scarcely accessible -from their natural steepness and asperity. This -they could see, yet cared neither for the growing -strength of the works, the height of the mountains, -nor the breadth of the river with its heavy sands, -and its mighty rushing tide; all were despised, and -while they marched with this confident valour, it -was observed that the French fought in defence of -their dizzy steeps with far less fierceness than, -when, striving against insurmountable obstacles, -they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren. -Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the -feebleness of the defence on this occasion may be -traced to another cause. It was a general’s not a -soldier’s battle. Wellington had with overmastering -combinations overwhelmed each point of attack. -Taupin’s and Maucune’s divisions were each less -than five thousand strong, and they were separately -assailed, the first by eighteen the second by fifteen -thousand men, and at neither point were Reille and -Clauzel able to bring their reserves into action -before the positions were won.</p> - -<p>Soult complained that he had repeatedly told -his lieutenants an attack was to be expected, and<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence with the Minister of War, MSS.</span> -recommended extreme vigilance; yet they were -quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of -the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of -the 5th and again on the night of the 6th. The -passage of the river he said had commenced at -seven o’clock, long after daylight, the allies’ masses -were then clearly to be seen forming on the banks, -and there was full time for Boyer’s division to arrive -before the Croix des Bouquets was lost. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270"></a>[270]</span> -battle was fought in disorder with less than five -thousand men, instead of with ten thousand in good -order, and supported by a part of Villatte’s reserve. -To this negligence the generals added also discouragement. -They had so little confidence in the -strength of their positions, that if the allies had -pushed vigorously forward before the marshal’s -arrival from Espelette, they would have entered St. -Jean de Luz, turned the right of the second position -and forced the French army back upon the Nive -and the Adour.</p> - -<p>This reasoning of Soult was correct, but such a -stroke did not belong to lord Wellington’s system. -He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted -whether he could even maintain his army during -the winter in the position he had already gained, -and he was averse to the experiment, while Pampeluna -held out and the war in Germany bore an -undecided aspect.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271"></a>[271]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">Soult was apprehensive for some days that lord<span class="sidenote9">1813. October.</span> -Wellington would push his offensive operations -further, but when he knew by Foy’s reports, and<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -by the numbers of the allies assembled on his right, -that there was no design of attacking his left, he -resumed his labours to advance the works covering -St. Jean de Luz. He also kept a vigilant watch -from his centre, holding his divisions in readiness to -concentrate towards Sarre, and when he saw the -heavy masses in his front disperse by degrees into -different camps, he directed Clauzel to recover the -fort of San Barbe. This work was constructed on -a comparatively low ridge barring issue from the -gorge leading out of the vale of Vera to Sarre, and -it defended the narrow ground between the Rhunes -and the Nivelle river. Abandoned on the 8th -without reason by the French, since it did not naturally -belong to the position of the allies, it was now -occupied by a Spanish picquet of forty men. Some -battalions were also encamped in a small wood close -behind; but many officers and men slept in the fort, -and on the night of the 12th, about eleven o’clock, -three battalions of Conroux’s division reached the -platform on which the fort stood without being perceived. -The work was then escaladed, the troops -behind it went off in confusion at the first alarm,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272"></a>[272]</span> -and two hundred soldiers with fifteen officers were -made prisoners. The Spaniards ashamed of the -surprize made a vigorous effort to recover the fort -at daylight, they were repulsed, and repeated the -attempt with five battalions, but Clauzel brought -up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in -the wood which lasted for several hours, the French -endeavouring to regain the whole of their old entrenchments -and the Spaniards to recover the fort. -Neither succeeded and San Barbe, too near the -enemy’s position to be safely held, was resigned -with a loss of two hundred men by the French and -five hundred by the Spaniards. Soon after this -isolated action a French sloop freighted with stores -for Santona attempted to run from St. Jean de Luz, -and being chased by three English brigs and cut -off from the open sea, her crew after exchanging a -few distant shots with one of the brigs, set her on -fire and escaped in their boats to the Adour.</p> - -<p>Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the -allied army was organized in three grand divisions. -The right having Mina’s and Morillo’s battalions -attached to it was commanded by sir Rowland Hill, -and extended from Roncesvalles to the Bastan. The -centre occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune, and -Bayonette mountains, was given to marshal Beresford. -The left extending from the Mandale mountain -to the sea was under sir John Hope. This -officer succeeded Graham who had returned to -England. Commanding in chief at Coruña after -sir John Moore’s death, he was superior in rank to -lord Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular -war, but when the latter obtained the baton -of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope with a patriotism -and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273"></a>[273]</span> -the friend and comrade of Moore offered to serve as -second in command, and lord Wellington joyfully -accepted him, observing that he was the “<em>ablest -officer in the army</em>.”</p> - -<p>The positions of the right and centre were offensive -and menacing, but the left was still on the -defensive, and the Bidassoa, impassable at high -water below the bridge, was close behind. However -the ridges were strong, a powerful artillery -was established on the right bank, field-works were -constructed, and although the fords below Behobia -furnished but a dangerous retreat even at low water, -those above were always available, and a pontoon -bridge laid down for the passage of the guns during -the action was a sure resource. The front was -along the heights of the Croix des Bouquets facing -Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes, and -there was a reserve in an entrenched camp above -Andaya. The right of the line rested on the Mandale, -and from that mountain and the Bayonette -the allies could descend upon the flank of an attacking -army.</p> - -<p>Soult had however no intention of renewing the -offensive. He had now lost many thousand men in -battle, and the old soldiers remaining did not exceed -seventy-nine thousand present under arms including -officers and artillery-men. Of this number -the garrisons absorbed about thirteen thousand, -leaving sixty-six thousand in the field, whereas the -allies, counting Mina’s and Del Parque’s troops, -now at Tudela, Pampeluna, and the Val de Irati, -exceeded one hundred thousand, seventy-three<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix 7</a>, sect. 2.</span> -thousand, including officers, sergeants, and artillery-men, -being British and Portuguese. And this was -below the calculation of the French general, for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274"></a>[274]</span> -deceived by the exaggerated reports which the -Spaniards always made of their forces, he thought -Del Parque had brought up twenty thousand men -and that there were one hundred and forty thousand -combatants in his front. But it was not so, and -as conscripts of a good description were now -joining the French army rapidly, and the national -guards of the Pyrenees were many, it was in the -number of soldiers rather than of men, that the -English general had the advantage.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs Soult’s policy was to -maintain a strict defensive, under cover of which the -spirit of the troops might be revived, the country in -the rear organized, and the conscripts disciplined -and hardened to war. The loss of the Lower Bidassoa -was in a political view mischievous to him, it had -an injurious effect upon the spirit of the frontier -departments, and gave encouragement to the secret -partizans of the Bourbons; but in a military view -it was a relief. The great development of the -mountains bordering the Bidassoa had rendered -their defence difficult; while holding them he -had continual fear that his line would be pierced -and his army suddenly driven beyond the Adour. -His position was now more concentrated.</p> - -<p>The right, under Reille, formed two lines. One -across the royal road on the fortified heights of -Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes; the -other in the entrenched camps of Bourdegain and<span class="sidenote7">Plan 6.</span> -Belchena, covering St. Jean de Luz and barring the -gorges of Olhette and Jollimont.</p> - -<p>The centre under Clauzel was posted on the -ridges between Ascain and Amotz holding the -smaller Rhune in advance; but one division was -retained by Soult in the camp of Serres on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275"></a>[275]</span> -right of the Nivelle, overhanging Ascain. To replace -it one of D’Erlon’s divisions crossed to the left of -the Nivelle and reinforced Clauzel’s left flank above -Sarre.</p> - -<p>Villatte’s reserve was about St. Jean de Luz but -having the Italian brigade in the camp of Serres.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon’s remaining divisions continued in their -old position, the right connected with Clauzel’s line -by the bridge of Amotz; the left, holding the Choupera -and Mondarin mountains, bordered on the Nive.</p> - -<p>Behind Clauzel and D’Erlon Soult had commenced -a second chain of entrenched camps, prolonged -from the camp of Serres up the right bank -of the Nivelle to San Pé, thence by Suraide to the -double bridge-head of Cambo on the Nive, and -beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain, covering -the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de -Port. He had also called general Paris up from -Oleron to the defence of the latter fortress and its -entrenched camp, and now drew Foy down the -Nive to Bidarray half-way between St. Jean Pied -de Port and Cambo. There watching the issues -from the Val de Baygorry he was ready to occupy -the Ursouia mountain on the right of the Nive, or, -moving by Cambo, to reinforce the great position -on the left of that river according to circumstances.</p> - -<p>To complete these immense entrenchments, which -between the Nive and the sea were double and on -an opening of sixteen miles, the whole army -laboured incessantly, and all the resources of the -country whether of materials or working men -were called out by requisition. Nevertheless this -defensive warfare was justly regarded by the duke -of Dalmatia as unsuitable to the general state of -affairs. Offensive operations were most consonant<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276"></a>[276]</span> -to the character of the French soldiers, and to the -exigencies of the time. Recent experience had -shown the impregnable nature of the allies’ positions -against a front attack, and he was too weak singly -to change the theatre of operations. But when he -looked at the strength of the armies appropriated -by the emperor to the Spanish contest, he thought -France would be ill-served if her generals could not -resume the offensive successfully. Suchet had just -proved his power at Ordal against lord William -Bentinck, and that nobleman’s successor, with -inferior rank and power, with an army unpaid -and feeding on salt meat from the ships, with -jealous and disputing colleagues amongst the -Spanish generals, none of whom were willing to -act cordially with him upon a fixed and well-considered -plan, was in no condition to menace the -French seriously. And that he was permitted at -this important crisis to paralyze from fifty to sixty -thousand excellent French troops possessing all the -strong places of the country, was one of the most -singular errors of the war.</p> - -<p>Exclusive of national guards and detachments of -the line, disposed along the whole frontier to guard -the passes of the Pyrenees against sudden marauding -excursions, the French armies counted at this -time about one hundred and seventy thousand men -and seventeen thousand horses. Of these one hundred<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix 8</a>, sect. 2.</span> -and thirty-eight thousand were present under -arms, and thirty thousand conscripts were in march -to join them. They held all the fortresses of Valencia -and Catalonia, and most of those in Aragon -Navarre and Guipuscoa, and they could unite -behind the Pyrenees for a combined effort in safety. -Lord Wellington could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277"></a>[277]</span> -and all the Spaniards in arms on the -eastern coast, bring into line one hundred and fifty -thousand men; he had several sieges on his hands, -and to unite his forces at any point required great -dispositions to avoid an attack during a flank march. -Suchet had above thirty thousand disposable men, -he could increase them to forty thousand by relinquishing -some unimportant posts, his means in -artillery were immense, and distributed in all his -strong places, so that he could furnish himself from -almost any point. It is no exaggeration therefore -to say that two hundred pieces of artillery and -ninety thousand old soldiers might have united at -this period upon the flank of lord Wellington, still -leaving thirty thousand conscripts and the national -guards of the frontier, supported by the fortresses -and entrenched camps of Bayonne and St. Jean -Pied de Port, the castles of Navarens and Jaca on -one side, and the numerous garrisons of the fortresses -in Catalonia on the other, to cover France -from invasion.</p> - -<p>To make this great power bear in a right direction -was the duke of Dalmatia’s object, and his -plans were large, and worthy of his reputation. -Yet he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his -projects, and that marshal’s resistance would appear -to have sprung from personal dislike contracted -during Soult’s sojourn near Valencia in -1812. It has been already shown how lightly he -abandoned Aragon and confined himself to Catalonia -after quitting Valencia. He did not indeed -then know that Soult had assumed the command of -the army of Spain and was preparing for his great -effort to relieve Pampeluna; but he was aware that -Clauzel and Paris were on the side of Jaca, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278"></a>[278]</span> -he was too good a general not to know that operating -on the allies’ flank was the best mode of -palliating the defeat of Vittoria. He might have -saved both his garrison and castle of Zaragoza; -the guns and other materials of a very large field-artillery -equipment were deposited there, and from -thence, by Jaca, he could have opened a sure and -short communication with Soult, obtained information -of that general’s projects, and saved Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>It may be asked why the duke of Dalmatia did -not endeavour to communicate with Suchet. The -reason was simple. The former quitted Dresden -suddenly on the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the -12th, and on the 20th his troops were in full march -towards St. Jean Pied de Port, and it was during this -very rapid journey that the other marshal abandoned -Valencia. Soult therefore knew neither Suchet’s plans -nor the force of his army, nor his movements, nor his -actual position, and there was no time to wait for -accurate information. However between the 6th -and the 16th of August, that is to say, immediately -after his own retreat from Sauroren, he -earnestly prayed that the army of Aragon should -march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by -Jaca, and thus drawing off some of Wellington’s -forces facilitate the efforts of the army of Spain to -relieve San Sebastian. In this communication he -stated, that his recent operations had caused troops -actually in march under general Hill towards Catalonia -to be recalled. This was an error. His -emissaries were deceived by the movements, and -counter-movements in pursuit of Clauzel immediately -after the battle of Vittoria, and by the -change in Wellington’s plans as to the siege of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279"></a>[279]</span> -Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia, -but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham, -and the Conde de La Bispal were all mentioned, in -this correspondence between Soult and Suchet, as -being actually in Catalonia, or on the march, the -three first having been really sounded as to taking -the command in that quarter, and the last having -demanded it himself.</p> - -<p>Suchet treated Soult’s proposal as chimerical. His -movable troops he said did not exceed eleven -thousand, and a march upon Zaragoza with so few -men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen, -unless he could fly into France by Venasque where -he had a garrison. An extraordinary view of affairs -which he supported by statements still more extraordinary!</p> - -<p>“<em>General Hill had joined lord William Bentinck -with twenty-four thousand men.</em>” “<em>La Bispal had -arrived with fifteen thousand.</em>” “<em>There were more -than two hundred thousand men on the Ebro.</em>” -“<em>The Spanish insurrection was general and strongly -organized.</em>” “<em>He had recovered the garrison of -Taragona and destroyed the works, and <ins class="corr" id="tn-279" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'he must revitual'"> -he must revictual</ins> Barcelona and then withdraw to the vicinity -of Gerona and remain on the defensive</em>”!</p> - -<p>This letter was written on the 23d of August, -when lord William Bentinck had just retreated from -the Gaya into the mountains above Hospitalet. The -imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of -Catalonia and Aragon, both under his command,<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix 8</a>, Sect. 2.</span> -exceeded sixty-five thousand men, fifty-six thousand -being present under arms. Thirty thousand -were united in the field when he received Soult’s -letter. There was nothing to prevent him marching -upon Tortoza, except lord William Bentinck’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280"></a>[280]</span> -army which had just acknowledged by a -retreat its inability to cope with him; there was -nothing at all to prevent him marching to Lerida. -The count of Bispal had thrown up his command -from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on -the Echallar mountains. Sir Rowland Hill was at -Roncesvalles, and not a man had moved from Wellington’s -army. Elio and Roche were near Valencia -in a starving condition. The Anglo-Sicilian -troops only fourteen thousand strong including -Whittingham’s division, were on the barren mountains -above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army -could remain; Del Parque’s troops and Sarzfield’s -division had gone over the Ebro, and Copons’ Catalans -had taken refuge in the mountains of Cervera. -In fine not two hundred thousand but less -than thirty-five thousand men, half-organized ill-fed -and scattered from Vich to Vinaros were -opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different -views and different lines of operations. The Anglo-Sicilians -could not abandon the coast, Copons could -not abandon the mountains. Del Parque’s troops -soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and to use -lord Wellington’s phrase there was nothing to prevent -Suchet “<em>tumbling lord William Bentinck back -even to the Xucar</em>.” The true nature of the great -insurrection which the French general pretended to -dread shall be shown when the political condition -of Spain is treated of.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s errors respecting the allies were easily -detected by Soult, those touching the French in -Catalonia he could not suspect and acquiesced -in the objections to his first plan; but fertile of -resource he immediately proposed another, akin to -that which he had urged Joseph to adopt in 1812<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281"></a>[281]</span> -after the battle of Salamanca, namely, to change -the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would -he said, inevitably fall before the allies in succession -if the French armies remained on the defensive, -and the only mode of rendering offensive -operations successful was a general concentration -of means and unity of action. The levy of conscripts -under an imperial decree, issued in August, -would furnish, in conjunction with the depôts of -the interior, a reinforcement of forty thousand men. -Ten thousand would form a sufficient corps of observation -about Gerona. The armies of Aragon and -Catalonia could, he hoped, by sacrificing some -posts produce twenty thousand infantry in the field. -The imperial muster-rolls prove that they could -have produced forty thousand, but Soult misled by -Suchet’s erroneous statements assumed only twenty -thousand, and he calculated that he could himself -bring thirty-five or forty thousand good infantry -and all his cavalry to a given point of junction for -the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen -thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to -be directed on that place, and thus seventy or -seventy-five thousand infantry all the cavalry of -both armies and one hundred guns, would be suddenly -assembled, to thread the narrow pass of Jaca -and descend upon Aragon. Once in that kingdom -they could attack the allied troops in Navarre if -the latter were dispersed, and if they were united -retire upon Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and -deliver a general battle upon the new line of operations. -Meanwhile the fifteen thousand unappropriated -conscripts might reinforce the twenty -or twenty-five thousand old soldiers left to cover -Bayonne.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282"></a>[282]</span></p> - -<p>An army so great and strongly constituted appearing -in Aragon would, Soult argued, necessarily -raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca, -Fraga, and Monzon, the two last being now -menaced by the bands, and it was probable that -Tortoza and even Saguntum would be relieved. -The great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca, -yet he was resolved to try, even though he should -convey them upon trucks to be made in Paris and -sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious -inconvenience from the union of the troops in -France since Suchet had already declared his intention -of retiring towards Gerona; and on the -Bayonne side the army to be left there could dispute -the entrenched line between Cambo and St. -Jean de Luz. If driven from thence it could take -a flanking position behind the Nive, the right resting -upon the entrenched camp of Bayonne, the left -upon the works at Cambo and holding communication -by the fortified mountain of Ursouia with St. -Jean Pied de Port. But there could be little fear -for this secondary force when the great army was -once in Aragon. That which he most dreaded was -delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected -after the middle of October, would entirely -close the pass of Jaca.</p> - -<p>This proposition written the 2d of September, -immediately after the battle of San Marcial, -reached Suchet the 11th and was peremptorily -rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia discouragement, -he said, would spread, desertion would -commence, and France be immediately invaded by -lord William Bentinck at the head of fifty thousand -men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable and the -power of man could not open it for carriages under<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283"></a>[283]</span> -a year’s labour. His wish was to act on the defensive, -but if an offensive movement was absolutely -necessary, he offered a counter-project; that -is, he would first make the English in his front -re-embark at Taragona, or he would drive them -over the Ebro and then march with one hundred -guns and thirty thousand men by Lerida to the -Gallego river near Zaragoza. Soult’s army, coming -by Jaca without guns, might there meet him, and -the united forces could then do what was fitting. -But to effect this he required a reinforcement of -conscripts, and to have Paris’s division and the -artillery-men and draft horses of Soult’s army sent -to Catalonia; he demanded also that two thousand -bullocks for the subsistence of his troops should -be provided to meet him on the Gallego. Then -touching upon the difficulties of the road from -Sanguessa to Pampeluna, he declared, that after -forcing Wellington across the Ebro, he would return -to Catalonia to revictual his fortresses and -prevent an invasion of France. This plan he -judged far less dangerous than Soult’s, yet he -enlarged upon its difficulties and its dangers if the -combined movements were not exactly executed. -In fine, he continued, “The French armies are -entangled amongst rocks, and the emperor should -direct a third army upon Spain, to act between the -Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the -army of Spain sixty thousand strong and that of -Aragon thirty thousand strong operate on the -flanks. Thus <em>the reputation of the English army, -too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will -be abated</em>.”</p> - -<p>This illiberal remark combined with the defects -of his project, proves that the duke of Albufera<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284"></a>[284]</span> -was far below the duke of Dalmatia’s standard both -in magnanimity and in capacity. The one giving -his adversary just praise, thought the force already -supplied by the emperor sufficient to dispute for -victory; the other, with an unseemly boast, desired -overwhelming numbers.</p> - -<p>Soult’s letter reached Suchet the day before the -combat of Ordal, and in pursuance of his own plan -he should have driven lord William Bentinck over -the Ebro, as he could well have done, because the -Catalan troops there separated from the Anglo-Sicilians. -In his former letters he had estimated -the enemies in his front at two hundred thousand -fighting men, and affirmed that his own disposable -force was only eleven thousand, giving that as a -reason why he could not march to Aragon. Now, -forgetful of his previous objections and estimates, -he admitted that he had thirty thousand disposable -troops, and proposed the very movement which he -had rejected as madness when suggested by the -duke of Dalmatia. And the futility of his arguments -relative to the general discouragement, the -desertion of his soldiers, and the temptation to an -invasion of France if he adopted Soult’s plan, is -apparent; for these things could only happen on -the supposition that he was retreating from weakness, -a notion which would have effectually covered -the real design until the great movement in advance -should change the public opinion. Soult’s -plan was surer better imagined and grander than -his; it was less dangerous in the event of failure -and more conformable to military principles. Suchet’s -project involved double lines of operation -without any sure communications, and consequently -without any certainty of just co-operation;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285"></a>[285]</span> -his point of junction was within the enemy’s power, -and the principal army was to be deprived of its -artillery. There was no solidity in this design; -a failure would have left no resource. But in -Soult’s project the armies were to be united at a -point beyond the enemy’s reach, and to operate -afterwards in mass with all arms complete, which -was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet -indeed averred the impracticability of moving the -guns by Jaca, yet Soult’s counter-opinion claims -more respect. Clauzel and Paris who had lately -passed with troops through that defile were in his -camp, he had besides made very exact inquiries of -the country people, had caused the civil engineers -of roads and bridges on the frontiers to examine -the route, and from their reports he judged the difficulty -to be not insurmountable.</p> - -<p>Neither the inconsistency, nor the exaggerations -of Suchet’s statements, escaped Soult’s observation, -but anxious to effect something while Pampeluna -still held out, and the season permitted operations -in the mountains he frankly accepted the other’s -modification, and adopted every stipulation, save -that of sending the artillery-men and horses of his -army to Catalonia which he considered dangerous. -Moreover he doubted not to pass his own guns by -Jaca. The preparations for this great movement -were therefore immediately commenced, and Suchet -on his part seemed equally earnest although he -complained of increasing difficulties, pretended -that Longa’s and Morillo’s divisions had arrived in -Catalonia, that general Graham was also in march -with troops to that quarter, and deplored the loss -of Fraga from whence the Empecinado had just -driven his garrison. This post commanded indeed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286"></a>[286]</span> -a bridge over the Cinca a river lying in his way -and dangerous from its sudden and great floods but -he still possessed the bridge of Monzon.</p> - -<p>During this correspondence between the French -marshals, Napoleon remained silent, yet at a later -period he expressed his discontent at Suchet’s inactivity, -and indirectly approved of Soult’s plans -by recommending a movement towards Zaragoza -which Suchet however did not execute. It would -appear that the emperor having given all the reinforcements -he could spare, and full powers to both -marshals to act as they judged fitting for his service, -would not, at a distance and while engaged in such -vast operations as those he was carrying on at Dresden, -decide so important a question. The vigorous -execution essential to success was not to be expected -if either marshal acted under constraint and against -his own opinion; Soult had adopted Suchet’s -modification and it would have been unwise to substitute -a new plan which would have probably displeased -both commanders. Meanwhile Wellington -passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet’s project was annulled -by the approach of winter and by the further -operations of the allies.</p> - -<p>If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon -had been happily achieved, it would certainly -have forced Wellington to repass the Ebro -or fight a great battle with an army much -less strongly constituted than the French army. -If he chose the latter, victory would have profited -him little, because his enemy strong in -cavalry could have easily retired on the fortresses -of Catalonia. If he received a check he must have -gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to Portugal, and -the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287"></a>[287]</span> -and Valencia. It is not probable however that such -a great operation could have been conducted without -being discovered in time by Wellington. It has -been already indicated in this History, that besides -the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence -employed by all generals, he had secret -emissaries amongst Joseph’s courtiers, and even -amongst French officers of rank; and it has been -shown that Soult vainly endeavoured to surprise him -on the 31st of August when the combinations were -only two days old. It is true that the retreat of -Suchet from Catalonia and his junction with Soult -in France at the moment when Napoleon was pressed -in Germany, together with the known difficulty of -passing guns by Jaca, would naturally have led to -the belief that it was a movement of retreat and -fear; nevertheless the secret must have been known -to more than one person about each marshal, and -the English general certainly had agents who were -little suspected. Soult would however still have -had the power of returning to his old positions, and, -with his numbers increased by Suchet’s troops, -could have repeated his former attack by the Roncesvalles. -It might be that his secret design was -thus to involve that marshal in his operations, and -being disappointed he was not very eager to -adopt the modified plan of the latter, which the -approach of the bad season, and the menacing -position of Wellington, rendered each day less promising. -His own project was hardy, and dangerous -for the allies, and well did it prove lord Wellington’s -profound acquaintance with his art. For he had -entered France only in compliance with the wishes -of the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely -for Suchet, averring that the true military line of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288"></a>[288]</span> -operations was towards Aragon and Catalonia. -Being now however actually established in France, -and the war in Germany having taken a favourable -turn for the allies, he resolved to continue the operations -on his actual front awaiting only the</p> - - -<h4>FALL OF PAMPELUNA.</h4> - -<p>This event was produced by a long blockade,<span class="sidenote9">September.</span> -less fertile of incident than the siege of San Sebastian -yet very honourable to the firmness of the -governor general Cassan.</p> - -<p>The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants, -stood on a bold table-land on which a number of -valleys opened, and where the great roads, coming -from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguessa, Tudela, -Estella, Vittoria, and Irurzun, were concentrated. -The northern and eastern fronts of the fortress were -covered by the Arga, and the defences there consisted -of simple walls edging the perpendicular -rocky bank of the river, but the other fronts were -regularly fortified with ditches, covered way, and -half-moons. Two bad unfinished outworks were -constructed on the south front, but the citadel which -stood on the south west was a regular pentagon, -with bomb-proofs and magazines, vaulted barracks -for a thousand men, and a complete system of -mines.</p> - -<p>Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by -Mina for eighteen months previous to the battle of -Vittoria, and when Joseph arrived after the action, -the place was badly provisioned. The stragglers -of his army increased the garrison to something -more than three thousand five hundred men of all -arms, who were immediately invested by the allies. -Many of the inhabitants went off during the short<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289"></a>[289]</span> -interval between the king’s arrival and departure, -and general Cassan, finding his troops too few for -action and yet too many for the food, abandoned <ins class="corr" id="tn-289" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the two outwarks'"> -the two outworks</ins> on the south, demolished everything -which could interfere with his defence outside, and -commenced such works as he deemed necessary -to improve it inside. Moreover <ins class="corr" id="tn-289a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'forseeing that the'"> -foreseeing that the</ins> French army might possibly make a sudden march -without guns to succour the garrison, he prepared -a field-train of forty pieces to meet the occasion.</p> - -<p>It has been already shown that Wellington,<span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -although at first inclined to besiege Pampeluna, -finally established a blockade and ordered works of -contravallation to be constructed. Cassan’s chief -object was then to obtain provisions, and on the -28th and 30th of June he sustained actions outside -the place to cover his foragers. On the 1st of July -he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the -river Arga, and forced many inhabitants to quit the -place before the blockaders’ works were completed. -Skirmishes now occurred almost daily, the French -always seeking to gather the grain, and vegetables -which were ripe and abundant beyond the walls, -and the allies endeavouring to set fire to the standing -corn within range of the guns of the fortress.</p> - -<p>On the 14th of July, O’Donnel’s Andalusians -were permanently established as the blockading -force, and the next day the garrison made a successful -forage on the south side of the town. This -operation was repeated towards the east beyond the -Arga on the 19th, when a sharp engagement of -cavalry took place, during which the remainder of -the garrison carried away a great deal of corn.</p> - -<p>The 26th the sound of Soult’s artillery reached -the place, and Cassan, judging rightly that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290"></a>[290]</span> -marshal was in march to succour Pampeluna, made -a sally in the night by the Roncesvalles road; he -was driven back, but the next morning he came out -again with eleven hundred men and two guns, overthrew -the Spanish outguards, and advanced towards -Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling -back with the third and fourth divisions. Then -O’Donnel, as I have before related, evacuated some -of the entrenchments, destroyed a great deal of -ammunition, spiked a number of guns, and but for -the timely arrival of Carlos D’España’s division, and -the stand made by Picton at Huarte, would have -abandoned the blockade altogether.</p> - -<p>Soon the battle on the mountains of Oricain commenced, -the smoke rose over the intervening heights -of Escava and San Miguel, the French cavalry -appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the baggage -of the allies was seen filing in the opposite direction -by Berioplano along the road of Irurzun. The -garrison thought deliverance sure, and having reaped -a good harvest withdrew into the place. The -bivouac fires of the French army cheered them -during the night, and the next morning a fresh -sally being made with the greatest confidence, -a great deal of corn was gathered with little loss of -men. Several deserters from the foreign regiments -in the English service also came over with intelligence -exaggerated and coloured after the manner -of such men, and the French re-entered the place -elated with hope; but in the evening the sound of -the conflict ceased and the silence of the next day -shewed that the battle was not to the advantage of -Soult. However the governor losing no time made -another sally and again obtained provisions from the -south side.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_291"></a>[291]</span></p> - -<p>The 30th the battle recommenced but the retreating -fire of the French told how the conflict was -decided and the spirit of the soldiers fell. Nevertheless -their indefatigable officers led another -sally on the south side, whence they carried off -grain and some ammunition which had been left in -one of the abandoned outworks.</p> - -<p>On the 31st Carlos D’España’s troops and two -thousand of O’Donnel’s Andalusians, in all about -seven thousand men, resumed the blockade, and -maintained it until the middle of September, when<span class="sidenote9">September.</span> -the Prince of Anglona’s division of Del Parque’s -army, relieved the Andalusians who rejoined their -own corps near Echallar. The allies’ works of contravallation -were now augmented, and when Paris -retired into France from Jaca, part of Mina’s troops -occupied the valleys leading from the side of Sanguessa -to Pampeluna and made entrenchments to -bar the escape of the garrison that way.</p> - -<p>In October Cassan put his fighting men upon -rations of horse-flesh, four ounces to each, with -some rice, and he turned more families out of the -town, but this time they were fired upon by their -countrymen and forced to re-enter.</p> - -<p>On the 9th of September baron Maucune, who -had conducted most of the sallies during the -blockade, attacked and carried some fortified houses -on the east side of the place; he was immediately -assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them -and pursued the fugitives close to Villalba. Carlos -D’España then advanced to their aid in person with -a greater body and the French were driven in with -the loss of eighty men, yet the Spaniards lost a far -greater number, Carlos D’España himself was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292"></a>[292]</span> -wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn which -was their principal object.</p> - -<p>The soldiers were now feeding on rats and other -disgusting animals; seeking also for roots beyond -the walls many in their hunger poisoned themselves -with hemlock, and a number of others unable to -bear their misery deserted. In this state Cassan<span class="sidenote9">October.</span> -made a general sally on the 10th of October, to -ascertain the strength of the lines around him, with -a view to breaking through, but after some fighting, -his troops were driven in with the loss of seventy -men and all hope of escape vanished. Yet he still -spoke of attempting it, and the public manner in -which he increased the mines under the citadel -induced Wellington to reinforce the blockade, and -to bring up his cavalry into the vicinity of Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>The scurvy now invaded the garrison. One thousand -men were sick, eight hundred had been -wounded, the deaths by battle and disease exceeded -four hundred, one hundred and twenty had deserted, -and the governor moved by the great misery, offered -on the 26th to surrender if he was allowed to retire -into France with his troops and six pieces of cannon. -This being refused he proposed to yield on condition -of not serving for a year and a day, which being -also denied, he broke off the negociation, giving -out that he would blow up the works of the fortress -and break through the blockade. To deter him a -menacing letter was thrown to his outposts, and -lord Wellington being informed of his design denounced -it as contrary to the laws of war, and -directed Carlos D’España to put him, all his officers -and non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293"></a>[293]</span> -soldiers to death when the place should be taken -if any damage were done to the works.</p> - -<p>Cassan’s object being merely to obtain better -terms this order remained dormant, and happily so, -for the execution would never have borne the test -of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna -and break through the blockading force, as -Brennier did at Almeida, would have been a very -noble exploit, and a useful one for the French army -if Soult’s plan of changing the theatre of war by -descending into Aragon had been followed. There -could therefore be nothing contrary to the laws of -war in a resolute action of that nature. On the -other hand if the governor, having no chance whatever -of success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence -for destroying a great fortress belonging to -the Spaniards and depriving the allies of the fruits -of their long blockade and glorious battles, the -conquerors might have justly exercised that severe -but undoubted right of war, refusing quarter to an -enemy. But lord Wellington’s <ins class="corr" id="tn-293" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'letter to España'"> -letter to D’España</ins> involved another question, namely the putting of -prisoners to death. For the soldiers could not be -decimated until captured, and their crime would -have been only obedience to orders in a matter of -which they dared not judge. This would have been -quite contrary to the usages of civilized nations, and -the threat must undoubtedly be considered only as -a device to save the works of Pampeluna and to -avoid the odium of refusing quarter.</p> - -<p>A few days longer the governor and garrison -endured their distress and then capitulated, having -defended themselves more than four months with -great constancy. The officers and soldiers became -prisoners of war. The first were allowed to keep<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294"></a>[294]</span> -their arms and baggage, the second their knapsacks, -expressly on the ground that they had treated the -inhabitants well during the investment. This compliment -was honourable to both sides, but there was -another article, <ins class="corr" id="tn-294" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'enforced by España'"> -enforced by D’España</ins> without being -accepted by the garrison, for which it is difficult to -assign any motive but the vindictive ferocity of the -Spanish character. No person of either sex was -permitted to follow the French troops, and women’s -affections were thus barbarously brought under the -action of the sword.</p> - -<p>There was no stronghold now retained by the -French in the north of Spain except Santona, and -as the blockade of that place had been exceedingly -tedious, lord Wellington, whose sea communications -were interrupted by the privateers from -thence, formed a small British corps under lord -Aylmer with a view to attack Laredo, which being -on the opposite point of the harbour to Santona -commanded the anchorage. Accidental circumstances -however prevented this body from proceeding -to its destination and Santona remained in the -enemy’s possession. With this exception the contest -in the northern parts of Spain was terminated and -the south of France was now to be invaded; but it -is fitting first to show with what great political -labour Wellington brought the war to this state, -what contemptible actions and sentiments, what a -faithless alliance, and what vile governments his -dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295"></a>[295]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXII_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><em>Political state of Portugal.</em> In this country the<span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -national jealousy which had been compressed by -the force of invasion expanded again with violence -as danger receded, and the influence of England -sunk precisely in the measure that her army -assured the safety of Portugal. When Wellington -crossed the Ebro, the Souza faction, always opposed -in the council to the British policy, became -elate; and those members of the government who -had hitherto cherished the British ascendancy -because it sustained them against the Brazilian -court intrigues, now sought popularity by taking -an opposite direction. Each person of the regency -had his own line of opposition marked out. -Noguera vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial -and financial operations; the Principal -Souza wrangled more fiercely and insolently at the -council-board; the Patriarch fomented ill-will at<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -Lisbon and in the northern provinces; Forjas, ambitious -to command the national troops, became -the organ of discontent upon military matters. -The return of the prince-regent, the treaty of -commerce, the Oporto company, the privileges of -the British factory merchants, the mode of paying -the subsidy, the means of military transport, the -convention with Spain relative to the supply of the -Portuguese troops in that country, the recruiting,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296"></a>[296]</span> -the organization, the command of the national -army, and the honours due to it, all furnished occasions -for factious proceedings, which were conducted -with the ignoble subtlety that invariably -characterizes the politics of the Peninsula. Moreover -the expenditure of the British army had been -immense, the trade and commerce dependent upon -it, now removed to the Spanish ports, enormous. -Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal -taxes carelessly or partially enforced were vexatious -to the people without being profitable to the government. -Nine-tenths of the revenue accrued -from duties upon British trade, and the sudden -cessation of markets and of employment, the absence -of ready money, the loss of profit, public -and private, occasioned by the departure of the -army while the contributions and other exactions -remained the same, galled all classes, and the -whole nation was ready to shake off the burthen -of gratitude.</p> - -<p>In this state of feeling emissaries were employed -to promulgate in various directions tales, some -true some false, of the disorders perpetrated by -the military detachments on the lines of communication, -adding that they were the result of secret -orders from Wellington to satisfy his personal hatred -of Portugal! At the same time discourses -and writings against the British influence abounded -in Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed -or surpassed by the London newspapers, whose -statements overflowing of falsehood could be -traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital. -It was asserted that England intending to retain -her power in Portugal opposed the return of the -prince-regent; that the war itself being removed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297"></a>[297]</span> -to the frontier of France was become wholly a -Spanish cause; that it was not for Portugal to levy -troops, and exhaust her resources to help a nation -whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner -or later to resist.</p> - -<p>Mr. Stuart’s diplomatic intercourse with the government -always difficult was now a continual remonstrance -and dispute; his complaints were met -with insolence or subterfuge, and illegal violence -against the persons and property of British subjects -was pushed so far, that Mr. Sloane, an English -gentleman upon whom no suspicion rested, -was cast into prison for three months because he -had come to Lisbon without a passport. The -rights of the English factory were invaded, and -the Oporto company which had been established -as its rival in violation of treaty was openly cherished. -Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious -company robbed every body, and the -prince-regent promising either to reform or totally -abolish it ordered a preparatory investigation, but -to use the words of Mr. Stuart, the regency acted -on the occasion no less unfairly by their sovereign -than unjustly by their ally.</p> - -<p>Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants -were another cause of disquiet. They pretended -to exemption from certain taxes, and from -billets, and that a fixed number of their clerks -domestics and cattle should be exonerated of military -service. These pretensions were disputed. -The one touching servants and cattle, doubtful at -best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to -billets unfounded; but the taxes were justly resisted, -and the merchants offered a voluntary contribution -to the same amount. The government<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298"></a>[298]</span> -rudely refused this offer, seized their property, -imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to -transport supplies that never reached the troops, -and made soldiers of their clerks and servants -without any intention of reinforcing the army. -Mr. Stuart immediately deducted from the subsidy -the amount of the property thus forcibly taken, -and repaid the sufferers. The regency then commenced -a dispute upon the fourth article of the -treaty of commerce, and the prince, though he -openly ordered it to be executed, secretly permitted -count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain -in London as ambassador until the disputes -arising upon this treaty generally were arranged. -Funchal who disliked to quit London took care to -interpose many obstacles to a final decision, always -advising delay under pretence of rendering ultimate -concession of value in other negociations then depending.</p> - -<p>When the battle of Vittoria became known, the -regency proposed to entreat the return of the prince -from the Brazils, hoping thereby to excite the opposition -of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to -their expectations, approved of the proposal they -deferred the execution. The British cabinet which -had long neglected Wellington’s suggestions on this -head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro, and -Funchal who had been at first averse now urged -it warmly, fearing that if the prince remained he -could no longer defer going to the Brazils. However -few of the Portuguese nobles desired the -return of the royal family, and when the thing was -proposed to the regent he discovered no inclination -for the voyage.</p> - -<p>But the most important subject of discord was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299"></a>[299]</span> -the army. The absence of the sovereign and the -intrigues which ruled the court of Rio Janeiro had -virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an -oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government -formed for mischief. The whole course -of this history has shewn that all Wellington’s -energy and ability, aided by the sagacity and firmness -of Mr. Stuart and by the influence of England’s -power and riches, were scarcely sufficient to -meet the evils flowing from this foul source. Even -while the French armies were menacing the capital -the regency was split into factions, the financial -resources were neglected or wasted, the public -servants were insolent incapable and corrupt, the -poorer people oppressed, and the military force for -want of sustenance was at the end of 1812 on the -point of dissolving together. The strenuous interference -of the English general and envoy, seconded -by the extraordinary exertions of the British officers -in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the -efficiency of the army, and in the campaign of -1813 the spirit of the troops was surpassing. Even -the militia-men, who had been deprived of their -colours and drafted into the line to punish their -bad conduct at Guarda under general Trant in -1812, nobly regained their standards on the Pyrenees.</p> - -<p>But this state of affairs acting upon the naturally -sanguine temperament and vanity of the Portuguese, -created a very exaggerated notion of their -military prowess and importance, and withal a<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -morbid sensitiveness to praise or neglect. General -Picton had thrown some slur upon the conduct of -a regiment at Vittoria, and marshal Beresford complained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300"></a>[300]</span> -that full justice had not been done to their -merits. The eulogiums passed in the English parliament -and in the despatches upon the conduct -of the British and Spanish troops, but not extended -to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation, and -the remarks and omissions of the London newspapers -were as wormwood.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the regency, under pretext of a dispute -with Spain relative to a breach of the military -convention of supply, neglected the subsistence -of the army altogether; and at the same time so -many obstacles to the recruiting were raised, that -the depôts, which ought to have furnished twelve -thousand men to replace the losses sustained in the -campaign, only contained four thousand, who were -also without the means of taking the field. This -matter became so serious that Beresford quitting -the army in October came to Lisbon, to propose a -new regulation which should disregard the exemptions -claimed by the nobles the clergy and the -English merchants for their servants and followers. -On his arrival Forjas urged the public discontent -at the political position of the Portuguese troops. -They were, he said, generally incorporated with -the British divisions, commanded by British officers, -and having no distinct recognized existence -their services were unnoticed and the glory of the -country suffered. The world at large knew not -how many men Portugal furnished for the war. -It was known indeed that there were Portuguese -soldiers, as it was known that there were Brunswickers -and Hanoverians, but as a national army -nothing was known of them; their exertions, their -courage, only went to swell the general triumph of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301"></a>[301]</span> -England, while the Spaniards, inferior in numbers, -and far inferior in all military qualities, were flattered, -praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the -English newspapers, and in the discourses and -votes of the British parliament. He proposed -therefore to have the Portuguese formed into a distinct -army acting under lord Wellington.</p> - -<p>It was objected that the brigades incorporated -with the British divisions were fed by the British -commissariat the cost being deducted from the -subsidy, an advantage the loss of which the Portuguese -could not sustain. Forjas rejoined that -they could feed their own troops cheaper if the -subsidy was paid in money, but Beresford referred -him to his scanty means of transport, so scanty -that the few stores they were then bound to furnish -for the unattached brigades depending upon the -Portuguese commissariat were not forwarded. -Foiled on this point Forjas proposed gradually to -withdraw the best brigades from the English divisions, -to incorporate them with the unattached -brigades of native troops and so form an auxiliary -corps; but the same objection of transport still -applied and this matter dropped for the moment. -The regency then agreed to reduce the legal age -of men liable to the conscription for the army, but -the islands, which ought to have given three hundred -men yearly, were exempt from their controul, -and the governors supported by the prince-regent -refused to permit any levies in their jurisdictions, -and even granted asylums to all those who wished to -avoid the levy in Portugal. In the islands also the -persons so unjustly and cruelly imprisoned in 1810 -were still kept in durance, although the regency yielding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302"></a>[302]</span> -to the persevering remonstrances of Mr. Stuart -and lord Wellington had released those at Lisbon.</p> - -<p>Soon after this Beresford desired to go to England, -and the occasion was seized by Forjas to -renew his complaints and his proposition for a separate -army which he designed to command himself. -General Sylveira’s claim to that honour was -however supported by the Souzas, to whose faction -he belonged, and the only matter in which all -agreed was the display of ill-will towards England. -Lord Wellington became indignant. The English -newspapers, he said, did much mischief by their -assertions, but he never suspected they could by -their omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and -government. The latter complained that their -troops were not praised in parliament, nothing -could be more different from a debate within the -house than the representation of it in the newspapers. -The latter seldom stated an event or -transaction as it really occurred, unless when they -absolutely copied what was written for them; and -even then their observations branched out so far -from the text, that they appeared absolutely incapable -of understanding much less of stating the -truth upon any subject. The Portuguese people -should therefore be cautious of taking English -newspapers as a test of the estimation in which -the Portuguese army was held in England, where -its character stood high and was rising daily. -“Mr. Forjas is,” said lord Wellington, “the ablest -man of business I have met with in the Peninsula, -it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have -the folly to alter a successful military system. I -understand something of the organization and feeding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303"></a>[303]</span> -of troops, and I assure him that separated -from the British, the Portuguese army could not -keep the field in a good state although their government -were to incur ten times the expense under -the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting -state for the field they can gain no honour, they -must suffer dishonour! The vexatious disputes -with Spain are increasing daily, and if the omissions -or assertions of newspapers are to be the -causes of disagreement with the Portuguese <em>I will -quit the Peninsula for ever</em>”!</p> - -<p>This remonstrance being read to the regency, -Forjas replied officially.</p> - -<p>“The Portuguese government demanded nothing -unreasonable. The happy campaign of 1813 was -not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its -means. It had a right to expect greater exertions -from Spain, which was more interested than Portugal -in the actual operations since the safety of -the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a -solid peace, she did not expect increase of territory, -nor any advantage save the consideration -and influence which the services and gallantry of -her troops would give her amongst European nations, -and which, unhappily, she would probably -require in her future intercourse with Spain. The -English prince-regent his ministers and his generals, -had rendered full justice to her military services -in the official reports, but that did not suffice -to give them weight in Europe. Official reports -did not remove this inconvenience. It was only -the public expressions of the English prince and -his ministers that could do justice. The Portuguese -army was commanded by Marshal Beresford, -Marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304"></a>[304]</span> -so considered and thanked accordingly for its exploits, -and with as much form and solemnity by -the English parliament and general as was used -towards the Spanish army. The more so that the -Portuguese had sacrificed their national pride to -the common good, whereas the Spanish pride had -retarded the success of the cause and the liberty -of Europe. It was necessary also to form good -native generals to be of use after the war; but -putting that question aside, it was only demanded -to have the divisions separated by degrees and -given to Portuguese officers. Nevertheless such -grave objections being advanced they were willing, -he said, to drop the matter altogether.”</p> - -<p>The discontent however remained, for the argument -had weight, and if any native officers’ reputation -had been sufficient to make the proceeding -plausible, the British officers would have been -driven from the Portuguese service, the armies -separated, and both ruined. As it was, the regency -terminated the discussion from inability to -succeed; from fear not from reason. The persons -who pretended to the command were Forjas -and Sylveira; but the English officers who were -as yet well-liked by the troops, would not have -served under the former, and Wellington objected -strongly to the latter, having by experience discovered -that he was an incapable officer seeking -a base and pernicious popularity by encouraging -the views of the soldiers. Beresford then relinquished -his intention of going to England, and the -justice of the complaint relative to the reputation -of the Portuguese army being obvious, the general -orders became more marked in favour of the -troops. But the most effectual check to the project<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305"></a>[305]</span> -of the regency was the significant intimation -of Mr. Stuart, that England, being bound by no -conditions in the payment of the subsidy, had a -right if it was not applied in the manner most -agreeable to her, to withdraw it altogether.</p> - -<p>To have this subsidy in specie and to supply -their own troops continued to be the cry of the -regency, until their inability to effect the latter -became at last so apparent that they gave the matter -up in despair. Indeed Forjas was too able a man -ever to have supposed, that the badly organized -administration of Portugal, was capable of supporting -an efficient army in the field five hundred miles -from its own country; the real object was to shake -off the British influence if possible without losing -the subsidy. For the honour of the army or the -welfare of the soldiers neither the regency nor the -prince himself had any care. While the former -were thus disputing for the command, they suffered -their subordinates to ruin an establishment at Ruña, -the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated soldiers, -and turned the helpless veterans adrift. And the -prince while he lavished honours upon the dependents -and creatures of his court at Rio Janeiro, -placed those officers whose fidelity and hard fighting -had preserved his throne in Portugal at the -bottom of the list, amongst the menial servants of -the palace who were decorated with the same ribands! -Honour, justice, humanity, were alike -despised by the ruling men and lord Wellington -thus expressed his strong disgust.</p> - -<p>“<em>The British army which I have the honour to -command has met with nothing but ingratitude from -the government and authorities in Portugal for -their services, every thing that could be done has<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_306"></a>[306]</span> -been done by the civil authorities lately to oppress -the officers and soldiers on every occasion in -which it has by any accident been in their power. -I hope however that we have seen the last of Portugal</em>”!</p> - -<p>Such were the relations of the Portuguese government -with England, and with Spain they were -not more friendly. Seven envoys from that country -had succeeded each other at Lisbon in three years. -The Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic -opinions which had obtained ground in Spain, and -the leading party in the Cortez were intent to -spread those opinions over the whole Peninsula. -The only bond of sympathy between the two governments -was hatred of the English who had -saved both. On all other points they differed. The -exiled bishop of Orense, from his asylum on the -frontier of Portugal, excited the Gallicians against -the Cortez so vigorously, that his expulsion from -Portugal, or at least his removal from the northern -frontier, was specially demanded by the Spanish -minister; but though a long and angry discussion -followed the bishop was only civilly requested by -the Portuguese government to abstain from acts -disagreeable to the Spanish regency. The latter -then demanded that he should be delivered up as a -delinquent, whereupon the Portuguese quoted a -decree of the Cortez which deprived the bishop of -his rights as a Spanish citizen and denaturalized -him. However he was removed twenty leagues -from the frontier, nor was the Portuguese government -itself quite free from ecclesiastic troubles. -The bishop of Braganza preached doctrines which -were offensive to the patriarch and the government; -he was confined but soon released and an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307"></a>[307]</span> -ecclesiastical sentence pronounced against him, -which only increased his followers and extended -the influence of his doctrines.</p> - -<p>Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period, -was the return of Ballesteros from his exile at -Ceuta. He had been permitted towards the end of -1813, and as lord Wellington thought with no -good intent, to reside at Fregenal. The Portuguese -regency, fearing that he would rally round him -other discontented persons, set agents to watch his -proceedings, and under pretence of putting down -robbers who abounded on that frontier, established -a line of cavalry and called out the militia, thus -making it manifest that but a little was wanting to -kindle a war between the two countries.</p> - -<p><em>Political state of Spain.</em> Lord Wellington’s victories -had put an end to the intercourse between -Joseph and the Spaniards who desired to make -terms with the French; but those people not losing -hope, formed a strong anti-English party and -watched to profit by the disputes between the two -great factions at Cadiz, which had now become -most rancorous and dangerous to the common -cause. The serviles extremely bigoted both in -religion and politics had the whole body of the -clergy on their side. They were the most numerous -in the Cortez and their views were generally -in accord with the feelings of the people -beyond the Isla de Leon, although their doctrines -were comprised in two sentences—<em>An absolute king, -An intolerant church</em>. The liberals supported and -instigated by all ardent innovators, by the commercial -body and populace of Cadiz, had also partizans -beyond the Isla; and taking as guides the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308"></a>[308]</span> -revolutionary writings of the French philosophers -were hastening onwards to a democracy, without -regard to ancient usages or feelings, and without -practical ability to carry their theories into execution. -There was also a fourth faction in the -Cortez, formed by the American deputies, who -were secretly labouring for the independence of the -colonies; they sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes -the serviles, as it suited their purposes, and -thus often produced anomalous results, because -they were numerous enough to turn the scale in -favour of the side which they espoused. Jealousy -of England was however common to all, and -“<i lang="es">Inglesismo</i>” was used as a term of contempt. -Posterity will scarcely believe, that when lord Wellington -was commencing the campaign of 1813 the -Cortez was with difficulty, and by threats rather -than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding -foreign troops to enter a Spanish fortress. -Alicant, Tarifa, Cadiz itself where they held their -sittings, had been preserved; Ciudad Rodrigo, -Badajos, had been retaken for them by British -valour; English money had restored their broken -walls and replenished their exhausted magazines; -English and Portuguese blood still smoked from -their ramparts; but the men from whose veins that -blood had flowed, were to be denied entrance at -gates which they could not approach, without -treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades -who had sacrificed their lives to procure for this -sordid ungrateful assembly the power to offer the -insult.</p> - -<p>The subjection of the bishops and other clergy, -who had in Gallicia openly opposed the abolition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309"></a>[309]</span> -of the inquisition and excited the people to resistance, -was an object of prominent interest with an -active section of the liberals called the Jacobins. -And this section generally ruled the Cortez, because -the Americanos leaned strongly towards their -doctrines, and the interest of the anti-English, or -French party, was to produce dissensions which -could be best effected by supporting the most violent -public men. A fierce and obstinate faction -they were, and they compelled the churchmen to -submit for the time, but not until the dispute became -so serious that lord Wellington when in the -Pyrenees expected a civil war on his communications, -and thought the clergy and the peasantry -would take part with the French. This notion -which gives his measure for the patriotism of both -parties, proved however unfounded; his extreme -discontent at the progress of liberal doctrines had -somewhat warped his judgment; the people were -less attached to the church than he imagined, the -clergy of Gallicia, meeting with no solid support, -submitted to the Cortez, and the archbishop of Santiago -fled to Portugal.</p> - -<p>Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed -the moving spring of the English tories’ -policy. Napoleon was warred against, not as they -pretended because he was a tyrant and usurper, -for he was neither; not because his invasion of -Spain was unjust, but because he was the powerful -and successful enemy of aristocratic privileges. -The happiness and independence of the Peninsula -were words without meaning in their state-papers -and speeches, and their anger and mortification -were extreme when they found success against the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_310"></a>[310]</span> -emperor had fostered that democracy it was their -object to destroy. They were indeed only prevented -by the superior prudence and sagacity of -their general, from interfering with the internal -government of Spain in so arrogant and injudicious -a manner, that an open rupture wherein the Spaniards -would have had all appearance of justice, -must have ensued. This folly was however stifled -by Wellington, who desired to wait until the blow -could be given with some effect, and he was quite -willing to deal it himself; yet the conduct of the -Cortez, and that of the executive government -which acted under its controul, was so injurious -to Spain and to his military operations, and so -unjust to him personally, that the warmest friends -of freedom cannot blame his enmity. Rather -should his moderation be admired, when we find -his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution -exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by -Vegas, a considerable member of the Cortez and -perfectly acquainted with the subject.</p> - -<p>Speaking of the “<i lang="es">Afrancesados</i>” or French -party, more numerous than was supposed and active -to increase their numbers, he says, “The thing<span class="sidenote">Original Letter, MSS.</span> -which they most enforced and which made most -progress was the diminution of the English influence.” -Amongst the serviles they gained proselytes, -by objecting the English religion and constitution -which restricted the power of the sovereign. -With the liberals, they said the same constitution -gave the sovereign too much power; and -the Spanish constitution having brought the king’s -authority under that of the Cortez was an object -of jealousy to the English cabinet and aristocracy,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_311"></a>[311]</span> -who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers -of England, were resolved that the Spanish -constitution should not stand. To the Americans -they observed that lord Wellington opposed them, -because he did not help them and permitted expeditions -to be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans -who wished to retain the colonies and -exclude foreign trade, they represented the English -as fomenters and sustainers of the colonial -rebellion, because they did not join their forces -with Spain to put it down. To the honest patriots -of all parties they said, that every concession to -the English general was an offence against the -dignity and independence of the nation. If he -was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate -Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was -careful in preparation, his delay was to enable -the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in -urging the government to useful measures, his -design was to impose his own laws; if he neglected -the Spanish armies, he desired they should -be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it -was to gain the soldiers turn the army against the -country and thus render Spain dependent on -England. And these perfidious insinuations were -effectual because they flattered the national pride, -as proving that the Spaniards could do every thing -for themselves without the aid of foreigners. -Finally that nothing could stop the spread of such -dangerous doctrines but new victories, which would -bring the simple honesty and gratitude of the -people at large into activity. Those victories -came and did indeed stifle the French party in -Spain, but many of their arguments were too well -founded to be stifled with their party.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_312"></a>[312]</span></p> - -<p>The change of government which had place -in the beginning of the year, gave hope that the -democratic violence of the Cortez would decline -under the control of the cardinal Bourbon; but that -prince, who was not of true royal blood in the -estimation of the Spaniards, because his father had -married without the consent of the king, was from -age, and infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The -new regency became therefore more the slaves of -the Cortez than their predecessors, and the Cadiz -editors of newspapers, pre-eminent in falsehood -and wickedness even amongst their unprincipled -European brotherhood, being the champions of the -Jacobins directed the populace of that city as they -pleased. And always the serviles yielded under -the dread of personal violence. Their own crimes -had become their punishment. They had taught -the people at the commencement of the contest that -murder was patriotism, and now their spirit sunk -and quailed, because at every step to use the -terribly significant expression of Wellington, “<em>The -ghost of Solano was staring them in the face</em>.”</p> - -<p>The principal points of the Jacobins’ policy in -support of their crude constitution, which they -considered as perfect as an emanation from the -Deity, were, 1º. The abolition of the Inquisition, -the arrest and punishment of the Gallician bishops, -and the consequent warfare with the clergy. 2º. The -putting aside the claim of Carlotta to the regency. -3º. The appointment of captain-generals and other -officers to suit their factious purposes. 4º. The -obtaining of money for their necessities, without -including therein the nourishment of the armies. -5º. The control of the elections for a new Cortez -so as to procure an assembly of their own way of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_313"></a>[313]</span> -thinking, or to prevent its assembling at the legal -period in October.</p> - -<p>The matter of the bishops as we have seen nearly -involved them in a national war with Portugal, and -a civil war with Gallicia. The affair of the princess -was less serious, but she had never ceased intriguing, -and her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British -ministers and general while the army was cooped -up in Portugal, were, although she was a declared -enemy to the English alliance, now rather favoured -by sir Henry Wellesley as a mode of checking the -spread of democracy. Lord Wellington however -still held aloof, observing that if appointed according -to the constitution, she would not be less a -slave to the Cortez than her predecessors, and -England would have the discredit of giving power -to the “worst woman in existence.”</p> - -<p>To remove the seat of government from the -influence of the Cadiz populace was one mode of -abating the power of the democratic party, and the -yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing -of the general Cortez in September, had apparently -given the executive government some freedom of -action, and seemed to furnish a favourable opportunity -for the English ambassador to effect its -removal. The regency, dreading the epidemic, -suddenly resolved to proceed to Madrid, telling -sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer -pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their -sole motive. They had secretly formed this resolution -at night and proposed to commence the journey -next day, but a disturbance arose in the city and -the alarmed regents convoked the extraordinary -Cortez; the ministers were immediately called before -it and bending in fear before their masters, declared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_314"></a>[314]</span> -with a scandalous disregard of truth, that there -was no intention to quit the Isla without consulting -the Cortez. Certain deputies were thereupon appointed<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, No. 2.</a></span> -to inquire if there was any fever, and a few -cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently -to shield the regents, recommended that they should -remove to Port St. Mary.</p> - -<p>This did not satisfy the assembly. The government -was commanded to remain at Cadiz until the new -general Cortez should be installed, and a committee -was appointed to probe the whole affair or rather -to pacify the populace, who were so offended with -the report of the first deputation, that the speech -of Arguelles on presenting it was hissed from the -galleries, although he was the most popular and -eloquent member of the Cortez. The more moderate -liberals thus discovered that they were equally with -the serviles the slaves of the newspaper writers. -Nevertheless the inherent excellence of freedom, -though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble -shapes, was involuntarily admitted by lord Wellington -when he declared, that wherever the Cortez and -government should fix themselves the press would -follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada, -or Madrid, would become as bad as the people of -Cadiz.</p> - -<p>The composition of the new Cortez was naturally -an object of hope and fear to all factions, and the -result being uncertain, the existing assembly took -such measures to prolong its own power that it was -expected two Cortez would be established, the one -at Cadiz, the other at Seville, each striving for -mastery in the nation. However the new body -after many delays was installed at Cadiz in November, -and the Jacobins, strong in the violence of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_315"></a>[315]</span> -populace, still swayed the assembly, and kept the -seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid spread -of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. -Then the resolution to repair to Madrid was -adopted, and the sessions in the Isla closed on the -29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For -the general belief being, that no person could take -the sickness twice, and almost every resident family -had already suffered from former visitations, the -merchants with an infamous cupidity declaring that<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, No. 2.</a></span> -there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously -to issue clean bills of health to ships leaving -the port, and endeavoured by intimidation to keep -the regency and Cortez in the city.</p> - -<p>An exact and copious account of these factions -and disputes, and of the permanent influence which -these discussions of the principles of government, -this constant collision of opposite doctrines, had -upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously -traced, form a lesson of the highest interest -for nations. But to treat the subject largely would -be to write a political history of the Spanish revolution, -and it is only the effect upon the military -operations which properly appertains to a history -of the war. That effect was one of unmitigated -evil, but it must be observed that this did not -necessarily spring from the democratic system, since -precisely the same mischiefs were to be traced in -Portugal, where arbitrary power, called legitimate -government, was prevalent. In both cases alike, -the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes -of factious politicians.</p> - -<p>It has been shewn in a former volume, that one -Spanish regency contracted an engagement with -lord Wellington on the faith of which he took the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_316"></a>[316]</span> -command of their armies in 1813. It was scrupulously -adhered to by him, but systematically violated -by the new regency and minister of war, almost -as soon as it was concluded. His recommendations -for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders -were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and -changes were made in the commands and in the -destinations of the troops without his concurrence, -and without passing through him as generalissimo. -Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, -captain-general of Gallicia, Estremadura, and Castile, -was disgracefully removed from his government -under pretence of calling him to assist in the council -of state. His nephew general Giron was at the -same time deprived of his command over the Gallician -army, although both he and Castaños had -been largely commended for their conduct by lord -Wellington. General Frere, appointed captain-general -of Castile and Estremadura, succeeded -Giron in command of the troops, and the infamous -Lacy replaced Castaños in Gallicia, chosen, it was -believed, as a fitter tool to work out the measures -of the Jacobins against the clergy in that kingdom. -Nor was the sagacity of that faction at -fault, for Castaños would, according to lord Wellington, -have turned his arms against the Cortez -if an opportunity had offered. He and others were -now menaced with death, and the Cortez contemplated -an attack upon the tithes, upon the -feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates of the -grandees. All except the last very fitting to do if -the times and circumstances had been favourable -for a peaceful arrangement; but most insane when -the nation generally was averse, and there was an -invader in the country to whom the discontented<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_317"></a>[317]</span> -could turn. The clergy were at open warfare with -the government, many generals were dissatisfied, -and menacing in their communications with the -superior civil authorities, the soldiers were starving -and the people tired of their miseries only desired -to get rid of the invaders, and to avoid the burthen -of supplying the troops of either side. The -English cabinet, after having gorged Spain with -gold and flattery was totally without influence. A -terrible convulsion was at hand if the French could -have maintained the war with any vigour in Spain -itself; and the following passages, from Wellington’s -letters to the ministers, prove, that even he contemplated -a forcible change in the government and -constitution.</p> - -<p>“If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads -from shoulders as the newspapers have threatened -Castaños, and the assembly seize upon landed property -to supply their necessities, I am afraid we -must do something more than discountenance them.”—“It -is quite impossible such a system can last. -What I regret is that I am the person that maintains -it. If I was out of the way there are -plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros -positively intended it, and I am much -mistaken if O’Donnel and even Castaños, and probably -others are not equally ready. If the king -should return he also will overturn the whole fabric -if he has any spirit.”—“I wish you would let me -know whether if I should find a fair opportunity of -striking at the democracy the government would -approve of my doing it.” And in another letter he -seriously treated the question of withdrawing from -the contest altogether. “The government were -the best judges,” he said, “of whether they could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_318"></a>[318]</span> -or ought to withdraw,” but he did not believe that -Spain could be a useful ally, or at all in alliance -with England, if the republican system was not put -down. Meanwhile he recommended to the English -government and to his brother, to take no part -either for or against the princess of Brazil, to discountenance -the democratical principles and measures -of the Cortez, and if their opinion was -asked regarding the formation of a new regency, -to recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution -which lodged all power with the Cortez, -and to give instead, some authority to the executive -government whether in the hands of king or regent. -To fill the latter office one of royal blood uniting -the strongest claims of birth with the best capacity -should he thought be selected, but if capacity -was wanting in the royal race then to choose the -Spaniard who was most deserving in the public -estimation! Thus necessity teaches privilege to -bend before merit.</p> - -<p>The whole force of Spain in arms was at this period -about one hundred and sixty thousand men. Of this -number not more than fifty thousand were available -for operations in the field, and those only because -they were paid clothed and armed by England, -and kept together by the ability and vigour of the -English general. He had proposed when at Cadiz -an arrangement for the civil and political government -of the provinces rescued from the French, -with a view to the supply of the armies, but his -plan was rejected and his repeated representations -of the misery the army and the people endured -under the system of the Spanish government were -unheeded. Certain districts were allotted for the -support of each army, yet, with a jealous fear<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_319"></a>[319]</span> -of military domination, the government refused -the captain-generals of those districts the necessary -powers to draw forth the resources of the -country, powers which lord Wellington recommended -that they should have, and wanting which -the whole system was sure to become a nullity. -Each branch of administration was thus conducted<span class="sidenote">Letter to the Spanish <ins class="corr" id="tn-319" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'minis- of war'"> -minister of war</ins>, 30th Aug. 1813.</span> -by chiefs independent in their attributes, yet each -too restricted in authority, generally at variance -with one another, and all of them neglectful of -their duty. The evil effect upon the troops was -thus described by the English general as early as -August.</p> - -<p>“More than half of Spain has been cleared of -the enemy above a year, and the whole of Spain -excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon -since the months of May and June last. The most -abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of -the country; millions of money spent by the contending -armies are circulating every where, and -yet your armies however weak in numbers are -literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese -armies under my command have been subsisted, -particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon -the magazines imported by sea, and I am concerned -to inform your excellency, that besides money for -the pay of all the armies, which has been given -from the military chest of the British army and has -been received from no other quarter, the British -magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to -all the Spanish armies in order to enable them to -remain in the field at all. And notwithstanding -this assistance I have had the mortification of seeing -the Spanish troops on the outposts, obliged to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_320"></a>[320]</span> -plunder the nut and apple-trees for subsistence, and -to know that the Spanish troops, employed in the -blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving -upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy -whom they were blockading were at the same time -receiving their full allowance. The system then is -insufficient to procure supplies for the army and at -the same time I assure your excellency that it is the -most oppressive and injurious to the country that -could be devised. It cannot be pretended that the -country does not produce the means of maintaining -the men necessary for its defence; those means are -undoubtedly superabundant, and the enemy has -proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at -the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger -than are necessary for its defence.”</p> - -<p>These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the -public servants, and to their overwhelming numbers, -that certain sign of an unprosperous state; to the -disgraceful negligence and disregard of public duties, -and to there being no power in the country for -enforcing the law; the collection of the revenue -cost in several branches seventy and eighty per cent. -Meanwhile no Spanish officers capable of commanding -a large body of troops or keeping it in an -efficient state had yet appeared, no efficient staff, -no system of military administration had been -formed, and no shame for these deficiencies, no -exertions to amend were visible.</p> - -<p>From this picture two conclusions are to be -drawn, 1º. that the provinces, thus described as -superabounding in resources, having been for -several years occupied by the French armies, the -warfare of the latter could not have been so devastating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_321"></a>[321]</span> -and barbarous as it was represented. -2º. That Spain, being now towards the end as -helpless as she had been at the beginning and all -through the war, was quite unequal to her own deliverance -either by arms or policy; that it was -English valour English steel, directed by the genius -of an English general, which rising superior to -all obstacles, whether presented by his own or -the peninsular governments or by the perversity of -national character, worked out her independence. -So utterly inefficient were the Spaniards themselves, -that now, at the end of six years’ war, lord -Wellington declared thirty thousand of their troops -could not be trusted to act separately; they were -only useful when mixed in the line with larger -numbers of other nations. And yet all men in authority -to the lowest alcalde were as presumptuous -as arrogant and as perverse as ever. Seeming to be -rendered callous to public misery by the desperate -state of affairs, they were reckless of the consequences -of their actions and never suffered prudential -considerations or national honour to check the -execution of any project. The generals from repeated -failures had become insensible to misfortunes, -and without any remarkable display of personal -daring, were always ready to deliver battle -on slight occasions, as if that were a common matter -instead of being the great event of war.</p> - -<p>The government agents were corrupt, and the -government itself was as it had ever been tyrannical -faithless mean and equivocating to the lowest degree. -In 1812 a Spaniard of known and active -patriotism thus commenced an elaborate plan of -defence for the provinces. “Catalonia abhors France -as her oppressor but she abhors still more the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_322"></a>[322]</span> -despotism which has been carried on in all the -branches of her administration since the beginning -of the war.” In fine there was no healthy action in -any part of the body politic, every thing was rotten -except the hearts of the poorer people. Even at -Cadiz Spanish writers compared the state to a -vessel in a hurricane without captain, pilot, compass, -chart sails or rudder, and advised the crew -to cry to heaven as their sole resource. But they -only blasphemed.</p> - -<p>When Wellington, indignant at the systematic -breach of his engagement, remonstrated, he was answered -that the actual regency did not hold itself -bound by the contracts of the former government. -Hence it was plain no considerations of truth, for -they had themselves also accepted the contract, nor -of honest policy, nor the usages of civilized states -with respect to national faith, had any influence on -their conduct. Enraged at this scandalous subterfuge, -he was yet conscious how essential it was -he should retain his command. And seeing all -Spanish generals more or less engaged in political -intrigues, none capable of co-operating with -him, and that no Spanish army could possibly -subsist as a military body under the neglect and -bad arrangement of the Spanish authorities, conscious -also that public opinion in Spain would, -better than the menaces of the English government, -enable him to obtain a counterpoise to the democratic -party, he tendered indeed his resignation if -the government engagement was not fulfilled, but -earnestly endeavoured by a due mixture of mildness -argument and reproof to reduce the ruling authorities -to reason. Nevertheless there were, he told -them, limits to his forbearance to his submission<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_323"></a>[323]</span> -under injury, and he had been already most unworthily -treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish -government.</p> - -<p>From the world these quarrels were covered by -an appearance of the utmost respect and honour. -He was made a grandee of the first class, and the estate -of Soto de Roma in Grenada, of which the much-maligned -and miserable Prince of Peace had been -despoiled, was settled upon him. He accepted the -gift, but, as he had before done with his Portuguese -and Spanish pay, transferred the proceeds to -the public treasury during the war. The regents -however, under the pressure of the Jacobins, and -apparently bearing some personal enmity, although -one of them, Ciscar, had been instrumental in procuring -him the command of the Spanish army, were -now intent to drive him from it; and the excesses -committed at San Sebastian served their factious -writers as a topic for exciting the people not only -to demand his resignation, but to commence a warfare -of assassination against the British soldiers. -Moreover, combining extreme folly with wickedness, -they pretended amongst other absurdities that the -nobility had offered, if he would change his religion, -to make him king of Spain. This tale was -eagerly adopted by the English newspapers, and -three Spanish grandees thought it necessary to -declare that they were not among the nobles who -made the proposition. His resignation was accepted -in the latter end of September, and he held the -command only until the assembling of the new -Cortez, but the attempt to render him odious failed -even at Cadiz, owing chiefly to the personal ascendancy -which all great minds so surely attain over<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_324"></a>[324]</span> -the masses in troubled times. Both the people and -the soldiers respected him more than they did their -own government, and the Spanish officers had -generally yielded as ready obedience to his wishes -before he was appointed generalissimo, as they did -to his orders when holding that high office. It was -this ascendancy which enabled him to maintain the -war with such troublesome allies; and yet so little -were the English ministers capable of appreciating -its importance, that after the battle of Vittoria they -entertained the design of removing him from Spain -to take part in the German operations. His answer -was short and modest, but full of wisdom.</p> - -<p>“Many might be found to conduct matters as -well as I can both here and in Germany, but nobody -would enjoy the same advantages here, and I should -be no better than another in Germany.”</p> - -<p>The egregious folly which dictated this proposition -was thus checked, and in December the new -Cortez decided that he should retain the command -of the armies and the regency be bound to fulfil -its predecessor’s engagements. Nevertheless so -deeply had he been offended by the libels relative -to San Sebastian that a private letter to his brother -terminated thus:—“<em>It will rest with the king’s -government to determine what they will do upon a -consideration of all the circumstances of the case, -but if I was to decide I would not keep the army in -Spain for one hour.</em>” And to many other persons at -different times he expressed his fears and conviction -that the cause was lost and that he should fail at -last. It was under these, and other enormous difficulties -he carried on his military operations. It was -with an enemy at his back more to be dreaded than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_325"></a>[325]</span> -the foe in his front that he invaded the south of -France; and that is the answer to those French -writers who have described him as being at the head -of more than two hundred thousand well-furnished -soldiers, supported by a well-organized insurrection -of the Spanish people, unembarrassed in his movements, -and luxuriously rioting in all the resources -of the Peninsula and of England.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_326"></a>[326]</span><br></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XXIII">BOOK XXIII.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - -<h4>WAR IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent">While Pampeluna held out, Soult laboured to<span class="sidenote9">1813. November.</span> -complete his works of defence, especially the entrenched -camp of St. Jean Pied de Port, that he -might be free to change the theatre of war to -Aragon. He pretended to entertain this project as -late as November; but he must have secretly -renounced all hope before that period, because the -snows of an early and severe winter had rendered -even the passes of the Lower Pyrenees impracticable -in October. Meanwhile his political difficulties -were not less than lord Wellington’s, all his -efforts to draw forth the resources of France were -met with apathy, or secret hostility, and there -was no money in the military chest to answer the -common daily expenses. A junta of the leading -merchants in Bayonne voluntarily provided for the -most pressing necessities of the troops, but their -means were limited and Soult vainly urged the -merchants of Bordeaux and Toulouse to follow the -patriotic example. It required therefore all his -firmness of character to support the crisis; and if -the English naval force had been sufficient to intercept -the coasting vessels between Bordeaux and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_327"></a>[327]</span> -Bayonne, the French army must have retired beyond -the Adour. As it was, the greatest part of -the field artillery and all the cavalry were sent so -far to the rear for forage, that they could not be -counted a part of the fighting troops; and the infantry, -in addition to their immense labours, were -forced to carry their own provisions from the -navigable points of the rivers to the top of the -mountains.</p> - -<p>Soult was strongly affected. “<em>Tell the emperor</em>,” -he wrote to the minister of war, “<em>tell him when you -make your next report that on the very soil of France, -this is the situation of the army destined to defend -the southern provinces from invasion; tell him also -that the unheard-of contradictions and obstacles I -meet with shall not make me fail in my duty</em>.”</p> - -<p>The French troops suffered much, but the privations -of the allies were perhaps greater, for being on -higher mountains, more extended, more dependent -upon the sea, their distress was in proportion to -their distance from the coast. A much shorter line -had been indeed gained for the supply of the centre, -and a bridge was laid down at Andarlassa which -gave access to the roots of the Bayonette mountain, -yet the troops were fed with difficulty; and -so scantily, that lord Wellington in amends reduced -the usual stoppage of pay, and invoked the army -by its military honour to sustain with firmness the -unavoidable pressure. The effect was striking. -The murmurs, loud in the camps before, were -hushed instantly, although the soldiers knew that -some commissaries leaguing with the speculators -upon the coast, secretly loaded the provision mules -with condiments and other luxuries, to sell on the -mountains at enormous profit. The desertion was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_328"></a>[328]</span> -however great, more than twelve hundred men went -over to the enemy in less than four months; and -they were all Germans, Englishmen or Spaniards, -for the Portuguese who abandoned their colours invariably -went back to their own country.</p> - -<p>This difficulty of feeding the Anglo-Portuguese, -the extreme distress of the Spaniards and the certainty -that they would plunder in France and so -raise the people in arms, together with the uneasy -state of the political affairs in the Peninsula, rendered -lord Wellington very averse to further offensive -operations while Napoleon so tenaciously -maintained his positions on the Elbe against the -allied sovereigns. It was impossible to make a -formidable and sustained invasion of France with -the Anglo-Portuguese alone, and he had neither -money nor means of transport to feed the Spaniards, -even if policy warranted such a measure. The -nature of the country also forbad a decisive victory, -and hence an advance was attended with the risk -of returning to Spain again during the winter, -when a retreat would be dangerous and dishonouring. -But on the 20th of October a letter from the -governor of Pampeluna was intercepted, and lord -Fitzroy Somerset, observing that the compliment of -ceremony at the beginning was also in numerals, -ingeniously followed the cue and made out the -whole. It announced that the place could not hold -out more than a week, and as intelligence of Napoleon’s -disasters in Germany became known at the -same time, lord Wellington was induced to yield -once more to the wishes of the allied sovereigns and -the English ministers, who were earnest that he -should invade France.</p> - -<p>His intent was to attack Soult’s entrenched camp<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_329"></a>[329]</span> -on the 29th, thinking Pampeluna would fall before -that period. In this he was mistaken; and bad -weather stopped his movements, for in the passes -above Roncesvalles the troops were knee-deep in -snow. The preparations however continued and -strict precautions were taken to baffle the enemy’s -emissaries. Soult was nevertheless perfectly informed -by the deserters of the original design and the -cause of the delay; and he likewise obtained from -a serjeant-major of artillery who losing his road was -taken on the 29th, certain letters and orders indicating -an attack in the direction of the bridge of Amotz, -between D’Erlon’s right and Clauzel’s left. Some -French peasants also who had been allowed to pass -the allied outposts declared they had been closely -questioned about that bridge and the roads leading -to it. The defences there were therefore augmented -with new redoubts and abbatis, and Soult -having thus as he judged, sufficiently provided for -its safety, and being in no pain for his right, nor -for Clauzel’s position, covered as the latter was by -the smaller Rhune, turned his attention towards -Foy’s corps.</p> - -<p>That general had been posted at Bidarray, half -way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo, to -watch certain roads, which leading to the Nive from -Val Baigorry by St. Martin d’Arosa, and from the -Bastan by Yspegui and the Gorospil mountain, gave -Soult anxiety for his left; but now expecting the principal -attack at the bridge of Amotz, and not by these -roads, nor by St. Jean Pied de Port, as he at first -supposed and as lord Wellington had at one time -designed, he resolved to use Foy’s division offensively. -In this view on the 3d of November he -instructed him if St. Jean Pied de Port should be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_330"></a>[330]</span> -only slightly attacked, to draw all the troops he -could possibly spare from its defence to Bidarray, -and when the allies assailed D’Erlon, he was to -seize the Gorospil mountain and fall upon their -right as they descended from the Puerto de Maya. -If on the other hand he was himself assailed by -those lines, he was to call in all his detached troops -from St. Jean Pied de Port, repass the Nive by the -bridge of Bidarray, make the best defence possible -behind that river, and open a communication with -Pierre Soult and Trielhard, whose divisions of cavalry -were at St. Palais and Orthes.</p> - -<p>On the 6th Foy, thinking the Gorospil difficult -to pass, proposed to seize the Col de Yspegui from -the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and so descend -into the Bastan. Soult however preferred Bidarray -as a safer point and more united with the main body -of the army; but he gave Foy a discretionary -power to march along the left of the Nive upon -Itzatzu and Espelette, if he judged it fitting to -reinforce D’Erlon’s left rather than to attack the -enemy.</p> - -<p>Having thus arranged his regular defence, the -French general directed the prefect of the Lower -Pyrenees to post the organized national guards at -the issues of all the valleys about St. Jean Pied de -Port, but to keep the mass of the people quiet until -the allies penetrating into the country should at -once provoke and offer facilities for an irregular -warfare.</p> - -<p>On the 9th, being still uneasy about the San -Martin d’Arosa and Gorospil roads, he brought up -his brother’s cavalry from St. Palais to the heights -above Cambo, and the next day the long-expected -storm burst.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_331"></a>[331]</span></p> - -<p>Allured by some fine weather on the 6th and 7th -of November, lord Wellington had moved sir Rowland -Hill’s troops from the Roncesvalles to the Bastan -with a view to attack Soult, leaving Mina on -the position of Altobiscar and in the Alduides. -The other corps had also received their orders, and -the battle was to commence on the 8th, but general -Freyre suddenly declared, that unable to subsist on -the mountains he must withdraw a part of his -troops. This was a scheme to obtain provisions -from the English magazines, and it was successful, -for the projected attack could not be made without -his aid. Forty thousand rations of flour with a -formal intimation that if he did not co-operate the -whole army must retire again into Spain, contented -Freyre for the moment; but the extravagant abuses -of the Spanish commissariat were plainly exposed -when the chief of the staff declared that the flour -would only suffice for two days, although there were -less than ten thousand soldiers in the field. Spain -therefore furnished at the rate of two rations for -every fighting man and yet her troops were starving!</p> - -<p>When this difficulty was surmounted heavy -rain caused the attack to be again deferred, but -on the 10th ninety thousand combatants of all<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix, 7</a>, No. 3.</span> -arms and ranks above seventy-four thousand being -Anglo-Portuguese, descended to the battle, and -with them went ninety-five pieces of artillery, which -under the command of colonel Dickson were all -with inconceivable vigour and activity thrown into -action. Nor in this host do I reckon four thousand -five hundred cavalry, nor the Spaniards of the blockading -division which remained in reserve. On the -other hand the French numbers were now increased -by the new levy of conscripts, but many had deserted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_332"></a>[332]</span> -again into the interior, and the fighting men -did not exceed seventy-nine thousand including the -garrisons. Six thousand of these were cavalry, and<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix, No. 8.</a></span> -as Foy’s operations were extraneous to the line of -defence scarcely sixty thousand infantry and artillery -were opposed to the allies.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington seeing that the right of Soult’s -line could not be forced without great loss, resolved -to hold it in check while he turned it by forcing the -centre and left, pushing down the Nivelle to San -Pé. In this view the second and sixth British -division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, Morillo’s Spaniards, -four of Mina’s battalions, and Grant’s brigade of -light cavalry, in all twenty-six thousand fighting -men and officers with nine guns, were collected -under general Hill in the Bastan to attack D’Erlon. -The position of Roncesvalles was meanwhile occupied -by the remainder of Mina’s troops supported -by the blockading force under Carlos D’España.</p> - -<p>The third fourth and seventh divisions, and<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.</span> -Giron’s Andalusians, the whole under the command -of marshal Beresford, were disposed about Zagaramurdi, -the Puerto de Echallar, and the lower parts -of those slopes of the greater Rhune which descended -upon Sarre. On the left of this body the -light division and Longa’s Spaniards, both under -Charles Alten, were disposed on those slopes of the -greater Rhune which led down towards Ascain. -Victor Alten’s brigade of light cavalry and three -British batteries, were placed on the road to Sarre, -and six mountain-guns followed Giron’s and Charles -Alten’s troops. Thus thirty-six thousand fighting -men and officers, with twenty-four guns, were concentrated -in this quarter to attack Clauzel.</p> - -<p>General Freyre’s Spaniards, about nine thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_333"></a>[333]</span> -strong, with six guns, were disposed on Alten’s left,<span class="sidenote7">Plan 6.</span> -at the fort of Calvary and towards Jollimont, ready -to fall upon any troops which might be detached -from the camp of Serres by the bridge of Ascain, -to support Clauzel.</p> - -<p>General Hope having the first and fifth divisions, -Wilson’s, Bradford’s, and lord Aylmer’s brigades of -infantry, Vandeleur’s brigade of light dragoons, and -the heavy German cavalry, in all about nineteen -thousand men and officers with fifty-four guns, was -opposed to Soult’s right wing; and the naval squadron -hovering on Hope’s left flank was to aid the -land operations.</p> - -<p>On the French side each lieutenant-general had -a special position to defend. D’Erlon’s first line, -its left resting on the fortified rocks of Mondarin -which could not be turned, run from thence along -the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains by the -forge of Urdax to the Nivelle. This range was -strongly entrenched and occupied by one of Abbé’s -and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades, Espelette being -behind the former and Ainhoa behind the latter. -The second line or main position was several miles -distant on a broad ridge, behind Ainhoa, and it was -occupied by the remaining brigades of the two -divisions. The left did not extend beyond the -centre of the first line, but the right reaching to -the bridge of Amotz stretched with a wider flank, -because the Nivelle flowing in a slanting direction -towards the French gave greater space as their -positions receded. Three great redoubts were constructed -in a line on this ridge, and a fourth had -been commenced close to the bridge.</p> - -<p>On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to -say beyond the bridge of Amotz, Clauzel’s position<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_334"></a>[334]</span> -extended to Ascain, also along a strong range of -heights fortified with many redoubts trenches and -abbatis, and as the Nivelle after passing Amotz -swept in a curve completely round the range to -Ascain, both flanks rested alike upon that river, -having communication by the bridges of Amotz and -Ascain on the right and left, and a retreat by the -bridges of San Pé and Harastagui which were in -rear of the centre. Two of Clauzel’s divisions -reinforced by one of D’Erlon’s under general Maransin -were here posted. In front of the left were -the redoubts of St. Barbe and Grenada covering -the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the -right was the smaller Rhune which was fortified -and occupied by a brigade of Maransin’s division. -A new redoubt with abbatis was also commenced to -cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz.</p> - -<p>On the right of this line beyond the bridge of -Ascain, Daricau’s division belonging to Clauzel’s -corps, and the Italian brigade of San Pol drawn -from Villatte’s reserve, were posted to hold the -entrenched camp of Serres and to connect Clauzel’s -position with Villatte’s, which was as I have before -said on a ridge crossing the gorges of Olette and -Jollimont. The French right wing under Reille, -strongly fortified on the lower ground and partially -covered by inundations, was nearly impregnable.</p> - -<p>Soult’s weakest point of general defence was -certainly the opening between the Rhune mountains -and the Nivelle. Gradually narrowing as it -approached the bridge of Amotz this space was the -most open, the least fortified, and the Nivelle being -fordable above that bridge could not hamper the -allies’ movements. Wherefore a powerful force acting -in this direction could pass by D’Erlon’s first line<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_335"></a>[335]</span> -and breaking in upon the main position, between -the right of that general’s second line and Clauzel’s -left, turn both by the same attack.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington thus designed his battle. General -Hill, leaving Minas four battalions on the -Gorospil mountain facing the rocks of Mondarin, -moved in the night by the different passes of -the Puerto de Maya, Morillo’s Spaniards being to -menace the French on the Choupera and Atchuleguy -mountains, the second division to attack Ainhoa -and Urdax. The sixth division and Hamilton’s -Portuguese were to assault the works covering the -bridge of Amotz, either on the right or left bank -of the Nivelle according to circumstances. Thus -the action of twenty-six thousand men was combined -against D’Erlon’s position, and on their left -Beresford’s corps was assembled. The third division -under general Colville, descending from Zagaramurdi, -was to move against the unfinished redoubts -and entrenchments covering the approaches to the -bridge of Amotz on the left bank of the Nivelle, -thus turning D’Erlon’s right at the moment when it -was attacked in front by Hill’s corps. On the left -of the third division, the seventh, descending from -the mouth of the Echallar pass, was to storm the -Grenada redoubt, and then passing the village of -Sarre assail Clauzel’s main position abreast with -the attack of the third division. On the left of the -seventh, the fourth division, assembling on the lower -slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon -the redoubt of San Barbe, and then moving through -Sarre also to assail Clauzel’s main position abreast -with the seventh division. On the left of the fourth -division, Giron’s Spaniards, gathered higher up on -the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_336"></a>[336]</span> -with the others leaving Sarre on their right. They -were to drive the enemy from the lower slopes of -the smaller Rhune and then in concert with the rest -attack Clauzel’s main position. In this way Hill’s -and Beresford’s corps, forming a mass of more than -forty thousand infantry were to be thrust, on both -sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clauzel and -D’Erlon to break their line of battle.</p> - -<p>Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s -Spaniards, furnishing together about eight thousand -men, was likewise to attack Clauzel’s line on the -left of Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians approached -the bridge of Ascain to prevent reinforcements -coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten -could assail Clauzel’s right the smaller Rhune which -covered it was to be stormed. This mountain outwork -was a hog’s-back ridge rising abruptly out of -table-land and parallel with the greater Rhune. It -was inaccessible along its front, which was precipitous -and from fifty to two hundred feet high; -but on the enemy’s left these rocks gradually decreased, -descending by a long slope to the valley -of Sarre, and about two-thirds of the way down -the thirty-fourth French regiment was placed, with -an advanced post on some isolated crags situated -in the hollow between the two Rhunes. On the -enemy’s right the hog’s-back sunk by degrees into -the plain or platform. It was however covered at -that point by a marsh scarcely passable, and the -attacking troops were therefore first to move up -against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to -file to their left under fire, between the marsh and -the lower crags, until they gained an accessible -point from whence they could fight their way along -the narrow ridge of the hog’s-back But the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_337"></a>[337]</span> -bristles of the latter were huge perpendicular crags -connected with walls of loose stones so as to form -several small forts or castles communicating with -each other by narrow foot-ways, and rising one -above another until the culminant point was attained. -The table-land beyond this ridge was extensive and -terminated in a very deep ravine on every side, -save a narrow space on the right of the marsh, -where the enemy had drawn a traverse of loose -stones, running perpendicularly from behind the -hog’s-back and ending in a star fort which overhung -the edge of the ravine.</p> - -<p>This rampart and fort, and the hog’s-back itself, -were defended by Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s -division, and the line of retreat was towards a low -narrow neck of land, which bridging the deep ravine -linked the Rhune to Clauzel’s main position: a -reserve was placed here, partly to sustain the thirty-fourth -French regiment posted on the slope of the -mountain towards Sarre, partly to protect the neck -of land on the side of that village. As this neck -was the only approach to the French position in that -part, to storm the smaller Rhune was a necessary -preliminary to the general battle, wherefore Alten, -filing his troops after dark on the 9th from the Hermitage, -the Commissary mountain, and the Puerto -de Vera, collected them at midnight on that slope -of the greater Rhune which descended towards -Ascain. The main body of the light division, -turning the marsh by the left, was to assail the -stone traverse and lap over the star fort by the -ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on -the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; -and the forty-third regiment supported by the seventeenth -Portuguese was to assail the hog’s-back.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_338"></a>[338]</span> -One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns -were however left on the summit of the greater -Rhune, with orders to assail the craggy post between -the Rhunes and connect Alten’s attack with that -of Giron’s Spaniards. All these troops gained their -respective stations so secretly that the enemy had -no suspicion of their presence, although for several -hours the columns were lying within half musket-shot -of the works. Towards morning indeed five or -six guns, fired in a hurried manner from the low -ground near the sea, broke the stillness, but the -French on the Rhune remained quiet, and the -British troops awaited the rising of the sun when -three guns fired from the Atchubia mountain were -to give the signal of attack.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE.</h4> - -<p>The day broke with great splendour, and as the -first ray of light played on the summit of the lofty -Atchubia the signal-guns were fired in rapid succession -from its summit. The soldiers instantly -leaped up, and the French beheld with astonishment -several columns rushing forward from the flank of -the great Rhune. Running to their defences with -much tumult they opened a few pieces, which were -answered from the top of the greater Rhune by the -mountain-artillery, and at the same moment two -companies of the forty-third were detached to cross -the marsh if possible, and keep down the enemy’s -fire from the lower part of the hog’s-back. The -action being thus commenced the remainder of the -regiment, formed partly in line partly in a column -of reserve, turned the marsh by the right and advanced -against the high rocks. From these crags -the French shot fast and thickly, but the quick<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_339"></a>[339]</span> -even movement of the British line deceived their -aim, and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly -though the ground was rough, turned suddenly -between the rocks and the marsh, and were immediately -joined by the two companies which had passed -that obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all -together jumped into the lower works, but the men -exhausted by their exertions, for they had passed -over half a mile of very difficult ground with a wonderful -speed, remained for a few minutes inactive -within half pistol-shot of the first stone castle from -whence came a sharp and biting musketry. When -they had recovered breath they arose and with a -stern shout commenced the assault.</p> - -<p>The defenders were as numerous as the assailants, -and for six weeks they had been labouring on their -well-contrived castles; but strong and valiant in arms -must the soldiers have been who stood in that hour -before the veterans of the forty-third. One French -grenadier officer only dared to sustain the rush. -Standing alone on the high wall of the first castle and -flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble -figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men -shrinking on each side sought safety among the rocks -on his flanks. Close and confused then was the action, -man met man at every turn, but with a rattling fire -of musketry, sometimes struggling in the intricate -narrow paths sometimes climbing the loose stone -walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way -until they had carried the second castle, called by -the French the place of arms, and the magpie’s nest, -because of a lofty pillar of rock which rose above -it and on which a few marksmen were perched. -From these points the defenders were driven into -their last castle, which being higher and larger<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_340"></a>[340]</span> -than the others and covered by a natural ditch or -cleft in the rocks, fifteen feet deep, was called the -Donjon. Here they made a stand, and the assailants, -having advanced so far as to look into the rear -of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below, -suspended the vehement throng of their attack for -a while, partly to gather a head for storming the -Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy beneath them, -who were now warmly engaged with the two -battalions of riflemen, the Portuguese Caçadores, -and the seventeenth Portuguese. This last regiment -was to have followed the forty-third but seeing -how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the -rocks, had moved at once against the traverse on -the other side of the marsh; and very soon the -French defending the rampart, being thus pressed -in front, and warned by the direction of the fire -that they were turned on the ridge above, seeing -also the fifty-second, forming the extreme left of -the division, now emerging from the deep ravine -beyond the star fort on the other flank, abandoned -their works. Then the forty-third gathering a -strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped -with a shout down the deep cleft in the rock, -others turned it by the narrow paths on each flank, -and the enemy abandoned the loose walls at the -moment they were being scaled. Thus in twenty -minutes six hundred old soldiers were hustled out -of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the -victors lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men.</p> - -<p>The whole mountain was now cleared of the -French, for the riflemen dropping perpendicularly -down from the greater Rhune upon the post of -crags in the hollow between the Rhunes seized it -with small loss; but they were ill-seconded by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_341"></a>[341]</span> -Giron’s Spaniards and were hardly handled by the -thirty-fourth French regiment, which maintaining -its post on the slope, covered the flight of the -confused crowd which came rushing down the mountain -behind them towards the neck of land leading -to the main position. At that point they all rallied -and seemed inclined to renew the action, but after -some hesitation continued their retreat. This favourable -moment for a decisive stroke had been -looked for by the commander of the forty-third, but -the officer entrusted with the reserve companies of -the regiment had thrown them needlessly into the -fight, thus rendering it impossible to collect a body -strong enough to assail such a heavy mass.</p> - -<p>The contest at the stone rampart and star fort, -being shortened by the rapid success on the hog’s-back, -was not very severe, but general Kempt, always -conspicuous for his valour, was severely wounded, -nevertheless he did not quit the field and soon reformed -his brigade on the platform he had thus so -gallantly won. Meanwhile the fifty-second having -turned the position by the ravine was now approaching -the enemy’s line of retreat, when general -Alten, following his instructions, halted the division -partly in the ravine itself to the left of the neck, -partly on the table-land, and during this action -Longa’s Spaniards having got near Ascain were in -connection with Freyre’s Gallicians. In this position -with the enemy now and then cannonading -Longa’s people and the troops in the ravine, Alten -awaited the progress of the army on his right, for -the columns there had a long way to march and it -was essential to regulate the movements.</p> - -<p>The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent -the light division against the Rhune, had also put<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_342"></a>[342]</span> -the fourth and seventh divisions in movement against -the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada. Eighteen -guns were immediately placed in battery against -the former, and while they poured their stream of -shot the troops advanced with scaling ladders and -the skirmishers of the fourth division got into the -rear of the work, whereupon the French leaped out -and fled. Ross’s battery of horse artillery galloping -to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada -fort drove the enemy from there also, and then the -fourth and seventh divisions carried the village of -Sarre and the position beyond it and advanced to the -attack of Clauzel’s main position.</p> - -<p>It was now eight o’clock and from the smaller -Rhune a splendid spectacle of war opened upon the -view. On one hand the ships of war slowly sailing to -and fro were exchanging shots with the fort of Socoa; -Hope menacing all the French lines in the low ground -sent the sound of a hundred pieces of artillery -bellowing up the rocks, and they were answered by -nearly as many from the tops of the mountains. -On the other hand the summit of the great Atchubia -was just lighted by the rising sun, and fifty -thousand men rushing down its enormous slopes -with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding -shadows into the deep valley. The plains of France -so long overlooked from the towering crags of the -Pyrenees were to be the prize of battle, and the half-famished -soldiers in their fury, broke through the -iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a -screen of reeds.</p> - -<p>The principal action was on a space of seven or -eight miles, but the skirts of battle spread wide, -and in no point had the combinations failed. Far -on the right general Hill after a long and difficult<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_343"></a>[343]</span> -night march had got within reach of the enemy a -little before seven o’clock. Opposing Morillo’s and -Mina’s Spaniards to Abbé’s troops on the Mondarain -and Atchuleguy rocks, he directed the second division -against D’Armagnac’s brigade and brushed it -back from the forge of Urdax and the village of -Ainhoa. Meanwhile the aid of the sixth division -and Hamilton’s Portuguese being demanded by him, -they passed the Nivelle lower down and bent their -march along the right bank towards the bridge of -Amotz. Thus while Mina’s battalion and Morillo’s -division kept Abbé in check on the mountains, the -three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, marching left -flank in advance, approached D’Erlon’s second position, -but the country being very rugged it was -eleven o’clock before they got within cannon-shot of -the French redoubts. Each of these contained five -hundred men, and they were placed along the summit -of a high ridge which being thickly clothed -with bushes, and covered by a deep ravine was -very difficult to attack. However general Clinton, -leading the sixth division on the extreme left, turned -this ravine and drove the enemy from the works -covering the approaches to the bridge, after which -wheeling to his right he advanced against the nearest -redoubt, and the garrison not daring to await -the assault abandoned it. Then the Portuguese -division passing the ravine and marching on the right -of the sixth menaced the second redoubt, and the -second division in like manner approached the third -redoubt. D’Armagnac’s troops now set fire to their -hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda -behind San Pé, pursued by the sixth division. Abbé’s -second brigade forming the French left was separated -by a ravine from D’Armagnac’s ground, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_344"></a>[344]</span> -he also after some hesitation retreated towards Espelette -and Cambo, where his other brigade, which -had meanwhile fallen back from the Mondarain -before Morillo, rejoined him.</p> - -<p>It was the progress of the battle on the left of -the Nive that rendered D’Erlon’s defence so feeble. -After the fall of the St. Barbe and Grenada redoubts -Conroux’s right and centre endeavoured to -defend the village and heights of Sarre; but while -the fourth and seventh divisions, aided by the ninety-fourth -regiment detached from the third division, attacked -and carried those points, the third division -being on their right and less opposed pushed rapidly -towards the bridge of Amotz, forming in conjunction -with the sixth division the narrow end of the wedge -into which Beresford’s and Hill’s corps were now -thrown. The French were thus driven from all their -new unfinished works covering the approaches to that -bridge on both sides of the Nivelle, and Conroux’s -division, spreading from Sarre to Amotz, was broken -by superior numbers at every point. That general -indeed vigorously defended the old works around -the bridge itself, but he soon fell mortally wounded, -his troops were again broken, and the third division -seized the bridge and established itself on the -heights between that structure and the redoubt of -Louis the XIV. which having been also lately commenced -was unfinished. This happened about eleven -o’clock and D’Erlon fearing to be cut off from -St. Pé yielded as we have seen at once to the -attack of the sixth division, and at the same time the -remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back in disorder -from Sarre, closely pursued by the fourth and -seventh divisions, which were immediately established -on the left of the third. Thus the communication<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_345"></a>[345]</span> -between Clauzel and D’Erlon was cut, -the left flank of one and the right flank of the other -broken, and a direct communication between Hill -and Beresford secured by the same blow.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon abandoned his position, but Clauzel -stood firm with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions. -The latter now completed by the return of Barbot’s -brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt -of Louis the XIV. and supported with eight -field-pieces attempted to cover the flight of Conroux’s -troops. The guns opened briskly but they -were silenced by Ross’s battery of horse artillery, -the only one which had surmounted the difficulties -of the ground after passing Sarre, the infantry -were then assailed, in front by the fourth and seventh -divisions, in flank by the third division, the -redoubt of Louis XIV. was stormed, the garrison -bayonetted, Conroux’s men continued to fly, -Maransin’s after a stiff combat were cast headlong -into the ravines behind their position, and Maransin -himself was taken but escaped in the confusion. -Giron’s Spaniards now came up on the left of the -fourth division, somewhat late however, and after -having abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes -of the smaller Rhune.</p> - -<p>On the French side Taupin’s division and a large -body of conscripts forming Clauzel’s right wing -still remained to fight. The left rested on a large -work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery -but overlooked the whole position; the right -was covered by two redoubts overhanging a ravine -which separated them from the camp of Serres, and -some works in the ravine itself protected the communication -by the bridge of Ascain. Behind the signal -redoubt, on a ridge crossing the road to San Pé and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_346"></a>[346]</span> -along which Maransin and Conroux’s beaten divisions -were now flying in disorder, there was another -work called the redoubt of Harastaguia, and Clauzel -thinking he might still dispute the victory, if his -reserve division, posted in the camp of Serres, -could come to his aid, drew the thirty-first French -regiment from Taupin, and posted it in front of -this redoubt of Harastaguia. His object was to -rally Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops there and so -form a new line, the left on the Harastaguia, the -right on the signal redoubt, into which last he threw -six hundred of the eighty-eighth regiment. In this -position having a retreat by the bridge of Ascain -he resolved to renew the battle, but his plan failed -at the moment of conception, because Taupin could -not stand before the light division which was now -again in full action.</p> - -<p>About half-past nine, general Alten, seeing the -whole of the columns on his right, as far as the eye -could reach, well engaged with the enemy, had -crossed the low neck of land in his front. It was -first passed by the fifty-second regiment with a -rapid pace and a very narrow front, under a destructive -cannonade and fire of musketry from the -entrenchments which covered the side of the opposite -mountain; a road coming from Ascain by the -ravine led up the position, and as the fifty-second -pushed their attack along it the enemy abandoned -his entrenchments on each side, and forsook even -his crowning works above. This formidable regiment -was followed by the remainder of Alten’s troops, -and Taupin, though his division was weak from its -losses on the 7th of October and now still further -diminished by the absence of the thirty-first regiment, -awaited the assault above, being supported<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_347"></a>[347]</span> -by the conscripts drawn up in his rear. But at -this time Longa, having turned the smaller Rhune, -approached Ascain, and being joined by part of -Freyre’s troops their skirmishers opened a distant<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Official Report to Soult, MSS.</span> -musketry against the works covering that bridge -on Taupin’s right; a panic immediately seized the -French, the seventieth regiment abandoned the two<span class="sidenote">Taupin’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -redoubts above, and the conscripts were withdrawn. -Clauzel ordered Taupin to retake the forts but this -only added to the disorder, the seventieth regiment -instead of facing about disbanded entirely and -were not reassembled until next day. There remained -only four regiments unbroken, one, the -eighty-eighth, was in the signal redoubt, two under -Taupin in person kept together in rear of the -works on the right, and the thirty-first covered the -fort of Harastaguia now the only line of retreat.</p> - -<p>In this emergency, Clauzel, anxious to bring off -the eighty-eighth regiment, ordered Taupin to -charge on one side of the signal redoubt, intending -to do the same himself on the other at the head of -the thirty-first regiment; but the latter was now -vigorously attacked by the Portuguese of the seventh -division, and the fourth division was rapidly interposing -between that regiment and the signal -redoubt. Moreover Alten previous to this had -directed the forty-third, preceded by Barnard’s -riflemen, to turn at the distance of musquet shot -the right flank of the signal redoubt, wherefore -Taupin instead of charging, was himself charged in -front by the riflemen, and being menaced at the -same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated, -closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer -fell dangerously wounded. During this struggle -the seventh division broke the thirty-first, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_348"></a>[348]</span> -rout was complete; the French fled to the different -bridges over the Nivelle and the signal redoubt -was left to its fate.</p> - -<p>This formidable work barred the way of the -light division, but it was of no value to the defence -when the forts on its flanks were abandoned. -Colborne approached it in front with the fifty-second -regiment, Giron’s Spaniards menaced it on -Colborne’s right, the fourth division was passing to -its rear, and Kempt’s brigade was as we have seen -turning it on the left. Colborne whose military -judgment was seldom at fault, halted under the -brow of the conical hill on which the work was -situated, but some of Giron’s Spaniards making a -vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking -it on his right were beaten back, and at that moment -a staff-officer without warrant, for general Alten on -the spot assured the Author of this History that he -sent no such order, rode up and directed Colborne -to advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance -and his troops covered by the steepness of the hill -reached the flat top which was about forty yards -across to the redoubt; then they made their rush, -but a wide ditch, thirty feet deep well fraised and -pallisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of the -enemy stretched all the foremost men dead. The -intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously for he was -always at the head and on horseback, immediately -led the regiment under cover of the brow to another -point, and thinking to take the French unawares made -another rush, yet with the same result. At three -different places did he rise to the surface in this -manner, and each time the French fire swept away the -head of his column. Resorting then to persuasion -he held out a white handkerchief and summoned the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_349"></a>[349]</span> -commandant, pointing out to him how his work was -surrounded and how hopeless his defence, whereupon -the garrison yielded having had only one man -killed, whereas on the British side there fell two -hundred soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in -arms since arms were first borne by men.</p> - -<p>During this affair Clauzel’s divisions had crossed -the Nivelle in great disorder, Maransin’s and -Conroux’s troops near San Pé, the thirty-first -regiment at Harastaguia, Taupin between that -place and the bridge of Serres. They were pursued -by the third and seventh divisions, and the -skirmishers of the former crossing by Amotz and a -bridge above San Pé entered that place while the -French were in the act of passing the river below. -It was now past two o’clock, Conroux’s troops -pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position -on the road from San Pé to Bayonne, where -they were joined by Taupin and by D’Erlon with -D’Armagnac’s division, but Clauzel rallied Maransin’s -men and took post on some heights immediately -above San Pé. Meanwhile Soult had -hurried from St. Jean de Luz to the camp -of Serres with all his reserve artillery and spare -troops to menace the allies’ left flank by Ascain, and -Wellington thereupon halted the fourth and light -divisions, and Giron’s Spaniards, on the reverse -slopes of Clauzel’s original position, facing the -camp of Serres, waiting until the sixth division, -then following D’Armagnac’s retreat on the right of -the Nivelle, was well advanced. When he was -assured of Clinton’s progress he crossed the Nivelle -with the third and seventh divisions and drove Maransin -from his new position after a hard struggle, -in which general Inglis was wounded and the fifty-first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_350"></a>[350]</span> -and sixty-eighth regiments handled very roughly. -This ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was -coming on and the troops were exhausted, especially -the sixth division which had been marching or -fighting for twenty-four hours. However three divisions -were firmly established in rear of Soult’s right -wing of whose operations it is now time to treat.</p> - -<p>In front of Reille’s entrenchments were two advanced -positions, the camp of the Sans Culottes on -the right, the Bons Secours in the centre covering -Urogne. The first had been attacked and carried -early in the morning by the fifth division, which -advanced to the inundation covering the heights of -Bordegain and Ciboure. The second after a short -cannonade was taken by Halket’s Germans and the -guards, and immediately afterwards the eighty-fifth -regiment, of lord Aylmer’s brigade, drove a French -battalion out of Urogne. The first division, being -on the right, then menaced the camp of Belchena, -and the German skirmishers passed a small stream -covering this part of the line, but they were driven -back by the enemy whose musketry and cannonade -were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile -Freyre, advancing in two columns from Jollimont -and the Calvaire on the right of the first division, -placed eight guns in battery against the Nassau -redoubt, a large work constructed on the ridge -occupied by Villate to cover the approaches to Ascain. -The Spaniards were here opposed by their own -countrymen under Casa Palacio who commanded -the remains of Joseph’s Spanish guards, and during -the fight general Freyre’s skirmishers on the right -united with Longa’s men. Thus a kind of false -battle was maintained along the whole line to the -sea until nightfall, with equal loss of men but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_351"></a>[351]</span> -great advantage to the allies, because it entirely -occupied Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s -reserve, and prevented the troops in the camp of -Serres from passing by the bridge of Ascain to aid -Clauzel, who was thus overpowered. When that -event happened and lord Wellington had passed the -Nivelle at San Pé, Daricau and the Italian brigade -withdrew from Serres, and Villatte’s reserve occupied -it, whereupon Freyre and Longa entered the -town of Ascain. Villatte however held the camp -above until Reille had withdrawn into St. Jean de -Luz and destroyed all the bridges on the Lower -Nivelle; when that was effected the whole retired -and at daybreak reached the heights of Bidart on -the road to Bayonne.</p> - -<p>During the night the allies halted on the position -they had gained in the centre, but an accidental -conflagration catching a wood completely separated -the picquets towards Ascain from the main body, -and spreading far and wide over the heath lighted -up all the hills, a blazing sign of war to France.</p> - -<p>On the 11th the army advanced in order of -battle. Sir John Hope on the left, forded the -river above St. Jean de Luz with his infantry, and -marched on Bidart. Marshal Beresford in the -centre moved by the roads leading upon Arbonne. -General Hill, communicating by his right with -Morillo who was on the rocks of Mondarain, -brought his left forward into communication with -Beresford, and with his centre <ins class="corr" id="tn-351" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'took possesion of'"> -took possession of</ins> Suraide and Espelette facing towards Cambo. The -time required to restore the bridges for the artillery -at Ciboure, and the change of front on the right -rendered these movements slow, and gave the duke -of Dalmatia time to rally his army upon a third<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_352"></a>[352]</span> -line of fortified camps which he had previously -commenced, the right resting on the coast at Bidart, -the centre at Helbacen Borda, the left at Ustaritz -on the Nive. This front was about eight miles, but -the works were only slightly advanced and Soult -dreading a second battle on so wide a field drew -back his centre and left to Arbonne and Arauntz, -broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and -at two o’clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the -allies in the centre, closed the day’s proceedings. -The next morning the French retired to the ridge -of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet -and their left in the entrenched camp of Bayonne -near Marac. During this movement a dense fog -arrested the allies, but when the day cleared sir John -Hope took post at Bidart on the left, and Beresford -occupied Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe, -in the centre. General Hill endeavoured to pass -the fords and restore the broken bridges of Ustaritz -and he also made a demonstration against the works -at Cambo, but the rain which fell heavily in the -mountains on the 11th rendered the fords impassable -and both points were defended successfully by Foy -whose operations had been distinct from the rest.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 9th D’Erlon, mistrusting the -strength of his own position, had sent that general -orders to march from Bidaray to Espelette, but the -messenger did not arrive in time and on the morning -of the 10th about eleven o’clock Foy, following -Soult’s previous instructions, drove Mina’s battalions -from the Gorospil mountain; then pressing -against the flank of Morillo he forced him also back -fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However D’Erlon’s -battle was at this period receding fast, and Foy -fearing to be cut off retired with the loss of a colonel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_353"></a>[353]</span> -and one hundred and fifty men, having however -taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners. -Continuing his retreat all night he reached -Cambo and Ustaritz on the 11th, just in time to -relieve Abbé’s division at those posts, and on the -12th defended them against general Hill. Such -were the principal circumstances of the battle of -the Nivelle, whereby Soult was driven from a mountain -position which he had been fortifying for three -months. He lost four thousand two hundred and -sixty-five men and officers including twelve or fourteen -hundred prisoners, and one general was killed. -His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz and Espelette -fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one -pieces of artillery were taken, the greater -part having been abandoned in the redoubts of the -low country to sir John Hope. The allies had two -generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost -two thousand six hundred and ninety-four men and -officers.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. Soult fared in this battle as most generals -will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want -of numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against -rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers lines -may avail, seldom against accomplished generals, -never when the assailants are the better soldiers. -Cæsar at Alesia resisted the Gauls, but his lines -served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey. -Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus, and in -modern times the duke of Marlborough broke -through all the French lines in Flanders. If Wellington<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_354"></a>[354]</span> -triumphed at Torres Vedras it was perhaps -because his lines were not attacked, and, it may be, -Soult was seduced by that example. His works -were almost as gigantic and upon the same plan, -that is to say a river on one flank, the ocean on the -other, and the front upon mountains covered with -redoubts and partially protected by inundations. -But the duke of Dalmatia had only three months to -complete his system, his labours were under the -gaze of his enemy, his troops, twice defeated during -the execution, were inferior in confidence and numbers -to the assailants. Lord Wellington’s lines at -Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year. -Massena only knew of them when they stopped his -progress, and his army inferior in numbers had -been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco.</p> - -<p>It is not meant by this to decry entrenched -camps within compass, and around which an -active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or -avoiding battle according to circumstances. The -objection applies only to those extensive covering -lines by which soldiers are taught to consider themselves -inferior in strength and courage to their -enemies. A general is thus precluded from shewing -himself at important points and at critical periods; -he is unable to encourage his troops or to correct -errors; his sudden resources and the combinations -of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering -to the works, while the assailants may make whatever -dispositions they like, menace every point -and select where to break through. The defenders, -seeing large masses directed against them and unable -to draw confidence from a like display of numbers, -become fearful, knowing there must be some -weak point which is the measure of strength for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_355"></a>[355]</span> -whole. The assailants fall on with that heat -and vehemence which belongs to those who act -voluntarily and on the offensive; each mass strives -to outdo those on its right and left, and failure is -only a repulse, whereas the assailed having no resource -but victory look to their flanks, and are more -anxious about their neighbours’ fighting than their -own.</p> - -<p>All these disadvantages were experienced at the -battle of the Nivelle. D’Erlon attributed his defeat -to the loss of the bridge of Amotz by Conroux’s -division, and to this cause also Maransin traced his -misfortunes. Taupin laid his defeat at Maransin’s -door, but Clauzel on the other hand ascribed it<span class="sidenote">Official Reports of the French generals to Soult, MSS.</span> -at once to want of firmness in the troops, although -he also asserted that if Daricau’s division had come -to his aid from the camp of Serres, he would have -maintained his ground. Soult however traced -Clauzel’s defeat to injudicious measures. That general<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report to the Minister of War, MSS.</span> -he said attempted to defend the village of Sarre -after the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada were -carried, whereby Conroux’s division was overwhelmed -in detail and driven back in flight to Amotz. Clauzel -should rather have assembled his three divisions at -once in the main position which was his battleground, -and there, covered by the smaller Rhune, -ought to have been victorious. It was scarcely -credible he observed that such entrenchments as -Clauzel’s and D’Erlon’s should have been carried. -For his part he relied on their strength so confidently -as to think the allies must sacrifice twenty-five -thousand men to force them and perhaps fail -then. He had been on the right when the battle -began, no reports came to him, he could judge of -events only by the fire, and when he reached the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_356"></a>[356]</span> -camp of Serres with his reserve troops and -artillery Clauzel’s works were lost! His arrival -had however paralyzed the march of three divisions. -This was true, yet there seems some -foundation for Clauzel’s complaint, namely, that he -had for five hours fought on his main position, and -during that time no help had come, although the -camp of Serres was close at hand, the distance -from St. Jean de Luz to that place only four miles, -and the attack in the low ground evidently a feint. -This then was Soult’s error. He suffered sir John -Hope to hold in play twenty-five thousand men in -the low ground, while fifteen thousand under -Clauzel lost the battle on the hills.</p> - -<p>2º. The French army was inferior in numbers -and many of the works were unfinished; and yet two -strong divisions, Daricau’s and Foy’s, were quite -thrown out of the fight, for the slight offensive -movement made by the latter produced no effect -whatever. Vigorous counter-attacks are no doubt -essential to a good defence, and it was in allusion -to this that Napoleon, speaking of Joseph’s position -behind the Ebro in the beginning of the war, said, -“if a river were as broad and rapid as the Danube -it would be nothing without secure points for passing -to the offensive.” The same maxim applies to -lines, and Soult grandly conceived and applied this -principle when he proposed the descent upon -Aragon to Suchet. But he conceived it meanly -and poorly when he ordered Foy to attack by the -Gorospil mountain. That general’s numbers were -too few, and the direction of the march false; one -regiment in the field of battle at the decisive moment -would have been worth three on a distant and secondary -point. Foy’s retreat was inevitable if<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_357"></a>[357]</span> -D’Erlon failed, and wanting the other’s aid he did -fail. What success could Foy obtain? He might -have driven Mina’s battalions over the Puerto de -Maya and quite through the Bastan; he might have -defeated Morillo and perhaps have taken general -Hill’s baggage; yet all this would have weighed -little against the allies’ success at Amotz; and the -deeper he penetrated the more difficult would -have been his retreat. The incursion into the Bastan -by Yspegui proposed by him on the 6th, although -properly rejected by Soult would probably -have produced greater effects than the one executed -by Gorospil on the 10th. A surprise on the 6th, -Hill’s troops being then in march by brigades -through the Alduides, might have brought some -advantages to the French, and perhaps delayed the -general attack beyond the 10th, when the heavy -rains which set in on the 11th would have rendered -it difficult to attack at all: Soult would thus have -had time to complete his works.</p> - -<p>3º. It has been observed that a minor cause of -defeat was the drawing up of the French troops in -front instead of in rear of the redoubts. This may -possibly have happened in some places from error -and confusion, not by design, for Clauzel’s report -expressly states that Maransin was directed to form -in rear of the redoubts and charge the allies when -they were between the works and the abbatis. It -is however needless to pry closely into these matters -when the true cause lies broad on the surface. -Lord Wellington directed superior numbers with -superior skill. The following analysis will prove -this, but it must be remembered that the conscripts -are not included in the enumeration of the French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_358"></a>[358]</span> -force: being quite undisciplined they were kept in -masses behind and never engaged.</p> - -<p>Abbé’s division, furnishing five thousand old -soldiers, was posted in two lines one behind the -other, and they were both paralyzed by the position -of Morillo’s division and Mina’s battalions. Foy’s -division was entirely occupied by the same troops. -Six thousand of Wellington’s worst soldiers therefore -sufficed to employ twelve thousand of Soult’s -best troops during the whole day. Meanwhile Hill -fell upon the decisive point where there was only -D’Armagnac’s division to oppose him, that is to say, -five thousand against twenty thousand. And while -the battle was secured on the right of the Nivelle -by this disproportion, Beresford on the other bank -thrust twenty-four thousand against the ten thousand -composing Conroux’s and Maransin’s divisions. -Moreover as Hill and Beresford, advancing, the one -from his left the other from his right, formed a -wedge towards the bridge of Amotz, forty-four -thousand men composing the six divisions under -those generals, fell upon the fifteen thousand composing -the divisions of D’Armagnac Conroux and -Maransin; and these last were also attacked in -detail, because part of Conroux’s troops were defeated -near Sarre, and Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s -corps was beaten on the Rhune by the light division -before the main position was attacked. Finally -Alten with eight thousand men, having first defeated -Barbot’s brigade, fell upon Taupin who had only -three thousand while the rest of the French army -was held in check by Freyre and Hope. Thus -more than fifty thousand troops full of confidence from -repeated victories were suddenly thrown upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_359"></a>[359]</span> -decisive point where there were only eighteen thousand -dispirited by previous reverses to oppose them. -Against such a thunderbolt there was no defence in -the French works. Was it then a simple matter -for Wellington so to combine his battle? The -mountains on whose huge flanks he gathered his -fierce soldiers, the roads he opened, the horrid -crags he surmounted, the headlong steeps he descended, -the wild regions through which he poured -the destructive fire of more than ninety guns, these -and the reputation of the French commander furnish -the everlasting reply.</p> - -<p>And yet he did not compass all that he designed. -The French right escaped, because when he passed -the Nivelle at San Pé he had only two divisions in -hand, the sixth had not come up, three were in -observation of the camp at Serres, and before he -could assemble enough men to descend upon the -enemy in the low ground the day had closed. The -great object of the battle was therefore unattained, -and it may be a question, seeing the shortness of -the days and the difficulty of the roads were not -unexpected obstacles, whether the combinations -would not have been surer if the principal attack -had been directed entirely against Clauzel’s position. -Carlos D’España’s force and the remainder -of Mina’s battalions could have reinforced Morillo’s -division with five thousand men to occupy D’Erlon’s -attention; it was not essential to defeat him, for -though he attributed his retreat to Clauzel’s reverse -that general did not complain that D’Erlon’s retreat -endangered his position. This arrangement would -have enabled the rest of Hill’s troops to reinforce -Beresford and have given lord Wellington three<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_360"></a>[360]</span> -additional divisions in hand with which to cross the -Nivelle before two o’clock. Soult’s right wing -could not then have escaped.</p> - -<p>4º. In the report of the battle lord Wellington -from some oversight did but scant and tardy justice -to the light division. Acting alone, for Longa’s -Spaniards went off towards Ascain and scarcely -fired a shot, this division furnishing only four thousand -seven hundred men and officers, first carried -the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s brigade, -and then beat Taupin’s division from the main -position, thus driving superior numbers from the -strongest works. In fine being less than one-sixth -of the whole force employed against Clauzel, they -defeated one-third of that general’s corps. Many -brave men they lost, and of two who fell in this -battle I will speak.</p> - -<p>The first, low in rank for he was but a lieutenant, -rich in honour for he bore many scars, was young -of days. He was only nineteen. But he had -seen more combats and sieges than he could -count years. So slight in person, and of such -surpassing and delicate beauty that the Spaniards -often thought him a girl disguised in man’s clothing, -he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that -the most daring and experienced veterans watched -his looks on the field of battle, and implicitly -following where he led, would like children obey his -slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His -education was incomplete, yet were his natural -powers so happy, the keenest and best-furnished intellects -shrunk from an encounter of wit, and every -thought and aspiration was proud and noble, indicating -future greatness if destiny had so willed it.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_361"></a>[361]</span> -Such was Edward Freer of the forty-third one of -three brothers who covered with wounds have all -died in the service. Assailed the night before the -battle with that strange anticipation of coming -death so often felt by military men, he was pierced -with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune -rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment -wept even in the middle of the fight when they -heard of his fate.</p> - -<p>On the same day and at the same hour was killed -colonel Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a -long time in the forty-third. Under him Freer had -learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the -course of the war promotion placed Lloyd at the -head of the ninety-fourth, and it was leading that -regiment he fell. In him also were combined -mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. -A graceful symmetry combined with Herculean -strength, and a countenance at once frank and -majestic gave the true index of his nature, for his -capacity was great and commanding, and his military -knowledge extensive both from experience and -study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the -army, I will not dwell, save to remark, that he used -the latter without offence, yet so as to increase his -ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse, -for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, -and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He -like Freer was prescient of, and predicted his -own fall, yet with no abatement of courage. When -he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, -he would not suffer himself to be moved but -remained watching the battle and making observations -upon the changes in it until death came. It -was thus at the age of thirty, that the good the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_362"></a>[362]</span> -brave the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to his<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Despatches.</span> -merit have been published by lord Wellington and -by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and -by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine, let<span class="sidenote">The Eventful Life of a Sergeant.</span> -those who served on equal terms with him say -whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_363"></a>[363]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">Soult having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to<span class="sidenote9">1813. November.</span> -leave part of his forces in the entrenched camp of -Bayonne, and with the remainder take a flanking -position behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne -and St. Jean Pied de Port, securing his left by the -entrenched mountain of Ursouia, and his right on -the heights above Cambo, the bridge-head of which -would give him the power of making offensive -movements. He could thus keep his troops together -and restore their confidence, while he confined the -allies to a small sterile district of France between -the river and the sea, and rendered their situation -very uneasy during the winter if they did not retire. -However he soon modified this plan. The works of -the Bayonne camp were not complete and his -presence was necessary to urge their progress. The -camp on the Ursouia mountain had been neglected -contrary to his orders, and the bridge-head at -Cambo was only commenced on the right bank. -On the left it was indeed complete but constructed -on a bad trace. Moreover he found that the Nive -in dry weather was fordable at Ustaritz below -Cambo, and at many places above that point. -Remaining therefore at Bayonne himself with six -divisions and Villatte’s reserve, he sent D’Erlon with -three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo. Yet -neither D’Erlon’s divisions nor Soult’s whole army -could have stopped lord Wellington at this time if<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_364"></a>[364]</span> -other circumstances had permitted the latter to -follow up his victory as he designed.</p> - -<p>The hardships and privations endured on the -mountains by the Anglo-Portuguese troops had -been beneficial to them as an army. The fine air -and the impossibility of the soldiers committing -their usual excesses in drink had rendered them -unusually healthy, while the facility of enforcing a -strict discipline, and their natural impatience to -win the fair plains spread out before them, had -raised their moral and physical qualities in a wonderful -degree. Danger was their sport, and their -experienced general in the prime and vigour of -life was as impatient for action as his soldiers. Neither -the works of the Bayonne camp nor the barrier -of the Nive, suddenly manned by a beaten and -dispirited army, could have long withstood the progress -of such a fiery host, and if Wellington could -have let their strength and fury loose in the first -days succeeding the battle of the Nivelle France -would have felt his conquering footsteps to her -centre. But the country at the foot of the Pyrenees -is a deep clay, quite impassable after rain -except by the royal road near the coast and that -of St. Jean Pied de Port, both of which were in -the power of the French. On the bye-roads the -infantry sunk to the mid leg, the cavalry above the -horses’ knees, and even to the saddle-girths in some -places. The artillery could not move at all. The -rain had commenced on the 11th, the mist in the -early part of the 12th had given Soult time to -regain his camp and secure the high road to St. -Jean Pied de Port, by which his troops easily -gained their proper posts on the Nive, while his -adversary fixed in the swamps could only make the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_365"></a>[365]</span> -ineffectual demonstration at Ustaritz and Cambo -already noticed.</p> - -<p>Wellington uneasy for his right flank while -the French commanded the Cambo passage across -the Nive directed general Hill to menace it -again on the 16th. Foy had received orders to -preserve the bridge-head on the right bank in any -circumstances, but he was permitted to abandon the -work on the left bank in the event of a general -attack; however at Hill’s approach the officer placed -there in command destroyed all the works and the -bridge itself. This was a great cross to Soult, and -the allies’ flank being thus secured they were put into -cantonments to avoid the rain, which fell heavily. -The bad weather was however not the only obstacle -to the English general’s operations. On the -very day of the battle Freyre’s and Longa’s soldiers -entering Ascain pillaged it and murdered -several persons; the next day the whole of the -Spanish troops continued these excesses in various -places, and on the right Mina’s battalions, some of -whom were also in a state of mutiny, made a -plundering and murdering incursion from the -mountains towards Hellette. The Portuguese and -British soldiers of the left wing had commenced -the like outrages and two French persons were -killed in one town, however the adjutant-general Pakenham -arriving at the moment saw and instantly put -the perpetrators to death thus nipping this wickedness -in the bud, but at his own risk for legally he had -not that power. This general whose generosity humanity -and chivalric spirit excited the admiration -of every honourable person who approached him, is -the man who afterwards fell at New Orleans and -who has been so foully traduced by American<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_366"></a>[366]</span> -writers. He who was pre-eminently distinguished -by his detestation of inhumanity and outrage has -been with astounding falsehood represented as instigating -his troops to the most infamous excesses. -But from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings -in the most horrible slavery while they prate -and vaunt of liberty until all men turn with loathing -from the sickening folly, what can be expected?</p> - -<p>Terrified by these excesses the French people -fled even from the larger towns, but Wellington -quickly relieved their terror. On the 12th, although -expecting a battle, he put to death all the -Spanish marauders he could take in the act, and -then with many reproaches and despite of the discontent -of their generals, forced the whole to withdraw -into their own country. He disarmed the -insubordinate battalions under Mina, quartered Giron’s -Andalusians in the Bastan where O’Donnel -resumed the command; sent Freyre’s Gallicians to -the district between Irun and Ernani, and Longa -over the Ebro. Morillo’s division alone remained -with the army. These decisive proceedings marking -the lofty character of the man proved not less -politic than resolute. The French people immediately -returned, and finding the strictest discipline -preserved and all things paid for adopted an amicable -intercourse with the invaders. However the -loss of such a mass of troops and the effects of -weather on the roads reduced the army for the -moment to a state of inactivity; the head-quarters -were suddenly fixed at St. Jean de Luz, and the -troops were established in permanent cantonments -with the following line of battle.</p> - -<p>The left wing occupied a broad ridge on both<span class="sidenote7">Plan 7.</span> -sides of the great road beyond Bidart, the principal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_367"></a>[367]</span> -post being at a mansion belonging to the mayor of -Biaritz. The front was covered by a small stream -spreading here and there into large ponds or tanks -between which the road was conducted. The -centre posted partly on the continuation of this -ridge in front of Arcangues, partly on the hill of -San Barbe, extended by Arrauntz to Ustaritz, the -right being thrown back to face count D’Erlon’s -position, extended by Cambo to Itzassu. From -this position which might stretch about six miles -on the front and eight miles on the flank, strong -picquets were pushed forwards to several points, -and the infantry occupied all the villages and towns -behind as far back as Espelette, Suraide, Ainhoa, -San Pé, Sarre, and Ascain. One regiment of Vandeleur’s -cavalry was with the advanced post on the -left, the remainder were sent to Andaya and Urogne, -Victor Alten’s horsemen were about San Pé, and -the heavy cavalry remained in Spain.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs the establishment of the -different posts in front led to several skirmishes. -In one on the 18th, general John Wilson and general -Vandeleur were wounded; but on the same day -Beresford drove the French from the bridge of Urdains, -near the junction of the Ustaritz and San -Pé roads, and though attacked in force the next -day he maintained his acquisition. A more serious -action occurred on the 23d in front of -Arcangues. This village held by the picquets of the -light division was two or three miles in front of -Arbonne where the nearest support was cantoned. -It is built on the centre of a crescent-shaped ridge, -and the sentries of both armies were so close that -the reliefs and patroles actually passed each other in -their rounds, so that a surprise was inevitable if it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_368"></a>[368]</span> -suited either side to attempt it. Lord Wellington -visited this post and the field-officer on duty made -known to him its disadvantages, and the means of -remedying them by taking entire possession of the -village, pushing picquets along the horns of the -crescent, and establishing a chain of posts across the -valley between them. He appeared satisfied with -this project, and two days afterwards the forty-third -and some of the riflemen were employed to effect -it, the greatest part of the division being brought up -in support. The French after a few shots abandoned -Arcangues, Bussussary, and both horns of -the crescent, retiring before the picquets to a large -fortified house situated at the mouth of the valley. -The project suggested by the field-officer was thus -executed with the loss of only five men wounded -and the action should have ceased, but the picquets -of the forty-third suddenly received orders to attack -the fortified house, and the columns of support -were shewn at several points of the semicircle; the -French then conceiving they were going to be seriously -assailed reinforced their post; a sharp skirmish -ensued and the picquets were finally withdrawn -to the ground they had originally gained and -beyond which they should never have been pushed. -This ill-managed affair cost eighty-eight men and -officers of which eighty were of the forty-third.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington, whose powerful artillery and -cavalry, the former consisting of nearly one hundred -field-pieces and the latter furnishing more than -eight thousand six hundred sabres, were paralysed<span class="sidenote">Original Morning States, MSS.</span> -in the contracted space he occupied, was now anxious -to pass the Nive, but the rain which continued -to fall baffled him, and meanwhile Mina’s Spaniards -descending once more from the Alduides to plunder<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_369"></a>[369]</span> -Baigorry were beaten by the national guards of -that valley. However early in December the weather<span class="sidenote9">December.</span> -amended, forty or fifty pieces of artillery were -brought up, and other preparations made to surprize -or force the passage of the Nive at Cambo -and Ustaritz. And as this operation led to sanguinary -battles it is fitting first to describe the -exact position of the French.</p> - -<p>Bayonne situated at the confluence of the Nive<span class="sidenote7">Plans 7 and 8.</span> -and the Adour commands the passage of both. A -weak fortress of the third order its importance was -in its position, and its entrenched camp, exceedingly -strong and commanded by the fortress could not -be safely attacked in front, wherefore Soult kept -only six divisions there. His right composed of -Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s reserve touched -on the Lower Adour where there was a flotilla of -gun-boats. It was covered by a swamp and artificial -inundation, through which the royal road led -to St. Jean de Luz, and the advanced posts, well -entrenched, were pushed forward beyond Anglet on -this causeway. His left under Clauzel, composed -of three divisions, extended from Anglet to the -Nive; it was covered partly by the swamp, partly -by the large fortified house which the light division -assailed on the 23d, partly by an inundation spreading -below Urdains towards the Nive. Thus entrenched -the fortified outposts may be called the -front of battle, the entrenched camp the second -line, and the fortress the citadel. The country in -front a deep clay soil, enclosed and covered with -small wood and farm-houses, was very difficult to -move in.</p> - -<p>Beyond the Nive the entrenched camp stretching<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_370"></a>[370]</span> -from that river to the Adour was called the front of -Mousseroles. It was in the keeping of D’Erlon’s -four divisions, which were also extended up the -right bank of the Nive; that is to say, D’Armagnac’s -troops was in front of Ustaritz, and Foy prolonged -the line to Cambo. The remainder of D’Erlon’s -corps was in reserve, occupying a strong range -of heights about two miles in front of Mousseroles, -the right at Villefranque on the Nive, the left at -Old Moguerre towards the Adour. D’Erlon’s communications -with the rest of the army were double, -one circuitous through Bayonne, the other direct -by a bridge of boats thrown above that place.</p> - -<p>After the battle of the Nivelle Soult brought -general Paris’s division from St. Jean Pied de Port to -Lahoussoa close under the Ursouia mountain, where -it was in connection with Foy’s left, communicating -by the great road to St. Jean Pied de Port which -ran in a parallel direction to the river.</p> - -<p>The Nive, the Adour, and the Gave de Pau which -falls into the latter many miles above Bayonne, were -all navigable, the first as far as Ustaritz, the second to -Dax, the third to Peyrehorade, and the great French -magazines were collected at the two latter places. -But the army was fed with difficulty, and hence -to restrain Soult from the country beyond the -Nive, to intercept his communications with St. Jean -Pied de Port, to bring a powerful cavalry into activity, -and to obtain secret intelligence from the -interior of Spain were Wellington’s inducements to -force a passage over the Nive. Yet to place the -troops on both sides of a navigable river with communications -bad at all times and subject to entire -interruptions from rain; to do this in face of an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_371"></a>[371]</span> -army possessing short communications good roads -and entrenched camps for retreat, was a delicate -and dangerous operation.</p> - -<p>On the 7th orders were issued for forcing the -passage on the 9th. On that day sir John Hope -and Charles Alten, with the first, fifth, and light -divisions, the unattached brigades of infantry, Vandeleur’s<span class="sidenote">Original States, MSS.</span> -cavalry and twelve guns, in all about twenty-four -thousand combatants, were to drive back the -French advanced posts along the whole front of the -entrenched camp between the Nive and the sea. This -movement was partly to examine the course of the -Lower Adour with a view to subsequent operations, -but principally to make Soult discover his dispositions -of defence on that side, and to keep his troops -in check while Beresford and Hill crossed the Nive. -To support this double operation the fourth and -seventh divisions were secretly brought up from -Ascain and Espelette on the 8th, the latter to the -hill of St. Barbe, from whence it detached one -brigade to relieve the posts of the third division. -There remained the second the third and the sixth -divisions, Hamilton’s Portuguese, and Morillo’s -Spaniards, for the passage. Beresford leading the -third and sixth reinforced with six guns and a -squadron of cavalry, was to cross at Ustaritz with -pontoons, Hill having the second division, Hamilton’s -Portuguese, Vivian’s and Victor Alten’s cavalry, -and fourteen guns, was to ford the river at -Cambo and Larressore. Both generals were then -to repair the bridges at these respective points -with materials prepared beforehand; and to cover -Hill’s movement on the right and protect the valley -of the Nive from Paris, who being at Lahoussoa -might have penetrated to the rear of the army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_372"></a>[372]</span> -during the operations, Morillo’s Spaniards were to -cross at Itzassu. At this time Foy’s division was -extended from Halzou in front of Larressore, to the -fords above Cambo, the Ursouia mountain being between -his left and Paris. The rest of D’Erlon’s -troops remained on the heights of Moguerre in front -of Mousserolles.</p> - - -<h4>PASSAGE OF THE NIVE<br> -AND<br> -BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE.</h4> - -<p>At Ustaritz the French had broken both bridges, -but the island connecting them was in possession of -the British. Beresford laid his pontoons down on<span class="sidenote7">Plans 7 and 8.</span> -the hither side in the night of the 8th and in the -morning of the 9th a beacon lighted on the heights -above Cambo gave the signal of attack. The -passage was immediately forced under the fire of -the artillery, the second bridge was laid, and D’Armagnac’s -brigade was driven back by the sixth -division; but the swampy nature of the country -between the river and the high road retarded the -allies’ march and gave the French time to retreat -with little loss. At the same time Hill’s troops, -also covered by the fire of artillery, forced the -passage in three columns above and below Cambo -with slight resistance, though the fords were so deep -that several horsemen were drowned, and the French -strongly posted, especially at Halzou where there -was a deep and strong mill-race to cross as well -as the river.</p> - -<p>Foy seeing, by the direction of Beresford’s fire, -that his retreat was endangered, retired hastily with -his left leaving his right wing under general -Berlier at Halzou without orders. Hence when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_373"></a>[373]</span> -general Pringle attacked the latter from Larressore, -the sixth division was already on the high road -between Foy and Berlier, who escaped by cross roads -towards Hasparen, but did not rejoin his division -until two o’clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile -Morillo crossed at Itzassu, and Paris retired to -Hellette where he was joined by a regiment of light -cavalry belonging to Pierre Soult who was then on -the Bidouse river. Morillo followed, and in one -village near Hellette his troops killed fifteen peasants, -amongst them several women and children.</p> - -<p>General Hill having won the passage, placed a -brigade of infantry at Urcurray to cover the bridge -of Cambo, and to support the cavalry which he -despatched to scour the roads towards Lahoussoa, -St. Jean Pied de Port, and Hasparen, and to observe -Paris and Pierre Soult. With the rest of his troops -he marched to the heights of Lormenthoa in front -of the hills of Moguerre and Villefranque, and was -there joined by the sixth division, the third remaining -to cover the bridge of Ustaritz. It was now -about one o’clock, and Soult, coming hastily from -Bayonne, approved of the disposition made by -D’Erlon, and offered battle, his line being extended -so as to bar the high road. D’Armagnac’s -brigade which had retired from Ustaritz was now in -advance at Villefranque and a heavy cannonade -and skirmish ensued along the front, but no general -attack was made because the deep roads had retarded -the rear of Hill’s columns. However the -Portuguese of the sixth division, descending from -Lormenthoa about three o’clock, drove D’Armagnac’s -brigade with sharp fighting and after one repulse -out of Villefranque. A brigade of the second -division was then established in advance connecting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_374"></a>[374]</span> -Hill’s corps with the troops in Villefranque. Thus -three divisions of infantry, wanting the brigade -left at Urcurray, hemmed up four French divisions; -and as the latter, notwithstanding their superiority -of numbers, made no advantage of the broken movements -of the allies caused by the deep roads, the -passage of the Nive may be judged a surprize. Wellington -thus far overreached his able adversary, yet -he had not trusted to this uncertain chance alone.</p> - -<p>The French masses falling upon the heads of -his columns at Lormenthoa while the rear was still -labouring in the deep roads, might have caused -some disorder, but could not have driven either Hill -or Beresford over the river again, because the third -division was close at hand to reinforce the sixth, and -the brigade of the seventh, left at San Barbe, could -have followed by the bridge of Ustaritz, thus giving -the allies the superiority of numbers. The greatest -danger was, that Paris, reinforced by Pierre Soult’s -cavalry, should have returned and fallen either upon -Morillo or the brigade left at Urcurray in the rear, -while Soult, reinforcing D’Erlon with fresh divisions -brought from the other side of the Nive, attacked -Hill and Beresford in front. It was to prevent this -that Hope and Alten whose operations are now to be -related pressed the enemy on the left bank.</p> - -<p>The first-named general having twelve miles to -march from St. Jean de Luz before he could reach -the French works, put his troops in motion during -the night, and about eight o’clock passed between -the tanks in front of Barrouilhet with his right, -while his left descended from the platform of Bidart -and crossed the valley towards Biaritz. The French -outposts retired fighting, and Hope sweeping with -a half circle to his right, and being preceded by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_375"></a>[375]</span> -the fire of his guns and many skirmishers, arrived -in front of the entrenched camp about one o’clock. -His left then rested on the Lower Adour, his centre -menaced a very strong advanced work on the ridge -of Beyris beyond Anglet, and his right was in communication -with Alten. That general having a -shorter distance to move, halted about Bussussary -and Arcangues until Hope’s fiery crescent was -closing on the French camp, and then he also advanced, -but with the exception of a slight skirmish -at the fortified house there was no resistance. Three -divisions, some cavalry, and the unattached brigades, -equal to a fourth division, sufficed therefore to keep -six French divisions in check on this side.</p> - -<p>When evening closed the allies fell back towards -their original positions, but under heavy rain, and -with great fatigue to Hope’s wing, for even the -royal road was knee-deep of mud and his troops -were twenty-four hours under arms. The whole -day’s fighting cost about eight hundred men for each -side, the loss of the allies being rather greater on -the left bank of the Nive than on the right.</p> - -<p>Wellington’s wings being now divided by the -Nive the French general resolved to fall upon one -of them with the whole of his forces united; and -misled by the prisoners who assured him that the -third and fourth divisions were both on the heights -of Lormenthoa, he resolved, being able to assemble -his troops with greater facility on the left of the -Nive where also the allies’ front was most extended, -to choose that side for his counter-stroke. The garrison -of Bayonne was eight thousand strong, partly -troops of the line partly national guards, with which -he ordered the governor to occupy the entrenched -camp of Mousserolles; then stationing ten gun-boats -on the Upper Adour to watch that river as high<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_376"></a>[376]</span> -as the confluence of the Gave de Pau, he made D’Erlon -file his four divisions over the bridge of boats -between the fortress and Mousserolles, directing him -to gain the camp of Marac and take post behind -Clauzel’s corps on the other side of the river. He thus -concentrated nine divisions of infantry and Villatte’s<span class="sidenote">Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.</span> -reserve, a brigade of cavalry and forty guns, furnishing -in all about sixty thousand combatants, -including conscripts, to assail a quarter where the -allies, although stronger by one division than the<span class="sidenote">Original Morning States.</span> -French general imagined, had yet only thirty thousand -infantry with twenty-four pieces of cannon.</p> - -<p>The French marshal’s first design was to burst -with his whole army on the table-land of Bussussary<span class="sidenote">Correspondence with the minister of war, MSS.</span> -and Arcangues, and then to act as circumstances -should dictate; and he judged so well of his position -that he desired the minister of war to expect -good news for the next day. Indeed the situation of -the allies although better than he knew of gave him -some right to anticipate success. On no point was -there any expectation of this formidable counter-attack. -Lord Wellington was on the left of the -Nive preparing to assault the heights where he -had last seen the French the evening before. -Hope’s troops, with the exception of Wilson’s Portuguese -now commanded by general Campbell and -posted at Barrouilhet, had retired to their cantonments; -the first division was at St. Jean de Luz -and Ciboure more than six miles distant from the -outposts; the fifth division was between those -places and Bidart, and all exceedingly fatigued. -The light division had orders to retire from Bussussary -to Arbonne a distance of four miles, and part -of the second brigade had already marched, when -fortunately general Kempt, somewhat suspicious of -the enemy’s movements, delayed obedience until he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_377"></a>[377]</span> -could see what was going on in his front, he thus -as the event proved saved the position.</p> - -<p>The extraordinary difficulty of moving through -the country even for single horsemen, the numerous -enclosures and copses which denied any distinct -view, the easy success of the operation to cross the -Nive, and a certain haughty confidence the sure -attendant of a long course of victory, seems to have -rendered the English general at this time somewhat -negligent of his own security. Undoubtedly the -troops were not disposed as if a battle was expected. -The general position, composed of two distinct parts -was indeed very strong; the ridge of Barrouilhet -could only be attacked along the royal road on a -narrow front between the tanks, and he had directed -entrenchments to be made; but there was only one -brigade there, and a road made with difficulty by the -engineers supplied a bad flank communication with -the light division. This Barrouilhet ridge was prolonged -to the platform of Bussussary, but in its -winding bulged out too near the enemy’s works in -the centre to be safely occupied in force, and behind -it there was a deep valley or basin extending to -Arbonne.</p> - -<p>The ridge of Arcangues on the other side of -this basin was the position of battle for the centre. -Three tongues of land shot out from this part -to the front, and the valleys between them as -well as their slopes were covered with copse-woods -almost impenetrable. The church of Arcangues, -a gentleman’s house, and parts of the village, -furnished rallying points of defence for the picquets, -which were necessarily numerous because -of the extent of front. At this time the left-hand -ridge or tongue of land was occupied by the fifty-second<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_378"></a>[378]</span> -regiment which had also posts in the great -basin separating the Arcangues position from that -of Barrouilhet; the central tongue was held by the -picquets of the forty-third with supporting companies -placed in succession towards Bussussary, where -was an open common across which troops in retreat -would have to pass to the church of Arcangues. -The third tongue was guarded, partly by the forty-third, -partly by the riflemen, but the valley between -was not occupied, and the picquets on the extreme -right extended to an inundation, across a narrow -part of which, near the house of the senator Garrat, -there was a bridge: the facility for attack was there -however small.</p> - -<p>One brigade of the seventh division continued -this line of posts to the Nive, holding the bridge -of Urdains, the rest of the division was behind -San Barbe and belonged rather to Ustaritz than to -this front. The fourth division was several miles -behind the right of the light division.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs if Soult had, as he first -designed, burst with his whole army upon Bussussary -and Arcangues it would have been impossible -for the light division, scattered as it was over such -an extent of difficult ground, to have stopped him -for half an hour; and there was no support within -several miles, no superior officer to direct the concentration -of the different divisions. Lord Wellington -had indeed ordered all the line to be entrenched, -but the works were commenced on a great scale, -and, as is common when danger does not spur, the -soldiers had laboured so carelessly that beyond a -few abbatis, the tracing of some lines and redoubts, -and the opening of a road of communication, the -ground remained in its natural state. The French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_379"></a>[379]</span> -general would therefore quickly have gained the -broad open hills beyond Arcangues, separated the -fourth and seventh divisions from the light division, -and cut them off from Hope. Soult however, in -the course of the night, for reasons which I do not -find stated, changed his project, and at day-break -Reille marched with Boyer’s and Maucune’s divisions, -Sparre’s cavalry and from twenty to thirty -guns against Hope by the main road. He was -followed by Foy and Villatte, but Clauzel assembled -his troops under cover of the ridges near the -fortified house in front of Bussussary, and one of -D’Erlon’s divisions approached the bridge of -Urdains.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of the 10th.</em>—A heavy rain fell in the -night yet the morning broke fair, and soon after -dawn the French infantry were observed by the -picquets of the forty-third pushing each other about -as if at gambols, yet lining by degrees the nearest -ditches; a general officer was also seen behind a farm-house -close to the sentinels, and at the same time the -heads of columns could be perceived in the rear. -Thus warned some companies of the forty-third -were thrown on the right into the basin to prevent -the enemy from penetrating that way to the small -plain between Bussussary and Arcangues. General -Kempt was with the picquets, and his foresight in -delaying his march to Arbonne now saved the -position, for he immediately placed the reserves of -his brigade in the church and mansion-house of -Arcangues. Meanwhile the French breaking forth -with loud cries, and a rattling musquetry, fell at -a running pace upon the picquets of the forty-third -both on the tongue and in the basin, and a -cloud of skirmishers descending on their left, penetrating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_380"></a>[380]</span> -between them and the fifty-second regiment, -sought to turn both. The right tongue was in like -manner assailed and at the same time the picquets -at the bridge near Garrat’s house were driven back.</p> - -<p>The assault was so strong and rapid, the enemy -so numerous, and the ground so extensive, that it -would have been impossible to have reached the -small plain beyond Bussussary in time to regain the -church of Arcangues if any serious resistance had -been attempted; wherefore delivering their fire at -pistol-shot distance the picquets fell back in succession, -and never were the steadiness and intelligence -of veteran soldiers more eminently displayed; -for though it was necessary to run at full speed to -gain the small plain before the enemy, who was -constantly outflanking the line of posts by the -basin, though the ways were so deep and narrow -that no formation could be preserved, though the -fire of the French was thick and close, and their -cries vehement as they rushed on in pursuit, the -instant the open ground at Bussussary was attained, -the apparently disordered crowd of fugitives became -a compact and well-formed body defying and deriding -the fruitless efforts of their adversaries.</p> - -<p>The fifty-second being about half a mile to the -left, though only slightly assailed fell back also to the -main ridge, for though the closeness of the country did -not permit colonel Colborne to observe the strength -of the enemy he could see the rapid retreat of -the forty-third, and thence judging how serious the -affair was, so well did the regiments of the light -division understand each other’s qualities, withdrew -his outposts to secure the main position. And in -good time he did so.</p> - -<p>On the right-hand tongue the troops were not so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_381"></a>[381]</span> -fortunate, for whether they delayed their retreat too -long, or that the country was more intricate, the -enemy moving by the basin, reached Bussussary -before the rear arrived, and about a hundred of the -forty-third and riflemen were thus intercepted. The -French were in a hollow road and careless, never -doubting that the officer of the forty-third, ensign -Campbell, a youth scarcely eighteen years of age, -would surrender; but he with a shout broke into -their column sword in hand, and though the struggle -was severe and twenty of the forty-third and thirty -of the riflemen with their officer remained prisoners, -reached the church with the rest.</p> - -<p>D’Armagnac’s division of D’Erlon’s corps now -pushed close up to the bridge of Urdains, and -Clauzel assembled his three divisions by degrees -at Bussussary, opening meanwhile a sharp fire of -musquetry. The position was however safe. The -mansion-house on the right, covered by abbatis and -not easily accessible, was defended by a rifle battalion -and the Portuguese. The church and church-yard -were occupied by the forty-third who were supported -with two mountain-guns, their front being -covered by a declivity of thick copse-wood, filled with -riflemen, and only to be turned by narrow hollow -roads leading on each side to the church. On the -left the fifty-second now supported by the remainder -of the division, spread as far as the great basin -which separated the right wing from the ridge of -Barrouilhet, towards which some small posts were -pushed, but there was still a great interval between -Alten’s and Hope’s positions.</p> - -<p>The skirmishing fire grew hot, Clauzel brought -up twelve guns to the ridge of Bussussary, -with which he threw shot and shells into the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_382"></a>[382]</span> -church-yard of Arcangues, and four or five hundred -infantry then made a rush forwards, but a heavy -fire from the forty-third sent them back over the -ridge where their guns were posted. Yet the practice -of the latter, well directed at first, would have been -murderous if this musquetry from the church-yard -had not made the French gunners withdraw their -pieces a little behind the ridge, which caused their -shot to fly wild and high. General Kempt thinking -the distance too great, was at first inclined to stop -this fire, but the moment it lulled the French gunners -pushed their pieces forwards again and their shells -knocked down eight men in an instant. The small -arms then recommenced and the shells again flew -high. The French were in like manner kept at -bay by the riflemen in the village and mansion-house, -and the action, hottest where the fifty-second -fought, continued all day. It was not very severe -but it has been noticed in detail because both -French and English writers, misled perhaps by an -inaccurate phrase in the public despatch, have -represented it as a desperate attack by which the -light division was driven into its entrenchments, -whereas it was the picquets only that were forced -back, there were no entrenchments save those made -on the spur of the moment by the soldiers in the -church-yard, and the French can hardly be said to -have attacked at all. The real battle was at Barrouilhet.</p> - -<p>On that side Reille advancing with two divisions -about nine o’clock, drove Campbell’s Portuguese -from Anglet, and Sparre’s cavalry charging during -the fight cut down a great many men. The French -infantry then assailed the ridge at Barrouilhet, but -moving along a narrow ridge and confined on each<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_383"></a>[383]</span> -flank by the tanks, only two brigades could get into -action by the main road, and the rain of the preceding -night had rendered all the bye-roads so deep -that it was mid-day before the French line of battle -was filled. This delay saved the allies, for the -attack here also was so unexpected, that the first -division and lord Aylmer’s brigade were at rest in -St. Jean de Luz and Bidart when the action commenced. -The latter did not reach the position -before eleven o’clock; the foot-guards did not -march from St. Jean until after twelve, and only -arrived at three o’clock in the afternoon when the -fight was done; all the troops were exceedingly fatigued, -only ten guns could be brought into play, -and from some negligence part of the infantry were -at first without ammunition.</p> - -<p>Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division first arrived -to support Campbell’s Portuguese, and fight -the battle. The French spread their skirmishers -along the whole valley in front of Biaritz, but their -principal effort was directed by the great road and -against the platform of Barrouilhet about the -mayor’s house, where the ground was so thick of -hedges and coppice-wood that a most confused fight -took place. The assailants cutting ways through -the hedges poured on in smaller or larger bodies as -the openings allowed, and were immediately engaged -with the defenders; at some points they were -successful at others beaten back, and few knew -what was going on to the right or left of where they -stood. By degrees Reille engaged both his divisions, -and some of Villatte’s reserve also entered -the fight, and then Bradford’s Portuguese and lord -Aylmer’s brigade arrived on the allies’ side, which -enabled colonel Greville’s brigade of the fifth division,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_384"></a>[384]</span> -hitherto kept in reserve, to relieve Robinson’s; -that general was however dangerously wounded -and his troops suffered severely.</p> - -<p>And now a very notable action was performed -by the ninth regiment under colonel Cameron. -This officer was on the extreme left of Greville’s -brigade, Robinson’s being then shifted in second -line and towards the right, Bradford’s brigade was -at the mayor’s house some distance to the left of the -ninth regiment, and the space between was occupied -by a Portuguese battalion. There was in -front of Greville’s brigade a thick hedge, but immediately -opposite the ninth was a coppice-wood -possessed by the enemy, whose skirmishers were -continually gathering in masses and rushing out as -if to assail the line, they were as often driven -back, yet the ground was so broken that nothing -could be seen beyond the flanks and when some -time had passed in this manner, Cameron, who had -received no orders, heard a sudden firing along the -main road close to his left. His adjutant was sent -to look out and returned immediately with intelligence -that there was little fighting on the road, -but a French regiment, which must have passed -unseen in small bodies through the Portuguese between -the ninth and the mayor’s house, was rapidly -filing into line on the rear. The fourth British<span class="sidenote">Manuscript note by lieutenant-general sir John Cameron.</span> -regiment was then in close column at a short distance, -and its commander colonel Piper was directed -by Cameron to face about, march to the rear, and -then bring up his left shoulder when he would -infallibly fall in with the French regiment. Piper -marched, but whether he misunderstood the order, -took a wrong direction, or mistook the enemy for -Portuguese, he passed them. No firing was heard,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_385"></a>[385]</span> -the adjutant again hurried to the rear, and returned -with intelligence that the fourth regiment was not -to be seen, but the enemy’s line was nearly formed. -Cameron leaving fifty men to answer the skirmishing -fire which now increased from the copse, -immediately faced about and marched in line -against the new enemy, who was about his own -strength, as fast as the rough nature of the ground -would permit. The French fire, slow at first, increased -vehemently as the distance lessened, but -when the ninth, coming close up, sprung forwards to -the charge the adverse line broke and fled to the -flanks in the utmost disorder. Those who made for -their own right brushed the left of Greville’s brigade, -and even carried off an officer of the royals in -their rush, yet the greatest number were made prisoners, -and the ninth having lost about eighty men -and officers resumed their old ground.</p> - -<p>The final result of the battle at Barrouilhet was -the repulse of Reille’s divisions, but Villatte still -menaced the right flank, and Foy, taking possession -of the narrow ridge connecting Bussussary with the -platform of Barrouilhet, threw his skirmishers into -the great basin leading to Arbonne, and connecting -his right with Reille’s left menaced Hope’s flank -at Barrouilhet. This was about two o’clock, -Soult, whose columns were now all in hand gave -orders to renew the battle, and his masses were beginning -to move when Clauzel reported that a large -body of fresh troops, apparently coming from the -other side of the Nive, was menacing D’Armagnac’s -division from the heights above Urdains. Unable -to account for this, Soult, who saw the guards and -Germans moving up fast from St. Jean de Luz and -all the unattached brigades already in line, hesitated,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_386"></a>[386]</span> -suspended his own attack, and ordered D’Erlon,<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -who had two divisions in reserve, to detach one to -the support of D’Armagnac: before this disposition -could be completed the night fell.</p> - -<p>The fresh troops seen by Clauzel were the third -fourth sixth and seventh divisions, whose movements -during the battle it is time to notice. When lord -Wellington, who remained on the right of the Nive -during the night of the 9th, discovered at daybreak, -that the French had abandoned the heights in -Hill’s front, he directed that officer to occupy them, -and push parties close up to the entrenched camp of -Mousseroles while his cavalry spread beyond Hasparen -and up the Adour. Meanwhile, the cannonade -on the left bank of the Nive being heard, he repaired -in person to that side, first making the third -and sixth divisions repass the river, and directing -Beresford to lay another bridge of communication -lower down the Nive, near Villefranque, to shorten -the line of movement. When he reached the left -of the Nive and saw how the battle stood, he made -the seventh division close to the left from the hill of -San Barbe, placed the third division at Urdains, -and brought up the fourth division to an open -heathy ridge on a hill about a mile behind the -church of Arcangues. From this point general -Cole sent Ross’s brigade down into the basin on the -left of Colborne, to cover Arbonne, being prepared -himself to march with his whole division if the -enemy attempted to penetrate in force between -Hope and Alten. These dispositions were for the -most part completed about two o’clock, and thus -Clauzel was held in check at Bussussary, and the -renewed attack by Foy, Villatte, and Reille’s divisions -on Barrouilhet prevented.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_387"></a>[387]</span></p> - -<p>This day’s battle cost the Anglo-Portuguese more -than twelve hundred men killed and wounded, two -generals were amongst the latter and about three -hundred men were made prisoners. The French -had one general, Villatte, wounded, and lost about -two thousand men, but when the action terminated -two regiments of Nassau and one of Frankfort, the -whole under the command of a colonel Kruse, came -over to the allies. These men were not deserters. -Their prince having abandoned Napoleon in Germany -sent secret instructions to his troops to do so likewise, -and in good time, for orders to disarm them -reached Soult the next morning. The generals on -each side, the one hoping to profit the other to -prevent mischief, immediately transmitted notice of -the event to Catalonia where several regiments of -the same nations were serving. Lord Wellington -failed for reasons to be hereafter mentioned, but -Suchet disarmed his Germans with reluctance -thinking they could be trusted, and the Nassau -troops at Bayonne were perhaps less influenced by -patriotism than by an old quarrel; for when belonging -to the army of the centre they had forcibly -foraged Soult’s district early in the year, and carried -off the spoil in defiance of his authority, which gave -rise to bitter disputes at the time and was probably -not forgotten by him.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of the 11th.</em>—In the night of the 10th -Reille withdrew behind the tanks as far as Pucho, -Foy and Villatte likewise drew back along the connecting -ridge towards Bussussary, thus uniting with -Clauzel’s left and D’Erlon’s reserve, so that on the -morning of the 11th the French army, with the -exception of D’Armagnac’s division which remained -in front of Urdains, was concentrated, for Soult<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_388"></a>[388]</span> -feared a counter-attack. The French deserters -indeed declared that Clauzel had formed a body of -two thousand choice grenadiers to assault the village -and church of Arcangues, but the day passed without -any event in that quarter save a slight skirmish -in which a few men were wounded. Not so on -the side of Barrouilhet. There was a thick fog, -and lord Wellington, desirous to ascertain what the -French were about, directed the ninth regiment -about ten o’clock to open a skirmish beyond the tanks -towards Pucho, and to push the action if the French -augmented their force. Cameron did so and the -fight was becoming warm, when colonel Delancy, a -staff-officer, rashly directed the ninth to enter the village. -The error was soon and sharply corrected, for -the fog cleared up, and Soult, who had twenty-four -thousand men at that point, observing the ninth unsupported, -ordered a counter-attack which was so -strong and sudden that Cameron only saved his -regiment with the aid of some Portuguese troops -hastily brought up by sir John Hope. The fighting -then ceased and lord Wellington went to the right, -leaving Hope with orders to push back the French -picquets and re-establish his former outposts on the -connecting ridge towards Bussussary.</p> - -<p>Soult had hitherto appeared undecided, but roused -by this second insult, he ordered Darricau’s division -to attack Barrouilhet along the connecting ridge, -while Boyer’s division fell on by the main road between -the tanks. This was about two o’clock and -the allies expecting no battle had dispersed to -gather fuel, for the time was wet and cold. In an -instant the French penetrated in all directions, they -outflanked the right, they passed the tanks, seized -the out-buildings of the mayor’s house, and occupied<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_389"></a>[389]</span> -the coppice in front of it; they were indeed -quickly driven from the out-buildings by the royals, -but the tumult was great and the coppice was filled -with men of all nations intermixed and fighting in -a perilous manner. Robinson’s brigade was very -hardly handled, the officer commanding it was -wounded, a squadron of French cavalry suddenly -cut down some of the Portuguese near the wood, and -on the right the colonel of the eighty-fourth having -unwisely engaged his regiment in a hollow road -where the French possessed the high bank, was -killed with a great number of men. However the -ninth regiment posted on the main road plied Boyer’s -flank with fire, the eighty-fifth regiment of lord -Aylmer’s brigade came into action, and sir John Hope -conspicuous from his gigantic stature and heroic -courage, was seen wherever danger pressed rallying -and encouraging the troops; at one time he was in -the midst of the enemy, his clothes were pierced -with bullets, and he received a severe wound in the -ankle, yet he would not quit the field and by his -great presence of mind and calm intrepidity restored -the battle. The French were finally beaten back from -the position of Barrouilhet yet they had recovered -their original posts, and continued to gall the allies -with a fire of shot and shells until the fall of night. -The total loss in this fight was about six hundred -men of a side, and as the fifth division was now considerably -reduced in numbers the first division took -its place on the front line. Meanwhile Soult sent -his cavalry over the Nive to Mousseroles to check -the incursions of Hill’s horsemen.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of the 12th.</em>—The rain fell heavily in the -night, and though the morning broke fair neither -side seemed inclined to recommence hostilities. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_390"></a>[390]</span> -advanced posts were however very close to each -other and about ten o’clock a misunderstanding -arose. The French general observing the fresh regiments<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Despatches, MSS.</span> -of the first division close to his posts, imagined -the allies were going to attack him and immediately -reinforced his front; this movement causing -an English battery to fall into a like error it opened -upon the advancing French troops, and in an instant -the whole line of posts was engaged. Soult then -brought up a number of guns, the firing continued -without an object for many hours, and three or four -hundred men of a side were killed and wounded, -but the great body of the French army remained -concentrated and quiet on the ridge between Barrouilhet -and Bussussary.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington as early as the 10th had expected -Soult would abandon this attack to fall upon -Hill, and therefore had given Beresford orders to -carry the sixth division to that general’s assistance -by the new bridge and the seventh division by -Ustaritz, without waiting for further instructions, if -Hill was assailed; now observing Soult’s tenacity -at Barrouilhet he drew the seventh division towards -Arbonne. Beresford had however made a movement -towards the Nive, and this with the march of -the seventh division and some changes in the position -of the fourth division, caused Soult to believe -the allies were gathering with a view to attack his -centre on the morning of the 13th; and it is remarkable -that the deserters at this early period told -him the Spaniards had re-entered France although -orders to that effect were not as we shall find given -until the next day. Convinced then that his bolt -was shot on the left of the Nive, he left two divisions -and Villatte’s reserve in the entrenched camp,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_391"></a>[391]</span> -and marched with the other seven to Mousseroles -intending to fall upon Hill.</p> - -<p>That general had pushed his scouting parties to -the Gambouri, and when general Sparre’s horsemen -arrived at Mousseroles on the 12th, Pierre Soult -advanced from the Bidouze with all the light cavalry. -He was supported by the infantry of general Paris -and drove the allies’ posts from Hasparen. Colonel -Vivian, who commanded there, immediately ordered -major Brotherton to charge with the fourteenth dragoons -across the bridge, but it was an ill-judged -order, and the impossibility of succeeding so manifest, -that when Brotherton, noted throughout the -army for his daring, galloped forward, only two -men and one subaltern, lieutenant Southwell, passed -the narrow bridge with him, and they were all -taken. Vivian then seeing his error charged with -his whole brigade to rescue them, yet in vain, he -was forced to fall back upon Urcuray where Morillo’s -Spaniards had relieved the British infantry brigade -on the 11th. This threatening movement induced -general Hill to put the British brigade in march -again for Urcuray on the 12th, but he recalled it at -sunset, having then discovered Soult’s columns passing -the Nive by the boat-bridge above Bayonne.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington now feeling the want of numbers, -brought forward a division of Gallicians to St. Jean -de Luz, and one of Andalusians from the Bastan to -Itzassu, and to prevent their plundering fed them -from the British magazines. The Gallicians were to -support Hope, the Andalusians to watch the upper -valley of the Nive and protect the rear of the army -from Paris and Pierre Soult, who could easily be -reinforced with a strong body of national guards.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_392"></a>[392]</span> -Meanwhile Hill had taken a position of battle on a -front of two miles.</p> - -<p>His left, composed of the twenty-eighth, thirty-fourth, -and thirty-ninth regiments under general -Pringle, occupied a wooded and broken range -crowned by the chateau of Villefranque; it covered -the new pontoon bridge of communication, which was -a mile and a half higher up the river, but it was -separated from the centre by a small stream forming -a chain of ponds in a very deep and marshy -valley.</p> - -<p>The centre placed on both sides of the high road -near the hamlet of St. Pierre, occupied a crescent-shaped<span class="sidenote7">Plan 8.</span> -height, broken with rocks and close brushwood -on the left hand, and on the right hand enclosed -with high and thick hedges, one of which, covering, -at the distance of a hundred yards, part of the line, -was nearly impassable. Here Ashworth’s Portuguese -and Barnes’s British brigade of the second division -were posted. The seventy-first regiment was on the -left, the fiftieth in the centre, the ninety-second on -the right. Ashworth’s Portuguese were posted in -advance immediately in front of St. Pierre, and -their skirmishers occupied a small wood covering -their right. Twelve guns under the colonels Ross -and Tullock were concentrated in front of the centre, -looking down the great road, and half a mile -in rear of this point Lecor’s Portuguese division -was stationed with two guns as a reserve.</p> - -<p>The right under Byng was composed of the third, -fifty-seventh, thirty-first, and sixty-sixth. One of -these regiments, the third, was posted on a height -running nearly parallel with the Adour called -the ridge of Partouhiria, or Old Moguerre, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_393"></a>[393]</span> -a village of that name was situated upon the summit. -This regiment was pushed in advance to a point -where it could only be approached by crossing the -lower part of a narrow swampy valley which separated -Moguerre from the heights of St. Pierre. The -upper part of this valley was held by Byng with the -remainder of his brigade, and his post was well -covered by a mill-pond leading towards the enemy -and nearly filling all the valley.</p> - -<p>One mile in front of St. Pierre was a range of -counter heights belonging to the French, but the -basin between was broad open and commanded in -every part by the fire of the allies, and in all parts -the country was too heavy and too much enclosed -for the action of cavalry. Nor could the enemy -approach in force, except on a narrow front of battle -and by the high road, until within cannon-shot, -when two narrow difficult lanes branched off to the -right and left, and crossing the swampy valleys on -each side, led, the one to the height where the third -regiment was posted on the extreme right of the -allies, the other to general Pringle’s position on the -left.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 12th the rain swelled the Nive -and carried away the allies’ bridge of communication. -It was soon restored, but on the morning of -the 13th general Hill was completely cut off from -the rest of the army; and while seven French divisions -of infantry, furnishing at least thirty-five thousand -combatants, approached him in front, an eighth -under general Paris and the cavalry division of -Pierre Soult menaced him in rear. To meet the<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix 7</a>, sect. 4.</span> -French in his front he had less than fourteen -thousand, men and officers with fourteen guns in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_394"></a>[394]</span> -position; and there were only four thousand -Spaniards with Vivian’s cavalry at Urcuray.</p> - -<p><em>Battle of St. Pierre.</em>—The morning broke with a<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_08"><ins class="corr" id="tn-394" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'See plan.'"> -See Plan 8.</ins></a></span> -heavy mist under cover of which Soult formed his -order of battle. D’Erlon, having D’Armagnac’s -Abbé’s and Daricau’s divisions of infantry, Sparre’s -cavalry and twenty-two guns, marched in front; he -was followed by Foy and Maransin, but the remainder -of the French army was in reserve, for the roads -would not allow of any other order. The mist hung -heavily and the French masses, at one moment -quite shrouded in vapour, at another dimly seen or -looming sudden and large and dark at different -points, appeared like thunder-clouds gathering before -the storm. At half-past eight Soult pushed back -the British picquets in the centre, the sun burst out -at that moment, the sparkling fire of the light troops -spread wide in the valley, and crept up the hills on -either flank, while the bellowing of forty pieces of -artillery shook the banks of the Nive and the Adour. -Darricau marching on the French right was directed -against general Pringle. D’Armagnac, moving on -their left and taking Old Moguerre as the point of -direction, was ordered to force Byng’s right. Abbé -assailed the centre at St. Pierre, where general -Stewart commanded, for sir Rowland Hill had taken -his station on a commanding mount in the rear, from -whence he could see the whole battle and direct the -movements.</p> - -<p>Abbé, a man noted for vigour, pushed his attack -with great violence and gained ground so rapidly -with his light troops, on the left of Ashworth’s Portuguese, -that Stewart sent the seventy-first regiment -and two guns from St. Pierre to the latter’s aid; the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_395"></a>[395]</span> -French skirmishers likewise won the small wood on -Ashworth’s right, and half of the fiftieth regiment -was also detached from St. Pierre to that quarter. -The wood was thus retaken, and the flanks of Stewart’s -position secured, but his centre was very much -weakened, and the fire of the French artillery was -concentrated against it. Abbé then pushed on a -column of attack there with such a power that in -despite of the play of musquetry on his flanks and -a crashing cannonade in his front, he gained the top -of the position, and drove back the remainder of -Ashworth’s Portuguese and the other half of the -fiftieth regiment which had remained in reserve.</p> - -<p>General Barnes who had still the ninety-second -regiment in hand behind St. Pierre, immediately -brought it on with a strong counter-attack. The -French skirmishers fell back on each side leaving -two regiments composing the column to meet the -charge of the ninety-second; it was rough and -pushed home, the French mass wavered and gave -way. Abbé immediately replaced it and Soult -redoubling the heavy play of his guns from the height -he occupied, sent forward a battery of horse artillery -which galloping down into the valley opened its -fire close to the allies with most destructive activity. -The cannonade and musquetry rolled like a prolonged -peal of thunder, and the second French -column, regardless of Ross’s guns, though they tore -the ranks in a horrible manner, advanced so steadily -up the high road that the ninety-second yielding to -the tempest slowly regained its old position behind -St. Pierre. The Portuguese guns, their British commanding -officer having fallen wounded, then limbered -up to retire and the French skirmishers reached the -impenetrable hedge in front of Ashworth’s right.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_396"></a>[396]</span> -General Barnes now seeing that hard fighting only -could save the position, made the Portuguese guns -resume their fire, and the wing of the fiftieth and -the Caçadores gallantly held the small wood on the -right; but Barnes was soon wounded, the greatest -part of his and general Stewart’s staff were hurt, and -the matter seemed desperate. For the light troops -overpowered by numbers were all driven in except -those in the wood, the artillerymen were falling at -the guns, Ashworth’s line of Portuguese crumbled -away rapidly before the musquetry and cannonade, -the ground was strewed with the dead in front, and -the wounded crawling to the rear were many.</p> - -<p>If the French light troops could then have penetrated -through the thick hedge in front of the Portuguese, -defeat would have been inevitable on this -point, for the main column of attack still steadily -advanced up the main road, and a second column -launched on its right was already victorious, because -the colonel of the seventy-first had shamefully withdrawn -that gallant regiment out of action and abandoned -the Portuguese. Pringle was indeed fighting -strongly against Daricau’s superior numbers on the -hill of Villefranque, but on the extreme right the -colonel of the third regiment had also abandoned his -strong post to D’Armagnac, whose leading brigade -was thus rapidly turning Byng’s other regiments on -that side. And now Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions, -hitherto retarded by the deep roads, were coming into -line ready to support Abbé, and this at the moment -when the troops opposed to him were deprived of -their reserve. For when general Hill beheld the -retreat of the third and seventy-first regiments he -descended in haste from his mount, met, and turned -the latter back to renew the fight, and then in person<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_397"></a>[397]</span> -leading one brigade of Le Cor’s reserve division to -the same quarter sent the other against D’Armagnac -on the hill of Old Moguerre. Thus at the decisive -moment of the battle the French reserve was augmented -and that of the allies thrown as a last resource -into action. However the right wing of the -fiftieth and Ashworth’s Caçadores, both spread as -skirmishers, never lost the small wood in front, upholding -the fight there and towards the high road -with such unflinching courage that the ninety-second -regiment had time to reform behind the hamlet of -St. Pierre. Then its gallant colonel Cameron once -more led it down the road with colours flying and -music playing resolved to give the shock to whatever -stood in the way. At this sight the British -skirmishers on the flanks, suddenly changing from -retreat to attack, rushed forward and drove those of -the enemy back on each side; yet the battle seemed -hopeless for Ashworth was badly wounded, his line -was shattered to atoms, and Barnes who had not -quitted the field for his former hurt was now shot -through the body.</p> - -<p>The ninety-second was but a small body compared<span class="sidenote">Published Memoir on the battle by captain Pringle, engineers.</span> -with the heavy mass in its front, and the French -soldiers seemed willing enough to close with the -bayonet; but an officer riding at their head suddenly -turned his horse waved his sword and appeared to -order a retreat, then they faced about and immediately -retired across the valley to their original position, -in good order however and scarcely pursued by the -allies, so exhausted were the victors. This retrograde -movement, for there was no panic or disorder, -was produced partly by the gallant advance of the -ninety-second and the returning rush of the skirmishers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_398"></a>[398]</span> -partly by the state of affairs immediately on -the right of the French column. For the seventy-first -indignant at their colonel’s conduct had returned -to the fight with such alacrity, and were so well -aided by Le Cor’s Portuguese, generals Hill and -Stewart each in person leading an attack, that the -hitherto victorious French were overthrown there -also in the very moment when the ninety-second -came with such a brave shew down the main road: -Le Cor was however wounded.</p> - -<p>This double action in the centre being seen from -the hill of Villefranque, Daricau’s division, already -roughly handled by Pringle, fell back in confusion; -and meantime on the right, Buchan’s Portuguese, -detached by Hill to recover the Moguerre or Partouhiria -ridge, crossed the valley, and ascending -under a heavy flank fire from Soult’s guns rallied -the third regiment; in happy time, for D’Armagnac’s -first brigade having already passed the -flank of Byng’s regiments at the mill-pond was -actually in rear of the allies’ lines. It was now -twelve o’clock, and while the fire of the light troops -in the front and the cannonade in the centre continued -the contending generals restored their respective -orders of battle. Soult’s right wing had -been quite repulsed by Pringle, his left was giving -way before Buchan, and the difficult ground forbad -his sending immediate succour to either; moreover -in the exigency of the moment he had called -D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to sustain Abbé’s -retiring columns. However that brigade and Foy’s -and Maransin’s divisions were in hand to renew the -fight in the centre, and the allies could not, unsuccoured, -have sustained a fresh assault; for their ranks<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_399"></a>[399]</span> -were wasted with fire, nearly all the staff had been -killed or wounded, and three generals had quitted -the field badly hurt.</p> - -<p>In this crisis general Hill seeing that Buchan -was now well and successfully engaged on the Partouhiria -ridge, and that Byng’s regiments were quite -masters of their ground in the valley of the mill-pond, -drew the fifty-seventh regiment from the -latter place to reinforce his centre. At the same -time the bridge above Villefranque having been -restored, the sixth division, which had been marching -since daybreak, appeared in order of battle on -the mount from whence Hill had descended to rally -the seventy-first. It was soon followed by the -fourth division, and that again by the brigades -of the third division; two other brigades of the -seventh division were likewise in march. With the -first of these troops came lord Wellington who had -hurried from Barrouilhet when the first sound of -the cannon reached him, yet he arrived only to -witness the close of the battle, the crisis was past, -Hill’s day of glory was complete. Soult had, -according to the French method, made indeed another -attack, or rather demonstration, against the centre, -to cover his new dispositions, an effort easily repulsed, -but at the same moment Buchan drove D’Armagnac -headlong off the Partouhiria ridge. The sixth division -then appeared on the commanding mount in the -rear of St. Pierre, and though the French masses -still maintained a menacing position on the high -road, and on a hillock rising between the road and -the mill-pond, they were quickly dispossessed. For -the English general being now supported by the -sixth division, sent Byng with two battalions against -the hillock, and some troops from the centre against<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_400"></a>[400]</span> -those on the high road. At this last point the -generals and staff had been so cut down that colonel -Currie, the aid-de-camp who brought the order, could -find no superior officer to deliver it to and led the -troops himself to the attack, but both charges were successful; -and two guns of the light battery sent down -in the early part of the fight by Soult, and which had -played without ceasing up to this moment, were taken.</p> - -<p>The battle now abated to a skirmish of light -troops, under cover of which the French endeavoured -to carry off their wounded and rally their stragglers, -but at two o’clock lord Wellington commanded a -general advance of the whole line. Then the -French retreated fighting, and the allies following -close on the side of the Nive plied them with musquetry -until dark. Yet they maintained their line -towards the Adour, for Sparre’s cavalry passing -out that way rejoined Pierre Soult on the side of -Hasparen. This last-named general and Paris had -during the day menaced Morillo and Vivian’s cavalry -at Urcuray, however not more than thirty men of -a side were hurt, and when Soult’s ill success became -known the French retired to Bonloc.</p> - -<p>In this bloody action Soult had designed to employ -seven divisions of infantry with one brigade of -cavalry on the front, and one brigade of infantry -with a division of cavalry on the rear; but the state -of the roads and the narrow front he was forced to -move upon did not permit more than five divisions -to act at St. Pierre, and only half of those were -seriously engaged. His loss was certainly three -thousand, making a total on the five days’ fighting -of six thousand men with two generals, Villatte and -Maucomble, wounded. The estimate made by the -British at the time far exceeded this number, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_401"></a>[401]</span> -one French writer makes their loss ten thousand -including probably the Nassau and Frankfort regiments. -The same writer however estimates the loss -of the allies at sixteen thousand! Whereas Hill<span class="sidenote9">Lapene.</span> -had only three generals and about fifteen hundred -men killed and wounded on the 13th and Morillo -lost but twenty-six men at Urcuray. The real -loss of the allies in the whole five days’ fighting -was only five thousand and nineteen, including -however five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes, -Lecor, and Ashworth. Of this number five hundred -were prisoners.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia, baffled by the unexpected -result of the battle of St. Pierre, left D’Erlon’s -three divisions in front of the camp of Mousseroles, -sent two others over the Nive to Marac, and -passing the Adour himself during the night with -Foy’s division, spread it along the right bank of -that river as far as the confluence of the Gave de -Pau.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. The French general’s plan was conceived -with genius but the execution offers a great contrast -to the conception. What a difference between the -sudden concentration of his whole army on the -platforms of Arcangues and Bussussary, where -there were only a few picquets to withstand him, -and from whence he could have fallen with the roll -of an avalanche upon any point of the allies’ line! -what a difference between that and the petty attack -of Clauzel, which a thousand men of the light division -sufficed to arrest at the village and church of -Arcangues. There beyond question was the weak<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_402"></a>[402]</span> -part of the English general’s cuirass. The spear -pushed home there would have drawn blood. For the -disposition and movements of the third fourth and -seventh divisions, were made more with reference to -the support of Hill than to sustain an attack from -Soult’s army, and it is evident that Wellington, -trusting to the effect of his victory on the 10th of -November, had treated the French general and -his troops, more contemptuously than he could -have justified by arms without the aid of fortune. -I know not what induced marshal Soult to -direct his main attack by Anglet and the connecting -ridge of Bussussary, against Barrouilhet, instead of -assailing Arcangues as he at first proposed; but -this is certain, that for three hours after Clauzel first -attacked the picquets at the latter place, there were -not troops enough to stop three French divisions, -much less a whole army. And this point being -nearer to the bridge by which D’Erlon passed the -Nive, the concentration of the French troops could -have been made sooner than at Barrouilhet, where -the want of unity in the attack caused by the difficulty -of the roads ruined the French combinations.</p> - -<p>The allies were so unexpectant of an attack, that -the battle at Barrouilhet which might have been -fought with seventeen thousand men, was actually -fought by ten thousand. And those were not -brought into action at once, for Robinson’s brigade -and Campbell’s Portuguese, favoured by the narrow -opening between the tanks, resisted Reille’s divisions -for two hours, and gave time for the rest of the -fifth division and Bradford’s brigade to arrive. But -if Foy’s division and Villatte’s reserve had been -able to assail the flank at the same time, by the -ridge coming from Bussussary, the battle would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_403"></a>[403]</span> -have been won by the French; and meanwhile three -divisions under Clauzel and two under D’Erlon -remained hesitating before Urdains and Arcangues, -for the cannonade and skirmishing at the latter -place were the very marks and signs of indecision.</p> - -<p>2º. On the 11th the inactivity of the French -during the morning may be easily accounted for. -The defection of the German regiments, the necessity -of disarming and removing those that remained, -the care of the wounded, and the time required to -re-examine the allies’ position and ascertain what -changes had taken place during the night, must -have given ample employment to the French general. -His attack in the afternoon also was well judged -because already he must have seen from the increase -of troops in his front, from the intrenched -battery and other works rapidly constructed at the -church of Arcangues, that no decisive success -could be expected on the left of the Nive, and that -his best chance was to change his line of attack -again to the right bank. To do this with effect, -it was necessary, not only to draw all lord Wellington’s -reserves from the right of the Nive but to be -certain that they had come, and this could only be -done by repeating the attacks at Barrouilhet. The -same cause operated on the 12th, for it was not -until the fourth and seventh divisions were seen by -him on the side of Arbonne that he knew his wile -had succeeded. Yet again the execution was -below the conception, for first, the bivouac fires on -the ridge of Bussussary were extinguished in the -evening, and then others were lighted on the side of -Mousseroles, thus plainly indicating the march, -which was also begun too early, because the leading<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_404"></a>[404]</span> -division was by Hill seen to pass the bridge of -boats before sun-set.</p> - -<p>These were serious errors yet the duke of Dalmatia’s -generalship cannot be thus fairly tested. -There are many circumstances which combine to -prove, that when he complained to the emperor of -the contradictions and obstacles he had to encounter -he alluded to military as well as to political and -financial difficulties. It is a part of human nature -to dislike any disturbance of previous habits, and -soldiers are never pleased at first with a general, -who introduces and rigorously exacts a system of -discipline differing from what they have been accustomed -to. Its utility must be proved and confirmed -by habit ere it will find favour in their eyes. -Now Soult suddenly assumed the command of -troops, who had been long serving under various -generals and were used to much license in Spain. -They were therefore, men and officers, uneasy at -being suddenly subjected to the austere and resolute -command of one who, from natural character -as well as the exigency of the times, the war being -now in his own country, demanded a ready and -exact obedience, and a regularity which long habits -of a different kind rendered onerous. Hence we -find in all the French writers, and in Soult’s own -reports, manifest proofs that his designs were frequently -thwarted or disregarded by his subordinates -when circumstances promised impunity. His greatest -and ablest military combinations were certainly -rendered abortive by the errors of his lieutenants in -the first operations to relieve Pampeluna, and on -the 31st of August a manifest negligence of his -earnest recommendations to vigilance led to serious -danger and loss at the passage of the Lower<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_405"></a>[405]</span> -Bidassoa. Complaint and recrimination were rife -in all quarters about the defeat on the 10th of November, -and on the 19th the bridge-head of Cambo -was destroyed contrary to the spirit of his instructions. -These things, joined to the acknowledged -jealousy and disputes prevalent amongst the French -generals employed in Spain, would indicate that -the discrepancy between the conception and execution -of the operations in front of Bayonne was not -the error of the commander-in-chief. Perhaps king -Joseph’s faction, so inimical to the duke of Dalmatia, -was still powerful in the army and difficult -to deal with.</p> - -<p>3º. Lord Wellington has been blamed for putting -his troops in a false position, and no doubt he -under-valued, it was not the first time, the military -genius and resources of his able adversary, when he -exposed Hill’s troops on the left of the Nive to a -species of surprize. But the passage of the Nive -itself, the rapidity with which he moved his divisions -from bank to bank, and the confidence with -which he relied upon the valour of his troops, so -far from justifying the censures which have been -passed upon him by French writers, emphatically -mark his mastery in the art. The stern justice of -sending the Spaniards back into Spain after the -battle of the Nivelle is apparent, but the magnanimity -of that measure can only be understood by -considering lord Wellington’s military situation at -the time. The battle of the Nivelle was delivered -on political grounds, but of what avail would his -gaining it have been if he had remained enclosed -as it were in a net between the Nive and the sea, -Bayonne and the Pyrenees, unable to open communications -with the disaffected in France, and having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_406"></a>[406]</span> -the beaten army absolutely forbidding him to -forage or even to look beyond the river on his right. -The invasion of France was not his own operation, -it was the project of the English cabinet and -the allied sovereigns; both were naturally urging -him to complete it, and to pass the Nive and free -his flanks was indispensable if he would draw any -profit from his victory of the 10th of November. -But he could not pass it with his whole army unless -he resigned the sea-coast and his communications -with Spain. He was therefore to operate -with a portion only of his force and consequently -required all the men he could gather to ensure -success. Yet at that crisis he divested himself of -twenty-five thousand Spanish soldiers!</p> - -<p>Was this done in ignorance of the military glory -awaiting him beyond the spot where he stood?</p> - -<p>“<em>If I had twenty thousand Spaniards paid and -fed</em>,” he wrote to lord Bathurst, “<em>I should have -Bayonne. If I had forty thousand I do not know -where I should stop. Now I have both the twenty -thousand and the forty thousand, but I have not the -means of paying and supplying them, and if they -plunder they will ruin all.</em>”</p> - -<p>Requisitions which the French expected as a part -of war would have enabled him to run this career, -but he looked further; he had promised the people -protection and his greatness of mind was disclosed -in a single sentence. “<em>I must tell your lordship that -our success and every thing depends upon our moderation -and justice.</em>” Rather than infringe on either, -he sent the Spaniards to the rear and passed the -Nive with the British and Portuguese only, thus -violating the military rule which forbids a general -to disseminate his troops before an enemy who remains<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_407"></a>[407]</span> -in mass lest he should be beaten in detail. -But genius begins where rules end. A great general -always seeks moral power in preference to physical -force. Wellington’s choice here was between -a shameful inactivity or a dangerous enterprise. -Trusting to the influence of his reputation, to his -previous victories, and to the ascendancy of his -troops in the field, he chose the latter, and the result, -though he committed some errors of execution, justified -his boldness. He surprised the passage of -the Nive, laid his bridges of communication, and -but for the rain of the night before, which ruined -the roads and retarded the march of Hill’s columns, -he would have won the heights of St. Pierre the -same day. Soult could not then have withdrawn -his divisions from the right bank without being observed. -Still it was an error to have the troops on -the left bank so unprepared for the battle of the -10th. It was perhaps another error not to have occupied -the valley or basin between Hope and Alten, -and surely it was negligence not to entrench Hill’s -position on the 10th, 11th, and 12th. Yet with all -this so brave so hardy so unconquerable were his -soldiers that he was successful at every point, and -that is the justification of his generalship. Hannibal -crossed the Alps and descended upon Italy, not in -madness but because he knew himself and his troops.</p> - -<p>4º. It is agreed by French and English that the -battle of St. Pierre was one of the most desperate of -the whole war. Lord Wellington declared that he -had never seen a field so thickly strewn with dead, -nor can the vigour of the combatants be well denied -where five thousand men were killed or wounded in -three hours upon a space of one mile square. How -then did it happen, valour being so conspicuous on -both sides, that six English and Portuguese brigades,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_408"></a>[408]</span> -furnishing less than fourteen thousand men -and officers with fourteen guns, were enabled to<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix 7</a>, Sect. 4.</span> -withstand seven French divisions, certainly furnishing -thirty-five thousand men and officers with twenty-two -guns? The analysis of this fact shows upon -what nice calculations and accidents war depends.</p> - -<p>If Hill had not observed the French passing -their bridge on the evening of the 12th, and their -bivouac fires in the night, Barnes’s brigade, with -which he saved the day, would have been at Urcuray, -and Soult could not have been stopped. But -the French general could only bring five divisions -into action, and those only in succession, so that in -fact three divisions or about sixteen thousand men -with twenty-two guns actually fought the battle. -Foy’s and Maransin’s troops did not engage until -after the crisis had passed. On the other hand the -proceedings of colonel Peacocke of the seventy-first, -and colonel Bunbury of the third, for which they -were both obliged to quit the service, forced general -Hill to carry his reserve away from the decisive -point at that critical period which always occurs in a -well-disputed field and which every great general -watches for with the utmost anxiety. This was no -error, it was a necessity, and the superior military -quality of the British troops rendered it successful.</p> - -<p>The French officer who rode at the head of the -second attacking column might be a brave man, -doubtless he was; he might be an able man, but -he had not the instinct of a general. On his right -flank indeed Hill’s vigorous counter-attack was -successful, but the battle was to be won in the centre; -his column was heavy, undismayed, and -only one weak battalion, the ninety-second, was -before it; a short exhortation, a decided gesture, -a daring example, and it would have overborne<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_409"></a>[409]</span> -the small body in its front, Foy’s, Maransin’s, -and the half of D’Armagnac’s divisions would then -have followed in the path thus marked out. -Instead of this he weighed chances and retreated. -How different was the conduct of the British generals, -two of whom and nearly all their staff fell at -this point, resolute not to yield a step at such a critical -period; how desperately did the fiftieth and<span class="sidenote">Published Memoir by Captain Pringle of the Royal Engineers.</span> -Portuguese fight to give time for the ninety-second -to rally and reform behind St. Pierre; how gloriously -did that regiment come forth again to charge -with their colours flying and their national music -playing as if going to a review. This was to understand -war. The man who in that moment and immediately -after a repulse thought of such military -pomp was by nature a soldier.</p> - -<p>I have said that sir Rowland Hill’s employment -of his reserve was no error, it was indeed worthy of -all praise. From the commanding mount on which -he stood, he saw at once, that the misconduct of the -two colonels would cause the loss of his position -more surely than any direct attack upon it, and -with a promptness and decision truly military he -descended at once to the spot, playing the soldier -as well as the general, rallying the seventy-first and -leading the reserve himself; trusting meanwhile with -a noble and well-placed confidence to the courage -of the ninety-second and the fiftieth to sustain the -fight at St. Pierre. He knew indeed that the sixth -division was then close at hand and that the battle -might be fought over again, but like a thorough -soldier he was resolved to win his own fight with -his own troops if he could. And he did so after a -manner that in less eventful times would have rendered -him the hero of a nation.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_410"></a>[410]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">To understand all the importance of the battle of<span class="sidenote9">1813. December.</span> -St. Pierre, the nature of the country and the relative -positions of the opposing generals before and after -that action must be considered. Bayonne although -a mean fortress in itself was at this period truly designated -by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks -of France. Covered by its entrenched camp, which -the inundations and the deep country rendered impregnable -while there was an army to defend it, this -place could not be assailed until that army was -drawn away, and it was obviously impossible to pass -it and leave the enemy to act upon the communications -with Spain and the sea-coast. To force -the French army to abandon Bayonne was therefore -lord Wellington’s object, and his first step was the -passage of the Nive; he thus cut Soult’s direct -communication with St. Jean Pied de Port, obtained -an intercourse with the malcontents in France, -opened a large tract of fertile country for his cavalry, -and menaced the navigation of the Adour so -as to render it difficult for the French general to receive -supplies. This was however but a first step, -because the country beyond the Nive was still the -same deep clayey soil with bad roads; and it was traversed -by many rivers more or less considerable, -which flooding with every shower in the mountains,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_411"></a>[411]</span> -formed in their concentric courses towards the -Adour a number of successive barriers, behind which -Soult could maintain himself on lord Wellington’s -right and hold communication with St. Jean Pied de -Port. He could thus still hem in the allies as -before; upon a more extended scale however and -with less effect, for he was thrown more on the -defensive, his line was now the longest, and his -adversary possessed the central position.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Wellington could not, in that -deep impracticable country, carry on the wide operations -necessary to pass the rivers on his right, and -render the French position at Bayonne untenable, -until fine weather hardened the roads, and the winter -of 1813 was peculiarly wet and inclement.</p> - -<p>From this exposition it is obvious that to nourish -their own armies and circumvent their adversaries -in that respect were the objects of both generals, -Soult aimed to make Wellington retire into Spain, -Wellington to make Soult abandon Bayonne entirely, -or so reduce his force in the entrenched -camp that the works might be stormed. The -French general’s recent losses forbad him to maintain -his extended positions except during the wet -season; three days’ fine weather made him tremble; -and the works of his camp were still too unfinished -to leave a small force there. The difficulty of the -roads and want of military transport threw his army -almost entirely upon water-carriage for subsistence, -and his great magazines were therefore established -at Dax on the Adour, and at Peyrehorade on the -Gave of Pau, the latter being about twenty-four -miles from Bayonne. These places he fortified to -resist sudden incursions, and he threw a bridge -across the Adour at the port of Landes, just above<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_412"></a>[412]</span> -its confluence with the Gave de Pau. But the navigation -of the Adour below that point, especially -at Urt, the stream being confined there, could be -interrupted by the allies who were now on the left -bank. To remedy this Soult ordered Foy to pass -the Adour at Urt and construct a bridge with a -head of works, but the movement was foreseen by -Wellington, and Foy, menaced with a superior force, -recrossed the river. The navigation was then carried -on at night by stealth, or guarded by the -French gun-boats and exposed to the fire of the -allies. Thus provisions became scarce, and the -supply would have been quite unequal to the demand -if the French coasting trade, now revived -between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been interrupted -by the navy, but lord Wellington’s representations -on this head were still unheeded.</p> - -<p>Soult was embarrassed by Foy’s failure at Urt. -He reinforced him with Boyer’s and D’Armagnac’s -divisions, which were extended to the Port de -Lannes; then leaving Reille with four divisions -to guard the entrenched camp and to finish the -works, he completed the garrison of Bayonne and -transferred his head-quarters to Peyrehorade. -Clauzel with two divisions of infantry and the light -cavalry now took post on the Bidouze, being supported -with Trielhard’s heavy dragoons, and having -his left in communication with Paris and with St. -Jean Pied de Port where there was a garrison of -eighteen hundred men besides national guards. He -soon pushed his advanced posts to the Joyeuse -or Gambouri, and the Aran, streams which unite to -fall into the Adour near Urt, and he also occupied -Hellette, Mendionde, Bonloc, and the Bastide de -Clerence. A bridge-head was constructed at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_413"></a>[413]</span> -Peyrehorade, Hastingues was fortified on the Gave -de Pau, Guiche, Bidache and Came, on the Bidouze, -and the works of Navarens were augmented. -In fine Soult with equal activity and intelligence -profited from the rain which stopped the allies’ -operations in that deep country.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington also made some changes of position. -Having increased his works at Barrouilhet he -was enabled to shift some of Hope’s troops towards -Arcangues, and he placed the sixth division on the -heights of Villefranque, which permitted general -Hill to extend his right up the Adour to Urt. The -third division was posted near Urcuray, the light -cavalry on the Joyeuse facing Clauzel’s outposts, and -a chain of telegraphs was established from the -right of the Nive by the hill of San Barbe to St. -Jean de Luz. Freyre’s Gallicians were placed in -reserve about St. Pé, and Morillo was withdrawn to -Itzassu where supported by the Andalusian division -and by Freyre, he guarded the valley of the Upper -Nive and watched general Paris beyond the Ursouia -mountain. Such was the state of affairs in<span class="sidenote9">1814. January.</span> -the beginning of January, but some minor actions -happened before these arrangements were completed.</p> - -<p>In December the allies seized the island of Holriague -near La Honce on the Adour, which gave -them a better command of that river, but Foy kept -possession of the islands of Berens and Broc above -Holriague. The allies’ bridges of communication -on the Nive were now carried away by floods which -occasioned some embarrassment, and meanwhile, -without any orders from lord Wellington, probably -with a view to plunder, for his troops were exceedingly -licentious, Morillo obtained from Victor Alten<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_414"></a>[414]</span> -two squadrons of the eighteenth hussars, under pretence -of exploring the enemy’s position towards -Mendionde and Maccaye. Their commander, major -Hughes, having with difficulty ascertained that he -was to form an advanced guard in a close wooded -country, demanded the aid of some Spanish Caçadores, -and then moving forwards drove in the -picquets, crossed the bridge of Mendionde and -commenced a skirmish. But during this action -Morillo withdrew his division without giving any -notice, and at the same time the Caçadores fled in -a shameful manner from the left, the cavalry were -thus turned and escaped with difficulty, having had -one captain killed, two other captains and a lieutenant, -and Hughes himself, badly wounded. The -unfortunate issue of this skirmish was attributed at -the time to the bad conduct of the eighteenth hussars, -against whom lord Wellington was by malicious -misrepresentation previously prejudiced; for -at Vittoria they were unjustly accused of being more -licentious than others in plundering the captured -property on the field, whereas they had fought well -and plundered less than many who were praised for -their orderly demeanour.</p> - -<p>About the same time that this disaster occurred -at Mendionde, Mina, acting independently, and -being pressed for provisions in the mountains, invaded -the Val de Baigorry and the Val des Osses, -where his men committed the greatest enormities, -plundering and burning, and murdering men women -and children without distinction. The people of -these valleys, distinguished amongst the Basques for -their warlike qualities, immediately took arms under -the command of one of their principal men, named -Etchevery, and being reinforced with two hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_415"></a>[415]</span> -and fifty men from St. Jean Pied de Port, surprised -one of Mina’s battalions, and attacked the rest with -great vigour. This event gave Soult hopes of exciting -the Basques to commence such a war as they -had carried on at the commencement of the French -revolution. His efforts to accomplish it were unceasing, -and he had for two months been expecting -the arrival of general Harispe an officer whose -courage and talents have been frequently noticed -in this History, and who being the head of an ancient -Basque family had great local influence, -which was increased by his military reputation. It -was thought that if he had come when first expected, -about November, lord Wellington’s strict -discipline being then unknown to the people, he -would have raised a formidable partizan war in the -mountains. But now the English general’s attention -to all complaints, his proclamation, and the -proof he gave of his sincerity by sending the Spaniards -back when they misconducted themselves, -had, in conjunction with the love of gain that -master passion with all mountaineers, tamed the -Basque spirit and disinclined them to exchange -ease and profit for turbulence and ravage. Nevertheless -this incursion by Mina and the licentious -conduct of Morillo’s troops, awakened the warlike -propensities of the Val de Baygorry Basques, and -Harispe was enabled to make a levy with which he -immediately commenced active operations, and was -supported by general Paris.</p> - -<p>Soult with a view to aid Harispe, to extend his -own cantonments, and to restrict those of the allies, -now resolved to drive the latter’s detachments altogether<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Official Reports and Orders MSS.</span> -from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and -fix Clauzel’s left at Hellette, the culminant point of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_416"></a>[416]</span> -the great road to that fortress. To effect this, on -the 3d of January, he caused Clauzel to establish two<span class="sidenote7">Plan 9.</span> -divisions of infantry at the heights of La Costa, near -the Bastide de Clerence and beyond the Joyeuse -river. Buchan’s Portuguese brigade, placed in observation -there, was thus forced to retreat upon -Briscons, and at the same time Paris advancing to -Bonloc connected his right with Clauzel’s left at -Ayherre, while the light cavalry menaced all the -allies’ line of outposts. Informed of this movement -by telegraph, Wellington, thinking Soult was -seeking a general battle on the side of Hasparen, -made the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade -relieve the light division which marched to -Arauntz; the fourth division then passed the Nive -at Ustaritz, and the sixth division made ready to -march from Villefranque, by the high road of St. -Jean Pied de Port, towards Hasparen, as a reserve -to the third fourth and seventh divisions. The -latter were concentrated beyond Urcuray on the -4th, their left in communication with Hill’s right at -Briscons, and their right, supported by Morillo, -who advanced from Itzassu for this purpose.</p> - -<p>The English general’s intent was to fall upon the -enemy at once, but the swelling of the small rivers -prevented him. However on the 5th having ascertained -the true object and dispositions of the French -general, and having twenty-four thousand infantry -in hand with a division of cavalry and four or five -brigades of artillery, he resolved to attack Clauzel’s -divisions on the heights of La Costa. In this view -Le Cor’s Portuguese marched against the French -right, the fourth division marched against their -centre, the third division supported by cavalry -against their left; the remainder of the cavalry and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_417"></a>[417]</span> -the seventh division, the whole under Stapleton -Cotton, were posted at Hasparen to watch Paris on -the side of Bonloc. Soult was in person at the -Bastide de Clerence and a general battle seemed -inevitable, but the intention of the English general -was merely to drive back the enemy from the -Joyeuse, and the French general, thinking the whole -allied army was in movement resolved to act on the -defensive, and directed the troops at La Costa to -retire fighting upon the Bidouze: the affair terminated -therefore with a slight skirmish on the -evening of the 6th. The allies then resumed their old -positions on the right of the Nive, the Andalusians -were ordered back to the Bastan, and <ins class="corr" id="tn-417" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Carlos D’Españo'"> -Carlos D’España</ins>’s Gallicians were brought up to Ascain in -their place.</p> - -<p>When Clauzel saw that nothing serious was designed -he sent his horsemen to drive away general -Hill’s detachments, which had taken advantage of -the great movements to forage on the lower parts -of the Joyeuse and Aran rivers. Meanwhile Soult -observing how sensitive his adversary was to any -demonstration beyond the Bidouze resolved to maintain -the line of those two rivers. In this view he -reduced his defence of the Adour to a line -drawn from the confluence of the Aran to Bayonne, -which enabled him to reinforce Clauzel with Foy’s -division and all the light cavalry. Meantime general -Harispe having the division of Paris and the brigade -of general Dauture placed under his orders -to support his mountaineers, fixed his quarters -at Hellette and commenced an active partizan warfare. -On the 8th he fell upon Mina in the Val des -Osses and drove him with loss into Baygorry. On -the 10th returning to Hellette he surprised Morillo’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_418"></a>[418]</span> -foragers with some English dragoons on the side of -Maccaye, and took a few prisoners. On the 12th -he again attacked Mina and drove him up into the -Alduides. During these affairs at the outposts -lord Wellington might have stormed the entrenched -camp in front of Bayonne, but he could not hold it -except under the fire of the fortress, and not being -prepared for a siege avoided that operation. Nor -would the weather, which was again become terrible, -permit him to make a general movement to drive -Harispe from his position in the upper country; -wherefore he preferred leaving that general in quiet -possession to irritating the mountaineers by a counter-warfare. -He endeavoured however to launch -some armed boats on the Adour above Bayonne, -where Soult had increased the flotilla to twenty -gun-boats for the protection of his convoys, which -were notwithstanding forced to run past Urt under -the fire of a battery constructed by general Hill.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington now dreading the bad effect -which the excesses committed by Mina’s and Morillo’s -men were likely to produce, for the Basques -were already beginning to speak of vengeance, put -forth his authority in repression. Rebuking Morillo -for his unauthorized and disastrous advance upon -Mendionde, and for the excesses of his troops, he -ordered him to keep the latter constantly under arms. -This was resented generally by the Spanish officers, -and especially by Morillo whose savage untractable -and bloody disposition, since so horribly displayed in -South America, prompted him to encourage violence. -He asserted falsely that his troops were starving, -declared that a settled design to ill-use the Spaniards -existed, and that the British soldiers were -suffered to commit every crime with impunity. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_419"></a>[419]</span> -English general in reply explained himself both to -Morillo, and to Freyre, who had alluded to the -libels about San Sebastian, with a clearness and -resolution that showed how hopeless it would be to -strive against him.</p> - -<p>“He had not,” he said, “lost thousands of men -to pillage and ill-treat the French peasantry, he -preferred a small army obedient to a large one disobedient -and undisciplined. If his measures to -enforce good order deprived him of the Spanish -troops the fault would rest with those who suffered -their soldiers to commit disorders. Professions -without corresponding actions would not do, he -was determined to enforce obedience one way or -another and would not command insubordinate -troops. The question between them was whether -they should or should not pillage the French peasants. -His measures were taken to prevent it and -the conduct which called them forth was more dishonouring -to the Spaniards than the measures -themselves. For libels he cared not, he was used -to them and he did not believe the union of the -two nations depended upon such things; but if it -did he desired no union founded upon such an infamous -interest as pillage. He had not lost twenty -thousand men in the campaign to enable Morillo to -plunder and he would not permit it. If the Spaniards -were resolved to do so let them march their -great armies into France under their own generals, -he would meanwhile cover Spain itself and they -would find they could not remain in France for -fifteen days. They had neither money nor magazines, -nothing to maintain an army in the field, the -country behind was incapable of supporting them -and were he scoundrel enough to permit pillage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_420"></a>[420]</span> -France rich as it was could not sustain the burthen. -Even with a view to living on the enemy by contributions -it would be essential to prevent plunder; and -yet in defiance of all these reasons he was called -an enemy by the Spanish generals because he opposed -such conduct, and his measures to prevent it -were considered dishonouring!</p> - -<p>“Something also he could say against it in a political -point of view, but it was unnecessary because -careless whether he commanded a large or a small -army he was resolved that it should obey him and -should not pillage.</p> - -<p>“General Morillo expressed doubts of his right -to interfere with the Spaniards. It was his right -and his duty, and never before did he hear that to -put soldiers under arms was a disgrace. It was a -measure to prevent evil and misfortunes. Mina -could tell by recent experience what a warfare the -French peasants could carry on, and Morillo was -openly menaced with a like trial. It was in vain -for that general to palliate or deny the plundering -of his division, after having acknowledged to general -Hill that it was impossible to prevent it because -the officers and soldiers received by every post -letters from their friends, congratulating them upon -their good luck in entering France and urging -them to seize the opportunity of making fortunes. -General Morillo asserted that the British troops -were allowed to commit crimes with impunity. -Neither he nor any other man could produce an -instance of injury done where proof being adduced -the perpetrators had escaped punishment. Let him -enquire how many soldiers had been hanged, how -many stricken with minor chastisements and made to -pay for damages done. But had the English troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_421"></a>[421]</span> -no cause of complaint against the Spaniards? Officers -and soldiers were frequently shot and robbed -on the high roads and a soldier had been lately -murdered between Oyarzun and Lesaca; the English -stores and convoys were plundered by the -Spanish soldiers, a British officer had been put to -death at Vittoria and others were ill-treated at -Santander.”</p> - -<p>A sullen obedience followed this correspondence -for the moment, but the plundering system was soon -renewed, and this with the mischief already done -was sufficient to rouse the inhabitants of Bidarray -as well as those of the Val de Baygorry into action. -They commenced and continued a partizan warfare -until lord Wellington, incensed by their -activity, issued a proclamation calling upon them -to take arms openly and join Soult or stay peaceably -at home, declaring that he would otherwise -burn their villages and hang all the inhabitants. -Thus it appeared that notwithstanding all the outcries -made against the French for resorting to this -system of repressing the warfare of peasants in -Spain, it was considered by the English general -both justifiable and necessary. However the threat -was sufficient for this occasion. The Basques set -the pecuniary advantages to be derived from the -friendship of the British and Portuguese troops and -the misery of an avenging warfare against the evils -of Spanish plunder, and generally disregarded -Harispe’s appeals to their patriotism.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Soult who expected reinforcements -seeing that little was to be gained by insurrection -and being desirous to resume the offensive, ordered -Harispe to leave only the troops absolutely necessary -for the defence of St. Jean Pied de Port and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_422"></a>[422]</span> -its entrenched camp with a few Basques as scouts -in the valleys, and to concentrate the remainder of -his force at Mendionde, Hellette and La Houssoa, -thus closely hemming in the right of the allies’ line -with a view to making incursions beyond the -Upper Nive. This was on the 14th, on the 23rd -Harispe, getting information that Morillo was to -forage in force on the side of Bidarray, endeavoured -to cut him off, the supporting troops consisting -of Spanish infantry and some English hussars -repulsed his first attack, but they were finally -pushed back with some loss in horses and mules. -About the same time one of Hill’s posts near the -confluence of the Aran with the Adour was surprised -by some French companies who remained -in advance until fresh troops detached from Urt -forced them to repass the river again. This affair -was a retaliation for the surprise of a French post a -few days before by the sixth division, which was -attended with some circumstances repugnant to the -friendly habits long established between the French -and British troops at the outposts. The value of -such a generous intercourse old soldiers well -understand, and some illustrations of it at this period -may be quoted.</p> - -<p>On the 9th of December, the forty-third was assembled -in column on an open space within twenty -yards of the enemy’s out-sentry, yet the latter continued -to walk his beat for an hour without concern, -relying so confidently on the customary system that -he placed his knapsack on the ground to ease his -shoulders. When at last the order to advance was -given, one of the British soldiers stepping out told -him to go away and helped him to replace his pack, -the firing then commenced; the next morning the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_423"></a>[423]</span> -French in like manner warned a forty-third sentry to -retire. But the most remarkable instance happened -on the occasion of lord Wellington’s being desirous -of getting to the top of a hill occupied by the -enemy near Bayonne. He ordered the riflemen -who escorted him to drive the French away, and -seeing the former stealing up, as he thought too -close, called out to commence firing; with a -loud voice one of those old soldiers replied “<em>no -firing!</em>” and then holding up the butt of his rifle -towards the French, tapped it in a peculiar way. -At the well-understood signal which meaned “<em>we -must have the hill for a short time</em>,” the French -who though they could not maintain would not have -relinquished the post without a fight if they had -been fired upon, quietly retired. And this signal -would never have been made if the post had been -one capable of a permanent defence, so well do -veterans understand war and its proprieties.</p> - -<p>The English general now only waited until the -roads were practicable, to take the offensive with an -army superior in every point of view to Soult’s. -That general’s numbers were also about to be reduced. -His conscripts were deserting fast, and the -inclemency of the weather was filling his hospitals, -while the bronzed veterans of Wellington’s army -impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, fierce in -execution, were free from serious maladies, ready -and able to plant their colours wherever their -general listed. At this time however the country was -a vast quagmire; it was with difficulty that provisions -or even orders could be conveyed to the -different quarters, and a Portuguese brigade on the -right of the Nive, was several days without food -from the swelling of the rivulets which stopped the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_424"></a>[424]</span> -commissariat mules. At the sea-side the troops -were better off, yet with a horrible counterpoise, -for on that iron-bound coast storms and shipwrecks -were so frequent, that scarcely a day passed but -some vessel, sometimes many together, were seen -embayed and drifting towards the reefs which shoot -out like needles for several miles. Once in this -situation there was no human help! a faint cry -might be heard at intervals, but the tall ship -floated slowly and solemnly onwards until the first -rock arrested her, a roaring surge then dashed her -to pieces and the shore was strewed with broken -timbers and dead bodies. December and January -were thus passed by the allies, but February saw -Wellington break into France the successful invader -of that mighty country. Yet neither his nor Soult’s -military operations can be understood without a -previous description of political affairs which shall -be given in the next chapter.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_425"></a>[425]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><em>Portugal.</em>—It has been shewn that marshal<span class="sidenote7">1814.</span> -Beresford’s arrival at Lisbon put a momentary -check upon the intrigues of the regency relative to -the command of the troops, when he rejoined the -army the vexatious conduct of the government was -renewed with greater violence, and its ill-will was -vented upon the English residents, whose goods -were arbitrarily seized and their persons imprisoned -without regard to justice or international law. The -supply and reinforcing of the army were the pretences -for these exactions, yet the army was neither -supplied nor recruited, for though the new regulations<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -had produced nine thousand trained soldiers, -they were, in contempt of the subsidizing treaty, -retained in the depôts. At first this was attributed -to the want of transport to enable them to march -through Spain, but though lord Wellington obtained -in the beginning of 1814 shipping to convey them -to the army, the Portuguese government still withheld -the greatest number, alleging in excuse the -ill-conduct of the Spaniards relative to the military -convention established between the two countries.</p> - -<p>This convention had been concluded in 1812 to -enable the Portuguese troops to establish hospitals -and to draw certain resources from Spain upon -fixed conditions. One of these was that all supplies<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_426"></a>[426]</span> -might be purchased, half with ready money -half with bills on the Portuguese treasury; nevertheless -in December 1813 the Spanish envoy at -Lisbon informed the Portuguese government, that to -give up the shells of certain public buildings for -hospitals was the only effect they would give to the -convention. Wherefore as neither troops nor horses -could march through Spain, and the supply of -those already with the army became nearly impossible, -the regency detained the reinforcements. Lord -Wellington strongly reproached the Spanish government -for this foul conduct, yet observed with great -force to the Portuguese regency, that the treaty by -which a certain number of soldiers were to be constantly -in the field was made with England, not -with Spain; and as the government of the former -country continued to pay the subsidy and provided -ships for the transport of the troops there was no -excuse for retaining them in Portugal.</p> - -<p>His remonstrances, Beresford’s orders, and Mr. -Stuart’s exertions although backed by the menaces -of lord Castlereagh, were however alike powerless; -the regency embarked only three thousand men out -of nine thousand, and those not until the month of -March when the war was on the point of terminating. -Thus instead of thirty thousand Portuguese -under arms lord Wellington had less than -twenty thousand, and yet Mr. Stuart affirmed that -by doing away with the militia and introducing -the Prussian system of granting furloughs, one -hundred thousand troops of the line might have -been furnished and supported by Portugal, without -pressing more severely on the finances of the country -than the actual system which supplied these twenty -thousand. The regency were now more than usually<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_427"></a>[427]</span> -importunate to have the subsidy paid in specie in -which case their army would have disappeared -altogether. Mr. Stuart firmly opposed this, knowing -the money would be misapplied if it fell into their -hands, and thinking their importunity peculiarly -ill-timed when their quota of troops was withheld, -and when lord Wellington, forced to pay ready -money for his supplies in France, wanted all the -specie that could be procured for the military chest. -Such was the countenance assumed by Portugal -towards England in return for the independence -which the latter had secured for her; and it is obvious -that if the war had not terminated immediately -afterwards the alliance could not have continued. -The British army deserted by Portugal -and treated hostilely, as we shall find, by the Spaniards, -must then have abandoned the Peninsula.</p> - -<p><em>Spain.</em>—The malice evinced towards lord Wellington -by the Spanish government, the libels upon -him and upon the Anglo-Portuguese army, the vices -of the system by which the Spanish troops were -supplied, and their own evil propensities fostered -by long and cruel neglect and suffering, the activity -of those intriguing politicians who were inimical to -the British alliance, the insolence and duplicity of -the minister of war, the growing enmity between -Spain and Portugal, the virulence of all parties -and the absolute hostility of the local authorities -towards the British army, the officers and soldiers -of which were on all occasions treated as if they -were invaders rather than friends, drove lord Wellington -in the latter end of November to extremity. -He judged the general disposition of the -Spanish people to be still favourable to the English -alliance, and with the aid of the serviles hoped to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_428"></a>[428]</span> -put down the liberals; but an open rupture with -the government he thought inevitable, and if the -liberal influence should prove most powerful with -the people he might be unable to effect a retreat -into Portugal. Wherefore he recommended the -British ministers to take measures with a view to a -war against Spain! And this at the very moment -when, victorious in every battle, he seemed to have -placed the cause he supported beyond the power of -fortune. Who when Napoleon was defeated at -Leipsic, when all Europe and even part of Asia -were pouring their armed hordes into the northern -and eastern parts of France, when Soult was unable -to defend the western frontier; who then looking -only on the surface could have supposed that Wellington, -the long-enduring general, whose profound -calculations and untiring vigour in war had brought -the affairs of the Peninsula to their apparently -prosperous state, that he the victorious commander -could with truth thus describe his own uneasy situation -to his government?</p> - -<p>“Matters are becoming so bad between us and -the Spaniards that I think it necessary to draw -your attention seriously to the subject. You will -have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which I -know were written and published by an officer of -the war department and I believe under the direction -of the minister at war Don Juan O’Donoju. -Advantage has been taken of the impression made -by these libels to circulate others in which the old -stories are repeated about the outrages committed -by sir John Moore’s army in Gallicia, and endeavours -are made to irritate the public mind about -our still keeping garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagena, -and particularly in Ceuta. They exaggerate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_429"></a>[429]</span> -the conduct of our traders in South America, and -every little concern of a master of a ship who may -behave ill in a Spanish port is represented as an -attack upon the sovereignty of the Spanish nation. -I believe these libels all proceed from the same -source, the government and their immediate servants -and officers; and although I have no reason -to believe that they have as yet made any impression -on the nation at large they certainly have upon -the officers of the government, and even upon the -principal officers of the army. These persons must -see that if the libels are not written or encouraged -by the government they are at least not discouraged, -they know that we are odious to the government -and they treat us accordingly. The Spanish -troops plunder every thing they approach, neither -their own nor our magazines are sacred. Until recently -there was some semblance of inquiry and -of a desire to punish offenders, lately these acts of -disorder have been left entirely unnoticed, unless -when I have interfered with my authority as commander-in-chief -of the Spanish army. The civil -magistrates in the country have not only refused us -assistance but have particularly ordered the inhabitants -not to give it for payment, and when robberies -have been discovered and the property proved to -belong to the commissariat the law has been violated -and possession withheld. This was the case -lately at Tolosa.</p> - -<p>“Then what is more extraordinary and more difficult -to understand is a transaction which occurred -lately at Fuenterabia. It was settled that the -British and Portuguese hospitals should go to that -town. There is a building there which has been a -Spanish hospital, and the Spanish authority who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_430"></a>[430]</span> -gave it over wanted to carry off, in order to burn as -fire-wood, the beds, that our soldiers might not have -the use of them; and these are people to whom -we have given medicines instruments and other aids, -who when wounded and sick we have taken into our -hospitals, and to whom we have rendered every -service in our power after having recovered their -country from the enemy! These are not the people -of Spain but the officers of government, who would -not dare to conduct themselves in this manner if -they did not know that their conduct was agreeable -to their employers. If this spirit is not checked, -if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury -done to our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly -nature of such proceedings, we must expect -that the people at large will soon behave towards -us in the same manner, and that we shall have no -friend or none who will dare to avow him as such in -Spain. Consider what will be the consequence of -this state of affairs if any reverse should happen, -or if an aggravation of the insults and injuries or -any other cause should cause the English army to -be withdrawn. I think I should experience great -difficulty, the Spanish people being hostile, in retiring -through Spain into Portugal from the peculiar -nature of our equipments, and I think I might -be able to embark the army at Passages in spite of -all the French and Spanish armies united. But I -should be much more certain of getting clear off -as we ought if we had possession of San Sebastian, -and this view of the subject is the motive for the -advice I am about to give you as the remedy for -the evils with which I have made you acquainted.</p> - -<p>“First then I recommend to you to alter the nature -of your political relations with Spain and to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_431"></a>[431]</span> -have nothing there but a “<i lang="fr">chargé d’affaires</i>.” Secondly -to complain seriously of the conduct of the government -and their servants, to remind them that -Cadiz, Carthagena, and I believe, Ceuta, were garrisoned -by British troops at their earnest request, -and that the troops were not sent to the two former -till the government agreed to certain conditions. If -we had not garrisoned the last it would before now -have fallen into the hands of the Moors. Thirdly -to demand, as security for the safety of the king’s -troops against the criminal disposition of the government -and of those in authority under them, -that a British garrison should be admitted into San -Sebastian, giving notice that unless this demand -was complied with the troops should be withdrawn. -Fourthly. To withdraw the troops if this demand -be not complied with, be the consequences what -they may, and to be prepared accordingly. You -may rely upon this, that if you take a firm decided -line and shew your determination to go through -with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you, -and will bring the government to their senses, and -you will put an end at once to all the petty cabals -and counter-action existing at the present moment, -and you will not be under the necessity of bringing -matters to extremities; if you take any other than -a decided line and one which in its consequences -will involve them in ruin you may depend upon it -you will gain nothing and will only make matters -worse. I recommend these measures whatever may -be the decision respecting my command of the -army. They are probably the more necessary if I -should keep my command. The truth is that a -crisis is approaching in our connection with Spain -and if you do not bring the government and nation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_432"></a>[432]</span> -to their senses before they go too far, you will -inevitably lose all the advantages which you might -expect from services rendered to them.”</p> - -<p>Thus it appears that lord Wellington at the end -of the war described the Spaniards precisely as sir -John Moore described them at the beginning. But -the seat of government was now transferred to -Madrid and the new Cortez, as I have already -noticed, decided, against the wishes of the regency, -that the English general should keep the -command of the Spanish armies. The liberals indeed -with great diligence had previously sought to -establish a system of controul over the Cortez by -means of the populace of Madrid as they had done -at Cadiz, and they were so active and created so -much alarm by their apparent success, that the serviles, -backed by the Americans, were ready to make -the princess Carlotta sole regent as the only resource -for stemming the progress of democracy. -However when they had proved their strength upon -the question of lord Wellington’s command, they -deferred the princess’s affair and resolved to oppose -their adversaries more vigorously in the assembly. -They were encouraged also by a tumult which happened -at Madrid, where the populace instigated -by their agents, or disliking the new constitution, -for the measures of the democratic party were generally -considered evil in the great towns beyond the -Isla, rose and forced the authorities to imprison a -number of obnoxious persons; the new Cortez then -arrived, the serviles got the upper hand and being -resolved to change the regency took as their ground -of attack its conduct towards the English general. -Pursuing this scheme of opposition with ardour -they caused the minister of war to be dismissed, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_433"></a>[433]</span> -were ready to attack the regency itself, expecting -full success, when to their amazement and extreme -anger lord Wellington, far from desiring to have his -personal enemies thus thrust out of power, expressed -his earnest desire to keep them in their stations.</p> - -<p>To men who were alike devoid of patriotism or -principle, and whose only rule of action was the -momentary impulse of passion, such a proceeding -was incomprehensible; yet it was a wise and well-considered -political change on his part, shewing that -private feelings were never the guides of his conduct -in public matters, and that he ever seemed to -bear in mind the maxim which Sophocles has put -into the mouth of Ajax, “<em>carrying himself towards -his friends as if they might one day become enemies -and treating his foes as men who might become -friends</em>.” The new spirit had given him no hopes -of any general alteration of the system, nor was he -less convinced that sooner or later he must come to -extremities with the Spaniards; but he was averse -to any appearance of disunion becoming public at -the moment he was invading France, lest it should -check his projects of raising an anti-Napoleon party -in that country. He therefore advised the British -government to keep his hostile propositions in abeyance, -leaving it to him and to his brother to put -them in execution or not as events might dictate. -Meanwhile he sent orders to evacuate Cadiz and -Carthagena, and opposed the projected change in -the Spanish government, observing that “the minister -of war being dismissed, the most obnoxious -opponent of military arrangement was gone; that the -mob of Madrid, being worked upon by the same press -in the hands of the same people who had made the -mob of Cadiz so ungovernable, would become as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_434"></a>[434]</span> -bad as these last, and though the mercantile interest -would not have so much power in the capital they -would not want partizans when desirous of carrying -a question by violence. The grandees were too poor -to retain their former natural influence, and the constitution -gave them no political power. The only -chance which the serviles had was to conduct -themselves with prudence, and when in the right -with a firm contempt for the efforts of the press and -the mob; but this was what no person in Spain -ever did and the smaller party being wiser bolder -and more active would soon govern the Cortez at -Madrid as they did that at Cadiz.”</p> - -<p>No permanent change for the better could be -expected, and meanwhile the actual government, -alarmed by the tumults in the capital, by the -strength of the serviles in the Cortez, by the rebukes -and remonstrances of the English general -and ministers, and by the evident danger of an open -rupture with England, displayed, according to lord -Wellington, the utmost prudence and fairness in a -most important affair which occurred at this time. -That is to say, their own views and interests coinciding -with those of the English commander and -government there was a momentary agreement, and -Wellington wisely preferred this opening for conciliation -to the more dangerous mode he had before -recommended.</p> - -<p>The event which called forth his approval of their -conduct was the secret arrival of the duke of San -Carlos at Madrid in December. He brought with -him a treaty of peace, proposed by Napoleon and -accepted by Ferdinand, called the treaty of Valençay. -It acknowledged Ferdinand as king of -Spain and the Indies, and the integrity of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_435"></a>[435]</span> -Spanish empire was recognized. He was in return -to make the English evacuate Spain, and the French -troops were to abandon the country at the same -time. The contracting powers were to maintain -their respective maritime rights as they had been -stipulated by the treaty of Utrecht and observed -until 1792. The sales of the national domains made -by Joseph were to be confirmed; all the Spaniards -who had attached themselves to the French -cause were to be reinstated in their dignities and -property, those who chose to quit Spain were -to have ten years to dispose of their possessions. -Prisoners, including all those delivered up by Spain -to the English, were to be sent home on both sides. -The king was to pay annually thirty millions of -reals to his father Charles IV., and two millions to -his widow; a treaty of commerce was to be arranged.</p> - -<p>Ferdinand being entirely devoid of principle acted -with that cunning which marked his infamous career -through life. He gave the duke of San Carlos secret -instructions to tell the serviles, if he found them all-powerful -in the Cortez, to ratify this treaty with a -secret resolution to break it when time served; but -if the Jacobins were strongest San Carlos was merely -to ask them to ratify it, Ferdinand in that case reserving -to himself the task of violating it on his own -authority. These instructions were made known to -the English ministers and the English general, but -they, putting no trust in such a negociator, and -thinking his intention was rather to deceive the -allies than Napoleon, thwarted him as much as they -could, and in this they were joined by the Portuguese<span class="sidenote">Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -government. The British authorities were -naturally little pleased with the prospect of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_436"></a>[436]</span> -forced to abandon Spain under a treaty, which would -necessarily give Napoleon great influence over that -country in after times, and for the present enable -him to concentrate all the old troops on the eastern -frontier of his empire; nor was the Jacobinical -Spanish government more content to have a master. -Wherefore, all parties being agreed, the regency, -keeping the matter secret, dismissed San Carlos -on the 8th of January with a copy of the decree -passed by the Cortez, which rendered null and void -all acts of Ferdinand while a prisoner, and forbad -negociation for peace while a French army remained -in the Peninsula. And that the king might -fully understand them, they told him “<em>the monster -despotism had been driven from the throne of Spain</em>.” -Meanwhile Joseph Palafox, who had been a prisoner -ever since the siege of Zaragoza, was by the French -emperor first sent to Valençay, after which he -was to follow San Carlos and he arrived at Madrid -four days after the latter’s departure. But -his negociations were equally fruitless with the -regency, and in the secret sittings of the Cortez -measures were discussed for watching the king’s -movements and forcing him to swear to the constitution -and to the Cortez before he passed the -frontier.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington was alarmed at the treaty of -Valençay. He had, he said, long suspected Napoleon -would adopt such an expedient and if he -had shewn less pride and more common sense it -would have succeeded. This sarcasm was perhaps -well applied to the measure as it appeared at the -time, but the emperor’s real proceedings he was unacquainted -with, and this splenetic ebullition only -indicated his own vexation at approaching mischief,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_437"></a>[437]</span> -for he was forced to acknowledge that the project -was not unlikely even then to succeed, because the -misery of Spain was so great and so clearly to be -traced to the views of the government and of the -new constitution, that many persons must have been -desirous to put an end to the general suffering -under the sanction of this treaty. “If Napoleon,” -he said, “had withdrawn the garrisons -from Catalonia and Valencia and sent Ferdinand -who must be <em>as useless a person in France as he -would probably be in Spain</em> at once to the frontier, -or into the Peninsula, peace would have been made -or the war at least rendered so difficult as to be -almost impracticable and without hope of great -success.” Now this was precisely what Napoleon -had designed, and it seems nearly certain that he -contemplated the treaty of Valençay and the restoration -of Ferdinand as early as the period of the -battle of Vittoria, if not before.</p> - -<p>The scheme was one which demanded the utmost -secrecy, that it might be too sudden for the English -influence to defeat it; the emperor had therefore -arranged that Ferdinand should enter Spain early -in November, that is at the very moment when it -would have been most injurious to the English -interest, because then the disputes in the Cortez -between the serviles and Jacobins were most rancorous, -and the hostility of the regencies both in -Portugal and Spain towards the English general -and English influence undisguised. Suchet had -then also proved his superiority to the allies in -Catalonia, and Soult’s gigantic lines being unessayed -seemed impregnable. But in Napoleon’s -council were persons seeking only to betray him. -It was the great misfortune of his life to have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_438"></a>[438]</span> -driven by circumstances to suffer such men as Talleyrand -and Fouché, whose innate treachery has -become proverbial, to meddle in his affairs or even -to approach his court. Mischief of this kind, -however, necessarily awaits men who like Napoleon -and Oliver Cromwell have the courage to attempt -after great convulsions and civil wars the rebuilding -of the social edifice without spilling blood. Either -to create universal abhorrence by their cruelty, or -to employ the basest of men, the Talleyrands, -Fouchés, and Monks, of revolutions, is their inevitable -fate; and never can they escape the opposition, -more dangerous still, of honest and resolute -men, who unable to comprehend the necessity of the -times see nothing but tyranny in the vigour which -prevents anarchy.</p> - -<p>The treaty of Valençay was too important a -measure to escape the sagacity of the traitors -around Napoleon, and when their opposition in the -council and their secret insinuations proved unavailing -to dissuade him from it, they divulged the -secret to the partizans of the Bourbons. Taking advantage -of the troubled state of public affairs which -occupied the emperor’s time and distracted his -attention, they contrived that Ferdinand’s emissaries -should precede him to Madrid, and delayed his -own departure until March when the struggle was -at an end. Nevertheless the chances of success for -this scheme, even in its imperfect execution, were -so many and so alarming that lord Wellington’s -sudden change from fierce enmity to a warm -support of the regency, when he found it resolute -and frank in its rejection of the treaty, although it -created so much surprize and anger at the moment, -cannot be judged otherwise than as the wise and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_439"></a>[439]</span> -prudent proceeding of a consummate statesman. -Nor did he fail to point out to his own government -the more distant as well as the immediate danger to -England and Spain involved in this singularly -complicated and important affair.</p> - -<p>The evils as affecting the war and English alliance -with Spain were obvious, but the two articles relating -to the provision for Ferdinand’s father and -mother, and to the future state of the Spaniards who -had joined the French involved great interests. It -was essential, he said, that the Spanish government -should explicitly declare its intentions. Negociations -for a general peace were said to be commenced, -of that he knew nothing, but he supposed -such being the case that a basis would be -embodied in a preliminary treaty which all the -belligerents would ratify, each power then to -arrange its own peculiar treaty with France under -protection of the general confederation. Napoleon -would necessarily put forward his treaty -with Ferdinand. It could be got rid of by the -statement that the latter was a prisoner when negociating; -but new articles would then have to be -framed and therefore the Spanish government -should be called upon previously to declare what -their intentions were as to the two articles in the -treaty of Valençay. His objections to them were -that the allowance to Charles IV. was beyond the -financial means of Spain, and were it not so, Napoleon -should not be allowed to stipulate for any -provision for him. Neither should he be suffered -to embody or establish a permanent French party -in Spain, under protection of a treaty, an article of -which provided for the restoration of the Spaniards -who had taken part with the French. It would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_440"></a>[440]</span> -give him the right, which he would not fail to -exercise, of interfering in their favour in every -question of property, or other interest, and the -Spanish government would be involved in perpetual -disputes with France. It was probable the allied -sovereigns would be desirous of getting rid of this -question and would think it desirable that Spain -should pardon her rebellious subjects. For this -reason he had before advised the Spanish government -to publish a general amnesty, with the view of -removing the difficulty when a general peace should -come to be negociated, and this difficulty and danger -be enhanced, if not before provided for, by the -desire which each of the allied powers would feel, -when negociating on their separate grounds, to save -their finances by disbanding their armies.</p> - -<p>This suggestion of an amnesty, made ten days -before the battle of Vittoria, illustrates Wellington’s -sagacity, his long and provident reach of mind, his -discriminating and magnanimous mode of viewing -the errors and weaknesses of human nature. Let it -be remembered that in the full tide of success, after -having passed the Douro, and when Joseph surprised -and bewildered was flying before him, that he -who had been called the iron duke in the midst of -his bivouac fires, found time to consider, and had -sufficient humanity and grandeur of mind thus to -address the Spanish government on this subject.</p> - -<p>“A large number of Spaniards who have taken -the side of the French are now with the enemy’s -army, many of these are highly meritorious and have -rendered most essential service to the cause even -during the period in which they have been in the -service of the enemy. It is also a known fact that -fear, the misery and distress which they suffered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_441"></a>[441]</span> -during the contest, and despair of the result, were -the motives which induced many of these unfortunate -persons to take the part which they have taken, -and I would suggest for consideration whether it is -expedient to involve the country in all the consequences -of a rigid adherence to the existing law in -order to punish such persons. I am the last man -who will be found to diminish the merit of those -Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the -country during the severe trial which I hope has -passed, particularly of those, who, having remained -amongst the enemy without entering their service, -have served their country at the risk of their lives. -But at the same time that I can appreciate the -merits of these individuals and of the nation at large -I can forgive the weakness of those who have been -induced by terror by distress or by despair to pursue -a different line of conduct.</p> - -<p>“I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances -of the commencement and of the different -stages of this eventful contest, and to the numerous -occasions in which all men must have imagined that -it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, -although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the -colossal power by which they were assailed and -nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness -of the country at the commencement of the -contest, upon the numerous and almost invariable -disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and disorganization -that followed, and let them decide -whether those who were witnesses of these events -are guilty because they could not foresee what has -since occurred. The majority are certainly not -guilty in any other manner, and many now deemed -guilty in the eye of the law as having served the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_442"></a>[442]</span> -pretended king have by that very act acquired the -means of serving and have rendered important services -to their country. It is my opinion that the -policy of Spain should lead the government and the -Cortez to grant a general amnesty with certain -exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in -the two views of failing or succeeding in freeing the -country from its oppressors. If the effort fail the -enemy will by an amnesty be deprived of the principal -means now in his hands of oppressing the -country in which his armies will be stationed; he -will see clearly that he can place no reliance on -any partizans in Spain, and he will not have even a -pretence for supposing that the country is divided -in opinion. If the effort succeed the object of the -government should be to pacify the country and to -heal the divisions which the contest has unavoidably -occasioned. It is impossible to accomplish this -object while there exists a great body of the -Spanish nation, some possessing the largest property -in the country and others endowed with -considerable talents, who are proscribed for their -conduct during the contest, conduct which has been -caused by the misfortunes to which I have above -adverted. These persons their friends and relations -will if persecuted naturally endeavour to perpetuate -the divisions in the country in the hope at some -time to take advantage of them, and adverting to -their number and to that power which they must -derive from their property and connections it must -be feared that they will be too successful.</p> - -<p>“But there are other important views of this -question. First should the effort to free the country -from its oppressors succeed, at some time or other -approaches to peace must be made between the two<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_443"></a>[443]</span> -nations and the amnesty to the persons above -described will remove the greatest difficulty in the -way of such an arrangement. Secondly, should -even Spain be at peace with France and the proscription -against these persons be continued, they -will remain in France a perpetual instrument in the -hands of that restless power to disturb the internal -tranquillity of Spain; and in case of a renewal of -the war, which will be their wish and object, they -will be the most mischievous and most inveterate -enemies of their country, of that country which -with mistaken severity aggravates her misfortunes -by casting off from her thousands of her useful -subjects. On every ground then it is desirable that -the measure should be adopted and the present -moment should be seized for adopting it.”</p> - -<p>Then pointing out with great accuracy and justice -those who should be exempted from an amnesty -he thus terminated this record of his own true -greatness, and of the littleness of the people to whom -it was fruitlessly addressed.</p> - -<p>“In bringing this subject under the consideration -of the government I am perhaps intruding my -opinion on a subject in which as a stranger I have -no concern, but having had an advantage enjoyed -by few of being acquainted with the concerns of -the country since the commencement of the contest, -and having been sensible both in the last and present -campaign of the disadvantages suffered by -Spain from the want of a measure of this description, -I have thought it proper as a well-wisher to -the cause to bring it under the consideration of the -government assuring them at the same time that I -have never had the slightest communication on the -subject with the government of my country, nor do<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_444"></a>[444]</span> -I believe that they have ever turned their attention -to it. What I have above stated are my own -opinions to which I may attribute more weight than -they merit but they are founded upon a sincere devotion -to the interests of the country.”</p> - -<p>Such was the general political state of the Peninsula -as bearing upon the military operations at the -close of the year 1813, and the state of England -and France shall be shewn in the next chapters. -But however hateful and injurious to England the -conduct of the Peninsular government appears, and -however just and well-founded were the greatest -part of lord Wellingtons complaints, it is not -to be assumed that the Spanish government and -Cortez were totally without excuse for their -hostility or ingratitude. It was not solely upon -military grounds that they were obnoxious to the -English general. He united heartily with the -English government in hatred of democratic institutions -as opposed to aristocratic domination. Spain -with the former seemed scarcely worth saving from -France, and in a letter written about that period to -the Conde de la Bispal, who it would appear proposed -some immediate stroke of violence against -the regency, he openly avows that he was inimical -to the constitution, because it admitted a free press -and refused to property any political influence -beyond what naturally belonged to it. That is, it -refused to heap undue honours privileges and power -upon those who already possessed all the luxury -and happiness which riches can bestow; it refused -to admit the principle that those who have much -should have more, that the indolence corruption and -insolence naturally attendant upon wealth should -be supported and increased by irresponsible power;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_445"></a>[445]</span> -that those who laboured and produced all things -should enjoy nothing, that the rich should be -tyrants and the poor slaves. But these essential -principles of aristocratic government have never yet -been, and never will be quietly received and submitted -to by any thinking people: where they -prevail there is no real freedom. Property inevitably -confers power on its possessors, and far from -adding to that natural power by political privileges -it should be the object of all men who love liberty -to balance it by raising the poorer classes to political -importance: the influence and insolence of riches -ought to be tamed and subdued instead of being -inflated and excited by political institutions. This -was the guiding principle of the most celebrated -Greek legislators, the opposite principle produced -the domestic dissensions of the Romans, and was -the ruin of Carthage. It was the cause also of the -French revolution. But after many years of darkness, -the light of reason is now breaking forth again, and -that ancient principle of justice which places the -right of man in himself, above the right of property, -is beginning to be understood. A clear perception -of it has produced the American republic. France -and Spain have admitted it and England ripens for -its adoption. Yet pure and bright and beautiful -and healthful as the light of freedom is in itself, it -fell at this time on such foul and stagnant pools, -such horrid repulsive objects, that millions turned -at first from its radiance with disgust and wished -for darkness again.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_446"></a>[446]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">The force and energy of Napoleon’s system of<span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -government was evinced in a marvellous manner -by the rapidity with which he returned to Germany, -at the head of an enormous army, before his enemies -had time even to understand the extent of his misfortunes -in the Russian campaign. The victories -of Lutzen and Bautzen then seemed to reinstate -him as the arbiter of Europe. But those battles -were fought with the heads of columns the rear of -which were still filing out of France. They were -fought also with young troops. Wherefore the emperor -when he had given himself a fixed and menacing -position in Germany more readily listened to the -fraudful negociations of his trembling opponents, -partly in hopes of attaining his object without -further appeal to arms, partly to obtain time to -organize and discipline his soldiers, confident in his -own unmatched skill in directing them if war was -finally to decide his fate. He counted also upon -the family ties between him and Austria, and believed -that power willing to mediate sincerely. -Not that he was so weak as to imagine the hope of -regaining some of its former power and possessions -was not uppermost, nor was he unprepared to make -concessions; but he seems to have been quite unsuspecting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_447"></a>[447]</span> -of the long course of treachery and -deceit followed by the Austrian politicians.</p> - -<p>It has been already shewn that while negociating -with France an offensive and defensive treaty in<span class="sidenote9">Vol. v. p. 49</span> -1812, the Austrian cabinet was cognizant of, and -secretly aiding the plan of a vast insurrection extending -from the Tyrol to Calabria and the Illyrian -provinces. The management of this scheme was -entrusted by the English cabinet to general Nugent -and Mr. King who were at Vienna; their agents -went from thence to Italy and the Illyrian coast, -many Austrian officers were engaged in the project; -and Italians of great families entered into commercial<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_I">Appendix, No. 1.</a></span> -houses to enable them with more facility to -carry on this plan. Moreover Austria while actually -signing the treaty with Napoleon was with unceasing -importunity urging Prussia to join the -Russians in opposition to him. The feeble operations -of Prince Swartzenberg, the manner in which -he uncovered the emperor’s right flank and permitted -Tchitchagoff to move to the Beresina in the -Russian campaign, were but continuations of -this deceitful policy. And it was openly advanced -as a merit by the Austrian cabinet that her offer of -mediation after the battle of Bautzen was made -solely with the view of gaining time to organize -the army which was to join the Russians and -Prussians. Finally the armistice itself was violated, -hostilities being commenced before its termination, -to enable the Russian troops safely to join the -Austrians in Bohemia.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless Napoleon’s genius triumphed at -Dresden over the unskilful operations of the allies, -directed by Swartzenberg, whose incapacity as a -commander was made manifest in this campaign.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_448"></a>[448]</span> -Nor would the after misfortunes of Vandamme and -Marshal Macdonald, or the defeat of Oudinot and -Ney have prevented the emperor’s final success but -for the continuation of a treachery, which seemed -at the time to be considered a virtue by sovereigns -who were unceasingly accusing their more noble -adversary of the very baseness that they were -practising so unblushingly. He had conceived a -project so vast so original so hardy, so far above -the imaginations of his contemporary generals, that -even Wellington’s sagacity failed to pierce it, and he -censured the emperor’s long stay on the Elbe as an -obstinacy unwarranted by the rules of art. But -Napoleon had more profoundly judged his own -situation. The large forces he left at Dresden at -Torgau, and Wittemberg, for which he has been so -much blamed by shallow military critics as lessening -his numbers on the field of Leipsic, were essential -parts of his gigantic plan. He quitted Dresden, -apparently in retreat, to deceive his enemies, but -with the intention of marching down the Elbe, recrossing -that river and throwing his opponents into -a false position. Then he would have seized Berlin -and reopening his communications with his garrisons -both on the Elbe and the Oder have operated -between those rivers; and with an army much augmented -in power, because he would have recovered -many thousand old soldiers cooped up in the garrisons; -an army more compact and firmly established -also, because he would have been in direct -communication with the Danes and with Davoust’s -force at Hamburgh, and both his flanks would have -been secured by his chains of fortresses on the two -rivers. Already had Blucher and the Swedes felt -his first stroke, the next would have taught the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_449"></a>[449]</span> -allies that the lion was still abroad in his strength, -if at the very moment of execution without any -previous declaration the Bavarians, upon whose -operations he depended for keeping the Austrians -in the valley of the Danube in check, had not formed -common cause with his opponents and the whole -marched together towards the Rhine. The battle -of Leipsic followed, the well-known treason of the -Saxon troops led to the victory gained there by the -allies, and Napoleon, now the prey of misfortune, -reached France with only one-third of his army, -having on the way however trampled in the dust -the Bavarian Wrede who attempted to stop his -passage at Hannau.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the allied sovereigns, by giving hopes -to their subjects that constitutional liberty would -be the reward of the prodigious popular exertions -against France, hopes which with the most -detestable baseness they had previously resolved to -defraud, assembled greater forces than they were -able to wield, and prepared to pass the Rhine. -But distrusting even their immense superiority of -numbers they still pursued their faithless system. -When Napoleon in consequence of the Bavarian -defection marched to Leipsic, he sent orders to -Gouvion St. Cyr to abandon Dresden and unite -with the garrisons on the Lower Elbe, the messengers -were intercepted, and St. Cyr, too little -enterprising to execute such a plan of his own -accord, surrendered on condition of being allowed -to regain France. The capitulation was broken -and general and soldiers remained prisoners.</p> - -<p>After <ins class="corr" id="tn-449" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the Lepsic battle'"> -the Leipsic battle</ins>, Napoleon’s adherents fell -away by nations. Murat the husband of his sister -joined Austria and thus forced prince Eugene to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_450"></a>[450]</span> -abandon his position on the Adige. A successful -insurrection in favour of the prince of Orange broke -out in Holland. The neutrality of Switzerland was -violated, and more than half a million of armed -men were poured across the frontiers of France in -all the violence of brute force, for their military -combinations were contemptible and their course -marked by murder and devastation. But previous -to this the allies gave one more notable example of -their faithless cunning.</p> - -<p>St. Aignan the French resident minister at Gotha -had been taken at Leipsic and treated at first as a -prisoner of war. He remonstrated and being known -to entertain a desire for peace was judged a good -tool with which to practise deception. Napoleon -had offered on the field of battle at Leipsic to negociate, -no notice was taken of it at the time, but -now the Austrian Metternich and the Russian Nesselrode -had an interview with St. Aignan at Frankfort, -and they assured him the Prussian minister -agreed in all things with them. They had previously -arranged that lord Aberdeen should come in -during the conference as if by accident; nothing -was put down in writing, yet St. Aignan was -suffered to make minutes of their proposals in reply -to the emperor’s offer to negociate. These were -generally that the alliance of the sovereigns was -indissoluble—that they would have only a general -peace—that France was to be confined to her natural<span class="sidenote">Diplomatic Correspondence, MSS.</span> -limits, viz. the Alps the Rhine and the Pyrenees—that -the independence of Germany was a -thing not to be disputed—that the Spanish Peninsula -should be free and the Bourbon dynasty be -restored—that Austria must have a frontier in Italy -the line of which could be afterwards discussed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_451"></a>[451]</span> -but Italy itself was to be independent of any preponderating -power—that Holland was also to be -independent and her frontier to be matter for after -discussion—that England was ready to make great -sacrifices for peace upon these bases and would acknowledge -that freedom of commerce and of navigation -which France had a right to pretend to. St. -Aignan here observed that Napoleon believed England -was resolved to restrict France to the possession -of thirty sail of the line, lord Aberdeen replied that -it was not true.</p> - -<p>This conference had place at the emperor of -Austria’s head-quarters on the 10th of November, -and lord Aberdeen inclosed the account of it in a -despatch dated at Smalcalde the 16th of November. -He had objected verbally to the passage relating to -the maritime question with England, nevertheless he -permitted it to remain in St. Aignan’s minutes. It -was decided also that the military operations should -go on notwithstanding the negociation, and in truth -the allies had not the slightest design to make peace. -They thought Napoleon would refuse the basis -proposed, which would give them an opportunity -to declare he was opposed to all reasonable modes -of putting an end to the war and thus work upon -the French people. This is proved by what followed. -For when contrary to their expectations the -emperor’s minister signified, on the 16th of November, -that he accepted the propositions, observing -that the independence of all nations at sea as well -as by land had been always Napoleon’s object, -Metternich in his reply, on the 25th of November, -pretended to consider this answer as avoiding the -acceptation of the basis. The emperor however -put that obstacle aside, on the 2d of December, by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_452"></a>[452]</span> -accepting explicitly the basis, generally and summarily, -such as it had been presented to him, -adding, that France would make great sacrifices -but the emperor was content if by like sacrifices on -the part of England, that general peace which was -the declared object of the allies could be obtained. -Metternich thus driven from his subterfuge required -Napoleon to send a like declaration to each of the -allies separately when negociations might, he said, -commence.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile lord Aberdeen, who had permitted -St. Aignan to retain the article relating to maritime -rights in his minutes of conference, presented to -Metternich on the 27th of November a note declaring -that England would not admit the turn -given by France to her share of the negociation; -that she was ready to yield all the rights of commerce -and navigation which France had a right to -pretend to, but the question would turn upon what -that right was. England would never permit her -navigation laws to be discussed at a congress, it -was a matter essentially foreign to the object of -such an assembly, and England would never depart -from the great principle thereby announced as to -her maritime rights. Metternich approved of lord -Aberdeen’s views, saying they were his own and -those of his court, thus proving that the negociation -had been a deceit from the beginning. This -fact was however placed beyond doubt by lord -Castlereagh’s simultaneous proceedings in London.</p> - -<p>In a note dated the 30th November that minister -told lord Aberdeen England admitted as a basis, -that the Alps the Rhine and the Pyrenees should -be the frontier of France, subject to such modifications -as might be necessary to give a secure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_453"></a>[453]</span> -frontier to Holland, and to Switzerland also, although -the latter had not been mentioned in the proposals -given by St. Aignan. He applauded the resolution -to pursue military operations notwithstanding the -negociations, and he approved of demanding nothing -but what they were resolved to have. Nevertheless -he said that any sacrifice to be made by England -was only to secure the independence of Holland -and Switzerland, and the former having already -declared for the house of Nassau was now out of -the pale of discussion. Finally he recommended -that any unnecessary delay or equivocation on the -part of the enemy should be considered as tantamount -to a rejection of the basis, and that the allies -<em>should then put forward the offer of peace to show -that it was not they but France that opposed an -honourable termination of the war</em>. Having thus -thrown fresh obstacles in the way of that peace -which the allies pretended to have so much at -heart, he, on the 21st December, sent notes to the -different ambassadors of the allied powers then in -London demanding explicit answers about the intentions -of their courts as to England’s maritime code. -To this they all responded that their cabinets would -not suffer any question relative to that code to be -entertained at a congress in which England was -represented, and this on the express ground that it -would mar the great object of peace.</p> - -<p>Lord Castlereagh thus provided, declared that -France should be informed of their resolutions -before negociations commenced, but twenty days -before this Napoleon having decreed a fresh levy -of three hundred thousand conscripts the allies had -published a manifesto treating this measure, so -essentially a defensive one since they would not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_454"></a>[454]</span> -suspend their military operations, as a fresh provocation -on his part, because the motives assigned for -the conscription contained a just and powerful -description of their past deceits and violence with -a view to rouse the national spirit of France. Thus -having first by a pretended desire for peace and a -willingness on the part of England to consent to an -arrangement about her maritime code, inveigled the -French emperor into negociations and thereby ascertained -that the maritime question was uppermost in -his mind and the only obstacle to peace, they declared -that vital question should not even be discussed. -And when by this subtlety they had -rendered peace impossible proclaimed that Napoleon -alone resisted the desire of the world for tranquillity. -And at this very moment Austria was secretly -endeavouring to obtain England’s consent to her -seizing upon Alsace a project which was stopped -by lord Wellington who forcibly pointed out the -danger of rousing France to a general insurrection -by such a proceeding.</p> - -<p>The contrast between these wiles to gain a momentary -advantage, and the manly, vigorous policy of -lord Wellington must make honest men of all nations -blush for the cunning which diplomatists call policy. -On one side the arts of guileful negociation masked -with fair protestations but accompanied by a savage -and revolting system of warfare; on the other a -broad open hostility declared on manly and just -grounds followed up with a strict regard to humanity -and good faith; nothing put forward with -an equivocal meaning and the actions true to the -word. On the eastern frontier the Cossack let -loose to ravage with all the barbarity of Asiatic -warfare. On the western frontier the Spaniards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_455"></a>[455]</span> -turned back into their own country in the very -midst of triumph, for daring to pass the bounds of -discipline prescribed by the wise and generous -policy of their commander. Terror and desolation -and the insurrection of a people rendered frantic by -the cruelty of the invaders marked the progress of -the ferocious multitudes who crossed the Rhine. -Order and tranquillity, profound even on the very -edge of the battle-field, attended the march of the -civilized army which passed the Bidassoa. And -what were the military actions? Napoleon rising -even above himself hurtled against the armed -myriads opposed to him with such a terrible energy -that though ten times his number they were rolled -back on every side in confusion and dismay. But -Wellington advanced without a check, victorious in -every battle, although one half of the veterans opposed -to him would have decided the campaign -on the eastern frontier. Nor can this be gainsaid, -since Napoleon’s career in this campaign was only -stayed by the defection of his brother-in-law Murat, -and by the sickening treachery of two marshals to -whom he had been prodigal of benefits. It is -undeniable that lord Wellington with sixty thousand -Anglo-Portuguese acting in the south, effected more -than half a million of the allies were able to effect -on the opposite side of France; and yet Soult’s army -on the 10th of November was stronger than that -with which Napoleon fought the battle of Brienne.</p> - -<p>That great man was never personally deceived by -the allies’ pretended negociations. He joined issue -with them to satisfy the French people that he was -not averse to peace, but his instructions dated the -4th of January and addressed to Caulaincourt prove -at once his sagacity and firmness. “I think,” he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_456"></a>[456]</span> -said, “that both the allies good faith and the wish -of England to make peace is doubtful; for my part -I desire peace but it must be solid and honourable. -I have accepted the basis proposed at Frankfort yet -it is more than probable the allies have other notions. -These propositions are but a mask, the negociations -are placed under the influence of the -military operations and it is easy to foresee what -the consequences of such a system must be. It is -necessary therefore to listen to and observe every -thing. It is not certain even that you will be admitted -to the head-quarters of the allies. The -Russians and the English watch to prevent any -opening for explanation and reconciliation with the -emperor of Austria. You must therefore endeavour -to ascertain the real views of the allies and let me -know day by day what you learn that I may frame -instructions for which at present I have no sure -grounds.”</p> - -<p>The internal state of France was more disquieting -to his mind than foreign negociations or the number -of invaders. The sincere republicans were -naturally averse to him as the restorer of monarchy, -yet they should have felt that the sovereign whose -ruin was so eagerly sought by the legitimate kings -and nobles of Europe could not be really opposed to -liberty. Meanwhile the advocates of legitimacy -shrunk from him as an usurper, and all those tired -of war, and they were a majority of the nation, -judging from the stupendous power <ins class="corr" id="tn-456" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'of his genins'"> -of his genius</ins> that he had only to will peace to attain it with -security, blamed his tardiness in negociation. An unexpected -opposition to his wishes was also displayed -in the legislative body, and the partizans of the Bourbons -were endeavouring to form a great conspiracy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_457"></a>[457]</span> -in favour of that house. There were many traitors -likewise to him and to their country, men devoid of -principle, patriotism, or honour, who with instinctive -hatred of a failing cause plotted to thwart his projects -for the defence of the nation. In fine the men -of action and the men of theories were alike combined -for mischief. Nor is this outbreak of passion -to be wondered at when it is considered how -recently Napoleon had stopped the anarchy of the -revolution and rebuilt the social and political structure -in France. But of all who by their untimely -opposition to the emperor hurt their country, the -most pernicious were those silly politicians, whom -he so felicitously described as “<em>discussing abstract -systems of government when the battering ram was -at the gates</em>.”</p> - -<p>Such however has been in all ages the conduct -of excited and disturbed nations, and it seems to be -inherent in human nature, because a saving policy -can only be understood and worked to good by -master-spirits, and they are few and far between, -their time on earth short, their task immense. They -have not time to teach, they must command although -they know that pride and ignorance and even -honesty will carp at the despotism which brings -general safety. It was this vain short-sighted -impatience that drove Hannibal into exile, caused -the assassination of Cæsar, and strewed thorns -beneath the gigantic footsteps of Oliver Cromwell. -It raged fiercely in Spain against lord Wellington, -and in France against Napoleon, and always with -the most grievous injury to the several nations. -Time only hallows human institutions. Under that -guarantee men will yield implicit obedience and -respect to the wildest caprices of the most stupid<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_458"></a>[458]</span> -tyrant that ever disgraced a throne, and wanting it -they will cavil at and reject the wisest measures of -the most sublime genius. The painful notion is -thus excited, that if governments are conducted -with just the degree of stability and tranquillity -which they deserve and no more, the people of all -nations, much as they may be oppressed, enjoy upon -an average of years precisely the degree of liberty -they are fitted for. National discontents mark, -according to their bitterness and constancy, not so -much the oppression of the rulers as the real progress -of the ruled in civilization and its attendant -political knowledge. When from peculiar circumstances -those discontents explode in violent revolutions, -shattering the fabric of society and giving -free vent and activity to all the passions and follies -of mankind, fortunate is the nation which possesses -a Napoleon or an Oliver Cromwell “<em>to step into -their state of dominion with spirit to controul and -capacity to subdue the factions of the hour and reconstruct -the frame of reasonable government</em>.”</p> - -<p>For great as these two men were in the field of -battle, especially the former, they were infinitely -greater when they placed themselves in the seat of -power, and put forth the gigantic despotism of genius -essential to the completion of their holy work. -Nor do I hold the conduct of Washington to be -comparable to either of those men. His situation -was one of infinitely less difficulty, and there is no -reason to believe that his capacity would have been -equal to the emergencies of a more formidable -crisis than he had to deal with. Washington could -not have made himself master of all had it been -necessary and he so inclined, for he was neither the -foremost general nor the foremost statesman of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_459"></a>[459]</span> -nation. His forbearance was a matter of necessity, -and his love of liberty did not prevent him from -bequeathing his black slaves to his widow.</p> - -<p>Such was Napoleon’s situation, and as he read the -signs of the times truly he knew that in his military -skill and the rage of the peasants at the ravages of -the enemy he must find the means to extricate himself -from his difficulties, or rather to extricate his -country, for self had no place in his policy save as his -personal glory was identified with France and her -prosperity. Never before did the world see a man, -soaring so high and devoid of all selfish ambition. -Let those who honestly seeking truth doubt this, -study Napoleon carefully; let them read the record -of his second abdication published by his brother -Lucien, that stern republican who refused kingdoms -as the price of his principles, and they will doubt -no longer. It is not however with these matters -that this History has to deal but with the emperor’s -measures affecting his lieutenants on the Spanish -frontier of France. There disaffection to his government -was extensive but principally from local -causes. The conscription was peculiarly hateful -to the wild mountaineers, who like most borderers -cherish very independent notions. The war with -England had ruined the foreign commerce of their -great towns, and the advantage of increased traffic -by land on the east was less directly felt in the -south. There also the recollection of the Vendean -struggle still lingered and the partizans of the -Bourbons had many connections. But the chief -danger arose from the just and politic conduct -of lord Wellington which, offering no cause of -anger and very much of private advantage to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_460"></a>[460]</span> -people, gave little or no hope of insurrection from -sufferings.</p> - -<p>While France was in this state England presented -a scene of universal exultation. Tory politics -were triumphant, opposition in the parliament was -nearly crushed by events, the press was either subdued -by persecution or in the pay of the ministers, -and the latter with undisguised joy hailed the -coming moment when aristocratic tyranny was to be -firmly established in England. The most enormous -subsidies and military supplies were poured into -the continent, and an act was passed to enable -three-fourths of the militia to serve abroad. They -were not however very forward to volunteer, and a -new army which ought to have reinforced Wellington -was sent, under the command of general -Graham, to support the insurrection of Holland, -where it was of necessity engaged in trifling or -unsuccessful operations in no manner affecting the -great objects of the war. Meanwhile the importance -of lord Wellington’s army and views was quite -overlooked or misunderstood. The ministers persevered -in the foolish plan of removing him to another -quarter of Europe, and at the same time, instigated -by the ambassadors of the allied sovereigns, -were continually urging him to push his -operations with more vigour in France. As if he -was the man who had done least!</p> - -<p>His letters were filled with strong and well-founded -complaints that his army was neglected. -Let his real position be borne in mind. He had, -not as a military man but with a political view -and to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns -backed by the importunities of his own government,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_461"></a>[461]</span> -placed himself in a confined and difficult district -of France, where his operations were cramped by -rivers and fortresses and by a powerful army occupying -strong positions on his front and flanks. In -this situation, unable to act at all in wet weather, -he was necessarily dependent upon the ocean for -supplies and reinforcements, and upon the Spanish -authorities for his hospitals, depôts, and communications. -Numbers were requisite to balance the -advantages derived by the enemy from the peculiar -conformation of the country and the position of the -fortresses. Money also was wanted to procure -supplies which he could not carry with him, and -must pay for exactly, if he would avoid a general -insurrection and the consequent ruin of the political -object for which he had adopted such critical military -operations. But though he had undertaken -the invasion of France at the express desire of the -government the latter seemed to be alike ignorant -of its importance and of the means to accomplish -it, at one moment urging progress beyond reason, -at another ready to change lightly what they had -proposed ignorantly. Their unsettled policy proved -their incapacity even to comprehend the nature of -the great tide of events on which they floated rather -than sailed. Lord Wellington was forced day by -day to teach them the value of their own schemes, -and to show them how small their knowledge was -of the true bearing of the political and military -affairs they pretended to direct.</p> - -<p>“Assure,” he wrote on the 21st of December to -lord Bathurst, in reply to one of their ill-founded -remonstrances, “Assure the Russian ambassador -there is nothing I can do to forward the general -interest that I will not do. What do they require?<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_462"></a>[462]</span> -I am already further advanced on the French territory -than any of the allied powers, and better prepared -to take advantage of any opportunities which -might offer as a consequence of my own situation -or of their proceedings.”—“In military operations -there are some things which can not be done, and -one is to move troops in this country during or immediately -after a violent fall of rain. To attempt -it will be to lose more men than can be replaced, a -guilty waste of life.”</p> - -<p>“The proper scene of action for the army was undoubtedly -a question for the government to decide, -but with thirty thousand men in the Peninsula, he -had for five years held two hundred thousand of -Napoleon’s best soldiers in check, since it was ridiculous -to suppose that the Spaniards and Portuguese -could have resisted for a moment if the -British troops had been withdrawn. The French -armies actually employed against him could not be -less than one hundred thousand men, more if he -included garrisons, and the French newspapers -spoke of orders to form a fresh reserve of one hundred -thousand at Bordeaux. Was there any man -weak enough to suppose one-third of the number -first mentioned would be employed against the -Spaniards and Portuguese if the British were withdrawn? -They would if it were an object with -Buonaparte to conquer the Peninsula and he would -in that case succeed; but he was more likely to -give peace to the Peninsula and turn against the -allied sovereigns his two hundred thousand men of -which one hundred thousand were such troops as -their armies had not yet dealt with. The war every -day offered a crisis the result of which might affect -the world for ages, and to change the scene of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_463"></a>[463]</span> -operations for the British army would render it -incapable of fighting for four months, even if the -scene were Holland, and it would even then be a -deteriorated machine.”</p> - -<p>“The ministers might reasonably ask how by remaining -where he was he could induce Napoleon -to make peace. The answer was ready. He held a -commanding situation on the most vulnerable frontier -of France, probably the only vulnerable one, and if -he could put twenty thousand Spaniards in activity, -and he could do it if he had money and was properly -supported by the fleet, Bayonne the only fortress on -the frontier, if it could be called a fortress, would -fall to him in a short time. If he could put forty -thousand Spaniards in motion his posts would soon -be on the Garonne, and did any man believe that -Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position -more than he would feel thirty or forty thousand -British troops laying siege to one of his fortresses in -Holland? The resources in men and money of which -the emperor would be thus deprived, and the loss -of reputation would do ten times more to procure -peace than ten armies on the side of Flanders. But -if he was right in believing a strong Bourbon party -existed in France and that it preponderated in the -south, what mischief would not an advance to the -Garonne do Napoleon! What sacrifices would he -not make to get rid of the danger!”</p> - -<p>“It was for the government not for him to dispose -of the nation’s resources, he had no right to give an -opinion upon the subject, but military operations in -Holland and in the Peninsula could not be maintained -at the same time with British troops; one or -other must be given up, the British military establishment -was not equal to maintain two armies in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_464"></a>[464]</span> -the field. He had begun the recent campaign with -seventy thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and if the men -got from the English militia, and the Portuguese -recruits which he expected, had been added to his -force, even though the Germans were removed from -his army according to the ministers’ plan, he might -have taken the field early in 1814 with eighty thousand -men. That was now impossible. The formation -of a Hanoverian army was the most reasonable plan -of acting on the continent but the withdrawal of the -Germans would reduce his force to fifty thousand -men unless he received real and efficient assistance -to bring up the Portuguese recruits. This would -increase his numbers to fifty-five or even sixty thousand -if his own wounded recovered well and he had -no more battles, but he would even then be twenty -thousand less than he had calculated upon, and it -was certain that if the government extended their -operations to other countries new means must be put -in activity or the war must be stinted on the old -stage. He did not desire to complain but every -branch of the service in the Peninsula was already -stinted especially in what concerned the navy and -the supplies which came directly from England!”</p> - -<p>While thus combating the false views of the -English cabinet as to the general state of affairs he -had also to struggle with its negligence and even -opposition to his measures in details.</p> - -<p>The general clothing of the Spanish troops and -the great coats of the British soldiers for 1813, were -not ready in January 1814, because the inferior departments -could not comprehend that the opening -of new scenes of exertion required new means, and -the soldiers had to brave the winter half naked, first -on the snowy mountains, then in the more chilling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_465"></a>[465]</span> -damps of the low country about Bayonne. The -clothing of the British soldiers for 1814 should -have arrived in the end of 1813 when the army -lying inactive near the coast by reason of the bad -weather could have received and fitted it without -difficulty. It did not however arrive until the -troops were in progress towards the interior of France, -wherefore, there being no means of transporting it -by land, many of the best regiments were obliged to -return to the coast to receive it, and the army as we -shall find had to fight a critical battle without them.</p> - -<p>He had upon commencing the invasion of France -issued a proclamation promising protection to persons -and property. This was construed by the -French to cover their vessels in the Nivelle when -the battle of that name gave the allies St. Jean de -Luz. Lord Wellington sacrificing personal profit to -the good of the service admitted this claim as tending -to render the people amicable, but it clashed with -the prize-money pretensions of lord Keith who commanded -the fleet of which Collier’s squadron formed -a detached portion. The serious evils endured by -the army in default of sufficient naval assistance had -been treated as of very slight importance, the object -of a trifling personal gain for the navy excited -a marvellous activity, and vigorous interference on -the part of the government. Upon these subjects, -and others of a like vexatious nature affecting his -operations, lord Wellington repeatedly and forcibly -declared his discontent during the months of December, -January, and February.</p> - -<p>“As to the naval affairs,” he said, “the reports of -the number of ships on the stations striking off those -coming out and going home would shew whether he -had just ground of complaint, and whatever their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_466"></a>[466]</span> -numbers there remained the right of complaint because -they did not perform the service required. -The French had recommenced their coast navigation -from Bordeaux to Bayonne, and if the blockade of -Santona had been maintained the place would have -been forced to surrender at an early period. The proclamation -of protection which he had issued, and -the licenses which he had granted to French vessels, -every act of that description, and two-thirds of the -acts which he performed every day could not he -knew be considered of any avail as affecting the -king’s government, unless approved of and confirmed -by the prince regent; and he knew that no power -short of the regent’s could save the property of -French subjects on the seas from the British navy. -For that reason he had requested the sanction of the -government to the sea passports which he had -granted. His proclamation of protection had been -construed whether rightfully or wrongfully to protect -the French ships in the rivers; his personal -interest, greater than others, would lead him to deny -this, but he sacrificed his profit to the general good.</p> - -<p>“Were lord Keith and sir George Collier because -the latter happened to have a brig or two cruizing -off the coast, to claim as prizes all the vessels lying -in every river which the army might pass in its -operations? and this to the detriment of the cause -which required the strictest respect for private property. -For the last five years he had been acting -in the confidence that his conduct would be approved -of and supported, and he concluded it would be so -still; but he was placed in a novel situation and -asked for legal advice to determine, whether lord -Keith and the channel fleet, were to be considered -as engaged in a conjoint expedition with the army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_467"></a>[467]</span> -under his command against the subjects of France, -neither having any specific instructions from government, -and the fleet having nothing to do with the -operations by land. He only required that fleet to -give him a free communication with the coast of -Spain, and prevent the enemy’s sea communication -between the Garonne and the Adour, and this last -was a part of its duty before the army arrived. Was -his proclamation of protection to hold good as regarded -the ships in the rivers? He desired to have it sanctioned -by the prince regent, or that he might be permitted -to issue another declaring that it was of no value.”</p> - -<p>This remonstrance produced so much effect that -lord Keith relinquished his claims, and admiral Penrose -was sent to command upon the station instead -of sir George Collier. The immediate intercourse of -lord Wellington with the navy was thus ameliorated -by the superior power of this officer, who was remarkable -for his suavity. Yet the licenses given -to French vessels were strongly condemned by the -government, and rendered null, for we find him -again complaining that “he had granted them -only in hopes of drawing money and supplies -from France, and of interesting the French mercantile -men to aid the army; but he feared the government -were not aware of, and did not feel the -difficulties in which he was placed at all times for -want of money, and judged his measures without -adverting to the necessity which occasioned them; -hence their frequent disapprobation of what he did.”</p> - -<p>Strange this may sound to those who seeing the -duke of Wellington in the fulness of his glory have -been accustomed to regard him as the star of -England’s greatness; but those who at that period -frequented the society of ministers know well that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_468"></a>[468]</span> -he was then looked upon by those self-sufficient men -as a person whose views were wild and visionary, -requiring the corroboration of older and wiser heads -before they could be assented to. Yea! even thus -at the eleventh hour was the giant Wellington -measured by the political dwarfs.</p> - -<p>Although he gained something by making San -Jean de Luz a free port for all nations not at war -with France, his financial situation was nearly intolerable, -and at the moment of greatest pressure -colonel Bunbury, under-secretary of state, was sent -out to protest against his expenses. One hundred -thousand pounds a month was the maximum in specie -which the government would consent to supply, a -sum quite inadequate to his wants. And this -remonstrance was addressed to this victorious -commander at the very crisis of his stupendous -struggle, when he was overwhelmed with debts and -could scarcely stir out of his quarters on account of -the multitude of creditors waiting at his door for -payment of just claims.</p> - - -<p>“Some of his muleteers he said were twenty-six<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Despatches.</span> -months in arrears, and recently, instigated -by British merchants, they had become so clamorous -that rather than lose their services he had -given them bills on the treasury for a part of -their claims, though he knew they would sell these -bills at a discount to the <em>sharks</em>, who had urged -them to be thus importunate and who were waiting -at the ports to take advantage of the public -distresses. A dangerous measure which he desired -not to repeat.</p> - -<p>“It might be true that the supply of one hundred -thousand pounds a month had been even -exceeded for some time past, but it was incontestible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_469"></a>[469]</span> -that the English army and all its departments, -and the Spanish and Portuguese armies -were at the moment paralyzed for want of money. -The arrears of pay to the soldiers was entering -the seventh month, the debt was immense, and -the king’s engagements with the Spanish and Portuguese -governments were not fulfilled. Indebted -in every part of Spain he was becoming so in -France, the price of all commodities was increasing -in proportion to the delay of payment, to the difficulty -of getting food at all, and the want of credit -into which all the departments of the army had -fallen. Of two hundred thousand dollars given to -marshal Beresford for the pay of his troops on -account of the Portuguese subsidy he had been -forced to take back fifty thousand to keep the -Spaniards together, and was even then forced to -withhold ten thousand to prevent the British cavalry -from perishing. Money to pay the Spaniards had -sailed from Cadiz, but the vessel conveying it, and -another containing the soldiers’ great coats, were by -the admiralty arrangements obliged to go first to -Corunna, and neither had arrived there in January -although the money had been ready in October. -But the ship of war designed to carry it did not -arrive at Cadiz until the end of December. Sixteen -thousand Spanish troops were thus rendered useless -because without pay they could not be trusted in -France.”</p> - -<p>“The commissary-in-chief in England had been -regularly informed of the state of the supplies of -the military chest and of the wants and prospects of -the army, but those wants were not attended to. -The monthly hundred thousand pounds spoken of -as the maximum, even if it had been given regularly, -would not cover the ordinary expenses of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_470"></a>[470]</span> -troops, and there were besides the subsidies other -outlays requiring ready money, such as meat for the -soldiers, hospital expenses, commissariat labourers, -and a variety of minor engagements. The Portuguese -government had been reduced to a monthly -sum of two hundred thousand dollars out of a subsidy -of two millions sterling. The Spanish government -got what they could out of a subsidy of one -million. And when money was obtained for the -government in the markets of Lisbon and Cadiz, it -came not in due time, because, such were the admiralty -arrangements, there were no ships to convey -the treasure to the north coast of Spain. The whole -sum which had passed through the military chest -during the past year was scarcely more than two -millions four hundred thousand pounds, out of -which part of the subsidies had been paid. This -was quite inadequate, the Government had desired -him to push his operations to the Garonne during -the winter, he was prepared to do so in every point -excepting money, and he knew the greatest advantages -would accrue from such a movement but -he could not stir. His posts were already so distant -from the coast that his means of transport were -daily destroyed by the journeys, he had not a -shilling to pay for any thing in the country and -his credit was gone. He had been obliged privately -to borrow the expense of a single courier sent to -general Clinton. It was not his duty to suggest -the fitting measures for relief, but it was obvious -that an immediate and large supply from England -was necessary and that ships should be provided -to convey that which was obtained at Lisbon and -Cadiz to the army.”</p> - -<p>Such was the denuded state of the victorious -Wellington at a time when millions, and the worth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_471"></a>[471]</span> -of more millions were being poured by the English -ministers into the continent; when every petty German -sovereign, partizan, or robber, who raised a -band, or a cry against Napoleon, was supplied to -satiety. And all this time there was not in England -one public salary reduced, one contract checked, one -abuse corrected, one public servant rebuked for -negligence; not a writer dared to expose the mischief -lest he should be crushed by persecution; no -minister ceased to claim and to receive the boasting -congratulations of the tories, no whig had sense to -discover or spirit to denounce the iniquitous system, -no voice of reprehension was heard from that selfish -faction unless it were in sneering contempt -of the general whose mighty genius sustained England -under this load of folly.</p> - -<p>Nor were these difficulties all that lord Wellington -had to contend with. We have seen that the -Portuguese regency withheld his reinforcements -even when he had provided transports for their conveyance. -The duke of York meanwhile insisted -upon withdrawing his provisional battalions, which -being all composed of old soldiers, the remains of -regiments reduced by the casualties of war, were -of more value in a winter campaign than three -times their numbers of new men. With respect to -the English militia regiments, he had no desire for -them, because they possessed, he said, all the worst -faults of the regulars and some peculiar to themselves -besides. What he desired was that eight or -ten thousand men should be drafted from them to -fill up his ranks, he could then without much injury -let his foreign battalions be taken away to reform a -Hanoverian army on the continent; and this plan -he was inclined to, because the Germans, brave and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_472"></a>[472]</span> -strong soldiers, were yet extremely addicted to -desertion and in that particular set a bad example -to the British: this suggestion was however disregarded, -and other reinforcements were promised to -him.</p> - -<p>But the most serious of all the secondary -vexations he endured sprung from the conduct of -the Spanish authorities. His hospitals and depôts -were for the most part necessarily in the Spanish -territories and principally at Santander. To avoid -inconvenience to the inhabitants he had caused portable -wooden houses to be brought from England in -which to shelter his sick and wounded men; and he -paid extravagantly and regularly for every aid demanded -from the natives. Nevertheless the natural -arrogance or ill-will which produced the libels -about St. Sebastian the insolence of the minister of -war and the sullen insubordination of Morillo and -other generals broke out here also. After much -underhand and irritating conduct at different times, -the municipality, resolute to drive the hospitals -from their town, suddenly, and under the false pretext -that there was a contagious fever, placed all the -British hospitals with their officers and attendants -under quarantine. This was in the middle of -January. Thirty thousand men had been wounded -since June in the service of Spain, and the return -was to make those wounded men close prisoners -and drive their general to the necessity of fixing his -hospitals in England. Vessels coming from Santander -were thus rendered objects of dread, and the -municipalities of the other ports, either really -fearing or pretending to fear the contagion, would -not suffer them to enter their waters. To such a -height did this cowardice and villainy attain that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_473"></a>[473]</span> -the political chief of Guipuscoa, without giving any -notice to lord Wellington, shut all the ports of that -province against vessels coming from Santander, and -the alcalde of Fuenterabia endeavoured to prevent -a Portuguese military officer from assisting an -English vessel which was about to be and was -afterwards actually cast away, because she came -from Santander.</p> - -<p>Now in consequence of the difficulties and dangers -of navigating the Bay of Biscay in the winter -and the badness of the ports near the positions of -the army, all the stores and provisions coming by -sea went in the first instance to Santander, the only -good port, there to wait until favourable opportunities -occurred for reaching the more eastern harbours. -Moreover all the provision magazines of the Spanish -army were there, but this blow cut them off, the -army was reduced to the smaller magazines at Passages -which could only last for a few days, and when -that supply was expended lord Wellington would -have had no resource but to withdraw across the -Pyrenees! “<em>Here,” he exclaimed, “here are the -consequences of the system by which these provinces -are governed! Duties of the highest description, -military operations, political interests, and the salvation -of the state, are made to depend upon the -caprices of a few ignorant individuals, who have -adopted a measure unnecessary and harsh without -adverting to its objects or consequences, and merely -with a view to their personal interests and convenience.</em>”</p> - -<p>They carried it into execution also with the -utmost hardness caprice and injustice, regardless of -the loss of ships and lives which must follow, and -finally desired lord Wellington to relinquish the harbour<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_474"></a>[474]</span> -and town of Santander altogether as a depôt! -However his vigorous remonstrances stopped this -nefarious proceeding in time to avert the danger -which it menaced.</p> - -<p>Be it remembered now, that these dangers and -difficulties, and vexations, although related in -succession, happened, not one after another, but -altogether; that it was when crossing the Bidassoa, -breaking through the mountain fortifications -of Soult, passing the Nive, fighting the battles -in front of Bayonne, and when still greater -and more intricate combinations were to be arranged, -that all these vials of folly and enmity were poured -upon his head. Who then shall refuse to admire -the undaunted firmness, the unwearied temper and -vigilance, the piercing judgement with which he -steered his gallant vessel and with a flowing sail, -unhurt through this howling storm of passion this -tumultuous sea of folly.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_475"></a>[475]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIII_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN THE EASTERN PARTS OF SPAIN.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent">When general Clinton succeeded lord William<span class="sidenote9">1813. September.</span> -Bentinck, his whole force, composed of the Anglo-Sicilians, -Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s Spaniards, -and two battalions of Roche’s division, did not -furnish quite nineteen thousand men under arms. -Copons, blockading Mequinenza Lerida and Monzon<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix 6.</a></span> -and having garrisons in Cardona and the Seo -d’Urgel, the only places in his possession, could -not bring more than nine thousand men into the -field. Elio had nominally twenty-five thousand, -but this included Sarzfield’s and Roche’s troops the -greater part of which were with Clinton. It included -likewise the bands of Villa Campa Duran -and the Empecinado, all scattered in Castile Aragon -and Valencia, and acting according to the caprices -of their chiefs. His force, daily diminishing also -from the extreme unhealthiness of the country about -Tortoza, was scarcely sufficient to maintain the -blockades of the French fortresses beyond the Ebro.</p> - -<p>Copons’ army having no base but the mountains -about Vich and Monserrat, having no magazines or -depôts or place of arms, having very little artillery -and scarcely any cavalry, lived as it could from day -to day; in like manner lived Sarzfield’s and Whittingham’s -troops, and Clinton’s army was chiefly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_476"></a>[476]</span> -fed on salt provisions from the ships. The two -former having no means of transport were unable -to make even one day’s march with ease, they were -continually upon the point of starvation and could -never be reckoned as a moveable force. Nor indeed -could the Anglo-Sicilians, owing to their scanty -means of transport, make above two or three marches -from the sea; and they were at this time more than -usually hampered, being without pay and shut out -from their principal depôts at Gibraltar and Malta, -by plague at the first and yellow fever at the second -place. In fine, the courage and discipline of the -British and Germans set aside, it would be difficult -to find armies less efficient for an offensive campaign -than those of the allies in Catalonia. Moreover -lord William Bentinck had been invested with the -command of all the Spanish armies, but Clinton had -only Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s troops under -him, and notwithstanding his constant endeavours to -conciliate Copons, the indolence and incapacity of -that general impeded or baffled all useful operations: -and to these disqualifications he added an -extreme jealousy of Eroles and Manso, men designated -by the public voice as the most worthy of -command.</p> - -<p>This analysis shows that Elio being entirely -engaged in Valencia, and Sarzfield and Whittingham -unprovided with the means of movement, the -army of Copons and the Anglo-Sicilians, together -furnishing, when the posts and escorts and the -labourers employed on the fortifications of Taragona -were deducted, not more than eighteen thousand -men in line of battle, were the only troops to be -counted on to oppose Suchet, who having sixty-five -thousand men, of which fifty-six thousand were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_477"></a>[477]</span> -present under arms, could without drawing a man -from his garrisons attack them with thirty thousand. -But Copons and Clinton could not act together -above a few days because their bases and lines of -retreat were on different sides. The Spaniard -depended upon the mountains and plains of the -interior for security and subsistence, the Englishman’s -base was Taragona and the fleet. Hence the -only mode of combining on a single line was to -make Valencia a common base, and throwing bridges -over the Ebro construct works on both sides to -defend them. This was strongly recommended by -lord Wellington to lord William and to Clinton; -but the former had several times lost his bridges -partly from the rapidity of the stream, partly from -the activity of the garrison of Tortoza. And for -general Clinton the difficulty was enhanced by distance, -because Taragona, where all his materials -were deposited was sixty miles from Amposta, and -all his artificers were required to restore the defences -of the former place. The blockade of Tortoza was -therefore always liable to be raised, and the troops -employed there exposed to a sudden and fatal -attack, since Suchet, sure to separate the Anglo-Sicilians -from Copons when he advanced, could -penetrate between them; and while the former -rallied at Taragona and the latter at Igualada his -march would be direct upon Tortoza. He could -thus either carry off his strong garrison, or passing -the Ebro by the bridge of the fortress, move without -let or hindrance upon Peniscola, Saguntum, and -Valencia, and driving Elio back upon Alicant collect -his garrisons and return too powerful to be -meddled with.</p> - -<p>In these circumstances lord Wellington’s opinion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_478"></a>[478]</span> -was, that the blockade of Tortoza should be given -up and the two armies acting on their own peculiar -lines, the one from Taragona the other from the -mountains, harass in concert the enemy’s flanks and -rear, alternately if he attacked either, but together -if he moved upon Tortoza. To besiege or blockade -that place with safety it was necessary to throw two -bridges over the Ebro below, to enable the armies -to avoid Suchet, by either bank when he should -succour the place, as he was sure to do. But it -was essential that Copons should not abandon -Catalonia and difficult for him to do so, wherefore -it would be advisable to make Taragona the point -of retreat for both armies in the first instance, after -which they could separate and infest the French -rear.</p> - -<p>The difficulties of besieging Tortoza he thought -insuperable, and he especially recommended that -they should be well considered before-hand, and if -it was invested, that the troops should be entrenched -around it. In fine all his instructions tended -towards defence and were founded upon his conviction -of the weak and dangerous position of the -allies, yet he believed them to have more resources -than they really had, and to be superior in number -to the French, a great error as I have already shewn. -Nothing therefore could be more preposterous than -Suchet’s alarm for the frontier of France at this -time, and it is unquestionable that his personal -reluctance was the only bar to aiding Soult either -indirectly by marching on Tortoza and Valencia, -or directly by adopting that marshal’s great project -of uniting the two armies in Aragon. So certain -indeed is this that general Clinton, seeing the -difficulties of his own situation, only retained the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_479"></a>[479]</span> -command from a strong sense of duty, and lord -Wellington despairing of any advantage in Catalonia -recommended that the Anglo-Sicilian army should -be broken up and employed in other places. The -French general’s inactivity was the more injurious -to the interests of his sovereign, because any -reverse or appearance of reverse to the allies would -at this time have gone nigh to destroy the alliance -between Spain and England; but personal jealousy, -the preference given to local and momentary interests -before general considerations, hurt the French cause -at all periods in the Peninsula and enabled the -allies to conquer.</p> - -<p>General Clinton had no thoughts of besieging -Tortoza, his efforts were directed to the obtaining -a secure place of arms, yet, despite of his intrinsic -weakness, he resolved to show a confident front, -hoping thus to keep Suchet at arm’s length. In -this view he endeavoured to render Taragona -once more defensible notwithstanding the nineteen -breaches which had been broken in its walls; the -progress of the work was however tedious and vexatious -because he depended for his materials upon -the Spanish authorities. Thus immersed in difficulties -of all kinds he could make little change -in his positions which were generally about the -Campo, Sarzfield’s division only being pushed to -Villafranca. Suchet meanwhile held the line of the -Llobregat, and apparently to colour his refusal to -join Soult, grounded on the great strength of the -allies in Catalonia, he suffered general Clinton to -remain in tranquillity.</p> - -<p>Towards the end of October reports that the<span class="sidenote9">October.</span> -French were concentrating, for what purpose was -not known, caused the English general, although<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_480"></a>[480]</span> -Taragona was still indefensible to make a forward -movement. He dared not indeed provoke a battle, -but unwilling to yield the resources which Villafranca -and other districts occupied by the allies still -offered, he adopted the resolution of pushing an -advanced guard to the former place. He even -fixed his head-quarters there, appearing ready to -fight, yet his troops were so disposed in succession -at Arbos, Vendrills and Torredembarra that he -could retreat without dishonour if the French advanced -in force, or could concentrate at Villafranca -in time to harass their flank and rear if they attempted -to carry off their garrisons on the Segre. -In this state of affairs Suchet made several demonstrations, -sometimes against Copons sometimes -against Clinton, but the latter maintained his offensive -attitude with firmness, and even in opposition -to lord Wellington’s implied opinion that the line -of the Ebro was the most suitable to his weakness; -for he liked not to abandon Taragona the repairs of -which were now advancing though slowly to completion. -His perseverance was crowned with success; -he preserved the few resources left for the -support of the Spanish troops, and furnished Suchet -with that semblance of excuse which he desired for -keeping aloof from Soult.</p> - -<p>In this manner October and November were -passed, but on the 1st of December the French<span class="sidenote9">December.</span> -general attempted to surprise the allies’ cantonments -at Villafranca, as he had before surprised -them at Ordal. He moved in the same order. One -column marched by San Sadurni on his right, -another by Bejer and Avionet on his left, and the -main body kept the great road. But he did not -find colonel Adam there. Clinton had blocked the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_481"></a>[481]</span> -Ordal so as to render a night surprise impossible, -and the natural difficulties of the other roads delayed -the flanking columns. Hence when the -French reached Villafranca, Sarzfield was in full -march for Igualada, and the Anglo-Sicilians, who -had only three men wounded at one of the advanced -posts, were on the strong ground about Arbos, -where being joined by the supporting divisions they -offered battle; but Suchet retired to the Llobregat -apparently so mortified by his failure that he has -not even mentioned it in his Memoirs.</p> - -<p>Clinton now resumed his former ground, yet his -embarrassments increased, and though he transferred -two of Whittingham’s regiments to Copons -and sent Roche’s battalions back to Valencia, the -country was so exhausted that the enduring constancy -of the Spanish soldiers under privations -alone enabled Sarzfield to remain in the field: more -than once, that general, a man of undoubted firmness -and courage, was upon the point of re-crossing -the Ebro to save his soldiers from perishing of -famine. Here as in other parts, the Spanish -government not only starved their troops but would -not even provide a piece of ordnance or any stores -for the defence of Taragona, now, by the exertions of -the English general, rendered defensible. Nay! when -admiral Hallowell in conjunction with Quesada the -Spanish commodore at Port Mahon, brought some -ship-guns from that place to the fortress, the minister -of war, O’Donoju, expressed his disapprobation, observing -with a sneer that the English might provide -the guns wanting from the Spanish ordnance moved -into Gibraltar by general Campbell when he destroyed -the lines of San Roque!</p> - -<p>The 9th Suchet pushed a small corps by Bejer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_482"></a>[482]</span> -between the Ordal and Sitjes, and on the 10th surprised -at the Ostel of Ordal an officer and thirty -men of the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry. This disaster -was the result of negligence. The detachment after -patroling to the front had dismounted without -examining the buildings of the inn, and some -French troopers who were concealed within immediately -seized the horses and captured the whole -party.</p> - -<p>On the 17th, French troops appeared at Martorel, -the Ordal, and Bejer, with a view to mask the march -of a large convoy coming from Upper Catalonia to -Barcelona; they then resumed their former positions, -and at the same time Soult’s and lord Wellington’s -respective letters announcing the defection of the -Nassau battalions in front of Bayonne arrived. -Lord Wellington’s came first, and enclosed a communication -from colonel Kruse to his countryman, -colonel Meder, who was serving in Barcelona and -as Kruse supposed willing to abandon the French. -But when Clinton by the aid of Manso transmitted -the letter to Meder, that officer handed it to general -Habert who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the -command of the city. All the German regiments, -principally cavalry, were immediately disarmed and -sent to France. Severoli’s Italians were at the same -time recalled to Italy and a number of French soldiers, -selected to fill the wasted ranks of the imperial -guards, marched with them; two thousand -officers and soldiers were likewise detached to the -depôts of the interior to organize the conscripts of -the new levy destined to reinforce the army of -Catalonia. Besides these drafts a thousand <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> -hitherto employed on the Spanish frontier -in aid of the regular troops were withdrawn; Suchet<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_483"></a>[483]</span> -thus lost seven thousand veterans, yet he had still -an overwhelming power compared to the allies.</p> - -<p>It was in this state of affairs that the duke of -San Carlos, bearing the treaty of Valençay, arrived -secretly at the French head-quarters on his <ins class="corr" id="tn-483" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'way ot Madrid'"> -way to Madrid</ins>. Copons knew this, and it seems certain was -only deterred from openly acceding to the views of -the French emperor and concluding a military convention, -by the decided conduct of the Cortez, and -the ascendancy which lord Wellington had obtained -over him in common with the other Spanish -officers: an ascendancy which had not escaped -Soult’s sagacity, for he early warned the French -minister that nothing could be expected from them -while under the powerful spell of the English -general. Meanwhile Clinton, getting information -that the French troops were diminished in numbers, -especially in front of Barcelona and on the Llobregat, -proposed to pass that river and invest Barcelona -if Copons, who was in the mountains, would undertake -to provision Sarzfield’s division and keep the -French troops between Barcelona and Gerona in -check. For this purpose he offered him the aid of -a Spanish regiment of cavalry which Elio had lent -for the operations in Catalonia; but Copons, -whether influenced by San Carlos’ mission and his -secret wishes for its success, or knowing that the -enemy were really stronger than Clinton imagined, -declared that he was unable to hold the French -troops between Gerona and Barcelona in check, and -that he could not provision either Sarzfield’s division -or the regiment of cavalry. He suggested instead of -Clinton’s plan, a combined attack upon some of -Suchet’s posts on the Llobregat, promising to send -Manso to Villafranca to confer upon the execution.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_484"></a>[484]</span> -Clinton’s proposal was made early in January yet -it was the middle of that month before Copons -replied, and then he only sent Manso to offer the -aid of his brigade in a combined attack upon two -thousand French who were at Molino del Rey. It -was however at last arranged that Manso should at -day-break on the 16th seize the high ground above -Molino, on the left of the Llobregat, to intercept -the enemy’s retreat upon Barcelona, while the -Anglo-Sicilians fell upon them from the right bank.</p> - -<p>Success depended upon Clinton’s remaining quiet<span class="sidenote9">1814. January.</span> -until the moment of execution, wherefore he could -only use the troops immediately in hand about Villafranca, -in all six thousand men with three pieces -of artillery; but with these he made a night march -of eighteen miles, and was close to the ford of San -Vicente about two miles below the fortified bridge -of Molino del Rey before daylight. The French -were tranquil and unsuspicious, and he anxiously -but vainly awaited the signal of Manso’s arrival. -When the day broke, the French piquets at -San Vicente descrying his troops commenced a -skirmish, and at the same time a column with -a piece of artillery, coming from Molino, advanced -to attack him thinking there was only a patroling -detachment to deal with, for he had concealed his -main body. Thus pressed he opened his guns per -force and crippled the French piece, whereupon -the reinforcements retired hastily to the entrenchments -at Molino; he could then easily have forced -the passage at the ford and attacked the enemy’s -works in the rear, but this would not have ensured -the capture of their troops, wherefore he still -awaited Manso’s arrival relying on that partizan’s -zeal and knowledge of the country. He appeared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_485"></a>[485]</span> -at last, not, as agreed upon, at St. Filieu, between -Molino and Barcelona, but at Papiol above Molino, -and the French immediately retreated by San Filieu. -Sarzfield, and the cavalry, which Clinton now detached -across the Llobregat, followed them hard, -but the country was difficult, the distance short, -and they soon gained a second entrenched camp -above San Filieu. A small garrison remained -in the masonry-works at Molino, general Clinton -endeavoured to reduce them but his guns were not -of a calibre to break the walls and the enemy was -strongly reinforced towards evening from Barcelona; -whereupon Manso went off to the mountains, and -Clinton returned to Villafranca having killed and -wounded about one hundred and eighty French, -and lost only sixty-four men, all Spaniards.</p> - -<p>Manso’s failure surprized the English general, -because that officer, unlike the generality of his -countrymen, was zealous, skilful, vigilant, modest, -and humane, and a sincere co-operator with the -British officers. He however soon cleared himself -of blame, assuring Clinton that Copons, contrary to -his previous declarations, had joined him with four -thousand men, and taking the controul of his troops -not only commenced the march two hours too late, but -without any reason halted for three hours on the -way. Nor did that general offer any excuse or -explanation of his conduct, merely observing, that -the plan having failed nothing more could be done -and he must return to his mountainous asylum -about Vich. A man of any other nation would -have been accused of treachery, but with the -Spaniards there is no limit to absurdity, and from -their actions no conclusion can be drawn as to their -motives.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_486"></a>[486]</span></p> - -<p>The great events of the general war were now -beginning to affect the struggle in Catalonia. Suchet -finding that Copons dared not agree to the -military convention dependent upon the treaty of -Valençay, resigned all thoughts of carrying off his -garrisons beyond the Ebro, and secretly instructed -the governor of Tortoza, that when his provisions, -calculated to last until April, were exhausted, he -should march upon Mequinenza and Lerida, unite -the garrisons there to his own, and make way by -Venasque into France. Meanwhile he increased -the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men -and prepared to take the line of the Fluvia; for -the allied sovereigns were in France and Napoleon -had recalled more of his cavalry and infantry, in -all ten thousand men with eighty pieces of artillery, -from Catalonia, desiring that they should march -as soon as the results expected from the mission of -San Carlos were felt by the allies. Suchet prepared -the troops but proposed that instead of waiting -for the uncertain result of San Carlos’ mission, -Ferdinand should himself be sent to Spain through -Catalonia and be trusted on his faith to restore the -garrisons in Valencia. Then he said he could -march with his whole army to Lyons which -would be more efficacious than sending detachments. -The restoration of Ferdinand was the Emperor’s -great object, but this plausible proposition -can only be viewed as a colourable counter-project -to Soult’s plan for a junction of the two -armies in Bearn, since the Emperor was undoubtedly -the best judge of what was required for the -warfare immediately under his own direction.</p> - -<p>It was in the midst of these operations that Clinton -attacked Molino del Rey and as we have seen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_487"></a>[487]</span> -would but for the interference of Copons have -stricken a great blow, which was however soon inflicted -in another manner.</p> - -<p>There was at this time in the French service a -Spaniard of Flemish descent called Van Halen. -This man, of fair complexion, handsome person, -and a natural genius for desperate treasons, appears<span class="sidenote">Memoir by Sir Wm. Clinton, MSS.</span> -to have been at first attached to Joseph’s court. -After that monarch’s retreat from Spain he was -placed by the duke de Feltre on Suchet’s staff; -but the French party was now a failing one and -Van Halen only sought by some notable treachery -to make his peace with his country. Through the -medium of a young widow, who followed him without -suffering their connection to appear, he informed -Eroles of his object. He transmitted -through the same channel regular returns of Suchet’s -force and other matters of interest, and at last -having secretly opened Suchet’s portfolio he copied -the key of his cypher, and transmitted that also, -with an intimation that he would now soon pass -over and endeavour to perform some other service -at the same time. The opportunity soon offered. -Suchet went to Gerona to meet the duke of San -Carlos, leaving Van Halen at Barcelona, and the -latter immediately taking an escort of three hussars -went to Granollers where the cuirassiers were -quartered. Using the marshal’s name he ordered -them to escort him to the Spanish outposts, which -being in the mountains could only be approached -by a long and narrow pass where cavalry would be -helpless. In this pass he ordered the troops to -bivouac for the night, and when their colonel expressed -his uneasiness, Van Halen quieted him and -made a solitary mill their common quarters. He<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_488"></a>[488]</span> -had before this, however, sent the widow to give -Eroles information of the situation into which he -would bring the troops and now with anxiety -awaited his attack; but the Spanish general failed -to come and at daybreak Van Halen, still pretending -he carried a flag of truce from Suchet, rode off -with his first escort of hussars and a trumpeter to -the Spanish lines. There he ascertained that the -widow had been detained by the outposts and immediately -delivered over his escort to their enemies, -giving notice also of the situation of the cuirassiers -with a view to their destruction, but they -escaped the danger.</p> - -<p>Van Halen and Eroles now forged Suchet’s signature, -and the former addressed letters in cypher -to the governors of Tortoza, Lerida, Mequinenza, -and Monzon, telling them that the emperor in consequence -of his reverses required large drafts of -men from Catalonia, and had given Suchet orders -to negotiate a convention by which the garrisons -south of the Llobregat were to join the army with -arms and baggage and followers. The result was -uncertain, but if the treaty could not be effected -the governors were to join the army by force, and -they were therefore immediately to mine their principal -bastions and be prepared to sally forth at an -appointed time. The marches and points of junction -were all given in detail, yet they were told -that if the convention took place the marshal would -immediately send an officer of his staff to them, -with such verbal instructions as might be necessary. -The document finished with deploring the -necessity which called for the sacrifice of conquests -achieved by the valour of the troops.</p> - -<p>Spies and emissaries who act for both sides are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_489"></a>[489]</span> -common in all wars, but in the Peninsula so many -pretended to serve the French and were yet true to -the Spaniards, that to avoid the danger of betrayal -Suchet had recourse to the ingenious artifice of -placing a very small piece of light-coloured hair in -the cyphered paper, the latter was then enclosed in a -quill sealed and wrapped in lead. When received, -the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of -white paper and if the hair was discovered the -communication was good, if not, the treachery was -apparent because the hair would escape the vigilance -of uninitiated persons and be lost by any -intermediate examination. Van Halen knew this -secret also, and when his emissaries had returned -after delivering the preparatory communication, he -proceeded in person with a forged convention, first -to Tortoza, for Suchet has erroneously stated in his -Memoirs that the primary attempts were made at -Lerida and Mequinenza. He was accompanied by -several Spanish officers and by some French deserters -dressed in the uniforms of the hussars he -had betrayed to the Spanish outposts. The -governor Robert though a vigilant officer was deceived -and prepared to evacuate the place. During -the night however a true emissary arrived with a -letter from Suchet of later date than the forged -convention. Robert then endeavoured to entice -Van Halen into the fortress, but the other was too -wary and proceeded at once to Mequinenza and -Lerida where he completely overreached the governors -and then went to Monzon.</p> - -<p>This small fortress had now been besieged since -the 28th of September 1813, by detachments from -the Catalan army and the bands from Aragon. Its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_490"></a>[490]</span> -means of defence were slight, but there was within -a man of resolution and genius called St. Jacques. -He was a Piedmontese by birth and only a private -soldier of engineers, but the commandant appreciating -his worth was so modest and prudent as to -yield the direction of the defence entirely to him. -Abounding in resources, he met, and at every point -baffled the besiegers who worked principally by -mines, and being as brave as he was ingenious -always led the numerous counter-attacks which he -contrived to check the approaches above and below -ground. The siege continued until the 18th -of February when the subtle Van Halen arrived, -and by his Spanish wiles obtained in a few hours -what Spanish courage and perseverance had vainly -strived to gain for one hundred and forty days. -The commandant was suspicious at first, but when -Van Halen suffered him to send an officer to ascertain -that Lerida and Mequinenza were evacuated, -he was beguiled like the others and marched to join -the garrisons of those places.</p> - -<p>Sir William Clinton had been informed of this -project by Eroles as early as the 22d of January -and though he did not expect any French general -would be so egregiously misled, readily promised -the assistance of his army to capture the garrisons -on their march. But Suchet was now falling back -upon the Fluvia, and Clinton, seeing the fortified -line of the Llobregat weakened and being uncertain -of Suchet’s real strength and designs, renewed -his former proposal to Copons for a combined attack -which should force the French general to discover -his real situation and projects. Ere he could -obtain an answer, the want of forage obliged him to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_491"></a>[491]</span> -refuse the assistance of the Spanish cavalry lent to -him by Elio, and Sarzfield’s division was reduced to -its last ration. The French thus made their retreat -unmolested, for Clinton’s project necessarily involved -the investment of Barcelona after passing -the Llobregat, and the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry, being -mounted on small Egyptian animals the greatest -part of which were foundered or unserviceable from -sand-cracks, a disease very common amongst the -horses of that country, were too weak to act without -the aid of Elio’s horsemen. Moreover as a division -of infantry was left at Taragona awaiting the -effect of Van Halen’s wiles against Tortoza the aid -of Sarzfield’s troops was indispensable.</p> - -<p>Copons accepted the proposition towards the end -of the month, the Spanish cavalry was then -gone to the rear, but Sarzfield having with great -difficulty obtained some provisions the army was<span class="sidenote9">February.</span> -put in movement on the 3d of February, and as -Suchet was now near Gerona, it passed the Llobregat -at the bridge of Molino del Rey without resistance. -On the 5th Sarzfield’s picquets were vigorously -attacked at San Filieu by the garrison of -Barcelona, he however supported them with his whole -division and being reinforced with some cavalry -repulsed the French and pursued them to the walls. -On the 7th the city was invested on the land -side by Copons who was soon aided by Manso; on -the sea-board by admiral Hallowell, who following -the movements of the army with the fleet blockaded -the harbour with the Castor frigate, and anchored -the Fame a seventy-four off Mataro. On the 8th -intelligence arrived of Van Halen’s failure at Tortoza, -but the blockade of Barcelona continued uninterrupted -until the 16th when Clinton was informed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_492"></a>[492]</span> -by Copons of the success at Lerida, Mequinenza, -and Monzon. The garrisons, he said, would march -upon Igualada, and Eroles who, under pretence of -causing the convention to be observed by the -Somatenes, was to follow in their rear, proposed to -undeceive and disarm them at that place. On the -17th however he sent notice that Martorel had been -fixed upon in preference to Igualada for undeceiving -and disarming the French, and as they would be at -the former place that evening general Clinton was -desired to send some of his troops there to ensure -the success of the project.</p> - -<p>This change of plan and the short warning, for -Martorel was a long march from Barcelona, together -with the doubts and embarrassments which Copons’ -conduct always caused, inclined the English general -to avoid meddling with the matter at all; yet -fearing that it would fail in the Spaniard’s hands -he finally drafted a strong division of troops and -marched in person to Martorel. There he met -Copons who now told him that the French would -not pass Esparaguera that night, that Eroles -was close in their rear, and another division of the -Catalan army at Bispal blocking the bridge of Martorel. -Clinton immediately undertook to pass the -Llobregat, meet the French column, and block the -road of San Sadurni; and he arranged with Copons -the necessary precautions and signals.</p> - -<p>About nine o’clock general Isidore La Marque -arrived with the garrisons at Martorel, followed -at a short distance by Eroles. No other troops -were to be seen and after a short halt the French -continued their march on the right bank of the -Llobregat, where the Barcelona road enters a narrow -pass between the river and a precipitous hill. When<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_493"></a>[493]</span> -they were completely entangled Clinton sent an -officer to forbid their further progress and referred -them to Copons who was at Martorel for an explanation, -then giving the signal all the heights around -were instantly covered with armed men. It was in -vain to offer resistance, and two generals, having -two thousand six hundred men, four guns, and a -rich military chest, capitulated, but upon conditions, -which were granted and immediately violated with -circumstances of great harshness and insult to the -prisoners. The odium of this baseness which was -quite gratuitous, since the French helpless in the -defile must have submitted to any terms, attaches -entirely to the Spaniards. Clinton refused to meddle -in any manner with the convention, he had not -been a party to Van Halen’s deceit, he appeared -only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in -the field which the Spaniards could not have subdued -without his aid, he refused even to be present -at any consultation previous to the capitulation, -and notwithstanding an assertion to the contrary in -Suchet’s Memoirs no appeal on the subject from -that marshal ever reached him.</p> - -<p>During the whole of these transactions the infatuation -of the French leaders was extreme. The -chief of one of the battalions more sagacious than -his general told Lamarque in the night of the 16th -at Igualada that he was betrayed, at the same time -urging him vainly to abandon his artillery and -baggage and march in the direction of Vich, to -which place they could force their way in despite -of the Spaniards. It is remarkable also that Robert -when he had detected the imposture and failed to -entice Van Halen into Tortoza did not make a sudden<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_494"></a>[494]</span> -sally upon him and the Spanish officers who -were with him, all close to the works. And still -more notable is it that the other governors, the -more especially as Van Halen was a foreigner, did -not insist upon the bearer of such a convention -remaining to accompany their march. It has -been well observed by Suchet that Van Halen’s -refusal to enter the gates was alone sufficient to -prove his treachery.</p> - -<p>The detachment recalled by Napoleon now moved -into France, and in March was followed by a -second column of equal force which was at first -directed upon Lyons, but the arrival of lord Wellington’s -troops on the Garonne caused, as we -shall hereafter find, a change in its destination. -Meanwhile by order of the minister at war Suchet -entered into a fresh negociation with Copons, to -deliver up all the fortresses held by his troops -except Figueras and Rosas, provided the garrisons -were allowed to rejoin the army. The Spanish -commander assented and the authorities generally -were anxious to adopt the proposal, but the regency -referred the matter to lord Wellington who rejected -it without hesitation, as tending to increase the force -immediately opposed to him. Thus baffled and overreached -at all points, Suchet destroyed the works -of Olot, Besalu, Bascara and Palamos, dismantled -Gerona and Rosas, and concentrated his forces at -Figueras. He was followed by Copons, but though -he still had twelve thousand veterans besides the -national guards and depôts of the French departments, -he continued most obstinately to refuse any -aid to Soult, and yet remained inactive himself. The -blockade of Barcelona was therefore maintained by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_495"></a>[495]</span> -the allies without difficulty or danger save what -arose from their commissariat embarrassments and -the efforts of the garrison.</p> - -<p>On the 23d of February Habert made a -sally with six battalions, thinking to surprize Sarzfield, -he was however beaten, and colonel Meder the -Nassau officer who had before shewn his attachment -to the French cause was killed. The blockade<span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -was thus continued until the 12th of March when -Clinton received orders from lord Wellington to -break up his army, send the foreign troops to lord -William Bentinck in Sicily, and march with the -British battalions by Tudela to join the great army -in France. Clinton at first prepared to obey but -Suchet was still in strength, Copons appeared -to be provoking a collision though he was quite -unable to oppose the French in the field; and to -maintain the blockade of Barcelona in addition, -after the Anglo-Sicilians should depart, was quite -impossible. The latter therefore remained and on -the 19th of March king Ferdinand reached the -French frontier.</p> - -<p>This event, which happening five or even three -months before would probably have changed the -fate of the war, was now of little consequence. -Suchet first proposed to Copons to escort Ferdinand -with the French army to Barcelona and put him in -possession of that place, but this the Spanish general -dared not assent to, for he feared lord Wellington -and his own regency, and was closely watched -by colonel Coffin who had been placed near him by -sir William Clinton. The French general then -proposed to the king a convention for the recovery -of his garrisons, to which Ferdinand agreed with the -facility of a false heart. His great anxiety was to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_496"></a>[496]</span> -reach Valencia, because the determination of the -Cortez to bind him to conditions before he recovered -his throne was evident, the Spanish generals were -apparently faithful to the Cortez, and the British -influence was sure to be opposed to him while he -was burthened with French engagements.</p> - -<p>Suchet had been ordered to demand securities -for the restoration of his garrisons previous to Ferdinand’s -entry into Spain, but time was precious -and he determined to escort him at once with the -whole French army to the Fluvia, having first received -a promise to restore the garrisons. He also -retained his brother Don Carlos as a hostage for<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span> -their return, but even this security he relinquished -when the king in a second letter written from Gerona -solemnly confirmed his first promise. On the 24th -therefore in presence of the Catalan and French -armies, ranged in order of battle on either bank of the -Fluvia, Ferdinand passed that river and became once -more king of Spain. He had been a rebellious son in -the palace, a plotting traitor at Aranjuez, a dastard at -Bayonne, an effeminate superstitious fawning slave at -Valençay, and now after six years’ captivity he returned -to his own country an ungrateful and cruel -tyrant. He would have been the most odious and -contemptible of princes if his favourite brother -Don Carlos had not existed. Reaching the camp -at Barcelona on the 30th he dined with sir William -Clinton, reviewed the allied troops and then proceeded -first to Zaragoza and finally to Valencia. -Marshal Suchet says the honours of war were paid<span class="sidenote">Memoirs by sir Wm. Clinton, MSS.</span> -to him by all the French garrisons but this was not -the case at Barcelona: no man appeared, even on -the walls. After this event the French marshal -repassed the Pyrenees leaving only one division at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_497"></a>[497]</span> -Figueras and Clinton proceeded to break up his -army, but was again stopped by the vexatious conduct -of Copons who would not relieve the Anglo-Sicilians -at the blockade, nor indeed take any notice -of the English general’s communications on the -subject before the 11th of April. On the 14th -however the troops marched, part to embark at -Taragona, part to join lord Wellington. Copons -then became terrified lest general Robert, -abandoning Tortoza, should join Habert at Barcelona, -and enclose him between them and the division -at Figueras, wherefore Clinton once more -halted to protect the Spaniards.</p> - -<p>Copons had indeed some reason to fear, for<span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -Habert about this time received, and transmitted to -Robert, the emperor’s orders to break out of Tortoza -and gain Barcelona instead of passing by the -valley of Venasque as Suchet had before prescribed: -the twelve thousand men thus united were then to -push into France. This letter was intercepted, copied, -and sent on to Robert, whose answer being -likewise intercepted shewed that he was not prepared -and had no inclination for the enterprise. -This seen Clinton continued his embarkation and thus -completed his honourable but difficult task. With a -force weak in numbers, and nearly destitute of every -thing that constitutes strength in the field, he had -maintained a forward and dangerous position for -eight months; and though Copons’ incapacity and -ill-will, and other circumstances beyond control, did -not permit him to perform any brilliant actions, he -occupied the attention of a very superior army, -suffered no disaster and gained some advantages.</p> - -<p>While his troops were embarking, Habert, in furtherance -of the emperor’s project, made a vigorous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_498"></a>[498]</span> -sally on the 18th, and though repulsed with loss -he killed or wounded eight hundred Spaniards. -This was a lamentable combat. The war had terminated -long before, yet intelligence of the cessation -of hostilities only arrived four days later. -Habert was now repeatedly ordered by Suchet -and the duke of Feltre to give up Barcelona, but -warned by the breach of former conventions he held -it until he was assured that all the French garrisons<span class="sidenote9">Lafaille.</span> -in Valencia had returned safely to France, which -did not happen until the 28th of May, when he -yielded up the town and marched to his own -country. This event, the last operation of the -whole war, released the duchess of Bourbon. She -and the old prince of Conti had been retained -prisoners in the city during the Spanish struggle, -the prince died early in 1814, the duchess survived, -and now returned to France.</p> - -<p>How strong Napoleon’s hold of the Peninsula had -been, how little the Spaniards were able of their own -strength to shake him off, was now apparent to all -the world. For notwithstanding lord Wellington’s -great victories, notwithstanding the invasion of -France, six fortresses, Figueras, Barcelona, Tortoza, -Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia were recovered, -not by arms but by the general peace. -And but for the deceits of Van Halen there would -have been three others similarly situated in the eastern -parts alone, while in the north Santona was recovered -in the same manner; for neither the long -blockade nor the active operations against that -place, of which some account shall now be given, -caused it to surrender.</p> - -<p>The site of Santona is one of those promontories -frequent on the coast of Spain which connected by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_499"></a>[499]</span> -low sandy necks with the main land offer good harbours. -Its waters deep and capacious furnished -two bays. The outer one or roadstead was commanded -by the works of Santona itself, and by -those of Laredo, a considerable town lying at the -foot of a mountain on the opposite point of the -harbour. A narrow entrance to the inner port -was between a spit of land, called the Puntal, and -the low isthmus on which the town of Santona is -built. The natural strength of the ground was -very great, but the importance of Santona arose -from its peculiar situation as a harbour and fort of -support in the Montaña de Santander. By holding -it the French shut out the British shipping from -the only place which being defensible on the land -side furnished a good harbour between San Sebastian -and Coruña; they thus protected the sea-flank -of their long line of invasion, obtained a port of -refuge for their own coasting vessels, and a post of -support for the moveable columns sent to chase the -partidas which abounded in that rough district. -And when the battle of Vittoria placed the allies -on the Bidassoa, from Santona issued forth a -number of privateers who, as we have seen, intercepted -lord Wellington’s supplies and interrupted -his communication with Coruña, Oporto, Lisbon, -and even with England.</p> - -<p>The advantages of possessing Santona were felt<span class="sidenote12">Vol. 3. Book XI. Chapter V.</span> -early by both parties; the French seized it at once -and although the Spaniards recovered possession of -it in 1810 they were driven out again immediately. -The English ministers then commenced deliberating -and concocting extensive and for that reason injudicious -and impracticable plans of offensive operations,<span class="sidenote12">Ibid. Book XII. Chapter I.</span> -to be based upon the possession of Santona;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_500"></a>[500]</span> -meanwhile Napoleon fortified it and kept it to the -end of the war. In August 1812 its importance -was better understood by the Spaniards, and it was -continually menaced by the numerous bands of -Biscay, the Asturias and the Montaña. Fourteen -hundred men, including the crew of a corvette, -then formed its garrison, the works were not very -strong and only forty pieces of artillery were -mounted. Napoleon however, foreseeing the disasters -which Marmont was provoking, sent general -Lameth, a chosen officer, to take charge of the -defence. He immediately augmented the works -and constructed advanced redoubts on two hills, -called the Gromo and the Brusco, which like San -Bartolomeo at San Sebastian closed the isthmus -inland. He also erected a strong redoubt and -blockhouse on the Puntal to command the straits, -and to sweep the roadstead in conjunction with the -fort of Laredo which he repaired. This done he -formed several minor batteries and cast a chain to -secure the narrow entrance to the inner harbour, -and then covered the rocky promontory of Santona -itself with defensive works.</p> - -<p>Some dismounted guns remained in the arsenal, -others which had been thrown into the sea by the -Spaniards when they took the place in 1810 were -fished up, and the garrison felling trees in the vicinity -made carriages for them; by these means a -hundred and twenty guns were finally placed in -battery and there was abundance of ammunition. -The corvette was not sea-worthy, but the governor -established a flotilla of gun-boats, and other small -craft, which sallied forth whenever the signal-posts -on the head-land gave notice of the approach of -vessels liable to attack, or of French coasters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_501"></a>[501]</span> -bringing provisions and stores. The garrison had -previously lost many men, killed in a barbarous -manner by the partidas, and in revenge they never -gave quarter to their enemies. Lameth shocked -at their inhumanity resolutely forbad under pain of -death any farther reprisals, rewarded those men -who brought in prisoners and treated the latter -with gentleness: the Spaniards discovering this -also changed their system and civilization resumed -its rights. From this time military operations were -incessant, the garrison sometimes made sallies, -sometimes sustained partial attacks, sometimes aided -the moveable columns employed by the different -generals of the army of the north to put down -the partizan warfare, which was seldom even lulled -in the Montaña.</p> - -<p>After the battle of Vittoria Santona being left to -its own resources was invested on the land side by a -part of the troops composing the Gallician or fourth -Spanish army. It was blockaded on the sea-board -by the English ships of war, but only nominally, -for the garrison received supplies, and the flotilla -vexed lord Wellington’s communications, took -many of his store-ships and other vessels, delayed -his convoys, and added greatly to the difficulties -of his situation. The land blockade thus also became -a nullity and the Spanish officers complained -with reason that they suffered privations and endured -hardships without an object. These complaints -and his own embarassments, caused by lord -Melville’s neglect, induced lord Wellington in -October, 1813, when he could ill spare troops, to -employ a British brigade under lord Aylmer in the -attack of Santona; the project for reasons already -mentioned was not executed, but an English engineer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_502"></a>[502]</span> -captain Wells, was sent with some sappers -and miners to quicken the operations of the -Spanish officers, and his small detachment has<span class="sidenote"><span lang="fr">Victoires et Conquêtes</span>.</span> -been by a French writer magnified into a whole -battalion.</p> - -<p>Captain Wells remained six months, for the -Spanish generals though brave and willing were -tainted with the national defect of procrastination. -The siege made no progress until the 13th of<span class="sidenote9">1814. February.</span> -February 1814 when general Barco the Spanish -commander carried the fort of Puntal in the night -by escalade, killing thirty men and taking twenty-three -prisoners, yet the fort being under the heavy -fire of the Santona works was necessarily dismantled -and abandoned the next morning. A picquet was -however left there and the French opened their batteries, -but as this did not dislodge the Spaniards -Lameth embarked a detachment and recovered his -fort. However in the night of the 21st general -Barco ordered an attack to be made with a part of -his force upon the outposts of El Grumo and Brusco, -on the Santona side of the harbour, and led the remainder -of his troops in person to storm the fort and -town of Laredo. He carried the latter and also some -outer defences of the fort, which being on a rock -was only to be approached by an isthmus so narrow -as to be closed by a single fortified house. In the -assault of the body of this fort Barco was killed -and the attack ceased, but the troops retained -what they had won and established themselves at -the foot of the rock where they were covered from -fire. The attack on the other side, conducted by -colonel Llorente, was successful; he carried the -smallest of the two outworks on the Brusco, and -closely invested the largest after an ineffectual attempt<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_503"></a>[503]</span> -by mine and assault to take it. A large -breach was however made and the commandant -seeing he could no longer defend his post, valiantly -broke through the investment and gained the work -of the Grumo. He was however aided by the appearance -on the isthmus of a strong column which sallied -at the same time from the works on the Santona -promontory, and the next day the Grumo itself was -abandoned by the French.</p> - -<p>Captain Wells, who had been wounded at the -Puntal escalade, now strenuously urged the Spaniards -to crown the counter-scarp of the fort at -Laredo and attack vigorously, but they preferred -establishing four field-pieces to batter it in form at -the distance of six hundred yards. These guns as -might be expected were dismounted the moment -they began to fire, and thus corrected, the Spanish -generals committed the direction of the attack to -Wells. He immediately opened a heavy musquetry<span class="sidenote">Professional papers by the royal engineers.</span> -fire on the fort to stifle the noise of his workmen, -then pushing trenches up the hill close to the -counterscarp in the night, he was proceeding to burst -open the gate with a few field-pieces and to cut down -the pallisades, when the Italian garrison, whose musquets -from constant use had become so foul that few -would go off, mutinied against their commander and -making him a prisoner surrendered the place. This -event gave the allies the command of the entrance<span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -to the harbour, and Lameth offered to capitulate in -April upon condition of returning to France with -his garrison. Lord Wellington refused the condition, -Santona therefore remained a few days longer in -possession of the enemy, and was finally evacuated -at the general cessation of hostilities.</p> - -<p>Having now terminated the narrative of all military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_504"></a>[504]</span> -and political events which happened in the -Peninsula, the reader will henceforth be enabled to -follow without interruption the events of the war -in the south of France which shall be continued -in the next book.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_505"></a>[505]</span><br></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XXIV">BOOK XXIV.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p class="noindent">Lord Wellington’s difficulties have been described.<span class="sidenote9">1814. January.</span> -Those of his adversary were even more embarrassing -because the evil was at the root; it was not -misapplication of power but the want of power -itself which paralyzed Soult’s operations. Napoleon -trusted much to the effect of his treaty with Ferdinand -who, following his intentions, should have -entered Spain in November, but the intrigues to -retard his journey continued, and though Napoleon, -when the refusal of the treaty by the Spanish government -became known, permitted him to return without -any conditions, as thinking his presence would -alone embarrass and perhaps break the English -alliance with Spain, he did not as we have seen -arrive until March. How the emperor’s views were -frustrated by his secret enemies is one of the obscure -parts of French history, at this period, which time -may possibly clear but probably only with a feeble -and uncertain light. For truth can never be expected -in the memoirs, if any should appear, of such -men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other politicians of -their stamp, whose plots rendered his supernatural -efforts to rescue France from her invaders abortive. -Meanwhile there is nothing to check and expose the -political and literary empirics who never fail on -such occasions to poison the sources of history.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_506"></a>[506]</span></p> - -<p>Relying upon the effect which the expected -journey of Ferdinand would produce, and pressed -by the necessity of augmenting his own weak army, -Napoleon gave notice to Soult that he must ultimately -take from him, two divisions of infantry and -one of cavalry. The undecided nature of his first -battle at Brienne caused him to enforce this notice -in the beginning of February, but he had previously -sent imperial commissaries to the different departments -of France, with instructions to hasten the new -conscription, to form national and urban guards, to draw -forth all the resources of the country, and to aid the -operations of the armies by the action of the people. -These measures however failed generally in the -south. The urban cohorts were indeed readily -formed as a means of police, and the conscription -was successful, but the people remained sullen and -apathetic; and the civil commissaries are said to<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Despatches, MSS.</span> -have been, with some exceptions, pompous, declamatory, -and affecting great state and dignity without -energy and activity. Ill-will was also produced by -the vexatious and corrupt conduct of the subordinate -government agents, who seeing in the general -distress and confusion a good opportunity to forward -their personal interests, oppressed the people for -their own profit. This it was easy to do, because -the extreme want of money rendered requisitions -unavoidable, and under the confused direction of -civilians, partly ignorant and unused to difficult -times, partly corrupt, and partly disaffected to the -emperor, the abuses inevitably attendant upon such -a system were numerous; and to the people so offensive, -that numbers to avoid them passed with their -carts and utensils into the lines of the allies. An -official letter written from Bayonne at this period<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_507"></a>[507]</span> -run thus: “The English general’s policy and the -good discipline he maintains does us more harm than -ten battles. Every peasant wishes to be under his -protection.”</p> - -<p>Another source of anger was Soult’s works near -Bayonne, where the richer inhabitants could not -bear to have their country villas and gardens destroyed -by the engineer, he who spares not for -beauty or for pleasure where his military traces are -crossed. The merchants, a class nearly alike in all -nations, with whom profit stands for country, -had been with a few exceptions long averse to -Napoleon’s policy which from necessity interfered -with their commerce. And this feeling must have -been very strong in Bayonne and Bordeaux, for one -Batbedat, a banker of the former place, having obtained -leave to go to St. Jean de Luz under pretence -of settling the accounts of English officers, prisoners -of war, to whom he had advanced money, offered lord -Wellington to supply his army with various commodities -and even provide money for bills on the -English treasury. In return he demanded licenses -for twenty vessels to go from Bordeaux, Rochelle -and Mants, to St. Jean de Luz, and they were given -on condition that he should not carry back colonial -produce. The English navy however shewed so -little inclination to respect them that the banker and -his coadjutors hesitated to risk their vessels, and -thus saved them, for the English ministers refused to -sanction the licenses and rebuked their general.</p> - -<p>During these events the partizans of the Bourbons,<span class="sidenote9">February.</span> -coming from Brittany and La Vendée, spread themselves -all over the south of France and entered into -direct communication with lord Wellington. One -of the celebrated family of La Roche Jacquelin<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_508"></a>[508]</span> -arrived at his head-quarters, Bernadotte sent an -agent to those parts, and the count of Grammont, -then serving as a captain in the British cavalry, was -at the desire of the marquis de Mailhos, another of -the malcontents, sent to England to call the princes -of the house of Bourbon forward. Finally the duke -of Angoulême arrived suddenly at the head-quarters, -and he was received with respect in private though -not suffered to attend the movements of the army. -The English general indeed, being persuaded that -the great body of the French people especially in -the south, were inimical to Napoleon’s government, -was sanguine as to the utility of encouraging a -Bourbon party. Yet he held his judgment in -abeyance, sagaciously observing that he could not -come to a safe conclusion merely from the feelings -of some people in one corner of France; and as the -allied sovereigns seemed backward to take the -matter in hand unless some positive general movement -in favour of the Bourbons was made, and there -were negociations for peace actually going on, it -would be, he observed, unwise and ungenerous to -precipitate the partizans of the fallen house into a -premature outbreak and then leave them to the -vengeance of the enemy.</p> - -<p>That lord Wellington should have been convinced -the prevailing opinion was against Napoleon is not -surprising, because every appearance at the time -would seem to prove it so; and certain it is that a -very strong Bourbon party and one still stronger -averse to the continuation of war existed. But in -civil commotions nothing is more dangerous, nothing -more deceitful, than the outward show and declarations -on such occasions. The great mass of men -in all nations are only endowed with moderate capacity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_509"></a>[509]</span> -and spirit, and as their thoughts are intent -upon the preservation of their families and property -they must bend to circumstances; thus fear and -suspicion, ignorance baseness and good feeling, all -combine to urge men in troubled times to put on -the mask of enthusiasm for the most powerful, while -selfish knaves ever shout with the loudest. Let the -scene change and the multitude will turn with the -facility of a weathercock. Lord Wellington soon -discovered that the count of Viel Chastel, Bernadotte’s -agent, while pretending to aid the Bourbons -was playing a double part, and only one year after -this period Napoleon returned from Elba, and -neither the presence of the duke of Angoulême, nor -the energy of the duchess, nor all the activity of -their partizans, could raise in this very country more -than the semblance of an opposition to him. The -tricolor was every where hoisted and the Bourbon -party vanished. And this was the true test of national -feeling, because in 1814 the white colours -were supported by foreign armies, and misfortune -had bowed the great democratic chief to the earth; -but when rising again in his wondrous might he -came back alone from Elba, the poorer people, with -whom only patriotism is ever really to be found, and -that because they are poor and therefore unsophisticated, -crowded to meet and hail him as a father. -Not because they held him entirely blameless. Who -born of woman is? They demanded redress of grievances -even while they clung instinctively to him as -their stay and protection against the locust tyranny -of aristocracy.</p> - -<p>There was however at this period in France<span class="sidenote9">January.</span> -enough of discontent passion and intrigue, enough -of treason, and enough of grovelling spirit in adversity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_510"></a>[510]</span> -added to the natural desire of escaping the -ravages of war, a desire so carefully fostered by the -admirable policy of the English general, as to render -the French general’s position extremely difficult -and dangerous. Nor is it the least remarkable circumstance -of this remarkable period, that while Soult -expected relief by the Spaniards falling away from -the English alliance, lord Wellington received from -the French secret and earnest warnings to beware of -some great act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards. -It was at this period also that Morillo and -other generals encouraged their soldiers’ licentiousness, -and displayed their own ill-will by sullen discontent -and captious complaints, while the civil -authorities disturbed the communications and made -war in their fashion against the hospitals and -magazines.</p> - -<p>His apprehensions and vigilance are plainly to be -traced in his correspondence. Writing about general -Copons he says, “his conduct is quite unjustifiable -both in concealing what he knew of the duke de -San Carlos’ arrival and the nature of his mission.” -In another letter he observes, that the Spanish military -people about himself desired peace with Napoleon -according to the treaty of Valençay; that they -all had some notion of what had occurred and yet -had been quite silent about it; that he had repeated -intelligence from the French of some act of treachery -meditated by the Spaniards; that several persons -of that nation had come from Bayonne to circulate -reports of peace, and charges against the British -which he knew would be well received on that -frontier; that he had arrested a man calling himself -an agent of and actually bearing a letter of credence -from Ferdinand.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_511"></a>[511]</span></p> - -<p>But the most striking proof of the alarm he felt -was his great satisfaction at the conduct of the -Spanish government in rejecting the treaty brought -by San Carlos and Palafox. Sacrificing all his -former great and just resentment he changed at -once from an enemy to a friend of the regency, supported -the members of it even against the serviles, -spoke of the matter as being the most important -concern of all that had engaged his attention, and -when the count of La Bispal, the deadly enemy -of the regency, proposed some violent and decided -action of hostility which a few weeks before would -have been received with pleasure, he checked and -softened him, observing, that the conduct of the -government about the treaty should content every -Spaniard, that it was not possible to act with more -frankness and loyalty, and that they had procured -honour for themselves and for their nation not only -in England but all over Europe. Such is the light -mode in which words are applied by public men, -even by the noblest and greatest, when their wishes -are fulfilled. This glorious and honourable conduct -of the regency was simply a resolution to uphold -their personal power and that of their faction, both -of which would have been destroyed by the arrival -of the king.</p> - -<p>Napoleon hoping much from the effect of these -machinations not only intimated to Soult, as I have -already shewn, that he would require ten thousand -of his infantry immediately, but that twice that -number with a division of cavalry would be called -away if the Spaniards fell off from the English -alliance. The duke of Dalmatia then foreseeing the -ultimate result of his own operations against Wellington, -conceived a vast general plan of action which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_512"></a>[512]</span> -showed how capable a man he was to treat the -greatest questions of military policy.</p> - -<p>“Neither his numbers nor means of supply after -Wellington had gained the banks of the Adour above -Bayonne would, he said, suffice to maintain his positions -covering that fortress and menacing the allies’ -right flank; the time therefore approached when he -must, even without a reduction of force, abandon -Bayonne to its own resources and fight his battles -on the numerous rivers which run with concentric -courses from the Pyrenees to the Adour. Leval’s -and Boyer’s divisions of infantry were to join the -grand army on the eastern frontier, Abbé’s division -was to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne and -its camp to fourteen thousand men, but he considered -this force too great for a simple general -of division and wished to give it to general Reille -whose corps would be broken up by the departure -of the detachments. That officer was however -altogether averse, and as an unwilling commander -would be half beaten before the battle -commenced he desired that count D’Erlon should -be appointed in Reille’s place.</p> - -<p>“The active army remaining could not then be -expected to fight the allies in pitched battles, and he -therefore recommended the throwing it as a great -partizan corps on the left, touching always upon the -Pyrenees and ready to fall upon lord Wellington’s -flank and rear if he should penetrate into France. -Clauzel a native of those parts and speaking the -country language was by his military qualities and -knowledge the most suitable person to command. -General Reille could then march with the troops -called to the great army, and as there would be -nothing left for him, Soult, to do in these parts he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_513"></a>[513]</span> -desired to be employed where he could aid the emperor -with more effect. This he pressed urgently -because, notwithstanding the refusal of the Cortez -to receive the treaty of Valençay, it was probable -the war on the eastern frontier would oblige the -emperor to recall all the troops designated. It -would then become imperative to change from a regular -to an irregular warfare, in which a numerous corps -of partizans would be more valuable than the shadow -of a regular army without value or confidence, and -likely to be destroyed in the first great battle. For -these partizans it was necessary to have a central -power and director. Clauzel was the man most fitted -for the task. He ought to have under his orders -all the generals who were in command in the military -departments between the Garonne and the -Pyrenees, with power to force all the inhabitants to -take arms and act under his directions.</p> - -<p>“I am sensible,” he continued, “that this system, -one of the least unhappy consequences of which -would be to leave the enemy apparently master of -all the country between the mountains and the -Garonne, can only be justified by the necessity of -forming an army in the centre of France sufficiently -powerful to fend off the multitude of our enemies -from the capital; but if Paris falls all will be lost, -whereas if it be saved the loss of a few large towns -in the south can be repaired. I propose then to -form a great army in front of Paris by a union of -all the disposable troops of the armies on the -different frontiers, and at the same time to spread -what remains of the latter as partizans wherever the -enemy penetrates or threatens to penetrate. All the -marshals of France the generals and other officers, -either in activity or in retirement, who shall not be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_514"></a>[514]</span> -attached to the great central army, should then -repair to their departments to organize the partizan -corps and bring those not actively useful as such -up to the great point of union, and they should have -military power to make all men able to bear arms, -find them at their own expense.” “This measure -is revolutionary but will infallibly produce important -results, while none or at least a very feeble effect -will be caused by the majority of the imperial commissioners -already sent to the military divisions. -They are grand persons, they temporize, make proclamations -and treat every thing as civilians instead -of acting with vigour to obtain promptly a result -which would astonish the world; for notwithstanding -the cry to the contrary, the resources of France -are not exhausted, what is wanted is to make those -who possess resources use them for the defence of the -throne and the emperor.”</p> - -<p>Having thus explained his views, he again requested -to be recalled to Paris to serve near the emperor, but -declared that he was ready to obey any order and -serve in any manner; all he demanded was clear instructions -with reference to the events that might -occur. 1º. What he should do if the treaty arrangements -with Ferdinand had no effect and the -Spanish troops remained with lord Wellington. -2º. If those troops retired and the British seeing -the French weakened by detachments should alone -penetrate into France. 3º. If the changes in Spain -should cause the allies to retire altogether.</p> - -<p>Such was Soult’s plan of action but his great -project was not adopted and the emperor’s reasons -for neglecting it have not been made known. Nor -can the workings of that capacious mind be judged -of without a knowledge of all the objects and conditions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_515"></a>[515]</span> -of his combinations. Yet it is not improbable -that at this period he did not despair of -rejecting the allies beyond the Rhine either by -force of arms, by negociation, or by working upon -the family pride of the emperor of Austria. With -this hope he would be naturally averse to incur the -risk of a civil war by placing France under martial -law, or of reviving the devouring fire of revolution -which it had been his object for so many years to -quell; and this is the more probable because it -seems nearly certain, that one of his reasons for replacing -Ferdinand on the Spanish throne was his -fear lest the republican doctrines which had gained -ground in Spain should spread to France. Was he -wrong? The fierce democrat will answer Yes! But -the man who thinks that real liberty was never -attained under a single unmixed form of government -giving no natural vent to the swelling pride of -honour birth or riches; those who measure the -weakness of pure republicanism by the miserable -state of France at home and abroad when Napoleon -by assuming power saved her; those who saw -America with all her militia and her licentious -liberty unable to prevent three thousand British -soldiers from passing three thousand miles of -ocean and burning her capital, will hesitate to condemn -him. And this without detriment to the democratic -principle which in substance may and -should always govern under judicious forms. Napoleon -early judged, and the event has proved he -judged truly, that the democratic spirit of France -however violent was unable to overbear the aristocratic -and monarchic tendencies of Europe; wisely -therefore while he preserved the essence of the -first by fostering equality, he endeavoured to blend<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_516"></a>[516]</span> -it with the other two; thus satisfying as far as the -nature of human institutions would permit the conditions -of the great problem he had undertaken to -solve. His object was the reconstruction of the -social fabric which had been shattered by the -French revolution, mixing with the new materials -all that remained of the old sufficiently unbroken -to build with again. If he failed to render his -structure stable it was because his design was -misunderstood, and the terrible passions let loose -by the previous stupendous explosion were too -mighty even for him to compress.</p> - -<p>To have accepted Soult’s project would have -been to endanger his work, to save himself at the -expense of his system, and probably to plunge -France again into the anarchy from which he had -with so much care and labour drawn her. But as I -have before said, and it is true, Napoleon’s ambition -was for the greatness and prosperity of France, for -the regeneration of Europe, for the stability of the -system which he had formed with that end, never -for himself personally; and hence it is that the multitudes -of many nations instinctively revere his memory. -And neither the monarch nor the aristocrat, -dominant though they be by his fall, feel themselves -so easy in their high places as to rejoice much -in their victory.</p> - -<p>Whatever Napoleon’s motive was he did not -adopt Soult’s project, and in February two divisions -of infantry and Trielhard’s cavalry with many batteries -were withdrawn. Two thousand of the best -soldiers were also selected to join the imperial -guards, and all the <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> were sent to the interior. -The total number of old soldiers left, did -not, including the division of General Paris, exceed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_517"></a>[517]</span> -forty thousand exclusive of the garrison of -Bayonne and other posts, and the conscripts, beardless -youths, were for the most part unfit to enter -the line nor were there enough of musquets in the -arsenals to arm them. It is remarkable also, as -shewing how easily military operations may be -affected by distant operations, that Soult expected -and dreaded at this time the descent of a great -English army upon the coast of La Vendée, led -thereto by intelligence of an expedition preparing -in England, under sir Thomas Graham, really to aid -the Dutch revolt.</p> - -<p>While the French general’s power was thus diminished, -lord Wellington’s situation was as suddenly -ameliorated. First by the arrival of reinforcements, -next by the security he felt from the rejection of the -treaty of Valençay, lastly by the approach of better -weather, and the acquisition of a very large sum in -gold which enabled him not only to put his Anglo-Portuguese -in activity but also to bring the Spaniards -again into line with less danger of their -plundering the country. During the forced cessation -of operations he had been actively engaged -preparing the means to enter France with power -and security, sending before him the fame of a just -discipline and a wise consideration for the people -who were likely to fall under his power, for there -was nothing he so much dreaded as the partizan and -insurgent warfare proposed by Soult. The peasants -of Baygorry and Bidarray had done him more mischief -than the French army, and his terrible menace -of destroying their villages, and hanging all the population -he could lay his hands upon if they ceased -not their hostility, marks his apprehensions in the -strongest manner. Yet he left all the local authorities<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_518"></a>[518]</span> -free to carry on the internal government, to -draw their salaries, and raise the necessary taxes -in the same mode and with as much tranquillity as -if perfect peace prevailed; he opened the ports and -drew a large commerce which served to support his -own army and engage the mercantile interests in his -favour; he established many sure channels for intelligence -political and military, and would have extended -his policy further and to more advantage if -the English ministers had not so abruptly and -ignorantly interfered with his proceedings. Finally -foreseeing that the money he might receive would, -being in foreign coin, create embarrassment, he -adopted an expedient which he had before practised -in India to obviate this. Knowing that in a British -army a wonderful variety of knowledge and vocations -good and bad may be found, he secretly caused -the coiners and die-sinkers amongst the soldiers to -be sought out, and once assured that no mischief was -intended them, it was not difficult to persuade them -to acknowledge their peculiar talents. With these -men he established a secret mint at which he coined -gold Napoleons, marking them with a private stamp -and carefully preserving their just fineness and -weight with a view of enabling the French government -when peace should be established to call them -in again. He thus avoided all the difficulties of -exchange, and removed a very fruitful source of -quarrels and ill-will between the troops and the -country people and shopkeepers; for the latter -are always fastidious in taking and desirous of -abating the current worth of strange coin, and the -former attribute to fraud any declination from the -value at which they receive their money. This -sudden increase of the current coin tended also<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_519"></a>[519]</span> -to diminish the pressure necessarily attendant upon -troubled times.</p> - -<p>Nor was his provident sagacity less eminently -displayed in purely military matters than in his -administrative and political operations. During the -bad weather he had formed large magazines at the -ports, examined the course of the Adour, and carefully -meditated upon his future plans. To penetrate -into France and rally a great Bourbon party under -the protection of his army was the system he desired -to follow; and though the last point depended upon -the political proceedings and successes of the allied -sovereigns the military operations most suitable at -the moment did not clash with it. To drive the -French army from Bayonne and either blockade or -besiege that place were the first steps in either case. -But this required extensive and daring combinations. -For the fortress and its citadel, comprising in their -circuit the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, -could not be safely invested with less than three -times the number necessary to resist the garrison at -any one point, because the communications of the invested -being short internal and secure, those of the -investers external difficult and unsafe, it behoved that -each division should be able to resist a sally of the -whole garrison. Hence, though reduced to the lowest -point, the whole must be so numerous as seriously -to weaken the forces operating towards the interior.</p> - -<p>How and where to cross the Adour with a view -to the investment was also a subject of solicitude. -It was a great river with a strong current and well -guarded by troops and gun-boats above Bayonne; -still greater was it below the town; there the ebb -tide run seven miles an hour, there also there were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_520"></a>[520]</span> -gun-boats, a sloop of war, and several merchant-vessels -which could be armed and employed to interrupt -the passage. The number of pontoons or -other boats required to bridge the stream across -either above or below, and the carriage of them, an -immense operation in itself, would inevitably give -notice of the design and render it abortive, unless -the French army were first driven away, and even -then the garrison of Bayonne nearly fifteen thousand -strong might be sufficient to baffle the attempt. -Nevertheless in the face of these difficulties he resolved -to pass, the means adopted being proportionate -to the greatness of the design.</p> - -<p>He considered, that, besides the difficulty of bringing -the materials across the Nive and through the -deep country on each side of that river, he could not -throw his bridge above Bayonne without first driving -Soult entirely from the confluents of the Adour and -from the Adour itself; that when he had effected -this his own communications between the bridge and -his magazines at the sea-ports would still be difficult -and unsafe, because his convoys would have a flank -march, passing the Nive as well as the Adour and -liable to interruption from the overflowing of those -rivers; finally, that his means of transport would be -unequal to the wear and tear of the deep roads and -be interrupted by rain. But throwing his bridge -below the town he would have the Adour itself as a -harbour, while his land convoys used the royal causeway -leading close to the river and not liable to -be interrupted by weather. His line of retreat also -would then be more secure if any unforeseen misfortune -should render it necessary to break up the investment. -He had no fear that Soult, while retiring -before the active force he intended to employ against<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_521"></a>[521]</span> -him on the upper parts of the rivers, would take his -line of retreat by the great Bordeaux road and fall -upon the investing force: that road led behind -Bayonne through the sandy wilderness called the -Landes, into which the French general would not -care to throw himself, lest his opponent’s operations -along the edge of the desert should prevent him -from ever getting out. To draw the attention of the -French army by an attack on their left near the -roots of the Pyrenees would be sure to keep the -lower Adour free from any formidable defensive -force, because the rapidity and breadth of the stream -there denied the use of common pontoons, and the -mouth, about six miles below Bayonne, was so -barred with sand, so beaten by surges, and so difficult -of navigation even with the help of the landmarks, -some of which had been removed, that the -French would never expect small vessels fit for -constructing a bridge could enter that way. Yet it -was thus lord Wellington designed to achieve his -object. He had collected forty large sailing boats -of from fifteen to thirty tons burthen, called <i lang="fr">chasse -marées</i>, as if for the commissariat service, but he -secretly loaded them with planks and other materials -for his bridge. These and some gun-boats he -designed, with the aid of the navy, to run up the -Adour to a certain point upon which he meant also -to direct the troops and artillery, and then with -hawsers, and pontoons formed into rafts, to throw -over a covering body and destroy a small battery -near the mouth of the river. He trusted to the -greatness and danger of the attempt for success and -in this he was favoured by fortune.</p> - -<p>The French trading vessels in the Adour had -offered secretly to come out upon licenses and enter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_522"></a>[522]</span> -the service of his commissariat, but he was obliged -to forego the advantage because of the former interference -and dissent of the English ministers about -the passports he had previously granted. This -added greatly to the difficulty of the enterprize. -He was thus forced to maltreat men willing to be -friends, to prepare grates for heating shot, and a -battery of Congreve rockets with which to burn -their vessels and the sloop of war, or at least to drive -them up the river, after which he proposed to protect -his bridge with the gun-boats and a boom.</p> - -<p>While he was thus preparing for offensive -operations the French general was active in defensive -measures. He had fortified all the main -passes of the rivers by the great roads leading -against his left, but the diminution of his force in -January obliged him to withdraw his outposts from -Anglet, which enabled lord Wellington to examine -the whole course of the Adour below Bayonne -and arrange for the passage with more facility. -Soult then in pursuance of Napoleon’s system of -warfare, which always prescribed a recourse to -moral force to cover physical weakness, immediately -concentrated his left wing against the allies’ right -beyond the Nive, and redoubled that harassing -partizan warfare which I have already noticed, -endeavouring to throw his adversary entirely upon -the defensive. Thus on the 26th of January, Morillo -having taken possession of an advanced post -near Mendionde not properly belonging to him, -Soult, who desired to ascertain the feelings of the -Spaniards about the English alliance, caused Harispe -under pretence of remonstrating to sound him; -he did not respond and Harispe then drove him, -not without a vigorous resistance, from the post.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_523"></a>[523]</span></p> - -<p>The French marshal had however no hope of checking -the allies long by these means. He judged justly -that Wellington was resolved to obtain Bordeaux -and the line of the Garonne, and foreseeing that his -own line of retreat must ultimately be in a parallel -direction with the Pyrenees, he desired to organize -in time a strong defensive system in the country -behind him and to cover Bordeaux if possible. In -this view he sent general Darricau a native of the -Landes to prepare an insurgent levy in that wilderness, -and directed Maransin to the High Pyrenees -to extend the insurrection of the mountaineers already -commenced in the Lower Pyrenees by Harispe. -The castle of Jaca was still held by eight hundred -men but they were starving, and a convoy collected -at Navarrens being stopped by the snow in -the mountain-passes made a surrender inevitable. -Better would it have been to have withdrawn -the troops at an early period; for though the -Spaniards would thus have gained access to the -rear of the French army and perhaps ravaged a part -of the frontier, they could have done no essential -mischief to the army; and their excesses would have -disposed the people of those parts who had not yet -felt the benefit of lord Wellington’s politic discipline -to insurrection.</p> - -<p>At Bordeaux there was a small reserve commanded<span class="sidenote9">February.</span> -by general La Huillier, Soult urged the minister of -war to increase it with conscripts from the interior. -Meanwhile he sent artillery-men from Bayonne, -ordered fifteen hundred national guards to be -selected as a garrison for the citadel of Blaye, and -desired that the Médoc and Paté forts and the batteries -along the banks of the Garonne should be put -in a state of defence. The vessels in that river fit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_524"></a>[524]</span> -for the purpose he desired might be armed, and a -flotilla of fifty gun-boats established below Bordeaux, -with a like number to navigate that river -above the city as far as Toulouse. But these orders -were feebly carried into execution or entirely neglected, -for there was no public spirit, and treason -and disaffection were rife in the city.</p> - -<p>On the side of the Lower Pyrenees Soult enlarged -and improved the works of Navarrens and designed -to commence an entrenched camp in front of it. The -castle of Lourdes in the High Pyrenees was already -defensible, and he gave orders to fortify the castle -of Pau, thus providing a number of supporting -points for the retreat which he foresaw. At Mauleon -he put on foot some partizan corps, and the imperial -commissary Caffarelli gave him hopes of being able -to form a reserve of seven or eight thousand national -guards, <i lang="fr">gensd’armes</i>, and artillery-men, at Tarbes. -Dax containing his principal depôts was already -being fortified, and the communication with it was -maintained across the rivers by the bridges and -bridge-heads at Port de Lannes, Hastingues, Pereyhorade, -and Sauveterre; but the floods in the -beginning of February carried away his bridge at -the Port de Lannes, and the communication between -Bayonne and the left of the army was thus interrupted -until he established a flying bridge in place of the -one carried away.</p> - -<p>Such was the situation of the French general -when lord Wellington advanced, and as the former -supposed with one hundred and twenty thousand infantry -and fifteen thousand cavalry, for he knew -nothing of the various political and financial difficulties -which had reduced the English general’s -power and prevented all the reinforcements he expected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_525"></a>[525]</span> -from joining him. His emissaries told him -that Clinton’s force was actually broken up, and the -British part in march to join Wellington; that the -garrisons of Carthagena Cadiz and Ceuta were on -the point of arriving and that reinforcements were -coming from England and Portugal. This information -made him conclude that there was no intention -of pressing the war in Catalonia and that all -the allied troops would be united and march against -him; wherefore with more earnestness than before -he urged that Suchet should be ordered to join him -that their united forces might form a “dike against -the torrent” which threatened to overwhelm the -south of France. The real power opposed to him -was however very much below his calculations. -The twenty thousand British and Portuguese reinforcements -promised had not arrived, Clinton’s army -was still in Catalonia; and though it is impossible to -fix the exact numbers of the Spaniards, their regular -forces available, and that only partially and with -great caution on account of their licentious conduct, -did not exceed the following approximation.</p> - -<p>Twelve thousand Gallicians under Freyre including -Carlos D’España’s division; four thousand -under Morillo; six thousand Andalusians under -O’Donnel; eight thousand of Del Parque’s troops -under the prince of Anglona. In all thirty thousand. -The Anglo-Portuguese present under arms were by -the morning states on the 13th of February, the day -on which the advance commenced, about seventy -thousand men and officers of all arms, nearly ten -thousand being cavalry. The whole force, exclusive -of Mina’s bands which were spread as we have seen -from Navarre to the borders of Catalonia, was therefore, -one hundred thousand men and officers, with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_526"></a>[526]</span> -one hundred pieces of field-artillery of which ninety-five -were Anglo-Portuguese.</p> - -<p>It is difficult to fix with precision the number of -the French army at this period, because the imperial -muster-rolls, owing to the troubled state of the -emperor’s affairs were either not continued beyond -December 1813 or have been lost. But from Soult’s -correspondence and other documents it would appear, -that exclusive of his garrisons, his reserves -and detachments at Bordeaux and in the department -of the High Pyrenees, exclusive also of the conscripts -of the second levy which were now beginning -to arrive, he could place in line of battle about -thirty-five thousand soldiers of all arms, three thousand -being cavalry, with forty pieces of artillery. -But Bayonne alone without reckoning the fortresses -of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navarrens occupied -twenty-eight thousand of the allies; and by this and -other drains lord Wellington’s superiority in the -field was so reduced, that his penetrating into -France, that France which had made all Europe -tremble at her arms, must be viewed as a surprising -example of courage and fine conduct, military and -political.</p> - - -<h4>PASSAGE OF THE GAVES.</h4> - -<p>In the second week of February the weather set -in with a strong frost, the roads became practicable -and the English general, eagerly seizing the long-expected -opportunity, advanced at the moment when -general Paris had again marched with the convoy -from Navarrens to make a last effort for the relief of -Jaca. But the troops were at this time receiving the -clothing which had been so long delayed in England, -and the regiments wanting the means of carriage,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_527"></a>[527]</span> -marched to the stores; the English general’s first -design was therefore merely to threaten the French -left and turn it by the sources of the rivers with -Hill’s corps, which was to march by the roots of the -Pyrenees, while Beresford kept the centre in check -upon the lower parts of the same rivers. Soult’s attention -would thus he hoped be drawn to that side while -the passage of the Adour was being made below -Bayonne. And it would seem that uncertain if he -should be able to force the passage of the tributary -rivers with his right, he intended, if his bridge was -happily thrown, to push his main operations on that -side and thus turn the Gaves by the right bank of -the Adour: a fine conception by which his superiority -of numbers would have best availed him to -seize Dax and the Port de Landes and cut Soult off -from Bordeaux.</p> - -<p>On the 12th and 13th Hill’s corps, which including -Picton’s division and five regiments of cavalry -furnished twenty thousand combatants with sixteen -guns, being relieved by the sixth and seventh divisions -in front of Mousseroles and on the Adour, was -concentrated about Urcurray and Hasparen. The -14th it marched in two columns. One by Bonloc<span class="sidenote7">Plan 9.</span> -to drive the French posts beyond the Joyeuse; another -by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port -against Harispe who was at Hellette. This second -column had the Ursouia mountain on the right, and -a third, composed of Morillo’s Spaniards, having -that mountain on its left marched from La Houssoa -against the same point. Harispe who had only three -brigades, principally conscripts, retired skirmishing -in the direction of St. Palais and took a position for -the night at Meharin. Not more than thirty men -on each side were hurt but the line of the Joyeuse<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_528"></a>[528]</span> -was turned by the allies, the direct communication -with St. Jean Pied de Port cut, and that place was -immediately invested by Mina’s battalions.</p> - -<p>On the 15th Hill, leaving the fifty-seventh regiment -at Hellette to observe the road to St. Jean -Pied de Port, marched through Meharin upon Garris, -eleven miles distant, but that road being impracticable -for artillery the guns moved by Armendaritz -more to the right. Harispe’s rear-guard was overtaken -and pushed back fighting, and meanwhile lord -Wellington directed Beresford to send a brigade of -the seventh division from the heights of La Costa -across the Gamboury to the Bastide de Clerence. -The front being thus extended from Urt by Briscons, -the Bastide and Isturitz, towards Garris, a distance -of more than twenty miles, was too attenuated; -wherefore he caused the fourth division to occupy -La Costa in support of the troops at the Bastide. -At the same time learning that the French had -weakened their force at Mousseroles, and thinking -that might be to concentrate on the heights of Anglet, -which would have frustrated his plan for throwing -a bridge over the Adour, he directed Hope secretly -to occupy the back of those heights in force and -prevent any intercourse between Bayonne and the -country.</p> - -<p>Soult knew of the intended operations against -his left on the 12th, but hearing the allies had collected -boats and constructed a fresh battery near -Urt on the Upper Adour, and that the pontoons had -reached Urcurray, he thought lord Wellington designed -to turn his left with Hill’s corps, to press -him on the Bidouze with Beresford’s, and to keep -the garrison of Bayonne in check with the Spaniards -while Hope crossed the Adour above that fortress.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_529"></a>[529]</span> -Wherefore, on the 14th, when Hill’s movement commenced, -he repaired to Passarou near the Bastide -de Clerence and made his dispositions to dispute -the passage, first of the Bidouze and the Soissons or -Gave of Mauleon, and then of the Gave of Oleron. -He had four divisions in hand with which he occupied -a position on the 15th along the Bidouze; and he<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.</span> -recalled general Paris, posting him on the road between -St. Palais and St. Jean Pied de Port, with a -view to watch Mina’s battalions which he supposed to -be more numerous than they really were. Jaca thus -abandoned capitulated on the 17th, the garrison returning -to France on condition of not serving until -exchanged. This part of the capitulation it appears -was broken by the French, but the recent violation -by the Spaniards of the convention made with the -deluded garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, -furnished a reply.</p> - -<p>Harispe, having Paris under his command and -being supported by Pierre Soult with a brigade of -light cavalry, now covered the road from St. Jean -Pied de Port with his left, and the upper line of the -Bidouze with his right. Lower down that river, -Villatte occupied Ilharre, Taupin was on the heights -of Bergoney below Villatte, and Foy guarded the -banks of the river from Came to its confluence with -the Adour. The rest of the army remained under -D’Erlon on the right of the latter river.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of Garris.</em>—Harispe had just taken a position -in advance of the Bidouze, on a height called -the Garris mountain which stretched to St. Palais, -when his rear-guard came plunging into a deep -ravine in his front closely followed by the light -troops of the second division. Upon the parallel -counter-ridge thus gained by the allies general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_530"></a>[530]</span> -Hill’s corps was immediately established, and -though the evening was beginning to close the -skirmishers descended into the ravine, and two guns -played over it upon Harispe’s troops. These last -to the number of four thousand were drawn up on -the opposite mountain, and in this state of affairs -Wellington arrived. He was anxious to turn the -line of the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen -himself there, and seeing that the communication -with general Paris by St. Palais was not well maintained, -sent Morillo by a flank march along the -ridge now occupied by the allies towards that place; -then menacing the enemy’s centre with Le Cor’s -Portuguese division he at the same time directed -the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments forming -Pringle’s brigade to attack, observing with a -concise energy, “<em>you must take the hill before -dark</em>.”</p> - -<p>The expression caught the attention of the<span class="sidenote">Memoir of the action published in the United Service Journal.</span> -troops, and it was repeated by colonel O’Callaghan -as he and general Pringle placed themselves at the -head of the thirty-ninth, which, followed by the -twenty-eighth, rushed with loud and prolonged -shouts into the ravine. The French fire was violent, -Pringle fell wounded and most of the mounted -officers had their horses killed, but the troops covered -by the thick wood gained with little loss the -summit of the Garris mountain, on the right of the -enemy who thought from the shouting that a larger -force was coming against them and retreated. The -thirty-ninth then wheeled to their own right intending -to sweep the summit, but soon the French -discovering their error came back at a charging -pace, and receiving a volley without flinching tried -the bayonet. Colonel O’Callaghan distinguished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_531"></a>[531]</span> -by his strength and courage received two strokes of -that weapon but repaid them with fatal power in -each instance, and the French, nearly all conscripts, -were beaten off. Twice however they came back -and fought until the fire of the twenty-eighth was -beginning to be felt, when Harispe seeing the remainder -of the second division ready to support the -attack, Le Cor’s Portuguese advancing against the -centre, and the Spaniards in march towards St. -Palais, retreated to that town and calling in Paris<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_09"><ins class="corr" id="tn-531" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'See Plan.'"> -See Plan 9.</ins></a></span> -from the side of Mauleon immediately broke down -the bridges over the Bidouze. He lost on this day -nearly five hundred men, of whom two hundred -were prisoners, and he would hardly have escaped -if Morillo had not been slow. The allies lost only -one hundred and sixty of whom not more than fifty -fell at Garris, and these chiefly in the bayonet contest, -for the trees and the darkness screened them at -first.</p> - -<p>During these operations at Garris Picton moved -from Bonloc to Oreque, on Hill’s left, menacing -Villatte, but though Beresford’s scouting parties, -acting on the left of Picton, approached the Bidouze -facing Taupin and Foy, his principal force -remained on the Gamboury, the pivot upon which -Wellington’s line hinged while the right sweeping -forward turned the French positions. Foy however -though in retreat observed the movement of the -fourth and seventh divisions on the heights between -the Nive and the Adour, pointing their march as he -thought towards the French left, and his reports to -that effect reached Soult at the moment that general -Blondeau gave notice of the investment of St. Jean -Pied de Port. The French general being thus convinced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_532"></a>[532]</span> -that lord Wellington’s design was not to pass -the Adour above Bayonne, but to gain the line of -that river by constantly turning the French left, -made new dispositions.</p> - -<p>The line of the Bidouze was strong, if he could -have supported Harispe at St. Palais, and guarded -at the same time the passage of the Soissons at -Mauleon; but this would have extended his front, -already too wide, wherefore he resolved to abandon -both the Bidouze and the Soissons and take the line -of the Gave d’Oleron, placing his right at Peyrehorade -and his left at Navarrens. In this view -D’Erlon was ordered to pass the Adour by the -flying bridge at the Port de Landes and take post -on the left bank of that river, while Harispe, having -Paris’ infantry still attached to his division, defended -the Gave de Mauleon and pushed parties on<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report.</span> -his left towards the town of that name. Villatte -occupied Sauveterre, where the bridge was fortified -with a head on the left bank, and from thence -Taupin lined the right bank to Sordes near the -confluence of the Gave de Pau. Foy occupied the -works of the bridge-head at Peyrehorade and Hastingues -guarding that river to its confluence with -the Adour; this line was prolonged by D’Erlon -towards Dax, but Soult still kept advanced parties -on the lower Bidouze at the different entrenched -passages of that river. One brigade of cavalry -was in reserve at Sauveterre, another distributed -along the line. Head-quarters were transported to -Orthes, and the parc of artillery to Aire. The -principal magazines of ammunition were however -at Bayonne, Navarrens, and Dax, and the French -general seeing that his communications with all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_533"></a>[533]</span> -these places were likely to be intercepted before he -could remove his stores, anticipated distress and -wrote to the minister of war to form new depôts.</p> - -<p>On the 16th lord Wellington repaired the broken -bridges of St. Palais, after a skirmish in which a -few men were wounded. Hill then crossed the -Bidouze, the cavalry and artillery by the repaired -bridge, the infantry by the fords, but the day -being spent in the operation the head of the column -only marched beyond St. Palais. Meanwhile -the fourth and part of the seventh divisions occupied -the Bastide de Clerence on the right of the -Joyeuse, and the light division came up in support -to the heights of La Costa on the left bank of that -river.</p> - -<p>The 17th Hill, marching at eight o’clock, passed -through Domenzain towards the Soissons, while the -third division advancing from Oreque on his left -passed by Masparraute to the heights of Somberraute, -both corps converging upon general Paris, who -was in position at Arriveriete to defend the Soissons -above its confluence with the Gave d’Oleron. The -French outposts were immediately driven across -the Gave. General Paris attempted to destroy the -bridge of Arriveriete but lord Wellington was too -quick; the ninety-second regiment covered by the -fire of some guns crossed at a ford above the -bridge, and beating two French battalions from the -village secured the passage. The allies then halted -for the day near Arriveriete having marched only -five miles and lost one man killed with twenty-three -wounded. Paris relinquished the Soissons but remained -between the two rivers during the night -and retired on the morning of the 18th. The allies -then seized the great road, which here runs from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_534"></a>[534]</span> -Sauveterre to Navarrens up the left bank of the -Oleron Gave.</p> - -<p>Harispe, Villatte, and Paris, supported by a brigade<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -of cavalry were now at Sauveterre occupying -the bridge-head on the left bank, Taupin’s division -was opposite the Bastide de Bearn lower down on -the right, Foy on the right of Taupin, and D’Erlon -on the left of the Adour above its confluence with -the Gave de Pau. Meanwhile the fourth division -advanced to Bidache on the Bidouze, and the light -division followed in support to the Bastide de Clerence, -the seventh division remaining as before, -partly in that vicinity partly extended on the left to -the Adour. The cavalry of the centre, under sir -Stapleton Cotton, arrived also on the banks of the -Bidouze connecting the fourth with the third division -at Somberraute. In this state of affairs Hill -sent Morillo up the Soissons to guard the fords as -high as Nabas, then spreading Fane’s cavalry and -the British and Portuguese infantry between that -river and the Gave d’Oleron, he occupied all the -villages along the road to Navarrens and at the -same time cannonaded the bridge-head of Sauveterre.</p> - -<p>Soult thrown from the commencement of the -operations entirely upon the defensive was now at a -loss to discover his adversary’s object. The situation -of the seventh division, and the march of the -fourth and light divisions, led him to think his -works at Hastingues and Peyrehorade would be -assailed. The weakness of his line, he having only -Taupin’s division to guard the river between -Sauveterre and Sordes a distance of ten miles, -made him fear the passage of the Gave would be -forced near the Bastide de Bearn, to which post<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_535"></a>[535]</span> -there was a good road from Came and Bidache. -On the other hand the prolongation of Hill’s line -up the Gave towards Navarrens indicated a design -to march on Pau, or it might be to keep him in -check on the Gaves while the camp at Bayonne was -assaulted. In this uncertainty he sent Pierre Soult, -with a cavalry brigade and two battalions of infantry -to act between Oleron and Pau, and keep -open a communication with the partizan corps forming -at Mauleon. That done he decided to hold the -Gaves as long as he could, and when they were -forced, to abandon the defensive concentrate his -whole force at Orthes and fall suddenly upon the -first of the allies’ converging columns that approached -him.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_536"></a>[536]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">The French general’s various conjectures embraced<span class="sidenote9">1814. February.</span> -every project but the true one of the English general. -The latter did indeed design to keep him in -check upon the rivers, not to obtain an opportunity -of assaulting the camp of Bayonne but to throw -his stupendous bridge over the Adour; yet were -his combinations so made that failing in that he -could still pursue his operations on the Gaves. -When therefore he had established his offensive -line strongly beyond the Soissons and the Bidouze, -and knew that his pontoon train was well advanced -towards Garris, he on the 19th returned rapidly to -St. Jean de Luz. Everything there depending on -man was ready, but the weather was boisterous -with snow for two days, and Wellington, fearful of -letting Soult strengthen himself on the Gave of -Oleron, returned on the 21st to Garris, having decided -to press his operations on that side in person -and leave to sir John Hope and admiral Penrose -the charge of effecting</p> - - -<h4>THE PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR.</h4> - -<p>The heights of Anglet had been occupied since -the 15th by the guards and Germans, small parties -were cautiously pushed towards the river through -the pine-forest called the wood of Bayonne, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_537"></a>[537]</span> -fifth division, now commanded by general Colville, -occupied Bussussary and the bridge of Urdains. -On the 21st Colville relieved the sixth division in -the blockade of Mousseroles on the right of the Nive. -To replace these troops at Bussussary, Freyre’s -Spaniards passed the Bidassoa, but the Andalusians -and Del Parque’s troops and the heavy -British and Portuguese cavalry were still retained -within the frontiers of Spain. Sir John Hope had -therefore only two British and two Spanish divisions, -three independent brigades of Anglo-Portuguese<span class="sidenote">Original Morning States, MSS.</span> -infantry and Vandeleur’s brigade of cavalry, -furnishing altogether about twenty-eight thousand -men and officers with twenty pieces of artillery. -There were however two regiments which had been -sent to the rear sick and several others expected -from England destined to join him.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 22d the first division, six -eighteen pounders, and the rocket battery, were -cautiously filed from the causeway near Anglet -towards the Adour, but the road was deep and -heavy and one of the guns falling into a ditch -delayed the march. Nevertheless at daybreak the -whole reached some sand-downs which extended<span class="sidenote7">Plan 7.</span> -behind the pine-forest to the river. The French -picquets were then driven into the entrenched camp -at Beyris, the pontoon train and the field-artillery -were brought down to the Adour opposite to the -village of Boucaut, and the eighteen-pounders were -placed in battery on the bank. The light troops -meanwhile closed to the edge of the marsh which -covered the right of the French camp, and Carlos -España’s division taking post on the heights of -Anglet, in concert with the independent brigades, -which were at Arcangues and the bridge of Urdains,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_538"></a>[538]</span> -attracted the enemy’s attention by false attacks -which were prolonged beyond the Nive by the fifth -division.</p> - -<p>It was intended that the arrival of the gun-boats -and <span lang="fr">chasse-marées</span> at the mouth of the Adour -should have been simultaneous with that of the -troops, but the wind having continued contrary -none were to be seen, and sir John Hope whose -firmness no untoward event could ever shake resolved -to attempt the passage with the army alone. -The French flotilla opened its fire on his columns -about nine o’clock, his artillery and rockets retorted -upon the French gun-boats and the sloop of -war so fiercely, that three of the former were destroyed -and the sloop so hardly handled that about -one o’clock the whole took refuge higher up the -river. Meanwhile sixty men of the guards were -rowed in a pontoon across the mouth of the river in -the face of a French picquet, which, seemingly bewildered, -retired without firing. A raft was then -formed with the remainder of the pontoons and a -hawser being stretched across, six hundred of the -guards and the sixtieth regiment, with a part of the -rocket battery, the whole under colonel Stopford, -passed, yet slowly, and at slack water only, for the -tide run strongly and the waters were wide.</p> - -<p>During this operation general Thouvenot deceived -by spies and prisoners thought that the light -division was with Hope as well as the first division, -and that fifteen thousand men were embarked at<span class="sidenote">Thouvenot’s Official Report</span> -St. Jean de Luz to land between Cape Breton and -the Adour. Wherefore fearing to endanger his -garrison by sending a strong force to any distance -down the river, when he heard Stopford’s detachment -was on the right bank, he detached only two<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_539"></a>[539]</span> -battalions under general Macomble to ascertain the -state of affairs, for the pine-forest and a great bending -of the river prevented him from obtaining any -view from Bayonne. Macomble made a show of -attacking Stopford, but the latter, flanked by the -field-artillery from the left bank, received him with -a discharge of rockets, projectiles which like the -elephants in ancient warfare often turn upon their -own side. This time however, amenable to their -directors they smote the French column and it fled, -amazed, and with a loss of thirty wounded. It is -nevertheless obvious that if Thouvenot had kept -strong guards, with a field-battery, on the right bank -of the Adour, sir John Hope could not have passed -over the troops in pontoons, nor could any vessels -have crossed the bar; no resource save that of disembarking -troops between the river and Cape Breton -would then have remained. This error was fatal to -the French. The British continued to pass all night, -and until twelve o’clock on the 24th, when the flotilla -was seen under a press of sail making with a -strong breeze for the mouth of the river.</p> - -<p>To enter the Adour is from the flatness of the -coast never an easy task, it was now most difficult, -because the high winds of the preceding days -had raised a great sea and the enemy had removed -one of the guiding flag-staves by which the navigation -was ordinarily directed. In front of the flotilla -came the boats of the men-of-war, and ahead of all, -the naval captain, O’Reilly, run his craft, a chosen -Spanish vessel, into the midst of the breakers, which -rolling in a frightful manner over the bar dashed -her on to the beach. That brave officer stretched -senseless on the shore would have perished with his -crew but for the ready succour of the soldiers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_540"></a>[540]</span> -however a few only were drowned and the remainder -with an intrepid spirit launched their boat again -to aid the passage of the troops which was still -going on. O’Reilly was followed and successfully -by lieutenant Debenham in a six-oared cutter, but -the tide was falling, wherefore the remainder of the -boats, the impossibility of passing until high water -being evident drew off, and a pilot was landed to -direct the line of navigation by concerted signals.</p> - -<p>When the water rose again the crews were promised -rewards in proportion to their successful -daring and the whole flotilla approached in close -order, but with it came black clouds and a -driving gale which covered the whole line of coast -with a rough tumbling sea, dashing and foaming -without an interval of dark water to mark the -entrance of the river. The men-of-war’s boats first -drew near this terrible line of surge and Mr. Bloye -of the Lyra, having the chief pilot with him, heroically -led into it, but in an instant his barge was -engulphed and he and all with him were drowned. -The Lyra’s boat thus swallowed up the following -vessels swerved in their course, and shooting up to -the right and left kept hovering undecided on the -edge of the tormented waters. Suddenly lieutenant -Cheyne of the Woodlark pulled ahead, and striking -the right line, with courage and fortune combined -safely passed the bar. The wind then lulled, the -waves as if conquered abated somewhat of their -rage, and the <span lang="fr">chasse-marées</span>, manned with Spanish -seamen but having an engineer officer with a party -of sappers in each who compelled them to follow -the men-of-war’s boats, came plunging one after -another through the huge breakers and reached the -point designed for the bridge. Thus was achieved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_541"></a>[541]</span> -this perilous and glorious exploit, but captain -Elliot of the Martial with his launch and crew and -three transports’ boats, perished close to the shore -in despite of the most violent efforts made by the -troops to save them; three other vessels cast on the -beach lost part of their crews; and one large <span lang="fr">chasse-marée</span>, -full of men, after passing the line of surf -safely was overtaken by a swift bellying wave -which breaking on her deck dashed her to pieces.</p> - -<p>The whole of the first division and Bradford’s -Portuguese, in all eight thousand men, being now -on the right bank took post on the sand-hills for -the night. The next morning, sweeping in a half -circle round the citadel and its entrenchments, -they placed their left on the Adour above the fortress, -and their right on the same river below the place; -for the water here made such a bend in their -favour that their front was little more than two -miles wide, and for the most part covered by a -marshy ravine. This nice operation was effected -without opposition because the entrenched camps, -menaced by the troops on the other side of the -Adour, were so enormous that Thouvenot’s force -was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. Meanwhile -the bridge was constructed, about three miles -below Bayonne, at a place where the river was contracted -to eight hundred feet by strong retaining -walls, built with the view of sweeping away the -bar by increasing the force of the current. The -plan of the bridge and boom were the conception -of colonel Sturgeon and major Todd, but the -execution was confided entirely to the latter, who, -with a mind less brilliant than Sturgeon’s but more -indefatigable, very ably and usefully served his -country throughout this war.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_542"></a>[542]</span></p> - -<p>Twenty-six of the <span lang="fr">chasse-marées</span> moored head -and stern at distances of forty feet, reckoning from -centre to centre, were bound together with ropes, -two thick cables were then carried loosely across -their decks, and the ends being cast over the walls -on each bank were strained and fastened in various -modes to the sands. They were sufficiently slack to -meet the spring-tides which rose fourteen feet, and -planks were laid upon them without any supporting -beams. The boom, moored with anchors above and -below, was a double line of masts connected with -chains and cables, so as to form a succession of -squares, in the design that if a vessel broke through -the outside, it should by the shock turn round in the -square and become entangled with the floating -wrecks of the line through which it had broken. -Gun-boats, with aiding batteries on the banks, -were then stationed to protect the boom, and to -keep off fire-vessels, many row-boats were furnished -with grappling irons. The whole was by the united -labour of seamen and soldiers finished on the 26th. -And contrary to the general opinion on such matters, -major Todd assured the Author of this History that -he found the soldiers, with minds quickened by the -wider range and variety of knowledge attendant on -their service, more ready of resource and their -efforts, combined by a more regular discipline, of -more avail, with less loss of time, than the irregular -activity of the seamen.</p> - -<p>The agitation of the water in the river from the -force of the tides was generally so great that to -maintain a pontoon bridge on it was impossible. -A knowledge of this had rendered the French officers -too careless of watch and defence, and this year the -shifting sands had given the course of the Adour<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_543"></a>[543]</span> -such a slanting direction towards the west that it -run for some distance almost parallel to the shore; -the outer bank thus acting as a breakwater lessened -the agitation within and enabled the large two-masted -boats employed, to ride safely and support -the heaviest artillery and carriages. Nevertheless -this fortune, the errors of the enemy, the matchless -skill and daring of the British seamen, and the discipline -and intrepidity of the British soldiers, all -combined by the genius of Wellington, were necessary -to the success of this stupendous undertaking -which must always rank amongst the prodigies of -war.</p> - -<p>When the bridge was finished sir John Hope -resolved to contract his line of investment round -the citadel. This was a serious affair. The position -of the French outside that fort was exceedingly -strong, for the flanks were protected by ravines the -sides of which were covered with fortified villas; -and in the centre a ridge, along which the great -roads from Bordeaux and Peyrehorade led into -Bayonne, was occupied by the village and church of -St. Etienne, both situated on rising points of ground -strongly entrenched and under the fire of the citadel -guns. The allies advanced in three converging columns -covered by skirmishers. Their wings easily -attained the edges of the ravines at either side, resting -their flanks on the Adour above and below the -town, at about nine hundred yards from the enemy’s -works. But a severe action took place in the centre. -The assailing body composed of Germans and a -brigade of guards was divided into three parts -which should have attacked simultaneously, the -guards on the left, the light battalions of Germans -on the right, and their heavy infantry in the centre.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_544"></a>[544]</span> -The flanks were retarded by some accident and the -centre first attacked the heights of St. Etienne. The -French guns immediately opened from the citadel -and the skirmishing fire became heavy, but the Germans -stormed church and village, forced the entrenched -line of houses, and took a gun, which however -they could not carry off under the close fire -from the citadel. The wings then gained their -positions and the action ceased for a time, but the -people of Bayonne were in such consternation that -Thouvenot to re-assure them sallied at the head -of the troops. He charged the Germans twice and -fought well but was wounded and finally lost his gun -and the position of St. Etienne. There is no return -of the allies’ loss, it could not have been less than -five hundred men and officers of which four hundred -were Germans, and the latter were dissatisfied -that their conduct was unnoticed in the despatch: -an omission somewhat remarkable because their -conduct was by sir John Hope always spoken of -with great commendation.</p> - -<p>The new position thus gained was defended by -ravines on each flank, and the centre being close -to the enemy’s works on the ridge of St. Etienne -was entrenched. Preparations for besieging the -citadel were then commenced under the direction -of the German colonel Hartmann, a code of -signals was established, and infinite pains taken to -protect the bridge and to secure a unity of action -between the three investing bodies. The communications -however required complicated arrangements, -for the ground on the right bank of the river -being low was overflowed every tide, and would -have occasioned great difficulty but for the retaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_545"></a>[545]</span> -wall which being four feet thick was made use of -as a carriage road.</p> - -<p>While these events were in progress at Bayonne -lord Wellington pushed his operations on the Gaves -with great vigour. On the 21st he returned as we -have seen to Garris, the pontoons had already -reached that place and on the 23d they were carried -beyond the Gave de Mauleon. During his -absence the sixth and light divisions had come up, -and thus six divisions of infantry and two brigades -of cavalry were concentrated beyond that river on -the Gave d’Oleron, between Sauveterre and Navarrens. -Beresford meanwhile held the line of the -Bidouze down to its confluence with the Adour,<span class="sidenote">French Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -and apparently to distract the enemy threw a battalion -over the latter river near Urt, and collected -boats as if to form a bridge there. In the evening -he recalled this detachment, yet continued the -appearance of preparations for a bridge until late in -the 23d, when he moved forward and drove Foy’s -posts from the works at Oeyergave and Hastingues, -on the lower parts of the Oleron Gave, into the -entrenchments of the bridge-head at Peyrehorade. -The allies lost fifty men, principally Portuguese, but -Soult’s right and centre were thus held in check, -for Beresford having the fourth and seventh divisions -and Vivian’s cavalry was strong enough for -Foy at Peyrehorade and Taupin at the Bastide of -Beam. The rest of the French army was distributed -at Orthes and Sauveterre, feeling towards -Navarrens, and on the 24th Wellington put his troops -in motion to pass the Gave d’Oleron.</p> - -<p>During the previous days his movements and the -arrival of his reinforcements had again deceived the -French general, who seems to have known nothing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_546"></a>[546]</span> -of the presence of the light division, and imagined -the first division was at Came on the 22d as well as -the fourth and seventh divisions. However his -dispositions remained the same, he did not expect -to hold the Gave and looked to a final concentration -at Orthes.</p> - -<p>On the 24th Morillo reinforced with a strong detachment -of cavalry moved to the Laussette, a small -river running in front of Navarrens, where rough -ground concealed his real force, while his scouters -beat back the French outposts, and a battalion -marching higher up menaced the fords of the Gave -at Doguen, with a view to draw the attention of the -garrison of Navarrens from the ford of Ville Nave. -This ford about three miles below Doguen was the -point where lord Wellington designed really to -pass, and a great concentric movement was now in -progress towards it. Le Cor’s Portuguese division -marched from Gestas, the light division from Aroue -crossing the Soissons at Nabas; the second division, -three batteries of artillery, the pontoons, and -four regiments of cavalry moved from other points. -Favoured by the hilly nature of the country the -columns were well concealed from the enemy, and -at the same time the sixth division advanced towards -the fords of Montfort about three miles below that -of Ville Nave. A battalion of the second division -was sent to menace the ford of Barraute below -Monfort, while the third division, reinforced with a -brigade of hussars and the batteries of the second -division, marched by Osserain and Arriveriette -against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, with orders -to make a feint of forcing a passage there. The -bulk of the light cavalry remained in reserve under -Cotton, but Vivian’s hussars coming up from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_547"></a>[547]</span> -Beresford’s right, threatened all the fords between -Picton’s left and the Bastide of Beam; and below -this Bastide some detachments were directed upon -the fords of Sindos Castagnhede and Hauterive. -During this movement Beresford keeping Foy in -check at Peyrehorade with the seventh division, -sent the fourth towards Sordes and Leren above the -confluence of the Gaves to seek a fit place to throw -a bridge. Thus the whole of the French front was -menaced on a line of twenty-five miles, but the great -force was above Sauveterre.</p> - -<p>The first operations were not happily executed. -The columns directed on the side of Sindos missed -the fords. Picton opened a cannonade against -the bridge-head of Sauveterre and made four -companies of Keane’s brigade and some cavalry -pass the Gave in the vicinity of the bridge; they -were immediately assailed by a French regiment -and driven across the river again with a loss of -ninety men and officers, of whom some were drowned -and thirty were made prisoners, whereupon the -cavalry returned to the left bank and the cannonade -ceased. Nevertheless the diversion was complete -and the general operations were successful. Soult -on the first alarm drew Harispe from Sauveterre and -placed him on the road to Orthes at Monstrueig, -where a range of hills running parallel to the Gave -of Oleron separates it from that of Pau; thus only -a division of infantry and Berton’s cavalry remained -under Villatte at Sauveterre, and that general, notwithstanding -his success against the four companies, -alarmed by the vigour of Picton’s demonstrations, -abandoned his works on the left bank and -destroyed the bridge. Meanwhile the sixth division -passed without opposition at Montfort above Sauveterre,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_548"></a>[548]</span> -and at the same time the great body of the -other troops coming down upon the ford of Villenave -met only with a small cavalry picquet and -crossed with no more loss than two men drowned: -a happy circumstance for the waters were deep and -rapid, the cold intense, and the ford so narrow that -the passage was not completed before dark. To -have forced it in face of an enemy would have been -exceedingly difficult and dangerous, and it is remarkable -that Soult who was with Harispe, only -five miles from Montfort and about seven from Villenave, -should not have sent that general down to -oppose the passage. The heads of the allies’ columns -immediately pushed forward to the range of -hills before spoken of, the right being established -near Loubeing, the left towards Sauveterre, from -whence Villatte and Berton had been withdrawn -by Clauzel, who commanding at this part seems to -have kept a bad watch when Clinton passed at -Montfort.</p> - -<p>The French divisions now took a position to give -time for Taupin to retire from the lower parts of -the Gave of Oleron, towards the bridge of Berenx -on the Gave of Pau, for both he and Foy had received -orders to march upon Orthes and break down -all the bridges as they passed. When the night -fell Soult sent Harispe’s division also over the bridge -of Orthes and D’Erlon was already established in -that town, but general Clauzel remained until the -morning at Orion to cover the movement. Meanwhile -Pierre Soult, posted beyond Navarrens with -his cavalry and two battalions of infantry to watch -the road to Pau, was pressed by Morillo, and being -cut off from the army by the passage of the allies -at Villenave was forced to retreat by Monein.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_549"></a>[549]</span></p> - -<p>On the 25th at daylight, lord Wellington with -some cavalry and guns pushed Clauzel’s rear-guard -from Magret into the suburb of Orthes, which -covered the bridge of that place on the left bank. -He also cannonaded the French troops beyond the -river, and the Portuguese of the light division, skirmishing -with the French in the houses to prevent -the destruction of the bridge, lost twenty-five men.</p> - -<p>The second sixth and light divisions, Hamilton’s -Portuguese, five regiments of cavalry, and three -batteries were now massed in front of Orthes; the -third division and a brigade of cavalry was in front -of the broken bridge of Berenx about five miles -lower down the Gave; the fourth and seventh -divisions with Vivian’s cavalry were in front of -Peyrehorade, from whence Foy retired by the great -Bayonne road to Orthes. Affairs being in this state -Morillo was directed to invest Navarrens. And as -Mina’s battalions were no sure guarantee against -the combined efforts of the garrison of St. Jean -Pied de Port and the warlike inhabitants of Baygorry, -five British regiments, which had gone to the -rear for clothing and were now coming up separately, -were ordered to halt at St. Palais in observation, -relieving each other in succession as they arrived at -that place.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 26th, Beresford, finding -that Foy had abandoned the French works at Peyrehorade, -passed the Gave, partly by a pontoon bridge -partly by a ford, where the current <ins class="corr" id="tn-549" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'run so strong'"> -ran so strong</ins> that a column of the seventh division was like to -have been carried away bodily. He had previously -detached the eighteenth hussars to find another ford -higher up, and this being effected under the guidance -of a miller, the hussars gained the high road about<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_550"></a>[550]</span> -half-way between Peyrehorade and Orthes, and -drove some French cavalry through Puyoo and -Ramous. The French rallying upon their reserves<span class="sidenote">Memoir by colonel Hughes, eighteenth hussars, MSS.</span> -turned and beat back the foremost of the pursuers, -but they would not await the shock of the main -body now reinforced by Vivian’s brigade and commanded -by Beresford in person. In this affair major -Sewell, an officer of the staff, who had frequently -distinguished himself by his personal prowess, happening -to be without a sword, pulled a large stake -from a hedge and with that weapon overthrew two -hussars in succession, and only relinquished the -combat when a third had cut his club in twain.</p> - -<p>Beresford now threw out a detachment to Habas -on his left to intercept the enemy’s communication -with Dax, and lord Wellington immediately ordered -lord Edward Somerset’s cavalry and the third division -to cross the Gave by fords below the broken -bridge of Berenx. Then directing Beresford to -take a position for the night on some heights near -the village of Baïghts he proceeded to throw a pontoon -bridge at Berenx, and thus after a circuitous -march of more than fifty miles with his right wing -he again united it with his centre and secured a -direct communication with Hope.</p> - -<p>During the 25th and 26th he had carefully -examined Soult’s position. The bridge of Orthes -could not be easily forced. That ancient and beautiful -structure consisted of several irregular arches, -with a high tower in the centre the gateway of -which was built up by the French, the principal -arch in front of the tower was mined, and the -houses on both sides contributed to the defence. -The river above and below was deep and full of tall -pointed rocks, but above the town the water spreading<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_551"></a>[551]</span> -wide with flat banks presented the means of -crossing. Lord Wellington’s first design was to pass -there with Hill’s troops and the light division, but -when he heard that Beresford had crossed the Gave -he suddenly changed his design, and as we have seen -passed the third division over and threw his bridge -at Berenx. This operation was covered by Beresford, -while Soult’s attention was diverted by the continual -skirmish at the suburbs of Orthes, by the -appearance of Hill’s columns above, and by Wellington’s -taking cognizance of the position near the -bridge so openly as to draw a cannonade.</p> - -<p>The English general did not expect Soult would, -when he found Beresford and Picton were over the -Gave, await a battle, and his emissaries reported -that the French army was already in retreat, a -circumstance to be borne in mind because the next -day’s operation required success to justify it. Hope’s -happy passage of the Adour being now known that -officer was instructed to establish a line of communication -to the port of Lannes, where a permanent -bridge was to be formed with boats brought -up from Urt. A direct line of intercourse was -thus secured with the army at Bayonne. But lord -Wellington felt that he was pushing his operations -beyond his strength if Suchet should send reinforcements -to Soult; wherefore he called up Freyre’s -Spaniards, ordering that general to cross the Adour -below Bayonne, with two of his divisions and a -brigade of Portuguese nine-pounders, and join him -by the port of Lannes. O’Donnel’s Andalusians -and the prince of Anglona’s troops were also -directed to be in readiness to enter France.</p> - -<p>These orders were given with the greatest reluctance.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_552"></a>[552]</span></p> - -<p>The feeble resistance made by the French in the -difficult country already passed, left him without -much uneasiness as to the power of Soult’s army in -the field, but his disquietude was extreme about -the danger of an insurgent warfare. “Maintain -the strictest discipline, <em>without that we are lost</em>,” -was his expression to general Freyre, and he issued -a proclamation authorizing the people of the districts -he had overrun to arm themselves for the -preservation of order under the direction of their -mayors. He invited them to arrest all straggling -soldiers and followers of the army, and all plunderers -and evil-doers and convey them to head-quarters -with proof of their crimes, promising to punish the -culpable and to pay for all damages. At the same -time he confirmed all the local authorities who -chose to retain their offices, on the sole condition -of having no political or military intercourse with -the countries still possessed by the French army. -Nor was his proclamation a dead letter, for in the -night of the 25th the inhabitants of a village, -situated near the road leading from Sauveterre to -Orthes, shot one English soldier dead and wounded -a second who had come with others to plunder. -Lord Wellington caused the wounded man to be -hung as an example, and he also forced an English -colonel to quit the army for suffering his soldiers -to destroy the municipal archives of a small town.</p> - -<p>Soult had no thought of retreating. His previous -retrograde movements had been effected with order, -his army was concentrated with its front to the Gave, -and every bridge, except the noble structure at -Orthes the ancient masonry of which resisted his -mines, had been destroyed. One regiment of<span class="sidenote">Official Report, MSS.</span> -cavalry was detached on the right to watch the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_553"></a>[553]</span> -fords as far as Peyrehorade, three others with two -battalions of infantry under Pierre Soult watched -those between Orthes and Pau, and a body of horsemen<span class="sidenote">Memoir by general Berton, MSS.</span> -and <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> covered the latter town from -Morillo’s incursions. Two regiments of cavalry remained -with the army, and the French general’s -intention was to fall upon the head of the first -column which should cross the Gave. But the negligence<span class="sidenote"><span lang="fr">Canevas de faits par general Reille et colonel de la Chasse</span>, MS.</span> -of the officer stationed at Puyoo, who had -suffered Vivian’s hussars, as we have seen, to pass on -the 26th without opposition and without making -any report of the event, enabled Beresford to make -his movement in safety when otherwise he would -have been assailed by at least two-thirds of the -French army. It was not until three o’clock in the -evening that Soult received intelligence of his march, -and his columns were then close to Baïghts on the -right flank of the French army, his scouters were -on the Dax road in its rear, and at the same time -the sixth and light divisions were seen descending -by different roads from the heights beyond the river -pointing towards Berenx.</p> - -<p>In this crisis the French marshal hesitated whether -to fall upon Beresford and Picton while the latter -was still passing the river, or take a defensive position, -but finally judging that he had not time to form -his columns of attack he decided upon the latter. -Wherefore under cover of a skirmish, sustained<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -near Baïghts by a battalion of infantry which -coming from the bridge of Berenx was joined by -the light cavalry from Puyoo, he hastily threw D’Erlon’s -and Reille’s divisions on a new line across the -road from Peyrehorade. The right extended to the -heights of San Boës along which run the road -from Orthes to Dax, and this line was prolonged by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_554"></a>[554]</span> -Clauzel’s troops to Castetarbe a village close to the -Gave. Having thus opposed a temporary front to -Beresford he made his dispositions to receive battle -the next morning, bringing Villatte’s infantry and -Pierre Soult’s cavalry from the other side of Orthes -through that town, and it was this movement that -led lord Wellington’s emissaries to report that the -army was retiring.</p> - -<p>Soult’s new line was on a ridge of hills partly -wooded partly naked.</p> - -<p>In the centre was an open rounded hill from -whence long narrow tongues were pushed out, on -the French left towards the high road of Peyrehorade, -on their right by St. Boës towards the high -church of Baïghts, the whole presenting a concave -to the allies.</p> - -<p>The front was generally covered by a deep and -marshy ravine broken by two short tongues of land -which jutted out from the principal hill.</p> - -<p>The road from Orthes to Dax passed behind the -front to the village of St. Boës and thence along -the ridge forming the right flank.</p> - -<p>Behind the centre a succession of undulating -bare heathy hills trended for several miles to the rear, -but behind the right the country was low and deep.</p> - -<p>The town of Orthes, receding from the river up -the slope of a steep hill and terminating with an -ancient tower, was behind the left wing.</p> - -<p>General Reille, having Taupin’s, Roguet’s, and -Paris’s divisions under him, commanded on the right, -and occupied all the ground from the village of St. -Boës to the centre of the position.</p> - -<p>Count D’Erlon, commanding Foy’s and D’Armagnac’s -divisions, was on the left of Reille. He placed -the first along a ridge extending towards the road of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_555"></a>[555]</span> -Peyrehorade, the second in reserve. In rear of -this last Villatte’s division and the cavalry were<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -posted above the village of Rontun, that is to say, -on the open hills behind the main position. In this -situation with the right overlooking the low country -beyond St. Boës, and the left extended towards -Orthes this division furnished a reserve to both -D’Erlon and Reille.</p> - -<p>Harispe, whose troops as well as Villatte’s were -under Clauzel, occupied Orthes and the bridge, having -a regiment near the ford of Souars above the town. -Thus the French army extended from St. Boës to -Orthes, but the great mass was disposed towards the -centre. Twelve guns were attached to general Harispe’s -troops, twelve were upon the round hill in the -centre, sweeping in their range the ground beyond -St. Boës, and sixteen were in reserve on the Dax road.</p> - -<p>The 27th at day-break the sixth and light divisions, -having passed the Gave near Berenx by the -pontoon bridge thrown in the night, wound up a -narrow way between high rocks to the great road -of Peyrehorade. The third division and lord Edward -Somerset’s cavalry were already established there -in columns of march with skirmishers pushed forwards -to the edge of the wooded height occupied by -D’Erlon’s left, and Beresford with the fourth and seventh -divisions and Vivian’s cavalry had meanwhile -gained the ridge of St. Boës and approached the -Dax road beyond. Hill remained with the second -British, and Le Cor’s Portuguese divisions -menacing the bridge of Orthes and the ford of -Souars. Between Beresford and Picton, a distance -of a mile and a half, there were no troops; but -about half-way, exactly in front of the French -centre, was a Roman camp crowning an isolated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_556"></a>[556]</span> -peering hill of singular appearance and nearly as -lofty as the centre of Soult’s position.</p> - -<p>On this camp, now covered with vineyards, but -then open and grassy with a few trees, lord Wellington, -after viewing the country on Beresford’s left, -stopped for an hour or more to examine the enemy’s -disposition for battle. During this time the two -divisions were coming up from the river, but so -hemmed in by rocks that only a few men could -march abreast, and their point of union with the -third division was little more than cannon-shot from -the enemy’s position. The moment was critical, -Picton did not conceal his disquietude, but Wellington -undisturbed as the deep sea continued his -observations without seeming to notice the dangerous -position of his troops. When they had reached -the main road he reinforced Picton with the sixth, -and drew the light division by cross roads behind -the Roman camp, thus connecting his wings and -forming a central reserve. From this point bye-ways -led, on the left to the high church of Baïghts -and the Dax road, on the right to the Peyrehorade -road; and two others led straight across the marsh -to the French position.</p> - -<p>This marsh, the open hill about which Soult’s -guns and reserves were principally gathered, the form -and nature of the ridges on the flanks, all combined -to forbid an attack in front, and the flanks were -scarcely more promising. The extremity of the -French left sunk indeed to a gentle undulation in -crossing the Peyrehorade road, yet it would have -been useless to push troops on that line towards -Orthes, between D’Erlon and Caste Tarbe, for the -town was strongly occupied by Harispe and was -there covered by an ancient wall and the bed of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_557"></a>[557]</span> -torrent. It was equally difficult to turn the St. -Boës flank because of the low marshy country into -which the troops must have descended beyond the -Dax road; and the brows of the hills trending -backwards from the centre of the French position -would have enabled Soult to oppose a new and -formidable front at right angles to his actual position. -The whole of the allied army must therefore -have made a circuitous flank movement within -gun-shot and through a most difficult country, or -Beresford’s left must have been dangerously extended -and the whole line weakened. Nor could -the movement be hidden, because the hills although -only moderately high were abrupt on that side, affording -a full view of the low country, and Soult’s -cavalry detachments were in observation on every -brow.</p> - -<p>It only remained to assail the French flanks along -the ridges, making the principal efforts on the side -of St. Boës, with intent if successful to overlap -the French right beyond, and seize the road of -St. Sever while Hill passed the Gave at Souars -and cut off the road to Pau, thus enclosing the -beaten army in Orthes. This was however no -slight affair. On Picton’s side it was easy to obtain -a footing on the flank ridge near the high road, but -beyond that the ground rose rapidly and the French -were gathered thickly with a narrow front and -plenty of guns. On Beresford’s side they could -only be assailed along the summit of the St. Boës -ridge, advancing from the high church of Baïghts -and the Dax road. But the village of St. Boës was -strongly occupied, the ground immediately behind it -was strangled to a narrow pass by the ravine, and the -French reserve of sixteen guns, placed on the Dax<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_558"></a>[558]</span> -road, behind the hill in the centre of Soult’s line, -and well covered from counter-fire, was in readiness -to crush the head of any column which should -emerge from the gorge of St. Boës.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF ORTHES.</h4> - -<p>During the whole morning a slight skirmish with -now and then a cannon-shot had been going on -with the third division on the right, and the French -cavalry at times pushed parties forward on each -flank, but at nine o’clock Wellington commenced -the real attack. The third and sixth divisions won -without difficulty the lower part of the ridges opposed -to them, and endeavoured to extend their left -along the French front with a sharp fire of musquetry; -but the main battle was on the other flank. -There general Cole, keeping Anson’s brigade of -the fourth division in reserve, assailed St. Boës -with Ross’s British brigade and Vasconcellos’ Portuguese; -his object was to get on to the open -ground beyond it, but fierce and slaughtering was -the struggle. Five times breaking through the -scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the -wider space beyond; yet ever as the troops issued -forth the French guns from the open hill smote -them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax -road swept through them with grape from flank to -flank. And then Taupin’s supporting masses rushed -forwards with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks -with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on -either hand, forced the shattered columns back into -the village. It was in vain that with desperate -valour the allies time after time broke through the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_559"></a>[559]</span> -narrow way and struggled to spread a front beyond, -Ross fell dangerously wounded, and Taupin, whose troops -were clustered thickly and well supported -defied their utmost efforts. Nor was Soult less happy -on the other side. The nature of the ground -would not permit the third and sixth divisions to -engage many men at once, so that no progress was -made; and one small detachment which Picton extended -to his left, having made an attempt to gain -the smaller tongue jutting out from the central hill, -was suddenly charged, as it neared the summit, by -Foy, and driven down again in confusion, losing several -prisoners.</p> - -<p>When the combat had thus continued with unabated -fury on the side of St. Boës for about three -hours, lord Wellington sent a caçadore regiment of -the light division from the Roman camp to protect -the right flank of Ross’s brigade against the French -skirmishers; but this was of no avail, for Vasconcellos’ -Portuguese, unable to sustain the violence -of the enemy any longer, gave way in disorder, -and the French pouring on, the British troops retreated -through St. Boës with difficulty. As this -happened at the moment when the detachment on -Picton’s left was repulsed, victory seemed to declare -for the French, and Soult, conspicuous on his commanding -open hill, the knot of all his combinations, -seeing his enemies thus broken and thrown backwards -on each side put all his reserves in movement -to complete the success. It is said that in the exultation -of the moment he smote his thigh exclaiming, -“<em>At last I have him</em>.” Whether this be so or -not it was no vain-glorious speech, for the moment -was most dangerous. There was however a small -black cloud rising just beneath him, unheeded at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_560"></a>[560]</span> -first amidst the thundering din and tumult that -now shook the field of battle, but which soon burst -with irresistible violence. Wellington seeing that -St. Boës was inexpugnable had suddenly changed -his plan of battle. Supporting Ross with Anson’s -brigade which had not hitherto been engaged, he -backed both with the seventh division and Vivian’s -cavalry now forming one heavy body towards the -Dax road. Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions -to be thrown in mass upon Foy’s left flank, -and at the same time sent the fifty-second regiment -down from the Roman camp with instructions -to cross the marsh in front, to mount the French -ridge beyond, and to assail the flank and rear of the -troops engaged with the fourth division at St. Boës.</p> - -<p>Colonel Colborne, so often distinguished in this war, -immediately led the fifty-second down and crossed -the marsh under fire, the men sinking at every step -above the knees, in some places to the middle, but -still pressing forwards with that stern resolution and -order to be expected from the veterans of the light -division, soldiers who had never yet met their match -in the field. They soon obtained footing on firm -land and ascended the heights in line at the moment -that Taupin was pushing vigorously through -St. Boës, Foy and D’Armagnac, hitherto more than -masters of their positions, being at the same time -seriously assailed on the other flank by the third and -sixth divisions. With a mighty shout and a rolling -fire the fifty-second soldiers dashed forwards between -Foy and Taupin, beating down a French battalion in -their course and throwing everything before them -into disorder. General Bechaud was killed in Taupin’s -division, Foy was dangerously wounded, and -his troops, discouraged by his fall and by this sudden<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_561"></a>[561]</span> -burst from a quarter where no enemy was expected, -for the march of the fifty-second had been -hardly perceived save by the skirmishers, got into -confusion, and the disorder spreading to Reille’s wing<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.</span> -he also was forced to fall back and take a new position -to restore his line of battle. The narrow pass behind -St. Boës was thus opened, and Wellington seizing -the critical moment thrust the fourth and seventh -divisions, Vivian’s cavalry, and two batteries of artillery -through, and spread a front beyond.</p> - -<p>The victory was thus secured. For the third and -sixth divisions had now won D’Armagnac’s position -and established a battery of guns on a knoll, from -whence their shot ploughed through the French -masses from one flank to another. Suddenly a -squadron of French chasseurs came at a hard gallop -down the main road of Orthes to charge these guns, -and sweeping to their right they rode over some of -the sixth division which had advanced too far; but -pushing this charge too madly got into a hollow -lane and were nearly all destroyed. The third and -seventh divisions then continued to advance and the -wings of the army were united. The French general -rallied all his forces on the open hills beyond the -Dax road, and with Taupin’s, Roguet’s, Paris’, and -D’Armagnac’s divisions made strong battle to cover -the reformation of Foy’s disordered troops, but -his foes were not all in front. This part of the -battle was fought with only two-thirds of the -allied army. Hill who had remained with twelve -thousand combatants, cavalry and infantry, before -the bridge of Orthes, received orders, when Wellington -changed his plan of attack, to force the passage -of the Gave, partly in the view of preventing Harispe -from falling upon the flank of the sixth division,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_562"></a>[562]</span> -partly in the hope of a successful issue to the attempt: -and so it happened. Hill though unable to -force the bridge, forded the river above at Souars, -and driving back the troops posted there seized the -heights above, cut off the French from the road to -Pau, and turned the town of Orthes. He thus -menaced Soult’s only line of retreat by Salespice, on -the road to St. Sever, at the very moment when the -fifty-second having opened the defile of St. Boës -the junction of the allies’ wings was effected on the -French position.</p> - -<p>Clauzel immediately ordered Harispe to abandon -Orthes and close towards Villatte on the heights -above Rontun, leaving however some conscript battalions -on a rising point beyond the road of St. Sever -called the “<em>Motte de Turenne</em>.” Meanwhile in person -he endeavoured to keep general Hill in check -by the menacing action of two cavalry regiments -and a brigade of infantry; but Soult arrived at the -moment and seeing that the loss of Souars had rendered -his whole position untenable, gave orders for -a general retreat.</p> - -<p>This was a perilous matter. The heathy hills -upon which he was now fighting, although for a -short distance they furnished a succession of parallel -positions favourable enough for defence, soon resolved -themselves into a low ridge running to the -rear on a line parallel with the road to St. Sever; -and on the opposite side of that road about cannon-shot -distance was a corresponding ridge along which -general Hill, judging by the firing how matters went, -was now rapidly advancing. Five miles distant was -the <em>Luy de Bearn</em>, and four miles beyond that the -<em>Luy de France</em>, two rivers deep and with difficult -banks. Behind these the Lutz, the Gabas, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_563"></a>[563]</span> -Adour, crossed the line, and though once beyond -the wooden bridge of Sault de Navailles on the <em>Luy -de Bearn</em>, these streams would necessarily cover the -retreat, to carry off by one road and one bridge a -defeated army still closely engaged in front seemed -impossible. Nevertheless Soult did so. For Paris -sustained the fight on his right until Foy and Taupin’s -troops rallied, and when the impetuous assault of the -fifty-second and the rush of the fourth and seventh -divisions drove Paris back, D’Armagnac interposed -to cover him until the union of the allies’ wings was -completed, then both retired, being covered in turn -by Villatte. In this manner the French yielded, -step by step and without confusion, the allies advancing -with an incessant deafening musketry and -cannonade, yet losing many men especially on the -right where the third division were very strongly -opposed. However as the danger of being cut off -at Salespice by Hill became more imminent the -retrograde movements were more hurried and confused; -Hill seeing this, quickened his pace until -at last both sides began to run violently, and so many -men broke from the French ranks making across the -fields towards the fords, and such a rush was necessarily -made by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de -Navailles, that the whole country was covered with -scattered bands. Sir Stapleton Cotton then breaking -with lord Edward Somerset’s hussars through a -small covering body opposed to him by Harispe -sabred two or three hundred men, and the seventh -hussars cut off about two thousand who threw down -their arms in an enclosed field; yet some confusion -or mismanagement occurring the greatest part recovering -their weapons escaped, and the pursuit -ceased at the Luy of Bearn.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_564"></a>[564]</span></p> - -<p>The French army appeared to be entirely dispersed, -but it was more disordered in appearance -than reality, for Soult passed the Luy of Bearn and -destroyed the bridge with the loss of only six guns -and less than four thousand men killed wounded -and prisoners. Many thousands of conscripts however -threw away their arms, and we shall find one -month afterwards the stragglers still amounting to -three thousand. Nor would the passage of the river -have been effected so happily if lord Wellington had -not been struck by a musket-ball just above the -thigh, which caused him to ride with difficulty, -whereby the vigour and unity of the pursuit was -necessarily abated. The loss of the allies was two -thousand three hundred, of which fifty with three -officers were taken, but among the wounded were -lord Wellington, general Walker, general Ross, and -the duke of Richmond, then lord March. He had -served on lord Wellington’s personal staff during the -whole war without a hurt, but being made a captain -in the fifty-second, like a good soldier joined his regiment -the night before the battle. He was shot -through the chest a few hours afterwards, thus learning -by experience, the difference between the labours -and dangers of staff and regimental officers, which -are generally in the inverse ratio to their promotions.</p> - -<p>General Berton, stationed between Pau and Orthes<span class="sidenote">Memoir by general Berton, MSS.</span> -during the battle, had been cut off by Hill’s -movement, yet skirting that general’s march he retreated -by Mant and Samadet with his cavalry, -picking up two battalions of conscripts on the road. -Meanwhile Soult having no position to rally upon, -continued his retreat in the night to St. Sever, breaking -down all the bridges behind him. Lord Wellington -pursued at daylight in three columns, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_565"></a>[565]</span> -right by Lacadée and St. Medard to Samadet, the -centre by the main road, the left by St. Cricq. At -St. Sever he hoped to find the enemy still in confusion, -but he was too late; the French were across -the river, the bridge was broken, and the army halted. -The result of the battle was however soon made -known far and wide, and Darricau who with a few -hundred soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent -levy at Dax, the works of which were incomplete -and still unarmed, immediately destroyed part -of the stores, the rest had been removed to Mont -Marsan, and retreated through the Landes to Langon -on the Garonne.</p> - -<p>From St. Sever which offered no position Soult -turned short to the right and moved upon Barcelona -higher up the Adour; but he left D’Erlon with -two divisions of infantry some cavalry and four guns -at Caceres on the right bank, and sent Clauzel to -occupy Aire on the other side of the river. He thus -abandoned his magazines at Mont Marsan and left -open the direct road to Bordeaux, but holding -Caceres with his right he commanded another road -by Rocquefort to that city, while his left being at -Aire protected the magazines and artillery parc at -that place and covered the road to Pau. Meanwhile -the main body at Barcelona equally supported -Clauzel and D’Erlon, and covered the great roads -leading to Agen and Toulouse on the Garonne, and -to the mountains by Tarbes.</p> - -<p>In this situation it was difficult to judge what -line of operations he meant to adopt. Wellington -however passed the Adour about one o’clock, partly -by the repaired bridge of St. Sever partly by a deep -ford below, and immediately detached Beresford -with the light division and Vivian’s cavalry to seize<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_566"></a>[566]</span> -the magazines at Mont Marsan; at the same time -he pushed the head of a column towards Caceres -where a cannonade and charge of cavalry had place, -and a few men and officers were hurt on both -sides. The next day Hill’s corps marching from -Samadet reached the Adour between St. Sever -and Aire, and D’Erlon was again assailed on the -right bank and driven back skirmishing to Barcelona. -This event proved that Soult had abandoned -Bordeaux, but the English general could not push -the pursuit more vigorously, because every bridge -was broken and a violent storm on the evening of -the 1st had filled the smaller rivers and torrents, -carried away the pontoon bridges, and cut off all -communication between the troops and the supplies.</p> - -<p>The bulk of the army was now necessarily halted<span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -on the right bank of the Adour until the bridges -could be repaired, but Hill who was on the left bank -marched to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in -two columns from St. Savin and St. Gillies on the -2d, he reached his destination about three o’clock -with two divisions of infantry a brigade of cavalry -and a battery of horse-artillery; he expected no -serious opposition, but general Clauzel had arrived -a few hours before and was in order of battle covering -the town with Villatte’s and Harispe’s divisions -and some guns. The French occupied a steep ridge -in front of Aire, high and wooded on the right -where it overlooked the river, but merging on the -left into a wide table-land over which the great road -led to Pau. The position was strong for battle yet -it could be readily outflanked on the left by the -table-land, and was an uneasy one for retreat on the -right where the ridge was narrow, the ravine behind -steep and rugged with a mill-stream at the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_567"></a>[567]</span> -bottom between it and the town. A branch of the -Adour also flowing behind Aire cut it off from Barcelona, -while behind the left wing was the greater -Lees a river with steep banks and only one bridge.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF AIRE.</h4> - -<p>General Hill arriving about two o’clock attacked -without hesitation. General Stewart with -two British brigades fell on the French right, a -Portuguese brigade assailed their centre, and the -other brigades followed in columns of march. The -action was however very sudden, the Portuguese -were pushed forward in a slovenly manner by -general Da Costa, a man of no ability, and the -French under Harispe met them on the flat summit -of the height with so rough a charge that they gave -way in flight. The rear of the allies’ column being -still in march the battle was like to be lost, but -general Stewart having by this time won the -heights on the French right, where Villatte, fearing -to be enclosed made but a feeble resistance, immediately -detached general Barnes with the fiftieth and -ninety-second regiments to the aid of the Portuguese. -The vehement charge of these troops turned the -stream of battle, the French were broken in turn and -thrown back on their reserves, yet they rallied and -renewed the action with great courage, fighting -obstinately until General Byng’s British brigade -came up, when Harispe was driven towards the -river Lees, and Villate quite through the town of -Aire into the space between the two branches of -the Adour behind.</p> - -<p>General Reille who was at Barcelona when the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_568"></a>[568]</span> -action began, brought up Roguet’s division to support -Villatte, the combat was thus continued until -night at that point, meanwhile Harispe crossed -the Lees and broke the bridge, but the French lost -many men. Two generals, Dauture and Gasquet, -were wounded, a colonel of engineers was killed, a -hundred prisoners were taken, many of Harispe’s -conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their -homes, and the magazines fell into the conqueror’s -hands. The loss of the British troops was one hundred -and fifty, general Barnes was wounded and -colonel Hood killed. The loss of the Portuguese was -never officially stated, yet it could not have been -less than that of the British, and the vigour of the -action proved that the French courage was very -little abated by the battle of Orthes. Soult immediately -retreated up the Adour by both banks towards -Maubourget and Marciac, and he was not -followed for new combinations were now opened -to the generals on both sides.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. On the 14th of February the passage of the -Gaves was commenced, by Hill’s attack on Harispe -at Hellette. On the 2d of March the first series of -operations was terminated by the combat at Aire. -In these sixteen days lord Wellington traversed -with his right wing eighty miles, passed five large -and several small rivers, forced the enemy to abandon -two fortified bridge-heads and many minor -works, gained one great battle and two combats, -captured six guns and about a thousand prisoners, -seized the magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_569"></a>[569]</span> -Aire, forced Soult to abandon Bayonne and cut him -off from Bordeaux. And in this time he also threw -his stupendous bridge below Bayonne and closely -invested that fortress after a sharp and bloody -action. Success in war like charity in religion -covers a multitude of sins; but success often belongs -to fortune as much as skill, and the combinations -of Wellington, profound and sagacious, might -in this manner be confounded with the lucky operations -of the allies on the other side of France, where -the presumption and the vacillation of ignorance -alternately predominated.</p> - -<p>2º. Soult attributed the loss of his positions to the -superior forces of the allies. Is this well-founded? -The French general’s numbers cannot be determined -exactly, but after all his losses in December, after -the detachments made by the emperor’s order in -January, and after completing the garrison of -Bayonne to fourteen thousand men, he informed the<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -minister of war that thirty thousand infantry, three -thousand cavalry and forty pieces of artillery were -in line. This did not include the conscripts of the -new levy, all youths indeed and hastily sent to the -army by battalions as they could be armed, but brave -and about eight thousand of them might have joined -before the battle of Orthes. Wherefore deducting -the detachments of cavalry and infantry under -Berton on the side of Pau, and under Daricau on -the side of Dax, it may be said that forty thousand -combatants of all arms were engaged in that action. -Thirty-five thousand were very excellent soldiers, for -the conscripts of the old levy who joined before the -battle of the Nivelle were stout men; their vigorous -fighting at Garris and Aire proved it, for of them -was Harispe’s division composed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_570"></a>[570]</span></p> - -<p>Now lord Wellington commenced his operations -with the second third fourth and seventh British -divisions, the independent Portuguese division under -Le Cor, Morillo’s Spaniards, forty-eight pieces of -artillery, and only four brigades of light cavalry, -for Vandaleur’s brigade remained with Hope and all -the heavy cavalry and the Portuguese were left in -Spain. Following the morning states of the army, -this would furnish, exclusive of Morillo’s Spaniards, -something more than forty thousand fighting men -and officers of all arms, of which four thousand were -horsemen. But five regiments of infantry, and -amongst them two of the strongest British regiments -of the light division, were absent to receive their -clothing; deduct these and we have about thirty-seven -thousand Anglo-Portuguese combatants. It -is true that Mina’s battalions and Morillo’s aided in -the commencement of the operations, but the first -immediately invested St. Jean Pied de Port and the -latter invested Navarrens. Lord Wellington was -therefore in the battle superior by a thousand horsemen -and eight guns, but Soult outnumbered him in -infantry by four or five thousand, conscripts it is -true, yet useful. Why then was the passage of the -Gaves so feebly disputed? Because the French -general remained entirely on the defensive in positions -too extended for his numbers.</p> - -<p>3º. <em>Offensive operations must be the basis of a good -defensive system.</em> Let Soult’s operations be tried by -this rule. On the 12th he knew that the allies were -in motion for some great operation and he judged -rightly that it was to drive him from the Gaves. -From the 14th to the 18th his left was continually -assailed by very superior numbers, but during part -of that time Beresford could only oppose to his right<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_571"></a>[571]</span> -and centre, the fourth and a portion of the seventh -divisions with some cavalry; and those not in a -body and at once but parcelled and extended, for -it was not until the 16th that the fourth seventh -and light divisions were so closed towards the Bidouze -as to act in one mass. On the 15th lord Wellington -admitted that his troops were too extended, -Villatte’s, Taupin’s, and Foy’s divisions, were never -menaced until the 18th, and there was nothing to -prevent D’Erlon’s divisions which only crossed the -Adour on the 17th from being on the Bidouze the -15th. Soult might therefore by rapid and well-digested -combinations have united four divisions of -infantry and a brigade of cavalry to attack Beresford -on the 15th or 16th between the Nive and the -Adour. If successful the defeated troops, pushed -back upon the sixth division, must have fought for -life with the rivers on their flanks, Soult in front, -and the garrison of Bayonne issuing from the works -of Mousseroles on their rear. If unsuccessful the -French retreat behind the Gave of Oleron could not -have been prevented.</p> - -<p>It is however to be pleaded that Soult was not -exactly informed of the numbers and situation of -his opponents. He thought Beresford had the first<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.</span> -division also on the Lower Bidouze; he knew that -Wellington had large reserves to employ, and, that -general’s design of passing the Adour below Bayonne -being unknown to him, he naturally supposed -they would be used to support the operations on the -Gaves: he therefore remained on the defensive. It -might possibly also have been difficult to bring -D’Erlon’s division across the Adour by the Port de -Lannes before the 17th, because the regular bridge -had been carried away and the communications interrupted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_572"></a>[572]</span> -a few days before by the floods. In fine -there are many matters of detail in war known only -to a general-in-chief which forbid the best combinations, -and this it is that makes the art so difficult -and uncertain. Great captains worship Fortune.</p> - -<p>On the 24th the passage of the Gave d’Oleron -was effected. Soult then recognised his error and -concentrated his troops at Orthes to retake the offensive. -It was a fine movement and effected with ability, -but he suffered another favourable opportunity -of giving a counter-blow to escape him. The infantry -under Villatte, Harispe, and Paris, supported -by a brigade of cavalry, were about Sauveterre, that -is to say, four miles from Montfort and only seven -from Villenave, where the principal passage was -effected, where the ford was deep, the stream rapid, -and the left bank although favourable for the passage -not entirely commanding the right bank. How -then did it happen that the operation was effected -without opposition? Amongst the allies it was -rumoured at the time that Soult complained of the -negligence of a general who had orders to march -against the passing troops. The position of Harispe’s -division at Monstrueig, forming a reserve at -equal distances from Sauveterre and Villenave, would -seem to have been adopted with that view, but I -find no confirmation of the report in Soult’s correspondence, -and it is certain he thought Picton’s -demonstrations at Sauveterre was a real attack.</p> - -<p>4º. The position adopted by the French general -at Orthes was excellent for offence. It was not so -for defence, when Beresford and Picton had crossed -the Gave below in force. Lord Wellington could -then throw his whole army on that side, and secure -his communication with Hope, after which outflanking<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_573"></a>[573]</span> -the right of the French he could seize the -defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from -their magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan and Aire, -and force them to retreat by the Pau road leaving -open the way to Bordeaux. To await this -attack was therefore an error, but Soult’s original<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -design was to assail the head of the first column -which should come near him and Beresford’s approach -to Baïghts on the 26th furnished the opportunity. -It is true that the French light cavalry -gave intelligence of that general’s march too late -and marred the combination, but there was still time -to fall on the head of the column while the third -division was in the act of passing the river and entangled -in the narrow way leading from the ford to<span class="sidenote">Notes by general Reille and colonel De la Chasse, MSS.</span> -the Peyrehorade road: it is said the French marshal -appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally -took a defensive position in which to receive battle.</p> - -<p>However when the morning came he neglected -another opportunity. For two hours the third division -and the hussars remained close to him, covering -the march of the sixth and light divisions through the -narrow ways leading from the bridge of Berenx up -to the main road; the infantry had no defined position, -the cavalry had no room to extend, and there -were no troops between them and Beresford who -was then in march by the heights of Baïghts to the -Dax road. If the French general had pushed a -column across the marsh to seize the Roman camp -he would have separated the wings of the allies; then -pouring down the Peyrehorade road with Foy’s, D’Armagnac’s -and Villatte’s divisions he would probably -have overwhelmed the third division before the other -two could have extricated themselves from the defiles. -Picton therefore had grounds for uneasiness.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_574"></a>[574]</span></p> - -<p>With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of -battle at Orthes, fiercely and strongly did he fight, -and wonderfully did he effect his retreat across the -Luy of Bearn, but twice in twenty-four hours he -had neglected those happy occasions which in war -take birth and flight at the same instant; and as -the value of his position, essentially an offensive one, -was thereby lost, a slowness to strike may be objected -to his generalship. Yet there is no commander, -unless a Hannibal or a Napoleon surpassing -the human proportions, but will abate something of -his confidence and hesitate after repeated defeats, -Soult in this campaign as in many others proved -himself a hardy captain full of resources.</p> - -<p>5º. Lord Wellington with a vastness of conception -and a capacity for arrangement and combination -equal to his opponent, possessed in a high degree -that daring promptness of action, that faculty -of inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole -campaigns with which Napoleon was endowed beyond -all mankind. It is this which especially constitutes -military genius. For so vast so complicated -are the combinations of war, so easily and by such -slight causes are they affected, that the best generals -do but grope in the dark, and they acknowledge the -humiliating truth. By the number and extent of -their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors, -the merit of commanders is to be measured.</p> - -<p>In this campaign lord Wellington designed to -penetrate France, not with a hasty incursion but -solidly, to force Soult over the Garonne, and if possible -in the direction of Bordeaux, because it was -the direct line, because the citizens were inimical -to the emperor, and the town, lying on the left bank -of the river, could not be defended; because a junction<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_575"></a>[575]</span> -with Suchet would thus be prevented. Finally -if by operating against Soult’s left he could throw -the French army into the Landes, where his own -superior cavalry could act, it would probably be -destroyed.</p> - -<p>To operate against Soult’s left in the direction of -Pau was the most obvious method of preventing a -junction with Suchet, and rendering the positions -which the French general had fortified on the Gaves -useless. But the investment of Bayonne required a -large force, which was yet weak against an outer -attack because separated in three parts by the rivers; -hence if lord Wellington had made a wide movement -on Pau, Soult might have placed the Adour -between him and the main army and then fallen upon -Hope’s troops on the right side of that river. The -English general was thus reduced to act upon a -more contracted line, and to cross all the Gaves. -To effect this he collected his principal mass on his -right by the help of the great road leading to St. -Jean Pied de Port, then by rapid marches and reiterated -attacks he forced the passage of the rivers -above the points which Soult had fortified for defence, -and so turned that general’s left with the view -of finally cutting him off from Suchet and driving -him into the wilderness of the Landes. During these -marches he left Beresford on the lower parts of the -rivers to occupy the enemy’s attention and cover the -troops blockading Mousseroles. Meanwhile by the -collection of boats at Urt and other demonstrations -indicating a design of throwing a bridge over the -Adour above Bayonne, he diverted attention from -the point chosen below the fortress for that operation, -and at the same time provided the means of -throwing another bridge at the Port de Lannes to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_576"></a>[576]</span> -secure the communication with Hope by the right -bank whenever Soult should be forced to abandon -the Gaves. These were fine combinations.</p> - -<p>I have shown that Beresford’s corps was so weak -at first that Soult might have struck a counter-blow. -Lord Wellington admitted the error. Writing -on the 15th he says, “If the enemy stand upon -the Bidouze I am not so strong as I ought to -be,” and he ordered up the fourth and light divisions; -but this excepted, his movements were conformable -to the principles of war. He chose the -best strategic line of operations, his main attack -was made with heavy masses against the enemy’s -weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and -daring. His conduct was conformable also to his -peculiar situation. He had two distinct operations -in hand, namely to throw his bridge below Bayonne -and to force the Gaves. He had the numbers required -to obtain these objects but dared not use -them lest he should put the Spanish troops into -contact with the French people; yet he could not entirely -dispense with them; wherefore bringing Freyre -up to Bayonne, Morillo to Navarrens, and Mina to -St. Jean Pied de Port, he seemed to put his whole -army in motion, thus gaining the appearance of -military strength with as little political danger as -possible. Nevertheless so terrible had the Spaniards -already made themselves by their cruel lawless -habits that their mere return across the frontier -threw the whole country into consternation.</p> - -<p>6º. When in front of Orthes it would at first sight -appear as if lord Wellington had changed his plan -of driving the enemy upon the Landes, but it was -not so. He did not expect a battle on the 27th. -This is proved by his letter to sir John Hope in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_577"></a>[577]</span> -which he tells that general that he anticipated no -difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau, that on the -evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring, and -that he designed to visit the position at Bayonne. -To pass the Gave in the quickest and surest manner, -to re-establish the direct communications with Hope -and to unite with Beresford, were his immediate -objects; if he finally worked by his left it was a -sudden act and extraneous to the general design, -which was certainly to operate with Hill’s corps and -the light division by the right.</p> - -<p>It was after passing the Gave at Berenx on the -morning of the 27th lord Wellington first discovered -Soult’s intention to fight, and that consequently -he was himself in a false position. Had he -shewn any hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured -to take a defensive position with either -Beresford’s or Picton’s troops, he would inevitably -have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous -situation. Instead of this, judging that -Soult would not on the instant change from the -defensive to the offensive, he confidently pushed -Picton’s skirmishers forward as if to assail the left -of the French position, and put Beresford in movement -against their right, and this with all the -coolness imaginable. The success was complete. -Soult who supposed the allies stronger than they -really were, naturally imagined the wings would not -be so bold unless well supported in the centre where -the Roman camp could hide a multitude. He therefore -held fast to his position until the movement -was more developed, and in two hours the sixth -and light divisions were up and the battle commenced. -It was well fought on both sides but the -crisis was decided by the fifty-second, and when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_578"></a>[578]</span> -that regiment was put in movement only a single -Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the -Roman camp: upon such nice combinations of time -and place does the fate of battles turn.</p> - -<p>7º. Soult certainly committed an error in receiving -battle at Orthes, and it has been said that lord -Wellington’s wound at the most critical period of -the retreat alone saved the hostile army. Nevertheless -the clear manner in which the French general -carried his troops away, his prompt judgement, -shown in the sudden change of his line of -retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which -he halted and showed front again at Caceres, Barcelonne, -and Aire, were all proofs of no common -ability. It was Wellington’s aim to drive the French -on to the Landes, Soult’s to avoid this, he therefore -shifted from the Bordeaux line to that of Toulouse, -not in confusion but with the resolution of a -man ready to dispute every foot of ground. The -loss of the magazines at Mont Marsan was no fault<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -of his; he had given orders for transporting them -towards the Toulouse side fifteen days before, but -the matter depending upon the civil authorities was -neglected. He was blamed by some of his officers -for fighting at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover -the magazines there, and essential to his design of -keeping up the courage of the soldiers under the -adverse circumstances which he anticipated. And -here the palm of generalship remained with him, -for certainly the battle of Orthes was less decisive -than it should have been. I speak not of the pursuit -to Sault de Navailles, nor of the next day’s -march upon St. Sever, but of Hill’s march on the -right. That general halted near Samade the 28th, -reached St. Savin on the Adour the 1st and fought<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_579"></a>[579]</span> -the battle of Aire on the evening of the 2d of March. -But from Samadet to Aire is not longer than from -Samadet to St. Savin where he was on the 1st. He -could therefore, if his orders had prescribed it so, -have seized Aire on the 1st before Clauzel arrived, -and thus spared the obstinate combat at that place. -It may also be observed that his attack did not -receive a right direction. It should have been -towards the French left, because they were more -weakly posted there, and the ridge held by their -right was so difficult to retire from, that no troops -would stay on it if any progress was made on the -left. This was however an accident of war, general -Hill had no time to examine the ground, his orders -were to attack, and to fall without hesitation upon -a retiring enemy after such a defeat as Orthes was -undoubtedly the right thing to do; but it cannot -be said that lord Wellington pushed the pursuit -with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm on the -evening of the 1st he could have reinforced Hill -and should not have given the French army time to -recover from their recent defeat. “The secret of -war,” says Napoleon, “is to march twelve leagues, -fight a battle and march twelve more in pursuit.”</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_580"></a>[580]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">Extremely perilous and disheartening was the<span class="sidenote9">1814. March.</span> -situation of the French general. His army was -greatly reduced by his losses in battle and by the -desertion of the conscripts, and three thousand -stragglers, old soldiers who ought to have rejoined -their eagles, were collected by different generals, into -whose districts they had wandered, and employed to -strengthen detached corps instead of being restored -to the army. All his magazines were taken, discontent -the natural offspring of misfortune prevailed -amongst his officers, a powerful enemy was in front, -no certain resources of men or money behind, and -his efforts were ill-seconded by the civil authorities. -The troops indignant at the people’s apathy -behaved with so much violence and insolence, -especially during the retreat from St. Sever, that -Soult, who wanted officers very badly, proposed to<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -fill the vacancies from the national guards that -he might have “men who would respect property.” -On the other hand the people comparing the conduct -of their own army with the discipline of the -Anglo-Portuguese, and contrasting the requisitions -necessarily imposed by their countrymen with the -ready and copious disbursements in gold made by -their enemies, for now one commissary preceded each -division to order rations for the troops and another -followed to arrange and pay on the spot, were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_581"></a>[581]</span> -become so absolutely averse to the French army -that Soult writing to the minister of war thus -expressed himself. “If the population of the departments -of the Landes of Gers, and the Lower -Pyrenees, were animated with a good spirit, this is -the moment to make the enemy suffer by carrying -off his convoys and prisoners, but they appear more -disposed to favour the invaders than to second the -army. It is scarcely possible to obtain a carriage -for transport and I shall not be surprised to find in -a short time these inhabitants taking arms against -us.” Soult was however a man formed by nature -and by experience to struggle against difficulties, -always appearing greater when in a desperate condition -than when more happily circumstanced. At -Genoa under Massena, at Oporto, and in Andalusia, -he had been inured to military distress, and probably -for that reason the emperor selected him to -sustain this dangerous contest in preference to -others accounted more ready tacticians on a field of -battle.</p> - -<p>On the 3d and 4th he retreated by Plaissance -and Madiran to Rabastens, Marciac, and Maubourget -where he halted, covering Tarbes, for his -design was to keep in mass and await the development -of the allies’ plans. In this view he called in -the detachments of cavalry and infantry which had -been left on the side of Pau before the battle of -Orthes, and hearing that Darricau was at Langon -with a thousand men he ordered him to march by -Agen and join the army immediately. He likewise -put the national guards and <i lang="fr">gensd’armes</i> in activity -on the side of the Pyrenees, and directed the -commanders of the military districts in his rear to -keep their old soldiers, of which there were many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_582"></a>[582]</span> -scattered through the country, in readiness to aid -the army.</p> - -<p>While thus acting he received from the minister -of war a note dictated by the emperor.</p> - -<p>“Fortresses,” said Napoleon, “are nothing in -themselves when the enemy having the command of -the sea can collect as many shells and bullets and -guns as he pleases to crush them. Leave therefore -only a few troops in Bayonne, the way to prevent -the siege is to keep the army close to the place. -Resume the offensive, fall upon one or other of the -enemy’s wings, and though you should have but -twenty thousand men if you seize the proper moment -and attack hardily you ought to gain some advantage. -You have enough talent to understand my meaning.”</p> - -<p>This note came fourteen days too late. But what -if it had come before? Lord Wellington after winning -the battle of St. Pierre the 13th of December -was firmly established on the Adour above Bayonne, -and able to interrupt the French convoys as they -descended from the Port de Landes. It was evident -then that when dry weather enabled the allies to -move Soult must abandon Bayonne to defend the -passage of the Gaves, or risk being turned and -driven upon the Landes from whence it would be -difficult for him to escape. Napoleon however -desired him to leave only a few men in Bayonne, -another division would thus have been added to his -field army, and this diminution of the garrison -would not have increased lord Wellington’s active -forces, because the investment of Bayonne -would still have required three separate corps: -moreover until the bridge-head at Peyrehorade was -abandoned to concentrate at Orthes, Bayonne was -not rigorously speaking left to its own defence.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_583"></a>[583]</span></p> - -<p>To the emperor’s observations Soult therefore -replied, that several months before, he had told the -minister of war Bayonne was incapable of sustaining -fifteen days open trenches unless the entrenched -camp was well occupied, and he had been by the -minister authorised so to occupy it. Taking that as -his base he had left a garrison of thirteen thousand -five hundred men, and now that he knew the emperor’s -wishes it was no longer in his power to -withdraw them. With respect to keeping close to -the place he had done so as long as he could without -endangering the safety of the army; but lord -Wellington’s operations had forced him to abandon -it, and he had only changed his line of operations -at St. Sever when he was being pushed back upon -Bordeaux with little prospect of being able to -pass the Garonne in time. He had for several -months thought of establishing a pivot of support -for his movements at Dax, in the design of still -holding by Bayonne, and with that view had ordered -the old works of the former place to be repaired -and a camp to be fortified; but from poverty of -means even the body of the place was not completed -or armed at the moment when the battle of -Orthes forced him to relinquish it. Moreover the -insurgent levy of the Landes upon which he depended -to man the works had failed, not more than -two hundred men had come forward. Neither was -he very confident of the advantage of such a position, -because Wellington with superior numbers -would probably have turned his left and forced him -to retire precipitately towards Bordeaux by the -desert of the greater Landes.</p> - -<p>The emperor ordered him to take the offensive -were it only with twenty thousand men. He would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_584"></a>[584]</span> -obey with this observation, that from the 14th of -February to that moment he had had no power to -take the initiatory movement, having been constantly -attacked by infinitely superior numbers. He -had defended himself as he could, but had not expected -to succeed against the enormous disproportion -of force. It being thus impossible, even though -he sacrificed his last man in the attempt, to stop the -enemy, he now sought to prolong the war as much -as possible on the frontier, and by defending every -position to keep the invaders in check and prevent -them from attacking Bordeaux or Toulouse, save by -detachments. He had taken his line of operations -by the road of Tarbes, St. Gaudens, and Toulouse, -that is to say, by the roots of the Pyrenees, calculating -that if lord Wellington sent small detachments -against Bordeaux or Toulouse, the generals commanding -at those places would be able if the national -guards would fight for their country to defend them.</p> - -<p>If the enemy made large detachments, an attack -in front while he was thus weakened would bring -them back again. If he marched with his whole -army upon Bordeaux he could be followed and -forced to face about. If he attempted to march by -Auch against Toulouse he might be stopped by an -attack in flank. If he remained stationary he should -be provoked by an advance <ins class="corr" id="tn-584" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'to develope his'"> -to develop his</ins> objects. -But if, as was to be expected, the French army -was itself attacked it would defend its position -vigorously, and then retreating by St. Gaudens draw -the allies into a difficult mountain country, where -the ground might be disputed step by step the -war be kept still on the frontier and the passage -of the Garonne be delayed. He had meditated -deeply upon his task and could find no better mode.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_585"></a>[585]</span> -But his army was weakened by combats, still more -by desertion; the conscripts went off so fast that of -five battalions lately called up from Toulouse two-thirds -were already gone without having seen an -enemy.</p> - -<p>Soult was mistaken as to the real force of the -allies in the recent operations. In other respects -he displayed clear views and great activity. He -reorganized his army in six divisions, called in his -detachments, urged the imperial commissioners and -local authorities to hasten the levies and restore -deserters, and he prepared a plan of action for the -partizans which had been organized towards the -mountains. Nevertheless his difficulties increased. -The conscripts who did arrive were for the most -part unarmed and he had none to spare. The -imperial commissary Cornudet, and the prefect of -the Gironde, quitted Bordeaux, and when general -L’Huillier attempted to remove the military stores -belonging to the army from Langon, Podensac, and -Bordeaux, the inferior authorities opposed him. -There was no money they said to pay the expense, -but in truth Bordeaux was the focus of Bourbon -conspiracy, and the mayor, count Lynch, was eager -to betray his sovereign.</p> - -<p>Nor was Wellington without embarrassments. -The storms prevented him following up his victory -while the French army was in confusion. Now it -was reorganized on a new line and could retreat for -many days in a direction parallel to the Pyrenees -with strong defensive positions. Should he press it -closely? His army weakened at every step would -have to move between the mountains and the Garonne -exposing its flanks and rear to the operations of any -force which the French might be able to collect on -those boundaries; that is to say all the power of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_586"></a>[586]</span> -France beyond the Garonne. It was essential to -find some counterpoise, and to increase his field -army. To establish a Bourbon party at Bordeaux -was an obvious mode of attaining the first object. -Should he then seize that city by a detachment? -He must employ twelve thousand men and remain -with twenty-six thousand to oppose Soult, who he -erroneously believed was being joined by the ten -thousand men which Suchet had sent to Lyons. The -five regiments detached for their clothing had rejoined -the army and all the reserves of cavalry and -artillery were now called up, but the reinforcements -from England and Portugal, amounting to twenty -thousand men, upon which he had calculated were -detained by the respective governments. Wherefore, -driven by necessity he directed Freyre to -join him by the Port de Landes with two divisions of -the Gallician army, a measure which was instantly -followed by innumerable complaints of outrages and -excesses, although the Spaniards were entirely provided -from the English military chest. Now also -Clinton was ordered to send the British and Germans -of the Anglo-Sicilian army to St. Jean de -Luz. This done he determined to seize Bordeaux. -Meanwhile he repaired the destroyed bridges, -brought up one of Morillo’s brigades from Navarrens -to the vicinity of Aire, sent Campbell’s -Portuguese dragoons to Rocquefort, general Fane -with two regiments of cavalry and a brigade of -infantry to Pau, and pushed posts towards Tarbes -and Vic Bigorre.</p> - -<p>Soult, now fearing the general apathy and ill-will -of the people would become fatal to him, endeavoured -to arouse the energies of the people and -the army by the following proclamation which has -been unreasonably railed at by several English<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_587"></a>[587]</span> -writers, for it was a judicious well-timed and powerful -address.</p> - -<p>“Soldiers, at the battle of Orthes you did your -duty, the enemy’s losses surpassed yours, his -blood moistened all the ground he gained. You -may consider that feat of arms as an advantage. -Other combats are at hand, no repose for us until -his army, formed of such extraordinary elements, -shall evacuate the French territory or be annihilated. -Its numbers and progress may be great, but at hand -are unexpected perils. Time will teach the enemy’s -general that French honour is not to be outraged -with impunity.</p> - -<p>“Soldiers, he has had the indecency to provoke -you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition, -he speaks of peace but firebrands of discord follow -him! He speaks of peace and excites the French to -a civil war! Thanks be to him for making known -his projects, our forces are thereby centupled; and -he himself rallies round the imperial eagles all those -who deceived by appearances believed our enemies -would make a loyal war. No peace with the disloyal -and perfidious nation! no peace with the -English and their auxiliaries until they quit the -French territory! they have dared to insult the national -honour, the infamy to incite Frenchmen to -become perjured towards the emperor. Revenge the -offence in blood. To arms! Let this cry resound -through the south of France, the Frenchman that -hesitates abjures his country and belongs to her -enemies.</p> - -<p>“Yet a few days and those who believe in -English delicacy and sincerity will learn to their -cost that cunning promises are made to abate their -courage and subjugate them. They will learn also -that if the English pay to-day and are generous,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_588"></a>[588]</span> -they will to-morrow retake and with interest in contributions -what they disburse. Let the pusillanimous -beings who calculate the cost of saving their country -remember that the English have in view to reduce -Frenchmen to the same servitude as the Spaniards -Portuguese and Sicilians who groan under their domination. -Past history will recall to those unworthy -Frenchmen who prefer momentary enjoyment to -the safety of the great family, the English making -Frenchmen kill Frenchmen at Quiberon; it will -show them at the head of all conspiracies, all odious -political intrigues plots and assassinations, aiming -to overthrow all principles, to destroy all grand -establishments of trade to satisfy their immeasurable -ambition, their insatiable cupidity. Does there -exist upon the face of the globe a point known to -the English where they have not destroyed <ins class="corr" id="tn-588" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'by sedidions and'"> -by seditions and</ins> violence all manufactures which could -rival their own? Thus they will do to the French -establishments if they prevail.</p> - -<p>“Devote then to opprobrium and execration all -Frenchmen who favour their insidious projects, -aye! even those who are under his power if they -seek not to hurt him. Devote to opprobrium and -reject as Frenchmen those who think under specious -pretexts to avoid serving their country; and -those also who from corruption or indolence hide -deserters instead of driving them back to their -colours. With such men we have nothing in common, -and history will pass their names with execrations -to posterity. As to us soldiers our duty -is clear. Honour and fidelity. This is our motto -and we will fight to the last the enemies of our -emperor and France. Respect persons and property. -Grieve for those who have momentarily -fallen under the enemy’s yoke, and hasten the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_589"></a>[589]</span> -moment of their deliverance. Be obedient and -disciplined, and bear implacable hatred towards -traitors and enemies of the French name! War to -death against those who would divide us to destroy -us; and to those cowards who desert the imperial -eagles to range themselves under another banner. -Remember always that fifteen ages of glory, triumphs -innumerable, have illustrated our country. -Contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great -sovereign, his signal victories which immortalize -the French name. Let us be worthy of him and -we can then bequeath without a taint to our posterity -the inheritance we hold from our fathers. -Be in fine Frenchmen and die arms in hand sooner -than survive dishonour.”</p> - -<p>Let the time and the occasion of this proclamation -be considered. Let it be remembered that no -English writer orator or politician, had for many -years used milder terms than robbers, murderers, -atheists, and tyrant, when speaking of Frenchmen -and their sovereign, that lord Wellington even at -this time refused that sovereign his title of emperor, -calling him Buonaparte; that on entering -France he had published an order of the day accusing -the French commanders of authorising and -encouraging the cruelties of their soldiers in Spain; -finally that for six years the Spanish Portuguese -and English state papers were filled with most -offensive ribald abuse of Napoleon his ministers -and commanders. Let all this be remembered and -the acrimony of Soult’s proclamation cannot be -justly blamed, while the noble energy, the loyalty -of the sentiments, the exciting passionate feeling -of patriotism which pervades it must be admired. -Was he, sprung from the ranks, a soldier of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_590"></a>[590]</span> -republic, a general of the empire, after fighting -thirty years under the tri-colour, to be tame and -measured to squeamishness in his phrases when he -saw his country invaded by foreigners, and a pretender -to the throne stalking behind their bayonets -beckoning his soldiers to desert their eagles, inviting -his countrymen to betray their sovereign and -dishonour their nation! Why the man was surrounded -by traitors, and proud and scornful of -danger was his spirit to strive so mightily against -defeat and treason combined.</p> - -<p>It has been said in condemnation of him that -the English general did not encourage the Bourbon -party. Is that true? Did it so appear to the French -general? Had not the duke of Angoulême come to -the English head-quarters with mystery, and following -the invading army and protected by its arms -assemble round him all the ancient partizans of -his house, sending forth agents, scattering proclamations -even in Soult’s camp, endeavouring to -debauch his soldiers and to aid strangers to subjugate -France. Soult not only knew this but was -suffering under the effects. On every side he met -with opposition and discontent from the civil authorities, -his movements were made known to the -enemy and his measures thwarted in all directions. -At Bordeaux a party were calling aloud with -open arms to the invaders. At Tarbes the fear of -provoking an action near the town had caused the -dispersion of the insurrectional levy organized by -the imperial commissioner Caffarelli. At Pau the -aristocracy had secretly assembled to offer homage -to the duke of Angoulême, and there was a rumour -that he was to be crowned at the castle of Henry IV. -Was the French general to disregard these facts<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_591"></a>[591]</span> -and symptoms because his opponent had avoided -any public declaration in favour of the Bourbon -family? Lord Wellington would have been the first -to laugh at his simplicity if he had.</p> - -<p>And what was the reason that the English general -did not openly call upon the Bourbon partizans -to raise the standard of revolt? Simply that Napoleon’s -astounding genius had so baffled the -banded sovereigns and their innumerable hordes -that a peace seemed inevitable to avoid fatal disasters; -and therefore lord Wellington, who had instructions -from his government not to embarrass<span class="sidenote">Secret instructions from Lord Bathurst, MSS.</span> -any negociation for peace by pledges to a Bourbon -party, acting as an honest statesman and commander, -would not excite men to their own ruin -for a momentary advantage. But so far from discouraging -treason to Napoleon on any other ground<span class="sidenote">Published Despatches.</span> -he avowed his anxious desire for it, and his readiness -to encourage every enemy of that monarch. -He had seen and consulted with La Roche Jacquelin, -with de Mailhos and other vehement partizans -for an immediate insurrection; and also with Viel -Castel an agent of Bernadotte’s until he found -him intriguing against the Bourbons. He advised -the duke of Angoulême to form regular battalions, -promised him arms and actually collected eighty -thousand stand, to arm the insurgents. Finally he -rebuked the timid policy of the English ministers -who having such an opportunity of assailing Napoleon -refrained from doing it. Before Soult’s proclamation -appeared he thus wrote to lord Bathurst.</p> - -<p>“I find the sentiment as we advance in the -country still more strong against the Buonaparte -dynasty and in favour of the Bourbons, but I am<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_592"></a>[592]</span> -quite certain there will be no declaration on the -part of the people if the allies do not in some -manner declare themselves.” “<em>I cannot discover the -policy of not hitting one’s enemy as hard as one can -and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that -he would not so act by us, he would certainly overturn -the British authority in Ireland if it were in -his power.</em>”</p> - -<p>Soult and Wellington acted and wrote, each in -the manner most suitable to their situation, but it -was not a little remarkable that Ireland should so -readily occur to the latter as a parallel case.</p> - -<p>It was in this state of affairs that the English -general detached Beresford with twelve thousand -men against Bordeaux, giving him instructions to -occupy that city and acquire the Garonne as a port -for the allies, but to make the French authorities -declare whether they would or would not continue -to exercise their functions under the conditions -announced by proclamation. For hitherto lord -Wellington had governed the country as he advanced -in this public manner, thus nullifying the -misrepresentations of political intriguers, obviating -the dangers of false reports and rumours of his -projects, making his justice and moderation known -to the poorest peasant, and securing the French -local authorities who continued to act under him -from any false and unjust representation of their -conduct to the imperial government if peace should -be made with Napoleon. This expedition against -Bordeaux however involved political as well as military -interests. Beresford was instructed that there -were many partizans of the Bourbons in that city -who might propose to hoist the white standard and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_593"></a>[593]</span> -proclaim Louis the Eighteenth under protection of -the troops. They were to be told that the British -nation and its allies wished well to their cause, and -while public tranquillity was maintained in the -districts occupied by the troops there would be no -hindrance to their political proceedings: they or -any party opposed to Napoleon would receive -assistance. Nevertheless, as the allied sovereigns -were negociating with the French emperor, however -well inclined the English general might be to -support a party against the latter during war, he -could give no help if peace were concluded, and -this they must weigh well before they revolted. -Beresford was therefore not to meddle with any -declaration in favour of Louis the Eighteenth; but -he was not to oppose it, and if revolt took place -he was to supply the revolters with the arms and -ammunition collected at Dax.</p> - -<p>On the 8th Beresford marched towards Langon -with the fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian’s -horsemen, and some guns; he was joined on the -road by some of Vandeleur’s cavalry from Bayonne, -and he had orders to observe the enemy’s -movements towards Agen, for it was still in Soult’s -power by a forced march on that side to cross the -Garonne and enter Bordeaux before him. La -Roche Jacquelin preceded the troops and the duke -of Angoulême followed closely, but his partizans in -the city frightened at the danger of their enterprize -now besought Beresford to delay his march. -La Roche Jacquelin vehemently condemned their -hesitation, and his influence supported by the consternation -which the battle of Orthes had created -amongst the Napoleonists decided the question in -favour of revolt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_594"></a>[594]</span></p> - -<p>Long before this epoch, Soult, foreseeing that the -probable course of the war would endanger Bordeaux, -had given orders to place the forts in a state -of defence, to arm the flotilla and to organize the -national guards and the urban legions; he had -urged these measures again when the imperial commissioner -Cornudet first arrived, but according to the -usual habits of civilians who have to meddle with -military affairs every thing was promised and nothing -done. Cornudet and the prefect quitted the city as -early as the 4th, first burning with a silly affectation -of vigour some ships of war upon the stocks; general -L’Huillier, unable to oppose the allies, then destroyed -the fort of Médoc on the left bank of the -Garonne, disarmed some of the river batteries, and -passing in the night of the 11th to the right bank -occupied the fortress of Blaye, the Paté and other -points. Meanwhile Beresford who reached Langon -the 10th, left lord Dalhousie there with the bulk of -the forces and advanced with eight hundred cavalry.</p> - -<p>Entering Bordeaux the 12th, he met the municipality -and a great body of Bourbonists, at the -head of whom was the mayor count Lynch, decorated -with the scarf of his office and the legion of honour, -both conferred upon him, and probably at his own -solicitation, by the sovereign he was then going to -betray. After some formal discourse in which -Beresford explicitly made known his instructions -Lynch very justly tore the tricolor, the emblem of -his country’s glory, from his own shoulders, the white -flag was then displayed and the allies took peaceable -possession of the city. The duke of Angoulême -arrived on the same day and Louis the Eighteenth -was formally proclaimed. This event, the act of a -party, was not generally approved, and the mayor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_595"></a>[595]</span> -conscious of weakness immediately issued with the -connivance of the duke of Angoulême a proclamation, -in which he asserted, that “the British Portuguese -and Spanish armies were united in the south, -as the other nations were united in the north, solely -to destroy Napoleon and replace him by a Bourbon -king who was conducted thither by these generous -allies, and only by accepting that king could the -French appease the resentment of the Spaniards.” -At the same time the duke of Angoulême, as if -quite master of the country, appointed prefects and -other authorities in districts beyond the limits of -Bordeaux.</p> - -<p>Both the duke and the mayor soon repented of -their precipitancy. The English fleet which should -have acted simultaneously with the troops had not arrived; -the Regulus a French seventy-four with several -inferior vessels of war were anchored below Blaye, and -Beresford was recalled with the fourth division and Vivian’s -cavalry. Lord Dalhousie remained with only -the seventh division and three squadrons to oppose -L’Huillier’s troops and other French corps which were -now on the Garonne. He could not guard the river -below Bordeaux, and some French troops recrossing -again took possession of the fort of Grave near the -mouth; a new army was forming under general Decaen -beyond the Garonne, the Napoleonists recovering from -their first stupor began to stir themselves, and a partizan -officer coming down to St. Macaire on the 18th -surprised fifty men which lord Dalhousie had sent -across the Garonne from Langon to take possession -of a French magazine. In the Landes the peasants -forming bands burned the houses of the gentlemen -who had joined the white standard, and in Bordeaux<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_596"></a>[596]</span> -itself a counter-insurrection was preparing whenever -Decaen should be ready to advance.</p> - -<p>The prince frightened at these symptoms of reaction -desired lord Dalhousie to bring his troops into -Bordeaux to awe the Napoleonists, and meanwhile -each party strove to outvie the other in idle rumours -and falsehoods relating to the emperor. Victories -and defeats were invented or exaggerated, Napoleon -was dead from illness, had committed suicide, -was poisoned, stabbed; and all these things were -related as certain with most circumstantial details. -Meanwhile Wellington, writing to the duke of Angoulême, -denied the veracity of the mayor’s proclamation -and expressed his trust that the prince -was not a party to such a mendacious document. -The latter however with some excuses about hurry -and confusion avowed his participation in its publication, -and defended the mayor’s conduct. He also -forwarded a statement of the danger his party was -exposed to and demanded aid of men and money, -supporting his application by a note of council in -which with more ingenuity than justice, it was argued, -that as civil government could not be conducted -without executive power, and as lord Wellington had -suffered the duke of Angoulême to assume the civil -government at Bordeaux without an adequate executive -force, he was bound to supply the deficiency -from his army, and even to furnish money until -taxes could be levied under the protection of the -soldiers.</p> - -<p>The English general was not a man to bear with -such sophistry in excuse for a breach of faith. -Sorry he was he said to find that the principle by -which he regulated his conduct towards the Bourbon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_597"></a>[597]</span> -party, though often stated, had made so little -impression that the duke could not perceive how -inconsistent it was with the mayor’s proclamation. -Most cautious therefore must be his future conduct, -seeing that as the chief of an army and the confidential -agent of three independent nations, he could not -permit his views to be misrepresented upon such an -important question. He had occupied Bordeaux as -a military point, but certain persons contrary to his -advice and opinion thought proper to proclaim Louis -the Eighteenth. Those persons made no exertions, -subscribed not a shilling, raised not a soldier, yet -because he would not extend the posts of his army -beyond what was proper and convenient, merely to -protect their families and property, exposed to danger, -not on account of their exertions for they had -made none, but on account of their premature declaration -contrary to his advice, they took him to -task in a document delivered to lord Dalhousie by -the prince himself. The writer of that paper and -all such persons however might be assured that -nothing should make him swerve from what he -thought his duty to the sovereigns who employed -him, he would not risk even a company of infantry -to save properties and families placed in a state of -danger contrary to his advice. The duke had better -then conduct his policy and compose his manifestos -in such a manner as not to force a public -contradiction of them. His royal highness was free -to act as he pleased for himself, but he was not free -to adduce the name and authority of the allied -governments in support of his measures when they -had not been consulted, nor of their general when -he had been consulted but had given his opinion -against those measures.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_598"></a>[598]</span></p> - -<p>He had told him that if any great town or extensive -district declared in favour of the Bourbons he -would not interfere with the government of that -town or district, and if there was a general declaration -in favour of his house he would deliver the civil -government of all the country overrun by the army -into his hands, but the fact was that even at Bordeaux -the movement in favour of the Bourbons was -not unanimous. The spirit had not spread elsewhere, -not even to La Vendée, nor in any part occupied -by the army. The events contemplated had -not therefore occurred, and it would be a great -breach of duty towards the allied sovereigns and -cruel to the inhabitants if he were to deliver them -over to his royal highness prematurely or against -their inclinations. He advised him therefore to -withdraw his prefects and confine his government to -Bordeaux. He could give him no money and after -what had passed he was doubtful if he should afford -him any countenance or protection. The argument -of the note of council, affirming that he was bound -to support the civil government of his royal highness, -only rendered it more incumbent upon him to -beware how he gave farther encouragement, or to -speak plainly, <em>permission</em> to the Bourbonists to declare -themselves. It was disagreeable to take any -step which should publicly mark a want of good -understanding between himself and the duke, but -count Lynch had not treated him with common fairness -or with truth, wherefore as he could not allow -the character of the allied sovereigns or his own to -be doubted, if his royal highness did not within ten -days contradict the objectionable parts of the mayor’s -proclamation he would do so himself.</p> - -<p>Thus it appeared that with the French as with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_599"></a>[599]</span> -Spaniards and Portuguese neither enthusiastic declarations -nor actual insurrection offered any guarantee -for sense truth or exertion; and most surely -all generals and politicians of every country who -trust to sudden popular commotions will find that -noisy declamations, vehement demonstrations of feeling, -idle rumours and boasting, the life-blood of -such affairs, are essentially opposed to useful public -exertions.</p> - -<p>When Beresford marched to rejoin the army the -line of occupation was too extensive for lord Dalhousie -and lord Wellington ordered him to keep -clear of the city and hold his troops together, observing -that his own projected operations on the -Upper Garonne would keep matters quiet on the -lower part of that river. Nevertheless if the war -had continued for a month that officer’s situation -would have been critical. For when Napoleon -knew that Bordeaux had fallen he sent Decaen by<span class="sidenote">Official Reports and Correspondence of general Decaen - upon the formation of the army of the Gironde, 1814, MSS.</span> -post to Libourne to form the “<em>army of the Gironde</em>.” -For this object general Despeaux acting under Soult’s -orders collected a body of <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> custom-house -officers and national guards on the Upper -Garonne, between Agen and La Reolle, and it was -one of his detachments that surprised lord Dalhousie’s -men at St. Macaire on the 18th. A battery -of eight guns was sent down from Narbonne, -other batteries were despatched from Paris to arrive -at Perigueux on the 11th of April, and three or four -hundred cavalry coming from the side of Rochelle -joined Le Huillier who with a thousand infantry was -in position at St. André de Cubsac beyond the Dordogne. -Behind these troops all the national guards -custom-house officers and <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> of five departments -were ordered to assemble, and march to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_600"></a>[600]</span> -the Dordogne; but the formidable part of the intended -army was a body of Suchet’s veterans, six -thousand in number under general Beurman, who -had been turned from the road of Lyons and directed -upon Libourne.</p> - -<p>Decaen entered Mucidan on the 1st of April but -Beurman’s troops had not then reached Perigeaux, -and lord Dalhousie’s cavalry were in Libourne between -him and L’Huillier. The power of concentration -was thus denied to the French and meanwhile -admiral Penrose had secured the command -of the Garonne. It appears lord Wellington<span class="sidenote">Published despatches.</span> -thought this officer dilatory, but on the 27th he -arrived with a seventy-four and two frigates, whereupon -the Regulus, and other French vessels then at -Royan, made sail up the river and were chased to -the shoal of Talmont, but they escaped through the -narrow channel on the north side and cast anchor -under some batteries. Previous to this event Mr. -Ogilvie a commissary, being on the river in a boat<span class="sidenote">Official Report by Mr. Ogilvie, MSS.</span> -manned with Frenchmen, discovered the Requin -sloop, half French half American, pierced for -twenty-two guns, lying at anchor not far below -Bordeaux, at the same time he saw a sailor leap -hastily into a boat above him and row for the vessel. -This man being taken proved to be the armourer -of the Requin, he said there were not many men -on board, and Mr. Ogilvie observing his alarm -and judging that the crew would also be fearful, -with ready resolution bore down upon the Requin, -boarded, and took her without any opposition either -from her crew or that of his own boat, although -she had fourteen guns mounted and eleven men -with two officers on board.</p> - -<p>The naval co-operation being thus assured lord<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_601"></a>[601]</span> -Dalhousie crossed the Garonne above the city, drove<span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -the French posts beyond the Dordogne, pushed -scouring parties to La Reolle and Marmande, and -sending his cavalry over the Dordogne intercepted -Decaen’s and La Huilhier’s communications; the -former was thus forced to remain at Mucidan with -two hundred and fifty <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> awaiting the -arrival of Beurman, and he found neither arms nor -ammunition nor a willing spirit to enable him to -organize the national guards.</p> - -<p>The English horsemen repassed the Dordogne -on the 2d of April, but on the 4th lord Dalhousie -crossed it again lower down, near St. André de -Cubzac, with about three thousand men, intending -to march upon Blaye, but hearing that L’Huillier -had halted at Etauliers he turned suddenly upon -him. The French general formed his line on an -open common occupying some woods in front with -his detachments. Overmatched in infantry he had -three hundred cavalry opposed to one weak squadron, -and yet his troops would not stand the shock -of the battle. The allied infantry cleared the -woods in a moment, the artillery then opened -upon the main body which retired in disorder, -horsemen and infantry together, through Etauliers, -leaving behind several scattered bodies upon whom -the British cavalry galloped and made two or three -hundred men and thirty officers prisoners.</p> - -<p>If the six thousand old troops under Beurman -had, according to Napoleon’s orders, arrived at this -time in lord Dalhousie’s rear, his position would -have been embarrassing but they were delayed on -the road until the 10th. Meanwhile admiral -Penrose, having on the 2d observed the French -flotilla, consisting of fifteen armed vessels and gun-boats,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_602"></a>[602]</span> -coming down from Blaye to join the Regulus -at Talmont sent the boats of his fleet to attack -them, whereupon the French vessels run on shore -and the crews aided by two hundred soldiers from -Blaye lined the beach to protect them. Lieutenant -Dunlop who commanded the English boats landing -all his seamen and marines, beat these troops -and carried off or destroyed the whole flotilla with -a loss to himself of only six men wounded and -missing. This operation completed and the action -at Etauliers known, the admiral, now reinforced -with a second ship of the line, resolved to attack -the French squadron and the shore batteries, but in -the night of the 6th the enemy set fire to their vessels. -Captain Harris of the Belle Poule frigate -then landed with six hundred seamen and marines -and destroyed the batteries and forts on the right -bank from Talmont to the Courbe point. Blaye -still held out, but at Paris treason had done its -work and Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity -known for good, was overthrown to make room for -despots, who with minds enlarged only to cruelty -avarice and dissoluteness, were at the very moment -of triumph intent to defraud the people, by whose -strength and suffering they had conquered, of the -only reward they demanded, <em>just government</em>. The -war was virtually over, but on the side of Toulouse, -Bayonne, and Barcelona, the armies ignorant of this -great event were still battling with unabated fury.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_603"></a>[603]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">While Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux<span class="sidenote7">1814. March.</span> -Soult and Wellington remained in observation, -each thinking the other stronger than himself. For -the English general having intelligence of Beurman’s -march, believed that his troops were intended -to reinforce and had actually joined Soult. On the -other hand that marshal, who knew not of Beresford’s -march until the 13th, concluded Wellington -still had the twelve thousand men detached -to Bordeaux. The numbers on each side were -however nearly equal. The French army was -thirty-one thousand, infantry and cavalry, yet three -thousand being stragglers detained by the generals -of the military districts, Soult could only put -into line, exclusive of conscripts without arms, -twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets with -thirty-eight pieces of artillery. On the allies’ side<span class="sidenote">Official Report, MSS.</span> -twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets were -under arms, with forty-two guns, but from this -number detachments had been sent to Pau on one -side, Roquefort on the other, and the cavalry scouts -were pushed into the Landes and to the Upper -Garonne.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington expecting Soult would retreat -upon Auch and designing to follow him, had caused<span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -Beresford to keep the bulk of his troops towards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_604"></a>[604]</span> -the Upper Garonne that he might the sooner rejoin -the army; but the French general having early fixed -his line of retreat by St. Guadens was only prevented -from retaking the offensive on the 9th or -10th by the loss of his magazines, which forced -him first to organize a system of requisition for -the subsistence of his army. Meanwhile his -equality of force passed away, for on the 13th -Freyre came up with eight thousand Spanish infantry, -and the next day Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry arrived. -Lord Wellington was then the strongest, yet -he still awaited Beresford’s troops, and was uneasy -about his own situation. He dreaded the junction<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#CHAPTER_BXXIII_VI">Chap. VI., Book XXIII.</a></span> -of Suchet’s army, for it was at this time the Spanish -regency referred the convention, proposed by that -marshal for the evacuation of the fortresses, to his -decision. He gave a peremptory negative, observing -that it would furnish twenty thousand veterans -for Soult while the retention of Rosas and -Figueras would bar the action of the Spanish armies -of Catalonia in his favour. But his anxiety was great -because he foresaw that Ferdinand’s return and -his engagement with Suchet, already related, together -with the evident desire of Copons that the garrisons -should be admitted to a convention would -finally render that measure inevitable. Meanwhile -the number of his own army was likely to decrease. -The English cabinet, less considerate even than the -Spanish government, had sent the militia, permitted -by the recent act of parliament to volunteer for -foreign service, to Holland, and with them the -other reinforcements originally promised for the -army in France: two or three regiments of militia -only came to the Garonne when the war was over. -To make amends the ministers proposed that lord<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_605"></a>[605]</span> -William Bentinck should send four thousand men -from Sicily to land at Rosas, or some point in -France, and so join lord Wellington, who was -thus expected to extend his weakened force from -the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean in order to -cover the junction of this uncertain reinforcement. -In fine experience had taught the English statesmen -so little that we find their general thus addressing -them only one week previous to the -termination of the war.</p> - -<p>Having before declared that he should be, contrary -to his wishes, forced to bring more Spaniards -into France, he says:—</p> - -<p>“There are limits to the numbers with which -this army can contend and I am convinced your -lordship would not wish to see the safety and honour -of this handful of brave men depend upon the -doubtful exertions and discipline of an undue proportion -of Spanish troops.”—“The service in Holland -may doubtless be more important to the -national interest than that in this country, but I -hope it will be considered that that which is most -important of all is not <em>to lose</em> the brave army which -has struggled through its difficulties for nearly six -years.”</p> - -<p>The French infantry was now re-organized in six -divisions commanded by Darricau, D’Armagnac, -Taupin, Maransin, Villatte and Harispe; general -Paris’ troops hitherto acting as an unattached<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -body were thus absorbed, the cavalry composed of -Berton’s and Vial’s brigades was commanded -by Pierre Soult, and there was a reserve division -of seven thousand conscripts, infantry under -general Travot. The division into wings and a -centre, each commanded by a lieutenant-general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_606"></a>[606]</span> -continued, yet this distinction was not attended to -in the movements. Reille though commanding the -right wing was at Maubourget on the left of the -line of battle; D’Erlon commanding the centre was -at Marsiac on the right covering the road to Auch; -Clauzel was at Rabastens forming a reserve to -both. The advanced guards were towards Plaissance -on the right, Madiran in the centre, and -Lembege on the left. Soult thus covered Tarbes, -and could move on a direct line by good roads -either to Auch or Pau.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington driven by necessity now sent<span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -orders to Giron’s Andalusians and Del Parque’s -troops to enter France from the Bastan, although -Freyre’s soldiers had by their outrages already -created a wide-spread consternation. His head-quarters -were fixed at Aire, his army was in position -on each side of the Adour, he had repaired all the -bridges behind him, restored that over the Lees in -his front, and dispersed some small bands which -had appeared upon his left flank and rear: Soult -had however organized a more powerful system of -partizans towards the mountains and only wanted -money to put them in activity. The main bodies -of the two armies were a long day’s march asunder, -but their advanced posts were not very distant, the -regular cavalry had frequent encounters and both -generals claimed the superiority though neither -made any particular report.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 7th Soult thinking to find -only some weak parties at Pau sent a strong detachment -there to arrest the nobles who had assembled -to welcome the duke of Angoulême, but -general Fane getting there before him with a brigade -of infantry and two regiments of cavalry the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_607"></a>[607]</span> -stroke failed; however the French returning by -another road made prisoners of an officer and four -or five English dragoons. Meanwhile a second detachment -penetrating between Pau and Aire carried -off a post of correspondence; and two days after, -when Fane had quitted Pau, a French officer -accompanied by only four hussars captured there -thirty-four Portuguese with their commander and -ten loaded mules. The French general having by -these excursions obtained exact intelligence of -Beresford’s march to Bordeaux resolved to attack -the allies, and the more readily that Napoleon had -recently sent him instructions to draw the war to -the side of Pau keeping his left resting on the -Pyrenees, which accorded with his own designs.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington’s main body was now concentrated -round <ins class="corr" id="tn-607" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Aire and Barcelone'"> -Aire and Barcelona</ins>, yet divided by -the Adour and the advanced guards were pushed to -Garlin, Conchez, Viella, Riscle and Pouydraguien,<span class="sidenote7"><a href="#i_b_688fp_10">See plan 10.</a></span> -that is to say, on a semicircle to the front and -about half a march in advance. Soult therefore -thought to strike a good blow, and gathering his -divisions on the side of Maubourget the 12th, -marched on the 13th, designing to throw himself -upon the high tabular land between Pau and Aire, -and then act according to circumstances.</p> - -<p>The country was suited to the action of all arms, -offering a number of long and nearly parallel ridges -of moderate height, the sides of which were sometimes -covered with vineyards, but the summits -commonly so open that troops could move along -them without much difficulty, and between these -ranges a number of small rivers and muddy -fords descended from the Pyrenees to the -Adour. This conformation determined the order of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_608"></a>[608]</span> -the French general’s march which followed the -courses of these rivers. Leaving one regiment of -cavalry to watch the valley of the Adour he moved -with the rest of his army by Lembege upon -Conchez down the smaller Lees. Clauzel thus seized -the high land of Daisse and pushed troops to Portet; -Reille supported him at Conchez; D’Erlon remained -behind that place in reserve. In this -position the head of the columns, pointing direct -upon Aire, separated Viella from Garlin which was -the right of general Hill’s position, and menaced that -general’s posts on the great Lees. Meanwhile Pierre -Soult marching with three regiments of cavalry -along the high land between the two Lees, reached -Mascaras and the castle of Sault, he thus covered -the left flank of the French army and pushed -Fane’s cavalry posts back with the loss of two -officers taken and a few men wounded. During this -movement Berton advancing from Madiran with -two regiments of cavalry towards Viella, on the -right flank of the French army, endeavoured to<span class="sidenote">Memoirs by general Berton, MSS.</span> -cross the Saye river at a difficult muddy ford near -the broken bridge. Sir John Campbell leading a -squadron of the fourth Portuguese cavalry overthrew<span class="sidenote">Note by sir John Campbell, MSS.</span> -the head of his column, but the Portuguese -horsemen were too few to dispute the passage -and Berton finally getting a regiment over higher -up, gained the table-land above, and charging the -rear of the retiring troops in a narrow way leading to -the Aire road killed several and took some prisoners, -amongst them Bernardo de Sà the since well-known -count of Bandeira.</p> - -<p>This terminated the French operations for the -day, and lord Wellington imagining the arrival of -Suchet’s troops had made Soult thus bold, resolved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_609"></a>[609]</span> -to keep on the defensive until his reinforcements -and detachments could come up. Hill however -passed the greater Lees partly to support his posts -partly to make out the force and true direction of -the French movement, but he recrossed that river -during the night and finally occupied the strong -platform between Aire and Garlin which Soult -had designed to seize. Lord Wellington immediately -brought the third and sixth division and -the heavy cavalry over the Adour to his support, -leaving the light division with the hussar brigade -still on the right bank. The bulk of the army thus -occupied a strong position parallel with the Pau -road. The right was at Garlin, the left at Aire, the -front covered by the greater Lees a river difficult -to pass; Fane’s cavalry was extended along the -Pau road as far as Boelho, and on the left of the -Adour the hussars pushed the French cavalry -regiment left there back upon Plaissance.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 14th Soult intending to -fall on Hill, whose columns he had seen the evening -before on the right of the Lees, drove in the advanced -posts which had been left to cover the -retrograde movement, and then examined the allies’ -new position; but these operations wasted the day, -and towards evening he disposed his army on the -heights between the two Lees, placing Clauzel and -D’Erlon at Castle Pugon opposite Garlin, and -Reille in reserve at Portet. Meanwhile Pierre -Soult carried three regiments of cavalry to Clarac, -on the Pau road, to intercept the communications -with that town and to menace the right flank of the -allies, against which the whole French army was -now pointing. Fane’s outposts being thus assailed -retired with some loss at first but they were soon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_610"></a>[610]</span> -supported and drove the French horsemen in disorder -clear off the Pau road to Carere.</p> - -<p>Soult now seeing the strength of the position -above Aire, and hearing from the peasants that -forty or fifty thousand men were concentrated there, -feared to attack, but changing his plan resolved to -hover about the right flank of the allies in the hopes -of enticing them from their vantage-ground. Lord -Wellington on the other hand drew his cavalry -posts down the valley of the Adour, and keeping -close on that side massed his forces on the right in -expectation of an attack. In fine each general acting -upon false intelligence of the other’s strength was -afraid to strike. The English commander’s error -as to the junction of Suchet’s troops was encouraged -by Soult, who had formed his battalions upon two -ranks instead of three to give himself an appearance -of strength, and in the same view had caused his -reserve of conscripts to move in rear of his line of -battle. And he also judged the allies’ strength by -what it might have been rather than by what it -was; for though Freyre’s Spaniards and Ponsonby’s<span class="sidenote">Morning States, MSS.</span> -dragoons were now up, the whole force did not -exceed thirty-six thousand men, including the light -division and the hussars who were on the right -bank of the Adour. This number was however -increasing every hour by the arrival of detachments -and reserves; and it behoved Soult, who was entangled -in a country extremely difficult if rain -should fall, to watch that Wellington while holding -the French in check with his right wing did not -strike with his left by Maubourget and Tarbes, and -thus cast them upon the mountains about Lourdes.</p> - -<p>This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of -the fall of Bordeaux, induced the French general to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_611"></a>[611]</span> -retire before day on the 16th to Lembege and Simacourbe, -where he occupied both sides of the two -branches of the Lees and the heights between them; -however his outposts remained at Conchez, and -Pierre Soult again getting upon the Pau road detached -a hundred chosen troopers against the allies’ -communication with Orthes. Captain Dania commanding -these men making a forced march reached -Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised six officers and -eight medical men with their baggage, made a -number of other prisoners and returned on the -evening of the 18th. This enterprize extended to -such a distance from the army was supposed to be -executed by the bands, and seemed to indicate a -disposition for insurrection; wherefore lord Wellington -to check it seized the civil authorities at -Hagetnau, and declared that he would hang all the -peasants caught in arms and burn their villages.</p> - -<p>The offensive movement of the French general -had now terminated, he sent his conscripts at once -to Toulouse and prepared for a rapid retreat on that -place. His recent operations had been commenced -too late, he should have been on the Lees the 10th -or 11th when there were not more than twenty -thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred -cavalry to oppose him between Aire and Garlin. -On the other hand the passive state of Wellington, -which had been too much prolonged, was now also at -an end, all his reinforcements and detachments were -either up or close at hand, and he could put in motion -six Anglo-Portuguese and three Spanish divisions -of infantry, furnishing forty thousand bayonets,<span class="sidenote">Morning States, MSS.</span> -with five brigades of cavalry, furnishing nearly six -thousand sabres, and from fifty to sixty pieces of -artillery.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_612"></a>[612]</span></p> - -<p>On the evening of the 17th, the English general -pushed the hussars up the valley of the Adour, towards -Plaissance, supporting them with the light -division, which was followed at the distance of -half a march by the fourth division coming from -the side of Roquefort, on its return from Langon.</p> - -<p>The 18th at daylight the whole army was in -movement, the hussars with the light and the fourth -division, forming the left, marched upon Plaissance; -Hill’s troops forming the right marched from Garlin -upon Conchez, keeping a detachment on the road to -Pau in observation of Pierre Soult’s cavalry. The<span class="sidenote7">Plan 10.</span> -main body moved in the centre, under Wellington -in person, to Viella, by the high road leading from -Aire to Maubourget. The French right was thus -turned by the valley of the Adour, while general -Hill with a sharp skirmish, in which about eighty -British and Germans were killed and wounded, -drove back their outposts upon Lembege.</p> - -<p>Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge -having a small river with rugged banks, called the -Laiza, in his front, and his right under D’Erlon was -extended towards Vic Bigorre on the great road of -Tarbes. Meanwhile Berton’s cavalry, one regiment<span class="sidenote">Berton’s Memoir, MSS.</span> -of which retreating from Viella on the 16th disengaged -itself with some difficulty and loss, reached -Maubourget, and took post in column behind that -place, the road being confined on each side by deep -and wide ditches. In this situation pressed by Bock’s -cavalry, which preceded the centre column of the -allies, the French horsemen suddenly charged the -Germans, at first with success, taking an officer and -some men, but finally they were beaten and retreated -through Vic Bigorre. Soult thinking a flanking column -only was on this side in the valley of the Adour,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_613"></a>[613]</span> -resolved to fall upon it with his whole army; but he -recognised the skill of his opponent when he found -that the whole of the allies’ centre, moving by Madiran,<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Official Report, MSS.</span> -had been thrown on to the Tarbes road while -he was retiring from Lembege. This heavy mass was -now approaching Vic Bigorre, the light division, coming -from Plaissance up the right bank of the Adour, -were already near Auriebat, pointing to Rabastens, -upon which place the hussars had already driven -the French cavalry left in observation when the -army first advanced: Vic Bigorre was thus turned, -Berton’s horsemen had passed it in retreat and the -danger was imminent. The French general immediately -ordered Berton to support the cavalry regiment -at Rabastens and cover that road to Tarbes. -Then directing D’Erlon to take post at Vic Bigorre -and check the allies on the main road, he marched, -in person and in all haste, with Clauzel’s and -Reille’s divisions to Tarbes by a circuitous road -leading through Ger-sur-landes.</p> - -<p>D’Erlon not seeming to comprehend the crisis -moved slowly, with his baggage in front, and having -the river Lechez to cross, rode on before his troops -expecting to find Berton at Vic Bigorre, but he -met the German cavalry there. Then indeed he -hurried his march yet he had only time to place -Darricau’s division, now under general Paris, -amongst some vineyards, two miles in front of Vic -Bigorre, when hither came Picton to the support of -the cavalry and fell upon him.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of Vic Bigorre.</em>—The French left flank -was secured by the Lechez river, but their right, -extending towards the Adour, being loose was menaced -by the German cavalry while the front was -attacked by Picton. The action commenced about<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_614"></a>[614]</span> -two o’clock, and Paris was soon driven back in disorder, -but then D’Armagnac’s division entered the -line and extending to the Adour renewed the fight, -which lasted until D’Erlon, after losing many men, -saw his right turned, beyond the Adour, by the light -division and by the hussars who were now close to -Rabastens, whereupon he likewise fell back behind -Vic Bigorre, and took post for the night. The -action was vigorous. About two hundred and fifty -Anglo-Portuguese, men and officers, fell, and -amongst them died colonel Henry Sturgeon so often -mentioned in this history. Skilled to excellence in -almost every branch of war and possessing a variety -of accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently for -himself and so usefully for the service that envy -offered no bar to admiration, and the whole army -felt painfully mortified that his merits were passed -unnoticed in the public despatches.</p> - -<p>Soult’s march through the deep sandy plain of -Ger was harassing, and would have been dangerous -if lord Wellington had sent Hill’s cavalry, now reinforced -by two regiments of heavy dragoons, in pursuit; -but the country was unfavorable for quick observation -and the French covered their movements -with rear-guards whose real numbers it was difficult -to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted on a -hill the end of which abutted on the high road, the -slope being clothed with trees and defended by skirmishers. -Lord Wellington was desirous to know -whether a small or a large force thus barred his -way, but all who endeavoured to ascertain the fact -were stopped by the fire of the enemy. At last -captain William Light, distinguished by the variety -of his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, -seaman, and soldier, made the trial. He rode forward<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_615"></a>[615]</span> -as if he would force his way through the -French skirmishers, but when in the wood dropt his -reins and leaned back as if badly wounded; his -horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of -the enemy’s light troops, and they thinking him -mortally hurt ceased their fire and took no further -notice. He thus passed unobserved through the -wood to the other side of the hill, where there were -no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit -above, put spurs to his horse and galloped along -the French main line counting their regiments as he -passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, -his daring confidence and his speed, made the -French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots -only were discharged, while he, dashing down the -opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the -very skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed -in front. Reaching the spot where lord Wellington -stood he told him there were but five battalions on -the hill.</p> - -<p>Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse -by St. Gaudens was inevitable, yet determined to -dispute every position which offered the least advantage, -his army was on the morning of the 20th -again in line of battle on the heights of Oleac, two -or three miles behind Tarbes, and covering Tournay -on the road to St. Gaudens: however he still held -Tarbes with Clauzel’s corps, which was extended on -the right towards Trie, as if to retain a power of -retreat by that road to Toulouse. The plain of -Tarbes although apparently open was full of deep -ditches which forbad the action of horsemen, wherefore -he sent his brother with five regiments of -cavalry to the Trie road, with orders to cover the -right flank and observe the route to Auch, for he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_616"></a>[616]</span> -feared lest Wellington should intercept his retreat -by that line.</p> - -<p>At day-break the allies again advanced in two -columns. The right under Hill moved along the -high road. The left under Wellington in person -was composed of the light division and hussars, -Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry, the sixth division and -Freyre’s Spaniards. It marched by the road from -Rabastens, and general Cole still making forced -marches with the fourth division and Vivian’s -cavalry, followed from Beaumarchez and La Deveze, -sending detachments through Marciac to watch -Pierre Soult on the side of Trie.</p> - -<p><em>Combat of Tarbes.</em>—The Adour separated Wellington’s -columns, but when the left approached -Tarbes, the light division and the hussars bringing<span class="sidenote7">Plan 10.</span> -up their right shoulders attacked the centre of -Harispe’s division, which occupied the heights of -Orliex and commanded the road from Rabastens -with two guns. Under cover of this attack general -Clinton made a flank movement to his left through -the village of Dours, and opening a cannonade -against Harispe’s right endeavoured to get between -that general and Soult’s main position at -Oleac. Meanwhile general Hill moving by the -other bank of the Adour assailed the town and -bridge of Tarbes, which was defended by Villatte’s -division. These operations were designed to envelope -and crush Clauzel’s two divisions, which seemed -the more easy because there appeared to be only a -fine plain, fit for the action of all the cavalry, between -him and Soult. The latter however, having sent -his baggage and encumbrances off during the night, -saw the movement without alarm, he was better -acquainted with the nature of the plain behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_617"></a>[617]</span> -Harispe and had made roads to enable him to retreat -upon the second position without passing -through Tarbes. Nevertheless Clauzel was in -some danger, for while Hill menaced his left at -Tarbes, the light division supported with cavalry -and guns fell upon his centre at Orleix, and general -Clinton opening a brisk cannonade passed through -the villages of Oleat and Boulin, penetrated between -Harispe and Pierre Soult, and cut the latter off from -the army.</p> - -<p>The action was begun about twelve o’clock. -Hill’s artillery thundered on the right, Clinton’s -answered it on the left, and Alten threw the light -division in mass upon the centre where Harispe’s -left brigade posted on a strong hill was suddenly -assailed by the three rifle battalions. Here the fight -was short yet wonderfully fierce and violent, for the -French, probably thinking their opponents to be -Portuguese on account of their green dress, charged -with great hardiness, and being encountered by -men not accustomed to yield, they fought muzzle -to muzzle, and it was difficult to judge at first who -would win. At last the French gave way, and -Harispe’s centre being thus suddenly overthrown -he retired rapidly through the fields, by the ways -previously opened, before Clinton could get into -his rear. Meanwhile Hill forced the passage of -the Adour at Tarbes and Villatte also retreated -along the high road to Tournay, but under a continued -cannonade. The flat country was now -covered with confused masses of pursuers and pursued, -all moving precipitately with an eager musquetry, -the French guns also replying as they -could to the allies’ artillery. The situation of the -retreating troops seemed desperate, but as Soult<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_618"></a>[618]</span> -had foreseen, the deep ditches and enclosures and -the small copses, villages, and farm-houses, prevented -the British cavalry from acting; Clauzel -therefore extricating his troops with great ability -from their dangerous situation, finally gained the -main position, where four fresh divisions were drawn -up in order of battle and immediately opened all -their batteries on the allies. The pursuit was thus -checked, and before lord Wellington could make -arrangements for a new attack darkness came on -and the army halted on the banks of the Larret and -Larros rivers. The loss of the French is unknown, -that of the allies did not exceed one hundred and -twenty, but of that number twelve officers and -eighty men were of the rifle battalions.</p> - -<p>During the night Soult retreated in two columns,<span class="sidenote">Official Report, MSS.</span> -one by the main road, the other on the left of it, -guided by fires lighted on different hills as points -of direction. The next day he reached St. Gaudens -with D’Erlon’s and Reille’s corps, while Clauzel,<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Orders, MSS.</span> -who had retreated across the fields, halted at -Monrejean and was there rejoined by Pierre -Soult’s cavalry. This march of more than thirty -miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in -the most rapid manner. For the French general, -having now seen nearly all Wellington’s infantry -and his five thousand horsemen, and hearing from -his brother that the fourth division and Vivian’s -cavalry were pointing towards Mielan on his right, -feared that the allies would by Trie and Castlenau -suddenly gain the plains of Muret and intercept -his retreat upon Toulouse, which was his great depôt, -the knot of all his future combinations, and the only -position where he could hope to make a successful -stand with his small army.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_619"></a>[619]</span></p> - -<p>The allies pursued in three columns by St. Gaudens, -Galan, and Trie, but their marches were short.</p> - -<p>On the 21st Beresford who had assumed the -command of the left column was at Castlenau, -Hill in the vicinity of Lannemezan, Wellington at -Tournay.</p> - -<p>The 22d Beresford was at Castlenau, Wellington -at Galan, Hill at Monrejean, and Fane’s horsemen -pushed forwards to St. Gaudens. Here four squadrons -of French cavalry were drawn up in front of -the town. Overthrown by two squadrons of the thirteenth -dragoons at the first shock, they galloped in -disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the -other side and were again broken and pursued for -two miles, many being sabred and above a hundred -taken prisoners. In this action the veteran major -Dogherty of the thirteenth was seen charging between -his two sons at the head of the leading squadron.</p> - -<p>On the 23d Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford -at Puymauren, Wellington at Boulogne.</p> - -<p>The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in -Lombez, Wellington at Isle en Dodon.</p> - -<p>The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached -St. Foy, and Wellington was at Samatan.</p> - -<p>The 26th Beresford entered St. Lys and marching -in order of battle by his left, while his cavalry -skirmished on the right, took post on the Auch -road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the -French army, which was on the Touch covering -Toulouse. The allies thus took seven days to march -what Soult had done in four.</p> - -<p>This tardiness, idly characterized by French military -writers as the sign of timidity and indecision of -character, has been by English writers excused on -the score of wet weather and the encumbrance of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_620"></a>[620]</span> -a large train of artillery and pontoons; yet the -rain equally affected the French, and the pontoons -might have been as usefully waited for on the Garonne -after the French army had been pressed in its -retreat of ninety miles. It is more probable that -the English general, not exactly informed of Soult’s -real numbers nor of his true line of retreat, nor -perfectly acquainted with the country, was cautious; -because being then acrimoniously disputing with -the duke of Angoulême he was also uneasy as to -the state of the country behind him and on his -flanks. The partizans were beginning to stir, his -reinforcements from England and Portugal were -stopped, and admiral Penrose had not yet entered -the Garonne. On the other hand Ferdinand had entered -Spain and formed that engagement with Suchet -about the garrisons already mentioned. In fine, -lord Wellington found himself with about forty-five -thousand men composed of different nations, -the Spaniards being almost as dangerous as useful -to him, opposed to an able and obstinate enemy, -and engaged on a line of operations running more -than a hundred and fifty miles along the French -frontier. His right flank was likely to be vexed by -the partizans forming in the Pyrenees, his left -flank by those behind the Garonne on the right -bank of which a considerable regular force was -also collecting, while the generals commanding the -military districts beyond Toulouse were forming -corps of volunteers national guards and old soldiers -of the regular depôts: and ever he expected -Suchet to arrive on his front and overmatch him -in numbers. He was careful therefore to keep his -troops well in hand, and to spare them fatigue that -the hospitals might not increase. In battle their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_621"></a>[621]</span> -bravery would he knew bring him through any -crisis, but if wearing down their numbers by -forced marches he should cover the country with -small posts and hospital stations, the French people -would be tempted to rise against him. So little -therefore was his caution allied to timidity that it -was no slight indication of daring to have advanced -at all.</p> - -<p>It does seem however that with an overwhelming -cavalry, and great superiority of artillery he -should not have suffered the French general so to -escape his hands. It must be admitted also that -Soult proved himself a very able commander. His -halting on the Adour, his success in reviving the -courage of his army, and the front he shewed in -hopes to prevent his adversary from detaching -troops against Bordeaux, were proofs not only of a -firm unyielding temper but of a clear and ready -judgment. For though, contrary to his hopes, lord -Wellington did send Beresford against Bordeaux, it -was not on military grounds but because treason -was there to aid him. Meanwhile he was forced to -keep his army for fifteen days passive within a few -miles of an army he had just defeated, permitting -his adversary to reorganize and restore the discipline -and courage of the old troops, to rally the -dispersed conscripts, to prepare the means of a -partizan warfare, to send off all his encumbrances -and sick to Toulouse, and to begin fortifying that -city as a final and secure retreat: for the works -there were commenced on the 3d or 4th of March, -and at this time the entrenchments covering the -bridge and suburb of St. Cyprien were nearly completed. -The French general was even the first to -retake the offensive after Orthes, too late indeed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_622"></a>[622]</span> -and he struck no important blow, and twice placed -his army in dangerous situations; but his delay -was a matter of necessity arising from the loss of -his magazines, and if he got into difficulties they -were inseparable from his operations and he extricated -himself again.</p> - -<p>That he gained no advantages in fight is rather -argument for lord Wellington than against Soult. -The latter sought but did not find a favourable opportunity -to strike, and it would have been unwise, -because his adversary gave him no opening, to have -fallen desperately upon superior numbers in a -strong position with an army so recently defeated, -and whose restored confidence it was so essential -not to shake again by a repulse. He increased -that confidence by appearing to insult the allied -army with an inferior force, and in combination -with his energetic proclamation encouraged the -Napoleonists and alarmed the Bourbonists; lastly, -by his rapid retreat from Tarbes he gained two -days to establish and strengthen himself on his -grand position at Toulouse. And certainly he deceived -his adversary, no common general and at -the head of no common army; for so little did -Wellington expect him to make a determined stand -there, that in a letter written on the 26th to sir -John Hope, he says, “I fear the Garonne is too -full and large for our bridge, if not we shall be in -that town (Toulouse) I hope immediately.”</p> - -<p>The French general’s firmness and the extent of -his views cannot however be fairly judged by -merely considering his movements in the field. -Having early proved the power of his adversary, -he had never deceived himself about the ultimate -course of the campaign and therefore struggled<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_623"></a>[623]</span> -without hope, a hard and distressing task; yet he -showed no faintness, fighting continually, and always -for delay as thinking Suchet would finally -cast personal feelings aside and strike for his -country. Nor did he forbear importuning that -marshal to do so. Notwithstanding his previous<span class="sidenote9">Choumara.</span> -disappointments he wrote to him again on the 9th -of February, urging the danger of the crisis, the -certainty that the allies would make the greatest -effort on the western frontier, and praying him to -abandon Catalonia and come with the bulk of his -troops to Bearn: in the same strain he wrote to -the minister of war, and his letters reached their -destinations on the 13th. Suchet, having no orders -to the contrary, could therefore have joined him with -thirteen thousand men before the battle of Orthes; -but that marshal giving a deceptive statement of -his forces in reply, coldly observed, that if he -marched anywhere it would be to join the emperor -and not the duke of Dalmatia. The latter continued -notwithstanding to inform him of all his -battles and his movements, and his accumulating -distresses, yet in vain, and Suchet’s apathy would -be incredible but for the unequivocal proofs of it -furnished in the work of the French engineer -Choumara.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_624"></a>[624]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent">The two armies being now once more in presence of<span class="sidenote7">1814. March.</span> -each other and with an equal resolution to fight, it is -fitting to show the peculiar calculations upon which -the generals founded their respective combinations. -Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country and -chose Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient -capital of the south contained fifty thousand -inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the -Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads -on both sides of that river, and the chief military -arsenal of the south of France. Here he could most -easily feed his troops, assemble arm and discipline -the conscripts, controul and urge the civil authorities, -and counteract the machinations of the discontented. -Posted at Toulouse he was master of -various lines of operations. He could retire upon -Suchet by Carcassone, or towards Lyons by Alby. -He could take a new position behind the Tarn and -prolong the contest by defending successively that -river and the Lot, retreating if necessary upon Decaen’s -army of the Gironde, and thus drawing the -allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had -before drawn them up the left bank, being well -assured that lord Wellington must follow him, and -with weakened forces as it would be necessary to -leave troops in observation of Suchet.</p> - -<p>His first care was to place a considerable body of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_625"></a>[625]</span> -troops, collected from the depôts and other parts of -the interior at Montauban, under the command of -general Loverdo, with orders to construct a bridge-head -on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that -river, and a strong point of retreat and assembly for all -the detachments sent to observe the Garonne below -Toulouse, was thus secured, and withal the command -of a number of great roads leading to the interior of -France, consequently the power of making fresh -combinations. To maintain himself as long as possible -in Toulouse was however a great political object. -It was the last point which connected him at -once with Suchet and with Decaen; and while he -held it, both the latter general and the partizans -in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on -their own side, against the long lines of communications -maintained by Wellington with Bordeaux and -Bayonne. Suchet also could do the same, either by -marching with his whole force or sending a detachment -through the Arriege department to the Upper -Garonne, where general Lafitte having seven or eight -hundred men, national guards and other troops, was -already in activity. These operations Soult now -strongly urged Suchet to adopt, but the latter treated -the proposition, as he had done all those before made -from the same quarter, with contempt.</p> - -<p>Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of -battle.</p> - -<p>The Garonne, flowing on the west, presented to the -allies a deep loop, at the bottom of which was the -bridge, completely covered by the suburb of St. -Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall -three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers: -these defences Soult had improved and he added a -line of exterior entrenchments.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_626"></a>[626]</span></p> - -<p>Beyond the Garonne was the city, surrounded by<span class="sidenote7">Plan 10.</span> -an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to -admit sixteen and twenty-four pound guns.</p> - -<p>The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the -Garonne a few miles below the town, wound for the -most part within point-blank shot of the walls, covering -them on the north and east as the Garonne -and St. Cyprien did on the west.</p> - -<p>The suburbs of St. Stephen and Guillermerie, -built on both sides of this canal, furnished outworks -on the west, for they were entrenched and connected -with and covered by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, -also entrenched and flanking the approaches to -the canal both above and below these suburbs.</p> - -<p>Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong -ridge, called the Mont Rave, run nearly parallel -with the canal, its outer slope was exceedingly -rugged and overlooked a marshy plain through -which the Ers river flowed.</p> - -<p>The south side of the town opened on a plain, but -the suburb of St. Michel lying there, between the -Garonne and the canal, furnished another advanced -defence, and at some distance beyond, a range of -heights called the Pech David commenced, trending -up the Garonne in a direction nearly parallel to -that river.</p> - -<p>Such being the French general’s position, he calculated, -that as lord Wellington could not force the -passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an -enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the -flanks above or below Toulouse, and leave a sufficient -force to blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having -the French army issue on that side against his communications. -If he passed the Garonne above its -confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_627"></a>[627]</span> -that river also, which could not be effected nearer -than Cintegabelle, one march higher up. Then he -must come down by the right of the Arriege, an -operation not to be feared in a country which -the recent rains had rendered impracticable for -guns. If the allies passed the Garonne below the -confluence of the Arriege, Soult judged that he -could from the Pech David, and its continuation, -overlook their movements, and that he should be in -position to fall upon the head of their column while -in the disorder of passing the river: if he failed in -this he had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont -Rave to retire upon, where he could fight again, -his retreat being secure upon Montauban.</p> - -<p>For these reasons the passage of the Garonne -above Toulouse would lead to no decisive result and -he did not fear it, but a passage below the city was -a different matter. Lord Wellington could thus cut -him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from -the northern and eastern quarters; and if the French -then lost the battle they could only retreat by Carcassonne -to form a junction with Suchet in Roussillon, -where having their backs to the mountains and -the allies between them and France they could not -exist. Hence feeling certain the attack would finally -be on that side, Soult lined the left bank of the Garonne -with his cavalry as far as the confluence of -the Tarn, and called up general Despeaux’s troops -from Agen in the view of confining the allies to the -space between the Tarn and the Garonne: for his -first design was to attack them there rather than -lose his communication with Montauban.</p> - -<p>On the other hand lord Wellington whether from -error from necessity or for the reasons I have before -touched upon, having suffered the French army to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_628"></a>[628]</span> -gain three days’ march in the retreat from Tarbes, -had now little choice of operations. He could not -halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops -should join him from the Bastan, without giving -Soult all the time necessary to strengthen himself -and organize his plan of defence, nor without appearing -fearful and weak in the eyes of the French -people, which would have been most dangerous. -Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He -had taken the offensive and could not resume the -defensive with safety, the invasion of France once -begun it was imperative to push it to a conclusion. -Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers -his business was to bring his adversary to battle -as soon as possible, and as he could not force his -way through St. Cyprien in face of the whole French -army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne -above or below Toulouse.</p> - -<p>It has been already shown that in a strategic view -this passage should have been made below that -town, but seeing that the south side of the city was -the most open to attack, the English general resolved -to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above -Toulouse, designing to throw his right wing suddenly<span class="sidenote">Manuscript notes by the duke of Wellington.</span> -into the open country between the Garonne -and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre -and left he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien. With -this object, at eight o’clock in the evening of the 27th, -one of Hill’s brigades marched up from Muret, some -men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced, -the remainder of that general’s troops being to pass -at midnight. But when the river was measured the -width was found too great for the pontoons and -there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore -this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_629"></a>[629]</span> -some considerable advantage would probably<span class="sidenote">French Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -have been gained, since it does not appear that Soult -knew of the attempt until two days later, and then -only by his emissaries, not by his scouts.</p> - -<p>Wellington thus baffled tried another scheme, he -drove the enemy from the Touch river on the 28th, -and collected the infantry of his left and centre -about Portet, masking the movement with his cavalry. -In the course of the operation a single squadron of -the eighteenth hussars, under major Hughes, being -inconsiderately pushed by colonel Vivian across the -bridge of St. Martyn de la Touch, suddenly came upon<span class="sidenote">Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.</span> -a whole regiment of French cavalry; the rashness of -the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety -of the British, for the enemy thinking that a strong -support must be at hand discharged their carbines -and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the -speed of both sides increased, and as the nature of -the road did not admit of any egress to the sides, this -great body of French horsemen was pushed headlong -by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.</p> - -<p>During these movements Hill’s troops were withdrawn -to St. Roques, but in the night of the 30th a -new bridge being laid near Pensaguel, two miles -above the confluence of the Arriege, that general -passed the Garonne with two divisions of infantry, -Morillo’s Spaniards, Gardiner’s and Maxwell’s artillery, -and Fane’s cavalry, in all thirteen thousand -sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket -brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition -by the great road, having orders to seize -the stone bridge of Cintegabelle, fifteen miles up the -Arriege, and, on the march, to secure a ferry-boat -known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the -troops followed, the intent being to pass the Arriege<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_630"></a>[630]</span> -river hastily at Cintegabelle, and so come down the -right bank to attack Toulouse on the south while -lord Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march -was to have been made privily in the night, but the -bridge, though ordered for the evening of the 30th, -was not finished until five o’clock in the morning of -the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the enterprise in -time to observe from the heights of Old Toulouse -the strength of the column, and to ascertain that the -great body of the army still remained in front of -St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the country on -the right of the Arriege was known to him, and the -suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in -a state to resist a partial attack, the matter appeared -a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse -while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne -passed below the city. In this persuasion he kept<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -his infantry in hand, and sent only his cavalry up -the right bank of the Arriege to observe the march -of the allies; but he directed general Lafitte, who -had collected some regular horsemen and the national -guards of the department, to hang upon their -skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet’s army. -He was however somewhat disquieted, because the -baggage, which to avoid encumbering the march had -been sent up the Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being -seen by his scouts, was reported to be a second -column, increasing Hill’s force to eighteen thousand -men.</p> - -<p>While in this uncertainty he heard of the measurement -of the river made at Portet on the night of -the 27th, and that many guns were still collected -there, wherefore, being ignorant of the cause why the -bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a -design to cross there also when Hill should descend<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_631"></a>[631]</span> -the Arriege. To meet this danger, he put four<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -divisions under Clauzel, with orders to fall upon the -head of the allies if they should attempt the -passage before Hill came down, resolving in the -contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse -and on the Mont-Rave, because the positions on the -right of the Arriege were all favourable to the -assailants. He was however soon relieved from -anxiety. General Hill effected indeed the passage -of the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry -towards Villefranche and Nailloux, but his artillery -were quite unable to move in the deep country -there, and as success and safety alike depended on -rapidity he returned during the night to Pinsaguel, -recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons -left only a flying bridge with a small guard of -infantry and cavalry on the right bank. His retreat -was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen who picked up -a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, -and Soult remained well pleased that his -adversary had thus lost three or four important -days.</p> - -<p>The French general was now sure the next attempt<span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -would be below Toulouse, yet he changed his design -of marching down the Garonne to fight between -that river and the Tarn rather than lose his communications -with Montauban. Having completed -his works of defence for the city and the suburbs, -and fortified all the bridges over the canal, he concluded -not to abandon Toulouse under any circumstances, -and therefore set his whole army and all -the working population to entrench the Mont -Rave, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking -he might thus securely meet the shock of battle let -it come on which side it would. Meanwhile the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_632"></a>[632]</span> -Garonne continued so full and rapid that lord Wellington -was forced to remain inactive before St. -Cyprien until the evening of the 3d; then the -waters falling, the pontoons were carried in the night -to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse, where -the bridge was at last thrown and thirty guns -placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. -The third fourth and sixth divisions of infantry -and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, -immediately passed, and the cavalry being -pushed out two leagues on the front and flanks -captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the -French army. But now the river again swelled so -fast, that the light division and the Spaniards were -unable to follow, the bridge got damaged and the -pontoons were taken up.</p> - -<p>This passage was made known to Soult immediately -by his cavalry scouts, yet he knew not the -exact force which had crossed, and as Morillo’s -Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, had taken -the outposts in front of St. Cyprien he imagined -Hill also had moved to Grenade, and that the greatest -part of the allied army was over the Garonne. -Wherefore merely observing Beresford with his -cavalry he continued to strengthen his field of battle -about Toulouse, his resolution to keep that city -being confirmed by hearing on the 7th that the -allied sovereigns had entered Paris.</p> - -<p>On the 8th the waters subsided, the allies’ bridge -was again laid down, Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese -artillery crossed, and lord Wellington taking -the command in person advanced to the heights of -Fenoulhiet within five miles of Toulouse. Marching -up both banks of the Ers his columns were separated -by that river, which was impassable without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_633"></a>[633]</span> -pontoons, and it was essential to secure as soon as -possible one of the stone bridges. Hence when his -left approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the -great road of Alby, Vivian’s horsemen drove Berton’s -cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the -bridge of Bordes, and the eighteenth hussars descended -towards that of Croix d’Orade. The latter was -defended by Vial’s dragoons, and after some skirmishing -the eighteenth was suddenly menaced by a -regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite -bank of the river being lined with dismounted carbineers. -The two parties stood facing each other, -hesitating to begin, until the approach of some -British infantry, when both sides sounded a charge -at the same moment, but the English horses were -so quick the French were in an instant jammed up -on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and -the mass breaking away to the rear went off in -disorder, leaving many killed and wounded and -above a hundred prisoners in the hands of the -victors. They were pursued through the village of -Croix d’Orade, but beyond it they rallied on the -rest of their brigade and advanced again, the hussars -then recrossed the bridge, which was now defended -by the British infantry whose fire stopped the -French cavalry. The communication between the -allied columns was thus secured.</p> - -<p>The credit of this brilliant action was given to -Colonel Vivian in the despatch, incorrectly, for -that officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous -to the charge at the bridge: the attack was conceived -and conducted entirely by major Hughes -of the eighteenth.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington from the heights of Kirie Eleison, -carefully examined the French general’s position<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_634"></a>[634]</span> -and resolved to attack on the 9th. Meanwhile -to shorten his communications with general Hill he -directed the pontoons to be removed from Grenade -and relaid higher up at Seilh. The light division -were to cross at the latter place at daybreak, but the -bridge was not relaid until late in the day, and the -English general extremely incensed at the failure -was forced to defer his battle until the 10th.</p> - -<p>Soult’s combinations were now crowned with -success. He had by means of his fortresses, his -battles, the sudden change of his line of operations -after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his -clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next -point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary -to an equality with his own. He had gained -seventeen days for preparation, had brought the -allies to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted -for defence, and well fortified; where one-third of -their force was separated by a great river from the -rest, where they could derive no advantage from -their numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in -artillery notwithstanding their previous superiority -in that arm.</p> - -<p>His position covered three sides of Toulouse. -Defending St. Cyprien on the west with his left, he -guarded the canal on the north with his centre, -and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east. -His reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of -Toulouse, and the urban guards while maintaining -tranquillity aided to transport the artillery and -ammunition to different posts. Hill was opposed to -his left, but while the latter, well fortified at St. Cyprien, -had short and direct communication with the -centre by the great bridge of Toulouse, the former -could only communicate with the main body under<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_635"></a>[635]</span> -Wellington by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit -of ten or twelve miles.</p> - -<p>The English general was advancing from the -north, but his intent was still to assail the city on -the south side, where it was weakest in defence. -With this design he had caused the country on the -left of the Ers to be carefully examined, in the view -of making, under cover of that river, a flank march -round the eastern front and thus gaining the open -ground which he had formerly endeavoured to reach -by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. But again he -was baffled by the deep country, which he could -not master so as to pass the Ers by force, because -all the bridges with the exception of that at Croix -d’Orade were mined or destroyed by Soult, and -the whole of the pontoons were on the Garonne. -There was then no choice save to attack from the -northern and eastern sides. The first, open and flat, -and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban -and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence, -because the canal, the bridges over which were -strongly defended by works, was under the fire of -the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part -within musquet-shot. Here then, as at St. Cyprien, -it was a fortress and not a position which was -opposed to him, and his field of battle was necessarily -confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.</p> - -<p>This range of heights, naturally strong and -rugged, and covered by the Ers river, which as we -have seen <ins class="corr" id="tn-635" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'was not be forded'"> -was not to be forded</ins>, presented two distinct -platforms, that of Calvinet, and that of St. Sypiere -on which the extreme right of the French was -posted. Between them, where the ground dipped a -little, two roads leading from Lavaur and Caraman -were conducted to Toulouse, passing the canal behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_636"></a>[636]</span> -the ridge at the suburbs of Guillemerie and -St. Etienne.</p> - -<p>The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme -left with a species of horn-work, consisting of several -open retrenchments and small works, supported by -two large redoubts, one of which flanked the approaches -to the canal on the north: a range of -abbatis was also formed there by felling the trees -on the Alby road. Continuing this line to the -right, two other large forts, called the Calvinet -and the Colombette redoubts, terminated the works -on this platform.</p> - -<p>On that of St. Sypiere there were also two redoubts, -one on the extreme right called St. Sypiere, -the other without a name nearer to the road of -Caraman.</p> - -<p>The whole range of heights occupied was -about two miles long, and an army attacking in -front would have to cross the Ers under fire, advance -through ground, naturally steep and marshy, and -now rendered almost impassable by means of artificial -inundations, to the assault of the ridge and the -works on the summit; and if the assailants should even -force between the two platforms, they would, while -their flanks were battered by the redoubts above, -come upon the works of Cambon and Saccarin. If -these fell the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. -Steven, the canal, and finally the ramparts of -the town, would still have to be carried in succession. -But it was not practicable to pass the -Ers except by the bridge of Croix d’Orade which -had been seized so happily on the 8th. Lord Wellington -was therefore reduced to make a flank march<span class="sidenote">Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.</span> -under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and -then to carry the latter with a view of crossing the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_637"></a>[637]</span> -canal above the suburb of Guillemerie, and establishing -his army on the south side of Toulouse, -where only the city could be assailed with any hope -of success.</p> - -<p>To impose this march upon him all Soult’s dispositions -had been directed. For this he had mined -all the bridges on the Ers, save only that of Croix -d’Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the -Ers and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond -that river by sending half his cavalry over to -dispute the passage of the numerous streams in the -deep country on the right bank. His army was -now disposed in the following order. General Reille -defended the suburb of St. Cyprien with Taupin’s -and Maransin’s divisions. Daricau’s division lined -the canal on the north from its junction with the -Garonne to the road of Alby, defending with his -left the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the -Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge -with his right. Harispe’s division was established -in the works on the Mont-Rave. His right at St. -Sypiere looked towards the bridge of Bordes, his -centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which -Vial’s horsemen were also collected; his left looked -down the road of Alby towards the bridge of Croix -d’Orade. On this side a detached eminence -within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, was -occupied by St. Pol’s brigade, drawn from Villatte’s -division. The two remaining divisions of infantry<span class="sidenote7">Plan 10.</span> -were formed in columns at certain points behind the -Mont Rave, and Travot’s reserve continued to man -the walls of Toulouse behind the canal. This line -of battle presented an angle towards the Croix -d’Orade, each side about two miles in length and -the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_638"></a>[638]</span></p> - -<p>Wellington having well observed the ground on -the 8th and 9th, made the following disposition of -attack for the 10th. General Hill was to menace -St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to -draw the enemy’s attention according to the progress -of the battle on the right of the Garonne, which he -could easily discern. The third and light divisions -and Freyre’s Spaniards, being already on the left of -the Ers, were to advance against the northern front -of Toulouse. The two first supported by Bock’s -German cavalry were to make demonstrations -against the line of canal defended by Daricau. That -is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux -and the convent of the Minimes, while Alten -maintained the communication between him and -Freyre who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, -was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover -Beresford’s column of march. This last composed -of the fourth and sixth division with three batteries -was, after passing the bridge of Croix d’Orade, to -move round the left of the Pugade and along the -low ground between the French heights and the -Ers, until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur, -when the two divisions were to wheel into line and -attack the platform of St. Sypiere. Freyre was -then to assail that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons -following close were to connect that general’s -left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile lord Edward -Somerset’s hussars were to move up the left of -the Ers, while Vivian’s cavalry moved up the right -of that river, each destined to observe Berton’s -cavalry, which, having possession of the bridges of -Bordes and Montaudran higher up, could pass from -the right bank to the left, and destroying the bridge fall -upon the head of Beresford’s troops while in march.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_639"></a>[639]</span></p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.</h4> - -<p>The 10th of April at two o’clock in the -morning the light division passed the Garonne -by the bridge at Seilh, and about six o’clock -the whole army moved forwards in the order -assigned for the different columns. Picton and -Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced -posts behind the works at the bridge over the -canal. Freyre’s columns, marching along the Alby -road, were cannonaded by St. Pol with two guns -until they had passed a small stream by the help of -some temporary bridges, when the French general -following his instructions retired to the horn-work -on the Calvinet platform. The Spaniards were thus -established on the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese -guns under major Arentschild opened a -heavy cannonade against Calvinet. Meanwhile -Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from -Croix d’Orade in three columns abreast. Passing -behind the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc, -he entered the marshy ground between the -Ers river and the Mont Rave, but he left his artillery -at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep -and difficult country under the fire of the enemy. -Beyond the Ers on his left, Vivian’s cavalry, now -under colonel Arentschild, drove Berton’s horsemen<span class="sidenote">Memoir by general Berton, MSS.</span> -back with loss, and nearly seized the bridge of -Bordes which the French general passed and destroyed -with difficulty at the last moment. However -the German hussars succeeded in gaining the -bridge of Montaudran higher up, though it was -barricaded, and defended by a detachment of cavalry<span class="sidenote">Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.</span> -sent there by Berton who remained himself in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_640"></a>[640]</span> -position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down -the left of the Ers.</p> - -<p>While these operations were in progress, general -Freyre who had asked as a favour to lead the battle -at Calvinet, whether from error or impatience assailed -the horn-work on that platform about eleven -o’clock and while Beresford was still in march. The -Spaniards, nine thousand strong, moved in two lines -and a reserve, and advanced with great resolution -at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as to -embrace the end of the Calvinet hill. The French -musquetry and great guns thinned the ranks at -every step, yet closing upon their centre they still -ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were -exposed to increasing in violence until their right -wing, which was also raked from the bridge of Matabiau, -unable to endure the torment wavered. -The leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped -for shelter into a hollow road, twenty-five feet -deep in parts, and covering this part of the French -entrenchments; but the left wing and the second line -run back in great disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers -under colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining -their ground under cover of a bank which protected -them. Then the French came leaping out of -their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of -the hollow road poured an incessant stream of shot -upon the helpless crowds entangled in the gulph -below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau, -constructed to rake this opening, sent its -bullets from flank to flank hissing through the quivering -mass of flesh and bones.</p> - -<p>The Spanish generals rallying the troops who -had fled, led them back again to the brink of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_641"></a>[641]</span> -fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage below and -the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror. -Again they fled, and again the French bounding -from their trenches pursued, while several battalions -sallying from the bridge of Matabiau and from -behind the Calvinet followed hard along the road of -Alby. The country was now covered with fugitives -whose headlong flight could not be restrained, -and with pursuers whose numbers and vehemence -increased, until lord Wellington, who was at that -point, covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby’s -cavalry, and the reserve artillery which -opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the Portuguese -guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a -brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, -menaced the flank of the victorious French who -immediately retired to their entrenchments on Calvinet: -but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards -had been killed or wounded and their defeat was -not the only misfortune.</p> - -<p>General Picton, regardless of his orders, which, -his temper on such occasions being known were especially -given, had turned his false attack into a -real one against the bridge of Jumeaux, and the -enemy fighting from a work too high to be forced -without ladders and approachable only along an -open flat, repulsed him with a loss of nearly four -hundred men and officers: amongst the latter -colonel Forbes of the forty-fifth was killed, and -general Brisbane who commanded the brigade was -wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to the -Garonne the French had completely vindicated -their position, the allies had suffered enormously, -and beyond the Garonne, although general Hill -had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_642"></a>[642]</span> -St. Cyprien and was menacing the second -line, the latter being much more contracted and -very strongly fortified could not be stormed. -The musquetry battle therefore subsided for a time, -but a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the -whole of the French line, and on the allies’ side -from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery -left by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the -Portuguese guns on the Pugade, poured its shot incessantly -against the works on the Calvinet platform: -injudiciously it has been said because the -ammunition thus used for a secondary object was -afterwards wanted when a vital advantage might -have been gained.</p> - -<p>It was now evident that the victory must be won -or lost by Beresford, and yet from Picton’s error -lord Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision; -for the light division and the heavy cavalry -only remained in hand, and these troops were -necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the -Spaniards, and to protect the artillery employed to -keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore -approached with all happy promise to the French -general. The repulse of Picton, the utter dispersion -of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second -line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled -him to draw, first Taupin’s whole division, and then -one of Maransin’s brigades from that quarter, to -reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus -three divisions and his cavalry, that is to say nearly -fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for an -offensive movement without in any manner weakening -the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on -the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon<span class="sidenote">Morning States, MSS.</span> -Beresford, whose force, originally less than thirteen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_643"></a>[643]</span> -thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced as it made -slow and difficult way for two miles through a deep -marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses. -For sometimes moving in mass, sometimes -filing under the French musquetry, and always -under the fire of their artillery from the Mont Rave, -without a gun to reply, the length of the column -had augmented so much at every step from the -difficulty of the way that frequent halts were necessary -to close up the ranks.</p> - -<p>The flat miry ground between the river and the -heights became narrower and deeper as the troops -advanced, Berton’s cavalry was ahead, an impassable -river was on the left, and three French -divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed -the right flank! Fortune came to their -aid. Soult always eyeing their march, had, when -the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin’s division -to the platform of St. Sypiere, and supporting -it with a brigade of D’Armagnac’s division disposed -the whole about the redoubts. From thence -after a short hortative to act vigorously he ordered -Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the -same time directing a regiment of Vial’s cavalry to -descend the heights by the Lavaur road and intercept -the line of retreat, while Berton’s horsemen -assailed the other flank from the side of the bridge -of Bordes. But this was not half of the force -which the French general might have employed. -Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still in -the streets of Toulouse, and that general instead -of attacking at once took ground to his right, -waiting until Beresford having completed his flank -march had wheeled into lines at the foot of the -heights.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_644"></a>[644]</span></p> - -<p>Taupin’s infantry, unskilfully arranged for action -it is said, at last poured down the hill, but -some rockets discharged in good time ravaged the -ranks and with their noise and terrible appearance, -unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers; -then the British skirmishers running forwards plied -them with a biting fire, and Lambert’s brigade of -the sixth division, aided by Anson’s brigade and -some provisional battalions of the fourth division, -for it is an error to say the sixth division alone repulsed -this attack, Lambert’s brigade I say, rushed -forwards with a terrible shout, and the French turning -fled back to the upper ground. Vial’s horsemen -trotting down the Lavaur road now charged -on the right flank, but the second and third lines of -the sixth division being thrown into squares repulsed -them, and on the other flank general Cole -had been so sudden in his advance up the heights, -that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity to charge. -Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry -in his front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of -brigade, and without a check won the summit of -the platform, his skirmishers even descended in pursuit -on the reverse slope, and meanwhile, on his -left, general Cole meeting with less resistance had -still more rapidly gained the height at that side: -so complete was the rout that the two redoubts -were abandoned from panic, and the French with the -utmost disorder sought shelter in the works of Sacarin -and Cambon.</p> - -<p>Soult astonished at this weakness in troops from -whom he had expected so much, and who had but -just before given him assurances of their resolution -and confidence, was in fear that Beresford pushing -his success would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_645"></a>[645]</span> -on the canal. Wherefore, covering the flight -as he could with the remainder of Vial’s cavalry, he -hastily led D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to the -works of Sacarin, checked the foremost British skirmishers -and rallied the fugitives; Taupin’s guns -arrived from the town at the same moment, and the -mischief being stayed a part of Travot’s reserve -immediately moved to defend the bridge of the -Demoiselles. A fresh order of battle was thus organized, -but the indomitable courage of the British -soldiers overcoming all obstacles and all opposition, -had decided the first great crisis of the fight.</p> - -<p>Lambert’s brigade immediately wheeled to its -right across the platform on the line of the Lavaur -road, menacing the flank of the French on the -Calvinet platform, while Pack’s Scotch brigade -and Douglas’s Portuguese, composing the second -and third lines of the sixth division, were disposed -on the right with a view to march against the Colombette -redoubts on the original front of the enemy. -And now also the eighteenth and German hussars, -having forced the bridge of Montaudran on the -Ers river, came round the south end of the Mont -Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers of -the fourth division they menaced the bridge of the -Demoiselles, from whence and from the works of -Cambon and Sacarin the enemy’s guns played -incessantly.</p> - -<p>The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely -changed. The French thrown entirely on the -defensive occupied three sides of a square. Their -right, extending from the works of Sacarin to the redoubts -of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced -by Lambert, who was solidly posted on the platform -of St. Sypiere while the redoubts themselves<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_646"></a>[646]</span> -were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French -left thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau -awaited the renewed attack of the Spaniards, and -the whole position was very strong, not exceeding -a thousand yards on each side with the angles all -defended by formidable works. The canal and city -of Toulouse, its walls and entrenched suburbs, -offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while the -Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the -other, insured the power of retreat.</p> - -<p>In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s -cavalry, the whole of Villatte’s division, one brigade -of Maransin’s, another of D’Armagnac’s, and with -the exception of the regiment driven from the St. -Sypiere redoubt the whole of Harispe’s division. -On the allies’ side therefore defeat had been staved -off, but victory was still to be contended for, and -with apparently inadequate means; for Picton -being successfully opposed by Darricau was so far -paralyzed, the Spaniards rallying slowly were not -to be depended upon for another attack, and there -remained only the heavy cavalry and the light -division, which lord Wellington could not venture -to thrust into the action under pain of being left -without any reserve in the event of a repulse. The -final stroke therefore was still to be made on the -left, and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert’s -brigade and the fourth division were necessarily -employed to keep in check the French troops -at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon and Sacarin. -This heavy mass, comprising one brigade of -Travot’s reserve, the half of D’Armagnac’s division -and all of Taupin’s, together with the regiment belonging -to Harispe which had abandoned the forts -of St. Sypiere, was commanded by general Clauzel,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_647"></a>[647]</span> -who disposed the greater part in advance of the -entrenchments as if to retake the offensive.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs about half-past two -o’clock, when Beresford renewed the action with -Pack’s Scotch brigade, and the Portuguese of the -sixth division under colonel Douglas. These -troops, ensconced in the hollow Lavaur road on -Lambert’s right, had been hitherto well protected from -the fire of the French works, but now scrambling -up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to -their left by wings of regiments as they could get -out, and ascending the heights by the slope facing -the Ers, under a wasting fire of cannon and musquetry -carried all the French breast-works, and the -Colombette, and Calvinet redoubts. It was a surprising -action when the loose disorderly nature of the -attack imposed by the difficulty of the ground is -considered; but the French although they yielded -at first to the thronging rush of the British troops -soon rallied and came back with a reflux. Their -cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and -the struggle became terrible. For Harispe, who -commanded in person at this part, and under whom -the French seemed always to fight with redoubled -vigour, brought up fresh men, and surrounding the -two redoubts with a surging multitude absolutely -broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths -of the forty-second, and drove the rest out. -The British troops were however supported by the -seventy-first and ninety-first, and the whole clinging -to the brow of the hill fought with a wonderful -courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen -that their order of battle was reduced to a thin line -of skirmishers. Some of the British cavalry then -rode up from the low ground and attempted a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_648"></a>[648]</span> -charge, but they were stopped by a deep hollow -road, of which there were many, and some of the -foremost troopers tumbling headlong in perished. -Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued -fiercely, the French from their numbers had -certainly the advantage, but they never retook the -Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents -down from the brow of the hill. At last when the -whole of the sixth division had rallied and again -assailed them, flank and front, when their generals -Harispe and Baurot had fallen dangerously wounded -and the Colombette was retaken by the seventy-ninth, -the battle turned, and the French finally -abandoned the platform, falling back partly by their -right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the -bridge of Matabiau.</p> - -<p>It was now about four o’clock. The Spaniards -during this contest had once more partially attacked, -but they were again put to flight, and the French -thus remained masters of their entrenchments in -that quarter; for the sixth division had been very -hardly handled, and Beresford halted to reform -his order of battle and receive his artillery: it -came to him indeed about this time, yet with great -difficulty and with little ammunition in consequence -of the heavy cannonade it had previously furnished -from Montblanc. However Soult seeing that the -Spaniards, supported by the light division, had -rallied a fourth time, that Picton again menaced the -bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while -Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, -was now advancing along the summit, deemed farther -resistance useless and relinquished the northern -end of the Calvinet platform also. About five o’clock -he withdrew his whole army behind the canal,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_649"></a>[649]</span> -still however holding the advanced works of Sacarin -and Cambon. Lord Wellington then established -the Spaniards in the abandoned works and so -became master of the Mont Rave in all its extent. -Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The French -had five generals, and perhaps three thousand men -killed or wounded and they lost one piece of -artillery. The allies lost four generals and four -thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men and -officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards. -A lamentable spilling of blood, and a useless, for -before this period Napoleon had abdicated the -throne of France and a provisional government was -constituted at Paris.</p> - -<p>During the night the French general, defeated -but undismayed, replaced the ammunition expended -in the action, re-organized and augmented his field -artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made -dispositions for fighting the next morning behind -the canal. Yet looking to the final necessity of a -retreat he wrote to Suchet to inform him of the -result of the contest and proposed a combined plan -of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity -of his temper. “March,” said he, “with -the whole of your forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne, -I will meet you there with my army, we can -then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the -seat of war to the Upper Garonne, and holding on -by the mountains oblige the enemy to recall his -troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to -recover that city and make a diversion in our -favour.”</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 11th he was again ready -to fight, but the English general was not. The -French position, within musquet-shot of the walls<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_650"></a>[650]</span> -of Toulouse, was still inexpugnable on the northern -and eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave -was only a preliminary step to the passage of -the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles and other -points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon, -with the view of throwing the army as originally -designed on to the south side of the town. But this -was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions, -and a fresh provision of ammunition only to be obtained -from the parc on the other side of the Garonne. -Hence to accelerate the preparations, to -ascertain the state of general Hill’s position, and to -give that general farther instructions, lord Wellington -repaired on the 11th to St. Cyprien; but -though he had shortened his communications by -removing the pontoon bridge from Grenade to -Seilh, the day was spent before the ammunition -arrived and the final arrangements for the passage -of the canal could be completed. The attack was -therefore deferred until daylight on the 12th.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the -canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet -and menace Soult’s retreat by the road leading to -Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen -on the heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together -with the preparations in his front, taught -Soult that he could no longer delay if he would not -be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated -all his arrangements, he left eight pieces of -heavy artillery, two generals, the gallant Harispe -being one, and sixteen hundred men whose wounds -were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors; -then filing out of the city with surprising order and -ability, he made a forced march of twenty-two miles, -cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_651"></a>[651]</span> -Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. -On the same day general Hill’s troops -were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit, and -the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, -beat the French with the loss of twenty-five men, -and cut off a like number of <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span> on the -side of Revel.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph, -the white flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, -a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon -colours, but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had -retired with the French army. The British general, -true to his honest line of policy, did not fail to warn -the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement -must be at their own risk, but in the afternoon two -officers, the English colonel Cooke, and the French -colonel St. Simon, arrived from Paris. Charged to -make known to the armies the abdication of Napoleon -they had been detained near Blois by the officiousness -of the police attending the court of the empress -Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave -men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence. -Nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to the -war. When St. Simon in pursuance of his mission -reached Soult’s quarters on the 13th, that marshal, -not without just cause, demurred to his authority, -and proposed to suspend hostilities until -authentic information could be obtained from the -ministers of the emperor: then sending all his -incumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he -took a position of observation at Castelnaudary -and awaited the progress of events. Lord Wellington -refused to accede to his proposal, and -as general Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, -acknowledged the authority of the provincial<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_652"></a>[652]</span> -government and readily concluded an armistice, -he judged that Soult designed to make a civil -war and therefore marched against him. The 17th -the outposts were on the point of engaging when -the duke of Dalmatia, who had now received official -information from the chief of the emperor’s staff, -notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs -in France: and with this honourable distinction -that he had faithfully sustained the cause of his -great monarch until the very last moment.</p> - -<p>A convention which included Suchet’s army was -immediately agreed upon, but that marshal had -previously adopted the white colours of his own -motion, and lord Wellington instantly transmitted -the intelligence to general Clinton in Catalonia and -to the troops at Bayonne. Too late it came for both -and useless battles were fought. That at Barcelona -has been already described, but at Bayonne misfortune -and suffering had fallen upon one of the -brightest soldiers of the British army.</p> - - -<h4>SALLY FROM BAYONNE.</h4> - -<p>During the progress of the main army in the interior -sir John Hope conducted the investment of -Bayonne, with all the zeal the intelligence and unremitting -vigilance and activity which the difficult -nature of the operation required. He had gathered -great stores of gabions and fascines and platforms, -and was ready to attack the citadel when rumours -of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly -and without any official character to warrant a formal -communication to the garrison without lord Wellington’s -authority. These rumours were however<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_653"></a>[653]</span> -made known at the outposts, and perhaps lulled -the vigilance of the besiegers, but to such irregular -communications which might be intended to deceive -the governor naturally paid little attention.</p> - -<p>The piquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were -at this time furnished by a brigade of the fifth division, -but from thence to the extreme right the -guards had charge of the line, and they had also one -company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber’s -German brigade was encamped as a support to the -left, the remainder of the first division was encamped -in the rear, towards Boucaut. In this state, about -one o’clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter, -coming over to general Hay who commanded the -outposts that night, gave an exact account of the -projected sally. The general not able to speak<span class="sidenote">Beamish’s History of the German Legion.</span> -French sent him to general Hinuber, who immediately -interpreting the man’s story to general Hay, -assembled his own troops under arms, and transmitted -the intelligence to sir John Hope. It would appear -that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s story, -took no additional precautions, and it is probable -that neither the German brigade nor the reserves of -the guards would have been put under arms but -for the activity of general Hinuber. However at -three o’clock the French, commencing with a false -attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured -suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three -thousand combatants. They surprised the piquets, -and with loud shouts breaking through the chain -of posts at various points, carried with one rush the -church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne -with exception of a fortified house which was defended -by captain Forster of the thirty-eighth regiment. -Masters of every other part and overthrowing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_654"></a>[654]</span> -all who stood before them they drove the picquets -and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, -killed general Hay, took colonel Townsend of the -guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing -troops, and passing in rear of the right threw the -whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, -having his Germans well in hand, moved up -on the side of St. Etienne, rallied some of the fifth -division, and being joined by a battalion of general -Bradford’s Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit -bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and -regained the village and church.</p> - -<p>The combat on the right was at first even more -disastrous than in the centre, neither the piquets -nor the reserves were able to sustain the fury of the -assault and the battle was most confused and terrible; -for on both sides the troops, broken into small -bodies by the enclosures and unable to recover -their order, came dashing together in the darkness, -fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes -friends encountered sometimes foes: all was tumult -and horror. The guns of the citadel vaguely guided -by the flashes of the musquetry sent their shot and -shells booming at random through the lines of -fight, and the gun-boats dropping down the river -opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting -columns, which being put in motion by sir John -Hope on the first alarm were now coming up from -the side of Boucaut. Thus nearly one hundred -pieces of artillery were in full play at once, and the -shells having set fire to the fascine depôts and to -several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over -the striving masses.</p> - -<p>Amidst this confusion sir John Hope suddenly -disappeared, none knew how or wherefore at the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_655"></a>[655]</span> -time, but it afterwards appeared, that having -brought up the reserves on the right, to stem the -torrent in that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by -a hollow road which led close behind the line of -picquets; the French had however lined both banks, -and when he endeavoured to return a shot struck -him in the arm, while his horse, a large one as was -necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, received -eight bullets and fell upon his leg. His followers -had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of -them, captain Herries, and Mr. Moore a nephew of -sir John Moore, seeing his helpless state turned -back and alighting endeavoured amidst the heavy -fire of the enemy to draw him from beneath the -horse. While thus engaged they were both struck -down with dangerous wounds, the French carried -them all off, and sir John Hope was again -severely hurt in the foot by an English bullet before -they gained the citadel.</p> - -<p>The day was now beginning to break and the -allies were enabled to act with more unity and -effect. The Germans were in possession of St. -Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards, -being properly disposed, by general Howard who -had succeeded to the command, suddenly raised a -loud shout, and running in upon the French drove -them back into the works with such slaughter -that their own writers admit a loss of one general -and more than nine hundred men. But on the British -side general Stopford was wounded, and the whole -loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers. -Of these more than two hundred were taken, besides -the commander-in-chief; and it is generally acknowledged -that captain Forster’s firm defence of the -fortified house first, and next the readiness and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_656"></a>[656]</span> -gallantry with which general Hinuber and his Germans -retook St. Etienne, saved the allies from a -very terrible disaster.</p> - -<p>A few days after this piteous event the convention -made with Soult became known and hostilities -ceased.</p> - -<p>All the French troops in the south were now reorganized -in one body under the command of -Suchet, but they were so little inclined to acquiesce -in the revolution, that prince Polignac, acting for -the duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general -Kennedy for a sum of money to -quiet them.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese army returned to Portugal. The -Spanish army to Spain, the generals being it is said -inclined at first to declare for the Cortez against the -king, but they were diverted from their purpose by -the influence and authority of lord Wellington.</p> - -<p>The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some -for America, some for England, and the cavalry -marching through France took shipping at Boulogne.</p> - -<p>Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance -of the veteran’s services.</p> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_657"></a>[657]</span><br></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXXIV_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent">Marshal Soult and General Thouvenot have<span class="sidenote7">1814.</span> -been accused of fighting with a full knowledge of -Napoleon’s abdication. This charge circulated originally -by the Bourbon party is utterly unfounded. -The extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot -through the advanced posts has been already -noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to induce -sir John Hope to make a formal communication, -and the governor could only treat it as an idle story -to insult or to deceive him, and baffle his defence -by retarding his counter-operations while the works -for the siege were advancing. For how unlikely, -nay impossible, must it not have appeared, that the -emperor Napoleon, whose victories at Mont-Mirail -and Champaubert were known before the close investment -of Bayonne, should have been deprived -of his crown in the space of a few weeks, and the -stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts -without any relaxation in the preparations for the -siege.</p> - -<p>As false and unsubstantial is the charge against -Soult.</p> - -<p>The acute remark of an English military writer,<span class="sidenote">Memoirs of captain Kincaid.</span> -that if the duke of Dalmatia had known of the -peace before he fought, he would certainly have announced -it after the battle, were it only to maintain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_658"></a>[658]</span> -himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable: -but there are direct proofs of the falsehood of -the accusation. How was the intelligence to reach -him? It was not until the 7th that the provisional -government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer -could not have reached Toulouse under three days -even by the most direct way, which was through -Montauban. Now the allies were in possession of -that road on the 4th, and on the 9th the French -army was actually invested. The intelligence from -Paris must therefore have reached the allies first, as -in fact it did, and it was not Soult, it was lord -Wellington who commenced the battle. The charge -would therefore bear more against the English general, -who would yet have been the most insane as -well as the wickedest of men to have risked his -army and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles -seemed to deny success. He also was the person -of all others called upon, by honour, gratitude, -justice and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter -of his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the -punishment of his inhuman adversary.</p> - -<p>Did he ever by word or deed countenance the -calumny?</p> - -<p>Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English -reform bill, repeated the accusation in the house of -lords and reviled the minister for being on amicable -political terms with a man capable of such a crime. -Lord Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically -declared that marshal Soult did not know, and that -it was impossible he could know of the emperor’s -abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable -distinction of sporting with men’s lives by wholesale -attaches to no general on the records of history -save the Orange William, the murderer of Glencoe.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_659"></a>[659]</span> -And though marshal Soult had known of the emperor’s -abdication he could not for that have been -justly placed beside that cold-blooded prince, who -fought at St. Denis with the peace of Nimeguen in -his pocket, because “<em>he would not deny himself a safe -lesson in his trade</em>.”</p> - -<p>The French marshal was at the head of a brave -army and it was impossible to know whether Napoleon -had abdicated voluntarily or been constrained. -The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, -and other intriguers, forming a provisional government, -self-instituted and under the protection of -foreign bayonets, demanded no respect from Soult. -He had even the right of denying the emperor’s -legal power to abdicate. He had the right, if he -thought himself strong enough, to declare, that he -would not suffer the throne to become the plaything -of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France -even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine -it was a question of patriotism and of calculation, -a national question which the general of an army -had a right to decide for himself, having reference -always to the real will and desire of the people at -large.</p> - -<p>It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter, -even after the battle and when he had seen colonel -St. Simon.</p> - -<p>Writing to Talleyrand on the 22d, he says, “The<span class="sidenote">Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -circumstances which preceded my act of adhesion -are so extraordinary as to create astonishment. The -7th the provisional government informed me of the -events which had happened since the 1st of April. -The 6th and 7th, count Dupont wrote to me on the -same subject. On the 8th the duke of Feltre, in his -quality of war minister, gave me notice, that having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_660"></a>[660]</span> -left the military cipher at Paris he would immediately -forward to me another. The 9th the prince -Berthier vice-constable and major-general, wrote to -me from Fontainbleau, transmitting the copy of a -convention and armistice which had been arranged -at Paris with the allied powers; he demanded at the -same time a state of the force and condition of my -army; but neither the prince nor the duke of Feltre -mentioned events, we had then only knowledge of a -proclamation of the empress, dated the 3rd, <em>which -forbade us to recognize any thing coming from Paris</em>.</p> - -<p>“The 10th I was attacked near Toulouse by the -whole allied army under the orders of lord Wellington. -This vigorous action, where the French army -the weakest by half showed all its worth, cost the -allies from eight to ten thousand men: lord Wellington -might perhaps have dispensed with it.</p> - -<p>“The 12th I received through the English the first -hint of the events at Paris. I proposed an armistice, -it was refused, I renewed the demand it was again -refused. At last I sent count Gazan to Toulouse, -and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms -was accepted and signed the 18th, the armies being -then in presence of each other. The 19th I ratified -this convention and gave my adhesion to the re-establishment -of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject -I ought to declare that I sought to obtain a suspension -of arms before I manifested my sentiments -in order that my will and that of the army should be -free. <em>That neither France nor posterity should have -power to say it was torn from us by force of arms. To -follow only the will of the nation was a homage I -owed to my country</em>.”</p> - -<p>The reader will observe in the above letter certain -assertions, relative to the numbers of the contending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_661"></a>[661]</span> -armies and the loss of the allies, which are at variance -with the statements in this History; and this loose -but common mode of assuming the state of an adverse -force has been the ground-work for great exaggeration -by some French writers, who strangely -enough claim a victory for the French army although -the French general himself made no such claim at -the time, and so far as appears has not done so -since.</p> - -<p><em>Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences.</em> -By this test we shall know who won the -battle of Toulouse.</p> - -<p>Now all persons, French and English, who have -treated the subject, including the generals on both -sides, are agreed, that Soult fortified Toulouse the -canal and the Mont Rave as positions of battle; -that he was attacked, that Taupin’s division was -beaten, that the Mont Rave with all its redoubts -and entrenchments fell into the allies’ power. -Finally that the French army abandoned Toulouse, -leaving there three wounded generals, sixteen hundred -men, several guns and a quantity of stores at -the discretion of their adversaries: and this without -any fresh forces having joined the allies, or any remarkable -event affecting the operations happening -elsewhere.</p> - -<p>Was Toulouse worth preserving? Was the abandonment -of it forced or voluntary? Let the French -general speak! “I have entrenched the suburb of<span class="sidenote">Soult to Suchet, 29th March.</span> -St. Cyprien which forms a good bridge-head. The -enemy will not I think attack me there unless he -desires to lose a part of his army. Two nights ago -he made a demonstration of passing the Garonne -two leagues above the city, but he will probably try -to pass it below, in which case I will attack him<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_662"></a>[662]</span> -whatever his force may be, because it is of the utmost -importance to me not to be cut off from Montauban -where I have made a bridge-head.”—“I -think the enemy will not move on your side <em>unless I -move that way first, and I am determined to avoid -that as long as I can</em>.”—“If I could remain a month -on the Garonne I should be able to put six or eight -thousand conscripts into the ranks who now embarass -me, and who want arms which I expect with -great impatience from Perpignan.”—“I am resolved -to deliver battle near Toulouse whatever may be the<span class="sidenote">Soult to Suchet, 7th April.</span> -superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified -a <em>position</em>, which, <em>supported by the town and the -canal</em>, furnishes me with a retrenched camp susceptible -of defence.”—“I have received the unhappy -news of the enemy’s entrance into Paris. This misfortune -strengthens my determination to defend -Toulouse whatever may happen. The preservation -of the place which contains establishments of all -kinds is of the utmost importance to us, but if unhappily -I am forced to quit it, my movements will -naturally bring me nearer to you. In that case you -cannot sustain yourself at Perpignan because the -enemy will inevitably follow me.”—“The enemy -appears astonished at the determination I have taken -to defend Toulouse, four days ago he passed the -Garonne and has done nothing since, perhaps the -bad weather is the cause.”</p> - -<p>From these extracts it is clear that Soult resolved -if possible not to fall back upon Suchet, and was -determined even to fight for the preservation of his -communications with Montauban; yet he finally -resigned this important object for the more important -one of defending Toulouse. And so intent -upon its preservation was he, that having on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_663"></a>[663]</span> -25th of March ordered all the stores and artillery<span class="sidenote">Soult’s Orders.</span> -not of immediate utility, to be sent away, he on the -2d of April forbade further progress in that work -and even had those things already removed brought -back. Moreover he very clearly marks that to abandon<span class="sidenote9">Choumara.</span> -the city and retreat towards Suchet will be the -signs and consequences of defeat.</p> - -<p>These points being fixed, we find him on the evening -of the 10th writing to the same general thus.</p> - -<p>“The battle which I announced to you took place -to-day, the enemy has been horribly maltreated, but -he succeeded in <em>establishing himself upon a position -which I occupied to the right of Toulouse</em>. The general -of division Taupin has been killed, general Harispe -has lost his foot by a cannon-ball, and three -generals of brigade are wounded. I am prepared -to recommence to-morrow if the enemy attacks, but -<em>I do not believe I can stay in Toulouse, it might even -happen that I shall be forced to open a passage to get -out</em>.”</p> - -<p>On the 11th of April he writes again:</p> - -<p>“As I told you in my letter of yesterday I am in -the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear -being obliged to fight my way at Baziege where the -enemy is directing a column to cut my communications. -To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche, -because I have good hope that this obstacle -will not prevent my passing.”</p> - -<p>To the minister of war he also writes on the -10th.</p> - -<p>“To-day I rest in position. If the enemy attacks -me I will defend myself. I have great need to replenish -my means before I put the army in march, -yet I believe that in the coming night I shall be -forced to abandon Toulouse, and it is probable I<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_664"></a>[664]</span> -shall direct my movements so as to rally upon the -troops of the duke of Albufera.”</p> - -<p>Soult lays no claim here to victory. He admits -that all the events previously indicated by him as -the consequences of defeat were fulfilled to the -letter. That is to say, the loss of the position of -battle, the consequent evacuation of the city, and -the march to join Suchet. On the other hand lord -Wellington clearly obtained all that he sought. -He desired to pass the Garonne and he did pass it; -he desired to win the position and works of Mont -Rave and he did win them; he desired to enter -Toulouse and he did enter it as a conqueror at the -head of his troops.</p> - -<p>Amongst the French writers who without denying -these facts lay claim to a victory Choumara is -most deserving of notice. This gentleman, known -as an able engineer, with a praise-worthy desire to -render justice to the great capacity of marshal -Soult, shews very clearly that his genius would -have shone in this campaign with far greater lustre -if marshal Suchet had adopted his plans and supported -him in a cordial manner. But Mr. Choumara -heated by his subject completes the picture -by a crowning victory at Toulouse which the marshal -himself appears not to recognize. The work -is a very valuable historical document with respect -to the disputes between Soult and Suchet, but -with respect to the battle of Toulouse it contains -grave errors as to facts, and the inferences are untenable -though the premises were admitted.</p> - -<p>The substance of Mr. Choumara’s argument is, -that the position of Toulouse was of the nature of -a fortress. That the canal was the real position of -battle, the Mont Rave an outwork, the loss of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_665"></a>[665]</span> -which weighed little in the balance, because the -French army was victorious at Calvinet against the -Spaniards, at the convent of the Minimes against -the light division, at the bridge of Jumeaux against -Picton, at St. Cyprien against General Hill. Finally -that the French general certainly won the -victory because he offered battle the next day and -did not retreat from Toulouse until the following -night.</p> - -<p>Now admitting that all these facts were established, -the fortress was still taken.</p> - -<p>But the facts are surprisingly incorrect. For -first marshal Soult himself tells Suchet that the -Mont Rave was his <em>position of battle</em>, and that the -town and the canal <em>supported it</em>. Nothing could -be more accurate than this description. For when -he lost the Mont Rave, the town and the canal -enabled him to rally his army and take measures -for a retreat. But the loss of the Mont Rave rendered -the canal untenable, why else was Toulouse -abandoned? That the line of the canal was a -more formidable one to attack in front than the -Mont Rave is true, yet that did not constitute it -a position; it was not necessary to attack it, except -partially at Sacarin and Cambon and the bridge -of the Demoiselles; those points once forced the -canal would, with the aid of the Mont Rave, have -helped to keep the French in Toulouse as it had -before helped to keep the allies out. Lord Wellington -once established on the south side of the -city and holding the Pech David could have removed -the bridge from Seilh to Portet, above -Toulouse, thus shortening and securing his communication -with Hill; the French army must then -have surrendered, or broken out, no easy matter in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_666"></a>[666]</span> -such a difficult and strangled country. The Mont -Rave was therefore not only the position of battle, -it was also the key of the position behind the canal, -and Mr. de Choumara is placed in this dilemma. -He must admit the allies won the fight, or confess -the main position was so badly chosen that a slight -reverse at an outwork was sufficient to make the -French army abandon it at every other point.</p> - -<p>But were the French victorious at every other -point? Against the Spaniards they were, and -Picton also was repulsed. The order of movements -for the battle proves indeed that this general’s -attack was intended to be a false one; he disobeyed<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_IX">Appendix, No. 9.</a></span> -his orders however, and one of his brigades -was repulsed; but to check one brigade with a loss -of three or four hundred men, is a small matter -in a battle where more than eighty thousand combatants -were engaged.</p> - -<p>The light division made a demonstration against -the convent of the Minimes and nothing more. -Its loss on the whole day was only fifty-six men -and officers, and no French veteran of the Peninsula<span class="sidenote">Official Returns.</span> -but would laugh at the notion that a real -attack by that matchless division could be so -stopped.</p> - -<p>It is said the exterior line of entrenchments at -St. Cyprien was occupied with a view to offensive -movements, and to prevent the allies from establishing -batteries to rake the line of the canal from -that side of the Garonne; but whatever may have -been the object, General Hill got possession of it, -and was so far victorious. He was ordered not to -assail the second line seriously and he did not, for -his whole loss scarcely exceeded eighty men and<span class="sidenote7">Ibid.</span> -officers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_667"></a>[667]</span></p> - -<p>From these undeniable facts, it is clear that the -French gained an advantage against Picton, and -a marked success against the Spaniards; but Beresford’s -attack was so decisive as to counterbalance -these failures and even to put the defeated Spaniards -in possession of the height they had originally -contended for in vain.</p> - -<p>Mr. Choumara attributes Beresford’s success to -Taupin’s errors and to a vast superiority of numbers -on the side of the allies. “Fifty-three thousand -infantry, more than eight thousand cavalry, -and a reserve of eighteen thousand men of all arms, -opposed to twenty-five thousand French infantry, -two thousand five hundred cavalry, and a reserve -of seven thousand conscripts three thousand of -which were unarmed.” Such is the enormous -disproportion assumed on the authority of general -Vaudoncourt.</p> - -<p>Now the errors of Taupin may have been great, -and his countrymen are the best judges of his demerit; -but the numbers here assumed are most -inaccurate. The imperial muster-rolls are not of a -later date than December 1813, yet an official table -of the organization of Soult’s army, published by<span class="sidenote">Kock’s Campaign of 1814.</span> -the French military historian Kock, gives thirty-six -thousand six hundred and thirty-five combatants on -the 10th of March. Of these, in round numbers, -twenty-eight thousand six hundred were infantry, -two thousand seven hundred cavalry, and five thousand -seven hundred were artillery-men, engineers, -miners, sappers, <span lang="fr">gensd’armes</span>, and military workmen. -Nothing is said of the reserve division of conscripts -commanded by general Travot, but general -Vaudoncourt’s table of the same army on the 1st -of April, adopted by Choumara, supplies the deficiency.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_668"></a>[668]</span> -The conscripts are there set down seven -thousand two hundred and sixty-seven, and this -cipher being added to Kock’s, gives a total of -forty-three thousand nine hundred fighting men. -The loss in combats and marches from the 10th of -March to the 1st of April must be deducted, but -on the other hand we find Soult informing the -minister of war, on the 7th of March, that three -thousand soldiers dispersed by the battle of Orthes -were still wandering behind the army: the -greatest part must have joined before the battle of -Toulouse. There was also the regular garrison of -that city, composed of the depôts of several regiments -and the urban guards, all under Travot. -Thus little less than fifty thousand men were at -Soult’s disposal.</p> - -<p>Let twelve thousand be deducted for, 1º. the -urban guard which was only employed to maintain -the police of the town, 2º. the unarmed conscripts, -3º. the military workmen not brought into action, -4º. the detachments employed on the flanks to communicate -with La Fitte in the Arriege, and to reinforce -general Loverdo at Montauban. There will -remain thirty-eight thousand fighting men of all -arms. And with a very powerful artillery; for we -find Soult after the action, directing seven field-batteries -of eight pieces each to attend the army; -and the French writers mention, besides this field-train, -1º. fifteen pieces which were transferred -during the battle from the exterior line of St. Cyprien -to the northern and eastern fronts. 2º. Four -twenty-four pounders and several sixteen-pounders -mounted on the walls of the city. 3º. The armaments -of the bridge-heads, the works on Calvinet -and those at Saccarin and Cambon. Wherefore<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_669"></a>[669]</span> -not less than eighty, or perhaps ninety, pieces of -French artillery were engaged.</p> - -<p>An approximation to the strength of the French -army being thus made it remains to show the number -of the allies, and with respect to the Anglo-Portuguese -troops that can be done very exactly, -not by approximative estimates but positively from -the original returns.</p> - -<p>The morning state delivered to lord Wellington<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#end-app">note at the end of the Appendix.</a></span> -on the 10th of April bears forty-three thousand -seven hundred and forty-four British and Germans, -and twenty thousand seven hundred and ninety-three -Portuguese, in all sixty-four thousand five -hundred and thirty-seven soldiers and officers present -under arms, exclusive of artillery-men. Of this -number nearly ten thousand were cavalry, eleven -hundred and eighty-eight being Portuguese.</p> - -<p>The Spanish auxiliaries, exclusive of Mina’s -bands investing St. Jean Pied de Port, were 1º. -Giron’s Andalusians and the third army under -O’Donnel, fifteen thousand. 2º. The Gallicians -under general Freyre, fourteen thousand. 3º. Three -thousand Gallicians under Morillo and as many more -under Longa, making with the Anglo-Portuguese a -total of ninety thousand combatants with somewhat -more than a hundred pieces of field-artillery.</p> - -<p>Of this force, O’Donnel’s troops were in the valley -of the Bastan, Longa’s on the Upper Ebro; one -division of Freyre’s Gallicians was under <ins class="corr" id="tn-669" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Carlos D’Espagne'"> -Carlos D’España</ins> in front of Bayonne; one half of Morillo’s -division was blockading Navarens, the other half -and the nine thousand Gallicians remaining under -Freyre, were in front of Toulouse. Of the Anglo-Portuguese, -the first and fifth divisions, and three -unattached brigades of infantry with one brigade of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_670"></a>[670]</span> -cavalry, were with sir John Hope at Bayonne; the -seventh division was at Bordeaux; the household -brigade of heavy cavalry was on the march from the -Ebro where it had passed the winter; the Portuguese -horsemen were partly employed on the communications -in the rear, partly near Agen, where sir<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#end-app">note at the end of the Appendix.</a></span> -John Campbell commanding the fourth regiment -had an engagement on the 11th with the celebrated -partizan Florian. The second, third, fourth, sixth,<span class="sidenote12"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix 7</a>, sections 6 and 7.</span> -and light divisions of infantry, and Le Cor’s Portuguese, -called the unattached division, were with lord -Wellington, who had also Bock’s, Ponsonby’s, Fane’s, -Vivian’s, and lord E. Somerset’s brigades of cavalry.</p> - -<p>These troops on the morning of the 10th mustered -under arms, in round numbers, thirty-one -thousand infantry, of which four thousand three hundred -were officers sergeants and drummers, leaving -twenty-six thousand and six hundred bayonets. -Add twelve thousand Spaniards under Freyre and -Morillo, and we have a total of forty-three thousand -five hundred infantry. The cavalry amounted to -seven thousand, and there were sixty-four pieces of -artillery. Hence about fifty-two thousand of all -ranks and arms were in line to fight thirty-eight -thousand French with more than eighty pieces of -artillery, some being of the largest calibre.</p> - -<p>But of the allies only twenty-four thousand men -with fifty-two guns can be said to have been seriously -engaged. Thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets -with eighteen guns were on the left of the Garonne -under general Hill. Neither the light division nor -Ponsonby’s heavy cavalry, nor Bock’s Germans were -really engaged. Wherefore twelve thousand six -hundred sabres and bayonets under Beresford, nine -thousand bayonets under Freyre, and two thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_671"></a>[671]</span> -five hundred of Picton’s division really fought the -battle. Thus the enormous disproportion assumed -by the French writers disappears entirely; for if the -allies had the advantage of numbers it was chiefly in -cavalry, and horsemen were of little avail against -the entrenched position and preponderating artillery -of the French general.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia’s claim to the admiration -of his countrymen is well-founded and requires no -vain assumption to prop it up. Vast combinations, -inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment, -unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, -unwavering fidelity to his sovereign and his country, -are what no man can justly deny him. In this celebrated -campaign of only nine months, although -counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of -his countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works -of five strong places and entrenched five great -camps with such works as Marius himself would not -have disdained; once he changed his line of operations -and either attacking or defending delivered -twenty-four battles and combats. Defeated in all -he yet fought the last as fiercely as the first, remaining -unconquered in mind, and still intent upon -renewing the struggle when peace came to put a -stop to his prodigious efforts. Those efforts were -fruitless because Suchet renounced him, because the -people of the south were apathetic and fortune was -adverse; because he was opposed to one of the -greatest generals of the world at the head of unconquerable -troops. For what Alexander’s Macedonians -were at Arbela, Hannibal’s Africans at Cannæ, -Cæsar’s Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon’s guards at -Austerlitz, such were Wellington’s British soldiers -at this period. The same men who had fought at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_672"></a>[672]</span> -Vimiera and Talavera contended at Orthes and Toulouse. -Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted -on their natural strength and fierceness a -confidence which rendered them invincible. It is -by this measure Soult’s firmness and the constancy -of his army is to be valued, and the equality to which -he reduced his great adversary at Toulouse is a -proof of ability which a judicious friend would put -forward rather than suppress.</p> - -<p>Was he not a great general who being originally -opposed on the Adour by nearly double his own -numbers, for such was the proportion after the great -detachments were withdrawn from the French army -by the emperor in January, did yet by the aid of his -fortresses, by his able marches and combinations, -oblige his adversary to employ so many troops for -blockades sieges and detached posts, that at Toulouse -his army was scarcely more numerous than the -French? Was it nothing to have drawn Wellington -from such a distance along the frontier, and force -him at last, either to fight a battle under the most -astonishing disadvantages or to retreat with dishonour. -And this not because the English general -had committed any fault, but by the force of combinations -which embracing all the advantages offered -by the country left him no option.</p> - -<p>That Soult made some mistakes is true, and perhaps -the most important was that which the emperor -warned him against, though too late, the -leaving so many men in Bayonne. He did so he -says because the place could not hold out fifteen -days without the entrenched camp, and the latter -required men; but the result proved Napoleon’s -sagacity, for the allies made no attempt to try the -strength of the camp, and on the 18th of March lord<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_673"></a>[673]</span> -Wellington knew not the real force of the garrison. -Up to that period sir John Hope was inclined to -blockade the place only, and from the difficulty of -gathering the necessary stores and ammunition on -the right bank of the Adour, the siege though resolved -upon was not even commenced on the 14th -of April when that bloody and most lamentable -sally was made. Hence the citadel could not even -with a weaker garrison have been taken before the -end of April, and Soult might have had Abbé’s division -of six thousand good troops in the battles of -Orthes and Toulouse. Had Suchet joined him, his -army would have been numerous enough to bar lord -Wellington’s progress altogether, especially in the -latter position. Here it is impossible not to admire -the sagacity of the English general, who from the -first was averse to entering France and only did so -for a political object, under the promise of great reinforcements -and in the expectation that he should -be allowed to organize a Bourbon army. What -could he have done if Soult had retained the twenty -thousand men drafted in January, or if Suchet had -joined, or the people had taken arms?</p> - -<p>How well Soult chose his ground at Toulouse, -how confidently he trusted that his adversary would -eventually pass the Garonne below and not above -the city, with what foresight he constructed the -bridge-head at Montauban, and prepared the difficulties -lord Wellington had to encounter have been -already touched upon. But Mr. Choumara has -assumed that the English general’s reason for relinquishing -the passage of the Garonne at Portet on -the night of the 27th, was not the want of pontoons -but the fear of being attacked during the operation, -adducing in proof Soult’s orders to assail the heads<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_674"></a>[674]</span> -of his columns. Those orders are however dated -the 31st, three days after the attempt of which -Soult appears to have known nothing at the time: -they were given in the supposition that lord Wellington -wished to effect a second passage at that -point to aid general Hill while descending the Arriege. -And what reason has any man to suppose -that the same general and troops who passed the -Nive and defeated a like counter-attack near Bayonne, -would be deterred by the fear of a battle from -attempting it on the Garonne? The passage of the -Nive was clearly more dangerous, because the communication -with the rest of the army was more difficult, -Soult’s disposable force larger, his counter-movements -more easily hidden until the moment of -execution. At Portet the passage, designed for the -night season, would have been a surprise, and the -whole army, drawn close to that side could have -been thrown over in three or four hours with the -exception of the divisions destined to keep the French -in check at St. Cyprien. Soult’s orders did not -embrace such an operation. They directed Clauzel -to fall upon the head of the troops and crush them -while in the disorder of a later passage which was -expected and watched for.</p> - -<p>General Clauzel having four divisions in hand -was no doubt a formidable enemy, and Soult’s notion -of defending the river by a counter-attack was -excellent in principle; but to conceive is one thing -to execute is another. His orders were, as I have -said, only issued on the 31st, when Hill was across -both the Garonne and the Arriege. Lord Wellington’s -design was then not to force a passage at -Portet, but to menace that point, and really attack -St. Cyprien when Hill should have descended the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_675"></a>[675]</span> -Arriege. Nor did Soult himself much expect -Clauzel would have any opportunity to attack, for -in his letter to the minister of war he said, the positions -between the Arriege and the canal were all -disadvantageous to the French and his intention -was to fight in Toulouse if the allies approached -from the south; yet he still believed Hill’s movement -to be only a blind and that lord Wellington -would finally attempt the passage below Toulouse.</p> - -<p>The French general’s views and measures were -profoundly reasoned but extremely simple. His -first care on arriving at Toulouse was to secure the -only bridge over the Garonne by completing the -works of St. Cyprien, which he had begun while -the army was still at Tarbes. He thus gained time, -and as he felt sure that the allies could not act in -the Arriege district, he next directed his attention -to the bridge-head of Montauban to secure a retreat -behind the Tarn and the power of establishing -a fresh line of operations. Meanwhile contrary to -his expectation lord Wellington did attempt to act -on the Arriege, and the French general, turning of -necessity in observation to that side, entrenched a -position on the south; soon however he had proof -that his first notion was well-founded, that his adversary -after losing much time must at last pass below -Toulouse; wherefore he proceeded with prodigious -activity to fortify the Mont Rave and prepare a field -of battle on the northern and eastern fronts of the -city. These works advanced so rapidly, while the -wet weather by keeping the rivers flooded reduced -lord Wellington to inactivity, that Soult became confident -in their strength, and being influenced also by -the news from Paris, relinquished his first design of -opposing the passage of the Garonne and preserving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_676"></a>[676]</span> -the line of operations by Montauban. To hold -Toulouse then became his great object, nor was he -diverted from this by the accident which befel lord -Wellington’s bridge at Grenade. Most writers, -French and English, have blamed him for letting -slip that opportunity of attacking Beresford. It -is said that general Reille first informed him of<span class="sidenote">Notes by general Berton, MSS.</span> -the rupture of the bridge, and strongly advised him -to attack the troops on the right bank; but Choumara -has well defended him on that point; the -distance was fifteen miles, the event uncertain, the -works on the Mount Rave would have stood still -meanwhile, and the allies might perhaps have -stormed St. Cyprien.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington was however under no alarm for -Beresford, or rather for himself, because each day -he passed the river in a boat and remained on -that side. His force was not less than twenty thousand<span class="sidenote">Morning State of lord Wellington, 4th of April, MSS.</span> -including sergeants and officers, principally -British; his position was on a gentle range the -flanks covered by the Ers and the Garonne; he had -eighteen guns in battery on his front, which was -likewise flanked by thirty other pieces placed on -the left of the Garonne. Nor was he without retreat. -He could cross the Ers, and Soult dared not -have followed to any distance lest the river should -subside and the rest of the army pass on his rear, -unless, reverting to his original design of operating -by Montauban, he lightly abandoned his now matured -plan of defending Toulouse. Wisely therefore -he continued to strengthen his position round -that city, his combinations being all directed to -force the allies to attack him between the Ers -and the Mount Rave where it seemed scarcely possible -to succeed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_677"></a>[677]</span></p> - -<p>He has been also charged with this fault, that he -did not entrench the Hill of Pugade. Choumara -holds that troops placed there would have been endangered -without adequate advantage. This does -not seem conclusive. The hill was under the shot -of the main height, it might have been entrenched -with works open to the rear, and St. Pol’s brigade -would thus have incurred no more danger than -when placed there without any entrenchments. Beresford -could not have moved up the left bank of -the Ers until these works were carried, and this -would have cost men. It is therefore probable that -want of time caused Soult to neglect this advantage. -He committed a graver error during the battle by -falling upon Beresford with Taupin’s division only -when he could have employed D’Armagnac’s and -Villatte’s likewise in that attack. He should have -fallen on him also while in the deep country below, -and before he had formed his lines at the foot of -the heights. What hindered him? Picton was repulsed, -Freyre was defeated, the light division was -protecting the fugitives, and one of Maransin’s brigades -withdrawn from St. Cyprien had reinforced -the victorious troops on the extreme left of the Calvinet -platform. Beresford’s column entangled in -the marshy ground, without artillery and menaced -both front and rear by cavalry, could not have resisted -such an overwhelming mass, and lord Wellington -can scarcely escape criticism for placing -him in that predicament.</p> - -<p>A commander is not indeed to refrain from -high attempts because of their perilous nature, the -greatest have ever been the most daring, and the -English general who could not remain inactive -before Toulouse was not deterred by danger or difficulty: -twice he passed the broad and rapid Garonne<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_678"></a>[678]</span> -and reckless of his enemy’s strength and -skill worked his way to a crowning victory. This -was hardihood, greatness. But in Beresford’s particular -attack he did not overstep the rules of art, -he hurtled against them, and that he was not damaged -by the shock is owing to his good fortune -the fierceness of his soldiers and the errors of his -adversary. What if Beresford had been overthrown -on the Ers? Wellington must have repassed the -Garonne, happy if by rapidity he could reunite in -time with Hill on the left bank. Beresford’s failure -would have been absolute ruin and that alone -refutes the French claim to a victory. Was there -no other mode of attack? That can hardly be said. -Beresford passed the Lavaur road to assail the platform -of St. Sypiere, and he was probably so ordered -to avoid an attack in flank by the Lavaur road, and -because the platform of Calvinet on the side of the -Ers river was more strongly entrenched than that -of St. Sypiere. But for this gain it was too -much to throw his column into the deep ground -without guns, and quite separated from the rest of -the army seeing that the cavalry intended to maintain -the connection were unable to act in that miry -labyrinth of water-courses. If the Spaniards were -judged capable of carrying the strongest part of the -Calvinet platform, Beresford’s fine Anglo-Portuguese -divisions were surely equal to attacking this -same platform on the immediate left of the Spaniards, -and an advanced guard would have sufficed -to protect the left flank. The assault would then -have been made with unity, by a great mass and on -the most important point: for the conquest of St. -Sypiere was but a step towards that of Calvinet, -but the conquest of Calvinet would have rendered -St. Sypiere untenable. It is however to be observed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_679"></a>[679]</span> -that the Spaniards attacked too soon and their -dispersion exceeded all reasonable calculation: so -panic-stricken they were as to draw from lord Wellington -at the time the bitter observation, that he -had seen many curious spectacles but never before -saw ten thousand men running a race.</p> - -<p>Soult’s retreat from Toulouse, a model of order -and regularity, was made in the night. This -proves the difficulty of his situation. Nevertheless -it was not desperate; nor was it owing to his adversary’s -generous forbearance that he passed unmolested -under the allies’ guns as an English writer -has erroneously assumed. For first those guns had -no ammunition, and this was one reason why lord -Wellington though eager to fall upon him on the -11th could not do so. On the 12th Soult was gone, -and his march covered by the great canal could -scarcely have been molested, because the nearest -point occupied by the allies was more than a mile -and a half distant. Nor do I believe that Soult, as -some other writers have imagined, ever designed to -hold Toulouse to the last. It would have been an -avowal of military insolvency to which his proposal, -that Suchet should join him at Carcassone and retake -the offensive, written on the night of the 11th, is -quite opposed. Neither was it in the spirit of -French warfare. The impetuous valour and susceptibility -of that people are ill-suited for stern -Numantian despair. Place an attainable object of -war before the French soldier and he will make -supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing he becomes -proportionally discouraged. Let some new -chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to -his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward -again with unbounded energy: the fear of death -never checks him he will attempt anything. But<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_680"></a>[680]</span> -the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance -wears his fury out; it was so proved in the -Peninsula, where the sudden deafening shout, rolling -over a field of battle more full and terrible than -that of any other nation, and followed by the strong -unwavering charge, often startled and appalled a -French column before whose fierce and vehement -assault any other troops would have given way.</p> - -<p>Napoleon’s system of war was admirably adapted -to draw forth and augment the military excellence -and to strengthen the weakness of the national character. -His discipline, severe but appealing to the -feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick -temperament of the French soldiers to patience -under hardships and strong endurance under fire; -he taught the generals to rely on their own talents, -to look to the country wherein they made war for -resources, and to dare every thing even with the -smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of -France might have full play: hence the violence of -their attacks. But he also taught them to combine -all arms together, and to keep strong reserves that -sudden disorders might be repaired and the discouraged -troops have time to rally and recover their -pristine spirit, certain that they would then renew -the battle with the same confidence as before. He -thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature -had put a bar to that in the character of the British -soldier, but so terrible and sure in war that the -number and greatness of their exploits surpassed -those of all other nations: the Romans not excepted -if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor -the Macedonians if the quality of their opponents -be considered.</p> - -<p>Let their amazing toils in the Peninsular war -alone, which though so great and important was but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_681"></a>[681]</span> -an episode in their military history, be considered. -“<em>In Spain large armies will starve and small armies -will be beaten</em>” was the saying of Henry IV. of -France, and this was no light phrase of an indolent -monarch but the profound conclusion of a sagacious -general. Yet Napoleon’s enormous armies were so -wonderfully organized that they existed and fought -in Spain for six years, and without cessation, for to -them winters and summers were alike. Their large -armies endured incredible toils and privations but -were not starved out, nor were their small armies -beaten by the Spaniards. And for their daring and -resource a single fact recorded by lord Wellington -will suffice. They captured more than one strong -place in Spain without any provision of bullets save -those fired at them by their enemies, having trusted -to that chance when they formed the siege! Before -the British troops they fell, but how terrible was -the struggle! how many defeats they recovered -from, how many brave men they slew, what changes -and interpositions of fortune occurred before they -could be rolled back upon their own frontiers! And -this is the glory of England, that her soldiers and -hers only were capable of overthrowing them in -equal battle. I seek not to defraud the Portuguese -of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard -the merit of his constancy. England could not -alone have triumphed in the struggle, but for her -share in the deliverance of the Peninsula let this -brief summary speak.</p> - -<p>She expended more than one hundred millions -sterling on her own operations, she subsidised Spain -and Portugal besides, and with her supplies of -clothing arms and ammunition maintained the -armies of both even to the guerillas. From thirty up<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_682"></a>[682]</span> -to seventy thousand British troops were employed -by her constantly, and while her naval squadrons -continually harassed the French with descents upon -the coasts, her land forces fought and won nineteen -pitched battles and innumerable combats; they -made or sustained ten sieges, took four great fortresses, -twice expelled the French from Portugal, -preserved Alicant, Carthagena, Cadiz, Lisbon; they -killed wounded and took about two hundred thousand -enemies, and the bones of forty thousand -British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and -mountains of the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>Finally, for Portugal she re-organized a native -army and supplied officers who led it to victory, and -to the whole Peninsula she gave a general whose -like has seldom gone forth to conquer. And all -this and more was necessary to redeem the Peninsula -from France!</p> - -<p>The duke of Wellington’s campaigns furnish -lessons for generals of all nations, but they must -always be peculiarly models for British commanders -in future continental wars, because he -modified and reconciled the great principles of art -with the peculiar difficulties which attend generals -controlled by politicians who depending upon -private intrigue prefer parliamentary to national -interests. An English commander must not trust -his fortune. He dare not risk much however conscious -he may be of personal resources when one -disaster will be his ruin at home. His measures -must therefore be subordinate to this primary consideration. -Lord Wellington’s caution, springing -from that source, has led friends and foes alike into -wrong conclusions as to his system of war. The -French call it want of enterprize, timidity; the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_683"></a>[683]</span> -English have denominated it the Fabian system. -These are mere phrases. His system was the same -as that of all great generals. He held his army in -hand, keeping it with unmitigated labour always -in a fit state to march or to fight; and thus prepared -he acted indifferently as occasion offered on the -offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete -mastery of his art. Sometimes he was indebted to -fortune, sometimes to his natural genius, but always -to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically a -pains-taking man.</p> - -<p>That he was less vast in his designs, less daring -in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a -commander as Napoleon must be admitted, and -being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed -that he learned something of the art from that -greatest of all masters; yet something besides the -difference of genius must be allowed for the difference -of situation; Napoleon was never even in his -first campaign of Italy so harassed by the French as -Wellington was by the English Spanish and Portuguese -governments. Their systems of war were -however alike in principle, their operations being -necessarily modified by their different political -positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, -exact combinations to protect their flanks -and communications without scattering their forces, -these were common to both. In defence firm, cool, -enduring; in attack fierce and obstinate; daring -when daring was politic, but always operating by -the flanks in preference to the front: in these things -they were alike, but in following up a victory the -English general fell short of the French emperor. -The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a -battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_684"></a>[684]</span> -battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a -mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded and -the roaring flood poured onwards covering all.</p> - -<p>Yet was there nothing of timidity or natural -want of enterprize to be discerned in the English -general’s campaigns. Neither was he of the Fabian -school. He recommended that commander’s system -to the Spaniards, but he did not follow it himself. -His military policy more resembled that of Scipio -Africanus. Fabius dreading Hannibal’s veterans, red -with the blood of four consular armies, hovered on -the mountains, refused battle, and to the unmatched -skill and valour of the great Carthaginian opposed -the almost inexhaustible military resources of Rome. -Lord Wellington was never loath to fight when there -was any equality of numbers. He landed in Portugal -with only nine thousand men, with intent to attack -Junot who had twenty-four thousand. At Roliça -he was the assailant, at Vimiera he was assailed, -but he would have changed to the offensive during -the battle if others had not interfered. At Oporto -he was again the daring and successful assailant. -In the Talavera campaign he took the initiatory -movements, although in the battle itself he sustained -the shock. His campaign of 1810 in Portugal was -entirely defensive, because the Portuguese army -was young and untried, but his pursuit of Massena -in 1811 was as entirely aggressive although cautiously -so, as well knowing that in mountain warfare -those who attack labour at a disadvantage. -The operations of the following campaign, including -the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera the first -siege of Badajos and the combat of Guinaldo, were -of a mixed character; so was the campaign of Salamanca; -but the campaign of Vittoria and that in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_685"></a>[685]</span> -the south of France were entirely and eminently -offensive.</p> - -<p>Slight therefore is the resemblance to the Fabian -warfare. And for the Englishman’s hardiness -and enterprise bear witness the passage of the -Douro at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, -the storming of Badajos, the surprise of the forts -at Mirabete, the march to Vittoria, the passage of -the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle, the passage -of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthes, -the crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he -committed faults is only to say that he made war; -but to deny him the qualities of a great commander -is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want of -light. How few of his combinations failed. How -many battles he fought, victorious in all! Iron -hardihood of body, a quick and sure vision, a -grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the -habit of laborious minute investigation and arrangement; -all these qualities he possessed, and with -them that most rare faculty of coming to prompt -and sure conclusions on sudden emergencies. This -is the certain mark of a master spirit in war, without -it a commander may be distinguished, he may -be a great man, but he cannot be a great captain: -where troops nearly alike in arms and knowledge -are opposed the battle generally turns upon the -decision of the moment.</p> - -<p>At the Somosierra, Napoleon’s sudden and what -to those about him appeared an insensate order, -sent the Polish cavalry successfully charging up -the mountain when more studied arrangements -with ten times that force might have failed. At -Talavera, if Joseph had not yielded to the imprudent -heat of Victor, the fate of the allies would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_686"></a>[686]</span> -been sealed. At the Coa, Montbrun’s refusal to -charge with his cavalry saved general Craufurd’s -division, the loss of which would have gone far -towards producing the evacuation of Portugal. At -Busaco, Massena would not suffer Ney to attack the -first day, and thus lost the only favourable opportunity -for assailing that formidable position. At -Fuentes Onoro, the same Massena suddenly suspended -his attack when a powerful effort would -probably have been decisive. At Albuera, Soult’s -column of attack instead of pushing forward halted -to fire from the first height they had gained on -Beresford’s right, which saved that general from an -early and total defeat; again at a later period of -that battle the unpremeditated attack of the -fusileers decided the contest. At Barosa, general -Graham with a wonderful promptitude snatched -the victory at the very moment when a terrible -defeat seemed inevitable. At Sabugal, not even -the astonishing fighting of the light division could -have saved it if general Reynier had possessed this -essential quality of a general. At El Bodon, Marmont -failed to seize the most favourable opportunity -which occurred during the whole war for -crushing the allies. At Orthes, Soult let slip two -opportunities of falling upon the allies with advantage, -and at Toulouse he failed to crush Beresford.</p> - -<p>At Vimiera, lord Wellington was debarred by -Burrard from giving a signal illustration of this -intuitive generalship, but at Busaco and the heights -of San Cristoval, near Salamanca, he suffered Massena -and Marmont to commit glaring faults unpunished. -On the other hand he has furnished -many examples of that successful improvisation in -which Napoleon seems to have <ins class="corr" id="tn-686" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'surpassed a mankind'"> -surpassed all mankind</ins>.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_687"></a>[687]</span> -His sudden retreat from Oropesa across the -Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo; his passage of -the Douro in 1809; his halt at Guinaldo in the -face of Marmont’s overwhelming numbers; the -battle of Salamanca; his sudden rush with the -third division to seize the hill of Arinez at Vittoria; -his counter-stroke with the sixth division at Sauroren; -his battle of the 30th two days afterwards; -his sudden passage of the Gave below Orthes. -Add to these his wonderful battle of Assye, and the -proofs are complete that he possesses in an eminent -degree that intuitive perception which distinguishes -the greatest generals.</p> - -<p>Fortune however always asserts her supremacy -in war, and often from a slight mistake such disastrous -consequences flow that in every age and every -nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial. -Napoleon’s march upon Madrid in 1808 before he -knew the exact situation of the British army is an -example. By that march he lent his flank to his -enemy. Sir John Moore seized the advantage and -though the French emperor repaired the error for -the moment by his astonishing march from Madrid -to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula was then decided. -If he had not been forced to turn against -Moore, Lisbon would have fallen, Portugal could -not have been organized for resistance, and the -jealousy of the Spaniards would never have suffered -Wellington to establish a solid base at Cadiz: that -general’s after-successes would then have been with -the things that are unborn. It was not so ordained. -Wellington was victorious, the great conqueror -was overthrown. England stood the most triumphant -nation of the world. But with an enormous -debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_688"></a>[688]</span> -without tranquillity, greatness without intrinsic -strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark -and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of -her arms! And it is a stirring sound! War is the -condition of this world. From man to the smallest -insect all are at strife, and the glory of arms which -cannot be obtained without the exercise of honour, -fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty and temperance, -excites the brave man’s patriotism and is -a chastening corrective for the rich man’s pride. It -is yet no security for power. Napoleon the greatest -man of whom history makes mention, Napoleon the -most wonderful commander, the most sagacious -politician, the most profound statesman, lost by -arms, Poland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and -France. Fortune, that name for the unknown combinations -of infinite power, was wanting to him, and -without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles -on a troubled ocean.</p> -<hr class="p4 chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_01" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60"><em>Nº. 1. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_01.jpg" alt="Map of Catalonian Operations"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_01-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -<em>Explanatory</em><br> -Sketch<br> -<em>of the</em><br> -CATALONIAN OPERATIONS<br> -1813-14<br> -<em>with the Plan of a</em><br> -position at<br> -CAPE SALOU<br> -<em>proposed by</em><br> -GEN<sup>L</sup>. DONKIN<br> -<em>to</em><br> -SIR S. MURRAY.<br> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_02" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 2. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_02.jpg" alt="Map of Soult’s Operations"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_02-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -<em>Explanatory</em><br> -Sketch of<br> -SOULT’S OPERATIONS<br> -<em>to relieve</em><br> -PAMPELUNA<br> -July 1813<br> -<br> -BATTLE OF THE 28<sup>th</sup>.<br> -Enlarged<br> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_03" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 3. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_03.jpg" alt="Map of combat at Maya and Roncesvalles"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_03-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -Combat of<br> -MAYA<br> -July 25<sup>th</sup>.<br> -1813.<br> -<br> -Combat of<br> -RONCESVALLES<br> -July 25<sup>th</sup>.<br> -1813.<br> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_04" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 4. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_04.jpg" alt="Map of Assault on St Sebastian"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_04-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> -</div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -<em>Explanatory</em><br> -Sketch<br> -<em>of the</em><br> -ASSAULT <span class="allsmcap">OF</span> S<sup>T</sup>. SEBASTIAN<br> -August 31<sup>st</sup>.<br> -1813.<br> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_05" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 5. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_05.jpg" alt="Map of crossing of Bidassoa"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_05-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -Explanatory Sketch<br> -of<br> -Soult’s passage of the<br> -Bidassoa,<br> -Aug<sup>t</sup>. 31<sup>st</sup>.<br> -<em>And</em><br> -Lord Wellington’s<br> -Passage <em>of that</em> River<br> -October 7<sup>th</sup>.<br> -1813.<br> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_06" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 6. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_06.jpg" alt="Map of battle of Nivelle"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_06-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> -</div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -Explanatory Sketch<br> -of<br> -The Battle of the Nivelle,<br> -Nov<sup>r</sup>. 10<sup>th</sup>.<br> -1813.<br> -<p>Centre Attack</p> -<p>Right Attack</p> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_07" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 7. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_07.jpg" alt="Map of Bayonne Operations"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_07-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -Explanatory Sketch<br> -<em>of the</em><br> -Operations round<br> -Bayonne<br> -in<br> -Dec<sup>r</sup>. & Feb<sup>y</sup>.<br> -1813-1814.<br> -<br> -Battle of the<br> -10<sup>th</sup>. Dec<sup>r</sup>.<br> -1813.<br> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_08" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 8. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_08.jpg" alt="Map of passage of Nive, battle of St Pierre"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_08-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -Explanatory<br> -Sketch<br> -<em>of the</em><br> -Passage of the Nive,<br> -And<br> -Battle of S<sup>t</sup>. Pierre;<br> -December<br> -9<sup>th</sup>. and 13<sup>th</sup>.<br> -1813.<br> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_09" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 9. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_09.jpg" alt="Map of battle of Orthez"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_09-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -Explanatory Sketch<br> -of the Battle<br> -of Orthez;<br> -And the Retreat of Soult,<br> -To Aire:<br> -1814.<br> -<br> -<em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em>    <em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_688fp_10" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p4 fs60"><em>Nº. 10. Vol. 6.</em></p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_688fp_10.jpg" alt="Map of battle of Toulouse"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_688fp_10-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<figcaption class="caption"> -Explanatory Sketch<br> -<em>of the</em><br> -operations<br> -<em>about</em><br> -Tarbes,<br> -<em>and the</em><br> -Battle of Toulouse.<br> -<br> -<em>London, Pub<sup>d</sup>. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840.</em>    <em>Drawn by Col. Napier</em><br> -</figcaption> -</figure> -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_689"></a>[689]</span><br> - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_690"></a>[690]</span></p> - -<h2 class="p4 p4b nobreak" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX.</h2> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_691"></a>[691]</span><br></p> - -<p class="p4 pfs150">APPENDIX.</p> -</div> - -<hr class="r20"> - -<h3 id="No_I">No. I.</h3> - -<p class="p1 pfs120">JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Lord William Bentinck to sir E. Pellew.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>At sea, June 18th, 1813.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap pad1">Sir</span>,</p> - -<p>Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected -attack upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. -It seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon, -should reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land -them in Sicily, or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of -Naples, if the intention be, as in the last instance, to transport -them to Sicily in the tonnage and small craft of the country.—The -most important question is, whether this can be effected by -the enemy.—I have no difficulty in saying on my part, that in the -present disposition of the Neapolitan army in Sicily, and in the -non-existence of any national force, and the imperfect composition -of the British force, if half the number intended for this expedition -should land in Sicily the island would be conquered.</p> - -<p class="right">(Signed)      <span class="smcap">W. Bentinck</span>.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Sir E. Pellew to lord W. Bentinck.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>H. M. S. Caledonia, June 19th, 1813.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap pad1">My lord</span>,</p> - -<p>I feel it my duty to state to your lordship that in my judgment -the Toulon fleet may evade mine without difficulty under a strong -N. W. wind to carry them through the passage of the Hieres -islands, without the possibility of my interrupting them, and that -they may have from twelve to twenty-four hours’ start of me in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_692"></a>[692]</span> -chasing them. When blown off the coast, my look-out ships -would certainly bring me such information as would enable me to -follow them immediately to the Bay of Naples. Your lordship is -most competent to judge whether in the interval of their arrival -and my pursuit, the French admiral would be able to embark -Murat’s army artillery and stores, and land them on the coast of -Sicily before I came up with them.—The facility of communication -by telegraph along the whole coast of Toulon would certainly -apprize Murat of their sailing at a very short notice, but for my -own part, I should entertain very sanguine hopes of overtaking -them either in the Bay of Naples or on the coast of Sicily before -they could make good their landing.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Lord Wm. Bentinck to lord Wellington.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>At sea, June 20th, 1813.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap pad1">My lord</span>,</p> - -<p>By the perusal of the accompanying despatch to lord Castlereagh, -your lordship will perceive that Murat has opened a -negociation with us, the object of which is friendship with us and -hostility to Buonaparte. You will observe in one of the conversations -with Murat’s agent, that he informed me that Buonaparte -had ordered Murat to hold twenty thousand men in readiness for -the invasion of Sicily in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. I enclose -the copy of a letter I have in consequence addressed to Sir -E. Pellew, together with his answer, upon the practicability of the -Toulon fleet sailing without the knowledge of the blockading fleet. -Your lordship will have received my letter of the 21st of May -enclosing a copy of my dispatch to Lord Bathurst, relative to the -discontent of the Neapolitan troops in Sicily and the consequent -state of weakness if not of danger resulting from it to that island. -I stated also that this circumstance had induced me to detain in -Sicily the two battalions which had been withdrawn from Spain.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Lord Wellington to lord William Bentinck.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Huarte, July 1st, 1813.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap pad1">My lord</span>,</p> - -<p>In answer to your lordship’s despatch, I have to observe, that I -conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger -whatever.</p> - - -<hr class="r20"> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_693"></a>[693]</span></p> - -<h3 id="No_II">No. II.</h3> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Letter from general Nugent to lord William Bentinck.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Vienna, January 24th, 1812.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap pad1">My dear lord William</span>,</p> - -<p>I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you shortly after -my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his -departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his -letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result it -would have and the manner it would be considered by the emperor -and the government here, and then to settle again the manner -of sending officers down to the Mediterranean, for some of those -then destined to be sent were implicated. All these circumstances -caused the delay of the present which otherwise you would have -had much sooner. Another cause of the delay was that I wanted -to inform you of the answer which would be given by this house -to the speculations that I was commissioned by the prince-regent -to propose relative to the arch-duke. There was no decisive answer -given, and the only manner of forming an opinion upon that -subject was by observing and getting information of their true intentions. -I am now firmly convinced that these are such as we -could wish, and that it is only fear of being committed that prevents -them to speak in a more positive manner. Their whole conduct -proves this, more particularly in La Tour’s affair which has -produced no change whatsoever nor led to any discovery of views -or connexions. There is even now less difficulty than ever for -officers going to the Mediterranean. They get passports from -government here without its inquiring or seeming to know the -real object. As it can do nothing else but connive, to which this -conduct answers, I think a more explicit declaration is not even -requisite and I am convinced that when the thing is once done -they will gladly agree. This is likewise King’s and Hardenberg’s -and Johnson’s opinion upon the subject, and as such they desire -me to express it to you, and to observe that the situation of things -here makes the forwarding of the measures you may think expedient -in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic the more desirable.</p> - -<p>They are here extremely satisfied with the conduct of government -in England, and by the accounts we have the latter is much -pleased with the conduct of this country, particularly relative to -the affairs of Prussia. These are however not decided yet. But<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_694"></a>[694]</span> -whatever the consequence may be and whatever this country may -do for the present, I am convinced that your measures will ultimately -contribute much to the result. I am happy to perceive by -the last information from England that every thing seems to have -been settled there by you. The recruiting business of major -Burke is going on rapidly. As it was not begun at the time of -my departure I can only attribute it to your presence. The letters -contain likewise that government is come to the most favorable -resolutions relative to the arch-duke, and I hope the formation of -the troops will soon be effectuated. The dispositions of the -Adriatic coasts and the Tyrol are as good as can be, but all depends -upon establishing a basis and without that all partial exertions -would be useless or destructive. At the same time that some -regiments would be formed, I think it would be very expedient, to -form at the same place a Dalmatian or a Croat regiment, particularly -as in the present state of things it will be much easier even than -the other. The men could be easily recruited in Bosnia, and sent -from Durazzo to the place you should appoint. The bearer will -give you every information upon the subject, and at all events, I -should propose to you to send him immediately back to Durazzo, -and, should you adopt the above, to give him the necessary orders -and the commission for recruiting and sending the men to the -place of formation. No person can be better qualified than he -is. He knows the languages, the country, and the character of -the people, and understands every thing that relates to commercial -affairs. As to the place of formation, I think I already proposed -Cephalonia to you. Lissa or one of the nearer islands would -give too much jealousy in the beginning in those parts, until our -capital increases so as to undertake an important enterprise, at all -events it is important to form a noyau of the three nations; it is -then that we may hope to be joined by the whole of Dalmatia and -Croatia after a short time. Major and other officers will shortly -proceed to the Mediterranean. They will be directed to Messina -where I request you will send orders for them. It would be very -useful and saving to provide means for transporting them to that -place from Durazzo, and if possible to establish a more frequent -and regular intercourse between you and the latter. Johnson who -soon sets off from here will in the meantime establish a communication -across Bosnia to Durazzo. His presence in those parts will -be productive of many good effects. You will find that he is an -able active and zealous man and will certainly be very useful in -forwarding your views. I can answer for his being worthy of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_695"></a>[695]</span> -your full confidence, should you adopt the proposition relative to -the recruiting it would be necessary to put at his disposal the -requisite funds.</p> - -<p>You will judge by the account the bearer of this will give you -whether cloth &c. can be had at a cheaper rate from this country -or where you are, and he will bring back your directions for this -object. Allow me to observe that it would be highly useful to -have clothes for a considerable number of men prepared beforehand. -Many important reasons have prevented me hitherto from -proceeding to the Mediterranean as speedily as I wished. I -hope however not to be detained much longer and soon to have -removed every obstacle. I think to set off from here in the beginning -of March, and request you will be so kind as to provide -with the return of the bearer to Durazzo the means of my passage -from thence, where I shall come with a feigned name. I hope he -will be back there by the time of my arrival. I shall endeavour -to hasten my journey as I have important information in every -respect. By that time we shall know the decision relative to the -north. King has informed you of the reasons which made an alteration -necessary in regard to Frozzi’s journey. Part of your -object is in fact fulfilled already, and there are agents in Italy -&c. As to the other and principal part relative to connections in -the army, and the gaining an exact knowledge of it and of the -government in Italy, with other circumstances, I expect soon to -have a person of sufficient consequence and ability to execute -your instructions, and he will go to Milan &c. as soon as it can -be done with safety. His permanent residence in that country seems -to be necessary, that he may be able to accomplish fully the object, -and as the sum you have assigned for this purpose is sufficient for -a considerable time, you can determine whether he is to remain -there permanently or not. Frozzi will bring you an exact account -of what has been arranged relative to this business, and will himself -be a very proper person for communications between you -and Italy or this country. He will for that purpose go back to -Italy, the obstacle that opposed it hitherto being now no more. I -cannot but repeat the importance of giving all possible extent to -the arch-duke’s establishment, and particularly the raising of as -much troops as possible, for all will depend upon having the -means of landing. We are then sure of augmenting very speedily, -and finding the greatest assistance. The place for beginning cannot -be determined on exactly, but there is much to be expected -in Dalmatia and Croatia where we could be joined by the inhabitants<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_696"></a>[696]</span> -and troops. The lower part would be best adapted in -case we begin with a small force. I shall send and bring officers -particularly acquainted with the country and provide every -other assistance such as plans &c. and I think it would be expedient -to prevent for the present any enterprize in that country -that would alarm them. Since I began my letter a courier has -arrived from Paris.</p> - -<p>The contingent of the Rhenish confederacy have got orders to -be ready for marching. Reinforcements are sending from France -to the north and every preparation is making for war. Buonaparte -told to Swartzenburg that he would begin in April and all -circumstances seem to agree with this. On the other side Russia -is very slow in making peace with Turkey. He entirely neglects -Prussia, and for this reason it is to be feared that the latter will -place his capital with Buonaparte notwithstanding that this cabinet -is endeavouring to prevent it. I should be then very much afraid for -the conduct of this house well inclined as the emperor is. Proposals -were made by France but no resolution has been taken until -it is known how things turn out. The worst is that Romanzow -is still in credit with Alexander, which prevents all confidence in -other houses and makes Russia adopt half measures. This sketch -of the situation will give you some idea of the wavering and uncertain -state people are in. There is no calculation to be made -as to the conduct of government, nor must we be surprised at any -thing they may do. On the other side our speculations are not -built upon them, but upon the disposition of the people; and -whatever may happen I am convinced that this is a good foundation -if the measures are taken and the means prepared. A principal -object of mine in these parts has been to prepare the measures -for the case that it comes here to the very worst. The most important -thing is the augmenting in every possible manner the force -at your disposition. The accounts we have to-day of your return -and the powers I hope you have give me the best hopes of your -overcoming every difficulty. I must yet observe that as Johnson’s -proceedings are entirely subordinate to, and make a part of your -plans and operations in general, and that he cannot of course depend -upon King, you will be so good as to give him decisive instructions -to that purpose, and assign him the means and powers -for acting in consequence. I shall combine with him in my passage -through Bosnia every thing in the hopes that you will approve -of this.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_697"></a>[697]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Letter from Mr. King to lord William Bentinck.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Vienna, January 24th, 1812.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap pad1">My lord</span>,</p> - -<p>I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship’s -letter of the 25th of August, which was delivered to me towards -the latter end of October by captain Frizzi whom I should immediately -have furnished with the means of proceeding to Italy for -the purpose of carrying your lordship’s instructions into effect, had -it not appeared to me that the measures which I had taken on my -arrival here had already in a great degree anticipated your lordship’s -intentions. As a confirmation of this, I beg leave to -transmit for your lordship’s perusal the reports (marked A) of -three messengers whom I sent to the north of Italy for the purpose -of ascertaining the state of the public mind, particularly in the -ci-devant Venetian territories and adjacent districts. These reports -confirm in a very satisfactory manner the assurances, which -I have received through various other channels, that the inhabitants -of those countries are ready and determined to avail themselves -of the first opportunity to shake off a yoke which is become -insupportable. I have also the honour to transmit to your lordship -the copy of a letter from count Montgelas, the minister of -foreign affairs in Bavaria, to the commissary-general at Nimpten, -from which it appears that the Bavarian government is not altogether -ignorant of the intentions of the Swiss and Tyroleze, but I -am happy to have it in my power to inform your lordship that the -persons who seem to have excited the suspicions of the Bavarian -government do not enjoy the confidence of our friends in Switzerland, -and have not been made acquainted with their intentions; it -is nevertheless indispensably necessary that we should act with the -greatest possible caution in the employment of emissaries, lest the -French and Bavarian governments should take the alarm and -adopt measures which would defeat our projects or at least occasion -a premature explosion. On these grounds (having previously -consulted with general N. to whom captain Frizzi was particularly -addressed and who entirely coincides in my opinion) I think it -eligible to send this officer back to Sicily and I trust that in so -doing I shall meet with your lordship’s approbation. I beg leave -to observe that the only service captain Frizzi could render in -Italy at the present moment would be to ascertain the number and -distribution of the French forces in this country, but as these -undergo continual changes I think it will be sufficient to despatch<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_698"></a>[698]</span> -a confidential agent to your lordship with the latest intelligence -from Italy, at a period when the northern war and consequent -occupation of the French troops will enable your lordship to derive -advantage from such intelligence.</p> - -<p>The general opinion is that hostilities will commence between -France and Russia in the month of April at which period the -preparations of the French government will be completed, and there -is little reason to hope that the Russians will avail themselves of -the interval, either to annihilate the army of the duchy of -Warsaw or to advance to the assistance of the king of Prussia, -who will in all probability ally himself with France notwithstanding -his former declarations to the contrary. The latest intelligence -from Berlin states that count St. Marsan had presented the ultimatum -of his government, which demands an unconditional surrender -of all the Prussian fortresses, and insists on the military -force and resources of Prussia being placed at the disposal of -French generals. It is positively asserted that the king is inclined -to submit to these humiliating proposals, but nothing has -been as yet definitively concluded. I am sorry to inform your -lordship that the aspect of affairs in this country is highly discouraging; -the injudicial financial measures which count Wallis -has thought proper to adopt have rendered it impossible for government -to place the army on a respectable footing, and have considerably -increased the discontent of the people, who however still -retain their characteristic aversion to the French. The government -is determined to maintain a strict neutrality during the -approaching crisis if possible.</p> - -<p>In my former letter I mentioned to your lordship my intention -of establishing a person at Durazzo in order to forward messengers -&c. &c. and to transmit to me occasionally intelligence of the -state of things in the Adriatic. But having received of late -repeated assurances of the increasing discontent of the inhabitants -of those parts of the coast who have the misfortune to be under -the dominion of the French, and of their willingness to make every -effort to shake off the yoke, and being aware how important it is -at the present moment not to neglect an object of this nature I -have desired Mr. Johnson to proceed thither in order to form -connections in Albania, Dalmatia, and to avail himself in every -possible manner of the spirit of discontent which has so decidedly -manifested itself. Mr. Johnson who has been employed on the -continent for some years past as an agent of government, and who -has given proofs of his zeal and abilities, will repair to Durazzo, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_699"></a>[699]</span> -according to circumstances to some other town in the neighbourhood -of the Adriatic and will there reside as agent of the British -government. He will communicate his arrival to your lordship -with as little delay as possible.</p> - -<p>By the following piece of information which I have derived -from an authentic source your lordship will perceive that the -French and Swedish governments are far from being on friendly -terms. An alliance has been proposed by the former to the -latter and instantaneously rejected. The terms of the alliance -were as follows, viz. 1st, a body of 30,000 Swedes to be placed -at the disposal of France. 2nd, 3000 seamen to be furnished to -the French marine, and 3rd, a regiment of Swedes to be raised -for the service of France as was the case before the French revolution. -I transmit this letter to your lordship by captain Steinberg -and ensign Ferandi, two officers who have served creditably in the -Austrian army. The former has connections and local knowledge -in his native country which may become particularly useful. I -fear it will not be in my power to send 50 subaltern officers to -Sicily as your lordship desired. I shall however occasionally -despatch some intelligent officers who will I think be extremely -useful in the formation of new corps.</p> - - -<hr class="r20"> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 id="No_III">No. III.</h3> - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Extracts from the correspondence of sir Henry Wellesley, -sir Charles Stuart, and Mr. Vaughan.</em></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Vaughan to sir Charles Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Cadiz, August 3d, 1813.</em></p> - -<p>“The Spanish troops in Catalonia and elsewhere are starving, -and the government are feeding them with proclamations to -intendants. Since I have known Spain I have never known the -seat of government in a worse state. There is a strong feeling -against the English and a miserable jacobin party which is violent -beyond measure.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Chichana, Nov. 2d, 1813.</em></p> - -<p>“Never was any thing so disgraceful in the annals of the -world as the conduct of all the Spanish authorities on the occasion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_700"></a>[700]</span> -of the sickness breaking out. It is believed that no persons have -the sickness twice, and as almost every family in Cadiz has passed -the epidemic of the fever the interested merchants would not allow -it to be said that the epidemic existed, they have continued to issue -clear bills of health to vessels leaving the port in the height of the -mortality and did all they could to intimidate the government and -Cortez into remaining amongst them.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Sir Henry Wellesley to lord Wellington.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Sept. 13th, 1813.</em></p> - -<p>“A curious scene has been passing here lately. The permanent -deputation<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> having been appointed the Cortez closed their -session on the 14th. There had been for some days reports of the -prevalence of the yellow fever which had excited alarm. On the -16th in the evening, I received an official note from the ministers -of state apprizing me of the intention of the government to proceed -to Madrid on the following day, but without assigning any reason -for so sudden a resolution. At night I went to the regency, -thinking this was an occasion when it would be right to offer them -some pecuniary assistance. I found Agar and Ciscar together, -the cardinal being ill of the gout. They told me that the prevalence -of the disorder was the sole cause of their determination to -leave Cadiz; and Ciscar particularly dwelt upon the necessity of -removing, saying he had seen the fatal effects of delay at Carthagena. -They then told me that there was disturbance in the town, -in consequence of which they determined on summoning the -extraordinary Cortez. I went from the regency to the Cortez. -A motion was made for summoning the ministers to account for -the proceedings of the regency. Never was I witness to so disgraceful -a scene of lying and prevarication. The ministers insisted -that it was not the intention of the regency to leave Cadiz -until the Cortez had been consulted, although I had in my pocket -the official note announcing their intention to do so, and had been -told by Ciscar that the extraordinary Cortez was assembled for no -other reason than because there were disturbances in the town.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Cadiz, Dec. 10th, 1813.</em></p> - -<p>“The party for placing the princess at the head of the Spanish -regency is gaining strength, and I should not be surprised if that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_701"></a>[701]</span> -measure were to be adopted soon after our arrival at Madrid, -unless a peace and the return of Ferdinand should put an end to -all such projects.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Mr. Stuart to lord Wellington.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>June 11th, 1813.</em></p> - -<p>“The repugnance of the Admiralty to adopt the measures suggested -by your lordship at the commencement of the American -war for the protection of the coast, has been followed by events -which have fully justified your opinion. <em>Fifteen merchantmen -have been taken off Oporto in a fortnight and a valuable -Portuguese homeward-bound merchant ship was captured three -days ago close to the bar of Lisbon.</em>”</p> - - -<hr class="r20"> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 id="No_IV">No. IV.</h3> - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Extract from a manuscript memoir by captain Norton, -thirty-fourth regiment.</em></p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF MAYA.</h4> - -<p>The thirty-ninth regiment, commanded by the hon. col. O’Callaghan, -then immediately engaged with the French and after a -severe contest also retired, the fiftieth was next in succession and -they also after a gallant stand retired, making way for the ninety-second -which met the advancing French column first with its -right wing drawn up in line, and after a most destructive fire and -heavy loss on both sides the remnant of the right wing retired, -leaving a line of killed and wounded that appeared to have no -interval; the French column advanced up to this line and then -halted, the killed and wounded of the ninety-second forming a -sort of rampart, the left wing then opened its fire on the column, -and as I was but a little to the right of the ninety-second I could -not help reflecting painfully how many of the wounded of their -right wing must have unavoidably suffered from the fire of their -comrades. The left wing after doing good service and sustaining -a loss equal to the first line retired.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_702"></a>[702]</span></p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF RONCESVALLES.</h4> - -<p class="p1 center"><span class="smcap">Extracts from general Cole’s and marshal Soult’s -Official Reports, MSS.</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General Cole to lord Wellington.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><em>Heights in front of Pampeluna, July 27th, 1813.</em></p> - -<p>——“The enemy having in the course of the night turned -those posts, were now perceived moving in very considerable -force along the ridge leading to the Puerto de Mendichurri. I -therefore proceeded in that direction and found that their advance -had nearly reached the road leading from Roncesvalles pass to -Los Alduides, from which it is separated by a small wooded valley. -Owing to the difficulty of the communications the head of major-general -Ross’s brigade could not arrive there sooner; the major-general -however, with great decision, attacked them with the -Brunswick company and three companies of the twentieth, all he -had time to form; these actually closed with the enemy and -bayonetted several in the ranks. They were however forced to -yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley, the -enemy attempted to follow them but were repulsed with loss, the -remainder of the brigade having come up.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Marshal Soult to the Minister of War.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><i lang="fr">“Linzoin, 26 Juiller, 1813.</i></p> - -<p lang="fr">“Leurs pertes ont également été considérables, soit à l’attaque -du Lindouz par le général Reille ou le 20<sup>me</sup> regiment a été presque -détruit à la suite d’une charge à la bayonnette executée par un -bataillon du 6<sup>me</sup> leger, division Foy, soit à l’attaque d’Altobiscar -par le général Clauzel.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Extract from the correspondence of the duke of Dalmatia with -the Minister of War.</em></p> - -<p class="right"><i lang="fr">Ascain, 12 Août, 1813.</i></p> - -<p lang="fr">“Dés a présent V. E. voit la situation de l’armée, elle connait -ses forces, celles de l’ennemi, et elle se fait sans doute une idée -de ses projets, et d’avance elle peut apprécier ce qu’il est en notre -pouvoir de faire; je ne charge point le tableau, je dis ma pensée -sans détour, et j’avoue que si l’ennemi emploie tous ses moyens,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_703"></a>[703]</span> -ainsi que probablement il le fera, ceux que nous pourrons en ce -moment lui opposer etant de beaucoup inferieurs, nous ne pourrons -pas empêcher qu’ils ne fasse beaucoup de mal. Mon devoir est -de le dire à V. E. quoique je tienne une autre language aux -troupes et au pays, et que d’ailleurs je ne néglige aucun moyen -pour remplir de mon mieux la tache qui m’est imposée.”</p> - - -<hr class="r20"> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 id="No_V">No. V.</h3> - -<p class="p2 center"><span class="smcap">Extracted from the Imperial Muster-Rolls.</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Report of the movements of the army of Arragon during the -first fifteen days of September, 1813.</em></p> - -<p lang="fr">“Le 12<sup>eme</sup> toute l’armée d’Aragon se reunit a Molino del Rey; -partie de celle de Catalonia et la garrison de Barcelonne se -placent a droite a Ollessa et Martorel, pour partir tous ensemble a -8 heures du soir et se porter le droite par San Sadurni, le rest -par le grande route d’Ordal sur Villa Franca, ou l’armée Anglaise -etait rasemble. General Harispe rencontré a onze heures du soir -un fort advant garde au Col d’Ordal <i lang="fr">dans les anciens ratranchemens</i>. -Un combat de plus vif s’engagea sous les ordres du -general de l’avant garde Mesclop. Le 7<sup>eme</sup> et 44<sup>eme</sup> reg<sup>ns.</sup> montrerent -une haute valeur, ainsi qu’une partie d’116<sup>eme</sup>. Les positions -sont prise et reprise, et nous restent enfin, couvert des morts -et de blesses Anglais. Dans la pursuite le 4<sup>eme</sup> houssards se -saissirent des 4 pieces de cannon Anglais, &c. avec trois ou -quatre cents prisoniers, presque tous de la 27<sup>eme</sup> reg<sup>n.</sup> Anglais. -Le droit, ayant rencontrer des obstacles et quelques troupes ennemis -a combattre dans les passages, est retarde dans sa marche, et -n’arriva pas avec le jour au rendezvouz entre L’Ongat et Grenada. -Un battalion de 117<sup>eme</sup> venant à gauche, par Bejas sur Avionet, -rejoint l’armée en position, avec des prisoniers.</p> - -<p lang="fr">“Le marechal Suchet directé une movement de cavalrie et de -l’artillerie qui tenaient la tête pour donner le tems à l’infanterie -d’entrer en ligne. Les Anglais etaient en battaile sur trois lignes -en avant de Villa Franca, ils commencerent aussitot leur retraite -en bon ordre. On les poursuiverent et on les harcelerent, la cavalrie -fit plusieurs charges assez vive. Ils opposerent de la resistance, -essuyerent des pertes, surtout en cavalrie, precipiterent leur<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_704"></a>[704]</span> -marche, brulerent un pont et s’eloignerent vers Arbos et Vendrils, -laissant plus que 150 hommes pris et beaucoup des morts et des -blesses, surtout des houssards de Brunswick. Nôtre avant garde -va ce soir à Vendrils et plusieurs certaines de deserteurs sont -ramassé.”</p> - - -<hr class="r20"> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 id="No_VI">No. VI.</h3> - - -<p class="negin1">No. 1.—Extract from the official state of the allied army, commanded by -lieutenant-general sir John Murray, at the Col de Balaguer, 17th June, -1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Present<br>fit for duty.</td> -<td class="tdc">  Sick.</td> -<td class="tdc">Command.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Mules.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrq">739</td> -<td class="tdrq">12</td> -<td class="tdrq">6</td> -<td class="tdrq">733</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">757</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British Portuguese and Sicilian artillery</td> -<td class="tdrq">783</td> -<td class="tdrq">8</td> -<td class="tdrq">199</td> -<td class="tdrq">362</td> -<td class="tdrq">604</td> -<td class="tdrq">990</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British engineers and staff corps</td> -<td class="tdrq">78</td> -<td class="tdrq">5</td> -<td class="tdrq">36</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">119</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">7,226</td> -<td class="tdrq">830</td> -<td class="tdrq">637</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">8,693</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Whittingham’s infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,370</td> -<td class="tdrq">503</td> -<td class="tdrq">316</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,189</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Sicilian infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">985</td> -<td class="tdrq">121</td> -<td class="tdrq">272</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,378</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">General Total</td> -<td class="tdrq">14,181</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,479</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,466</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,095</td> -<td class="tdrq">604</td> -<td class="tdrq">17,126</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 2.—Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian -force, commanded by lieutenant-general sir William Clinton. Head-quarters, -Taragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, -and drummers.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Present<br>fit for duty.</td> -<td class="tdc">  Sick.</td> -<td class="tdc">Command.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Mules.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrq">663</td> -<td class="tdrq">61</td> -<td class="tdrq">215</td> -<td class="tdrq">875</td> -<td class="tdrq">40</td> -<td class="tdrq">939</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery, engineers, and staff corps</td> -<td class="tdrq">997</td> -<td class="tdrq">67</td> -<td class="tdrq">58</td> -<td class="tdrq">507</td> -<td class="tdrq">896</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,122</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">9,124</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,390</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,019</td> -<td class="tdrq">115</td> -<td class="tdrq">429</td> -<td class="tdrq">11,533</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">General Total</td> -<td class="tdrq">10,784</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,518</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,292</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,497</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,465</td> -<td class="tdrq">13,594</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 3.—Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division -(Whittingham’s.) Taragona, 15th of December, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc">  Sick.</td> -<td class="tdc">Command.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Mules.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,014</td> -<td class="tdrq">400</td> -<td class="tdrq">627</td> -<td class="tdrq">110</td> -<td class="tdrq">21</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,041</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 4.—Extract from the original state of the first army commanded by -the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Copons et Navia. Head-quarters, -Vich, 1st of August, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrq">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdrq">  Sick.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Command.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Mules.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Total men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Infantry disposable</td> -<td class="tdrq">10,219</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,535</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,207</td> -<td class="tdrq">586</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">13,961</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">In Cardona</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,182</td> -<td class="tdrq">115</td> -<td class="tdrq">398</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,695</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Seo d’Urgel</td> -<td class="tdrq">984</td> -<td class="tdrq">172</td> -<td class="tdrq">144</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,300</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery, &c.</td> -<td class="tdrq">877</td> -<td class="tdrq">7</td> -<td class="tdrq">59</td> -<td class="tdrq">6</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,070</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdrq">13,262</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,829</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,808</td> -<td class="tdrq">592</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdrq">18,026</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="6"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_705"></a>[705]</span></p> - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 5.—Extract from the original state of the second army commanded -by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Xavier Elio. Vinaros, 19th September, -1833.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">  Sick.</td> -<td class="tdr">Command.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total of men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total of all arms</td> -<td class="tdr">26,835</td> -<td class="tdr">3,181</td> -<td class="tdr">7,454</td> -<td class="tdr">37,470</td> -<td class="tdr">4,073</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 fs80"><em>Note.</em>—This state includes Villa Campa’s, Sarzfield’s, Duran’s, the -Empecinado’s, and Roche’s divisions, besides the troops immediately -under Elio himself.</p> - - -<hr class="r20"> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 id="No_VII">No. VII.</h3> - -<p class="negin1">No. 1.—Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the marquis of -Wellington’s command. Extracted from the original morning state for -the 24th of July, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Officers,</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Sergeants, &c.</td> -<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">916</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">5,894</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">6,750</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">5,834</td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Present under arms</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Ditto infantry</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,665</td> -<td class="tdrq">29,926</td> -<td class="tdrq">34,581</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrq">251</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,241</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,492</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,178</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Ditto infantry</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrq">2,594</td> -<td class="tdrq">20,565</td> -<td class="tdrq">23,459</td> -<td class="tdrq">”</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="4"></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">Grand Total, exclusive of</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">8,726</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">57,566</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">66,282</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">7,012</td> -<td class="tdl">{Infantry</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">sick and absent on command</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdl">{and cavalry.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="4"></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdlh" colspan="7">The artillerymen, &c. were about 4,000.</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 2.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning -state, 15th of October, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Officers,</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Sergeants,&c.</td> -<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry<br>and infantry</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">5,859</td> -<td class="tdrq">37,250</td> -<td class="tdrq">43,109</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese ditto</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,253</td> -<td class="tdrq">21,274</td> -<td class="tdrq">25,527</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">    Grand Total, exclusive of sick,</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">10,112</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">58,524</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">68,636</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">absent on command. &c. &c.</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdlh" colspan="4">The artillerymen and drivers about</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,000</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="bb"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdc">Total</td> -<td class="tdrq">72,636</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="bb"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 3.—Anglo-Portuguese force, from the original morning state, -9th November, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Officers,</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Sergeants,&c.</td> -<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry<br>and infantry</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">5,356</td> -<td class="tdrq">39,687</td> -<td class="tdrq">45,043</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese ditto</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">2,990</td> -<td class="tdrq">22,237</td> -<td class="tdrq">25,227</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">    Grand Total, exclusive of sick,</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">8,346</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">61,924</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">70,270</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">absent on command. &c.</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc tdlh" colspan="4">The artillerymen &c. &c. about</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,000</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="bb"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdc">Total</td> -<td class="tdrq">74,270</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="bb"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_706"></a>[706]</span></p> - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 4.—Sir Rowland Hill’s force at the battle of St. Pierre. Extracted -from the original morning state, 13th December, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Officers,</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Sergeants, &c.</td> -<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">Second division</td> -<td class="tdl">{British</td> -<td class="tdrq">802</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,371</td> -<td class="tdrq">6,173</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">{Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdrq">277</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,331</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,608</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Lecor’s Portuguese division</td> -<td class="tdrq">507</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,163</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,670</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">Total under arms, exclusive of artillerymen</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,586</td> -<td class="tdrq">11,865</td> -<td class="tdrq">13,451</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 5.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning -state, 13th February, 1814.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Officers,</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Sergeants, &c.</td> -<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cavalry.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,093</td> -<td class="tdrq">7,315</td> -<td class="tdrq">8,408}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">9,898</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrq">280</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,210</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,490}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="tdr">Infantry.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,853</td> -<td class="tdrq">29,714</td> -<td class="tdrq">34,567}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">56,306</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,828</td> -<td class="tdrq">18,911</td> -<td class="tdrq">21,739}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="bb"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">General Total, present under arms</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">66,204</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="bb"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="3">Artillerymen, &c. about</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,000</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 6.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning -state, 10th of April, 1814.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Officers,</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Sergeants, &c.</td> -<td class="tdc">Rank and file.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total.</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,159</td> -<td class="tdrq">7,640</td> -<td class="tdrq">8,799}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">9,987</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrq">230</td> -<td class="tdrq">958</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,188}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British and German infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,946</td> -<td class="tdrq">29,999</td> -<td class="tdrq">34,945}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">54,550</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese infantry</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,622</td> -<td class="tdrq">16,983</td> -<td class="tdrq">19,605}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="bb"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">General Total, present under arms</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">64,537</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="bb"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="3">The artillerymen, &c. about</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,000</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 negin1">No. 7.—Actual strength of the infantry divisions engaged in the battle -of Toulouse. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, -1814.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Officers,</td> -<td>  </td> -<td class="tdc">  Rank</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">Infantry, present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdl">Sergeants, &c.</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr">and file.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Second division,</td> -<td class="tdl">British</td> -<td class="tdrq">715</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,123} </td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">6,940</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdrq">235</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,867} </td> -<td class="tdl">Grand Total</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Third division,</td> -<td class="tdl">British</td> -<td class="tdrq">529</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">2,741 }</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">4,679</td> -<td class="tdl">infantry,</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdrq">226</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,183 }</td> -<td class="tdl">officers and</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fourth division,</td> -<td class="tdl">British</td> -<td class="tdrq">531</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">3,028} </td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">5,383</td> -<td class="tdl">soldiers,</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdrq">239</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,585} </td> -<td class="tdl">present</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Sixth division,</td> -<td class="tdl">British</td> -<td class="tdrq">558</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">3,233 }</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">5,681</td> -<td class="tdl">under arms.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdrq">246</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,644 }</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Light division,</td> -<td class="tdl">British</td> -<td class="tdrq">378</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">2,469} </td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">4,318</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">30,963</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdrq">231</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,240} </td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Lecor’s Portuguese division</td> -<td class="tdrq">455</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">3,507   </td> -<td class="tdrq">3,962</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">———</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">————</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,343</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">26,620   </td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">———</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">————</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p1 fs80"><em>Note.</em>—There is no separate state for the cavalry on the 10th of April, -but on the 15th of May, 1814, they stood as follows.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_707"></a>[707]</span></p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Officers,</td> -<td>  </td> -<td class="tdc">Rank</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Cavalry, present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc">Sergeants, &c.</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">and file.</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Bock’s brigade of Germans</td> -<td class="tdrq">112</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">694</td> -<td class="tdl">Total cavalry,</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Ponsonby’s brigade of British</td> -<td class="tdrq">188</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,921</td> -<td class="tdc">present</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fane’s brigade of British</td> -<td class="tdrq">240</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,506</td> -<td class="tdc">under arms.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Vivian’s brigade of British</td> -<td class="tdrq">128</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">960</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Lord Edw. Somerset’s brigade of British</td> -<td class="tdrq">214</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,691</td> -<td class="tdrq">6,954</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">——</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">———</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">882</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">6,072</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">——</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">———</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="4">Total of Anglo-Portuguese cavalry and infantry, present under arms</td> -<td class="tdrq">37,917</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="4">Add the Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, together said to be</td> -<td class="tdrq">14,000</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="tdrq">51,917</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Artillerymen, &c.</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,500</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">General Total</td> -<td class="tdrq">53,417</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="4"></td> -<td class="tdrq tdlha">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 fs80"><em>Note.</em>—My authority for the number of guns employed during this -campaign are copies of the returns given to me by sir Alexander Dickson -who commanded that arm. The number of artillerymen is not borne on -the morning states, but in the original weekly state of the 15th of May, -1814, I find the artillerymen, engineers, drivers, and waggon-train, -amounted to four thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, with five -thousand and thirty horses and mules. This may be taken as the average -strength during the campaign, but more than half were with sir John -Hope and some with lord Dalhousie. Wherefore, the number at the -battle of Toulouse could not have exceeded fifteen hundred, making a -total of all ranks and arms of fifty-three thousand combatants.</p> - - -<hr class="r20"> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 id="No_VIII">No. VIII.</h3> - -<p class="negin1">No. 1.—General state of the French armies under Soult and Suchet. Extracted -from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July 1813. The armies of the -north centre and south being by an imperial decree reorganised in one -body, taking the title of the army of Spain.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hosp-</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">itals</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Army of Spain</td> -<td class="tdrq">97,983</td> -<td class="tdrq">12,676</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,110</td> -<td class="tdrq">392</td> -<td class="tdrq">14,074</td> -<td class="tdrq">114,167</td> -<td class="tdrq">13,028</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad5">Arragon</td> -<td class="tdrq">32,362</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,919</td> -<td class="tdrq">3,621</td> -<td class="tdrq">551</td> -<td class="tdrq">3,201</td> -<td class="tdrq">39,184</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,470</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad5">Catalonia</td> -<td class="tdrq">25,910</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,869</td> -<td class="tdrq">168</td> -<td class="tdrq">”  </td> -<td class="tdrq">1,379</td> -<td class="tdrq">27,457</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,744</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">General Total</td> -<td class="tdrq">156,255</td> -<td class="tdrq">19,464</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,899</td> -<td class="tdrq">943</td> -<td class="tdrq">18,654</td> -<td class="tdrq">180,808</td> -<td class="tdrq">20,242</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs80">No. 2.—15th of September, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Army of Spain</td> -<td class="tdrq">81,351</td> -<td class="tdrq">11,159</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,004</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,438</td> -<td class="tdrq">22,488</td> -<td class="tdrq">107,843</td> -<td class="tdrq">11,272</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad5">Arragon</td> -<td class="tdrq">32,476</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,447</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,721</td> -<td class="tdrq">320</td> -<td class="tdrq">3,616</td> -<td class="tdrq">38,813</td> -<td class="tdrq">6,305</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad5">Catalonia</td> -<td class="tdrq">24,026</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,670</td> -<td class="tdrq">120</td> -<td class="tdrq">”  </td> -<td class="tdrq">2,137</td> -<td class="tdrq">26,283</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,497</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">General Total</td> -<td class="tdrq">137,853</td> -<td class="tdrq">17,276</td> -<td class="tdrq">6,845</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,758</td> -<td class="tdrq">28,241</td> -<td class="tdrq">172,939</td> -<td class="tdrq">20,074</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - - -<p class="p1 fs80"><em>Note.</em>—The garrison of San Sebastian though captive is borne on -this state.</p> - -<p class="fs80">This is the last general state of the French army in my possession -but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_708"></a>[708]</span></p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">“Army of Spain,</td> -<td class="tdl">16th November, 1813.—</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">102 battalions.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">74 squadrons, without garrisons.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4">74,152 men present under arms. - <span class="pad3">100,212 effectives.</span></td> -<td class="tdl">17,206 horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">18,230 Hospital.</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">  8,555 Troop horses.</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">  1,809 Officers’ horses.</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">  5,384 Horses of draft.</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="6"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">“Army of Spain,</td> -<td class="tdl">1st December.—</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">93 battalions.</td> -<td class="tdl">74 squadrons.</td> -<td class="tdl">17,989 horses.”</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs80">No. 3.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, July 1813, when Soult took -the command.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Effective and</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">Right wing.—Lieutenant-general Reille.</td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">non-effective.</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">First division,</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Foy, 9 battalions</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,922</td> -<td class="tdrq">189 }</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms,</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 6,784 }</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Seventh ditto,</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Maucune, 7 ditto</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,186</td> -<td class="tdrq">110 }</td> -<td class="tdrq">17,235</td> -<td class="tdrq">450</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 5,676 }</td> -<td class="tdrq">21,366</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Ninth ditto,</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">La Martiniere, 11 ditto</td> -<td class="tdrq">7,127</td> -<td class="tdrq">151 }</td> -<td class="tdc">men.</td> -<td class="tdc">horses.</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 8,906 }</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdlh" colspan="6">Centre.—Drouet, Count D’Erlon.</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Second division,</td> -<td class="tdl">D’Armagnac,</td> -<td class="tdl">8 batt.</td> -<td class="tdrq">6,961</td> -<td class="tdrq">116 }</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 8,580 }</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Third ditto,</td> -<td class="tdl">Abbé,</td> -<td class="tdl">9 ditto</td> -<td class="tdrq">8,030</td> -<td class="tdrq">285 }</td> -<td class="tdrq">20,957</td> -<td class="tdrq">624</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 8,723 }</td> -<td class="tdrq">23,935</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Sixth ditto,</td> -<td class="tdl">Daricau,</td> -<td class="tdl">8 ditto</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,966</td> -<td class="tdrq">223 }</td> -<td class="tdc">men.</td> -<td class="tdc">horses.</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 6,627 }</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdlh" colspan="6">Left wing.—Lieut.-general Clauzel.</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fourth division,</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Conroux, 9 battalions</td> -<td class="tdrq">7,056</td> -<td class="tdrq">150 }</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 7,477 }</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fifth ditto,</td> -<td class="tdl">Vandermaesen,</td> -<td class="tdl">7 ditto</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,181</td> -<td class="tdrq">141 }</td> -<td class="tdrq">17,218</td> -<td class="tdrq">432</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 5,201 }</td> -<td class="tdrq">20,265</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Eighth ditto,</td> -<td class="tdl">Taupin,</td> -<td class="tdl">10 ditto</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,981</td> -<td class="tdrq">141 }</td> -<td class="tdc">men.</td> -<td class="tdc">horses.</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 7,587 }</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdlh pad4" colspan="6">Reserve, General Villatte.</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">French</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrq">14,959</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,091</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">17,929</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">Foreign</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="7">4 battalions of the Rhine, strength not given.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">4 ditto</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">Italians, general St. Pol, ditto.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">4 ditto</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">Spaniards, general Casabianca, ditto.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdlh pad4" colspan="6">Cavalry, Pierre Soult.</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Effective and</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">non-effective.</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">22 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,723</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,416}</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 5,098 }</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">7,621</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Ditto</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Trielhard</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,358</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,275}</td> -<td class="tdrq">7,081</td> -<td class="tdrq">6,691</td> -<td class="tdrq">{ 2,523 }</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdc">men.</td> -<td class="tdc">horses.</td> -<td colspan="2"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="5">Total according to the organization, but }</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">77,450</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">91,086  </td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="5">exclusive of the foreign battalions }</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Men under arms.</td> -<td colspan="3"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Troops not in the organization</td> -<td class="tdrq">14,938</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">16,946</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Generals {Garrison of St. Sebastian, 1st July</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2"><span class="fs150">}</span> 2,731</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">3,086</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="4">Rey      {forming part of this number</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="4">Cassan.—   Ditto of Pampeluna, 1st July</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,951</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">3,121</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="4">Lameth.—Ditto of Santona, 1st May</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,465</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,674</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Second reserve, not in the above</td> -<td class="tdrq">5,595</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">6,105</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="9"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="3">Effective and non-effective.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4" colspan="3">General Total</td> -<td class="tdrq">97,983</td> -<td class="tdrq">12,676.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2"> Present under arms. </td> -<td class="tdrq">114,167</td> -<td class="tdrq">13,028</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs80">No. 4.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, 16th of September, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Effective and</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.  </td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">non-effective.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Foy</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">5,002 }</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc">present</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Right wing</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Maucune</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,166 }</td> -<td class="tdr">14,875</td> -<td class="tdc">under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Menne</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">5,707 }</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlha" colspan="6"> </td> -<td class="tdlha tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ D’Armagnac</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,353 }</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Centre.</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Abbé</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">5,903 }</td> -<td class="tdr">15,098</td> -<td class="tdc">ditto</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdrq">45,752</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Maranzin</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,842 }</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlha" colspan="6"> </td> -<td class="tdlha tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Conroux</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">4,736 }</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Left wing.</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Roguet</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">5,982 }</td> -<td class="tdr">15,789</td> -<td class="tdc">ditto</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Taupin</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">5,071 }</td> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlha" colspan="8"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Reserve.</td> -<td class="tdl pad2">Villatte</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdr">8,256   }</td> -<td colspan="4"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Provisional troops of the</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">The Italian brigade,</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">right wing, destined</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdr">2,168   }</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">about 2,000</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdrq">10,424</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">to reinforce the</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">ordered to Milan.</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2" colspan="2">garrison of Bayonne</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td class="tdr">}</td> -<td colspan="4"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_709"></a>[709]</span></p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdrq">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Cavalry.—</td> -<td class="tdl">Pierre Soult</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,456</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,617</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Ditto</td> -<td class="tdl">Trielhard</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,368</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,583</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">8,325</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">Gensd’armes</td> -<td class="tdl">{ mounted</td> -<td class="tdrq">291</td> -<td class="tdrq">247</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">{ <ins class="corr" id="tn-709" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'dismountned'">dismounted</ins></td> -<td class="tdrq">1,210</td> -<td class="tdrq">”  </td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlha" colspan="6"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Parc</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">895</td> -<td class="tdrq">885</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdrq" rowspan="2">1,399</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Engineers</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">504</td> -<td class="tdrq">127</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlha" colspan="6"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Pampeluna</td> -<td class="tdrq">3,805</td> -<td class="tdrq">191</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ San Sebastian</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,366</td> -<td class="tdr">prisoners of war.</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Santona</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,633</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Garrisons.</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Bayonne</td> -<td class="tdrq">4,631</td> -<td class="tdrq">137</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdrq">15,164</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ St. Jean Pied de Port</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,786</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Navarens</td> -<td class="tdrq">842</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Castle of Lourdes</td> -<td class="tdrq">107</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdrq">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdrq">81,064</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="5">Deduct garrison of San Sebastian</td> -<td class="tdrq">2,366</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdrq">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total, present under arms</td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrq">78,698</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdrq">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - - - -<hr class="r20"> - -<h3 id="No_IX">No. IX.</h3> - - -<p class="negin1 fs100"><em>Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the -attack of the enemy’s fortified position in front of Toulouse -for to-morrow, 1st April, 1814. Published in the United -Service Journal, October 1838.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 center">(<span class="smcap">Extract.</span>)</p> - -<p class="right">“<em>St. Jory, 9th April, 1814.</em></p> - -<p>“The front attack of the third division is to extend from the -river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of -La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban) inclusive of -that road.</p> - -<p>“The light division will be immediately on the left of the third -division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road -above-mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of -the Spanish troops.</p> - -<p>“The operations of these two divisions are meant, however, -more as diversions than as real attacks; it not being expected -that they will be able to force any of the passes of the canal -which covers Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened -chiefly at the bridges and at the locks or any other points where -the form of the ground, or other circumstances most favour the -advance of the troops. A considerable part both of the third and -of the light divisions must be kept in reserve.”</p> - - -<p class="fs80" id="end-app"><em>Note.</em>—The analysis of the allied army on the 10th of April, given in -Appendix VII. Sections 6 and 7, has been very carefully made and -faithfully set down; but as the real number of the allies has lately become -a point of dispute between French and English writers, I here give -the Morning State of the whole army, accurately printed from the original -document delivered by the adjutant-general to lord Wellington on the -morning of the 10th of April, 1814. The reader will thus be enabled, -with the help of my text, to trace each division in its course and ascertain -its true numbers.</p> - - -<hr class="r20"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_710"></a>[710]</span></p> - -<h3 id="No_X">No. X.</h3> - -<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="state" style="max-width: 102em;"> - <img class="w100" src="images/state.jpg" alt="Table of state of forces"> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/state-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> -</figure> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p1 pfs80">MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the PENINSULA, under the Command of HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD-MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON, K.G. Head-Quarters, St. Jory, 10th April, 1814.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2"><span class="transnote">(Part 1 of 3)</span>   KEY:</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AA = Colonels.</td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">KEY:</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BA = Quarter-Masters of Cavalry.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AB = Lieut.-Colonels.</td> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BB = Present.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AC = Majors.</td> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BC = Present.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AD = Captains.</td> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BD = Absent.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AE = Lieutenants.</td> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BE = Command.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AF = Cornets or Ensigns.</td> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BF = Prs. of War & Missing.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">AG = Staff.</td> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">BG = Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="16"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="16"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Date of</td> -<td class="tdcl br" rowspan="3">DIVISIONS.</td> -<td class="tdcl" colspan="7">OFFICERS</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdcl br" colspan="6">SERGEANTS.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">last State</td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcl bt" colspan="2">Sick.</td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">received.</td> -<td class="tdrl">AA</td> -<td class="tdrl">AB</td> -<td class="tdrl">AC</td> -<td class="tdrl">AD</td> -<td class="tdrl">AE</td> -<td class="tdrl">AF</td> -<td class="tdrl">AG</td> -<td class="tdrl">BA</td> -<td class="tdrl">BB</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">BC</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">BD</td> -<td class="tdrl">BE</td> -<td class="tdrl">BF</td> -<td class="tdrl br">BG</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="16"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdcl">BRITISH.</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">7th Apr.</td> -<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">13</td> -<td class="tdrl">17</td> -<td class="tdrl">106</td> -<td class="tdrl">189</td> -<td class="tdrl">25</td> -<td class="tdrl">94</td> -<td class="tdrl">25</td> -<td class="tdrl">581</td> -<td class="tdrl">9</td> -<td class="tdrl">17</td> -<td class="tdrl">68</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl br">682</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq"> ”   Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">1st Dn. Infantry</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">16</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">64</td> -<td class="tdrl">53</td> -<td class="tdrl">56</td> -<td class="tdrl">48</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">433</td> -<td class="tdrl">13</td> -<td class="tdrl">40</td> -<td class="tdrl">38</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl br">528</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">9th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">2d</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">45</td> -<td class="tdrl">123</td> -<td class="tdrl">29</td> -<td class="tdrl">41</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">320</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">89</td> -<td class="tdrl">68</td> -<td class="tdrl">18</td> -<td class="tdrl br">500</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq"> ”   Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">3d</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">38</td> -<td class="tdrl">69</td> -<td class="tdrl">30</td> -<td class="tdrl">32</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">231</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">82</td> -<td class="tdrl">47</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl br">368</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">6th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">4th</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">9</td> -<td class="tdrl">42</td> -<td class="tdrl">86</td> -<td class="tdrl">27</td> -<td class="tdrl">30</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">232</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">76</td> -<td class="tdrl">56</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl br">371</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">7th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">5th</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">35</td> -<td class="tdrl">82</td> -<td class="tdrl">39</td> -<td class="tdrl">38</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">245</td> -<td class="tdrl">28</td> -<td class="tdrl">63</td> -<td class="tdrl">30</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl br">376</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">8th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">6th</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">9</td> -<td class="tdrl">41</td> -<td class="tdrl">102</td> -<td class="tdrl">41</td> -<td class="tdrl">25</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">236</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">59</td> -<td class="tdrl">41</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl br">341</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">5th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">7th</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">38</td> -<td class="tdrl">74</td> -<td class="tdrl">31</td> -<td class="tdrl">31</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">187</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">62</td> -<td class="tdrl">42</td> -<td class="tdrl">16</td> -<td class="tdrl br">312</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">9th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">Lt.</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">24</td> -<td class="tdrl">68</td> -<td class="tdrl">13</td> -<td class="tdrl">19</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">182</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">39</td> -<td class="tdrl">21</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl br">245</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">7th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">37</td> -<td class="tdrl">74</td> -<td class="tdrl">19</td> -<td class="tdrl">26</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">188</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">8</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">210</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdcl">TOTAL</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdcl">--------</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdcl pad1">PORTUGUESE.</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">7th Apr.</td> -<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">17</td> -<td class="tdrl">39</td> -<td class="tdrl">15</td> -<td class="tdrl">41</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">64</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">28</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">94</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">9th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">2d Dn. Infantry</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">16</td> -<td class="tdrl">16</td> -<td class="tdrl">28</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">122</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">19</td> -<td class="tdrl">32</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">173</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq"> ”   Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">3d</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">9</td> -<td class="tdrl">17</td> -<td class="tdrl">23</td> -<td class="tdrl">14</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">101</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">20</td> -<td class="tdrl">39</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">165</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">6th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">4th</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">12</td> -<td class="tdrl">24</td> -<td class="tdrl">51</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">103</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">27</td> -<td class="tdrl">23</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">153</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">7th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">5th</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">13</td> -<td class="tdrl">12</td> -<td class="tdrl">22</td> -<td class="tdrl">49</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">105</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">25</td> -<td class="tdrl">18</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">151</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">8th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">6th</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">12</td> -<td class="tdrl">13</td> -<td class="tdrl">16</td> -<td class="tdrl">47</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">119</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">12</td> -<td class="tdrl">20</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">154</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">5th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">7th</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">17</td> -<td class="tdrl">18</td> -<td class="tdrl">27</td> -<td class="tdrl">43</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">110</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">12</td> -<td class="tdrl">23</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">149</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">9th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">Lt.</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">13</td> -<td class="tdrl">11</td> -<td class="tdrl">26</td> -<td class="tdrl">29</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">101</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">27</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">137</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">7th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">Unattached Dn.</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">25</td> -<td class="tdrl">22</td> -<td class="tdrl">51</td> -<td class="tdrl">80</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">197</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">47</td> -<td class="tdrl">26</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl br">278</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq">8th Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">1st Brigade</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">9</td> -<td class="tdrl">12</td> -<td class="tdrl">27</td> -<td class="tdrl">16</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">137</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">20</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">168</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq"> ”   Do.</td> -<td class="tdll">10th</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">18</td> -<td class="tdrl">14</td> -<td class="tdrl">23</td> -<td class="tdrl">38</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">124</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">15</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">153</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdll">Total Portuguese</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tdll">Total British</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlh"> </td> -<td class="tdll">Grand Total</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="16"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<table class="p2 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2"><span class="transnote">(Part 2 of 3)</span>     KEY:</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">CA = Present.</td> -<td class="tdr">KEY:</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DA = Present.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CB = Present.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DB = Present.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CC = Absent.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DC = Absent.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CD = Command.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DD = Command.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CE = Prs. of War & Missing.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DE = Prs. of War & Missing.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">CF = Total.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">DF = Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="13"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl" rowspan="3">DIVISIONS.</td> -<td class="tdcl" colspan="6">TRUMPETERS OR DRUMMERS.</td> -<td class="tdcl br" colspan="6">RANK AND FILE</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcl bt" colspan="2">Sick.</td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcl bt" colspan="2">Sick.</td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrl">CA</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">CB</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">CC</td> -<td class="tdrl">CD</td> -<td class="tdrl">CE</td> -<td class="tdrl">CF</td> -<td class="tdrl">DA</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">DB</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">DC</td> -<td class="tdrl">DD</td> -<td class="tdrl">DE</td> -<td class="tdrl br">DF</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl">BRITISH.</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrl">108</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">8</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">122</td> -<td class="tdrl">7640</td> -<td class="tdrl">106</td> -<td class="tdrl">406</td> -<td class="tdrl">1071</td> -<td class="tdrl">233</td> -<td class="tdrl br">9456</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">1st Dn. Infantry</td> -<td class="tdrl">142</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">152</td> -<td class="tdrl">5894</td> -<td class="tdrl">244</td> -<td class="tdrl">632</td> -<td class="tdrl">200</td> -<td class="tdrl">185</td> -<td class="tdrl br">7155</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">2d</td> -<td class="tdrl">143</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">23</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">8</td> -<td class="tdrl">178</td> -<td class="tdrl">4123</td> -<td class="tdrl">112</td> -<td class="tdrl">2251</td> -<td class="tdrl">474</td> -<td class="tdrl">716</td> -<td class="tdrl br">7676</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">3d</td> -<td class="tdrl">114</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">20</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">145</td> -<td class="tdrl">2741</td> -<td class="tdrl">75</td> -<td class="tdrl">1352</td> -<td class="tdrl">297</td> -<td class="tdrl">229</td> -<td class="tdrl br">4694</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">4th</td> -<td class="tdrl">102</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">15</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">129</td> -<td class="tdrl">3028</td> -<td class="tdrl">44</td> -<td class="tdrl">1700</td> -<td class="tdrl">279</td> -<td class="tdrl">201</td> -<td class="tdrl br">5252</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">5th</td> -<td class="tdrl">99</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">8</td> -<td class="tdrl">130</td> -<td class="tdrl">3277</td> -<td class="tdrl">363</td> -<td class="tdrl">1075</td> -<td class="tdrl">224</td> -<td class="tdrl">315</td> -<td class="tdrl br">5254</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">6th</td> -<td class="tdrl">101</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">19</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">124</td> -<td class="tdrl">3233</td> -<td class="tdrl">54</td> -<td class="tdrl">1223</td> -<td class="tdrl">309</td> -<td class="tdrl">103</td> -<td class="tdrl br">4922</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">7th</td> -<td class="tdrl">92</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">8</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">11</td> -<td class="tdrl">117</td> -<td class="tdrl">2738</td> -<td class="tdrl">114</td> -<td class="tdrl">1074</td> -<td class="tdrl">391</td> -<td class="tdrl">673</td> -<td class="tdrl br">4990</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Lt.</td> -<td class="tdrl">66</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">73</td> -<td class="tdrl">2469</td> -<td class="tdrl">77</td> -<td class="tdrl">696</td> -<td class="tdrl">131</td> -<td class="tdrl">146</td> -<td class="tdrl br">3519</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.</td> -<td class="tdrl">72</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">77</td> -<td class="tdrl">2496</td> -<td class="tdrl">212</td> -<td class="tdrl">312</td> -<td class="tdrl">92</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">3112</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl">TOTAL</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl bt">37639</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">1401</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">10721</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">3468</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">2801</td> -<td class="tdrl bt br">56030</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl">-------</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl pad1">PORTUGUESE.</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrl">40</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">50</td> -<td class="tdrl">958</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">73</td> -<td class="tdrl">598</td> -<td class="tdrl">16</td> -<td class="tdrl br">1650</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">2d Dn. Infantry</td> -<td class="tdrl">39</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">44</td> -<td class="tdrl">1867</td> -<td class="tdrl">71</td> -<td class="tdrl">472</td> -<td class="tdrl">101</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">2511</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">3d</td> -<td class="tdrl">58</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">71</td> -<td class="tdrl">1183</td> -<td class="tdrl">105</td> -<td class="tdrl">598</td> -<td class="tdrl">383</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">2269</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">4th</td> -<td class="tdrl">36</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">47</td> -<td class="tdrl">1585</td> -<td class="tdrl">30</td> -<td class="tdrl">635</td> -<td class="tdrl">199</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">2449</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">5th</td> -<td class="tdrl">34</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">40</td> -<td class="tdrl">1161</td> -<td class="tdrl">13</td> -<td class="tdrl">550</td> -<td class="tdrl">176</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">1900</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">6th</td> -<td class="tdrl">33</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">42</td> -<td class="tdrl">1644</td> -<td class="tdrl">44</td> -<td class="tdrl">469</td> -<td class="tdrl">151</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">2308</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">7th</td> -<td class="tdrl">33</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">38</td> -<td class="tdrl">1736</td> -<td class="tdrl">48</td> -<td class="tdrl">228</td> -<td class="tdrl">211</td> -<td class="tdrl">48</td> -<td class="tdrl br">2271</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Lt.</td> -<td class="tdrl">51</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">7</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">63</td> -<td class="tdrl">1240</td> -<td class="tdrl">54</td> -<td class="tdrl">237</td> -<td class="tdrl">394</td> -<td class="tdrl">11</td> -<td class="tdrl br">1936</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Unattached Dn.</td> -<td class="tdrl">67</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">85</td> -<td class="tdrl">3507</td> -<td class="tdrl">215</td> -<td class="tdrl">835</td> -<td class="tdrl">219</td> -<td class="tdrl">76</td> -<td class="tdrl br">4852</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">1st Brigade</td> -<td class="tdrl">64</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">72</td> -<td class="tdrl">1510</td> -<td class="tdrl">68</td> -<td class="tdrl">328</td> -<td class="tdrl">146</td> -<td class="tdrl">213</td> -<td class="tdrl br">2265</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">10th</td> -<td class="tdrl">31</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">5</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">39</td> -<td class="tdrl">1550</td> -<td class="tdrl">115</td> -<td class="tdrl">351</td> -<td class="tdrl">82</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl br">2102</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Total Portuguese</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl bt">17941</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">768</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">4776</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">2660</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">368</td> -<td class="tdrl bt br">26513</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Total British</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll tdlh">Grand Total</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<table class="p2 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2"><span class="transnote">(Part 3 of 3)</span>   KEY:</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">EA = Present.</td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">KEY:</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FA = Joined.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">EB = Sick.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FB = Dead.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">EC = Command.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FC = Discharged.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="5">ED = Total.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FD = Deserted.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FE = Transferred</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FF = Promoted.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FG = Reduced.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="6">FH = Effective Rank and File,</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td colspan="7"></td> -<td class="tdl pad1" colspan="5">Portuguese included.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="13"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl" rowspan="3">DIVISIONS.</td> -<td class="tdcl" colspan="4">HORSES.</td> -<td class="tdcl" colspan="7">ALTERATIONS.</td> -<td class="tdcl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="bl bt"></td> -<td class="tdcl bt" colspan="7">Men.</td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrl">EA</td> -<td class="tdrl">EB</td> -<td class="tdrl">EC</td> -<td class="tdrl">ED</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">FA</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">FB</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">FC</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">FD</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">FE</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">FF</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">FG</td> -<td class="tdrl br">FH</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl">BRITISH.</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrl">7289</td> -<td class="tdrl">611</td> -<td class="tdrl">602</td> -<td class="tdrl">8502</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">8144</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl">{b}</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl">{c}</td> -<td class="tdrl">{c}</td> -<td class="tdrl">{d}</td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">1st Dn. Infantry</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">6</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">10</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl br">5894</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">2d</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">11</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">4</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">5990</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl">{a}</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl">{a}</td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">3d</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl br">3924</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">4th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">4613</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl">{a}</td> -<td class="tdrl">{e}</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">5th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">17</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">4438</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">6th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">4877</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">7th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">4474</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl">{a}</td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Lt.</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl br">3709</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">2496</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl">TOTAL</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">7289</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">611</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">602</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">8502</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">5</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">24</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">..</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">6</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">33</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">4</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">6</td> -<td class="tdrl bt br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl">-------</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl pad1">PORTUGUESE.</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrl">855</td> -<td class="tdrl">114</td> -<td class="tdrl">404</td> -<td class="tdrl">1373</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">2d Dn. Infantry</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="tdrl">{e}</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">3d</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">4th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">5th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">69</td> -<td class="tdrl">3</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">2</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">6th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">7th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Lt.</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Unattached Dn.</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">3507</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">1st Brigade</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">1</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">1510</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">10th</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">.. ..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl">..</td> -<td class="tdrl br">1550</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcl">-------</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Total Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">855</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">114</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">404</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">1373</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">70</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">5</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">1</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">..</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">2</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">1</td> -<td class="tdrl bt">..</td> -<td class="tdrl bt br">..</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll">Total British</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdll tdlh">Grand Total</td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl"></td> -<td class="bl br"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bt" colspan="13"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="8">3 Men deserted 2d Line Bn. K.G.L.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="8">1 Do. ” 1st Line Do.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="8">1 Do. ” 47th Foot.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="5"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="8">1 Do. ” 4th Do.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdl tdlh" colspan="10">The Men transferred are Invalids sent home.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl tdlh pad3" colspan="13">_Note._—The figures belonging to the -grand total are wanting in the original.</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<div class="transnote"> -<p class="noindent pad6">This table has five table-note anchors indicated in this etext by {a} to {e}.<br> -They were printed as one or more asterisks in the original book;<br> -however there is no explanation of their meaning.</p> -</div> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="footnotes"> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="FOOTNOTES">FOOTNOTES:</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> Since colonel and surveyor-general of South Australia.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> The present major-general sir George Napier.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> A splendid soldier.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> A false stopping here misled me about the bridge. I made the -allies pass by ladders instead of the French.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> Since the first publication of this Letter I have learned from excellent -authority that marshal Beresford did actually in person order general -sir Colin Halket to retreat from the bridge, and rebuked him for being -slow to obey.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> I have since obtained from other sources many of those orders of -movements signed, George Murray, and addressed to the generals commanding -divisions. Had they been given to me according to the duke of -Wellington’s desire when I first commenced my Work they would have -saved me much time much expense and much labour; but I repeat that -from sir George Murray and from him only I have met with hostility. He -has not been able to hurt me but I take the will for the deed.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Above five thousand pounds.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> Since this was written Mr. Leader did put the question in the house -when sir George Murray’s conduct was strongly animadverted upon by -lord Howick and his lordship’s observations were loudly cheered. Sir -George is now publishing these maps, but they belong to the public.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> Another has appeared since but I have not read it being informed -that it was precisely like its predecessors.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[10]</a> This work has been since discontinued by lieutenant Godwin in -consequence as he told me of foul play in a high quarter where he least -expected it.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[11]</a> That very successful Spanish general and very temperate English -politician, sir De Lacy Evans, pronounces all such animadversions upon -the Spanish armies to be “<em>a most deplorable defect in a historian, and -the result of violent partialities</em>.” I dare to say the Spaniards will agree -with him.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[12]</a> This was in February.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[13]</a> Called the Extraordinary Cortez.</p> - -</div> -</div> - -<hr class="full"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs60">PUBLISHED BY</span><br> -<span class="smcap fs120 lsp2">T. and W. BOONE,</span><br> -<span class="fs60"><em>29, New Bond-Street</em>.</span><br> -</p> - -<hr class="r65"> - -<p class="center"> -COLONEL NAPIER’S<br> -HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA<br> -<span class="fs60">AND</span><br> -THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.<br> -<span class="fs80">Illustrated with numerous Plans, 6 vols. 8vo. price £6.<br> -The Third Editions, vols. 1, 2, 3, and vols. 4, 5, and 6, may be had separately, -Price 20s. each.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - -<p class="center"> -A REPLY<br> -TO LORD STRANGFORD’S “OBSERVATIONS,”<br> -<span class="fs60">ON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN -THE PENINSULA.</span><br> -BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.<br> -<span class="fs80">Second Edition, 8vo. price 1s.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -A REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,<br> -<span class="fs60">PARTICULARLY TO</span><br> -“Strictures on Colonel Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula.”<br> -<span class="fs60">TOGETHER WITH<br> -OBSERVATIONS ILLUSTRATING SIR JOHN MOORE’S CAMPAIGN.</span><br> -BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.<br> -<span class="fs80">8vo. price 2s.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -COLONEL NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS -THIRD VOLUME.<br> -<span class="fs60">FORMING</span><br> -A SEQUEL TO HIS REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,<br> -<span class="fs60">AND CONTAINING SOME NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO</span><br> -THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.<br> -<span class="fs80">8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -A LETTER<br> -TO GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,<br> -<span class="fs60">BEING AN ANSWER TO HIS LORDSHIP’S ASSUMED REFUTATION OF COLONEL -NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.</span><br> -BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.<br> -<span class="fs80">In 8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -COUNTER-REMARKS<br> -TO MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S REMARKS<br> -<span class="fs60">UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME -OF HIS HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">In 8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<em>Preparing for immediate publication.</em></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - - -<p class="center"> -LAWRENCE’S PORTRAIT<br> -<span class="fs90">OF HIS GRACE</span><br> -<span class="fs120">THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.</span><br> -Engraved the full Size of Life, for the first Time, thus giving a fac-simile of -the Features of this illustrious Hero.<br> -<span class="smcap">By F.C. LEWIS, Esq.</span><br> -<span class="fs70">FROM THE ORIGINAL DRAWING BY SIR THOMAS LAWRENCE, P.R.A.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>This very exquisite Drawing was so highly esteemed by the late Sir Thomas -Lawrence that during his life he never could be persuaded to part with it, and -from it he commenced all his pictures of the Duke. After his decease, it was -sold with his other Drawings, and the Publishers have now placed it in the hands -of Mr. <span class="smcap">F. C. Lewis</span>, to enable all the admirers of the late President to possess a -fac-simile of this very interesting Drawing of <span class="smcap">His Grace the Duke of Wellington</span>.</p> -</div> -<hr class="r10a"> -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">Prints £1 : 1. India Proofs, with Autograph £2 : 2.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs90">LONDON: PUBLISHED BY HODGSON & GRAVES, 6, PALL-MALL,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">AND</span><br> -<span class="fs80">SUBSCRIBERS’ NAMES ALSO RECEIVED BY T. AND W. BOONE,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">29, NEW BOND STREET.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">In one volume, 8vo. price 7s. boards,</span><br> -<span class="fs120">REMARKS ON MILITARY LAW</span><br> -<span class="fs60">AND</span><br> -THE PUNISHMENT OF FLOGGING.<br> -<span class="fs60">BY</span><br> -<span class="fs80">MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, K.C.B.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“Every newspaper puts forth its attacks upon Commanders of Regiments, -filled with unjust and false assertions. I have endeavoured, perhaps erroneously -and unsuccessfully, to clear the question from the rubbish with which it -has been loaded, and exhibit it to the view in its general bearings. In the -performance of this task, I am not conscious of any influence but that of the -desire to speak the truth.”—<em>Vide Preface.</em></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">In 8vo. price 2s.</span><br> -<span class="fs120"><span class="lsp2">PRUSSIA IN</span> 1833;</span><br> -ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF PRUSSIA,<br> -<span class="fs90">AND HER CIVIL INSTITUTIONS.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">Translated from the French by M. de Chambray. With an Appendix -by General de Caraman.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“We would recommend to military readers in general, and especially to the -authorities who have the destiny of the army in their hands, an attentive perusal -of this work. The public will learn from it that the army in Prussia, -hitherto supposed to be the worst paid force, is, in fact, better dealt with than -is the case ‘<em>with the best paid army in Europe</em>.’”—<cite>United Service Journal.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs120">COLONIZATION:</span><br> -<span class="fs60">PARTICULARLY</span><br> -<span class="lsp2">IN SOUTHERN AUSTRALIA,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">WITH SOME</span><br> -REMARKS ON SMALL FARMS AND OVER POPULATION,<br> -<span class="fs90 smcap">By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, K.C.B.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">Author of “The Colonies; particularly the Ionian Islands.”<br> -In one vol. 8vo. price 7s. boards.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“We earnestly recommend the book to all who feel an interest in the welfare -of the people.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">In foolscap 8vo. price 1s.</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp2">THE NURSERY GOVERNESS:</span><br> -BY ELIZABETH NAPIER.<br> -<span class="fs80"><em>Published after her Death by her Husband, Col. C. J. Napier, C.B.</em></span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“Hear the instructions of thy father, and forsake not the law of thy mother.” <em>Proverbs</em>, c. i. v. 8.<br></p> - -<p>“This is an admirable little book.”—<cite>True Sun.</cite></p> - -<p>“The excellent instructions laid down by Mrs. Napier will, we have no -doubt, prove a ‘rich legacy,’ not only to her own children, but to those in -many a nursery.”—<cite>Liverpool Chronicle.</cite></p> - -<p>“Not only the nursery governess, but the mother and daughter, especially in -the higher walks of life, may read it with advantage.”—<cite>Atlas.</cite></p> - -<p>“We are so convinced of its utility, that we would strongly recommend it -to the diligent study of every female who has the care of a family, either as -a mother or a governess.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">In Two Volumes, post 8vo. price 21s.</span><br> -ADMIRAL NAPIER’S<br> -<span class="fs120">ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN PORTUGAL,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">BETWEEN</span><br> -DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL;<br> -<span class="fs60">WITH</span><br> -<span class="fs80">PLAN OF HIS ACTIONS OFF CAPE ST. VINCENT.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“An excellent and spirit-stirring book—plain, honest, and straight-forward—the -very stuff of which the web of history alone should be composed. This is -indeed an honest, fair, and impartial history.”—<cite>Morning Chronicle.</cite></p> - -<p>“In spirit and in keeping, from beginning to end, Admiral Napier’s ‘War in -Portugal,’ is the happiest picture we could conceive of the hero of the battle off -Cape St. Vincent—its especial excellence consisting in a regardless bluntness of -manner and language that is quite admirable and delightful.”—<cite>Monthly Review.</cite></p> - -<p>“It is Cæsar’s Commentaries in the first person.”—<cite>Spectator.</cite></p> - -<p>“Candid to a degree, and sincere as a sailor’s will. This is the very stuff -of which history should be composed.”—<cite>Bell’s Messenger.</cite></p> - -<p>“If Admiral Napier be not distinguished by the common-place facilities of -authorship, he possesses the higher qualities of truth, discretion, and clear-sightedness, -in no slight degree.”—<cite>Atlas.</cite></p> - -<p>“In speaking of himself and his deeds, he has hit the just and difficult medium—shewing -his real feelings, yet steering clear of affected modesty on the -one hand, and of overweening modesty on the other.”—<cite>Tait’s Magazine.</cite></p> - -<p>“This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant author -figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of Napier.”—<cite>News.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80"><span class="smcap">The Second Edition</span> of</span><br> -<span class="fs120">ADVENTURES IN THE RIFLE BRIGADE</span><br> -<span class="fs60">IN THE</span><br> -<span class="fs100 lsp">PENINSULA, FRANCE, AND THE NETHERLANDS,</span><br> -<span class="fs90">From the Year 1809 to 1815.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">By CAPTAIN JOHN KINCAID, <span class="smcap">First Battalion</span>.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">One vol. post 8vo. price 10s. 6d. boards.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“An admirable little book.”—<cite>Quarterly Review.</cite></p> - -<p>“To those who are unacquainted with John Kincaid of the Rifles,—and few, -we trow, of the old Peninsula bands are in this ignorant predicament, and to -those who know him, we equally recommend the perusal of his book: it is a -fac-simile of the man,—a perfect reflection of his image, <i lang="la">veluti in speculo</i>. A -capital soldier, a pithy and graphic narrator, and a fellow of infinite jest. Captain -Kincaid has given us, in this modest volume, the impress of his qualities, -the <i lang="fr">beau ideal</i> of a thorough-going Soldier of Service, and the faithful and witty -history of some six years’ honest and triumphant fighting.</p> - -<p>“There is nothing extant in a Soldier’s Journal, which, with so little pretension, -paints with such truth and raciness the ‘domestic economy’ of campaigning, -and the downright business of handling the enemy.</p> - -<p>“But we cannot follow further;—recommending every one of our readers to -pursue the Author himself to his crowning scene of Waterloo, where they will -find him as quaint and original as at his <i lang="fr">debut</i>. We assure them, it is not possible, -by isolated extracts, to give a suitable impression of the spirit and -originality which never flag from beginning to end of Captain Kincaid’s volume; -in every page of which he throws out flashes of native humour, a tithe of which -would make the fortune of a Grub-street Bookmaker.”—<cite>United Service Journal.</cite></p> - -<p>“His book has one fault, the rarest fault in books, it is too short.”—<cite>Monthly Magazine, April.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="r30a"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">Also, by the same Author, in one vol. post 8vo. price 10s. 6d.</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp2">RANDOM SHOTS</span><br> -<span class="fs80">FROM A RIFLEMAN.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“It is one of the most pithy, witty, soldier-like, and pleasant books in -existence.”—<cite>United Service Journal.</cite></p> - -<p>“The present volume is to the full as pleasant, and what is still more strange, -as <em>original</em> as the last. Criticism would become a sinecure if many such volumes -were written: all left for us is to admire and recommend.”—<cite>New Monthly Magazine.</cite></p> - -<p>“The present volume is likely to add to his reputation. It is a useful -appendix to the larger works of Napier and other military commentators. It -is never dull, tedious, technical, or intricate.”—<cite>Times.</cite></p> - -<p>“Those who have read Captain Kincaid’s Adventures in the Rifle Brigade -will seize this volume with avidity, and having dashed through it, will lay it -down with only one feeling of regret—that it is not longer.”—<cite>News.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">In post 8vo. price 5s.</span><br> -<span class="fs120">RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS</span><br> -<span class="fs60">RELATIVE TO THE<br> -DUTIES OF TROOPS COMPOSING THE ADVANCED CORPS OF THE ARMY,</span><br> -<span class="smcap">By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL I. LEACH, C.B.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">Late of the Rifle Brigade.<br> -Author of “Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier.”</span></p> -<hr class="r30a"> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">Also, by the same Author,</span><br> -<span class="lsp2">A SKETCH OF THE</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp2">SERVICES OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">FROM ITS FORMATION TO THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">In 8vo. price 2s. 6d. boards.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -MEMOIR BY<br> -<span class="fs120">GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, <span class="smcap">Bart.</span></span><br> -<span class="fs60">OF HIS<br> -PROCEEDINGS AS CONNECTED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN,<br> -AND THE</span><br> -COMMENCEMENT OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.<br> -<span class="fs80">In one vol. post 8vo. price 9s. boards.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“The care bestowed upon this subject by Sir Hew Dalrymple is evident -in the publication before us, which is unquestionably the most dignified, -clear, and satisfactory vindication of Sir Hew’s motives and conduct, and -forms, with the documents in the Appendix, a very valuable and authentic -addition to the materials for the history of the period in question. Without a -participation in the facts it discloses, the records of the war, as far as regards -this particular subject, are, in fact, incomplete or distorted.”—<cite>United Service -Journal.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs120">SKETCHES IN SPAIN,</span><br> -<span class="fs90">DURING THE YEARS <span class="fs90 smcap">1829-30-31 and 32;</span></span><br> -<span class="fs60">CONTAINING NOTICES OF SOME DISTRICTS VERY LITTLE KNOWN;<br> -OF THE MANNERS OF THE PEOPLE, GOVERNMENT, RECENT CHANGE,<br> -COMMERCE, NATURAL HISTORY, AND FINE ARTS;</span><br> -<span class="fs80"><em>With Lives of Spanish Painters</em>.</span><br> -<span class="fs90">BY CAPTAIN S. E. COOK, R.N., K.T.S., F.G.S.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">Two volumes, 8vo. price 21s.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>This work contains a very full account of the present seat of War in Spain.</p> - -<p>“Volumes of great value and attraction: we would say, in a word, they -afford us the most complete account of Spain in every respect which has issued -from the press.”—<cite>Literary Gazette.</cite></p> - -<p>“The value of the book is in its matter and its facts. If written upon any -country it would have been useful, but treating of one like Spain, about which -we know almost nothing, but of which it is desirable to know so much, Captain -Cook’s Sketches must be considered an acquisition to the library.”—<cite>Spectator.</cite></p> - -<p>“These volumes comprise every point worthy of notice, and the whole is so interspersed -with lively adventure and description; so imbued with a kindly spirit -of good nature, courting and acknowledging attention, as to render it attractive -reading.”—<cite>United Service Gazette.</cite></p> - -<p>“No one could either pretend to write or converse upon this subject without -preparing himself by a previous perusal of this instructive work.”—<cite>Metropolitan.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs60">AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF</span><br> -<span class="fs120">MILITARY BRIDGES,</span><br> -<span class="fs90"><em>And the Passage of Rivers in Military Operations</em>.</span><br> -<span class="fs90">BY GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART. K.S.C. &c. &c.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">The Second Edition, containing much additional Matter and Plates,<br> -8vo. price 20s. boards.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“Of this valuable work we expressed a very high opinion when it was first -published; and now that the able author has added much important new matter -to it, we need only say that it is worthy of his own high reputation as a tactician -and Military Engineer; and that no soldier in Europe can know his -business thoroughly without consulting it.”—<cite>Literary Gazette.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs120">THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN LEGION,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">FROM THE PERIOD OF ITS ORGANIZATION IN 1803, TO THAT OF ITS<br> -DISSOLUTION IN 1816.</span><br> -<span class="fs70"><em>Compiled from Manuscript Documents.</em></span><br> -<span class="fs90 smcap">By N. LUDLOW BEAMISH, Esq. F.R.S late Major unattached</span>.<br> -<span class="fs80">Two Vols. 8vo. complete, with Plans and Coloured Plates of Costumes, -price £1 10s.<br> -The second volume sold separately, price 10s.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“The work is not like others we could name—a mere compilation from newspapers -and magazines. Major Beamish has left no source of information unexplored; -and the access he obtained to manuscript journals has enabled him to -intersperse his general narrative with interesting personal anecdotes, that render -this volume as delightful for those who read for amusement, as those who read -for profit.”—<cite>Athenæum.</cite></p> - -<p>“We are altogether much pleased with the volume, and heartily recommend -it to the British public.”—<cite>Literary Gazette.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">Elegantly bound in the Uniform of the Regiment, 1 vol. post 8vo. price 10s. 6d.</span><br> -THE ADVENTURES OF<br> -<span class="fs120 lsp">MAJOR JOHN PATTERSON,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">(AUTHOR OF “CAMP AND QUARTERS,”)</span><br> -<span class="fs80"><em>With Notices of the Officers, &c. of the 50th, or Queen’s Own Regiment</em>.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">FROM 1807 TO 1821.</span><br> -<span class="fs60">DEDICATED BY PERMISSION TO QUEEN ADELAIDE.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“This volume contains a well-written, yet unvarnished narrative, of the adventures -of the 50th foot, (better known as the ‘Dirty Half-hundred,’ from their -black facings,’) during the Peninsular war. It argues well for the bravery, as -well as modesty, of Major Patterson, that throughout his work we have but -little of himself, and much of his brother-officers.”—<cite>Bell’s Messenger.</cite></p> - -<p>“Major Patterson’s Adventures are the record of a brave soldier—of a -dashing, high-minded British officer, who never fears a rival, and never knew -what it was to have an enemy, or to hate any man. His descriptions are remarkable -for their vividness and accuracy, and his anecdotes will bear repetition -once a week for life.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p> - -<p>“Major Patterson is one of the pleasantest of the numerous tribe of gallant -officers who has done so much credit to the British name, by fighting and writing -with equal spirit.”—<cite>Constitutional.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">In One Volume, post 8vo. price 10s. 6d. boards,</span><br> -<span class="fs90">NARRATIVE OF</span><br> -<span class="fs120">EVENTS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE,</span><br> -<span class="fs80"><em>AND OF THE ATTACK ON NEW ORLEANS IN 1814 AND 1815</em>.</span><br> -<span class="fs80"><span class="smcap">By</span> MAJOR I. H. COOKE, 43d Regiment.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“This clever and fearless account of the attack on New Orleans is penned -by one of the ‘occupation;’ whose soldier-like view and keen observation -during the period of the stirring events he so well relates, has enabled him to -bring before the public the ablest account that has yet been given of that -ill-fated and disgraceful expedition, and also to rescue the troops who were -employed on it from those degrading reflections which have hitherto unjustly -been insinuated against them.”—<cite>Gentleman’s Magazine.</cite></p> - -<p>“We wish earnestly to call the attention of military men to the campaign -before New Orleans. It is fraught with a fearful interest, and fixes upon the -mind reflections of almost every hue. Major Cooke’s relation is vivid; every -evolution is made as clear to the eye as if we had been present, and the remarks, -we think, are eminently judicious. The book must be generally read,” &c.—<cite>Metropolitan.</cite></p> - -<p>“It is full of good feeling, and it abounds with sketches of the service.”—<cite>Sunday Herald.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs120">A TREATISE ON THE GAME OF WHIST;</span><br> -<span class="fs60">BY THE LATE</span><br> -ADMIRAL CHARLES BURNEY,<br> -<span class="fs80">Author of “Voyages and Discoveries in the Pacific,” &c.<br> -Second Edition. 18mo. price 2s.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“The kind of play recommended in this Treatise is on the most plain, and -what the Author considers the most safe principles. I have limited my endeavours -to the most necessary instructions, classing them as much as the subject -enabled me, under separate heads, to facilitate their being rightly comprehended -and easily remembered. For the greater encouragement of the learner, I have -studied brevity; but not in a degree to have prevented my endeavouring more -to make the principles of the game, and the rationality of them intelligible, -than to furnish a young player with a set of rules to get by rote, that he might -go blindly right.”</p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">One vol. post 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 5s. Only 250 copies printed.</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp">THE TOUR</span><br> -<span class="fs90">OF THE FRENCH TRAVELLER,</span><br> -M. DE LA BOULLAYE LE GOUZ, <span class="smcap">in IRELAND, a.d. 1644.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">Edited by T. CROFTON CROKER,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS, CONTRIBUTED BY</span></p> - -<p class="fs80 pad8 noindent"> -<span class="smcap">James Roche</span>, Esq. of Cork.<br> -The Rev. <span class="smcap">Francis Mahony</span>.<br> -<span class="smcap">Thos. Wright</span>, Esq. B.A. Trin. Coll. Camb.<br> -And the <span class="smcap">Editor</span>.</p> - -<div class="poetry-container"> -<div class="poetry"> - <div class="stanza antiqua"> - <div class="verse indentq">“To treate of Ireland’s toile </div> - <div class="verse indent2">And tell the troubles now,</div> - <div class="verse indent0">And paint you out in prose or vers</div> - <div class="verse indent2">The Countries sorowe thorowe.</div> - </div> - <div class="stanza"> - <div class="verse antiqua indentq">“The greef so common is</div> - <div class="verse antiqua indent2">That each one bears a peece,</div> - <div class="verse antiqua indent0">And God he knows who licks the fatte</div> - <div class="verse antiqua indent2">And shears awaie the flece.”</div> - <div class="verse indent10"><span class="smcap">Churchyard’s</span> <cite>Unquietnes of Ireland</cite>, 1579.</div> - </div> -</div> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">VOYAGE PITTORESQUE ET ARCHEOLOGIQUE</span><br> -<span class="fs60">DANS</span><br> -<span class="fs120">LA PROVINCE D’YUCATAN</span><br> -<span class="fs60">(AMERIQUE CENTRALE),</span><br> -<span class="lsp2">PENDANT LES ANNEES 1834 ET 1836,</span><br> -<span class="fs80">PAR FREDERIC DE WALDECK,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">DEDIE<br> -A LA MEMOIRE DU VICOMTE KINGSBOROUGH.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<p class="fs80 pad6">Priz de l’ouvrage, grand en folio, figures noires <span class="pad8">£5.</span><br> -<span class="pad2">”</span><span class="pad3">”</span><span class="pad5">coloriées, sous la direction de l’auteur       £6 : 6.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<p class="pfs60">LISTE DES PLANCHES QUI SERONT CONTENUES DANS LE VOLUME:</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">Pl. 1.</td> -<td class="tdl wd40">Carte générale de l’Yucatan avec Walis.</td> -<td class="tdr">Pl. 12.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Plan du grand carré des 4 temples.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">2.</td> -<td class="tdl">Costume des femmes de Campêche.</td> -<td class="tdr">13.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Façade du temple aux deux serpents.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">3.</td> -<td class="tdl">Costume des soldats de la milice.</td> -<td class="tdr">14.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Façade du temple aux asterismes.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">4.</td> -<td class="tdl">Costume des Mestices de Mérida.</td> -<td class="tdr">15.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Façade du temple du soleil.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">5.</td> -<td class="tdl">Indien contrebandier de l’intérieur.</td> -<td class="tdr">16.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Etude d’une partie du temple du soleil.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">6.</td> -<td class="tdl">Manière de voyager dans l’Yucatan.</td> -<td class="tdr">17.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Etude d’une partie du templenaux asterismes.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">7.</td> -<td class="tdl">Costume de majordome des fermes.</td> -<td class="tdr">18.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Planche de détails de l’édifice aux deux serpents.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">8.</td> -<td class="tdl">Carte et plan d’une partie des ruines d’Ytzalane.</td> -<td class="tdr">19.</td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="3">Ces trois planches sont des terres cuites trouvées - dans les ruines de l’antique ville de Tulhà ou - Ocozingo à 32 lieues des ruines de Palenqué.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">9.</td> -<td class="tdl">Plan de la pyramide de Kingsborough.</td> -<td class="tdr">20.</td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">10.</td> -<td class="tdl">Elévation de la pyramide de Kingsborough.</td> -<td class="tdr">21.</td> -<td class="tdl">{</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt">11.</td> -<td class="tdl">Etude d’une partie de cet édifice, coupe des pierres.</td> -<td class="tdr">22.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Bas relief Astronomique des ruines de Palenqué.</td> -</tr> -</table> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">BAMPTON LECTURES.—One volume 8vo. price 15s.</span><br> -<span class="fs120">THE ANALOGY OF REVELATION AND SCIENCE,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">ESTABLISHED IN A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY -OF OXFORD, IN THE YEAR 1833.</span><br> -<span class="fs80"><em>On the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton.</em></span><br> -<span class="fs90">BY FREDERICK NOLAN, LL.D. F.R.S.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">Vicar of Prittlewell, Essex, and formerly Student <ins class="corr" id="tn-cat" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'of Exter College'"> -of Exeter College</ins>, Oxford.</span><br> -<span class="fs60">ALSO, ALL THE OTHER WORKS OF THE SAME AUTHOR.</span></p> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs60">IN CONTINUATION OF THE CATHEDRAL ANTIQUITIES OF ENGLAND.</span><br> -<span class="fs80">THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp2">CARLISLE CATHEDRAL,</span><br> -<span class="fs80">BY ROBERT WILLIAM BILLINGS,</span><br> -<span class="fs60"><em>Author of the Illustrations of the Temple Church, London</em>.</span></p> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>This work is printed uniform with Britton’s Cathedral Antiquities of England, -and contains Forty-five Engravings of Plans, Elevations, Sections, Details, and -Perspective Views; with an Historical and Architectural Account.</p> - -<p>In illustrating Carlisle Cathedral, the aim has been to give such a series of -careful measurements and details, that any portion, or the whole building, -might be completely restored in the event of accident or decay.</p> - -<p>The historical and descriptive letter-press will be presented <i lang="la">gratis</i>.</p> -</div> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">PRICE,</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Medium Quarto</td> -<td class="tdl">Three Guineas.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Imperial Quarto, limited to 115 copies</td> -<td class="tdl">Four Guineas and a Half.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Imperial Quarto, with Proofs of the Plates on</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">India Paper, limited to Ten Copies</td> -<td class="tdl">Seven Guineas and a Half.</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>It is the intention of the Proprietors to publish the remaining Cathedrals in -the same manner, viz. Chester, Chichester, Ely, Lincoln, Manchester, Rippon, -and Rochester.</p> - -<p><em>Durham</em> will be proceeded with immediately, to which Subscribers’ names -are respectfully solicited.</p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">Just published, uniformly with Britton’s Cathedrals,</span><br> -<span class="fs80">ARCHITECTURAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp2">THE TEMPLE CHURCH, LONDON;</span><br> -<span class="fs60">DRAWN AND ENGRAVED BY</span><br> -<span class="fs80">ROBERT WILLIAM BILLINGS,</span><br> -<span class="fs60"><em>Associate of the Institute of British Architects</em>.</span></p> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>This work contains Thirty-one Engravings, principally in Outline, embracing -Plans, Elevations, Sections, Details, and perspective Views of this interesting -Church; also a short historical and descriptive Account: and an Essay on the -Symbolic Evidences of the Temple Church, by <span class="smcap">Edward Clarkson</span>, Esq.</p> - -<p>Price Two Guineas in Medium Quarto, and Three Guineas Imperial Quarto.</p> -</div> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“Thirty-one plates illustrate this volume, the first that has ever attempted to -do justice to one of the most interesting ecclesiastical structures in the metropolis -or the country. They reflect great credit on Mr. Billings’ perseverance and -skill; and the whole is a welcome contribution to the antiquarian and architectural -library.”—<cite>Lit. Gaz.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">Just published,</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp2">WILL PAPERS,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">(TO BE USED AFTER THE 31ST OF DECEMBER, 1837,)</span></p> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>Being Papers on which Testators may write their Wills as on common writing-paper, -but containing printed Marginal Directions for the due execution of -Wills under the new Statute. To be had of two sizes. Large size, price 4<em>d.</em> -Small ditto, 2<em>d.</em> Also, <span class="smcap">Codicil Papers</span>, of the same description.</p> - -<p>“This is an excellent form for testators, and will save an infinity of manuscript. It -also furnishes whatever legal advice or reference may be necessary, and is of equal -service indeed to the solicitor as his client.”—<cite>Conservative Journal.</cite></p> - -<p>“So simple and plain are they that any person may make his own Will, without -either the expense or the delay of professional assistance.”—<cite>Weekly Chronicle.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">The Fourth Edition, 18mo. price 1s.</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp">HINTS TO THE CHARITABLE,</span><br> -<span class="fs90">Being Practical Observations on the proper Distribution of Private Charity.</span><br> -<span class="fs90">BY THE HON. AND REV. S. G. OSBORNE.</span><br> -<span class="fs60">CONTAINING LETTERS ON</span></p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">The “Coal Fund,”</td> -<td class="tdl">The “Benefit Society,”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">The “Wife’s Society,”</td> -<td class="tdl">The “Loan Fund,”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">The “Penny Club,”</td> -<td class="tdl">The “Children’s Benevolent Society,” &c.</td> -</tr> -</table> -<hr class="r10a"> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“It is impossible that this plain, familiar, and engaging exposition (price, -a trifle), will not be generally sought after, and earnestly perused, the moment -that some of its excellencies and contents are understood.”—<cite>Monthly Review.</cite></p> - -<p>“This little work is addressed to those beneficent spirits who delight in doing -good, and who, in accordance with true Christian feelings, wish to see mankind -happy. Its principal aim is to promote economy and industry among the poorer -classes, and show how they can be made comfortable with very little. We would -like to see the plans of the benevolent author carried into effect in every village -of Great Britain. We hope all those who look with eyes of Christian feeling on -the miseries of their fellow-creatures will carefully look over the plans laid down -in this little volume. How much good can be done with a little rightly bestowed!”—<cite>Polyglot -Mag. Sept. 1, 1838.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">By the same Author, the Third Edition, 18mo. price 1s.</span><br> -<span class="fs120 lsp">HINTS FOR THE AMELIORATION</span><br> -<span class="fs80">OF THE MORAL CONDITION OF</span><br> -<span class="fs100 lsp">A VILLAGE POPULATION.</span><br> -<span class="fs60">CONTAINING CHAPTERS</span></p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl wd35">1 & 2 Introductory.</td> -<td class="tdl wd35">5 The Tradesman.</td> -<td class="tdl">7 The Labourer.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3"> 3 The Squire.</td> -<td class="tdl">6 Keepers of the</td> -<td class="tdl">8 Female Service.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3"> 4 The Farmer.</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">Public Houses.</td> -<td class="tdl">9 Education.</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<div class="blockquotx"> - -<p>“The following pages contain, with some few alterations and additions, the -substance of a series of Letters, published in a local periodical, under the signature -of “Pastor.” Believing as I do, that there are few rural parishes that -have not within them the elements of sound Moral Government, I am induced -to give these “Hints” the chance of a more general circulation; in the hope -that they may be useful, in exciting some of those who may have the opportunity, -to the importance of aiding the moral amelioration of their neighbourhood, both -by personal example and a judicious exercise of personal effort.”—<cite>Preface.</cite></p> -</div> -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<p class="center"> -<span class="fs80">Also, by the same author,</span><br> -<span class="fs120">A HAND-BILL FOR THE COTTAGE WALL,</span><br> -<span class="fs60">CONTAINING</span><br> -<span class="fs90">“ABOUT GOD AND YOUR SOUL,”<br> -“HOW TO MAKE THE BEST OF YOUR SITUATION IN LIFE,”<br> -“A WORD ABOUT HEALTH.”</span><br> -<span class="fs80">On one large sheet, containing five Wood Engravings, price Threepence each, -or 20s. per 100.</span></p> - -<hr class="fulla"> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="p4 transnote" id="TN"> -<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p> - -<p>Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been -corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within -the text and consultation of external sources.</p> - -<p>Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, -when a predominant preference was found in the original book.</p> - -<p>Some occurrences of upper-case titles (such as Lord, Sir, Colonel) -have been made lower-case for consistency.</p> - -<p>The names d’España and d’Amarante have been changed to D’España -and D’Amarante, for consistency.</p> - -<p>In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, -incorrect grammar, spelling and accents have been left unchanged.</p> - -<p>The table at the end of the original book (<a href="#No_X">page 710</a>) was very large, -about 240 characters in width. For this etext it has been split into -three parts. The second column ‘DIVISIONS’ has been replicated in each -part, for readability.</p> - -<p>This table has five table-note anchors indicated in this etext by {a} -to {e}. They were printed as one or more asterisks in the original -book; however there is no explanation of their meaning.</p> - -<p>Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, -and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.</p> - -<p> -<a href="#tn-toc">TOC:</a> ‘hemns the allies’ replaced by ‘hems the allies’.<br> -<a href="#tn-xi">Pg xi:</a> ‘citadel of Ciuded’ replaced by ‘citadel of Ciudad’.<br> -<a href="#tn-xxiv">Pg xxiv:</a> ‘mistate facts for’ replaced by ‘misstate facts for’.<br> -<a href="#tn-xxix">Pg xxix:</a> ‘twice over, tbat’ replaced by ‘twice over, that’.<br> -<a href="#tn-xxxiv">Pg xxxiv:</a> ‘ever acuated me’ replaced by ‘ever actuated me’.<br> -<a href="#tn-xli">Pg xli:</a> ‘Medium estimate’ replaced by ‘Median estimate’.<br> -<a href="#tn-lxvii">Pg lxvii:</a> ‘the Portuguse treat’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese treat’.<br> -<a href="#tn-lxxx">Pg lxxx:</a> ‘witten expressly’ replaced by ‘written expressly’.<br> -<a href="#tn-11">Pg 11:</a> ‘neigbourhood of Reus’ replaced by ‘neighbourhood of Reus’.<br> -<a href="#tn-49">Pg 49:</a> ‘also run upon’ replaced by ‘also ran upon’.<br> -<a href="#tn-74">Pg 74:</a> ‘his way p from’ replaced by ‘his way up from’.<br> -<a href="#tn-93">Pg 93:</a> ‘all amountaineers’ replaced by ‘all mountaineers’.<br> -<a href="#tn-141">Pg 141:</a> ‘some hishonour’ replaced by ‘some dishonour’.<br> -<a href="#tn-143">Pg 143:</a> ‘to whse corps’ replaced by ‘to whose corps’.<br> -<a href="#tn-247">Pg 247:</a> ‘frequent scouring’ replaced by ‘frequent scouting’.<br> -<a href="#tn-254">Pg 254:</a> ‘between the brige’ replaced by ‘between the bridge’.<br> -<a href="#tn-279">Pg 279:</a> ‘he must revitual’ replaced by ‘he must revictual’.<br> -<a href="#tn-289">Pg 289:</a> ‘the two outwarks’ replaced by ‘the two outworks’.<br> -<a href="#tn-289a">Pg 289:</a> ‘forseeing that the’ replaced by ‘foreseeing that the’.<br> -<a href="#tn-293">Pg 293:</a> ‘letter to España’ replaced by ‘letter to D’España’.<br> -<a href="#tn-294">Pg 294:</a> ‘enforced by España’ replaced by ‘enforced by D’España’.<br> -<a href="#tn-319">Pg 319:</a> (Sidenote) ‘minis- of war’ replaced by ‘minister of war’.<br> -<a href="#tn-351">Pg 351:</a> ‘took possesion of’ replaced by ‘took possession of’.<br> -<a href="#tn-394">Pg 394:</a> (Sidenote) ‘See plan.’ replaced by ‘See Plan 8.’.<br> -<a href="#tn-417">Pg 417:</a> ‘Carlos D’Españo’ replaced by ‘Carlos D’España’.<br> -<a href="#tn-449">Pg 449:</a> ‘the Lepsic battle’ replaced by ‘the Leipsic battle’.<br> -<a href="#tn-456">Pg 456:</a> ‘of his genins’ replaced by ‘of his genius’.<br> -<a href="#tn-483">Pg 483:</a> ‘way ot Madrid’ replaced by ‘way to Madrid’.<br> -<a href="#tn-531">Pg 531:</a> (Sidenote) ‘See Plan.’ replaced by ‘See Plan 9.’.<br> -<a href="#tn-549">Pg 549:</a> ‘current run so’ replaced by ‘current ran so’.<br> -<a href="#tn-584">Pg 584:</a> ‘to develope his’ replaced by ‘to develop his’.<br> -<a href="#tn-588">Pg 588:</a> ‘by sedidions and’ replaced by ‘by seditions and’.<br> -<a href="#tn-607">Pg 607:</a> ‘Aire and Barcelone’ replaced by ‘Aire and Barcelona’.<br> -<a href="#tn-635">Pg 635:</a> ‘was not be forded’ replaced by ‘was not to be forded’.<br> -<a href="#tn-669">Pg 669:</a> ‘Carlos D’Espagne’ replaced by ‘Carlos D’España’.<br> -<a href="#tn-686">Pg 686:</a> ‘surpassed a mankind’ replaced by ‘surpassed all mankind’.<br> -<a href="#tn-709">Pg 709:</a> ‘dismountned’ replaced by ‘dismounted’.<br> -<a href="#tn-cat">Catalog:</a> ‘of Exter College’ replaced by ‘of Exeter College’.<br> -</p> -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE: FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 6 (OF 6) ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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