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diff --git a/old/69964-0.txt b/old/69964-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 7deaca8..0000000 --- a/old/69964-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26830 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the war in the Peninsula -and in the south of France: from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 6 -(of 6), by William Francis Patrick Napier - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France: - from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 6 (of 6) - -Author: William Francis Patrick Napier - -Release Date: February 6, 2023 [eBook #69964] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE: FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 6 (OF 6) *** - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example nov^r or 28^{th}. - - Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been - placed at the end of the book. - - This is volume 6 of 6. Similar to volumes 4 and 5, this volume had a - date (Year. Month) as a margin header on most pages. This information - about the chronology of the narrative has been preserved as a Sidenote - to the relevant paragraph on that page, whenever the header date - changed. - - The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. - - With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings - of names have not been changed. - - Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - Volume 1 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318 - Volume 2 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554 - Volume 3 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68187 - Volume 4 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68536 - Volume 5 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/69220 - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND IN THE - - SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. - - - BY - - W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. - - _COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH - ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES._ - - VOL. VI. - - - PREFIXED TO WHICH ARE - SEVERAL JUSTIFICATORY PIECES - - IN REPLY TO - COLONEL GURWOOD, MR. ALISON, SIR WALTER SCOTT, - LORD BERESFORD, AND THE QUARTERLY REVIEW. - - - LONDON: - THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. - - MDCCCXL. - - - - - LONDON: - - MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS. - - - Notice and Justification, &c., &c. Page i - - - BOOK XXI. - - - CHAPTER I. - - Lord Wellington blockades Pampeluna, besieges St. - Sebastian—Operations on the eastern coast of Spain—General Elio’s - misconduct—Sir John Murray sails to attack Taragona—Colonel Prevot - takes St. Felippe de Balaguer—Second siege of Taragona—Suchet and - Maurice Mathieu endeavour to relieve the place—Sir John Murray - raises the siege—Embarks with the loss of his guns—Disembarks again - at St. Felippe de Balaguer—Lord William Bentinck arrives—Sir John - Murray’s trial—Observations Page 1 - - - CHAP. II. - - Danger of Sicily—Averted by Murat’s secret defection from the - emperor—Lord William Bentinck re-embarks—His design of attacking - the city of Valencia frustrated—Del Parque is defeated on the - Xucar—The Anglo-Sicilians disembark at Alicant—Suchet prepares to - attack the allies—Prevented by the battle of Vittoria—Abandons - Valencia—Marches towards Zaragoza—Clauzel retreats to - France—Paris evacuates Zaragoza—Suchet retires to Taragona—Mines - the walls—Lord William Bentinck passes the Ebro—Secures the - Col de Balaguer—Invests Taragona—Partial insurrection in - Upper Catalonia—Combat of Salud—Del Parque joins lord William - Bentinck who projects an attack upon Suchet’s cantonments—Suchet - concentrates his army—Is joined by Decaen—Advances—The allies - retreat to the mountains—Del Parque invests Tortoza—His rear-guard - attacked by the garrison while passing the Ebro—Suchet blows up the - walls of Taragona—Lord William desires to besiege Tortoza—Hears - that Suchet has detached troops—Sends Del Parque’s army to join - lord Wellington—Advances to Villa Franca—Combat of Ordal—The allies - retreat—Lord Frederick Bentinck fights with the French general - Myers and wounds him—Lord William returns to Sicily—Observations 33 - - - CHAP. III. - - Siege of Sebastian—Convent of Bartolomeo stormed—Assault on the - place fails—Causes thereof—Siege turned into a blockade, and the - guns embarked at Passages—French make a successful sally 65 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Soult appointed the emperor’s lieutenant—Arrives at Bayonne—Joseph - goes to Paris—Sketch of Napoleon’s political and military - situation—His greatness of mind—Soult’s activity—Theatre of - operations described—Soult resolves to succour Pampeluna—Relative - positions and numbers of the contending armies described 86 - - - CHAP. V. - - Soult attacks the right of the allies—Combat of Roncesvalles—Combat - of Linzoain—Count D’Erlon attacks the allies’ right centre—Combat - of Maya—General Hill takes a position at Irueta—General Picton - and Cole retreat down the Val de Zubiri—They turn at Huarte and - offer battle—Lord Wellington arrives—Combat of the 27th—First - battle of Sauroren—Various movements—D’Erlon joins Soult who - attacks general Hill—Second battle of Sauroren—Foy is cut off - from the main army—Night march of the light division—Soult - retreats—Combat of Doña Maria—Dangerous position of the - French at San Estevan—Soult marches down the Bidassoa—Forced - march of the light division—Terrible scene near the bridge of - Yanzi—Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly—Narrow escape of lord - Wellington—Observations 109 - - - BOOK XXII. - - CHAP. I. - - New positions of the armies—Lord Melville’s mismanagement of the - naval co-operation—Siege of St. Sebastian—Progress of the second - attack 179 - - - CHAP. II. - - Storming of St. Sebastian—Lord Wellington calls for volunteers - from the first fourth and light divisions—The place is - assaulted and taken—The town burned—The castle is bombarded and - surrenders—Observations 197 - - - CHAP. III. - - Soult’s views and positions during the siege described—He - endeavours to succour the place—Attacks lord Wellington—Combats - of San Marcial and Vera—The French are repulsed the same day that - San Sebastian is stormed—Soult resolves to adopt a defensive - system—Observations 218 - - - CHAP. IV. - - The duke of Berri proposes to invade France promising the aid - of twenty thousand insurgents—Lord Wellington’s views on this - subject—His personal acrimony against Napoleon—That monarch’s - policy and character defended—Dangerous state of affairs in - Catalonia—Lord Wellington designs to go there himself, but at - the desire of the allied sovereigns and the English government - resolves to establish a part of his army in France—His plans - retarded by accidents and bad weather—Soult unable to divine his - project—Passage of the Bidassoa—Second combat of Vera—Colonel - Colborne’s great presence of mind—Gallant action of lieutenant - Havelock—The French lose the redoubt of Sarre and abandon the - great Rhune—Observations 239 - - - CHAP. V. - - Soult retakes the redoubt of Sarre—Wellington organizes the army in - three great divisions under sir Rowland Hill, marshal Beresford, - and sir John Hope—Disinterested conduct of the last-named - officer—Soult’s immense entrenchments described—His correspondence - with Suchet—Proposes to retake the offensive and unite their armies - in Aragon—Suchet will not accede to his views and makes inaccurate - statements—Lord Wellington, hearing of advantages gained by the - allied sovereigns in Germany, resolves to invade France—Blockade - and fall of Pampeluna—Lord Wellington organizes a brigade under - lord Aylmer to besiege Santona, but afterwards changes his design 271 - - - CHAP. VI. - - Political state of Portugal—Violence, ingratitude, and folly of - the government of that country—Political state of Spain—Various - factions described, their violence, insolence, and folly—Scandalous - scenes at Cadiz—Several Spanish generals desire a revolution—Lord - Wellington describes the miserable state of the country—Anticipates - the necessity of putting down the Cortez by force—Resigns his - command of the Spanish armies—The English ministers propose to - remove him to Germany—The new Cortez reinstate him as generalissimo - on his own terms—He expresses his fears that the cause will finally - fail and advises the English ministers to withdraw the British army 295 - - - BOOK XXIII. - - CHAP. I. - - War in the south of France—Soult’s political - difficulties—Privations of the allied troops—Lord Wellington - appeals to their military honour with effect—Averse to offensive - operations, but when Napoleon’s disasters in Germany became - known, again yields to the wishes of the allied sovereigns—His - dispositions of attack retarded—They are described—Battle of the - Nivelle—Observations—Deaths and characters of Mr. Edward Freer and - colonel Thomas Lloyd 326 - - - CHAP. II. - - Soult occupies the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and the line of - the Nive river—Lord Wellington unable to pursue his victory - from the state of the roads—Bridge-head of Cambo abandoned by - the French—Excesses of the Spanish troops—Lord Wellington’s - indignation—He sends them back to Spain—Various skirmishes in front - of Bayonne—The generals J. Wilson and Vandeleur are wounded—Mina - plunders the Val de Baygorry—Is beaten by the national - guards—Passage of the Nive and battles in front of Bayonne—Combat - of the 10th—Combat of the 11th—Combat of the 12th—Battle of St. - Pierre—Observations 363 - - - CHAP. III. - - Respective situations and views of lord Wellington and - Soult—Partizan warfare—The Basques of the Val de Baygorry excited - to arms by the excesses of Mina’s troops—General Harispe takes - the command of the insurgents—Clauzel advances beyond the Bidouze - river—General movements—Partizan combats—Excesses committed by the - Spaniards—Lord Wellington reproaches their generals—His vigorous - and resolute conduct—He menaces the French insurgents of the - valleys with fire and sword and the insurrection subsides—Soult - hems the allies right closely—Partizan combats continued—Remarkable - instances of the habits established between the French and British - soldiers of the light division—Shipwrecks on the coast 410 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Political state of Portugal—Political state of Spain—Lord - Wellington advises the English government to prepare for a war with - Spain and to seize St. Sebastian as a security for the withdrawal - of the British and Portuguese troops—The seat of government and the - new Cortez are removed to Madrid—The duke of San Carlos arrives - secretly with the treaty of Valençay—It is rejected by the Spanish - regency and Cortez—Lord Wellington’s views on the subject 425 - - - CHAP. V. - - Political state of Napoleon—Guileful policy of the allied - sovereigns—M. de St. Aignan—General reflections—Unsettled policy of - the English ministers—They neglect lord Wellington—He remonstrates - and exposes the denuded state of his army 440 - - - CHAP. VI. - - Continuation of the war in the eastern provinces—Suchet’s erroneous - statements—Sir William Clinton repairs Taragona—Advances to - Villa Franca—Suchet endeavours to surprise him—Fails—The French - cavalry cut off an English detachment at Ordal—The duke of San - Carlos passes through the French posts—Copons favourable to his - mission—Clinton and Manso endeavour to cut off the French troops at - Molino del Rey—They fail through the misconduct of Copons—Napoleon - recalls a great body of Suchet’s troops—Whereupon he reinforces the - garrison of Barcelona and retires to Gerona—Van Halen—He endeavours - to beguile the governor of Tortoza—Fails—Succeeds at Lerida, - Mequinenza, and Monzon—Sketch of the siege of Monzon—It is defended - by the Italian soldier St. Jaques for one hundred and forty - days—Clinton and Copons invest Barcelona—The beguiled garrisons of - Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, arrive at Martorel—Are surrounded - and surrender on terms—Capitulation violated by Copons—King - Ferdinand returns to Spain—His character—Clinton breaks up his - army—His conduct eulogised—Lamentable sally from Barcelona—The - French garrisons beyond the Ebro return to France and Habert - evacuates Barcelona—Fate of the prince of Conti and the duchess of - Bourbon—Siege of Santona 475 - - - BOOK XXIV. - - CHAP. I. - - Napoleon recalls several divisions of infantry and cavalry from - Soult’s army—Embarrassments of that marshal—Mr. Batbedat a - banker of Bayonne offers to aid the allies secretly with money - and provisions—La Roche Jacquelin and other Bourbon partizans - arrive at the allies’ head-quarter—The duke of Angoulême arrives - there—Lord Wellington’s political views—General reflections—Soult - embarrassed by the hostility of the French people—Lord Wellington - embarrassed by the hostility of the Spaniards—Soult’s remarkable - project for the defence of France—Napoleon’s reasons for neglecting - it put hypothetically—Lord Wellington’s situation suddenly - ameliorated—His wise policy, foresight, and diligence—Resolves to - throw a bridge over the Adour below Bayonne, and to drive Soult - from that river—Soult’s system of defence—Numbers of the contending - armies—Passage of the Gaves—Combat of Garris—Lord Wellington forces - the line of the Bidouze and Gave of Mauleon—Soult takes the line of - the Gave de Oleron and resolves to change his system of operation 505 - - - CHAP. II. - - Lord Wellington arrests his movements and returns in person to St. - Jean de Luz to throw his bridge over the Adour—Is prevented by bad - weather and returns to the Gave of Mauleon—Passage of the Adour - by sir John Hope—Difficulty of the operation—The flotilla passes - the bar and enters the river—The French sally from Bayonne but are - repulsed and the stupendous bridge is cast—Citadel invested after a - severe action—Lord Wellington passes the Gave of Oleron and invests - Navarrens—Soult concentrates his army at Orthes—Beresford passes - the Gave de Pau near Pereyhorade—Battle of Orthes—Soult changes his - line of operations—Combat of Aire—Observations 536 - - - CHAP. III. - - Soult’s perilous situation—He falls back to Tarbes—Napoleon - sends him a plan of operations—His reply and views stated—Lord - Wellington’s embarrassments—Soult’s proclamation—Observations - upon it—Lord Wellington calls up Freyre’s Gallicians and detaches - Beresford against Bordeaux—The mayor of that city revolts from - Napoleon—Beresford enters Bordeaux and is followed by the duke - of Angoulême—Fears of a reaction—The mayor issues a false - proclamation—Lord Wellington expresses his indignation—Rebukes - the duke of Angoulême—Recalls Beresford but leaves lord Dalhousie - with the seventh division and some cavalry—Decaen commences the - organization of the army of the Gironde—Admiral Penrose enters the - Garonne—Remarkable exploit of the commissary Ogilvie—Lord Dalhousie - passes the Garonne and the Dordogne and defeats L’Huillier at - Etauliers—Admiral Penrose destroys the French flotilla—The French - set fire to their ships of war—The British seamen and marines land - and destroy all the French batteries from Blaye to the mouth of the - Garonne 580 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Wellington’s and Soult’s situations and forces described—Folly - of the English ministers—Freyre’s Gallicians and Ponsonby’s - heavy cavalry join lord Wellington—He orders Giron’s Andalusians - and Del Parque’s army to enter France—Soult suddenly takes the - offensive—Combats of cavalry—Partizan expedition of Captain - Dania—Wellington menaces the peasantry with fire and sword if they - take up arms—Soult retires—Lord Wellington advances—Combat of - Vic Bigorre—Death and character of colonel Henry Sturgeon—Daring - exploit of captain William Light[1]—Combat of Tarbes—Soult - retreats by forced marches to Toulouse—Wellington follows more - slowly—Cavalry combat at St. Gaudens—The allies arrive in front of - Toulouse—Reflections 603 - - - CHAP. V. - - Views of the commanders on each side—Wellington designs to throw - a bridge over the Garonne at Portet above Toulouse, but below - the confluence of the Arriege and Garonne—The river is found too - wide for the pontoons—He changes his design—Cavalry action at St. - Martyn de Touch—General Hill passes the Garonne at Pensaguel above - the confluence of the Arriege—Marches upon Cintegabelle—Crosses - the Arriege—Finds the country too deep for his artillery and - returns to Pensaguel—Recrosses the Garonne—Soult fortifies - Toulouse and the Mont Rave—Lord Wellington sends his pontoons - down the Garonne—Passes that river at Grenade fifteen miles below - Toulouse with twenty thousand men—The river floods and his bridge - is taken up—The waters subside—The bridge is again laid—The - Spaniards pass—Lord Wellington advances up the right bank to - Fenouilhet—Combat of cavalry—The eighteenth hussars win the bridge - of Croix d’Orade—Lord Wellington resolves to attack Soult on the - 9th of April—Orders the pontoons to be taken up and relaid higher - up the Garonne at Seilth in the night of the 8th—Time is lost in - the execution and the attack is deferred—The light division cross - at Seilth on the morning of the 10th—Battle of Toulouse 624 - - - CHAP. VI. - - General observations and reflections 657 - - -LIST OF APPENDIX. - - No. I. - - Lord William Bentinck’s correspondence with sir Edward Pellew and - lord Wellington about Sicily 691 - - - No. II. - - General Nugent’s and Mr. King’s correspondence with lord William - Bentinck about Italy 693 - - - No. III. - - Extracts from the correspondence of sir H. Wellesley, Mr. Vaughan, - and Mr. Stuart upon Spanish and Portuguese affairs 699 - - - No. IV. - - Justificatory pieces relating to the combats of Maya and - Roncesvalles 701 - - - No. V. - - Ditto ditto of Ordal 703 - - - No. VI. - - Official States of the allied army in Catalonia 704 - - - No. VII. - - Ditto of the Anglo-Portuguese at different epochs 705 - - - No. VIII. - - Ditto of the French armies at different epochs 707 - - - No. IX. - - Extract from lord Wellington’s order of movements for the battle - of Toulouse 709 - - - No. X. - - Note and morning state of the Anglo-Portuguese on the 10th of - April, 1814 710 - - -PLATES. - - No. 1. Explanatory of the Catalonian Operations and plan of Position - at Cape Salud. - - 2. Explanatory of Soult’s Operations to relieve Pampeluna. - - 3. Combats of Maya and Roncesvalles. - - 4. Explanatory Sketch of the Assault of St. Sebastian. - - 5. Explanatory Sketch of Soult’s and lord Wellington’s Passage - of the Bidassoa. - - 6. Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of the Nivelle. - - 7. Explanatory Sketch of the Operations round Bayonne, and of - the Battle. - - 8. Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of the Nive, and Battle of - St. Pierre. - - 9. Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of Orthes, and the Retreat - of Soult to Aire. - - 10. Explanatory Sketch of the Operations against Tarbes, and the - Battle of Toulouse. - - _To follow Page 689._ - - - - -NOTICE. - - -This volume was nearly printed when my attention was called to a -passage in an article upon the duke of Wellington’s despatches, -published in the last number of the “British and Foreign Quarterly -Review.” - -After describing colonel Gurwood’s proceedings to procure the -publication of the despatches the reviewer says, - -“_We here distinctly state_, that no other person ever had access -to _any_ documents of the duke, by his grace’s permission, for any -historical or other purpose, and that all inferential pretensions to -such privilege are not founded in fact.” - -This assertion, which if not wholly directed against my history -certainly includes it with others, _I distinctly state to be untrue_. - -For firstly, the duke of Wellington gave me access to the original -morning states of his army for the use of my history; he permitted me -to take them into my possession, and I still have possession of them. - -Secondly. The duke of Wellington voluntarily directed me to apply -to sir George Murray for the “_orders of movements_.” That is to -say the orders of battle issued by him to the different generals -previous to every great action. Sir George Murray thought proper, as -the reader will see in the justificatory pieces of this volume, to -deny all knowledge of these “_orders of movements_.” I have since -obtained some of them from others, but the permission to get them -all was given to me at Strathfieldsaye, in the presence of lord -Fitzroy Somerset, who was at the same time directed to give me the -morning states and he did do so. These were documents of no ordinary -importance for a history of the war. - -Thirdly. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, with the consent of the duke of -Wellington, put into my hands king Joseph’s portfolio, taken at -Vittoria and containing that monarch’s correspondence with the -emperor, with the French minister of war, and with the marshals and -generals who at different periods were employed in the Peninsula. -These also were documents of no slight importance for a history of -the war, and they are still in my possession. - -When I first resolved to write this History, I applied verbally to -the duke of Wellington to give me papers in aid of my undertaking. -His answer in substance was, that he had arranged all his own -papers with a view to publication himself—that he had not decided -in what form they should be given to the world, or when, probably -not during his lifetime, but he thought his plan would be to “_write -a plain didactic history_” to be published after his death—that he -was resolved never to publish anything unless he could tell the -whole truth, but at that time he could not tell the whole truth -without wounding the feelings of many worthy men, without doing -mischief: adding in a laughing way “_I should do as much mischief as -Buonaparte_.” Then expatiating upon the subject he related to me many -anecdotes illustrative of this observation, shewing errors committed -by generals and others acting with him, or under him, especially at -Waterloo; errors so materially affecting his operations that he could -not do justice to himself if he suppressed them, and yet by giving -them publicity he would ungraciously affect the fame of many worthy -men whose only fault was dulness. - -For these reasons he would not, he said, give me his own private -papers, but he gave me the documents I have already noticed, and told -me he would then, and always, answer any questions as to facts which -I might in the course of my work think necessary to put. And he has -fulfilled that promise rigidly, for I did then put many questions to -him verbally and took notes of his answers, and many of the facts -in my History which have been most cavilled at and denied by my -critics have been related by me solely upon his authority. Moreover -I have since at various times sent to the duke a number of questions -in writing, and always they have been fully and carefully answered -without delay, though often put when his mind must have been harassed -and his attention deeply occupied by momentous affairs. - -But though the duke of Wellington denied me access to his own -peculiar documents, the greatest part of those documents existed in -duplicate; they were in other persons’ hands, and in two instances -were voluntarily transferred with other interesting papers to mine. -Of this truth the reader may easily satisfy himself by referring to -my five first volumes, some of which were published years before -colonel Gurwood’s compilation appeared. He will find in those -volumes frequent allusions to the substance of the duke’s private -communications with the governments he served; and in the Appendix -a number of his letters, printed precisely as they have since been -given by colonel Gurwood. I could have greatly augmented the number -if I had been disposed so to swell my work. Another proof will be -found in the Justificatory Pieces of this volume, where I have -restored the whole reading of a remarkable letter of the duke’s which -has been garbled in colonel Gurwood’s compilation, and this not from -any unworthy desire to promulgate what the duke of Wellington desired -to suppress, but that having long before attributed, on the strength -of that passage, certain strong opinions to his grace, I was bound in -defence of my own probity as an historian to reproduce my authority. - - W. F. P. NAPIER. - -_March 28th, 1840._ - - - - -JUSTIFICATORY NOTES. - - -Having in my former volumes printed several controversial papers -relating to this History, I now complete them, thus giving the -reader all that I think necessary to offer in the way of answer to -those who have assailed me. The Letter to marshal Beresford and the -continuation of my Reply to the Quarterly Review have been published -before, the first as a pamphlet, the second in the London and -Westminster Review. And the former is here reproduced, not with any -design to provoke the renewal of a controversy which has been at rest -for some years, but to complete the justification of a work which, -written honestly and in good faith from excellent materials, has cost -me sixteen years of incessant labour. The other papers being new -shall be placed first in order and must speak for themselves. - - -ALISON. - -Some extracts from Alison’s History of the French Revolution -reflecting upon the conduct of sir John Moore have been shewn to me -by a friend. In one of them I find, in reference to the magazines at -Lugo, a false quotation from my own work, not from carelessness but -to sustain a miserable censure of that great man. This requires no -further notice, but the following specimen of disingenuous writing -shall not pass with impunity. - -Speaking of the prevalent opinion that England was unable to succeed -in military operations on the continent, Mr. Alison says:— - -“In sir John Moore’s case this universal and perhaps unavoidable -error was greatly enhanced by his connection with the opposition -party, by whom the military strength of England had been always -underrated, the system of continental operations uniformly decried, -and the power and capacity of the French emperor, great as they were, -unworthily magnified.” - -Mr. Alison here proves himself to be one of those enemies to sir -John Moore who draw upon their imaginations for facts and upon their -malice for conclusions. - -Sir John Moore never had any connection with any political party, -but during the short time he was in parliament he voted with the -government. He may in society have met with some of the leading men -of opposition thus grossly assailed by Mr. Alison, yet it is doubtful -if he ever conversed with any of them, unless perhaps Mr. Wyndham, -with whom, when the latter was secretary at war, he had a dispute -upon a military subject. He was however the intimate friend of Mr. -Pitt and of Mr. Pitt’s family. It is untrue that sir John Moore -entertained or even leaned towards exaggerated notions of French -prowess; his experience and his natural spirit and greatness of mind -swayed him the other way. How indeed could the man who stormed the -forts of Fiorenza and the breach of Calvi in Corsica, he who led the -disembarkation at Aboukir Bay, the advance to Alexandria on the 13th, -and defended the ruins of the camp of Cæsar on the 21st of March, he -who had never been personally foiled in any military exploit feel -otherwise than confident in arms? Mr. Alison may calumniate but he -cannot hurt sir John Moore. - - -SIR WALTER SCOTT. - -In the last volume of sir Walter Scott’s life by Mr. Lockhart, page -143, the following passage from sir Walter’s diary occurs:— - -“He (Napier) has however given a bad sample of accuracy in the case -of lord Strangford, _where_ his pointed affirmation has been as -pointedly repelled.” - -This peremptory decision is false in respect of grammar, of logic, -and of fact. - -[Sidenote: Vide Times, Morning Chronicle, Sun, &c. 1828.] - -Of grammar because _where_, an adverb of place, has no proper -antecedent. Of logic, because a truth may be pointedly repelled -without ceasing to be a truth. Of fact because lord Strangford did -not repel but admitted the essential parts of my affirmation, namely, -that he had falsified the date and place of writing his dispatch, and -attributed to himself the chief merit of causing the royal emigration -from Lisbon. Lord Strangford indeed, published two pamphlets to -prove that the merit really attached to him, but the hollowness of -his pretensions was exposed in my reply to his _first pamphlet_; -the accuracy of my statement was supported by the testimony of -disinterested persons, and moreover many writers, professing to know -the facts, did, at the time, in the newspapers, contradict lord -Strangford’s statements. - -The chief point of his _second pamphlet_, was the reiterated -assertion that he accompanied the prince regent over the bar of -Lisbon. - -To this I could have replied, 1º. That I had seen a letter, written -at the time by Mr. Smith the naval officer commanding the boat which -conveyed lord Strangford from Lisbon to the prince’s ship, and in -that letter it was distinctly stated, _that they did not reach that -vessel until after she had passed the bar_. 2º. That I possessed -letters from other persons present at the emigration of the same -tenor, and that between the writers of those letters and the writer -of the Bruton-street dispatch, to decide which were the better -testimony, offered no difficulty. - -Why did I not so reply? For a reason twice before published, namely, -that Mr. Justice Bailey had done it for me. Sir Walter takes no -notice of the judge’s answer, neither does Mr. Lockhart; and yet it -was the most important point of the case. Let the reader judge. - -[Sidenote: Vide Sun newspaper 28th Nov. 1828.] - -The editor of the Sun newspaper after quoting an article from the -Times upon the subject of my controversy with lord Strangford, -remarked, that his lordship “_would hardly be believed upon his oath, -certainly not upon his honour at the Old Bailey_.” - -Lord Strangford obtained a rule to shew cause why a criminal -information should not be filed against the editor for a libel. The -present lord Brougham appeared for the defence and justified the -offensive passage by references to lord Strangford’s own admissions -in his controversy with me. The judges thinking the justification -good, discharged the rule by the mouth of lord Tenterden. - -[Sidenote: Report in the Sun newspaper] - -During the proceedings in court the attorney-general, on the part -of lord Strangford, referring to that nobleman’s dispatch which, -though purporting to be written on the 29th November from H.M.S. -Hibernia off the Tagus was really written the 29th of December in -Bruton-street, said, “Every body knew that in diplomacy there were -two copies prepared of all documents, No. 1 for the minister’s -inspection, No. 2 for the public.” - -Mr. Justice Bayley shook his head in disapprobation. - -Attorney-general—“Well, my lord, it is the practice of these -departments and may be justified by necessity.” - -Mr. Justice Bayley—“_I like honesty in all places, Mr. Attorney_.” - -And so do I, wherefore I recommend this pointed repeller to Mr. -Lockhart when he publishes another edition of his father-in-law’s -life. - - -COLONEL GURWOOD. - -In the eighth volume of the Duke of Wellington’s Despatches page 531, -colonel Gurwood has inserted the following note:— - -“Lieutenant Gurwood fifty-second regiment led the “forlorn hope” of -the light division in the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards -took the French governor general Barrié in the citadel; and from -the hands of lord Wellington on the breach by which he had entered, -he received the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by -the duke of Wellington to compile this work has doubtless been one -of the distinguished consequences resulting from this service, and -lieutenant Gurwood feels pride as a soldier of fortune in here -offering himself as an encouraging example to the subaltern in -future wars.”—“The detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the -lesser breach is of too little importance except to those who -served in it to become a matter of history. The compiler however -takes this opportunity of observing that colonel William Napier -has been misinformed respecting the conduct of the “forlorn hope,” -in the account given of it by him as it appears in the Appendix of -the fourth volume of his History of the Peninsular War. A correct -statement and proofs of it have been since furnished to colonel -William Napier for any future edition of his book which will render -any further notice of it _here_ unnecessary.” - -My account is not to be disposed of in this summary manner, and this -note, though put forth as it were with the weight of the duke of -Wellington’s name by being inserted amongst his Despatches, shall -have an answer. - -Colonel Gurwood sent me what in the above note he calls “_a correct -statement and proofs of it_.” I know of no _proofs_, and the -correctness of his statement depends on his own recollections which -the wound he received in the head at this time seems to have rendered -extremely confused, at least the following recollections of other -officers are directly at variance with his. Colonel Gurwood in his -“_correct statement_” says, “When I first went up the breach there -were still some of the enemy in it, it was very steep and on my -arrival at the top of it under the gun I was knocked down either by -a shot or stone thrown at me. I can assure you that not a lock was -snapped as you describe, but finding it impossible that the breach -from its steepness and narrowness could be carried by the bayonet I -ordered the men to load, certainly before the arrival of the storming -party, and having placed some of the men on each side of the breach -I went up the middle with the remainder, and when in the act of -climbing over the disabled gun at the top of the breach which you -describe, I was wounded in the head by a musquet shot fired so close -to me that it blew my cap to pieces, and I was tumbled over senseless -from the top to the bottom of the breach. When I recovered my senses -I found myself close to George,[2] who was sitting on a stone with -his arm broken, I asked him how the thing was going on, &c. &c.” - -Now to the above statement I oppose the following letters from the -authors of the statements given in the Appendix to my fourth volume. - - -Major-General Sir GEORGE NAPIER to Colonel WILLIAM NAPIER. - -“I am sorry our gallant friend Gurwood is not satisfied with and -disputes the accuracy of your account of the assault of the lesser -breach at Ciudad Rodrigo as detailed in your fourth volume. I can -only say, that account was principally, if not wholly taken from -colonel Fergusson’s, he being one of my storming captains, and my -own narrative of that transaction up to the period when we were each -of us wounded. _I adhere to the correctness of all I stated to you_, -and beg further to say that my friend colonel Mitchell, who was also -one of my captains in the storming party, told me the last time I -saw him at the commander-in-chief’s levee, that my statement was -“_perfectly correct_.” And both he and colonel Fergusson recollected -the circumstance of my not permitting the party to load, and also -that upon being checked, when nearly two-thirds up the breach, by -the enemy’s fire, the men forgetting their pieces were not loaded -snapped them off, but I called to them and reminded them of my orders -to force their way with the bayonet alone! It was at that moment I -was wounded and fell, and I never either spoke to or saw Gurwood -afterwards during that night, as he rushed on with the other officers -of the party to the top of the breach. Upon looking over a small -manuscript of the various events of my life as a soldier, written -many years ago, I find all I stated to you corroborated in every -particular. Of course as colonel Gurwood tells you he was _twice_ at -the top of the breach, before any of the storming party entered it, -I cannot take upon myself to contradict him, but I certainly do not -conceive how it was possible, as he and myself jumped into the ditch -together, I saw him wounded, and spoke to him _after_ having mounted -the faussbraye with him, and _before_ we rushed up the breach in the -body of the place. I never saw him or spoke to him after I was struck -down, the whole affair did not last above twenty-five or thirty -minutes, but as I fell when about two-thirds up the breach I can only -answer for the correctness of my account to that period, as soon -after I was assisted to get down the breach by the Prince of Orange -(who kindly gave his sash to tie up my shattered arm and which sash -is now in my possession) by the present duke of Richmond and lord -Fitzroy Somerset, all three of whom I believe were actively engaged -in the assault. Our friend Gurwood did his duty like a gallant and -active soldier, but I cannot admit of his having been _twice in the -breach before the other officers of the storming party and myself_! - -“I believe yourself and every man in the army with whom I have the -honor to be acquainted will acquit me of any wish or intention to -deprive a gallant comrade and brother-officer of the credit and honor -due to his bravery, more particularly one with whom I have long been -on terms of intimate friendship, and whose abilities I admire as much -as I respect and esteem his conduct as a soldier; therefore this -statement can or ought only to be attributed to my sense _of what -is due_ to the other gallant officers and soldiers who were under -my command in the assault of the lesser breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, -and not to any _wish_ or _intention_ on my part to detract from the -distinguished services of, or the laurels gained by colonel Gurwood -on that occasion. Of course you are at liberty to refer to me if -necessary and to make what use you please of this letter privately or -publicly either now or at any future period, as _I steadily adhere to -all I have ever stated to you or any one else_ and I am &c. &c. - - “GEORGE NAPIER.” - - - Extract of a letter from colonel JAMES FERGUSSON, fifty-second - regiment (formerly a captain of the forty-third and one of the - storming party.) Addressed to Sir GEORGE NAPIER. - -“I send you a memorandum I made some time back from memory and in -consequence of having seen various accounts respecting our assault. -You are perfectly correct as to Gurwood and your description of the -way we carried the breach is accurate; and now I have seen your -memorandum I recollect the circumstance of the men’s arms not being -loaded and the snapping of the firelocks.”—“I was not certain when -you were wounded but your description of the scene on the breach and -the way in which it was carried is perfectly accurate.” - - - Extract of a letter from colonel FERGUSSON to colonel WILLIAM - NAPIER. - -“I think the account you give in your fourth volume of the attack -of the little breach at Ciudad Rodrigo is as favorable to Gurwood -as he has any right to expect, and agrees perfectly both with your -brother George’s recollections of that attack and with mine. Our late -friend Alexander Steele who was one of my officers declared he was -with Gurwood the whole of the time, for a great part of the storming -party of the forty-third joined Gurwood’s party who were placing the -ladders against the work, and it was the engineer officer calling out -that they were wrong and pointing out the way to the breach in the -fausse braye that directed our attention to it. Jonathan Wyld[3] of -the forty-third was the first man that run up the fausse braye, and -we made directly for the little breach which was defended _exactly -as you describe_. We were on the breach some little time and when we -collected about thirty men (some of the third battalion rifle brigade -in the number) we made a simultaneous rush, cheered, and run in, so -that positively no claim could be made as to the first who entered -the breach. I do not want to dispute with Gurwood but I again say -(in which your brother agrees) that some of the storming party were -_before_ the forlorn hope. I do not dispute that Gurwood and some -of his party were among the number that rushed in at the breach, -but as to his having twice mounted the breach before us, _I cannot -understand it_, and Steele always _positively denied it_.” - - -Having thus justified myself from the charge of writing upon bad -information about the assault of the little breach I shall add -something about that of the great breach. - -Colonel Gurwood offers himself as an encouraging example for the -subalterns of the British army in future wars; but the following -extract from a statement of the late major Mackie, so well known for -his bravery worth and modesty, and who as a subaltern led the forlorn -hope at the great breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, denies colonel Gurwood’s -claim to the particular merit upon which he seems inclined to found -his good fortune in after life. - - - Extracts from a memoir addressed by the late Major MACKIE to - Colonel NAPIER. October 1838. - -“The troops being immediately ordered to advance were soon across the -ditch, and upon the breach at the same instant with the ninety-fourth -who had advanced along the ditch. To mount under the fire of the -defenders was the work of a moment, but when there difficulties of a -formidable nature presented themselves; on each flank a deep trench -was cut across the rampart isolating the breach, which was enfiladed -with cannon and musquetry, while in front, from the rampart into -the streets of the town, was a perpendicular fall of ten or twelve -feet; the whole preventing the soldiers from making that bold and -rapid onset so effective in facilitating the success of such an -enterprize. The great body of the fire of defence being from the -houses and from an open space in front of the breach, in the first -impulse of the moment I dropt from the rampart into the town. Finding -myself here quite alone and no one following, I discovered that the -trench upon the right of the breach was cut across the whole length -of the rampart, thereby opening a free access to our troops and -rendering what was intended by the enemy as a defence completely the -reverse. By this opening I again mounted to the top of the breach -and led the men down into the town. The enemy’s fire which I have -stated had been, after we gained the summit of the wall, confined -to the houses and open space alluded to, now began to slacken, and -ultimately they abandoned the defence. Being at this time in advance -of the whole of the third division, I led what men I could collect -along the street, leading in a direct line from the great breach -into the centre of the town, by which street the great body of the -enemy were precipitately retiring. Having advanced considerably and -passed across a street running to the left, a body of the enemy came -suddenly from that street, rushed through our ranks and escaped. In -pursuit of this body, which after passing us held their course to the -right, I urged the party forwards in that direction until we reached -the citadel, where the governor and garrison had taken refuge. The -outer gate of the enclosure being open, I entered at the head of the -party composed of men of different regiments who by this time had -joined the advance. Immediately on entering I was hailed by a French -officer asking for an English general to whom they might surrender. -Pointing to my epaulets in token of their security, the door of the -keep or stronghold of the place was opened and a sword presented to -me in token of surrender, which sword I accordingly received. This -I had scarcely done when two of their officers laid hold of me for -protection, one on each arm, and _it was while I was thus situated -that lieutenant Gurwood came up and obtained the sword of the -governor_. - -“In this way, the governor, with lieutenant Gurwood and the two -officers I have mentioned still clinging to my arms, the whole party -moved towards the rampart. Having found when there, that in the -confusion incident to such a scene I had lost as it were by accident -that prize which was actually within my reach, and which I had justly -considered as my own, in the chagrin of the moment I turned upon my -heel and left the spot. The following day, in company with captain -Lindsay of the eighty-eighth regiment I waited upon colonel Pakenham, -then assistant adjutant-general to the third division, to know if my -name had been mentioned by general Picton as having led the advance -of the right brigade. He told me that it had and I therefore took no -further notice of the circumstance, feeling assured that I should be -mentioned in the way of which all officers in similar circumstances -must be so ambitious. My chagrin and disappointment may be easily -imagined when lord Wellington’s dispatches reached the army from -England to find my name altogether omitted, and the right brigade -deprived of their just meed of praise.”—“Sir, it is evident that -the tendency of this note” (colonel Gurwood’s note quoted from the -Despatches) “is unavoidably, though I do him the justice to believe -by no means intentionally upon colonel Gurwood’s part, to impress the -public with the belief that he was himself the first British officer -that entered the citadel of Ciudad Rodrigo, consequently the one -to whom its garrison surrendered. This impression the language he -employs is the more likely to convey, inasmuch as to his exertions -and good fortune in this particular instance he refers the whole -of his professional success, to which he points the attention of -the future aspirant as a pledge of the rewards to be expected from -similar efforts to deserve them. To obviate this impression and in -bare justice to the right brigade of the third division and, as a -member of it, to myself, I feel called on to declare that though I -do not claim for that brigade exclusively the credit of forcing the -defences of the great breach, the left brigade having joined in it -contrary to the intention of lord Wellington under the circumstances -stated, yet I do declare on the word of a man of honour, that _I was -the first individual who effected the descent from the main breach -into the streets of the town, that I preceded the advance into the -body of the place, that I was the first who entered the citadel, and -that the enemy there assembled had surrendered to myself and party -before lieutenant Gurwood came up_. Referring to the inference which -colonel Gurwood has been pleased to draw from his own good fortune -as to the certainty and value of the rewards awaiting the exertions -of the British soldier, permit me, sir, in bare justice to myself to -say that at the time I volunteered the forlorn hope on this occasion, -I was senior lieutenant of my own regiment consequently the first -for promotion. Having as such succeeded so immediately after to a -company, I could scarcely expect nor did I ask further promotion at -the time, but after many years of additional service, I did still -conceive and do still maintain, that I was entitled to bring forward -my services on that day as a ground for asking that step of rank -which every officer leading a forlorn hope had received with the -exception of myself. - -“May I, sir, appeal to your sense of justice in lending me your -aid to prevent my being deprived of the only reward I had hitherto -enjoyed, in the satisfaction of thinking that the services which -I am now compelled most reluctantly to bring in some way to the -notice of the public, had during the period that has since elapsed, -never once been called in question. It was certainly hard enough -that a service of this nature should have been productive of no -advantage to me in my military life. I feel it however infinitely -more annoying that I should now find myself in danger of being stript -of any credit to which it might entitle me, by the looseness of the -manner in which colonel Gurwood words his statement. I need not -say that this danger is only the more imminent from his statement -appearing in a work which as being published under the auspices of -the duke of Wellington as well as of the Horse Guards, has at least -the appearance of coming in the guise of an official authority,” -“I agree most cordially with colonel Gurwood in the opinion he has -expressed in his note, that he is himself an instance where reward -and merit have gone hand in hand. I feel compelled however, for the -reasons given to differ from him materially as to the precise ground -on which he considers the honours and advantages that have followed -his deserts to be not only the distinguished but the just and natural -consequences of his achievements on that day. _I allude to the claim -advanced by colonel Gurwood to be considered the individual by whom -the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo was made prisoner of war._ It could -scarcely be expected that at such a moment I could be aware that the -sword which I received was not the governor’s being in fact that of -one of his aide-de-camps. I repeat however that before lieutenant -Gurwood and his party came up, the enemy had expressed their wish to -surrender, that a sword was presented by them in token of submission -and received by me as a pledge, on the honour of a British officer, -that according to the laws of war, I held myself responsible for -their safety as prisoners under the protection of the British arms. -Not a shadow of resistance was afterwards made and I appeal to every -impartial mind in the least degree acquainted with the rules of -modern warfare, if under these circumstances I am not justified in -asserting that before, and at the time lieutenant Gurwood arrived, -the whole of the enemy’s garrison within the walls of the citadel, -governor included, were both _de jure_ and _de facto_ prisoners to -myself. In so far, therefore, as he being the individual who made -its owner captive, could give either of us a claim to receive that -sword to which colonel Gurwood ascribes such magic influence in the -furthering of his after fortunes, I do maintain that at the time it -became _de facto_ his, it was _de jure_ mine.” - - -Something still remains to set colonel Gurwood right upon matters -which he has apparently touched upon without due consideration. In -a note appended to that part of the duke of Wellington’s Despatches -which relate to the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo he says that the late -captain Dobbs of the fifty-second at Sabugal “recovered the howitzer, -taken by the forty-third regiment but retaken by the enemy.” This -is totally incorrect. The howitzer was taken by the forty-third and -retained by the forty-third. The fifty-second regiment never even -knew of its capture until the action was over. Captain Dobbs was a -brave officer and a very generous-minded man, he was more likely to -keep his own just claims to distinction in the back-ground than to -appropriate the merit of others to himself. I am therefore quite -at a loss to know upon what authority colonel Gurwood has stated a -fact inaccurate itself and unsupported by the duke of Wellington’s -dispatch about the battle of Sabugal, which distinctly says the -howitzer was taken by the forty-third regiment, as in truth it was, -and it was kept by that regiment also. - -While upon the subject of colonel Gurwood’s compilation I must -observe that in my fifth volume, when treating of general Hill’s -enterprise against the French forts at Almaraz I make lord Wellington -complain to the ministers that his generals were so fearful of -responsibility the slightest movements of the enemy deprived them -of their judgment. Trusting that the despatches then in progress of -publication would bear me out, I did not give my authority at large -in the Appendix; since then, the letter on which I relied has indeed -been published by colonel Gurwood in the Despatches, but purged of -the passage to which I allude and without any indication of its being -so garbled. This omission might hereafter give a handle to accuse me -of bad faith, wherefore I now give the letter in full, the Italics -marking the restored passage:— - - -_From lord Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool._ - - _Fuente Guinaldo, May 28th, 1812._ - -MY DEAR LORD, - -You will be as well pleased as I am at general Hill’s success, which -certainly would have been still more satisfactory if he had taken the -garrison of Mirabete; which he would have done if general Chowne had -got on a little better in the night of the 16th, and if sir William -Erskine had not very unnecessarily alarmed him, by informing him -that Soult’s whole army were in movement, and in Estremadura. Sir -Rowland therefore according to his instructions came back on the -21st, whereas if he had staid a day or two he would have brought -his heavy howitzers to bear on the castle and he would either have -stormed it under his fire or the garrison would have surrendered. -_But notwithstanding all that has passed I cannot prevail upon the -general officers to feel a little confidence in their situation. They -take alarm at the least movement of the enemy and then spread the -alarm, and interrupt every thing, and the extraordinary circumstance -is, that if they are not in command they are as stout as any private -soldiers in the army._ Your lordship will observe that I have marked -some passages in Hill’s report not to be published. My opinion is -that the enemy must evacuate the tower of Mirabete and indeed it is -useless to keep that post, unless they have another bridge which I -doubt. But if they see that we entertain a favourable opinion of the -strength of Mirabete, they will keep their garrison there, which -might be inconvenient to us hereafter, if we should wish to establish -there our own bridge. I enclose a Madrid Gazette in which you will -see a curious description of the state of king Joseph’s authority and -his affairs in general, from the most authentic sources. - - Ever, my dear lord, &c. &c. - WELLINGTON. - - -VILLA MURIEL. - -The following statement of the operations of the fifth division at -the combat of Muriel 25th October, 1812, is inserted at the desire -of sir John Oswald. It proves that I have erroneously attributed to -him the first and as it appeared to me unskilful disposition of the -troops; but with respect to the other portions of his statement, -without denying or admitting the accuracy of his recollections, I -shall give the authority I chiefly followed, first printing his -statement. - - -_Affair of Villa Muriel._ - -On the morning 25th of October 1812 major-general Oswald joined and -assumed the command of the fifth division at Villa Muriel on the -Carion. Major-general Pringle had already posted the troops, and the -greater portion of the division were admirably disposed of about the -village as also in the dry bed of a canal running in its rear, in -some places parallel to the Carion. Certain of the corps were formed -in columns of attack supported by reserves, ready to fall upon the -enemy if in consequence of the mine failing he should venture to push -a column along the narrow bridge. The river had at some points been -reported fordable, but these were said to be at all times difficult -and in the then rise of water as they proved hardly practicable. -As the enemy closed towards the bridge, he opened a heavy fire of -artillery on the village. At that moment lord Wellington entered -it and passed the formed columns well sheltered both from fire and -observation. His lordship approved of the manner the post was -occupied and of the advantage taken of the _canal and village_ -to mask the troops. The French supported by a heavy and superior -fire rushed gallantly on the bridge, the mine not exploding and -destroying the arch till the leading section had almost reached the -spot. Shortly after, the main body retired, leaving only a few light -troops. Immediately previous to this an orderly officer announced -to lord Wellington that Palencia and its bridges were gained by the -foe. He ordered the main body of the division immediately to ascend -the heights in its rear, and along the plateau to move towards -Palencia in order to meet an attack from that quarter. Whilst the -division was in the act of ascending, a report was made by major -Hill of the eighth caçadores that the ford had been won, passed by -a body of cavalry causing the caçadores to fall back on the broken -ground. The enemy, it appears, were from the first, acquainted with -these fords, for his push to them was nearly simultaneous with his -assault on the bridge. The division moved on the heights towards -Palencia, it had not however proceeded far, before an order came -directing it to retire and form on the right of the Spaniards, and -when collected to remain on the heights till further orders. About -this time the cavalry repassed the river, nor had either infantry or -artillery passed by the ford to aid in the attack, but in consequence -of the troops being withdrawn from the village and canal a partial -repair was given to the bridge, and small bodies of infantry were -passed over skirmishing with the Spaniards whose post on the heights -was directly in front of Villa Muriel. No serious attack from that -quarter was to be apprehended until an advance from Palencia. It was -on that point therefore that attention was fixed. Day was closing -when lord Wellington came upon the heights and said all was quiet -at Palencia and that the enemy must now be driven from the right -bank. General Oswald enquired if after clearing the village the -division was to remain there for the night. His lordship replied, the -village was to be occupied in force and held by the division till it -was withdrawn, which would probably be very early in the morning. -He directed the first brigade under brigadier-general Barnes to -attack the enemy’s flank, the second under Pringle to advance in -support extending to the left so as to succour the Spaniards who -were unsuccessfully contending with the enemy in their front. The -casualties in the division were not numerous especially when the fire -it was exposed to is considered. The enemy sustained a comparative -heavy loss. The troops were by a rapid advance of the first brigade -cut off from the bridge and forced into the river where many were -drowned. The allies fell back in the morning unmolested. - - JOHN OSWALD, &c. &c. &c. - - -_Memoir on the combat of Muriel by captain Hopkins, fourth regiment._ - -As we approached Villa Muriel the face of the country upon our left -flank as we were then retrograding appeared open, in our front ran -the river Carrion, and immediately on the opposite side of the river -and parallel to it there was a broad deep dry canal. On our passing -the bridge at Villa Muriel we had that village on our left, from the -margin of the canal the ground sloped gradually up into heights, -the summit forming a fine plateau. Villa Muriel was occupied by -the brigadier Pringle with a _small_ detachment of infantry but -at the time we considered that it required a larger force, as its -maintenance appeared of the utmost importance to the army, we were -aware that the enemy had passed the Carrion with cavalry and also -that Hill’s caçadores had given way at another part of the river. -Our engineers had partly destroyed the bridge of Villa Muriel, the -enemy attacked the village, at the time the brigadier and his staff -were there,[4] passing the ruins of the bridge by means of ladders, -&c. The enemy in driving the detachment from the village made some -prisoners. We retired to the plateau of the heights, under a fire of -musquetry and artillery, where we halted in close column; the enemy -strengthened the village. - -Lord Wellington arrived with his staff on the plateau, and -immediately reconnoitred the enemy whose reinforcements had arrived -and were forming strong columns on the other side of the river. Lord -Wellington immediately ordered some artillery to be opened on the -enemy. I happened to be close to the head-quarter staff and heard -lord Wellington say to an aide-de-camp, “Tell Oswald I want him.” On -sir John Oswald arriving he said, “Oswald, you will get the division -under arms and drive the enemy from the village and retain possession -of it.” He replied, “My lord, if the village should be taken I do -not consider it as tenable.” Wellington then said, “It is my orders, -general.” Oswald replied, “My lord as it is your orders they shall -be obeyed.” Wellington then gave orders to him “that he should take -the second brigade of the division and attack in line, that the first -brigade should in column first descend the heights on the right of -the second, enter the canal and assist in clearing it of the enemy,” -and saying, “I will tell you what I will do, Oswald. I will give you -the Spaniards and Alava into the bargain, headed by a company of the -ninth regiment upon your left.” The attack was made accordingly, the -second battalion of the fourth regiment being left in reserve in -column on the slope of the hill exposed to a severe cannonade which -for a short time caused them some confusion. The enemy were driven -from the canal and village, and the prisoners which they made in the -morning were retaken. The enemy lost some men in this affair, but -general Alava was wounded, the officer commanding the company of -Brunswickers killed, and several of the division killed and wounded. -During the attack lord Wellington sent the prince of Orange under -a heavy fire for the purpose of preventing the troops exposing -themselves at the canal, two companies defended the bridge with a -detachment just arrived from England. The possession of the village -proved of the utmost importance, as the retrograde movement we made -that night could not have been effected with safety had the enemy -been on our side of the river, as it was we were enabled to pass -along the river with all arms in the most perfect security. - - - A LETTER - TO - GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD, - BEING - _An Answer to his Lordships Assumed Refutation_ - OF - COL. NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME. - -MY LORD, - -You have at last appeared in print without any disguise. Had you -done so at first it might have spared us both some trouble. I should -have paid more deference to your argument and would willingly -have corrected any error fairly pointed out. Now having virtually -acknowledged yourself the author of the two publications entitled -“_Strictures_” and “_Further Strictures_,” _&c._ I will not suffer -you to have the advantage of using two kinds of weapons, without -making you also feel their inconvenience. I will treat your present -publication as a mere continuation of your former two, and then my -lord, how will you stand in this controversy? - -Starting anonymously you wrote with all the scurrility that bad taste -and mortified vanity could suggest to damage an opponent, because -in the fair exercise of his judgement he had ventured to deny your -claim to the title of a great commander: and you coupled this with -such fulsome adulation of yourself that even in a dependent’s mouth -it would have been sickening. Now when you have suffered defeat, when -all the errors misquotations and misrepresentations of your anonymous -publications have been detected and exposed, you come forward in your -own name as if a new and unexceptionable party had appeared, and -you expect to be allowed all the advantage of fresh statements and -arguments and fresh assertions, without the least reference to your -former damaged evidence. You expect that I should have that deference -for you, which your age, your rank, your services, and your authority -under other circumstances might have fairly claimed at my hands; that -I should acknowledge by my silence how much I was in error, or that -I should defend myself by another tedious dissection and exposition -of your production. My lord, you will be disappointed. I have neither -time nor inclination to enter for the third time upon such a task; -and yet I will not suffer you to claim a victory which you have not -gained. I deny the strength of your arguments, I will expose some -prominent inconsistencies, and as an answer to those which I do not -notice I will refer to your former publications to show, that in this -controversy, I am now entitled to disregard any thing you may choose -to advance, and that I am in justice exonerated from the necessity of -producing any more proofs. - -You have published above six hundred pages at three different -periods, and you have taken above a year to digest and arrange the -arguments and evidence contained in your present work; a few lines -will suffice for the answer. The object of your literary labours is -to convince the world that at Campo Mayor you proved yourself an -excellent general, and that at Albuera you were superlatively great! -Greater even than Cæsar! My lord, the duke of Wellington did not take -a much longer time to establish his European reputation by driving -the French from the Peninsula; and methinks if your exploits vouch -not for themselves your writings will scarcely do it for them. At all -events, a plain simple statement at first, having your name affixed, -would have been more effectual with the public, and would certainly -have been more dignified than the anonymous publications with which -you endeavoured to feel your way. Why should not all the main points -contained in the laboured pleadings of your Further Strictures, and -the still more laboured pleadings of your present work, have been -condensed and published at once with your name? if indeed it was -necessary to publish at all! Was it that by anonymous abuse of your -opponent and anonymous praise of yourself you hoped to create a -favourable impression on the public before you appeared in person? -This, my lord, seems very like a consciousness of weakness. And then -how is it that so few of the arguments and evidences now adduced -should have been thought of before? It is a strange thing that in the -first defence of your generalship, for one short campaign, you should -have neglected proofs and arguments sufficient to form a second -defence of two hundred pages. - -You tell us, that you disdained to notice my “_Reply to various -Opponents_,” because you knew the good sense of the public -would never be misled by a production containing such numerous -contradictions and palpable inconsistencies, and that your friends’ -advice confirmed you in this view of the matter. There were -nevertheless some things in that work which required an answer even -though the greatest part of it had been weak; and it is a pity your -friends did not tell you that an affected contempt for an adversary -who has hit hard only makes the bystanders laugh. Having condescended -to an anonymous attack it would have been wiser to refute the proofs -offered of your own inaccuracy than to shrink with mock grandeur from -a contest which you had yourself provoked. My friends, my lord, gave -me the same advice with respect to your anonymous publications, and -with more reason, because they were anonymous; but I had the proofs -of your weakness in my hands, I preferred writing an answer, and -if you had been provided in the same manner you would like me have -neglected your friends’ advice. - -My lord, I shall now proceed with my task in the manner I have -before alluded to. You have indeed left me no room for that refined -courtesy with which I could have wished to soften the asperities of -this controversy, but I must request of you to be assured, and I say -it in all sincerity, that I attribute the errors to which I must -revert, not to any wilful perversion or wilful suppression of facts, -but entirely to a natural weakness of memory, and the irritation of -a mind confused by the working of wounded vanity. I acknowledge that -it is a hard trial to have long-settled habits of self satisfaction -suddenly disturbed,— - - “Cursed be my harp and broke be every chord, - If I forget thy worth, _victorious Beresford_.” - -It was thus the flattering muse of poetry lulled you with her sweet -strains into a happy dream of glory, and none can wonder at your -irritation when the muse of history awakened you with the solemn -clangour of her trumpet to the painful reality that you were only an -ordinary person. My lord, it would have been wiser to have preserved -your equanimity, there would have been some greatness in that. - -In your first Strictures you began by asserting that I knew nothing -whatever of you or your services; and that I was actuated entirely by -vulgar political rancour when I denied your talents as a general. To -this I replied that I was not ignorant of your exploits. That I knew -something of your proceedings at Buenos Ayres, at Madeira, and at -Coruña; and in proof thereof I offered to enter into the details of -the first, if you desired it. To this I have received no answer. - -You affirmed that your perfect knowledge of the Portuguese language -was one of your principal claims to be commander of the Portuguese -army. In reply I quoted from your own letter to lord Wellington, -your confession, that, such was your ignorance of that language at -the time you could not even read the communication from the regency, -relative to your own appointment. - -You asserted that no officer, save sir John Murray, objected at the -first moment to your sudden elevation of rank. In answer I published -sir John Sherbroke’s letter to sir J. Cradock complaining of it. - -You said the stores (which the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo refused to -let you have in 1809) had not been formed by lord Wellington. In -reply I published lord Wellington’s declaration that they had been -formed by him. - -You denied that you had ever written a letter to the junta of -Badajos, and this not doubtfully or hastily, but positively and -accompanied with much scorn and ridicule of my assertion to that -effect. You harped upon the new and surprising information I had -obtained relative to your actions, and were, in truth, very facetious -upon the subject. In answer I published your own letter to that -junta! So much for your first Strictures. - -In your second publication (page 42) you asserted that colonel -Colborne was not near the scene of action at Campo Mayor; and now in -your third publication (page 48) you show very clearly that he took -an active part in those operations. - -You called the distance from Campo Mayor to Merida _two marches_, and -now you say it is _four marches_. - -Again, in your first “_Strictures_,” you declared that the extent of -the intrigues against you in Portugal were exaggerated by me; and you -were very indignant that I should have supposed you either needed, -or had the support and protection of the duke of Wellington while -in command of the Portuguese army. In my third and fourth volumes, -published since, I have shown what the extent of those intrigues -was: and I have still something in reserve to add when time shall -be fitting. Meanwhile I will stay your lordship’s appetite by two -extracts bearing upon this subject, and upon the support which you -derived from the duke of Wellington. - -1º. Mr. Stuart, writing to lord Wellesley, in 1810, after noticing -the violence of the Souza faction relative to the fall of Almeida, -says,—“I could have borne all this with patience if not accompanied -by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the -Tagus, and that the regency should send an order to marshal Beresford -to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary; -followed by reflections on the persons composing the family of that -officer, and by hints to the same purport respecting the Portuguese -who are attached to lord Wellington.” - -2º. Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beira by marshal -Beresford, and dated 6th September, 1810.—“However, as I mentioned, -I have no great desire to hold my situation beyond the period lord -Wellington retains his situation, or after active operations have -ceased in this country, even should things turn out favourably, of -which I really at this instant have better hopes than I ever had -though I have been usually sanguine. But in regard to myself, though -I do not pretend to say the situation I hold is not at all times -desirable to hold, yet I am fully persuaded that if tranquillity is -ever restored to this country under its legal government, that I -should be too much vexed and thwarted by intrigues of all sorts to -reconcile either my temper or my conscience to what would then be my -situation.” - -For the further exposition of the other numerous errors and failures -of your two first publications, I must refer the reader to my -“_Reply_” and “_Justification_,” but the points above noticed it was -necessary to fix attention upon, because they give me the right to -call upon the public to disregard your present work. And this right -I cannot relinquish. I happened fortunately to have the means of -repelling your reckless assaults in the instances above mentioned, -but I cannot always be provided with your own letters to disprove -your own assertions. The combat is not equal my lord, I cannot -contend with such odds and must therefore, although reluctantly, use -the advantages which by the detection of such errors I have already -obtained. - -These then are strong proofs of an unsound memory upon essential -points, and they deprive your present work of all weight as an -authority in this controversy. Yet the strangest part of your new -book (see page 135) is, that you avow an admiration for what you call -the _generous principle_ which leads French authors to _misstate -facts for the honour of their country_; and not only you do this but -sneer at me very openly for not doing the same! you sneer at me, my -lord, for not falsifying facts to pander to the morbid vanity of my -countrymen, and at the same time, with a preposterous inconsistency -you condemn me for being an inaccurate historian! My lord, I have -indeed yet to learn that the _honour_ of my country either requires -to be or can be supported by deliberate historical falsehoods. Your -lordship’s personal experience in the field may perhaps have led -you to a different conclusion but I will not be your historian: and -coupling this, your expressed sentiment, with your forgetfulness on -the points which I have before noticed, I am undoubtedly entitled to -laugh at your mode of attacking others. What, my lord? like Banquo’s -ghost you rise, “with twenty mortal murthers on your crown to push us -from our stools.” You have indeed a most awful and ghost-like way of -arguing: all your oracular sentences are to be implicitly believed, -and all my witnesses to facts sound and substantial, are to be -discarded for your airy nothings. - -Captain Squire! heed him not, he was a dissatisfied, talking, -self-sufficient, ignorant officer. - -The officer of dragoons who charged at Campo Mayor! He is nameless, -his narrative teems with misrepresentations, he cannot tell whether -he charged or not. - -Colonel Light! spunge him out, he was only a subaltern. - -Captain Gregory! believe him not, his statement cannot be correct, he -is too minute, and has no diffidence. - -Sir Julius Hartman, Colonel Wildman, Colonel Leighton! Oh! very -honourable men, but they know nothing of the fact they speak of, all -their evidence put together is worth nothing! But, my lord, it is -very exactly corroborated by additional evidence contained in Mr. -Long’s publication. Aye! aye! all are wrong; their eyes, their ears, -their recollections, all deceived them. They were not competent to -judge. But they speak to single facts! no matter! - -Well, then, my lord, I push to you your own despatch! Away with -it! It is worthless, bad evidence, not to be trusted! Nothing more -likely, my lord, but what then, and who is to be trusted? Nobody -who contradicts me: every body who coincides with me, nay, the same -person is to be believed or disbelieved exactly as he supports or -opposes my assertion; even those French authors, whose generous -principles lead them to write falsehoods for the _honour of their -country_. Such, my lord, after a year’s labour of cogitation, is -nearly the extent of your “_Refutation_.” - -In your first publication you said that I should have excluded all -hearsay evidence, and have confined myself to what could be proved -in a court of justice; and now when I bring you testimony which no -court of justice could refuse, with a lawyer’s coolness you tell the -jury that none of it is worthy of credit; that my witnesses, being -generally of a low rank in the army, are not to be regarded, that -they were not competent to judge. My lord, this is a little too much: -there would be some shew of reason if these subalterns’ opinions -had been given upon the general dispositions of the campaign, but -they are all witnesses to facts which came under their personal -observation. What! hath not a subaltern eyes? Hath he not ears? -Hath he not understanding? You were once a subaltern yourself, and -you cannot blind the world by such arrogant pride of station, such -overweening contempt for men’s capacity because they happen to be of -lower rank than yourself. Long habits of imperious command may have -so vitiated your mind that you cannot dispossess yourself of such -injurious feelings, yet, believe me it would be much more dignified -to avoid this indecent display of them. - -I shall now, my lord, proceed to remark upon such parts of your -new publication as I think necessary for the further support of my -history, that is, where new proofs, or apparent proofs, are brought -forward. For I am, as I have already shewn, exonerated by your former -inaccuracies from noticing any part of your “_Refutation_” save where -new evidence is brought forward; and that only in deference to those -gentlemen who, being unmixed with your former works, have a right -either to my acquiescence in the weight of their testimony, or my -reasons for declining to accept it. I have however on my hands a -much more important labour than contending with your lordship, and -I shall therefore leave the greatest part of your book to those who -choose to take the trouble to compare your pretended Refutation with -my original Justification in combination with this letter, being -satisfied that in so doing I shall suffer nothing by their award. - -1st. With respect to the death of the lieutenant-governor of Almeida, -you still harp upon my phrase that it was the _only_ evidence. -The expression is common amongst persons when speaking of trials; -it is said the prisoner was condemned by such or such a person’s -evidence, never meaning that there was no other testimony, but -that in default of that particular evidence he would not have been -condemned. Now you say that there was other evidence, yet you do -not venture to affirm that Cox’s letter was not _the testimony_ -upon which the lieutenant-governor was condemned, while the extract -from lord Stuart’s letter, quoted by me, says it was. And, my lord, -his lordship’s letter to you, in answer to your enquiry, neither -contradicts nor is intended to contradict my statement; nor yet does -it in any manner deny the authenticity of my extracts, which indeed -were copied verbatim from his letter to lord Castlereagh. - -Lord Stuart says, that extract is the only thing bearing on the -question _which he can find_. Were there nothing more it would be -quite sufficient, but his papers are very voluminous, more than fifty -large volumes, and he would naturally only have looked for his letter -of the 25th July, 1812, to which you drew his attention. However, in -my notes and extracts taken from his documents, I find, under the -date of August, 1812, the following passage:— - - “The lieutenant-governor of Almeida was executed by Beresford’s - order, he, Beresford, having full powers, and the government none, - to interfere. Great interest was made to save him, but in vain. - The sentence and trial were published before being carried into - execution and were much criticized. Both the evidence and the - choice of officers were blamed; and moreover the time chosen was - one of triumph just after the battle of Salamanca, and the place - Lisbon.” - -This passage I have not marked in my book of notes as being lord -Stuart’s words; it must therefore be only taken as an abstract of -the contents of one of his papers; but comparing it with the former -passage, and with the facts that your lordship’s words are still very -vague and uncertain as to the main point in question, namely, the -evidence on which this man was really condemned, I see no reason to -doubt the substantial accuracy of the statement in my first edition, -nor the perfect accuracy of it as amended in the second edition of -my third volume, published many months ago. You will find that I -have there expunged the word “_only_,” and made the sentence exactly -to accord with the extract from lord Stuart’s letter. You will also -observe, my lord, that I never did do more than mention the simple -fact, for which I had such good authority; and that so far from -imputing blame to you for the execution of the sentence I expressly -stated that the man richly deserved death. - -Passing now to the subject of the eighth Portuguese regiment, I -will first observe, that when I said the eighth Portuguese regiment -was broken to pieces I imputed no blame to it. No regiment in the -world could have stemmed the first fury of that French column which -attacked the mountain where the eighth was posted. If the eighth was -not broken by it, as sir James Douglas’s letter would seem to imply, -what was it doing while the enemy by their flank movement gained the -crest of the position in such numbers as to make it a most daring -exploit of the ninth British regiment to attack them there. It is a -strange thing that a heavy column of French who were resolute to gain -the crest of such a position should have made “_a flank movement_,” -to avoid one wing of a regiment of Portuguese conscripts. I should -rather imagine, with all deference, that it was the conscripts -who made the flank movement, and that some optical deception had -taken place, like that which induces children while travelling -in a carriage to think the trees and rocks are moving instead of -themselves. However, with this I have nothing to do, I have given my -authority, namely, the statement of major Waller, a staff-officer -present, and the statement of colonel Taylor (for he is my nameless -eye-witness) of the ninth, the very regiment to which sir James -Douglas appeals for support of his account. These are my authorities, -and if their recollections are irreconcilable with that of sir James -Douglas it only shows how vain it is to expect perfect accuracy of -detail. I knew not of sir James Douglas’s negative testimony, but I -had two positive testimonies to my statement, and as I have still two -to one, I am within the rules of the courts of justice to which your -lordship would refer all matter of history; moreover, some grains of -allowance must be made for the natural partiality of every officer -for his own regiment. The following extract from sir James Leith’s -report on the occasion is also good circumstantial evidence in favour -of my side of the question. - -“The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different aspect, -for the enemy who had been the assailant, _having dispersed or -driven every thing there opposed to him_, was in possession of the -rocky eminence of the sierra at this part of major-general Picton’s -position _without a shot being fired at him_. Not a moment was to be -lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with -the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which -had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in columns in order to -gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form -the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude accuracy and -coolness under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed -on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of -the ridge, and who had then for the first time also perceived the -British brigade under him. Major general Leith had intended that the -thirty-eighth, second battalion, should have moved on in the rear and -to the left of the ninth regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond -the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of -the sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right -of the rocky height, the royals to have been posted (as they were) in -reserve; but the enemy _having driven every thing before them in that -quarter_, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky -ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the -British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment -had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that -purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without -halting and frequently in double quick time.” - -Here we have nothing of flank movements to avoid a wing of Portuguese -conscripts, but the plain and distinct assertion twice over, that -_every thing in front was dispersed or driven away_—and that not even -a shot was fired at the enemy. Where then was the eighth Portuguese? -Did the French column turn aside merely at the menacing looks of -these conscripts? If so, what a pity the latter had not been placed -to keep the crest of the position. There is also another difficulty. -Sir James Douglas says he was with the royals in the attack, and sir -James Leith says that the royals were held in reserve while the ninth -drove away the enemy; besides which, the eighth Portuguese might have -been broke by the enemy when the latter were mounting the hill and -yet have rallied and joined in the pursuit when the ninth had broken -the French. Moreover, my lord, as you affirm that both yourself -and the duke of Wellington _saw_ all the operations of the eighth -Portuguese on this occasion, I will extend my former extract from -colonel Taylor’s letter, wherein you will perceive something which -may perhaps lead you to doubt the accuracy of your recollection on -that head. - -“No doubt general Leith’s letter to the duke was intended to describe -the aspect of affairs in so critical a situation, and where the duke -himself could not _possibly_ have made his observations; and also -Leith wished to have due credit given to his brigade, which was not -done in the despatches. On the contrary, their exertions were made -light of, and the eighth Portuguese regiment was extolled, which I -know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or -a dozen men at the outside; but he and they were amongst the very -foremost ranks of the ninth British.”—“General Leith’s correspondence -would be an interesting document to colonel Napier, as throwing -considerable light upon the operations at Busaco, between Picton and -Hill’s corps, a very considerable extent of position _which could not -of possibility be overlooked from any other part of the field_.” - -_Charge of the nineteenth Portuguese._ Your lordship has here gained -an advantage; I cannot indeed understand some of general M‘Bean’s -expressions, but it is impossible for me to doubt his positive -statement; I believe therefore that he was in front of the convent -wall and that he charged some body of the enemy. It is however -necessary to restore the question at issue between your lordship and -myself to its true bearing. You accused me of a desire to damage the -reputation of the Portuguese army, and you asked why I did not speak -of a particular charge made by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment -at Busaco. This charge you described as being against one of _Ney’s -attacking columns_, which had, you said, _gained the ascent of the -position, and then forming advanced on the plain above_ before it was -charged by the nineteenth regiment. As this description was certainly -wrong I treated the whole as a magniloquent allusion to an advance -which I had observed to have been made by a Portuguese regiment -posted on the mountain to the right. (General M‘Bean is mistaken when -he quotes me as saying that his line was never nearer to the enemy’s -lines than a hundred yards. I spoke of _a Portuguese regiment, which -might possibly be the nineteenth_.) I never denied that any charge -had been made, but that a charge _such as described by you_ had taken -place, and in fact general M‘Bean’s letter while it confirms the -truth of your general description, by implication denies the accuracy -of the particulars. Certainly Ney’s columns never passed the front of -the light division nor advanced on the plain behind it. - -The difficulty I have to reconcile general M‘Bean’s statement with -my own recollections and with the ground and position of the light -division, may perhaps arise from the general’s meaning to use certain -terms in a less precise sense than I take them. Thus he says he was -posted in front of the convent-wall, and also on the right of the -light division; but the light division was half a mile in front -of the convent-wall, and hence I suppose he does not mean as his -words might imply immediately under the wall. He speaks also of the -light division as being to his left, but unless he speaks of the -line of battle with reference to the sinuosities of the ground, the -light division was with respect to the enemy and the convent in -his front; and if he does speak with regard to those sinuosities, -his front would have been nearly at right angles to the front of -the fifty-second and forty-third, which I suppose to be really the -case. Again he says that he charged and drove the French from _their -position_ down to the bottom of the ravine; but the enemy’s position, -properly so called, was on the opposite side of the great ravine, -and as all his artillery and cavalry, all the eighth corps and the -reserves of the sixth corps, were in order of battle there, ten -regiments, much less one, dared not to have crossed the ravine which -was of such depth that it was difficult to distinguish troops at the -bottom. I conclude therefore, general M‘Bean here means by the word -position some accidental ground on which the enemy had formed. Taking -this to be so, I will now endeavour to reconcile general M‘Bean’s -statement with my own recollection; because certainly I do still hold -my description of the action at that part to be accurate as to all -the main points. - -The edge of the table-land or tongue on which the light division -stood was very abrupt, and formed a salient angle, behind the apex -of which the forty-third and fifty-second were drawn up in a line, -the right of the one and the left of the other resting on the very -edges; the artillery was at the apex looking down the descent, and -far below the Caçadores and the ninety-fifth were spread on the -mountain side as skirmishers. Ney employed only two columns of -attack. The one came straight against the light division; the head -of it striking the right company of the fifty-second and the left -company of the forty-third was broken as against a wall; and at the -same time the wings of those regiments reinforced by the skirmishers -of the ninety-fifth, who had retired on the right of the forty-third, -advanced and lapped over the broken column on both sides. No other -troops fought with them at that point. In this I cannot be mistaken, -because my company was in the right wing of the forty-third, we -followed the enemy down to the first village which was several -hundred yards below the edge, and we returned leisurely; the ground -was open to the view on the right and on the left, we saw no other -column, and heard of none save that which we were pursuing. - -When we returned from this pursuit the light division had been -reformed on the little plain above, and some time after several -German battalions, coming from under the convent wall, passed through -our ranks and commenced skirmishing with Ney’s reserve in the woods -below. - -General M‘Bean says he saw no German infantry, and hence it is clear -that it was not at this point his charge had place. But it is also -certain Ney had only two columns of attack. Now his second, under the -command of general Marchand, moved up the hollow curve of the great -mountain to the right of the light division, and having reached a -pine-wood, which however was far below the height on which the light -division stood, he sent skirmishers out against Pack’s brigade which -was in his front. A part of Ross’s troops of artillery under the -direction of lieutenant, now colonel M‘Donald, played very sharply -upon this column in the pine-wood. I was standing in company with -captain Loyd of my own regiment, close to the guns watching their -effect, and it was then I saw the advance of the Portuguese regiment -to which I have alluded; but general M‘Bean again assures me that the -nineteenth regiment was not there. Two suppositions therefore present -themselves. The enemy’s skirmishers from this column were very -numerous. Some of them might have passed the left flank of Pack’s -skirmishers, and gathering in a body have reached the edge of the -hill on which the light division were posted, and then rising behind -it have been attacked by general M‘Bean; or, what is more likely, the -skirmishers, or a small flanking detachment from the column which -attacked the light division, might have passed under the edge of the -descent on the right of the light division, and gathering in a like -manner have risen under general M‘Bean’s line. - -Either of these suppositions, and especially the last, would render -the matter clear to me in all points save that of attacking the -enemy’s position, which as I have before observed, may be only a -loose expression of the general’s to denote the ground which the -French opposed to him had attained on our position. This second -supposition seems also to be confirmed by a fact mentioned by general -M‘Bean, namely, that the enemy’s guns opened on him immediately -after his charge. The French guns did open also on that part of the -light division which followed the enemy down the hill to the first -village, thus the time that the nineteenth charged seems marked, -and as I was one of those who went to the village, it also accounts -for my not seeing that charge. However considering all things, I -must admit that I was so far in error that I really did not, nor -do I now possess any clear recollection of this exploit of the -nineteenth regiment; and in proof of the difficulty of attaining -strict accuracy on such occasions, I can here adduce the observation -of general M‘Bean viz. that he saw no Germans save the artillery; -yet there was a whole brigade of that nation near the convent wall, -and they advanced and skirmished sharply with the enemy soon after -the charge of the nineteenth would appear to have taken place. Very -often also, things appear greater to those who perform them than -to the bye-standers, and I would therefore ask how many men the -nineteenth lost in the charge, how many prisoners it took, and how -many French were opposed to it? for I still maintain that neither by -the nineteenth Portuguese, nor by any other regiment, save those of -the light division, was any charge made which called for particular -notice on my part as a general historian. I am not bound to relate -all the minor occurrences of a great battle; “those things belong to -the history of regiments,” is the just observation of Napoleon. Yet -general M‘Bean may be assured that no desire to underrate either his -services or the gallantry of the Portuguese soldiers ever actuated -me, and to prove it, if my third volume should ever come to a third -edition, I will take his letter as my ground for noticing this -charge, although I will not promise to make it appear so prominent as -your lordship would have me to do. - -Your lordship closes this subject by the following observation. “As -colonel Napier represents himself as having been an eye-witness of -a gallant movement made by a certain Portuguese regiment,—which -regiment he does not profess to know,—but which movement took place -a mile distant from the position given to the nineteenth regiment, -it is evident he could not also have been an eye-witness of what was -passing a mile to the left. Nor can he therefore negative what is -said to have occurred there. It is extraordinary that the historian -should not have perceived the predicament in which he has placed -himself.” Now your lordship does not say that the two events occurred -at the _same time_, wherefore your conclusion is what the renowned -Partridge calls a “_non sequitur_;” and as general M‘Bean expressly -affirms his charge to have taken place on the _right_ of the light -division, it was not absolutely necessary that I should look to the -_left_ in order to see the said charge. Hence the predicament in -which I am placed, is that of being obliged to remark your lordship’s -inability to reason upon your own materials. - -Your next subject is captain Squire, but I will pass over that -matter as having been I think sufficiently discussed before, and -I am well assured that the memory of that very gallant and able -officer will never suffer from your lordship’s angry epithets. -Campo Mayor follows. In your “_Further Strictures_” you said that -colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action; you now show in -detail that he was actively engaged in it. You denied also that he -was in support of the advanced guard, and yet quote his own report -explaining how he happened to be separated from the advanced guard -just before the action, thus proving that he was marching in support -of it. You refuse any credit to the statements of captain Gregory and -colonel Light; and you endeavour to discredit and trample upon the -evidence of the officer of the thirteenth dragoons who was an actor -in the charge of that regiment, but with respect to him a few remarks -are necessary. - -1º. The accuracy of that gentleman’s narrative concerns my -Justification very little, except in one part. I published it whole -as he gave it to me, because I thought it threw light upon the -subject. I think so still, and I see nothing in your lordship’s -observation to make me doubt its general correctness. But it was -only the part which I printed in italics that concerned me. I had -described a remarkable combat of cavalry, wherein the hostile -squadrons _had twice passed through each other_, and then the British -put the French to flight. Your lordship ridiculed this as a nursery -tale; you called my description of it a “_country dance_,” and you -still call it my “_scenic effect_.” Did the hostile masses meet -twice, and did the British then put their opponents to flight? These -were the real questions. The unusual fact of two cavalry bodies -charging through each other, was the point in dispute; it is scenic, -but is it true? Now my first authority, whom I have designated as an -“_eye-witness_,” was colonel Colborne; my second authority colonel -Dogherty of the thirteenth dragoons, an _actor_; and when your -lordship so coolly says the latter’s statement does not afford “the -slightest support to my scenic description,” I must take the liberty -of laughing at you. Why, my lord, you really seem disposed to treat -common sense as if it were a subaltern. Colonel Dogherty bears me out -even to the letter; for as the second charge took place with the same -violence that the third did, if the hostile bodies had not passed -through to their original position, the French must have fled towards -the allied army; but they fled towards Badajos. The English must -therefore have passed through and turned, and it was then that in the -personal conflict with the sabre which followed the second charge the -thirteenth dragoons defeated the French. - -My lord, you will never by such special pleading, I know of no other -term by which I can properly designate your argument, you will never, -I say, by such special pleading, hide your bad generalship at Campo -Mayor. The proofs of your errors there are too many and too clear; -the errors themselves too glaring too gross to leave you the least -hope; the same confusion of head which prevented you from seizing the -advantages then offered to you seems to prevail in your writing; and -yet while impeaching every person’s credit where their statements -militate against your object, you demand the most implicit confidence -in your own contradictory assertions and preposterous arguments. My -lord, you only fatigue yourself and your readers by your unwieldy -floundering, you are heavy and throw much mud about; like one of -those fine Andalusian horses so much admired in the Peninsula, you -prance and curvet and foam and labour in your paces but you never get -on. At Campo Mayor you had an enormous superiority of troops, the -enemy were taken by surprize, they were in a plain, their cavalry -were beaten, their artillery-drivers cut down, their infantry, hemmed -in by your horsemen and under the play of your guns, were ready to -surrender; yet you suffered them to escape and to carry off their -captured artillery and then you blamed your gallant troops. The enemy -escaped from you, my lord, but you cannot escape from the opinion -of the world by denying the truth of all statements which militate -against you. - -_The march by Merida._ If you had said at once that the duke of -Wellington forbade you to go by Merida, there would have been an -end of all my arguments against your skill; yet it by no means -follows that these arguments would be futile in themselves, though -not applicable to you personally. New combinations were presented, -and the duke of Wellington might very probably have changed his -instructions had he been present on the spot. But, why was this your -justification withheld until now? why was so plain, so clear, so -decisive a defence of yourself never thought of before? and why is -it now smothered with such a heap of arguments as you have added, -to prove that you ought not to have gone by Merida? Have you found -out that I am not such a bad reasoner upon military affairs as you -were pleased to style me in your former publication? Have you found -out that pleading high rank is not a sufficient answer to plain and -well supported statements? It is good however that you have at last -condescended to adopt a different mode of proceeding. I applaud you -for it, and with the exception of two points I will leave you in the -full enjoyment of any triumph which the force of your arguments may -procure you; always, however, retaining my right to assume that your -lordship’s memory with respect to the duke of Wellington’s negative, -may have been as treacherous as it was about your own letter to the -junta of Badajos. - -I have therefore nothing to add to the arguments I have already used -in my Justification, and in my History, in favour of the march to -Merida; if I am wrong the world will so judge me. But the two points -I have reserved are, 1º. That you assert now, in direct contradiction -to your former avowal, that the march to Merida would have been one -of _four_ days instead of _two_; and that the road by Albuquerque -was the only one which you could use. In answer to this last part -I observe, that the French before, and the Spaniards then, marched -by the road of Montigo; and that a year after, when lord Hill’s -expedition against Almaraz took place, the whole of his battering -and pontoon train, with all the ammunition belonging to it, moved -with great facility in three days from Elvas, by this very road -of Montigo, to Merida; and Elvas as your Lordship knows is rather -further than Campo Mayor from Merida. - -The second point is that mode of conducting a controversy which I -have so often had occasion to expose in your former publications, -viz. mis-stating my arguments to suit your own reasoning. I never -said that you should have attempted, or could have succeeded in a -“_coup de main_” against Badajos; I never even said you should have -commenced the siege immediately. What I did say was, that by the -march through Merida you could have placed your army at once between -Badajos and the French army, and so have thrown the former upon its -own resources at a most inconvenient time; that in this situation -you could have more readily thrown your bridge at Jerumenha, and -proceeded at your convenience. - -Further than this I do not think it necessary to dissect and expose -your new fallacies and contradictions; it requires too much time. You -have written upwards of six hundred pages, four hundred of them I -have before demolished; but my own volumes are rather thick and to me -at least much more important than yours; your lordship must therefore -spare me the other two hundred, or at least permit me to treat them -lightly. I will leave the whole siege of Badajos to you, it is matter -of opinion and I will not follow your example in overloading what -is already clear by superfluity of argument. I will only expose one -error into which you have been led by colonel La Marre’s work. On his -authority you say the garrison on the 10th of April had three months’ -provisions; but the following extract from a letter of marshal -Soult’s to the prince of Wagram will prove that La Marre is wrong:— - - - _“Seville, 18th April._ - -“From the 11th of this month the place was provisioned, according to -the report of general Phillipon, for _two months and some days_ as to -subsistence; and there are 100 milliers of powder,” &c. &c. - - -Let us now come to the _battle of Albuera_. - -You still doubt that the position as I explained it is four miles -long, and you rest upon the superior accuracy of major Mitchell’s -plan, on which you have measured the distance with your compasses. I -also am in possession of one of major Mitchell’s plans, and I find -by the aid of my pair of compasses, that even from the left of the -Portuguese _infantry_ (without noticing Otway’s squadron of cavalry) -to the right of the Spanish line, as placed at the termination of the -battle, is exactly four miles; and every body knows that a line over -the actual ground will from the latter’s rises and falls exceed the -line on paper. Wherefore as my measurement does not coincide with -your lordship’s, and as we are both Irishmen, I conclude that either -your compasses are too short or that mine are too long. - -Your grand cheval de bataille is, however, the numbers of the armies -on each side. Thirty-eight long pages you give us, to prove what -cannot be proved, namely, that my estimate is wrong and yours right; -and at the end you are just where you began. All is uncertain, there -are no returns, no proof! the whole matter is one of guess upon -probabilities as to the allies, and until lately was so also with -respect to the French. - -Mine was a very plain statement. I named a certain number as the -nearest approximation I could make, and when my estimate was -questioned by you I explained as briefly as possible the foundation -of that estimate. You give in refutation thirty-eight pages of most -confused calculations, and what is the result? why that the numbers -of the allies on your own shewing still remain uncertain; and your -estimate of the French, as I will shew by the bye, is quite erroneous. - -I said in my History, you had more than two thousand cavalry in the -field, and in my Justification I gave reasons for believing you -had nearly three thousand; you now acknowledge two thousand; my -history then is not far wrong. But your lordship does not seem to -know the composition of your own divisions. General Long’s morning -states, now before me, do not include general Madden’s cavalry. That -officer’s regiments were the fifth and eighth, and if I mistake not -the sixth and ninth also were under him; those in general Long’s -division are the first and seventh. I find from general Madden’s -own account of his services, given in the Military Calendar, that -a part of his brigade, namely, the eighth regiment, under colonel -Windham, was in the battle of Albuera. Now taking the eighth to -be between two hundred and seventy and two hundred and eighty-one -troopers, which were the respective strengths of the first and -seventh regiments in Long’s Division on the 29th of May, I have above -eighteen hundred troopers, namely, fifteen hundred and eighty-seven -in Long’s division, and two hundred and seventy-five in the eighth -regiment, and to these I add about two hundred and fifty officers and -sergeants, making in all more than two thousand sabres. In general -Long’s states of the 8th of May, those two Portuguese regiments -had indeed fewer under arms than on the 29th, but then six hundred -and eighty-nine men and forty-four serjeants and trumpeters were -on command, of which more than four hundred belonged to those two -Portuguese regiments. Many of these men must surely have joined -before the battle, because such an unusual number on command could -only be temporary. Again I find in the state of the 29th of May, one -hundred and fifteen serjeants trumpeters and troopers returned as -prisoners of war; and when the killed and wounded in the battle are -added, we may fairly call the British and Portuguese cavalry above -two thousand. Your lordship admits the Spaniards to have had seven -hundred and fifty; but I will for clearness place this in a tabular -form: - - -GENERAL LONG’S STATES. - - 8th May. - Serjeants, trumpeters, and troopers. - - Present under arms 1576 - On command 733 - Prisoners of war 115 - ———— - 2424 - 29th May. - - Present 1739 - Command 522 - Prisoners of war 127 - ———— - 2388 - ———— - - - Median estimate for the 16th of May. - - Present 8th May 1576 - Ditto 29th May 1739 - ———— - 2)3315 - ———— - 1657½ - 270 8th Portuguese regt. - ———— - 1927 - 127 Prisoners of war. - ———— - 2054 - 750 Spaniards. - ———— - 2804 - - Deduct prisoners on - the 8th 115 - ———— - Total 2689 - ———— - -To which are to be added the killed and wounded of the -Anglo-Portuguese, and the men rejoined from command. - -Thus, the statements in my History and in my Justification are both -borne out; for the numbers are above two thousand as set down in the -first, and nearly three thousand as stated in the last. Moreover, -a general historian is not blameable for small inaccuracies. If -he has reasonably good authority for any fact he cannot be justly -censured for stating that fact, and you should make a distinction -between that which is stated in my History and that which is stated -in my controversial writings. All mistakes in the latter however -trifling are fair; but to cavil at trifles in the former rather hurts -yourself. Now with respect to the artillery there is an example of -this cavilling, and also an illustration of your lordship’s mode of -raising a very confused argument on a very plain fact. I said there -were so many guns in the field, and that so many were nine-pounders; -you accused me of arbitrarily deciding upon their calibre. In reply -I shewed you that I took the _number_ on the report of colonel -Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery, the _calibre_ upon -the authority of your own witness and quarter-master-general, sir -Benjamin D’Urban. The latter was wrong and there the matter should -have ended. Your lordship, however, requires me, as a mark of -ingenuousness, to acknowledge as my mistake that which is the mistake -of sir Benjamin D’Urban, and you give a grand table, with the gross -number of pounds of iron as if the affair had been between two ships. -You set down in your columns the statements of the writer of a note -upon your Strictures, the statement of the Strictures themselves, -and my statement; and then come on with your own observations as -if there were three witnesses on your side. But the author of the -note is again your witness D’Urban, who thus shews himself incorrect -both as to number and weight; and the author of the Strictures is -yourself. This is not an _ingenuous_, though it is an _ingenious_ -mode of multiplying testimony. In your Further Strictures also you -first called in sir B. D’Urban in person, you then used his original -memoir, you also caused him to write anonymously a running commentary -upon yours and his own statements, and now you comment in your own -name upon your own anonymous statements, thus making five testimonies -out of two. - -The answer is simple and plain. When I took sir Benjamin D’Urban as -a guide he led me wrong; and you instead of visiting his error upon -his own head visit it upon mine, and require me and your readers -to follow him implicitly upon all points while to do so avails for -your defence, but not when they contradict it. From sir B. D’Urban -I took the _calibre_ of the allies’ guns employed in the battle of -Albuera, and he was wrong! From him, if I had not possessed sir A. -Dickson’s official return, I should also have taken the _number_ of -guns, and I should have been wrong, because he calls them thirty-four -instead of thirty-eight. He also (see page 26 of the Appendix to your -Further Strictures) says that the Spaniards had six guns, whereas -Dickson says, they had but four; and if his six guns were reckoned -there would have been forty pieces of artillery, which he however -reduced to thirty-four by another error, namely, leaving out a whole -brigade of German artillery. On sir Benjamin’s authority I called -major Dickson the commander of the artillery, and this also was -wrong. From sir Benjamin D’Urban’s Memoir, I took the statement that -the fourth division arrived on the field of battle at _six o’clock -in the morning_, and yet I am assured that they did not arrive until -nine o’clock, and after the action had commenced. And this last is a -very serious error because it gives the appearance of skill to your -lordship’s combinations for battle and to sir Benjamin’s arrangements -for the execution, which they do not merit, if, as I now believe, -that division arrived at nine o’clock. But the latter hour would be -quite in keeping with the story of the cavalry going to forage, and -both together would confirm another report very current, namely, -that your lordship did not anticipate any battle on the 16th of May. -Setting this however aside, I know not why, in the face of all these -glaring errors and a multitude of smaller ones, I am to take sir -Benjamin D’Urban’s authority upon any disputed point. - -I will now, my lord, admit one complete triumph which you have -attained in your dissertation upon the numbers of the troops. I did -say that from the 20th of March to the 16th of May, was only twenty -days, and though the oversight is so palpably one that could not be -meant to deceive, I will not deny your right to ridicule and to laugh -at it. I have laughed at so many of your lordship’s oversights that -it would be unfair to deny you this opportunity for retaliation, -which I also admit you have used moderately. - -I have since I wrote my Justification procured some proofs about the -French numbers, you will find them in the following extracts from -the duke of Dalmatia’s correspondence of that time. They are worth -your attention. They throw some light upon the numbers of the allies, -and one of them shows unquestionably that my estimate of the French -numbers was, as I have before said, too high instead of too low. I -give the translations to avoid the trouble and expense of printing in -two languages, and I beg your lordship to observe that these extracts -are not liable to the praise of that generous patriotism which you -alluded to in speaking of French authors, because they were written -before the action and for the emperor’s information, and because it -was the then interest of the writer rather to exaggerate than to -lessen his own numbers, in order to give his sovereign an idea of his -activity and zeal. - - - Extract of a letter from MARSHAL SOULT to the PRINCE of WAGRAM. - - _Seville, 22d April, 1811._ - -“General Latour Maubourg announces to me that general Beresford -commanding the Anglo-Portuguese army, and the Spanish generals -Castaños and Ballesteros with the remains of the corps of their -nation are united at Zafra, and I am assured that the whole of their -forces is twenty-five thousand men, of which three thousand are -cavalry.” - -“Colonel Quennot of the ninth regiment of dragoons, who commands upon -the line of the Tinto and observes the movements on that side as far -as Ayamonte, informs me that on the 18th and 19th, general Blake -disembarked ten thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry between -the mouths of the Piedra and the Guadiana. These troops come from -Cadiz, they have cannon, and Blake can unite in that part fifteen -thousand men.” - - - Ditto to Ditto. - - “_May 4th, 1811._ - -“Cordova is menaced by a corps of English Portuguese and Spaniards, -many troops are concentrated in Estremadura, Badajos is invested, -Blake _has_ united on the Odiel an army of fifteen to sixteen -thousand men.” “I depart in four days with _twenty thousand -men_, _three thousand horses_, _and thirty pieces of cannon_ to -drive across the Guadiana the enemy’s corps which are spread in -Estremadura, to disengage Badajos and to facilitate the arrival of -count D’Erlon. If the troops which that general brings can unite -with mine, and if the troops coming from the armies of the north and -centre, and which I have already in part arranged, arrive in time, -I shall have in Estremadura, thirty-five thousand men five thousand -horses and forty pieces of artillery.” - - -Now, my lord, I find by the imperial returns that count D’Erlon -marched towards Andalusia with twelve thousand men present under -arms, and that he did not arrive until the 14th June. There remain -three thousand men as coming from the armies of the north and centre, -to make up the thirty-five thousand men mentioned by Soult, and I -find the following passage in his letter to the prince of Wagram, -dated the 9th of May. - -“The 12th, I shall be at Fuente Cantos, general Bron commands there, -he brings with him the first reinforcement coming from the armies of -the north and centre, and I shall employ him in the expedition.” - -Hence, if we take the first reinforcement at half of the whole -number expected, we add one thousand five hundred men and five guns -to the twenty thousand, making a total for the battle of Albuera of -twenty-one thousand five hundred men of all arms, and thirty-five -guns. From these must be deducted the detachments left at Villalba, -stragglers on the march, and some hussars sent to scout on the -flanks, for I find in general Madden’s narrative of his services, -that he was watched by part of the enemy’s cavalry on the day of the -battle. - -I have now, my lord, given you positive and undeniable testimony -that the French numbers were overrated instead of being underrated -by me, and I have given you corroborative evidence, that the number -of the allies was as great as I have stated it to be; for we find -in the above extracts Soult giving Blake fifteen thousand men, of -which, at least, seven hundred are cavalry, _before_ the battle, and -twenty-five thousand, of which three thousand are cavalry, to your -lordship, Castaños, &c. We find the French general’s information, -taking into consideration the troops which joined Blake in the -Niebla, not differing essentially from Mr. Henry Wellesley’s report -of the numbers of Blake’s army, namely twelve thousand, of which one -thousand one hundred were cavalry; and we find both in some manner -confirmed by lord Wellington’s repeated statements of the forces of -Blake’s army after the battle, that is to say, making a reasonable -allowance for the numbers lost in the action. Soult and Mr. Wellesley -also agree in making out the Spanish cavalry more numerous than your -lordship will admit of. Blake alone had from seven to eleven hundred -cavalry, following the statement of these persons, and there was in -addition the corps of Penne Villemur, which, as I have said in my -Justification, was not less than five hundred. - -In closing your calculation of numbers you exultingly observe that it -is the first time you ever heard of a general’s being censured for -keeping one-third of his force in reserve and _beating the enemy with -the other two_. Aye—but this involves the very pith of the question. -At Albuera the _general_ did not beat the enemy. My lord, you have -bestowed great pains on your argument about the battle of Albuera, -and far be it from me to endeavour to deprive you of any addition to -your reputation which you may thus obtain. I have no desire to rob -you of any well-earned laurels, my observations were directed against -what appeared to me your bad generalship; if I have not succeeded in -pointing that out to the satisfaction of the public I have nothing -further to offer in fairness and certainly will not by any vile -sophistry endeavour to damage your fame. But do not think that I -acknowledge the force of your present arguments. If I do not take the -trouble to dissect them for reasons before mentioned, be assured it -is not from any want of points to fasten upon; indeed, my lord, your -book is very weak, there are many failures in it, and a few more I -will touch upon that you may estimate my forbearance at its proper -value. I will begin with your observations on captain Gregory’s -testimony, not in defence of that gentleman’s credit, for in truth, -as his and the other officers’ evidence is given to facts of which -they were personally cognizant I cannot pay the slightest regard to -your confused arguments in opposition to their honour. I am aware -that you do not mean to impeach anything but their memory; but if I -were to attempt to defend them from your observations it would appear -as if I thought otherwise. My lord, you have missed captain Gregory, -but you have hit yourself very hard. - -Behold the proof. - -At page 167 you say, “I will now point out the gross and palpable -errors of captain Gregory’s narrative.”—“He says, that on receiving -the intelligence from an orderly of the thirteenth dragoons who came -in from a picquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was -crossing the river, general Long galloped off.” I conclude to the -right, “and found half the army across,” and to the right. _Why, -every other authority has stated that the enemy’s first movement was -from the wood along the right bank of the Albuera upon our left_; -and that we were not at all aware of their intention to cross above -our right and there make an attack, till after their first movement -was considerably advanced and the action had actually commenced with -Godinot’s corps on the opposite side of the river to our left. It -is quite surprising that colonel Napier should have overlooked a -blunder so gross as to destroy the value of the whole of his friend’s -testimony. - -Now, my lord, compare the passage marked by italics (pardon me the -italics) in the above, with the following extract from your own -despatch. - -“The enemy on the 16th did not long delay his attack: at eight -o’clock” (the very time mentioned by captain Gregory,) “he was -observed to be in movement, and his cavalry were seen passing the -rivulet of Albuera considerably _above our right, and shortly after_, -he marched, out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry -and two heavy columns of infantry, posting them to our front, _as if -to attack the village and bridge of Albuera_. During this time he -was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river _beyond -our right_, and it was not long before his intention appeared to be -to turn us by that flank.” Your lordship has, indeed in another part -discarded the authority of your despatch, as appears most necessary -in treating of this battle, but is rather hard measure to attack me -so fiercely for having had some faith in it. - -With respect to sir Wm. Lumley’s letter I cannot but admire -his remembrance of the exact numbers of the British cavalry. A -recollection of twenty-three years, founded on a few hasty words -spoken on a field of battle is certainly a rare thing; yet I was -not quite unprepared for such precision, for if I do not greatly -mistake, sir William was the general, who at Santarem edified the -head-quarters by a report, that “_the enemy were certainly going to -move either to their right or to their left, to their front or to -their rear_.” One would suppose that so exact a person could never be -in error; and yet the following extract from general Harvey’s journal -would lead me to suppose that his memory was not quite so clear and -powerful as he imagines. Sir William Lumley says, that to the best -of his recollection he was not aware of the advance of the fuzileers -and Harvey’s brigade until they had passed his left flank; that they -then came under his eye; that as the rain and smoke cleared away he -saw them as one body moving to engage, and although they had become -so oblique, relative to the point where he stood, that he could not -well speak as to their actual distance from one another, there did -not appear any improper interval between them. - -Now hear general Harvey! - -“The twenty-third and one battalion of the seventh fuzileers were in -line. The other battalion at quarter distance, forming square, at -every halt to cover the right which the cavalry continued to menace. -_Major-general Lumley, with the British cavalry, was also in column -of half squadrons in rear of our right and moved with us, being too -weak to advance against the enemy’s cavalry._” - -There, my lord, you see that generals as well as doctors differ. Sir -W. Lumley, twenty-three years after the event, recollects seeing the -fuzileers and Harvey’s brigade at such a distance, and so obliquely, -that he could not speak to their actual distance from one another. -General Harvey writing the day after the event, says, sir William -Lumley had his cavalry in half squadrons close in rear of these -very brigades, and was moving with them! This should convince your -lordship that it is not wise to cry out and cavil at every step in -the detail of a battle. - -As to the term _gap_, I used the word without the mark of quotation, -because it was my own and it expressed mine and your meaning very -well. You feared that the cavalry of the French would overpower ours, -and break in on your rear and flank when the support of the fuzileers -was taken away. I told you that general Cole had placed Harvey’s -brigade in the _gap_, that is, in such a situation that the French -could not break in. I knew very well that Harvey’s brigade followed -in support of the attack of the fuzileers because he says so in his -journal; but he also says, that both ours and the enemy’s cavalry -made a corresponding movement. Thus the fear of the latter breaking -in was chimerical, especially as during the march Harvey halted, -formed, received and beat off a charge of the French horsemen. - -But I have not yet done with sir W. Lumley’s numbers. How curious it -is that brigade-major Holmes’s verbal report on the field of battle, -as recollected by sir William, should give the third dragoon guards -and the fourth dragoons, forming the heavy brigade, the exact number -of five hundred and sixty men, when the same brigade-major Holmes -in his written morning state of the 8th of May, one week before the -battle, gives to those regiments seven hundred and fifty-two troopers -present under arms, and one hundred and eighty-three on command. -What became of the others in the interval? Again, on the 29th of -May, thirteen days after the battle, he writes down these regiments -six hundred and ninety-five troopers present under arms, one hundred -and eighty-two on command, and thirty-two prisoners of war. In both -cases also the sergeants, trumpeters, &c. are to be added; and I -mark this circumstance, because in the French returns all persons -from the highest officer to the conductors of carriages are included -in the strength of men. I imagine neither of the distinguished -regiments alluded to will be willing to admit that their ranks were -full before and after, but empty on the day of battle. It is contrary -to the English custom. Your lordship, also, in a parenthesis (page -125) says that the thirteenth dragoons had not three hundred men -at this time to produce; but this perverse brigade-major Holmes -writes that regiment down also on the 8th of May, at three hundred -and fifty-seven troopers present under arms, and sixty-three on -command; and on the 29th of May, three hundred and forty-one present -seventy-nine on command, eighty-two prisoners-of-war. Staff-officers -are notoriously troublesome people. - -One point more, and I have done. - -You accuse me of having placed sir A. Dickson in a position where he -never was, and you give a letter from that officer to prove the fact. -You also deny the correctness of sir Julius Hartman’s statement, and -you observe that even were it accurate, he does not speak of an order -to retreat, but an order to cover a retreat. Now to say that I place -Dickson in a wrong position is scarcely fair, because I only use sir -Julius Hartman’s words, and that in my Justification; whereas in my -History, I have placed colonel Dickson’s guns exactly in the position -where he himself says they were. If your lordship refers to my work -you will see that it is so; and surely it is something akin to -quibbling, to deny, that artillery posted to defend a bridge was not -at the bridge because its long range enabled it to effect its object -from a distance. - -You tell me also that I had your quarter-master general’s evidence -to counteract sir Julius Hartman’s relative to this retreat. But sir -Benjamin D’Urban had already misled me more than once; and why, my -lord, did you garble sir A Dickson’s communication? I will answer for -you. It contained positive evidence that _a retreat was ordered_. -Your lordship may ask how I know this. I will tell you that also. -Sir Alexander Dickson at my request sent me the substance of his -communication to you at the same time. You are now I hope, convinced -that it is not weakness which induces me to neglect a complete -analysis of your work. I do assure you it is very weak in every part. - -My lord, you have mentioned several other letters which you have -received from different officers, colonel Arbuthnot, colonel -Colborne, &c. as confirming your statements, but you have not, as in -the cases of sir James Douglas and general M‘Bean, where they were -wholly on your own side, given these letters in full; wherefore, -seeing the gloss you have put upon lord Stuart’s communication, and -this garbling of sir A. Dickson’s letter, I have a right to suppose -that the others do not bear up your case very strongly,—probably they -contradict it on some points as sir Alexander Dickson’s does. I shall -now give the latter entire. - -“The Portuguese artillery under my command (twelve guns) attached to -general Hamilton’s division was posted on favourable ground about -750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and at least 700 yards S. W. of -the village of Albuera, their fire bore effectually upon the bridge -and the road from it to the bridge, and I received my orders to take -this position from lord Beresford when the enemy threatened their -main attack at the bridge. At a certain period of the day, I should -judge it to have been about the time the fourth division moved to -attack, _I received a verbal order in English from Don Jose Luiz de -Souza_ (now Conde de Villa Real, an aid-de-camp of lord Beresford) -_to retire by the Valverde road, or upon the Valverde road, I am not -sure which_; to this I strongly expressed words of doubt, and he then -rode off towards Albuera; as, however, I could see no reason for -falling back, and the infantry my guns belonged to being at hand, I -continued in action, and though I believe I limbered up once or twice -previous to the receipt of this message and moved a little to improve -my position, I never did so to retire. Soon after Don Jose left me, -seeing lord Beresford and some of his staff to my right, I rode -across to satisfy myself that I was acting correctly, but perceiving -that the French were giving way I did not mention the order I had -received, and as soon as lord Beresford saw me, he asked what state -my guns were in, and then ordered me to proceed as quickly as I could -with my nine-pounders to the right, which I did in time to bring them -into action against the retiring masses of the enemy. The foregoing -is the substance of an explanation given to lord Beresford which he -lately requested.” - -Thus you have the whole of what sir Alexander Dickson (as he tells -me) wrote to you; and here therefore I might stop, my lord, to -enjoy your confusion. I might harp upon this fact, as being so -formidable a bar to your lordship’s argument, that rather than give -it publicity, you garbled your own correspondent’s letter. But my -object is not to gain a triumph over you, it is to establish the -truth, and I will not follow your example by suppressing what may -tend to serve your argument and weaken mine. It is of no consequence -to me whether you gave orders for a retreat or not. I said in my -History that you did not do so, thinking the weight of testimony to -be on that side, and it was only when your anonymous publications -called forth new evidence that I began to doubt the correctness of my -first statement.[5] But if the following observation in sir Alexander -Dickson’s letter can serve your argument, you are welcome to it, -although it is not contained in the substance of what he wrote to -you; and here also I beg of you to remember that this letter of sir -Alexander’s was written to me _after my Justification_ was printed. - -“I had never mentioned the matter to any one, except to Hartman, with -whom I was on the greatest habits of intimacy, and indeed I was from -the first induced to attribute Souza’s message to some mistake, as -neither in my conversation with lord Beresford was there any allusion -to it, nor did any thing occur to indicate to me that he was aware of -my having received such an order.” - -Your lordship will no doubt deny that the Count of Villa Real had -any authority from you to order this retreat, so be it; but then you -call upon me and others to accept this Count of Villa Real’s evidence -upon other points, and you attempt to discredit some of my witnesses, -because their testimony is opposed to the testimony of the Count of -Villa Real; if you deny him at Albuera, you cannot have him at Campo -Mayor. And behold, my lord, another difficulty you thus fall into. -Your publications are intended to prove your talent as a general, and -yet we find you acknowledging, that in the most critical period of -this great and awful battle of Albuera, your own staff had so little -confidence in your ability, that sir Henry Hardinge took upon himself -to win it for you, while the Conde de Villa Real took upon himself to -lose it; the one ordering an advance, which gained the day; the other -ordering a retreat, which would have ruined all. My lord, be assured -that such liberties are never taken by the staff of great commanders. - -In ancient times it was reckoned a worthy action to hold the mirror -of truth up to men placed in high stations, when the partiality of -friends, the flattery of dependents, and their own human vanity -had given them too exalted notions of their importance. You, my -lord, are a man in a high station, and you have evidently made a -false estimate of your importance, or you would not treat men of -inferior rank with so much disdain as you have expressed in these -your publications; wherefore it may be useful, and certainly will be -just, to let you know the judgment which others have formed of your -talents. The following character was sketched about two months after -the battle of Albuera. The author was a man of great ability, used -to public affairs, experienced in the study of mankind, opposed to -you by no personal interest, and withal had excellent opportunities -of observing your disposition; and surely his acuteness will not -be denied by those who have read your three publications in this -controversy. - -“Marshal Beresford appears to possess a great deal of information -upon all subjects connected with the military establishments of the -kingdom, the departments attached to the army, and the resources of -the country. But nothing appears to be well arranged and digested in -his head; he never fixes upon a point, but deviates from his subject, -and overwhelms a very slender thread of argument by a profusion -of illustrations, stories, and anecdotes, most of which relate to -himself. He is captious and obstinate, and difficult to be pleased. -He appears to grasp at every thing for his own party, without -considering what it would be fair, and reasonable, and decent to -expect from the other party.” - -I now take leave of you, my lord, and notwithstanding all that has -passed, I take leave of you with respect, because I think you to -be a brave soldier, and even an able organizer of an army. I know -that you have served your country long, I firmly believe to the -utmost of your ability, and I admit that ability to have been very -considerable; but history, my lord, deals with very great men, and -you sink in the comparison. She will speak of you as a general far -above mediocrity, as one who has done much and a great deal of it -well, yet when she looks at Campo Mayor and Albuera she will not -rank you amongst great commanders, and if she should ever cast her -penetrating eyes upon this your present publication, she will not -class you amongst great writers. - - - REPLY - TO THE - _Third Article in the Quarterly Review_ - ON - COL. NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. - - ‘Now there are two of them; and one has been called _Crawley_, and - the other is _Honest Iago_.’—OLD PLAY. - -This article is the third of its family, and like its predecessors -is only remarkable for malignant imbecility and systematic violation -of truth. The malice is apparent to all; it remains to show the -imbecility and falseness. - -The writer complains of my ill-breeding, and with that valour which -belongs to the _incognito_ menaces me with his literary vengeance -for my former comments. His vengeance! Bah! The ass’ ears peep too -far beyond the lion’s hide. He shall now learn that I always adapt -my manners to the level of the person I am addressing; and though -his petty industry indicates a mind utterly incapable of taking an -enlarged view of any subject he shall feel that chastisement awaits -his malevolence. And first with respect to the small sketches in my -work which he pronounces to be the very worst _plans_ possible. It is -expressly stated on the face of each that they are only ‘_Explanatory -Sketches_,’ his observations therefore are a mere ebullition of -contemptible spleen; but I will now show my readers why they are only -sketches and not accurate plans. - -When I first commenced my work, amongst the many persons from whom -I sought information was sir George Murray, and this in consequence -of a message from him, delivered to me by sir John Colborne, to the -effect, that if I would call upon him he would answer any question I -put to him on the subject of the Peninsular War. The interview took -place, but sir George Murray, far from giving me information seemed -intent upon persuading me to abandon my design; repeating continually -that it was his intention to write the History of the War himself. -He appeared also desirous of learning what sources of information -I had access to. I took occasion to tell him that the duke of -Wellington had desired me to ask him particularly for the ‘_Order of -Movements_,’ as essentially necessary to a right understanding of -the campaign and the saving of trouble; because otherwise I should -have to search out the different movements through a variety of -documents. Sir George replied that he knew of no such orders, that -he did not understand me. To this I could only reply that I spoke -as the duke had desired me, and knew no more.[6] I then asked his -permission to have reduced plans made from captain Mitchell’s fine -drawings, informing him that officer was desirous so to assist me. -His reply was uncourteously vehement—‘No! certainly not!’ I proposed -to be allowed to inspect those drawings if I were at any time at a -loss about ground. The answer was still ‘No!’ And as sir George then -intimated to me that my work could only be a momentary affair for the -booksellers and would not require plans I took my leave. I afterwards -discovered that he had immediately caused captain Mitchell’s drawings -to be locked up and sealed. - -I afterwards waited on sir Willoughby Gordon, the -quarter-master-general, who treated me with great kindness, and -sent me to the chief of the plan department in his office with an -order to have access to everything which might be useful. From that -officer I received every attention; but he told me that sir George -Murray had been there the day before to borrow all the best plans -relating to the Peninsular War, and that consequently little help -could be given to me. Now Captain Mitchell’s drawings were made by -him after the war, by order of the government, and at the public -expense. He remained in the Peninsula for more than two years with -pay as a staff-officer, his extra expenses were also paid:[7] he -was attended constantly by two Spanish dragoons as a protection and -the whole mission was costly. Never was money better laid out, for -I believe no topographical drawings, whether they be considered for -accuracy of detail, perfection of manner, or beauty of execution, -ever exceeded Mitchell’s. But those drawings belong to the public and -were merely placed in sir George Murray’s official keeping. I believe -they are still in his possession and it would be well if some member -of parliament were to ask why they are thus made the property of a -private man?[8] - -Here I cannot refrain from observing that, in the course of my -labours, I have asked information of many persons of various nations, -even of Spaniards, after my first volume was published, and when -the unfavourable view I took of their exertions was known. And from -Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French, and Germans, whether of high -or low rank, I have invariably met with the greatest kindness, and -found an eager desire to aid me. Sir George Murray only has thrown -obstacles in my way; and if I am rightly informed of the following -circumstance, his opposition has not been confined to what I have -stated above. Mr. Murray, the bookseller, purchased my first volume -with the right of refusal for the second volume. When the latter was -nearly ready a friend informed me that he did not think Murray would -purchase, because he had heard him say that sir George Murray had -declared it was not ‘_The Book_.’ He did not point out any particular -error; but it was not ‘_The Book_;’ meaning doubtless that his own -production, when it appeared, would be ‘_The Book_.’ My friend’s -prognostic was good. I was offered just half of the sum given for -the first volume. I declined it, and published on my own account; -and certainly I have had no reason to regret that Mr. Murray waited -for ‘_The Book_:’ indeed he has since told me very frankly that -he had mistaken his own interest. Now whether three articles in -‘The Quarterly,’ and a promise of more,[9] be a tribute paid to the -importance of ‘_My Book_,’ or whether they be the puff preliminary -to ‘_The Book_,’ I know not; but I am equally bound to Mr. Editor -Lockhart for the distinction, and only wish he had not hired such a -stumbling sore-backed hackney for the work. Quitting this digression, -I return to the Review. - -My topographical ignorance is a favourite point with the writer, and -he mentions three remarkable examples on the present occasion:—1. -That I have said Oporto is built in a hollow; 2. That I have placed -the Barca de Avintas only three miles from the Serra Convent, instead -of nine miles; 3. That I have described a ridge of land near Medellin -where no such ridge exists. - -These assertions are all hazarded in the hope that they will pass -current with those who know no better, and will be unnoticed by those -who do. But first a town may be _on_ a hill and yet _in_ a hollow. If -the reader will look at lieutenant Godwin’s Atlas,[10] or at Gage’s -Plan of Oporto, or at Avlis’ Plan of that city—all three published by -Mr. Wylde of Charing Cross—he will find that Oporto, which by the way -is situated very much like the hot-wells at Bristol, is built partly -on the slopes of certain heights partly on the banks of the river; -that it is surrounded on every side by superior heights; and that -consequently my description of it, having relation to the Bishop’s -lines of defence and the attack of the French army, is militarily -correct. Again, if the reader will take his compasses and any or all -of the three maps above-mentioned, he will find that the Barca de -Avintas is, as I have said, just three miles from the Serra Convent, -and not nine miles as the reviewer asserts. Lord Wellington’s -despatch called it four miles _from Oporto_, but there is a bend in -the river which makes the distance greater on that side. - -Such being the accuracy of this very correct topographical critic -upon two or three examples, let us see how he stands with respect to -the third. - - -_Extracts from marshal Victors Official Report and Register of the -Battle of Medellin._ - - ‘Medellin is situated upon the left bank of the Guadiana. To arrive - there, a handsome stone-bridge is passed. On the left of the town - is a very high hill (_mamelon tres elévé_), which commands all the - plain; on the right is a ridge or steppe (_rideau_), which _forms - the basin of the Guadiana_. Two roads or openings (_débouchés_) - present themselves on quitting Medellin; the one conducts to - Mingrabil, the other to Don Benito. They traverse a vast plain, - bounded by a ridge (_rideau_), which, from the right of the - Ortigosa, is prolonged in the direction of Don Benito, and Villa - Neuva de la Serena.’... ‘The ridge which confines the plain of - Medellin has many rises and falls (_movemens de terrain_) more or - less apparent. _It completely commands (domine parfaitement) the - valley of the Guadiana_; and it was at the foot of this ridge the - enemy’s cavalry was posted. Not an infantry man was to be seen; - but the presence of the cavalry made us believe that the enemy’s - army was _masked behind this ridge_ of Don Benito.’... ‘Favoured by - _this ridge_, _he could manœuvre his troops_, and carry them upon - any point of the line he pleased _without being seen by us_.’ - -Now ‘_rideau_’ can only be rendered, with respect to ground, a -_steppe_ or a _ridge_; but, in this case, it could not mean a -_steppe_, since the Spanish army was hidden _behind it_, and on a -steppe it would have been seen. Again, it must have been a _high -ridge_, because it not only _perfectly commanded the basin_ of the -Guadiana, overlooking the _steppe_ which formed that basin, but was -itself not overlooked by the very high hill on the left of Medellin. -What is my description of the ground?—‘The plain on the side of Don -Benito was bounded by _a high ridge of land_, mark, reader, not -a mountain ridge, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry -concealed, showing only his cavalry and guns in advance.’ Here then -we have another measure of value for the reviewer’s topographical -pretensions. - -The reference to French military reports and registers has not been -so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer; and yet he rests the -main part of his criticisms upon such documents. Thus, having got -hold of the divisional register of general Heudelet, which register -was taken, very much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto, -he is so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles over -it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in my possession -the general report and register of Soult’s army, which enables me to -show what a very little callow bird his treasure is. And first, as he -accuses _me_ of painting the wretched state of Soult’s army at St. -Jago, previous to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of -giving a false colouring to the campaign, I will extract Soult’s own -account, and the account of _Le Noble_, historian of the campaign, -and _ordonnateur en chef_ or comptroller of the civil administration -of the army. - - -_Extract from Soult’s Official Journal of the Expedition to Portugal, -dated Lugo, 30th May, 1809._ - - ‘Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most - difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be - surmounted, the _shattered and exhausted state_ (“delabrement et - epuisement”) of the “_corps d’armée_,” and the insufficiency of the - means of which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it - was necessary to obey.’... ‘The march was directed upon St. Jago, - where the troops took the first repose it had been possible to give - them since they quitted the Carion River in Castile.’... ‘Marshal - Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed some - shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the horses shod; - the parc which since the Carion had not been seen now came up, - and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared at Coruña), - together with various detachments that the previous hardships and - the exhaustion of the men had caused to remain behind. He would - have prolonged his stay until the end of February because he could - not hide from himself that his troops had the most urgent need of - it; but his operations were connected with the duke of Belluno’s, - &c. &c., and he thought it his duty to go on without regard to time - or difficulties.’ - - -_Extract from Le Noble’s History._ - - ‘The army was without money, without provision, without clothing, - without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to the latter, - not even ordinarily complete, when they should have been doubled to - profit from the feeble resources of the country.’ - -Who now is the false colourist? But what can be expected from a -writer so shameless in his statements as this reviewer? Let the -reader look to the effrontery with which he asserts that I have -_celebrated marshal Soult_ for the reduction of two fortresses, -Ferrol and Coruña, which were not even defended, whereas my whole -passage is a censure upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and -without one word of praise towards the French marshal. - -To return to general Heudelet’s register. The first notable discovery -from this document is, that it makes no mention of an action -described by me as happening on the 17th of February at Ribadavia; -and therefore the reviewer says no such action happened, though I -have been so particular as to mention the strength of the Spaniards’ -position, their probable numbers, and the curious fact that twenty -priests were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he -contradicts. Now this is only the old story of ‘_the big book which -contains all that sir George does not know_.’ For, first, Heudelet’s -register, being only divisional, would not, as a matter of course, -take notice of an action in which other troops were also engaged, -and where the commander-in-chief was present. But that the action -did take place, as I have described it, and on the 17th February, -the following extracts will prove, and also the futility of the -reviewer’s other objections. And I request the reader, both now and -always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the work -itself, and not trust the garbled extracts of the reviewer, or he -will have a very false notion of my meaning. - - -_Extract from Soult’s General Report._ - - ‘The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist, and - the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the approach - of La Romana’s corps, organized itself in the province of Orense. - - ‘The insurrection of the province of Orense, directed by the monks - and by officers, became each day more enterprising, and extended - itself to the quarters of general La Houssaye at Salvaterra. _It - was said the corps of Romana was at Orense_ (on disait le corps de - Romana à Orense), and his advanced guard at Ribadavia. - - ‘The 16th of February the troops commenced their march upon - Ribadavia. - - ‘The left column, under general Heudelet, found the route - intercepted by barricades on the bridges between Franquiera and - Canizar; and defended besides by a party of insurgents eight - hundred strong. The brigade Graindorge, arriving in the night, - overthrew them _in the morning of the 17th_, and pursued them to - the heights of Ribadavia, where they united themselves with a body - _far more numerous_. General Heudelet having come up with the rest - of his division, and being sustained by Maransin’s brigade of - dragoons, overthrew the enemy and killed many. _Twenty monks at the - least perished, and the town was entered fighting._ - - ‘The 18th, general Heudelet scoured all the valley of the Avia, - where _three or four thousand insurgents had thrown themselves_, - Maransin followed the route of Rosamunde chasing all that was - before him.’ - -The reviewer further says that, with my habitual inaccuracy as to -dates, I have concentrated all Soult’s division at Orense on the -20th. But Soult himself says, ‘The 19th, Franceschi and Heudelet -marched upon Orense, and seized the bridge. _The 20th, the other -divisions followed the movement upon Orense._’ Here then, besides -increasing the bulk of the book, containing what sir George _does not -know_, the reviewer has only proved his own habitual want of truth. - -In the above extracts nothing is said of the ‘_eight or ten thousand_ -Spaniards;’ nothing of the ‘_strong rugged hill_’ on which they -were posted; nothing of ‘_Soult’s presence in the action_.’ But -the reader will find all these particulars in the Appendix to the -‘Victoires et Conquêtes des Français,’ and in ‘Le Noble’s History of -Soult’s Campaign.’ The writers in each work were present, and the -latter, notwithstanding the reviewer’s sneers, and what is of more -consequence, notwithstanding many serious errors as to the projects -and numbers of his enemies, is highly esteemed by his countrymen, -and therefore good authority for those operations on his own side -which he witnessed. Well, Le Noble says there were 15,000 or 20,000 -insurgents and some regular troops in position, and he describes -that position as very rugged and strong, which I can confirm, having -marched over it only a few weeks before. Nevertheless, as this -estimate was not borne out by Soult’s report, I set the Spaniards -down at 8,000 or 10,000, grounding my estimate on the following -data: 1st. Soult says that 800 men fell back on a body _far more -numerous_. 2d. It required a considerable body of troops and several -combinations to dislodge them from an extensive position. 3d. _‘Three -or four thousand fugitives went off by one road only.’_ Finally, the -expression _eight or ten thousand_ showed that I had doubts. - -Let us proceed with Heudelet’s register. In my history it is said -that Soult softened the people’s feelings by kindness and by -enforcing strict discipline. To disprove this the reviewer quotes, -from Heudelet’s register, statements of certain excesses, committed -principally by the light cavalry, and while in actual pursuit of the -enemy—excesses, however, which he admits that count Heudelet blamed -and rigorously repressed, thus proving the truth of my statement -instead of his own, for verily the slow-worm is strong within him. -Yet I will not rely upon this curious stupidity of the reviewer. -I will give absolute authority for the fact that Soult succeeded -in soothing the people’s feelings, begging the reader to observe -that both Heudelet and my history speak of Soult’s stay at Orense -immediately after the action at Ribadavia. - - -_Extract from Soult’s General Report._ - - ‘At this period the _prisoners of Romana’s corps_ (note, the - reviewer says none of Romana’s corps were there) had all demanded - to take the oath of fidelity, and to serve king Joseph. The Spanish - general himself was far off (_fort éloigné_). The inhabitants of - the province of Orense were returning to their houses, breaking - their arms, and cursing the excitement and the revolt which Romana - had fomented. The priests even encouraged their submission, and - offered themselves as sureties. These circumstances appeared - favourable for the invasion of Portugal.’ - -Animated by a disgraceful anxiety which has always distinguished -the Quarterly Review to pander to the bad feelings of mankind by -making the vituperation of an enemy the test of patriotism, this -critic accuses me of an unnatural bias, and an inclination to do -injustice to the Spaniards, because I have not made the report of -some outrages, committed by Soult’s cavalry, the ground of a false -and infamous charge against the whole French army and French nation. -Those outrages he admits himself were vigorously repressed, and they -were committed by troops in a country where all the inhabitants were -in arms, where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by -torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived from day -to day on what they could take in the country. I shall now put this -sort of logic to a severe test, and leave the Reviewer’s patriots -to settle the matter as they can. That is, I shall give from lord -Wellington’s despatches, through a series of years, extracts touching -the conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula, -where they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated, tortured, -and assassinated, but well provided and kindly treated. - - - _Sir A. Wellesley to Mr. Villiers._ - - _Extract, May 1, 1809._—‘I have long been of opinion that a British - army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had - manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its - branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They - have plundered the country most terribly.’—‘They have plundered - the people of bullocks, amongst other property, for what reason - I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their - practice, to sell them to the people again.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, May 31, 1809._ - - ‘The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear - success more than sir John Moore’s army could bear failure. I am - endeavouring to tame them but if I should not succeed I shall make - an official complaint of them and send one or two corps home in - disgrace; they plunder in all directions.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, June 13, 1809._ - - ‘It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded; - it is probable that all three have been put to death by the - peasantry of Martede; I am sorry to say that from the conduct of - the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants - may have had some provocation for their animosity against the - soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and the general, that - these effects of their animosity must be discouraged and even - punished, otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the - peasantry of the country in general as well as to the army.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to colonel Donkin, June, 1809._ - - ‘I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the greatest - pain, I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters of the - disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of the —— and - —— regiments.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June, 1809._ - - ‘It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and - outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight - of their officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the - commanding officers of the regiments and the general officers of - the army, that outrages are not committed.’... ‘Not a post or a - courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the - army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by - the soldiers who have been left behind on the march. _There is - not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on - a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers - who never yet for one moment_ suffered the slightest want or the - smallest privation.’... ‘It is most difficult to convict any - prisoner before a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to - say that soldiers have little regard to the oath administered - to them; and the officers who are sworn, “well and truly to try - and determine _according to evidence_, the matter before them,” - have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered - to them.’... ‘There ought to be in the British army a regular - provost establishment.’... ‘All the foreign armies have such an - establishment. The French _gendarmerie nationale_ to the amount of - forty or fifty with each corps. The Spaniards have their police - militia to a still larger amount. _While we who require such an aid - more, I am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe_, have - nothing of the kind.’ - - ‘We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must - depend upon the diligence of regimental officers, particularly - subalterns. I may order what I please, but if they do not execute - what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect - that British soldiers will be orderly or regular.’... ‘I believe I - should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this - description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to - be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence,’... ‘We - are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, _but - we are worse than an enemy in a country_, and take my word for it - that either defeat or success would dissolve us.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, July, 1809._ - - ‘We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of criminal - outrages of British officers and soldiers.’... ‘As matters are now - conducted, the government and myself stand complimenting each other - while no notice is taken of the murderer.’ - - - _Sir Arthur to lord Wellesley, August, 1809._ - - ‘But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose - their discipline and spirit; they plunder even in the presence of - their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as bad - as the men.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, September, 1809._ - - ‘In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct of - detachments, they are only a repetition of others which I receive - every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal and I can only - lament my inability to apply any remedy. In the first place, our - law is not what it ought to be and I cannot prevail upon Government - even to look at a remedy; secondly, our military courts having - been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military - discipline, and with the same wisdom which has marked all our - proceedings of late years we have obliged the officers to swear - to decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we - have obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath, the - witnesses being in almost every instance common soldiers whose - conduct this tribunal was constituted to controul; _the consequence - is, that perjury is almost as common an offence as drunkenness and - plunder_.’ - - - _Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, January, 1810._ - - ‘I am concerned to tell you, that notwithstanding the pains taken - by the general and other officers of the army the conduct of the - soldiers is infamous.’... ‘At this moment there are three general - courts-martial sitting in Portugal for the trial of soldiers guilty - of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been killed by - them since we returned to Portugal), robberies, thefts, robbing - convoys under their charge, &c. &c. Perjury is as common as robbery - and murder.’ - - - _Lord Wellington to the adjutant-general of the forces, 1810._ - - ‘It is proper I should inform the commander-in-chief that desertion - is not the only crime of which the soldiers of the army have been - guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom marches, - particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned officer - (which rarely happens,) that a murder or a highway robbery, or some - act of outrage, is not committed by the British soldiers composing - it: they have killed eight people since the army returned to - Portugal.’ - - - _Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810._ - - ‘Several soldiers have lately been convicted before a general - court-martial and have been executed.’... ‘I am still apprehensive - of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the - enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder or wine is - within reach.’ - - - _Lord Wellington to sir S. Cotton, 1810._ - - ‘I have read complaints from different quarters of the conduct of - the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country.’... ‘It has - gone so far, that they (the people) have inquired whether they - might kill the Germans in our service as well as in the service of - the French.’ - - - _Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, May, 1812._ - - ‘The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so - _enormous_, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the - people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be - so injurious to the army itself, that I request your Lordship’s - early attention to the subject.’ - -Many more extracts I could give, but let us now see what was the -conduct of the French towards men who did not murder and mutilate -prisoners:— - - - _Lord Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, August, 1810._ - - ‘Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have always - treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made - prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous - instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have - had for this conduct has been, that they might treat our officers - and soldiers well who might fall into their hands; and I must do - the French the justice to say that they have been universally well - treated, and in recent instances _the wounded prisoners of the - British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the - French army_.’ - - - _Lord Wellington to admiral Berkeley, October, 1810._ - - ‘I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners - whom they take from us and the Portuguese treat their prisoners - exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer an - arrangement, by which prisoners who have once come into the hands - of the provost marshal of the British army should avoid falling - under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government.’ - -Having thus displayed the conduct of the British army, as described -by its own general through a series of years; and having also from -the same authority, shown the humane treatment English officers -and soldiers, when they happened to be made prisoners, experienced -from the French, I demand of any man with a particle of honour, -truth or conscience in his composition,—of any man, in fine, who is -not at once knave and fool, whether these outrages perpetrated by -British troops upon a friendly people can be suppressed, and the -outrages of French soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged -upon with justice? Whether it is right and decent to impute -relentless ferocity, atrocious villainy, to the whole French army, -and stigmatize the whole French nation for the excesses of some bad -soldiers, prating at the same time of the virtue of England and -the excellent conduct of her troops; and this too in the face of -Wellington’s testimony to the kindness with which they treated our -men, and in the face also of his express declaration (see letter to -Lord Wellesley, 26th January, 1811), that the majority of the French -soldiers were ‘_sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in -some degree educated_.’ But what intolerable injustice it would be -to stigmatise either nation for military excesses which are common -to all armies and to all wars; and when I know that the general -characteristic of the British and French troops alike, is generosity, -bravery, humanity, and honour. - -And am I to be accused of an unnatural bias against the Spaniards -because I do not laud them for running away in battle; because I do -not express my admiration of their honour in assassinating men whom -they dared not face in fight; because I do not commend their humanity -for mutilating, torturing, and murdering their prisoners. I have -indeed heard of a British staff-officer, high in rank, who, after -the battle of Talavera, looked on with apparent satisfaction at a -Spaniard beating a wounded Frenchman’s brains out with a stone, and -even sneered at the indignant emotion and instant interference of my -informant. Such an adventure I have heard of, yet there are few such -cold-blooded men in the British army. But what have I said to the -disparagement of the Spaniards in my history without sustaining it by -irrefragable testimony? Nothing, absolutely nothing! I have quoted -the deliberate judgment of every person of note, French and English, -who had to deal with them; nay, I have in some instances supported my -opinion by the declaration even of Spanish generals. I have brought -forward the testimony of sir Hew Dalrymple, of sir John Moore, of sir -John Craddock, of Mr. Stuart, of Mr. Frere, of general Graham, of -lord William Bentinck, of sir Edward Pellew, of lord Collingwood, of -sir Edward Codrington, and of Mr. Sydenham, and a crowd of officers -of inferior rank. Lastly, I have produced the testimony of the duke -of Wellington; and I will now add more proofs that his opinion of the -Spanish character coincides with that expressed in my history. - - -_Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence, 1809._ - - ‘I come now to another topic, which is one of serious - consideration.’... ‘That is the frequent, I ought to say constant - and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy: - we in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have - heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and twenty actions - of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo.’... ‘In the - battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very trifling - exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms - and ran off _in my presence_ when they were neither attacked nor - threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own - fire.’... ‘I have found, upon inquiry, and from experience, the - instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish troops to be so - numerous and those of their good behaviour to be so few, that I - must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon.’ - - ‘The Spanish cavalry are I believe nearly entirely without - discipline; they are in general well clothed armed and accoutred, - and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good - condition; but I never heard anybody pretend that in one instance - they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an - enemy.’... ‘In respect to that great body of all armies—I mean the - infantry—it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards - is.’... ‘It is said that sometimes they behave well; though I - acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill.’... - ‘Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and - it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, - as this nation has by the measures it has adopted in the last two - years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the - military profession by any individual.’... ‘I cannot say that they - do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running - away and assembling again in a state of nature.’ - - ‘The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, - bravery or arrangement to carry on the contest.’ - - -_Extracts, 1810._ - - ‘The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards are - of a disposition too sanguine; they have invariably expected only - success in objects for the attainment of which they had adopted no - measures; they have never looked to or prepared for a lengthened - contest; and all those, or nearly all who have had anything to do - with them, have imbibed the same spirit and the same sentiments.’ - - ‘Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with - Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can - be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for - everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as I have - I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country.’ - - ‘The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the - war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, - or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy - by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading - people amongst them have invariably deceived the lower orders; - and instead of making them acquainted with their real situation, - and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which - were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with - idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of - offensive operations which those who offer them for consideration - know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of - driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked-for good. - The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every - misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will at last become - fatigued with the succession of their disasters which common - prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented.’ - - - _Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810._ - - ‘In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I - enclose you a report which sir William Beresford has received from - general Madden the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese - cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word - in this letter that is not true. _Yet these are the soldiers who - are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!_ - - ‘There is no remedy for these evils excepting a vigorous system of - government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised - to pay and find resources for an army in which discipline can be - established. _It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French, - or of carrying on the war in any other manner._ Indeed, if the - destruction occasioned by the Guerillas and by the Spanish armies, - and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies, are - calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the - country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field. - - ‘But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to - produce an effect at a future period. _Their courage, and even - their activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon them - by the necessity of their circumstances and is never a matter of - choice nor of foresight._’ - - - _Wellington to lord Wellesley, 1810._ - - ‘There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army either - amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, - indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It - has in my opinion been the cause of the _dastardly conduct_ which - we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and _they have - become odious to the country_. _The peaceable inhabitants, much - as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the - establishment of Joseph’s government to be protected from the - outrages of their own troops._’ - - - _Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, Dec. 1810._ - - ‘I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It - is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having been - more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained - no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be - depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon - having one or two, more or less, British regiments; and that after - having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the - works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated - remonstrances of general Graham and the British officers on the - danger of omitting them. - - ‘The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as - great a degree as the other authorities—_that is, boasting of the - strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously - convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and - indulging their national indolence_.’ - - - _Wellington to general Graham, 1811._ - - ‘The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition (Barrosa) - _is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be_. They - march the troops night and day without provisions or rest, and - abuse everybody who proposes a moment’s delay to afford either to - the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such - a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any - plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus, when the moment - of action arrives they are totally incapable of movement, and they - stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them - because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human - nature is not equal.’[11] - -So much for Wellington’s opinion of the Spanish soldiers and -statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish generals:— - - 1809. ‘Although the Duque de Albuquerque is _proné_ by many, - amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out. - I think the marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the - Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is - certainly a sensible man and has seen much of the world.’ - -Now reader, the following is the character given to Romana in my -history; compare it with the above:— - -‘Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information, but -disqualified by nature for military command.’ And again, speaking of -his death, I say, ‘He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although -deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss.’ If the -expressions are more positive than Wellington’s, it is because this -was the duke’s first notion of the marquis; he was more positive -afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown to him, and after -circumstances known to him, gave me a right to be more decided. The -following additional proofs, joined to those already given in my -former reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one of -his letters, says, ‘_I am sorry to find that Romana is a shuffler_.’ -And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about the same period to -general Doyle to urge the advance of Palafox and Infantado, says, ‘_I -know that Romana has not supported the British as he ought to have -done, and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported -it with a tolerably efficient force_.’ - -In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham, expressing lord -Wellington’s opinions, after saying that Wellington declared he had -never met with a really able man in Spain, while in Portugal he had -found several, proceeds thus— - - ‘It is indeed clear to any person who is acquainted with the - present state of Spain, that _the Spaniards are incapable of - forming either a good government or a good army_.’... ‘With respect - to the army there are certainly in Spain abundant materials for - good common soldiers. But where is one general of even moderate - skill and talents? I know nothing of Lacy and Sarzfield, but - assuredly a good general is not to be found amongst Castaños, - Ballesteros, Palacios, Mendizabal, Santocildes, Abadia, Duque del - Parque, La Pena, Elio, Mahy, or Joseph O’Donnel.’... ‘_You cannot - make good officers in Spain._’ - -If to this the reader will add what I have set forth in my history -about Vives, Imas, Contreras, Campo Verde, Cuesta, and Areyasaga, and -that he is not yet satisfied, I can still administer to his craving. -In 1809 Wellington speaks with dread of ‘_Romana’s cormorants -flying into Portugal_,’ and says, ‘that _foolish fellow the Duque -del Parque_ has been endeavouring to get his corps destroyed on the -frontier.’ Again— - - ‘The Duque del Parque has advanced, because, whatever may be the - consequences, the Spaniards always think it necessary to advance - when their front is clear of an enemy.’ - - ‘There never was anything like the _madness_, the _imprudence_, - and the _presumption_ of the _Spanish officers_ in the way they - risk their corps, knowing that the _national vanity_ will prevent - them from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that if - attacked they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only - chance of safety for the Duque del Parque’s corps; but instead - of making it he calls upon you for cavalry.’... ‘I have ordered - magazines to be prepared on the Douro and Mondego to assist in - providing _these vagabonds_ if they should retire into Portugal, - which I hope they will do as their only chance of salvation.’ - -Again in 1811, defending himself from an accusation, made by the -Spaniards, that he had caused the loss of Valencia, he says, ‘the -misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to _Blake’s ignorance of -his profession and to Mahy’s cowardice and treachery_.’ - -Now if any passage in my history can be pointed out more disparaging -to the Spaniards than the expressions of lord Wellington and the -other persons quoted above, I am content to be charged with an -‘unnatural bias’ against that people. But if this cannot be done, it -is clear that the reviewer has proved, not my unnatural bias to the -French but his own natural bias to calumny. He has indeed a wonderful -aversion to truth, for close under his eye, in my second volume which -he was then reviewing, was the following passage; and there are many -of a like tendency in my work relative to the Spaniards which he -leaves unnoticed. - - ‘Under such a system it was impossible that the peasantry could - be rendered energetic soldiers, and they certainly were not - active supporters of their country’s cause; but _with a wonderful - constancy they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, - nakedness and famine with patience, and displaying in all their - actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful - national character_. _This constancy and the iniquity of the - usurpation, hallowed their efforts in despite of their ferocity and - merits respect_, though the vices and folly of the juntas and the - leading men rendered the effects nugatory.’—_History_, vol. ii. - chap. 1. - -I would stop here, but the interests of truth and justice, and -the interests of society require that I should thoroughly expose -this reviewer. Let the reader therefore mark his reasoning upon -Soult’s government of Oporto and the intrigue of the _Anti-Braganza_ -party. Let him however look first at the whole statement of these -matters in _my book_, and not trust the garbled extracts made by -the reviewer. Let him observe how Heudelet’s expedition to Tuy is by -this shameless writer, at one time made to appear as if it took place -_after_ Soult had received the deputations and addresses calling for -a change of dynasty; and this to show that no beneficial effect had -been produced in the temper of the people, as I had asserted, and -of which I shall presently give ample proof. How at another time -this same expedition of Heudelet is used as happening _before_ the -arrival of the addresses and deputations, with a view to show that -Soult had laboured to procure those addresses, a fact which, far from -denying, I had carefully noticed. Let him mark how an expression in -my history, namely, that Soult was _unprepared_ for one effect of his -own vigorous conduct, has been perverted, for the purpose of deceit; -and all this with a spirit at once so malignant and stupid, that the -reviewer is unable to see that the garbled extracts he gives from -Heudelet’s and Riccard’s Registers, not only do not contradict but -absolutely confirm the essential point of my statement. - -Certainly Soult was not unprepared for the submission of the -Portuguese to the French arms because it was the object and bent of -his invasion to make them so submit. But there is a great difference -between that submission of which Heudelet and Riccard speak, and the -proposal coming from the Portuguese for the establishment of a _new -and independent dynasty_; a still greater difference between that and -_offering the crown to Soult himself_; and it was this last which the -word _unprepared_ referred to in my history. So far from thinking or -saying that Soult was unprepared for the deputations and addresses, -I have expressly said, that he ‘_encouraged the design_,’ that he -‘_acted with great dexterity_,’ and I called the whole affair an -‘_intrigue_.’ But if I had said that he was unprepared for the whole -affair it would have been correct in one sense. He was unprepared to -accede to the extent of the _Anti-Braganza_ party’s views. He had -only received authority from his sovereign to conquer Portugal, not -to establish a new and independent dynasty, placing a French prince -upon the throne; still less to accept that throne for himself. -These were dangerous matters to meddle with under such a monarch -as Napoleon; but the weakness of Soult’s military position made it -absolutely necessary to catch at every aid, and it would have been a -proof that the duke of Dalmatia was only a common man and unsuited -for the great affairs confided to his charge if he had rejected such -a powerful auxiliary to his military operations: wisely, therefore, -and even magnanimously did he encourage the _Anti-Braganza_ party, -drawing all the military benefit possible from it, and trusting to -Napoleon’s sagacity and grandeur of soul for his justification. Nor -was he mistaken in either. Yet I am ready to admit that all this -must appear very strange to Quarterly Reviewers and parasites, whose -knowledge of the human mind is confined to an accurate measure of the -sentiments of patrons, rich and powerful, but equally with themselves -incapable of true greatness and therefore always ready to ridicule it. - -The facts then stand thus. Heudelet’s expedition through the _Entre -Minho e Douro_ took place between the 5th of April and the 27th -of that month, and the country people being then in a state of -exasperation opposed him vehemently; in my history the combats -he sustained are mentioned, and it is said that previous to the -_Anti-Braganza_ intrigue the horrible warfare of assassinations had -been carried on with infinite activity. But the intrigue of the -malcontents was not completed until the end of April, and the good -effect of it on the military operations was not apparent until May, -consequently could not have been felt by Heudelet in the beginning of -April. In my history the difference of time in these two affairs is -expressly marked, inasmuch as I say that in treating of the intrigue -I have anticipated the chronological order of events. Truly if Mr. -Lockhart has paid for this part of the Review as criticism Mr. Murray -should disallow the unfair charge in his accounts. - -I shall now give two extracts from Soult’s general report, before -quoted, in confimation of my statements:— - - ‘Marshal Soult was led by necessity to favour the party of the - malcontents, which he found already formed in Portugal when he - arrived. He encouraged them, and soon that party thought itself - strong enough in the province of _Entre Minho e Douro_, to - propose to the marshal to approve of the people declaring for the - deposition of the house of Braganza, and that the emperor of the - French should be asked to name a prince of his family to reign in - Portugal. In a political view, marshal Soult could not without - express authority, permit such a proceeding, and he could not ask - for such authority having lost his own communication with France, - and being without news of the operations of any of the other corps - which were to aid him; but considered in a military point of - view the proposition took another character. Marshal Soult there - saw the means of escaping from his embarrassments, and he seized - them eagerly, certain that whatever irregularity there was in his - proceedings ultimate justice would be done to him.’ - - ‘These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity - was re-established, and the confidence was such, that in the - province (Entre Minho e Douro) all the inhabitants returned to - their labours, supplied the markets and familiarized themselves - with the idea of an approaching change.’... ‘Marshal Soult received - numerous deputations of the clergy to thank him for the attentions - he paid them, and for the order which he had restored. Before this - no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and killed. - The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful to God - to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated the - most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell into their - hands.’ - -It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to continue -thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore, neglecting his -farrago about the principles of war, and his application of them to -show how I am wrong in my statement, that, in a _strategic point of -view it was better to attack Victor, but that especial circumstances_ -led sir Arthur to fall upon Soult, I hold it sufficient to place sir -Arthur’s own statement before the reader and leave him to compare it -with mine. - - - ‘_Lisbon, April 24, 1809._ - - ‘I intend to move towards Soult and attack him, if I should be able - to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes which can - give me any security for the safety of this place during my absence - to the northward. - - ‘I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more - good to the general cause by combining with general Cuesta in - an operation against Victor; and I believe I should prefer the - last if Soult was not in possession of a part of this country - very fertile in resources, and of the town of Oporto, and if to - concert the operations with Cuesta would not take time which might - be profitably employed in operations against Soult. I think it - probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when - I shall pass the Mondego. If he does I shall attack him. _If he - should retire, I am convinced that it would be most advantageous - for the common cause that we should remain upon the defensive in - the north of Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with - Cuesta against Victor._ - - ‘An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages—if - successful it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in - case affairs should take such a turn as to enable the King’s - ministers to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the - corps under my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a - distance from the scene of operation as to render its co-operation - impossible; and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort - made by a combined and concentrated force.’ - -The assertion of the reviewer that I have underrated Cuesta’s force, -inasmuch as it was only 19,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, instead -of 30,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, as I have stated it to be, -and that consequently the greatest numbers could not be brought -to bear on Victor, is one of those curious examples of elaborate -misrepresentation in which this writer abounds. For first, admitting -that Cuesta had only 20,000 men, sir Arthur would have brought -24,000 to aid him, and Victor had only 30,000. The allies would then -have had double the number opposed to Soult. But the pith of the -misrepresentation lies in this, that the reviewer has taken Cuesta’s -account of his actual force on the 23d of April, and suppresses the -facts, that reinforcements were continually pouring into him at that -time, and that he actually did advance against Victor with rather -greater numbers than those stated by me. - - -PROOFS. - - _Sir Arthur to lord Castlereagh, April 24, 1809._ - - ‘Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which it is said - will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.’ - - - _To general Mackenzie, May 1, 1809._ - - ‘They (Victor’s troops) have in their front a Spanish army with - general Cuesta at Llerena, which army was defeated in the month - of March, and has since been reinforced to the amount of _twenty - thousand men_.’... ‘They will be attacked by Cuesta, who is - _receiving reinforcements_.’ - - - _Mr. Frere to sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, May 4._ - - ‘We have here 3,000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of - Estremadura (under Cuesta). Cuesta has with him 4,000 cavalry.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June 17, 1809._ - - ‘We had every reason to believe that the French army consisted of - about 27,000, of which 7,000 were cavalry; and the combined British - and Portuguese force which I was in hopes I should have enabled to - march upon this expedition would have amounted to about 24,000 men.’ - - - _To lord Wellesley, August 8, 1809._ - - ‘The army of Cuesta, which crossed the Tagus _thirty-six or - thirty-eight thousand strong_, does not now consist of 30,000.’ - - - _Extract from a Memoir by sir A. Wellesley, 1809._ - - ‘The Spanish army under General Cuesta had been _reinforced with - cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary - celerity after the action of Medellin_.’ - -All the reviewer’s remarks about Cuesta’s numbers, and about -the unfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction of -misrepresentations and objections before exposed and refuted by me -in my controversy with marshal Beresford; but as it is now attempted -to support them by garbled extracts from better authorities, I will -again and completely expose and crush them. This will however be more -conveniently done farther on. Meanwhile I repeat, that the Tagus is -only unfordable during the winter, and not then if there is a few -days dry weather; that six months of the year it is always fordable -in many places, and as low down as Salvaterra near Lisbon; finally, -that my expression, ‘_a river fordable at almost every season_,’ -is strictly correct, and is indeed not mine but lord Wellington’s -expression. To proceed with the rest:— - -Without offering any proof beyond his own assertion, the reviewer -charges me with having _exaggerated the importance of D’Argenton’s -conspiracy for the sole purpose of excusing Soult’s remissness in -guarding the Douro_. But my account of that conspiracy was compiled -from the duke of Wellington’s letters—some public, some private -addressed to me; and from a narrative of the conspiracy written -expressly for my guidance by major-general sir James Douglas, who -was the officer employed to meet and conduct D’Argenton to and from -the English army;—from Soult’s own official report; from Le Noble’s -history; and from secret information which I received from a French -officer who was himself one of the principal movers—not of that -particular conspiracy—but of a general one of which the one at Oporto -was but a branch. - -Again, the reviewer denies that I am correct in saying, that Soult -thought Hill’s division had been disembarked from the ocean; that he -expected the vessels would come to the mouth of the Douro; and that -considering that river secure above the town his personal attention -was directed to the line below Oporto. Let Soult and Le Noble answer -this. - - -_Extract from Soult’s General Report._ - - ‘In the night of the 9th and 10th the enemy made a _considerable - disembarkation at Aveiro, and another at Ovar_. The 10th, at - daybreak, they attacked the right flank of general Franceschi, - while the _column coming from Lisbon by Coimbra_ attacked him in - front.’ - - -_Extract from Le Noble._ - - ‘The house occupied by the general-in-chief was situated beyond - the town on the road to the sea. The site was very high, and from - thence he could observe the left bank of the Douro from the convent - to the sea. His orders, given on the 8th, to scour the left bank - of the river, those which he had expedited in the morning, and the - position of his troops, rendered him confident that no passage - would take place above Oporto; _he believed that the enemy, master - of the sea, would try a disembarkation near the mouth of the - Douro_.’ - -Such is the value of this carping disingenuous critic’s observations -on this point; and I shall now demolish his other misstatements about -the passage of the Douro. - -1st. The poor barber’s share in the transaction is quite true; my -authority is major-general sir John Waters who was the companion -of the barber in the daring exploit of bringing over the boats. -And if Waters had recollected his name, it is not the despicable -aristocratic sneer of the reviewer about the ‘_Plebeian_’ that would -have prevented me from giving it. 2d. _The Barca de Avintas_, where -sir John Murray crossed, has already been shown by a reference to the -maps and to lord Wellington’s despatch, to be not nine miles from the -Serra Convent as the reviewer says, but three miles as I have stated: -moreover, two Portuguese leagues would not make nine English miles. -But to quit these minor points, the reviewer asks, ‘_Why colonel -Napier departed from the account of the events given in the despatch -of sir Arthur Wellesley?_’ This is the only decent passage in the -whole review, and it shall have a satisfactory answer. - -Public despatches, written in the hurry of the moment, immediately -after the events and before accurate information can be obtained, -are very subject to errors of detail, and are certainly not what a -judicious historian would rely upon for details without endeavouring -to obtain other information. In this case I discovered several -discrepancies between the despatch and the accounts of eye-witnesses -and actors written long afterwards and deliberately. I knew also, -that the passage of the Douro, though apparently a very rash action -and little considered in England, was a very remarkable exploit, -prudent skilful and daring. Anxious to know the true secret of the -success, I wrote to the duke of Wellington, putting a variety of -questions relative to the whole expeditions. In return I received -from him distinct answers, with a small diagram of the seminary and -ground about it to render the explanation clear. Being thus put in -possession of all the leading points relative to the passage of the -Douro by the commanders on each side, for I had before got Soult’s, -I turned to the written and printed statements of several officers -engaged in the action for those details which the generals had not -touched upon. - -Now the principal objections of the reviewer to my statement -are,—1st. That I have given too many troops to sir John Murray. 2d. -That I have unjustly accused him of want of military hardihood. 3d. -That I have erroneously described the cause of the loss sustained by -the fourteenth dragoons in retiring from their charge. In reply I -quote my authorities; and first, as to the numbers with Murray. - - -_Extract from lord Wellington’s answers to colonel Napier’s -questions._ - - ‘_The right_ of the troops which passed over to the seminary, which - in fact made an admirable _tête de pont_, was protected by the - passage of the Douro higher up by lieut.-general _sir John Murray - and the king’s German legion, supported by other troops_.’ - -Armed with this authority, I did set aside the despatch, because, -though it said that Murray was _sent_ with a battalion and a -squadron, it _did not say_ that he was not followed by others. And in -lord Londonderry’s narrative I found the following passage:— - - ‘General Murray, too, who had been detached with _his division_ - to a ferry higher up, was fortunate enough to gain possession of - as many boats as enabled him to pass over with _two battalions of - Germans and two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons_.’ - -And his lordship, further on, says, that he himself charged several -times and with advantage at the head of those squadrons. His -expression is ‘_the dragoons from Murray’s corps_.’ - -With respect to the loss of the dragoons sustained by having to fight -their way back again, I find the following account in the narrative -of sir James Douglas, written, as I have before said, expressly for -my guidance:— - - ‘Young soldiers like young greyhounds run headlong on their prey; - while experience makes old dogs of all sorts run cunning. Here - _two squadrons_ actually rode over the _whole rear French guard_, - which laid down upon the road; and was, to use their own terms, - _passé sur le ventre_: but no support to the dragoons being at hand - no great execution was done; and the _two squadrons themselves - suffered severely in getting back again through the infantry_.’ - -Thus, even in this small matter, the reviewer is not right. And now -with the above facts fixed I shall proceed to rebut the charge of -having calumniated sir John Murray. - -First, the reviewers assertion, that Murray’s troops were never -within several miles of the seminary, and that they would have been -crushed by Soult if they had attacked the enemy, is evidently false -from the following facts. Lord Wellington expressly says, in his -answer to my questions quoted before,—That the _right_ of the troops -in the seminary _was protected_ by the troops under Murray; which -could not be if the latter were several miles off. Again, if the -dragoons of Murray’s corps could charge repeatedly with advantage, -the infantry and guns of that corps might have followed up the attack -without danger upon a confused, flying, panic-stricken body of men -who had been surprised and were at the same time taken both in flank -and rear. But if Murray dared not with any prudence even approach -the enemy,—if it were absolutely necessary for him to retire as he -did,—what brought him there at all? Is the duke of Wellington a -general to throw his troops wantonly into such a situation,—and on -ground which his elevated post at the Serra Convent enabled him to -command perfectly, and where the men and movements of both sides were -as much beneath his eye as the men and movements on a chess-board? -Bah! - -But the fact is that a part of the Germans under Murray, aye!—a -very small part! did actually engage the enemy with success. Major -Beamish, in his ‘History of the German Legion,’ on the authority of -one of the German officers’ journals, writes thus:— - - ‘The skirmishers of the first line under lieutenant Von Hölle, and - two companies of the same regiment under ensign Hodenberg, were - alone brought into fire. The skirmishers made several prisoners, - and one rifleman (Henry Hauer) was lucky enough to capture a French - lieutenant-colonel. Seven of the legion were wounded.’ - -Murray wanted hardihood. And it is no answer to say lord Wellington -did not take notice of his conduct. A commander-in-chief is guided -by many circumstances distinct from the mere military facts, and it -might be, that, on this occasion he did not choose to judge rashly or -harshly a man, who had other good qualities, for an error into which, -perhaps, a very bold and able man might have fallen by accident. -And neither would I have thus judged sir John Murray from this fact -alone, although the whole army were disgusted at the time by his -want of daring and openly expressed an unfavourable opinion of his -military vigour. But when I find that the same want of hardihood -was again apparent in him at Castalla, as I have shown in my fifth -volume, and still more glaringly displayed by him at Taragona, as I -shall show in my sixth volume, the matter became quite different, and -the duty of the historian is to speak the truth even of a general, -strange as that may and I have no doubt does appear to this reviewer. - -Having disposed of this matter, I shall now set down some passages -evincing the babbling shallowness and self-conceit of the critic, and -beneath them my authorities, whereby it will appear that the big book -containing all sir George does not know is increasing in bulk:— - - ‘Sir Arthur Wellesley was detained at Oporto neither by the - instructions of the English Cabinet nor by his own want of - generalship, _but simply by the want of provisions_.’—_Review._ - -Indeed! Reader, mark the following question to, and answer from the -duke of Wellington. - - -_Question to the duke of Wellington by colonel Napier._ - -Why did the duke halt the next day after the passage of the Douro? - - _Answer._—‘The halt was made next day,—first, because the whole - army had not crossed the Douro and none of its supplies and - baggage had crossed. Secondly, on account of the great exertion - and fatigue of the preceding days particularly the last. Thirdly, - because we had no account of lord Beresford being in possession of - Amarante, or even across the Douro; we having, in fact, out-marched - everything. Fourthly, the horses and animals required a day’s rest - as well as the men.’ - -And, in the answer to another question, the following observation -occurs:—‘The relative numbers and the nature of the troops must -be considered in all these things; _and this fact moreover, that -excepting to attain a very great object we could not risk the loss of -a corps_.’ - -I pass over the reviewer’s comments upon my description of Soult’s -retreat, because a simple reference to my work will at once show -their folly and falseness; but I beg to inform this acute and -profound historical critic that the first field-marshal captured -by an English general was marshal Tallard, and that the English -general who captured him was called John, duke of Marlborough. And, -with respect to his sneers about the ‘_little river of Ruivaens_;’ -‘_Soult’s theatrical speech_;’ ‘_the use of the twenty-five -horsemen_;’ ‘_the non-repairs of the Ponte Nova_;’ and the ‘_Romance -composed by colonel Napier and Le Noble_;’ I shall, in answer, only -offer the following authorities, none of which, the reader will -observe, are taken from Le Noble. - - -_Extract from Soult’s General Report._ - - ‘The 15th, in the morning, the enemy appeared one league from - Braga; our column was entangled in the defile; the rain came down - in torrents; and the wind was frightful. On reaching Salamanca - we learned that _the bridge of Ruivaens, over the little river_ - (ruisseau) _of that name was cut, and the passage guarded by 1,200 - men with cannon_. It was known also that the _Ponte Nova on the - route of Montelegre_, which they had begun to destroy, was feebly - guarded; and the marshal gave to major Dulong the command of 100 - brave men, of his own choice, to carry it. The valiant Dulong under - cover of the night reached the bridge, passed it notwithstanding - the cuts in it, surprised the guard, and put to the sword those who - could not escape. _In four hours the bridge was repaired_; general - Loison passed it and marched upon the bridge of Misserella, near - Villa da Ponte, where 800 Portuguese _well retrenched_ defended the - passage. _A battalion and some brave men, again led by the intrepid - Dulong, forced the abbatis entered the entrenchments and seized the - bridge._’ - - -_Extract from the ‘Victoires et Conquêtes des Français’._ - - ‘The marshal held a council, at the end of which he called major - Dulong. It was nine o’clock in the evening. “I have selected you - from the army, he said to that brave officer, to seize the bridge - of Ponte Nova which the enemy are now cutting: you must endeavour - to surprise them. The time is favourable. Attack, vigorously with - the bayonet you will succeed or you will die. I want no news save - that of your success, send me no other report, your silence will - be sufficient in a contrary case. Take a hundred men at your - choice; they will be sufficient; add _twenty-five dragoons_, _and - kill their horses to make a rampart, if it be necessary, on the - middle of the bridge to sustain yourself and remain master of the - passage_.”’ - - ‘The major departed with determined soldiers and a Portuguese guide - who was tied with the leather slings of the muskets. Arrived within - pistol-shot of the bridge he saw the enemy _cutting the last beam_. - It was then one o’clock the rain fell heavily and the enemy’s - labourers being fatigued thought they might take some repose - before they finished their work. The torrents descending from the - mountains and the cavado itself made such a noise that the march - of the French was not heard, the sentinel at the bridge was killed - without giving any alarm, and _Dulong with twenty-five grenadiers - passed crawling on the beam, one of them fell into the cavado but - happily his fall produced no effect_. The enemy’s advanced post of - twenty-four men was destroyed, &c. &c. The marshal, informed of - this happy event, came up in haste with the first troops he could - find _to defend the bridge and accelerate the passage of the army_; - _but the repairing was neither sufficiently prompt or solid to - prevent many brave soldiers perishing_. The marshal embraced major - Dulong, saying to him, “I thank you in the name of France brave - major; you have saved the army.”’ - -Then follows a detailed account of the Misserella bridge, or -Saltador, and its abbatis and other obstacles; of Dulong’s attack; -of his being twice repulsed; and of his carrying of the bridge, the -Leaper as it was called, at the third assault, falling dreadfully -wounded at the moment of victory; finally, of the care and devotion -with which his soldiers carried him on their shoulders during the -rest of the retreat. And the reader will observe that this account is -not a mere description in the body of the work, but a separate paper -in the Appendix, written by some officer evidently well acquainted -with all the facts, perhaps Dulong himself, and for the express -purpose of correcting the errors of detail in the body of that work. -Theatrical to the critic, and even ridiculous it may likely enough -appear. The noble courage and self-devotion of such a soldier as -Dulong is a subject which no person will ever expect a Quarterly -viewer to understand. - -In the foregoing comments I have followed the stream of my own -thoughts, rather than the order of the reviewer’s criticisms; I -must therefore retrace my steps to notice some points which have -been passed over. His observations about Zaragoza have been already -disposed of in my reply to his first articles published in my fifth -volume, but his comments upon Catalonian affairs shall now be noticed. - -The assertion that lord Collingwood was incapable of judging of the -efforts of the Catalans, although he was in daily intercourse with -their chiefs, co-operating with their armies and supplying them with -arms and stores, _because he was a seaman_, is certainly ingenious. -It has just so much of pertness in it as an Admiralty clerk of the -Melville school might be supposed to acquire by a long habit of -official insolence to naval officers, whose want of parliamentary -interest exposed them to the mortification of having intercourse with -him. And it has just so much of cunning wisdom as to place it upon -a par with that which dictated the inquiry which we have heard was -sent out to sir John Warren during the late American war, namely, -“whether _light_—_very light_ frigates, could not sail up the St. -Lawrence to Lake Ontario?” And with that surprising providence, which -did send out birch-brooms and tanks to hold _fresh water_ for the use -of the ships on the said lake of Ontario. But quitting these matters, -the reviewer insinuates what is absolutely untrue, namely, that I -have only quoted lord Collingwood as authority for my statements -about Catalonia. The readers of my work know that I have adduced in -testimony the Spanish generals themselves, namely, Contreras, Lacy, -and Rovira; the testimony of sir Edward Codrington, of sir Edward -Pellew, of colonel Doyle, and of other Englishmen. That I have -referred to St. Cyr, Suchet, Lafaille, and other French writers; that -I have quoted Vacani and Cabane’s Histories, the first an Italian -serving with the French army in Catalonia, the last a Spaniard and -chief of the staff to the Catalan army: and now, to complete the -reviewer’s discomfiture, I will add the duke of Wellington, who is -a landsman and therefore according to this reviewer’s doctrine, -entitled to judge:— - - -_Letter to lord Liverpool, 19th Dec. 1809._ - - ‘In Catalonia the resistance is more general and regular; but still - the people are of a description with which your armies could not - co-operate with any prospect of success, or even of safety. You see - what Burghersh says of the Somatenes; _and it is notorious that the - Catalans have at all times been the most irregular, and the least - to be depended upon of any of the Spaniards_.’ - -So much for light frigates, birch-brooms, fresh-water tanks, and -Collingwood’s incapacity to judge of the Catalans, _because he was a -seaman_; and as for Reding’s complaints of the Spaniards when dying, -they must go to sir George’s big book with this marginal note, that -St. Cyr is not the authority. But for the grand flourish, the threat -to prove at another time, ‘_from Wellington’s despatches_,’ that the -Spaniards gave excellent intelligence and made _no false reports_, -let the reader take the following testimony in anticipation:— - - -_Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence, 1809._ - - ‘At present I have no intelligence whatever, excepting the nonsense - I receive occasionally from ——; _as the Spaniards have defeated all - my attempts to obtain any by stopping those whom I sent out to make - inquiries_.’ - - ‘I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed - 8,000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and you have been made acquainted - with the exact extent of it, _because_, the Duque del Albuquerque, - who is appointed to command it, _is interested in making known the - truth_; but they have _lied_ about the cavalry ordered to the Duque - del Parque.’ - - ‘It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at - Seville _with their own false intelligence_.’ - - ‘It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads, - or any local circumstances, which must be considered in the - decisions to be formed respecting the march of troops.’ - - 1810. ‘We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the - efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that we - know is the movement of troops at the moment, or probably after it - is made.’ - - ‘I have had accounts from the marquis de la Romana: he tells me - that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23d, _which cannot be - true_.’ - - ‘I believe there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection at - Madrid.’ - - ‘There is so far a foundation for the report of O’Donnel’s action, - as that it appears that Suchet’s advanced guard was at Lerida - on the 11th of April. It is doubtful, however, _according to my - experience of Spanish reports_, whether O’Donnel was beaten or - gained a victory.’ - - ‘I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution in - respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the marquis de la - Romana, _and all the Spanish officers_. It is obvious there is - nothing they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their - operations. This is evident both from the letters of the marquis - himself, and from the _false reports_ made to lieutenant Heathcote - of the firing heard from Badajos at Albuquerque.’ - - - _Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810. Cartaxo._ - - ‘The circumstances which I have related above will show your - Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not - much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate - operations with a corps so ill-organised, _in possession of so - little intelligence_, and upon whose actions no reliance can be - placed. It will scarcely be credited that _the first intelligence - which general Mendizabal received of the assembling of the enemy’s - troops at Seville was from hence_.’ - - - _Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810._ - - ‘Mendizabal, &c. &c., have sent us so many _false reports_ that I - cannot make out what the French are doing.’ - - ‘This is a part of the system on which _all the Spanish authorities - have been acting_, to induce us to take a part in the desultory - operations which they are carrying on. _False reports and - deceptions of every description are tried_, and then popular - insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct.’ - - ‘The Spaniards take such bad care of their posts, and have so - little intelligence, that it is difficult to say by what troops the - blow has been struck.’ - - ‘It is strange that the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo should have no - intelligence of the enemy’s movements near his garrison, of which - we have received so many accounts.’ - - ‘We hear also a great deal of Blake’s army in the Alpujarras, and - of a corps from Valencia operating upon the enemy’s communications - with Madrid; but I conclude that there is as little foundation - for this intelligence as for that relating to the insurrection of - Ronda.’ - - ‘I enclose a letter from General Carrera, in which I have requested - him to communicate with you. I beg you to observe, however, that - very little reliance can be placed on the report made to you - _by any Spanish general at the head of a body of troops_. They - generally exaggerate on one side or the other; and _make no scruple - of communicating supposed intelligence, in order to induce those to - whom they communicate it to adopt a certain line of conduct_.’ - -The reader must be now somewhat tired of quotations; let us -therefore turn for relaxation to the reviewer’s observations about -light troops,—of which he seems indeed to know as much as the wise -gentleman of the Admiralty did about the facility of sailing up the -St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; but though that wise gentleman did -not know much about sailing-craft, the reviewer knows something of -another kind of craft, namely misrepresentation. Thus he quotes a -passage from captain Kincaid’s amusing and clever work as if it -told in his favour; whereas it in no manner supports his foolish -insinuation—namely, that the 43d and 52d regiments of the light -division were not light troops, never acted as such, and never -skirmished! Were he to say as much to the lowest bugler of these -corps, he would give him the fittest answer for his folly—that is to -say, laugh in his face. - -‘There are but two kinds of soldiers in the world’ said Napoleon, -‘the good and the bad.’ - -Now, the light division were not only good but, I will say it -fearlessly, the best soldiers in the world. The three British -regiments composing it had been formed by sir John Moore precisely -upon the same system. There was no difference save in the colour of -the riflemen’s jackets and the weapons which they carried. Captain -Kincaid’s observation, quoted by the reviewer, merely says, what -is quite true, that the riflemen fought in skirmishing order more -frequently than the 43d and 52d did. Certainly they did, and for this -very sufficient reason—their arms, the rifle and sword, did not suit -any other formation; it is a defect in the weapon, which is inferior -to the musket and bayonet, fitted alike for close or open order. -Napoleon knew this so well that he had no riflemen in his army, -strange as it may appear to those persons who have read so much about -French riflemen. The riflemen of the light division could form line, -columns, and squares—could move as a heavy body—could do, and did do -everything that the best soldiers in the world ought to do; and in -like manner the 52d and 43d regiments skirmished and performed all -the duties of light troops with the same facility as the riflemen; -but the difference of the weapon made it advisable to use the latter -nearly always in open order: I do not, indeed, remember ever to have -seen them act against the enemy either in line or square. Captain -Kincaid is too sensible and too good a soldier, and far too honest a -man, to serve the purpose of this snarling blockhead, who dogmatizes -in defiance of facts and with a plenitude of pompous absurdity that -would raise the bile of an alderman. Thus, after quoting from my work -the numbers of the French army, he thus proceeds:— - - ‘Notwithstanding that this enormous force was _pressing_ upon the - _now unaided_ Spanish people with _all its weight_, and acting - against them with its _utmost energy_, it proved wholly unable to - put down resistance.’—_Review_, page 497. - -Now this relates to the period following sir John Moore’s death, -which was on the 16th of January. That general’s fine movement upon -Sahagun, and his subsequent retreat, had drawn the great bulk of the -French forces towards Gallicia, and had paralyzed many corps. The -war with Austria had drawn Napoleon himself and the imperial guards -away from the Peninsula. Joseph was establishing his court at Madrid; -Victor remained very inactive in Estremadura; Soult marched into -Portugal;—in fine, this was precisely the period of the whole war in -which the French army were most insert. Napoleon has fixed upon the -four months of February, March, April, and May, 1809, as the period -in which the King let the Peninsula slip from his feeble hands. - -Let us see then what the Spaniards did during that time. And first -it is false to say that they were unaided. They were aided against -Victor by the vicinity of sir John Craddock’s troops; they were aided -on the Gallician coast by an English squadron; they were aided on -the Beira frontier, against Lapisse, by the Portuguese troops under -sir Robert Wilson; they were aided on the Catalonian coast by lord -Collingwood’s fleet; they were aided at Cadiz by the presence of -general M‘Kenzie’s troops, sent from Lisbon; and they were aided -everywhere by enormous supplies of money arms and ammunition sent -from England. Finally, they were aided, and most powerfully so, by -sir John Moore’s generalship, which had enabled them to rally and -keep several considerable armies on foot in the southern parts of -the country. What did these armies—these invincible Spaniards—do? -They lost Zaragoza, Monzon, and Jaca, in the east; the fortresses -of Ferrol and Coruña, and their fleet, in the north; they lost -Estremadura, La Mancha, Aragon, the Asturias, and Gallicia; they lost -the battles of Ucles and of Valls; the battle of Monterrey, that of -Ciudid Real, and the battle of Medellin. They won nothing! they did -not save themselves, it was the _British army and the indolence and -errors of the French that saved them_. - - -_Extract from Napoleon’s Memoirs._ - - ‘After the embarkation of the English army, the king of Spain did - nothing; _he lost four months_; he ought to have marched upon - Cadiz, upon Valencia, upon Lisbon; political means would have done - the rest.’ - - -_Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence. 1809._ - - ‘It is obvious that the longer, and the more intimately we become - acquainted with the affairs of Spain, the less prospect do they - hold out of anything like a glorious result. The great extent of - the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an enemy, - and the enmity of the people towards the French may spin out the - war into length, and at last the French may find it impossible to - establish a government in the country; but there is no prospect of - a glorious termination to the contest.’ - - ‘After the perusal of these details, and of Soult’s letters, can - any one doubt that the evacuation of Gallicia was occasioned by the - operations of the British troops in Portugal?’ - - ‘The fact is, that the British army _has saved Spain and Portugal_ - during this year.’ - -The reviewer is not only a great critic, he is a great general also. -He has discovered that there are no positions in the mountains of -Portugal; nay, he will scarcely allow that there are mountains at -all; and he insists that they offer no defence against an invader, -but that the rivers do—that the Douro defends the _eastern_ frontier -of Beira, and that the frontier of Portugal generally is very compact -and strong for defence, and well suited for a weak army to fight -superior numbers;—that the weak army cannot be turned and cut off -from Lisbon, and the strong army must invade in mass and by one line. - -Now, first, it so happened, unluckily for this lucid military notion -of Portugal, that in Massena’s invasion lord Wellington stopped to -fight on the mountain of Busaco, and stopped Massena altogether at -the mountains of Alhandra, Aruda, Sobral, and Torres Vedras—in other -words at the lines, and that he did not once stop him or attempt to -stop him by defending a river. That Massena, in his retreat, stopped -lord Wellington on the mountain of Santarem, attempted to stop him on -the mountains of Cazal Nova, Moita, and Guarda, but never attempted -to stop him by defending a river, save at Sabugal, and then he was -instantly beaten. Oh, certainly, ’tis a most noble general, and a -very acute critic! Nevertheless, I must support my own opinions about -the frontier of Portugal, the non-necessity of invading this country -in one mass, and the unfordable nature of the Tagus, by the testimony -of two generals as distinguished as honest Iago. - - -_Extract of a letter from sir John Moore._ - - ‘I am not prepared at this moment to answer minutely your - lordship’s question respecting the defence of Portugal; but I can - say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible - against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally - rugged, but all equally to be penetrated.’ - - -_Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence._ - - ‘In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will probably - make his attack by _two distinct lines_, the one north the other - south of the Tagus; and the system of defence must be founded upon - this general basis. In the summer season, however, the _Tagus being - fordable_, &c. &c., care must be taken that the enemy does not by - his attack directed from the south of the Tagus and by the passage - of that river, _cut off from Lisbon the British army engaged in - operations to the north of the Tagus_.’ - - ‘The line of frontier to Portugal is so long in proportion to the - extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains - separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it is - so open in many parts, that it would be _impossible for an army - acting upon the defensive to carry on its operations upon the - frontier without being cut off from the capital_.’ - - ‘In the summer it is probable as I have before stated that the - enemy will make his attacks in two principal corps, and that he - will also push on through the mountains between Castello Branco and - Abrantes. His object will be by means of his corps, _south of the - Tagus_, to turn the positions which might be taken in his front on - the north of that river; _to cut off from Lisbon the corps opposed - to him_; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear at the - same time. This can be avoided only _by the retreat of the right - centre and left of the allies, and their junction at a point, at - which from the state of the river they cannot be turned by the - passage of the Tagus by the enemy’s left_. The first point of - defence which presents itself below that at which the Tagus ceases - to be fordable, is the river Castenheira close to the lines.’ - -In the above extracts, the fordable nature of the Tagus has been -pretty clearly shown, but I will continue my proofs upon that fact to -satiety. - - - _Lord Wellington to Charles Stuart, Esq._ - - ‘The line of operations which we are obliged to adopt for the - defence of Lisbon and for our own embarkation necessarily throws us - back as far as below Salvaterra on the Tagus, to which place, and - I believe lower, _the Tagus is fordable during the summer_; and we - should be liable to be turned or cut off from Lisbon and the Tagus - if we were to take our line of defence higher upon the river.’ - - - _Lord Wellington to general Hill, August._ - - ‘I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might _move - across the fords of the Tagus at Vilha Velha_ and thus turn your - right.’ - - - _Lord Wellington to general Hill, October._ - - ‘If there are no boats, send them (the sick and encumbrances) - _across the Tagus by the ford_ (at Santarem).’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to general Hill._ - - ‘I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have, - _with some of the fords of the Tagus_ marked upon it, but I believe - _the whole river from Barquina to Santarem is fordable_.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to marshal Beresford._ - - ‘I enclose a letter which colonel Fletcher has given me, _which - affords but a bad prospect of a defence for the Tagus_. I think - that if captain Chapman’s facts are true his arguments are - unanswerable, and that it is very doubtful whether any heavy - ordnance should be placed in the batteries on the upper Tagus.’ - - - _Sir Arthur Wellesley to admiral Berkeley._ - - ‘But if the invasion should be made in summer, _when the Tagus is - fordable in many places_.’... ‘In the event of the attack being - made _between the months of June and November_, when the _Tagus is - fordable, at least as low down as Salvaterra_ (near the lines).’ - - - _Sir John Craddock to lord Castlereagh, April._ - - ‘There is a ferry at Salvaterra, near Alcantara, and another up - the left bank of the Tagus in the Alemtejo, _where there is also a - ford_, and the river may be easily passed.’ - - - _Extract from a Memoir by sir B. D’Urban, quarter-master-general - to Beresford’s army_:—‘_The Tagus_, between Golegao and Rio - Moinhos was _known to offer several fords after a few days’ dry - weather_.’[12] - -Thus we see that, in nearly every month in the year, this unfordable -Tagus of the reviewer is fordable in many places, and that in fact -it is no barrier except in very heavy rains. But to render this -still clearer I will here give one more and conclusive proof. In an -elaborate manuscript memoir upon the defence of Portugal, drawn up -by the celebrated general Dumourier for the duke of Wellington, that -officer argues like this reviewer, that the Tagus is unfordable and -a strong barrier. But a marginal note in Wellington’s hand-writing -runs thus:—‘_He (Dumourier) does not seem to be aware of the real -state of the Tagus at any season_.’ - -What can I say more? Nothing upon this head, but much upon others. -I can call upon the reader to trace the deceitful mode in which the -reviewer perverts or falsifies my expressions throughout. How he -represents the Spaniards at one moment so formidable as to resist -successfully the utmost efforts of more than 300,000 soldiers, the -next breath calls them a poor unarmed horde of peasants incapable of -making any resistance at all. How he quotes me as stating that the -ministers had unbounded confidence in the success of the struggle in -Spain; whereas my words are, that the ministers _professed_ unbounded -confidence. How he represents me as saying, the _Cabinet_ were too -much dazzled to analyse the real causes of the Spanish Revolution; -whereas it was the _nation_ not the _Cabinet_ of which I spoke. And -this could not be mistaken, because I had described the ministers -as only anxious to pursue a warlike system necessary to their own -existence, and that they were actuated by a personal hatred of -Napoleon. Again, how he misrepresents me as wishing the British to -_seize_ Cadiz, and speaks of a _mob_ in that city, when I have spoken -only of the _people_ (oh, true Tory!); and never proposed to seize -Cadiz at all, and have also given the unexceptionable authority of -Mr. Stuart, general M‘Kenzie, and sir George Smith, for my statement. -And here I will notice a fine specimen of this reviewer’s mode of -getting up a case. Having undertaken to prove that every river in -Portugal is a barrier, except the Zezere which I had fixed upon as -being an important line, he gives an extract of a letter from lord -Wellington to a general _Smith_, to the effect that, as the Zezere -might be _turned at that season_ in so many ways, he did not wish -to construct works to defend it then. Now, first, it is necessary -to inform the reader that there is no letter to general Smith. The -letter in question was to general Leith, and the _mistake_ was not -without its object, namely, to prevent any curious person from -discovering that the very next sentence is as follows:—‘If, however, -this work can be performed, either by the peasantry or by the troops, -without any great inconvenience, _the line of the Zezere may, -hereafter, become of very great importance_.’ - -All this is very pitiful, and looks like extreme soreness in the -reviewer; but the effrontery with which he perverts my statements -about the Austrian war surpasses all his other efforts in that line, -and deserves a more elaborate exposure. - -In my history it is stated, that some obscure intrigues of -the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies on -the continent, emanating from patrician sources, excited the -sympathy, and nourished certain _distempered feelings_ in the -English ministers, _which feeling_ made them see only weakness and -disaffection in France. This I stated, because I knew that those -intrigues were, in fact, a conspiracy concocted, with Talleyrand’s -connivance, for the dethronement of Napoleon; and the English -ministers neglected Spain and every other part of their foreign -affairs for the moment, so intent were they upon this foolish scheme -and so sanguine of success. These facts are not known to many, but -they are true. - -In the same paragraph of my history it is said, the _warlike -preparations of Austria_, and the reputation of the archduke Charles, -whose talents were foolishly said to exceed Napoleon’s, _had awakened -the dormant spirit of coalitions_; meaning, as would be evident to -any persons not wilfully blind, had awakened that dormant spirit in -the English ministers. - -Now reader, mark the candour and simplicity of the reviewer. He says -that I condemned these ministers, ‘for nourishing their distempered -feelings _by combining the efforts of a German monarch in favour of -national independence_.’ As if it were the _Austrian war_, and not -the _obscure intrigues for dethroning Napoleon_ that the expression -of _distempered feelings_ applied to. As if the awakening the -_dormant spirit of coalitions_, instead of being a reference to the -sentiments of the English ministers, meant the exciting the Austrians -and other nations to war, and the forming of a vast plan of action by -those ministers! And for fear any mistake on that head should arise, -it is so asserted in another part of the review in the following -terms:— - - ‘_To have “awakened the dormant spirit”_ of _coalitions_, is - another of the crimes which the British ministers are charged - with, as if it would have been a proof of wisdom to have abstained - from _forming a combination of those states of Europe which still - retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist a - conqueror_,’ &c. &c.—_Review._ - -The Quarterly’s attention to Spanish affairs seems to have rendered -it very intimate with the works of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto. But since -it has thus claimed the Austrian war as the work of its former -patrons, the ministers of 1809, I will throw some new light upon -the history of that period, which, though they should prove little -satisfactory to the Quarterly, may, as the details are really -curious, in some measure repay the reader for his patience in wading -through the tedious exposition of this silly and unscrupulous -writer’s misrepresentations. - -After the conference of Erfurth, the Austrian count Stadion, a man -of ability and energy, either believing, or affecting to believe, -that Napoleon was determined to destroy Austria and only waited until -Spain was conquered, resolved to employ the whole force of the German -empire against the French monarch in a war of destruction for one -or other of the contending states. With this view his first efforts -were directed to change the opinions of the archduke Charles and -those immediately about him who were averse to a war; and though he -was long and vigorously resisted by general Grün, an able man and -the archduke’s confidant, he finally succeeded. Some time before -this France had insisted upon a reduction of the Austrian forces, -and being asked if she would do the same for the sake of peace, -replied that she would maintain no more troops in Germany than should -be found necessary; but the army of the Confederation must be kept -up as a constitutional force, and it was impossible during the war -with England to reduce the French troops in other quarters. To this -succeeded an attempt at a triple treaty, by which the territories -of Austria, Russia, and France, were to be mutually guaranteed. -Champagny and Romanzow suggested this plan, but the Austrian minister -did not conceive Russia strong enough to guarantee Austria against -France. Stadion’s project was more agreeable, and a note of a -declaration of war was sent to Metternich, then at Paris, to deliver -to the French government. The archduke Charles set off for the army, -and was followed by the emperor. - -When the war was thus resolved upon, it remained to settle whether -it should be carried on for the sole benefit of Austria, or in such -a manner as to interest other nations. Contrary to her usual policy -Austria decided for the latter, and contrary to her usual parsimony -she was extremely liberal to her general officers and spies. It was -determined that the war should be one of restitution, and in that -view secret agents had gone to Italy, and were said to have made -great progress in exciting the people; officers had been also sent -to Sicily and Sardinia to urge those courts to attempt their own -restoration to the continental thrones. The complete restoration of -Naples, of Tuscany, and the Pope’s dominions, and large additions to -the old kingdom of Piedmont were proposed, and Austria herself only -demanded a secure frontier, namely, the Tyrol, the river Po, and the -Chiusa, which was not much more than the peace of Campo Formio had -left her. - -Such were her views in the south where kings were to be her -coadjutors, but in the north she was intent upon a different plan. -There she expected help from the people, who were discontented at -being parcelled out by Napoleon. Treaties were entered into with -the elector of Hesse, the dukes of Brunswick and Oels, and it was -understood that the people there and in the provinces taken from -Prussia, were ready to rise on the first appearance of an Austrian -soldier. Hanover was to be restored to England; but Austria was so -discontented with the Prussian king, that the restoration of the -Prussian provinces, especially the duchy of Warsaw, was to depend -upon his conduct in the war. - -The means of effecting this mighty project were the great resources -which Stadion had found or created; they were greater than Austria -had ever before produced and the enthusiasm of her people was in -proportion. The landwehr levy had been calculated at only 150 -battalions; it produced 300 battalions, besides the Hungarian -insurrection. The regular army was complete in everything, and the -cavalry good, though not equal to what it had been in former wars. -There were nine ‘_corps d’armée_.’ The archduke Ferdinand with one -was to strike a blow in the duchy of Warsaw. The archduke Charles -commanded in chief. Marching with six corps, containing 160,000 -regular troops besides the landwehr attached to them, he was to -cross the frontier and fall on the French army, supposed to be only -40,000. That is to say, the first corps, under Belgarde and Klenau, -were to march by Peterwalde and Dresden against Bernadotte who was -in that quarter. The second corps, under Kollowrath and Brady, were -to march by Eger upon Bareith and Wurzburg, to prevent the union of -Davoust and Bernadotte. The third corps, under prince Rosenberg, was -to move by Waldmunchen, in the Upper Palatinate, and after beating -Wrede at Straubingen, to join the archduke Charles near Munich. The -archduke himself was to proceed against that city with the reserves -of prince John of Lichtenstein, Hiller’s corps, Stipchitz, and those -of Hohenzollern’s, and the archduke Louis’. The archduke John was -to attack Italy; and the different corps, exclusive of landwehr, -amounted to not less than 260,000 men. - -The project was gigantic, the force prodigious, and though the -quarter-master-general Meyer, seeing the vice of the military plan, -resigned his situation, and that Meerfelt quarrelled with the -archduke Charles, the general feeling was high and sanguine; and -the princes of the empire were, with the exception of Wirtemberg -and Westphalia, thought to be rather favourable towards the -Austrians. But all the contributions were in kind; Austria had only -a depreciated paper currency which would not serve her beyond her -own frontiers; wherefore England, at that time the paymaster of -all Europe, was looked to. England, however, had no ambassador, -no regular accredited agent at Vienna; all this mighty armament -and plan were carried on without her aid, almost without her -knowledge; and a despatch from the Foreign Office, dated the 8th of -December, but which only arrived the 10th of March, _refused all -aid whatsoever! and even endeavoured to prove that Austria could -not want, and England was not in a situation to grant_. Yet this -was the period in which such lavish grants had been made to Spain -without any condition—so lavish, that, in Cadiz, nearly four hundred -thousand pounds, received from England, was lying untouched by the -Spaniards. They were absolutely glutted with specie, for they had, at -that moment, of their own money, and lying idle in their treasury, -_fourteen millions of dollars_, and _ten millions more were on the -way from Vera Cruz and Buenes Ayres_. Such was the wisdom, such -the providence of the English ministers! heaping money upon money -at Cadiz, where it was not wanted, and if it had been wanted, ill -bestowed; but refusing it to Austria to forward the explosion of the -enormous mine prepared against Napoleon in Germany and Italy. Their -agent, Mr. Frere, absolutely refused even to ask for a loan of some -of this money from the Spaniards. This is what the reviewer, wilfully -perverting my expression, namely, ‘_awakened the dormant spirit of -coalitions_,’ calls ‘_the forming a combination of the states of -Europe_!’ The English ministers were treated as mere purse-bearers, -to be bullied or cajoled as the case might be; and in these two -instances, not without reason, for they neither know how to give nor -how to refuse in the right time or place. Nor were their military -dispositions better arranged, as we shall presently see. - -To proceed with our narrative. Stadion, to prevent the mischief -which this despatch from England might have produced, by encouraging -the peace-party at the court, and discouraging the others, only -imparted it to the emperor and his secret council, but hid it from -those members of the cabinet who were wavering. Even this was like -to have cost him his place; and some members of the council actually -proposed to reduce one-third of the army. In fine, a cry was arising -against the war, but the emperor declared himself on Stadion’s side, -and the cabinet awaited the result of count Walmoden’s mission -to London. That nobleman had been despatched with full powers to -conclude a treaty of alliance and subsidy with England, and to learn -the feeling of the English cabinet upon an extraordinary measure -which Austria had resorted to; for being utterly unable to pay her -way at the outset, and trusting to the importance of the crisis, and -not a little to the known facility with which the English ministers -lavished their subsidies, she had resolved to raise, through the -principal bankers in Vienna, £150,000 a month, by making drafts -through Holland upon their correspondents in London, _to be repaid -from the subsidy_ TO BE granted by England! Prince Staremberg was -sent at the same time with a special mission to London, to arrange -a definite treaty for money, and a convention regulating the future -object and conduct of the war—a very curious proceeding—because -Staremberg had been recalled before for conduct offensive to the -English cabinet; but he was well acquainted with London, and the -emperor wished to get him away lest he should put himself at the head -of the peace-party in Vienna. Thus the English ministers continued so -to conduct their affairs, that, while they gave their money to Spain -and their advice to Austria, and both unprofitably, they only excited -the contempt of both countries. - -From the conference of Erfurth, France had been earnest with Russia -to take an active part, according to treaty, against Austria; -and Romanzow, who was an enemy of England, increased Alexander’s -asperity toward that country, but nothing was done against Austria; -and when Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at Petersburg, became -clamorous, Alexander pretended to take the Austrian ambassador -Swartzenberg to task for the measures of his court, but really gave -him encouragement, by repairing immediately afterwards to Finland -without inviting Caulaincourt. A contemporaneous official note, -from Romanzow to Austria, was indeed couched in terms to render the -intention of Alexander apparently doubtful, but this was only a -blind for Napoleon. There was no doubt of the favourable wishes and -feelings of the court, the Russian troops in Poland did not stir, and -Stadion, far from having any dread of them, calculated upon their -assistance in case of any marked success in the outset. The emperor -Alexander was, however, far from inattentive to his own interests, -for he sent general Hitroff at this time to Turkey to demand Moldavia -and Wallachia as the price of a treaty, hoping thus to snatch these -countries during the general commotion. He was foiled by the Austrian -cabinet, which secretly directed the Turks sent to meet Hitroff, to -assume a high tone and agree to no negociation in which England was -not a party: hence, when the Russians demanded the dismissal of Mr. -Adair from Constantinople Hitroff was himself sent away. - -While the affairs with Russia were in this state, the present king of -Holland arrived, incognito, at Vienna, to offer his services either -as heir to the stadtholdership, as a prince of the German empire, or -as a near and confidential connection of the house of Brandenberg; -but it was only in the latter view he could be useful, and it was -evident he expected the Austrian court would make their policy in -the north coincide with that of the Prussian court. He said the -secret voyage of the royal family to Petersburg had exposed them -to mortifications and slights which had changed the sentiments of -both the king and queen towards France, and the queen, bowed down -by misfortune, dreaded new reverses and depressed the spirit of the -king. They stood alone in their court, ministers and officers alike -openly maintained opinions diametrically opposed to the sovereign, -and at a grand council held in Koningsberg every minister had voted -for war with Napoleon. The king assented, but the next day the queen -induced him to retract. However, the voice of the people and of the -army was for war, and any order to join the troops to those of the -Rhenish confederation was sure to produce an explosion. There were -between 30,000 and 40,000 regular troops under arms, and Austria was -assured, that if any Austrian force approached the frontier, the -Prussian soldiers would, bag and baggage, join it, despite of king or -queen. - -In this state of affairs, and when a quarrel had arisen between -Bernadotte and the Saxon king (for the people of that country -were ill-disposed towards the French), it is evident that a large -English army appearing in the north of Germany would have gathered -around it all the people and armies of the north, and accordingly -Stadion proposed a landing in the Weser and the Elbe. Now England -had at that time the great armament which went to Walcheren, the -army under Wellington in the Peninsula, and that under sir John -Stuart in Sicily, that is to say, she had about 80,000 or 90,000 -men disposable; and yet so contriving were the ministers, that they -kept Wellington too weak in Spain, Stuart too strong in Sicily; -and instead of acting in the north of Germany where such a great -combination awaited them, they sent their most powerful force to -perish in the marshes of Walcheren, where the only diversion they -caused was the bringing together a few thousand national guards from -the nearest French departments. And this the reviewer calls ‘_the -forming a combination of those states in Europe which still retained -some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist the ambition of -a conqueror_.’ What a profound, modest, and, to use a Morning Post -compound, not-at-all-a-flagitious writer this reviewer is. - -Well, notwithstanding this grand ‘_combination_,’ things did not -turn out well. The Austrians changed their first plan of campaign in -several particulars. Napoleon suddenly and unexpectedly appeared at -the head of his army, which, greatly inferior in number, and composed -principally of German contingents, was not very well disposed towards -him; and yet, such was the stupendous power of this man’s genius and -bravery, he in a few days by a series of movements unequalled in -skill by any movement known in military records, broke through the -Austrian power, separated her armies, drove them in disorder before -him, and seized Vienna; and but for an accident, one of those minor -accidents so frequent in war, which enabled the archduke Charles to -escape over the Danube at Ratisbon, he would have terminated this -gigantic contest in ten days. The failure there led to the battle -of Esling, where the sudden swell of the Danube again baffled him -and produced another crisis, which might have been turned to his -hurt if the English army had been in the north of Germany; but it -was then perishing amongst the stagnant ditches of Walcheren, and -the only combination of the English ministers to be discovered was -a combination of folly, arrogance, and conceit. I have now done -with the review. Had all the objections contained in it been true, -it would have evinced the petty industry of a malicious mind more -than any just or generous interest in the cause of truth; but being, -as I have demonstrated, false even in the minutest particular, I -justly stigmatise it as remarkable only for malignant imbecility and -systematic violation of truth. - - * * * * * - -The reviewers having asserted that I picked out of Foy’s history the -charge against lord Melville of saying “the worst men made the best -soldiers,” I replied that I drew for it on my own clear recollection -of the fact. - -Since then a friend has sent me the report of lord Melville’s speech, -extracted from the Annual Register (Baldwin’s) 1808, p. 112, and the -following passage extracted from his lordship’s speech bears out my -assertion and proves the effrontery with which the reviewers deny -facts. - - “What was meant by a better sort of men? Was it that they should be - taller or shorter, broader or thinner? This might be intelligible, - but it was not the fact. The men that had hitherto formed the - British armies were men of stout hearts and habits; men of spirit - and courage; lovers of bold enterprize. These were the materials of - which an army must be composed. Give him such men though not of the - better description. _The worse men were the fittest for soldiers._ - Keep the better sort at home.” - - - - -HISTORY - -OF THE - -WAR IN THE PENINSULA. - - - - -HISTORY - -OF THE - -PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -BOOK XXI. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -[Sidenote: 1813. June.] - -The fate of Spain was decided at Vittoria, but on the fields of -Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon’s genius restored the general balance, -and the negociations which followed those victories affected the war -in the Peninsula. - -Lord Wellington’s first intention was to reduce Pampeluna by force, -and the sudden fall of the Pancorbo forts, which opened the great -Madrid road was a favourable event; but Portugal being relinquished -as a place of arms, a new base of operations was required, lest a -change of fortune should force the allies to return to that country -when all the great military establishments were broken up, when -the opposition of the native government to British influence was -become rancorous, and the public sentiment quite averse to English -supremacy. The Western Pyrenees, in conjunction with the ocean, -offered such a base, yet the harbours were few, and the English -general desired to secure a convenient one, near the new positions -of the army; wherefore to reduce San Sebastian was of more immediate -importance than to reduce Pampeluna; and it was essential to effect -this during the fine season because the coast was iron-bound and very -dangerous in winter. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -Pampeluna was strong. A regular attack required three weeks for the -bringing up of ordnance and stores, five or six weeks more for the -attack, and from fifteen to twenty thousand of the best men, because -British soldiers were wanted for the assault; but an investment could -be maintained by fewer and inferior troops, Spaniards and Portuguese, -and the enemy’s magazines were likely to fail under blockade sooner -than his ramparts would crumble under fire. Moreover on the eastern -coast misfortune and disgrace had befallen the English arms. Sir -John Murray had failed at Taragona. He had lost the honoured -battering-train intrusted to his charge, and his artillery equipage -was supposed to be ruined. The French fortresses in Catalonia and -Valencia were numerous, the Anglo-Sicilian army could neither -undertake an important siege, nor seriously menace the enemy without -obtaining some strong place as a base. Suchet was therefore free to -march on Zaragoza, and uniting with Clauzel and Paris, to operate -with a powerful mass against the right flank of the allies. For -these reasons Wellington finally concluded to blockade Pampeluna and -besiege San Sebastian, and the troops, as they returned from the -pursuit of Clauzel, marched to form a covering army in the mountains. -The peasantry of the vicinity were then employed on the works of the -blockade which was ultimately intrusted to O’Donnel’s Andalusian -reserve. - -Confidently did the English general expect the immediate fall of -San Sebastian, and he was intent to have it before the negociations -for the armistice in Germany should terminate; but mighty pains -and difficulties awaited him, and ere these can be treated of, the -progress of the war in other parts, during his victorious march from -Portugal to the Pyrenees, must be treated of. - - -CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN COAST. - -[Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 512.] - -It will be remembered that the duke Del Parque was to move from -the Sierra Morena, by Almanza, to join Elio, whose army had been -reinforced from Minorca; the united troops were then to act against -Suchet, on the Xucar, while sir John Murray sailed to attack -Taragona. Del Parque received his orders the 24th of April, he had -long known of the project and the march was one of twelve days, yet -he did not reach his destination until the end of May. This delay -resulted, partly from the bad state of his army, partly from the -usual procrastination of Spaniards, partly from the conduct of Elio, -whose proceedings, though probably springing from a dislike to serve -under Del Parque, created doubts of his own fidelity. - -[Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 460.] - -It has been already shewn, how, contrary to his agreement with -Murray, Elio withdrew his cavalry when Mijares was at Yecla, whence -sprung that general’s misfortune; how he placed the regiment of -Velez Malaga in Villena, a helpless prey for Suchet; how he left the -Anglo-Sicilian army to fight the battle of Castalla unaided. He now -persuaded Del Parque to move towards Utiel instead of Almanza, and -to send a detachment under Mijares to Requeña, thereby threatening -Suchet’s right, but exposing the Spanish army to a sudden blow, and -disobeying his instructions which prescribed a march by Almanza. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -This false movement Elio represented as Del Parque’s own, but the -latter, when Murray remonstrated, quickly approached Castalla by -Jumilla, declaring his earnest desire to obey Wellington’s orders. -The divergence of his former march had, however, already placed him -in danger; his left flank was so exposed, while coming by Jumilla, -that Murray postponed his own embarkation to concert with Elio a -combined operation, from Biar and Sax, against Fuente de la Higuera -where Suchet’s troops were lying in wait. Previous to this epoch Elio -had earnestly urged the English general, to disregard Del Parque -altogether and embark at once for Taragona, undertaking himself -to secure the junction with his fellow-commander. And now, after -agreeing to co-operate with Murray he secretly withdrew his cavalry -from Sax, sent Whittingham in a false direction, placed Roche without -support at Alcoy, retired himself to the city of Murcia, and at -the same time one of his regiments quartered at Alicant fired upon -a British guard. Roche was attacked and lost eighty men, and Del -Parque’s flank was menaced from Fuente de la Higuera, but the British -cavalry, assembling at Biar, secured his communication with Murray -on the 25th, and the 27th the Anglo-Sicilians broke up from their -quarters to embark at Alicant. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -The French were now very strong. Suchet unmolested for forty days -after the battle of Castalla, had improved his defensive works, -chased the bands from his rear, called up his reinforcements, -rehorsed his cavalry and artillery, and prepared for new operations, -without losing the advantage of foraging the fertile districts -immediately in front of the Xucar. On the other hand lord William -Bentinck, alarmed by intelligence of an intended descent upon Sicily, -had recalled more British troops; and as Whittingham’s cavalry, -and Roche’s division, were left at Alicant, the force actually -embarked to attack Taragona, including a fresh English regiment from -Carthagena, scarcely exceeded fourteen thousand present under arms. -Of these, less than eight thousand were British or German, and the -horsemen were only seven hundred. Yet the armament was formidable, -for the battering train was complete and powerful, the materials for -gabions and fascines previously collected at Ivica, and the naval -squadron, under admiral Hallowel, consisted of several line-of-battle -ships, frigates, bomb-vessels and gun-boats, besides the transports. -There was however no cordiality between general Clinton and Murray, -nor between the latter and his quarter-master-general Donkin, nor -between Donkin and the admiral; subordinate officers also, in both -services, adopting false notions, some from vanity, some from -hearsay, added to the uneasy feeling which prevailed amongst the -chiefs. Neither admiral nor general seem to have had sanguine hopes -of success even at the moment of embarkation, and there was in no -quarter a clear understanding of lord Wellington’s able plan for the -operations. - -[Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 495.] - -While Del Parque’s army was yet in march, Suchet, if he had no -secret understanding with Elio or any of his officers, must have -been doubtful of the allies’ intentions, although the strength of -the battering-train at Alicant indicated some siege of importance. -He however recalled Pannetier’s brigade from the frontier of Aragon, -and placed it on the road to Tortoza; and at the same time, knowing -Clauzel was then warring down the partidas in Navarre, he judged -Aragon safe, and drew Severoli’s Italian brigade from thence, leaving -only the garrisons, and a few thousand men under general Paris as -a reserve at Zaragoza: and this was the reason the army of Aragon -did not co-operate to crush Mina after his defeat by Clauzel in the -valley of Roncal. Decaen also sent some reinforcements, wherefore, -after completing his garrisons, Suchet could furnish the drafts -required by Napoleon, and yet bring twenty thousand men into the -field. He was however very unquiet, and notwithstanding Clauzel’s -operations, in fear for his troops in Aragon, where Paris had been -attacked by Goyan, even in Zaragoza; moreover now, for the first -time since its subjugation, an unfriendly feeling was perceptible in -Valencia. - -[Sidenote: June.] - -On the 31st of May Murray sailed from Alicant. Suchet immediately -ordered Pannetier’s brigade to close towards Tortoza, but kept his -own positions in front of Valencia until the fleet was seen to pass -the Grāo with a fair wind. Then feeling assured the expedition aimed -at Catalonia, he prepared to aid that principality; but the column of -succour being drawn principally from the camp of Xativa, forty miles -from Valencia, he could not quit the latter before the 7th of June. -He took with him nine thousand men of all arms, leaving Harispe on -the Xucar, with seven thousand infantry and cavalry, exclusive of -Severoli’s troops which were in full march from Teruel. Meanwhile sir -John Murray’s armament, having very favourable weather, anchored on -the evening of the 2d in the bay of Taragona, whence five ships of -war under captain Adam, and two battalions of infantry with some guns -under colonel Prevot, were detached to attack San Felippe de Balaguer. - -The strength and value of this fort arose from its peculiar position. -The works, garrisoned by a hundred men, were only sixty feet square, -but the site was a steep isolated rock, standing in the very gorge of -a pass, and blocking the only carriageway from Tortoza to Taragona. -The mountains on either hand, although commanding the fort, were -nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labour was required to form -the batteries. - -Prevot, landing on the 3d, was joined by a Spanish brigade of -Copons’ army, and in concert with the navy immediately commenced -operations by placing two six-pounders on the heights south of the -pass, from whence at six or seven hundred yards distance they threw -shrapnel-shells; but this projectile is, when used with guns of small -calibre, insignificant save as a round shot. - -On the 4th two twelve-pounders, and a howitzer, being brought to the -same point by the sailors, opened their fire, and at night the seamen -with extraordinary exertions dragged up five twenty-four-pounders -and their stores. The troops then constructed one battery, for two -howitzers, on the slope of the grand ridge to the northward of the -pass, and a second, for four heavy guns, on the rock where the fort -stood at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. To form these -batteries earth was carried from below, and every thing else, even -water, brought from the ships, though the landing place was more -than a mile and a half off. Hence, as time was valuable, favourable -terms were offered to the garrison, but the offer was refused. The -5th the fire was continued, but with slight success, the howitzer -battery on the great ridge was relinquished, and at night a very -violent storm retarded the construction of the breaching batteries. -Previous to this colonel Prevot had warned Murray, that his means -were insufficient, and a second Spanish brigade was sent to him. Yet -the breaching batteries were still incomplete on the 6th, so severe -was the labour of carrying up the guns, and out of three, already -mounted, one was disabled by a shot from the fort. - -[Sidenote: Notes by sir Henry Peyton, R.N. MSS.] - -Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortoza, had ordered the -governor of that place to succour San Felippe. He tried, and would -undoubtedly have succeeded, if captain Peyton, of the Thames frigate, -had not previously obtained from admiral Hallowel two eight-inch -mortars, which, being placed just under the fort and worked by Mr. -James of the marine artillery, commencing at day-break on the 7th, -soon exploded a small magazine in the fort, whereupon the garrison -surrendered. The besiegers who had lost about fifty men and officers -then occupied the place, and meanwhile sir John Murray had commenced -the - - -SECOND SIEGE OF TARAGONA. - -Although the fleet cast anchor in the bay on the evening of the -2d, the surf prevented the disembarkation of the troops until the -next day. The rampart of the lower town had been destroyed by -Suchet, but Fort Royal remained and though in bad condition served, -together with the ruins of the San Carlos bastion, to cover the -western front which was the weakest line of defence. The governor -Bertoletti, an Italian, was supposed by Murray to be disaffected, but -he proved himself a loyal and energetic officer; and his garrison -sixteen hundred strong, five hundred being privateer seamen and -Franco-Spaniards, served him well. - -The Olivo, and Loretto heights were occupied the first day by -Clinton’s and Whittingham’s divisions, the other troops remaining on -the low ground about the Francoli river; the town was then bombarded -during the night by the navy, but the fire was sharply returned and -the flotilla suffered the most. The next day two batteries were -commenced six hundred yards from San Carlos, and nine hundred yards -from Fort Royal. They opened the 6th, but being too distant to -produce much effect, a third was commenced six hundred yards from -Fort Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in that outwork, -yet the assault was deferred, and some pieces removed to play from -the Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired -the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. The subsequent -proceedings cannot be understood without an accurate knowledge of the -relative positions of the French and allied armies. - -[Sidenote: Plan, No. 1.] - -Taragona though situated on one of a cluster of heights, which -terminate a range descending from the northward to the sea, is, with -the exception of that range, surrounded by an open country called -the _Campo de Taragona_, which is again environed by very rugged -mountains, through which the several roads descend into the plain. - -Westward there were only two carriage ways, one direct, by the Col de -Balaguer to Taragona; the other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet, -Momblanch and Reus. The first was blocked by the taking of San -Felippe; the second, although used by Suchet for his convoys during -the French siege of Taragona, was now in bad order, and at best only -available for small mountain-guns. - -Northward there was a carriage way, leading from Lerida, which united -with that from Falcet at Momblanch. - -Eastward there was the royal causeway, coming from Barcelona, through -Villa Franca, Arbos, Vendrills, and Torredembarra; this road after -passing Villa Franca sends off two branches to the right, one passing -through the Col de Cristina, the other through Masarbones and Col de -Leibra, leading upon Braffin and Valls. It was by the latter branch -that M‘Donald passed to Reus in 1810; he had, however, no guns or -carriages, and his whole army laboured to make the way practicable. - -Between these various roads the mountains were too rugged to permit -any direct cross communications; and troops, coming from different -sides, could only unite in the Campo de Taragona now occupied by the -allies. Wherefore, as Murray had, including sergeants, above fifteen -thousand fighting men, and Copons, reinforced with two regiments sent -by sea from Coruña, was at Reus with six thousand regulars besides -the irregular division of Manso, twenty-five thousand combatants were -in possession of the French point of junction. - -The Catalans, after Lacy’s departure, had, with the aid of captain -Adam’s ship, destroyed two small forts at Perillo and Ampolla, and -Eroles had blockaded San Felippe de Balaguer for thirty-six days, but -it was then succoured by Maurice Mathieu; and the success at Perillo -was more than balanced by a check which Sarzfield received on the 3d -of April from some of Pannetier’s troops. The partida warfare had, -however, been more active in Upper Catalonia, and Copons claimed two -considerable victories, one gained by himself on the 17th of May, at -La Bispal near the Col de Cristina, where he boasted to have beaten -six thousand French with half their numbers, destroying six hundred, -as they returned from succouring San Felippe de Balaguer. In the -other, won by colonel Lander near Olot on the 7th of May, it was -said twelve hundred of Lamarque’s men fell. These exploits are by -French writers called skirmishes, and the following description of -the Catalan army, given to sir John Murray by Cabanes, the chief of -Copons’ staff, renders the French version the most credible. - -“_We do not_,” said that officer, “_exceed nine or ten thousand men, -extended on different points of a line running from the neighbourhood -of Reus along the high mountains to the vicinity of Olot. The -soldiers are brave, but without discipline, without subordination, -without clothing, without artillery, without ammunition, without -magazines, without money, and without means of transport!_” - -Copons himself, when he came down to the Campo, very frankly told -Murray, that as his troops could only fight in position, he would -not join in any operation which endangered his retreat into the high -mountains. However, with the exception of twelve hundred men left -at Vich under Eroles, all his forces, the best perhaps in Spain, -were now at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to intercept the -communications of the different French corps, and to harass their -marches if they should descend into the Campo. Murray could also -calculate upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to aid him -in pushing on the works of the siege, or in a battle near the shore; -and he expected three thousand additional troops from Sicily. Sir -Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean fleet, had promised -to divert the attention of the French troops by a descent eastward -of Barcelona, and the armies of Del Parque and Elio were to make a -like diversion westward of Tortoza. Finally, a general rising of the -Somatenes might have been effected, and those mountaineers were all -at Murray’s disposal, to procure intelligence, to give timely notice -of the enemy’s approach, or to impede his march by breaking up the -roads. - -On the French side there was greater but more scattered power. Suchet -had marched with nine thousand men from Valencia, and what with -Pannetier’s brigade and some spare troops from Tortoza, eleven or -twelve thousand men with artillery, might have come to the succour -of Taragona from that side, if the sudden fall of San Felippe de -Balaguer had not barred the only carriage way on the westward. A -movement by Mora, Falcet, and Momblanch, remained open, yet it would -have been tedious, and the disposable troops at Lerida were few. To -the eastward therefore the garrison looked for the first succour. -Maurice Mathieu, reinforced with a brigade from Upper Catalonia, -could bring seven thousand men with artillery from Barcelona, and -Decaen could move from the Ampurdam with an equal number, hence -twenty-five thousand men might finally bear upon the allied army. - -But Suchet, measuring from the Xucar, had more than one hundred and -sixty miles to march; Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from -various places and march seventy miles after Murray had disembarked; -nor could he stir at all, until Taragona was actually besieged, -lest the allies should reimbark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had -in like manner to look to the security of the Ampurdam, and he was -one hundred and thirty miles distant. Wherefore, however active the -French generals might be, the English general could calculate upon -ten days’ clear operations, after investment, before even the heads -of the enemy’s columns, coming from different quarters, could issue -from the hills bordering the Campo. - -Some expectation also he might have, that Suchet would endeavour to -cripple Del Parque, before he marched to the succour of Taragona; -and it was in his favour, that eastward and westward, the royal -causeway was in places exposed to the fire of the naval squadron. The -experience of captain Codrington during the first siege of Taragona, -had proved indeed, that an army could not be stopped by this fire, -yet it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation. -Thus, the advantage of a central position, the possession of the -enemy’s point of junction, the initial movement, the good will of -the people, and the aid of powerful flank diversions, belonged to -Murray; superior numbers and a better army to the French, since the -allies, brave, and formidable to fight in a position, were not well -constituted for general operations. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -Taragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, -was a weak place. A simple revetment three feet and a half thick, -without ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the two -outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, -were not armed, nor even repaired until after the investment, and -the garrison, too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed -with labour. Here then, time being precious to both sides, ordinary -rules should have been set aside and daring operations adopted. Lord -Wellington had judged ten thousand men sufficient to take Taragona. -Murray brought seventeen thousand, of which fourteen thousand were -effective. To do this he had, he said, so reduced his equipments, -stores, and means of land transport, that his army could not move -from the shipping; he was yet so unready for the siege, that Fort -Royal was not stormed on the 8th, because the engineer was unprepared -to profit from a successful assault. - -This excuse, founded on the scarcity of stores, was not however borne -out by facts. The equipments left behind, were only draft animals -and commissariat field-stores; the thing wanting was vigour in the -general, and this was made manifest in various ways. Copons, like all -regular Spanish officers, was averse to calling out the Somatenes, -and Murray did not press the matter. Suchet took San Felippe de -Balaguer by escalade. Murray attacked in form, and without sufficient -means; for if captain Peyton had not brought up the mortars, which -was an afterthought, extraneous to the general’s arrangements, -the fort could not have been reduced before succour arrived from -Tortoza. Indeed the surrender was scarcely creditable to the French -commandant, for his works were uninjured, and only a small part of -his powder destroyed. It is also said, I believe truly, that one -of the officers employed to regulate the capitulation had in his -pocket, an order from Murray to raise the siege and embark, spiking -the guns! At Taragona, the troops on the low ground, did not approach -so near, by three hundred yards, as they might have done; and the -outworks should have been stormed at once, as Wellington stormed -Fort Francisco at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Francisco was a good -outwork and complete. The outworks of Taragona were incomplete, -ill-flanked, without palisades or casements, and their fall would -have enabled the besiegers to form a parallel against the body of -the place as Suchet had done in the former siege; a few hours’ -firing would then have brought down the wall and a general assault -might have been delivered. The French had stormed a similar breach -in that front, although defended by eight thousand Spanish troops, -and the allies opposed by only sixteen hundred French and Italians, -soldiers and seamen, were in some measure bound by honour to follow -that example, since colonel Skerrett, at the former siege, refused -to commit twelve hundred British troops in the place, on the special -ground that it was indefensible, though so strongly garrisoned. -Murray’s troops were brave, they had been acting together for nearly -a year; and after the fight at Castalla had become so eager, that -an Italian regiment, which at Alicant, was ready to go over bodily -to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal. -This confidence was not shared by their general. Even at the moment -of victory, he had resolved, if Suchet advanced a second time, to -relinquish the position of Castalla and retire to Alicant! - -It is clear, that, up to the 8th, sir John Murray’s proceedings were -ill-judged, and his after operations, were more injudicious. - -As early as the 5th, false reports had made Suchet reach Tortoza, -and had put two thousand French in movement from Lerida. Murray then -openly avowed his alarm and his regret at having left Alicant; yet he -proceeded to construct two heavy counter-batteries near the Olivo, -sent a detachment to Valls in observation of the Lerida road, and -desired Manso to watch that of Barcelona. - -On the 9th his emissaries said the French were coming from the east, -and from the west; and would, when united, exceed twenty thousand. -Murray immediately sought an interview with the admiral, declaring -his intention to raise the siege; his views were changed during the -conference but he was discontented; and the two commanders were now -evidently at variance, for Hallowel refused to join in a summons to -the governor, and his flotilla again bombarded the place. - -The 10th the spies in Barcelona gave notice that eight or ten -thousand French with fourteen guns, would march from that city the -next day. Copons immediately joined Manso, and Murray, as if he now -disdained his enemy, continued to disembark stores, landed several -mortars, armed the batteries at the Olivo, and on the 11th opened -their fire, in concert with that from the ships of war. - -This was the first serious attack, and the English general, -professing a wish to fight the column coming from Barcelona, sent the -cavalry under lord Frederick Bentinck to Altafalla, and in person -sought a position of battle to the eastward. He left orders to storm -the outworks that night, but returned, before the hour appointed, -extremely disturbed by intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at -Villa Franca with eight thousand combatants, and Suchet closing upon -the Col de Balaguer. The infirmity of his mind was now apparent to -the whole army. At eight o’clock he repeated his order to assault the -outworks; at ten o’clock the storming party was in the dry bed of -the Francoli, awaiting the signal, when a countermand arrived; the -siege was then to be raised and the guns removed immediately from the -Olivo; the commander of the artillery remonstrated, and the general -then promised to hold the batteries until the next night. Meanwhile -the detachment at Valls and the cavalry at Altafalla were called in, -without any notice to general Copons, though he depended on their -support. - -The parc and all the heavy guns of the batteries on the low grounds -were removed to the beach for embarkation on the morning of the 12th, -and at twelve o’clock lord Frederick Bentinck arrived from Altafalla -with the cavalry. It is said he was ordered to shoot his horses, -but refused to obey, and moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The -detachment from Valls arrived next, and the infantry marched to Cape -Salou to embark, but the horsemen followed lord Frederick, and were -themselves followed by fourteen pieces of artillery; each body moved -independently, and all was confused, incoherent, afflicting, and -dishonorable to the British arms. - -While the seamen were embarking the guns, the quarter-master-general -came down to the beach, with orders to abandon that business and -collect boats for the reception of troops, the enemy being supposed -close at hand; and notwithstanding Murray’s promise to hold the -Olivo until nightfall, fresh directions were given to spike the guns -there, and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose on every -side, and from both services; army and navy were alike indignant, -and so excited, that it is said personal insult was offered to -the general. Three staff-officers repaired in a body to Murray’s -quarters, to offer plans and opinions, and the admiral who it would -appear did not object to raising the siege but to the manner of -doing it, would not suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation -of artillery. He even urged an attack upon the column coming from -Barcelona, and opposed the order to spike the guns at the Olivo, -offering to be responsible for carrying all clear off during the -night. - -[Sidenote: Admiral Hallowel’s evidence on the trial.] - -Thus pressed, Murray again wavered. Denying that he had ordered the -battering pieces to be spiked, he sent counter-orders, and directed -a part of Clinton’s troops to advance towards the Gaya river. Yet -a few hours afterwards he reverted to his former resolution, and -peremptorily renewed the order for the artillery to spike the guns on -the Olivo, and burn the carriages. Nor was even this unhappy action -performed without confusion. The different orders received by Clinton -in the course of the day had indicated the extraordinary vacillation -of the commander-in-chief, and Clinton himself, forgetful of his own -arrangements, with an obsolete courtesy took off his hat to salute an -enemy’s battery which had fired upon him; but this waving of his hat -from that particular spot was also the conventional signal for the -artillery to spike the guns, and they were thus spiked prematurely. -The troops were however all embarked in the night of the 12th, and -many of the stores and horses were shipped on the 13th without the -slightest interruption from the enemy; but eighteen or nineteen -battering pieces, whose carriages had been burnt, were, with all the -platforms, fascines, gabions, and small ammunition, in view of the -fleet and army, triumphantly carried into the fortress. Sir J. Murray -meanwhile seemingly unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on -the evening of the 12th and took his usual repose in bed. - -[Sidenote: Laffaille Campagne de Catalonia.] - -While the English general was thus precipitately abandoning the -siege, the French generals, unable to surmount the obstacles opposed -to their junction, unable even to communicate by their emissaries, -were despairing of the safety of Taragona. Suchet did not reach -Tortoza before the 10th, but a detachment from the garrison, had on -the 8th attempted to succour San Felipe, and nearly captured the -naval captain Adam, colonel Prevot, and other officers, who were -examining the country. On the other side Maurice Mathieu, having -gathered troops from various places, reached Villa Franca early on -the 10th, and deceiving even his own people as to his numbers, gave -out that Decaen, who he really expected, was close behind with a -powerful force. To give effect to this policy, he drove Copons from -Arbos on the 11th, and his scouting parties entered Vendrills, as -if he was resolved singly to attack Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had -however landed his marines at Rosas, which arrested Decaen’s march; -and Maurice Mathieu alarmed at the cessation of fire about Taragona, -knowing nothing of Suchet’s movements, and too weak to fight the -allies alone, fell back in the night of the 12th to the Llobregat, -his main body never having passed Villa Franca. - -Suchet’s operations to the westward were even less decisive. His -advanced guard under Panettier, reached Perillo the 10th. The 11th -not hearing from his spies, he caused Panettier to pass by his left -over the mountains through Valdillos to some heights which terminate -abruptly on the Campo, above Monroig. The 12th that officer reached -the extreme verge of the hills, being then about twenty-five miles -from Taragona. His patroles descending into the plains, met with -lord Frederick Bentinck’s troopers reported that Murray’s whole army -was at hand, wherefore he would not enter the Campo, but at night -he kindled large fires to encourage the garrison of Taragona. These -signals were however unobserved, the country people had disappeared, -no intelligence could be procured, and Suchet could not follow him -with a large force into those wild desert hills, where there was no -water. Thus on both sides of Taragona the succouring armies were -quite baffled at the moment chosen by Murray for flight. - -Suchet now received alarming intelligence from Valencia, yet still -anxious for Taragona, he pushed, on the 14th, along the coast-road -towards San Felippe de Balaguer, thinking to find Prevôt’s division -alone; but the head of his column was suddenly cannonaded by the -Thames frigate, and he was wonderfully surprised to see the whole -British fleet anchored off San Felippe, and disembarking troops. -Murray’s operations were indeed as irregular as those of a partizan, -yet without partizan vigour. He had heard in the night of the 12th, -from colonel Prevôt, of Panettier’s march to Monroig, and to protect -the cavalry and guns under lord Frederick Bentinck, sent Mackenzie’s -division by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with the whole -army on the 14th. Mackenzie drove back the French posts on both sides -of the pass, the embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then -commenced, and Suchet, still uncertain if Taragona had fallen, moved -towards Valdillos to bring off Panettier. - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 1.] - -At this precise period, Murray heard that Maurice Mathieu’s column, -which he always erroneously supposed to be under Decaen, had retired -to the Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and that Taragona -had not been reinforced. Elated by this information, he revolved -various projects in his mind, at one time thinking to fall upon -Suchet, at another to cut off Panettier, now resolving to march upon -Cambrills, and even to menace Taragona again by land; then he was -for sending a detachment by sea to surprise the latter, but finally -he disembarked his whole force on the 15th, and being ignorant of -Suchet’s last movement decided to strike at Panettier. In this view, -he detached Mackenzie, by a rugged valley leading from the eastward -to Valdillos, and that officer reached it on the 16th, but Suchet -had already carried off Panettier’s brigade, and the next day the -British detachment was recalled by Murray, who now only thought of -re-embarking. - -This determination was caused by a fresh alarm from the eastward, -for Maurice Mathieu, whose whole proceedings evinced both skill -and vigour, hearing that the siege of Taragona was raised, and the -allies re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, retraced his steps and -boldly entered Cambrills the 17th. On that day, however, Mackenzie -returned, and Murray’s whole army was thus concentrated in the -pass. Suchet was then behind Perillo, Copons at Reus, having come -there at Murray’s desire to attack Maurice Mathieu, and the latter -would have suffered, if the English general had been capable of a -vigorous stroke. On the other hand it was fortunate for Mackenzie, -that Suchet, too anxious for Valencia, disregarded his movement -upon Valdillos; but, taught by the disembarkation of the whole -English army that the fate of Taragona, whether for good or evil, -was decided, he had sent an emissary to Maurice Mathieu on the 16th, -and then retired to Perillo and Amposta. He reached the latter place -the 17th, attentive only to the movement of the fleet, and meanwhile -Maurice Mathieu endeavoured to surprize the Catalans at Reus. - -Copons was led into this danger by sir John Murray, who had desired -him to harass Maurice Mathieu’s rear, with a view to a general -attack, and then changed his plan without giving the Spanish general -any notice. However he escaped. The French moved upon Taragona, and -Murray was left free to embark or to remain at the Col de Balaguer. -He called a council of war, and it was concluded to re-embark, but at -that moment, the great Mediterranean fleet appeared in the offing, -and admiral Hallowel, observing a signal announcing lord William -Bentinck’s arrival, answered with more promptitude than propriety, -“_we are all delighted_.” - -Sir John Murray’s command having thus terminated, the general -discontent rendered it impossible to avoid a public investigation, -yet the difficulty of holding a court in Spain, and some disposition -at home to shield him, caused great delay. He was at last tried in -England. Acquitted of two charges, on the third he was declared -guilty of an error in judgement, and sentenced to be admonished; but -even that slight mortification was not inflicted. - -This decision does not preclude the judgement of history, nor will -it sway that of posterity. The court-martial was assembled twenty -months after the event, when the war being happily terminated, men’s -minds were little disposed to treat past failures with severity. -There were two distinct prosecutors, having different views; the -proceedings were conducted at a distance from the scene of action, -defects of memory could not be remedied by references to localities, -and a door was opened for contradiction and doubt upon important -points. There was no indication that the members of the court were -unanimous in their verdict; they were confined to specific charges, -restricted by legal rules of evidence, and deprived of the testimony -of all the Spanish officers, who were certainly discontented with -Murray’s conduct, and whose absence caused the serious charge of -abandoning Copons’ army to be suppressed. Moreover the warmth of -temper displayed by the principal prosecutor, admiral Hallowel, -together with his signal on lord William Bentinck’s arrival, whereby, -to the detriment of discipline, he manifested his contempt for the -general with whom he was acting, gave Murray an advantage which he -improved skilfully, for he was a man sufficiently acute and prompt -when not at the head of an army. He charged the admiral with deceit, -factious dealings, and disregard of the service; described him as -a man of a passionate overweening, busy disposition, troubled with -excess of vanity, meddling with everything, and thinking himself -competent to manage both troops and ships. - -Nevertheless sir John Murray had signally failed, both as an -independent general, and as a lieutenant acting under superior -orders. On his trial, blending these different capacities together, -with expert sophistry he pleaded his instructions in excuse for -his errors as a free commander, and his discretionary power in -mitigation of his disobedience as a lieutenant; but his operations -were indefensible in both capacities. Lord Wellington’s instructions, -precise, and founded upon the advantages offered by a command of the -sea, prescribed an attack upon Taragona, with a definite object, -namely, to deliver Valencia. - -“_You tell me_,” said he, “_that the line of the Xucar, which covers -Valencia, is too strong to force; turn it then by the ocean, assail -the rear of the enemy, and he will weaken his strong line to protect -his communication; or, he will give you an opportunity to establish a -new base of operations behind him._” - -This plan however demanded promptness and energy, and Murray -professed neither. The weather was so favourable, that a voyage -which might have consumed nine or ten days was performed in two, -the Spanish troops punctually effected their junction, the initial -operations were secured, Fort Balaguer fell, the French moved from -all sides to the succour of Taragona, the line of the Xucar was -weakened, the diversion was complete. In the night of the 12th the -bulk of Murray’s army was again afloat, a few hours would have -sufficed to embark the cavalry at the Col de Balaguer, and the whole -might have sailed for the city of Valencia, while Suchet’s advanced -guard was still on the hills above Monroig, and he, still uncertain -as to the fate of Taragona, one hundred and fifty miles from the -Xucar. In fine Murray had failed to attain the first object pointed -out by Wellington’s instructions, but the second was within his -reach; instead of grasping it he loitered about the Col de Balaguer, -and gave Suchet, as we shall find, time to reach Valencia again. - -[Sidenote: Defence of sir J. Murray in Phillipart’s Military -Calendar.] - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 1.] - -Now whether the letter or the spirit of Wellington’s instructions -be considered, there was here a manifest dereliction on the part of -Murray. What was that officer’s defence? That no specific period -being named for his return to Valencia, he was entitled to exercise -his discretion! Did he then as an independent general perform any -useful or brilliant action to justify his delay? No! his tale was one -of loss and dishonour! The improvident arrangements for the siege of -San Felippe de Balaguer, and the unexpected fortune which saved him -from the shame of abandoning his guns there also have been noted; -and it has been shown, that when the gain of time was the great -element of success, he neither urged Copons to break up the roads, -nor pushed the siege of Taragona with vigour. The feeble formality of -this latter operation has indeed been imputed to the engineer major -Thackary, yet unjustly so. It was the part of that officer to form a -plan of attack agreeable to the rules of art, it might be a bold or a -cautious plan, and many persons did think Taragona was treated by him -with too much respect; but it was the part of the commander-in-chief, -to decide, if the general scheme of operations required a deviation -from the regular course. The untrammelled engineer could then have -displayed his genius. Sir John Murray made no sign. His instructions -and his ultimate views were withheld alike, from his naval colleague, -from his second in command, and from his quarter-master-general; -and while the last-named functionary was quite shut out from the -confidence of his commander, the admiral, and many others, both -of the army and navy, imagined him to be the secret author of the -proceedings which were hourly exciting their indignation. Murray -however declared on his trial, that he had rejected general Donkin’s -advice, an avowal consonant to facts, since that officer urged him to -raise the siege on the 9th and had even told him where four hundred -draught bullocks were to be had, to transport his heavy artillery. -On the 12th he opposed the spiking of the guns, and urged Murray to -drag them to Cape Salou, of which place he had given as early as the -third day of the siege, a military plan, marking a position, strong -in itself, covering several landing places, and capable of being -flanked on both sides by the ships of war: it had no drawback save a -scarcity of water, yet there were some springs, and the fleet would -have supplied the deficiency. - -[Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 512.] - -It is true that Donkin, unacquainted with Wellington’s instructions, -and having at Castalla seen no reason to rely on sir John Murray’s -military vigour, was averse to the enterprize against Taragona. He -thought the allies should have worked Suchet out of Valencia by -operating on his right flank. And so Wellington would have thought, -if he had only looked at their numbers and not at their quality; he -had even sketched such a plan for Murray, if the attack upon Taragona -should be found impracticable. But he knew the Spaniards too well, -to like such combinations for an army, two-thirds of which were of -that nation, and not even under one head; an army ill-equipped, and -with the exception of Del Parque’s troops, unused to active field -operations. Wherefore, calculating their power with remarkable -nicety, he preferred the sea-flank, and the aid of an English fleet. - -Here it may be observed, that Napoleon’s plan of invasion did not -embrace the coast-lines where they could be avoided. It was an -obvious disadvantage to give the British navy opportunities of acting -against his communications. The French indeed, seized Santona and -Santander in the Bay of Biscay, because, these being the only good -ports on that coast, the English ships were thus in a manner shut out -from the north of Spain. They likewise worked their invasion by the -Catalonian and Valencian coast, because the only roads practicable -for artillery run along that sea-line; but their general scheme was -to hold, with large masses, the interior of the country, and keep -their communications aloof from the danger of combined operations by -sea and land. The providence of the plan was proved by Suchet’s peril -on this occasion. - -Sir John Murray, when tried, grounded his justification on the -following points. 1º. That he did not know with any certainty until -the night of the 11th that Suchet was near. 2º. That the fall of -Taragona being the principal object, and the drawing of the French -from Valencia the accessary, he persisted in the siege, because he -expected reinforcements from Sicily, and desired to profit from -the accidents of war. 3º. That looking only to the second object, -the diversion would have been incomplete, if the siege had been -raised sooner, or even relaxed; hence the landing of guns and stores -after he despaired of success. 4º. That he dared not risk a battle -to save his battering train, because Wellington would not pardon -a defeat. Now had he adopted a vigorous plan, or persisted until -the danger of losing his army was apparent, and then made a quick -return to Valencia, this defence would have been plausible, though -inconclusive. But when every order, every movement, every expression, -discovered his infirmity of purpose, his pleading can only be -regarded as the subtle tale of an advocate. - -The fault was not so much in the raising of the siege as in the -manner of doing it, and in the feebleness of the attack. For first, -however numerous the chances of war are, fortresses expecting succour -do not surrender without being vigorously assailed. The arrival -of reinforcements from Sicily was too uncertain for reasonable -calculation, and it was scarcely possible for the governor of -Taragona, while closely invested, to discover that no fresh stores -or guns were being landed; still less could he judge so timeously of -Murray’s final intention by that fact, as to advertize Suchet that -Taragona was in no danger. Neither were the spies, if any were in the -allies’ camp, more capable of drawing such conclusions, seeing that -sufficient artillery and stores for the siege were landed the first -week. And the landing of more guns could not have deceived them, when -the feeble operations of the general, and the universal discontent, -furnished surer guides for their reports. - -Murray designed to raise the siege as early as the 9th and only -deferred it, after seeing the admiral, from his natural vacillation. -It was therefore mere casuistry to say, that he first obtained -certain information of Suchet’s advance on the night of the 11th. On -the 8th and 10th through various channels he knew the French marshal -was in march for Tortoza, and that his advanced guard menaced the -Col de Balaguer. The approach of Maurice Mathieu on the other side -was also known; he should therefore have been prepared to raise the -siege without the loss of his guns on the 12th. Why were they lost -at all? They could not be saved, he said, without risking a battle -in a bad position, and Wellington had declared he would not pardon a -defeat! This was the after-thought of a sophister, and not warranted -by Wellington’s instructions, which on that head, referred only to -the duke Del Parque and Elio. - -But was it necessary to fight a battle in a bad position to save -the guns? All persons admitted that they could have been embarked -before mid-day on the 13th. Panettier was then at Monroig, Suchet -still behind Perillo, Maurice Mathieu falling back from Villa Franca. -The French on each side were therefore respectively thirty-six and -thirty-four miles distant on the night of the 12th, and their point -of junction was Reus. Yet how form that junction? The road from Villa -Franca by the Col de Cristina was partially broken up by Copons, the -road from Perillo to Reus was always impracticable for artillery, -and from the latter place to Taragona was six miles of very rugged -country. The allies were in possession of the point of junction, -Maurice Mathieu was retiring, not advancing. And if the French could -have marched thirty-four and thirty-six miles, through the mountains -in one night, and been disposed to attack in the morning without -artillery, they must still have ascertained the situation of Murray’s -army; they must have made arrangements to watch Copons, Manso, and -Prevôt, who would have been on their rear and flanks; they must -have formed an order of battle and decided upon the mode of attack -before they advanced. It is true that their junction at Reus would -have forced Murray to suspend his embarkation to fight; but not, as -he said, in a bad position, with his back to the beach, where the -ships’ guns could not aid him, and where he might expect a dangerous -surf for days. The naval officers denied the danger from surf at -that season of the year; and it was not right to destroy the guns -and stores when the enemy was not even in march for Reus. Coolness -and consideration would have enabled Murray to see that there was no -danger. In fact no emissaries escaped from the town, and the enemy -had no spies in the camp, since no communication took place between -the French columns until the 17th. On the 15th Suchet knew nothing of -the fate of Taragona. - -[Sidenote: Naval evidence on the trial.] - -The above reasoning leaves out the possibility of profiting from -a central position to fall with superior forces upon one of the -French columns. It supposes however that accurate information was -possessed by the French generals; that Maurice Mathieu was as strong -as he pretended to be, Suchet eager and resolute to form a junction -with him. But in truth Suchet knew not what to do after the fall -of Fort Balaguer, Maurice Mathieu had less than seven thousand men -of all arms, he was not followed by Decaen, and he imagined the -allies to have twenty thousand men, exclusive of the Catalans. -Besides which the position at Cape Salou was only six miles distant, -and Murray might with the aid of the draft bullocks discovered by -Donkin, have dragged all his heavy guns there, still maintaining the -investment; he might have shipped his battery train, and when the -enemy approached Reus, have marched to the Col de Balaguer, where he -could, as he afterwards did, embark or disembark in the presence of -the enemy. The danger of a flank march, Suchet being at Reus, could -not have deterred him, because he did send his cavalry and field -artillery by that very road on the 12th, when the French advanced -guard was at Monroig and actually skirmished with lord Frederick -Bentinck. Finally he could have embarked his main body, leaving a -small corps with some cavalry to keep the garrison in check and bring -off his guns. Such a detachment, together with the heavy guns, would -have been afloat in a couple of hours and on board the ships in four -hours; it could have embarked on the open beach, or, if fearful of -being molested by the garrison, might have marched to Cape Salou, -or to the Col de Balaguer; and if the guns had thus been lost, the -necessity would have been apparent, and the dishonour lessened. It -is clear therefore that there was no military need to sacrifice -the battery pieces. And those were the guns that shook the bloody -ramparts of Badajos! - -Wellington felt their loss keenly, sir John Murray spoke of them -lightly. “_They were of small value, old iron! he attached little -importance to the sacrifice of artillery, it was his principle, he -had approved of colonel Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also -desired colonel Prevôt, if pressed, to abandon his battering train -before the Fort of Balaguer._” “_Such doctrine might appear strange -to a British army, but it was the rule with the continental armies -and the French owed much of their successes to the adoption of it._” - -Strange indeed! Great commanders have risked their own lives, and -sacrificed their bravest men, charging desperately in person, to -retrieve even a single piece of cannon in a battle. They knew the -value of moral force in war, and that of all the various springs and -levers on which it depends military honour is the most powerful. -No! it was not to the adoption of such a doctrine, that the French -owed their great successes. It was to the care with which Napoleon -fostered and cherished a contrary feeling. Sir John Murray’s argument -would have been more pungent, more complete, if he had lost his -colours, and pleaded that they were only wooden staves, bearing old -pieces of silk! - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. June.] - -Lord William Bentinck arrived without troops, for, having removed the -queen from Sicily, he feared internal dissension and Napoleon had -directed Murat to invade the island with twenty thousand men, the -Toulon squadron being to act in concert. Sir Edward Pellew admitted -that the latter might easily gain twenty-four hours’ start of his -fleet, and lord William judged that ten thousand invaders would -suffice to conquer. Murat however, opened a secret negociation, and -thus, that monarch, Bernadotte, and the emperor Francis endeavoured -to destroy a hero connected with them by marriage and to whom they -all owed their crowns either by gift or clemency! - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1.] - -This early defection of Murat is certain, and his declaration that -he had instructions to invade Sicily was corroborated by a rumour, -rife in the French camps before the battle of Vittoria, that the -Toulon fleet had sailed and the descent actually made. Nevertheless -there is some obscurity about the matter. The negociation was never -completed, Murat left Italy to command Napoleon’s cavalry and at -the battle of Dresden contributed much to the success of that day. -Now it is conceivable that he should mask his plans by joining the -grand army, and that his fiery spirit should in the battle forget -everything except victory. But to disobey Napoleon’s orders as to -the invasion of Sicily and dare to face that monarch immediately -after, was so unlikely as to indicate rather a paper demonstration to -alarm lord Wellington than a real attack. And it would seem from the -short observation of the latter in answer to lord William Bentinck’s -detailed communication on this subject, namely “_Sicily is in no -danger_,” that he viewed it so, or thought it put forward by Murat -to give more value to his defection. However it sufficed to hinder -reinforcements going to Murray. - -Lord William Bentinck on landing was informed that Suchet was at -Tortoza with from eight to twelve thousand men, Maurice Mathieu with -seven thousand at Cambrils. To drive the latter back and re-invest -Taragona was easy, and the place would have fallen because the -garrison had exhausted all their powder in the first siege; but this -lord William did not know, and to renew the attack vigorously was -impossible, because all the howitzers and platforms and fascines had -been lost, and the animals and general equipment of the army were too -much deteriorated by continual embarkations, and disembarkations, -to keep the field in Catalonia. Wherefore he resolved to return to -Alicant, not without hope still to fulfil Wellington’s instructions -by landing at Valencia between Suchet and Harispe. The re-embarkation -was unmolested, the fort of Balaguer was destroyed, and one regiment -of Whittingham’s division, destined to reinforce Copons’ army, being -detached to effect a landing northward of Barcelona, the fleet put -to sea; but misfortune continued to pursue this unhappy armament. -A violent tempest impeded the voyage, fourteen sail of transports -struck upon the sands off the mouth of the Ebro, and the army was -not entirely disembarked at Alicant before the 27th. Meanwhile -marshal Suchet, seeing the English fleet under sail and taught by the -destruction of the fort of Balaguer, that the allies had relinquished -operations in Lower Catalonia, marched with such extraordinary -diligence as to reach Valencia in forty-eight hours after quitting -Tortoza, thus frustrating lord William’s project of landing at -Valencia. - -During his absence Harispe had again proved the weakness of the -Spanish armies, and demonstrated the sagacity and prudence of lord -Wellington. That great man’s warning about defeat was distinctly -addressed to the Spanish generals, because the chief object of the -operations was not to defeat Suchet but to keep him from aiding the -French armies in the north. Pitched battles were therefore to be -avoided their issue being always doubtful, and the presence of a -numerous and increasing force on the front and flank of the French -was more sure to obtain the end in view. But all Spanish generals -desired to fight great battles, soothing their national pride by -attributing defeats to want of cavalry. It was at first doubtful -if Murray could transport his horsemen to Taragona, and if left -behind they would have been under Elio and Del Parque, whereby those -officers would have been encouraged to fight. Hence the English -general’s menacing intimation. And he also considered that as the -army of Del Parque had been for three years in continued activity -under Ballesteros without being actually dispersed, it must be more -capable than Elio’s in the dodging warfare suitable for Spaniards. -Moreover Elio was best acquainted with the country between the Xucar -and Alicant. Wherefore Del Parque was directed to turn the enemy’s -right flank by Requeña, Elio to menace the front, which, adverting -to the support and protection furnished by Alicant and the mountains -behind Castalla, was the least dangerous operation. - -But to trust Spanish generals was to trust the winds and the clouds. -General Elio persuaded the duke Del Parque to adopt the front attack, -took the flank line himself, and detached general Mijares to fall -upon Requeña. And though Suchet had weakened his line on the 2d of -June, Del Parque was not ready until the 9th, thus giving the French -a week for the relief of Taragona, and for the arrival of Severoli at -Liria. - -At this time Harispe had about eight thousand men of all arms in -front of the Xucar. The Spaniards, including Roche’s and Mijares’ -divisions and Whittingham’s cavalry, were twenty-five thousand -strong; and the Empecinado, Villa Campa, and the Frayle, Nebot, -waited in the Cuenca and Albaracyn mountains to operate on the French -rear. Notwithstanding this disproportion, the contest was short, -and for the Spaniards, disastrous. They advanced in three columns. -Elio, by the pass of Almanza; Del Parque by Villena and Fuente de la -Higuera menacing Moxente; Roche and the prince of Anglona from Alcoy, -by Onteniente and the pass of Albayda, menacing San Felippe de Xativa -and turning Moxente. - -Harispe abandoned those camps on the 11th, and took the line of -the Xucar, occupying the entrenchments in front of his bridges at -Alcira and Barca del Rey, near Alberique; and during this retrograde -movement general Mesclop, commanding the rear-guard, being pressed -by the Spanish horsemen, wheeled round and drove them in great -confusion upon the infantry. - -On the 15th Mijares took the fort of Requeña, thus turning the line -of the Xucar, and securing the defiles of Cabrillas through which the -Cuenca road leads to Valencia. Villa Campa immediately joined him -thereby preventing Severoli from uniting with Harispe, and meanwhile -Del Parque, after razing the French works at Moxente and San Felippe, -advanced towards Alcira in two columns, the one moving by the road of -Cargagente, the other by the road of Gandia. General Habert overthrew -the first with one shock, took five hundred prisoners, and marched -to attack the other, but it was already routed by general Gudin. -After this contest Del Parque and Harispe maintained their respective -positions, while Elio joined Mijares at Requeña. Villa Campa then -descended to Chiva, and Harispe’s position was becoming critical, -when on the 23d the head of Suchet’s column coming from the Ebro -entered Valencia, and on the 24th Del Parque resumed the position of -Castalla. - -Thus in despite of Wellington’s precautions every thing turned -contrary to his designs. Elio had operated by the flank, Del Parque -by the front, and the latter was defeated because he attacked the -enemy in an entrenched position. Murray had failed entirely. His -precipitancy at Taragona and his delays at Balaguer were alike -hurtful, and would have caused the destruction of one or both of the -Spanish armies but for the battle of Vittoria. For Suchet, having -first detached general Musnier to recover the fort of Requeña and -drive back Villa Campa, had assembled the bulk of his forces in his -old positions, of San Felippe and Moxente, before the return of the -Anglo-Sicilian troops; and as Elio, unable to subsist at Utiel, had -then returned towards his former quarters, the French marshal was -upon the point of striking a fatal blow against him, or Del Parque, -or both, when the news of Wellington’s victory averted the danger. - -Here the firmness, the activity and coolness of Suchet, may be -contrasted with the infirmity of purpose displayed by Murray. Slow in -attack, precipitate in retreat, the English commander always mistimed -his movements; the French marshal doubled his force by rapidity. -The latter was isolated by the operations of lord Wellington; his -communication with Aragon was interrupted, and that province placed -in imminent danger; the communication between Valencia and Catalonia -was exposed to the attacks of the Anglo-Sicilian army and the fleet; -nearly thirty thousand Spaniards menaced him on the Xucar in front; -Villa Campa, the Frayle and the Empecinado could bring ten thousand -men on his right flank; yet he did not hesitate to leave Harispe with -only seven or eight thousand men to oppose the Spaniards, while with -the remainder of his army he relieved Taragona and yet returned in -time to save Valencia. - -Such was the state of affairs when lord William Bentinck brought -the Anglo-Sicilian troops once more to Alicant. His first care was -to re-organize the means of transport for the commissariat and -artillery, but this was a matter of difficulty. Sir John Murray, -with a mischievous economy, and strange disregard of that part of -Wellington’s instructions, which proscribed active field operations -in Valencia if he should be forced to return from Catalonia, had -discharged six hundred mules, and two hundred country carts, that -is to say five-sixths of the whole field equipment, before he sailed -for Taragona. The army was thus crippled, while Suchet gathered -strong in front, and Musnier’s division retaking Requeña forced the -Spaniards to retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del Parque -to advance meanwhile from Castalla, but he had not means of carrying -even one day’s biscuit, and at the same time Elio pressed by famine -went off towards Cuenca. It was not until the 1st of July that the -Anglo-Sicilian troops could even advance towards Alcoy. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -Lord William Bentinck commanded the Spanish armies as well as his -own, and letters passed between him and lord Wellington relative -to further operations. The latter, keeping to his original views, -advised a renewed attack on Taragona or on Tortoza, if the ordnance -still in possession of the army would admit of such a measure; but -supposing this could not be, he recommended a general advance to -seize the open country of Valencia, the British keeping close to the -sea and in constant communication with the fleet. - -Lord William’s views were different. He found the Spanish soldiers -robust and active, but their regimental officers bad, and their -organization generally so deficient that they could not stand against -even a small French force, as proved by their recent defeat at -Alcira. The generals however pleased him at first, especially Del -Parque, that is, like all Spaniards, they had fair words at command, -and lord William Bentinck without scanning very nicely their deeds, -thought he could safely undertake a grand stragetic operation in -conjunction with them. - -[Sidenote: Lord William Bentinck’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -To force the line of the Xucar he deemed unadvisable, inasmuch as -there were only two carriage roads, both of which led to Suchet’s -entrenched bridges; and though the river was fordable the enemy’s -bank was so favourable for defence as to render the passage by force -dangerous. The Anglo-Sicilians were unaccustomed to great tactical -movements, the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore, -relinquishing an attack in front, lord William proposed to move the -allied armies in one mass and turn the enemy’s right flank either -by Utiel and Requeña, or, by a wider march, to reach Cuenca and -from thence gaining the Madrid road to Zaragoza, communicate with -Wellington’s army and operate down the Ebro. In either case it was -necessary to cross the Albaracyn mountains and there were no carriage -roads, save those of Utiel and Cuenca. But the passes near Utiel -were strongly fortified by the French, and a movement on that line -would necessarily lead to an attack upon Suchet which was to be -avoided. The line of Cuenca was preferable though longer, and being -in the harvest season provisions he said would not fail. The allies -would thus force Suchet to cross the Ebro, or attack him in a chosen -position where Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and in -the event of a defeat they could retire for shelter upon his army. - -Wellington, better acquainted with Spanish warfare, and the nature of -Spanish co-operation, told him, provisions would fail on the march to -Cuenca, even in harvest time, and without money he would get nothing; -moreover by separating himself from the fleet, he would be unable to -return suddenly to Sicily if that island should be really exposed to -any imminent danger. - -While these letters were being exchanged the Anglo-Sicilians marched -towards Villena on Del Parque’s left, and Suchet was preparing to -attack when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching both -parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs. The French general -instantly abandoned Valencia, and lord William entered that city. - -Suchet knew that Clauzel was at Zaragoza, and desirous of maintaining -himself there to secure a point of junction for the army of Aragon -with the king’s army, if the latter should re-enter Spain. It was -possible therefore, by abandoning all the fortresses in Valencia and -some of those in Catalonia, to have concentrated more than thirty -thousand men with which to join Clauzel, and the latter having -carried off several small garrisons during his retreat, had fifteen -thousand. Lord Wellington’s position would then have been critical, -since forty-five thousand good troops, having many supporting -fortresses, would have menaced his right flank at the moment when -his front was assailed by a new general and a powerful army. But if -this junction with Clauzel invited Suchet on the one hand, on the -other, with a view of influencing the general negociations during the -armistice in Germany, it was important to appear strong in Spain. On -such occasions men generally endeavour to reconcile both objects and -obtain neither. Suchet resolved to march upon Zaragoza and at the -same time retain his grasp upon Valencia by keeping large garrisons -in the fortresses. This reduced his field force, a great error, it -was so proved by the result. But if the war in the north of Spain and -in Germany had taken a different turn, his foresight and prudence -would have been applauded. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -The army of Aragon now counted thirty-two thousand effective men. -Four thousand were in Zaragoza, two thousand in Mequinenza, Venasque, -Monzons, Ayerbe, Jaca, and some smaller posts. Twenty-six thousand -remained. Of these one hundred and ten were left in Denia, with -provisions for eight months; twelve hundred and fifty in Saguntum, -where there were immense stores, eight months’ provisions for the -garrison, and two months’ subsistence for the whole army; four -hundred with provisions for a year, were in Peniscola, and in Morella -one hundred and twenty with magazines for six months. Into Tortoza, -where there was a large artillery parc, Suchet threw a garrison of -nearly five thousand men and then destroying the bridges on the -Xucar, marched from Valencia on the 5th of July, taking the coast -road for Tortoza. - -The inhabitants, grateful for the discipline he had maintained, -were even friendly, and while the main body thus moved, Musnier -retreated from Requeña across the mountains towards Caspe, the point -of concentration for the whole army: but ere it could reach that -point, Clauzel’s flight to Jaca, unnecessary for he was only pursued -from Tudela by Mina, became known, and the effect was fatal. All the -Partidas immediately united and menaced Zaragoza, whereupon Suchet -ordered Paris to retire upon Caspe, and pressed forward himself -to Favara. Musnier, meanwhile, reached the former town, having on -the march picked up Severoli’s brigade and the garrisons of Teruel -and Alcanitz. Thus on the 12th the whole army was in military -communication but extended along the Ebro from Tortoza to Caspe. Mina -had, however, seized the Monte Torrero on the 8th, and general Paris -evacuated Zaragoza in the night of the 9th, leaving five hundred men -in the castle with much ordnance. Encumbered with a great train of -carriages he got entangled in the defiles of Alcubiere, and being -attacked lost many men and all his baggage and artillery. Instead of -joining Suchet he fled to Huesca, where he rallied the garrison of -Ayerbe and then made for Jaca, reaching it on the 14th at the moment -when Clauzel, after another ineffectual attempt to join the king, had -returned to that place. Duran then invested the castle of Zaragoza, -and the fort of Daroca. The first surrendered on the 30th, but Daroca -did not fall until the 11th of August. - -This sudden and total loss of Aragon made Suchet think it no longer -possible to fix a base in that province, nor to rally Clauzel’s -troops on his own. He could not remain on the right bank of the Ebro, -neither could he feed his army permanently in the sterile country -about Tortoza while Aragon was in possession of the enemy. Moreover, -the allies having the command of the sea, might land troops, and -seize the passes of the hills behind him, wherefore fixing upon the -fertile country about Taragona for his position, he passed the Ebro -at Tortoza, Mora, and Mequinenza, on the 14th and 15th, detaching -Isidore Lamarque to fetch off the garrisons of Belchite, Fuentes, -Pina, and Bujarola, and bring the whole to Lerida. Meanwhile the bulk -of the army moving on the road from Tortoza to Taragona, although -cannonaded by the English fleet, reached Taragona with little hurt -and the walls were mined for destruction, but the place was still -held with a view to field operations. - -The general state of the war seems to have been too little considered -by Suchet at this time, or he would have made a more vigorous effort -to establish himself in Aragon. Had he persisted to march on Zaragoza -he would have raised the siege of the castle, perchance have given a -blow to Mina whose orders were to retire upon Tudela where Wellington -designed to offer battle; but Suchet might have avoided this, and to -have appeared upon Wellington’s flank were it only for a fortnight, -would, as shall be hereafter shewn, have changed the aspect of the -campaign. Suchet’s previous rapidity and excellent arrangements had -left the allies in Valencia far behind, they could not have gathered -in force soon enough to meddle with him, and their pursuit now to be -described, was not so cautiously conducted but that he might have -turned and defeated them. - -The 9th of July, four days after the French abandoned Valencia, -lord William Bentinck entered that city and made it his place of -arms instead of Alicant. On the 16th, marching by the coast road, -in communication with the fleet and masking Peniscola, a fortress -now of little importance, he followed the enemy; but Suchet had on -that day completed the passage of the Ebro, he might have been close -to Zaragoza, and Del Parque’s army was still near Alicant in a very -disorderly condition. And though Elio and Roche were at Valencia, the -occupation of that town, and the blockades of Denia and Murviedro, -proved more than a sufficient task for them: the garrison of the -latter place received provisions continually, and were so confident -as to assemble in order of battle on the glacis when the allies -marched past. - -The 20th lord William entered Vinaros and remained there until the -26th. Suchet might then have been at Tudela or Sanguessa, and it -shall be shewn that Wellington could not have met him at the former -place as he designed. - -During this period various reports were received. “_The French had -vainly endeavoured to regain France by Zaragoza._” “_Taragona was -destroyed._” “_The evacuation of Spain was certain._” “_A large -detachment had already quitted Catalonia._” The English general, -who had little time to spare from the pressure of Sicilian affairs, -became eager to advance. He threw a flying bridge over the Ebro at -Amposta, and having before embarked Clinton’s division with a view -to seize the Col de Balaguer, resolved to follow Suchet with the -remainder of his army, which now included Whittingham’s cavalry. -A detachment from Tortoza menaced his bridge on the 25th, but the -troops were reinforced and the passage of the Ebro completed on the -27th. The next day Villa Campa arrived with four thousand men and -meanwhile the Col de Balaguer was secured. - -On the 29th the cavalry being in march was threatened by infantry -from Tortoza, near the Col de Alba, but the movements generally were -unopposed, and the army got possession of the mountains beyond the -Ebro. - -Suchet was at this time inspecting the defences of Lerida and -Mequinenza, and his escort was necessarily large because Copons -was hanging on his flanks in the mountains about Manresa; but his -position about Villa Franca was exceedingly strong. Taragona and -Tortoza covered the front; Barcelona, the rear; the communication -with Decaen was secure, and on the right flank stood Lerida, to -which the small forts of Mequinenza and Monzon served as outposts. - -The Anglo-Sicilian troops reinforced with Whittingham’s cavalry did -not exceed ten thousand effective men, of which one division was on -board ship from the 22d to the 26th. Elio and Roche were at Valencia -in a destitute condition. Del Parque’s army thirteen thousand strong, -including Whittingham’s infantry, was several marches in the rear, -it was paid from the British subsidy but very ill-provided and the -duke himself disinclined to obedience. Villa Campa did not join -until the 28th, and Copons was in the mountains above Vich. Lord -William therefore remained with ten thousand men and a large train -of carriages, for ten days without any position of battle behind him -nearer than the hills about Saguntum. His bridge over the Ebro was -thrown within ten miles of Tortoza where there was a garrison of -five thousand men, detachments from which could approach unperceived -through the rugged mountains near the fortress; and Suchet’s -well-organised experienced army was within two marches. That marshal -however, expecting a sharp warfare, was visiting his fortresses in -person, and his troops quartered for the facility of feeding were -unprepared to strike a sudden blow; moreover, judging his enemy’s -strength in offence what it might have been rather than what it was, -he awaited the arrival of Decaen’s force from Upper Catalonia before -he offered battle. - -But Decaen was himself pressed. The great English fleet menacing -Rosas and Palamos had encouraged a partial insurrection of the -Somatenes, which was supported by the divisions of Eroles, Manso, -and Villamiel. Several minor combats took place on the side of -Besala and Olot, Eroles invested Bañolas, and though beaten there -in a sharp action by Lamarque on the 23d of June the insurrection -spread. To quell it Decaen combined a double operation from the side -of Gerona upon Vich, which was generally the Catalan head-quarters. -Designing to attack by the south himself, he sent Maximilian -Lamarque, with fifteen hundred French troops and some Miguelets, -by the mountain paths of San Felice de Pallarols and Amias. On the -8th of July that officer gained the heights of Salud, seized the -road from Olot and descended from the north upon Roda and Manlieu, -in the expectation of seeing Decaen attacking from the other side. -He perceived below him a heavy body in march, and at the same time -heard the sound of cannon and musquetry about Vich. Concluding this -was Decaen he advanced confidently against the troops in his front, -although very numerous, thinking they were in retreat, but they -fought him until dark without advantage on either side. - -In the night an officer came with intelligence, that Decaen’s attack -had been relinquished in consequence of Suchet’s orders to move to -the Llobregat, and it then appeared that a previous despatch had -been intercepted, that the whole Catalan force to the amount of six -or seven thousand combatants was upon Lamarque’s hands, and the -firing heard at Vich was a rejoicing for lord Wellington’s victories -in Navarre. A retreat was imperative. The Spaniards followed at -daylight, and Lamarque getting entangled in difficult ground near -Salud was forced to deliver battle. The fight lasted many hours, -all his ammunition was expended, he lost four hundred men and was -upon the point of destruction, when general Beurmann came to his -succour with four fresh battalions, and the Catalans were finally -defeated with great loss. After this vigorous action Decaen marched -to join Suchet, and the Catalans, moving by the mountains in separate -divisions, approached lord William Bentinck. - -The allies having thus passed the Ebro several officers of both -nations conceived the siege of Tortoza would be the best operation. -Nearly forty thousand men, that is to say, Villa Campa’s, Copons’, -Del Parque’s, Whittingham’s, some of Elio’s forces and the -Anglo-Sicilians, could be united for the siege, and the defiles of -the mountains on the left bank of the Ebro would enable them to -resist Suchet’s attempts to succour the place on that side, and force -him to move by the circuitous route of Lerida. Wellington also leaned -towards this operation, but lord William Bentinck resolved to push -at once for Taragona, and even looked to an attack upon Barcelona; -certainly a rash proceeding, inasmuch as Suchet awaited his approach -with an army every way superior. It does not however follow that to -besiege Tortoza would have been advisable, for though the battering -train, much larger than Murray’s losses gave reason at first to -expect, was equal to the reduction of the place, the formal siege of -such a fortress was a great undertaking. The vicinity was unhealthy -and it would have been difficult to feed the Spanish troops. They -were quite inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be long, not -sure to be successful, and Suchet seeing the allies engaged in such a -difficult operation might have marched at once to Aragon. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls.] - -It would seem lord William Bentinck was at this time misled, -partly by the reports of the Catalans, partly by lord Wellington’s -great successes, into a belief that the French were going to -abandon Catalonia. His mind also ran upon Italian affairs, and he -did not perceive that Suchet judiciously posted and able to draw -reinforcements from Decaen was in fact much stronger than all the -allies united. The two armies of Aragon and Catalonia, numbered -sixty-seven thousand men. Of these, about twenty-seven thousand, -including Paris’ division then at Jaca, were in garrison, five -thousand were sick, the remainder in the field. In Catalonia the -allies were not principals, they were accessories. They were to -keep Suchet from operating on the flank of the allies in Navarre -and their defeat would have been a great disaster. So entirely was -this lord Wellington’s view, that the duke Del Parque’s army was to -make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should either move himself -or detach largely towards Aragon. Lord William after passing the -Ebro could have secured the defiles of the mountains with his own -and Villa Campa’s troops, that is to say, with twenty thousand men -including Whittingham’s division. He could have insulted the garrison -of Tortoza, and commenced the making of gabions and fascines, which -would have placed Suchet in doubt as to his ulterior objects while -he awaited the junction of del Parque’s, Copons’, and the rest of -Elio’s troops. Thus forty thousand men, three thousand being cavalry -and attended by a fleet, could have descended into the Campo, still -leaving a detachment to watch Tortoza. If Suchet then came to the -succour of Taragona the allies superior in numbers could have fought -in a position chosen beforehand. Still it is very doubtful if all -these corps would, or could have kept together. - -Lord William Bentinck’s operations were headlong. He had prepared -platforms and fascines for a siege in the island of Yvica, and on -the 30th quitting the mountains suddenly invested Taragona with less -than six thousand men, occupying ground three hundred yards nearer to -the walls the first day than Murray had ever done. He thus prevented -the garrison from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed, they -had that intention; yet the fortress could not be besieged because -of Suchet’s vicinity and the dissemination of the allies. The 31st -the bridge at Amposta was accidentally broken, three hundred bullocks -were drowned, and the head of Del Parque’s army, being on the left -of the Ebro, fell back a day’s march. However Whittingham’s division -and the cavalry came up, and on the 3rd, the bridge being restored, -Del Parque also joined the investing army. Copons then promised to -bring up his Catalans, Sarzfield’s division now belonging to the -second army arrived, and Elio had been ordered to reinforce it with -three additional battalions while Villa Campa observed Tortoza. -Meanwhile lord William seeing that Suchet’s troops were scattered -and the marshal himself at Barcelona, thought of surprizing his -posts and seizing the mountain line of the Llobregat; but Elio sent -no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications between the -English general and Eroles, was slow, the garrison of Tortoza burned -the bridge at Amposta, and Suchet taking alarm suddenly returned from -Barcelona and concentrated his army. - -Up to this time the Spaniards giving copious but false information -to lord William, and no information at all to Suchet, had induced a -series of faults on both sides balancing each other, a circumstance -not uncommon in war, which demands all the faculties of the greatest -minds. The Englishman thinking his enemy retreating had pressed -rashly forward. The Frenchman deeming from the other’s boldness the -whole of the allies were at hand, thought himself too weak, and -awaited the arrival of Decaen, whose junction was retarded as we have -seen by the combined operations of the Catalan army and the English -fleet. - -[Sidenote: August.] - -In this state of affairs Suchet heard of new and important successes -gained in Navarre by lord Wellington, one of his Italian battalions -was at the same time cut off at San Sadurni by Manso, and lord -William Bentinck took a position of battle beyond the Gaya. His left, -composed of Whittingham’s division, occupied Braffin, the Col de -Liebra, and Col de Christina, his right covered the great coast-road. -These were the only carriage ways by which the enemy could approach, -but they were ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham -thought himself too weak to defend the passes alone; hence, when -Suchet, reinforced by Decaen with eight thousand sabres and bayonets, -finally advanced, lord William who had landed neither guns nor stores -decided to refuse battle. For such a resolute officer, this must have -been a painful decision. He had now nearly thirty thousand fighting -men, including a thousand marines which had been landed to join the -advanced guard at Altafalla; he had assumed the offensive, invested -Taragona where the military honour of England had suffered twice -before, in fine provoked the action which he now declined. But Suchet -had equal numbers of a better quality; the banks of the Gaya were -rugged to pass in retreat if the fight should be lost; much must have -been left to the general officers at different points; Del Parque’s -was an uneasy coadjutor, and if any part was forced the whole line -would have been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however -manifest, for though he expected the enemy on the 9th he did not send -his field artillery and baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day -on which Decaen reached Villa Franca. - -The French general dreading the fire of the fleet endeavoured by -false attacks on the coast road to draw the allies from the defiles -beyond Braffin, towards which he finally carried his whole army, and -those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his Memoirs state because -of these demonstrations, but because lord William had previously -determined to retreat. On the 16th finding the passes unguarded, -he poured through and advanced upon Valls thus turning the allies, -but he had lost time and the latter were in full retreat towards -the mountains, the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrills. -The march of the former was covered by lord Frederick Bentinck who -leading the British and German cavalry defeated the fourth French -hussars with a loss of forty or fifty men; and it is said that either -general Habert or Harispe was taken but escaped in the confusion. - -The Anglo-Sicilians and Whittingham’s division now entrenched -themselves near the Col de Balaguer, and Del Parque marched with his -own and Sarzfield’s troops to invest Tortoza, but the garrison fell -upon his rear while passing the Ebro and some loss was sustained. -Meanwhile Suchet, more swayed by the remembrance of Castalla than by -his recent success, would not again prove the courage of the British -troops on a mountain position. Contrary to the wishes of his army he -returned to Taragona and destroyed the ancient walls, which from the -extreme hardness of the Roman cement proved a tedious and difficult -matter: then resuming his old positions about Villa Franca and on -the Llobregat he sent Decaen to Upper Catalonia. This terminated -lord William Bentinck’s first effort and the general result was -favourable. He had risked much on insufficient grounds, yet his enemy -made no profit and lost Taragona with its fertile Campo, Tortoza was -invested, and Suchet was kept away from Navarre. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.] - -It is strange that this renowned French general suffered his large -force to be thus paralyzed at such a crisis. Above twenty-seven -thousand of his soldiers if we include the isolated division of Paris -were shut up in garrison, but thirty-two thousand remained with which -he marched to and fro in Catalonia while the war was being decided -in Navarre. Had he moved to that province by Aragon before the end -of July lord Wellington would have been overpowered. What was to be -feared? That lord William Bentinck would follow, or attack one of his -fortresses? If the French were successful in Navarre the loss of a -fortress in Catalonia would have been a trifle, it was not certain -that any would have fallen, and lord William could not abandon the -coast. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned Catalonia; -but to invade France, guarded as she was by her great military -reputation, and to do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of -Valencia and Catalonia the latter barring all the carriage roads was -chimerical. Success in Navarre would have made an invasion by sea -pass as a partizan descent, and moreover France, wanting Suchet’s -troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded by Wellington -and in a far more formidable manner. This question shall however be -treated more largely in another place, it is sufficient to observe -here, that Clarke the minister of war, a man without genius or -attachment to the emperor’s cause, discouraged any great combined -plan of action, and Napoleon absorbed by his own immense operations -did not interpose. - -Lord William now intent upon the siege of Tortoza wished lord -Wellington to attack Mequinenza with a detachment of his army; but -this the situation of affairs in Navarre and Guipuscoa did not admit -of, and he soon discovered that to assail Tortoza was an undertaking -beyond his own means. Elio when desired to gather provisions and -assist in the operations demanded three weeks for preparation; -all the Spanish troops were in want, Roche’s division, blockading -Murviedro, although so close to Valencia was on half rations; and the -siege of Tortoza was necessarily relinquished, because no great or -sustained operation could be conducted in concert with such generals -and such armies. Suchet’s fear of them was an illustration of -Napoleon’s maxim, that war is an affair of discrimination. It is more -essential to know the quality than the quantity of enemies. - -It was difficult for lord William Bentinck to apply his mind -vigorously to the campaign he was conducting, because fresh changes -injurious to the British policy in Sicily called him to that island, -and his thoughts were running upon the invasion of Italy; but as the -Spaniards, deceived by the movements of escorts and convoys, reported -that Suchet had marched with twelve thousand men to join Soult, he -once more fixed his head-quarters at Taragona, and, following lord -Wellington’s instructions, detached Del Parque’s troops by forced -marches upon Tudela. - -[Sidenote: September.] - -On the 5th of September the army entered Villa Franca, and the 12th, -detachments of Calabrese, Swiss, German, and British infantry, a -squadron of cavalry and one battery, in all about twelve hundred -men under colonel Adam, occupied the heights of Ordal. At this -place, ten miles in advance of Villa Franca, being joined by -three of Sarzfield’s battalions and a Spanish squadron they took -a position; but it now appeared that very few French troops had -been detached; that Suchet had concentrated his whole force on the -Llobregat; and that his army was very superior in numbers, because -the allies, reduced by the loss of Del Parque’s troops, had also left -Whittingham’s division at Reus and Valls to procure food. Sarzfield’s -division was feeding on the British supplies, and lord William again -looked to a retreat, yet thinking the enemy disinclined to advance -desired to preserve his forward position as long as possible. - -He had only two lines of operation to watch. The one menacing his -front from Molino del Rey by the main road, which colonel Adam -blocked by his position at Ordal; the other from Martorel, by San -Sadurni, menacing his left; but on this route, a difficult one, he -had pushed the Catalans under Eroles and Manso reinforcing them with -some Calabrese; there was indeed a third line by Avionet on his -right, but it was little better than a goat-path. He had designed -to place his main body close up to the Ordal on the evening of the -12th, yet from some slight cause delayed it until the next day. -Meanwhile he viewed the country in advance of that defile without -discovering an enemy. His confidential emissaries assured him the -French were not going to advance, and he returned, satisfied that -Adam’s detachment was safe, and so expressed himself to that officer. -A report of a contrary tendency was indeed made by colonel Reeves -of the twenty-seventh, on the authority of a Spanish woman who had -before proved her accuracy and ability as a spy; she was now however -disbelieved, and this incredulity was unfortunate. For Suchet thus -braved, and his communication with Lerida threatened by Manso on the -side of Martorel, was already in march to attack Ordal with the army -of Aragon, while Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, moving with the army -of Catalonia from Martorel by San Sardurni, turned the left of the -allies. - - -COMBAT OF ORDAL. - -The heights occupied by colonel Adam although rugged rose gradually -from a magnificent bridge, by which the main road was carried over -a very deep and impracticable ravine. The second battalion of the -twenty-seventh British regiment was posted on the right, the Germans -and De Roll’s Swiss with the artillery, defended an old Spanish fort -commanding the main road; the Spaniards were in the centre, the -Calabrese on the left; and the cavalry were in reserve. A bright -moonlight facilitated the movements of the French, and a little -before midnight, their leading column under general Mesclop passing -the bridge without let or hindrance, mounted the heights with a -rapid pace and driving back the picquets gave the first alarm. The -allied troops lying on their arms in order of battle were ready -instantly and the fight commenced. The first effort was against the -twenty-seventh, then the Germans and the Spanish battalions were -vigorously assailed in succession as the French columns got free of -the bridge, but the Calabrese were too far on the left to take a -share in the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate. Harispe who -commanded the French constantly outflanked the right of the allies, -and at the same time pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought -gallantly. - -Colonel Adam was wounded very early, the command devolved upon -colonel Reeves, and that officer seeing his flank turned and his men -falling fast, in short, finding himself engaged with a whole army -on a position of which colonel Adam had lost the key by neglecting -the bridge, resolved to retreat. In this view he first ordered the -guns to fall back, and to cover the movement charged a column of -the enemy which was pressing forward on the high road, but he was -severely wounded in this attack and there was no recognized commander -on the spot to succeed him. Then the affair became confused. For -though the order to retreat was given the Spaniards were fighting -desperately, and the twenty-seventh thought it shame to abandon -them; wherefore the Germans and De Roll’s regiment still held the -old fort and the guns came back. The action was thus continued with -great fury. Colonel Carey now brought the Calabrese into line from -the left, and menaced the right flank of the French, but he was too -late; the Spaniards overwhelmed in the centre were broken, the right -was completely turned, the old fort was lost, the enemy’s skirmishers -got into the allies’ rear, and at three o’clock the whole dispersed, -the most part in flight; the Spanish cavalry were then overthrown on -the main road by the French hussars and four guns were taken in the -tumult. - -Captain Waldron, with the twenty-seventh reduced to eighty men, and -captain Müller with about the same number of Germans and Swiss, -breaking through several small parties of the enemy effected their -retreat in good order by the hills on each side of the road. Colonel -Carey endeavoured at first to gain the road of Sadurni on the left, -but meeting with Decaen’s people on that side he retraced his steps, -and crossing the field of battle in the rear of Suchet’s columns made -for Villa Nueva de Sitjes. There he finally embarked without loss, -save a few stragglers who fell into the hands of a flanking battalion -of French infantry which had moved through the mountains by Begas -and Avionet. The overthrow was complete and the prisoners were at -first very numerous, but the darkness enabled many to escape, and two -thousand men reached Manso and Eroles. - -Suchet pursuing his march came up with lord William about eight -o’clock. The latter retired skirmishing and with excellent order -beyond Villa Franca, followed by the French horsemen some of which -assailed his rear-guard while others edged to their right to secure -the communication with Decaen. The latter was looked for by both -parties with great anxiety, but he had been delayed by the resistance -of Manso and Eroles in the rugged country between Martorel and San -Sadurni. Suchet’s cavalry and artillery continued however to infest -the rear of the retreating army until it reached a deep baranco, -near the Venta de Monjos, where the passage being dangerous and -the French horseman importunate, that brave and honest soldier, -lord Frederick Bentinck, charged their right, and fighting hand -to hand with the enemy’s general Myers wounded him and overthrew -his light cavalry; they rallied upon their dragoons and advanced -again, endeavouring to turn the flank, but were stopped by the fire -of two guns which general Clinton opened upon them. Meanwhile the -cuirassiers, on the left, pressed the Brunswick hussars and menaced -the infantry yet they were finally checked by the fire of the tenth -regiment. This cavalry action was vigorous, the twentieth and the -Germans although few in numbers lost more than ninety men. The -baranco was however safely passed and about three o’clock the army -having reached Arbos the pursuit ceased. The Catalans meanwhile -had retreated towards Igualada and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to -Taragona. - -It was now thought Suchet would make a movement to carry off the -garrisons of Lerida and Tortoza, but this did not happen, and lord -William went to Sicily, leaving the command of the army to sir -William Clinton. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. Lord William Bentinck committed errors, yet he has been censured -without discrimination. “_He advanced rashly._” “_He was undecided._” -“_He exposed his advanced guard without support._” Such were the -opinions expressed at the time. Their justness may be disputed. His -first object was to retain all the French force in Catalonia; his -second, to profit from Suchet’s weakness if he detached largely. He -could do neither by remaining inactive on the barren hills behind -Hospitalet, because the Spaniards would have dispersed for want of -provisions and the siege of Tortoza was found to be impracticable. -It was therefore the part of a bold and skilful general to menace -his enemy, if he could be sure of retreating again without danger or -dishonour. The position at Villa Franca fulfilled this condition. It -was strong in itself and offensive; sir Edward Pellew’s fleet was -in movement to create diversions in Upper Catalonia, and all the -emissaries and Spanish correspondents concurred in declaring, though -falsely, that the French general had detached twelve thousand men. - -It is indeed one of the tests of a sagacious general to detect -false intelligence, yet the greatest are at times deceived, and all -must act, if they act at all, upon what appears at the time to be -true. Lord William’s advance was founded on erroneous data, but his -position in front of Villa Franca was well chosen. It enabled him to -feed Whittingham’s division in the fertile country about Reus and -Valls, and there were short and easy communications from Villa Franca -to the sea-coast. The army could only be seriously assailed on two -lines. In front, by the main road, which though broad was from Molino -del Rey to the heights of Ordal one continued defile. On the left by -San Sardurni, a road still more rugged and difficult than the other. -And the Catalans were launched on this side as their natural line of -operations, because, without losing their hold of the mountains they -protected the left of the allies, menacing at the same time the right -of the enemy and his communications with Lerida. Half a march to the -rear would bring the army to Vendrills, beyond which the enemy could -not follow without getting under the fire of the ships; neither could -he forestall this movement by a march through the Liebra and Cristina -defiles, because the Catalans falling back on Whittingham’s division -could hold him in check. - -2º. Ordal and San Sadurni were the keys of the position. The last -was well secured, the first not so, and there was the real error of -Lord William Bentinck. It was none however to push an advanced guard -of three thousand five hundred men, with cavalry and artillery, to a -distance of ten miles for a few hours. He had a right to expect the -commander of such a force would maintain his post until supported, or -at least retreat without disaster. An officer of capacity would have -done so. But whoever relies upon the capacity of sir Frederick Adam -either in peace or war will be disappointed. - -In 1810 lord Wellington detached general Robert Craufurd with two or -three thousand men to a much greater distance, not for one night but -for many weeks. And that excellent officer, though close to Massena’s -immense army the very cavalry of which was double his whole numbers; -though he had the long line of the Agueda a fordable river to guard; -though he was in an open country and continually skirmishing, never -lost so much as a patrole and always remained master of his movements -for his combat on the Coa was a studied and wilful error. It was no -fault therefore to push colonel Adam’s detachment to Ordal, but it -was a fault that lord William, having determined to follow with his -whole force, should have delayed doing so for one night, or that -delaying he did not send some supporting troops forward. It was a -fault not to do so because there was good reason to do so, and to -delay was to tempt fortune. There was good reason to do so as well to -profit of the advantage of the position as to support Adam. Had lord -William Bentinck been at hand with his main body when the attack on -Ordal commenced, the head of Suchet’s force which was kept at bay for -three hours by a detachment so ill commanded would have been driven -into the ravine behind, and the victorious allies would still have -had time to march against Decaen by the road along which colonel -Cary endeavoured to join Manso. In fine, Suchet’s dispositions were -vicious in principle and ought not to have succeeded. He operated -on two distinct lines having no cross communications, and before an -enemy in possession of a central position with good communications. - -3º. It was another fault that lord William Bentinck disregarded the -Spanish woman’s report to colonel Reeves; his observations made in -front of the bridge of Ordal on the evening of the 12th accorded -indeed with the reports of his own emissaries, but the safe side -should always be the rule of precaution. He also, although on the -spot, overlooked the unmilitary dispositions of colonel Adam on the -heights of Ordal. The summit could not be defended against superior -numbers with a small corps, and that officer had nevertheless -extended the Calabrese so far on the left that they could take -no share in the action, and yet could not retreat without great -difficulty. A commander who understood his business, would have -blocked up the bridge in front of the heights, and defended it by -a strong detachment, supporting that detachment by others placed in -succession on the heights behind, but keeping his main body always -in hand, ready either to fall on the head of the enemy’s column of -attack, or to rally the advanced detachments and retreat in order. -There were plenty of trees and stones to block the bridge, its own -parapet would have supplied materials, and the ravine was so deep and -rugged, that the enemy could not have crossed it on the flanks in the -dark. - -It is no defence to say colonel Adam only took his ground in the -evening after a march; that he expected the main body up the next -morning and that lord William assured him he was safe from attack. -Every officer is responsible for the security of his own troops, -and the precautions prescribed by the rules of war should never be -dispensed with or delayed at an outpost. Now it does not appear that -colonel Adam ever placed an infantry picquet on the bridge, or sent -a cavalry patrole beyond it; and I have been informed by a French -soldier, one of a party sent to explore the position, that they -reached the crest of the heights without opposition and returned -safely, whereupon Mesclop’s brigade instantly crossed the bridge and -attacked. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -4º. Ordal might be called a surprize with respect to the -general-in-chief, yet the troops engaged were not surprised; they -were beaten and dispersed because colonel Adam was unskilful. The -French general’s victory was complete; but he has in his Memoirs -exaggerated his difficulties and the importance of his success, -his private report to the emperor was more accurate. The Memoirs -state that the English grenadiers defended certain works which -commanded the ascent of the main road, and in the accompanying atlas -a perspective view of well-conditioned redoubts with colours flying, -is given. The reader is thus led to imagine these were regular forts -of a fresh construction defended by select troops; but in the private -report they are correctly designated as ancient retrenchments, being -in fact the ruins of some old Spanish field-works and of no more -advantage to the allies than any natural inequality of ground. Again -in the Memoirs the attack of the French cavalry near Villa Franca is -represented as quite successful; but the private report only says the -rear was harassed by repeated charges, which is true, and moreover -those charges were vigorously repulsed. The whole French loss was -about three hundred men, that of the allies, heavy at Ordal, was -lightened by escape of prisoners during the night and ultimately did -not exceed a thousand men including Spaniards. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. June.] - -Turning from the war in Catalonia to the operations in Navarre -and Guipuscoa, we shall find lord Wellington’s indomitable energy -overcoming every difficulty. It has been already shown how, changing -his first views, he disposed the Anglo-Portuguese divisions to cover -the siege of San Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna, at the same -time attacking with the Spanish divisions Santona on the coast, and -the castles of Daroca, Morella, Zaragoza, and the forts of Pancorbo -in the interior. These operations required many men, but the early -fall of Pancorbo enabled O’Donnel’s reserve to blockade Pampeluna, -and Don Carlos D’España’s division, four thousand strong, which had -remained at Miranda del Castanar to improve its organization when -lord Wellington advanced to the Ebro, was approaching to reinforce -him. - -The harbour of Passages was the only port near the scene of -operations suited for the supply of the army. Yet it had this defect, -that being situated between the covering and the besieging army, -the stores and guns once landed were in danger from every movement -of the enemy. The Deba river, between San Sebastian and Bilbaō, -was unfit for large vessels, and hence no permanent depôt could be -established nearer than Bilbaō. At that port therefore, and at St. -Ander and Coruña, the great depôts of the army were fixed, the stores -being transported to them from the establishments in Portugal; -but the French held Santona, and their privateers interrupted the -communication along the coast of Spain while American privateers did -the same between Lisbon and Coruña. On the other hand the intercourse -between San Sebastian and the ports of France was scarcely molested, -and the most urgent remonstrances failed to procure a sufficient -naval force on the coast of Biscay. It was in these circumstances -Wellington commenced - - -THE SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN. - -This place was built on a low sandy isthmus formed by the harbour on -one side and the river Urumea on the other. Behind it rose the Monte -Orgullo, a rugged cone nearly four hundred feet high, washed by the -ocean and crowned with the small castle of La Mota. Its southern face -overlooking the town, was yet cut off from it by a line of defensive -works and covered with batteries; but La Mota itself was commanded, -at a distance of thirteen hundred yards, by the Monte Olia on the -other side of the Urumea. - -The land front of San Sebastian was three hundred and fifty yards -wide, stretching quite across the isthmus. It consisted of a high -curtain or rampart, very solid, strengthened by a lofty casemated -flat bastion or cavalier placed in the centre, and by half bastions -at either end. A regular horn-work was pushed out from this front, -and six hundred yards beyond the horn-work the isthmus was closed by -the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the foot of which stood the suburb of -San Martin. - -On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain sandy hills called -the _Chofres_, through which the road from Passages passed to the -wooden bridge over the river, and thence, by the suburb of Santa -Catalina, along the top of a sea-wall which formed a _fausse braye_ -for the horn-work. - -The flanks of the town were protected by simple ramparts. The one -was washed by the water of the harbour, the other by the Urumea -which at high tide covered four of the twenty-seven feet comprised -in its elevation. This was the weak side of the fortress, for though -covered by the river there was only a single wall ill-flanked by two -old towers, and by the half bastion of San Elmo which was situated -at the extremity of the rampart close under the Monte Orgullo. There -was no ditch, no counter-scarp, or glacis, the wall could be seen to -its base from the Chofre hills at distances varying from five hundred -to a thousand yards, and when the tide was out the Urumea left a dry -strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo. However the guns from -the batteries at Monte Orgullo especially that called the Mirador, -could see this strand. - -The other flank of the town was secured by the harbour, in the mouth -of which was a rocky island, called Santa Clara, where the French had -established a post of twenty-five men. - -[Sidenote: Bellas’ Journal of French Sieges in Spain.] - -When the battle of Vittoria happened San Sebastian was nearly -dismantled; many of the guns had been removed to form battering -trains or to arm smaller ports on the coast, there were no -bomb-proofs nor pallisades nor outworks, the wells were foul and the -place was supplied with water by a single aqueduct. Joseph’s defeat -restored its importance as a fortress. General Emanuel Rey entered -it the 22d of June, bringing with him the escort of the convoy -which had quitted Vittoria the day before the battle. The town was -thus filled with emigrant Spanish families, with the ministers and -other persons attached to the court; the population ordinarily eight -thousand was increased to sixteen thousand and disorder and confusion -were predominant. Rey, pushed by necessity, immediately forced all -persons not residents to march at once to France granting them only -a guard of one hundred men; the people of quality went by sea, the -others by land, and fortunately all arrived safely for the Partidas -would have given them no quarter. - -On the 27th general Foy while retreating before sir Thomas Graham -threw a reinforcement into the place. The next day Mendizabal’s -Spaniards appeared on the hills behind the ridge of San Bartolomeo -and on the Chofres, whereupon general Rey burned the wooden bridge -and both the suburbs, and commenced fortifying the heights of San -Bartolomeo. The 29th the Spaniards slightly attacked San Bartolomeo, -and were repulsed. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -[Sidenote: Sir G. Collier’s Despatch.] - -The 1st of July the governor of Gueteria abandoned that place, and -with detestable ferocity secretly left a lighted train which exploded -the magazine and destroyed many of the inhabitants. His troops three -hundred in number entered San Sebastian, and at the same time a -vessel from St. Jean de Luz arrived with fifty-six cannoneers and -some workmen; the garrison was thus increased to three thousand men -and all persons not able to provide subsistence for themselves in -advance were ordered to quit the place. Meanwhile Mendizabal, having -cut off the aqueduct, made some approaches towards the head of the -burned bridge on the right of the Urumea and molested the workmen on -the heights of Bartolomeo. - -On the 3d, the Surveillante frigate and a sloop with some small craft -arrived to blockade the harbour, yet the French vessels from St. Jean -de Luz continued to enter by night. The same day the governor made a -sally with eleven hundred men in three columns to obtain news, and -after some hours’ skirmishing returned with a few prisoners. - -The 6th some French vessels with a detachment of troops and a -considerable convoy of provisions came from St. Jean de Luz. - -The 7th Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set fire to the convent -of San Bartolomeo. - -On the 9th sir Thomas Graham arrived with a corps of British and -Portuguese troops, and on the 13th the Spaniards marched, some to -reinforce the force blockading Santona, the remainder to rejoin the -fourth army on the Bidassoa. - -At this time general Reille held the entrances to the Bastan by -Vera and Echallar, but Wellington drove him thence on the 15th and -established the seventh and light divisions there, thus covering -the passes over the Peña de Haya by which the siege might have been -interrupted. - -Before general Graham arrived the French had constructed a redoubt on -the heights of San Bartolomeo, and connected it with the convent of -that name which they also fortified. These outworks were supported by -posts in the ruined houses of the suburb of San Martin behind, and by -a low circular redoubt, formed of casks on the main road, half-way -between the convent and the horn-work. Hence to reduce the place, -working along the isthmus, it was necessary to carry in succession -three lines of defence covering the town, and a fourth at the foot -of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota could be assailed. -Seventy-six pieces of artillery were mounted upon these works and -others were afterwards obtained from France by sea. - -[Sidenote: Jones’s Journal of British Sieges.] - -The besieging army consisted of the fifth division under general -Oswald, and the independent Portuguese brigades of J. Wilson and -Bradford reinforced by detachments from the first division. Thus, -including the artillery-men some seamen commanded by lieutenant -O’Reilly of the Surveillante and one hundred regular sappers and -miners, now for the first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula, -nearly ten thousand men were employed. The guns available for -the attack, in the first instance, were a new battering train -originally prepared for the siege of Burgos, consisting of fourteen -iron twenty-four pounders, six eight-inch brass howitzers, four -sixty-eight-pound iron carronades, and four iron ten-inch mortars. -To these were added six twenty-four pounders lent by the ships -of war, and six eighteen pounders which had moved with the army -from Portugal, making altogether forty pieces commanded by colonel -Dickson. The distance from the depôt of siege at Passages to the -Chofre sand-hills was one mile and a half of good road, and a pontoon -bridge was laid over the Urumea river above the Chofres, but from -thence to the height of Bartolomeo was more than five miles of very -bad road. - -Early in July the fortress had been twice closely examined by Major -Smith, the engineer who had so ably defended Tarifa. He proposed -a plan of siege founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofre -hills to destroy the flanks, rake the principal front and form a -breach with the same batteries, the works being at the same time -secured, except at low water, by the Urumea. Counter-batteries, to -be constructed on the left of that river, were to rake the line -of defence in which the breach was to be formed; and against the -castle and its outworks he relied principally upon vertical fire, -instancing the reduction of Fort Bourbon in the West Indies in proof -of its efficacy. This plan would probably have reduced San Sebastian -in a reasonable time without any remarkable loss of men, and lord -Wellington approving of it, though he doubted the efficacy of the -vertical fire, ordered the siege to be commenced. He renewed his -approval afterwards when he had examined the works in person, and -all his orders were in the same spirit; but neither the plan nor his -orders were followed, the siege, which should have been an ordinary -event of war has obtained a mournful celebrity, and lord Wellington -has been unjustly charged with a contempt for the maxims of the -great masters of the art. Anxious he was no doubt to save time, yet -he did not for that urge the engineer beyond the rules. _Take the -place in the quickest manner, yet do not from over speed fail to -take it_, was the sense of his instructions; but sir Thomas Graham, -one of England’s best soldiers, appears to have been endowed with a -genius for war intuitive rather than reflective; and this joined to -his natural modesty and a certain easiness of temper, caused him at -times to abandon his own correct conceptions, for the less judicious -counsels of those about him who advised deviations from the original -plan. - -Active operations were commenced on the night of the 10th by the -construction of two batteries against the convent and redoubt of San -Bartolomeo. And on the night of the 13th four batteries to contain -twenty of the heaviest guns and four eight-inch howitzers, were -marked out on the Chofre sand-hills, at distances varying from six -hundred to thirteen hundred yards from the eastern rampart of the -town. The river was supposed to be unfordable, wherefore no parallel -of support was made, yet good trenches of communications, and -subsequently regular approaches were formed. Two attacks were thus -established. One on the right bank of the Urumea entrusted to the -unattached Portuguese brigades; one on the left bank to the fifth -division; but most of the troops were at first encamped on the right -bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army in the event of -a general battle. - -On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour with supplies, and the -batteries of the left attack, under the direction of the German major -Hartman, opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing hot shot into that -building. The besieged responded with musquetry from the redoubt, -with heavy guns from the town, and with a field-piece which they had -mounted on the belfry of the convent itself. - -The 15th of July sir Richard Fletcher took the chief command of the -engineers, but major Smith retained the direction of the attack from -the Chofre Hills and lord Wellington’s orders continued to pass -through his hands. This day the batteries of the left attack, aided -by some howitzers from the right of the Urumea, set the convent on -fire, silenced the musquetry of the besieged, and so damaged the -defences that the Portuguese troops attached to the fifth division -were ordered to feel the enemy’s post. They were however repulsed -with great loss, the French sallied, and the firing did not cease -until nightfall. - -A battery for seven additional guns to play against Bartolomeo -was now commenced on the right of the Urumea, and the original -batteries set fire to the convent several times, but the flames were -extinguished by the garrison. - -In the night of the 16th general Rey sounded the Urumea as high as -Santa Catalina, designing to pass over and storm the batteries on the -Chofres; but the fords discovered were shifting, and the difficulty -of execution deterred him from this project. - -The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, the assault was ordered -without waiting for the effect of the new battery raised on the other -side of the Urumea. The storming party was formed in two columns. -Detachments from Wilson’s Portuguese, supported by the light company -of the ninth British regiment and three companies of the royals, -composed the right, which under the direction of general Hay was -destined to assail the redoubt. General Bradford directed the left -which being composed of Portuguese, supported by three companies of -the ninth British regiment under colonel Cameron, was ordered to -assail the convent. - - -ASSAULT OF SAN BARTOLOMEO. - -At ten o’clock in the morning two heavy six-pounders opened against -the redoubt; and a sharp fire of musquetry in return from the French, -who had been reinforced and occupied the suburb of San Martin, -announced their resolution to fight. The allied troops were assembled -behind the crest of the hill overlooking the convent, and the first -signal was given, but the Portuguese advanced slowly at both attacks, -and the supporting companies of the ninth regiment on each side, -passing through them fell upon the enemy with the usual impetuosity -of British soldiers. Colonel Cameron while leading his grenadiers -down the face of the hill was exposed to a heavy cannonade from the -horn-work, but he soon gained the cover of a wall fifty yards from -the convent and there awaited the second signal. However his rapid -advance, which threatened to cut off the garrison from the suburb, -joined to the fire of the two six-pounders and that of some other -field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea, caused the French -to abandon the redoubt. Seeing this, Cameron jumped over the wall -and assaulted both the convent and the houses of the suburb. At the -latter a fierce struggle ensued and captain Woodman of the ninth was -killed in the upper room of a house after fighting his way up from -below; but the grenadiers carried the convent with such rapidity that -the French, unable to explode some small mines they had prepared, -hastily joined the troops in the suburb. There however the fighting -continued and colonel Cameron’s force being very much reduced the -affair was becoming doubtful, when the remaining companies of his -regiment, which he had sent for after the attack commenced, arrived, -and the suburb was with much fighting entirely won. At the right -attack the company of the ninth, although retarded by a ravine by a -thick hedge by the slowness of the Portuguese and by a heavy fire, -entered the abandoned redoubt with little loss, but the troops -were then rashly led against the cask redoubt, contrary to general -Oswald’s orders, and were beaten back by the enemy. - -[Sidenote: Bellas Journaux des Sièges.] - -The loss of the French was two hundred and forty men, that of the -allies considerable; the companies of the ninth under colonel -Cameron, alone, had seven officers and sixty men killed or wounded, -and the operation although successful was an error. The battery -erected on the right bank of the Urumea was not opened, wherefore, -either the assault was precipitated or the battery not necessary; but -the loss justified the conception of the battery. - -When the action ceased the engineers made a lodgement in the redoubt, -and commenced two batteries for eight pieces to rake the horn-work -and the eastern rampart of the place. Two other batteries to contain -four sixty-eight-pound carronades and four ten-inch mortars were also -commenced on the right bank of the Urumea. - -The 18th the besieged threw up traverses on the land front to meet -the raking fire of the besiegers, and the latter dragged four pieces -up the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and other batteries on -the Monte Orgullo. In the night a lodgement was made on the ruins of -San Martin, the two batteries at the right attack were armed, and two -additional mortars dragged up the Monte Olia. - -The 19th all the batteries at both attacks were armed, and in the -night two approaches being commenced from the suburb of San Martin -towards the cask redoubt the French were driven from that small work. - -On the 20th the whole of the batteries opened their fire, the -greatest part being directed to form the breach. - -[Sidenote: Notes of the Siege by sir C. Smith, MSS.] - -Major Smith’s plan was similar to that followed by marshal Berwick a -century before. He proposed a lodgement on the horn-work before the -breach should be assailed, but he had not then read the description -of that siege and therefore unknowingly fixed the breaching-point -precisely where the wall had been most strongly rebuilt after -Berwick’s attack. This was the first fault, yet a slight one because -the wall did not resist the batteries very long, but it was a serious -matter that sir Thomas Graham at the suggestion of the commander -of the artillery began his operations by breaching. Major Smith -objected to it, and sir R. Fletcher acquiesced reluctantly on the -understanding that the ruining of the defences was only postponed, an -understanding afterwards unhappily forgotten. - -The result of the first day’s attack was not satisfactory, the -weather proved bad, the guns mounted on ship carriages failed, one -twenty-four pounder was rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another -became useless from an accident, a captain of engineers was killed, -and the besiegers’ shot had little effect upon the solid wall. In the -night however the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages, and a -parallel across the isthmus was projected; but the greatest part of -the workmen, to avoid a tempest, sought shelter in the suburb of San -Martin and when day broke only one-third of the work was performed. - -The 21st the besiegers’ batteries ceased firing to allow of a -summons, but the governor refused to receive the letter and the -firing was resumed. The main wall still resisted yet the parapets -and embrazures crumbled away fast, and the batteries on Monte Olia -plunged into the horn-work, although at sixteen hundred yards -distance, with such effect, that the besieged having no bomb-proofs -were forced to dig trenches to protect themselves. The counter-fire -directed solely against the breaching batteries was feeble, but -at midnight a shell thrown from the castle into the bay gave the -signal for a sally, and during the firing which ensued several -French vessels with supplies entered the harbour. This night also -the besieged isolated the breach by cuts in the rampart and other -defences. On the other hand the besiegers’ parallel across the -isthmus was completed, and in its progress laid bare the mouth of a -drain, four feet high and three feet wide, containing the pipe of the -aqueduct cut off by the Spaniards. Through this dangerous opening -lieutenant Reid of the engineers, a young and zealous officer, crept -even to the counterscarp of the horn-work, and finding the passage -there closed by a door returned without an accident. Thirty barrels -of powder were placed in this drain, and eight feet was stopped with -sand-bags, thus forming a globe of compression designed to blow, as -through a tube, so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill -the narrow ditch of the horn-work. - -[Sidenote: Plan 3.] - -On the 22d the fire from the batteries, unexampled from its -rapidity and accuracy, opened what appeared a practicable breach in -the eastern flank wall, between the towers of Los Hornos and Las -Mesquitas. The counter-fire of the besieged now slackened, but the -descent into the town behind the breach was more than twelve feet -perpendicular, and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently -working at the interior defences to receive the assault: they added -also another gun to the battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador -battery, to flank the front attack. On the other hand the besiegers -had placed four sixty-eight pound carronades in battery to play on -the defences of the breach, but the fire on both sides slackened -because the guns were greatly enlarged at the vents with constant -practice. - -On the 23d the sea blockade being null the French vessels returned -to France with the badly wounded men. This day the besiegers judging -the breach between the towers quite practicable turned the guns, at -the suggestion of general Oswald, to break the wall on the right of -the main breach. Major Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage -would be gained by making a second opening to get at which the troops -must first pass the great breach; that time would be thus uselessly -lost to the besiegers, and that there was a manifest objection on -account of the tide and depth of water at the new point attacked. His -counsel was overruled, and in the course of the day, the wall being -thin the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach thirty feet wide was -rendered practicable. - -The defensive fire of the besieged being now much diminished, the -ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight pound carronades were turned -upon the defences of the great breach, and upon a stockade which -separated the high curtain on the land front, from the lower works -of the flank against which the attack was conducted. The houses -near the breach were soon in flames which spread rapidly, destroyed -some of the defences of the besieged and menacing the whole town -with destruction. The assault was ordered for the next morning. -But when the troops assembled in the trenches the burning houses -appeared so formidable that the attack was deferred and the batteries -again opened, partly against the second breach, partly against the -defences, partly to break the wall in a third place between the half -bastion of St. John on the land front and the main breach. - -[Sidenote: Bellas, &c.] - -During the night the vigilant governor expecting the assault mounted -two field-pieces on the cavalier, in the centre of the land front, -which being fifteen feet above the other defences commanded the high -curtain, and they still had on the horn-work a light piece, and two -casemated guns on the flank of the cavalier. Two other field-pieces -were mounted on an entrenchment which crossing the ditch of the -land front bore on the approaches to the main breach; a twenty-four -pounder looked from the tower of Las Mesquitas, between the main -breach and where the third opening was being made and consequently -flanking both; two four-pounders were in the tower of Hornos; two -heavy guns were on the flank of St. Elmo, and two others, placed on -the right of the Mirador, could play upon the breaches from within -the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus fourteen pieces were still -available for defence, the retaining sea-wall or _fausse braye_ which -strengthened the flank of the horn-work, and between which and the -river the storming parties must necessarily advance, was covered -with live shells to roll over on the columns, and behind the flaming -houses near the breach other edifices were loop-holed and filled with -musqueteers. However the fire extending rapidly and fiercely greatly -injured the defences, the French to save their guns withdrew them -until the moment of attack, and the British artillery officers were -confident that in daylight they could silence the enemy’s guns and -keep the parapet clear of men; wherefore sir Thomas Graham renewed -the order for - - -THE ASSAULT. - -In the night of the 24th two thousand men of the fifth division filed -into the trenches on the isthmus. This force was composed of the -third battalion of the royals under major Frazer, destined to storm -the great breach; the thirty-eighth regiment under colonel Greville, -designed to assail the lesser and most distant breach; the ninth -regiment under colonel Cameron, appointed to support the royals; -finally a detachment, selected from the light companies of all those -battalions, was placed in the centre of the royals under the command -of lieutenant Campbell of the ninth regiment. This chosen detachment, -accompanied by the engineer Machel with a ladder party, was intended -to sweep the high curtain after the breach should be won. - -The distance from the trenches to the points of attack was more than -three hundred yards along the contracted space lying between the -retaining wall of the horn-work and the river; the ground was strewed -with rocks covered by slippery sea-weeds; the tide had left large -and deep pools of water; the parapet of the horn-work was entire -as well as the retaining wall; the parapets of the other works and -the two towers, which closely flanked the breach, although injured -were far from being ruined, and every place was thickly garnished -with musqueteers. The difficulties of the attack were obvious, and -a detachment of Portuguese placed in a trench opened beyond the -parallel on the isthmus, within sixty yards of the ramparts, was -ordered to quell if possible the fire of the horn-work. - -While it was still dark the storming columns moved out of the -trenches, and the globe of compression in the drain was exploded with -great effect against the counterscarp and glacis of the horn-work. -The garrison astonished by the unlooked-for event abandoned the -flanking parapet, and the troops rushed onwards, the stormers for -the main breach leading and suffering more from the fire of their -own batteries on the right of the Urumea than from the enemy. Major -Frazer and the engineer Harry Jones first reached the breach. The -enemy had fallen back in confusion behind the ruins of the still -burning houses, and those brave officers rushed up expecting that -their troops would follow, but not many followed, for it was -extremely dark, the natural difficulties of the way had contracted -the front and disordered the column in its whole length, and the -soldiers, straggling and out of wind, arrived in small disconnected -parties at the foot of the breach. The foremost gathered near their -gallant leaders, but the depth of the descent into the town and the -volumes of flames and smoke which still issued from the burning -houses behind awed the stoutest; and more than two-thirds of the -storming column, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had broken -off at the demi-bastion to commence a musquetry battle with the enemy -on the rampart. Meanwhile the shells from the Monte Orgullo fell -rapidly, the defenders of the breach rallied and with a smashing -musquetry from the ruins and loopholed houses smote the head of the -column, while the men in the towers smote them on the flanks; and -from every quarter came showers of grape and hand-grenades tearing -the ranks in a dreadful manner. - -Major Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the intrepid Jones -stood there awhile longer amidst a few heroic soldiers, hoping for -aid, but none came and he and those with him were struck down. The -engineer Machel had been killed early and the men bearing ladders -fell or were dispersed. Thus the rear of the column was in absolute -confusion before the head was beaten. It was in vain that colonel -Greville of the thirty-eighth, colonel Cameron of the ninth, captain -Archimbeau of the royals, and many other regimental officers -exerted themselves to rally their discomfited troops and refill the -breach; it was in vain that lieutenant Campbell, breaking through -the tumultuous crowd with the survivors of his chosen detachment, -mounted the ruins; twice he ascended, twice he was wounded, and all -around him died. The royals endeavouring to retire got intermixed -with the thirty-eighth, and with some companies of the ninth which -had unsuccessfully endeavoured to pass them and get to the lesser -breach. Then swayed by different impulses and pent up in the narrow -way between the horn-work and the river, the mass reeling to and fro -could neither advance nor go back until the shells and musquetry, -constantly plied both in front and flank, had thinned the concourse -and the trenches were regained in confusion. At daylight a truce -was agreed to for an hour, during which the French, who had already -humanely removed the gallant Jones and the other wounded men from the -breach, now carried off the more distant sufferers lest they should -be drowned by the rising of the tide. - -Five officers of engineers including sir Richard Fletcher, and -forty-four officers of the line with five hundred and twenty men, had -been killed, wounded, or made prisoners in this assault the failure -of which was signal, yet the causes were obvious and may be classed -thus. - -1º. Deviation from the original project of siege and from lord -Wellington’s instructions. - -2º. Bad arrangements of detail. - -3º. Want of vigour in the execution. - -In respect of the first, lord Wellington having visited the Chofre -trenches on the 22d confirmed his former approval of Smith’s plan, -and gave that officer final directions for the attack finishing thus, -“_Fair daylight must be taken for the assault_.” These instructions -and their emphatic termination were repeated by major Smith in the -proper quarter, but they were not followed, no lodgement was made -on the horn-work, the defences were nearly entire both in front and -flank, and the assault was made in darkness. Major Smith had also, -by calculation and by consultations with the fishermen, ascertained -that the ebb of tide would serve exactly at day-break on the 24th; -but the assault was made the 25th, and then before daylight, when the -water being too high contracted the ground, increased the obstacles, -and forced the assaulting column to march on a narrow front and a -long line, making an uneasy progress and trickling onwards instead -of dashing with a broad surge against the breach. In fine the rules -of art being neglected and no extraordinary resource substituted the -operation failed. - -[Sidenote: Notes on the siege, by sir C. Smith, MSS.] - -The troops filed out of the long narrow trenches in the night, a -tedious operation, and were immediately exposed to a fire of grape -from their own batteries on the Chofres. This fire, intended to -keep down that of the enemy, should have ceased when the globe of -compression was sprung in the drain, but owing to the darkness and -the noise the explosion could neither be seen nor heard. The effect -of it however drove the enemy from the horn-work, the Portuguese -on that side advanced to the ditch, and a vigorous escalade would -probably have succeeded but they had no ladders. Again the stormers -of the great breach marched first, filling up the way and rendering -the second breach, as major Smith had foretold, useless, and the -ladder-bearers never got to their destination. The attack was -certainly ill-digested, and there was a neglect of moral influence -followed by its natural consequence want of vigour in execution. - -The deferring of the assault from the 24th to the 25th expressly -because the breach was too difficult rendered the troops uneasy, -they suspected some hidden danger, and in this mood emerging from -the trenches they were struck by the fire of their own batteries; -then wading through deep pools of water, or staggering in the dark -over slippery rocks, and close under the enemy’s flanking works -whence every shot told with fatal effect, how could they manifest -their natural conquering energy? It is possible that a second and -more vigorous assault on the great breach might have been effected -by a recognized leader, but no general or staff officer went out -of the trenches with the troops, and the isolated exertions of the -regimental officers were unavailing. Nor were there wanting other -sinister influences. General Oswald had in the councils earnestly and -justly urged the dangers arising from the irregular mode of attack, -but this anticipation of ill success, in which other officers of rank -joined, was freely expressed out of council, and it said even in the -hearing of the troops abating that daring confidence which victory -loves. - -Lord Wellington repaired immediately to St. Sebastian. The causes -of the failure were apparent and he would have renewed the attack, -but wanting ammunition, deferred it until the powder and additional -ordnance which he had written for to England as early as the 26th of -June should arrive. The next day other events caused him to resort -to a blockade and the battering train was transported to Passages, -two guns and two howitzers only being retained on the Chofres and -the Monte Olia. This operation was completed in the night of the -26th, but at day-break the garrison made a sally from the horn-work, -surprised the trenches and swept off two hundred Portuguese and -thirty British soldiers. To avoid a repetition of this disaster the -guards of the trenches were concentrated in the left parallel, and -patroles only were sent out, yet one of those also was cut off on -the 1st of August. Thus terminated the first part of the siege of -San Sebastian in which the allies lost thirteen hundred soldiers and -seamen, exclusive of Spaniards during Mendizabal’s blockade. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -The battle of Vittoria was fought on the 21st of June. - -[Sidenote: 1813. July.] - -The 1st of July marshal Soult, under a decree issued at Dresden, -succeeded Joseph as lieutenant to the emperor, who thus shewed how -little his mind had been affected by his brother’s accusations. - -The 12th, Soult, travelling with surprising expedition, assumed -the command of the armies of the “_north_,” the “_centre_” and the -“_south_” now reorganised in one body, called “_the army of Spain_.” -And he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside if necessary, -but that monarch voluntarily retired from the army. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -At this period general Paris remained at Jaca, as belonging to -Suchet’s command, but Clauzel had entered France, and the “_army of -Spain_,” reinforced from the interior, was composed of nine divisions -of infantry, a reserve, and two regular divisions of cavalry besides -the light horsemen attached to the infantry. Following the imperial -muster-rolls this army, including the garrisons and thirteen German -Italian and Spanish battalions not belonging to the organisation, -amounted to one hundred and fourteen thousand men; and as the armies -of Catalonia and of Aragon numbered at the same period above -sixty-six thousand, the whole force still employed against Spain -exceeded one hundred and eighty thousand men with twenty thousand -horses; and of this number one hundred and fifty-six thousand were -present under arms, while in Germany and Poland above seven hundred -thousand French soldiers were in activity. - -Such great forces, guided by Napoleon, seemed sufficient to defy the -world, but moral power which he has himself described as constituting -three-fourths of military strength, that power which puny essayists -declaiming for their hour against the genius of warriors, are unable -to comprehend although by far the most important part of the art -which they decry, was wanting. One half of this force, organized -in peace and setting forth in hope at the beginning of a war, -would have enabled Napoleon to conquer; but now, near the close -of a terrible struggle, with a declining fate and the national -confidence in his fortune and genius shaken, although that genius -was never more surpassingly displayed, his military power was a -vast but unsound machine. The public mind was bewildered by the -intricacy and greatness of combinations the full scope of which he -alone could see clearly, and generals and ministers doubted and -feared when they should have supported him, neglecting their duty or -coldly executing his orders when their zeal should have redoubled. -The unity of impulse so essential to success was thus lost, and his -numerous armies carried not with them proportionate strength. To have -struggled with hope under such astounding difficulties was scarcely -to be expected from the greatest minds, but like the emperor, to -calculate and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness and -accuracy, to seize every favourable chance with unerring rapidity, -to sustain every reverse with undisturbed constancy, never urged to -rashness by despair yet enterprizing to the utmost verge of daring -consistent with reason, was a display of intellectual greatness so -surpassing, that it is not without justice Napoleon has been called, -in reference as well to past ages as to the present, the foremost of -mankind. - -The suddenness, as well as the completeness, of the destruction -caused by the snows of Russia, had shattered the emperor’s military -and political system, and the broken parts of the former, scattered -widely, were useless until he could again bind them together. To -effect this he rushed with a raw army into the midst of Germany, for -his hope was to obtain by celerity a rallying point for his veterans, -who having survived the Russian winter and the succeeding pestilence -were widely dispersed. His first effort was successful, but without -good cavalry victory cannot be pushed far, and the practised horsemen -of France had nearly disappeared; their successors badly mounted -and less skilful were too few and too weak, and thus extraordinary -exertion was required from soldiers, whose youth and inexperience -rendered them unfit even for the ordinary hardships of war. - -The measure of value for Wellington’s campaign is thus attained, for -if Joseph had opposed him with only moderate ability and had avoided -a great battle, not less than fifty thousand veterans could have -been drawn off to reinforce and give stability to the young soldiers -in Germany. On the side of Spain those veterans were indeed still -numerous, but the spirit of the French people behind them almost -worn out by victory, was now abashed by defeat, and even the military -men who had acquired grandeur and riches beyond their hopes, were -with few exceptions averse to further toil. Napoleon’s astonishing -firmness of mind was understood by few in high stations, shared by -fewer; and many were the traitors to him and to France and to the -glories of both. However his power was still enormous, and wherever -he led in person his brave and faithful soldiers, fighting with the -true instinct of patriotism, conquered. Where he was not their iron -hardihood abated. - -Marshal Soult was one of the few men whose indefatigable energy -rendered them worthy lieutenants of the emperor; and with singular -zeal, vigour and ability he now served. His troops, nominally above -one hundred thousand men ninety-seven thousand being present under -arms with eighty-six pieces of artillery, were not all available -for field operations. The garrisons of Pampeluna, San Sebastian, -Santona, and Bayonne, together with the foreign battalions, absorbed -seventeen thousand; and most of the latter had orders to regain their -own countries with a view to form the new levies. The permanent -“_army of Spain_” furnished therefore only seventy-seven thousand -five hundred men present under arms, seven thousand of which were -cavalry, and its condition was not satisfactory. The people on the -frontier were flying from the allies, the military administration was -disorganized, and the recent disasters had discouraged the soldiers -and deteriorated their discipline. Under these circumstances Soult -was desirous of some delay to secure his base and restore order ere -he attempted to regain the offensive, but his instructions on that -point were imperative. - -Napoleon’s system was perfectly adapted for great efforts, civil -or military; but so rapid had been lord Wellington’s advance from -Portugal, so decisive his operations that the resources of France -were in a certain degree paralyzed, and the army still reeled and -rocked from the blows it had received. Bayonne, a fortress of no -great strength in itself, had been entirely neglected, and the -arming and provisioning that and other places was indispensible. -The restoration of an entrenched camp originally traced by Vauban -to cover Bayonne followed, and the enforcement of discipline, -the removal of the immense train of Spanish families, civil -administrators, and other wasteful followers of Joseph’s court, the -arrangement of a general system for supply of money and provisions, -aided by judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities and -excite the national spirit, were amongst the first indications that -a great commander was in the field. The soldiers’ confidence soon -revived and some leading merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded the -general; but the people of the south were generally more inclined to -avoid the burthen of defending their country than to answer appeals -to their patriotism. - -On the 14th Soult examined the line of military positions, and -ordered Reille, who then occupied the passes of Vera and Echallar, -to prepare pontoons for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at -Biriatou. That general as we have seen was driven from those passes -the next day, but he prepared his bridges; and such was Soult’s -activity that on the 16th all the combinations for a gigantic -offensive movement were digested, the means of executing it rapidly -advancing, and orders were issued for the preliminary dispositions. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -At this time the French army was divided into three corps of battle, -and a reserve. Clauzel commanding the left wing was at St. Jean Pied -de Port and in communication, by the French frontier, with general -Paris at Jaca. Drouet, count D’Erlon, commanding the centre, occupied -the heights near Espelette and Ainhoa, with an advanced guard behind -Urdax. General Reille commanding the right wing was in position on -the mountains overlooking Vera from the side of France. The reserve -under Villatte, comprising a separate body of light horsemen and the -foreign battalions, guarded the banks of the Bidassoa from the mouth -upwards to Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed. The -division of heavy cavalry under Trielhard, and that of light cavalry -under Pierre Soult, the Marshal’s brother, were on the banks of the -Nive and the Adour. - -The counter-disposition of the allies was as follows. - -Byng’s brigade of British infantry, detached from the second division -and reinforced by Morillo’s Spaniards, was on the extreme right. -These troops had early in June driven the French from the village -of Valcarlos in the valley of that name, and had foraged the French -territory, but finding no good permanent position, retreated again to -the rocks in front of the passes of Roncesvalles and Ibañeta. - -On the left of Byng, Campbell’s brigade detached from Hamilton’s -Portuguese division, was posted in the Alduides and supported by -general Cole, who was with the fourth division at Viscayret in the -valley of Urroz. - -On the left of Campbell general Hill defended the Bastan with the -remainder of the second division, and with Hamilton’s Portuguese, -now commanded by Sylveira, Conde D’Amarante. Picton, with the third -division, was stationed at Olague as a reserve to those troops and to -Cole. - -On the left of Hill the seventh and light divisions occupied a chain -of mountains running by Echallar to Vera, and behind them at the town -of San Estevan was posted the sixth division. - -Longa’s Spaniards continued the line of defence from Vera to general -Giron’s position, which extending along the mountains bordering the -Bidassoa to the sea, crossed the great road of Irun. Behind Giron was -the besieging army under sir Thomas Graham. - -Thirty-six pieces of field artillery, and some regiments of British -and Portuguese cavalry, were with the right wing and centre, but the -bulk of the horsemen and the heavy guns were behind the mountains, -chiefly about Tafalla. The great hospitals were in Vittoria, the -commissariat depôts were principally on the coast, and to supply the -troops in the mountains was exceedingly difficult and onerous. - -Henry O’Donnel, Conde de la Bispal, blockaded Pampeluna with the -Andalusian army of reserve, and Carlos D’España’s division was on the -march to join him. Mina, Julian Sanchez, Duran, Empecinado, Goyan and -some smaller bands, were on the side of Zaragoza and Daroca, cutting -the communication between Soult and Suchet, and the latter, thinking -Aragon lost, was, as we have seen, falling back upon Catalonia. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, 7.] - -[Sidenote: Notes by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.] - -The whole force under lord Wellington’s immediate command, that is -to say in Navarre and Guipuscoa, was certainly above one hundred -thousand men, of which the Anglo-Portuguese furnished fifty-seven -thousand present under arms, seven thousand being cavalry; but the -Spanish regulars under Giron, Labispal and Carlos D’España, including -Longa’s division and some of Mendizabal’s army, scarcely amounted -to twenty-five thousand. According to the respective muster-rolls, -the troops in line actually under arms and facing each other, were, -of the allies, about eighty-two thousand, of the French about -seventy-eight thousand; but as the rolls of the latter include every -man and officer of all arms belonging to the organization, and the -British and Portuguese rolls so quoted, would furnish between ten -and twelve thousand additional combatants, the French force must be -reduced, or the allies augmented in that proportion. This surplus -was however now compensated by the foreign battalions temporarily -attached to Soult’s army, and by the numerous national guards, all -mountaineers, fierce warlike and very useful as guides. In other -respects lord Wellington stood at a disadvantage. - -The theatre of operations was a trapezoid, with sides from forty to -sixty miles in length, and having Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, -St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, all fortresses, in possession of the -French at the angles. The interior, broken and tormented by dreadful -mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep water-courses, precipices and -forests, would at first sight appear a wilderness which no military -combinations could embrace, and susceptible only of irregular and -partizan operations. But the great spinal ridge of the Pyrenees -furnishes a clue to the labyrinth of hills and valleys. Running -diagonally across the quadrilateral, it separated Bayonne St. Jean -Pied de Port and San Sebastian from Pampeluna, and thus the portion -of the allied army which more especially belonged to the blockade -of Pampeluna, was in a manner cut off from that which belonged to -the siege of San Sebastian. They were distinct armies, each having -its particular object, and the only direct communication between -them was the great road running behind the mountains from Toloza, by -Irurzun, to Pampeluna. The centre of the allies was indeed an army -of succour and connection, but of necessity very much scattered, and -with lateral communications so few, difficult and indirect as to -prevent any unity of movement; nor could general Hill’s corps move -at all until an attack was decidedly pronounced against one of the -extremities, lest the most direct gun-road to Pampeluna which it -covered should be unwarily opened to the enemy. In short the French -general, taking the offensive, could by beaten roads concentrate -against any part of the English general’s line, which, necessarily -a passively defensive one, followed an irregular trace of more than -fifty miles of mountains. - -Wellington having his battering train and stores about San -Sebastian, which was also nearer and more accessible to the enemy -than Pampeluna, made his army lean towards that side. His left -wing, including the army of siege, was twenty-one thousand strong -with singularly strong positions of defence, and the centre, about -twenty-four thousand strong, could in two marches unite with the left -wing to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of an enemy advancing -by the high road of Irun; but three days or more were required by -those troops to concentrate for the security of the blockade on the -right. Soult however judged that no decisive result would attend a -direct movement upon San Sebastian; because Guipuscoa was exhausted -of provisions, and the centre of the allies could fall on his flank -before he reached Ernani, which, his attack in front failing, would -place him in a dangerous position. Moreover by means of his sea -communication he knew that San Sebastian was not in extremity; but he -had no communication with Pampeluna and feared its fall. Wherefore he -resolved to operate by his left. - -Profiting by the roads leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, and covering -his movement by the Nivelle and Nive rivers and by the positions of -his centre, he hoped to gather on Wellington’s right quicker than -that general could gather to oppose him, and thus compensating by -numbers the disadvantage of assailing mountain positions force a way -to Pampeluna. That fortress once succoured, he designed to seize the -road of Irurzun, and keeping in mass either fall upon the separated -divisions of the centre in detail as they descended from the hills, -or operate on the rear of the force besieging San Sebastian, while -a corps of observation, which he proposed to leave on the Lower -Bidassoa, menaced it in front and followed it in retreat. The siege -of San Sebastian, the blockade of Pampeluna and probably that of -Santona, would be thus raised, and the French army united in an -abundant country, and its communication with Suchet secured, would -be free either to co-operate with that marshal or to press its own -attack. - -In this view, and to mislead lord Wellington by vexing his right -simultaneously with the construction of the bridges against his -left, Soult wrote to general Paris, desiring him to march when time -suited from Jaca by the higher valleys towards Aviz or Sanguessa, -to drive the partizans from that side and join the left of the army -when it should have reached Pampeluna. Meanwhile Clauzel was directed -to repair the roads in his own front, to push the heads of his -columns towards the passes of Roncesvalles, and by sending a strong -detachment into the Val de Baygorry, towards the lateral pass of -Yspegui, to menace Hill’s flank which was at that pass, and the front -of Campbell’s brigade in the Alduides. - -On the 20th Reille’s troops on the heights above Vera and Sarre, -being cautiously relieved by Villatte, marched through Cambo towards -St. Jean Pied de Port. They were to reach the latter early on the -22d, and on that day also the two divisions of cavalry and the park -of artillery were to be concentrated at the same place. D’Erlon with -the centre meanwhile still held his positions at Espelette, Ainhoüe -or Ainhoa, and Urdax, thus covering and masking the great movements -taking place behind. - -Villatte who including the foreign battalions had eighteen thousand -troops on the rolls, furnishing about fifteen thousand sabres and -bayonets, remained in observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened -by superior forces he was to retire slowly and in mass upon the -entrenched camp commenced at Bayonne, yet halting successively on -the positions of Bordegain in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the -heights of Bidart in rear of that town. He was especially directed -to shew only French troops at the advanced posts, and if the -assailants made a point with a small corps, to drive them vigorously -over the Bidassoa again. But if the allies should in consequence -of Soult’s operations against their right retire, Villatte was to -relieve San Sebastian and to follow them briskly by Tolosa. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -Rapidity was of vital importance to the French general, but heavy -and continued rains swelled the streams, and ruined the roads in -the deep country between Bayonne and the hills; the head-quarters, -which should have arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port on the 20th, -only reached Olhonce, a few miles short of that place, the 21st; -and Reille’s troops unable to make way at all by Cambo took the -longer road of Bayonne. The cavalry was retarded in like manner, -and the whole army, men and horses, were worn down by the severity -of the marches. Two days were thus lost, but on the 24th more than -sixty thousand fighting men including cavalry national guards and -gensd’armes, with sixty-six pieces of artillery, were assembled to -force the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya. The main road leading to -the former was repaired, three hundred sets of bullocks were provided -to draw the guns up the mountain, and the national guards of the -frontier on the left were ordered to assemble in the night on the -heights of Yropil, to be reinforced on the morning of the 25th by -detachments of regular troops with a view to vex and turn the right -of the allies which extended to the foundry of Orbaiceta. - -Such were Soult’s first dispositions, but as mountain warfare is -complicated in the extreme, it will be well to consider more in -detail the relative positions and objects of the hostile forces and -the nature of the country. - -It has been already stated that the great spine of the hills, -trending westward, run diagonally across the theatre of operations. -From this spine huge ridges shot out on either hand, and the -communications between the valleys thus formed on both sides of -the main chain passed over certain comparatively low places called -“_cols_” by the French, and _puertos_ by the Spaniards. The Bastan, -the Val Carlos, and the Val de Baygorry the upper part of which is -divided into the Alduides and the Val de Ayra, were on the French -side of the great chain; on the Spanish side were the valleys of -Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, the valley of Iscua or Roncesvalles, the valley -of Urros, the Val de Zubiri, and the valley of Lanz, the two latter -leading down directly upon Pampeluna which stands within two miles -of the junction of their waters. Such being the relative situations -of the valleys, the disposition, and force, of the armies, shall now -be traced from left to right of the French, and from right to left -of the allies. But first it must be observed that the main chain, -throwing as it were a shoulder forward from Roncesvalles towards -St. Jean Pied de Port, placed the entrance to the Spanish valley of -Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, in the power of Soult, who could thus by Yropil -turn the extreme right of his adversary with detachments, although -not with an army. - -_Val Carlos._—Two issues led from this valley over the main chain, -namely the Ibañeta and Mendichuri passes; and there was also the -lateral pass of Atalosti leading into the Alduides, all comprised -within a space of two or three miles. - -The high road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Pampeluna, ascending -the left-hand ridge or boundary of Val Carlos, runs along the crest -until it joins the superior chain of mountains, and then along the -summit of that also until it reaches the pass of Ibañeta, whence it -descends to Roncesvalles. Ibañeta may therefore be called the Spanish -end of the pass; but it is also a pass in itself, because a narrow -road, leading through Arnegui and the village of Val Carlos, ascends -directly to Ibañeta and falls into the main road behind it. - -Clauzel’s three divisions of infantry, all the artillery and the -cavalry were formed in two columns in front of St. Jean Pied de -Port. The head of one was placed on some heights above Arnegui about -two miles from the village of Val Carlos; the head of the other at -the Venta de Orrisson, on the main road and within two miles of the -remarkable rocks of Chateau Piñon, a little beyond which one narrow -way descended on the right to the village of Val Carlos, and another -on the left to the foundry of Orbaiceta. - -On the right-hand boundary of Val Carlos, near the rock of Ayrola, -Reille’s divisions were concentrated, with orders to ascend that rock -at daylight, and march by the crest of the ridge towards a culminant -point of the great chain called the Lindouz, which gained, Reille -was to push detachments through the passes of Ibañeta and Mendichuri -to the villages of Roncesvalles and Espinal. He was, at the same -time, to seize the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga immediately on -his right, and even approach the more distant passes of Renecabal -and Bellate, thus closing the issues from the Alduides, and menacing -those from the Bastan. - -[Sidenote: Plan, No. 2.] - -_Val de Ayra._ _The Alduides._ _Val de Baygorry._ The ridge of -Ayrola, at the foot of which Reille’s troops were posted, separates -Val Carlos from these valleys which must be designated by the general -name of the Alduides for the upper part, and the Val de Baygorry for -the lower. The issues from the Alduides over the great chain towards -Spain were the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga; and there was also a -road running from the village of Alduides through the Atalosti pass -to Ibañeta a distance of eight miles, by which general Campbell’s -brigade communicated with and could join Byng and Morillo. - -_Bastan._ This district, including the valley of Lerins and the Cinco -Villas, is separated from the Alduides and Val de Baygorry by the -lofty mountain of La Houssa, on which the national guards of the Val -de Baygorry and the Alduides were ordered to assemble on the night -of the 24th, and to light fires so as to make it appear a great body -was menacing the Bastan by that flank. The Bastan however does not -belong to the same geographical system as the other valleys. Instead -of opening to the French territory it is entirely enclosed with high -mountains, and while the waters of the Val Carlos, the Alduides, and -Val de Baygorry run off northward by the Nive, those of the Bastan -run off westward by the Bidassoa, from which they are separated by -the Mandale, Commissari, La Rhune, Santa Barbara, Ivantelly, Atchiola -and other mountains. - -The entrances to the Bastan with reference to the position of the -French army, were by the passes of Vera and Echallar on its right; -by the Col de Maya and Arietta passes in the centre; and on the left -by the lateral passes of Yspegui, Lorrieta, and Berderez, which -lead from the Val de Baygorry and the Alduides. The issues over -the principal chain of the Pyrenees in the direct line from the -Maya entrances, were the passes of Renecabal and Bellate; the first -leading into the valley of Zubiri, the second into the valley of -Lanz. There was also the pass of Artesiaga leading into the Val de -Zubiri, but it was nearly impracticable, and all the roads through -the Bastan were crossed by strong positions dangerous to assail. - -The Col de Maya comprised several passages in a space of four miles, -all of which were menaced by D’Erlon from Espelete and Urdax; and -he had twenty-one thousand men, furnishing about eighteen thousand -bayonets. His communications with Soult were maintained by cavalry -posts through the Val de Baygorry, and his orders were to attack the -allies when the combinations in the Val Carlos and on the Houssa -mountain should cause them to abandon the passes at Maya; but he -was especially directed to operate by his left, so as to secure the -passes leading towards Reille with a view to the concentration of the -whole army. Thus if Hill retreated by the pass of Bellate D’Erlon was -to move by Berderez and the Alduides; but if Hill retired upon San -Estevan D’Erlon was to move by the pass of Bellate. Such being the -dispositions of the French general, those of the allies shall now be -traced. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Morning States.] - -General Byng and Morillo guarded the passes in front of Roncesvalles. -Their combined force consisted of sixteen hundred British and from -three to four thousand Spaniards. Byng’s brigade and two Spanish -battalions occupied the rocks of Altobiscar on the high road facing -Chateau Piñon; one Spanish battalion was at the foundry in the -valley of Orbaiceta on their right; Morillo with the remainder of -the Spaniards occupied the heights of Iroulepe, on the left of the -road leading to the village of Val Carlos and overlooking the nearest -houses of that straggling place. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Morning States.] - -These positions, distant only four and five miles from the French -columns assembled at Venta de Orrisson and Arnegui, were insecure. -The ground was indeed steep and difficult of access but too -extensive; moreover, although the passes led into the Roncesvalles -that valley did not lead direct to Pampeluna; the high road after -descending a few miles turned to the right, and crossing two ridges -and the intervening valley of Urros entered the valley of Zubiri, -down which it was conducted to Pampeluna: wherefore after passing -Ibañeta in retreat the allied troops could not avoid lending their -right flank to Reille’s divisions as far as Viscayret in the valley -of Urroz. It was partly to obviate this danger, partly to support -O’Donnel while Clauzel’s force was in the vicinity of Jaca, that the -fourth division, about six thousand strong, occupied Viscayret, six -miles from the pass of Ibañeta, ten miles from Morillo’s position, -and twelve miles from Byng’s position. But when Clauzel retired to -France, general Cole was directed to observe the roads leading over -the main chain from the Alduides district, and to form a rallying -point and reserve for Campbell, Byng, and Morillo, his instructions -being to maintain the Roncesvalles passes against a front attack, but -not to commit his troops in a desperate battle if the flanks were -insecure. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -On the left of Byng and Morillo, Campbell’s Portuguese, about two -thousand strong, were encamped above the village of Alduides on a -mountain called Mizpira. They observed the national guards of the -Val de Baygorry, preserved the communication between Byng and Hill, -and in some measure covered the right flank of the latter. From -the Alduides Campbell could retreat through the pass of Sahorgain -upon Viscayret in the valley of Urroz, and through the passes of -Urtiaga and Renacabal upon Eugui in the Val de Zubiri; finally by the -lateral pass of Atalosti he could join Byng and the fourth division. -The communication between all these posts was maintained by Long’s -cavalry. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s States.] - -Continuing the line of positions to the left, general Hill occupied -the Bastan with the second British division, Sylveira’s Portuguese, -and some squadrons of horse, but Byng’s and Campbell’s brigades being -detached, he had not more than nine thousand sabres and bayonets. -His two British brigades under general William Stewart guarded the -Col de Maya; Sylveira’s Portuguese were at Erazu, on the right of -Stewart, observing the passes of Arrieta, Yspegui and Elliorita; of -which the two former were occupied by Major Brotherton’s cavalry -and by the sixth Caçadores. The direct line of retreat and point of -concentration for all these troops was Elizondo. - -From Elizondo the route of Pampeluna over the great chain was by -the pass of Bellate and the valley of Lanz. The latter running -nearly parallel with the valley of Zubiri is separated from it by -a wooded and rugged ridge, and between them there were but three -communications: the one high up, leading from Lanz to Eugui, and -prolonged from thence to Viscayret in the valley of Urros; the other -two lower down, leading from Ostiz and Olague to the village of -Zubiri. At Olague the third division, furnishing four thousand three -hundred bayonets under Picton, was posted ready to support Cole or -Hill as occasion required. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Morning States.] - -Continuing the front line from the left of Stewart’s position at -the Col de Maya, the trace run along the mountains forming the -French boundary of the Bastan. It comprized the passes of Echallar -and Vera, guarded by the seventh division under lord Dalhousie, -and by the light division under general Charles Alten. The former -furnishing four thousand seven hundred bayonets communicated with -general Stewart by a narrow road over the Atchiola mountain, and the -eighty-second regiment was encamped at its junction with the Elizondo -road, about three miles behind the pass of Maya. The light division, -four thousand strong, was at Vera, guarding the roads which led -behind the mountains through Sumbilla and San Estevan to Elizondo. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -These two divisions being only observed by the left wing of -Villatte’s reserve were available for the succour of either wing, -and behind them, at the town of San Estevan, was the sixth division -of six thousand bayonets, now under general Pack. Placed at equal -distances from Vera and Maya, having free communication with both -and a direct line of march to Pampeluna over the main chain of the -Pyrenees by the _Puerto de Arraiz_, sometimes called the pass of -_Doña Maria_, this division was available for any object and could -not have been better posted. - -Around Pampeluna, the point to which all the lines of march -converged, the Spanish troops under O’Donnel maintained the blockade, -and they were afterwards joined by Carlos D’España’s division at -a very critical moment. Thus reinforced they amounted to eleven -thousand, of which seven thousand could be brought into action -without abandoning the works of blockade. - -Head-quarters were at Lesaca, and the line of correspondence with -the left wing was over the Peña de Haya, that with the right wing by -San Estevan, Elizondo and the Alduides. The line of correspondence -between sir Thomas Graham and Pampeluna was by Goizueta and the high -road of Irurzun. - -As the French were almost in contact with the allies’ positions -at Roncesvalles, which was also the point of defence nearest to -Pampeluna, it followed that on the rapidity or slowness with which -Soult overcame resistance in that quarter depended his success; and a -comparative estimate of numbers and distances will give the measure -of his chances. - -Clauzel’s three divisions furnished about sixteen thousand bayonets, -besides the cavalry, the artillery, and the national guards menacing -the valley of Orbaiceta. Byng and Morillo were therefore with five -thousand infantry, to sustain the assault of sixteen thousand until -Cole could reinforce them; but Cole being twelve miles distant could -not come up in fighting order under four or five hours. And as -Reille’s divisions, of equal strength with Clauzel’s, could before -that time seize the Lindouz and turn the left, it was clear the -allied troops, although increased to eleven thousand by the junction -of the fourth division, must finally abandon their ground to seek a -new field of battle where the third division could join them from -the valley of Lanz, and Campbell’s brigade from the Alduides. Thus -raised to seventeen or eighteen thousand bayonets with some guns, -they might on strong ground oppose Clauzel and Reille’s thirty -thousand; but as Picton’s position at Olague was more than a day’s -march from Byng’s position at Altobiscar, their junction could -only be made in the valley of the Zubiri and not very distant from -Pampeluna. And when seven thousand Spaniards from the blockade, and -two or three thousand cavalry from the side of the Ebro are added, we -have the full measure of the allies’ strength in this quarter. - -General Hill, menaced by D’Erlon with a very superior force, and -having the pass of Maya, half a day’s march further from Pampeluna -than the passes of Roncesvalles, to defend, could not give ready -help. If he retreated rapidly D’Erlon could follow as rapidly, and -though Picton and Cole would thus be reinforced with ten thousand -men Soult would gain eighteen thousand. Hill could not however move -until he knew that Byng and Cole were driven from the Roncesvalles -passes; in fine he could not avoid a dilemma. For if he maintained -the passes at Maya and affairs went wrong near Pampeluna, his own -situation would be imminently dangerous; if he maintained Irrueta, -his next position, the same danger was to be dreaded; and the passes -of Maya once abandoned, D’Erlon, moving by his own left towards the -Alduides, could join Soult in the valley of Zubiri before Hill could -join Cole and Picton by the valley of Lanz. But if Hill did not -maintain the position of Irrueta D’Erlon could follow and cut the -sixth and seventh divisions off from the valley of Lanz. The extent -and power of Soult’s combinations are thus evinced. Hill forced to -await orders and hampered by the operations of D’Erlon, required, -it might be three days to get into line near Pampeluna; but D’Erlon -after gaining Maya could in one day and a half, by the passes of -Berderez and Urtiaga, join Soult in the Val de Zubiri. Meanwhile -Byng, Morillo, Cole, Campbell, and Picton would be exposed to the -operations of double their own numbers; and however firm and able -individually those generals might be, they could not when suddenly -brought together be expected to seize the whole system of operations -and act with that decision and nicety of judgment which the occasion -demanded. It was clear therefore that Hill’s force must be in some -measure paralyzed at first, and finally thrown with the sixth, -seventh, and light divisions, upon an external line of operations -while the French moved upon internal lines. - -On the other hand it is also clear that the corps of Byng, Morillo, -Campbell, Cole, Picton, and Hill were only pieces of resistance on -Lord Wellington’s board, and that the sixth, seventh, and light -divisions were those with which he meant to win his game. There was -however a great difference in their value. The light division and the -seventh, especially the former, being at the greatest distance from -Pampeluna, having enemies close in front and certain points to guard, -were, the seventh division a day, the light division two days, behind -the sixth division, which was quite free to move at an instant’s -notice and was, the drag of D’Erlon’s corps considered, a day nearer -to Pampeluna than Hill. Wherefore upon the rapid handling of this -well-placed body the fate of the allies depended. If it arrived in -time, nearly thirty thousand infantry with sufficient cavalry and -artillery would be established, under the immediate command of the -general-in-chief, on a position of strength to check the enemy until -the rest of the army arrived. Where that position was and how the -troops were there gathered and fought shall now be shown. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. July.] - -[Sidenote: Plan 3.] - -_Combat of Roncesvalles._—On the 23d Soult issued an order of the day -remarkable for its force and frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the -leading events of the past campaign, he shewed that the disasters -sprung from the incapacity of the king, not from the weakness of the -soldiers whose military virtue he justly extolled, and whose haughty -courage he inflamed by allusions to former glories. He has been, by -writers who disgrace English literature with unfounded aspersions of -a courageous enemy, accused of unseemly boasting as to his ultimate -operations at this time, but the calumny is refuted by the following -passage from his dispatch to the minister at war. - -“_I shall move directly upon Pampeluna, and if I succeed in relieving -it I will operate towards my right to embarrass the enemy’s troops in -Guipuscoa, Biscay, and Alava, and to enable the reserve to join me, -which will relieve St. Sebastian and Santona. If this should happen I -will then consider what is to be done, either to push my own attack -or to help the army of Aragon, but to look so far ahead would now be -temerity._” - -It is true that conscious of superior abilities he did not suppress -the sentiment of his own worth as a commander, but he was too proud -to depreciate brave adversaries on the eve of battle. - -“_Let us not_,” he said, “_defraud the enemy of the praise which -is due to him. The dispositions of the general have been prompt, -skilful, and consecutive, the valour and steadiness of his troops -have been praiseworthy_.” - -Having thus stimulated the ardour of his troops he put himself at the -head of Clauzel’s divisions, and on the 25th at daylight led them up -against the rocks of Altobiscar. - -General Byng, warned the evening before that danger was near, and -jealous of some hostile indications towards the village of Val -Carlos, had sent the fifty-seventh regiment down there but kept the -rest of his men well in hand and gave notice to general Cole who -had made a new disposition of his troops. Ross’s brigade was now at -Espinal two miles in advance of Viscayret, six miles from the pass -of Ibañeta, and eleven from Byng’s position, but somewhat nearer to -Morillo. Anson’s brigade was close behind Ross, Stubbs’ Portuguese -behind Anson, and the artillery was at Linzoain. - -Such was the exact state of affairs when Soult, throwing out a -multitude of skirmishers and pushing forward his supporting columns -and guns as fast as the steepness of the road and difficult nature -of the ground would permit, endeavoured to force Byng’s position; -but the British general, undismayed at the multitude of assailants, -fought strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and their -rolling musketry pealed in vain for hours along that cloudy field of -battle elevated five thousand feet above the level of the plains. -Their numbers however continually increased in front, and the -national guards from Yropil, reinforced by Clauzel’s detachments, -skirmished with the Spanish battalions at the foundry of Orbaiceta -and threatened to turn the right. The Val Carlos was at the same time -menaced from Arnegui, and Reille’s divisions ascending the rock of -Airola turned Morillo’s left. - -About mid-day general Cole arrived at Altobiscar, but his brigades -were still distant, and the French renewing their attack neglected -the Val Carlos to gather more thickly on the front of Byng. He -resisted all their efforts, but Reille made progress along the -summit of the Airola ridge. Morillo then fell back towards Ibañeta, -and the French were already nearer to that pass than the troops -at Altobiscar were, when Ross’s brigade, coming up the pass of -Mendichuri, suddenly appeared on the Lindouz, at the instant when the -head of Reille’s column being close to Atalosti was upon the point -of cutting the communication with Campbell. This officer’s picquets -had been attacked early in the morning by the national guards of the -Val de Baygorry, but he soon discovered that it was only a feint -and therefore moved by his right towards Atalosti when he heard -the firing on that side. His march was secured by the Val d’Ayra -which separated him from the ridge of Airola along which Reille was -advancing, but noting that general’s strength, and at the same time -seeing Ross’s brigade labouring up the steep ridge of Mendichuri, -Campbell judged that the latter was ignorant of what was going on -above. Wherefore sending advice of the enemy’s proximity and strength -to Cole, he offered to pass the Atalosti and join in the battle if he -could be furnished with transport for his sick, and provisions on -the new line of operations. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3.] - -Before this message could reach Cole, the head of Ross’s column, -composed of a wing of the twentieth regiment and a company of -Brunswickers, was on the summit of the Lindouz, where most -unexpectedly it encountered Reille’s advanced guard. The moment was -critical, but Ross an eager hardy soldier called aloud to charge, -and captain Tovey of the twentieth running forward with his company -crossed a slight wooded hollow and full against the front of the -sixth French light infantry dashed with the bayonet. Brave men fell -by that weapon on both sides, but numbers prevailing these daring -soldiers were pushed back again by the French, Ross however gained -his object, the remainder of his brigade had come up and the pass of -Atalosti was secured, yet with a loss of one hundred and forty men of -the twentieth regiment and forty-one of the Brunswickers. - -Previous to this vigorous action general Cole seeing the French in -the Val Carlos and in the valley of Orbaiceta, that is to say on both -flanks of Byng whose front was not the less pressed, had ordered -Anson to reinforce the Spaniards at the foundry, and Stubbs to enter -the Val Carlos in support of the fifty-seventh. He now recalled Anson -to assist in defence of the Lindouz, and learning from Campbell how -strong Reille was, caused Byng, with a view to a final retreat, to -relinquish his advanced position at Altobiscar and take a second -nearer the Ibañeta. This movement uncovered the road leading down to -the foundry of Orbaiceta, but it concentrated all the troops, and -at the same time general Campbell, although he could not enter the -line of battle, because Cole was unable to supply his demands, made -so skilful a display of his Portuguese as to impress Reille with the -notion that their numbers were considerable. - -During these movements the skirmishing of the light troops continued, -but a thick fog coming up the valley prevented Soult from making -dispositions for a general attack with his six divisions, and when -night fell general Cole still held the great chain of the mountains -with a loss of only three hundred and eighty men killed and wounded. -His right was however turned by Orbaiceta, he had but ten or eleven -thousand bayonets to oppose to thirty thousand, and his line of -retreat being for four or five miles down hill and flanked all the -way by the Lindouz, was uneasy and unfavourable. Wherefore putting -the troops silently in march after dark, he threaded the passes -and gained the valley of Urros. His rear-guard composed of Anson’s -brigade followed in the morning, general Campbell retired from the -Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga to Eugui in the valley of Zubiri, -and the Spanish battalion retreating from the foundry of Orbaiceta -by the narrow way of Navala rejoined Morillo near Espinal. The great -chain was thus abandoned, but the result of the day’s operation was -unsatisfactory to the French general; he acknowledged a loss of four -hundred men, he had not gained ten miles, and from the passes now -abandoned, to Pampeluna, the distance was not less than twenty-two -miles, with strong defensive positions in the way where increasing -numbers of intrepid enemies were to be expected. - -[Sidenote: Pellot, Mémoires des Campagnes des Pyrennées.] - -Soult’s combinations, contrived for greater success, had been -thwarted, partly by fortune, partly by errors of execution the like -of which all generals must expect, and the most experienced are the -most resigned as knowing them to be inevitable. The interference -of fortune was felt in the fog which rose at the moment when he -was ready to thrust forward his heavy masses of troops entire. The -failure in execution was Reille’s tardy movement. His orders were to -gain with all expedition the Lindouz, that is to say the knot tying -the heads of the Alduides, the Val Carlos, the Roncesvalles, and -the valley of Urroz. From that position he would have commanded the -Mendichuri, Atalosti, Ibañeta and Sahorgain passes, and by moving -along the crest of the hills could menace the Urtiaga, Renacabal, -and Bellate passes, thus endangering Campbell’s and Hill’s lines of -retreat. But when he should have ascended the rocks of Airola he -halted to incorporate two newly arrived conscript battalions and -to issue provisions, and the hours thus lost would have sufficed -to seize the Lindouz before general Ross got through the pass of -Mendichuri. The fog would still have stopped the spread of the French -columns to the extent designed by Soult, but fifteen or sixteen -thousand men, placed on the flank and rear of Byng and Morillo, would -have separated them from the fourth division, and forced the latter -to retreat beyond Viscayret. - -[Sidenote: Official Despatch to the Minister of war, MSS.] - -Soult however overrated the force opposed to him, supposing it -to consist of two British divisions, besides Byng’s brigade and -Morillo’s Spaniards. He was probably deceived by the wounded men, who -hastily questioned on the field would declare they belonged to the -second and fourth divisions, because Byng’s brigade was part of the -former; but that general and the Spaniards had without aid sustained -Soult’s first efforts, and even when the fourth division came up, -less than eleven thousand men, exclusive of sergeants and officers, -were present in the fight. Campbell’s Portuguese never entered the -line at all, the remainder of the second division was in the Bastan, -and the third division was at Olague in the valley of Lanz. - -On the 26th the French general put Clauzel’s wing on the track -of Cole, and ordered Reille to follow the crest of the mountains -and seize the passes leading from the Bastan in Hill’s rear while -D’Erlon pressed him in front. That general would thus, Soult hoped, -be crushed or thrown on the side of San Estevan; D’Erlon could then -reach his proper place in the valley of Zubiri, while the right -descended the valley of Lanz and prevented Picton quitting it to aid -Cole. A retreat by those generals and on separate lines would thus be -inevitable, and the French army could issue forth in a compact order -of battle from the mouths of the two valleys against Pampeluna. - - -COMBAT OF LINZOAIN. - -All the columns were in movement at day-break, but every hour brought -its obstacle. The fog still hung heavy on the mountain-tops, Reille’s -guides, bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the crests, and -at ten o’clock having no other resource he marched down the pass of -Mendichuri upon Espinal, and fell into the rear of the cavalry and -artillery following Clauzel’s divisions. Meanwhile Soult, although -retarded also by the fog and the difficulties of the ground, overtook -Cole’s rear-guard in front of Viscayret. The leading troops struck -hotly upon some British light companies incorporated under the -command of colonel Wilson of the forty-eighth, and a French squadron -passing round their flank fell on the rear; but Wilson facing about, -drove off these horsemen and thus fighting, Cole, about two o’clock, -reached the heights of Linzoain a mile beyond Viscayret, where -general Picton met him with intelligence that Campbell had reached -Eugui from the Alduides, and that the third division having crossed -the hills from Olague was at Zubiri. The junction of all these troops -was thus secured, the loss of the day was less than two hundred, and -neither wounded men nor baggage had been left behind. However the -French gathered in front and at four o’clock seized some heights on -the allies’ left which endangered their position, wherefore again -falling back a mile, Cole offered battle on the ridge separating the -valley of Urroz from that of Zubiri. During this skirmish Campbell -coming from Eugui shewed his Portuguese on the ridges above the right -flank of the French, but they were distant, Picton’s troops were -still at Zubiri, and there was light for an action. Soult however -disturbed with intelligence received from D’Erlon, and perhaps -doubtful what Campbell’s troops might be, put off the attack until -next morning, and after dark the junction of all the allies was -effected. - -[Sidenote: Edouard de LaPene Campagne 1813, 1814.] - -This delay on the part of the French general seems injudicious. Cole -was alone for five hours. Every action, by increasing the number of -wounded men and creating confusion in the rear, would have augmented -the difficulties of the retreat; and the troops were fatigued with -incessant fighting and marching for two days and one night. Moreover -the alteration of Reille’s march, occasioned by the fog, had reduced -the chances dependant on the primary combinations to the operations -of D’Erlon’s corps, but the evening reports brought the mortifying -conviction that he also had gone wrong, and by rough fighting only -could Soult now attain his object. It is said that his expressions -discovered a secret anticipation of failure, if so, his temper was -too stedfast to yield for he gave the signal to march the next day, -and more strongly renewed his orders to D’Erlon whose operations must -now be noticed. - -That general had three divisions of infantry, furnishing twenty-one -thousand men of which about eighteen thousand were combatants. Early -on the morning of the 25th he assembled two of them behind some -heights near the passes of Maya, having caused the national guards -of Baygorry to make previous demonstrations towards the passes of -Arriette, Yspeguy, and Lorietta. No change had been made in the -disposition of general Hill’s force, but general Stewart, deceived by -the movements of the national guards, looked towards Sylveira’s posts -on the right rather than to his own front; his division, consisting -of two British brigades, was consequently neither posted as it should -be nor otherwise prepared for an attack. The ground to be defended -was indeed very strong, but however rugged a mountain position may -be, if it is too extensive for the troops or those troops are not -disposed with judgment, the very inequalities constituting its -defensive strength become advantageous to an assailant. - -There were three passes to defend. Aretesque on the right, Lessessa -in the centre, Maya on the left, and from these entrances two ways -led to Elisondo in parallel directions; one down the valley through -the town of Maya, receiving in its course the Erazu road; the other -along the Atchiola mountain. General Pringle’s brigade was charged -to defend the Aretesque, and colonel Cameron’s brigade the Maya and -Lessessa passes. The Col itself was broad on the summit, about three -miles long, and on each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above -another; those on the right blending with the Goramendi mountains, -those on the left with the Atchiola, near the summit of which the -eighty-second regiment belonging to the seventh division was posted. - -Cameron’s brigade, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops -coming from Urdax; but at Aretesque a great round hill, one mile -in front, masked the movements of an enemy coming from Espelette. -This hill was not occupied at night, nor in the daytime save by some -Portuguese cavalry videttes, and the next guard was an infantry -piquet posted on that slope of the Col which fronted the great hill. -Behind this piquet of eighty men there was no immediate support, but -four light companies were encamped one mile down the reverse slope -which was more rugged and difficult of access than that towards the -enemy. The rest of general Pringle’s brigade was disposed at various -distances from two to three miles in the rear, and the signal for -assembling on the position was to be the fire of four Portuguese guns -from the rocks above the Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments -furnishing more than three thousand fighting men, half only were in -line of battle, and those chiefly massed on the left of a position, -wide open and of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side, and their -general, Stewart, quite deceived as to the real state of affairs, was -at Elisondo when about mid-day D’Erlon commenced the battle. - - -COMBAT OF MAYA. - -[Sidenote: Plan 3.] - -Captain Moyle Sherer, the officer commanding the picquet at the -Aretesque pass, was told by his predecessor, that at dawn a glimpse -had been obtained of cavalry and infantry in movement along the hills -in front, some peasants also announced the approach of the French, -and at nine o’clock major Thorne, a staff-officer, having patroled -round the great hill in front of the pass discovered sufficient to -make him order up the light companies to support the picquet. These -companies had just formed on the ridge with their left at the rock of -Aretesque, when D’Armagnac’s division coming from Espelette mounted -the great hill in front, Abbé followed, and general Maransin with a -third division advanced from Ainhoa and Urdax against the Maya pass, -meaning also to turn it by a narrow way leading up the Atchiola -mountain. - -D’Armagnac’s men pushed forwards at once in several columns, and -forced the picquet back with great loss upon the light companies, who -sustained his vehement assault with infinite difficulty. The alarm -guns were now heard from the Maya pass, and general Pringle hastened -to the front, but his regiments moving hurriedly from different -camps were necessarily brought into action one after the other. The -thirty-fourth came up first at a running pace, yet by companies not -in mass and breathless from the length and ruggedness of the ascent; -the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth followed, but not immediately -nor together, and meanwhile D’Armagnac, closely supported by -Abbé, with domineering numbers and valour combined, maugre the -desperate fighting of the picquet of the light companies and of the -thirty-fourth, had established his columns on the broad ridge of the -position. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3.] - -Colonel Cameron then sent the fiftieth from the left to the -assistance of the overmatched troops, and that fierce and formidable -old regiment charging the head of an advancing column drove it clear -out of the pass of Lessessa in the centre. Yet the French were so -many that, checked at one point, they assembled with increased -force at another; nor could general Pringle restore the battle -with the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments, which, cut off -from the others were though fighting desperately forced back to a -second and lower ridge crossing the main road to Elizondo. They were -followed by D’Armagnac, but Abbé continued to press the fiftieth -and thirty-fourth whose natural line of retreat was towards the -Atchiola road on the left, because the position trended backward -from Aretesque towards that point, and because Cameron’s brigade was -there. And that officer, still holding the pass of Maya with the left -wings of the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments, brought their -right wings and the Portuguese guns into action and thus maintained -the fight; but so dreadful was the slaughter, especially of the -ninety-second, that it is said the advancing enemy was actually -stopped by the heaped mass of dead and dying; and then the left wing -of that noble regiment coming down from the higher ground smote -wounded friends and exulting foes alike, as mingled together they -stood or crawled before its fire. - -It was in this state of affairs that general Stewart, returning -from Elizondo by the mountain road, reached the field of battle. -The passes of Lessessa and Aretesque were lost, that of Maya was -still held by the left wing of the seventy-first, but Stewart seeing -Maransin’s men gathered thickly on one side and Abbé’s men on the -other, abandoned it to take a new position on the first rocky -ridge covering the road over the Atchiola; and he called down the -eighty-second regiment from the highest part of that mountain and -sent messengers to demand further aid from the seventh division. -Meanwhile although wounded himself he made a strenuous resistance, -for he was a very gallant man; but during the retrograde movement, -Maransin no longer seeking to turn the position, suddenly thrust -the head of his division across the front of the British line and -connected his left with Abbé, throwing as he passed a destructive -fire into the wasted remnant of the ninety-second, which even then -sullenly gave way, for the men fell until two-thirds of the whole had -gone to the ground. Still the survivors fought, and the left wing of -the seventy-first came into action, but, one after the other all the -regiments were forced back, and the first position was lost together -with the Portuguese guns. - -[Sidenote: French official report, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: British official return.] - -Abbé’s division now followed D’Armagnac on the road to the town -of Maya, leaving Maransin to deal with Stewart’s new position, -and notwithstanding its extreme strength the French gained ground -until six o’clock, for the British, shrunk in numbers, also wanted -ammunition, and a part of the eighty-second under major Fitzgerald -were forced to roll down stones to defend the rocks on which they -were posted. In this desperate condition Stewart was upon the point -of abandoning the mountain entirely, when a brigade of the seventh -division, commanded by general Barnes, arrived from Echallar, and -that officer charging at the head of the sixth regiment drove the -French back to the Maya ridge. Stewart thus remained master of -the Atchiola, and the count D’Erlon who probably thought greater -reinforcements had come up, recalled his other divisions from the -Maya road and reunited his whole corps on the _Col_. He had lost -fifteen hundred men and a general; but he took four guns, and -fourteen hundred British soldiers were killed or wounded. - -[Sidenote: Southey.] - -[Sidenote: General Stewart’s Official Report.] - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Despatches.] - -Such was the fight of Maya, a disaster, yet one much exaggerated -by French writers, and by an English author misrepresented as a -surprise caused by the negligence of the cavalry. General Stewart -was surprised, his troops were not, and never did soldiers fight -better, seldom so well. The stern valour of the ninety-second, -principally composed of Irishmen, would have graced Thermopylæ. The -Portuguese cavalry patroles, if any went out which is uncertain, -might have neglected their duty, and doubtless the front should have -been scoured in a more military manner; but the infantry picquets, -and the light companies so happily ordered up by major Thorne, were -ready, and no man wondered to see the French columns crown the great -hill in front of the pass. Stewart expecting no attack at Maya, had -gone to Elisondo leaving orders for the soldiers to cook; from his -erroneous views therefore the misfortune sprung and from no other -source. Having deceived himself as to the true point of attack he did -not take proper military precautions on his own front; his position -was only half occupied, his troops brought into action wildly, and -finally he caused the loss of his guns by a misdirection as to the -road. General Stewart was a brave, energetic, zealous, indefatigable -man and of a magnanimous spirit, but he possessed neither the calm -reflective judgment nor the intuitive genius which belongs to -nature’s generals. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Despatch, MSS.] - -It is difficult to understand count D’Erlon’s operations. Why, when -he had carried the right of the position, did he follow two weak -regiments with two divisions, and leave only one division to attack -five regiments, posted on the strongest ground and having hopes of -succour from Echallar? Certainly if Abbé’s division had acted with -Maransin’s, Stewart who was so hardly pressed by the latter alone, -must have passed the road from Echallar in retreat before general -Barnes’s brigade arrived. On the other hand, Soult’s orders directed -D’Erlon to operate by his left, with the view of connecting the whole -army on the summit of the great chain of the Pyrenees. He should -therefore either have used his whole force to crush the troops on the -Atchiola before they could be succoured from Echallar; or, leaving -Maransin there, have marched by the Maya road upon Ariscun to cut -Sylveira’s line of retreat; instead of this he remained inactive upon -the Col de Maya for twenty hours after the battle! And general Hill -concentrating his whole force, now augmented by Barnes’s brigade, -would probably have fallen upon him from the commanding rocks of -Atchiola the next day, if intelligence of Cole’s retreat from the -Roncesvalles passes had not come through the Alduides. This rendered -the recovery of the Col de Maya useless, and Hill withdrawing all -his troops during the night, posted the British brigades which had -been engaged, together with one Portuguese brigade of infantry and a -Portuguese battery, on the heights in rear of Irueta, fifteen miles -from the scene of action. The other Portuguese brigade he left in -front of Elizondo, thus covering the road of San Estevan on his left, -that of Berderez on his right, and the pass of Vellate in his rear. - -Such was the commencement of Soult’s operations to restore the -fortunes of France. Three considerable actions fought on the same -day had each been favourable. At St. Sebastian the allies were -repulsed; at Roncesvalles they abandoned the passes; at Maya they -were defeated; but the decisive blow had not yet been struck. - -Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on his way back from St. -Sebastian, but with the false addition that D’Erlon was beaten. -As early as the 22d he had known that Soult was preparing a great -offensive movement, but the immovable attitude of the French centre, -the skilful disposition of their reserve which was twice as strong as -he at first supposed, together with the preparations made to throw -bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriatou, were all calculated to mislead -and did mislead him. - -Soult’s complicated combinations to bring D’Erlon’s divisions finally -into line on the crest of the great chain were impenetrable, and the -English general could not believe his adversary would throw himself -with only thirty thousand men into the valley of the Ebro unless -sure of aid from Suchet, and that general’s movements indicated -a determination to remain in Catalonia; moreover Wellington, in -contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna was not in extremity, and -before the failure of the assault thought that San Sebastian was. -Hence the operations against his right, their full extent not known, -appeared a feint, and he judged the real effort would be to throw -bridges over the Bidassoa and raise the siege of San Sebastian. -But in the night correct intelligence of the Maya and Roncesvalles -affairs arrived, Soult’s object was then scarcely doubtful, and sir -T. Graham was ordered to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark -his guns and stores, and hold all his spare troops in hand to join -Giron, on a position of battle marked out near the Bidassoa. General -Cotton was ordered to move the cavalry up to Pampeluna, and O’Donnel -was instructed to hold some of his Spanish troops ready to act in -advance. This done Wellington arranged his lines of correspondence -and proceeded to San Estevan, which he reached early in the morning. - -[Sidenote: Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.] - -While the embarkation of the guns and stores was going on it was -essential to hold the posts at Vera and Echallar, because D’Erlon’s -object was not pronounced, and an enemy in possession of those places -could approach San Sebastian by the roads leading over the Pena de -Haya, a rocky mountain behind Lesaca, or by the defiles of Zubietta -leading round that mountain from the valley of Lerins. Wherefore in -passing through Estevan on the morning of the 26th, Wellington merely -directed general Pack to guard the bridges over the Bidassoa. But -when he reached Irueta, saw the reduced state of Stewart’s division, -and heard that Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all the -troops within his power upon Pampeluna; and to prevent mistakes -indicated the valley of Lanz as the general line of movement. Of -Picton’s exact position or of his intentions nothing positive was -known, but supposing him to have joined Cole at Linzoain, as indeed -he had, Wellington judged that their combined forces would be -sufficient to check the enemy until assistance could reach them from -the centre or from Pampeluna, and he so advised Picton on the evening -of the 26th. - -In consequence of these orders the seventh division abandoned -Echallar in the night of the 26th, the sixth division quitted San -Estevan at daylight on the 27th, and general Hill concentrating his -own troops and Barnes’s brigade on the heights of Irueta, halted -until the evening of the 27th but marched during the night through -the pass of Vellate upon the town of Lanz. Meanwhile the light -division quitting Vera also on the 27th retired by Lesaca to the -summit of the Santa Cruz mountain, overlooking the valley of Lerins, -and there halted, apparently to cover the pass of Zubieta until -Longa’s Spaniards should take post to block the roads leading over -the Pena de Haya and protect the embarkation of the guns on that -flank. That object being effected it was to thread the passes and -descend upon Lecumberri on the great road of Irurzun, thus securing -sir Thomas Graham’s communication with the army round Pampeluna. -These various movements spread fear and confusion far and wide. All -the narrow valleys and roads were crowded with baggage, commissariat -stores, artillery and fugitive families; reports of the most alarming -nature were as usual rife; each division, ignorant of what had really -happened to the other, dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes -related might be true; none knew what to expect or where they were -to meet the enemy, and one universal hubbub filled the wild regions -through which the French army was now working its fiery path towards -Pampeluna. - -D’Erlon’s inactivity gave great uneasiness to Soult, who repeated -the order to push forward by his left whatever might be the force -opposed, and thus stimulated he advanced to Elizondo on the 27th, but -thinking the sixth division was still at San Estevan, again halted, -and it was not until the morning of the 28th, when general Hill’s -retreat had opened the way, that he followed through the pass of -Vellate. His further progress belongs to other combinations arising -from Soult’s direct operations which are now to be continued. - -General Picton, having assumed the command of all the troops in -the valley of Zubiri on the evening of the 26th, recommenced the -retreat before dawn on the 27th, and without the hope or intention -of covering Pampeluna. Soult followed in the morning, having first -sent scouts towards the ridges where Campbell’s troops had appeared -the evening before. Reille marched by the left bank of the Guy -river, Clauzel by the right bank, the cavalry and artillery closed -the rear and as the whole moved in compact order the narrow valley -was overgorged with troops, a hasty bicker of musketry alone marking -the separation of the hostile forces. Meanwhile the garrison of -Pampeluna made a sally and O’Donnel in great alarm spiked some of his -guns, destroyed his magazines, and would have suffered a disaster, -if Carlos D’España had not fortunately arrived with his division -and checked the garrison. Nevertheless the danger was imminent, for -general Cole, first emerging from the valley of Zubiri, had passed -Villalba, only three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat; Picton, -following close, was at Huarte, and O’Donnel’s Spaniards were in -confusion; in fine Soult was all but successful when Picton, feeling -the importance of the crisis, suddenly turned on some steep ridges, -which, stretching under the names of San Miguel Mont Escava and San -Cristoval quite across the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys, -screen Pampeluna. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -Posting the third division on the right of Huarte he prolonged his -line to the left with Morillo’s Spaniards, called upon O’Donnel to -support him, and directed Cole to occupy some heights between Oricain -and Arletta. But that general having with a surer eye observed a -salient hill near Zabaldica, one mile in advance and commanding the -road to Huarte, demanded and obtained permission to occupy it instead -of the heights first appointed. Two Spanish regiments belonging to -the blockading troops were still posted there, and towards them -Cole directed his course. Soult had also marked this hill, a French -detachment issuing from the mouth of the Val de Zubiri was in full -career to seize it, and the hostile masses were rapidly approaching -the summit on either side when the Spaniards, seeing the British so -close, vindicated their own post by a sudden charge. This was for -Soult the stroke of fate. His double columns just then emerging, -exultant, from the narrow valley, were arrested at the sight of ten -thousand men which under Cole crowned the summit of the mountain in -opposition; and two miles further back stood Picton with a greater -number, for O’Donnel had now taken post on Morillo’s left. To advance -by the Huarte road was impossible, and to stand still was dangerous, -because the French army contracted to a span in front was cleft in -its whole length by the river Guy, and compressed on each side by -the mountains which in that part narrowed the valley to a quarter -of a mile. Soult however, like a great and ready commander, at once -shot the head of Clauzel’s columns to his right across the mountain -which separated the Val de Zubiri from the Val de Lanz, and at the -same time threw one of Reille’s divisions of infantry and a body of -cavalry across the mountains on his left, beyond the Guy river, as -far as the village of Elcano, to menace the front and right flank of -Picton’s position at Huarte. The other two divisions of infantry he -established at the village of Zabaldica in the Val de Zubiri, close -under Cole’s right, and meanwhile Clauzel seized the village of -Sauroren close under that general’s left. - -[Sidenote: Notes by Lord Wellington, MSS.] - -While the French general thus formed his line of battle, lord -Wellington who had quitted sir Rowland Hill’s quarters in the -Bastan very early on the 27th, crossed the main ridge and descended -the valley of Lanz without having been able to learn any thing of -Picton’s movements or position, and in this state of uncertainty -reached Ostiz, a few miles from Sauroren, where he found general -Long with the brigade of light cavalry which had furnished the -posts of correspondence in the mountains. Here learning that Picton -having abandoned the heights of Linzoain was moving on Huarte, he -left his quarter-master-general with instructions to stop all the -troops coming down the valley of Lanz until the state of affairs -at Huarte should be ascertained. Then at racing speed he made for -Sauroren. As he entered that village he saw Clauzel’s divisions -moving from Zabaldica along the crest of the mountain, and it was -clear that the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were intercepted, -wherefore pulling up his horse he wrote on the parapet of the bridge -of Sauroren fresh instructions to turn every thing from that valley -to the right, by a road which led through Lizasso and Marcalain -behind the hills to the village of Oricain, that is to say, in rear -of the position now occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the -only staff-officer who had kept up with him, galloped with these -orders out of Sauroren by one road, the French light cavalry dashed -in by another, and the English general rode alone up the mountain -to reach his troops. One of Campbell’s Portuguese battalions first -descried him and raised a cry of joy, and the shrill clamour caught -up by the next regiments swelled as it run along the line into that -stern and appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give -upon the edge of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. -Lord Wellington suddenly stopped in a conspicuous place, he desired -that both armies should know he was there, and a double spy who was -present pointed out Soult, then so near that his features could be -plainly distinguished. The English general, it is said, fixed his -eyes attentively upon this formidable man, and speaking as if to -himself, said, “_Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious -one and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause of these cheers; -that will give time for the sixth division to arrive and I shall beat -him._” And certain it is that the French general made no serious -attack that day. - -The position adopted by Cole was the summit of a mountain mass which -filled all the space between the Guy and the Lanz rivers as far back -as Huarte and Villalba. It was highest in the centre, and boldly -defined towards the enemy, but the trace was irregular, the right -being thrown back towards the village of Arletta so as to flank the -high road to Huarte. This road was also swept by some guns placed on -a lower range, or neck, connecting the right of Cole with Picton and -Morillo. - -Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river was the bulging hill -vindicated by the Spaniards; it was a distinct point on the right of -the fourth division, dependent upon the centre of the position but -considerably lower. The left of the position also abating in height -was yet extremely rugged and steep overlooking the Lanz river and -the road to Villalba. General Ross’s brigade of the fourth division -was posted on that side, having a Portuguese battalion, whose flank -rested on a small chapel, in his front. General Campbell was on -the right of Ross. General Anson was on the highest ground, partly -behind, and partly on the right of Campbell. General Byng’s brigade -was on a second mass of hills in reserve, and the Spanish hill was -reinforced by a battalion of the fourth Portuguese regiment. - -The front of battle being less than two miles was well filled, and -the Lanz and Guy river washed the flanks. Those torrents continuing -their course break by narrow passages through the steep ridges of -San Miguel and Cristoval, and then flowing past Huarte and Villalba -meet behind those places to form the Arga river. On the ridges thus -cleft by the waters the second line was posted, that is to say, at -the distance of two miles from, and nearly parallel to the first -position, but on a more extended front. Picton’s left was at Huarte, -his right strengthened with a battery stretched to the village of -Goraitz, covering more than a mile of ground on that flank. Morillo -prolonged Picton’s left along the crest of San Miguel to Villalba, -and O’Donnel continued the line to San Cristoval; Carlos D’España’s -division maintained the blockade behind these ridges, and the British -cavalry under General Cotton, coming up from Tafalla and Olite, took -post, the heavy brigades on some open ground behind Picton, the -hussar brigade on his right. This second line being on a wider trace -than the first and equally well filled with troops, entirely barred -the openings of the two valleys leading down to Pampeluna. - -Soult’s position was also a mountain filling the space between the -two rivers. It was even more rugged than the allies’ mountain and -they were only separated by a deep narrow valley. Clauzel’s three -divisions leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren, which -was quite down in the valley of Lanz and close under the chapel -height where the left of the fourth division was posted. His left -was prolonged by two of Reille’s divisions, which also occupied -the village of Zabaldica quite down in the valley of Zubiri under -the right of the allies. The remaining division of this wing and a -division of cavalry, were, as I have before stated, thrown forward -on the mountains at the other side of the Guy river, menacing -Picton and seeking for an opportunity to communicate with the -garrison of Pampeluna. Some guns were pushed in front of Zabaldica, -but the elevation required to send the shot upward rendered their -fire ineffectual and the greatest part of the artillery remained -therefore in the narrow valley of Zubiri. - -_Combat of the 27th._ Soult’s first effort was to gain the Spaniards’ -hill and establish himself near the centre of the allies’ line -of battle. The attack was vigorous but the French were valiantly -repulsed about the time lord Wellington arrived, and he immediately -reinforced that post with the fortieth British regiment. There was -then a general skirmish along the front, under cover of which Soult -carefully examined the whole position, and the firing continued on -the mountain side until evening, when a terrible storm, the usual -precursor of English battles in the Peninsula, brought on premature -darkness and terminated the dispute. This was the state of affairs -at day-break on the 28th, but a signal alteration had place before -the great battle of that day commenced, and the movements of the -wandering divisions by which this change was effected must now be -traced. - -It has been shewn that the Lanz covered the left of the allies -and the right of the French. Nevertheless the heights occupied by -either army were prolonged beyond that river, the continuation of -the allies’ ridge sweeping forward so as to look into the rear of -Sauroren, while the continuation of the French heights fell back in a -direction nearly parallel to the forward inclination of the opposing -ridge. They were both steep and high, yet lower and less rugged -than the heights on which the armies stood opposed, for the latter -were mountains where rocks piled on rocks stood out like castles, -difficult to approach and so dangerous to assail that the hardened -veterans of the Peninsula only would have dared the trial. Now the -road by which the sixth division marched on the 27th, after clearing -the pass of Doña Maria, sends one branch to Lanz, another to Ostiz, a -third through Lizasso and Marcalain; the first and second fall into -the road from Bellate and descend the valley of Lanz to Sauroren; -the third passing behind the ridges, just described as prolonging -the positions of the armies, also falls into the valley of Lanz, but -at the village of Oricain, that is to say one mile behind the ground -occupied by general Cole’s left. - -It was by this road of Marcalain that Wellington now expected the -sixth and seventh divisions, but the rapidity with which Soult seized -Sauroren caused a delay of eighteen hours. For the sixth division, -having reached Olague in the valley of Lanz about one o’clock on the -27th, halted there until four, and then following the orders brought -by lord Fitzroy Somerset marched by Lizasso to gain the Marcalain -road; but the great length of these mountain marches, and the heavy -storm which had terminated the action at Zabaldica sweeping with -equal violence in this direction, prevented the division from passing -Lizasso that night. However the march was renewed at daylight on the -28th, and meanwhile general Hill, having quitted the Bastan on the -evening of the 27th, reached the town of Lanz on the morning of the -28th, and rallying general Long’s cavalry and his own artillery, -which were in that valley, moved likewise upon Lizasso. At that place -he met the seventh division coming from San Estevan, and having -restored general Barnes’s brigade to lord Dalhousie, took a position -on a ridge covering the road to Marcalain. The seventh division being -on his right, was in military communication with the sixth division, -and thus lord Wellington’s left was prolonged, and covered the great -road leading from Pampeluna by Irurzun to Tolosa. And during these -important movements, which were not completed until the evening of -the 28th, which brought six thousand men into the allies’ line of -battle, and fifteen thousand more into military communication with -their left, D’Erlon remained planted in his position of observation -near Elizondo! - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The near approach of the sixth division early on the morning of -the 28th and the certainty of Hill’s junction, made Wellington -imagine that Soult would not venture an attack, and certainly that -marshal, disquieted about D’Erlon of whom he only knew that he had -not followed his instructions, viewed the strong position of his -adversary with uneasy anticipations. Again with anxious eyes he -took cognizance of all its rugged strength, and seemed dubious and -distrustful of his fortune. He could not operate with advantage by -his own left beyond the Guy river, because the mountains there were -rough, and Wellington having shorter lines of movement could meet him -with all arms combined; and meanwhile the French artillery, unable -to emerge from the Val de Zubiri except by the Huarte road, would -have been exposed to a counter-attack. He crossed the Lanz river and -ascended the prolongation of the allies’ ridge, which, as he had -possession of the bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own -ground. From this height he could see all the left and rear of Cole’s -position, looking down the valley of Lanz as far as Villalba, but -the country beyond the ridge towards Marcalain was so broken that he -could not discern the march of the sixth division; he knew however -from the deserters, that Wellington expected four fresh divisions -from that side, that is to say, the second, sixth, and seventh -British, and Sylviera’s Portuguese division which always marched with -Hill. This information and the nature of the ground decided the plan -of attack. The valley of Lanz growing wider as it descended, offered -the means of assailing the allies’ left in front and rear at one -moment, and the same combination would cut off the reinforcements -expected from the side of Marcalain. - -One of Clauzel’s divisions already occupied Sauroren, and the other -two coming from the mountain took post upon each side of that -village. The division on the right hand was ordered to throw some -flankers on the ridge from whence Soult was taking his observations, -and upon a signal given to move in one body to a convenient distance -down the valley and then, wheeling to its left, assail the rear of -the allies’ left flank while the other two divisions advancing from -their respective positions near Sauroren assailed the front. Cole’s -left, which did not exceed five thousand men, would thus be enveloped -by sixteen thousand, and Soult expected to crush it notwithstanding -the strength of the ground. Meanwhile Reille’s two divisions -advancing from the mountain on the side of Zabaldica, were each to -send a brigade against the hill occupied by the fortieth regiment; -the right of this attack was to be connected with the left of -Clauzel, the remaining brigades were closely to support the assailing -masses, the divisions beyond the Guy were to keep Picton in check, -and Soult who had no time to lose ordered his lieutenants to throw -their troops frankly and at once into action. - -_First battle of Sauroren._—It was fought on the fourth anniversary -of the battle of Talavera. - -About mid-day the French gathered at the foot of the position and -their skirmishers rushing forward spread over the face of the -mountain, working upward like a conflagration; but the columns of -attack were not all prepared when Clauzel’s division in the valley -of Lanz, too impatient to await the general signal of battle, threw -out its flankers on the ridge beyond the river and pushed down the -valley in one mass. With a rapid pace it turned Cole’s left and was -preparing to wheel up on his rear, when a Portuguese brigade of the -sixth division, suddenly appearing on the crest of the ridge beyond -the river, drove the French flankers back and instantly descended -with a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the column in the -valley. And almost at the same instant, the main body of the sixth -division emerging from behind the same ridge, near the village of -Oricain, formed in order of battle across the front. It was the -counter-stroke of Salamanca! The French, striving to encompass the -left of the allies were themselves encompassed, for two brigades -of the fourth division turned and smote them from the left, the -Portuguese smote them from the right; and while thus scathed on both -flanks with fire, they were violently shocked and pushed back with a -mighty force by the sixth division, yet not in flight, but fighting -fiercely and strewing the ground with their enemies’ bodies as well -as with their own. - -Clauzel’s second division, seeing this dire conflict, with a hurried -movement assailed the chapel height to draw off the fire from the -troops in the valley, and gallantly did the French soldiers throng -up the craggy steep, but the general unity of the attack was ruined; -neither their third division nor Reille’s brigades had yet received -the signal, and their attacks instead of being simultaneous were -made in succession, running from right to left as the necessity of -aiding the others became apparent. It was however a terrible battle -and well fought. One column darting out of the village of Sauroren, -silently, sternly, without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel -under a tempest of bullets which swept away whole ranks without -abating the speed and power of the mass. The seventh Caçadores -shrunk abashed and that part of the position was won. Soon however -they rallied upon general Ross’s British brigade, and the whole -running forward charged the French with a loud shout and dashed -them down the hill. Heavily stricken they were, yet undismayed, -and recovering their ranks again, they ascended in the same manner -to be again broken and overturned. But the other columns of attack -were now bearing upwards through the smoke and flame with which the -skirmishers had covered the face of the mountain, and the tenth -Portuguese regiment fighting on the right of Ross’s brigade yielded -to their fury; a heavy body crowned the heights and wheeling against -the exposed flank of Ross forced that gallant officer also to go -back. His ground was instantly occupied by the enemies with whom he -had been engaged in front, and the fight raged close and desperate -on the crest of the position, charge succeeded charge and each -side yielded and recovered by turns; yet this astounding effort of -French valour was of little avail. Lord Wellington brought Byng’s -brigade forward at a running pace, and sent the twenty-seventh and -forty-eighth British regiments belonging to Anson’s brigade down from -the higher ground in the centre against the crowded masses, rolling -them backward in disorder and throwing them one after the other -violently down the mountain side; and with no child’s play; the two -British regiments fell upon the enemy three separate times with the -bayonet and lost more than half their own numbers. - -During this battle on the mountain-top, the British brigades of the -sixth division strengthened by a battery of guns, gained ground in -the valley of Lanz and arrived on the same front with the left of the -victorious troops about the chapel. Lord Wellington then seeing the -momentary disorder of the enemy ordered Madden’s Portuguese brigade, -which had never ceased its fire against the right flank of the French -column, to assail the village of Sauroren in the rear, but the -state of the action in other parts and the exhaustion of the troops -soon induced him to countermand this movement. Meanwhile Reille’s -brigades, connecting their right with the left of Clauzel’s third -division, had environed the Spanish hill, ascended it unchecked, -and at the moment when the fourth division was so hardly pressed -made the regiment of El Pravia give way on the left of the fortieth. -A Portuguese battalion rushing forward covered the flank of that -invincible regiment, which waited in stern silence until the French -set their feet upon the broad summit; but when their glittering arms -appeared over the brow of the mountain the charging cry was heard, -the crowded mass was broken to pieces and a tempest of bullets -followed its flight. Four times this assault was renewed, and the -French officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the belts, so -fierce and resolute they were to win. It was however the labour of -Sysiphus. The vehement shout and shock of the British soldier always -prevailed, and at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, hearts -fainting, and hopeless from repeated failures, they were so abashed -that three British companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade. - -While the battle was thus being fought on the height the French -cavalry beyond the Guy river, passed a rivulet, and with a fire of -carbines forced the tenth hussars to yield some rocky ground on -Picton’s right, but the eighteenth hussars having better firearms -than the tenth renewed the combat, killed two officers, and finally -drove the French over the rivulet again. - -Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, which -lord Wellington fresh from the fight with homely emphasis called -“_bludgeon work_.” Two generals and eighteen hundred men had been -killed or wounded on the French side, following their official -reports, a number far below the estimate made at the time by the -allies whose loss amounted to two thousand six hundred. These -discrepancies between hostile calculations ever occur, and there -is little wisdom in disputing where proof is unattainable; but the -numbers actually engaged were, of French, twenty-five thousand, of -the allies twelve thousand, and if the strength of the latter’s -position did not save them from the greater loss their stedfast -courage is to be the more admired. - -The 29th the armies rested in position without firing a shot, but the -wandering divisions on both sides were now entering the line. - -General Hill, having sent all his baggage artillery and wounded men -to Berioplano behind the Cristoval ridge, still occupied his strong -ground between Lizasso and Arestegui, covering the Marcalain and -Irurzun roads, and menacing that leading from Lizasso to Olague in -rear of Soult’s right. His communication with Oricain was maintained -by the seventh division, and the light division was approaching -his left. Thus on Wellington’s side the crisis was over. He had -vindicated his position with only sixteen thousand combatants, and -now, including the troops still maintaining the blockade, he had -fifty thousand, twenty thousand being British, in close military -combination. Thirty thousand flushed with recent success were in -hand, and Hill’s troops were well-placed for retaking the offensive. - -Soult’s situation was proportionably difficult. Finding that he could -not force the allies’ position in front, he had sent his artillery -part of his cavalry and his wounded men back to France immediately -after the battle, ordering the two former to join Villatte on the -Lower Bidassoa and there await further instructions. Having shaken -off this burthen he awaited D’Erlon’s arrival by the valley of Lanz, -and that general reached Ostiz a few miles above Sauroren at mid-day -on the 29th, bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his -march, that general Graham had retired from the Bidassoa and Villatte -had crossed that river. This gave Soult a hope that his first -movements had disengaged San Sebastian, and he instantly conceived -a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed yet conformable to the -critical state of his affairs. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -No success was to be expected from another attack, yet he could not -at the moment of being reinforced with eighteen thousand men, retire -by the road he came without some dishonour; nor could he remain where -he was, because his supplies of provisions and ammunition derived -from distant magazines by slow and small convoys was unequal to the -consumption. Two-thirds of the British troops, the greatest part of -the Portuguese, and all the Spaniards were, as he supposed, assembled -in his front under Wellington, or on his right flank under Hill, -and it was probable that other reinforcements were on the march; -wherefore he resolved to prolong his right with D’Erlon’s corps, -and then cautiously drawing off the rest of his army place himself -between the allies and the Bastan, in military connection with his -reserve and closer to his frontier magazines. Thus posted and able to -combine all his troops in one operation, he expected to relieve San -Sebastian entirely and profit from the new state of affairs. - -[Sidenote: Plan 2.] - -In the evening of the 29th the second division of cavalry, which -was in the valley of Zubiri, passed over the position to the valley -of Lanz, and joined D’Erlon, who was ordered to march early on the -30th by Etulain upon Lizasso, sending out strong scouting parties -to his left on all the roads leading upon Pampeluna, and also -towards Letassa and Irurzun. During the night the first division of -cavalry and La Martiniere’s division of infantry, both at Elcano on -the extreme left of the French army, retired over the mountains by -Illurdos to Eugui, in the upper part of the valley of the Zubiri, -having orders to cross the separating ridge enter the valley of Lanz -and join D’Erlon. The remainder of Reille’s wing was at the same time -to march by the crest of the position from Zabaldica to the village -of Sauroren, and gradually relieve Clauzel’s troops which were then -to assemble behind Sauroren, that is to say towards Ostiz, and thus -following the march of D’Erlon were to be themselves followed in like -manner by Reille’s troops. To cover these last movements Clauzel -detached two regiments to occupy the French heights beyond the Lanz -river, and they were also to maintain his connection with D’Erlon -whose line of operations was just beyond those heights. He was -however to hold by Reille rather than by D’Erlon until the former had -perfected his dangerous march across Wellington’s front. - -In the night of the 29th Soult heard from the deserters that three -divisions were to make an offensive movement towards Lizasso on -the 30th, and when daylight came he was convinced the men spoke -truly, because from a point beyond Sauroren he discerned certain -columns descending the ridge of Cristoval and the heights above -Oricain, while others were in march on a wide sweep apparently to -turn Clauzel’s right flank. These columns were Morillo’s Spaniards, -Campbell’s Portuguese, and the seventh division, the former rejoining -Hill to whose corps they properly belonged, the others adapting -themselves to a new disposition of Wellington’s line of battle which -shall be presently explained. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -At six o’clock in the morning Foy’s division of Reille’s wing was -in march along the crest of the mountain from Zabaldica towards -Sauroren, where Maucune’s division had already relieved Conroux’s; -the latter, belonging to Clauzel’s wing, was moving up the valley -of Lanz to rejoin that general, who had, with exception of the two -flanking regiments before mentioned, concentrated his remaining -divisions between Olabe and Ostiz. In this state of affairs -Wellington opening his batteries from the chapel height sent -skirmishers against Sauroren, and the fire spreading to the allies’ -right became brisk between Cole and Foy. It subsided however at -Sauroren, and Soult, relying on the strength of the position, ordered -Reille to maintain it until nightfall unless hardly pressed, and went -off himself at a gallop to join D’Erlon, for his design was to fall -upon the division attempting to turn his right and crush them with -superior numbers: a daring project, well and quickly conceived, but -he had to deal with a man whose rapid perception and rough stroke -rendered sleight of hand dangerous. The marshal overtook D’Erlon at -the moment when that general, having entered the valley of Ulzema -with three divisions of infantry and two divisions of heavy cavalry, -was making dispositions to assail Hill who was between Buenza and -Arestegui. - -_Combat of Buenza._ The allies who were about ten thousand fighting -men, including Long’s brigade of light cavalry, occupied a very -extensive mountain ridge. Their right was strongly posted on rugged -ground, but the left prolonged towards Buenza was insecure, and -D’Erlon who including his two divisions of heavy cavalry had not -less than twenty thousand sabres and bayonets, was followed by La -Martiniere’s division of infantry now coming from Lanz. Soult’s -combination was therefore extremely powerful. The light troops were -already engaged when he arrived, and the same soldiers on both sides -who had so strenuously combated at Maya on the 25th were again -opposed to each other. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official despatch, MS.] - -D’Armagnac’s division was directed to make a false attack upon Hill’s -right; Abbé’s division, emerging by Lizasso, endeavoured to turn -the allies’ left and gain the summit of the ridge in the direction -of Buenza; Maranzin followed Abbé, and the divisions of cavalry -entering the line supported and connected the two attacks. The action -was brisk at both points, but D’Armagnac pushing his feint too far -became seriously engaged, and was beaten by Da Costa and Ashworth’s -Portuguese aided by a part of the twenty-eighth British regiment. Nor -were the French at first more successful on the other flank, being -repeatedly repulsed, until Abbé, turning that wing gained the summit -of the mountain and rendered the position untenable. General Hill -who had lost about four hundred men then retired to the heights of -Equaros behind Arestegui and Berasin, thus drawing towards Marcalain -with his right and throwing back his left. Here being joined by -Campbell and Morillo he again offered battle, but Soult whose -principal loss was in D’Armagnac’s division had now gained his main -object; he had turned Hill’s left, secured a fresh line of retreat, a -shorter communication with Villatte by the pass of Donna Maria, and -withal, the great Irurzun road to Toloza distant only one league and -a half was in his power. His first thought was to seize it and march -through Lecumberri either upon Toloza, or Andoain and Ernani. There -was nothing to oppose except the light division whose movements shall -be noticed hereafter, but neither the French marshal nor general Hill -knew of its presence, and the former thought himself strong enough to -force his way to San Sebastian and there unite with Villatte, and his -artillery which following his previous orders was now on the Lower -Bidassoa. - -This project was feasible. Lamartiniere’s division, of Reille’s -wing, coming from Lanz, was not far off. Clauzel’s three divisions -were momentarily expected, and Reille’s during the night. On the -31st therefore, Soult with at least fifty thousand men would have -broken into Guipuscoa, thrusting aside the light division in his -march, and menacing sir Thomas Graham’s position in reverse while -Villatte’s reserve attacked it in front. The country about Lecumberri -was however very strong for defence and lord Wellington would have -followed, yet scarcely in time, for he did not suspect his views -and was ignorant of his strength, thinking D’Erlon’s force, to be -originally two divisions of infantry and now only reinforced with a -third division, whereas that general had three divisions originally -and was now reinforced by a fourth division of infantry and two of -cavalry. This error however did not prevent him from seizing with -the rapidity of a great commander, the decisive point of operation, -and giving a counter-stroke which Soult trusting to the strength of -Reille’s position little expected. - -When Wellington saw that La Martiniere’s divisions and the cavalry -had abandoned the mountains above Elcano, and that Zabaldica was -evacuated, he ordered Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of -cavalry and a battery of artillery, to enter the valley of Zubiri and -turn the French left; the seventh division was directed to sweep over -the hills beyond the Lanz river upon the French right; the march of -Campbell and Morillo insured the communication with Hill; and that -general was to point his columns upon Olague and Lanz threatening the -French rear, but meeting as we have seen with D’Erlon was forced -back to Eguaros. The fourth division was to assail Foy’s position, -but respecting its great strength the attack was to be measured -according to the effect produced on the flanks. Meanwhile Byng’s -brigade and the sixth division, the latter having a battery of guns -and some squadrons of cavalry, were combined to assault Sauroren. -La Bispal’s Spaniards followed the sixth division. Fane’s horsemen -were stationed at Berioplano with a detachment pushed to Irurzun, the -heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte, and Carlos D’España maintained -the blockade. - -_Second battle of Sauroren._—These movements began at daylight. -Picton’s advance was rapid. He gained the valley of Zubiri and threw -his skirmishers at once on Foy’s flank, and about the same time -general Inglis, one of those veterans who purchase every step of -promotion with their blood, advancing with only five hundred men of -the seventh division, broke at one shock the two French regiments -covering Clauzel’s right, and drove them down into the valley -of Lanz. He lost indeed one-third of his own men, but instantly -spreading the remainder in skirmishing order along the descent, -opened a biting fire upon the flank of Conroux’s division, which was -then moving up the valley from Sauroren, sorely amazed and disordered -by this sudden fall of two regiments from the top of the mountain -into the midst of the column. - -Foy’s division, marching to support Conroux and Maucune, was on the -crest of the mountains between Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment -of attack, but too far off to give aid, and his own light troops -were engaged with the skirmishers of the fourth division; and Inglis -had been so sudden and vigorous, that before the evil could be well -perceived it was past remedy. For Wellington instantly pushed the -sixth division, now commanded by general Pakenham Pack having been -wounded on the 28th, to the left of Sauroren, and shoved Byng’s -brigade headlong down from the chapel height against that village, -which was defended by Maucune’s division. Byng’s vigorous assault -was simultaneously enforced from the opposite direction by Madden’s -Portuguese of the sixth division, and at the same time the battery -near the chapel sent its bullets crashing through the houses, and -booming up the valley towards Conroux’s column, which Inglis never -ceased to vex and he was closely supported by the remainder of the -seventh division. - -The village and bridge of Sauroren and the straits beyond were now -covered with a pall of smoke, the musquetry pealed frequent and -loud, and the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to mountain -filled all the valley. Byng with hard fighting carried the village -of Sauroren, and fourteen hundred prisoners were made, for the two -French divisions thus vehemently assailed in the front and flank -were entirely broken. Part retreated along the valley towards -Clauzel’s other divisions which were now beyond Ostiz; part fled up -the mountain side to seek a refuge with Foy, who had remained on -the summit a helpless spectator of this rout; but though he rallied -the fugitives in great numbers, he had soon to look to himself, for -by this time his skirmishers had been driven up the mountain by -those of the fourth division, and his left was infested by Picton’s -detachments. Thus pressed, he abandoned his strong position, and fell -back along the summit of the mountain between the valley of Zubiri -and valley of Lanz, and the woods enabled him to effect his retreat -without much loss; but he dared not descend into either valley, and -thinking himself entirely cut off, sent advice of his situation to -Soult and then retired into the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga. -Meanwhile Wellington pressing up the valley of Lanz drove Clauzel as -far as Olague, and the latter now joined by La Martiniere’s division -took a position in the evening covering the roads of Lanz and -Lizasso. The English general whose pursuit had been damped by hearing -of Hill’s action also halted near Ostiz. - -The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed and wounded, or taken, -in the two battles of this day, and of these nearly twelve hundred -were Portuguese, the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt -of both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous. Conroux’s -and Maucune’s divisions were completely disorganized; Foy with -eight thousand men, including the fugitives he had rallied, was -entirely separated from the main body; two thousand men at the lowest -computation had been killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the -woods and ravines, and three thousand prisoners were taken. This blow -joined to former losses reduced Soult’s fighting men to thirty-five -thousand, of which the fifteen thousand under Clauzel and Reille were -dispirited by defeat, and the whole were placed in a most critical -situation. Hill’s force now increased to fifteen thousand men by the -junction of Morillo and Campbell was in front, and thirty thousand -were on the rear in the valley of Lanz, or on the hills at each -side; for the third division finding no more enemies in the valley -of Zubiri, had crowned the heights in conjunction with the fourth -division. - -Lord Wellington had detached some of La Bispal’s Spaniards to -Marcalain when he heard of Hill’s action, but he was not yet aware of -the true state of affairs on that side. His operations were founded -upon the notion that Soult was in retreat towards the Bastan. He -designed to follow closely pushing his own left forward to support -sir Thomas Graham on the Bidassoa, but always underrating D’Erlon’s -troops he thought La Martiniere’s division had retreated by the -Roncesvalles road; and as Foy’s column was numerous and two divisions -had been broken at Sauroren, he judged the force immediately under -Soult to be weak and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth -division and the thirteenth light dragoons were to march by Eugui -to join the third division, which was directed upon Linzoain and -Roncesvalles. The fourth division was to descend into the valley of -Lanz. General Hill, supported by the Spaniards at Marcalain, was to -press Soult closely, always turning his right but directing his own -march upon Lanz, from whence he was to send Campbell’s brigade to the -Alduides. The seventh division which had halted on the ridges between -Hill and Wellington, was to suffer the former to cross its front and -then march for the pass of Doña Maria. - -It appears from these arrangements, that Wellington expecting Soult -would rejoin Clauzel and make for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate, -intended to confine and press him closely in that district. But the -French marshal was in a worse position than his adversary imagined, -being too far advanced towards Buenza to return to Lanz; in fine -he was between two fires and without a retreat save by the pass of -Doña Maria upon San Estevan. Wherefore calling in Clauzel, and giving -D’Erlon whose divisions, hitherto successful were in good order -and undismayed, the rear-guard, he commenced his march soon after -midnight towards the pass. But mischief was thickening around him. - -Sir Thomas Graham having only the blockade of San Sebastian to -maintain was at the head of twenty thousand men, ready to make a -forward movement, and there remained besides the light division under -Charles Alten of whose operations it is time to speak. That general, -as we have seen, took post on the mountain of Santa Cruz the 27th. -From thence on the evening of the 28th he marched to gain Lecumberri -on the great road of Irurzun; but whether by orders from sir Thomas -Graham or in default of orders, the difficulty of communication being -extreme in those wild regions, I know not, he commenced his descent -into the valley of Lerins very late. His leading brigade, getting -down with some difficulty, reached Leyza beyond the great chain by -the pass of Goriti or Zubieta, but darkness caught the other brigade -and the troops dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and -precipices. Many made faggot torches waving them as signals, and thus -moving about, the lights served indeed to assist those who carried -them but misled and bewildered others who saw them at a distance. -The heights and the ravines were alike studded with these small -fires, and the soldiers calling to each other for directions filled -the whole region with their clamour. Thus they continued to rove and -shout until morning shewed the face of the mountain covered with -tired and scattered men and animals who had not gained half a league -of ground beyond their starting place, and it was many hours, ere -they could be collected to join the other brigade at Leyza. - -General Alten, who had now been separated for three days from the -army, sent mounted officers in various directions to obtain tidings, -and at six o’clock in the evening renewed his march. At Areysa he -halted for some time without suffering fires to be lighted, for -he knew nothing of the enemy and was fearful of discovering his -situation, but at night he again moved and finally established his -bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th. The noise of Hill’s -battle at Buenza was clearly heard in the course of the day, and the -light division was thus again comprized in the immediate system of -operations directed by Wellington in person. Had Soult continued his -march upon Guipuscoa Alten would have been in great danger, but the -French general being forced to retreat, the light division was a new -power thrown into his opponent’s hands, the value of which will be -seen by a reference to the peculiarity of the country through which -the French general was now to move. - -It has been shewn that Foy cut off from the main army was driven -towards the Alduides; that the French artillery and part of the -cavalry were again on the Bidassoa, whence Villatte, contrary to -the intelligence received by Soult, had not advanced, though he had -skirmished with Longa, leaving the latter however in possession of -heights above Lesaca. The troops under Soult’s immediate command -were therefore completely isolated, and had no resources save what -his ability and their own courage could supply. His single line of -retreat by the pass of Doña Maria was secure as far as San Estevan, -and from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to Elizondo and so -gain France by the Col de Maya, or down the same river towards Vera -by Sumbilla and Yanzi, from both of which places roads branching -off to the right lead over the mountains to the passes of Echallar. -There was also a third mountain-road leading direct from Estevan -to Zagaramurdi and Urdax, but it was too steep and rugged for his -wounded men and baggage. - -The road to Elizondo was very good, but that down the Bidassoa was -a long and terrible defile, and so contracted about the bridges of -Yanzi and Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast. This then -Soult had to dread; that Wellington who by the pass of Vellate could -reach Elizondo before him would block his passage on that side; that -Graham would occupy the rocks about Yanzi, blocking the passage there -and by detachments cut off his line of march upon Echallar. Then, -confined to the narrow mountain-way from San Estevan to Zagaramurdi, -he would be followed hard by general Hill, exposed to attacks in rear -and flank during his march, and perhaps be headed at Urdax by the -allied troops moving through Vellate Elizondo and the Col de Maya. In -this state, his first object being to get through the pass of Doña -Maria, he commenced his retreat as we have seen in the night of the -30th, and Wellington still deceived as to the real state of affairs -did not take the most fitting measures to stop his march, that is to -say, he continued in his first design, halting in the valley of Lanz -while Hill passed his front to enter the Bastan, into which district -he sent Byng’s brigade as belonging to the second division. But early -on the 31st, when Soult’s real strength became known, he directed -the seventh division to aid Hill, followed Byng through the pass of -Vellate with the remainder of his forces, and thinking the light -division might be at Zubieta in the valley of Lerins, sent Alten -orders to head the French if possible at San Estevan, or at Sumbilla, -in fine to cut in upon their line of march somewhere; Longa also was -ordered to come down to the defiles at Yanzi, thus aiding the light -division to block the way on that side, and sir Thomas Graham was -advertised to hold his army in readiness to move in the same view, -and it would appear that the route of the sixth and third divisions -were also changed for a time. - -_Combat of Doña Maria._—At ten o’clock in the morning of the 31st, -general Hill overtook Soult’s rear-guard between Lizasso and the -Puerto. The seventh division, coming from the hills above Olague, -was already ascending the mountain on his right, and the French only -gained a wood on the summit of the pass under the fire of Hill’s -guns. There, however, they turned and throwing out their skirmishers -made strong battle. General Stewart, leading the attack of the second -division, now for the third time engaged with D’Erlon’s troops, was -again wounded and his first brigade was repulsed, but general Pringle -who succeeded to the command, renewed the attack with the second -brigade, and the thirty-fourth regiment leading, broke the enemy at -the moment that the seventh division did the same on the right. Some -prisoners were taken, but a thick fog prevented further pursuit, and -the loss of the French in the action is unknown, probably less than -that of the allies which was something short of four hundred men. - -[Sidenote: Notes by the duke of Wellington, MSS.] - -The seventh division remained on the mountain, but Hill fell back -to Lizasso, and then, following his orders, moved by a short but -rugged way, leading between the passes of Doña Maria and Vellate over -the great chain to Almandoz, to join Wellington, who had during the -combat descended into the Bastan by the pass of Vellate. Meanwhile -Byng reached Elizondo, and captured a large convoy of provisions -and ammunition left there under guard of a battalion by D’Erlon -on the 29th; he made several hundred prisoners also after a sharp -skirmish and then pushed forward to the pass of Maya. Wellington -now occupied the hills through which the road leads from Elizondo -to San Estevan, and full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow; -for Soult, not being pursued after passing Doña Maria, had halted -in San Estevan, although by his scouts he knew that the convoy had -been taken at Elizondo. He was in a deep narrow valley, and three -British divisions with one of Spaniards were behind the mountains -overlooking the town; the seventh division was on the mountain of -Doña Maria; the light division and sir Thomas Graham’s Spaniards were -marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits from the valley; Byng -was already at Maya, and Hill was moving by Almandoz just behind -Wellington’s own position. A few hours gained and the French must -surrender or disperse. Wellington gave strict orders to prevent the -lighting of fires the straggling of soldiers or any other indication -of the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst some rocks -at a commanding point from whence he could observe every movement of -the enemy. Soult seemed tranquil, and four of his “_gensd’armes_” -were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. Some of the -staff proposed to cut them off; the English general whose object -was to hide his own presence, would not suffer it, but the next -moment three marauding English soldiers entered the valley and were -instantly carried off by the horsemen. Half an hour afterwards the -French drums beat to arms and their columns began to move out of San -Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of three plundering -knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate -commander of the most splendid success, and saved another from the -most terrible disaster. - -The captives walked from their prison but their chains hung upon -them. The way was narrow, the multitude great, and the baggage, and -wounded men borne on their comrades’ shoulders, filed with such long -procession, that Clauzel’s divisions forming the rear-guard were -still about San Estevan on the morning of the 1st of August, and -scarcely had they marched a league of ground, when the skirmishers of -the fourth division and the Spaniards thronging along the heights on -the right flank opened a fire to which little reply could be made. -The troops and baggage then got mixed with an extreme disorder, -numbers of the former fled up the hills, and the commanding energy -of Soult whose personal exertions were conspicuous could scarcely -prevent a general dispersion. However prisoners and baggage fell at -every step into the hands of the pursuers, the boldest were dismayed -at the peril, and worse would have awaited them in front, if -Wellington had been on other points well seconded by his subordinate -generals. - -The head of the French column instead of taking the first road -leading from Sumbilla to Echallar, had passed onward towards that -leading from the bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere -cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa was on their left, -and there was a tributary torrent to cross, the bridge of which was -defended by a battalion of Spanish Caçadores detached to that point -from the heights of Vera by general Barceñas. The front was now as -much disordered as the rear, and had Longa or Barceñas reinforced the -Caçadores, those only of the French who being near Sumbilla could -take the road from that place to Echallar would have escaped; but -the Spanish generals kept aloof and D’Erlon won the defile. However -Reille’s divisions were still to pass, and when they came up a new -enemy had appeared. - -[Sidenote: August.] - -It will be remembered that the light division was directed to head -the French army at San Estevan, or Sumbilla. This order was received -on the evening of the 31st, and the division, repassing the defiles -of the Zubieta, descended the deep valley of Lerins and reached -Elgoriaga about mid-day on the 1st of August, having then marched -twenty-four miles and being little more than a league from Estevan -and about the same distance from Sumbilla. The movement of the French -along the Bidassoa was soon discovered, but the division instead -of moving on Sumbilla turned to the left, clambered up the great -mountain of Santa Cruz and made for the bridge of Yanzi. The weather -was exceedingly sultry, the mountain steep and hard to overcome, -many men fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while -others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled, -leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they -yielded for the first time. - -Towards evening, after marching for nineteen consecutive hours over -forty miles of mountain roads, the head of the exhausted column -reached the edge of a precipice near the bridge of Yanzi. Below, -within pistol-shot, Reille’s divisions were seen hurrying forward -along the horrid defile in which they were pent up, and a fire of -musketry commenced, slightly from the British on the high rock, more -vigorously from some low ground near the bridge of Yanzi, where the -riflemen had ensconced themselves in the brushwood. The scene which -followed is thus described by an eye-witness. - -[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs.] - -“We overlooked the enemy at stone’s throw, and from the summit of a -tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were -wedged in a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side and the -river on the other. Confusion impossible to describe followed, the -wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry -drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echallar, -but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were -precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded -called out for quarter, while others pointed to them, supported as -they were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats -clotted with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different -habitations to aid the sufferers.” - -On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire, and so -piteous was the spectacle that it was with averted or doubtful -aim they shot at the others, although the latter rapidly plied -their muskets in passing, and some in their veteran hardihood even -dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to make a counter-attack. It was -a soldier-like but a vain effort! the night found the British in -possession of the bridge, and though the great body of the enemy -escaped by the road to Echallar, the baggage was cut off and fell, -together with many prisoners, into the hands of the light troops -which were still hanging on the rear in pursuit from San Estevan. - -The loss of the French this day was very great, that of the allies -about a hundred men, of which sixty-five were British, principally -of the fourth division. Nevertheless lord Wellington was justly -discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor general Alten -had fulfilled their mission. The former excused himself as being -too feeble to oppose the mass Soult led down the valley; but the -rocks were so precipitous that the French could not have reached -him, and the resistance made by the Spanish caçadores was Longa’s -condemnation. A lamentable fatuity prevailed in many quarters. If -Barceñas had sent his whole brigade instead of a weak battalion, the -small torrent could not have been forced by D’Erlon; and if Longa -had been near the bridge of Yanzi the French must have surrendered, -for the perpendicular rocks on their right forbade even an escape -by dispersion. Finally if the light division instead of marching -down the valley of Lerins as far as Elgoriaga, had crossed the Santa -Cruz mountain by the road used the night of the 28th, it would have -arrived much earlier at the bridge of Yanzi, and then belike Longa -and Barceñas would also have come down. Alten’s instructions indeed -prescribed Sumbilla and San Estevan as the first points to head the -French army, but judging them too strong at Sumbilla he marched as -we have seen upon Yanzi; and if he had passed the bridge there and -seized the road to Echallar with one brigade, while the other plied -the flank with fire from the left of the Bidassoa, he would have -struck a great blow. It was for that the soldiers had made such a -prodigious exertion, yet the prize was thrown away. - -During the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar, and on -the morning of the 2d occupied the “_Puerto_” of that name. His left -was placed at the rocks of Zagaramurdi; his right at the rock of -Ivantelly communicating with the left of Villatte’s reserve, which -was in position on the ridges between Soult’s right and the head -of the great Rhune mountain. Meanwhile Clauzel’s three divisions, -now reduced to six thousand men, took post on a strong hill between -the “_Puerto_” and town of Echallar. This position was momentarily -adopted by Soult to save time, to examine the country, and to make -Wellington discover his final object, but that general would not -suffer the affront. He had sent the third and sixth divisions to -reoccupy the passes of Roncesvalles and the Alduides; Hill had -reached the Col de Maya, and Byng was at Urdax; the fourth, seventh, -and light divisions remained in hand, and with these he resolved to -fall upon Clauzel whose position was dangerously advanced. - -_Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly._—The light division held the -road running from the bridge of Yanzi to Echallar until relieved by -the fourth division, and then marched by Lesaca to Santa Barbara, -thus turning Clauzel’s right. The fourth division marched from -Yanzi upon Echallar to attack his front, and the seventh moved from -Sumbilla against his left; but Barnes’s brigade, contrary to lord -Wellington’s intention, arrived unsupported before the fourth and -light divisions were either seen or felt, and without awaiting the -arrival of more troops assailed Clauzel’s strong position. The fire -became vehement, but neither the steepness of the mountain nor the -overshadowing multitude of the enemy clustering above in support of -their skirmishers could arrest the assailants, and then was seen -the astonishing spectacle of fifteen hundred men driving, by sheer -valour and force of arms, six thousand good troops from a position, -so rugged that there would have been little to boast of if the -numbers had been reversed and the defence made good. It is true that -the fourth division arrived towards the end of the action, that the -French had fulfilled their mission as a rear-guard, that they were -worn with fatigue and ill-provided with ammunition, having exhausted -all their reserve stores during the retreat, but the real cause of -their inferiority belongs to the highest part of war. - -The British soldiers, their natural fierceness stimulated by the -remarkable personal daring of their general, Barnes, were excited by -the pride of success; and the French divisions were those which had -failed in the attack on the 28th, which had been utterly defeated on -the 30th, and which had suffered so severely the day before about -Sumbilla. Such then is the preponderance of moral power. The men who -had assailed the terrible rocks above Sauroren, with a force and -energy that all the valour of the hardiest British veterans scarcely -sufficed to repel, were now, only five days afterwards, although -posted so strongly, unable to sustain the shock of one-fourth of -their own numbers. And at this very time eighty British soldiers, the -comrades and equals of those who achieved this wonderful exploit, -having wandered to plunder surrendered to some French peasants, -who lord Wellington truly observed, “_they would under other -circumstances have eat up!_” What gross ignorance of human nature -then do those writers display who assert, that the employing of brute -force is the highest qualification of a general! - -Clauzel, thus dispossessed of the mountain, fell back fighting to a -strong ridge beyond the pass of Echallar, having his right covered -by the Ivantelly mountain which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile -the light division emerging by Lesaca from the narrow valley of -the Bidassoa, ascended the broad heights of Santa Barbara without -opposition, and halted there until the operations of the fourth and -seventh divisions were far enough advanced to render it advisable -to attack the Ivantelly. This lofty mountain lifted its head on -the right, rising as it were out of the Santa Barbara heights, and -separating them from the ridges through which the French troops -beaten at Echallar were now retiring. Evening was coming on, a thick -mist capped the crowning rocks which contained a strong French -regiment, the British soldiers besides their long and terrible march -the previous day had been for two days without sustenance, and were -leaning, weak and fainting, on their arms, when the advancing fire of -Barnes’s action about Echallar indicated the necessity of dislodging -the enemy from Ivantelly. Colonel Andrew Barnard instantly led five -companies of his riflemen to the attack, and four companies of the -forty-third followed in support. The misty cloud had descended, and -the riflemen were soon lost to the view, but the sharp clang of their -weapons heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous rolling musketry -of the French, told what work was going on. For some time the echoes -rendered it doubtful how the action went, but the following companies -of the forty-third could find no trace of an enemy save the killed -and wounded. Barnard had fought his way unaided and without a check -to the summit, where his dark-clothed swarthy veterans raised their -victorious shout from the highest peak, just as the coming night -shewed the long ridges of the mountains beyond sparkling with the -last musket-flashes from Clauzel’s troops retiring in disorder from -Echallar. - -This day’s fighting cost the British four hundred men, and lord -Wellington narrowly escaped the enemy’s hands. He had carried with -him towards Echallar half a company of the forty-third as an escort, -and placed a serjeant named Blood with a party to watch in front -while he examined his maps. The French who were close at hand sent -a detachment to cut the party off; and such was the nature of the -ground that their troops, rushing on at speed, would infallibly have -fallen unawares upon lord Wellington, if Blood a young intelligent -man, seeing the danger, had not with surprising activity, leaping -rather than running down the precipitous rocks he was posted on, -given the general notice, and as it was the French arrived in time to -send a volley of shot after him as he galloped away. - -Soult now caused count D’Erlon to re-occupy the hills about Ainhoa, -Clauzel to take post on the heights in advance of Sarre, and Reille -to carry his two divisions to St. Jean de Luz in second line behind -Villatte’s reserve. Foy, who had rashly uncovered St. Jean Pied de -Port by descending upon Cambo, was ordered to return and reinforce -his troops with all that he could collect of national guards and -detachments. - -Wellington had on the 1st directed general Graham to collect his -forces and bring up pontoons for crossing the Bidassoa, but he -finally abandoned this design, and the two armies therefore rested -quiet in their respective positions, after nine days of continual -movement during which they had fought ten serious actions. Of the -allies, including the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred -officers and soldiers had been killed wounded or taken, and many were -dispersed from fatigue or to plunder. On the French side the loss was -terrible and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate. -Nevertheless a close approximation may be made. Lord Wellington at -first called it twelve thousand, but hearing that the French officers -admitted more he raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. The -engineer, _Belmas_, in his Journals of Sieges, compiled from official -documents by order of the French government, sets down above thirteen -thousand. Soult in his dispatches at the time, stated fifteen hundred -as the loss at Maya, four hundred at Roncesvalles, two hundred on -the 27th, and eighteen hundred on the 28th, after which he speaks -no more of losses by battle. There remains therefore to be added -the killed and wounded at the combats of Linzoain on the 26th, the -double battles of Sauroren and Buenza on the 30th, the combats of the -31st, and those of the 1st and 2d of August; finally, four thousand -unwounded prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to sound -the stream of blood in all its horrid depths. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The allies’ line of defence was weak. Was it therefore -injudiciously adopted? - -The French beaten at Vittoria were disorganized and retreated without -artillery or baggage on excentric lines; Foy by Guipuscoa, Clauzel -by Zaragoza, Reille by San Estevan, the King by Pampeluna. There was -no reserve to rally upon, the people fled from the frontier, Bayonne -and St. Jean Pied de Port if not defenceless were certainly in a very -neglected state, and the English general might have undertaken any -operation, assumed any position, offensive or defensive, which seemed -good to him. Why then did he not establish the Anglo-Portuguese -beyond the mountains, leaving the Spaniards to blockade the -fortresses behind him? The answer to this question involves the -difference between the practice and the theory of war. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Dispatches.] - -“_The soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting themselves -after the battle dispersed in the night to plunder, and were so -fatigued that when the rain came on the next day they were incapable -of marching and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy. Eighteen -days after the victory twelve thousand five hundred men, chiefly -British, were absent, most of them marauding in the mountains._” - -Such were the reasons assigned by the English general for his slack -pursuit after the battle of Vittoria, yet he had commanded that army -for six years! Was he then deficient in the first qualification -of a general, the art of disciplining and inspiring troops, or was -the English military system defective? It is certain that he always -exacted the confidence of his soldiers as a leader. It is not so -certain that he ever gained their affections. The barbarity of the -English military code excited public horror, the inequality of -promotion created public discontent; yet the general complained he -had no adequate power to reward or punish, and he condemned alike the -system and the soldiers it produced. The latter “_were detestable -for every thing but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the -men_.” The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent with his -celebrated observation, subsequently made, namely, “that he thought -he could go any where and do any thing with the army that fought on -the Pyrenees,” and although it cannot be denied that his complaints -were generally too well-founded, there were thousands of true and -noble soldiers, and zealous worthy officers, who served their country -honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough that they have been -since neglected, exactly in proportion to their want of that corrupt -aristocratic influence which produced the evils complained of. - -2º. When the misconduct of the troops had thus weakened the effect -of victory, the question of following Joseph at once into France -assumed a new aspect. Wellington’s system of warfare had never varied -after the battle of Talavera. Rejecting dangerous enterprize, it -rested on profound calculation both as to time and resources for the -accomplishment of a particular object, namely, the gradual liberation -of Spain by the Anglo-Portuguese army. Not that he held it impossible -to attain that object suddenly, and his battles in India, the -passage of the Douro, the advance to Talavera, prove that by nature -he was inclined to daring operations; but such efforts, however -glorious, could not be adopted by a commander who feared even the -loss of a brigade lest the government he served should put an end to -the war. Neither was it suitable to the state of his relations with -the Portuguese and Spaniards; their ignorance jealousy and passionate -pride, fierce in proportion to their weakness and improvidence, would -have enhanced every danger. - -No man could have anticipated the extraordinary errors of the -French in 1813. Wellington did not expect to cross the Ebro before -the end of the campaign, and his battering train was prepared for -the siege of Burgos not for that of Bayonne. A sudden invasion of -France her military reputation considered, was therefore quite out -of the pale of his methodized system of warfare, which was founded -upon political as well as military considerations; and of the most -complicated nature, seeing that he had at all times to deal with the -personal and factious interests and passions, as well as the great -state interests of three distinct nations two of which abhorred each -other. At this moment also, the uncertain state of affairs in Germany -strongly influenced his views. An armistice which might end in a -separate peace excluding England, would have brought Napoleon’s whole -force to the Pyrenees, and Wellington held cheap both the military -and political proceedings of the coalesced powers. “_I would not -move a corporal’s guard in reliance upon such a system_,” was the -significant phrase he employed to express his contempt. - -These considerations justified his caution as to invading France, -but there were local military reasons equally cogent. 1º. He could -not dispense with a secure harbour, because the fortresses still -in possession of the French, namely, Santona, Pancorbo, Pampeluna, -and St. Sebastian, interrupted his communications with the interior -of Spain; hence the siege of the latter place. 2º. He had to guard -against the union of Suchet and Clauzel on his right flank; hence his -efforts to cut off the last-named general; hence also the blockade of -Pampeluna in preference to siege and the launching of Mina and the -bands on the side of Zaragoza. - -3º. After Vittoria the nature of the campaign depended upon -Suchet’s operations, which were rendered more important by Murray’s -misconduct. The allied force on the eastern coast was badly -organized, it did not advance from Valencia as we have seen until -the 16th, and then only partially and by the coast, whereas Suchet -had assembled more than twenty thousand excellent troops on the -Ebro as early as the 12th of July; and had he continued his march -upon Zaragoza he would have saved the castle of that place with -its stores. Then rallying Paris’ division, he could have menaced -Wellington’s flank with twenty-five thousand men exclusive of -Clauzel’s force, and if that general joined him with forty thousand. - -On the 16th, the day lord William Bentinck quitted Valencia, Suchet -might have marched from Zaragoza on Tudela or Sanguessa, and -Soult’s preparations originally made as we have seen to attack on -the 23d instead of the 25th, would have naturally been hastened. -How difficult it would then have been for the allies to maintain -themselves beyond the Ebro is evident, much more so to hold a -forward position in France. That Wellington feared an operation of -this nature is clear from his instructions to lord William Bentinck -and to Mina; and because Picton’s and Cole’s divisions instead of -occupying the passes were kept behind the mountains solely to watch -Clauzel; when the latter had regained the frontier of France Cole was -permitted to join Byng and Morillo. It follows that the operations -after the battle of Vittoria were well considered and consonant to -lord Wellington’s general system. Their wisdom would have been proved -if Suchet had seized the advantages within his reach. - -4º. A general’s capacity is sometimes more taxed to profit from a -victory than to gain one. Wellington, master of all Spain, Catalonia -excepted, desired to establish himself solidly in the Pyrenees, lest -a separate peace in Germany should enable Napoleon to turn his whole -force against the allies. In this expectation, with astonishing -exertion of body and mind, he had in three days achieved a rigorous -examination of the whole mass of the Western Pyrenees, and concluded -that if Pampeluna and San Sebastian fell, a defensive position as -strong as that of Portugal, and a much stronger one than could be -found behind the Ebro, might be established. But to invest those -places and maintain so difficult a covering line was a greater task -than to win the battle of Vittoria. However, the early fall of San -Sebastian he expected, because the errors of execution in that siege -could not be foreseen, and also for gain of time he counted upon the -disorganized state of the French army, upon Joseph’s want of military -capacity, and upon the moral ascendancy which his own troops had -acquired over the enemy by their victories. He could not anticipate -the expeditious journey, the sudden arrival of Soult, whose rapid -reorganization of the French army, and whose vigorous operations -contrasted with Joseph’s abandonment of Spain, illustrated the old -Greek saying, that a herd of deer led by a lion are more dangerous -than a herd of lions led by a deer. - -5º. The duke of Dalmatia was little beholden to fortune at the -commencement of his movements. Her first contradiction was the bad -weather, which breaking up the roads delayed the concentration of -his army at St. Jean Pied de Port for two days; all officers know -the effect which heavy rain and hard marches have upon the vigour -and confidence of soldiers who are going to attack. If Soult had -commenced on the 23d instead of the 25th the surprise would have been -more complete his army more brisk; and as no conscript battalions -would have arrived to delay Reille, that general would probably have -been more ready in his attack, and might possibly have escaped the -fog which on the 26th stopped his march along the superior crest of -the mountain towards Vellate. On the other hand the allies would -have been spared the unsuccessful assault on San Sebastian, and the -pass of Maya might have been better furnished with troops. However -Soult’s combinations were so well knit that more than one error in -execution, and more than one accident of fortune, were necessary to -baffle him. Had count D’Erlon followed his instructions even on the -26th general Hill would probably have been shouldered off the valley -of Lanz, and Soult would have had twenty thousand additional troops -in the combats of the 27th and 28th. Such failures however generally -attend extensively combined movements, and it is by no means certain -that the count would have been able to carry the position of the Col -de Maya on the 25th, if all general Stewart’s forces had been posted -there. It would therefore perhaps have been more strictly within -the rules of art, if D’Erlon had been directed to leave one of his -three divisions to menace the Col de Maya while he marched with the -other two by St. Etienne de Baygorry up the Alduides. This movement, -covered by the national guards who occupied the mountain of La -Houssa, could not have been stopped by Campbell’s Portuguese brigade, -and would have dislodged Hill from the Bastan while it secured the -junction of D’Erlon with Soult on the crest of the superior chain. - -[Sidenote: Original Note by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.] - -6º. The intrepid constancy with which Byng and Ross defended their -several positions on the 25th, the able and clean retreat made by -general Cole as far as the heights of Linzoain, gave full effect to -the errors of Reille and D’Erlon, and would probably have baffled -Soult at an early period if general Picton had truly comprehended -the importance of his position. Lord Wellington says that the -concentration of the army would have been effected on the 27th -if that officer and general Cole had not agreed in thinking it -impossible to make a stand behind Linzoain; and surely the necessity -of retreating on that day may be questioned. For if Cole with ten -thousand men maintained the position in front of Altobiscar, Ibañeta, -and Atalosti, Picton might have maintained the more contracted one -behind Linzoain and Erro with twenty thousand. And that number he -could have assembled, because Campbell’s Portuguese reached Eugui -long before the evening of the 26th, and lord Wellington had directed -O’Donnel to keep three thousand five hundred of the blockading -troops in readiness to act in advance, of which Picton could not have -been ignorant. It was impossible to turn him by the valley of Urroz -that line being too rugged for the march of an army and not leading -directly upon Pampeluna. The only roads into the Val de Zubiri were -by Erro and Linzoain, lying close together and both leading upon the -village of Zubiri over the ridges which Picton occupied, and the -strength of which was evident from Soult’s declining an attack on the -evening of the 26th when Cole only was before him. To abandon this -ground so hastily when the concentration of the army depended upon -keeping it, appears therefore an error, aggravated by the neglect -of sending timely information to the commander-in-chief, for lord -Wellington did not know of the retreat until the morning of the 27th -and then only from general Long. It might be that Picton’s messenger -failed, but many should have been sent when a retrograde movement -involving the fate of Pampeluna was contemplated. - -[Sidenote: Note by General Cole, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -It has been said that general Cole was the adviser of this retreat -which if completed would have ruined lord Wellington’s campaign. -This is incorrect, Picton was not a man to be guided by others. -General Cole indeed gave him a report, drawn up by colonel Bell -one of the ablest staff-officers of the army, which stated that no -position suitable for a very inferior force existed between Zubiri -and Pampeluna, and this was true in the sense of the report, which -had reference only to a division not to an army; moreover, although -the actual battle of Sauroren was fought by inferior numbers, the -whole position, including the ridges of the second line occupied by -Picton and the Spaniards, was only maintained by equal numbers; -and if Soult had made the attack of the 28th on the evening of the -27th before the sixth division arrived, the position would have -been carried. However there is no doubt that colonel Bell’s report -influenced Picton, and it was only when his troops had reached Huarte -and Villalba that he suddenly resolved on battle. That was a military -resolution, vigorous and prompt; and not the less worthy of praise -that he so readily adopted Cole’s saving proposition to regain the -more forward heights above Zabaldica. - -7º. Marshal Soult appeared unwilling to attack on the evenings of the -26th and 27th. Yet success depended upon forestalling the allies at -their point of concentration; and it is somewhat inexplicable that -on the 28th, having possession of the ridge beyond the Lanz river -and plenty of cavalry, he should have known so little of the sixth -division’s movements. The general conception of his scheme on the -30th has also been blamed by some of his own countrymen, apparently -from ignorance of the facts and because it failed. Crowned with -success it would have been cited as a fine illustration of the art of -war. To have retired at once by the two valleys of Zubiri and Lanz -after being reinforced with twenty thousand men would have given -great importance to his repulse on the 28th; his reputation as a -general capable of restoring the French affairs would have vanished, -and mischief only have accrued, even though he should have effected -his retreat safely, which, regard being had to the narrowness of the -valleys the position of general Hill on his right and the boldness -of his adversary, was not certain. To abandon the valley of Zubiri -and secure that of Lanz; to obtain another and shorter line of -retreat by the Doña Maria pass; to crush general Hill with superior -numbers, and thus gaining the Irurzun road to succour San Sebastian, -or failing of that, to secure the union of the whole army and give -to his retreat the appearance of an able offensive movement; to -combine all these chances by one operation immediately after a severe -check was Soult’s plan, it was not impracticable and was surely the -conception of a great commander. - -To succeed however it was essential either to beat general Hill -off-hand and thus draw Wellington to that side by the way of -Marcalain, or to secure the defence of the French left in such -a solid manner that no efforts against it should prevail to the -detriment of the offensive movement on the right: neither was -effected. The French general indeed brought an overwhelming force to -bear upon Hill, and drove him from the road of Irurzun, but he did -not crush him, because that general fought so strongly and retired -with such good order, that beyond the loss of the position no injury -was sustained. Meanwhile the left wing of the French was completely -beaten, and thus the advantage gained on the right was more than -nullified. Soult trusted to the remarkable defensive strength of the -ground occupied by his left, and he had reason to do so, for it was -nearly impregnable. Lord Wellington turned it on both flanks at the -same time, but neither Picton’s advance into the valley of Zubiri -on Foy’s left, nor Cole’s front attack on that general, nor Byng’s -assault upon the village of Sauroren, would have seriously damaged -the French without the sudden and complete success of general Inglis -beyond the Lanz. The other attacks would indeed have forced the -French to retire somewhat hastily up the valley of the Lanz, yet -they could have held together in mass secure of their junction with -Soult. But when the ridges running between them and the right wing of -the French army were carried by Inglis, and the whole of the seventh -division was thrown upon their flank and rear, the front attack -became decisive. It is clear therefore that the key of the defence -was on the ridge beyond the Lanz, and instead of two regiments -Clauzel should have placed two divisions there. - -8º. Lord Wellington’s quick perception and vigorous stroke on the -30th were to be expected from such a consummate commander, yet he -certainly was not master of all the bearings of the French general’s -operations; he knew neither the extent of Hill’s danger nor the -difficulties of Soult, otherwise it is probable that he would have -put stronger columns in motion, and at an earlier hour, towards the -pass of Doña Maria on the morning of the 31st. Hill did not commence -his march that day until 8 o’clock, and it has been shewn that even -with the help of the seventh division he was too weak against the -heavy mass of the retreating French army. The faults and accidents -which baffled Wellington’s after operations have been sufficiently -touched upon in the narrative, but he halted in the midst of his -victorious career, when Soult’s army was broken and flying, when -Suchet had retired into Catalonia, and all things seemed favourable -for the invasion of France. - -His motives for this were strong. He knew the armistice in Germany -had been renewed with a view to peace, and he had therefore reason to -expect Soult would be reinforced. A forward position in France would -have lent his right to the enemy who pivotted upon St. Jean Pied de -Port could operate against his flank. His arrangements for supply, -and intercourse with his depôts and hospitals, would have been more -difficult and complicated, and as the enemy possessed all the French -and Spanish fortresses commanding the great roads, his need to gain -one, at least, before the season closed, was absolute if he would -not resign his communications with the interior of Spain. Then long -marches and frequent combats had fatigued his troops destroyed their -shoes and used up their musquet ammunition; and the loss of men had -been great, especially of British in the second division where their -proportion to foreign troops was become too small. The difficulty -of re-equipping the troops would have been increased by entering an -enemy’s state, because the English system did not make war support -war and his communications would have been lengthened. Finally it -was France that was to be invaded, France in which every person was -a soldier, where the whole population was armed and organised under -men, not as in other countries inexperienced in war but who had all -served more or less. Beyond the Adour the army could not advance, -and if a separate peace was made by the northern powers, if any -misfortune befel the allies in Catalonia so as to leave Suchet at -liberty to operate towards Pampeluna, or if Soult profiting from -the possession of San Jean Pied de Port should turn the right flank -of the new position, a retreat into Spain would become necessary, -and however short would be dangerous from the hostility and warlike -disposition of the people directed in a military manner. - -These reasons joined to the fact, that a forward position, although -offering better communications from right to left, would have given -the enemy greater facilities for operating against an army which must -until the fortresses fell hold a defensive and somewhat extended -line, were conclusive as to the rashness of an invasion; but they do -not appear so conclusive as to the necessity of stopping short after -the action of the 2d of August. The questions were distinct. The one -was a great measure involving vast political and military conditions, -the other was simply whether Wellington should profit of his own -victory and the enemy’s distresses; and in this view the objections -above-mentioned, save the want of shoes the scarcity of ammunition -and the fatigue of the troops, are inapplicable. But in the two last -particulars the allies were not so badly off as the enemy, and in -the first not so deficient as to cripple the army, wherefore if the -advantage to be gained was worth the effort it was an error to halt. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, 4.] - -The solution of this problem is to be found in the comparative -condition of the armies. Soult had recovered his reserve his cavalry -and artillery, but Wellington was reinforced by general Graham’s -corps which was more numerous and powerful than Villate’s reserve. -The new chances then were for the allies, and the action of the 2d -of August demonstrated that their opponents however strongly posted -could not stand before them; one more victory would have gone nigh -to destroy the French force altogether; for such was the disorder -that Maucune’s division had on the 2d only one thousand men left out -of more than five thousand, and on the 6th it had still a thousand -stragglers besides killed and wounded: Conroux’s and La Martinière’s -divisions were scarcely in better plight, and the losses of the -other divisions although less remarkable were great. It must also -be remembered that general Foy with eight thousand men was cut off -from the main body; and the Nivelle, the sources of which were in -the allies’ power, was behind the French. With their left pressed -from the pass of Maya, and their front vigorously assailed by the -main body of the allies, they could hardly have kept together, since -more than twenty-one thousand men exclusive of Foy’s troops were then -absent from their colours. And as late as the 12th of August Soult -warned the minister of war that he was indeed preparing to assail his -enemy again, but he had not the means of resisting a counter-attack, -although he held a different language to his army and to the people -of the country. - -Had Cæsar halted because his soldiers were fatigued, Pharsalia would -have been but a common battle. - - - - -BOOK XXII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. August.] - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -After the combat of Echallar Soult adopted a permanent position and -reorganized his army. The left wing under D’Erlon occupied the hills -of Ainhoa, with an advanced guard on the heights overlooking Urdax -and Zuguramurdi. The centre under Clauzel was in advance of Sarre -guarding the issues from Vera and Echallar, his right resting on the -greatest of the Rhune mountains. The right wing under Reille composed -of Maucune’s and La Martinière’s divisions extended along the Lower -Bidassoa to the sea; Villatte’s reserve was encamped behind the -Nivelle near Serres, and Reille’s third division, under Foy, covered -in conjunction with the national guards, St. Jean Pied de Port and -the roads leading into France on that side. The cavalry for the -convenience of forage were quartered, one division between the Nive -and the Nivelle rivers, the other as far back as Dax. - -Lord Wellington occupied his old positions from the pass of -Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa, but the disposition of his -troops was different. Sir Rowland Hill, reinforced by Morillo, held -the Roncesvalles and Alduides throwing up field-works at the former. -The third and sixth divisions were in the Bastan guarding the Puerto -de Maya, and the seventh division, reinforced by O’Donnel’s army of -reserve, occupied the passes at Echallar and Zugaramurdi. The light -division was posted on the Santa Barbara heights having picquets in -the town of Vera; their left rested on the Bidassoa, their right on -the Ivantelly rock, round which a bridle communication with Echallar -was now made by the labour of the soldiers. Longa’s troops were -beyond the Bidassoa on the left of the light division; the fourth -division was in reserve behind him, near Lesaca; the fourth Spanish -army, now commanded by general Freyre, prolonged the line from the -left of Longa to the sea; it crossed the royal causeway occupied -Irun and Fontarabia and guarded the Jaizquibel mountain. The first -division was in reserve behind these Spaniards; the fifth division -was destined to resume the siege of San Sebastian; the blockade of -Pampeluna was maintained by Carlos D’España’s troops. - -This disposition, made with increased means, was more powerful for -defence than the former occupation of the same ground. A strong corps -under a single command was well entrenched at Roncesvalles; and in -the Bastan two British divisions admonished by Stewart’s error were -more than sufficient to defend the Puerto de Maya. The Echallar -mountains were with the aid of O’Donnel’s Spaniards equally secure, -and the reserve instead of occupying San Estevan was posted near -Lesaca in support of the left, now become the most important part of -the line. - -The castles of Zaragoza and Daroca had fallen, the Empecinado was -directed upon Alcanitz and he maintained the communication between -the Catalan army, and Mina. The latter now joined by Duran was -gathering near Jaca from whence his line of retreat was by Sanguessa -upon Pampeluna; in this position he menaced general Paris, who -marched after a slight engagement on the 11th into France, leaving -eight hundred men in the town and castle. At this time lord William -Bentinck having crossed the Ebro was investing Taragona, and thus -the allies, acting on the offensive, were in direct military -communication from the Mediteranean to the Bay of Biscay, while -Suchet though holding the fortresses could only communicate with -Soult through France. - -This last-named marshal, being strongly posted, did not much expect -a front attack, but the augmentation of the allies on the side of -Roncesvalles and Maya gave him uneasiness, lest they should force him -to abandon his position by operating along the Nive river. To meet -this danger general Paris took post at Oleron in second line to Foy, -and the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navareins were put in -a state of defence as pivots of operation on that side, while Bayonne -served a like purpose on the other flank of the army. But with great -diligence the French general fortified his line from the mouth of the -Bidassoa to the rocks of Mondarain and the Nive. - -Lord Wellington, whose reasons for not invading France at this period -have been already noticed, and who had now little to fear from any -renewal of the French operations against his right wing, turned his -whole attention to the reduction of San Sebastian. In this object he -was however crossed in a manner to prove that the English ministers -were the very counterparts of the Spanish and Portuguese statesmen. -Lord Melville was at the head of the board of admiralty; under his -rule the navy of England for the first time met with disasters in -battle, and his neglect of the general’s demands for maritime aid -went nigh to fasten the like misfortunes upon the army. This neglect -combined with the cabinet scheme of employing lord Wellington in -Germany, would seem to prove that experience had taught the English -ministers nothing as to the nature of the Peninsular war, or that -elated with the array of sovereigns against Napoleon they were now -careless of a cause so mixed up with democracy. Still it would be -incredible that lord Melville, a man of ordinary capacity, should -have been suffered to retard the great designs and endanger the final -success of a general, whose sure judgement and extraordinary merit -were authenticated by exploits unparalleled in English warfare, if -lord Wellington’s correspondence and that of Mr. Stuart did not -establish the following facts. - -1º. Desertion from the enemy was stopped, chiefly because the -Admiralty, of which lord Melville was the head, refused to let the -ships of war carry deserters or prisoners to England; they were thus -heaped up by hundreds at Lisbon and maltreated by the Portuguese -government, which checked all desire in the French troops to come -over. - -2º. When the disputes with America commenced, Mr. Stuart’s efforts to -obtain flour for the army were most vexatiously thwarted by the board -of admiralty, which permitted if it did not encourage the English -ships of war to capture American vessels trading under the secret -licenses. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1.] - -3º. The refusal of the admiralty to establish certain cruisers along -the coast, as recommended by lord Wellington, caused the loss of many -store-ships and merchantmen, to the great detriment of the army -before it quitted Portugal. Fifteen were taken off Oporto, and one -close to the bar of Lisbon in May. And afterwards, the Mediterranean -packet bearing despatches from lord William Bentinck was captured, -which led to lamentable consequences; for the papers were not in -cypher, and contained detailed accounts of plots against the French -in Italy, with the names of the principal persons engaged. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Despatches, MSS.] - -4º. A like neglect of the coast of Spain caused ships containing -money, shoes, and other indispensable stores to delay in port, or -risk the being taken on the passage by cruizers issuing from Santona, -Bayonne, and Bordeaux. And while the communications of the allies -were thus intercepted, the French coasting vessels supplied their -army and fortresses without difficulty. - -5º. After the battle of Vittoria lord Wellington was forced to -use French ammunition, though too small for the English muskets, -because the ordnance store-ships which he had ordered from Lisbon to -Santander could not sail for want of convoy. When the troops were -in the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of five thousand men was kept at -Gibraltar and Lisbon waiting for ships of war, and the transports -employed to convey them were thus withdrawn from the service of -carrying home wounded men, at a time when the Spanish authorities -at Bilbao refused even for payment to concede public buildings for -hospitals. - -6º. When snow was falling on the Pyrenees the soldiers were without -proper clothing, because the ship containing their great coats, -though ready to sail in August, was detained at Oporto until -November waiting for convoy. When the victories of July were to -be turned to profit ere the fitting season for the siege of San -Sebastian should pass away, the attack of that fortress was retarded -sixteen days because a battering train and ammunition, demanded -several months before by lord Wellington, had not yet arrived from -England. - -7º. During the siege the sea communication with Bayonne was free. -“Any thing in the shape of a naval force,” said lord Wellington, -“would drive away sir George Collier’s squadron.” The garrison -received reinforcements artillery ammunition and all necessary stores -for its defence, sending away the sick and wounded men in empty -vessels. The Spanish general blockading Santona complained at the -same time that the exertions of his troops were useless, because the -French succoured the place by sea when they pleased; and after the -battle of Vittoria not less than five vessels laden with stores and -provisions, and one transport having British soldiers and clothing -on board, were taken by cruizers issuing out of that port. The great -advantage of attacking San Sebastian by water as well as by land was -foregone for want of naval means, and from the same cause British -soldiers were withdrawn from their own service to unload store-ships; -the gun-boats employed in the blockade were Spanish vessels manned by -Spanish soldiers withdrawn from the army, and the store-boats were -navigated by Spanish women. - -8º. The coasting trade between Bordeaux and Bayonne being quite free, -the French, whose military means of transport had been so crippled -by their losses at Vittoria that they could scarcely have collected -magazines with land carriage only, received their supplies by -water, and were thus saved trouble and expense and the unpopularity -attending forced requisitions. - -Between April and August, more than twenty applications and -remonstrances, were addressed by lord Wellington to the government -upon these points without producing the slightest attention to his -demands. Mr. Croker, the under-secretary of the Admiralty, of whose -conduct he particularly complained, was indeed permitted to write an -offensive official letter to him, but his demands and the dangers -to be apprehended from neglecting them were disregarded, and to -use his own words, “_since Great Britain had been a naval power a -British army had never before been left in such a situation at a most -important moment_.” - -Nor is it easy to determine whether negligence and incapacity -or a grovelling sense of national honour prevailed most in the -cabinet, when we find this renowned general complaining that the -government, ignorant even to ridicule of military operations, seemed -to know nothing of the nature of the element with which England was -surrounded, and lord Melville so insensible to the glorious toils of -the Peninsula as to tell him that his army was the last thing to be -attended to. - - -RENEWED SIEGE OF SEBASTIAN. - -Villatte’s demonstration against Longa on the 28th of July had caused -the ships laden with the battering train to put to sea, but on the -5th of August the guns were re-landed and the works against the -fortress resumed. On the 8th, a notion having spread that the enemy -was mining under the cask redoubt, the engineers seized the occasion -to exercise their inexperienced miners by sinking a shaft and driving -a gallery. The men soon acquired expertness, and as the water rose in -the shaft at twelve feet, the work was discontinued when the gallery -had attained eighty feet. Meanwhile the old trenches were repaired, -the heights of San Bartolomeo were strengthened, and the convent of -Antigua, built on a rock to the left of those heights, was fortified -and armed with two guns to scour the open beach and sweep the bay. -The siege however languished for want of ammunition; and during this -forced inactivity the garrison received supplies and reinforcements -by sea, their damaged works were repaired, new defences constructed, -the magazines filled, and sixty-seven pieces of artillery put in a -condition to play. Eight hundred and fifty men had been killed and -wounded since the commencement of the attack in July, but as fresh -men came by sea, more than two thousand six hundred good soldiers -were still present under arms. And to show that their confidence -was unabated they celebrated the Emperor’s birthday by crowning the -castle with a splendid illumination; encircling it with a fiery -legend to his honour in characters so large as to be distinctly read -by the besiegers. - -On the 19th of August, that is to say after a delay of sixteen -days, the battering train arrived from England, and in the night of -the 22d fifteen heavy pieces were placed in battery, eight at the -right attack and seven at the left. A second battering train came -on the 23d, augmenting the number of pieces of various kinds to a -hundred and seventeen, including a large Spanish mortar; but with -characteristic negligence this enormous armament had been sent out -from England with no more shot and shells than would suffice for one -day’s consumption! - -In the night of the 23d the batteries on the Chofre sand-hills -were reinforced with four long pieces and four sixty-eight pound -carronades, and the left attack with six additional guns. Ninety -sappers and miners had come with the train from England, the seamen -under Mr. O’Reilly were again attached to the batteries, and part of -the field artillerymen were brought to the siege. - -On the 24th the attack was recommenced with activity. The Chofre -batteries were enlarged to contain forty-eight pieces, and two -batteries for thirteen pieces were begun on the heights of -Bartolomeo, designed to breach at seven hundred yards distance the -faces of the left demi-bastion of the horn-work, that of St. John -on the main front, and the end of the high curtain, for these works -rising in gradation one above another were in the same line of shot. -The approaches on the isthmus were now also pushed forward by the -sap, but the old trenches were still imperfect, and before daylight -on the 25th the French coming from the horn-work swept the left of -the parallel, injured the sap, and made some prisoners before they -were repulsed. - -On the night of the 25th the batteries were all armed on both sides -of the Urumea, and on the 26th fifty-seven pieces opened with a -general salvo, and continued to play with astounding noise and -rapidity until evening. The firing from the Chofre hills destroyed -the revêtement of the demi-bastion of St. John, and nearly ruined the -towers near the old breach together with the wall connecting them; -but at the isthmus, the batteries although they injured the horn-work -made little impression on the main front from which they were too -distant. - -Lord Wellington, present at this attack and discontented with the -operation, now ordered a battery for six guns to be constructed -amongst some ruined houses on the right of the parallel, only three -hundred yards from the main front, and two shafts were sunk with -a view to drive galleries for the protection of this new battery -against the enemy’s mines, but the work was slow because of the sandy -nature of the soil. - -At 3 o’clock in the morning of the 27th the boats of the squadron, -commanded by lieut. Arbuthnot of the Surveillante and carrying a -hundred soldiers of the ninth regiment under captain Cameron, pulled -to attack the island of Santa Clara. A heavy fire was opened on them, -and the troops landed with some difficulty, but the island was then -easily taken and a lodgement made with the loss of only twenty-eight -men and officers, of which eighteen were seamen. - -In the night of the 27th, about 3 o’clock, the French sallied against -the new battery on the isthmus, but as colonel Cameron of the ninth -regiment met them on the very edge of the trenches with the bayonet -the attempt failed, yet it delayed the arming of the battery. At -day-break the renewed fire of the besiegers, especially that from -the Chofres sand-hills, was extremely heavy, and the shrapnel shells -were supposed to be very destructive; nevertheless the practice with -that missile was very uncertain, the bullets frequently flew amongst -the guards in the parallel and one struck the field-officer. In the -course of the day another sally was commenced, but the enemy being -discovered and fired upon did not persist. The trenches were now -furnished with banquettes and parapets as fast as the quantity of -gabions and fascines would permit, yet the work was slow, because the -Spanish authorities of Guipuscoa, like those in every other part of -Spain, neglected to provide carts to convey the materials from the -woods, and this hard labour was performed by the Portuguese soldiers. -It would seem however an error not to have prepared all the materials -of this nature during the blockade. - -Lord Wellington again visited the works this day, and in the night -the advanced battery, which, at the desire of sir Richard Fletcher -had been constructed for only four guns, was armed. The 29th it -opened, but an accident had prevented the arrival of one gun, and the -fire of the enemy soon dismounted another, so that only two instead -of six guns as lord Wellington had designed, smote at short range -the face of the demi-bastion of St. John and the end of the high -curtain; however the general firing was severe both upon the castle -and the town-works and great damage was done to the defences. By this -time the French guns were nearly silenced and as additional mortars -were mounted on the Chofre batteries, making in all sixty-three -pieces of which twenty-nine threw shells or spherical case-shot, the -superiority of the besiegers was established. - -The Urumea was now discovered to be fordable. Captain Alexander -Macdonald of the artillery, without orders, waded across in the night -passed close under the works to the breach and returned safely. -Wherefore as a few minutes would suffice to bring the enemy into the -Chofre batteries, to save the guns from being spiked their vents -were covered with iron plates fastened by chains; and this was also -done at the advanced battery on the isthmus. - -This day the materials and ordnance for a battery of six pieces, -to take the defences of the Monte Orgullo in reverse, were sent to -the island of Santa Clara; and several guns in the Chofre batteries -were turned upon the retaining wall of the horn-work, in the hope -of shaking down any mines the enemy might have prepared there, -without destroying the wall itself which offered cover for the troops -advancing to the assault. - -The trenches leading from the parallel on the isthmus were now -very wide and good, the sap was pushed on the right close to the -demi-bastion of the horn-work, and the sea-wall supporting the high -road into the town, which had increased the march and cramped the -formation of the columns in the first assault, was broken through to -give access to the strand and shorten the approach to the breaches. -The crisis was at hand and in the night of the 29th a false attack -was ordered to make the enemy spring his mines; a desperate service -and bravely executed by lieutenant Macadam of the ninth regiment. The -order was sudden, no volunteers were demanded, no rewards offered, no -means of excitement resorted to; yet such is the inherent bravery of -British soldiers, that seventeen men of the royals, the nearest at -hand, immediately leaped forth ready and willing to encounter what -seemed certain death. With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries -playing hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach -unperceived, and then mounted in extended order shouting and firing; -but the French were too steady to be imposed upon and their musquetry -laid the whole party low with the exception of their commander, who -returned alone to the trenches. - -On the 30th the sea-flank of the place being opened from the -half-bastion of St. John on the right to the most distant of the -old breaches, that is to say, for five hundred feet, the batteries -on the Chofres were turned against the castle and other defences of -the Monte Orgullo, while the advanced battery on the isthmus, now -containing three guns, demolished, in conjunction with the fire from -the Chofres, the face of the half-bastion of St. John’s and the end -of the high curtain above it. The whole of that quarter was in ruins, -and at the same time the batteries on San Bartolomeo broke the face -of the demi-bastion of the horn-work and cut away the palisades. - -The 30th the batteries continued their fire, and about three o’clock -lord Wellington after examining the enemy’s defence resolved to make -a lodgement on the breach, and in that view ordered the assault to be -made the next day at eleven o’clock when the ebb of tide would leave -full space between the horn-work and the water. - -The galleries in front of the advanced battery on the isthmus were -now pushed close up to the sea wall, under which three mines were -formed with the double view of opening a short and easy way for the -troops to reach the strand, and rendering useless any subterranean -works the enemy might have made in that part. At two o’clock in the -morning of the 31st they were sprung, and opened three wide passages -which were immediately connected, and a traverse of gabions, six feet -high, was run across the mouth of the main trench on the left, to -screen the opening from the grape-shot of the castle. Everything was -now ready for the assault, but before describing that terrible event -it will be fitting to shew the exact state of the besieged in defence. - -Sir Thomas Graham had been before the place for fifty-two days, -during thirty of which the attack was suspended. All this time the -garrison had laboured incessantly, and though the heavy fire of the -besiegers since the 26th appeared to have ruined the defences of the -enormous breach in the sea flank, it was not so. A perpendicular fall -behind of more than twenty feet barred progress, and beyond that, -amongst the ruins of the burned houses, was a strong counter-wall -fifteen feet high, loopholed for musquetry, and extending in a -parallel direction with the breaches, which were also cut off from -the sound part of the rampart by traverses at the extremities. The -only really practicable road into the town was by the narrow end of -the high curtain above the half bastion of St. John. - -In front of the counter-wall, about the middle of the great breach, -stood the tower of Los Hornos still capable of some defence, and -beneath it a mine charged with twelve hundred weight of powder. -The streets were all trenched, and furnished with traverses to -dispute the passage and to cover a retreat to the Monte Orgullo; but -before the assailants could reach the main breach it was necessary -either to form a lodgment in the horn-work, or to pass as in the -former assault under a flanking fire of musquetry for a distance of -nearly two hundred yards. And the first step was close under the -sea-wall covering the salient angle of the covered way, where two -mines charged with eight hundred pounds of powder were prepared to -overwhelm the advancing columns. - -[Sidenote: Belmas.] - -To support this system of retrenchments and mines the French had -still some artillery in reserve. One sixteen-pounder mounted at St. -Elmo flanked the left of the breaches on the river face; a twelve -and an eight-pounder preserved in the casemates of the Cavalier were -ready to flank the land face of the half-bastion of St. John; many -guns from the Monte Orgullo especially those of the Mirador could -play upon the columns, and there was a four-pounder hidden on the -horn-work to be brought into action when the assault commenced. -Neither the resolution of the governor nor the courage of the -garrison were abated, but the overwhelming fire of the last few days -had reduced the number of fighting men; General Rey had only two -hundred and fifty men in reserve, and he demanded of Soult whether -his brave garrison should be exposed to another assault. “The army -would endeavour to succour him” was the reply, and he abided his fate. - -Napoleon’s ordinance, which forbade the surrender of a fortress -without having stood at least one assault, has been strongly censured -by English writers upon slender grounds. The obstinate defences -made by French governors in the Peninsula were the results, and to -condemn an enemy’s system from which we have ourselves suffered -will scarcely bring it into disrepute. But the argument runs, that -the besiegers working by the rules of art must make a way into the -place, and to risk an assault for the sake of military glory or to -augment the loss of the enemy is to sacrifice brave men uselessly; -that capitulation always followed a certain advance of the besiegers -in Louis the Fourteenth’s time, and to suppose Napoleon’s upstart -generals possessed of superior courage or sense of military honour -to the high-minded nobility of that age was quite inadmissible; and -it has been rather whimsically added that obedience to the emperor’s -orders might suit a predestinarian Turk but could not be tolerated by -a reflecting Christian. From this it would seem, that certain nice -distinctions as to the extent and manner reconcile human slaughter -with Christianity, and that the true standard of military honour -was fixed by the intriguing, depraved and insolent court of Louis -the Fourteenth. It may however be reasonably supposed, that as the -achievements of Napoleon’s soldiers far exceeded the exploits of -Louis’s cringing courtiers they possessed greater military virtues. - -But the whole argument seems to rest upon false grounds. To inflict -loss upon an enemy is the very essence of war, and as the bravest men -and officers will always be foremost in an assault, the loss thus -occasioned may be of the utmost importance. To resist when nothing -can be gained or saved is an act of barbarous courage which reason -spurns at; but how seldom does that crisis happen in war? Napoleon -wisely insisted upon a resistance which should make it dangerous for -the besiegers to hasten a siege beyond the rules of art, he would -not have a weak governor yield to a simulation of force not really -existing; he desired that military honour should rest upon the -courage and resources of men rather than upon the strength of walls: -in fine he made a practical application of the proverb that necessity -is the mother of invention. - -Granted that a siege artfully conducted and with sufficient means -must reduce the fortress attacked; still there will be some -opportunity for a governor to display his resources of mind. Vauban -admits of one assault and several retrenchments, after a lodgment -is made on the body of the place; Napoleon only insisted that every -effort which courage and genius could dictate should be exhausted -before a surrender, and those efforts can never be defined or bounded -before-hand. Tarifa is a happy example. To be consistent, any -attack which deviates from the rules of art must also be denounced -as barbarous; yet how seldom has a general all the necessary means -at his disposal. In Spain not one siege could be conducted by the -British army according to the rules. And there is a manifest weakness -in praising the Spanish defence of Zaragoza, and condemning Napoleon -because he demanded from regular troops a devotion similar to that -displayed by peasants and artizans. What governor was ever in a more -desperate situation than general Bizanet at Bergen-op-Zoom, when sir -Thomas Graham, with a hardihood and daring which would alone place -him amongst the foremost men of enterprize which Europe can boast of, -threw more than two thousand men upon the ramparts of that almost -impregnable fortress. The young soldiers of the garrison frightened -by a surprise in the night, were dispersed, were flying. The -assailants had possession of the walls for several hours, yet some -cool and brave officers rallying the men towards morning, charged -up the narrow ramps and drove the assailants over the parapets into -the ditch. They who could not at first defend their works were now -able to retake them, and so completely successful and illustrative -of Napoleon’s principle was this counter-attack that the number -of prisoners equalled that of the garrison. There are no rules to -limit energy and genius, and no man knew better than Napoleon how to -call those qualities forth; he possessed them himself in the utmost -perfection and created them in others. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -STORMING OF SAN SEBASTIAN. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. August.] - -To assault the breaches without having destroyed the enemy’s defences -or established a lodgment on the horn-work, was, notwithstanding the -increased fire and great facilities of the besiegers, obviously a -repetition of the former fatal error. And the same generals who had -before so indiscreetly made their disapproval of such operations -public, now even more freely and imprudently dealt out censures, -which not ill-founded in themselves were most ill-timed, since there -is much danger when doubts come down from the commanders to the -soldiers. Lord Wellington thought the fifth division had been thus -discouraged, and incensed at the cause, demanded fifty volunteers -from each of the fifteen regiments composing the first, fourth, and -light divisions, “_men who could shew other troops how to mount a -breach_.” This was the phrase employed, and seven hundred and fifty -gallant soldiers instantly marched to San Sebastian in answer to the -appeal. Colonel Cooke and major Robertson led the guards and Germans -of the first division, major Rose commanded the men of the fourth -division, and colonel Hunt, a daring officer who had already won his -promotion at former assaults, was at the head of the fierce rugged -veterans of the light division, yet there were good officers and -brave soldiers in the fifth division. - -It being at first supposed that lord Wellington merely designed -a simple lodgment on the great breach, the volunteers and one -brigade of the fifth division only were ordered to be ready; but -in a council held at night major Smith maintained that the orders -were misunderstood, as no lodgment could be formed unless the high -curtain was gained. General Oswald being called to the council was -of the same opinion, whereupon the remainder of the fifth division -was brought to the trenches, and general Bradford having offered the -services of his Portuguese brigade, was told he might ford the Urumea -and assail the farthest breach if he judged it advisable. - -Sir James Leith had resumed the command of the fifth division, -and being assisted by general Oswald directed the attack from the -isthmus. He was extremely offended by the arrival of the volunteers -and would not suffer them to lead the assault; some he spread along -the trenches to keep down the fire of the horn-work, the remainder -were held as a reserve along with general Hay’s British and Sprye’s -Portuguese brigades of the fifth division. To general Robinson’s -brigade the assault was confided. It was formed in two columns, one -to assault the old breach between the towers, the other to storm the -bastion of St. John and the end of the high curtain. The small breach -on the extreme right was left for general Bradford’s Portuguese who -were drawn up on the Chofre hills; some large boats filled with -troops, were directed to make a demonstration against the sea-line -of the Monte Orgullo, and sir Thomas Graham overlooked the whole -operations from the right bank of the river. - -[Sidenote: Memoirs of Captain Cooke.] - -The morning of the 31st broke heavily, a thick fog hid every object, -and the besiegers’ batteries could not open until eight o’clock. From -that hour a constant shower of heavy missiles was poured upon the -besieged until eleven, when Robinson’s brigade getting out of the -trenches passed through the openings in the sea-wall and was launched -bodily against the breaches. While the head of the column was still -gathering on the strand, about thirty yards from the salient angle of -the horn-work, twelve men, commanded by a serjeant whose heroic death -has not sufficed to preserve his name, running violently forward -leaped upon the covered way with intent to cut the sausage of the -enemy’s mines. The French startled by this sudden assault fired the -train prematurely, and though the serjeant and his brave followers -were all destroyed and the high sea-wall was thrown with a dreadful -crash upon the head of the advancing column, not more than forty men -were crushed by the ruins and the rush of the troops was scarcely -checked. The forlorn hope had already passed beyond the play of the -mine, and now speeded along the strand amidst a shower of grape -and shells, the leader lieutenant Macguire of the fourth regiment, -conspicuous from his long white plume his fine figure and his -swiftness, bounded far ahead of his men in all the pride of youthful -strength and courage, but at the foot of the great breach he fell -dead, and the stormers went sweeping like a dark surge over his body; -many died however with him and the trickling of wounded men to the -rear was incessant. - -This time there was a broad strand left by the retreating tide -and the sun had dried the rocks, yet they disturbed the order and -closeness of the formation, the distance to the main breach was still -nearly two hundred yards, and the French, seeing the first mass of -assailants pass the horn-work regardless of its broken bastion, -immediately abandoned the front and crowding on the river face -of that work, poured their musketry into the flank of the second -column as it rushed along a few yards below them; but the soldiers -still running forward towards the breach returned this fire without -slackening their speed. The batteries of the Monte Orgullo and the -St. Elmo now sent their showers of shot and shells, the two pieces on -the cavalier swept the face of the breach in the bastion of St. John, -and the four-pounder in the horn-work being suddenly mounted on the -broken bastion poured grape-shot into their rear. - -Thus scourged with fire from all sides, the stormers, their array -broken alike by the shot and by the rocks they passed over, reached -their destinations, and the head of the first column gained the top -of the great breach; but the unexpected gulf below could only be -passed at a few places where meagre parcels of the burned houses -were still attached to the rampart, and the deadly clatter of the -French musquets from the loop-holed wall beyond soon strewed the -narrow crest of the ruins with dead. In vain the following multitude -covered the ascent seeking an entrance at every part; to advance -was impossible and the mass of assailants, slowly sinking downwards -remained stubborn and immoveable on the lower part of the breach. -Here they were covered from the musquetry in front, but from several -isolated points, especially the tower of Las Hornos under which the -great mine was placed, the French still smote them with small arms, -and the artillery from the Monte Orgullo poured shells and grape -without intermission. - -Such was the state of affairs at the great breach, and at the half -bastion of St. John it was even worse. The access to the top of the -high curtain being quite practicable, the efforts to force a way were -more persevering and constant, and the slaughter was in proportion; -for the traverse on the flank, cutting it off from the cavalier, was -defended by French grenadiers who would not yield; the two pieces -on the cavalier itself swept along the front face of the opening, -and the four-pounder and the musquetry from the horn-work, swept in -like manner along the river face. In the midst of this destruction -some sappers and a working party attached to the assaulting columns -endeavoured to form a lodgement, but no artificial materials had been -provided, and most of the labourers were killed before they could -raise the loose rocky fragments into a cover. - -During this time the besiegers’ artillery kept up a constant -counter-fire which killed many of the French, and the reserve -brigades of the fifth division were pushed on by degrees to feed -the attack until the left wing of the ninth regiment only remained -in the trenches. The volunteers also who had been with difficulty -restrained in the trenches, “calling out to know, why they had been -brought there if they were not to lead the assault,” these men, whose -presence had given such offence to general Leith that he would have -kept them altogether from the assault, being now let loose went like -a whirlwind to the breaches, and again the crowded masses swarmed up -the face of the ruins, but reaching the crest line they came down -like a falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to mount, to totter, -and to sink, the deadly French fire was unabated, the smoke floated -away, and the crest of the breach bore no living man. - -[Sidenote: Manuscript Memoir by colonel Hunt.] - -Sir Thomas Graham, standing on the nearest of the Chofre batteries, -beheld this frightful destruction with a stern resolution to win -at any cost; and he was a man to have put himself at the head of -the last company and died sword in hand upon the breach rather -than sustain a second defeat, but neither his confidence nor his -resources were yet exhausted. He directed an attempt to be made on -the horn-work, and turned all the Chofre batteries and one on the -Isthmus, that is to say the concentrated fire of fifty heavy pieces -upon the high curtain. The shot ranged over the heads of the troops -who now were gathered at the foot of the breach, and the stream of -missiles thus poured along the upper surface of the high curtain -broke down the traverses, and in its fearful course shattering all -things strewed the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders. -When this flight of bullets first swept over the heads of the -soldiers a cry arose, from some inexperienced people, “to retire -because the batteries were firing on the stormers;” but the veterans -of the light division under Hunt being at that point were not to be -so disturbed, and in the very heat and fury of the cannonade effected -a solid lodgement in some ruins of houses actually within the rampart -on the right of the great breach. - -For half an hour this horrid tempest smote upon the works and the -houses behind, and then suddenly ceasing the small clatter of the -French musquets shewed that the assailants were again in activity; -and at the same time the thirteenth Portuguese regiment led by Major -Snodgrass and followed by a detachment of the twenty-fourth under -colonel Macbean entered the river from the Chofres. The ford was -deep the water rose above the waist, and when the soldiers reached -the middle of the stream which was two hundred yards wide, a heavy -gun struck on the head of the column with a shower of grape; the -havoc was fearful but the survivors closed and moved on. A second -discharge from the same piece tore the ranks from front to rear, -still the regiment moved on, and amidst a confused fire of musquetry -from the ramparts, and of artillery from St. Elmo, from the castle, -and from the Mirador, landed on the left bank and rushed against the -third breach. Macbean’s men who had followed with equal bravery then -reinforced the great breach, about eighty yards to the left of the -other although the line of ruins seemed to extend the whole way. The -fighting now became fierce and obstinate again at all the breaches, -but the French musquetry still rolled with deadly effect, the heaps -of slain increased, and once more the great mass of stormers sunk to -the foot of the ruins unable to win; the living sheltered themselves -as they could, but the dead and wounded lay so thickly that hardly -could it be judged whether the hurt or unhurt were most numerous. - -It was now evident that the assault must fail unless some accident -intervened, for the tide was rising, the reserves all engaged, and -no greater effort could be expected from men whose courage had -been already pushed to the verge of madness. In this crisis fortune -interfered. A number of powder barrels, live shells, and combustible -materials which the French had accumulated behind the traverses for -their defence caught fire, a bright consuming flame wrapped the whole -of the high curtain, a succession of loud explosions were heard, -hundreds of the French grenadiers were destroyed, the rest were -thrown into confusion, and while the ramparts were still involved -with suffocating eddies of smoke the British soldiers broke in at the -first traverse. The defenders bewildered by this terrible disaster -yielded for a moment, yet soon rallied, and a close desperate -struggle took place along the summit of the high curtain, but the -fury of the stormers whose numbers increased every moment could not -be stemmed. The French colours on the cavalier were torn away by -lieutenant Gethin of the eleventh regiment. The horn-work and the -land front below the curtain, and the loop-holed wall behind the -great breach were all abandoned; the light division soldiers who -had already established themselves in the ruins on the French left, -immediately penetrated to the streets, and at the same moment the -Portuguese at the small breach, mixed with British who had wandered -to that point seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side. - -Five hours the dreadful battle had lasted at the walls and now the -stream of war went pouring into the town. The undaunted governor -still disputed the victory for a short time with the aid of his -barricades, but several hundreds of his men being cut off and taken -in the horn-work, his garrison was so reduced that even to effect a -retreat behind the line of defences which separated the town from -the Monte Orgullo was difficult. Many of his troops flying from the -horn-work along the harbour flank of the town broke through a body of -the British who had reached the vicinity of the fortified convent of -Santa Téresa before them, and this post was the only one retained by -the French in the town. It was thought by some distinguished officers -engaged in the action that Monte Orgullo might have been carried on -this day, if a commander of sufficient rank to direct the troops had -been at hand; but whether from wounds or accident no general entered -the place until long after the breach had been won, the commanders of -battalions were embarrassed for want of orders, and a thunder-storm, -which came down from the mountains with unbounded fury immediately -after the place was carried, added to the confusion of the fight. - -This storm seemed to be the signal of hell for the perpetration of -villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of -antiquity. At Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the -principal object; at Badajos lust and murder were joined to rapine -and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting -cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes. One atrocity of which a -girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous, -incredible, indescribable barbarity. Some order was at first -maintained, but the resolution of the troops to throw off discipline -was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer was pursued with a -volley of small arms and escaped with difficulty from men who mistook -him for the provost-martial of the fifth division; a Portuguese -adjutant, who endeavoured to prevent some atrocity, was put to death -in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, -but deliberately by a number of English soldiers. Many officers -exerted themselves to preserve order, many men were well conducted, -but the rapine and violence commenced by villains soon spread, the -camp-followers crowded into the place, and the disorder continued -until the flames following the steps of the plunderer put an end to -his ferocity by destroying the whole town. - -Three generals, Leith, Oswald, and Robinson, had been hurt in the -trenches, sir Richard Fletcher the chief engineer, a brave man who -had served his country honorably was killed, and colonel Burgoyne the -next in command of that arm was wounded. - -The carnage at the breaches was appalling. The volunteers, although -brought late into the action, had nearly half their number struck -down, most of the regiments of the fifth division suffered in the -same proportion, and the whole loss since the renewal of the siege -exceeded two thousand five hundred men and officers. - -The town being thus taken, the Monte Orgullo was to be attacked, -but it was very steep and difficult to assail. The castle served as -a citadel and just below it four batteries connected with masonry -stretched across the face of the hill. From the Mirador and Queen’s -batteries at the extremities of this line, ramps, protected by -redans, led to the convent of Santa Teresa which was the most salient -part of the defence. On the side of Santa Clara and behind the -mountain were some sea batteries, and if all these works had been -of good construction, the troops fresh and well supplied, the siege -would have been long and difficult; but the garrison was shattered -by the recent assault, most of the engineers and leaders killed, -the governor and many others wounded, five hundred men were sick or -hurt, the soldiers fit for duty did not exceed thirteen hundred, -and they had four hundred prisoners to guard. The castle was small, -the bomb-proofs scarcely sufficed to protect the ammunition and -provisions, and only ten guns remained in a condition for service, -three of which were on the sea line. There was very little water and -the troops were forced to lie out on the naked rock exposed to the -fire of the besiegers, or only covered by the asperities of ground. -General Rey and his brave garrison were however still resolute to -fight, and they received nightly by sea supplies of ammunition though -in small quantities. - -[Sidenote: September.] - -Lord Wellington arrived the day after the assault. Regular approaches -could not be carried up the steep naked rock, he doubted the power -of vertical fire, and ordered batteries to be formed on the captured -works of the town, intending to breach the enemy’s remaining lines -of defence and then storm the Orgullo. And as the convent of Santa -Teresa would enable the French to sally by the rampart on the left -of the allies’ position in the town, he composed his first line -with a few troops strongly barricaded, placing a supporting body in -the market-place, and strong reserves on the high curtain and flank -ramparts. Meanwhile from the convent, which being actually in the -town might have been easily taken at first, the enemy killed many of -the besiegers, and when after several days it was assaulted, they -set the lower parts on fire and retired by a communication made from -the roof to a ramp on the hill behind. All this time the flames were -destroying the town, and the Orgullo was overwhelmed with shells shot -upward from the besiegers’ batteries. - -[Sidenote: Jones’ Sieges.] - -[Sidenote: Bellas’ Sieges.] - -On the 3d of September, the governor being summoned to surrender -demanded terms inadmissible, his resolution was not to be shaken, -and the vertical fire was therefore continued day and night, though -the British prisoners suffered as well as the enemy; for the officer -commanding in the castle, irritated by the misery of the garrison -cruelly refused to let the unfortunate captives make trenches to -cover themselves. The French on the other hand complain that their -wounded and sick men, although placed in an empty magazine with a -black flag flying, were fired upon by the besiegers, although the -English prisoners in their red uniforms were placed around it to -strengthen the claim of humanity. - -The new breaching batteries were now commenced, one for three pieces -on the isthmus, the other for seventeen pieces on the land front -of the horn-work. These guns were brought from the Chofres at low -water across the Urumea, at first in the night, but the difficulty -of labouring in the water during darkness induced the artillery -officers to transport the remainder in daylight, and within reach of -the enemy’s batteries, which did not fire a shot. In the town the -besiegers’ labours were impeded by the flaming houses, but near the -foot of the hill the ruins furnished shelter for the musqueteers -employed to gall the garrison, and the guns on the island of Santa -Clara being reinforced were actively worked by the seamen. The -besieged replied but little, their ammunition was scarce and the -horrible vertical fire subdued their energy. In this manner the -action was prolonged until the 8th of September when fifty-nine heavy -battering pieces opened at once from the island the isthmus the -horn-work and the Chofres. In two hours both the Mirador and the -Queen’s battery were broken, the fire of the besieged was entirely -extinguished, and the summit and face of the hill torn and furrowed -in a frightful manner; the bread-ovens were destroyed, a magazine -exploded, and the castle, small and crowded with men, was overlaid -with the descending shells. Then the governor proudly bending to -his fate surrendered. On the 9th this brave man and his heroic -garrison, reduced to one-third of their original number and leaving -five hundred wounded behind them in the hospital, marched out with -the honours of war. The Spanish flag was hoisted under a salute of -twenty-one guns, and the siege terminated after sixty-three days -open trenches, precisely when the tempestuous season, beginning to -vex the coast, would have rendered a continuance of the sea blockade -impossible. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. San Sebastian a third-rate fortress and in bad condition when -first invested, resisted a besieging army, possessing an enormous -battering train, for sixty-three days. This is to be attributed -partly to the errors of the besiegers, principally to obstructions -extraneous to the military operations. Amongst the last are to be -reckoned the misconduct of the Admiralty, and the negligence of the -government relative to the battering train and supply of ammunition; -the latter retarded the second siege for sixteen days; the former -enabled the garrison to keep up and even increase its means as the -siege proceeded. - -Next, in order and importance, was the failure of the Spanish -authorities, who neglected to supply carts and boats from the -country, and even refused the use of their public buildings for -hospitals. Thus between the sea and the shore, receiving aid from -neither, lord Wellington had to conduct an operation of war which -more than any other depends for success upon labour and provident -care. It was probably the first time that an important siege was -maintained by women’s exertions; the stores of the besiegers were -landed from boats rowed by Spanish girls! - -Another impediment was Soult’s advance towards Pampeluna, but the -positive effect of this was slight since the want of ammunition would -have equally delayed the attack. The true measure of the English -government’s negligence is thus obtained. It was more mischievous -than the operations of sixty thousand men under a great general. - -2º. The errors of execution having been before touched upon need no -further illustration. The greatest difference between the first and -second part of the siege preceding the assaults, was that in the -latter, the approaches near the isthmus being carried further on and -openings made in the sea-wall, the troops more easily and rapidly -extricated themselves from the trenches, the distance to the breach -was shortened, and the French fire bearing on the fronts of attack -was somewhat less powerful. These advantages were considerable, but -not proportionate to the enormous increase of the besiegers’ means; -and it is quite clear from the terrible effects of the cannonade -during the assault, that the whole of the defences might have been -ruined, even those of the castle, if this overwhelming fire had in -compliance with the rules of art been first employed to silence the -enemy’s fire. A lodgement in the horn-work could then have been made -with little difficulty, and the breach attacked without much danger. - -3º. As the faults leading to failure in the first part of the -siege were repeated in the second, while the enemy’s resources -had increased by the gain of time, and because his intercourse -with France by sea never was cut off, it follows that there was no -reasonable security for success; not even to make a lodgement on the -breach, since no artificial materials were prepared and the workmen -failed to effect that object. But the first arrangement and the -change adopted in the council of war, the option given to general -Bradford, the remarkable fact, that the simultaneous attack on the -horn-work was only thought of when the first efforts against the -breach had failed, all prove, that the enemy’s defensive means were -underrated, and the extent of the success exceeded the preparations -to obtain it. - -The place was won by accident. For first the explosion of the great -mine under the tower of Los Hornos, was only prevented by a happy -shot which cut the sausage of the train during the fight, and this -was followed by the ignition of the French powder-barrels and shells -along the high curtain, which alone opened the way into the town. Sir -Thomas Graham’s firmness and perseverance in the assault, and the -judicious usage of his artillery against the high curtain during the -action, an operation however which only belonged to daylight, were -no mean helps to the victory. It was on such sudden occasions that -his prompt genius shone conspicuously, yet it was nothing wonderful -that heavy guns at short distances, the range being perfectly known, -should strike with certainty along a line of rampart more than -twenty-seven feet above the heads of the troops. Such practice was -to be expected from British artillery, and Graham’s genius was more -evinced by the promptness of the thought and the trust he put in -the valour of his soldiers. It was far more extraordinary that the -stormers did not relinquish their attack when thus exposed to their -own guns, for it is a mistake to say that no mischief occurred; a -serjeant of the ninth regiment was killed by the batteries close to -his commanding officer, and it is probable that other casualties also -had place. - -[Sidenote: Captain Cooke, forty-third regiment. Vide his Memoirs.] - -[Sidenote: Bellas.] - -4º. The explosion on the ramparts is generally supposed to have -been caused by the cannonade from the Chofre batteries, yet a cool -and careful observer, whose account I have adopted, because he was -a spectator in perfect safety and undisturbed by having to give or -receive orders, affirms that the cannonade ceased before colonel -Snodgrass forded the river, whereas the great explosion did not -happen until half an hour after that event. By some persons that -intrepid exploit of the Portuguese was thought one of the principal -causes of success, and it appears certain that an entrance was made -at the small breach by several soldiers, British and Portuguese, many -of the former having wandered from the great breach and got mixed -with the latter, before the explosion happened on the high curtain. -Whether those men would have been followed by greater numbers is -doubtful, but the lodgement made by the light division volunteers -within the great breach was solid and could have been maintained. -The French call the Portuguese attack a feint. Sir Thomas Graham -certainly did not found much upon it. He gave general Bradford the -option to attack or remain tranquil, and colonel M‘Bean actually -received counter-orders when his column was already in the river and -too far advanced to be withdrawn. - -5º. When the destruction of San Sebastian became known, it was used -by the anti-British party at Cadiz to excite the people against -England. The political chief of Guipuscoa publicly accused sir Thomas -Graham, “that he sacked and burned the place because it had formerly -traded entirely with France,” his generals were said to have excited -the furious soldiers to the horrid work, and his inferior officers -to have boasted of it afterwards. A newspaper, edited by an agent of -the Spanish government, repeating these accusations, called upon the -people to avenge the injury upon the British army, and the Spanish -minister of war, designated by lord Wellington as the abettor and -even the writer of this and other malignant libels published at -Cadiz, officially demanded explanations. - -Lord Wellington addressed a letter of indignant denial and -remonstrance to sir Henry Wellesley. “It was absurd,” he said, “to -suppose the officers of the army would have risked the loss of all -their labours and gallantry, by encouraging the dispersion of the -men while the enemy still held the castle. To him the town was of -the utmost value as a secure place for magazines and hospitals. -He had refused to bombard it when advised to do so, as he had -previously refused to bombard Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, because -the injury would fall on the inhabitants and not upon the enemy; -yet nothing could have been more easy, or less suspicious than this -method of destroying the town if he had been so minded. It was the -enemy who set fire to the houses, it was part of the defence; the -British officers strove to extinguish the flames, some in doing -so lost their lives by the French musquetry from the castle, and -the difficulty of communicating and working through the fire was -so great, that he had been on the point of withdrawing the troops -altogether. He admitted the plunder, observing, that he knew not -whether that or the libels made him most angry; he had taken measures -to stop it, but when two-thirds of the officers had been killed or -wounded in the action, and when many of the inhabitants taking part -with the enemy fired upon the troops, to prevent it was impossible. -Moreover he was for several days unable from other circumstances to -send fresh men to replace the stormers.” - -This was a solid reply to the scandalous libels circulated, but the -broad facts remained. San Sebastian was a heap of smoking ruins, and -atrocities degrading to human nature had been perpetrated by the -troops. Of these crimes, the municipal and ecclesiastic bodies the -consuls and principal persons of San Sebastian, afterwards published -a detailed statement, solemnly affirming the truth of each case; -and if Spanish declarations on this occasion are not to be heeded, -four-fifths of the excesses attributed to the French armies must be -effaced as resting on a like foundation. That the town was first -set on fire behind the breaches during the operations, and that it -spread in the tumult following the assault is undoubted; yet it is -not improbable that plunderers, to forward their own views increased -it, and certainly the great destruction did not befall until long -after the town was in possession of the allies. I have been assured -by a surgeon, that he was lodged the third day after the assault -at a house well furnished, and in a street then untouched by fire -or plunderers, but house and street were afterwards plundered and -burned. The inhabitants could only have fired upon the allies the -first day, and it might well have been in self-defence for they were -barbarously treated. The abhorrent case alluded to was notorious, so -were many others. I have myself heard around the picquet fires, when -soldiers as every experienced officer knows, speak without reserve -of their past deeds and feelings, the abominable actions mentioned -by the municipality related with little variation long before that -narrative was published; told however with sorrow for the sufferers -and indignation against the perpetrators, for these last were not so -numerous as might be supposed from the extent of the calamities they -inflicted. - -[Sidenote: Colonel Cadell’s Memoirs.] - -It is a common but shallow and mischievous notion, that a villain -makes never the worse soldier for an assault, because the appetite -for plunder supplies the place of honour; as if the compatability of -vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and courage unnecessary -in warlike matters. In all the host which stormed San Sebastian there -was not a man who being sane would for plunder only have encountered -the danger of that assault, yet under the spell of discipline all -rushed eagerly to meet it. Discipline however has its root in -patriotism, or how could armed men be controuled at all, and it would -be wise and far from difficult to graft moderation and humanity -upon such a noble stock. The modern soldier is not necessarily the -stern bloody-handed man the ancient soldier was, there is as much -difference between them as between the sportsman and the butcher; -the ancient warrior, fighting with the sword and reaping his harvest -of death when the enemy was in flight, became habituated to the -act of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his bayonet, sees -not his peculiar victim fall, and exults not over mangled limbs as -proofs of personal prowess. Hence preserving his original feelings, -his natural abhorrence of murder and crimes of violence, he differs -not from other men unless often engaged in the assault of towns, -where rapacity, lust, and inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of -discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said that no soldier -can be restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least -of all, because he is brutish and insensible to honor! Shame on -such calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as no other -soldier ever fights? His pay! Soldiers of all nations receive pay. -At the period of this assault, a serjeant of the twenty-eighth -regiment, named Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from -Roncesvalles, to make purchases for his officers. He placed the -money he was entrusted with, two thousand dollars, in the hands of a -commissary and having secured a receipt persuaded his party to join -in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the money, made his purchases, -and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these the -spirits who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear. It is -precisely fear to which they are most insensible. - -Undoubtedly if soldiers hear and read, that it is impossible to -restrain their violence they will not be restrained. But let the -plunder of a town after an assault, be expressly made criminal by the -articles of war, with a due punishment attached; let it be constantly -impressed upon the troops that such conduct is as much opposed to -military honour and discipline as it is to morality; let a select -permanent body of men receiving higher pay form a part of the army, -and be charged to follow storming columns to aid in preserving order, -and with power to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be -necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary valour should keep -pace with chastisement for crimes committed under such temptation, it -would be fitting that money, apportioned to the danger and importance -of the service, should be insured to the successful troops and always -paid without delay. This money might be taken as ransom from enemies, -but if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor, government should -furnish the amount. With such regulations the storming of towns would -not produce more military disorders than the gaining of battles in -the field. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. August.] - -While San Sebastian was being stormed Soult fought a battle with the -covering force, not willingly nor with much hope of success, but he -was averse to let San Sebastian fall without another effort, and -thought a bold demeanour would best hide his real weakness. Guided -however by the progress of the siege, which he knew perfectly through -his sea communication, he awaited the last moment of action, striving -meanwhile to improve his resources and to revive the confidence of -the army and of the people. Of his dispersed soldiers eight thousand -had rejoined their regiments by the 12th of August, and he was -promised a reinforcement of thirty thousand conscripts; these last -were however yet to be enrolled, and neither the progress of the -siege, nor the general panic along the frontier which recurred with -increased violence after the late battles, would suffer him to remain -inactive. - -He was in no manner deceived as to his enemy’s superior strength of -position number and military confidence; but his former efforts on -the side of Pampeluna had interrupted the attack of San Sebastian, -and another offensive movement would necessarily produce a like -effect; wherefore he hoped by repeating the disturbance, as long as -a free intercourse by sea enabled him to reinforce and supply the -garrison, to render the siege a wasting operation for the allies. To -renew the movement against Pampeluna was most advantageous, but it -required fifty thousand infantry for the attack, and twenty thousand -as a corps of observation on the Lower Bidassoa, and he had not -such numbers to dispose of. The subsistence of his troops also was -uncertain, because the loss of all the military carriages at Vittoria -was still felt, and the resources of the country were reluctantly -yielded by the people. To act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port -was therefore impracticable. And to attack the allies’ centre, at -Vera, Echallar, and the Bastan, was unpromising, seeing that two -mountain-chains were to be forced before the movement could seriously -affect lord Wellington: moreover, the ways being impracticable for -artillery, success if such should befall, would lead to no decisive -result. It only remained to attack the left of the allies by the -great road of Irun. - -Against that quarter Soult could bring more than forty thousand -infantry, but the positions were of perilous strength. The Upper -Bidassoa was in Wellington’s power, because the light division, -occupying Vera and the heights of Santa Barbara on the right bank, -covered all the bridges; but the Lower Bidassoa flowing from Vera -with a bend to the left separated the hostile armies, and against -this front about nine miles wide Soult’s operations were necessarily -directed. On his right, that is to say, from the broken bridge of -Behobia in front of Irun to the sea, the river, broad and tidal, -offered no apparent facility for a passage; and between the fords -of Biriatu and those of Vera, a distance of three miles, there was -only the one passage of Andarlassa about two miles below Vera; along -this space also the banks of the river, steep craggy mountain ridges -without roads, forbade any great operations. Thus the points of -attack were restricted to Vera and the fords between Biriatu and the -broken bridge of Behobia. - -[Sidenote: Plan 5.] - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -To raise the siege it was only necessary to force a way to Oyarzun, -a small town about seven or eight miles beyond the Bidassoa, from -thence the assailants could march at once upon Passages and upon -the Urumea. To gain Oyarzun was therefore the object of the French -marshal’s combinations. The royal road led directly to it by the -broad valley which separates the Peña de Haya from the Jaizquibel -mountain. The latter was on the sea-coast, but the Peña de Haya, -commonly called the four-crowned mountain, filled with its dependent -ridges all the space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun and Oyarzun. Its -staring head bound with a rocky diadem was impassable, but from the -bridges of Vera and Lesaca, several roads, one of them not absolutely -impracticable for guns, passed over its enormous flanks to Irun -at one side and to Oyarzun on the other, falling into the royal -road at both places. Soult’s first design was to unite Clauzel’s -and D’Erlon’s troops, drive the light division from the heights of -Santa Barbara, and then using the bridges of Lesaca and Vera force -a passage over the Peña de Haya on the left of its summit, and push -the heads of columns towards Oyarzun and the Upper Urumea; meanwhile -Reille and Villatte, passing the Bidassoa at Biriatu, were to -fight their way also to Oyarzun by the royal road. He foresaw that -Wellington might during this time collect his right wing and seek to -envelope the French army, or march upon Bayonne; but he thought the -general state of his affairs required bold measures, and the progress -of the besiegers at San Sebastian soon drove him into action. - -On the 29th Foy, marching by the road of Lohoussoa, crossed the Nive -at Cambo and reached Espelette, leaving behind him six hundred men, -and the national guards who were very numerous, with orders to watch -the roads and valleys leading upon St. Jean Pied de Port. If pressed -by superior forces, this corps of observation was to fall back upon -that fortress, and it was supported with a brigade of light cavalry -stationed at St. Palais. - -In the night two of D’Erlon’s divisions were secretly drawn from -Ainhoa, Foy continued his march through Espelette, by the bridges -of Amotz and Serres to San Jean de Luz, from whence the reserve -moved forward, and thus in the morning of the 30th two strong French -columns of attack were assembled on the Lower Bidassoa. - -The first, under Clauzel, consisted of four divisions, furnishing -twenty thousand men with twenty pieces of artillery. It was -concentrated in the woods behind the Commissary and Bayonette -mountains, above Vera. - -The second, commanded by general Reille, was composed of two -divisions and Villatte’s reserve in all eighteen thousand men; but -Foy’s division and some light cavalry were in rear ready to augment -this column to about twenty-five thousand, and there were thirty-six -pieces of artillery and two bridge equipages collected behind the -camp of Urogne on the royal road. - -Reille’s troops were secreted, partly behind the Croix des Bouquets -mountain, partly behind that of Louis XIV. and the lower ridges of -the Mandale near Biriatu. Meanwhile D’Erlon, having Conroux’s and -Abbé’s divisions and twenty pieces of artillery under his command, -held the camps in advance of Sarre and Ainhoa. If the allies in his -front marched to reinforce their own left on the crowned mountain, -he was to vex and retard their movements, always however avoiding a -serious engagement, and feeling to his right to secure his connection -with Clauzel’s column; that is to say, he was with Abbé’s division, -moving from Ainhoa, to menace the allies towards Zagaramurdi and the -Puerto de Echallar; and with Conroux’s division, then in front of -Sarre, to menace the light division, to seize the rock of Ivantelly -if it was abandoned, and be ready to join Clauzel if occasion -offered. On the other hand, should the allies assemble a large force -and operate offensively by the Nive and Nivelle rivers, D’Erlon, -without losing his connection with the main army, was to concentrate -on the slopes descending from the Rhune mountains towards San Pé. -Finally, if the attack on the Lower Bidassoa succeeded, he was to -join Clauzel, either by Vera, or by the heights of Echallar and the -bridge of Lesaca. Soult also desired to support D’Erlon with the two -divisions of heavy cavalry, but forage could only be obtained for the -artillery horses, two regiments of light horsemen, six chosen troops -of dragoons and two or three hundred gensd’armes, which were all -assembled on the royal road behind Reille’s column. - -It was the French marshal’s intention to attack at daybreak on the -30th, but his preparations being incomplete he deferred it until -the 31st, and took rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence -passing over to the allies’ camps. Nevertheless Wellington’s -emissaries advised him of the movements in the night of the 29th, the -augmentation of troops in front of Irun was observed in the morning -of the 30th, and in the evening the bridge equipage and the artillery -were descried on the royal road beyond the Bidassoa. Thus warned he -prepared for battle with little anxiety. For the brigade of English -foot-guards, left at Oporto when the campaign commenced, was now come -up; most of the marauders and men wounded at Vittoria had rejoined; -and three regiments just arrived from England formed a new brigade -under lord Aylmer, making the total augmentation of British troops in -this quarter little less than five thousand men. - -[Sidenote: Plan 5.] - -The extreme left was on the Jaizquibel. This narrow mountain ridge, -seventeen hundred feet high, runs along the coast, abutting at one -end upon the Passages harbour and at the other upon the navigable -mouth of the Bidassoa. Offering no mark for an attack it was only -guarded by a flanking detachment of Spaniards, and at its foot the -small fort of Figueras commanding the entrance of the river was -garrisoned by seamen from the naval squadron. Fuenterabia a walled -place, also at its base, was occupied, and the low ground between -that town and Irun defended by a chain of eight large field redoubts, -which connected the position of Jaizquibel with the heights covering -the royal road to Oyarzun. - -On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the burned bridge of -Behobia, there was a sudden bend in the river, the concave towards -the French, and their positions commanded the passage of the fords -below; but opposed to them was the exceedingly stiff and lofty -ridge, called San Marcial, terminating one of the great flanks of -the Pena de Haya. The water flowed round the left of this ridge, -confining the road leading from the bridge of Behobia to Irun, a -distance of one mile, to the narrow space between its channel and the -foot of the height, and Irun itself, strongly occupied and defended -by a field-work, blocked this way. It followed that the French, after -forcing the passage of the river, must of necessity win San Marcial -before their army could use the great road. - -About six thousand men of the fourth Spanish army now under general -Freyre, were established on the crest of San Marcial, which was -strengthened by abbattis and temporary field-works. - -Behind Irun the first British division, under general Howard, was -posted, and lord Aylmer’s brigade was pushed somewhat in advance of -Howard’s right to support the left of the Spaniards. - -The right of San Marcial falling back from the river was, although -distinct as a position, connected with the Pena de Haya, and in some -degree exposed to an enemy passing the river above Biriatu, wherefore -Longa’s Spaniards were drawn off from those slopes of the Pena de -Haya which descended towards Vera, to be posted on those descending -towards Biriatu. In this situation he protected and supported the -right of San Marcial. - -Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus directly opposed to the -progress of the enemy, and the fourth division quartered near Lesaca -was still disposable. From this body a Portuguese brigade had been -detached, to replace Longa on the heights opposite Vera, and to cover -the roads leading from the bridge and fords of that place over the -flanks of the Pena de Haya. Meanwhile the British brigades of the -division were stationed up the mountain, close under the foundry of -San Antonio and commanding the intersection of the roads coming from -Vera and Lesaca; thus furnishing a reserve to the Portuguese brigade -to Longa and to Freyre, they tied the whole together. The Portuguese -brigade was however somewhat exposed, and too weak to guard the -enormous slopes on which it was placed, wherefore Wellington drew -general Inglis’s brigade of the seventh division from Echallar to -reinforce it, and even then the flanks of the Pena de Haya were -so rough and vast that the troops seemed sprinkled here and there -with little coherence. The English general aware that his positions -were too extensive had commenced the construction of several large -redoubts on commanding points of the mountain, and had traced out a -second fortified camp on a strong range of heights, which immediately -in front of Oyarzun connected the Haya with the Jaizquibel, but these -works were unfinished. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -During the night of the 30th Soult garnished with artillery all the -points commanding the fords of Biriatu, the descent to the broken -bridge and the banks below it, called the Bas de Behobia. This was -partly to cover the passage of the fords and the formation of his -bridges, partly to stop gun-boats coming up to molest the troops in -crossing, and in this view also he spread Casa Palacio’s brigade -of Joseph’s Spanish guards along the river as far down as Andaya, -fronting Fuenterabia. - -[Sidenote: Plan 5.] - -General Reille, commanding La Martiniere’s, Maucune’s, and Villatte’s -divisions, directed the attack. His orders were to storm the camp of -San Marcial, and leaving there a strong reserve to keep in check any -reinforcement coming from the side of Vera or descending from the -Pena de Haya, to drive the allies with the remainder of his force -from ridge to ridge, until he gained that flank of the great mountain -which descends upon Oyarzun. The royal road being thus opened, Foy’s -division with the cavalry and artillery in one column, was to cross -by bridges to be laid during the attack on San Marcial. And it was -Soult’s intention under any circumstances to retain this last-named -ridge, and to fortify it as a bridge-head with a view to subsequent -operations. - -To aid Reille’s progress and to provide for the concentration of the -whole army at Oyarzun, Clauzel was directed to make a simultaneous -attack from Vera, not as at first designed by driving the allies -from Santa Barbara and seizing the bridges, but leaving one division -and his guns on the ridges above Vera to keep the light division -in check, to cross the river by two fords just below the town of -Vera with the rest of his troops, and assail that slope of the Pena -de Haya where the Portuguese brigade and the troops under general -Inglis were posted. Then forcing his way upwards to the forge of San -Antonio, which commanded the intersection of the roads leading round -the head of the mountain, he could aid Reille directly by falling on -the rear of San Marcial, or meet him at Oyarzun by turning the rocky -summit of the Pena de Haya. - -[Sidenote: August.] - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -_Combat of San Marcial._ At daylight on the 31st, Reille, under -protection of the French guns, forded the river above Biriatu -with two divisions and two pieces of artillery. He quickly seized -a detached ridge of inferior height just under San Marcial, and -leaving there one brigade as a reserve detached another to attack the -Spanish left by a slope which descended in that quarter to the river. -Meanwhile with La Martiniere’s division he assailed their right. But -the side of the mountain was covered with brushwood and remarkably -steep, the French troops being ill-managed preserved no order, the -supports and the skirmishers mixing in one mass got into confusion, -and when two-thirds of the height were gained the Spaniards charged -in columns and drove the assailants headlong down. - -During this action two bridges were thrown, partly on trestles -partly on boats, below the fords, and the head of Villatte’s reserve -crossing ascended the ridge and renewed the fight more vigorously; -one brigade even reached the chapel of San Marcial and the left of -the Spanish line was shaken, but the eighty-fifth regiment belonging -to lord Aylmer’s brigade advanced a little way to support it, and -at that moment lord Wellington rode up with his staff. Then the -Spaniards who cared so little for their own officers, with that -noble instinct which never abandons the poor people of any country -acknowledged real greatness without reference to nation, and shouting -aloud dashed their adversaries down with so much violence that many -were driven into the river, and some of the French pontoon boats -coming to their succour were overloaded and sunk. It was several -hours before the broken and confused masses could be rallied and -the bridges, which had been broken up to let the boats save the -drowning men, repaired. When this was effected, Soult who overlooked -the action from the summit of the mountain Louis XIV., sent the -remainder of Villatte’s reserve over the river, and calling up Foy’s -division prepared a more formidable and better arranged attack; and -he expected greater success, inasmuch as the operation from the side -of Vera, of which it is time to treat, was now making considerable -progress up the Pena de Haya on the allies’ right. - -_Combat of Vera._ General Clauzel had descended the Bayonette and -Commissari mountains immediately after day-break, under cover of -a thick fog, but at seven o’clock the weather cleared, and three -divisions formed in heavy columns were seen, by the troops on Santa -Barbara, making for the fords below Vera in the direction of two -hamlets called the Salinas and the Bario de Lesaca. A fourth division -and the guns remained stationary on the slopes of the mountain, and -the artillery opened now and then upon the little town of Vera, from -which the picquets of the light division were recalled with exception -of one post in a fortified house commanding the bridge. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Manuscript Memoir by general Inglis.] - -About eight o’clock the enemy’s columns began to pass the fords -covered by the fire of their artillery, but the first shells thrown -fell into the midst of their own ranks and the British troops on -Santa Barbara cheered the French battery with a derisive shout. Their -march was however sure, and a battalion of chosen light troops, -without knapsacks, quickly commenced the battle on the left bank -of the river, with the Portuguese brigade, and by their extreme -activity and rapid fire forced the latter to retire up the slopes of -the mountain. General Inglis then reinforced the line of skirmishers -and the whole of his brigade was soon afterwards engaged, but -Clauzel menaced his left flank from the lower ford, and the French -troops still forced their way upwards in front without a check, -until the whole mass disappeared fighting amidst the asperities of -the Pena de la Haya. Inglis lost two hundred and seventy men and -twenty-two officers, but he finally halted on a ridge commanding the -intersection of the roads leading from Vera and Lesaca to Irun and -Oyarzun. That is to say somewhat below the foundry of Antonio, where -the fourth division, having now recovered its Portuguese brigade, -was, in conjunction with Longa’s Spaniards, so placed as to support -and protect equally the left of Inglis and the right of Freyre on San -Marcial. - -These operations, from the great height and asperity of the mountain, -occupied many hours, and it was past two o’clock before even the -head of Clauzel’s columns reached this point. Meanwhile as the -French troops left in front of Santa Barbara made no movement, -and lord Wellington had before directed the light division to aid -general Inglis, a wing of the forty-third and three companies of -the riflemen from general Kempt’s brigade, with three weak Spanish -battalions drawn from O’Donnel’s Andalusians at Echallar, crossed the -Bidassoa by the Lesaca bridge, and marched towards some lower slopes -on the right of Inglis where they covered another knot of minor -communications coming from Lesaca and Vera. They were followed by the -remainder of Kempt’s brigade which occupied Lesaca itself, and thus -the chain of connection and defence between Santa Barbara and the -positions of the fourth division on the Pena de la Haya was completed. - -[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.] - -Clauzel seeing these movements, and thinking the allies at Echallar -and Santa Barbara were only awaiting the proper moment to take him -in flank and rear, by the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, if he engaged -further up the mountain, now abated his battle and sent notice of -his situation and views to Soult. This opinion was well-founded; -lord Wellington was not a general to let half his army be paralyzed -by D’Erlon’s divisions. On the 30th, when he observed Soult’s first -preparations in front of San Marcial, he had ordered attacks to be -made upon D’Erlon from the Puerto of Echallar Zagaramurdi and Maya; -general Hill was also directed to shew the heads of columns towards -St. Jean Pied de Port. And on the 31st when the force and direction -of Clauzel’s columns were known, he ordered lord Dalhousie to bring -the remainder of the seventh division by Lesaca to aid Inglis. - -Following these orders Giron, who commanded the Spaniards O’Donnel -being sick, slightly skirmished on the 30th with Conroux’s advanced -posts in front of Sarre, and on the 31st at day-break the whole of -the French line was assailed. That is to say, Giron again fought -with Conroux, feebly as before, but two Portuguese brigades of the -sixth and seventh divisions, directed by lord Dalhousie and general -Colville from the passes of Zagaramurdi and Maya, drove the French -from their camp behind Urdax and burned it. Abbé who commanded there -being thus pressed, collected his whole force in front of Ainhoa -on an entrenched position, and making strong battle repulsed the -allies with some loss of men by the sixth division. Thus five combats -were fought in one day at different points of the general line, and -D’Erlon, who had lost three or four hundred men, seeing a fresh -column coming from Maya as if to turn his left, judged that a great -movement against Bayonne was in progress and sent notice to Soult. He -was mistaken. Lord Wellington being entirely on the defensive, only -sought by these demonstrations to disturb the plan of attack, and the -seventh division, following the second order sent to lord Dalhousie, -marched towards Lesaca; but the fighting at Urdax having lasted until -mid-day the movement was not completed that evening. - -D’Erlon’s despatch reached Soult at the same time that Clauzel’s -report arrived. All his arrangements for a final attack on San -Marcial were then completed, but these reports and the ominous -cannonade at San Sebastian, plainly heard during the morning, induced -him to abandon this object and hold his army ready for a general -battle on the Nivelle. In this view he sent Foy’s division which -had not yet crossed the Bidassoa to the heights of Serres, behind -the Nivelle, as a support to D’Erlon, and caused six chosen troops -of dragoons to march upon San Pé higher up on that river. Clauzel -received orders to arrest his attack and repass the Bidassoa in -the night. He was to leave Maransin’s division upon the Bayonette -mountain and the Col de Bera, and with the other three divisions to -march by Ascain and join Foy on the heights of Serres. - -Notwithstanding these movements Soult kept Reille’s troops beyond -the Bidassoa, and the battle went on sharply, for the Spaniards -continually detached men from the ridge, endeavouring to drive the -French from the lower positions into the river, until about four -o’clock when their hardihood abating they desired to be relieved; but -Wellington careful of their glory seeing the French attacks were -exhausted and thinking it a good opportunity to fix the military -spirit of his allies, refused to relieve or to aid them; yet it -would not be just to measure their valour by this fact. The English -general blushed while he called upon them to fight, knowing that -they had been previously famished by their vile government, and that -there were no hospitals to receive no care for them when wounded. -The battle was however arrested by a tempest which commencing in the -mountains about three o’clock, raged for several hours with wonderful -violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees and whirled through -the air like feathers on the howling winds, while the thinnest -streams swelling into torrents dashed down the mountains, rolling -innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. Amidst this -turmoil and under cover of night the French re-crossed the river, and -the head-quarters were fixed at St. Jean de Luz. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -Clauzel’s retreat was more unhappy. Having received the order to -retire early in the evening when the storm had already put an end to -all fighting, he repassed the fords in person and before dark at the -head of two brigades, ordering general Vandermaesen to follow with -the remainder of his divisions. It would appear that he expected no -difficulty, since he did not take possession of the bridge of Vera -nor of the fortified house covering it; and apparently ignorant of -the state of his own troops on the other bank of the river occupied -himself with suggesting new projects displeasing to Soult. Meanwhile -Vandermaesen’s situation became critical. Many of his soldiers -attempting to cross were drowned by the rising waters, and finally, -unable to effect a passage at the fords, that general marched up the -stream to seize the bridge of Vera. His advanced guard surprising -a corporal’s picquet rushed over, but was driven back by a rifle -company posted in the fortified house. This happened about three -o’clock in the morning and the riflemen defended the passage until -daylight when a second company and some Portuguese Caçadores came to -their aid. But the French reserve left at Vera seeing how matters -stood opened a fire of guns against the fortified house from a high -rock just above the town, and their skirmishers approached it on the -right bank while Vandermaesen plied his musquetry from the left bank. -The two rifle captains and many men fell under this cross fire, and -the passage was forced, but Vandermaesen urging the attack in person -was killed, and more than two hundred of his soldiers were hurt. - -[Sidenote: September] - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -Soult now learning from D’Erlon that all offensive movements on the -side of Maya had ceased at twelve o’clock on the 31st, contemplated -another attack on San Marcial, but in the course of the day general -Rey’s report of the assault on San Sebastian reached him, and at the -same time he heard that general Hill was in movement on the side of -St. Jean Pied de Port. This state of affairs brought reflection. San -Sebastian was lost, a fresh attempt to carry off the wasted garrison -from the castle would cost five or six thousand good soldiers, -and the safety of the whole army would be endangered by pushing -headlong amongst the terrible asperities of the crowned mountain. -For Wellington could throw his right wing and centre, forming a mass -of at least thirty-five thousand men, upon the French left during -the action, and he would be nearer to Bayonne than the French right -when once the battle was engaged beyond the Lower Bidassoa. The -army had lost in the recent actions three thousand six hundred men. -General Vandermaesen had been killed, and four others, La Martiniere, -Menne, Remond, and Guy, wounded, the first mortally; all the superior -officers agreed that a fresh attempt would be most dangerous, and -serious losses might draw on an immediate invasion of France before -the necessary defensive measures were completed. - -Yielding to these reasons he resolved to recover his former positions -and thenceforward remain entirely on the defensive, for which his -vast knowledge of war, his foresight, his talent for methodical -arrangement and his firmness of character, peculiarly fitted him. -Twelve battles or combats fought in seven weeks, bore testimony that -he had strived hard to regain the offensive for the French army, and -willing still to strive if it might be so, he had called upon Suchet -to aid him and demanded fresh orders from the emperor; but Suchet -helped him not, and Napoleon’s answer indicated at once his own -difficulties and his reliance upon the duke of Dalmatia’s capacity -and fidelity. - -“_I have given you my confidence and can add neither to your means -nor to your instructions._” - -The loss of the allies was one thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and sixteen -hundred Spaniards. Wherefore the cost of men on this day, including -the storming of San Sebastian, exceeded five thousand, but the battle -in no manner disturbed the siege. The French army was powerless -against such strong positions. Soult had brought forty-five thousand -men to bear in two columns upon a square of less than five miles, -and the thirty thousand French actually engaged, were repulsed by ten -thousand, for that number only of the allies fought. - -But the battle was a half measure and ill-judged on Soult’s part. -Lord Wellington’s experience of French warfare, his determined -character, coolness and thorough acquaintance with the principles of -his art, left no hope that he would suffer two-thirds of his army -to be kept in check by D’Erlon’s two divisions; and accordingly, -the moment D’Erlon was menaced Soult stopped his own attack to make -a counter-movement and deliver a decisive battle on favourable -ground. Perhaps his secret hope was to draw his opponent to such a -conclusion, but if so, the combat of San Marcial was too dear a price -to pay for the chance. - -A general who had made up his mind to force a way to San Sebastian, -would have organized his rear so that no serious embarrassment could -arise from any partial incursions towards Bayonne; he would have -concentrated his whole army, and have calculated his attack so as -to be felt at San Sebastian before his adversary’s counter-movement -could be felt towards Bayonne. In this view D’Erlon’s two divisions -should have come in the night of the 30th to Vera, which without -weakening the reserve opposed to the light division would have -augmented Clauzel’s force by ten thousand men; and on the most -important line, because San Marcial offered no front for the action -of great numbers, and the secret of mountain warfare is, by surprise -or the power of overwhelming numbers, to seize such commanding points -as shall force an enemy either to abandon his strong position, or -become the assailant to recover those he has thus lost. Now the -difficulty of defending the crowned mountain was evinced by the rapid -manner in which Clauzel at once gained the ridges as far as the -foundry of San Antonio; with ten thousand additional men he might -have gained a commanding position on the rear and left flank of San -Marcial, and forced the allies to abandon it. That lord Wellington -thought himself weak on the Haya mountain is proved by his calling up -the seventh division from Echallar, and by his orders to the light -division. - -[Sidenote: Correspondence with the minister of war, MSS.] - -Soult’s object was to raise the siege, but his plan involved the risk -of having thirty-five thousand of the allies interposed during his -attack between him and Bayonne, clearly a more decisive operation -than the raising of the siege, therefore the enterprise may be -pronounced injudicious. He admitted indeed, that excited to the -enterprise, partly by insinuations, whether from the minister of -war or his own lieutenants does not appear, partly by a generous -repugnance to abandon the brave garrison, he was too precipitate, -acting contrary to his judgment; but he was probably tempted by the -hope of obtaining at least the camp of San Marcial as a bridge-head, -and thus securing a favourable point for after combinations. - -Lord Wellington having resolved not to invade France at this time, -was unprepared for so great an operation as throwing his right and -centre upon Soult’s left; and it is obvious also that on the 30th he -expected only a partial attack at San Marcial. The order he first -gave to assail D’Erlon’s position, and then the counter-order for the -seventh division to come to Lesaca, prove this, because the latter -was issued after Clauzel’s numbers and the direction of his attack -were ascertained. The efforts of two Portuguese brigades against -D’Erlon sufficed therefore to render null the duke of Dalmatia’s -great combinations, and his extreme sensitiveness to their operations -marks the vice of his own. Here it may be observed, that the movement -of the forty-third the rifle companies and the Spaniards, to secure -the right flank of Inglis, was ill-arranged. Dispatched by different -roads without knowing precisely the point they were to concentrate -at, each fell in with the enemy at different places; the Spaniards -got under fire and were forced to alter their route; the forty-third -companies stumbling on a French division had to fall back half a -mile; it was only by thus feeling the enemy at different points that -the destined position was at last found, and a disaster was scarcely -prevented by the fury of the tempest. Nevertheless those detachments -were finally well placed to have struck a blow the next morning, -because their post was only half an hour’s march from the high ground -behind Vandermaesen’s column when he forced the bridge at Vera, and -the firing would have served as a guide. The remainder of Kempt’s -brigade could also have moved upon the same point from Lesaca. It is -however very difficult to seize such occasions in mountain warfare -where so little can be seen of the general state of affairs. - -A more obvious advantage was neglected by general Skerrit. The -defence of the bridge at Vera by a single company of rifles lasted -more than an hour, and four brigades of the enemy, crossing in a -tumultuous manner, could not have cleared the narrow passage after -it was won in a moment. Lord Wellington’s despatch erroneously -describes the French as passing under the fire of great part of -general Skerrit’s brigade, whereas that officer remained in order of -battle on the lower slopes of Santa Barbara, half a mile distant, and -allowed the enemy to escape. It is true that a large mass of French -troops were on the counter slopes of the Bayonette mountain, beyond -Vera, but the seventh division, being then close to San Barbara, -would have prevented any serious disaster if the blow had failed. A -great opportunity was certainly lost, but war in rough mountains is -generally a series of errors. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. September.] - -Soult, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of an attack -along the Nive, that his uneasy movements made the allies think -he was again preparing for offensive operations. This double -misunderstanding did not however last long, and each army resumed its -former position. - -The fall of San Sebastian had given lord Wellington a new port and -point of support, had increased the value of Passages as a depôt, -and let loose a considerable body of troops for field operations; -the armistice in Germany was at an end, Austria had joined the -allies, and it seemed therefore certain that he would immediately -invade France. The English cabinet had promised the continental -sovereigns that it should be so when the French were expelled from -Spain, meaning Navarre and Guipuscoa; and the newspaper editors -were, as usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries by -their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions. Meanwhile the -partizans of the Bourbons were secretly endeavouring to form a -conspiracy in the south, and the duke of Berri desired to join the -British army, pretending that twenty thousand Frenchmen were already -armed and organized at the head of which he would place himself. -In fine all was exultation and extravagance. But lord Wellington, -well understanding the inflated nature of such hopes and promises, -while affecting to rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the -opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, by observing, -“_that if he had done all that was expected he should have been -before that period in the moon_.” - -With respect to the duke of Berri’s views, it was for the sovereigns -he said to decide whether the restoration of the Bourbons should form -part of their policy, but as yet no fixed line of conduct on that or -any other political points was declared. It was for their interest to -get rid of Napoleon, and there could be no question of the advantage -or propriety of accepting the aid of a Bourbon party without pledging -themselves to dethrone the emperor. The Bourbons might indeed -decline, in default of such a pledge, to involve their partizans in -rebellion, and he advised them to do so, because Napoleon’s power -rested internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of -corruption ever established in any country, externally upon his -military force which was supported almost exclusively by foreign -contributions; once confined to the limits of France he would be -unable to bear the double expense of his government and army, the -reduction of either would be fatal to him, and the object of the -Bourbons would thus be obtained without risk. But, if they did not -concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of Europe must -declare they would dethrone Napoleon before the duke of Berri should -be allowed to join the army; and the British government must make up -its mind upon the question. - -This reasoning put an end to the project, because neither the -English cabinet nor the allied sovereigns were ready to adopt a -decisive open line of policy. The ministers exulting at the progress -of aristocratic domination, had no thought save that of wasting -England’s substance by extravagant subsidies and supplies, taken -without gratitude by the continental powers who held themselves -no-ways bound thereby to uphold the common cause, which each secretly -designed to make available for peculiar interests. Moreover they all -still trembled before the conqueror and none would pledge themselves -to a decided policy. Lord Wellington alone moved with a firm -composure, the result of profound and well-understood calculations; -yet his mind, naturally so dispassionate, was strangely clouded at -this time by personal hatred of Napoleon. - -Where is the proof, or even probability, of that great man’s system -of government being internally dependent upon “_the most extensive -corruption ever established in any country_”? - -The annual expenditure of France was scarcely half that of England, -and Napoleon rejected public loans which are the very life-blood of -state corruption. He left no debt. Under him no man devoured the -public substance in idleness merely because he was of a privileged -class; the state servants were largely paid but they were made to -labour effectually for the state. They did not eat their bread and -sleep. His system of public accounts, remarkable for its exactness -simplicity and comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public -fraud, and therefore extremely unfavourable to corruption. Napoleon’s -power was supported in France by that deep sense of his goodness as -a sovereign, and that admiration for his genius which pervaded the -poorer and middle classes of the people; by the love which they bore -towards him, and still bear for his memory because he cherished the -principles of a just equality. They loved him also for his incessant -activity in the public service, his freedom from all private vices, -and because his public works, wondrous for their number their utility -and grandeur, never stood still; under him the poor man never wanted -work. To France he gave noble institutions, a comparatively just -code of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the Romans. His -_Cadastre_, more extensive and perfect than the Doomsday Book, that -monument of the wisdom and greatness of our Norman Conqueror, was -alone sufficient to endear him to the nation. Rapidly advancing under -his vigorous superintendence, it registered and taught every man -the true value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities -public or private. It was designed and most ably adapted to fix and -secure titles to property, to prevent frauds, to abate litigation, -to apportion the weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the -insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the revenue, and -to secure the sacred freedom of the poor man’s home. The French -_Cadastre_, although not original, would from its comprehensiveness, -have been when completed the greatest boon ever conferred upon a -civilized nation by a statesman. - -To say that the emperor was supported by his soldiers, is to say that -he was supported by the people; because the law of conscription, that -mighty staff on which France leaned when all Europe attempted to -push her down, the conscription, without which she could never have -sustained the dreadful war of antagonist principles entailed upon her -by the revolution; that energetic law, which he did not establish -but which he freed from abuse, and rendered great, national, and -endurable by causing it to strike equally on all classes, the -conscription made the soldiers the real representatives of the -people. The troops idolized Napoleon, well they might, and to assert -that their attachment commenced only when they became soldiers, is to -acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness of mind turned -hatred into devotion the moment he was approached. But Napoleon never -was hated by the people of France; he was their own creation and -they loved him so as never monarch was loved before. His march from -Cannes to Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of poor men, who -were not soldiers, can never be effaced or even disfigured. For six -weeks, at any moment, a single assassin might by a single shot have -acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide, and obtained vast rewards -besides from the trembling monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who -scrupled not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many there were -base enough to undertake but none so hardy as to execute the crime, -and Napoleon, guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed to a -throne from whence it required a million of foreign bayonets to drive -him again. From the throne they drove him, but not from the thoughts -and hearts of men. - -Lord Wellington having shaken off the weight of the continental -policy, proceeded to consider the question of invading France -simply as a military operation, which might conduce to or militate -against the security of the Peninsula while Napoleon’s power was -weakened by the war in Germany; and such was his inflexible probity -of character, that no secret ambitious promptings, no facility of -gaining personal reputation, diverted him from this object, all the -renown of which he already enjoyed, the embarrassments mortifications -and difficulties, enormous, although to the surface-seeing public -there appeared none, alone remaining. - -The rupture of the congress of Prague, Austria’s accession to -the coalition, and the fall of San Sebastian were favourable -circumstances; but he relied not much on the military skill of the -banded sovereigns, and a great defeat might at any moment dissolve -their alliance. Napoleon could then reinforce Soult and drive -the allies back upon Spain, where the French still possessed the -fortresses of Santona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon, Fraga, -Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortoza, -Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia. Meanwhile lord William -Bentinck, misled by false information, had committed a serious error -in sending Del Parque’s army to Tudela, because the Ordal disaster -and subsequent retreat shewed that Suchet was strong enough, if it so -pleased him, to drive the Anglo-Sicilian army back even to the Xucar -and recover all his strong places. In fine the affairs of Catalonia -were in the same unsatisfactory state they had been in from the -first. It was not even certain that a British army would remain there -at all, for lord William assured of Murat’s defection was intent upon -invading Italy; and the ministers seemed to have leaned towards the -project, since Wellington now seriously desired to know whether the -Anglo-Sicilians were to go or stay in Spain. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Dispatches, MSS.] - -Lord William himself had quitted that army, making the seventh change -in fifteen months; this alone was sufficient to account for its -misfortunes, and the Spanish generals, who had been placed under -the English commander, ridiculed the latter’s ill success and spoke -vauntingly of themselves. Strenuously did lord Wellington urge the -appointment of some commander for the Anglo-Sicilian troops who -would devote his whole attention to his business, observing that at -no period of the war would he have quitted his own army even for a -few days without danger to its interests. But the English minister’s -ignorance of every thing relating to war was profound, and at this -time he was himself being stript of generals. Graham, Picton, Leith, -lord Dalhousie, H. Clinton, and Skerrit, had gone or were going to -England on account of ill health wounds or private business; and -marshal Beresford was at Lisbon, where dangerous intrigues to be -noticed hereafter menaced the existence of the Portuguese army. -Castaños and Giron had been removed by the Spanish regency from their -commands, and O’Donnel, described as an able officer but of the most -impracticable temper, being denied the chief command of Elio’s, -Copons’, and Del Parque’s troops, quitted the army under pretext that -his old wounds had broken out; whereupon, Giron was placed at the -head of the Andalusians. The operations in Catalonia were however -so important, that lord Wellington thought of going there himself; -and he would have done so, if the after misfortunes of Napoleon in -Germany, had not rendered it impossible for that monarch to reinforce -his troops on the Spanish frontier. - -These general reasons for desiring to operate on the side of -Catalonia were strengthened also by the consideration, that the -country, immediately beyond the Bidassoa, being sterile, the -difficulty of feeding the army in winter would be increased; and -the twenty-five thousand half-starved Spaniards in his army, -would certainly plunder for subsistence and incense the people of -France. Moreover Soult’s actual position was strong, his troops -still numerous, and his entrenched camp furnished a secure retreat. -Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port were so placed that no serious -invasion could be made until one or both were taken, or blockaded, -which, during the tempestuous season and while the admiralty refused -to furnish sufficient naval means, was scarcely possible; even to -get at those fortresses would be a work of time difficult against -Soult alone, impracticable if Suchet, as he well might, came to the -other’s support. Towards Catalonia therefore lord Wellington desired -to turn when the frontier of the western Pyrenees should be secured -by the fall of Pampeluna. Yet he thought it not amiss meanwhile to -yield something to the allied sovereigns, and give a spur to public -feeling by occupying a menacing position within the French territory. -A simple thing this seemed but the English general made no slight -concession when he thus bent his military judgment to political -considerations. - -The French position was the base of a triangle of which Bayonne -was the apex, and the great roads leading from thence to Irun and -St. Jean Pied de Port, were the sides. A rugged mass of mountains -intervened between the left and centre, but nearly all the valleys -and communications, coming from Spain beyond the Nive, centred at -St. Jean Pied de Port and were embraced by an entrenched camp which -Foy occupied in front of that fortress. That general could, without -calling upon Paris who was at Oleron, bring fifteen thousand men -including the national guards into action, and serious dispositions -were necessary to dislodge him; but these could not be made secretly, -and Soult calculated upon having time to aid him and deliver a -general battle on chosen ground. Meanwhile Foy barred any movement -along the right bank of the Nive, and he could, either by the great -road leading to Bayonne or by shorter communications through Bidaray, -reach the bridge of Cambo on the Nive and so gain Espelette behind -the camps of Ainhoa. From thence, passing the Nivelle by the bridges -at Amotz and Serres he could reach St. Jean de Luz, and it was by -this route he moved to aid in the attack of San Marcial. However, -the allies marching from the Alduides and the Bastan could also -penetrate by St. Martin D’Arosa and the Gorospil mountain to Bidaray, -that is to say, between Foy’s and D’Erlon’s positions. Yet the roads -were very difficult, and as the French sent out frequent scouting -detachments and the bridge of Cambo was secured by works, Foy could -not be easily cut off from the rest of the army. - -[Sidenote: Plans 5 and 6.] - -D’Erlon’s advanced camps were near Urdax, and on the Mondarain and -Choupera mountains, but his main position was a broad ridge behind -Ainhoa, the right covering the bridge of Amotz. Beyond that bridge -Clauzel’s position extended along a range of strong hills, trending -towards Ascain and Serres, and as the Nivelle swept with a curve -quite round his rear his right flank rested on that river also. -The redoubts of San Barbe and the camp of Sarre, barring the roads -leading from Vera and the Puerto de Echallar, were in advance of -his left, and the greater Rhune, whose bare rocky head lifted two -thousand eight hundred feet above the sea level overtopped all the -neighbouring mountains, formed, in conjunction with its dependants -the Commissary and Bayonette, a mask for his right. - -From the Bayonette the French position run along the summit of the -Mandale or Sulcogain mountain, on a single line, but from thence -to the sea the ridges suddenly abated and there were two lines of -defence; the first along the Bidassoa, the second commencing near St. -Jean de Luz stretched from the heights of Bordegain towards Ascain, -having the camps of Urogne and the Sans Culottes in advance. Reille’s -divisions guarded these lines, and the second was connected with -Clauzel’s position by Villatte’s reserve which was posted at Ascain. -Finally the whole system of defence was tied to that of St. Jean -Pied de Port, by the double bridge-head at Cambo which secured the -junction of Foy with the rest of the army. - -The French worked diligently on their entrenchments, yet they were -but little advanced when the castle of San Sebastian surrendered, -and Wellington had even then matured a plan of attack as daring as -any undertaken during the whole war. This was to seize the great -Rhune mountain and its dependents, and at the same time to force -the passage of the Lower Bidassoa and establish his left wing in -the French territory. He would thus bring the Rhune Commissary and -Bayonette mountains, forming a salient menacing point of great -altitude and strength towards the French centre, within his own -system, and shorten his communications by gaining the command of the -road running along the river from Irun to Vera. Thus also he would -obtain the port of Fuentarabia, which, though bad in winter, was some -advantage to a general whose supplies came from the ocean, and who -with scanty means of land-transport had to encounter the perverse -negligence and even opposition of the Spanish authorities. Moreover -Passages, his nearest port, was restricted in its anchorage-ground, -hard to make from the sea and dangerous when full of vessels. - -[Sidenote: October.] - -[Sidenote: Foy’s report to Soult, 2d October, MSS.] - -He designed this operation for the middle of September, immediately -after the castle of San Sebastian fell and before the French works -acquired strength, but some error retarded the arrival of his -pontoons, the weather became bad, and the attack, which depended as -we shall find upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity -deferred until the 7th of October. Meanwhile to mislead Soult, to -ascertain Foy’s true position about St. Jean Pied de Port, and to -strengthen his own right, he brought part of Del Parque’s force up -from Tudela to Pampeluna. The Andalusian division which had remained -at the blockade after the battle of Sauroren then rejoined Giron -at Echallar, and at the same time Mina’s troops gathered in the -neighbourhood of Roncesvalles. Wellington himself repaired to that -quarter on the 1st of October, and in his way, passing through the -Alduides, he caused general Campbell to surprize some isolated posts -on the rock of Airola, a French scouting detachment was also cut off -near the foundry of Baygorry, and two thousand sheep were swept from -the valley. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -These affairs awaked Soult’s jealousy. He was in daily expectation -of an attack without being able to ascertain on what quarter the -blow would fall, and at first, deceived by false information that -the fourth division had reinforced Hill, he thought the march of -Mina’s troops and the Andalusians was intended to mask an offensive -movement by the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of light cavalry in the -Bastan, lord Wellington’s presence at Roncesvalles, and the loss of -the post at Airola seemed to confirm this; but he knew the pontoons -were at Oyarzun, and some deserters told him that the real object of -the allies was to gain the great Rhune. On the other hand a French -commissary, taken at San Sebastian and exchanged after remaining -twelve days at Lesaca, assured him, that nothing at Wellington’s -head-quarters indicated a serious attack, although the officers spoke -of one and there were many movements of troops; and this weighed -much with the French general, because the slow march of the pontoons -and the wet weather had caused a delay contradictory to the reports -of the spies and deserters. It was also beyond calculation that -Wellington should, against his military judgment, push his left wing -into France merely to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns in -Germany, and as the most obvious line for a permanent invasion was by -his right and centre, there was no apparent cause for deferring his -operations. - -The true reason of the procrastination, namely the state of the tides -and fords on the Lower Bidassoa, was necessarily hidden from Soult, -who finally inclined to the notion that Wellington only designed -to secure his blockade at Pampeluna from interruption by menacing -the French and impeding their labours, the results of which were -now becoming visible. However, as all the deserters and spies came -with the same story he recommended increased vigilance along the -whole line. And yet so little did he anticipate the nature of his -opponent’s project, that on the 6th he reviewed D’Erlon’s divisions -at Ainhoa, and remained that night at Espelette, doubting if any -attack was intended and no way suspecting that it would be against -his right. But Wellington could not diminish his troops on the side -of Roncesvalles and the Alduides, lest Foy and Paris and the light -cavalry under Pierre Soult should unite at St. Jean Pied de Port to -raise the blockade of Pampeluna; the troops at Maya were already -posted offensively, menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle, -and it was therefore only with his left wing and left centre, and -against the French right that he could act. - -Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred British soldiers -arrived from England. Mina was then in the Ahescoa, on the right of -general Hill, who was thus enabled to relieve Campbell’s Portuguese -in the Alduides; and the latter marching to Maya replaced the third -division, which, shifting to its left occupied the heights above -Zagaramurdi, to enable the seventh division to relieve Giron’s -Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar. - -These dispositions were made with a view to the attack of the great -Rhune and its dependents, the arrangements for which shall now be -described. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Plan 5.] - -Giron, moving with his Andalusians from the Ivantelly, was to assail -a lofty ridge or saddle, uniting the Commissari and the great Rhune. -A battalion, stealing up the slopes and hollows on his right flank, -was to seize the rocky head of the last-named mountain, and after -placing detachments there in observation of the roads leading round -it from Sarre and Ascain, was to descend upon the saddle and menace -the rear of the enemy’s position at the Puerto de Vera. Meanwhile -the principal attack was to be made in two columns, but to protect -the right and rear against a counter-attack from Sarre, the Spanish -general was to leave one brigade in the narrow pass leading from -Vera, between the Ivantelly and the Rhune to that place. - -On the left of Giron the light division was to assail the Bayonette -mountain and the Puerto de Vera, connecting its right with Giron’s -left by skirmishers. - -Longa, who had resumed his old positions above the Salinas de Lesaca, -was to move in two columns across the Bidassoa. One passing by the -ford of Salinas was to aid the left wing of the light division in its -attack on the Bayonette; the other passing by the bridge of Vera, was -to move up the ravine separating the slopes of the Bayonette from -the Puerto de Vera, and thus connect the two attacks of the light -division. During these operations Longa was also to send some men -over the river at Andarlasa, to seize a telegraph which the French -used to communicate between the left and centre of their line. - -Behind the light division general Cole was to take post with the -fourth division on Santa Barbara, pushing forward detachments to -secure the commanding points gained by the fighting troops in front. -The sixth division was meanwhile to make a demonstration on the right -by Urdax and Zagaramurdi, against D’Erlon’s advanced posts. Thus -without weakening his line between Roncesvalles and Echallar lord -Wellington put nearly twenty thousand men in motion against the Rhune -mountain and its dependents, and he had still twenty-four thousand -disposable to force the passage of the Lower Bidassoa. - -It has been already shewn that between Andarlasa and Biriatu, a -distance of three miles, there were neither roads nor fords nor -bridges. The French trusting to this difficulty of approach, and -to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the Mandale, had -collected their troops principally, where the Bildox or green -mountain, and the entrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords. -Against these points Wellington directed general Freyre’s Spaniards, -who were to descend from San Marcial, cross the upper fords of -Biriatu, assail the Bildox and Mandale mountains, and turn the left -of that part of the enemy’s line which being prolonged from Biriatu -crossed the royal road and passed behind the town of Andaya. - -Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence were the -mountain of _Louis_ XIV., the ridge called the _Caffé Republicain_, -and the town of Andaya. Behind these the _Calvaire d’Urogne_, the -_Croix des Bouquets_, and the camp of the _Sans Culottes_, served as -rallying posts. - -For the assault on these positions Wellington designed to employ -the first and fifth divisions and the unattached brigades of Wilson -and lord Aylmer, in all about fifteen thousand men. By the help -of Spanish fishermen he had secretly discovered three fords, -practicable at low water, between the bridge of Behobia and the sea, -and his intent was to pass his column at the old fords above, and -at the new fords below the bridge, and this though the tides rose -sixteen feet, leaving at the ebb open heavy sands not less than half -a mile broad. The left bank of the river also was completely exposed -to observation from the enemy’s hills, which though low in comparison -of the mountains above the bridge, were nevertheless strong ridges of -defence; but relying on his previous measures to deceive the enemy -the English general disdained these dangers, and his anticipations -were not belied by the result. - -The unlikelihood that a commander, having a better line of -operations, would pass such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth, -deceived the French general. Meanwhile his lieutenants were -negligent. Of Reille’s two divisions La Martiniere’s, now commanded -by general Boyer, was at the camp of Urogne, and on the morning of -the seventh was dispersed as usual to labour at the works; Villatte’s -reserve was at Ascain and Serres; the five thousand men composing -Maucune’s division were indeed on the first line but unexpectant of -an attack, and though the works on the Mandale were finished and -those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter to the sea they -were scarcely commenced. - -[Sidenote: Plan 5.] - -_Passage of the Bidassoa._ The night set in heavily. A sullen -thunder-storm gathering about the craggy summit of the Pena de Haya -came slowly down its flanks, and towards morning rolling over the -Bidassoa fell in its greatest violence upon the French positions. -During this turmoil Wellington whose pontoons and artillery were -close up to Irun, disposed a number of guns and howitzers along -the crest of San Marcial, and his columns attained their respective -stations along the banks of the river. Freyre’s Spaniards one brigade -of the guards and Wilson’s Portuguese, stretching from the Biriatu -fords to that near the broken bridge of Behobia, were ensconced -behind the detached ridge which the French had first seized in the -attack of the 31st. The second brigade of guards and the Germans of -the first division were concealed near Irun, close to a ford below -the bridge of Behobia called the great Jonco. The British brigades of -the fifth division covered themselves behind a large river embankment -opposite Andaya; Sprye’s Portuguese and lord Aylmer’s brigade were -posted in the ditch of Fuenterabia. - -As all the tents were left standing in the camps of the allies, the -enemy could perceive no change on the morning of the 7th, but at -seven o’clock, the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade emerging -from their concealment took the sands in two columns, that on the -left pointing against the French camp of the Sans Culottes, that on -the right against the ridge of Andaya. No shot was fired, but when -they had passed the fords of the low-water channel a rocket was sent -up from the steeple of Fuenterabia as a signal. Then the guns and -howitzers opened from San Marcial, the troops near Irun, covered -by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco ford, and the passage -above the bridge also commenced. From the crest of San Marcial seven -columns could be seen at once, attacking on a line of five miles, -those above the bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest, -those below it appearing in the distance like huge sullen snakes -winding over the heavy sands. The Germans missing the Jonco ford got -into deep water but quickly recovered the true line, and the French, -completely surprised, permitted even the brigades of the fifth -division to gain the right bank and form their lines before a hostile -musket flashed. - -The cannonade from San Marcial was heard by Soult at Espelette, -and at the same time the sixth division, advancing beyond Urdax -and Zagaramurdi, made a false attack on D’Erlon’s positions; the -Portuguese brigade under colonel Douglas, were however pushed too -far and repulsed with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and the -French marshal instantly detecting the true nature of this attack -hurried to his right, but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before -he arrived. - -When the British artillery first opened, Maucune’s troops had -assembled at their different posts of defence, and the French guns, -established principally near the mountain of Louis XIV. and the -Caffé Republicain, commenced firing. The alarm spread, and Boyer’s -marched from the second line behind Urogne to support Maucune without -waiting for the junction of the working parties; but his brigades -moved separately as they could collect, and before the first came -into action, Sprye’s Portuguese, forming the extreme left of the -allies, menaced the camp of the Sans Culottes; thither therefore -one of Boyer’s regiments was ordered, while the others advanced by -the royal road towards the Croix des Bouquets. But Andaya, guarded -only by a piquet, was abandoned, and Reille thinking the camp of -the Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer’s men reached it, sent -a battalion there from the centre, thus weakening his force at -the chief point of attack; for the British brigades of the fifth -division, were now advancing left in front from Andaya, and bearing -under a sharp fire of artillery and musquetry towards the Croix des -Bouquets. - -By this time the columns of the first division had passed the river, -one above the bridge, preceded by Wilson’s Portuguese, one below, -preceded by Colin Halkett’s German light troops, who aided by the -fire of the guns on San Marcial, drove back the enemy’s advanced -posts, won the Caffé Republicain, the mountain of Louis XIV. and -drove the French from those heights to the Croix des Bouquets: this -was the key of the position, and towards it guns and troops were -now hastening from every side. The Germans who had lost many men in -the previous attacks were here brought to a check, for the heights -were very strong, and Boyer’s leading battalions were now close at -hand; but at this critical moment colonel Cameron arrived with the -ninth regiment of the fifth division, and passing through the German -skirmishers rushed with great vehemence to the summit of the first -height. The French infantry instantly opened their ranks to let their -guns retire, and then retreated themselves at full speed to a second -ridge, somewhat lower but where they could only be approached on a -narrow front. Cameron as quickly threw his men into a single column -and bore against this new position, which curving inwards enabled the -French to pour a concentrated fire upon his regiment; nor did his -violent course seem to dismay them until he was within ten yards, -when appalled by the furious shout and charge of the ninth they gave -way, and the ridges of the Croix des Bouquets were won as far as the -royal road. The British regiment however lost many men and officers, -and during the fight the French artillery and scattered troops, -coming from different points and rallying on Boyer’s battalions, were -gathered on the ridges to the French left of the road. - -The entrenched camp above Biriatu and the Bildox, had been meanwhile -defended with success in front, but Freyre turned them with his right -wing, which being opposed only by a single battalion soon won the -Mandale mountain, and the French fell back from that quarter to the -Calvaire d’Urogne and Jollimont. Reille thus beaten at the Croix des -Bouquets, and his flanks turned, the left by the Spaniards on the -Mandale, the right by the allies along the sea-coast, retreated in -great disorder along the royal causeway and the old road of Bayonne. -He passed through the village of Urogne and the British skirmishers -at first entered it in pursuit, but they were beaten out again by the -second brigade of Boyer’s division, for Soult now arrived with part -of Villatte’s reserve and many guns, and by his presence and activity -restored order and revived the courage of the troops at the moment -when the retreat was degenerating into a flight. - -Reille lost eight pieces of artillery and about four hundred men, -the allies did not lose more than six hundred of which half were -Spaniards, so slight and easy had the skill of the general rendered -this stupendous operation. But if the French commander penetrating -Wellington’s design, and avoiding the surprize, had opposed all his -troops, amounting with what Villatte could spare to sixteen thousand, -instead of the five thousand actually engaged, the passage could -scarcely have been forced; and a check would have been tantamount to -a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning tide would have -come with a swallowing flood upon the rear. - -Equally unprepared and equally unsuccessful were the French on the -side of Vera, although the struggle there proved more fierce and -constant. - -At day-break Giron had descended from the Ivantelly rocks and general -Alten from Santa Barbara; the first to the gorge of the pass leading -from Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where he was joined -by half of Longa’s force. - -One brigade, consisting of the forty-third the seventeenth Portuguese -regiment of the line and the first and third battalions of riflemen, -drew up in column on an open space to the right of Vera. The other -brigade under colonel Colborne, consisting of the fifty-second two -battalions of Caçadores and a battalion of British riflemen, was -disposed on the left of Vera. Half of Longa’s division was between -these brigades, the other half after crossing the ford of Salinas -drew up on Colborne’s left. The whole of the narrow vale of Vera was -thus filled with troops ready to ascend the mountains, and general -Cole displaying his force to advantage on the heights of Santa -Barbara presented a formidable reserve. - -[Sidenote: Plan 5.] - -Taupin’s division guarded the enormous positions in front of the -allies. His right was on the Bayonette, from whence a single slope -descended to a small plain about two parts down the mountain. From -this platform three distinct tongues shot into the valley below, each -was defended by an advanced post, and the platform itself secured by -a star redoubt, behind which, about half-way up the single slope, -there was a second retrenchment with abbatis. Another large redoubt -and an unfinished breast-work on the superior crest completed the -system of defence for the Bayonette. - -The Commissari, which is a continuation of the Bayonette towards -the great Rhune, was covered by a profound gulf thickly wooded and -defended with skirmishers, and between this gulf and another of the -same nature the main road, leading from Vera over the Puerto, pierced -the centre of the French position. Rugged and ascending with short -abrupt turns this road was blocked at every uncovered point with -abbatis and small retrenchments; each obstacle was commanded, at -half musquet shot, by small detachments placed on all the projecting -parts overlooking the ascent, and a regiment, entrenched above on the -Puerto itself, connected the troops on the crest of the Bayonette -and Commissari with those on the saddle-ridge, against which Giron’s -attack was directed. - -But between Alten’s right and Giron’s left was an isolated ridge -called by the soldiers the _Boar’s back_, the summit of which, about -half a mile long and rounded at each end, was occupied by four French -companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as it were into the gulf to -cover the Puerto and saddle ridges, although of mean height in -comparison of the towering ranges behind, was yet so great that the -few warning shots fired from the summit by the enemy, reached the -allies at its base with that slow singing sound which marks the dying -force of a musquet-ball. It was essential to take the Boar’s back -before the general attack commenced, and five companies of British -riflemen, supported by the seventeenth Portuguese regiment, were -ordered to assail it at the Vera end, while a battalion of Giron’s -Spaniards preceded by a detached company of the forty-third attacked -it on the other. - -[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.] - -At four o’clock in the morning Clauzel had received intelligence that -the Bayonette was to be assaulted that day or the next, and at seven -o’clock he heard from Conroux, who commanded at Sarre, that Giron’s -camps were abandoned although the tents of the seventh division were -still standing; at the same time the sound of musquetry was heard on -the side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun, and then came -Taupin’s report that the vale of Vera was filled with troops. To -this last quarter Clauzel hurried. The Spaniards had already driven -Conroux’s outposts from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment -was creeping up towards the unguarded head of the great Rhune. He -immediately ordered four regiments of Conroux’s division to occupy -the summit the front and the flanks of that mountain, and he formed a -reserve of two other regiments behind. With these troops he designed -to secure the mountain and support Taupin, but ere they could reach -their destination that general’s fate was decided. - -[Sidenote: Plan 5.] - -_Second Combat of Vera._—Soon after seven o’clock a few cannon-shot -from some mountain-guns, of which each side had a battery, were -followed by the Spanish musquetry on the right, and the next moment -the “_Boars back_” was simultaneously assailed at both ends. The -riflemen on the Vera side ascended to a small pine-wood two-thirds of -the way up and there rested, but soon resuming their movement with a -scornful gallantry they swept the French off the top, disdaining to -use their rifles beyond a few shots down the reverse side, to show -that they were masters of the ridge. This was the signal for the -general attack. The seventeenth Portuguese followed the victorious -sharp-shooters, the forty-third, preceded by their own skirmishers -and by the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged -into the rugged pass, Longa’s troops entered the gloomy wood of the -ravine on the left, and beyond them Colborne’s brigade moving by -narrow paths and throwing out skirmishers assailed the Bayonette, the -fifty-second took the middle tongue, the Caçadores and riflemen the -two outermost and all bore with a concentric movement against the -star redoubt on the platform above. Longa’s second brigade should -have flanked the left of this attack with a wide skirting movement, -but neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of such warfare, -and therefore quietly followed the riflemen in reserve. - -Soon the open slopes of the mountains were covered with men and -with fire, a heavy confused sound of mingled shouts and musquetry -filled the deep hollows between, and the white smoke came curling up -above the dark forest trees which covered their gloomy recesses. The -French compared with their assailants seemed few and scattered on -the mountain side, and Kempt’s brigade soon forced its way without a -check through all the retrenchments on the main pass, his skirmishers -spreading wider and breaking into small detachments of support as the -depth of the ravine lessened and the slopes melted into the higher -ridges. When about half-way up an open platform gave a clear view -over the Bayonette slopes, and all eyes were turned that way. Longa’s -right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed labouring and -overmatched, but beyond, on the broad open space in front of the star -fort, the Caçadores and riflemen of Colborne’s brigade, were seen -coming out, in small bodies, from a forest which covered the three -tongues of land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire was sharp, -their pace rapid, and in a few moments they closed upon the redoubt -in a mass as if resolved to storm it. The fifty-second were not then -in sight, and the French thinking from the dark clothing that all -were Portuguese rushed in close order out of the entrenchment; they -were numerous and very sudden; the rifle as a weapon is overmatched -by the musket and bayonet, and this rough charge sent the scattered -assailants back over the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill -cries the French followed, but just then the fifty-second appeared, -partly in line partly in column, on the platform, and raising their -shout rushed forward. The red uniform and full career of this -regiment startled the hitherto adventurous French, they stopped -short, wavered, and then turning fled to their entrenchment; the -fifty-second following hard entered the works with them, the riflemen -and Caçadores who had meanwhile rallied passed it on both flanks, -and for a few moments every thing was hidden by a dense volume of -smoke. Soon however the British shout pealed again and the whole -mass emerged on the other side, the French, now the fewer, flying -the others pursuing, until the second entrenchment, half-way up the -parent slope, enabled the retreating troops to make another stand. - -The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt’s brigade now echoed -along the mountain side, and with renewed vigour the men continued -to scale the craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to the top -of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne after having carried the second -entrenchment above the star fort, was brought to a check by the works -on the very crest of the mountain, from whence the French not only -plied his troops with musquetry at a great advantage, but rolled huge -stones down the steep. - -[Sidenote: Plan 5.] - -These works were extensive well lined with men and strengthened -by a large redoubt on the right, but the defenders soon faltered, -for their left flank was turned by Kempt and the effects of lord -Wellington’s skilful combinations were now felt in another quarter. -Freyre’s Spaniards after carrying the Mandale mountain, between -Biriatu and the Bayonette, had pushed to a road leading from the -latter by Jollimont to St. Jean de Luz, and this was the line of -retreat from the crest of the Bayonette for Taupin’s right wing; but -Freyre’s Spaniards got there first, and if Longa’s brigade instead -of slowly following Colborne had spread out widely on the left, a -military line would have been completed from Giron to Freyre. Still -Taupin’s right was cut off on that side, and he was forced to file -it under fire along the crest of the Bayonette to reach the Puerto -de Vera road, where he was joined by his centre. He effected this -but lost his mountain battery and three hundred men. These last, -apparently the garrison of the large fort on the extreme right of the -Bayonette crest, were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner. -Accompanied by only one of his staff and half-a-dozen riflemen, he -crossed their march unexpectedly, and with great presence of mind -and intrepidity ordered them to lay down their arms, an order which -they thinking themselves entirely cut off obeyed. Meanwhile the -French skirmishers in the deep ravine, between the two lines of -attack, being feebly pushed by Longa’s troops, retreated too slowly -and getting amongst some rocks from whence there was no escape -surrendered to Kempt’s brigade. - -The right and centre of Taupin’s division being now completely beaten -fled down the side of the mountain towards Olette, they were pursued -by a part of the allies until they rallied upon Villatte’s reserve, -which was in order of battle on a ridge extending across the gorge -of Olette between Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonette and Commissari, -with the Puerto de Vera, were thus won after five hours’ incessant -fighting and toiling up their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle -was still maintained by the French troops on the Rhune. - -Giron after driving Conroux’s advanced post from the gorge leading -from Vera to Sarre had, following his orders, pushed a battalion from -that side towards the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve -in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack which Conroux -might make. And when his left wing was rendered free to move by the -capture of the “_Boar’s back_” he fought his way up abreast with -the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to his own -right of the Puerto. There however he was arrested by a strong line -of abbattis from behind which two French regiments poured a heavy -fire. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer Downie, now a -Spanish general, encouraged them with his voice and they kept their -ranks, they seemed irresolute and did not advance. There happened to -be present an officer of the forty-third regiment named Havelock, -who being attached to general Alten’s staff was sent to ascertain -Giron’s progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He -took off his hat, he called upon the Spaniards to follow him, and -putting spurs to his horse, at one bound cleared the abbattis and -went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for “_El -chico bianco_” “_the fair boy_” so they called him, for he was very -young and had light hair, with one shock broke through the French, -and this at the very moment when their centre was flying under the -fire of Kempt’s skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera. - -The two regiments thus defeated by the Spaniards retired by their -left along the saddle-ridge to the flanks of the Rhune, so that -Clauzel had now eight regiments concentrated on this great mountain. -Two occupied the crest including the highest rock called the -Hermitage; four were on the flanks, descending towards Ascain on one -hand, and towards Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied -a lower and parallel crest behind called the small Rhune. In this -situation they were attacked at four o’clock by Giron’s right wing. -The Spaniards first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of -crags about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed the bald -staring rocks of the Hermitage itself, endeavouring at the same time -to turn it by their right. In both objects they were defeated with -loss. The Hermitage was impregnable, the French rolled down stones -large enough to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards -resorted to a distant musketry which lasted until night. This day’s -fighting cost Taupin’s division two generals and four hundred men -killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the -allies was nearly a thousand, of which about five hundred were -Spaniards, and the success was not complete, for while the French -kept possession of the summit of the Rhune the allies’ new position -was insecure. - -[Sidenote: Plan 6.] - -The front and the right flank of that great mountain were -impregnable, but lord Wellington observing that the left flank, -descending towards Sarre, was less inaccessible, concentrated the -Spaniards on that side on the 8th, designing a combined attack -against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. At three -o’clock in the afternoon the rocks which studded the lower parts -of the Rhune slope were assailed by the Spaniards, and at the same -time detachments of the seventh division descended from the Puerto -de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe, and other outworks covering -the advanced French camp of Sarre. The Andalusians soon won the -rocks and an entrenched height that commanded the camp, for Clauzel, -too easily alarmed at some slight demonstrations made by the sixth -division towards the bridge of Amotz in rear of his left, thought he -should be cut off from his great camp, and very suddenly abandoned -not only the slope of the mountain but all his advanced works in the -basin below, including the fort of San Barbe. His troops were thus -concentrated on the height behind Sarre still holding with their -right the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his error were soon -made apparent. Wellington immediately established a strong body of -the Spanish troops close up to the rocks of the Hermitage, and the -two French regiments there, seeing the lower slopes and the fort of -San Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off, and without -orders abandoned the impregnable rocks of the Hermitage and retired -in the night to the smaller Rhune. The next morning some of the -seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but they -were quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and works taken -the day before if the Spaniards had not succoured them. - -The whole loss on the three days of fighting was about fourteen -hundred French and sixteen hundred of the allies, one half being -Spaniards, but many of the wounded were not brought in until the -third day after the actions, and several perished miserably where -they fell, it being impossible to discover them in those vast -solitudes. Some men were also lost from want of discipline; having -descended into the French villages they got drunk and were taken -the next day by the enemy. Nor was the number small of those who -plundered in defiance of lord Wellington’s proclamation; for he -thought it necessary to arrest and send to England several officers, -and renewed his proclamation, observing that if he had five times as -many men he could not venture to invade France unless marauding was -prevented. It is remarkable that the French troops on the same day -acted towards their own countrymen in the same manner, but Soult also -checked the mischief with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some -reputation to be shot as an example, for having suffered his men to -plunder a house in Sarre during the action. - -With exception of the slight checks sustained at Sarre and Ainhoa, -the course of these operations had been eminently successful, and -surely the bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous -positions must be admired. To them the unfinished state of the -French works was not visible. Day after day, for more than a month, -entrenchment had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast slopes of -mountains which were scarcely accessible from their natural steepness -and asperity. This they could see, yet cared neither for the growing -strength of the works, the height of the mountains, nor the breadth -of the river with its heavy sands, and its mighty rushing tide; all -were despised, and while they marched with this confident valour, it -was observed that the French fought in defence of their dizzy steeps -with far less fierceness than, when, striving against insurmountable -obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren. -Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the feebleness of the -defence on this occasion may be traced to another cause. It was a -general’s not a soldier’s battle. Wellington had with overmastering -combinations overwhelmed each point of attack. Taupin’s and Maucune’s -divisions were each less than five thousand strong, and they were -separately assailed, the first by eighteen the second by fifteen -thousand men, and at neither point were Reille and Clauzel able to -bring their reserves into action before the positions were won. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence with the Minister of War, -MSS.] - -Soult complained that he had repeatedly told his lieutenants an -attack was to be expected, and recommended extreme vigilance; yet -they were quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of the -guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th and again on -the night of the 6th. The passage of the river he said had commenced -at seven o’clock, long after daylight, the allies’ masses were then -clearly to be seen forming on the banks, and there was full time for -Boyer’s division to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost. -The battle was fought in disorder with less than five thousand men, -instead of with ten thousand in good order, and supported by a part -of Villatte’s reserve. To this negligence the generals added also -discouragement. They had so little confidence in the strength of -their positions, that if the allies had pushed vigorously forward -before the marshal’s arrival from Espelette, they would have entered -St. Jean de Luz, turned the right of the second position and forced -the French army back upon the Nive and the Adour. - -This reasoning of Soult was correct, but such a stroke did not belong -to lord Wellington’s system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he -doubted whether he could even maintain his army during the winter -in the position he had already gained, and he was averse to the -experiment, while Pampeluna held out and the war in Germany bore an -undecided aspect. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. October.] - -[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -Soult was apprehensive for some days that lord Wellington would -push his offensive operations further, but when he knew by Foy’s -reports, and by the numbers of the allies assembled on his right, -that there was no design of attacking his left, he resumed his -labours to advance the works covering St. Jean de Luz. He also kept -a vigilant watch from his centre, holding his divisions in readiness -to concentrate towards Sarre, and when he saw the heavy masses in his -front disperse by degrees into different camps, he directed Clauzel -to recover the fort of San Barbe. This work was constructed on a -comparatively low ridge barring issue from the gorge leading out of -the vale of Vera to Sarre, and it defended the narrow ground between -the Rhunes and the Nivelle river. Abandoned on the 8th without reason -by the French, since it did not naturally belong to the position of -the allies, it was now occupied by a Spanish picquet of forty men. -Some battalions were also encamped in a small wood close behind; but -many officers and men slept in the fort, and on the night of the -12th, about eleven o’clock, three battalions of Conroux’s division -reached the platform on which the fort stood without being perceived. -The work was then escaladed, the troops behind it went off in -confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred soldiers with fifteen -officers were made prisoners. The Spaniards ashamed of the surprize -made a vigorous effort to recover the fort at daylight, they were -repulsed, and repeated the attempt with five battalions, but Clauzel -brought up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in the wood -which lasted for several hours, the French endeavouring to regain the -whole of their old entrenchments and the Spaniards to recover the -fort. Neither succeeded and San Barbe, too near the enemy’s position -to be safely held, was resigned with a loss of two hundred men by the -French and five hundred by the Spaniards. Soon after this isolated -action a French sloop freighted with stores for Santona attempted to -run from St. Jean de Luz, and being chased by three English brigs and -cut off from the open sea, her crew after exchanging a few distant -shots with one of the brigs, set her on fire and escaped in their -boats to the Adour. - -Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was -organized in three grand divisions. The right having Mina’s and -Morillo’s battalions attached to it was commanded by sir Rowland -Hill, and extended from Roncesvalles to the Bastan. The centre -occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune, and Bayonette mountains, was -given to marshal Beresford. The left extending from the Mandale -mountain to the sea was under sir John Hope. This officer succeeded -Graham who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at Coruña -after sir John Moore’s death, he was superior in rank to lord -Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular war, but when the -latter obtained the baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope with a -patriotism and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie the friend -and comrade of Moore offered to serve as second in command, and lord -Wellington joyfully accepted him, observing that he was the “_ablest -officer in the army_.” - -The positions of the right and centre were offensive and menacing, -but the left was still on the defensive, and the Bidassoa, impassable -at high water below the bridge, was close behind. However the ridges -were strong, a powerful artillery was established on the right bank, -field-works were constructed, and although the fords below Behobia -furnished but a dangerous retreat even at low water, those above were -always available, and a pontoon bridge laid down for the passage of -the guns during the action was a sure resource. The front was along -the heights of the Croix des Bouquets facing Urogne and the camp of -the Sans Culottes, and there was a reserve in an entrenched camp -above Andaya. The right of the line rested on the Mandale, and from -that mountain and the Bayonette the allies could descend upon the -flank of an attacking army. - -[Sidenote: Appendix 7, sect. 2.] - -Soult had however no intention of renewing the offensive. He had now -lost many thousand men in battle, and the old soldiers remaining -did not exceed seventy-nine thousand present under arms including -officers and artillery-men. Of this number the garrisons absorbed -about thirteen thousand, leaving sixty-six thousand in the field, -whereas the allies, counting Mina’s and Del Parque’s troops, now -at Tudela, Pampeluna, and the Val de Irati, exceeded one hundred -thousand, seventy-three thousand, including officers, sergeants, and -artillery-men, being British and Portuguese. And this was below the -calculation of the French general, for deceived by the exaggerated -reports which the Spaniards always made of their forces, he thought -Del Parque had brought up twenty thousand men and that there were -one hundred and forty thousand combatants in his front. But it was -not so, and as conscripts of a good description were now joining the -French army rapidly, and the national guards of the Pyrenees were -many, it was in the number of soldiers rather than of men, that the -English general had the advantage. - -In this state of affairs Soult’s policy was to maintain a strict -defensive, under cover of which the spirit of the troops might be -revived, the country in the rear organized, and the conscripts -disciplined and hardened to war. The loss of the Lower Bidassoa was -in a political view mischievous to him, it had an injurious effect -upon the spirit of the frontier departments, and gave encouragement -to the secret partizans of the Bourbons; but in a military view -it was a relief. The great development of the mountains bordering -the Bidassoa had rendered their defence difficult; while holding -them he had continual fear that his line would be pierced and his -army suddenly driven beyond the Adour. His position was now more -concentrated. - -[Sidenote: Plan 6.] - -The right, under Reille, formed two lines. One across the royal road -on the fortified heights of Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes; -the other in the entrenched camps of Bourdegain and Belchena, -covering St. Jean de Luz and barring the gorges of Olhette and -Jollimont. - -The centre under Clauzel was posted on the ridges between Ascain and -Amotz holding the smaller Rhune in advance; but one division was -retained by Soult in the camp of Serres on the right of the Nivelle, -overhanging Ascain. To replace it one of D’Erlon’s divisions crossed -to the left of the Nivelle and reinforced Clauzel’s left flank above -Sarre. - -Villatte’s reserve was about St. Jean de Luz but having the Italian -brigade in the camp of Serres. - -D’Erlon’s remaining divisions continued in their old position, the -right connected with Clauzel’s line by the bridge of Amotz; the left, -holding the Choupera and Mondarin mountains, bordered on the Nive. - -Behind Clauzel and D’Erlon Soult had commenced a second chain of -entrenched camps, prolonged from the camp of Serres up the right bank -of the Nivelle to San Pé, thence by Suraide to the double bridge-head -of Cambo on the Nive, and beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain, -covering the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port. He had -also called general Paris up from Oleron to the defence of the latter -fortress and its entrenched camp, and now drew Foy down the Nive to -Bidarray half-way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo. There -watching the issues from the Val de Baygorry he was ready to occupy -the Ursouia mountain on the right of the Nive, or, moving by Cambo, -to reinforce the great position on the left of that river according -to circumstances. - -To complete these immense entrenchments, which between the Nive and -the sea were double and on an opening of sixteen miles, the whole -army laboured incessantly, and all the resources of the country -whether of materials or working men were called out by requisition. -Nevertheless this defensive warfare was justly regarded by the -duke of Dalmatia as unsuitable to the general state of affairs. -Offensive operations were most consonant to the character of the -French soldiers, and to the exigencies of the time. Recent experience -had shown the impregnable nature of the allies’ positions against -a front attack, and he was too weak singly to change the theatre -of operations. But when he looked at the strength of the armies -appropriated by the emperor to the Spanish contest, he thought France -would be ill-served if her generals could not resume the offensive -successfully. Suchet had just proved his power at Ordal against lord -William Bentinck, and that nobleman’s successor, with inferior rank -and power, with an army unpaid and feeding on salt meat from the -ships, with jealous and disputing colleagues amongst the Spanish -generals, none of whom were willing to act cordially with him upon -a fixed and well-considered plan, was in no condition to menace the -French seriously. And that he was permitted at this important crisis -to paralyze from fifty to sixty thousand excellent French troops -possessing all the strong places of the country, was one of the most -singular errors of the war. - -[Sidenote: Appendix 8, sect. 2.] - -Exclusive of national guards and detachments of the line, disposed -along the whole frontier to guard the passes of the Pyrenees against -sudden marauding excursions, the French armies counted at this time -about one hundred and seventy thousand men and seventeen thousand -horses. Of these one hundred and thirty-eight thousand were present -under arms, and thirty thousand conscripts were in march to join -them. They held all the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, and -most of those in Aragon Navarre and Guipuscoa, and they could unite -behind the Pyrenees for a combined effort in safety. Lord Wellington -could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians and all the Spaniards in -arms on the eastern coast, bring into line one hundred and fifty -thousand men; he had several sieges on his hands, and to unite his -forces at any point required great dispositions to avoid an attack -during a flank march. Suchet had above thirty thousand disposable -men, he could increase them to forty thousand by relinquishing -some unimportant posts, his means in artillery were immense, and -distributed in all his strong places, so that he could furnish -himself from almost any point. It is no exaggeration therefore to say -that two hundred pieces of artillery and ninety thousand old soldiers -might have united at this period upon the flank of lord Wellington, -still leaving thirty thousand conscripts and the national guards -of the frontier, supported by the fortresses and entrenched camps -of Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, the castles of Navarens and -Jaca on one side, and the numerous garrisons of the fortresses in -Catalonia on the other, to cover France from invasion. - -To make this great power bear in a right direction was the duke -of Dalmatia’s object, and his plans were large, and worthy of his -reputation. Yet he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his projects, -and that marshal’s resistance would appear to have sprung from -personal dislike contracted during Soult’s sojourn near Valencia in -1812. It has been already shown how lightly he abandoned Aragon and -confined himself to Catalonia after quitting Valencia. He did not -indeed then know that Soult had assumed the command of the army of -Spain and was preparing for his great effort to relieve Pampeluna; -but he was aware that Clauzel and Paris were on the side of Jaca, -and he was too good a general not to know that operating on the -allies’ flank was the best mode of palliating the defeat of Vittoria. -He might have saved both his garrison and castle of Zaragoza; the -guns and other materials of a very large field-artillery equipment -were deposited there, and from thence, by Jaca, he could have opened -a sure and short communication with Soult, obtained information of -that general’s projects, and saved Pampeluna. - -It may be asked why the duke of Dalmatia did not endeavour to -communicate with Suchet. The reason was simple. The former quitted -Dresden suddenly on the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the 12th, and on -the 20th his troops were in full march towards St. Jean Pied de Port, -and it was during this very rapid journey that the other marshal -abandoned Valencia. Soult therefore knew neither Suchet’s plans nor -the force of his army, nor his movements, nor his actual position, -and there was no time to wait for accurate information. However -between the 6th and the 16th of August, that is to say, immediately -after his own retreat from Sauroren, he earnestly prayed that the -army of Aragon should march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by -Jaca, and thus drawing off some of Wellington’s forces facilitate -the efforts of the army of Spain to relieve San Sebastian. In this -communication he stated, that his recent operations had caused -troops actually in march under general Hill towards Catalonia to be -recalled. This was an error. His emissaries were deceived by the -movements, and counter-movements in pursuit of Clauzel immediately -after the battle of Vittoria, and by the change in Wellington’s plans -as to the siege of Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia, -but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham, and the Conde de La -Bispal were all mentioned, in this correspondence between Soult and -Suchet, as being actually in Catalonia, or on the march, the three -first having been really sounded as to taking the command in that -quarter, and the last having demanded it himself. - -Suchet treated Soult’s proposal as chimerical. His movable troops -he said did not exceed eleven thousand, and a march upon Zaragoza -with so few men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen, unless -he could fly into France by Venasque where he had a garrison. An -extraordinary view of affairs which he supported by statements still -more extraordinary! - -“_General Hill had joined lord William Bentinck with twenty-four -thousand men._” “_La Bispal had arrived with fifteen thousand._” -“_There were more than two hundred thousand men on the Ebro._” “_The -Spanish insurrection was general and strongly organized._” “_He had -recovered the garrison of Taragona and destroyed the works, and he -must revictual Barcelona and then withdraw to the vicinity of Gerona -and remain on the defensive_”! - -[Sidenote: Appendix 8, Sect. 2.] - -This letter was written on the 23d of August, when lord William -Bentinck had just retreated from the Gaya into the mountains above -Hospitalet. The imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of -Catalonia and Aragon, both under his command, exceeded sixty-five -thousand men, fifty-six thousand being present under arms. Thirty -thousand were united in the field when he received Soult’s letter. -There was nothing to prevent him marching upon Tortoza, except -lord William Bentinck’s army which had just acknowledged by a -retreat its inability to cope with him; there was nothing at all to -prevent him marching to Lerida. The count of Bispal had thrown up -his command from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on the -Echallar mountains. Sir Rowland Hill was at Roncesvalles, and not -a man had moved from Wellington’s army. Elio and Roche were near -Valencia in a starving condition. The Anglo-Sicilian troops only -fourteen thousand strong including Whittingham’s division, were on -the barren mountains above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army could -remain; Del Parque’s troops and Sarzfield’s division had gone over -the Ebro, and Copons’ Catalans had taken refuge in the mountains of -Cervera. In fine not two hundred thousand but less than thirty-five -thousand men, half-organized ill-fed and scattered from Vich to -Vinaros were opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different -views and different lines of operations. The Anglo-Sicilians could -not abandon the coast, Copons could not abandon the mountains. Del -Parque’s troops soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and to use lord -Wellington’s phrase there was nothing to prevent Suchet “_tumbling -lord William Bentinck back even to the Xucar_.” The true nature of -the great insurrection which the French general pretended to dread -shall be shown when the political condition of Spain is treated of. - -Suchet’s errors respecting the allies were easily detected by -Soult, those touching the French in Catalonia he could not suspect -and acquiesced in the objections to his first plan; but fertile of -resource he immediately proposed another, akin to that which he had -urged Joseph to adopt in 1812 after the battle of Salamanca, namely, -to change the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would he said, -inevitably fall before the allies in succession if the French armies -remained on the defensive, and the only mode of rendering offensive -operations successful was a general concentration of means and -unity of action. The levy of conscripts under an imperial decree, -issued in August, would furnish, in conjunction with the depôts of -the interior, a reinforcement of forty thousand men. Ten thousand -would form a sufficient corps of observation about Gerona. The -armies of Aragon and Catalonia could, he hoped, by sacrificing some -posts produce twenty thousand infantry in the field. The imperial -muster-rolls prove that they could have produced forty thousand, but -Soult misled by Suchet’s erroneous statements assumed only twenty -thousand, and he calculated that he could himself bring thirty-five -or forty thousand good infantry and all his cavalry to a given point -of junction for the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen -thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to be directed on -that place, and thus seventy or seventy-five thousand infantry all -the cavalry of both armies and one hundred guns, would be suddenly -assembled, to thread the narrow pass of Jaca and descend upon Aragon. -Once in that kingdom they could attack the allied troops in Navarre -if the latter were dispersed, and if they were united retire upon -Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and deliver a general battle -upon the new line of operations. Meanwhile the fifteen thousand -unappropriated conscripts might reinforce the twenty or twenty-five -thousand old soldiers left to cover Bayonne. - -An army so great and strongly constituted appearing in Aragon would, -Soult argued, necessarily raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca, -Fraga, and Monzon, the two last being now menaced by the bands, and -it was probable that Tortoza and even Saguntum would be relieved. -The great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca, yet he was -resolved to try, even though he should convey them upon trucks to -be made in Paris and sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious -inconvenience from the union of the troops in France since Suchet had -already declared his intention of retiring towards Gerona; and on the -Bayonne side the army to be left there could dispute the entrenched -line between Cambo and St. Jean de Luz. If driven from thence it -could take a flanking position behind the Nive, the right resting -upon the entrenched camp of Bayonne, the left upon the works at -Cambo and holding communication by the fortified mountain of Ursouia -with St. Jean Pied de Port. But there could be little fear for this -secondary force when the great army was once in Aragon. That which he -most dreaded was delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected -after the middle of October, would entirely close the pass of Jaca. - -This proposition written the 2d of September, immediately after the -battle of San Marcial, reached Suchet the 11th and was peremptorily -rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia discouragement, he said, -would spread, desertion would commence, and France be immediately -invaded by lord William Bentinck at the head of fifty thousand -men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable and the power of man could -not open it for carriages under a year’s labour. His wish was to -act on the defensive, but if an offensive movement was absolutely -necessary, he offered a counter-project; that is, he would first -make the English in his front re-embark at Taragona, or he would -drive them over the Ebro and then march with one hundred guns and -thirty thousand men by Lerida to the Gallego river near Zaragoza. -Soult’s army, coming by Jaca without guns, might there meet him, -and the united forces could then do what was fitting. But to effect -this he required a reinforcement of conscripts, and to have Paris’s -division and the artillery-men and draft horses of Soult’s army -sent to Catalonia; he demanded also that two thousand bullocks for -the subsistence of his troops should be provided to meet him on -the Gallego. Then touching upon the difficulties of the road from -Sanguessa to Pampeluna, he declared, that after forcing Wellington -across the Ebro, he would return to Catalonia to revictual his -fortresses and prevent an invasion of France. This plan he judged far -less dangerous than Soult’s, yet he enlarged upon its difficulties -and its dangers if the combined movements were not exactly executed. -In fine, he continued, “The French armies are entangled amongst -rocks, and the emperor should direct a third army upon Spain, to act -between the Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the army of -Spain sixty thousand strong and that of Aragon thirty thousand strong -operate on the flanks. Thus _the reputation of the English army, too -easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will be abated_.” - -This illiberal remark combined with the defects of his project, -proves that the duke of Albufera was far below the duke of -Dalmatia’s standard both in magnanimity and in capacity. The one -giving his adversary just praise, thought the force already supplied -by the emperor sufficient to dispute for victory; the other, with an -unseemly boast, desired overwhelming numbers. - -Soult’s letter reached Suchet the day before the combat of Ordal, -and in pursuance of his own plan he should have driven lord William -Bentinck over the Ebro, as he could well have done, because the -Catalan troops there separated from the Anglo-Sicilians. In his -former letters he had estimated the enemies in his front at two -hundred thousand fighting men, and affirmed that his own disposable -force was only eleven thousand, giving that as a reason why he could -not march to Aragon. Now, forgetful of his previous objections -and estimates, he admitted that he had thirty thousand disposable -troops, and proposed the very movement which he had rejected as -madness when suggested by the duke of Dalmatia. And the futility of -his arguments relative to the general discouragement, the desertion -of his soldiers, and the temptation to an invasion of France if he -adopted Soult’s plan, is apparent; for these things could only happen -on the supposition that he was retreating from weakness, a notion -which would have effectually covered the real design until the great -movement in advance should change the public opinion. Soult’s plan -was surer better imagined and grander than his; it was less dangerous -in the event of failure and more conformable to military principles. -Suchet’s project involved double lines of operation without any -sure communications, and consequently without any certainty of just -co-operation; his point of junction was within the enemy’s power, -and the principal army was to be deprived of its artillery. There was -no solidity in this design; a failure would have left no resource. -But in Soult’s project the armies were to be united at a point beyond -the enemy’s reach, and to operate afterwards in mass with all arms -complete, which was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet -indeed averred the impracticability of moving the guns by Jaca, yet -Soult’s counter-opinion claims more respect. Clauzel and Paris who -had lately passed with troops through that defile were in his camp, -he had besides made very exact inquiries of the country people, had -caused the civil engineers of roads and bridges on the frontiers to -examine the route, and from their reports he judged the difficulty to -be not insurmountable. - -Neither the inconsistency, nor the exaggerations of Suchet’s -statements, escaped Soult’s observation, but anxious to effect -something while Pampeluna still held out, and the season permitted -operations in the mountains he frankly accepted the other’s -modification, and adopted every stipulation, save that of sending the -artillery-men and horses of his army to Catalonia which he considered -dangerous. Moreover he doubted not to pass his own guns by Jaca. -The preparations for this great movement were therefore immediately -commenced, and Suchet on his part seemed equally earnest although he -complained of increasing difficulties, pretended that Longa’s and -Morillo’s divisions had arrived in Catalonia, that general Graham -was also in march with troops to that quarter, and deplored the loss -of Fraga from whence the Empecinado had just driven his garrison. -This post commanded indeed a bridge over the Cinca a river lying in -his way and dangerous from its sudden and great floods but he still -possessed the bridge of Monzon. - -During this correspondence between the French marshals, Napoleon -remained silent, yet at a later period he expressed his discontent -at Suchet’s inactivity, and indirectly approved of Soult’s plans by -recommending a movement towards Zaragoza which Suchet however did -not execute. It would appear that the emperor having given all the -reinforcements he could spare, and full powers to both marshals to -act as they judged fitting for his service, would not, at a distance -and while engaged in such vast operations as those he was carrying on -at Dresden, decide so important a question. The vigorous execution -essential to success was not to be expected if either marshal acted -under constraint and against his own opinion; Soult had adopted -Suchet’s modification and it would have been unwise to substitute -a new plan which would have probably displeased both commanders. -Meanwhile Wellington passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet’s project was -annulled by the approach of winter and by the further operations of -the allies. - -If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon had been happily -achieved, it would certainly have forced Wellington to repass -the Ebro or fight a great battle with an army much less strongly -constituted than the French army. If he chose the latter, victory -would have profited him little, because his enemy strong in cavalry -could have easily retired on the fortresses of Catalonia. If he -received a check he must have gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to -Portugal, and the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre, and -Valencia. It is not probable however that such a great operation -could have been conducted without being discovered in time by -Wellington. It has been already indicated in this History, that -besides the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence employed -by all generals, he had secret emissaries amongst Joseph’s courtiers, -and even amongst French officers of rank; and it has been shown that -Soult vainly endeavoured to surprise him on the 31st of August when -the combinations were only two days old. It is true that the retreat -of Suchet from Catalonia and his junction with Soult in France at -the moment when Napoleon was pressed in Germany, together with the -known difficulty of passing guns by Jaca, would naturally have led to -the belief that it was a movement of retreat and fear; nevertheless -the secret must have been known to more than one person about each -marshal, and the English general certainly had agents who were little -suspected. Soult would however still have had the power of returning -to his old positions, and, with his numbers increased by Suchet’s -troops, could have repeated his former attack by the Roncesvalles. -It might be that his secret design was thus to involve that marshal -in his operations, and being disappointed he was not very eager to -adopt the modified plan of the latter, which the approach of the bad -season, and the menacing position of Wellington, rendered each day -less promising. His own project was hardy, and dangerous for the -allies, and well did it prove lord Wellington’s profound acquaintance -with his art. For he had entered France only in compliance with the -wishes of the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely for -Suchet, averring that the true military line of operations was -towards Aragon and Catalonia. Being now however actually established -in France, and the war in Germany having taken a favourable turn for -the allies, he resolved to continue the operations on his actual -front awaiting only the - - -FALL OF PAMPELUNA. - -[Sidenote: September.] - -This event was produced by a long blockade, less fertile of incident -than the siege of San Sebastian yet very honourable to the firmness -of the governor general Cassan. - -The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants, stood on a bold -table-land on which a number of valleys opened, and where the great -roads, coming from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguessa, Tudela, Estella, -Vittoria, and Irurzun, were concentrated. The northern and eastern -fronts of the fortress were covered by the Arga, and the defences -there consisted of simple walls edging the perpendicular rocky bank -of the river, but the other fronts were regularly fortified with -ditches, covered way, and half-moons. Two bad unfinished outworks -were constructed on the south front, but the citadel which stood -on the south west was a regular pentagon, with bomb-proofs and -magazines, vaulted barracks for a thousand men, and a complete system -of mines. - -Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by Mina for eighteen months -previous to the battle of Vittoria, and when Joseph arrived after the -action, the place was badly provisioned. The stragglers of his army -increased the garrison to something more than three thousand five -hundred men of all arms, who were immediately invested by the allies. -Many of the inhabitants went off during the short interval between -the king’s arrival and departure, and general Cassan, finding his -troops too few for action and yet too many for the food, abandoned -the two outworks on the south, demolished everything which could -interfere with his defence outside, and commenced such works as he -deemed necessary to improve it inside. Moreover foreseeing that -the French army might possibly make a sudden march without guns to -succour the garrison, he prepared a field-train of forty pieces to -meet the occasion. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -It has been already shown that Wellington, although at first inclined -to besiege Pampeluna, finally established a blockade and ordered -works of contravallation to be constructed. Cassan’s chief object -was then to obtain provisions, and on the 28th and 30th of June he -sustained actions outside the place to cover his foragers. On the -1st of July he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the river Arga, -and forced many inhabitants to quit the place before the blockaders’ -works were completed. Skirmishes now occurred almost daily, the -French always seeking to gather the grain, and vegetables which were -ripe and abundant beyond the walls, and the allies endeavouring -to set fire to the standing corn within range of the guns of the -fortress. - -On the 14th of July, O’Donnel’s Andalusians were permanently -established as the blockading force, and the next day the garrison -made a successful forage on the south side of the town. This -operation was repeated towards the east beyond the Arga on the 19th, -when a sharp engagement of cavalry took place, during which the -remainder of the garrison carried away a great deal of corn. - -The 26th the sound of Soult’s artillery reached the place, and -Cassan, judging rightly that the marshal was in march to succour -Pampeluna, made a sally in the night by the Roncesvalles road; he -was driven back, but the next morning he came out again with eleven -hundred men and two guns, overthrew the Spanish outguards, and -advanced towards Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling back -with the third and fourth divisions. Then O’Donnel, as I have before -related, evacuated some of the entrenchments, destroyed a great -deal of ammunition, spiked a number of guns, and but for the timely -arrival of Carlos D’España’s division, and the stand made by Picton -at Huarte, would have abandoned the blockade altogether. - -Soon the battle on the mountains of Oricain commenced, the smoke rose -over the intervening heights of Escava and San Miguel, the French -cavalry appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the baggage of -the allies was seen filing in the opposite direction by Berioplano -along the road of Irurzun. The garrison thought deliverance sure, and -having reaped a good harvest withdrew into the place. The bivouac -fires of the French army cheered them during the night, and the -next morning a fresh sally being made with the greatest confidence, -a great deal of corn was gathered with little loss of men. Several -deserters from the foreign regiments in the English service also came -over with intelligence exaggerated and coloured after the manner -of such men, and the French re-entered the place elated with hope; -but in the evening the sound of the conflict ceased and the silence -of the next day shewed that the battle was not to the advantage of -Soult. However the governor losing no time made another sally and -again obtained provisions from the south side. - -The 30th the battle recommenced but the retreating fire of the French -told how the conflict was decided and the spirit of the soldiers -fell. Nevertheless their indefatigable officers led another sally on -the south side, whence they carried off grain and some ammunition -which had been left in one of the abandoned outworks. - -[Sidenote: September.] - -On the 31st Carlos D’España’s troops and two thousand of O’Donnel’s -Andalusians, in all about seven thousand men, resumed the blockade, -and maintained it until the middle of September, when the Prince of -Anglona’s division of Del Parque’s army, relieved the Andalusians -who rejoined their own corps near Echallar. The allies’ works of -contravallation were now augmented, and when Paris retired into -France from Jaca, part of Mina’s troops occupied the valleys leading -from the side of Sanguessa to Pampeluna and made entrenchments to bar -the escape of the garrison that way. - -In October Cassan put his fighting men upon rations of horse-flesh, -four ounces to each, with some rice, and he turned more families out -of the town, but this time they were fired upon by their countrymen -and forced to re-enter. - -On the 9th of September baron Maucune, who had conducted most of the -sallies during the blockade, attacked and carried some fortified -houses on the east side of the place; he was immediately assailed by -the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them and pursued the fugitives close -to Villalba. Carlos D’España then advanced to their aid in person -with a greater body and the French were driven in with the loss of -eighty men, yet the Spaniards lost a far greater number, Carlos -D’España himself was wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn -which was their principal object. - -[Sidenote: October.] - -The soldiers were now feeding on rats and other disgusting animals; -seeking also for roots beyond the walls many in their hunger poisoned -themselves with hemlock, and a number of others unable to bear their -misery deserted. In this state Cassan made a general sally on the -10th of October, to ascertain the strength of the lines around him, -with a view to breaking through, but after some fighting, his troops -were driven in with the loss of seventy men and all hope of escape -vanished. Yet he still spoke of attempting it, and the public manner -in which he increased the mines under the citadel induced Wellington -to reinforce the blockade, and to bring up his cavalry into the -vicinity of Pampeluna. - -The scurvy now invaded the garrison. One thousand men were sick, -eight hundred had been wounded, the deaths by battle and disease -exceeded four hundred, one hundred and twenty had deserted, and -the governor moved by the great misery, offered on the 26th to -surrender if he was allowed to retire into France with his troops -and six pieces of cannon. This being refused he proposed to yield -on condition of not serving for a year and a day, which being also -denied, he broke off the negociation, giving out that he would blow -up the works of the fortress and break through the blockade. To deter -him a menacing letter was thrown to his outposts, and lord Wellington -being informed of his design denounced it as contrary to the laws of -war, and directed Carlos D’España to put him, all his officers and -non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of the soldiers to death when -the place should be taken if any damage were done to the works. - -Cassan’s object being merely to obtain better terms this order -remained dormant, and happily so, for the execution would never have -borne the test of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna -and break through the blockading force, as Brennier did at Almeida, -would have been a very noble exploit, and a useful one for the French -army if Soult’s plan of changing the theatre of war by descending -into Aragon had been followed. There could therefore be nothing -contrary to the laws of war in a resolute action of that nature. -On the other hand if the governor, having no chance whatever of -success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence for destroying a great -fortress belonging to the Spaniards and depriving the allies of the -fruits of their long blockade and glorious battles, the conquerors -might have justly exercised that severe but undoubted right of -war, refusing quarter to an enemy. But lord Wellington’s letter to -D’España involved another question, namely the putting of prisoners -to death. For the soldiers could not be decimated until captured, -and their crime would have been only obedience to orders in a matter -of which they dared not judge. This would have been quite contrary -to the usages of civilized nations, and the threat must undoubtedly -be considered only as a device to save the works of Pampeluna and to -avoid the odium of refusing quarter. - -A few days longer the governor and garrison endured their distress -and then capitulated, having defended themselves more than four -months with great constancy. The officers and soldiers became -prisoners of war. The first were allowed to keep their arms and -baggage, the second their knapsacks, expressly on the ground that -they had treated the inhabitants well during the investment. This -compliment was honourable to both sides, but there was another -article, enforced by D’España without being accepted by the garrison, -for which it is difficult to assign any motive but the vindictive -ferocity of the Spanish character. No person of either sex was -permitted to follow the French troops, and women’s affections were -thus barbarously brought under the action of the sword. - -There was no stronghold now retained by the French in the north of -Spain except Santona, and as the blockade of that place had been -exceedingly tedious, lord Wellington, whose sea communications were -interrupted by the privateers from thence, formed a small British -corps under lord Aylmer with a view to attack Laredo, which being on -the opposite point of the harbour to Santona commanded the anchorage. -Accidental circumstances however prevented this body from proceeding -to its destination and Santona remained in the enemy’s possession. -With this exception the contest in the northern parts of Spain was -terminated and the south of France was now to be invaded; but it is -fitting first to show with what great political labour Wellington -brought the war to this state, what contemptible actions and -sentiments, what a faithless alliance, and what vile governments his -dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -_Political state of Portugal._ In this country the national jealousy -which had been compressed by the force of invasion expanded again -with violence as danger receded, and the influence of England -sunk precisely in the measure that her army assured the safety of -Portugal. When Wellington crossed the Ebro, the Souza faction, always -opposed in the council to the British policy, became elate; and those -members of the government who had hitherto cherished the British -ascendancy because it sustained them against the Brazilian court -intrigues, now sought popularity by taking an opposite direction. -Each person of the regency had his own line of opposition marked out. -Noguera vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial and financial -operations; the Principal Souza wrangled more fiercely and insolently -at the council-board; the Patriarch fomented ill-will at Lisbon and -in the northern provinces; Forjas, ambitious to command the national -troops, became the organ of discontent upon military matters. The -return of the prince-regent, the treaty of commerce, the Oporto -company, the privileges of the British factory merchants, the mode of -paying the subsidy, the means of military transport, the convention -with Spain relative to the supply of the Portuguese troops in that -country, the recruiting, the organization, the command of the -national army, and the honours due to it, all furnished occasions -for factious proceedings, which were conducted with the ignoble -subtlety that invariably characterizes the politics of the Peninsula. -Moreover the expenditure of the British army had been immense, the -trade and commerce dependent upon it, now removed to the Spanish -ports, enormous. Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal taxes -carelessly or partially enforced were vexatious to the people without -being profitable to the government. Nine-tenths of the revenue -accrued from duties upon British trade, and the sudden cessation of -markets and of employment, the absence of ready money, the loss of -profit, public and private, occasioned by the departure of the army -while the contributions and other exactions remained the same, galled -all classes, and the whole nation was ready to shake off the burthen -of gratitude. - -In this state of feeling emissaries were employed to promulgate -in various directions tales, some true some false, of the -disorders perpetrated by the military detachments on the lines of -communication, adding that they were the result of secret orders from -Wellington to satisfy his personal hatred of Portugal! At the same -time discourses and writings against the British influence abounded -in Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed or surpassed by the -London newspapers, whose statements overflowing of falsehood could -be traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital. It was asserted -that England intending to retain her power in Portugal opposed the -return of the prince-regent; that the war itself being removed to -the frontier of France was become wholly a Spanish cause; that it was -not for Portugal to levy troops, and exhaust her resources to help a -nation whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner or later to -resist. - -Mr. Stuart’s diplomatic intercourse with the government always -difficult was now a continual remonstrance and dispute; his -complaints were met with insolence or subterfuge, and illegal -violence against the persons and property of British subjects was -pushed so far, that Mr. Sloane, an English gentleman upon whom no -suspicion rested, was cast into prison for three months because he -had come to Lisbon without a passport. The rights of the English -factory were invaded, and the Oporto company which had been -established as its rival in violation of treaty was openly cherished. -Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious company robbed every -body, and the prince-regent promising either to reform or totally -abolish it ordered a preparatory investigation, but to use the words -of Mr. Stuart, the regency acted on the occasion no less unfairly by -their sovereign than unjustly by their ally. - -Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants were another -cause of disquiet. They pretended to exemption from certain -taxes, and from billets, and that a fixed number of their clerks -domestics and cattle should be exonerated of military service. These -pretensions were disputed. The one touching servants and cattle, -doubtful at best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to -billets unfounded; but the taxes were justly resisted, and the -merchants offered a voluntary contribution to the same amount. -The government rudely refused this offer, seized their property, -imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to transport -supplies that never reached the troops, and made soldiers of their -clerks and servants without any intention of reinforcing the army. -Mr. Stuart immediately deducted from the subsidy the amount of the -property thus forcibly taken, and repaid the sufferers. The regency -then commenced a dispute upon the fourth article of the treaty of -commerce, and the prince, though he openly ordered it to be executed, -secretly permitted count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain in -London as ambassador until the disputes arising upon this treaty -generally were arranged. Funchal who disliked to quit London took -care to interpose many obstacles to a final decision, always advising -delay under pretence of rendering ultimate concession of value in -other negociations then depending. - -When the battle of Vittoria became known, the regency proposed to -entreat the return of the prince from the Brazils, hoping thereby to -excite the opposition of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to their -expectations, approved of the proposal they deferred the execution. -The British cabinet which had long neglected Wellington’s suggestions -on this head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro, and Funchal -who had been at first averse now urged it warmly, fearing that if -the prince remained he could no longer defer going to the Brazils. -However few of the Portuguese nobles desired the return of the royal -family, and when the thing was proposed to the regent he discovered -no inclination for the voyage. - -But the most important subject of discord was the army. The -absence of the sovereign and the intrigues which ruled the court -of Rio Janeiro had virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an -oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government formed -for mischief. The whole course of this history has shewn that all -Wellington’s energy and ability, aided by the sagacity and firmness -of Mr. Stuart and by the influence of England’s power and riches, -were scarcely sufficient to meet the evils flowing from this foul -source. Even while the French armies were menacing the capital -the regency was split into factions, the financial resources were -neglected or wasted, the public servants were insolent incapable and -corrupt, the poorer people oppressed, and the military force for -want of sustenance was at the end of 1812 on the point of dissolving -together. The strenuous interference of the English general and -envoy, seconded by the extraordinary exertions of the British -officers in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the efficiency -of the army, and in the campaign of 1813 the spirit of the troops -was surpassing. Even the militia-men, who had been deprived of their -colours and drafted into the line to punish their bad conduct at -Guarda under general Trant in 1812, nobly regained their standards on -the Pyrenees. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -But this state of affairs acting upon the naturally sanguine -temperament and vanity of the Portuguese, created a very exaggerated -notion of their military prowess and importance, and withal a morbid -sensitiveness to praise or neglect. General Picton had thrown -some slur upon the conduct of a regiment at Vittoria, and marshal -Beresford complained that full justice had not been done to their -merits. The eulogiums passed in the English parliament and in the -despatches upon the conduct of the British and Spanish troops, but -not extended to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation, and the -remarks and omissions of the London newspapers were as wormwood. - -Meanwhile the regency, under pretext of a dispute with Spain relative -to a breach of the military convention of supply, neglected the -subsistence of the army altogether; and at the same time so many -obstacles to the recruiting were raised, that the depôts, which ought -to have furnished twelve thousand men to replace the losses sustained -in the campaign, only contained four thousand, who were also without -the means of taking the field. This matter became so serious that -Beresford quitting the army in October came to Lisbon, to propose a -new regulation which should disregard the exemptions claimed by the -nobles the clergy and the English merchants for their servants and -followers. On his arrival Forjas urged the public discontent at the -political position of the Portuguese troops. They were, he said, -generally incorporated with the British divisions, commanded by -British officers, and having no distinct recognized existence their -services were unnoticed and the glory of the country suffered. The -world at large knew not how many men Portugal furnished for the war. -It was known indeed that there were Portuguese soldiers, as it was -known that there were Brunswickers and Hanoverians, but as a national -army nothing was known of them; their exertions, their courage, only -went to swell the general triumph of England, while the Spaniards, -inferior in numbers, and far inferior in all military qualities, -were flattered, praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the -English newspapers, and in the discourses and votes of the British -parliament. He proposed therefore to have the Portuguese formed into -a distinct army acting under lord Wellington. - -It was objected that the brigades incorporated with the British -divisions were fed by the British commissariat the cost being -deducted from the subsidy, an advantage the loss of which the -Portuguese could not sustain. Forjas rejoined that they could -feed their own troops cheaper if the subsidy was paid in money, -but Beresford referred him to his scanty means of transport, so -scanty that the few stores they were then bound to furnish for the -unattached brigades depending upon the Portuguese commissariat were -not forwarded. Foiled on this point Forjas proposed gradually to -withdraw the best brigades from the English divisions, to incorporate -them with the unattached brigades of native troops and so form an -auxiliary corps; but the same objection of transport still applied -and this matter dropped for the moment. The regency then agreed to -reduce the legal age of men liable to the conscription for the army, -but the islands, which ought to have given three hundred men yearly, -were exempt from their controul, and the governors supported by the -prince-regent refused to permit any levies in their jurisdictions, -and even granted asylums to all those who wished to avoid the levy -in Portugal. In the islands also the persons so unjustly and cruelly -imprisoned in 1810 were still kept in durance, although the regency -yielding to the persevering remonstrances of Mr. Stuart and lord -Wellington had released those at Lisbon. - -Soon after this Beresford desired to go to England, and the occasion -was seized by Forjas to renew his complaints and his proposition -for a separate army which he designed to command himself. General -Sylveira’s claim to that honour was however supported by the Souzas, -to whose faction he belonged, and the only matter in which all -agreed was the display of ill-will towards England. Lord Wellington -became indignant. The English newspapers, he said, did much mischief -by their assertions, but he never suspected they could by their -omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and government. The latter -complained that their troops were not praised in parliament, nothing -could be more different from a debate within the house than the -representation of it in the newspapers. The latter seldom stated -an event or transaction as it really occurred, unless when they -absolutely copied what was written for them; and even then their -observations branched out so far from the text, that they appeared -absolutely incapable of understanding much less of stating the truth -upon any subject. The Portuguese people should therefore be cautious -of taking English newspapers as a test of the estimation in which -the Portuguese army was held in England, where its character stood -high and was rising daily. “Mr. Forjas is,” said lord Wellington, -“the ablest man of business I have met with in the Peninsula, -it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have the folly to -alter a successful military system. I understand something of the -organization and feeding of troops, and I assure him that separated -from the British, the Portuguese army could not keep the field in -a good state although their government were to incur ten times the -expense under the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting -state for the field they can gain no honour, they must suffer -dishonour! The vexatious disputes with Spain are increasing daily, -and if the omissions or assertions of newspapers are to be the causes -of disagreement with the Portuguese _I will quit the Peninsula for -ever_”! - -This remonstrance being read to the regency, Forjas replied -officially. - -“The Portuguese government demanded nothing unreasonable. The happy -campaign of 1813 was not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its -means. It had a right to expect greater exertions from Spain, which -was more interested than Portugal in the actual operations since -the safety of the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a solid -peace, she did not expect increase of territory, nor any advantage -save the consideration and influence which the services and gallantry -of her troops would give her amongst European nations, and which, -unhappily, she would probably require in her future intercourse with -Spain. The English prince-regent his ministers and his generals, -had rendered full justice to her military services in the official -reports, but that did not suffice to give them weight in Europe. -Official reports did not remove this inconvenience. It was only the -public expressions of the English prince and his ministers that could -do justice. The Portuguese army was commanded by Marshal Beresford, -Marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be so considered and -thanked accordingly for its exploits, and with as much form and -solemnity by the English parliament and general as was used towards -the Spanish army. The more so that the Portuguese had sacrificed -their national pride to the common good, whereas the Spanish pride -had retarded the success of the cause and the liberty of Europe. It -was necessary also to form good native generals to be of use after -the war; but putting that question aside, it was only demanded to -have the divisions separated by degrees and given to Portuguese -officers. Nevertheless such grave objections being advanced they were -willing, he said, to drop the matter altogether.” - -The discontent however remained, for the argument had weight, and -if any native officers’ reputation had been sufficient to make the -proceeding plausible, the British officers would have been driven -from the Portuguese service, the armies separated, and both ruined. -As it was, the regency terminated the discussion from inability to -succeed; from fear not from reason. The persons who pretended to the -command were Forjas and Sylveira; but the English officers who were -as yet well-liked by the troops, would not have served under the -former, and Wellington objected strongly to the latter, having by -experience discovered that he was an incapable officer seeking a base -and pernicious popularity by encouraging the views of the soldiers. -Beresford then relinquished his intention of going to England, and -the justice of the complaint relative to the reputation of the -Portuguese army being obvious, the general orders became more marked -in favour of the troops. But the most effectual check to the project -of the regency was the significant intimation of Mr. Stuart, that -England, being bound by no conditions in the payment of the subsidy, -had a right if it was not applied in the manner most agreeable to -her, to withdraw it altogether. - -To have this subsidy in specie and to supply their own troops -continued to be the cry of the regency, until their inability to -effect the latter became at last so apparent that they gave the -matter up in despair. Indeed Forjas was too able a man ever to have -supposed, that the badly organized administration of Portugal, was -capable of supporting an efficient army in the field five hundred -miles from its own country; the real object was to shake off the -British influence if possible without losing the subsidy. For the -honour of the army or the welfare of the soldiers neither the regency -nor the prince himself had any care. While the former were thus -disputing for the command, they suffered their subordinates to ruin -an establishment at Ruña, the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated -soldiers, and turned the helpless veterans adrift. And the prince -while he lavished honours upon the dependents and creatures of his -court at Rio Janeiro, placed those officers whose fidelity and hard -fighting had preserved his throne in Portugal at the bottom of the -list, amongst the menial servants of the palace who were decorated -with the same ribands! Honour, justice, humanity, were alike despised -by the ruling men and lord Wellington thus expressed his strong -disgust. - -“_The British army which I have the honour to command has met with -nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in -Portugal for their services, every thing that could be done has been -done by the civil authorities lately to oppress the officers and -soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in -their power. I hope however that we have seen the last of Portugal_”! - -Such were the relations of the Portuguese government with England, -and with Spain they were not more friendly. Seven envoys from that -country had succeeded each other at Lisbon in three years. The -Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic opinions which had obtained -ground in Spain, and the leading party in the Cortez were intent to -spread those opinions over the whole Peninsula. The only bond of -sympathy between the two governments was hatred of the English who -had saved both. On all other points they differed. The exiled bishop -of Orense, from his asylum on the frontier of Portugal, excited the -Gallicians against the Cortez so vigorously, that his expulsion from -Portugal, or at least his removal from the northern frontier, was -specially demanded by the Spanish minister; but though a long and -angry discussion followed the bishop was only civilly requested by -the Portuguese government to abstain from acts disagreeable to the -Spanish regency. The latter then demanded that he should be delivered -up as a delinquent, whereupon the Portuguese quoted a decree of the -Cortez which deprived the bishop of his rights as a Spanish citizen -and denaturalized him. However he was removed twenty leagues from -the frontier, nor was the Portuguese government itself quite free -from ecclesiastic troubles. The bishop of Braganza preached doctrines -which were offensive to the patriarch and the government; he was -confined but soon released and an ecclesiastical sentence pronounced -against him, which only increased his followers and extended the -influence of his doctrines. - -Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period, was the return of -Ballesteros from his exile at Ceuta. He had been permitted towards -the end of 1813, and as lord Wellington thought with no good intent, -to reside at Fregenal. The Portuguese regency, fearing that he would -rally round him other discontented persons, set agents to watch his -proceedings, and under pretence of putting down robbers who abounded -on that frontier, established a line of cavalry and called out the -militia, thus making it manifest that but a little was wanting to -kindle a war between the two countries. - -_Political state of Spain._ Lord Wellington’s victories had put an -end to the intercourse between Joseph and the Spaniards who desired -to make terms with the French; but those people not losing hope, -formed a strong anti-English party and watched to profit by the -disputes between the two great factions at Cadiz, which had now -become most rancorous and dangerous to the common cause. The serviles -extremely bigoted both in religion and politics had the whole body -of the clergy on their side. They were the most numerous in the -Cortez and their views were generally in accord with the feelings of -the people beyond the Isla de Leon, although their doctrines were -comprised in two sentences—_An absolute king, An intolerant church_. -The liberals supported and instigated by all ardent innovators, -by the commercial body and populace of Cadiz, had also partizans -beyond the Isla; and taking as guides the revolutionary writings -of the French philosophers were hastening onwards to a democracy, -without regard to ancient usages or feelings, and without practical -ability to carry their theories into execution. There was also a -fourth faction in the Cortez, formed by the American deputies, who -were secretly labouring for the independence of the colonies; they -sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes the serviles, as it suited -their purposes, and thus often produced anomalous results, because -they were numerous enough to turn the scale in favour of the side -which they espoused. Jealousy of England was however common to all, -and “_Inglesismo_” was used as a term of contempt. Posterity will -scarcely believe, that when lord Wellington was commencing the -campaign of 1813 the Cortez was with difficulty, and by threats -rather than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding foreign -troops to enter a Spanish fortress. Alicant, Tarifa, Cadiz itself -where they held their sittings, had been preserved; Ciudad Rodrigo, -Badajos, had been retaken for them by British valour; English money -had restored their broken walls and replenished their exhausted -magazines; English and Portuguese blood still smoked from their -ramparts; but the men from whose veins that blood had flowed, were to -be denied entrance at gates which they could not approach, without -treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades who had sacrificed -their lives to procure for this sordid ungrateful assembly the power -to offer the insult. - -The subjection of the bishops and other clergy, who had in Gallicia -openly opposed the abolition of the inquisition and excited the -people to resistance, was an object of prominent interest with an -active section of the liberals called the Jacobins. And this section -generally ruled the Cortez, because the Americanos leaned strongly -towards their doctrines, and the interest of the anti-English, -or French party, was to produce dissensions which could be best -effected by supporting the most violent public men. A fierce and -obstinate faction they were, and they compelled the churchmen to -submit for the time, but not until the dispute became so serious -that lord Wellington when in the Pyrenees expected a civil war on -his communications, and thought the clergy and the peasantry would -take part with the French. This notion which gives his measure for -the patriotism of both parties, proved however unfounded; his extreme -discontent at the progress of liberal doctrines had somewhat warped -his judgment; the people were less attached to the church than he -imagined, the clergy of Gallicia, meeting with no solid support, -submitted to the Cortez, and the archbishop of Santiago fled to -Portugal. - -Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed the moving spring -of the English tories’ policy. Napoleon was warred against, not -as they pretended because he was a tyrant and usurper, for he was -neither; not because his invasion of Spain was unjust, but because -he was the powerful and successful enemy of aristocratic privileges. -The happiness and independence of the Peninsula were words without -meaning in their state-papers and speeches, and their anger and -mortification were extreme when they found success against the -emperor had fostered that democracy it was their object to destroy. -They were indeed only prevented by the superior prudence and sagacity -of their general, from interfering with the internal government of -Spain in so arrogant and injudicious a manner, that an open rupture -wherein the Spaniards would have had all appearance of justice, -must have ensued. This folly was however stifled by Wellington, who -desired to wait until the blow could be given with some effect, and -he was quite willing to deal it himself; yet the conduct of the -Cortez, and that of the executive government which acted under its -controul, was so injurious to Spain and to his military operations, -and so unjust to him personally, that the warmest friends of freedom -cannot blame his enmity. Rather should his moderation be admired, -when we find his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution -exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by Vegas, a -considerable member of the Cortez and perfectly acquainted with the -subject. - -[Sidenote: Original Letter, MSS.] - -Speaking of the “_Afrancesados_” or French party, more numerous than -was supposed and active to increase their numbers, he says, “The -thing which they most enforced and which made most progress was the -diminution of the English influence.” Amongst the serviles they -gained proselytes, by objecting the English religion and constitution -which restricted the power of the sovereign. With the liberals, they -said the same constitution gave the sovereign too much power; and the -Spanish constitution having brought the king’s authority under that -of the Cortez was an object of jealousy to the English cabinet and -aristocracy, who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers -of England, were resolved that the Spanish constitution should not -stand. To the Americans they observed that lord Wellington opposed -them, because he did not help them and permitted expeditions to -be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans who wished to retain the -colonies and exclude foreign trade, they represented the English as -fomenters and sustainers of the colonial rebellion, because they -did not join their forces with Spain to put it down. To the honest -patriots of all parties they said, that every concession to the -English general was an offence against the dignity and independence -of the nation. If he was active in the field, he was intent to -subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in -preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he -was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design -was to impose his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he -desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it -was to gain the soldiers turn the army against the country and thus -render Spain dependent on England. And these perfidious insinuations -were effectual because they flattered the national pride, as proving -that the Spaniards could do every thing for themselves without the -aid of foreigners. Finally that nothing could stop the spread of such -dangerous doctrines but new victories, which would bring the simple -honesty and gratitude of the people at large into activity. Those -victories came and did indeed stifle the French party in Spain, but -many of their arguments were too well founded to be stifled with -their party. - -The change of government which had place in the beginning of the -year, gave hope that the democratic violence of the Cortez would -decline under the control of the cardinal Bourbon; but that prince, -who was not of true royal blood in the estimation of the Spaniards, -because his father had married without the consent of the king, -was from age, and infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The new -regency became therefore more the slaves of the Cortez than their -predecessors, and the Cadiz editors of newspapers, pre-eminent in -falsehood and wickedness even amongst their unprincipled European -brotherhood, being the champions of the Jacobins directed the -populace of that city as they pleased. And always the serviles -yielded under the dread of personal violence. Their own crimes -had become their punishment. They had taught the people at the -commencement of the contest that murder was patriotism, and now their -spirit sunk and quailed, because at every step to use the terribly -significant expression of Wellington, “_The ghost of Solano was -staring them in the face_.” - -The principal points of the Jacobins’ policy in support of their -crude constitution, which they considered as perfect as an emanation -from the Deity, were, 1º. The abolition of the Inquisition, the -arrest and punishment of the Gallician bishops, and the consequent -warfare with the clergy. 2º. The putting aside the claim of Carlotta -to the regency. 3º. The appointment of captain-generals and other -officers to suit their factious purposes. 4º. The obtaining of money -for their necessities, without including therein the nourishment of -the armies. 5º. The control of the elections for a new Cortez so as -to procure an assembly of their own way of thinking, or to prevent -its assembling at the legal period in October. - -The matter of the bishops as we have seen nearly involved them in -a national war with Portugal, and a civil war with Gallicia. The -affair of the princess was less serious, but she had never ceased -intriguing, and her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British -ministers and general while the army was cooped up in Portugal, were, -although she was a declared enemy to the English alliance, now rather -favoured by sir Henry Wellesley as a mode of checking the spread of -democracy. Lord Wellington however still held aloof, observing that -if appointed according to the constitution, she would not be less a -slave to the Cortez than her predecessors, and England would have the -discredit of giving power to the “worst woman in existence.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2.] - -To remove the seat of government from the influence of the Cadiz -populace was one mode of abating the power of the democratic party, -and the yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing of the -general Cortez in September, had apparently given the executive -government some freedom of action, and seemed to furnish a favourable -opportunity for the English ambassador to effect its removal. The -regency, dreading the epidemic, suddenly resolved to proceed to -Madrid, telling sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer -pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their sole motive. They -had secretly formed this resolution at night and proposed to commence -the journey next day, but a disturbance arose in the city and the -alarmed regents convoked the extraordinary Cortez; the ministers -were immediately called before it and bending in fear before their -masters, declared with a scandalous disregard of truth, that there -was no intention to quit the Isla without consulting the Cortez. -Certain deputies were thereupon appointed to inquire if there was any -fever, and a few cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently -to shield the regents, recommended that they should remove to Port -St. Mary. - -This did not satisfy the assembly. The government was commanded to -remain at Cadiz until the new general Cortez should be installed, -and a committee was appointed to probe the whole affair or rather -to pacify the populace, who were so offended with the report of -the first deputation, that the speech of Arguelles on presenting -it was hissed from the galleries, although he was the most popular -and eloquent member of the Cortez. The more moderate liberals thus -discovered that they were equally with the serviles the slaves of the -newspaper writers. Nevertheless the inherent excellence of freedom, -though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble shapes, was -involuntarily admitted by lord Wellington when he declared, that -wherever the Cortez and government should fix themselves the press -would follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada, or -Madrid, would become as bad as the people of Cadiz. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2.] - -The composition of the new Cortez was naturally an object of hope and -fear to all factions, and the result being uncertain, the existing -assembly took such measures to prolong its own power that it was -expected two Cortez would be established, the one at Cadiz, the other -at Seville, each striving for mastery in the nation. However the new -body after many delays was installed at Cadiz in November, and the -Jacobins, strong in the violence of the populace, still swayed the -assembly, and kept the seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid -spread of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. Then the -resolution to repair to Madrid was adopted, and the sessions in the -Isla closed on the 29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For -the general belief being, that no person could take the sickness -twice, and almost every resident family had already suffered from -former visitations, the merchants with an infamous cupidity declaring -that there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously -to issue clean bills of health to ships leaving the port, and -endeavoured by intimidation to keep the regency and Cortez in the -city. - -An exact and copious account of these factions and disputes, and of -the permanent influence which these discussions of the principles -of government, this constant collision of opposite doctrines, had -upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously traced, -form a lesson of the highest interest for nations. But to treat the -subject largely would be to write a political history of the Spanish -revolution, and it is only the effect upon the military operations -which properly appertains to a history of the war. That effect was -one of unmitigated evil, but it must be observed that this did not -necessarily spring from the democratic system, since precisely the -same mischiefs were to be traced in Portugal, where arbitrary power, -called legitimate government, was prevalent. In both cases alike, -the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes of factious -politicians. - -It has been shewn in a former volume, that one Spanish regency -contracted an engagement with lord Wellington on the faith of which -he took the command of their armies in 1813. It was scrupulously -adhered to by him, but systematically violated by the new regency -and minister of war, almost as soon as it was concluded. His -recommendations for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders -were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were -made in the commands and in the destinations of the troops without -his concurrence, and without passing through him as generalissimo. -Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, captain-general of -Gallicia, Estremadura, and Castile, was disgracefully removed from -his government under pretence of calling him to assist in the council -of state. His nephew general Giron was at the same time deprived of -his command over the Gallician army, although both he and Castaños -had been largely commended for their conduct by lord Wellington. -General Frere, appointed captain-general of Castile and Estremadura, -succeeded Giron in command of the troops, and the infamous Lacy -replaced Castaños in Gallicia, chosen, it was believed, as a fitter -tool to work out the measures of the Jacobins against the clergy in -that kingdom. Nor was the sagacity of that faction at fault, for -Castaños would, according to lord Wellington, have turned his arms -against the Cortez if an opportunity had offered. He and others were -now menaced with death, and the Cortez contemplated an attack upon -the tithes, upon the feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates -of the grandees. All except the last very fitting to do if the times -and circumstances had been favourable for a peaceful arrangement; -but most insane when the nation generally was averse, and there was -an invader in the country to whom the discontented could turn. The -clergy were at open warfare with the government, many generals were -dissatisfied, and menacing in their communications with the superior -civil authorities, the soldiers were starving and the people tired -of their miseries only desired to get rid of the invaders, and to -avoid the burthen of supplying the troops of either side. The English -cabinet, after having gorged Spain with gold and flattery was totally -without influence. A terrible convulsion was at hand if the French -could have maintained the war with any vigour in Spain itself; and -the following passages, from Wellington’s letters to the ministers, -prove, that even he contemplated a forcible change in the government -and constitution. - -“If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders as the -newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly seize upon -landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do -something more than discountenance them.”—“It is quite impossible -such a system can last. What I regret is that I am the person that -maintains it. If I was out of the way there are plenty of generals -who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it, and I am -much mistaken if O’Donnel and even Castaños, and probably others are -not equally ready. If the king should return he also will overturn -the whole fabric if he has any spirit.”—“I wish you would let me -know whether if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at -the democracy the government would approve of my doing it.” And in -another letter he seriously treated the question of withdrawing from -the contest altogether. “The government were the best judges,” he -said, “of whether they could or ought to withdraw,” but he did not -believe that Spain could be a useful ally, or at all in alliance with -England, if the republican system was not put down. Meanwhile he -recommended to the English government and to his brother, to take no -part either for or against the princess of Brazil, to discountenance -the democratical principles and measures of the Cortez, and if their -opinion was asked regarding the formation of a new regency, to -recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution which lodged -all power with the Cortez, and to give instead, some authority to the -executive government whether in the hands of king or regent. To fill -the latter office one of royal blood uniting the strongest claims of -birth with the best capacity should he thought be selected, but if -capacity was wanting in the royal race then to choose the Spaniard -who was most deserving in the public estimation! Thus necessity -teaches privilege to bend before merit. - -[Sidenote: Letter to the Spanish minister of war, 30th Aug. 1813.] - -The whole force of Spain in arms was at this period about one hundred -and sixty thousand men. Of this number not more than fifty thousand -were available for operations in the field, and those only because -they were paid clothed and armed by England, and kept together by the -ability and vigour of the English general. He had proposed when at -Cadiz an arrangement for the civil and political government of the -provinces rescued from the French, with a view to the supply of the -armies, but his plan was rejected and his repeated representations -of the misery the army and the people endured under the system -of the Spanish government were unheeded. Certain districts were -allotted for the support of each army, yet, with a jealous fear of -military domination, the government refused the captain-generals of -those districts the necessary powers to draw forth the resources -of the country, powers which lord Wellington recommended that they -should have, and wanting which the whole system was sure to become -a nullity. Each branch of administration was thus conducted by -chiefs independent in their attributes, yet each too restricted in -authority, generally at variance with one another, and all of them -neglectful of their duty. The evil effect upon the troops was thus -described by the English general as early as August. - -“More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a -year, and the whole of Spain excepting Catalonia and a small part -of Aragon since the months of May and June last. The most abundant -harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country; millions of -money spent by the contending armies are circulating every where, -and yet your armies however weak in numbers are literally starving. -The allied British and Portuguese armies under my command have -been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon -the magazines imported by sea, and I am concerned to inform your -excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies, which -has been given from the military chest of the British army and has -been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have -supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies in order -to enable them to remain in the field at all. And notwithstanding -this assistance I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish -troops on the outposts, obliged to plunder the nut and apple-trees -for subsistence, and to know that the Spanish troops, employed in -the blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving upon half an -allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading were -at the same time receiving their full allowance. The system then is -insufficient to procure supplies for the army and at the same time I -assure your excellency that it is the most oppressive and injurious -to the country that could be devised. It cannot be pretended that the -country does not produce the means of maintaining the men necessary -for its defence; those means are undoubtedly superabundant, and the -enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the -expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger than are necessary -for its defence.” - -These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the public servants, -and to their overwhelming numbers, that certain sign of an -unprosperous state; to the disgraceful negligence and disregard -of public duties, and to there being no power in the country for -enforcing the law; the collection of the revenue cost in several -branches seventy and eighty per cent. Meanwhile no Spanish officers -capable of commanding a large body of troops or keeping it in an -efficient state had yet appeared, no efficient staff, no system of -military administration had been formed, and no shame for these -deficiencies, no exertions to amend were visible. - -From this picture two conclusions are to be drawn, 1º. that the -provinces, thus described as superabounding in resources, having been -for several years occupied by the French armies, the warfare of the -latter could not have been so devastating and barbarous as it was -represented. 2º. That Spain, being now towards the end as helpless -as she had been at the beginning and all through the war, was quite -unequal to her own deliverance either by arms or policy; that it was -English valour English steel, directed by the genius of an English -general, which rising superior to all obstacles, whether presented -by his own or the peninsular governments or by the perversity -of national character, worked out her independence. So utterly -inefficient were the Spaniards themselves, that now, at the end of -six years’ war, lord Wellington declared thirty thousand of their -troops could not be trusted to act separately; they were only useful -when mixed in the line with larger numbers of other nations. And yet -all men in authority to the lowest alcalde were as presumptuous as -arrogant and as perverse as ever. Seeming to be rendered callous to -public misery by the desperate state of affairs, they were reckless -of the consequences of their actions and never suffered prudential -considerations or national honour to check the execution of any -project. The generals from repeated failures had become insensible to -misfortunes, and without any remarkable display of personal daring, -were always ready to deliver battle on slight occasions, as if that -were a common matter instead of being the great event of war. - -The government agents were corrupt, and the government itself was -as it had ever been tyrannical faithless mean and equivocating to -the lowest degree. In 1812 a Spaniard of known and active patriotism -thus commenced an elaborate plan of defence for the provinces. -“Catalonia abhors France as her oppressor but she abhors still more -the despotism which has been carried on in all the branches of -her administration since the beginning of the war.” In fine there -was no healthy action in any part of the body politic, every thing -was rotten except the hearts of the poorer people. Even at Cadiz -Spanish writers compared the state to a vessel in a hurricane without -captain, pilot, compass, chart sails or rudder, and advised the crew -to cry to heaven as their sole resource. But they only blasphemed. - -When Wellington, indignant at the systematic breach of his -engagement, remonstrated, he was answered that the actual regency -did not hold itself bound by the contracts of the former government. -Hence it was plain no considerations of truth, for they had -themselves also accepted the contract, nor of honest policy, nor the -usages of civilized states with respect to national faith, had any -influence on their conduct. Enraged at this scandalous subterfuge, -he was yet conscious how essential it was he should retain his -command. And seeing all Spanish generals more or less engaged in -political intrigues, none capable of co-operating with him, and that -no Spanish army could possibly subsist as a military body under the -neglect and bad arrangement of the Spanish authorities, conscious -also that public opinion in Spain would, better than the menaces -of the English government, enable him to obtain a counterpoise to -the democratic party, he tendered indeed his resignation if the -government engagement was not fulfilled, but earnestly endeavoured by -a due mixture of mildness argument and reproof to reduce the ruling -authorities to reason. Nevertheless there were, he told them, limits -to his forbearance to his submission under injury, and he had been -already most unworthily treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish -government. - -From the world these quarrels were covered by an appearance of the -utmost respect and honour. He was made a grandee of the first class, -and the estate of Soto de Roma in Grenada, of which the much-maligned -and miserable Prince of Peace had been despoiled, was settled upon -him. He accepted the gift, but, as he had before done with his -Portuguese and Spanish pay, transferred the proceeds to the public -treasury during the war. The regents however, under the pressure of -the Jacobins, and apparently bearing some personal enmity, although -one of them, Ciscar, had been instrumental in procuring him the -command of the Spanish army, were now intent to drive him from it; -and the excesses committed at San Sebastian served their factious -writers as a topic for exciting the people not only to demand his -resignation, but to commence a warfare of assassination against the -British soldiers. Moreover, combining extreme folly with wickedness, -they pretended amongst other absurdities that the nobility had -offered, if he would change his religion, to make him king of Spain. -This tale was eagerly adopted by the English newspapers, and three -Spanish grandees thought it necessary to declare that they were -not among the nobles who made the proposition. His resignation was -accepted in the latter end of September, and he held the command -only until the assembling of the new Cortez, but the attempt to -render him odious failed even at Cadiz, owing chiefly to the personal -ascendancy which all great minds so surely attain over the masses -in troubled times. Both the people and the soldiers respected him -more than they did their own government, and the Spanish officers -had generally yielded as ready obedience to his wishes before he was -appointed generalissimo, as they did to his orders when holding that -high office. It was this ascendancy which enabled him to maintain the -war with such troublesome allies; and yet so little were the English -ministers capable of appreciating its importance, that after the -battle of Vittoria they entertained the design of removing him from -Spain to take part in the German operations. His answer was short and -modest, but full of wisdom. - -“Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can both here -and in Germany, but nobody would enjoy the same advantages here, and -I should be no better than another in Germany.” - -The egregious folly which dictated this proposition was thus -checked, and in December the new Cortez decided that he should -retain the command of the armies and the regency be bound to fulfil -its predecessor’s engagements. Nevertheless so deeply had he been -offended by the libels relative to San Sebastian that a private -letter to his brother terminated thus:—“_It will rest with the king’s -government to determine what they will do upon a consideration of all -the circumstances of the case, but if I was to decide I would not -keep the army in Spain for one hour._” And to many other persons at -different times he expressed his fears and conviction that the cause -was lost and that he should fail at last. It was under these, and -other enormous difficulties he carried on his military operations. It -was with an enemy at his back more to be dreaded than the foe in his -front that he invaded the south of France; and that is the answer to -those French writers who have described him as being at the head of -more than two hundred thousand well-furnished soldiers, supported by -a well-organized insurrection of the Spanish people, unembarrassed in -his movements, and luxuriously rioting in all the resources of the -Peninsula and of England. - - - - -BOOK XXIII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -WAR IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. November.] - -While Pampeluna held out, Soult laboured to complete his works of -defence, especially the entrenched camp of St. Jean Pied de Port, -that he might be free to change the theatre of war to Aragon. He -pretended to entertain this project as late as November; but he must -have secretly renounced all hope before that period, because the -snows of an early and severe winter had rendered even the passes of -the Lower Pyrenees impracticable in October. Meanwhile his political -difficulties were not less than lord Wellington’s, all his efforts to -draw forth the resources of France were met with apathy, or secret -hostility, and there was no money in the military chest to answer the -common daily expenses. A junta of the leading merchants in Bayonne -voluntarily provided for the most pressing necessities of the troops, -but their means were limited and Soult vainly urged the merchants of -Bordeaux and Toulouse to follow the patriotic example. It required -therefore all his firmness of character to support the crisis; and -if the English naval force had been sufficient to intercept the -coasting vessels between Bordeaux and Bayonne, the French army must -have retired beyond the Adour. As it was, the greatest part of the -field artillery and all the cavalry were sent so far to the rear for -forage, that they could not be counted a part of the fighting troops; -and the infantry, in addition to their immense labours, were forced -to carry their own provisions from the navigable points of the rivers -to the top of the mountains. - -Soult was strongly affected. “_Tell the emperor_,” he wrote to the -minister of war, “_tell him when you make your next report that on -the very soil of France, this is the situation of the army destined -to defend the southern provinces from invasion; tell him also that -the unheard-of contradictions and obstacles I meet with shall not -make me fail in my duty_.” - -The French troops suffered much, but the privations of the allies -were perhaps greater, for being on higher mountains, more extended, -more dependent upon the sea, their distress was in proportion to -their distance from the coast. A much shorter line had been indeed -gained for the supply of the centre, and a bridge was laid down at -Andarlassa which gave access to the roots of the Bayonette mountain, -yet the troops were fed with difficulty; and so scantily, that -lord Wellington in amends reduced the usual stoppage of pay, and -invoked the army by its military honour to sustain with firmness the -unavoidable pressure. The effect was striking. The murmurs, loud -in the camps before, were hushed instantly, although the soldiers -knew that some commissaries leaguing with the speculators upon the -coast, secretly loaded the provision mules with condiments and other -luxuries, to sell on the mountains at enormous profit. The desertion -was however great, more than twelve hundred men went over to the -enemy in less than four months; and they were all Germans, Englishmen -or Spaniards, for the Portuguese who abandoned their colours -invariably went back to their own country. - -This difficulty of feeding the Anglo-Portuguese, the extreme distress -of the Spaniards and the certainty that they would plunder in France -and so raise the people in arms, together with the uneasy state of -the political affairs in the Peninsula, rendered lord Wellington very -averse to further offensive operations while Napoleon so tenaciously -maintained his positions on the Elbe against the allied sovereigns. -It was impossible to make a formidable and sustained invasion of -France with the Anglo-Portuguese alone, and he had neither money nor -means of transport to feed the Spaniards, even if policy warranted -such a measure. The nature of the country also forbad a decisive -victory, and hence an advance was attended with the risk of returning -to Spain again during the winter, when a retreat would be dangerous -and dishonouring. But on the 20th of October a letter from the -governor of Pampeluna was intercepted, and lord Fitzroy Somerset, -observing that the compliment of ceremony at the beginning was also -in numerals, ingeniously followed the cue and made out the whole. It -announced that the place could not hold out more than a week, and -as intelligence of Napoleon’s disasters in Germany became known at -the same time, lord Wellington was induced to yield once more to the -wishes of the allied sovereigns and the English ministers, who were -earnest that he should invade France. - -His intent was to attack Soult’s entrenched camp on the 29th, -thinking Pampeluna would fall before that period. In this he -was mistaken; and bad weather stopped his movements, for in the -passes above Roncesvalles the troops were knee-deep in snow. The -preparations however continued and strict precautions were taken -to baffle the enemy’s emissaries. Soult was nevertheless perfectly -informed by the deserters of the original design and the cause of the -delay; and he likewise obtained from a serjeant-major of artillery -who losing his road was taken on the 29th, certain letters and orders -indicating an attack in the direction of the bridge of Amotz, between -D’Erlon’s right and Clauzel’s left. Some French peasants also who -had been allowed to pass the allied outposts declared they had been -closely questioned about that bridge and the roads leading to it. -The defences there were therefore augmented with new redoubts and -abbatis, and Soult having thus as he judged, sufficiently provided -for its safety, and being in no pain for his right, nor for Clauzel’s -position, covered as the latter was by the smaller Rhune, turned his -attention towards Foy’s corps. - -That general had been posted at Bidarray, half way between St. -Jean Pied de Port and Cambo, to watch certain roads, which leading -to the Nive from Val Baigorry by St. Martin d’Arosa, and from the -Bastan by Yspegui and the Gorospil mountain, gave Soult anxiety for -his left; but now expecting the principal attack at the bridge of -Amotz, and not by these roads, nor by St. Jean Pied de Port, as he at -first supposed and as lord Wellington had at one time designed, he -resolved to use Foy’s division offensively. In this view on the 3d of -November he instructed him if St. Jean Pied de Port should be only -slightly attacked, to draw all the troops he could possibly spare -from its defence to Bidarray, and when the allies assailed D’Erlon, -he was to seize the Gorospil mountain and fall upon their right as -they descended from the Puerto de Maya. If on the other hand he was -himself assailed by those lines, he was to call in all his detached -troops from St. Jean Pied de Port, repass the Nive by the bridge of -Bidarray, make the best defence possible behind that river, and open -a communication with Pierre Soult and Trielhard, whose divisions of -cavalry were at St. Palais and Orthes. - -On the 6th Foy, thinking the Gorospil difficult to pass, proposed -to seize the Col de Yspegui from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, -and so descend into the Bastan. Soult however preferred Bidarray as -a safer point and more united with the main body of the army; but he -gave Foy a discretionary power to march along the left of the Nive -upon Itzatzu and Espelette, if he judged it fitting to reinforce -D’Erlon’s left rather than to attack the enemy. - -Having thus arranged his regular defence, the French general directed -the prefect of the Lower Pyrenees to post the organized national -guards at the issues of all the valleys about St. Jean Pied de Port, -but to keep the mass of the people quiet until the allies penetrating -into the country should at once provoke and offer facilities for an -irregular warfare. - -On the 9th, being still uneasy about the San Martin d’Arosa and -Gorospil roads, he brought up his brother’s cavalry from St. Palais -to the heights above Cambo, and the next day the long-expected storm -burst. - -Allured by some fine weather on the 6th and 7th of November, lord -Wellington had moved sir Rowland Hill’s troops from the Roncesvalles -to the Bastan with a view to attack Soult, leaving Mina on the -position of Altobiscar and in the Alduides. The other corps had -also received their orders, and the battle was to commence on the -8th, but general Freyre suddenly declared, that unable to subsist -on the mountains he must withdraw a part of his troops. This was a -scheme to obtain provisions from the English magazines, and it was -successful, for the projected attack could not be made without his -aid. Forty thousand rations of flour with a formal intimation that if -he did not co-operate the whole army must retire again into Spain, -contented Freyre for the moment; but the extravagant abuses of the -Spanish commissariat were plainly exposed when the chief of the staff -declared that the flour would only suffice for two days, although -there were less than ten thousand soldiers in the field. Spain -therefore furnished at the rate of two rations for every fighting man -and yet her troops were starving! - -[Sidenote: Appendix, 7, No. 3.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -When this difficulty was surmounted heavy rain caused the attack to -be again deferred, but on the 10th ninety thousand combatants of all -arms and ranks above seventy-four thousand being Anglo-Portuguese, -descended to the battle, and with them went ninety-five pieces of -artillery, which under the command of colonel Dickson were all -with inconceivable vigour and activity thrown into action. Nor in -this host do I reckon four thousand five hundred cavalry, nor the -Spaniards of the blockading division which remained in reserve. On -the other hand the French numbers were now increased by the new -levy of conscripts, but many had deserted again into the interior, -and the fighting men did not exceed seventy-nine thousand including -the garrisons. Six thousand of these were cavalry, and as Foy’s -operations were extraneous to the line of defence scarcely sixty -thousand infantry and artillery were opposed to the allies. - -Lord Wellington seeing that the right of Soult’s line could not -be forced without great loss, resolved to hold it in check while -he turned it by forcing the centre and left, pushing down the -Nivelle to San Pé. In this view the second and sixth British -division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, Morillo’s Spaniards, four of Mina’s -battalions, and Grant’s brigade of light cavalry, in all twenty-six -thousand fighting men and officers with nine guns, were collected -under general Hill in the Bastan to attack D’Erlon. The position of -Roncesvalles was meanwhile occupied by the remainder of Mina’s troops -supported by the blockading force under Carlos D’España. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.] - -The third fourth and seventh divisions, and Giron’s Andalusians, the -whole under the command of marshal Beresford, were disposed about -Zagaramurdi, the Puerto de Echallar, and the lower parts of those -slopes of the greater Rhune which descended upon Sarre. On the left -of this body the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, both under -Charles Alten, were disposed on those slopes of the greater Rhune -which led down towards Ascain. Victor Alten’s brigade of light -cavalry and three British batteries, were placed on the road to -Sarre, and six mountain-guns followed Giron’s and Charles Alten’s -troops. Thus thirty-six thousand fighting men and officers, with -twenty-four guns, were concentrated in this quarter to attack Clauzel. - -[Sidenote: Plan 6.] - -General Freyre’s Spaniards, about nine thousand strong, with six -guns, were disposed on Alten’s left, at the fort of Calvary and -towards Jollimont, ready to fall upon any troops which might be -detached from the camp of Serres by the bridge of Ascain, to support -Clauzel. - -General Hope having the first and fifth divisions, Wilson’s, -Bradford’s, and lord Aylmer’s brigades of infantry, Vandeleur’s -brigade of light dragoons, and the heavy German cavalry, in all about -nineteen thousand men and officers with fifty-four guns, was opposed -to Soult’s right wing; and the naval squadron hovering on Hope’s left -flank was to aid the land operations. - -On the French side each lieutenant-general had a special position -to defend. D’Erlon’s first line, its left resting on the fortified -rocks of Mondarin which could not be turned, run from thence along -the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains by the forge of Urdax to the -Nivelle. This range was strongly entrenched and occupied by one of -Abbé’s and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades, Espelette being behind the -former and Ainhoa behind the latter. The second line or main position -was several miles distant on a broad ridge, behind Ainhoa, and it was -occupied by the remaining brigades of the two divisions. The left -did not extend beyond the centre of the first line, but the right -reaching to the bridge of Amotz stretched with a wider flank, because -the Nivelle flowing in a slanting direction towards the French gave -greater space as their positions receded. Three great redoubts were -constructed in a line on this ridge, and a fourth had been commenced -close to the bridge. - -On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to say beyond the -bridge of Amotz, Clauzel’s position extended to Ascain, also along -a strong range of heights fortified with many redoubts trenches and -abbatis, and as the Nivelle after passing Amotz swept in a curve -completely round the range to Ascain, both flanks rested alike -upon that river, having communication by the bridges of Amotz and -Ascain on the right and left, and a retreat by the bridges of San Pé -and Harastagui which were in rear of the centre. Two of Clauzel’s -divisions reinforced by one of D’Erlon’s under general Maransin were -here posted. In front of the left were the redoubts of St. Barbe and -Grenada covering the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the -right was the smaller Rhune which was fortified and occupied by a -brigade of Maransin’s division. A new redoubt with abbatis was also -commenced to cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz. - -On the right of this line beyond the bridge of Ascain, Daricau’s -division belonging to Clauzel’s corps, and the Italian brigade of San -Pol drawn from Villatte’s reserve, were posted to hold the entrenched -camp of Serres and to connect Clauzel’s position with Villatte’s, -which was as I have before said on a ridge crossing the gorges of -Olette and Jollimont. The French right wing under Reille, strongly -fortified on the lower ground and partially covered by inundations, -was nearly impregnable. - -Soult’s weakest point of general defence was certainly the opening -between the Rhune mountains and the Nivelle. Gradually narrowing -as it approached the bridge of Amotz this space was the most open, -the least fortified, and the Nivelle being fordable above that -bridge could not hamper the allies’ movements. Wherefore a powerful -force acting in this direction could pass by D’Erlon’s first line -and breaking in upon the main position, between the right of that -general’s second line and Clauzel’s left, turn both by the same -attack. - -Lord Wellington thus designed his battle. General Hill, leaving -Minas four battalions on the Gorospil mountain facing the rocks of -Mondarin, moved in the night by the different passes of the Puerto de -Maya, Morillo’s Spaniards being to menace the French on the Choupera -and Atchuleguy mountains, the second division to attack Ainhoa and -Urdax. The sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese were to assault -the works covering the bridge of Amotz, either on the right or left -bank of the Nivelle according to circumstances. Thus the action of -twenty-six thousand men was combined against D’Erlon’s position, and -on their left Beresford’s corps was assembled. The third division -under general Colville, descending from Zagaramurdi, was to move -against the unfinished redoubts and entrenchments covering the -approaches to the bridge of Amotz on the left bank of the Nivelle, -thus turning D’Erlon’s right at the moment when it was attacked -in front by Hill’s corps. On the left of the third division, the -seventh, descending from the mouth of the Echallar pass, was to -storm the Grenada redoubt, and then passing the village of Sarre -assail Clauzel’s main position abreast with the attack of the third -division. On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling -on the lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon the -redoubt of San Barbe, and then moving through Sarre also to assail -Clauzel’s main position abreast with the seventh division. On the -left of the fourth division, Giron’s Spaniards, gathered higher up on -the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast with the others -leaving Sarre on their right. They were to drive the enemy from the -lower slopes of the smaller Rhune and then in concert with the rest -attack Clauzel’s main position. In this way Hill’s and Beresford’s -corps, forming a mass of more than forty thousand infantry were to -be thrust, on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clauzel and -D’Erlon to break their line of battle. - -Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, -furnishing together about eight thousand men, was likewise to attack -Clauzel’s line on the left of Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians -approached the bridge of Ascain to prevent reinforcements coming -from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten could assail Clauzel’s right -the smaller Rhune which covered it was to be stormed. This mountain -outwork was a hog’s-back ridge rising abruptly out of table-land and -parallel with the greater Rhune. It was inaccessible along its front, -which was precipitous and from fifty to two hundred feet high; but -on the enemy’s left these rocks gradually decreased, descending by a -long slope to the valley of Sarre, and about two-thirds of the way -down the thirty-fourth French regiment was placed, with an advanced -post on some isolated crags situated in the hollow between the two -Rhunes. On the enemy’s right the hog’s-back sunk by degrees into the -plain or platform. It was however covered at that point by a marsh -scarcely passable, and the attacking troops were therefore first to -move up against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to file to -their left under fire, between the marsh and the lower crags, until -they gained an accessible point from whence they could fight their -way along the narrow ridge of the hog’s-back But the bristles of the -latter were huge perpendicular crags connected with walls of loose -stones so as to form several small forts or castles communicating -with each other by narrow foot-ways, and rising one above another -until the culminant point was attained. The table-land beyond this -ridge was extensive and terminated in a very deep ravine on every -side, save a narrow space on the right of the marsh, where the enemy -had drawn a traverse of loose stones, running perpendicularly from -behind the hog’s-back and ending in a star fort which overhung the -edge of the ravine. - -This rampart and fort, and the hog’s-back itself, were defended by -Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s division, and the line of retreat was -towards a low narrow neck of land, which bridging the deep ravine -linked the Rhune to Clauzel’s main position: a reserve was placed -here, partly to sustain the thirty-fourth French regiment posted -on the slope of the mountain towards Sarre, partly to protect the -neck of land on the side of that village. As this neck was the only -approach to the French position in that part, to storm the smaller -Rhune was a necessary preliminary to the general battle, wherefore -Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th from the Hermitage, -the Commissary mountain, and the Puerto de Vera, collected them at -midnight on that slope of the greater Rhune which descended towards -Ascain. The main body of the light division, turning the marsh by -the left, was to assail the stone traverse and lap over the star -fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on the -left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; and the forty-third -regiment supported by the seventeenth Portuguese was to assail -the hog’s-back. One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns -were however left on the summit of the greater Rhune, with orders -to assail the craggy post between the Rhunes and connect Alten’s -attack with that of Giron’s Spaniards. All these troops gained their -respective stations so secretly that the enemy had no suspicion of -their presence, although for several hours the columns were lying -within half musket-shot of the works. Towards morning indeed five -or six guns, fired in a hurried manner from the low ground near the -sea, broke the stillness, but the French on the Rhune remained quiet, -and the British troops awaited the rising of the sun when three guns -fired from the Atchubia mountain were to give the signal of attack. - - -BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE. - -The day broke with great splendour, and as the first ray of light -played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal-guns were fired -in rapid succession from its summit. The soldiers instantly leaped -up, and the French beheld with astonishment several columns rushing -forward from the flank of the great Rhune. Running to their defences -with much tumult they opened a few pieces, which were answered from -the top of the greater Rhune by the mountain-artillery, and at the -same moment two companies of the forty-third were detached to cross -the marsh if possible, and keep down the enemy’s fire from the -lower part of the hog’s-back. The action being thus commenced the -remainder of the regiment, formed partly in line partly in a column -of reserve, turned the marsh by the right and advanced against the -high rocks. From these crags the French shot fast and thickly, but -the quick even movement of the British line deceived their aim, -and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly though the ground -was rough, turned suddenly between the rocks and the marsh, and -were immediately joined by the two companies which had passed that -obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all together jumped into the -lower works, but the men exhausted by their exertions, for they had -passed over half a mile of very difficult ground with a wonderful -speed, remained for a few minutes inactive within half pistol-shot of -the first stone castle from whence came a sharp and biting musketry. -When they had recovered breath they arose and with a stern shout -commenced the assault. - -The defenders were as numerous as the assailants, and for six weeks -they had been labouring on their well-contrived castles; but strong -and valiant in arms must the soldiers have been who stood in that -hour before the veterans of the forty-third. One French grenadier -officer only dared to sustain the rush. Standing alone on the high -wall of the first castle and flinging large stones with both his -hands, a noble figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men -shrinking on each side sought safety among the rocks on his flanks. -Close and confused then was the action, man met man at every turn, -but with a rattling fire of musketry, sometimes struggling in the -intricate narrow paths sometimes climbing the loose stone walls, -the British soldiers won their desperate way until they had carried -the second castle, called by the French the place of arms, and the -magpie’s nest, because of a lofty pillar of rock which rose above -it and on which a few marksmen were perched. From these points the -defenders were driven into their last castle, which being higher -and larger than the others and covered by a natural ditch or cleft -in the rocks, fifteen feet deep, was called the Donjon. Here they -made a stand, and the assailants, having advanced so far as to look -into the rear of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below, -suspended the vehement throng of their attack for a while, partly to -gather a head for storming the Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy -beneath them, who were now warmly engaged with the two battalions of -riflemen, the Portuguese Caçadores, and the seventeenth Portuguese. -This last regiment was to have followed the forty-third but seeing -how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the rocks, had moved -at once against the traverse on the other side of the marsh; and very -soon the French defending the rampart, being thus pressed in front, -and warned by the direction of the fire that they were turned on the -ridge above, seeing also the fifty-second, forming the extreme left -of the division, now emerging from the deep ravine beyond the star -fort on the other flank, abandoned their works. Then the forty-third -gathering a strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped with a shout -down the deep cleft in the rock, others turned it by the narrow -paths on each flank, and the enemy abandoned the loose walls at the -moment they were being scaled. Thus in twenty minutes six hundred old -soldiers were hustled out of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but -that the victors lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men. - -The whole mountain was now cleared of the French, for the riflemen -dropping perpendicularly down from the greater Rhune upon the post -of crags in the hollow between the Rhunes seized it with small loss; -but they were ill-seconded by Giron’s Spaniards and were hardly -handled by the thirty-fourth French regiment, which maintaining its -post on the slope, covered the flight of the confused crowd which -came rushing down the mountain behind them towards the neck of -land leading to the main position. At that point they all rallied -and seemed inclined to renew the action, but after some hesitation -continued their retreat. This favourable moment for a decisive stroke -had been looked for by the commander of the forty-third, but the -officer entrusted with the reserve companies of the regiment had -thrown them needlessly into the fight, thus rendering it impossible -to collect a body strong enough to assail such a heavy mass. - -The contest at the stone rampart and star fort, being shortened -by the rapid success on the hog’s-back, was not very severe, but -general Kempt, always conspicuous for his valour, was severely -wounded, nevertheless he did not quit the field and soon reformed -his brigade on the platform he had thus so gallantly won. Meanwhile -the fifty-second having turned the position by the ravine was -now approaching the enemy’s line of retreat, when general Alten, -following his instructions, halted the division partly in the ravine -itself to the left of the neck, partly on the table-land, and -during this action Longa’s Spaniards having got near Ascain were in -connection with Freyre’s Gallicians. In this position with the enemy -now and then cannonading Longa’s people and the troops in the ravine, -Alten awaited the progress of the army on his right, for the columns -there had a long way to march and it was essential to regulate the -movements. - -The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent the light division -against the Rhune, had also put the fourth and seventh divisions in -movement against the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada. Eighteen guns -were immediately placed in battery against the former, and while they -poured their stream of shot the troops advanced with scaling ladders -and the skirmishers of the fourth division got into the rear of the -work, whereupon the French leaped out and fled. Ross’s battery of -horse artillery galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada -fort drove the enemy from there also, and then the fourth and seventh -divisions carried the village of Sarre and the position beyond it and -advanced to the attack of Clauzel’s main position. - -It was now eight o’clock and from the smaller Rhune a splendid -spectacle of war opened upon the view. On one hand the ships of war -slowly sailing to and fro were exchanging shots with the fort of -Socoa; Hope menacing all the French lines in the low ground sent the -sound of a hundred pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks, and -they were answered by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains. -On the other hand the summit of the great Atchubia was just lighted -by the rising sun, and fifty thousand men rushing down its enormous -slopes with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding shadows -into the deep valley. The plains of France so long overlooked from -the towering crags of the Pyrenees were to be the prize of battle, -and the half-famished soldiers in their fury, broke through the iron -barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of reeds. - -The principal action was on a space of seven or eight miles, but the -skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point had the combinations -failed. Far on the right general Hill after a long and difficult -night march had got within reach of the enemy a little before seven -o’clock. Opposing Morillo’s and Mina’s Spaniards to Abbé’s troops -on the Mondarain and Atchuleguy rocks, he directed the second -division against D’Armagnac’s brigade and brushed it back from the -forge of Urdax and the village of Ainhoa. Meanwhile the aid of the -sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese being demanded by him, -they passed the Nivelle lower down and bent their march along the -right bank towards the bridge of Amotz. Thus while Mina’s battalion -and Morillo’s division kept Abbé in check on the mountains, the -three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, marching left flank in advance, -approached D’Erlon’s second position, but the country being very -rugged it was eleven o’clock before they got within cannon-shot of -the French redoubts. Each of these contained five hundred men, and -they were placed along the summit of a high ridge which being thickly -clothed with bushes, and covered by a deep ravine was very difficult -to attack. However general Clinton, leading the sixth division on -the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy from the -works covering the approaches to the bridge, after which wheeling to -his right he advanced against the nearest redoubt, and the garrison -not daring to await the assault abandoned it. Then the Portuguese -division passing the ravine and marching on the right of the sixth -menaced the second redoubt, and the second division in like manner -approached the third redoubt. D’Armagnac’s troops now set fire to -their hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda behind San Pé, -pursued by the sixth division. Abbé’s second brigade forming the -French left was separated by a ravine from D’Armagnac’s ground, but -he also after some hesitation retreated towards Espelette and Cambo, -where his other brigade, which had meanwhile fallen back from the -Mondarain before Morillo, rejoined him. - -It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive that -rendered D’Erlon’s defence so feeble. After the fall of the St. -Barbe and Grenada redoubts Conroux’s right and centre endeavoured to -defend the village and heights of Sarre; but while the fourth and -seventh divisions, aided by the ninety-fourth regiment detached from -the third division, attacked and carried those points, the third -division being on their right and less opposed pushed rapidly towards -the bridge of Amotz, forming in conjunction with the sixth division -the narrow end of the wedge into which Beresford’s and Hill’s corps -were now thrown. The French were thus driven from all their new -unfinished works covering the approaches to that bridge on both sides -of the Nivelle, and Conroux’s division, spreading from Sarre to -Amotz, was broken by superior numbers at every point. That general -indeed vigorously defended the old works around the bridge itself, -but he soon fell mortally wounded, his troops were again broken, and -the third division seized the bridge and established itself on the -heights between that structure and the redoubt of Louis the XIV. -which having been also lately commenced was unfinished. This happened -about eleven o’clock and D’Erlon fearing to be cut off from St. Pé -yielded as we have seen at once to the attack of the sixth division, -and at the same time the remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back -in disorder from Sarre, closely pursued by the fourth and seventh -divisions, which were immediately established on the left of the -third. Thus the communication between Clauzel and D’Erlon was cut, -the left flank of one and the right flank of the other broken, and a -direct communication between Hill and Beresford secured by the same -blow. - -D’Erlon abandoned his position, but Clauzel stood firm with Taupin’s -and Maransin’s divisions. The latter now completed by the return of -Barbot’s brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt of -Louis the XIV. and supported with eight field-pieces attempted to -cover the flight of Conroux’s troops. The guns opened briskly but -they were silenced by Ross’s battery of horse artillery, the only one -which had surmounted the difficulties of the ground after passing -Sarre, the infantry were then assailed, in front by the fourth and -seventh divisions, in flank by the third division, the redoubt of -Louis XIV. was stormed, the garrison bayonetted, Conroux’s men -continued to fly, Maransin’s after a stiff combat were cast headlong -into the ravines behind their position, and Maransin himself was -taken but escaped in the confusion. Giron’s Spaniards now came up on -the left of the fourth division, somewhat late however, and after -having abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes of the smaller -Rhune. - -On the French side Taupin’s division and a large body of conscripts -forming Clauzel’s right wing still remained to fight. The left rested -on a large work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery but -overlooked the whole position; the right was covered by two redoubts -overhanging a ravine which separated them from the camp of Serres, -and some works in the ravine itself protected the communication by -the bridge of Ascain. Behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing -the road to San Pé and along which Maransin and Conroux’s beaten -divisions were now flying in disorder, there was another work called -the redoubt of Harastaguia, and Clauzel thinking he might still -dispute the victory, if his reserve division, posted in the camp of -Serres, could come to his aid, drew the thirty-first French regiment -from Taupin, and posted it in front of this redoubt of Harastaguia. -His object was to rally Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops there and so -form a new line, the left on the Harastaguia, the right on the signal -redoubt, into which last he threw six hundred of the eighty-eighth -regiment. In this position having a retreat by the bridge of Ascain -he resolved to renew the battle, but his plan failed at the moment of -conception, because Taupin could not stand before the light division -which was now again in full action. - -[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Report to Soult, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Taupin’s Official Report, MSS.] - -About half-past nine, general Alten, seeing the whole of the columns -on his right, as far as the eye could reach, well engaged with the -enemy, had crossed the low neck of land in his front. It was first -passed by the fifty-second regiment with a rapid pace and a very -narrow front, under a destructive cannonade and fire of musketry from -the entrenchments which covered the side of the opposite mountain; -a road coming from Ascain by the ravine led up the position, and as -the fifty-second pushed their attack along it the enemy abandoned -his entrenchments on each side, and forsook even his crowning works -above. This formidable regiment was followed by the remainder of -Alten’s troops, and Taupin, though his division was weak from its -losses on the 7th of October and now still further diminished by the -absence of the thirty-first regiment, awaited the assault above, -being supported by the conscripts drawn up in his rear. But at this -time Longa, having turned the smaller Rhune, approached Ascain, and -being joined by part of Freyre’s troops their skirmishers opened a -distant musketry against the works covering that bridge on Taupin’s -right; a panic immediately seized the French, the seventieth regiment -abandoned the two redoubts above, and the conscripts were withdrawn. -Clauzel ordered Taupin to retake the forts but this only added to the -disorder, the seventieth regiment instead of facing about disbanded -entirely and were not reassembled until next day. There remained -only four regiments unbroken, one, the eighty-eighth, was in the -signal redoubt, two under Taupin in person kept together in rear of -the works on the right, and the thirty-first covered the fort of -Harastaguia now the only line of retreat. - -In this emergency, Clauzel, anxious to bring off the eighty-eighth -regiment, ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal redoubt, -intending to do the same himself on the other at the head of the -thirty-first regiment; but the latter was now vigorously attacked by -the Portuguese of the seventh division, and the fourth division was -rapidly interposing between that regiment and the signal redoubt. -Moreover Alten previous to this had directed the forty-third, -preceded by Barnard’s riflemen, to turn at the distance of musquet -shot the right flank of the signal redoubt, wherefore Taupin instead -of charging, was himself charged in front by the riflemen, and being -menaced at the same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated, -closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer fell -dangerously wounded. During this struggle the seventh division broke -the thirty-first, the rout was complete; the French fled to the -different bridges over the Nivelle and the signal redoubt was left to -its fate. - -This formidable work barred the way of the light division, but it -was of no value to the defence when the forts on its flanks were -abandoned. Colborne approached it in front with the fifty-second -regiment, Giron’s Spaniards menaced it on Colborne’s right, the -fourth division was passing to its rear, and Kempt’s brigade was -as we have seen turning it on the left. Colborne whose military -judgment was seldom at fault, halted under the brow of the conical -hill on which the work was situated, but some of Giron’s Spaniards -making a vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking it on his -right were beaten back, and at that moment a staff-officer without -warrant, for general Alten on the spot assured the Author of this -History that he sent no such order, rode up and directed Colborne to -advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance and his troops covered -by the steepness of the hill reached the flat top which was about -forty yards across to the redoubt; then they made their rush, but a -wide ditch, thirty feet deep well fraised and pallisaded, stopped -them short, and the fire of the enemy stretched all the foremost -men dead. The intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously for he was -always at the head and on horseback, immediately led the regiment -under cover of the brow to another point, and thinking to take the -French unawares made another rush, yet with the same result. At three -different places did he rise to the surface in this manner, and each -time the French fire swept away the head of his column. Resorting -then to persuasion he held out a white handkerchief and summoned the -commandant, pointing out to him how his work was surrounded and how -hopeless his defence, whereupon the garrison yielded having had only -one man killed, whereas on the British side there fell two hundred -soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms were first -borne by men. - -During this affair Clauzel’s divisions had crossed the Nivelle in -great disorder, Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops near San Pé, the -thirty-first regiment at Harastaguia, Taupin between that place and -the bridge of Serres. They were pursued by the third and seventh -divisions, and the skirmishers of the former crossing by Amotz and -a bridge above San Pé entered that place while the French were in -the act of passing the river below. It was now past two o’clock, -Conroux’s troops pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position -on the road from San Pé to Bayonne, where they were joined by Taupin -and by D’Erlon with D’Armagnac’s division, but Clauzel rallied -Maransin’s men and took post on some heights immediately above San -Pé. Meanwhile Soult had hurried from St. Jean de Luz to the camp of -Serres with all his reserve artillery and spare troops to menace the -allies’ left flank by Ascain, and Wellington thereupon halted the -fourth and light divisions, and Giron’s Spaniards, on the reverse -slopes of Clauzel’s original position, facing the camp of Serres, -waiting until the sixth division, then following D’Armagnac’s -retreat on the right of the Nivelle, was well advanced. When he -was assured of Clinton’s progress he crossed the Nivelle with the -third and seventh divisions and drove Maransin from his new position -after a hard struggle, in which general Inglis was wounded and the -fifty-first and sixty-eighth regiments handled very roughly. This -ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming on and the -troops were exhausted, especially the sixth division which had been -marching or fighting for twenty-four hours. However three divisions -were firmly established in rear of Soult’s right wing of whose -operations it is now time to treat. - -In front of Reille’s entrenchments were two advanced positions, the -camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bons Secours in the -centre covering Urogne. The first had been attacked and carried -early in the morning by the fifth division, which advanced to the -inundation covering the heights of Bordegain and Ciboure. The -second after a short cannonade was taken by Halket’s Germans and -the guards, and immediately afterwards the eighty-fifth regiment, -of lord Aylmer’s brigade, drove a French battalion out of Urogne. -The first division, being on the right, then menaced the camp of -Belchena, and the German skirmishers passed a small stream covering -this part of the line, but they were driven back by the enemy whose -musketry and cannonade were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile -Freyre, advancing in two columns from Jollimont and the Calvaire on -the right of the first division, placed eight guns in battery against -the Nassau redoubt, a large work constructed on the ridge occupied by -Villate to cover the approaches to Ascain. The Spaniards were here -opposed by their own countrymen under Casa Palacio who commanded the -remains of Joseph’s Spanish guards, and during the fight general -Freyre’s skirmishers on the right united with Longa’s men. Thus a -kind of false battle was maintained along the whole line to the sea -until nightfall, with equal loss of men but great advantage to the -allies, because it entirely occupied Reille’s two divisions and -Villatte’s reserve, and prevented the troops in the camp of Serres -from passing by the bridge of Ascain to aid Clauzel, who was thus -overpowered. When that event happened and lord Wellington had passed -the Nivelle at San Pé, Daricau and the Italian brigade withdrew from -Serres, and Villatte’s reserve occupied it, whereupon Freyre and -Longa entered the town of Ascain. Villatte however held the camp -above until Reille had withdrawn into St. Jean de Luz and destroyed -all the bridges on the Lower Nivelle; when that was effected the -whole retired and at daybreak reached the heights of Bidart on the -road to Bayonne. - -During the night the allies halted on the position they had gained -in the centre, but an accidental conflagration catching a wood -completely separated the picquets towards Ascain from the main body, -and spreading far and wide over the heath lighted up all the hills, a -blazing sign of war to France. - -On the 11th the army advanced in order of battle. Sir John Hope on -the left, forded the river above St. Jean de Luz with his infantry, -and marched on Bidart. Marshal Beresford in the centre moved by -the roads leading upon Arbonne. General Hill, communicating by his -right with Morillo who was on the rocks of Mondarain, brought his -left forward into communication with Beresford, and with his centre -took possession of Suraide and Espelette facing towards Cambo. The -time required to restore the bridges for the artillery at Ciboure, -and the change of front on the right rendered these movements slow, -and gave the duke of Dalmatia time to rally his army upon a third -line of fortified camps which he had previously commenced, the right -resting on the coast at Bidart, the centre at Helbacen Borda, the -left at Ustaritz on the Nive. This front was about eight miles, but -the works were only slightly advanced and Soult dreading a second -battle on so wide a field drew back his centre and left to Arbonne -and Arauntz, broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and at -two o’clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the allies in the centre, -closed the day’s proceedings. The next morning the French retired -to the ridge of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet and -their left in the entrenched camp of Bayonne near Marac. During this -movement a dense fog arrested the allies, but when the day cleared -sir John Hope took post at Bidart on the left, and Beresford occupied -Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe, in the centre. General -Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges of -Ustaritz and he also made a demonstration against the works at Cambo, -but the rain which fell heavily in the mountains on the 11th rendered -the fords impassable and both points were defended successfully by -Foy whose operations had been distinct from the rest. - -In the night of the 9th D’Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his -own position, had sent that general orders to march from Bidaray -to Espelette, but the messenger did not arrive in time and on the -morning of the 10th about eleven o’clock Foy, following Soult’s -previous instructions, drove Mina’s battalions from the Gorospil -mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo he forced him -also back fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However D’Erlon’s battle -was at this period receding fast, and Foy fearing to be cut off -retired with the loss of a colonel and one hundred and fifty men, -having however taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners. -Continuing his retreat all night he reached Cambo and Ustaritz on -the 11th, just in time to relieve Abbé’s division at those posts, -and on the 12th defended them against general Hill. Such were the -principal circumstances of the battle of the Nivelle, whereby Soult -was driven from a mountain position which he had been fortifying for -three months. He lost four thousand two hundred and sixty-five men -and officers including twelve or fourteen hundred prisoners, and -one general was killed. His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz and -Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one pieces -of artillery were taken, the greater part having been abandoned in -the redoubts of the low country to sir John Hope. The allies had two -generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost two thousand six -hundred and ninety-four men and officers. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. Soult fared in this battle as most generals will who seek by -extensive lines to supply the want of numbers or of hardiness in the -troops. Against rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers lines -may avail, seldom against accomplished generals, never when the -assailants are the better soldiers. Cæsar at Alesia resisted the -Gauls, but his lines served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey. -Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus, and in modern times the -duke of Marlborough broke through all the French lines in Flanders. -If Wellington triumphed at Torres Vedras it was perhaps because his -lines were not attacked, and, it may be, Soult was seduced by that -example. His works were almost as gigantic and upon the same plan, -that is to say a river on one flank, the ocean on the other, and the -front upon mountains covered with redoubts and partially protected -by inundations. But the duke of Dalmatia had only three months to -complete his system, his labours were under the gaze of his enemy, -his troops, twice defeated during the execution, were inferior in -confidence and numbers to the assailants. Lord Wellington’s lines at -Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year. Massena only knew -of them when they stopped his progress, and his army inferior in -numbers had been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco. - -It is not meant by this to decry entrenched camps within compass, -and around which an active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or -avoiding battle according to circumstances. The objection applies -only to those extensive covering lines by which soldiers are -taught to consider themselves inferior in strength and courage to -their enemies. A general is thus precluded from shewing himself at -important points and at critical periods; he is unable to encourage -his troops or to correct errors; his sudden resources and the -combinations of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering -to the works, while the assailants may make whatever dispositions -they like, menace every point and select where to break through. -The defenders, seeing large masses directed against them and unable -to draw confidence from a like display of numbers, become fearful, -knowing there must be some weak point which is the measure of -strength for the whole. The assailants fall on with that heat -and vehemence which belongs to those who act voluntarily and on -the offensive; each mass strives to outdo those on its right and -left, and failure is only a repulse, whereas the assailed having no -resource but victory look to their flanks, and are more anxious about -their neighbours’ fighting than their own. - -[Sidenote: Official Reports of the French generals to Soult, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report to the Minister of War, MSS.] - -All these disadvantages were experienced at the battle of the -Nivelle. D’Erlon attributed his defeat to the loss of the bridge -of Amotz by Conroux’s division, and to this cause also Maransin -traced his misfortunes. Taupin laid his defeat at Maransin’s door, -but Clauzel on the other hand ascribed it at once to want of -firmness in the troops, although he also asserted that if Daricau’s -division had come to his aid from the camp of Serres, he would have -maintained his ground. Soult however traced Clauzel’s defeat to -injudicious measures. That general he said attempted to defend the -village of Sarre after the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada were -carried, whereby Conroux’s division was overwhelmed in detail and -driven back in flight to Amotz. Clauzel should rather have assembled -his three divisions at once in the main position which was his -battleground, and there, covered by the smaller Rhune, ought to have -been victorious. It was scarcely credible he observed that such -entrenchments as Clauzel’s and D’Erlon’s should have been carried. -For his part he relied on their strength so confidently as to think -the allies must sacrifice twenty-five thousand men to force them and -perhaps fail then. He had been on the right when the battle began, -no reports came to him, he could judge of events only by the fire, -and when he reached the camp of Serres with his reserve troops -and artillery Clauzel’s works were lost! His arrival had however -paralyzed the march of three divisions. This was true, yet there -seems some foundation for Clauzel’s complaint, namely, that he had -for five hours fought on his main position, and during that time no -help had come, although the camp of Serres was close at hand, the -distance from St. Jean de Luz to that place only four miles, and the -attack in the low ground evidently a feint. This then was Soult’s -error. He suffered sir John Hope to hold in play twenty-five thousand -men in the low ground, while fifteen thousand under Clauzel lost the -battle on the hills. - -2º. The French army was inferior in numbers and many of the works -were unfinished; and yet two strong divisions, Daricau’s and Foy’s, -were quite thrown out of the fight, for the slight offensive -movement made by the latter produced no effect whatever. Vigorous -counter-attacks are no doubt essential to a good defence, and it was -in allusion to this that Napoleon, speaking of Joseph’s position -behind the Ebro in the beginning of the war, said, “if a river were -as broad and rapid as the Danube it would be nothing without secure -points for passing to the offensive.” The same maxim applies to -lines, and Soult grandly conceived and applied this principle when -he proposed the descent upon Aragon to Suchet. But he conceived it -meanly and poorly when he ordered Foy to attack by the Gorospil -mountain. That general’s numbers were too few, and the direction of -the march false; one regiment in the field of battle at the decisive -moment would have been worth three on a distant and secondary point. -Foy’s retreat was inevitable if D’Erlon failed, and wanting the -other’s aid he did fail. What success could Foy obtain? He might -have driven Mina’s battalions over the Puerto de Maya and quite -through the Bastan; he might have defeated Morillo and perhaps have -taken general Hill’s baggage; yet all this would have weighed little -against the allies’ success at Amotz; and the deeper he penetrated -the more difficult would have been his retreat. The incursion into -the Bastan by Yspegui proposed by him on the 6th, although properly -rejected by Soult would probably have produced greater effects than -the one executed by Gorospil on the 10th. A surprise on the 6th, -Hill’s troops being then in march by brigades through the Alduides, -might have brought some advantages to the French, and perhaps delayed -the general attack beyond the 10th, when the heavy rains which set in -on the 11th would have rendered it difficult to attack at all: Soult -would thus have had time to complete his works. - -3º. It has been observed that a minor cause of defeat was the -drawing up of the French troops in front instead of in rear of the -redoubts. This may possibly have happened in some places from error -and confusion, not by design, for Clauzel’s report expressly states -that Maransin was directed to form in rear of the redoubts and charge -the allies when they were between the works and the abbatis. It is -however needless to pry closely into these matters when the true -cause lies broad on the surface. Lord Wellington directed superior -numbers with superior skill. The following analysis will prove this, -but it must be remembered that the conscripts are not included in the -enumeration of the French force: being quite undisciplined they were -kept in masses behind and never engaged. - -Abbé’s division, furnishing five thousand old soldiers, was posted -in two lines one behind the other, and they were both paralyzed by -the position of Morillo’s division and Mina’s battalions. Foy’s -division was entirely occupied by the same troops. Six thousand of -Wellington’s worst soldiers therefore sufficed to employ twelve -thousand of Soult’s best troops during the whole day. Meanwhile -Hill fell upon the decisive point where there was only D’Armagnac’s -division to oppose him, that is to say, five thousand against twenty -thousand. And while the battle was secured on the right of the -Nivelle by this disproportion, Beresford on the other bank thrust -twenty-four thousand against the ten thousand composing Conroux’s -and Maransin’s divisions. Moreover as Hill and Beresford, advancing, -the one from his left the other from his right, formed a wedge -towards the bridge of Amotz, forty-four thousand men composing the -six divisions under those generals, fell upon the fifteen thousand -composing the divisions of D’Armagnac Conroux and Maransin; and -these last were also attacked in detail, because part of Conroux’s -troops were defeated near Sarre, and Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s -corps was beaten on the Rhune by the light division before the main -position was attacked. Finally Alten with eight thousand men, having -first defeated Barbot’s brigade, fell upon Taupin who had only -three thousand while the rest of the French army was held in check -by Freyre and Hope. Thus more than fifty thousand troops full of -confidence from repeated victories were suddenly thrown upon the -decisive point where there were only eighteen thousand dispirited by -previous reverses to oppose them. Against such a thunderbolt there -was no defence in the French works. Was it then a simple matter for -Wellington so to combine his battle? The mountains on whose huge -flanks he gathered his fierce soldiers, the roads he opened, the -horrid crags he surmounted, the headlong steeps he descended, the -wild regions through which he poured the destructive fire of more -than ninety guns, these and the reputation of the French commander -furnish the everlasting reply. - -And yet he did not compass all that he designed. The French right -escaped, because when he passed the Nivelle at San Pé he had only -two divisions in hand, the sixth had not come up, three were in -observation of the camp at Serres, and before he could assemble -enough men to descend upon the enemy in the low ground the day had -closed. The great object of the battle was therefore unattained, -and it may be a question, seeing the shortness of the days and the -difficulty of the roads were not unexpected obstacles, whether the -combinations would not have been surer if the principal attack -had been directed entirely against Clauzel’s position. Carlos -D’España’s force and the remainder of Mina’s battalions could have -reinforced Morillo’s division with five thousand men to occupy -D’Erlon’s attention; it was not essential to defeat him, for though -he attributed his retreat to Clauzel’s reverse that general did -not complain that D’Erlon’s retreat endangered his position. This -arrangement would have enabled the rest of Hill’s troops to reinforce -Beresford and have given lord Wellington three additional divisions -in hand with which to cross the Nivelle before two o’clock. Soult’s -right wing could not then have escaped. - -4º. In the report of the battle lord Wellington from some oversight -did but scant and tardy justice to the light division. Acting alone, -for Longa’s Spaniards went off towards Ascain and scarcely fired a -shot, this division furnishing only four thousand seven hundred men -and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s -brigade, and then beat Taupin’s division from the main position, thus -driving superior numbers from the strongest works. In fine being less -than one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clauzel, they -defeated one-third of that general’s corps. Many brave men they lost, -and of two who fell in this battle I will speak. - -The first, low in rank for he was but a lieutenant, rich in honour -for he bore many scars, was young of days. He was only nineteen. But -he had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. So -slight in person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty that -the Spaniards often thought him a girl disguised in man’s clothing, -he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring -and experienced veterans watched his looks on the field of battle, -and implicitly following where he led, would like children obey -his slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His education -was incomplete, yet were his natural powers so happy, the keenest -and best-furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and -every thought and aspiration was proud and noble, indicating future -greatness if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the -forty-third one of three brothers who covered with wounds have all -died in the service. Assailed the night before the battle with that -strange anticipation of coming death so often felt by military men, -he was pierced with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune -rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept even in the -middle of the fight when they heard of his fate. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Despatches.] - -[Sidenote: The Eventful Life of a Sergeant.] - -On the same day and at the same hour was killed colonel Thomas Lloyd. -He likewise had been a long time in the forty-third. Under him Freer -had learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the course of the -war promotion placed Lloyd at the head of the ninety-fourth, and it -was leading that regiment he fell. In him also were combined mental -and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A graceful symmetry combined -with Herculean strength, and a countenance at once frank and majestic -gave the true index of his nature, for his capacity was great and -commanding, and his military knowledge extensive both from experience -and study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, I -will not dwell, save to remark, that he used the latter without -offence, yet so as to increase his ascendancy over those with whom -he held intercourse, for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, -and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He like Freer was -prescient of, and predicted his own fall, yet with no abatement of -courage. When he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, he -would not suffer himself to be moved but remained watching the battle -and making observations upon the changes in it until death came. It -was thus at the age of thirty, that the good the brave the generous -Lloyd died. Tributes to his merit have been published by lord -Wellington and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and -by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine, let those who served -on equal terms with him say whether in aught I have exceeded his -deserts. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. November.] - -Soult having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to leave part of his -forces in the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and with the remainder take -a flanking position behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne and St. -Jean Pied de Port, securing his left by the entrenched mountain of -Ursouia, and his right on the heights above Cambo, the bridge-head -of which would give him the power of making offensive movements. He -could thus keep his troops together and restore their confidence, -while he confined the allies to a small sterile district of France -between the river and the sea, and rendered their situation very -uneasy during the winter if they did not retire. However he soon -modified this plan. The works of the Bayonne camp were not complete -and his presence was necessary to urge their progress. The camp on -the Ursouia mountain had been neglected contrary to his orders, and -the bridge-head at Cambo was only commenced on the right bank. On the -left it was indeed complete but constructed on a bad trace. Moreover -he found that the Nive in dry weather was fordable at Ustaritz below -Cambo, and at many places above that point. Remaining therefore at -Bayonne himself with six divisions and Villatte’s reserve, he sent -D’Erlon with three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo. Yet neither -D’Erlon’s divisions nor Soult’s whole army could have stopped lord -Wellington at this time if other circumstances had permitted the -latter to follow up his victory as he designed. - -The hardships and privations endured on the mountains by the -Anglo-Portuguese troops had been beneficial to them as an army. The -fine air and the impossibility of the soldiers committing their -usual excesses in drink had rendered them unusually healthy, while -the facility of enforcing a strict discipline, and their natural -impatience to win the fair plains spread out before them, had raised -their moral and physical qualities in a wonderful degree. Danger -was their sport, and their experienced general in the prime and -vigour of life was as impatient for action as his soldiers. Neither -the works of the Bayonne camp nor the barrier of the Nive, suddenly -manned by a beaten and dispirited army, could have long withstood the -progress of such a fiery host, and if Wellington could have let their -strength and fury loose in the first days succeeding the battle of -the Nivelle France would have felt his conquering footsteps to her -centre. But the country at the foot of the Pyrenees is a deep clay, -quite impassable after rain except by the royal road near the coast -and that of St. Jean Pied de Port, both of which were in the power -of the French. On the bye-roads the infantry sunk to the mid leg, -the cavalry above the horses’ knees, and even to the saddle-girths -in some places. The artillery could not move at all. The rain had -commenced on the 11th, the mist in the early part of the 12th had -given Soult time to regain his camp and secure the high road to St. -Jean Pied de Port, by which his troops easily gained their proper -posts on the Nive, while his adversary fixed in the swamps could only -make the ineffectual demonstration at Ustaritz and Cambo already -noticed. - -Wellington uneasy for his right flank while the French commanded -the Cambo passage across the Nive directed general Hill to menace -it again on the 16th. Foy had received orders to preserve the -bridge-head on the right bank in any circumstances, but he was -permitted to abandon the work on the left bank in the event of a -general attack; however at Hill’s approach the officer placed there -in command destroyed all the works and the bridge itself. This was a -great cross to Soult, and the allies’ flank being thus secured they -were put into cantonments to avoid the rain, which fell heavily. -The bad weather was however not the only obstacle to the English -general’s operations. On the very day of the battle Freyre’s and -Longa’s soldiers entering Ascain pillaged it and murdered several -persons; the next day the whole of the Spanish troops continued these -excesses in various places, and on the right Mina’s battalions, -some of whom were also in a state of mutiny, made a plundering -and murdering incursion from the mountains towards Hellette. The -Portuguese and British soldiers of the left wing had commenced -the like outrages and two French persons were killed in one town, -however the adjutant-general Pakenham arriving at the moment saw and -instantly put the perpetrators to death thus nipping this wickedness -in the bud, but at his own risk for legally he had not that power. -This general whose generosity humanity and chivalric spirit excited -the admiration of every honourable person who approached him, is the -man who afterwards fell at New Orleans and who has been so foully -traduced by American writers. He who was pre-eminently distinguished -by his detestation of inhumanity and outrage has been with astounding -falsehood represented as instigating his troops to the most infamous -excesses. But from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings -in the most horrible slavery while they prate and vaunt of liberty -until all men turn with loathing from the sickening folly, what can -be expected? - -Terrified by these excesses the French people fled even from the -larger towns, but Wellington quickly relieved their terror. On the -12th, although expecting a battle, he put to death all the Spanish -marauders he could take in the act, and then with many reproaches -and despite of the discontent of their generals, forced the whole -to withdraw into their own country. He disarmed the insubordinate -battalions under Mina, quartered Giron’s Andalusians in the Bastan -where O’Donnel resumed the command; sent Freyre’s Gallicians to the -district between Irun and Ernani, and Longa over the Ebro. Morillo’s -division alone remained with the army. These decisive proceedings -marking the lofty character of the man proved not less politic than -resolute. The French people immediately returned, and finding the -strictest discipline preserved and all things paid for adopted an -amicable intercourse with the invaders. However the loss of such a -mass of troops and the effects of weather on the roads reduced the -army for the moment to a state of inactivity; the head-quarters were -suddenly fixed at St. Jean de Luz, and the troops were established in -permanent cantonments with the following line of battle. - -[Sidenote: Plan 7.] - -The left wing occupied a broad ridge on both sides of the great road -beyond Bidart, the principal post being at a mansion belonging -to the mayor of Biaritz. The front was covered by a small stream -spreading here and there into large ponds or tanks between which the -road was conducted. The centre posted partly on the continuation of -this ridge in front of Arcangues, partly on the hill of San Barbe, -extended by Arrauntz to Ustaritz, the right being thrown back to face -count D’Erlon’s position, extended by Cambo to Itzassu. From this -position which might stretch about six miles on the front and eight -miles on the flank, strong picquets were pushed forwards to several -points, and the infantry occupied all the villages and towns behind -as far back as Espelette, Suraide, Ainhoa, San Pé, Sarre, and Ascain. -One regiment of Vandeleur’s cavalry was with the advanced post on the -left, the remainder were sent to Andaya and Urogne, Victor Alten’s -horsemen were about San Pé, and the heavy cavalry remained in Spain. - -In this state of affairs the establishment of the different posts -in front led to several skirmishes. In one on the 18th, general -John Wilson and general Vandeleur were wounded; but on the same day -Beresford drove the French from the bridge of Urdains, near the -junction of the Ustaritz and San Pé roads, and though attacked in -force the next day he maintained his acquisition. A more serious -action occurred on the 23d in front of Arcangues. This village held -by the picquets of the light division was two or three miles in -front of Arbonne where the nearest support was cantoned. It is built -on the centre of a crescent-shaped ridge, and the sentries of both -armies were so close that the reliefs and patroles actually passed -each other in their rounds, so that a surprise was inevitable if it -suited either side to attempt it. Lord Wellington visited this post -and the field-officer on duty made known to him its disadvantages, -and the means of remedying them by taking entire possession of the -village, pushing picquets along the horns of the crescent, and -establishing a chain of posts across the valley between them. He -appeared satisfied with this project, and two days afterwards the -forty-third and some of the riflemen were employed to effect it, the -greatest part of the division being brought up in support. The French -after a few shots abandoned Arcangues, Bussussary, and both horns -of the crescent, retiring before the picquets to a large fortified -house situated at the mouth of the valley. The project suggested -by the field-officer was thus executed with the loss of only five -men wounded and the action should have ceased, but the picquets of -the forty-third suddenly received orders to attack the fortified -house, and the columns of support were shewn at several points of -the semicircle; the French then conceiving they were going to be -seriously assailed reinforced their post; a sharp skirmish ensued and -the picquets were finally withdrawn to the ground they had originally -gained and beyond which they should never have been pushed. This -ill-managed affair cost eighty-eight men and officers of which eighty -were of the forty-third. - -[Sidenote: December.] - -[Sidenote: Original Morning States, MSS.] - -Lord Wellington, whose powerful artillery and cavalry, the former -consisting of nearly one hundred field-pieces and the latter -furnishing more than eight thousand six hundred sabres, were -paralysed in the contracted space he occupied, was now anxious to -pass the Nive, but the rain which continued to fall baffled him, and -meanwhile Mina’s Spaniards descending once more from the Alduides to -plunder Baigorry were beaten by the national guards of that valley. -However early in December the weather amended, forty or fifty pieces -of artillery were brought up, and other preparations made to surprize -or force the passage of the Nive at Cambo and Ustaritz. And as this -operation led to sanguinary battles it is fitting first to describe -the exact position of the French. - -[Sidenote: Plans 7 and 8.] - -Bayonne situated at the confluence of the Nive and the Adour -commands the passage of both. A weak fortress of the third order its -importance was in its position, and its entrenched camp, exceedingly -strong and commanded by the fortress could not be safely attacked -in front, wherefore Soult kept only six divisions there. His right -composed of Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s reserve touched -on the Lower Adour where there was a flotilla of gun-boats. It was -covered by a swamp and artificial inundation, through which the -royal road led to St. Jean de Luz, and the advanced posts, well -entrenched, were pushed forward beyond Anglet on this causeway. His -left under Clauzel, composed of three divisions, extended from Anglet -to the Nive; it was covered partly by the swamp, partly by the large -fortified house which the light division assailed on the 23d, partly -by an inundation spreading below Urdains towards the Nive. Thus -entrenched the fortified outposts may be called the front of battle, -the entrenched camp the second line, and the fortress the citadel. -The country in front a deep clay soil, enclosed and covered with -small wood and farm-houses, was very difficult to move in. - -Beyond the Nive the entrenched camp stretching from that river to -the Adour was called the front of Mousseroles. It was in the keeping -of D’Erlon’s four divisions, which were also extended up the right -bank of the Nive; that is to say, D’Armagnac’s troops was in front -of Ustaritz, and Foy prolonged the line to Cambo. The remainder of -D’Erlon’s corps was in reserve, occupying a strong range of heights -about two miles in front of Mousseroles, the right at Villefranque -on the Nive, the left at Old Moguerre towards the Adour. D’Erlon’s -communications with the rest of the army were double, one circuitous -through Bayonne, the other direct by a bridge of boats thrown above -that place. - -After the battle of the Nivelle Soult brought general Paris’s -division from St. Jean Pied de Port to Lahoussoa close under the -Ursouia mountain, where it was in connection with Foy’s left, -communicating by the great road to St. Jean Pied de Port which ran in -a parallel direction to the river. - -The Nive, the Adour, and the Gave de Pau which falls into the latter -many miles above Bayonne, were all navigable, the first as far as -Ustaritz, the second to Dax, the third to Peyrehorade, and the -great French magazines were collected at the two latter places. But -the army was fed with difficulty, and hence to restrain Soult from -the country beyond the Nive, to intercept his communications with -St. Jean Pied de Port, to bring a powerful cavalry into activity, -and to obtain secret intelligence from the interior of Spain -were Wellington’s inducements to force a passage over the Nive. -Yet to place the troops on both sides of a navigable river with -communications bad at all times and subject to entire interruptions -from rain; to do this in face of an army possessing short -communications good roads and entrenched camps for retreat, was a -delicate and dangerous operation. - -[Sidenote: Original States, MSS.] - -On the 7th orders were issued for forcing the passage on the 9th. -On that day sir John Hope and Charles Alten, with the first, -fifth, and light divisions, the unattached brigades of infantry, -Vandeleur’s cavalry and twelve guns, in all about twenty-four -thousand combatants, were to drive back the French advanced posts -along the whole front of the entrenched camp between the Nive and -the sea. This movement was partly to examine the course of the Lower -Adour with a view to subsequent operations, but principally to make -Soult discover his dispositions of defence on that side, and to -keep his troops in check while Beresford and Hill crossed the Nive. -To support this double operation the fourth and seventh divisions -were secretly brought up from Ascain and Espelette on the 8th, the -latter to the hill of St. Barbe, from whence it detached one brigade -to relieve the posts of the third division. There remained the -second the third and the sixth divisions, Hamilton’s Portuguese, and -Morillo’s Spaniards, for the passage. Beresford leading the third -and sixth reinforced with six guns and a squadron of cavalry, was to -cross at Ustaritz with pontoons, Hill having the second division, -Hamilton’s Portuguese, Vivian’s and Victor Alten’s cavalry, and -fourteen guns, was to ford the river at Cambo and Larressore. Both -generals were then to repair the bridges at these respective points -with materials prepared beforehand; and to cover Hill’s movement on -the right and protect the valley of the Nive from Paris, who being -at Lahoussoa might have penetrated to the rear of the army during -the operations, Morillo’s Spaniards were to cross at Itzassu. At this -time Foy’s division was extended from Halzou in front of Larressore, -to the fords above Cambo, the Ursouia mountain being between his left -and Paris. The rest of D’Erlon’s troops remained on the heights of -Moguerre in front of Mousserolles. - - - PASSAGE OF THE NIVE - AND - BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE. - -[Sidenote: Plans 7 and 8.] - -At Ustaritz the French had broken both bridges, but the island -connecting them was in possession of the British. Beresford laid his -pontoons down on the hither side in the night of the 8th and in the -morning of the 9th a beacon lighted on the heights above Cambo gave -the signal of attack. The passage was immediately forced under the -fire of the artillery, the second bridge was laid, and D’Armagnac’s -brigade was driven back by the sixth division; but the swampy -nature of the country between the river and the high road retarded -the allies’ march and gave the French time to retreat with little -loss. At the same time Hill’s troops, also covered by the fire of -artillery, forced the passage in three columns above and below Cambo -with slight resistance, though the fords were so deep that several -horsemen were drowned, and the French strongly posted, especially at -Halzou where there was a deep and strong mill-race to cross as well -as the river. - -Foy seeing, by the direction of Beresford’s fire, that his retreat -was endangered, retired hastily with his left leaving his right wing -under general Berlier at Halzou without orders. Hence when general -Pringle attacked the latter from Larressore, the sixth division was -already on the high road between Foy and Berlier, who escaped by -cross roads towards Hasparen, but did not rejoin his division until -two o’clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile Morillo crossed at Itzassu, -and Paris retired to Hellette where he was joined by a regiment of -light cavalry belonging to Pierre Soult who was then on the Bidouse -river. Morillo followed, and in one village near Hellette his troops -killed fifteen peasants, amongst them several women and children. - -General Hill having won the passage, placed a brigade of infantry at -Urcurray to cover the bridge of Cambo, and to support the cavalry -which he despatched to scour the roads towards Lahoussoa, St. Jean -Pied de Port, and Hasparen, and to observe Paris and Pierre Soult. -With the rest of his troops he marched to the heights of Lormenthoa -in front of the hills of Moguerre and Villefranque, and was there -joined by the sixth division, the third remaining to cover the -bridge of Ustaritz. It was now about one o’clock, and Soult, coming -hastily from Bayonne, approved of the disposition made by D’Erlon, -and offered battle, his line being extended so as to bar the high -road. D’Armagnac’s brigade which had retired from Ustaritz was now -in advance at Villefranque and a heavy cannonade and skirmish ensued -along the front, but no general attack was made because the deep -roads had retarded the rear of Hill’s columns. However the Portuguese -of the sixth division, descending from Lormenthoa about three -o’clock, drove D’Armagnac’s brigade with sharp fighting and after -one repulse out of Villefranque. A brigade of the second division -was then established in advance connecting Hill’s corps with the -troops in Villefranque. Thus three divisions of infantry, wanting -the brigade left at Urcurray, hemmed up four French divisions; and -as the latter, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, made no -advantage of the broken movements of the allies caused by the deep -roads, the passage of the Nive may be judged a surprize. Wellington -thus far overreached his able adversary, yet he had not trusted to -this uncertain chance alone. - -The French masses falling upon the heads of his columns at Lormenthoa -while the rear was still labouring in the deep roads, might have -caused some disorder, but could not have driven either Hill or -Beresford over the river again, because the third division was close -at hand to reinforce the sixth, and the brigade of the seventh, left -at San Barbe, could have followed by the bridge of Ustaritz, thus -giving the allies the superiority of numbers. The greatest danger -was, that Paris, reinforced by Pierre Soult’s cavalry, should have -returned and fallen either upon Morillo or the brigade left at -Urcurray in the rear, while Soult, reinforcing D’Erlon with fresh -divisions brought from the other side of the Nive, attacked Hill and -Beresford in front. It was to prevent this that Hope and Alten whose -operations are now to be related pressed the enemy on the left bank. - -The first-named general having twelve miles to march from St. Jean de -Luz before he could reach the French works, put his troops in motion -during the night, and about eight o’clock passed between the tanks -in front of Barrouilhet with his right, while his left descended -from the platform of Bidart and crossed the valley towards Biaritz. -The French outposts retired fighting, and Hope sweeping with a half -circle to his right, and being preceded by the fire of his guns and -many skirmishers, arrived in front of the entrenched camp about one -o’clock. His left then rested on the Lower Adour, his centre menaced -a very strong advanced work on the ridge of Beyris beyond Anglet, -and his right was in communication with Alten. That general having -a shorter distance to move, halted about Bussussary and Arcangues -until Hope’s fiery crescent was closing on the French camp, and then -he also advanced, but with the exception of a slight skirmish at -the fortified house there was no resistance. Three divisions, some -cavalry, and the unattached brigades, equal to a fourth division, -sufficed therefore to keep six French divisions in check on this side. - -When evening closed the allies fell back towards their original -positions, but under heavy rain, and with great fatigue to Hope’s -wing, for even the royal road was knee-deep of mud and his troops -were twenty-four hours under arms. The whole day’s fighting cost -about eight hundred men for each side, the loss of the allies being -rather greater on the left bank of the Nive than on the right. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Original Morning States.] - -Wellington’s wings being now divided by the Nive the French general -resolved to fall upon one of them with the whole of his forces -united; and misled by the prisoners who assured him that the third -and fourth divisions were both on the heights of Lormenthoa, he -resolved, being able to assemble his troops with greater facility on -the left of the Nive where also the allies’ front was most extended, -to choose that side for his counter-stroke. The garrison of Bayonne -was eight thousand strong, partly troops of the line partly national -guards, with which he ordered the governor to occupy the entrenched -camp of Mousserolles; then stationing ten gun-boats on the Upper -Adour to watch that river as high as the confluence of the Gave de -Pau, he made D’Erlon file his four divisions over the bridge of boats -between the fortress and Mousserolles, directing him to gain the -camp of Marac and take post behind Clauzel’s corps on the other side -of the river. He thus concentrated nine divisions of infantry and -Villatte’s reserve, a brigade of cavalry and forty guns, furnishing -in all about sixty thousand combatants, including conscripts, to -assail a quarter where the allies, although stronger by one division -than the French general imagined, had yet only thirty thousand -infantry with twenty-four pieces of cannon. - -[Sidenote: Correspondence with the minister of war, MSS.] - -The French marshal’s first design was to burst with his whole army -on the table-land of Bussussary and Arcangues, and then to act as -circumstances should dictate; and he judged so well of his position -that he desired the minister of war to expect good news for the next -day. Indeed the situation of the allies although better than he knew -of gave him some right to anticipate success. On no point was there -any expectation of this formidable counter-attack. Lord Wellington -was on the left of the Nive preparing to assault the heights where he -had last seen the French the evening before. Hope’s troops, with the -exception of Wilson’s Portuguese now commanded by general Campbell -and posted at Barrouilhet, had retired to their cantonments; the -first division was at St. Jean de Luz and Ciboure more than six -miles distant from the outposts; the fifth division was between -those places and Bidart, and all exceedingly fatigued. The light -division had orders to retire from Bussussary to Arbonne a distance -of four miles, and part of the second brigade had already marched, -when fortunately general Kempt, somewhat suspicious of the enemy’s -movements, delayed obedience until he could see what was going on in -his front, he thus as the event proved saved the position. - -The extraordinary difficulty of moving through the country even for -single horsemen, the numerous enclosures and copses which denied -any distinct view, the easy success of the operation to cross the -Nive, and a certain haughty confidence the sure attendant of a long -course of victory, seems to have rendered the English general at -this time somewhat negligent of his own security. Undoubtedly the -troops were not disposed as if a battle was expected. The general -position, composed of two distinct parts was indeed very strong; the -ridge of Barrouilhet could only be attacked along the royal road on -a narrow front between the tanks, and he had directed entrenchments -to be made; but there was only one brigade there, and a road made -with difficulty by the engineers supplied a bad flank communication -with the light division. This Barrouilhet ridge was prolonged to -the platform of Bussussary, but in its winding bulged out too near -the enemy’s works in the centre to be safely occupied in force, and -behind it there was a deep valley or basin extending to Arbonne. - -The ridge of Arcangues on the other side of this basin was the -position of battle for the centre. Three tongues of land shot out -from this part to the front, and the valleys between them as well as -their slopes were covered with copse-woods almost impenetrable. The -church of Arcangues, a gentleman’s house, and parts of the village, -furnished rallying points of defence for the picquets, which were -necessarily numerous because of the extent of front. At this time the -left-hand ridge or tongue of land was occupied by the fifty-second -regiment which had also posts in the great basin separating the -Arcangues position from that of Barrouilhet; the central tongue was -held by the picquets of the forty-third with supporting companies -placed in succession towards Bussussary, where was an open common -across which troops in retreat would have to pass to the church of -Arcangues. The third tongue was guarded, partly by the forty-third, -partly by the riflemen, but the valley between was not occupied, and -the picquets on the extreme right extended to an inundation, across a -narrow part of which, near the house of the senator Garrat, there was -a bridge: the facility for attack was there however small. - -One brigade of the seventh division continued this line of posts to -the Nive, holding the bridge of Urdains, the rest of the division was -behind San Barbe and belonged rather to Ustaritz than to this front. -The fourth division was several miles behind the right of the light -division. - -In this state of affairs if Soult had, as he first designed, burst -with his whole army upon Bussussary and Arcangues it would have been -impossible for the light division, scattered as it was over such an -extent of difficult ground, to have stopped him for half an hour; and -there was no support within several miles, no superior officer to -direct the concentration of the different divisions. Lord Wellington -had indeed ordered all the line to be entrenched, but the works -were commenced on a great scale, and, as is common when danger does -not spur, the soldiers had laboured so carelessly that beyond a few -abbatis, the tracing of some lines and redoubts, and the opening of a -road of communication, the ground remained in its natural state. The -French general would therefore quickly have gained the broad open -hills beyond Arcangues, separated the fourth and seventh divisions -from the light division, and cut them off from Hope. Soult however, -in the course of the night, for reasons which I do not find stated, -changed his project, and at day-break Reille marched with Boyer’s and -Maucune’s divisions, Sparre’s cavalry and from twenty to thirty guns -against Hope by the main road. He was followed by Foy and Villatte, -but Clauzel assembled his troops under cover of the ridges near -the fortified house in front of Bussussary, and one of D’Erlon’s -divisions approached the bridge of Urdains. - -_Combat of the 10th._—A heavy rain fell in the night yet the morning -broke fair, and soon after dawn the French infantry were observed by -the picquets of the forty-third pushing each other about as if at -gambols, yet lining by degrees the nearest ditches; a general officer -was also seen behind a farm-house close to the sentinels, and at the -same time the heads of columns could be perceived in the rear. Thus -warned some companies of the forty-third were thrown on the right -into the basin to prevent the enemy from penetrating that way to the -small plain between Bussussary and Arcangues. General Kempt was with -the picquets, and his foresight in delaying his march to Arbonne now -saved the position, for he immediately placed the reserves of his -brigade in the church and mansion-house of Arcangues. Meanwhile the -French breaking forth with loud cries, and a rattling musquetry, fell -at a running pace upon the picquets of the forty-third both on the -tongue and in the basin, and a cloud of skirmishers descending on -their left, penetrating between them and the fifty-second regiment, -sought to turn both. The right tongue was in like manner assailed and -at the same time the picquets at the bridge near Garrat’s house were -driven back. - -The assault was so strong and rapid, the enemy so numerous, and the -ground so extensive, that it would have been impossible to have -reached the small plain beyond Bussussary in time to regain the -church of Arcangues if any serious resistance had been attempted; -wherefore delivering their fire at pistol-shot distance the -picquets fell back in succession, and never were the steadiness and -intelligence of veteran soldiers more eminently displayed; for though -it was necessary to run at full speed to gain the small plain before -the enemy, who was constantly outflanking the line of posts by the -basin, though the ways were so deep and narrow that no formation -could be preserved, though the fire of the French was thick and -close, and their cries vehement as they rushed on in pursuit, the -instant the open ground at Bussussary was attained, the apparently -disordered crowd of fugitives became a compact and well-formed body -defying and deriding the fruitless efforts of their adversaries. - -The fifty-second being about half a mile to the left, though only -slightly assailed fell back also to the main ridge, for though the -closeness of the country did not permit colonel Colborne to observe -the strength of the enemy he could see the rapid retreat of the -forty-third, and thence judging how serious the affair was, so well -did the regiments of the light division understand each other’s -qualities, withdrew his outposts to secure the main position. And in -good time he did so. - -On the right-hand tongue the troops were not so fortunate, for -whether they delayed their retreat too long, or that the country was -more intricate, the enemy moving by the basin, reached Bussussary -before the rear arrived, and about a hundred of the forty-third and -riflemen were thus intercepted. The French were in a hollow road and -careless, never doubting that the officer of the forty-third, ensign -Campbell, a youth scarcely eighteen years of age, would surrender; -but he with a shout broke into their column sword in hand, and though -the struggle was severe and twenty of the forty-third and thirty -of the riflemen with their officer remained prisoners, reached the -church with the rest. - -D’Armagnac’s division of D’Erlon’s corps now pushed close up to the -bridge of Urdains, and Clauzel assembled his three divisions by -degrees at Bussussary, opening meanwhile a sharp fire of musquetry. -The position was however safe. The mansion-house on the right, -covered by abbatis and not easily accessible, was defended by a -rifle battalion and the Portuguese. The church and church-yard -were occupied by the forty-third who were supported with two -mountain-guns, their front being covered by a declivity of thick -copse-wood, filled with riflemen, and only to be turned by narrow -hollow roads leading on each side to the church. On the left the -fifty-second now supported by the remainder of the division, spread -as far as the great basin which separated the right wing from the -ridge of Barrouilhet, towards which some small posts were pushed, but -there was still a great interval between Alten’s and Hope’s positions. - -The skirmishing fire grew hot, Clauzel brought up twelve guns to the -ridge of Bussussary, with which he threw shot and shells into the -church-yard of Arcangues, and four or five hundred infantry then made -a rush forwards, but a heavy fire from the forty-third sent them -back over the ridge where their guns were posted. Yet the practice -of the latter, well directed at first, would have been murderous if -this musquetry from the church-yard had not made the French gunners -withdraw their pieces a little behind the ridge, which caused their -shot to fly wild and high. General Kempt thinking the distance too -great, was at first inclined to stop this fire, but the moment -it lulled the French gunners pushed their pieces forwards again -and their shells knocked down eight men in an instant. The small -arms then recommenced and the shells again flew high. The French -were in like manner kept at bay by the riflemen in the village and -mansion-house, and the action, hottest where the fifty-second fought, -continued all day. It was not very severe but it has been noticed -in detail because both French and English writers, misled perhaps -by an inaccurate phrase in the public despatch, have represented it -as a desperate attack by which the light division was driven into -its entrenchments, whereas it was the picquets only that were forced -back, there were no entrenchments save those made on the spur of the -moment by the soldiers in the church-yard, and the French can hardly -be said to have attacked at all. The real battle was at Barrouilhet. - -On that side Reille advancing with two divisions about nine o’clock, -drove Campbell’s Portuguese from Anglet, and Sparre’s cavalry -charging during the fight cut down a great many men. The French -infantry then assailed the ridge at Barrouilhet, but moving along -a narrow ridge and confined on each flank by the tanks, only two -brigades could get into action by the main road, and the rain of -the preceding night had rendered all the bye-roads so deep that it -was mid-day before the French line of battle was filled. This delay -saved the allies, for the attack here also was so unexpected, that -the first division and lord Aylmer’s brigade were at rest in St. -Jean de Luz and Bidart when the action commenced. The latter did not -reach the position before eleven o’clock; the foot-guards did not -march from St. Jean until after twelve, and only arrived at three -o’clock in the afternoon when the fight was done; all the troops -were exceedingly fatigued, only ten guns could be brought into play, -and from some negligence part of the infantry were at first without -ammunition. - -Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division first arrived to support -Campbell’s Portuguese, and fight the battle. The French spread their -skirmishers along the whole valley in front of Biaritz, but their -principal effort was directed by the great road and against the -platform of Barrouilhet about the mayor’s house, where the ground -was so thick of hedges and coppice-wood that a most confused fight -took place. The assailants cutting ways through the hedges poured -on in smaller or larger bodies as the openings allowed, and were -immediately engaged with the defenders; at some points they were -successful at others beaten back, and few knew what was going on to -the right or left of where they stood. By degrees Reille engaged both -his divisions, and some of Villatte’s reserve also entered the fight, -and then Bradford’s Portuguese and lord Aylmer’s brigade arrived on -the allies’ side, which enabled colonel Greville’s brigade of the -fifth division, hitherto kept in reserve, to relieve Robinson’s; -that general was however dangerously wounded and his troops suffered -severely. - -[Sidenote: Manuscript note by lieutenant-general sir John Cameron.] - -And now a very notable action was performed by the ninth regiment -under colonel Cameron. This officer was on the extreme left of -Greville’s brigade, Robinson’s being then shifted in second line -and towards the right, Bradford’s brigade was at the mayor’s house -some distance to the left of the ninth regiment, and the space -between was occupied by a Portuguese battalion. There was in front of -Greville’s brigade a thick hedge, but immediately opposite the ninth -was a coppice-wood possessed by the enemy, whose skirmishers were -continually gathering in masses and rushing out as if to assail the -line, they were as often driven back, yet the ground was so broken -that nothing could be seen beyond the flanks and when some time had -passed in this manner, Cameron, who had received no orders, heard a -sudden firing along the main road close to his left. His adjutant -was sent to look out and returned immediately with intelligence -that there was little fighting on the road, but a French regiment, -which must have passed unseen in small bodies through the Portuguese -between the ninth and the mayor’s house, was rapidly filing into line -on the rear. The fourth British regiment was then in close column at -a short distance, and its commander colonel Piper was directed by -Cameron to face about, march to the rear, and then bring up his left -shoulder when he would infallibly fall in with the French regiment. -Piper marched, but whether he misunderstood the order, took a wrong -direction, or mistook the enemy for Portuguese, he passed them. -No firing was heard, the adjutant again hurried to the rear, and -returned with intelligence that the fourth regiment was not to be -seen, but the enemy’s line was nearly formed. Cameron leaving fifty -men to answer the skirmishing fire which now increased from the -copse, immediately faced about and marched in line against the new -enemy, who was about his own strength, as fast as the rough nature of -the ground would permit. The French fire, slow at first, increased -vehemently as the distance lessened, but when the ninth, coming -close up, sprung forwards to the charge the adverse line broke and -fled to the flanks in the utmost disorder. Those who made for their -own right brushed the left of Greville’s brigade, and even carried -off an officer of the royals in their rush, yet the greatest number -were made prisoners, and the ninth having lost about eighty men and -officers resumed their old ground. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -The final result of the battle at Barrouilhet was the repulse of -Reille’s divisions, but Villatte still menaced the right flank, and -Foy, taking possession of the narrow ridge connecting Bussussary with -the platform of Barrouilhet, threw his skirmishers into the great -basin leading to Arbonne, and connecting his right with Reille’s left -menaced Hope’s flank at Barrouilhet. This was about two o’clock, -Soult, whose columns were now all in hand gave orders to renew the -battle, and his masses were beginning to move when Clauzel reported -that a large body of fresh troops, apparently coming from the other -side of the Nive, was menacing D’Armagnac’s division from the -heights above Urdains. Unable to account for this, Soult, who saw -the guards and Germans moving up fast from St. Jean de Luz and all -the unattached brigades already in line, hesitated, suspended his -own attack, and ordered D’Erlon, who had two divisions in reserve, -to detach one to the support of D’Armagnac: before this disposition -could be completed the night fell. - -The fresh troops seen by Clauzel were the third fourth sixth and -seventh divisions, whose movements during the battle it is time -to notice. When lord Wellington, who remained on the right of the -Nive during the night of the 9th, discovered at daybreak, that the -French had abandoned the heights in Hill’s front, he directed that -officer to occupy them, and push parties close up to the entrenched -camp of Mousseroles while his cavalry spread beyond Hasparen and up -the Adour. Meanwhile, the cannonade on the left bank of the Nive -being heard, he repaired in person to that side, first making the -third and sixth divisions repass the river, and directing Beresford -to lay another bridge of communication lower down the Nive, near -Villefranque, to shorten the line of movement. When he reached the -left of the Nive and saw how the battle stood, he made the seventh -division close to the left from the hill of San Barbe, placed the -third division at Urdains, and brought up the fourth division to -an open heathy ridge on a hill about a mile behind the church of -Arcangues. From this point general Cole sent Ross’s brigade down into -the basin on the left of Colborne, to cover Arbonne, being prepared -himself to march with his whole division if the enemy attempted to -penetrate in force between Hope and Alten. These dispositions were -for the most part completed about two o’clock, and thus Clauzel was -held in check at Bussussary, and the renewed attack by Foy, Villatte, -and Reille’s divisions on Barrouilhet prevented. - -This day’s battle cost the Anglo-Portuguese more than twelve hundred -men killed and wounded, two generals were amongst the latter and -about three hundred men were made prisoners. The French had one -general, Villatte, wounded, and lost about two thousand men, but when -the action terminated two regiments of Nassau and one of Frankfort, -the whole under the command of a colonel Kruse, came over to the -allies. These men were not deserters. Their prince having abandoned -Napoleon in Germany sent secret instructions to his troops to do so -likewise, and in good time, for orders to disarm them reached Soult -the next morning. The generals on each side, the one hoping to profit -the other to prevent mischief, immediately transmitted notice of -the event to Catalonia where several regiments of the same nations -were serving. Lord Wellington failed for reasons to be hereafter -mentioned, but Suchet disarmed his Germans with reluctance thinking -they could be trusted, and the Nassau troops at Bayonne were perhaps -less influenced by patriotism than by an old quarrel; for when -belonging to the army of the centre they had forcibly foraged Soult’s -district early in the year, and carried off the spoil in defiance of -his authority, which gave rise to bitter disputes at the time and was -probably not forgotten by him. - -_Combat of the 11th._—In the night of the 10th Reille withdrew -behind the tanks as far as Pucho, Foy and Villatte likewise drew -back along the connecting ridge towards Bussussary, thus uniting -with Clauzel’s left and D’Erlon’s reserve, so that on the morning -of the 11th the French army, with the exception of D’Armagnac’s -division which remained in front of Urdains, was concentrated, for -Soult feared a counter-attack. The French deserters indeed declared -that Clauzel had formed a body of two thousand choice grenadiers -to assault the village and church of Arcangues, but the day passed -without any event in that quarter save a slight skirmish in which a -few men were wounded. Not so on the side of Barrouilhet. There was a -thick fog, and lord Wellington, desirous to ascertain what the French -were about, directed the ninth regiment about ten o’clock to open a -skirmish beyond the tanks towards Pucho, and to push the action if -the French augmented their force. Cameron did so and the fight was -becoming warm, when colonel Delancy, a staff-officer, rashly directed -the ninth to enter the village. The error was soon and sharply -corrected, for the fog cleared up, and Soult, who had twenty-four -thousand men at that point, observing the ninth unsupported, ordered -a counter-attack which was so strong and sudden that Cameron only -saved his regiment with the aid of some Portuguese troops hastily -brought up by sir John Hope. The fighting then ceased and lord -Wellington went to the right, leaving Hope with orders to push back -the French picquets and re-establish his former outposts on the -connecting ridge towards Bussussary. - -Soult had hitherto appeared undecided, but roused by this second -insult, he ordered Darricau’s division to attack Barrouilhet along -the connecting ridge, while Boyer’s division fell on by the main -road between the tanks. This was about two o’clock and the allies -expecting no battle had dispersed to gather fuel, for the time was -wet and cold. In an instant the French penetrated in all directions, -they outflanked the right, they passed the tanks, seized the -out-buildings of the mayor’s house, and occupied the coppice in -front of it; they were indeed quickly driven from the out-buildings -by the royals, but the tumult was great and the coppice was filled -with men of all nations intermixed and fighting in a perilous manner. -Robinson’s brigade was very hardly handled, the officer commanding -it was wounded, a squadron of French cavalry suddenly cut down some -of the Portuguese near the wood, and on the right the colonel of the -eighty-fourth having unwisely engaged his regiment in a hollow road -where the French possessed the high bank, was killed with a great -number of men. However the ninth regiment posted on the main road -plied Boyer’s flank with fire, the eighty-fifth regiment of lord -Aylmer’s brigade came into action, and sir John Hope conspicuous from -his gigantic stature and heroic courage, was seen wherever danger -pressed rallying and encouraging the troops; at one time he was in -the midst of the enemy, his clothes were pierced with bullets, and -he received a severe wound in the ankle, yet he would not quit the -field and by his great presence of mind and calm intrepidity restored -the battle. The French were finally beaten back from the position -of Barrouilhet yet they had recovered their original posts, and -continued to gall the allies with a fire of shot and shells until the -fall of night. The total loss in this fight was about six hundred men -of a side, and as the fifth division was now considerably reduced -in numbers the first division took its place on the front line. -Meanwhile Soult sent his cavalry over the Nive to Mousseroles to -check the incursions of Hill’s horsemen. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Despatches, MSS.] - -_Combat of the 12th._—The rain fell heavily in the night, and though -the morning broke fair neither side seemed inclined to recommence -hostilities. The advanced posts were however very close to each -other and about ten o’clock a misunderstanding arose. The French -general observing the fresh regiments of the first division close -to his posts, imagined the allies were going to attack him and -immediately reinforced his front; this movement causing an English -battery to fall into a like error it opened upon the advancing French -troops, and in an instant the whole line of posts was engaged. Soult -then brought up a number of guns, the firing continued without an -object for many hours, and three or four hundred men of a side -were killed and wounded, but the great body of the French army -remained concentrated and quiet on the ridge between Barrouilhet and -Bussussary. - -Lord Wellington as early as the 10th had expected Soult would abandon -this attack to fall upon Hill, and therefore had given Beresford -orders to carry the sixth division to that general’s assistance by -the new bridge and the seventh division by Ustaritz, without waiting -for further instructions, if Hill was assailed; now observing Soult’s -tenacity at Barrouilhet he drew the seventh division towards Arbonne. -Beresford had however made a movement towards the Nive, and this with -the march of the seventh division and some changes in the position -of the fourth division, caused Soult to believe the allies were -gathering with a view to attack his centre on the morning of the -13th; and it is remarkable that the deserters at this early period -told him the Spaniards had re-entered France although orders to that -effect were not as we shall find given until the next day. Convinced -then that his bolt was shot on the left of the Nive, he left two -divisions and Villatte’s reserve in the entrenched camp, and marched -with the other seven to Mousseroles intending to fall upon Hill. - -That general had pushed his scouting parties to the Gambouri, and -when general Sparre’s horsemen arrived at Mousseroles on the 12th, -Pierre Soult advanced from the Bidouze with all the light cavalry. -He was supported by the infantry of general Paris and drove the -allies’ posts from Hasparen. Colonel Vivian, who commanded there, -immediately ordered major Brotherton to charge with the fourteenth -dragoons across the bridge, but it was an ill-judged order, and -the impossibility of succeeding so manifest, that when Brotherton, -noted throughout the army for his daring, galloped forward, only -two men and one subaltern, lieutenant Southwell, passed the narrow -bridge with him, and they were all taken. Vivian then seeing his -error charged with his whole brigade to rescue them, yet in vain, he -was forced to fall back upon Urcuray where Morillo’s Spaniards had -relieved the British infantry brigade on the 11th. This threatening -movement induced general Hill to put the British brigade in march -again for Urcuray on the 12th, but he recalled it at sunset, having -then discovered Soult’s columns passing the Nive by the boat-bridge -above Bayonne. - -Lord Wellington now feeling the want of numbers, brought forward a -division of Gallicians to St. Jean de Luz, and one of Andalusians -from the Bastan to Itzassu, and to prevent their plundering fed them -from the British magazines. The Gallicians were to support Hope, the -Andalusians to watch the upper valley of the Nive and protect the -rear of the army from Paris and Pierre Soult, who could easily be -reinforced with a strong body of national guards. Meanwhile Hill had -taken a position of battle on a front of two miles. - -His left, composed of the twenty-eighth, thirty-fourth, and -thirty-ninth regiments under general Pringle, occupied a wooded and -broken range crowned by the chateau of Villefranque; it covered the -new pontoon bridge of communication, which was a mile and a half -higher up the river, but it was separated from the centre by a small -stream forming a chain of ponds in a very deep and marshy valley. - -[Sidenote: Plan 8.] - -The centre placed on both sides of the high road near the hamlet of -St. Pierre, occupied a crescent-shaped height, broken with rocks and -close brushwood on the left hand, and on the right hand enclosed -with high and thick hedges, one of which, covering, at the distance -of a hundred yards, part of the line, was nearly impassable. Here -Ashworth’s Portuguese and Barnes’s British brigade of the second -division were posted. The seventy-first regiment was on the left, the -fiftieth in the centre, the ninety-second on the right. Ashworth’s -Portuguese were posted in advance immediately in front of St. Pierre, -and their skirmishers occupied a small wood covering their right. -Twelve guns under the colonels Ross and Tullock were concentrated in -front of the centre, looking down the great road, and half a mile in -rear of this point Lecor’s Portuguese division was stationed with two -guns as a reserve. - -The right under Byng was composed of the third, fifty-seventh, -thirty-first, and sixty-sixth. One of these regiments, the third, -was posted on a height running nearly parallel with the Adour called -the ridge of Partouhiria, or Old Moguerre, because a village of -that name was situated upon the summit. This regiment was pushed in -advance to a point where it could only be approached by crossing the -lower part of a narrow swampy valley which separated Moguerre from -the heights of St. Pierre. The upper part of this valley was held by -Byng with the remainder of his brigade, and his post was well covered -by a mill-pond leading towards the enemy and nearly filling all the -valley. - -One mile in front of St. Pierre was a range of counter heights -belonging to the French, but the basin between was broad open and -commanded in every part by the fire of the allies, and in all parts -the country was too heavy and too much enclosed for the action of -cavalry. Nor could the enemy approach in force, except on a narrow -front of battle and by the high road, until within cannon-shot, when -two narrow difficult lanes branched off to the right and left, and -crossing the swampy valleys on each side, led, the one to the height -where the third regiment was posted on the extreme right of the -allies, the other to general Pringle’s position on the left. - -[Sidenote: Appendix 7, sect. 4.] - -In the night of the 12th the rain swelled the Nive and carried away -the allies’ bridge of communication. It was soon restored, but on the -morning of the 13th general Hill was completely cut off from the rest -of the army; and while seven French divisions of infantry, furnishing -at least thirty-five thousand combatants, approached him in front, an -eighth under general Paris and the cavalry division of Pierre Soult -menaced him in rear. To meet the French in his front he had less than -fourteen thousand, men and officers with fourteen guns in position; -and there were only four thousand Spaniards with Vivian’s cavalry at -Urcuray. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 8.] - -_Battle of St. Pierre._—The morning broke with a heavy mist under -cover of which Soult formed his order of battle. D’Erlon, having -D’Armagnac’s Abbé’s and Daricau’s divisions of infantry, Sparre’s -cavalry and twenty-two guns, marched in front; he was followed -by Foy and Maransin, but the remainder of the French army was in -reserve, for the roads would not allow of any other order. The mist -hung heavily and the French masses, at one moment quite shrouded in -vapour, at another dimly seen or looming sudden and large and dark at -different points, appeared like thunder-clouds gathering before the -storm. At half-past eight Soult pushed back the British picquets in -the centre, the sun burst out at that moment, the sparkling fire of -the light troops spread wide in the valley, and crept up the hills -on either flank, while the bellowing of forty pieces of artillery -shook the banks of the Nive and the Adour. Darricau marching on the -French right was directed against general Pringle. D’Armagnac, moving -on their left and taking Old Moguerre as the point of direction, -was ordered to force Byng’s right. Abbé assailed the centre at St. -Pierre, where general Stewart commanded, for sir Rowland Hill had -taken his station on a commanding mount in the rear, from whence he -could see the whole battle and direct the movements. - -Abbé, a man noted for vigour, pushed his attack with great violence -and gained ground so rapidly with his light troops, on the left of -Ashworth’s Portuguese, that Stewart sent the seventy-first regiment -and two guns from St. Pierre to the latter’s aid; the French -skirmishers likewise won the small wood on Ashworth’s right, and -half of the fiftieth regiment was also detached from St. Pierre to -that quarter. The wood was thus retaken, and the flanks of Stewart’s -position secured, but his centre was very much weakened, and the -fire of the French artillery was concentrated against it. Abbé then -pushed on a column of attack there with such a power that in despite -of the play of musquetry on his flanks and a crashing cannonade in -his front, he gained the top of the position, and drove back the -remainder of Ashworth’s Portuguese and the other half of the fiftieth -regiment which had remained in reserve. - -General Barnes who had still the ninety-second regiment in hand -behind St. Pierre, immediately brought it on with a strong -counter-attack. The French skirmishers fell back on each side -leaving two regiments composing the column to meet the charge of the -ninety-second; it was rough and pushed home, the French mass wavered -and gave way. Abbé immediately replaced it and Soult redoubling the -heavy play of his guns from the height he occupied, sent forward -a battery of horse artillery which galloping down into the valley -opened its fire close to the allies with most destructive activity. -The cannonade and musquetry rolled like a prolonged peal of thunder, -and the second French column, regardless of Ross’s guns, though -they tore the ranks in a horrible manner, advanced so steadily -up the high road that the ninety-second yielding to the tempest -slowly regained its old position behind St. Pierre. The Portuguese -guns, their British commanding officer having fallen wounded, -then limbered up to retire and the French skirmishers reached the -impenetrable hedge in front of Ashworth’s right. General Barnes now -seeing that hard fighting only could save the position, made the -Portuguese guns resume their fire, and the wing of the fiftieth and -the Caçadores gallantly held the small wood on the right; but Barnes -was soon wounded, the greatest part of his and general Stewart’s -staff were hurt, and the matter seemed desperate. For the light -troops overpowered by numbers were all driven in except those in the -wood, the artillerymen were falling at the guns, Ashworth’s line of -Portuguese crumbled away rapidly before the musquetry and cannonade, -the ground was strewed with the dead in front, and the wounded -crawling to the rear were many. - -If the French light troops could then have penetrated through the -thick hedge in front of the Portuguese, defeat would have been -inevitable on this point, for the main column of attack still -steadily advanced up the main road, and a second column launched -on its right was already victorious, because the colonel of the -seventy-first had shamefully withdrawn that gallant regiment -out of action and abandoned the Portuguese. Pringle was indeed -fighting strongly against Daricau’s superior numbers on the hill -of Villefranque, but on the extreme right the colonel of the third -regiment had also abandoned his strong post to D’Armagnac, whose -leading brigade was thus rapidly turning Byng’s other regiments -on that side. And now Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions, hitherto -retarded by the deep roads, were coming into line ready to support -Abbé, and this at the moment when the troops opposed to him were -deprived of their reserve. For when general Hill beheld the retreat -of the third and seventy-first regiments he descended in haste from -his mount, met, and turned the latter back to renew the fight, and -then in person leading one brigade of Le Cor’s reserve division -to the same quarter sent the other against D’Armagnac on the hill -of Old Moguerre. Thus at the decisive moment of the battle the -French reserve was augmented and that of the allies thrown as a last -resource into action. However the right wing of the fiftieth and -Ashworth’s Caçadores, both spread as skirmishers, never lost the -small wood in front, upholding the fight there and towards the high -road with such unflinching courage that the ninety-second regiment -had time to reform behind the hamlet of St. Pierre. Then its gallant -colonel Cameron once more led it down the road with colours flying -and music playing resolved to give the shock to whatever stood in the -way. At this sight the British skirmishers on the flanks, suddenly -changing from retreat to attack, rushed forward and drove those of -the enemy back on each side; yet the battle seemed hopeless for -Ashworth was badly wounded, his line was shattered to atoms, and -Barnes who had not quitted the field for his former hurt was now shot -through the body. - -[Sidenote: Published Memoir on the battle by captain Pringle, -engineers.] - -The ninety-second was but a small body compared with the heavy mass -in its front, and the French soldiers seemed willing enough to close -with the bayonet; but an officer riding at their head suddenly -turned his horse waved his sword and appeared to order a retreat, -then they faced about and immediately retired across the valley to -their original position, in good order however and scarcely pursued -by the allies, so exhausted were the victors. This retrograde -movement, for there was no panic or disorder, was produced partly by -the gallant advance of the ninety-second and the returning rush of -the skirmishers, partly by the state of affairs immediately on the -right of the French column. For the seventy-first indignant at their -colonel’s conduct had returned to the fight with such alacrity, and -were so well aided by Le Cor’s Portuguese, generals Hill and Stewart -each in person leading an attack, that the hitherto victorious French -were overthrown there also in the very moment when the ninety-second -came with such a brave shew down the main road: Le Cor was however -wounded. - -This double action in the centre being seen from the hill of -Villefranque, Daricau’s division, already roughly handled by -Pringle, fell back in confusion; and meantime on the right, Buchan’s -Portuguese, detached by Hill to recover the Moguerre or Partouhiria -ridge, crossed the valley, and ascending under a heavy flank fire -from Soult’s guns rallied the third regiment; in happy time, for -D’Armagnac’s first brigade having already passed the flank of Byng’s -regiments at the mill-pond was actually in rear of the allies’ lines. -It was now twelve o’clock, and while the fire of the light troops in -the front and the cannonade in the centre continued the contending -generals restored their respective orders of battle. Soult’s right -wing had been quite repulsed by Pringle, his left was giving way -before Buchan, and the difficult ground forbad his sending immediate -succour to either; moreover in the exigency of the moment he had -called D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to sustain Abbé’s retiring -columns. However that brigade and Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions were -in hand to renew the fight in the centre, and the allies could not, -unsuccoured, have sustained a fresh assault; for their ranks were -wasted with fire, nearly all the staff had been killed or wounded, -and three generals had quitted the field badly hurt. - -In this crisis general Hill seeing that Buchan was now well and -successfully engaged on the Partouhiria ridge, and that Byng’s -regiments were quite masters of their ground in the valley of the -mill-pond, drew the fifty-seventh regiment from the latter place to -reinforce his centre. At the same time the bridge above Villefranque -having been restored, the sixth division, which had been marching -since daybreak, appeared in order of battle on the mount from -whence Hill had descended to rally the seventy-first. It was soon -followed by the fourth division, and that again by the brigades -of the third division; two other brigades of the seventh division -were likewise in march. With the first of these troops came lord -Wellington who had hurried from Barrouilhet when the first sound of -the cannon reached him, yet he arrived only to witness the close of -the battle, the crisis was past, Hill’s day of glory was complete. -Soult had, according to the French method, made indeed another -attack, or rather demonstration, against the centre, to cover his -new dispositions, an effort easily repulsed, but at the same moment -Buchan drove D’Armagnac headlong off the Partouhiria ridge. The sixth -division then appeared on the commanding mount in the rear of St. -Pierre, and though the French masses still maintained a menacing -position on the high road, and on a hillock rising between the road -and the mill-pond, they were quickly dispossessed. For the English -general being now supported by the sixth division, sent Byng with -two battalions against the hillock, and some troops from the centre -against those on the high road. At this last point the generals -and staff had been so cut down that colonel Currie, the aid-de-camp -who brought the order, could find no superior officer to deliver it -to and led the troops himself to the attack, but both charges were -successful; and two guns of the light battery sent down in the early -part of the fight by Soult, and which had played without ceasing up -to this moment, were taken. - -The battle now abated to a skirmish of light troops, under cover of -which the French endeavoured to carry off their wounded and rally -their stragglers, but at two o’clock lord Wellington commanded -a general advance of the whole line. Then the French retreated -fighting, and the allies following close on the side of the Nive -plied them with musquetry until dark. Yet they maintained their line -towards the Adour, for Sparre’s cavalry passing out that way rejoined -Pierre Soult on the side of Hasparen. This last-named general and -Paris had during the day menaced Morillo and Vivian’s cavalry at -Urcuray, however not more than thirty men of a side were hurt, and -when Soult’s ill success became known the French retired to Bonloc. - -[Sidenote: Lapene.] - -In this bloody action Soult had designed to employ seven divisions of -infantry with one brigade of cavalry on the front, and one brigade -of infantry with a division of cavalry on the rear; but the state -of the roads and the narrow front he was forced to move upon did -not permit more than five divisions to act at St. Pierre, and only -half of those were seriously engaged. His loss was certainly three -thousand, making a total on the five days’ fighting of six thousand -men with two generals, Villatte and Maucomble, wounded. The estimate -made by the British at the time far exceeded this number, and one -French writer makes their loss ten thousand including probably the -Nassau and Frankfort regiments. The same writer however estimates the -loss of the allies at sixteen thousand! Whereas Hill had only three -generals and about fifteen hundred men killed and wounded on the 13th -and Morillo lost but twenty-six men at Urcuray. The real loss of the -allies in the whole five days’ fighting was only five thousand and -nineteen, including however five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes, -Lecor, and Ashworth. Of this number five hundred were prisoners. - -The duke of Dalmatia, baffled by the unexpected result of the battle -of St. Pierre, left D’Erlon’s three divisions in front of the camp of -Mousseroles, sent two others over the Nive to Marac, and passing the -Adour himself during the night with Foy’s division, spread it along -the right bank of that river as far as the confluence of the Gave de -Pau. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The French general’s plan was conceived with genius but the -execution offers a great contrast to the conception. What a -difference between the sudden concentration of his whole army on the -platforms of Arcangues and Bussussary, where there were only a few -picquets to withstand him, and from whence he could have fallen with -the roll of an avalanche upon any point of the allies’ line! what -a difference between that and the petty attack of Clauzel, which a -thousand men of the light division sufficed to arrest at the village -and church of Arcangues. There beyond question was the weak part -of the English general’s cuirass. The spear pushed home there would -have drawn blood. For the disposition and movements of the third -fourth and seventh divisions, were made more with reference to the -support of Hill than to sustain an attack from Soult’s army, and it -is evident that Wellington, trusting to the effect of his victory on -the 10th of November, had treated the French general and his troops, -more contemptuously than he could have justified by arms without -the aid of fortune. I know not what induced marshal Soult to direct -his main attack by Anglet and the connecting ridge of Bussussary, -against Barrouilhet, instead of assailing Arcangues as he at first -proposed; but this is certain, that for three hours after Clauzel -first attacked the picquets at the latter place, there were not -troops enough to stop three French divisions, much less a whole army. -And this point being nearer to the bridge by which D’Erlon passed the -Nive, the concentration of the French troops could have been made -sooner than at Barrouilhet, where the want of unity in the attack -caused by the difficulty of the roads ruined the French combinations. - -The allies were so unexpectant of an attack, that the battle at -Barrouilhet which might have been fought with seventeen thousand men, -was actually fought by ten thousand. And those were not brought into -action at once, for Robinson’s brigade and Campbell’s Portuguese, -favoured by the narrow opening between the tanks, resisted Reille’s -divisions for two hours, and gave time for the rest of the fifth -division and Bradford’s brigade to arrive. But if Foy’s division -and Villatte’s reserve had been able to assail the flank at the -same time, by the ridge coming from Bussussary, the battle would -have been won by the French; and meanwhile three divisions under -Clauzel and two under D’Erlon remained hesitating before Urdains and -Arcangues, for the cannonade and skirmishing at the latter place were -the very marks and signs of indecision. - -2º. On the 11th the inactivity of the French during the morning may -be easily accounted for. The defection of the German regiments, the -necessity of disarming and removing those that remained, the care of -the wounded, and the time required to re-examine the allies’ position -and ascertain what changes had taken place during the night, must -have given ample employment to the French general. His attack in the -afternoon also was well judged because already he must have seen from -the increase of troops in his front, from the intrenched battery and -other works rapidly constructed at the church of Arcangues, that no -decisive success could be expected on the left of the Nive, and that -his best chance was to change his line of attack again to the right -bank. To do this with effect, it was necessary, not only to draw -all lord Wellington’s reserves from the right of the Nive but to be -certain that they had come, and this could only be done by repeating -the attacks at Barrouilhet. The same cause operated on the 12th, -for it was not until the fourth and seventh divisions were seen by -him on the side of Arbonne that he knew his wile had succeeded. Yet -again the execution was below the conception, for first, the bivouac -fires on the ridge of Bussussary were extinguished in the evening, -and then others were lighted on the side of Mousseroles, thus plainly -indicating the march, which was also begun too early, because the -leading division was by Hill seen to pass the bridge of boats before -sun-set. - -These were serious errors yet the duke of Dalmatia’s generalship -cannot be thus fairly tested. There are many circumstances which -combine to prove, that when he complained to the emperor of the -contradictions and obstacles he had to encounter he alluded to -military as well as to political and financial difficulties. It -is a part of human nature to dislike any disturbance of previous -habits, and soldiers are never pleased at first with a general, who -introduces and rigorously exacts a system of discipline differing -from what they have been accustomed to. Its utility must be proved -and confirmed by habit ere it will find favour in their eyes. Now -Soult suddenly assumed the command of troops, who had been long -serving under various generals and were used to much license in -Spain. They were therefore, men and officers, uneasy at being -suddenly subjected to the austere and resolute command of one who, -from natural character as well as the exigency of the times, the war -being now in his own country, demanded a ready and exact obedience, -and a regularity which long habits of a different kind rendered -onerous. Hence we find in all the French writers, and in Soult’s own -reports, manifest proofs that his designs were frequently thwarted or -disregarded by his subordinates when circumstances promised impunity. -His greatest and ablest military combinations were certainly rendered -abortive by the errors of his lieutenants in the first operations to -relieve Pampeluna, and on the 31st of August a manifest negligence -of his earnest recommendations to vigilance led to serious danger -and loss at the passage of the Lower Bidassoa. Complaint and -recrimination were rife in all quarters about the defeat on the 10th -of November, and on the 19th the bridge-head of Cambo was destroyed -contrary to the spirit of his instructions. These things, joined to -the acknowledged jealousy and disputes prevalent amongst the French -generals employed in Spain, would indicate that the discrepancy -between the conception and execution of the operations in front of -Bayonne was not the error of the commander-in-chief. Perhaps king -Joseph’s faction, so inimical to the duke of Dalmatia, was still -powerful in the army and difficult to deal with. - -3º. Lord Wellington has been blamed for putting his troops in a -false position, and no doubt he under-valued, it was not the first -time, the military genius and resources of his able adversary, when -he exposed Hill’s troops on the left of the Nive to a species of -surprize. But the passage of the Nive itself, the rapidity with -which he moved his divisions from bank to bank, and the confidence -with which he relied upon the valour of his troops, so far from -justifying the censures which have been passed upon him by French -writers, emphatically mark his mastery in the art. The stern justice -of sending the Spaniards back into Spain after the battle of the -Nivelle is apparent, but the magnanimity of that measure can only be -understood by considering lord Wellington’s military situation at the -time. The battle of the Nivelle was delivered on political grounds, -but of what avail would his gaining it have been if he had remained -enclosed as it were in a net between the Nive and the sea, Bayonne -and the Pyrenees, unable to open communications with the disaffected -in France, and having the beaten army absolutely forbidding him to -forage or even to look beyond the river on his right. The invasion -of France was not his own operation, it was the project of the -English cabinet and the allied sovereigns; both were naturally -urging him to complete it, and to pass the Nive and free his flanks -was indispensable if he would draw any profit from his victory of -the 10th of November. But he could not pass it with his whole army -unless he resigned the sea-coast and his communications with Spain. -He was therefore to operate with a portion only of his force and -consequently required all the men he could gather to ensure success. -Yet at that crisis he divested himself of twenty-five thousand -Spanish soldiers! - -Was this done in ignorance of the military glory awaiting him beyond -the spot where he stood? - -“_If I had twenty thousand Spaniards paid and fed_,” he wrote to lord -Bathurst, “_I should have Bayonne. If I had forty thousand I do not -know where I should stop. Now I have both the twenty thousand and -the forty thousand, but I have not the means of paying and supplying -them, and if they plunder they will ruin all._” - -Requisitions which the French expected as a part of war would -have enabled him to run this career, but he looked further; he -had promised the people protection and his greatness of mind was -disclosed in a single sentence. “_I must tell your lordship that our -success and every thing depends upon our moderation and justice._” -Rather than infringe on either, he sent the Spaniards to the rear -and passed the Nive with the British and Portuguese only, thus -violating the military rule which forbids a general to disseminate -his troops before an enemy who remains in mass lest he should -be beaten in detail. But genius begins where rules end. A great -general always seeks moral power in preference to physical force. -Wellington’s choice here was between a shameful inactivity or a -dangerous enterprise. Trusting to the influence of his reputation, -to his previous victories, and to the ascendancy of his troops in -the field, he chose the latter, and the result, though he committed -some errors of execution, justified his boldness. He surprised the -passage of the Nive, laid his bridges of communication, and but for -the rain of the night before, which ruined the roads and retarded the -march of Hill’s columns, he would have won the heights of St. Pierre -the same day. Soult could not then have withdrawn his divisions from -the right bank without being observed. Still it was an error to have -the troops on the left bank so unprepared for the battle of the -10th. It was perhaps another error not to have occupied the valley -or basin between Hope and Alten, and surely it was negligence not to -entrench Hill’s position on the 10th, 11th, and 12th. Yet with all -this so brave so hardy so unconquerable were his soldiers that he -was successful at every point, and that is the justification of his -generalship. Hannibal crossed the Alps and descended upon Italy, not -in madness but because he knew himself and his troops. - -[Sidenote: Appendix 7, Sect. 4.] - -4º. It is agreed by French and English that the battle of St. Pierre -was one of the most desperate of the whole war. Lord Wellington -declared that he had never seen a field so thickly strewn with dead, -nor can the vigour of the combatants be well denied where five -thousand men were killed or wounded in three hours upon a space of -one mile square. How then did it happen, valour being so conspicuous -on both sides, that six English and Portuguese brigades, furnishing -less than fourteen thousand men and officers with fourteen guns, were -enabled to withstand seven French divisions, certainly furnishing -thirty-five thousand men and officers with twenty-two guns? The -analysis of this fact shows upon what nice calculations and accidents -war depends. - -If Hill had not observed the French passing their bridge on the -evening of the 12th, and their bivouac fires in the night, Barnes’s -brigade, with which he saved the day, would have been at Urcuray, -and Soult could not have been stopped. But the French general could -only bring five divisions into action, and those only in succession, -so that in fact three divisions or about sixteen thousand men with -twenty-two guns actually fought the battle. Foy’s and Maransin’s -troops did not engage until after the crisis had passed. On the -other hand the proceedings of colonel Peacocke of the seventy-first, -and colonel Bunbury of the third, for which they were both obliged -to quit the service, forced general Hill to carry his reserve away -from the decisive point at that critical period which always occurs -in a well-disputed field and which every great general watches for -with the utmost anxiety. This was no error, it was a necessity, and -the superior military quality of the British troops rendered it -successful. - -[Sidenote: Published Memoir by Captain Pringle of the Royal -Engineers.] - -The French officer who rode at the head of the second attacking -column might be a brave man, doubtless he was; he might be an able -man, but he had not the instinct of a general. On his right flank -indeed Hill’s vigorous counter-attack was successful, but the battle -was to be won in the centre; his column was heavy, undismayed, and -only one weak battalion, the ninety-second, was before it; a short -exhortation, a decided gesture, a daring example, and it would have -overborne the small body in its front, Foy’s, Maransin’s, and the -half of D’Armagnac’s divisions would then have followed in the path -thus marked out. Instead of this he weighed chances and retreated. -How different was the conduct of the British generals, two of whom -and nearly all their staff fell at this point, resolute not to yield -a step at such a critical period; how desperately did the fiftieth -and Portuguese fight to give time for the ninety-second to rally and -reform behind St. Pierre; how gloriously did that regiment come forth -again to charge with their colours flying and their national music -playing as if going to a review. This was to understand war. The man -who in that moment and immediately after a repulse thought of such -military pomp was by nature a soldier. - -I have said that sir Rowland Hill’s employment of his reserve was -no error, it was indeed worthy of all praise. From the commanding -mount on which he stood, he saw at once, that the misconduct of the -two colonels would cause the loss of his position more surely than -any direct attack upon it, and with a promptness and decision truly -military he descended at once to the spot, playing the soldier as -well as the general, rallying the seventy-first and leading the -reserve himself; trusting meanwhile with a noble and well-placed -confidence to the courage of the ninety-second and the fiftieth -to sustain the fight at St. Pierre. He knew indeed that the sixth -division was then close at hand and that the battle might be fought -over again, but like a thorough soldier he was resolved to win his -own fight with his own troops if he could. And he did so after a -manner that in less eventful times would have rendered him the hero -of a nation. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. December.] - -To understand all the importance of the battle of St. Pierre, the -nature of the country and the relative positions of the opposing -generals before and after that action must be considered. Bayonne -although a mean fortress in itself was at this period truly -designated by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks of France. -Covered by its entrenched camp, which the inundations and the deep -country rendered impregnable while there was an army to defend it, -this place could not be assailed until that army was drawn away, -and it was obviously impossible to pass it and leave the enemy to -act upon the communications with Spain and the sea-coast. To force -the French army to abandon Bayonne was therefore lord Wellington’s -object, and his first step was the passage of the Nive; he thus cut -Soult’s direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port, obtained -an intercourse with the malcontents in France, opened a large tract -of fertile country for his cavalry, and menaced the navigation of -the Adour so as to render it difficult for the French general to -receive supplies. This was however but a first step, because the -country beyond the Nive was still the same deep clayey soil with bad -roads; and it was traversed by many rivers more or less considerable, -which flooding with every shower in the mountains, formed in their -concentric courses towards the Adour a number of successive barriers, -behind which Soult could maintain himself on lord Wellington’s right -and hold communication with St. Jean Pied de Port. He could thus -still hem in the allies as before; upon a more extended scale however -and with less effect, for he was thrown more on the defensive, his -line was now the longest, and his adversary possessed the central -position. - -On the other hand, Wellington could not, in that deep impracticable -country, carry on the wide operations necessary to pass the rivers -on his right, and render the French position at Bayonne untenable, -until fine weather hardened the roads, and the winter of 1813 was -peculiarly wet and inclement. - -From this exposition it is obvious that to nourish their own armies -and circumvent their adversaries in that respect were the objects -of both generals, Soult aimed to make Wellington retire into Spain, -Wellington to make Soult abandon Bayonne entirely, or so reduce his -force in the entrenched camp that the works might be stormed. The -French general’s recent losses forbad him to maintain his extended -positions except during the wet season; three days’ fine weather made -him tremble; and the works of his camp were still too unfinished to -leave a small force there. The difficulty of the roads and want of -military transport threw his army almost entirely upon water-carriage -for subsistence, and his great magazines were therefore established -at Dax on the Adour, and at Peyrehorade on the Gave of Pau, the -latter being about twenty-four miles from Bayonne. These places -he fortified to resist sudden incursions, and he threw a bridge -across the Adour at the port of Landes, just above its confluence -with the Gave de Pau. But the navigation of the Adour below that -point, especially at Urt, the stream being confined there, could -be interrupted by the allies who were now on the left bank. To -remedy this Soult ordered Foy to pass the Adour at Urt and construct -a bridge with a head of works, but the movement was foreseen by -Wellington, and Foy, menaced with a superior force, recrossed the -river. The navigation was then carried on at night by stealth, or -guarded by the French gun-boats and exposed to the fire of the -allies. Thus provisions became scarce, and the supply would have been -quite unequal to the demand if the French coasting trade, now revived -between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been interrupted by the navy, but -lord Wellington’s representations on this head were still unheeded. - -Soult was embarrassed by Foy’s failure at Urt. He reinforced him -with Boyer’s and D’Armagnac’s divisions, which were extended to the -Port de Lannes; then leaving Reille with four divisions to guard the -entrenched camp and to finish the works, he completed the garrison -of Bayonne and transferred his head-quarters to Peyrehorade. Clauzel -with two divisions of infantry and the light cavalry now took post -on the Bidouze, being supported with Trielhard’s heavy dragoons, and -having his left in communication with Paris and with St. Jean Pied -de Port where there was a garrison of eighteen hundred men besides -national guards. He soon pushed his advanced posts to the Joyeuse or -Gambouri, and the Aran, streams which unite to fall into the Adour -near Urt, and he also occupied Hellette, Mendionde, Bonloc, and the -Bastide de Clerence. A bridge-head was constructed at Peyrehorade, -Hastingues was fortified on the Gave de Pau, Guiche, Bidache and -Came, on the Bidouze, and the works of Navarens were augmented. In -fine Soult with equal activity and intelligence profited from the -rain which stopped the allies’ operations in that deep country. - -[Sidenote: 1814. January.] - -Lord Wellington also made some changes of position. Having increased -his works at Barrouilhet he was enabled to shift some of Hope’s -troops towards Arcangues, and he placed the sixth division on the -heights of Villefranque, which permitted general Hill to extend -his right up the Adour to Urt. The third division was posted near -Urcuray, the light cavalry on the Joyeuse facing Clauzel’s outposts, -and a chain of telegraphs was established from the right of the Nive -by the hill of San Barbe to St. Jean de Luz. Freyre’s Gallicians were -placed in reserve about St. Pé, and Morillo was withdrawn to Itzassu -where supported by the Andalusian division and by Freyre, he guarded -the valley of the Upper Nive and watched general Paris beyond the -Ursouia mountain. Such was the state of affairs in the beginning of -January, but some minor actions happened before these arrangements -were completed. - -In December the allies seized the island of Holriague near La Honce -on the Adour, which gave them a better command of that river, but Foy -kept possession of the islands of Berens and Broc above Holriague. -The allies’ bridges of communication on the Nive were now carried -away by floods which occasioned some embarrassment, and meanwhile, -without any orders from lord Wellington, probably with a view to -plunder, for his troops were exceedingly licentious, Morillo obtained -from Victor Alten two squadrons of the eighteenth hussars, under -pretence of exploring the enemy’s position towards Mendionde and -Maccaye. Their commander, major Hughes, having with difficulty -ascertained that he was to form an advanced guard in a close wooded -country, demanded the aid of some Spanish Caçadores, and then moving -forwards drove in the picquets, crossed the bridge of Mendionde -and commenced a skirmish. But during this action Morillo withdrew -his division without giving any notice, and at the same time the -Caçadores fled in a shameful manner from the left, the cavalry were -thus turned and escaped with difficulty, having had one captain -killed, two other captains and a lieutenant, and Hughes himself, -badly wounded. The unfortunate issue of this skirmish was attributed -at the time to the bad conduct of the eighteenth hussars, against -whom lord Wellington was by malicious misrepresentation previously -prejudiced; for at Vittoria they were unjustly accused of being more -licentious than others in plundering the captured property on the -field, whereas they had fought well and plundered less than many who -were praised for their orderly demeanour. - -About the same time that this disaster occurred at Mendionde, Mina, -acting independently, and being pressed for provisions in the -mountains, invaded the Val de Baigorry and the Val des Osses, where -his men committed the greatest enormities, plundering and burning, -and murdering men women and children without distinction. The people -of these valleys, distinguished amongst the Basques for their -warlike qualities, immediately took arms under the command of one -of their principal men, named Etchevery, and being reinforced with -two hundred and fifty men from St. Jean Pied de Port, surprised one -of Mina’s battalions, and attacked the rest with great vigour. This -event gave Soult hopes of exciting the Basques to commence such a war -as they had carried on at the commencement of the French revolution. -His efforts to accomplish it were unceasing, and he had for two -months been expecting the arrival of general Harispe an officer whose -courage and talents have been frequently noticed in this History, -and who being the head of an ancient Basque family had great local -influence, which was increased by his military reputation. It was -thought that if he had come when first expected, about November, lord -Wellington’s strict discipline being then unknown to the people, he -would have raised a formidable partizan war in the mountains. But now -the English general’s attention to all complaints, his proclamation, -and the proof he gave of his sincerity by sending the Spaniards -back when they misconducted themselves, had, in conjunction with -the love of gain that master passion with all mountaineers, tamed -the Basque spirit and disinclined them to exchange ease and profit -for turbulence and ravage. Nevertheless this incursion by Mina and -the licentious conduct of Morillo’s troops, awakened the warlike -propensities of the Val de Baygorry Basques, and Harispe was enabled -to make a levy with which he immediately commenced active operations, -and was supported by general Paris. - -[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Reports and Orders MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Plan 9.] - -Soult with a view to aid Harispe, to extend his own cantonments, and -to restrict those of the allies, now resolved to drive the latter’s -detachments altogether from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and -fix Clauzel’s left at Hellette, the culminant point of the great -road to that fortress. To effect this, on the 3d of January, he -caused Clauzel to establish two divisions of infantry at the heights -of La Costa, near the Bastide de Clerence and beyond the Joyeuse -river. Buchan’s Portuguese brigade, placed in observation there, -was thus forced to retreat upon Briscons, and at the same time -Paris advancing to Bonloc connected his right with Clauzel’s left -at Ayherre, while the light cavalry menaced all the allies’ line -of outposts. Informed of this movement by telegraph, Wellington, -thinking Soult was seeking a general battle on the side of Hasparen, -made the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade relieve the light -division which marched to Arauntz; the fourth division then passed -the Nive at Ustaritz, and the sixth division made ready to march from -Villefranque, by the high road of St. Jean Pied de Port, towards -Hasparen, as a reserve to the third fourth and seventh divisions. -The latter were concentrated beyond Urcuray on the 4th, their left -in communication with Hill’s right at Briscons, and their right, -supported by Morillo, who advanced from Itzassu for this purpose. - -The English general’s intent was to fall upon the enemy at once, but -the swelling of the small rivers prevented him. However on the 5th -having ascertained the true object and dispositions of the French -general, and having twenty-four thousand infantry in hand with a -division of cavalry and four or five brigades of artillery, he -resolved to attack Clauzel’s divisions on the heights of La Costa. -In this view Le Cor’s Portuguese marched against the French right, -the fourth division marched against their centre, the third division -supported by cavalry against their left; the remainder of the cavalry -and the seventh division, the whole under Stapleton Cotton, were -posted at Hasparen to watch Paris on the side of Bonloc. Soult was -in person at the Bastide de Clerence and a general battle seemed -inevitable, but the intention of the English general was merely -to drive back the enemy from the Joyeuse, and the French general, -thinking the whole allied army was in movement resolved to act on the -defensive, and directed the troops at La Costa to retire fighting -upon the Bidouze: the affair terminated therefore with a slight -skirmish on the evening of the 6th. The allies then resumed their old -positions on the right of the Nive, the Andalusians were ordered back -to the Bastan, and Carlos D’España’s Gallicians were brought up to -Ascain in their place. - -When Clauzel saw that nothing serious was designed he sent his -horsemen to drive away general Hill’s detachments, which had taken -advantage of the great movements to forage on the lower parts of the -Joyeuse and Aran rivers. Meanwhile Soult observing how sensitive -his adversary was to any demonstration beyond the Bidouze resolved -to maintain the line of those two rivers. In this view he reduced -his defence of the Adour to a line drawn from the confluence of the -Aran to Bayonne, which enabled him to reinforce Clauzel with Foy’s -division and all the light cavalry. Meantime general Harispe having -the division of Paris and the brigade of general Dauture placed -under his orders to support his mountaineers, fixed his quarters at -Hellette and commenced an active partizan warfare. On the 8th he -fell upon Mina in the Val des Osses and drove him with loss into -Baygorry. On the 10th returning to Hellette he surprised Morillo’s -foragers with some English dragoons on the side of Maccaye, and -took a few prisoners. On the 12th he again attacked Mina and drove -him up into the Alduides. During these affairs at the outposts -lord Wellington might have stormed the entrenched camp in front -of Bayonne, but he could not hold it except under the fire of the -fortress, and not being prepared for a siege avoided that operation. -Nor would the weather, which was again become terrible, permit him -to make a general movement to drive Harispe from his position in the -upper country; wherefore he preferred leaving that general in quiet -possession to irritating the mountaineers by a counter-warfare. He -endeavoured however to launch some armed boats on the Adour above -Bayonne, where Soult had increased the flotilla to twenty gun-boats -for the protection of his convoys, which were notwithstanding forced -to run past Urt under the fire of a battery constructed by general -Hill. - -Lord Wellington now dreading the bad effect which the excesses -committed by Mina’s and Morillo’s men were likely to produce, for -the Basques were already beginning to speak of vengeance, put forth -his authority in repression. Rebuking Morillo for his unauthorized -and disastrous advance upon Mendionde, and for the excesses of his -troops, he ordered him to keep the latter constantly under arms. -This was resented generally by the Spanish officers, and especially -by Morillo whose savage untractable and bloody disposition, since -so horribly displayed in South America, prompted him to encourage -violence. He asserted falsely that his troops were starving, declared -that a settled design to ill-use the Spaniards existed, and that the -British soldiers were suffered to commit every crime with impunity. -The English general in reply explained himself both to Morillo, and -to Freyre, who had alluded to the libels about San Sebastian, with -a clearness and resolution that showed how hopeless it would be to -strive against him. - -“He had not,” he said, “lost thousands of men to pillage and -ill-treat the French peasantry, he preferred a small army obedient -to a large one disobedient and undisciplined. If his measures to -enforce good order deprived him of the Spanish troops the fault would -rest with those who suffered their soldiers to commit disorders. -Professions without corresponding actions would not do, he was -determined to enforce obedience one way or another and would not -command insubordinate troops. The question between them was whether -they should or should not pillage the French peasants. His measures -were taken to prevent it and the conduct which called them forth was -more dishonouring to the Spaniards than the measures themselves. For -libels he cared not, he was used to them and he did not believe the -union of the two nations depended upon such things; but if it did he -desired no union founded upon such an infamous interest as pillage. -He had not lost twenty thousand men in the campaign to enable Morillo -to plunder and he would not permit it. If the Spaniards were resolved -to do so let them march their great armies into France under their -own generals, he would meanwhile cover Spain itself and they would -find they could not remain in France for fifteen days. They had -neither money nor magazines, nothing to maintain an army in the -field, the country behind was incapable of supporting them and were -he scoundrel enough to permit pillage France rich as it was could -not sustain the burthen. Even with a view to living on the enemy by -contributions it would be essential to prevent plunder; and yet in -defiance of all these reasons he was called an enemy by the Spanish -generals because he opposed such conduct, and his measures to prevent -it were considered dishonouring! - -“Something also he could say against it in a political point of view, -but it was unnecessary because careless whether he commanded a large -or a small army he was resolved that it should obey him and should -not pillage. - -“General Morillo expressed doubts of his right to interfere with -the Spaniards. It was his right and his duty, and never before did -he hear that to put soldiers under arms was a disgrace. It was a -measure to prevent evil and misfortunes. Mina could tell by recent -experience what a warfare the French peasants could carry on, and -Morillo was openly menaced with a like trial. It was in vain for -that general to palliate or deny the plundering of his division, -after having acknowledged to general Hill that it was impossible to -prevent it because the officers and soldiers received by every post -letters from their friends, congratulating them upon their good luck -in entering France and urging them to seize the opportunity of making -fortunes. General Morillo asserted that the British troops were -allowed to commit crimes with impunity. Neither he nor any other man -could produce an instance of injury done where proof being adduced -the perpetrators had escaped punishment. Let him enquire how many -soldiers had been hanged, how many stricken with minor chastisements -and made to pay for damages done. But had the English troops no -cause of complaint against the Spaniards? Officers and soldiers were -frequently shot and robbed on the high roads and a soldier had been -lately murdered between Oyarzun and Lesaca; the English stores and -convoys were plundered by the Spanish soldiers, a British officer -had been put to death at Vittoria and others were ill-treated at -Santander.” - -A sullen obedience followed this correspondence for the moment, but -the plundering system was soon renewed, and this with the mischief -already done was sufficient to rouse the inhabitants of Bidarray as -well as those of the Val de Baygorry into action. They commenced -and continued a partizan warfare until lord Wellington, incensed by -their activity, issued a proclamation calling upon them to take arms -openly and join Soult or stay peaceably at home, declaring that he -would otherwise burn their villages and hang all the inhabitants. -Thus it appeared that notwithstanding all the outcries made against -the French for resorting to this system of repressing the warfare -of peasants in Spain, it was considered by the English general both -justifiable and necessary. However the threat was sufficient for this -occasion. The Basques set the pecuniary advantages to be derived from -the friendship of the British and Portuguese troops and the misery -of an avenging warfare against the evils of Spanish plunder, and -generally disregarded Harispe’s appeals to their patriotism. - -Meanwhile Soult who expected reinforcements seeing that little was to -be gained by insurrection and being desirous to resume the offensive, -ordered Harispe to leave only the troops absolutely necessary for -the defence of St. Jean Pied de Port and its entrenched camp with -a few Basques as scouts in the valleys, and to concentrate the -remainder of his force at Mendionde, Hellette and La Houssoa, thus -closely hemming in the right of the allies’ line with a view to -making incursions beyond the Upper Nive. This was on the 14th, on -the 23rd Harispe, getting information that Morillo was to forage -in force on the side of Bidarray, endeavoured to cut him off, the -supporting troops consisting of Spanish infantry and some English -hussars repulsed his first attack, but they were finally pushed back -with some loss in horses and mules. About the same time one of Hill’s -posts near the confluence of the Aran with the Adour was surprised -by some French companies who remained in advance until fresh troops -detached from Urt forced them to repass the river again. This affair -was a retaliation for the surprise of a French post a few days before -by the sixth division, which was attended with some circumstances -repugnant to the friendly habits long established between the French -and British troops at the outposts. The value of such a generous -intercourse old soldiers well understand, and some illustrations of -it at this period may be quoted. - -On the 9th of December, the forty-third was assembled in column on -an open space within twenty yards of the enemy’s out-sentry, yet -the latter continued to walk his beat for an hour without concern, -relying so confidently on the customary system that he placed his -knapsack on the ground to ease his shoulders. When at last the order -to advance was given, one of the British soldiers stepping out -told him to go away and helped him to replace his pack, the firing -then commenced; the next morning the French in like manner warned -a forty-third sentry to retire. But the most remarkable instance -happened on the occasion of lord Wellington’s being desirous of -getting to the top of a hill occupied by the enemy near Bayonne. He -ordered the riflemen who escorted him to drive the French away, and -seeing the former stealing up, as he thought too close, called out to -commence firing; with a loud voice one of those old soldiers replied -“_no firing!_” and then holding up the butt of his rifle towards the -French, tapped it in a peculiar way. At the well-understood signal -which meaned “_we must have the hill for a short time_,” the French -who though they could not maintain would not have relinquished the -post without a fight if they had been fired upon, quietly retired. -And this signal would never have been made if the post had been one -capable of a permanent defence, so well do veterans understand war -and its proprieties. - -The English general now only waited until the roads were practicable, -to take the offensive with an army superior in every point of view to -Soult’s. That general’s numbers were also about to be reduced. His -conscripts were deserting fast, and the inclemency of the weather was -filling his hospitals, while the bronzed veterans of Wellington’s -army impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, fierce in execution, -were free from serious maladies, ready and able to plant their -colours wherever their general listed. At this time however the -country was a vast quagmire; it was with difficulty that provisions -or even orders could be conveyed to the different quarters, and -a Portuguese brigade on the right of the Nive, was several days -without food from the swelling of the rivulets which stopped the -commissariat mules. At the sea-side the troops were better off, yet -with a horrible counterpoise, for on that iron-bound coast storms -and shipwrecks were so frequent, that scarcely a day passed but some -vessel, sometimes many together, were seen embayed and drifting -towards the reefs which shoot out like needles for several miles. -Once in this situation there was no human help! a faint cry might be -heard at intervals, but the tall ship floated slowly and solemnly -onwards until the first rock arrested her, a roaring surge then -dashed her to pieces and the shore was strewed with broken timbers -and dead bodies. December and January were thus passed by the -allies, but February saw Wellington break into France the successful -invader of that mighty country. Yet neither his nor Soult’s military -operations can be understood without a previous description of -political affairs which shall be given in the next chapter. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -[Sidenote: 1814.] - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -_Portugal._—It has been shewn that marshal Beresford’s arrival at -Lisbon put a momentary check upon the intrigues of the regency -relative to the command of the troops, when he rejoined the army -the vexatious conduct of the government was renewed with greater -violence, and its ill-will was vented upon the English residents, -whose goods were arbitrarily seized and their persons imprisoned -without regard to justice or international law. The supply and -reinforcing of the army were the pretences for these exactions, yet -the army was neither supplied nor recruited, for though the new -regulations had produced nine thousand trained soldiers, they were, -in contempt of the subsidizing treaty, retained in the depôts. At -first this was attributed to the want of transport to enable them -to march through Spain, but though lord Wellington obtained in the -beginning of 1814 shipping to convey them to the army, the Portuguese -government still withheld the greatest number, alleging in excuse -the ill-conduct of the Spaniards relative to the military convention -established between the two countries. - -This convention had been concluded in 1812 to enable the Portuguese -troops to establish hospitals and to draw certain resources from -Spain upon fixed conditions. One of these was that all supplies -might be purchased, half with ready money half with bills on the -Portuguese treasury; nevertheless in December 1813 the Spanish envoy -at Lisbon informed the Portuguese government, that to give up the -shells of certain public buildings for hospitals was the only effect -they would give to the convention. Wherefore as neither troops nor -horses could march through Spain, and the supply of those already -with the army became nearly impossible, the regency detained the -reinforcements. Lord Wellington strongly reproached the Spanish -government for this foul conduct, yet observed with great force to -the Portuguese regency, that the treaty by which a certain number of -soldiers were to be constantly in the field was made with England, -not with Spain; and as the government of the former country continued -to pay the subsidy and provided ships for the transport of the troops -there was no excuse for retaining them in Portugal. - -His remonstrances, Beresford’s orders, and Mr. Stuart’s exertions -although backed by the menaces of lord Castlereagh, were however -alike powerless; the regency embarked only three thousand men out -of nine thousand, and those not until the month of March when the -war was on the point of terminating. Thus instead of thirty thousand -Portuguese under arms lord Wellington had less than twenty thousand, -and yet Mr. Stuart affirmed that by doing away with the militia and -introducing the Prussian system of granting furloughs, one hundred -thousand troops of the line might have been furnished and supported -by Portugal, without pressing more severely on the finances of -the country than the actual system which supplied these twenty -thousand. The regency were now more than usually importunate to -have the subsidy paid in specie in which case their army would have -disappeared altogether. Mr. Stuart firmly opposed this, knowing the -money would be misapplied if it fell into their hands, and thinking -their importunity peculiarly ill-timed when their quota of troops was -withheld, and when lord Wellington, forced to pay ready money for -his supplies in France, wanted all the specie that could be procured -for the military chest. Such was the countenance assumed by Portugal -towards England in return for the independence which the latter had -secured for her; and it is obvious that if the war had not terminated -immediately afterwards the alliance could not have continued. The -British army deserted by Portugal and treated hostilely, as we shall -find, by the Spaniards, must then have abandoned the Peninsula. - -_Spain._—The malice evinced towards lord Wellington by the Spanish -government, the libels upon him and upon the Anglo-Portuguese army, -the vices of the system by which the Spanish troops were supplied, -and their own evil propensities fostered by long and cruel neglect -and suffering, the activity of those intriguing politicians who were -inimical to the British alliance, the insolence and duplicity of the -minister of war, the growing enmity between Spain and Portugal, the -virulence of all parties and the absolute hostility of the local -authorities towards the British army, the officers and soldiers of -which were on all occasions treated as if they were invaders rather -than friends, drove lord Wellington in the latter end of November to -extremity. He judged the general disposition of the Spanish people to -be still favourable to the English alliance, and with the aid of the -serviles hoped to put down the liberals; but an open rupture with -the government he thought inevitable, and if the liberal influence -should prove most powerful with the people he might be unable to -effect a retreat into Portugal. Wherefore he recommended the British -ministers to take measures with a view to a war against Spain! And -this at the very moment when, victorious in every battle, he seemed -to have placed the cause he supported beyond the power of fortune. -Who when Napoleon was defeated at Leipsic, when all Europe and even -part of Asia were pouring their armed hordes into the northern -and eastern parts of France, when Soult was unable to defend the -western frontier; who then looking only on the surface could have -supposed that Wellington, the long-enduring general, whose profound -calculations and untiring vigour in war had brought the affairs of -the Peninsula to their apparently prosperous state, that he the -victorious commander could with truth thus describe his own uneasy -situation to his government? - -“Matters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards that I -think it necessary to draw your attention seriously to the subject. -You will have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which I know -were written and published by an officer of the war department -and I believe under the direction of the minister at war Don Juan -O’Donoju. Advantage has been taken of the impression made by these -libels to circulate others in which the old stories are repeated -about the outrages committed by sir John Moore’s army in Gallicia, -and endeavours are made to irritate the public mind about our still -keeping garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagena, and particularly in Ceuta. -They exaggerate the conduct of our traders in South America, and -every little concern of a master of a ship who may behave ill in a -Spanish port is represented as an attack upon the sovereignty of the -Spanish nation. I believe these libels all proceed from the same -source, the government and their immediate servants and officers; -and although I have no reason to believe that they have as yet made -any impression on the nation at large they certainly have upon the -officers of the government, and even upon the principal officers of -the army. These persons must see that if the libels are not written -or encouraged by the government they are at least not discouraged, -they know that we are odious to the government and they treat us -accordingly. The Spanish troops plunder every thing they approach, -neither their own nor our magazines are sacred. Until recently there -was some semblance of inquiry and of a desire to punish offenders, -lately these acts of disorder have been left entirely unnoticed, -unless when I have interfered with my authority as commander-in-chief -of the Spanish army. The civil magistrates in the country have -not only refused us assistance but have particularly ordered the -inhabitants not to give it for payment, and when robberies have been -discovered and the property proved to belong to the commissariat the -law has been violated and possession withheld. This was the case -lately at Tolosa. - -“Then what is more extraordinary and more difficult to understand is -a transaction which occurred lately at Fuenterabia. It was settled -that the British and Portuguese hospitals should go to that town. -There is a building there which has been a Spanish hospital, and the -Spanish authority who gave it over wanted to carry off, in order to -burn as fire-wood, the beds, that our soldiers might not have the -use of them; and these are people to whom we have given medicines -instruments and other aids, who when wounded and sick we have taken -into our hospitals, and to whom we have rendered every service in our -power after having recovered their country from the enemy! These are -not the people of Spain but the officers of government, who would not -dare to conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that -their conduct was agreeable to their employers. If this spirit is not -checked, if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury done to -our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly nature of such -proceedings, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave -towards us in the same manner, and that we shall have no friend or -none who will dare to avow him as such in Spain. Consider what will -be the consequence of this state of affairs if any reverse should -happen, or if an aggravation of the insults and injuries or any other -cause should cause the English army to be withdrawn. I think I should -experience great difficulty, the Spanish people being hostile, in -retiring through Spain into Portugal from the peculiar nature of -our equipments, and I think I might be able to embark the army at -Passages in spite of all the French and Spanish armies united. But I -should be much more certain of getting clear off as we ought if we -had possession of San Sebastian, and this view of the subject is the -motive for the advice I am about to give you as the remedy for the -evils with which I have made you acquainted. - -“First then I recommend to you to alter the nature of your political -relations with Spain and to have nothing there but a “_chargé -d’affaires_.” Secondly to complain seriously of the conduct of the -government and their servants, to remind them that Cadiz, Carthagena, -and I believe, Ceuta, were garrisoned by British troops at their -earnest request, and that the troops were not sent to the two former -till the government agreed to certain conditions. If we had not -garrisoned the last it would before now have fallen into the hands -of the Moors. Thirdly to demand, as security for the safety of the -king’s troops against the criminal disposition of the government and -of those in authority under them, that a British garrison should -be admitted into San Sebastian, giving notice that unless this -demand was complied with the troops should be withdrawn. Fourthly. -To withdraw the troops if this demand be not complied with, be the -consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly. You may -rely upon this, that if you take a firm decided line and shew your -determination to go through with it, you will have the Spanish nation -with you, and will bring the government to their senses, and you -will put an end at once to all the petty cabals and counter-action -existing at the present moment, and you will not be under the -necessity of bringing matters to extremities; if you take any other -than a decided line and one which in its consequences will involve -them in ruin you may depend upon it you will gain nothing and will -only make matters worse. I recommend these measures whatever may be -the decision respecting my command of the army. They are probably -the more necessary if I should keep my command. The truth is that -a crisis is approaching in our connection with Spain and if you do -not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go -too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might -expect from services rendered to them.” - -Thus it appears that lord Wellington at the end of the war described -the Spaniards precisely as sir John Moore described them at the -beginning. But the seat of government was now transferred to Madrid -and the new Cortez, as I have already noticed, decided, against -the wishes of the regency, that the English general should keep -the command of the Spanish armies. The liberals indeed with great -diligence had previously sought to establish a system of controul -over the Cortez by means of the populace of Madrid as they had done -at Cadiz, and they were so active and created so much alarm by their -apparent success, that the serviles, backed by the Americans, were -ready to make the princess Carlotta sole regent as the only resource -for stemming the progress of democracy. However when they had proved -their strength upon the question of lord Wellington’s command, -they deferred the princess’s affair and resolved to oppose their -adversaries more vigorously in the assembly. They were encouraged -also by a tumult which happened at Madrid, where the populace -instigated by their agents, or disliking the new constitution, for -the measures of the democratic party were generally considered evil -in the great towns beyond the Isla, rose and forced the authorities -to imprison a number of obnoxious persons; the new Cortez then -arrived, the serviles got the upper hand and being resolved to change -the regency took as their ground of attack its conduct towards the -English general. Pursuing this scheme of opposition with ardour they -caused the minister of war to be dismissed, and were ready to attack -the regency itself, expecting full success, when to their amazement -and extreme anger lord Wellington, far from desiring to have his -personal enemies thus thrust out of power, expressed his earnest -desire to keep them in their stations. - -To men who were alike devoid of patriotism or principle, and -whose only rule of action was the momentary impulse of passion, -such a proceeding was incomprehensible; yet it was a wise and -well-considered political change on his part, shewing that private -feelings were never the guides of his conduct in public matters, and -that he ever seemed to bear in mind the maxim which Sophocles has -put into the mouth of Ajax, “_carrying himself towards his friends -as if they might one day become enemies and treating his foes as men -who might become friends_.” The new spirit had given him no hopes of -any general alteration of the system, nor was he less convinced that -sooner or later he must come to extremities with the Spaniards; but -he was averse to any appearance of disunion becoming public at the -moment he was invading France, lest it should check his projects of -raising an anti-Napoleon party in that country. He therefore advised -the British government to keep his hostile propositions in abeyance, -leaving it to him and to his brother to put them in execution or not -as events might dictate. Meanwhile he sent orders to evacuate Cadiz -and Carthagena, and opposed the projected change in the Spanish -government, observing that “the minister of war being dismissed, the -most obnoxious opponent of military arrangement was gone; that the -mob of Madrid, being worked upon by the same press in the hands of -the same people who had made the mob of Cadiz so ungovernable, would -become as bad as these last, and though the mercantile interest -would not have so much power in the capital they would not want -partizans when desirous of carrying a question by violence. The -grandees were too poor to retain their former natural influence, and -the constitution gave them no political power. The only chance which -the serviles had was to conduct themselves with prudence, and when in -the right with a firm contempt for the efforts of the press and the -mob; but this was what no person in Spain ever did and the smaller -party being wiser bolder and more active would soon govern the Cortez -at Madrid as they did that at Cadiz.” - -No permanent change for the better could be expected, and meanwhile -the actual government, alarmed by the tumults in the capital, by -the strength of the serviles in the Cortez, by the rebukes and -remonstrances of the English general and ministers, and by the -evident danger of an open rupture with England, displayed, according -to lord Wellington, the utmost prudence and fairness in a most -important affair which occurred at this time. That is to say, -their own views and interests coinciding with those of the English -commander and government there was a momentary agreement, and -Wellington wisely preferred this opening for conciliation to the more -dangerous mode he had before recommended. - -The event which called forth his approval of their conduct was the -secret arrival of the duke of San Carlos at Madrid in December. -He brought with him a treaty of peace, proposed by Napoleon and -accepted by Ferdinand, called the treaty of Valençay. It acknowledged -Ferdinand as king of Spain and the Indies, and the integrity of -the Spanish empire was recognized. He was in return to make the -English evacuate Spain, and the French troops were to abandon the -country at the same time. The contracting powers were to maintain -their respective maritime rights as they had been stipulated by the -treaty of Utrecht and observed until 1792. The sales of the national -domains made by Joseph were to be confirmed; all the Spaniards who -had attached themselves to the French cause were to be reinstated in -their dignities and property, those who chose to quit Spain were to -have ten years to dispose of their possessions. Prisoners, including -all those delivered up by Spain to the English, were to be sent home -on both sides. The king was to pay annually thirty millions of reals -to his father Charles IV., and two millions to his widow; a treaty of -commerce was to be arranged. - -[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Ferdinand being entirely devoid of principle acted with that cunning -which marked his infamous career through life. He gave the duke of -San Carlos secret instructions to tell the serviles, if he found -them all-powerful in the Cortez, to ratify this treaty with a secret -resolution to break it when time served; but if the Jacobins were -strongest San Carlos was merely to ask them to ratify it, Ferdinand -in that case reserving to himself the task of violating it on his -own authority. These instructions were made known to the English -ministers and the English general, but they, putting no trust in -such a negociator, and thinking his intention was rather to deceive -the allies than Napoleon, thwarted him as much as they could, and -in this they were joined by the Portuguese government. The British -authorities were naturally little pleased with the prospect of being -forced to abandon Spain under a treaty, which would necessarily -give Napoleon great influence over that country in after times, and -for the present enable him to concentrate all the old troops on the -eastern frontier of his empire; nor was the Jacobinical Spanish -government more content to have a master. Wherefore, all parties -being agreed, the regency, keeping the matter secret, dismissed San -Carlos on the 8th of January with a copy of the decree passed by the -Cortez, which rendered null and void all acts of Ferdinand while -a prisoner, and forbad negociation for peace while a French army -remained in the Peninsula. And that the king might fully understand -them, they told him “_the monster despotism had been driven from the -throne of Spain_.” Meanwhile Joseph Palafox, who had been a prisoner -ever since the siege of Zaragoza, was by the French emperor first -sent to Valençay, after which he was to follow San Carlos and he -arrived at Madrid four days after the latter’s departure. But his -negociations were equally fruitless with the regency, and in the -secret sittings of the Cortez measures were discussed for watching -the king’s movements and forcing him to swear to the constitution and -to the Cortez before he passed the frontier. - -Lord Wellington was alarmed at the treaty of Valençay. He had, he -said, long suspected Napoleon would adopt such an expedient and if he -had shewn less pride and more common sense it would have succeeded. -This sarcasm was perhaps well applied to the measure as it appeared -at the time, but the emperor’s real proceedings he was unacquainted -with, and this splenetic ebullition only indicated his own vexation -at approaching mischief, for he was forced to acknowledge that the -project was not unlikely even then to succeed, because the misery -of Spain was so great and so clearly to be traced to the views of -the government and of the new constitution, that many persons must -have been desirous to put an end to the general suffering under the -sanction of this treaty. “If Napoleon,” he said, “had withdrawn the -garrisons from Catalonia and Valencia and sent Ferdinand who must -be _as useless a person in France as he would probably be in Spain_ -at once to the frontier, or into the Peninsula, peace would have -been made or the war at least rendered so difficult as to be almost -impracticable and without hope of great success.” Now this was -precisely what Napoleon had designed, and it seems nearly certain -that he contemplated the treaty of Valençay and the restoration of -Ferdinand as early as the period of the battle of Vittoria, if not -before. - -The scheme was one which demanded the utmost secrecy, that it might -be too sudden for the English influence to defeat it; the emperor -had therefore arranged that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in -November, that is at the very moment when it would have been most -injurious to the English interest, because then the disputes in the -Cortez between the serviles and Jacobins were most rancorous, and the -hostility of the regencies both in Portugal and Spain towards the -English general and English influence undisguised. Suchet had then -also proved his superiority to the allies in Catalonia, and Soult’s -gigantic lines being unessayed seemed impregnable. But in Napoleon’s -council were persons seeking only to betray him. It was the great -misfortune of his life to have been driven by circumstances to -suffer such men as Talleyrand and Fouché, whose innate treachery -has become proverbial, to meddle in his affairs or even to approach -his court. Mischief of this kind, however, necessarily awaits men -who like Napoleon and Oliver Cromwell have the courage to attempt -after great convulsions and civil wars the rebuilding of the social -edifice without spilling blood. Either to create universal abhorrence -by their cruelty, or to employ the basest of men, the Talleyrands, -Fouchés, and Monks, of revolutions, is their inevitable fate; and -never can they escape the opposition, more dangerous still, of honest -and resolute men, who unable to comprehend the necessity of the times -see nothing but tyranny in the vigour which prevents anarchy. - -The treaty of Valençay was too important a measure to escape the -sagacity of the traitors around Napoleon, and when their opposition -in the council and their secret insinuations proved unavailing to -dissuade him from it, they divulged the secret to the partizans -of the Bourbons. Taking advantage of the troubled state of public -affairs which occupied the emperor’s time and distracted his -attention, they contrived that Ferdinand’s emissaries should precede -him to Madrid, and delayed his own departure until March when the -struggle was at an end. Nevertheless the chances of success for this -scheme, even in its imperfect execution, were so many and so alarming -that lord Wellington’s sudden change from fierce enmity to a warm -support of the regency, when he found it resolute and frank in its -rejection of the treaty, although it created so much surprize and -anger at the moment, cannot be judged otherwise than as the wise -and prudent proceeding of a consummate statesman. Nor did he fail -to point out to his own government the more distant as well as the -immediate danger to England and Spain involved in this singularly -complicated and important affair. - -The evils as affecting the war and English alliance with Spain -were obvious, but the two articles relating to the provision for -Ferdinand’s father and mother, and to the future state of the -Spaniards who had joined the French involved great interests. It was -essential, he said, that the Spanish government should explicitly -declare its intentions. Negociations for a general peace were said -to be commenced, of that he knew nothing, but he supposed such being -the case that a basis would be embodied in a preliminary treaty -which all the belligerents would ratify, each power then to arrange -its own peculiar treaty with France under protection of the general -confederation. Napoleon would necessarily put forward his treaty with -Ferdinand. It could be got rid of by the statement that the latter -was a prisoner when negociating; but new articles would then have -to be framed and therefore the Spanish government should be called -upon previously to declare what their intentions were as to the two -articles in the treaty of Valençay. His objections to them were that -the allowance to Charles IV. was beyond the financial means of Spain, -and were it not so, Napoleon should not be allowed to stipulate for -any provision for him. Neither should he be suffered to embody or -establish a permanent French party in Spain, under protection of -a treaty, an article of which provided for the restoration of the -Spaniards who had taken part with the French. It would give him -the right, which he would not fail to exercise, of interfering in -their favour in every question of property, or other interest, and -the Spanish government would be involved in perpetual disputes with -France. It was probable the allied sovereigns would be desirous of -getting rid of this question and would think it desirable that Spain -should pardon her rebellious subjects. For this reason he had before -advised the Spanish government to publish a general amnesty, with -the view of removing the difficulty when a general peace should come -to be negociated, and this difficulty and danger be enhanced, if not -before provided for, by the desire which each of the allied powers -would feel, when negociating on their separate grounds, to save their -finances by disbanding their armies. - -This suggestion of an amnesty, made ten days before the battle of -Vittoria, illustrates Wellington’s sagacity, his long and provident -reach of mind, his discriminating and magnanimous mode of viewing -the errors and weaknesses of human nature. Let it be remembered that -in the full tide of success, after having passed the Douro, and when -Joseph surprised and bewildered was flying before him, that he who -had been called the iron duke in the midst of his bivouac fires, -found time to consider, and had sufficient humanity and grandeur of -mind thus to address the Spanish government on this subject. - -“A large number of Spaniards who have taken the side of the French -are now with the enemy’s army, many of these are highly meritorious -and have rendered most essential service to the cause even during -the period in which they have been in the service of the enemy. -It is also a known fact that fear, the misery and distress which -they suffered during the contest, and despair of the result, -were the motives which induced many of these unfortunate persons -to take the part which they have taken, and I would suggest for -consideration whether it is expedient to involve the country in all -the consequences of a rigid adherence to the existing law in order to -punish such persons. I am the last man who will be found to diminish -the merit of those Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the -country during the severe trial which I hope has passed, particularly -of those, who, having remained amongst the enemy without entering -their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives. -But at the same time that I can appreciate the merits of these -individuals and of the nation at large I can forgive the weakness of -those who have been induced by terror by distress or by despair to -pursue a different line of conduct. - -“I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances of the -commencement and of the different stages of this eventful contest, -and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined -that it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, although -aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they -were assailed and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness -of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous -and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and -disorganization that followed, and let them decide whether those -who were witnesses of these events are guilty because they could -not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not -guilty in any other manner, and many now deemed guilty in the eye of -the law as having served the pretended king have by that very act -acquired the means of serving and have rendered important services to -their country. It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead -the government and the Cortez to grant a general amnesty with certain -exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of -failing or succeeding in freeing the country from its oppressors. -If the effort fail the enemy will by an amnesty be deprived of the -principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which -his armies will be stationed; he will see clearly that he can place -no reliance on any partizans in Spain, and he will not have even a -pretence for supposing that the country is divided in opinion. If the -effort succeed the object of the government should be to pacify the -country and to heal the divisions which the contest has unavoidably -occasioned. It is impossible to accomplish this object while there -exists a great body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the -largest property in the country and others endowed with considerable -talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest, -conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have -above adverted. These persons their friends and relations will if -persecuted naturally endeavour to perpetuate the divisions in the -country in the hope at some time to take advantage of them, and -adverting to their number and to that power which they must derive -from their property and connections it must be feared that they will -be too successful. - -“But there are other important views of this question. First should -the effort to free the country from its oppressors succeed, at some -time or other approaches to peace must be made between the two -nations and the amnesty to the persons above described will remove -the greatest difficulty in the way of such an arrangement. Secondly, -should even Spain be at peace with France and the proscription -against these persons be continued, they will remain in France a -perpetual instrument in the hands of that restless power to disturb -the internal tranquillity of Spain; and in case of a renewal of the -war, which will be their wish and object, they will be the most -mischievous and most inveterate enemies of their country, of that -country which with mistaken severity aggravates her misfortunes by -casting off from her thousands of her useful subjects. On every -ground then it is desirable that the measure should be adopted and -the present moment should be seized for adopting it.” - -Then pointing out with great accuracy and justice those who should be -exempted from an amnesty he thus terminated this record of his own -true greatness, and of the littleness of the people to whom it was -fruitlessly addressed. - -“In bringing this subject under the consideration of the government I -am perhaps intruding my opinion on a subject in which as a stranger I -have no concern, but having had an advantage enjoyed by few of being -acquainted with the concerns of the country since the commencement -of the contest, and having been sensible both in the last and -present campaign of the disadvantages suffered by Spain from the -want of a measure of this description, I have thought it proper as -a well-wisher to the cause to bring it under the consideration of -the government assuring them at the same time that I have never had -the slightest communication on the subject with the government of my -country, nor do I believe that they have ever turned their attention -to it. What I have above stated are my own opinions to which I may -attribute more weight than they merit but they are founded upon a -sincere devotion to the interests of the country.” - -Such was the general political state of the Peninsula as bearing -upon the military operations at the close of the year 1813, and the -state of England and France shall be shewn in the next chapters. -But however hateful and injurious to England the conduct of the -Peninsular government appears, and however just and well-founded were -the greatest part of lord Wellingtons complaints, it is not to be -assumed that the Spanish government and Cortez were totally without -excuse for their hostility or ingratitude. It was not solely upon -military grounds that they were obnoxious to the English general. He -united heartily with the English government in hatred of democratic -institutions as opposed to aristocratic domination. Spain with the -former seemed scarcely worth saving from France, and in a letter -written about that period to the Conde de la Bispal, who it would -appear proposed some immediate stroke of violence against the -regency, he openly avows that he was inimical to the constitution, -because it admitted a free press and refused to property any -political influence beyond what naturally belonged to it. That is, -it refused to heap undue honours privileges and power upon those -who already possessed all the luxury and happiness which riches -can bestow; it refused to admit the principle that those who have -much should have more, that the indolence corruption and insolence -naturally attendant upon wealth should be supported and increased -by irresponsible power; that those who laboured and produced all -things should enjoy nothing, that the rich should be tyrants and -the poor slaves. But these essential principles of aristocratic -government have never yet been, and never will be quietly received -and submitted to by any thinking people: where they prevail there is -no real freedom. Property inevitably confers power on its possessors, -and far from adding to that natural power by political privileges it -should be the object of all men who love liberty to balance it by -raising the poorer classes to political importance: the influence and -insolence of riches ought to be tamed and subdued instead of being -inflated and excited by political institutions. This was the guiding -principle of the most celebrated Greek legislators, the opposite -principle produced the domestic dissensions of the Romans, and was -the ruin of Carthage. It was the cause also of the French revolution. -But after many years of darkness, the light of reason is now breaking -forth again, and that ancient principle of justice which places the -right of man in himself, above the right of property, is beginning -to be understood. A clear perception of it has produced the American -republic. France and Spain have admitted it and England ripens for -its adoption. Yet pure and bright and beautiful and healthful as the -light of freedom is in itself, it fell at this time on such foul and -stagnant pools, such horrid repulsive objects, that millions turned -at first from its radiance with disgust and wished for darkness -again. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -The force and energy of Napoleon’s system of government was evinced -in a marvellous manner by the rapidity with which he returned -to Germany, at the head of an enormous army, before his enemies -had time even to understand the extent of his misfortunes in the -Russian campaign. The victories of Lutzen and Bautzen then seemed -to reinstate him as the arbiter of Europe. But those battles were -fought with the heads of columns the rear of which were still filing -out of France. They were fought also with young troops. Wherefore -the emperor when he had given himself a fixed and menacing position -in Germany more readily listened to the fraudful negociations of -his trembling opponents, partly in hopes of attaining his object -without further appeal to arms, partly to obtain time to organize -and discipline his soldiers, confident in his own unmatched skill in -directing them if war was finally to decide his fate. He counted also -upon the family ties between him and Austria, and believed that power -willing to mediate sincerely. Not that he was so weak as to imagine -the hope of regaining some of its former power and possessions -was not uppermost, nor was he unprepared to make concessions; but -he seems to have been quite unsuspecting of the long course of -treachery and deceit followed by the Austrian politicians. - -[Sidenote: Vol. v. p. 49] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1.] - -It has been already shewn that while negociating with France an -offensive and defensive treaty in 1812, the Austrian cabinet was -cognizant of, and secretly aiding the plan of a vast insurrection -extending from the Tyrol to Calabria and the Illyrian provinces. The -management of this scheme was entrusted by the English cabinet to -general Nugent and Mr. King who were at Vienna; their agents went -from thence to Italy and the Illyrian coast, many Austrian officers -were engaged in the project; and Italians of great families entered -into commercial houses to enable them with more facility to carry -on this plan. Moreover Austria while actually signing the treaty -with Napoleon was with unceasing importunity urging Prussia to join -the Russians in opposition to him. The feeble operations of Prince -Swartzenberg, the manner in which he uncovered the emperor’s right -flank and permitted Tchitchagoff to move to the Beresina in the -Russian campaign, were but continuations of this deceitful policy. -And it was openly advanced as a merit by the Austrian cabinet that -her offer of mediation after the battle of Bautzen was made solely -with the view of gaining time to organize the army which was to -join the Russians and Prussians. Finally the armistice itself was -violated, hostilities being commenced before its termination, to -enable the Russian troops safely to join the Austrians in Bohemia. - -Nevertheless Napoleon’s genius triumphed at Dresden over the -unskilful operations of the allies, directed by Swartzenberg, whose -incapacity as a commander was made manifest in this campaign. Nor -would the after misfortunes of Vandamme and Marshal Macdonald, or -the defeat of Oudinot and Ney have prevented the emperor’s final -success but for the continuation of a treachery, which seemed at the -time to be considered a virtue by sovereigns who were unceasingly -accusing their more noble adversary of the very baseness that they -were practising so unblushingly. He had conceived a project so -vast so original so hardy, so far above the imaginations of his -contemporary generals, that even Wellington’s sagacity failed to -pierce it, and he censured the emperor’s long stay on the Elbe as -an obstinacy unwarranted by the rules of art. But Napoleon had more -profoundly judged his own situation. The large forces he left at -Dresden at Torgau, and Wittemberg, for which he has been so much -blamed by shallow military critics as lessening his numbers on the -field of Leipsic, were essential parts of his gigantic plan. He -quitted Dresden, apparently in retreat, to deceive his enemies, but -with the intention of marching down the Elbe, recrossing that river -and throwing his opponents into a false position. Then he would have -seized Berlin and reopening his communications with his garrisons -both on the Elbe and the Oder have operated between those rivers; and -with an army much augmented in power, because he would have recovered -many thousand old soldiers cooped up in the garrisons; an army more -compact and firmly established also, because he would have been in -direct communication with the Danes and with Davoust’s force at -Hamburgh, and both his flanks would have been secured by his chains -of fortresses on the two rivers. Already had Blucher and the Swedes -felt his first stroke, the next would have taught the allies that -the lion was still abroad in his strength, if at the very moment of -execution without any previous declaration the Bavarians, upon whose -operations he depended for keeping the Austrians in the valley of the -Danube in check, had not formed common cause with his opponents and -the whole marched together towards the Rhine. The battle of Leipsic -followed, the well-known treason of the Saxon troops led to the -victory gained there by the allies, and Napoleon, now the prey of -misfortune, reached France with only one-third of his army, having on -the way however trampled in the dust the Bavarian Wrede who attempted -to stop his passage at Hannau. - -Meanwhile the allied sovereigns, by giving hopes to their subjects -that constitutional liberty would be the reward of the prodigious -popular exertions against France, hopes which with the most -detestable baseness they had previously resolved to defraud, -assembled greater forces than they were able to wield, and prepared -to pass the Rhine. But distrusting even their immense superiority -of numbers they still pursued their faithless system. When Napoleon -in consequence of the Bavarian defection marched to Leipsic, he -sent orders to Gouvion St. Cyr to abandon Dresden and unite with -the garrisons on the Lower Elbe, the messengers were intercepted, -and St. Cyr, too little enterprising to execute such a plan of his -own accord, surrendered on condition of being allowed to regain -France. The capitulation was broken and general and soldiers remained -prisoners. - -After the Leipsic battle, Napoleon’s adherents fell away by nations. -Murat the husband of his sister joined Austria and thus forced -prince Eugene to abandon his position on the Adige. A successful -insurrection in favour of the prince of Orange broke out in Holland. -The neutrality of Switzerland was violated, and more than half a -million of armed men were poured across the frontiers of France in -all the violence of brute force, for their military combinations were -contemptible and their course marked by murder and devastation. But -previous to this the allies gave one more notable example of their -faithless cunning. - -[Sidenote: Diplomatic Correspondence, MSS.] - -St. Aignan the French resident minister at Gotha had been taken at -Leipsic and treated at first as a prisoner of war. He remonstrated -and being known to entertain a desire for peace was judged a good -tool with which to practise deception. Napoleon had offered on the -field of battle at Leipsic to negociate, no notice was taken of it at -the time, but now the Austrian Metternich and the Russian Nesselrode -had an interview with St. Aignan at Frankfort, and they assured -him the Prussian minister agreed in all things with them. They had -previously arranged that lord Aberdeen should come in during the -conference as if by accident; nothing was put down in writing, yet -St. Aignan was suffered to make minutes of their proposals in reply -to the emperor’s offer to negociate. These were generally that the -alliance of the sovereigns was indissoluble—that they would have only -a general peace—that France was to be confined to her natural limits, -viz. the Alps the Rhine and the Pyrenees—that the independence -of Germany was a thing not to be disputed—that the Spanish -Peninsula should be free and the Bourbon dynasty be restored—that -Austria must have a frontier in Italy the line of which could be -afterwards discussed, but Italy itself was to be independent of -any preponderating power—that Holland was also to be independent -and her frontier to be matter for after discussion—that England was -ready to make great sacrifices for peace upon these bases and would -acknowledge that freedom of commerce and of navigation which France -had a right to pretend to. St. Aignan here observed that Napoleon -believed England was resolved to restrict France to the possession of -thirty sail of the line, lord Aberdeen replied that it was not true. - -This conference had place at the emperor of Austria’s head-quarters -on the 10th of November, and lord Aberdeen inclosed the account of -it in a despatch dated at Smalcalde the 16th of November. He had -objected verbally to the passage relating to the maritime question -with England, nevertheless he permitted it to remain in St. Aignan’s -minutes. It was decided also that the military operations should -go on notwithstanding the negociation, and in truth the allies had -not the slightest design to make peace. They thought Napoleon would -refuse the basis proposed, which would give them an opportunity to -declare he was opposed to all reasonable modes of putting an end -to the war and thus work upon the French people. This is proved by -what followed. For when contrary to their expectations the emperor’s -minister signified, on the 16th of November, that he accepted the -propositions, observing that the independence of all nations at sea -as well as by land had been always Napoleon’s object, Metternich in -his reply, on the 25th of November, pretended to consider this answer -as avoiding the acceptation of the basis. The emperor however put -that obstacle aside, on the 2d of December, by accepting explicitly -the basis, generally and summarily, such as it had been presented -to him, adding, that France would make great sacrifices but the -emperor was content if by like sacrifices on the part of England, -that general peace which was the declared object of the allies could -be obtained. Metternich thus driven from his subterfuge required -Napoleon to send a like declaration to each of the allies separately -when negociations might, he said, commence. - -Meanwhile lord Aberdeen, who had permitted St. Aignan to retain the -article relating to maritime rights in his minutes of conference, -presented to Metternich on the 27th of November a note declaring -that England would not admit the turn given by France to her share -of the negociation; that she was ready to yield all the rights of -commerce and navigation which France had a right to pretend to, but -the question would turn upon what that right was. England would never -permit her navigation laws to be discussed at a congress, it was a -matter essentially foreign to the object of such an assembly, and -England would never depart from the great principle thereby announced -as to her maritime rights. Metternich approved of lord Aberdeen’s -views, saying they were his own and those of his court, thus proving -that the negociation had been a deceit from the beginning. This fact -was however placed beyond doubt by lord Castlereagh’s simultaneous -proceedings in London. - -In a note dated the 30th November that minister told lord Aberdeen -England admitted as a basis, that the Alps the Rhine and the Pyrenees -should be the frontier of France, subject to such modifications as -might be necessary to give a secure frontier to Holland, and to -Switzerland also, although the latter had not been mentioned in -the proposals given by St. Aignan. He applauded the resolution to -pursue military operations notwithstanding the negociations, and he -approved of demanding nothing but what they were resolved to have. -Nevertheless he said that any sacrifice to be made by England was -only to secure the independence of Holland and Switzerland, and the -former having already declared for the house of Nassau was now out of -the pale of discussion. Finally he recommended that any unnecessary -delay or equivocation on the part of the enemy should be considered -as tantamount to a rejection of the basis, and that the allies -_should then put forward the offer of peace to show that it was not -they but France that opposed an honourable termination of the war_. -Having thus thrown fresh obstacles in the way of that peace which the -allies pretended to have so much at heart, he, on the 21st December, -sent notes to the different ambassadors of the allied powers then -in London demanding explicit answers about the intentions of their -courts as to England’s maritime code. To this they all responded that -their cabinets would not suffer any question relative to that code -to be entertained at a congress in which England was represented, -and this on the express ground that it would mar the great object of -peace. - -Lord Castlereagh thus provided, declared that France should be -informed of their resolutions before negociations commenced, but -twenty days before this Napoleon having decreed a fresh levy of three -hundred thousand conscripts the allies had published a manifesto -treating this measure, so essentially a defensive one since they -would not suspend their military operations, as a fresh provocation -on his part, because the motives assigned for the conscription -contained a just and powerful description of their past deceits and -violence with a view to rouse the national spirit of France. Thus -having first by a pretended desire for peace and a willingness on -the part of England to consent to an arrangement about her maritime -code, inveigled the French emperor into negociations and thereby -ascertained that the maritime question was uppermost in his mind and -the only obstacle to peace, they declared that vital question should -not even be discussed. And when by this subtlety they had rendered -peace impossible proclaimed that Napoleon alone resisted the desire -of the world for tranquillity. And at this very moment Austria was -secretly endeavouring to obtain England’s consent to her seizing upon -Alsace a project which was stopped by lord Wellington who forcibly -pointed out the danger of rousing France to a general insurrection by -such a proceeding. - -The contrast between these wiles to gain a momentary advantage, -and the manly, vigorous policy of lord Wellington must make honest -men of all nations blush for the cunning which diplomatists call -policy. On one side the arts of guileful negociation masked with fair -protestations but accompanied by a savage and revolting system of -warfare; on the other a broad open hostility declared on manly and -just grounds followed up with a strict regard to humanity and good -faith; nothing put forward with an equivocal meaning and the actions -true to the word. On the eastern frontier the Cossack let loose to -ravage with all the barbarity of Asiatic warfare. On the western -frontier the Spaniards turned back into their own country in the -very midst of triumph, for daring to pass the bounds of discipline -prescribed by the wise and generous policy of their commander. Terror -and desolation and the insurrection of a people rendered frantic by -the cruelty of the invaders marked the progress of the ferocious -multitudes who crossed the Rhine. Order and tranquillity, profound -even on the very edge of the battle-field, attended the march of the -civilized army which passed the Bidassoa. And what were the military -actions? Napoleon rising even above himself hurtled against the armed -myriads opposed to him with such a terrible energy that though ten -times his number they were rolled back on every side in confusion -and dismay. But Wellington advanced without a check, victorious -in every battle, although one half of the veterans opposed to him -would have decided the campaign on the eastern frontier. Nor can -this be gainsaid, since Napoleon’s career in this campaign was only -stayed by the defection of his brother-in-law Murat, and by the -sickening treachery of two marshals to whom he had been prodigal of -benefits. It is undeniable that lord Wellington with sixty thousand -Anglo-Portuguese acting in the south, effected more than half a -million of the allies were able to effect on the opposite side of -France; and yet Soult’s army on the 10th of November was stronger -than that with which Napoleon fought the battle of Brienne. - -That great man was never personally deceived by the allies’ pretended -negociations. He joined issue with them to satisfy the French -people that he was not averse to peace, but his instructions dated -the 4th of January and addressed to Caulaincourt prove at once his -sagacity and firmness. “I think,” he said, “that both the allies -good faith and the wish of England to make peace is doubtful; for -my part I desire peace but it must be solid and honourable. I have -accepted the basis proposed at Frankfort yet it is more than probable -the allies have other notions. These propositions are but a mask, -the negociations are placed under the influence of the military -operations and it is easy to foresee what the consequences of such a -system must be. It is necessary therefore to listen to and observe -every thing. It is not certain even that you will be admitted to -the head-quarters of the allies. The Russians and the English watch -to prevent any opening for explanation and reconciliation with the -emperor of Austria. You must therefore endeavour to ascertain the -real views of the allies and let me know day by day what you learn -that I may frame instructions for which at present I have no sure -grounds.” - -The internal state of France was more disquieting to his mind -than foreign negociations or the number of invaders. The sincere -republicans were naturally averse to him as the restorer of monarchy, -yet they should have felt that the sovereign whose ruin was so -eagerly sought by the legitimate kings and nobles of Europe could not -be really opposed to liberty. Meanwhile the advocates of legitimacy -shrunk from him as an usurper, and all those tired of war, and they -were a majority of the nation, judging from the stupendous power of -his genius that he had only to will peace to attain it with security, -blamed his tardiness in negociation. An unexpected opposition to his -wishes was also displayed in the legislative body, and the partizans -of the Bourbons were endeavouring to form a great conspiracy in -favour of that house. There were many traitors likewise to him and -to their country, men devoid of principle, patriotism, or honour, -who with instinctive hatred of a failing cause plotted to thwart his -projects for the defence of the nation. In fine the men of action -and the men of theories were alike combined for mischief. Nor is -this outbreak of passion to be wondered at when it is considered -how recently Napoleon had stopped the anarchy of the revolution and -rebuilt the social and political structure in France. But of all who -by their untimely opposition to the emperor hurt their country, the -most pernicious were those silly politicians, whom he so felicitously -described as “_discussing abstract systems of government when the -battering ram was at the gates_.” - -Such however has been in all ages the conduct of excited and -disturbed nations, and it seems to be inherent in human nature, -because a saving policy can only be understood and worked to good by -master-spirits, and they are few and far between, their time on earth -short, their task immense. They have not time to teach, they must -command although they know that pride and ignorance and even honesty -will carp at the despotism which brings general safety. It was this -vain short-sighted impatience that drove Hannibal into exile, caused -the assassination of Cæsar, and strewed thorns beneath the gigantic -footsteps of Oliver Cromwell. It raged fiercely in Spain against -lord Wellington, and in France against Napoleon, and always with the -most grievous injury to the several nations. Time only hallows human -institutions. Under that guarantee men will yield implicit obedience -and respect to the wildest caprices of the most stupid tyrant that -ever disgraced a throne, and wanting it they will cavil at and reject -the wisest measures of the most sublime genius. The painful notion -is thus excited, that if governments are conducted with just the -degree of stability and tranquillity which they deserve and no more, -the people of all nations, much as they may be oppressed, enjoy upon -an average of years precisely the degree of liberty they are fitted -for. National discontents mark, according to their bitterness and -constancy, not so much the oppression of the rulers as the real -progress of the ruled in civilization and its attendant political -knowledge. When from peculiar circumstances those discontents -explode in violent revolutions, shattering the fabric of society and -giving free vent and activity to all the passions and follies of -mankind, fortunate is the nation which possesses a Napoleon or an -Oliver Cromwell “_to step into their state of dominion with spirit -to controul and capacity to subdue the factions of the hour and -reconstruct the frame of reasonable government_.” - -For great as these two men were in the field of battle, especially -the former, they were infinitely greater when they placed themselves -in the seat of power, and put forth the gigantic despotism of genius -essential to the completion of their holy work. Nor do I hold the -conduct of Washington to be comparable to either of those men. His -situation was one of infinitely less difficulty, and there is no -reason to believe that his capacity would have been equal to the -emergencies of a more formidable crisis than he had to deal with. -Washington could not have made himself master of all had it been -necessary and he so inclined, for he was neither the foremost general -nor the foremost statesman of his nation. His forbearance was a -matter of necessity, and his love of liberty did not prevent him from -bequeathing his black slaves to his widow. - -Such was Napoleon’s situation, and as he read the signs of the -times truly he knew that in his military skill and the rage of the -peasants at the ravages of the enemy he must find the means to -extricate himself from his difficulties, or rather to extricate his -country, for self had no place in his policy save as his personal -glory was identified with France and her prosperity. Never before -did the world see a man, soaring so high and devoid of all selfish -ambition. Let those who honestly seeking truth doubt this, study -Napoleon carefully; let them read the record of his second abdication -published by his brother Lucien, that stern republican who refused -kingdoms as the price of his principles, and they will doubt no -longer. It is not however with these matters that this History has -to deal but with the emperor’s measures affecting his lieutenants on -the Spanish frontier of France. There disaffection to his government -was extensive but principally from local causes. The conscription -was peculiarly hateful to the wild mountaineers, who like most -borderers cherish very independent notions. The war with England had -ruined the foreign commerce of their great towns, and the advantage -of increased traffic by land on the east was less directly felt in -the south. There also the recollection of the Vendean struggle still -lingered and the partizans of the Bourbons had many connections. But -the chief danger arose from the just and politic conduct of lord -Wellington which, offering no cause of anger and very much of private -advantage to the people, gave little or no hope of insurrection from -sufferings. - -While France was in this state England presented a scene of universal -exultation. Tory politics were triumphant, opposition in the -parliament was nearly crushed by events, the press was either subdued -by persecution or in the pay of the ministers, and the latter with -undisguised joy hailed the coming moment when aristocratic tyranny -was to be firmly established in England. The most enormous subsidies -and military supplies were poured into the continent, and an act was -passed to enable three-fourths of the militia to serve abroad. They -were not however very forward to volunteer, and a new army which -ought to have reinforced Wellington was sent, under the command of -general Graham, to support the insurrection of Holland, where it -was of necessity engaged in trifling or unsuccessful operations in -no manner affecting the great objects of the war. Meanwhile the -importance of lord Wellington’s army and views was quite overlooked -or misunderstood. The ministers persevered in the foolish plan of -removing him to another quarter of Europe, and at the same time, -instigated by the ambassadors of the allied sovereigns, were -continually urging him to push his operations with more vigour in -France. As if he was the man who had done least! - -His letters were filled with strong and well-founded complaints that -his army was neglected. Let his real position be borne in mind. He -had, not as a military man but with a political view and to meet -the wishes of the allied sovereigns backed by the importunities of -his own government, placed himself in a confined and difficult -district of France, where his operations were cramped by rivers and -fortresses and by a powerful army occupying strong positions on his -front and flanks. In this situation, unable to act at all in wet -weather, he was necessarily dependent upon the ocean for supplies and -reinforcements, and upon the Spanish authorities for his hospitals, -depôts, and communications. Numbers were requisite to balance the -advantages derived by the enemy from the peculiar conformation of the -country and the position of the fortresses. Money also was wanted to -procure supplies which he could not carry with him, and must pay for -exactly, if he would avoid a general insurrection and the consequent -ruin of the political object for which he had adopted such critical -military operations. But though he had undertaken the invasion of -France at the express desire of the government the latter seemed to -be alike ignorant of its importance and of the means to accomplish -it, at one moment urging progress beyond reason, at another ready to -change lightly what they had proposed ignorantly. Their unsettled -policy proved their incapacity even to comprehend the nature of the -great tide of events on which they floated rather than sailed. Lord -Wellington was forced day by day to teach them the value of their -own schemes, and to show them how small their knowledge was of the -true bearing of the political and military affairs they pretended to -direct. - -“Assure,” he wrote on the 21st of December to lord Bathurst, in -reply to one of their ill-founded remonstrances, “Assure the -Russian ambassador there is nothing I can do to forward the general -interest that I will not do. What do they require? I am already -further advanced on the French territory than any of the allied -powers, and better prepared to take advantage of any opportunities -which might offer as a consequence of my own situation or of their -proceedings.”—“In military operations there are some things which -can not be done, and one is to move troops in this country during or -immediately after a violent fall of rain. To attempt it will be to -lose more men than can be replaced, a guilty waste of life.” - -“The proper scene of action for the army was undoubtedly a question -for the government to decide, but with thirty thousand men in the -Peninsula, he had for five years held two hundred thousand of -Napoleon’s best soldiers in check, since it was ridiculous to suppose -that the Spaniards and Portuguese could have resisted for a moment -if the British troops had been withdrawn. The French armies actually -employed against him could not be less than one hundred thousand -men, more if he included garrisons, and the French newspapers -spoke of orders to form a fresh reserve of one hundred thousand at -Bordeaux. Was there any man weak enough to suppose one-third of the -number first mentioned would be employed against the Spaniards and -Portuguese if the British were withdrawn? They would if it were an -object with Buonaparte to conquer the Peninsula and he would in that -case succeed; but he was more likely to give peace to the Peninsula -and turn against the allied sovereigns his two hundred thousand men -of which one hundred thousand were such troops as their armies had -not yet dealt with. The war every day offered a crisis the result of -which might affect the world for ages, and to change the scene of -operations for the British army would render it incapable of fighting -for four months, even if the scene were Holland, and it would even -then be a deteriorated machine.” - -“The ministers might reasonably ask how by remaining where he was he -could induce Napoleon to make peace. The answer was ready. He held -a commanding situation on the most vulnerable frontier of France, -probably the only vulnerable one, and if he could put twenty thousand -Spaniards in activity, and he could do it if he had money and was -properly supported by the fleet, Bayonne the only fortress on the -frontier, if it could be called a fortress, would fall to him in a -short time. If he could put forty thousand Spaniards in motion his -posts would soon be on the Garonne, and did any man believe that -Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position more than he -would feel thirty or forty thousand British troops laying siege to -one of his fortresses in Holland? The resources in men and money of -which the emperor would be thus deprived, and the loss of reputation -would do ten times more to procure peace than ten armies on the -side of Flanders. But if he was right in believing a strong Bourbon -party existed in France and that it preponderated in the south, -what mischief would not an advance to the Garonne do Napoleon! What -sacrifices would he not make to get rid of the danger!” - -“It was for the government not for him to dispose of the nation’s -resources, he had no right to give an opinion upon the subject, -but military operations in Holland and in the Peninsula could not -be maintained at the same time with British troops; one or other -must be given up, the British military establishment was not equal -to maintain two armies in the field. He had begun the recent -campaign with seventy thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and if the men -got from the English militia, and the Portuguese recruits which he -expected, had been added to his force, even though the Germans were -removed from his army according to the ministers’ plan, he might -have taken the field early in 1814 with eighty thousand men. That -was now impossible. The formation of a Hanoverian army was the most -reasonable plan of acting on the continent but the withdrawal of -the Germans would reduce his force to fifty thousand men unless he -received real and efficient assistance to bring up the Portuguese -recruits. This would increase his numbers to fifty-five or even -sixty thousand if his own wounded recovered well and he had no more -battles, but he would even then be twenty thousand less than he had -calculated upon, and it was certain that if the government extended -their operations to other countries new means must be put in activity -or the war must be stinted on the old stage. He did not desire to -complain but every branch of the service in the Peninsula was already -stinted especially in what concerned the navy and the supplies which -came directly from England!” - -While thus combating the false views of the English cabinet as to the -general state of affairs he had also to struggle with its negligence -and even opposition to his measures in details. - -The general clothing of the Spanish troops and the great coats of the -British soldiers for 1813, were not ready in January 1814, because -the inferior departments could not comprehend that the opening of new -scenes of exertion required new means, and the soldiers had to brave -the winter half naked, first on the snowy mountains, then in the more -chilling damps of the low country about Bayonne. The clothing of the -British soldiers for 1814 should have arrived in the end of 1813 when -the army lying inactive near the coast by reason of the bad weather -could have received and fitted it without difficulty. It did not -however arrive until the troops were in progress towards the interior -of France, wherefore, there being no means of transporting it by -land, many of the best regiments were obliged to return to the coast -to receive it, and the army as we shall find had to fight a critical -battle without them. - -He had upon commencing the invasion of France issued a proclamation -promising protection to persons and property. This was construed by -the French to cover their vessels in the Nivelle when the battle -of that name gave the allies St. Jean de Luz. Lord Wellington -sacrificing personal profit to the good of the service admitted this -claim as tending to render the people amicable, but it clashed with -the prize-money pretensions of lord Keith who commanded the fleet -of which Collier’s squadron formed a detached portion. The serious -evils endured by the army in default of sufficient naval assistance -had been treated as of very slight importance, the object of a -trifling personal gain for the navy excited a marvellous activity, -and vigorous interference on the part of the government. Upon these -subjects, and others of a like vexatious nature affecting his -operations, lord Wellington repeatedly and forcibly declared his -discontent during the months of December, January, and February. - -“As to the naval affairs,” he said, “the reports of the number of -ships on the stations striking off those coming out and going home -would shew whether he had just ground of complaint, and whatever -their numbers there remained the right of complaint because they -did not perform the service required. The French had recommenced -their coast navigation from Bordeaux to Bayonne, and if the blockade -of Santona had been maintained the place would have been forced to -surrender at an early period. The proclamation of protection which -he had issued, and the licenses which he had granted to French -vessels, every act of that description, and two-thirds of the acts -which he performed every day could not he knew be considered of any -avail as affecting the king’s government, unless approved of and -confirmed by the prince regent; and he knew that no power short of -the regent’s could save the property of French subjects on the seas -from the British navy. For that reason he had requested the sanction -of the government to the sea passports which he had granted. His -proclamation of protection had been construed whether rightfully or -wrongfully to protect the French ships in the rivers; his personal -interest, greater than others, would lead him to deny this, but he -sacrificed his profit to the general good. - -“Were lord Keith and sir George Collier because the latter happened -to have a brig or two cruizing off the coast, to claim as prizes all -the vessels lying in every river which the army might pass in its -operations? and this to the detriment of the cause which required the -strictest respect for private property. For the last five years he -had been acting in the confidence that his conduct would be approved -of and supported, and he concluded it would be so still; but he was -placed in a novel situation and asked for legal advice to determine, -whether lord Keith and the channel fleet, were to be considered -as engaged in a conjoint expedition with the army under his -command against the subjects of France, neither having any specific -instructions from government, and the fleet having nothing to do with -the operations by land. He only required that fleet to give him a -free communication with the coast of Spain, and prevent the enemy’s -sea communication between the Garonne and the Adour, and this last -was a part of its duty before the army arrived. Was his proclamation -of protection to hold good as regarded the ships in the rivers? He -desired to have it sanctioned by the prince regent, or that he might -be permitted to issue another declaring that it was of no value.” - -This remonstrance produced so much effect that lord Keith -relinquished his claims, and admiral Penrose was sent to command upon -the station instead of sir George Collier. The immediate intercourse -of lord Wellington with the navy was thus ameliorated by the superior -power of this officer, who was remarkable for his suavity. Yet the -licenses given to French vessels were strongly condemned by the -government, and rendered null, for we find him again complaining that -“he had granted them only in hopes of drawing money and supplies from -France, and of interesting the French mercantile men to aid the army; -but he feared the government were not aware of, and did not feel the -difficulties in which he was placed at all times for want of money, -and judged his measures without adverting to the necessity which -occasioned them; hence their frequent disapprobation of what he did.” - -Strange this may sound to those who seeing the duke of Wellington in -the fulness of his glory have been accustomed to regard him as the -star of England’s greatness; but those who at that period frequented -the society of ministers know well that he was then looked upon -by those self-sufficient men as a person whose views were wild and -visionary, requiring the corroboration of older and wiser heads -before they could be assented to. Yea! even thus at the eleventh hour -was the giant Wellington measured by the political dwarfs. - -Although he gained something by making San Jean de Luz a free port -for all nations not at war with France, his financial situation was -nearly intolerable, and at the moment of greatest pressure colonel -Bunbury, under-secretary of state, was sent out to protest against -his expenses. One hundred thousand pounds a month was the maximum -in specie which the government would consent to supply, a sum quite -inadequate to his wants. And this remonstrance was addressed to this -victorious commander at the very crisis of his stupendous struggle, -when he was overwhelmed with debts and could scarcely stir out of his -quarters on account of the multitude of creditors waiting at his door -for payment of just claims. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Despatches.] - -“Some of his muleteers he said were twenty-six months in arrears, -and recently, instigated by British merchants, they had become so -clamorous that rather than lose their services he had given them -bills on the treasury for a part of their claims, though he knew they -would sell these bills at a discount to the _sharks_, who had urged -them to be thus importunate and who were waiting at the ports to take -advantage of the public distresses. A dangerous measure which he -desired not to repeat. - -“It might be true that the supply of one hundred thousand pounds -a month had been even exceeded for some time past, but it was -incontestible that the English army and all its departments, and -the Spanish and Portuguese armies were at the moment paralyzed for -want of money. The arrears of pay to the soldiers was entering the -seventh month, the debt was immense, and the king’s engagements with -the Spanish and Portuguese governments were not fulfilled. Indebted -in every part of Spain he was becoming so in France, the price of all -commodities was increasing in proportion to the delay of payment, to -the difficulty of getting food at all, and the want of credit into -which all the departments of the army had fallen. Of two hundred -thousand dollars given to marshal Beresford for the pay of his troops -on account of the Portuguese subsidy he had been forced to take back -fifty thousand to keep the Spaniards together, and was even then -forced to withhold ten thousand to prevent the British cavalry from -perishing. Money to pay the Spaniards had sailed from Cadiz, but -the vessel conveying it, and another containing the soldiers’ great -coats, were by the admiralty arrangements obliged to go first to -Corunna, and neither had arrived there in January although the money -had been ready in October. But the ship of war designed to carry it -did not arrive at Cadiz until the end of December. Sixteen thousand -Spanish troops were thus rendered useless because without pay they -could not be trusted in France.” - -“The commissary-in-chief in England had been regularly informed of -the state of the supplies of the military chest and of the wants and -prospects of the army, but those wants were not attended to. The -monthly hundred thousand pounds spoken of as the maximum, even if -it had been given regularly, would not cover the ordinary expenses -of the troops, and there were besides the subsidies other outlays -requiring ready money, such as meat for the soldiers, hospital -expenses, commissariat labourers, and a variety of minor engagements. -The Portuguese government had been reduced to a monthly sum of two -hundred thousand dollars out of a subsidy of two millions sterling. -The Spanish government got what they could out of a subsidy of one -million. And when money was obtained for the government in the -markets of Lisbon and Cadiz, it came not in due time, because, such -were the admiralty arrangements, there were no ships to convey -the treasure to the north coast of Spain. The whole sum which had -passed through the military chest during the past year was scarcely -more than two millions four hundred thousand pounds, out of which -part of the subsidies had been paid. This was quite inadequate, the -Government had desired him to push his operations to the Garonne -during the winter, he was prepared to do so in every point excepting -money, and he knew the greatest advantages would accrue from such a -movement but he could not stir. His posts were already so distant -from the coast that his means of transport were daily destroyed by -the journeys, he had not a shilling to pay for any thing in the -country and his credit was gone. He had been obliged privately to -borrow the expense of a single courier sent to general Clinton. It -was not his duty to suggest the fitting measures for relief, but -it was obvious that an immediate and large supply from England was -necessary and that ships should be provided to convey that which was -obtained at Lisbon and Cadiz to the army.” - -Such was the denuded state of the victorious Wellington at a time -when millions, and the worth of more millions were being poured by -the English ministers into the continent; when every petty German -sovereign, partizan, or robber, who raised a band, or a cry against -Napoleon, was supplied to satiety. And all this time there was not -in England one public salary reduced, one contract checked, one -abuse corrected, one public servant rebuked for negligence; not a -writer dared to expose the mischief lest he should be crushed by -persecution; no minister ceased to claim and to receive the boasting -congratulations of the tories, no whig had sense to discover or -spirit to denounce the iniquitous system, no voice of reprehension -was heard from that selfish faction unless it were in sneering -contempt of the general whose mighty genius sustained England under -this load of folly. - -Nor were these difficulties all that lord Wellington had to -contend with. We have seen that the Portuguese regency withheld -his reinforcements even when he had provided transports for their -conveyance. The duke of York meanwhile insisted upon withdrawing his -provisional battalions, which being all composed of old soldiers, -the remains of regiments reduced by the casualties of war, were of -more value in a winter campaign than three times their numbers of -new men. With respect to the English militia regiments, he had no -desire for them, because they possessed, he said, all the worst -faults of the regulars and some peculiar to themselves besides. What -he desired was that eight or ten thousand men should be drafted from -them to fill up his ranks, he could then without much injury let his -foreign battalions be taken away to reform a Hanoverian army on the -continent; and this plan he was inclined to, because the Germans, -brave and strong soldiers, were yet extremely addicted to desertion -and in that particular set a bad example to the British: this -suggestion was however disregarded, and other reinforcements were -promised to him. - -But the most serious of all the secondary vexations he endured sprung -from the conduct of the Spanish authorities. His hospitals and depôts -were for the most part necessarily in the Spanish territories and -principally at Santander. To avoid inconvenience to the inhabitants -he had caused portable wooden houses to be brought from England in -which to shelter his sick and wounded men; and he paid extravagantly -and regularly for every aid demanded from the natives. Nevertheless -the natural arrogance or ill-will which produced the libels about -St. Sebastian the insolence of the minister of war and the sullen -insubordination of Morillo and other generals broke out here also. -After much underhand and irritating conduct at different times, -the municipality, resolute to drive the hospitals from their town, -suddenly, and under the false pretext that there was a contagious -fever, placed all the British hospitals with their officers and -attendants under quarantine. This was in the middle of January. -Thirty thousand men had been wounded since June in the service of -Spain, and the return was to make those wounded men close prisoners -and drive their general to the necessity of fixing his hospitals in -England. Vessels coming from Santander were thus rendered objects -of dread, and the municipalities of the other ports, either really -fearing or pretending to fear the contagion, would not suffer them to -enter their waters. To such a height did this cowardice and villainy -attain that the political chief of Guipuscoa, without giving any -notice to lord Wellington, shut all the ports of that province -against vessels coming from Santander, and the alcalde of Fuenterabia -endeavoured to prevent a Portuguese military officer from assisting -an English vessel which was about to be and was afterwards actually -cast away, because she came from Santander. - -Now in consequence of the difficulties and dangers of navigating the -Bay of Biscay in the winter and the badness of the ports near the -positions of the army, all the stores and provisions coming by sea -went in the first instance to Santander, the only good port, there to -wait until favourable opportunities occurred for reaching the more -eastern harbours. Moreover all the provision magazines of the Spanish -army were there, but this blow cut them off, the army was reduced to -the smaller magazines at Passages which could only last for a few -days, and when that supply was expended lord Wellington would have -had no resource but to withdraw across the Pyrenees! “_Here,” he -exclaimed, “here are the consequences of the system by which these -provinces are governed! Duties of the highest description, military -operations, political interests, and the salvation of the state, are -made to depend upon the caprices of a few ignorant individuals, who -have adopted a measure unnecessary and harsh without adverting to its -objects or consequences, and merely with a view to their personal -interests and convenience._” - -They carried it into execution also with the utmost hardness caprice -and injustice, regardless of the loss of ships and lives which -must follow, and finally desired lord Wellington to relinquish the -harbour and town of Santander altogether as a depôt! However his -vigorous remonstrances stopped this nefarious proceeding in time to -avert the danger which it menaced. - -Be it remembered now, that these dangers and difficulties, and -vexations, although related in succession, happened, not one after -another, but altogether; that it was when crossing the Bidassoa, -breaking through the mountain fortifications of Soult, passing the -Nive, fighting the battles in front of Bayonne, and when still -greater and more intricate combinations were to be arranged, that all -these vials of folly and enmity were poured upon his head. Who then -shall refuse to admire the undaunted firmness, the unwearied temper -and vigilance, the piercing judgement with which he steered his -gallant vessel and with a flowing sail, unhurt through this howling -storm of passion this tumultuous sea of folly. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN THE EASTERN PARTS OF SPAIN. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. September.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix 6.] - -When general Clinton succeeded lord William Bentinck, his whole -force, composed of the Anglo-Sicilians, Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s -Spaniards, and two battalions of Roche’s division, did not furnish -quite nineteen thousand men under arms. Copons, blockading Mequinenza -Lerida and Monzon and having garrisons in Cardona and the Seo -d’Urgel, the only places in his possession, could not bring more than -nine thousand men into the field. Elio had nominally twenty-five -thousand, but this included Sarzfield’s and Roche’s troops the -greater part of which were with Clinton. It included likewise the -bands of Villa Campa Duran and the Empecinado, all scattered in -Castile Aragon and Valencia, and acting according to the caprices -of their chiefs. His force, daily diminishing also from the extreme -unhealthiness of the country about Tortoza, was scarcely sufficient -to maintain the blockades of the French fortresses beyond the Ebro. - -Copons’ army having no base but the mountains about Vich and -Monserrat, having no magazines or depôts or place of arms, having -very little artillery and scarcely any cavalry, lived as it could -from day to day; in like manner lived Sarzfield’s and Whittingham’s -troops, and Clinton’s army was chiefly fed on salt provisions from -the ships. The two former having no means of transport were unable -to make even one day’s march with ease, they were continually upon -the point of starvation and could never be reckoned as a moveable -force. Nor indeed could the Anglo-Sicilians, owing to their scanty -means of transport, make above two or three marches from the sea; and -they were at this time more than usually hampered, being without pay -and shut out from their principal depôts at Gibraltar and Malta, by -plague at the first and yellow fever at the second place. In fine, -the courage and discipline of the British and Germans set aside, it -would be difficult to find armies less efficient for an offensive -campaign than those of the allies in Catalonia. Moreover lord William -Bentinck had been invested with the command of all the Spanish -armies, but Clinton had only Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s troops -under him, and notwithstanding his constant endeavours to conciliate -Copons, the indolence and incapacity of that general impeded or -baffled all useful operations: and to these disqualifications he -added an extreme jealousy of Eroles and Manso, men designated by the -public voice as the most worthy of command. - -This analysis shows that Elio being entirely engaged in Valencia, and -Sarzfield and Whittingham unprovided with the means of movement, the -army of Copons and the Anglo-Sicilians, together furnishing, when the -posts and escorts and the labourers employed on the fortifications of -Taragona were deducted, not more than eighteen thousand men in line -of battle, were the only troops to be counted on to oppose Suchet, -who having sixty-five thousand men, of which fifty-six thousand were -present under arms, could without drawing a man from his garrisons -attack them with thirty thousand. But Copons and Clinton could not -act together above a few days because their bases and lines of -retreat were on different sides. The Spaniard depended upon the -mountains and plains of the interior for security and subsistence, -the Englishman’s base was Taragona and the fleet. Hence the only mode -of combining on a single line was to make Valencia a common base, -and throwing bridges over the Ebro construct works on both sides to -defend them. This was strongly recommended by lord Wellington to -lord William and to Clinton; but the former had several times lost -his bridges partly from the rapidity of the stream, partly from the -activity of the garrison of Tortoza. And for general Clinton the -difficulty was enhanced by distance, because Taragona, where all his -materials were deposited was sixty miles from Amposta, and all his -artificers were required to restore the defences of the former place. -The blockade of Tortoza was therefore always liable to be raised, and -the troops employed there exposed to a sudden and fatal attack, since -Suchet, sure to separate the Anglo-Sicilians from Copons when he -advanced, could penetrate between them; and while the former rallied -at Taragona and the latter at Igualada his march would be direct -upon Tortoza. He could thus either carry off his strong garrison, or -passing the Ebro by the bridge of the fortress, move without let or -hindrance upon Peniscola, Saguntum, and Valencia, and driving Elio -back upon Alicant collect his garrisons and return too powerful to be -meddled with. - -In these circumstances lord Wellington’s opinion was, that the -blockade of Tortoza should be given up and the two armies acting on -their own peculiar lines, the one from Taragona the other from the -mountains, harass in concert the enemy’s flanks and rear, alternately -if he attacked either, but together if he moved upon Tortoza. To -besiege or blockade that place with safety it was necessary to throw -two bridges over the Ebro below, to enable the armies to avoid -Suchet, by either bank when he should succour the place, as he was -sure to do. But it was essential that Copons should not abandon -Catalonia and difficult for him to do so, wherefore it would be -advisable to make Taragona the point of retreat for both armies in -the first instance, after which they could separate and infest the -French rear. - -The difficulties of besieging Tortoza he thought insuperable, and -he especially recommended that they should be well considered -before-hand, and if it was invested, that the troops should be -entrenched around it. In fine all his instructions tended towards -defence and were founded upon his conviction of the weak and -dangerous position of the allies, yet he believed them to have more -resources than they really had, and to be superior in number to the -French, a great error as I have already shewn. Nothing therefore -could be more preposterous than Suchet’s alarm for the frontier of -France at this time, and it is unquestionable that his personal -reluctance was the only bar to aiding Soult either indirectly by -marching on Tortoza and Valencia, or directly by adopting that -marshal’s great project of uniting the two armies in Aragon. So -certain indeed is this that general Clinton, seeing the difficulties -of his own situation, only retained the command from a strong sense -of duty, and lord Wellington despairing of any advantage in Catalonia -recommended that the Anglo-Sicilian army should be broken up and -employed in other places. The French general’s inactivity was the -more injurious to the interests of his sovereign, because any reverse -or appearance of reverse to the allies would at this time have gone -nigh to destroy the alliance between Spain and England; but personal -jealousy, the preference given to local and momentary interests -before general considerations, hurt the French cause at all periods -in the Peninsula and enabled the allies to conquer. - -General Clinton had no thoughts of besieging Tortoza, his efforts -were directed to the obtaining a secure place of arms, yet, -despite of his intrinsic weakness, he resolved to show a confident -front, hoping thus to keep Suchet at arm’s length. In this view he -endeavoured to render Taragona once more defensible notwithstanding -the nineteen breaches which had been broken in its walls; the -progress of the work was however tedious and vexatious because -he depended for his materials upon the Spanish authorities. Thus -immersed in difficulties of all kinds he could make little change -in his positions which were generally about the Campo, Sarzfield’s -division only being pushed to Villafranca. Suchet meanwhile held the -line of the Llobregat, and apparently to colour his refusal to join -Soult, grounded on the great strength of the allies in Catalonia, he -suffered general Clinton to remain in tranquillity. - -[Sidenote: October.] - -Towards the end of October reports that the French were -concentrating, for what purpose was not known, caused the English -general, although Taragona was still indefensible to make a forward -movement. He dared not indeed provoke a battle, but unwilling to -yield the resources which Villafranca and other districts occupied -by the allies still offered, he adopted the resolution of pushing an -advanced guard to the former place. He even fixed his head-quarters -there, appearing ready to fight, yet his troops were so disposed -in succession at Arbos, Vendrills and Torredembarra that he could -retreat without dishonour if the French advanced in force, or could -concentrate at Villafranca in time to harass their flank and rear -if they attempted to carry off their garrisons on the Segre. In -this state of affairs Suchet made several demonstrations, sometimes -against Copons sometimes against Clinton, but the latter maintained -his offensive attitude with firmness, and even in opposition to lord -Wellington’s implied opinion that the line of the Ebro was the most -suitable to his weakness; for he liked not to abandon Taragona the -repairs of which were now advancing though slowly to completion. His -perseverance was crowned with success; he preserved the few resources -left for the support of the Spanish troops, and furnished Suchet with -that semblance of excuse which he desired for keeping aloof from -Soult. - -[Sidenote: December.] - -In this manner October and November were passed, but on the 1st -of December the French general attempted to surprise the allies’ -cantonments at Villafranca, as he had before surprised them at Ordal. -He moved in the same order. One column marched by San Sadurni on his -right, another by Bejer and Avionet on his left, and the main body -kept the great road. But he did not find colonel Adam there. Clinton -had blocked the Ordal so as to render a night surprise impossible, -and the natural difficulties of the other roads delayed the flanking -columns. Hence when the French reached Villafranca, Sarzfield was -in full march for Igualada, and the Anglo-Sicilians, who had only -three men wounded at one of the advanced posts, were on the strong -ground about Arbos, where being joined by the supporting divisions -they offered battle; but Suchet retired to the Llobregat apparently -so mortified by his failure that he has not even mentioned it in his -Memoirs. - -Clinton now resumed his former ground, yet his embarrassments -increased, and though he transferred two of Whittingham’s regiments -to Copons and sent Roche’s battalions back to Valencia, the country -was so exhausted that the enduring constancy of the Spanish soldiers -under privations alone enabled Sarzfield to remain in the field: -more than once, that general, a man of undoubted firmness and -courage, was upon the point of re-crossing the Ebro to save his -soldiers from perishing of famine. Here as in other parts, the -Spanish government not only starved their troops but would not -even provide a piece of ordnance or any stores for the defence of -Taragona, now, by the exertions of the English general, rendered -defensible. Nay! when admiral Hallowell in conjunction with Quesada -the Spanish commodore at Port Mahon, brought some ship-guns from that -place to the fortress, the minister of war, O’Donoju, expressed his -disapprobation, observing with a sneer that the English might provide -the guns wanting from the Spanish ordnance moved into Gibraltar by -general Campbell when he destroyed the lines of San Roque! - -The 9th Suchet pushed a small corps by Bejer between the Ordal and -Sitjes, and on the 10th surprised at the Ostel of Ordal an officer -and thirty men of the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry. This disaster was the -result of negligence. The detachment after patroling to the front -had dismounted without examining the buildings of the inn, and some -French troopers who were concealed within immediately seized the -horses and captured the whole party. - -On the 17th, French troops appeared at Martorel, the Ordal, and -Bejer, with a view to mask the march of a large convoy coming -from Upper Catalonia to Barcelona; they then resumed their former -positions, and at the same time Soult’s and lord Wellington’s -respective letters announcing the defection of the Nassau battalions -in front of Bayonne arrived. Lord Wellington’s came first, and -enclosed a communication from colonel Kruse to his countryman, -colonel Meder, who was serving in Barcelona and as Kruse supposed -willing to abandon the French. But when Clinton by the aid of Manso -transmitted the letter to Meder, that officer handed it to general -Habert who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the command of the city. -All the German regiments, principally cavalry, were immediately -disarmed and sent to France. Severoli’s Italians were at the same -time recalled to Italy and a number of French soldiers, selected to -fill the wasted ranks of the imperial guards, marched with them; two -thousand officers and soldiers were likewise detached to the depôts -of the interior to organize the conscripts of the new levy destined -to reinforce the army of Catalonia. Besides these drafts a thousand -gensd’armes hitherto employed on the Spanish frontier in aid of the -regular troops were withdrawn; Suchet thus lost seven thousand -veterans, yet he had still an overwhelming power compared to the -allies. - -It was in this state of affairs that the duke of San Carlos, bearing -the treaty of Valençay, arrived secretly at the French head-quarters -on his way to Madrid. Copons knew this, and it seems certain was only -deterred from openly acceding to the views of the French emperor -and concluding a military convention, by the decided conduct of the -Cortez, and the ascendancy which lord Wellington had obtained over -him in common with the other Spanish officers: an ascendancy which -had not escaped Soult’s sagacity, for he early warned the French -minister that nothing could be expected from them while under the -powerful spell of the English general. Meanwhile Clinton, getting -information that the French troops were diminished in numbers, -especially in front of Barcelona and on the Llobregat, proposed -to pass that river and invest Barcelona if Copons, who was in the -mountains, would undertake to provision Sarzfield’s division and -keep the French troops between Barcelona and Gerona in check. For -this purpose he offered him the aid of a Spanish regiment of cavalry -which Elio had lent for the operations in Catalonia; but Copons, -whether influenced by San Carlos’ mission and his secret wishes for -its success, or knowing that the enemy were really stronger than -Clinton imagined, declared that he was unable to hold the French -troops between Gerona and Barcelona in check, and that he could not -provision either Sarzfield’s division or the regiment of cavalry. -He suggested instead of Clinton’s plan, a combined attack upon some -of Suchet’s posts on the Llobregat, promising to send Manso to -Villafranca to confer upon the execution. Clinton’s proposal was -made early in January yet it was the middle of that month before -Copons replied, and then he only sent Manso to offer the aid of his -brigade in a combined attack upon two thousand French who were at -Molino del Rey. It was however at last arranged that Manso should at -day-break on the 16th seize the high ground above Molino, on the left -of the Llobregat, to intercept the enemy’s retreat upon Barcelona, -while the Anglo-Sicilians fell upon them from the right bank. - -[Sidenote: 1814. January.] - -Success depended upon Clinton’s remaining quiet until the moment of -execution, wherefore he could only use the troops immediately in -hand about Villafranca, in all six thousand men with three pieces of -artillery; but with these he made a night march of eighteen miles, -and was close to the ford of San Vicente about two miles below the -fortified bridge of Molino del Rey before daylight. The French were -tranquil and unsuspicious, and he anxiously but vainly awaited the -signal of Manso’s arrival. When the day broke, the French piquets at -San Vicente descrying his troops commenced a skirmish, and at the -same time a column with a piece of artillery, coming from Molino, -advanced to attack him thinking there was only a patroling detachment -to deal with, for he had concealed his main body. Thus pressed he -opened his guns per force and crippled the French piece, whereupon -the reinforcements retired hastily to the entrenchments at Molino; he -could then easily have forced the passage at the ford and attacked -the enemy’s works in the rear, but this would not have ensured the -capture of their troops, wherefore he still awaited Manso’s arrival -relying on that partizan’s zeal and knowledge of the country. He -appeared at last, not, as agreed upon, at St. Filieu, between -Molino and Barcelona, but at Papiol above Molino, and the French -immediately retreated by San Filieu. Sarzfield, and the cavalry, -which Clinton now detached across the Llobregat, followed them hard, -but the country was difficult, the distance short, and they soon -gained a second entrenched camp above San Filieu. A small garrison -remained in the masonry-works at Molino, general Clinton endeavoured -to reduce them but his guns were not of a calibre to break the walls -and the enemy was strongly reinforced towards evening from Barcelona; -whereupon Manso went off to the mountains, and Clinton returned to -Villafranca having killed and wounded about one hundred and eighty -French, and lost only sixty-four men, all Spaniards. - -Manso’s failure surprized the English general, because that officer, -unlike the generality of his countrymen, was zealous, skilful, -vigilant, modest, and humane, and a sincere co-operator with the -British officers. He however soon cleared himself of blame, assuring -Clinton that Copons, contrary to his previous declarations, had -joined him with four thousand men, and taking the controul of his -troops not only commenced the march two hours too late, but without -any reason halted for three hours on the way. Nor did that general -offer any excuse or explanation of his conduct, merely observing, -that the plan having failed nothing more could be done and he must -return to his mountainous asylum about Vich. A man of any other -nation would have been accused of treachery, but with the Spaniards -there is no limit to absurdity, and from their actions no conclusion -can be drawn as to their motives. - -The great events of the general war were now beginning to affect the -struggle in Catalonia. Suchet finding that Copons dared not agree -to the military convention dependent upon the treaty of Valençay, -resigned all thoughts of carrying off his garrisons beyond the Ebro, -and secretly instructed the governor of Tortoza, that when his -provisions, calculated to last until April, were exhausted, he should -march upon Mequinenza and Lerida, unite the garrisons there to his -own, and make way by Venasque into France. Meanwhile he increased -the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men and prepared to take -the line of the Fluvia; for the allied sovereigns were in France -and Napoleon had recalled more of his cavalry and infantry, in all -ten thousand men with eighty pieces of artillery, from Catalonia, -desiring that they should march as soon as the results expected from -the mission of San Carlos were felt by the allies. Suchet prepared -the troops but proposed that instead of waiting for the uncertain -result of San Carlos’ mission, Ferdinand should himself be sent -to Spain through Catalonia and be trusted on his faith to restore -the garrisons in Valencia. Then he said he could march with his -whole army to Lyons which would be more efficacious than sending -detachments. The restoration of Ferdinand was the Emperor’s great -object, but this plausible proposition can only be viewed as a -colourable counter-project to Soult’s plan for a junction of the two -armies in Bearn, since the Emperor was undoubtedly the best judge of -what was required for the warfare immediately under his own direction. - -It was in the midst of these operations that Clinton attacked Molino -del Rey and as we have seen would but for the interference of Copons -have stricken a great blow, which was however soon inflicted in -another manner. - -[Sidenote: Memoir by Sir Wm. Clinton, MSS.] - -There was at this time in the French service a Spaniard of Flemish -descent called Van Halen. This man, of fair complexion, handsome -person, and a natural genius for desperate treasons, appears to -have been at first attached to Joseph’s court. After that monarch’s -retreat from Spain he was placed by the duke de Feltre on Suchet’s -staff; but the French party was now a failing one and Van Halen -only sought by some notable treachery to make his peace with his -country. Through the medium of a young widow, who followed him -without suffering their connection to appear, he informed Eroles of -his object. He transmitted through the same channel regular returns -of Suchet’s force and other matters of interest, and at last having -secretly opened Suchet’s portfolio he copied the key of his cypher, -and transmitted that also, with an intimation that he would now -soon pass over and endeavour to perform some other service at the -same time. The opportunity soon offered. Suchet went to Gerona to -meet the duke of San Carlos, leaving Van Halen at Barcelona, and -the latter immediately taking an escort of three hussars went to -Granollers where the cuirassiers were quartered. Using the marshal’s -name he ordered them to escort him to the Spanish outposts, which -being in the mountains could only be approached by a long and narrow -pass where cavalry would be helpless. In this pass he ordered the -troops to bivouac for the night, and when their colonel expressed -his uneasiness, Van Halen quieted him and made a solitary mill their -common quarters. He had before this, however, sent the widow to -give Eroles information of the situation into which he would bring -the troops and now with anxiety awaited his attack; but the Spanish -general failed to come and at daybreak Van Halen, still pretending he -carried a flag of truce from Suchet, rode off with his first escort -of hussars and a trumpeter to the Spanish lines. There he ascertained -that the widow had been detained by the outposts and immediately -delivered over his escort to their enemies, giving notice also of the -situation of the cuirassiers with a view to their destruction, but -they escaped the danger. - -Van Halen and Eroles now forged Suchet’s signature, and the former -addressed letters in cypher to the governors of Tortoza, Lerida, -Mequinenza, and Monzon, telling them that the emperor in consequence -of his reverses required large drafts of men from Catalonia, and had -given Suchet orders to negotiate a convention by which the garrisons -south of the Llobregat were to join the army with arms and baggage -and followers. The result was uncertain, but if the treaty could not -be effected the governors were to join the army by force, and they -were therefore immediately to mine their principal bastions and be -prepared to sally forth at an appointed time. The marches and points -of junction were all given in detail, yet they were told that if the -convention took place the marshal would immediately send an officer -of his staff to them, with such verbal instructions as might be -necessary. The document finished with deploring the necessity which -called for the sacrifice of conquests achieved by the valour of the -troops. - -Spies and emissaries who act for both sides are common in all wars, -but in the Peninsula so many pretended to serve the French and were -yet true to the Spaniards, that to avoid the danger of betrayal -Suchet had recourse to the ingenious artifice of placing a very small -piece of light-coloured hair in the cyphered paper, the latter was -then enclosed in a quill sealed and wrapped in lead. When received, -the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of white paper and -if the hair was discovered the communication was good, if not, the -treachery was apparent because the hair would escape the vigilance -of uninitiated persons and be lost by any intermediate examination. -Van Halen knew this secret also, and when his emissaries had returned -after delivering the preparatory communication, he proceeded in -person with a forged convention, first to Tortoza, for Suchet has -erroneously stated in his Memoirs that the primary attempts were -made at Lerida and Mequinenza. He was accompanied by several Spanish -officers and by some French deserters dressed in the uniforms of the -hussars he had betrayed to the Spanish outposts. The governor Robert -though a vigilant officer was deceived and prepared to evacuate the -place. During the night however a true emissary arrived with a letter -from Suchet of later date than the forged convention. Robert then -endeavoured to entice Van Halen into the fortress, but the other was -too wary and proceeded at once to Mequinenza and Lerida where he -completely overreached the governors and then went to Monzon. - -This small fortress had now been besieged since the 28th of September -1813, by detachments from the Catalan army and the bands from Aragon. -Its means of defence were slight, but there was within a man of -resolution and genius called St. Jacques. He was a Piedmontese by -birth and only a private soldier of engineers, but the commandant -appreciating his worth was so modest and prudent as to yield the -direction of the defence entirely to him. Abounding in resources, he -met, and at every point baffled the besiegers who worked principally -by mines, and being as brave as he was ingenious always led the -numerous counter-attacks which he contrived to check the approaches -above and below ground. The siege continued until the 18th of -February when the subtle Van Halen arrived, and by his Spanish wiles -obtained in a few hours what Spanish courage and perseverance had -vainly strived to gain for one hundred and forty days. The commandant -was suspicious at first, but when Van Halen suffered him to send an -officer to ascertain that Lerida and Mequinenza were evacuated, he -was beguiled like the others and marched to join the garrisons of -those places. - -Sir William Clinton had been informed of this project by Eroles -as early as the 22d of January and though he did not expect any -French general would be so egregiously misled, readily promised the -assistance of his army to capture the garrisons on their march. But -Suchet was now falling back upon the Fluvia, and Clinton, seeing -the fortified line of the Llobregat weakened and being uncertain of -Suchet’s real strength and designs, renewed his former proposal to -Copons for a combined attack which should force the French general -to discover his real situation and projects. Ere he could obtain an -answer, the want of forage obliged him to refuse the assistance of -the Spanish cavalry lent to him by Elio, and Sarzfield’s division -was reduced to its last ration. The French thus made their retreat -unmolested, for Clinton’s project necessarily involved the investment -of Barcelona after passing the Llobregat, and the Anglo-Sicilian -cavalry, being mounted on small Egyptian animals the greatest part -of which were foundered or unserviceable from sand-cracks, a disease -very common amongst the horses of that country, were too weak to -act without the aid of Elio’s horsemen. Moreover as a division of -infantry was left at Taragona awaiting the effect of Van Halen’s -wiles against Tortoza the aid of Sarzfield’s troops was indispensable. - -[Sidenote: February.] - -Copons accepted the proposition towards the end of the month, the -Spanish cavalry was then gone to the rear, but Sarzfield having -with great difficulty obtained some provisions the army was put in -movement on the 3d of February, and as Suchet was now near Gerona, -it passed the Llobregat at the bridge of Molino del Rey without -resistance. On the 5th Sarzfield’s picquets were vigorously attacked -at San Filieu by the garrison of Barcelona, he however supported -them with his whole division and being reinforced with some cavalry -repulsed the French and pursued them to the walls. On the 7th the -city was invested on the land side by Copons who was soon aided by -Manso; on the sea-board by admiral Hallowell, who following the -movements of the army with the fleet blockaded the harbour with the -Castor frigate, and anchored the Fame a seventy-four off Mataro. On -the 8th intelligence arrived of Van Halen’s failure at Tortoza, but -the blockade of Barcelona continued uninterrupted until the 16th when -Clinton was informed by Copons of the success at Lerida, Mequinenza, -and Monzon. The garrisons, he said, would march upon Igualada, and -Eroles who, under pretence of causing the convention to be observed -by the Somatenes, was to follow in their rear, proposed to undeceive -and disarm them at that place. On the 17th however he sent notice -that Martorel had been fixed upon in preference to Igualada for -undeceiving and disarming the French, and as they would be at the -former place that evening general Clinton was desired to send some of -his troops there to ensure the success of the project. - -This change of plan and the short warning, for Martorel was a long -march from Barcelona, together with the doubts and embarrassments -which Copons’ conduct always caused, inclined the English general -to avoid meddling with the matter at all; yet fearing that it would -fail in the Spaniard’s hands he finally drafted a strong division of -troops and marched in person to Martorel. There he met Copons who now -told him that the French would not pass Esparaguera that night, that -Eroles was close in their rear, and another division of the Catalan -army at Bispal blocking the bridge of Martorel. Clinton immediately -undertook to pass the Llobregat, meet the French column, and block -the road of San Sadurni; and he arranged with Copons the necessary -precautions and signals. - -About nine o’clock general Isidore La Marque arrived with the -garrisons at Martorel, followed at a short distance by Eroles. No -other troops were to be seen and after a short halt the French -continued their march on the right bank of the Llobregat, where -the Barcelona road enters a narrow pass between the river and a -precipitous hill. When they were completely entangled Clinton sent -an officer to forbid their further progress and referred them to -Copons who was at Martorel for an explanation, then giving the signal -all the heights around were instantly covered with armed men. It was -in vain to offer resistance, and two generals, having two thousand -six hundred men, four guns, and a rich military chest, capitulated, -but upon conditions, which were granted and immediately violated with -circumstances of great harshness and insult to the prisoners. The -odium of this baseness which was quite gratuitous, since the French -helpless in the defile must have submitted to any terms, attaches -entirely to the Spaniards. Clinton refused to meddle in any manner -with the convention, he had not been a party to Van Halen’s deceit, -he appeared only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in the -field which the Spaniards could not have subdued without his aid, -he refused even to be present at any consultation previous to the -capitulation, and notwithstanding an assertion to the contrary in -Suchet’s Memoirs no appeal on the subject from that marshal ever -reached him. - -During the whole of these transactions the infatuation of the -French leaders was extreme. The chief of one of the battalions more -sagacious than his general told Lamarque in the night of the 16th at -Igualada that he was betrayed, at the same time urging him vainly -to abandon his artillery and baggage and march in the direction of -Vich, to which place they could force their way in despite of the -Spaniards. It is remarkable also that Robert when he had detected -the imposture and failed to entice Van Halen into Tortoza did not -make a sudden sally upon him and the Spanish officers who were with -him, all close to the works. And still more notable is it that the -other governors, the more especially as Van Halen was a foreigner, -did not insist upon the bearer of such a convention remaining to -accompany their march. It has been well observed by Suchet that Van -Halen’s refusal to enter the gates was alone sufficient to prove his -treachery. - -The detachment recalled by Napoleon now moved into France, and in -March was followed by a second column of equal force which was at -first directed upon Lyons, but the arrival of lord Wellington’s -troops on the Garonne caused, as we shall hereafter find, a change -in its destination. Meanwhile by order of the minister at war Suchet -entered into a fresh negociation with Copons, to deliver up all the -fortresses held by his troops except Figueras and Rosas, provided -the garrisons were allowed to rejoin the army. The Spanish commander -assented and the authorities generally were anxious to adopt the -proposal, but the regency referred the matter to lord Wellington -who rejected it without hesitation, as tending to increase the -force immediately opposed to him. Thus baffled and overreached at -all points, Suchet destroyed the works of Olot, Besalu, Bascara and -Palamos, dismantled Gerona and Rosas, and concentrated his forces -at Figueras. He was followed by Copons, but though he still had -twelve thousand veterans besides the national guards and depôts of -the French departments, he continued most obstinately to refuse any -aid to Soult, and yet remained inactive himself. The blockade of -Barcelona was therefore maintained by the allies without difficulty -or danger save what arose from their commissariat embarrassments and -the efforts of the garrison. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -On the 23d of February Habert made a sally with six battalions, -thinking to surprize Sarzfield, he was however beaten, and colonel -Meder the Nassau officer who had before shewn his attachment to the -French cause was killed. The blockade was thus continued until the -12th of March when Clinton received orders from lord Wellington to -break up his army, send the foreign troops to lord William Bentinck -in Sicily, and march with the British battalions by Tudela to join -the great army in France. Clinton at first prepared to obey but -Suchet was still in strength, Copons appeared to be provoking a -collision though he was quite unable to oppose the French in the -field; and to maintain the blockade of Barcelona in addition, after -the Anglo-Sicilians should depart, was quite impossible. The latter -therefore remained and on the 19th of March king Ferdinand reached -the French frontier. - -This event, which happening five or even three months before would -probably have changed the fate of the war, was now of little -consequence. Suchet first proposed to Copons to escort Ferdinand -with the French army to Barcelona and put him in possession of that -place, but this the Spanish general dared not assent to, for he -feared lord Wellington and his own regency, and was closely watched -by colonel Coffin who had been placed near him by sir William -Clinton. The French general then proposed to the king a convention -for the recovery of his garrisons, to which Ferdinand agreed with the -facility of a false heart. His great anxiety was to reach Valencia, -because the determination of the Cortez to bind him to conditions -before he recovered his throne was evident, the Spanish generals were -apparently faithful to the Cortez, and the British influence was sure -to be opposed to him while he was burthened with French engagements. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -[Sidenote: Memoirs by sir Wm. Clinton, MSS.] - -Suchet had been ordered to demand securities for the restoration of -his garrisons previous to Ferdinand’s entry into Spain, but time -was precious and he determined to escort him at once with the whole -French army to the Fluvia, having first received a promise to restore -the garrisons. He also retained his brother Don Carlos as a hostage -for their return, but even this security he relinquished when the -king in a second letter written from Gerona solemnly confirmed his -first promise. On the 24th therefore in presence of the Catalan -and French armies, ranged in order of battle on either bank of the -Fluvia, Ferdinand passed that river and became once more king of -Spain. He had been a rebellious son in the palace, a plotting traitor -at Aranjuez, a dastard at Bayonne, an effeminate superstitious -fawning slave at Valençay, and now after six years’ captivity he -returned to his own country an ungrateful and cruel tyrant. He -would have been the most odious and contemptible of princes if his -favourite brother Don Carlos had not existed. Reaching the camp at -Barcelona on the 30th he dined with sir William Clinton, reviewed the -allied troops and then proceeded first to Zaragoza and finally to -Valencia. Marshal Suchet says the honours of war were paid to him by -all the French garrisons but this was not the case at Barcelona: no -man appeared, even on the walls. After this event the French marshal -repassed the Pyrenees leaving only one division at Figueras and -Clinton proceeded to break up his army, but was again stopped by the -vexatious conduct of Copons who would not relieve the Anglo-Sicilians -at the blockade, nor indeed take any notice of the English general’s -communications on the subject before the 11th of April. On the 14th -however the troops marched, part to embark at Taragona, part to join -lord Wellington. Copons then became terrified lest general Robert, -abandoning Tortoza, should join Habert at Barcelona, and enclose him -between them and the division at Figueras, wherefore Clinton once -more halted to protect the Spaniards. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -Copons had indeed some reason to fear, for Habert about this time -received, and transmitted to Robert, the emperor’s orders to break -out of Tortoza and gain Barcelona instead of passing by the valley -of Venasque as Suchet had before prescribed: the twelve thousand -men thus united were then to push into France. This letter was -intercepted, copied, and sent on to Robert, whose answer being -likewise intercepted shewed that he was not prepared and had -no inclination for the enterprise. This seen Clinton continued -his embarkation and thus completed his honourable but difficult -task. With a force weak in numbers, and nearly destitute of every -thing that constitutes strength in the field, he had maintained a -forward and dangerous position for eight months; and though Copons’ -incapacity and ill-will, and other circumstances beyond control, did -not permit him to perform any brilliant actions, he occupied the -attention of a very superior army, suffered no disaster and gained -some advantages. - -[Sidenote: Lafaille.] - -While his troops were embarking, Habert, in furtherance of the -emperor’s project, made a vigorous sally on the 18th, and though -repulsed with loss he killed or wounded eight hundred Spaniards. -This was a lamentable combat. The war had terminated long before, -yet intelligence of the cessation of hostilities only arrived four -days later. Habert was now repeatedly ordered by Suchet and the duke -of Feltre to give up Barcelona, but warned by the breach of former -conventions he held it until he was assured that all the French -garrisons in Valencia had returned safely to France, which did not -happen until the 28th of May, when he yielded up the town and marched -to his own country. This event, the last operation of the whole war, -released the duchess of Bourbon. She and the old prince of Conti had -been retained prisoners in the city during the Spanish struggle, the -prince died early in 1814, the duchess survived, and now returned to -France. - -How strong Napoleon’s hold of the Peninsula had been, how little the -Spaniards were able of their own strength to shake him off, was now -apparent to all the world. For notwithstanding lord Wellington’s -great victories, notwithstanding the invasion of France, six -fortresses, Figueras, Barcelona, Tortoza, Morella, Peniscola, -Saguntum and Denia were recovered, not by arms but by the general -peace. And but for the deceits of Van Halen there would have been -three others similarly situated in the eastern parts alone, while in -the north Santona was recovered in the same manner; for neither the -long blockade nor the active operations against that place, of which -some account shall now be given, caused it to surrender. - -The site of Santona is one of those promontories frequent on the -coast of Spain which connected by low sandy necks with the main -land offer good harbours. Its waters deep and capacious furnished -two bays. The outer one or roadstead was commanded by the works of -Santona itself, and by those of Laredo, a considerable town lying at -the foot of a mountain on the opposite point of the harbour. A narrow -entrance to the inner port was between a spit of land, called the -Puntal, and the low isthmus on which the town of Santona is built. -The natural strength of the ground was very great, but the importance -of Santona arose from its peculiar situation as a harbour and fort of -support in the Montaña de Santander. By holding it the French shut -out the British shipping from the only place which being defensible -on the land side furnished a good harbour between San Sebastian and -Coruña; they thus protected the sea-flank of their long line of -invasion, obtained a port of refuge for their own coasting vessels, -and a post of support for the moveable columns sent to chase the -partidas which abounded in that rough district. And when the battle -of Vittoria placed the allies on the Bidassoa, from Santona issued -forth a number of privateers who, as we have seen, intercepted lord -Wellington’s supplies and interrupted his communication with Coruña, -Oporto, Lisbon, and even with England. - -[Sidenote: Vol. 3. Book XI. Chapter V.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid. Book XII. Chapter I.] - -The advantages of possessing Santona were felt early by both parties; -the French seized it at once and although the Spaniards recovered -possession of it in 1810 they were driven out again immediately. -The English ministers then commenced deliberating and concocting -extensive and for that reason injudicious and impracticable plans of -offensive operations, to be based upon the possession of Santona; -meanwhile Napoleon fortified it and kept it to the end of the war. In -August 1812 its importance was better understood by the Spaniards, -and it was continually menaced by the numerous bands of Biscay, the -Asturias and the Montaña. Fourteen hundred men, including the crew -of a corvette, then formed its garrison, the works were not very -strong and only forty pieces of artillery were mounted. Napoleon -however, foreseeing the disasters which Marmont was provoking, sent -general Lameth, a chosen officer, to take charge of the defence. He -immediately augmented the works and constructed advanced redoubts on -two hills, called the Gromo and the Brusco, which like San Bartolomeo -at San Sebastian closed the isthmus inland. He also erected a strong -redoubt and blockhouse on the Puntal to command the straits, and to -sweep the roadstead in conjunction with the fort of Laredo which he -repaired. This done he formed several minor batteries and cast a -chain to secure the narrow entrance to the inner harbour, and then -covered the rocky promontory of Santona itself with defensive works. - -Some dismounted guns remained in the arsenal, others which had been -thrown into the sea by the Spaniards when they took the place in 1810 -were fished up, and the garrison felling trees in the vicinity made -carriages for them; by these means a hundred and twenty guns were -finally placed in battery and there was abundance of ammunition. The -corvette was not sea-worthy, but the governor established a flotilla -of gun-boats, and other small craft, which sallied forth whenever -the signal-posts on the head-land gave notice of the approach of -vessels liable to attack, or of French coasters bringing provisions -and stores. The garrison had previously lost many men, killed in -a barbarous manner by the partidas, and in revenge they never -gave quarter to their enemies. Lameth shocked at their inhumanity -resolutely forbad under pain of death any farther reprisals, -rewarded those men who brought in prisoners and treated the latter -with gentleness: the Spaniards discovering this also changed their -system and civilization resumed its rights. From this time military -operations were incessant, the garrison sometimes made sallies, -sometimes sustained partial attacks, sometimes aided the moveable -columns employed by the different generals of the army of the north -to put down the partizan warfare, which was seldom even lulled in the -Montaña. - -[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.] - -After the battle of Vittoria Santona being left to its own resources -was invested on the land side by a part of the troops composing -the Gallician or fourth Spanish army. It was blockaded on the -sea-board by the English ships of war, but only nominally, for the -garrison received supplies, and the flotilla vexed lord Wellington’s -communications, took many of his store-ships and other vessels, -delayed his convoys, and added greatly to the difficulties of his -situation. The land blockade thus also became a nullity and the -Spanish officers complained with reason that they suffered privations -and endured hardships without an object. These complaints and his -own embarassments, caused by lord Melville’s neglect, induced lord -Wellington in October, 1813, when he could ill spare troops, to -employ a British brigade under lord Aylmer in the attack of Santona; -the project for reasons already mentioned was not executed, but an -English engineer, captain Wells, was sent with some sappers and -miners to quicken the operations of the Spanish officers, and his -small detachment has been by a French writer magnified into a whole -battalion. - -[Sidenote: 1814. February.] - -Captain Wells remained six months, for the Spanish generals -though brave and willing were tainted with the national defect -of procrastination. The siege made no progress until the 13th of -February 1814 when general Barco the Spanish commander carried the -fort of Puntal in the night by escalade, killing thirty men and -taking twenty-three prisoners, yet the fort being under the heavy -fire of the Santona works was necessarily dismantled and abandoned -the next morning. A picquet was however left there and the French -opened their batteries, but as this did not dislodge the Spaniards -Lameth embarked a detachment and recovered his fort. However in the -night of the 21st general Barco ordered an attack to be made with a -part of his force upon the outposts of El Grumo and Brusco, on the -Santona side of the harbour, and led the remainder of his troops in -person to storm the fort and town of Laredo. He carried the latter -and also some outer defences of the fort, which being on a rock was -only to be approached by an isthmus so narrow as to be closed by a -single fortified house. In the assault of the body of this fort Barco -was killed and the attack ceased, but the troops retained what they -had won and established themselves at the foot of the rock where they -were covered from fire. The attack on the other side, conducted by -colonel Llorente, was successful; he carried the smallest of the two -outworks on the Brusco, and closely invested the largest after an -ineffectual attempt by mine and assault to take it. A large breach -was however made and the commandant seeing he could no longer defend -his post, valiantly broke through the investment and gained the work -of the Grumo. He was however aided by the appearance on the isthmus -of a strong column which sallied at the same time from the works -on the Santona promontory, and the next day the Grumo itself was -abandoned by the French. - -[Sidenote: Professional papers by the royal engineers.] - -[Sidenote: April.] - -Captain Wells, who had been wounded at the Puntal escalade, now -strenuously urged the Spaniards to crown the counter-scarp of the -fort at Laredo and attack vigorously, but they preferred establishing -four field-pieces to batter it in form at the distance of six -hundred yards. These guns as might be expected were dismounted the -moment they began to fire, and thus corrected, the Spanish generals -committed the direction of the attack to Wells. He immediately -opened a heavy musquetry fire on the fort to stifle the noise -of his workmen, then pushing trenches up the hill close to the -counterscarp in the night, he was proceeding to burst open the gate -with a few field-pieces and to cut down the pallisades, when the -Italian garrison, whose musquets from constant use had become so foul -that few would go off, mutinied against their commander and making -him a prisoner surrendered the place. This event gave the allies -the command of the entrance to the harbour, and Lameth offered to -capitulate in April upon condition of returning to France with his -garrison. Lord Wellington refused the condition, Santona therefore -remained a few days longer in possession of the enemy, and was -finally evacuated at the general cessation of hostilities. - -Having now terminated the narrative of all military and political -events which happened in the Peninsula, the reader will henceforth be -enabled to follow without interruption the events of the war in the -south of France which shall be continued in the next book. - - - - -BOOK XXIV. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: 1814. January.] - -Lord Wellington’s difficulties have been described. Those of his -adversary were even more embarrassing because the evil was at the -root; it was not misapplication of power but the want of power itself -which paralyzed Soult’s operations. Napoleon trusted much to the -effect of his treaty with Ferdinand who, following his intentions, -should have entered Spain in November, but the intrigues to retard -his journey continued, and though Napoleon, when the refusal of the -treaty by the Spanish government became known, permitted him to -return without any conditions, as thinking his presence would alone -embarrass and perhaps break the English alliance with Spain, he did -not as we have seen arrive until March. How the emperor’s views -were frustrated by his secret enemies is one of the obscure parts -of French history, at this period, which time may possibly clear -but probably only with a feeble and uncertain light. For truth can -never be expected in the memoirs, if any should appear, of such men -as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other politicians of their stamp, whose -plots rendered his supernatural efforts to rescue France from her -invaders abortive. Meanwhile there is nothing to check and expose the -political and literary empirics who never fail on such occasions to -poison the sources of history. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Despatches, MSS.] - -Relying upon the effect which the expected journey of Ferdinand -would produce, and pressed by the necessity of augmenting his own -weak army, Napoleon gave notice to Soult that he must ultimately -take from him, two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The -undecided nature of his first battle at Brienne caused him to enforce -this notice in the beginning of February, but he had previously sent -imperial commissaries to the different departments of France, with -instructions to hasten the new conscription, to form national and -urban guards, to draw forth all the resources of the country, and to -aid the operations of the armies by the action of the people. These -measures however failed generally in the south. The urban cohorts -were indeed readily formed as a means of police, and the conscription -was successful, but the people remained sullen and apathetic; and -the civil commissaries are said to have been, with some exceptions, -pompous, declamatory, and affecting great state and dignity without -energy and activity. Ill-will was also produced by the vexatious -and corrupt conduct of the subordinate government agents, who -seeing in the general distress and confusion a good opportunity to -forward their personal interests, oppressed the people for their own -profit. This it was easy to do, because the extreme want of money -rendered requisitions unavoidable, and under the confused direction -of civilians, partly ignorant and unused to difficult times, partly -corrupt, and partly disaffected to the emperor, the abuses inevitably -attendant upon such a system were numerous; and to the people so -offensive, that numbers to avoid them passed with their carts and -utensils into the lines of the allies. An official letter written -from Bayonne at this period run thus: “The English general’s policy -and the good discipline he maintains does us more harm than ten -battles. Every peasant wishes to be under his protection.” - -Another source of anger was Soult’s works near Bayonne, where the -richer inhabitants could not bear to have their country villas and -gardens destroyed by the engineer, he who spares not for beauty or -for pleasure where his military traces are crossed. The merchants, -a class nearly alike in all nations, with whom profit stands for -country, had been with a few exceptions long averse to Napoleon’s -policy which from necessity interfered with their commerce. And this -feeling must have been very strong in Bayonne and Bordeaux, for one -Batbedat, a banker of the former place, having obtained leave to go -to St. Jean de Luz under pretence of settling the accounts of English -officers, prisoners of war, to whom he had advanced money, offered -lord Wellington to supply his army with various commodities and -even provide money for bills on the English treasury. In return he -demanded licenses for twenty vessels to go from Bordeaux, Rochelle -and Mants, to St. Jean de Luz, and they were given on condition that -he should not carry back colonial produce. The English navy however -shewed so little inclination to respect them that the banker and his -coadjutors hesitated to risk their vessels, and thus saved them, for -the English ministers refused to sanction the licenses and rebuked -their general. - -[Sidenote: February.] - -During these events the partizans of the Bourbons, coming from -Brittany and La Vendée, spread themselves all over the south of -France and entered into direct communication with lord Wellington. -One of the celebrated family of La Roche Jacquelin arrived at his -head-quarters, Bernadotte sent an agent to those parts, and the count -of Grammont, then serving as a captain in the British cavalry, was -at the desire of the marquis de Mailhos, another of the malcontents, -sent to England to call the princes of the house of Bourbon forward. -Finally the duke of Angoulême arrived suddenly at the head-quarters, -and he was received with respect in private though not suffered to -attend the movements of the army. The English general indeed, being -persuaded that the great body of the French people especially in the -south, were inimical to Napoleon’s government, was sanguine as to -the utility of encouraging a Bourbon party. Yet he held his judgment -in abeyance, sagaciously observing that he could not come to a safe -conclusion merely from the feelings of some people in one corner -of France; and as the allied sovereigns seemed backward to take -the matter in hand unless some positive general movement in favour -of the Bourbons was made, and there were negociations for peace -actually going on, it would be, he observed, unwise and ungenerous -to precipitate the partizans of the fallen house into a premature -outbreak and then leave them to the vengeance of the enemy. - -That lord Wellington should have been convinced the prevailing -opinion was against Napoleon is not surprising, because every -appearance at the time would seem to prove it so; and certain it is -that a very strong Bourbon party and one still stronger averse to -the continuation of war existed. But in civil commotions nothing -is more dangerous, nothing more deceitful, than the outward show -and declarations on such occasions. The great mass of men in all -nations are only endowed with moderate capacity and spirit, -and as their thoughts are intent upon the preservation of their -families and property they must bend to circumstances; thus fear -and suspicion, ignorance baseness and good feeling, all combine to -urge men in troubled times to put on the mask of enthusiasm for the -most powerful, while selfish knaves ever shout with the loudest. Let -the scene change and the multitude will turn with the facility of a -weathercock. Lord Wellington soon discovered that the count of Viel -Chastel, Bernadotte’s agent, while pretending to aid the Bourbons -was playing a double part, and only one year after this period -Napoleon returned from Elba, and neither the presence of the duke -of Angoulême, nor the energy of the duchess, nor all the activity -of their partizans, could raise in this very country more than the -semblance of an opposition to him. The tricolor was every where -hoisted and the Bourbon party vanished. And this was the true test of -national feeling, because in 1814 the white colours were supported by -foreign armies, and misfortune had bowed the great democratic chief -to the earth; but when rising again in his wondrous might he came -back alone from Elba, the poorer people, with whom only patriotism is -ever really to be found, and that because they are poor and therefore -unsophisticated, crowded to meet and hail him as a father. Not -because they held him entirely blameless. Who born of woman is? They -demanded redress of grievances even while they clung instinctively -to him as their stay and protection against the locust tyranny of -aristocracy. - -[Sidenote: January.] - -There was however at this period in France enough of discontent -passion and intrigue, enough of treason, and enough of grovelling -spirit in adversity, added to the natural desire of escaping the -ravages of war, a desire so carefully fostered by the admirable -policy of the English general, as to render the French general’s -position extremely difficult and dangerous. Nor is it the least -remarkable circumstance of this remarkable period, that while Soult -expected relief by the Spaniards falling away from the English -alliance, lord Wellington received from the French secret and earnest -warnings to beware of some great act of treachery meditated by the -Spaniards. It was at this period also that Morillo and other generals -encouraged their soldiers’ licentiousness, and displayed their own -ill-will by sullen discontent and captious complaints, while the -civil authorities disturbed the communications and made war in their -fashion against the hospitals and magazines. - -His apprehensions and vigilance are plainly to be traced in his -correspondence. Writing about general Copons he says, “his conduct -is quite unjustifiable both in concealing what he knew of the duke -de San Carlos’ arrival and the nature of his mission.” In another -letter he observes, that the Spanish military people about himself -desired peace with Napoleon according to the treaty of Valençay; that -they all had some notion of what had occurred and yet had been quite -silent about it; that he had repeated intelligence from the French -of some act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards; that several -persons of that nation had come from Bayonne to circulate reports of -peace, and charges against the British which he knew would be well -received on that frontier; that he had arrested a man calling himself -an agent of and actually bearing a letter of credence from Ferdinand. - -But the most striking proof of the alarm he felt was his great -satisfaction at the conduct of the Spanish government in rejecting -the treaty brought by San Carlos and Palafox. Sacrificing all his -former great and just resentment he changed at once from an enemy to -a friend of the regency, supported the members of it even against the -serviles, spoke of the matter as being the most important concern -of all that had engaged his attention, and when the count of La -Bispal, the deadly enemy of the regency, proposed some violent and -decided action of hostility which a few weeks before would have been -received with pleasure, he checked and softened him, observing, that -the conduct of the government about the treaty should content every -Spaniard, that it was not possible to act with more frankness and -loyalty, and that they had procured honour for themselves and for -their nation not only in England but all over Europe. Such is the -light mode in which words are applied by public men, even by the -noblest and greatest, when their wishes are fulfilled. This glorious -and honourable conduct of the regency was simply a resolution to -uphold their personal power and that of their faction, both of which -would have been destroyed by the arrival of the king. - -Napoleon hoping much from the effect of these machinations not only -intimated to Soult, as I have already shewn, that he would require -ten thousand of his infantry immediately, but that twice that number -with a division of cavalry would be called away if the Spaniards fell -off from the English alliance. The duke of Dalmatia then foreseeing -the ultimate result of his own operations against Wellington, -conceived a vast general plan of action which showed how capable a -man he was to treat the greatest questions of military policy. - -“Neither his numbers nor means of supply after Wellington had -gained the banks of the Adour above Bayonne would, he said, suffice -to maintain his positions covering that fortress and menacing the -allies’ right flank; the time therefore approached when he must, -even without a reduction of force, abandon Bayonne to its own -resources and fight his battles on the numerous rivers which run -with concentric courses from the Pyrenees to the Adour. Leval’s and -Boyer’s divisions of infantry were to join the grand army on the -eastern frontier, Abbé’s division was to reinforce the garrison of -Bayonne and its camp to fourteen thousand men, but he considered -this force too great for a simple general of division and wished -to give it to general Reille whose corps would be broken up by the -departure of the detachments. That officer was however altogether -averse, and as an unwilling commander would be half beaten before the -battle commenced he desired that count D’Erlon should be appointed in -Reille’s place. - -“The active army remaining could not then be expected to fight the -allies in pitched battles, and he therefore recommended the throwing -it as a great partizan corps on the left, touching always upon the -Pyrenees and ready to fall upon lord Wellington’s flank and rear if -he should penetrate into France. Clauzel a native of those parts -and speaking the country language was by his military qualities -and knowledge the most suitable person to command. General Reille -could then march with the troops called to the great army, and as -there would be nothing left for him, Soult, to do in these parts -he desired to be employed where he could aid the emperor with more -effect. This he pressed urgently because, notwithstanding the refusal -of the Cortez to receive the treaty of Valençay, it was probable the -war on the eastern frontier would oblige the emperor to recall all -the troops designated. It would then become imperative to change -from a regular to an irregular warfare, in which a numerous corps of -partizans would be more valuable than the shadow of a regular army -without value or confidence, and likely to be destroyed in the first -great battle. For these partizans it was necessary to have a central -power and director. Clauzel was the man most fitted for the task. He -ought to have under his orders all the generals who were in command -in the military departments between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, -with power to force all the inhabitants to take arms and act under -his directions. - -“I am sensible,” he continued, “that this system, one of the least -unhappy consequences of which would be to leave the enemy apparently -master of all the country between the mountains and the Garonne, -can only be justified by the necessity of forming an army in the -centre of France sufficiently powerful to fend off the multitude of -our enemies from the capital; but if Paris falls all will be lost, -whereas if it be saved the loss of a few large towns in the south can -be repaired. I propose then to form a great army in front of Paris by -a union of all the disposable troops of the armies on the different -frontiers, and at the same time to spread what remains of the latter -as partizans wherever the enemy penetrates or threatens to penetrate. -All the marshals of France the generals and other officers, either in -activity or in retirement, who shall not be attached to the great -central army, should then repair to their departments to organize the -partizan corps and bring those not actively useful as such up to the -great point of union, and they should have military power to make all -men able to bear arms, find them at their own expense.” “This measure -is revolutionary but will infallibly produce important results, while -none or at least a very feeble effect will be caused by the majority -of the imperial commissioners already sent to the military divisions. -They are grand persons, they temporize, make proclamations and treat -every thing as civilians instead of acting with vigour to obtain -promptly a result which would astonish the world; for notwithstanding -the cry to the contrary, the resources of France are not exhausted, -what is wanted is to make those who possess resources use them for -the defence of the throne and the emperor.” - -Having thus explained his views, he again requested to be recalled -to Paris to serve near the emperor, but declared that he was ready -to obey any order and serve in any manner; all he demanded was clear -instructions with reference to the events that might occur. 1º. -What he should do if the treaty arrangements with Ferdinand had no -effect and the Spanish troops remained with lord Wellington. 2º. If -those troops retired and the British seeing the French weakened by -detachments should alone penetrate into France. 3º. If the changes in -Spain should cause the allies to retire altogether. - -Such was Soult’s plan of action but his great project was not -adopted and the emperor’s reasons for neglecting it have not been -made known. Nor can the workings of that capacious mind be judged -of without a knowledge of all the objects and conditions of his -combinations. Yet it is not improbable that at this period he did -not despair of rejecting the allies beyond the Rhine either by force -of arms, by negociation, or by working upon the family pride of the -emperor of Austria. With this hope he would be naturally averse -to incur the risk of a civil war by placing France under martial -law, or of reviving the devouring fire of revolution which it had -been his object for so many years to quell; and this is the more -probable because it seems nearly certain, that one of his reasons -for replacing Ferdinand on the Spanish throne was his fear lest the -republican doctrines which had gained ground in Spain should spread -to France. Was he wrong? The fierce democrat will answer Yes! But the -man who thinks that real liberty was never attained under a single -unmixed form of government giving no natural vent to the swelling -pride of honour birth or riches; those who measure the weakness of -pure republicanism by the miserable state of France at home and -abroad when Napoleon by assuming power saved her; those who saw -America with all her militia and her licentious liberty unable to -prevent three thousand British soldiers from passing three thousand -miles of ocean and burning her capital, will hesitate to condemn -him. And this without detriment to the democratic principle which -in substance may and should always govern under judicious forms. -Napoleon early judged, and the event has proved he judged truly, -that the democratic spirit of France however violent was unable to -overbear the aristocratic and monarchic tendencies of Europe; wisely -therefore while he preserved the essence of the first by fostering -equality, he endeavoured to blend it with the other two; thus -satisfying as far as the nature of human institutions would permit -the conditions of the great problem he had undertaken to solve. His -object was the reconstruction of the social fabric which had been -shattered by the French revolution, mixing with the new materials -all that remained of the old sufficiently unbroken to build with -again. If he failed to render his structure stable it was because -his design was misunderstood, and the terrible passions let loose by -the previous stupendous explosion were too mighty even for him to -compress. - -To have accepted Soult’s project would have been to endanger his -work, to save himself at the expense of his system, and probably to -plunge France again into the anarchy from which he had with so much -care and labour drawn her. But as I have before said, and it is true, -Napoleon’s ambition was for the greatness and prosperity of France, -for the regeneration of Europe, for the stability of the system which -he had formed with that end, never for himself personally; and hence -it is that the multitudes of many nations instinctively revere his -memory. And neither the monarch nor the aristocrat, dominant though -they be by his fall, feel themselves so easy in their high places as -to rejoice much in their victory. - -Whatever Napoleon’s motive was he did not adopt Soult’s project, and -in February two divisions of infantry and Trielhard’s cavalry with -many batteries were withdrawn. Two thousand of the best soldiers were -also selected to join the imperial guards, and all the gensd’armes -were sent to the interior. The total number of old soldiers left, -did not, including the division of General Paris, exceed forty -thousand exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne and other posts, and -the conscripts, beardless youths, were for the most part unfit to -enter the line nor were there enough of musquets in the arsenals -to arm them. It is remarkable also, as shewing how easily military -operations may be affected by distant operations, that Soult expected -and dreaded at this time the descent of a great English army upon -the coast of La Vendée, led thereto by intelligence of an expedition -preparing in England, under sir Thomas Graham, really to aid the -Dutch revolt. - -While the French general’s power was thus diminished, lord -Wellington’s situation was as suddenly ameliorated. First by the -arrival of reinforcements, next by the security he felt from the -rejection of the treaty of Valençay, lastly by the approach of better -weather, and the acquisition of a very large sum in gold which -enabled him not only to put his Anglo-Portuguese in activity but also -to bring the Spaniards again into line with less danger of their -plundering the country. During the forced cessation of operations he -had been actively engaged preparing the means to enter France with -power and security, sending before him the fame of a just discipline -and a wise consideration for the people who were likely to fall under -his power, for there was nothing he so much dreaded as the partizan -and insurgent warfare proposed by Soult. The peasants of Baygorry -and Bidarray had done him more mischief than the French army, and -his terrible menace of destroying their villages, and hanging all -the population he could lay his hands upon if they ceased not their -hostility, marks his apprehensions in the strongest manner. Yet -he left all the local authorities free to carry on the internal -government, to draw their salaries, and raise the necessary taxes -in the same mode and with as much tranquillity as if perfect peace -prevailed; he opened the ports and drew a large commerce which served -to support his own army and engage the mercantile interests in his -favour; he established many sure channels for intelligence political -and military, and would have extended his policy further and to more -advantage if the English ministers had not so abruptly and ignorantly -interfered with his proceedings. Finally foreseeing that the money -he might receive would, being in foreign coin, create embarrassment, -he adopted an expedient which he had before practised in India to -obviate this. Knowing that in a British army a wonderful variety -of knowledge and vocations good and bad may be found, he secretly -caused the coiners and die-sinkers amongst the soldiers to be sought -out, and once assured that no mischief was intended them, it was not -difficult to persuade them to acknowledge their peculiar talents. -With these men he established a secret mint at which he coined gold -Napoleons, marking them with a private stamp and carefully preserving -their just fineness and weight with a view of enabling the French -government when peace should be established to call them in again. -He thus avoided all the difficulties of exchange, and removed a very -fruitful source of quarrels and ill-will between the troops and the -country people and shopkeepers; for the latter are always fastidious -in taking and desirous of abating the current worth of strange coin, -and the former attribute to fraud any declination from the value at -which they receive their money. This sudden increase of the current -coin tended also to diminish the pressure necessarily attendant upon -troubled times. - -Nor was his provident sagacity less eminently displayed in purely -military matters than in his administrative and political operations. -During the bad weather he had formed large magazines at the ports, -examined the course of the Adour, and carefully meditated upon his -future plans. To penetrate into France and rally a great Bourbon -party under the protection of his army was the system he desired -to follow; and though the last point depended upon the political -proceedings and successes of the allied sovereigns the military -operations most suitable at the moment did not clash with it. To -drive the French army from Bayonne and either blockade or besiege -that place were the first steps in either case. But this required -extensive and daring combinations. For the fortress and its citadel, -comprising in their circuit the confluence of the Nive and the -Adour, could not be safely invested with less than three times the -number necessary to resist the garrison at any one point, because -the communications of the invested being short internal and secure, -those of the investers external difficult and unsafe, it behoved that -each division should be able to resist a sally of the whole garrison. -Hence, though reduced to the lowest point, the whole must be so -numerous as seriously to weaken the forces operating towards the -interior. - -How and where to cross the Adour with a view to the investment was -also a subject of solicitude. It was a great river with a strong -current and well guarded by troops and gun-boats above Bayonne; -still greater was it below the town; there the ebb tide run seven -miles an hour, there also there were gun-boats, a sloop of war, -and several merchant-vessels which could be armed and employed to -interrupt the passage. The number of pontoons or other boats required -to bridge the stream across either above or below, and the carriage -of them, an immense operation in itself, would inevitably give notice -of the design and render it abortive, unless the French army were -first driven away, and even then the garrison of Bayonne nearly -fifteen thousand strong might be sufficient to baffle the attempt. -Nevertheless in the face of these difficulties he resolved to pass, -the means adopted being proportionate to the greatness of the design. - -He considered, that, besides the difficulty of bringing the materials -across the Nive and through the deep country on each side of that -river, he could not throw his bridge above Bayonne without first -driving Soult entirely from the confluents of the Adour and from the -Adour itself; that when he had effected this his own communications -between the bridge and his magazines at the sea-ports would still be -difficult and unsafe, because his convoys would have a flank march, -passing the Nive as well as the Adour and liable to interruption -from the overflowing of those rivers; finally, that his means of -transport would be unequal to the wear and tear of the deep roads -and be interrupted by rain. But throwing his bridge below the town -he would have the Adour itself as a harbour, while his land convoys -used the royal causeway leading close to the river and not liable to -be interrupted by weather. His line of retreat also would then be -more secure if any unforeseen misfortune should render it necessary -to break up the investment. He had no fear that Soult, while retiring -before the active force he intended to employ against him on the -upper parts of the rivers, would take his line of retreat by the -great Bordeaux road and fall upon the investing force: that road led -behind Bayonne through the sandy wilderness called the Landes, into -which the French general would not care to throw himself, lest his -opponent’s operations along the edge of the desert should prevent him -from ever getting out. To draw the attention of the French army by -an attack on their left near the roots of the Pyrenees would be sure -to keep the lower Adour free from any formidable defensive force, -because the rapidity and breadth of the stream there denied the use -of common pontoons, and the mouth, about six miles below Bayonne, -was so barred with sand, so beaten by surges, and so difficult of -navigation even with the help of the landmarks, some of which had -been removed, that the French would never expect small vessels fit -for constructing a bridge could enter that way. Yet it was thus lord -Wellington designed to achieve his object. He had collected forty -large sailing boats of from fifteen to thirty tons burthen, called -_chasse marées_, as if for the commissariat service, but he secretly -loaded them with planks and other materials for his bridge. These -and some gun-boats he designed, with the aid of the navy, to run up -the Adour to a certain point upon which he meant also to direct the -troops and artillery, and then with hawsers, and pontoons formed into -rafts, to throw over a covering body and destroy a small battery near -the mouth of the river. He trusted to the greatness and danger of the -attempt for success and in this he was favoured by fortune. - -The French trading vessels in the Adour had offered secretly to -come out upon licenses and enter the service of his commissariat, -but he was obliged to forego the advantage because of the former -interference and dissent of the English ministers about the passports -he had previously granted. This added greatly to the difficulty -of the enterprize. He was thus forced to maltreat men willing to -be friends, to prepare grates for heating shot, and a battery of -Congreve rockets with which to burn their vessels and the sloop of -war, or at least to drive them up the river, after which he proposed -to protect his bridge with the gun-boats and a boom. - -While he was thus preparing for offensive operations the French -general was active in defensive measures. He had fortified all the -main passes of the rivers by the great roads leading against his -left, but the diminution of his force in January obliged him to -withdraw his outposts from Anglet, which enabled lord Wellington to -examine the whole course of the Adour below Bayonne and arrange for -the passage with more facility. Soult then in pursuance of Napoleon’s -system of warfare, which always prescribed a recourse to moral -force to cover physical weakness, immediately concentrated his left -wing against the allies’ right beyond the Nive, and redoubled that -harassing partizan warfare which I have already noticed, endeavouring -to throw his adversary entirely upon the defensive. Thus on the 26th -of January, Morillo having taken possession of an advanced post -near Mendionde not properly belonging to him, Soult, who desired to -ascertain the feelings of the Spaniards about the English alliance, -caused Harispe under pretence of remonstrating to sound him; he -did not respond and Harispe then drove him, not without a vigorous -resistance, from the post. - -The French marshal had however no hope of checking the allies long -by these means. He judged justly that Wellington was resolved to -obtain Bordeaux and the line of the Garonne, and foreseeing that -his own line of retreat must ultimately be in a parallel direction -with the Pyrenees, he desired to organize in time a strong defensive -system in the country behind him and to cover Bordeaux if possible. -In this view he sent general Darricau a native of the Landes to -prepare an insurgent levy in that wilderness, and directed Maransin -to the High Pyrenees to extend the insurrection of the mountaineers -already commenced in the Lower Pyrenees by Harispe. The castle of -Jaca was still held by eight hundred men but they were starving, and -a convoy collected at Navarrens being stopped by the snow in the -mountain-passes made a surrender inevitable. Better would it have -been to have withdrawn the troops at an early period; for though the -Spaniards would thus have gained access to the rear of the French -army and perhaps ravaged a part of the frontier, they could have done -no essential mischief to the army; and their excesses would have -disposed the people of those parts who had not yet felt the benefit -of lord Wellington’s politic discipline to insurrection. - -[Sidenote: February.] - -At Bordeaux there was a small reserve commanded by general La -Huillier, Soult urged the minister of war to increase it with -conscripts from the interior. Meanwhile he sent artillery-men from -Bayonne, ordered fifteen hundred national guards to be selected as -a garrison for the citadel of Blaye, and desired that the Médoc and -Paté forts and the batteries along the banks of the Garonne should -be put in a state of defence. The vessels in that river fit for the -purpose he desired might be armed, and a flotilla of fifty gun-boats -established below Bordeaux, with a like number to navigate that river -above the city as far as Toulouse. But these orders were feebly -carried into execution or entirely neglected, for there was no public -spirit, and treason and disaffection were rife in the city. - -On the side of the Lower Pyrenees Soult enlarged and improved the -works of Navarrens and designed to commence an entrenched camp in -front of it. The castle of Lourdes in the High Pyrenees was already -defensible, and he gave orders to fortify the castle of Pau, thus -providing a number of supporting points for the retreat which he -foresaw. At Mauleon he put on foot some partizan corps, and the -imperial commissary Caffarelli gave him hopes of being able to form -a reserve of seven or eight thousand national guards, _gensd’armes_, -and artillery-men, at Tarbes. Dax containing his principal depôts was -already being fortified, and the communication with it was maintained -across the rivers by the bridges and bridge-heads at Port de Lannes, -Hastingues, Pereyhorade, and Sauveterre; but the floods in the -beginning of February carried away his bridge at the Port de Lannes, -and the communication between Bayonne and the left of the army was -thus interrupted until he established a flying bridge in place of the -one carried away. - -Such was the situation of the French general when lord Wellington -advanced, and as the former supposed with one hundred and twenty -thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, for he knew nothing -of the various political and financial difficulties which had reduced -the English general’s power and prevented all the reinforcements he -expected from joining him. His emissaries told him that Clinton’s -force was actually broken up, and the British part in march to join -Wellington; that the garrisons of Carthagena Cadiz and Ceuta were -on the point of arriving and that reinforcements were coming from -England and Portugal. This information made him conclude that there -was no intention of pressing the war in Catalonia and that all the -allied troops would be united and march against him; wherefore with -more earnestness than before he urged that Suchet should be ordered -to join him that their united forces might form a “dike against the -torrent” which threatened to overwhelm the south of France. The real -power opposed to him was however very much below his calculations. -The twenty thousand British and Portuguese reinforcements promised -had not arrived, Clinton’s army was still in Catalonia; and though -it is impossible to fix the exact numbers of the Spaniards, their -regular forces available, and that only partially and with great -caution on account of their licentious conduct, did not exceed the -following approximation. - -Twelve thousand Gallicians under Freyre including Carlos D’España’s -division; four thousand under Morillo; six thousand Andalusians under -O’Donnel; eight thousand of Del Parque’s troops under the prince -of Anglona. In all thirty thousand. The Anglo-Portuguese present -under arms were by the morning states on the 13th of February, the -day on which the advance commenced, about seventy thousand men -and officers of all arms, nearly ten thousand being cavalry. The -whole force, exclusive of Mina’s bands which were spread as we -have seen from Navarre to the borders of Catalonia, was therefore, -one hundred thousand men and officers, with one hundred pieces of -field-artillery of which ninety-five were Anglo-Portuguese. - -It is difficult to fix with precision the number of the French -army at this period, because the imperial muster-rolls, owing -to the troubled state of the emperor’s affairs were either not -continued beyond December 1813 or have been lost. But from Soult’s -correspondence and other documents it would appear, that exclusive of -his garrisons, his reserves and detachments at Bordeaux and in the -department of the High Pyrenees, exclusive also of the conscripts of -the second levy which were now beginning to arrive, he could place in -line of battle about thirty-five thousand soldiers of all arms, three -thousand being cavalry, with forty pieces of artillery. But Bayonne -alone without reckoning the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and -Navarrens occupied twenty-eight thousand of the allies; and by this -and other drains lord Wellington’s superiority in the field was so -reduced, that his penetrating into France, that France which had -made all Europe tremble at her arms, must be viewed as a surprising -example of courage and fine conduct, military and political. - - -PASSAGE OF THE GAVES. - -In the second week of February the weather set in with a strong -frost, the roads became practicable and the English general, eagerly -seizing the long-expected opportunity, advanced at the moment when -general Paris had again marched with the convoy from Navarrens to -make a last effort for the relief of Jaca. But the troops were at -this time receiving the clothing which had been so long delayed in -England, and the regiments wanting the means of carriage, marched to -the stores; the English general’s first design was therefore merely -to threaten the French left and turn it by the sources of the rivers -with Hill’s corps, which was to march by the roots of the Pyrenees, -while Beresford kept the centre in check upon the lower parts of the -same rivers. Soult’s attention would thus he hoped be drawn to that -side while the passage of the Adour was being made below Bayonne. -And it would seem that uncertain if he should be able to force the -passage of the tributary rivers with his right, he intended, if -his bridge was happily thrown, to push his main operations on that -side and thus turn the Gaves by the right bank of the Adour: a fine -conception by which his superiority of numbers would have best -availed him to seize Dax and the Port de Landes and cut Soult off -from Bordeaux. - -[Sidenote: Plan 9.] - -On the 12th and 13th Hill’s corps, which including Picton’s division -and five regiments of cavalry furnished twenty thousand combatants -with sixteen guns, being relieved by the sixth and seventh divisions -in front of Mousseroles and on the Adour, was concentrated about -Urcurray and Hasparen. The 14th it marched in two columns. One by -Bonloc to drive the French posts beyond the Joyeuse; another by -the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port against Harispe who was at -Hellette. This second column had the Ursouia mountain on the right, -and a third, composed of Morillo’s Spaniards, having that mountain on -its left marched from La Houssoa against the same point. Harispe who -had only three brigades, principally conscripts, retired skirmishing -in the direction of St. Palais and took a position for the night at -Meharin. Not more than thirty men on each side were hurt but the line -of the Joyeuse was turned by the allies, the direct communication -with St. Jean Pied de Port cut, and that place was immediately -invested by Mina’s battalions. - -On the 15th Hill, leaving the fifty-seventh regiment at Hellette to -observe the road to St. Jean Pied de Port, marched through Meharin -upon Garris, eleven miles distant, but that road being impracticable -for artillery the guns moved by Armendaritz more to the right. -Harispe’s rear-guard was overtaken and pushed back fighting, and -meanwhile lord Wellington directed Beresford to send a brigade of the -seventh division from the heights of La Costa across the Gamboury -to the Bastide de Clerence. The front being thus extended from Urt -by Briscons, the Bastide and Isturitz, towards Garris, a distance -of more than twenty miles, was too attenuated; wherefore he caused -the fourth division to occupy La Costa in support of the troops at -the Bastide. At the same time learning that the French had weakened -their force at Mousseroles, and thinking that might be to concentrate -on the heights of Anglet, which would have frustrated his plan for -throwing a bridge over the Adour, he directed Hope secretly to occupy -the back of those heights in force and prevent any intercourse -between Bayonne and the country. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.] - -Soult knew of the intended operations against his left on the 12th, -but hearing the allies had collected boats and constructed a fresh -battery near Urt on the Upper Adour, and that the pontoons had -reached Urcurray, he thought lord Wellington designed to turn his -left with Hill’s corps, to press him on the Bidouze with Beresford’s, -and to keep the garrison of Bayonne in check with the Spaniards -while Hope crossed the Adour above that fortress. Wherefore, on the -14th, when Hill’s movement commenced, he repaired to Passarou near -the Bastide de Clerence and made his dispositions to dispute the -passage, first of the Bidouze and the Soissons or Gave of Mauleon, -and then of the Gave of Oleron. He had four divisions in hand with -which he occupied a position on the 15th along the Bidouze; and he -recalled general Paris, posting him on the road between St. Palais -and St. Jean Pied de Port, with a view to watch Mina’s battalions -which he supposed to be more numerous than they really were. Jaca -thus abandoned capitulated on the 17th, the garrison returning to -France on condition of not serving until exchanged. This part of the -capitulation it appears was broken by the French, but the recent -violation by the Spaniards of the convention made with the deluded -garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, furnished a reply. - -Harispe, having Paris under his command and being supported by Pierre -Soult with a brigade of light cavalry, now covered the road from St. -Jean Pied de Port with his left, and the upper line of the Bidouze -with his right. Lower down that river, Villatte occupied Ilharre, -Taupin was on the heights of Bergoney below Villatte, and Foy guarded -the banks of the river from Came to its confluence with the Adour. -The rest of the army remained under D’Erlon on the right of the -latter river. - -_Combat of Garris._—Harispe had just taken a position in advance of -the Bidouze, on a height called the Garris mountain which stretched -to St. Palais, when his rear-guard came plunging into a deep ravine -in his front closely followed by the light troops of the second -division. Upon the parallel counter-ridge thus gained by the allies -general Hill’s corps was immediately established, and though the -evening was beginning to close the skirmishers descended into the -ravine, and two guns played over it upon Harispe’s troops. These -last to the number of four thousand were drawn up on the opposite -mountain, and in this state of affairs Wellington arrived. He was -anxious to turn the line of the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen -himself there, and seeing that the communication with general Paris -by St. Palais was not well maintained, sent Morillo by a flank march -along the ridge now occupied by the allies towards that place; then -menacing the enemy’s centre with Le Cor’s Portuguese division he at -the same time directed the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments -forming Pringle’s brigade to attack, observing with a concise energy, -“_you must take the hill before dark_.” - -[Sidenote: Memoir of the action published in the United Service -Journal.] - -[Sidenote: See Plan 9.] - -The expression caught the attention of the troops, and it was -repeated by colonel O’Callaghan as he and general Pringle placed -themselves at the head of the thirty-ninth, which, followed by -the twenty-eighth, rushed with loud and prolonged shouts into the -ravine. The French fire was violent, Pringle fell wounded and most -of the mounted officers had their horses killed, but the troops -covered by the thick wood gained with little loss the summit of the -Garris mountain, on the right of the enemy who thought from the -shouting that a larger force was coming against them and retreated. -The thirty-ninth then wheeled to their own right intending to sweep -the summit, but soon the French discovering their error came back -at a charging pace, and receiving a volley without flinching tried -the bayonet. Colonel O’Callaghan distinguished by his strength and -courage received two strokes of that weapon but repaid them with -fatal power in each instance, and the French, nearly all conscripts, -were beaten off. Twice however they came back and fought until the -fire of the twenty-eighth was beginning to be felt, when Harispe -seeing the remainder of the second division ready to support the -attack, Le Cor’s Portuguese advancing against the centre, and the -Spaniards in march towards St. Palais, retreated to that town and -calling in Paris from the side of Mauleon immediately broke down the -bridges over the Bidouze. He lost on this day nearly five hundred -men, of whom two hundred were prisoners, and he would hardly have -escaped if Morillo had not been slow. The allies lost only one -hundred and sixty of whom not more than fifty fell at Garris, and -these chiefly in the bayonet contest, for the trees and the darkness -screened them at first. - -During these operations at Garris Picton moved from Bonloc to Oreque, -on Hill’s left, menacing Villatte, but though Beresford’s scouting -parties, acting on the left of Picton, approached the Bidouze facing -Taupin and Foy, his principal force remained on the Gamboury, the -pivot upon which Wellington’s line hinged while the right sweeping -forward turned the French positions. Foy however though in retreat -observed the movement of the fourth and seventh divisions on the -heights between the Nive and the Adour, pointing their march as he -thought towards the French left, and his reports to that effect -reached Soult at the moment that general Blondeau gave notice of the -investment of St. Jean Pied de Port. The French general being thus -convinced that lord Wellington’s design was not to pass the Adour -above Bayonne, but to gain the line of that river by constantly -turning the French left, made new dispositions. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report.] - -The line of the Bidouze was strong, if he could have supported -Harispe at St. Palais, and guarded at the same time the passage of -the Soissons at Mauleon; but this would have extended his front, -already too wide, wherefore he resolved to abandon both the Bidouze -and the Soissons and take the line of the Gave d’Oleron, placing his -right at Peyrehorade and his left at Navarrens. In this view D’Erlon -was ordered to pass the Adour by the flying bridge at the Port de -Landes and take post on the left bank of that river, while Harispe, -having Paris’ infantry still attached to his division, defended the -Gave de Mauleon and pushed parties on his left towards the town -of that name. Villatte occupied Sauveterre, where the bridge was -fortified with a head on the left bank, and from thence Taupin lined -the right bank to Sordes near the confluence of the Gave de Pau. Foy -occupied the works of the bridge-head at Peyrehorade and Hastingues -guarding that river to its confluence with the Adour; this line was -prolonged by D’Erlon towards Dax, but Soult still kept advanced -parties on the lower Bidouze at the different entrenched passages -of that river. One brigade of cavalry was in reserve at Sauveterre, -another distributed along the line. Head-quarters were transported to -Orthes, and the parc of artillery to Aire. The principal magazines -of ammunition were however at Bayonne, Navarrens, and Dax, and the -French general seeing that his communications with all these places -were likely to be intercepted before he could remove his stores, -anticipated distress and wrote to the minister of war to form new -depôts. - -On the 16th lord Wellington repaired the broken bridges of St. -Palais, after a skirmish in which a few men were wounded. Hill then -crossed the Bidouze, the cavalry and artillery by the repaired -bridge, the infantry by the fords, but the day being spent in the -operation the head of the column only marched beyond St. Palais. -Meanwhile the fourth and part of the seventh divisions occupied -the Bastide de Clerence on the right of the Joyeuse, and the light -division came up in support to the heights of La Costa on the left -bank of that river. - -The 17th Hill, marching at eight o’clock, passed through Domenzain -towards the Soissons, while the third division advancing from Oreque -on his left passed by Masparraute to the heights of Somberraute, -both corps converging upon general Paris, who was in position at -Arriveriete to defend the Soissons above its confluence with the Gave -d’Oleron. The French outposts were immediately driven across the -Gave. General Paris attempted to destroy the bridge of Arriveriete -but lord Wellington was too quick; the ninety-second regiment covered -by the fire of some guns crossed at a ford above the bridge, and -beating two French battalions from the village secured the passage. -The allies then halted for the day near Arriveriete having marched -only five miles and lost one man killed with twenty-three wounded. -Paris relinquished the Soissons but remained between the two rivers -during the night and retired on the morning of the 18th. The allies -then seized the great road, which here runs from Sauveterre to -Navarrens up the left bank of the Oleron Gave. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -Harispe, Villatte, and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry -were now at Sauveterre occupying the bridge-head on the left bank, -Taupin’s division was opposite the Bastide de Bearn lower down on -the right, Foy on the right of Taupin, and D’Erlon on the left of -the Adour above its confluence with the Gave de Pau. Meanwhile the -fourth division advanced to Bidache on the Bidouze, and the light -division followed in support to the Bastide de Clerence, the seventh -division remaining as before, partly in that vicinity partly extended -on the left to the Adour. The cavalry of the centre, under sir -Stapleton Cotton, arrived also on the banks of the Bidouze connecting -the fourth with the third division at Somberraute. In this state -of affairs Hill sent Morillo up the Soissons to guard the fords as -high as Nabas, then spreading Fane’s cavalry and the British and -Portuguese infantry between that river and the Gave d’Oleron, he -occupied all the villages along the road to Navarrens and at the same -time cannonaded the bridge-head of Sauveterre. - -Soult thrown from the commencement of the operations entirely upon -the defensive was now at a loss to discover his adversary’s object. -The situation of the seventh division, and the march of the fourth -and light divisions, led him to think his works at Hastingues and -Peyrehorade would be assailed. The weakness of his line, he having -only Taupin’s division to guard the river between Sauveterre and -Sordes a distance of ten miles, made him fear the passage of the Gave -would be forced near the Bastide de Bearn, to which post there was a -good road from Came and Bidache. On the other hand the prolongation -of Hill’s line up the Gave towards Navarrens indicated a design to -march on Pau, or it might be to keep him in check on the Gaves while -the camp at Bayonne was assaulted. In this uncertainty he sent Pierre -Soult, with a cavalry brigade and two battalions of infantry to -act between Oleron and Pau, and keep open a communication with the -partizan corps forming at Mauleon. That done he decided to hold the -Gaves as long as he could, and when they were forced, to abandon the -defensive concentrate his whole force at Orthes and fall suddenly -upon the first of the allies’ converging columns that approached him. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: 1814. February.] - -The French general’s various conjectures embraced every project but -the true one of the English general. The latter did indeed design to -keep him in check upon the rivers, not to obtain an opportunity of -assaulting the camp of Bayonne but to throw his stupendous bridge -over the Adour; yet were his combinations so made that failing -in that he could still pursue his operations on the Gaves. When -therefore he had established his offensive line strongly beyond the -Soissons and the Bidouze, and knew that his pontoon train was well -advanced towards Garris, he on the 19th returned rapidly to St. Jean -de Luz. Everything there depending on man was ready, but the weather -was boisterous with snow for two days, and Wellington, fearful of -letting Soult strengthen himself on the Gave of Oleron, returned on -the 21st to Garris, having decided to press his operations on that -side in person and leave to sir John Hope and admiral Penrose the -charge of effecting - - -THE PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR. - -[Sidenote: Original Morning States, MSS.] - -The heights of Anglet had been occupied since the 15th by the guards -and Germans, small parties were cautiously pushed towards the river -through the pine-forest called the wood of Bayonne, and the fifth -division, now commanded by general Colville, occupied Bussussary -and the bridge of Urdains. On the 21st Colville relieved the sixth -division in the blockade of Mousseroles on the right of the Nive. -To replace these troops at Bussussary, Freyre’s Spaniards passed -the Bidassoa, but the Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops and the -heavy British and Portuguese cavalry were still retained within the -frontiers of Spain. Sir John Hope had therefore only two British and -two Spanish divisions, three independent brigades of Anglo-Portuguese -infantry and Vandeleur’s brigade of cavalry, furnishing altogether -about twenty-eight thousand men and officers with twenty pieces of -artillery. There were however two regiments which had been sent to -the rear sick and several others expected from England destined to -join him. - -[Sidenote: Plan 7.] - -In the night of the 22d the first division, six eighteen pounders, -and the rocket battery, were cautiously filed from the causeway near -Anglet towards the Adour, but the road was deep and heavy and one -of the guns falling into a ditch delayed the march. Nevertheless -at daybreak the whole reached some sand-downs which extended -behind the pine-forest to the river. The French picquets were then -driven into the entrenched camp at Beyris, the pontoon train and -the field-artillery were brought down to the Adour opposite to the -village of Boucaut, and the eighteen-pounders were placed in battery -on the bank. The light troops meanwhile closed to the edge of the -marsh which covered the right of the French camp, and Carlos España’s -division taking post on the heights of Anglet, in concert with the -independent brigades, which were at Arcangues and the bridge of -Urdains, attracted the enemy’s attention by false attacks which were -prolonged beyond the Nive by the fifth division. - -It was intended that the arrival of the gun-boats and chasse-marées -at the mouth of the Adour should have been simultaneous with that -of the troops, but the wind having continued contrary none were to -be seen, and sir John Hope whose firmness no untoward event could -ever shake resolved to attempt the passage with the army alone. The -French flotilla opened its fire on his columns about nine o’clock, -his artillery and rockets retorted upon the French gun-boats and the -sloop of war so fiercely, that three of the former were destroyed -and the sloop so hardly handled that about one o’clock the whole -took refuge higher up the river. Meanwhile sixty men of the guards -were rowed in a pontoon across the mouth of the river in the face -of a French picquet, which, seemingly bewildered, retired without -firing. A raft was then formed with the remainder of the pontoons and -a hawser being stretched across, six hundred of the guards and the -sixtieth regiment, with a part of the rocket battery, the whole under -colonel Stopford, passed, yet slowly, and at slack water only, for -the tide run strongly and the waters were wide. - -[Sidenote: Thouvenot’s Official Report] - -During this operation general Thouvenot deceived by spies and -prisoners thought that the light division was with Hope as well as -the first division, and that fifteen thousand men were embarked at -St. Jean de Luz to land between Cape Breton and the Adour. Wherefore -fearing to endanger his garrison by sending a strong force to any -distance down the river, when he heard Stopford’s detachment was -on the right bank, he detached only two battalions under general -Macomble to ascertain the state of affairs, for the pine-forest and -a great bending of the river prevented him from obtaining any view -from Bayonne. Macomble made a show of attacking Stopford, but the -latter, flanked by the field-artillery from the left bank, received -him with a discharge of rockets, projectiles which like the elephants -in ancient warfare often turn upon their own side. This time however, -amenable to their directors they smote the French column and it fled, -amazed, and with a loss of thirty wounded. It is nevertheless obvious -that if Thouvenot had kept strong guards, with a field-battery, on -the right bank of the Adour, sir John Hope could not have passed over -the troops in pontoons, nor could any vessels have crossed the bar; -no resource save that of disembarking troops between the river and -Cape Breton would then have remained. This error was fatal to the -French. The British continued to pass all night, and until twelve -o’clock on the 24th, when the flotilla was seen under a press of sail -making with a strong breeze for the mouth of the river. - -To enter the Adour is from the flatness of the coast never an easy -task, it was now most difficult, because the high winds of the -preceding days had raised a great sea and the enemy had removed one -of the guiding flag-staves by which the navigation was ordinarily -directed. In front of the flotilla came the boats of the men-of-war, -and ahead of all, the naval captain, O’Reilly, run his craft, a -chosen Spanish vessel, into the midst of the breakers, which rolling -in a frightful manner over the bar dashed her on to the beach. That -brave officer stretched senseless on the shore would have perished -with his crew but for the ready succour of the soldiers, however -a few only were drowned and the remainder with an intrepid spirit -launched their boat again to aid the passage of the troops which was -still going on. O’Reilly was followed and successfully by lieutenant -Debenham in a six-oared cutter, but the tide was falling, wherefore -the remainder of the boats, the impossibility of passing until high -water being evident drew off, and a pilot was landed to direct the -line of navigation by concerted signals. - -When the water rose again the crews were promised rewards in -proportion to their successful daring and the whole flotilla -approached in close order, but with it came black clouds and a -driving gale which covered the whole line of coast with a rough -tumbling sea, dashing and foaming without an interval of dark water -to mark the entrance of the river. The men-of-war’s boats first drew -near this terrible line of surge and Mr. Bloye of the Lyra, having -the chief pilot with him, heroically led into it, but in an instant -his barge was engulphed and he and all with him were drowned. The -Lyra’s boat thus swallowed up the following vessels swerved in their -course, and shooting up to the right and left kept hovering undecided -on the edge of the tormented waters. Suddenly lieutenant Cheyne of -the Woodlark pulled ahead, and striking the right line, with courage -and fortune combined safely passed the bar. The wind then lulled, -the waves as if conquered abated somewhat of their rage, and the -chasse-marées, manned with Spanish seamen but having an engineer -officer with a party of sappers in each who compelled them to follow -the men-of-war’s boats, came plunging one after another through the -huge breakers and reached the point designed for the bridge. Thus -was achieved this perilous and glorious exploit, but captain Elliot -of the Martial with his launch and crew and three transports’ boats, -perished close to the shore in despite of the most violent efforts -made by the troops to save them; three other vessels cast on the -beach lost part of their crews; and one large chasse-marée, full of -men, after passing the line of surf safely was overtaken by a swift -bellying wave which breaking on her deck dashed her to pieces. - -The whole of the first division and Bradford’s Portuguese, in all -eight thousand men, being now on the right bank took post on the -sand-hills for the night. The next morning, sweeping in a half -circle round the citadel and its entrenchments, they placed their -left on the Adour above the fortress, and their right on the same -river below the place; for the water here made such a bend in their -favour that their front was little more than two miles wide, and for -the most part covered by a marshy ravine. This nice operation was -effected without opposition because the entrenched camps, menaced -by the troops on the other side of the Adour, were so enormous that -Thouvenot’s force was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. Meanwhile -the bridge was constructed, about three miles below Bayonne, at a -place where the river was contracted to eight hundred feet by strong -retaining walls, built with the view of sweeping away the bar by -increasing the force of the current. The plan of the bridge and -boom were the conception of colonel Sturgeon and major Todd, but -the execution was confided entirely to the latter, who, with a mind -less brilliant than Sturgeon’s but more indefatigable, very ably and -usefully served his country throughout this war. - -Twenty-six of the chasse-marées moored head and stern at distances of -forty feet, reckoning from centre to centre, were bound together with -ropes, two thick cables were then carried loosely across their decks, -and the ends being cast over the walls on each bank were strained -and fastened in various modes to the sands. They were sufficiently -slack to meet the spring-tides which rose fourteen feet, and planks -were laid upon them without any supporting beams. The boom, moored -with anchors above and below, was a double line of masts connected -with chains and cables, so as to form a succession of squares, in -the design that if a vessel broke through the outside, it should by -the shock turn round in the square and become entangled with the -floating wrecks of the line through which it had broken. Gun-boats, -with aiding batteries on the banks, were then stationed to protect -the boom, and to keep off fire-vessels, many row-boats were furnished -with grappling irons. The whole was by the united labour of seamen -and soldiers finished on the 26th. And contrary to the general -opinion on such matters, major Todd assured the Author of this -History that he found the soldiers, with minds quickened by the wider -range and variety of knowledge attendant on their service, more ready -of resource and their efforts, combined by a more regular discipline, -of more avail, with less loss of time, than the irregular activity of -the seamen. - -The agitation of the water in the river from the force of the tides -was generally so great that to maintain a pontoon bridge on it was -impossible. A knowledge of this had rendered the French officers too -careless of watch and defence, and this year the shifting sands had -given the course of the Adour such a slanting direction towards the -west that it run for some distance almost parallel to the shore; the -outer bank thus acting as a breakwater lessened the agitation within -and enabled the large two-masted boats employed, to ride safely and -support the heaviest artillery and carriages. Nevertheless this -fortune, the errors of the enemy, the matchless skill and daring of -the British seamen, and the discipline and intrepidity of the British -soldiers, all combined by the genius of Wellington, were necessary -to the success of this stupendous undertaking which must always rank -amongst the prodigies of war. - -When the bridge was finished sir John Hope resolved to contract his -line of investment round the citadel. This was a serious affair. The -position of the French outside that fort was exceedingly strong, for -the flanks were protected by ravines the sides of which were covered -with fortified villas; and in the centre a ridge, along which the -great roads from Bordeaux and Peyrehorade led into Bayonne, was -occupied by the village and church of St. Etienne, both situated on -rising points of ground strongly entrenched and under the fire of -the citadel guns. The allies advanced in three converging columns -covered by skirmishers. Their wings easily attained the edges of the -ravines at either side, resting their flanks on the Adour above and -below the town, at about nine hundred yards from the enemy’s works. -But a severe action took place in the centre. The assailing body -composed of Germans and a brigade of guards was divided into three -parts which should have attacked simultaneously, the guards on the -left, the light battalions of Germans on the right, and their heavy -infantry in the centre. The flanks were retarded by some accident -and the centre first attacked the heights of St. Etienne. The French -guns immediately opened from the citadel and the skirmishing fire -became heavy, but the Germans stormed church and village, forced -the entrenched line of houses, and took a gun, which however they -could not carry off under the close fire from the citadel. The wings -then gained their positions and the action ceased for a time, but -the people of Bayonne were in such consternation that Thouvenot -to re-assure them sallied at the head of the troops. He charged -the Germans twice and fought well but was wounded and finally lost -his gun and the position of St. Etienne. There is no return of the -allies’ loss, it could not have been less than five hundred men and -officers of which four hundred were Germans, and the latter were -dissatisfied that their conduct was unnoticed in the despatch: an -omission somewhat remarkable because their conduct was by sir John -Hope always spoken of with great commendation. - -The new position thus gained was defended by ravines on each flank, -and the centre being close to the enemy’s works on the ridge of St. -Etienne was entrenched. Preparations for besieging the citadel were -then commenced under the direction of the German colonel Hartmann, -a code of signals was established, and infinite pains taken to -protect the bridge and to secure a unity of action between the three -investing bodies. The communications however required complicated -arrangements, for the ground on the right bank of the river being low -was overflowed every tide, and would have occasioned great difficulty -but for the retaining wall which being four feet thick was made use -of as a carriage road. - -[Sidenote: French Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -While these events were in progress at Bayonne lord Wellington -pushed his operations on the Gaves with great vigour. On the 21st -he returned as we have seen to Garris, the pontoons had already -reached that place and on the 23d they were carried beyond the Gave -de Mauleon. During his absence the sixth and light divisions had -come up, and thus six divisions of infantry and two brigades of -cavalry were concentrated beyond that river on the Gave d’Oleron, -between Sauveterre and Navarrens. Beresford meanwhile held the -line of the Bidouze down to its confluence with the Adour, and -apparently to distract the enemy threw a battalion over the latter -river near Urt, and collected boats as if to form a bridge there. -In the evening he recalled this detachment, yet continued the -appearance of preparations for a bridge until late in the 23d, when -he moved forward and drove Foy’s posts from the works at Oeyergave -and Hastingues, on the lower parts of the Oleron Gave, into the -entrenchments of the bridge-head at Peyrehorade. The allies lost -fifty men, principally Portuguese, but Soult’s right and centre -were thus held in check, for Beresford having the fourth and -seventh divisions and Vivian’s cavalry was strong enough for Foy -at Peyrehorade and Taupin at the Bastide of Beam. The rest of the -French army was distributed at Orthes and Sauveterre, feeling towards -Navarrens, and on the 24th Wellington put his troops in motion to -pass the Gave d’Oleron. - -During the previous days his movements and the arrival of his -reinforcements had again deceived the French general, who seems -to have known nothing of the presence of the light division, and -imagined the first division was at Came on the 22d as well as the -fourth and seventh divisions. However his dispositions remained -the same, he did not expect to hold the Gave and looked to a final -concentration at Orthes. - -On the 24th Morillo reinforced with a strong detachment of cavalry -moved to the Laussette, a small river running in front of Navarrens, -where rough ground concealed his real force, while his scouters beat -back the French outposts, and a battalion marching higher up menaced -the fords of the Gave at Doguen, with a view to draw the attention -of the garrison of Navarrens from the ford of Ville Nave. This ford -about three miles below Doguen was the point where lord Wellington -designed really to pass, and a great concentric movement was now -in progress towards it. Le Cor’s Portuguese division marched from -Gestas, the light division from Aroue crossing the Soissons at Nabas; -the second division, three batteries of artillery, the pontoons, and -four regiments of cavalry moved from other points. Favoured by the -hilly nature of the country the columns were well concealed from -the enemy, and at the same time the sixth division advanced towards -the fords of Montfort about three miles below that of Ville Nave. -A battalion of the second division was sent to menace the ford of -Barraute below Monfort, while the third division, reinforced with a -brigade of hussars and the batteries of the second division, marched -by Osserain and Arriveriette against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, -with orders to make a feint of forcing a passage there. The bulk of -the light cavalry remained in reserve under Cotton, but Vivian’s -hussars coming up from Beresford’s right, threatened all the fords -between Picton’s left and the Bastide of Beam; and below this Bastide -some detachments were directed upon the fords of Sindos Castagnhede -and Hauterive. During this movement Beresford keeping Foy in check at -Peyrehorade with the seventh division, sent the fourth towards Sordes -and Leren above the confluence of the Gaves to seek a fit place to -throw a bridge. Thus the whole of the French front was menaced on a -line of twenty-five miles, but the great force was above Sauveterre. - -The first operations were not happily executed. The columns directed -on the side of Sindos missed the fords. Picton opened a cannonade -against the bridge-head of Sauveterre and made four companies of -Keane’s brigade and some cavalry pass the Gave in the vicinity of -the bridge; they were immediately assailed by a French regiment -and driven across the river again with a loss of ninety men and -officers, of whom some were drowned and thirty were made prisoners, -whereupon the cavalry returned to the left bank and the cannonade -ceased. Nevertheless the diversion was complete and the general -operations were successful. Soult on the first alarm drew Harispe -from Sauveterre and placed him on the road to Orthes at Monstrueig, -where a range of hills running parallel to the Gave of Oleron -separates it from that of Pau; thus only a division of infantry and -Berton’s cavalry remained under Villatte at Sauveterre, and that -general, notwithstanding his success against the four companies, -alarmed by the vigour of Picton’s demonstrations, abandoned his -works on the left bank and destroyed the bridge. Meanwhile the sixth -division passed without opposition at Montfort above Sauveterre, -and at the same time the great body of the other troops coming down -upon the ford of Villenave met only with a small cavalry picquet and -crossed with no more loss than two men drowned: a happy circumstance -for the waters were deep and rapid, the cold intense, and the ford -so narrow that the passage was not completed before dark. To have -forced it in face of an enemy would have been exceedingly difficult -and dangerous, and it is remarkable that Soult who was with Harispe, -only five miles from Montfort and about seven from Villenave, should -not have sent that general down to oppose the passage. The heads of -the allies’ columns immediately pushed forward to the range of hills -before spoken of, the right being established near Loubeing, the -left towards Sauveterre, from whence Villatte and Berton had been -withdrawn by Clauzel, who commanding at this part seems to have kept -a bad watch when Clinton passed at Montfort. - -The French divisions now took a position to give time for Taupin to -retire from the lower parts of the Gave of Oleron, towards the bridge -of Berenx on the Gave of Pau, for both he and Foy had received orders -to march upon Orthes and break down all the bridges as they passed. -When the night fell Soult sent Harispe’s division also over the -bridge of Orthes and D’Erlon was already established in that town, -but general Clauzel remained until the morning at Orion to cover the -movement. Meanwhile Pierre Soult, posted beyond Navarrens with his -cavalry and two battalions of infantry to watch the road to Pau, was -pressed by Morillo, and being cut off from the army by the passage of -the allies at Villenave was forced to retreat by Monein. - -On the 25th at daylight, lord Wellington with some cavalry and guns -pushed Clauzel’s rear-guard from Magret into the suburb of Orthes, -which covered the bridge of that place on the left bank. He also -cannonaded the French troops beyond the river, and the Portuguese -of the light division, skirmishing with the French in the houses to -prevent the destruction of the bridge, lost twenty-five men. - -The second sixth and light divisions, Hamilton’s Portuguese, five -regiments of cavalry, and three batteries were now massed in front -of Orthes; the third division and a brigade of cavalry was in front -of the broken bridge of Berenx about five miles lower down the Gave; -the fourth and seventh divisions with Vivian’s cavalry were in front -of Peyrehorade, from whence Foy retired by the great Bayonne road to -Orthes. Affairs being in this state Morillo was directed to invest -Navarrens. And as Mina’s battalions were no sure guarantee against -the combined efforts of the garrison of St. Jean Pied de Port and the -warlike inhabitants of Baygorry, five British regiments, which had -gone to the rear for clothing and were now coming up separately, were -ordered to halt at St. Palais in observation, relieving each other in -succession as they arrived at that place. - -[Sidenote: Memoir by colonel Hughes, eighteenth hussars, MSS.] - -On the morning of the 26th, Beresford, finding that Foy had abandoned -the French works at Peyrehorade, passed the Gave, partly by a pontoon -bridge partly by a ford, where the current ran so strong that a -column of the seventh division was like to have been carried away -bodily. He had previously detached the eighteenth hussars to find -another ford higher up, and this being effected under the guidance of -a miller, the hussars gained the high road about half-way between -Peyrehorade and Orthes, and drove some French cavalry through Puyoo -and Ramous. The French rallying upon their reserves turned and beat -back the foremost of the pursuers, but they would not await the shock -of the main body now reinforced by Vivian’s brigade and commanded -by Beresford in person. In this affair major Sewell, an officer of -the staff, who had frequently distinguished himself by his personal -prowess, happening to be without a sword, pulled a large stake from a -hedge and with that weapon overthrew two hussars in succession, and -only relinquished the combat when a third had cut his club in twain. - -Beresford now threw out a detachment to Habas on his left to -intercept the enemy’s communication with Dax, and lord Wellington -immediately ordered lord Edward Somerset’s cavalry and the third -division to cross the Gave by fords below the broken bridge of -Berenx. Then directing Beresford to take a position for the night -on some heights near the village of Baïghts he proceeded to throw a -pontoon bridge at Berenx, and thus after a circuitous march of more -than fifty miles with his right wing he again united it with his -centre and secured a direct communication with Hope. - -During the 25th and 26th he had carefully examined Soult’s position. -The bridge of Orthes could not be easily forced. That ancient and -beautiful structure consisted of several irregular arches, with a -high tower in the centre the gateway of which was built up by the -French, the principal arch in front of the tower was mined, and -the houses on both sides contributed to the defence. The river -above and below was deep and full of tall pointed rocks, but above -the town the water spreading wide with flat banks presented the -means of crossing. Lord Wellington’s first design was to pass there -with Hill’s troops and the light division, but when he heard that -Beresford had crossed the Gave he suddenly changed his design, -and as we have seen passed the third division over and threw his -bridge at Berenx. This operation was covered by Beresford, while -Soult’s attention was diverted by the continual skirmish at the -suburbs of Orthes, by the appearance of Hill’s columns above, and by -Wellington’s taking cognizance of the position near the bridge so -openly as to draw a cannonade. - -The English general did not expect Soult would, when he found -Beresford and Picton were over the Gave, await a battle, and his -emissaries reported that the French army was already in retreat, a -circumstance to be borne in mind because the next day’s operation -required success to justify it. Hope’s happy passage of the Adour -being now known that officer was instructed to establish a line -of communication to the port of Lannes, where a permanent bridge -was to be formed with boats brought up from Urt. A direct line of -intercourse was thus secured with the army at Bayonne. But lord -Wellington felt that he was pushing his operations beyond his -strength if Suchet should send reinforcements to Soult; wherefore -he called up Freyre’s Spaniards, ordering that general to cross -the Adour below Bayonne, with two of his divisions and a brigade -of Portuguese nine-pounders, and join him by the port of Lannes. -O’Donnel’s Andalusians and the prince of Anglona’s troops were also -directed to be in readiness to enter France. - -These orders were given with the greatest reluctance. - -The feeble resistance made by the French in the difficult country -already passed, left him without much uneasiness as to the power of -Soult’s army in the field, but his disquietude was extreme about the -danger of an insurgent warfare. “Maintain the strictest discipline, -_without that we are lost_,” was his expression to general Freyre, -and he issued a proclamation authorizing the people of the districts -he had overrun to arm themselves for the preservation of order -under the direction of their mayors. He invited them to arrest all -straggling soldiers and followers of the army, and all plunderers -and evil-doers and convey them to head-quarters with proof of their -crimes, promising to punish the culpable and to pay for all damages. -At the same time he confirmed all the local authorities who chose to -retain their offices, on the sole condition of having no political -or military intercourse with the countries still possessed by the -French army. Nor was his proclamation a dead letter, for in the night -of the 25th the inhabitants of a village, situated near the road -leading from Sauveterre to Orthes, shot one English soldier dead and -wounded a second who had come with others to plunder. Lord Wellington -caused the wounded man to be hung as an example, and he also forced -an English colonel to quit the army for suffering his soldiers to -destroy the municipal archives of a small town. - -[Sidenote: Official Report, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Memoir by general Berton, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Canevas de faits par general Reille et colonel de la -Chasse, MS.] - -Soult had no thought of retreating. His previous retrograde movements -had been effected with order, his army was concentrated with its -front to the Gave, and every bridge, except the noble structure at -Orthes the ancient masonry of which resisted his mines, had been -destroyed. One regiment of cavalry was detached on the right to watch -the fords as far as Peyrehorade, three others with two battalions -of infantry under Pierre Soult watched those between Orthes and Pau, -and a body of horsemen and gensd’armes covered the latter town from -Morillo’s incursions. Two regiments of cavalry remained with the -army, and the French general’s intention was to fall upon the head of -the first column which should cross the Gave. But the negligence of -the officer stationed at Puyoo, who had suffered Vivian’s hussars, -as we have seen, to pass on the 26th without opposition and without -making any report of the event, enabled Beresford to make his -movement in safety when otherwise he would have been assailed by at -least two-thirds of the French army. It was not until three o’clock -in the evening that Soult received intelligence of his march, and his -columns were then close to Baïghts on the right flank of the French -army, his scouters were on the Dax road in its rear, and at the same -time the sixth and light divisions were seen descending by different -roads from the heights beyond the river pointing towards Berenx. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -In this crisis the French marshal hesitated whether to fall upon -Beresford and Picton while the latter was still passing the river, or -take a defensive position, but finally judging that he had not time -to form his columns of attack he decided upon the latter. Wherefore -under cover of a skirmish, sustained near Baïghts by a battalion of -infantry which coming from the bridge of Berenx was joined by the -light cavalry from Puyoo, he hastily threw D’Erlon’s and Reille’s -divisions on a new line across the road from Peyrehorade. The right -extended to the heights of San Boës along which run the road from -Orthes to Dax, and this line was prolonged by Clauzel’s troops -to Castetarbe a village close to the Gave. Having thus opposed a -temporary front to Beresford he made his dispositions to receive -battle the next morning, bringing Villatte’s infantry and Pierre -Soult’s cavalry from the other side of Orthes through that town, and -it was this movement that led lord Wellington’s emissaries to report -that the army was retiring. - -Soult’s new line was on a ridge of hills partly wooded partly naked. - -In the centre was an open rounded hill from whence long narrow -tongues were pushed out, on the French left towards the high road of -Peyrehorade, on their right by St. Boës towards the high church of -Baïghts, the whole presenting a concave to the allies. - -The front was generally covered by a deep and marshy ravine broken by -two short tongues of land which jutted out from the principal hill. - -The road from Orthes to Dax passed behind the front to the village of -St. Boës and thence along the ridge forming the right flank. - -Behind the centre a succession of undulating bare heathy hills -trended for several miles to the rear, but behind the right the -country was low and deep. - -The town of Orthes, receding from the river up the slope of a steep -hill and terminating with an ancient tower, was behind the left wing. - -General Reille, having Taupin’s, Roguet’s, and Paris’s divisions -under him, commanded on the right, and occupied all the ground from -the village of St. Boës to the centre of the position. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -Count D’Erlon, commanding Foy’s and D’Armagnac’s divisions, was on -the left of Reille. He placed the first along a ridge extending -towards the road of Peyrehorade, the second in reserve. In rear -of this last Villatte’s division and the cavalry were posted above -the village of Rontun, that is to say, on the open hills behind the -main position. In this situation with the right overlooking the low -country beyond St. Boës, and the left extended towards Orthes this -division furnished a reserve to both D’Erlon and Reille. - -Harispe, whose troops as well as Villatte’s were under Clauzel, -occupied Orthes and the bridge, having a regiment near the ford of -Souars above the town. Thus the French army extended from St. Boës to -Orthes, but the great mass was disposed towards the centre. Twelve -guns were attached to general Harispe’s troops, twelve were upon the -round hill in the centre, sweeping in their range the ground beyond -St. Boës, and sixteen were in reserve on the Dax road. - -The 27th at day-break the sixth and light divisions, having passed -the Gave near Berenx by the pontoon bridge thrown in the night, wound -up a narrow way between high rocks to the great road of Peyrehorade. -The third division and lord Edward Somerset’s cavalry were already -established there in columns of march with skirmishers pushed -forwards to the edge of the wooded height occupied by D’Erlon’s left, -and Beresford with the fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian’s -cavalry had meanwhile gained the ridge of St. Boës and approached -the Dax road beyond. Hill remained with the second British, and Le -Cor’s Portuguese divisions menacing the bridge of Orthes and the ford -of Souars. Between Beresford and Picton, a distance of a mile and a -half, there were no troops; but about half-way, exactly in front of -the French centre, was a Roman camp crowning an isolated peering -hill of singular appearance and nearly as lofty as the centre of -Soult’s position. - -On this camp, now covered with vineyards, but then open and grassy -with a few trees, lord Wellington, after viewing the country on -Beresford’s left, stopped for an hour or more to examine the enemy’s -disposition for battle. During this time the two divisions were -coming up from the river, but so hemmed in by rocks that only a few -men could march abreast, and their point of union with the third -division was little more than cannon-shot from the enemy’s position. -The moment was critical, Picton did not conceal his disquietude, but -Wellington undisturbed as the deep sea continued his observations -without seeming to notice the dangerous position of his troops. When -they had reached the main road he reinforced Picton with the sixth, -and drew the light division by cross roads behind the Roman camp, -thus connecting his wings and forming a central reserve. From this -point bye-ways led, on the left to the high church of Baïghts and the -Dax road, on the right to the Peyrehorade road; and two others led -straight across the marsh to the French position. - -This marsh, the open hill about which Soult’s guns and reserves -were principally gathered, the form and nature of the ridges on the -flanks, all combined to forbid an attack in front, and the flanks -were scarcely more promising. The extremity of the French left sunk -indeed to a gentle undulation in crossing the Peyrehorade road, -yet it would have been useless to push troops on that line towards -Orthes, between D’Erlon and Caste Tarbe, for the town was strongly -occupied by Harispe and was there covered by an ancient wall and -the bed of a torrent. It was equally difficult to turn the St. -Boës flank because of the low marshy country into which the troops -must have descended beyond the Dax road; and the brows of the hills -trending backwards from the centre of the French position would have -enabled Soult to oppose a new and formidable front at right angles to -his actual position. The whole of the allied army must therefore have -made a circuitous flank movement within gun-shot and through a most -difficult country, or Beresford’s left must have been dangerously -extended and the whole line weakened. Nor could the movement be -hidden, because the hills although only moderately high were abrupt -on that side, affording a full view of the low country, and Soult’s -cavalry detachments were in observation on every brow. - -It only remained to assail the French flanks along the ridges, -making the principal efforts on the side of St. Boës, with intent if -successful to overlap the French right beyond, and seize the road of -St. Sever while Hill passed the Gave at Souars and cut off the road -to Pau, thus enclosing the beaten army in Orthes. This was however no -slight affair. On Picton’s side it was easy to obtain a footing on -the flank ridge near the high road, but beyond that the ground rose -rapidly and the French were gathered thickly with a narrow front and -plenty of guns. On Beresford’s side they could only be assailed along -the summit of the St. Boës ridge, advancing from the high church of -Baïghts and the Dax road. But the village of St. Boës was strongly -occupied, the ground immediately behind it was strangled to a narrow -pass by the ravine, and the French reserve of sixteen guns, placed -on the Dax road, behind the hill in the centre of Soult’s line, and -well covered from counter-fire, was in readiness to crush the head of -any column which should emerge from the gorge of St. Boës. - - -BATTLE OF ORTHES. - -During the whole morning a slight skirmish with now and then a -cannon-shot had been going on with the third division on the right, -and the French cavalry at times pushed parties forward on each flank, -but at nine o’clock Wellington commenced the real attack. The third -and sixth divisions won without difficulty the lower part of the -ridges opposed to them, and endeavoured to extend their left along -the French front with a sharp fire of musquetry; but the main battle -was on the other flank. There general Cole, keeping Anson’s brigade -of the fourth division in reserve, assailed St. Boës with Ross’s -British brigade and Vasconcellos’ Portuguese; his object was to get -on to the open ground beyond it, but fierce and slaughtering was -the struggle. Five times breaking through the scattered houses did -Ross carry his battle into the wider space beyond; yet ever as the -troops issued forth the French guns from the open hill smote them in -front, and the reserved battery on the Dax road swept through them -with grape from flank to flank. And then Taupin’s supporting masses -rushed forwards with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks with -skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on either hand, forced -the shattered columns back into the village. It was in vain that with -desperate valour the allies time after time broke through the narrow -way and struggled to spread a front beyond, Ross fell dangerously -wounded, and Taupin, whose troops were clustered thickly and well -supported defied their utmost efforts. Nor was Soult less happy on -the other side. The nature of the ground would not permit the third -and sixth divisions to engage many men at once, so that no progress -was made; and one small detachment which Picton extended to his left, -having made an attempt to gain the smaller tongue jutting out from -the central hill, was suddenly charged, as it neared the summit, by -Foy, and driven down again in confusion, losing several prisoners. - -When the combat had thus continued with unabated fury on the side -of St. Boës for about three hours, lord Wellington sent a caçadore -regiment of the light division from the Roman camp to protect the -right flank of Ross’s brigade against the French skirmishers; but -this was of no avail, for Vasconcellos’ Portuguese, unable to sustain -the violence of the enemy any longer, gave way in disorder, and the -French pouring on, the British troops retreated through St. Boës -with difficulty. As this happened at the moment when the detachment -on Picton’s left was repulsed, victory seemed to declare for the -French, and Soult, conspicuous on his commanding open hill, the knot -of all his combinations, seeing his enemies thus broken and thrown -backwards on each side put all his reserves in movement to complete -the success. It is said that in the exultation of the moment he -smote his thigh exclaiming, “_At last I have him_.” Whether this be -so or not it was no vain-glorious speech, for the moment was most -dangerous. There was however a small black cloud rising just beneath -him, unheeded at first amidst the thundering din and tumult that now -shook the field of battle, but which soon burst with irresistible -violence. Wellington seeing that St. Boës was inexpugnable had -suddenly changed his plan of battle. Supporting Ross with Anson’s -brigade which had not hitherto been engaged, he backed both with the -seventh division and Vivian’s cavalry now forming one heavy body -towards the Dax road. Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions -to be thrown in mass upon Foy’s left flank, and at the same time sent -the fifty-second regiment down from the Roman camp with instructions -to cross the marsh in front, to mount the French ridge beyond, and -to assail the flank and rear of the troops engaged with the fourth -division at St. Boës. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.] - -Colonel Colborne, so often distinguished in this war, immediately -led the fifty-second down and crossed the marsh under fire, the men -sinking at every step above the knees, in some places to the middle, -but still pressing forwards with that stern resolution and order to -be expected from the veterans of the light division, soldiers who had -never yet met their match in the field. They soon obtained footing -on firm land and ascended the heights in line at the moment that -Taupin was pushing vigorously through St. Boës, Foy and D’Armagnac, -hitherto more than masters of their positions, being at the same -time seriously assailed on the other flank by the third and sixth -divisions. With a mighty shout and a rolling fire the fifty-second -soldiers dashed forwards between Foy and Taupin, beating down a -French battalion in their course and throwing everything before them -into disorder. General Bechaud was killed in Taupin’s division, Foy -was dangerously wounded, and his troops, discouraged by his fall and -by this sudden burst from a quarter where no enemy was expected, -for the march of the fifty-second had been hardly perceived save by -the skirmishers, got into confusion, and the disorder spreading to -Reille’s wing he also was forced to fall back and take a new position -to restore his line of battle. The narrow pass behind St. Boës was -thus opened, and Wellington seizing the critical moment thrust the -fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian’s cavalry, and two batteries of -artillery through, and spread a front beyond. - -The victory was thus secured. For the third and sixth divisions had -now won D’Armagnac’s position and established a battery of guns on -a knoll, from whence their shot ploughed through the French masses -from one flank to another. Suddenly a squadron of French chasseurs -came at a hard gallop down the main road of Orthes to charge these -guns, and sweeping to their right they rode over some of the sixth -division which had advanced too far; but pushing this charge too -madly got into a hollow lane and were nearly all destroyed. The -third and seventh divisions then continued to advance and the wings -of the army were united. The French general rallied all his forces -on the open hills beyond the Dax road, and with Taupin’s, Roguet’s, -Paris’, and D’Armagnac’s divisions made strong battle to cover the -reformation of Foy’s disordered troops, but his foes were not all in -front. This part of the battle was fought with only two-thirds of the -allied army. Hill who had remained with twelve thousand combatants, -cavalry and infantry, before the bridge of Orthes, received orders, -when Wellington changed his plan of attack, to force the passage of -the Gave, partly in the view of preventing Harispe from falling upon -the flank of the sixth division, partly in the hope of a successful -issue to the attempt: and so it happened. Hill though unable to force -the bridge, forded the river above at Souars, and driving back the -troops posted there seized the heights above, cut off the French -from the road to Pau, and turned the town of Orthes. He thus menaced -Soult’s only line of retreat by Salespice, on the road to St. Sever, -at the very moment when the fifty-second having opened the defile of -St. Boës the junction of the allies’ wings was effected on the French -position. - -Clauzel immediately ordered Harispe to abandon Orthes and close -towards Villatte on the heights above Rontun, leaving however some -conscript battalions on a rising point beyond the road of St. Sever -called the “_Motte de Turenne_.” Meanwhile in person he endeavoured -to keep general Hill in check by the menacing action of two cavalry -regiments and a brigade of infantry; but Soult arrived at the moment -and seeing that the loss of Souars had rendered his whole position -untenable, gave orders for a general retreat. - -This was a perilous matter. The heathy hills upon which he was now -fighting, although for a short distance they furnished a succession -of parallel positions favourable enough for defence, soon resolved -themselves into a low ridge running to the rear on a line parallel -with the road to St. Sever; and on the opposite side of that road -about cannon-shot distance was a corresponding ridge along which -general Hill, judging by the firing how matters went, was now -rapidly advancing. Five miles distant was the _Luy de Bearn_, and -four miles beyond that the _Luy de France_, two rivers deep and with -difficult banks. Behind these the Lutz, the Gabas, and the Adour, -crossed the line, and though once beyond the wooden bridge of Sault -de Navailles on the _Luy de Bearn_, these streams would necessarily -cover the retreat, to carry off by one road and one bridge a defeated -army still closely engaged in front seemed impossible. Nevertheless -Soult did so. For Paris sustained the fight on his right until Foy -and Taupin’s troops rallied, and when the impetuous assault of the -fifty-second and the rush of the fourth and seventh divisions drove -Paris back, D’Armagnac interposed to cover him until the union of -the allies’ wings was completed, then both retired, being covered in -turn by Villatte. In this manner the French yielded, step by step and -without confusion, the allies advancing with an incessant deafening -musketry and cannonade, yet losing many men especially on the right -where the third division were very strongly opposed. However as the -danger of being cut off at Salespice by Hill became more imminent -the retrograde movements were more hurried and confused; Hill seeing -this, quickened his pace until at last both sides began to run -violently, and so many men broke from the French ranks making across -the fields towards the fords, and such a rush was necessarily made -by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, that the whole -country was covered with scattered bands. Sir Stapleton Cotton then -breaking with lord Edward Somerset’s hussars through a small covering -body opposed to him by Harispe sabred two or three hundred men, -and the seventh hussars cut off about two thousand who threw down -their arms in an enclosed field; yet some confusion or mismanagement -occurring the greatest part recovering their weapons escaped, and the -pursuit ceased at the Luy of Bearn. - -The French army appeared to be entirely dispersed, but it was more -disordered in appearance than reality, for Soult passed the Luy -of Bearn and destroyed the bridge with the loss of only six guns -and less than four thousand men killed wounded and prisoners. Many -thousands of conscripts however threw away their arms, and we shall -find one month afterwards the stragglers still amounting to three -thousand. Nor would the passage of the river have been effected so -happily if lord Wellington had not been struck by a musket-ball just -above the thigh, which caused him to ride with difficulty, whereby -the vigour and unity of the pursuit was necessarily abated. The -loss of the allies was two thousand three hundred, of which fifty -with three officers were taken, but among the wounded were lord -Wellington, general Walker, general Ross, and the duke of Richmond, -then lord March. He had served on lord Wellington’s personal staff -during the whole war without a hurt, but being made a captain in -the fifty-second, like a good soldier joined his regiment the -night before the battle. He was shot through the chest a few hours -afterwards, thus learning by experience, the difference between the -labours and dangers of staff and regimental officers, which are -generally in the inverse ratio to their promotions. - -[Sidenote: Memoir by general Berton, MSS.] - -General Berton, stationed between Pau and Orthes during the battle, -had been cut off by Hill’s movement, yet skirting that general’s -march he retreated by Mant and Samadet with his cavalry, picking up -two battalions of conscripts on the road. Meanwhile Soult having no -position to rally upon, continued his retreat in the night to St. -Sever, breaking down all the bridges behind him. Lord Wellington -pursued at daylight in three columns, the right by Lacadée and St. -Medard to Samadet, the centre by the main road, the left by St. -Cricq. At St. Sever he hoped to find the enemy still in confusion, -but he was too late; the French were across the river, the bridge was -broken, and the army halted. The result of the battle was however -soon made known far and wide, and Darricau who with a few hundred -soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent levy at Dax, the works -of which were incomplete and still unarmed, immediately destroyed -part of the stores, the rest had been removed to Mont Marsan, and -retreated through the Landes to Langon on the Garonne. - -From St. Sever which offered no position Soult turned short to the -right and moved upon Barcelona higher up the Adour; but he left -D’Erlon with two divisions of infantry some cavalry and four guns at -Caceres on the right bank, and sent Clauzel to occupy Aire on the -other side of the river. He thus abandoned his magazines at Mont -Marsan and left open the direct road to Bordeaux, but holding Caceres -with his right he commanded another road by Rocquefort to that city, -while his left being at Aire protected the magazines and artillery -parc at that place and covered the road to Pau. Meanwhile the main -body at Barcelona equally supported Clauzel and D’Erlon, and covered -the great roads leading to Agen and Toulouse on the Garonne, and to -the mountains by Tarbes. - -In this situation it was difficult to judge what line of operations -he meant to adopt. Wellington however passed the Adour about one -o’clock, partly by the repaired bridge of St. Sever partly by a -deep ford below, and immediately detached Beresford with the light -division and Vivian’s cavalry to seize the magazines at Mont Marsan; -at the same time he pushed the head of a column towards Caceres -where a cannonade and charge of cavalry had place, and a few men -and officers were hurt on both sides. The next day Hill’s corps -marching from Samadet reached the Adour between St. Sever and Aire, -and D’Erlon was again assailed on the right bank and driven back -skirmishing to Barcelona. This event proved that Soult had abandoned -Bordeaux, but the English general could not push the pursuit more -vigorously, because every bridge was broken and a violent storm on -the evening of the 1st had filled the smaller rivers and torrents, -carried away the pontoon bridges, and cut off all communication -between the troops and the supplies. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -The bulk of the army was now necessarily halted on the right bank -of the Adour until the bridges could be repaired, but Hill who was -on the left bank marched to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in -two columns from St. Savin and St. Gillies on the 2d, he reached -his destination about three o’clock with two divisions of infantry -a brigade of cavalry and a battery of horse-artillery; he expected -no serious opposition, but general Clauzel had arrived a few hours -before and was in order of battle covering the town with Villatte’s -and Harispe’s divisions and some guns. The French occupied a steep -ridge in front of Aire, high and wooded on the right where it -overlooked the river, but merging on the left into a wide table-land -over which the great road led to Pau. The position was strong -for battle yet it could be readily outflanked on the left by the -table-land, and was an uneasy one for retreat on the right where -the ridge was narrow, the ravine behind steep and rugged with a -mill-stream at the bottom between it and the town. A branch of the -Adour also flowing behind Aire cut it off from Barcelona, while -behind the left wing was the greater Lees a river with steep banks -and only one bridge. - - -COMBAT OF AIRE. - -General Hill arriving about two o’clock attacked without hesitation. -General Stewart with two British brigades fell on the French right, -a Portuguese brigade assailed their centre, and the other brigades -followed in columns of march. The action was however very sudden, the -Portuguese were pushed forward in a slovenly manner by general Da -Costa, a man of no ability, and the French under Harispe met them on -the flat summit of the height with so rough a charge that they gave -way in flight. The rear of the allies’ column being still in march -the battle was like to be lost, but general Stewart having by this -time won the heights on the French right, where Villatte, fearing -to be enclosed made but a feeble resistance, immediately detached -general Barnes with the fiftieth and ninety-second regiments to the -aid of the Portuguese. The vehement charge of these troops turned -the stream of battle, the French were broken in turn and thrown back -on their reserves, yet they rallied and renewed the action with -great courage, fighting obstinately until General Byng’s British -brigade came up, when Harispe was driven towards the river Lees, and -Villate quite through the town of Aire into the space between the two -branches of the Adour behind. - -General Reille who was at Barcelona when the action began, brought -up Roguet’s division to support Villatte, the combat was thus -continued until night at that point, meanwhile Harispe crossed -the Lees and broke the bridge, but the French lost many men. Two -generals, Dauture and Gasquet, were wounded, a colonel of engineers -was killed, a hundred prisoners were taken, many of Harispe’s -conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their homes, and the -magazines fell into the conqueror’s hands. The loss of the British -troops was one hundred and fifty, general Barnes was wounded and -colonel Hood killed. The loss of the Portuguese was never officially -stated, yet it could not have been less than that of the British, -and the vigour of the action proved that the French courage was very -little abated by the battle of Orthes. Soult immediately retreated up -the Adour by both banks towards Maubourget and Marciac, and he was -not followed for new combinations were now opened to the generals on -both sides. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. On the 14th of February the passage of the Gaves was commenced, -by Hill’s attack on Harispe at Hellette. On the 2d of March the first -series of operations was terminated by the combat at Aire. In these -sixteen days lord Wellington traversed with his right wing eighty -miles, passed five large and several small rivers, forced the enemy -to abandon two fortified bridge-heads and many minor works, gained -one great battle and two combats, captured six guns and about a -thousand prisoners, seized the magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and -Aire, forced Soult to abandon Bayonne and cut him off from Bordeaux. -And in this time he also threw his stupendous bridge below Bayonne -and closely invested that fortress after a sharp and bloody action. -Success in war like charity in religion covers a multitude of sins; -but success often belongs to fortune as much as skill, and the -combinations of Wellington, profound and sagacious, might in this -manner be confounded with the lucky operations of the allies on the -other side of France, where the presumption and the vacillation of -ignorance alternately predominated. - -[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -2º. Soult attributed the loss of his positions to the superior forces -of the allies. Is this well-founded? The French general’s numbers -cannot be determined exactly, but after all his losses in December, -after the detachments made by the emperor’s order in January, and -after completing the garrison of Bayonne to fourteen thousand men, -he informed the minister of war that thirty thousand infantry, three -thousand cavalry and forty pieces of artillery were in line. This -did not include the conscripts of the new levy, all youths indeed -and hastily sent to the army by battalions as they could be armed, -but brave and about eight thousand of them might have joined before -the battle of Orthes. Wherefore deducting the detachments of cavalry -and infantry under Berton on the side of Pau, and under Daricau on -the side of Dax, it may be said that forty thousand combatants of -all arms were engaged in that action. Thirty-five thousand were very -excellent soldiers, for the conscripts of the old levy who joined -before the battle of the Nivelle were stout men; their vigorous -fighting at Garris and Aire proved it, for of them was Harispe’s -division composed. - -Now lord Wellington commenced his operations with the second third -fourth and seventh British divisions, the independent Portuguese -division under Le Cor, Morillo’s Spaniards, forty-eight pieces of -artillery, and only four brigades of light cavalry, for Vandaleur’s -brigade remained with Hope and all the heavy cavalry and the -Portuguese were left in Spain. Following the morning states of the -army, this would furnish, exclusive of Morillo’s Spaniards, something -more than forty thousand fighting men and officers of all arms, of -which four thousand were horsemen. But five regiments of infantry, -and amongst them two of the strongest British regiments of the light -division, were absent to receive their clothing; deduct these and we -have about thirty-seven thousand Anglo-Portuguese combatants. It is -true that Mina’s battalions and Morillo’s aided in the commencement -of the operations, but the first immediately invested St. Jean Pied -de Port and the latter invested Navarrens. Lord Wellington was -therefore in the battle superior by a thousand horsemen and eight -guns, but Soult outnumbered him in infantry by four or five thousand, -conscripts it is true, yet useful. Why then was the passage of -the Gaves so feebly disputed? Because the French general remained -entirely on the defensive in positions too extended for his numbers. - -3º. _Offensive operations must be the basis of a good defensive -system._ Let Soult’s operations be tried by this rule. On the 12th -he knew that the allies were in motion for some great operation and -he judged rightly that it was to drive him from the Gaves. From the -14th to the 18th his left was continually assailed by very superior -numbers, but during part of that time Beresford could only oppose -to his right and centre, the fourth and a portion of the seventh -divisions with some cavalry; and those not in a body and at once but -parcelled and extended, for it was not until the 16th that the fourth -seventh and light divisions were so closed towards the Bidouze as -to act in one mass. On the 15th lord Wellington admitted that his -troops were too extended, Villatte’s, Taupin’s, and Foy’s divisions, -were never menaced until the 18th, and there was nothing to prevent -D’Erlon’s divisions which only crossed the Adour on the 17th from -being on the Bidouze the 15th. Soult might therefore by rapid and -well-digested combinations have united four divisions of infantry and -a brigade of cavalry to attack Beresford on the 15th or 16th between -the Nive and the Adour. If successful the defeated troops, pushed -back upon the sixth division, must have fought for life with the -rivers on their flanks, Soult in front, and the garrison of Bayonne -issuing from the works of Mousseroles on their rear. If unsuccessful -the French retreat behind the Gave of Oleron could not have been -prevented. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.] - -It is however to be pleaded that Soult was not exactly informed of -the numbers and situation of his opponents. He thought Beresford had -the first division also on the Lower Bidouze; he knew that Wellington -had large reserves to employ, and, that general’s design of passing -the Adour below Bayonne being unknown to him, he naturally supposed -they would be used to support the operations on the Gaves: he -therefore remained on the defensive. It might possibly also have been -difficult to bring D’Erlon’s division across the Adour by the Port de -Lannes before the 17th, because the regular bridge had been carried -away and the communications interrupted a few days before by the -floods. In fine there are many matters of detail in war known only to -a general-in-chief which forbid the best combinations, and this it is -that makes the art so difficult and uncertain. Great captains worship -Fortune. - -On the 24th the passage of the Gave d’Oleron was effected. Soult then -recognised his error and concentrated his troops at Orthes to retake -the offensive. It was a fine movement and effected with ability, but -he suffered another favourable opportunity of giving a counter-blow -to escape him. The infantry under Villatte, Harispe, and Paris, -supported by a brigade of cavalry, were about Sauveterre, that is to -say, four miles from Montfort and only seven from Villenave, where -the principal passage was effected, where the ford was deep, the -stream rapid, and the left bank although favourable for the passage -not entirely commanding the right bank. How then did it happen that -the operation was effected without opposition? Amongst the allies it -was rumoured at the time that Soult complained of the negligence of -a general who had orders to march against the passing troops. The -position of Harispe’s division at Monstrueig, forming a reserve at -equal distances from Sauveterre and Villenave, would seem to have -been adopted with that view, but I find no confirmation of the report -in Soult’s correspondence, and it is certain he thought Picton’s -demonstrations at Sauveterre was a real attack. - -[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Notes by general Reille and colonel De la Chasse, MSS.] - -4º. The position adopted by the French general at Orthes was -excellent for offence. It was not so for defence, when Beresford and -Picton had crossed the Gave below in force. Lord Wellington could -then throw his whole army on that side, and secure his communication -with Hope, after which outflanking the right of the French he could -seize the defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from their -magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan and Aire, and force them to retreat by -the Pau road leaving open the way to Bordeaux. To await this attack -was therefore an error, but Soult’s original design was to assail the -head of the first column which should come near him and Beresford’s -approach to Baïghts on the 26th furnished the opportunity. It is true -that the French light cavalry gave intelligence of that general’s -march too late and marred the combination, but there was still time -to fall on the head of the column while the third division was in -the act of passing the river and entangled in the narrow way leading -from the ford to the Peyrehorade road: it is said the French marshal -appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally took a defensive -position in which to receive battle. - -However when the morning came he neglected another opportunity. -For two hours the third division and the hussars remained close to -him, covering the march of the sixth and light divisions through -the narrow ways leading from the bridge of Berenx up to the main -road; the infantry had no defined position, the cavalry had no room -to extend, and there were no troops between them and Beresford who -was then in march by the heights of Baïghts to the Dax road. If -the French general had pushed a column across the marsh to seize -the Roman camp he would have separated the wings of the allies; -then pouring down the Peyrehorade road with Foy’s, D’Armagnac’s and -Villatte’s divisions he would probably have overwhelmed the third -division before the other two could have extricated themselves from -the defiles. Picton therefore had grounds for uneasiness. - -With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of battle at Orthes, -fiercely and strongly did he fight, and wonderfully did he effect -his retreat across the Luy of Bearn, but twice in twenty-four hours -he had neglected those happy occasions which in war take birth -and flight at the same instant; and as the value of his position, -essentially an offensive one, was thereby lost, a slowness to strike -may be objected to his generalship. Yet there is no commander, unless -a Hannibal or a Napoleon surpassing the human proportions, but -will abate something of his confidence and hesitate after repeated -defeats, Soult in this campaign as in many others proved himself a -hardy captain full of resources. - -5º. Lord Wellington with a vastness of conception and a capacity -for arrangement and combination equal to his opponent, possessed -in a high degree that daring promptness of action, that faculty of -inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole campaigns with -which Napoleon was endowed beyond all mankind. It is this which -especially constitutes military genius. For so vast so complicated -are the combinations of war, so easily and by such slight causes are -they affected, that the best generals do but grope in the dark, and -they acknowledge the humiliating truth. By the number and extent of -their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors, the merit of -commanders is to be measured. - -In this campaign lord Wellington designed to penetrate France, not -with a hasty incursion but solidly, to force Soult over the Garonne, -and if possible in the direction of Bordeaux, because it was the -direct line, because the citizens were inimical to the emperor, and -the town, lying on the left bank of the river, could not be defended; -because a junction with Suchet would thus be prevented. Finally if -by operating against Soult’s left he could throw the French army -into the Landes, where his own superior cavalry could act, it would -probably be destroyed. - -To operate against Soult’s left in the direction of Pau was the most -obvious method of preventing a junction with Suchet, and rendering -the positions which the French general had fortified on the Gaves -useless. But the investment of Bayonne required a large force, which -was yet weak against an outer attack because separated in three parts -by the rivers; hence if lord Wellington had made a wide movement on -Pau, Soult might have placed the Adour between him and the main army -and then fallen upon Hope’s troops on the right side of that river. -The English general was thus reduced to act upon a more contracted -line, and to cross all the Gaves. To effect this he collected his -principal mass on his right by the help of the great road leading to -St. Jean Pied de Port, then by rapid marches and reiterated attacks -he forced the passage of the rivers above the points which Soult had -fortified for defence, and so turned that general’s left with the -view of finally cutting him off from Suchet and driving him into the -wilderness of the Landes. During these marches he left Beresford on -the lower parts of the rivers to occupy the enemy’s attention and -cover the troops blockading Mousseroles. Meanwhile by the collection -of boats at Urt and other demonstrations indicating a design of -throwing a bridge over the Adour above Bayonne, he diverted attention -from the point chosen below the fortress for that operation, and at -the same time provided the means of throwing another bridge at the -Port de Lannes to secure the communication with Hope by the right -bank whenever Soult should be forced to abandon the Gaves. These were -fine combinations. - -I have shown that Beresford’s corps was so weak at first that Soult -might have struck a counter-blow. Lord Wellington admitted the error. -Writing on the 15th he says, “If the enemy stand upon the Bidouze I -am not so strong as I ought to be,” and he ordered up the fourth and -light divisions; but this excepted, his movements were conformable -to the principles of war. He chose the best strategic line of -operations, his main attack was made with heavy masses against the -enemy’s weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and daring. -His conduct was conformable also to his peculiar situation. He had -two distinct operations in hand, namely to throw his bridge below -Bayonne and to force the Gaves. He had the numbers required to obtain -these objects but dared not use them lest he should put the Spanish -troops into contact with the French people; yet he could not entirely -dispense with them; wherefore bringing Freyre up to Bayonne, Morillo -to Navarrens, and Mina to St. Jean Pied de Port, he seemed to put -his whole army in motion, thus gaining the appearance of military -strength with as little political danger as possible. Nevertheless -so terrible had the Spaniards already made themselves by their cruel -lawless habits that their mere return across the frontier threw the -whole country into consternation. - -6º. When in front of Orthes it would at first sight appear as if lord -Wellington had changed his plan of driving the enemy upon the Landes, -but it was not so. He did not expect a battle on the 27th. This is -proved by his letter to sir John Hope in which he tells that general -that he anticipated no difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau, that on -the evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring, and that he designed -to visit the position at Bayonne. To pass the Gave in the quickest -and surest manner, to re-establish the direct communications with -Hope and to unite with Beresford, were his immediate objects; if he -finally worked by his left it was a sudden act and extraneous to the -general design, which was certainly to operate with Hill’s corps and -the light division by the right. - -It was after passing the Gave at Berenx on the morning of the 27th -lord Wellington first discovered Soult’s intention to fight, and that -consequently he was himself in a false position. Had he shewn any -hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured to take a defensive -position with either Beresford’s or Picton’s troops, he would -inevitably have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous -situation. Instead of this, judging that Soult would not on the -instant change from the defensive to the offensive, he confidently -pushed Picton’s skirmishers forward as if to assail the left of -the French position, and put Beresford in movement against their -right, and this with all the coolness imaginable. The success was -complete. Soult who supposed the allies stronger than they really -were, naturally imagined the wings would not be so bold unless well -supported in the centre where the Roman camp could hide a multitude. -He therefore held fast to his position until the movement was more -developed, and in two hours the sixth and light divisions were up and -the battle commenced. It was well fought on both sides but the crisis -was decided by the fifty-second, and when that regiment was put in -movement only a single Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the -Roman camp: upon such nice combinations of time and place does the -fate of battles turn. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -7º. Soult certainly committed an error in receiving battle at -Orthes, and it has been said that lord Wellington’s wound at the -most critical period of the retreat alone saved the hostile army. -Nevertheless the clear manner in which the French general carried his -troops away, his prompt judgement, shown in the sudden change of his -line of retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which he halted -and showed front again at Caceres, Barcelonne, and Aire, were all -proofs of no common ability. It was Wellington’s aim to drive the -French on to the Landes, Soult’s to avoid this, he therefore shifted -from the Bordeaux line to that of Toulouse, not in confusion but -with the resolution of a man ready to dispute every foot of ground. -The loss of the magazines at Mont Marsan was no fault of his; he had -given orders for transporting them towards the Toulouse side fifteen -days before, but the matter depending upon the civil authorities -was neglected. He was blamed by some of his officers for fighting -at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover the magazines there, and -essential to his design of keeping up the courage of the soldiers -under the adverse circumstances which he anticipated. And here the -palm of generalship remained with him, for certainly the battle of -Orthes was less decisive than it should have been. I speak not of the -pursuit to Sault de Navailles, nor of the next day’s march upon St. -Sever, but of Hill’s march on the right. That general halted near -Samade the 28th, reached St. Savin on the Adour the 1st and fought -the battle of Aire on the evening of the 2d of March. But from -Samadet to Aire is not longer than from Samadet to St. Savin where -he was on the 1st. He could therefore, if his orders had prescribed -it so, have seized Aire on the 1st before Clauzel arrived, and thus -spared the obstinate combat at that place. It may also be observed -that his attack did not receive a right direction. It should have -been towards the French left, because they were more weakly posted -there, and the ridge held by their right was so difficult to retire -from, that no troops would stay on it if any progress was made on the -left. This was however an accident of war, general Hill had no time -to examine the ground, his orders were to attack, and to fall without -hesitation upon a retiring enemy after such a defeat as Orthes was -undoubtedly the right thing to do; but it cannot be said that lord -Wellington pushed the pursuit with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm -on the evening of the 1st he could have reinforced Hill and should -not have given the French army time to recover from their recent -defeat. “The secret of war,” says Napoleon, “is to march twelve -leagues, fight a battle and march twelve more in pursuit.” - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1814. March.] - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -Extremely perilous and disheartening was the situation of the French -general. His army was greatly reduced by his losses in battle and -by the desertion of the conscripts, and three thousand stragglers, -old soldiers who ought to have rejoined their eagles, were collected -by different generals, into whose districts they had wandered, and -employed to strengthen detached corps instead of being restored -to the army. All his magazines were taken, discontent the natural -offspring of misfortune prevailed amongst his officers, a powerful -enemy was in front, no certain resources of men or money behind, and -his efforts were ill-seconded by the civil authorities. The troops -indignant at the people’s apathy behaved with so much violence and -insolence, especially during the retreat from St. Sever, that Soult, -who wanted officers very badly, proposed to fill the vacancies -from the national guards that he might have “men who would respect -property.” On the other hand the people comparing the conduct of -their own army with the discipline of the Anglo-Portuguese, and -contrasting the requisitions necessarily imposed by their countrymen -with the ready and copious disbursements in gold made by their -enemies, for now one commissary preceded each division to order -rations for the troops and another followed to arrange and pay on -the spot, were become so absolutely averse to the French army that -Soult writing to the minister of war thus expressed himself. “If the -population of the departments of the Landes of Gers, and the Lower -Pyrenees, were animated with a good spirit, this is the moment to -make the enemy suffer by carrying off his convoys and prisoners, but -they appear more disposed to favour the invaders than to second the -army. It is scarcely possible to obtain a carriage for transport and -I shall not be surprised to find in a short time these inhabitants -taking arms against us.” Soult was however a man formed by nature -and by experience to struggle against difficulties, always appearing -greater when in a desperate condition than when more happily -circumstanced. At Genoa under Massena, at Oporto, and in Andalusia, -he had been inured to military distress, and probably for that -reason the emperor selected him to sustain this dangerous contest in -preference to others accounted more ready tacticians on a field of -battle. - -On the 3d and 4th he retreated by Plaissance and Madiran to -Rabastens, Marciac, and Maubourget where he halted, covering Tarbes, -for his design was to keep in mass and await the development of the -allies’ plans. In this view he called in the detachments of cavalry -and infantry which had been left on the side of Pau before the battle -of Orthes, and hearing that Darricau was at Langon with a thousand -men he ordered him to march by Agen and join the army immediately. -He likewise put the national guards and _gensd’armes_ in activity on -the side of the Pyrenees, and directed the commanders of the military -districts in his rear to keep their old soldiers, of which there were -many scattered through the country, in readiness to aid the army. - -While thus acting he received from the minister of war a note -dictated by the emperor. - -“Fortresses,” said Napoleon, “are nothing in themselves when the -enemy having the command of the sea can collect as many shells and -bullets and guns as he pleases to crush them. Leave therefore only a -few troops in Bayonne, the way to prevent the siege is to keep the -army close to the place. Resume the offensive, fall upon one or other -of the enemy’s wings, and though you should have but twenty thousand -men if you seize the proper moment and attack hardily you ought to -gain some advantage. You have enough talent to understand my meaning.” - -This note came fourteen days too late. But what if it had come -before? Lord Wellington after winning the battle of St. Pierre the -13th of December was firmly established on the Adour above Bayonne, -and able to interrupt the French convoys as they descended from the -Port de Landes. It was evident then that when dry weather enabled -the allies to move Soult must abandon Bayonne to defend the passage -of the Gaves, or risk being turned and driven upon the Landes from -whence it would be difficult for him to escape. Napoleon however -desired him to leave only a few men in Bayonne, another division -would thus have been added to his field army, and this diminution -of the garrison would not have increased lord Wellington’s active -forces, because the investment of Bayonne would still have required -three separate corps: moreover until the bridge-head at Peyrehorade -was abandoned to concentrate at Orthes, Bayonne was not rigorously -speaking left to its own defence. - -To the emperor’s observations Soult therefore replied, that several -months before, he had told the minister of war Bayonne was incapable -of sustaining fifteen days open trenches unless the entrenched camp -was well occupied, and he had been by the minister authorised so to -occupy it. Taking that as his base he had left a garrison of thirteen -thousand five hundred men, and now that he knew the emperor’s wishes -it was no longer in his power to withdraw them. With respect to -keeping close to the place he had done so as long as he could without -endangering the safety of the army; but lord Wellington’s operations -had forced him to abandon it, and he had only changed his line of -operations at St. Sever when he was being pushed back upon Bordeaux -with little prospect of being able to pass the Garonne in time. He -had for several months thought of establishing a pivot of support -for his movements at Dax, in the design of still holding by Bayonne, -and with that view had ordered the old works of the former place to -be repaired and a camp to be fortified; but from poverty of means -even the body of the place was not completed or armed at the moment -when the battle of Orthes forced him to relinquish it. Moreover the -insurgent levy of the Landes upon which he depended to man the works -had failed, not more than two hundred men had come forward. Neither -was he very confident of the advantage of such a position, because -Wellington with superior numbers would probably have turned his left -and forced him to retire precipitately towards Bordeaux by the desert -of the greater Landes. - -The emperor ordered him to take the offensive were it only with -twenty thousand men. He would obey with this observation, that from -the 14th of February to that moment he had had no power to take the -initiatory movement, having been constantly attacked by infinitely -superior numbers. He had defended himself as he could, but had not -expected to succeed against the enormous disproportion of force. It -being thus impossible, even though he sacrificed his last man in the -attempt, to stop the enemy, he now sought to prolong the war as much -as possible on the frontier, and by defending every position to keep -the invaders in check and prevent them from attacking Bordeaux or -Toulouse, save by detachments. He had taken his line of operations by -the road of Tarbes, St. Gaudens, and Toulouse, that is to say, by the -roots of the Pyrenees, calculating that if lord Wellington sent small -detachments against Bordeaux or Toulouse, the generals commanding at -those places would be able if the national guards would fight for -their country to defend them. - -If the enemy made large detachments, an attack in front while he was -thus weakened would bring them back again. If he marched with his -whole army upon Bordeaux he could be followed and forced to face -about. If he attempted to march by Auch against Toulouse he might be -stopped by an attack in flank. If he remained stationary he should -be provoked by an advance to develop his objects. But if, as was to -be expected, the French army was itself attacked it would defend its -position vigorously, and then retreating by St. Gaudens draw the -allies into a difficult mountain country, where the ground might be -disputed step by step the war be kept still on the frontier and the -passage of the Garonne be delayed. He had meditated deeply upon his -task and could find no better mode. But his army was weakened by -combats, still more by desertion; the conscripts went off so fast -that of five battalions lately called up from Toulouse two-thirds -were already gone without having seen an enemy. - -Soult was mistaken as to the real force of the allies in the recent -operations. In other respects he displayed clear views and great -activity. He reorganized his army in six divisions, called in his -detachments, urged the imperial commissioners and local authorities -to hasten the levies and restore deserters, and he prepared a plan -of action for the partizans which had been organized towards the -mountains. Nevertheless his difficulties increased. The conscripts -who did arrive were for the most part unarmed and he had none to -spare. The imperial commissary Cornudet, and the prefect of the -Gironde, quitted Bordeaux, and when general L’Huillier attempted -to remove the military stores belonging to the army from Langon, -Podensac, and Bordeaux, the inferior authorities opposed him. There -was no money they said to pay the expense, but in truth Bordeaux was -the focus of Bourbon conspiracy, and the mayor, count Lynch, was -eager to betray his sovereign. - -Nor was Wellington without embarrassments. The storms prevented him -following up his victory while the French army was in confusion. Now -it was reorganized on a new line and could retreat for many days in a -direction parallel to the Pyrenees with strong defensive positions. -Should he press it closely? His army weakened at every step would -have to move between the mountains and the Garonne exposing its -flanks and rear to the operations of any force which the French -might be able to collect on those boundaries; that is to say all the -power of France beyond the Garonne. It was essential to find some -counterpoise, and to increase his field army. To establish a Bourbon -party at Bordeaux was an obvious mode of attaining the first object. -Should he then seize that city by a detachment? He must employ twelve -thousand men and remain with twenty-six thousand to oppose Soult, -who he erroneously believed was being joined by the ten thousand men -which Suchet had sent to Lyons. The five regiments detached for their -clothing had rejoined the army and all the reserves of cavalry and -artillery were now called up, but the reinforcements from England -and Portugal, amounting to twenty thousand men, upon which he had -calculated were detained by the respective governments. Wherefore, -driven by necessity he directed Freyre to join him by the Port de -Landes with two divisions of the Gallician army, a measure which -was instantly followed by innumerable complaints of outrages and -excesses, although the Spaniards were entirely provided from the -English military chest. Now also Clinton was ordered to send the -British and Germans of the Anglo-Sicilian army to St. Jean de Luz. -This done he determined to seize Bordeaux. Meanwhile he repaired -the destroyed bridges, brought up one of Morillo’s brigades from -Navarrens to the vicinity of Aire, sent Campbell’s Portuguese -dragoons to Rocquefort, general Fane with two regiments of cavalry -and a brigade of infantry to Pau, and pushed posts towards Tarbes and -Vic Bigorre. - -Soult, now fearing the general apathy and ill-will of the people -would become fatal to him, endeavoured to arouse the energies of the -people and the army by the following proclamation which has been -unreasonably railed at by several English writers, for it was a -judicious well-timed and powerful address. - -“Soldiers, at the battle of Orthes you did your duty, the enemy’s -losses surpassed yours, his blood moistened all the ground he -gained. You may consider that feat of arms as an advantage. Other -combats are at hand, no repose for us until his army, formed of such -extraordinary elements, shall evacuate the French territory or be -annihilated. Its numbers and progress may be great, but at hand are -unexpected perils. Time will teach the enemy’s general that French -honour is not to be outraged with impunity. - -“Soldiers, he has had the indecency to provoke you and your -countrymen to revolt and sedition, he speaks of peace but firebrands -of discord follow him! He speaks of peace and excites the French to a -civil war! Thanks be to him for making known his projects, our forces -are thereby centupled; and he himself rallies round the imperial -eagles all those who deceived by appearances believed our enemies -would make a loyal war. No peace with the disloyal and perfidious -nation! no peace with the English and their auxiliaries until they -quit the French territory! they have dared to insult the national -honour, the infamy to incite Frenchmen to become perjured towards the -emperor. Revenge the offence in blood. To arms! Let this cry resound -through the south of France, the Frenchman that hesitates abjures his -country and belongs to her enemies. - -“Yet a few days and those who believe in English delicacy and -sincerity will learn to their cost that cunning promises are made to -abate their courage and subjugate them. They will learn also that -if the English pay to-day and are generous, they will to-morrow -retake and with interest in contributions what they disburse. Let the -pusillanimous beings who calculate the cost of saving their country -remember that the English have in view to reduce Frenchmen to the -same servitude as the Spaniards Portuguese and Sicilians who groan -under their domination. Past history will recall to those unworthy -Frenchmen who prefer momentary enjoyment to the safety of the great -family, the English making Frenchmen kill Frenchmen at Quiberon; -it will show them at the head of all conspiracies, all odious -political intrigues plots and assassinations, aiming to overthrow all -principles, to destroy all grand establishments of trade to satisfy -their immeasurable ambition, their insatiable cupidity. Does there -exist upon the face of the globe a point known to the English where -they have not destroyed by seditions and violence all manufactures -which could rival their own? Thus they will do to the French -establishments if they prevail. - -“Devote then to opprobrium and execration all Frenchmen who favour -their insidious projects, aye! even those who are under his power -if they seek not to hurt him. Devote to opprobrium and reject as -Frenchmen those who think under specious pretexts to avoid serving -their country; and those also who from corruption or indolence hide -deserters instead of driving them back to their colours. With such -men we have nothing in common, and history will pass their names -with execrations to posterity. As to us soldiers our duty is clear. -Honour and fidelity. This is our motto and we will fight to the last -the enemies of our emperor and France. Respect persons and property. -Grieve for those who have momentarily fallen under the enemy’s -yoke, and hasten the moment of their deliverance. Be obedient and -disciplined, and bear implacable hatred towards traitors and enemies -of the French name! War to death against those who would divide us to -destroy us; and to those cowards who desert the imperial eagles to -range themselves under another banner. Remember always that fifteen -ages of glory, triumphs innumerable, have illustrated our country. -Contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great sovereign, his signal -victories which immortalize the French name. Let us be worthy of -him and we can then bequeath without a taint to our posterity the -inheritance we hold from our fathers. Be in fine Frenchmen and die -arms in hand sooner than survive dishonour.” - -Let the time and the occasion of this proclamation be considered. Let -it be remembered that no English writer orator or politician, had -for many years used milder terms than robbers, murderers, atheists, -and tyrant, when speaking of Frenchmen and their sovereign, that -lord Wellington even at this time refused that sovereign his title -of emperor, calling him Buonaparte; that on entering France he had -published an order of the day accusing the French commanders of -authorising and encouraging the cruelties of their soldiers in Spain; -finally that for six years the Spanish Portuguese and English state -papers were filled with most offensive ribald abuse of Napoleon -his ministers and commanders. Let all this be remembered and the -acrimony of Soult’s proclamation cannot be justly blamed, while the -noble energy, the loyalty of the sentiments, the exciting passionate -feeling of patriotism which pervades it must be admired. Was he, -sprung from the ranks, a soldier of the republic, a general of the -empire, after fighting thirty years under the tri-colour, to be -tame and measured to squeamishness in his phrases when he saw his -country invaded by foreigners, and a pretender to the throne stalking -behind their bayonets beckoning his soldiers to desert their eagles, -inviting his countrymen to betray their sovereign and dishonour -their nation! Why the man was surrounded by traitors, and proud and -scornful of danger was his spirit to strive so mightily against -defeat and treason combined. - -It has been said in condemnation of him that the English general did -not encourage the Bourbon party. Is that true? Did it so appear to -the French general? Had not the duke of Angoulême come to the English -head-quarters with mystery, and following the invading army and -protected by its arms assemble round him all the ancient partizans -of his house, sending forth agents, scattering proclamations even -in Soult’s camp, endeavouring to debauch his soldiers and to aid -strangers to subjugate France. Soult not only knew this but was -suffering under the effects. On every side he met with opposition -and discontent from the civil authorities, his movements were made -known to the enemy and his measures thwarted in all directions. At -Bordeaux a party were calling aloud with open arms to the invaders. -At Tarbes the fear of provoking an action near the town had caused -the dispersion of the insurrectional levy organized by the imperial -commissioner Caffarelli. At Pau the aristocracy had secretly -assembled to offer homage to the duke of Angoulême, and there was a -rumour that he was to be crowned at the castle of Henry IV. Was the -French general to disregard these facts and symptoms because his -opponent had avoided any public declaration in favour of the Bourbon -family? Lord Wellington would have been the first to laugh at his -simplicity if he had. - -[Sidenote: Secret instructions from Lord Bathurst, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Published Despatches.] - -And what was the reason that the English general did not openly -call upon the Bourbon partizans to raise the standard of revolt? -Simply that Napoleon’s astounding genius had so baffled the banded -sovereigns and their innumerable hordes that a peace seemed -inevitable to avoid fatal disasters; and therefore lord Wellington, -who had instructions from his government not to embarrass any -negociation for peace by pledges to a Bourbon party, acting as an -honest statesman and commander, would not excite men to their own -ruin for a momentary advantage. But so far from discouraging treason -to Napoleon on any other ground he avowed his anxious desire for it, -and his readiness to encourage every enemy of that monarch. He had -seen and consulted with La Roche Jacquelin, with de Mailhos and other -vehement partizans for an immediate insurrection; and also with Viel -Castel an agent of Bernadotte’s until he found him intriguing against -the Bourbons. He advised the duke of Angoulême to form regular -battalions, promised him arms and actually collected eighty thousand -stand, to arm the insurgents. Finally he rebuked the timid policy of -the English ministers who having such an opportunity of assailing -Napoleon refrained from doing it. Before Soult’s proclamation -appeared he thus wrote to lord Bathurst. - -“I find the sentiment as we advance in the country still more strong -against the Buonaparte dynasty and in favour of the Bourbons, but I -am quite certain there will be no declaration on the part of the -people if the allies do not in some manner declare themselves.” “_I -cannot discover the policy of not hitting one’s enemy as hard as one -can and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that he would not -so act by us, he would certainly overturn the British authority in -Ireland if it were in his power._” - -Soult and Wellington acted and wrote, each in the manner most -suitable to their situation, but it was not a little remarkable that -Ireland should so readily occur to the latter as a parallel case. - -It was in this state of affairs that the English general detached -Beresford with twelve thousand men against Bordeaux, giving him -instructions to occupy that city and acquire the Garonne as a port -for the allies, but to make the French authorities declare whether -they would or would not continue to exercise their functions -under the conditions announced by proclamation. For hitherto -lord Wellington had governed the country as he advanced in this -public manner, thus nullifying the misrepresentations of political -intriguers, obviating the dangers of false reports and rumours of -his projects, making his justice and moderation known to the poorest -peasant, and securing the French local authorities who continued -to act under him from any false and unjust representation of their -conduct to the imperial government if peace should be made with -Napoleon. This expedition against Bordeaux however involved political -as well as military interests. Beresford was instructed that there -were many partizans of the Bourbons in that city who might propose -to hoist the white standard and proclaim Louis the Eighteenth under -protection of the troops. They were to be told that the British -nation and its allies wished well to their cause, and while public -tranquillity was maintained in the districts occupied by the troops -there would be no hindrance to their political proceedings: they or -any party opposed to Napoleon would receive assistance. Nevertheless, -as the allied sovereigns were negociating with the French emperor, -however well inclined the English general might be to support a -party against the latter during war, he could give no help if peace -were concluded, and this they must weigh well before they revolted. -Beresford was therefore not to meddle with any declaration in -favour of Louis the Eighteenth; but he was not to oppose it, and if -revolt took place he was to supply the revolters with the arms and -ammunition collected at Dax. - -On the 8th Beresford marched towards Langon with the fourth and -seventh divisions, Vivian’s horsemen, and some guns; he was joined -on the road by some of Vandeleur’s cavalry from Bayonne, and he had -orders to observe the enemy’s movements towards Agen, for it was -still in Soult’s power by a forced march on that side to cross the -Garonne and enter Bordeaux before him. La Roche Jacquelin preceded -the troops and the duke of Angoulême followed closely, but his -partizans in the city frightened at the danger of their enterprize -now besought Beresford to delay his march. La Roche Jacquelin -vehemently condemned their hesitation, and his influence supported by -the consternation which the battle of Orthes had created amongst the -Napoleonists decided the question in favour of revolt. - -Long before this epoch, Soult, foreseeing that the probable course -of the war would endanger Bordeaux, had given orders to place the -forts in a state of defence, to arm the flotilla and to organize the -national guards and the urban legions; he had urged these measures -again when the imperial commissioner Cornudet first arrived, but -according to the usual habits of civilians who have to meddle with -military affairs every thing was promised and nothing done. Cornudet -and the prefect quitted the city as early as the 4th, first burning -with a silly affectation of vigour some ships of war upon the stocks; -general L’Huillier, unable to oppose the allies, then destroyed the -fort of Médoc on the left bank of the Garonne, disarmed some of the -river batteries, and passing in the night of the 11th to the right -bank occupied the fortress of Blaye, the Paté and other points. -Meanwhile Beresford who reached Langon the 10th, left lord Dalhousie -there with the bulk of the forces and advanced with eight hundred -cavalry. - -Entering Bordeaux the 12th, he met the municipality and a great -body of Bourbonists, at the head of whom was the mayor count Lynch, -decorated with the scarf of his office and the legion of honour, both -conferred upon him, and probably at his own solicitation, by the -sovereign he was then going to betray. After some formal discourse -in which Beresford explicitly made known his instructions Lynch very -justly tore the tricolor, the emblem of his country’s glory, from -his own shoulders, the white flag was then displayed and the allies -took peaceable possession of the city. The duke of Angoulême arrived -on the same day and Louis the Eighteenth was formally proclaimed. -This event, the act of a party, was not generally approved, and the -mayor conscious of weakness immediately issued with the connivance -of the duke of Angoulême a proclamation, in which he asserted, that -“the British Portuguese and Spanish armies were united in the south, -as the other nations were united in the north, solely to destroy -Napoleon and replace him by a Bourbon king who was conducted thither -by these generous allies, and only by accepting that king could the -French appease the resentment of the Spaniards.” At the same time -the duke of Angoulême, as if quite master of the country, appointed -prefects and other authorities in districts beyond the limits of -Bordeaux. - -Both the duke and the mayor soon repented of their precipitancy. The -English fleet which should have acted simultaneously with the troops -had not arrived; the Regulus a French seventy-four with several -inferior vessels of war were anchored below Blaye, and Beresford -was recalled with the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry. Lord -Dalhousie remained with only the seventh division and three squadrons -to oppose L’Huillier’s troops and other French corps which were now -on the Garonne. He could not guard the river below Bordeaux, and some -French troops recrossing again took possession of the fort of Grave -near the mouth; a new army was forming under general Decaen beyond -the Garonne, the Napoleonists recovering from their first stupor -began to stir themselves, and a partizan officer coming down to St. -Macaire on the 18th surprised fifty men which lord Dalhousie had -sent across the Garonne from Langon to take possession of a French -magazine. In the Landes the peasants forming bands burned the houses -of the gentlemen who had joined the white standard, and in Bordeaux -itself a counter-insurrection was preparing whenever Decaen should be -ready to advance. - -The prince frightened at these symptoms of reaction desired lord -Dalhousie to bring his troops into Bordeaux to awe the Napoleonists, -and meanwhile each party strove to outvie the other in idle rumours -and falsehoods relating to the emperor. Victories and defeats -were invented or exaggerated, Napoleon was dead from illness, had -committed suicide, was poisoned, stabbed; and all these things were -related as certain with most circumstantial details. Meanwhile -Wellington, writing to the duke of Angoulême, denied the veracity of -the mayor’s proclamation and expressed his trust that the prince was -not a party to such a mendacious document. The latter however with -some excuses about hurry and confusion avowed his participation in -its publication, and defended the mayor’s conduct. He also forwarded -a statement of the danger his party was exposed to and demanded aid -of men and money, supporting his application by a note of council -in which with more ingenuity than justice, it was argued, that as -civil government could not be conducted without executive power, and -as lord Wellington had suffered the duke of Angoulême to assume the -civil government at Bordeaux without an adequate executive force, -he was bound to supply the deficiency from his army, and even to -furnish money until taxes could be levied under the protection of the -soldiers. - -The English general was not a man to bear with such sophistry in -excuse for a breach of faith. Sorry he was he said to find that the -principle by which he regulated his conduct towards the Bourbon -party, though often stated, had made so little impression that the -duke could not perceive how inconsistent it was with the mayor’s -proclamation. Most cautious therefore must be his future conduct, -seeing that as the chief of an army and the confidential agent of -three independent nations, he could not permit his views to be -misrepresented upon such an important question. He had occupied -Bordeaux as a military point, but certain persons contrary to his -advice and opinion thought proper to proclaim Louis the Eighteenth. -Those persons made no exertions, subscribed not a shilling, raised -not a soldier, yet because he would not extend the posts of his -army beyond what was proper and convenient, merely to protect their -families and property, exposed to danger, not on account of their -exertions for they had made none, but on account of their premature -declaration contrary to his advice, they took him to task in a -document delivered to lord Dalhousie by the prince himself. The -writer of that paper and all such persons however might be assured -that nothing should make him swerve from what he thought his duty to -the sovereigns who employed him, he would not risk even a company -of infantry to save properties and families placed in a state of -danger contrary to his advice. The duke had better then conduct his -policy and compose his manifestos in such a manner as not to force a -public contradiction of them. His royal highness was free to act as -he pleased for himself, but he was not free to adduce the name and -authority of the allied governments in support of his measures when -they had not been consulted, nor of their general when he had been -consulted but had given his opinion against those measures. - -He had told him that if any great town or extensive district declared -in favour of the Bourbons he would not interfere with the government -of that town or district, and if there was a general declaration in -favour of his house he would deliver the civil government of all -the country overrun by the army into his hands, but the fact was -that even at Bordeaux the movement in favour of the Bourbons was -not unanimous. The spirit had not spread elsewhere, not even to La -Vendée, nor in any part occupied by the army. The events contemplated -had not therefore occurred, and it would be a great breach of duty -towards the allied sovereigns and cruel to the inhabitants if he -were to deliver them over to his royal highness prematurely or -against their inclinations. He advised him therefore to withdraw -his prefects and confine his government to Bordeaux. He could give -him no money and after what had passed he was doubtful if he should -afford him any countenance or protection. The argument of the note of -council, affirming that he was bound to support the civil government -of his royal highness, only rendered it more incumbent upon him -to beware how he gave farther encouragement, or to speak plainly, -_permission_ to the Bourbonists to declare themselves. It was -disagreeable to take any step which should publicly mark a want of -good understanding between himself and the duke, but count Lynch had -not treated him with common fairness or with truth, wherefore as he -could not allow the character of the allied sovereigns or his own to -be doubted, if his royal highness did not within ten days contradict -the objectionable parts of the mayor’s proclamation he would do so -himself. - -Thus it appeared that with the French as with the Spaniards and -Portuguese neither enthusiastic declarations nor actual insurrection -offered any guarantee for sense truth or exertion; and most surely -all generals and politicians of every country who trust to sudden -popular commotions will find that noisy declamations, vehement -demonstrations of feeling, idle rumours and boasting, the life-blood -of such affairs, are essentially opposed to useful public exertions. - -[Sidenote: Official Reports and Correspondence of general Decaen upon -the formation of the army of the Gironde, 1814, MSS.] - -When Beresford marched to rejoin the army the line of occupation was -too extensive for lord Dalhousie and lord Wellington ordered him to -keep clear of the city and hold his troops together, observing that -his own projected operations on the Upper Garonne would keep matters -quiet on the lower part of that river. Nevertheless if the war had -continued for a month that officer’s situation would have been -critical. For when Napoleon knew that Bordeaux had fallen he sent -Decaen by post to Libourne to form the “_army of the Gironde_.” For -this object general Despeaux acting under Soult’s orders collected -a body of gensd’armes custom-house officers and national guards on -the Upper Garonne, between Agen and La Reolle, and it was one of his -detachments that surprised lord Dalhousie’s men at St. Macaire on -the 18th. A battery of eight guns was sent down from Narbonne, other -batteries were despatched from Paris to arrive at Perigueux on the -11th of April, and three or four hundred cavalry coming from the side -of Rochelle joined Le Huillier who with a thousand infantry was in -position at St. André de Cubsac beyond the Dordogne. Behind these -troops all the national guards custom-house officers and gensd’armes -of five departments were ordered to assemble, and march to the -Dordogne; but the formidable part of the intended army was a body of -Suchet’s veterans, six thousand in number under general Beurman, who -had been turned from the road of Lyons and directed upon Libourne. - -[Sidenote: Published despatches.] - -[Sidenote: Official Report by Mr. Ogilvie, MSS.] - -Decaen entered Mucidan on the 1st of April but Beurman’s troops had -not then reached Perigeaux, and lord Dalhousie’s cavalry were in -Libourne between him and L’Huillier. The power of concentration was -thus denied to the French and meanwhile admiral Penrose had secured -the command of the Garonne. It appears lord Wellington thought this -officer dilatory, but on the 27th he arrived with a seventy-four and -two frigates, whereupon the Regulus, and other French vessels then -at Royan, made sail up the river and were chased to the shoal of -Talmont, but they escaped through the narrow channel on the north -side and cast anchor under some batteries. Previous to this event -Mr. Ogilvie a commissary, being on the river in a boat manned with -Frenchmen, discovered the Requin sloop, half French half American, -pierced for twenty-two guns, lying at anchor not far below Bordeaux, -at the same time he saw a sailor leap hastily into a boat above -him and row for the vessel. This man being taken proved to be the -armourer of the Requin, he said there were not many men on board, and -Mr. Ogilvie observing his alarm and judging that the crew would also -be fearful, with ready resolution bore down upon the Requin, boarded, -and took her without any opposition either from her crew or that of -his own boat, although she had fourteen guns mounted and eleven men -with two officers on board. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -The naval co-operation being thus assured lord Dalhousie crossed the -Garonne above the city, drove the French posts beyond the Dordogne, -pushed scouring parties to La Reolle and Marmande, and sending his -cavalry over the Dordogne intercepted Decaen’s and La Huilhier’s -communications; the former was thus forced to remain at Mucidan with -two hundred and fifty gensd’armes awaiting the arrival of Beurman, -and he found neither arms nor ammunition nor a willing spirit to -enable him to organize the national guards. - -The English horsemen repassed the Dordogne on the 2d of April, but -on the 4th lord Dalhousie crossed it again lower down, near St. -André de Cubzac, with about three thousand men, intending to march -upon Blaye, but hearing that L’Huillier had halted at Etauliers he -turned suddenly upon him. The French general formed his line on an -open common occupying some woods in front with his detachments. -Overmatched in infantry he had three hundred cavalry opposed to -one weak squadron, and yet his troops would not stand the shock of -the battle. The allied infantry cleared the woods in a moment, the -artillery then opened upon the main body which retired in disorder, -horsemen and infantry together, through Etauliers, leaving behind -several scattered bodies upon whom the British cavalry galloped and -made two or three hundred men and thirty officers prisoners. - -If the six thousand old troops under Beurman had, according to -Napoleon’s orders, arrived at this time in lord Dalhousie’s rear, -his position would have been embarrassing but they were delayed on -the road until the 10th. Meanwhile admiral Penrose, having on the 2d -observed the French flotilla, consisting of fifteen armed vessels and -gun-boats, coming down from Blaye to join the Regulus at Talmont -sent the boats of his fleet to attack them, whereupon the French -vessels run on shore and the crews aided by two hundred soldiers -from Blaye lined the beach to protect them. Lieutenant Dunlop who -commanded the English boats landing all his seamen and marines, -beat these troops and carried off or destroyed the whole flotilla -with a loss to himself of only six men wounded and missing. This -operation completed and the action at Etauliers known, the admiral, -now reinforced with a second ship of the line, resolved to attack -the French squadron and the shore batteries, but in the night of -the 6th the enemy set fire to their vessels. Captain Harris of the -Belle Poule frigate then landed with six hundred seamen and marines -and destroyed the batteries and forts on the right bank from Talmont -to the Courbe point. Blaye still held out, but at Paris treason had -done its work and Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity known -for good, was overthrown to make room for despots, who with minds -enlarged only to cruelty avarice and dissoluteness, were at the very -moment of triumph intent to defraud the people, by whose strength and -suffering they had conquered, of the only reward they demanded, _just -government_. The war was virtually over, but on the side of Toulouse, -Bayonne, and Barcelona, the armies ignorant of this great event were -still battling with unabated fury. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -[Sidenote: 1814. March.] - -[Sidenote: Official Report, MSS.] - -While Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux Soult and Wellington -remained in observation, each thinking the other stronger than -himself. For the English general having intelligence of Beurman’s -march, believed that his troops were intended to reinforce and had -actually joined Soult. On the other hand that marshal, who knew not -of Beresford’s march until the 13th, concluded Wellington still -had the twelve thousand men detached to Bordeaux. The numbers on -each side were however nearly equal. The French army was thirty-one -thousand, infantry and cavalry, yet three thousand being stragglers -detained by the generals of the military districts, Soult could only -put into line, exclusive of conscripts without arms, twenty-eight -thousand sabres and bayonets with thirty-eight pieces of artillery. -On the allies’ side twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets were -under arms, with forty-two guns, but from this number detachments had -been sent to Pau on one side, Roquefort on the other, and the cavalry -scouts were pushed into the Landes and to the Upper Garonne. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -[Sidenote: See Chap. VI., Book XXIII.] - -Lord Wellington expecting Soult would retreat upon Auch and designing -to follow him, had caused Beresford to keep the bulk of his troops -towards the Upper Garonne that he might the sooner rejoin the army; -but the French general having early fixed his line of retreat by St. -Guadens was only prevented from retaking the offensive on the 9th or -10th by the loss of his magazines, which forced him first to organize -a system of requisition for the subsistence of his army. Meanwhile -his equality of force passed away, for on the 13th Freyre came up -with eight thousand Spanish infantry, and the next day Ponsonby’s -heavy cavalry arrived. Lord Wellington was then the strongest, yet -he still awaited Beresford’s troops, and was uneasy about his own -situation. He dreaded the junction of Suchet’s army, for it was at -this time the Spanish regency referred the convention, proposed by -that marshal for the evacuation of the fortresses, to his decision. -He gave a peremptory negative, observing that it would furnish twenty -thousand veterans for Soult while the retention of Rosas and Figueras -would bar the action of the Spanish armies of Catalonia in his -favour. But his anxiety was great because he foresaw that Ferdinand’s -return and his engagement with Suchet, already related, together with -the evident desire of Copons that the garrisons should be admitted -to a convention would finally render that measure inevitable. -Meanwhile the number of his own army was likely to decrease. The -English cabinet, less considerate even than the Spanish government, -had sent the militia, permitted by the recent act of parliament to -volunteer for foreign service, to Holland, and with them the other -reinforcements originally promised for the army in France: two or -three regiments of militia only came to the Garonne when the war -was over. To make amends the ministers proposed that lord William -Bentinck should send four thousand men from Sicily to land at Rosas, -or some point in France, and so join lord Wellington, who was thus -expected to extend his weakened force from the Bay of Biscay to -the Mediterranean in order to cover the junction of this uncertain -reinforcement. In fine experience had taught the English statesmen so -little that we find their general thus addressing them only one week -previous to the termination of the war. - -Having before declared that he should be, contrary to his wishes, -forced to bring more Spaniards into France, he says:— - -“There are limits to the numbers with which this army can contend -and I am convinced your lordship would not wish to see the safety -and honour of this handful of brave men depend upon the doubtful -exertions and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish -troops.”—“The service in Holland may doubtless be more important to -the national interest than that in this country, but I hope it will -be considered that that which is most important of all is not _to -lose_ the brave army which has struggled through its difficulties for -nearly six years.” - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -The French infantry was now re-organized in six divisions commanded -by Darricau, D’Armagnac, Taupin, Maransin, Villatte and Harispe; -general Paris’ troops hitherto acting as an unattached body were thus -absorbed, the cavalry composed of Berton’s and Vial’s brigades was -commanded by Pierre Soult, and there was a reserve division of seven -thousand conscripts, infantry under general Travot. The division -into wings and a centre, each commanded by a lieutenant-general -continued, yet this distinction was not attended to in the movements. -Reille though commanding the right wing was at Maubourget on the -left of the line of battle; D’Erlon commanding the centre was at -Marsiac on the right covering the road to Auch; Clauzel was at -Rabastens forming a reserve to both. The advanced guards were towards -Plaissance on the right, Madiran in the centre, and Lembege on the -left. Soult thus covered Tarbes, and could move on a direct line by -good roads either to Auch or Pau. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -Lord Wellington driven by necessity now sent orders to Giron’s -Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops to enter France from the Bastan, -although Freyre’s soldiers had by their outrages already created a -wide-spread consternation. His head-quarters were fixed at Aire, his -army was in position on each side of the Adour, he had repaired all -the bridges behind him, restored that over the Lees in his front, and -dispersed some small bands which had appeared upon his left flank and -rear: Soult had however organized a more powerful system of partizans -towards the mountains and only wanted money to put them in activity. -The main bodies of the two armies were a long day’s march asunder, -but their advanced posts were not very distant, the regular cavalry -had frequent encounters and both generals claimed the superiority -though neither made any particular report. - -On the night of the 7th Soult thinking to find only some weak parties -at Pau sent a strong detachment there to arrest the nobles who had -assembled to welcome the duke of Angoulême, but general Fane getting -there before him with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of -cavalry the stroke failed; however the French returning by another -road made prisoners of an officer and four or five English dragoons. -Meanwhile a second detachment penetrating between Pau and Aire -carried off a post of correspondence; and two days after, when Fane -had quitted Pau, a French officer accompanied by only four hussars -captured there thirty-four Portuguese with their commander and ten -loaded mules. The French general having by these excursions obtained -exact intelligence of Beresford’s march to Bordeaux resolved to -attack the allies, and the more readily that Napoleon had recently -sent him instructions to draw the war to the side of Pau keeping his -left resting on the Pyrenees, which accorded with his own designs. - -[Sidenote: See plan 10.] - -Lord Wellington’s main body was now concentrated round Aire and -Barcelona, yet divided by the Adour and the advanced guards were -pushed to Garlin, Conchez, Viella, Riscle and Pouydraguien, that -is to say, on a semicircle to the front and about half a march in -advance. Soult therefore thought to strike a good blow, and gathering -his divisions on the side of Maubourget the 12th, marched on the -13th, designing to throw himself upon the high tabular land between -Pau and Aire, and then act according to circumstances. - -[Sidenote: Memoirs by general Berton, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Note by sir John Campbell, MSS.] - -The country was suited to the action of all arms, offering a number -of long and nearly parallel ridges of moderate height, the sides of -which were sometimes covered with vineyards, but the summits commonly -so open that troops could move along them without much difficulty, -and between these ranges a number of small rivers and muddy fords -descended from the Pyrenees to the Adour. This conformation -determined the order of the French general’s march which followed -the courses of these rivers. Leaving one regiment of cavalry to -watch the valley of the Adour he moved with the rest of his army by -Lembege upon Conchez down the smaller Lees. Clauzel thus seized the -high land of Daisse and pushed troops to Portet; Reille supported -him at Conchez; D’Erlon remained behind that place in reserve. In -this position the head of the columns, pointing direct upon Aire, -separated Viella from Garlin which was the right of general Hill’s -position, and menaced that general’s posts on the great Lees. -Meanwhile Pierre Soult marching with three regiments of cavalry -along the high land between the two Lees, reached Mascaras and the -castle of Sault, he thus covered the left flank of the French army -and pushed Fane’s cavalry posts back with the loss of two officers -taken and a few men wounded. During this movement Berton advancing -from Madiran with two regiments of cavalry towards Viella, on the -right flank of the French army, endeavoured to cross the Saye river -at a difficult muddy ford near the broken bridge. Sir John Campbell -leading a squadron of the fourth Portuguese cavalry overthrew the -head of his column, but the Portuguese horsemen were too few to -dispute the passage and Berton finally getting a regiment over -higher up, gained the table-land above, and charging the rear of -the retiring troops in a narrow way leading to the Aire road killed -several and took some prisoners, amongst them Bernardo de Sà the -since well-known count of Bandeira. - -This terminated the French operations for the day, and lord -Wellington imagining the arrival of Suchet’s troops had made -Soult thus bold, resolved to keep on the defensive until his -reinforcements and detachments could come up. Hill however passed -the greater Lees partly to support his posts partly to make out the -force and true direction of the French movement, but he recrossed -that river during the night and finally occupied the strong platform -between Aire and Garlin which Soult had designed to seize. Lord -Wellington immediately brought the third and sixth division and -the heavy cavalry over the Adour to his support, leaving the light -division with the hussar brigade still on the right bank. The bulk of -the army thus occupied a strong position parallel with the Pau road. -The right was at Garlin, the left at Aire, the front covered by the -greater Lees a river difficult to pass; Fane’s cavalry was extended -along the Pau road as far as Boelho, and on the left of the Adour -the hussars pushed the French cavalry regiment left there back upon -Plaissance. - -On the morning of the 14th Soult intending to fall on Hill, whose -columns he had seen the evening before on the right of the Lees, -drove in the advanced posts which had been left to cover the -retrograde movement, and then examined the allies’ new position; but -these operations wasted the day, and towards evening he disposed his -army on the heights between the two Lees, placing Clauzel and D’Erlon -at Castle Pugon opposite Garlin, and Reille in reserve at Portet. -Meanwhile Pierre Soult carried three regiments of cavalry to Clarac, -on the Pau road, to intercept the communications with that town and -to menace the right flank of the allies, against which the whole -French army was now pointing. Fane’s outposts being thus assailed -retired with some loss at first but they were soon supported and -drove the French horsemen in disorder clear off the Pau road to -Carere. - -[Sidenote: Morning States, MSS.] - -Soult now seeing the strength of the position above Aire, and hearing -from the peasants that forty or fifty thousand men were concentrated -there, feared to attack, but changing his plan resolved to hover -about the right flank of the allies in the hopes of enticing them -from their vantage-ground. Lord Wellington on the other hand drew -his cavalry posts down the valley of the Adour, and keeping close -on that side massed his forces on the right in expectation of an -attack. In fine each general acting upon false intelligence of the -other’s strength was afraid to strike. The English commander’s error -as to the junction of Suchet’s troops was encouraged by Soult, who -had formed his battalions upon two ranks instead of three to give -himself an appearance of strength, and in the same view had caused -his reserve of conscripts to move in rear of his line of battle. And -he also judged the allies’ strength by what it might have been rather -than by what it was; for though Freyre’s Spaniards and Ponsonby’s -dragoons were now up, the whole force did not exceed thirty-six -thousand men, including the light division and the hussars who were -on the right bank of the Adour. This number was however increasing -every hour by the arrival of detachments and reserves; and it behoved -Soult, who was entangled in a country extremely difficult if rain -should fall, to watch that Wellington while holding the French in -check with his right wing did not strike with his left by Maubourget -and Tarbes, and thus cast them upon the mountains about Lourdes. - -This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of the fall of -Bordeaux, induced the French general to retire before day on the -16th to Lembege and Simacourbe, where he occupied both sides of the -two branches of the Lees and the heights between them; however his -outposts remained at Conchez, and Pierre Soult again getting upon -the Pau road detached a hundred chosen troopers against the allies’ -communication with Orthes. Captain Dania commanding these men making -a forced march reached Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised six officers -and eight medical men with their baggage, made a number of other -prisoners and returned on the evening of the 18th. This enterprize -extended to such a distance from the army was supposed to be executed -by the bands, and seemed to indicate a disposition for insurrection; -wherefore lord Wellington to check it seized the civil authorities at -Hagetnau, and declared that he would hang all the peasants caught in -arms and burn their villages. - -[Sidenote: Morning States, MSS.] - -The offensive movement of the French general had now terminated, he -sent his conscripts at once to Toulouse and prepared for a rapid -retreat on that place. His recent operations had been commenced -too late, he should have been on the Lees the 10th or 11th when -there were not more than twenty thousand infantry and two thousand -five hundred cavalry to oppose him between Aire and Garlin. On the -other hand the passive state of Wellington, which had been too -much prolonged, was now also at an end, all his reinforcements and -detachments were either up or close at hand, and he could put in -motion six Anglo-Portuguese and three Spanish divisions of infantry, -furnishing forty thousand bayonets, with five brigades of cavalry, -furnishing nearly six thousand sabres, and from fifty to sixty pieces -of artillery. - -On the evening of the 17th, the English general pushed the hussars up -the valley of the Adour, towards Plaissance, supporting them with the -light division, which was followed at the distance of half a march by -the fourth division coming from the side of Roquefort, on its return -from Langon. - -[Sidenote: Plan 10.] - -The 18th at daylight the whole army was in movement, the hussars -with the light and the fourth division, forming the left, marched -upon Plaissance; Hill’s troops forming the right marched from Garlin -upon Conchez, keeping a detachment on the road to Pau in observation -of Pierre Soult’s cavalry. The main body moved in the centre, under -Wellington in person, to Viella, by the high road leading from Aire -to Maubourget. The French right was thus turned by the valley of -the Adour, while general Hill with a sharp skirmish, in which about -eighty British and Germans were killed and wounded, drove back their -outposts upon Lembege. - -[Sidenote: Berton’s Memoir, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] - -Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge having a small -river with rugged banks, called the Laiza, in his front, and his -right under D’Erlon was extended towards Vic Bigorre on the great -road of Tarbes. Meanwhile Berton’s cavalry, one regiment of which -retreating from Viella on the 16th disengaged itself with some -difficulty and loss, reached Maubourget, and took post in column -behind that place, the road being confined on each side by deep -and wide ditches. In this situation pressed by Bock’s cavalry, -which preceded the centre column of the allies, the French horsemen -suddenly charged the Germans, at first with success, taking an -officer and some men, but finally they were beaten and retreated -through Vic Bigorre. Soult thinking a flanking column only was on -this side in the valley of the Adour, resolved to fall upon it with -his whole army; but he recognised the skill of his opponent when -he found that the whole of the allies’ centre, moving by Madiran, -had been thrown on to the Tarbes road while he was retiring from -Lembege. This heavy mass was now approaching Vic Bigorre, the light -division, coming from Plaissance up the right bank of the Adour, were -already near Auriebat, pointing to Rabastens, upon which place the -hussars had already driven the French cavalry left in observation -when the army first advanced: Vic Bigorre was thus turned, Berton’s -horsemen had passed it in retreat and the danger was imminent. The -French general immediately ordered Berton to support the cavalry -regiment at Rabastens and cover that road to Tarbes. Then directing -D’Erlon to take post at Vic Bigorre and check the allies on the main -road, he marched, in person and in all haste, with Clauzel’s and -Reille’s divisions to Tarbes by a circuitous road leading through -Ger-sur-landes. - -D’Erlon not seeming to comprehend the crisis moved slowly, with his -baggage in front, and having the river Lechez to cross, rode on -before his troops expecting to find Berton at Vic Bigorre, but he met -the German cavalry there. Then indeed he hurried his march yet he -had only time to place Darricau’s division, now under general Paris, -amongst some vineyards, two miles in front of Vic Bigorre, when -hither came Picton to the support of the cavalry and fell upon him. - -_Combat of Vic Bigorre._—The French left flank was secured by the -Lechez river, but their right, extending towards the Adour, being -loose was menaced by the German cavalry while the front was attacked -by Picton. The action commenced about two o’clock, and Paris was -soon driven back in disorder, but then D’Armagnac’s division entered -the line and extending to the Adour renewed the fight, which lasted -until D’Erlon, after losing many men, saw his right turned, beyond -the Adour, by the light division and by the hussars who were now -close to Rabastens, whereupon he likewise fell back behind Vic -Bigorre, and took post for the night. The action was vigorous. About -two hundred and fifty Anglo-Portuguese, men and officers, fell, and -amongst them died colonel Henry Sturgeon so often mentioned in this -history. Skilled to excellence in almost every branch of war and -possessing a variety of accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently -for himself and so usefully for the service that envy offered no bar -to admiration, and the whole army felt painfully mortified that his -merits were passed unnoticed in the public despatches. - -Soult’s march through the deep sandy plain of Ger was harassing, and -would have been dangerous if lord Wellington had sent Hill’s cavalry, -now reinforced by two regiments of heavy dragoons, in pursuit; but -the country was unfavorable for quick observation and the French -covered their movements with rear-guards whose real numbers it was -difficult to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted on a hill the -end of which abutted on the high road, the slope being clothed with -trees and defended by skirmishers. Lord Wellington was desirous to -know whether a small or a large force thus barred his way, but all -who endeavoured to ascertain the fact were stopped by the fire of the -enemy. At last captain William Light, distinguished by the variety of -his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman, and soldier, -made the trial. He rode forward as if he would force his way through -the French skirmishers, but when in the wood dropt his reins and -leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to canter wildly -along the front of the enemy’s light troops, and they thinking him -mortally hurt ceased their fire and took no further notice. He thus -passed unobserved through the wood to the other side of the hill, -where there were no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit -above, put spurs to his horse and galloped along the French main line -counting their regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his -blue undress, his daring confidence and his speed, made the French -doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged, while -he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through -the very skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed in front. -Reaching the spot where lord Wellington stood he told him there were -but five battalions on the hill. - -Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse by St. Gaudens was -inevitable, yet determined to dispute every position which offered -the least advantage, his army was on the morning of the 20th again -in line of battle on the heights of Oleac, two or three miles behind -Tarbes, and covering Tournay on the road to St. Gaudens: however he -still held Tarbes with Clauzel’s corps, which was extended on the -right towards Trie, as if to retain a power of retreat by that road -to Toulouse. The plain of Tarbes although apparently open was full of -deep ditches which forbad the action of horsemen, wherefore he sent -his brother with five regiments of cavalry to the Trie road, with -orders to cover the right flank and observe the route to Auch, for -he feared lest Wellington should intercept his retreat by that line. - -At day-break the allies again advanced in two columns. The right -under Hill moved along the high road. The left under Wellington in -person was composed of the light division and hussars, Ponsonby’s -heavy cavalry, the sixth division and Freyre’s Spaniards. It marched -by the road from Rabastens, and general Cole still making forced -marches with the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry, followed from -Beaumarchez and La Deveze, sending detachments through Marciac to -watch Pierre Soult on the side of Trie. - -[Sidenote: Plan 10.] - -_Combat of Tarbes._—The Adour separated Wellington’s columns, but -when the left approached Tarbes, the light division and the hussars -bringing up their right shoulders attacked the centre of Harispe’s -division, which occupied the heights of Orliex and commanded the -road from Rabastens with two guns. Under cover of this attack -general Clinton made a flank movement to his left through the -village of Dours, and opening a cannonade against Harispe’s right -endeavoured to get between that general and Soult’s main position -at Oleac. Meanwhile general Hill moving by the other bank of the -Adour assailed the town and bridge of Tarbes, which was defended by -Villatte’s division. These operations were designed to envelope and -crush Clauzel’s two divisions, which seemed the more easy because -there appeared to be only a fine plain, fit for the action of all -the cavalry, between him and Soult. The latter however, having sent -his baggage and encumbrances off during the night, saw the movement -without alarm, he was better acquainted with the nature of the plain -behind Harispe and had made roads to enable him to retreat upon the -second position without passing through Tarbes. Nevertheless Clauzel -was in some danger, for while Hill menaced his left at Tarbes, the -light division supported with cavalry and guns fell upon his centre -at Orleix, and general Clinton opening a brisk cannonade passed -through the villages of Oleat and Boulin, penetrated between Harispe -and Pierre Soult, and cut the latter off from the army. - -The action was begun about twelve o’clock. Hill’s artillery thundered -on the right, Clinton’s answered it on the left, and Alten threw -the light division in mass upon the centre where Harispe’s left -brigade posted on a strong hill was suddenly assailed by the three -rifle battalions. Here the fight was short yet wonderfully fierce -and violent, for the French, probably thinking their opponents to -be Portuguese on account of their green dress, charged with great -hardiness, and being encountered by men not accustomed to yield, they -fought muzzle to muzzle, and it was difficult to judge at first who -would win. At last the French gave way, and Harispe’s centre being -thus suddenly overthrown he retired rapidly through the fields, by -the ways previously opened, before Clinton could get into his rear. -Meanwhile Hill forced the passage of the Adour at Tarbes and Villatte -also retreated along the high road to Tournay, but under a continued -cannonade. The flat country was now covered with confused masses -of pursuers and pursued, all moving precipitately with an eager -musquetry, the French guns also replying as they could to the allies’ -artillery. The situation of the retreating troops seemed desperate, -but as Soult had foreseen, the deep ditches and enclosures and -the small copses, villages, and farm-houses, prevented the British -cavalry from acting; Clauzel therefore extricating his troops with -great ability from their dangerous situation, finally gained the main -position, where four fresh divisions were drawn up in order of battle -and immediately opened all their batteries on the allies. The pursuit -was thus checked, and before lord Wellington could make arrangements -for a new attack darkness came on and the army halted on the banks -of the Larret and Larros rivers. The loss of the French is unknown, -that of the allies did not exceed one hundred and twenty, but of that -number twelve officers and eighty men were of the rifle battalions. - -[Sidenote: Official Report, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Orders, MSS.] - -During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main -road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on -different hills as points of direction. The next day he reached -St. Gaudens with D’Erlon’s and Reille’s corps, while Clauzel, who -had retreated across the fields, halted at Monrejean and was there -rejoined by Pierre Soult’s cavalry. This march of more than thirty -miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner. -For the French general, having now seen nearly all Wellington’s -infantry and his five thousand horsemen, and hearing from his brother -that the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry were pointing towards -Mielan on his right, feared that the allies would by Trie and -Castlenau suddenly gain the plains of Muret and intercept his retreat -upon Toulouse, which was his great depôt, the knot of all his future -combinations, and the only position where he could hope to make a -successful stand with his small army. - -The allies pursued in three columns by St. Gaudens, Galan, and Trie, -but their marches were short. - -On the 21st Beresford who had assumed the command of the left column -was at Castlenau, Hill in the vicinity of Lannemezan, Wellington at -Tournay. - -The 22d Beresford was at Castlenau, Wellington at Galan, Hill at -Monrejean, and Fane’s horsemen pushed forwards to St. Gaudens. Here -four squadrons of French cavalry were drawn up in front of the town. -Overthrown by two squadrons of the thirteenth dragoons at the first -shock, they galloped in disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on -the other side and were again broken and pursued for two miles, many -being sabred and above a hundred taken prisoners. In this action the -veteran major Dogherty of the thirteenth was seen charging between -his two sons at the head of the leading squadron. - -On the 23d Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at Puymauren, -Wellington at Boulogne. - -The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in Lombez, Wellington at -Isle en Dodon. - -The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached St. Foy, and -Wellington was at Samatan. - -The 26th Beresford entered St. Lys and marching in order of battle -by his left, while his cavalry skirmished on the right, took post on -the Auch road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the French army, -which was on the Touch covering Toulouse. The allies thus took seven -days to march what Soult had done in four. - -This tardiness, idly characterized by French military writers as the -sign of timidity and indecision of character, has been by English -writers excused on the score of wet weather and the encumbrance -of a large train of artillery and pontoons; yet the rain equally -affected the French, and the pontoons might have been as usefully -waited for on the Garonne after the French army had been pressed in -its retreat of ninety miles. It is more probable that the English -general, not exactly informed of Soult’s real numbers nor of his -true line of retreat, nor perfectly acquainted with the country, was -cautious; because being then acrimoniously disputing with the duke of -Angoulême he was also uneasy as to the state of the country behind -him and on his flanks. The partizans were beginning to stir, his -reinforcements from England and Portugal were stopped, and admiral -Penrose had not yet entered the Garonne. On the other hand Ferdinand -had entered Spain and formed that engagement with Suchet about the -garrisons already mentioned. In fine, lord Wellington found himself -with about forty-five thousand men composed of different nations, the -Spaniards being almost as dangerous as useful to him, opposed to an -able and obstinate enemy, and engaged on a line of operations running -more than a hundred and fifty miles along the French frontier. His -right flank was likely to be vexed by the partizans forming in the -Pyrenees, his left flank by those behind the Garonne on the right -bank of which a considerable regular force was also collecting, while -the generals commanding the military districts beyond Toulouse were -forming corps of volunteers national guards and old soldiers of the -regular depôts: and ever he expected Suchet to arrive on his front -and overmatch him in numbers. He was careful therefore to keep his -troops well in hand, and to spare them fatigue that the hospitals -might not increase. In battle their bravery would he knew bring -him through any crisis, but if wearing down their numbers by forced -marches he should cover the country with small posts and hospital -stations, the French people would be tempted to rise against him. So -little therefore was his caution allied to timidity that it was no -slight indication of daring to have advanced at all. - -It does seem however that with an overwhelming cavalry, and great -superiority of artillery he should not have suffered the French -general so to escape his hands. It must be admitted also that Soult -proved himself a very able commander. His halting on the Adour, his -success in reviving the courage of his army, and the front he shewed -in hopes to prevent his adversary from detaching troops against -Bordeaux, were proofs not only of a firm unyielding temper but of -a clear and ready judgment. For though, contrary to his hopes, -lord Wellington did send Beresford against Bordeaux, it was not on -military grounds but because treason was there to aid him. Meanwhile -he was forced to keep his army for fifteen days passive within a few -miles of an army he had just defeated, permitting his adversary to -reorganize and restore the discipline and courage of the old troops, -to rally the dispersed conscripts, to prepare the means of a partizan -warfare, to send off all his encumbrances and sick to Toulouse, and -to begin fortifying that city as a final and secure retreat: for the -works there were commenced on the 3d or 4th of March, and at this -time the entrenchments covering the bridge and suburb of St. Cyprien -were nearly completed. The French general was even the first to -retake the offensive after Orthes, too late indeed, and he struck no -important blow, and twice placed his army in dangerous situations; -but his delay was a matter of necessity arising from the loss of his -magazines, and if he got into difficulties they were inseparable from -his operations and he extricated himself again. - -That he gained no advantages in fight is rather argument for lord -Wellington than against Soult. The latter sought but did not find -a favourable opportunity to strike, and it would have been unwise, -because his adversary gave him no opening, to have fallen desperately -upon superior numbers in a strong position with an army so recently -defeated, and whose restored confidence it was so essential not to -shake again by a repulse. He increased that confidence by appearing -to insult the allied army with an inferior force, and in combination -with his energetic proclamation encouraged the Napoleonists and -alarmed the Bourbonists; lastly, by his rapid retreat from Tarbes -he gained two days to establish and strengthen himself on his grand -position at Toulouse. And certainly he deceived his adversary, no -common general and at the head of no common army; for so little did -Wellington expect him to make a determined stand there, that in a -letter written on the 26th to sir John Hope, he says, “I fear the -Garonne is too full and large for our bridge, if not we shall be in -that town (Toulouse) I hope immediately.” - -[Sidenote: Choumara.] - -The French general’s firmness and the extent of his views cannot -however be fairly judged by merely considering his movements in -the field. Having early proved the power of his adversary, he had -never deceived himself about the ultimate course of the campaign and -therefore struggled without hope, a hard and distressing task; yet -he showed no faintness, fighting continually, and always for delay -as thinking Suchet would finally cast personal feelings aside and -strike for his country. Nor did he forbear importuning that marshal -to do so. Notwithstanding his previous disappointments he wrote to -him again on the 9th of February, urging the danger of the crisis, -the certainty that the allies would make the greatest effort on the -western frontier, and praying him to abandon Catalonia and come with -the bulk of his troops to Bearn: in the same strain he wrote to the -minister of war, and his letters reached their destinations on the -13th. Suchet, having no orders to the contrary, could therefore have -joined him with thirteen thousand men before the battle of Orthes; -but that marshal giving a deceptive statement of his forces in -reply, coldly observed, that if he marched anywhere it would be to -join the emperor and not the duke of Dalmatia. The latter continued -notwithstanding to inform him of all his battles and his movements, -and his accumulating distresses, yet in vain, and Suchet’s apathy -would be incredible but for the unequivocal proofs of it furnished in -the work of the French engineer Choumara. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -[Sidenote: 1814. March.] - -The two armies being now once more in presence of each other and with -an equal resolution to fight, it is fitting to show the peculiar -calculations upon which the generals founded their respective -combinations. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country and chose -Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the -south contained fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal -passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads -on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the -south of France. Here he could most easily feed his troops, assemble -arm and discipline the conscripts, controul and urge the civil -authorities, and counteract the machinations of the discontented. -Posted at Toulouse he was master of various lines of operations. He -could retire upon Suchet by Carcassone, or towards Lyons by Alby. He -could take a new position behind the Tarn and prolong the contest -by defending successively that river and the Lot, retreating if -necessary upon Decaen’s army of the Gironde, and thus drawing the -allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them -up the left bank, being well assured that lord Wellington must follow -him, and with weakened forces as it would be necessary to leave -troops in observation of Suchet. - -His first care was to place a considerable body of troops, collected -from the depôts and other parts of the interior at Montauban, -under the command of general Loverdo, with orders to construct a -bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that river, and a -strong point of retreat and assembly for all the detachments sent to -observe the Garonne below Toulouse, was thus secured, and withal the -command of a number of great roads leading to the interior of France, -consequently the power of making fresh combinations. To maintain -himself as long as possible in Toulouse was however a great political -object. It was the last point which connected him at once with Suchet -and with Decaen; and while he held it, both the latter general and -the partizans in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on -their own side, against the long lines of communications maintained -by Wellington with Bordeaux and Bayonne. Suchet also could do the -same, either by marching with his whole force or sending a detachment -through the Arriege department to the Upper Garonne, where general -Lafitte having seven or eight hundred men, national guards and other -troops, was already in activity. These operations Soult now strongly -urged Suchet to adopt, but the latter treated the proposition, as he -had done all those before made from the same quarter, with contempt. - -Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle. - -The Garonne, flowing on the west, presented to the allies a deep -loop, at the bottom of which was the bridge, completely covered by -the suburb of St. Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall -three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers: these defences -Soult had improved and he added a line of exterior entrenchments. - -[Sidenote: Plan 10.] - -Beyond the Garonne was the city, surrounded by an old wall flanked -with towers, and so thick as to admit sixteen and twenty-four pound -guns. - -The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles -below the town, wound for the most part within point-blank shot of -the walls, covering them on the north and east as the Garonne and St. -Cyprien did on the west. - -The suburbs of St. Stephen and Guillermerie, built on both sides of -this canal, furnished outworks on the west, for they were entrenched -and connected with and covered by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, -also entrenched and flanking the approaches to the canal both above -and below these suburbs. - -Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong ridge, called the -Mont Rave, run nearly parallel with the canal, its outer slope was -exceedingly rugged and overlooked a marshy plain through which the -Ers river flowed. - -The south side of the town opened on a plain, but the suburb of St. -Michel lying there, between the Garonne and the canal, furnished -another advanced defence, and at some distance beyond, a range of -heights called the Pech David commenced, trending up the Garonne in a -direction nearly parallel to that river. - -Such being the French general’s position, he calculated, that as -lord Wellington could not force the passage by the suburb of St. -Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn -the flanks above or below Toulouse, and leave a sufficient force to -blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having the French army issue on -that side against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above -its confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross that river -also, which could not be effected nearer than Cintegabelle, one march -higher up. Then he must come down by the right of the Arriege, an -operation not to be feared in a country which the recent rains had -rendered impracticable for guns. If the allies passed the Garonne -below the confluence of the Arriege, Soult judged that he could from -the Pech David, and its continuation, overlook their movements, and -that he should be in position to fall upon the head of their column -while in the disorder of passing the river: if he failed in this he -had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont Rave to retire upon, where -he could fight again, his retreat being secure upon Montauban. - -For these reasons the passage of the Garonne above Toulouse would -lead to no decisive result and he did not fear it, but a passage -below the city was a different matter. Lord Wellington could thus -cut him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern -and eastern quarters; and if the French then lost the battle they -could only retreat by Carcassonne to form a junction with Suchet in -Roussillon, where having their backs to the mountains and the allies -between them and France they could not exist. Hence feeling certain -the attack would finally be on that side, Soult lined the left bank -of the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn, -and called up general Despeaux’s troops from Agen in the view of -confining the allies to the space between the Tarn and the Garonne: -for his first design was to attack them there rather than lose his -communication with Montauban. - -On the other hand lord Wellington whether from error from necessity -or for the reasons I have before touched upon, having suffered the -French army to gain three days’ march in the retreat from Tarbes, -had now little choice of operations. He could not halt until the -Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops should join him from the Bastan, -without giving Soult all the time necessary to strengthen himself -and organize his plan of defence, nor without appearing fearful and -weak in the eyes of the French people, which would have been most -dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had -taken the offensive and could not resume the defensive with safety, -the invasion of France once begun it was imperative to push it to a -conclusion. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers his -business was to bring his adversary to battle as soon as possible, -and as he could not force his way through St. Cyprien in face of the -whole French army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne above or -below Toulouse. - -[Sidenote: Manuscript notes by the duke of Wellington.] - -[Sidenote: French Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -It has been already shown that in a strategic view this passage -should have been made below that town, but seeing that the south side -of the city was the most open to attack, the English general resolved -to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse, designing -to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country between the -Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left -he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien. With this object, at eight -o’clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill’s brigades marched up -from Muret, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced, -the remainder of that general’s troops being to pass at midnight. But -when the river was measured the width was found too great for the -pontoons and there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore -this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed some considerable -advantage would probably have been gained, since it does not appear -that Soult knew of the attempt until two days later, and then only by -his emissaries, not by his scouts. - -[Sidenote: Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.] - -Wellington thus baffled tried another scheme, he drove the enemy -from the Touch river on the 28th, and collected the infantry of his -left and centre about Portet, masking the movement with his cavalry. -In the course of the operation a single squadron of the eighteenth -hussars, under major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by colonel -Vivian across the bridge of St. Martyn de la Touch, suddenly came -upon a whole regiment of French cavalry; the rashness of the act, -as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British, for the -enemy thinking that a strong support must be at hand discharged their -carbines and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the speed of -both sides increased, and as the nature of the road did not admit -of any egress to the sides, this great body of French horsemen was -pushed headlong by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien. - -[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -During these movements Hill’s troops were withdrawn to St. Roques, -but in the night of the 30th a new bridge being laid near Pensaguel, -two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, that general passed -the Garonne with two divisions of infantry, Morillo’s Spaniards, -Gardiner’s and Maxwell’s artillery, and Fane’s cavalry, in all -thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket -brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition by the great -road, having orders to seize the stone bridge of Cintegabelle, -fifteen miles up the Arriege, and, on the march, to secure a -ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the troops -followed, the intent being to pass the Arriege river hastily at -Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on -the south while lord Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march -was to have been made privily in the night, but the bridge, though -ordered for the evening of the 30th, was not finished until five -o’clock in the morning of the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the -enterprise in time to observe from the heights of Old Toulouse the -strength of the column, and to ascertain that the great body of the -army still remained in front of St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the -country on the right of the Arriege was known to him, and the suburbs -of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in a state to resist a -partial attack, the matter appeared a feint to draw off a part of his -army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne -passed below the city. In this persuasion he kept his infantry in -hand, and sent only his cavalry up the right bank of the Arriege to -observe the march of the allies; but he directed general Lafitte, -who had collected some regular horsemen and the national guards of -the department, to hang upon their skirts and pretend to be the van -of Suchet’s army. He was however somewhat disquieted, because the -baggage, which to avoid encumbering the march had been sent up the -Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being seen by his scouts, was reported -to be a second column, increasing Hill’s force to eighteen thousand -men. - -[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -While in this uncertainty he heard of the measurement of the river -made at Portet on the night of the 27th, and that many guns were -still collected there, wherefore, being ignorant of the cause why the -bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a design to cross there -also when Hill should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger, -he put four divisions under Clauzel, with orders to fall upon the -head of the allies if they should attempt the passage before Hill -came down, resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs -of Toulouse and on the Mont-Rave, because the positions on the -right of the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was -however soon relieved from anxiety. General Hill effected indeed the -passage of the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry towards -Villefranche and Nailloux, but his artillery were quite unable to -move in the deep country there, and as success and safety alike -depended on rapidity he returned during the night to Pinsaguel, -recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons left only a flying -bridge with a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank. -His retreat was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen who picked up a few -stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult remained -well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important -days. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -The French general was now sure the next attempt would be below -Toulouse, yet he changed his design of marching down the Garonne -to fight between that river and the Tarn rather than lose his -communications with Montauban. Having completed his works of defence -for the city and the suburbs, and fortified all the bridges over the -canal, he concluded not to abandon Toulouse under any circumstances, -and therefore set his whole army and all the working population to -entrench the Mont Rave, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking -he might thus securely meet the shock of battle let it come on which -side it would. Meanwhile the Garonne continued so full and rapid -that lord Wellington was forced to remain inactive before St. Cyprien -until the evening of the 3d; then the waters falling, the pontoons -were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse, -where the bridge was at last thrown and thirty guns placed in battery -on the left bank to protect it. The third fourth and sixth divisions -of infantry and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, -immediately passed, and the cavalry being pushed out two leagues on -the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks destined for -the French army. But now the river again swelled so fast, that the -light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge -got damaged and the pontoons were taken up. - -This passage was made known to Soult immediately by his cavalry -scouts, yet he knew not the exact force which had crossed, and as -Morillo’s Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, had taken the -outposts in front of St. Cyprien he imagined Hill also had moved -to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over -the Garonne. Wherefore merely observing Beresford with his cavalry -he continued to strengthen his field of battle about Toulouse, his -resolution to keep that city being confirmed by hearing on the 7th -that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris. - -On the 8th the waters subsided, the allies’ bridge was again laid -down, Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery crossed, and -lord Wellington taking the command in person advanced to the heights -of Fenoulhiet within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both -banks of the Ers his columns were separated by that river, which -was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure -as soon as possible one of the stone bridges. Hence when his left -approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby, -Vivian’s horsemen drove Berton’s cavalry up the right of the Ers -towards the bridge of Bordes, and the eighteenth hussars descended -towards that of Croix d’Orade. The latter was defended by Vial’s -dragoons, and after some skirmishing the eighteenth was suddenly -menaced by a regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite bank of -the river being lined with dismounted carbineers. The two parties -stood facing each other, hesitating to begin, until the approach of -some British infantry, when both sides sounded a charge at the same -moment, but the English horses were so quick the French were in an -instant jammed up on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and -the mass breaking away to the rear went off in disorder, leaving many -killed and wounded and above a hundred prisoners in the hands of the -victors. They were pursued through the village of Croix d’Orade, but -beyond it they rallied on the rest of their brigade and advanced -again, the hussars then recrossed the bridge, which was now defended -by the British infantry whose fire stopped the French cavalry. The -communication between the allied columns was thus secured. - -The credit of this brilliant action was given to Colonel Vivian in -the despatch, incorrectly, for that officer was wounded by a carbine -shot previous to the charge at the bridge: the attack was conceived -and conducted entirely by major Hughes of the eighteenth. - -Lord Wellington from the heights of Kirie Eleison, carefully examined -the French general’s position and resolved to attack on the 9th. -Meanwhile to shorten his communications with general Hill he directed -the pontoons to be removed from Grenade and relaid higher up at -Seilh. The light division were to cross at the latter place at -daybreak, but the bridge was not relaid until late in the day, and -the English general extremely incensed at the failure was forced to -defer his battle until the 10th. - -Soult’s combinations were now crowned with success. He had by means -of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of -operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear -judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, -reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. -He had gained seventeen days for preparation, had brought the allies -to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted for defence, and well -fortified; where one-third of their force was separated by a great -river from the rest, where they could derive no advantage from their -numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in artillery notwithstanding -their previous superiority in that arm. - -His position covered three sides of Toulouse. Defending St. Cyprien -on the west with his left, he guarded the canal on the north with -his centre, and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east. -His reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the -urban guards while maintaining tranquillity aided to transport the -artillery and ammunition to different posts. Hill was opposed to -his left, but while the latter, well fortified at St. Cyprien, had -short and direct communication with the centre by the great bridge of -Toulouse, the former could only communicate with the main body under -Wellington by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve -miles. - -The English general was advancing from the north, but his intent was -still to assail the city on the south side, where it was weakest -in defence. With this design he had caused the country on the left -of the Ers to be carefully examined, in the view of making, under -cover of that river, a flank march round the eastern front and thus -gaining the open ground which he had formerly endeavoured to reach -by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. But again he was baffled by the -deep country, which he could not master so as to pass the Ers by -force, because all the bridges with the exception of that at Croix -d’Orade were mined or destroyed by Soult, and the whole of the -pontoons were on the Garonne. There was then no choice save to attack -from the northern and eastern sides. The first, open and flat, and -easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet -impregnable in defence, because the canal, the bridges over which -were strongly defended by works, was under the fire of the ramparts -of Toulouse, and for the most part within musquet-shot. Here then, -as at St. Cyprien, it was a fortress and not a position which was -opposed to him, and his field of battle was necessarily confined to -the Mont Rave or eastern front. - -This range of heights, naturally strong and rugged, and covered by -the Ers river, which as we have seen was not to be forded, presented -two distinct platforms, that of Calvinet, and that of St. Sypiere on -which the extreme right of the French was posted. Between them, where -the ground dipped a little, two roads leading from Lavaur and Caraman -were conducted to Toulouse, passing the canal behind the ridge at -the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Etienne. - -The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme left with a -species of horn-work, consisting of several open retrenchments and -small works, supported by two large redoubts, one of which flanked -the approaches to the canal on the north: a range of abbatis was also -formed there by felling the trees on the Alby road. Continuing this -line to the right, two other large forts, called the Calvinet and the -Colombette redoubts, terminated the works on this platform. - -On that of St. Sypiere there were also two redoubts, one on the -extreme right called St. Sypiere, the other without a name nearer to -the road of Caraman. - -[Sidenote: Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.] - -The whole range of heights occupied was about two miles long, and -an army attacking in front would have to cross the Ers under fire, -advance through ground, naturally steep and marshy, and now rendered -almost impassable by means of artificial inundations, to the assault -of the ridge and the works on the summit; and if the assailants -should even force between the two platforms, they would, while their -flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come upon the works of -Cambon and Saccarin. If these fell the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. -Steven, the canal, and finally the ramparts of the town, would still -have to be carried in succession. But it was not practicable to pass -the Ers except by the bridge of Croix d’Orade which had been seized -so happily on the 8th. Lord Wellington was therefore reduced to make -a flank march under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and then -to carry the latter with a view of crossing the canal above the -suburb of Guillemerie, and establishing his army on the south side -of Toulouse, where only the city could be assailed with any hope of -success. - -[Sidenote: Plan 10.] - -To impose this march upon him all Soult’s dispositions had been -directed. For this he had mined all the bridges on the Ers, save only -that of Croix d’Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the Ers -and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond that river by sending -half his cavalry over to dispute the passage of the numerous streams -in the deep country on the right bank. His army was now disposed -in the following order. General Reille defended the suburb of St. -Cyprien with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions. Daricau’s division -lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to -the road of Alby, defending with his left the bridge-head of Jumeaux, -the convent of the Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge -with his right. Harispe’s division was established in the works on -the Mont-Rave. His right at St. Sypiere looked towards the bridge of -Bordes, his centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which Vial’s -horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Alby -towards the bridge of Croix d’Orade. On this side a detached eminence -within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, was occupied by St. -Pol’s brigade, drawn from Villatte’s division. The two remaining -divisions of infantry were formed in columns at certain points behind -the Mont Rave, and Travot’s reserve continued to man the walls of -Toulouse behind the canal. This line of battle presented an angle -towards the Croix d’Orade, each side about two miles in length and -the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade. - -Wellington having well observed the ground on the 8th and 9th, made -the following disposition of attack for the 10th. General Hill was -to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to draw -the enemy’s attention according to the progress of the battle on -the right of the Garonne, which he could easily discern. The third -and light divisions and Freyre’s Spaniards, being already on the -left of the Ers, were to advance against the northern front of -Toulouse. The two first supported by Bock’s German cavalry were to -make demonstrations against the line of canal defended by Daricau. -That is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux and the -convent of the Minimes, while Alten maintained the communication -between him and Freyre who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, -was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover Beresford’s -column of march. This last composed of the fourth and sixth division -with three batteries was, after passing the bridge of Croix d’Orade, -to move round the left of the Pugade and along the low ground -between the French heights and the Ers, until the rear should pass -the road of Lavaur, when the two divisions were to wheel into line -and attack the platform of St. Sypiere. Freyre was then to assail -that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons following close were to -connect that general’s left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile lord -Edward Somerset’s hussars were to move up the left of the Ers, while -Vivian’s cavalry moved up the right of that river, each destined to -observe Berton’s cavalry, which, having possession of the bridges of -Bordes and Montaudran higher up, could pass from the right bank to -the left, and destroying the bridge fall upon the head of Beresford’s -troops while in march. - - -BATTLE OF TOULOUSE. - -[Sidenote: Memoir by general Berton, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.] - -The 10th of April at two o’clock in the morning the light division -passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and about six o’clock the -whole army moved forwards in the order assigned for the different -columns. Picton and Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced -posts behind the works at the bridge over the canal. Freyre’s -columns, marching along the Alby road, were cannonaded by St. Pol -with two guns until they had passed a small stream by the help -of some temporary bridges, when the French general following his -instructions retired to the horn-work on the Calvinet platform. -The Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, from whence the -Portuguese guns under major Arentschild opened a heavy cannonade -against Calvinet. Meanwhile Beresford, preceded by the hussars, -marched from Croix d’Orade in three columns abreast. Passing behind -the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc, he entered the marshy -ground between the Ers river and the Mont Rave, but he left his -artillery at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep and -difficult country under the fire of the enemy. Beyond the Ers on his -left, Vivian’s cavalry, now under colonel Arentschild, drove Berton’s -horsemen back with loss, and nearly seized the bridge of Bordes which -the French general passed and destroyed with difficulty at the last -moment. However the German hussars succeeded in gaining the bridge -of Montaudran higher up, though it was barricaded, and defended by a -detachment of cavalry sent there by Berton who remained himself in -position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers. - -While these operations were in progress, general Freyre who had -asked as a favour to lead the battle at Calvinet, whether from error -or impatience assailed the horn-work on that platform about eleven -o’clock and while Beresford was still in march. The Spaniards, nine -thousand strong, moved in two lines and a reserve, and advanced with -great resolution at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as -to embrace the end of the Calvinet hill. The French musquetry and -great guns thinned the ranks at every step, yet closing upon their -centre they still ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were -exposed to increasing in violence until their right wing, which was -also raked from the bridge of Matabiau, unable to endure the torment -wavered. The leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped for shelter -into a hollow road, twenty-five feet deep in parts, and covering this -part of the French entrenchments; but the left wing and the second -line run back in great disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers under -colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining their ground under cover -of a bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping out of -their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road -poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds entangled -in the gulph below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau, -constructed to rake this opening, sent its bullets from flank to -flank hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones. - -The Spanish generals rallying the troops who had fled, led them back -again to the brink of the fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage -below and the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror. -Again they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches -pursued, while several battalions sallying from the bridge of -Matabiau and from behind the Calvinet followed hard along the road -of Alby. The country was now covered with fugitives whose headlong -flight could not be restrained, and with pursuers whose numbers and -vehemence increased, until lord Wellington, who was at that point, -covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby’s cavalry, and the -reserve artillery which opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the -Portuguese guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a brigade of -the light division, wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the -victorious French who immediately retired to their entrenchments on -Calvinet: but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or -wounded and their defeat was not the only misfortune. - -General Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such -occasions being known were especially given, had turned his false -attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux, and the enemy -fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders and -approachable only along an open flat, repulsed him with a loss of -nearly four hundred men and officers: amongst the latter colonel -Forbes of the forty-fifth was killed, and general Brisbane who -commanded the brigade was wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to -the Garonne the French had completely vindicated their position, the -allies had suffered enormously, and beyond the Garonne, although -general Hill had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering -St. Cyprien and was menacing the second line, the latter being much -more contracted and very strongly fortified could not be stormed. -The musquetry battle therefore subsided for a time, but a prodigious -cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line, and on the -allies’ side from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery left -by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the Portuguese guns on the -Pugade, poured its shot incessantly against the works on the Calvinet -platform: injudiciously it has been said because the ammunition -thus used for a secondary object was afterwards wanted when a vital -advantage might have been gained. - -[Sidenote: Morning States, MSS.] - -It was now evident that the victory must be won or lost by Beresford, -and yet from Picton’s error lord Wellington had no reserves to -enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy cavalry -only remained in hand, and these troops were necessarily retained to -cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and to protect the artillery -employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore approached -with all happy promise to the French general. The repulse of Picton, -the utter dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second -line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first -Taupin’s whole division, and then one of Maransin’s brigades from -that quarter, to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus three -divisions and his cavalry, that is to say nearly fifteen thousand -combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement without in -any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on -the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, -whose force, originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was -cruelly reduced as it made slow and difficult way for two miles -through a deep marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses. -For sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French -musquetry, and always under the fire of their artillery from the Mont -Rave, without a gun to reply, the length of the column had augmented -so much at every step from the difficulty of the way that frequent -halts were necessary to close up the ranks. - -The flat miry ground between the river and the heights became -narrower and deeper as the troops advanced, Berton’s cavalry was -ahead, an impassable river was on the left, and three French -divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right -flank! Fortune came to their aid. Soult always eyeing their march, -had, when the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin’s division -to the platform of St. Sypiere, and supporting it with a brigade -of D’Armagnac’s division disposed the whole about the redoubts. -From thence after a short hortative to act vigorously he ordered -Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the same time directing a -regiment of Vial’s cavalry to descend the heights by the Lavaur road -and intercept the line of retreat, while Berton’s horsemen assailed -the other flank from the side of the bridge of Bordes. But this was -not half of the force which the French general might have employed. -Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets -of Toulouse, and that general instead of attacking at once took -ground to his right, waiting until Beresford having completed his -flank march had wheeled into lines at the foot of the heights. - -Taupin’s infantry, unskilfully arranged for action it is said, at -last poured down the hill, but some rockets discharged in good time -ravaged the ranks and with their noise and terrible appearance, -unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers; then the British -skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting fire, and -Lambert’s brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson’s brigade -and some provisional battalions of the fourth division, for it is an -error to say the sixth division alone repulsed this attack, Lambert’s -brigade I say, rushed forwards with a terrible shout, and the French -turning fled back to the upper ground. Vial’s horsemen trotting down -the Lavaur road now charged on the right flank, but the second and -third lines of the sixth division being thrown into squares repulsed -them, and on the other flank general Cole had been so sudden in his -advance up the heights, that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity -to charge. Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry in his -front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a -check won the summit of the platform, his skirmishers even descended -in pursuit on the reverse slope, and meanwhile, on his left, general -Cole meeting with less resistance had still more rapidly gained the -height at that side: so complete was the rout that the two redoubts -were abandoned from panic, and the French with the utmost disorder -sought shelter in the works of Sacarin and Cambon. - -Soult astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected -so much, and who had but just before given him assurances of their -resolution and confidence, was in fear that Beresford pushing his -success would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal. -Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with the remainder of -Vial’s cavalry, he hastily led D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to the -works of Sacarin, checked the foremost British skirmishers and -rallied the fugitives; Taupin’s guns arrived from the town at the -same moment, and the mischief being stayed a part of Travot’s reserve -immediately moved to defend the bridge of the Demoiselles. A fresh -order of battle was thus organized, but the indomitable courage of -the British soldiers overcoming all obstacles and all opposition, had -decided the first great crisis of the fight. - -Lambert’s brigade immediately wheeled to its right across the -platform on the line of the Lavaur road, menacing the flank of the -French on the Calvinet platform, while Pack’s Scotch brigade and -Douglas’s Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the -sixth division, were disposed on the right with a view to march -against the Colombette redoubts on the original front of the enemy. -And now also the eighteenth and German hussars, having forced the -bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, came round the south end of -the Mont Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers of the -fourth division they menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles, from -whence and from the works of Cambon and Sacarin the enemy’s guns -played incessantly. - -The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely changed. The -French thrown entirely on the defensive occupied three sides of a -square. Their right, extending from the works of Sacarin to the -redoubts of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced by Lambert, -who was solidly posted on the platform of St. Sypiere while the -redoubts themselves were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French -left thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau awaited the renewed -attack of the Spaniards, and the whole position was very strong, not -exceeding a thousand yards on each side with the angles all defended -by formidable works. The canal and city of Toulouse, its walls and -entrenched suburbs, offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while -the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured -the power of retreat. - -In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s cavalry, the -whole of Villatte’s division, one brigade of Maransin’s, another of -D’Armagnac’s, and with the exception of the regiment driven from the -St. Sypiere redoubt the whole of Harispe’s division. On the allies’ -side therefore defeat had been staved off, but victory was still to -be contended for, and with apparently inadequate means; for Picton -being successfully opposed by Darricau was so far paralyzed, the -Spaniards rallying slowly were not to be depended upon for another -attack, and there remained only the heavy cavalry and the light -division, which lord Wellington could not venture to thrust into the -action under pain of being left without any reserve in the event of a -repulse. The final stroke therefore was still to be made on the left, -and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert’s brigade and the -fourth division were necessarily employed to keep in check the French -troops at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon and Sacarin. This -heavy mass, comprising one brigade of Travot’s reserve, the half of -D’Armagnac’s division and all of Taupin’s, together with the regiment -belonging to Harispe which had abandoned the forts of St. Sypiere, -was commanded by general Clauzel, who disposed the greater part in -advance of the entrenchments as if to retake the offensive. - -Such was the state of affairs about half-past two o’clock, when -Beresford renewed the action with Pack’s Scotch brigade, and the -Portuguese of the sixth division under colonel Douglas. These troops, -ensconced in the hollow Lavaur road on Lambert’s right, had been -hitherto well protected from the fire of the French works, but now -scrambling up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to their -left by wings of regiments as they could get out, and ascending -the heights by the slope facing the Ers, under a wasting fire of -cannon and musquetry carried all the French breast-works, and the -Colombette, and Calvinet redoubts. It was a surprising action when -the loose disorderly nature of the attack imposed by the difficulty -of the ground is considered; but the French although they yielded -at first to the thronging rush of the British troops soon rallied -and came back with a reflux. Their cannonade was incessant, their -reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible. For Harispe, -who commanded in person at this part, and under whom the French -seemed always to fight with redoubled vigour, brought up fresh -men, and surrounding the two redoubts with a surging multitude -absolutely broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths -of the forty-second, and drove the rest out. The British troops -were however supported by the seventy-first and ninety-first, and -the whole clinging to the brow of the hill fought with a wonderful -courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen that their order -of battle was reduced to a thin line of skirmishers. Some of the -British cavalry then rode up from the low ground and attempted a -charge, but they were stopped by a deep hollow road, of which there -were many, and some of the foremost troopers tumbling headlong in -perished. Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued fiercely, -the French from their numbers had certainly the advantage, but they -never retook the Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents -down from the brow of the hill. At last when the whole of the sixth -division had rallied and again assailed them, flank and front, when -their generals Harispe and Baurot had fallen dangerously wounded and -the Colombette was retaken by the seventy-ninth, the battle turned, -and the French finally abandoned the platform, falling back partly by -their right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the bridge of -Matabiau. - -It was now about four o’clock. The Spaniards during this contest had -once more partially attacked, but they were again put to flight, -and the French thus remained masters of their entrenchments in -that quarter; for the sixth division had been very hardly handled, -and Beresford halted to reform his order of battle and receive his -artillery: it came to him indeed about this time, yet with great -difficulty and with little ammunition in consequence of the heavy -cannonade it had previously furnished from Montblanc. However -Soult seeing that the Spaniards, supported by the light division, -had rallied a fourth time, that Picton again menaced the bridge -of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while Beresford, master of -three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now advancing along the summit, -deemed farther resistance useless and relinquished the northern end -of the Calvinet platform also. About five o’clock he withdrew his -whole army behind the canal, still however holding the advanced -works of Sacarin and Cambon. Lord Wellington then established the -Spaniards in the abandoned works and so became master of the Mont -Rave in all its extent. Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The -French had five generals, and perhaps three thousand men killed -or wounded and they lost one piece of artillery. The allies lost -four generals and four thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men -and officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards. A lamentable -spilling of blood, and a useless, for before this period Napoleon -had abdicated the throne of France and a provisional government was -constituted at Paris. - -During the night the French general, defeated but undismayed, -replaced the ammunition expended in the action, re-organized and -augmented his field artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made -dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal. Yet -looking to the final necessity of a retreat he wrote to Suchet to -inform him of the result of the contest and proposed a combined plan -of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his -temper. “March,” said he, “with the whole of your forces by Quillan -upon Carcassonne, I will meet you there with my army, we can then -retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the Upper -Garonne, and holding on by the mountains oblige the enemy to recall -his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that -city and make a diversion in our favour.” - -On the morning of the 11th he was again ready to fight, but the -English general was not. The French position, within musquet-shot of -the walls of Toulouse, was still inexpugnable on the northern and -eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave was only a preliminary -step to the passage of the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles and -other points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon, with the view of -throwing the army as originally designed on to the south side of the -town. But this was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions, and -a fresh provision of ammunition only to be obtained from the parc on -the other side of the Garonne. Hence to accelerate the preparations, -to ascertain the state of general Hill’s position, and to give that -general farther instructions, lord Wellington repaired on the 11th -to St. Cyprien; but though he had shortened his communications by -removing the pontoon bridge from Grenade to Seilh, the day was spent -before the ammunition arrived and the final arrangements for the -passage of the canal could be completed. The attack was therefore -deferred until daylight on the 12th. - -Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt -the communications with Suchet and menace Soult’s retreat by the -road leading to Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen on the -heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together with the preparations -in his front, taught Soult that he could no longer delay if he would -not be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated all his -arrangements, he left eight pieces of heavy artillery, two generals, -the gallant Harispe being one, and sixteen hundred men whose wounds -were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors; then filing out of -the city with surprising order and ability, he made a forced march -of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper -Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. On the same -day general Hill’s troops were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit, -and the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, beat the -French with the loss of twenty-five men, and cut off a like number of -gensd’armes on the side of Revel. - -Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was -displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted -the Bourbon colours, but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had -retired with the French army. The British general, true to his -honest line of policy, did not fail to warn the Bourbonists that -their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk, but in the -afternoon two officers, the English colonel Cooke, and the French -colonel St. Simon, arrived from Paris. Charged to make known to the -armies the abdication of Napoleon they had been detained near Blois -by the officiousness of the police attending the court of the empress -Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the -Mont Rave in consequence. Nor did their arrival immediately put a -stop to the war. When St. Simon in pursuance of his mission reached -Soult’s quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause, -demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities -until authentic information could be obtained from the ministers -of the emperor: then sending all his incumbrances by the canal to -Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnaudary and -awaited the progress of events. Lord Wellington refused to accede -to his proposal, and as general Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, -acknowledged the authority of the provincial government and readily -concluded an armistice, he judged that Soult designed to make a civil -war and therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were on -the point of engaging when the duke of Dalmatia, who had now received -official information from the chief of the emperor’s staff, notified -his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France: and with this -honourable distinction that he had faithfully sustained the cause of -his great monarch until the very last moment. - -A convention which included Suchet’s army was immediately agreed -upon, but that marshal had previously adopted the white colours -of his own motion, and lord Wellington instantly transmitted the -intelligence to general Clinton in Catalonia and to the troops -at Bayonne. Too late it came for both and useless battles were -fought. That at Barcelona has been already described, but at Bayonne -misfortune and suffering had fallen upon one of the brightest -soldiers of the British army. - - -SALLY FROM BAYONNE. - -During the progress of the main army in the interior sir John -Hope conducted the investment of Bayonne, with all the zeal the -intelligence and unremitting vigilance and activity which the -difficult nature of the operation required. He had gathered great -stores of gabions and fascines and platforms, and was ready to attack -the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him, yet -indirectly and without any official character to warrant a formal -communication to the garrison without lord Wellington’s authority. -These rumours were however made known at the outposts, and perhaps -lulled the vigilance of the besiegers, but to such irregular -communications which might be intended to deceive the governor -naturally paid little attention. - -[Sidenote: Beamish’s History of the German Legion.] - -The piquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were at this time -furnished by a brigade of the fifth division, but from thence to the -extreme right the guards had charge of the line, and they had also -one company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber’s German brigade -was encamped as a support to the left, the remainder of the first -division was encamped in the rear, towards Boucaut. In this state, -about one o’clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter, coming -over to general Hay who commanded the outposts that night, gave an -exact account of the projected sally. The general not able to speak -French sent him to general Hinuber, who immediately interpreting the -man’s story to general Hay, assembled his own troops under arms, -and transmitted the intelligence to sir John Hope. It would appear -that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s story, took no additional -precautions, and it is probable that neither the German brigade -nor the reserves of the guards would have been put under arms but -for the activity of general Hinuber. However at three o’clock the -French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as -a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three -thousand combatants. They surprised the piquets, and with loud shouts -breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with -one rush the church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne -with exception of a fortified house which was defended by captain -Forster of the thirty-eighth regiment. Masters of every other part -and overthrowing all who stood before them they drove the picquets -and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, killed general -Hay, took colonel Townsend of the guards prisoner, divided the wings -of the investing troops, and passing in rear of the right threw the -whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, having his -Germans well in hand, moved up on the side of St. Etienne, rallied -some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of -general Bradford’s Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit bravely -gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and regained the village and -church. - -The combat on the right was at first even more disastrous than in the -centre, neither the piquets nor the reserves were able to sustain the -fury of the assault and the battle was most confused and terrible; -for on both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the -enclosures and unable to recover their order, came dashing together -in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes -friends encountered sometimes foes: all was tumult and horror. The -guns of the citadel vaguely guided by the flashes of the musquetry -sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of -fight, and the gun-boats dropping down the river opened their fire -upon the flank of the supporting columns, which being put in motion -by sir John Hope on the first alarm were now coming up from the -side of Boucaut. Thus nearly one hundred pieces of artillery were -in full play at once, and the shells having set fire to the fascine -depôts and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the -striving masses. - -Amidst this confusion sir John Hope suddenly disappeared, none knew -how or wherefore at the time, but it afterwards appeared, that -having brought up the reserves on the right, to stem the torrent in -that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road which led -close behind the line of picquets; the French had however lined both -banks, and when he endeavoured to return a shot struck him in the -arm, while his horse, a large one as was necessary to sustain the -gigantic warrior, received eight bullets and fell upon his leg. His -followers had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of them, -captain Herries, and Mr. Moore a nephew of sir John Moore, seeing his -helpless state turned back and alighting endeavoured amidst the heavy -fire of the enemy to draw him from beneath the horse. While thus -engaged they were both struck down with dangerous wounds, the French -carried them all off, and sir John Hope was again severely hurt in -the foot by an English bullet before they gained the citadel. - -The day was now beginning to break and the allies were enabled to -act with more unity and effect. The Germans were in possession of -St. Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards, being properly -disposed, by general Howard who had succeeded to the command, -suddenly raised a loud shout, and running in upon the French drove -them back into the works with such slaughter that their own writers -admit a loss of one general and more than nine hundred men. But on -the British side general Stopford was wounded, and the whole loss -was eight hundred and thirty men and officers. Of these more than -two hundred were taken, besides the commander-in-chief; and it is -generally acknowledged that captain Forster’s firm defence of the -fortified house first, and next the readiness and gallantry with -which general Hinuber and his Germans retook St. Etienne, saved the -allies from a very terrible disaster. - -A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult -became known and hostilities ceased. - -All the French troops in the south were now reorganized in one body -under the command of Suchet, but they were so little inclined to -acquiesce in the revolution, that prince Polignac, acting for the -duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general Kennedy -for a sum of money to quiet them. - -The Portuguese army returned to Portugal. The Spanish army to Spain, -the generals being it is said inclined at first to declare for the -Cortez against the king, but they were diverted from their purpose by -the influence and authority of lord Wellington. - -The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for -England, and the cavalry marching through France took shipping at -Boulogne. - -Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veteran’s -services. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. - - -[Sidenote: 1814.] - -Marshal Soult and General Thouvenot have been accused of fighting -with a full knowledge of Napoleon’s abdication. This charge -circulated originally by the Bourbon party is utterly unfounded. The -extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot through the advanced -posts has been already noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to -induce sir John Hope to make a formal communication, and the governor -could only treat it as an idle story to insult or to deceive him, -and baffle his defence by retarding his counter-operations while the -works for the siege were advancing. For how unlikely, nay impossible, -must it not have appeared, that the emperor Napoleon, whose victories -at Mont-Mirail and Champaubert were known before the close investment -of Bayonne, should have been deprived of his crown in the space of a -few weeks, and the stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts -without any relaxation in the preparations for the siege. - -As false and unsubstantial is the charge against Soult. - -[Sidenote: Memoirs of captain Kincaid.] - -The acute remark of an English military writer, that if the duke of -Dalmatia had known of the peace before he fought, he would certainly -have announced it after the battle, were it only to maintain -himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable: but -there are direct proofs of the falsehood of the accusation. How was -the intelligence to reach him? It was not until the 7th that the -provisional government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer could -not have reached Toulouse under three days even by the most direct -way, which was through Montauban. Now the allies were in possession -of that road on the 4th, and on the 9th the French army was actually -invested. The intelligence from Paris must therefore have reached -the allies first, as in fact it did, and it was not Soult, it was -lord Wellington who commenced the battle. The charge would therefore -bear more against the English general, who would yet have been the -most insane as well as the wickedest of men to have risked his army -and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles seemed to deny -success. He also was the person of all others called upon, by honour, -gratitude, justice and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter of -his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the punishment of his -inhuman adversary. - -Did he ever by word or deed countenance the calumny? - -Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English reform bill, repeated -the accusation in the house of lords and reviled the minister for -being on amicable political terms with a man capable of such a crime. -Lord Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically declared that -marshal Soult did not know, and that it was impossible he could know -of the emperor’s abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable -distinction of sporting with men’s lives by wholesale attaches to -no general on the records of history save the Orange William, the -murderer of Glencoe. And though marshal Soult had known of the -emperor’s abdication he could not for that have been justly placed -beside that cold-blooded prince, who fought at St. Denis with the -peace of Nimeguen in his pocket, because “_he would not deny himself -a safe lesson in his trade_.” - -The French marshal was at the head of a brave army and it was -impossible to know whether Napoleon had abdicated voluntarily or been -constrained. The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and -other intriguers, forming a provisional government, self-instituted -and under the protection of foreign bayonets, demanded no respect -from Soult. He had even the right of denying the emperor’s legal -power to abdicate. He had the right, if he thought himself strong -enough, to declare, that he would not suffer the throne to become -the plaything of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France -even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine it was a question of -patriotism and of calculation, a national question which the general -of an army had a right to decide for himself, having reference always -to the real will and desire of the people at large. - -It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter, even after the -battle and when he had seen colonel St. Simon. - -[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -Writing to Talleyrand on the 22d, he says, “The circumstances which -preceded my act of adhesion are so extraordinary as to create -astonishment. The 7th the provisional government informed me of -the events which had happened since the 1st of April. The 6th and -7th, count Dupont wrote to me on the same subject. On the 8th the -duke of Feltre, in his quality of war minister, gave me notice, -that having left the military cipher at Paris he would immediately -forward to me another. The 9th the prince Berthier vice-constable and -major-general, wrote to me from Fontainbleau, transmitting the copy -of a convention and armistice which had been arranged at Paris with -the allied powers; he demanded at the same time a state of the force -and condition of my army; but neither the prince nor the duke of -Feltre mentioned events, we had then only knowledge of a proclamation -of the empress, dated the 3rd, _which forbade us to recognize any -thing coming from Paris_. - -“The 10th I was attacked near Toulouse by the whole allied army -under the orders of lord Wellington. This vigorous action, where the -French army the weakest by half showed all its worth, cost the allies -from eight to ten thousand men: lord Wellington might perhaps have -dispensed with it. - -“The 12th I received through the English the first hint of the events -at Paris. I proposed an armistice, it was refused, I renewed the -demand it was again refused. At last I sent count Gazan to Toulouse, -and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms was accepted -and signed the 18th, the armies being then in presence of each -other. The 19th I ratified this convention and gave my adhesion to -the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject I ought -to declare that I sought to obtain a suspension of arms before I -manifested my sentiments in order that my will and that of the army -should be free. _That neither France nor posterity should have power -to say it was torn from us by force of arms. To follow only the will -of the nation was a homage I owed to my country_.” - -The reader will observe in the above letter certain assertions, -relative to the numbers of the contending armies and the loss of the -allies, which are at variance with the statements in this History; -and this loose but common mode of assuming the state of an adverse -force has been the ground-work for great exaggeration by some French -writers, who strangely enough claim a victory for the French army -although the French general himself made no such claim at the time, -and so far as appears has not done so since. - -_Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences._ By this -test we shall know who won the battle of Toulouse. - -Now all persons, French and English, who have treated the subject, -including the generals on both sides, are agreed, that Soult -fortified Toulouse the canal and the Mont Rave as positions of -battle; that he was attacked, that Taupin’s division was beaten, -that the Mont Rave with all its redoubts and entrenchments fell into -the allies’ power. Finally that the French army abandoned Toulouse, -leaving there three wounded generals, sixteen hundred men, several -guns and a quantity of stores at the discretion of their adversaries: -and this without any fresh forces having joined the allies, or any -remarkable event affecting the operations happening elsewhere. - -[Sidenote: Soult to Suchet, 29th March.] - -[Sidenote: Soult to Suchet, 7th April.] - -Was Toulouse worth preserving? Was the abandonment of it forced or -voluntary? Let the French general speak! “I have entrenched the -suburb of St. Cyprien which forms a good bridge-head. The enemy -will not I think attack me there unless he desires to lose a part -of his army. Two nights ago he made a demonstration of passing the -Garonne two leagues above the city, but he will probably try to -pass it below, in which case I will attack him whatever his force -may be, because it is of the utmost importance to me not to be cut -off from Montauban where I have made a bridge-head.”—“I think the -enemy will not move on your side _unless I move that way first, -and I am determined to avoid that as long as I can_.”—“If I could -remain a month on the Garonne I should be able to put six or eight -thousand conscripts into the ranks who now embarass me, and who -want arms which I expect with great impatience from Perpignan.”—“I -am resolved to deliver battle near Toulouse whatever may be the -superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified a _position_, -which, _supported by the town and the canal_, furnishes me with -a retrenched camp susceptible of defence.”—“I have received the -unhappy news of the enemy’s entrance into Paris. This misfortune -strengthens my determination to defend Toulouse whatever may happen. -The preservation of the place which contains establishments of all -kinds is of the utmost importance to us, but if unhappily I am -forced to quit it, my movements will naturally bring me nearer to -you. In that case you cannot sustain yourself at Perpignan because -the enemy will inevitably follow me.”—“The enemy appears astonished -at the determination I have taken to defend Toulouse, four days ago -he passed the Garonne and has done nothing since, perhaps the bad -weather is the cause.” - -[Sidenote: Soult’s Orders.] - -[Sidenote: Choumara.] - -From these extracts it is clear that Soult resolved if possible -not to fall back upon Suchet, and was determined even to fight -for the preservation of his communications with Montauban; yet he -finally resigned this important object for the more important one of -defending Toulouse. And so intent upon its preservation was he, that -having on the 25th of March ordered all the stores and artillery -not of immediate utility, to be sent away, he on the 2d of April -forbade further progress in that work and even had those things -already removed brought back. Moreover he very clearly marks that to -abandon the city and retreat towards Suchet will be the signs and -consequences of defeat. - -These points being fixed, we find him on the evening of the 10th -writing to the same general thus. - -“The battle which I announced to you took place to-day, the enemy has -been horribly maltreated, but he succeeded in _establishing himself -upon a position which I occupied to the right of Toulouse_. The -general of division Taupin has been killed, general Harispe has lost -his foot by a cannon-ball, and three generals of brigade are wounded. -I am prepared to recommence to-morrow if the enemy attacks, but _I do -not believe I can stay in Toulouse, it might even happen that I shall -be forced to open a passage to get out_.” - -On the 11th of April he writes again: - -“As I told you in my letter of yesterday I am in the necessity -of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear being obliged to fight my -way at Baziege where the enemy is directing a column to cut my -communications. To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche, -because I have good hope that this obstacle will not prevent my -passing.” - -To the minister of war he also writes on the 10th. - -“To-day I rest in position. If the enemy attacks me I will defend -myself. I have great need to replenish my means before I put the army -in march, yet I believe that in the coming night I shall be forced to -abandon Toulouse, and it is probable I shall direct my movements so -as to rally upon the troops of the duke of Albufera.” - -Soult lays no claim here to victory. He admits that all the events -previously indicated by him as the consequences of defeat were -fulfilled to the letter. That is to say, the loss of the position -of battle, the consequent evacuation of the city, and the march to -join Suchet. On the other hand lord Wellington clearly obtained all -that he sought. He desired to pass the Garonne and he did pass it; -he desired to win the position and works of Mont Rave and he did win -them; he desired to enter Toulouse and he did enter it as a conqueror -at the head of his troops. - -Amongst the French writers who without denying these facts lay claim -to a victory Choumara is most deserving of notice. This gentleman, -known as an able engineer, with a praise-worthy desire to render -justice to the great capacity of marshal Soult, shews very clearly -that his genius would have shone in this campaign with far greater -lustre if marshal Suchet had adopted his plans and supported him in a -cordial manner. But Mr. Choumara heated by his subject completes the -picture by a crowning victory at Toulouse which the marshal himself -appears not to recognize. The work is a very valuable historical -document with respect to the disputes between Soult and Suchet, but -with respect to the battle of Toulouse it contains grave errors as -to facts, and the inferences are untenable though the premises were -admitted. - -The substance of Mr. Choumara’s argument is, that the position of -Toulouse was of the nature of a fortress. That the canal was the real -position of battle, the Mont Rave an outwork, the loss of which -weighed little in the balance, because the French army was victorious -at Calvinet against the Spaniards, at the convent of the Minimes -against the light division, at the bridge of Jumeaux against Picton, -at St. Cyprien against General Hill. Finally that the French general -certainly won the victory because he offered battle the next day and -did not retreat from Toulouse until the following night. - -Now admitting that all these facts were established, the fortress was -still taken. - -But the facts are surprisingly incorrect. For first marshal Soult -himself tells Suchet that the Mont Rave was his _position of battle_, -and that the town and the canal _supported it_. Nothing could be -more accurate than this description. For when he lost the Mont -Rave, the town and the canal enabled him to rally his army and take -measures for a retreat. But the loss of the Mont Rave rendered the -canal untenable, why else was Toulouse abandoned? That the line of -the canal was a more formidable one to attack in front than the Mont -Rave is true, yet that did not constitute it a position; it was not -necessary to attack it, except partially at Sacarin and Cambon and -the bridge of the Demoiselles; those points once forced the canal -would, with the aid of the Mont Rave, have helped to keep the French -in Toulouse as it had before helped to keep the allies out. Lord -Wellington once established on the south side of the city and holding -the Pech David could have removed the bridge from Seilh to Portet, -above Toulouse, thus shortening and securing his communication with -Hill; the French army must then have surrendered, or broken out, no -easy matter in such a difficult and strangled country. The Mont Rave -was therefore not only the position of battle, it was also the key of -the position behind the canal, and Mr. de Choumara is placed in this -dilemma. He must admit the allies won the fight, or confess the main -position was so badly chosen that a slight reverse at an outwork was -sufficient to make the French army abandon it at every other point. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -But were the French victorious at every other point? Against the -Spaniards they were, and Picton also was repulsed. The order of -movements for the battle proves indeed that this general’s attack was -intended to be a false one; he disobeyed his orders however, and one -of his brigades was repulsed; but to check one brigade with a loss of -three or four hundred men, is a small matter in a battle where more -than eighty thousand combatants were engaged. - -[Sidenote: Official Returns.] - -The light division made a demonstration against the convent of -the Minimes and nothing more. Its loss on the whole day was only -fifty-six men and officers, and no French veteran of the Peninsula -but would laugh at the notion that a real attack by that matchless -division could be so stopped. - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -It is said the exterior line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien was -occupied with a view to offensive movements, and to prevent the -allies from establishing batteries to rake the line of the canal from -that side of the Garonne; but whatever may have been the object, -General Hill got possession of it, and was so far victorious. He was -ordered not to assail the second line seriously and he did not, for -his whole loss scarcely exceeded eighty men and officers. - -From these undeniable facts, it is clear that the French gained an -advantage against Picton, and a marked success against the Spaniards; -but Beresford’s attack was so decisive as to counterbalance these -failures and even to put the defeated Spaniards in possession of the -height they had originally contended for in vain. - -Mr. Choumara attributes Beresford’s success to Taupin’s errors and to -a vast superiority of numbers on the side of the allies. “Fifty-three -thousand infantry, more than eight thousand cavalry, and a reserve of -eighteen thousand men of all arms, opposed to twenty-five thousand -French infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and a reserve of -seven thousand conscripts three thousand of which were unarmed.” Such -is the enormous disproportion assumed on the authority of general -Vaudoncourt. - -[Sidenote: Kock’s Campaign of 1814.] - -Now the errors of Taupin may have been great, and his countrymen -are the best judges of his demerit; but the numbers here assumed -are most inaccurate. The imperial muster-rolls are not of a later -date than December 1813, yet an official table of the organization -of Soult’s army, published by the French military historian Kock, -gives thirty-six thousand six hundred and thirty-five combatants on -the 10th of March. Of these, in round numbers, twenty-eight thousand -six hundred were infantry, two thousand seven hundred cavalry, and -five thousand seven hundred were artillery-men, engineers, miners, -sappers, gensd’armes, and military workmen. Nothing is said of the -reserve division of conscripts commanded by general Travot, but -general Vaudoncourt’s table of the same army on the 1st of April, -adopted by Choumara, supplies the deficiency. The conscripts are -there set down seven thousand two hundred and sixty-seven, and this -cipher being added to Kock’s, gives a total of forty-three thousand -nine hundred fighting men. The loss in combats and marches from -the 10th of March to the 1st of April must be deducted, but on the -other hand we find Soult informing the minister of war, on the 7th -of March, that three thousand soldiers dispersed by the battle of -Orthes were still wandering behind the army: the greatest part must -have joined before the battle of Toulouse. There was also the regular -garrison of that city, composed of the depôts of several regiments -and the urban guards, all under Travot. Thus little less than fifty -thousand men were at Soult’s disposal. - -Let twelve thousand be deducted for, 1º. the urban guard which was -only employed to maintain the police of the town, 2º. the unarmed -conscripts, 3º. the military workmen not brought into action, 4º. -the detachments employed on the flanks to communicate with La Fitte -in the Arriege, and to reinforce general Loverdo at Montauban. There -will remain thirty-eight thousand fighting men of all arms. And -with a very powerful artillery; for we find Soult after the action, -directing seven field-batteries of eight pieces each to attend the -army; and the French writers mention, besides this field-train, 1º. -fifteen pieces which were transferred during the battle from the -exterior line of St. Cyprien to the northern and eastern fronts. 2º. -Four twenty-four pounders and several sixteen-pounders mounted on -the walls of the city. 3º. The armaments of the bridge-heads, the -works on Calvinet and those at Saccarin and Cambon. Wherefore not -less than eighty, or perhaps ninety, pieces of French artillery were -engaged. - -An approximation to the strength of the French army being thus made -it remains to show the number of the allies, and with respect to -the Anglo-Portuguese troops that can be done very exactly, not by -approximative estimates but positively from the original returns. - -[Sidenote: See note at the end of the Appendix.] - -The morning state delivered to lord Wellington on the 10th of April -bears forty-three thousand seven hundred and forty-four British -and Germans, and twenty thousand seven hundred and ninety-three -Portuguese, in all sixty-four thousand five hundred and thirty-seven -soldiers and officers present under arms, exclusive of artillery-men. -Of this number nearly ten thousand were cavalry, eleven hundred and -eighty-eight being Portuguese. - -The Spanish auxiliaries, exclusive of Mina’s bands investing St. Jean -Pied de Port, were 1º. Giron’s Andalusians and the third army under -O’Donnel, fifteen thousand. 2º. The Gallicians under general Freyre, -fourteen thousand. 3º. Three thousand Gallicians under Morillo and as -many more under Longa, making with the Anglo-Portuguese a total of -ninety thousand combatants with somewhat more than a hundred pieces -of field-artillery. - -[Sidenote: See note at the end of the Appendix.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix 7, sections 6 and 7.] - -Of this force, O’Donnel’s troops were in the valley of the Bastan, -Longa’s on the Upper Ebro; one division of Freyre’s Gallicians was -under Carlos D’España in front of Bayonne; one half of Morillo’s -division was blockading Navarens, the other half and the nine -thousand Gallicians remaining under Freyre, were in front of -Toulouse. Of the Anglo-Portuguese, the first and fifth divisions, and -three unattached brigades of infantry with one brigade of cavalry, -were with sir John Hope at Bayonne; the seventh division was at -Bordeaux; the household brigade of heavy cavalry was on the march -from the Ebro where it had passed the winter; the Portuguese horsemen -were partly employed on the communications in the rear, partly near -Agen, where sir John Campbell commanding the fourth regiment had an -engagement on the 11th with the celebrated partizan Florian. The -second, third, fourth, sixth, and light divisions of infantry, and -Le Cor’s Portuguese, called the unattached division, were with lord -Wellington, who had also Bock’s, Ponsonby’s, Fane’s, Vivian’s, and -lord E. Somerset’s brigades of cavalry. - -These troops on the morning of the 10th mustered under arms, in round -numbers, thirty-one thousand infantry, of which four thousand three -hundred were officers sergeants and drummers, leaving twenty-six -thousand and six hundred bayonets. Add twelve thousand Spaniards -under Freyre and Morillo, and we have a total of forty-three thousand -five hundred infantry. The cavalry amounted to seven thousand, and -there were sixty-four pieces of artillery. Hence about fifty-two -thousand of all ranks and arms were in line to fight thirty-eight -thousand French with more than eighty pieces of artillery, some being -of the largest calibre. - -But of the allies only twenty-four thousand men with fifty-two guns -can be said to have been seriously engaged. Thirteen thousand sabres -and bayonets with eighteen guns were on the left of the Garonne -under general Hill. Neither the light division nor Ponsonby’s heavy -cavalry, nor Bock’s Germans were really engaged. Wherefore twelve -thousand six hundred sabres and bayonets under Beresford, nine -thousand bayonets under Freyre, and two thousand five hundred -of Picton’s division really fought the battle. Thus the enormous -disproportion assumed by the French writers disappears entirely; for -if the allies had the advantage of numbers it was chiefly in cavalry, -and horsemen were of little avail against the entrenched position and -preponderating artillery of the French general. - -The duke of Dalmatia’s claim to the admiration of his countrymen is -well-founded and requires no vain assumption to prop it up. Vast -combinations, inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment, -unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, unwavering -fidelity to his sovereign and his country, are what no man can -justly deny him. In this celebrated campaign of only nine months, -although counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of his -countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works of five strong places -and entrenched five great camps with such works as Marius himself -would not have disdained; once he changed his line of operations -and either attacking or defending delivered twenty-four battles and -combats. Defeated in all he yet fought the last as fiercely as the -first, remaining unconquered in mind, and still intent upon renewing -the struggle when peace came to put a stop to his prodigious efforts. -Those efforts were fruitless because Suchet renounced him, because -the people of the south were apathetic and fortune was adverse; -because he was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world -at the head of unconquerable troops. For what Alexander’s Macedonians -were at Arbela, Hannibal’s Africans at Cannæ, Cæsar’s Romans at -Pharsalia, Napoleon’s guards at Austerlitz, such were Wellington’s -British soldiers at this period. The same men who had fought at -Vimiera and Talavera contended at Orthes and Toulouse. Six years of -uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength and -fierceness a confidence which rendered them invincible. It is by -this measure Soult’s firmness and the constancy of his army is to be -valued, and the equality to which he reduced his great adversary at -Toulouse is a proof of ability which a judicious friend would put -forward rather than suppress. - -Was he not a great general who being originally opposed on the Adour -by nearly double his own numbers, for such was the proportion after -the great detachments were withdrawn from the French army by the -emperor in January, did yet by the aid of his fortresses, by his able -marches and combinations, oblige his adversary to employ so many -troops for blockades sieges and detached posts, that at Toulouse -his army was scarcely more numerous than the French? Was it nothing -to have drawn Wellington from such a distance along the frontier, -and force him at last, either to fight a battle under the most -astonishing disadvantages or to retreat with dishonour. And this not -because the English general had committed any fault, but by the force -of combinations which embracing all the advantages offered by the -country left him no option. - -That Soult made some mistakes is true, and perhaps the most important -was that which the emperor warned him against, though too late, the -leaving so many men in Bayonne. He did so he says because the place -could not hold out fifteen days without the entrenched camp, and -the latter required men; but the result proved Napoleon’s sagacity, -for the allies made no attempt to try the strength of the camp, -and on the 18th of March lord Wellington knew not the real force -of the garrison. Up to that period sir John Hope was inclined to -blockade the place only, and from the difficulty of gathering the -necessary stores and ammunition on the right bank of the Adour, the -siege though resolved upon was not even commenced on the 14th of -April when that bloody and most lamentable sally was made. Hence -the citadel could not even with a weaker garrison have been taken -before the end of April, and Soult might have had Abbé’s division -of six thousand good troops in the battles of Orthes and Toulouse. -Had Suchet joined him, his army would have been numerous enough to -bar lord Wellington’s progress altogether, especially in the latter -position. Here it is impossible not to admire the sagacity of the -English general, who from the first was averse to entering France -and only did so for a political object, under the promise of great -reinforcements and in the expectation that he should be allowed -to organize a Bourbon army. What could he have done if Soult had -retained the twenty thousand men drafted in January, or if Suchet had -joined, or the people had taken arms? - -How well Soult chose his ground at Toulouse, how confidently he -trusted that his adversary would eventually pass the Garonne -below and not above the city, with what foresight he constructed -the bridge-head at Montauban, and prepared the difficulties lord -Wellington had to encounter have been already touched upon. But -Mr. Choumara has assumed that the English general’s reason for -relinquishing the passage of the Garonne at Portet on the night of -the 27th, was not the want of pontoons but the fear of being attacked -during the operation, adducing in proof Soult’s orders to assail the -heads of his columns. Those orders are however dated the 31st, three -days after the attempt of which Soult appears to have known nothing -at the time: they were given in the supposition that lord Wellington -wished to effect a second passage at that point to aid general Hill -while descending the Arriege. And what reason has any man to suppose -that the same general and troops who passed the Nive and defeated a -like counter-attack near Bayonne, would be deterred by the fear of -a battle from attempting it on the Garonne? The passage of the Nive -was clearly more dangerous, because the communication with the rest -of the army was more difficult, Soult’s disposable force larger, his -counter-movements more easily hidden until the moment of execution. -At Portet the passage, designed for the night season, would have -been a surprise, and the whole army, drawn close to that side could -have been thrown over in three or four hours with the exception of -the divisions destined to keep the French in check at St. Cyprien. -Soult’s orders did not embrace such an operation. They directed -Clauzel to fall upon the head of the troops and crush them while in -the disorder of a later passage which was expected and watched for. - -General Clauzel having four divisions in hand was no doubt a -formidable enemy, and Soult’s notion of defending the river by a -counter-attack was excellent in principle; but to conceive is one -thing to execute is another. His orders were, as I have said, only -issued on the 31st, when Hill was across both the Garonne and the -Arriege. Lord Wellington’s design was then not to force a passage -at Portet, but to menace that point, and really attack St. Cyprien -when Hill should have descended the Arriege. Nor did Soult himself -much expect Clauzel would have any opportunity to attack, for in his -letter to the minister of war he said, the positions between the -Arriege and the canal were all disadvantageous to the French and his -intention was to fight in Toulouse if the allies approached from the -south; yet he still believed Hill’s movement to be only a blind and -that lord Wellington would finally attempt the passage below Toulouse. - -[Sidenote: Notes by general Berton, MSS.] - -The French general’s views and measures were profoundly reasoned -but extremely simple. His first care on arriving at Toulouse was to -secure the only bridge over the Garonne by completing the works of -St. Cyprien, which he had begun while the army was still at Tarbes. -He thus gained time, and as he felt sure that the allies could not -act in the Arriege district, he next directed his attention to the -bridge-head of Montauban to secure a retreat behind the Tarn and -the power of establishing a fresh line of operations. Meanwhile -contrary to his expectation lord Wellington did attempt to act -on the Arriege, and the French general, turning of necessity in -observation to that side, entrenched a position on the south; soon -however he had proof that his first notion was well-founded, that his -adversary after losing much time must at last pass below Toulouse; -wherefore he proceeded with prodigious activity to fortify the Mont -Rave and prepare a field of battle on the northern and eastern -fronts of the city. These works advanced so rapidly, while the -wet weather by keeping the rivers flooded reduced lord Wellington -to inactivity, that Soult became confident in their strength, and -being influenced also by the news from Paris, relinquished his first -design of opposing the passage of the Garonne and preserving the -line of operations by Montauban. To hold Toulouse then became his -great object, nor was he diverted from this by the accident which -befel lord Wellington’s bridge at Grenade. Most writers, French -and English, have blamed him for letting slip that opportunity of -attacking Beresford. It is said that general Reille first informed -him of the rupture of the bridge, and strongly advised him to attack -the troops on the right bank; but Choumara has well defended him on -that point; the distance was fifteen miles, the event uncertain, the -works on the Mount Rave would have stood still meanwhile, and the -allies might perhaps have stormed St. Cyprien. - -[Sidenote: Morning State of lord Wellington, 4th of April, MSS.] - -Lord Wellington was however under no alarm for Beresford, or rather -for himself, because each day he passed the river in a boat and -remained on that side. His force was not less than twenty thousand -including sergeants and officers, principally British; his position -was on a gentle range the flanks covered by the Ers and the Garonne; -he had eighteen guns in battery on his front, which was likewise -flanked by thirty other pieces placed on the left of the Garonne. Nor -was he without retreat. He could cross the Ers, and Soult dared not -have followed to any distance lest the river should subside and the -rest of the army pass on his rear, unless, reverting to his original -design of operating by Montauban, he lightly abandoned his now -matured plan of defending Toulouse. Wisely therefore he continued to -strengthen his position round that city, his combinations being all -directed to force the allies to attack him between the Ers and the -Mount Rave where it seemed scarcely possible to succeed. - -He has been also charged with this fault, that he did not entrench -the Hill of Pugade. Choumara holds that troops placed there would -have been endangered without adequate advantage. This does not seem -conclusive. The hill was under the shot of the main height, it might -have been entrenched with works open to the rear, and St. Pol’s -brigade would thus have incurred no more danger than when placed -there without any entrenchments. Beresford could not have moved up -the left bank of the Ers until these works were carried, and this -would have cost men. It is therefore probable that want of time -caused Soult to neglect this advantage. He committed a graver error -during the battle by falling upon Beresford with Taupin’s division -only when he could have employed D’Armagnac’s and Villatte’s likewise -in that attack. He should have fallen on him also while in the deep -country below, and before he had formed his lines at the foot of -the heights. What hindered him? Picton was repulsed, Freyre was -defeated, the light division was protecting the fugitives, and one -of Maransin’s brigades withdrawn from St. Cyprien had reinforced -the victorious troops on the extreme left of the Calvinet platform. -Beresford’s column entangled in the marshy ground, without artillery -and menaced both front and rear by cavalry, could not have resisted -such an overwhelming mass, and lord Wellington can scarcely escape -criticism for placing him in that predicament. - -A commander is not indeed to refrain from high attempts because of -their perilous nature, the greatest have ever been the most daring, -and the English general who could not remain inactive before Toulouse -was not deterred by danger or difficulty: twice he passed the broad -and rapid Garonne and reckless of his enemy’s strength and skill -worked his way to a crowning victory. This was hardihood, greatness. -But in Beresford’s particular attack he did not overstep the rules -of art, he hurtled against them, and that he was not damaged by the -shock is owing to his good fortune the fierceness of his soldiers and -the errors of his adversary. What if Beresford had been overthrown -on the Ers? Wellington must have repassed the Garonne, happy if -by rapidity he could reunite in time with Hill on the left bank. -Beresford’s failure would have been absolute ruin and that alone -refutes the French claim to a victory. Was there no other mode of -attack? That can hardly be said. Beresford passed the Lavaur road to -assail the platform of St. Sypiere, and he was probably so ordered -to avoid an attack in flank by the Lavaur road, and because the -platform of Calvinet on the side of the Ers river was more strongly -entrenched than that of St. Sypiere. But for this gain it was too -much to throw his column into the deep ground without guns, and -quite separated from the rest of the army seeing that the cavalry -intended to maintain the connection were unable to act in that miry -labyrinth of water-courses. If the Spaniards were judged capable of -carrying the strongest part of the Calvinet platform, Beresford’s -fine Anglo-Portuguese divisions were surely equal to attacking this -same platform on the immediate left of the Spaniards, and an advanced -guard would have sufficed to protect the left flank. The assault -would then have been made with unity, by a great mass and on the -most important point: for the conquest of St. Sypiere was but a step -towards that of Calvinet, but the conquest of Calvinet would have -rendered St. Sypiere untenable. It is however to be observed that -the Spaniards attacked too soon and their dispersion exceeded all -reasonable calculation: so panic-stricken they were as to draw from -lord Wellington at the time the bitter observation, that he had seen -many curious spectacles but never before saw ten thousand men running -a race. - -Soult’s retreat from Toulouse, a model of order and regularity, was -made in the night. This proves the difficulty of his situation. -Nevertheless it was not desperate; nor was it owing to his -adversary’s generous forbearance that he passed unmolested under -the allies’ guns as an English writer has erroneously assumed. For -first those guns had no ammunition, and this was one reason why lord -Wellington though eager to fall upon him on the 11th could not do -so. On the 12th Soult was gone, and his march covered by the great -canal could scarcely have been molested, because the nearest point -occupied by the allies was more than a mile and a half distant. Nor -do I believe that Soult, as some other writers have imagined, ever -designed to hold Toulouse to the last. It would have been an avowal -of military insolvency to which his proposal, that Suchet should join -him at Carcassone and retake the offensive, written on the night of -the 11th, is quite opposed. Neither was it in the spirit of French -warfare. The impetuous valour and susceptibility of that people are -ill-suited for stern Numantian despair. Place an attainable object of -war before the French soldier and he will make supernatural efforts -to gain it, but failing he becomes proportionally discouraged. Let -some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to his ardent -sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with unbounded -energy: the fear of death never checks him he will attempt anything. -But the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance -wears his fury out; it was so proved in the Peninsula, where the -sudden deafening shout, rolling over a field of battle more full and -terrible than that of any other nation, and followed by the strong -unwavering charge, often startled and appalled a French column before -whose fierce and vehement assault any other troops would have given -way. - -Napoleon’s system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and -augment the military excellence and to strengthen the weakness of -the national character. His discipline, severe but appealing to the -feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the -French soldiers to patience under hardships and strong endurance -under fire; he taught the generals to rely on their own talents, -to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to -dare every thing even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous -valour of France might have full play: hence the violence of their -attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and -to keep strong reserves that sudden disorders might be repaired and -the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine -spirit, certain that they would then renew the battle with the same -confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, -nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier, -but so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of -their exploits surpassed those of all other nations: the Romans not -excepted if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the -Macedonians if the quality of their opponents be considered. - -Let their amazing toils in the Peninsular war alone, which though so -great and important was but an episode in their military history, -be considered. “_In Spain large armies will starve and small armies -will be beaten_” was the saying of Henry IV. of France, and this was -no light phrase of an indolent monarch but the profound conclusion -of a sagacious general. Yet Napoleon’s enormous armies were so -wonderfully organized that they existed and fought in Spain for six -years, and without cessation, for to them winters and summers were -alike. Their large armies endured incredible toils and privations -but were not starved out, nor were their small armies beaten by the -Spaniards. And for their daring and resource a single fact recorded -by lord Wellington will suffice. They captured more than one strong -place in Spain without any provision of bullets save those fired at -them by their enemies, having trusted to that chance when they formed -the siege! Before the British troops they fell, but how terrible was -the struggle! how many defeats they recovered from, how many brave -men they slew, what changes and interpositions of fortune occurred -before they could be rolled back upon their own frontiers! And -this is the glory of England, that her soldiers and hers only were -capable of overthrowing them in equal battle. I seek not to defraud -the Portuguese of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard the -merit of his constancy. England could not alone have triumphed in the -struggle, but for her share in the deliverance of the Peninsula let -this brief summary speak. - -She expended more than one hundred millions sterling on her own -operations, she subsidised Spain and Portugal besides, and with -her supplies of clothing arms and ammunition maintained the armies -of both even to the guerillas. From thirty up to seventy thousand -British troops were employed by her constantly, and while her naval -squadrons continually harassed the French with descents upon the -coasts, her land forces fought and won nineteen pitched battles and -innumerable combats; they made or sustained ten sieges, took four -great fortresses, twice expelled the French from Portugal, preserved -Alicant, Carthagena, Cadiz, Lisbon; they killed wounded and took -about two hundred thousand enemies, and the bones of forty thousand -British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and mountains of the -Peninsula. - -Finally, for Portugal she re-organized a native army and supplied -officers who led it to victory, and to the whole Peninsula she gave a -general whose like has seldom gone forth to conquer. And all this and -more was necessary to redeem the Peninsula from France! - -The duke of Wellington’s campaigns furnish lessons for generals of -all nations, but they must always be peculiarly models for British -commanders in future continental wars, because he modified and -reconciled the great principles of art with the peculiar difficulties -which attend generals controlled by politicians who depending upon -private intrigue prefer parliamentary to national interests. An -English commander must not trust his fortune. He dare not risk -much however conscious he may be of personal resources when one -disaster will be his ruin at home. His measures must therefore -be subordinate to this primary consideration. Lord Wellington’s -caution, springing from that source, has led friends and foes alike -into wrong conclusions as to his system of war. The French call it -want of enterprize, timidity; the English have denominated it the -Fabian system. These are mere phrases. His system was the same as -that of all great generals. He held his army in hand, keeping it -with unmitigated labour always in a fit state to march or to fight; -and thus prepared he acted indifferently as occasion offered on the -offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete mastery of his -art. Sometimes he was indebted to fortune, sometimes to his natural -genius, but always to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically -a pains-taking man. - -That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution, -neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon must be -admitted, and being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed -that he learned something of the art from that greatest of all -masters; yet something besides the difference of genius must be -allowed for the difference of situation; Napoleon was never even in -his first campaign of Italy so harassed by the French as Wellington -was by the English Spanish and Portuguese governments. Their systems -of war were however alike in principle, their operations being -necessarily modified by their different political positions. Great -bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to -protect their flanks and communications without scattering their -forces, these were common to both. In defence firm, cool, enduring; -in attack fierce and obstinate; daring when daring was politic, but -always operating by the flanks in preference to the front: in these -things they were alike, but in following up a victory the English -general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington -was the stroke of a battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins. The -battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before -which the barrier yielded and the roaring flood poured onwards -covering all. - -Yet was there nothing of timidity or natural want of enterprize to -be discerned in the English general’s campaigns. Neither was he of -the Fabian school. He recommended that commander’s system to the -Spaniards, but he did not follow it himself. His military policy -more resembled that of Scipio Africanus. Fabius dreading Hannibal’s -veterans, red with the blood of four consular armies, hovered on -the mountains, refused battle, and to the unmatched skill and -valour of the great Carthaginian opposed the almost inexhaustible -military resources of Rome. Lord Wellington was never loath to -fight when there was any equality of numbers. He landed in Portugal -with only nine thousand men, with intent to attack Junot who had -twenty-four thousand. At Roliça he was the assailant, at Vimiera -he was assailed, but he would have changed to the offensive during -the battle if others had not interfered. At Oporto he was again the -daring and successful assailant. In the Talavera campaign he took -the initiatory movements, although in the battle itself he sustained -the shock. His campaign of 1810 in Portugal was entirely defensive, -because the Portuguese army was young and untried, but his pursuit of -Massena in 1811 was as entirely aggressive although cautiously so, -as well knowing that in mountain warfare those who attack labour at -a disadvantage. The operations of the following campaign, including -the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera the first siege of Badajos -and the combat of Guinaldo, were of a mixed character; so was the -campaign of Salamanca; but the campaign of Vittoria and that in the -south of France were entirely and eminently offensive. - -Slight therefore is the resemblance to the Fabian warfare. And for -the Englishman’s hardiness and enterprise bear witness the passage -of the Douro at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, the storming -of Badajos, the surprise of the forts at Mirabete, the march to -Vittoria, the passage of the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle, -the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthes, the -crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he committed faults is -only to say that he made war; but to deny him the qualities of a -great commander is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want -of light. How few of his combinations failed. How many battles he -fought, victorious in all! Iron hardihood of body, a quick and sure -vision, a grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the habit of -laborious minute investigation and arrangement; all these qualities -he possessed, and with them that most rare faculty of coming to -prompt and sure conclusions on sudden emergencies. This is the -certain mark of a master spirit in war, without it a commander may -be distinguished, he may be a great man, but he cannot be a great -captain: where troops nearly alike in arms and knowledge are opposed -the battle generally turns upon the decision of the moment. - -At the Somosierra, Napoleon’s sudden and what to those about him -appeared an insensate order, sent the Polish cavalry successfully -charging up the mountain when more studied arrangements with ten -times that force might have failed. At Talavera, if Joseph had not -yielded to the imprudent heat of Victor, the fate of the allies would -have been sealed. At the Coa, Montbrun’s refusal to charge with -his cavalry saved general Craufurd’s division, the loss of which -would have gone far towards producing the evacuation of Portugal. -At Busaco, Massena would not suffer Ney to attack the first day, -and thus lost the only favourable opportunity for assailing that -formidable position. At Fuentes Onoro, the same Massena suddenly -suspended his attack when a powerful effort would probably have been -decisive. At Albuera, Soult’s column of attack instead of pushing -forward halted to fire from the first height they had gained on -Beresford’s right, which saved that general from an early and total -defeat; again at a later period of that battle the unpremeditated -attack of the fusileers decided the contest. At Barosa, general -Graham with a wonderful promptitude snatched the victory at the very -moment when a terrible defeat seemed inevitable. At Sabugal, not even -the astonishing fighting of the light division could have saved it if -general Reynier had possessed this essential quality of a general. -At El Bodon, Marmont failed to seize the most favourable opportunity -which occurred during the whole war for crushing the allies. At -Orthes, Soult let slip two opportunities of falling upon the allies -with advantage, and at Toulouse he failed to crush Beresford. - -At Vimiera, lord Wellington was debarred by Burrard from giving a -signal illustration of this intuitive generalship, but at Busaco and -the heights of San Cristoval, near Salamanca, he suffered Massena -and Marmont to commit glaring faults unpunished. On the other hand -he has furnished many examples of that successful improvisation in -which Napoleon seems to have surpassed all mankind. His sudden -retreat from Oropesa across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo; his -passage of the Douro in 1809; his halt at Guinaldo in the face of -Marmont’s overwhelming numbers; the battle of Salamanca; his sudden -rush with the third division to seize the hill of Arinez at Vittoria; -his counter-stroke with the sixth division at Sauroren; his battle of -the 30th two days afterwards; his sudden passage of the Gave below -Orthes. Add to these his wonderful battle of Assye, and the proofs -are complete that he possesses in an eminent degree that intuitive -perception which distinguishes the greatest generals. - -Fortune however always asserts her supremacy in war, and often from -a slight mistake such disastrous consequences flow that in every -age and every nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial. -Napoleon’s march upon Madrid in 1808 before he knew the exact -situation of the British army is an example. By that march he lent -his flank to his enemy. Sir John Moore seized the advantage and -though the French emperor repaired the error for the moment by his -astonishing march from Madrid to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula -was then decided. If he had not been forced to turn against Moore, -Lisbon would have fallen, Portugal could not have been organized -for resistance, and the jealousy of the Spaniards would never -have suffered Wellington to establish a solid base at Cadiz: that -general’s after-successes would then have been with the things that -are unborn. It was not so ordained. Wellington was victorious, the -great conqueror was overthrown. England stood the most triumphant -nation of the world. But with an enormous debt, a dissatisfied -people, gaining peace without tranquillity, greatness without -intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark and -threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms! And it is a -stirring sound! War is the condition of this world. From man to the -smallest insect all are at strife, and the glory of arms which cannot -be obtained without the exercise of honour, fortitude, courage, -obedience, modesty and temperance, excites the brave man’s patriotism -and is a chastening corrective for the rich man’s pride. It is yet no -security for power. Napoleon the greatest man of whom history makes -mention, Napoleon the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious -politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms, Poland, -Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and France. Fortune, that name for -the unknown combinations of infinite power, was wanting to him, and -without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled -ocean. - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 1. Vol. 6._ - - _Explanatory_ - Sketch - _of the_ - CATALONIAN OPERATIONS - 1813-14 - _with the Plan of a_ - position at - CAPE SALOU - _proposed by_ - GEN^L. DONKIN - _to_ - SIR S. MURRAY. - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 2. Vol. 6._ - - _Explanatory_ - Sketch of - SOULT’S OPERATIONS - _to relieve_ - PAMPELUNA - July 1813 - - BATTLE OF THE 28^{th}. - Enlarged - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 3. Vol. 6._ - - Combat of - MAYA - July 25^{th}. - 1813. - - Combat of - RONCESVALLES - July 25^{th}. - 1813. - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 4. Vol. 6._ - - _Explanatory_ - Sketch - _of the_ - ASSAULT OF S^T. SEBASTIAN - August 31^{st}. - 1813. - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 5. Vol. 6._ - - Explanatory Sketch - of - Soult’s passage of the - Bidassoa, - Aug^t. 31^{st}. - _And_ - Lord Wellington’s - Passage _of that_ River - October 7^{th}. - 1813. - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 6. Vol. 6._ - - Explanatory Sketch - of - The Battle of the Nivelle, - Nov^r. 10^{th}. - 1813. - - Centre Attack - - Right Attack - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 7. Vol. 6._ - - Explanatory Sketch - _of the_ - Operations round - Bayonne - in - Dec^r. & Feb^y. - 1813-1814. - - Battle of the - 10^{th}. Dec^r. - 1813. - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 8. Vol. 6._ - - Explanatory - Sketch - _of the_ - Passage of the Nive, - And - Battle of S^t. Pierre; - December - 9^{th}. and 13^{th}. - 1813. - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 9. Vol. 6._ - - Explanatory Sketch - of the Battle - of Orthez; - And the Retreat of Soult, - To Aire: - 1814. - - _Drawn by Col. Napier_ _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ -] - - -[Illustration: _Nº. 10. Vol. 6._ - - Explanatory Sketch - _of the_ - operations - _about_ - Tarbes, - _and the_ - Battle of Toulouse. - - _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_ -] - - - - -APPENDIX. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - - - -No. I. - -JUSTIFICATORY PIECES. - - -_Lord William Bentinck to sir E. Pellew._ - - _At sea, June 18th, 1813._ - - SIR, - -Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected attack -upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. It -seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon, should -reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land them in Sicily, -or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of Naples, if the -intention be, as in the last instance, to transport them to Sicily -in the tonnage and small craft of the country.—The most important -question is, whether this can be effected by the enemy.—I have no -difficulty in saying on my part, that in the present disposition -of the Neapolitan army in Sicily, and in the non-existence of any -national force, and the imperfect composition of the British force, -if half the number intended for this expedition should land in Sicily -the island would be conquered. - - (Signed) W. BENTINCK. - - -_Sir E. Pellew to lord W. Bentinck._ - - _H. M. S. Caledonia, June 19th, 1813._ - - MY LORD, - -I feel it my duty to state to your lordship that in my judgment the -Toulon fleet may evade mine without difficulty under a strong N. -W. wind to carry them through the passage of the Hieres islands, -without the possibility of my interrupting them, and that they may -have from twelve to twenty-four hours’ start of me in chasing them. -When blown off the coast, my look-out ships would certainly bring me -such information as would enable me to follow them immediately to -the Bay of Naples. Your lordship is most competent to judge whether -in the interval of their arrival and my pursuit, the French admiral -would be able to embark Murat’s army artillery and stores, and land -them on the coast of Sicily before I came up with them.—The facility -of communication by telegraph along the whole coast of Toulon would -certainly apprize Murat of their sailing at a very short notice, but -for my own part, I should entertain very sanguine hopes of overtaking -them either in the Bay of Naples or on the coast of Sicily before -they could make good their landing. - - -_Lord Wm. Bentinck to lord Wellington._ - - _At sea, June 20th, 1813._ - - MY LORD, - -By the perusal of the accompanying despatch to lord Castlereagh, -your lordship will perceive that Murat has opened a negociation -with us, the object of which is friendship with us and hostility -to Buonaparte. You will observe in one of the conversations with -Murat’s agent, that he informed me that Buonaparte had ordered Murat -to hold twenty thousand men in readiness for the invasion of Sicily -in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. I enclose the copy of a letter -I have in consequence addressed to Sir E. Pellew, together with his -answer, upon the practicability of the Toulon fleet sailing without -the knowledge of the blockading fleet. Your lordship will have -received my letter of the 21st of May enclosing a copy of my dispatch -to Lord Bathurst, relative to the discontent of the Neapolitan -troops in Sicily and the consequent state of weakness if not of -danger resulting from it to that island. I stated also that this -circumstance had induced me to detain in Sicily the two battalions -which had been withdrawn from Spain. - - -_Lord Wellington to lord William Bentinck._ - - _Huarte, July 1st, 1813._ - - MY LORD, - -In answer to your lordship’s despatch, I have to observe, that -I conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger -whatever. - - - - -No. II. - - -_Letter from general Nugent to lord William Bentinck._ - - _Vienna, January 24th, 1812._ - - MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM, - -I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you shortly after -my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his -departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his -letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result -it would have and the manner it would be considered by the emperor -and the government here, and then to settle again the manner of -sending officers down to the Mediterranean, for some of those then -destined to be sent were implicated. All these circumstances caused -the delay of the present which otherwise you would have had much -sooner. Another cause of the delay was that I wanted to inform you -of the answer which would be given by this house to the speculations -that I was commissioned by the prince-regent to propose relative -to the arch-duke. There was no decisive answer given, and the only -manner of forming an opinion upon that subject was by observing -and getting information of their true intentions. I am now firmly -convinced that these are such as we could wish, and that it is -only fear of being committed that prevents them to speak in a more -positive manner. Their whole conduct proves this, more particularly -in La Tour’s affair which has produced no change whatsoever nor led -to any discovery of views or connexions. There is even now less -difficulty than ever for officers going to the Mediterranean. They -get passports from government here without its inquiring or seeming -to know the real object. As it can do nothing else but connive, to -which this conduct answers, I think a more explicit declaration is -not even requisite and I am convinced that when the thing is once -done they will gladly agree. This is likewise King’s and Hardenberg’s -and Johnson’s opinion upon the subject, and as such they desire me to -express it to you, and to observe that the situation of things here -makes the forwarding of the measures you may think expedient in the -Mediterranean and the Adriatic the more desirable. - -They are here extremely satisfied with the conduct of government in -England, and by the accounts we have the latter is much pleased with -the conduct of this country, particularly relative to the affairs -of Prussia. These are however not decided yet. But whatever the -consequence may be and whatever this country may do for the present, -I am convinced that your measures will ultimately contribute much -to the result. I am happy to perceive by the last information from -England that every thing seems to have been settled there by you. -The recruiting business of major Burke is going on rapidly. As it -was not begun at the time of my departure I can only attribute it -to your presence. The letters contain likewise that government is -come to the most favorable resolutions relative to the arch-duke, -and I hope the formation of the troops will soon be effectuated. -The dispositions of the Adriatic coasts and the Tyrol are as good -as can be, but all depends upon establishing a basis and without -that all partial exertions would be useless or destructive. At the -same time that some regiments would be formed, I think it would be -very expedient, to form at the same place a Dalmatian or a Croat -regiment, particularly as in the present state of things it will be -much easier even than the other. The men could be easily recruited -in Bosnia, and sent from Durazzo to the place you should appoint. -The bearer will give you every information upon the subject, and at -all events, I should propose to you to send him immediately back to -Durazzo, and, should you adopt the above, to give him the necessary -orders and the commission for recruiting and sending the men to the -place of formation. No person can be better qualified than he is. He -knows the languages, the country, and the character of the people, -and understands every thing that relates to commercial affairs. As -to the place of formation, I think I already proposed Cephalonia to -you. Lissa or one of the nearer islands would give too much jealousy -in the beginning in those parts, until our capital increases so as -to undertake an important enterprise, at all events it is important -to form a noyau of the three nations; it is then that we may hope to -be joined by the whole of Dalmatia and Croatia after a short time. -Major and other officers will shortly proceed to the Mediterranean. -They will be directed to Messina where I request you will send orders -for them. It would be very useful and saving to provide means for -transporting them to that place from Durazzo, and if possible to -establish a more frequent and regular intercourse between you and -the latter. Johnson who soon sets off from here will in the meantime -establish a communication across Bosnia to Durazzo. His presence in -those parts will be productive of many good effects. You will find -that he is an able active and zealous man and will certainly be very -useful in forwarding your views. I can answer for his being worthy -of your full confidence, should you adopt the proposition relative -to the recruiting it would be necessary to put at his disposal the -requisite funds. - -You will judge by the account the bearer of this will give you -whether cloth &c. can be had at a cheaper rate from this country -or where you are, and he will bring back your directions for this -object. Allow me to observe that it would be highly useful to have -clothes for a considerable number of men prepared beforehand. Many -important reasons have prevented me hitherto from proceeding to the -Mediterranean as speedily as I wished. I hope however not to be -detained much longer and soon to have removed every obstacle. I think -to set off from here in the beginning of March, and request you will -be so kind as to provide with the return of the bearer to Durazzo the -means of my passage from thence, where I shall come with a feigned -name. I hope he will be back there by the time of my arrival. I -shall endeavour to hasten my journey as I have important information -in every respect. By that time we shall know the decision relative -to the north. King has informed you of the reasons which made an -alteration necessary in regard to Frozzi’s journey. Part of your -object is in fact fulfilled already, and there are agents in Italy -&c. As to the other and principal part relative to connections in the -army, and the gaining an exact knowledge of it and of the government -in Italy, with other circumstances, I expect soon to have a person -of sufficient consequence and ability to execute your instructions, -and he will go to Milan &c. as soon as it can be done with safety. -His permanent residence in that country seems to be necessary, that -he may be able to accomplish fully the object, and as the sum you -have assigned for this purpose is sufficient for a considerable time, -you can determine whether he is to remain there permanently or not. -Frozzi will bring you an exact account of what has been arranged -relative to this business, and will himself be a very proper person -for communications between you and Italy or this country. He will -for that purpose go back to Italy, the obstacle that opposed it -hitherto being now no more. I cannot but repeat the importance of -giving all possible extent to the arch-duke’s establishment, and -particularly the raising of as much troops as possible, for all -will depend upon having the means of landing. We are then sure of -augmenting very speedily, and finding the greatest assistance. The -place for beginning cannot be determined on exactly, but there is -much to be expected in Dalmatia and Croatia where we could be joined -by the inhabitants and troops. The lower part would be best adapted -in case we begin with a small force. I shall send and bring officers -particularly acquainted with the country and provide every other -assistance such as plans &c. and I think it would be expedient to -prevent for the present any enterprize in that country that would -alarm them. Since I began my letter a courier has arrived from Paris. - -The contingent of the Rhenish confederacy have got orders to be ready -for marching. Reinforcements are sending from France to the north and -every preparation is making for war. Buonaparte told to Swartzenburg -that he would begin in April and all circumstances seem to agree -with this. On the other side Russia is very slow in making peace -with Turkey. He entirely neglects Prussia, and for this reason it is -to be feared that the latter will place his capital with Buonaparte -notwithstanding that this cabinet is endeavouring to prevent it. I -should be then very much afraid for the conduct of this house well -inclined as the emperor is. Proposals were made by France but no -resolution has been taken until it is known how things turn out. -The worst is that Romanzow is still in credit with Alexander, which -prevents all confidence in other houses and makes Russia adopt half -measures. This sketch of the situation will give you some idea of the -wavering and uncertain state people are in. There is no calculation -to be made as to the conduct of government, nor must we be surprised -at any thing they may do. On the other side our speculations are -not built upon them, but upon the disposition of the people; and -whatever may happen I am convinced that this is a good foundation if -the measures are taken and the means prepared. A principal object of -mine in these parts has been to prepare the measures for the case -that it comes here to the very worst. The most important thing is the -augmenting in every possible manner the force at your disposition. -The accounts we have to-day of your return and the powers I hope you -have give me the best hopes of your overcoming every difficulty. -I must yet observe that as Johnson’s proceedings are entirely -subordinate to, and make a part of your plans and operations in -general, and that he cannot of course depend upon King, you will be -so good as to give him decisive instructions to that purpose, and -assign him the means and powers for acting in consequence. I shall -combine with him in my passage through Bosnia every thing in the -hopes that you will approve of this. - - -_Letter from Mr. King to lord William Bentinck._ - - _Vienna, January 24th, 1812._ - - MY LORD, - -I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship’s -letter of the 25th of August, which was delivered to me towards the -latter end of October by captain Frizzi whom I should immediately -have furnished with the means of proceeding to Italy for the purpose -of carrying your lordship’s instructions into effect, had it not -appeared to me that the measures which I had taken on my arrival -here had already in a great degree anticipated your lordship’s -intentions. As a confirmation of this, I beg leave to transmit for -your lordship’s perusal the reports (marked A) of three messengers -whom I sent to the north of Italy for the purpose of ascertaining -the state of the public mind, particularly in the ci-devant Venetian -territories and adjacent districts. These reports confirm in a very -satisfactory manner the assurances, which I have received through -various other channels, that the inhabitants of those countries are -ready and determined to avail themselves of the first opportunity -to shake off a yoke which is become insupportable. I have also -the honour to transmit to your lordship the copy of a letter from -count Montgelas, the minister of foreign affairs in Bavaria, to -the commissary-general at Nimpten, from which it appears that the -Bavarian government is not altogether ignorant of the intentions of -the Swiss and Tyroleze, but I am happy to have it in my power to -inform your lordship that the persons who seem to have excited the -suspicions of the Bavarian government do not enjoy the confidence of -our friends in Switzerland, and have not been made acquainted with -their intentions; it is nevertheless indispensably necessary that we -should act with the greatest possible caution in the employment of -emissaries, lest the French and Bavarian governments should take the -alarm and adopt measures which would defeat our projects or at least -occasion a premature explosion. On these grounds (having previously -consulted with general N. to whom captain Frizzi was particularly -addressed and who entirely coincides in my opinion) I think it -eligible to send this officer back to Sicily and I trust that in so -doing I shall meet with your lordship’s approbation. I beg leave to -observe that the only service captain Frizzi could render in Italy at -the present moment would be to ascertain the number and distribution -of the French forces in this country, but as these undergo continual -changes I think it will be sufficient to despatch a confidential -agent to your lordship with the latest intelligence from Italy, at -a period when the northern war and consequent occupation of the -French troops will enable your lordship to derive advantage from such -intelligence. - -The general opinion is that hostilities will commence between France -and Russia in the month of April at which period the preparations of -the French government will be completed, and there is little reason -to hope that the Russians will avail themselves of the interval, -either to annihilate the army of the duchy of Warsaw or to advance to -the assistance of the king of Prussia, who will in all probability -ally himself with France notwithstanding his former declarations to -the contrary. The latest intelligence from Berlin states that count -St. Marsan had presented the ultimatum of his government, which -demands an unconditional surrender of all the Prussian fortresses, -and insists on the military force and resources of Prussia being -placed at the disposal of French generals. It is positively asserted -that the king is inclined to submit to these humiliating proposals, -but nothing has been as yet definitively concluded. I am sorry to -inform your lordship that the aspect of affairs in this country is -highly discouraging; the injudicial financial measures which count -Wallis has thought proper to adopt have rendered it impossible for -government to place the army on a respectable footing, and have -considerably increased the discontent of the people, who however -still retain their characteristic aversion to the French. The -government is determined to maintain a strict neutrality during the -approaching crisis if possible. - -In my former letter I mentioned to your lordship my intention of -establishing a person at Durazzo in order to forward messengers &c. -&c. and to transmit to me occasionally intelligence of the state -of things in the Adriatic. But having received of late repeated -assurances of the increasing discontent of the inhabitants of those -parts of the coast who have the misfortune to be under the dominion -of the French, and of their willingness to make every effort to shake -off the yoke, and being aware how important it is at the present -moment not to neglect an object of this nature I have desired Mr. -Johnson to proceed thither in order to form connections in Albania, -Dalmatia, and to avail himself in every possible manner of the -spirit of discontent which has so decidedly manifested itself. Mr. -Johnson who has been employed on the continent for some years past -as an agent of government, and who has given proofs of his zeal and -abilities, will repair to Durazzo, or according to circumstances to -some other town in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic and will there -reside as agent of the British government. He will communicate his -arrival to your lordship with as little delay as possible. - -By the following piece of information which I have derived from an -authentic source your lordship will perceive that the French and -Swedish governments are far from being on friendly terms. An alliance -has been proposed by the former to the latter and instantaneously -rejected. The terms of the alliance were as follows, viz. 1st, a body -of 30,000 Swedes to be placed at the disposal of France. 2nd, 3000 -seamen to be furnished to the French marine, and 3rd, a regiment of -Swedes to be raised for the service of France as was the case before -the French revolution. I transmit this letter to your lordship by -captain Steinberg and ensign Ferandi, two officers who have served -creditably in the Austrian army. The former has connections and local -knowledge in his native country which may become particularly useful. -I fear it will not be in my power to send 50 subaltern officers -to Sicily as your lordship desired. I shall however occasionally -despatch some intelligent officers who will I think be extremely -useful in the formation of new corps. - - - - -No. III. - -_Extracts from the correspondence of sir Henry Wellesley, sir Charles -Stuart, and Mr. Vaughan._ - - -_Mr. Vaughan to sir Charles Stuart._ - - _Cadiz, August 3d, 1813._ - -“The Spanish troops in Catalonia and elsewhere are starving, and the -government are feeding them with proclamations to intendants. Since I -have known Spain I have never known the seat of government in a worse -state. There is a strong feeling against the English and a miserable -jacobin party which is violent beyond measure.” - - -_Ditto to Ditto._ - - _Chichana, Nov. 2d, 1813._ - -“Never was any thing so disgraceful in the annals of the world as -the conduct of all the Spanish authorities on the occasion of the -sickness breaking out. It is believed that no persons have the -sickness twice, and as almost every family in Cadiz has passed the -epidemic of the fever the interested merchants would not allow it -to be said that the epidemic existed, they have continued to issue -clear bills of health to vessels leaving the port in the height of -the mortality and did all they could to intimidate the government and -Cortez into remaining amongst them.” - - -_Sir Henry Wellesley to lord Wellington._ - - _Sept. 13th, 1813._ - -“A curious scene has been passing here lately. The permanent -deputation[13] having been appointed the Cortez closed their session -on the 14th. There had been for some days reports of the prevalence -of the yellow fever which had excited alarm. On the 16th in the -evening, I received an official note from the ministers of state -apprizing me of the intention of the government to proceed to Madrid -on the following day, but without assigning any reason for so sudden -a resolution. At night I went to the regency, thinking this was -an occasion when it would be right to offer them some pecuniary -assistance. I found Agar and Ciscar together, the cardinal being ill -of the gout. They told me that the prevalence of the disorder was -the sole cause of their determination to leave Cadiz; and Ciscar -particularly dwelt upon the necessity of removing, saying he had -seen the fatal effects of delay at Carthagena. They then told me -that there was disturbance in the town, in consequence of which they -determined on summoning the extraordinary Cortez. I went from the -regency to the Cortez. A motion was made for summoning the ministers -to account for the proceedings of the regency. Never was I witness -to so disgraceful a scene of lying and prevarication. The ministers -insisted that it was not the intention of the regency to leave Cadiz -until the Cortez had been consulted, although I had in my pocket the -official note announcing their intention to do so, and had been told -by Ciscar that the extraordinary Cortez was assembled for no other -reason than because there were disturbances in the town.” - - -_Ditto to Ditto._ - - _Cadiz, Dec. 10th, 1813._ - -“The party for placing the princess at the head of the Spanish -regency is gaining strength, and I should not be surprised if that -measure were to be adopted soon after our arrival at Madrid, unless -a peace and the return of Ferdinand should put an end to all such -projects.” - - -_Mr. Stuart to lord Wellington._ - - _June 11th, 1813._ - -“The repugnance of the Admiralty to adopt the measures suggested -by your lordship at the commencement of the American war for the -protection of the coast, has been followed by events which have -fully justified your opinion. _Fifteen merchantmen have been taken -off Oporto in a fortnight and a valuable Portuguese homeward-bound -merchant ship was captured three days ago close to the bar of -Lisbon._” - - - - -No. IV. - -_Extract from a manuscript memoir by captain Norton, thirty-fourth -regiment._ - - -COMBAT OF MAYA. - -The thirty-ninth regiment, commanded by the hon. col. O’Callaghan, -then immediately engaged with the French and after a severe contest -also retired, the fiftieth was next in succession and they also after -a gallant stand retired, making way for the ninety-second which met -the advancing French column first with its right wing drawn up in -line, and after a most destructive fire and heavy loss on both sides -the remnant of the right wing retired, leaving a line of killed and -wounded that appeared to have no interval; the French column advanced -up to this line and then halted, the killed and wounded of the -ninety-second forming a sort of rampart, the left wing then opened -its fire on the column, and as I was but a little to the right of the -ninety-second I could not help reflecting painfully how many of the -wounded of their right wing must have unavoidably suffered from the -fire of their comrades. The left wing after doing good service and -sustaining a loss equal to the first line retired. - - -COMBAT OF RONCESVALLES. - -EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL COLE’S AND MARSHAL SOULT’S OFFICIAL REPORTS, -MSS. - - -_General Cole to lord Wellington._ - - _Heights in front of Pampeluna, July 27th, 1813._ - -——“The enemy having in the course of the night turned those posts, -were now perceived moving in very considerable force along the ridge -leading to the Puerto de Mendichurri. I therefore proceeded in that -direction and found that their advance had nearly reached the road -leading from Roncesvalles pass to Los Alduides, from which it is -separated by a small wooded valley. Owing to the difficulty of the -communications the head of major-general Ross’s brigade could not -arrive there sooner; the major-general however, with great decision, -attacked them with the Brunswick company and three companies of the -twentieth, all he had time to form; these actually closed with the -enemy and bayonetted several in the ranks. They were however forced -to yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley, the -enemy attempted to follow them but were repulsed with loss, the -remainder of the brigade having come up.” - - -_Marshal Soult to the Minister of War._ - - _“Linzoin, 26 Juiller, 1813._ - -“Leurs pertes ont également été considérables, soit à l’attaque -du Lindouz par le général Reille ou le 20^{me} regiment a été -presque détruit à la suite d’une charge à la bayonnette executée -par un bataillon du 6^{me} leger, division Foy, soit à l’attaque -d’Altobiscar par le général Clauzel.” - - -_Extract from the correspondence of the duke of Dalmatia with the -Minister of War._ - - _Ascain, 12 Août, 1813._ - -“Dés a présent V. E. voit la situation de l’armée, elle connait ses -forces, celles de l’ennemi, et elle se fait sans doute une idée de -ses projets, et d’avance elle peut apprécier ce qu’il est en notre -pouvoir de faire; je ne charge point le tableau, je dis ma pensée -sans détour, et j’avoue que si l’ennemi emploie tous ses moyens, -ainsi que probablement il le fera, ceux que nous pourrons en ce -moment lui opposer etant de beaucoup inferieurs, nous ne pourrons pas -empêcher qu’ils ne fasse beaucoup de mal. Mon devoir est de le dire à -V. E. quoique je tienne une autre language aux troupes et au pays, et -que d’ailleurs je ne néglige aucun moyen pour remplir de mon mieux la -tache qui m’est imposée.” - - - - -No. V. - -EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS. - - -_Report of the movements of the army of Arragon during the first -fifteen days of September, 1813._ - -“Le 12^{eme} toute l’armée d’Aragon se reunit a Molino del Rey; -partie de celle de Catalonia et la garrison de Barcelonne se placent -a droite a Ollessa et Martorel, pour partir tous ensemble a 8 heures -du soir et se porter le droite par San Sadurni, le rest par le grande -route d’Ordal sur Villa Franca, ou l’armée Anglaise etait rasemble. -General Harispe rencontré a onze heures du soir un fort advant garde -au Col d’Ordal _dans les anciens ratranchemens_. Un combat de plus -vif s’engagea sous les ordres du general de l’avant garde Mesclop. -Le 7^{eme} et 44^{eme} reg^{ns.} montrerent une haute valeur, ainsi -qu’une partie d’116^{eme}. Les positions sont prise et reprise, et -nous restent enfin, couvert des morts et de blesses Anglais. Dans -la pursuite le 4^{eme} houssards se saissirent des 4 pieces de -cannon Anglais, &c. avec trois ou quatre cents prisoniers, presque -tous de la 27^{eme} reg^{n.} Anglais. Le droit, ayant rencontrer -des obstacles et quelques troupes ennemis a combattre dans les -passages, est retarde dans sa marche, et n’arriva pas avec le jour au -rendezvouz entre L’Ongat et Grenada. Un battalion de 117^{eme} venant -à gauche, par Bejas sur Avionet, rejoint l’armée en position, avec -des prisoniers. - -“Le marechal Suchet directé une movement de cavalrie et de -l’artillerie qui tenaient la tête pour donner le tems à l’infanterie -d’entrer en ligne. Les Anglais etaient en battaile sur trois lignes -en avant de Villa Franca, ils commencerent aussitot leur retraite en -bon ordre. On les poursuiverent et on les harcelerent, la cavalrie -fit plusieurs charges assez vive. Ils opposerent de la resistance, -essuyerent des pertes, surtout en cavalrie, precipiterent leur -marche, brulerent un pont et s’eloignerent vers Arbos et Vendrils, -laissant plus que 150 hommes pris et beaucoup des morts et des -blesses, surtout des houssards de Brunswick. Nôtre avant garde va ce -soir à Vendrils et plusieurs certaines de deserteurs sont ramassé.” - - - - -No. VI. - - - No. 1.—Extract from the official state of the allied army, - commanded by lieutenant-general sir John Murray, at the Col de - Balaguer, 17th June, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and - drummers. - - Present - fit for Sick. Command. Horses. Mules. Total - duty. men. - - British and - German cavalry 739 12 6 733 ” 757 - - British Portuguese and - Sicilian artillery 783 8 199 362 604 990 - - British engineers and - staff corps 78 5 36 ” ” 119 - - British and German - infantry 7,226 830 637 ” ” 8,693 - - Whittingham’s infantry 4,370 503 316 ” ” 5,189 - - Sicilian infantry 985 121 272 ” ” 1,378 - ------------------------------------------------ - General Total 14,181 1,479 1,466 1,095 604 17,126 - ------------------------------------------------ - - - No. 2.—Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian - force, commanded by lieutenant-general sir William Clinton. - Head-quarters, Taragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of - officers, sergeants, and drummers. - - Present - fit for Sick. Command. Horses. Mules. Total - duty. men. - - Cavalry 663 61 215 875 40 939 - - Artillery, engineers, - and staff corps 997 67 58 507 896 1,122 - - Infantry 9,124 1,390 1,019 115 429 11,533 - ------------------------------------------------- - General Total 10,784 1,518 1,292 1,497 1,465 13,594 - ------------------------------------------------- - - - No. 3.—Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division - (Whittingham’s.) Taragona, 15th of December, 1813. - - Under Sick. Command. Horses. Mules. Total - arms. men. - - Infantry 4,014 400 627 110 21 5,041 - - - No. 4.—Extract from the original state of the first army commanded - by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Copons et Navia. Head-quarters, - Vich, 1st of August, 1813. - - Under Sick. Command. Horses. Mules. Total - arms. men. - - Infantry disposable 10,219 1,535 2,207 586 ” 13,961 - - In Cardona 1,182 115 398 ” ” 1,695 - - Seo d’Urgel 984 172 144 ” ” 1,300 - - Artillery, &c. 877 7 59 6 ” 1,070 - -------------------------------------------------- - Grand total 13,262 1,829 2,808 592 ” 18,026 - -------------------------------------------------- - - No. 5.—Extract from the original state of the second army commanded - by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Xavier Elio. Vinaros, 19th - September, 1833. - - Present Sick. Command. Total Horses. - under arms. of men. - Total of all arms 26,835 3,181 7,454 37,470 4,073 - -_Note._—This state includes Villa Campa’s, Sarzfield’s, Duran’s, the -Empecinado’s, and Roche’s divisions, besides the troops immediately -under Elio himself. - - - - -No. VII. - - No. 1.—Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the marquis of - Wellington’s command. Extracted from the original morning state for - the 24th of July, 1813. - - Officers, Rank Total. - Sergeants, &c. and file. Men. Horses. - British and German cavalry} - Present under arms } 916 5,894 6,750 5,834 - Ditto infantry 4,665 29,926 34,581 ” - Portuguese cavalry 251 1,241 1,492 1,178 - Ditto infantry 2,594 20,565 23,459 ” - ------------------------------------- - Grand Total, exclusive of} - sick and absent on command } 8,726 57,566 66,282 7,012 - (Infantry and cavalry.) ------------------------------------- - - The artillerymen, &c. were about 4,000. - - - No. 2.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning - state, 15th of October, 1813. - - Officers, Rank - Sergeants,&c. and file. Total. - British and German - cavalry and infantry 5,859 37,250 43,109 - Portuguese ditto 4,253 21,274 25,527 - ------------------------------- - Grand Total, exclusive of sick,} - absent on command. &c. &c.} 10,112 58,524 68,636 - ------------------------------- - The artillerymen and drivers about 4,000 - ------ - Total 72,636 - ------ - - - No. 3.—Anglo-Portuguese force, from the original morning state, 9th - November, 1813. - - Officers, Rank - Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. - British and German - cavalry and infantry 5,356 39,687 45,043 - Portuguese ditto 2,990 22,237 25,227 - ------------------------------- - Grand Total, exclusive of sick,} - absent on command, &c. } 8,346 61,924 70,270 - ------------------------------- - The artillerymen, &c. &c. about 4,000 - ------ - Total 74,270 - ------ - - - No. 4.—Sir Rowland Hill’s force at the battle of St. Pierre. - Extracted from the original morning state, 13th December, 1813. - - Officers, Rank - Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. - Second division {British 802 5,371 6,173 - {Portuguese 277 2,331 2,608 - Lecor’s Portuguese division 507 4,163 4,670 - ------------------------------ - Total under arms, exclusive} - of artillerymen } 1,586 11,865 13,451 - ------------------------------ - - - No. 5.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning - state, 13th February, 1814. - - Officers, Rank - Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. Cavalry. - British and German cavalry 1,093 7,315 8,408} - Portuguese cavalry 280 1,210 1,490} 9,898 - - Infantry. - British and German infantry 4,853 29,714 34,567} - Portuguese infantry 2,828 18,911 21,739} 56,306 - ------ - General Total, present under arms 66,204 - ------ - Artillerymen, &c. about 4,000 - - - No. 6.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning - state, 10th of April, 1814. - - Officers, Rank - Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. - British and German cavalry 1,159 7,640 8,799} - Portuguese cavalry 230 958 1,188} 9,987 - - British and German infantry 4,946 29,999 34,945} - Portuguese infantry 2,622 16,983 19,605} 54,550 - ------ - General Total, present under arms 64,537 - ------ - The artillerymen, &c. about 4,000 - - - No. 7.—Actual strength of the infantry divisions engaged in the - battle of Toulouse. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th - April, 1814. - - Infantry, present Officers, Rank - under arms. Sergeants, &c. and file. Total. - - Second division, British 715 4,123} Grand - Ditto Portuguese 235 1,867} 6,940 Total - Third division, British 529 2,741 } infantry, - Ditto Portuguese 226 1,183 } 4,679 officers - Fourth division, British 531 3,028} and - Ditto Portuguese 239 1,585} 5,383 soldiers, - Sixth division, British 558 3,233 } present - Ditto Portuguese 246 1,644 } 5,681 under - Light division, British 378 2,469} arms. - Ditto Portuguese 231 1,240} 4,318 - Lecor’s Portuguese division 455 3,507 3,962 30,963 - ----- ------- - 4,343 26,620 - ----- ------- - -_Note._—There is no separate state for the cavalry on the 10th of -April, but on the 15th of May, 1814, they stood as follows. - - Cavalry, present Officers, Rank - under arms. Sergeants, &c. and file. - - Bock’s brigade of Germans 112 694 Total - Ponsonby’s brigade of British 188 1,921 cavalry, - Fane’s brigade of British 240 1,506 present - Vivian’s brigade of British 128 960 under - Lord Edw. Somerset’s brigade 214 1,691 arms. - of British ---- ----- - 882 6,072 6,954 - ---- ----- - - Total of Anglo-Portuguese cavalry and infantry, - present under arms 37,917 - Add the Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, - together said to be 14,000 - ------ - 51,917 - Artillerymen, &c. 1,500 - ------ - General Total 53,417 - ------ - -_Note._—My authority for the number of guns employed during this -campaign are copies of the returns given to me by sir Alexander -Dickson who commanded that arm. The number of artillerymen is not -borne on the morning states, but in the original weekly state of the -15th of May, 1814, I find the artillerymen, engineers, drivers, and -waggon-train, amounted to four thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, -with five thousand and thirty horses and mules. This may be taken as -the average strength during the campaign, but more than half were -with sir John Hope and some with lord Dalhousie. Wherefore, the -number at the battle of Toulouse could not have exceeded fifteen -hundred, making a total of all ranks and arms of fifty-three thousand -combatants. - - - - -No. VIII. - - - No. 1.—General state of the French armies under Soult and Suchet. - Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July 1813. The armies of - the north centre and south being by an imperial decree reorganised - in one body, taking the title of the army of Spain. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hosp- Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. itals Men. Horses. - Army of Spain 97,983 12,676 2,110 392 14,074 114,167 13,028 - Arragon 32,362 4,919 3,621 551 3,201 39,184 5,470 - Catalonia 25,910 1,869 168 ” 1,379 27,457 1,744 - ------------------------------------------------------- - General Total 156,255 19,464 5,899 943 18,654 180,808 20,242 - ------------------------------------------------------- - - - No. 2.—15th of September, 1813. - - Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Horses. - Army of Spain 81,351 11,159 4,004 1,438 22,488 107,843 11,272 - Arragon 32,476 4,447 2,721 320 3,616 38,813 6,305 - Catalonia 24,026 1,670 120 ” 2,137 26,283 2,497 - ------------------------------------------------------- - General Total 137,853 17,276 6,845 1,758 28,241 172,939 20,074 - ------------------------------------------------------- - -_Note._—The garrison of San Sebastian though captive is borne on this -state. - -This is the last general state of the French army in my possession -but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls. - - “Army of Spain, 16th November, 1813. - —102 battalions. 74 squadrons, without garrisons. - 74,152 men present under arms. 100,212 effectives. 17,206 horses. - - 18,230 Hospital. } - 8,555 Troop horses. } - 1,809 Officers’ horses. } - 5,384 Horses of draft. } - - “Army of Spain, 1st December. - —93 battalions. 74 squadrons. 17,989 horses.” - - - No. 3.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, July 1813, when Soult - took the command. - - Right wing.—Lieutenant-general Reille. - Present Effective and - under arms, non-effective. - Men. Horses. men. horses. Men. Total. - First division, Foy, 9 battalions - 5,922 189 } { 6,784 } - Seventh ditto, Maucune, 7 ditto - 4,186 110 } 17,235 450 { 5,676 } 21,366 - Ninth ditto, La Martiniere, 11 ditto - 7,127 151 } { 8,906 } - - Centre.—Drouet, Count D’Erlon. - - Second division, D’Armagnac, 8 batt. - 6,961 116 } { 8,580 } - Third ditto, Abbé, 9 ditto - 8,030 285 } 20,957 624 { 8,723 } 23,935 - Sixth ditto, Daricau, 8 ditto - 5,966 223 } { 6,627 } - - Left wing.—Lieut.-general Clauzel. - - Fourth division, Conroux, 9 battalions - 7,056 150 } { 7,477 } - Fifth ditto, Vandermaesen, 7 ditto - 4,181 141 } 17,218 432 { 5,201 } 20,265 - Eighth ditto, Taupin, 10 ditto - 5,981 141 } { 7,587 } - - Reserve, General Villatte. - - French 14,959 2,091 17,929 - Foreign 4 battalions of the Rhine, strength not given. - 4 ditto Italians, general St. Pol, ditto. - 4 ditto Spaniards, general Casabianca, ditto. - - Cavalry, Pierre Soult. - Present Effective and - under arms, non-effective. - Men. Horses. men. horses. Men. Total. - 22 squadrons 4,723 4,416} { 5,098 } - Ditto Trielhard 2,358 2,275} 7,081 6,691 { 2,523 } 7,621 - - Total according to the } - organization, but } - exclusive of the } 77,450 91,086 - foreign battalions } - - Men under arms. - Troops not in the organization 14,938 16,946 - Generals {Garrison of St. Sebastian, } 2,731 3,086 - { 1st July, forming part } - Rey { of this number } - Cassan.—Ditto of Pampeluna, 1st July 2,951 3,121 - Lameth.—Ditto of Santona, 1st May 1,465 1,674 - Second reserve, not in the above 5,595 6,105 - - Effective and - non-effective. - Men. Horses. Present Men. Horses. - General Total 97,983 12,676. under arms. 114,167 13,028 - - - No. 4.—Detailed state of the army of Spain, 16th of September, 1813. - - Effective and - Men. non-effective. - { Foy 5,002 } present } - Right wing { Maucune 4,166 } 14,875 under arms. } - { Menne 5,707 } } Men. - } - { D’Armagnac 4,353 } } - Centre. { Abbé 5,903 } 15,098 ditto } 45,752 - { Maranzin 4,842 } } - } - { Conroux 4,736 } } - Left wing. { Roguet 5,982 } 15,789 ditto } - { Taupin 5,071 } - - Reserve. Villatte 8,256 } The Italian brigade,} - Provisional troops of the } } about 2,000 } - right wing, destined } 2,168 } ordered to Milan. } 10,424 - to reinforce the } - garrison of Bayonne } - - Total. - Men. Horses. Men. - Cavalry.—Pierre Soult 4,456 4,617 } - Ditto Trielhard 2,368 2,583 } - Gensd’armes { mounted 291 247 } 8,325 - { dismounted 1,210 ” } - Parc 895 885 } - Engineers 504 127 } 1,399 - - { Pampeluna 3,805 191 } - { San Sebastian 2,366 prisoners of war. } - Garr- { Santona 1,633 } - isons. { Bayonne 4,631 137 } 15,164 - { St. Jean Pied de Port 1,786 } - { Navarens 842 } - { Castle of Lourdes 107 } - ------ - 81,064 - Deduct garrison of San Sebastian 2,366 - ------ - Total, present under arms 78,698 - ------ - - - - -No. IX. - - _Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the - attack of the enemy’s fortified position in front of Toulouse - for to-morrow, 1st April, 1814. Published in the United Service - Journal, October 1838._ - -(EXTRACT.) - - “_St. Jory, 9th April, 1814._ - -“The front attack of the third division is to extend from the river -Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of La Lande to -Toulouse (the road from Montauban) inclusive of that road. - -“The light division will be immediately on the left of the third -division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road -above-mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of -the Spanish troops. - -“The operations of these two divisions are meant, however, more as -diversions than as real attacks; it not being expected that they -will be able to force any of the passes of the canal which covers -Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened chiefly at the -bridges and at the locks or any other points where the form of the -ground, or other circumstances most favour the advance of the troops. -A considerable part both of the third and of the light divisions must -be kept in reserve.” - - - _Note._—The analysis of the allied army on the 10th of April, - given in Appendix VII. Sections 6 and 7, has been very carefully - made and faithfully set down; but as the real number of the - allies has lately become a point of dispute between French and - English writers, I here give the Morning State of the whole army, - accurately printed from the original document delivered by the - adjutant-general to lord Wellington on the morning of the 10th of - April, 1814. The reader will thus be enabled, with the help of my - text, to trace each division in its course and ascertain its true - numbers. - - - - -No. X. - - MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the PENINSULA, under the Command - of HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD-MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON, K.G. - Head-Quarters, St. Jory, 10th April, 1814. - - - (Part 1 of 6) KEY: AA = Colonels. - AB = Lieut.-Colonels. - AC = Majors. - AD = Captains. - AE = Lieutenants. - AF = Cornets or Ensigns. - AG = Staff. - +----------+-----------------+------------------------------------+ - | Date of | | OFFICERS | - |last State| DIVISIONS. +----+----+----+-----+-----+----+----+ - | received.| | AA | AB | AC | AD | AE | AF | AG | - +----------+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+----+----+ - | | BRITISH. | | | | | | | | - | 7th Apr. | Cavalry | 1 | 13 | 17 | 106 | 189 | 25 | 94 | - | | | | | | | | | | - | ” Do. | 1st Dn. Infantry| 3 | 16 | 6 | 64 | 53 | 56 | 48 | - | 9th Do. | 2d | 2 | 2 | 10 | 45 | 123 | 29 | 41 | - | | | | | | | | | | - | ” Do. | 3d | 2 | 3 | 10 | 38 | 69 | 30 | 32 | - | 6th Do. | 4th | .. | 3 | 9 | 42 | 86 | 27 | 30 | - | | | | | | | | | | - | 7th Do. | 5th | 1 | 3 | 6 | 35 | 82 | 39 | 38 | - | 8th Do. | 6th | .. | 4 | 9 | 41 | 102 | 41 | 25 | - | 5th Do. | 7th | 1 | 4 | 6 | 38 | 74 | 31 | 31 | - | | | | | | | | | | - | 9th Do. | Lt. | 2 | 2 | 4 | 24 | 68 | 13 | 19 | - | 7th Do. | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| .. | 6 | 7 | 37 | 74 | 19 | 26 | - | | | | | | | | | | - | | TOTAL | | | | | | | | - | | ------- | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | - | | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | | - | 7th Apr. | Cavalry | 2 | 4 | 4 | 17 | 39 | 15 | 41 | - | 9th Do. | 2d Dn. Infantry | .. | 2 | 2 | 16 | 16 | 28 | 10 | - | | | | | | | | | | - | ” Do. | 3d | 2 | .. | 2 | 9 | 17 | 23 | 14 | - | 6th Do. | 4th | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 12 | 24 | 51 | - | 7th Do. | 5th | 1 | 2 | 3 | 13 | 12 | 22 | 49 | - | 8th Do. | 6th | 1 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 13 | 16 | 47 | - | 5th Do. | 7th | 2 | 3 | 4 | 17 | 18 | 27 | 43 | - | 9th Do. | Lt. | .. | 2 | 3 | 13 | 11 | 26 | 29 | - | 7th Do. | Unattached Dn. | 2 | 4 | 7 | 25 | 22 | 51 | 80 | - | 8th Do. | 1st Brigade | 1 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 27 | 16 | - | ” Do. | 10th | .. | 4 | 4 | 18 | 14 | 23 | 38 | - | | | | | | | | | | - | | Total Portuguese| | | | | | | | - | | Total British | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | - | | Grand Total | | | | | | | | - +----------+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+----+----+ - - - (Part 2 of 6) KEY: BA = Quarter-Masters of Cavalry. - BB = Present. - BC = Present. - BD = Absent. - BE = Command. - BF = Prs. of War & Missing. - BG = Total. - +-----------------+----+-------------------------------+ - | | | SERGEANTS. | - | | |-----+---------+---------------| - | | | | Sick. | | | | - | DIVISIONS. | | |---------| | | | - | | BA | BB | BC | BD | BE | BF | BG | - +-----------------+----+-----+----+----+----+----+-----+ - | BRITISH. | | | | | | | | - | Cavalry | 25 | 581 | 9 | 17 | 68 | 7 | 682 | - | | | | | | | | | - | 1st Dn. Infantry| .. | 433 | 13 | 40 | 38 | 4 | 528 | - | 2d | .. | 320 | 5 | 89 | 68 | 18 | 500 | - | | | | | | | | | - | 3d | .. | 231 | 3 | 82 | 47 | 5 | 368 | - | 4th | .. | 232 | 3 | 76 | 56 | 4 | 371 | - | | | | | | | | | - | 5th | .. | 245 | 28 | 63 | 30 | 10 | 376 | - | 6th | .. | 236 | 4 | 59 | 41 | 1 | 341 | - | 7th | .. | 187 | 5 | 62 | 42 | 16 | 312 | - | | | | | | | | | - | Lt. | .. | 182 | 2 | 39 | 21 | 1 | 245 | - | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| .. | 188 | 7 | 7 | 8 | .. | 210 | - | | | | | | | | | - | TOTAL | | | | | | | | - | ------- | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | - | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | | - | Cavalry | 4 | 64 | 2 | .. | 28 | .. | 94 | - | 2d Dn. Infantry | .. | 122 | .. | 19 | 32 | .. | 173 | - | | | | | | | | | - | 3d | .. | 101 | 5 | 20 | 39 | .. | 165 | - | 4th | .. | 103 | .. | 27 | 23 | .. | 153 | - | 5th | .. | 105 | 3 | 25 | 18 | .. | 151 | - | 6th | .. | 119 | 3 | 12 | 20 | .. | 154 | - | 7th | .. | 110 | 4 | 12 | 23 | .. | 149 | - | Lt. | .. | 101 | 3 | 6 | 27 | .. | 137 | - | Unattached Dn. | .. | 197 | 7 | 47 | 26 | 1 | 278 | - | 1st Brigade | .. | 137 | 1 | 10 | 20 | .. | 168 | - | 10th | .. | 124 | 7 | 7 | 15 | .. | 153 | - | | | | | | | | | - | Total Portuguese| | | | | | | | - | Total British | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | - | Grand Total | | | | | | | | - +-----------------+----+-----+----+----+----+----+-----+ - - - (Part 3 of 6) KEY: CA = Present. - CB = Present. - CC = Absent. - CD = Command. - CE = Prs. of War & Missing. - CF = Total. - +-----------------+-------------------------------+ - | | TRUMPETERS OR DRUMMERS. | - | |-----+---------+---------------| - | | | Sick. | | | | - | DIVISIONS. | |---------| | | | - | | CA | CB | CC | CD | CE | CF | - +-----------------+-----+----+----+----+----+-----+ - | BRITISH. | | | | | | | - | Cavalry | 108 | .. | 8 | 4 | 2 | 122 | - | | | | | | | | - | 1st Dn. Infantry| 142 | 4 | 3 | .. | 3 | 152 | - | 2d | 143 | 1 | 23 | 3 | 8 | 178 | - | | | | | | | | - | 3d | 114 | .. | 20 | 7 | 4 | 145 | - | 4th | 102 | 1 | 15 | 5 | 6 | 129 | - | | | | | | | | - | 5th | 99 | 10 | 10 | 3 | 8 | 130 | - | 6th | 101 | 1 | 19 | 3 | .. | 124 | - | 7th | 92 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 117 | - | | | | | | | | - | Lt. | 66 | 1 | 3 | .. | 3 | 73 | - | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| 72 | 1 | 4 | .. | .. | 77 | - | | | | | | | | - | TOTAL | | | | | | | - | ------- | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | - | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | - | Cavalry | 40 | .. | .. | 10 | .. | 50 | - | 2d Dn. Infantry | 39 | .. | 1 | 4 | .. | 44 | - | | | | | | | | - | 3d | 58 | 2 | 5 | 6 | .. | 71 | - | 4th | 36 | .. | 6 | 5 | .. | 47 | - | 5th | 34 | 1 | 3 | 2 | .. | 40 | - | 6th | 33 | 1 | 5 | 3 | .. | 42 | - | 7th | 33 | .. | 3 | 2 | .. | 38 | - | Lt. | 51 | 3 | 2 | 7 | .. | 63 | - | Unattached Dn. | 67 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 85 | - | 1st Brigade | 64 | .. | 2 | 2 | 4 | 72 | - | 10th | 31 | .. | 3 | 5 | .. | 39 | - | | | | | | | | - | Total Portuguese| | | | | | | - | Total British | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | - | Grand Total | | | | | | | - +-----------------|-----+----+----+----+----+-----+ - - - (Part 4 of 6) KEY: DA = Present. - DB = Present. - DC = Absent. - DD = Command. - DE = Prs. of War & Missing. - DF = Total. - +-----------------+--------------------------------------------+ - | | RANK AND FILE | - | |-------+--------------+---------------------| - | | | Sick. | | | | - | DIVISIONS. | |--------------| | | | - | | DA | DB | DC | DD | DE | DF | - +-----------------+-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+ - | BRITISH. | | | | | | | - | Cavalry | 7640 | 106 | 406 | 1071 | 233 | 9456 | - | | | | | | | | - | 1st Dn. Infantry| 5894 | 244 | 632 | 200 | 185 | 7155 | - | 2d | 4123 | 112 | 2251 | 474 | 716 | 7676 | - | | | | | | | | - | 3d | 2741 | 75 | 1352 | 297 | 229 | 4694 | - | 4th | 3028 | 44 | 1700 | 279 | 201 | 5252 | - | | | | | | | | - | 5th | 3277 | 363 | 1075 | 224 | 315 | 5254 | - | 6th | 3233 | 54 | 1223 | 309 | 103 | 4922 | - | 7th | 2738 | 114 | 1074 | 391 | 673 | 4990 | - | | | | | | | | - | Lt. | 2469 | 77 | 696 | 131 | 146 | 3519 | - | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| 2496 | 212 | 312 | 92 | .. | 3112 | - | |-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+ - | TOTAL | 37639 | 1401 | 10721 | 3468 | 2801 | 56030 | - | ------- | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | - | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | - | Cavalry | 958 | 5 | 73 | 598 | 16 | 1650 | - | 2d Dn. Infantry | 1867 | 71 | 472 | 101 | .. | 2511 | - | | | | | | | | - | 3d | 1183 | 105 | 598 | 383 | .. | 2269 | - | 4th | 1585 | 30 | 635 | 199 | .. | 2449 | - | 5th | 1161 | 13 | 550 | 176 | .. | 1900 | - | 6th | 1644 | 44 | 469 | 151 | .. | 2308 | - | 7th | 1736 | 48 | 228 | 211 | 48 | 2271 | - | Lt. | 1240 | 54 | 237 | 394 | 11 | 1936 | - | Unattached Dn. | 3507 | 215 | 835 | 219 | 76 | 4852 | - | 1st Brigade | 1510 | 68 | 328 | 146 | 213 | 2265 | - | 10th | 1550 | 115 | 351 | 82 | 4 | 2102 | - | |-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+ - | Total Portuguese| 17941 | 768 | 4776 | 2660 | 368 | 26513 | - | Total British | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | - | Grand Total | | | | | | | - +-----------------|-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+ - - - (Part 5 of 6) KEY: EA = Present. - EB = Sick. - EC = Command. - ED = Total. - +-----------------+-------------------------------+ - | | HORSES. | - | |-------+-------+-------+-------| - | DIVISIONS. | | | | | - | | EA | EB | EC | ED | - +-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - | BRITISH. | | | | | - | Cavalry | 7289 | 611 | 602 | 8502 | - | | | | | | - | 1st Dn. Infantry| .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 2d | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | | | | | | - | 3d | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 4th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | | | | | | - | 5th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 6th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 7th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | | | | | | - | Lt. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | |-------+-------+-------+-------+ - | TOTAL | 7289 | 611 | 602 | 8502 | - | ------- | | | | | - | | | | | | - | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | - | Cavalry | 855 | 114 | 404 | 1373 | - | 2d Dn. Infantry | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | | | | | | - | 3d | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 4th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 5th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 6th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 7th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | Lt. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | Unattached Dn. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 1st Brigade | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | 10th | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | .. .. | - | |-------+-------+-------+-------+ - | Total Portuguese| 855 | 114 | 404 | 1373 | - | Total British | | | | | - | | | | | | - | Grand Total | | | | | - +-----------------|-------+-------+-------+-------+ - - - (Part 6 of 6) KEY: FA = Joined. - FB = Dead. - FC = Discharged. - FD = Deserted. - FE = Transferred - FF = Promoted. - FG = Reduced. - FH = Effective Rank and File, - Portuguese included. - +-----------------+-----------------------------------------+------+ - | | ALTERATIONS. | | - | |-----------------------------------------| | - | | Men. | | - | DIVISIONS. |-----------------------------------------| | - | | FA | FB | FC | FD | FE | FF | FG | FH | - +-----------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+ - | BRITISH. | | | | | | | | | - | Cavalry | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8144 | - | | {b} | | | | {c} | {c} | {d} | | - | 1st Dn. Infantry| 4 | 6 | .. | 4 | 10 | 3 | 4 | 5894 | - | 2d | .. | 11 | .. | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 5990 | - | | {a} | | | | | | {a} | | - | 3d | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 3924 | - | 4th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4613 | - | | | | | | {a} | {e} | .. | | - | 5th | .. | 2 | .. | 2 | 17 | 1 | .. | 4438 | - | 6th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4877 | - | 7th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4474 | - | | | | | | | | {a} | | - | Lt. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 3709 | - | Ld.Aylmer’s Bde.| .. | 2 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | 2496 | - | |-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+ - | TOTAL | 5 | 24 | .. | 6 | 33 | 4 | 6 | .. | - | ------- | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | - | PORTUGUESE. | | | | | | | | | - | Cavalry | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | 2d Dn. Infantry | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | | | | {e} | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | 3d | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | 4th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | 5th | 69 | 3 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | - | 6th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | 7th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | Lt. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | Unattached Dn. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3507 | - | 1st Brigade | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1510 | - | 10th | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1550 | - | |-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+ - | Total Portuguese| 70 | 5 | 1 | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | - | Total British | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | - | Grand Total | | | | | | | | | - +-----------------|-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+ - - 3 Men deserted 2d Line Bn. K.G.L. - 1 Do. ” 1st Line Do. - 1 Do. ” 47th Foot. - 1 Do. ” 4th Do. - - The Men transferred are Invalids sent home. - - _Note._—The figures belonging to the - grand total are wanting in the original. - - +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ - | Transcriber Note: This table has five table-note anchors indicated | - | in this etext by {a} to {e}. They were printed as one or more | - | asterisks in the original book; however there is no explanation of | - | their meaning. | - +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Since colonel and surveyor-general of South Australia. - -[2] The present major-general sir George Napier. - -[3] A splendid soldier. - -[4] A false stopping here misled me about the bridge. I made the -allies pass by ladders instead of the French. - -[5] Since the first publication of this Letter I have learned from -excellent authority that marshal Beresford did actually in person -order general sir Colin Halket to retreat from the bridge, and -rebuked him for being slow to obey. - -[6] I have since obtained from other sources many of those orders -of movements signed, George Murray, and addressed to the generals -commanding divisions. Had they been given to me according to the duke -of Wellington’s desire when I first commenced my Work they would have -saved me much time much expense and much labour; but I repeat that -from sir George Murray and from him only I have met with hostility. -He has not been able to hurt me but I take the will for the deed. - -[7] Above five thousand pounds. - -[8] Since this was written Mr. Leader did put the question in the -house when sir George Murray’s conduct was strongly animadverted upon -by lord Howick and his lordship’s observations were loudly cheered. -Sir George is now publishing these maps, but they belong to the -public. - -[9] Another has appeared since but I have not read it being informed -that it was precisely like its predecessors. - -[10] This work has been since discontinued by lieutenant Godwin in -consequence as he told me of foul play in a high quarter where he -least expected it. - -[11] That very successful Spanish general and very temperate English -politician, sir De Lacy Evans, pronounces all such animadversions -upon the Spanish armies to be “_a most deplorable defect in a -historian, and the result of violent partialities_.” I dare to say -the Spaniards will agree with him. - -[12] This was in February. - -[13] Called the Extraordinary Cortez. - - - - - * * * * * - - - PUBLISHED BY - - T. AND W. BOONE, - - _29, New Bond-Street_. - - - COLONEL NAPIER’S - - HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND - - THE SOUTH OF FRANCE. - - Illustrated with numerous Plans, 6 vols. 8vo. price £6. - - The Third Editions, vols. 1, 2, 3, and vols. 4, 5, and 6, may be had - separately, Price 20s. each. - - - A REPLY - TO LORD STRANGFORD’S “OBSERVATIONS,” - - ON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN - THE PENINSULA. - - BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B. - - Second Edition, 8vo. price 1s. - - - A REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS, - - PARTICULARLY TO - - “Strictures on Colonel Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula.” - - TOGETHER WITH - OBSERVATIONS ILLUSTRATING SIR JOHN MOORE’S CAMPAIGN. - - BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B. - - 8vo. price 2s. - - - COLONEL NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS - THIRD VOLUME. - - FORMING - - A SEQUEL TO HIS REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS, - AND CONTAINING SOME NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO - THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA. - - 8vo. price 1s. 6d. - - - A LETTER - TO GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD, - - BEING AN ANSWER TO HIS LORDSHIP’S ASSUMED REFUTATION OF COLONEL - NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME. - - BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B. - - In 8vo. price 1s. 6d. - - - COUNTER-REMARKS - TO MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S REMARKS - - UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME - OF HIS HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. - - In 8vo. price 1s. 6d. - - - _Preparing for immediate publication._ - - - LAWRENCE’S PORTRAIT - OF HIS GRACE - THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G. - - Engraved the full Size of Life, for the first Time, thus giving a - fac-simile of the Features of this illustrious Hero. - - BY F.C. LEWIS, ESQ. - - FROM THE ORIGINAL DRAWING BY SIR THOMAS LAWRENCE, P.R.A. - - This very exquisite Drawing was so highly esteemed by the late Sir - Thomas Lawrence that during his life he never could be persuaded - to part with it, and from it he commenced all his pictures of the - Duke. After his decease, it was sold with his other Drawings, and - the Publishers have now placed it in the hands of Mr. F. C. LEWIS, - to enable all the admirers of the late President to possess a - fac-simile of this very interesting Drawing of HIS GRACE THE DUKE - OF WELLINGTON. - - Prints £1 : 1. India Proofs, with Autograph £2 : 2. - - LONDON: PUBLISHED BY HODGSON & GRAVES, 6, PALL-MALL, - AND - SUBSCRIBERS’ NAMES ALSO RECEIVED BY T. AND W. BOONE, - 29, NEW BOND STREET. - - - In one volume, 8vo. price 7s. boards, - - REMARKS ON MILITARY LAW - AND - THE PUNISHMENT OF FLOGGING. - - BY - MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, K.C.B. - - “Every newspaper puts forth its attacks upon Commanders of - Regiments, filled with unjust and false assertions. I have - endeavoured, perhaps erroneously and unsuccessfully, to clear - the question from the rubbish with which it has been loaded, and - exhibit it to the view in its general bearings. In the performance - of this task, I am not conscious of any influence but that of the - desire to speak the truth.”—_Vide Preface._ - - - In 8vo. price 2s. - - PRUSSIA IN 1833; - - ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF PRUSSIA, - AND HER CIVIL INSTITUTIONS. - - Translated from the French by M. de Chambray. With an Appendix - by General de Caraman. - - “We would recommend to military readers in general, and especially - to the authorities who have the destiny of the army in their hands, - an attentive perusal of this work. The public will learn from it - that the army in Prussia, hitherto supposed to be the worst paid - force, is, in fact, better dealt with than is the case ‘_with the - best paid army in Europe_.’”—_United Service Journal._ - - - COLONIZATION: - - PARTICULARLY - IN SOUTHERN AUSTRALIA, - - WITH SOME - REMARKS ON SMALL FARMS AND OVER POPULATION, - - BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, K.C.B. - - Author of “The Colonies; particularly the Ionian Islands.” - - In one vol. 8vo. price 7s. boards. - - “We earnestly recommend the book to all who feel an interest in the - welfare of the people.”—_Sun._ - - - In foolscap 8vo. price 1s. - - THE NURSERY GOVERNESS: - - BY ELIZABETH NAPIER. - - _Published after her Death by her Husband, Col. C. J. Napier, C.B._ - - “Hear the instructions of thy father, and forsake not the law of - thy mother.” - _Proverbs_, c. i. v. 8. - - “This is an admirable little book.”—_True Sun._ - - “The excellent instructions laid down by Mrs. Napier will, we have - no doubt, prove a ‘rich legacy,’ not only to her own children, but - to those in many a nursery.”—_Liverpool Chronicle._ - - “Not only the nursery governess, but the mother and daughter, - especially in the higher walks of life, may read it with - advantage.”—_Atlas._ - - “We are so convinced of its utility, that we would strongly - recommend it to the diligent study of every female who has the care - of a family, either as a mother or a governess.”—_Sun._ - - - In Two Volumes, post 8vo. price 21s. - - ADMIRAL NAPIER’S - ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN PORTUGAL, - - BETWEEN - DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL; - - WITH - PLAN OF HIS ACTIONS OFF CAPE ST. VINCENT. - - “An excellent and spirit-stirring book—plain, honest, and - straight-forward—the very stuff of which the web of history alone - should be composed. This is indeed an honest, fair, and impartial - history.”—_Morning Chronicle._ - - “In spirit and in keeping, from beginning to end, Admiral Napier’s - ‘War in Portugal,’ is the happiest picture we could conceive of the - hero of the battle off Cape St. Vincent—its especial excellence - consisting in a regardless bluntness of manner and language that is - quite admirable and delightful.”—_Monthly Review._ - - “It is Cæsar’s Commentaries in the first person.”—_Spectator._ - - “Candid to a degree, and sincere as a sailor’s will. This is the - very stuff of which history should be composed.”—_Bell’s Messenger._ - - “If Admiral Napier be not distinguished by the common-place - facilities of authorship, he possesses the higher qualities - of truth, discretion, and clear-sightedness, in no slight - degree.”—_Atlas._ - - “In speaking of himself and his deeds, he has hit the just and - difficult medium—shewing his real feelings, yet steering clear of - affected modesty on the one hand, and of overweening modesty on the - other.”—_Tait’s Magazine._ - - “This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant - author figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of - Napier.”—_News._ - - - THE SECOND EDITION of - - ADVENTURES IN THE RIFLE BRIGADE - IN THE - PENINSULA, FRANCE, AND THE NETHERLANDS, - - From the Year 1809 to 1815. - - By CAPTAIN JOHN KINCAID, FIRST BATTALION. - - One vol. post 8vo. price 10s. 6d. boards. - - “An admirable little book.”—_Quarterly Review._ - - “To those who are unacquainted with John Kincaid of the Rifles,—and - few, we trow, of the old Peninsula bands are in this ignorant - predicament, and to those who know him, we equally recommend the - perusal of his book: it is a fac-simile of the man,—a perfect - reflection of his image, _veluti in speculo_. A capital soldier, a - pithy and graphic narrator, and a fellow of infinite jest. Captain - Kincaid has given us, in this modest volume, the impress of his - qualities, the _beau ideal_ of a thorough-going Soldier of Service, - and the faithful and witty history of some six years’ honest and - triumphant fighting. - - “There is nothing extant in a Soldier’s Journal, which, with - so little pretension, paints with such truth and raciness the - ‘domestic economy’ of campaigning, and the downright business of - handling the enemy. - - “But we cannot follow further;—recommending every one of our - readers to pursue the Author himself to his crowning scene of - Waterloo, where they will find him as quaint and original as at his - _debut_. We assure them, it is not possible, by isolated extracts, - to give a suitable impression of the spirit and originality - which never flag from beginning to end of Captain Kincaid’s - volume; in every page of which he throws out flashes of native - humour, a tithe of which would make the fortune of a Grub-street - Bookmaker.”—_United Service Journal._ - - “His book has one fault, the rarest fault in books, it is too - short.”—_Monthly Magazine, April._ - - - Also, by the same Author, in one vol. post 8vo. price 10s. 6d. - - RANDOM SHOTS - FROM A RIFLEMAN. - - “It is one of the most pithy, witty, soldier-like, and pleasant - books in existence.”—_United Service Journal._ - - “The present volume is to the full as pleasant, and what is still - more strange, as _original_ as the last. Criticism would become a - sinecure if many such volumes were written: all left for us is to - admire and recommend.”—_New Monthly Magazine._ - - “The present volume is likely to add to his reputation. It - is a useful appendix to the larger works of Napier and other - military commentators. It is never dull, tedious, technical, or - intricate.”—_Times._ - - “Those who have read Captain Kincaid’s Adventures in the Rifle - Brigade will seize this volume with avidity, and having dashed - through it, will lay it down with only one feeling of regret—that - it is not longer.”—_News._ - - - In post 8vo. price 5s. - - RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS - - RELATIVE TO THE - DUTIES OF TROOPS COMPOSING THE ADVANCED CORPS OF THE ARMY, - - BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL I. LEACH, C.B. - - Late of the Rifle Brigade. - Author of “Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier.” - - - Also, by the same Author, - - A SKETCH OF THE - SERVICES OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE, - - FROM ITS FORMATION TO THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. - - In 8vo. price 2s. 6d. boards. - - - MEMOIR BY - GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, BART. - - OF HIS - PROCEEDINGS AS CONNECTED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN, - AND THE - COMMENCEMENT OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. - - In one vol. post 8vo. price 9s. boards. - - “The care bestowed upon this subject by Sir Hew Dalrymple is - evident in the publication before us, which is unquestionably the - most dignified, clear, and satisfactory vindication of Sir Hew’s - motives and conduct, and forms, with the documents in the Appendix, - a very valuable and authentic addition to the materials for the - history of the period in question. Without a participation in the - facts it discloses, the records of the war, as far as regards this - particular subject, are, in fact, incomplete or distorted.”—_United - Service Journal._ - - - SKETCHES IN SPAIN, - - DURING THE YEARS 1829-30-31 AND 32; - - CONTAINING NOTICES OF SOME DISTRICTS VERY LITTLE KNOWN; - OF THE MANNERS OF THE PEOPLE, GOVERNMENT, RECENT CHANGE, - COMMERCE, NATURAL HISTORY, AND FINE ARTS; - - _With Lives of Spanish Painters_. - - BY CAPTAIN S. E. COOK, R.N., K.T.S., F.G.S. - - Two volumes, 8vo. price 21s. - - This work contains a very full account of the present seat of War - in Spain. - - “Volumes of great value and attraction: we would say, in a word, - they afford us the most complete account of Spain in every respect - which has issued from the press.”—_Literary Gazette._ - - “The value of the book is in its matter and its facts. If written - upon any country it would have been useful, but treating of one - like Spain, about which we know almost nothing, but of which it - is desirable to know so much, Captain Cook’s Sketches must be - considered an acquisition to the library.”—_Spectator._ - - “These volumes comprise every point worthy of notice, and the whole - is so interspersed with lively adventure and description; so imbued - with a kindly spirit of good nature, courting and acknowledging - attention, as to render it attractive reading.”—_United Service - Gazette._ - - “No one could either pretend to write or converse upon this subject - without preparing himself by a previous perusal of this instructive - work.”—_Metropolitan._ - - - AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF - MILITARY BRIDGES, - - _And the Passage of Rivers in Military Operations_. - - BY GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART. K.S.C. &c. &c. - - The Second Edition, containing much additional Matter and Plates, - 8vo. price 20s. boards. - - “Of this valuable work we expressed a very high opinion when it - was first published; and now that the able author has added much - important new matter to it, we need only say that it is worthy of - his own high reputation as a tactician and Military Engineer; and - that no soldier in Europe can know his business thoroughly without - consulting it.”—_Literary Gazette._ - - - THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN LEGION, - - FROM THE PERIOD OF ITS ORGANIZATION IN 1803, TO THAT OF ITS - DISSOLUTION IN 1816. - - _Compiled from Manuscript Documents._ - - BY N. LUDLOW BEAMISH, ESQ. F.R.S LATE MAJOR UNATTACHED. - - Two Vols. 8vo. complete, with Plans and Coloured Plates of Costumes, - price £1 10s. - - The second volume sold separately, price 10s. - - “The work is not like others we could name—a mere compilation from - newspapers and magazines. Major Beamish has left no source of - information unexplored; and the access he obtained to manuscript - journals has enabled him to intersperse his general narrative - with interesting personal anecdotes, that render this volume as - delightful for those who read for amusement, as those who read for - profit.”—_Athenæum._ - - “We are altogether much pleased with the volume, and heartily - recommend it to the British public.”—_Literary Gazette._ - - - Elegantly bound in the Uniform of the Regiment, 1 vol. post 8vo. - price 10s. 6d. - - THE ADVENTURES OF - MAJOR JOHN PATTERSON, - - (AUTHOR OF “CAMP AND QUARTERS,”) - - _With Notices of the Officers, &c. of the 50th, or - Queen’s Own Regiment_. - - FROM 1807 TO 1821. - - DEDICATED BY PERMISSION TO QUEEN ADELAIDE. - - “This volume contains a well-written, yet unvarnished narrative, - of the adventures of the 50th foot, (better known as the ‘Dirty - Half-hundred,’ from their black facings,’) during the Peninsular - war. It argues well for the bravery, as well as modesty, of Major - Patterson, that throughout his work we have but little of himself, - and much of his brother-officers.”—_Bell’s Messenger._ - - “Major Patterson’s Adventures are the record of a brave soldier—of - a dashing, high-minded British officer, who never fears a rival, - and never knew what it was to have an enemy, or to hate any man. - His descriptions are remarkable for their vividness and accuracy, - and his anecdotes will bear repetition once a week for life.”—_Sun._ - - “Major Patterson is one of the pleasantest of the numerous tribe of - gallant officers who has done so much credit to the British name, - by fighting and writing with equal spirit.”—_Constitutional._ - - - In One Volume, post 8vo. price 10s. 6d. boards, - - NARRATIVE OF - EVENTS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - _AND OF THE ATTACK ON NEW ORLEANS IN 1814 AND 1815_. - - BY MAJOR I. H. COOKE, 43d Regiment. - - “This clever and fearless account of the attack on New Orleans is - penned by one of the ‘occupation;’ whose soldier-like view and keen - observation during the period of the stirring events he so well - relates, has enabled him to bring before the public the ablest - account that has yet been given of that ill-fated and disgraceful - expedition, and also to rescue the troops who were employed on it - from those degrading reflections which have hitherto unjustly been - insinuated against them.”—_Gentleman’s Magazine._ - - “We wish earnestly to call the attention of military men to - the campaign before New Orleans. It is fraught with a fearful - interest, and fixes upon the mind reflections of almost every - hue. Major Cooke’s relation is vivid; every evolution is made as - clear to the eye as if we had been present, and the remarks, we - think, are eminently judicious. The book must be generally read,” - &c.—_Metropolitan._ - - “It is full of good feeling, and it abounds with sketches of the - service.”—_Sunday Herald._ - - - A TREATISE ON THE GAME OF WHIST; - - BY THE LATE - ADMIRAL CHARLES BURNEY, - - Author of “Voyages and Discoveries in the Pacific,” &c. - - Second Edition. 18mo. price 2s. - - “The kind of play recommended in this Treatise is on the most - plain, and what the Author considers the most safe principles. I - have limited my endeavours to the most necessary instructions, - classing them as much as the subject enabled me, under separate - heads, to facilitate their being rightly comprehended and easily - remembered. For the greater encouragement of the learner, I - have studied brevity; but not in a degree to have prevented my - endeavouring more to make the principles of the game, and the - rationality of them intelligible, than to furnish a young player - with a set of rules to get by rote, that he might go blindly right.” - - - One vol. post 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 5s. - Only 250 copies printed. - - THE TOUR - OF THE FRENCH TRAVELLER, - M. DE LA BOULLAYE LE GOUZ, IN IRELAND, A.D. 1644. - - Edited by T. CROFTON CROKER, - - WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS, CONTRIBUTED BY - - JAMES ROCHE, Esq. of Cork. - The Rev. FRANCIS MAHONY. - THOS. WRIGHT, Esq. B.A. Trin. Coll. Camb. - And the EDITOR. - - “To treate of Ireland’s toile - And tell the troubles now, - And paint you out in prose or vers - The Countries sorowe thorowe. - - “The greef so common is - That each one bears a peece, - And God he knows who licks the fatte - And shears awaie the flece.” - CHURCHYARD’S _Unquietnes of Ireland_, 1579. - - - VOYAGE PITTORESQUE ET ARCHEOLOGIQUE - DANS - LA PROVINCE D’YUCATAN - (AMERIQUE CENTRALE), - - PENDANT LES ANNEES 1834 ET 1836, - PAR FREDERIC DE WALDECK, - - DEDIE - A LA MEMOIRE DU VICOMTE KINGSBOROUGH. - - Priz de l’ouvrage, grand en folio, figures noires £5. - ” ” coloriées, sous la direction £6 : 6. - de l’auteur - - LISTE DES PLANCHES QUI SERONT CONTENUES DANS LE VOLUME: - - Pl. 1. Carte générale de l’Yucatan avec Walis. - 2. Costume des femmes de Campêche. - 3. Costume des soldats de la milice. - 4. Costume des Mestices de Mérida. - 5. Indien contrebandier de l’intérieur. - 6. Manière de voyager dans l’Yucatan. - 7. Costume de majordome des fermes. - 8. Carte et plan d’une partie des ruines d’Ytzalane. - 9. Plan de la pyramide de Kingsborough. - 10. Elévation de la pyramide de Kingsborough. - 11. Etude d’une partie de cet édifice, coupe des pierres. - 12. Plan du grand carré des 4 temples. - 13. Façade du temple aux deux serpents. - 14.}Façade du temple aux asterismes. - 15.}Façade du temple du soleil. - 16. Etude d’une partie du temple du soleil. - 17. Etude d’une partie du templenaux asterismes. - 18. Planche de détails de l’édifice aux deux serpents. - 19.{Ces trois planches sont des terres cuites trouvées dans les - 20.{ ruines de l’antique ville de - 21.{ Tulhà ou Ocozingo à 32 lieues des ruines de Palenqué. - 22. Bas relief Astronomique des ruines de Palenqué. - - - BAMPTON LECTURES.—One volume 8vo. price 15s. - - THE ANALOGY OF REVELATION AND SCIENCE, - - ESTABLISHED IN A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY - OF OXFORD, IN THE YEAR 1833. - - _On the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton._ - - BY FREDERICK NOLAN, LL.D. F.R.S. - Vicar of Prittlewell, Essex, and formerly Student of - Exeter College, Oxford. - - ALSO, ALL THE OTHER WORKS OF THE SAME AUTHOR. - - - IN CONTINUATION OF THE CATHEDRAL ANTIQUITIES OF ENGLAND. - - THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF - CARLISLE CATHEDRAL, - - BY ROBERT WILLIAM BILLINGS, - _Author of the Illustrations of the Temple Church, London_. - - This work is printed uniform with Britton’s Cathedral Antiquities - of England, and contains Forty-five Engravings of Plans, - Elevations, Sections, Details, and Perspective Views; with an - Historical and Architectural Account. - - In illustrating Carlisle Cathedral, the aim has been to give such - a series of careful measurements and details, that any portion, or - the whole building, might be completely restored in the event of - accident or decay. - - The historical and descriptive letter-press will be presented - _gratis_. - - PRICE, - Medium Quarto Three Guineas. - Imperial Quarto, limited to 115 copies Four Guineas and a Half. - Imperial Quarto, with Proofs of the Plates - on India Paper, limited to Ten Copies Seven Guineas and a Half. - - It is the intention of the Proprietors to publish the remaining - Cathedrals in the same manner, viz. Chester, Chichester, Ely, - Lincoln, Manchester, Rippon, and Rochester. - - _Durham_ will be proceeded with immediately, to which Subscribers’ - names are respectfully solicited. - - - Just published, uniformly with Britton’s Cathedrals, - - ARCHITECTURAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF - THE TEMPLE CHURCH, LONDON; - - DRAWN AND ENGRAVED BY - ROBERT WILLIAM BILLINGS, - - _Associate of the Institute of British Architects_. - - This work contains Thirty-one Engravings, principally in Outline, - embracing Plans, Elevations, Sections, Details, and perspective - Views of this interesting Church; also a short historical and - descriptive Account: and an Essay on the Symbolic Evidences of the - Temple Church, by EDWARD CLARKSON, Esq. - - Price Two Guineas in Medium Quarto, and Three Guineas Imperial - Quarto. - - “Thirty-one plates illustrate this volume, the first that has - ever attempted to do justice to one of the most interesting - ecclesiastical structures in the metropolis or the country. They - reflect great credit on Mr. Billings’ perseverance and skill; - and the whole is a welcome contribution to the antiquarian and - architectural library.”—_Lit. Gaz._ - - - Just published, - - WILL PAPERS, - - (TO BE USED AFTER THE 31ST OF DECEMBER, 1837,) - - Being Papers on which Testators may write their Wills as on common - writing-paper, but containing printed Marginal Directions for the - due execution of Wills under the new Statute. To be had of two - sizes. Large size, price 4_d._ Small ditto, 2_d._ Also, CODICIL - PAPERS, of the same description. - - “This is an excellent form for testators, and will save an infinity - of manuscript. It also furnishes whatever legal advice or reference - may be necessary, and is of equal service indeed to the solicitor - as his client.”—_Conservative Journal._ - - “So simple and plain are they that any person may make his own - Will, without either the expense or the delay of professional - assistance.”—_Weekly Chronicle._ - - - The Fourth Edition, 18mo. price 1s. - - HINTS TO THE CHARITABLE, - Being Practical Observations on the proper Distribution - of Private Charity. - - BY THE HON. AND REV. S. G. OSBORNE. - - CONTAINING LETTERS ON - - The “Coal Fund,” The “Benefit Society,” - The “Wife’s Society,” The “Loan Fund,” - The “Penny Club,” The “Children’s Benevolent Society,” &c. - - “It is impossible that this plain, familiar, and engaging - exposition (price, a trifle), will not be generally sought after, - and earnestly perused, the moment that some of its excellencies and - contents are understood.”—_Monthly Review._ - - “This little work is addressed to those beneficent spirits who - delight in doing good, and who, in accordance with true Christian - feelings, wish to see mankind happy. Its principal aim is to - promote economy and industry among the poorer classes, and show how - they can be made comfortable with very little. We would like to see - the plans of the benevolent author carried into effect in every - village of Great Britain. We hope all those who look with eyes of - Christian feeling on the miseries of their fellow-creatures will - carefully look over the plans laid down in this little volume. How - much good can be done with a little rightly bestowed!”—_Polyglot - Mag. Sept. 1, 1838._ - - - By the same Author, the Third Edition, 18mo. price 1s. - - HINTS FOR THE AMELIORATION - OF THE MORAL CONDITION OF - A VILLAGE POPULATION. - - CONTAINING CHAPTERS - - 1 & 2 Introductory. - 3 The Squire. - 4 The Farmer. - 5 The Tradesman. - 6 Keepers of the Public Houses. - 7 The Labourer. - 8 Female Service. - 9 Education. - - “The following pages contain, with some few alterations and - additions, the substance of a series of Letters, published in a - local periodical, under the signature of “Pastor.” Believing as I - do, that there are few rural parishes that have not within them - the elements of sound Moral Government, I am induced to give these - “Hints” the chance of a more general circulation; in the hope that - they may be useful, in exciting some of those who may have the - opportunity, to the importance of aiding the moral amelioration - of their neighbourhood, both by personal example and a judicious - exercise of personal effort.”—_Preface._ - - - Also, by the same author, - - A HAND-BILL FOR THE COTTAGE WALL, - - CONTAINING - “ABOUT GOD AND YOUR SOUL,” - “HOW TO MAKE THE BEST OF YOUR SITUATION IN LIFE,” - “A WORD ABOUT HEALTH.” - - On one large sheet, containing five Wood Engravings, - price Threepence each, or 20s. per 100. - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, - when a predominant preference was found in the original book. - - Some occurrences of upper-case titles (such as Lord, Sir, Colonel) - have been made lower-case for consistency. - - The names d’España and d’Amarante have been changed to D’España - and D’Amarante, for consistency. - - In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, - incorrect grammar, spelling and accents have been left unchanged. - - The tables in Appendix VIII No. 3 (page 708) have been restructured - to fit on the page. No data has been lost. - - The table at the end of the original book (page 710) was very large, - about 240 characters in width. For this etext it has been split into - six parts. The second column ‘DIVISIONS’ has been replicated in each - part, for readability. - - This table has five table-note anchors indicated in this etext by {a} - to {e}. They were printed as one or more asterisks in the original - book; however there is no explanation of their meaning. - - Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, - and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. - - TOC: ‘hemns the allies’ replaced by ‘hems the allies’. - Pg xi: ‘citadel of Ciuded’ replaced by ‘citadel of Ciudad’. - Pg xxiv: ‘mistate facts for’ replaced by ‘misstate facts for’. - Pg xxix: ‘twice over, tbat’ replaced by ‘twice over, that’. - Pg xxxiv: ‘ever acuated me’ replaced by ‘ever actuated me’. - Pg xli: ‘Medium estimate’ replaced by ‘Median estimate’. - Pg lxvii: ‘the Portuguse treat’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese treat’. - Pg lxxx: ‘witten expressly’ replaced by ‘written expressly’. - Pg 11: ‘neigbourhood of Reus’ replaced by ‘neighbourhood of Reus’. - Pg 49: ‘also run upon’ replaced by ‘also ran upon’. - Pg 74: ‘his way p from’ replaced by ‘his way up from’. - Pg 93: ‘all amountaineers’ replaced by ‘all mountaineers’. - Pg 141: ‘some hishonour’ replaced by ‘some dishonour’. - Pg 143: ‘to whse corps’ replaced by ‘to whose corps’. - Pg 247: ‘frequent scouring’ replaced by ‘frequent scouting’. - Pg 254: ‘between the brige’ replaced by ‘between the bridge’. - Pg 279: ‘he must revitual’ replaced by ‘he must revictual’. - Pg 289: ‘the two outwarks’ replaced by ‘the two outworks’. - Pg 289: ‘forseeing that the’ replaced by ‘foreseeing that the’. - Pg 293: ‘letter to España’ replaced by ‘letter to D’España’. - Pg 294: ‘enforced by España’ replaced by ‘enforced by D’España’. - Pg 319: (Sidenote) ‘minis- of war’ replaced by ‘minister of war’. - Pg 351: ‘took possesion of’ replaced by ‘took possession of’. - Pg 394: (Sidenote) ‘See plan.’ replaced by ‘See Plan 8.’. - Pg 417: ‘Carlos D’Españo’ replaced by ‘Carlos D’España’. - Pg 449: ‘the Lepsic battle’ replaced by ‘the Leipsic battle’. - Pg 456: ‘of his genins’ replaced by ‘of his genius’. - Pg 483: ‘way ot Madrid’ replaced by ‘way to Madrid’. - Pg 531: (Sidenote) ‘See Plan.’ replaced by ‘See Plan 9.’. - Pg 549: ‘current run so’ replaced by ‘current ran so’. - Pg 584: ‘to develope his’ replaced by ‘to develop his’. - Pg 588: ‘by sedidions and’ replaced by ‘by seditions and’. - Pg 607: ‘Aire and Barcelone’ replaced by ‘Aire and Barcelona’. - Pg 635: ‘was not be forded’ replaced by ‘was not to be forded’. - Pg 669: ‘Carlos D’Espagne’ replaced by ‘Carlos D’España’. - Pg 686: ‘surpassed a mankind’ replaced by ‘surpassed all mankind’. - Pg 709: ‘dismountned’ replaced by ‘dismounted’. - Catalog: ‘of Exter College’ replaced by ‘of Exeter College’. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE: FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 6 (OF 6) *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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