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If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Red blight - -Author: Mary Lamar Knight - -Release Date: January 2, 2023 [eBook #69684] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Tim Lindell, Bob Taylor and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was - produced from images made available by the HathiTrust - Digital Library.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RED BLIGHT *** - - - - - - Transcriber’s Note - - Italic text displayed as: _italic_ - - - - - RED - BLIGHT - - - Order Extra Copies From - _CHRISTIAN NATIONALIST - CRUSADE_ - P. O. Box D-4 - St. Louis 1, Missouri - - - - - To - - - _Everyone everywhere who would help to make the “lure” of freedom - so irresistible that the false promises of security, made by the - Communists, will be seen for what they are—a delusion and a fraud._ - - - - - RED - BLIGHT - - by - MARY LAMAR KNIGHT - - [Illustration: Star symbol] - - - LORRIN L. MORRISON - _Publisher - Los Angeles_ - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1951 - BY - MARY LAMAR KNIGHT - - - FIRST PRINTING - IN TWO EDITIONS: - _Paper Bound, June, 1951_ - _Cloth Bound, June, 1951_ - - - Printed in the United States of America by - LORRIN L. MORRISON, _Printing and Publishing_ - 1915 So. Western Ave., Los Angeles 18, Calif. - All rights reserved, including the rights of reproduction, - in whole or in part, in any form. - - - - - AUTHOR’S NOTE - - -The opinions expressed in this book represent only one individual’s -point of view. They are based upon what I, myself, have seen and -heard and are subject, therefore, to human error, preferences and -prejudices. I ask only that they be considered in this light, and -hope that they may serve to stimulate independent thinking and -inquiry. - -What I am reporting I have experienced personally or learned from the -most reliable sources at my command. If I succeed only in a small -measure in conveying my thoughts and opinions, it is, nonetheless, a -load off my chest, and I shall sleep more easily for having made a -sincere, if limited, contribution toward a better understanding of -our present disheartening dilemma. - - MARY LAMAR KNIGHT - - - - - _Table of Contents_ - - - _Introduction_ 1 - - _Chapter I—Incompetence or Treachery?_ 7 - - _Chapter II—Yenan Interlude_ 29 - - _Chapter III—Communist Personalities_ 45 - - _Chapter IV—Communism’s Forebears_ 70 - - _Chapter V—Communist Propaganda_ 82 - - _Chapter VI—Manchuria, the Prize_ 94 - - _Chapter VII—The Tragedy of the Generalissimo_ 102 - - _Chapter VIII—Behind the Red Curtain_ 117 - - _Chapter IX—Quo Vadis?_ 131 - - _Appendix_ 151 - - _Bibliography_ 189 - - _Index_ 193 - - _About the Author_ 199 - - - - - _Introduction_ - - -The “lure” of Communism is the same in every country—the promise of -security and a richer life for all, with less pain and effort to -the individual from the cradle to the grave. We have only to think -clearly, however, to realize that such promises are impossible of -fulfillment in a Communist State. Never has progress been made in -that direction except where there was personal freedom, initiative -and enterprise, for these are the qualities that take civilization -forward _toward_ Perfection, instead of backward _into_ Chaos. -The theories of Marx and Engels have been used and misused by the -Soviets. As far as their present laws are concerned, the “Yassa” of -Genghis Khan would have served the purpose, had it been as well known -in the Twentieth Century as it was in the Thirteenth. - -In studying the historical backgrounds of those great movements -which, at various times in the past, have churned up the quietude -of the earth, I found that they were always propelled or motivated -by extreme fanaticism. A distinctive feature of all of them seems -to be the desire to change the established order by revolution and -intrigue, as well as by military conquest. These movements are -opposed not only by the diehards, but by the believers in evolution -and slow change; not only by the wealthy and comfortable, but by the -practical men of affairs. All of this has been happening since the -beginning of history. Believers in the established order of things -always are on the defensive. Only open and direct attack stirs them -to the offensive. This last is true of the United States, and it is -also true of China. It is difficult for the rulers of peace-loving -nations to create or inspire prolonged hatred in those who must do -their bidding. This fact has been one of Stalin’s major worries with -respect to the Chinese Communists. His predecessor, Trotsky, gave -them up as impossible. “The Chinese have no capacity for sustained -mass indignation,” Trotsky has been quoted as saying. “As Communists -they are hopeless.” - -Everyone who has lived in China learns to respect and to love the -Chinese people. No nation on earth has left a greater endowment -in wealth of artistic accomplishment or evolved a more workable -philosophy than has China. Even the poorest coolie is acquainted with -some of the simple lessons contained in the Classics. - -As a correspondent in China for the United Press Associations, I -learned to admire the people deeply. When in 1946 I was invited -by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to -spend six months there as a consultant, without compensation, I was -delighted at the opportunity to return. Each time, I increased my -knowledge and improved my understanding of the country and made an -earnest effort to comprehend the divergent forces underlying modern -China and to gauge their effect upon the peace of the world. - -The red blight, as everyone knows, is world wide, but I have focused -my attention on China because it is the part of the world I know -best. I saw the blight spread over this area with sickening rapidity -in 1936, and again in 1946. - -On both my trips, I travelled slowly from Singapore through most of -the major cities to Manchuria, where I remained for a considerable -length of time. Manchuria in 1946 had changed radically from -Manchuria in 1936. The Russians had supplanted the Japanese, and two -wars in the brief span of ten years had left their tragic imprint. - -The more I travelled, and the more I read and studied, the more -aware I became of the pattern underlying the great upheavals, not -only in China but throughout Eurasia. Each eruption had moved in -a cycle from tribal communism to communistic imperialism, and -then to a dictatorship so despotic that its tyranny lasted in -some instances for generations. Invariably, the dictatorship fell -into dissolution and decline, followed by desolation and chaos. -The despots engineering these movements were all nurtured on the -vast steppe-lands, and they never attempted the invasion of their -more civilized neighbors until their own strength was such that no -opposing army could match them. - -Stalin, the latest of these despots, is as barbaric as his -predecessors. Certainly, no one could intimate that his methods are -even remotely civilized. He has “refined” and “distilled” their -characteristic brutality to an exacting degree. It took him fifteen -years to turn his own people from the techniques of Lenin to those of -his own fiendish thuggery. He has “conquered, bamboozled, outsmarted -and trapped” more than nine hundred million people into “political -and moral paralysis.” - -Are we also going to fall victims to the machinations of this -latest of these world shakers? Will we be sucked in through fear or -blandishment? Or have we the common sense, the spiritual development -and the _will_ to save ourselves? Human nature has changed little -during the history of mankind. Our challenge now is to try to develop -our spiritual growth so that it will be commensurate with our -fantastic material growth. - -A strong Nationalism made us great, as it has all nations that have -risen to world power. To maintain this power, however, requires the -intelligence and wisdom of our Founding Fathers, who, by their use of -initiative, ingenuity, enterprise and prayerful determination, made -us the Historic United States. Is it possible that recent generations -of American men and women have lost these qualities and have failed -to achieve complete maturity? - -I keep asking myself: Is “civilized” man intelligent enough, in the -light of his own past experience, to stop this human tragedy now, and -perhaps for a foreseeable future? Or, will he become hopelessly and -irrevocably lost in the futile contemplation of an idyllic dream that -is ages old, but that never has become a reality, and never will. - - - - - PROLOGUE - - - _Oh Man, thou feeble tenant of an hour, - Debased by slavery, debauched by power; - Thy love is lust; thy friendship a cheat; - Hypocrisy thy smile; thy word deceit— - Thy nature ennobled but by name, - The very beasts might bid thee blush for shame._ - - LORD BYRON - - - - - CHAPTER I - - _Incompetence or Treachery?_ - - -“The greatest single mistake made in China, leading to our present -debacle, was the withdrawal of United States forces from the Peking, -Tientsin, Chingwangtao triangle in 1947.” This was done obviously at -the direction of President Truman, General George Marshall and the -State Department. - -This statement comes from Major General William Arthur Worton, -Chief of Staff, Third Amphibious Corps, U. S. Marines in China, -1945-1946, but with twelve years prior experience there. He adds: -“Twenty-five thousand men easily could have maintained this important -triangle—Peking, Tientsin, Chingwangtao—which would have kept the -Chinese Communists from moving South of the Great Wall. They were -not strong at that time, and a display of American strength in -Nationalist China would have served as a deterrent to them.” - -Instead, our withdrawal of U. S. forces from this strategic area -was the first show of American weakness that gave the lie to both -Nationalist and Communist Chinese, if not to the whole of Eurasia. -The Russians constantly had complained that the Americans were -occupying sovereign territory of China, but the request for us to -do so had been made in 1945 by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s -Nationalist Government for the purpose of disarming the Japanese and -of stabilizing the country. - -General Worton, with five officers and a handful of men first moved -into the area in August, 1945, turning the civil government of China -over to the Nationalists. A month later, a force of sixty-five -thousand U. S. Marines moved in and occupied the area, and from then -on to 1947, there was relative peace and quiet. - -In view of the testimony of General George C. Marshall before the -joint houses of Congress on the hypothetical issue that if we permit -Chiang’s forces to attack South China, we will be starting a global -war, I would like to quote General Worton on a similar issue. - -“The occupation of Peking was not specifically in my orders,” he -says, “but I was to occupy whatever strategic territory I deemed -necessary. In the triangle previously referred to, was located the -important mining area of Kailan at Tang Shan, which supplied the -coal output of 150,000 tons per month, and the Nan Yuan, Pei Yuan -Airfields. When I determined that the Communists would go into Peking -if I did not, I decided to occupy Peking. At eleven o’clock one -evening, Chou En-lai’s agent in Tientsin informed me that if I moved -on Peking, the lives of every American Marine would be the price. -I told him I was going into Peking, just when and where our forces -would enter, and that he had better have as strong a force as I -intended to have, and that I would also be supported by an air cover. -We followed our blueprint, and not one of our men was scratched. We -had no opposition whatsoever.” - -With the withdrawal of U. S. forces from this area the coal output, -supplying power as far south as Shanghai, dropped to 30,000 tons. - -In Worton’s opinion, “as small a force as 15,000 troops, officered -by men acquainted with China, could have kept the Reds from crossing -into the coveted triangle.” - -But Marshall was determined to withdraw our forces. “The State -Department to this day,” says Worton, “has never asked the opinion, -as far I can ascertain, of any qualified military men who spent any -length of time in China, on this subject.” He adds, “Manchuria should -have been occupied and we should have insisted on a joint occupation -force there with our allies. Any study of China and the Far East must -be predicated upon a study of our relations with China since 1784. We -have consistently held to the Open Door Policy for China and the Far -East. We went to war with Japan because Japan had seized the coastal -areas and was controlling the communication lines of China. Many men -died across the Pacific to regain China for the free world, and yet, -in the course of minutes, as time is known, we have lost China. It is -a truism of students of the Far East that, ‘As China goes, so goes -the Orient’.” - -The U. S. should have taken Dairen, Port Arthur and Cheefoo, while we -were at it, and should have insisted on occupying the Kalgan Pass, -gateway to Mongolia. These rightfully belonged to the Nationalist -Government at the conclusion of the Japanese war, according to -Worton. Another disastrous move on the part of the U. S. was the -recall of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer from the China -Theater. “Wedemeyer had the complete admiration and respect of the -Chinese,” he says. “Although he had been the Generalissimo’s Chief -of Staff for nearly three years during the war, at no time had he -subordinated himself to Chiang. Wedemeyer was first, last and always -an American, and an officer in the service of his country.” - -Others claim that China’s and the world’s present situation can be -attributed to any number of mistakes on the part of Chiang Kai-shek, -General Marshall and the United States Government. Ignoring the -tragedy of Yalta for the moment, one vitally important mistake Chiang -made was the decision to fly his troops into Manchuria after the war, -against the advice of General Wedemeyer. His mistake was an honest -one, because he undoubtedly felt that the United States, having gone -so far, would see him through to the end. He knew that if China were -to occupy her rightful place in the world, control of the industrial -potential of Manchuria was a “must.” In spite of the fateful decision -at Yalta, about which Chiang was informed several months later by -Ambassador Hurley, he still could not believe that Roosevelt, whom he -deeply respected and admired, would slap him in the face by giving -away Manchuria. - -Truman, inheriting Roosevelt’s policy of appeasement toward Russia, -sent General Marshall to China in 1946 on the impossible mission of -forcing the Generalissimo to accept Communists into his Government. -Marshall, who at that time had the admiration and respect of the -entire United States, undoubtedly had a freer hand than any diplomat -in our history. Had he been unbiased in his judgement, the future of -China, Asia, and probably the Eurasian Continent would have been -different. He had unlimited resources to give, a neat nest egg of -$500,000,000, and the decision to spend some, all, or none of it was -his, and his alone. - -When Marshall arrived in China, the Nationalist Armies were -over-extended, that is, their supply lines were stretched so long -and so thin that they could not be protected from constant Communist -raids. Chiang’s Armies held the main lines of communication, to be -sure, and all the large cities of North China and a few in Manchuria. -However, these Armies, although many of them were trained and -equipped with American arms, had little ammunition, and they were -surrounded on all sides by the Soviet-backed Communist Armies. The -Communists retained the initiative, could strike when and where they -wished, and thus succeeded in keeping their opponents paralyzed. -It was not difficult to see that the future of Chiang’s Armies was -dependent solely on aid, especially on munitions, and that no country -on earth but the United States could supply their requirements. To -shut off this aid meant strangulation and death. - -Marshall’s first act was to set up a headquarters in Chungking, where -he assembled his American experts on China and started a series -of conferences with Communist and Nationalist leaders. From the -beginning, the Chinese Communists showed, by their every action, that -their only interest was in cutting off North China and Manchuria. -They had no intention whatever of joining any kind of coalition -government, over which they would not have complete control. After a -great deal of discussion, these conferences resulted in superficial -agreement on a few points of the controversy. - -Prior to his return to Washington, the General decided to make a -hasty trip to Yenan, probably out of curiosity. He must have wanted -a closer look at these people whose propaganda he appeared to have -accepted as fact during the entire war. Whether this was emotional -caprice or political expediency only history can tell. We cannot -assume that he was ignorant, therefore we must assume that he knew -what he was doing. - -Certainly the utterances of that period indicated that Marshall -subscribed to the idea that we were dealing with “agrarian reformers.” - -In his testimony before Congress, Marshall stated flatly that he had -known all the time that the Chinese Communists were Marxists “because -they told me so,” he said. But while he was negotiating with them he -certainly gave the impression to others that he did not think they -were the same brand of Communists as were the Russians. This fact, -in itself, makes him doubly culpable, in my opinion. It is an intent -to deceive, which makes the deception all the more sinister. If he -knew all the time that the Chinese Communists were the same brand of -Communists as the Russians, and he still threw the weight of every -decision he made in China to them, then he could not possibly have -given more aid and comfort to the enemy, Stalin, had he been a member -of the Communist Party. - -On Marshall’s arrival at the Airport of Yenan, he was greeted with -pomp and ceremony by every military unit the Communists could muster. -Welcomed enthusiastically by stocky Mao Tse-tung, in his coarse -homespun peasant’s garb, suave Chou En-lai, in the snappy uniform -of a three-star General, and Chu Teh, wearing a Russian soldier’s -fur-lined cape, he accompanied his colorful and grateful hosts on -an inspection of the troops. The Cadets from the Communist Military -Academy, who had hiked in some fifty or sixty miles in order to form -the Guard of Honor, were the best dressed and best outfitted of all -the troops in the Communist Army. While spartanly clad in coarse -but neat dark blue uniforms, they gave every evidence of superb -leadership and discipline. Especially trained and selected, these -Cadets became the equivalent, in Communist China, of the Soviet NKVD, -or uniformed police troops. - -In marked contrast, there was a battalion of Ming Bing, or militia, -armed with spears for the occasion and lined up for the General’s -inspection. These troops were dressed in everything from long robes -to dirty white jackets and vests, and decorated with rings, bracelets -and earrings. Their long, rusty spears were topped with flowering -pompoms of dried grain. In no respect did they differ from their -forbears of two thousand years ago. - -The rest of the show consisted of masses of people in the drab -dress affected by the Communists. The more colorful costumes of the -non-Communist Yenanese were conspicuous by their absence. - -Marshall must have been impressed! - -For quarters, or hotel accommodations, the General had been assigned -the best Yenan cave, boasting all the comforts offered by that -archaic type of dwelling. His person was safeguarded during the night -by two crack soldiers armed with ancient Chinese broadswords. - -Making the most of their distinguished visitor’s sojourn among -them, Chairman Mao Tse-tung gave a banquet, followed by a Chinese -Opera. The dinner was staged in a large bare room with cracking -plaster walls. The table consisted of rough hewn boards, contrasting -strangely with the lavishness of the food. Dozens of southern style -delicacies were imported for the occasion: crisp, roasted Peking -duck; succulent sweet and sour pork; thousand-year-old eggs—the -whole washed down with copious draughts of sweet local wine. Formal -speeches of mutual friendship were followed by cries of “Gambei!” or -“Bottoms up!” - -After the banquet, the entire party crossed the river to attend -the Opera. The Communists had improvised a crude bridge over which -their esteemed guest might ride, but it was so wobbly that Marshall -preferred to get out and follow his car across. - -The Opera was performed in an unheated, barnlike structure. It was so -cold that the audience kept on their heavy coats and were provided, -in addition, with blankets to wrap around their feet. In spite of the -fact that charcoal braziers were placed between the stage and the -first row, the temperature in the building was close to freezing, -and the breath of the actors as they chanted their lines came out in -puffs of smoke. These performers were Spartans indeed, changing their -costumes in the draughty, unheated barn, their teeth chattering and -their tawny flesh a mass of goose pimples. The costumes, in contrast -to those seen on a Peking or a Shanghai stage, were fashioned of -rough, drab bits of cast-off apparel, crudely sewn together and -patched with whatever pieces of material could be begged, borrowed or -stolen. - -The show itself, like the Ballet in Moscow, was a superb exhibition -of Chinese art, for, when shown to foreigners, it was free from -Communist propaganda. The falsetto voices of the actors sing-songed -the ancient Chinese poetry, while their bodies swayed to its rhythmic -cadence. During the performance, an usher went up and down the aisle -tossing hot towels to guests who called shrilly for them. These, -wrung out of boiling water, gave the hall a dank, slightly rancid -atmosphere, reminiscent of a river in summer. Roasted watermelon -seeds were pressed generously upon the honored guest by his Chinese -Communist hosts, who were noisily but skillfully cracking them -edgewise between their strong front teeth and spitting out the husks. - -Not all the visitor’s stay, however, was passed in entertainment. -Before leaving Yenan, General Marshall sat behind locked doors with -Mao and members of the Politburo. No other American was allowed to be -present at this meeting. What was said is not known, but there were -rumors in Communist circles that the subject of the conversations had -to do with the future of Manchuria, and perhaps all of Asia. - -On leaving this capital city of Communist China, Marshall returned to -the United States to make his report to President Truman. - -When he came back to China, Marshall made his residence in Nanking -(the Nationalist capital at that time), but established a Northern -Headquarters in Peiping (meaning Northern Peace), in order to work -out a truce between Communists and Nationalists. The futility of -this endeavor was obvious even to the Chinese GI, who nicknamed the -Peiping Headquarters the “Temple of the Thousand Sleeping Colonels,” -and to the American GI, who dubbed it “Marshall’s Bird Sanctuary.” - -If the soldiers in the lower brackets put their tongues in their -cheeks, those in the higher echelons took the mission very seriously. -They kept a very sober face, indeed. Shoulder patches were issued and -worn by all the members of the Peiping Headquarters and its truce -teams. These were called “Ballentine Beer Patches,” due to the three -rings in the emblem representing the Nationalists, the Communists and -the Americans. No doubt this symbol, to some of the homesick GI’s, -was a nostalgic reminder of the good old USA. - -Truce teams, made up of one Communist, one Nationalist and one -American officer, were sent out into the field, their purpose being -to try to bring about agreement between the opposing forces. With -the Chinese Communist Army and the Nationalist Army locked in a -deadly battle for power, any action on the part of the third member, -the United States, would be likely to aid one party only at the -expense of the other. With Marshall’s preference for Mao over Chiang -Kai-shek, the “truces” forced upon the Nationalist Armies at the -most inopportune times, from a military standpoint, acted to the -advantage of the Chinese Communist Army. Because of the slowness of -their transportation and their lack of modern means of training, -the Chinese Communist Armies, as in the days of Genghis Khan, were -constantly in need of breathing spells. During these periods they -could regroup their forces, move and gather supplies, and train their -troops. Such breathing spells, provided in the form of “Cease Fire!” -commands to the Nationalist Armies, upon the insistence of Marshall, -came almost as a gift from Heaven. - -As history has shown, Marshall threw the weight of every decision to -the Communists. This, combined with the mistake the Generalissimo -made in trying to hold Manchuria without American support, would -appear to be at least one of the reasons for the situation in China -today. In addition to the fact that Marshall favored the Communists, -that he acquiesced in the sellout of Manchuria, if not all of Asia, -to the Russians, the final and fatal blow was delivered to the -Nationalist Government itself. The expected help in arms, ammunition, -money and supplies from the United States was either cut off entirely -or reduced to a trickle. Too late did the Nationalist Government -recognize its precarious position and force itself to accept the fact -that, apparently, we just did not care who won the fight in China, so -long as it was not the Generalissimo. - -Continued evidence to the above effect appeared from numerous -sources. In the summer of 1950, Walter H. Judd, Representative from -Minnesota, commented in public: - -“Why should the Soviets think that the most important thing for -American Communists to do right after the defeat of Japan was to get -American assistance to China stopped?” To him, the answer seems to -appear obvious, in that without the right kind of outside aid, the -Chinese Government could not possibly recover. Only a handful of -people appeared to understand that, to a Chinese, the idea of putting -his country ahead of family interests, just was not his idea of -patriotism. First loyalty, always, in a Chinese family, was to that -family. - -Marshall asked for patience and generosity for the European countries -saying that it had taken the South fifty years to recover from only -four years of civil war. But he did not seem to remember that Chiang -had been fighting Japan for more than eight years, coupled with a -civil war with Communists in his own country for more than twenty -years. China, too, needed a little patience and generosity from us, -just as much as Italy or Greece or France. And what would England -have done without our patience and generosity? By comparison, were -not China’s needs embarrassingly small? - -One may call the Nationalist Government of China all the names -there are, synonymous with corrupt, incompetent, reactionary, -undemocratic—but in the light of what is known today about Communism -and its stated methods, aims and ambitions, which is the lesser of -the two evils—Chinese Nationalism or Soviet Internationalism? - -An interesting news item came to light in a press dispatch by -International News Service, dated September 19, 1950, as follows: -“Marshall’s statement on Far Eastern Policy electrified the jammed -committee room (Senate Armed Services Committee) because it had been -accepted for years that he had authored the recommendation that -peace in China be sought through a coalition government. Before this -committee, Marshall repudiated all claims for having had anything to -do with it, much less to have authored it by saying that it had been -drawn up in the State Department while he was testifying on Capitol -Hill in the Pearl Harbor investigation.” According to the same news -dispatch: “The author of the Marshall Plan added that the Chinese -policy was issued ‘while I was on the ocean going over there’ as -President Truman’s personal representative.” - -Could Marshall have meant that he had not even been consulted on such -an important matter, prior to being sent to implement that policy? -Hardly. Former Secretary of State Byrnes, in his memoirs entitled -“_Speaking Frankly_,” spoke thus frankly on this subject: - -“As soon as President Truman appointed General Marshall his personal -representative in China, I asked the General to study the draft -(of policy) so that he could help prepare the final statement for -presentation to the President. The Sunday before I left for Moscow, -Under Secretary Acheson, General Marshall and members of his staff -met in my office. By the end of the morning’s discussion, we had -agreed upon the statement of policy. Thereafter the President made -no change in that policy except upon the recommendation of General -Marshall or with his approval.” - -I learned from an intimate source that when Marshall left for China -he had in his pocket, documents outlining the policy of enforcing a -coalition government on Chiang Kai-shek and also a letter from the -President stating flatly: - -“I understand that these documents have been shown to you and have -received your approval.” What could General Marshall think himself to -be, an ostrich with his head in the sand? - -Much has happened since 1946, particularly as pertains to the -relationship between China and General Marshall. A few excerpts from -the September 15th, 1950, issue of the _Congressional Record_, Volume -96, Number 184, bring the matter further to a head. Senator William -E. Jenner from Indiana holds the floor: - - “I believe the time has come to expose this whole tragic conspiracy - in which we are caught, to hew to the line of truth, and to let - the chips fall where they may.... I can assure the Senate there - is no pleasure, no pride of authorship, and no sense of personal - satisfaction in taking this stand. There is only a growing sense - of shame, of outraged decency, and of painful duty as I speak the - dictates of my conscience. Even if I have to stand and speak alone, - I am both unable and unwilling by my silence to be an accomplice - in compounding crimes that have already been committed against my - native land. Mr. President, this background is necessary because - without it we cannot understand where the appointment of General - George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense fits into the picture. - With it, we can help the disillusionment of the American people to - run its course by exposing General Marshall as a living symbol of - the swindle in which we are caught. The appointment of Marshall at - this peculiar juncture in our destiny is a last desperate attempt of - this administration to swallow up the treachery of the past in the - new treachery they are planning for the future.... Everything he has - been a party to during the past ten years has helped to betray his - solemn trust and to set the stage for the staggering Soviet victory - that is sweeping across the earth....” - -Senator Jenner’s full and documented statements cover eighteen pages -of the _Record_ but interest here is centered upon those comments -bearing on China, which confirm my own first-hand information -and knowledge. He goes back to April 26, 1938, when Marshall was -appointed a member of the liaison committee created by President -Roosevelt for the coordination of policy of common concern to the -Departments of State, War and Navy. From then on, Marshall remained -one of the top-ranking policy makers in our Government. Truman was -aware of the closeness between Marshall and Roosevelt, and of their -consultations on matters of vital policy affecting our security and -the defending of our interests around the world. Was this, perhaps, a -reason for Truman’s wanting Marshall as Secretary of Defense, even as -a possible stop-gap in a Democratic political crisis? - -“Marshall knew of the deceit and the duplicity that was indulged in -by President Roosevelt during the critical years of 1939, 1940 and -1941, by which we were secretly committed to go to war.... He went -along with the most criminal and outrageous betrayals of American -interests and principles in history that resulted from Teheran, Yalta -and Potsdam,” says Jenner. To anyone’s comment: “He was a soldier. -He was taking orders,” I feel urged to ask: “Does there not come a -time in everyone’s life when he has to decide whether he is first a -citizen of integrity? General of the Army Douglas MacArthur made that -decision in April, 1951, and made it unflinchingly. - -“At Yalta,” Jenner adds, “the President did the age-old thing with -regard to Asia and General Marshall knew that at Potsdam, President -Truman confirmed the sellout of half the world to the Soviet Union -... this meant that American GI’s were turned into political whipping -boys, betrayed by their own Chief of Staff and used for advancing -the cause of Communism across the earth.... Marshall lent all of his -great prestige and power to the Jessup-Lattimore-Service-Acheson line -calling for a cessation of the civil war, paralyzing the Nationalist -Government and withholding aid from Chiang, while he knew that the -Russians were not only taking over Manchuria and northern China, -but were being rearmed with captured Japanese equipment and were -preparing for the eventual conquest, not only of China, but of the -whole Far East.” - -Harold Lamb, historian and authority on Asiatic history, has -commented: “Curiously enough, when I began to study the Mongols -nearly thirty years ago, I found two studies of the methods of -Genghis Khan made by young American Army officers. They were George -C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur.” How differently these two men -have interpreted their research, in the light of their subsequent -actions! - -Let me quote a remark or two from the March, 1951, issue of _The -American Mercury_. I have high regard for the journalistic integrity -of Walter Trohan, Washington, D. C., Bureau Manager of _The Chicago -Tribune_, and concur heartily with his comments in an article -entitled: “_The Tragedy of George Marshall_”: - - “On March 19, 1950, General Marshall announced that he would not - write his memoirs for these remarkable reasons: - “‘To be of any historic importance they have got to be accurate; - that is one mustn’t omit, and make it pleasant reading. Now, if - you do put it all in, you do irreparable harm. You almost ruin a - man, but if you don’t mention that, it is not history’.” - - -Mr. Trohan states that these are disillusioning words, and imply that -“free men must not be told the truth; they indicate that the speaker -is in a mental purgatory for hidden sins which he has either observed -or committed; and they emphasize the graver tragedy: that an old man -who must conceal past errors from his countrymen is still exercising -powers of decision.” - -Trohan asks, and so do I: “Should free men trust a leader who will -not trust them with the truth? By what right does a public servant -say to free men: ‘You trusted me with leadership, but I will not give -a true accounting because the truth might do irreparable harm’?” - -Marshall has ever been quick to blame the people for the ills that -may beset them—never the leaders, as warrant a remark he made -following the debacle of the Korean war: “The basic error has always -been with the American people”—these same American people who cannot -be trusted with the truth, lest “irreparable harm” be done. - -Other indications as to the stature of the man reveal themselves as -isolated vignettes. When Marshall arrived in China and was met by -General Albert C. Wedemeyer, even after he had read and suppressed -the _Wedemeyer Report_, he told his junior officer of his intention -with regard to forcing Communists on the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer -commented in all calmness: - -“General, you can’t do it. It is impossible!” - -To which Marshall replied in white heat: “I am going to do it, and -_you_ are going to help me!” - -Marshall’s double-cross of Wedemeyer in appointing the latter -Ambassador to China in 1947 is another instance. Secretary of State -James Byrnes had told Wedemeyer to go ahead and buy his civilian -clothing, which he did, and as Wedemeyer was on the point of severing -his last connections from the Army, Marshall learned that the -Communists strongly opposed the Wedemeyer appointment and recommended -instead, J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University. -Without consulting with or informing General Wedemeyer, Marshall -immediately appointed Stuart, leaving Wedemeyer to find out through -second-hand sources that he was no longer Ambassador-elect to China. - -A parallel action of this nature in which Marshall had a direct hand -was the midnight dismissal of General MacArthur, who learned of the -order when an aide heard it on a radio news broadcast and relayed it -to Mrs. MacArthur. - -Again, with reference to Marshall’s so-called ignorance of the China -policy situation, Jonathan Daniels, in his authorized biography of -Truman, quotes Admiral William D. Leahy as saying: “I was present -when Marshall was going to China. He said he was going to tell Chiang -that he had to get along with the Communists, or get no help from us.” - -Before the removal, by Truman, of General of the Army Douglas -MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far East—one of the -greatest acts of perfidy to go down in American history—few people -realized that Marshall was not a West Pointer. This, of course, is -in no way to be held against Marshall, but, during World War I, as -General Pershing’s aide-de-camp, when Pershing was Chief of Staff, a -promotion of Marshall to a Generalship was requested of MacArthur by -Pershing. - -MacArthur was willing enough, provided his military record merited -it. From Walter Trohan’s documented personal files comes information -that Marshall’s record lacked sufficient time served with troops. -“MacArthur proposed to remedy this,” says Trohan, “by giving -him command of the Eighth Regiment at Fort Screven, Ga., one -of the finest regiments in the Army.” Marshall was moved up from -lieutenant-colonel to colonel, but his way to a general’s stars -appeared to be blocked forever when the Inspector General reported -that under one year of Marshall’s command the Eighth Regiment had -dropped from “one of the best to one of the worst.” It was mandatory, -therefore, that MacArthur decline the promotion. Is it any wonder, -today, that Truman’s action in removing MacArthur from the military -scene should be most pleasing to the Secretary of Defense? - -Of course, this is not the whole story, for Pershing was a -persevering soldier and had no intention of giving up his -determination to see Marshall become a general. In 1936, he bypassed -the Army entirely, and went directly to the White House where he -succeeded in persuading President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to -“appoint” Marshall a general. Later, Marshall had proved himself so -“acceptable” to Roosevelt that, over the heads of “twenty senior -major generals and fourteen senior brigadier generals, Roosevelt made -him Chief of Staff.” - -I believe that the “tragedy” implied by Walter Trohan concerning -Marshall lies in the current knowledge that Marshall, despite -personal bravery, even stoicism, was sadly lacking in vision to match -it. Thus, he became a willing tool in the hands of the opposition. -He trusted Russia as an ally and, contrary to the Churchill belief, -he did not care how much of Europe Stalin took, so long as we sent -Russia enough tanks and ammunition to crush the German Army. He was -easy prey to the insidious propaganda put out by Hiss, Acheson, -Lattimore, Jessup and others who, misguided or otherwise, permitted -American lives to be sacrificed to make both Europe and Asia “safe -for Communism.” - -We know now what was in the _Wedemeyer Report_. Because it disagreed -with Marshall’s ideas he, personally, suppressed it. In contrast -to his decision, Wedemeyer had advocated a strong defense against -Communism in China, and had gained the Generalissimo’s complete -approval for American supervision of all aid, financial, military, -psychological—that would have been forthcoming if the report had been -approved. - -Marshall, as was Pershing, is for an enormous army—for pitting -manpower, our most precious commodity, against the enemy, in place -of our superb technological and psychological know-how. General -MacArthur has shown the absurdity and the tragedy of any such -commitment on our part. Should Marshall, with Anna Rosenberg at his -side, be allowed to continue with plans to fight the Asiatic hordes -thusly, we are, indeed, doomed. May God forbid! - -Once again, in retrospect, it appears that American foreign policy -had been to support the Generalissimo as long as he fought the -Japanese, but to do nothing that might offend the Communists at any -time. For the past ten years, or more, our Government seems to have -had its bets on Communism in China—if not in all Eurasia—to win. The -facts are against any other conclusion, and we must, again, _assume_ -that Marshall, the President, and the State Department know what they -are doing. And if they know what they are doing, they must be doing -it deliberately. - -From 1946 through 1948, Marshall ordered destroyed all of the -reserves of ammunition earmarked for Chiang Kai-shek. These had been -stored in India and could easily have been transferred to China -at the end of the war in 1945. Marshall also ordered our military -mission to refuse further training and aid to the Nationalist armies. - -On leaving China, General Marshall was overheard to remark -enthusiastically, “There is a definite liberal group among the -Communist Chinese.” This particular group included China’s “Front -Man,” Chou En-lai, Communist Foreign Minister since October, 1948, -and his assistant, Chiao Kuan-Hua, spokesman for the Communist -delegation that was entertained in late 1950 by the United Nations, -and which was housed and fed at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria in New York -City. - -It is not difficult to see how Marshall contributed to Chiang’s -capitulation to the Communists. How can we answer for our refusal to -accept the 30,000 Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa, initially -offered by the Generalissimo to the United Nations for combat in -Korea or in South China? We accepted units, even token ones, from -other members of the U.N., but not from Nationalist China, who is -still an official member. Of course, I know the answer is couched -in the language of “Peace, peace.” But Stalin will not be provoked -into full-scale war until Russia is ready for it, and the _danger_ of -letting Chiang attack south China is no more than a blind. - -How can we have aided the Russians more, or brought greater tragedy -to ourselves than we already have by our own actions? - - - - - CHAPTER II - - _Yenan Interlude_ - - -Prior to October, 1949, the capital of Communist China was the two -thousand-year-old city of Yenan. After the capture of Peking, the -leaders established grandiose headquarters in that ancient seat of -emperors, known as “The Pearl of the Orient.” It was in the quaint -old city of Yenan, however, that the important incubation period -of these present rulers took place. Here they spent the war years, -planned their strategy to take over all of China, and cemented their -contacts with Moscow. From the cold, crude caves of this primitive -stronghold to the glittering palaces of Peking was a tremendous leap, -and doubtless it gave the conquering heroes many jolts. How often -they must have longed for that unique little city, remote and quiet, -in Shensi Province. - -That those early carefree days on the edge of the Gobi Desert did -not altogether prepare them for their present responsibilities was -evidenced by the fact that after the Communists occupied Peking -the municipal government staff there was temporarily retained. The -new Communist mayor explained, “We have been living in the hills -(Yenan) and know far less about municipal government than you do. -Therefore we must learn from you.” Even Mao Tse-tung, whose word is -law all over China, has already been quoted as saying, “The task of -reconstruction is apt to be far more difficult than the achievement -of power.” - -Shensi Province boasts one of the best climates in China, dry and -healthy, with many bright sunshiny days. However, it is frequently -visited by suffocating dust storms from the desert, giving the -inhabitants a yellow-powdered coating on the hair, face and -clothing. The farm lands which were owned formerly by a few of the -comparatively wealthy peasants were, in 1949, divided into little -holdings or made into cooperative farms. No all-out effort was made -to collectivize[1] the land, as in Russia. - -The city of Yenan has a population of about fifty thousand, most of -whom live in caves burrowed into the clay cliffs of three converging -river valleys. Before the move to Peking, the schools and army -headquarters of the city were all underground, and only outside the -city were there many buildings of any size. - -One of the most important landmarks was the International Hospital, -located on the edge of the city in a series of caves. It was called -“International” because it was supported in part by contributions -from abroad. The United States had made every effort to be helpful. -During the war, for the first time in its history, and largely -through the humanitarianism of the China Theater Commander, -Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, this hospital was one of the best -equipped, if not _the best_ equipped, in all of North China. When Mao -Tse-tung’s little five-year-old daughter fell ill with pneumonia, -penicillin was flown to her directly from General Wedemeyer’s -headquarters. Without it she would, almost certainly, have died. - -The hospital was Madame Sun Yat-sen’s favorite project There she -spent many hours, allowing the patients and nurses to bask in the -radiance of her sacred person. This beguilling “Saint Elizabeth,” -after impassioned pleading, succeeded in 1945, in getting the United -States to expedite shipment of increased amounts of medical supplies -to the hospital from Communist sources. A small contingent of U. S. -soldiers was stationed in Yenan as a liaison between the Communists -and the Nationalists. These cartons and crates were opened, as a -matter of routine inspection by Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, Communist -expert and one of the American military observers there. To his -great consternation, he found that, instead of the urgently needed -medical supplies, the crates and cartons were filled to bursting -with Communist propaganda books and leaflets. Going directly to -Madame Sun, he said, “Why, Madame, I am disappointed and astonished -to find that you have abused the courtesy extended to you by the -United States Government. I find that this last shipment, instead of -containing medical supplies, is filled with nothing but Communist -propaganda!” Madame Sun blushed prettily and replied with false calm: -“I am sure that you are not aware of the _many_ kinds of medicine our -patients need here.” It goes without saying that her supplies were -cut off, then and there. - -Although Communists laid great stress on the good the hospital was -doing for _all_ Chinese, the conduct and methods of admissions -smacked of the General Hospital in Moscow. Patients were classified -in three categories: The Hierarchy of the Communist Party and their -families took precedence over all; next in line were the Red Army -officers and soldiers and their families; last, least and very rarely -came the non-Communist Chinese. - -Another distinguished landmark located just outside the city was the -famous “Prisoner of War School.” Here the captured Japanese soldiers -were never referred to as “prisoners,” but always as “students,” and -their compound was referred to as “The School.” - -Although, during the war, the Chinese Communist Armies made great -claims about their successes against the Japanese, their primary -purpose was to capture Japanese prisoners of war with the idea -of converting them to Communism. Those who showed promise of -becoming good subjects promptly were sent to Yenan, given courteous -treatment and enrolled in the Communist School under Moscow-trained -instructors. Students who showed little aptitude or whose loyalties -were questioned were weeded out rapidly and returned to their own -troops. This last proved to be a diabolical form of punishment, for -a Japanese soldier is taught never to surrender, but to fight to the -death. The mere fact that he had allowed himself to be captured and -was returned to his own troops in good condition was clear evidence -that he was either a coward or untrustworthy. His end was often the -guard house or a bullet in the back of his head. - -Graduates of the school were dispatched as spies into Manchuria or -sent back to Japan, there to scatter the red seeds of Communism. This -was referred to as going to the “Front.” When one friend would say to -another, “I haven’t seen Yashi for four or five days. Where can he -be?” the reply invariably was, “Oh, he’s gone to the Front!” Thus the -Prisoner of War School helped to spread the red gospel throughout the -Japanese-speaking areas. Its guiding spirit and conductor was Okano, -now known as Sanzo Nozako, who aspired to be the Stalin of Japan, and -who is said to be working vigorously to bring all the Japanese into -the Communist orbit. - -The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had appropriated -for special meetings one of the few well built halls just outside the -Walled City. On its bare walls were life-size, full length portraits -of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Chu Teh, together with a -large flag bearing the Hammer and Sickle. This hall also served as -Mao Tse-tung’s city residence. Only on the rarest occasions were -foreigners ever received here, and at such times the portraits and -flag were laboriously removed. Surrounding the hall were the best and -most productive of the local farms, which had been confiscated by the -Communist Hierarchy for their own use. Here they spent many weekends -relaxing and enjoying life. - -The office where foreigners were habitually received was in a large -cave. It was decorated with life-size portraits of Stalin, Mao, -Chu Teh, Churchill, Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek -placed over a grouping of small allied flags. The general atmosphere -appeared to be one of friendly cooperation based on mutual aims and -interests. When foreign visitors were present, the Chinese National -flag was displayed conspicuously over the gates of the compound, as -a token of good will, and to create the false impression that both -parties were working in harmony. On all other occasions, and in -all other places, it was considered extremely bad taste to mention -Nationalist China, Great Britain or the United States, especially -with references to any part they were taking in winning the war. - -Anyone living in Yenan at that time became aware of the complete -absence of religious symbols. The ancient temples were occupied by -Communist families. Religion, as in other Communist countries, had -gone underground or disappeared. Even the tiny symbolic caves, so -revered by the Chinese as places of worship, were never used openly. -Instead, Americans often caught glimpses of Communist soldiers going -through their ritual when they thought themselves unobserved by -hostile eyes. Doubtless these little scenes reminded some of the -better informed GI’s of similar ones enacted in Moscow, where the old -peasant women braved the wrath of the NKVD and the Stalin Youth to -worship at the few churches that were allowed to remain open. - -The Catholic missionaries, long distrusted by the Communists, had -been forced into a life of almost complete religious inactivity. -Their Compound, once a busy center, had become the home of the Lu -Hsun Art Academy. The old convent had been converted into dormitories -for students of both sexes. In the Chapel, Communists had torn down -the painting of Jesus, which was the first object seen on entering, -and had replaced it with a more than life-size portrait of Stalin. -The Holy Vessels and Sacred Images lay in rubble on the floor. Only -the organ was left. Here, the music students practiced American jazz -and sang “The Internationale.” - -[Illustration: _Ancient Pagoda built hundreds of years ago, seen from -outskirts of Yenan. Caves at right are similar to those used to house -the Japanese Prisoners of War._] - -[Illustration: _“Ballentine Beer Patches” Worn by Marshall’s workers -in Chungking._] - -[Illustration: _The movie actress wife of Mao Tse-tung appears -pleased with the story she has just told General Marshall, while the -latter seems to wonder if he got the point._] - -[Illustration: _Left to right: Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, Chairman -Mao Tse-tung, General Chang, (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s -propaganda chief), and General Chu Teh, shown after conference in -Yenan._] - -[Illustration: _Mao has just proposed a welcoming toast to General -Marshall, and politely listens while others do likewise. The banquet -was held in Marshall’s honor._] - -[Illustration: _Chinese Nationalist and American flags fly between -banner welcoming Marshall, Nationalist General Chang and Communist -Chou En-lai. Side banners say “Long Live Peace in the Far East!”_] - -[Illustration: _Saturday inspection of Caves in Yenan. Last, on the -extreme far end to the right, is the cave in which Marshall was -installed._] - -[Illustration: _Crowds greeting Marshall on his arrival in Yenan. At -extreme left can be seen the Ming Bing with their long spears. Note -American and Chinese Communist flag on jeep._] - -[Illustration: _Left to right: Chairman Mao, Chou En-lai, Marshall, -General Chang (Nationalist), and Chu Teh. On the right are picked -troops of the Communist Military Academy._] - -[Illustration: _Under Communism man still competes with the lowly -donkey. Here several are seen carrying fire wood in Yenan._] - -[Illustration: _A camel caravan arriving at Yenan from the Gobi -Desert after passing through the Great Wall. The lead camel wears a -mask to frighten away evil spirits. (In photo below)—Oxen laden with -bundles and wares to be sold in the Yenan markets._] - -[Illustration: _The Market Place in Yenan, run by non-Communists as -in the days of their ancestors._] - -[Illustration: _Child-mother with twins in improvised home-made -tandem baby carriage._] - -[Illustration: _Caves of the Communists and Red Army seen in the -distance, sheep grazing beneath them. Small house in foreground -was used for storage of food._] - -Protestants suffered equal indignities. From outlying districts came -reports of religious oppression and sometimes of atrocities. American -missionaries, both by word and letter, told of the destruction not -only of churches but of agricultural and hospital activities which -had operated for many years to help _all_ Chinese, Communist and -Nationalist alike. - -The population of Yenan was for the most part non-Communist. The -distinction was not difficult to note for the Communists were easily -recognized by their dull blue cloth uniforms, their bobbed haired -women wearing no make-up, and their complete lack of Chinese silks -and gay colors. The non-Communist majority were allowed to continue -their usual occupations undisturbed, as long as they minded their -own affairs. Nearly all the merchants within the Walled City were -non-Communist, and all gathered daily in the big market, as they had -done for generations, to display their wares in the open, on boards -or on the ground. When the Communists wanted anything, they forced -the merchants to cooperate by handing over a desired commodity, and -at the Communists’ own price. - -Due to the Chinese and Mongolian background of most of the Communist -leaders, many of them did not, at first, wish their women to play any -political roles or to appear at public banquets with the men. With -the growing acceptance of the Russian doctrines, however, all were -considered equal, and the women worked and ate beside the men. The -female Communists tried to look as unlike the old fashioned Chinese -women as possible. Their adopted cause had emancipated them, if -emancipation meant compelling them to work as hard as the men. In -Russia, after the Revolution, the women, dressed as men, were allowed -to load and unload trucks, which the men drove. The rules for the -masses, however, did not apply to the wives of the leaders. They were -encouraged to mix freely, to wear better clothes, and to indulge -in light make-up occasionally. Moreover, it is said that they all -ate quantities of sunflower seeds in order to obtain the fine, firm -breasts for which many a Soviet woman is famous! - -Tipping was not allowed in the Red realm, for it indicated class -distinction. As all classes were supposed to be equal under -Communism, any breach of this regulation was severely punished. In -Yenan, an American GI tried to express his gratitude to a young -Communist for helping him make some furniture for his cave by -offering him a package of American cigarettes. The Chinese boy -frowned and backed away. “No, thank you,” he said, “I cannot accept -anything for my services. We are all equal now.” The American -shrugged slightly and put the cigarettes on a table. A few minutes -later, when his back was turned, the Chinese boy _and_ the cigarettes -had disappeared. The following day the American soldier found the -Communist youth smoking furiously behind a pile of rubbish. He -learned later that the boy had been spied upon by other Communist -youths who, out of envy or an excess of Party zeal, had beaten -him unmercifully. After generations of accepting the traditional -“cumshaw,” or little token of appreciation, it is well nigh -impossible to convince a Chinese, Communist or otherwise, that this -time-honored custom is wrong. - -During the war, all American troops stationed in Yenan lived in caves -on the level nearest the ground. This made for greater convenience -in getting in and out, in line with the wish of the Chinese -Communists to show the foreigner every courtesy. The Americans had -one small house built primarily to shelter the electric generator -they had brought with them, and here also lived the Commander of -the Americans. The generator made it possible for the Americans to -have the only electric light in Yenan. In contrast, the natives and -families of the Red Armies burned wicks in precious oil or built -small fires for occasional light. Their rule was to bed down with the -sun and to arise with the dawn. - -One other building allocated to the Americans was used as a -recreation room, where the GI’s and a highly selected group of -Chinese Communists played games and had their meals in common. This -group of Communists assigned to fraternize with the Americans was -headed by a fellow named Lock Ho, meaning “Old Horse,” whose job was -to start arguments and to guide the Americans in their thinking. The -GI’s were never allowed to fraternize with any Chinese who was not -thoroughly indoctrinated, even at the Saturday night dances. Nurses -from the International Hospital, students from Yenan University, -girls and women from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist -Party, other students, teachers and members of families of the -Communists, all were completely propagandized before being permitted, -or ordered, to attend the dances. In other words, the Americans -never came in contact with any Chinese who was not fully imbued with -the tenets of Communism. Be it said to the credit of the Americans, -the Reds, despite their efforts, were never able to work on the GI’s -with any degree of success. - -On hunting trips, a propaganda expert went along with the Americans, -but even this could not spoil the superb sport and the pleasure that -came from shooting an occasional wolf, mountain lion or tiger. The -pheasant coveys were numerous and the birds huge, making them much -sought-after additions to the monotonous diet. A man who was a good -shot, even with an old carbine, would bring down five to ten cocks -in a day. There were no bird dogs, but when Chu Teh, a fine shot -himself, and a tireless hunter, accompanied the group, he had his -bodyguard act as a retriever, a service the American “Imperialists” -did not have. - -The jeeps and trucks of the United States Army were a source of -wonder and terror to the natives, who were entirely unfamiliar with -any motor transportation. In this connection, pregnant women proved a -special headache to the GI’s. When the donkeys or Mongol ponies, on -which the pregnant ladies were riding, shied away or stood on their -hind legs at the approach of a vehicle, the ladies naturally fell off -their mounts screaming and yelling in their high, piercing voices as -they rolled into the dust or a ditch, their bundles and belongings -flying helter skelter in all directions. Even when the Americans -drove slowly or stopped, the havoc wrought was considerable. Many of -the pregnant riders were indignant and demanded “cumshaw,” or money, -to compensate for damages to their person and pride, but fortunately -there were never any serious accidents. - -Many things puzzled American soldiers in Yenan. One was how a Chinese -herdsman, driving dozens of sheep and pigs, could meet and pass, -on a narrow mountain path, another herdsman equally encumbered. -Amid ear-splitting squeals, grunts and Chinese swear words, men and -animals would pass each other without loss or mishap, each going in -his own direction, with his own animals intact! Surely no American -could accomplish such a feat. - -The GI’s had constant trouble with money. The Communists manipulated -the exchange any way they wished, but always in their own favor. -Nobody knew exactly how much money he was worth at any one time. -Eager to procure all the American dollars and Nationalist currency -possible to finance trips to the South for their agents, the -Communists put up their special script in small packages to entice -the Americans to purchase them for one United States dollar. They -were counting heavily on the GI’s never-failing interest in a -“souvenir to take home.” - -Every foreigner, on entering Yenan, was thoroughly briefed by the -Commander of the American Observer Group, who boarded incoming -planes. This presented a clear indication of Moscow influence. All -entrants were told never to use the word “coolie,” as it signified -class consciousness. They were not to mention the words “Reds” or -“Commies,” as these terms cast aspersions upon the dignity of their -hosts. All, Communists and non-Communists must be referred to as -“local people.” - -American movies were shown almost nightly out of doors in summer. -These were so superior to the Chinese or Russian movies that the -enthusiastic natives would pull down the gates of the Compound if any -effort was made to keep them out. In the winter, however, the movies -were shown indoors, and only guests invited by the Chinese Communists -were allowed to attend. Chu Teh was on hand almost nightly and was a -particular fan of Betty Hutton’s. He returned eight times to drink in -her charms as the heroine of the picture “Texas Guinan.” - -The only other movies were those supplied by the Chinese Communists. -Crude and boring, they were largely sent from the Kremlin, and were -in Russian with no Chinese sub-titles. A leader, in a sing-song -voice, gave the general idea of the picture, particularly stressing -the propaganda line it illustrated. The audience, not understanding -Russian, could hope for only slight amusement. - -Even the Hierarchy gave every evidence of preferring American films. -The lavish background in the Guinan picture made a particularly deep -impression, as it was such a far cry from the way even the most -important Chinese and Red Army officers and their families lived. In -the upper tiers of mud caves, dug into the soft cliffs, they existed -as primitively as had their ancestors thousands of years before them. -Little or no furniture cluttered the Reds’ caves, and almost all -their utensils were wooden bowls and horn cups. After the Americans -and the British came, the local people salvaged the tin cans thrown -out by the visitors and had them beaten into plates and dishes, -copied faithfully from the originals by the blacksmith. Unused to -comfort, their beds were skins thrown on boards or spread on the mud -floors—a sharp contrast to the luxury of the sleeping arrangement -built for Ambassador Hurley when he was in Yenan. This crude approach -to a truly beautiful Chinese bed was seven feet long, with rope slats -for a spring, rough unbleached sheets, and a pillow filled with -bird seed, or millet. It later became the property of the American -Military Commander and was always greatly admired and coveted by the -Chinese visitors. - -During these years, although life in Yenan was primitive and often -carefree, the Hierarchy never lost sight of the responsibilities that -lay ahead of them, and for these they tried to prepare themselves, -within the limits of their knowledge and capabilities. In 1946, -contrary to all Chinese Communist teachings, several American -soldiers were questioned extensively by the Communist leaders on -matters of capitalist etiquette and protocol. The Americans, amused -at their roles of male Emily Posts, accepted the challenge in the -finest American tradition. With grave faces and dressed in their -best, they gave cocktail parties, movie suppers, and even formal -sit-down dinners for the education of the distinguished members of -the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Table manners and light -conversation were stressed. The pupils were most appreciative of -these examples of Western culture and refinement and strove in every -way to learn their lessons and to act accordingly. - -Hugely enjoying this fascinating taste of the foreign, they put -together a so-called Jazz Band and held Saturday night dances that -were entirely Western in every respect, even to a crude rendition of -“_The Saint Louis Blues_.” Eager to have everything done in proper -Western style, the Red leaders provided their teachers with a list -of Central Committee Communist Party Members, arranged according -to rank, and insisted that the best State Department protocol be -observed and practiced rigidly. They were shrewd enough to realize, -even then, that in conquering new countries, they would have to have -more than one front man. At that time, Chou En-lai was their only -polished negotiator. He alone was able to meet foreigners on an equal -footing and was therefore obliged to be their Minister of Foreign -Affairs. - -The Communists in Yenan, as in all countries in the beginning of -their transition to slavery, adopted the term “New Democracy” -and made a great display of its outward form by allowing the -non-Communist peasants to “vote.” The outcome, of course, was -previously agreed upon. The balloting was merely a matter of form and -a means of convincing the people that they still were privileged to -make their own choice. The literate cast their vote by burning a hole -in the ballot with a lighted stick of punk, or incense, at the point -where the name of their candidate appeared. The illiterate dropped -a pea into a bowl or pitcher, placed in front of a picture of their -candidate. After the voting was over and the successful candidate -announced, a huge rally was held and the voter was constrained to -forget his choice, if unsuccessful, in a frenzy of dancing, shouting -and singing. After a few hours of this, the tired voter would wend -his way slowly homeward to his mud cave, or if he were a country man, -to his ancestral mud hut, often many miles away. - -The roads that lead into the Walled City of Yenan are -two-thousand-year-old trails used by the descendants, both man and -beast, of those earliest travellers. Both inside and out of the city, -little has changed. The men driving the camel caravans pad softly -through the dust, their animals heavily laden with burdens of fur -and other wares to be marketed in the city. They still practice the -age-old custom of putting a mask on the lead animal’s head, to drive -away the evil spirits. Water carriers, after dragging great buckets -of the muddy liquid from the river, chant their endless “water! -water!” as they go from cave to cave in the time-honored manner. -Food vendors, squatting in the dusty lanes cooking bits of lamb and -pork, roots and herbs over tiny charcoal braziers, cry out shrilly -to the passers-by, eating occasionally from the pot with their grimy -fingers. Half-naked babies crawl nearby, whimpering to their mothers, -who pacify them by giving them sweetened tree bark on which to chew. -Donkeys, heavily laden, and round Mongolian ponies jostle dog carts -and belabored oxen. Everywhere, cotton clad coolies, bowed beneath -huge bales of firewood, coal and charcoal, shuffle along the dusty -streets. For, alas, although the rickshaw and pedicab or bicycle -rickshaw has been banned as an occupation beneath the dignity of man, -the older use of man as a beast of burden has to be accepted. For -the very poor, there is nothing else to take his place. - -This, then, was Yenan in 1946. Now that the Communists have won China -and moved from the mud caves to the glamorous palaces of Peking, it -will be interesting to watch their actions. - -Will they be able to carry out their plan of communizing the entire -country? And how long will this take? Will China remain China for -the Chinese or, for the first time in nearly five thousand years, -will the once free peoples of this basically democratic country be -hopelessly enthralled by the yoke of tyranny? - -The Chinese have a quality that has distinguished them. This quality -is patience. The Communists too have patience, but only up to a -point. Beyond that they use force to accomplish their ends. - -There are literally hundreds of languages spoken in China—each -province speaks a different dialect. Moreover, aside from travel -between major cities, there is relatively little transportation and -practically no communication between smaller cities in the interior. -In view of these facts, is it not possible that the Russians will -find their progress slow? - -Will the Chinese absorb the Soviets as they did the Huns, the Mongols -and the Tartars? Time alone will give us the answers to these -questions. Time alone will prove the importance of the incubation -period spent in Yenan, and whether or not it was worth the sacrifices -made by the Reds. The die is cast. From it we shall learn what the -future holds for Asia, for Europe, and perhaps for ourselves as well. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Collectivize means controlled farming, where the peasants are -only hired hands. - - - - - CHAPTER III - - _Communist Personalities_ - - -The Central People’s Government of the Chinese Communist Party is -the ruling class. It makes the policy, enforces the laws and governs -with dictatorial power. Mao Tse-tung, at fifty-six, is Chairman and -Supreme Commander—for the time being at least. Directly responsible -to him are six Vice-Chairmen among whom is the famous Madame Sun -Yet-sen. Under these Vice-Chairmen are fifty-six Supreme and fifteen -Administrative Councilors, twenty Ministries and a political -Consultative Committee of one hundred and eighty Active Members. - -Mao Tse-tung, or Chairman Mao, is a rotund little figure, rather -dejected looking, with an undistinguished face, topped by a broad -forehead and a luxuriant crop of black hair. Now installed in Peking, -he dresses less slovenly than in those earlier days in Yenan when a -sloppy appearance was considered a badge of honor. - -His name, pronounced “Mout-zz-dung,” is easily mispronounced by -foreigners. Once, during the Japanese war, when Mao was in Chungking -for a short time, ostensibly to coordinate the Communist forces -with the Generalissimo’s war effort, he was consistently called -“Mousy-dung,” by Ambassador Hurley. In conferences, and with the -best intentions in the world, Hurley would keep saying, “Mr. -Mousy-dung,” this or that ..., while the Generalissimo would politely -cover his face with his hand to hide his smile and Mao would blush. -“Mousy-dung,” in a more common Chinese dialect means “the hole in -the water closet.” - -Earnest and zealous, Mao, a “China for the Chinese” promoter, and -therefore basically at odds with the Russians, speaks in a distinct, -sometimes shrill, high-pitched voice. He has a habit of quoting from -his wide reading. His oratory is forceful but, like Hitler’s, not -polished. Although brilliantly educated in the Chinese Classics and -familiar with ancient Greece and Rome through translations of their -history and literature, up to the time he left Yenan he had never -learned to speak or understand English. Nearly all foreigners relied -upon his interpreter when speaking to him. In spite of this, he held -one group of reporters spellbound for nearly three hours as he talked -to them in the Foreign Office cave, gesticulating nervously and -cracking watermelon seeds endlessly between his square white teeth. -Sometimes his sober countenance and intense preoccupation would amuse -foreigners. Hurley, after long hours of serious discussions, always -through an interpreter of course, would, on leaving, bow in sweeping -Western style and invariably say in English, “Good night, you sad -little apple you,” to his politely bowing host. - -Mao’s childhood was one of unusual drudgery. His father was a -peasant and a domestic tyrant. Understandably, the boy’s thoughts -were turned, at an early age, to revolution against authority and -oppression. He chopped off his pigtail in defiance of the Manchus and -joined other restless youths who had a hand in the formation of the -Chinese Communist Party. A few years later, largely through his help, -this party was joined briefly to the revolutionary party of Dr. Sun -Yat-sen, which Russia was then aiding. - -Years of civil war had taught Mao the technique of guerilla warfare, -as well as the qualities necessary for leadership. He likens his -guerilla tactics to the behavior of fleas. “We attack by night,” -he says, “and wear out strong men.” In 1927 he became President of -the first Chinese Peasants Union and has never lost his standing -with it. The ignorant peasants are always impressed not only by his -rugged and often ruthless qualities, but also by his great learning -and his ability to write Chinese poetry in the classic style. In the -early days, he won their further applause by moving freely among the -people, organizing rickshaw boys into labor unions, and sometimes -pulling them about in rickshaws himself, while he talked intimately -of the glories of Communism. - -Most of the activities of the Communist Party in the early days were -carried on in the South, especially around Canton. By 1934, however, -the Nationalists had gained such power that the Communists were -forced to leave the Southern province of Kiangsi for the Northern -caves of Yenan. This, the “Long March,” was a journey of thousands -of miles, travelled on foot, partly over almost impassable trails -and some of the highest mountains and largest rivers in Asia. In -three hundred and sixty-eight days, eighteen major mountain passes -were crossed, five of them snow-capped, and twenty-four rivers were -forded. At each stop that was made, the marchers ravaged villages, -impoverished the well-to-do, and persuaded the poorer peasants to -join them. They whipped up such a frenzied crusade that their ranks -were swelled by thousands. So strenuous was the journey, however, -that at its end only twenty thousand men and women were left, ten -thousand having fallen by the way. Those who survived were tough, -one may be sure. A much-quoted legend has grown up about Mao, the -stalwart leader, which tells how he stumbled along barefooted, -refusing a wounded soldier’s offer to share a pony’s back. “No,” said -Mao to the soldier, “your wounds are worse than mine. We shall suffer -and fight together. That is what makes us comrades.” - -Mao’s domestic career, like his political one, has been stormy. His -first wife, a child, was forced upon him by his parents, at the -age of fourteen. In his opinion, she does not count, and he never -mentions her. His second, a school teacher’s daughter, is said to -have been shot by a Nationalist General. His third was the heroine -of the “Long March,” and Mao had just cause to be proud of her. -Tall, frail looking, clever and high spirited, she was sometimes -argumentative, behavior unheard of in a Chinese women. A female -soldier, she is said to have received many wounds in battle. She also -gave birth to a son by Mao during the “Long March,” but when the -going became too difficult and unsafe she left the child along the -way with old peasants who were unable to join the marchers. - -Alas for this brave wife, when Mao met the beauteous movie actress -Lang Ping, on arriving in Yenan, she was completely forgotten. He -was so enraptured with the newcomer that he sent his wife to Moscow, -normally a reward sought after by any Communist. In this case it was -only a face-saving gesture, however, and there were rumors that the -rejected woman contracted tuberculosis and died. Mao’s new marriage -to Lang Ping caused a flutter of excitement and alarm in Yenan, -where the Communists knew and admired the courage and fortitude of -his third wife and where she was held in esteem. News of this flurry -of unrest reached the Comintern in Moscow, where the practice of -casually exchanging wives was recognized, if not encouraged. There -Mao’s conduct was dismissed lightly, and the Chinese Communists were -told that the matter was to be regarded as “personal, not a Party -affair.” - -During the war, Mao lived happily in a cave in Yenan with wife Number -Four. Both dressed simply in blue uniforms padded with cotton in the -winter. In spite of this simplicity they enjoyed more privileges -than the average Communist. They ate special meals and had extra -rations of cigarettes, which Mao liked to chain-smoke. He and his -ex-movie starlet went, occasionally, to Saturday night dances given -for the Party workers. Here an improvised orchestra struggled with -Viennese waltzes, known to be Mao’s favorites, along with scattered -bits of boogie-woogie. Mao also liked Chinese translations of Russian -songs, but whatever the music, he and his wife swung into action with -genuine enthusiasm. - -On the whole, Mao’s simple life adds to his popularity. A Mao-myth, -similar to the Stalin-myth, is being built up about him, and by -similar means. His picture is everywhere. His words are repeated and -his name is spoken with reverence. In 1937, Mao wrote a letter to -Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party in the United States, in -which he said, in part: “We feel that when we achieve victory (in -China) this victory will be of considerable help to the struggle -of the American people for liberation.” Mao signed his letter, -“President of the Chinese Soviet Republic.” - -Today, Mao is not only the most influential Communist in China, -but probably, next to Stalin, the most powerful Red on earth. With -Kremlin approval, he controls, temporarily more than four hundred -and sixty million people, which is three times the population of the -United States and double that of Russia. A typical student of the -methods of Moscow, in spite of his devotion to Confucius and Plato, -he has no compunction whatever about condemning thousands to death -upon suspicion that their loyalties are slipping. Aware of this -quality in him, Japanese and Korean Communist representatives have -declared him, “The Symbol of the struggle for emancipation of all -the peoples of the Orient.” They claim he has attained his position -of power through his sincere and idealistic solicitude for China’s -masses and his realism in bringing about reforms. His enemies, -however, intimate that his “realism” has not excluded any means to -gain his ends, from walking out of attempted peace conferences to -assassinations. - -The second most important man in Communist China, now that the war -with the Chinese Nationalists is over, is Chu Teh, pronounced “Ju -Duh,” Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist Armies. He is -often called the “Red Heart” of Communist China, as contrasted -with Mao’s nickname of the “Red Brain.” Number Two in the Hierarchy -is a plump, jolly, genial-appearing fellow. Looking anything but a -martinet, he has a broad, disarming smile which shows a wide expanse -of pink gum. He loves to trot about chucking little children under -the chin. Born with a gold spoon in his mouth, he was a reckless -though courageous child who always wanted to be a soldier and kept -breaking away from an early existence of luxury and high living. -Rich at the outset, he became even richer through “squeeze” in a -government financial post. Son of a family of overlords, he rose -to power and wealth despite his addiction to opiates while still a -youth. His early use of opium can be laid to his parents. They spread -the thick, gooey, sweet-smelling stuff on sugar cane and gave it -to him to suck at night—a common practice of the time to still an -infant’s nocturnal wails. - -Chu Teh had a large family of wives, concubines and children. He was -past forty when he decided to leave them all and devote his entire -future and fortune to the revolutionary ideal that burned fanatically -within him. After squandering part of his wealth and donating the -rest to the Communist cause, he plundered public funds in order to -leave his large household well established in a comfortable residence. - -Chu was persuaded that the revolution of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911 -had proved to be an utter failure for the masses. In his opinion, -it lacked the spark of a vigorous ideological revolution, because -it only substituted one bureaucracy for another. He longed to -modernize China and to emulate the Marxian heroes of the West. In -order to further his ambitions and to carry out his ideals, Chu -put a large foot in the mouth of tradition and, having abandoned -his family, swashbuckled into Shanghai to meet and mingle with the -Nationalist revolutionaries. These he joined temporarily, but he -was always regarded by them with a jaundiced eye. They even went -so far as to try to kill him one night when a Nationalist officer -invited him to dinner. Chu scented danger. Realizing at the same -time that his host was naive and impressionable, he flashed one -of his face-consuming smiles, followed by a rat-a-tat fire of -vitriolic conversation damning Communism. He fondled the feminine -entertainers, recited sensuous love sonnets, and generally made -himself the life of the party. It worked. His would-be murderous host -was completely captivated, and Chu escaped without a scratch! In like -fashion, by such guile and beguiling ways, Chu’s predecessors, under -Genghis Khan, performed the remarkable feat in the 13th century of -subjugating the entire country. The old party tricks are still up to -date! - -A practical fellow, with more intestinal fortitude than his habits -would indicate, Chu picked up his meager belongings a little later on -and went to Germany to study the Marxian and the Russian Revolutions -with the Communists there. He moved on up the scale to Moscow, -matriculated in the Eastern Toilers’ Union, where he studied under -the best Communist teachers. When he came back to Shanghai, he -regaled his friends with what he had learned in Germany and Russia. -“I am determined to make this work in China,” he vowed. To this -end, he placed great emphasis on guerilla warfare, the people’s -self-defense corps, to suppress activities of traitors, draw out -information about the enemy, and guard military secrets. His military -tactics are the same as those of the Huns of Attila, the Mongols -of Genghis Khan and the Tartars of Tamerlane. Let the enemy be the -source of supplies—the enemy being anyone who has anything you want. - -As far back as 1927, Earl Browder had been in China helping the -Communists plant the seeds for the future control of that country. -They had planned on Chiang Kai-shek playing the role of Kerensky in -Russia—that of being a temporary leader of the Chinese to be kicked -out as soon as he had defeated the warlords in southern and central -China. Chiang, however, was more than a match for them and succeeded -in blocking their “October Revolution.” He took over, on the death -of Sun Yat-sen, and ousted all of the Russian advisors and so-called -“master minds,” who had been posing as friends. The Kremlin whimpered -and licked its wounds, preparing a relentless revenge. - -This was the only serious set-back they encountered until Tito -deserted and U. S. aid in 1947 saved Greece, Italy and France. -Their hatred of Chiang, therefore, was deeply rooted and they had -discredited him and his government in every way prior to their -take-over of the country when we, the U. S., failed China in 1946 and -1947. - -In 1928, Chu joined forces with Mao, and together they founded the -first Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army in Kiangsi Province. -Chu became Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army in China. With Mao, he -led the “Long March” to Yenan. Unlike Mao, who will stop at nothing -to gain his ends, Chu has a Robin Hood quality that makes him a -friend to the poor, with whom he is ever gaining in popularity. When -the peasants, for example, complain bitterly that the soldiers are -stealing from them (a time-honored custom among Asiatic troops), -he forces them to return the stolen goods. Often, as a matter of -discipline for other offenses, and as a demonstration to convince -the peasants of his “sincerity” as to looting, he gathers the entire -village together and gives the populace the satisfaction of seeing -the worst looters shot. “No more looting,” he says, shaking a long -bony finger. “Hereafter, when we need anything we will ‘confiscate’ -it from the rich, our natural enemies, who use cheap and offensive -tactics against us.” - -In spite of an occasional shooting, Chu is popular with his troops -and has been able to recruit from one to two million guerillas, -both men and women. One of the latter, a pistol-packing Amazon -named K’ang K’eching, revived his temporarily restrained love life. -Dressed as a man, this big-boned siren with platter-sized hands and -feet, approached him one day and told him she and her companions had -captured a machine gun. Would he teach her how to use it? He would, -indeed, for he was delighted with this husky bit of pulchritude. He -continued to teach her many other guerilla tricks, and from these -lessons romance flowered. The next year she became Mrs. Chu Teh, and -the newlyweds set up housekeeping in a cave in Yenan. - -Sometimes, on weekends, Chu would leave his cave-office and the -headaches that beset him there. Sniffing the fresh air as though it -held an alien fragrance, and baring his buck teeth in a flash grin, -he would ask in Chinese: “What’s cooking?” This was not idle slang -with him. When soldiers in the Red Army have been rewarded for some -deed, they often use the small change they receive to buy a goose -which they roast and share with their comrades. A standing joke among -them was that since General Chu could not be rewarded—there being no -immediate superior to bestow such favor—he could always smell a goose -and thereby get himself invited to a meal. Among the soldiers he was -nicknamed “The Cook,” and not alone for his interest in the kitchen. -Once, disguised as a cook, he was cornered behind Chiang Kai-shek’s -lines. With revolvers poked into his ribs, he yelled: “Don’t shoot! I -can cook for you!” The hungry soldiers, touched to their taste buds, -hesitated for a closer inspection. When he was recognized and the cry -“kill him!” went up, Chu whipped out a concealed pistol, shot the -crier, overcame a guard and fled. - -Always able to compensate by his keen wits for lack of material, -he is one of the most talented products of Moscow’s training. He -has taught his troops to use the old steppe dweller method of -getting much needed equipment from the enemy. In addition, he has -successfully augmented his supplies with material obtained from the -Japanese and the Russians. In spite of Chu’s long association with -Marx and Moscow, he probably has the interests of China at heart to -such an extent that the Moscow yoke could cause him to revolt. Chu -can be likened in the Chinese Communist Hierarchy, to Budnenie in -the Russian Soviet Army and left in political isolation after his -usefulness is over. Not a political figure, but entirely military, -Chu will never compete with Mao. - -The third most important man in Communist China, who was the -Number Two during the war with Japan, is Chou En-lai. His name is -pronounced “Joe-n-lie.” Like “Mousy-dung,” the name has given rise -to considerable amusement. Chou himself, unlike Mao, never failed to -be highly entertained when Ambassador Hurley saluted him with the -familiar “Hi, Joe!” - -The Party’s most polished envoy, Chou is practically the only one -capable of meeting foreign dignitaries with ease. He is wily, clever -at negotiation and, like the Property Man of Chinese drama, set the -stage for the spectacular performance before a world audience of the -talks with General Marshall in 1945. As “Chief Front Man” and one of -the directors of foreign propaganda, Chou did such a consummate job -that Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart told friends, “He presents his -case better than anyone I have ever encountered, clearly, forcefully, -urbanely.” Chou was urbane, certainly, for at a large cocktail party -he charmed the peace negotiators of all three parties, including -Stuart and Marshall. The tired “diplomats” sought respite in small -chow and small talk, and for an hour Chou showed himself the polite, -intelligent, agreeable mixer that he is. Stuart, a scholar and an -intellectual, told me in Nanking: “Whenever I cannot get a point -across to Chou, I talk the matter over with some of my students at -Yenching University. They discuss it with Chou and a solution is -arrived at immediately.” - -It is no secret that the young intelligentsia of the Chinese -Communist Party were reared and fostered under Stuart’s faithful -hand, as President of Yenching University, near Peking. He gave his -best and his all to represent the United States, yet he was an old -and tired man, and his ideologies and hopes for the Chinese people -were wrapped up in a belief that the salvation of their country lay -in Socialism. The only group capable of carrying out these ideals -was the Chinese Communist Party, which, like its dictator, was -ready to prostitute Socialism and replace it with its own brand of -dictatorship. - -Following the cheerful little get-togethers, the negotiators would -return to their arguments, hammer and sickle, and Chou’s charm was -abruptly turned off. On one or two occasions, however, this charm -caused the Hierarchy embarrassment. For instance, he was recalled to -the “Ivory Tower” in Yenan once because Mao felt that he had gone too -far in his talks with Marshall; that he had appeared to be making -too many concessions, even though he told a comrade he had not the -slightest intention of ever living up to any of them. Moreover, he -seemed to be getting too friendly with Marshall. Chou spent many -unhappy hours in the Chinese Communist dog house in consequence. - -After he confessed, with mock solemnity, to the error of his ways -and promised “Papa Mao” to be a “good boy,” Chou was sent back to -Nanking to continue the negotiations. (Mao had to send him back -anyway, because he was the only man in the Chinese Communist Party at -the time who could do the job). To prove that he was now “reformed,” -Chou let out a series of blasts against the United States Government -that were more violent and vitriolic than any that had yet come from -Communist Headquarters. Among other things, he accused President -Truman of fomenting the civil war and of trying to turn China into an -American Colony. - -As an individual, Chou En-lai appears to many by far the most -personable of all the Chinese Communist leaders. Of medium height, he -is well built and well groomed. At press interviews he has a nervous -habit of removing and replacing his black-rimmed glasses as he talks. -His broad, handsome face is distinguished by thick eyebrows and clear -cut features. He speaks English in a well-modulated, yet vibrant -and dramatic voice, undoubtedly cultivated while acting in amateur -theatricals in college in Tientsin. There he frequently took the -feminine lead, because of his facial beauty and willowy figure, and -it was there that he first learned to speak English. - -I had several conversations with Chou En-lai in Nanking, always -speaking through an interpreter. Once, after several hours of -laborious questions and answers, I said: “Will you ask the General if -he came through Moscow on his return to China from Europe?” At this, -Chou threw back his head and laughed heartily. “Heck no,” he said in -plain American, “I couldn’t speak any Russian then!” I should have -realized that nearly all Chinese pretend they understand no English, -hoping they may catch you off guard. - -Chou’s grandfather was a high official in the Manchu Dynasty, his -father a school teacher, and his mother an unusually well-read woman. -Reared as an intellectual, if not moneyed, aristocrat, he early -rebelled against the corruption of Chinese politicians. He went to -France in 1920, and in Paris two years later founded the Chinese -Youth Group, a branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning -to China, he became a secret organizer of workers in Shanghai and -Nanking, successfully engineering two revolts. Because of his -ruthlessness he was called “Executioner,” a title that certainly -belies his suave appearance. - -The Nationalists always considered Chou one of their cleverest -foes, and they are said to have offered $80,000 for him once, dead -or alive. During the war he never actually soldiered, although he -“assumed” the title of “General.” He did help to organize and served -for a time with the Chinese Red Army in several minor operations -in the capacity of Chief Political Commissar. With a magnificent -flair for political education and propaganda, he won his present -outstanding position as a member of the Politburo, which rules the -Red-blighted areas wherever they may be. He learned much from Michael -Borodin, Russian-born Communist, and also from Chiang Kai-shek’s -one-time Russian advisor, Gallen, who later, as General Bleucher, -commanded the Russian Far Eastern Army. - -Chou is not afraid of work. Toiling late at night, he writes articles -for the press and prepares lengthy speeches for the radio. He has -been able to convert many U. S. State Department officials to the -view that in helping Chiang, we were backing the wrong horse and -should, instead, have put our money on the Red. From Earl Browder, to -whom he wrote in 1937, we learn this: “Comrade, do you still remember -the Chinese comrades who worked with you in China ten years ago?”—in -1927! - -Chou is a true turncoat and has served, back and forth, both the -Nationalists and the Communist Governments. One job he held during -the war was liaison officer between the Nationalists and Communists -in their so-called drive against the Japanese. This was a smoke -screen, for when Chiang ordered Communist troops to fight the -Japanese north of the Yangtse River, Chou violently objected. He knew -that he and the Communists would either starve or be annihilated by -the Japanese. Thereafter, the Communists pulled their anti-Japanese -punches, or did not punch at all. - -As “Property Man” for the great drama being staged by the Communists, -Chou always listens to the prompting voice from the wings, the voice -of his wife. Her’s is a strong, clear voice, the one that converted -him to Communism, and the one that reminds him constantly of his -duties. He met her during one of the lowest ebbs of his erratic -life, in jail. Mrs. Chou is one of the hardest working and most -enthusiastic and important members of the Party. Not especially -pretty, she is attractive in a quiet way. In spite of illness (she -is said to have tuberculosis), she remains politically active and -influential. Like her husband, she once held a post in Chiang’s -Government, as Finance Chairman of his New Life Movement. - -More favored by Moscow than either Mao, Chu or Chou, is Li Li San, -whose name is pronounced “Lee Lee Sahn.” Long ago, he and Mao -quarrelled bitterly, and Li Li San fled to Russia, there to become -close to the heart of the Comintern. Fifteen years later, this lean -and hungry-looking agitator returned as Moscow’s appointee to the -head political role in Manchuria. A rumored cause of the rift with -Mao was that Li Li was caught heading an anti-Mao secret society, -with Russian connivance. The angle of their Communism differs. Mao, -a peasant, supports the farmers, while Li Li San, with his Moscow -training, favors the city workers. - -Probably few men in history have been reported dying or dead over a -long period of their lives more often than has Li Li San. Nicknamed -the “Tito of Red China,” when Tito was still dominated by Moscow, his -career followed closely that of his namesake. After quarreling with -Mao, he vanished and was presumed dead by his friends. Some years -later he reappeared, with full Russian support, as a power to be -reckoned with in the Far Eastern picture. - -While in Moscow, Li Li had married a Russian woman and, in the Far -Eastern University had trained Communist agents and sent them back -to their homelands as agitators. He maintained a close liaison with -the Kremlin. As Russia’s war with Japan was nearing an end, Stalin, -ignoring Li Li’s petty dispute with Mao, sent him, with Marshal -Malinovsky’s Russian Army of Mongols, into Manchuria six days before -the Japanese surrendered. His job was to take over this “Prize of -Asia,” rich in everything the Russians or anybody else needed and -which no contester for world power could do without. - -Another important military personality in the Communist picture -is Lin Piao, pronounced “Lin Bow.” A great guerilla fighter and a -natural leader of men, he is a tactical genius who served on Chiang -Kai-shek’s staff and rose to become President of the Military -Academy. A little later he left the Nationalists and threw in his lot -with the Red Army. At twenty-eight he was given command of the First -Red Army Corps, a unit that is said never to have been defeated. Lin -Piao was to the Chinese Communist Army what Zukov was to the Russian -Army, Chief of Staff and a military wizard. - -Today, Lin, in his forties, has never gotten over his youthful -tendency to blush. His agreeable face has slanting eyes that trail -off into little mice tail wrinkles. He is a sloppy dresser and is -over-casual in appearance. He has a good singing voice and he and -Mao, who also fancies himself a singer, often join in duets. After a -hearty meal when all are feeling warm and rosy from the choicest wine -of the Communist vineyards, Lin likes to tune up his vocal chords and -suggest that they sing Mao’s special song, “The Hot Red Pepper.” - -This is the story of the Red Pepper who sneers at all the lazy -vegetables for living such a spineless existence, especially the -fat and contented cabbage. Finally, the Red Pepper, by means of -his exceptional personality and cunning ways, incites them all to -revolution. - -The theory, Mao says, is that pepper is loved by all revolutionaries -from Spain and Mexico to Russia. Lin, like many of the Communist -leaders, has never been out of China, but because of his excellent -articles in military magazines his name is familiar in both Japan and -Russia. - -The Hierarchy of the Chinese Communist Party has attached to it -a liaison officer originally from the Third Internationale, a -Syrian-American named Dr. Hatem. His Chinese name is Ma Hia-teh, -pronounced “Ma-High-Da,” and he is always referred to by the -Chinese as “Dr. Ma.” Fiftyish and fat, he is typically American -in appearance, resembling more than anything else a successful -businessman. Born in Buffalo, New York, he was educated in North -Carolina and in Switzerland where he is said to have received a -degree in medicine. He has been with the Communists now for about -twelve years. So completely submerged is he in Communist ideologies, -he insists he has forgotten his American name. - -Proud of having an ardent foreign convert, the Communists still do -not trust Dr. Hatem politically, although they use him wherever -they need information from Americans. Because of his ingratiating -manner, he is a natural to make lonely Americans open up their hearts -to an old friend from home. He enjoys strutting about among his -Chinese and foreign friends and bragging about his connections. His -chief value to the Communists, however, is his ability to evaluate -American newscasts. In the summer of 1946, he was seen almost daily -at the fashionable Peking Hotel, immaculately groomed and wearing -well-tailored clothes. There he spent hours eating and drinking with -the foreign diplomats and correspondents. - -Married to a Chinese movie actress—they all lean in that direction—he -has a son about three or four years old. Mrs. Ma is a graduate of -the Lu Hsun Art Academy, formerly the Catholic Church in Yenan, and -is accustomed to wearing silk and using cosmetics. She finds it -quite a bore to obey the Communist dictates of “cotton clothes and -no make-up,” and on several occasions she has been called down for -making a “spectacle” of herself. Being a Russian-language student and -much younger than her husband, she was constantly in the company of -a young Russian doctor who was part of the Soviet liaison group in -Yenan. - -Dr. Ma is a most enthusiastic Communist worker, who has remarked many -times that he would gladly “kill for the Cause.” He has been known to -add with emphasis, “And I would just as soon kill Americans as anyone -else!” He is said, despite his loose tongue, to stand well with -Moscow because he is such a willing tool. - -No panorama of Communist personalities can be complete without the -name of Madame Sun Yat-sen, famous in Chinese history as the wife -of the founder of the Revolution that overthrew the Manchu Dynasty. -Madame Sun, sister of the celebrated Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and the -slightly less illustrious Madame H. H. Kung, is known widely as “one -of the famous Soong Sisters.” The middle one of the three—Eiling, -Chingling and Meiling—Chingling is listed on the new governmental -roster as Soong Chingling, perhaps to cause less embarrassment to her -family. She is in charge of the so-called “independent liberals” in -the Party. - -Under her maiden name, this clever conniver has had a somewhat stormy -career. Claiming that she shuns publicity, she has, nevertheless, -managed to stay in the limelight a large part of her life. The -daughter of Charlie Soong, a wealthy merchant who had been reared by -a missionary and educated in America, she was one of six children and -is said to have been her mother’s favorite. Chingling has been called -a pretty child and a not-so-pretty child, so that one might infer -that her beauty lies rather in her personality than in her face. As -a young girl, she was on the “dreamy” side, rather shy but highly -emotional. When she is deeply aroused over a person or a cause, she -becomes enthusiastic to the point of fanaticism, a quality that has -proved alarming and distressing to the other members of her family. - -Educated in the United States, she adopted the American name of -“Rosamond,” by which her classmates at Wesleyan College, in Macon, -Georgia, called her affectionately. Her teachers said that she was -“very studious, had high ideals and was extremely interested in -moral and philosophical ideas.” No timid flower, she showed a fiery -temper when provoked. Very proud of her country and interested in its -affairs, she often said that she considered the Revolution of 1911 -the “Greatest event of the Twentieth Century.” - -“Rosamond’s” English was excellent, and she wrote numerous articles -for the college paper, one of which read: “When China moves, she -will move the world. The Revolution has established China in Liberty -and Equality, those two inalienable rights of the individual....” -A copy of this was sent to her father, who was so pleased with his -daughter that he forwarded to her one of the new five barred flags of -the Republic of China. On receiving it, Chingling shouted with joy, -climbed up and pulled down the dragon banner from the wall of her -bedroom, and stomped on it crying, “Down with the dragon! Up with the -flag of the Republic!” - -While still in college, Chingling began a hero worship of Dr. Sun. -When she returned to China, she shocked everyone by announcing -her determination to marry him—this, although he was married to a -woman his own age who had borne him three sons, of whom Dr. Sun Fo -undoubtedly is the best known. Subsequently she became his secretary -and, with skill and determination, aided by her youth and beauty, she -finally overcame all obstacles and, in 1915, became the second Madame -Sun Yet-sen. Basking in all the excitement and publicity she so -“abhorred,” she wrote to a classmate back at Wesleyan, “Being married -to Dr. Sun is just like going to school all over again, only there -are no examinations to take!” - -The marriage lasted until Dr. Sun’s death, in 1925. They had the -usual ups and downs, but she reported to her friends from time to -time that “it never lacks excitement.” The Revolution inspired by -her husband, Communistic in its original structure, shifted back and -forth from reactionary to conservative to reactionary. - -On the death of Dr. Sun, the reins of the revolution were put -into the hands of Madame Sun’s brother-in-law, Chiang Kai-shek. -Never in harmony, politically or emotionally, Chiang and Mme. Sun -had had many violent disagreements. Finally, in 1927, two years -after her husband’s death, she confirmed her leftist sympathy by -going to Moscow. There she remained for three years, studying -Communist doctrines in the World Anti-Imperialist League. In -self-justification, she claimed that the Nationalist Government had -distorted the meaning of her husband’s original ideas, that they had -always been similar to those of the Russian Revolution. - -Again, in 1930, Mme. Sun, the former Soong Chingling, burst into -print in an angry tirade against the Generalissimo. On January 22nd -of that year, she sent a cable to the Anti-Imperialist League in -Berlin, saying: “Reactionary forces in the Nationalist Government -are combining with the Imperialists in brutal repression against the -Chinese masses. They have degenerated into Imperialist tools and -attempted to provoke war with Russia.” - -Feeling ever closer to the Communists and farther, ideologically, -from the rest of her family, she chose the anniversary of the -eightieth birthday of her predecessor, the first Madame Sun, to -take her stand, in 1946, in favor of the Chinese Communists and -the Soviets. Her stinging speech was headlined in every Chinese -newspaper and many abroad. There could be no doubt now that she was -a full-fledged militant Communist, willing to use the powers of her -brilliant mind and persuasive personality to the utmost. - -Today, nearing sixty, she is third Vice-Chairman of the Communist -Party, and her influence is, perhaps, the strongest and most forceful -of any women member, so global are her contacts. Soon after her -“elevation” to the third Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party -early in 1950, she said: “China will continue to follow the policy -of leaning to one side, to the side led by the great Soviet Union -under the leadership of the mighty Stalin: the side of peace and -construction.” - -A current rumor, despite denials, is to the effect that Mme. Sun may -be having another change of ideas and ideals and is, therefore, not -in the good graces of General Mao who, like his mentors, Stalin and -Genghis Khan, hates a turncoat. - -In appearance, Madame Sun is not unattractive. She dresses simply, -preferring plain silks without the elaborate trimmings so dearly -loved by her sisters. She wears her neat, black hair parted in the -center and drawn back smoothly from her face to form a large, soft -“bun” at the nape of her neck. She speaks in a quiet voice and says -exactly what she thinks. - -At the Shanghai Opera one evening in 1946, Madame Wei Tao-ming, wife -of the then Chinese Ambassador to the United States, was seated just -behind her. Madame Sun, who was flanked on either side by well-known -Chinese and American Communists, turned around at each intermission -to chat with Madame Wei, who had been one of the youngest and most -devout revolutionaries. I learned the subject of the conversations -that evening when we returned to Madame Wei’s temporary home in the -Avenue Lafayette. Livid with rage, Madame Wei said to me: - -“Do you know what she kept saying to me, over and over again?” - -Naturally I could not have known and said as much. Madame Wei -continued: - -“She berated me bitterly for not being nicer to the Communists! Me, -of all people, who was one of the first and hardest working fighters -in her husband’s own revolution! She said, ‘You’re going to regret it -one day, if you do not change your attitude. They are in the driver’s -seat, and they are going to stay there’!” - -I had never seen Madame Wei so beside herself with anger. This -was just four years before it was generally acknowledged that -the Communists were in full authority, and the period of tenure -is a matter of conjecture. Madame Sun, apparently, had seen the -handwriting on the wall and had interpreted it correctly. - - * * * * * - -While there are many other Communist personalities aside from those -discussed in the foregoing pages, to mention them all would do no -service to this story. Those included are the ones whose names appear -most frequently in the press and on the radio. To know them and their -ways is to know the spirit and the methods of the unholy movement to -which they subscribe. - - - - - CHAPTER IV - - _Communism’s Forebears_ - - -Who are these people who have conquered most of Europe and Asia and -openly flaunt their determination to conquer the world? Where did -they come from? How have they been able to enslave approximately nine -hundred million people? Do they really have the secrets of the A and -H bombs? Will they use them to fulfill their diabolical schemes? And -when? - -The answers to these questions are vital to all people—to every -American, man, woman and child. Not even in the days of Genghis -Khan was there such a tremendous upheaval over so vast an area of -the earth’s surface, as the one we are witnessing, as we pass the -half-way mark of the Twentieth Century. - -Long before Moses was found in the bullrushes, the people who lived -in the Northern steppe lands sucked hardship from their mothers’ -breasts and grew into sturdy savages, mortally feared by their -neighbors. They were Asiatics, that is, they belonged to the Yellow -Race, the best known tribes of which are the Huns, the Mongols and -the Tartars. Today, “Mongol” is the common name given to people -comprising nearly all of Central Asia. Destiny gave a strange role to -these fearless nomads. Blood-thirsty and aggressive, time and again -they burst the seams of their homelands and overran most of Europe -and Asia. Each time they rose to world conquest, the pattern followed -was the same. Guided by the genius of a merciless and brilliant -individual, the dominant tribe or clan ran the full gamut from -tribal communism, necessary in the early days for self-preservation -and mutual benefit, to communistic imperialism. As the tribes grew -larger and more powerful, and the value of the spoils increased -enormously, several leaders struggled for complete control. This -struggle ended in a period of despotic dictatorship, when one man -gained supreme power and wielded it ruthlessly. The period of -oppression lasted, at various times in the past, anywhere from a -few years to a few hundred years, depending upon the foresight and -strategy of the rulers. Invariably, the dictatorship disintegrated, -and the empires fell into dissolution and decline, followed by -desolation and chaos. The method by which each nomad chieftain rose -to power was strikingly similar. He would consistently strengthen his -armies and trap his victims by guile, trickery, infiltration, and -every known deceit. - -Succession to the leadership of the clan, tribe or nation was not -necessarily hereditary. It could pass from father to son or outside -the family, just as in the Soviet Hierarchy today succession -passes from Party member to Party member. Then, as now, it was the -strongest physically, and the cunningest mentally, who always assumed -leadership. - -These primitive conquerors had several great advantages over their -more civilized neighbors. One was their extraordinary physical -stamina. The weeding out of the weak began practically at birth. -Children, weaned from mother’s milk, were fed on mare’s milk for a -few years and then were left to care for themselves as best they -could. - -As clans gathered around the open fires, where all the food was -cooked in huge pots, the strongest men ate first; the aged and women -next; and the children were left to fight over the bones and scraps. -Food was abundant in the spring when mutton, game and fish were -available. In the early winter the hordes lived largely on millet, -and fermented mare’s milk. The latter had a high alcoholic content -and was quite “heady” for the younger children. By the end of the -winter, the clansmen were reduced to foraging and making raids on the -herds of other tribes. The old and weak were left to perish. Only the -hardiest survived. - -Another great advantage of the militant nomads over their victims -was their ability to ride the horse. Everywhere else in the ancient -world, this animal was used only to draw the heavy war chariots. -The Mongols, fearing nothing, mastered the horse and became expert -cavalrymen. The resulting mobility was a tremendous asset in warfare. -Without the horse, the Mongols would never have been able to conquer -such vast territories. Learning to ride as children of three or four, -they were superb horsemen in their early manhood and hunted with -consummate skill. When they appeared upon the horizon in a cloud of -dust and with a clatter of hooves, it was only a matter of minutes -before each dropped down like an eagle upon his prey. - -Of even more strategic importance was their conception of the fifth -column. Poor always, in comparison with their neighbors, whose lands -and goods they coveted, they—like their Russian descendants—developed -a technique of boring from within. Ahead of them were sent -humble-looking barterers or beggars, who easily bribed and cajoled -their way inside the walls of a city. At the critical moment, the -unfortunate citizens would find their gates open and hordes of wild -tribesmen bursting in upon them with bloodcurdling yells. - -Whether at home or in the field, these nomads lived in yurts, or -domelike tents, made of felt and mounted on wooden carts, drawn by -oxen. They spent most of their days on horseback, hunting, fishing -and constantly fighting among themselves and with neighboring clans. -Often they remained in the saddle for days, eating little or no food. - -Between each major conquest, there were long periods when fighting -was confined to the steppe lands. It was only when an outstanding -genius appeared that they attempted the invasion of the more -civilized countries—Europe, China or the Near East—which, throughout -the ages, were constantly on the defensive against them. - -One of the first of these tribes that grew to world power was led -by Attila the Hun, in the Fifth Century. Slashing and murdering his -way through Europe, he terrorized the entire continent and captured -the greatest city of antiquity, Rome. Earlier, when Rome fell to the -Goths, the citizens though that surely the end of the world had come. -It was not until the Huns attacked, however, that they felt the full -fury of Asiatic destruction and torture. - -Attila was a typical Mongol of his day. Shaggy-headed, dirty and -disheveled, his gorilla-like appearance evoked as much terror as if -he had been a wild animal. With as little regard for human suffering -as for the priceless treasures of Rome, he was lustful only for -power, wine and women. He is said to have kept a huge harem, and, -like his followers, to have left countless children by captured -slaves all over Europe and Asia. Because of his merciless brutality, -plundering and rape, he was called by his victims, “The Scourge of -God.” - -In 451 A. D., Attila was finally defeated, and while celebrating the -addition of a new beauty to his harem, he died. He had taken from the -world, by force, everything he wanted, because he knew no other way -to get it. His vast and powerful empire collapsed like a house of -cards and fell into utter ruin. - -Approximately seven hundred years later came the most brilliant, the -most destructive, and the most incredible of all the forerunners of -Communism, Genghis Khan. He conquered not only the major part of -Europe and almost all of Northern Asia, but also established powerful -dynasties in Persia and China. - -Born in 1162 A. D., Genghis Khan, at thirteen, succeeded his -father as Chief of the Yakka Mongols. A robust lad, he was tall -and broad-shouldered. His eyes set far apart, unlike those of the -Mongols, did not slant and were a curious shade of green. He had high -cheekbones and a sloping forehead beneath abundant red hair, which he -wore in long braids down his back. His was a striking personality. He -was as different from the other members of his horde in appearance as -he was in mentality. - -In his early years, Genghis wore the simple clothing of his -tribesmen, consisting of skins sewn together with sinews. Frequently -he greased his body to keep out the cold and moisture when it was -necessary to sleep in the snow. He ate raw meat, and drank mare’s -milk and sometimes blood which he let from the veins of his horses’ -legs. Mentally the equal of any Caucasian, he undoubtedly had -European blood in his veins. Perhaps that of a Princess, who knows? - -Although this despot had an ungovernable temper and a wrath that -could terrorize the strongest, he also had the capacity to make firm -and lasting friends and loyal followers. He spoke thoughtfully and -deliberately and is said to have remarked many times, “Monasteries -and Temples breed mildness of character, but it is only the fierce -and warlike who dominate mankind.” His eloquence could spellbind the -masses. - -He was an expert with the bow and arrow. His physical strength -made him the leader of the wrestlers. He had been known to pick up -an opponent, hold him high above his head, then break his back as -though it were a bamboo reed! He enjoyed wrestling matches only when -they rivaled the Roman gladiators, when the bones of the weaker -adversaries were broken and crushed. He despised weakness of any -kind, for he himself was a match for any man, and he had never been -bested at any sport. Born of a race unwashed and illiterate, he -raised his tribe of unknown barbarians to a position of world renown. -Believing firmly that the Mongols were the natural masters of the -world, he also was convinced that he had been chosen by Destiny -to lead and control them. Thus impelled, this amazing barbarian, -starting with only a tribe of wild nomads, finally conquered -everything from Armenia to Korea, and from Tibet to the Volga River. - -After Genghis Khan had subdued all of China, he settled down and -developed into a typical oriental potentate. He lived in splendor -on the present site of Peking, a far cry from his earlier primitive -tent on the Gobi desert. Just so, in 1949, Mao Tse-tung sprang from -the mud caves of Yenan to the palaces of Peking as China’s Number One -dictator. Here, in this ancient city, Genghis, as Emperor, surrounded -himself with courtiers and officials, as well as with wives, -concubines and slaves. - -He held high court and worked on affairs of state in a high pavilion -of white felt, lined with treasured silk. Here also he entertained -his friends and kept a silver table on which sat vessels of fermented -mare’s milk and bowls of meat and fruit for their pleasure. Dressed -in a lavishly embroidered robe and wearing a long and flaming beard, -he sat at state functions on a dais at the far end of the pavilion. -With him on a low bench sat Bourtai, his favorite wife. She was the -real love of his life, and he claimed only the children born by her -as his own. The Empress was small and dainty, with beautiful features -and long hair braided with jewels and heavy coins. She was the mother -of three sons who were destined to rule at a later period a domain -larger than Rome’s. Other wives and concubines grouped themselves at -his left, on lower platforms. His nobles sat on benches around the -walls of the building, wearing long coats, bound around with enormous -bright-colored silken girdles, and large, uptilted felt hats. In the -center of the pavilion glowed a great fire made of thorns and dung. -There was utter silence when Genghis spoke. His word was absolute -law. It is said, “Any who disobeyed his word was like a stone dropped -into deep water, or as an arrow among the reeds.” - -Genghis Khan was almost as superstitious as he was brilliant. -Believing that the character of every animal was in its heart, he -hunted lions and tigers with great zest, preferring to capture them -alive. He tore them open with his bare hands, pulled out the heart, -and ate it while it was still throbbing. Convinced that this gave him -the courage of a savage beast, he compelled his men to follow his -example. - -A military genius, he is known as the greatest guerilla fighter in -history, but his real life work was the molding together of his -vast hordes into a disciplined, well equipped, highly trained, and -completely organized army. He used the forced labor of subjugated -people—a significant parallel to the present day methods of Stalin, -who, in order to increase the efficiency of his armies, drafted -into them German scientists, artisans and technicians, as well as -thousands of humbler laborers. - -Genghis acquired, ultimately, over four hundred thousand warriors, -countless elephant and camel trains loaded with the wealth of -Croesus, and multitudes of armed slaves. “Unmatched in human valor,” -it is said, “his hordes overcame the terrors of barren wastes, of -mountains and seas, the severities of climate and the ravages of -famine and pestilence. No dangers could appall them, no prayer for -mercy could move them.” - -Genghis Khan was the symbol of a new power in history. The ability of -one man to alter human civilization began with him and ended with his -grandson Kublai Khan, when the Mongol empires began to crack. It did -not reappear again until the rise of Stalin to power. - -The vast empires that Genghis established, with their accompanying -devastation, was not all that he achieved. Had this been so, he would -have been merely another Attila destroying with little or no definite -purpose. His genius for organization and his clever statesmanship -made him the model of kings, although he could not read or write when -he drew up the incomparable “Yassa,” or code of conduct. This curious -document, not unlike the dictates of Stalin, had three main purposes: -to ensure absolute obedience to Genghis Khan; to bind together all -the nomad clans for the purpose of making war; and to punish swiftly -and mercilessly, anyone who violated the law, civil, military or -political. With the “Yassa,” he and his heirs ruled their empires -for three generations. The lash of its ruthless authority held it -together. - -Genghis died in 1227 A. D., leaving the greatest empires and the -most destructive armies the world had ever known to that day. Not -until the advent of the Tartars, a few centuries later, did another -Asiatic tribe rise to world power. Led by fearless Tamerlane, they -also laid waste everything in their path, in the savage manner of -their predecessors. Once again the pattern was repeated. It is -characteristic of the empires built by the steppe nomads that they -were not the result of gradual development and expansion, but the -product of a rapid growth under the leadership of a single powerful -man. These men all seem to have had an evil genius for political -intrigue, for exacting fanatical loyalty among their followers, and -for devising ways to conquer many times their own numbers. - -The aim of each of these Asiatic conquerors was to control the vast -area of the world from the Pacific Ocean to Central Europe. They -planned the overthrow, by force and violence, if need be, of all -other governments and peoples in their path. Czarist Russia, in -1905, achieved the geographical empires of Genghis Khan, actually -peopled by descendants of the same racial elements. Had they not been -defeated subsequently by the Japanese, the Czars and their successors -probably would have controlled all of China. In this new grouping -of mankind, however, it was the half-Tartar Russians and not the -Mongols, who were the dominant military factor. Today, the ruling -power comes from Moscow, and not from the Mongolian East, except for -the infusion of Chinese blood that has resulted from seven hundred -years of constant conflict with the Celestial Empire. - -With the discovery of America and her tremendous natural resources, -the lust for world dominion has increased. Today, Stalin has -ambitions for global mastery. His first tools of conquest are the -Communists in every country. In February, 1947, as the Communist -Convention in London, delegates from thirty-two countries met -to reaffirm their pledges to support the Communist Party. These -Communists are not members of a political party in the American -sense; they are sinister and potentially powerful weapons of the -Soviet Government. - -Everywhere today, the “New Democracy,” or early Communism, has -followed the pattern of the rise of each Asiatic despot. It repeated -itself in Moscow in the early Twenties at the death of Lenin, when -Stalin and Trotsky struggled for power. China, today, is passing from -the first stage, the period of self-denial, of sharing the wealth, of -submitting to rigid discipline and purification for “The Cause”—the -Sackcloth and Ashes stage. The Chinese Communists are beginning to -experience the progressive steps of disillusionment, apprehension and -abject terror, as was the lot of millions of Russian peasants during -the infamous Thirties. - -The great and overpowering tragedy of Communism is that at no stage -or time has it ever been the shining Utopia that hypnotizes the -credulous common man and woman and some of the dreamers in high -places in our own government. It would appear that neither Marx -nor Engels understood human psychology or analyzed intelligently -the lessons of history, for Socialism, in suppressing individual -initiative, inevitably leads to I-Don’t-Care-ism. An economy based on -share-and-share-alike, without regard to individual effort, failed in -Russia because it put a premium on mediocrity and deprived man of the -fruits of his own labor. It had to be replaced with “Stakhanovitism,” -or piece work, which the American labor unions have fought constantly -in their march toward Socialism. The Russians found that the only -way to make men exert themselves without the incentive of reward -was through fear of punishment. Thus Socialism has to be enforced by -police methods to be at all effective. What is this but dictatorship? -Socialism, Communism, Stateism—these can no more be separated from -each other than can the component parts of homogenized milk. - -Communist leaders, motivated by the promise of power, insist that -world revolution is inevitable. The Chinese Communists, for many -years, repeated an ancient legend. They said: “The Mongols still are -waiting in their felt tents, for the issue to be decided. They are -gathering around their yurt fires and chanting together: ‘When that -which is harder than rock and stronger than the storm winds shall -fail, the Empires of the North Court and the Empires of the South -Court shall cease to be; when the White Tsar is no more, and the Son -of Heaven has vanished, then the campfires of Genghis Khan will be -seen again, and his empire shall stretch over all the earth’.” That -prophesy is being fulfilled. - - - - - CHAPTER V - - _Communist Propaganda_ - - -Propaganda, thanks to a better understanding of mass psychology, -has become in the past few years almost an exact science as well as -an art In the hands of the Communists it is a powerful weapon, so -subtle that, as in shadow boxing, one cannot judge the exact position -of the enemy. With wily cleverness, it has perverted the meanings -of cherished words, so that great national masses of people are no -longer aware of their rightful connotations. - -We, in the United States, for instance, think of Democracy as the -dictionary defines it: “Government in which the supreme power -is retained by the people.” The Communists have distorted this -by adopting the term “New Democracy,” to represent a Communist -controlled state, that is, a dictatorship. - -Freedom, a beautiful word, has also been distorted. In a Western -democracy, it means “liberation from slavery,” that is, the -opportunity to work, live and play where, when and how one chooses, -in open competition. In a Communist State, none of these things -is possible. There can be no freedom where full regimentation is -required. The Soviet’s claim of freeing the peasants from onerous -landlords and the workers from grasping capitalists is only a blind. -Any poor Chinese on the street soon sadly learns that these are being -replaced by more oppressive masters, the Soviet Commissars. - -Security is another wonderful word, and the Communists have been -quick to realize its universal appeal. However, they use it in a -purely economic sense, deliberately ignoring any but material values. -Their type of security can be promised only at the price of personal -freedom. It is already in operation in all penitentiaries, where the -life-term convict is fed, clothed, cared for when ill, sheltered, -entertained and protected from the harsh conditions of economic -competition. He need not worry about any of these things. Yet it is -a generally accepted fact that he would gladly and immediately trade -all of the benefits he receives from his prison incarceration for the -one little matter of Freedom. - -[Illustration: _The Chinese Commissar, in the footsteps of his -Russian counterpart, reads to his military unit the daily propaganda -bulletin._] - -[Illustration: _Communist Propaganda Poster captions_: HAPPY ARE -THOSE WHO WORK FOR THE PEOPLE!] - -[Illustration: DRAW WATER AGAINST THE DROUGHT! _Another propaganda -poster._] - -[Illustration: _Non-Communists looking at bulletin reporting expected -visit of General Marshall to Yenan. Bulletin is put out by Communist -Cultural Committee for Mass Education._] - -[Illustration: _Communist propaganda poster_: PRODUCE FOR THE PEOPLE!] - -[Illustration: _Communist propaganda picture showing how to_ RESCUE -THE WOUNDED!] - -Besides twisting the meaning of words, the Communists have subtly -changed long accepted human values and relationships. By distortion -of Truth, and constant repetition of the Party Line, they gradually -paralyze all individual thinking and destroy the will to resist. -Russian propaganda is far more effective than was the German, and -their Chinese henchmen have had to modify it slightly to adapt it for -use in their country. By false promises, intimidation and persuasion, -the Communists lulled the weakened opposition and made the conquest -of China easier. When necessary, they never hesitated to use terror -and brutality. By these two means they have established a vast web of -control over the entire land of nearly five hundred million people. - -The Chinese Communists have found it expedient to have two types of -propaganda: one which is directed at foreigners and follows strictly -the Moscow line; the other maintained for domestic consumption. The -home propaganda concentrates on Chinese affairs and plays down the -foreign and international angles. Slogans, or catch phrases, are -evident everywhere, on billboards, in handbills, on posters, in the -press and on the air channels. In this way, the slogans are repeated -over and over again, until everyone becomes thoroughly familiar with -them. Throughout China are heard the shouts of the victors—SERVE THE -PEOPLE! PRODUCE FOR THE PEOPLE! RESCUE THE WOUNDED! BEAR SONS FOR THE -PEOPLE! The latter is one of the most surprising in a land that has -an annual death rate of a million from starvation and is presently -suffering from the worst famine in years! - -The slogans are often illustrated and used as picture posters. -Gay and colorful, they frequently show a prosperous looking group -standing or sitting before an enormous basket overflowing with -luscious fruits and vegetables. The caption: HAPPY ARE THOSE WHO -WORK FOR THE PEOPLE! Billboards and handbills in villages and towns -are, of necessity, simple and elementary, while in Shanghai and -other large cities they are more elaborate and sometimes quite -sophisticated. - -As in Germany before the war, and in Russia today, the Chinese -concentrate on the children. These are often separated from their -families when they are very young and sent to special schools away -from their homes. The Chinese Communists, like the Soviets, are -making every effort to destroy family life and ties, since family -loyalty competes with their training program. The first and only -loyalty must be to the State. In some schools, youngsters have been -given new textbooks which begin with the verse: - -“I do not love my Mama. I do not love my Papa. I love only my Country -and Mao Tse-tung.” Other books show pictures of Generalissimo Chiang -Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders and characterize them as -enemies of the State who are “to be killed on sight.” - -Children, otherwise well brought up and, prior to the new schooling, -devoted to their families, return to their homes and face their -parents with: “We don’t love you any more. We are leaving home and -will fight the Nationalists ourselves, wherever we find them!” - -Some of the propaganda is directed against foreigners, especially -Americans. The children are taught to repeat little songs in which -Americans are called “greedy and vicious capitalists,” and they are -shown cartoons depicting Americans as two-headed pigs being kicked -out of China. - -The effect of such systematic mind-poisoning is shown in an incident -that happened in North China just before the Communists took over. -An American on a business trip watched a Chinese woman, carrying a -baby and a large bundle, attempt to cross a narrow bridge over a -little river. A tiny girl, barely old enough to walk, clung to the -mother’s skirts. The planking of the bridge was wobbly and narrow. -Realizing they could not all cross at once, the woman loosened the -child’s hands and told her: “Wait there and I’ll come back for you.” -Then, with the bundle and baby, she crossed the poorly constructed -span. The American, trying to be a good Samaritan, went toward the -stranded little girl to offer to take her across. At his approach -she screamed in terror and ran from him. Catching up with her, he -talked to her in a quiet voice for some minutes. Soon the youngster -dried her tears, accepted the man’s arms, and was carried to safety. -The mother turning to go back for the child, cried out in alarm at -seeing her in the arms of the American. With the realization that the -man meant no harm, she appeared amazed at his courtesy. - -Among the near illiterate, speeches are the most effective means of -propaganda, and the Chinese Red Armies have large doses of these -inflicted upon them. The soldiers, following the example of their -Russian comrades, are briefed on when to clap and when to cheer. Like -any college football crowd, they dutifully follow the cheer leaders. - -The Communists are especially proud of their so-called “Educational -Program” for soldiers, and they claim that thirty per cent of the -time allotted to military training is devoted to “cultural” and -political work. As a result of attendance at daily classes, over -eighty per cent of the troops are reported able to read elementary -Chinese characters, giving them enough background to understand -simplified Communist newspapers. These “newspapers” are filled with -news strictly censored by the leaders, and the characters learned -in school are those that enable them to read only what the posters -and textbooks say. No effort is wasted on superfluous, non-political -knowledge. - -Bestowing tides as a reward is another Moscow-inspired incentive for -the soldiers, as well as for the illiterate populace. This device -is also used to encourage labor production and to throw a smoke -screen over exploitation. Labor “Heroes” and “Heroines” are greatly -admired in all Red-blighted areas, and any Communist who studies and -works hard has a chance to be thus honored and to obtain the coveted -material reward or special privilege that accompanies the title. - -Russian propaganda, when modified for the Chinese, is slanted so -that it may not offend them too greatly while they are still being -taken over, that is, during the transition period of persuasion and -deception. Shortly after the capture of Tientsin, an enormous picture -of Stalin appeared beside that of Mao Tse-tung in Min Yuan Park. -The people milling around in great throngs stared up at it, some in -wonderment. One of them finally remarked, “Who is that other man? -He is not Chinese, he is a foreigner.” In order to keep the surface -smooth at first and to cause no undue alarm or suspicion among the -people, the next day Mao hung alone. - -The capture of Tientsin and Peking was accomplished with -comparatively little fighting except on the outskirts of both cities. -The plans for taking Peking had been well thought out. Secret agents, -for years, had been “persuading” the people and softening up the -Nationalist troops. The actual capture was cunningly timed. The -Chinese New Year was chosen, with due respect to superstition, by the -incoming lords of the land. They allowed the people to spend three -days making their customary friendly calls upon each other, in the -ancient manner, and settling up their bills and accounts. Farmers -poured into the cities with supplies of meat and vegetables, and -the Communists bided their time while the citizenry, ate, drank and -made merry. In the Chinese calendar 1949 was the Year of the Rat, and -1950 ushered in the Year of the Cow. Time-honored superstition has it -that when, in the passage of years, the tail of the Rat touches the -horn of the Cow, times will be good, luck will change and the future -will be successful. The Chinese were all congratulating themselves -over their coming good year when the Communists, after waiting for -the psychological moment, marched their armies in and took over the -ancient capital. - -The new masters gave the populace various choices of “surrender” -terms, although they did not use the expression “surrendering.” -First, the vanquished were politely invited to “Come out and join us, -for we are all brothers now.” This invitation was called the “Peking -way.” When anyone showed reluctance to accept, the “Tientsin way” was -tried. This method involved pressure, first psychological, then if -that failed, material, and finally if there was still any hesitation, -physical, in the form of more or less severe beatings. In other -words, the same old formula was at work—persuasion and then force. - -The Chinese Communists, after the fall of the entire country, -copied from their Soviet comrades the trick of inviting all the -industrialists, financiers and scientists who had fled to Canton, -Hong Kong and elsewhere to return to their Northern homes, where -they could continue to operate their businesses as before. So in -1946 Stalin invited all the White Russians living in China to return -to the USSR. The old birdie in the cage trick! Persuaded that they -were going to receive fair treatment, many of the expatriate Russians -gladly gave up their jobs and homes in Shanghai and Tientsin and -spent their last dollars on passage to Siberia. No word was ever -heard from many of them, but gradually a few letters appeared, -smuggled in through Chinese friends, which told of great suffering. -A few of the hardiest escaped and returned, all with the same -story—Siberia, the salt mines, death. What happened to their Chinese -counterparts who heeded the siren song of the victors of Peking we do -not know, but we can guess. - -Communist propaganda is apparent in practically every aspect of -Chinese life. Only the Opera and the Russian Ballet appear to have -remained relatively free from taint. The Reds are tremendously -proud of both of these world renowned examples of creative art and -make a great show of claiming that they are always performed in -the “original.” However, when put on before strictly indoctrinated -audiences, propaganda appears in the shape of Party line -interpretations of dances, songs and long curtain speeches. The -audience is never allowed to forget for a moment that it is there to -be instructed as well as entertained. - -The basic purpose of Communist propaganda, of course, is to make -conquest as easy as possible. The Party line is fed to the people -like opium, and it dulls their senses and makes them docile. When -persuasion proves inadequate, threats and brutality are resorted -to, for in a Totalitarian State no one can remain on the fence. -Only through complete unity, voluntary or forced, can such a state -survive. It is impossible for anyone to remain non-political. - -Should both persuasion and force fail, the Communists then resort -to a method which represents an all time low in evil—the use of -poisonous drugs to draw out false confessions from their victims. -This is called the “biodynamic” treatment. The drugs, “actedon” -and “mescaline” are used to paralyze the brain, then to cause its -disintegration. The doses are administered in coffee, and the victim, -with nothing else to eat or drink, consumes large quantities, which -are generously supplied, unaware of the effect being produced on -his mind and body. When the personality has been sufficiently -disintegrated or “split” by these drugs—when the sufferer has been -driven crazy—a skilled psychiatrist can put the pieces together -at his will and gradually evolve a completely new personality. In -other words, when the physical breakdown of the individual has been -accomplished, his mental collapse is brought about by the use of -these fiendish drugs. - -The Communists say, “The average person can be made to give in -through brutality and fear, but in complicated cases the combination -of neurology, or brain study, chemistry and psychiatry must be used.” -Preparing the victim valuable enough for this process often takes as -long as three or four months, during which time he is jailed and kept -in solitary confinement. Frequently dozens of doctors, scientists, -and assistants are worn out in the process of treatment. It is so -diabolical that the Communists say they use it only in exceptional -cases where they feel that the results warrant a demonstration to -the public at large of their complete mastery over man. - -The world now knows that this was the treatment administered in -1949 to Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, Primate of the Catholic church, -Budapest; to Michael Shipkov, Bulgarian Translator for the U. S. -Legation in Sofia; and again in 1950 to Robert A. Vogeler, American -business executive in Hungary. This same heinous method has been -repeated in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Eastern Germany and -undoubtedly elsewhere throughout the world, though actual reports of -every case have not, as yet, come into print. - -The use of hypnotism as a propaganda weapon and as a device for -manipulating victims also has not been overlooked by the Communists. -Dr. G. H. Estabrooks, Chairman of the Department of Psychology at -Colgate University, who has pioneered in developing hypnotism’s -wartime uses, says: - -“With the Twentieth Century’s revived interest in psychology, -hypnotism has been brought to the status of a full-fledged science.” - -“A person,” continues Estabrooks, “can be hypnotized against his will -or without his knowledge.” - -“A foreign agent working in a hospital or a doctor in his own office -could,” he avers, “over a period of time, place thousands of people -under his power by means of fake physical examinations.” - -For instance, he explains how in wartime this masked manoeuver could -enable a junior medical officer to take over the reins of the U. S. -Army and lead it into total defeat. - -Hypnotism, we now know, was used in addition to drugs by the Nazis to -obtain a “confession” from Van der Lubbe at the Reichstag Trial and -also by the Soviet Union to demoralize Cardinal Mindszenty, Robert -Vogeler and others. - -Mao Tse-tung, like all Moscow-trained speakers and others of their -ilk, is fully aware of the power of hypnosis over large audiences. In -the early days of victory, he spellbound his listeners not alone by -words but also by the strength of his mesmeric will. - -“Make up your minds! We abhor fence straddlers. There is no middle of -the road! Not in all China, not in all the universe,” he continued. -“One must be either on the side of Imperialism or on the side of -Communism!” - -In a speech commemorating the 28th anniversary of the Chinese -Communist Party, Mao, addressing a mass meeting early in 1950, said: - -“Internationally, China belongs to the anti-imperialist front. To -Russia we proudly look for genuine, friendly aid, and to no other -country. The second world war, with the Soviet Union as the principle -fighting force, defeated the great Imperialist powers, Germany and -Japan. It weakened England and France, and left only one Imperialist -country in the world—the United States of America! Even _she_ -suffered great losses. Her economy was smashed and her domestic -crisis is acute! There is great unrest in the country, and the people -have no leader. They are fighting among themselves. And yet she -thinks _she_ can enslave the world! She is nothing but a weakling! -By aiding Chiang Kai-shek, she is responsible for the slaughter of -millions of Chinese!” - -An outburst of applause and cries of “Ding How!” (Good! Good!) -greeted his words. - -Mao continued, waving his arms: “In China, some Imperialism still -exists in our ‘New Democracy,’ but we will work steadfastly for -a complete Communist Society. Our tools are the People’s Army, -Police and Communist Court. Under the leadership of the working -class, we will unite to form our own dictatorship over the lackeys -of foreign Imperialism. We will drive them out like dogs, howling -through the streets! Let us establish a People’s Dictatorship over -the reactionaries, to be known throughout the world as the People’s -Democratic Dictatorship. Let us raise China from an agricultural -country by eliminating all classes, and realizing the state of -universal fraternity!” - -Another storm of applause from the duped audience followed these -closing words, along with shrill cries of “Long live our People’s -Dictatorship! Long live our Chairman Mao! Long live our Comrade -Stalin!” - - - - - CHAPTER VI - - _Manchuria, the Prize_ - - -Manchuria is the home of the Manchus who conquered China and ruled -it until 1911. It is the Prize, the bone of contention over which -the bloodiest battles have been fought, and the one area in all Asia -without which neither the Communists nor the Nationalists could hope -to become a world power. - -Studded with Japanese industrial plants, Manchuria is known as the -Pittsburgh of China, due to the fact that here both coal and iron -are mined close together. Here, also, is contained seventy per cent -of the industrial potential of all China. A rugged, windy land, -much like our American prairie states, it is one of the few places -in Asia that has a food surplus and serves as the granary of that -vast region. Farmers, using shaggy Mongol ponies, till broad fields -of soybeans, millet, corn, wheat and opium poppies. With the great -abundance of grain, the people are able to produce beef and mutton -for export. - -Even before the Japanese occupation, Manchuria was a thriving center, -and the conquerors, with characteristic efficiency, speeded its -industrial and agricultural development during the fourteen years -of their occupation. They developed the largest coal, iron and gold -mines in Eastern Asia. From Manchuria alone they obtained more gold -than from any other source, in addition to five million tons of iron -and steel and thirty million tons of coal every year. - -The great cities in Manchuria, of which Mukden is the capital, -were modernized. New railroad lines were built into the outlying -districts, and thousands of workers, heretofore purely agricultural, -were taught to work in factories. For the first time, modern hotels -and apartments covered city blocks, and Mukden undoubtedly boasted -more bathtubs, per capita, than any other city in Asia, with the -possible exception of Shanghai. - -The Generalissimo had believed that Manchuria, when it was liberated, -would become a part of the Nationalist Government. He had sent -occupation troops there, had incorporated it into his rightful -territory, and at the end of the war had already started repairing -the damage caused by the final phase of the fighting. He was unaware -of the fact that Roosevelt had promised Manchuria to Russia as her -price for entering the war against Japan. He still firmly believed -in Roosevelt’s friendship, because Roosevelt had promised that _all_ -Chinese territory liberated from the Japanese would be returned to -China. - -Although Russia kept a tight rein on the Prize, she did everything -she could to help and encourage the Chinese Communists. Immediately -upon entering the war, she began to supply them with arms and -ammunition captured from the Japanese. At first this was done -stealthily by the simple ruse of allowing the Chinese Communists -to “find” these supplies themselves. After V-J Day Russia made no -attempt to hide from the world her interest in, and her support of, -the Chinese Communist regime. Besides supplying arms and propaganda -material, she assisted her lusty child by hampering, in every way, -the liberation of the Nationalist troops held by the Japanese. Since -then she has continued to work closely with the Chinese Reds. Li Li -San, the Kremlin’s Chinese agent, is in command. Russia, therefore, -takes everything she desires for herself, first. - -Russian Armies in the East are composed of Asiatics, closely related -geographically, racially and politically to the Chinese Communists. -In behavior they are as clumsy and vindicative as their forebears -under Genghis Khan. Many peace-loving Chinese, after experiencing Red -domination, cried out, “Six months under the Communists are worse -than fourteen years under the Japs.” - -As an example of what happens when these people overrun a country, -let us examine Manchuria at close range. Russian troops taking over -the country from the Japanese stripped nearly all the factories of -machinery, but with characteristic inefficiency. When a machine to -be sent to Russia was dismantled, no effort was made to keep the -pieces together in numbered crates so they could be reassembled in -another location. On the contrary, the machines were broken down in -mass and the jumbled parts loaded into trucks or freight cars with no -regard whatever to system. Where a machine could not be brought out -through doors or windows, the whole side of a wall was pushed out and -the rubble left where it fell. Completely ignorant of the delicate -mechanism of precision instruments, they permitted them to be left -out in the rain and snow to rust into utter uselessness. Somewhere -east of the Urals, the Russians must have a tremendous pile of scrap, -if it is not scattered along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway. -This inability to appreciate and handle machinery may throw some -light on Russia’s frantic desire to acquire machine tools, at almost -any cost. Incidentally, the same wanton disregard of everything -technical applies to the looting of Eastern Europe. - -Not only were Manchuria’s factories moved out bodily, piled onto -freight cars and, in a desultory manner, slowly moved into Siberia, -but what the troops were unable to take with them, they maliciously -destroyed. Aside from the Kremlin-activated seizure of the factories, -the primitive soldiers of the occupying forces, as well as just -common bandits, stripped Manchuria’s cities of everything that -could, by any remote chance, be useful to them. Both Chinese and -Russians followed the age old Mongolian custom and gleefully stole or -destroyed all personal property that they could get their hands on. -Even fixtures fastened to the walls were pulled out, and door knobs, -pipes and plumbing appliances were removed and turned over to the -government to be made into ammunition. - -The Nationalist troops that the Generalissimo had moved in right -after V-J Day found it well-nigh impossible to defend Manchurian -property. The Chinese Communists used guerrilla warfare almost -exclusively against the villagers, their tactics being to terrorize, -kill and destroy before help could come from the Nationalist troops. -“Sack and pillage” kept the people in constant panic. In an endeavor -to isolate and defeat the Nationalists, the Communists tore up all -the railroads. Peasants were conscripted to dig up hundreds of miles -of railway track. They burned the ties, levelled the roadbeds, hid -or carried away the rails, and demolished the drainage structures. -Practically all the bridges were destroyed by explosives, all signal -towers and sidetrack mechanisms were wrecked, and every other -wanton damage that fiendish ingenuity could conceive or devise was -inflicted. As a final gesture of brutality, captured locomotive -engineers who were known to have Nationalist sympathies had their -hands cut off. - -This kind of fighting completely destroyed the economy of Manchuria. -From being a food and industrial surplus area, she became -poverty-stricken. The people, living in barren houses without -furniture or utensils of any kind, were reduced to the level of -their primitive ancestors. Water became the scarcest of commodities -and, with the reservoirs destroyed, had to be brought up from the -dirty rivers in buckets. City transportation was at a premium. It -ranged from the luxury of a pedicab, to ancient carriage bodies -or automobile chassis, hauled by men, tiny ponies and dogs. A few -families found a new use for the bathtub which they had been able -to salvage. Mounted on rickety wheels, it was used as a public -conveyance, and men, women and children sat huddled together in it. -Sometimes a huge umbrella, Chinese or foreign, protected them from a -scorching sun or a driving rain. It made a grotesque picture indeed! - -With the disruption of transportation and the commandeering of -much of the foodstuffs for the troops, obtaining food became the -major problem of the people of Manchuria. Starvation stalked the -cities. Mukden families were reduced to eating dung. So precious -was this commodity that every horse wore a contraption under his -tail resembling a large, crude dust pan to preserve even minute -droppings. The very poor mixed mud with the dung, and after baking -the concoction in the sun used it as food. Hawkers sold it on the -streets. - -Just as the Mongols under Genghis Khan burned, looted and tortured -when they invaded Cathay, so the modern Mongols have behaved in -like manner. Some of the more decent among them were so outraged by -these tactics that they deserted and joined the Nationalists. One, -a Colonel, told how he had been ordered to round up bandits and -drive them at bayonet point into villages. Here they were allowed to -pillage, burn and rape to their hearts’ content. While this was being -done, the Communists would remain hidden a short distance away. After -the terror had subsided somewhat, when the village was reduced to -a shambles and the inhabitants were all but insane, the Communists -soldiers would rush in and shoot the bandits, ostensibly to rescue -the villagers. This technique seldom failed to swell the Communist -ranks. All who resisted conversion were, of course, subjected to more -drastic treatment. - -Another ex-Communist told of teaching little boys of ten and twelve -to use knives and pistols to murder members of their own families -who refused to cooperate with the Reds. The child criminals became -fugitives and were forced to join the guerrillas in the hills. - -Many of the well-to-do managed to get away, where, no one knew, but -the poor, aged and helpless were not exempt from the senseless fury -of the Mongol hordes. They were used at times as object lessons to -demonstrate the pitiless power of the Red Terror. According to an -eye witness, the hands of women and children were sometimes smashed -with mallets and left dangling like raw hamburgers. These utterly -miserable creatures wandered insanely through the streets, moaning -pitifully and gradually dying from loss of blood, infection and -unendurable pain. - -At other times, the Communists tied bombs around the bodies of men -and women, carted them to thickly populated areas, lighted the fuses -and left them to explode. This invariably happened at night, when -the effect was more terrifying. These human torches were supposed -to be the unreliable Quislings. The method of their disposal by the -Reds shows how the latter are running true to form. In the days of -Genghis Khan a Quisling was despised. When he had served his purpose, -he was taken out and his throat was slit. As an example, there is -the story of the Battle of Samarkand, when thirty thousand Kankali -Turks, seeing that the victory was going against them, and hoping -to save their lives, deserted to the Mongols. They were received in -a friendly manner and shown every courtesy. Equipped with Mongol -military dress and weapons, they felt welcome and honored. But, alas, -after being royally wined and dined, they were massacred to a man. -Like Stalin, the Mongols had utter contempt for such people. - -Conquering armies, however, sometimes get a dose of their own -medicine, and, when they do, it is apt to be fatal. At least it -proved so in the case of the forty Russian soldiers who looted a -Japanese hospital near Mukden. Finding a large vat of alcohol in the -basement, they spent a riotous night, drinking and carousing. The -next morning an officer found all forty of them dead. Evidently they -had never heard of “rubbing” alcohol. - -Today, in Manchuria, the Chinese Communists, aided by Russian -technicians and advisors, are rebuilding the country for their -own advantage. It is said that Stalin will use Manchuria as an -experimental training station for Communism. He now controls the -reconstructed railways in and out of this highly strategic area and -requires banks to give them fifty to sixty per cent of their loans -for industrial developments. Some private businesses were told that -they would not be molested, provided they would do all they could to -boost production under Communist supervision. During the last three -years of civil war in China, the Manchurian farmers turned over -4,500,000 tons of grain to the Communists. In spite of this, they are -being urged to PRODUCE FOR THE PEOPLE!—to raise more and more grain -to be exported to Siberia. In Russia’s grandiose scheme of developing -Siberia with Chinese slave labor, the wealth of Manchuria is her -greatest industrial asset. - -In contrast to Stalin’s close personal supervision of Manchuria, -experts seem agreed that he will leave China pretty much alone, for -the time being, and let Mao and other leaders of the moment believe -that they are solidifying their positions. Sometime within the next -one, two or three years, he may “liquidate” or “retire” them all and -replace them with the out-and-out Russian Commissars. How soon Stalin -will be able to accomplish this, time alone will tell. - - - - - CHAPTER VII - - _The Tragedy of the Generalissimo_ - - -Any account of conditions in China today would be incomplete without -mentioning the Nationalist Government and what it attempted to -achieve. - -The political and social revolution inside China has been in progress -many years, and these years have been turbulent ones. The Chinese, -largely illiterate, were for a long time completely isolated. Many -believed that China was the entire world and that a “foreigner” was a -Chinese from another province. Patriotism was felt by them only where -the home and family were concerned. - -In 1911, Dr. Sun Yet-sen led a successful revolution and overthrew -the Manchu Dynasty. Desiring to make China a modern republic, he -proclaimed as his aim: “To dedicate the few score perishable years of -our life to the laying of an imperishable foundation for our Nation.” -To this end he gave his life. - -The educated Chinese then began the creation of a modern, unified and -democratic country. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, co-founder of the -revolution of 1911, became its second leader in 1925, on the death of -Dr. Sun. China knew no other leader until 1949. - -In the beginning, the Chinese Communist and Nationalist Parties were -one and the same. They were _the_ Revolutionary Party. An admirer of -the United States and Great Britain, Dr. Sun first requested their -help in reorganizing and revitalizing his country, but they refused. -With no alternative, he was forced to accept the aid of Russian -revolutionaries who jumped at the chance to tie China up with their -own impending revolution. Working with the famous Communist, Adolph -Joffe, Dr. Sun drew up the policy of the new government. However, -not all the Chinese revolutionaries were radical. Some were moderate -liberals, and many were wealthy conservatives who desired only a -more modern setup than the Manchus had. Among the latter the Soong -family is certainly the best known. This family cleverly safeguarded -its future by marrying one of its charming daughters, Chingling, to -Dr. Sun Yat-sen; another, Meiling, to Chiang Kai-shek; and a third, -Eiling, to Dr. H. H. Kung, a 75th lineal descendant of Confucius. -This last was of definite psychological significance, as it united -the mighty Soong family with that of China’s most revered Saint. - -When Chiang Kai-shek inherited the mantle of Sun Yat-sen, he -determined to carry out the policy of the revolution. His actions -followed his words. Enormous progress was made during the so-called -“Golden Decade,” between 1927 and 1937. China made a beginning toward -industrialization and economic stability and improved her educational -facilities. - -This was the age of enormous industrial expansion. Railroads were -constructed, telephone lines built, and even radio was introduced. -Electricity and power plants were created, and merchants did a -flourishing business. Tourist trade was at its height, and Chinese -and American importers were cooperating harmoniously. Everyone -_seemed_ to be better off than before, the poor as well as the rich. - - - Chinese Communist Party Koumintang - - 1910 Period of +————————————+ 1910 - 1912 | | Dr. Sun Yat-Sen 1911 - 1914 Socialist | | Republican - 1916 Activity | | Regime 1912 - 1918 |_Revolution_| Kuomintang - | _and_ | Government - 1920 Birth of Chinese |_Warlordism_| - 1922 Communist Party | | 1921 - | | Period of - | | Cooperation - 1924 Period of | | Death of Dr. Sun, - 1926 | | Advent of - 1928 Russian | | Chiang Kai-shek - 1930 +————+ +—————+ 1927 - 1932 Interference | - 1934 _Single | Party_ Hide and - 1936 “Long March” | Seek Period - +————+ +—————+ - |_Revolution_| - 1938 Marco Polo | _and_ | - Bridge |_Civil War_ | Reconciliation 1937 - +————+ +—————+ Period of Mixed - 1940 “Yenan | | Civil War, - 1942 Interlude” | | Cooperation and - 1944 | | Anti-Japanese - | | Activities - | | 1945 - 1946 Period of | | End of - American +————+ +—————+ Japanese War - 1948 Interference | | - |_Civil War_ | 1949 - 1950 USSR and British | | Retreat to - Recognition | | Formosa 1950 - - _Chart showing origins of the Chinese Communist Party and the - Nationalist Party, or Koumintang (KMT), as the latter frequently was - called_ - -Thousands of Chinese enthusiastically took part in helping to build -this New China, and every effort was made to instill a real spirit of -Nationalism in the hearts of the people. To quote the Generalissimo, -“If the National Revolution should fail, China, as a nation, would -have nothing to rely upon. Should this happen, not only would China -cease to rank as one of the Four Powers of the world, but she would -be at the mercy of other countries.” - -The period of progress, unhappily, was short lived. It had become -obvious to the Japanese war lords that a patriotic, united China -might, on the one hand, prove an insurmountable obstacle to their -own plan to conquer and control all of Asia. On the other hand, it -would be too sweet a plum to pass up! Twice during the Thirties they -shelled Shanghai and in 1939 launched a full scale war of aggression. -All of the cities along the coast were captured, and the Chinese were -forced to move far inland. - -Led by the Generalissimo, thousands of Chinese moved whole libraries, -printing presses, government records and valuables laboriously up -the Yangtse River to the city of Chungking. Every kind of river -craft was used from a few modern boats to small sampans, junks and -home-made rafts pushed by hand. All had to be either lifted out of -the water and carried around the rapids in the river or be abandoned. -Many families travelled on foot, each member carrying a bundle on -his back. Even children of four and five had their small belongings -wrapped in a large scarf and tied to the end of a stick slung over -their shoulders. The road along the river valley became lined with -food vendors and shoemakers who did a big business in woven straw -sandals. Professors, surrounded by their students carrying modern -books or ancient Chinese written scrolls, conducted classes during -their periods of rest. United with their leader against a foreign -enemy, the people of China revered and respected the Generalissimo. - -At last the long procession of uprooted patriots reached its -destination, Chungking, and here Chiang set up his military -headquarters and conducted his affairs of State. The Japanese, unable -to reach the city by land, attacked almost nightly by air. Without -anti-aircraft guns or planes of their own, the Chinese suffered -terrible civilian casualties. A great part of the city was burned by -incendiary bombs. - -On the ruins of the old city, Madame Chiang Kai-shek proceeded -to build a model village, with schools, nurseries, libraries and -churches such as she had known in America. The project proved a -wonderful morale builder. Everybody for miles around took part in the -construction of the unique little city, and it became the center of a -broader undertaking known as “The New Life Movement.” - -In this new village, personal habits of cleanliness and sanitation -were taught and ways of being mutually helpful suggested. Concerts -and community singing were held almost nightly. The Generalissimo, -wishing to emphasize unselfish cooperation, expressed the philosophy -of the movement in four simple words: “Honesty, Industry, Sincerity -and Justice.” There developed, among these people at least, a feeling -of pride and unity that was well on the way to becoming national -patriotism. This new spirit of oneness in the face of common danger -was greater than at any time since Emperor Chin caused the Great Wall -to be built in 214 B. C. to keep the Huns from invading his Empire. - -The Generalissimo’s gallant stand against the modern war machines -and trappings of the Japanese added shining pages to the history of -China. History will record a full realization of the importance of -his contributions to the United States in World War II. After Pearl -Harbor, while the Japanese won many military successes against the -Americans and the British, Chiang’s determination to stay in the -fight saved countless American lives. The Japanese were forced to -keep a million and a half of their best troops in China, although -these were needed desperately in the East Indies and the Islands of -the Pacific, where they were trying to stop the Allied advance under -General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. We in the United States, for -the first time, became dimly aware of what a capable and relentless -foe the Japanese could be and of the tremendous battle the Chinese -had long been fighting. - -The Chinese have never been a warlike nation. Their industrial -development was comparable to that of Europe in the Middle Ages. -Therefore, their political and economic structures were totally -unable to meet the demands of a modern military struggle with -Japan. Regardless of how little they had, however, they fought -doggedly against increasing odds. When all surface communication -with the outside world was cut off, their resistance forces burrowed -underground. - -Several times the Japanese offered the Generalissimo very attractive -peace terms, but he resolutely declined them. He had promised to -stick with his Allies to the end, to give them his _full_ assistance -to achieve a decisive victory. His confidence in Roosevelt was -complete, and, like a great many Americans, British and others, -Chiang believed Roosevelt incapable of injustice. He was undoubtedly -familiar with the discussions at the Cairo Conference when Roosevelt, -in mock seriousness, said to Churchill: - -“I think all of the Chinese territory liberated from the Japanese -during the war should be returned to China, including Hong Kong.” - -Churchill, jumping to his feet, said emphatically, “I will never -permit the return of Hong Kong to the Chinese!” - -“Then I will take the matter up, personally, with your King!” said -Roosevelt. - -“The King of England has no authority to give away Imperial -Territory,” shouted Churchill. “I alone hold that power!” - -Roosevelt laughed heartily. He always enjoyed baiting Churchill, -because the latter was so hot tempered and quick to jump whenever he -was goaded. - -Chiang took Roosevelt seriously. - -During the years of the Japanese war, the Generalissimo also had to -contend with the Communists. The Chinese Red Armies, while giving lip -service to anti-Japanese activity, were in fact so placed militarily -as to be facing the Nationalist troops, rather than the Japanese! -It is true that the Communists made a number of raids on isolated -Japanese posts, but this they did with the purpose of capturing -soldiers whom they could then indoctrinate with Communist propaganda. -Naturally the Japanese resented these raids and retaliated. -Consequently, there were skirmishes now and then, but they were of -little importance. The fact still remains that the Japanese fought -their major war against the Generalissimo’s Armies. Wherever and -whenever possible, the Chinese Communist Armies helped the enemy by -attacking Nationalist-held towns and lines of communication. - -The Japanese surrender, when it finally came, was received with great -jubilation throughout China and the world. It was indeed a triumphant -hour for the Generalissimo. Now, at long last, he was in a position -to undertake a peaceful rehabilitation of his country and to pick up -where he had left off when the Japanese struck. He could go forward -with his program of political and social reforms and establish, first -of all, a sound economy. The stage was set for his dreams to become -a reality—the dream that China would take her rightful place in the -world of democratic nations. - -Although the American Ambassador, General Patrick J. Hurley, had told -Chiang of the decision at Yalta to give Manchuria to Russia as her -price for entering the war against Japan, the Generalissimo believed -so firmly in the good will and friendship of Roosevelt that he was -sure he would be supported in his effort to regain this important -Northern province. Therefore, as soon after the Japanese surrender as -possible, he sent troops to occupy and try to hold Manchuria. There -his army found itself confronted by the Russian Mongolian Army bent -on the same mission. - -At home, likewise, the Generalissimo was faced with ever-increasing -problems. The Allied and Japanese bombing had caused great -destruction, not unlike that in Europe. Villages had to be rebuilt, -factories and lines of communication restored. Millions of displaced -Chinese were waiting patiently to be returned to their homes. -Approximately three and a half million Japanese soldiers and -civilians were ready for repatriation. - -With great courage, inexhaustible patience and amazing wisdom, Chiang -Kai-shek began his program of reconstruction and rehabilitation. He -little realized that his three great Allies—Russia, England and the -United States—had plotted behind his back to snatch from his hands, -in his moment of victory, the one area that could change China from -a backward agricultural country into a modern and powerful nation. -Without Manchuria Chiang was lost. This was the juicy bone that first -the Japanese, then the Communists or the Generalissimo had to have -to complete their growth as a modern power. Without it each would be -rendered impotent. - -Chiang Kai-shek had fought for eight years to prevent the spread of -Japanese totalitarianism in China. Now he was confronted with a much -more vicious brand, Communist totalitarianism. He commented, “The -Japanese were a disease of the skin. The Communists are a disease of -the bone.” - -Many people wonder why the Nationalist Armies were so ineffective and -why so many of them went over to the Communists without even putting -up a fight. Certainly the bulk of the Chinese are not disposed to -Communism. They just want an opportunity to feed, clothe and shelter -their families. Most of them do not understand Communism or any other -political philosophy. Some accepted the new leadership through sheer -inertia. Some of them leaned toward it in protest against stupid and -oppressive government police measures, corrupt practices and bad -administration. Squeeze, or graft as we call it, was never a crime in -China. The Chinese people have no sense of political right or wrong, -no convictions about political truths as the Western world recognizes -them. As one Chinese General put it, “To take from the government is -no crime.” Indeed the principal weakness of the Generalissimo was the -very fact that he surrounded himself with men who did not hesitate to -take all they could get from the government. - -Chiang showed the same loyalty to those who surrounded him and -supported him, including members of his own and his wife’s families, -as President Truman, for instance, has demonstrated in his loyalty -to the Pendergast machine and others who have done his bidding. -The Generalissimo’s honesty and personal integrity have never been -questioned by those who know him best, and who were in constant -association with him during the Japanese war. General Wedemeyer -has attested to this statement and he was the American Chief of -Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and knew him intimately. For us to say his -Nationalist Government was corrupt and deserved to fall, amounts to -the pot calling the kettle black. Such a situation exists today in -Washington, D. C. - -Feeding the armies was Chiang’s greatest problem. The government at -first gave a lump sum to the army commanders, but many of these were -unscrupulous rascals who kept most of it for themselves, allocating -a small remainder to subordinates, who passed a still smaller -proportion on down through the lower levels to the unprotected -soldier. This was a century-old practice in China, and the hungry -soldier was reduced to stealing or appropriating his food from the -peasant merchants. Naturally there was always trouble between the -soldiers and the merchants, with no love lost between the two. The -latter lost their profits, and the soldiers reasoned that they were -at least entitled to food from the people they were fighting to -protect. It became increasingly easy for the Chinese Communists to -win converts. They went with those who offered them food. - -In spite of this tragic situation, the Generalissimo, with the same -patience and strength that had made his war leadership outstanding, -continued to hold the loyalty of a great number of his people. Long -after his flight to Formosa, rich and poor, officer and soldier -continued to fight for his principles. For example, as the Communists -entered Peking, there was desperate street fighting. The commander -of a battalion told his men, “We are greatly outnumbered. I cannot -keep you from going over to the other side, but I have fought the -Communists for eight years and I will not give up now!” Inspired -by his brave stand, most of his men remained with him and formed an -obstacle to the Communist advance. Finally, after an hour of hopeless -fighting, and when all his men had been killed, the battalion -commander manned the last machine gun himself and turned it full -force on the solid front of Communist troops advancing toward him. - -The Generalissimo had many such brave soldiers who fought to the -death in his armies. Not all those loyal to Chiang were soldiers. In -Canton, after the Communists took over, they held a great celebration -featuring a long victory parade. This stopped every few miles and put -on a little skit which showed the Generalissimo on his knees, with -his hands tied behind his back, confessing his sins to the Communist -leaders who laughed uproariously! The actor who impersonated Chiang -received numerous threatening letters. When he reported this to his -Soviet boss, he was told to disregard the threats and was ordered to -continue his role. A few days later the actor was shot. Even behind -the Red Curtain there are still snipers about. In fact there is every -reason to believe that active guerrilla bands are on the prowl. - -In Kwangsi Province, the Southern Province of General Li Tsun-jen, -pronounced “Lee Tzun-ren,” the villagers found that if they did not -cooperate with the Communists, they would be shot. On the other hand, -if they did, they took the chance of meeting a similar fate at the -hands of Nationalist guerrillas for collaborating with the enemy. -Undoubtedly this situation existed in many other places. - -Many of those who knew the Generalissimo best believed that despite -the corruption that surrounded him he would go down in history as a -man of integrity and high purpose. Tribute is paid him by General -Wedemeyer when he says, “There are few people who can speak more -authoritatively than I can concerning the sincerity and Christian -humility of the Generalissimo. I had frequent, almost daily, contacts -with him for nearly a year. I can vouch for his unselfish devotion to -the Chinese people and for his earnest desire to provide a democratic -way of life within China. Surely his loyalty and his faithful -cooperation during the war fully merit our lasting friendship.” - -Our assistance was denied to Chiang, and the outcome of our most -grievous mistakes will be judged by future historians. Not only the -United States, but some of the Chinese themselves, selfishly withheld -the aid they could have given their leader and their country. In -1946, fifty of the wealthiest Chinese were called in and asked if -they would each donate a large portion of their enormous fortunes, -which together ran into the billions, to their government. Bowing and -nodding their heads, they listened politely, but not one of them was -willing to sacrifice his future security or even to jeopardize it -against such stupendous odds. - -Support of the State still is a secondary consideration to the -Chinese. Their principal loyalty—financial, filial, and political—is -to their own family. As in the ancient days, the poor, the sick and -the destitute can claim the protection of their nearest relative. -No matter how distant the relationship, they are given food and -shelter. Be it said to their credit, there are very few asylums or -orphanages in China. The family takes care of its own. - -Perhaps this idea was in Chiang’s mind when he refused the enticing -peace terms offered him by the Japanese at Hankow. A devout scholar, -he quoted Confucius: “The men of old, when they wished their virtues -to shine throughout the land, first had to govern their states -well. To govern their states well, they had to establish harmony in -their families. To establish harmony in their families, they had to -discipline themselves and set their minds in order. To set their -minds in order, they had to make their purpose sincere. To make their -purpose sincere, they had to extend their knowledge to the utmost. -Such knowledge is acquired through a careful investigation of things. -For, with things investigated, knowledge becomes complete. With -knowledge complete, the purpose becomes sincere. With the purpose -sincere, the mind is set in order, and there is real self-discipline. -With self-discipline, the family achieves harmony. With harmony in -the family, the state becomes well governed. With the state well -governed, there is peace throughout the land.” - -With due respect for what the Generalissimo attempted to do in China -and what he has accomplished on Formosa, I would like to quote one -paragraph from a scholarly article entitled: “_What Americans Don’t -Know About Asia_,” appearing in the June 4, 1951, issue of _Life -Magazine_, written by James Michener, Pulitzer Prize author of -“_Tales of the South Pacific_”: - - “To appreciate the greatness of our loss (of China) one must - visit Formosa. This island today is the bright spot of Asia. The - Nationalist government, shaken to its withers by the debacle on the - mainland, has matured astonishingly in the chastisement of defeat. - It has established an enlightened commonwealth. Nowhere in Asia is - the food problem more fairly handled. Nowhere are justice, human - safety and property—those universal measures of good government—so - respected and secured. The American cannot visit this island without - one lament filling his mind: _this_ might have been China today.” - -Let us, in the United States, so _act_ in the moments left of the -immediate and perilous hours of this half-way-mark of the Twentieth -Century to preclude a similar “chastisement of defeat.” May it never -be said, by some lone survivor of an atomic attack, tossed upon a -distant isle, the beauty, dignity and grandeur of which is strangely -familiar, yet defies Paradise itself: “_This_ might have been -America.” - - - - - CHAPTER VIII - - _Behind the Red Curtain_ - - -Immediately after the Communists gained control of China and occupied -it from North to South, Russian technicians and advisors poured into -the country. Everyone was asking: “What are the Russians doing in -China?” - -From a few foreigners and Chinese, who had made an early escape from -behind the Red Curtain, and from letters later smuggled out of the -country, came the revealing truth. Some of the informants had lived -under the Communist yoke for as long as eight and nine months, and -among these was a United Press correspondent, Chang Kuo Sin. - -“The Russians,” he said “began at once to fit China into the -political-military bloc of Soviet dominated States which, by the -end of 1949, extended from the Danube River to the Pacific Ocean. -Their organization was beyond anything China had ever seen, and it -certainly proved that they had been planning it for a long time. -I was frankly shocked by the influence they seemed to have on the -Chinese, from the very beginning. - -“The ‘Big Noses,’ as the Chinese called the Russians,” he continued, -“took over as fast as they could. They tried to make a good -impression on the Chinese by moving right in with them. They ate -Chinese food and fumbled with chopsticks, and even wore Chinese -Communist uniforms made for them in Russia. They had already learned -to speak Chinese and to write a certain number of characters before -they arrived. Also, they had been taught some of the old Chinese -customs, such as raising the rice bowl as a gesture of friendly -greeting. - -“The Russians brought in about seventy railroad engineers to -supervise the rebuilding of the railroads and bridges damaged by the -war. They were especially interested in everything military and sent -movie units around to make films of Chinese strategic areas. A friend -of mine, who saw them taking pictures, told me that Chinese officers, -who had been trained in Russia, were showing them all of the defenses -of the country.” - -The original plan, in 1950, was to attack Formosa before the typhoon -season began in June. The Russians knew then what the world knows now -from the 1951 release of Dean Acheson’s diplomatic report of December -23, 1949, that we had written off Formosa as of no importance to -our Pacific defenses. Acheson tried, in vain, to involve Lieutenant -General Wedemeyer in this act of treachery. Acheson testified, -June 1, 1951, that the State Department prepared the report after -Wedemeyer, then Assistant Chief of Staff, suggested to the State -Department that it use the _Voice of America_ to “minimize” any -damage that might result from the fall of Formosa. But we know -from the complete _Wedemeyer Report_ that the General advocated -unequivocal defense of Formosa as being of definite strategic -importance in our chain of defenses in the Pacific. MacArthur and -Wedemeyer both had warned that the fall of Formosa would leave Japan, -Okinawa and the Philippines outflanked. The following is an account -of how the enemy planned to take Formosa with an offensive beginning -June, 1950. - -Chang Kuo Sin reported: “We are given to understand that the island -will be taken by the biggest land, sea and air force that has yet -been launched against any place within the Russian orbit. They -will muster hundreds of fighting planes and thirty warships, plus -thousands of troops for this invasion. The warships, of course, -include many that went over to the Communists from the Nationalist -forces.” - -The Chinese correspondent was not the only one who watched with -alarm the preparations for the invasion of Formosa. From every side -came evidence of the size and strength of the forces assembling -for the attack. The British, after recognition of the Communist -Government, and in order to protect their investments, were forced -into the distasteful position of giving them, by court order, ninety -airplanes. Worth twenty million dollars, these planes belonged to -the airline companies owned by the picturesque American flyer Claire -L. Chennault, whose famous “Flying Tiger” raids on the Japanese -added brilliant pages to American military history. This high-handed -transfer of American-made planes, probably the best in the world -outside those in use by the U. S. Air Force, to the Communists by -the British was cause for alarm in official circles. The planes will -undoubtedly wind up under the direct control of the Kremlin, whether -or not they are used for the initial air assault on Formosa. - -The ground forces were nominally to be under the command of the Mayor -of Shanghai, who was said to have marshalled a picked force of one -hundred and eighty thousand troops for the invasion. Their training -in beach landings and personal combat was supervised by the Russians, -and many of their special weapons are said to have been of Soviet -make. The Mayor, a pawn of the Russians, was content to leave the -military strategy entirely in the hands of his more than helpful -allies. - -Russian engineers were busy at every port from which the invasion -might be launched. After forcing those already on the job to resign, -they hired shipbuilders and began work on the dockyards, repairing -the damage caused by Nationalist bombings. They assembled ships of -different sizes and made them ready for invasion day. So we see that -the Russians were well occupied in Shanghai. - -The fact that American troops were withdrawn by the State Department -from occupation in South Korea a few months earlier, left that -country a more logical target of opportunity to begin their -aggressive action. This explains why the Formosa attack was not made -as originally scheduled in 1950. - -In Canton the Russians were busy moving complete factories to -Siberia, just as they had done earlier in Manchuria. This, they -said, was to save them from Nationalist bombs. The real reason was -that they needed them to build up Siberia industrially. Most of -the Southern factories produced cement, cotton cloth or chemicals, -vitally needed to support the large Siberian populace. It mattered -little to the Russians that China needed these same commodities -for herself. When workers complained that they could not live -without their jobs, the Communist bosses said: “Well, then, come -along with your plant and bring your family.” When the workers, -usually encumbered with large families, would ask hopefully about -transportation, they would always receive the same reply: “Can’t you -walk? We did on the ‘Long March.’ You can, too.” - -The Chinese are always desperately in need of doctors, and the -Communists, right after taking over the country, allowed the -physicians to go about their business unmolested, provided they did -not discuss politics. So great was the demand for medical services -that outrageous fees were charged. The Communists permitted this -situation to continue, as it kept the doctors happy. With a flood -raging in China and plague beginning to show itself, doctors were a -priceless commodity. Even Russian doctors and scientists were brought -in and added to the Ministry of Health in China. - -Although the flood of 1950 was the worst one in years, it did not -stop the Russians from sending food out of the country and into -Siberia. The Chinese granaries were empty, and everyone was hungry. -In Shanghai alone there were reported at least a hundred and twenty -thousand foodless and homeless refugees, and no agency was able to do -anything for them. It became dangerous for the average citizen, poor -though he might be, to go out in the streets at night. Every morning -a number of dead bodies were found piled up against the walls of -buildings. - -Mao Tse-tung, his slogans still promising “Abundance for All,” -ordered a part of the army to work on the cooperative farms and -offered handsome rewards for boosting food production. In Peking -the worried Chinese Communists admitted that there were some nine -million people dead or dying in those areas, but that they were -unable to halt the shipments out of the country. Starving beggars in -filthy rags, a not unusual sight in China during the famine and flood -seasons, died by the score on the streets of Nanking and Shanghai, -where they had come with the faint hope of finding work. These -were the stronger ones; the weaker were never able to leave their -villages, or else they fell along the way. - -“Food is the one vital concern here,” said a letter from Peking. “Any -kind of food. Even if you have money there is very little to buy, and -everybody is poor down to the bone. We are thoroughly sick of the -whole situation, but what can we do? Our friends are sent to jail if -they complain about anything, sometimes even if they voice an opinion -about the Communists that is not flattering. - -“The beautiful lawns and gardens in the public parks and surrounding -the homes of wealthy families have been plowed up and planted with -vegetables. When this is not done within a reasonable length of time, -soldiers enter, armed with guns, and ask politely: ‘You would like -to have your gardens Produce for the People, would you not?’ In any -case, the owner is lucky if he is permitted to keep a small share -of what he is able to raise. After the gardens are taken over, it -is a matter of the Camel in the Arab’s tent. Next, the valuables -in the house are removed, to be sent out of the country in return -for dollars and pounds. Then the troops or Party officers quarter -themselves comfortably in the house, and if there is the slightest -difficulty, the owners are forced out.” - -Another letter said, “It is considered very bad taste, if not -dangerous, to appear well off, and when I go to market I wear my -oldest clothes to avoid being conspicuous. Only the Communist -Hierarchy go about dressed in furs and finery, and they never go out -except in shiny limousines.” - -Adding to the difficulty of obtaining food and other necessities, -Communists, for propaganda reasons, had put the pedicabs and -rickshaws off some of the streets in the larger cities. The price of -gasoline went up so high that no one could use his car, even if he -still had one. Thus transportation became another severe problem. -Only a few crowded, rickety busses still operated, and these were -almost impossible to board. They were so packed that people clung -tightly to each other at the doors, somewhat reminiscent of rush-hour -in the New York subway. Those not able to get on the vehicles -dog-trotted along behind. The busses never ran on any schedule, and -the driver, if given a large enough bribe, would even change the -route at a moment’s notice. - -From a Chinese refugee now living in San Francisco, I learned that -Peking families, as well as others in the Northern area, were sending -their children out of the country on the pretext of aiding their -fathers in business. “We try to make the Communists feel that we are -cooperating with them wholeheartedly. Then, when we are sure that we -have their confidence and that it is safe, we ask them if we may -send our son or daughter to Hong Kong for business reasons or, better -still, on work for the Party. If they are lucky enough to get away, -they may have to stay in Hong Kong three or four months before they -can book passage on a ship. When we hear, via the grapevine, that -they are safe on board, we do not care what becomes of us.” - -A tragic letter from a former military attaché in Washington during -the war told of the fall of Shanghai and the stampede of hundreds of -people trying to get away from the Communists. “The conquerors closed -the gates of the city during most of the day and night to prevent -crowds from trying to reach the railway stations or river banks and -wharves. Steamships anchored in mid-stream to protect themselves from -the mobs that tried to board them. Had everyone been successful in -the attempt, the ships would have capsized. It was necessary to go -out in small sampans and junks. Ropes with knots tied at intervals, -to which people could cling, were thrown over the sides of the ships. -I saw one father fasten a rope to his three children, and then the -family tried to scale the ship’s side. Suddenly, when they were all -about half-way up, the child at the top slipped or let go, pushing -the other children with him as he fell. The parents screamed wildly -and jumped into the churning, muddy water after them. Their cries -were heart rending.” - -In talking to Americans and Chinese who have returned to the United -States, I caught many interesting and authoritative glimpses of life -behind the Red Curtain. For instance, as with Stalin in Moscow, no -one in China seemed to know where in Peking Chairman Mao lived. Some -said he had taken over the Wagon Lits Hotel, others that he had a -place in the country. Some said he appeared on the streets rarely, -although he was seen at official gatherings now and then. At one -such affair, Mao displayed a batch of letters, supposed to have been -received from non-Communists, telling how pleased they were at the -way the Communists had taken over and how courteous they had been. -The tone of all these letters was flattering and to the effect that -the non-Communists were impressed with their new masters. What Mao -did not know, or did not mention, of course, was that the letters had -been written and signed under duress and that, later, the writers had -pleaded with friends going out of the country to tell those to whom -the letters were addressed that nothing could be further from the -truth. - -The Communists strictly censored all mail coming into China, -especially from the United States. Many letters were confiscated when -they contained names and information about people the Reds wished to -add to their files, and almost always when there was money in them. - -Mao and Chou En-lai were said to be on very good terms with a number -of Russian advisors. All called each other by their first names. The -Chinese also were copying Russian ways with surprising alacrity. I -learned that one of the most popular of the adopted Moscow customs -was wife-swapping, or free love. In the New Democracy marriage was -performed and terminated merely by mutual consent, Russian style. -There was no exchange of vows when mating was done for the Cause, -no priest or magistrate to pronounce the pair man and wife or to -separate them later. Mrs. Chou En-lai told me very frankly in 1946 -that she had never been legally married to her well-known husband. -“The New Democracy did away with all that,” she said. “We did away -with ceremonies. They are foolish and we don’t need them. Such things -are for you Imperialists!” - -Such laxity in marital affairs has long been the accepted custom in -Russia, and indeed the Russian official often finds himself going -even further, sometimes involuntarily. A Soviet army officer arriving -at the Shanghai Airport not long ago looked around for his wife. She -was nowhere in sight. A good looking blonde walked up to him and -asked, “Are you Colonel Kovicov?” “I am,” he replied, a little taken -aback. He had never seen her before and felt a faint chill when she -said, “I am your wife now, on Party orders.” He knew then that he was -under suspicion. - -Another high official in Russia returned home from an arduous day in -the Politburo and found that his “wife” had been replaced by a new -and not so pretty one. “Who are you?” he asked rather sadly, and she -replied, “You know who I am. I am the wife assigned to go with you to -China.” It developed that this woman spoke Chinese fluently, a talent -not possessed by the deposed mate. One may also infer that she was -more adept at spying. - -Furs, silks, cosmetics and some jewelry were said to have been -brought into China at times by the Russians as rewards for faithful -service, and many a smart Party woman already had a neat nest egg -laid away in clothes and other commodities, such as the Communist -“unmentionable” one, money. - -Americans who admire China and the Chinese will be disheartened by -a letter written by a retired colonel in the United States Army and -an old China hand. “The campaign of hatred stirred up against the -United States is impossible to realize unless you are right here on -the spot,” he wrote. “We are constantly branded as the worst enemies -China ever had. All the people who spent their lives here working -for China and the Chinese are called spies or tools of Imperialism. -At first they were polite and assured us that we could do business -as usual. Later we felt that we were being eased out, and finally we -were kicked out. We are all suspected of being agents of the American -Government and can never go out on the street without being jostled, -jeered at and spat upon. Many of us in Shanghai have been beaten, -jailed and fined huge sums before being released. Two men I know have -been taken out of their houses at night and beaten up. I don’t know -how much longer we will be able to stay here, but you can expect us -as soon as we can get away. I have plenty to tell when I do get home! -It is difficult to leave, as everyone has to have a Chinese vouch -for his good behavior before he can go. This Chinese friend actually -becomes a hostage, and any criticism of the Communist Government on -the part of the American may endanger his life.” - -A correspondent in Shanghai was one of the Americans who was sure -that it would be possible to “do business” with the Communists. He -wrote a letter to the effect that “things really are not going to -be as bad as people are inclined to believe. They have assured me -that my office will not be molested and that they are very anxious -to do business with the foreigners.” A few days after the Reds took -Shanghai, they locked him up in that same office and confiscated his -business. He was allowed to return to the States, but, like everyone -else, had to leave his Chinese hostage behind him. When his American -ship stopped at Hong Kong, he talked to the press. A few days later, -when his ship was in mid-ocean, he received a radio message saying -in effect: “Make no statements about China. Authorities holding me -responsible.” - -American missionaries fared no better than the businessmen. Many -churches were sealed officially as they were considered “private -organizations” which, under Communism, cannot exist. Christian -pastors of all faiths were made to register with the police and were -questioned for hours as to their attitudes toward the Russians and -the Chinese Communists. They were told plainly that although the -Communists “guaranteed” them freedom of religious _belief_—that is, a -man could believe anything he wished if he did not talk about it—they -intended to eliminate all freedom of religious _action_—that is, no -gathering together for the purpose of worship would be tolerated. And -this was in late 1948 and early 1949! - -So much for the Americans. How did the British fare after recognizing -the Communist Government? Once feared and respected throughout the -Orient and now huddled together on their little island of Hong Kong, -they were forced to eat humble pie from the hands of the Communists -sitting on the front steps of their one-time imperial domain. At -stake was their one billion, two hundred million dollar investment, -the key to what was left of their Empire in the Far East. - -A correspondent from Hong Kong wrote, “The city is packed with -refugees, Chinese, British and Americans. It is terribly expensive. -As much as three thousand Hong Kong dollars down payment is required -before you can rent a room, and everything else is sky high. It is -dreadfully hot, there are few parks or out-of-door places to sit, -and almost nowhere to eat. The Communists are everywhere. They have -closed most of the bookstores except those run by the Communists, -and these carry nothing, of course, except books and magazines about -Communism. Even the British bookstores are forced to carry Party -literature. It was impossible to get a doctor when my wife was sick, -as the Communists will not issue licenses to practice to any but -British doctors, and they are so busy with the care of both Chinese -and foreigners that they are worn out. With such overcrowding, many -are sick, as you can imagine. I wish I could send my family home, but -it is impossible. It takes many weeks or months to get reservations. -We are just trapped!” - -Thus the Lion’s mighty roar, that once thundered throughout the -world, was reduced to a whimpering sniffle. Everywhere the British, -especially in the foreign office in London, were embarrassed at -the turn of events. Dr. Cheng Tien-shi, the Chinese Nationalist -Government’s ambassador to Great Britain, was called in and told -that England had recognized the Chinese Communist Government and that -his office must be vacated. With Confucian calm the elderly Chinese -gentleman faced the youthful Minister of State, Hector McNeil. -The latter fingered his tie, cleared his throat and, shifting his -feet uneasily, read the announcement in a strained voice. Sitting -down with McNeil, Cheng recalled the days when it was fashionable -to praise Chiang Kai-shek for his magnificent stand against the -Japanese. He quoted Mark Anthony’s speech over the dead body of -Caesar: - - “_But yesterday the word of Caesar might - Have stood against the world. Now lies he there, - And none so poor to do him reverence._” - -Several times McNeil referred deferentially to Cheng, who is one of -the greatest living Chinese philosophers, as “Mr. Ambassador.” At -length, the gentle old man asked politely, “How can you still call -me ‘Mr. Ambassador?’” McNeil replied, “Once an Ambassador, always an -Ambassador.” The Chinese scholar hesitated a moment and then said, -“In my country, we have a similar saying, ‘Once a friend, always a -friend.’ Homage to force and violence is a dangerous thing. If you -worship Caesar, you will die by Caesar. Why must you bury us while we -are still very much alive? One day you will need us again.” - - - - - CHAPTER IX - - _Quo Vadis?_ - - -The dangers facing the United States and the countries friendly to -us are becoming increasingly serious. We must recognize the fact -that, as individuals, we are as responsible for what is happening -today as were the people living peacefully at one time under Hitler, -Hirohito and Stalin, and whom we heartily condemn for having allowed -disastrous conditions to develop and get beyond their control. - -Concerning the forces building up around us and the world today, -we are still far too apathetic and complacent. Much of the -responsibility for this must, of necessity, be placed upon our -leadership. We know that America is the one bastion of freedom left -in the world today, and that continued strength in it reflects the -hope of the world—that is, of the free peoples of the world as well -as those behind iron curtains everywhere who now know the true -meaning of slavery which was sold to them in the guise of “security.” - -Remaining strong entails a price. What is it? To me, above all, it -requires faith in God, faith in our fellow man and faith in ourselves -and other individuals of personal integrity. Meanwhile, we must -first keep strong our foundations of initiative, self-reliance and -individual responsibility for our actions with respect to our duties -to our own country. - -Unfortunately many people in America have believed the Henry Wallace -theory that it was an “over-abundance” or “excessive production” -which brought on the depression of the Thirties, or that has or -ever could, cause any depression. But this is not true. Economists -tell us today that “misdirected production, plus misdirected and -over-stimulated consumption” aided our previous downfall, and that -it was an abuse of our credit, both at home and abroad. But what -does this mean? Was part of our trouble then, as now, caused by too -many loans to foreign countries for goods bought here, and an abuse -of credit to consumers (you and me) here at home? This did bring on -the boom of the late Twenties and also the terrific maladjustment -which the depression of the Thirties should have corrected, but -which it could not, under the circumstances existing then. The -“over-abundance” or “excess savings” theory—that we had so much that -we could well afford to give it away—is dangerously misleading. It -was invented to justify unwise, if not calculated, giving to foreign -countries with the resultant weakening of our own country to a point -where Social Security and many other “social laws,” including the -limitation of productive effort were adopted as expediencies here at -home. Outright charity to people has, throughout history, tended to -destroy their moral fiber. Proud people will not, moreover, accept -charity and will be determined to work out their own salvation. -Finland is just such an example. Contrast that country’s attitude -with France today, and even with England. - -Our country, America, has always been a philanthropic one. No one, -in his right mind, could or ever has, questioned the humanitarian -feelings of the American body politic, but unless our assistance is -selective and well timed, it cannot bring permanent relief, nor can -it accomplish worthwhile objectives. - -There are some who say that America has always had a hit-or-miss -approach to most of her problems, and that Lady Luck has been on -our side. This also is not quite so. In the 19th Century, we had -a relatively free competitive society—not perfect, of course, but -the best we’d ever had. The laws which govern human nature under a -government of limited powers, such as we had under the Constitution -before we began changing it, operated then. During that period these -laws governing human nature were patterned on a system of checks and -balances, remarkably similar to those dictated by God to Moses at -Mount Sinai. The hit-or-miss approach became apparent only when we -began to turn to government “to relieve us from our mistakes under -freedom.” - -We know that this nation came into being after the victory of -the War of Independence. At this time, a Constitution was drawn -up and ratified by the states. But there is more to it than -that. A confusion in terms always has led to a misunderstanding -in definition. There are some who feel quite strongly that -“democracy” is a principle, and was never intended to become a -form of government. The word “democracy” does not appear once -in our Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Declaration of -Independence. In our Salute to the Flag, known by every school boy -and girl in America, it is the “Republic” for which we stand—not a -“Democracy.” Of course the words are used almost interchangeably in -the encyclopedia, and we know that the purest form of democracy -envisions the realistic participation in the government on the part -of all the governed. Town meetings were typical of this in the past, -but as our society became more complex, it was found impractical -to hold these, and as a result, representatives were selected, and -a Republic evolved. It all boiled down to what might be called a -practicing democracy, because people do have the opportunity today -to make their desires known as to how and by whom they will be -governed—that is, however, on condition that they express themselves -at the voting polls. - -The framers of our Constitution sought to give each department of -government its due share of power, and to prevent any one of them -from making itself supreme. In his “_Back to the Republic_,” Harry -E. Atwood comments: “Almost daily Russia is spoken of as ‘the new -republic.’ That phrase is as inaccurate as it would be to speak of a -drunken man as a new example of temperance. To speak of Mexico as a -‘republic’ is as inaccurate as it would be to speak of fanaticism as -a new form of reverence. To call Communist China a ‘republic’ is as -far-fetched as it would be to speak of insomnia as a new form of rest -... for at the present time, these are all types of democracy, they -are not republics....” - -In the “_Federalist_,” James Madison said of our government: “The -true distinction between these forms (democracy and republic) is that -in a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person. -In a republic they assemble and administer it by their representative -agents.... The first question that offers itself is whether the -general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican? It -is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius -of the American people.” - -We know from the experiences of other nations that perfection in -government never has been found _via_ the route of mob rule. If -we think otherwise we play right into the hands of the Communists -and all others who oppose our government. Unethical procedure -in any established order is brought about little by little. The -theory of lesser concessions is always active. In our trend toward -paternalism in government we must constantly guard against the ogre -of an established bureaucracy, a denying to the individual those -“inalienable rights” of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” -so definitely vouchsafed to him in the Republican form of government -which was established in this country “under God.” With any -impairment of our system of checks and balances, all power to protect -every man’s God-given rights is rendered impotent. - -Everywhere people are expressing the thought that, “Things just -can’t go on like this,” and “What is going to happen?” Is there -then, a sense of impending judgment in the very atmosphere itself? -Let me illustrate the theory of lesser concessions mentioned above. -Back in September, 1932, during a campaign speech at Sioux City, -President Roosevelt accused the Hoover administration of being the -greatest spendthrift in U. S. history; that bureaus and bureaucrats -had been retained at the taxpayers’ expense, and then he proceeded -to out-Hoover Hoover with alphabetical agencies to the point where -cartoonists branded us “alphabetical goofs.” - -The Foundation for Economic Education at Irvington-on-Hudson, has -compiled some interesting statistics: - - “Expended by all Presidents up to Lincoln $ 1,795,319,694 - “Expended by Lincoln (including the - Civil War) 3,252,380,410 - “Spent by Johnson thru Taft 19,373,146,217 - “Wilson (including World War I) 47,938,260,143 - “Warren G. Harding 6,667,235,429 - “Calvin Coolidge 18,585,549,115 - “Herbert Hoover 15,490,476,636 - “Franklin D. Roosevelt (including eight - years of peace) 67,518,746,001 - “Total expended by all Presidents from - the beginning to July 1, 1945 $179,630,113,645 - “Total spent by Harry S. Truman from - July 1, 1945, to September 1, 1949 $191,081,394,191” - -With constantly rising taxes and increased government spending, the -dollar bill soon will be worthless, as will be the paper on which it -is printed. A mathematician figuring hurriedly on his cuff, comments: -“We’ll be back to where the South was in 1865, with its worthless -Confederate money.” Why? Little by little our executive branch has -usurped the functions of Congress, under the flimsy guise of a -so-called “mandate” from us, the people. Unless we become _aware_ of -what we have permitted to happen in our midst, and elect people to -Congress who will make the government their servant and not their -master, we will soon be where the Germans were under Hitler, the -Italians under Mussolini, and where the Russians are today, under -Stalin—and the British to a lesser degree, under their socialist -regime. - -For the first time in global history, the forces are drawn between -two distinct ways of life—Christianity and Barbarism. Through the -cobwebs of confusion and the roadblocks of distortion we now know -that our one enemy is Stalin and his particular brand of thuggery. -Modern, civilized peoples throughout the universe, including those -behind the iron curtain, have but one common enemy—Communism. If we -do indeed believe what we profess, as Christians, to believe, “Man -cannot serve God and Mammon,” how can we expect a United Nations to -succeed in anything so long as the head of the Communist Governments, -the world over, is represented in its midst? - -All doubt and uncertainty has been dispelled as to who, where and -how our enemy operates. In China we have seen the Communist system -operate to the complete disintegration of human rights. Here in -the United States we do not know precisely how many Communists are -among us, or exactly where and how they connive. We are told on -good authority (J. Edgar Hoover) that they are growing in strength -and numbers as well as going underground, but we are unable to put -our fingers on enough of them. Communism operates and succeeds by -deception here as in the early phases of China’s recent history. -It bores from within. Frequently its voice is soft and seductive, -like the voice of Delilah, and equally treacherous. As we have seen -though, once it has the situation in hand, it does not hesitate to -use brute force. - -In contrast, what we call Democracy makes its mistakes openly for -all to see and endeavor to correct. Democracy, to us, means complete -personal liberty, the right to live, work and play how, when and -where one chooses, in open competition, and is maintained by a -process of checks and balances or trial and error. We who live in -this atmosphere of free enterprise, take these things for granted, -while treason catches us off guard. Until we recognize this, we will -continue to be at the mercy of organized political traitors both -foreign and domestic. We can no longer afford to assume a casual -attitude, even though history reveals that the Communism of Stalin, -like other world shaking movements in the past, if given sufficient -time, will fall of its own weight. - -“Well,” you may ask: “If Communism is going to fall anyway, (or be -pushed), why bother to do anything about it now?” The answer is -simple. We must do something about it now because generations, even -centuries, may elapse before it collapses without help other than -human intervention. In the meantime, what will happen to us and -to our children? Do we realize the long period of humiliation and -degradation, with increasing controls by the Communists, that this -means? - -War, a global holocaust, in the not too distant future seems a much -more likely turn of events. We know that Russia is expanding and -improving her military force, including long range submarines and -airplanes as well as ultra-destructive weapons. She has more planes -than the United States and other democracies put together. We are -told that Russia is making A bombs and has already had at least one -atomic explosion behind the Iron Curtain. The H bomb is a logical -sequel. She is capable, we understand, of delivering a surprise -atomic attack against any part of the United States, while we have no -sure defense against such an attack. Her submarine fleet rapidly is -being patterned after Germany’s and this, with her other combat ships -will make her the third greatest Naval Power. She has an army of two -and one-half million uniformed troops and thousands of undercover -agents to act as spies or scouts. We know that she is on a complete -war footing, just as England was during the latter days of World War -II and as we made an attempt to be. - -This is grave food for thought. If our most responsible leaders are -assured that Russia is intending to attack us within a short time, -then should we not prepare and attack first, trying with the initial -blow, so to paralyze the enemy that she will be unable to retaliate. -This would be a terrible decision to have to make, and we may not -have the chance, but we must give it serious thought. - -As long as Russia feels that she is winning the cold war, however, -she would be a fool to start a hot one she might lose. I do not -believe that she would even let herself be goaded into it. When -she is ready to strike, she will strike, of that we may be sure. -It may be possible that the men in the Kremlin are hesitant about -upsetting their present position, fearing counter-revolution at home -and abroad. Perhaps the mighty armada is for propaganda purposes -and to hold the Red Empire together. If this is so, we must never -relax our own efforts behind the Iron Curtains everywhere in order to -enlist the support of the unhappy 90 per cent of the enslaved people, -without whose help we cannot hope to defeat the Soviet Union. Our -most powerful secret weapon is not the A or the H bomb, but this same -overwhelming majority of victims who fought and won a revolution only -to find that they had been sold down the river at the moment of their -victory. - -These terrorized victims in every country are our most powerful -potential allies, and we must do all in our power to make them -understand that we are in sympathy with them—with their hopes and -prayers for liberation—and that the only thing we reject is Communist -despotism. All peoples who are denied the basic freedoms of speech, -press, religion, assembly—immediately become enormous whispering -galleries. There is greater “lure” in suppressed facts and ideas than -there is in political propaganda. Even the threat of death will not -keep people from reading forbidden material when they are hungry for -news from those who may be sympathetic to their plight. But all this -would take well-trained counter espionage, and it would cost money. - -It would make sense to me if, first of all, we saw to it that our -homeland was protected—but not by an armed camp or maintained by a -disproportionate amount of military might that would hamstring our -economy or deprive us of too many of our liberties. Our military -forces should be trained and equipped to provide a reasonable degree -of military security for the United States. Then, bring about this -same type of coordination in Canada and the Latin American countries, -thereby creating a modicum of safety throughout the Western -Hemisphere. - -In doing the above, we’d be licked before we started unless we -made assurance doubly sure that we, the people, knew beyond all -possibility of doubt, what was going on and why. Once we are -possessed of complete understanding, and support the purpose for -which we may be called upon to make the greatest sacrifices of our -lives—even including our lives if need be—our objectives will thus -be constantly in view. We know this would require a rebirth or a -resurgence of courageous leadership, honesty and integrity—and an old -fashioned “patriotism” too long lacking in our leaders. But are not -these qualities still inherent within us? They were, certainly, until -clever and sinister propaganda infiltrated our very marrow. - -To go a step further. We know that we cannot stop with our own -Western Hemisphere. Our thinking and our responsibility is now -global. There’s “no hidin’ place” anywhere. Therefore we must improve -our position, militarily, economically and psychologically throughout -Europe and Asia by helping nations and peoples there to help -themselves to keep their few remaining freedoms. Of course we have to -protect certain sea and air routes to and from our best sources of -raw materials. - -To me, it is sheer nonsense to give, indiscriminately, whether it -be money or military aid, without stipulating that we get something -for it. To do otherwise is contrary to individual human nature, and -yet as a nation, we have given billions in money and material—not -to mention thousands of lives in Korea—without demanding anything -in return. To keep on throwing good money, things and men into the -hopper will bring no permanent relief, nor will it accomplish any -outright objective. - -We need oil from the Middle East, uranium from the Belgian Congo, -or anywhere else we can get it, and we need tin and rubber from -southeast Asia, plus other important things. But if we are cut -off and cannot get them, then we can use our almost unprecedented -ingenuity in the department of synthetics. Germany demonstrated what -can be accomplished with ersatz. - -I agree heartily with Generals MacArthur and Wedemeyer, and others, -who have not expressed their views openly, or who have so indicated -and been severely reprimanded for it, that we must have areas of -operation such as the British Isles, Formosa, the African coast, -Philippines, Japan, the Scandinavian Peninsula, Denmark, Iberian -Peninsula and Saudi Arabia. These could be held or taken, if need be, -with a minimum of manpower, for we know our weapons are far superior -to those of our enemy, both in mechanics and quality, while their -manpower is far in excess of anything that we can muster. From these -so-called “islands” it would be possible for the allied forces to -rain ultimate death and destruction on the enemy, and without them we -are powerless to strike except from long range. - -To those who, like General Marshall, insist that we must have -an enormous land army, or armies, to go in and occupy conquered -territory so as to be able to control the people, I give this answer, -or make this suggestion. Why not establish colonies of people of -all nationalities, who would be charged with responsibilities of -teaching people how to produce or earn a living and to study forms -of government suitable for creating small civil communities that -could be transplanted into any conquered territory after organized -resistance had been broken by the military? This would be entirely -within the realm of possibility, and it would definitely conserve our -most precious potential—manpower. - -It has been said that: “Every despotism has an especially known -and hostile instinct for whatever keeps up human dignity and -independence. Materialism is the sister doctrine of every tyranny, -whether of the one or of the many. To crush what is spiritual, moral, -human in a man by specializing him; to form more wheels of the great -social machine, instead of perfecting individuals ... is the dominant -drift of our epoch.... The test of every religious, political or -educational system, is what it does to man. If it injures his -intelligence, it is bad. If it injures his character, it is vicious. -If it injures his conscience, it is criminal.” - -Expediency is the voice of danger. We must do away with the false -idea that immediate and temporary gain is a substitute for moral -principle. We can recognize, as did Thomas Jefferson, that: -“Whenever a man casts a longing eye on office, a rottenness begins -in his conduct.” We must become aware that slavery develops in -direct proportion as government control becomes a substitute for -self-control and responsibility. Search for the solution at the -spiritual instead of the material level. - -Aristotle, the philosopher, has told us: “There are a million ways -to be wrong, but only one way to be right.” A principle is a very -tangible “element” that we treasure as an active force of life or -nature or—God. If we know, in our hearts, that a thing is _right_, -even though the results of such thought or action may not become -evident within the span of our own lifetime, and we go ahead and -sacrifice the principle for expediency, ours is a crime far greater -than that which was committed by the hand that “all the perfumes of -Arabia could not sweeten!” - -This is the day of the individual. Only you and I, as independent -units, can right the wrongs that have beset our nation and the world. -This is encouraging, isn’t it? Dean Russell tells us: “Fortunately -for the cause of freedom, it is only as an individual that you or I -can do anything at all. This is the voluntary way of accomplishing -a desired objective. It is the only method that is in accord with -freedom.” The opposite side of the coin is that people who have -agreed to accept a bad idea band themselves together to force—by -vote or otherwise—their ideas upon other people. It may all be -perfectly legal, but it is dishonest. We are at perfect liberty to -vote ourselves into serfdom. But it is very dangerous to believe that -freedom automatically is safe because the individual vote has become -so popular in America, where the “democratic” way prevails. When -we vote money into our pockets, old age pensions, farm subsidies, -price parities and a million other “props” to lean on, we are voting -paralysis to our brains and slavery to our physical beings. - -It is a dangerous thing to do, but I would like to make one -prediction. Each day we live we draw nearer to a climax in human -history. The immediate future is dark. Bitter conflicts at home -and abroad are on the horizon. I believe that the armies of all -nations will, during the next two years, be drawn inevitably toward -the countries in and around the Great Pyramid of Egypt. The crisis -precipitated in Iran over the nationalization of her oil industry, -makes this highly probable, in my opinion. Let me substantiate -further. - -Toward the end of 1949, England received warning from Iran on this -impending move, for she believed that only a violent act on her part -could meet this extreme emergency. London correspondent Kenneth de -Courcy, cabling to _Intelligence Digest_ on April 1, 1951, stated: - - “More than a year ago, a prominent Persian statesman gave Britain - his final confidential warning. He said that only drastic action - could save the situation. A Persian statesman flew to America and - remained there for several days in an effort to lay all the facts - before Mr. Truman. Attempt after attempt was made to arrange a - meeting. The envoy, although carrying high credentials, was refused - an interview. The Persian statesman had been one of his country’s - most important and successful Prime Ministers. His prestige and - influence were considerable....” - -De Courcy concluded: - - “The Persian situation has now been allowed to deteriorate to such - an extent that no politician there dares oppose the popular movement - which has been whipped up by the extremely clever work of Soviet - agents. Some of the highest officials, moreover, are on Russia’s - payroll, and this has been allowed to happen right under our noses.” - -On Saturday morning, June 2, 1951, the following headline appeared in -_The Los Angeles Times_: - - “TRUMAN INTERVENES IN IRAN OIL ROW.” The Associated Press dispatch - datelined Tehran, June 1, 1951, continued in part: - - “President Truman took a hand personally today in the - British-Iranian oil dispute by sending letters to Premier Mohammed - Mossadegh and Prime Minister Attlee reportedly urging moderation on - both sides. The unusual move by the President indicated the extreme - seriousness with which the U. S. government views the oil crisis.” - -A member of Iran’s Senate who declined to reveal his name, was quoted -by _The Los Angeles Times_ article as saying: - -“Why should Truman belittle himself by sending such a message?” - -In my humble opinion, therefore, World War III began on June 25, -1950. Our entry into it was two days later. There will be no peace, -of any importance, as I see it, until 1953 or thereabouts. I say -this with a heavy heart. This war that is so pointless and was so -unnecessary, had its birth in our Administration’s betrayal of China. -It will have its death on a bloody battlefield in Palestine. - -What a heritage we have, on the one hand, and what means for -destruction on the other! How far we are today from Chaos, no man -knows. It may be far later than we think. Until the time of greater -enlightenment we know that a strong and forceful public opinion can -be the result only of strong and forceful individual opinions. We -are not, as yet, God-like creatures, but by making a supreme and -prayerful effort we might become more nearly creatures like God. One -small voice crying in the wilderness can be doubled and quadrupled -into millions until, finally, it becomes the deafening roar of all -freedom-loving peoples the world over. - -“The journey of a thousand miles,” the Chinese say, “begins with -just one step.” If each of us will take that one step now, toward a -better understanding of how to protect our country from its enemies, -both within and without, America will remain the light to which the -whole world turns in the blackness of its oppression. And let us each -remember that, as individuals, “it is better to light one candle, -than to curse the darkness.” - -In the words of our own beloved National Anthem: - - _“Oh! thus be it ever, when free men shall stand - Between their loved homes and the war’s desolation!_ - - _Blest with victory and peace, may the Heaven rescued land - Praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation._ - - _Then conquer we must, for our cause it is just, - And this be our motto: ‘In God is our trust.’_ - - _And the Star-Spangled Banner in triumph_ SHALL _wave - O’er the land of the Free and the home of the Brave!”_ - - - - - EPILOGUE - - Deep in the Siberian mine, - Keep your patience proud; - The bitter toil shall not be lost, - The rebel thought unbowed. - - The sister of misfortune, Hope, - In the under-darkness dumb - Speaks joyful courage to your heart: - The day desired will come... - - The heavy-hanging chains will fall, - The walls will crumble at a word; - And Freedom greet you in the light, - And brothers give you back the sword. - - ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH PUSHKIN - - - - - _Appendix_ - - THE WEDEMEYER REPORT ON CHINA AND KOREA - - _Submitted to_ - THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES - _September 9, 1947_ - - _by_ - ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER - _Lieutenant General, United States Army_ - - Paragraphs which have been deleted for security reasons - are indicated by asterisks. - - [Illustration: Decoration] - - - PART I—GENERAL STATEMENT - -China’s history is replete with examples of encroachment, arbitrary -action, special privilege, exploitation, and usurpation of territory -on the part of foreign powers. Continued foreign infiltration, -penetration or efforts to obtain spheres of influence in China, -including Manchuria and Taiwan (Formosa), could be interpreted only -as a direct infringement and violation of China’s sovereignty and a -contravention of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. -It is mandatory that the United States and those other nations -subscribing to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations -should combine their efforts to insure the unimpeded march of all -peoples toward goals that recognize the dignity of man and his civil -rights and, further, definitely provide the opportunity to express -freely how and by whom they will be governed. - -Those goals and the lofty aims of freedom-loving peoples are -jeopardized today by forces as sinister as those that operated in -Europe and Asia during the ten years leading to World War II. The -pattern is familiar—employment of subversive agents; infiltration -tactics; incitement of disorder and chaos to disrupt normal economy -and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and -leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of -the people—all the techniques skillfully designed and ruthlessly -implemented in order to create favorable conditions for the -imposition of totalitarian ideologies. This pattern is present in -the Far East, particularly in the areas contiguous to Siberia. - -If the United Nations is to have real effect in establishing economic -stability and in maintaining world peace, these developments merit -high priority on the United Nations’ agenda for study and action. -Events of the past two years demonstrate the futility of appeasement -based on the hope that the strongly consolidated forces of the Soviet -Union will adopt either a conciliatory or a cooperative attitude, -except as tactical expedients. Soviet practice in the countries -already occupied or dominated completes the mosaic of aggressive -expansion through ruthless secret police methods and through an -increasing political and economic enslavement of peoples. Soviet -literature, confirmed repeatedly by Communist leaders, reveals a -definite plan for expansion far exceeding that of Nazism in its -ambitious scope and dangerous implications. Therefore in attempting -a solution to the problem presented in the Far East, as well as in -other troubled areas of the world, every possible opportunity must be -used to seize the initiative in order to create and maintain bulwarks -of freedom. - -Notwithstanding all the corruption and incompetence that one notes -in China, it is a certainty that the bulk of the people are not -disposed to a Communist political and economic structure. Some -have become affiliated with Communism in indignant protest against -oppressive police measures, corrupt practices, and maladministration -of National Government officials. Some have lost all hope for China -under existing leadership and turn to the Communists in despair. Some -accept a new leadership by mere inertia. - -Indirectly, the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the -Far East by agreeing at the Yalta Conference to Russian re-entry into -Manchuria, and later by withholding aid from the National Government. -There were justifiable reasons for these policies. In the one case we -were concentrating maximum Allied strength against the Japanese in -order to accelerate crushing defeat and thus save Allied lives. In -the other, we were withholding unqualified support from a government -within which corruption and incompetence were so prevalent that it -was losing the support of its own people. Further, the United States -had not yet realized that the Soviet Union would fail to cooperate in -the accomplishment of world-wide plans for postwar rehabilitation. -Our own participation in those plans has already afforded assistance -to other nations and peoples, friends and former foes alike, to a -degree unparalleled in humanitarian history. - -Gradually it has become apparent that the World War II objectives for -which we and others made tremendous sacrifices are not being fully -attained, and that there remains in the world a force presenting even -greater dangers to world peace than did the Nazi militarists and the -Japanese jingoists. Consequently the United States made the decision -in the Spring of 1947 to assist Greece and Turkey with a view to -protecting their sovereignties, which were threatened by the direct -or inspired activities of the Soviet Union. Charges of unilateral -action and circumvention of the United Nations were made by members -of that organization. In the light of its purposes and principles -such criticism seemed plausible. The United States promptly declared -its intention of referring the matter to the United Nations when that -organization would be ready to assume responsibility. - -It follows that the United Nations should be informed of contemplated -action with regard to China. If the recommendations of this report -are approved, the United States should suggest to China that -she inform the United Nations officially of her request to the -United States for material assistance and advisory aid in order to -facilitate China’s postwar rehabilitation and economic recovery. - -This will demonstrate that the United Nations is not being -circumvented, and that the United States is not infringing upon -China’s sovereignty, but contrary-wise is cooperating constructively -in the interest of peace and stability in the Far East, concomitantly -in the world. - -The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that -prompt action is necessary to prevent that area from becoming a -Soviet satellite. The Chinese Communists may soon gain military -control of Manchuria and announce the establishment of a government. -Outer Mongolia, already a Soviet satellite, may then recognize -Manchuria and conclude a “mutual support agreement” with a _de -facto_ Manchurian government of the Chinese Communists. In that -event, the Soviet Union might accomplish a mutual support agreement -with Communist-dominated Manchuria, because of her current similar -agreement with Outer Mongolia. This would create a difficult -situation for China, the United States and the United Nations. -Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China. - -The United Nations might take immediate action to bring about -cessation of hostilities in Manchuria as a prelude to the -establishment of a Guardianship or Trusteeship. The Guardianship -might consist of China, Soviet Russia, the United States, Great -Britain and France. This should be attempted promptly and could -be initiated only by China. Should one of the nations refuse to -participate in Manchurian Guardianship, China might then request the -General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Trusteeship, -under the provisions of the Charter. - -Initially China might interpret Guardianship or Trusteeship as an -infringement upon her sovereignty. But the urgency of the matter -should encourage a realistic view of the situation. If these steps -are not taken by China, Manchuria may be drawn into the Soviet orbit, -despite United States aid, and lost, perhaps permanently, to China. - -The economic deterioration and the incompetence and corruption in the -political and military organizations in China should be considered -against an all-inclusive background lest there be disproportionate -emphasis upon defects. Comity requires that cognizance be taken of -the following. - - Unlike other Powers since VJ-Day, China has never been free to - devote full attention to internal problems that were greatly - confounded by eight years of war. The current civil war has imposed - an overwhelming financial and economic burden at a time when - resources and energies have been dissipated and when, in any event, - they would have been strained to the utmost to meet the problems of - recovery. - - The National Government has consistently, since 1927, opposed - Communism. Today the same political leader and same civil and - military officials are determined to prevent their country from - becoming a Communist-dominated State or Soviet satellite. - - Although the Japanese offered increasingly favorable surrender terms - during the course of the war, China elected to remain steadfast with - her Allies. If China had accepted surrender terms, approximately a - million Japanese would have been released for employment against - American forces in the Pacific. - -I was assured by the Generalissimo that China would support to the -limit of her ability an American program for the stabilization of -the Far East. He stated categorically that, regardless of moral -encouragement or material aid received from the United States, he -is determined to oppose Communism and to create a democratic form -of government in consonance with Doctor Sun Yat-sen’s principles. -He stated further that he plans to make sweeping reforms in the -government including the removal of incompetent and corrupt -officials. He stated that some progress has been made along these -lines but, with spiraling inflation, economic distress, and civil -war, it has been difficult to accomplish fully these objectives. -He emphasized that, when the Communist problem is solved, he could -drastically reduce the Army and concentrate upon political and -economic reforms. I retain the conviction that the Generalissimo is -sincere in his desire to attain these objectives. I am not certain -that he has today sufficient determination to do so if this requires -absolute overruling of the political and military cliques surrounding -him. Yet, if realistic United States aid is to prove effective in -stabilizing the situation in China and in coping with the dangerous -expansion of Communism, that determination must be established. - -Adoption by the United States of a policy motivated solely toward -stopping the expansion of Communism without regard to the continued -existence of an unpopular repressive government would render any -aid ineffective. Further, United States prestige in the Far East -would suffer heavily, and wavering elements might turn away from the -existing government to Communism. - -In China and Korea, the political, economic, and psychological -problems are inextricably mingled. All of them are complex and -are becoming increasingly difficult of solution. Each has been -studied assiduously in compliance with your directive. Each will be -discussed in the course of this report. However, it is recognized -that a continued global appraisal is mandatory in order to preclude -disproportionate or untimely assistance to any specific area. - -The following three postulates of United States foreign policy are -pertinent to indicate the background of my investigations, analyses, -and report: - - The United States will continue support of the United Nations in the - attainment of its lofty aims, accepting the possible development - that the Soviet Union or other nations may not actively participate. - - Moral support will be given to nations and peoples that have - established political and economic structures compatible with our - own, or that give convincing evidence of their desire to do so. - - Material aid may be given to those same nations and peoples in - order to accelerate postwar rehabilitation and to develop economic - stability, provided: - - That such aid shall be used for the purposes intended. - - That there is continuing evidence that they are taking effective - steps to help themselves, or are firmly committed to do so. - - That such aid shall not jeopardize American economy and shall - conform to an integrated program that involves other international - commitments and contributes to the attainment of political, - economic, and psychological objectives of the United States. - - - - - PART II—CHINA - - POLITICAL - -Although the Chinese people are unanimous in their desire for -peace at almost any cost, there seems to be no possibility of -its realization under existing circumstances. On one side is the -Kuomingtang, whose reactionary leadership, repression and corruption -have caused a loss of popular faith in the government. On the other -side, bound ideologically to the Soviet Union, are the Chinese -Communists, whose eventual aim is admittedly a Communist state in -China. Some reports indicate that Communist measures of land reform -have gained for them the support of the majority of peasants in -areas under their control, while others indicate that their ruthless -tactics of land distribution and terrorism have alienated the -majority of such peasants. They have, however, successfully organized -many rural areas against the National Government. Moderate groups -are caught between Kuomintang misrule and repression and ruthless -Communist totalitarianism. Minority parties lack dynamic leadership -and sizable following. Neither the moderates, many of whom are in -the Kuomingtang, nor the minority parties are able to make their -influence felt because of National Government repression. Existing -provincial opposition leading to possible separatist movements would -probably crystallize only if collapse of the government were imminent. - -Soviet actions, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Sino-Soviet -treaty of 1945 and its related documents, have strengthened the -Chinese Communist position in Manchuria, with political, economic -and military repercussions on the National Government’s position -both in Manchuria and in China proper, and have made more difficult -peace and stability in China. The present trend points toward a -gradual disintegration of the National Government’s control, with the -ultimate possibility of a Communist-dominated China. - -Steps taken by the Chinese Government toward governmental -reorganization in mid-April, 1947, aroused hopes of improvement -in the political situation. However, the reorganization resulted -in little change. Reactionary influences continue to mold -important policies even though the Generalissimo remains the -principal determinative force in the government. Since the April -reorganization, the most significant change has been the appointment -of General Chen Cheng to head the civil and militant administration -in Manchuria. Projected steps include elections in the Fall for -the formation of a constitutional government, but, under present -conditions, they are not expected to result in a government more -representative than the present regime. - - - ECONOMIC - -Under the impact of civil strife and inflation, the Chinese -economy is disintegrating. The most probable outcome of present -trends would be, not sudden collapse, but a continued and creeping -paralysis and consequent decline in the authority and power of the -National Government. The past ten years of war have caused serious -deterioration of transportation and communication facilities, mines, -utilities and industries. Notwithstanding some commendable efforts -and large amounts of economic aid; their overall capabilities -are scarcely half those of the prewar period. With disruption of -transportation facilities and the loss of much of North China and -Manchuria, important resources of those rich areas are no longer -available for the rehabilitation and support of China’s economy. - -Inflation in China has been diffused slowly through an enormous -population without causing the immediate dislocation which would -have occurred in a highly industrialized economy. The rural people, -80 per cent of the total Chinese population of 450 millions, barter -foodstuffs for local handicraft products without suffering a drastic -cut in living standards. Thus, local economies exist in many parts of -China, largely insulated from the disruption of urban industry. Some -local economies are under the control of Communists, and some are -loosely under the control of provincial authorities. - -The principal cause of the hyper-inflation is the long-continued -deficit in the national budget. Present revenue collections, plus -the profits of nationalized enterprises, cover only one-third of -governmental expenditures, which are approximately 70 per cent -military, and an increasing proportion of the budget is financed -by the issuance of new currency. In the first six months of 1947 -note-issue was tripled but rice prices increased seven-fold. Thus -prices and governmental expenditures spiral upwards, with price -increases occurring faster than new currency can be printed. With -further price increases, budget revisions will undoubtedly be -necessary. The most urgent economic need of Nationalist China is a -reduction of the military budget. - -China’s external official assets amounted to $327 million (US) on -July 30, 1947. Privately-held foreign exchange assets are at least -$600 million and may total $1500 million, but no serious attempt has -been made to mobilize these private resources for rehabilitation -purposes. Private Chinese assets located in China include probably -$200 million in gold, and about $75 million in US currency notes. -Although China has not exhausted her foreign official assets, and -probably will not do so at the present rates of imports and exports -until early 1949, the continuing deficit in her external balance of -payments is a serious problem. - -Disparity between the prices of export goods in China and in world -markets at unrealistic official exchange rates has greatly penalized -exports, as have disproportionate increases in wages and other costs. -Despite rigorous trade and exchange controls, imports have greatly -exceeded exports, and there consistently has been a heavy adverse -trade balance. - -China’s food harvests this year are expected to be significantly -larger than last year’s fairly good returns. This moderately -encouraging situation with regard to crops is among the few favorable -factors which can be found in China’s current economic situation. - -Under inflationary conditions, long-term investment is unattractive -for both Chinese and foreign capital. Private Chinese funds tends to -go into short-term advances, hoarding of commodities, and capital -flight The entire psychology is speculative and inflationary, -preventing ordinary business planning and handicapping industrial -recovery. - -Foreign business enterprises in China are adversely affected by -the inefficient and corrupt administration of exchange and import -controls, discriminatory application of tax laws, the increasing -role of government trading agencies and the trend towards state -ownership of industries. The Chinese Government has taken some steps -toward improvement but generally has been apathetic in its efforts. -Between 1944 and 1947, the anti-inflationary measure on which the -Chinese Government placed most reliance was the public sale of gold -borrowed from the United States. The intention was to absorb paper -currency, and thus reduce the effective demand for goods. Under the -circumstance of continued large deficits, however, the only effect of -the gold sales program was to retard slightly the price inflation and -dissipate dollar assets. - -A program to stabilize the economic situation was undertaken in -February, 1947. The measures included a wage freeze, a system of -limited rationing to essential workers in a few cities, and the sale -of government bonds. The effect of this program has been slight, and -the wage freeze has been abandoned. In August, 1947, the unrealistic -official rate of exchange was replaced, for proceeds of exports -and remittances, by a free market in foreign exchange. This step -is expected to stimulate exports, but it is too early to determine -whether it will be effective. - -The issuance of a new silver currency has been proposed as a future -measure to combat inflation. If the government continued to finance -budgetary deficits by unbacked note issue, the silver would probably -go into hoards and the price inflation would continue. The effect -would be no more than that of the gold sales in 1944-1947, namely, -a slight and temporary retardation of the inflationary spiral. The -proposal could be carried out, moreover, only through a loan from the -United States of at least $200 million in silver. - -In the construction field, China has prepared plans for -reconstruction of communications, mines and industries. Some -progress has been made in implementing them, notably in the partial -rehabilitation of certain railroads and in the textile industry. -Constructive results have been handicapped by a lack of funds, -equipment and experienced management, supervisory and technical -personnel. - -On August 1, 1947, the State Council approved a “Plan for Economic -Reform.” This appears to be an omnibus of plans covering all phases -of Chinese economic reconstruction but its effectiveness cannot yet -be determined. - - - SOCIAL—CULTURAL - -Public education has been one of the chief victims of war and social -and economic disruption. Schoolhouses, textbooks and other equipment -have been destroyed and the cost of replacing my considerable portion -cannot now be met. Teachers, like other public servants, have seen -the purchasing power of a month’s salary shrink to the market value -of a few days’ rice ration. This applies to the entire educational -system, from primary schools, which provide a medium to combat the -nation’s grievous illiteracy, to universities, from which must come -the nation’s professional men, technicians and administrators. The -universities have suffered in an additional and no less serious -respect—traditional academic freedom. Students participating in -protest demonstrations have been severely and at times brutally -punished by National Government agents without pretense of trial or -public evidence of the sedition charged. Faculty members have often -been dismissed or refused employment with no evidence of professional -unfitness, patently because they were politically objectionable to -government officials. Somewhat similarly, periodicals have been -closed down “for reasons of military security” without stated -charges, and permitted to reopen only after new managements have -been imposed. Resumption of educational and other public welfare -activities on anything like the desired scale can be accomplished -only by restraint of officialdom’s abuses, and when the nation’s -economy is stabilized sufficiently to defray the cost of such vital -activities. - - - MILITARY - -The overall military position of the National Government has -deteriorated in the past several months and the current military -situation favors Communist forces. The Generalissimo has never -wavered in his contention that he is fighting for national -independence against forces of an armed rebellion nor has he been -completely convinced that the Communist problem can be resolved -except by force of arms. Although the Nationalist Army has a -preponderance of force, the tactical initiative rests with the -Communists. Their hit-and-run tactics, adapted to their mission of -destruction at points or in areas of their own selection, give them -a decided advantage over Nationalists, who must defend many critical -areas including connecting lines of communication. Obviously large -numbers of Nationalist troops involved in such defensive roles are -immobilized whereas Communist tactics permit almost complete freedom -of action. The Nationalists’ position is precarious in Manchuria, -where they occupy only a slender finger of territory. Their control -is strongly disputed in Shantung and Hopei Provinces where the -Communists make frequent dislocating attacks against isolated -garrisons. - -In order to improve materially the current military situation, the -Nationalist forces must first stabilize the fronts and then regain -the initiative. Further, since the government is supporting the civil -war with approximately seventy per cent of its national budget, it -is evident that steps taken to alleviate the situation must point -toward an improvement in the effectiveness of the armed forces with -a concomitant program of social, political and economic reforms, -including a decrease in the size of the military establishment. -Whereas some rather ineffective steps have been taken to reorganize -and revitalize the command structure, and more sweeping reforms are -projected, the effectiveness of the Nationalist Army requires a sound -program of equipment and improved logistical support. The present -industrial potential of China is inadequate to support military -forces effectively. Chinese forces under present conditions cannot -cope successfully with internal strife or fulfill China’s obligations -as a member of the family of nations. Hence outside aid, in the form -of munitions (most urgently ammunition) and technical assistance, -is essential before any plan of operations can be undertaken with a -reasonable prospect of success. Military advice is now available to -the Nationalists on a General Staff level through American military -advisory groups. The Generalissimo expressed to me repeatedly a -strong desire to have this advice and supervision extended in scope -to include field forces, training centers and particularly logistical -agencies. - -Extension of military aid by the United States to the National -Government might possibly be followed by similar aid from the Soviet -Union to the Chinese Communists, either openly or covertly—the latter -course seems more likely. An arena of conflicting ideologies might -be created as in 1935 in Spain. There is always the possibility that -such developments in this area, as in Europe and the Middle East, -might precipitate a third world war. - - - PART III—KOREA - - POLITICAL - -The major political problem in Korea is that of carrying out -the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, for the formation of a -Provisional Korean Government to be followed by a Four-Power -Trusteeship over Korea. The United States-Soviet Joint Commission, -established in accordance with that Agreement, reached a deadlock -in 1946 in the effort to implement the Moscow Agreement due to -Soviet opposition to consultations with the Commission by all Korean -democratic parties and social organizations, as provided for in -that Agreement. Soviet motives have been to eliminate the extreme -rightist groups in the United States zone from consultations and -subsequently from participation in the new government thus ensuring -a Communist-dominated government in Korea. Soviet objections to -such consultations have been based on the rightist groups’ openly -expressed opposition to trusteeship, while the United States has -taken the position that to disqualify these groups would deprive a -large section of the Korean people of an opportunity to express views -regarding their government. - -A resumption of the Joint Commission meetings in May, 1947, following -an exchange of notes between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister -Molotov, resulted in a further deadlock on the same issue, although -these notes had established a formula which would have permitted -participation in consultation by the rightist groups in question. -After the Soviet Government failed to reply to Secretary Marshall’s -note of August 12, requesting the submission by the Commission of -a joint status report or separate reports by each Delegation, the -United States Delegation, on August 20, transmitted a unilateral -report to Washington. An American proposal then made to China, the -United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union for a Four-Power Conference to -discuss Korea has been agreed to by China and the United Kingdom, but -has been rejected by the Soviet Union. - -Internally, the Korean problem has been complicated by the Soviet -establishment of a Communist regime in North Korea and by the -machinations in South Korea of Communist groups, openly hostile to -the United States. - - * * * * * - -The latter, in accordance with their directives, are endeavoring -to turn over to Koreans as rapidly as possible full administrative -responsibility in governmental departments. In consequence with this -plan they have organized an interim Korean legislative assembly and -in general, are striving to carry out a policy of “Koreanization” of -government in South Korea. - - - ECONOMIC - -South Korea, basically an agricultural area, does not have the -overall economic resources to sustain its economy without external -assistance. The soil depleted, and imports of food as well as -fertilizer are required. The latter has normally come from North -Korea, as have most of the electric power, timber, anthracite, and -other basic products. - -The economic dependence of South Korea upon North Korea, and of Korea -as a whole, in prewar years, upon trade with Japan and Manchuria, -cannot be too strongly emphasized. Division of the country at the 38° -North parallel and prevention of all except smuggling trade between -North and South Korea have reduced the Korean economy to its lowest -level in many years. Prospects for developing sizeable exports are -slight. Food exports cannot be anticipated on any scale for several -years, and then only with increased use of artificial fertilizer. -South Korea’s few manufacturing industries, which have been operating -at possibly 20 per cent of prewar production, are now reducing their -output or closing down. In part this is a natural result of ten years -of deferred maintenance and war-time abuse, but lack of raw materials -and essential repair parts, and a gross deficiency of competent -management and technical personnel are the principal factors. - -A runaway inflation has not yet occurred in South Korea, because -the Military Government has restrained the issuance of currency by -keeping governmental expenditures and local occupation costs at -reasonable levels; because cannibalization and the use of Japanese -stocks have kept some industries going; and because the forcible -collection of rice at harvest time has brought in sufficient food -to maintain—with imports provided by the United States—an adequate -official ration in the cities. Highly inflationary factors such as -the exhaustion of raw material stocks, cumulative breakdowns in -public services and transportation, and the cutting of power supply -from the North might occur simultaneously. The South Korean economic -outlook is, therefore, most grave. - -A five-year rehabilitation program starting in July, 1948, and -requiring United States financing at a cost of $647 million, has -been proposed by the Military Government. A review of preliminary -estimates indicates that the proposed annual rehabilitation cost -would be substantially greater than the relief program of $137 -million which was tentatively approved for fiscal 1948, but later -reduced to $92.7 million. These preliminary estimates of costs and -the merits of individual projects need careful review. It is not -considered feasible to make South Korea self-sustaining. If the -United States elects to remain in South Korea, support of that area -should be on a relief basis. - - - SOCIAL—CULTURAL - -Since the Japanese were expelled, the Korean people have vehemently -and unceasingly pressed for restoration of their ancient culture. -There is particular zeal for public education. Individual and -collective efforts to reduce illiteracy have produced results meeting -the praise of American Military Government officials. There will be -materially better results when there are more school buildings, more -trained teachers and advisors, and many more textbooks in the Korean -language. Current American activities aim at adult visual education -on a modest but reasonably effective scale. South Korea’s health -and public-welfare work are at present fully as effective as under -Japanese administration and considerably more so in the prevention of -serious diseases. Even the Koreans’ eagerness for improvement cannot -immediately overcome the unquestionable need for large funds for -social betterment. - - - MILITARY - -The military situation in Korea, stemming from political and -economic disputes which in turn are accentuated by the artificial -barrier along the 38° North parallel, is potentially dangerous -to United States strategic interests. Large-scale Communist -inspired or abetted riots and revolutionary activities in the -South are a constant threat. However, American forces supplemented -by quasi-military Korean units are adequate to cope with such -trouble or disorder except in the currently improbable event of an -outright Soviet-controlled invasion. Whereas American and Soviet -forces engaged in occupation duties in South Korea and North Korea -respectively are approximately equal, each comprising less than -50,000 troops, the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People’s -(Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the -United States-organized Constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with -Japanese small arms. The North Korean People’s Army constitutes a -potential military threat to South Korea, since there is strong -possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces, -and thus induce our own withdrawal. This probably will take place -just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet -government and its armed forces which they have created, are strong -enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry -out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops. - -It appears advisable that the United States organize, equip, and -train a South Korean Force, similar to the former Philippine Scouts. -This force should be under the control of the United States military -commander and, initially should be officered throughout by Americans, -with a program for replacement by Korean officers. It should be -of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the North. It -would counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s Army -when American and Soviet forces are withdrawn from Korea, possibly -preclude the forcible establishment of a Communist government, and -thus contribute toward a free and independent Korea. - - - PART IV—CONCLUSIONS - -The peaceful aims of freedom-loving peoples in the world are -jeopardized today by developments as portentous as those leading to -World War II. - -The Soviet Union and her satellites give no evidence of a -conciliatory or cooperative attitude in these developments. The -United States is compelled, therefore to initiate realistic lines of -action in order to create and maintain bulwarks of freedom, and to -protect United States strategic interests. - -The bulk of the Chinese and Korean peoples are not disposed to -Communism and they are not concerned with ideologies. They desire -food, shelter, and the opportunity to live in peace. - - - CHINA - -The spreading internecine struggle within China threatens world -peace. Repeated American efforts to mediate have proved unavailing. -It is apparent that positive steps are required to end hostilities -immediately. The most logical approach to this very complex and -ominous situation would be to refer the matter to the United Nations. - -A China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the -interests of the United States, in view of their openly expressed -hostility and active opposition to those principles which the United -States regards as vital to the peace of the world. - -The Communists have the tactical initiative in the overall military -situation. The Nationalist position in Manchuria is precarious, -and in Shantung and Hopei Provinces strongly disputed. Continued -deterioration of the situation may result in the early establishment -of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in the -evolution of a Communist-dominated China. - -China is suffering increasingly from disintegration. Her requirements -for rehabilitation are large. Her most urgent needs include -governmental reorganization and reforms, reduction of the military -budget and external assistance. - -A program of aid, if effectively employed, would bolster opposition -to Communist expansion, and would contribute to gradual development -of stability in China. - -Due to excesses and oppressions by government police agencies basic -freedoms of the people are being jeopardized. Maladministration -and corruption cause a loss of confidence in the government. Until -drastic political and economic reforms are undertaken United States -aid cannot accomplish its purpose. - -Even so, criticism of results achieved by the National Government in -efforts for improvement should be tempered by a recognition of the -handicaps imposed on China by eight years of war, the burden of her -opposition to Communism, and her sacrifices for the Allied cause. - -A United States program of assistance could best be implemented -under the supervision of American advisors in specified economic -and military fields. Such a program can be undertaken only if China -requests advisory aid as well as material assistance. - - - KOREA - -The situation in Korea, in its political, economic and psychological -aspects, is strongly and adversely influenced by the artificial -barrier of the 38° North parallel separating agricultural South Korea -from the more industrialized North Korea. - -The South Korean economic position is grave. Agriculture is -debilitated and there are few other resources. - -The establishment of a self-sustaining economy in South Korea is not -feasible. Accordingly, United States aid should include a minimum of -capital investment and should consist chiefly of items required for -support on a relief basis. - -Korean Communist agents are creating unrest and fomenting disorder in -South Korea. - - * * * * * - -Since the United States-Soviet Joint Commission meetings have -twice ended in deadlock, and offer no real hope of success, the -United Nations now seems to be the appropriate medium through which -a Provisional Korean Government, functioning under a Four-Power -Trusteeship, can be established. - -The United States may be confronted with a situation requiring -decision concerning continued occupation in South Korea should the -Soviet Union withdraw her occupation forces. This could reasonably be -expected to occur when the Soviet-created puppet government and its -armed forces are sufficiently well established to carry out Communist -objectives without the presence of Soviet troops. - -The creation of an American controlled and officered Korean Scout -Force, sufficient in strength to cope with the threat from the North, -is required to prevent the forcible establishment of a Communist -government after the United States and Soviet Union withdraw their -occupation forces. - - - PART V—RECOMMENDATIONS - -It is recommended: - -That the United States Government provide as early as practicable -moral, advisory, and material support to China and South Korea in -order to contribute to the early establishment of peace in the world -in consonance with the enunciated principles of the United Nations, -and concomitantly to protect United States strategic interests -against militant forces which now threaten them. - -That United States policies and actions suggested in this report -be thoroughly integrated by appropriate government agencies with -other international commitments. It is recognized that any foreign -assistance extended must avoid jeopardizing the American economy. - - - CHINA - -That China be advised that the United States is favorably disposed -to continue aid designated to protect China’s territorial integrity -and to facilitate her recovery, under agreements to be negotiated -by representatives of the two government, with the following -stipulations: - - That China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the - United States for increasing material and advisory assistance. - - That China request the United Nations to take immediate action to - bring about a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria and request that - Manchuria be placed under a Five-Power Guardianship or, failing - that, under a Trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations - Charter. - - That China make effective use of her own resources in a program for - economic reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading - to reduction of budgetary deficits. - - That China give continuing evidence that the urgently required - political and military reforms are being implemented. - - That China accept American advisors as responsible representatives - of the United States Government in specified military and economic - fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner - for which it is intended. - - - KOREA - -That the United States continue efforts for the early establishment -of a Provisional Korean Government in consonance with the Moscow -Agreement and meanwhile provide necessary support of the political, -economic and military position of South Korea. - - - APPENDIX E TO PART III—KOREA - - POLITICAL - -_Resumé of United States Policy Toward Korea_ - -The first treaty between the United States and Korea, signed in 1882, -provided that if other powers dealt unjustly or oppressively with -either Government, the other would exert its good offices to bring -about an “amicable agreement.” During the early period of United -States-Korean relations the United States considered Korea as an -independent state for the purposes of fulfilling treaty obligations, -although that nation was actually under Chinese suzerainty. Prior to -the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, when efforts were made to gain the -support of the United States to avert war, the United States took -the position that, while it stood for peace, it would do nothing -which might cause it to assume responsibility for settlement of -the dispute. Under the treaty ending the war, China relinquished -suzerainty over Korea, which was in turn assumed by Japan. Therefore, -the United States continued its policy of non-interference in Korean -internal affairs and in 1899 denied a Korean request for American -initiative in obtaining from the powers an agreement guaranteeing -Korea’s integrity. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, -President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the United States could -not intervene to preserve Korea’s integrity since the Koreans were -unable “to strike one blow in their own defense.” When Japan forced -the Korean Emperor to agree to Japanese control of the administration -of Korean affairs, the Emperor appealed to the United States, under -the good offices clause of the United States-Korean Treaty of 1882, -but his appeal was denied. Nor did the United States protest Japanese -formal annexation of Korea in 1910. Thus, with little or no effort -on the part of the United States to oppose such a development, Korea -passed from the suzerainty of China to that of Japan and thence -to the status of a Japanese colony. Efforts of Korean exiles to -introduce Korea’s case at the Paris Peace Conference and at the -Washington Conference of 1921-22 were rebuffed, but these exiles -continued their efforts to further the cause of Korean independence, -some of them in the United States. With the outbreak of World War II, -the question of Korean independence was revived and Korean exiles in -the United States and China began to agitate for Korean independence -and official recognition. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, agreement -was reached by the participating powers, later adhered to by the -Soviet Union, that Korea would become independent “in due course.” -This phrase caused great resentment among the Koreans who felt that -they should be given immediate independence upon the defeat of Japan. -This resentment was increased when the decision was reached at the -Moscow Conference in December, 1945, that Korea would be placed -under a Four-Power Trusteeship (the Soviet Union, the United States, -the United Kingdom, and China) for a period of up to five years. -A tentative agreement in this regard had previously been reached -between the United States and the Soviet Union, and when the end -of the war was imminent agreement was reached between the United -States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China that Soviet -forces accept the Japanese surrender in Korea north of the 38° North -parallel, while the American forces would accept such surrender south -of that line. This arbitrary line, originally serving as a marker -of military responsibility, soon became a complete barrier to free -movement between North and South Korea. It has resulted in separation -of the country into two parts, an economically unstable division -which has seriously blocked efforts to establish a unified Korea. - - -_Current Political Situation_ - -The major political problem in Korea is that of carrying out -the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, for the formation of a -Provisional Korean Government. The United States-Soviet Joint -Commission, established in accordance with that Agreement, held -its first meeting March 8, 1946, but finally adjourned on May -28, 1946, without having reached an agreement looking toward the -implementation of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. The failure -of the Joint Commission arose from the unwillingness of the Soviet -Delegation to agree to consultation with the Commission of all -Korean groups, as provided for in the Moscow agreement, to assist in -the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. Soviet motives -have been to eliminate the majority of the rightist groups in the -American-occupied zone of Korea from consultation and subsequently -from participation in the new government. Had the Soviet Delegation -been successful the result would have been a Communist-dominated -government in Korea. Soviet objections to consultation with these -rightist groups have been based on the latter’s openly expressed -opposition to trusteeship. The American Delegation has taken the -stand that criticism of trusteeship did not disqualify Korean groups -from participation in consultation, since to do so would deprive -a considerable section of the Korean people of an opportunity to -be heard in regard to the formation of the Provisional Korean -Government. An exchange of notes between the Secretary of State -and the Soviet Foreign Minister in April and May, 1947, resulted -in a resumption of the meetings of the Joint Commission on May 21, -1947, under a formula which provided for consultation by all Korean -groups which were prepared to sign a declaration that they would -not, after such signing, “foment or instigate active opposition” -to the work of the Joint Commission or to the fulfillment of the -Moscow Agreement. After repeated sessions of the Joint Commission a -deadlock was again reached in July, the Soviet Delegation returning -to its position of the previous year and the American Delegation -insisting upon the implementation of the formula set forth in the -Marshall-Molotov letters, which guaranteed wide-scale participation -of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in consultation -and freedom of expression of opinion by all Koreans. Further meetings -of the Commission having produced no results, Secretary Marshall -addressed another note to Foreign Minister Molotov on August 12, -requesting that the Commission submit by August 21, 1947, a joint -status report or that each Delegation submit separate reports. No -reply having been received to this note and the Soviet Delegation -refusing to participate in a joint report, the American Delegation -on August 20 transmitted a unilateral report to Washington. Since -the receipt of this report, the Secretary of State has addressed -identical notes to China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union -proposing a Four Power Conference for a settlement of the Korean -situation. China and the United Kingdom have indicated their -willingness to participate in such a conference. The Soviet Union has -declined. - -Internally, the Korean problem has been complicated by the Soviet -establishment of a Communist state in North Korea and by its -encouragement of the activities of Communist and Communist-dominated -organizations in South Korea hostile to the United States. - - * * * * * - -The rightist groups are probably the best organized parties in South -Korea. They command a majority of the Korean Interim Legislative -Assembly and, if elections were held under present conditions would -gain control of any government established in South Korea by such -elections. The American authorities in South Korea are endeavoring -to turn over to the Koreans as rapidly as possible administrative -responsibility in the various departments of the United States -Military Government, have organized a half-elected and half-appointed -Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, and in general are striving to -carry out a policy of “Koreanization” of government in South Korea. - - -_Military Government Directive and Steps Taken to Implement Same_ - -The Directive under which the United States Military Government now -operates in Korea sets forth three basic United States objectives: -(1) To establish an independent and sovereign Korea, free from -all foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United -Nations (2) to insure that the National Government so established -shall be a democratic government fully representative of the freely -expressed will of the Korean people; and (3) to assist the Koreans -in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system -necessary for an independent democratic state. The Directive points -out that the policy of the United States in regard to Korea, in -accordance with the Moscow Agreement, contemplates the establishment -of a Provisional Korean Government to assist the United States-Soviet -Joint Commission in preparing Korea for self-government, the creation -of some form of trusteeship for Korea under the United States, the -United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union for a period of up to -five years and the complete independence of Korea at the earliest -possible moment, with subsequent membership in the United Nations. -The Directive goes on to state that the American occupation of South -Korea is for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of the -basic American objectives in Korea and shall continue as long as it -contributes to that end. - -As a result of Soviet obstruction and tactics designed to eliminate -the majority of the rightist groups from participation in the -new government to be established for all of Korea, the American -military authorities in South Korea have been unable to proceed -with the initial steps required for the establishment of a -Provisional Korean Government. As required by the Directive, the -American authorities have made considerable progress in utilizing -qualified Koreans in posts in local and provincial administration -and in the administration of the United States zones as a whole. -American personnel remains in the provincial administrations only -in an advisory capacity and all administrative posts are filled -by Koreans. In the overall administration of South Korea, all -Government departments are now headed by Korean officials and -Americans are utilized only in an advisory capacity, although -important controversial matters may be referred either to the United -States Military Governor or the Commanding General of the United -States Occupation Forces for final decision. American military -personnel in the Military Government are being replaced as rapidly -as possible by American civilians. A Korean Interim Legislative -Assembly was established in December, 1946, half of its membership -being selected by the United States Commanding General from a list -of Koreans recommended by Korean groups and half being elected -as representatives of the various provinces and municipalities. -Presently under consideration by this Assembly is a program for -land reform in South Korea and the Assembly has recently adopted -a general election law providing for election of officials to an -Interim South Korean Government according to certain stipulated rules -and regulations. In accordance with the Directive, the United States -military authorities have permitted full freedom of expression to -all political groups, except in those cases when the activities of -certain Communist-dominated groups were clearly prejudicial to the -security of American military occupation. - - * * * * * - -In seeking to attain the cultural objectives set forth in the -Directive, the United States occupational authorities have caused -funds to be set aside for training courses in industry and -agriculture, have encouraged the establishment of teacher training -schools and of summer and winter institutes for the reeducation -of teachers and have in general devoted their efforts to the -restoration of schools, the enforcement of new system of education -and expansion of school facilities. They have also encouraged the -formation of various committees for the purpose of democratizing -the Korean educational administration. The implementation of these -programs has been handicapped by lack of funds. Culturally, as well -as politically, efforts have been made to carry out a process of -“Koreanization” looking toward a free and independent Korea. - -It should be pointed out that the Directive itself necessarily allows -latitude of interpretation and execution and that the American -authorities in Korea have functioned within the framework of that -Directive. - - * * * * * - -Also, the failure to implement the badly needed land reform program -has been due to the desire to await the unification of North and -South Korea, at which time a Provisional Korean Government would be -in a position to carry out a uniform program of this kind for the -entire nation. Now that unification appears to be a matter for the -indefinite future, plans are being made to carry out such a program -at the earliest possible moment. - - -_Obstructions to Realizations of United States Objectives_ - -The chief obstructions to the realization of United States objectives -in Korea have been the division of that country by the 38° North -parallel barrier and the lack of Soviet cooperation in carrying out -the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. Behind the -38° North parallel the Soviet Union has established a Democratic -Front Government modelled along Soviet lines and has eliminated -all political parties of a non-Communist character. North Korean -Communist groups have thus been able to encourage and assist the -activities of the Democratic Front and other Communist-dominated -leftist groups in South Korea hostile to the United States by the -infiltration of agents from North Korea into the American zone -of occupation. The Soviet refusal in the United States-Soviet -Joint Commission to consult with all Korean political and social -organizations, as the first step in the formation of a Provisional -Korean Government, has so far made it impossible to realize American -objectives in Korea—the establishment of a self-governing, sovereign -Korea, independent of foreign control and fully representative of the -freely expressed will of the Korean people. - -Other obstructions to the realization of American objectives in Korea -have come from sources within the United States zone of occupation: - - * * * * * - -2. Similarly, extreme leftist groups have endeavored to foment -hostility to the United States and opposition to the attainment of -American objectives in Korea. Such groups have been particularly -active among Korean peasants in opposing the rice collection program -instituted by the United States Military Government for the purpose -of ensuring sufficient food for the urban areas. - - -_Implication of Withdrawal of All United States Assistance or -Continuing Present United States Policy_ - -The American occupation forces in Korea could not remain in that -country if all assistance to South Korea were stopped, since the -cessation of all aid would lead to an early economic breakdown and -to the outbreak of riots and disorder throughout the United States -zone of occupation. The withdrawal of American military forces -from Korea would, in turn, result in the occupation of South Korea -either by Soviet troops, or, as seems more likely, by the Korean -military units trained under Soviet auspices in North Korea. The -end result would be the creation of a Soviet satellite Communist -regime in all of Korea. A withdrawal of all American assistance with -these results would cost the United States an immense loss on moral -prestige among the peoples of Asia; it would probably have serious -repercussions in Japan and would more easily permit the infiltration -of Communist agents into that country; and it would gain for the -Soviet Union prestige in Asia which would be particularly important -in the peripheral areas bordering the Soviet Union, thus creating -opportunities for further Soviet expansion among nations in close -proximity to the Soviet Union. - -Present American policy provides that, in view of the failure of the -United States-Soviet Joint Commission to succeed in implementing -the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea, the matter -be referred to the Four Powers for solution. It also provides that -the matter be referred to the General Assembly of the United States -in the event of the failure of the Four Powers to solve the Korean -problem. This indicates that the United States will continue to seek, -by consultation with the powers concerned, a solution of the problem, -but a failure to reach an agreement on Korea in the United Nations -will require that the United States make a decision regarding its -future course in Korea: whether it shall withdraw or whether it shall -organize a South Korean Government and under what conditions and -whether it shall give economic and military aid to such a government. - -A continuation of present American policies will serve to give -notice to the Soviet Union and to other nations in the Far East -that the United States will not abandon Korea in the face of Soviet -intransigence and that the United States will continue to insist upon -the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. - -A continuation of present American policies will serve to deny to the -Soviet Union direct or indirect control of all of Korea and prevent -her free use of the entire nation as a military base of operations, -including the ice-free ports in South Korea. - - - APPENDIX F TO PART III—KOREA - - ECONOMIC - -South Korea has few resources except agricultural land. This area -formerly obtained much of its anthracite, electric power, timber, -fertilizer, and other chemical products from North Korea, and -bituminous coal and food from Manchuria, but must now obtain these -essential items (except electric power) as well as raw materials and -repair parts for her industries, from other external sources. - -_Coal_—The whole of Korea, particularly South Korea, lacks coal No -bituminous deposits are known and existing coal deposits are of -a law-grade anthracite. The coal runs high in ash, and tends to -disintegrate to powder. The largest producing mine in South Korea, -constituting in fact 50 per cent of the production, is located at -Sam Chok on the east coast. Production involves costly rail-sea-rail -distribution. This coal can be and is being used in thermal plants -by pulverizing and mixing with oil, but its use is costly and -maintenance of boiler equipment is heavy. In any case, bituminous -coal must be imported for the operation of the railways and most of -the industries. - -_Electric Power_—Because of the unfavorable coal situation, South -Korea is at the mercy of North Korea with respect to electric power -because virtually all of the large hydroelectric installations are -in North Korea. In 1945 there was a total of 1,240,000 kilowatts of -installed capacity, 90 per cent of it hydroelectric and in North -Korea. Some of the capacity in North Korea has been removed by the -Russians. At the present time South Korea depends on North Korea -sources for 75 per cent of its power requirements in the winter -months when stream flow for its hydroelectric plants is low, and 50 -per cent to 60 per cent during the rainy summer months. Conditions -will be critical during the coming winter. Minimum peak requirements -are estimated at 200,000 kilowatts and only 110,000 kilowatts are -in sight including the area’s own generating capacity of 60,000 -kilowatts—and that only if rehabilitation materials are received—plus -50,000 kilowatts from North Korea, which is all the Russians profess -to be able to deliver. If North Korea power were cut off, all -industrial production in South Korea would have to be suspended, -and remaining locally generated energy rationed for military and -emergency use. Any new plants to correct this deficiency or permit -any revival of industry would require four to five years to complete, -and would still be dependent upon imported coal or oil, or upon a -considerable expansion of the low quality anthracite production. -There is no reasonable solution to this dilemma other than to unite -North and South Korea. - -_Forestry_—The forest situation in South Korea is unfavorable. Before -the war, effective programs of reforestation and erosion control were -under way, but dining the war the annual cut averaged 168 million -cubic feet as compared with annual estimated growth of only 113 -million cubic feet. Furthermore, over two-thirds of South Korean -requirements of lumber, fuel wood, and pulp were formerly supplied by -North Korea. With this source cut off and coal imports and production -drastically reduced, hills and mountains around the Urge cities have -been literally denuded. Unless North and South Korea are united or -substantial imports are provided, the needs of South Korea for fuel -wood, lumber, railroad ties, and telephone and telegraph poles, make -it inevitable that overcutting and denuding of forest land in South -Korea will continue, with resulting increased erosion and flood -damage to agricultural land. - -_Mineral Resources_—Mineral resources of Korea are varied and rather -extensive, but with a few exceptions are of low grade. There is a -large deposit—over one billion metric tons—of low grade (35 per cent -magnetic) iron ore at Musan in Northeastern Korea which the Japanese -mined extensively before and during the war. Capacities are said to -have been developed for the production of over 800,000 tons of pig -iron and 350,000 tons of steel annually, but operations were possible -only by large imports of bituminous coal from Manchuria and Japan. - -In both North and South Korea, gold and copper were also mined, the -latter as an adjunct of the former, and some lead and zinc, and a -large quantity of graphite, the latter, however, of low quality. -There is enough developed tungsten production in South Korea to make -it an important export commodity. - -_Industries_—The prospects for Korean industry, even in the event -of early unification, are not bright. Before 1931 Japan exploited -Korea primarily as a source of raw materials, rice and cheap labor. -Thereafter Korea became Japan’s bridgehead to the Asiatic mainland, -and with Manchuria, was developed as the mainland portion of -Japan’s war potential. By 1938 there were 7,000 factories, mostly -small, employing 183,000 workers, principally in the production -of chemicals, textiles and processed foods. Main industrial -concentrations were in the north, near hydroelectric power plants -and the larger mineral deposits. This rather impressive industrial -plant was not damaged by bombing, but it would be a mistake to assume -therefore that Korea possesses a ready-made industrial plant which -could quickly be turned to full and efficient peacetime operations. -Production, at perhaps 20 per cent of capacity, was restored after -the occupation, but output has dwindled as stocks of raw materials -have been exhausted, and as machinery has stopped functioning -for lack of spare parts and competent maintenance and operating -personnel. The dearth of competent administrative supervisory and -technical personnel, practically all of whom were formerly Japanese -and are now evacuated, is the outstanding deficiency in Korean -industries, power, and transportation systems. The unification of -North and South Korea would make some of the required raw materials -available, and spare parts may eventually be obtainable from Japan, -but the serious deficiency of competent personnel is an unresolved -problem. - -_Railways_—Korea has an excellent standard-gauge railway system -including a double-track main line from Pusan on the southeast coast -to Antung on the Manchurian border, which adequately serves the -country with the exception of the eastern half of Kangwon Province. -However, trackage, rolling stock except locomotives, and railway -communications are badly in need of rehabilitation as a result of -years of undermaintenance because of wartime shortages of materials. -The railways in common with the country as a whole have been -badly crippled by the evacuation of the Japanese administrative, -supervisory, and technical personnel. The right-of-way is excellently -engineered and constructed and characterized by a profusion of -concrete and masonry structures, but all of the seven million ties -in South Korea will require replacement within the next seven -years, and quantities of rails and fishplates are also needed. One -hundred and one new locomotives of the 2-8-0 type have been provided -by the Military Government, but much of the other rolling stock -requires overhaul. Railway communications also require considerable -rehabilitation. - -_Highways_—There are no modern roads in Korea. The highways of South -Korea are practically nonoperable for automotive traffic except from -Seoul to Inchon, Kaisong, and Chunchon. Practically all supplies must -be distributed throughout Korea by rail. - -_Shipping_—The only shipping of South Korea consists of eight Baltic -vessels, and 12 LST’s, operated by the Military Government coast-wise -and for some trade with Japan. - -_Ports_—There are two major ports in South Korea; Pusan, an excellent -deep-water port with four large piers at the Southeast end of the -peninsula, and Inchon, west of Seoul, a much smaller tidal-basin -port which can accommodate four three-quarter-thousand-ton ships at -dockside in the basin and larger trans-Pacific cargo and passenger -vessels in the anchorage outside. Two other deep-water ports, -Masan and Yosu, were mined and are little used at present. Mukko -on the east coast is the export terminal for Sam Chok, the largest -anthracite mining area in South Korea. The other ports of Mokpo, -Pohang, Chinhae, and Kunsan are limited by unfavorable factors of -nigh tidal range, and a lack of berths and port clearance facilities. - -In North Korea, there are two first-class warm water commercial and -naval ports at Wonsan and Chungjin on the east coast, the latter -particularly desirable from a Russian viewpoint, and other ports -Oongki, Rashin, Eungjin, Chinnanpo, and Simhu, the latter two -handicapped by the 25- to 30- foot tides of the Yellow Sea. - - -_Withdrawal of Japanese Personnel_ - -As disastrous in its effects on Korean economy as the division of -Korea’s people and resources by the 38° North parallel, was the -evacuation of all Japanese personnel, except 500 retained in North -Korea, after VJ-Day. The 700,000 Japanese formerly resident in Korea -dominated all elements of the economy and supplied management and -technical personnel even to the mechanic class. Koreans were denied -opportunities or positions of consequence in all phases of political -and economic life. It is no reflection on the individuals concerned -to note that a former Korean stationmaster at Pusan is now head of -the railways, or that a vocational school graduate is in responsible -charge of a large hydroelectric plant not far from Seoul. It is -however, an indication of an almost fatal deficiency in South Korean -economy. The ultimate solution is not readily apparent. - - -_Disinvestment_ - -The process of disinvestment probably began in South Korea during the -late thirties when the Japanese decided to put all new capital into -war production and permit nonwar facilities to depreciate. Capital -goods provided by the Japanese for maintenance and development in -South Korea went with few exceptions to war plants such as the -submarine shop at Pusan, and to the strategic transport services -linking Japan with the Manchuria-North Korea industrial complex. -This meant that facilities such as the north-south railroad from -Pusan to Antung on the Manchurian border received the main portion -of construction materials available. Other industrial establishments -in South Korea were converted to war production or allowed to -deteriorate. The supply of fertilizer, essential to rice culture in -the exhausted paddies of South Korea, was drastically reduced in the -early forties as a result of the conversion of North Korean nitrogen -fixation plants to the manufacture of explosives. Exploitation of -South Korea’s meager forest resources resulted in severe erosion and -the destruction of crops and utilities through flooding The Japanese -also depleted Korean stock-piles and withdrew skilled labor for Army -service, or for the mines and factories of Manchuria and the Japanese -islands. During two years of military government, the process of -disinvestment has continued. - -The possibility of South Korea financing a program of investment -and rehabilitation out of the proceeds of exports is not worth -considering in detail. Although South Korea is primarily -agricultural, it is unlikely that it will be able to export -foodstuff, even under the most favorable circumstances. Deterioration -of agriculture, due to accumulated soil deficiencies and erosion, -and an increase of population from 15 to 20 million since 1940 -indicate that no export surplus of food can be expected in the next -several years. The only exports which may be derived from South Korea -are small amounts of such minerals as tungsten, gold and copper, -some ginseng root, and marine products such as agar-agar. The most -optimistic estimate is $10 million worth of exports by 1950. Much -more than $10 million earned by Korean exports will be needed to -finance essential raw material imports, and there is no prospect of -any capital development out of current production. - - -_Inflation_ - -The Korean inflation is not as serious as the Chinese inflation -in rate of price increase, but its causes are less susceptible to -control by measures taken within Korea. Price increases have been -due to physical inability to produce goods, and not to unrestrained -issuance of paper currency. Prices of consumers’ goods in various -categories have risen 200 to 700 times over the 1937 level. The -official rise price, however, has risen only 70 times, and about -80 per cent of the calorie requirement for the urban population -is available at the official price. A runaway inflation has not -yet occurred in South Korea, because (_a_) the Military Government -has restrained the issuance of currency by keeping governmental -expenditures and local occupation costs at reasonable levels, and -(_b_) because cannibalization and the use of Japanese stocks have -kept some industry going, and (_c_) the forcible collection of rice -at harvest time has brought in sufficient food to maintain, with -“disease an unrest” imports, an adequate official ration in the -cities without the use of large inflationary payments to the farmers. -Highly inflationary factors such as the exhaustion of raw material -stocks, cumulative breakdowns in public services and transportation, -and the cutting of power supply from the North, might occur -simultaneously. The Korean economic outlook is, therefore, more grave -than in China or Japan, where governmental fiscal policies as well as -low production, are the main causes of inflation. Korea, lacking raw -materials and skilled labor, is not in a position to be saved from -a disastrous and chaotic hyper-inflation by the efforts of its own -people combined with correct policy decisions. A breakdown could be -forestalled only by external provision of large amounts of consumers’ -goods and transportation equipment. - - -_Agriculture and Fisheries_ - -_Agriculture_—Over three-quarters of the total population of South -Korea are farmers. The total area of land under cultivation in -1946 was 6,033,000 acres, or about 2½ acres per farm household. -Approximately 15 per cent of agricultural land was formerly owned by -Japanese, but title thereto remains with the Military Government and -will eventually pass to Koreans. In the projected land reforms an -additional 60 per cent of land, which is tenant-operated, would be -involved. The Military Government has not proceeded with land reform -even with regard to Japanese-held land, in the view that such reform -should not precede establishment of an interim Korean Government. - -After VJ-Day the influx of over two and a half million Koreans from -Japan, China, and North Korea into South Korea, coupled with almost -complete lack of commercial fertilizers as well as severe floods, -resulted in a severe food shortage. Farmers have been reluctant to -double-crop soils already depleted because of a lack of fertilizer, -and have preferred to conserve land for rice, the best money crop. In -1946 the average planted acreage was only 79 per cent of the 1935-39 -average, and production of grains and pulses was only 71 per cent. - -In the past, about 36 per cent of the population and 36 per cent -of the food production of Korea were located north of the 38° -North parallel. However, postwar population movements, plus the -availability of more commercial fertilizers in North Korea (where -almost all of Korea’s large chemical plants are located), has changed -this situation. Only about 30 per cent of Korea’s population is now -north of the 38° North parallel, but that area accounts for around 38 -per cent of food production. - -Rice is the principal Korean crop, and it has consistently -represented more than half the total value of agricultural -production. During the 1930’s the rice crop averaged about -100,000,000 bushels annually. Forty per cent or more was exported -each year to Japan accounting generally for about one-third of the -total gross value of exports. This was by no means voluntary on -the part of the Korean people. In line with Japanese policy, farm -tenancy increased from less than 40 per cent in 1910 to more than 75 -per cent in 1945. This facilitated grain collections, for landlords -usually received their rentals in rice, and these averaged about 60 -per cent of the crop. Consequently, although Koreans preferred rice -to other grains, their per capita consumption was forced down from -3.62 bushels in 1915-19 to 2.0 bushels in 1939-45, a decline of 44 -per cent. This deficiency was partly made up by imports of Manchurian -millet and soya beans, but underconsumption was nevertheless chronic. - -To meet the food crisis in South Korea and to rehabilitate -agriculture the Military Government developed program to import -foodstuffs to prevent starvation and to assure Korean urban residents -at least a subsistence diet until indigenous production could be -increased to meet minimum food needs; and a fertilizer import -program designed to restore depleted soils and increase agricultural -production to levels at least as high as had been reached in the past. - -In 1945 the Military Government’s attempt to institute a compulsory -system of rice collection for rationing to non-self-suppliers was -largely unsuccessful. In 1946, a poor crop year due to floods, the -Military Government collected 87,428 tons of rice, or about one-sixth -of the total production. In order to supplement indigenous production -to meet the minimum needs of non-self-suppliers in South Korea, -180,848 metric tons of wheat, corn, and flour were imported into -South Korea by the Military Government from May through December, -1946. - -A program for the collection of the rice in 1946 was given highest -priority by the Military Government, as one of the most important -ways to ease the food situation, stabilize the economy, and check -the inflationary spiral. This program was fully supported by all -agencies, and it succeeded in collecting a total of 548,000 metric -tons of polished rice, or its equivalent, about 30 per cent of the -total 1946 production. - -This successful collection program, coupled with the importation of -275,962 metric tons of cereals purchased with U. S. funds during the -first seven months of 1947, has enabled the Military Government to -stabilize the food situation in South Korea through the issuance to -non-self-suppliers of minimum staple rations averaging slightly over -300 grams (1,050 calories) per person per day. - -_Fisheries_—Fishing was one of the important prewar Korean -industries, ranking sixth in the world. It is second in importance, -only to agriculture in the economic structure of the country. The -industry was, however, largely dependent upon Japan for imports of -fisheries supplies and, has deteriorated seriously since this source -has been cut off. Consumption of fish products has decreased from -a prewar average of 47 pounds per capita per year to 32 pounds. -Korea needs additional fisheries supplies, boats, manila line, nets, -trawls, ammonia for refrigeration, tin plate for canning, salt and -sugar for canning. Fears are expressed that if such supplies are -not forthcoming and fishing operations considerably expanded, the -Japanese will enter claims for fishing grounds now reserved for the -Koreans. - - -_Foreign Trade_ - -The total volume of Korea’s external trade grew from 660,000,000 yen -in 1910 to more than 2,400,000,000 yen in 1939. With respect to the -principal categories of its trade, i. e., foodstuffs, textiles and -fibres, minerals, manufactures, and miscellaneous items. Korea was -consistently a net importer; of all, except for foodstuffs. Food -exports however, were seldom so large that they did more than offset -imports of textiles and fibers. - -From 1910 to 1945, Korea’s external trade was almost wholly absorbed -by the Japanese Empire and the prime factor during the entire -period was the export of rice to Japan. In 1936, of the value of 41 -Korean products showing a net export balance, rice accounted for -approximately 64 per cent. Although by 1939 the relative importance -of rice exports had declined in favor of minerals and manufactures, -of the 55 net export products in that year, rice still made up -one-third of the total money value. Until the years immediately -preceding the war, fish and marine products ranked second to -rice, averaging from 7.5 per cent to 9 per cent of all net export -commodities. Other exports individually were of minor significance. -Korea’s principal imports historically have reflected its dependence -on the outside world for fuels, heavy manufacturers, machinery, -automotive equipment, textiles, and fibers, and specialized products. - -Under current conditions, foreign trade in the ordinary sense of -the term is small in amount. During the period August 15, 1945, -through June 30, 1947, the value of goods entering or leaving the -area was approximately $168,000,000. Of this sum, however, only about -$25,000,000 represents the value of goods exchanged between Korea -and the mainland of Asia as a result of the operations of private -traders. The remaining $143,000,000 represents mainly commodities -imported by agencies of the United State Government as a part of the -Civilian Supply Program and financed with appropriated funds of the -War Department, or as shipments made under the $25,000,000 UNRRA -supplies. Exports which enter into this figure are surplus Foreign -Liquidation Commission credit, plus small amounts of government-owned -minerals and marine products, to the value of some $5,000,000. - -The Military Government is endeavoring to encourage such trade as -will reduce the area’s dependence upon American funds. Credits -realized from South Korea exports, unless balanced in kind by imports -approved as essential, are to be used to purchase commodities similar -to those making up the Civilian Supply list and certified for import -by the Military Government. On July 15, 1947, Korea was declared open -to small numbers of foreign businessmen, who might desire to develop -trade possibilities within the framework established by the military -authorities. Meanwhile, trade has been undertaken with Hong Kong and -Macao, and some critically needed materials have been obtained by -barter in exchange for Korean surpluses. Recent negotiations with the -Egyptian government have led to an agreement to exchange 730 tons of -tungsten concentrates for 3,000 bales of long-staple Egyptian cotton. - -All dealings with Japan are restricted to a governmental level, and -China has imposed conditions which make legitimate trade virtually -out of the question. Actually, a growing smuggling trade is going -on both with Japan and China, and via Hong Kong and Macao. An -essential step for promoting Korea’s trade on a sound basis would be -development of an efficient customs service. - - -_United States Investment in Rehabilitation_ - -There is one basic policy question which overhangs all financial and -economic programs for Korea: How long will the occupation of South -Korea continue on a unilateral basis? Until this question is answered -in terms of months or years, no satisfactory decision can be made on -United States financial or developmental programs for the area. The -characteristics of the South Korean economy are such that there is -no compromise which provides effective utilization of dollars, and -at the same time leaves open the decision concerning the duration -of the occupation. If a serious decline in the living standard, and -possibly economic disintegration are to be avoided, South Korea must -have (_a_) unification with North Korea, or (_b_) substantial relief -supplies, or (_c_) relief and rehabilitation supplies of $200 to $300 -million a year for several years. The third alternative would provide -a possible basis for an indefinite continuance of occupation. The -capital investment in a permanently separate South Korea would be -wasteful, and the likelihood of a stable economy resulting therefrom -would be in doubt for some years. South Korea is a depleted and -eroded country with no minerals worth mentioning; an agriculture -dependent on nitrate input, and a backward people. In terms of the -needs of the East Asia area, an investment in rehabilitation and -industrialization, which would permit South Korea to subsist on its -own industrial output at its standards of the past 10 years with a -minimum of relief, could be justified only by political and strategic -consideration of the highest order. - -A consideration affecting the duration of the occupation of Korea, -and hence the type of economic program, is the estimated length of -the occupation in Japan. General MacArthur has indicated his desire -for a United Nations, or other international administration to take -responsibility in Japan soon after the peace treaty is signed. -There would be obvious difficulties in any long-term occupation and -rehabilitation program for South Korea, initiated at a time when -the occupation of Japan was about to be relinquished by the United -States. Apart from the problem of tactical forces in Japan to back -up the Korean occupation, there would be communication and supply -problems. There might he political objection to the occupation of -liberated Korea after the termination of occupation in defeated Japan. - -The United States Military Government in Korea has recommended -a five-year rehabilitation program starting in July, 1948, and -requiring U. S. financing for a deficit of $647 million. The -estimates indicate that the proposed rehabilitation of the Korean -economy would cost more per year for the first three years, than the -relief program of $137 million which was tentatively approved for -fiscal 1948, but reduced in July, 1947, to $92.7 million. - -A feature of the proposed rehabilitation program is an expenditure -of $35 million to provide a chemical fertilizer industry and the -supporting power installations, roughly duplicating the installations -in North Korea which formerly supplied the fertilizer needs of -South Korea. An additional amount of approximately $85 million -is included in the five-year rehabilitation program to cover the -cost of fertilizer imports, pending the completion of the plants. -Other items in the program are investment in coal mining to provide -low-grade anthracite for briquetting, and to provide for the -development and reconstruction of the transportation, textile and -fisheries industries. There is no assurance, however, that (_a_) $35 -million fertilizer industry would meet the estimated requirements, -or reach capacity production in the time allotted. The suitability -of low-grade anthracite dust as the basic energy source for a -considerable industrial establishment in South Korea has not been -tested, and (_b_) there are no reliable estimates of the reserves of -this fuel, and no evidence of this fuel, and no evidence that the -mines and railroads could be developed to fit the prescribed time -schedule. - -In the event that it is decided to continue a one-nation occupation -of South Korea for some years, the least costly program would be -one designed to provide, not capital goods, but raw materials and -fertilizer in sufficient quantity to stabilize the economy at a -satisfactory standard of living as measured by a prewar Japanese and -potential North Korean living standards. In this way, the risk of an -experiment in industrialization without resources would be avoided. - -A relief program of the type envisaged might cost the United States -about $150 million a year, in addition to the present military -occupation costs which are in the neighborhood of $200 million a -year. It would be necessary frankly to recognize this as a relief -program which held no prospect of financial return, and no prospect -of making South Korea a self sufficient economy. - - -_Industrial Survey_ - -A comprehensive industrial survey of South Korea would not be -warranted. The industrial elements and capabilities as well as -weaknesses of that area are all too evident. Should Korea be -reunited, and the United States bear a responsibility in the economic -rehabilitation of the country, an industrial survey wholly or in -part by qualified United States Government personnel is indicated. -If, however, it be made by private consultants, they should clearly -understand that the survey must be realistic and reflect the economic -needs and capabilities of the country. Foreign consultants and -construction firms do themselves and their own country as well as the -country concerned, a disservice in recommending projects for which -there is not complete economic justification. - - - APPENDIX G TO PART III—KOREA - - SOCIAL AND CULTURAL - -Because Japan had administered and developed Korea uniformly for -Japanese and not Korean purposes, and in particular had persistently -suppressed the people’s historic culture, once the region was freed -of the Japanese, its people undertook a re-Koreanization program -with feverish activity. Since VJ-Day, their own labors in behalf of -education, for example, apart from the contributions of American -authorities have been determined and surprisingly effective. In that -short time it is estimated that total illiteracy has been cut from 75 -to 44 per cent (to 25 per cent in a most favored area), a commendable -record even when one notes warningly that the degree of literacy thus -attained is necessarily a modest one permitting little more in some -cases than ability to read a ballot. Although there are today more -children in school in South Korea than were in school in all Korea -during the Japanese rule, popular education is but begun, whether -one considers primary or secondary schooling. Its advancement calls -for buildings, texts and other equipment, teachers and advisors, and -these requirements call for money. - -The program of the educational group in our own Military Government -is well designed but promoted within tight financial limits The same -can be said for adult educational work of the United States Office -of Civil Information. It operates through local libraries whose -pictures, posters, periodicals, and other exhibits reach a great many -urban visitors, and through a special train which moves periodically -among the villages, presenting well-attended educational picture -shows and distributing eagerly read farm weeklies and newspapers. Of -many lacks the worst is of picture films. - -Korean newspapers are numerous but for the most part are primarily -political organs. Only by hastening education in the Korean language, -long suppressed by Japan, can there be prompt development of adult -education; there is present need for increased educational and -cultural activities to occupy the attention of young people who -presently have insufficient employment. - -American health advisers report good progress in prevention of such -serious diseases as smallpox and typhus, scant progress in the fight -on chronic maladies. Institutional welfare work is insufficient but -no more so than under Japan. - -In general, one notes abundant energy among Korean leaders and a -great desire for mass improvement socially and culturally as well as -in other fields; it merits greater financial encouragement than thus -far has been available. - - - APPENDIX H TO PART III—KOREA - - THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA AND PROPOSED MILITARY AID - - -_Military Situation_ - -In September, 1945, United States Army Forces, pursuant to -instructions contained in General Order Number 1 of the Supreme -Commander Allied Powers, occupied Korea south of the 38° North -parallel and accepted the surrender of Japanese troops south of that -line. This arbitrary line of demarcation between the United States -and Soviet Union occupation areas rapidly became a complete barrier -to free movement between agricultural South Korea and the more -industrialized North Korea. Numerous disputes and incidents, mostly -political or economic, continue to take place even after two years of -occupation. - -The Commander in Chief, Far East, has delegated military -responsibility and authority for occupation of South Korea to -Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the XXIV -Corps. This Corps of two divisions totals 41,000 United States troops -and constitutes the American Occupational Force in Korea. - -There are no South Korean Armed Forces to augment these American -occupational troops. There are, however, three authorized Korean -uniformed elements or quasi-military forces: the National Police with -a strength of 28,000, the Constabulary with 16,000, and the Korean -Coast Guard with 3,000. These forces may be expected to remain loyal -to the United States Military Government in the event of emergency. -The National Police Force is the agency for enforcing law and order -in Korea and is organized into district and subdistrict headquarters -with police stations in principal towns and villages. - - * * * * * - -The Constabulary is similar in purpose to the National Guard of the -United States in that it is used to back up the police in event of -major disorders. At present, the Constabulary is also being utilized -to augment American guards on United States Army installations. -It is armed with captured Japanese rifles and small arms, and its -efficiency is low by American standards. - -North of the 38° North parallel, the estimated Soviet troop strength -in Korea is approximately 45,000. These forces are organized into -two major units, the 40th Rifle Division and the 19th Mechanized -Division, plus complementary air, naval, and service support. There -is evidence of further Soviet withdrawal now underway. An accurate -figure denoting the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean People’s -(Communist) Army in its overall structure has not yet been obtained -but the figure of 125,000 troops has been generally accepted. These -forces assist Soviets in control of the border, maintain liaison with -Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and constitute a potential military -threat to South Korea. - -Current political and economic unrest in Southern Korea is aggravated -by Communistic terrorism, and by Communist-inspired riots and -revolutionary activities in the occupied area. Such disorders impose -additional military burdens on the police, the constabulary, and the -American Occupation Forces. In addition, there is a possibility, -however remote, of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea by -troops of the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army. Recent reports -from Manchuria indicate that sizable elements of Korean troops -are operating with Chinese Communists, possibly to acquire battle -conditioning. Furthermore there is evidence that Soviet officers and -equipment are being used to groom the Korean Army. - -Although it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets or their North -Korean satellites would invade South Korea in the near future, -infiltration of Communists and of large numbers of the North Korean -Army, in connection with large-scale Communist-inspired or abetted -riots or revolts in the South, is always a dangerous threat. Should -this occur, the forces available should be adequate for maintaining -order under any circumstances except for an outright Soviet directed -or controlled invasion. - - -_Strategic Importance_ - -The political, social, economic, and military situations in South -Korea are inextricably mingled. A Soviet-dominated Korea would -constitute a serious political and psychological threat to Manchuria, -North China, the Ryukyus, and Japan, and hence to United States -strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore in the best -interest of the United States to ensure the permanent military -neutralization of Korea. Neutralization can only be assured by its -occupation until its future independence as a buffer state is assured. - -So long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of North Korea, the -United States must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the -world an “ideological retreat.” The military standing of the United -States would decline accordingly; not only throughout the Far East, -but throughout the world. Withdrawal of United States Occupation -Forces from Korea would result in a growing unrest among the Japanese -people because of their uncertainty regarding future United States -policy in the Far East, and their consequent fears of expanding -Soviet influence. This might well increase occupational requirements -for Japan. - -Except as indicated above, and the fact that its occupation denies -a potential enemy the use of warm-water ports and the opportunity -to establish strong air and naval bases in the peninsula, the -United States has little military interest in maintaining troops or -bases in Korea. In the event of major hostilities in the Far East, -present forces in Korea would most likely be a military liability -as they could not be maintained there within our present military -capabilities. - -There are three possible courses of action with reference to United -States Occupation Forces in Korea: - -They may be withdrawn immediately, which would abandon South Korea -to the Soviet Union through pressures which could be exerted by -the North Korea People’s (Communist) Army and is therefore an -unacceptable course from the strategic viewpoint. - -They may remain in occupation indefinitely, which course would be -unacceptable to the American public after Soviet withdrawal, and -would subject United States to international censure. - -They may be withdrawn concurrently with Soviet occupation forces. - -Soviet forces in Northern Korea will not be withdrawn until the North -Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created -are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied -upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of -Soviet troops. One of these Soviet objectives will undoubtedly be -to obtain control of South Korea by utilization of Communist Korean -armed forces as a means of pressure after withdrawal of United -States forces, as was done in the cases of Poland, Outer Mongolia, -Yugoslavia, and Albania. - -There appears to be a strong possibility that Soviet Russia will -withdraw its occupational forces when such conditions are favorable -and thus induce our own withdrawal. - - -_Military Aid to Korea_ - -The Military Government in Korea, which is currently being turned -over to American and Korean civilians, is the only government in -South Korea. The immediate and primary objectives of the American -Military Commander in Korea are to maintain law and order in the -face of subversive uprisings in the American zone, to care for -and safeguard American noncombatants and property, and to operate -a military government which looks toward the future political -independence of Korea together with its economic and social -rehabilitation. In view of these objectives, the immediate purpose -of any American military aid to Korea should be to facilitate their -realization. - -The long-term purpose of military aid to Korea should be to enable -South Korea, and later all Korea, to engage in a holding operation -against the progressive expansion of militaristic Communism. Minimum -military aid to Southern Korea therefore should envisage the support -of the uniformed elements of Korean military and quasi-military -forces through the furnishing of United States equipment including -carbines and some light machine guns as well as furnishing vehicles, -telephone and radio communications, etc., and training advice. - -Consideration was given by the Mission to the organization, training, -and equipping of a strong Korean military force along the lines -of the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the -control of the United States Military Commander, initially should be -officered throughout by Americans, but with a program for replacement -and understudy by Korean officers, and should be of sufficient -strength to cope with the threat from the north. Such a force will -become truly effective only if the United States Commander in Korea -is given clear-cut authority to establish and control it. - -Because of its occupation by two nations of radically differing -ideologies and policies, and the corresponding separation into two -parts economically, there is little that Korea, even as a liberated -nation, can do to improve its situation. South Korea lacks the -experience and industrial potential to create or support its own -armed forces. - -An American organized and equipped Korean military force would serve -to counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s (Communist) -Army when the American and the Soviet forces are withdrawn from -Korea. It might possibly preclude the forceful establishment of a -Communist Government, and thus contribute to a situation favorable -for the establishment of a free and independent Korea. - - -_Conclusions_ - -United States-Soviet Union troop strengths in South and North -Korea are approximately equal but the Soviets, assisted by a -Soviet-controlled, equipped, and trained North Korean People’s -(Communist) Army of 125,000 men, and geographically supported by a -contiguous Soviet Siberia, are in an infinitely stronger military -position. - -There is considerable unrest in South Korea but forces available to -General Hodge are adequate to cope with it and to maintain order, -though completely inadequate, even with maximum assistance from -General MacArthur, to meet Soviet-controlled invasion of North Korean -forces. - -A United States withdrawal which permitted the Soviet Union to -dominate Korea would result in a serious political and psychological -threat to China, including Manchuria, and Japan. - -The United States has a strong strategic interest in insuring -permanent military neutralization of Korea and its denial as a base -to the Soviet Union. - -The Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces just as soon as -they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and armed -forces which they have created will be strong enough and sufficiently -well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives -without the actual presence of Soviet troops. - - -_Recommendations_ - -It is recommended that: - -United States withdrawal from Korea be based upon agreements with -the Soviet Union to effect proportional withdrawals, with as many -guarantees as possible to safeguard Korean freedom and independence. - -Military aid be furnished to South Korea which would support the -achievement of such adequate safeguards and which would envisage: - - Continuing to furnish arms and equipment to Korean National - Police and Korean Coast Guard. - -The creation of an American-officered Korean Scout Force to replace -the present Constabulary of sufficient strength to cope with the -threat from the North. - -Continued interim occupation by United States Army forces in Korea. - -Advice in training of technical specialists and tactical units. - - - - - _Bibliography_ - - - A - - _Alexander of Macedon_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday, Doran Co., Garden - City, N. 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Y., - 1927. - - _Great Globe Itself, The_, by William C. Bullitt, Charles Scribner’s - Sons, N. Y., 1946. - - - H - - _History of Civilization_, by James Henry Breasted, Ginn & Co., N. - Y. and Boston, 1937. - - _History of Russia, A_, by Bernard Pares, Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y., - 1926. - - _History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great_, by Voltaire, - Vol. XVIII, St. Hubert Guild, N. Y., 1901. - - _History of the Russian Revolution_, by Leon Trotsky, Vols. I, II, - III, Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1932. - - - I - - _Inside Asia_, by John Gunther, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, - 1942. - - _Intelligence Digest_—A Review of World Affairs. - - _International Relations of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea - Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., Vols. I, II, III, 1918. - - _I Speak for the Chinese_, by Carl Crow, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and - London, 1937. - - _Ivan the Terrible, Czar of Russia_, by George Backer, Random House, - N. Y., 1950. - - - J - - _Journey to China, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, London, Constable and - Co., Ltd., 1931. - - - L - - _Life Magazine_, The June 14, issue. - - _Lost Peace in China_, by George Moorad, E. P. Dutton, N. Y., 1949. - - - M - - _Man of Independence, The_, by Jonathan Daniels, Lippincott & Co., - N. Y., 1940. - - _March of the Barbarians_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday, Doran and Co., - Inc., N. Y., 1940. - - _March of Muscovy, The_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday and Co., Inc., - Garden City, N. Y., 1948. - - _Marco Polo, the Venetian_, Everyman’s Library, Edited by Ernest - Rhys, 1907. - - - O - - _Old Civilizations of the New World_, by Hyatt Verrill, - Bobbs-Merrill Co., N. Y., 1929. - - - P - - _Pageant of Chinese History, The_, by Elizabeth Seeger, Longmans, - Green and Co., N. Y., 1934. - - Pamphlets, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, - N. Y. - - _Practical Program for America, A_, Edited by Henry Hazlett, - Harcourt Brace and Co., N. Y., 1932. - - - R - - _Resistance and Reconstruction_, by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, - Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1943. - - _Riding the Tiger_, by Harry Carr, Houghton Mifflin Co., N. Y., and - Boston, 1934. - - _Russia and the Peace_, by Bernard Pares, The MacMillan Co., N. Y., - 1944. - - _Russian Enigma, The_, by William Henry Chamberlin, Charles - Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1943. - - _Russia and the Russians_, by Edward Crankshaw, Viking Press, N. Y., - 1948. - - - S - - _Siberia_, by Emil Lengyel, Random House, N. Y., 1942. - - _Soong Sisters, The_, by Emily Hahn, Doubleday, Doran and Co., - Garden City, N. Y., 1942. - - _Speaking Frankly_, by James F. Byrnes, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1947. - - _Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism_, by Boris Souvarine, - Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1939. - - _Stalin’s Russia and the Crisis in Socialism_, by Max Eastman, W. W. - Norton and Co., N. Y., 1940. - - _Study in History, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, Abridgement of Vols. - I-VI, by D. C. Somervell, N. Y., G. Cumberlege, Oxford University - Press, 1946. - - - T - - _Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker_, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and - Co., N. Y., 1928. - - _Tinder Box of Asia, The_, by George E. Sokolsky, Doubleday, Doran - and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1932. - - _Together_, by Katherine Tupper Marshall, Tupper & Love, Inc., N. - Y., Atlanta, 1946. - - _Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea - Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1908. - - - W - - _War in the East_, by Charles A’Court Repington, John Murray, - London, 1905. - - _We’re in This with Russia_, by Wallace Carroll, Houghton Mifflin - Co., Boston, 1942. - - - - - _Index_ - - - A - - Acheson, 19, 26, 118. - - _American Mercury_, 23. - - Atwood, Harry E., 134. - - Anti-Imperialist League, 67 - - Aristotle, 144. - - Attila, the Hun, 73, 74. - - Attlee, Prime Minister, 146. - - - B - - “Ballentine Beer Patches,” 16. - - “Big Noses,” 117. - - Bleucher, General, 59. - - Borodin, Michael, 59. - - Bourtai, 76. - (See _also_ Genghis Khan, favorite wife of) - - Browder, Earl, 50, 53, 59, 60. - - Byrnes, Secretary of State, 19, 24. - - - C - - Cairo Conference, 108. - - Canton, Russians in, 113, 120, 121. - - Chang Kuo Sin, 117, 119. - - Checfoo, 9. - - Cheng Tien-shi, Dr., 129, 130. - - Chennault, Claire L., 119. - - Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106; - building of model village by, 106, (See _also_ Soong, Sisters). - - Chiang Kai-shek, 7, 8, 27, 59, 62, 67, 85, 92, 93, 103-116, - contributions of, to the U. S., 103; - “Golden Decade” of, 104; - mistakes of, 10; - tragedy of, 103-116. - - Chinese Communist Party, 45; - Central Committee of, 32; - Central People’s Government, 45; - Personalities, 45-68; - young intelligentsia of, 57. - - Chinese New Year, 87. - - Chingwangtao, 7. - - Chou En-lai, 8, 13, 28, 42, 56-61, 125; - family of, 59; - wife of, 60, 126; - “Executioner,” 59. - - Chungking, 45, 105, 106; - destruction of, by Japanese, 106; - model village in, 106. - - Churchill, 26, 33, 108. - - Chu Teh, 13, 38, 40, 50-56; - as a movie “fan,” 40; - family of, 51; - hunting prowess of, 40; - wives of, 51, 54. - - Comintern, 49. - - Communism, the “lure” of, 1; - forebears of, 70-81. - - Communist, flag; propaganda, 82-93; - (See _also_ Propaganda, Communist) - - Confucius, 50, 115. - - Courcy, Kenneth de, 145. - - “Cumshaw,” 36. - - - D - - Dairen, 9. - - Daniels, Jonathan, 25. - - Drugs, “actedon,” 90; - “mescaline,” 90; - use of, 90, 91; - on Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, 91; - (See _also_ Hypnotism, use of) - on Michael Shipkov, 91; - on Robert A. Vogeler, 91, 92; - (See _also_ Hypnotism, use of). - - Democracy, as a principle, 133. - - - E - - England, 139. - - Estabrooks, Dr. G. H., 91; - (See _also_ Hypnotism, use of). - - Eurasia, 7. - - F - - Fifth Column, conception of, 72. - - Finland, 132. - - Foundation for Economic Education, 136. - - Formosa, 112, 115, 118; - invasion of, 118-120. - - France, 132. - - Free love, 125. - - - G - - Gallen, 59. - - Genghis Khan, 17, 22, 53, 68, 70, 74-78, 79, 81, 96, 99, 100, 105, - 106, 108, 109; - favorite wife of, 76; - “Scourge of God,” 74; - superstitions of, 77; - Yassa of, 1, 78. - - Generalissimo, 7, 10, 17, 28, 33, 45. - - - H - - Hankow, 115. - - Hatem, Dr., 63, 64; - family of, 63, 64. (See _also_ Ma Hia-teh). - - Hiss, 26. - - Hirohito, 131. - - Hitler, 46, 131, 136. - - Hong Kong, 108, 124, 128, 129; - treatment of British in, 129. - - Hoover administration, 135, 136. - - Hoover, J. Edgar, 137. - - Huns, 70, 73. - - Hutton, Betty, 40. - - Hurley, Ambassador, 10, 41, 45, 109. - - Hypnotism, use of, 91, 92; - (See _also_ Estabrooks, Dr. G. H.); - on Cardinal Mindszenty, 91, 92; - on Robert Vogeler, 91, 92; - (See _also_ Drugs, use of); - on Van der Lubbe, 92; - (See _also_ Drugs, use of). - - - I - - International News Service, 18. - - International Hospital, 30, 37. - (See _also_ Yenan). - - - J - - Japanese, peace terms offered, 108, 115. - - Jefferson, Thomas, 142. - - Jenner, William E., 20, 22. - - Jessup, 26. - - Joffe, Adolph, 104. - - Judd, Walter H., 17. - - - K - - Kalgan Pass, 9. - - Kung, H. H., Madame, 64. - (See _also_ Soong, Sisters). - - Kung, H. H., Dr., 104. - - Kwangsi Province, 113. - - - L - - Lamb, Harold, 22. - - Lattimore, 26. - - Lehey, William D., 25. - - Lesser concessions, theory of, 135. - - Li Li San, 61, 96; - wife of, 61. - - _Life Magazine_, 115. - - Lin Piao, 62. - - Li Tsun-jen, General, 113. - - “Long March,” the, 47, 48, 54, 121. - - Lu Hsun Art Academy, 34, 64. - - - M - - MacArthur, General Douglas, 22, 23, 25, 107. - - Madison, James, 134. - - Ma Hai-teh, 63, 64. - (See _also_ Hatem, Dr.). - - Malinovsky, Marshall, 61. - - Mao Tse-tung, 13, 14, 15, 29, 33, 45-50, 54, 57, 61, 62, 63, 68, 76, - 92, 102, 121, 125; - daughter of, 30; - son of, 46; - wives of, 48; - heroine of “Long March,” 48, 49; - Lang Ping, 48, 49; - Myth, 49; - propaganda speech by, 92, 93. - - Manchuria, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 61, 94-102; - as granary of Asia, 94; - occupation of, by Japanese, 94; - stripping of, by Communists, 96. - - Manchus, 94, 104. - - Marriage, New Democracy, 125-126. - - Marshall, General George C., 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24, - 28, 56; - at a Chinese opera, 14; - at a Communist banquet, 14; - in conference with Mao, 15; - preference for Mao, 16; - visit of, to Yenan, 12, 14, 15. - - McNeil, Hector, 130. - - Michener, James, 115. - - Mindszenty, Joseph Cardinal, 91; - (See _also_ Drugs, use; Hypnotism, use of). - - Ming Bing, 13. - - Min Yuan Park, 87. - - Missionaries, Catholic, 34; - Protestants, 35. - - Mongol, 38, 70, 72, 73, 74, 81, 100, 101. - - Mongolia, 9. - - Mossadegh, Mohammed, 146. - - Moses, 70, 133. - - Mud caves, of Yenan, 29, 44. - - Mukden, 95, 99. - - - N - - Nanking, 16, 56, 58. - - Nan Yuan, 8. - - Nationalist, 9, 11; - (See _also_ Chiang Kai-shek, tragedy of). - - “New Democracy,” 82; - marriage under the, 125-126. - - New Life Movement, 61, 106. - - Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 107. - - - O - - Open Door Policy, 9. - - Opera, Chinese, 14; - Shanghai, 68. - - P - - Peace terms, Japanese, 108. - - Pei Yuan, 8. - - Peking, 7, 8, 57, 87, 122; - capture of, 87, 122; - famine in, 122. - - Personalities, Communist, 45-69. - - Plato, 50 - - Politburo, 15. - - Port Arthur, 9. - - “Prisoners of War School,” 32; - (See _also_ Yenan). - - Propaganda, Communist, 82-93; - against Americans, 85; - basic purpose of, 82; - distortion of terms in, 82, 83; - Democracy, 82; - Freedom, 82, 83; - Security, 83; - Truth, 83; - for children, 84, 85; - newspapers as, 86; - opera as, 89; - posters as, 84; - slogans as, 84; - speeches as, 86; - by Mao Tse-tung, 12, 93; - titles as reward, 87; - types of, two, 83. - - - Q - - Quislings, 100. - - Quo Vadis, 131-148. - - - R - - Red Curtain, Behind the, 117-130. - - Republic, discussion of, 133, 134. - - Rosenberg, Anna, 27. - - Roosevelt, 21, 26, 33, 108, 135. - - “Rosamond,” 65. - - Russell, Dean, 143. - - Russia, war potential, 138, 139. - - Russian advisors, 117. - - - S - - Samarkand, Battle of, 100. - - Sanzo Nosako, 33. - - Shanghai, fall of, 119, 120, 124; - Mayor of, 119; - Russians in, 120; - treatment of Americans in, 127. - Shensi Province, 29. - - Shipkov, Michael, 91; - (See _also_ Drugs, use of). - - Soong, Charlie, 65; - family, 65, 104; - Sisters, 64, 104. - - “Stakhanovitism,” 80. - - Stalin, 3, 28, 49, 50, 131. - - State Department, 7, 9, 27, 42. - - Stuart, J. Leighton, Ambassador, 24, 56. - - Sun Fo, 66. - - Sun Yat-sen, Madame, 31, 45, 64-69; - (See _also_ Soong, Sisters). - - Sun Yat-sen, 47, 103; - revolution of, 51. - - - T - - Tamerlane, 53, 78. - - Tang Shan, 8. - - Tartars, 63, 70, 78. - - Tientsin, 7, 87, 88. - - Tipping, prohibition against, 36; - “cumshaw,” 36. - - Trans-Siberian Railway, 97. - - Trohan, Walter, 23, 25. - - Trotsky, 2. - - Truce teams, 16. - - Truman, President, 7, 10, 15, 19, 22, 108, 111. - - - U - - United States, 7, 8, 16, 117. - - Urals, 96, 97. - - - V - - Vogeler, Robert A., 91; - (See _also_ Drugs, use of; Hypnotism, use of). - - V-J Day, 95, 97. - - _Voice of America_, 118. - - - W - - Wallace, Henry, 131. - - Wedemeyer, Lieutenant General Albert C., 9, 24, 111, 114, 118, 142. - - Wei Tao-ming, Madame, 68, 69. - - Wesleyan College, 65. - - Wife swapping, 125. - - Worton, Major General William Arthur, 7, 8. - - - Y - - Yalta, 10, 12, 13, 22. - - Yangtse River, 60, 105. - - “Yassa,” 1, 78. - - Yeaton, Colonel Ivan D., 31. - - Yenan, 12, 15, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 48, 57, 64; - International Hospital in, 30; - Market place in, 35; - “Prisoner of War School,” 32. - - Yenching University, 24, 56, 57. - - - Z - - Zukov, 62. - - - - -About the Author... - - -Mary Lamar Knight, famed foreign correspondent and lecturer, -graduated into the ranks of foreign correspondents while she was on -a two-month “tour” of Europe in 1930. The tour lasted for five full -years with only brief vacations and assignments at home. At that -time Miss Knight was the only woman employed on a full-time basis in -the Paris Bureau of the United Press Associations. In this capacity -she covered the European continent as a feature writer in the varied -fields of women’s fashions, crime and politics. - -She reported on the outstanding fashions of the Parisian designers -as they paraded their creations into pages of history; she was the -first woman since the days of the French Revolution to witness the -guillotining of a famous convict in Paris; she interviewed royalty -of many nationalities; and, most important of all, she saw and -studied the beginnings of World War II: the propaganda build-up, the -international deceit and intrigue, the in-human characters of the men -who promoted the war and prepared the nations of Europe for their own -destruction. - -During her varied career, Miss Knight, who is the daughter of the -late Dr. Lucian Lamar and Edith Nelson Knight, of Atlanta, Georgia, -has worked as a nurse at Bellevue Hospital, New York, to report on -a bitter campaign to regulate working conditions for doctors and -nurses; she was assigned to the New York Women’s House of Detention -to pose as a prostitute, going to jail with Lucky Luciano’s “girls” -and latter covered his vice trial in the courtroom; at one time she -was assigned the role of a taxi-dance girl, and at another time to -join the chorus line of the world-famous “Rockettes” at the lavish -Music Hall theater; she was the first woman reporter allowed to -invade the training camps of Joe Louis and Max Schmeling prior to -their title fight which she covered at ringside. In 1935, the author -embarked for China on a Norwegian freighter. - -Remaining in China for two years she travelled to most of the -principal cities in China, Korea and Manchuria. At the borders of -Mongolia she witnessed the beginnings of her RED BLIGHT of today. -The Communists were then in the process of developing the tactics, -the brutality, the deceit and the methods which they have so far so -successfully employed against their homeland and the neighboring -countries of Tibet and Korea. In China, 1935-36, Mary Lamar Knight -had a 15-year advance in preview of the tragic days that are now -immediately ahead for all civilized nations. She returned to China -again in 1946, independently covering the Pauley and the Marshall -Missions. She met and became personally acquainted with most of the -men who dominate today’s great human conflict—Marshall, Wedemeyer, -Ambassador Hurley, Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang, Chou En-lai -and many others. Herein she was able to objectively view the entire -American-Chinese crisis, make a personal analysis of the appalling -international situation and draw the conclusions which she presents -in RED BLIGHT. - -In recent months Miss Knight has spent her time in bringing this -vitally enlightening book up-to-the-minute and appearing before many -outstanding political, civic and patriotic clubs and organizations as -a featured speaker on Communism and its avowed principles of ruling -or ruining the earth. - -Among Miss Knight’s published works are: _On My Own_, an -autobiography, (MacMillan, 1938); _Spies versus Censors_ (Reader’s -Digest, May, 1946) and _Red Realm in China_ (Reader’s Digest, -February, 1947). The author was the only woman contributor to _We -Cover the World_, the first symposium of foreign correspondents -(Prentice-Hall). - -The author is available for personal appearances and speaking -engagements. (Fees are variable.) - - - - -A Note on KOREA ... - -_By Mary Lamar Knight_ - - -Books already have been written about the Korean situation. Although -it is one spoke in the great Asiatic wheel, Korea is very important, -but China still remains in the hub of the wheel. One of the greatest -tragedies of this whole chain of events is that General Douglas -MacArthur had the difficult—the impossible—task of trying to rescue -the Korean chestnut from the fire—a fire which might not have ignited -had his counsel and advice, along with that of Lieutenant General -Albert C. Wedemeyer and others, been heeded in the first place. - -The Communist-inspired invasion of South Korea by the North Korean -Communists was a trial balloon let loose by the Soviet and Chinese -Communists to determine how far the United States and the United -Nations would go before buying an all-out Asiatic war. It was a trick -from the start, to draw U. S. and UN forces foremost into the area -from which the U. S. had withdrawn in 1949. Once committed, and once -having dispatched American—and a trickle of UN soldiers into South -Korea, the chances were that they could be kept there indefinitely. -We were permitted, early in the conflict, to cross the arbitrary 38th -parallel, and to proceed at great difficulty and even greater loss -of life, to the borders of Manchuria. Then, in typical Communist -fashion, they struck back in the evening, almost, of our declaration -of all but total victory. One need only to glance at a map of Korea -to realize that the Communists, Soviet and Chinese, are in a position -to pour millions of men into North Korea, dressed as Koreans or -otherwise, at their will. How could we hope to do anything of a -permanent nature in unifying Korea against the Communists? The Korean -patriot Kim Koo, shortly before his assassination and replying to a -question put to him by Representative Walter Judd said: “It doesn’t -make any difference what you (the U. S.) do now. There just isn’t -any way to get Korea so that she can be independent and secure and -self-sustaining, until you solve the Communist problem across the -border in Manchuria.” We solved that problem by giving that prize to -the Soviets. It was Russia’s price for entering the war, the last six -days of it, as an ally, even though it was rather generally known -that Japan was ready to surrender. - -For every life that may have been spared by the signing of the -questionable Yalta agreement, thousands of American and Korean GI’s, -and Korean civilians are now dead, dying and maimed. This little -Florida-shaped country of Korea, cut up by outsiders, is a tragic -example of failure to think beyond military objectives. We cannot -defend Korea from Russian attack without an all-out war. We can only -prolong the agony. If it was right for us to leave Korea in 1949, can -we, honestly, justify our re-entry there in 1950—at the price we have -paid? - -There yet remain other fates to be decided—Formosa, the Philippines -and numerous islands of the Pacific, whether we occupy them or not. -Have we not already proven that, “It is fantastic to imagine that we -can convert our enemies into our friends by treating our friends as -if they were our enemies”? - -But to understand the overall picture, one must begin with a -knowledge of the background that has made China and the United States -the estranged bed-fellow nations which they have become. The historic -removal of Douglas MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far -East, by President Truman at 1 a. m. on April 11, 1951, will have -far-reaching effects. Due to this move, disaster looms before us -larger than ever, especially for the United States and Great Britain. -Nearly a month before the news of the impending MacArthur dismissal -by the President “leaked” to the American press, headlines had -appeared in Danish newspapers saying: “British Say ‘MacArthur Must -go’.” - -The average reader, in all probability, sees only a difference of -opinion in the policies of the political and military leadership on -the conduct of World War III, but the facts go deeper than this. -There appears to be a determination on the part of those who are -playing international politics, to obtain and control world power. -MacArthur, definitely, was the greatest single stumbling block in -their path. To be in a position, militarily, to bomb enemy supply -sources, and yet forbidden, by political directives from Washington, -to do this, put greater handicaps on MacArthur than he was willing -to take. With the MacArthur removal, Truman will bend every effort -toward silencing all who remain opposed to his Acheson-approved -manifesto. - -On April 1, 1951, correspondent Kenneth de Courcy (_Intelligence -Digest_—A Review of World Affairs) cabled from London: - - “There is no longer even a definite objective in the Korean war. - Each nation or organization concerned in it seems to have a - different objective; while each high commander seems to have a - private idea of what would represent success or victory. If the - powers that be cannot agree even in Korea, it is hardly surprising - that they cannot devise an agreed strategy for the entire world. - Mr. Truman, who is becoming very tired, seems determined to await - decisive trends of public opinion. His private views and conclusions - are not likely to be pressed unless he is convinced that public - opinion is more than ready for them. In fact, American public - opinion is far ahead of its leadership. Mr. Truman however, has not - yet been convinced of this.... - - “The Kremlin reckons on a steadily progressive weakening of the - Atlantic group of powers. Meanwhile, it is intended to increase the - flow of warlike supplies and indirect help to Asiatic Communist - forces, rather than to the European satellites. Major developments - are timed to take place in Asia before the end of this year, which - by the middle of 1952, will give the USSR access to certain valuable - and essential raw materials which now have to be purchased from - outside the Soviet system.... The Kremlin thinks war with the West - will become inevitable ... but hopes to be able to postpone this war - until Burma and India have been brought within the Soviet sphere of - influence.” - -To follow the MacArthur program has been called a “colossal gamble,” -but what greater gamble can there be than sitting back and waiting -for the enemy to come and destroy us? Was England able to stop -Hitler by appeasement? Nor will the present British Labor Government -be able to silence the Chinese Communists by promising them Formosa -and a hand in the Japanese peace treaty if, indeed, the Japanese -accept such a treaty. - -Those who still believe that a “deal” can be made with Stalin or -Communists anywhere, just do not know the history of Communism or of -Communism’s forbears. MacArthur’s removal from the scene at this time -is cause for jubilation among the radically inclined the world over, -for this particular American hero was Stalin’s Enemy Number One. - -Another great boon to the Chinese and Korean Reds is that Truman -has virtually promised them that their Manchurian bases will not be -bombed by us, unless of course, they step out of line and bomb us -first. Thus, they can continue to kill and maim our boys without fear -of too much retaliation on our part. We won two great victories on -the battlefields of World Wars I and II, but we lost them both at -conference tables. Political double-talk always gives the enemy a far -greater victory than could be won on the battlefield. - -The political moves made by the powers that be in Washington serve -only to cancel out our military victories. On November 16, 1950, -when Russia vetoed the Security Council’s resolution demanding -that China clear out of Korea, she put the blame for the Korean -war squarely in her own lap. But as long as Stalin and the Kremlin -remain within the United Nations, this international body politic -will remain hamstrung, for it will be used as an instrument to give -aid and comfort to Communists everywhere in achieving military -aggression against the Western Hemisphere. For Russia, as a member -of the United Nations, with veto power, has sent no troops to Korea -to fight the aggression. But why should she be exempt when others -are not? A United Nations operating in opposite directions cannot be -very united. With one side of the UN fighting aggression and another -faction pushing it, defeat can be the only outcome. When the Korean -war first burst into actual flame, and we discovered that Russia was -openly, as well as secretly, supporting the North Koreans, why did -we not then expel her from the UN and declare her an enemy of the -peace? Had we had the courage to do so, the story would be different -today. Now, with our hands tied behind our backs, we wait for the -enemy to make the next move in the most tragic game of chess ever -played with flesh and blood pawns. - -It is difficult to understand why General MacArthur was prevented -from arming some 400,000 unarmed South Koreans. On April 6, 1951, he -stated that political decisions beyond his authority prevented him -from doing this, but why were they deprived of fighting for their -own land? And why were American fathers and sons to be butchered -in battle to free those who would gladly fight for themselves, but -for political interference? No short term good ever derived from a -long term evil, nor can any amount of political expediency replace -military emergency. - -Terrible sabotage in this country is not unlikely. On April 7, 1951, -J. Edgar Hoover stood before the Senate Committee and said: “A hard -core of Communists trained in sabotage is ready to strike at vital -industries ...” and he added that this would be one of the most -effective weapons that Stalin could use against the United States. - -Despite denials from the White House and State Department, we know -that Russia has a solid network of spies and undercover agents -operating in every department of our national life, operating to -destroy us from within, circumventing the need for any long-range -attack. - -To those who stubbornly maintain that the blood of more than sixty -thousand American boys killed or wounded in Korea, in addition to an -almost equal number of what are called non-battle casualties, still -constitutes merely a “police action,” I say in all reverence, may God -forgive you. We are at war now. No amount of waiting or appeasement -will put off World War III. We are in it up to our necks. - - - - -Your First Step.... - - -“The journey of a thousand miles begins with just one step ...” says -a Chinese proverb. - -Millions of Americans today know that we have to take that “one step” -individually, if order is to be restored to the national house in -which we live. - -You have read in this volume of the many wrong steps in the wrong -direction that have been taken by our national planners. These have -resulted in the human turmoil, the domestic unrest, and in undeclared -war against Communism. Our battlefield casualties have already passed -the seventy thousand mark. - -Every American must act NOW to preserve our Constitutional Way of -Life. But before concerted political action can be taken the facts -must be known. RED BLIGHT tells these facts! - -Now _you_ can take _your_ first step in the right direction by -helping to disseminate the truth about the RED BLIGHT that is -engulfing the earth. 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State................... - - - - - Transcriber’s Notes - - pg 10 Changed at no time had be to: he - pg 13 Changed spelling of Moa Tse-tung to: Mao - pg 15 Changed swayed to its ryhthmic to: rhythmic - pg 22 Changed methods of Genghis Kahn to: Khan - pg 23 Changed that these are dissillusioning to: disillusioning - pg 25 Changed Eighth Regiment at Fort Screvan to: Screven - pg 26 Added quote after: finest regiments in the Army. - pg 27 Changed May God forebid to: forbid - pg 31 Changed this last shipemnt to: shipment - pg 32 Changed proved to be a diobolical to: diabolical - pg 46 Changed Moa’s childhood was to: Mao’s - pg 50 Changed devotion to Confuscius to: Confucius - pg 52 Changed fire of vitrolic to: vitriolic - pg 56 Replaced comma with period at: foreign dignitaries with ease - pg 56 Changed did such a consumate to: consummate - pg 58 Changed more violent and vitrolic to: vitriolic - pg 58 Added double quote to end of sentence: return to China - from Europe? - pg 66 Changed publicity she so abhored to: abhorred - pg 67 Changed capitalization of world Anti-Imperialist to: World - pg 67 Changed capitalization of a cable to the anti-Imperialist - to: Anti - pg 67 Changed mind and persuasive personalitly to: personality - pg 72 Changed horsemen in the earily to: early - pg 73 Changed dirty and disheaveled to: disheveled - pg 86 Changed effort is wasted on superflous to: superfluous - pg 91 Changed warrant a demontration to: demonstration - pg 105 Changed capitalization of it had become obvious to: It - pg 135 Changed established in this county to: country - pg 138 Changed humiliation and degredation to: degradation - pg 141 Changed economically and phychologically to: psychologically - pg 142 Changed use our almost unprecendented to: unprecedented - pg 146 Changed dispatch datelined Teheran to: Tehran - pg 152 Changed Russian reentry to: re-entry - pg 153 Changed facilitate China’s post-war to: postwar - pg 154 Added comma after: Korea, the political - pg 155 Changed bound ideolologically to: ideologically - pg 163 Changed developments as portentious to: portentous - pg 164 Changed program of assistant to: assistance - pg 164 Changed eight years of war. to: war, - pg 166 Changed to preserve Korea to: Korea’s - pg 167 Removed comma from: first meeting March 8, 1946 - pg 169 Changed continue as long is to: as - pg 169 Changed In the over-all administration to: overall - pg 174 Added space between words eastern and half - pg 177 Changed land for rise to: rice - pg 177 Changed chaotic hyperinflation to: hyper-inflation - pg 178 Removed period after: 1915-19 to 2.0 - pg 178 Changed diet until indigeous to: indigenous - pg 179 Changed over 300 gram to: grams - pg 179 Changed salt an sugar to: and - pg 180 Changed long-staple Egyption to: Egyptian - pg 181 Changed in the time alloted to: allotted - pg 182 Removed duplicate word and their own own country - pg 184 Changed Army in its over-all to: overall - pg 186 Changed expansion of miltaristic to: militaristic - pg 189 Changed Charles Schribner’s to: Scribner’s - pg 191 Changed Education, Irrington-on Hudson to: Irvington - pg 193 Changed spelling of Aristole to Aristotle and changed page - number from 143 to 144 - pg 193 Changed spelling of Centrol People’s Government to: Central - pg 193 Changed spelling of Crinese New Year to: Chinese - pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: Drugs, use of, 90, 91 - pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: - Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106 - pg 194 Fixed page references under Hypnotism - pg 194 Replaced semi-colon with period after: International News - Service - pg 195 Changed spelling under Mindszenty of Hynotism to: Hypnotism - pg 196 Changed Sun Yet-sen to: Yat-sen - pg 196 Changed spelling of: Hynotism under Vogeler to: Hypnotism - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RED BLIGHT *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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