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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bc9cb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #69585 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/69585) diff --git a/old/69585-0.txt b/old/69585-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 3613f69..0000000 --- a/old/69585-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7291 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Napoleon and his court, by C. S. -Forester - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Napoleon and his court - -Author: C. S. Forester - -Release Date: December 20, 2022 [eBook #69585] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Al Haines, Cindy Beyer & the online Distributed - Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAPOLEON AND HIS COURT *** - - - - - - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - NAPOLEON AND HIS COURT - - - - - BY THE SAME AUTHOR - - A PAWN AMONG KINGS - - - - -[Illustration: EQUESTRIAN GROUP OF NAPOLEON AND HIS STAFF AT AUSTERLITZ - (_From a print in Canon Brook-Jackson’s collection, believed to be - the only one in existence._)] - - - - - NAPOLEON AND - HIS COURT - - - - BY - C. S. FORESTER - - WITH SIXTEEN ILLUSTRATIONS - - METHUEN & CO. LTD. - 36 E S S E X S T R E E T, W.C. - L O N D O N - - - - - _First Published in 1924_ - - PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN - - - - - CONTENTS - CHAP. PAGE - I. IN GENERAL....................................... 9 - II. THE MAN HIMSELF.................................. 17 - III. SOME PALADINS.................................... 25 - IV. ONE WIFE......................................... 35 - V. THE DIVORCE...................................... 42 - VI. ANOTHER WIFE..................................... 47 - VII. SOME COURT DETAILS............................... 55 - VIII. THE GREATEST PALADIN............................. 67 - IX. MORE PALADINS.................................... 80 - X. BROTHERS......................................... 95 - XI. SISTERS.......................................... 114 - XII. STARS OF LESSER MAGNITUDE........................ 133 - XIII. WOMEN............................................ 151 - XIV. LIKES AND DISLIKES............................... 174 - XV. WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN............................. 184 - XVI. SPOTS IN THE SUN................................. 202 - XVII. ST. HELENA....................................... 223 - APPENDIX—INCIDENTS AND AUTHORITIES............... 237 - INDEX............................................ 245 - - - - - LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - _Page_ - EQUESTRIAN GROUP OF NAPOLEON AND HIS STAFF AT - AUSTERLITZ.......................................... front - GENERAL BONAPARTE..................................... 16 - PRINCE JOACHIM (MURAT, KING OF THE TWO SICILIES)...... 34 - MARIE LOUISE, EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH................... 54 - GRAF VON NEIPPERG..................................... 66 - EUGÈNE DE BEAUHARNAIS (VICEROY OF ITALY, PRINCE DE - VENISE)............................................. 79 - AUGEREAU, DUC DE CASTIGLIONE.......................... 94 - JOSEPH NAPOLEON, KING OF NAPLES....................... 113 - CAROLINE MURAT........................................ 132 - LETIZIA BONAPARTE (MADAME MÈRE)....................... 151 - ELISE BACIOCCHI....................................... 151 - THE KING OF ROME...................................... 173 - PAULINE BORGHESE...................................... 183 - DAVOUT (PRINCE D’ECKMÜHL AND DUC D’AUERSTÄDT)......... 201 - MASSENA (PRINCE D’ESSLING AND DUC DE RIVOLI).......... 222 - LOUIS NAPOLEON, KING OF HOLLAND....................... 236 - - NOTE.—_The illustrations are reproduced from prints in the - collection of Canon Brook-Jackson, by kind permission._ - - Napoleon and His Court - - - - - CHAPTER I - IN GENERAL - - -THERE was a time when France extended to the Baltic, the Ebro and the -Tiber; when the term “Frenchmen” included Frenchmen, Spaniards, -Italians, Belgians, Dutch, Germans and even a few stray Danes, Poles and -Letts; when Rome was the second city of France, and Amsterdam the third; -when the Emperor of the French was also King of Italy and Mediator of -Switzerland; when one of his brothers was King of Spain, another, King -of Westphalia, and one of his generals King of Naples; when all Germany -was ruled by his vassals; when Poland was a French province in all but -name; when Austria was the French Emperor’s subservient ally; and when -one of his less successful generals had just been appointed ruler of -Sweden. - -Never, since the days of the Roman Empire, had one man held so much -power, and never in all history has so much power been as rapidly -acquired or as rapidly lost. In ten years Napoleon rose from the -obscurity of a disgraced artillery officer to the dignity of the most -powerful ruler in the world; in ten more he was a despised fugitive -flying for his life from his enemies. - -It is difficult for us nowadays to visualize such a state of affairs. To -the people of that time life must have appeared like a wild nightmare, -as impossibly logical as a lunatic’s dream. There seems to have been no -doubt anywhere that the frantic hypertrophy could not last, and yet when -the end was clearly at hand hardly a soul perceived its approach. - -There was only one nation of Europe which escaped the mesmerism of the -man in the grey coat, and that was the British. It was only in Britain -that they did not speak of him with bated breath as “the Emperor,” and -remained undaunted by his monstrous power and ruthless energy. To the -English he was not His Imperial and Royal Majesty, Napoleon, Emperor of -the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, -and Mediator of the Helvetian Republic. No, the English thought of him -merely as Boney, a fantastic figment of the imagination of the other -peoples of the world, who were of course a queer lot with unaccountable -fears and superstitions. - -But this Boney, this Corsican Ogre, incredible though he was, loomed -appallingly large upon the horizon. There were beacons all round the -coast in case he landed; his privateers were the scourge of shipping; -prices were at famine point and business was parlous on account of his -activities; the militia was embodied and there was a ceaseless drain of -recruits into the army; every village mourned the loss of a son who had -enlisted and whose life had been thrown away in some harebrained -expedition into ill-defined foreign parts. And yet on the other hand -there were considerations which gave an aspect of unreality to the whole -menace. England was constantly victorious at sea, and though Nelson -might be mourned the glory of Trafalgar and the Nile cast the -possibility of invasion into insignificance. The English people were -confident that on land as well they would beat the French at every -encounter. Not for nothing were Agincourt and Minden blazoned on English -history, and Alexandria and Maida supplied whatever confirmation might -be desired. Such disasters as that at Buenos Ayres were forgotten; -confidence ran high. When Wellington gained a victory by which all -Portugal was cleared of the French at one blow the public annoyance that -even greater results had not been achieved, that the whole French army -had not been captured, was extreme. There were few English people who -did not think that, should Napoleon by some freak of fortune land in -England, the veterans of Austerlitz and the almost legendary Imperial -Guard would be routed by the militia and the hasty levies of the -countryside. There was nothing which could drive the realities of war -hard home into the public mind. If prices were high, then as -compensation colonies fell into our hands, employment was fairly good, -and the business of manufacturing arms and equipment was simply booming. -Besides, intercourse with the Continent was not entirely cut off for the -smugglers worked busily and successfully, and French lace and French -fashions and French brandy circulated freely. It was hard for the -average Englishman to realize that the Corsican Ogre was not merely an -ogre, especially as the fantastic cartoons of the period and the wild -legends which were current were more fitted to grace a child’s -fairy-tale than to depict the most formidable enemy England had yet -encountered. - -On the mainland of Europe the picture was utterly reversed. The reality -of war was only too obvious. The Emperor was no mere cartoonist’s figure -drawn with disgusting detail. They had seen him; he had ridden into -their capitals on his white horse in the midst of the army which had -shattered their proud battalions over and over again. His power was -terrible and his vengeance was swift. In half the countries of Europe a -chance word might result in the careless speaker being flung next day -into an unknown dungeon. His armies swarmed everywhere, and wherever -they went they left a trail of desolation behind them. The peasants were -starved and the landowners were ruined, to pay the enormous taxes which -the indemnities he imposed demanded. The mass of the people, who had -once hailed the great conqueror because his arrival meant their delivery -from feudalism, now found themselves crushed under a despotism ten times -more exacting. The Emperor was very real to them. Many of them now -served new rulers who had been imposed upon them by him, and him alone. -Wherever he appeared he was attended by a train of subject kings to whom -his wish was law. At his word an Italian might find himself a Frenchman, -or an Austrian a Bavarian. And this was no mere distinction without a -difference. Once upon a time the peasant classes cared little about the -politics of their rulers, or even about which ruler they served. The -fate of a professional army was a royal, not a national concern. But now -every able-bodied man found himself in the ranks. Badeners fought -Portuguese on the question as to whether a Frenchman should rule Spain, -and a hundred thousand Germans perished in the northern snows because -the Emperor of the French wished to exclude English goods from Russian -ports. The imposition was monstrous, and in consequence the question of -nationality became of supreme importance. If a country made war upon -Napoleon every citizen of that country now realized that defeat meant -the continuance of a slavery as exasperating as it was degrading. The -fact that their eventual victory left them very little freer does not -enter into this argument. It is sufficient to say that Napoleon was -regarded on the Continent with an interest agonizing in its intensity, -and that this interest was nourished in a much more substantial fashion -than prevailed in England. - -It has been maintained and has infected all nationalities alike. The -ability of the French nation to write telling memoirs is nowhere better -displayed than in the period of the Empire. A large amount of very -fascinating material was produced, by which the history of the period, -which had previously been grossly distorted, was corrected and balanced. -Details were worked out with an elaboration all too rare. The events in -themselves were so exceedingly interesting, and the books about them -were so well written, that it can hardly be considered surprising that -more and more attention was turned towards the Empire. In addition, the -fascinating personality of the Emperor concentrated and specialized the -attention. More important than all, since events of huge importance -turned merely upon his own whims and predilections, it was necessary to -analyse and to examine the nature of the man who had this vast -responsibility. It has become fashionable to inquire into every detail -of his life, and there has grown up an enormous literature about him. -Most of these books contain a fair amount of truth, but they nearly all -contain a high proportion of lies. Napoleon himself was a good liar, but -by now he is much more lied about than lying. - -That coffee legend, for instance. Nine books on Napoleon out of ten say -(with no more regard for physiology than for fact) that he was -accustomed to drinking ten, twenty, even thirty cups of coffee a day. -Napoleon drinking coffee is as familiar a figure to us as Sherlock -Holmes injecting morphine, but both figures are equally apocryphal. The -best authorities, people who really knew, are unanimous in saying that -he never drank more than three cups a day. De Bausset, who was a Prefect -of the Palace, and in charge of such arrangements, distinctly says he -took only two, and goes out of his way to deny the rumours to the -contrary which were already circulating. This is but one example out of -many; perhaps we shall meet with others later on. - -It is necessary first to sketch Napoleon’s career in brief, for the sake -of later reference. The merest outline will suffice. - -Napoleon began his military life under the old régime as an officer in -the artillery; despite an inauspicious start, he attracted attention by -his conduct at the siege of Toulon. Later he was nearly involved in the -fall of Robespierre, but, extricating himself, he served with credit in -the Riviera campaign of 1794. Next, he earned all the gratitude of which -Barras was capable by crushing the revolt of the Sections against the -Directory in 1795. By some means (it is certain that Josephine his wife -had something to do with it) he obtained the command of the army of -Italy; in 1796 and 1797 he crushed the Austrians and Piedmontese, -conquered Piedmont and Lombardy, and made himself a name as the greatest -living general. There followed the expedition to Egypt, where his -successes (extolled as only he knew how) stood out in sharp contrast to -the failures of the other French armies in Italy and Germany. Returning -at the psychological moment, he seized the supreme power, and made -himself First Consul. Masséna had already almost saved France by his -victory at Zürich and his defence of Genoa, and Napoleon continued the -work by a spectacular passage of the Alps and a perilously narrow -victory at Marengo. Moreau settled the business by the battle of -Hohenlinden. During the interval of peace which followed, Napoleon -strengthened himself in every possible way. He codified the legal -system, built up the Grand Army which later astonished the world, -disposed of Moreau and various other possible rivals, assured the French -people of his political wholeheartedness by shooting the Duc d’Enghien -and by sending republicans wholesale to Cayenne; and finally grasped as -much as possible of the shadow as well as the substance of royalty by -proclaiming himself Emperor and receiving the Papal blessing at his -coronation. But already he was at war again with England, and the -following year (1805) Russia and Austria declared against him. He hurled -the Grand Army across Europe with a sure aim. Mack surrendered at Ulm; -out of seventy thousand men only a few escaped. At Austerlitz the -Russian army was smitten into fragments. Austria submitted, and Napoleon -triumphantly tore Tyrol and Venetia from her, gave crowns to his vassal -rulers of Bavaria and Würtemberg, and proclaimed himself overlord of -Germany as Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. His brother -Louis he made King of Holland; his brother Joseph King of Naples; his -brother-in-law Murat Grand Duke of Berg. Prussia demurred, and was -crushed almost out of existence at Jena. Russia, tardily moving to her -support, was, after a hard fight at Eylau, beaten at Friedland (1807). -At Tilsit the Emperors of the French and of Russia settled the fate of -Continental Europe, and Jerome, the youngest brother of Napoleon, was -given a new kingdom, Westphalia. - -So far, nothing but glory and progress; but from now on, nothing but -false steps and failure. First, the overrunning of Spain and the -proclamation of Joseph as King of Spain. This brought Napoleon into -contact with the enmity of a people instead of that merely of a king. It -gave England a chance of effective military intervention, and it shook -the world’s belief in the invulnerability of the Colossus by the defeats -of Vimiero and Baylen. Austria made another effort for freedom in 1809, -to submit tamely, after one victory and two defeats, when the game was -by no means entirely lost. Hence followed further annexations and -maltreatment. Then came blunder after blunder, while the Empire sagged -through its sheer dead weight. The divorce of Josephine lost him the -sympathy of the fervent Catholics and of the sentimentalists. The -marriage with Marie Louise lost him the support of the republicans and -of Russia. He quarrelled with his brother Louis, drove him from the -country and annexed Holland. He tried to direct the Spanish war from -Paris, with bad results. Annexation followed annexation in his attempt -to shut the coasts to English trade. The Empire was gorged and -surfeited, but Napoleon was inevitably forced to further action. Having -irritated each other past bearing, he and Alexander of Russia drifted -into war, and the snows of Russia swallowed up what few fragments of the -old Grand Army had been spared from the Spanish and Danube campaigns. It -was like a blow delivered by a dazed boxer—powerful, but ill-directed -and easily avoided, so that the striker overbalances by his own -momentum. Napoleon struggled once more to his feet. In 1813 he summoned -to the eagles every Frenchman capable of bearing arms. But one by one -his friends turned against him. Prussia, Austria, Saxony, Bavaria, each -in turn joined the ranks of his enemies. His victories of Lützen, -Bautzen and Dresden were of no avail. At Leipzig his army was shattered; -he fought on desperately for a few more months, but at last he had to -submit and abdicate. - -A further effort after his escape from Elba ended with the disaster of -Waterloo, and merely led to the last tragedy of St. Helena. - -So much for the general. From this we can turn with relief to the -particular; and from the particular, with perhaps even more relief, to -the merely trivial. - -[Illustration: GENERAL BONAPARTE] - - - - - CHAPTER II - THE MAN HIMSELF - - -OF course, we all know him. He was rather short and corpulent, and he -wore a cocked hat, a green coat with red facings, and white breeches. -Sometimes, when the mood took him, he would appear in trailing robes, -with a wreath of laurel round his forehead. Very appropriate, -admittedly, but—that wreath does appear a little incongruous, does it -not? Then there are times when we see him on a white horse in the midst -of the battle. One or two dead men are lying near him in graceful -attitudes; one or two others are engaged in dying still more gracefully. -His staff is round him; in the distance are long lines of infantry and -volumes of cannon-smoke. But everything is so orderly and respectable -that one cannot help thinking that even in that discreet, dim distance -the dying are as careful about their manner as was Cæsar at the foot of -Pompey’s statue. Verestchagin and others strike a different note, but -they never saw Napoleon alive. We have portraits and pictures -innumerable, but are we any nearer to the man himself—to what was -inside the green coat and the cocked hat? - -It is the same when we come to read the mountains of memoirs which have -been written around him. There are solemn memoirs, there are indiscreet -memoirs. There are abusive memoirs, there are flattering memoirs. There -are memoirs, written in all honesty, during the reading of which one -cannot help feeling that the writer would really like to begin personal -pronouns referring to Him with a capital letter. And yet, after -months—years, perhaps—of reading, one still feels that one knows -nothing of him. One realizes, naturally, that he was a marvellously -clever man, with a marvellous sense of his own cleverness. But of the -man himself, of his little intimate desires and feelings, one remains -ignorant. A century of memoir-reading will not do as much for us as -would, say, a week’s sojourn alone with him on a desert island. What -adds point to the argument is that obviously the writer of the most -intimate memoirs was just as far from him as we are. - -The fact of the matter is that Napoleon in all his life never had a -friend. From his adolescence to his death there was nobody to whom he -could speak unguardedly. It was not so much that he posed, as that he -had himself well in hand on all occasions. He could unbend; he could -pinch a grognard’s ear or crack jokes with his Guard; he could write -passionate letters to Josephine or supplicatory ones to Walewska; but we -realize that each of these displays is merely a flash from some new -facet of the gem. To the design of the whole, to the light which glowed -within secretly, we are perforce blind. - -His tastes in art, which would be a valuable indication to his -character, are variously rated by contemporaries. One thing is certain, -and that is that art did not flourish under the Empire. A heavily -censored press acts as a drag upon the wheel of progress in this, as in -all other matters, but one cannot help thinking that this cessation of -development is due as much to Napoleon’s lack of interest in the -subject. David’s hard classicism and Isabey’s futilities are the best -that the Empire can show in painting, while in sculpture (save perhaps -for Houdon), in poetry, in romance, in criticism, not one names -survives, with the slight exception of Madame de Staël. There is no -French contemporary with Körner who could bear a moment’s comparison; -there is not even any single achievement, like Rouget de l’Isle’s of the -previous decade, to which France can point with pride. Napoleon’s own -favourite works in literature make a rather curious list; tragedy was -the only kind of dramatic literature which he favoured, although tragedy -is the weakest part of the French drama, and in tragedy he ranked -Corneille far above all others; Ossian’s poems, despite translation into -French, had a great attraction for him, perhaps because the exalted -wording appealed to him in his moments of fantastic planning; Goethe, -the greatest living poet, held no fascination for him; but Rousseau did. -Indeed Rousseau’s influence is clearly visible in many of Napoleon’s own -writings. Beyond this, there is almost nothing modern which received the -seal of his approval. The classics he read in translation, and solely -for the sake of their matter. Music was not specially liked by him; he -tolerated it because it roused in him the same sensations as did -Ossian’s verse—it was a drug, a stimulant to him, but not a staple -necessary. In painting he showed no special taste; the honours he gave -David clearly indicate that he held no theories of his own on the -subject. This list of likes and dislikes is non-committal; it can tell -us little about Napoleon himself; and we are once more brought to an -abrupt halt in our endeavour to discover what manner of man he really -was. - -Yet we can approach the question indirectly. Napoleon had no friend; -there was never a time when he was taken off his guard. His soldiers -loved him—stay! It was not love, it was adoration. That is the key to -the mystery. It was not the love of one man for another; it was the -worship of a God. But just as no man can be a hero to his own valet, so -can no general be a God to his immediate subordinates. The rank and file -could think of Marengo, of Austerlitz, of Jena, but what of the -Marshals? At Marengo, France was on the verge of a frightful disaster. -The slightest touch would have turned the scale, and Napoleon, hemmed in -against the Alps, must have surrendered. What of France then, with a -triumphant army at her frontier and not another regiment at hand? In the -Austerlitz campaign it was nearly the same. Before Jena, Napoleon fell -into error after error. Not until the next day was he made aware that -only half the Prussian army had fought against him, and that he had -recklessly exposed a single corps to meet the attack of the other half -at Auerstädt. That Davout fought and won was Napoleon’s good fortune, -not the result of his skill. - -Looking back on fifteen years of unbroken success, the private soldiers -might well believe Napoleon to be a God, but the Marshals were near -enough to him to see the feet of clay. For them there was neither -adoration nor love. He was their taskmaster, and a jealous one at that, -lavish of reprimand and miserly of praise. He gave them wealth, titles, -kingdoms even, but he never risked rivalry with himself by giving any -one of them what they most desired—military power. The Peninsular War -dragged on largely because he did not dare to entrust the supreme -command of three hundred thousand men to a single general. With gold and -glory even misers like Masséna became eventually satiated, and one by -one they dropped away from his allegiance when the tide turned. It fell -to Marmont, the only one of all the Marshals who owed everything to the -Emperor, to surrender Paris to the Allies and complete his ruin. Not one -of the twenty-six paladins accompanied their master to Elba or St. -Helena; that was left to the junior officers such as Bertrand, Montholon -and Gourgaud, who had been near enough to him to adore, but too far off -to see faults. Yet even to these, life with their idol became at times -unbearable, and more than one of them deserted before the end. In men -Napoleon could not inspire the love that endures. - -As regards women, it is an unpleasant task to venture a definite -opinion. An aura of tradition has gradually developed around Josephine’s -memory, and she is frequently looked upon as a woman who sacrificed -herself for her love, and allowed herself to be divorced to aid her -husband. Yet her most indignant partisan would not deny that she had -much to lose beside her husband. The position of Queen of Queens; -unlimited jewels; an unstinted wardrobe (and she was passionately fond -of clothes); the prospect of the loss of all this might well have moved -a woman to more tears even than Josephine shed. And of her affection for -her husband one may be permitted to have suspicions. Her circumstances -before the marriage were at least doubtful, and afterwards—those nasty -rumours about Hippolyte Charles and others seem to have some foundation -in fact. - -Of Marie Louise mere mention is enough. When we come to discuss her -later life and her conduct with Neipperg we shall find clear proof that -she did not love Napoleon. The other women who came into his life are -pale shades compared even to these two. With none of them was he in -love, and none of them loved him, or came to share his exile. Madame -Walewska visited him for a few days at Elba, but that was merely to seek -further favours for herself and her son. After Waterloo she married; all -her predecessors had already done the same. Women did not love Napoleon. -We may picture Napoleon, then, going through life friendless and quite -alone. Never a moment’s relaxation from the stiffness of his mental -attitude of superiority; never the light of friendship in the eye of man -or woman; every single person in Europe was either his slave or his -enemy. To say the least, his was an isolated position. And yet, was he -unhappy? Bourrienne tells us that in the early Revolution days Napoleon -walked the streets, gaunt and passionate, with a lustful eye for rich -carriages, ornate houses, and all the outward emblems of power. The -phase ended as soon as power was his, and he passed easily into the -condition of isolation which endured for the rest of his life. He was -the Man of Destiny, the sole creature of his kind, and he was happy. His -isolation never troubled him in the least. If ever he referred to it, it -was in terms of satisfaction. He was guilty on more than one occasion of -saying that he was above all law, and it is well known that he believed -in his “star”; he believed that he was marked out by some inscrutable -higher power (the limitations of whose exact nature he never defined) to -achieve unbounded success and to wield a permanently unlimited power. It -is difficult to imagine such a condition. The most ordinary or most -modest man has usually an undying belief that his own ability transcends -all others, and that Providence regards him with a special interest, but -deeper still there is almost invariably a further feeling (often -ignored, but usually obvious at a crisis) that this simply cannot be so. -Even if this further feeling does not become apparent, a man’s sense of -humour usually comes to his rescue and saves him from the uttermost -absurdity. But Napoleon’s sense of humour was only feebly developed, and -in many directions was totally wanting. On the other hand, there were -certainly many reasons for his classification of himself as a different -being from ordinary men. He never turned his hand to anything without -achieving much greater success than his contemporaries. If a -codification of law was required, then Napoleon codified laws, without -one half of the difficulty previously experienced. He won battles over -every general whom the Continent pitted against him. If a province was -to be conquered, or, conquered, had to be reorganized, then Napoleon was -ready at a moment’s notice to dictate the methods of procedure—and he -was usually proved to be correct. For twelve years, from 1800 to 1812, -Napoleon did not know what it was to fail in any matter under his own -personal control, while during that period his successes were -unprecedented. Besides, there were more convenient standards of -comparison. He was able to work at a pace which wore out all his -subordinates, and he was able to continue working long after they had -been compelled to confess themselves beaten. In his capacity for mental -labour he stood not merely unequalled, but unapproached. Even physically -he was frequently able to display superiority; his staff over and over -again were unable to endure fatigues which he bore unmoved. Lastly, he -was usually able to bend to his will anyone with whom he came in -contact. The unruly generals of the Army of Italy in 1796 gave way to -him, when he was little more than a favoured upstart, with extraordinary -mildness. He induced conscientious men like Lefebvre to agree to the -most unscrupulous actions. Alexander of Russia, smarting under the -defeats of Austerlitz and Friedland, was won over in the course of a few -hours’ interview, and became Napoleon’s enthusiastic ally. - -There certainly was a great deal in favour of the theory that Napoleon -was a very remarkable man, but not even the greatest of men is justified -in believing that he is different from other men in kind as well as in -degree. The fact that Napoleon really did believe this is highly -significant. It hints at something being wanting in his mental -constitution, something similar to, but even more important than a sense -of humour. His shameless duplicity in both his public and his private -concerns points to the same end. His inability to gain the lasting -friendship of any of those with whom he came in contact is another link -in the chain of argument. His complete disbelief in the -disinterestedness of the motives of any single human being completes it. -Napoleon was one of the most brilliant thinkers the world has ever seen; -he was the most practical and strenuous in action; he enjoyed for twenty -years more good luck than anyone has ever deserved; but he had a -meanness of soul unsurpassed in recorded history. As a machine, he was -wellnigh perfect (until he began to wear out); as a man he was -deplorably wanting. - - - - - CHAPTER III - SOME PALADINS - - -IT was a common saying in the Napoleonic army that every man in the -ranks carried a Marshal’s bâton in his knapsack. This was correct in -theory, but in actual practice it hardly proved true. Every one of the -twenty-six Marshals of the First Empire had held important commands -before the rank was instituted. - -Grouchy, the last Marshal to be created, was second-in-command of the -Bantry Bay expedition in 1796, when Napoleon was just making his name; -Jourdan had commanded the Army of the North as far back as 1794. - -But if the title of Marshal was no more than their bare due, Napoleon -certainly gave his generals other honours in plenty. One of them, Murat, -he made a King; another, Bernadotte, after receiving the title of -Sovereign Prince of Ponte Corvo, later became King of Sweden and Norway. -Berthier was Sovereign Prince of Neufchâtel. Three other Marshals were -created Princes of the Empire; thirteen were created Dukes; six, Counts; -and the only one remaining, Poniatowski, was a Prince of Poland already. - -Besides titles, wealth without limit was showered upon them. Suchet -received half a million francs with his bâton; Davout in 1811 enjoyed an -income, all told, of two million francs a year along with the unofficial -dictatorship of Poland and the command of a hundred and fifty thousand -men. It was Napoleon’s habit to bestow upon his generals huge estates in -each country he conquered. Lefebvre received the domain of Johannisberg, -on the Rhine, which had once belonged to the Emperor of Austria and -later passed to the Metternich family, while Junot received a castle and -estate of the unlucky King of Prussia. Nearly every man of mark was -given five thousand acres or so in Poland, with the attached serfs. And -Napoleon was the Apostle of the Revolution! - -The one condition attached to the gifts was that the recipient must -spend as much as possible in the capital. So Parisian shopkeepers grew -fat and praised the Empire; the Paris mob battened on the crumbs which -fell from the tables, and a feverish gaiety impressed the onlooker. Out -in the subject countries was nothing but a grinding poverty, and in the -countries recently conquered by France the tax-collectors strove to -gather in enough to pay the indemnities, and even the rats starved -because the Grand Army had passed that way. - -It is when we come to examine the careers of the Marshals that we first -meet evidence of one of the most curious and significant facts of -Napoleon’s life. Everybody to whom Napoleon showed great favour; -everyone who received his confidence; everyone, in consequence, who had -appeared at one time to be on the direct road to unbounded prosperity, -met with a most tragic and unfortunate end. Not a few of the worst -set-backs which Napoleon experienced were due to the defects of those -whom he had trusted and aggrandized, and many of his favourites, -apparently too weak morally to endure the intoxication of success, -turned against him when fortune ceased to smile upon him. Their deaths -were tragic, and their lives were nearly all dishonourable. - -Of all the Marshals, Berthier was the foremost in seniority, in -precedence, and in favour. In every campaign which Napoleon fought, from -1796 to 1814, he held the position of Chief of Staff. The history of his -military career during this period needs no repetition—it is one with -Napoleon’s. Every conceivable honour was bestowed upon him. He was given -the sovereignty of the principality of Neufchâtel and Valangin; in 1809 -the additional title of Prince of Wagram; he was appointed a Senator, a -Minister, Vice-Constable of France and a Grand Dignitary of the Empire; -at Napoleon’s hands he received a bride of royal descent, in the person -of a Princess of Bavaria; in 1810 the supreme honour was his of -representing Napoleon at the preliminary ceremony of the marriage with -Marie Louise. It seemed that he was one with Napoleon, his faithful -shadow and devoted servant. And yet when Napoleon abdicated and was sent -to Elba, Berthier threw in his lot with the Bourbons, and swore -allegiance to them. Napoleon’s return and new accession to power during -the Hundred Days, in consequence placed him in a terrible position. He -was torn between his new allegiance and his old devotion to Napoleon. -The strain proved too severe. He died at Bamberg, just before Waterloo, -having flung himself from a high window in his despair. - -The second senior of the Marshals was Joachim Murat. Murat was fortunate -in two ways. He was able to handle large masses of cavalry with decision -on a battlefield, and he married the sister of the Emperor. There was -very little else to recommend him for distinction, but these two facts -were sufficient to raise him to a throne. Napoleon appointed him to the -command of the cavalry of the Grand Army. He made him a Prince and Grand -Admiral of France. Next came a sovereignty—the Grand Duchy of Berg and -Cleves, and two years later Murat mounted the throne which Joseph -Bonaparte had just vacated, and became King of the Two Sicilies. So far, -it was a highly satisfactory career for a man who had begun as the -assistant of his father, the inn and posting-house keeper of La Bastide. -Murat determined to keep his throne, and during the dark days of 1814 he -turned against Napoleon, and marched at the head of his Neapolitans -against the French. But retribution was swift. He lost his throne next -year in a premature attempt to unite Italy, and in the end he was shot -by the indignant Neapolitan Bourbons after the miserable failure of an -attempt on his part to recover his crown after the fashion set by -Napoleon in his descent from Elba. - -It is, perhaps, a pardonable digression to consider here what might have -happened had Murat retained his throne. It is certain that he would have -been as progressive as the Austrians and his own weak nature would have -allowed. It is possible that the United Italy party would have looked -towards his dynasty instead of to the House of Savoy. The growing -Napoleonic tradition would have aided. Perhaps to-day we might behold in -the south a King of Italy descended from a Gascon stable-boy, to balance -in the north a King of Sweden descended from a Gascon lawyer’s clerk. - -But to return to our former theme. So far we have seen two of Napoleon’s -favourites meet with violent deaths. There are many more instances. -Bessières was a nonentity distinguished by little except his devotion to -the Empire. He attracted Napoleon’s notice in 1796, and his doglike -faithfulness was a sure recommendation. Bessières became the Commander -of the Guard; later he was created Duke of Istria and was given immense -riches. Napoleon honoured him with all the friendship of which he was -capable; it seemed not unlikely that a throne would be found for him. -But Bessières died in agony after receiving a mortal wound at Lützen. - -Then there was Ney, the brave des braves. His personal courage was -almost his only title to fame. When Napoleon attained supreme power, Ney -was a divisional general of the Army of the Rhine. Under the Empire he -became Marshal, Duke of Elchingen and Prince of the Moskowa. It was Ney -who made Ulm possible by his victory at Elchingen; it was he whose -attack beat back the Russians at Friedland; to him is due much of the -credit for Borodino, while his command of the rearguard during the -retreat from Moscow is beyond praise. And yet he was many times in -error. At Jena and during the Eylau campaign his impetuosity was almost -disastrous. He made several grave mistakes during Masséna’s campaign in -Spain, 1810-1811. At Bautzen in 1813 he lost a great opportunity, and he -was beaten later at Dennewitz. It was his vigour and his dauntless -courage which recommended him to Napoleon, who made full use of these -qualities to stimulate the hero-worship of his young troops. Ney -received wealth, high command and a princely title at the Emperor’s -hands. Then he helped to force the Emperor to abdicate. However, he was -unstable; he betrayed his new king and went over to Napoleon during the -descent from Elba. Napoleon entrusted him with the task of staving off -the English during the Waterloo campaign, and he failed lamentably. He -lost a great opportunity at Quatre Bras through having allowed his -columns to lengthen out; he shilly-shallied all the morning of the 16th -of June; he ruined the campaign by his furious countermand to d’Erlon in -the afternoon; and finally at Waterloo he wasted the reserve cavalry by -his unsupported attacks on the English squares. And the Bourbons shot -him as soon as possible after the second Restoration. - -Lannes, “the Bayard of the French Army,” whom Napoleon had called “le -braves des braves” before he gave the title to Ney, met with as -miserable a fate. He had begun life as a dyer’s apprentice at Lectourne, -but enlisted at the opening of the Revolutionary wars, and was a colonel -on Napoleon’s staff during the first campaign of Italy. His fearless -acceptance of responsibility, and his magnificent dash and courage while -in action were his great assets, and Napoleon favoured him more than any -of the younger Marshals, except Murat. It was largely through him that -Napoleon found it possible to employ the strategic weapon which he -invented—the strategic advanced guard. Victories as widely divided as -Marengo and Friedland were directly due to Lannes, and he was -proportionately rewarded with a Marshalate, a Colonel-generalship, an -enormous fortune and the title of Duke of Montebello. But he was -mortally wounded at Aspern, and died of gangrene at Vienna. - -There was one Marshal whom Napoleon especially favoured who did not meet -with a violent death. Nevertheless his end was more terrible by far than -was Bessières’ or even Lannes’. This was Marmont, who in 1796 was a -young captain twenty-two years of age, but who gained Napoleon’s regard -to such good effect that he was Inspector-General of Artillery at -twenty-six, governor of Illyria and Duke of Ragusa at thirty-four, and -Marshal in 1809, one year later. But he failed in Spain, Wellington -beating him thoroughly at Salamanca. In 1814 he dealt the finishing blow -to the tottering Empire by his surrender of Paris. He seemed fated to be -unfortunate. Pampered by the Bourbons, he mishandled the army in Paris -during Charles X.’s attempt at absolute power, and ruined both the -dynasty and himself. He dragged out the remainder of his life in exile, -hated and despised alike by Bonapartists, Legitimists, Orleanists and -Republicans. - -So much for the Marshals Napoleon liked; his favour certainly appears to -have been blighting. Now for those whom he disliked. - -When Napoleon finally got rid of Moreau, the man who succeeded in -general estimation to the vacant and undesirable position of unofficial -leader of the unofficial opposition was Jean Baptiste Jules Bernadotte. -This man was one of the most despicable and successful trimmers in -history. In Moreau’s Army of the Rhine he had attained the rank of -general of division, but he was in no way a talented leader. Just before -Napoleon’s return from Egypt he had intrigued to attain the supreme -power, but over-reached himself. In Napoleon’s _coup d’état_ of the 18th -Brumaire he hunted with the hounds and ran with the hare with remarkable -success, assuring the Directory on the one hand of his unfaltering -support, and yet joining the group of generals who accompanied Napoleon, -but characteristically not wearing uniform. In addition, he had a -convenient shelter behind a woman’s petticoats, for with subtle -forethought he had married Joseph Bonaparte’s sister-in-law, Désirée -Clary. Désirée was a jilted sweetheart of Napoleon’s, and what with her -hatred of the great man, Joseph’s support, and Napoleon’s horror of a -scandal in his family (combined with a sneaking affection for her) -Bernadotte made himself fairly secure all round. But he still continued -to intrigue against Napoleon. During the Consulate an extraordinary -conspiracy was discovered centring at Rennes, Bernadotte’s headquarters. -Bernadotte himself was undoubtedly implicated, but he somehow wriggled -free from suspicion. To the Republicans he posed as a Republican; the -Bourbons were convinced that he was on their side; actually he was -working for his own hand, while, thanks to Joseph, he obtained his -Marshalate and the principality of Ponte Corvo from the Empire. - -In action, various unsavourily suspicious incidents occurred in -connection with him. In 1806 he took advantage of an ambiguous order to -absent his corps both from Jena and Auerstädt; the results of his action -might have been far-reaching. Later Benningsen and the Russian army -escaped from the trap Napoleon had set for them by capturing vital -orders which were on their way to the Prince of Ponte Corvo. At Wagram -his corps was routed and broken up. - -But when, in 1810, the Swedes were seeking a Crown Prince for their -country, he was the man they selected. Apparently their choice should -have been agreeable to Napoleon. Was Bernadotte not the brother-in-law -of the King of Spain, a connection by marriage of the Emperor, Prince of -Ponte Corvo and one of the senior Marshals? Moreover, while Governor of -Hanover, he had had dealings with the Swedes and had ingratiated himself -in their esteem. Napoleon was furious, but he could do nothing, and -Bernadotte became Crown Prince and virtual autocrat of Sweden. It only -remained for him to win the favour of Russia by turning against France, -so that, at the Treaty of Abo, Norway as well was handed over to his -tender mercies. - -Later he even angled for the throne of France, but the French could -never forgive the part he had played in defeating them at Gross Beeren, -Dennewitz and Leipzig; they did not realize that with this very object -in view he had almost betrayed his new allies, and had hung back and -procrastinated in order to retain his French popularity. - -But double-dealer, intriguer, traitor that he was, hated by Napoleon, -hated by the French people, despised by the rest of Europe, he -nevertheless held on to his throne, and transmitted it to his -descendants. Nowadays the House of Bernadotte is not considered too -ignoble to wed even with a branch of the House of Windsor. - -There were other Marshals whom Napoleon disliked, mainly because of -their former association with Moreau. Macdonald was the son of a -supporter of the Young Pretender, and was a relative of Flora Macdonald. -He failed to pass the examination for a commission under the old régime, -but with the Revolution came his chance. He distinguished himself under -Dumouriez and Pichegru (who subsequently turned Royalist), and then -under Moreau. It was an unlucky start for him. The Directory appointed -him to the command of the Army of Naples, but with this force he was -beaten by Suvaroff in the four days’ battle of the Trebbia. Subsequently -he performed the marvellous feat of leading an army across the Splugen -in midwinter, but for all that Napoleon employed him as little as -possible, keeping him on half-pay until 1809. However, Macdonald -received his bâton after Wagram; mainly, it is believed, to throw a -stronger light on Bernadotte’s failure. In 1813 Macdonald, Duke of -Tarentum, was beaten again at the Katzbach, but by now Napoleon had some -idea of his worth and retained him in command. By a delicious piece of -irony, Macdonald the distrusted was the last Marshal to leave the -Emperor in 1814; he was also one of the few to adhere to the Bourbons -during the Hundred Days. He enjoyed great honour under the Restoration -and the July Monarchy, and died comfortably in his bed at the age of -seventy-five. - -Another _bête noire_ of Napoleon’s was St. Cyr. He too was one of the -“Spartans of the Rhine.” In consequence Napoleon kept him out of active -service as much as possible. This course of action was of doubtful -utility, for St. Cyr was a man of superior talents. Not until 1812 was -he made a Marshal, but wounds then kept him out of action until August, -1813, and he was made prisoner by the Allies in the autumn. The -Bourbons, however, took kindly to him, and he held various high offices -until his death in 1830. - -Thus the five favourite Marshals of Napoleon died miserably, and the -three whom he disliked would be said to have lived happily ever after by -any self-respecting moral story-teller. It is a very curious fact, and -one which finds a parallel elsewhere in Napoleon’s career, as we shall -see in later chapters. - -[Illustration: PRINCE JOACHIM - (MURAT, KING OF THE TWO SICILIES)] - - - - - CHAPTER IV - ONE WIFE - - -WE have already alluded to the intensely needy period of Napoleon’s -life, which was mainly centred around the year 1795. He knew himself to -be a world conqueror; he despised the shifty intriguers who controlled -at that time both his own destiny and that of France; he bitterly envied -the few insolent survivors of the old noblesse whom he had met, while -his very bread was precariously earned. It was a maddening situation. - -Then circumstances suddenly took a change for the better. By a happy -accident Barras employed him to put down the revolt of the sections, and -within a few days Napoleon found himself general of the army of the -interior, and a person of some consequence. Still, there were bitter -drops even in this first draught of success, for his position depended -solely on the whim of the readily corruptible Director, who could with a -word have sent him either to a dungeon or to a command-in-chief. -Moreover, the haughty Parisian society regarded the gaunt, desperately -earnest general of twenty-six with an amusement they made no attempt to -conceal. Parisian society had had nearly two years by now in which to -concentrate, and it was already crystallizing out. There were old -sans-culottes, now Ambassadors, Ministers or Directors. There were Army -contractors in hordes. There were their wives (either by courtesy or by -Republican law) who were just recovering from the _sans chemise_ phase -and beginning to ape the old customs of the _haut noblesse_. Finally -there were a few of the old court families along with innumerable -pretenders, ex-valets masquerading as ci-devant marquises; comtesses (as -_précieuses_ as they could manage) who had once been kitchenmaids, while -every name hinted at a “de” which had been perforce dropped during the -Terror. And because trifling was for the moment the fashion, this select -band could well afford to sneer at the ridiculous little Corsican -officer who meant everything he said, and who had had great difficulty -before the Revolution in proving the three generations of noble descent -necessary to obtain nomination as a military cadet. - -Napoleon in these circumstances acted very much as he did in a military -difficulty. He selected the most advantageous objective, flung himself -upon it, and followed up his initial success without hesitation. He -broke into the charmed circle of Directory society by marrying one of -its shining lights. - -Josephine, vicomtesse de Beauharnais, was a representative of the -farthest outside fringe of Court society under the old régime. Her -marriage with Beauharnais had been arranged by her aunt, who was her -father-in-law’s mistress. This unfortunate relationship, combined with -poverty and the obscurity of the family, had barred most of the doors of -pre-Revolutionary society to her, and the Beauharnais were, in the minds -of the Montmorencys and Rohans, no more worthy of notice than the merest -bourgeois. Of this fact Bonaparte cannot have been ignorant, no matter -what has been said to the contrary, but it was of no importance to him. -He cared little even for the fact that Beauharnais had been at one time -a President of the Constituent Assembly and Commander-in-Chief of the -Army of the Rhine, before meeting the fate of most of the -Commanders-in-Chief of 1794. All that mattered to Bonaparte was that -Josephine was a member of the narrow circle of the Directory, that in -fact she and Madame Tallien were the two most important women therein, -and that marriage with her would gain him admission also. The Directory -was fast becoming a close oligarchy keeping a jealous eye watching for -intruders, and Napoleon had to act at once. His policy was soon -justified, for immediately after his marriage his position was -recognized by the offer of the longed-for command of the Army of Italy. - -There were other considerations as well. Josephine possessed a wonderful -charm of manner, and her taste was irreproachable. The beauty of her -figure was undoubted; that of her face was enhanced by dexterous art. To -Napoleon, starved of the good things of life, and incredibly lustful -after them, she must have appeared a houri of his Paradise. The violence -of his reaction from a forced self-control may be judged by the stream -of passionate letters which he sent her every few hours during the -opening of his campaign of Italy. Heaven knows he had difficulties -enough to contend with there, what with mutinous generals, starving -soldiers, and an enemy twice his strength, but we find him snatching a -few minutes two or three times a day to turn from his labours and -worries in order to contemplate the joys he had attained, and -endeavouring to express them on paper. - -Josephine’s motives were also mixed. She was thirty-two years of age, -and she was desperately poor. Her late husband’s property was almost -entirely situated in the West Indies, and it was now held by the -English. Her dreadful experiences under the Terror, when she was -imprisoned and within an ace of being guillotined, had probably aged her -and shaken her nerve. Barras and various bankers had helped her with -funds (perhaps expecting a return, perhaps not) but such resources would -soon come to an end. In this extremity, appeared Napoleon, pressing an -urgent suit. After all, he was not too bad a match. He was already -general of the army of the interior, and between them both they ought to -screw some better appointment out of Barras. He had not a sou to bless -himself with beside his pay, but Republican generals usually found means -to become rich in a short time. If he were killed, there would be a -pension; if he survived, and was unsuccessful, divorce was easy under -Republican law. She obviously stood to gain much and to lose little. - -And then it could not be denied that Napoleon had a way with him. His -fierce Southern nature would sometimes raise a response in her. After -all, she was a Creole, and her Creole blood could hardly fail to stir at -his passionate wooing. Although six years his senior, disillusioned, -experienced, hardened and shallow though she was, there were times when -his tempestuous advances carried her away. - -Yet at other times, when he was absent, and she had once more caught the -infection of cynicism and trifling from her associates, Napoleon -appeared vaguely absurd to her. “Il m’ennuie,” she would say, languidly -turning the pages of his letters. She had no desire to leave Paris, -where she was enjoying the prestige of being the wife of a successful -general, to share with him the privations of active service. Only when -Lombardy was in his hands, and a palace and an almost royal reception -were awaiting her, did she join him. - -Moreover, until she had a position to lose, she undoubtedly indulged in -flirtations. Corsican jealousy may have played a part in the furious -rages to which Napoleon gave rein, but there is no denying that -Josephine was several times indiscreet. In turn, he suspected Hippolyte -Charles, a young and handsome army contractor, Murat (at that time his -aide-de-camp) and even Junot, his blind admirer. - -By the time that Napoleon was nearing supreme power, his brief passion -for Josephine had burnt itself out. He himself had already been several -times unfaithful to her, and the only feeling that still remained was -the half-pitying affection a man bears towards a discarded mistress. On -his return from Egypt he found elaborate preparations made for him. His -family, poisonously jealous of Josephine, were waiting with -circumstantial accounts of her actions, and they pressed him to obtain a -divorce. Josephine, who had set out to meet him, in order to get in the -first word, had taken the wrong road and missed him, so that the -Bonaparte family had a clear field. They made the most of it. Josephine -returned to Paris to find her husband almost determined upon divorce. - -At one and the same time Napoleon had to endure the anxieties of the -_coup d’état_, the urging of his brothers and sisters and the appeals of -his wife and step-children. It must have been a severe trial, and in the -end he gave way to Josephine. Probably he realized that it was the -wisest thing he could do. He could ill afford a scandal at this crisis -in his career, and Josephine was a really useful helpmate to him. He -paid off her debts (to the amount of a mere hundred thousand pounds) and -settled down to make the best of things. - -The lesson was not lost on Josephine. She was now the first lady of the -Continent, and never again did she risk the loss of that position. -Thenceforward she lived a life of rigid correctness, and instead it was -Napoleon who became more and more unfaithful to her. - -It was a strange period through which Josephine now lived. On the one -hand she had reached heights of which she could never have dreamed -before; on the other was the bitter probability that all her power and -position would vanish in a moment when Napoleon made up his mind to take -the plunge. The other Bonapartes were most bitterly hostile to her, and -lost no opportunity of displaying their hostility. The only possible -method of making her position permanent was to have a child, and this -boon was denied her. And yet Napoleon found her a most invaluable ally. -Her queenly carriage and perfect taste in clothes were grateful in a -Court the awkwardness of whose manners was the jest of Europe. The -majority of Frenchmen were honestly fond of her, and her tactful -distribution of the charitable funds placed at her disposal by Napoleon -enhanced this sentiment. In her meetings with royalty she was superb; -she displayed the arrogance neither of an upstart nor of an Empress; the -Kings of Würtemberg and of Bavaria grew exceedingly fond of her. Most -important of all, perhaps, was the help which she gave Napoleon during -the Bayonne Conference. The haughty grandees of Spain, the harebrained -Prince of the Asturias and even the imbecile King himself showed her the -deepest respect, despite the fact that Napoleon was endeavouring to -coerce them into handing over the crown to his brother. - -The occasions were rare, however, when Josephine was allowed to enter -into more than the mere ceremonies of international politics. She was -neither allowed to act nor to advise. At the least hint of interference -on her part Napoleon was up in arms on the instant. Current rumour -credited her with attempting to save the life of the Duc d’Enghien, and -this has frequently been affirmed since, but from what we know of -Napoleon and from what we know of Josephine we can only conclude that -her attempt was timid and that Napoleon’s refusal was blank and brief. -For Josephine there only remained a purely decorative function. Other -activities were denied to her (one cannot help thinking that she did not -strive for them with much vigour); she was placidly content to spend her -days in inspections of her wardrobe, in changing her toilettes half a -dozen times daily and talking scandal with her ladies-in-waiting. - -These amusements were not quite as harmless as might be imagined, for -her passion for dress caused her to run heavily into debt, and every -jeweller in Paris knew that he had only to send her jewellery for -inspection for it to be instantly bought. To pay her debts she was put -to curious expedients. She was in continual terror lest her husband -should discover them, and she gladly paid enormous blackmail to her -creditors to postpone the day of claim. She even appealed for assistance -to Ministers and other high officials sooner than tell Napoleon. -Naturally the storms which occurred when the day of reckoning could no -longer be put off were terrible. Napoleon raged ferociously at every -discovery. He paid the debts, it is true, but he usually arbitrarily -reduced the totals by a quarter or even a half before doing so. Even -then the tradespeople made a large profit, for they not only made -allowance for his action, but they also took full advantage of -Josephine’s uninquiring nature. - -The unstable situation dragged along, to the surprise of many people, to -the consternation of many others, and to the delight of even more, for -several nerve-racking years. The end had to come sooner or later, and it -came surprisingly late. - - - - - CHAPTER V - THE DIVORCE - - -AT the close of 1809 Napoleon was at the height of his power. Every -country of Europe, except England, was his vassal or his ally, and he -was about to send Masséna and a sufficient force to Spain to ensure that -England also would cease from troubling. The circumstances which were to -lead to the fall of his enormous empire were already well developed, but -they were hardly obvious to the common eye, which was dazzled by his -brilliance. - -The one element of weakness apparent was the lack of an heir to the -throne. The equilibrium of Europe was poised upon the life of one man, -and although many people believed that man to be superhuman, there was -no one who thought him immortal. Napoleon had been wounded at Ratisbon; -perhaps at his next battle the bullet would be better aimed. But hit or -miss, there were many would-be assassins in Europe, and knives were -being sharpened and infernal machines prepared in scores of dingy -garrets. - -No one could imagine what would happen were Napoleon to die. The -Marshals recalled longingly the break-up of the Macedonian Empire, and -already in fancy saw themselves kings. The Republicans saw in his death -the downfall of autocracy; the Royalists hoped for the restoration of -Legitimacy. Subject nations saw themselves free; hostile nations saw -themselves enriched. The one thing which obviously could not happen was -the succession of the legal heir; Joseph in Spain, Louis in Holland and -Jerome in Westphalia were at that very moment showing how unfit they -were to govern anything. The Viceroy of Italy (Eugène de Beauharnais, -Napoleon’s stepson) was popular and capable, but Napoleon realized that -on account of his lack of Bonaparte blood he would not be tolerated. -There was one child who might perhaps have been accepted, and that was -Napoleon Charles, son of Louis Bonaparte and Hortense Beauharnais. -Vulgar gossip gave Napoleon himself the credit for being the father of -his step-daughter’s child, and on this account Napoleon Charles was -considered the likely heir, but he died of croup. It is possible that -calamities without number would have been prevented had there been in -1807 an efficient nurse at the sick-bed of a child. - -However that may be, Napoleon had no heir, and he had given up hope of -Josephine presenting him with one. At the same time, any doubts he had -on his own account were effaced by the birth of a son to him by Madame -Walewska. He dismissed as impractical a suggested scheme of simulated -pregnancy on Josephine’s part; too many people would have to be in the -secret; if they lived they would hold as much power as the Emperor -himself; and if (as he was quite capable of doing) he executed everyone -concerned, in Oriental fashion, tongues would wag harder than ever. -Besides, although the French would apparently put up indefinitely with -his losing a hundred thousand of their young men’s lives a year, they -would not tolerate for one second being made fools of in the eyes of the -whole world. - -Then Napoleon might have adopted one of his own illegitimate sons. Even -this wild project he considered carefully, but he put it aside. The only -course left open was to divorce Josephine and take some more fruitful -wife instead, and Napoleon gradually came to accept this project. - -Whether he was wise or not in this course of action cannot be decided -definitely. Certainly he was not justified in the event, and he later -alluded to the Austrian marriage as an “abyss covered with flowers.” -What he left out of full consideration when making his decision was -that, while Europe might suffer his tyranny uncomplainingly if they -believed that the system would end with his death, they would endeavour -to end it at once if there were a chance of its continuing indefinitely. -In a similar manner the birth of an heir to James II. of England had -precipitated matters a century before. But whether Napoleon forgot this -point, or whether he believed his Empire more stable than it actually -was, he nevertheless determined on divorce and a new marriage. - -On his return from the Wagram campaign of 1809, Josephine found him -fixed in his decision. The connection between their apartments was -walled up, and for weeks the Emperor and the Empress never met without a -third person being present. It seems strange that the man who did not -falter at Eylau, who sent the Guard to destruction at Waterloo, should -have been daunted by the prospect of a woman’s tears, but Napoleon -undoubtedly put off the unpleasant interview as long as possible. At -last he nerved himself to the inevitable, and the dreaded sentence was -pronounced. An official of the palace tells a story of Napoleon’s sudden -appearance among the Imperial ladies-in-waiting carrying the fainting -Empress in his arms. Ten days later, on the 15th of December, Josephine -announced her acquiescence in the decision to the Imperial council, and -the marriage was annulled by _senatus consultum_. - -Napoleon had endeavoured to procure a more satisfactory form of divorce -from the Pope, but Pius, to his credit, would not assist him. Five years -before, at the coronation, he had refused his blessing until the -Imperial pair had been married by the Church (the marriage in 1796 was -purely a legal contract), and Napoleon, exasperated but compelled to -yield, had submitted to a ceremony conducted by the Archbishop of Paris -under conditions of the utmost secrecy. Pius could not in decency give -his aid to break a marriage celebrated at his especial request only five -years before, and in consequence he found himself a prisoner in French -hands, and the last of the patrimony of St. Peter was annexed to the -French Empire. - -It would puzzle a cleverer man even than Napoleon to devise a series of -actions better calculated to annoy the Church and its more devout -followers. - -For Josephine the pill was gilded in a style more elaborate even than -was customary under the Empire. She retained her Imperial titles; she -received the Elysée at Paris, Malmaison, and the palace of Navarre. An -income of a hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling per annum was -settled upon her. No restraint in reason was set upon her actions; she -was not forced into retirement; and Napoleon continued to visit her even -after his marriage to Marie Louise. For the last four years of her life -Josephine occupied a position unique in history. - -Josephine bore her troubles well in public. However much she may have -wept to Napoleon, however much she may have knelt at his feet imploring -him to have mercy, to the world at large she showed dry eyes and an -immobile expression. Perhaps her pride came to her help; perhaps, after -all, freedom, the title of Empress, and a monstrous income, may have -reconciled her to her loss of precedence; it is even conceivable that -she preferred the sympathy of Europe, expressed in no uncertain voice, -to the burdens of royalty. - -Josephine all her life was a _poseuse_ of minor mental capacity; what -could be more gratifying to her than a situation where the possibilities -of posing were quite unlimited? - -For her, these possibilities were never cut short. She never had to -endure the anticlimax of being the divorced wife of a fallen Emperor; -she died suddenly just before Napoleon’s first abdication, soon after -receiving visits from all sorts of Emperors and Kings who were -accompanying their armies in the campaign of 1814. - - - - - CHAPTER VI - ANOTHER WIFE - - -THUS at the beginning of 1810 Napoleon found himself once more -unmarried, and free to choose himself a new bride. There never was a -choice so fraught with possibilities of disaster. It was not so much a -matter of making the most advantageous selection, as of making the least -dangerous. If he married a woman of inferior rank, all Europe would -exultantly proclaim that it was because no royal family would admit him. -If he married a princess of one of his subject kingdoms, Bavaria, -Würtemberg or Saxony, the others would become instantly jealous. A -Bourbon bride was obviously out of the question, seeing that he was -keeping all three royal branches out of their patrimonies. Should he -choose a Hohenzollern, then the countries which held territories which -had once been Prussian would become justifiably uneasy. There only -remained the Hapsburgs and the Romanoffs, and a marriage with either -would annoy the other. The best thing Napoleon could do was to ally -himself with the more powerful, which was undoubtedly the royal house of -Russia. - -But here Napoleon met with an unexpected reverse. The Czar Alexander was -at once a realist and an idealist, and he could not decide anything -without months of cogitation. Moreover, the clever advisers round him -foresaw that Napoleon’s demands of their country must increase -unbearably, and they had no intention of tying their ruler’s hands in -this fashion. Torn between his ministers’ advice and the urging of his -old admiration for Napoleon, between his pride of race and his desire -for a powerful alliance, Alexander temporized and then temporized again. -He explained that all the Grand Duchesses were members of the Greek -Church, and he had qualms about the necessary change of religion. He -tried to show that they were all already affianced. He said, literally, -that his mother would not allow him to act. - -In the end, Napoleon, fearing a rebuff, and conscious that delay would -weaken his position, abandoned the project and turned his attention to -Austria. Alexander was naturally annoyed. 1812 may be said to have begun -in 1810. - -However, if a Grand Duchess were unavailable, an Archduchess would -certainly bring Napoleon compensations. The House of Hapsburg-Lorraine -was the most celebrated in Europe; it had supplied Holy Roman Emperors -since the thirteenth century. After Napoleon and Alexander, Francis was -easily the most powerful continental ruler, despite his recent defeats; -Aspern and Wagram had just shown how delicately the balance was poised. -But more than this; the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons had repeatedly -intermarried; if there were anything that would convince the doubters -that Napoleon was a real, permanent monarch, it would be his marriage -with the niece of Louis XVI, the daughter of His Imperial, Royal and -Apostolic Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, King of -Bohemia, Duke of Styria, of Carinthia and of Carniola, erstwhile Emperor -of the Holy Roman Empire, and titular King of Jerusalem. - -The achievement would be deficient in some respects. Tyrol and Dalmatia -no longer figured in the Emperor’s resounding list of titles—France -ruled one and Bavaria the other, and Austria might easily demand -restitution as the price of Marie Louise’s hand. The very name of the -new Empress would remind people of Marie Antoinette, her ill-fated aunt, -and a family alliance between Napoleon and the autocrat of autocrats -might well give the _coup de grâce_ to the moribund belief in Napoleon -as the Apostle of the Revolution. - -Be that as it may, Napoleon had already gone too far to draw back, and -early in 1810 he prevailed on Francis I. to make a formal offer of his -daughter’s hand. - -They were an oddly contrasting couple. He was forty, she was eighteen. -He was an Italian-Corsican-French hybrid of unknown ancestry, she was of -the bluest blood in Christendom. He was the victorious leader of the new -idea, she was the scion of a dying autocracy. Three times had Marie -Louise fled with her family from the wrath of the French; all her life -she had heard the man who was about to become her husband alluded to as -the embodiment of evil, as the Corsican Ogre, as the Beast of the -Apocalypse. They had never met, and she had certainly not the least idea -as to what kind of a man he was. All things considered, it was as well -that she had been trained all her life to accept her parents’ decision -on her marriage without demur. - -Her training had been what might have been expected of the -etiquette-ridden, hidebound, conservative, dogmatic House of Hapsburg. -She was familiar with every language of Europe, because it could not be -foreseen whom she would eventually marry. Music, drawing, embroidery, -all those accomplishments which permitted of surveillance and which did -not encourage thought were hers. But she was proudest of the fact that -she could move her ears without moving her face. - -Every possible precaution that she would retain her valuable innocence -had been taken. She had never been to a theatrical performance. She had -never been allowed to own a male animal of any species; her principal -pets were hen canaries. Her reading matter was closely scrutinized -beforehand, and every single word which might possibly hint at -difference of sex was cut out with scissors. It seems probable that she -had spoken to no man other than her father and her uncles. One can -hardly be surprised at reading that her mental power was small, after -being stunted in its growth in this fashion for eighteen years. - -Napoleon sent as his proxy to Vienna Berthier, his trusted chief of -staff. One can find nowhere any statement that the Austrians were -pleased to see their princess standing side by side with a general whose -latest acquired title was Prince of Wagram. - -Perhaps as a sop to the national pride of Austria, Napoleon sent the -bride he had not yet seen presents which have never been equalled in -cost or magnificence. The trousseau he sent cost a hundred thousand -francs; it included a hundred and fifty chemises each costing five -pounds sterling, and enormous quantities of all other necessary linen. -In addition he sent another hundred thousand francs’ worth of lace and -twelve dozen pairs of stockings at from one to three pounds sterling a -pair. Dressing-table fittings and similar trifles cost nearly twenty -thousand pounds, but all this expenditure was a mere trifle compared to -the cost of the jewellery which Marie Louise received. The lowest -estimate of this is placed at ten million francs—four hundred thousand -pounds. Her dress allowance was to be over a thousand pounds a month. - -Poor stupid Marie Louise might well fancy she was in Heaven. The -daughter of an impoverished emperor, she had never possessed any -jewellery other than a few corals and seed-pearls, and her wardrobe had -been limited both by her niggardly stepmother and by circumstances. - -All her life she had been treated as a person of minor importance, but -suddenly she found even her pride-ridden father regarding her with -deference. Metternich and Schwartzenberg sought her favour. Her aunts -and cousins clustered eagerly round her, anxious to share in the spoils. -It certainly was a silver lining to the cloud of matrimony with an -unknown. - -Napoleon on his side was enraptured with the prospect. His meanness of -soul is well displayed by his snobbish delight. He went to inordinate -lengths in order to secure the approval of the great lady who had -condescended to share his throne. He swept his palaces clear of anything -which might remind his wife of her predecessor, and refurnished them -with meticulous care. The fittings were standardized as far as possible, -so that she might feel at once at home wherever she might choose to -live; he even arranged a suite of rooms for her exactly like those she -had lived in at Schönbrunn. Napoleon gave his passion for organization -full rein in matters of this kind, and without doubt he achieved a -splendid success. “He was a good tenant, this Napoleon,” said Louis -XVIII., inspecting the Tuileries after the Restoration. - -It was not merely her home that Napoleon adorned for Marie Louise, but -even himself. For a space the green coat was laid aside, and he arrayed -himself in a tunic stiff with embroidery. He tried to learn to waltz, -and failed miserably. In everything he acted in a manner which amazed -even those who had lived with him for years. No woman was half so -excited over her first ball as was Napoleon over the prospect of -marrying a Hapsburg. - -He grew more and more excited as Marie Louise and her train journeyed -across Germany and drew nearer and nearer. From every halting place -despatches reached him in dozens. Marie Louise wrote to him, Caroline -Murat (whom he had sent to welcome her) wrote to him, Berthier wrote to -him, the ladies-in-waiting wrote to him, even the mayors of the towns -passed through wrote to him. The officers who brought the letters were -eagerly cross-questioned. The Emperor who, when on the brink of grand -military events, would tell his attendants only to awaken him for bad -news, passed his days waiting for his unknown bride in a fever of -impatience. - -At last he could bear it no longer. Napoleon was at Soissons, where the -meeting had been arranged to take place, but, unable to wait, he rode -forward post haste through pelting rain, with only Murat at his side. At -Courcelles they met the Empress. At first the coachman was minded to -drive past the two muddy figures who hailed him, but Napoleon made -himself known, and clambered into the Imperial berline. He would brook -not another moment’s delay. The carriage pelted forward through all the -towns where addresses of welcome were ready, where droves of damsels all -in white were preparing to greet them, where banquets and fêtes were -ready. They drove past Soissons, where a wonderful pavilion had been -erected, in which the Imperial pair had expected to meet for the first -time during a ceremony more pompous even than epoch-making Tilsit; they -only stopped when they reached the palace of Compiegne, where, at nine -o’clock at night, a hurried dinner was prepared by the astonished -servants. - -Even the dinner was cut short. Half-way through Napoleon asked Marie -Louise a question; she blushed, and was unable to answer. It is to be -doubted if she even knew what he was talking about. Napoleon turned to -the Austrian envoy. “Her Majesty is doubtful,” he said. “Is it not true -that we are properly married?” The envoy hesitated. No one had expected -that Napoleon would take the ceremony by proxy seriously; elaborate -arrangements had been made for a further ceremony in Paris. But it was -useless for the envoy to demur; Napoleon carried off Marie Louise to his -own apartments, and breakfasted at her bedside next morning. Later his -meanness of soul once more obtruded itself, when he hinted at his -experiences to one of his friends. - -If Napoleon was a parvenu among monarchs, he was at least able to show -scoffers that his own royal ceremonies could put in the shade any -similar display by thousand-year-old dynasties. At Marie Louise’s -coronation four queens bore her train. - -Characteristically they tried to trip her up with it. Never before had -the world beheld four queens bearing another woman’s robes, and -certainly never before had it seen anything parallel to the other -exhibition. - -When we come to see who these queens were, we shall appreciate the -peculiar irony of the situation. First, there was the Queen of Spain, -Joseph’s wife, who was still angry about Napoleon’s jilting of her -sister Désirée, and who furthermore saw as a consequence of this -marriage the probability of the arrival of a direct heir and the -extinction of her husband’s chances of the succession. Secondly came -Caroline Murat, Queen of Naples, Napoleon’s sister, violently jealous of -Napoleon, of Marie Louise, and of everyone else. Third came the wife of -Jerome Bonaparte, Catherine, Queen of Westphalia, whom Napoleon had torn -from the arms of her betrothed to give to his loose-living young -brother. The fourth was Hortense, Queen of Holland, whose mother -Napoleon had just divorced in order to marry the woman whose train -Hortense was carrying. Had Marie Louise been capable of any unusual -thought whatever, she must have felt that she would be safer entering a -powder magazine than going up the aisle of Nôtre Dame with those four -viragoes at her heels. - -[Illustration: MARIE LOUISE - EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH] - - - - - CHAPTER VII - SOME COURT DETAILS - - -ONCE bitten, twice shy. Napoleon had had one wife of whom doubtful -stories had circulated. He would run no risk with the new one. Marie -Louise had been strictly guarded all her life. Napoleon determined that -in that respect he would substitute scorpions for her father’s whips. No -man was ever to be presented to his wife without his consent; under no -circumstances whatever was she to be alone with a man at any time. - -To achieve his object he revived all the court ceremony of the Soleil -Monarque; he added a few oriental improvements of his own, and to see -that his orders were carried out he surrounded Marie Louise with women -who were the wives and sisters of his own generals, absolutely dependent -on him and accustomed to military procedure. - -The Austrian ladies who had attended on Marie Louise before her marriage -were sent home, every single one of them, as soon as she crossed the -frontier. Marie Louise bade good-bye there to the friends of a -lifetime—Napoleon was risking nothing. As Dame d’Honneur and -consequently first lady-in-waiting, Napoleon appointed the Duchess of -Montebello, widow of the unfortunate Lannes, who had died fighting at -Aspern against Marie Louise’s father and an army commanded by Marie -Louise’s uncle. The other important positions were filled in similar -fashion. Four “red women” were appointed, whose duty was to be by the -Empress’s side night and day, two on duty and two within call. Had -enough eunuchs been available, Napoleon would probably have employed -them. A seraglio would have been quite in agreement with his estimation -of woman’s constancy. - -Considering that his court etiquette had to recover from the citizen -phase of the Revolution and from the solemn, military stiffness of the -Consulate, Napoleon certainly succeeded remarkably well. Where -aides-de-camp sufficed in 1802, equerries were necessary from 1804 -onwards; the _maîtres d’hotel_ had to be replaced by chamberlains; the -Empress’s friends had to be appointed ladies-in-waiting. Like all -reactions, this one went too far. The gaiety of the Bourbon court was -extinguished, and the devil-may-care trifling of the Directory salons -perished equally miserably. - -Napoleon himself was mainly responsible for this. He was never good -company in any sense of the word. He had a remarkable gift for saying -unpleasant things in an unpleasant manner, and in his presence the whole -company was on tenterhooks, wondering what was going to happen next. If -a lady had a snub nose, he said so; if a gentleman’s coat was shabby, he -said so with fury, because it was his pride to be the only shabby person -present. If rumours hinting at a lady’s fall from virtue were in -circulation, he told her so at the top of his voice, and demanded an -explanation. When Napoleon quitted his court he invariably left half the -women in tears and half the men in a rage. Then Talleyrand, Prince of -Benevento and Grand Chamberlain, would go limping round from group to -group, saying with his twisted smile, “The Emperor commands you to be -amused.” - -While Josephine was Empress, this state of affairs was not so -noticeable, for her dexterous tact soothed the smart caused by -Napoleon’s brusqueness, but under Marie Louise unbearable situations -occurred again and again. - -It must be admitted that the various parties at court made at least as -dangerous a mixture as the constituents of gunpowder. To begin with, the -members of the Imperial family itself were as jealous of each other as -they could possibly be. Pauline, who was a mere Serene Highness, would -grind her teeth when she had to address her sister Caroline as “Your -Majesty.” Caroline and the other Queens would rejoice openly because, -being Queens, they were given armchairs when Napoleon’s own mother had -to be content with a stool. And they were one and all scheming for the -succession in the event of Napoleon’s fall. - -Then there were still a few Republicans among the Princes and Dukes. One -of the Marshals, compelled by Napoleon to be present at the solemn Mass -which celebrated the Concordat, salved his conscience by swearing -horribly throughout the ceremony, and, when asked by the First Consul -how he had liked it, replied that it only needed to complete the picture -the presence of the half million men who had died to uproot the system. -Such men as these thought little of pushing in front of Serene -Highnesses, or of laughing loudly when Pauline Bonaparte made the -gesture which led to her banishment from court. - -Then there were a few representatives of the old noblesse, to whom -Napoleon, in his wholehearted snobbery, had offered large inducements to -come to his court. These people regarded the ennobled barrel-coopers, -smugglers and stable-boys with a mild but galling amusement. On one -occasion Lannes, finding his path to the throne-room blocked by these -ci-devants, drew his sword and swore to cut off the ears of the next -person who impeded him. It was naturally exasperating to the Marshals, -who had risen from the ranks in the course of twenty campaigns, after -receiving wounds in dozens, to find these nobles given high positions -purely on account of their names. To make matters worse, there were very -lively suspicions that many of them had actually borne arms against -France as _émigrés_, in La Vendée, on the Rhine, or in Italy. Yet even -these considerations were of small account compared to the wrath of the -new nobility when they found that the old still clung stubbornly -together, and refused, apparently, to admit even the existence of anyone -outside the Faubourg St. Germain. - -The largest group at court was that of the new nobility, but its -superiority of numbers was discounted by the violent jealousies of its -individual members. The maxim which guided Napoleon in his dealings with -his subordinates was, apparently, “Divide et impera.” He set his -generals and ministers by the ears until there was not one of them who -had not some cherished hatred for another. Davout hated Berthier, Lannes -hated Bessières, Ney hated Masséna, Fouché hated them all, Savary hated -Talleyrand; and the resultant bickerings were incessant. At court this -was merely undignified; in the field, as was proved twenty times over in -the Peninsular War, it was positively dangerous. It might be thought -that Napoleon, with inexhaustible funds and domains at his disposal, and -unlimited princely titles in his gift, could have satisfied them all. -But that was where the trouble began. Napoleon could not give them all -they desired, as otherwise (such was the condition of the Empire) they -would have nothing to fight for. There were glaring examples of this. -When Masséna had been made a prince, and had accumulated wealth and -glory past calculation, he deteriorated hopelessly. He failed badly in -the Busaco campaign of 1810-11, and sank promptly into an effete -degeneracy at the age of fifty-five. No, Napoleon could not afford to -give his Marshals all they desired, and in consequence jealousies and -friction increased unbearably. - -With the junior officers the difficulties were just as great. Brutes -like Vandamme, aristocrats like Belliard and Ségur, rakes like Lasalle -and fools like Grouchy, were all mingled together. What was worse was -that generals and diplomats of subject states necessarily came into -contact with them also. It must have been maddening for the Prussian, -Von Yorck, to hear Vandamme discoursing on the plunder he had acquired -in Silesia in 1806, or for Schwartzenburg, the Austrian, to hear Lasalle -boasting of his successes among the ladies of Vienna during the -Austerlitz campaign. - -But for a whole year, beginning in 1810, Napoleon in spite of these -difficulties was supremely happy. There was peace all over the -Continent, and the Continental system seemed at last to be on the point -of success, for England’s finances were undoubtedly shaken. So short was -gold in England that Wellington in the Peninsula rarely had enough for -his needs, and the Portuguese and Spanish subsidies were heavily in -arrears. Masséna with a hundred thousand men had plunged into the fog of -guerilla warfare on the Tagus, and everyone was confidently expecting to -hear of the fall of Lisbon and the expulsion of the English from -Portugal. - -Meanwhile, Napoleon was savouring the delights of respectable married -life. With his nineteen-year-old wife he indulged in all sorts of -innocent pleasures, riding, hunting, practical joking, theatricals. He -so far forgot himself as to _tutoyer_ his Imperial bride in the presence -of his whole Court, and the mighty nobles (who never indulged in such -behaviour even in the intimacy of their wives’ boudoirs) were astonished -to hear the Emperor and Empress exchanging “thees” and “thous.” - -Napoleon gave up hours of his precious time to his wife, waited -patiently when she was late for an appointment (Josephine was never -guilty of such an offence) and generally acted the devoted husband to -the life. For a whole year he was faithful to Marie Louise, a feat which -he never achieved before or after until St. Helena. And as the months -rolled by and hope changed to certainty his devotion grew greater still. - -For the birth of the child the most elaborate preparations were made. -Some time before he was born Mme. de Montesquieu was named Governess of -the Children of France, a healthy Normandy girl who was in the same -condition as the Empress was secured as prospective wet nurse and kept -under strict surveillance (her own child died when it was taken from -her, but that is not usually recorded), and all France waited in a hush -of expectation. - -Once again Napoleon was risking nothing. He was going to leave no -possible foundation for rumours to the effect that the child was not -his, or was not Marie Louise’s. Napoleon Francis Joseph Charles was born -in the presence of the four doctors, Dubois, Corvisart, Bourdier and -Yvan; of the Duchess of Montebello, dame d’honneur; of Mme. de Luçay, -dame d’atours; of Mme. de Montesquieu, Governess of the Children of -France; of six premières dames de chambre; of five women of inferior -rank, and of two filles de garde-robe. Cambacères, Duke of Parma and -Archchancellor of the Empire, was present in an ante-room, and should -have witnessed the birth even if he did not; Berthier, Prince of -Neufchâtel and Wagram, was in attendance on Napoleon, and also may have -witnessed it, while immediately after the birth all the other Grand -Dignitaries of the Empire and the representatives of all the friendly -countries of Europe were paraded through the room. Napoleon had ordered -Corvisart, whose nerve was giving way under the strain of the business, -to treat Marie Louise like a bourgeois wife, but he hardly practised -what he preached. The birth took three days; it certainly seemed a good -omen for this scrap of humanity to keep all these dozens of people with -high-sounding titles waiting for seventy-two consecutive hours. - -After an anxious ten minutes the young Napoleon showed signs of life; he -had at first appeared to be dead, and brandy had to be given him and he -had to be discreetly smacked before he would cry. But he did so at -length, and Napoleon announced to the waiting dignitaries, “It is a King -of Rome.” The guns fired a salute to inform the expectant crowds; -twenty-one guns were to herald the birth of a daughter; one hundred a -son. At the twenty-second gun a storm of cheers arose. More than forty -years after, a ceremony almost identical announced the birth of an -equally ill-fated son to another Emperor of the French. - -Thus the wish of Napoleon’s heart was fulfilled. For the moment he -disregarded all the counter-balancing disadvantages and revelled in the -possession of an heir. He cared nothing at the time for the fact that -the doctors forbade the Empress to have the much desired second son to -inherit the crown of Italy; it was nothing to him that Bavaria, Holland, -Würtemberg and Saxony at once became restless at seeing their period of -thraldom indefinitely prolonged; he hardly cared that Masséna had come -miserably back from Portugal, with a ruined army, baulked irretrievably -by Wellington at Torres Vedras, so that the “running sore” of the -Peninsular campaign was reopened. He flung away his last chance of going -in person to end the business, merely to remain by the side of the wife -and child of whom he was so proud. - -But despite his pride, he still left nothing to chance. Attendance on -Marie Louise was maintained as strictly as before; an unauthorized -presentation to the Empress by the Duchess of Montebello of some -relation of hers called forth a tornado of wrath from the Emperor. The -surveillance was redoubled when Napoleon left for the Russian campaign, -although he paid her a compliment which had never been paid to -Josephine—he appointed her Regent. Poor, silly Marie Louise, three -years after being an insignificant princess, found herself Empress of -the French, Queen of Italy and Regent of half Europe! - -Her august husband nevertheless saw fit to have the Empress-Queen-Regent -spied upon by a scullion, who sent him weekly reports, fantastically -spelt on blotched and smeared kitchen paper! Nothing else is necessary -to prove how utterly lacking in decent instincts was the victor of -Austerlitz. - -The action was typical of many. Perhaps Napoleon was right; everyone -knows how readily autocracy becomes bureaucracy when the autocrat ceases -to supervise his subordinates adequately; but not even the Second Empire -nor Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century could show so many -spies and counter-spies, police and counter-police and counter -counter-police as did the First Empire. Secret delation flourished, and -the prisons were full of people who had been arbitrarily cast into gaol -without even a form of trial. Napoleon wished to know everything that -was going on; not the least stray fragment of tittle-tattle came amiss -to him. Consequently his regular police developed an organization which -spread its tentacles into every avenue of life. Fouché, Minister of -Police, could boast of having an agent in every drawing-room and kitchen -in the Empire. But then Napoleon feared that Fouché would distort for -his own purposes the reports of the agents when making his own report to -Napoleon. Since Fouché was Fouché such a thing was not unlikely. So -Napoleon had a second and independent police system making similar -reports to another minister. Yet even when Fouché was at last got rid -of, and packed off as His Excellency the Governor of Rome (and later -Dalmatia); even when Savary, “the man who would kill his own father if -Napoleon ordered it,” was in charge of the police affairs the dual -police system was still adhered to. And besides these, Napoleon had -spies of his own, working quite independently, reporting direct to -himself, and he placed these not only in the two original police -systems, but everywhere where they could keep an eye on those in high -places. His royal brothers were surrounded with them; they were to be -found in the secretariats of all the ministers; and since payment was -largely by results, and they had to justify their existence somehow, it -is not surprising that they brought forward trumped-up charges, suborned -perjury, and generally acted as typical Continental agents-provocateurs. -But all this elaborate system failed to gain the least hint of the -Mallet conspiracy, which came so near to pulling down the Empire in the -autumn of 1812. - -There were opportunities enough for conspiracy, goodness knows. -Bourbonists and Republicans, Bonapartists and anarchists, all sought to -keep or to acquire power. The Murats, the Beauharnais, the various -Bonaparte brothers and even Bernadotte, were all scheming for the -succession or the regency, while intertwining among all this was the -more legitimate scheming of the various European powers, whose secret -agents were equally active throughout the Empire. There is small room -for wonder that after a dozen years of this frantic merry-go-round the -French people accepted the Bourbon restoration quietly, lest worse -befall. - -Yet all this does not excuse Napoleon for spying on his wife; for that -the only justification lies in the event. How many times has Napoleon -been rated for saying that adultery is a matter of opportunity? But his -wife apparently did her best to prove him right. In 1814 the Empire was -falling, and Napoleon’s abdication was evidently inevitable. One thing -alone raised him to an equality with hereditary monarchs, and that was -the fact that he had married the daughter of the greatest of them all. -They might exile General Bonaparte, but would they dare to exile along -with him the Emperor of Austria’s daughter? Besides, in Marie Louise’s -keeping was the young Napoleon. To allow him to accompany his mother -into exile with his father was simply to court disaster. - -At first the prospect seemed dark for the Allies. Marie Louise stood -firm, refused to be parted either from her son or from her husband, and -generally acted the devoted wife to the life. In this dilemma the Allies -appealed to the most cunning and cold-hearted of all their -agents—Metternich, who for thirty years was to hold Europe in the -hollow of his hand. Metternich was the cynic magnificent, without belief -in the constancy of any man or woman born. In that self-seeking age his -opinions were largely justified. Metternich plunged adroitly into the -affair. He must have known a great deal about the mentality of -feeble-minded women, seeing that one of his boasts was that he never had -fewer than three mistresses at a time. He selected an agent whom no one -at first sight would have believed to be of any use, but who turned out -to be extremely valuable. If Neipperg was a knave, he was at least the -knave of trumps. He was an elderly one-eyed diplomat, a count and a -general in the Austrian army, with a good record behind him. He -justified Metternich’s choice remarkably quickly, and while His -Imperial, Royal and Apostolic Majesty looked on and applauded this -prostitution of his daughter, he wormed his way into Marie Louise’s -affections, so that by the time Napoleon was deposited in Elba, Marie -Louise’s second child (whose engendering Corvisart had so strictly -forbidden) was expected in a few months’ time, while her first was under -lock and key at Schönbrunn, deprived of all his French friends and -attendants, and started on the unhappy life which was to end sixteen -years later in consumption, despair and death. - -To Napoleon’s credit be it recorded that never by word or deed did he -hint at this horrible desertion. All the rest of his life he spoke of -Marie Louise with affection and respect, and had he had his way, Marie -Louise would have been Regent of the French during the minority of -Napoleon II. - -Marie Louise lived happily for another thirty years. The Allies rewarded -her adultery by giving her the sovereignty of Parma for life, and there -she lived with Neipperg, whom she married morganatically as soon as -Napoleon was dead. For a long time she bore him one child a year, and -the Emperor of Austria, with great consideration, made all of them -illegitimate and morganatic alike, princes and princesses of the Empire. -No sooner was Neipperg dead than she contracted another morganatic -marriage with a person of even lowlier degree. When she was expelled -from her duchy by the rising of 1831, she was restored by Austrian -bayonets, and she died at length a year before the far more serious -rising of 1848. She never saw her first-born child after 1815 until he -was on his deathbed in 1832. - -The unfortunate Louise of Tuscany, who married and then deserted the -Crown Prince of Saxony, tells us that to her, as to all the other -Hapsburg princesses, Marie Louise’s career was held up as a shining -example of the fortune which attended good girls who did just what the -head of the family, the Emperor, told them. But the Emperor of Austria, -since he had nothing to gain by it, did not condone the adultery of this -particular Archduchess. - -[Illustration: GRAF VON NEIPPERG] - - - - - CHAPTER VIII - THE GREATEST PALADIN - - -IN the course of his military career Napoleon found he needed three -different kinds of subordinate officers. First, he wanted men of supreme -courage and vigour in action, whose other talents need not be more than -mediocre. These he could keep under his own hand until the decisive -moment arrived, and could then let loose, confident that they would -complete the work which his strategic achievements had begun. Of this -type, Ney, Augereau and Oudinot were examples. - -Then he needed a few generals who combined initiative and resource along -with their tactical talents. On these he could rely to execute minor -strategical movements, knowing that their tactical skill would help them -to sustain any difficulties into which they might fall until the -perfection of his strategical arrangements helped them out. The supreme -example of this type was Lannes the irreplaceable. - -Besides these, Napoleon needed one or two men who could combine all the -qualities necessary to a good general, so that he could entrust to them -the supreme command of the minor theatres of war. To be a good general, -a man must possess strategical skill, tactical skill and administrative -ability, as well as the personality to ensure that his ideas are carried -out. But to satisfy Napoleon’s jealousy, such a general in the Imperial -army had to have another quality—he had to be a man who would never -allow his thoughts to wander in the direction of obtaining the throne -for himself. If Napoleon could have found three men with all these -qualifications he could very possibly have maintained his Empire, since -they would have assured to him the safety of Italy, Spain and Poland. -But there was only one of these Admirable Crichtons available, and that -was Davout. Under Davout Poland and North Germany were held strongly for -the Empire. In Italy Eugène de Beauharnais, by the aid of powerful -common-sense, high ideals and capable subordinates, was fairly -successful, but in Spain there was nothing but shame and disaster. -Masséna failed badly; so did Marmont; Joseph Bonaparte and his -Major-General, Jourdan, were worse than useless; Soult and Suchet made a -fair show, but could not rise superior to the handicap of circumstances. -Another Davout might have saved Spain for the Empire, but there was only -one Davout. - -Davout is the ideal type of the man who combines ability with a sense of -duty. In many ways he reminds one of Wellington. He was the scion of an -old noble and military family of Burgundy, and was born a year later -than Napoleon. He passed through the military college, and received his -commission in 1789, just before the Revolution. The loss of many -officers through emigration gave him rapid promotion. He was a colonel -in 1791 (at the age of twenty-one!) and a brigadier-general two years -later. Already he had attracted attention by the stern discipline he -maintained (discipline was hardly the most noticeable feature of the -Revolutionary armies) and Napoleon, realizing his ability, included him -in his army after Campo Formo. He went to Egypt as one of Desaix’ -brigadiers, and returned with the same general in 1800. After Marengo -and the treaty of Luneville, Napoleon gave him employment suitable to -his talents, and appointed him to the command of the 3rd Corps of the -Army of the Ocean. A marshalate followed in 1804. As commander of the -3rd Corps Davout began to build up the wonderful reputation which he -later enjoyed. There was no other force in the Grand Army which could -rival the 3rd Corps for discipline, for marching capacity, for fighting -capacity, and for perfection of equipment. - -The 3rd Corps was to Napoleon what the Numidians were to Hannibal, the -Tenth Legion to Cæsar, the archers to Edward III., the Light Division to -Wellington—they were the men who could be trusted most nearly to -achieve the impossible. - -At Austerlitz Davout was called upon to sustain the attack of -practically the whole of the Austro-Russian army, and he and the 3rd -Corps clung doggedly on to the difficult country round the lakes for -hour after hour while Napoleon developed his attack on the heights of -Pratzen. Before Austerlitz Napoleon had declared that an ordinary -victory would be of no use to him; on the morning of the battle he -called upon his men for a “_coup de tonnerre_.” But for Davout -Austerlitz would have been at best an “ordinary victory.” - -The next campaign, that of Jena, was marked by the failure of Napoleon’s -intelligence arrangements and by confusion in his strategical -arrangements. But it was also marked by the most sweeping success -Napoleon ever gained. He himself with most of the Grand Army fought and -routed half the Prussian army at Jena. On the same day Davout, with a -single corps, fought and routed the other half at Auerstädt. -Single-handed Davout sustained the attack of an army of twice his -strength; he beat off Blücher and the furious Prussian squadrons; he -counter-attacked without hesitation; he called for efforts of which few -troops could have been capable, and finally he flung the enemy back in -utter disorder. - -The battle was more than a mere tactical success. Without Davout’s -victory the pursuit after Jena would never have become historic. In fact -Napoleon refrained from pursuit until he had heard from Davout. Well he -might, indeed. Had Davout been beaten, Napoleon must have swung aside to -face the victors, who would have been menacing his flank; Bernadotte’s -corps would have been isolated and in serious peril, and there would -have been no chance of close pursuit of Hohenlohe’s force. This would -have had time to rally; the stern Prussian discipline would have knitted -it once more together; it might have made a good defence of the line of -the Elbe; the Russians might have arrived in time to save Berlin; there -would perhaps have been no Friedland, and no Tilsit. - -The stout little bald-pated man who commanded the 3rd Corps changed the -face of Europe at Auerstädt. - -Davout brought his corps through blizzards and across marshes to save -the situation at Eylau; it was his opportune arrival and bold counsel -which saved Napoleon from a grave tactical reverse, with probable -serious consequences. - -After Friedland Napoleon needed, as has already been said, a man of iron -to hold down the north while he attended to the south. He made the only -possible choice in Davout. - -It would seem curious to us nowadays to hear that a general had made his -fortune while in command; what a storm of rage would be aroused if -anyone were to suggest that a modern English general had acquired three -or four hundred thousand pounds while commanding in France! But -apparently under the First Republic and First Empire it was the usual -practice for all officers of high rank to plunder for their own hands, -and to make enormous fortunes out of perquisites. Davout was the only -exception, but Napoleon saw that he did not suffer on account of his -singular disinterestedness, and heaped wealth upon him. - -Another peculiar distinction which he gave him was the title of Duke of -Auerstädt. When, about the beginning of 1808, Napoleon first began to -bestow titles of honour, as distinct from titles of sovereignty, he -acted upon a very definite plan. No one was to receive a title which did -not enhance the glory of the Emperor. The less famous Marshals received -ducal fiefs in Italy; Macdonald was made Duke of Tarentum, Mortier Duke -of Treviso, Bessières Duke of Istria. With the title the Marshals -received the fief with some show of sovereignty, but they were -allowed—encouraged, in fact—to sell their sovereignties to the Empire -as soon as received. - -The more famous Marshals took their titles from the battles in which -they had taken part; Lannes was made Duke of Montebello, Ney Duke of -Elchingen. Lefebvre, whose reputation for republicanism Napoleon -repeatedly employed to hallmark his own actions, was created Duke of -Dantzic. Soult strove to obtain for himself the title of Duke of -Austerlitz, but Napoleon put the idea impatiently aside. He wished to -reserve the glory of Austerlitz entirely for himself, and Soult had to -be content with the title of Duke of Dalmatia, which set him in the -lower class of Marshal. But Napoleon’s jealousy went further than this. -He did not want to give anyone a title derived from a battle which had -not been fought under his own direction. He forced the title of Duke of -Rivoli upon Masséna, although that Marshal had to his credit the far -greater achievements of Zürich and Genoa. When it was suggested to him -that it would be a kindly action to make the unhappy, neglected Jourdan -Duke of Fleurus, he replied “Never! I might as well make him King of -France at once.” - -To this rule Napoleon only made two exceptions. One was Kellermann, whom -he made Duke of Valmy, but by now Kellermann was too old (he was -seventy-three) to be any danger, while Valmy was a landmark in French -history. The other was Davout. - -The Duke of Auerstädt had before him in 1807 a task which would give his -sternness and devotion to duty free play. He had command of at least a -hundred thousand men. For the support of these he received not a sou -from the French Government—everything, pay, provisions and equipment, -had to be wrung from the wretched countries in which they were in -garrison. From Prussia Davout had to grind the enormous indemnity which -Napoleon had imposed. In Westphalia he had to see that Jerome Bonaparte -did not make too big a fool of himself. He had to keep a sharp eye upon -the movements of Austria. Besides all this, he had to govern the infant -Grand Duchy of Warsaw, where he had simultaneously to assure the Poles -that an independent kingdom of Poland would shortly be set up, and the -Russians and Austrians that an independent kingdom of Poland would never -be set up. - -And yet he succeeded. Throughout northern central Europe he built -himself up a reputation as the justest brute in Christendom. His army -was well fed and well equipped, but he did his best to make the burden -as light as possible. He saw that Napoleon’s outrageous demands of -Prussia were complied with, but at the same time he was not -unnecessarily harsh. He sent Polish regiments to fight in Spain (at -Poland’s expense) while he kept French troops about Warsaw (also at -Poland’s expense), but he managed to persuade the Poles that such a -proceeding was just. He carried out Napoleon’s orders both in the spirit -and to the letter, but after that he made enormous and successful -efforts to minimize the damage done. What would a second Davout have -done in Spain? - -Early in 1809 his proceedings were interrupted. Austria, undaunted by -the conference of Erfurt, and inspirited by the success of the -Spaniards, was on the move again. Davout had to concentrate his enormous -force on the upper Danube as rapidly as possible, with a weather eye -lifting in case of a further effort by Prussia, and, once there, he had -to weld his troops once more into divisions and army corps. From all -quarters other troops were being rushed to the scene of action, and in -command of them all was the hesitating Berthier. Napoleon, with his -hands full with the Spanish muddle, tried to direct operations from -Paris as long as possible. The natural result was that when the Emperor -arrived at headquarters he found his army divided and in an apparently -hopeless position, with the skilful and resolute Archduke Charles -thrusting enormous forces between the dislocated wings. Only a supreme -effort could save the situation, but the situation was saved. Napoleon -gathered together Lannes, Vandamme and Masséna, and hurled them forward. -He called upon Davout to achieve the impossible, and make a flank march -of thirty miles while in actual contact with superior forces. The -impossible was achieved. Davout brought his men safely through, to gain -along with the other forces the shattering victory of Eckmühl. - -Davout’s performance is practically unique in military history. A year -or two later the disastrous possibilities of a flank march were -thoroughly demonstrated at Salamanca, where Marmont, who prided himself -upon his tactical ability, was utterly routed in an hour’s fighting by -Wellington. Marmont had good troops, and his army was as nearly as -possible equal to Wellington’s, but this did not save him. Davout’s -force was partly composed of new troops, and of disaffected allies, -while his opponents were nearly twice his strength. Only the most -consummate daring combined with the maximum of vigilance and skill could -have saved Davout, but Davout was saved. The title of Prince of Eckmühl -which Napoleon bestowed upon him was well deserved. - -The next outstanding incident in the campaign was Napoleon’s first -defeat in the open field. He dared just a little too much in attempting -to cross a broad river in the face of a powerful opponent, with the -result that he was beaten back with frightful loss. Lannes was mortally -wounded; the bridges by which the army had crossed were broken before -Davout’s turn came to pass over. - -For a while the Empire tottered. A prompt offensive on the part of the -Archduke Charles might have overthrown it, but his army, too, had been -hard hit, and he delayed. Napoleon’s frantic exertions turned the scale -in the end. He claimed Aspern as a victory, and so skilfully did he make -his claim that for a time he was believed throughout Europe. Masséna was -created Prince of Essling, to conceal the defeat—in much the same way -as the Earl of Chatham might have been made Duke of Walcheren in the -same year. The army of Italy, under Eugène, Macdonald and Marmont -outmarched their opponents, and arrived in time to enable the Emperor to -cast the die once more. - -He passed the Danube a little lower down than at his previous attempt, -turned the Austrian position, and fought the battle of Wagram on -practically equal terms. It was evenly contested, too. Masséna on the -left was beaten back until the flank was nearly turned; Bernadotte’s -Saxon corps was repulsed in terrible disorder, and the French reserves -were drawn in at an alarming rate. A hundred French guns, massed in the -centre, battered the Austrian line, and Macdonald led his corps, formed -in a gigantic square, against the gap. But he suffered terribly from the -Austrian artillery, and his men left the ranks in thousands. In the end, -it was Davout on the right who won the battle for the French, for he -turned the Austrian left and began to roll up their line; the Austrians -fell sullenly back. It was a defeat, not a disaster, but the Austrians -sued for peace immediately afterwards. - -After Wagram Davout went back to his old post in the north. Month by -month the position grew more and more difficult, as the topsy-turvy -finances of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw verged nearer to bankruptcy, and -the spirit of nationality grew in Prussia. But there was never a hint of -open rebellion as long as the bald-headed little man was at the head of -affairs; the Tugendbund might plot in secret; English agents might stir -up trouble at every opportunity; Blücher might fume and Alexander might -plan, but Davout’s grip was never loosened. - -At last, after three years, came the Russian campaign. Half a million -Frenchmen and allies came thronging forward to the Niemen. A hundred -thousand of these men were under Davout’s command, and, with Napoleon’s -new supply arrangements breaking down at once, they had to plunder in -order to live. Prussia was left behind secretly raging, and the doomed -army pressed forward over the barren plains of Lithuania. Everything -seemed to go wrong. The half-trained levies could not perform the feats -of marching which had gained such marvellous successes at Ulm and after -Jena; the Marshals wrangled among themselves; while Napoleon, angered by -the failure of his plans, dealt out reprimands right and left until the -irritation became almost unbearable. Jerome Bonaparte, King of -Westphalia, was placed under Davout’s command in consequence of his -blundering, but he could not endure such a state of affairs, threw up -his command, and went back to the softer delights of his palace at -Cassel. - -With Moscow almost in sight, the Russians delivered battle. Napoleon’s -powers were fast waning, and he paid no heed to Davout’s urgent pleading -that he should be allowed to turn their left. At Wagram he had -exclaimed, “You will see Davout gain another battle for me,” but at -Borodino he had forgotten this. The battle resolved itself into a series -of horribly costly frontal assaults, and the victors lost as heavily as -their opponents. There followed five weeks’ useless delay in Moscow; -Napoleon waited for Alexander to plead for terms, and Alexander refused -to consider the matter as long as a Frenchman remained on Russian soil. -No course was open to the French except retreat, and retreat they did. -There is no need to describe in detail that exhausted famished army -crawling across the Russian plains; sufficient to say that of the half -million men who had advanced in 1812 hardly thirty thousand remained to -rally on the Oder in 1813. - -Napoleon left them as soon as hope was lost. He tore across Europe from -Smorgoni to Paris in the depth of winter with hardly a stop, bent on -making a last effort to save his Empire. Murat was left in command, but -Murat flinched from his task. Three weeks of command were enough for -him, and then he said he was ill. Ill or not, he travelled from Posen to -Naples in a fortnight, in January weather. - -Somehow Davout and Ney and Eugène de Beauharnais held the wretched Grand -Army together until Napoleon’s return, and then Davout was sent off to -hold down Northern Germany once more. It was a task which might have -daunted anybody. Prussia was ablaze with hatred of Napoleon, and -Prussian troops were swarming forward to the attack. The citizens of the -Hanseatic towns, ruined by the Continental system, and bankrupted by -Napoleon’s requisitions, were in a state of sullen rebellion. Davout’s -troops consisted merely of invalids, cripples and raw levies, while the -loyalty of most of them was to be doubted. Bernadotte, once a Marshal of -France, was leading his Swedes against his old countrymen. Benningsen -with a Russian army advanced to the attack. But Davout’s grip was upon -Hamburg, and it was a grip which nothing could break. He held on through -the summer of 1813, while the armistice of Pleissvitz gave hope of -relief. He held on through the autumn, while Austria joined the ranks of -Napoleon’s enemies. The victory of Dresden was followed by the defeats -of the Katzbach, of Kulm, of Gross Beeren, of Dennewitz, and finally by -the complete disaster of Leipzig, but Davout still held on to Hamburg. -Provisions began to fail, the populace broke into insurrection; it was -known that the Allies were over the Rhine, that Napoleon was carrying on -a hopeless struggle in France itself. Marmont, Mortier, Ney, in turn -deserted, but Davout still held on to Hamburg. It was not until the end -of April, when the Bourbons were once more on the throne of France, and -a Bourbon general was sent to take command, that he relaxed his grip. -Half his army had died during the horrors of the siege, enormous offers -had been made to him for his submission, the famished inhabitants had -implored him to surrender, but he had allowed nothing to interfere with -his fulfilment of his duty. - -The Bourbons tried to have him shot for this on his return, but such a -feat was beyond their power. Thus he was not asked, nor did he ask to -take the oath of allegiance. - -On Napoleon’s return from Elba Davout was the only Marshal who could -join him without staining his honour. Marmont stayed by the Bourbons, -for fear of the consequences of his surrender of Paris; Macdonald and -St. Cyr, Oudinot and Victor, held to their oaths. Ney flagrantly broke -his word to serve his old Emperor once more; Masséna, as was to be -expected, tried to keep a middle course. Davout was the one man free -from the Bourbon taint, and in consequence Napoleon had to leave him -behind as Governor of Paris and Minister of War to hold France quiet -during the Waterloo campaign. - -Could it have been otherwise, Waterloo might well have been a victory -for France. We can picture Davout in command of the left wing in the -advance over the Sambre. In place of Ney’s bungled staff work and -haphazard arrangements, there would have been a prompt and orderly -movement. The columns would have been kept closed up, instead of -straggling for miles. Davout’s accurate, lengthy reports would have kept -Napoleon clearly informed as to the situation. A prompt attack on the -morning of the 16th of June at Quatre Bras would have cleared the air -effectively, and d’Erlon, instead of wasting his strength in marching -and counter-marching, could have been employed to much better advantage -at Ligny. Ney’s position at Quatre Bras was, as a matter of fact, very -like Davout’s at Auerstädt eleven years before. Davout succeeded at -Auerstädt; Ney failed at Quatre Bras. With Davout in command of the left -wing in the Waterloo campaign, the history of the world might have been -different. - -At Waterloo, when the cavalry was dashing itself to pieces on the -English squares, Napoleon is said to have cried, “Oh, for one hour of -Murat.” Murat by that time would not have made an atom of difference. -The destiny of France had been decided two days before at Quatre Bras. -One hour of Davout would have been worth fifty hours of Murat. - -After Waterloo had been lost and won, for a few days it was the Prince -of Eckmühl who ruled France. He pulled the army together, and thereby -saved Napoleon’s life, for he managed to stave off the Prussian army -while Napoleon fled to Rochefort. But with the return of the Bourbons he -sank into oblivion, and died of pneumonia eight years afterwards almost -unnoticed. - -Such was the end of the one great officer of Napoleon’s whose honour had -never been sullied, who had always done his duty, and who had never -failed. His enemies hated him as well as feared him; his friends feared -him as well as trusted him. His one aim in life was to do his duty; in -this aim he stood almost alone in his age, and in its achievement he -stood quite alone. - -[Illustration: EUGÈNE DE BEAUHARNAIS - (VICEROY OF ITALY PRINCE DE VENISE)] - - - - - CHAPTER IX - MORE PALADINS - - -WHEN the Marshalate was inaugurated, the first list afforded many -opportunities for dissatisfaction, both among those included and those -excluded. - -Men like Macdonald and St. Cyr, of high reputation and undoubted -talents, found themselves ignored for political reasons, while giants of -the Republican armies like Masséna found that Napoleon’s family feeling -had given comparatively unknown men like Murat seniority over them. -Masséna’s curt reply to congratulations on his new appointment was “Yes, -one of fourteen,” and it must indeed have been galling to him to have -Bessières, Moncey and other nonentities raised to a rank equal to his -own. - -For in 1804 Masséna towered in achievement head and shoulders above all -other French soldiers, with the exception of Napoleon. He was of Italian -extraction (many people said Jewish-Italian, and hinted that Masséna was -a euphonized version of Manasseh), and he had served fourteen years in -Louis XVI.’s regiment of Italian mercenaries. Quitting the army, he had -plunged into the various shady employments of the Côte d’Azur. Smuggling -by land and by sea, coast trading, wine-dealing, fruit-selling, he tried -his hand at them all, mainly successfully. - -But with the revolution came his chance. In two years he was general of -division, and he actually had under his orders at Toulon a certain -Napoleon Bonaparte. For two campaigns Masséna was the life and soul of -the army of the Riviera; Dumerbion, Schérer, and even Moreau turned to -him for counsel. Then suddenly Barras sent Napoleon as -commander-in-chief in 1796. It is perhaps the greatest tribute to -Napoleon’s personality that as a young man of twenty-six he was able to -compel obedience from a crowd of generals, many years his senior both in -age and experience. Masséna yielded place to him grudgingly, but -Napoleon found a golden salve for his injured amour-propre. The campaign -of Italy laid the foundations of the enormous fortune which Masséna -later built up. Every general pillaged and peculated right and left in -those two memorable years. Napoleon himself was moderate; his fortune at -the end of 1797 only amounted to about two hundred thousand pounds -sterling; Masséna and Augereau acquired about half a million each. - -But if they could steal, these men could also fight. Masséna was the -supreme master of tactics, and it was his division which at that time -was given the most difficult tasks. Battle followed battle, Montenotte, -Mondovi, Lodi, Lonato, Castiglione, Mantua, Arcola, Rivoli, until at -last Austria succumbed; and by that time, what with gold and glory, the -generals of the army of Italy were Napoleon’s slaves. - -Napoleon had served another purpose, too, in enriching Masséna, for his -wealth kept him quiet while Napoleon was in Egypt. In 1798 the Directory -made a curious blunder. Their army of Rome, maddened by the peculations -of generals and commissaries, which left the men half starved and in -rags, broke out into mutiny. The man who was sent to quell them was -Masséna! The mutiny naturally redoubled in intensity, and Masséna was -compelled to give up his command. But at once more congenial work was -given him. Another coalition had declared war upon France, and the -Archduke Charles in Germany and Suvaroff in Italy were gaining success -after success. Masséna was sent to command in Switzerland, the last -buttress of France. Upon him depended all the hopes of the Republic, and -well he justified the Republic’s confidence. He clung on desperately, -holding back immensely superior numbers. At last the Aulic Council at -Vienna blundered more badly than usual, and Masséna grasped at the -opportunity, as if it had been a moneybag. He flung himself upon -Korsakoff at Zürich, and practically destroyed his army. Suvaroff, -marching over the St. Gotthard, only escaped the same fate by a -desperate march along the wildest paths of Switzerland. France was saved -in the same hour as Napoleon seized the reins of the Government. - -By varied cajolery Napoleon next prevailed upon Masséna to take command -of the army of Italy, and to hold back the Austrian army while he -himself organized the army of reserve. Napoleon had assured Masséna that -the army of Italy was in good condition, and that supplies and -reinforcements would be sent him in abundance, but as soon as Masséna -arrived he found how little trust could be placed in the First Consul’s -word. The men were starving and dispirited, and they were attacked by -vastly superior forces. Somehow Masséna held them together, but he was -forced back into Genoa and closely besieged. For the troops there was -some sort of food, hair-powder and cocoa mainly, but for the inhabitants -there was—_nothing_. For nine weeks Masséna held out. The troops died -in hundreds by the sword, by disease, by starvation; the inhabitants -died in thousands, and their bodies littered the streets. The Austrian -prisoners who were taken starved to death in the hulks in the harbour. -No wonder that Masséna said that after the siege he had not one hair -left which was not white on his whole body. - -At last surrender was necessary. Napoleon had promised him prompt -relief, but the relief never came. Day by day Masséna had listened for -the thunder of his guns in the near-by Apennines, but it had never -reached his ears. The capitulation was signed, and the French marched -out. But while Masséna had been clinging to Genoa, Napoleon’s army was -swinging over the Alps. Ten days after the surrender of Genoa, Marengo -gave Italy once more to the French. - -To Masséna, covered with glory, Napoleon gave the command of the army of -Italy on his own return to Paris; but the arrangement did not long -endure. Within two months Masséna’s avarice had got the better of him, -and he was removed from his command and placed upon half-pay on account -of his sharp practice. - -This retirement endured for four years, but in the Austerlitz campaign -Masséna received the command-in-chief in Italy. If he accomplished -little here, at least he prevented the enemy from achieving any success, -and after Austerlitz and the treaty of Presburg he was sent to conquer -Naples for Joseph Bonaparte. The campaign was a mere military promenade, -but it ended, as did so many of Masséna’s commands, in his compulsory -resignation on account of his illicit money-making. On this occasion -Napoleon improved on his previous practice, and confiscated over a -hundred thousand pounds which Masséna had accumulated in a Livornese -bank. - -Once again Napoleon summoned Masséna to his aid in 1807, and at Pultusk -and Friedland Masséna divided the laurels with Lannes and Ney. But it -was the Wagram campaign which brought him the greatest glory, as it did -also to Davout. At Eckmühl Masséna performed the turning movement which -gained the victory after Davout’s holding attack. At Essling it was -Masséna who held the reeling French line together until darkness brought -relief. At Wagram Masséna, crippled just before by a fall from his -horse, led his corps in a coach drawn by white horses, the mark for all -the enemy’s guns. Small wonder was it that the end of the campaign found -Masséna both Duke of Rivoli and Prince of Essling, with a pension of -twenty thousand pounds a year in addition to his pay, his perquisites -and his enormous savings. - -But this was the zenith of Masséna’s fame; it was to reach its nadir -immediately afterwards. Masséna had lived hard all his life; he had -spared himself no more than he had spared his men, and in addition he -had at intervals indulged in unbridled debauchery. By 1810 Masséna was -an old, worn-out, satiated man, although he was only fifty-five years of -age. All he wished to do was to retire and live in peace, but Napoleon -was at his wits’ end to find someone who could be trusted in Spain. -Masséna found the command thrust upon him, and he was forced to accept. -Then followed the blundering campaign of Torres Vedras. Blunders in the -choice of route, blunders in the attack at Busaco, blunders at Torres -Vedras, and finally, in 1811, the crowning blunder of Fuentes d’Onoro. - -These blunders might have been foreseen; Masséna was old and feeble; he -knew nothing of Spain; he took women with him on the campaign; his corps -commanders were Ney, Junot and Reynier, all men of hot temper and -inferior talent; while opposed to him was the inflexible Wellington with -his incomparable English infantry. - -In March, 1811, Masséna was removed from his command. He crept miserably -away, to bury his shame in the retirement of the Marseilles command. -From that time forward his one aim was to enjoy his riches in comfort; -he made submission to the Bourbons, and then reverted to Napoleon in -1815; after Waterloo he went back to the Bourbons. - -But though he retained his wealth and his rank, there was yet further -trouble awaiting him. His treason in 1815 had not been sufficiently -extensive in that age of treason for him to suffer any penalty, and -Louis XVIII., like the most humane Mikado, determined to make the -punishment fit the crime as far as possible by appointing him one of -Ney’s judges. Masséna must have had a guilty conscience, and the horror -of having to condemn his former colleague for the same crime as his own -weighed heavily on him. At the same time the atrocious murder of his -friend and fellow Marshal Brune during the White Terror at Avignon was a -further blow. Tortured by remorse, hated by all parties alike, worn out -with a life lived at high pressure, Masséna died in 1817 at the age of -fifty-nine. - -Masséna and Davout were the two foremost officers of Napoleon; the great -contrast between them is due to the fact that one of them was guided by -a strict sense of duty, the other merely by avarice. - -There was another Marshal who is frequently considered to be at least -the equal of these two, and the fact that he is so considered is -peculiarly illustrative of his whole career, for Soult was for ever -thrusting himself into the limelight and being elbowed out of it. Like -many of the other Marshals, he rose from the ranks of the old regular -army, and he first attained high rank by attracting Masséna’s attention. -He was second-in-command to that Marshal during the siege of Genoa, -until he was taken prisoner during a sortie. He received his Marshalate -in 1804, at a time when he was commanding a corps of the army at -Boulogne, and he continued in command during the historic march to the -Danube. At Austerlitz he was in command of the centre, and all his life -he considered that the battle was won mainly by himself. He ignored -Davout’s splendid defence of the lake defiles, Murat’s wonderful -handling of the cavalry reserve, Lannes’ management of the left, and -Bernadotte’s assault of the centre; he, and he alone, he said, was -responsible for Austerlitz. He was greatly disappointed when he was -created Duke of Dalmatia in 1808; he claimed that the only fitting title -for him was Duke of Austerlitz. Napoleon ignored his pleadings. - -Soult fought at Jena, Eylau and Friedland, 1806-1807, and was then sent -to Spain. To him was entrusted the pursuit of Sir John Moore to Corunna, -and it cannot be denied that he failed in his mission. Moore was never -seriously engaged throughout the retreat, and when finally Soult caught -him up at Corunna he was easily beaten back, despite his superior -numbers. But for all that Soult had the impertinence to claim a victory. - -To him next was assigned the conquest of Portugal; all he conquered was -the northern extremity; he was two months late in his arrival at Oporto, -and once there he settled down and would not budge. The reason for this -delay soon emerged. Soult was scheming for the crown of Portugal. But -the plan evaporated promptly when Wellington unexpectedly passed the -Douro, surprised Soult in his cantonments and bundled him out of -Portugal, compelling him to abandon his guns, his train, his treasure, -his sick—everything, in fact, except what was on his men’s backs. - -Had Wellington ever suffered a similar reverse he would probably have -received the same treatment as did Admiral Byng fifty years before, but -Napoleon was lenient and retained Soult in command. The new task -assigned to him was the conquest of Andalusia, and against the wretched -Spanish armies he achieved some remarkable successes. Seville and -Granada fell before him; and he quietly proceeded to establish himself -firmly and make his fortune. He looted cathedrals and treasuries, and -sent the proceeds home. He ignored the Government of Madrid, and -conducted himself like an independent and absolute monarch. Cadiz defied -him, and all the efforts of his subordinate, Victor, Duke of Belluno, -could not gain the place for him. - -Masséna, held up at Torres Vedras by Wellington, with his army starving -and disorganized, appealed to Soult for help. It was grudgingly -given—too late. By the time Soult was ready to move upon the Tagus -Masséna had already fallen back, utterly ruined. Soult was eventually -stirred to action by Beresford’s siege of Badajoz, but he met with an -unexpected reverse at Albuera (which, characteristically, he claimed as -a victory), and after that he was content to hold on to Andalusia until -at last Wellington’s victory at Salamanca and capture of Madrid -compelled him to abandon his conquests. So exasperated was Joseph -Bonaparte, King of Spain, by Soult’s independence that he demanded -Soult’s recall, threatening abdication in the event of refusal. Napoleon -complied, and during the beginning of 1813 Soult commanded the Guard in -Germany, but after Vittoria he was sent back to try and keep the English -out of France. - -It was during this campaign of the Pyrenees that Soult’s talents were -exhibited at their best, but even here he failed. His manœuvres, -concentrations and determined counter-attacks are models of technical -skill, but the fire, resolution and insight of greater generals are -sadly lacking. He certainly delayed Wellington, and achieved a fair -success considering the means at his disposal, but he was beaten back -across the Pyrenees, back from Bayonne, from Orthez, and at last from -Toulouse. Napoleon’s abdication found Soult’s army rapidly -disintegrating, and it is certain that the Duke of Dalmatia could not -have continued the struggle much longer. - -In 1814 and 1815 Soult conducted himself as might have been expected of -a self-seeker. He submitted to the Bourbons, but went over to Napoleon -as soon as the Emperor was on the throne after the descent from Elba. - -Napoleon appointed him chief of staff during the Waterloo campaign. The -choice was unfortunate in the event, but it is difficult to see what -other course the Emperor could have pursued. Of the five Marshals fit -for service of whom Napoleon could dispose, Davout had to be left to -hold down Paris, and Suchet had to guard the south. Ney was obviously -useless for staff work, and Grouchy had neither the brains nor the -prestige for a position of such vital responsibility. So Soult took -charge of the staff, and the staff work was badly done. Blunders were -committed even in the orders given for the crossing of the Sambre, and -subsequently delay followed delay and error followed error in fatal -sequence. Ney, d’Erlon and Grouchy were in turn misled by ambiguous -orders. The responsibility for the failure of Waterloo is undoubtedly -partly Soult’s. - -Naturally enough, Soult was proscribed after the second Restoration, but -after four years’ exile, he managed to ingratiate himself with the -Bourbons, and climbed steadily back to power by the aid of hypocrisy and -tuft-hunting. The July revolution brought him further power, and he was -one of the main props of Louis Philippe’s authority. In fact the citizen -king thought so much of him that he made Soult Marshal-General of -France, thus placing him on a level with Saxe and Turenne. He lived to -the venerable age of eighty-one, and died at last rich and honoured -above all the other soldiers of France. His reputation grew steadily -after the wars were over, partly on account of Napier’s liking for him, -partly on account of the natural tendency displayed by the English to -over-value a beaten antagonist, and partly on account of his own deft -powers of self-advertisement. His career is a striking example of the -success of cold, self-contained mediocrity. - -There is only one other Marshal of Napoleon for whom any claims to -greatness have been made, and that is Suchet, Duke of Albufera. One of -the most interesting points about his career is that he had no military -training whatever before the Revolution. As a young man of twenty-three -years of age he enlisted; at twenty-five he was a colonel. He made -friends with the young Bonaparte at the siege of Toulon, and later -fought in the Italian campaign of 1796, gaining command of a brigade in -1797. - -With the rank of general of division he served Masséna and Joubert, and -while Masséna held Genoa in 1800 Suchet guarded the frontiers of France -itself on the Var. - -But for eight years longer Suchet had to be content with the rank of a -mere divisional commander, leading a division of Lannes’ corps at -Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland. At last the wholesale toppling of -reputations in the Spanish war brought him his chance, and he received -command of the army of Aragon. To say the least, at first his position -was rather awkward. His army was composed of raw troops, shaken by the -horrors of the siege of Saragossa; the Spaniards were in arms against -him on all sides; he was compelled by the neglect of the Paris -Government to live on the country; while to crown it all he was expected -to obey not only the orders from Paris but also the frequently -contradictory ones from Joseph at Madrid. - -We must give Suchet credit for coming through the ordeal exceedingly -well. After an “unfortunate incident” at Alcaniz, Suchet got his men -well in hand, and, by victories at Maria and Belchite, he cleared Aragon -of the enemy and proceeded to subdue Catalonia. His way was barred in -every direction by fortresses, but, thanks partly to the folly of the -Spaniards and partly to his own resolution and determination, he -conquered the country inch by inch. Somewhat cynically, in his memoirs, -he tells us that at the storming of Lerida he took care to drive as many -women and children as possible into the citadel, and then by a vigorous -bombardment he so daunted the garrison that they surrendered. To what -total the casualties among the women and children amounted before the -surrender he does not say. - -Catalonia in his power, Suchet moved on to the reduction of Valencia. -His previous campaigns repeated themselves. Battle followed siege, and -siege followed battle, until at last Suchet ruled all Aragon, Catalonia -and Valencia. Soult had already conquered Andalusia, so that all Spain -might, by straining the truth a little, be said to be in the hands of -the French. For his achievements Suchet received a Marshal’s bâton, the -title of Duke of Albufera and half a million francs. - -However, he was not fated to retain his conquests long. Wellington’s -victory at Vittoria in 1813 brought about Suchet’s evacuation of -Valencia, just as Salamanca had caused Soult to abandon Andalusia. - -The same year an Anglo-Sicilian expedition under Murray landed in -Catalonia, and once more set aflame the embers of the guerilla warfare. -Suchet himself, in action against unwontedly disciplined enemies, met -with a serious reverse at Castalla, but Murray was too much of a -nincompoop to follow up his success. In the end Murray once more took -ship, and Suchet still held Catalonia and most of Aragon. At this time -he had a great opportunity to turn against Wellington, who had his hands -full with Soult’s offensive in the Pyrenees, but he let the chance go. -Immediately afterwards Lord William Bentinck, who had succeeded to Sir -John Murray, kept him busy until the fall of the Empire. Soult’s and -Napoleon’s demands had deprived Suchet of his best troops, and he did -all that could be expected of him with the few men left to him. - -In 1814 Suchet submitted to the Bourbons; in 1815 he betrayed them. -During the Hundred Days he was ordered to secure the south-east with a -few thousand men, and though unsuccessful, he accomplished much. After -the Restoration the Bourbons refused to re-employ him. - -Napoleon is credited with saying that Suchet was the best of his -Marshals after Masséna’s decay, and also that with two men like Suchet -he would have held Spain against all endeavours. If Napoleon really did -say this (and O’Meara’s testimony is untrustworthy) Napoleon was wrong. -The only time Suchet encountered English troops he was beaten; he was -just as selfish and self-seeking as the other Marshals in Spain; he -refused help whenever he could; and his success was due in a great part -to the blunders of his opponents. Every French general and Marshal -(Dupont excepted) succeeded against Spaniards; it was only against the -English that they failed. Napoleon might just as well have said that -Bessières was his best Marshal, because Bessières beat the Spaniards at -Rio Seco while Masséna failed at Torres Vedras. - -The one Marshal of Napoleon’s whose career is more interesting in its -pre-Revolutionary stages than under Napoleon is Augereau, Duke of -Castiglione. He was a gigantic, swaggering fellow with a nose rendered -brilliant by alcohol, devil-may-care and reckless, the ideal soldier of -fortune. For he was a soldier of fortune. As a young man in the army of -Louis XVI. he had killed one of his own officers on parade, and fled -from the country with the police at his heels. In exile, he wandered -through the East, joined the Russian army, took part in the storming of -Ismail under Suvaroff, and then deserted. Next he joined the Prussian -army, and served in the Prussian Guard, but once more he deserted. -Desertion from the Prussian army was a difficult matter, but Augereau -achieved it by banding together all the malcontents and fighting his way -to the frontier. - -On the birth of the Dauphin (later the unhappy Louis XVII.) an amnesty -was proclaimed in France, and Augereau took advantage of it to rejoin -his old regiment, but once more tired of continuous service and got -himself sent off to Naples as an instructor to the Neapolitan troops. -From Naples he eloped with a Greek heiress to Lisbon, and in Lisbon he -annoyed the Inquisition, so that he was put in prison. - -But still his luck held. He escaped from the clutches of the Holy -Office, and arrived with his wife in France just after the execution of -Louis XVI. His varied military experience naturally obtained him high -command in the Republican army; he fought in La Vendée and in the -Pyrenees, and then found himself a divisional general under Napoleon in -1796. In this campaign his reckless courage won him fame; he was one of -the heroes of the bridge of Lodi, and at Castiglione it was his dashing -leadership which gained the day. - -Augereau received the command of the army of the Rhine after Bonaparte’s -departure for Egypt, but, suspected of intriguing for the supreme power, -he was dismissed from his command, and, two years later, he saw the -prize fall into Napoleon’s hands. Napoleon bought Augereau’s support -with huge gifts of money and, in 1804, a Marshal’s bâton. - -During the Austerlitz campaign Augereau was only entrusted with the -minor operation of subduing Tyrol, but he fought well at Jena in 1806. -At Eylau came disaster. His corps, sent forward against the Russians in -the teeth of a blinding snowstorm, lost direction, and was torn to -pieces by a furious cannonade. Three-quarters of his men died; he -himself, already gravely ill, was badly wounded. - -Napoleon was furious. Augereau was sent home in disgrace, and what -remained of the 7th Corps was broken up and distributed round the rest -of the army. This was practically the end of Augereau’s military life; -he held command for a brief space during the war in Spain, but he failed -again at Gerona and was superseded. By now he was well over fifty years -of age, and dissipation had sapped his vitality. In 1814 and 1815 -Augereau received commands of minor importance, his chief duty being the -training of recruits, but his heart was not in his work. He lived long -enough to betray Napoleon twice and the Bourbons once, and then died in -1816. - -These brief biographies are sufficient to illustrate what kind of men -the Marshals and their master were. With only a few exceptions they were -all traitors, from Napoleon, plotting against the constitution he had -sworn to uphold, to Ney, deserting his King. They were greedy, they were -unscrupulous, they were selfish. Many of them were men of second-rate -talent. Two attributes they had in common—extreme personal bravery and -enormous experience in war. Soult is the only Marshal about whom we find -any hints of cowardice (and there seems to be no foundation for these -hints), while Suchet, Mortier and Brune were the only ones who had not -served in the pre-Revolutionary army. None of the Marshals was a -heaven-sent genius, and only one, Davout, combined loyalty and honesty -with both military and administrative ability. - -There is, of course, another side to the picture. If treachery can be -excused at all, then there were good excuses for the treachery of every -one of the guilty ones; if their talents appear mediocre to us now, it -cannot be denied that they were nevertheless highly successful for a -long period; if they were self-seeking, they were always ready, despite -their riches and titles, to risk their lives in action at the head of -their men. - -The extravagant praise often meted out collectively to Napoleon’s -subordinates is undeserved, but somehow one can hardly avoid coming to -the conclusion that a nation might well consider itself fortunate could -it muster a similar array of men in high places. - -[Illustration: AUGEREAU DUC DE CASTIGLIONE] - - - - - CHAPTER X - BROTHERS - - -NAPOLEON was one of a large family, children of a shiftless father and a -wonderful mother. Much the same might be said of a large number of other -successful men—Moltke and Lincoln, for instance. But it is doubtful -whether any importance from a eugenic point of view can be attached to -this circumstance, for although some of the other Bonapartes showed -undoubted talent in various directions, not one of them has ever -displayed greatness comparable to the Emperor’s. Biologically, Napoleon -might be said to be a “sport,” a “mutation,” as de Vries would say. Yet -even this theory is open to controversy, for mutations usually breed -true, and none of Napoleon’s children ever showed, as far as can be -ascertained, any really striking amount of talent. Napoleon may thus be -considered to be an isolated incident in his family history, one of the -many immovable facts which are so gingerly skirted round by eugenists -and other theorists. - -What achievements can be ascribed to the brothers of the man who -achieved so much? A few impracticable suggestions, a few novels (diluted -St. Pierre, most of them), a few lost battles, a few lost kingdoms; -beyond that—nothing. Louis was the father of Napoleon III., a clever -man with many natural disadvantages mingled with his advantages. Lucien -saved one unpleasant situation when president of the Council of Five -Hundred in 1799. Jerome’s grandson was a fairly eminent lawyer of the -United States. The other Bonapartes were like their fathers and -grandfathers before them, dilettanti, wobblers, unstable and -irresponsible. - -But useless as were Napoleon’s brothers to him, he nevertheless bore -with them patiently for years. A clannish clinging together is to be -noticed in all their dealings, both while they were obscure and while -they were powerful. An early Corsican environment may perhaps account -for this, or perhaps it is to be ascribed to the intense pride in -himself which Napoleon felt, and which perhaps was extended to all of -his own blood. - -Napoleon, the second son, and Joseph, the eldest, were separated from -the other brothers and sisters by a gap of some seven years; the -intervening children had died in infancy. When Charles Bonaparte, the -father, died, therefore, it was upon these two that the headship of the -family and the attendant responsibility fell. Joseph had already shown -signs of his general uselessness. His mathematics and education -generally had been too weak for him to have much chance of success in -the army; he flinched from the Church, and therefore returned to Corsica -to farm the few acres the Bonapartes possessed, and to carry on somehow, -Micawber-like, until something turned up. - -Napoleon, just appointed second-lieutenant of artillery, took upon -himself to keep and educate the next brother, Louis. Since he had only -thirty pounds a year pay, the struggle must have been terribly hard. -After a year or two came the temporary success of the Paolists in -Corsica, and as the Bonapartes had taken the French side the family had -to fly to France for safety, leaving all their property behind. -Difficulties increased without number. The French Government, in the -throes of the Terror, had voted monetary support for the refugees, but -in the excitement of the Toulon rebellion the decree was forgotten, and -not a sou was paid. St. Cyr, the State school for girls, was closed, and -another mouth, that of the eldest daughter, Elise, had to be fed by the -struggling family. - -But then everything suddenly changed for the better. Napoleon, after -distinguishing himself at Toulon, fought his way up to the rank of chef -de brigade. Joseph obtained a commissaryship in the army of Italy -through the aid of a fellow Corsican, Salicetti. Then also he married -Mademoiselle Clary, daughter of a Marseilles merchant. Her dowry must -have appeared enormous to the famished Bonapartes—it amounted to no -less than six thousand pounds sterling. None of the Bonapartes could as -yet foresee the day when any one of them would spend six thousand pounds -on their most trifling whim. - -A year later Napoleon saved the Directory from the revolt of the -sections, and the family was at last in comparatively smooth water. With -Napoleon in command of the Army of the Interior, influence could be -brought to bear to help his brothers. Louis became his aide-de-camp. -Lucien received a commissaryship with the Army of the North, while -immediately afterwards the horizon of possibilities was widened still -further by Napoleon’s appointment to the command in Italy and his -amazing victories there. Joseph received important diplomatic -appointments at Parma and Rome. Louis distinguished himself with the -army. Lucien at this time was the black sheep of the family. He threw up -one appointment after another; he expressed undesirable opinions with -undesirable force, and finally he married a completely illiterate girl -of the Midi. However, Napoleon forgave him, and before setting out for -Egypt he enabled him to secure election to the Council of Five Hundred. -Lucien had always been, even in Corsica, a ranting rhetorician, and in -the Council he would be able to indulge his bent to his heart’s desire. -Jerome, the youngest brother, was still at school, and he had to master -as best he could his disappointment at not accompanying Napoleon to -Egypt. Eugène Beauharnais, his schoolfellow, was going; he asked -bitterly why he could not go also, leaving out of calculation the years -of difference in their ages. - -Napoleon returned from Egypt to find his brothers had somewhat improved -their positions. Lucien was president of the Council of Five Hundred; -Joseph’s diplomatic services had enabled him to enter intimately into -the Directory circles, so that Napoleon was at once able to plunge into -the welter of politics. The _coup d’état_ of the 19th Brumaire was -planned. Joseph acted as intermediary between Napoleon, Sièyes, Ducos, -Bernadotte (now his brother-in-law), Fouché and Moreau. Lucien made -himself responsible for the Council, and arranged for the vital meeting -to be held at Versailles. Their united efforts gained for Napoleon the -command of the Army of the Interior. Everything was in readiness. On the -morning of the 19th the Upper House, the Council of Ancients, readily -bowed to the will of the great soldier, but the Council of Five Hundred -were not so willing to pronounce their own sentence of extinction. - -Murmurs arose and grew louder, and when Napoleon appeared before them he -was greeted with fierce cries. Half of the Five Hundred were old -_sans-culottes_, men who had gambled with their lives for power under -Hébert and Danton, and when Napoleon, for the only time in his career, -flinched from danger, the dreadful cry which had announced Robespierre’s -fall arose. “Hors la loi! Hors la loi!” shouted the deputies. Napoleon -staggered out of the council hall, apparently ruined. - -Lucien Bonaparte leaped into the breach. He spoke fervently on behalf of -his brother, but he was shouted down by the furious deputies. Somebody -demanded a motion of outlawry against Napoleon; Lucien refused to put it -to the vote. Neither side would give way, and the passions grew fiercer -and fiercer. Suddenly Lucien tore off the insignia of his office, and -even as he did so the door flew open and Napoleon’s troops burst in. -Leclerc, Napoleon’s brother-in-law, was at their head. “The Council is -dissolved,” said Leclerc, and the soldiers cleared the hall with fixed -bayonets. Napoleon had utilized to the full the few minutes Lucien had -gained for him. He had inflamed the soldiers with tales of treachery and -assassination. On the evening of the same day a rump of the Council met -under Lucien’s presidency and confirmed Napoleon in all the powers he -demanded. - -At first sight this action of Lucien’s appears invaluable. Nevertheless, -on further consideration one realizes that Napoleon could have succeeded -without it. When Bernadotte was King of Sweden, he told the French -Ambassador, apropos of some news regarding French parliamentary -criticism, that if he were King of France with two hundred thousand -soldiers at his back he would put his tongue out at the chamber of -deputies. Napoleon at the time of the _coup d’état_, had not merely two -hundred thousand soldiers, but the whole weight of public opinion at his -back. No decree of outlawry by a discredited Council of Five Hundred -could injure him. - -For all this, Lucien was of great use to Napoleon during the Consulate. -As Tribune, he employed his undoubted parliamentary gifts to foist on -the legislative various unpalatable measures. He skilfully defended the -proposed Legion of Honour to an acutely suspicious House, and then -finally he effected a judicious weeding of the Senate and Corps -Législatif during the retirements of 1802. For all these services he was -made Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, and a Senator; he received a -large official income and a palace (Poppesdorf on the Moselle), while it -seemed as if it would not be long before he received royal honours. -Napoleon proposed that he should act as French agent in the Kingdom of -Etruria; the Queen was recently widowed; a marriage would follow -naturally, and Lucien would be proclaimed king. As far as Napoleon knew, -there was no legal bar to such an arrangement, for Lucien’s illiterate -wife had died some time back, but the proposal forced Lucien to make an -announcement he should have made earlier. In 1803 he had secretly -married a widow, Madame Jouberthon, who had been his mistress for a -year, and actually had borne him a child the day before the ceremony. - -This was the end of things as far as Lucien was concerned. Napoleon -quarrelled violently with him, and Lucien left the country. He lived for -a time in Rome, where Pius VII. made him Prince of Canino, but had to -move on at the French occupation. He tried to reach the United States, -but the English prevented this, as they feared he might have designs on -Spanish America. They could have known little about the dilatory, -hesitating æsthete to imagine he was capable of any action of -importance. Lucien was brought a prisoner to England, and he promptly -settled down and made himself comfortable at Ludlow, perfectly contented -to enjoy his books, his scientific dabblings, his pictures, in peace. -Once only did he rouse himself, and that was during the Hundred Days. -The old clan feeling apparently re-awoke, and he was at Napoleon’s side -during that brief period. But as soon as Napoleon had left for St. -Helena, and three months in a Piedmontese prison had cooled his own -blood, he went back to Rome and continued his placid existence until his -death in 1840. Two or three feeble novels and one frigid epic stand to -his credit—further comment appears unnecessary; if a man with Lucien’s -opportunities abandons them in favour of a mild life of artistic -enjoyment, he must be either a great man or a very small man, and Lucien -was not a great man. - -But Lucien had at any rate the hardihood to stand up to his terrible -brother about his marriage; Louis and Jerome gave way in a ridiculous -fashion. - -Louis allowed himself to be persuaded into marrying Hortense -Beauharnais, Napoleon’s step-daughter, thereby making his sister-in-law -Josephine into his mother-in-law as well. No love was lost between the -newly-married pair, and they drifted apart after a month or two of -married life. A child, Napoleon Charles, was born at the end of 1802, -and Napoleon was popularly credited with being its incestuous father. At -first he did his utmost to check these rumours, but later he tried to -use them for his own ends—a scheme nipped in the bud by the child’s -death from croup in 1807. Napoleon repeatedly tried to reconcile the -parents, and on two occasions he met with success. The product of the -first reconciliation was a child, Napoleon Louis, born in 1804, who died -during the Carbonari insurrection in Italy in 1831, and the product of -the second reconciliation was another child who later became Napoleon -III. - -On Louis, for his compliance, honours and wealth were heaped in -profusion. He became a Prince of the Empire, with a million francs a -year; as Constable of France, and consequently a Grand Imperial -Dignitary, he received one-third of a million francs a year; he was -Governor of Paris; a member of the Council of State; in precedence only -the Emperor and Joseph Bonaparte came before him. Louis found himself -the third person in the Empire with an annual income of about eighty -thousand pounds sterling. - -Yet even this was not all. Austerlitz had laid Europe at Napoleon’s -feet, and he used his power to the full. The rulers of Bavaria and -Würtemberg became kings; a terse proclamation announced that the Bourbon -house of Naples had “ceased to reign,” and Masséna with sixty thousand -men swept into the country to establish Joseph Bonaparte on the throne. -Louis was given the kingdom of Holland. Just before, Napoleon had -offered the crown of Italy to these two brothers in turn, but they had -refused it, partly on account of the utter dependence of Italy upon -France, and partly because one condition of acceptance was resignation -of all claims upon the throne of France. - -Holland, when Louis arrived, was in a bad way. Her people were ground -down by remorseless taxation; the Continental system was ruining them -rapidly; the conscription was exhausting them; and the outlook generally -was hopeless. In fact they were so sunk in despondency that on one -occasion, when Napoleon called a plebiscite among them to decide on -their Government, only one-sixth of the voters troubled to vote. With -the advent of Louis they hoped for better things, but Louis was the kind -of man from whom it is better to hope for nothing. His health was bad, -his domestic troubles upset him, his terrible brother held him -completely under his thumb, and tumbled over like card houses all his -tentative schemes of improvement. Matters in Holland went from bad to -worse. At intervals the wretched Louis roused himself, and tried to help -his subjects, but every time the thunders of Napoleon daunted him. - -At last, in 1810, he found the French demanding military occupation of -Holland as the only way to secure the thorough observance of the -Continental system. A French division was marching on Amsterdam, and -fighting was threatened between the Dutch troops and the French. Louis -dropped his kingly dignity as if it were red-hot; he abdicated in favour -of his son, Napoleon Louis, and then, leaving his wife and family -behind, he fled across the frontier and never stopped until he was safe -in Austria. Neither threats nor cajoleries on Napoleon’s part were able -to bring him back to France and the undignified dignities which were -offered him. He settled down with relief in Styria with his books and -his artistic studies. A novel or two and some peculiarly unsatisfying -memoirs were all he left behind after his death. - -Hortense, his wife, found means to console herself. The Comte de -Flahault became a frequent visitor at her house in Paris, and a son was -eventually born to her, who became, under the Second Empire, the Duc de -Morny. Flahault himself was with good reason believed to be a son of the -great Talleyrand, Prince of Benevento, so that de Morny had the proud -privilege of calling himself a doubly illegitimate grandson of -Talleyrand, an illegitimate Beauharnais, an illegitimate Flahault and a -natural brother of Napoleon III. A highly satisfactory pedigree, in -truth. - -It appeared at first as though Joseph Bonaparte would have better -fortune than Lucien or Louis. He had already held positions of great -responsibility as Ambassador and Plenipotentiary, and in 1806 he became -King of Naples. His rule at first was precarious, for although many of -the Neapolitans acquiesced in his elevation, the English, and the -Bourbons who still held Sicily did their best to make him as -uncomfortable as possible. By landing banditti, galley-slaves and -unpleasant characters generally, they kept Calabria in a blaze. A small -English force was landed, won a battle at Maida, and then had to retire. -But with fifty thousand Frenchmen at his back Joseph gradually wore down -opposition and established himself more or less firmly. - -However, this had hardly been accomplished when in 1808 he was suddenly -called back to France and proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies. As -regards the Indies, Joseph was divided from them by the British fleet, -and if the fleet could preserve Sicily for the Italian Bourbons, it -could most certainly preserve America for the Spanish ones. The Atlantic -is a good deal wider than the Straits of Messina. As regards Spain the -position was only not quite so difficult. The whole country was in -rebellion, it is true; three weeks before the streets of Madrid had run -knee-deep with the blood of Spaniards and Frenchmen. Some thirty -thousand of his subjects had to be beaten in a pitched battle before -Joseph could enter his capital, but Napoleon promised him two hundred -thousand French soldiers to support him, and Joseph, a little -bewildered, a little timorous, proceeded with the adventure. He reached -Madrid, and sent his armies forward to subdue his kingdom. In three -weeks one army, under Moncey, had been beaten back from Valencia with -ruinous losses, while twenty thousand men under Dupont were hemmed in at -Baylen and compelled to surrender. A hundred thousand Spaniards were -marching on Madrid, and the King of Spain returned with all speed to the -security of the French armies on the Ebro. Another battle had to be -fought before this sanctuary could be gained. Immediately afterwards -came the news that the pestilent English, for ever intruding themselves -uninvited, had landed in Portugal, beaten Junot and cleared Portugal of -the French by the Convention of Cintra. Napoleon at this moment was at -the Conference of Erfurt, trying to disentangle the politics of Russia, -Austria, Prussia and the Rhenish Confederation, but as soon as he could, -he ended this meeting, issued a few hasty orders to organize his army -against a probable attack by Austria in the spring, and rushed back -across Europe bent upon settling the affair out of hand. Calling up -eighty thousand more troops, he pushed suddenly over the Ebro. The -Spanish armies were shattered in three battles at Gamonal, Espinosa and -Tudela. Once more Joseph was established in Madrid, but the English -again interfered. A skilful thrust by Sir John Moore against the French -communications led to the French armies being wheeled against him -instead of pushing on to complete the overthrow of the Spaniards. In the -middle of this movement Napoleon was called back to Paris on account of -the Austrian trouble and the plottings of Talleyrand and Fouché; Joseph -was left in Madrid, King of a country ablaze with rebellion, and -commander of an army openly contemptuous. - -Joseph bore his troubles for five years. Madrid and its environs were -just able to bear the expense of his guard and his court; the rest of -the country was parcelled out among French generals who ruled their -districts despotically as far as the English and the partidas would -allow them. Joseph simply did not count; his pathetic appeals to his -protectors to combine as he wished were disregarded. Time and again he -asked Napoleon either to give him full power or to relieve him of the -burden of his mock sovereignty, but Napoleon bullied him into continuing -with the farce. In 1812 he lost Madrid for a time, and in 1813 he lost -all Spain. He gathered together all his possessions, and tried to retire -in as dignified a fashion as possible. Forced by Wellington to fight at -Vittoria, he was badly beaten and driven off his line of communications. -Everything had to be abandoned. During the flight Joseph left his -carriage by one door while the English Hussars entered it by the other, -pistol shots were fired at him, and altogether he was hardly treated -with the dignity a King deserves. All his court paraphernalia was -captured by the English. His carriage was found stuffed with -masterpieces; he lost gold to the value of a million sterling, and his -plate, his personal belongings, and his lady friends were alike left -behind. Soult at last arrived to hold the line of the Pyrenees, and -Joseph was ignominiously thrust aside. - -He pathetically re-entered the limelight in Paris during the fatal early -months of 1814, but he was no longer taken seriously. A proclamation of -his to the people of Paris, practically telling them to have no fear for -he was with them was received with howls of derision. He pottered -helplessly about until the abdication, he figured inconspicuously in the -last gathering of the Bonaparte clan during the Hundred Days, and then -went off to America. He shook from his shoulders with relief the burden -of kingship. As with his brothers, feeble novels and the study of -literature engaged his attention from 1815 until his death. - -A third brother of Napoleon’s was also a king; he also was thrust on to -an unwilling people, and he also was thrust off again in course of time. -Jerome was the hope of the family; in 1801, at the age of seventeen, he -appeared to give promise of great gifts. Napoleon sent him off to join -the navy and to acquire manhood in that hardest of all schools. The -First Consul’s plan was defeated, for the officers of the squadron -hastened to make the great man’s young brother as comfortable as -possible. - -When Gantheaume, with vastly superior numbers, fell in with and captured -the English _Swiftsure_, Jerome (seventeen years old, if you please) was -sent to receive the English captain’s sword. On the West Indian station -the French admiral bluntly told Jerome that he was bound to become an -admiral anyway, and he should work hard, not to achieve promotion but to -be ready for it. Jerome did not follow his advice. The renewal of war -with England in 1803 found Jerome still in the West Indies, and he left -his ship (which was subsequently captured) and went off to the United -States. At Washington he found the French Ambassador, Pichon, and drew -lavishly on him for funds and embarrassed the worthy man enormously. -Jerome had quite a nice little holiday in America, travelling about from -place to place, making hordes of friends, spending thousands of dollars, -and being generally lionized. - -The climax was reached when at the age of nineteen he informed the -wretched Pichon that he had just married a Miss Elizabeth Patterson, -daughter of a worthy Baltimore merchant, and asked him for further funds -to support his new condition. Pichon was horrified. The marriage was -illegal by the law of France, it is true, but Jerome apparently took it -seriously. Napoleon would be mad with rage. Pichon saw himself deprived -of his position and driven into exile. He implored Jerome to go home. -Jerome refused. Pichon cut off supplies. Jerome gaily borrowed from his -new father-in-law. Then came the news that Napoleon had proclaimed -himself Emperor of the French. Madame Jerome Bonaparte naturally wanted -to go to France as soon as possible and enjoy her rank as an Imperial -Princess. Jerome had doubts on the subject, but at last, when his funds -ran low, he set out in one of Mr. Patterson’s ships for Lisbon with his -wife. At Lisbon what Jerome had feared came about. The French consul, -acting on instructions from Paris, announced that he could give only -Jerome a passport; he could not give “Miss Patterson” one. At first -Jerome swore he would stay by his wife, but Napoleon’s emissaries made -him tempting offers. If he abandoned Miss Patterson he would be made an -Imperial Prince; he would have high command; he would receive at least -150,000 francs a year. Jerome succumbed. He told his wife to travel -round by sea to Amsterdam, whence she could more easily reach Paris to -join him. He himself went direct. Naturally by Napoleon’s orders -Elizabeth was denied permission to land at Amsterdam; she at last -realized what Jerome had done, and, as she could do nothing else, she -went to England, where she was cordially received. A child was born to -her while she was in lodgings at Camberwell, and this son’s son was in -1906 Attorney-General of the United States. But Elizabeth was never -recognized by the French Government as Jerome’s wife, and eventually she -went back to the United States. There is a story that many years after -she encountered Jerome and his next wife, Catherine of Würtemberg, in a -picture gallery at Florence. Jerome was a perfect gentleman, and passed -her by after telling Catherine who she was. - -Be that as it may, Jerome gained many solid advantages from his -desertion of his wife. His debts were paid and a large income was -allowed him. He was entrusted with the command of a small naval -expedition against Algiers, and on his return to Genoa with a few score -French prisoners whom he had released he was greeted with storms of -salutes and congratulatory addresses. From the tone of the announcements -one would gather that he had anticipated Lord Exmouth’s feat in 1816, -bombarded the city and wrung submission from the Dey by daring and -courage. As a matter of fact the prisoners had been ransomed before he -even started for a few pounds each by a French representative sent -specially over. - -It was much the same with the West Indian expedition which followed. -Jerome certainly did considerable damage to English commerce, and -somehow escaped the English cruisers, but the official description of -his exploits seemed to indicate that he had almost subverted the British -Empire. - -No sooner was Jerome back in France than he turned soldier. On his early -naval expeditions he had strutted about the deck in a Hussar uniform of -which he was very fond, but apparently he did not see fit to appear -before his troops in naval attire by way of returning the compliment. -Napoleon was already planning to give Jerome a German kingdom, and he -therefore decided that the young man should gain some military -experience along with as much military glory as possible. With Vandamme -as his adviser and a strong _corps d’armée_ at his back, Jerome plunged -into Silesia. The Prussians were stunned by the defeats of Jena and -Auerstädt, and by the relentless pursuit which had followed, and they -gave way before him with hardly a blow struck. One or two fortresses -showed signs of resistance, and were blockaded. The remainder of the -province was soon in Jerome’s hands, and he and Vandamme and the -divisional commanders promptly enriched themselves with plunder. Once -more Jerome’s achievements were blazoned abroad as feats of marvellous -skill. Napoleon was usually successful in obtaining the gold of devotion -in return for the tinsel of propaganda, and now he was exerting all his -arts in his brother’s favour. - -Napoleon’s victory of Friedland was followed by the Treaty of Tilsit, -and one of the clauses therein gave Westphalia to Jerome. At the mature -age of twenty-three the young man found himself ruler of two millions of -subjects. Moreover, he was given a royal bride. The King of Würtemberg, -it is true, had not been a king for more than two years, but the house -of Wittelsbach could trace its ancestry back to the time of Charlemagne. -Catherine of Würtemberg was already affianced, but at the Emperor’s -command the engagement was broken off and Catherine was given to Jerome. -Jerome’s American marriage was declared null and void, first by Napoleon -because at the time Jerome was a minor, and secondly by the Metropolitan -of Paris, for no particular reason. The fact that the ceremony had been -performed by a Roman Catholic archbishop with all due regard to the -forms of the Church, did not count. - -However, the splendours of the new marriage were such that the old one -might well be forgotten. It took place in the gallery of Diana at the -Tuileries, and was attended by all the shining lights of the Empire. -There was a goodly assembly of Kings, and there were Princes and Grand -Dukes in dozens. Everybody seemed to have made a special effort to wear -as much jewellery as possible, and the display of diamond-sewn dresses -and yard-long ropes of pearls was remembered for years afterwards. The -Democratic Empire had certainly made great strides. - -Once married, Jerome departed with his Queen to his kingdom of -Westphalia. The new state was a curious mixture of fragments of other -countries. Hesse, Hanover, Brunswick and Prussia had all contributed to -it (unwillingly), and Calvinists and Catholics were represented in about -equal numbers and with an equal aversion each from the other. The whole -country was ruined by prolonged military occupation; it was loaded with -debt, for Napoleon blithely began to collect money owing to the Elector -of Hesse whom he had dispossessed; nearly one-fourth of the whole area -was claimed by the Emperor to be distributed as endowments to his -officers; a huge army had to be maintained, and a French army of -occupation had to be paid and supplied; a war contribution had to be -paid to the French treasury; and to crown it all the Continental system -was slowly crushing the life out of the industries. During the first -administrative year there was a deficit of five million francs, and this -was the smallest there was during the whole lifetime of the country. -From then onwards the financial measures proceeded on the well-worn way -to ruin, the landmarks thereon being forced loans, repudiation of debt, -and taxes amounting to one-half the total national income. There is -nothing remarkable in the fact that the six years of the existence of -the kingdom were marked by two serious mutinies and three distinct -rebellions. - -Jerome himself was quite indifferent to the troubles of his people. He -spent enormous amounts on his palace at Cassel, and in addition he fell -heavily into personal debt despite a Civil List of five million francs a -year. His pleasures were, to say the least, of a dubious sort, and we -find hints everywhere that the orgies at Cassel eclipsed even those at -the Parc-aux-Cerfs in the good old days of the Bourbon régime. Catherine -apparently made no violent objection to this behaviour of her husband’s; -the graceless young scamp seems to have completely bewitched her. He -must have had the time of his life during these years, despite -occasional shocks like the one he experienced when he read in the -_Moniteur_ (the first indication he received) that one quarter of his -kingdom had been annexed to France. - -Only once did Jerome appear on active service during this period, and -that was to command thirty or forty thousand men during the Russian -campaign of 1812. He travelled with all the luxuries he could think of, -equerries, cooks, valets, barbers, mistresses, until his headquarters -appeared like a small town. But the hardships of war did not last long; -Jerome was found wanting in military ability. His failure to keep up to -the difficult time-table Napoleon set him during the advance into -Lithuania led to his being placed under Davout’s command. Neither he nor -Davout liked the arrangement, and Jerome threw up his command and went -back to Cassel. - -Here he enjoyed himself for one more year. Even he had flinched from -reviving the old _droit du seigneur_, but he did his best in that -direction without that amount of ceremony. But the sands were running -out as the French armies fell back from the Niemen to the Oder, from the -Oder to the Elbe, and at last the battle of Leipzig laid open all the -country between the Elbe and the Rhine to the triumphant Allies. The -Kingdom of Westphalia vanished in a night, like a dream; the Westphalian -army went over to the Allies _en bloc_, and Jerome returned to France -with barely two hundred men at his back. - -The Hundred Days gave Jerome one last chance of displaying his manhood, -and, curiously enough, he made the most of it. He was given command of a -division of Reille’s corps in the Waterloo campaign, and he led it with -unexpected dash and vigour. He fought heroically at Quatre Bras, -exposing himself recklessly in the dreadful fighting in the wood. At -Waterloo he headed the attack on Hougomont, leading assault after -assault with unflinching bravery. He was wounded, but remained in -action, and at the close of the day he was seen striving to rally his -men when they broke panic-stricken before the allied advance. - -Waterloo almost atones in the general estimation for Jerome’s long and -useless life. After the second Restoration he drifted idly about Europe, -accompanied by his devoted Catherine; when the Orleans monarchy fell he -hastened back to France. Along with Louis Napoleon he planned the _coup -d’état_, and for the rest of his life, until 1860, he was once more a -prominent subject of the French Empire. Napoleon III. made him a -Marshal; his son married a princess of the house of Savoy, and he died -comfortably in bed at the age of seventy-six. He never met with any -fatal retribution for his callous desertion of Elizabeth Patterson, or -for the wild debauchery of his youth. There seems to be no moral to -attach to the tale of his career. - -Of the remaining descendants in the male line of the house of Bonaparte -there is little to tell. One of them, Lucien, a grandson of Lucien, -Napoleon’s brother, rose to the eminence of Cardinal; one or two of them -have shown ability in various branches of science; the curious tendency -to literature has repeatedly cropped out; but none of them has ever -achieved anything really striking. Their novels are more feeble even -than Garibaldi’s, while their political achievements are of course -beneath comparison. Some of them have fought duels, and some of them -have committed manslaughter. Some of them have even attained the -dazzling heights of the French chamber of deputies. But there is not one -of them who would receive two lines of notice in any fair-sized book of -reference were it not for his relationship to the great Napoleon. The -present head of the house is Napoleon Victor Jerome, who married in 1910 -a Coburg princess, a member of the royal family of Belgium. He is -Napoleon VI., if the principle of legitimacy can yet be applied to the -house of Bonaparte; anyway, he shows not the least desire to become -Napoleon VI. - -Had Napoleon had no brothers, he would probably have been more -successful; had he had any brothers of equal ability they would have -pulled each other down in Europe, if they had not cut each other’s -throats years before in Corsica; as it is, he stands as unique in his -family as he does in his age. - -[Illustration: JOSEPH NAPOLEON ROI DE NAPLES et de SICILE - ET ROI D’ESPAGNE ET DES INDES - _Né le 7 janvier 1768. Sacré et couronné le - 3e Mars 1806._] - - - - - CHAPTER XI - SISTERS - - -IF Napoleon’s brothers were all a generally hopeless lot, the same can -by no means be said of his sisters. These stood out head and shoulders -above the other women of the time; they were all distinguished by their -force of character; whether they were married to nonentities or -personalities they all did their best to wear the breeches—but they did -not flinch from wearing nothing at all if the whim took them. They were -all handsome women, and one of them, Pauline, was generally considered -to be the most beautiful woman of the time. - -Napoleon’s sisters resembled him much more closely than did his -brothers. Xerxes, watching Artemisia fighting desperately at Salamis, -exclaimed, “This woman plays the man while my men play the woman,” and a -dispassionate observer of the conduct of the rulers of the countries of -Europe in the Napoleonic era might well say the same. One has only to -compare Joseph Bonaparte flying from Vittoria, or Murat flying from -Tolentino, with Caroline rallying the Neapolitans, Louise of Prussia -fighting desperately hard against fate at Tilsit, and Marie Caroline of -Bourbon directing Sicily’s struggle with the great conqueror. - -There are obvious differences, too, between Napoleon’s treatment of his -brothers and his treatment of his sisters. Joseph and Jerome and Louis -he bullied unmercifully, but it was far otherwise with Pauline, Caroline -and Elise. He himself admitted that he always “formed into line of -battle” in preparation for an interview with Caroline, and although -authorities are at variance as to when he actually said to his family -that anyone would think he was trying to rob them of the inheritance of -the late King, their father, it is certain that the remark was addressed -to his sisters and mother. They were all of them women with a very keen -sense of what they wanted, and they fought like tiger-cats to obtain it. - -The three girls all married before or during the Consulate, when -Napoleon had not yet attained the heights he reached later, so that the -marriages they made were by no means as brilliant as they might have -been, and fell far short of the marriages which Napoleon arranged for -much more distant relatives who became marriageable at a later period. -Elise was old enough to experience acutely the trials of poverty which -overtook the family before Napoleon was promoted to important commands. -She was sent as a child to school at St. Cyr, a state-supported -institution under the patronage of the Bourbons, and had to leave there -at the same time as the Bonaparte family had to fly from Corsica to -Marseilles. During the next few years she was rather a trial to her -family, for she flirted with every man she met, eligible and ineligible. -One of her admirers was Admiral Truguet, who was a thoroughly good -sailor and quite a good match at that time, but Madame Bonaparte -declined to allow the affair to develop. In the end it was a fellow -Corsican, Félix Baciocchi, who gained her hand. Baciocchi was a distant -connection of the Bonaparte family, and also, by a curious coincidence, -he was a relation of Charles Andrea Pozzo di Borgo, another Corsican, -who is believed to have been at feud with the Bonapartes, and who -certainly distinguished himself, while in the service of various -European monarchs, by his virulent hatred of Napoleon. - -But Baciocchi did not distinguish himself at all. He was a complete -nonentity, with neither the desire nor the capacity to achieve power. At -the marriage Elise only brought him thirty thousand francs as dowry (her -share of the Bonaparte property, now recovered from the Paolists), but -after 1797 Napoleon was able to make Elise presents of considerably -greater value. Baciocchi was then a major of infantry; but during the -Consulate his wife endeavoured to obtain higher military command for -him. So persistently did she scheme to this end that at last in -self-defence Napoleon made him a senator in order to cut short his -military career. - -Pauline, the next sister, married Leclerc, a capable soldier, who -rendered Napoleon valuable service during the _coup d’état_ of Brumaire. -He, at least, was worthy of promotion, and Bonaparte gave it to him -lavishly. But it was Caroline, the youngest, who looked after herself -best. Most of the generals of the Consulate sought her hand, including -Lannes, but both Napoleon and Caroline desired alliance with the -greatest of them all, Moreau. However, Moreau declined the honour -(thereby directly bringing about his own exile soon after), and Caroline -chose for herself a husband of whose military talents she was -sufficiently sure to be certain that high command would be given him, -but who also was sufficiently weak-willed to be well under her thumb. -Lannes was of too lofty a type to please her in this respect, and his -personal devotion to Napoleon was undoubted; Caroline therefore selected -a young cavalry officer, Murat. - -Pauline experienced an unfortunate beginning to the career she had -planned for herself and her husband. Leclerc was appointed to the -command of the expeditionary force which was sent to subdue Hayti, and -Pauline was ordered to accompany him. In vain she pleaded ill-health; in -vain she said that her complexion would be ruined by the West Indian -sun; Napoleon was adamant. Pauline kept up the plea of ill-health -sufficiently well to be carried on board ship at Brest in a litter, but -the expedition started. As was only to be expected, it ended in -disastrous failure. Toussaint l’Ouverture, the leader of the rebellion, -was indeed captured and sent to France to perish in a freezing mountain -prison, but yellow fever attacked the French troops, and they died in -thousands. Leclerc was one of those who perished. - -Napoleon himself was able to gain some satisfaction even from the -failure, because the men he had sent had all been drawn from the Army of -the Rhine, and they were all guilty of the crime of believing that -Moreau was a great man, and that Hohenlinden was a greater victory than -Marengo. But, as has been said, the French died in thousands; the -negroes fought stoutly, and at last after fifteen thousand Frenchmen had -perished only a miserable fragment of the expeditionary force survived -to be withdrawn under Rochambeau. Pauline returned to France to deplore -her ruined complexion. - -However, with the establishment of the Empire the sisters found plenty -to occupy their minds in acquiring as much spoil as possible. Money they -sought greedily, and Napoleon gave them millions of francs. They shed -tears of rage when they found that the Emperor expected them to remain -content with being plain Mesdames Murat, Leclerc and Baciocchi, while -the hated Josephine was Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale l’Impératrice et -Reine, and while plain Julie Clary and Hortense Beauharnais (Joseph’s -and Louis’s wives) were Imperial and Royal Highnesses. Napoleon gave way -to their bitter pleadings and at one stroke created them Princesses of -the Empire, making their husbands Princes at the same time. - -These names, Elise, Pauline and Caroline, were not the baptismal names -of the ladies concerned. At baptism they had been given Italian names, -each of them attached to the ever popular name of Maria. Their mother -was Maria Letizia; while Elise was really Maria Anna, Pauline, Maria -Paoletta and Caroline, Maria Annunziata. It is by these names that they -are described on their marriage certificates, but they dropped them soon -afterwards to assume names which appealed to them more. Changing their -names did not change their natures; they intrigued and schemed and -plotted; they flirted; they sought favours; they quarrelled with their -husbands, with their sisters-in-law, and with each other; in fact they -exhibited all the fierce self-seeking which characterized the ladies of -the old monarchy. There was this difference, however. Fifty years before -the Court ladies had intrigued for places, and for thousands of francs. -Now they intrigued for kingdoms and millions. - -Caroline early took first place in the race for power. Her husband, -Murat, distinguished himself in the Austerlitz campaign by capturing the -great bridge over the Danube by a trick which savoured rather of -treachery, and by bold heading of cavalry charges at Austerlitz itself. -He was already a Prince and second senior Marshal of the Empire; the -only possible promotion left for him was a sovereignty. Napoleon, -carving out his Confederation of the Rhine, found him one. A tiny area -on the Rhine was obtained by exchange from Prussia and Bavaria, and -Murat and Caroline became Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Berg and -Cleves. Caroline was in no way satisfied. She egged her husband on to -demand increases of territory, privileges of toll on the Rhine, and so -on, until the little state had set both France and Prussia in a ferment. -The tension hardly relaxed until, a month or two later, war broke out -between the two countries. Murat went away with the Grand Army to Jena, -Eylau and Friedland; Caroline stayed behind in Paris to guard their -interests. She did it well. She indulged in an outrageous flirtation -with Junot, Governor of Paris, and hints have not been wanting that her -purpose was to arrange a revolution rather on the same lines as Mallet -tried to follow in 1812. At her palace of the Elysée (now the official -residence of the President of the Third Republic) she gave the most -brilliant fêtes imaginable. She worked like a slave to gain popularity, -so that she could gain the throne in the event of her brother’s death. -Then Tilsit followed Friedland, and the Emperor returned. The campaign -had brought more glory to Murat than he had as yet gained. He had headed -the marvellous pursuit after Jena, when he had captured fortresses with -a few regiments of Hussars, and it was largely through him that -practically the whole Prussian army had fallen into the hands of the -French. At Eylau, when Augereau’s corps had come reeling back through -the blizzard, shattered and almost annihilated, when it seemed as though -the Grand Army was at last going to taste defeat, Napoleon had called on -Murat to save the day. Murat replied by charging at the head of eighteen -thousand cavalry. He broke up the first Russian line, captured thousands -of prisoners, and beat back the Russians until Davout and Ney were in -position. - -Naturally, he reaped vast rewards. His Grand Duchy was doubled in size; -millions of francs were bestowed upon him and upon Caroline; but they -were hugely dissatisfied. Murat had hoped for the crown of Poland, or, -failing that, for a whole kingdom in Germany. But Poland was given to -the King of Saxony, and the creation of Jerome Bonaparte’s kingdom of -Westphalia shut out all hopes of the further expansion of Berg. Caroline -and Murat were furious. Murat showed his rage by hinting at rebellion; -Caroline used her native Corsican guile and became as friendly to -Napoleon as possible, helping him in his affairs with women, recounting -to him the tittle-tattle of the drawing-rooms of Paris, and even at -times giving him the shelter of her roof to conceal from Josephine some -of his more flagrant unfaithfulnesses. - -However, Murat was soon in employment again. He was appointed to the -command in Spain, where Napoleon’s tortuous intrigues to dispossess the -unspeakable Bourbons were beginning to take effect. Murat certainly -achieved fair success. He gained possession of the Spanish fortresses, -stamped out the little spurts of rebellion which occasionally flamed -out, and by the time the outrageous treaty of Bayonne had been signed he -was in a position to hand over to Napoleon the greater part of the -country. Another disappointment awaited him. He had hoped that all this -mysterious business would result in his being given the crown of -Spain—but Joseph Bonaparte received it instead, and Murat and Caroline -were forced to be content with Joseph’s former kingdom of Naples. -Caroline was at last a Queen. - -The royal pair began at once to treat their new kingdom much as Sancho -Panza had determined to treat his island. Taxes were increased, the army -was reorganized, and preparations were set on foot for the conquest of -Sicily. To gain popularity with the Neapolitans they abrogated some of -the more obnoxious decrees of Murat’s predecessor, and they further -employed all their arts to blacken his memory, so that they would by -contrast appear the better rulers. - -But Napoleon nipped this scheme in the bud at once. Every day brought -fresh thunders from Paris. The Emperor sent furious orders forbidding -certain measures, enjoining others, until it became very evident that he -was determined to rule Naples himself, although he was content to allow -Murat to bear the title and honours of King. Poor Murat could do nothing -right. Any well-advised action on his part was looked upon as potential -treason, while any failure called forth tornadoes of wrath from Paris. -When, by a well-planned raid, he captured Capri from Sir Hudson Lowe, he -was actually censured for informing the Emperor through the Ministry of -Foreign Affairs instead of through the Ministry for War! Murat and -Caroline chafed against their bonds, but while the Empire stood firm -they were powerless. - -Meanwhile, Pauline and Elise, although not as successful as Caroline, -had nevertheless attained to some measure of sovereignty. Elise -contrived for the greater part of the time to have her dullard husband -sent away on various duties, while she herself flirted gaily with every -man she could. As a matter of fact, her flirting was never so serious as -was her sisters’; she had another outlet for her ingenuity in that she -was passionately devoted to the stage and to all connected with it. She -visited the theatre as often as she could; she read plays in hundreds, -and she indulged in amateur theatricals whenever possible. When Italy -was being parcelled out into fiefs by Napoleon, she prevailed on her -brother to allot to her the principality of Piombino in full -sovereignty, and later she contrived to have Lucca added to her little -state. Here she settled down for a time, with all the paraphernalia of -sovereignty, equerries, chamberlains, ladies-in-waiting, and especially -a Court troupe of actors. Baciocchi, her husband, had indeed been given -the title of Prince of Piombino, but Elise alone had been given the -principality. Baciocchi was merely his wife’s subject, and Elise made -the most of it. He could never worry her again, for Elise allotted him -apartments far distant from her own, and never saw him without a third -person being present. Scandal said that other men were allowed greater -privileges, but there is nothing very definite from which one may draw -reliable conclusions. - -Soon Elise received further promotion. Napoleon cast a covetous eye upon -the kingdom of Etruria which had set up in 1802, and by treaty with -Spain he arranged to give the widowed Queen of Etruria (a Spanish -princess) a new kingdom of Northern Lusitania in exchange. That this new -kingdom was to be carved out of Portugal troubled him not at all; he -even promised to make Godoy (First Minister of Spain) Prince of the -Algarve, another Portuguese district. He had very little intention of -fulfilling either promise, but they enabled him to send Junot marching -hotfoot on Lisbon, and to annex Tuscany to the Empire. Elise seized her -opportunity. By cajolery and blandishment she persuaded Napoleon to -erect Tuscany into a government-general, and to confer upon her the -ruling power with the title of Grand Duchess of Tuscany. Poor Baciocchi -was appointed general of division in command of the French garrison. -Elise settled down in the Pitti palace at Florence, and proceeded to -rule the cradle of the Renaissance, the erstwhile domain of the Medicis, -as thoroughly as her brother would allow her. - -Pauline’s widowhood ended in a much more splendid match than was made by -any of the other Bonapartes. She took as her second husband Prince -Camillo Borghese, the head of one of the most renowned houses of Italy. -The marriage was not a success (no Bonaparte marriage was, at that -time), but Borghese’s wealth and the presents Napoleon heaped upon her -enabled Pauline to indulge every whim of which she was capable. Proud of -her reputation as the most beautiful woman of the time, she did all she -could to enhance and set off her beauty. Like Poppæa, she bathed every -day in milk—a hot milk bath followed by a cold milk shower. She -surrounded herself with negro servants and dwarfs, by way of contrast, -and her extravagances and wanton waste of money were the talk of the -whole Empire. Canova carved her statue, and despite his cold classicism -we can still perceive in that recumbent, self-satisfied figure the -fiery, tempestuous woman who was once Pauline. Her posing semi-nude, -even to such a sculptor as Canova, called forth a storm of comment from -a gossip-loving Empire. The tale was told that when Pauline was asked if -she did not feel uncomfortable, posing half-dressed, she replied, “Oh -no, there was a fire in the room.” - -When Elise received Piombino, Pauline begged Guastalla from Napoleon, -and as Duchess she, too, held sovereignty. Borghese was made -Governor-General of the Piedmontese departments, and was sent to Turin -with an enormous Civil List to play the part of a semi-royalty, and to -reconcile the Piedmontese to the loss of their Sardinian king. Such a -task was naturally agreeable to Pauline, and in Turin she and Borghese -did their best to astonish the provincials with a series of fêtes of -unheard-of opulence. Pauline was the most talked about of all -Bonaparte’s sisters; the voice of adulation praised her beauty; the -voice of vituperation hinted frightful things about her morals. She was -accused of hideous vices, of too great an affection for her brothers, of -a lunatic passion for various men. Pauline apparently did not mind. She -went gaily on through life, quarrelling with Borghese, spending money -like water, indulging in hectic episodes with artists and soldiers, and -generally recalling to mind the old days of the Borgias and the -Viscontis. - -With the publication of the fate of Napoleon’s Russian expedition a -shudder ran through the Empire. Murat, whom Napoleon had left in command -of the wreck of the Grand Army, deserted his charge and rushed home so -as to be at hand to preserve his own kingdom should the Empire fall. -Prussia became Russia’s ally. Sweden, under Bernadotte, had already done -the same. Napoleon made a gigantic effort; in three months he raised and -equipped an army of three hundred thousand men; he beat back the Allies, -winning victories at Lützen and Bautzen; for a space it seemed as if he -would regain his old European domination. Consequently the pendulum of -his allies’ attitude swung back once more towards faithfulness, and -Murat left Naples once more to command the cavalry of the Grand Army. -But already Caroline and he had negotiated a secret convention with -Austria by which he would declare war on France if called upon to do so. -Elise in Tuscany had decided to join him, although, unfortunately for -her, she extracted no definite promise from Austria that she would -retain her throne. - -Thus, while Murat was fighting for the Grand Army, leading charges made -by fifty and seventy squadrons at a time, and capturing twelve thousand -Austrian prisoners in a single battle, his wife in Naples was assuring -Austria of his devotion to Austria; she was recruiting the Neapolitan -army to the utmost, and, while not actually moving against France, she -was refusing to allow a single Neapolitan battalion to go to Napoleon’s -help. Then came the French defeats of 1813, culminating in the disaster -of Leipzig. It was obvious that the Empire could not endure much longer. -Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg, all turned against Napoleon, and Murat -realized that if he delayed further the Allies would not have so -pressing a need for his aid, and he would be unable to secure his throne -by his treachery. Without further hesitation he left the beaten Emperor, -hurried across Europe through the first snows of autumn, and reached -Naples early in November. The Neapolitan army was at last going to -advance. - -The advance was a very slow and cautious one. Eugène de Beauharnais, -Viceroy of Italy, was fighting fiercely in Venetia against the -Austrians. Tempting offers were made to him by the Allies, but he -refused them; his dignified replies are worthy of Bayard or Francis I. -But Murat and his Neapolitans were moving steadily northward; even now -he had made no public declaration as to which side he was on, and in -private he and Caroline were assuring Eugène, Napoleon and the Austrians -at one and the same time of their unfailing support. Nor was this all. -They were further intriguing with the infant United Italy party in an -endeavour to increase their dominion in that way; while in addition they -had made some sort of agreement with Elise Bonaparte in Tuscany. It -would be hard to discover anywhere in history an equally loathsome -example of double-dealing. - -Murat occupied the Papal States, Tuscany, and portions of the Kingdom of -Italy, but he still refrained from making any open attack on either -French or Austrians. Not until March 6th, 1814, when he received from -Caroline definite news of the certainty of the fall of the Empire, did -he attack Eugène’s forces. He achieved little, and after two fierce -little skirmishes he subsided once more into inaction. At last official -intimation of Napoleon’s fall came to hand, and, abandoning Elise to her -fate, Murat returned to Naples. Further diplomacy confirmed him in his -possession of Naples; the only person concerned who kept to his pledged -word in all the intricacies of the negotiations was Francis of Austria. - -Thus 1815 found Napoleon’s three sisters in very different situations. -Caroline was still a Queen; Elise, turned out of Tuscany by the -Austrians, was a pensioner on her bounty; while Pauline, who alone had -remained faithful to her brother, was living with Napoleon at Elba. -Suddenly there came another dramatic change, for Napoleon escaped from -Elba, and within a few days was once more Emperor of the French. Italy -was again plunged into a ferment. Murat and Caroline were naturally -anxious, for they could not expect that Napoleon would forgive their -black treachery of the year before, while it was only too obvious that -not a single country in Europe retained any interest in their possession -of the throne of Naples. In these circumstances Murat took the first -heroic decision of his life, and decided to cut the Gordian knot by -force of arms. He declared war against Austria, proclaimed a United -Italy, and with fifty thousand men he marched northward to establish -himself as King of Italy. It was a vain effort. The Neapolitan army was -a wretched force, and Murat himself was worse than useless in -independent command. The Austrian army hurriedly concentrated, defeated -Murat in one or two minor actions, and finally utterly routed him at -Tolentino. The Neapolitans deserted in thousands, and Murat re-entered -his dominions with only five thousand men left. The Austrians followed -him up remorselessly; the Sicilians were preparing an expedition against -him; and all that was left for Murat to do was to abdicate and fly for -his life. - -Caroline was successful in obtaining the protection of Francis of -Austria, and she soon went off to settle down in Austria with a pension -and a residence. Murat had reached France, and for some weeks he was in -hiding in Marseilles. After Waterloo he left by sea to join his wife, -but on his way he changed his mind and took his second heroic decision. -Napoleon had regained France simply by appearing in person before his -army; why should not Murat regain Naples in the same way? Murat landed -with a score of companions at Pizzo in Calabria, and marched into the -market place with his escort shouting “Long live King Joachim!” For a -moment there was an astonished silence, and then the townspeople fell on -the little party. Not for nothing had Murat decorated every mile of -every road in Calabria with a gallows from which hung captured bandits; -every soul in Pizzo must have had a blood feud with their late King. -Battered with sticks and stones, Murat was seized and flung into prison, -and five days later he was tried and shot. - -Murat’s attempt was the last spurt of the Napoleonic feeling for a long -period. Not until, with the passage of years, the Legend had been built -up, do we hear of any surprising action or heroic deed. Europe sank into -a slough of inaction, crushed down by the weight of the Holy Alliance -and the burden of accumulated debts. The most typical action of a dull -generation was the establishment on the throne of France of fat, -pathetic, bourgeois Louis Philippe as King of the French. It was a safe -thing to do, and Louis Philippe and his Amelia did their best to make it -remain safe. No risks were taken until the movement of 1848. Happiness -has no history, and there is precious little history about the period -1815-48. Had the Holy Alliance had its way, there would be even less. -Somehow one cannot help feeling that the dullness of the period is the -dullness of unhappiness. It was the time when “order reigned in Warsaw,” -when little children died in droves in English factories, when in Naples -the negation of God was erected into a system of government. Historians -may sneer at the ineffectiveness of the Napoleonides; they may point to -a pillaged, blood-drenched Europe writhing under the heel of a Corsican -Emperor; they can draw horrible pictures of the sacks of Lübeck or -Badajoz, but they are unconvincing when they attempt to prove that there -was more unhappiness under the Empire than under the Holy Alliance. -Peace has its defeats as well as war. - -This digression may be unpardonable, but it was nevertheless inevitable. -Let us minimize our error, even if we cannot repair it, by turning back -to the consideration of three fair and frail women whom we left thrust -back unwillingly into a private station of life. One of them did not -long survive the calamities of 1814. This was Elise. The Allies refused -her request to join Napoleon at St. Helena, and she lived quietly in -Italy until her death in 1820. She was only forty-two when she died. -Pauline had the advantage over her sisters of having a husband whose -position was independent of the Empire. Prince Borghese was a very -considerable person in Rome, and Pauline for some time was a leading -figure in Italian society. It did not last long, however. She quarrelled -with her husband; her beauty left her; Austrian, French and Papal -surveillance worried her, and she died in 1825. - -Caroline, the most capable and cold-hearted of all the Bonapartes, after -Napoleon, bore her troubles with more dignity and for a much longer -time. As the Countess of Lipona (an anagram of Napoli) she lived for -some time in Austria; she travelled restlessly about; she seemed in fact -to have completely recovered from the shock of the loss of her husband -and her throne, when at last a whole series of deaths broke down her -reserve and shortened her life. Pauline and Elise, as has been said, -were already dead; in 1832 the Prince Imperial (Napoleon II.) died at -Vienna; Prince Borghese died in the same year. Another brother-in-law, -Baciocchi, died in 1834; Catherine of Westphalia, her best beloved -sister-in-law, died in 1835, and then in 1836 Madame Mère, her stern but -adored mother, also died. Caroline endured her loneliness for a little -while longer, but she died in 1839. Even she, almost the last of her -generation, was only fifty-six at her death. - -None of the Bonaparte family was as long-lived as Napoleon’s mother. -Maria Letizia Ramolino was certainly one of the greatest women of the -period. Elise Bonaparte might be called the Semiramis of Italy; Caroline -might intrigue for Empires; Pauline might be the most beautiful woman of -France; but their mother combined all their good qualities with very few -of their bad ones. To bring up a family of eight children thoroughly -well on an income of less than one hundred pounds a year in a -revolution-torn country like Corsica is in itself a remarkable feat, -though hardly likely in unfavourable circumstances to gain mention in -history, but to do it when handicapped by a husband like Carlo Bonaparte -is more remarkable still. The strain of those dreadful years in Ajaccio -would have broken down anyone of stuff less stern than Maria Letizia’s; -pitched battles were fought in the streets outside the Bonapartes’ -house; three-quarters of Corsica were at feud with the Bonapartes and -the party they represented; death threatened them all at different -times, while all the time a most bitter, grinding poverty harried them -unmercifully. - -Maria Letizia came through the ordeal unbroken in body or spirit. Even -Napoleon’s fierce pride humbled itself before her, and her other -children were her slaves. But she had a woman’s weaknesses as well as a -man’s strength. She was bitterly jealous of her daughter-in-law -Josephine; she was bigoted in church matters; and she fought like a -tigress in the cause of whichever of her children was experiencing -misfortune. When Lucien left France in disgrace in consequence of his -marriage to Madame Jouberthon, his mother strove desperately hard to -re-establish him. She went to Italy to be near him, and endeavoured, by -absenting herself at the time of the coronation, to force Napoleon to -recall Lucien and herself together. However, her great son outwitted her -on this occasion, for he dispensed with her presence, and yet arranged -with David the artist for her portrait to appear along with the other -French dignitaries in the celebrated picture of the coronation. - -Letizia had a very good opinion of her own position. When Napoleon -became Emperor, and made his brothers and sisters Imperial Highnesses, -she demanded some greater title for herself. Napoleon was in a quandary, -for on consulting precedents he found that no French king’s mother had -ever been given any such honour if she had never been queen. Letizia -insisted, and, almost at his wits’ end, Napoleon at last gave her a -singular dignity. He awarded her the same position and precedence as -used to be given under the Bourbons to the wife of the king’s second -son. The king’s second son was Monsieur, and his wife was Madame. -Letizia was named Madame, and as a subsidiary title she was called Mère -de S.M. l’Empéreur et Roi. Almost at once the titles were merged -together in common speech, and Letizia was called Madame Mère everywhere -except at strict official gatherings. - -By the time that the Empire was firmly founded, and all her children -except Lucien were seated on thrones, Letizia was able to give free rein -to the passion which came only second with her to her love for her -children. It is said that shipwrecked sailors who have been starved for -a long time cannot help, after being rescued, hoarding fragments of food -for fear of another period of famine. With Madame Mère a similar state -of affairs prevailed. She had felt the pinch of poverty for fifty years, -and in no circumstances could she endure it again. She still lived as -cheaply as she could, and she saved her money like a miser. She coaxed -Napoleon into giving her an annual income of a million francs, and she -did not spend a quarter of it. She did her best to obtain a sovereignty -for herself, not that she wanted to rule, but because she could sell the -fief back to the French and invest the proceeds. She made money by acute -speculation. She clung like grim death to every sou which came within -her reach. - -Yet avarice pure and simple was not the sole motive of her actions. Just -as a prophet has no honour in his own country, so the Emperor and the -Kings and Princesses who were her children still seemed to be children -to her, and all their talk of sovereignty was little better than -childish prattling. She did not believe for one moment that the Empire -could long endure, and in this her judgment was more acute than that of -the majority of European statesmen. Wellington, as early as 1809, had -seen through the shams and pretences of the glittering Empire, but few -other men, not even Metternich, agreed with him at that time. But Madame -Mère saw the end long before it came, and it was against that time of -need that she saved so avariciously. Her judgment was proved accurate, -and her savings proved useful in 1814. - -In 1802 she had befriended Lucien; in 1805, Jerome; in 1810, Louis; now -the greatest of her sons had met with adversity, and Letizia rushed to -his assistance. She shared his exile in Elba, and from her own purse she -provided the money which enabled him to maintain his Lilliputian court. -She was by his side during the Hundred Days, and after he had been sent -to St. Helena she returned to Italy and resumed the headship of the -family. Her wealth as well as her marvellous personality assured her the -respect of her sons and daughters. The death of the Prince Imperial in -1832 was a terrible shock to her; she had long been looking to him to -restore the fame of the exiled house, and she had arranged to leave him -all her money and papers. She did not long survive his death, but died -in 1836, at the age of eighty-six. - -She lies buried in Ajaccio, and the inscription over her tomb can still -make the casual tourist catch his breath, and still makes the blood of -Corsican youth run a little faster— - - MARIA LETIZIA RAMOLINO BONAPARTE. - MATER REGUM. - -[Illustration: CAROLINE MURAT - (née BONAPARTE)] - - - - - CHAPTER XII - STARS OF LESSER MAGNITUDE - - -‟BAD troops do not exist,” said Napoleon on one occasion. “There are -only bad officers.” Napoleon did his best therefore to find good -officers, and trusted that the rank and file would through them become -good soldiers. And yet, was he successful either in his end or in his -method? The army of 1796, which he did not train, was timid in retreat -though terrible in advance. The men were fanatics, and similar strengths -and weaknesses are typical of fanatics in large bodies. In 1800 Napoleon -had an army which he could manœuvre in line, and which bore the dreadful -strain of Marengo without breaking. Half the men in the ranks, however, -were untrained boys, who, as Napoleon’s despatches tell us, were -ignorant a few days before the battle as to which eye they should use to -aim their muskets. Marengo was largely a personal triumph for Napoleon; -it was his vehement encouragement, coupled with the confident -expectation of Desaix’ arrival, which held the men together during that -long-drawn agony. - -The peace which followed Hohenlinden gave Napoleon a chance to train an -army as he wished, and the Austerlitz campaign found him at the head of -an army of two hundred thousand men, half of them veterans, all of them -of very considerable length of service, who were to a man inspired with -the utmost enthusiasm for him and for the Empire. Yet at Austerlitz the -line was abandoned almost entirely in favour of the column; the columns -showed evident signs of disintegration even when victorious. It was -already a little obvious that the Imperial armies were only adapted to a -furious offensive effort, and that failure of this effort meant -unlimited catastrophe. At Jena the Prussians were too heavily -outnumbered to offer any serious resistance, but at Eylau the French -army was only saved from destruction after the failure of their first -offensive by the fact that Napoleon held ready at hand eighteen thousand -cavalry, and by the constitutional sluggishness of the Russian army. - -Friedland offered the last example of a really heroic defensive by an -Imperial force, but the soul of that defensive was Lannes. Few other men -could have held a French army corps together against superior forces as -did Lannes on that fateful anniversary of Marengo. After Friedland we -find the French army growing progressively poorer and more unreliable. -We read of panics at Wagram, of the introduction of regimental artillery -to give the infantry confidence, of shameless skulking on the field of -battle and of heavy desertion while on the march. Discipline was fading -at the same time as devotion to the Emperor was losing some of its -force. In the Russian campaign of 1812 the Grand Army had barely crossed -the frontier before it began to go to pieces. Napoleon could not trust -his men to manœuvre at Borodino, and in consequence he had to rely on -frontal attacks made against elaborate fieldworks defended by the most -stubborn of all Continental infantry. At the crisis of the battle he -refused to fling the Imperial Guard into the struggle; some thought it -was because he was too far from his base to risk his best reserve; some -suspected Bessières of having implored him not to waste his best troops; -but perhaps the reason was a more logical one. Had the Guard been sent -forward and been beaten back, the whole army would have fallen back -routed; at Waterloo Napoleon took the risk and lost; at Borodino he -refused to take it and was satisfied with an indecisive gain. - -The Grand Army perished in Russia, but in three months Napoleon raised, -trained and equipped three hundred thousand more men and was for a time -once more successful. Curiously enough, this raw infantry of 1813 was to -all intents and purposes of greater military value than the two or three -year trained infantry of 1812. The army of 1812 possessed the little -knowledge proverbially dangerous, and would not willingly expose itself -to sacrifice, but the novices of 1813 knew nothing of war, and suffered -losses and privations which would have roused veterans to mutiny. At -Lützen Ney’s corps of half-grown boys endured for hours the attack of -the whole Allied force, and fought like demons in the shelter of the -villages of Gorschen and Kaya. At Bautzen the French attacked with a -dash and fury reminiscent of Elchingen or Saalfeld. Before Dresden they -accomplished a march which easily bears comparison with anything -achieved in 1796. But the decline of their fame had already begun. At -the Katzbach, at Gross Beeren, at Dennewitz, the conscripts fled in -panic. They had discovered by this time that a battle generally implies -the sacrifice of one portion of the army while the rest gains the -victory, and they were one and all determined not to be the sacrifice. -At Leipzig what was left of the army of 1813 lost the greater part of -its numbers—a new lesson to the effect that it is easier to surrender -than to fight had been learned. Napoleon’s last victorious phase, in the -campaign of France in 1814, coincides with his use of a fresh army of -raw conscripts, and his surrender took place when the men of the ranks -had once more learnt the lessons of their predecessors. - -Waterloo, the last battle of the Empire, epitomizes all these -observations. The French attacked with dash, but a single reverse was -sufficient to weaken the infantry so much that no support was -forthcoming for the later cavalry attacks. A powerful counter-attack by -the enemy brought about, not merely retreat, but unspeakable panic. -Practically every battalion which had been in action broke and fled. The -Guard, which had moved forward so majestically, dispersed like the -merest conscripts. The only troops which held together were the reserve -battalions of the Old Guard, which had not yet been engaged, and for a -time Lobau’s corps at Planchenoit. The Prussians after Jena were not so -hopelessly disorganized as were the French after Waterloo. - -Napoleon undoubtedly appreciated this weakness of his army, and this -explains the reckless manner in which he sought battle at all costs, and -the risks he cheerfully ran in his endeavour to get to grips with his -enemy. His headlong, energetic strategy gave him the initiative, and -this initiative he retained on the field of battle. Jena, Eylau, -Eckmühl, Aspern, Wagram, Borodino, were all examples of a fierce -tactical offensive. On the two principal occasions, at Austerlitz and -Friedland, when he confined some part of his force to a dogged -defensive, he saw that the generals in command were men of wide personal -influence, and that the troops they led were the best available. Davout -and Lannes were certainly successful. At Lützen Ney’s necessarily -defensive rôle was not fully foreseen, but he was able to hold on, -partly through the enthusiasm of his young men, partly through the -advantage they possessed in holding the villages, and partly through -Wittgenstein’s bungling of the attack. - -At no period in its development will Napoleon’s army bear comparison -with, say, the army of Cromwell, or the original force of Gustavus -Adolphus, or with the army of the Third Republic. It incidentally -follows that Napoleon’s military achievements should be rated even -higher than they usually are, seeing that the immense successes he -gained were gained with inferior troops. - -But if the rank and file were of this doubtful quality, it was far -otherwise with the officers, and the statement of Napoleon’s with which -this chapter opens is therefore subject to doubt. Napoleon’s method of -making war support war exposed his armies, as he candidly admitted, to a -loss of one-half of their numbers every year, and since this loss fell -far more heavily on the privates than on the officers, it followed that -a very widely experienced corps of officers was built up. It was quite -usual for men of good birth to serve a few months in the ranks before -taking commissions; Marbot and Bugeaud are good examples of this among -the younger men. Once they had gained their lieutenancy anything might -happen. They might in ten years be dukes and generals, or they might -still be lieutenants. The open system of promotion was stimulating, -certainly, but it was undoubtedly unfair at times. Curély, who served -from 1800 to 1814, and was subsequently admitted to be the best light -cavalry officer in the French service, only attained his colonelcy in -his last campaign. The men who received the most rapid promotion were -those who had attracted Napoleon’s notice in 1796 or in the Egyptian -campaign. Some of these choices were highly successful, as witness the -career of Davout, but others were positively harmful. Marmont was a -failure, Junot was a failure, Murat was a failure, while men of -undoubted talent served in twenty campaigns without receiving promotion. -Kellermann the younger fought at Waterloo with the same military rank as -he had held at Marengo. Suchet, who was one of the most successful -generals of division in 1799, remained a general of division until 1811. -If this was the case with the higher ranks, it must have been nearly as -bad with the lower ranks. When the rush of promotion of the -Revolutionary era ended, advancement became very slow indeed. A man who -was a captain at the battle of the Pyramids might well consider himself -fortunate if he commanded a battalion at Ligny. Occasionally, however, -the divisional generals were given their chance. The vast expansion of -the Imperial Army for the Russian campaign increased the commands of -some of the Marshals to eighty or a hundred thousand men, and generals -of division similarly found themselves at the head of twenty or thirty -thousand. Many of them displayed talents of a very high order. St. Cyr -won the battle of Polotsk, for which he received his bâton. The most -remarkable example occurred at Salamanca. Here Wellington had flung -himself suddenly on the over-extended Army of Portugal, had shattered -one wing, and had beaten back the remainder in dire confusion; Marmont, -the commander-in-chief, was badly wounded. Bonnet had hardly succeeded -to the command when he was killed. Several other generals of division -were struck down. The man who took over command of the fleeing mob was -already wounded. He was practically unknown; he was leading a beaten -army in wild retreat from the finest troops in the world. And yet he -rallied that beaten army; in the course of a few hours he had them once -more in hand. He faced about time and again as he toiled across the -wasted Castilian plains; in a dozen fierce rearguard actions he taught -the exultant English that some Frenchmen, as well as being more than men -in victory, were not less than women in defeat, and he showed Wellington -that every French general was not a Marmont. Every morning found his -army posted in some strong position; all day long the English marched by -wretched roads and over thirsty plains to turn the flanks; every evening -as the movement was nearing completion the French fell back to some new -position where the English had to resume the whole weary business next -day. The French survived the severest defeat they had yet received in -the Peninsula at English hands with astonishingly little loss; a few -weeks later they had so far recovered as to thrust fiercely forward once -more, and aid in driving Wellington from Madrid. The man who was -responsible for this wonderful achievement deserved reward. Bessières -and Marmont had been given bâtons for much less. A title, a marshalate, -a dotation of a million francs would not have seemed too much for saving -for France a kingdom, an army of forty thousand men, and dependent -forces numbering a quarter of a million. But Clausel was not made -Marshal, nor Duke of Burgos. Instead he was recalled, and an inferior -general, Souham, sent in his place. Napoleon had a prejudice against -“retreating generals” dating from the days of Moreau. Clausel took the -affront philosophically, and fought on for his Emperor. When it was too -late, his worth was recognized, and during the Hundred Days he was given -the independent command of the Pyrenees. After Waterloo he fled from -France with a price on his head. Clausel went unrewarded; Murat was -over-rewarded. Their lines of conduct differed greatly. - -The men who were never granted the coveted rank of Marshal, but who did -each as much for France as any one of half the Marshals, are in number -legion. Their very names would fill a page. Kellermann the younger has -already been mentioned. At Marengo his desperate charge at the head of -the heavy cavalry saved the day, and “set the crown of France on -Napoleon’s head.” But Napoleon found it far safer and far cheaper to -praise a dead man, and he awarded the chief credit to the slain Desaix. -D’Hautpoult died at the head of his Cuirassiers at Eylau, charging one -army to save another. St. Hilaire, the finest of them all, died -miserably at Essling, with the Empire reeling round him. Lasalle, the -pride of the light cavalry, the man who captured Stettin with a few -score Hussars, fell at the head of his men in the pursuit after Wagram. -Montbrun, another Cuirassier, was killed in the great redoubt at -Borodino. - -Their names are carved upon the Arc de Triomphe, and the bourgeois peer -at them with self-satisfaction. They fell in a far less worthy cause -than did the myriad Frenchmen who died by poison gas and shrapnel in the -trenches a few years ago. To us now it seems to be nearly blasphemy to -think in the same moment of the Moskowa and the Marne, or to speak in -the same breath of the sieges of Verdun and of Hamburg. The Englishman -turns lightly from the great names on the Arc de Triomphe, and thinks -with proud regret of the simple inscription on an empty tomb in -Whitehall. And yet these men were the wonders of their time. They did -their duty; more cannot be said of any man, and much less of most. They -gave their lives with a smile for a country which they adored. Danger -was as usual to them as was the air they breathed. They gave their blood -in streams; they marched with their men into every Continental capital. -Their cowed enemies regarded them timidly, as though they were beings -from another world. Their continued success and their overwhelming -victories might well have led them to believe themselves superhuman. And -when Waterloo was fought and lost they went back to their beloved -France—such of them as survived—and nursed their wounds on pensions of -thirty pounds a year. - -There was one general of division who attained as near as might be to a -marshalate without quite achieving this last step. He was made a duke -and he gained a vast fortune. This man was Junot. Junot, indeed, is -often stated to have received his bâton, but he never did, although he -was as much a favourite of Napoleon’s at one time as was Marmont. It was -Junot who at Toulon was writing a letter at Bonaparte’s dictation, when -a cannon shot plunged near-by and scattered earth over them. “We need no -sand to dry the ink now,” laughed Junot, and from that day his future -was made. He married Mademoiselle Laurette Permon, whom Napoleon had -once courted, and whose memoirs are one of the most interesting books of -the period. Junot himself served as Bonaparte’s aide-de-camp all over -Europe and in Egypt as well. He received promotion steadily, and was a -general of division in a very brief while. With that rank, however, he -was forced to be content, for Napoleon realized his shortcomings, while -a wound in the head which he early received unbalanced him a little -mentally. The one outstanding feature of his character was his -passionate devotion to Napoleon. Napoleon was his God, and Junot served -him with a faithfulness almost unexampled. Adventures came his way with -a frequency characteristic of the period. He fell into English hands and -was exchanged; he went as ambassador to Portugal and made a large -fortune; he was appointed Governor of Paris, and withstood Caroline -Bonaparte’s blandishments when she tried to induce him to subvert the -Government. Half dead with wounds, he travelled across Europe in -November, 1805, and arrived at Austerlitz on the very morning of the -battle. He was again wounded heading a charge that day. In 1807 Napoleon -gave him a command which he hoped would bring him fame, and a marshalate -was promised in the event of success. Junot was to lead the army of -Portugal from France to Lisbon; he was to capture the Portuguese royal -family and the English shipping in the harbour; he was to tear down the -Portuguese Government and to rule the country himself in the name of the -Emperor. Junot set out with a mixed French and Spanish force numbering -nearly forty thousand men. At every stage he received frantic orders -from Paris demanding greater speed from him and his men. Junot did what -he could. The whole valley of the Tagus was littered with the guns, dead -horses and exhausted men whom he had left behind. His army was dispersed -into fragments, and it was only with four hundred men at his back that -Junot burst into Lisbon. The English shipping and the Portuguese royal -family had fled the day before. - -Junot was in a serious position. With four hundred men he had to rule a -large town simmering with rebellion, but he succeeded, and held the -country down while the rest of his army trailed disconsolately into -Lisbon. His astonishing march had not achieved its object, and the -marshal’s bâton was therefore withheld. Napoleon offered some sort of -consolation by creating Junot Duke of Abrantès, but there is no doubt -that the disappointment weighed heavily upon him. Napoleon had meditated -making Junot Duke of Nazareth, in memory of his victory during the -Syrian campaign, but he had decided that it would be inadvisable, as the -soldiers would call him “Junot of Nazareth.” - -Napoleon was not quite so far-sighted when at the same time he made -Victor, at the suggestion of one of the wits of his court, Duke of -Belluno. Victor was commonly called the Beau Soleil of the French Army. -Napoleon’s investiture made him Duke of Belle Lune. - -Immediately afterwards the Spanish war broke out, and Junot found -himself isolated at Lisbon. He gathered his forces together, and without -any help whatever from France he maintained them and re-equipped them at -the cost of unfortunate Portugal. But it was not to last long, for -Wellington landed in Mondego bay, and Junot, furiously attacking him, -was badly beaten at Vimiero. There followed the Convention of Cintra. By -it Junot and his men were transported back to France with their arms, -baggage and plunder; all that the English gained was a bloodless -occupation of Portugal. It is difficult now to decide who had the best -of this agreement. Certainly Napoleon thought that Junot had made a good -bargain, and equally certainly the English public thought that -Wellington had blundered badly. - -If the Convention had not been concluded, the English would have cut -Junot off from France (two hundred thousand Spanish insurgents had done -that already) and would have shut him up in Lisbon. Without a doubt, -Junot would have made a desperate resistance there. Masséna’s holding of -Genoa in 1800 might have been re-enacted, and the wretched Portuguese -might have starved while Junot held out. In this event the hands of the -English would have been so full that no help could have been offered to -the Spanish armies; Moore’s skilful thrust at Sahagun could never have -been made, and the Spaniards might have met with utter annihilation. By -the Convention of Cintra, France gained an immediate benefit, but -England eventually gained even more. - -After Vimiero, Junot’s military career is one of continued -failure—failure under Masséna in the Busaco campaign, failure under -Napoleon in the Russian campaign, until at last the Duke of Abrantès was -sent into comparative exile as Governor of Illyria. Here his troubles, -his wounds and his disappointments bore too heavily upon him. He went -raving mad, and performed all sorts of lunatic actions in his Illyrian -province until he was removed to France. At Dijon he flung himself from -a window and killed himself. Junot is one more example of those whom -Napoleon favoured, who met with horrible ends. - -But Marshals and Generals alike, Napoleon’s superior officers were -nearly all distinguished by one common failing—a dread of -responsibility and a hopeless irresolution when compelled to act on -their own initiative. The examples of this are almost too numerous to -mention; the most striking perhaps is Berthier’s failure during the -early period of the campaign of 1809. There are many others which had -much more important results, although at first they seem trivial in -comparison. Thus, Dupont’s surrender at Baylen, although it only -involved twenty thousand men, was one of the principal causes of the -prolongation of the Peninsular War. Dupont surrendered with twenty -thousand men; his action necessitated the employment in the Peninsula of -three hundred thousand men for six years afterwards. - -Another incident of the same type was Vandamme’s disaster at Kulm. -Vandamme was a burly, heavy-jawed soldier of the furious and thoughtless -kind, who had learnt his trade thoroughly well by rule of thumb, and who -had made his name a byword throughout Germany on account of his dreadful -depredations. His boast was that he feared neither God nor devil, and -Napoleon referred to this once when he said that Vandamme was the most -valuable of all his soldiers because he was the only one he could employ -in a war against the Infernal regions, should such a contingency arise. - -In July, 1813, the Armistice of Pleisswitz had come to an end, and -Austria had joined the ranks of Napoleon’s enemies. The Grand Army was -in Silesia when the news arrived that the Austrians were marching on -Dresden. Napoleon turned back without hesitation, marched a hundred and -twenty miles in four days, and by what was almost his last victory he -saved the town. At the commencement of his march he had detached -Vandamme with twenty thousand men to hold the passes of the Erz Gebirge -against the retreating forces. The beaten Austrian army came reeling -back towards them. The Emperor of Austria and the Czar of Russia were -present in its ranks, and it seemed as if nothing could save them from -surrender. Fortunately, perhaps, for Europe, Napoleon was unwell and did -not press the pursuit as closely as he might have done, and Vandamme, -who rushed into peril like a bull into the ring, without outposts, -without flank guards, without any reasonable protection, was overwhelmed -by forces outnumbering his by four to one, and was forced to surrender. -Vandamme may have feared neither God nor devil, but he had not the -brains for a command in chief, even against men. - -His own honour he redeemed from all possible accusations of cowardice, -when, a prisoner in Austrian hands, with all the possibilities before -him of condemnation to slow death in a salt-mine or speedy death on the -spot, he was led before the Czar, and he did not quail. Alexander rated -him for his excesses in Prussia, and Vandamme hit back at Alexander’s -tender spot—his conscience. “At least I did not kill my own father,” -said Vandamme. - -Indecision characterizes the actions of many French generals during the -Empire. The most discussed case perhaps was Grouchy’s hesitation at -Wavre during the Waterloo campaign, and this, curiously enough, was not -really hesitation. The sole military crime of which Grouchy was guilty -was a too pedantic obedience to orders. Grouchy has been blamed for -misreading the situation and for not marching from Wavre on Waterloo, -but Napoleon misread the situation just as badly, as his orders to -Grouchy clearly prove. Moreover, once Grouchy’s hands had been freed by -the destruction of the main French army, his actions were exceedingly -bold and competent. His retreat across the Allies’ rear and his capture -of Namur were manœuvres of sound military skill. - -Grouchy’s military career had been in every way honourable throughout -his life. He had ridden bravely to destruction at the head of his -dragoons during Murat’s charge at Eylau. He had fought magnificently at -Friedland and elsewhere. The only other time when he had been in -independent command, and when he did display genuine dilatoriness was -many years before when he had found himself in command owing to the loss -of Hoche on the French expedition to Bantry Bay in 1796. Grouchy’s -courage failed him then, and he withdrew at the very time when his -landing would have set Ireland in an inextinguishable blaze. For a -series of quite strictly correct actions at Waterloo Grouchy has gone -down to history as a fool and a humbug, but he was neither—to any great -extent. - -During the Waterloo campaign there was certainly one example of a -general being overwhelmed by his sense of responsibility. Up to the -moment of execution not one of Napoleon’s plans of attack had been more -brilliantly conceived or better arranged. A hundred and twenty thousand -men were assembled at the crossings of the Sambre by Charleroi without -the enemy gathering more than a hint as to what was in the air; in fact -the Allies’ Intelligence completely lost sight of Gérard’s corps of -sixteen thousand men. From this point, however, the arrangements rapidly -grew worse and worse. Bad staff work caused delays at the crossing of -the Sambre; Ney’s unexpected appointment to the command of the left wing -was disturbing, in that he was without a staff and his sudden elevation -annoyed d’Erlon and Reille, his subordinate corps commanders. Zieten’s -stubborn rearguard actions held up the French columns for a considerable -time; and finally a sort of universal misunderstanding led to everyone -being more or less in the dark as to the need for a determined and -immediate attack. Ney, goaded by repeated orders, at last attacked at -Quatre Bras quite six hours later than he should have done, and even -then he had only half his force in hand. The other half, under d’Erlon, -was making its way towards him, when it was caught up by an aide-de-camp -of Napoleon’s, who was bearing a message to Ney requesting him to send -help to the Emperor at Ligny. The aide-de-camp, on his own -responsibility, sent d’Erlon marching over towards Ligny instead of to -Quatre Bras, and went on to inform Ney of his action. Ney was furious. -Every moment the British army in front of him was being reinforced, and -he was now being steadily pushed back. He saw defeat close upon him, and -he sent off a frantic order to d’Erlon to retrace his steps and march on -Quatre Bras. The order reached d’Erlon at the crisis of the battle of -Ligny. For hours a fierce and sanguinary battle had raged there, and at -the crucial moment d’Erlon had appeared, like a god from a machine, with -twenty thousand men on the Prussian flank. Napoleon sent him urgent -orders to attack, but the officier d’ordonnance returned disconsolate. -D’Erlon had just received Ney’s order and had marched back towards -Quatre Bras, where he arrived just as darkness fell, two hours too late. -His sense of responsibility did not permit him to disregard the orders -of his immediate superior, although it had lain in his power, by -disregarding them, to have dealt the Prussian army a blow from which it -could hardly have recovered. The attack d’Erlon should have made was -later made by six thousand weary men who had fought all day long, and -naturally did not have the immense success d’Erlon might have achieved. - -Drouet, Comte d’Erlon, had built himself up during twenty campaigns a -reputation as a skilful and hard-fighting officer. He was neither a -poltroon nor congenitally weak-minded; what was the matter with him was -that he had fought twenty campaigns under Napoleon. The brilliance of -the Emperor and the implicit, blind obedience he demanded had weakened -d’Erlon’s initiative past all reckoning. It is interesting to compare -d’Erlon’s action at Ligny with Lannes’ at Friedland, or with the daring -of the subordinate Prussian officers at Mars-la-Tour and at Gravelotte -in 1870. - -And yet one cannot help but think, on reading military history, that the -Lannes and the Davouts of this world are astonishingly few when compared -with the d’Erlons and the Duponts. Military history is a history of -blunders, fortunate or unfortunate. Men are found everywhere in control -of the lives and destinies of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand men, and -completely unable even to expend them in an efficient manner. On reading -of the fumbling campaigns of Schwartzenberg, of Carlo Alberto, of -Napoleon III., or even of wars waged more recently still, and of which -we ourselves have had experience, one cannot help feeling overwhelming -pity at the thought of the wretched men—every one of them as full of -life as you or I—who were called upon to lay down everything at the -call of duty or patriotism—and to lay down everything _uselessly_. The -argument against war which appeals most to those who may have to take -part in it is not so much that it is expensive or that it costs lives, -but that it is so blightingly inefficient. To die because one’s country -is in need, that is one thing; but to die because one’s commanding -officer has bad dreams, is quite another matter. - -But the armies of Napoleon were at least free from a horrible slur which -has been cast upon other armies. We cannot find anywhere any hint that -the officers did not do all their duty as far as they visualized it. On -going into action the men did not shout “Les epaulettes en avant” as did -the army of the Second Empire at Solferino. No officer of Napoleon’s -ever wasted his men’s lives to gratify his own pride, in the way that -English marines died at Trafalgar. It was said with pride of an officer -of Marlborough’s that he always said, “Come on” not “Go on” to his men. -The same could be said of every one of the higher officers of the army -of the First Empire. The hundreds of volumes of memoirs written by -Napoleon’s men teem with examples (grudgingly given, in some cases) of -valour, but there is hardly one case where an Imperial officer is -accused of cowardice, or even of shirking. The officers bore exactly the -same hardships as did the men, and the friendship and trust which -existed between the rank and file and the commissioned officers of the -army of the First Empire has never been excelled in any other army in -history. - -A simple calculation at any Napoleonic battle will show that the number -of generals killed is proportionate to that of the privates, while of -the twenty-four Marshals of the Empire who fought after the -inauguration, three—Lannes, Bessières and Poniatowski—were killed in -action, and all the others were wounded at various times. Napoleon -himself, as is well known, was wounded during the fighting round -Ratisbon in 1809, and Duroc, his trusted Grand Marshal of the Palace, -was struck down at his side by a stray cannon shot at Bautzen in 1813, -and died an hour later in horrible agony. - -The facts about the Imperial army are curiously contradictory. The men -were devoted to Napoleon, but their devotion did not hold them together -in moments of panic. The officers were experienced in all the details of -war, but for all their experience they lost touch with the Prussian army -during the vital period following Ligny. Napoleon had laid down as -essential various rules of strategy—but he departed from them during -the autumn campaign of 1813. Nothing seems consistent or satisfactory -during the whole period. - -Yet there are hundreds upon hundreds of incidents of which one cannot -read without a thrill. Cambronne at Waterloo replying with a curse when -called upon to surrender in the face of certain destruction; the Red -Lancers of the Guard gaining the Somo Sierra in the teeth of a tempest -of cannon shot; the conscripts of 1814, in sabots and blouses, facing -undaunted the savage enemy cavalry at Champaubert; Ney rallying the -rearguard during the retreat from Moscow; Kellermann charging an army at -Quatre Bras; the engineers dying gladly to save the army at the -Beresina; all these incidents are worthy to be remembered with pride, -and almost blot out the memory of the hideous ferocity of these selfsame -men in Spain, in Germany and in Russia. - -It is the fate of the Emperor and the Grand Army to be equally at the -mercy of the panegyrics of the admirer and the insults of anyone who -chooses to inveigh against them. - -[Illustration: LETIZIA BONAPARTE - (MADAME MÈRE)] - -[Illustration: ELISE BACCIOCHI - (née BONAPARTE)] - - - - - CHAPTER XIII - WOMEN - - -IT would be as easy to omit all mention of Napoleon’s mistresses in a -serious history as it would be difficult to omit the king’s mistresses -from a history of Louis le Grand or Louis le Bien-Aimé. Napoleon was not -the man to allow his policy to be influenced by women. Not one of the -many with whom he came into contact could boast that she had deflected -him one hairbreadth from the path he had mapped for himself. Not all -Josephine’s tears could save the life of the young d’Enghien; not all -Walewska’s pleading could re-establish the kingdom of Poland. - -“Adultery,” said Napoleon, “is a sofa affair,” and he was speaking for -once in all honesty. He was a man blessed with a vast personality, a -vast power and a vast income, and it is unusual for a man with these -three to go long a-suing. Moreover, if the lady who attracted his -attention proved recalcitrant, Napoleon rarely pleaded; he raised his -offer, and in the event of a further refusal he turned away without a -sigh and forgot all about her. That indicates Napoleon’s attitude -towards women. - -There were, as a matter of fact, one or two whom he honoured by more -lover-like attentions. Josephine cost him many bitter hours of -self-reproach; Walewska he sought long and earnestly; he displayed every -sign of attachment towards Marie Louise. Yet not merely these three, but -every woman who granted him favours received in return immense gifts, -and, if she desired it, a husband whose path to promotion was made -specially easy. The women who flit into and then out of Napoleon’s life -seem to be without number, but the gossip of a thousand memoirs, and the -hints of a thousand letters, combined with the painstaking care of a -crowd of patient inquirers, have brought them all under notice at some -time or other. And yet the most elaborate research can only prove that -there was one woman who might perhaps have given much to Bonaparte -before his meeting with Josephine, and that was a street-walker of the -Palais Royal. This tiny incident is hinted at in a letter written by -Bonaparte at the age of eighteen. - -After this, we find nothing of the same nature for another nine years. -Napoleon was too busy and too desperately poor to trouble about such -things. He flirted with Laurette Permon, who later became Madame Junot, -Duchess d’Abrantès; with his sister-in-law, Désirée Clary, afterwards -Madame Bernadotte, Princess of Ponte Corvo and Queen of Sweden and -Norway; and with a few young women of good social position whom he met -while serving as a junior officer of artillery at Valence. That is all. -He came to Josephine heartwhole and inexperienced, and he lavished upon -her during the first feverish months of his married life all the -stored-up passion of a man of twenty-six. Josephine baulked and thwarted -this passion by her delay in joining him while he was conquering Italy, -by her petty flirtations with Charles and others, and by the general -light-mindedness of her behaviour; from that time forth Napoleon became -passionless towards all women. Some he liked, and some he even admired, -as far as it was in his nature to admire anyone, but for none did he -ever exhibit the uncontrollable desire which for that brief space he had -felt for Josephine. Unfaithfulness to her, which he would once have -regarded as treason, he now thought of merely as necessary to a man of -mature age. - -However, throughout the years 1796 and 1797 one cannot find any proof of -genuine inconstancy. It was only in 1798, when Napoleon found himself -the unrestrained ruler of Egypt, with the whole East apparently at his -feet, that he left the narrow path of strict physical virtue. The native -ladies did not appeal to him, and he turned with disgust from their over -opulent charms. The same cannot be said of some of his officers, a few -of whom actually married Egyptian beauties and later brought them back -to France. Menou, who succeeded to the chief command after Napoleon’s -departure and Kléber’s assassination, was one of these. Others, again, -married and settled down in Egypt after the evacuation. Their -descendants were supporters of Mehemet Ali, and even nowadays many rich -Egyptian proprietors can trace back their descent to a Frankish ancestor -who became a Mohammedan a hundred and twenty years ago. - -But although, as has been said, Napoleon found no charms behind the -yashmaks, the possibilities were by no means exhausted, as his -aides-de-camp hastened to point out to him. A few Frenchwomen, by -donning male attire, had evaded the strict regulation that no women -should accompany the Army of the Orient. The most attractive of these -was Marguerite Pauline, wife of a lieutenant of Chasseurs, by name -Fourès. To a Commander-in-Chief all things are possible, and young -Fourès was packed off in one of the frigates which had escaped from the -disaster of the Nile with orders to carry despatches to the Directory. -The night of his departure Madame Fourès (la Bellîlote, as she was -called, from her maiden name of Belleisle) was entertained by Napoleon -at a gay little dinner party; the proceedings, however, were cut short -by the General upsetting iced water over her dress and carrying her off -under the pretext of having the damage attended to. - -After this la Bellîlote was established in a Cairo palace close to -General Headquarters, and the little idyll seemed to be progressing -famously when a most indignant intruder in the person of Lieutenant -Fourès appeared on the scene. He had been captured by the English on his -way to Italy, and had been returned for the express purpose of -inconveniencing the Général-en-chef. The English were, however, doomed -to disappointment, for Napoleon, exercising his dictatorial powers, had -a divorce pronounced between Fourès and his wife, and then sent the -wretched man back once more to France. From this time forth la Bellîlote -had an almost regal dominion in Cairo. The finest silks in the land were -confiscated for her adornment, and she drove about the streets amid -cries from the soldiers of “Vive la Générale!” and “Vive Clioupatre!” At -times she even appeared on horseback in a general’s uniform and cocked -hat. The whole proceeding savours of some of the doings of the early -Roman Emperors. Suetonius tells us very similar stories of Nero and -Caligula. Little adverse comment was caused among the French; it was a -very usual thing during the Revolutionary era for officers to be -accompanied by women in this fashion. Some women even served generals as -aides-de-camp and orderlies, while the Army of Portugal during 1810-11 -was frequently hindered because Masséna, commanding, had his _chère -amie_ with him. - -Madame Fourès’ experience of the delights of being the left-handed queen -of the uncrowned king of an unacknowledged kingdom was not destined to -endure long; Napoleon returned to France, and she, following him, by his -orders, as soon as possible, fell into the hands of the English just as -her husband had done. When at last she reached France Bonaparte refused -to see her, for he was now reconciled to Josephine, besides being First -Consul and having to be careful of his moral reputation. Napoleon did -whatever else he could for her; he gave her large sums of money, bought -her houses, and secured a new husband for her, whose agreement he -ensured by means of valuable appointments under the Ministry of Foreign -Affairs. - -Napoleon and la Bellîlote never met again; after 1815 she eloped with -another man, built up a substantial fortune in the South American trade, -and finally died quite in the odour of sanctity at the venerable age of -ninety-one. - -On Bonaparte’s return to France Josephine had contrived to win him once -more to her, despite the efforts of his family, and his own -half-determination to end the business there and then, but matters were -never the same between them. Napoleon indulged more and more frequently -in petty amours with various women, and Josephine, instead of -appreciating her helplessness, as is the more usual way with queens and -empresses, caused frequent furious scenes by spying on his actions and -upbraiding him when any rumour came to her notice. Napoleon cared no -whit; he was, moreover, able, by virtue of his supreme power, frequently -to ensure that Josephine knew nothing of his infidelity. In 1800 he was -peculiarly successful in this way. Marengo had been fought and won, and -the First Consul was enjoying, at Milan, the fruits of his dramatic -success. The most eminent contralto of the time, Grassini, sang at -concerts hurriedly arranged in his honour. Grassini had endeavoured to -force herself on his notice three years before, without success, for -Josephine held power over him then. The circumstances were different -now, and Napoleon, his Italian temperament inexpressibly charmed by her -magnificent voice, honoured her by a summons to his apartments. She -obeyed gladly; she came at his request to Paris; and finally Napoleon -had the effrontery to command her to sing at the thanksgiving festival -in the Invalides for the Marengo campaign, where he appeared accompanied -by his wife and by all the notabilities of the Consulate. Later she -appeared at the Théâtre de la République, and was given a large -allowance, both publicly as a singer and secretly as a friend of -Napoleon’s. The arrangement ended abruptly, for Grassini was detected in -an intrigue with an Italian musician, and left France for a Continental -tour. - -It was not till 1807 that she returned, and although Napoleon never -renewed the old relationship, he gave her an official title, a large -salary and employment under his Bureau of Music. - -Grassini spent the rest of her days mainly in Paris, and she enjoyed a -vast reputation all her life. Money troubles, due to her passion for -gambling, and wild adventures of the heart, engaged most of her -attention. It has even been said that after Waterloo she condescended to -grant Wellington the same favours as Napoleon had enjoyed thirteen years -before. Despite the obvious bias of many of the witnesses, the evidence -to this end seems conclusive. If it really was true, then Grassini might -claim a distinction as notable as Alava’s, who was the only man who -fought both at Trafalgar and at Waterloo. - -After Grassini passed out of Napoleon’s life, a long period ensued -during which no woman received the Emperor’s favour for any continuous -length of time. At intervals various hooded figures slipped through the -postern door of the Tuileries, past Roustam the Mameluke, and through a -secret passage to the Imperial apartments, but the visits were irregular -and were merely the results of passing whims on the part of the Emperor. -Not one of the women concerned had need of much pressure to become -agreeable to the invitations brought them by Duroc, the faithful Grand -Marshal of the Palace. They were actresses mainly, and since most of -them appeared at theatres managed or subsidized by the Government, -Napoleon, if not their direct employer, had in his gift important acting -parts and desirable salaries. Many of them were already the mistresses -of dandies of the town, and some of them passed on to act in the same -capacity for various crowned heads of Europe, while one was actually -requested by a powerful party in Russia to win Alexander the Czar from -an objectionable _chère amie_ so that he might return to the Czarina! - -Napoleon did all he could to keep these liaisons secret, but he was -rarely successful. The women boasted far and wide of their success, and -it is likely that many of those who boasted had nothing to boast about. -Some even went so far as to publish their memoirs after the Restoration, -and to make capital of their own dishonour. Another factor which -militated against secrecy was Josephine’s jealousy. Josephine, with the -spectre of divorce always before her eyes, was in continual terror lest -Napoleon should experience a lasting attachment for one of his stray -lights o’ love. Consequently she spied upon him incessantly, battered on -his locked doors, wrote frantic appeals to her friends for help and -information, and generally acted with less than her usual dignity. -Napoleon disregarded her appeals, and stormed back at her whenever she -ventured to remonstrate. He was above all law, he declared, and he would -allow no human being to judge his actions. Nevertheless, he took care to -interfere with the most intimate affairs of all his friends. He tried to -bully Berthier, his trusted Chief of Staff, into separating from the -lady with whom he had lived for years. At first it seemed as if he was -successful, and he consoled his friend by giving him as wife a Princess -of the royal House of Bavaria. However, Berthier contrived to obtain his -young bride’s agreement to the presence of the other lady, and the three -of them ran a perfectly happy _ménage à trois_ for the rest of his life. -Napoleon meddled with many other people’s domestic affairs, and it is -darkly hinted that Talleyrand’s enmity for the Emperor began when -Napoleon first disturbed the tranquillity which existed between the -great diplomat and Madame Grand. - -The Emperor continued serenely on his way, acting up to his dictum that -women were merely incidents in a man’s life. His Court was thronged with -greedily ambitious women who threw themselves in his path at every -opportunity. At the least hint of a preference on his part, officious -courtiers hurried to assist in the negotiations in the hope either of -favour or perquisites. The astonishing thing is that the list of the -chosen is not many times longer. These intrigues all ran much the same -course—a brief partnership, generally without a hint of affection on -either side; a minor place in Court for the lady; then a marriage was -arranged, an ample dowry provided by the Emperor, and the incident was -closed. Not merely did people endeavour to gain their private ends in -this manner, but even political parties made use of similar tools. -During the Consulate the Bourbons despatched a lady to Paris for the -sole purpose of ensnaring Bonaparte, and it is hinted that Metternich -endeavoured to place a friend at Court in the same fashion. The great -example of this political manœuvre, however, occurs later. - -But before Madame Walewska’s name, even, was known to Napoleon, he -formed an attachment of some slight historical importance. Eléonore -Denuelle was an exceedingly beautiful girl, daughter of parents of a -doubtful mode of life, who had been educated at Madame Campan’s famous -school along with Caroline Bonaparte and various other great ladies of -the Court. Her parents designed a great marriage for her, but they met -with poor success, for a certain graceless ex-officer, by name Revel, -succeeded in making her believe that he was a good match, and the couple -were married early in 1805. Revel believed that Eléonore was an heiress; -Eléonore believed that Revel was a rich man; they were both of them -woefully disappointed, and separated after two months of married life. -Eléonore in despair applied for help to Caroline Murat, and received a -minor post in that princess’s household. Napoleon noticed her in -January, 1806, and from that time the affair moved rapidly, for in -February Eléonore applied for a divorce from Revel (who was now in -gaol), and in December a son was born to her whose father, almost -without a doubt, was Napoleon. - -By the time of his birth, however, Napoleon had formed a new attachment, -and Eléonore was never again admitted to his rooms. Napoleon saw that -both his son and his ex-mistress were suitably provided for; he settled -a thousand pounds a year on Eléonore and married her to a prominent -politician (a Monsieur Augier), while he invested large sums of money in -trust for her son, Léon. He further mentioned him in his will. -Eléonore’s later career was unlucky; her second husband died, a prisoner -in Russian hands, and when she married for a third time she was -blackmailed for the rest of her life by her first husband and by her -scapegrace illegitimate son. Léon ruined all his chances of success in -life by his reckless way of living. He gambled away all he possessed, -and then lived on what small sums he could beg from his mother and from -his Bonaparte relations. He plunged into politics, and even considered -for a while standing as a candidate for the position of President of the -Second Republic in opposition to Louis Napoleon. He induced the latter -to give him a small pension; he made all manner of claims upon the -Government, and squandered whatever he obtained in a wild fashion. He -issued all sorts of remarkable suggestions, not one of them of the -slightest value, on every conceivable subject, and he raised the most -frightful clamour when they were disregarded. There is no doubt that he -was mentally deranged. He died in 1881 without having accomplished a -single noteworthy action. - -There is a faint doubt as to Léon’s paternity, due to his mother’s way -of living, but the doubts are countered by his striking physical -resemblance to the Emperor. Napoleon himself certainly believed him to -be his own child; perhaps if he could have foreseen the later career of -the child in question he would have been more chary of his -acknowledgment. The whole affair seems to be very much wrapped in doubt; -Napoleon evinced for young Léon not half the care which he displayed for -his other sons, while Léon’s birth (perhaps because it took place while -Napoleon was away in Poland) did not rouse nearly as much interest as -Walewski’s three years later. - -It has already been said that at the time of Léon’s birth Napoleon’s -attention was occupied by a new mistress; it was this particular -mistress who has been elevated by some writers to the proud position of -being “the only woman Napoleon ever loved,” and who certainly held -whatever affection the Emperor was able to display for a longer period -than any other woman. To begin with, she was of a rank and class far -different from any of her predecessors, Josephine not excepted, while -secondly she was far fonder of him than was any other woman. The -circumstances in which the two met were romantic. Napoleon had just -overturned the Prussian monarchy; he had advanced like lightning from -the Rhine to the Niemen, and he burst at the head of the Grand Army into -Poland, where never before had a French army appeared. The Poles were in -ecstasy. They had not the least doubt that their period of slavery was -ended, and that the young conqueror would once more unchain the White -Eagle. Deputations thronged to meet him, and mobs gave him homage in the -villages. At the little town of Bronia, not far from Warsaw, a lady was -presented to him at her earnest request, for she had braved all the -terrors of the hysterical mob in order to meet him. She proved to be -hardly more than a child, and dazzlingly beautiful. Napoleon thanked her -for her kindness, and said that he was anxious to see her again. The -whole interview barely lasted a minute, for it was imperative that -Napoleon should press on to Warsaw, but it made a deep impression on -both of them. - -Marie Laczinska was the daughter of one of the old noble families of -Poland, and she had recently married Anastase Colonna de -Walewice-Walewska. Although Marie’s family was noble, it was hardly to -be compared with that of her husband, for Anastase was not only the head -of a house in whose veins ran the bluest blood of Poland, but he also -traced his descent to the Roman family of Colonna, and through them his -line ran back into the mists of history beyond the Carolings and the -Merovings until one could trace its source among the patrician families -of republican Rome. He was rich, he was famous, he held vast power. The -only objections to him as a husband were that he was seventy years old -and already had grandchildren who were older than Marie. In the minds of -Marie’s guardians such objections were trivial, and the young girl was -forced into marriage with the old noble, to play the part of Abishag to -Walewska’s David. She was not fated to endure this for long, because -Napoleon had not forgotten the meeting at Bronia, and sought her at all -the fêtes at which he appeared in Warsaw. The secret could not be kept, -and soon all Poland was aware that the great Emperor was in love with -the Polish lady. The nationalist party heard the news with wild -exultation, and Poniatowski, the hope of Poland, called upon her to -sacrifice herself for her country. The other great nobles pressed her -feverishly, and they contrived to persuade Walewska (who, naturally, was -the only man who was ignorant of what was going on) to bring his wife to -a ball which Poniatowski was giving in the Emperor’s honour. - -Marie came reluctantly. She was dressed as plainly as possible, in white -satin without jewels, and, once in the ballroom, she kept herself as far -in the background as she could. To no purpose, however. Napoleon, -overjoyed, observed her as soon as she appeared, and immediately sent to -her and requested her to dance with him. She refused. Duroc and -Poniatowski remonstrated with her, but she remained adamant. Many other -French officers had already noticed her dazzling beauty, her rich fair -hair and the blueness of her eyes, and they swarmed round her. Napoleon -watched the proceedings jealously from the other end of the room. As -soon as any one of his officers appeared to have made any progress, he -called to his Chief of Staff, and that particular officer was sent off -post haste to carry a message somewhere out in the bleak countryside a -hundred miles away. The situation verged on the impossible. Napoleon in -desperation made a tour of the room, speaking to all the hundreds of -women present merely in order to exchange half a dozen words with the -one who was the cause of all this trouble. When at last he reached -Madame Walewska the interview was unsatisfactory. She was as pale as -death, and said nothing. He was vastly and unusually embarrassed. “White -upon white is a mistake, Madame,” he said, looking at her pale cheeks. -Then—“This is not the sort of reception I expected after——” Then he -passed on, and left the ballroom soon after. - -That same evening she received a wild, urgent note from Napoleon. Others -followed in rapid succession. Poniatowski and all the fiery patriots of -Poland implored her to yield. Her blind husband, infatuated by this -remarkable new popularity, bore her to reception after reception. A -mercenary old aunt of hers, tampered with by Poniatowski, flung herself -into the business as well, and offered herself as go-between. At last -she received a letter from Napoleon hinting that he would restore Poland -if she would yield. She yielded. Napoleon did not restore Poland. - -For Poland’s sake she had broken her marriage vows and violated all the -dictates of her conscience. Napoleon, in return, temporized and -compromised. He erected the Grand Duchy of Warsaw out of territory torn -from Prussia, but the Grand Duchy was not autonomous, it was not called -Poland, it was only one-third the size of the old land of the White -Eagle. Poor Marie protested to the best of her ability, to be soothed by -fair words from the Emperor. At Napoleon’s request she left Poland after -Tilsit, and came to Paris, where she lived in extreme retirement, -visited by Napoleon as often as he could manage. Her gentleness and -dislike of display must have been grateful to Napoleon after his other -experiences, and he passed many happy hours with her. She was by his -side during the maelstrom of the Essling campaign, and at Schönbrunn, -the Palace of the Cæsars, she told him she was about to bear him a -child. She did not realize then that from that selfsame palace Napoleon -would summon, in a few months’ time, a young girl who would supplant her -in his affections, and who would also bear him a son, who, in place of -being a nameless bastard, would bear the title of King of Rome. She went -back to her dear Poland for the event, and at Walewice, in May, 1810, -Alexander-Florian-Joseph-Colonna-Walewski was born. On her return to -Paris Napoleon had married Marie Louise. - -Napoleon softened the blow for her as well as he could. He heaped wealth -upon her; he gave her town houses and country houses; the Imperial -officials were always at her orders, and the Imperial theatres were -always open to her. Her son, young Walewski, was made a Count of the -Empire. Perhaps this was some consolation to her. Perhaps—seeing that -it was her son’s birth which had determined Napoleon to make a new -marriage—not. Napoleon even found time during the turmoil of the -Campaign of France to make additional arrangements in their favour, but -by this time whatever remained of the affair had long since burnt itself -out. - -After the fall of the Empire, Marie Walewska seems to have considered -herself free. She paid a mysterious visit to Napoleon at Elba in 1814, -accompanied by her little son, and she was present at the Tuileries on -Napoleon’s arrival there during the Hundred Days, but apparently on -neither occasion was the old relationship renewed. In 1816 she married a -distant cousin of the Bonapartes, a certain d’Ornano, a Colonel of the -Guard, but she was not destined long to enjoy her new happiness. Marie -de Walewska died in December, 1817. - -Poor Marie! Her life was short, but it must have been full of -bitterness. Napoleon’s affairs of the heart (if they are even worthy of -that name) all seem inexpressibly harsh and matter-of-fact. He seemed to -have a kind of Midas touch in these matters, whereby everything -honourable and romantic with which he came into contact turned, not into -gold, but into lead. Various authors have tried to infuse into his -association with Marie de Walewska some gleam of romance, some essence -of the self-sacrificing spirit which is noticeable in the parallel deeds -of other monarchs, but they have failed. Marie certainly seems at first -to have believed him to be a hero, a knight without reproach as well as -without fear, but as soon as she was disillusioned she resigned herself -to an existence as drab as if she had been once more a septuagenarian’s -wife, and not the mistress of an Emperor. Contemporary Parisian society -was almost entirely ignorant of her existence. She paid no calls, and -she received none. The few appearances she made at Court were such as -were only to be expected from a Polish lady of high rank. Napoleon could -not keep her love for long, and, though she was faithful to him as long -as the Empire endured, she obviously considered herself free as soon as -Napoleon was sent to St. Helena. It was not the long-drawn, heroic -romance some writers have endeavoured to make it appear; rather was it a -brief burst of passion, and then—monotony. - -The baby Count of the Empire whom she left behind enjoyed a -distinguished career. In appearance he certainly resembled his great -father, but his talents never seem to have risen above a mediocre -standard. Alexander-Florian-Joseph-Colonna-Walewski was mainly educated -in France, but he was a Pole by birth, and he fought for Poland at the -age of twenty during the rising of 1830-31. When Poland fell once more -before the might of Russia, he returned to France, became a Frenchman, -and served in the French army. The revolution of 1848 brought Napoleon -III. to the front, and the new Emperor, with his power based on the -frail fabric of a legend, saw fit to surround himself with names which -recalled to men’s minds the old splendours of the First Empire. Walewski -received honours in plenty; he was Ambassador to the most important -Courts of Europe, a Senator, and a Minister of State. He wrote learnedly -on various subjects. But all his glory was only a pale reflection of his -father’s and cousin’s; he suffered eclipse after Sedan, and when he -died, aged seventy-two, he had, after all, made very little mark in the -world. He had not played the part of a Don John of Austria, or even of a -Monmouth. De Morny quite outshone him. - -With Napoleon’s marriage to Marie Louise and association with Madame -Walewska, his casual amorous adventures came to a more or less abrupt -end. It has been suggested that this was on account of increasing age, -but Napoleon was only in the early forties, and this cannot be the true -reason. However, the explanation is just as simple. Napoleon was devoted -to his new wife, and he was frightfully busy. From the summer of 1812, -two years after his second marriage, he was almost continuously in the -field. His exertions and worries thenceforward were sufficient to occupy -even him, without any other complications. One likes to think of him -turning with relief from the agonizing strain of ruling Europe to snatch -a few quiet minutes in the placid peace surrounding Marie Louise and her -child. That is all. He had no other mistress. At Elba he lived with his -sister and mother, with no woman to share his inner life. Perhaps this -was policy, for Napoleon was trying hard to induce Marie Louise to join -him, and he would naturally be chary of doing anything which might annoy -her—ignorant as he was of her unfaithfulness. This may be the -explanation of the briefness of Madame Walewska’s visit; she may have -come intending to join him, and he may have sent her away again, but the -fact that she was accompanied by her brother and other relations -militates against this theory. Moreover, Marie was already close friends -with d’Ornano. After the Hundred Days Napoleon was sent to St. Helena, -and once again no woman accompanied him. The manifold rumours about -Madame de Montholon and others at St. Helena seem to have no foundation -whatever in fact. Thus practically all Napoleon’s illicit loves are -confined to the decade 1800-10, while the last decade is entirely clear -of them. - -Thus far we have only treated of women who were Napoleon’s mistresses; -but considerable interest also attaches to a large number of women who, -although members of the Imperial circle, never attained this dubious -honour. Perhaps of these the one who attained the greatest heights (and -who, incidentally, did least to deserve it) was Désirée Clary. She was -the sister of the lady whom Joseph Bonaparte made his wife, and whose -dowry of six thousand pounds was so welcome to the struggling family. -Désirée’s own dowry would have been of the same amount, and Joseph and -various other Bonapartes tried to induce Napoleon to marry her. He seems -to have dallied with the idea; indeed, it is frequently stated that a -contract of betrothal was drawn up, but, however it was, Napoleon broke -off the negotiations rather abruptly when he went to Paris in 1795. -There is hardly any doubt that he had flirted with Désirée rather -excessively, and that, after making a deep impression upon her, he had -wounded her deeply by his precipitate abandonment. Subsequently he tried -to make amends in much the same manner as he employed with his discarded -mistresses—he tried to find her a husband to whom he could give -substantial promotion. But Désirée was once more unlucky, for the man -Napoleon sent to her, General Duphot, was murdered almost on her -threshold while she was staying at Joseph Bonaparte’s Embassy in Rome. - -Eventually she was approached by Bernadotte, during Napoleon’s absence -in Egypt, and married him. Subsequently she declared that she had done -this because Bernadotte was the only man who could injure Bonaparte, but -she must have been far-sighted indeed if she could perceive the career -which was awaiting Bernadotte. Moreau, and half a dozen other generals, -such as Augereau, were more powerful than Bernadotte at the time. -Désirée’s statement was probably made in the light of subsequent events. - -It was Bernadotte who gained most by the marriage. He acquired at one -stroke a venomous, if inert, ally in his wife, an enthusiastic supporter -in Joseph, his brother-in-law, and a sure refuge in case of trouble in -Napoleon’s dislike of a scandal in his family. From this time on, -Désirée received distinction after distinction, and soon she was Son -Altesse Serène la Maréchale Princesse de Ponte Corvo, sister of the -Queen of Spain, and a leading figure in Imperial society. Then came the -greatest distinction of all, and she found herself Princess Royal of -Sweden. This last she found rather upsetting, for she discovered she was -expected to leave her beloved Paris to live in the bleakness of the -Stockholm palaces. She said, tearfully and truthfully, that she had -thought at first that her new rank was merely a titular distinction, of -the same class as her sovereignty of Ponte Corvo. She refused absolutely -to leave France, and so Bernadotte went alone to Stockholm, thence to -lead his Swedes against the Empire, while his wife stayed on in Paris. -It certainly was an anomalous position, and some authors have said that -Désirée acted as a spy on behalf of the Allies during the war of -liberation. However, we can be quite sure that Napoleon, whatever -tenderness he still felt towards her, would not have tolerated her -sending news of any value to her husband; incidentally, it is obvious -that a woman to whose mind Ponte Corvo, with its six thousand -inhabitants, was in the same class as Sweden, with its millions, could -not have been of much use as a spy. - -After 1815, fate overtook her, and she was borne away to spend the rest -of her life in the spartan splendour of the palace in the Staden. From -that time forth she and her husband were a disappointed couple, -distrusted and despised by all Europe, he with his eyes turned -lingeringly towards the France whose crown he believed he had so nearly -attained, she thinking longingly of the gaiety and careless freedom of -the Paris she had left behind, which now hated her with true Parisian -virulence. - -Napoleon’s sisters married before the plenitude of his power, and the -matches they made were not as splendid as they might have been later; it -was for his younger but much more distant connections that Napoleon was -able to find husbands of royal rank. It is curious to notice the -extraordinary marriages which were arranged while the Empire was at its -height. A niece of Murat’s, who had been brought up as the ragged and -bare-footed daughter of a small farmer, married Prince Charles of -Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and among her grandchildren and -great-grandchildren at the present day are the King of Rumania, the King -of the Belgians and the Queen of Portugal. Several of the petty -princelings of Germany, with thirty generations of royal descent behind -them, married obscure little Beauharnais and Taschers de la Pagerie. -Eugène de Beauharnais and Berthier married princesses of Bavaria, and -Jerome received as bride a daughter of the King of Würtemberg. - -Eugène’s marriage had caused a difficult situation, for Augusta of -Bavaria was already affianced to the Hereditary Prince of Baden, heir -apparent to the reigning Grand Duke. Napoleon had caused the marriage -contract to be broken, but he was in no way disconcerted; he straightway -found a new bride for the Hereditary Prince. He selected Stéphanie de -Beauharnais, a “thirty-second cousin” of Josephine’s. Stéphanie was the -merest child, who had had the most extraordinary upbringing. Her parents -were of a shiftless character, like various other Beauharnais, and after -the Revolution Stéphanie had been dependent on an English peeress, Lady -de Bathe, who had arranged with two nuns from the suppressed houses to -look after her. As soon as Napoleon heard of her existence, he summoned -her to Court, and in accordance with his pronounced ideas on family -loyalty, made himself responsible for her support. Next he announced to -her that he had secured her a royal husband. Stéphanie immediately -became a person of consequence, because as yet royal marriages were by -no means common in the Bonaparte family. Their Imperial Highnesses, -Napoleon’s sisters, naturally turned like tigresses upon the interloper, -and reduced the fifteen-year-old child to tears more than once in the -presence of the Court. This was more than Napoleon could stand, and by a -single decree he gave the girl precedence over the whole Imperial family -save himself and Josephine. He wished to keep the House of Baden as -satisfied as possible. With the same idea he gave Stéphanie a marvellous -trousseau, a dowry of sixty thousand pounds, and jewels costing the same -amount. Her wretched father, who had returned from exile, received an -income of three thousand pounds a year and a lump sum of two hundred -thousand francs. He had done nothing to earn it; he was merely the -father of the girl who was marrying an ally of the Emperor’s. - -The period was one of general rejoicing, for Austerlitz had just been -won, and French domination over Europe seemed assured. The fêtes of the -marriage were of unexampled splendour; there were illuminations; there -were fireworks; and there were balls without number, at one of which -over two thousand persons appeared. But behind all the rejoicings there -was a curious tragi-comedy being played, for poor Stéphanie, married at -sixteen to a man she had never met, displayed a disconcerting reluctance -to complete all the accompanying formalities. Night after night she -insisted on a girl friend sharing her room with her. The Hereditary -Prince grew restive; the whole Court knew of the deadlock, and were -proportionately amused. But international politics cannot wait on a -girl’s whim; war clouds were appearing again across the Rhine; Prussia -seemed bent on war, and it was important for Napoleon to be sure of -Baden’s friendship. Napoleon admonished Stéphanie with all the severity -of which he was capable; he terrified the wretched girl into passivity, -and when at last the newly-married couple set off for Carlsruhe Baden’s -support of France was assured. - -But the unhappiness which awaited all Napoleon’s favourites dogged poor -Stéphanie to her grave. The House of Zaehringen hated her as an -intruder; her male children all died in infancy, and when in 1818 her -husband died she found herself without any established position in a -hostile land. Hints have not been lacking that Charles of Baden died -through poison administered by the Hochberg family (of morganatic -descent from an earlier Elector), which ultimately obtained the throne. -But the strangest story is that concerning Kaspar Hauser. In 1828 a -young man was found wandering in the streets of Nuremberg, who had never -seen the sunlight, and whose whole appearance seemed to indicate that he -had been shut up in a cellar all his life. He did not long survive his -freedom. Stéphanie jumped to the conclusion that he was her second son, -born in 1811, who was supposed to have died as an infant while she was -seriously ill. Many people have agreed with her, and have supposed that -he had been kidnapped by the Hochbergs to prevent his inheritance of the -throne. Some people go further, and boldly declare that after his escape -he was poisoned. The whole matter has an aura of peculiarity, and it has -attracted the attention of many writers of authority, among them Mr. -Baring Gould. The most obvious counter to the theory that Kaspar Hauser -was a son of Stéphanie is that the people who would be bold enough to -kidnap him would have had the sense to kill him outright, and not to -keep him as living evidence of their guilt. If they murdered him in -1828, they would certainly not have flinched from murdering him in 1811. - -But Stéphanie always believed that Kaspar was her son, and she passed -the last thirty years of her life in mourning a murdered husband, a -murdered son, a lost throne, and the utter ruin of her whole life. - -This is only one more example of the blight which Napoleon left upon the -lives of nearly everyone with whom he came into close contact. All the -people who were indebted to him for their entire personal advancement -lived to see the day when they paid for a few golden hours with the most -utter regret and bitterness. The only ones who “lived happily ever -after” were those who had always regarded him with suspicion, like -Macdonald, or those of inferior mental calibre, like Marie Louise, whom -a strange Providence seemed to take under its own special care. - -So much for Napoleon’s relations with women. Nowhere can one find the -least trace of romance or self-sacrifice on his part, and it can safely -be said that no woman ever loved him devotedly. Never could Napoleon -have said of any woman’s beauty, as Richard III. said, - - “Your beauty, that did haunt me in my sleep - To undertake the death of all the world - So I might live one hour in your sweet bosom.” - -In men he could inspire the utmost self-devotion; it seems hateful to -think first of the Cuirassiers, a living torrent of steel, pouring -cheering to their deaths at Wagram at his command, and then of his -vulgar deceit of Walewska and his petty, mercenary intrigues with other -women. It leaves a foul blot on the splendour which surrounds him. - - “Methought I saw a slug crawl slavering - Over the delicate petals of a flower.” - -[Illustration: THE KING OF ROME] - - - - - CHAPTER XIV - LIKES AND DISLIKES - - -PERHAPS now we can see a little more clearly the man who was the centre -of so much interest. To appreciate a man’s character it is not so much -necessary to realize what he did, as to realize what he wanted to do, -what he was fond of doing, and what he would have done had he been able; -and on the other hand it is equally necessary to realize what it was he -did not like doing. With Napoleon these matters do not bear a great deal -of analysis. - -One is astonished at first when it is borne in upon one that Napoleon -was a man of tepid desires in most directions. It seems almost -inconceivable that the man who was the storm centre of Europe, who was -capable of rousing overwhelming emotion in others, was nearly incapable -of emotion himself. Yet so it was. Napoleon had one ruling desire—for -work, and he had one ruling passion—for the army. His secondary -passions were small, and his dislikes were equally small. Compared in -this light to any full-blooded personality, Dr. Johnson, for instance, -Napoleon fades away into dismal uninterestingness. Work was what -Napoleon liked best of all in this world. When other men would have -broken down under the simultaneous strain of work and anxiety, he throve -and grew fat. One of his most famous letters was written on this very -subject to his brother Joseph at the height of the Eylau campaign. -Joseph, from among the soft delights of Naples, had written complaining -of the troubles which beset him while ruling his little kingdom, and -Napoleon wrote back briefly and sternly, telling how he was at that -moment engaged in a life and death struggle against Bennigsen; how he -was encumbered with the difficulties of feeding and manœuvring two -hundred thousand men in the boggy plains of Poland, where even he -himself could hardly obtain the necessaries of life; how at the same -time the affairs of half Europe demanded his attention, and yet for all -this he did not allow himself to be worried by these numerous interests; -he did all he had to do and delighted in the strain. - -It can safely be said that Napoleon never took a holiday. Sometimes it -has been hinted that in 1810 and 1811, after his marriage with Marie -Louise, he slackened his pace and did not do as much as he might have -done. This is true in part, but it is equally true that during that time -he got through an amount of work which would have broken down most men. -Napoleon was not made for holidays. It is hard to find, during the whole -period covered by his correspondence, a single day in which he did not -despatch a dozen letters, all of them bearing the hallmarks of the -utmost care and thought, and nearly all of them vitally important links -in a chain of important decisions. Inactivity was hateful to him. No -sooner had he landed in Elba, removed entirely from the usual outlets of -his energy, than he flung himself into the business of building up new -interests. He laboured harder while governing his little island than did -Kings of countries hundreds of times its size. Only when he was lodged -in St. Helena, do we find a cessation of his frantic toil. Here -circumstances were against him; his gaolers did their best in a blind -fashion to prevent him from indulging in either mental or physical -activity, while the climate and environments were both conducive to -torpor. Yet even at St. Helena Napoleon was responsible for the -production of a mass of written material of whose amount an average man -might be proud if it were the results of the labour of a lifetime. Hard, -unrelenting toil was to Napoleon the breath of life. - -His chief relaxation was also in the nature of toil. Napoleon was -passionately fond of all things military. Reviews were to him a source -of unending delight. On emerging triumphant from a period of intense -anxiety his first action almost invariably was to hold a review of all -the troops he could muster; the very day on which he took up his -residence at the Tuileries after the _coup d’état_ of Brumaire, he -reviewed on the Caroussel those battalions which later formed the -nucleus of the Guard, while at Tilsit he contrived to arrange for two or -three reviews every day. All the pageantry and pomp of war appealed -irresistibly to this man to whom so little else appealed. To Napoleon a -battalion marching past in column of double companies was worth all the -vigour of Schiller and all the passion of Alfieri. Soldiers are a -delight to most of us from our nursery days to our maturity; the sight -of a long line of bayonets or the brilliance and glitter of the plumes -and armour of the Household Cavalry can still make us catch our breath -for an instant, but in few instances does this passion become -overwhelming. When it becomes characteristic of a nation it usually -portends calamity. Frederick William I. of Prussia suffered from it to -an extent which has become historic, but in his case his passion for -soldiers was so overwhelming that he did not risk losing any of his -Potsdam Guards. Napoleon was different; he intended his army for -fighting, and fight it did for twenty years, pomp and pageantry -notwithstanding. Not the wildest calumniator has ever hinted that the -reason why Napoleon did not send the Guard into action at Borodino was -because he wanted to keep them to review in peace-time—though this -explanation is sounder than some of those put forward. Napoleon indulged -his passion whenever possible, but he kept it nevertheless strictly -within bounds. - -Napoleon had been a soldier from the age of twelve, so that one can -easily explain his liking for military detail; he had been human from -the day of his birth, but it is not so easy to find any other human -traits or weaknesses. The pleasures of the table meant nothing to him; -twenty minutes sufficed for dinner at the Tuileries, and he dined just -as contentedly on horse-steak in Russia as he did on the elaborate -dishes which delighted Marie Louise. So far as can be ascertained -Napoleon was never seen drunk, or sea-sick, or dyspeptic. It would be -almost with relief that we would read of his suffering from measles, had -he ever done so. His freedom from ordinary weaknesses tends to throw the -whole picture out of perspective. One can hardly be surprised that even -so sensible a man as Thiers lost his head while telling of Napoleon’s -exploits. There is only one human touch to which we can turn to gain the -measure of the whole. Napoleon loved a lord. - -We have already described how ardently Napoleon looked forward to his -meeting with his Imperial bride, and the complacency with which he -referred to her royal uncle and aunt his predecessors, Louis XVI. and -Marie Antoinette. The same characteristic is noticeable in many of his -actions. Perhaps it is going to extremes to describe his origination of -the Legend of Honour as a piece of snobbery, but his other arrangements -for the provision of a titled nobility are strongly indicative of this -curious stray littleness of mind. No one reading his letters can doubt -that he preferred speaking of Monsieur le Maréchal Prince d’Essling, Duc -de Rivoli, Grand Aigle de la Légion d’Honneur to speaking of plain -General Masséna. He delighted in seeing about him Grand Constables, -Arch-Chancellors, Grand Chamberlains; it pleased him to walk midst Grand -Dukes and Princesses; he preferred conversation with the not -over-talented Queen of Prussia to any interview with Goethe. -Characteristically, he once invited an actor to come and perform before -a “Parterre of Kings.” It may perhaps be pleaded that his painstaking -care in the regulation of precedence, and his minute examination of -forms and ceremonies were due to his desire to have his Imperial -arrangements perfect, but it may be pleaded with equal justice that he -entered voluntarily into these arrangements. The Imperial dignity was -not forced upon him; he lost as many adherents by his assumption of it -as he gained. For all this, once Napoleon decided upon indulging his -snobbery, he indulged in such a manner as to gain most profit by it. -Just as his delight in military matters tended towards the improvement -of his army, so his snobbery tended towards buttressing his throne. -Napoleon took advantage of his own weaknesses just as he did of other -people’s. - -One searches in vain for other prominent characteristics. The -selfishness so often attributed to him is not so much the selfishness of -Napoleon as the selfishness of the Emperor. One cannot call selfish the -young lieutenant who took upon himself the maintenance of a brother when -his sole income was thirty pounds a year, nor the man who gave crowns -and fiefs and fortunes to his friends, but the Emperor who pried -jealously into the management of his subject kingdoms and took them back -if he saw fit, the Emperor who refused to share his glory with his -general, the Emperor who sacrificed thousands of lives in order to hold -down Europe was selfish because he believed the Imperial power would -suffer were he unselfish. Even the ambition with which he is usually -credited does not appear on close examination to be very remarkable or -extraordinary. Ambition is, after all, one of the commonest of human -traits, and varies only in degree and not in occurrence. When Napoleon -was a young man he wanted to “get on”; he “got on” partly through -abundance of opportunity and partly through his extraordinary talent. If -it be said that he succeeded through the force of his ambition, it can -easily be countered that most of the men who have ever succeeded were -ambitious. A quite plausible life of Napoleon might be written showing -that he was entirely the reverse of ambitious, and that all the steps of -his career towards power from the day of his receiving the command of -the army of Italy to his invasion of Russia in 1812, were forced upon -him. At the beginning of his career Napoleon had far less chance of -gaining supreme power than had Hoche, or Pichegru, or Jourdan, or -Moreau, but his rivals dropped out of the race through early deaths, -sheer folly, or, perhaps in the case of Moreau, mere inertia. Napoleon -is believed to have schemed to seize the reins of government as early as -1797, but half a dozen others, including even Bernadotte and Augereau, -did the same. Napoleon was lucky, vigorous, and far more gifted than -they, and it was into his hands that the ripened fruit dropped. From -1799 on, from the Consulate to the Consulate for life, from the -Consulate for life to the Empire of the French, from the Empire of the -French to the visionary Empire of the West, were steps which he could -hardly have avoided taking in some form or other if he wished to retain -any power at all. The attempt to enforce the Continental System -undoubtedly led him further forward than was wise or than he desired. -Had Bonaparte been a Washington, he might have retired after the peace -of Amiens, but it is perfectly possible that even if a series of -Washingtons had succeeded him, the last of them would have been beaten -in a great battle some ten years later by the armies of an alliance of -nations which had for some time back been oppressed and enslaved in -increasing degree by the French. Undoubtedly this train of reasoning is -forced and unsound in some respects, but it certainly gives a great deal -of plausibility to the theory that Napoleon’s ambition was not so -far-reaching and impossibly aspiring as it is sometimes carelessly said -to have been. In addition, it is necessary to remember that his restless -energy must occasionally have spurred him to further action while a -lazier man would have remained tranquil. This is possibly an explanation -of his suicidal plunge into Spanish affairs. - -In like fashion the other indications of Napoleon’s character are faint -and colourless. Women had no vast attraction for him; he appreciated -them as a physical necessity, but that was all. Undoubtedly he ranked -women in his mind along with exercise and medicine, as things without -which men are liable to deteriorate. Wit and humour had very little -meaning for him—as witness his distaste for Molière—and Art had even -less. He ransacked Europe to fill the Louvre with masterpieces, but he -himself did not enjoy them. He was careless of his ease, of his attire, -of his comfort. When he fell from power, he did not seem to resent it -very much. There is a story of his having attempted suicide after his -abdication in 1814, but it is much to be doubted. The details seem far -more in agreement with the symptoms of his mysterious illness, or of the -malignant disease of which he died a few years later. He did not seem -vastly depressed at Elba, or even at St. Helena. Comparable to this lack -of depression is his hopefulness during the hopeless campaign of 1814. -He stood to lose so much, and he lost so much, but neither the -possibility nor the loss weighed upon him unbearably. Perhaps he was -confident that more greatness awaited him in the future; perhaps he -simply did not care. The furious rages in which Napoleon sometimes -indulged seem to have been merely good acting; he himself admitted that -he never allowed his rage to mount higher than his chin. - -Another human trait which was wanting in Napoleon was the capacity for -hatred. With his Corsican upbringing one might have expected to find him -at feud with numbers of people, but he was not. Napoleon was not a good -hater. He never hated Pozzo di Borgo, for instance, half as much as -Pozzo hated him. He took violent dislikes to a few individuals, but he -frequently overcame these in course of time. Macdonald is a case in -point. Hating must be distinguished from despising. Napoleon despised -the Spanish and Neapolitan Bourbons, but he did not hate them. He waged -war after war on Francis of Austria, but he never admitted any personal -dislike. Hatred and affection were alike unknown to Napoleon. - -There are one or two isolated examples of men for whom Napoleon -professed affection, but a good deal of doubt surrounds the matter. -Napoleon said he was fond of Muiron, who gave up his life for him at -Arcola; he said he was fond of Duroc, the Grand Marshal of the Palace, -who was killed at Bautzen, but it is significant that we do not hear -much about this affection in either case until after Duroc and Muiron -were both dead. More than one contemporary writer, indeed, has hinted -that Duroc disliked Napoleon, although he did his duty in an exemplary -manner, while so little is known about Muiron that we can be permitted -to assume that the affection Napoleon expressed after Duroc and he were -dead was a theatrical touch assumed for the purpose of enlisting still -more sympathy at St. Helena. This is quite in accordance with what we -know both of Napoleon’s own nature and of his plan of campaign while in -exile. - -One more point. Napoleon habitually attributed the lowest possible -motives to all human actions. His attitude was not so much cynical as -uncomprehending (though some people think that cynicism is merely lack -of comprehension); he simply could not understand anyone making any -self-sacrifice when quite disinterested or altruistic. If anyone did, he -put it down to hysteria. The brave boys who died for him in the filth -and misery of twenty campaigns were so enthusiastic, Napoleon thought, -merely because they were hysterical. - -This idea is plainly to be discerned on reading Napoleon’s bulletins and -proclamations. They are all of them apparently designed to appeal to a -sentimental and hysterical public. Without doubt, they did appeal to -their readers, but one cannot help feeling nowadays a sensation of -distaste when looking through them. They are unbearably reminiscent of -street corner oratory and of the flamboyant efforts of the sensational -press—appeals to hysteria pure and simple. Moreover, it is also plain -that Napoleon himself felt none of these hysterical impulses—he was -merely working cold-bloodedly on the passions of a passionate people. -Napoleon was entirely unfamiliar with noble instincts or with the idea -of devotion. He laid claim to them himself, of course, despite his -disbelief in them, but that was merely another method of capturing the -favour of the populace. Washington’s loftiness of character was as much -a sealed book to him as would have been (had he lived to see it) -Garibaldi’s disinterested patriotism. - -Even the sympathy with nationalism which his nephew later laboured so -hard to attribute to him was wanting; the man who could unite seven -nationalities into one state, and who tossed fragments of territory from -one power to another without consulting anything beyond his own desires -must of necessity have cared nothing either for national or individual -sentiment. - -We can sum up then by describing Napoleon as the embodiment of enormous -ability, unquenchable energy, and—nothing else. He can be compared to -an unguarded store of high explosive; he was bound to cause trouble -wherever he settled. Once afforded an opportunity he was certain to -bring about unexpected results, and, as it happened, the turmoil into -which France was flung just as he reached manhood afforded a very early -opportunity. Without morals or ideals to restrain or guide him, he would -cause destruction wherever he went, like a runaway horse or a motor -lorry out of control. He was a Frankenstein monster let loose on the -world; the good he did was as haphazard as the harm. - -[Illustration: PAULINE BORGHESE - (née Bonaparte)] - - - - - CHAPTER XV - WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN - - -OFTEN and often it has been savagely pointed out that Napoleon enjoyed -greater good fortune than anyone could with reason expect. Every -incident in Napoleon’s life, from his employment by Barras in 1795 to -the collapse of Francis I.’s nerve in 1809, has been used to prove this, -while his later misfortunes have been casually mentioned as being -inevitable considering his careless taking of risks. The former -criticism is undoubtedly fair, but the latter is open to serious -disagreement, and has hardly received the opposition it deserves. - -Napoleon’s domination of Europe from 1805 onwards depended entirely upon -his military supremacy; nobody would dream of saying that he would have -received the homage of the Confederation of the Rhine, the submission of -Prussia and the co-operation of Austria simply because of the force of -his personality, if that personality had not also been supported by the -menace of four hundred battalions. Consequently Napoleon’s policy could -not be questioned so long as his army was invincible, and mistakes of -policy could be rapidly erased by a victory in the field. Similarly a -military error was of far more importance than a political one; if the -Bonapartes had never met with a defeat in battle their line would still -inevitably hold the throne of France, with a ring of subject countries -round them. It is therefore of the first importance to inquire into the -failure of the army; the other failures are merely secondary. Thus if -anyone says that he has just quitted a certain building for three -reasons, one of them being that he was thrown out, the other two reasons -are of secondary importance. - -Various dates have been assigned to the commencement of the decline of -Napoleon’s military ascendancy, and the very fact that this is so proves -how difficult it is to be dogmatic on the subject. Napoleon lost battles -in 1807, and he won battles in 1813—and 1814 and 1815 for the matter of -that. The quality of the material at his disposal certainly grew more -and more inferior as time went on, but it is easy to make too much of -this point, for Napoleon was _never_ defeated except by superior -numbers. However, the first time he met with serious disaster was, -undoubtedly, in the campaign of 1812. The catastrophe has been described -times without number; what has not so often been mentioned is the -nearness of Napoleon’s approach to another triumph. - -A Napoleonic army never took the field without the full expectation of -losing half its numbers through hardship, as distinct from the action of -the enemy. This was the price it paid for its rapidity of marching and -its freedom from a rigid dependence upon its base. If Napoleon led half -a million men to attack Russia, he expected to lose a quarter of a -million before he was in a position to gain a decisive success; he -certainly lost the quarter million, and he certainly gained a success, -but the losses continued and the success was not decisive. And yet on -several occasions it appeared as if a new Austerlitz or a new Friedland -were at hand. - -The irony of the situation lies in the fact that in 1812 Napoleon took -much more extensive measures to ensure that losses due to poverty of -supplies would be minimized than he did in any other campaign. He -organized an elaborate Intendance, with vast trains of wagons, and he -collected enormous depôts of stores wherever possible. The system broke -down almost at once, partly on account of the inexperience of the -commissariat staff, partly because of torrential rains which ruined the -roads as soon as the army started, and partly because the army and train -were so huge that they had already absorbed every available horse in -Europe, so that losses (which necessarily increased with the distance -marched from the depôts) could not be replaced at all. This threw -additional work on the surviving horses, thereby increasing the wastage, -so that the Intendance went to pieces at a rate increasing by -geometrical progression. Before very long the Grand Army was once more -dependent entirely on the country through which it marched, and the -numbers were vast and Lithuania and White Russia were miserably poor. It -was a combination of circumstances apparently almost justifying the -Russian boast that God was on their side. - -Yet matters were not progressing any too well for the Russians. Their -field army was hopelessly divided; one portion, from the Danube, could -not be expected for months, while of the other two parts one was almost -in the clutches of the French, and the two together were hopelessly -inferior in numbers to the forces at Napoleon’s disposal. The tide of -war came surging back across Russia; the Russians were marching -desperately to escape from the trap; the French were pursuing equally -desperately in the hope of closing the last avenue of escape. The -balance wavered, but at length turned in favour of the Czar. The roads -were mere mud tracks, churned by the Russians into quagmires, and the -French were delayed. Jerome Bonaparte was not as insistent on speed as -he might have been, and at last, after fierce rearguard fighting, -Bagration escaped from the snare laid for him. A little more—ever so -little!—and Smolensk might have been another Ulm. - -The two main Russian armies were now combined, and, a hundred and twenty -thousand strong, with a numerous cavalry, they were able to sweep the -country bare before the French advance. Had the French movements round -Smolensk been successful, the Russians would have had only half these -numbers, and they would probably have been panic-stricken in addition; -the French advance would have been proportionately easier and less -expensive. In fact, it is difficult to see how Russia could have -continued the war, for Alexander’s nerve would have been shaken, the war -party would have received a severe rebuff, and altogether an entirely -different atmosphere would have arisen. The Russians fell slowly back -towards Moscow, the French, starving and disease-ridden, toiled -painfully after them. Barclay de Tolly was relieved from his command in -consequence of his inaction, and Kutusoff, the disciple of the great -Suvaroff, took his place. A battle was fought at Borodino. For Napoleon, -it was the first victory which did not give him huge captures of -prisoners and the prompt and abject submission of his enemies; for the -Russians it seemed as good as a victory, for they had met the great -conqueror _en rase campagne_, and had escaped. - -Yet they should not have done. The late Lord Wolseley declares that -Napoleon’s plan of attack at Borodino “could not be more perfectly -conceived or better elaborated,” and he goes on to say that it was a -sudden attack of illness which prevented Napoleon from controlling the -battle when it reached its height, and from sending adequate supports to -Ney at the crucial moment. This is the first mention we find of the -mysterious illness on which a large number of writers lay so much -stress; in the next campaign we shall find a much more important -example. But whether Napoleon was ill or not, a little better luck for -Ney or Davout would certainly have brought about important results. The -destruction of Kutusoff’s army would have had a great effect on the rest -of the campaign, even if it had not appalled Alexander into making -peace. - -The next mistake of the Emperor’s was in staying too long at Moscow; -during the five weeks he spent there his own army became demoralized, -the Russians had time to rally and to bring up the Army of the Danube, -and winter closed down on the countryside. When at last Napoleon decided -to retreat Kutusoff was able at Malo-Jaroslavetz to bar the way to -Kaluga, and to force him to go back through the pillaged districts -through which he had come; this could mean nothing less than the -destruction of his army, and, as everyone knows, the Grand Army was -destroyed. It is needless here to tell once more the tale of the -Beresina and Krasnoi; the interest of “what might have been” ceases with -the battle of Malo-Jaroslavetz. - -The points to be remembered are that during the fighting round Smolensk -Napoleon was within a hairbreadth of an overwhelming victory; at -Borodino he might have gained a satisfactory victory; a prompt retreat -from Moscow would at least have minimized disaster; a success at -Malo-Jaroslavetz would have saved part of the army, while the check -which was actually experienced here was due to the accumulated effects -of the earlier bad luck. In a military sense the campaign of 1812 was -not merely justifiable but it was very nearly justified. A little—a -very little more thrown into the scale would have saved his Empire for -Napoleon and set him on a higher throne than ever before. - -The campaign of 1813 was in this sense even more striking. It was waged -with untrained, immature forces, for the most part against overwhelming -odds, but during the course of the fighting Napoleon was not once, but -many times, within an ace of successes more splendid than Austerlitz. -The actions of the Allies seemed to portend failure for them from the -start. Although Prussia joined Russia as soon as the extent of the -French disaster became known; although there was nothing to bar their -way except a few thousand starving survivors of the Grand Army; although -all Germany was in a ferment, and the French domination of the Rhenish -Confederation was tottering, the Russians advanced with pitiful caution -and delay. Napoleon had returned to Paris, had raised, organized, -equipped and set in motion a new army of a quarter of a million men by -the time the Russians reached the Elbe. Almost before the Russian -commander-in-chief, Wittgenstein, knew what was happening, Napoleon had -rushed back at the head of his new army, had won the battle of Lützen, -had reconquered Saxony, and had flung the Allied army back across the -Oder. - -At Bautzen they stood once more to fight. Napoleon drew up the most -gigantic battle plan ever conceived up to that time; with half his force -he assailed the Allied centre, while Ney with sixty thousand men marched -against the right. The struggle lasted for twelve bitter hours. Somehow -Napoleon held his own command together and kept the Allies pinned to -their position, while Ney was slowly wheeling his immense force round -for the decisive movement. But the stars in their courses fought against -the Emperor. Ney failed lamentably. He lost sight of the main object of -his march, and he showed his hand and then wasted his strength in a -fierce attack on Blücher at Preistitz. Blücher struggled gamely; more -and more of Ney’s forces were drawn into the fight; the turning movement -was delayed, and the Allies, warned in time, writhed out of the trap. -Fifty thousand prisoners and two hundred guns might have been captured; -as it was, Napoleon was left to deplore a massacre—for nothing! -Alluding to Soult’s capture of Badajoz in 1811, Napoleon had said, -“Soult gained me a town and lost me a kingdom.” He might well have said -of Ney’s attack on Preistitz that Ney gained him a village and lost him -an Empire. It is inconceivable that the war could have been prolonged if -Ney had obeyed orders at Bautzen; the allied army comprised all the -troops that Russia and Prussia could at that time put into the field; -its destruction would have meant the reconquest of Prussia and of -Poland, the intimidation of Austria, and the regaining of Napoleon’s -European ascendancy. - -After Bautzen Napoleon concluded an armistice with his enemies. He still -hoped for an advantageous peace, and even if he failed to obtain this he -expected that the delay would enable him to rest the weary boys who -filled the ranks, to drill his wretched cavalry into some semblance of -order, and to clear his rear of the bandits and partisans who were -swarming everywhere. Moreover, for the last eighteen months he had been -working at a pace which would have killed most men, and he himself was -undoubtedly feeling the strain. The armistice would give him a little -rest. But it meant disaster, nevertheless. From all over Russia new -recruits were plodding across the unending plains to fill the gaps in -the ranks of the field army; Prussia was calling out her whole male -population, and Bernadotte’s Swedes were gradually moving up into line. -Worse than all, Austria turned against him. The delay enabled Francis to -bring his army up to war strength on the receipt of lavish English -subsidies, and, even while he still hesitated to attack his son-in-law, -the news arrived that Wellington had routed Joseph Bonaparte at -Vittoria, had cleared Spain of the French, and was about to attack the -sacred soil of France herself. The news was decisive, and the demands of -the Allies promptly increased inordinately. When, in August, the -armistice came to an end, Napoleon found himself assailed by forces of -twice his strength. - -Yet he did not despair; he thrust fiercely into Silesia, and then, -finding the Austrians moving against Dresden, he wheeled about, marched -a hundred and twenty miles in four days, and gained at Dresden the most -surprising of all his victories. With a hundred thousand men he flung -back a hundred and sixty thousand Russians and Austrians in utter -disorder; Vandamme had cut off their retreat, and once again it seemed -as if Ulm and Austerlitz were to be repeated. And then once more -occurred a startling change of fortune. Napoleon might have taken a -hundred thousand prisoners; the Emperors of Austria and of Russia might -have fallen into his power; Austria would have been ruined, and Napoleon -could have dictated peace on his own terms. But Napoleon handed over the -pursuit to Murat and St. Cyr, and returned to Dresden. In consequence, -the retreating Austrians were not pressed, Vandamme was overwhelmed, and -the action at Kulm gave the Allies twenty thousand prisoners instead of -placing the whole Allied army in the hands of the French. - -No one knows why Napoleon returned to Dresden when victory was in his -grasp. The advocates of the illness theory certainly have a strong case -here; but perhaps it was news of the disasters in Silesia which recalled -him; perhaps he was merely too tired to continue; perhaps he only had a -bad cold as the result of sitting his horse all day in the pelting rain -which fell all day during the battle of Dresden. However it was, -Napoleon’s mastership of Europe was lost irreparably when he came to his -decision to leave his army. - -For two months disaster now followed disaster. Macdonald had already -been routed on the Katzbach; Oudinot was beaten at Gross Beeren, Ney was -beaten at Dennewitz, St. Cyr surrendered at Dresden, and Napoleon -himself tasted the bitter cup of defeat at Leipzig. The astonishing -feature of the autumn campaign of 1813 was not that Napoleon was -defeated, but that he ever escaped from Germany at all. But he did, -blotting out on his path the Bavarian army which opposed him at Hanau. - -Once again the Allies advanced too slowly, and once again Napoleon was -able to organize a fresh army to defend France. Soult had grappled with -Wellington in the south, and was stubbornly contesting every inch of -French soil in his desperate campaign of Toulouse. Napoleon prepared to -make one more effort for success in the north. Russia, Austria, Prussia, -Sweden, the Confederation of the Rhine, Holland and even Belgium had -sent every man available against him. Four hundred thousand men were -about to pass the Rhine while Napoleon had not a quarter of this force -with which to oppose them. However, the prospect was not as hopeless as -it would appear. The Allies were bitterly jealous of each other, and -Napoleon had good grounds for hoping to divide them even now. Besides, -they were all of them intent upon gaining possession of whatever -territory they wished to claim at the conclusion of peace, and an army -guided solely by political motives is at the mercy of another which is -directed only in accordance with the dictates of military strategy. - -This early became obvious. Austria had bought the alliance of the -smaller German states only by means of extensive guarantees of their -possessions; in consequence she determined to find compensation for her -losses by acquisitions in Italy. But Italy was stoutly defended by the -Viceroy Eugène; she could make no progress there, and in consequence she -did not yet desire Napoleon’s fall. Schwartzenberg, the Austrian -general, was therefore held back by Metternich’s secret orders until -Venetia and Lombardy should be in Austrian hands. Metternich was quite -capable of leaving the Russians and Prussians in the lurch while he -played his own tortuous game; however, the situation was saved by -Murat’s betrayal of Napoleon. With Murat on his side, and the Neapolitan -army moving forward against Eugène, Metternich was sure of Italy, and -Schwartzenberg was allowed to proceed into France. Once more the -weakness and treachery of a subordinate had prevented Napoleon from -gaining a decisive success. - -The prospect grew gloomier and gloomier for the French. Napoleon was -beaten at Brienne and at La Rothière; immediate and utter ruin seemed -inevitable. Suddenly everything was changed. Napoleon fell upon the -dispersed army of the Allies. At Champ-Aubert, Vauchamp, Château-Thierry -and Mormant the Allies were beaten and hurled back. More than this, the -Prussians under Blücher, thirty thousand strong, hard pressed by -Napoleon, came reeling back towards Soissons and the Marne—and Soissons -was held by a French garrison. With an unfordable river before him; the -only bridge held by the enemy; a panic-stricken army under his command, -and Napoleon and his unbeaten Frenchmen, flushed with victory, at his -heels, Blücher seemed doomed to destruction. The officer in command at -Soissons bore the ominous name of Moreau; he was intimidated into -surrender when one more day’s defence would have had incalculable -results. Blücher escaped across the Marne not a minute too soon. - -This was Napoleon’s last chance before his abdication. His armies were -weakened even by their victories; the Allied forces seemed -inexhaustible. All Napoleon’s efforts were unavailing; his final threat -at Schwartzenberg’s communications was disregarded, and the Allies -reached Paris. Marmont’s surrender here has often been brought forward -as one more instance of treachery in high places, but it was not -treachery, it was only timidity and fear of responsibility. One cannot -imagine Blücher surrendering under similar circumstances. Be that as it -may, Paris fell, and Napoleon abdicated. - -After the abdication came the descent from Elba; after the descent from -Elba came the Hundred Days; and at the end of the Hundred Days came the -Waterloo campaign. It was during the Waterloo campaign that there -occurred, not one but half a dozen chances for Napoleon to win the -decisive victory for which he had been striving ever since 1812, but all -these half-dozen chances were spoilt by unexpected happenings and by -sheer hard luck. - -Many critics have inveighed against Napoleon’s decision to take the -initiative into his own hands and to carry the war into the enemy’s camp -by his invasion of Belgium, but there is hardly one who can find any -fault with the plan of invasion once it had been decided upon. The chief -fault-finder, indeed, is Wellington, who, to his dying day, maintained -that the movement should have been commenced through Mons, against the -English right, and not through Charleroi, against their left. However, -Wellington’s opinion on this matter does not carry as much weight as it -might, because the Iron Duke was guilty of several serious mistakes -during the campaign, and was only too anxious to draw any red herring -that offered across their trail, especially as these mistakes were -nearly all committed while he was under the impression that Napoleon’s -ultimate objective was his right and not his centre. The whole weight of -later opinion is in favour of Napoleon’s plan. - -Napoleon decided, then, to invade Belgium via Charleroi, to interpose -between the Prussian and the Anglo-Allied armies and defeat them in -detail. The fact that he had only 130,000 men against 120,000 Prussians -and 100,000 English and Allies does not seem to have caused him any -grave apprehension. The greatest handicap under which he suffered was -the absence of Berthier and Davout; both staff work and the higher -commands suffered because of this, for Soult had no aptitude for the -task of Chief of Staff, and Ney and Grouchy had no skill either in -higher strategy or in the handling of large numbers of men. -Nevertheless, the initial movements, without the interference of the -enemy, were carried out with brilliant success; the 130,000 men -available were assembled on the Sambre without either Blücher or -Wellington having any suspicion as to the storm that was gathering. Next -day the advance across the Sambre was ordered, and the storm burst. - -The two vitally important factors for success were extreme simplicity of -movement and the utmost secrecy of design. But these were rendered -impossible at the very moment of the opening of the campaign. First, a -general of division, as soon as he was over the river, deserted to the -Prussians and disclosed the very considerable information of which he -was possessed, and secondly the officer bearing orders to Vandamme to -advance met with an accident and broke his leg. This held up both -Vandamme’s corps and the one behind it, Lobau’s, and delayed the advance -after the movement had become known for six valuable hours. All chance -of surprising the Prussians in their cantonments was now lost, but for -all that the plan of campaign was so perfect that on the next day the -English and Prussians could only bring slightly superior numbers to bear -on the French force. At Ligny the Prussians were beaten; at Quatre Bras -the English were held back. Ney’s and d’Erlon’s mistakes on this day -have already been described. Had Ney acted with all possible diligence, -or had d’Erlon used his wits, either a completely crushing victory over -the Prussians or a nearly equally satisfactory success over the English -could have been obtained. Even both were possible. But Napoleon’s chance -was spoiled owing to the inefficiency of his subordinates. Soult, Ney -and d’Erlon were all equally to blame. - -The next point is more mysterious. After Ligny was fought and won, it -was clearly to Napoleon’s advantage to follow up his success without a -moment’s delay. No other general had ever been so remorseless in hunting -down a beaten enemy, and in wringing every possible advantage from his -victory. But at Digny Napoleon paused. No order for an advance was -issued. For twelve hours paralysis descended upon the Imperial army. The -Prussians struggled out of harm’s way, and crawled painfully by by-roads -to Wavre to keep in touch with the English. The cavalry reconnaissances -which were sent out later the next morning to find the Prussian army did -their work badly, and left Napoleon convinced that they had fallen back -on Liège and not on Wavre. It was the delay, however, and not the faulty -scouting, which proved most disastrous. Like Napoleon’s return to -Dresden in 1813, it has never been explained. Some historians say that -he was struck down by an attack of the same nameless illness which had -overcome him at Borodino, at Moscow, at Dresden and at Leipzig. In this -case it is the only possible explanation. For four or five hours -Napoleon must have suffered from a complete lapse of his faculties. -Those four or five hours were sufficient to ruin the Empire. Napoleon -was left completely in the dark as to the moral, strength and position -of the Prussians, and consequently he detached Grouchy with ambiguous -orders in pursuit, gave him a force too small for decisive operations -and yet much too large for mere observation, and sent him by a route -which precluded him either from assisting the main body or from -interfering seriously with the operations of the Prussians. Grouchy -might possibly have done both if only he had possessed vast insight, -vast skill and vast determination, but he did not; he was merely -ordinary. So Wellington turned to bay at Waterloo; the Prussians -assailed Napoleon’s flank, and the day ended in despair and disaster. - -Thus, on looking back through the years of defeat, 1812, 1813, 1814 and -1815, we find that there were a great number of occasions when Napoleon -might have gained a success which would have counter-balanced the -previous reverses. At Smolensk he might have gained another Friedland; -at Borodino he might still have snatched some slight triumph out of the -Moscow campaign. At Bautzen he came within an ace of destroying the -Russian and Prussian armies, at Dresden he nearly captured the whole -Austrian army and the two most powerful autocrats of Europe. The -surrender of Soissons just saved the Prussians in 1814. In 1815 he might -have shattered either or both of the armies opposed to him. It is not -too much to say that with the good luck which had attended him during -his earlier campaigns not only might he not have been forced to abdicate -in 1814, but he might have enjoyed his continental ascendancy for a very -considerable additional length of time. - -Beside these undoubted possibilities there are others not as firmly -based. Marbot tells a story that on the eve of Leipzig, while at the -head of his Chasseurs, he saw a party of horsemen moving about in the -darkness a short distance ahead. For various reasons he refrained from -attacking—to discover later that the hostile force had consisted of the -King of Prussia, the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and their staffs. A -resolute charge by Marbot would have brought back as prisoners all the -brains and authority of the opposing army. The Spanish victory at Pavia, -when Francis the First lost “everything except honour,” would have been -a poor success in comparison. We have, however, only Marbot’s word for -this incident, and Marbot is distinctly untrustworthy. Edward III.’s -army was not the only one which used the long bow. - -It is more to the purpose to consider Dupont’s surrender at Baylen. When -Dupont was sent out from Madrid to conquer Andalusia, there was only one -Spanish field army in being, and that was the one he was to attack. As -it happened, his nerve failed him, he frittered away weeks of valuable -time, and finally he was hemmed in and forced to surrender rather -feebly. The news of the disaster spread like wildfire over the -Peninsula. Moncey was repulsed from Valencia; Catalonia broke into -insurrection and hemmed Duhesme into Barcelona. Galicia and Aragon began -to arm. The Peninsular War was soon fully developed; it was to absorb -the energies of an army of three hundred thousand men for five years; it -was to shed the blood of half a million Frenchmen; it was to encourage -first Austria, then Russia, to rebel against the Napoleonic domination, -and it was only to end when the British flag waved over Bordeaux and -Toulouse. Had Lannes or some other really capable officer been in -command of Dupont’s twenty thousand men, the Army of Andalusia might -have been thoroughly beaten and the Peninsula overawed, for Baylen was -the battle which destroyed the French army’s reputation for -invincibility. Had not the Spaniards been victorious there, there would -not have been an opportunity for the simultaneous call to arms which set -all Spain in an inextinguishable blaze; isolated outbreaks might -naturally have occurred, but the long respite given to the Spaniards -during the summer of 1808, while Madrid was evacuated, would not have -taken place to give the Peninsula its opportunity for arming and -organizing. Baylen is as great a turning-point in Napoleonic history as -even Bautzen or Leipzig—and but for Dupont history might have turned in -another direction. - -Instances such as this might be multiplied indefinitely, from Marmont at -El Bodin (where he hesitated when half the British army was in his -power) to Jourdan in his retreat to Vittoria; from Jerome’s -mismanagement of Westphalia to Ney at Dennewitz; but it is useless to -continue. It is obvious that Napoleon’s military set-backs were due very -largely, not to his own failings, but to the incapacity of his -subordinates. Napoleon made mistakes, enormous ones, sometimes (a few -will be considered in the next chapter), but none of them as utterly -fatal as those of the other generals. And yet these other generals were -quite good generals as far as generals go—they were far and away -superior to Schwartzenberg and Wittgenstein, for instance. Only -Wellington and perhaps Blücher can be compared to them. The only moral -to be drawn is that nothing human and fallible could sustain the vast -Empire any longer; the dead weight of the whole was such that the least -flaw in any of the pillars meant the progressive collapse of the entire -fabric. - -This conclusion enables us to approach a definite decision as to “what -might have been.” It is unnecessary to argue as to whether the English -Cabinet would have survived a defeat at Waterloo, or whether Francis -would have made peace if he had been captured at Dresden. The result -eventually would have been the same. There was only one Napoleon, and -the Empire was too big for him to govern. Sooner or later something -would go wrong, and the disturbance would increase in geometrical -progression, and with a violence directly proportionate to the length of -time during which the repressive force had been in action. It was -inevitable that the Empire should fall, although as it happened the fall -was accelerated by a series of unfortunate incidents. Victor Hugo meant -the same thing when he said “God was bored with Napoleon”; and Napoleon -himself had occasional glimpses of the same inevitable result—as -witness the occasion when he said, “After me, my son will be lucky if he -has a few thousand francs a year.” - -Thus, if Napoleon by good fortune had reestablished his Empire in 1813, -and taken advantage (just as he did in 1810) of peace in the east to -reconquer Spain in the south, even then he would not long have retained -his throne. The persistent enmity of England would have continued to -injure him, and to seek out some weak spot for the decisive blow. Even -if Ferdinand had been sent back to Spain, and French prestige survived -such a reverse, there would have still remained various avenues of -attack. England was suffering severely, but France was suffering more. -Perhaps the patience of the French would have become exhausted, and some -trivial revolt in Paris would have driven Napoleon into exile. A very -similar thing happened in 1830, and the house of Orleans was always -anxiously awaiting some such chance. There could hardly have arisen a -Napoleonic Legend in that event. To the French mind Napoleon the Great -and Napoleon the Little would have been the same person, instead of -uncle and nephew. - -However it was, Napoleon was not destined to live long, and even if his -Empire had survived him, at his death one can hardly imagine Europe -remaining under the thumb of any Council of Regency he might appoint, -with Joseph and Jerome and the Murats all scheming and conspiring to -grasp the main power. Poor silly Marie Louise could never have kept -order; some Monk would have arisen to restore the Bourbons, and Napoleon -II. would have received the same treatment as did Richard Cromwell. The -legend of l’Aiglon would then have been very different. A Bonaparte -restoration in France might be as feasible as ever was a Protectorate -restoration in England. Not all Louis Napoleon’s wiles could have built -up a reactionary party; not all the glamour of Austerlitz and Jena could -have masked the discredit of a new dynasty being cast out by its own -people instead of by a league of indignant autocrats; even Sedan was not -the death-blow to Bonapartism. As it is, there will be a Third Empire in -France as soon as there arises a Napoleon the Fourth. - -[Illustration: DAVOUT - (PRINCE D’ECKMÜHL AND DUC D’AUERSTÄDT)] - - - - - CHAPTER XVI - SPOTS IN THE SUN - - -IT was Napoleon’s fate, during his lifetime and for some time after, to -have his worst mistakes overlooked, and to have various strokes of -policy violently condemned as shocking errors. Everyone has heard the -execution of the Duc d’Enghien spoken of as “worse than a crime—it was -a blunder.” It is difficult to see why. Perhaps Fouché, to whom the -remark is attributed, did not see why either. If a man should happen to -think of an epigram of that brilliancy, it is hard to condemn him for -using it without troubling much as to its truth. But whether launched in -good faith or not, that shaft of wit sped most accurately to its mark, -and proved so efficiently barbed that it has stuck ever since. - -The real point was that France was at war with England at the time, and -that Napoleon was so universally dreaded that any stick was considered -good enough to beat him with. Consequently a storm of indignation arose, -diligently fostered by those who benefited, and soon all Europe was -furious that a poor dear Bourbon had been shot. If nowadays the -President of the German Republic were to lay hold of a young -Hohenzollern and shoot him on a charge of conspiracy, it is doubtful -whether it would cause any similar stir. Europe is not fond of -Hohenzollerns, and the principle of Legitimacy is so far discredited -that it is not considered blasphemy to treat the descendant of an -autocrat with violence. - -Undoubtedly it was a crime for Napoleon to shoot the Duke, but it was -hardly a blunder. It was contrary to international law for him to send -the expedition to Ettenheim which arrested d’Enghien; it was contrary to -statutory law to try him without allowing him to make any defence; it -was contrary to moral law to shoot him for an offence of which he was -not guilty. For all this Napoleon deserves the utmost possible -censure—but without doubt he profited largely. Everywhere among -Napoleon’s enemies arose a weeping and wailing; the English poured out -indignant seas of ink (in 1914 they wrote in much the same fashion about -Wilhelm of Germany’s withered arm). Alexander of Russia put his Court in -mourning (only three years before he had been cognisant of the plot -which brought about the murder of his own father); the King of Sweden -tried to organize a crusade of revenge; but a month after d’Enghien died -the Senate begged Napoleon to assume the Imperial title. It is curious, -indeed, that so much notice should have been taken of one more murder by -a generation which witnessed, without one quarter so much emotion, the -partition of Poland, the storming of Praga, the sack of Badajoz, the -shooting of Ney, and Wellington’s devastation of the Tagus Valley. The -art of propaganda was at quite a high level even more than a century -ago. - -Once again, the execution of d’Enghien was a crime and not a mistake. By -it Napoleon showed that he was no mere Monk dallying with the idea of -restoring the Bourbons. He brought to his support all the most -determined of the irreconcilables. He showed the monarchs of Europe that -he was a man to be reckoned with. Murat, Savary, everyone implicated was -cut off from all possible communication with the Bourbons. The deed -cowed the Pope into submission at a vitally important moment, while the -mere mention of it later was sufficient to frighten the wretched -Ferdinand of Spain into abject obedience at that strange conference at -Bayonne, when an idiotic father and a craven son handed the crown of -Charles V. to an incompetent upstart. But Napoleon would have met with -no more than he deserved had he had dealt out to him at Fontainebleau in -1814 the same tender mercy which Condé’s heir received at Vincennes ten -years before—ten years almost to the day. - -If Enghien’s execution were a crime but not a mistake, there are several -incidents, most of them occurring about the same time, which undoubtedly -indicated mistakes, even if they were not crimes. Thus Pichegru was -found dead in prison. Pichegru was one of the generals of the Republic, -almost worthy of ranking with Hoch and Kléber. He had conquered Holland, -and was credited with the mythical exploit of capturing the frozen-in -Dutch fleet with a squadron of Hussars. (The Dutch had obligingly -forestalled this achievement by surrendering some time previously.) -Later he had been found to be parleying with the Bourbons, and had been -disgraced and exiled. Returning at the time of Cadoudal’s conspiracy, he -had been arrested, imprisoned—and was found one morning dead, with a -handkerchief round his neck which had been twisted tight by means of a -stick. Paris gossip credited Napoleon with the guilt of his death, and -darkly hinted that his confidential Mamelukes had revived the Oriental -process of bowstringing. It is hard to believe that Napoleon really was -guilty, for he could have secured Pichegru’s death by legal methods had -he wished, while if he wanted to kill Pichegru quietly he could have -adopted more subtle means. The blunder lay in his allowing the -circumstances to become known; with his power he could have arranged a -much more satisfactory announcement which would leave no doubt in men’s -minds that Pichegru really had committed suicide. In consequence of his -carelessness Napoleon was also charged with the murder, a year later, of -an English naval officer, Captain Wright, who also committed suicide in -prison. - -A more terrible mystery surrounds the death of Villeneuve. This -unfortunate man had been in command at Trafalgar; he had been wounded -and taken prisoner, and had subsequently been sent back to France. As -soon as he landed he found that Napoleon was furious with him as a -consequence of his defeat, and he was found dead in his room at Rennes, -with half a dozen knife-stabs in his body. It was announced that he had -committed suicide, but there are several unpleasant facts in connection -with his death which point to another conclusion. Letters from him to -his wife and from his wife to him had disappeared in the post; the -manner of death was strange, for the knife-thrusts were numerous and one -of them was so situated that it could hardly have been self-inflicted. -Perhaps Napoleon had Villeneuve killed; perhaps the crime was committed -by over-zealous underlings; however it was, it was a serious error on -Napoleon’s part to have allowed any room for gossip whatever. A possible -motive for the crime (if it was one) lies in the fact that Napoleon was -terribly anxious to keep secret the news of Trafalgar; not until the -Restoration was the general French public acquainted with the fact that -the French fleet had been destroyed—Napoleon had never admitted more -than the loss of one or two ships. - -It was incidents of this nature which caused the feeling of distrust -which gradually arose in the minds of the French people. Broken treaties -and international bad faith did not move them so much, partly because -they were never in possession of the true facts, partly because a series -of brilliant victories wiped off the smudges from the slate, and partly -because international morality was at its usual low ebb; but tales of -official murder and of unsavoury scandals in high places constitute the -ideal food for gossip, and rumours spread and were distorted in the way -rumours are, until a large section of the public had lost its faith in -the Emperor. As long as Napoleon was successful in the field this -defection was unimportant, but as soon as his power began to ebb it -became decidedly noticeable, and, as much as anything else, helped to -reconcile the mass of the people to the return of the Bourbons. - -It has been well said that the man who never makes any mistakes never -makes anything else, and allied to this statement is Wellington’s famous -dictum (which applies equally well to all kinds of endeavour) that the -best general is not the one who makes fewest mistakes, but the one who -takes most advantage of the mistakes of his opponent. On examining -Napoleon’s career one finds mistakes innumerable—and the successes are -more numerous still. In military matters the explanation lies in the -extreme and elaborate care Napoleon devoted to his strategic -arrangements. His movements were so planned that no tactical check could -derange them. His _bataillon carré_ of a hundred thousand men, with -Lannes the incomparable at the head of the advanced guard, could take -care of itself whatever happened. The advanced guard caught the enemy -and pinned him to his ground, providing that fixed point which Napoleon -always desired as a pivot, and then the massed army could be wheeled -with ease against whatever part of the enemy’s line Napoleon selected. -If victory was the result, then the pursuit was relentless; if perhaps a -check was experienced, then the previous strategy had been such that the -damage done was minimized. It was this system which saved him at Eylau -and which was so marvellously successful at Friedland. - -The occasions when danger threatened or when disaster occurred were -those when Napoleon did not act on these lines. The campaign of 1796, -indeed, shows no trace of the “Napoleonic system.” The principles which -Napoleon followed were only those of the other generals of the period, -but they were acted upon with such vigour and with such a clarity of -vision that they were successful against all the odds which the Aulic -Council brought to bear. At Marengo, on the other hand, the conditions -were different and more exacting. This victory had to be as gratifying -as possible to the French nation—it had to be gained by extraordinary -means; it had to be as unlooked-for as a thunderbolt, as startling as it -was successful, and it must bring prodigious results. Also (for -Napoleon’s own sake) it had to be gained as quickly as possible, so that -he could return to Paris to overcome his enemies. - -The Austrians had overrun Italy, were besieging Genoa, and had advanced -to the Var. No mere frontal attack upon them would fulfil all the -onerous conditions imposed upon the First Consul. A series of successes -painfully gained, resulting in the slow driving of the Austrians from -one river line to another, might be safe, but it would not be dramatic -nor unexpected, and, worst of all, it would not be rapid. Napoleon took -an enormous risk, and led his Army of Reserve over the Alps. He had -satisfied the need for drama; now he had to justify himself by a speedy -victory. Defeat, with an impassable defile in his rear, meant nothing -less than disaster; but delay, with his enemies gradually rallying at -Paris, meant similar disaster. The strain became unbearable, and -Napoleon scattered his army far and wide in his endeavour to come to -grips with the Austrians. The risk he ran was appalling, and was almost -fatal, for the fraction of the army which he still retained under his -own hand was suddenly attacked by the combined Austrians, and driven -back. Napoleon flung himself into the battle; somehow he kept his -battered battalions together until three undeserved strokes of luck -occurred simultaneously. Desaix arrived with his stray division; Zach -unduly extended the Austrian line; and Kellermann was afforded an -opportunity for a decisive charge. In ten minutes the whole situation -was changed. Marengo was won; it was the Austrians who were defeated -without an avenue of retreat; and Napoleon was free to enjoy the -intoxication of supreme power—and to meditate on the destiny which had -saved him from indescribable disgrace. - -The errors into which Napoleon fell during the campaign of 1805 were -mainly the result of his overestimation of his adversaries’ talents. No -one could possibly have imagined that Mack would have been such a -spiritless fool as to stay in Ulm and allow himself to be surrounded by -an army three times his strength. Napoleon certainly did not expect him -to, and made his dispositions on the supposition that Mack would -endeavour to fight his way through to Bohemia or Tyrol. But Mack -remained paralysed; the one gap left open was closed to him by Ney’s -dashing victory at Elchingen, and all that remained to be done was for -Napoleon to receive the timid surrender of thirty thousand men and for -Murat to hunt down whatever fragments were still at large. Five weeks -later the Russians were destroyed at Austerlitz. There is no manœuvre of -Napoleon’s during these five weeks at which anyone can reasonably cavil; -the faint criticism that Napoleon ought not to have advanced as far as -he did into Moravia is easily falsified by the fact that by this means -he was able to find room for his retreat on Austerlitz which gave so -much heart to the Russians and which induced them to make their ruinous -attack on his right wing. - -The mistakes which Napoleon made during the Jena campaign have already -been fully discussed. He made several gross miscalculations, and his -only justification is his final success. As the war went on, however, -and the French advanced into Poland, we find Napoleon at his very best -strategically. At Eylau he blundered in sending forward Augereau’s corps -in their mad rush at the powerful Russian line, but once again he was -able to extricate himself from his difficulties, and Friedland settled -the matter. - -It is now that we come to the most disastrous adventure of all—the -Spanish affair. The remark has been made that until 1808 Napoleon had -only fought kings, and never a people. He plunged into the involved -politics of Spain expecting as easy a victory as Masséna’s conquest of -Naples in 1806, or Junot’s conquest of Portugal in 1807. He was sadly -mistaken. And yet one can find traces indicating that he was taking all -possible precautions. His instructions to his representatives at Madrid -certainly suggest that he was trying to frighten the Spanish royal -family out of the country, and that only when this scheme had been upset -by the abdication of Charles at Aranjuez (which could not possibly have -been foreseen) did he call the suicidal conference of Bayonne. The -Portuguese royal family had fled from Junot; the Neapolitan Bourbons had -fled from Masséna; it might have been expected that the Spanish Bourbons -would have fled from Murat, especially as they had rich American -dependencies in which to settle. The Spaniards would not have fought -half so hard for a craven King in America as they did for one who was -pictured to them as suffering a martyr’s torments in a French prison. So -far Napoleon’s methods are perhaps justified in every way except -morally. But from this time onward he made mistake after mistake. He -entrusted the conquest of Spain to officers and troops of poor -quality—generals like Savary, Dupont and Duhesme, with mere provisional -regiments formed from the sweepings of the depôts. The capitulation of -Baylen and the loss of Madrid were the natural consequence. In wrath -Napoleon called upon the Grand Army. He plunged into Spain, routed the -wretched Spanish levies, pressed on to conquer all Spain and—was forced -to wheel back to counter Moore’s swift thrust at his rear. - -Napoleon never returned to the Peninsula. It was not central enough; he -could not from there keep an eye on the rest of Europe. He endeavoured -instead to direct affairs from Paris, with the result that what little -order remained dissolved into chaos. His despatches arrived six weeks -late, and co-ordination was impossible. The best course left open to him -was to entrust the supreme command in Spain to the most capable of his -subordinates, someone who could make his plans on the spot and see that -they were carried out. But there Napoleon stopped short. Give to another -Frenchman the command of three hundred thousand men and all the -resources of a vast kingdom? Unthinkable! So matters drifted from bad to -worse while the Marshals quarrelled among themselves, while Joseph and -Jourdan tried to make their authority felt, and while Napoleon blindly -stirred up still further trouble among them. - -Worse than this; Napoleon entirely misread the character of the Spanish -war. Despite his own experiences there, he did not realize the enormous -difficulties with which the French armies had to contend. He set three -hundred thousand men a task which would have kept half a million fully -occupied, and he further hampered them by the niggardly nature of their -allowances of money and material. He under-estimated the fighting power -of the guerillas, of the Portuguese levies, and (worst of all) of the -English army. He over-estimated the power of his name among the -unlettered Spanish peasants. He left entirely out of account the -impossibility of communication and of supply. In a word, there was no -error open to him into which he did not fall. - -The Spanish trouble had hardly assumed serious dimensions when in 1809 -Austria made one more bid for freedom and commenced hostilities against -him. As busy as he could possibly be with Spanish affairs, with troubles -in Paris, and with ruling the rest of Europe, Napoleon delayed before -going in person to the seat of war. He miscalculated the time necessary -to Austria to mobilize, and he entrusted the temporary command to -Berthier—two grave errors. Only Davout’s skill and his own -unconquerable energy staved off a serious disaster and snatched a -victory from the jaws of defeat. The French pressed on to Vienna. This -time there was no Auersperg to be cozened out of his command of the -Danube bridge; the crossings were all broken down, and Napoleon was -compelled to force a passage in face of a hostile army of equal -strength—the most delicate operation known to military science. -Napoleon’s first attempt was rash to the verge of madness. It was simply -a blind thrust at the heart of the opposing army; the bridges provided -were insufficient, and broke down through enemy action at the crisis of -the battle; the staff work and the arrangements generally appear to have -been defective. Thirty-six hours of fierce fighting saw the French -hurled back again; Masséna’s tenacity and Lannes’ daring saved the army -from destruction, but the cost of defeat amounted to twenty thousand -men—among them was Lannes, the hero of Montebello, of Saalfeld, of -Friedland, of Saragossa; one of the few who dared to say what they -thought to the Emperor, and one of the few who enjoyed his trust and -friendship. - -To point the moral, Napoleon contrived soon afterwards to bring up huge -reinforcements, and then to cross the Danube without opposition. The -movement was carefully planned and carried out, and the results were the -victory of Wagram, the armistice of Znaim, and the dismemberment of -Austria. If, after experiencing a severe defeat, Napoleon could succeed -in bringing up the Army of Italy and crossing the Danube without -opposition, he could surely have done so at the first attempt. The -battle of Aspern is typical of Napoleon’s reckless methods and of his -under-estimation of the enemy. - -In this campaign of 1809 Napoleon’s fall was nearly anticipated. Had the -forty thousand men whom England sent to Walcheren, too late, been -despatched a little earlier, under a competent general; had Prussia -flung her weight into the scale at the same time, it is hard to see how -Napoleon could have recovered himself. Germany was already prepared to -revolt, Tyrol was ablaze with insurrection, Wellington was marching into -the heart of Spain, Russia was ready to change sides at a moment’s -notice. What saved Napoleon was the fact that three of his enemies were -timid and incompetent. Chatham could achieve nothing in the Netherlands; -Frederick William III. hesitated in Prussia, and Francis of Austria, -although Wagram was not in the least a crushing defeat, decided that he -could not continue the struggle. - -We have already dealt in part with 1812 and 1813. There are mistakes in -plenty here, although now they were accentuated by the worst of ill -luck. The whole advance into Russia was one gigantic error; not even -Napoleon’s tremendous efforts could counter-balance the handicaps which -he encountered, and which he ought to have foreseen. As far back as 1807 -he had commented bitterly on the horrible Polish roads and on the -clinging black mud of that district; he should have realized that it was -impossible for him to feed an army five hundred thousand strong by road -transport under such conditions. Nevertheless, he nearly succeeded at -Smolensk in countering a strategic disadvantage by a tactical victory, -in the same manner as he had done twelve years before at Marengo. Even -after utter ruin had descended upon him, he contrived by his gigantic -labours to raise a new army and to enter afresh into the field in 1813 -before his enemies were ready for him. The early movements in the -campaign are practically perfect; until after Bautzen he showed all his -old brilliancy and skill—negatived this time by the mistakes of -subordinates. But from Bautzen onwards we find repeated errors both in -policy and in the field. It was a mistake to enter into the armistice of -Pleisswitz; it was a mistake not to secure the neutrality of Austria, -even if it had cost him the whole Kingdom of Italy; it was a mistake not -to accept the Allies’ offers of peace; it was a mistake not to send back -Ferdinand to Spain and extricate himself somehow from the tangle of the -Peninsular War; it was a mistake to send Oudinot and Ney against Berlin; -it was a mistake to try to hold the line of the Elbe; it was a mistake -to fight at Leipzig; and, having decided to fight, it was a mistake not -to see that there was a satisfactory line of retreat over the Elster. - -It is clear that Napoleon was not the man he once was. And yet—and yet -he nearly saved the whole situation at Dresden! Three days’ fighting -there nearly counter-balanced all the disasters of the previous eighteen -months. Smolensk, Bautzen and Dresden—three times he almost made up for -all his defeats. The conclusion is forced upon one that all through the -years of victory Napoleon was on the verge of defeat, and all through -the years of defeat he was on the verge of victory. For twenty years the -fate of Europe hung balanced upon a razor edge. - -Napoleon’s good luck is very evident; his bad luck was an equally potent -factor in his career. On striking a balance and considering what -enormous success was his for a time, the resultant inference is -unavoidable. He was vastly superior to all the other men of his time; -his superiority was such that individual differences between others fade -into insignificance when contrasted with the difference between him and -anyone else who may be selected for comparison. He was superior not -merely in mental capacity, but in all other qualities necessary for -success in any sphere of business. His moral courage was enormous; his -finesse and rapidity of thought were unequalled. He hardly knew what it -was to despair. His adaptability and his fertility of resource were -amazing. - -In spite of this (or perhaps because of this) it is very easy to detract -from any of his achievements. The Code Napoleon, his most enduring -monument, was not his own work, nor, of course, can much credit be given -to his assistants. Codification of laws is in no way a new idea—it is -almost contemporary with laws themselves. Napoleon’s German policy was -much the same as that of Louis XIV.; his Italian policy is reminiscent -of Charles VIII.’s or even earlier; the germ of his Oriental policy can -be found in that of Louis IX.; his Spanish policy was similar to, but -more unsuccessful than that of his predecessors. Even the Continental -system was only the development of previous schemes to their logical -climax. In his Court arrangements Napoleon brought no new idea into -play; most of his regulations were elaborated from the ceremony which -surrounded the Soleil Monarque, while others were borrowed from the -etiquette of the courts of Vienna and Madrid. Any approaching ceremony -called for an anxious examination of precedents; if Napoleon could find -a parallel far back stamped with the approval of a Valois or an -Orléans-Angoulême the matter was settled on the same lines, no matter -what inconveniences resulted. Similarly in purely Imperial concerns he -was always harking back to Charlemagne or to the Empire of Rome. It is -exceedingly probable that his annexation of Spain north of the Ebro in -1812, which excited roars of derision all over Europe because -three-quarters of the district was aflame with guerillas who shot on -sight any Frenchman they met, was directly inspired by Charlemagne’s -action a thousand years before. Charlemagne’s Spanish campaign, even if -it added the Spanish March to his dominions, cost him his rearguard and -all his Paladins; Napoleon might well have taken warning. The references -to Imperial Rome, from the design of his coinage and the plan of the Arc -de Triomphe to the “cohorts” of the National Guard and his adoption of -Eugène, are too numerous to mention. We even find him going back farther -still, and complaining that he could not, like Alexander, announce -himself as of divine birth and the son of Jupiter. - -In military matters an equally well (or ill) founded charge of -unoriginality can be brought against Napoleon’s methods. To those of us -who saw a short time ago what changes four years of war wrought in the -weapons and tactics employed, it seems amazing that at the end of twenty -years of life and death struggles the soldiers were still armed with the -smooth bore flintlock musket which had already been in use for a -century. Only two important new weapons were evolved, and neither of -them attained any great popularity. They were shrapnel shell and -military rockets, and the latter, at least, Napoleon never employed. The -rifle never attained any popularity with him, although to us it seems -obvious that it was the weapon of the future. Fulton offered Napoleon -his steamboat invention, and was treated as a wild dreamer—at the very -time when Napoleon was most preoccupied with the problem of sending an -army across the Channel. As an irresponsible autocrat, Napoleon had -boundless opportunities of testing and employing any new invention which -might be suggested, but he made no use of them. In this respect he -compares unfavourably with his far less gifted nephew. Napoleon III.’s -system of “sausages and champagne” certainly finds a parallel in his -uncle’s treatment of his troops when not on active service. When -Napoleon’s armies returned victorious they were received with fêtes and -salutes innumerable; an ignorant observer might well have believed them -to be demigods, to whom ceremonies and sacrifices were peculiarly -acceptable. The arrangement had a double effect; it is certainly good -for an army’s esprit de corps for the men to be considered demigods; and -it is certainly useful for an autocrat whose rule is based on his army -to have his subjects believe that that army is semi-divine. But for the -little personal comforts of his men Napoleon took small notice. They -were not relieved of the cumbersome features of their uniforms; even if -they were not worried by petty details of pipeclay and brass polish as -were the English, they were still forced to wear the horrible stock and -tunic which Frederick the Great had set in fashion. The French army -slang term “bleu” for recruit has its origin in the fact that the -recruits for the old army used to go black and blue in the face owing to -the unaccustomed restriction of the Napoleonic stock. The French helmets -may have been imposing, but they were terribly uncomfortable to wear. -The gain in efficiency resulting from a radical change in these matters -must have counter-balanced any possible loss in esprit de corps had -Napoleon seen fit to bring this change about. - -It is with trembling and delicacy that one approaches the realm in which -Napoleon apparently reigns supreme—that of tactics. It is a rash act to -say that the winner of sixty battles won them badly. Yet one cannot help -making a few cautious comments. When Napoleon attained supreme power the -line and the column were almost equally in favour in the French army. -The most usual formation in action was the line, backed at intervals by -the column. At Marengo this arrangement was largely employed, and was -successful. As time went on, however, we find that the line disappeared, -its place was taken by additional skirmishers, and the columns became -heavier and heavier. The system was altogether vicious; the column is -both untrustworthy and expensive. French columns might be successful -when pitted against any other columns, but they failed against -disciplined infantry formed in line. Every battle and combat fought by -the English, from Alexandria and Maida to Vittoria, proved this, but -Napoleon and his officers never learnt the lesson. The Emperor’s letters -to his generals in Spain give repeated examples of his contempt for the -English and Portuguese troops; it was hardly a contempt that was -justified. And despite all these warnings, despite (so it is reported) -Soult’s and Foy’s pleadings, the first grand attack at Waterloo was made -by twenty thousand infantry herded together twenty-four deep. This -clumsy mass was easily held up, outflanked and forced back by six -thousand English and Hanoverians under Picton. It was not the first -example which had been forced upon Napoleon’s notice of the uselessness -of the column. At Wagram he had sent Macdonald’s corps, some twenty -thousand strong, against the Austrian centre, massed in a gigantic -hollow square, which can be considered as forming two columns each about -thirty-five deep. Macdonald reached his objective, but by the time he -arrived his men were so jostled together, ploughed up by artillery, and -generally demoralized that they could effect nothing. One lesson such as -this ought to have convinced Napoleon, but it did not. He continued to -use columns—and he was beaten at Waterloo. It is frequently urged in -his defence that the column was the “natural” formation in the French -army, that tradition had grown up around it, so that it was unsafe to -meddle with it, that French troops fight better in column than in line, -and that his troops were of necessity so raw that they could not be -trusted in line. These arguments seem completely nullified by the facts -that the line was actually employed early in Napoleon’s career, that -both before and after Waterloo French troops fought well in line, and -that at Waterloo, at any rate, the French troops were all well-trained, -while Picton’s men were largely new recruits. - -The employment of cavalry in the Imperial armies might similarly be -condemned as extravagant and inefficient. The system of Seidlitz under -Frederick the Great was forgotten. Napoleon had uprooted the triumphal -memorial erected at Rossbach, and with it it seemed he had uprooted the -memory of the charges with which Seidlitz’ hard-welded squadrons had -routed the army of France fifty years before. Murat’s famous charges -were not pressed home in the hard, utterly logical fashion of -Frederick’s cavalry. If the opposing infantry stood firm at the approach -of the cavalry, then the latter parted and drifted away down each flank. -If (as must be admitted was much more usual) the infantry broke at the -sight of the horsemen tearing down on them, then the pursuit was pushed -home remorselessly, but never do we find the perfect charge, in few -ranks, packed close together and held together like a steel chain, which -must overturn everything in its way. Under Napoleon the French cavalry -never charged home; at Waterloo we find the great cavalry charges, which -Ney directed against the English squares, made at a trot, and the -horsemen, swerving from the steel-rimmed, fire-spouting squares, -wandering idly about on the flanks, while a few of the more enterprising -cut feebly at the bayonets with their sabres. Wellington’s description -of them riding about as if they owned the place argues powerfully -against their ever having flung themselves upon the bayonet points, as -good cavalry should do if sent against unbroken infantry. - -In fact, both the French infantry and the French cavalry relied upon the -moral effect of their advance rather than upon their capacity for doing -damage when they made their charges. It is perfectly true that they were -generally successful; Napoleon’s dictum that the moral is to the -physical as three to one was borne out in a hundred battles from Arcola -to Dresden; but it was found wanting at Vimiero, at Busaco, at Borodino, -at Waterloo, everywhere in fact, where the enemy was too stubborn or -well-disciplined to flinch from the waving sabres or the grenadiers’ -gigantic head-dresses. - -In the wider field of strategy it cannot be denied that Napoleon made -use of original devices and brought about revolutionary changes in the -whole system. They do not appear in the Italian campaign of 1796 nor in -the campaigns of Egypt and Marengo, but in 1805 we find the cavalry -screen completely contrived and in efficient working order; in 1806 the -strategic advanced guard; and in 1807 the perfect combination of the -two. The curious part is that Napoleon himself did not seem to realize -the importance of his own inventions; time and again in 1812 and 1813 he -did not employ them, with invariably disastrous results. It seems a -mistake on Napoleon’s part not to have made use of the new devices on -these occasions, but it is unwise to condemn him offhand, because it -seems inconceivable that he of all persons did not appreciate the -magnitude and efficiency of his own discoveries; there must have been -some reason not now apparent for these actions. - -It is very nearly impossible to discover any action of Napoleon’s which -was not faulty in some way, or which could not be improved upon. But -since he met with unprecedented success the only conclusion is that, -although his mistakes were many, they were far fewer than would have -been the average man’s. Furthermore, since his schemes were all so -direct and simple (a comparison between his plan and Moreau’s for the -crossing of the Rhine at Schaffhausen in 1800 is very illuminating on -this point), no one can help feeling a sneaking suspicion, when reading -of Napoleon’s achievements, that he could not have done the same—only -just a little better. Thiers’ long-drawn panegyric grows ineffably -wearisome simply on this account; the writer’s efforts to minimize his -hero’s errors are so obvious and so ineffective that the reader is -irritated by them, while the continued superlatives seem to be given -with gross unfairness to a man whose blunders are so difficult to -conceal. It is far easier to write a panegyric on a man who has done -nothing whatever than on a man whose whole life was spent in productive -activity. - -Of what has sometimes been termed Napoleon’s cardinal error, the -Continental System, I have not ventured to speak. As originally -conceived it was undoubtedly a wise move. If France could exist without -English products, then obviously it was a sound proceeding to deprive -England of so rich a market for her goods. The complications make the -question much more difficult. Certainly the effort to close the whole of -Europe to British trade led Napoleon into damaging annexations and -disastrous wars, while the fact that the countries involved, Russia, for -instance, preferred to fight rather than to continue to enforce the -system, seems to indicate that it was impossible to enforce—that the -country (or at least its Government) could not continue to exist without -British trade. This is the simplest complication of all. It is when we -come to consider Napoleon’s juggling with permits and licenses that we -become involved in the fog which surrounds all tariff questions. The -only certain points are that Napoleon derived a large revenue from his -licenses, that the British Government was frequently severely -embarrassed for want of money (the difficulties involved in collecting -sufficient gold to pay subsidies and the expenses of armies in the field -led to unfortunate delays), and that the discontent of the Continent was -great and general. It is a purely arbitrary matter, dependent on the -personal equation, to come to any decision as to the balance of these -conclusions. - -Taking the career of Napoleon as a whole, it is easy to see how -frequently he was guilty of errors; what should also be obvious is that -it was almost inevitable that he should fall into these errors. If the -Austrian marriage was a mistake, then it was a mistake Napoleon could -not help making; undoubtedly he did the best he could for himself in the -prevailing circumstances. If the advance into Russia was a mistake, it -is impossible to indicate what alternative could have been chosen, for -Napoleon, at war with Russia, could not safely remain at war without -gaining a decision; he could hardly maintain an army on the Russian -frontier awaiting Alexander’s pleasure. - -If it was a mistake to advance into Belgium in June, 1815, it would have -been a far worse one not to have advanced. The greatest mistake of those -into which he was _not_ driven by circumstances was his theft of the -throne of Spain—and it was that which ruined him. - -[Illustration: MASSENA - (PRINCE D’ESSLING AND DUC DE RIVOLI)] - - - - - CHAPTER XVII - ST. HELENA - - -WHEN Napoleon abdicated after Waterloo, for the second time, the Allies -had achieved the object for which ostensibly they had made war. The -Emperor had fallen, and the war they had waged had, they declared, been -directed entirely against him. The immediate and burning question now -arose as to what was to be done with the man against whom a million -other men were on the march. Blücher wanted to catch him and shoot him; -Wellington, with his usual cautious good sense, did not want to be -burdened with the responsibility of an action which might be unnecessary -and would certainly be unpopular. Napoleon himself, disowned by the -government and by the army, wanted to retire to America, but his enemies -were unwilling to set him free. The English fleet blockaded the coast, -and Napoleon was compelled to surrender to it, lest worse should befall -from the Prussians, or the Republicans, or the White Terror, or from -personal enemies. He tried to make the best of his necessity by claiming -the hospitality of England, but England kept him a close prisoner until -her Allies had been consulted. They offered to hand him over to Louis -XVIII. for trial as a rebel, but even Louis had the sense to decline the -offer. He could shoot Ney and la Bédoyère, but he could not shoot -Napoleon. For Louis to shut him up in a fortress would be as dangerous -as it would be for a private individual to keep a tiger in his cellar. -In the same way no Continental state would willingly see any other -appointed his guardian. That would mean giving the guardian country a -most potent instrument of menace. England remained the sole possible -gaoler, and England accepted the responsibility. - -Next arose the question as to the locality of the prison, and the answer -to that question was already prepared—St. Helena. To keep Napoleon in -England was obviously impossible, for England was nearer France even -than was Elba, while, incredible though it might seem, the oligarchy -which ruled England were afraid lest Napoleon should corrupt the mass of -the people to Republicanism. That there was some foundation for this -fear is shown by the intense interest in Napoleon which the people -displayed while he was in Plymouth harbour. Similar arguments were -effective against Malta or any other Mediterranean island. But St. -Helena had none of these disadvantages. It was thousands of miles away; -it was small, and could be filled with troops; there were only two -possible places for landing, and these could be well guarded; the few -reports on the island which were to be had seemed to indicate that fair -comfort was obtainable there, and, above all, it was not at all a place -where ships or individuals could easily find an excuse for calling or -remaining. Even before the descent from Elba St. Helena had been -suggested as a more suitable place for Napoleon’s prison, and now, with -little discussion, he was sent off there. - -It is impossible to argue about the legality or otherwise of this -decision. Morally, the Powers were as justified in imprisoning Napoleon -as is a government in locking up a homicidal maniac. A maniac may hurt -people; Napoleon might hurt the Powers. Napoleon might hurt them for -reasons which to him might appear perfectly defensible; but a homicidal -maniac can usually boast the same purity of motive. The maniac may be -right and everyone else wrong; Napoleon may have been right and the -Powers wrong; but the Powers were none the less justified in seeing that -he could do no more harm. It has been argued that by invading France and -removing her ruler Europe was committing a moral crime; that it is -intolerable for one country to interfere in another country’s system of -government. This argument fails because its scope is inelastic. In the -same way it is said that “an Englishman’s house is his castle,” and -that, for instance, a man’s conduct towards, or training of, his -children is his own personal business. But if that man tries to cut his -children’s throats, or worse, encourages his children to cut his -neighbours’ throats, then the State steps in and prevents him from doing -so. That is exactly what the Powers did with Napoleon. Where they went -wrong was in not seeing that their decision was carried into effect with -humanity and dignity. - -The initial arrangements for Napoleon’s exile seemed to portend that he -would end his days in luxury. Lord Liverpool had said that on the island -there was a most comfortable house exactly suited for Napoleon and his -suite; Lord Bathurst had given official orders that he was to be allowed -all possible indulgence so long as his detention was not imperilled. But -Napoleon was not given the comfortable house, while Bathurst’s -confidential orders to Sir Hudson Lowe displayed unbelievable rigour. -Already Napoleon had experienced some of the results of the workings of -the official mind; the naval officers with whom he had come in contact -had been strictly ordered not to pay him any of the compliments usually -accorded to royalty. They remained covered in his presence, and they -addressed him as “General Bonaparte.” Cockburn, the Admiral in command, -acted strictly to the letter of the orders which commanded him to treat -“General Bonaparte” in the same manner as he would a general officer not -in employ. If Napoleon seemed inclined to act with more dignity than -this rather humble station would warrant, then Cockburn was distant and -reserved; but if Napoleon ever showed signs of “conducting himself with -modesty,” as Cockburn himself writes, then the Admiral was graciously -pleased to unbend a little to his helpless prisoner. - -The whole question of the title was intricate and irritating. The -English Government declared that they had never recognized Napoleon as -Emperor even at the height of his power, and they certainly were not -going to do so now that he was a discredited outcast. They were hardly -correct in fact or in theory, for they had sent him an Ambassador when -he was First Consul; they had sent plenipotentiaries to Châtillon who -had signed documents in which he was called Emperor; they had sent a -representative to him at Elba when he was Emperor there, and, equally -important, they had ratified the Convention of Cintra, among the -documents of which he was distinctly called His Imperial Majesty. -Moreover, by refusing him this mode of address, they were insulting the -French people, who had elected him, the Courts of Europe, who had -recognized him, and the Pope, who had crowned and anointed him. It was -the English Government which lost its dignity in this ridiculous affair, -not Napoleon. But the worst result of this decision was not the loss of -dignity, nor the injury to French pride. It was that it gave Napoleon an -opportunity to hit back. It gave him a definite cause of complaint, -apart from that of his arbitrary incarceration, which was generally held -to be justified. It was the first opportunity of many, of all of which -Napoleon eagerly took advantage, so that the Napoleonic Legend had a -firm base for future development. By complaining at any and every -opportunity Napoleon was able to surround his own memory with an aura of -frightful privations, so that it was easy for his subtle nephew later to -picture him as Prometheus, the benefactor of mankind, bound to his rock -in mid-ocean with the vultures of the allied commissioners gnawing at -his liver. - -A further blunder on the part of the English Government afforded -Napoleon his next cause of complaint. Sir Hudson Lowe was a good, if -unimaginative soldier who had fought all his life against the French. -Furthermore, he had commanded a force of Corsican Rangers, recruited -from the island that was Napoleon’s birthplace. He had held Capri for -two years in the face of Masséna and Joseph Bonaparte, and was only -turned out by a daring expedition sent by Murat. His very name was -hateful to Napoleon, and yet he was appointed his guardian. But this was -not all. A huge responsibility devolved upon Sir Hudson Lowe. A moment’s -carelessness on his part might allow Napoleon to escape, and if Napoleon -escaped there might ensue another Waterloo campaign with a very -different result. The responsibility was too great altogether for Lowe. -Because of it he carried out the orders sent him with a strictness which -knew no bounds. He pestered the wretched prisoner, who already had good -reason to dislike him, until he nearly drove him frantic. Lowe himself -was desperate, and many people who saw him during that period commented -on his worried demeanour and his inability to support his -responsibilities. It is easy then to imagine the violent friction which -prevailed between him and his captive. - -On a casual inspection, the restrictions imposed upon Napoleon do not -seem particularly severe. He was to keep within certain limits; he was -to be accompanied by an English officer if he went beyond them; his -correspondence was to pass through Lowe’s hands, and he was to assure -the English of his presence every day. But these restrictions galled -Napoleon inexpressibly. Along the boundaries of his free area was posted -a line of sentries, and he could not turn his eyes in any direction -without perceiving the hated redcoats. The continued presence of an -officer if he rode elsewhere was not unnaturally irksome—so irksome, in -fact, that Napoleon, who had previously passed half his days on -horseback, gave up riding—while the mortification of having his letters -pried into and the utter, hateful humiliation of having to exhibit -himself on command to an Englishman must have been maddening to a man -who not so many months before had ruled half Europe. - -Napoleon found himself shut up in a restricted area and with limited -accommodation; he had no old friends with him, because he had never had -any friends; of the five officers who had accompanied him only two were -men of any distinction and of any length of service. Not one of them was -particularly talented, and they were one and all fiercely jealous of -each other. Add to these conditions a tropical climate and the utter -despair into which they were all plunged, and it is easy to realize that -furious quarrels and bitter heart-burnings must have been their lot. It -is the most difficult matter in the world to find the exact truth about -what went on in Longwood. Everyone concerned wrote voluminously, and -everyone concerned wrote accounts which differed from everyone else’s. -There is an atmosphere of untruth surrounding everything which has been -written by the actors in this last tragedy. Napoleon himself set his -friends the example, for his dictated memoirs and the information which -he gave Las Cases to help him in his writings are full of lies, some -cunning, some clumsy, but all of them devised for obvious purposes. He -tried to throw the blame of the Spanish insurrection on Murat, the blame -of the execution of d’Enghien on Talleyrand, the blame of Waterloo on -Grouchy. It is difficult to discover whether he was merely trying to -excuse himself in the eyes of the world, or to rehabilitate Bonapartism -so that his son might eventually mount the Imperial throne. And his -companions’ memoirs lie so blatantly and so obviously that one cannot -decide which was his aim. - -Napoleon himself had deteriorated vastly. As might be expected, his -complete cessation of bodily activity led to an increase in his -corpulence until he became gross and unwieldy. His mental power had -decayed, although he was still able to dictate for hours on end. Even -under the burdensome conditions imposed upon him he never seems to have -abandoned the rigid reserve which he had maintained all his life. The -few scenes which the memoirists describe which have a ring of truth -about them seem to show him still acting a part, still posing as the -inestimably superior being whom his followers believed him to be. -Sometimes we have a brief glimpse of him stripped of his heroics, as -witness the occasion when he said bitterly that his son must necessarily -have forgotten him; but most of the time he seems to have adhered to his -old methods, and posed as the misunderstood benefactor of humanity, -ignoring Marie Louise’s defection, ignoring the distrust with which the -Council of State had regarded him during the last months of his reign; -in fact proclaiming himself the man who martyred himself for the French -nation, with such iteration that he was at last believed. His -declamations have coloured nearly everything written since, so that it -is quite usual to find it stated, either actually or inferentially, that -his fall was due solely to the jealousy of the other rulers of Europe, -and not due in any degree to the slowly developed dislike of his own -subjects. - -And all this time he was making Sir Hudson Lowe’s life a burden to him -as well. Some of Napoleon’s complaints were just, some merely frivolous, -but every one of them goaded Lowe into further painful activity. This -activity reacted in another direction, so that Lowe issued edicts of -increased stringency, and, half mad with responsibility, treated -Napoleon with an exaggeration of precaution and imposed upon him -restraints of a pettiness and a casuistry almost unbelievable. It can -hardly be doubted that Napoleon actually sought opportunities for egging -Lowe on to further ill-treatment; he certainly treated him with a most -amazing contumely, and it is very probable that the numerous rumours of -attempts at rescue, by submarine boat, by an armed force from Brazil, or -by any other fantastic means, had their origin in Napoleon himself, so -that Lowe was inspired to further obnoxious measures. Napoleon made the -most of his opportunity. He raised a clamour which reached Europe (as he -had intended), so that interest in his fate and sympathy for the poor -ill-treated captive gradually worked up to fever heat. He sold his plate -to buy himself necessaries (at a time when he had ample money at his -command) and of course France heard about it, and was wrung with pity -for the wretched man forced by his captor’s rapacity to dine off -earthenware. The fact that Napoleon nevertheless retained sufficient -silver to supply his table was not so readily divulged. He made a -continual complaint about his health; undoubtedly he was not well, and -equally undoubtedly he was already suffering from the disease which -killed him; but his complaints were neither consistent nor, as far as -can be ascertained, entirely true. He hinted that the Powers were -endeavouring to shorten his life; he even said that he went in fear of -assassins. All this news reached Europe by devious routes, and sympathy -grew and grew until, after the lapse of years, it waxed into the -hysteria evinced at his second funeral and the more effective hysteria -which set Napoleon III. on the throne. - -Despite all the undignified squabbles in which he was engaged, one can -nevertheless hardly restrain a feeling of admiration for Napoleon amid -the trials which he was enduring. He was hitting back as hard as -circumstances would allow him, and he was hitting back with effect. He -had driven Lowe frantic, and he had secured his object of reviving -European interest in him. Furthermore, he flatly refused to submit to -the humiliating commands which Lowe attempted to enforce. Lowe might -speak of “General Bonaparte” or “Napoleon Bonaparte” (in the same way as -he might speak of John Robinson, says Lord Rosebery) but in his own home -Napoleon was always His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, to whom everyone -uncovered, and in whose presence everyone remained standing. Lowe’s -order that he must show himself to an English officer every day was -completely ignored, and we hear of officers climbing trees and peering -through keyholes in vain attempts to make sure of his presence. For days -together Napoleon might have been out of the island for all Lowe knew to -the contrary. The commissioners sent by France and Austria and Russia -did not set eyes on him from the time of their arrival until after his -death. Napoleon had sworn that he would shoot with his own hand the -first man who intruded on his privacy, and he was believed; the attempt -was never made, and Napoleon continued to reign in Longwood, in an -_imperium in imperio_. - -The whole period seems indescribably sordid and wretched. Napoleon’s -companions were intriguing jealously for his favour, scheming for the -privilege of eating at his table, and even endeavouring to be sure that -he would leave them his money in his will. Tropical weather, harassing -conditions, prolonged strain, and the overwhelming gloom of recent -frightful disasters, all tended towards overstrained nerves and -continual quarrels. Napoleon wrangling with Lowe over his -dinner-service; Montholon in tears because Napoleon chooses to dine with -Las Cases; an Emperor quarrelling with a general as to whether or not -his liver is enlarged; this is not tragedy, it is only squalor with a -hideously tragic taint. It is Lear viewed through reversed -opera-glasses. - -The end came at last in 1821. The disease of which his father had died -held Napoleon as well in its grip. He was an intractable patient, and -diagnosis was not easy, but it certainly seems that the medical -treatment he received was unspeakably bad. He was dosed with tartar -emetic, of all drugs, at a time when his stomach was deranged with -cancer. At times he suffered frightful agony. He bore it somehow; argued -with his doctors, chaffed his friends, until at last he sank into -unconsciousness, and he died while a great storm howled round the -island. The lies and contradictions of the memoirists persist even here, -for no one knows accurately what were his last words, or when they were -uttered. - -The post-mortem report is sufficient to convince any reader that none of -the doctors concerned knew their business;[A] the man who had once ruled -Europe was now thrust into a coffin too small to allow him to wear his -complete uniform, so that his hat rested on his stomach; and he was -buried in one of his old favourite spots in the island. Once more there -arose the old vexed question of title, for the French wished to inscribe -“Napoleon” on the coffin; Lowe insisted on “Bonaparte” being added; in -the end it was a nameless coffin which was lowered into the grave. - ------ - -[A] It is, I believe, a fact never previously published that the first -post-mortem certificate drawn up by the doctors responsible was rejected -by Sir Hudson Lowe. It contained the words “the liver was perhaps a -little larger than natural,” and this remark naturally did not commend -itself to Lowe, in consequence of the fierce quarrels he had had with -Napoleon on this very subject. The post-mortem certificate in the -English Record Office does not contain these words, but the Rev. Canon -E. Brook Jackson, Rector of Streatham, has in his possession the earlier -certificate, signed by the doctors concerned, with the footnote -“N.B.—The words obliterated were suppressed by order of Sir Hudson -Lowe. Signed, Thomas Short, P.M.O.” The words referred to are clearly -legible and are those given above. - -Napoleon failed during his lifetime, but he was triumphant after death. -His gallant fight at St. Helena against overwhelming odds was remembered -with pride by every Frenchman. Men hearing garbled versions of his -sufferings felt a pricking of their consciences that they had abandoned -him in 1814 and 1815. The helpless policy of Louis XVIII. and Charles -X., and the humdrum policy of Louis Philippe set all minds thinking of -the glorious days, not so very long ago, when France had been Queen of -the Continent. Louis Napoleon skilfully employed the revulsion of -feeling to his own advantage, and the glory of Austerlitz and Jena was -sufficient to hide the absurdities of Boulogne and Strasbourg. But it -was the six years’ struggle of St. Helena which made so refulgent that -glory of Austerlitz. - -What the British Government could have done to prevent the formation of -a St. Helena legend cannot easily be decided. They were in terror lest -he should escape again, and severe ordinances were necessary to prevent -this. Had they treated him luxuriously, public opinion in England would -have been roused to a dangerous pitch. They had originally tried to get -out of the difficulty by handing him over to Louis XVIII. for execution, -but Louis XVIII. had no real case against him. A state trial would have -given Napoleon unbounded opportunities for the rhetoric in which he -delighted, and which had so often rallied France to his side. Napoleon -might well have pleaded, with perfect truth, that in the descent from -Elba he was no rebel, but the Emperor of Elba making war upon the King -of France; but so tame a plea would hardly have been employed. Napoleon -would have proclaimed himself the purest altruist come to see that the -French people obtained their rights, or to save France from the -machinations of tyrants. Louis was wise in refusing the offer. The -custody of Napoleon was thus thrust upon the British Government. If -remarkably far-sighted, they might have lapped him in every luxury; have -treated him subserviently as if he was Emperor in fact as well as in -name; they might have encouraged him to debauchery as wild as Tiberius’ -at Capri; and then by subtle propaganda they might have exhibited him to -a scornful world as a man who cared nothing for his lost greatness, or -for the dependence of his position. Such a scheme appealed favourably to -the imagination, but there was an insuperable obstacle—Napoleon. -Napoleon had a definite plan of campaign. He was going to complain about -everything and everybody with whom he came in contact. He was going to -clamour unceasingly against the brutality and arbitrariness of his -gaolers. Without regard for truth he was going to proclaim continually -that he was being ill-treated and martyred, and he would have done it -whatever had been his treatment, and, being Napoleon, he would have done -it well. The error of the British Government lay in their affording him -so many opportunities, not in their affording him any at all. - -And after he was dead there followed the events which he had foreseen -and over whose engendering he had laboured so diligently. Little by -little the evil features of the Imperial régime were forgotten; the -glory of his victories blazed more brightly in comparison with the -exhaustion of France under the Bourbons and the pettifogging Algerian -razzias of Louis Philippe. The literature of St. Helena, both the -spurious and the inspired, induced men to believe that Napoleon was the -exact opposite of what he really was. It gave him credit for the -achievements of Carnot; it shifted the disgrace of failure on to the -shoulders of helpless scapegoats. It proved to the satisfaction of the -uninquiring that Napoleon stood for democracy, for the principle of -nationality, and even for peace. It raised to the Imperial throne the -man who said “the Empire means peace.” The whole legend which developed -was a flagrant denial of patent facts, but it was a denial sufficiently -reiterated to be believed. The belief is not yet dead. - -[Illustration: LOUIS NAPOLEON, KING OF HOLLAND] - - - - - APPENDIX - INCIDENTS AND AUTHORITIES - - -IT is much more than a hundred years since Napoleon lived; since his -time we have witnessed cataclysms more vast than were the Napoleonic -wars; the Europe of that period seems to us as unfamiliar and as -profitless a study as Siam or primitive Australia. Perhaps this is so. -Perhaps the lessons to be drawn from the Napoleonic era are now -exhausted. Perhaps the epoch ushered in by Marengo is slight and -unimportant compared to that which follows the Marne. Perhaps Englishmen -will forget the men who stood firm in the squares at Waterloo, and will -only remember those who stood firm at Ypres and the Second Marne. -Perhaps the Congress of Vienna will lapse into insignificance when -compared with the Congress of Versailles. But this is inconceivable. -Previously, perhaps, too much importance has been attached to the -Napoleonic era, but that is because it had no parallel; it was unique. -Similarly the period pivoting about the Great War of 1914-18 might be -said to be unique, but it is not so. The two epochs are very closely -related, very closely indeed. Much may be gained from the study of -either, but this is nothing to be compared with the gain resulting from -the study and comparison of the two together. In this way the Napoleonic -era becomes more significant even than it was before the great war, and -this without considering how much of the great war was directly due to -arrangements made as a consequence of Napoleon’s career. - -But apart from all such considerations, the study of the period is one -from which a great deal of purely personal pleasure can be derived. Even -nowadays one cannot help a thrill of excitement when reading of the -advance of the British infantry at Albuera; one cannot help feeling a -surge of emotion on reading how Alvarez at the siege of Gerona moaned -“No surrender! No surrender!” although he was dying of fever and half -the populace lay dead in the streets, while the other half still fought -on against all the might of Reille and St. Cyr. Even the best novel -compares unfavourably with Ségur’s account of the Russian campaign; and -although there is no French biographer quite as good as Boswell, yet -there are scores of memoirs and biographies of the period which rank -very nearly as high, and which are pleasant to read at all times. Marbot -may be untruthful, but he is delightful reading; Madame Junot gives a -picture of her times and of the people whom she met which is honestly -worthy of comparison with Dickens and Thackeray; while to track down in -their memoirs Fouché’s and Talleyrand’s carefully concealed mistakes is -as interesting a pastime as ever was the attempt to guess the dénouement -in a modern detective novel. - -The literature of the time is full of happy anecdotes, some of which -have attained the supreme honour of being taken out bodily, furnished -with modern trimmings, and published in twentieth century magazines, -without acknowledgment, as modern humour. But many have escaped this -fate, partly because they are untranslatable, and partly because they -bear the definite imprint of the period. Thus there is the story of the -fat and pursy King of Würtemberg, who once kept waiting a committee of -the Congress of Vienna. At last he arrived, and as his portly majesty -came bustling through the door, Talleyrand remarked, “Here comes the -King of Würtemberg, _ventre à terre_.” In a grimmer vein is the story of -the reception held on the night after Ney was shot. The company were -mournfully discussing the tragedy, when a certain M. Lemaréchal was -announced. As this gentleman had a son of mature years, the announcement -was worded “M. Lemaréchal ainé”—which the panic-stricken assembly heard -as “M. le Maréchal Ney.” - -Some of the heroes of that time have had the bad luck to be -misrepresented not only in literature but even in portraits and in -sculpture. Napoleon had at one time the plan of placing statues of all -his generals in the Louvre, but he abdicated before the work was -anywhere near completion, and left its continuation to his successors. -Louis and Charles did nothing towards it, and the parsimonious Louis -Philippe, when he came to the throne, decided as a measure of economy -only to represent the most famous. But some of the statues of junior -officers were already finished. Louis Philippe saw his chance of still -greater economy. For Lasalle’s head was substituted Lannes’; for -Colbert’s, Mortier’s; while the entire statue of St. Hilaire was simply -labelled Masséna and set up without further alteration. These statues -are still in the Louvre; no subsequent correction has ever been made. - -But the anecdotes are responsible for only a very small part of the -interest of Napoleonic literature. Many of the subsequent histories are -very nearly models of everything a book ought to be. Napier’s -“Peninsular War,” despite its bias and its frequent inaccuracies, has -already become a classic; Sir Charles Oman’s work on the same subject is -much more striking and makes a far greater appeal. His descriptions of -the siege of Gerona and of the cavalry pursuit at Tudela are more moving -in their cold eloquence than ever was Napier at his fieriest. One -English author whose books have attracted far less attention than they -should have done is Mr. F. Loraine Petre; his accurate and impartial -histories of the successive Napoleonic campaigns are dramatic enough to -hold the interest of the ordinary reader as well as that of the military -student. In matters other than military, the writer whose reputation -overtops all others is M. Frédéric Masson. His celebrity is such that it -would be almost impertinence to cavil at his writings. For painstaking -and careful accumulation of evidence he stands far and away above all -his contemporaries. He examines and brings to notice every single -detail. A catalogue of an Empress’s chemises interests him as deeply as -a list of a Council of State. The trouble is that his catalogue of -chemises is merely a catalogue of chemises—as interesting as a -laundress’s bill. M. Masson’s books are exceedingly important and -invaluable to the student: but that they are important and invaluable is -all one can say about them. - -The ultimate source of much information is, of course, the endless -collection of volumes of Napoleon’s correspondence. Even merely to -glance at one of these is a lesson in industry far more thorough than -anything achieved by the worthy Dr. Samuel Smiles and his like. -Examination of a single day’s correspondence is sufficient to show the -complexity of Napoleon’s interests, the extent of his knowledge of each -subject, and the nature of the driving power which built up the First -Empire. Close study of the Correspondence is necessary to enable one to -follow the twists and turns of Napoleon’s policy; the main difficulty is -that the bundle of hay is so large that the finding of needles in it is -a painfully tedious business. However, the casual reader will find that -this spadework has been done for him by a large number of painstaking -writers. Even during the present century several English authors have -published books upon particular events and persons of the Napoleonic -era. Mr. Hilliard Atteridge is an example of those who have done the -best work in this direction. But the greater number of these books seem -to be struck with the same blight—they are ineffably tedious. Generally -they are most correct as to facts; their impartiality is admirable; the -knowledge displayed is wide; but they are most terribly boring to read. -They are useful to familiarize the reader with the various persons -described so that their place in the whole period is better understood, -for the Napoleonic era is a tangled skein of threads, each of them a -different personality, wound round and completely dependent upon the -central core, which is Napoleon. - -Of biographies and general histories it is impossible to speak -definitely. Napoleon can boast hundreds more lives than any cat in fact -or fancy. The percentage of lies contained in books on Napoleon varies -between ten and ninety—and what is more aggravating is that the -picturesque and readable lives are usually those which contain the most -inexactitudes. It is perfectly safe to say that no Life of Napoleon has -ever been written which combines complete accuracy with genuine -readableness. This is of small account, however, for one has only to -read enough of the readable and inexact lives to form a fairly correct -opinion on most matters of importance at the same time as one enjoys -both the reading and the forming of the opinion. The contemporary -memoirs are very useful, and are mainly interesting. Bourrienne’s -biography is rather overrated usually, for he is unreliable in personal -matters, and a great deal of his book is undeniably heavy. One of his -most illuminating pictures shows Napoleon driving with him over the -countryside, and ignoring the beauty of the scenery in favour of the -military features of the landscape. This anecdote receives an additional -interest when it is recalled that an exactly similar story is told of -von Schlieffen, the German Chief of Staff of the ’nineties, who planned -the advance through Belgium which had such vast consequences in 1914. -One certainly cannot help thinking that if Napoleon had been at the head -of the German army at that date he, too, would have advanced through -Belgium, and this tiny parallel offers curious corroboration. Such a -move would have been in complete accordance with Napoleon’s -character—compare Bernadotte’s march through Anspach in 1805. The way -in which Napoleon took enormous risks, such as this, and his method of -securing the friendship of other Powers by storming and bluster instead -of by finesse, is the most curious trait of his whole curious character. -Bourrienne offers several examples; so do Talleyrand, Fouché, Pasquier -and Molé. - -For some decades after Napoleon’s death an immense amount of spurious or -heavily revised reminiscent literature appeared. Constant (the valet), -Josephine, and various others, are credited with volumes of ingeniously -written memoirs. They are well worth reading, but they contain little -worth remembering. In many matters they are demonstrably incorrect, and -they are generally prejudiced and misleading. For personal and intimate -details one of the best contemporary writers is de Bausset, who -certainly wrote the book which bears his name, and who equally certainly -was in a position to perceive what he described, for he was a palace -official for many years under the Empire. - -In military matters the Marshals’ memoirs are peculiarly enlightening, -not so much in matters of detail (in fact they are frequently incorrect -there) but in exhibiting the characters of the writers themselves. -Davout’s book is just what one would expect of him, cold and unrelenting -and yet sound and brilliant. Suchet’s is cynical and clever and subtle, -and, if necessary, untrue. St. Cyr’s displays his jealousy, suspicion -and general unpleasantness along with undoubted proof of talent. -Macdonald’s is bluff and honest. There is a whole host of smaller fry, -from Marbot downwards, who wrote fascinating little books about the Army -and their own personal experiences. Some of them, such as the -Reminiscences of Colonel de Gonneville, have appeared in English. They -are all obtainable in French. The last authority, of course, on military -matters is the Correspondence. There are only one or two doubtful -letters in the whole collection, and these are either printed with -reserve or bear the proofs of their spuriousness on the face of them. - -But no matter how much is written, or published, or read, no two men -will ever form quite the same estimate of Napoleon. It is as easy to -argue that he only rose through sheer good luck as it is to argue that -he only fell through sheer bad luck. He can be compared to Iscariot or -to St. Paul, to Alexander or to Wilhelm II. At times he seems a body -without a soul; at others, a soul without a body. All this seems to -indicate that he was a man of contradictions, but on the other hand he -was, admittedly, thoroughly consistent in all his actions. The most one -can hope for is to form one’s own conclusions about him; one cannot hope -to form other people’s. - - - - - INDEX - - -Abo, Treaty of, 32 -Agincourt, 11 -Alexander (Czar), 16, 23, 47, 145 -Alexandria, 11 -Aspern, 30, 74, 211 -Atteridge, A. Hilliard, 240 -Auerstädt, 20, 69 -Augereau, 67, 81, =91-93= -Austerlitz, 15, 20, 69, 134, 208 - -Baciocchi, Elise (_née_ Bonaparte), =114-128= -Barras, 14, 35, 38 -Bausset, de, 13, 242 -Bautzen, 16, 29, 135, =189= -Baylen, 15, 198 -Bennigsen, 32, 77 -Bernadotte, 25, =31-33=, 74 -Bernadotte, Désirée (_née_ Clary), 31, 152, =167-169= -Berthier, 25, 27, 50, 58, 157 -Bertrand, 21 -Bessières, =28=, 58, 149 -Blücher, 193, 199 -Borghese, Pauline (_née_ Bonaparte), 57, =114-128= -Borodino, 134, 176, 187 -Bourrienne, 22, 241 -Buenos Ayres, 11 - -Catherine of Westphalia, 53, 110, 111, 129 -Charles, Hippolyte, 21, 39 -Clausel, =138-139= -Cockburn, Admiral, 226 -Confederation of the Rhine, 15 -Continental System, 111, 220 -Corneille, 19 - -David, 18, 19 -Davout, 20, 25, 58, =67-79=, 85, 136, 242 -Dennewitz, 29, 135 -Denuelle, Eléonore, =158-160= -Dresden, 16, 135, 191, 213 -Dupont, =198-199= -Duroc, 149, 157, 181 - -Eckmühl, 73, 83 -Egypt, 14 -Elba, 16 -Elchingen, 29 -Enghien, d’, 15, 40, =202-204= -Eugène de Beauharnais, 68, 74, 76, 125, 169 -Erlon, d’, =146-148= -Eylau, 15, 29, 93 - -Fouché, 58, 62, 238 -Fourès, Marguerite, =153-155= -Francis I., Emperor of Austria, 48, 181 -Friedland, 15, 30, 134 - -Genoa, 82 -Goethe, 19 -Gourgaud, 21 -Grassini, =155-156= -Grouchy, 25, 59, =145-146= - -Hamburg, 77 -Hauser, Kaspar, 171-172 -Hortense Bonaparte, 43, 54 - -Isabey, 18 - -Jena, 15, 20, 29, 69, 134 -Jerome Bonaparte, 15, 75, =106-113=, 186 -Joseph Bonaparte, 15, 18, 83, 87, 96, =103-106= -Josephine, Empress, 14, 17, 21, =35-46=, 57, 155, 242 -Jourdain, 68, 72, 210 -Junot, 26, 39, 84, =141-144=, 238 -Junot, Madame, 141, 152 - -Katzbach, 33, 77 -Kellermann, 140, 208 - -Lannes, =30=, 57, 58, 67, 73, 131, 149, 206, 211 -Leclerc, 99, 116, 117 -Lefebvre, 23, 26 -Leipzig, 16, 77, 135 -Léon (Denuelle), =159-160= -Letizia Bonaparte (Madame Mère), 57, =129-132= -Ligny, 147, =196= -Louis XVIII., 51, 223, 234 -Louis Bonaparte, 15, 43, 96, =101-103= -Lowe, Sir Hudson, 121, 225-235 -Lucien Bonaparte, =97-101= -Lützen, 16, 189 - -Macdonald, =33=, 78, 242 -Mack, 15 -Maida, 11 -Mallet Conspiracy, 63 -Malo-Jaroslavetz, 188 -Marbot, 137, 197 -Marengo, 14, 20, 30, 207, 208 -Marie Antoinette, 49 -Marie Louise, 16, 21, =47-66=, 166 -Marmont, =30=, 68, 73, 78 -Masséna, 14, 20, 42, 58, 59, 68, 71, 73, =80-85=, 154 -Metternich, 26, 50, 64, 158, 238 -Minden, 11 -Montebello, Duchess of, 55, 62 -Moore, Sir John, 86, 105, 143, 210 -Montholon, 21, 232 -Moreau, 14, 31, 33, 81, 116 -Moscow, 188 -Murat, Joachim, 15, 25, 27-=28=, 39, 76, 118-125 -Murat, Caroline (_née_ Bonaparte), 52, 53, 57, =114-128=, 159 - -Napier, =239= -Napoleon, I., =9-243= -Napoleon II., 60, 61 -Napoleon Charles Bonaparte, 43 -Neipperg, 21, =64-66= -Ney, =29=, 58, 67, 78, 85, 136, 189 - -Oman, Sir Charles, 239 -Ossian, 19 -Oudinot, 67, 78 - -Patterson-Bonaparte, Elizabeth, 107, 108 -Petre, F. L., 239 -Pichegru, =204= -Pius VII., 44, 45 -Poniatowski, 25, 149 - -Rouget de l’Isle, 19 -Rousseau, 19 - -St. Helena, 16, 223-235 -St. Cyr, =33-34=, 78, 242 -Salamanca, 30, 138 -Savary, 58, 63, 203 -Schwartzenberg, 51, 148, 193 -Ségur, 59, 238 -Soissons, 193 -Soult, 68, 71, =85-89= -Staël, Mme. de, 19 -Stéphanie de Beauharnais, =170-172= -Suchet, 25, 68, 88, =89-91=, 138, 242 -Suvaroff, 82 - -Talleyrand, 56, 158, 238 -Tallien, Mme., 37 -Thiers, 177 -Tilsit, Treaty of, 15 - -Ulm, 15, 29 - -Vandamme, 59, 73, 109, =144-145=, 191 -Verestchagin, 17 -Victor, 143 -Villeneuve, 205 -Vittoria, 106, 191 -Vimiero, 15, 143 - -Wagram, 32, 74, 84, =212= -Walewska, Marie de, 18, 21, 43, =160-165= -Walewski, Alexander, =165-166= -Waterloo, 16, 78, 79, 112, 136, 217 -Wellington, 11, 84, 86, 87, 156 - -Zürich, 82 - - - - - PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE NORTHUMBERLAND PRESS LIMITED - - WATERLOO HOUSE, THORNTON STREET, NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Misspelled words and printer errors have been corrected. 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S. Forester</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Napoleon and his court</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: C. S. Forester</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: December 20, 2022 [eBook #69585]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: Al Haines, Cindy Beyer & the online Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAPOLEON AND HIS COURT ***</div> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0000' style='width:350px;height:auto;'/> -</div> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<p class='line0' style='text-align:center;margin-top:1em;margin-bottom:10em;font-size:1.2em;font-weight:bold;'>NAPOLEON AND HIS COURT</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:10em;'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line0'><span class='sc'>By the Same Author</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line0'>A PAWN AMONG KINGS</p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illofront.jpg' alt='' id='ilfront' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>EQUESTRIAN GROUP OF NAPOLEON AND HIS STAFF AT AUSTERLITZ<br/> (<span class='it'>From a print in Canon Brook-Jackson’s collection, believed to be<br/> the only one in existence.</span>)</p> -</div> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style=''> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line0' style='margin-top:1em;font-size:2.5em;font-weight:bold;'>NAPOLEON AND</p> -<p class='line0' style='font-size:2.5em;font-weight:bold;'>HIS COURT</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line0' style='font-size:.7em;'>BY</p> -<p class='line0' style='margin-top:.3em;margin-bottom:3em;font-size:1.5em;font-weight:bold;'>C. S. FORESTER</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line0' style='font-size:.7em;'>WITH SIXTEEN ILLUSTRATIONS</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line0' style='margin-top:5em;font-size:.9em;'>METHUEN & CO. LTD.</p> -<p class='line0' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:.2em;font-size:.9em;'>36 <span class='gesp'>ESSEX STREET</span>, W.C.</p> -<p class='line0' style='margin-bottom:2em;font-size:.9em;'><span class='gesp'>LONDON</span></p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:2em;'> <!-- rend=';fs:.7em;' --> -<p class='line0' style='font-size:.7em;'><span class='it'>First Published in 1924</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line0' style='margin-top:10em;margin-bottom:5em;font-size:.7em;'>PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN</p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<table id='tab1' summary='' class='center' style='font-size:.8em;'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 3em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 24.5em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 3em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle0' colspan='3'><span style='font-size:x-large'>CONTENTS</span></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'><span style='font-size:x-small'>CHAP.</span></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><span style='font-size:x-small'>PAGE</span></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>I.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>IN GENERAL</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_9'>9</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>II.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>THE MAN HIMSELF</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_17'>17</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>III.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>SOME PALADINS</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_25'>25</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>IV.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>ONE WIFE</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_35'>35</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>V.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>THE DIVORCE</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_42'>42</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>VI.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>ANOTHER WIFE</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_47'>47</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>VII.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>SOME COURT DETAILS</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_55'>55</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>VIII.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>THE GREATEST PALADIN</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_67'>67</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>IX.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>MORE PALADINS</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_80'>80</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>X.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>BROTHERS</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_95'>95</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>XI.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>SISTERS</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_114'>114</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>XII.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>STARS OF LESSER MAGNITUDE</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_133'>133</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>XIII.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>WOMEN</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_151'>151</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>XIV.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>LIKES AND DISLIKES</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_174'>174</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>XV.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_184'>184</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>XVI.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>SPOTS IN THE SUN</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_202'>202</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'>XVII.</td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>ST. HELENA</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_223'>223</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>APPENDIX—INCIDENTS AND AUTHORITIES</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_237'>237</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab1c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>INDEX</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#Page_245'>245</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<table id='tab2' summary='' class='center' style='font-size:.8em;'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 0.5em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 27em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 3em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tab2c1-col3 tdStyle0' colspan='3'><span style='font-size:x-large'>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</span></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><span style='font-size:x-small'><span class='it'>Page</span></span></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>EQUESTRIAN GROUP OF NAPOLEON AND HIS STAFF AT AUSTERLITZ</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#ilfront'>front</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>GENERAL BONAPARTE</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il16'>16</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>PRINCE JOACHIM (MURAT, KING OF THE TWO SICILIES)</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il34'>34</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>MARIE LOUISE, EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il54'>54</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>GRAF VON NEIPPERG</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il66'>66</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>EUGÈNE DE BEAUHARNAIS (VICEROY OF ITALY, PRINCE DE VENISE)</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il79'>79</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>AUGEREAU, DUC DE CASTIGLIONE</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il94'>94</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>JOSEPH NAPOLEON, KING OF NAPLES</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il113'>113</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>CAROLINE MURAT</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il132'>132</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>LETIZIA BONAPARTE (MADAME MÈRE)</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il151a'>151</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>ELISE BACIOCCHI</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il151b'>151</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>THE KING OF ROME</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il173'>173</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>PAULINE BORGHESE</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il183'>183</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>DAVOUT (PRINCE D’ECKMÜHL AND DUC D’AUERSTÄDT)</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il201'>201</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>MASSENA (PRINCE D’ESSLING AND DUC DE RIVOLI)</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il222'>222</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'></td><td class='tab2c2 leader-dots tdStyle2'><span>LOUIS NAPOLEON, KING OF HOLLAND</span></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'><a href='#il236'>236</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle4'> </td><td class='tab2c2 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle3'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tab2c1-col3 tdStyle4' colspan='3'> <span style='font-size:smaller'><span class='sc'>Note.</span>—<span class='it'>The illustrations are reproduced from prints in the collection of Canon Brook-Jackson, by kind permission.</span></span></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<p class='line0' style='text-align:center;margin-top:3em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:2.5em;'>Napoleon and His Court</p> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='9' id='Page_9'></span><h1 class='nobreak'>CHAPTER I<br/> <span class='sub-head'>IN GENERAL</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>T</span>HERE was a time when France extended to -the Baltic, the Ebro and the Tiber; when -the term “Frenchmen” included Frenchmen, -Spaniards, Italians, Belgians, Dutch, Germans -and even a few stray Danes, Poles and Letts; when -Rome was the second city of France, and Amsterdam -the third; when the Emperor of the French was -also King of Italy and Mediator of Switzerland; -when one of his brothers was King of Spain, another, -King of Westphalia, and one of his generals King of -Naples; when all Germany was ruled by his vassals; -when Poland was a French province in all but name; -when Austria was the French Emperor’s subservient -ally; and when one of his less successful -generals had just been appointed ruler of Sweden.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Never, since the days of the Roman Empire, -had one man held so much power, and never in all -history has so much power been as rapidly acquired -or as rapidly lost. In ten years Napoleon rose from -the obscurity of a disgraced artillery officer to the -dignity of the most powerful ruler in the world; in -ten more he was a despised fugitive flying for his life -from his enemies. -<span class='pageno' title='10' id='Page_10'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is difficult for us nowadays to visualize such a -state of affairs. To the people of that time life must -have appeared like a wild nightmare, as impossibly -logical as a lunatic’s dream. There seems to have -been no doubt anywhere that the frantic hypertrophy -could not last, and yet when the end was clearly at -hand hardly a soul perceived its approach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was only one nation of Europe which -escaped the mesmerism of the man in the grey coat, -and that was the British. It was only in Britain -that they did not speak of him with bated breath as -“the Emperor,” and remained undaunted by his -monstrous power and ruthless energy. To the -English he was not His Imperial and Royal Majesty, -Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, -Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and -Mediator of the Helvetian Republic. No, the -English thought of him merely as Boney, a fantastic -figment of the imagination of the other peoples of -the world, who were of course a queer lot with -unaccountable fears and superstitions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But this Boney, this Corsican Ogre, incredible -though he was, loomed appallingly large upon the -horizon. There were beacons all round the coast in -case he landed; his privateers were the scourge of -shipping; prices were at famine point and business -was parlous on account of his activities; the militia -was embodied and there was a ceaseless drain of -recruits into the army; every village mourned the -loss of a son who had enlisted and whose life had -been thrown away in some harebrained expedition -into ill-defined foreign parts. And yet on the other -hand there were considerations which gave an aspect -of unreality to the whole menace. England was constantly -victorious at sea, and though Nelson might -be mourned the glory of Trafalgar and the Nile cast -the possibility of invasion into insignificance. The -English people were confident that on land as well -<span class='pageno' title='11' id='Page_11'></span> -they would beat the French at every encounter. -Not for nothing were Agincourt and Minden -blazoned on English history, and Alexandria and -Maida supplied whatever confirmation might be -desired. Such disasters as that at Buenos Ayres -were forgotten; confidence ran high. When -Wellington gained a victory by which all Portugal -was cleared of the French at one blow the public -annoyance that even greater results had not been -achieved, that the whole French army had not been -captured, was extreme. There were few English -people who did not think that, should Napoleon by -some freak of fortune land in England, the veterans -of Austerlitz and the almost legendary Imperial -Guard would be routed by the militia and the hasty -levies of the countryside. There was nothing which -could drive the realities of war hard home into the -public mind. If prices were high, then as compensation -colonies fell into our hands, employment was -fairly good, and the business of manufacturing arms -and equipment was simply booming. Besides, -intercourse with the Continent was not entirely cut -off for the smugglers worked busily and successfully, -and French lace and French fashions and -French brandy circulated freely. It was hard for -the average Englishman to realize that the Corsican -Ogre was not merely an ogre, especially as the -fantastic cartoons of the period and the wild legends -which were current were more fitted to grace a -child’s fairy-tale than to depict the most formidable -enemy England had yet encountered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the mainland of Europe the picture was -utterly reversed. The reality of war was only too -obvious. The Emperor was no mere cartoonist’s -figure drawn with disgusting detail. They had seen -him; he had ridden into their capitals on his white -horse in the midst of the army which had shattered -their proud battalions over and over again. His -<span class='pageno' title='12' id='Page_12'></span> -power was terrible and his vengeance was swift. In -half the countries of Europe a chance word might -result in the careless speaker being flung next day -into an unknown dungeon. His armies swarmed -everywhere, and wherever they went they left a trail -of desolation behind them. The peasants were -starved and the landowners were ruined, to pay the -enormous taxes which the indemnities he imposed -demanded. The mass of the people, who had once -hailed the great conqueror because his arrival meant -their delivery from feudalism, now found themselves -crushed under a despotism ten times more exacting. -The Emperor was very real to them. Many of -them now served new rulers who had been imposed -upon them by him, and him alone. Wherever he -appeared he was attended by a train of subject kings -to whom his wish was law. At his word an Italian -might find himself a Frenchman, or an Austrian a -Bavarian. And this was no mere distinction without -a difference. Once upon a time the peasant -classes cared little about the politics of their rulers, -or even about which ruler they served. The fate of -a professional army was a royal, not a national concern. -But now every able-bodied man found himself -in the ranks. Badeners fought Portuguese on -the question as to whether a Frenchman should rule -Spain, and a hundred thousand Germans perished -in the northern snows because the Emperor of the -French wished to exclude English goods from -Russian ports. The imposition was monstrous, and -in consequence the question of nationality became -of supreme importance. If a country made war -upon Napoleon every citizen of that country now -realized that defeat meant the continuance of a -slavery as exasperating as it was degrading. The -fact that their eventual victory left them very little -freer does not enter into this argument. It is -sufficient to say that Napoleon was regarded on the -<span class='pageno' title='13' id='Page_13'></span> -Continent with an interest agonizing in its intensity, -and that this interest was nourished in a much more -substantial fashion than prevailed in England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It has been maintained and has infected all -nationalities alike. The ability of the French nation -to write telling memoirs is nowhere better displayed -than in the period of the Empire. A large amount -of very fascinating material was produced, by which -the history of the period, which had previously been -grossly distorted, was corrected and balanced. -Details were worked out with an elaboration all too -rare. The events in themselves were so exceedingly -interesting, and the books about them were so well -written, that it can hardly be considered surprising -that more and more attention was turned towards -the Empire. In addition, the fascinating personality -of the Emperor concentrated and specialized the -attention. More important than all, since events of -huge importance turned merely upon his own whims -and predilections, it was necessary to analyse and to -examine the nature of the man who had this vast -responsibility. It has become fashionable to inquire -into every detail of his life, and there has grown up -an enormous literature about him. Most of these -books contain a fair amount of truth, but they -nearly all contain a high proportion of lies. -Napoleon himself was a good liar, but by now he -is much more lied about than lying.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That coffee legend, for instance. Nine books on -Napoleon out of ten say (with no more regard for -physiology than for fact) that he was accustomed to -drinking ten, twenty, even thirty cups of coffee a -day. Napoleon drinking coffee is as familiar a figure -to us as Sherlock Holmes injecting morphine, but -both figures are equally apocryphal. The best -authorities, people who really knew, are unanimous -in saying that he never drank more than three cups -a day. De Bausset, who was a Prefect of the -<span class='pageno' title='14' id='Page_14'></span> -Palace, and in charge of such arrangements, -distinctly says he took only two, and goes out of his -way to deny the rumours to the contrary which were -already circulating. This is but one example out of -many; perhaps we shall meet with others later on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is necessary first to sketch Napoleon’s career -in brief, for the sake of later reference. The merest -outline will suffice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon began his military life under the old -régime as an officer in the artillery; despite an -inauspicious start, he attracted attention by his -conduct at the siege of Toulon. Later he was nearly -involved in the fall of Robespierre, but, extricating -himself, he served with credit in the Riviera campaign -of 1794. Next, he earned all the gratitude of -which Barras was capable by crushing the revolt of -the Sections against the Directory in 1795. By -some means (it is certain that Josephine his wife had -something to do with it) he obtained the command -of the army of Italy; in 1796 and 1797 he crushed -the Austrians and Piedmontese, conquered Piedmont -and Lombardy, and made himself a name as -the greatest living general. There followed the -expedition to Egypt, where his successes (extolled -as only he knew how) stood out in sharp contrast to -the failures of the other French armies in Italy and -Germany. Returning at the psychological moment, -he seized the supreme power, and made himself -First Consul. Masséna had already almost saved -France by his victory at Zürich and his defence of -Genoa, and Napoleon continued the work by a -spectacular passage of the Alps and a perilously -narrow victory at Marengo. Moreau settled the -business by the battle of Hohenlinden. During -the interval of peace which followed, Napoleon -strengthened himself in every possible way. He -codified the legal system, built up the Grand Army -which later astonished the world, disposed of Moreau -<span class='pageno' title='15' id='Page_15'></span> -and various other possible rivals, assured the French -people of his political wholeheartedness by shooting -the Duc d’Enghien and by sending republicans -wholesale to Cayenne; and finally grasped as much -as possible of the shadow as well as the substance -of royalty by proclaiming himself Emperor and -receiving the Papal blessing at his coronation. But -already he was at war again with England, and the -following year (1805) Russia and Austria declared -against him. He hurled the Grand Army across -Europe with a sure aim. Mack surrendered at Ulm; -out of seventy thousand men only a few escaped. -At Austerlitz the Russian army was smitten into -fragments. Austria submitted, and Napoleon -triumphantly tore Tyrol and Venetia from her, gave -crowns to his vassal rulers of Bavaria and Würtemberg, -and proclaimed himself overlord of Germany -as Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. -His brother Louis he made King of Holland; his -brother Joseph King of Naples; his brother-in-law -Murat Grand Duke of Berg. Prussia demurred, -and was crushed almost out of existence at Jena. -Russia, tardily moving to her support, was, after a -hard fight at Eylau, beaten at Friedland (1807). -At Tilsit the Emperors of the French and of Russia -settled the fate of Continental Europe, and Jerome, -the youngest brother of Napoleon, was given a new -kingdom, Westphalia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So far, nothing but glory and progress; but from -now on, nothing but false steps and failure. First, -the overrunning of Spain and the proclamation of -Joseph as King of Spain. This brought Napoleon -into contact with the enmity of a people instead of -that merely of a king. It gave England a chance of -effective military intervention, and it shook the -world’s belief in the invulnerability of the Colossus -by the defeats of Vimiero and Baylen. Austria -made another effort for freedom in 1809, to submit -<span class='pageno' title='16' id='Page_16'></span> -tamely, after one victory and two defeats, when the -game was by no means entirely lost. Hence -followed further annexations and maltreatment. -Then came blunder after blunder, while the Empire -sagged through its sheer dead weight. The divorce -of Josephine lost him the sympathy of the fervent -Catholics and of the sentimentalists. The marriage -with Marie Louise lost him the support of the -republicans and of Russia. He quarrelled with his -brother Louis, drove him from the country and -annexed Holland. He tried to direct the Spanish -war from Paris, with bad results. Annexation -followed annexation in his attempt to shut the coasts -to English trade. The Empire was gorged and surfeited, -but Napoleon was inevitably forced to -further action. Having irritated each other past -bearing, he and Alexander of Russia drifted into -war, and the snows of Russia swallowed up what few -fragments of the old Grand Army had been spared -from the Spanish and Danube campaigns. It was -like a blow delivered by a dazed boxer—powerful, -but ill-directed and easily avoided, so that -the striker overbalances by his own momentum. -Napoleon struggled once more to his feet. In 1813 -he summoned to the eagles every Frenchman -capable of bearing arms. But one by one his friends -turned against him. Prussia, Austria, Saxony, -Bavaria, each in turn joined the ranks of his enemies. -His victories of Lützen, Bautzen and Dresden were -of no avail. At Leipzig his army was shattered; he -fought on desperately for a few more months, but -at last he had to submit and abdicate.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A further effort after his escape from Elba -ended with the disaster of Waterloo, and merely led -to the last tragedy of St. Helena.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So much for the general. From this we can turn -with relief to the particular; and from the particular, -with perhaps even more relief, to the merely trivial.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo16.jpg' alt='' id='il16' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>GENERAL BONAPARTE</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='17' id='Page_17'></span><h1>CHAPTER II<br/> <span class='sub-head'>THE MAN HIMSELF</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>O</span>F course, we all know him. He was rather -short and corpulent, and he wore a cocked -hat, a green coat with red facings, and -white breeches. Sometimes, when the mood took -him, he would appear in trailing robes, with a -wreath of laurel round his forehead. Very appropriate, -admittedly, but—that wreath does appear a -little incongruous, does it not? Then there are -times when we see him on a white horse in the midst -of the battle. One or two dead men are lying near -him in graceful attitudes; one or two others are -engaged in dying still more gracefully. His staff is -round him; in the distance are long lines of infantry -and volumes of cannon-smoke. But everything is -so orderly and respectable that one cannot help -thinking that even in that discreet, dim distance the -dying are as careful about their manner as was -Cæsar at the foot of Pompey’s statue. Verestchagin -and others strike a different note, but they never saw -Napoleon alive. We have portraits and pictures -innumerable, but are we any nearer to the man -himself—to what was inside the green coat and -the cocked hat?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is the same when we come to read the mountains -of memoirs which have been written around him. -There are solemn memoirs, there are indiscreet -memoirs. There are abusive memoirs, there are -<span class='pageno' title='18' id='Page_18'></span> -flattering memoirs. There are memoirs, written in -all honesty, during the reading of which one cannot -help feeling that the writer would really like to begin -personal pronouns referring to Him with a capital -letter. And yet, after months—years, perhaps—of -reading, one still feels that one knows nothing of -him. One realizes, naturally, that he was a marvellously -clever man, with a marvellous sense of his own -cleverness. But of the man himself, of his little -intimate desires and feelings, one remains ignorant. -A century of memoir-reading will not do as much -for us as would, say, a week’s sojourn alone with him -on a desert island. What adds point to the argument -is that obviously the writer of the most -intimate memoirs was just as far from him as we are.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The fact of the matter is that Napoleon in all his -life never had a friend. From his adolescence to his -death there was nobody to whom he could speak -unguardedly. It was not so much that he posed, as -that he had himself well in hand on all occasions. -He could unbend; he could pinch a grognard’s ear -or crack jokes with his Guard; he could write passionate -letters to Josephine or supplicatory ones to -Walewska; but we realize that each of these displays -is merely a flash from some new facet of the gem. -To the design of the whole, to the light which glowed -within secretly, we are perforce blind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>His tastes in art, which would be a valuable -indication to his character, are variously rated by -contemporaries. One thing is certain, and that is -that art did not flourish under the Empire. A -heavily censored press acts as a drag upon the wheel -of progress in this, as in all other matters, but one -cannot help thinking that this cessation of development -is due as much to Napoleon’s lack of interest -in the subject. David’s hard classicism and Isabey’s -futilities are the best that the Empire can show -in painting, while in sculpture (save perhaps for -<span class='pageno' title='19' id='Page_19'></span> -Houdon), in poetry, in romance, in criticism, not one -names survives, with the slight exception of Madame -de Staël. There is no French contemporary with -Körner who could bear a moment’s comparison; -there is not even any single achievement, like Rouget -de l’Isle’s of the previous decade, to which France -can point with pride. Napoleon’s own favourite -works in literature make a rather curious list; -tragedy was the only kind of dramatic literature -which he favoured, although tragedy is the weakest -part of the French drama, and in tragedy he ranked -Corneille far above all others; Ossian’s poems, -despite translation into French, had a great attraction -for him, perhaps because the exalted wording appealed -to him in his moments of fantastic planning; Goethe, -the greatest living poet, held no fascination for him; -but Rousseau did. Indeed Rousseau’s influence is -clearly visible in many of Napoleon’s own writings. -Beyond this, there is almost nothing modern which -received the seal of his approval. The classics he -read in translation, and solely for the sake of their -matter. Music was not specially liked by him; he -tolerated it because it roused in him the same -sensations as did Ossian’s verse—it was a drug, a -stimulant to him, but not a staple necessary. In -painting he showed no special taste; the honours he -gave David clearly indicate that he held no theories -of his own on the subject. This list of likes and -dislikes is non-committal; it can tell us little about -Napoleon himself; and we are once more brought to -an abrupt halt in our endeavour to discover what -manner of man he really was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet we can approach the question indirectly. -Napoleon had no friend; there was never a time when -he was taken off his guard. His soldiers loved him—stay! -It was not love, it was adoration. That is -the key to the mystery. It was not the love of one -man for another; it was the worship of a God. But -<span class='pageno' title='20' id='Page_20'></span> -just as no man can be a hero to his own valet, so can -no general be a God to his immediate subordinates. -The rank and file could think of Marengo, of -Austerlitz, of Jena, but what of the Marshals? At -Marengo, France was on the verge of a frightful -disaster. The slightest touch would have turned the -scale, and Napoleon, hemmed in against the Alps, -must have surrendered. What of France then, with -a triumphant army at her frontier and not another -regiment at hand? In the Austerlitz campaign it -was nearly the same. Before Jena, Napoleon fell into -error after error. Not until the next day was he made -aware that only half the Prussian army had fought -against him, and that he had recklessly exposed a -single corps to meet the attack of the other half at -Auerstädt. That Davout fought and won was -Napoleon’s good fortune, not the result of his skill.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Looking back on fifteen years of unbroken -success, the private soldiers might well believe -Napoleon to be a God, but the Marshals were near -enough to him to see the feet of clay. For them -there was neither adoration nor love. He was their -taskmaster, and a jealous one at that, lavish of -reprimand and miserly of praise. He gave them -wealth, titles, kingdoms even, but he never risked -rivalry with himself by giving any one of them what -they most desired—military power. The Peninsular -War dragged on largely because he did not dare to -entrust the supreme command of three hundred -thousand men to a single general. With gold and -glory even misers like Masséna became eventually -satiated, and one by one they dropped away from his -allegiance when the tide turned. It fell to Marmont, -the only one of all the Marshals who owed -everything to the Emperor, to surrender Paris to -the Allies and complete his ruin. Not one of the -twenty-six paladins accompanied their master to Elba -or St. Helena; that was left to the junior officers -<span class='pageno' title='21' id='Page_21'></span> -such as Bertrand, Montholon and Gourgaud, who -had been near enough to him to adore, but too far -off to see faults. Yet even to these, life with their -idol became at times unbearable, and more than one -of them deserted before the end. In men Napoleon -could not inspire the love that endures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As regards women, it is an unpleasant task to -venture a definite opinion. An aura of tradition has -gradually developed around Josephine’s memory, and -she is frequently looked upon as a woman who -sacrificed herself for her love, and allowed herself to -be divorced to aid her husband. Yet her most indignant -partisan would not deny that she had much -to lose beside her husband. The position of Queen -of Queens; unlimited jewels; an unstinted wardrobe -(and she was passionately fond of clothes); the -prospect of the loss of all this might well have moved -a woman to more tears even than Josephine shed. -And of her affection for her husband one may be -permitted to have suspicions. Her circumstances -before the marriage were at least doubtful, and -afterwards—those nasty rumours about Hippolyte -Charles and others seem to have some foundation in -fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of Marie Louise mere mention is enough. When -we come to discuss her later life and her conduct with -Neipperg we shall find clear proof that she did not -love Napoleon. The other women who came into -his life are pale shades compared even to these two. -With none of them was he in love, and none of them -loved him, or came to share his exile. Madame -Walewska visited him for a few days at Elba, but -that was merely to seek further favours for herself -and her son. After Waterloo she married; all her -predecessors had already done the same. Women -did not love Napoleon. We may picture Napoleon, -then, going through life friendless and quite alone. -Never a moment’s relaxation from the stiffness of his -<span class='pageno' title='22' id='Page_22'></span> -mental attitude of superiority; never the light of -friendship in the eye of man or woman; every single -person in Europe was either his slave or his enemy. -To say the least, his was an isolated position. And -yet, was he unhappy? Bourrienne tells us that in -the early Revolution days Napoleon walked the -streets, gaunt and passionate, with a lustful eye for -rich carriages, ornate houses, and all the outward -emblems of power. The phase ended as soon as -power was his, and he passed easily into the condition -of isolation which endured for the rest of his life. -He was the Man of Destiny, the sole creature of his -kind, and he was happy. His isolation never troubled -him in the least. If ever he referred to it, it was in -terms of satisfaction. He was guilty on more than -one occasion of saying that he was above all law, and -it is well known that he believed in his “star”; he -believed that he was marked out by some inscrutable -higher power (the limitations of whose exact -nature he never defined) to achieve unbounded success -and to wield a permanently unlimited power. It is -difficult to imagine such a condition. The most -ordinary or most modest man has usually an undying -belief that his own ability transcends all others, and -that Providence regards him with a special interest, -but deeper still there is almost invariably a further -feeling (often ignored, but usually obvious at a crisis) -that this simply cannot be so. Even if this further -feeling does not become apparent, a man’s sense of -humour usually comes to his rescue and saves him -from the uttermost absurdity. But Napoleon’s -sense of humour was only feebly developed, and in -many directions was totally wanting. On the other -hand, there were certainly many reasons for his -classification of himself as a different being from -ordinary men. He never turned his hand to anything -without achieving much greater success than -his contemporaries. If a codification of law was -<span class='pageno' title='23' id='Page_23'></span> -required, then Napoleon codified laws, without one -half of the difficulty previously experienced. He -won battles over every general whom the Continent -pitted against him. If a province was to be conquered, -or, conquered, had to be reorganized, then -Napoleon was ready at a moment’s notice to dictate -the methods of procedure—and he was usually proved -to be correct. For twelve years, from 1800 to 1812, -Napoleon did not know what it was to fail in any -matter under his own personal control, while during -that period his successes were unprecedented. -Besides, there were more convenient standards of -comparison. He was able to work at a pace which -wore out all his subordinates, and he was able to -continue working long after they had been compelled -to confess themselves beaten. In his capacity for -mental labour he stood not merely unequalled, but -unapproached. Even physically he was frequently -able to display superiority; his staff over and over -again were unable to endure fatigues which he bore -unmoved. Lastly, he was usually able to bend to -his will anyone with whom he came in contact. The -unruly generals of the Army of Italy in 1796 gave -way to him, when he was little more than a favoured -upstart, with extraordinary mildness. He induced -conscientious men like Lefebvre to agree to the most -unscrupulous actions. Alexander of Russia, smarting -under the defeats of Austerlitz and Friedland, -was won over in the course of a few hours’ interview, -and became Napoleon’s enthusiastic ally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There certainly was a great deal in favour of the -theory that Napoleon was a very remarkable man, -but not even the greatest of men is justified in -believing that he is different from other men in kind -as well as in degree. The fact that Napoleon really -did believe this is highly significant. It hints at -something being wanting in his mental constitution, -something similar to, but even more important than -<span class='pageno' title='24' id='Page_24'></span> -a sense of humour. His shameless duplicity in both -his public and his private concerns points to the same -end. His inability to gain the lasting friendship of -any of those with whom he came in contact is another -link in the chain of argument. His complete -disbelief in the disinterestedness of the motives of any -single human being completes it. Napoleon was one -of the most brilliant thinkers the world has ever seen; -he was the most practical and strenuous in action; -he enjoyed for twenty years more good luck than -anyone has ever deserved; but he had a meanness of -soul unsurpassed in recorded history. As a machine, -he was wellnigh perfect (until he began to wear out); -as a man he was deplorably wanting.</p> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='25' id='Page_25'></span><h1>CHAPTER III<br/> <span class='sub-head'>SOME PALADINS</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>I</span>T was a common saying in the Napoleonic army -that every man in the ranks carried a Marshal’s -bâton in his knapsack. This was correct in -theory, but in actual practice it hardly proved true. -Every one of the twenty-six Marshals of the First -Empire had held important commands before the -rank was instituted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Grouchy, the last Marshal to be created, was -second-in-command of the Bantry Bay expedition -in 1796, when Napoleon was just making his name; -Jourdan had commanded the Army of the North -as far back as 1794.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But if the title of Marshal was no more than their -bare due, Napoleon certainly gave his generals -other honours in plenty. One of them, Murat, he -made a King; another, Bernadotte, after receiving -the title of Sovereign Prince of Ponte Corvo, later -became King of Sweden and Norway. Berthier -was Sovereign Prince of Neufchâtel. Three other -Marshals were created Princes of the Empire; -thirteen were created Dukes; six, Counts; and the -only one remaining, Poniatowski, was a Prince of -Poland already.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Besides titles, wealth without limit was showered -upon them. Suchet received half a million francs -with his bâton; Davout in 1811 enjoyed an income, -all told, of two million francs a year along with the -unofficial dictatorship of Poland and the command -<span class='pageno' title='26' id='Page_26'></span> -of a hundred and fifty thousand men. It was -Napoleon’s habit to bestow upon his generals huge -estates in each country he conquered. Lefebvre -received the domain of Johannisberg, on the Rhine, -which had once belonged to the Emperor of Austria -and later passed to the Metternich family, while Junot -received a castle and estate of the unlucky King of -Prussia. Nearly every man of mark was given five -thousand acres or so in Poland, with the attached -serfs. And Napoleon was the Apostle of the -Revolution!</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The one condition attached to the gifts was that -the recipient must spend as much as possible in -the capital. So Parisian shopkeepers grew fat and -praised the Empire; the Paris mob battened on the -crumbs which fell from the tables, and a feverish -gaiety impressed the onlooker. Out in the subject -countries was nothing but a grinding poverty, and in -the countries recently conquered by France the tax-collectors -strove to gather in enough to pay the -indemnities, and even the rats starved because the -Grand Army had passed that way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is when we come to examine the careers of the -Marshals that we first meet evidence of one of the -most curious and significant facts of Napoleon’s life. -Everybody to whom Napoleon showed great favour; -everyone who received his confidence; everyone, -in consequence, who had appeared at one time to -be on the direct road to unbounded prosperity, -met with a most tragic and unfortunate end. -Not a few of the worst set-backs which Napoleon -experienced were due to the defects of those whom -he had trusted and aggrandized, and many of his -favourites, apparently too weak morally to endure -the intoxication of success, turned against him -when fortune ceased to smile upon him. Their -deaths were tragic, and their lives were nearly all -dishonourable. -<span class='pageno' title='27' id='Page_27'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of all the Marshals, Berthier was the foremost -in seniority, in precedence, and in favour. In every -campaign which Napoleon fought, from 1796 -to 1814, he held the position of Chief of Staff. The -history of his military career during this period needs -no repetition—it is one with Napoleon’s. Every -conceivable honour was bestowed upon him. He -was given the sovereignty of the principality of -Neufchâtel and Valangin; in 1809 the additional -title of Prince of Wagram; he was appointed a -Senator, a Minister, Vice-Constable of France and -a Grand Dignitary of the Empire; at Napoleon’s -hands he received a bride of royal descent, in the -person of a Princess of Bavaria; in 1810 the supreme -honour was his of representing Napoleon at the preliminary -ceremony of the marriage with Marie -Louise. It seemed that he was one with Napoleon, -his faithful shadow and devoted servant. And yet -when Napoleon abdicated and was sent to Elba, -Berthier threw in his lot with the Bourbons, and -swore allegiance to them. Napoleon’s return and -new accession to power during the Hundred Days, -in consequence placed him in a terrible position. -He was torn between his new allegiance and his old -devotion to Napoleon. The strain proved too -severe. He died at Bamberg, just before Waterloo, -having flung himself from a high window in his -despair.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second senior of the Marshals was Joachim -Murat. Murat was fortunate in two ways. He was -able to handle large masses of cavalry with decision -on a battlefield, and he married the sister of the -Emperor. There was very little else to recommend -him for distinction, but these two facts were sufficient -to raise him to a throne. Napoleon appointed him -to the command of the cavalry of the Grand Army. -He made him a Prince and Grand Admiral of -France. Next came a sovereignty—the Grand -<span class='pageno' title='28' id='Page_28'></span> -Duchy of Berg and Cleves, and two years later Murat -mounted the throne which Joseph Bonaparte had -just vacated, and became King of the Two Sicilies. -So far, it was a highly satisfactory career for a man -who had begun as the assistant of his father, the inn -and posting-house keeper of La Bastide. Murat -determined to keep his throne, and during the dark -days of 1814 he turned against Napoleon, and -marched at the head of his Neapolitans against the -French. But retribution was swift. He lost his -throne next year in a premature attempt to unite -Italy, and in the end he was shot by the indignant -Neapolitan Bourbons after the miserable failure of -an attempt on his part to recover his crown after the -fashion set by Napoleon in his descent from Elba.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is, perhaps, a pardonable digression to consider -here what might have happened had Murat -retained his throne. It is certain that he would -have been as progressive as the Austrians and his own -weak nature would have allowed. It is possible that -the United Italy party would have looked towards -his dynasty instead of to the House of Savoy. The -growing Napoleonic tradition would have aided. -Perhaps to-day we might behold in the south a King -of Italy descended from a Gascon stable-boy, to -balance in the north a King of Sweden descended -from a Gascon lawyer’s clerk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But to return to our former theme. So far we -have seen two of Napoleon’s favourites meet with -violent deaths. There are many more instances. -Bessières was a nonentity distinguished by little -except his devotion to the Empire. He attracted -Napoleon’s notice in 1796, and his doglike faithfulness -was a sure recommendation. Bessières became -the Commander of the Guard; later he was created -Duke of Istria and was given immense riches. -Napoleon honoured him with all the friendship of -which he was capable; it seemed not unlikely that a -<span class='pageno' title='29' id='Page_29'></span> -throne would be found for him. But Bessières died -in agony after receiving a mortal wound at Lützen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then there was Ney, the brave des braves. His -personal courage was almost his only title to fame. -When Napoleon attained supreme power, Ney was -a divisional general of the Army of the Rhine. -Under the Empire he became Marshal, Duke of -Elchingen and Prince of the Moskowa. It was Ney -who made Ulm possible by his victory at Elchingen; -it was he whose attack beat back the Russians at -Friedland; to him is due much of the credit for -Borodino, while his command of the rearguard -during the retreat from Moscow is beyond praise. -And yet he was many times in error. At Jena and -during the Eylau campaign his impetuosity was -almost disastrous. He made several grave mistakes -during Masséna’s campaign in Spain, 1810-1811. -At Bautzen in 1813 he lost a great opportunity, and -he was beaten later at Dennewitz. It was his -vigour and his dauntless courage which recommended -him to Napoleon, who made full use of these -qualities to stimulate the hero-worship of his young -troops. Ney received wealth, high command and a -princely title at the Emperor’s hands. Then he -helped to force the Emperor to abdicate. However, -he was unstable; he betrayed his new king and -went over to Napoleon during the descent from -Elba. Napoleon entrusted him with the task of -staving off the English during the Waterloo -campaign, and he failed lamentably. He lost a -great opportunity at Quatre Bras through having -allowed his columns to lengthen out; he shilly-shallied -all the morning of the 16th of June; he -ruined the campaign by his furious countermand to -d’Erlon in the afternoon; and finally at Waterloo he -wasted the reserve cavalry by his unsupported attacks -on the English squares. And the Bourbons shot -him as soon as possible after the second Restoration. -<span class='pageno' title='30' id='Page_30'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Lannes, “the Bayard of the French Army,” -whom Napoleon had called “le braves des braves” -before he gave the title to Ney, met with as -miserable a fate. He had begun life as a dyer’s -apprentice at Lectourne, but enlisted at the opening -of the Revolutionary wars, and was a colonel on -Napoleon’s staff during the first campaign of Italy. -His fearless acceptance of responsibility, and his -magnificent dash and courage while in action were -his great assets, and Napoleon favoured him more -than any of the younger Marshals, except Murat. -It was largely through him that Napoleon found it -possible to employ the strategic weapon which he -invented—the strategic advanced guard. Victories -as widely divided as Marengo and Friedland were -directly due to Lannes, and he was proportionately -rewarded with a Marshalate, a Colonel-generalship, an -enormous fortune and the title of Duke of Montebello. -But he was mortally wounded at Aspern, and -died of gangrene at Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was one Marshal whom Napoleon especially -favoured who did not meet with a violent death. -Nevertheless his end was more terrible by far than -was Bessières’ or even Lannes’. This was Marmont, -who in 1796 was a young captain twenty-two years -of age, but who gained Napoleon’s regard to such -good effect that he was Inspector-General of -Artillery at twenty-six, governor of Illyria and -Duke of Ragusa at thirty-four, and Marshal in 1809, -one year later. But he failed in Spain, Wellington -beating him thoroughly at Salamanca. In 1814 he -dealt the finishing blow to the tottering Empire -by his surrender of Paris. He seemed fated to -be unfortunate. Pampered by the Bourbons, he -mishandled the army in Paris during Charles X.’s -attempt at absolute power, and ruined both -the dynasty and himself. He dragged out the -remainder of his life in exile, hated and despised -<span class='pageno' title='31' id='Page_31'></span> -alike by Bonapartists, Legitimists, Orleanists and -Republicans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So much for the Marshals Napoleon liked; his -favour certainly appears to have been blighting. -Now for those whom he disliked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When Napoleon finally got rid of Moreau, the -man who succeeded in general estimation to the -vacant and undesirable position of unofficial leader -of the unofficial opposition was Jean Baptiste Jules -Bernadotte. This man was one of the most -despicable and successful trimmers in history. In -Moreau’s Army of the Rhine he had attained the -rank of general of division, but he was in no way -a talented leader. Just before Napoleon’s return -from Egypt he had intrigued to attain the supreme -power, but over-reached himself. In Napoleon’s -<span class='it'>coup d’état</span> of the 18th Brumaire he hunted with the -hounds and ran with the hare with remarkable -success, assuring the Directory on the one hand -of his unfaltering support, and yet joining the -group of generals who accompanied Napoleon, but -characteristically not wearing uniform. In addition, -he had a convenient shelter behind a woman’s petticoats, -for with subtle forethought he had married -Joseph Bonaparte’s sister-in-law, Désirée Clary. -Désirée was a jilted sweetheart of Napoleon’s, and -what with her hatred of the great man, Joseph’s -support, and Napoleon’s horror of a scandal in his -family (combined with a sneaking affection for her) -Bernadotte made himself fairly secure all round. -But he still continued to intrigue against Napoleon. -During the Consulate an extraordinary conspiracy -was discovered centring at Rennes, Bernadotte’s -headquarters. Bernadotte himself was undoubtedly -implicated, but he somehow wriggled free from -suspicion. To the Republicans he posed as a -Republican; the Bourbons were convinced that he -was on their side; actually he was working for his -<span class='pageno' title='32' id='Page_32'></span> -own hand, while, thanks to Joseph, he obtained his -Marshalate and the principality of Ponte Corvo from -the Empire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In action, various unsavourily suspicious incidents -occurred in connection with him. In 1806 he took -advantage of an ambiguous order to absent his corps -both from Jena and Auerstädt; the results of his -action might have been far-reaching. Later -Benningsen and the Russian army escaped from -the trap Napoleon had set for them by capturing -vital orders which were on their way to the Prince -of Ponte Corvo. At Wagram his corps was routed -and broken up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But when, in 1810, the Swedes were seeking a -Crown Prince for their country, he was the man -they selected. Apparently their choice should have -been agreeable to Napoleon. Was Bernadotte not -the brother-in-law of the King of Spain, a connection -by marriage of the Emperor, Prince of Ponte Corvo -and one of the senior Marshals? Moreover, while -Governor of Hanover, he had had dealings with the -Swedes and had ingratiated himself in their esteem. -Napoleon was furious, but he could do nothing, and -Bernadotte became Crown Prince and virtual autocrat -of Sweden. It only remained for him to win -the favour of Russia by turning against France, so -that, at the Treaty of Abo, Norway as well was -handed over to his tender mercies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Later he even angled for the throne of France, -but the French could never forgive the part he had -played in defeating them at Gross Beeren, Dennewitz -and Leipzig; they did not realize that with this -very object in view he had almost betrayed his new -allies, and had hung back and procrastinated in order -to retain his French popularity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But double-dealer, intriguer, traitor that he was, -hated by Napoleon, hated by the French people, -despised by the rest of Europe, he nevertheless -<span class='pageno' title='33' id='Page_33'></span> -held on to his throne, and transmitted it to his -descendants. Nowadays the House of Bernadotte -is not considered too ignoble to wed even with a -branch of the House of Windsor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There were other Marshals whom Napoleon -disliked, mainly because of their former association -with Moreau. Macdonald was the son of a supporter -of the Young Pretender, and was a relative of Flora -Macdonald. He failed to pass the examination for -a commission under the old régime, but with the -Revolution came his chance. He distinguished -himself under Dumouriez and Pichegru (who subsequently -turned Royalist), and then under Moreau. -It was an unlucky start for him. The Directory -appointed him to the command of the Army of -Naples, but with this force he was beaten by -Suvaroff in the four days’ battle of the Trebbia. -Subsequently he performed the marvellous feat of -leading an army across the Splugen in midwinter, -but for all that Napoleon employed him as little as -possible, keeping him on half-pay until 1809. However, -Macdonald received his bâton after Wagram; -mainly, it is believed, to throw a stronger light on -Bernadotte’s failure. In 1813 Macdonald, Duke of -Tarentum, was beaten again at the Katzbach, but -by now Napoleon had some idea of his worth and -retained him in command. By a delicious piece of -irony, Macdonald the distrusted was the last Marshal -to leave the Emperor in 1814; he was also one of the -few to adhere to the Bourbons during the Hundred -Days. He enjoyed great honour under the Restoration -and the July Monarchy, and died comfortably -in his bed at the age of seventy-five.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another <span class='it'>bête noire</span> of Napoleon’s was St. Cyr. -He too was one of the “Spartans of the Rhine.” -In consequence Napoleon kept him out of active -service as much as possible. This course of action -was of doubtful utility, for St. Cyr was a man of -<span class='pageno' title='34' id='Page_34'></span> -superior talents. Not until 1812 was he made a -Marshal, but wounds then kept him out of action -until August, 1813, and he was made prisoner by the -Allies in the autumn. The Bourbons, however, -took kindly to him, and he held various high offices -until his death in 1830.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus the five favourite Marshals of Napoleon -died miserably, and the three whom he disliked would -be said to have lived happily ever after by any self-respecting -moral story-teller. It is a very curious -fact, and one which finds a parallel elsewhere in -Napoleon’s career, as we shall see in later chapters.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo34.jpg' alt='' id='il34' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>PRINCE JOACHIM<br/> (MURAT, KING OF THE TWO SICILIES)</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='35' id='Page_35'></span><h1>CHAPTER IV<br/> <span class='sub-head'>ONE WIFE</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>W</span>E have already alluded to the intensely -needy period of Napoleon’s life, which -was mainly centred around the year -1795. He knew himself to be a world conqueror; -he despised the shifty intriguers who controlled at -that time both his own destiny and that of France; -he bitterly envied the few insolent survivors of the -old noblesse whom he had met, while his very bread -was precariously earned. It was a maddening -situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then circumstances suddenly took a change for -the better. By a happy accident Barras employed -him to put down the revolt of the sections, and -within a few days Napoleon found himself general -of the army of the interior, and a person of some -consequence. Still, there were bitter drops even in -this first draught of success, for his position depended -solely on the whim of the readily corruptible -Director, who could with a word have sent him -either to a dungeon or to a command-in-chief. -Moreover, the haughty Parisian society regarded -the gaunt, desperately earnest general of twenty-six -with an amusement they made no attempt to -conceal. Parisian society had had nearly two years -by now in which to concentrate, and it was already -crystallizing out. There were old sans-culottes, now -Ambassadors, Ministers or Directors. There were -<span class='pageno' title='36' id='Page_36'></span> -Army contractors in hordes. There were their -wives (either by courtesy or by Republican law) -who were just recovering from the <span class='it'>sans chemise</span> -phase and beginning to ape the old customs of the -<span class='it'>haut noblesse</span>. Finally there were a few of the old -court families along with innumerable pretenders, -ex-valets masquerading as ci-devant marquises; -comtesses (as <span class='it'>précieuses</span> as they could manage) who -had once been kitchenmaids, while every name -hinted at a “de” which had been perforce dropped -during the Terror. And because trifling was for the -moment the fashion, this select band could well -afford to sneer at the ridiculous little Corsican -officer who meant everything he said, and who had -had great difficulty before the Revolution in proving -the three generations of noble descent necessary to -obtain nomination as a military cadet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon in these circumstances acted very -much as he did in a military difficulty. He selected -the most advantageous objective, flung himself upon -it, and followed up his initial success without -hesitation. He broke into the charmed circle of -Directory society by marrying one of its shining -lights.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Josephine, vicomtesse de Beauharnais, was a -representative of the farthest outside fringe of -Court society under the old régime. Her marriage -with Beauharnais had been arranged by her aunt, -who was her father-in-law’s mistress. This unfortunate -relationship, combined with poverty and the -obscurity of the family, had barred most of the doors -of pre-Revolutionary society to her, and the Beauharnais -were, in the minds of the Montmorencys and -Rohans, no more worthy of notice than the merest -bourgeois. Of this fact Bonaparte cannot have been -ignorant, no matter what has been said to the -contrary, but it was of no importance to him. He -cared little even for the fact that Beauharnais had -<span class='pageno' title='37' id='Page_37'></span> -been at one time a President of the Constituent -Assembly and Commander-in-Chief of the Army -of the Rhine, before meeting the fate of most of the -Commanders-in-Chief of 1794. All that mattered -to Bonaparte was that Josephine was a member of -the narrow circle of the Directory, that in fact she -and Madame Tallien were the two most important -women therein, and that marriage with her would -gain him admission also. The Directory was fast -becoming a close oligarchy keeping a jealous eye -watching for intruders, and Napoleon had to act at -once. His policy was soon justified, for immediately -after his marriage his position was recognized by the -offer of the longed-for command of the Army of -Italy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There were other considerations as well. Josephine -possessed a wonderful charm of manner, and -her taste was irreproachable. The beauty of her -figure was undoubted; that of her face was enhanced -by dexterous art. To Napoleon, starved of the good -things of life, and incredibly lustful after them, she -must have appeared a houri of his Paradise. The -violence of his reaction from a forced self-control may -be judged by the stream of passionate letters which -he sent her every few hours during the opening of -his campaign of Italy. Heaven knows he had difficulties -enough to contend with there, what with -mutinous generals, starving soldiers, and an enemy -twice his strength, but we find him snatching a few -minutes two or three times a day to turn from his -labours and worries in order to contemplate the joys -he had attained, and endeavouring to express them -on paper.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Josephine’s motives were also mixed. She was -thirty-two years of age, and she was desperately poor. -Her late husband’s property was almost entirely -situated in the West Indies, and it was now held by -the English. Her dreadful experiences under the -<span class='pageno' title='38' id='Page_38'></span> -Terror, when she was imprisoned and within an ace -of being guillotined, had probably aged her and -shaken her nerve. Barras and various bankers had -helped her with funds (perhaps expecting a return, -perhaps not) but such resources would soon come to -an end. In this extremity, appeared Napoleon, -pressing an urgent suit. After all, he was not too -bad a match. He was already general of the army -of the interior, and between them both they ought -to screw some better appointment out of Barras. -He had not a sou to bless himself with beside his -pay, but Republican generals usually found means -to become rich in a short time. If he were killed, -there would be a pension; if he survived, and was -unsuccessful, divorce was easy under Republican -law. She obviously stood to gain much and to lose -little.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And then it could not be denied that Napoleon -had a way with him. His fierce Southern nature -would sometimes raise a response in her. After all, -she was a Creole, and her Creole blood could hardly -fail to stir at his passionate wooing. Although six -years his senior, disillusioned, experienced, hardened -and shallow though she was, there were times when -his tempestuous advances carried her away.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet at other times, when he was absent, and she -had once more caught the infection of cynicism and -trifling from her associates, Napoleon appeared -vaguely absurd to her. “Il m’ennuie,” she would -say, languidly turning the pages of his letters. She -had no desire to leave Paris, where she was enjoying -the prestige of being the wife of a successful general, -to share with him the privations of active service. -Only when Lombardy was in his hands, and a palace -and an almost royal reception were awaiting her, did -she join him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Moreover, until she had a position to lose, she -undoubtedly indulged in flirtations. Corsican -<span class='pageno' title='39' id='Page_39'></span> -jealousy may have played a part in the furious rages -to which Napoleon gave rein, but there is no denying -that Josephine was several times indiscreet. In -turn, he suspected Hippolyte Charles, a young -and handsome army contractor, Murat (at that -time his aide-de-camp) and even Junot, his blind -admirer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By the time that Napoleon was nearing supreme -power, his brief passion for Josephine had burnt -itself out. He himself had already been several -times unfaithful to her, and the only feeling that -still remained was the half-pitying affection a man -bears towards a discarded mistress. On his return -from Egypt he found elaborate preparations made -for him. His family, poisonously jealous of -Josephine, were waiting with circumstantial accounts -of her actions, and they pressed him to obtain a -divorce. Josephine, who had set out to meet him, -in order to get in the first word, had taken the wrong -road and missed him, so that the Bonaparte family -had a clear field. They made the most of it. -Josephine returned to Paris to find her husband -almost determined upon divorce.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At one and the same time Napoleon had to -endure the anxieties of the <span class='it'>coup d’état</span>, the urging -of his brothers and sisters and the appeals of his wife -and step-children. It must have been a severe trial, -and in the end he gave way to Josephine. Probably -he realized that it was the wisest thing he could do. -He could ill afford a scandal at this crisis in his career, -and Josephine was a really useful helpmate to him. -He paid off her debts (to the amount of a mere -hundred thousand pounds) and settled down to make -the best of things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The lesson was not lost on Josephine. She was -now the first lady of the Continent, and never again -did she risk the loss of that position. Thenceforward -she lived a life of rigid correctness, and instead it was -<span class='pageno' title='40' id='Page_40'></span> -Napoleon who became more and more unfaithful to -her.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was a strange period through which Josephine -now lived. On the one hand she had reached heights -of which she could never have dreamed before; on -the other was the bitter probability that all her -power and position would vanish in a moment when -Napoleon made up his mind to take the plunge. -The other Bonapartes were most bitterly hostile to -her, and lost no opportunity of displaying their -hostility. The only possible method of making her -position permanent was to have a child, and this boon -was denied her. And yet Napoleon found her a -most invaluable ally. Her queenly carriage and -perfect taste in clothes were grateful in a Court -the awkwardness of whose manners was the jest of -Europe. The majority of Frenchmen were honestly -fond of her, and her tactful distribution of the charitable -funds placed at her disposal by Napoleon -enhanced this sentiment. In her meetings with -royalty she was superb; she displayed the arrogance -neither of an upstart nor of an Empress; the Kings -of Würtemberg and of Bavaria grew exceedingly -fond of her. Most important of all, perhaps, was -the help which she gave Napoleon during the Bayonne -Conference. The haughty grandees of Spain, the -harebrained Prince of the Asturias and even the -imbecile King himself showed her the deepest -respect, despite the fact that Napoleon was -endeavouring to coerce them into handing over the -crown to his brother.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The occasions were rare, however, when Josephine -was allowed to enter into more than the mere ceremonies -of international politics. She was neither -allowed to act nor to advise. At the least hint of -interference on her part Napoleon was up in arms -on the instant. Current rumour credited her with -attempting to save the life of the Duc d’Enghien, -<span class='pageno' title='41' id='Page_41'></span> -and this has frequently been affirmed since, but from -what we know of Napoleon and from what we know -of Josephine we can only conclude that her attempt -was timid and that Napoleon’s refusal was blank and -brief. For Josephine there only remained a purely -decorative function. Other activities were denied to -her (one cannot help thinking that she did not strive -for them with much vigour); she was placidly content -to spend her days in inspections of her wardrobe, in -changing her toilettes half a dozen times daily and -talking scandal with her ladies-in-waiting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These amusements were not quite as harmless as -might be imagined, for her passion for dress caused -her to run heavily into debt, and every jeweller in -Paris knew that he had only to send her jewellery for -inspection for it to be instantly bought. To pay her -debts she was put to curious expedients. She was -in continual terror lest her husband should discover -them, and she gladly paid enormous blackmail to -her creditors to postpone the day of claim. She even -appealed for assistance to Ministers and other high -officials sooner than tell Napoleon. Naturally the -storms which occurred when the day of reckoning -could no longer be put off were terrible. Napoleon -raged ferociously at every discovery. He paid the -debts, it is true, but he usually arbitrarily reduced -the totals by a quarter or even a half before doing so. -Even then the tradespeople made a large profit, for -they not only made allowance for his action, but they -also took full advantage of Josephine’s uninquiring -nature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The unstable situation dragged along, to the -surprise of many people, to the consternation of -many others, and to the delight of even more, for -several nerve-racking years. The end had to come -sooner or later, and it came surprisingly late.</p> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='42' id='Page_42'></span><h1>CHAPTER V<br/> <span class='sub-head'>THE DIVORCE</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>A</span>T the close of 1809 Napoleon was at the -height of his power. Every country of -Europe, except England, was his vassal or -his ally, and he was about to send Masséna and a -sufficient force to Spain to ensure that England also -would cease from troubling. The circumstances -which were to lead to the fall of his enormous empire -were already well developed, but they were hardly -obvious to the common eye, which was dazzled by -his brilliance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The one element of weakness apparent was the -lack of an heir to the throne. The equilibrium of -Europe was poised upon the life of one man, and -although many people believed that man to be superhuman, -there was no one who thought him immortal. -Napoleon had been wounded at Ratisbon; perhaps at -his next battle the bullet would be better aimed. -But hit or miss, there were many would-be assassins -in Europe, and knives were being sharpened and -infernal machines prepared in scores of dingy garrets.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>No one could imagine what would happen were -Napoleon to die. The Marshals recalled longingly -the break-up of the Macedonian Empire, and already -in fancy saw themselves kings. The Republicans saw -in his death the downfall of autocracy; the Royalists -hoped for the restoration of Legitimacy. Subject -nations saw themselves free; hostile nations saw themselves -<span class='pageno' title='43' id='Page_43'></span> -enriched. The one thing which obviously -could not happen was the succession of the legal -heir; Joseph in Spain, Louis in Holland and Jerome -in Westphalia were at that very moment showing -how unfit they were to govern anything. The Viceroy -of Italy (Eugène de Beauharnais, Napoleon’s -stepson) was popular and capable, but Napoleon -realized that on account of his lack of Bonaparte -blood he would not be tolerated. There was one -child who might perhaps have been accepted, and that -was Napoleon Charles, son of Louis Bonaparte and -Hortense Beauharnais. Vulgar gossip gave Napoleon -himself the credit for being the father of his step-daughter’s -child, and on this account Napoleon -Charles was considered the likely heir, but he died -of croup. It is possible that calamities without -number would have been prevented had there been -in 1807 an efficient nurse at the sick-bed of a child.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However that may be, Napoleon had no heir, and -he had given up hope of Josephine presenting him -with one. At the same time, any doubts he had -on his own account were effaced by the birth of a -son to him by Madame Walewska. He dismissed -as impractical a suggested scheme of simulated -pregnancy on Josephine’s part; too many people -would have to be in the secret; if they lived they -would hold as much power as the Emperor himself; -and if (as he was quite capable of doing) he executed -everyone concerned, in Oriental fashion, tongues -would wag harder than ever. Besides, although the -French would apparently put up indefinitely with his -losing a hundred thousand of their young men’s lives -a year, they would not tolerate for one second being -made fools of in the eyes of the whole world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Napoleon might have adopted one of his -own illegitimate sons. Even this wild project he -considered carefully, but he put it aside. The only -course left open was to divorce Josephine and take -<span class='pageno' title='44' id='Page_44'></span> -some more fruitful wife instead, and Napoleon -gradually came to accept this project.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Whether he was wise or not in this course of -action cannot be decided definitely. Certainly he -was not justified in the event, and he later alluded to -the Austrian marriage as an “abyss covered with -flowers.” What he left out of full consideration -when making his decision was that, while Europe -might suffer his tyranny uncomplainingly if they -believed that the system would end with his death, -they would endeavour to end it at once if there were -a chance of its continuing indefinitely. In a similar -manner the birth of an heir to James II. of England -had precipitated matters a century before. But -whether Napoleon forgot this point, or whether he -believed his Empire more stable than it actually was, -he nevertheless determined on divorce and a new -marriage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On his return from the Wagram campaign of -1809, Josephine found him fixed in his decision. -The connection between their apartments was walled -up, and for weeks the Emperor and the Empress -never met without a third person being present. -It seems strange that the man who did not falter -at Eylau, who sent the Guard to destruction at -Waterloo, should have been daunted by the prospect -of a woman’s tears, but Napoleon undoubtedly put -off the unpleasant interview as long as possible. At -last he nerved himself to the inevitable, and the -dreaded sentence was pronounced. An official of -the palace tells a story of Napoleon’s sudden appearance -among the Imperial ladies-in-waiting carrying -the fainting Empress in his arms. Ten days later, -on the 15th of December, Josephine announced her -acquiescence in the decision to the Imperial council, -and the marriage was annulled by <span class='it'>senatus consultum</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon had endeavoured to procure a more -satisfactory form of divorce from the Pope, but Pius, -<span class='pageno' title='45' id='Page_45'></span> -to his credit, would not assist him. Five years -before, at the coronation, he had refused his blessing -until the Imperial pair had been married by the -Church (the marriage in 1796 was purely a legal -contract), and Napoleon, exasperated but compelled -to yield, had submitted to a ceremony conducted by -the Archbishop of Paris under conditions of the utmost -secrecy. Pius could not in decency give his aid to -break a marriage celebrated at his especial request -only five years before, and in consequence he found -himself a prisoner in French hands, and the last of -the patrimony of St. Peter was annexed to the -French Empire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It would puzzle a cleverer man even than -Napoleon to devise a series of actions better calculated -to annoy the Church and its more devout followers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For Josephine the pill was gilded in a style -more elaborate even than was customary under -the Empire. She retained her Imperial titles; she -received the Elysée at Paris, Malmaison, and the -palace of Navarre. An income of a hundred and fifty -thousand pounds sterling per annum was settled upon -her. No restraint in reason was set upon her actions; -she was not forced into retirement; and Napoleon -continued to visit her even after his marriage to -Marie Louise. For the last four years of her life -Josephine occupied a position unique in history.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Josephine bore her troubles well in public. -However much she may have wept to Napoleon, -however much she may have knelt at his feet imploring -him to have mercy, to the world at large she -showed dry eyes and an immobile expression. -Perhaps her pride came to her help; perhaps, after -all, freedom, the title of Empress, and a monstrous -income, may have reconciled her to her loss of precedence; -it is even conceivable that she preferred the -sympathy of Europe, expressed in no uncertain voice, -to the burdens of royalty. -<span class='pageno' title='46' id='Page_46'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Josephine all her life was a <span class='it'>poseuse</span> of minor -mental capacity; what could be more gratifying to -her than a situation where the possibilities of posing -were quite unlimited?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For her, these possibilities were never cut short. -She never had to endure the anticlimax of being the -divorced wife of a fallen Emperor; she died suddenly -just before Napoleon’s first abdication, soon after -receiving visits from all sorts of Emperors and Kings -who were accompanying their armies in the campaign -of 1814.</p> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='47' id='Page_47'></span><h1>CHAPTER VI<br/> <span class='sub-head'>ANOTHER WIFE</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>T</span>HUS at the beginning of 1810 Napoleon -found himself once more unmarried, and -free to choose himself a new bride. There -never was a choice so fraught with possibilities of -disaster. It was not so much a matter of making the -most advantageous selection, as of making the least -dangerous. If he married a woman of inferior rank, -all Europe would exultantly proclaim that it was -because no royal family would admit him. If he -married a princess of one of his subject kingdoms, -Bavaria, Würtemberg or Saxony, the others would -become instantly jealous. A Bourbon bride was -obviously out of the question, seeing that he was -keeping all three royal branches out of their patrimonies. -Should he choose a Hohenzollern, then the -countries which held territories which had once been -Prussian would become justifiably uneasy. There -only remained the Hapsburgs and the Romanoffs, -and a marriage with either would annoy the other. -The best thing Napoleon could do was to ally himself -with the more powerful, which was undoubtedly the -royal house of Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But here Napoleon met with an unexpected -reverse. The Czar Alexander was at once a realist -and an idealist, and he could not decide anything -without months of cogitation. Moreover, the clever -<span class='pageno' title='48' id='Page_48'></span> -advisers round him foresaw that Napoleon’s demands -of their country must increase unbearably, and they -had no intention of tying their ruler’s hands in this -fashion. Torn between his ministers’ advice and the -urging of his old admiration for Napoleon, between -his pride of race and his desire for a powerful alliance, -Alexander temporized and then temporized again. -He explained that all the Grand Duchesses were -members of the Greek Church, and he had qualms -about the necessary change of religion. He tried to -show that they were all already affianced. He said, -literally, that his mother would not allow him to act.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the end, Napoleon, fearing a rebuff, and -conscious that delay would weaken his position, -abandoned the project and turned his attention to -Austria. Alexander was naturally annoyed. 1812 -may be said to have begun in 1810.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, if a Grand Duchess were unavailable, -an Archduchess would certainly bring Napoleon -compensations. The House of Hapsburg-Lorraine -was the most celebrated in Europe; it had supplied -Holy Roman Emperors since the thirteenth century. -After Napoleon and Alexander, Francis was easily -the most powerful continental ruler, despite his -recent defeats; Aspern and Wagram had just shown -how delicately the balance was poised. But more -than this; the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons had -repeatedly intermarried; if there were anything that -would convince the doubters that Napoleon was a -real, permanent monarch, it would be his marriage -with the niece of Louis XVI, the daughter of His -Imperial, Royal and Apostolic Majesty the Emperor -of Austria, King of Hungary, King of Bohemia, -Duke of Styria, of Carinthia and of Carniola, -erstwhile Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and -titular King of Jerusalem.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The achievement would be deficient in some -respects. Tyrol and Dalmatia no longer figured -<span class='pageno' title='49' id='Page_49'></span> -in the Emperor’s resounding list of titles—France -ruled one and Bavaria the other, and Austria might -easily demand restitution as the price of Marie -Louise’s hand. The very name of the new Empress -would remind people of Marie Antoinette, her ill-fated -aunt, and a family alliance between Napoleon -and the autocrat of autocrats might well give the -<span class='it'>coup de grâce</span> to the moribund belief in Napoleon as -the Apostle of the Revolution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Be that as it may, Napoleon had already gone -too far to draw back, and early in 1810 he prevailed -on Francis I. to make a formal offer of his daughter’s -hand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>They were an oddly contrasting couple. He -was forty, she was eighteen. He was an Italian-Corsican-French -hybrid of unknown ancestry, she -was of the bluest blood in Christendom. He was -the victorious leader of the new idea, she was the -scion of a dying autocracy. Three times had Marie -Louise fled with her family from the wrath of the -French; all her life she had heard the man who was -about to become her husband alluded to as the -embodiment of evil, as the Corsican Ogre, as the Beast -of the Apocalypse. They had never met, and she -had certainly not the least idea as to what kind of -a man he was. All things considered, it was as well -that she had been trained all her life to accept her -parents’ decision on her marriage without demur.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Her training had been what might have been -expected of the etiquette-ridden, hidebound, conservative, -dogmatic House of Hapsburg. She was -familiar with every language of Europe, because it -could not be foreseen whom she would eventually -marry. Music, drawing, embroidery, all those -accomplishments which permitted of surveillance -and which did not encourage thought were hers. -But she was proudest of the fact that she could -move her ears without moving her face. -<span class='pageno' title='50' id='Page_50'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Every possible precaution that she would retain -her valuable innocence had been taken. She had -never been to a theatrical performance. She had -never been allowed to own a male animal of any -species; her principal pets were hen canaries. Her -reading matter was closely scrutinized beforehand, -and every single word which might possibly hint at -difference of sex was cut out with scissors. It seems -probable that she had spoken to no man other than -her father and her uncles. One can hardly be -surprised at reading that her mental power was -small, after being stunted in its growth in this fashion -for eighteen years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon sent as his proxy to Vienna Berthier, -his trusted chief of staff. One can find nowhere -any statement that the Austrians were pleased to -see their princess standing side by side with a -general whose latest acquired title was Prince of -Wagram.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps as a sop to the national pride of Austria, -Napoleon sent the bride he had not yet seen presents -which have never been equalled in cost or magnificence. -The trousseau he sent cost a hundred -thousand francs; it included a hundred and fifty -chemises each costing five pounds sterling, and -enormous quantities of all other necessary linen. In -addition he sent another hundred thousand francs’ -worth of lace and twelve dozen pairs of stockings at -from one to three pounds sterling a pair. Dressing-table -fittings and similar trifles cost nearly twenty -thousand pounds, but all this expenditure was a mere -trifle compared to the cost of the jewellery which -Marie Louise received. The lowest estimate of this -is placed at ten million francs—four hundred thousand -pounds. Her dress allowance was to be over a -thousand pounds a month.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Poor stupid Marie Louise might well fancy she -was in Heaven. The daughter of an impoverished -<span class='pageno' title='51' id='Page_51'></span> -emperor, she had never possessed any jewellery other -than a few corals and seed-pearls, and her wardrobe -had been limited both by her niggardly stepmother -and by circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All her life she had been treated as a person of -minor importance, but suddenly she found even her -pride-ridden father regarding her with deference. -Metternich and Schwartzenberg sought her favour. -Her aunts and cousins clustered eagerly round her, -anxious to share in the spoils. It certainly was a -silver lining to the cloud of matrimony with an -unknown.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon on his side was enraptured with the -prospect. His meanness of soul is well displayed by -his snobbish delight. He went to inordinate lengths -in order to secure the approval of the great lady who -had condescended to share his throne. He swept -his palaces clear of anything which might remind his -wife of her predecessor, and refurnished them with -meticulous care. The fittings were standardized as -far as possible, so that she might feel at once at home -wherever she might choose to live; he even arranged -a suite of rooms for her exactly like those she had -lived in at Schönbrunn. Napoleon gave his passion -for organization full rein in matters of this kind, -and without doubt he achieved a splendid success. -“He was a good tenant, this Napoleon,” said -Louis XVIII., inspecting the Tuileries after the -Restoration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was not merely her home that Napoleon -adorned for Marie Louise, but even himself. For a -space the green coat was laid aside, and he arrayed -himself in a tunic stiff with embroidery. He tried -to learn to waltz, and failed miserably. In everything -he acted in a manner which amazed even those -who had lived with him for years. No woman was -half so excited over her first ball as was Napoleon over -the prospect of marrying a Hapsburg. -<span class='pageno' title='52' id='Page_52'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>He grew more and more excited as Marie Louise -and her train journeyed across Germany and drew -nearer and nearer. From every halting place -despatches reached him in dozens. Marie Louise -wrote to him, Caroline Murat (whom he had sent -to welcome her) wrote to him, Berthier wrote to him, -the ladies-in-waiting wrote to him, even the mayors -of the towns passed through wrote to him. The -officers who brought the letters were eagerly cross-questioned. -The Emperor who, when on the brink -of grand military events, would tell his attendants -only to awaken him for bad news, passed his days -waiting for his unknown bride in a fever of -impatience.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At last he could bear it no longer. Napoleon -was at Soissons, where the meeting had been arranged -to take place, but, unable to wait, he rode forward -post haste through pelting rain, with only Murat at -his side. At Courcelles they met the Empress. At -first the coachman was minded to drive past the two -muddy figures who hailed him, but Napoleon made -himself known, and clambered into the Imperial -berline. He would brook not another moment’s -delay. The carriage pelted forward through all the -towns where addresses of welcome were ready, where -droves of damsels all in white were preparing to -greet them, where banquets and fêtes were ready. -They drove past Soissons, where a wonderful pavilion -had been erected, in which the Imperial pair had -expected to meet for the first time during a ceremony -more pompous even than epoch-making Tilsit; they -only stopped when they reached the palace of -Compiegne, where, at nine o’clock at night, a -hurried dinner was prepared by the astonished -servants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even the dinner was cut short. Half-way -through Napoleon asked Marie Louise a question; -she blushed, and was unable to answer. It is to be -<span class='pageno' title='53' id='Page_53'></span> -doubted if she even knew what he was talking about. -Napoleon turned to the Austrian envoy. “Her -Majesty is doubtful,” he said. “Is it not true that -we are properly married?” The envoy hesitated. -No one had expected that Napoleon would take the -ceremony by proxy seriously; elaborate arrangements -had been made for a further ceremony in Paris. But -it was useless for the envoy to demur; Napoleon -carried off Marie Louise to his own apartments, and -breakfasted at her bedside next morning. Later his -meanness of soul once more obtruded itself, when he -hinted at his experiences to one of his friends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If Napoleon was a parvenu among monarchs, he -was at least able to show scoffers that his own royal -ceremonies could put in the shade any similar display -by thousand-year-old dynasties. At Marie Louise’s -coronation four queens bore her train.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Characteristically they tried to trip her up with -it. Never before had the world beheld four queens -bearing another woman’s robes, and certainly never -before had it seen anything parallel to the other -exhibition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When we come to see who these queens were, -we shall appreciate the peculiar irony of the situation. -First, there was the Queen of Spain, Joseph’s wife, -who was still angry about Napoleon’s jilting of her -sister Désirée, and who furthermore saw as a consequence -of this marriage the probability of the -arrival of a direct heir and the extinction of her -husband’s chances of the succession. Secondly came -Caroline Murat, Queen of Naples, Napoleon’s sister, -violently jealous of Napoleon, of Marie Louise, and -of everyone else. Third came the wife of Jerome -Bonaparte, Catherine, Queen of Westphalia, whom -Napoleon had torn from the arms of her betrothed -to give to his loose-living young brother. The fourth -was Hortense, Queen of Holland, whose mother -Napoleon had just divorced in order to marry the -<span class='pageno' title='54' id='Page_54'></span> -woman whose train Hortense was carrying. Had -Marie Louise been capable of any unusual thought -whatever, she must have felt that she would be -safer entering a powder magazine than going up -the aisle of Nôtre Dame with those four viragoes -at her heels.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo54.jpg' alt='' id='il54' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>MARIE LOUISE<br/> EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='55' id='Page_55'></span><h1>CHAPTER VII<br/> <span class='sub-head'>SOME COURT DETAILS</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>O</span>NCE bitten, twice shy. Napoleon had had -one wife of whom doubtful stories had -circulated. He would run no risk with the -new one. Marie Louise had been strictly guarded -all her life. Napoleon determined that in that -respect he would substitute scorpions for her father’s -whips. No man was ever to be presented to his wife -without his consent; under no circumstances whatever -was she to be alone with a man at any time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To achieve his object he revived all the court -ceremony of the Soleil Monarque; he added a few -oriental improvements of his own, and to see that his -orders were carried out he surrounded Marie Louise -with women who were the wives and sisters of his -own generals, absolutely dependent on him and -accustomed to military procedure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Austrian ladies who had attended on Marie -Louise before her marriage were sent home, every -single one of them, as soon as she crossed the frontier. -Marie Louise bade good-bye there to the friends of a -lifetime—Napoleon was risking nothing. As Dame -d’Honneur and consequently first lady-in-waiting, -Napoleon appointed the Duchess of Montebello, -widow of the unfortunate Lannes, who had died -fighting at Aspern against Marie Louise’s father and -an army commanded by Marie Louise’s uncle. The -<span class='pageno' title='56' id='Page_56'></span> -other important positions were filled in similar -fashion. Four “red women” were appointed, -whose duty was to be by the Empress’s side night -and day, two on duty and two within call. Had -enough eunuchs been available, Napoleon would -probably have employed them. A seraglio would -have been quite in agreement with his estimation of -woman’s constancy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Considering that his court etiquette had to -recover from the citizen phase of the Revolution and -from the solemn, military stiffness of the Consulate, -Napoleon certainly succeeded remarkably well. -Where aides-de-camp sufficed in 1802, equerries were -necessary from 1804 onwards; the <span class='it'>maîtres d’hotel</span> -had to be replaced by chamberlains; the Empress’s -friends had to be appointed ladies-in-waiting. Like -all reactions, this one went too far. The gaiety of -the Bourbon court was extinguished, and the devil-may-care -trifling of the Directory salons perished -equally miserably.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon himself was mainly responsible for this. -He was never good company in any sense of the -word. He had a remarkable gift for saying -unpleasant things in an unpleasant manner, and in -his presence the whole company was on tenterhooks, -wondering what was going to happen next. If a -lady had a snub nose, he said so; if a gentleman’s -coat was shabby, he said so with fury, because it was -his pride to be the only shabby person present. If -rumours hinting at a lady’s fall from virtue were in -circulation, he told her so at the top of his voice, and -demanded an explanation. When Napoleon quitted -his court he invariably left half the women in tears -and half the men in a rage. Then Talleyrand, Prince -of Benevento and Grand Chamberlain, would go -limping round from group to group, saying with his -twisted smile, “The Emperor commands you to be -amused.” -<span class='pageno' title='57' id='Page_57'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>While Josephine was Empress, this state of -affairs was not so noticeable, for her dexterous tact -soothed the smart caused by Napoleon’s brusqueness, -but under Marie Louise unbearable situations -occurred again and again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It must be admitted that the various parties at -court made at least as dangerous a mixture as the -constituents of gunpowder. To begin with, the -members of the Imperial family itself were as jealous -of each other as they could possibly be. Pauline, -who was a mere Serene Highness, would grind her -teeth when she had to address her sister Caroline as -“Your Majesty.” Caroline and the other Queens -would rejoice openly because, being Queens, they -were given armchairs when Napoleon’s own mother -had to be content with a stool. And they were one -and all scheming for the succession in the event of -Napoleon’s fall.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then there were still a few Republicans among -the Princes and Dukes. One of the Marshals, compelled -by Napoleon to be present at the solemn Mass -which celebrated the Concordat, salved his conscience -by swearing horribly throughout the ceremony, and, -when asked by the First Consul how he had liked it, -replied that it only needed to complete the picture -the presence of the half million men who had died -to uproot the system. Such men as these thought -little of pushing in front of Serene Highnesses, -or of laughing loudly when Pauline Bonaparte -made the gesture which led to her banishment -from court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then there were a few representatives of the -old noblesse, to whom Napoleon, in his wholehearted -snobbery, had offered large inducements to come to -his court. These people regarded the ennobled -barrel-coopers, smugglers and stable-boys with a -mild but galling amusement. On one occasion -Lannes, finding his path to the throne-room blocked -<span class='pageno' title='58' id='Page_58'></span> -by these ci-devants, drew his sword and swore to cut -off the ears of the next person who impeded him. -It was naturally exasperating to the Marshals, who -had risen from the ranks in the course of twenty -campaigns, after receiving wounds in dozens, to find -these nobles given high positions purely on account -of their names. To make matters worse, there were -very lively suspicions that many of them had actually -borne arms against France as <span class='it'>émigrés</span>, in La Vendée, -on the Rhine, or in Italy. Yet even these considerations -were of small account compared to the wrath -of the new nobility when they found that the old still -clung stubbornly together, and refused, apparently, -to admit even the existence of anyone outside the -Faubourg St. Germain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The largest group at court was that of the new -nobility, but its superiority of numbers was discounted -by the violent jealousies of its individual -members. The maxim which guided Napoleon in -his dealings with his subordinates was, apparently, -“Divide et impera.” He set his generals and -ministers by the ears until there was not one of them -who had not some cherished hatred for another. -Davout hated Berthier, Lannes hated Bessières, -Ney hated Masséna, Fouché hated them all, Savary -hated Talleyrand; and the resultant bickerings were -incessant. At court this was merely undignified; -in the field, as was proved twenty times over in the -Peninsular War, it was positively dangerous. It -might be thought that Napoleon, with inexhaustible -funds and domains at his disposal, and unlimited -princely titles in his gift, could have satisfied them -all. But that was where the trouble began. -Napoleon could not give them all they desired, as -otherwise (such was the condition of the Empire) -they would have nothing to fight for. There were -glaring examples of this. When Masséna had been -made a prince, and had accumulated wealth and -<span class='pageno' title='59' id='Page_59'></span> -glory past calculation, he deteriorated hopelessly. -He failed badly in the Busaco campaign of 1810-11, -and sank promptly into an effete degeneracy at the -age of fifty-five. No, Napoleon could not afford to -give his Marshals all they desired, and in consequence -jealousies and friction increased unbearably.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the junior officers the difficulties were just -as great. Brutes like Vandamme, aristocrats like -Belliard and Ségur, rakes like Lasalle and fools like -Grouchy, were all mingled together. What was -worse was that generals and diplomats of subject -states necessarily came into contact with them also. -It must have been maddening for the Prussian, -Von Yorck, to hear Vandamme discoursing on the -plunder he had acquired in Silesia in 1806, or for -Schwartzenburg, the Austrian, to hear Lasalle -boasting of his successes among the ladies of Vienna -during the Austerlitz campaign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But for a whole year, beginning in 1810, -Napoleon in spite of these difficulties was supremely -happy. There was peace all over the Continent, -and the Continental system seemed at last to be on -the point of success, for England’s finances were -undoubtedly shaken. So short was gold in England -that Wellington in the Peninsula rarely had enough -for his needs, and the Portuguese and Spanish -subsidies were heavily in arrears. Masséna with -a hundred thousand men had plunged into the fog -of guerilla warfare on the Tagus, and everyone was -confidently expecting to hear of the fall of Lisbon -and the expulsion of the English from Portugal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Meanwhile, Napoleon was savouring the delights -of respectable married life. With his nineteen-year-old -wife he indulged in all sorts of innocent pleasures, -riding, hunting, practical joking, theatricals. He so -far forgot himself as to <span class='it'>tutoyer</span> his Imperial bride in -the presence of his whole Court, and the mighty -nobles (who never indulged in such behaviour even -<span class='pageno' title='60' id='Page_60'></span> -in the intimacy of their wives’ boudoirs) were -astonished to hear the Emperor and Empress -exchanging “thees” and “thous.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon gave up hours of his precious time to -his wife, waited patiently when she was late for an -appointment (Josephine was never guilty of such an -offence) and generally acted the devoted husband to -the life. For a whole year he was faithful to Marie -Louise, a feat which he never achieved before or -after until St. Helena. And as the months rolled -by and hope changed to certainty his devotion grew -greater still.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For the birth of the child the most elaborate -preparations were made. Some time before he was -born Mme. de Montesquieu was named Governess -of the Children of France, a healthy Normandy girl -who was in the same condition as the Empress was -secured as prospective wet nurse and kept under -strict surveillance (her own child died when it was -taken from her, but that is not usually recorded), -and all France waited in a hush of expectation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Once again Napoleon was risking nothing. He -was going to leave no possible foundation for rumours -to the effect that the child was not his, or was not -Marie Louise’s. Napoleon Francis Joseph Charles -was born in the presence of the four doctors, Dubois, -Corvisart, Bourdier and Yvan; of the Duchess of -Montebello, dame d’honneur; of Mme. de Luçay, -dame d’atours; of Mme. de Montesquieu, Governess -of the Children of France; of six premières dames -de chambre; of five women of inferior rank, and -of two filles de garde-robe. Cambacères, Duke of -Parma and Archchancellor of the Empire, was -present in an ante-room, and should have witnessed -the birth even if he did not; Berthier, Prince of -Neufchâtel and Wagram, was in attendance on -Napoleon, and also may have witnessed it, while -immediately after the birth all the other Grand -<span class='pageno' title='61' id='Page_61'></span> -Dignitaries of the Empire and the representatives -of all the friendly countries of Europe were paraded -through the room. Napoleon had ordered Corvisart, -whose nerve was giving way under the strain of the -business, to treat Marie Louise like a bourgeois wife, -but he hardly practised what he preached. The -birth took three days; it certainly seemed a good -omen for this scrap of humanity to keep all these -dozens of people with high-sounding titles waiting -for seventy-two consecutive hours.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After an anxious ten minutes the young -Napoleon showed signs of life; he had at first -appeared to be dead, and brandy had to be given -him and he had to be discreetly smacked before he -would cry. But he did so at length, and Napoleon -announced to the waiting dignitaries, “It is a King -of Rome.” The guns fired a salute to inform the -expectant crowds; twenty-one guns were to herald -the birth of a daughter; one hundred a son. At the -twenty-second gun a storm of cheers arose. More -than forty years after, a ceremony almost identical -announced the birth of an equally ill-fated son to -another Emperor of the French.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus the wish of Napoleon’s heart was fulfilled. -For the moment he disregarded all the counter-balancing -disadvantages and revelled in the possession -of an heir. He cared nothing at the time for the -fact that the doctors forbade the Empress to have -the much desired second son to inherit the crown -of Italy; it was nothing to him that Bavaria, -Holland, Würtemberg and Saxony at once became -restless at seeing their period of thraldom indefinitely -prolonged; he hardly cared that Masséna had come -miserably back from Portugal, with a ruined army, -baulked irretrievably by Wellington at Torres -Vedras, so that the “running sore” of the -Peninsular campaign was reopened. He flung -away his last chance of going in person to end the -<span class='pageno' title='62' id='Page_62'></span> -business, merely to remain by the side of the wife -and child of whom he was so proud.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But despite his pride, he still left nothing to -chance. Attendance on Marie Louise was maintained -as strictly as before; an unauthorized -presentation to the Empress by the Duchess of -Montebello of some relation of hers called forth a -tornado of wrath from the Emperor. The surveillance -was redoubled when Napoleon left for the -Russian campaign, although he paid her a compliment -which had never been paid to Josephine—he -appointed her Regent. Poor, silly Marie Louise, -three years after being an insignificant princess, -found herself Empress of the French, Queen of -Italy and Regent of half Europe!</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Her august husband nevertheless saw fit to have -the Empress-Queen-Regent spied upon by a scullion, -who sent him weekly reports, fantastically spelt on -blotched and smeared kitchen paper! Nothing else -is necessary to prove how utterly lacking in decent -instincts was the victor of Austerlitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The action was typical of many. Perhaps -Napoleon was right; everyone knows how readily -autocracy becomes bureaucracy when the autocrat -ceases to supervise his subordinates adequately; but -not even the Second Empire nor Russia at the -beginning of the twentieth century could show so -many spies and counter-spies, police and counter-police -and counter counter-police as did the First -Empire. Secret delation flourished, and the prisons -were full of people who had been arbitrarily cast into -gaol without even a form of trial. Napoleon wished -to know everything that was going on; not the least -stray fragment of tittle-tattle came amiss to him. -Consequently his regular police developed an -organization which spread its tentacles into every -avenue of life. Fouché, Minister of Police, could -boast of having an agent in every drawing-room and -<span class='pageno' title='63' id='Page_63'></span> -kitchen in the Empire. But then Napoleon feared -that Fouché would distort for his own purposes the -reports of the agents when making his own report -to Napoleon. Since Fouché was Fouché such a -thing was not unlikely. So Napoleon had a second -and independent police system making similar -reports to another minister. Yet even when -Fouché was at last got rid of, and packed off as -His Excellency the Governor of Rome (and later -Dalmatia); even when Savary, “the man who -would kill his own father if Napoleon ordered it,” -was in charge of the police affairs the dual police -system was still adhered to. And besides these, -Napoleon had spies of his own, working quite -independently, reporting direct to himself, and he -placed these not only in the two original police -systems, but everywhere where they could keep an -eye on those in high places. His royal brothers -were surrounded with them; they were to be found -in the secretariats of all the ministers; and since -payment was largely by results, and they had to -justify their existence somehow, it is not surprising -that they brought forward trumped-up charges, -suborned perjury, and generally acted as typical -Continental agents-provocateurs. But all this -elaborate system failed to gain the least hint of -the Mallet conspiracy, which came so near to pulling -down the Empire in the autumn of 1812.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There were opportunities enough for conspiracy, -goodness knows. Bourbonists and Republicans, -Bonapartists and anarchists, all sought to keep or -to acquire power. The Murats, the Beauharnais, -the various Bonaparte brothers and even Bernadotte, -were all scheming for the succession or the -regency, while intertwining among all this was the -more legitimate scheming of the various European -powers, whose secret agents were equally active -throughout the Empire. There is small room for -<span class='pageno' title='64' id='Page_64'></span> -wonder that after a dozen years of this frantic merry-go-round -the French people accepted the Bourbon -restoration quietly, lest worse befall.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet all this does not excuse Napoleon for spying -on his wife; for that the only justification lies in the -event. How many times has Napoleon been rated -for saying that adultery is a matter of opportunity? -But his wife apparently did her best to prove him -right. In 1814 the Empire was falling, and -Napoleon’s abdication was evidently inevitable. -One thing alone raised him to an equality with -hereditary monarchs, and that was the fact that -he had married the daughter of the greatest of them -all. They might exile General Bonaparte, but -would they dare to exile along with him the -Emperor of Austria’s daughter? Besides, in Marie -Louise’s keeping was the young Napoleon. To -allow him to accompany his mother into exile with -his father was simply to court disaster.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At first the prospect seemed dark for the Allies. -Marie Louise stood firm, refused to be parted either -from her son or from her husband, and generally acted -the devoted wife to the life. In this dilemma the -Allies appealed to the most cunning and cold-hearted -of all their agents—Metternich, who for thirty years -was to hold Europe in the hollow of his hand. -Metternich was the cynic magnificent, without belief -in the constancy of any man or woman born. In -that self-seeking age his opinions were largely -justified. Metternich plunged adroitly into the -affair. He must have known a great deal about the -mentality of feeble-minded women, seeing that one -of his boasts was that he never had fewer than three -mistresses at a time. He selected an agent whom -no one at first sight would have believed to be of any -use, but who turned out to be extremely valuable. -If Neipperg was a knave, he was at least the knave -of trumps. He was an elderly one-eyed diplomat, -<span class='pageno' title='65' id='Page_65'></span> -a count and a general in the Austrian army, with a -good record behind him. He justified Metternich’s -choice remarkably quickly, and while His Imperial, -Royal and Apostolic Majesty looked on and -applauded this prostitution of his daughter, he -wormed his way into Marie Louise’s affections, so -that by the time Napoleon was deposited in Elba, -Marie Louise’s second child (whose engendering -Corvisart had so strictly forbidden) was expected in -a few months’ time, while her first was under lock -and key at Schönbrunn, deprived of all his French -friends and attendants, and started on the unhappy -life which was to end sixteen years later in -consumption, despair and death.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To Napoleon’s credit be it recorded that never -by word or deed did he hint at this horrible desertion. -All the rest of his life he spoke of Marie Louise with -affection and respect, and had he had his way, Marie -Louise would have been Regent of the French -during the minority of Napoleon II.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Marie Louise lived happily for another thirty -years. The Allies rewarded her adultery by giving -her the sovereignty of Parma for life, and there she -lived with Neipperg, whom she married morganatically -as soon as Napoleon was dead. For a long -time she bore him one child a year, and the Emperor -of Austria, with great consideration, made all of -them illegitimate and morganatic alike, princes and -princesses of the Empire. No sooner was Neipperg -dead than she contracted another morganatic -marriage with a person of even lowlier degree. -When she was expelled from her duchy by the -rising of 1831, she was restored by Austrian -bayonets, and she died at length a year before the -far more serious rising of 1848. She never saw her -first-born child after 1815 until he was on his deathbed -in 1832.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The unfortunate Louise of Tuscany, who -<span class='pageno' title='66' id='Page_66'></span> -married and then deserted the Crown Prince of -Saxony, tells us that to her, as to all the other -Hapsburg princesses, Marie Louise’s career was -held up as a shining example of the fortune which -attended good girls who did just what the head of -the family, the Emperor, told them. But the -Emperor of Austria, since he had nothing to gain -by it, did not condone the adultery of this particular -Archduchess.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo66.jpg' alt='' id='il66' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>GRAF VON NEIPPERG</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='67' id='Page_67'></span><h1>CHAPTER VIII<br/> <span class='sub-head'>THE GREATEST PALADIN</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>I</span>N the course of his military career Napoleon -found he needed three different kinds of -subordinate officers. First, he wanted men -of supreme courage and vigour in action, whose -other talents need not be more than mediocre. -These he could keep under his own hand until the -decisive moment arrived, and could then let loose, -confident that they would complete the work which -his strategic achievements had begun. Of this type, -Ney, Augereau and Oudinot were examples.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then he needed a few generals who combined -initiative and resource along with their tactical -talents. On these he could rely to execute minor -strategical movements, knowing that their tactical -skill would help them to sustain any difficulties into -which they might fall until the perfection of his -strategical arrangements helped them out. The -supreme example of this type was Lannes the -irreplaceable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Besides these, Napoleon needed one or two men -who could combine all the qualities necessary to a -good general, so that he could entrust to them the -supreme command of the minor theatres of war. -To be a good general, a man must possess strategical -skill, tactical skill and administrative ability, as well -as the personality to ensure that his ideas are carried -out. But to satisfy Napoleon’s jealousy, such a -<span class='pageno' title='68' id='Page_68'></span> -general in the Imperial army had to have another -quality—he had to be a man who would never allow -his thoughts to wander in the direction of obtaining -the throne for himself. If Napoleon could have -found three men with all these qualifications he -could very possibly have maintained his Empire, -since they would have assured to him the safety of -Italy, Spain and Poland. But there was only one -of these Admirable Crichtons available, and that -was Davout. Under Davout Poland and North -Germany were held strongly for the Empire. In -Italy Eugène de Beauharnais, by the aid of powerful -common-sense, high ideals and capable subordinates, -was fairly successful, but in Spain there was nothing -but shame and disaster. Masséna failed badly; so -did Marmont; Joseph Bonaparte and his Major-General, -Jourdan, were worse than useless; Soult -and Suchet made a fair show, but could not rise -superior to the handicap of circumstances. Another -Davout might have saved Spain for the Empire, but -there was only one Davout.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Davout is the ideal type of the man who combines -ability with a sense of duty. In many ways -he reminds one of Wellington. He was the scion -of an old noble and military family of Burgundy, -and was born a year later than Napoleon. He -passed through the military college, and received his -commission in 1789, just before the Revolution. -The loss of many officers through emigration gave -him rapid promotion. He was a colonel in 1791 -(at the age of twenty-one!) and a brigadier-general -two years later. Already he had attracted attention -by the stern discipline he maintained (discipline -was hardly the most noticeable feature of the -Revolutionary armies) and Napoleon, realizing his -ability, included him in his army after Campo -Formo. He went to Egypt as one of Desaix’ -brigadiers, and returned with the same general in -<span class='pageno' title='69' id='Page_69'></span> -1800. After Marengo and the treaty of Luneville, -Napoleon gave him employment suitable to his -talents, and appointed him to the command of the -3rd Corps of the Army of the Ocean. A marshalate -followed in 1804. As commander of the 3rd Corps -Davout began to build up the wonderful reputation -which he later enjoyed. There was no other force -in the Grand Army which could rival the 3rd Corps -for discipline, for marching capacity, for fighting -capacity, and for perfection of equipment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The 3rd Corps was to Napoleon what the -Numidians were to Hannibal, the Tenth Legion -to Cæsar, the archers to Edward III., the Light -Division to Wellington—they were the men who -could be trusted most nearly to achieve the -impossible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Austerlitz Davout was called upon to sustain -the attack of practically the whole of the Austro-Russian -army, and he and the 3rd Corps clung -doggedly on to the difficult country round the lakes -for hour after hour while Napoleon developed his -attack on the heights of Pratzen. Before Austerlitz -Napoleon had declared that an ordinary victory would -be of no use to him; on the morning of the battle he -called upon his men for a “<span class='it'>coup de tonnerre</span>.” But -for Davout Austerlitz would have been at best an -“ordinary victory.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next campaign, that of Jena, was marked by -the failure of Napoleon’s intelligence arrangements -and by confusion in his strategical arrangements. -But it was also marked by the most sweeping success -Napoleon ever gained. He himself with most of -the Grand Army fought and routed half the -Prussian army at Jena. On the same day Davout, -with a single corps, fought and routed the other -half at Auerstädt. Single-handed Davout sustained -the attack of an army of twice his strength; he beat -off Blücher and the furious Prussian squadrons; he -<span class='pageno' title='70' id='Page_70'></span> -counter-attacked without hesitation; he called for -efforts of which few troops could have been capable, -and finally he flung the enemy back in utter disorder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The battle was more than a mere tactical success. -Without Davout’s victory the pursuit after Jena -would never have become historic. In fact Napoleon -refrained from pursuit until he had heard from -Davout. Well he might, indeed. Had Davout -been beaten, Napoleon must have swung aside to -face the victors, who would have been menacing his -flank; Bernadotte’s corps would have been isolated -and in serious peril, and there would have been no -chance of close pursuit of Hohenlohe’s force. This -would have had time to rally; the stern Prussian -discipline would have knitted it once more together; -it might have made a good defence of the line of -the Elbe; the Russians might have arrived in time -to save Berlin; there would perhaps have been no -Friedland, and no Tilsit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The stout little bald-pated man who commanded -the 3rd Corps changed the face of Europe at -Auerstädt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Davout brought his corps through blizzards and -across marshes to save the situation at Eylau; it was -his opportune arrival and bold counsel which saved -Napoleon from a grave tactical reverse, with probable -serious consequences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After Friedland Napoleon needed, as has already -been said, a man of iron to hold down the north -while he attended to the south. He made the only -possible choice in Davout.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It would seem curious to us nowadays to hear -that a general had made his fortune while in command; -what a storm of rage would be aroused if -anyone were to suggest that a modern English -general had acquired three or four hundred thousand -pounds while commanding in France! But apparently -under the First Republic and First Empire it -<span class='pageno' title='71' id='Page_71'></span> -was the usual practice for all officers of high rank to -plunder for their own hands, and to make enormous -fortunes out of perquisites. Davout was the only -exception, but Napoleon saw that he did not suffer -on account of his singular disinterestedness, and -heaped wealth upon him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another peculiar distinction which he gave him -was the title of Duke of Auerstädt. When, about -the beginning of 1808, Napoleon first began to bestow -titles of honour, as distinct from titles of sovereignty, -he acted upon a very definite plan. No one was to -receive a title which did not enhance the glory of -the Emperor. The less famous Marshals received -ducal fiefs in Italy; Macdonald was made Duke of -Tarentum, Mortier Duke of Treviso, Bessières Duke -of Istria. With the title the Marshals received -the fief with some show of sovereignty, but they -were allowed—encouraged, in fact—to sell their -sovereignties to the Empire as soon as received.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The more famous Marshals took their titles from -the battles in which they had taken part; Lannes -was made Duke of Montebello, Ney Duke of -Elchingen. Lefebvre, whose reputation for republicanism -Napoleon repeatedly employed to hallmark -his own actions, was created Duke of Dantzic. Soult -strove to obtain for himself the title of Duke of -Austerlitz, but Napoleon put the idea impatiently -aside. He wished to reserve the glory of Austerlitz -entirely for himself, and Soult had to be content -with the title of Duke of Dalmatia, which set him in -the lower class of Marshal. But Napoleon’s jealousy -went further than this. He did not want to give -anyone a title derived from a battle which had not -been fought under his own direction. He forced the -title of Duke of Rivoli upon Masséna, although that -Marshal had to his credit the far greater achievements -of Zürich and Genoa. When it was suggested to -him that it would be a kindly action to make the -<span class='pageno' title='72' id='Page_72'></span> -unhappy, neglected Jourdan Duke of Fleurus, he -replied “Never! I might as well make him King -of France at once.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To this rule Napoleon only made two exceptions. -One was Kellermann, whom he made Duke of Valmy, -but by now Kellermann was too old (he was seventy-three) -to be any danger, while Valmy was a landmark -in French history. The other was Davout.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Duke of Auerstädt had before him in 1807 -a task which would give his sternness and devotion -to duty free play. He had command of at least a -hundred thousand men. For the support of these -he received not a sou from the French Government—everything, -pay, provisions and equipment, had to -be wrung from the wretched countries in which they -were in garrison. From Prussia Davout had to -grind the enormous indemnity which Napoleon had -imposed. In Westphalia he had to see that Jerome -Bonaparte did not make too big a fool of himself. -He had to keep a sharp eye upon the movements -of Austria. Besides all this, he had to govern -the infant Grand Duchy of Warsaw, where he -had simultaneously to assure the Poles that an -independent kingdom of Poland would shortly be -set up, and the Russians and Austrians that an -independent kingdom of Poland would never be -set up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And yet he succeeded. Throughout northern -central Europe he built himself up a reputation as -the justest brute in Christendom. His army was -well fed and well equipped, but he did his best to -make the burden as light as possible. He saw that -Napoleon’s outrageous demands of Prussia were -complied with, but at the same time he was not -unnecessarily harsh. He sent Polish regiments to -fight in Spain (at Poland’s expense) while he kept -French troops about Warsaw (also at Poland’s -expense), but he managed to persuade the Poles -<span class='pageno' title='73' id='Page_73'></span> -that such a proceeding was just. He carried out -Napoleon’s orders both in the spirit and to the letter, -but after that he made enormous and successful -efforts to minimize the damage done. What would -a second Davout have done in Spain?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Early in 1809 his proceedings were interrupted. -Austria, undaunted by the conference of Erfurt, and -inspirited by the success of the Spaniards, was on -the move again. Davout had to concentrate his -enormous force on the upper Danube as rapidly as -possible, with a weather eye lifting in case of a -further effort by Prussia, and, once there, he had -to weld his troops once more into divisions and army -corps. From all quarters other troops were being -rushed to the scene of action, and in command of -them all was the hesitating Berthier. Napoleon, -with his hands full with the Spanish muddle, tried -to direct operations from Paris as long as possible. -The natural result was that when the Emperor -arrived at headquarters he found his army divided -and in an apparently hopeless position, with the -skilful and resolute Archduke Charles thrusting -enormous forces between the dislocated wings. -Only a supreme effort could save the situation, but -the situation was saved. Napoleon gathered together -Lannes, Vandamme and Masséna, and hurled them -forward. He called upon Davout to achieve the -impossible, and make a flank march of thirty miles -while in actual contact with superior forces. The -impossible was achieved. Davout brought his men -safely through, to gain along with the other forces -the shattering victory of Eckmühl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Davout’s performance is practically unique in -military history. A year or two later the disastrous -possibilities of a flank march were thoroughly demonstrated -at Salamanca, where Marmont, who prided -himself upon his tactical ability, was utterly routed in -an hour’s fighting by Wellington. Marmont had -<span class='pageno' title='74' id='Page_74'></span> -good troops, and his army was as nearly as possible -equal to Wellington’s, but this did not save him. -Davout’s force was partly composed of new troops, -and of disaffected allies, while his opponents were -nearly twice his strength. Only the most consummate -daring combined with the maximum of vigilance -and skill could have saved Davout, but Davout was -saved. The title of Prince of Eckmühl which -Napoleon bestowed upon him was well deserved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next outstanding incident in the campaign -was Napoleon’s first defeat in the open field. He -dared just a little too much in attempting to cross -a broad river in the face of a powerful opponent, with -the result that he was beaten back with frightful loss. -Lannes was mortally wounded; the bridges by which -the army had crossed were broken before Davout’s -turn came to pass over.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For a while the Empire tottered. A prompt -offensive on the part of the Archduke Charles might -have overthrown it, but his army, too, had been hard -hit, and he delayed. Napoleon’s frantic exertions -turned the scale in the end. He claimed Aspern as -a victory, and so skilfully did he make his claim that -for a time he was believed throughout Europe. -Masséna was created Prince of Essling, to conceal -the defeat—in much the same way as the Earl of -Chatham might have been made Duke of Walcheren -in the same year. The army of Italy, under -Eugène, Macdonald and Marmont outmarched their -opponents, and arrived in time to enable the -Emperor to cast the die once more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He passed the Danube a little lower down than -at his previous attempt, turned the Austrian position, -and fought the battle of Wagram on practically equal -terms. It was evenly contested, too. Masséna on -the left was beaten back until the flank was nearly -turned; Bernadotte’s Saxon corps was repulsed in -terrible disorder, and the French reserves were drawn -<span class='pageno' title='75' id='Page_75'></span> -in at an alarming rate. A hundred French guns, -massed in the centre, battered the Austrian line, and -Macdonald led his corps, formed in a gigantic square, -against the gap. But he suffered terribly from the -Austrian artillery, and his men left the ranks in -thousands. In the end, it was Davout on the right -who won the battle for the French, for he turned the -Austrian left and began to roll up their line; the -Austrians fell sullenly back. It was a defeat, not a -disaster, but the Austrians sued for peace immediately -afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After Wagram Davout went back to his old post -in the north. Month by month the position grew -more and more difficult, as the topsy-turvy finances -of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw verged nearer to -bankruptcy, and the spirit of nationality grew in -Prussia. But there was never a hint of open rebellion -as long as the bald-headed little man was at the head -of affairs; the Tugendbund might plot in secret; -English agents might stir up trouble at every -opportunity; Blücher might fume and Alexander -might plan, but Davout’s grip was never loosened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At last, after three years, came the Russian -campaign. Half a million Frenchmen and allies -came thronging forward to the Niemen. A hundred -thousand of these men were under Davout’s command, -and, with Napoleon’s new supply arrangements -breaking down at once, they had to plunder -in order to live. Prussia was left behind secretly -raging, and the doomed army pressed forward over -the barren plains of Lithuania. Everything seemed -to go wrong. The half-trained levies could not -perform the feats of marching which had gained -such marvellous successes at Ulm and after Jena; -the Marshals wrangled among themselves; while -Napoleon, angered by the failure of his plans, dealt -out reprimands right and left until the irritation -became almost unbearable. Jerome Bonaparte, -<span class='pageno' title='76' id='Page_76'></span> -King of Westphalia, was placed under Davout’s command -in consequence of his blundering, but he could -not endure such a state of affairs, threw up his -command, and went back to the softer delights of -his palace at Cassel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With Moscow almost in sight, the Russians -delivered battle. Napoleon’s powers were fast -waning, and he paid no heed to Davout’s urgent -pleading that he should be allowed to turn their left. -At Wagram he had exclaimed, “You will see -Davout gain another battle for me,” but at Borodino -he had forgotten this. The battle resolved itself into -a series of horribly costly frontal assaults, and the -victors lost as heavily as their opponents. There -followed five weeks’ useless delay in Moscow; -Napoleon waited for Alexander to plead for terms, -and Alexander refused to consider the matter as long -as a Frenchman remained on Russian soil. No -course was open to the French except retreat, and -retreat they did. There is no need to describe in -detail that exhausted famished army crawling across -the Russian plains; sufficient to say that of the half -million men who had advanced in 1812 hardly thirty -thousand remained to rally on the Oder in 1813.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon left them as soon as hope was lost. He -tore across Europe from Smorgoni to Paris in the -depth of winter with hardly a stop, bent on making -a last effort to save his Empire. Murat was left in -command, but Murat flinched from his task. Three -weeks of command were enough for him, and then -he said he was ill. Ill or not, he travelled from Posen -to Naples in a fortnight, in January weather.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Somehow Davout and Ney and Eugène de Beauharnais -held the wretched Grand Army together -until Napoleon’s return, and then Davout was sent -off to hold down Northern Germany once more. It -was a task which might have daunted anybody. -Prussia was ablaze with hatred of Napoleon, and -<span class='pageno' title='77' id='Page_77'></span> -Prussian troops were swarming forward to the attack. -The citizens of the Hanseatic towns, ruined by the -Continental system, and bankrupted by Napoleon’s -requisitions, were in a state of sullen rebellion. -Davout’s troops consisted merely of invalids, cripples -and raw levies, while the loyalty of most of them -was to be doubted. Bernadotte, once a Marshal -of France, was leading his Swedes against his old -countrymen. Benningsen with a Russian army -advanced to the attack. But Davout’s grip was upon -Hamburg, and it was a grip which nothing could -break. He held on through the summer of 1813, -while the armistice of Pleissvitz gave hope of relief. -He held on through the autumn, while Austria joined -the ranks of Napoleon’s enemies. The victory of -Dresden was followed by the defeats of the Katzbach, -of Kulm, of Gross Beeren, of Dennewitz, and finally -by the complete disaster of Leipzig, but Davout still -held on to Hamburg. Provisions began to fail, the -populace broke into insurrection; it was known that -the Allies were over the Rhine, that Napoleon was -carrying on a hopeless struggle in France itself. -Marmont, Mortier, Ney, in turn deserted, but -Davout still held on to Hamburg. It was not until -the end of April, when the Bourbons were once more -on the throne of France, and a Bourbon general was -sent to take command, that he relaxed his grip. -Half his army had died during the horrors of the -siege, enormous offers had been made to him for his -submission, the famished inhabitants had implored -him to surrender, but he had allowed nothing to interfere -with his fulfilment of his duty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Bourbons tried to have him shot for this on -his return, but such a feat was beyond their power. -Thus he was not asked, nor did he ask to take the -oath of allegiance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Napoleon’s return from Elba Davout was the -only Marshal who could join him without staining -<span class='pageno' title='78' id='Page_78'></span> -his honour. Marmont stayed by the Bourbons, for -fear of the consequences of his surrender of Paris; -Macdonald and St. Cyr, Oudinot and Victor, held to -their oaths. Ney flagrantly broke his word to serve -his old Emperor once more; Masséna, as was to be -expected, tried to keep a middle course. Davout -was the one man free from the Bourbon taint, and in -consequence Napoleon had to leave him behind as -Governor of Paris and Minister of War to hold -France quiet during the Waterloo campaign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Could it have been otherwise, Waterloo might -well have been a victory for France. We can picture -Davout in command of the left wing in the advance -over the Sambre. In place of Ney’s bungled staff -work and haphazard arrangements, there would have -been a prompt and orderly movement. The columns -would have been kept closed up, instead of straggling -for miles. Davout’s accurate, lengthy reports would -have kept Napoleon clearly informed as to the situation. -A prompt attack on the morning of the 16th -of June at Quatre Bras would have cleared the air -effectively, and d’Erlon, instead of wasting his -strength in marching and counter-marching, could -have been employed to much better advantage at -Ligny. Ney’s position at Quatre Bras was, as a -matter of fact, very like Davout’s at Auerstädt eleven -years before. Davout succeeded at Auerstädt; Ney -failed at Quatre Bras. With Davout in command -of the left wing in the Waterloo campaign, the -history of the world might have been different.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Waterloo, when the cavalry was dashing itself -to pieces on the English squares, Napoleon is said to -have cried, “Oh, for one hour of Murat.” Murat -by that time would not have made an atom of difference. -The destiny of France had been decided two -days before at Quatre Bras. One hour of Davout -would have been worth fifty hours of Murat.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After Waterloo had been lost and won, for a few -<span class='pageno' title='79' id='Page_79'></span> -days it was the Prince of Eckmühl who ruled France. -He pulled the army together, and thereby saved -Napoleon’s life, for he managed to stave off the -Prussian army while Napoleon fled to Rochefort. -But with the return of the Bourbons he sank into -oblivion, and died of pneumonia eight years afterwards -almost unnoticed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Such was the end of the one great officer of -Napoleon’s whose honour had never been sullied, -who had always done his duty, and who had never -failed. His enemies hated him as well as feared him; -his friends feared him as well as trusted him. His -one aim in life was to do his duty; in this aim he -stood almost alone in his age, and in its achievement -he stood quite alone.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo79.jpg' alt='' id='il79' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>EUGÈNE <span style='font-size:smaller'>DE</span> BEAUHARNAIS<br/> (VICEROY OF ITALY PRINCE DE VENISE)</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='80' id='Page_80'></span><h1>CHAPTER IX<br/> <span class='sub-head'>MORE PALADINS</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>W</span>HEN the Marshalate was inaugurated, the -first list afforded many opportunities for -dissatisfaction, both among those included -and those excluded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Men like Macdonald and St. Cyr, of high reputation -and undoubted talents, found themselves ignored -for political reasons, while giants of the Republican -armies like Masséna found that Napoleon’s family -feeling had given comparatively unknown men like -Murat seniority over them. Masséna’s curt reply to -congratulations on his new appointment was “Yes, -one of fourteen,” and it must indeed have been -galling to him to have Bessières, Moncey and other -nonentities raised to a rank equal to his own.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For in 1804 Masséna towered in achievement head -and shoulders above all other French soldiers, with -the exception of Napoleon. He was of Italian -extraction (many people said Jewish-Italian, and -hinted that Masséna was a euphonized version of -Manasseh), and he had served fourteen years in -Louis XVI.’s regiment of Italian mercenaries. -Quitting the army, he had plunged into the various -shady employments of the Côte d’Azur. Smuggling -by land and by sea, coast trading, wine-dealing, fruit-selling, -he tried his hand at them all, mainly -successfully.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But with the revolution came his chance. In two -years he was general of division, and he actually had -<span class='pageno' title='81' id='Page_81'></span> -under his orders at Toulon a certain Napoleon Bonaparte. -For two campaigns Masséna was the life and -soul of the army of the Riviera; Dumerbion, Schérer, -and even Moreau turned to him for counsel. Then -suddenly Barras sent Napoleon as commander-in-chief -in 1796. It is perhaps the greatest tribute to -Napoleon’s personality that as a young man of -twenty-six he was able to compel obedience from a -crowd of generals, many years his senior both in age -and experience. Masséna yielded place to him grudgingly, -but Napoleon found a golden salve for his -injured amour-propre. The campaign of Italy laid -the foundations of the enormous fortune which -Masséna later built up. Every general pillaged and -peculated right and left in those two memorable -years. Napoleon himself was moderate; his fortune -at the end of 1797 only amounted to about two -hundred thousand pounds sterling; Masséna and -Augereau acquired about half a million each.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But if they could steal, these men could also fight. -Masséna was the supreme master of tactics, and it -was his division which at that time was given the -most difficult tasks. Battle followed battle, Montenotte, -Mondovi, Lodi, Lonato, Castiglione, Mantua, -Arcola, Rivoli, until at last Austria succumbed; and -by that time, what with gold and glory, the generals -of the army of Italy were Napoleon’s slaves.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon had served another purpose, too, in -enriching Masséna, for his wealth kept him quiet -while Napoleon was in Egypt. In 1798 the Directory -made a curious blunder. Their army of Rome, -maddened by the peculations of generals and -commissaries, which left the men half starved and in -rags, broke out into mutiny. The man who was sent -to quell them was Masséna! The mutiny naturally -redoubled in intensity, and Masséna was compelled -to give up his command. But at once more congenial -work was given him. Another coalition had -<span class='pageno' title='82' id='Page_82'></span> -declared war upon France, and the Archduke Charles -in Germany and Suvaroff in Italy were gaining success -after success. Masséna was sent to command in -Switzerland, the last buttress of France. Upon him -depended all the hopes of the Republic, and well -he justified the Republic’s confidence. He clung -on desperately, holding back immensely superior -numbers. At last the Aulic Council at Vienna -blundered more badly than usual, and Masséna -grasped at the opportunity, as if it had been a moneybag. -He flung himself upon Korsakoff at Zürich, -and practically destroyed his army. Suvaroff, marching -over the St. Gotthard, only escaped the same fate -by a desperate march along the wildest paths of -Switzerland. France was saved in the same hour as -Napoleon seized the reins of the Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By varied cajolery Napoleon next prevailed upon -Masséna to take command of the army of Italy, and -to hold back the Austrian army while he himself -organized the army of reserve. Napoleon had assured -Masséna that the army of Italy was in good condition, -and that supplies and reinforcements would be sent -him in abundance, but as soon as Masséna arrived -he found how little trust could be placed in the -First Consul’s word. The men were starving and -dispirited, and they were attacked by vastly superior -forces. Somehow Masséna held them together, but -he was forced back into Genoa and closely besieged. -For the troops there was some sort of food, hair-powder -and cocoa mainly, but for the inhabitants -there was—<span class='it'>nothing</span>. For nine weeks Masséna held -out. The troops died in hundreds by the sword, -by disease, by starvation; the inhabitants died in -thousands, and their bodies littered the streets. The -Austrian prisoners who were taken starved to death -in the hulks in the harbour. No wonder that Masséna -said that after the siege he had not one hair left -which was not white on his whole body. -<span class='pageno' title='83' id='Page_83'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>At last surrender was necessary. Napoleon had -promised him prompt relief, but the relief never -came. Day by day Masséna had listened for the -thunder of his guns in the near-by Apennines, but -it had never reached his ears. The capitulation was -signed, and the French marched out. But while -Masséna had been clinging to Genoa, Napoleon’s -army was swinging over the Alps. Ten days after -the surrender of Genoa, Marengo gave Italy once -more to the French.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To Masséna, covered with glory, Napoleon gave -the command of the army of Italy on his own return -to Paris; but the arrangement did not long endure. -Within two months Masséna’s avarice had got the -better of him, and he was removed from his command -and placed upon half-pay on account of his sharp -practice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This retirement endured for four years, but in the -Austerlitz campaign Masséna received the command-in-chief -in Italy. If he accomplished little here, at -least he prevented the enemy from achieving any -success, and after Austerlitz and the treaty of Presburg -he was sent to conquer Naples for Joseph -Bonaparte. The campaign was a mere military -promenade, but it ended, as did so many of Masséna’s -commands, in his compulsory resignation on account -of his illicit money-making. On this occasion -Napoleon improved on his previous practice, and -confiscated over a hundred thousand pounds -which Masséna had accumulated in a Livornese -bank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Once again Napoleon summoned Masséna to his -aid in 1807, and at Pultusk and Friedland Masséna -divided the laurels with Lannes and Ney. But it -was the Wagram campaign which brought him the -greatest glory, as it did also to Davout. At -Eckmühl Masséna performed the turning movement -which gained the victory after Davout’s holding -<span class='pageno' title='84' id='Page_84'></span> -attack. At Essling it was Masséna who held the -reeling French line together until darkness brought -relief. At Wagram Masséna, crippled just before -by a fall from his horse, led his corps in a coach drawn -by white horses, the mark for all the enemy’s guns. -Small wonder was it that the end of the campaign -found Masséna both Duke of Rivoli and Prince of -Essling, with a pension of twenty thousand pounds a -year in addition to his pay, his perquisites and his -enormous savings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But this was the zenith of Masséna’s fame; it was -to reach its nadir immediately afterwards. Masséna -had lived hard all his life; he had spared himself no -more than he had spared his men, and in addition -he had at intervals indulged in unbridled debauchery. -By 1810 Masséna was an old, worn-out, satiated man, -although he was only fifty-five years of age. All he -wished to do was to retire and live in peace, but -Napoleon was at his wits’ end to find someone who -could be trusted in Spain. Masséna found the command -thrust upon him, and he was forced to accept. -Then followed the blundering campaign of Torres -Vedras. Blunders in the choice of route, blunders in -the attack at Busaco, blunders at Torres Vedras, and -finally, in 1811, the crowning blunder of Fuentes -d’Onoro.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These blunders might have been foreseen; -Masséna was old and feeble; he knew nothing of -Spain; he took women with him on the campaign; -his corps commanders were Ney, Junot and Reynier, -all men of hot temper and inferior talent; while -opposed to him was the inflexible Wellington with -his incomparable English infantry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In March, 1811, Masséna was removed from his -command. He crept miserably away, to bury his -shame in the retirement of the Marseilles command. -From that time forward his one aim was to enjoy -his riches in comfort; he made submission to the -<span class='pageno' title='85' id='Page_85'></span> -Bourbons, and then reverted to Napoleon in 1815; -after Waterloo he went back to the Bourbons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But though he retained his wealth and his rank, -there was yet further trouble awaiting him. His -treason in 1815 had not been sufficiently extensive in -that age of treason for him to suffer any penalty, -and Louis XVIII., like the most humane Mikado, -determined to make the punishment fit the crime as -far as possible by appointing him one of Ney’s judges. -Masséna must have had a guilty conscience, and the -horror of having to condemn his former colleague for -the same crime as his own weighed heavily on him. -At the same time the atrocious murder of his friend -and fellow Marshal Brune during the White Terror -at Avignon was a further blow. Tortured by -remorse, hated by all parties alike, worn out with a -life lived at high pressure, Masséna died in 1817 at -the age of fifty-nine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Masséna and Davout were the two foremost -officers of Napoleon; the great contrast between -them is due to the fact that one of them was -guided by a strict sense of duty, the other merely -by avarice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was another Marshal who is frequently considered -to be at least the equal of these two, and the -fact that he is so considered is peculiarly illustrative -of his whole career, for Soult was for ever thrusting -himself into the limelight and being elbowed out of -it. Like many of the other Marshals, he rose from -the ranks of the old regular army, and he first attained -high rank by attracting Masséna’s attention. He -was second-in-command to that Marshal during the -siege of Genoa, until he was taken prisoner during a -sortie. He received his Marshalate in 1804, at a -time when he was commanding a corps of the army -at Boulogne, and he continued in command during -the historic march to the Danube. At Austerlitz -he was in command of the centre, and all his life he -<span class='pageno' title='86' id='Page_86'></span> -considered that the battle was won mainly by himself. -He ignored Davout’s splendid defence of the lake -defiles, Murat’s wonderful handling of the cavalry -reserve, Lannes’ management of the left, and Bernadotte’s -assault of the centre; he, and he alone, he -said, was responsible for Austerlitz. He was greatly -disappointed when he was created Duke of Dalmatia -in 1808; he claimed that the only fitting title for -him was Duke of Austerlitz. Napoleon ignored his -pleadings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Soult fought at Jena, Eylau and Friedland, 1806-1807, -and was then sent to Spain. To him was -entrusted the pursuit of Sir John Moore to Corunna, -and it cannot be denied that he failed in his mission. -Moore was never seriously engaged throughout the -retreat, and when finally Soult caught him up at -Corunna he was easily beaten back, despite his -superior numbers. But for all that Soult had the -impertinence to claim a victory.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To him next was assigned the conquest of -Portugal; all he conquered was the northern -extremity; he was two months late in his arrival at -Oporto, and once there he settled down and would -not budge. The reason for this delay soon emerged. -Soult was scheming for the crown of Portugal. But -the plan evaporated promptly when Wellington -unexpectedly passed the Douro, surprised Soult in -his cantonments and bundled him out of Portugal, -compelling him to abandon his guns, his train, his -treasure, his sick—everything, in fact, except what -was on his men’s backs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Had Wellington ever suffered a similar reverse he -would probably have received the same treatment as -did Admiral Byng fifty years before, but Napoleon -was lenient and retained Soult in command. The -new task assigned to him was the conquest of -Andalusia, and against the wretched Spanish armies -he achieved some remarkable successes. Seville and -<span class='pageno' title='87' id='Page_87'></span> -Granada fell before him; and he quietly proceeded -to establish himself firmly and make his fortune. He -looted cathedrals and treasuries, and sent the proceeds -home. He ignored the Government of Madrid, and -conducted himself like an independent and absolute -monarch. Cadiz defied him, and all the efforts of -his subordinate, Victor, Duke of Belluno, could not -gain the place for him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Masséna, held up at Torres Vedras by Wellington, -with his army starving and disorganized, appealed -to Soult for help. It was grudgingly given—too -late. By the time Soult was ready to move upon the -Tagus Masséna had already fallen back, utterly -ruined. Soult was eventually stirred to action by -Beresford’s siege of Badajoz, but he met with an -unexpected reverse at Albuera (which, characteristically, -he claimed as a victory), and after that he was -content to hold on to Andalusia until at last Wellington’s -victory at Salamanca and capture of Madrid -compelled him to abandon his conquests. So -exasperated was Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, -by Soult’s independence that he demanded Soult’s -recall, threatening abdication in the event of refusal. -Napoleon complied, and during the beginning of -1813 Soult commanded the Guard in Germany, but -after Vittoria he was sent back to try and keep the -English out of France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was during this campaign of the Pyrenees that -Soult’s talents were exhibited at their best, but even -here he failed. His manœuvres, concentrations and -determined counter-attacks are models of technical -skill, but the fire, resolution and insight of greater -generals are sadly lacking. He certainly delayed -Wellington, and achieved a fair success considering -the means at his disposal, but he was beaten back -across the Pyrenees, back from Bayonne, from -Orthez, and at last from Toulouse. Napoleon’s -abdication found Soult’s army rapidly disintegrating, -<span class='pageno' title='88' id='Page_88'></span> -and it is certain that the Duke of Dalmatia could -not have continued the struggle much longer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1814 and 1815 Soult conducted himself as -might have been expected of a self-seeker. He submitted -to the Bourbons, but went over to Napoleon -as soon as the Emperor was on the throne after the -descent from Elba.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon appointed him chief of staff during the -Waterloo campaign. The choice was unfortunate in -the event, but it is difficult to see what other course -the Emperor could have pursued. Of the five -Marshals fit for service of whom Napoleon could -dispose, Davout had to be left to hold down Paris, -and Suchet had to guard the south. Ney was -obviously useless for staff work, and Grouchy had -neither the brains nor the prestige for a position of -such vital responsibility. So Soult took charge of -the staff, and the staff work was badly done. -Blunders were committed even in the orders given -for the crossing of the Sambre, and subsequently -delay followed delay and error followed error in fatal -sequence. Ney, d’Erlon and Grouchy were in turn -misled by ambiguous orders. The responsibility for -the failure of Waterloo is undoubtedly partly Soult’s.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Naturally enough, Soult was proscribed after the -second Restoration, but after four years’ exile, he -managed to ingratiate himself with the Bourbons, -and climbed steadily back to power by the aid of -hypocrisy and tuft-hunting. The July revolution -brought him further power, and he was one of the -main props of Louis Philippe’s authority. In fact -the citizen king thought so much of him that he -made Soult Marshal-General of France, thus placing -him on a level with Saxe and Turenne. He lived to -the venerable age of eighty-one, and died at last rich -and honoured above all the other soldiers of France. -His reputation grew steadily after the wars were over, -partly on account of Napier’s liking for him, partly -<span class='pageno' title='89' id='Page_89'></span> -on account of the natural tendency displayed by the -English to over-value a beaten antagonist, and partly -on account of his own deft powers of self-advertisement. -His career is a striking example of the success -of cold, self-contained mediocrity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is only one other Marshal of Napoleon for -whom any claims to greatness have been made, and -that is Suchet, Duke of Albufera. One of the most -interesting points about his career is that he had no -military training whatever before the Revolution. -As a young man of twenty-three years of age he -enlisted; at twenty-five he was a colonel. He made -friends with the young Bonaparte at the siege of -Toulon, and later fought in the Italian campaign of -1796, gaining command of a brigade in 1797.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the rank of general of division he served -Masséna and Joubert, and while Masséna held Genoa -in 1800 Suchet guarded the frontiers of France itself -on the Var.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But for eight years longer Suchet had to be content -with the rank of a mere divisional commander, -leading a division of Lannes’ corps at Austerlitz, -Jena and Friedland. At last the wholesale toppling -of reputations in the Spanish war brought him his -chance, and he received command of the army of -Aragon. To say the least, at first his position was -rather awkward. His army was composed of raw -troops, shaken by the horrors of the siege of Saragossa; -the Spaniards were in arms against him on all -sides; he was compelled by the neglect of the Paris -Government to live on the country; while to crown -it all he was expected to obey not only the orders -from Paris but also the frequently contradictory ones -from Joseph at Madrid.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We must give Suchet credit for coming through -the ordeal exceedingly well. After an “unfortunate -incident” at Alcaniz, Suchet got his men well in -hand, and, by victories at Maria and Belchite, he -<span class='pageno' title='90' id='Page_90'></span> -cleared Aragon of the enemy and proceeded to subdue -Catalonia. His way was barred in every direction by -fortresses, but, thanks partly to the folly of the -Spaniards and partly to his own resolution and -determination, he conquered the country inch by -inch. Somewhat cynically, in his memoirs, he tells -us that at the storming of Lerida he took care to drive -as many women and children as possible into the -citadel, and then by a vigorous bombardment he so -daunted the garrison that they surrendered. To -what total the casualties among the women and -children amounted before the surrender he does -not say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Catalonia in his power, Suchet moved on to the -reduction of Valencia. His previous campaigns -repeated themselves. Battle followed siege, and -siege followed battle, until at last Suchet ruled all -Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia. Soult had already -conquered Andalusia, so that all Spain might, by -straining the truth a little, be said to be in the hands -of the French. For his achievements Suchet received -a Marshal’s bâton, the title of Duke of Albufera and -half a million francs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, he was not fated to retain his conquests -long. Wellington’s victory at Vittoria in 1813 -brought about Suchet’s evacuation of Valencia, just -as Salamanca had caused Soult to abandon Andalusia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The same year an Anglo-Sicilian expedition under -Murray landed in Catalonia, and once more set aflame -the embers of the guerilla warfare. Suchet himself, -in action against unwontedly disciplined enemies, -met with a serious reverse at Castalla, but Murray -was too much of a nincompoop to follow up his -success. In the end Murray once more took ship, -and Suchet still held Catalonia and most of Aragon. -At this time he had a great opportunity to turn -against Wellington, who had his hands full with -Soult’s offensive in the Pyrenees, but he let the -<span class='pageno' title='91' id='Page_91'></span> -chance go. Immediately afterwards Lord William -Bentinck, who had succeeded to Sir John Murray, -kept him busy until the fall of the Empire. Soult’s -and Napoleon’s demands had deprived Suchet of his -best troops, and he did all that could be expected of -him with the few men left to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1814 Suchet submitted to the Bourbons; in -1815 he betrayed them. During the Hundred Days -he was ordered to secure the south-east with a few -thousand men, and though unsuccessful, he accomplished -much. After the Restoration the Bourbons -refused to re-employ him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon is credited with saying that Suchet was -the best of his Marshals after Masséna’s decay, and -also that with two men like Suchet he would have -held Spain against all endeavours. If Napoleon -really did say this (and O’Meara’s testimony is -untrustworthy) Napoleon was wrong. The only time -Suchet encountered English troops he was beaten; -he was just as selfish and self-seeking as the other -Marshals in Spain; he refused help whenever he -could; and his success was due in a great part to the -blunders of his opponents. Every French general -and Marshal (Dupont excepted) succeeded against -Spaniards; it was only against the English that they -failed. Napoleon might just as well have said that -Bessières was his best Marshal, because Bessières beat -the Spaniards at Rio Seco while Masséna failed at -Torres Vedras.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The one Marshal of Napoleon’s whose career is -more interesting in its pre-Revolutionary stages than -under Napoleon is Augereau, Duke of Castiglione. -He was a gigantic, swaggering fellow with a nose -rendered brilliant by alcohol, devil-may-care and -reckless, the ideal soldier of fortune. For he was a -soldier of fortune. As a young man in the army of -Louis XVI. he had killed one of his own officers on -parade, and fled from the country with the police at -<span class='pageno' title='92' id='Page_92'></span> -his heels. In exile, he wandered through the East, -joined the Russian army, took part in the storming -of Ismail under Suvaroff, and then deserted. Next -he joined the Prussian army, and served in the -Prussian Guard, but once more he deserted. Desertion -from the Prussian army was a difficult matter, -but Augereau achieved it by banding together all the -malcontents and fighting his way to the frontier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the birth of the Dauphin (later the unhappy -Louis XVII.) an amnesty was proclaimed in France, -and Augereau took advantage of it to rejoin his old -regiment, but once more tired of continuous service -and got himself sent off to Naples as an instructor -to the Neapolitan troops. From Naples he eloped -with a Greek heiress to Lisbon, and in Lisbon he -annoyed the Inquisition, so that he was put in prison.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But still his luck held. He escaped from the -clutches of the Holy Office, and arrived with his wife -in France just after the execution of Louis XVI. -His varied military experience naturally obtained him -high command in the Republican army; he fought in -La Vendée and in the Pyrenees, and then found -himself a divisional general under Napoleon in 1796. -In this campaign his reckless courage won him fame; -he was one of the heroes of the bridge of Lodi, and -at Castiglione it was his dashing leadership which -gained the day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Augereau received the command of the army of -the Rhine after Bonaparte’s departure for Egypt, -but, suspected of intriguing for the supreme power, -he was dismissed from his command, and, two years -later, he saw the prize fall into Napoleon’s hands. -Napoleon bought Augereau’s support with huge gifts -of money and, in 1804, a Marshal’s bâton.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the Austerlitz campaign Augereau was -only entrusted with the minor operation of subduing -Tyrol, but he fought well at Jena in 1806. At Eylau -came disaster. His corps, sent forward against the -<span class='pageno' title='93' id='Page_93'></span> -Russians in the teeth of a blinding snowstorm, lost -direction, and was torn to pieces by a furious -cannonade. Three-quarters of his men died; he -himself, already gravely ill, was badly wounded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon was furious. Augereau was sent home -in disgrace, and what remained of the 7th Corps was -broken up and distributed round the rest of the army. -This was practically the end of Augereau’s military -life; he held command for a brief space during the -war in Spain, but he failed again at Gerona and was -superseded. By now he was well over fifty years of -age, and dissipation had sapped his vitality. In 1814 -and 1815 Augereau received commands of minor -importance, his chief duty being the training of -recruits, but his heart was not in his work. He lived -long enough to betray Napoleon twice and the -Bourbons once, and then died in 1816.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These brief biographies are sufficient to illustrate -what kind of men the Marshals and their master were. -With only a few exceptions they were all traitors, -from Napoleon, plotting against the constitution he -had sworn to uphold, to Ney, deserting his King. -They were greedy, they were unscrupulous, they -were selfish. Many of them were men of second-rate -talent. Two attributes they had in common—extreme -personal bravery and enormous experience -in war. Soult is the only Marshal about whom we -find any hints of cowardice (and there seems to be no -foundation for these hints), while Suchet, Mortier and -Brune were the only ones who had not served in the -pre-Revolutionary army. None of the Marshals was -a heaven-sent genius, and only one, Davout, combined -loyalty and honesty with both military and -administrative ability.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is, of course, another side to the picture. -If treachery can be excused at all, then there were -good excuses for the treachery of every one of the -guilty ones; if their talents appear mediocre to us -<span class='pageno' title='94' id='Page_94'></span> -now, it cannot be denied that they were nevertheless -highly successful for a long period; if they were self-seeking, -they were always ready, despite their riches -and titles, to risk their lives in action at the head -of their men.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The extravagant praise often meted out collectively -to Napoleon’s subordinates is undeserved, but -somehow one can hardly avoid coming to the conclusion -that a nation might well consider itself fortunate -could it muster a similar array of men in high places.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo94.jpg' alt='' id='il94' style='width:70%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>AUGEREAU DUC DE CASTIGLIONE</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='95' id='Page_95'></span><h1>CHAPTER X<br/> <span class='sub-head'>BROTHERS</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>N</span>APOLEON was one of a large family, -children of a shiftless father and a -wonderful mother. Much the same -might be said of a large number of other successful -men—Moltke and Lincoln, for instance. But -it is doubtful whether any importance from a -eugenic point of view can be attached to this -circumstance, for although some of the other -Bonapartes showed undoubted talent in various -directions, not one of them has ever displayed -greatness comparable to the Emperor’s. Biologically, -Napoleon might be said to be a “sport,” -a “mutation,” as de Vries would say. Yet even -this theory is open to controversy, for mutations -usually breed true, and none of Napoleon’s children -ever showed, as far as can be ascertained, any really -striking amount of talent. Napoleon may thus be -considered to be an isolated incident in his family -history, one of the many immovable facts which -are so gingerly skirted round by eugenists and other -theorists.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What achievements can be ascribed to the -brothers of the man who achieved so much? A -few impracticable suggestions, a few novels (diluted -St. Pierre, most of them), a few lost battles, a few -lost kingdoms; beyond that—nothing. Louis was -the father of Napoleon III., a clever man with many -<span class='pageno' title='96' id='Page_96'></span> -natural disadvantages mingled with his advantages. -Lucien saved one unpleasant situation when -president of the Council of Five Hundred in 1799. -Jerome’s grandson was a fairly eminent lawyer of -the United States. The other Bonapartes were like -their fathers and grandfathers before them, dilettanti, -wobblers, unstable and irresponsible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But useless as were Napoleon’s brothers to him, -he nevertheless bore with them patiently for years. -A clannish clinging together is to be noticed in all -their dealings, both while they were obscure and -while they were powerful. An early Corsican -environment may perhaps account for this, or -perhaps it is to be ascribed to the intense pride in -himself which Napoleon felt, and which perhaps was -extended to all of his own blood.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon, the second son, and Joseph, the -eldest, were separated from the other brothers and -sisters by a gap of some seven years; the intervening -children had died in infancy. When Charles -Bonaparte, the father, died, therefore, it was upon -these two that the headship of the family and the -attendant responsibility fell. Joseph had already -shown signs of his general uselessness. His mathematics -and education generally had been too weak -for him to have much chance of success in the army; -he flinched from the Church, and therefore returned -to Corsica to farm the few acres the Bonapartes -possessed, and to carry on somehow, Micawber-like, -until something turned up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon, just appointed second-lieutenant of -artillery, took upon himself to keep and educate the -next brother, Louis. Since he had only thirty -pounds a year pay, the struggle must have been -terribly hard. After a year or two came the -temporary success of the Paolists in Corsica, and -as the Bonapartes had taken the French side the -family had to fly to France for safety, leaving all -<span class='pageno' title='97' id='Page_97'></span> -their property behind. Difficulties increased without -number. The French Government, in the -throes of the Terror, had voted monetary support -for the refugees, but in the excitement of the -Toulon rebellion the decree was forgotten, and not -a sou was paid. St. Cyr, the State school for girls, -was closed, and another mouth, that of the eldest -daughter, Elise, had to be fed by the struggling -family.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But then everything suddenly changed for the -better. Napoleon, after distinguishing himself at -Toulon, fought his way up to the rank of chef de -brigade. Joseph obtained a commissaryship in the -army of Italy through the aid of a fellow Corsican, -Salicetti. Then also he married Mademoiselle Clary, -daughter of a Marseilles merchant. Her dowry -must have appeared enormous to the famished -Bonapartes—it amounted to no less than six -thousand pounds sterling. None of the Bonapartes -could as yet foresee the day when any one of them -would spend six thousand pounds on their most -trifling whim.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A year later Napoleon saved the Directory from -the revolt of the sections, and the family was at last -in comparatively smooth water. With Napoleon in -command of the Army of the Interior, influence -could be brought to bear to help his brothers. -Louis became his aide-de-camp. Lucien received a -commissaryship with the Army of the North, while -immediately afterwards the horizon of possibilities -was widened still further by Napoleon’s appointment -to the command in Italy and his amazing -victories there. Joseph received important diplomatic -appointments at Parma and Rome. Louis -distinguished himself with the army. Lucien at -this time was the black sheep of the family. He -threw up one appointment after another; he -expressed undesirable opinions with undesirable -<span class='pageno' title='98' id='Page_98'></span> -force, and finally he married a completely illiterate -girl of the Midi. However, Napoleon forgave him, -and before setting out for Egypt he enabled him to -secure election to the Council of Five Hundred. -Lucien had always been, even in Corsica, a ranting -rhetorician, and in the Council he would be able to -indulge his bent to his heart’s desire. Jerome, the -youngest brother, was still at school, and he had -to master as best he could his disappointment at -not accompanying Napoleon to Egypt. Eugène -Beauharnais, his schoolfellow, was going; he asked -bitterly why he could not go also, leaving out of -calculation the years of difference in their ages.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon returned from Egypt to find his -brothers had somewhat improved their positions. -Lucien was president of the Council of Five -Hundred; Joseph’s diplomatic services had enabled -him to enter intimately into the Directory circles, -so that Napoleon was at once able to plunge into -the welter of politics. The <span class='it'>coup d’état</span> of the -19th Brumaire was planned. Joseph acted as intermediary -between Napoleon, Sièyes, Ducos, Bernadotte -(now his brother-in-law), Fouché and Moreau. -Lucien made himself responsible for the Council, -and arranged for the vital meeting to be held at -Versailles. Their united efforts gained for Napoleon -the command of the Army of the Interior. Everything -was in readiness. On the morning of the -19th the Upper House, the Council of Ancients, -readily bowed to the will of the great soldier, but -the Council of Five Hundred were not so willing to -pronounce their own sentence of extinction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Murmurs arose and grew louder, and when -Napoleon appeared before them he was greeted -with fierce cries. Half of the Five Hundred were -old <span class='it'>sans-culottes</span>, men who had gambled with their -lives for power under Hébert and Danton, and when -Napoleon, for the only time in his career, flinched -<span class='pageno' title='99' id='Page_99'></span> -from danger, the dreadful cry which had announced -Robespierre’s fall arose. “Hors la loi! Hors la -loi!” shouted the deputies. Napoleon staggered -out of the council hall, apparently ruined.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Lucien Bonaparte leaped into the breach. He -spoke fervently on behalf of his brother, but he was -shouted down by the furious deputies. Somebody -demanded a motion of outlawry against Napoleon; -Lucien refused to put it to the vote. Neither side -would give way, and the passions grew fiercer and -fiercer. Suddenly Lucien tore off the insignia of his -office, and even as he did so the door flew open and -Napoleon’s troops burst in. Leclerc, Napoleon’s -brother-in-law, was at their head. “The Council -is dissolved,” said Leclerc, and the soldiers cleared -the hall with fixed bayonets. Napoleon had utilized -to the full the few minutes Lucien had gained for -him. He had inflamed the soldiers with tales of -treachery and assassination. On the evening of the -same day a rump of the Council met under Lucien’s -presidency and confirmed Napoleon in all the powers -he demanded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At first sight this action of Lucien’s appears -invaluable. Nevertheless, on further consideration -one realizes that Napoleon could have succeeded -without it. When Bernadotte was King of Sweden, -he told the French Ambassador, apropos of some news -regarding French parliamentary criticism, that if he -were King of France with two hundred thousand -soldiers at his back he would put his tongue out at -the chamber of deputies. Napoleon at the time -of the <span class='it'>coup d’état</span>, had not merely two hundred -thousand soldiers, but the whole weight of public -opinion at his back. No decree of outlawry by a -discredited Council of Five Hundred could injure -him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For all this, Lucien was of great use to Napoleon -during the Consulate. As Tribune, he employed -<span class='pageno' title='100' id='Page_100'></span> -his undoubted parliamentary gifts to foist on the -legislative various unpalatable measures. He skilfully -defended the proposed Legion of Honour to -an acutely suspicious House, and then finally he -effected a judicious weeding of the Senate and Corps -Législatif during the retirements of 1802. For all -these services he was made Grand Officer of the -Legion of Honour, and a Senator; he received a -large official income and a palace (Poppesdorf on the -Moselle), while it seemed as if it would not be long -before he received royal honours. Napoleon proposed -that he should act as French agent in the -Kingdom of Etruria; the Queen was recently -widowed; a marriage would follow naturally, and -Lucien would be proclaimed king. As far as -Napoleon knew, there was no legal bar to such an -arrangement, for Lucien’s illiterate wife had died -some time back, but the proposal forced Lucien to -make an announcement he should have made earlier. -In 1803 he had secretly married a widow, Madame -Jouberthon, who had been his mistress for a year, -and actually had borne him a child the day before the -ceremony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This was the end of things as far as Lucien was -concerned. Napoleon quarrelled violently with him, -and Lucien left the country. He lived for a time in -Rome, where Pius VII. made him Prince of Canino, -but had to move on at the French occupation. He -tried to reach the United States, but the English -prevented this, as they feared he might have designs -on Spanish America. They could have known little -about the dilatory, hesitating æsthete to imagine he -was capable of any action of importance. Lucien -was brought a prisoner to England, and he promptly -settled down and made himself comfortable at -Ludlow, perfectly contented to enjoy his books, his -scientific dabblings, his pictures, in peace. Once -only did he rouse himself, and that was during the -<span class='pageno' title='101' id='Page_101'></span> -Hundred Days. The old clan feeling apparently -re-awoke, and he was at Napoleon’s side during that -brief period. But as soon as Napoleon had left for -St. Helena, and three months in a Piedmontese -prison had cooled his own blood, he went back to -Rome and continued his placid existence until his -death in 1840. Two or three feeble novels and one -frigid epic stand to his credit—further comment -appears unnecessary; if a man with Lucien’s opportunities -abandons them in favour of a mild life of -artistic enjoyment, he must be either a great man or -a very small man, and Lucien was not a great man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But Lucien had at any rate the hardihood to -stand up to his terrible brother about his marriage; -Louis and Jerome gave way in a ridiculous fashion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Louis allowed himself to be persuaded into -marrying Hortense Beauharnais, Napoleon’s step-daughter, -thereby making his sister-in-law Josephine -into his mother-in-law as well. No love was lost -between the newly-married pair, and they drifted -apart after a month or two of married life. A child, -Napoleon Charles, was born at the end of 1802, and -Napoleon was popularly credited with being its -incestuous father. At first he did his utmost to -check these rumours, but later he tried to use them -for his own ends—a scheme nipped in the bud by -the child’s death from croup in 1807. Napoleon -repeatedly tried to reconcile the parents, and on two -occasions he met with success. The product of the -first reconciliation was a child, Napoleon Louis, born -in 1804, who died during the Carbonari insurrection -in Italy in 1831, and the product of the second -reconciliation was another child who later became -Napoleon III.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Louis, for his compliance, honours and -wealth were heaped in profusion. He became a -Prince of the Empire, with a million francs a year; -as Constable of France, and consequently a Grand -<span class='pageno' title='102' id='Page_102'></span> -Imperial Dignitary, he received one-third of a -million francs a year; he was Governor of Paris; a -member of the Council of State; in precedence only -the Emperor and Joseph Bonaparte came before -him. Louis found himself the third person in the -Empire with an annual income of about eighty -thousand pounds sterling.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet even this was not all. Austerlitz had laid -Europe at Napoleon’s feet, and he used his power to -the full. The rulers of Bavaria and Würtemberg -became kings; a terse proclamation announced that -the Bourbon house of Naples had “ceased to reign,” -and Masséna with sixty thousand men swept into the -country to establish Joseph Bonaparte on the throne. -Louis was given the kingdom of Holland. Just -before, Napoleon had offered the crown of Italy to -these two brothers in turn, but they had refused it, -partly on account of the utter dependence of Italy -upon France, and partly because one condition of -acceptance was resignation of all claims upon the -throne of France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Holland, when Louis arrived, was in a bad way. -Her people were ground down by remorseless taxation; -the Continental system was ruining them -rapidly; the conscription was exhausting them; and -the outlook generally was hopeless. In fact they -were so sunk in despondency that on one occasion, -when Napoleon called a plebiscite among them to -decide on their Government, only one-sixth of the -voters troubled to vote. With the advent of Louis -they hoped for better things, but Louis was the kind -of man from whom it is better to hope for nothing. -His health was bad, his domestic troubles upset him, -his terrible brother held him completely under his -thumb, and tumbled over like card houses all his -tentative schemes of improvement. Matters in -Holland went from bad to worse. At intervals the -wretched Louis roused himself, and tried to help his -<span class='pageno' title='103' id='Page_103'></span> -subjects, but every time the thunders of Napoleon -daunted him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At last, in 1810, he found the French demanding -military occupation of Holland as the only way to -secure the thorough observance of the Continental -system. A French division was marching on -Amsterdam, and fighting was threatened between -the Dutch troops and the French. Louis dropped -his kingly dignity as if it were red-hot; he abdicated -in favour of his son, Napoleon Louis, and then, -leaving his wife and family behind, he fled across -the frontier and never stopped until he was safe -in Austria. Neither threats nor cajoleries on -Napoleon’s part were able to bring him back to -France and the undignified dignities which were -offered him. He settled down with relief in Styria -with his books and his artistic studies. A novel or -two and some peculiarly unsatisfying memoirs were -all he left behind after his death.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hortense, his wife, found means to console -herself. The Comte de Flahault became a frequent -visitor at her house in Paris, and a son was eventually -born to her, who became, under the Second Empire, -the Duc de Morny. Flahault himself was with good -reason believed to be a son of the great Talleyrand, -Prince of Benevento, so that de Morny had the -proud privilege of calling himself a doubly illegitimate -grandson of Talleyrand, an illegitimate -Beauharnais, an illegitimate Flahault and a natural -brother of Napoleon III. A highly satisfactory -pedigree, in truth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It appeared at first as though Joseph Bonaparte -would have better fortune than Lucien or Louis. -He had already held positions of great responsibility -as Ambassador and Plenipotentiary, and in 1806 he -became King of Naples. His rule at first was -precarious, for although many of the Neapolitans -acquiesced in his elevation, the English, and the -<span class='pageno' title='104' id='Page_104'></span> -Bourbons who still held Sicily did their best to -make him as uncomfortable as possible. By landing -banditti, galley-slaves and unpleasant characters -generally, they kept Calabria in a blaze. A small -English force was landed, won a battle at Maida, -and then had to retire. But with fifty thousand -Frenchmen at his back Joseph gradually wore down -opposition and established himself more or less firmly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, this had hardly been accomplished -when in 1808 he was suddenly called back to France -and proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies. As -regards the Indies, Joseph was divided from them -by the British fleet, and if the fleet could preserve -Sicily for the Italian Bourbons, it could most -certainly preserve America for the Spanish ones. -The Atlantic is a good deal wider than the Straits -of Messina. As regards Spain the position was only -not quite so difficult. The whole country was in -rebellion, it is true; three weeks before the streets -of Madrid had run knee-deep with the blood of -Spaniards and Frenchmen. Some thirty thousand -of his subjects had to be beaten in a pitched battle -before Joseph could enter his capital, but Napoleon -promised him two hundred thousand French soldiers -to support him, and Joseph, a little bewildered, a -little timorous, proceeded with the adventure. He -reached Madrid, and sent his armies forward to -subdue his kingdom. In three weeks one army, -under Moncey, had been beaten back from Valencia -with ruinous losses, while twenty thousand men -under Dupont were hemmed in at Baylen and compelled -to surrender. A hundred thousand Spaniards -were marching on Madrid, and the King of Spain -returned with all speed to the security of the French -armies on the Ebro. Another battle had to be -fought before this sanctuary could be gained. -Immediately afterwards came the news that the -pestilent English, for ever intruding themselves -<span class='pageno' title='105' id='Page_105'></span> -uninvited, had landed in Portugal, beaten Junot -and cleared Portugal of the French by the -Convention of Cintra. Napoleon at this moment -was at the Conference of Erfurt, trying to disentangle -the politics of Russia, Austria, Prussia and -the Rhenish Confederation, but as soon as he could, -he ended this meeting, issued a few hasty orders to -organize his army against a probable attack by -Austria in the spring, and rushed back across -Europe bent upon settling the affair out of hand. -Calling up eighty thousand more troops, he pushed -suddenly over the Ebro. The Spanish armies were -shattered in three battles at Gamonal, Espinosa -and Tudela. Once more Joseph was established in -Madrid, but the English again interfered. A skilful -thrust by Sir John Moore against the French communications -led to the French armies being wheeled -against him instead of pushing on to complete the -overthrow of the Spaniards. In the middle of this -movement Napoleon was called back to Paris on -account of the Austrian trouble and the plottings -of Talleyrand and Fouché; Joseph was left in -Madrid, King of a country ablaze with rebellion, -and commander of an army openly contemptuous.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Joseph bore his troubles for five years. Madrid -and its environs were just able to bear the expense -of his guard and his court; the rest of the country -was parcelled out among French generals who ruled -their districts despotically as far as the English and -the partidas would allow them. Joseph simply did -not count; his pathetic appeals to his protectors to -combine as he wished were disregarded. Time and -again he asked Napoleon either to give him full -power or to relieve him of the burden of his mock -sovereignty, but Napoleon bullied him into continuing -with the farce. In 1812 he lost Madrid for -a time, and in 1813 he lost all Spain. He gathered -together all his possessions, and tried to retire in -<span class='pageno' title='106' id='Page_106'></span> -as dignified a fashion as possible. Forced by -Wellington to fight at Vittoria, he was badly -beaten and driven off his line of communications. -Everything had to be abandoned. During the -flight Joseph left his carriage by one door while -the English Hussars entered it by the other, pistol -shots were fired at him, and altogether he was hardly -treated with the dignity a King deserves. All his -court paraphernalia was captured by the English. -His carriage was found stuffed with masterpieces; -he lost gold to the value of a million sterling, and his -plate, his personal belongings, and his lady friends -were alike left behind. Soult at last arrived to -hold the line of the Pyrenees, and Joseph was -ignominiously thrust aside.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He pathetically re-entered the limelight in Paris -during the fatal early months of 1814, but he was no -longer taken seriously. A proclamation of his to the -people of Paris, practically telling them to have no -fear for he was with them was received with howls -of derision. He pottered helplessly about until the -abdication, he figured inconspicuously in the last -gathering of the Bonaparte clan during the Hundred -Days, and then went off to America. He shook -from his shoulders with relief the burden of kingship. -As with his brothers, feeble novels and the -study of literature engaged his attention from 1815 -until his death.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A third brother of Napoleon’s was also a king; -he also was thrust on to an unwilling people, and he -also was thrust off again in course of time. Jerome -was the hope of the family; in 1801, at the age of -seventeen, he appeared to give promise of great gifts. -Napoleon sent him off to join the navy and to -acquire manhood in that hardest of all schools. -The First Consul’s plan was defeated, for the -officers of the squadron hastened to make the great -man’s young brother as comfortable as possible. -<span class='pageno' title='107' id='Page_107'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>When Gantheaume, with vastly superior numbers, -fell in with and captured the English <span class='it'>Swiftsure</span>, -Jerome (seventeen years old, if you please) was sent -to receive the English captain’s sword. On the -West Indian station the French admiral bluntly -told Jerome that he was bound to become an -admiral anyway, and he should work hard, not to -achieve promotion but to be ready for it. Jerome -did not follow his advice. The renewal of war with -England in 1803 found Jerome still in the West -Indies, and he left his ship (which was subsequently -captured) and went off to the United States. At -Washington he found the French Ambassador, -Pichon, and drew lavishly on him for funds and -embarrassed the worthy man enormously. Jerome -had quite a nice little holiday in America, travelling -about from place to place, making hordes of friends, -spending thousands of dollars, and being generally -lionized.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The climax was reached when at the age of -nineteen he informed the wretched Pichon that -he had just married a Miss Elizabeth Patterson, -daughter of a worthy Baltimore merchant, and -asked him for further funds to support his new -condition. Pichon was horrified. The marriage -was illegal by the law of France, it is true, but -Jerome apparently took it seriously. Napoleon -would be mad with rage. Pichon saw himself -deprived of his position and driven into exile. He -implored Jerome to go home. Jerome refused. -Pichon cut off supplies. Jerome gaily borrowed -from his new father-in-law. Then came the news -that Napoleon had proclaimed himself Emperor of -the French. Madame Jerome Bonaparte naturally -wanted to go to France as soon as possible and enjoy -her rank as an Imperial Princess. Jerome had doubts -on the subject, but at last, when his funds ran low, -he set out in one of Mr. Patterson’s ships for Lisbon -<span class='pageno' title='108' id='Page_108'></span> -with his wife. At Lisbon what Jerome had feared -came about. The French consul, acting on instructions -from Paris, announced that he could give -only Jerome a passport; he could not give “Miss -Patterson” one. At first Jerome swore he would -stay by his wife, but Napoleon’s emissaries made -him tempting offers. If he abandoned Miss Patterson -he would be made an Imperial Prince; he would -have high command; he would receive at least 150,000 -francs a year. Jerome succumbed. He told his -wife to travel round by sea to Amsterdam, whence -she could more easily reach Paris to join him. He -himself went direct. Naturally by Napoleon’s -orders Elizabeth was denied permission to land at -Amsterdam; she at last realized what Jerome had -done, and, as she could do nothing else, she went -to England, where she was cordially received. A -child was born to her while she was in lodgings at -Camberwell, and this son’s son was in 1906 Attorney-General -of the United States. But Elizabeth was -never recognized by the French Government as -Jerome’s wife, and eventually she went back to the -United States. There is a story that many years -after she encountered Jerome and his next wife, -Catherine of Würtemberg, in a picture gallery at -Florence. Jerome was a perfect gentleman, and -passed her by after telling Catherine who she was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Be that as it may, Jerome gained many solid -advantages from his desertion of his wife. His -debts were paid and a large income was allowed him. -He was entrusted with the command of a small naval -expedition against Algiers, and on his return to -Genoa with a few score French prisoners whom he -had released he was greeted with storms of salutes -and congratulatory addresses. From the tone of -the announcements one would gather that he had -anticipated Lord Exmouth’s feat in 1816, bombarded -the city and wrung submission from the -<span class='pageno' title='109' id='Page_109'></span> -Dey by daring and courage. As a matter of fact -the prisoners had been ransomed before he even -started for a few pounds each by a French representative -sent specially over.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was much the same with the West Indian -expedition which followed. Jerome certainly did -considerable damage to English commerce, and -somehow escaped the English cruisers, but the -official description of his exploits seemed to indicate -that he had almost subverted the British Empire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>No sooner was Jerome back in France than he -turned soldier. On his early naval expeditions he -had strutted about the deck in a Hussar uniform of -which he was very fond, but apparently he did not -see fit to appear before his troops in naval attire by -way of returning the compliment. Napoleon was -already planning to give Jerome a German kingdom, -and he therefore decided that the young man should -gain some military experience along with as much -military glory as possible. With Vandamme as his -adviser and a strong <span class='it'>corps d’armée</span> at his back, -Jerome plunged into Silesia. The Prussians were -stunned by the defeats of Jena and Auerstädt, and -by the relentless pursuit which had followed, and -they gave way before him with hardly a blow struck. -One or two fortresses showed signs of resistance, and -were blockaded. The remainder of the province -was soon in Jerome’s hands, and he and Vandamme -and the divisional commanders promptly enriched -themselves with plunder. Once more Jerome’s -achievements were blazoned abroad as feats of -marvellous skill. Napoleon was usually successful -in obtaining the gold of devotion in return for the -tinsel of propaganda, and now he was exerting all -his arts in his brother’s favour.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon’s victory of Friedland was followed by -the Treaty of Tilsit, and one of the clauses therein -gave Westphalia to Jerome. At the mature age of -<span class='pageno' title='110' id='Page_110'></span> -twenty-three the young man found himself ruler of -two millions of subjects. Moreover, he was given a -royal bride. The King of Würtemberg, it is true, -had not been a king for more than two years, but -the house of Wittelsbach could trace its ancestry -back to the time of Charlemagne. Catherine of -Würtemberg was already affianced, but at the -Emperor’s command the engagement was broken -off and Catherine was given to Jerome. Jerome’s -American marriage was declared null and void, first -by Napoleon because at the time Jerome was a -minor, and secondly by the Metropolitan of Paris, -for no particular reason. The fact that the ceremony -had been performed by a Roman Catholic archbishop -with all due regard to the forms of the Church, did -not count.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, the splendours of the new marriage -were such that the old one might well be forgotten. -It took place in the gallery of Diana at the Tuileries, -and was attended by all the shining lights of the -Empire. There was a goodly assembly of Kings, -and there were Princes and Grand Dukes in dozens. -Everybody seemed to have made a special effort to -wear as much jewellery as possible, and the display -of diamond-sewn dresses and yard-long ropes of -pearls was remembered for years afterwards. The -Democratic Empire had certainly made great strides.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Once married, Jerome departed with his Queen -to his kingdom of Westphalia. The new state was -a curious mixture of fragments of other countries. -Hesse, Hanover, Brunswick and Prussia had all contributed -to it (unwillingly), and Calvinists and -Catholics were represented in about equal numbers -and with an equal aversion each from the other. -The whole country was ruined by prolonged military -occupation; it was loaded with debt, for Napoleon -blithely began to collect money owing to the Elector -of Hesse whom he had dispossessed; nearly one-fourth -<span class='pageno' title='111' id='Page_111'></span> -of the whole area was claimed by the Emperor -to be distributed as endowments to his officers; a -huge army had to be maintained, and a French army -of occupation had to be paid and supplied; a war -contribution had to be paid to the French treasury; -and to crown it all the Continental system was slowly -crushing the life out of the industries. During the -first administrative year there was a deficit of five -million francs, and this was the smallest there was -during the whole lifetime of the country. From -then onwards the financial measures proceeded on -the well-worn way to ruin, the landmarks thereon -being forced loans, repudiation of debt, and taxes -amounting to one-half the total national income. -There is nothing remarkable in the fact that the six -years of the existence of the kingdom were marked -by two serious mutinies and three distinct rebellions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Jerome himself was quite indifferent to the -troubles of his people. He spent enormous amounts -on his palace at Cassel, and in addition he fell heavily -into personal debt despite a Civil List of five million -francs a year. His pleasures were, to say the least, -of a dubious sort, and we find hints everywhere that -the orgies at Cassel eclipsed even those at the -Parc-aux-Cerfs in the good old days of the Bourbon -régime. Catherine apparently made no violent -objection to this behaviour of her husband’s; the -graceless young scamp seems to have completely -bewitched her. He must have had the time of his -life during these years, despite occasional shocks -like the one he experienced when he read in the -<span class='it'>Moniteur</span> (the first indication he received) that one -quarter of his kingdom had been annexed to France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Only once did Jerome appear on active service -during this period, and that was to command thirty -or forty thousand men during the Russian campaign -of 1812. He travelled with all the luxuries he could -think of, equerries, cooks, valets, barbers, mistresses, -<span class='pageno' title='112' id='Page_112'></span> -until his headquarters appeared like a small town. -But the hardships of war did not last long; Jerome -was found wanting in military ability. His failure -to keep up to the difficult time-table Napoleon set -him during the advance into Lithuania led to his -being placed under Davout’s command. Neither he -nor Davout liked the arrangement, and Jerome threw -up his command and went back to Cassel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Here he enjoyed himself for one more year. -Even he had flinched from reviving the old <span class='it'>droit du -seigneur</span>, but he did his best in that direction without -that amount of ceremony. But the sands were -running out as the French armies fell back from the -Niemen to the Oder, from the Oder to the Elbe, and -at last the battle of Leipzig laid open all the country -between the Elbe and the Rhine to the triumphant -Allies. The Kingdom of Westphalia vanished in a -night, like a dream; the Westphalian army went over -to the Allies <span class='it'>en bloc</span>, and Jerome returned to France -with barely two hundred men at his back.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Hundred Days gave Jerome one last chance -of displaying his manhood, and, curiously enough, -he made the most of it. He was given command of -a division of Reille’s corps in the Waterloo campaign, -and he led it with unexpected dash and vigour. He -fought heroically at Quatre Bras, exposing himself -recklessly in the dreadful fighting in the wood. At -Waterloo he headed the attack on Hougomont, leading -assault after assault with unflinching bravery. He -was wounded, but remained in action, and at the close -of the day he was seen striving to rally his men when -they broke panic-stricken before the allied advance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Waterloo almost atones in the general estimation -for Jerome’s long and useless life. After the second -Restoration he drifted idly about Europe, accompanied -by his devoted Catherine; when the Orleans -monarchy fell he hastened back to France. Along -with Louis Napoleon he planned the <span class='it'>coup d’état</span>, and -<span class='pageno' title='113' id='Page_113'></span> -for the rest of his life, until 1860, he was once -more a prominent subject of the French Empire. -Napoleon III. made him a Marshal; his son married -a princess of the house of Savoy, and he died comfortably -in bed at the age of seventy-six. He never -met with any fatal retribution for his callous desertion -of Elizabeth Patterson, or for the wild debauchery of -his youth. There seems to be no moral to attach to -the tale of his career.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of the remaining descendants in the male line of -the house of Bonaparte there is little to tell. One of -them, Lucien, a grandson of Lucien, Napoleon’s -brother, rose to the eminence of Cardinal; one or -two of them have shown ability in various branches -of science; the curious tendency to literature has -repeatedly cropped out; but none of them has ever -achieved anything really striking. Their novels are -more feeble even than Garibaldi’s, while their political -achievements are of course beneath comparison. -Some of them have fought duels, and some of them -have committed manslaughter. Some of them have -even attained the dazzling heights of the French -chamber of deputies. But there is not one of them -who would receive two lines of notice in any fair-sized -book of reference were it not for his relationship -to the great Napoleon. The present head of the -house is Napoleon Victor Jerome, who married in -1910 a Coburg princess, a member of the royal family -of Belgium. He is Napoleon VI., if the principle of -legitimacy can yet be applied to the house of Bonaparte; -anyway, he shows not the least desire to -become Napoleon VI.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Had Napoleon had no brothers, he would -probably have been more successful; had he had any -brothers of equal ability they would have pulled each -other down in Europe, if they had not cut each -other’s throats years before in Corsica; as it is, he -stands as unique in his family as he does in his age.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo113.jpg' alt='' id='il113' style='width:70%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>JOSEPH NAPOLEON ROI DE NAPLES et de SICILE<br/> ET ROI D’ESPAGNE ET DES INDES<br/> <span class='it'>Né le 7 janvier 1768. Sacré et couronné le<br/> 3e Mars 1806.</span></p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='114' id='Page_114'></span><h1>CHAPTER XI<br/> <span class='sub-head'>SISTERS</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>I</span>F Napoleon’s brothers were all a generally hopeless -lot, the same can by no means be said of -his sisters. These stood out head and shoulders -above the other women of the time; they were all -distinguished by their force of character; whether -they were married to nonentities or personalities they -all did their best to wear the breeches—but they did -not flinch from wearing nothing at all if the whim -took them. They were all handsome women, and -one of them, Pauline, was generally considered to be -the most beautiful woman of the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon’s sisters resembled him much more -closely than did his brothers. Xerxes, watching -Artemisia fighting desperately at Salamis, exclaimed, -“This woman plays the man while my men play the -woman,” and a dispassionate observer of the conduct -of the rulers of the countries of Europe in the -Napoleonic era might well say the same. One has -only to compare Joseph Bonaparte flying from -Vittoria, or Murat flying from Tolentino, with -Caroline rallying the Neapolitans, Louise of Prussia -fighting desperately hard against fate at Tilsit, and -Marie Caroline of Bourbon directing Sicily’s struggle -with the great conqueror.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are obvious differences, too, between -Napoleon’s treatment of his brothers and his treatment -of his sisters. Joseph and Jerome and Louis -<span class='pageno' title='115' id='Page_115'></span> -he bullied unmercifully, but it was far otherwise with -Pauline, Caroline and Elise. He himself admitted -that he always “formed into line of battle” in preparation -for an interview with Caroline, and although -authorities are at variance as to when he actually said -to his family that anyone would think he was trying -to rob them of the inheritance of the late King, -their father, it is certain that the remark was -addressed to his sisters and mother. They were all -of them women with a very keen sense of what they -wanted, and they fought like tiger-cats to obtain it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The three girls all married before or during the -Consulate, when Napoleon had not yet attained the -heights he reached later, so that the marriages they -made were by no means as brilliant as they might -have been, and fell far short of the marriages which -Napoleon arranged for much more distant relatives -who became marriageable at a later period. Elise -was old enough to experience acutely the trials of -poverty which overtook the family before Napoleon -was promoted to important commands. She was -sent as a child to school at St. Cyr, a state-supported -institution under the patronage of the Bourbons, and -had to leave there at the same time as the Bonaparte -family had to fly from Corsica to Marseilles. During -the next few years she was rather a trial to her -family, for she flirted with every man she met, eligible -and ineligible. One of her admirers was Admiral -Truguet, who was a thoroughly good sailor and quite -a good match at that time, but Madame Bonaparte -declined to allow the affair to develop. In the end -it was a fellow Corsican, Félix Baciocchi, who gained -her hand. Baciocchi was a distant connection of the -Bonaparte family, and also, by a curious coincidence, -he was a relation of Charles Andrea Pozzo di Borgo, -another Corsican, who is believed to have been at -feud with the Bonapartes, and who certainly distinguished -himself, while in the service of various -<span class='pageno' title='116' id='Page_116'></span> -European monarchs, by his virulent hatred of -Napoleon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But Baciocchi did not distinguish himself at all. -He was a complete nonentity, with neither the desire -nor the capacity to achieve power. At the marriage -Elise only brought him thirty thousand francs as -dowry (her share of the Bonaparte property, now -recovered from the Paolists), but after 1797 Napoleon -was able to make Elise presents of considerably -greater value. Baciocchi was then a major of -infantry; but during the Consulate his wife -endeavoured to obtain higher military command -for him. So persistently did she scheme to this -end that at last in self-defence Napoleon made him -a senator in order to cut short his military career.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Pauline, the next sister, married Leclerc, a -capable soldier, who rendered Napoleon valuable -service during the <span class='it'>coup d’état</span> of Brumaire. He, at -least, was worthy of promotion, and Bonaparte gave -it to him lavishly. But it was Caroline, the youngest, -who looked after herself best. Most of the generals -of the Consulate sought her hand, including Lannes, -but both Napoleon and Caroline desired alliance with -the greatest of them all, Moreau. However, Moreau -declined the honour (thereby directly bringing about -his own exile soon after), and Caroline chose for -herself a husband of whose military talents she was -sufficiently sure to be certain that high command -would be given him, but who also was sufficiently -weak-willed to be well under her thumb. Lannes -was of too lofty a type to please her in this -respect, and his personal devotion to Napoleon was -undoubted; Caroline therefore selected a young -cavalry officer, Murat.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Pauline experienced an unfortunate beginning to -the career she had planned for herself and her -husband. Leclerc was appointed to the command of -the expeditionary force which was sent to subdue -<span class='pageno' title='117' id='Page_117'></span> -Hayti, and Pauline was ordered to accompany him. -In vain she pleaded ill-health; in vain she said that -her complexion would be ruined by the West Indian -sun; Napoleon was adamant. Pauline kept up the -plea of ill-health sufficiently well to be carried on -board ship at Brest in a litter, but the expedition -started. As was only to be expected, it ended in -disastrous failure. Toussaint l’Ouverture, the leader -of the rebellion, was indeed captured and sent to -France to perish in a freezing mountain prison, but -yellow fever attacked the French troops, and they -died in thousands. Leclerc was one of those who -perished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon himself was able to gain some satisfaction -even from the failure, because the men he had -sent had all been drawn from the Army of the Rhine, -and they were all guilty of the crime of believing that -Moreau was a great man, and that Hohenlinden was -a greater victory than Marengo. But, as has been -said, the French died in thousands; the negroes -fought stoutly, and at last after fifteen thousand -Frenchmen had perished only a miserable fragment -of the expeditionary force survived to be withdrawn -under Rochambeau. Pauline returned to France to -deplore her ruined complexion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, with the establishment of the Empire -the sisters found plenty to occupy their minds in -acquiring as much spoil as possible. Money they -sought greedily, and Napoleon gave them millions of -francs. They shed tears of rage when they found -that the Emperor expected them to remain content -with being plain Mesdames Murat, Leclerc and -Baciocchi, while the hated Josephine was Sa Majesté -Impériale et Royale l’Impératrice et Reine, and -while plain Julie Clary and Hortense Beauharnais -(Joseph’s and Louis’s wives) were Imperial and Royal -Highnesses. Napoleon gave way to their bitter -pleadings and at one stroke created them Princesses -<span class='pageno' title='118' id='Page_118'></span> -of the Empire, making their husbands Princes at the -same time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These names, Elise, Pauline and Caroline, were -not the baptismal names of the ladies concerned. At -baptism they had been given Italian names, each of -them attached to the ever popular name of Maria. -Their mother was Maria Letizia; while Elise was -really Maria Anna, Pauline, Maria Paoletta and -Caroline, Maria Annunziata. It is by these names -that they are described on their marriage certificates, -but they dropped them soon afterwards to assume -names which appealed to them more. Changing -their names did not change their natures; they -intrigued and schemed and plotted; they flirted; they -sought favours; they quarrelled with their husbands, -with their sisters-in-law, and with each other; in fact -they exhibited all the fierce self-seeking which -characterized the ladies of the old monarchy. There -was this difference, however. Fifty years before the -Court ladies had intrigued for places, and for -thousands of francs. Now they intrigued for -kingdoms and millions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Caroline early took first place in the race for -power. Her husband, Murat, distinguished himself -in the Austerlitz campaign by capturing the great -bridge over the Danube by a trick which savoured -rather of treachery, and by bold heading of cavalry -charges at Austerlitz itself. He was already a Prince -and second senior Marshal of the Empire; the only -possible promotion left for him was a sovereignty. -Napoleon, carving out his Confederation of the -Rhine, found him one. A tiny area on the Rhine -was obtained by exchange from Prussia and Bavaria, -and Murat and Caroline became Grand Duke and -Grand Duchess of Berg and Cleves. Caroline was -in no way satisfied. She egged her husband on to -demand increases of territory, privileges of toll on -the Rhine, and so on, until the little state had set -<span class='pageno' title='119' id='Page_119'></span> -both France and Prussia in a ferment. The tension -hardly relaxed until, a month or two later, war broke -out between the two countries. Murat went away -with the Grand Army to Jena, Eylau and Friedland; -Caroline stayed behind in Paris to guard their -interests. She did it well. She indulged in an outrageous -flirtation with Junot, Governor of Paris, -and hints have not been wanting that her purpose -was to arrange a revolution rather on the same lines -as Mallet tried to follow in 1812. At her palace of -the Elysée (now the official residence of the President -of the Third Republic) she gave the most brilliant -fêtes imaginable. She worked like a slave to gain -popularity, so that she could gain the throne in the -event of her brother’s death. Then Tilsit followed -Friedland, and the Emperor returned. The -campaign had brought more glory to Murat than -he had as yet gained. He had headed the marvellous -pursuit after Jena, when he had captured fortresses -with a few regiments of Hussars, and it was largely -through him that practically the whole Prussian army -had fallen into the hands of the French. At Eylau, -when Augereau’s corps had come reeling back -through the blizzard, shattered and almost annihilated, -when it seemed as though the Grand Army -was at last going to taste defeat, Napoleon had called -on Murat to save the day. Murat replied by charging -at the head of eighteen thousand cavalry. He -broke up the first Russian line, captured thousands -of prisoners, and beat back the Russians until Davout -and Ney were in position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Naturally, he reaped vast rewards. His Grand -Duchy was doubled in size; millions of francs were -bestowed upon him and upon Caroline; but they -were hugely dissatisfied. Murat had hoped for the -crown of Poland, or, failing that, for a whole -kingdom in Germany. But Poland was given to the -King of Saxony, and the creation of Jerome Bonaparte’s -<span class='pageno' title='120' id='Page_120'></span> -kingdom of Westphalia shut out all hopes of -the further expansion of Berg. Caroline and Murat -were furious. Murat showed his rage by hinting at -rebellion; Caroline used her native Corsican guile and -became as friendly to Napoleon as possible, helping -him in his affairs with women, recounting to him the -tittle-tattle of the drawing-rooms of Paris, and even -at times giving him the shelter of her roof to conceal -from Josephine some of his more flagrant unfaithfulnesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, Murat was soon in employment again. -He was appointed to the command in Spain, -where Napoleon’s tortuous intrigues to dispossess -the unspeakable Bourbons were beginning to take -effect. Murat certainly achieved fair success. He -gained possession of the Spanish fortresses, stamped -out the little spurts of rebellion which occasionally -flamed out, and by the time the outrageous treaty of -Bayonne had been signed he was in a position to -hand over to Napoleon the greater part of the -country. Another disappointment awaited him. -He had hoped that all this mysterious business would -result in his being given the crown of Spain—but -Joseph Bonaparte received it instead, and Murat and -Caroline were forced to be content with Joseph’s -former kingdom of Naples. Caroline was at last a -Queen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The royal pair began at once to treat their new -kingdom much as Sancho Panza had determined to -treat his island. Taxes were increased, the army -was reorganized, and preparations were set on foot -for the conquest of Sicily. To gain popularity with -the Neapolitans they abrogated some of the more -obnoxious decrees of Murat’s predecessor, and they -further employed all their arts to blacken his memory, -so that they would by contrast appear the better -rulers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But Napoleon nipped this scheme in the bud at -<span class='pageno' title='121' id='Page_121'></span> -once. Every day brought fresh thunders from Paris. -The Emperor sent furious orders forbidding certain -measures, enjoining others, until it became very -evident that he was determined to rule Naples himself, -although he was content to allow Murat to bear -the title and honours of King. Poor Murat could -do nothing right. Any well-advised action on his -part was looked upon as potential treason, while any -failure called forth tornadoes of wrath from Paris. -When, by a well-planned raid, he captured Capri -from Sir Hudson Lowe, he was actually censured -for informing the Emperor through the Ministry of -Foreign Affairs instead of through the Ministry for -War! Murat and Caroline chafed against their -bonds, but while the Empire stood firm they were -powerless.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Meanwhile, Pauline and Elise, although not as -successful as Caroline, had nevertheless attained to -some measure of sovereignty. Elise contrived for -the greater part of the time to have her dullard -husband sent away on various duties, while she herself -flirted gaily with every man she could. As a -matter of fact, her flirting was never so serious as was -her sisters’; she had another outlet for her ingenuity -in that she was passionately devoted to the stage and -to all connected with it. She visited the theatre as -often as she could; she read plays in hundreds, and -she indulged in amateur theatricals whenever possible. -When Italy was being parcelled out into fiefs by -Napoleon, she prevailed on her brother to allot to -her the principality of Piombino in full sovereignty, -and later she contrived to have Lucca added to her -little state. Here she settled down for a time, with -all the paraphernalia of sovereignty, equerries, -chamberlains, ladies-in-waiting, and especially a -Court troupe of actors. Baciocchi, her husband, had -indeed been given the title of Prince of Piombino, -but Elise alone had been given the principality. -<span class='pageno' title='122' id='Page_122'></span> -Baciocchi was merely his wife’s subject, and Elise -made the most of it. He could never worry her -again, for Elise allotted him apartments far distant -from her own, and never saw him without a third -person being present. Scandal said that other men -were allowed greater privileges, but there is nothing -very definite from which one may draw reliable -conclusions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Soon Elise received further promotion. Napoleon -cast a covetous eye upon the kingdom of Etruria -which had set up in 1802, and by treaty with Spain -he arranged to give the widowed Queen of Etruria -(a Spanish princess) a new kingdom of Northern -Lusitania in exchange. That this new kingdom was -to be carved out of Portugal troubled him not at all; -he even promised to make Godoy (First Minister of -Spain) Prince of the Algarve, another Portuguese -district. He had very little intention of fulfilling -either promise, but they enabled him to send Junot -marching hotfoot on Lisbon, and to annex Tuscany -to the Empire. Elise seized her opportunity. By -cajolery and blandishment she persuaded Napoleon -to erect Tuscany into a government-general, and to -confer upon her the ruling power with the title of -Grand Duchess of Tuscany. Poor Baciocchi was -appointed general of division in command of the -French garrison. Elise settled down in the Pitti -palace at Florence, and proceeded to rule the cradle -of the Renaissance, the erstwhile domain of the -Medicis, as thoroughly as her brother would allow -her.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Pauline’s widowhood ended in a much more -splendid match than was made by any of the other -Bonapartes. She took as her second husband Prince -Camillo Borghese, the head of one of the most -renowned houses of Italy. The marriage was not -a success (no Bonaparte marriage was, at that time), -but Borghese’s wealth and the presents Napoleon -<span class='pageno' title='123' id='Page_123'></span> -heaped upon her enabled Pauline to indulge every -whim of which she was capable. Proud of her -reputation as the most beautiful woman of the time, -she did all she could to enhance and set off her -beauty. Like Poppæa, she bathed every day in -milk—a hot milk bath followed by a cold milk -shower. She surrounded herself with negro servants -and dwarfs, by way of contrast, and her extravagances -and wanton waste of money were the talk of -the whole Empire. Canova carved her statue, and -despite his cold classicism we can still perceive in -that recumbent, self-satisfied figure the fiery, tempestuous -woman who was once Pauline. Her posing -semi-nude, even to such a sculptor as Canova, called -forth a storm of comment from a gossip-loving -Empire. The tale was told that when Pauline was -asked if she did not feel uncomfortable, posing half-dressed, -she replied, “Oh no, there was a fire in the -room.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When Elise received Piombino, Pauline begged -Guastalla from Napoleon, and as Duchess she, too, -held sovereignty. Borghese was made Governor-General -of the Piedmontese departments, and was -sent to Turin with an enormous Civil List to play -the part of a semi-royalty, and to reconcile the Piedmontese -to the loss of their Sardinian king. Such a -task was naturally agreeable to Pauline, and in Turin -she and Borghese did their best to astonish the provincials -with a series of fêtes of unheard-of opulence. -Pauline was the most talked about of all Bonaparte’s -sisters; the voice of adulation praised her beauty; the -voice of vituperation hinted frightful things about -her morals. She was accused of hideous vices, of too -great an affection for her brothers, of a lunatic -passion for various men. Pauline apparently did not -mind. She went gaily on through life, quarrelling -with Borghese, spending money like water, indulging -in hectic episodes with artists and soldiers, and -<span class='pageno' title='124' id='Page_124'></span> -generally recalling to mind the old days of the -Borgias and the Viscontis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the publication of the fate of Napoleon’s -Russian expedition a shudder ran through the -Empire. Murat, whom Napoleon had left in command -of the wreck of the Grand Army, deserted his -charge and rushed home so as to be at hand to -preserve his own kingdom should the Empire fall. -Prussia became Russia’s ally. Sweden, under Bernadotte, -had already done the same. Napoleon made -a gigantic effort; in three months he raised and -equipped an army of three hundred thousand men; -he beat back the Allies, winning victories at Lützen -and Bautzen; for a space it seemed as if he would -regain his old European domination. Consequently -the pendulum of his allies’ attitude swung back once -more towards faithfulness, and Murat left Naples -once more to command the cavalry of the Grand -Army. But already Caroline and he had negotiated -a secret convention with Austria by which he would -declare war on France if called upon to do so. Elise -in Tuscany had decided to join him, although, -unfortunately for her, she extracted no definite -promise from Austria that she would retain her -throne.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus, while Murat was fighting for the Grand -Army, leading charges made by fifty and seventy -squadrons at a time, and capturing twelve thousand -Austrian prisoners in a single battle, his wife in -Naples was assuring Austria of his devotion to -Austria; she was recruiting the Neapolitan army to -the utmost, and, while not actually moving against -France, she was refusing to allow a single Neapolitan -battalion to go to Napoleon’s help. Then came the -French defeats of 1813, culminating in the disaster -of Leipzig. It was obvious that the Empire could -not endure much longer. Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg, -all turned against Napoleon, and Murat realized -<span class='pageno' title='125' id='Page_125'></span> -that if he delayed further the Allies would not have -so pressing a need for his aid, and he would be -unable to secure his throne by his treachery. Without -further hesitation he left the beaten Emperor, -hurried across Europe through the first snows of -autumn, and reached Naples early in November. -The Neapolitan army was at last going to advance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The advance was a very slow and cautious one. -Eugène de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, was -fighting fiercely in Venetia against the Austrians. -Tempting offers were made to him by the Allies, -but he refused them; his dignified replies are -worthy of Bayard or Francis I. But Murat and -his Neapolitans were moving steadily northward; -even now he had made no public declaration as to -which side he was on, and in private he and Caroline -were assuring Eugène, Napoleon and the Austrians -at one and the same time of their unfailing support. -Nor was this all. They were further intriguing -with the infant United Italy party in an endeavour -to increase their dominion in that way; while in -addition they had made some sort of agreement with -Elise Bonaparte in Tuscany. It would be hard to -discover anywhere in history an equally loathsome -example of double-dealing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Murat occupied the Papal States, Tuscany, and -portions of the Kingdom of Italy, but he still -refrained from making any open attack on either -French or Austrians. Not until March 6th, 1814, -when he received from Caroline definite news of the -certainty of the fall of the Empire, did he attack -Eugène’s forces. He achieved little, and after two -fierce little skirmishes he subsided once more into -inaction. At last official intimation of Napoleon’s -fall came to hand, and, abandoning Elise to her fate, -Murat returned to Naples. Further diplomacy confirmed -him in his possession of Naples; the only -person concerned who kept to his pledged word in -<span class='pageno' title='126' id='Page_126'></span> -all the intricacies of the negotiations was Francis of -Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus 1815 found Napoleon’s three sisters in very -different situations. Caroline was still a Queen; -Elise, turned out of Tuscany by the Austrians, was -a pensioner on her bounty; while Pauline, who alone -had remained faithful to her brother, was living with -Napoleon at Elba. Suddenly there came another -dramatic change, for Napoleon escaped from Elba, -and within a few days was once more Emperor of -the French. Italy was again plunged into a ferment. -Murat and Caroline were naturally anxious, for they -could not expect that Napoleon would forgive their -black treachery of the year before, while it was only -too obvious that not a single country in Europe -retained any interest in their possession of the -throne of Naples. In these circumstances Murat -took the first heroic decision of his life, and decided -to cut the Gordian knot by force of arms. He -declared war against Austria, proclaimed a United -Italy, and with fifty thousand men he marched -northward to establish himself as King of Italy. It -was a vain effort. The Neapolitan army was a -wretched force, and Murat himself was worse than -useless in independent command. The Austrian -army hurriedly concentrated, defeated Murat in -one or two minor actions, and finally utterly routed -him at Tolentino. The Neapolitans deserted in -thousands, and Murat re-entered his dominions with -only five thousand men left. The Austrians followed -him up remorselessly; the Sicilians were preparing -an expedition against him; and all that was left for -Murat to do was to abdicate and fly for his life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Caroline was successful in obtaining the protection -of Francis of Austria, and she soon went -off to settle down in Austria with a pension and -a residence. Murat had reached France, and for -some weeks he was in hiding in Marseilles. After -<span class='pageno' title='127' id='Page_127'></span> -Waterloo he left by sea to join his wife, but on his -way he changed his mind and took his second heroic -decision. Napoleon had regained France simply by -appearing in person before his army; why should -not Murat regain Naples in the same way? Murat -landed with a score of companions at Pizzo in -Calabria, and marched into the market place with -his escort shouting “Long live King Joachim!” -For a moment there was an astonished silence, and -then the townspeople fell on the little party. Not -for nothing had Murat decorated every mile of every -road in Calabria with a gallows from which hung -captured bandits; every soul in Pizzo must have -had a blood feud with their late King. Battered -with sticks and stones, Murat was seized and flung -into prison, and five days later he was tried and shot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Murat’s attempt was the last spurt of the -Napoleonic feeling for a long period. Not until, -with the passage of years, the Legend had been -built up, do we hear of any surprising action or -heroic deed. Europe sank into a slough of inaction, -crushed down by the weight of the Holy Alliance -and the burden of accumulated debts. The most -typical action of a dull generation was the establishment -on the throne of France of fat, pathetic, -bourgeois Louis Philippe as King of the French. -It was a safe thing to do, and Louis Philippe and his -Amelia did their best to make it remain safe. No -risks were taken until the movement of 1848. -Happiness has no history, and there is precious -little history about the period 1815-48. Had the -Holy Alliance had its way, there would be even less. -Somehow one cannot help feeling that the dullness -of the period is the dullness of unhappiness. It was -the time when “order reigned in Warsaw,” when -little children died in droves in English factories, -when in Naples the negation of God was erected -into a system of government. Historians may sneer -<span class='pageno' title='128' id='Page_128'></span> -at the ineffectiveness of the Napoleonides; they -may point to a pillaged, blood-drenched Europe -writhing under the heel of a Corsican Emperor; -they can draw horrible pictures of the sacks of -Lübeck or Badajoz, but they are unconvincing -when they attempt to prove that there was more -unhappiness under the Empire than under the Holy -Alliance. Peace has its defeats as well as war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This digression may be unpardonable, but it was -nevertheless inevitable. Let us minimize our error, -even if we cannot repair it, by turning back to the -consideration of three fair and frail women whom we -left thrust back unwillingly into a private station of -life. One of them did not long survive the calamities -of 1814. This was Elise. The Allies refused -her request to join Napoleon at St. Helena, and she -lived quietly in Italy until her death in 1820. She -was only forty-two when she died. Pauline had the -advantage over her sisters of having a husband whose -position was independent of the Empire. Prince -Borghese was a very considerable person in Rome, -and Pauline for some time was a leading figure in -Italian society. It did not last long, however. She -quarrelled with her husband; her beauty left her; -Austrian, French and Papal surveillance worried -her, and she died in 1825.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Caroline, the most capable and cold-hearted of -all the Bonapartes, after Napoleon, bore her troubles -with more dignity and for a much longer time. As -the Countess of Lipona (an anagram of Napoli) she -lived for some time in Austria; she travelled restlessly -about; she seemed in fact to have completely -recovered from the shock of the loss of her husband -and her throne, when at last a whole series of deaths -broke down her reserve and shortened her life. -Pauline and Elise, as has been said, were already -dead; in 1832 the Prince Imperial (Napoleon II.) -died at Vienna; Prince Borghese died in the same -<span class='pageno' title='129' id='Page_129'></span> -year. Another brother-in-law, Baciocchi, died in -1834; Catherine of Westphalia, her best beloved -sister-in-law, died in 1835, and then in 1836 Madame -Mère, her stern but adored mother, also died. -Caroline endured her loneliness for a little while -longer, but she died in 1839. Even she, almost the -last of her generation, was only fifty-six at her -death.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>None of the Bonaparte family was as long-lived -as Napoleon’s mother. Maria Letizia Ramolino was -certainly one of the greatest women of the period. -Elise Bonaparte might be called the Semiramis of -Italy; Caroline might intrigue for Empires; Pauline -might be the most beautiful woman of France; but -their mother combined all their good qualities with -very few of their bad ones. To bring up a family of -eight children thoroughly well on an income of less -than one hundred pounds a year in a revolution-torn -country like Corsica is in itself a remarkable feat, -though hardly likely in unfavourable circumstances -to gain mention in history, but to do it when handicapped -by a husband like Carlo Bonaparte is more -remarkable still. The strain of those dreadful years -in Ajaccio would have broken down anyone of stuff -less stern than Maria Letizia’s; pitched battles were -fought in the streets outside the Bonapartes’ house; -three-quarters of Corsica were at feud with the -Bonapartes and the party they represented; death -threatened them all at different times, while all the -time a most bitter, grinding poverty harried them -unmercifully.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Maria Letizia came through the ordeal unbroken -in body or spirit. Even Napoleon’s fierce pride -humbled itself before her, and her other children -were her slaves. But she had a woman’s weaknesses -as well as a man’s strength. She was bitterly jealous -of her daughter-in-law Josephine; she was bigoted -in church matters; and she fought like a tigress in -<span class='pageno' title='130' id='Page_130'></span> -the cause of whichever of her children was experiencing -misfortune. When Lucien left France in -disgrace in consequence of his marriage to Madame -Jouberthon, his mother strove desperately hard to -re-establish him. She went to Italy to be near him, -and endeavoured, by absenting herself at the time -of the coronation, to force Napoleon to recall Lucien -and herself together. However, her great son outwitted -her on this occasion, for he dispensed with -her presence, and yet arranged with David the -artist for her portrait to appear along with the other -French dignitaries in the celebrated picture of the -coronation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Letizia had a very good opinion of her own -position. When Napoleon became Emperor, and -made his brothers and sisters Imperial Highnesses, -she demanded some greater title for herself. -Napoleon was in a quandary, for on consulting -precedents he found that no French king’s mother -had ever been given any such honour if she had -never been queen. Letizia insisted, and, almost at -his wits’ end, Napoleon at last gave her a singular -dignity. He awarded her the same position and -precedence as used to be given under the Bourbons -to the wife of the king’s second son. The king’s -second son was Monsieur, and his wife was Madame. -Letizia was named Madame, and as a subsidiary title -she was called Mère de S.M. l’Empéreur et Roi. -Almost at once the titles were merged together in -common speech, and Letizia was called Madame -Mère everywhere except at strict official gatherings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By the time that the Empire was firmly founded, -and all her children except Lucien were seated on -thrones, Letizia was able to give free rein to the -passion which came only second with her to her love -for her children. It is said that shipwrecked sailors -who have been starved for a long time cannot help, -after being rescued, hoarding fragments of food for -<span class='pageno' title='131' id='Page_131'></span> -fear of another period of famine. With Madame -Mère a similar state of affairs prevailed. She had -felt the pinch of poverty for fifty years, and in no -circumstances could she endure it again. She still -lived as cheaply as she could, and she saved her -money like a miser. She coaxed Napoleon into -giving her an annual income of a million francs, and -she did not spend a quarter of it. She did her best -to obtain a sovereignty for herself, not that she -wanted to rule, but because she could sell the fief -back to the French and invest the proceeds. She -made money by acute speculation. She clung like -grim death to every sou which came within her reach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet avarice pure and simple was not the sole -motive of her actions. Just as a prophet has no -honour in his own country, so the Emperor and the -Kings and Princesses who were her children still -seemed to be children to her, and all their talk of -sovereignty was little better than childish prattling. -She did not believe for one moment that the Empire -could long endure, and in this her judgment was -more acute than that of the majority of European -statesmen. Wellington, as early as 1809, had seen -through the shams and pretences of the glittering -Empire, but few other men, not even Metternich, -agreed with him at that time. But Madame Mère -saw the end long before it came, and it was against -that time of need that she saved so avariciously. -Her judgment was proved accurate, and her savings -proved useful in 1814.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1802 she had befriended Lucien; in 1805, -Jerome; in 1810, Louis; now the greatest of her -sons had met with adversity, and Letizia rushed to -his assistance. She shared his exile in Elba, and -from her own purse she provided the money which -enabled him to maintain his Lilliputian court. She -was by his side during the Hundred Days, and after -he had been sent to St. Helena she returned to Italy -<span class='pageno' title='132' id='Page_132'></span> -and resumed the headship of the family. Her wealth -as well as her marvellous personality assured her the -respect of her sons and daughters. The death of the -Prince Imperial in 1832 was a terrible shock to her; -she had long been looking to him to restore the fame -of the exiled house, and she had arranged to leave -him all her money and papers. She did not long -survive his death, but died in 1836, at the age of -eighty-six.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>She lies buried in Ajaccio, and the inscription -over her tomb can still make the casual tourist catch -his breath, and still makes the blood of Corsican -youth run a little faster—</p> - -<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:1em;'> <!-- rend=';fs:.8em;' --> -<p class='line0' style='font-size:.8em;'>MARIA LETIZIA RAMOLINO BONAPARTE.</p> -<p class='line0' style='margin-top:.5em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:.8em;'>MATER REGUM.</p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo132.jpg' alt='' id='il132' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>CAROLINE MURAT<br/> (née BONAPARTE)</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='133' id='Page_133'></span><h1>CHAPTER XII<br/> <span class='sub-head'>STARS OF LESSER MAGNITUDE</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>‟B</span>AD troops do not exist,” said Napoleon -on one occasion. “There are only bad -officers.” Napoleon did his best therefore -to find good officers, and trusted that the rank -and file would through them become good soldiers. -And yet, was he successful either in his end or in -his method? The army of 1796, which he did -not train, was timid in retreat though terrible in -advance. The men were fanatics, and similar -strengths and weaknesses are typical of fanatics in -large bodies. In 1800 Napoleon had an army which -he could manœuvre in line, and which bore the -dreadful strain of Marengo without breaking. Half -the men in the ranks, however, were untrained boys, -who, as Napoleon’s despatches tell us, were ignorant -a few days before the battle as to which eye they -should use to aim their muskets. Marengo was -largely a personal triumph for Napoleon; it was his -vehement encouragement, coupled with the confident -expectation of Desaix’ arrival, which held the men -together during that long-drawn agony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The peace which followed Hohenlinden gave -Napoleon a chance to train an army as he wished, -and the Austerlitz campaign found him at the head -of an army of two hundred thousand men, half of -them veterans, all of them of very considerable -length of service, who were to a man inspired with -<span class='pageno' title='134' id='Page_134'></span> -the utmost enthusiasm for him and for the Empire. -Yet at Austerlitz the line was abandoned almost -entirely in favour of the column; the columns showed -evident signs of disintegration even when victorious. -It was already a little obvious that the Imperial -armies were only adapted to a furious offensive -effort, and that failure of this effort meant unlimited -catastrophe. At Jena the Prussians were too heavily -outnumbered to offer any serious resistance, but at -Eylau the French army was only saved from destruction -after the failure of their first offensive -by the fact that Napoleon held ready at hand -eighteen thousand cavalry, and by the constitutional -sluggishness of the Russian army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Friedland offered the last example of a really -heroic defensive by an Imperial force, but the soul -of that defensive was Lannes. Few other men -could have held a French army corps together -against superior forces as did Lannes on that -fateful anniversary of Marengo. After Friedland -we find the French army growing progressively -poorer and more unreliable. We read of panics -at Wagram, of the introduction of regimental -artillery to give the infantry confidence, of shameless -skulking on the field of battle and of heavy -desertion while on the march. Discipline was -fading at the same time as devotion to the -Emperor was losing some of its force. In the -Russian campaign of 1812 the Grand Army had -barely crossed the frontier before it began to go -to pieces. Napoleon could not trust his men to -manœuvre at Borodino, and in consequence he had -to rely on frontal attacks made against elaborate -fieldworks defended by the most stubborn of all -Continental infantry. At the crisis of the battle -he refused to fling the Imperial Guard into the -struggle; some thought it was because he was too -far from his base to risk his best reserve; some -<span class='pageno' title='135' id='Page_135'></span> -suspected Bessières of having implored him not to -waste his best troops; but perhaps the reason was -a more logical one. Had the Guard been sent -forward and been beaten back, the whole army -would have fallen back routed; at Waterloo -Napoleon took the risk and lost; at Borodino he -refused to take it and was satisfied with an indecisive -gain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Grand Army perished in Russia, but in -three months Napoleon raised, trained and equipped -three hundred thousand more men and was for a -time once more successful. Curiously enough, this -raw infantry of 1813 was to all intents and -purposes of greater military value than the two or -three year trained infantry of 1812. The army -of 1812 possessed the little knowledge proverbially -dangerous, and would not willingly expose itself to -sacrifice, but the novices of 1813 knew nothing of -war, and suffered losses and privations which would -have roused veterans to mutiny. At Lützen Ney’s -corps of half-grown boys endured for hours the -attack of the whole Allied force, and fought like -demons in the shelter of the villages of Gorschen -and Kaya. At Bautzen the French attacked with -a dash and fury reminiscent of Elchingen or Saalfeld. -Before Dresden they accomplished a march which -easily bears comparison with anything achieved in -1796. But the decline of their fame had already -begun. At the Katzbach, at Gross Beeren, at -Dennewitz, the conscripts fled in panic. They -had discovered by this time that a battle generally -implies the sacrifice of one portion of the army while -the rest gains the victory, and they were one and all -determined not to be the sacrifice. At Leipzig -what was left of the army of 1813 lost the greater -part of its numbers—a new lesson to the effect that -it is easier to surrender than to fight had been -learned. Napoleon’s last victorious phase, in the -<span class='pageno' title='136' id='Page_136'></span> -campaign of France in 1814, coincides with his -use of a fresh army of raw conscripts, and his -surrender took place when the men of the ranks had -once more learnt the lessons of their predecessors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Waterloo, the last battle of the Empire, -epitomizes all these observations. The French -attacked with dash, but a single reverse was -sufficient to weaken the infantry so much that no -support was forthcoming for the later cavalry -attacks. A powerful counter-attack by the enemy -brought about, not merely retreat, but unspeakable -panic. Practically every battalion which had been -in action broke and fled. The Guard, which had -moved forward so majestically, dispersed like the -merest conscripts. The only troops which held -together were the reserve battalions of the Old -Guard, which had not yet been engaged, and for -a time Lobau’s corps at Planchenoit. The Prussians -after Jena were not so hopelessly disorganized as -were the French after Waterloo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon undoubtedly appreciated this weakness -of his army, and this explains the reckless manner -in which he sought battle at all costs, and the risks -he cheerfully ran in his endeavour to get to grips -with his enemy. His headlong, energetic strategy -gave him the initiative, and this initiative he -retained on the field of battle. Jena, Eylau, -Eckmühl, Aspern, Wagram, Borodino, were all -examples of a fierce tactical offensive. On the two -principal occasions, at Austerlitz and Friedland, -when he confined some part of his force to a dogged -defensive, he saw that the generals in command were -men of wide personal influence, and that the troops -they led were the best available. Davout and -Lannes were certainly successful. At Lützen -Ney’s necessarily defensive rôle was not fully foreseen, -but he was able to hold on, partly through the -enthusiasm of his young men, partly through the -<span class='pageno' title='137' id='Page_137'></span> -advantage they possessed in holding the villages, -and partly through Wittgenstein’s bungling of the -attack.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At no period in its development will Napoleon’s -army bear comparison with, say, the army of Cromwell, -or the original force of Gustavus Adolphus, or -with the army of the Third Republic. It incidentally -follows that Napoleon’s military achievements should -be rated even higher than they usually are, seeing -that the immense successes he gained were gained -with inferior troops.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But if the rank and file were of this doubtful -quality, it was far otherwise with the officers, and -the statement of Napoleon’s with which this chapter -opens is therefore subject to doubt. Napoleon’s -method of making war support war exposed his -armies, as he candidly admitted, to a loss of one-half -of their numbers every year, and since this loss fell -far more heavily on the privates than on the officers, -it followed that a very widely experienced corps of -officers was built up. It was quite usual for men of -good birth to serve a few months in the ranks before -taking commissions; Marbot and Bugeaud are good -examples of this among the younger men. Once -they had gained their lieutenancy anything might -happen. They might in ten years be dukes and -generals, or they might still be lieutenants. The -open system of promotion was stimulating, certainly, -but it was undoubtedly unfair at times. Curély, -who served from 1800 to 1814, and was subsequently -admitted to be the best light cavalry officer in the -French service, only attained his colonelcy in his last -campaign. The men who received the most rapid -promotion were those who had attracted Napoleon’s -notice in 1796 or in the Egyptian campaign. Some -of these choices were highly successful, as witness the -career of Davout, but others were positively harmful. -Marmont was a failure, Junot was a failure, -<span class='pageno' title='138' id='Page_138'></span> -Murat was a failure, while men of undoubted talent -served in twenty campaigns without receiving promotion. -Kellermann the younger fought at Waterloo -with the same military rank as he had held at -Marengo. Suchet, who was one of the most -successful generals of division in 1799, remained a -general of division until 1811. If this was the case -with the higher ranks, it must have been nearly as -bad with the lower ranks. When the rush of -promotion of the Revolutionary era ended, advancement -became very slow indeed. A man who was -a captain at the battle of the Pyramids might well -consider himself fortunate if he commanded a -battalion at Ligny. Occasionally, however, the -divisional generals were given their chance. The -vast expansion of the Imperial Army for the -Russian campaign increased the commands of -some of the Marshals to eighty or a hundred -thousand men, and generals of division similarly -found themselves at the head of twenty or thirty -thousand. Many of them displayed talents of a -very high order. St. Cyr won the battle of -Polotsk, for which he received his bâton. The -most remarkable example occurred at Salamanca. -Here Wellington had flung himself suddenly on -the over-extended Army of Portugal, had shattered -one wing, and had beaten back the remainder in -dire confusion; Marmont, the commander-in-chief, -was badly wounded. Bonnet had hardly succeeded -to the command when he was killed. Several other -generals of division were struck down. The man -who took over command of the fleeing mob was -already wounded. He was practically unknown; -he was leading a beaten army in wild retreat from -the finest troops in the world. And yet he rallied -that beaten army; in the course of a few hours he -had them once more in hand. He faced about time -and again as he toiled across the wasted Castilian -<span class='pageno' title='139' id='Page_139'></span> -plains; in a dozen fierce rearguard actions he -taught the exultant English that some Frenchmen, -as well as being more than men in victory, were not -less than women in defeat, and he showed Wellington -that every French general was not a Marmont. -Every morning found his army posted in some -strong position; all day long the English marched -by wretched roads and over thirsty plains to turn -the flanks; every evening as the movement was -nearing completion the French fell back to some -new position where the English had to resume the -whole weary business next day. The French survived -the severest defeat they had yet received in -the Peninsula at English hands with astonishingly -little loss; a few weeks later they had so far recovered -as to thrust fiercely forward once more, and aid in -driving Wellington from Madrid. The man who -was responsible for this wonderful achievement -deserved reward. Bessières and Marmont had been -given bâtons for much less. A title, a marshalate, -a dotation of a million francs would not have -seemed too much for saving for France a kingdom, -an army of forty thousand men, and dependent -forces numbering a quarter of a million. But -Clausel was not made Marshal, nor Duke of Burgos. -Instead he was recalled, and an inferior general, -Souham, sent in his place. Napoleon had a -prejudice against “retreating generals” dating -from the days of Moreau. Clausel took the affront -philosophically, and fought on for his Emperor. -When it was too late, his worth was recognized, -and during the Hundred Days he was given the -independent command of the Pyrenees. After -Waterloo he fled from France with a price on -his head. Clausel went unrewarded; Murat was -over-rewarded. Their lines of conduct differed -greatly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The men who were never granted the coveted -<span class='pageno' title='140' id='Page_140'></span> -rank of Marshal, but who did each as much for -France as any one of half the Marshals, are in -number legion. Their very names would fill a page. -Kellermann the younger has already been mentioned. -At Marengo his desperate charge at the head of the -heavy cavalry saved the day, and “set the crown of -France on Napoleon’s head.” But Napoleon found -it far safer and far cheaper to praise a dead man, and -he awarded the chief credit to the slain Desaix. -D’Hautpoult died at the head of his Cuirassiers at -Eylau, charging one army to save another. St. -Hilaire, the finest of them all, died miserably at -Essling, with the Empire reeling round him. -Lasalle, the pride of the light cavalry, the man who -captured Stettin with a few score Hussars, fell at -the head of his men in the pursuit after Wagram. -Montbrun, another Cuirassier, was killed in the -great redoubt at Borodino.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Their names are carved upon the Arc de -Triomphe, and the bourgeois peer at them with -self-satisfaction. They fell in a far less worthy -cause than did the myriad Frenchmen who died by -poison gas and shrapnel in the trenches a few years -ago. To us now it seems to be nearly blasphemy -to think in the same moment of the Moskowa and -the Marne, or to speak in the same breath of the -sieges of Verdun and of Hamburg. The Englishman -turns lightly from the great names on the Arc -de Triomphe, and thinks with proud regret of the -simple inscription on an empty tomb in Whitehall. -And yet these men were the wonders of their time. -They did their duty; more cannot be said of any -man, and much less of most. They gave their -lives with a smile for a country which they adored. -Danger was as usual to them as was the air they -breathed. They gave their blood in streams; they -marched with their men into every Continental -capital. Their cowed enemies regarded them -<span class='pageno' title='141' id='Page_141'></span> -timidly, as though they were beings from another -world. Their continued success and their overwhelming -victories might well have led them to -believe themselves superhuman. And when Waterloo -was fought and lost they went back to their -beloved France—such of them as survived—and -nursed their wounds on pensions of thirty pounds -a year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was one general of division who attained -as near as might be to a marshalate without quite -achieving this last step. He was made a duke and -he gained a vast fortune. This man was Junot. -Junot, indeed, is often stated to have received his -bâton, but he never did, although he was as much -a favourite of Napoleon’s at one time as was -Marmont. It was Junot who at Toulon was writing -a letter at Bonaparte’s dictation, when a cannon shot -plunged near-by and scattered earth over them. -“We need no sand to dry the ink now,” laughed -Junot, and from that day his future was made. He -married Mademoiselle Laurette Permon, whom -Napoleon had once courted, and whose memoirs are -one of the most interesting books of the period. -Junot himself served as Bonaparte’s aide-de-camp all -over Europe and in Egypt as well. He received -promotion steadily, and was a general of division in -a very brief while. With that rank, however, he -was forced to be content, for Napoleon realized his -shortcomings, while a wound in the head which he -early received unbalanced him a little mentally. -The one outstanding feature of his character was his -passionate devotion to Napoleon. Napoleon was his -God, and Junot served him with a faithfulness almost -unexampled. Adventures came his way with a -frequency characteristic of the period. He fell into -English hands and was exchanged; he went as -ambassador to Portugal and made a large fortune; -he was appointed Governor of Paris, and withstood -<span class='pageno' title='142' id='Page_142'></span> -Caroline Bonaparte’s blandishments when she tried -to induce him to subvert the Government. Half -dead with wounds, he travelled across Europe in -November, 1805, and arrived at Austerlitz on the very -morning of the battle. He was again wounded -heading a charge that day. In 1807 Napoleon gave -him a command which he hoped would bring him -fame, and a marshalate was promised in the event of -success. Junot was to lead the army of Portugal -from France to Lisbon; he was to capture the Portuguese -royal family and the English shipping in the -harbour; he was to tear down the Portuguese Government -and to rule the country himself in the name of -the Emperor. Junot set out with a mixed French -and Spanish force numbering nearly forty thousand -men. At every stage he received frantic orders from -Paris demanding greater speed from him and his men. -Junot did what he could. The whole valley of the -Tagus was littered with the guns, dead horses and -exhausted men whom he had left behind. His army -was dispersed into fragments, and it was only with -four hundred men at his back that Junot burst into -Lisbon. The English shipping and the Portuguese -royal family had fled the day before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Junot was in a serious position. With four -hundred men he had to rule a large town simmering -with rebellion, but he succeeded, and held the -country down while the rest of his army trailed disconsolately -into Lisbon. His astonishing march had -not achieved its object, and the marshal’s bâton was -therefore withheld. Napoleon offered some sort of -consolation by creating Junot Duke of Abrantès, but -there is no doubt that the disappointment weighed -heavily upon him. Napoleon had meditated making -Junot Duke of Nazareth, in memory of his victory -during the Syrian campaign, but he had decided that -it would be inadvisable, as the soldiers would call -him “Junot of Nazareth.” -<span class='pageno' title='143' id='Page_143'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon was not quite so far-sighted when at -the same time he made Victor, at the suggestion of -one of the wits of his court, Duke of Belluno. -Victor was commonly called the Beau Soleil of the -French Army. Napoleon’s investiture made him -Duke of Belle Lune.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Immediately afterwards the Spanish war broke -out, and Junot found himself isolated at Lisbon. He -gathered his forces together, and without any help -whatever from France he maintained them and -re-equipped them at the cost of unfortunate Portugal. -But it was not to last long, for Wellington landed in -Mondego bay, and Junot, furiously attacking him, -was badly beaten at Vimiero. There followed the -Convention of Cintra. By it Junot and his men were -transported back to France with their arms, baggage -and plunder; all that the English gained was a bloodless -occupation of Portugal. It is difficult now to -decide who had the best of this agreement. Certainly -Napoleon thought that Junot had made a good -bargain, and equally certainly the English public -thought that Wellington had blundered badly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Convention had not been concluded, the -English would have cut Junot off from France (two -hundred thousand Spanish insurgents had done that -already) and would have shut him up in Lisbon. -Without a doubt, Junot would have made a desperate -resistance there. Masséna’s holding of Genoa in -1800 might have been re-enacted, and the wretched -Portuguese might have starved while Junot held out. -In this event the hands of the English would have -been so full that no help could have been offered to -the Spanish armies; Moore’s skilful thrust at Sahagun -could never have been made, and the Spaniards -might have met with utter annihilation. By the -Convention of Cintra, France gained an immediate -benefit, but England eventually gained even more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After Vimiero, Junot’s military career is one of -<span class='pageno' title='144' id='Page_144'></span> -continued failure—failure under Masséna in the -Busaco campaign, failure under Napoleon in the -Russian campaign, until at last the Duke of Abrantès -was sent into comparative exile as Governor of -Illyria. Here his troubles, his wounds and his disappointments -bore too heavily upon him. He went -raving mad, and performed all sorts of lunatic actions -in his Illyrian province until he was removed to -France. At Dijon he flung himself from a window -and killed himself. Junot is one more example of -those whom Napoleon favoured, who met with -horrible ends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But Marshals and Generals alike, Napoleon’s -superior officers were nearly all distinguished by one -common failing—a dread of responsibility and a -hopeless irresolution when compelled to act on their -own initiative. The examples of this are almost too -numerous to mention; the most striking perhaps is -Berthier’s failure during the early period of the -campaign of 1809. There are many others which had -much more important results, although at first they -seem trivial in comparison. Thus, Dupont’s surrender -at Baylen, although it only involved twenty -thousand men, was one of the principal causes of the -prolongation of the Peninsular War. Dupont -surrendered with twenty thousand men; his action -necessitated the employment in the Peninsula of -three hundred thousand men for six years afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another incident of the same type was Vandamme’s -disaster at Kulm. Vandamme was a burly, -heavy-jawed soldier of the furious and thoughtless -kind, who had learnt his trade thoroughly well by -rule of thumb, and who had made his name a byword -throughout Germany on account of his dreadful -depredations. His boast was that he feared neither -God nor devil, and Napoleon referred to this once -when he said that Vandamme was the most valuable -of all his soldiers because he was the only one he -<span class='pageno' title='145' id='Page_145'></span> -could employ in a war against the Infernal regions, -should such a contingency arise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In July, 1813, the Armistice of Pleisswitz had -come to an end, and Austria had joined the ranks of -Napoleon’s enemies. The Grand Army was in -Silesia when the news arrived that the Austrians were -marching on Dresden. Napoleon turned back without -hesitation, marched a hundred and twenty miles -in four days, and by what was almost his last victory -he saved the town. At the commencement of his -march he had detached Vandamme with twenty -thousand men to hold the passes of the Erz Gebirge -against the retreating forces. The beaten Austrian -army came reeling back towards them. The -Emperor of Austria and the Czar of Russia were -present in its ranks, and it seemed as if nothing could -save them from surrender. Fortunately, perhaps, -for Europe, Napoleon was unwell and did not press -the pursuit as closely as he might have done, and -Vandamme, who rushed into peril like a bull into -the ring, without outposts, without flank guards, -without any reasonable protection, was overwhelmed -by forces outnumbering his by four to one, and was -forced to surrender. Vandamme may have feared -neither God nor devil, but he had not the brains for -a command in chief, even against men.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>His own honour he redeemed from all possible -accusations of cowardice, when, a prisoner in Austrian -hands, with all the possibilities before him of condemnation -to slow death in a salt-mine or speedy -death on the spot, he was led before the Czar, and he -did not quail. Alexander rated him for his excesses in -Prussia, and Vandamme hit back at Alexander’s -tender spot—his conscience. “At least I did not -kill my own father,” said Vandamme.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Indecision characterizes the actions of many -French generals during the Empire. The most -discussed case perhaps was Grouchy’s hesitation at -<span class='pageno' title='146' id='Page_146'></span> -Wavre during the Waterloo campaign, and this, -curiously enough, was not really hesitation. The -sole military crime of which Grouchy was guilty was -a too pedantic obedience to orders. Grouchy has -been blamed for misreading the situation and for not -marching from Wavre on Waterloo, but Napoleon -misread the situation just as badly, as his orders to -Grouchy clearly prove. Moreover, once Grouchy’s -hands had been freed by the destruction of the main -French army, his actions were exceedingly bold and -competent. His retreat across the Allies’ rear and -his capture of Namur were manœuvres of sound -military skill.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Grouchy’s military career had been in every way -honourable throughout his life. He had ridden -bravely to destruction at the head of his dragoons -during Murat’s charge at Eylau. He had fought -magnificently at Friedland and elsewhere. The -only other time when he had been in independent -command, and when he did display genuine dilatoriness -was many years before when he had found -himself in command owing to the loss of Hoche on -the French expedition to Bantry Bay in 1796. -Grouchy’s courage failed him then, and he withdrew -at the very time when his landing would have set -Ireland in an inextinguishable blaze. For a series -of quite strictly correct actions at Waterloo Grouchy -has gone down to history as a fool and a humbug, -but he was neither—to any great extent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the Waterloo campaign there was -certainly one example of a general being overwhelmed -by his sense of responsibility. Up to the moment -of execution not one of Napoleon’s plans of attack -had been more brilliantly conceived or better -arranged. A hundred and twenty thousand men -were assembled at the crossings of the Sambre by -Charleroi without the enemy gathering more than a -hint as to what was in the air; in fact the Allies’ -<span class='pageno' title='147' id='Page_147'></span> -Intelligence completely lost sight of Gérard’s corps -of sixteen thousand men. From this point, however, -the arrangements rapidly grew worse and worse. -Bad staff work caused delays at the crossing of the -Sambre; Ney’s unexpected appointment to the -command of the left wing was disturbing, in that -he was without a staff and his sudden elevation -annoyed d’Erlon and Reille, his subordinate corps -commanders. Zieten’s stubborn rearguard actions -held up the French columns for a considerable time; -and finally a sort of universal misunderstanding led -to everyone being more or less in the dark as to the -need for a determined and immediate attack. Ney, -goaded by repeated orders, at last attacked at Quatre -Bras quite six hours later than he should have done, -and even then he had only half his force in hand. -The other half, under d’Erlon, was making its way -towards him, when it was caught up by an aide-de-camp -of Napoleon’s, who was bearing a message to -Ney requesting him to send help to the Emperor at -Ligny. The aide-de-camp, on his own responsibility, -sent d’Erlon marching over towards Ligny instead -of to Quatre Bras, and went on to inform Ney of -his action. Ney was furious. Every moment the -British army in front of him was being reinforced, -and he was now being steadily pushed back. He -saw defeat close upon him, and he sent off a frantic -order to d’Erlon to retrace his steps and march on -Quatre Bras. The order reached d’Erlon at the -crisis of the battle of Ligny. For hours a fierce and -sanguinary battle had raged there, and at the crucial -moment d’Erlon had appeared, like a god from a -machine, with twenty thousand men on the Prussian -flank. Napoleon sent him urgent orders to attack, -but the officier d’ordonnance returned disconsolate. -D’Erlon had just received Ney’s order and had -marched back towards Quatre Bras, where he arrived -just as darkness fell, two hours too late. His sense -<span class='pageno' title='148' id='Page_148'></span> -of responsibility did not permit him to disregard the -orders of his immediate superior, although it had lain -in his power, by disregarding them, to have dealt the -Prussian army a blow from which it could hardly -have recovered. The attack d’Erlon should have -made was later made by six thousand weary men who -had fought all day long, and naturally did not have -the immense success d’Erlon might have achieved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Drouet, Comte d’Erlon, had built himself up -during twenty campaigns a reputation as a skilful -and hard-fighting officer. He was neither a poltroon -nor congenitally weak-minded; what was the matter -with him was that he had fought twenty campaigns -under Napoleon. The brilliance of the Emperor and -the implicit, blind obedience he demanded had -weakened d’Erlon’s initiative past all reckoning. It -is interesting to compare d’Erlon’s action at Ligny -with Lannes’ at Friedland, or with the daring of the -subordinate Prussian officers at Mars-la-Tour and at -Gravelotte in 1870.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And yet one cannot help but think, on reading -military history, that the Lannes and the Davouts -of this world are astonishingly few when compared -with the d’Erlons and the Duponts. Military history -is a history of blunders, fortunate or unfortunate. -Men are found everywhere in control of the lives -and destinies of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand -men, and completely unable even to expend them in -an efficient manner. On reading of the fumbling -campaigns of Schwartzenberg, of Carlo Alberto, of -Napoleon III., or even of wars waged more recently -still, and of which we ourselves have had experience, -one cannot help feeling overwhelming pity at the -thought of the wretched men—every one of them as -full of life as you or I—who were called upon to lay -down everything at the call of duty or patriotism—and -to lay down everything <span class='it'>uselessly</span>. The argument -against war which appeals most to those who may -<span class='pageno' title='149' id='Page_149'></span> -have to take part in it is not so much that it is -expensive or that it costs lives, but that it is so -blightingly inefficient. To die because one’s country -is in need, that is one thing; but to die because one’s -commanding officer has bad dreams, is quite another -matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But the armies of Napoleon were at least free -from a horrible slur which has been cast upon other -armies. We cannot find anywhere any hint that the -officers did not do all their duty as far as they -visualized it. On going into action the men did not -shout “Les epaulettes en avant” as did the army -of the Second Empire at Solferino. No officer of -Napoleon’s ever wasted his men’s lives to gratify his -own pride, in the way that English marines died at -Trafalgar. It was said with pride of an officer of -Marlborough’s that he always said, “Come on” not -“Go on” to his men. The same could be said of -every one of the higher officers of the army of the -First Empire. The hundreds of volumes of memoirs -written by Napoleon’s men teem with examples -(grudgingly given, in some cases) of valour, but there -is hardly one case where an Imperial officer is accused -of cowardice, or even of shirking. The officers bore -exactly the same hardships as did the men, and the -friendship and trust which existed between the rank -and file and the commissioned officers of the army -of the First Empire has never been excelled in any -other army in history.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A simple calculation at any Napoleonic battle will -show that the number of generals killed is proportionate -to that of the privates, while of the twenty-four -Marshals of the Empire who fought after the -inauguration, three—Lannes, Bessières and Poniatowski—were -killed in action, and all the others were -wounded at various times. Napoleon himself, as is -well known, was wounded during the fighting round -Ratisbon in 1809, and Duroc, his trusted Grand -<span class='pageno' title='150' id='Page_150'></span> -Marshal of the Palace, was struck down at his side -by a stray cannon shot at Bautzen in 1813, and died -an hour later in horrible agony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The facts about the Imperial army are curiously -contradictory. The men were devoted to Napoleon, -but their devotion did not hold them together in -moments of panic. The officers were experienced -in all the details of war, but for all their experience -they lost touch with the Prussian army during the -vital period following Ligny. Napoleon had laid -down as essential various rules of strategy—but he -departed from them during the autumn campaign of -1813. Nothing seems consistent or satisfactory -during the whole period.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet there are hundreds upon hundreds of -incidents of which one cannot read without a thrill. -Cambronne at Waterloo replying with a curse when -called upon to surrender in the face of certain -destruction; the Red Lancers of the Guard gaining -the Somo Sierra in the teeth of a tempest of cannon -shot; the conscripts of 1814, in sabots and blouses, -facing undaunted the savage enemy cavalry at -Champaubert; Ney rallying the rearguard during the -retreat from Moscow; Kellermann charging an army -at Quatre Bras; the engineers dying gladly to save -the army at the Beresina; all these incidents are -worthy to be remembered with pride, and almost blot -out the memory of the hideous ferocity of these selfsame -men in Spain, in Germany and in Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is the fate of the Emperor and the Grand -Army to be equally at the mercy of the panegyrics -of the admirer and the insults of anyone who chooses -to inveigh against them.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo151a.jpg' alt='' id='il151a' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>LETIZIA BONAPARTE<br/> (MADAME MÈRE)</p> -</div> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo151b.jpg' alt='' id='il151b' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>ELISE BACCIOCHI<br/> (née BONAPARTE)</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='151' id='Page_151'></span><h1>CHAPTER XIII<br/> <span class='sub-head'>WOMEN</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>I</span>T would be as easy to omit all mention of -Napoleon’s mistresses in a serious history as it -would be difficult to omit the king’s mistresses -from a history of Louis le Grand or Louis le Bien-Aimé. -Napoleon was not the man to allow his policy -to be influenced by women. Not one of the many -with whom he came into contact could boast that -she had deflected him one hairbreadth from the path -he had mapped for himself. Not all Josephine’s -tears could save the life of the young d’Enghien; -not all Walewska’s pleading could re-establish the -kingdom of Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Adultery,” said Napoleon, “is a sofa affair,” -and he was speaking for once in all honesty. He -was a man blessed with a vast personality, a vast -power and a vast income, and it is unusual for a man -with these three to go long a-suing. Moreover, if -the lady who attracted his attention proved recalcitrant, -Napoleon rarely pleaded; he raised his offer, -and in the event of a further refusal he turned -away without a sigh and forgot all about her. That -indicates Napoleon’s attitude towards women.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There were, as a matter of fact, one or two whom -he honoured by more lover-like attentions. Josephine -cost him many bitter hours of self-reproach; -Walewska he sought long and earnestly; he displayed -every sign of attachment towards Marie Louise. -<span class='pageno' title='152' id='Page_152'></span> -Yet not merely these three, but every woman who -granted him favours received in return immense gifts, -and, if she desired it, a husband whose path to promotion -was made specially easy. The women who -flit into and then out of Napoleon’s life seem to -be without number, but the gossip of a thousand -memoirs, and the hints of a thousand letters, combined -with the painstaking care of a crowd of patient -inquirers, have brought them all under notice at some -time or other. And yet the most elaborate research -can only prove that there was one woman who might -perhaps have given much to Bonaparte before his -meeting with Josephine, and that was a street-walker -of the Palais Royal. This tiny incident is hinted at -in a letter written by Bonaparte at the age of -eighteen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After this, we find nothing of the same nature -for another nine years. Napoleon was too busy and -too desperately poor to trouble about such things. -He flirted with Laurette Permon, who later became -Madame Junot, Duchess d’Abrantès; with his -sister-in-law, Désirée Clary, afterwards Madame -Bernadotte, Princess of Ponte Corvo and Queen of -Sweden and Norway; and with a few young women -of good social position whom he met while serving -as a junior officer of artillery at Valence. That is -all. He came to Josephine heartwhole and inexperienced, -and he lavished upon her during the first -feverish months of his married life all the stored-up -passion of a man of twenty-six. Josephine baulked -and thwarted this passion by her delay in joining him -while he was conquering Italy, by her petty flirtations -with Charles and others, and by the general light-mindedness -of her behaviour; from that time forth -Napoleon became passionless towards all women. -Some he liked, and some he even admired, as far as -it was in his nature to admire anyone, but for none -did he ever exhibit the uncontrollable desire which -<span class='pageno' title='153' id='Page_153'></span> -for that brief space he had felt for Josephine. -Unfaithfulness to her, which he would once have -regarded as treason, he now thought of merely as -necessary to a man of mature age.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, throughout the years 1796 and 1797 -one cannot find any proof of genuine inconstancy. -It was only in 1798, when Napoleon found himself -the unrestrained ruler of Egypt, with the whole East -apparently at his feet, that he left the narrow path of -strict physical virtue. The native ladies did not -appeal to him, and he turned with disgust from their -over opulent charms. The same cannot be said of -some of his officers, a few of whom actually married -Egyptian beauties and later brought them back to -France. Menou, who succeeded to the chief command -after Napoleon’s departure and Kléber’s -assassination, was one of these. Others, again, -married and settled down in Egypt after the -evacuation. Their descendants were supporters of -Mehemet Ali, and even nowadays many rich -Egyptian proprietors can trace back their descent -to a Frankish ancestor who became a Mohammedan -a hundred and twenty years ago.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But although, as has been said, Napoleon found -no charms behind the yashmaks, the possibilities -were by no means exhausted, as his aides-de-camp -hastened to point out to him. A few Frenchwomen, -by donning male attire, had evaded the strict regulation -that no women should accompany the Army of -the Orient. The most attractive of these was -Marguerite Pauline, wife of a lieutenant of Chasseurs, -by name Fourès. To a Commander-in-Chief -all things are possible, and young Fourès was packed -off in one of the frigates which had escaped from the -disaster of the Nile with orders to carry despatches -to the Directory. The night of his departure -Madame Fourès (la Bellîlote, as she was called, from -her maiden name of Belleisle) was entertained by -<span class='pageno' title='154' id='Page_154'></span> -Napoleon at a gay little dinner party; the proceedings, -however, were cut short by the General upsetting -iced water over her dress and carrying her off -under the pretext of having the damage attended to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After this la Bellîlote was established in a Cairo -palace close to General Headquarters, and the little -idyll seemed to be progressing famously when a most -indignant intruder in the person of Lieutenant -Fourès appeared on the scene. He had been -captured by the English on his way to Italy, and -had been returned for the express purpose of inconveniencing -the Général-en-chef. The English were, -however, doomed to disappointment, for Napoleon, -exercising his dictatorial powers, had a divorce pronounced -between Fourès and his wife, and then sent -the wretched man back once more to France. From -this time forth la Bellîlote had an almost regal -dominion in Cairo. The finest silks in the land were -confiscated for her adornment, and she drove about -the streets amid cries from the soldiers of “Vive -la Générale!” and “Vive Clioupatre!” At times -she even appeared on horseback in a general’s -uniform and cocked hat. The whole proceeding -savours of some of the doings of the early Roman -Emperors. Suetonius tells us very similar stories -of Nero and Caligula. Little adverse comment -was caused among the French; it was a very usual -thing during the Revolutionary era for officers to be -accompanied by women in this fashion. Some -women even served generals as aides-de-camp and -orderlies, while the Army of Portugal during 1810-11 -was frequently hindered because Masséna, commanding, -had his <span class='it'>chère amie</span> with him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Madame Fourès’ experience of the delights of -being the left-handed queen of the uncrowned king -of an unacknowledged kingdom was not destined to -endure long; Napoleon returned to France, and she, -following him, by his orders, as soon as possible, -<span class='pageno' title='155' id='Page_155'></span> -fell into the hands of the English just as her husband -had done. When at last she reached France Bonaparte -refused to see her, for he was now reconciled -to Josephine, besides being First Consul and having -to be careful of his moral reputation. Napoleon did -whatever else he could for her; he gave her large sums -of money, bought her houses, and secured a new -husband for her, whose agreement he ensured by -means of valuable appointments under the Ministry -of Foreign Affairs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon and la Bellîlote never met again; after -1815 she eloped with another man, built up a substantial -fortune in the South American trade, and -finally died quite in the odour of sanctity at the -venerable age of ninety-one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Bonaparte’s return to France Josephine had -contrived to win him once more to her, despite the -efforts of his family, and his own half-determination -to end the business there and then, but matters were -never the same between them. Napoleon indulged -more and more frequently in petty amours with -various women, and Josephine, instead of appreciating -her helplessness, as is the more usual way -with queens and empresses, caused frequent furious -scenes by spying on his actions and upbraiding him -when any rumour came to her notice. Napoleon -cared no whit; he was, moreover, able, by virtue of -his supreme power, frequently to ensure that Josephine -knew nothing of his infidelity. In 1800 he -was peculiarly successful in this way. Marengo had -been fought and won, and the First Consul was -enjoying, at Milan, the fruits of his dramatic success. -The most eminent contralto of the time, Grassini, -sang at concerts hurriedly arranged in his honour. -Grassini had endeavoured to force herself on his -notice three years before, without success, for -Josephine held power over him then. The circumstances -were different now, and Napoleon, his -<span class='pageno' title='156' id='Page_156'></span> -Italian temperament inexpressibly charmed by her -magnificent voice, honoured her by a summons to -his apartments. She obeyed gladly; she came at his -request to Paris; and finally Napoleon had the -effrontery to command her to sing at the thanksgiving -festival in the Invalides for the Marengo -campaign, where he appeared accompanied by his -wife and by all the notabilities of the Consulate. -Later she appeared at the Théâtre de la République, -and was given a large allowance, both publicly as a -singer and secretly as a friend of Napoleon’s. The -arrangement ended abruptly, for Grassini was -detected in an intrigue with an Italian musician, and -left France for a Continental tour.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was not till 1807 that she returned, and -although Napoleon never renewed the old relationship, -he gave her an official title, a large salary and -employment under his Bureau of Music.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Grassini spent the rest of her days mainly in -Paris, and she enjoyed a vast reputation all her life. -Money troubles, due to her passion for gambling, and -wild adventures of the heart, engaged most of her -attention. It has even been said that after Waterloo -she condescended to grant Wellington the same -favours as Napoleon had enjoyed thirteen years -before. Despite the obvious bias of many of the -witnesses, the evidence to this end seems conclusive. -If it really was true, then Grassini might claim a -distinction as notable as Alava’s, who was the only -man who fought both at Trafalgar and at Waterloo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After Grassini passed out of Napoleon’s life, a -long period ensued during which no woman received -the Emperor’s favour for any continuous length of -time. At intervals various hooded figures slipped -through the postern door of the Tuileries, past -Roustam the Mameluke, and through a secret -passage to the Imperial apartments, but the visits -were irregular and were merely the results of passing -<span class='pageno' title='157' id='Page_157'></span> -whims on the part of the Emperor. Not one of the -women concerned had need of much pressure to -become agreeable to the invitations brought them by -Duroc, the faithful Grand Marshal of the Palace. -They were actresses mainly, and since most of them -appeared at theatres managed or subsidized by the -Government, Napoleon, if not their direct employer, -had in his gift important acting parts and desirable -salaries. Many of them were already the mistresses -of dandies of the town, and some of them passed on -to act in the same capacity for various crowned heads -of Europe, while one was actually requested by a -powerful party in Russia to win Alexander the Czar -from an objectionable <span class='it'>chère amie</span> so that he might -return to the Czarina!</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon did all he could to keep these liaisons -secret, but he was rarely successful. The women -boasted far and wide of their success, and it is likely -that many of those who boasted had nothing to boast -about. Some even went so far as to publish their -memoirs after the Restoration, and to make capital -of their own dishonour. Another factor which -militated against secrecy was Josephine’s jealousy. -Josephine, with the spectre of divorce always before -her eyes, was in continual terror lest Napoleon should -experience a lasting attachment for one of his stray -lights o’ love. Consequently she spied upon him -incessantly, battered on his locked doors, wrote -frantic appeals to her friends for help and information, -and generally acted with less than her usual -dignity. Napoleon disregarded her appeals, and -stormed back at her whenever she ventured to -remonstrate. He was above all law, he declared, and -he would allow no human being to judge his actions. -Nevertheless, he took care to interfere with the most -intimate affairs of all his friends. He tried to bully -Berthier, his trusted Chief of Staff, into separating -from the lady with whom he had lived for years. At -<span class='pageno' title='158' id='Page_158'></span> -first it seemed as if he was successful, and he consoled -his friend by giving him as wife a Princess of -the royal House of Bavaria. However, Berthier -contrived to obtain his young bride’s agreement to -the presence of the other lady, and the three of them -ran a perfectly happy <span class='it'>ménage à trois</span> for the rest -of his life. Napoleon meddled with many other -people’s domestic affairs, and it is darkly hinted that -Talleyrand’s enmity for the Emperor began when -Napoleon first disturbed the tranquillity which existed -between the great diplomat and Madame Grand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Emperor continued serenely on his way, -acting up to his dictum that women were merely -incidents in a man’s life. His Court was thronged -with greedily ambitious women who threw themselves -in his path at every opportunity. At the least -hint of a preference on his part, officious courtiers -hurried to assist in the negotiations in the hope either -of favour or perquisites. The astonishing thing is -that the list of the chosen is not many times longer. -These intrigues all ran much the same course—a brief -partnership, generally without a hint of affection on -either side; a minor place in Court for the lady; then -a marriage was arranged, an ample dowry provided -by the Emperor, and the incident was closed. Not -merely did people endeavour to gain their private -ends in this manner, but even political parties made -use of similar tools. During the Consulate the -Bourbons despatched a lady to Paris for the sole -purpose of ensnaring Bonaparte, and it is hinted that -Metternich endeavoured to place a friend at Court -in the same fashion. The great example of this -political manœuvre, however, occurs later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But before Madame Walewska’s name, even, -was known to Napoleon, he formed an attachment -of some slight historical importance. Eléonore -Denuelle was an exceedingly beautiful girl, daughter -of parents of a doubtful mode of life, who had been -<span class='pageno' title='159' id='Page_159'></span> -educated at Madame Campan’s famous school along -with Caroline Bonaparte and various other great -ladies of the Court. Her parents designed a great -marriage for her, but they met with poor success, -for a certain graceless ex-officer, by name Revel, -succeeded in making her believe that he was a -good match, and the couple were married early in -1805. Revel believed that Eléonore was an heiress; -Eléonore believed that Revel was a rich man; they -were both of them woefully disappointed, and -separated after two months of married life. Eléonore -in despair applied for help to Caroline Murat, and -received a minor post in that princess’s household. -Napoleon noticed her in January, 1806, and from -that time the affair moved rapidly, for in February -Eléonore applied for a divorce from Revel (who was -now in gaol), and in December a son was born to -her whose father, almost without a doubt, was -Napoleon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By the time of his birth, however, Napoleon had -formed a new attachment, and Eléonore was never -again admitted to his rooms. Napoleon saw that -both his son and his ex-mistress were suitably provided -for; he settled a thousand pounds a year on -Eléonore and married her to a prominent politician -(a Monsieur Augier), while he invested large sums -of money in trust for her son, Léon. He further -mentioned him in his will. Eléonore’s later career -was unlucky; her second husband died, a prisoner in -Russian hands, and when she married for a third -time she was blackmailed for the rest of her life by -her first husband and by her scapegrace illegitimate -son. Léon ruined all his chances of success in life -by his reckless way of living. He gambled away all -he possessed, and then lived on what small sums he -could beg from his mother and from his Bonaparte -relations. He plunged into politics, and even considered -for a while standing as a candidate for the -<span class='pageno' title='160' id='Page_160'></span> -position of President of the Second Republic in -opposition to Louis Napoleon. He induced the -latter to give him a small pension; he made all -manner of claims upon the Government, and -squandered whatever he obtained in a wild fashion. -He issued all sorts of remarkable suggestions, not -one of them of the slightest value, on every conceivable -subject, and he raised the most frightful clamour -when they were disregarded. There is no doubt -that he was mentally deranged. He died in 1881 -without having accomplished a single noteworthy -action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is a faint doubt as to Léon’s paternity, due -to his mother’s way of living, but the doubts are -countered by his striking physical resemblance to the -Emperor. Napoleon himself certainly believed him -to be his own child; perhaps if he could have foreseen -the later career of the child in question he would have -been more chary of his acknowledgment. The -whole affair seems to be very much wrapped in doubt; -Napoleon evinced for young Léon not half the care -which he displayed for his other sons, while Léon’s -birth (perhaps because it took place while Napoleon -was away in Poland) did not rouse nearly as much -interest as Walewski’s three years later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It has already been said that at the time of Léon’s -birth Napoleon’s attention was occupied by a new -mistress; it was this particular mistress who has been -elevated by some writers to the proud position of -being “the only woman Napoleon ever loved,” and -who certainly held whatever affection the Emperor -was able to display for a longer period than any other -woman. To begin with, she was of a rank and class -far different from any of her predecessors, Josephine -not excepted, while secondly she was far fonder of -him than was any other woman. The circumstances -in which the two met were romantic. Napoleon had -just overturned the Prussian monarchy; he had -<span class='pageno' title='161' id='Page_161'></span> -advanced like lightning from the Rhine to the -Niemen, and he burst at the head of the Grand Army -into Poland, where never before had a French army -appeared. The Poles were in ecstasy. They had -not the least doubt that their period of slavery was -ended, and that the young conqueror would once -more unchain the White Eagle. Deputations -thronged to meet him, and mobs gave him homage -in the villages. At the little town of Bronia, not -far from Warsaw, a lady was presented to him at -her earnest request, for she had braved all the terrors -of the hysterical mob in order to meet him. She -proved to be hardly more than a child, and dazzlingly -beautiful. Napoleon thanked her for her kindness, -and said that he was anxious to see her again. The -whole interview barely lasted a minute, for it was -imperative that Napoleon should press on to Warsaw, -but it made a deep impression on both of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Marie Laczinska was the daughter of one of the -old noble families of Poland, and she had recently -married Anastase Colonna de Walewice-Walewska. -Although Marie’s family was noble, it was hardly -to be compared with that of her husband, for -Anastase was not only the head of a house in whose -veins ran the bluest blood of Poland, but he also -traced his descent to the Roman family of Colonna, -and through them his line ran back into the mists -of history beyond the Carolings and the Merovings -until one could trace its source among the patrician -families of republican Rome. He was rich, he was -famous, he held vast power. The only objections -to him as a husband were that he was seventy years -old and already had grandchildren who were older -than Marie. In the minds of Marie’s guardians -such objections were trivial, and the young girl was -forced into marriage with the old noble, to play -the part of Abishag to Walewska’s David. She -was not fated to endure this for long, because -<span class='pageno' title='162' id='Page_162'></span> -Napoleon had not forgotten the meeting at Bronia, -and sought her at all the fêtes at which he appeared -in Warsaw. The secret could not be kept, and -soon all Poland was aware that the great Emperor -was in love with the Polish lady. The nationalist -party heard the news with wild exultation, and -Poniatowski, the hope of Poland, called upon her -to sacrifice herself for her country. The other great -nobles pressed her feverishly, and they contrived to -persuade Walewska (who, naturally, was the only -man who was ignorant of what was going on) to -bring his wife to a ball which Poniatowski was giving -in the Emperor’s honour.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Marie came reluctantly. She was dressed as -plainly as possible, in white satin without jewels, -and, once in the ballroom, she kept herself as far in -the background as she could. To no purpose, -however. Napoleon, overjoyed, observed her as -soon as she appeared, and immediately sent to her -and requested her to dance with him. She refused. -Duroc and Poniatowski remonstrated with her, but -she remained adamant. Many other French officers -had already noticed her dazzling beauty, her rich fair -hair and the blueness of her eyes, and they swarmed -round her. Napoleon watched the proceedings -jealously from the other end of the room. As soon -as any one of his officers appeared to have made any -progress, he called to his Chief of Staff, and that -particular officer was sent off post haste to carry a -message somewhere out in the bleak countryside a -hundred miles away. The situation verged on the -impossible. Napoleon in desperation made a tour of -the room, speaking to all the hundreds of women -present merely in order to exchange half a dozen -words with the one who was the cause of all this -trouble. When at last he reached Madame -Walewska the interview was unsatisfactory. She -was as pale as death, and said nothing. He was -<span class='pageno' title='163' id='Page_163'></span> -vastly and unusually embarrassed. “White upon -white is a mistake, Madame,” he said, looking at -her pale cheeks. Then—“This is not the sort of -reception I expected after——” Then he passed on, -and left the ballroom soon after.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That same evening she received a wild, urgent -note from Napoleon. Others followed in rapid -succession. Poniatowski and all the fiery patriots of -Poland implored her to yield. Her blind husband, -infatuated by this remarkable new popularity, bore -her to reception after reception. A mercenary old -aunt of hers, tampered with by Poniatowski, flung -herself into the business as well, and offered herself -as go-between. At last she received a letter from -Napoleon hinting that he would restore Poland if -she would yield. She yielded. Napoleon did not -restore Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For Poland’s sake she had broken her marriage -vows and violated all the dictates of her conscience. -Napoleon, in return, temporized and compromised. -He erected the Grand Duchy of Warsaw out of -territory torn from Prussia, but the Grand Duchy -was not autonomous, it was not called Poland, it was -only one-third the size of the old land of the White -Eagle. Poor Marie protested to the best of her -ability, to be soothed by fair words from the -Emperor. At Napoleon’s request she left Poland -after Tilsit, and came to Paris, where she lived in -extreme retirement, visited by Napoleon as often as -he could manage. Her gentleness and dislike of -display must have been grateful to Napoleon after -his other experiences, and he passed many happy -hours with her. She was by his side during the -maelstrom of the Essling campaign, and at Schönbrunn, -the Palace of the Cæsars, she told him she -was about to bear him a child. She did not realize -then that from that selfsame palace Napoleon would -summon, in a few months’ time, a young girl who -<span class='pageno' title='164' id='Page_164'></span> -would supplant her in his affections, and who would -also bear him a son, who, in place of being a nameless -bastard, would bear the title of King of Rome. She -went back to her dear Poland for the event, and at -Walewice, in May, 1810, Alexander-Florian-Joseph-Colonna-Walewski -was born. On her return to -Paris Napoleon had married Marie Louise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon softened the blow for her as well as he -could. He heaped wealth upon her; he gave her -town houses and country houses; the Imperial -officials were always at her orders, and the Imperial -theatres were always open to her. Her son, young -Walewski, was made a Count of the Empire. -Perhaps this was some consolation to her. Perhaps—seeing -that it was her son’s birth which had determined -Napoleon to make a new marriage—not. -Napoleon even found time during the turmoil of -the Campaign of France to make additional arrangements -in their favour, but by this time whatever -remained of the affair had long since burnt itself -out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After the fall of the Empire, Marie Walewska -seems to have considered herself free. She paid a -mysterious visit to Napoleon at Elba in 1814, -accompanied by her little son, and she was present -at the Tuileries on Napoleon’s arrival there during -the Hundred Days, but apparently on neither -occasion was the old relationship renewed. In -1816 she married a distant cousin of the Bonapartes, -a certain d’Ornano, a Colonel of the Guard, but she -was not destined long to enjoy her new happiness. -Marie de Walewska died in December, 1817.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Poor Marie! Her life was short, but it must -have been full of bitterness. Napoleon’s affairs of -the heart (if they are even worthy of that name) -all seem inexpressibly harsh and matter-of-fact. -He seemed to have a kind of Midas touch in -these matters, whereby everything honourable and -<span class='pageno' title='165' id='Page_165'></span> -romantic with which he came into contact turned, -not into gold, but into lead. Various authors have -tried to infuse into his association with Marie de -Walewska some gleam of romance, some essence of -the self-sacrificing spirit which is noticeable in the -parallel deeds of other monarchs, but they have -failed. Marie certainly seems at first to have believed -him to be a hero, a knight without reproach as well -as without fear, but as soon as she was disillusioned -she resigned herself to an existence as drab as if she -had been once more a septuagenarian’s wife, and not -the mistress of an Emperor. Contemporary Parisian -society was almost entirely ignorant of her existence. -She paid no calls, and she received none. The few -appearances she made at Court were such as were -only to be expected from a Polish lady of high rank. -Napoleon could not keep her love for long, and, -though she was faithful to him as long as the Empire -endured, she obviously considered herself free as -soon as Napoleon was sent to St. Helena. It was -not the long-drawn, heroic romance some writers -have endeavoured to make it appear; rather was it -a brief burst of passion, and then—monotony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The baby Count of the Empire whom she left -behind enjoyed a distinguished career. In appearance -he certainly resembled his great father, but his -talents never seem to have risen above a mediocre -standard. Alexander-Florian-Joseph-Colonna-Walewski -was mainly educated in France, but he -was a Pole by birth, and he fought for Poland at the -age of twenty during the rising of 1830-31. When -Poland fell once more before the might of Russia, -he returned to France, became a Frenchman, and -served in the French army. The revolution of 1848 -brought Napoleon III. to the front, and the new -Emperor, with his power based on the frail fabric of -a legend, saw fit to surround himself with names -which recalled to men’s minds the old splendours of -<span class='pageno' title='166' id='Page_166'></span> -the First Empire. Walewski received honours in -plenty; he was Ambassador to the most important -Courts of Europe, a Senator, and a Minister of State. -He wrote learnedly on various subjects. But all his -glory was only a pale reflection of his father’s and -cousin’s; he suffered eclipse after Sedan, and when -he died, aged seventy-two, he had, after all, made -very little mark in the world. He had not played -the part of a Don John of Austria, or even of a -Monmouth. De Morny quite outshone him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With Napoleon’s marriage to Marie Louise and -association with Madame Walewska, his casual -amorous adventures came to a more or less abrupt -end. It has been suggested that this was on account -of increasing age, but Napoleon was only in the early -forties, and this cannot be the true reason. However, -the explanation is just as simple. Napoleon -was devoted to his new wife, and he was frightfully -busy. From the summer of 1812, two years after -his second marriage, he was almost continuously in -the field. His exertions and worries thenceforward -were sufficient to occupy even him, without any -other complications. One likes to think of him -turning with relief from the agonizing strain of -ruling Europe to snatch a few quiet minutes in the -placid peace surrounding Marie Louise and her child. -That is all. He had no other mistress. At Elba he -lived with his sister and mother, with no woman to -share his inner life. Perhaps this was policy, for -Napoleon was trying hard to induce Marie Louise to -join him, and he would naturally be chary of doing -anything which might annoy her—ignorant as he -was of her unfaithfulness. This may be the explanation -of the briefness of Madame Walewska’s visit; -she may have come intending to join him, and he -may have sent her away again, but the fact that she -was accompanied by her brother and other relations -militates against this theory. Moreover, Marie was -<span class='pageno' title='167' id='Page_167'></span> -already close friends with d’Ornano. After the -Hundred Days Napoleon was sent to St. Helena, -and once again no woman accompanied him. The -manifold rumours about Madame de Montholon and -others at St. Helena seem to have no foundation -whatever in fact. Thus practically all Napoleon’s -illicit loves are confined to the decade 1800-10, while -the last decade is entirely clear of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus far we have only treated of women who -were Napoleon’s mistresses; but considerable interest -also attaches to a large number of women who, -although members of the Imperial circle, never -attained this dubious honour. Perhaps of these the -one who attained the greatest heights (and who, -incidentally, did least to deserve it) was Désirée -Clary. She was the sister of the lady whom Joseph -Bonaparte made his wife, and whose dowry of six -thousand pounds was so welcome to the struggling -family. Désirée’s own dowry would have been of -the same amount, and Joseph and various other -Bonapartes tried to induce Napoleon to marry her. -He seems to have dallied with the idea; indeed, it is -frequently stated that a contract of betrothal was -drawn up, but, however it was, Napoleon broke off -the negotiations rather abruptly when he went to -Paris in 1795. There is hardly any doubt that he -had flirted with Désirée rather excessively, and -that, after making a deep impression upon her, he -had wounded her deeply by his precipitate abandonment. -Subsequently he tried to make amends in -much the same manner as he employed with his -discarded mistresses—he tried to find her a husband -to whom he could give substantial promotion. -But Désirée was once more unlucky, for the -man Napoleon sent to her, General Duphot, -was murdered almost on her threshold while she -was staying at Joseph Bonaparte’s Embassy in -Rome. -<span class='pageno' title='168' id='Page_168'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Eventually she was approached by Bernadotte, -during Napoleon’s absence in Egypt, and married -him. Subsequently she declared that she had done -this because Bernadotte was the only man who could -injure Bonaparte, but she must have been far-sighted -indeed if she could perceive the career which -was awaiting Bernadotte. Moreau, and half a dozen -other generals, such as Augereau, were more powerful -than Bernadotte at the time. Désirée’s statement -was probably made in the light of subsequent -events.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was Bernadotte who gained most by the -marriage. He acquired at one stroke a venomous, -if inert, ally in his wife, an enthusiastic supporter -in Joseph, his brother-in-law, and a sure refuge in -case of trouble in Napoleon’s dislike of a scandal -in his family. From this time on, Désirée received -distinction after distinction, and soon she was Son -Altesse Serène la Maréchale Princesse de Ponte -Corvo, sister of the Queen of Spain, and a leading -figure in Imperial society. Then came the greatest -distinction of all, and she found herself Princess -Royal of Sweden. This last she found rather upsetting, -for she discovered she was expected to leave -her beloved Paris to live in the bleakness of the Stockholm -palaces. She said, tearfully and truthfully, -that she had thought at first that her new rank was -merely a titular distinction, of the same class as her -sovereignty of Ponte Corvo. She refused absolutely -to leave France, and so Bernadotte went alone to -Stockholm, thence to lead his Swedes against the -Empire, while his wife stayed on in Paris. It -certainly was an anomalous position, and some -authors have said that Désirée acted as a spy on -behalf of the Allies during the war of liberation. -However, we can be quite sure that Napoleon, -whatever tenderness he still felt towards her, would -not have tolerated her sending news of any value to -<span class='pageno' title='169' id='Page_169'></span> -her husband; incidentally, it is obvious that a woman -to whose mind Ponte Corvo, with its six thousand -inhabitants, was in the same class as Sweden, with -its millions, could not have been of much use as -a spy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After 1815, fate overtook her, and she was borne -away to spend the rest of her life in the spartan -splendour of the palace in the Staden. From that -time forth she and her husband were a disappointed -couple, distrusted and despised by all Europe, he -with his eyes turned lingeringly towards the France -whose crown he believed he had so nearly attained, -she thinking longingly of the gaiety and careless -freedom of the Paris she had left behind, which now -hated her with true Parisian virulence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon’s sisters married before the plenitude of -his power, and the matches they made were not as -splendid as they might have been later; it was for -his younger but much more distant connections that -Napoleon was able to find husbands of royal rank. -It is curious to notice the extraordinary marriages -which were arranged while the Empire was at its -height. A niece of Murat’s, who had been brought -up as the ragged and bare-footed daughter of a small -farmer, married Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, -and among her grandchildren and -great-grandchildren at the present day are the King -of Rumania, the King of the Belgians and the -Queen of Portugal. Several of the petty princelings -of Germany, with thirty generations of royal -descent behind them, married obscure little Beauharnais -and Taschers de la Pagerie. Eugène de -Beauharnais and Berthier married princesses of -Bavaria, and Jerome received as bride a daughter -of the King of Würtemberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Eugène’s marriage had caused a difficult situation, -for Augusta of Bavaria was already affianced -to the Hereditary Prince of Baden, heir apparent to -<span class='pageno' title='170' id='Page_170'></span> -the reigning Grand Duke. Napoleon had caused -the marriage contract to be broken, but he was in -no way disconcerted; he straightway found a new -bride for the Hereditary Prince. He selected -Stéphanie de Beauharnais, a “thirty-second cousin” -of Josephine’s. Stéphanie was the merest child, -who had had the most extraordinary upbringing. -Her parents were of a shiftless character, like -various other Beauharnais, and after the Revolution -Stéphanie had been dependent on an English -peeress, Lady de Bathe, who had arranged with two -nuns from the suppressed houses to look after her. -As soon as Napoleon heard of her existence, he -summoned her to Court, and in accordance with his -pronounced ideas on family loyalty, made himself -responsible for her support. Next he announced -to her that he had secured her a royal husband. -Stéphanie immediately became a person of consequence, -because as yet royal marriages were by no -means common in the Bonaparte family. Their -Imperial Highnesses, Napoleon’s sisters, naturally -turned like tigresses upon the interloper, and reduced -the fifteen-year-old child to tears more than once in -the presence of the Court. This was more than -Napoleon could stand, and by a single decree he -gave the girl precedence over the whole Imperial -family save himself and Josephine. He wished to -keep the House of Baden as satisfied as possible. -With the same idea he gave Stéphanie a marvellous -trousseau, a dowry of sixty thousand pounds, and -jewels costing the same amount. Her wretched -father, who had returned from exile, received an -income of three thousand pounds a year and a lump -sum of two hundred thousand francs. He had done -nothing to earn it; he was merely the father of the -girl who was marrying an ally of the Emperor’s.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The period was one of general rejoicing, for -Austerlitz had just been won, and French domination -<span class='pageno' title='171' id='Page_171'></span> -over Europe seemed assured. The fêtes of the -marriage were of unexampled splendour; there were -illuminations; there were fireworks; and there were -balls without number, at one of which over two -thousand persons appeared. But behind all the -rejoicings there was a curious tragi-comedy being -played, for poor Stéphanie, married at sixteen to a -man she had never met, displayed a disconcerting -reluctance to complete all the accompanying formalities. -Night after night she insisted on a girl -friend sharing her room with her. The Hereditary -Prince grew restive; the whole Court knew of the -deadlock, and were proportionately amused. But -international politics cannot wait on a girl’s whim; -war clouds were appearing again across the Rhine; -Prussia seemed bent on war, and it was important -for Napoleon to be sure of Baden’s friendship. -Napoleon admonished Stéphanie with all the severity -of which he was capable; he terrified the wretched -girl into passivity, and when at last the newly-married -couple set off for Carlsruhe Baden’s support of -France was assured.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But the unhappiness which awaited all Napoleon’s -favourites dogged poor Stéphanie to her grave. The -House of Zaehringen hated her as an intruder; her -male children all died in infancy, and when in 1818 -her husband died she found herself without any -established position in a hostile land. Hints have -not been lacking that Charles of Baden died through -poison administered by the Hochberg family (of -morganatic descent from an earlier Elector), which -ultimately obtained the throne. But the strangest -story is that concerning Kaspar Hauser. In 1828 a -young man was found wandering in the streets of -Nuremberg, who had never seen the sunlight, and -whose whole appearance seemed to indicate that he -had been shut up in a cellar all his life. He did not -long survive his freedom. Stéphanie jumped to the -<span class='pageno' title='172' id='Page_172'></span> -conclusion that he was her second son, born in 1811, -who was supposed to have died as an infant while -she was seriously ill. Many people have agreed with -her, and have supposed that he had been kidnapped -by the Hochbergs to prevent his inheritance of the -throne. Some people go further, and boldly declare -that after his escape he was poisoned. The whole -matter has an aura of peculiarity, and it has attracted -the attention of many writers of authority, among -them Mr. Baring Gould. The most obvious counter -to the theory that Kaspar Hauser was a son of -Stéphanie is that the people who would be bold -enough to kidnap him would have had the sense to kill -him outright, and not to keep him as living evidence -of their guilt. If they murdered him in 1828, they -would certainly not have flinched from murdering -him in 1811.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But Stéphanie always believed that Kaspar was -her son, and she passed the last thirty years of her -life in mourning a murdered husband, a murdered -son, a lost throne, and the utter ruin of her whole -life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is only one more example of the blight -which Napoleon left upon the lives of nearly everyone -with whom he came into close contact. All the -people who were indebted to him for their entire -personal advancement lived to see the day when they -paid for a few golden hours with the most utter -regret and bitterness. The only ones who “lived -happily ever after” were those who had always -regarded him with suspicion, like Macdonald, or -those of inferior mental calibre, like Marie Louise, -whom a strange Providence seemed to take under its -own special care.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So much for Napoleon’s relations with women. -Nowhere can one find the least trace of romance or -self-sacrifice on his part, and it can safely be said that -no woman ever loved him devotedly. Never could -<span class='pageno' title='173' id='Page_173'></span> -Napoleon have said of any woman’s beauty, as -Richard III. said,</p> - - - <div class='poetry-container' style=''> - <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<div class='stanza-outer'> -<p class='line0'>“Your beauty, that did haunt me in my sleep</p> -<p class='line0'>To undertake the death of all the world</p> -<p class='line0'>So I might live one hour in your sweet bosom.”</p> -</div> -</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> - -<p class='pindent'>In men he could inspire the utmost self-devotion; -it seems hateful to think first of the Cuirassiers, a -living torrent of steel, pouring cheering to their -deaths at Wagram at his command, and then of his -vulgar deceit of Walewska and his petty, mercenary -intrigues with other women. It leaves a foul blot on -the splendour which surrounds him.</p> - - - <div class='poetry-container' style=''> - <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<div class='stanza-outer'> -<p class='line0'>“Methought I saw a slug crawl slavering</p> -<p class='line0'>Over the delicate petals of a flower.”</p> -</div> -</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo173.jpg' alt='' id='il173' style='width:70%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>THE KING OF ROME</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='174' id='Page_174'></span><h1>CHAPTER XIV<br/> <span class='sub-head'>LIKES AND DISLIKES</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>P</span>ERHAPS now we can see a little more clearly the -man who was the centre of so much interest. -To appreciate a man’s character it is not so -much necessary to realize what he did, as to realize -what he wanted to do, what he was fond of doing, -and what he would have done had he been able; and -on the other hand it is equally necessary to realize -what it was he did not like doing. With Napoleon -these matters do not bear a great deal of analysis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One is astonished at first when it is borne in upon -one that Napoleon was a man of tepid desires in -most directions. It seems almost inconceivable that -the man who was the storm centre of Europe, who -was capable of rousing overwhelming emotion in -others, was nearly incapable of emotion himself. -Yet so it was. Napoleon had one ruling desire—for -work, and he had one ruling passion—for the army. -His secondary passions were small, and his dislikes -were equally small. Compared in this light to any -full-blooded personality, Dr. Johnson, for instance, -Napoleon fades away into dismal uninterestingness. -Work was what Napoleon liked best of all in this -world. When other men would have broken down -under the simultaneous strain of work and anxiety, -he throve and grew fat. One of his most famous -letters was written on this very subject to his -brother Joseph at the height of the Eylau campaign. -<span class='pageno' title='175' id='Page_175'></span> -Joseph, from among the soft delights of Naples, had -written complaining of the troubles which beset him -while ruling his little kingdom, and Napoleon wrote -back briefly and sternly, telling how he was at that -moment engaged in a life and death struggle against -Bennigsen; how he was encumbered with the difficulties -of feeding and manœuvring two hundred -thousand men in the boggy plains of Poland, where -even he himself could hardly obtain the necessaries -of life; how at the same time the affairs of half -Europe demanded his attention, and yet for all this -he did not allow himself to be worried by these -numerous interests; he did all he had to do and -delighted in the strain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It can safely be said that Napoleon never took a -holiday. Sometimes it has been hinted that in 1810 -and 1811, after his marriage with Marie Louise, he -slackened his pace and did not do as much as he -might have done. This is true in part, but it is -equally true that during that time he got through an -amount of work which would have broken down most -men. Napoleon was not made for holidays. It is -hard to find, during the whole period covered by his -correspondence, a single day in which he did not -despatch a dozen letters, all of them bearing the hallmarks -of the utmost care and thought, and nearly -all of them vitally important links in a chain of -important decisions. Inactivity was hateful to him. -No sooner had he landed in Elba, removed entirely -from the usual outlets of his energy, than he flung -himself into the business of building up new interests. -He laboured harder while governing his little island -than did Kings of countries hundreds of times its -size. Only when he was lodged in St. Helena, do -we find a cessation of his frantic toil. Here circumstances -were against him; his gaolers did their best -in a blind fashion to prevent him from indulging in -either mental or physical activity, while the climate -<span class='pageno' title='176' id='Page_176'></span> -and environments were both conducive to torpor. -Yet even at St. Helena Napoleon was responsible for -the production of a mass of written material of whose -amount an average man might be proud if it were -the results of the labour of a lifetime. Hard, -unrelenting toil was to Napoleon the breath of life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>His chief relaxation was also in the nature of toil. -Napoleon was passionately fond of all things military. -Reviews were to him a source of unending delight. -On emerging triumphant from a period of intense -anxiety his first action almost invariably was to hold -a review of all the troops he could muster; the very -day on which he took up his residence at the Tuileries -after the <span class='it'>coup d’état</span> of Brumaire, he reviewed on the -Caroussel those battalions which later formed the -nucleus of the Guard, while at Tilsit he contrived -to arrange for two or three reviews every day. All -the pageantry and pomp of war appealed irresistibly -to this man to whom so little else appealed. To -Napoleon a battalion marching past in column of -double companies was worth all the vigour of Schiller -and all the passion of Alfieri. Soldiers are a delight -to most of us from our nursery days to our maturity; -the sight of a long line of bayonets or the brilliance -and glitter of the plumes and armour of the Household -Cavalry can still make us catch our breath for an -instant, but in few instances does this passion become -overwhelming. When it becomes characteristic of a -nation it usually portends calamity. Frederick -William I. of Prussia suffered from it to an extent -which has become historic, but in his case his passion -for soldiers was so overwhelming that he did not risk -losing any of his Potsdam Guards. Napoleon was -different; he intended his army for fighting, and -fight it did for twenty years, pomp and pageantry -notwithstanding. Not the wildest calumniator has -ever hinted that the reason why Napoleon did not -send the Guard into action at Borodino was because -<span class='pageno' title='177' id='Page_177'></span> -he wanted to keep them to review in peace-time—though -this explanation is sounder than some of those -put forward. Napoleon indulged his passion whenever -possible, but he kept it nevertheless strictly -within bounds.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon had been a soldier from the age of -twelve, so that one can easily explain his liking for -military detail; he had been human from the day of -his birth, but it is not so easy to find any other human -traits or weaknesses. The pleasures of the table -meant nothing to him; twenty minutes sufficed for -dinner at the Tuileries, and he dined just as contentedly -on horse-steak in Russia as he did on the -elaborate dishes which delighted Marie Louise. So -far as can be ascertained Napoleon was never seen -drunk, or sea-sick, or dyspeptic. It would be almost -with relief that we would read of his suffering from -measles, had he ever done so. His freedom from -ordinary weaknesses tends to throw the whole picture -out of perspective. One can hardly be surprised that -even so sensible a man as Thiers lost his head while -telling of Napoleon’s exploits. There is only one -human touch to which we can turn to gain the -measure of the whole. Napoleon loved a lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have already described how ardently Napoleon -looked forward to his meeting with his Imperial -bride, and the complacency with which he referred to -her royal uncle and aunt his predecessors, Louis XVI. -and Marie Antoinette. The same characteristic is -noticeable in many of his actions. Perhaps it is -going to extremes to describe his origination of the -Legend of Honour as a piece of snobbery, but his -other arrangements for the provision of a titled -nobility are strongly indicative of this curious stray -littleness of mind. No one reading his letters can -doubt that he preferred speaking of Monsieur le -Maréchal Prince d’Essling, Duc de Rivoli, Grand -Aigle de la Légion d’Honneur to speaking of plain -<span class='pageno' title='178' id='Page_178'></span> -General Masséna. He delighted in seeing about -him Grand Constables, Arch-Chancellors, Grand -Chamberlains; it pleased him to walk midst Grand -Dukes and Princesses; he preferred conversation -with the not over-talented Queen of Prussia to -any interview with Goethe. Characteristically, he -once invited an actor to come and perform before -a “Parterre of Kings.” It may perhaps be pleaded -that his painstaking care in the regulation of precedence, -and his minute examination of forms and -ceremonies were due to his desire to have his Imperial -arrangements perfect, but it may be pleaded with -equal justice that he entered voluntarily into these -arrangements. The Imperial dignity was not forced -upon him; he lost as many adherents by his assumption -of it as he gained. For all this, once Napoleon -decided upon indulging his snobbery, he indulged in -such a manner as to gain most profit by it. Just as -his delight in military matters tended towards the -improvement of his army, so his snobbery tended -towards buttressing his throne. Napoleon took -advantage of his own weaknesses just as he did of -other people’s.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One searches in vain for other prominent -characteristics. The selfishness so often attributed -to him is not so much the selfishness of Napoleon as -the selfishness of the Emperor. One cannot call -selfish the young lieutenant who took upon himself -the maintenance of a brother when his sole income -was thirty pounds a year, nor the man who gave -crowns and fiefs and fortunes to his friends, but the -Emperor who pried jealously into the management -of his subject kingdoms and took them back if he -saw fit, the Emperor who refused to share his -glory with his general, the Emperor who sacrificed -thousands of lives in order to hold down Europe was -selfish because he believed the Imperial power would -suffer were he unselfish. Even the ambition with -<span class='pageno' title='179' id='Page_179'></span> -which he is usually credited does not appear on close -examination to be very remarkable or extraordinary. -Ambition is, after all, one of the commonest of -human traits, and varies only in degree and not in -occurrence. When Napoleon was a young man he -wanted to “get on”; he “got on” partly through -abundance of opportunity and partly through his -extraordinary talent. If it be said that he succeeded -through the force of his ambition, it can easily be -countered that most of the men who have ever -succeeded were ambitious. A quite plausible life of -Napoleon might be written showing that he was -entirely the reverse of ambitious, and that all the -steps of his career towards power from the day of his -receiving the command of the army of Italy to his -invasion of Russia in 1812, were forced upon him. -At the beginning of his career Napoleon had far less -chance of gaining supreme power than had Hoche, -or Pichegru, or Jourdan, or Moreau, but his rivals -dropped out of the race through early deaths, sheer -folly, or, perhaps in the case of Moreau, mere inertia. -Napoleon is believed to have schemed to seize the -reins of government as early as 1797, but half a dozen -others, including even Bernadotte and Augereau, did -the same. Napoleon was lucky, vigorous, and far -more gifted than they, and it was into his hands that -the ripened fruit dropped. From 1799 on, from the -Consulate to the Consulate for life, from the Consulate -for life to the Empire of the French, from the -Empire of the French to the visionary Empire of -the West, were steps which he could hardly have -avoided taking in some form or other if he wished to -retain any power at all. The attempt to enforce the -Continental System undoubtedly led him further -forward than was wise or than he desired. Had -Bonaparte been a Washington, he might have retired -after the peace of Amiens, but it is perfectly possible -that even if a series of Washingtons had succeeded -<span class='pageno' title='180' id='Page_180'></span> -him, the last of them would have been beaten in a -great battle some ten years later by the armies of an -alliance of nations which had for some time back been -oppressed and enslaved in increasing degree by the -French. Undoubtedly this train of reasoning is -forced and unsound in some respects, but it certainly -gives a great deal of plausibility to the theory that -Napoleon’s ambition was not so far-reaching and -impossibly aspiring as it is sometimes carelessly said -to have been. In addition, it is necessary to -remember that his restless energy must occasionally -have spurred him to further action while a lazier man -would have remained tranquil. This is possibly an -explanation of his suicidal plunge into Spanish affairs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In like fashion the other indications of Napoleon’s -character are faint and colourless. Women had no -vast attraction for him; he appreciated them as a -physical necessity, but that was all. Undoubtedly -he ranked women in his mind along with exercise and -medicine, as things without which men are liable to -deteriorate. Wit and humour had very little meaning -for him—as witness his distaste for Molière—and -Art had even less. He ransacked Europe to fill -the Louvre with masterpieces, but he himself did not -enjoy them. He was careless of his ease, of his -attire, of his comfort. When he fell from power, he -did not seem to resent it very much. There is a story -of his having attempted suicide after his abdication -in 1814, but it is much to be doubted. The details -seem far more in agreement with the symptoms of -his mysterious illness, or of the malignant disease of -which he died a few years later. He did not seem -vastly depressed at Elba, or even at St. Helena. -Comparable to this lack of depression is his hopefulness -during the hopeless campaign of 1814. He -stood to lose so much, and he lost so much, but -neither the possibility nor the loss weighed upon him -unbearably. Perhaps he was confident that more -<span class='pageno' title='181' id='Page_181'></span> -greatness awaited him in the future; perhaps he -simply did not care. The furious rages in which -Napoleon sometimes indulged seem to have been -merely good acting; he himself admitted that he -never allowed his rage to mount higher than his -chin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another human trait which was wanting in -Napoleon was the capacity for hatred. With his -Corsican upbringing one might have expected to -find him at feud with numbers of people, but he was -not. Napoleon was not a good hater. He never -hated Pozzo di Borgo, for instance, half as much as -Pozzo hated him. He took violent dislikes to a -few individuals, but he frequently overcame these -in course of time. Macdonald is a case in point. -Hating must be distinguished from despising. -Napoleon despised the Spanish and Neapolitan -Bourbons, but he did not hate them. He waged war -after war on Francis of Austria, but he never admitted -any personal dislike. Hatred and affection were -alike unknown to Napoleon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are one or two isolated examples of men -for whom Napoleon professed affection, but a good -deal of doubt surrounds the matter. Napoleon said -he was fond of Muiron, who gave up his life for him -at Arcola; he said he was fond of Duroc, the Grand -Marshal of the Palace, who was killed at Bautzen, -but it is significant that we do not hear much about -this affection in either case until after Duroc and -Muiron were both dead. More than one contemporary -writer, indeed, has hinted that Duroc disliked -Napoleon, although he did his duty in an exemplary -manner, while so little is known about Muiron that -we can be permitted to assume that the affection -Napoleon expressed after Duroc and he were dead -was a theatrical touch assumed for the purpose of -enlisting still more sympathy at St. Helena. This -is quite in accordance with what we know both of -<span class='pageno' title='182' id='Page_182'></span> -Napoleon’s own nature and of his plan of campaign -while in exile.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One more point. Napoleon habitually attributed -the lowest possible motives to all human actions. -His attitude was not so much cynical as uncomprehending -(though some people think that cynicism is -merely lack of comprehension); he simply could not -understand anyone making any self-sacrifice when -quite disinterested or altruistic. If anyone did, he -put it down to hysteria. The brave boys who died -for him in the filth and misery of twenty campaigns -were so enthusiastic, Napoleon thought, merely -because they were hysterical.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This idea is plainly to be discerned on reading -Napoleon’s bulletins and proclamations. They are -all of them apparently designed to appeal to a sentimental -and hysterical public. Without doubt, they -did appeal to their readers, but one cannot help -feeling nowadays a sensation of distaste when looking -through them. They are unbearably reminiscent of -street corner oratory and of the flamboyant efforts of the -sensational press—appeals to hysteria pure and simple. -Moreover, it is also plain that Napoleon himself felt -none of these hysterical impulses—he was merely -working cold-bloodedly on the passions of a passionate -people. Napoleon was entirely unfamiliar with noble -instincts or with the idea of devotion. He laid claim -to them himself, of course, despite his disbelief in -them, but that was merely another method of capturing -the favour of the populace. Washington’s loftiness -of character was as much a sealed book to him -as would have been (had he lived to see it) Garibaldi’s -disinterested patriotism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even the sympathy with nationalism which his -nephew later laboured so hard to attribute to him -was wanting; the man who could unite seven nationalities -into one state, and who tossed fragments of -territory from one power to another without consulting -<span class='pageno' title='183' id='Page_183'></span> -anything beyond his own desires must of -necessity have cared nothing either for national or -individual sentiment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We can sum up then by describing Napoleon as -the embodiment of enormous ability, unquenchable -energy, and—nothing else. He can be compared to -an unguarded store of high explosive; he was bound -to cause trouble wherever he settled. Once afforded -an opportunity he was certain to bring about unexpected -results, and, as it happened, the turmoil into -which France was flung just as he reached manhood -afforded a very early opportunity. Without morals -or ideals to restrain or guide him, he would cause -destruction wherever he went, like a runaway horse -or a motor lorry out of control. He was a Frankenstein -monster let loose on the world; the good he did -was as haphazard as the harm.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo183.jpg' alt='' id='il183' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>PAULINE BORGHESE<br/> (née Bonaparte)</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='184' id='Page_184'></span><h1>CHAPTER XV<br/> <span class='sub-head'>WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>O</span>FTEN and often it has been savagely pointed -out that Napoleon enjoyed greater good -fortune than anyone could with reason -expect. Every incident in Napoleon’s life, from his -employment by Barras in 1795 to the collapse of -Francis I.’s nerve in 1809, has been used to prove -this, while his later misfortunes have been casually -mentioned as being inevitable considering his careless -taking of risks. The former criticism is undoubtedly -fair, but the latter is open to serious disagreement, -and has hardly received the opposition it deserves.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon’s domination of Europe from 1805 -onwards depended entirely upon his military -supremacy; nobody would dream of saying that he -would have received the homage of the Confederation -of the Rhine, the submission of Prussia and the -co-operation of Austria simply because of the force -of his personality, if that personality had not also -been supported by the menace of four hundred -battalions. Consequently Napoleon’s policy could -not be questioned so long as his army was invincible, -and mistakes of policy could be rapidly erased by a -victory in the field. Similarly a military error was -of far more importance than a political one; if the -Bonapartes had never met with a defeat in battle -their line would still inevitably hold the throne of -<span class='pageno' title='185' id='Page_185'></span> -France, with a ring of subject countries round them. -It is therefore of the first importance to inquire into -the failure of the army; the other failures are merely -secondary. Thus if anyone says that he has just -quitted a certain building for three reasons, one of -them being that he was thrown out, the other two -reasons are of secondary importance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Various dates have been assigned to the commencement -of the decline of Napoleon’s military -ascendancy, and the very fact that this is so proves -how difficult it is to be dogmatic on the subject. -Napoleon lost battles in 1807, and he won battles in -1813—and 1814 and 1815 for the matter of that. -The quality of the material at his disposal certainly -grew more and more inferior as time went on, but it -is easy to make too much of this point, for Napoleon -was <span class='it'>never</span> defeated except by superior numbers. -However, the first time he met with serious disaster -was, undoubtedly, in the campaign of 1812. The -catastrophe has been described times without -number; what has not so often been mentioned -is the nearness of Napoleon’s approach to another -triumph.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A Napoleonic army never took the field without -the full expectation of losing half its numbers -through hardship, as distinct from the action of the -enemy. This was the price it paid for its rapidity of -marching and its freedom from a rigid dependence -upon its base. If Napoleon led half a million men to -attack Russia, he expected to lose a quarter of a -million before he was in a position to gain a decisive -success; he certainly lost the quarter million, and he -certainly gained a success, but the losses continued -and the success was not decisive. And yet on several -occasions it appeared as if a new Austerlitz or a new -Friedland were at hand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The irony of the situation lies in the fact that in -1812 Napoleon took much more extensive measures -<span class='pageno' title='186' id='Page_186'></span> -to ensure that losses due to poverty of supplies would -be minimized than he did in any other campaign. -He organized an elaborate Intendance, with vast -trains of wagons, and he collected enormous depôts -of stores wherever possible. The system broke down -almost at once, partly on account of the inexperience -of the commissariat staff, partly because of torrential -rains which ruined the roads as soon as the army -started, and partly because the army and train were -so huge that they had already absorbed every available -horse in Europe, so that losses (which necessarily -increased with the distance marched from the depôts) -could not be replaced at all. This threw additional -work on the surviving horses, thereby increasing the -wastage, so that the Intendance went to pieces at a -rate increasing by geometrical progression. Before -very long the Grand Army was once more dependent -entirely on the country through which it marched, -and the numbers were vast and Lithuania and White -Russia were miserably poor. It was a combination -of circumstances apparently almost justifying the -Russian boast that God was on their side.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet matters were not progressing any too well -for the Russians. Their field army was hopelessly -divided; one portion, from the Danube, could not be -expected for months, while of the other two parts -one was almost in the clutches of the French, and -the two together were hopelessly inferior in numbers -to the forces at Napoleon’s disposal. The tide of -war came surging back across Russia; the Russians -were marching desperately to escape from the trap; -the French were pursuing equally desperately in the -hope of closing the last avenue of escape. The -balance wavered, but at length turned in favour of -the Czar. The roads were mere mud tracks, churned -by the Russians into quagmires, and the French were -delayed. Jerome Bonaparte was not as insistent on -speed as he might have been, and at last, after fierce -<span class='pageno' title='187' id='Page_187'></span> -rearguard fighting, Bagration escaped from the snare -laid for him. A little more—ever so little!—and -Smolensk might have been another Ulm.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The two main Russian armies were now combined, -and, a hundred and twenty thousand strong, -with a numerous cavalry, they were able to sweep the -country bare before the French advance. Had the -French movements round Smolensk been successful, -the Russians would have had only half these numbers, -and they would probably have been panic-stricken -in addition; the French advance would have been -proportionately easier and less expensive. In fact, it -is difficult to see how Russia could have continued -the war, for Alexander’s nerve would have been -shaken, the war party would have received a severe -rebuff, and altogether an entirely different atmosphere -would have arisen. The Russians fell slowly -back towards Moscow, the French, starving and -disease-ridden, toiled painfully after them. Barclay -de Tolly was relieved from his command in consequence -of his inaction, and Kutusoff, the disciple of -the great Suvaroff, took his place. A battle was -fought at Borodino. For Napoleon, it was the first -victory which did not give him huge captures of -prisoners and the prompt and abject submission of -his enemies; for the Russians it seemed as good as -a victory, for they had met the great conqueror -<span class='it'>en rase campagne</span>, and had escaped.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet they should not have done. The late Lord -Wolseley declares that Napoleon’s plan of attack at -Borodino “could not be more perfectly conceived or -better elaborated,” and he goes on to say that it was -a sudden attack of illness which prevented Napoleon -from controlling the battle when it reached its height, -and from sending adequate supports to Ney at the -crucial moment. This is the first mention we find of -the mysterious illness on which a large number of -writers lay so much stress; in the next campaign we -<span class='pageno' title='188' id='Page_188'></span> -shall find a much more important example. But -whether Napoleon was ill or not, a little better -luck for Ney or Davout would certainly have -brought about important results. The destruction -of Kutusoff’s army would have had a great effect -on the rest of the campaign, even if it had not -appalled Alexander into making peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next mistake of the Emperor’s was in staying -too long at Moscow; during the five weeks he spent -there his own army became demoralized, the Russians -had time to rally and to bring up the Army of the -Danube, and winter closed down on the countryside. -When at last Napoleon decided to retreat Kutusoff -was able at Malo-Jaroslavetz to bar the way to -Kaluga, and to force him to go back through the -pillaged districts through which he had come; this -could mean nothing less than the destruction of his -army, and, as everyone knows, the Grand Army was -destroyed. It is needless here to tell once more the -tale of the Beresina and Krasnoi; the interest of -“what might have been” ceases with the battle of -Malo-Jaroslavetz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The points to be remembered are that during the -fighting round Smolensk Napoleon was within a hairbreadth -of an overwhelming victory; at Borodino he -might have gained a satisfactory victory; a prompt -retreat from Moscow would at least have minimized -disaster; a success at Malo-Jaroslavetz would have -saved part of the army, while the check which was -actually experienced here was due to the accumulated -effects of the earlier bad luck. In a military sense -the campaign of 1812 was not merely justifiable but -it was very nearly justified. A little—a very little -more thrown into the scale would have saved his -Empire for Napoleon and set him on a higher throne -than ever before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The campaign of 1813 was in this sense even -more striking. It was waged with untrained, -<span class='pageno' title='189' id='Page_189'></span> -immature forces, for the most part against overwhelming -odds, but during the course of the fighting -Napoleon was not once, but many times, within an -ace of successes more splendid than Austerlitz. The -actions of the Allies seemed to portend failure for -them from the start. Although Prussia joined -Russia as soon as the extent of the French disaster -became known; although there was nothing to bar -their way except a few thousand starving survivors -of the Grand Army; although all Germany was -in a ferment, and the French domination of the -Rhenish Confederation was tottering, the Russians -advanced with pitiful caution and delay. Napoleon -had returned to Paris, had raised, organized, equipped -and set in motion a new army of a quarter of a -million men by the time the Russians reached the -Elbe. Almost before the Russian commander-in-chief, -Wittgenstein, knew what was happening, -Napoleon had rushed back at the head of his new -army, had won the battle of Lützen, had reconquered -Saxony, and had flung the Allied army back across -the Oder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Bautzen they stood once more to fight. -Napoleon drew up the most gigantic battle plan ever -conceived up to that time; with half his force he -assailed the Allied centre, while Ney with sixty -thousand men marched against the right. The -struggle lasted for twelve bitter hours. Somehow -Napoleon held his own command together and -kept the Allies pinned to their position, while Ney -was slowly wheeling his immense force round for -the decisive movement. But the stars in their -courses fought against the Emperor. Ney failed -lamentably. He lost sight of the main object of his -march, and he showed his hand and then wasted his -strength in a fierce attack on Blücher at Preistitz. -Blücher struggled gamely; more and more of Ney’s -forces were drawn into the fight; the turning movement -<span class='pageno' title='190' id='Page_190'></span> -was delayed, and the Allies, warned in time, -writhed out of the trap. Fifty thousand prisoners -and two hundred guns might have been captured; as -it was, Napoleon was left to deplore a massacre—for -nothing! Alluding to Soult’s capture of Badajoz in -1811, Napoleon had said, “Soult gained me a town -and lost me a kingdom.” He might well have said -of Ney’s attack on Preistitz that Ney gained him a -village and lost him an Empire. It is inconceivable -that the war could have been prolonged if Ney had -obeyed orders at Bautzen; the allied army comprised -all the troops that Russia and Prussia could at that -time put into the field; its destruction would have -meant the reconquest of Prussia and of Poland, -the intimidation of Austria, and the regaining of -Napoleon’s European ascendancy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After Bautzen Napoleon concluded an armistice -with his enemies. He still hoped for an advantageous -peace, and even if he failed to obtain this he -expected that the delay would enable him to rest -the weary boys who filled the ranks, to drill his -wretched cavalry into some semblance of order, and -to clear his rear of the bandits and partisans who -were swarming everywhere. Moreover, for the last -eighteen months he had been working at a pace -which would have killed most men, and he himself -was undoubtedly feeling the strain. The armistice -would give him a little rest. But it meant disaster, -nevertheless. From all over Russia new recruits -were plodding across the unending plains to fill the -gaps in the ranks of the field army; Prussia was -calling out her whole male population, and Bernadotte’s -Swedes were gradually moving up into line. -Worse than all, Austria turned against him. The -delay enabled Francis to bring his army up to war -strength on the receipt of lavish English subsidies, -and, even while he still hesitated to attack his son-in-law, -the news arrived that Wellington had routed -<span class='pageno' title='191' id='Page_191'></span> -Joseph Bonaparte at Vittoria, had cleared Spain of -the French, and was about to attack the sacred soil -of France herself. The news was decisive, and the -demands of the Allies promptly increased inordinately. -When, in August, the armistice came to an -end, Napoleon found himself assailed by forces of -twice his strength.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yet he did not despair; he thrust fiercely into -Silesia, and then, finding the Austrians moving -against Dresden, he wheeled about, marched a -hundred and twenty miles in four days, and gained -at Dresden the most surprising of all his victories. -With a hundred thousand men he flung back a -hundred and sixty thousand Russians and Austrians -in utter disorder; Vandamme had cut off their -retreat, and once again it seemed as if Ulm and -Austerlitz were to be repeated. And then once -more occurred a startling change of fortune. -Napoleon might have taken a hundred thousand -prisoners; the Emperors of Austria and of Russia -might have fallen into his power; Austria would -have been ruined, and Napoleon could have dictated -peace on his own terms. But Napoleon handed over -the pursuit to Murat and St. Cyr, and returned to -Dresden. In consequence, the retreating Austrians -were not pressed, Vandamme was overwhelmed, and -the action at Kulm gave the Allies twenty thousand -prisoners instead of placing the whole Allied army -in the hands of the French.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>No one knows why Napoleon returned to -Dresden when victory was in his grasp. The -advocates of the illness theory certainly have a -strong case here; but perhaps it was news of the -disasters in Silesia which recalled him; perhaps he -was merely too tired to continue; perhaps he only -had a bad cold as the result of sitting his horse all -day in the pelting rain which fell all day during the -battle of Dresden. However it was, Napoleon’s -<span class='pageno' title='192' id='Page_192'></span> -mastership of Europe was lost irreparably when he -came to his decision to leave his army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For two months disaster now followed disaster. -Macdonald had already been routed on the Katzbach; -Oudinot was beaten at Gross Beeren, Ney was beaten -at Dennewitz, St. Cyr surrendered at Dresden, and -Napoleon himself tasted the bitter cup of defeat at -Leipzig. The astonishing feature of the autumn -campaign of 1813 was not that Napoleon was -defeated, but that he ever escaped from Germany -at all. But he did, blotting out on his path the -Bavarian army which opposed him at Hanau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Once again the Allies advanced too slowly, and -once again Napoleon was able to organize a fresh -army to defend France. Soult had grappled with -Wellington in the south, and was stubbornly contesting -every inch of French soil in his desperate -campaign of Toulouse. Napoleon prepared to make -one more effort for success in the north. Russia, -Austria, Prussia, Sweden, the Confederation of the -Rhine, Holland and even Belgium had sent every -man available against him. Four hundred thousand -men were about to pass the Rhine while Napoleon -had not a quarter of this force with which to oppose -them. However, the prospect was not as hopeless -as it would appear. The Allies were bitterly jealous -of each other, and Napoleon had good grounds for -hoping to divide them even now. Besides, they were -all of them intent upon gaining possession of whatever -territory they wished to claim at the conclusion of -peace, and an army guided solely by political motives -is at the mercy of another which is directed only in -accordance with the dictates of military strategy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This early became obvious. Austria had bought -the alliance of the smaller German states only by -means of extensive guarantees of their possessions; -in consequence she determined to find compensation -for her losses by acquisitions in Italy. But Italy -<span class='pageno' title='193' id='Page_193'></span> -was stoutly defended by the Viceroy Eugène; she -could make no progress there, and in consequence -she did not yet desire Napoleon’s fall. Schwartzenberg, -the Austrian general, was therefore held back -by Metternich’s secret orders until Venetia and -Lombardy should be in Austrian hands. Metternich -was quite capable of leaving the Russians and -Prussians in the lurch while he played his own -tortuous game; however, the situation was saved -by Murat’s betrayal of Napoleon. With Murat on -his side, and the Neapolitan army moving forward -against Eugène, Metternich was sure of Italy, and -Schwartzenberg was allowed to proceed into France. -Once more the weakness and treachery of a subordinate -had prevented Napoleon from gaining a decisive -success.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The prospect grew gloomier and gloomier for -the French. Napoleon was beaten at Brienne and -at La Rothière; immediate and utter ruin seemed -inevitable. Suddenly everything was changed. -Napoleon fell upon the dispersed army of the -Allies. At Champ-Aubert, Vauchamp, Château-Thierry -and Mormant the Allies were beaten and -hurled back. More than this, the Prussians under -Blücher, thirty thousand strong, hard pressed by -Napoleon, came reeling back towards Soissons and -the Marne—and Soissons was held by a French -garrison. With an unfordable river before him; -the only bridge held by the enemy; a panic-stricken -army under his command, and Napoleon and his -unbeaten Frenchmen, flushed with victory, at his -heels, Blücher seemed doomed to destruction. The -officer in command at Soissons bore the ominous -name of Moreau; he was intimidated into surrender -when one more day’s defence would have had -incalculable results. Blücher escaped across the -Marne not a minute too soon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This was Napoleon’s last chance before his -<span class='pageno' title='194' id='Page_194'></span> -abdication. His armies were weakened even by their -victories; the Allied forces seemed inexhaustible. -All Napoleon’s efforts were unavailing; his final -threat at Schwartzenberg’s communications was -disregarded, and the Allies reached Paris. Marmont’s -surrender here has often been brought -forward as one more instance of treachery in high -places, but it was not treachery, it was only timidity -and fear of responsibility. One cannot imagine -Blücher surrendering under similar circumstances. -Be that as it may, Paris fell, and Napoleon abdicated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After the abdication came the descent from -Elba; after the descent from Elba came the Hundred -Days; and at the end of the Hundred Days came the -Waterloo campaign. It was during the Waterloo -campaign that there occurred, not one but half a -dozen chances for Napoleon to win the decisive -victory for which he had been striving ever since -1812, but all these half-dozen chances were spoilt -by unexpected happenings and by sheer hard luck.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Many critics have inveighed against Napoleon’s -decision to take the initiative into his own hands -and to carry the war into the enemy’s camp by -his invasion of Belgium, but there is hardly one -who can find any fault with the plan of invasion -once it had been decided upon. The chief fault-finder, -indeed, is Wellington, who, to his dying -day, maintained that the movement should have -been commenced through Mons, against the English -right, and not through Charleroi, against their left. -However, Wellington’s opinion on this matter does -not carry as much weight as it might, because the -Iron Duke was guilty of several serious mistakes -during the campaign, and was only too anxious to -draw any red herring that offered across their trail, -especially as these mistakes were nearly all committed -while he was under the impression that Napoleon’s -ultimate objective was his right and not his centre. -<span class='pageno' title='195' id='Page_195'></span> -The whole weight of later opinion is in favour of -Napoleon’s plan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon decided, then, to invade Belgium via -Charleroi, to interpose between the Prussian and -the Anglo-Allied armies and defeat them in detail. -The fact that he had only 130,000 men against -120,000 Prussians and 100,000 English and Allies -does not seem to have caused him any grave -apprehension. The greatest handicap under which -he suffered was the absence of Berthier and Davout; -both staff work and the higher commands suffered -because of this, for Soult had no aptitude for the -task of Chief of Staff, and Ney and Grouchy had -no skill either in higher strategy or in the handling -of large numbers of men. Nevertheless, the initial -movements, without the interference of the enemy, -were carried out with brilliant success; the 130,000 -men available were assembled on the Sambre without -either Blücher or Wellington having any suspicion -as to the storm that was gathering. Next day the -advance across the Sambre was ordered, and the -storm burst.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The two vitally important factors for success -were extreme simplicity of movement and the -utmost secrecy of design. But these were rendered -impossible at the very moment of the opening of -the campaign. First, a general of division, as soon -as he was over the river, deserted to the Prussians and -disclosed the very considerable information of which -he was possessed, and secondly the officer bearing -orders to Vandamme to advance met with an accident -and broke his leg. This held up both Vandamme’s -corps and the one behind it, Lobau’s, and delayed -the advance after the movement had become known -for six valuable hours. All chance of surprising the -Prussians in their cantonments was now lost, but for -all that the plan of campaign was so perfect that on -the next day the English and Prussians could only -<span class='pageno' title='196' id='Page_196'></span> -bring slightly superior numbers to bear on the French -force. At Ligny the Prussians were beaten; at -Quatre Bras the English were held back. Ney’s -and d’Erlon’s mistakes on this day have already -been described. Had Ney acted with all possible -diligence, or had d’Erlon used his wits, either a -completely crushing victory over the Prussians or a -nearly equally satisfactory success over the English -could have been obtained. Even both were possible. -But Napoleon’s chance was spoiled owing to the -inefficiency of his subordinates. Soult, Ney and -d’Erlon were all equally to blame.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next point is more mysterious. After Ligny -was fought and won, it was clearly to Napoleon’s -advantage to follow up his success without a moment’s -delay. No other general had ever been so remorseless -in hunting down a beaten enemy, and in wringing -every possible advantage from his victory. But at -Digny Napoleon paused. No order for an advance -was issued. For twelve hours paralysis descended -upon the Imperial army. The Prussians struggled -out of harm’s way, and crawled painfully by by-roads -to Wavre to keep in touch with the English. -The cavalry reconnaissances which were sent out -later the next morning to find the Prussian army -did their work badly, and left Napoleon convinced -that they had fallen back on Liège and not on -Wavre. It was the delay, however, and not the -faulty scouting, which proved most disastrous. Like -Napoleon’s return to Dresden in 1813, it has never -been explained. Some historians say that he was -struck down by an attack of the same nameless -illness which had overcome him at Borodino, at -Moscow, at Dresden and at Leipzig. In this case -it is the only possible explanation. For four or five -hours Napoleon must have suffered from a complete -lapse of his faculties. Those four or five hours were -sufficient to ruin the Empire. Napoleon was left -<span class='pageno' title='197' id='Page_197'></span> -completely in the dark as to the moral, strength and -position of the Prussians, and consequently he -detached Grouchy with ambiguous orders in pursuit, -gave him a force too small for decisive operations -and yet much too large for mere observation, and -sent him by a route which precluded him either from -assisting the main body or from interfering seriously -with the operations of the Prussians. Grouchy -might possibly have done both if only he had -possessed vast insight, vast skill and vast determination, -but he did not; he was merely ordinary. So -Wellington turned to bay at Waterloo; the Prussians -assailed Napoleon’s flank, and the day ended in -despair and disaster.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus, on looking back through the years of -defeat, 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815, we find that -there were a great number of occasions when -Napoleon might have gained a success which would -have counter-balanced the previous reverses. At -Smolensk he might have gained another Friedland; -at Borodino he might still have snatched some slight -triumph out of the Moscow campaign. At Bautzen -he came within an ace of destroying the Russian and -Prussian armies, at Dresden he nearly captured the -whole Austrian army and the two most powerful -autocrats of Europe. The surrender of Soissons just -saved the Prussians in 1814. In 1815 he might have -shattered either or both of the armies opposed to him. -It is not too much to say that with the good luck -which had attended him during his earlier campaigns -not only might he not have been forced to abdicate -in 1814, but he might have enjoyed his continental -ascendancy for a very considerable additional length -of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Beside these undoubted possibilities there are -others not as firmly based. Marbot tells a story that -on the eve of Leipzig, while at the head of his -Chasseurs, he saw a party of horsemen moving about -<span class='pageno' title='198' id='Page_198'></span> -in the darkness a short distance ahead. For various -reasons he refrained from attacking—to discover later -that the hostile force had consisted of the King of -Prussia, the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and -their staffs. A resolute charge by Marbot would have -brought back as prisoners all the brains and authority -of the opposing army. The Spanish victory at -Pavia, when Francis the First lost “everything -except honour,” would have been a poor success in -comparison. We have, however, only Marbot’s word -for this incident, and Marbot is distinctly untrustworthy. -Edward III.’s army was not the only one -which used the long bow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is more to the purpose to consider Dupont’s -surrender at Baylen. When Dupont was sent out -from Madrid to conquer Andalusia, there was only -one Spanish field army in being, and that was the -one he was to attack. As it happened, his nerve -failed him, he frittered away weeks of valuable time, -and finally he was hemmed in and forced to surrender -rather feebly. The news of the disaster spread like -wildfire over the Peninsula. Moncey was repulsed -from Valencia; Catalonia broke into insurrection -and hemmed Duhesme into Barcelona. Galicia and -Aragon began to arm. The Peninsular War was -soon fully developed; it was to absorb the energies of -an army of three hundred thousand men for five -years; it was to shed the blood of half a million -Frenchmen; it was to encourage first Austria, then -Russia, to rebel against the Napoleonic domination, -and it was only to end when the British flag waved -over Bordeaux and Toulouse. Had Lannes or some -other really capable officer been in command of -Dupont’s twenty thousand men, the Army of -Andalusia might have been thoroughly beaten and -the Peninsula overawed, for Baylen was the battle -which destroyed the French army’s reputation for -invincibility. Had not the Spaniards been victorious -<span class='pageno' title='199' id='Page_199'></span> -there, there would not have been an opportunity for -the simultaneous call to arms which set all Spain in -an inextinguishable blaze; isolated outbreaks might -naturally have occurred, but the long respite given -to the Spaniards during the summer of 1808, while -Madrid was evacuated, would not have taken place -to give the Peninsula its opportunity for arming -and organizing. Baylen is as great a turning-point -in Napoleonic history as even Bautzen or Leipzig—and -but for Dupont history might have turned in -another direction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Instances such as this might be multiplied -indefinitely, from Marmont at El Bodin (where he -hesitated when half the British army was in his -power) to Jourdan in his retreat to Vittoria; from -Jerome’s mismanagement of Westphalia to Ney at -Dennewitz; but it is useless to continue. It is -obvious that Napoleon’s military set-backs were due -very largely, not to his own failings, but to the -incapacity of his subordinates. Napoleon made mistakes, -enormous ones, sometimes (a few will be considered -in the next chapter), but none of them as -utterly fatal as those of the other generals. And yet -these other generals were quite good generals as far -as generals go—they were far and away superior -to Schwartzenberg and Wittgenstein, for instance. -Only Wellington and perhaps Blücher can be compared -to them. The only moral to be drawn is that -nothing human and fallible could sustain the vast -Empire any longer; the dead weight of the whole -was such that the least flaw in any of the pillars -meant the progressive collapse of the entire fabric.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This conclusion enables us to approach a definite -decision as to “what might have been.” It is -unnecessary to argue as to whether the English -Cabinet would have survived a defeat at Waterloo, -or whether Francis would have made peace if he had -been captured at Dresden. The result eventually -<span class='pageno' title='200' id='Page_200'></span> -would have been the same. There was only one -Napoleon, and the Empire was too big for him to -govern. Sooner or later something would go wrong, -and the disturbance would increase in geometrical -progression, and with a violence directly proportionate -to the length of time during which the repressive -force had been in action. It was inevitable that the -Empire should fall, although as it happened the fall -was accelerated by a series of unfortunate incidents. -Victor Hugo meant the same thing when he said -“God was bored with Napoleon”; and Napoleon -himself had occasional glimpses of the same inevitable -result—as witness the occasion when he said, “After -me, my son will be lucky if he has a few thousand -francs a year.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus, if Napoleon by good fortune had reestablished -his Empire in 1813, and taken advantage -(just as he did in 1810) of peace in the east to -reconquer Spain in the south, even then he would -not long have retained his throne. The persistent -enmity of England would have continued to injure -him, and to seek out some weak spot for the decisive -blow. Even if Ferdinand had been sent back to -Spain, and French prestige survived such a reverse, -there would have still remained various avenues of -attack. England was suffering severely, but France -was suffering more. Perhaps the patience of the -French would have become exhausted, and some -trivial revolt in Paris would have driven Napoleon -into exile. A very similar thing happened in 1830, -and the house of Orleans was always anxiously -awaiting some such chance. There could hardly -have arisen a Napoleonic Legend in that event. To -the French mind Napoleon the Great and Napoleon -the Little would have been the same person, instead -of uncle and nephew.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However it was, Napoleon was not destined to -live long, and even if his Empire had survived him, -<span class='pageno' title='201' id='Page_201'></span> -at his death one can hardly imagine Europe remaining -under the thumb of any Council of Regency he -might appoint, with Joseph and Jerome and the -Murats all scheming and conspiring to grasp the -main power. Poor silly Marie Louise could never -have kept order; some Monk would have arisen to -restore the Bourbons, and Napoleon II. would have -received the same treatment as did Richard Cromwell. -The legend of l’Aiglon would then have been very -different. A Bonaparte restoration in France might -be as feasible as ever was a Protectorate restoration -in England. Not all Louis Napoleon’s wiles could -have built up a reactionary party; not all the glamour -of Austerlitz and Jena could have masked the discredit -of a new dynasty being cast out by its own -people instead of by a league of indignant autocrats; -even Sedan was not the death-blow to Bonapartism. -As it is, there will be a Third Empire in France as -soon as there arises a Napoleon the Fourth.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo201.jpg' alt='' id='il201' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>DAVOUT<br/> (PRINCE D’ECKMÜHL AND DUC D’AUERSTÄDT)</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='202' id='Page_202'></span><h1>CHAPTER XVI<br/> <span class='sub-head'>SPOTS IN THE SUN</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>I</span>T was Napoleon’s fate, during his lifetime and -for some time after, to have his worst mistakes -overlooked, and to have various strokes of policy -violently condemned as shocking errors. Everyone -has heard the execution of the Duc d’Enghien spoken -of as “worse than a crime—it was a blunder.” It -is difficult to see why. Perhaps Fouché, to whom -the remark is attributed, did not see why either. If -a man should happen to think of an epigram of that -brilliancy, it is hard to condemn him for using it -without troubling much as to its truth. But whether -launched in good faith or not, that shaft of wit sped -most accurately to its mark, and proved so efficiently -barbed that it has stuck ever since.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The real point was that France was at war with -England at the time, and that Napoleon was so -universally dreaded that any stick was considered -good enough to beat him with. Consequently a -storm of indignation arose, diligently fostered by -those who benefited, and soon all Europe was furious -that a poor dear Bourbon had been shot. If nowadays -the President of the German Republic were to -lay hold of a young Hohenzollern and shoot him on -a charge of conspiracy, it is doubtful whether it -would cause any similar stir. Europe is not fond of -Hohenzollerns, and the principle of Legitimacy is so -far discredited that it is not considered blasphemy to -treat the descendant of an autocrat with violence. -<span class='pageno' title='203' id='Page_203'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Undoubtedly it was a crime for Napoleon to -shoot the Duke, but it was hardly a blunder. It was -contrary to international law for him to send the -expedition to Ettenheim which arrested d’Enghien; -it was contrary to statutory law to try him without -allowing him to make any defence; it was contrary -to moral law to shoot him for an offence of which -he was not guilty. For all this Napoleon deserves -the utmost possible censure—but without doubt he -profited largely. Everywhere among Napoleon’s -enemies arose a weeping and wailing; the English -poured out indignant seas of ink (in 1914 they -wrote in much the same fashion about Wilhelm of -Germany’s withered arm). Alexander of Russia put -his Court in mourning (only three years before he -had been cognisant of the plot which brought about -the murder of his own father); the King of Sweden -tried to organize a crusade of revenge; but a month -after d’Enghien died the Senate begged Napoleon -to assume the Imperial title. It is curious, indeed, -that so much notice should have been taken of one -more murder by a generation which witnessed, without -one quarter so much emotion, the partition of -Poland, the storming of Praga, the sack of Badajoz, -the shooting of Ney, and Wellington’s devastation -of the Tagus Valley. The art of propaganda was at -quite a high level even more than a century ago.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Once again, the execution of d’Enghien was a -crime and not a mistake. By it Napoleon showed -that he was no mere Monk dallying with the idea of -restoring the Bourbons. He brought to his support -all the most determined of the irreconcilables. He -showed the monarchs of Europe that he was a man -to be reckoned with. Murat, Savary, everyone -implicated was cut off from all possible communication -with the Bourbons. The deed cowed the Pope -into submission at a vitally important moment, while -the mere mention of it later was sufficient to frighten -<span class='pageno' title='204' id='Page_204'></span> -the wretched Ferdinand of Spain into abject obedience -at that strange conference at Bayonne, when an -idiotic father and a craven son handed the crown of -Charles V. to an incompetent upstart. But Napoleon -would have met with no more than he deserved had -he had dealt out to him at Fontainebleau in 1814 the -same tender mercy which Condé’s heir received at -Vincennes ten years before—ten years almost to the -day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If Enghien’s execution were a crime but not a -mistake, there are several incidents, most of them -occurring about the same time, which undoubtedly -indicated mistakes, even if they were not crimes. -Thus Pichegru was found dead in prison. Pichegru -was one of the generals of the Republic, almost -worthy of ranking with Hoch and Kléber. He had -conquered Holland, and was credited with the -mythical exploit of capturing the frozen-in Dutch -fleet with a squadron of Hussars. (The Dutch had -obligingly forestalled this achievement by surrendering -some time previously.) Later he had been found -to be parleying with the Bourbons, and had been -disgraced and exiled. Returning at the time of -Cadoudal’s conspiracy, he had been arrested, -imprisoned—and was found one morning dead, with -a handkerchief round his neck which had been -twisted tight by means of a stick. Paris gossip -credited Napoleon with the guilt of his death, and -darkly hinted that his confidential Mamelukes had -revived the Oriental process of bowstringing. It is -hard to believe that Napoleon really was guilty, for -he could have secured Pichegru’s death by legal -methods had he wished, while if he wanted to kill -Pichegru quietly he could have adopted more subtle -means. The blunder lay in his allowing the circumstances -to become known; with his power he could -have arranged a much more satisfactory announcement -which would leave no doubt in men’s minds -<span class='pageno' title='205' id='Page_205'></span> -that Pichegru really had committed suicide. In -consequence of his carelessness Napoleon was also -charged with the murder, a year later, of an English -naval officer, Captain Wright, who also committed -suicide in prison.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A more terrible mystery surrounds the death of -Villeneuve. This unfortunate man had been in -command at Trafalgar; he had been wounded and -taken prisoner, and had subsequently been sent back -to France. As soon as he landed he found that -Napoleon was furious with him as a consequence of -his defeat, and he was found dead in his room at -Rennes, with half a dozen knife-stabs in his body. -It was announced that he had committed suicide, -but there are several unpleasant facts in connection -with his death which point to another conclusion. -Letters from him to his wife and from his wife to -him had disappeared in the post; the manner of death -was strange, for the knife-thrusts were numerous -and one of them was so situated that it could hardly -have been self-inflicted. Perhaps Napoleon had -Villeneuve killed; perhaps the crime was committed -by over-zealous underlings; however it was, it was -a serious error on Napoleon’s part to have allowed -any room for gossip whatever. A possible motive -for the crime (if it was one) lies in the fact that -Napoleon was terribly anxious to keep secret the -news of Trafalgar; not until the Restoration was the -general French public acquainted with the fact that -the French fleet had been destroyed—Napoleon had -never admitted more than the loss of one or two ships.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was incidents of this nature which caused the -feeling of distrust which gradually arose in the minds -of the French people. Broken treaties and international -bad faith did not move them so much, partly -because they were never in possession of the true -facts, partly because a series of brilliant victories -wiped off the smudges from the slate, and partly -<span class='pageno' title='206' id='Page_206'></span> -because international morality was at its usual low -ebb; but tales of official murder and of unsavoury -scandals in high places constitute the ideal food for -gossip, and rumours spread and were distorted in the -way rumours are, until a large section of the public -had lost its faith in the Emperor. As long as -Napoleon was successful in the field this defection -was unimportant, but as soon as his power began to -ebb it became decidedly noticeable, and, as much as -anything else, helped to reconcile the mass of the -people to the return of the Bourbons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It has been well said that the man who never -makes any mistakes never makes anything else, and -allied to this statement is Wellington’s famous -dictum (which applies equally well to all kinds of -endeavour) that the best general is not the one who -makes fewest mistakes, but the one who takes most -advantage of the mistakes of his opponent. On -examining Napoleon’s career one finds mistakes -innumerable—and the successes are more numerous -still. In military matters the explanation lies in the -extreme and elaborate care Napoleon devoted to his -strategic arrangements. His movements were so -planned that no tactical check could derange them. -His <span class='it'>bataillon carré</span> of a hundred thousand men, with -Lannes the incomparable at the head of the advanced -guard, could take care of itself whatever happened. -The advanced guard caught the enemy and pinned -him to his ground, providing that fixed point which -Napoleon always desired as a pivot, and then the -massed army could be wheeled with ease against -whatever part of the enemy’s line Napoleon selected. -If victory was the result, then the pursuit was relentless; -if perhaps a check was experienced, then the -previous strategy had been such that the damage -done was minimized. It was this system which -saved him at Eylau and which was so marvellously -successful at Friedland. -<span class='pageno' title='207' id='Page_207'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The occasions when danger threatened or when -disaster occurred were those when Napoleon did not -act on these lines. The campaign of 1796, indeed, -shows no trace of the “Napoleonic system.” The -principles which Napoleon followed were only those -of the other generals of the period, but they were -acted upon with such vigour and with such a clarity -of vision that they were successful against all the -odds which the Aulic Council brought to bear. At -Marengo, on the other hand, the conditions were -different and more exacting. This victory had to be -as gratifying as possible to the French nation—it had -to be gained by extraordinary means; it had to be -as unlooked-for as a thunderbolt, as startling as it -was successful, and it must bring prodigious results. -Also (for Napoleon’s own sake) it had to be gained -as quickly as possible, so that he could return to Paris -to overcome his enemies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Austrians had overrun Italy, were besieging -Genoa, and had advanced to the Var. No mere -frontal attack upon them would fulfil all the onerous -conditions imposed upon the First Consul. A series -of successes painfully gained, resulting in the slow -driving of the Austrians from one river line to -another, might be safe, but it would not be dramatic -nor unexpected, and, worst of all, it would not be -rapid. Napoleon took an enormous risk, and led his -Army of Reserve over the Alps. He had satisfied -the need for drama; now he had to justify himself -by a speedy victory. Defeat, with an impassable -defile in his rear, meant nothing less than disaster; -but delay, with his enemies gradually rallying at -Paris, meant similar disaster. The strain became -unbearable, and Napoleon scattered his army far and -wide in his endeavour to come to grips with the -Austrians. The risk he ran was appalling, and was -almost fatal, for the fraction of the army which he -still retained under his own hand was suddenly -<span class='pageno' title='208' id='Page_208'></span> -attacked by the combined Austrians, and driven -back. Napoleon flung himself into the battle; somehow -he kept his battered battalions together until -three undeserved strokes of luck occurred simultaneously. -Desaix arrived with his stray division; Zach -unduly extended the Austrian line; and Kellermann -was afforded an opportunity for a decisive charge. -In ten minutes the whole situation was changed. -Marengo was won; it was the Austrians who were -defeated without an avenue of retreat; and Napoleon -was free to enjoy the intoxication of supreme power—and -to meditate on the destiny which had saved -him from indescribable disgrace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The errors into which Napoleon fell during the -campaign of 1805 were mainly the result of his overestimation -of his adversaries’ talents. No one could -possibly have imagined that Mack would have been -such a spiritless fool as to stay in Ulm and allow -himself to be surrounded by an army three times his -strength. Napoleon certainly did not expect him to, -and made his dispositions on the supposition that -Mack would endeavour to fight his way through to -Bohemia or Tyrol. But Mack remained paralysed; -the one gap left open was closed to him by Ney’s -dashing victory at Elchingen, and all that remained -to be done was for Napoleon to receive the timid -surrender of thirty thousand men and for Murat to -hunt down whatever fragments were still at large. -Five weeks later the Russians were destroyed at -Austerlitz. There is no manœuvre of Napoleon’s -during these five weeks at which anyone can reasonably -cavil; the faint criticism that Napoleon ought -not to have advanced as far as he did into Moravia -is easily falsified by the fact that by this means he -was able to find room for his retreat on Austerlitz -which gave so much heart to the Russians and which -induced them to make their ruinous attack on his -right wing. -<span class='pageno' title='209' id='Page_209'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The mistakes which Napoleon made during the -Jena campaign have already been fully discussed. -He made several gross miscalculations, and his only -justification is his final success. As the war went on, -however, and the French advanced into Poland, we -find Napoleon at his very best strategically. At -Eylau he blundered in sending forward Augereau’s -corps in their mad rush at the powerful Russian line, -but once again he was able to extricate himself from -his difficulties, and Friedland settled the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is now that we come to the most disastrous -adventure of all—the Spanish affair. The remark -has been made that until 1808 Napoleon had only -fought kings, and never a people. He plunged into -the involved politics of Spain expecting as easy a -victory as Masséna’s conquest of Naples in 1806, or -Junot’s conquest of Portugal in 1807. He was sadly -mistaken. And yet one can find traces indicating -that he was taking all possible precautions. His -instructions to his representatives at Madrid certainly -suggest that he was trying to frighten the Spanish -royal family out of the country, and that only when -this scheme had been upset by the abdication of -Charles at Aranjuez (which could not possibly have -been foreseen) did he call the suicidal conference of -Bayonne. The Portuguese royal family had fled -from Junot; the Neapolitan Bourbons had fled from -Masséna; it might have been expected that the -Spanish Bourbons would have fled from Murat, -especially as they had rich American dependencies -in which to settle. The Spaniards would not have -fought half so hard for a craven King in America as -they did for one who was pictured to them as suffering -a martyr’s torments in a French prison. So far -Napoleon’s methods are perhaps justified in every -way except morally. But from this time onward he -made mistake after mistake. He entrusted the conquest -of Spain to officers and troops of poor quality—generals -<span class='pageno' title='210' id='Page_210'></span> -like Savary, Dupont and Duhesme, with -mere provisional regiments formed from the sweepings -of the depôts. The capitulation of Baylen and -the loss of Madrid were the natural consequence. In -wrath Napoleon called upon the Grand Army. He -plunged into Spain, routed the wretched Spanish -levies, pressed on to conquer all Spain and—was -forced to wheel back to counter Moore’s swift thrust -at his rear.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon never returned to the Peninsula. It -was not central enough; he could not from there -keep an eye on the rest of Europe. He endeavoured -instead to direct affairs from Paris, with the result -that what little order remained dissolved into chaos. -His despatches arrived six weeks late, and co-ordination -was impossible. The best course left open to -him was to entrust the supreme command in Spain -to the most capable of his subordinates, someone who -could make his plans on the spot and see that they -were carried out. But there Napoleon stopped short. -Give to another Frenchman the command of three -hundred thousand men and all the resources of a -vast kingdom? Unthinkable! So matters drifted -from bad to worse while the Marshals quarrelled -among themselves, while Joseph and Jourdan tried -to make their authority felt, and while Napoleon -blindly stirred up still further trouble among them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Worse than this; Napoleon entirely misread the -character of the Spanish war. Despite his own -experiences there, he did not realize the enormous -difficulties with which the French armies had to -contend. He set three hundred thousand men a -task which would have kept half a million fully -occupied, and he further hampered them by the -niggardly nature of their allowances of money and -material. He under-estimated the fighting power of -the guerillas, of the Portuguese levies, and (worst of -all) of the English army. He over-estimated the -<span class='pageno' title='211' id='Page_211'></span> -power of his name among the unlettered Spanish -peasants. He left entirely out of account the -impossibility of communication and of supply. In -a word, there was no error open to him into which -he did not fall.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Spanish trouble had hardly assumed serious -dimensions when in 1809 Austria made one more -bid for freedom and commenced hostilities against -him. As busy as he could possibly be with Spanish -affairs, with troubles in Paris, and with ruling the -rest of Europe, Napoleon delayed before going in -person to the seat of war. He miscalculated the -time necessary to Austria to mobilize, and he -entrusted the temporary command to Berthier—two -grave errors. Only Davout’s skill and his own -unconquerable energy staved off a serious disaster -and snatched a victory from the jaws of defeat. The -French pressed on to Vienna. This time there was -no Auersperg to be cozened out of his command of -the Danube bridge; the crossings were all broken -down, and Napoleon was compelled to force a passage -in face of a hostile army of equal strength—the -most delicate operation known to military science. -Napoleon’s first attempt was rash to the verge of -madness. It was simply a blind thrust at the -heart of the opposing army; the bridges provided -were insufficient, and broke down through enemy -action at the crisis of the battle; the staff work -and the arrangements generally appear to have been -defective. Thirty-six hours of fierce fighting saw -the French hurled back again; Masséna’s tenacity -and Lannes’ daring saved the army from destruction, -but the cost of defeat amounted to twenty thousand -men—among them was Lannes, the hero of Montebello, -of Saalfeld, of Friedland, of Saragossa; one of -the few who dared to say what they thought to the -Emperor, and one of the few who enjoyed his trust -and friendship. -<span class='pageno' title='212' id='Page_212'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>To point the moral, Napoleon contrived soon -afterwards to bring up huge reinforcements, and -then to cross the Danube without opposition. The -movement was carefully planned and carried out, and -the results were the victory of Wagram, the armistice -of Znaim, and the dismemberment of Austria. If, -after experiencing a severe defeat, Napoleon could -succeed in bringing up the Army of Italy and crossing -the Danube without opposition, he could surely -have done so at the first attempt. The battle of -Aspern is typical of Napoleon’s reckless methods -and of his under-estimation of the enemy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this campaign of 1809 Napoleon’s fall was -nearly anticipated. Had the forty thousand men -whom England sent to Walcheren, too late, been -despatched a little earlier, under a competent -general; had Prussia flung her weight into the -scale at the same time, it is hard to see how -Napoleon could have recovered himself. Germany -was already prepared to revolt, Tyrol was ablaze -with insurrection, Wellington was marching into -the heart of Spain, Russia was ready to change sides -at a moment’s notice. What saved Napoleon was -the fact that three of his enemies were timid and -incompetent. Chatham could achieve nothing in -the Netherlands; Frederick William III. hesitated -in Prussia, and Francis of Austria, although Wagram -was not in the least a crushing defeat, decided that -he could not continue the struggle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have already dealt in part with 1812 and -1813. There are mistakes in plenty here, although -now they were accentuated by the worst of ill luck. -The whole advance into Russia was one gigantic -error; not even Napoleon’s tremendous efforts could -counter-balance the handicaps which he encountered, -and which he ought to have foreseen. As far back -as 1807 he had commented bitterly on the horrible -Polish roads and on the clinging black mud of that -<span class='pageno' title='213' id='Page_213'></span> -district; he should have realized that it was impossible -for him to feed an army five hundred thousand strong -by road transport under such conditions. Nevertheless, -he nearly succeeded at Smolensk in countering -a strategic disadvantage by a tactical victory, in the -same manner as he had done twelve years before -at Marengo. Even after utter ruin had descended -upon him, he contrived by his gigantic labours to -raise a new army and to enter afresh into the field -in 1813 before his enemies were ready for him. The -early movements in the campaign are practically -perfect; until after Bautzen he showed all his old -brilliancy and skill—negatived this time by the -mistakes of subordinates. But from Bautzen -onwards we find repeated errors both in policy and -in the field. It was a mistake to enter into the -armistice of Pleisswitz; it was a mistake not to -secure the neutrality of Austria, even if it had cost -him the whole Kingdom of Italy; it was a mistake -not to accept the Allies’ offers of peace; it was a -mistake not to send back Ferdinand to Spain and -extricate himself somehow from the tangle of the -Peninsular War; it was a mistake to send Oudinot -and Ney against Berlin; it was a mistake to try to -hold the line of the Elbe; it was a mistake to fight -at Leipzig; and, having decided to fight, it was a -mistake not to see that there was a satisfactory line -of retreat over the Elster.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is clear that Napoleon was not the man he -once was. And yet—and yet he nearly saved the -whole situation at Dresden! Three days’ fighting -there nearly counter-balanced all the disasters of the -previous eighteen months. Smolensk, Bautzen and -Dresden—three times he almost made up for all his -defeats. The conclusion is forced upon one that all -through the years of victory Napoleon was on the -verge of defeat, and all through the years of defeat -he was on the verge of victory. For twenty years -<span class='pageno' title='214' id='Page_214'></span> -the fate of Europe hung balanced upon a razor -edge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon’s good luck is very evident; his bad -luck was an equally potent factor in his career. On -striking a balance and considering what enormous -success was his for a time, the resultant inference is -unavoidable. He was vastly superior to all the other -men of his time; his superiority was such that -individual differences between others fade into -insignificance when contrasted with the difference -between him and anyone else who may be selected -for comparison. He was superior not merely in -mental capacity, but in all other qualities necessary -for success in any sphere of business. His moral -courage was enormous; his finesse and rapidity of -thought were unequalled. He hardly knew what it -was to despair. His adaptability and his fertility of -resource were amazing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In spite of this (or perhaps because of this) it is -very easy to detract from any of his achievements. -The Code Napoleon, his most enduring monument, -was not his own work, nor, of course, can much -credit be given to his assistants. Codification of -laws is in no way a new idea—it is almost -contemporary with laws themselves. Napoleon’s -German policy was much the same as that of -Louis XIV.; his Italian policy is reminiscent of -Charles VIII.’s or even earlier; the germ of his -Oriental policy can be found in that of Louis IX.; -his Spanish policy was similar to, but more unsuccessful -than that of his predecessors. Even the -Continental system was only the development of -previous schemes to their logical climax. In his -Court arrangements Napoleon brought no new idea -into play; most of his regulations were elaborated -from the ceremony which surrounded the Soleil -Monarque, while others were borrowed from the -etiquette of the courts of Vienna and Madrid. Any -<span class='pageno' title='215' id='Page_215'></span> -approaching ceremony called for an anxious examination -of precedents; if Napoleon could find a parallel -far back stamped with the approval of a Valois or -an Orléans-Angoulême the matter was settled on -the same lines, no matter what inconveniences -resulted. Similarly in purely Imperial concerns he -was always harking back to Charlemagne or to the -Empire of Rome. It is exceedingly probable that -his annexation of Spain north of the Ebro in 1812, -which excited roars of derision all over Europe -because three-quarters of the district was aflame with -guerillas who shot on sight any Frenchman they -met, was directly inspired by Charlemagne’s action -a thousand years before. Charlemagne’s Spanish -campaign, even if it added the Spanish March to -his dominions, cost him his rearguard and all his -Paladins; Napoleon might well have taken warning. -The references to Imperial Rome, from the design -of his coinage and the plan of the Arc de Triomphe -to the “cohorts” of the National Guard and his -adoption of Eugène, are too numerous to mention. -We even find him going back farther still, and complaining -that he could not, like Alexander, announce -himself as of divine birth and the son of Jupiter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In military matters an equally well (or ill) founded -charge of unoriginality can be brought against -Napoleon’s methods. To those of us who saw a -short time ago what changes four years of war -wrought in the weapons and tactics employed, it -seems amazing that at the end of twenty years of -life and death struggles the soldiers were still armed -with the smooth bore flintlock musket which had -already been in use for a century. Only two -important new weapons were evolved, and neither -of them attained any great popularity. They were -shrapnel shell and military rockets, and the latter, at -least, Napoleon never employed. The rifle never -attained any popularity with him, although to us it -<span class='pageno' title='216' id='Page_216'></span> -seems obvious that it was the weapon of the future. -Fulton offered Napoleon his steamboat invention, -and was treated as a wild dreamer—at the very time -when Napoleon was most preoccupied with the -problem of sending an army across the Channel. -As an irresponsible autocrat, Napoleon had boundless -opportunities of testing and employing any -new invention which might be suggested, but he -made no use of them. In this respect he compares -unfavourably with his far less gifted nephew. -Napoleon III.’s system of “sausages and champagne” -certainly finds a parallel in his uncle’s treatment -of his troops when not on active service. -When Napoleon’s armies returned victorious they -were received with fêtes and salutes innumerable; an -ignorant observer might well have believed them to -be demigods, to whom ceremonies and sacrifices -were peculiarly acceptable. The arrangement had -a double effect; it is certainly good for an army’s -esprit de corps for the men to be considered demigods; -and it is certainly useful for an autocrat whose -rule is based on his army to have his subjects believe -that that army is semi-divine. But for the little -personal comforts of his men Napoleon took small -notice. They were not relieved of the cumbersome -features of their uniforms; even if they were not -worried by petty details of pipeclay and brass polish -as were the English, they were still forced to wear -the horrible stock and tunic which Frederick the -Great had set in fashion. The French army slang -term “bleu” for recruit has its origin in the fact -that the recruits for the old army used to go black -and blue in the face owing to the unaccustomed -restriction of the Napoleonic stock. The French -helmets may have been imposing, but they were -terribly uncomfortable to wear. The gain in -efficiency resulting from a radical change in these -matters must have counter-balanced any possible loss -<span class='pageno' title='217' id='Page_217'></span> -in esprit de corps had Napoleon seen fit to bring this -change about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is with trembling and delicacy that one -approaches the realm in which Napoleon apparently -reigns supreme—that of tactics. It is a rash act to -say that the winner of sixty battles won them badly. -Yet one cannot help making a few cautious comments. -When Napoleon attained supreme power -the line and the column were almost equally in -favour in the French army. The most usual formation -in action was the line, backed at intervals by the -column. At Marengo this arrangement was largely -employed, and was successful. As time went on, -however, we find that the line disappeared, its place -was taken by additional skirmishers, and the columns -became heavier and heavier. The system was -altogether vicious; the column is both untrustworthy -and expensive. French columns might be -successful when pitted against any other columns, -but they failed against disciplined infantry formed -in line. Every battle and combat fought by the -English, from Alexandria and Maida to Vittoria, -proved this, but Napoleon and his officers never -learnt the lesson. The Emperor’s letters to his -generals in Spain give repeated examples of his -contempt for the English and Portuguese troops; it -was hardly a contempt that was justified. And -despite all these warnings, despite (so it is reported) -Soult’s and Foy’s pleadings, the first grand attack -at Waterloo was made by twenty thousand infantry -herded together twenty-four deep. This clumsy -mass was easily held up, outflanked and forced back -by six thousand English and Hanoverians under -Picton. It was not the first example which had -been forced upon Napoleon’s notice of the uselessness -of the column. At Wagram he had -sent Macdonald’s corps, some twenty thousand -strong, against the Austrian centre, massed in -<span class='pageno' title='218' id='Page_218'></span> -a gigantic hollow square, which can be considered -as forming two columns each about thirty-five deep. -Macdonald reached his objective, but by the time -he arrived his men were so jostled together, ploughed -up by artillery, and generally demoralized that they -could effect nothing. One lesson such as this ought -to have convinced Napoleon, but it did not. He -continued to use columns—and he was beaten at -Waterloo. It is frequently urged in his defence -that the column was the “natural” formation in -the French army, that tradition had grown up -around it, so that it was unsafe to meddle with it, -that French troops fight better in column than in -line, and that his troops were of necessity so raw -that they could not be trusted in line. These arguments -seem completely nullified by the facts that the -line was actually employed early in Napoleon’s -career, that both before and after Waterloo French -troops fought well in line, and that at Waterloo, at -any rate, the French troops were all well-trained, -while Picton’s men were largely new recruits.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The employment of cavalry in the Imperial -armies might similarly be condemned as extravagant -and inefficient. The system of Seidlitz under -Frederick the Great was forgotten. Napoleon had -uprooted the triumphal memorial erected at Rossbach, -and with it it seemed he had uprooted the -memory of the charges with which Seidlitz’ hard-welded -squadrons had routed the army of France -fifty years before. Murat’s famous charges were -not pressed home in the hard, utterly logical fashion -of Frederick’s cavalry. If the opposing infantry -stood firm at the approach of the cavalry, then the -latter parted and drifted away down each flank. If -(as must be admitted was much more usual) the -infantry broke at the sight of the horsemen tearing -down on them, then the pursuit was pushed home -remorselessly, but never do we find the perfect -<span class='pageno' title='219' id='Page_219'></span> -charge, in few ranks, packed close together and held -together like a steel chain, which must overturn -everything in its way. Under Napoleon the French -cavalry never charged home; at Waterloo we find -the great cavalry charges, which Ney directed against -the English squares, made at a trot, and the horsemen, -swerving from the steel-rimmed, fire-spouting -squares, wandering idly about on the flanks, while -a few of the more enterprising cut feebly at the -bayonets with their sabres. Wellington’s description -of them riding about as if they owned the place -argues powerfully against their ever having flung -themselves upon the bayonet points, as good cavalry -should do if sent against unbroken infantry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In fact, both the French infantry and the French -cavalry relied upon the moral effect of their advance -rather than upon their capacity for doing damage -when they made their charges. It is perfectly true -that they were generally successful; Napoleon’s -dictum that the moral is to the physical as three to -one was borne out in a hundred battles from Arcola -to Dresden; but it was found wanting at Vimiero, -at Busaco, at Borodino, at Waterloo, everywhere in -fact, where the enemy was too stubborn or well-disciplined -to flinch from the waving sabres or the -grenadiers’ gigantic head-dresses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the wider field of strategy it cannot be denied -that Napoleon made use of original devices and -brought about revolutionary changes in the whole -system. They do not appear in the Italian campaign -of 1796 nor in the campaigns of Egypt and Marengo, -but in 1805 we find the cavalry screen completely -contrived and in efficient working order; in 1806 the -strategic advanced guard; and in 1807 the perfect -combination of the two. The curious part is that -Napoleon himself did not seem to realize the -importance of his own inventions; time and again -in 1812 and 1813 he did not employ them, with -<span class='pageno' title='220' id='Page_220'></span> -invariably disastrous results. It seems a mistake on -Napoleon’s part not to have made use of the new -devices on these occasions, but it is unwise to condemn -him offhand, because it seems inconceivable -that he of all persons did not appreciate the magnitude -and efficiency of his own discoveries; there -must have been some reason not now apparent for -these actions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is very nearly impossible to discover any action -of Napoleon’s which was not faulty in some way, or -which could not be improved upon. But since he -met with unprecedented success the only conclusion -is that, although his mistakes were many, they were -far fewer than would have been the average man’s. -Furthermore, since his schemes were all so direct -and simple (a comparison between his plan and -Moreau’s for the crossing of the Rhine at Schaffhausen -in 1800 is very illuminating on this point), -no one can help feeling a sneaking suspicion, when -reading of Napoleon’s achievements, that he could -not have done the same—only just a little better. -Thiers’ long-drawn panegyric grows ineffably wearisome -simply on this account; the writer’s efforts to -minimize his hero’s errors are so obvious and so -ineffective that the reader is irritated by them, while -the continued superlatives seem to be given with -gross unfairness to a man whose blunders are so -difficult to conceal. It is far easier to write a -panegyric on a man who has done nothing whatever -than on a man whose whole life was spent in -productive activity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of what has sometimes been termed Napoleon’s -cardinal error, the Continental System, I have not -ventured to speak. As originally conceived it was -undoubtedly a wise move. If France could exist -without English products, then obviously it was a -sound proceeding to deprive England of so rich a -market for her goods. The complications make the -<span class='pageno' title='221' id='Page_221'></span> -question much more difficult. Certainly the effort -to close the whole of Europe to British trade led -Napoleon into damaging annexations and disastrous -wars, while the fact that the countries involved, -Russia, for instance, preferred to fight rather than -to continue to enforce the system, seems to indicate -that it was impossible to enforce—that the country -(or at least its Government) could not continue to -exist without British trade. This is the simplest -complication of all. It is when we come to consider -Napoleon’s juggling with permits and licenses that -we become involved in the fog which surrounds all -tariff questions. The only certain points are that -Napoleon derived a large revenue from his licenses, -that the British Government was frequently severely -embarrassed for want of money (the difficulties -involved in collecting sufficient gold to pay subsidies -and the expenses of armies in the field led to -unfortunate delays), and that the discontent of the -Continent was great and general. It is a purely -arbitrary matter, dependent on the personal equation, -to come to any decision as to the balance of these -conclusions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Taking the career of Napoleon as a whole, it is -easy to see how frequently he was guilty of errors; -what should also be obvious is that it was almost -inevitable that he should fall into these errors. If -the Austrian marriage was a mistake, then it was a -mistake Napoleon could not help making; undoubtedly -he did the best he could for himself in the -prevailing circumstances. If the advance into Russia -was a mistake, it is impossible to indicate what -alternative could have been chosen, for Napoleon, -at war with Russia, could not safely remain at war -without gaining a decision; he could hardly maintain -an army on the Russian frontier awaiting Alexander’s -pleasure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If it was a mistake to advance into Belgium in -<span class='pageno' title='222' id='Page_222'></span> -June, 1815, it would have been a far worse one not -to have advanced. The greatest mistake of those -into which he was <span class='it'>not</span> driven by circumstances was -his theft of the throne of Spain—and it was that -which ruined him.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo222.jpg' alt='' id='il222' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>MASSENA<br/> (PRINCE D’ESSLING AND DUC DE RIVOLI)</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='223' id='Page_223'></span><h1>CHAPTER XVII<br/> <span class='sub-head'>ST. HELENA</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>W</span>HEN Napoleon abdicated after Waterloo, -for the second time, the Allies had -achieved the object for which ostensibly -they had made war. The Emperor had fallen, and -the war they had waged had, they declared, been -directed entirely against him. The immediate and -burning question now arose as to what was to be -done with the man against whom a million other -men were on the march. Blücher wanted to catch -him and shoot him; Wellington, with his usual -cautious good sense, did not want to be burdened -with the responsibility of an action which might -be unnecessary and would certainly be unpopular. -Napoleon himself, disowned by the government -and by the army, wanted to retire to America, but -his enemies were unwilling to set him free. The -English fleet blockaded the coast, and Napoleon was -compelled to surrender to it, lest worse should befall -from the Prussians, or the Republicans, or the -White Terror, or from personal enemies. He tried -to make the best of his necessity by claiming the -hospitality of England, but England kept him a -close prisoner until her Allies had been consulted. -They offered to hand him over to Louis XVIII. for -trial as a rebel, but even Louis had the sense to -decline the offer. He could shoot Ney and la -Bédoyère, but he could not shoot Napoleon. For -<span class='pageno' title='224' id='Page_224'></span> -Louis to shut him up in a fortress would be as -dangerous as it would be for a private individual to -keep a tiger in his cellar. In the same way no -Continental state would willingly see any other -appointed his guardian. That would mean giving -the guardian country a most potent instrument of -menace. England remained the sole possible gaoler, -and England accepted the responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Next arose the question as to the locality of -the prison, and the answer to that question was -already prepared—St. Helena. To keep Napoleon -in England was obviously impossible, for England -was nearer France even than was Elba, while, -incredible though it might seem, the oligarchy -which ruled England were afraid lest Napoleon -should corrupt the mass of the people to Republicanism. -That there was some foundation for this -fear is shown by the intense interest in Napoleon -which the people displayed while he was in Plymouth -harbour. Similar arguments were effective against -Malta or any other Mediterranean island. But -St. Helena had none of these disadvantages. It -was thousands of miles away; it was small, and could -be filled with troops; there were only two possible -places for landing, and these could be well guarded; -the few reports on the island which were to be had -seemed to indicate that fair comfort was obtainable -there, and, above all, it was not at all a place where -ships or individuals could easily find an excuse for -calling or remaining. Even before the descent from -Elba St. Helena had been suggested as a more -suitable place for Napoleon’s prison, and now, with -little discussion, he was sent off there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is impossible to argue about the legality or -otherwise of this decision. Morally, the Powers -were as justified in imprisoning Napoleon as is a -government in locking up a homicidal maniac. A -maniac may hurt people; Napoleon might hurt the -<span class='pageno' title='225' id='Page_225'></span> -Powers. Napoleon might hurt them for reasons -which to him might appear perfectly defensible; but -a homicidal maniac can usually boast the same purity -of motive. The maniac may be right and everyone -else wrong; Napoleon may have been right and the -Powers wrong; but the Powers were none the less -justified in seeing that he could do no more harm. It -has been argued that by invading France and removing -her ruler Europe was committing a moral crime; -that it is intolerable for one country to interfere in -another country’s system of government. This argument -fails because its scope is inelastic. In the same -way it is said that “an Englishman’s house is his -castle,” and that, for instance, a man’s conduct -towards, or training of, his children is his own -personal business. But if that man tries to cut his -children’s throats, or worse, encourages his children -to cut his neighbours’ throats, then the State steps -in and prevents him from doing so. That is exactly -what the Powers did with Napoleon. Where they -went wrong was in not seeing that their decision was -carried into effect with humanity and dignity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The initial arrangements for Napoleon’s exile -seemed to portend that he would end his days in -luxury. Lord Liverpool had said that on the island -there was a most comfortable house exactly suited -for Napoleon and his suite; Lord Bathurst had -given official orders that he was to be allowed all -possible indulgence so long as his detention was -not imperilled. But Napoleon was not given the -comfortable house, while Bathurst’s confidential -orders to Sir Hudson Lowe displayed unbelievable -rigour. Already Napoleon had experienced some of -the results of the workings of the official mind; the -naval officers with whom he had come in contact -had been strictly ordered not to pay him any of the -compliments usually accorded to royalty. They -remained covered in his presence, and they addressed -<span class='pageno' title='226' id='Page_226'></span> -him as “General Bonaparte.” Cockburn, the -Admiral in command, acted strictly to the letter -of the orders which commanded him to treat -“General Bonaparte” in the same manner as he -would a general officer not in employ. If Napoleon -seemed inclined to act with more dignity than this -rather humble station would warrant, then Cockburn -was distant and reserved; but if Napoleon ever showed -signs of “conducting himself with modesty,” as -Cockburn himself writes, then the Admiral was -graciously pleased to unbend a little to his helpless -prisoner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The whole question of the title was intricate and -irritating. The English Government declared that -they had never recognized Napoleon as Emperor even -at the height of his power, and they certainly were -not going to do so now that he was a discredited -outcast. They were hardly correct in fact or in -theory, for they had sent him an Ambassador when -he was First Consul; they had sent plenipotentiaries -to Châtillon who had signed documents in which he -was called Emperor; they had sent a representative -to him at Elba when he was Emperor there, and, -equally important, they had ratified the Convention -of Cintra, among the documents of which he was -distinctly called His Imperial Majesty. Moreover, -by refusing him this mode of address, they were -insulting the French people, who had elected him, -the Courts of Europe, who had recognized him, and -the Pope, who had crowned and anointed him. It -was the English Government which lost its dignity -in this ridiculous affair, not Napoleon. But the -worst result of this decision was not the loss of -dignity, nor the injury to French pride. It was that -it gave Napoleon an opportunity to hit back. It -gave him a definite cause of complaint, apart from -that of his arbitrary incarceration, which was -generally held to be justified. It was the first -<span class='pageno' title='227' id='Page_227'></span> -opportunity of many, of all of which Napoleon -eagerly took advantage, so that the Napoleonic -Legend had a firm base for future development. -By complaining at any and every opportunity -Napoleon was able to surround his own memory -with an aura of frightful privations, so that it was -easy for his subtle nephew later to picture him as -Prometheus, the benefactor of mankind, bound to -his rock in mid-ocean with the vultures of the allied -commissioners gnawing at his liver.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A further blunder on the part of the English -Government afforded Napoleon his next cause of -complaint. Sir Hudson Lowe was a good, if -unimaginative soldier who had fought all his life -against the French. Furthermore, he had commanded -a force of Corsican Rangers, recruited from -the island that was Napoleon’s birthplace. He had -held Capri for two years in the face of Masséna -and Joseph Bonaparte, and was only turned out -by a daring expedition sent by Murat. His very -name was hateful to Napoleon, and yet he was -appointed his guardian. But this was not all. A -huge responsibility devolved upon Sir Hudson Lowe. -A moment’s carelessness on his part might allow -Napoleon to escape, and if Napoleon escaped there -might ensue another Waterloo campaign with a very -different result. The responsibility was too great -altogether for Lowe. Because of it he carried out -the orders sent him with a strictness which knew no -bounds. He pestered the wretched prisoner, who -already had good reason to dislike him, until he -nearly drove him frantic. Lowe himself was -desperate, and many people who saw him during that -period commented on his worried demeanour and -his inability to support his responsibilities. It is easy -then to imagine the violent friction which prevailed -between him and his captive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On a casual inspection, the restrictions imposed -<span class='pageno' title='228' id='Page_228'></span> -upon Napoleon do not seem particularly severe. He -was to keep within certain limits; he was to be -accompanied by an English officer if he went beyond -them; his correspondence was to pass through -Lowe’s hands, and he was to assure the English of -his presence every day. But these restrictions galled -Napoleon inexpressibly. Along the boundaries of -his free area was posted a line of sentries, and he -could not turn his eyes in any direction without -perceiving the hated redcoats. The continued -presence of an officer if he rode elsewhere was -not unnaturally irksome—so irksome, in fact, that -Napoleon, who had previously passed half his days -on horseback, gave up riding—while the mortification -of having his letters pried into and the utter, hateful -humiliation of having to exhibit himself on command -to an Englishman must have been maddening to a -man who not so many months before had ruled half -Europe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon found himself shut up in a restricted -area and with limited accommodation; he had no old -friends with him, because he had never had any -friends; of the five officers who had accompanied -him only two were men of any distinction and of -any length of service. Not one of them was -particularly talented, and they were one and all -fiercely jealous of each other. Add to these -conditions a tropical climate and the utter despair -into which they were all plunged, and it is easy to -realize that furious quarrels and bitter heart-burnings -must have been their lot. It is the most -difficult matter in the world to find the exact truth -about what went on in Longwood. Everyone concerned -wrote voluminously, and everyone concerned -wrote accounts which differed from everyone else’s. -There is an atmosphere of untruth surrounding -everything which has been written by the actors in -this last tragedy. Napoleon himself set his friends -<span class='pageno' title='229' id='Page_229'></span> -the example, for his dictated memoirs and the -information which he gave Las Cases to help him in -his writings are full of lies, some cunning, some -clumsy, but all of them devised for obvious -purposes. He tried to throw the blame of the -Spanish insurrection on Murat, the blame of the -execution of d’Enghien on Talleyrand, the blame of -Waterloo on Grouchy. It is difficult to discover -whether he was merely trying to excuse himself in -the eyes of the world, or to rehabilitate Bonapartism -so that his son might eventually mount the Imperial -throne. And his companions’ memoirs lie so -blatantly and so obviously that one cannot decide -which was his aim.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon himself had deteriorated vastly. As -might be expected, his complete cessation of bodily -activity led to an increase in his corpulence until he -became gross and unwieldy. His mental power had -decayed, although he was still able to dictate for -hours on end. Even under the burdensome conditions -imposed upon him he never seems to have -abandoned the rigid reserve which he had maintained -all his life. The few scenes which the memoirists -describe which have a ring of truth about them seem -to show him still acting a part, still posing as the -inestimably superior being whom his followers -believed him to be. Sometimes we have a brief -glimpse of him stripped of his heroics, as witness -the occasion when he said bitterly that his son must -necessarily have forgotten him; but most of the time -he seems to have adhered to his old methods, and -posed as the misunderstood benefactor of humanity, -ignoring Marie Louise’s defection, ignoring the distrust -with which the Council of State had regarded -him during the last months of his reign; in fact -proclaiming himself the man who martyred himself -for the French nation, with such iteration that he -was at last believed. His declamations have coloured -<span class='pageno' title='230' id='Page_230'></span> -nearly everything written since, so that it is quite -usual to find it stated, either actually or inferentially, -that his fall was due solely to the jealousy of -the other rulers of Europe, and not due in any -degree to the slowly developed dislike of his own -subjects.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And all this time he was making Sir Hudson -Lowe’s life a burden to him as well. Some of -Napoleon’s complaints were just, some merely -frivolous, but every one of them goaded Lowe into -further painful activity. This activity reacted in -another direction, so that Lowe issued edicts of -increased stringency, and, half mad with responsibility, -treated Napoleon with an exaggeration of -precaution and imposed upon him restraints of a -pettiness and a casuistry almost unbelievable. It can -hardly be doubted that Napoleon actually sought -opportunities for egging Lowe on to further ill-treatment; -he certainly treated him with a most -amazing contumely, and it is very probable that -the numerous rumours of attempts at rescue, by -submarine boat, by an armed force from Brazil, or -by any other fantastic means, had their origin in -Napoleon himself, so that Lowe was inspired to -further obnoxious measures. Napoleon made the -most of his opportunity. He raised a clamour which -reached Europe (as he had intended), so that interest -in his fate and sympathy for the poor ill-treated -captive gradually worked up to fever heat. He sold -his plate to buy himself necessaries (at a time when -he had ample money at his command) and of course -France heard about it, and was wrung with pity for -the wretched man forced by his captor’s rapacity to -dine off earthenware. The fact that Napoleon nevertheless -retained sufficient silver to supply his table -was not so readily divulged. He made a continual -complaint about his health; undoubtedly he was not -well, and equally undoubtedly he was already suffering -<span class='pageno' title='231' id='Page_231'></span> -from the disease which killed him; but his -complaints were neither consistent nor, as far as can -be ascertained, entirely true. He hinted that the -Powers were endeavouring to shorten his life; he -even said that he went in fear of assassins. All -this news reached Europe by devious routes, and -sympathy grew and grew until, after the lapse of -years, it waxed into the hysteria evinced at his -second funeral and the more effective hysteria which -set Napoleon III. on the throne.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Despite all the undignified squabbles in which he -was engaged, one can nevertheless hardly restrain a -feeling of admiration for Napoleon amid the trials -which he was enduring. He was hitting back as -hard as circumstances would allow him, and he was -hitting back with effect. He had driven Lowe -frantic, and he had secured his object of reviving -European interest in him. Furthermore, he flatly -refused to submit to the humiliating commands -which Lowe attempted to enforce. Lowe might -speak of “General Bonaparte” or “Napoleon -Bonaparte” (in the same way as he might speak of -John Robinson, says Lord Rosebery) but in his own -home Napoleon was always His Imperial Majesty -the Emperor, to whom everyone uncovered, and in -whose presence everyone remained standing. Lowe’s -order that he must show himself to an English officer -every day was completely ignored, and we hear of -officers climbing trees and peering through keyholes -in vain attempts to make sure of his presence. For -days together Napoleon might have been out of the -island for all Lowe knew to the contrary. The -commissioners sent by France and Austria and -Russia did not set eyes on him from the time of -their arrival until after his death. Napoleon had -sworn that he would shoot with his own hand the -first man who intruded on his privacy, and he was -believed; the attempt was never made, and Napoleon -<span class='pageno' title='232' id='Page_232'></span> -continued to reign in Longwood, in an <span class='it'>imperium in -imperio</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The whole period seems indescribably sordid and -wretched. Napoleon’s companions were intriguing -jealously for his favour, scheming for the privilege -of eating at his table, and even endeavouring to be -sure that he would leave them his money in his will. -Tropical weather, harassing conditions, prolonged -strain, and the overwhelming gloom of recent frightful -disasters, all tended towards overstrained nerves -and continual quarrels. Napoleon wrangling with -Lowe over his dinner-service; Montholon in tears -because Napoleon chooses to dine with Las Cases; -an Emperor quarrelling with a general as to whether -or not his liver is enlarged; this is not tragedy, it is -only squalor with a hideously tragic taint. It is -Lear viewed through reversed opera-glasses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The end came at last in 1821. The disease of -which his father had died held Napoleon as well -in its grip. He was an intractable patient, and -diagnosis was not easy, but it certainly seems that -the medical treatment he received was unspeakably -bad. He was dosed with tartar emetic, of all drugs, -at a time when his stomach was deranged with -cancer. At times he suffered frightful agony. He -bore it somehow; argued with his doctors, chaffed -his friends, until at last he sank into unconsciousness, -and he died while a great storm howled round the -island. The lies and contradictions of the memoirists -persist even here, for no one knows accurately what -were his last words, or when they were uttered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The post-mortem report is sufficient to convince -any reader that none of the doctors concerned knew -their business;<a id='rA'/><a href='#fA' style='text-decoration:none'><sup><span style='font-size:0.9em'>[A]</span></sup></a> the man who had once ruled Europe -<span class='pageno' title='233' id='Page_233'></span> -was now thrust into a coffin too small to allow him -to wear his complete uniform, so that his hat rested -on his stomach; and he was buried in one of his old -favourite spots in the island. Once more there arose -the old vexed question of title, for the French wished -to inscribe “Napoleon” on the coffin; Lowe insisted -on “Bonaparte” being added; in the end it was a -nameless coffin which was lowered into the grave.</p> - -<hr class='footnotemark'/> - -<div class='footnote'> -<table summary='footnote_A'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' class='footnoteid'/> -<col span='1'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td style='vertical-align:top;'> -<div class='footnote-id' id='fA'><a href='#rA'>[A]</a></div> -</td><td> - -<p class='pindent'>It is, I believe, a fact never previously published -that the first post-mortem certificate drawn up by the -doctors responsible was rejected by Sir Hudson Lowe. -It contained the words “the liver was perhaps a little -larger than natural,” and this remark naturally did not -commend itself to Lowe, in consequence of the fierce -quarrels he had had with Napoleon on this very subject. -The post-mortem certificate in the English Record Office -does not contain these words, but the Rev. Canon E. Brook -Jackson, Rector of Streatham, has in his possession the -earlier certificate, signed by the doctors concerned, with -the footnote “N.B.—The words obliterated were suppressed -by order of Sir Hudson Lowe. Signed, Thomas -Short, P.M.O.” The words referred to are clearly -legible and are those given above.</p> - -</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Napoleon failed during his lifetime, but he was -triumphant after death. His gallant fight at St. -Helena against overwhelming odds was remembered -with pride by every Frenchman. Men hearing -garbled versions of his sufferings felt a pricking of -their consciences that they had abandoned him in -1814 and 1815. The helpless policy of Louis XVIII. -and Charles X., and the humdrum policy of Louis -Philippe set all minds thinking of the glorious days, -not so very long ago, when France had been Queen of -the Continent. Louis Napoleon skilfully employed -the revulsion of feeling to his own advantage, and the -glory of Austerlitz and Jena was sufficient to hide -the absurdities of Boulogne and Strasbourg. But it -was the six years’ struggle of St. Helena which made -so refulgent that glory of Austerlitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What the British Government could have done -to prevent the formation of a St. Helena legend -cannot easily be decided. They were in terror lest -he should escape again, and severe ordinances were -<span class='pageno' title='234' id='Page_234'></span> -necessary to prevent this. Had they treated him -luxuriously, public opinion in England would have -been roused to a dangerous pitch. They had originally -tried to get out of the difficulty by handing -him over to Louis XVIII. for execution, but -Louis XVIII. had no real case against him. A -state trial would have given Napoleon unbounded -opportunities for the rhetoric in which he delighted, -and which had so often rallied France to his side. -Napoleon might well have pleaded, with perfect -truth, that in the descent from Elba he was no -rebel, but the Emperor of Elba making war upon -the King of France; but so tame a plea would hardly -have been employed. Napoleon would have proclaimed -himself the purest altruist come to see that -the French people obtained their rights, or to save -France from the machinations of tyrants. Louis -was wise in refusing the offer. The custody of -Napoleon was thus thrust upon the British Government. -If remarkably far-sighted, they might have -lapped him in every luxury; have treated him -subserviently as if he was Emperor in fact as well -as in name; they might have encouraged him to -debauchery as wild as Tiberius’ at Capri; and then -by subtle propaganda they might have exhibited him -to a scornful world as a man who cared nothing for -his lost greatness, or for the dependence of his -position. Such a scheme appealed favourably to -the imagination, but there was an insuperable -obstacle—Napoleon. Napoleon had a definite plan -of campaign. He was going to complain about -everything and everybody with whom he came in -contact. He was going to clamour unceasingly -against the brutality and arbitrariness of his gaolers. -Without regard for truth he was going to proclaim -continually that he was being ill-treated and -martyred, and he would have done it whatever had -been his treatment, and, being Napoleon, he would -<span class='pageno' title='235' id='Page_235'></span> -have done it well. The error of the British Government -lay in their affording him so many opportunities, -not in their affording him any at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And after he was dead there followed the events -which he had foreseen and over whose engendering -he had laboured so diligently. Little by little the -evil features of the Imperial régime were forgotten; -the glory of his victories blazed more brightly in -comparison with the exhaustion of France under the -Bourbons and the pettifogging Algerian razzias of -Louis Philippe. The literature of St. Helena, both -the spurious and the inspired, induced men to believe -that Napoleon was the exact opposite of what he -really was. It gave him credit for the achievements -of Carnot; it shifted the disgrace of failure on to the -shoulders of helpless scapegoats. It proved to the -satisfaction of the uninquiring that Napoleon stood -for democracy, for the principle of nationality, and -even for peace. It raised to the Imperial throne the -man who said “the Empire means peace.” The -whole legend which developed was a flagrant denial -of patent facts, but it was a denial sufficiently -reiterated to be believed. The belief is not yet dead.</p> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/illo236.jpg' alt='' id='il236' style='width:80%;height:auto;'/> -<p class='caption'>LOUIS NAPOLEON, KING OF HOLLAND</p> -</div> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='237' id='Page_237'></span><h1><span style='font-size:x-large'>APPENDIX</span><br/> <span class='sub-head'>INCIDENTS AND AUTHORITIES</span></h1></div> - -<p class='noindent'><span class='dropcap'>I</span>T is much more than a hundred years since Napoleon -lived; since his time we have witnessed cataclysms -more vast than were the Napoleonic wars; the -Europe of that period seems to us as unfamiliar and -as profitless a study as Siam or primitive Australia. -Perhaps this is so. Perhaps the lessons to be drawn from -the Napoleonic era are now exhausted. Perhaps the -epoch ushered in by Marengo is slight and unimportant -compared to that which follows the Marne. Perhaps -Englishmen will forget the men who stood firm in the -squares at Waterloo, and will only remember those who -stood firm at Ypres and the Second Marne. Perhaps the -Congress of Vienna will lapse into insignificance when -compared with the Congress of Versailles. But this is -inconceivable. Previously, perhaps, too much importance -has been attached to the Napoleonic era, but that is -because it had no parallel; it was unique. Similarly the -period pivoting about the Great War of 1914-18 might be -said to be unique, but it is not so. The two epochs are -very closely related, very closely indeed. Much may be -gained from the study of either, but this is nothing to be -compared with the gain resulting from the study and -comparison of the two together. In this way the -Napoleonic era becomes more significant even than it was -before the great war, and this without considering how -much of the great war was directly due to arrangements -made as a consequence of Napoleon’s career. -<span class='pageno' title='238' id='Page_238'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>But apart from all such considerations, the study of -the period is one from which a great deal of purely personal -pleasure can be derived. Even nowadays one cannot help -a thrill of excitement when reading of the advance of the -British infantry at Albuera; one cannot help feeling a -surge of emotion on reading how Alvarez at the siege -of Gerona moaned “No surrender! No surrender!” -although he was dying of fever and half the populace lay -dead in the streets, while the other half still fought on -against all the might of Reille and St. Cyr. Even the -best novel compares unfavourably with Ségur’s account -of the Russian campaign; and although there is no French -biographer quite as good as Boswell, yet there are scores -of memoirs and biographies of the period which rank very -nearly as high, and which are pleasant to read at all -times. Marbot may be untruthful, but he is delightful -reading; Madame Junot gives a picture of her times and -of the people whom she met which is honestly worthy of -comparison with Dickens and Thackeray; while to track -down in their memoirs Fouché’s and Talleyrand’s carefully -concealed mistakes is as interesting a pastime as -ever was the attempt to guess the dénouement in a modern -detective novel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The literature of the time is full of happy anecdotes, -some of which have attained the supreme honour of being -taken out bodily, furnished with modern trimmings, -and published in twentieth century magazines, without -acknowledgment, as modern humour. But many have -escaped this fate, partly because they are untranslatable, -and partly because they bear the definite imprint of the -period. Thus there is the story of the fat and pursy King -of Würtemberg, who once kept waiting a committee of the -Congress of Vienna. At last he arrived, and as his portly -majesty came bustling through the door, Talleyrand -remarked, “Here comes the King of Würtemberg, <span class='it'>ventre -à terre</span>.” In a grimmer vein is the story of the reception -held on the night after Ney was shot. The company -<span class='pageno' title='239' id='Page_239'></span> -were mournfully discussing the tragedy, when a certain -M. Lemaréchal was announced. As this gentleman had -a son of mature years, the announcement was worded -“M. Lemaréchal ainé”—which the panic-stricken -assembly heard as “M. le Maréchal Ney.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Some of the heroes of that time have had the bad -luck to be misrepresented not only in literature but even -in portraits and in sculpture. Napoleon had at one time -the plan of placing statues of all his generals in the -Louvre, but he abdicated before the work was anywhere -near completion, and left its continuation to his successors. -Louis and Charles did nothing towards it, and the -parsimonious Louis Philippe, when he came to the throne, -decided as a measure of economy only to represent the -most famous. But some of the statues of junior officers -were already finished. Louis Philippe saw his chance of -still greater economy. For Lasalle’s head was substituted -Lannes’; for Colbert’s, Mortier’s; while the entire statue -of St. Hilaire was simply labelled Masséna and set up -without further alteration. These statues are still in the -Louvre; no subsequent correction has ever been made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But the anecdotes are responsible for only a very -small part of the interest of Napoleonic literature. Many -of the subsequent histories are very nearly models of -everything a book ought to be. Napier’s “Peninsular -War,” despite its bias and its frequent inaccuracies, has -already become a classic; Sir Charles Oman’s work on the -same subject is much more striking and makes a far -greater appeal. His descriptions of the siege of Gerona -and of the cavalry pursuit at Tudela are more moving in -their cold eloquence than ever was Napier at his fieriest. -One English author whose books have attracted far less -attention than they should have done is Mr. F. Loraine -Petre; his accurate and impartial histories of the -successive Napoleonic campaigns are dramatic enough to -hold the interest of the ordinary reader as well as that of -the military student. In matters other than military, the -<span class='pageno' title='240' id='Page_240'></span> -writer whose reputation overtops all others is M. Frédéric -Masson. His celebrity is such that it would be almost -impertinence to cavil at his writings. For painstaking -and careful accumulation of evidence he stands far and -away above all his contemporaries. He examines and -brings to notice every single detail. A catalogue of an -Empress’s chemises interests him as deeply as a list of a -Council of State. The trouble is that his catalogue of -chemises is merely a catalogue of chemises—as interesting -as a laundress’s bill. M. Masson’s books are exceedingly -important and invaluable to the student: but that they -are important and invaluable is all one can say about -them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The ultimate source of much information is, of course, -the endless collection of volumes of Napoleon’s correspondence. -Even merely to glance at one of these is a -lesson in industry far more thorough than anything -achieved by the worthy Dr. Samuel Smiles and his like. -Examination of a single day’s correspondence is sufficient -to show the complexity of Napoleon’s interests, the extent -of his knowledge of each subject, and the nature of the -driving power which built up the First Empire. Close -study of the Correspondence is necessary to enable one -to follow the twists and turns of Napoleon’s policy; the -main difficulty is that the bundle of hay is so large that -the finding of needles in it is a painfully tedious business. -However, the casual reader will find that this spadework -has been done for him by a large number of painstaking -writers. Even during the present century several English -authors have published books upon particular events and -persons of the Napoleonic era. Mr. Hilliard Atteridge is -an example of those who have done the best work in this -direction. But the greater number of these books seem -to be struck with the same blight—they are ineffably -tedious. Generally they are most correct as to facts; -their impartiality is admirable; the knowledge displayed -is wide; but they are most terribly boring to read. They -<span class='pageno' title='241' id='Page_241'></span> -are useful to familiarize the reader with the various -persons described so that their place in the whole period -is better understood, for the Napoleonic era is a tangled -skein of threads, each of them a different personality, -wound round and completely dependent upon the central -core, which is Napoleon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of biographies and general histories it is impossible to -speak definitely. Napoleon can boast hundreds more -lives than any cat in fact or fancy. The percentage of -lies contained in books on Napoleon varies between ten -and ninety—and what is more aggravating is that the -picturesque and readable lives are usually those which -contain the most inexactitudes. It is perfectly safe to say -that no Life of Napoleon has ever been written which -combines complete accuracy with genuine readableness. -This is of small account, however, for one has only to -read enough of the readable and inexact lives to form a -fairly correct opinion on most matters of importance at -the same time as one enjoys both the reading and the -forming of the opinion. The contemporary memoirs are -very useful, and are mainly interesting. Bourrienne’s -biography is rather overrated usually, for he is unreliable -in personal matters, and a great deal of his book is -undeniably heavy. One of his most illuminating pictures -shows Napoleon driving with him over the countryside, -and ignoring the beauty of the scenery in favour of the -military features of the landscape. This anecdote receives -an additional interest when it is recalled that an exactly -similar story is told of von Schlieffen, the German Chief -of Staff of the ’nineties, who planned the advance -through Belgium which had such vast consequences in -1914. One certainly cannot help thinking that if Napoleon -had been at the head of the German army at that -date he, too, would have advanced through Belgium, -and this tiny parallel offers curious corroboration. Such -a move would have been in complete accordance -with Napoleon’s character—compare Bernadotte’s march -<span class='pageno' title='242' id='Page_242'></span> -through Anspach in 1805. The way in which Napoleon -took enormous risks, such as this, and his method of -securing the friendship of other Powers by storming and -bluster instead of by finesse, is the most curious trait of -his whole curious character. Bourrienne offers several -examples; so do Talleyrand, Fouché, Pasquier and Molé.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For some decades after Napoleon’s death an immense -amount of spurious or heavily revised reminiscent literature -appeared. Constant (the valet), Josephine, and -various others, are credited with volumes of ingeniously -written memoirs. They are well worth reading, but they -contain little worth remembering. In many matters they -are demonstrably incorrect, and they are generally -prejudiced and misleading. For personal and intimate -details one of the best contemporary writers is de Bausset, -who certainly wrote the book which bears his name, and -who equally certainly was in a position to perceive what -he described, for he was a palace official for many years -under the Empire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In military matters the Marshals’ memoirs are -peculiarly enlightening, not so much in matters of detail -(in fact they are frequently incorrect there) but in -exhibiting the characters of the writers themselves. -Davout’s book is just what one would expect of him, cold -and unrelenting and yet sound and brilliant. Suchet’s is -cynical and clever and subtle, and, if necessary, untrue. -St. Cyr’s displays his jealousy, suspicion and general -unpleasantness along with undoubted proof of talent. -Macdonald’s is bluff and honest. There is a whole host of -smaller fry, from Marbot downwards, who wrote fascinating -little books about the Army and their own personal -experiences. Some of them, such as the Reminiscences -of Colonel de Gonneville, have appeared in English. -They are all obtainable in French. The last authority, of -course, on military matters is the Correspondence. -There are only one or two doubtful letters in the whole -collection, and these are either printed with reserve or -<span class='pageno' title='243' id='Page_243'></span> -bear the proofs of their spuriousness on the face of -them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But no matter how much is written, or published, or -read, no two men will ever form quite the same estimate -of Napoleon. It is as easy to argue that he only rose -through sheer good luck as it is to argue that he only -fell through sheer bad luck. He can be compared to -Iscariot or to St. Paul, to Alexander or to Wilhelm II. -At times he seems a body without a soul; at others, a soul -without a body. All this seems to indicate that he was a -man of contradictions, but on the other hand he was, -admittedly, thoroughly consistent in all his actions. The -most one can hope for is to form one’s own conclusions -about him; one cannot hope to form other people’s.</p> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='245' id='Page_245'></span><h1><span style='font-size:x-large'>INDEX</span></h1></div> - -<div class='lgl' style=''> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line'>Abo, Treaty of, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></p> -<p class='line'>Agincourt, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p> -<p class='line'>Alexander (Czar), <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a></p> -<p class='line'>Alexandria, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p> -<p class='line'>Aspern, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></p> -<p class='line'>Atteridge, A. Hilliard, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></p> -<p class='line'>Auerstädt, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a></p> -<p class='line'>Augereau, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_91'>91</a>-<a href='#Page_93'>93</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Austerlitz, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Baciocchi, Elise (<span class='it'>née</span> Bonaparte), <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_114'>114</a>-<a href='#Page_128'>128</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Barras, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a></p> -<p class='line'>Bausset, de, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></p> -<p class='line'>Bautzen, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_189'>189</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Baylen, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a></p> -<p class='line'>Bennigsen, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></p> -<p class='line'>Bernadotte, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_31'>31</a>-<a href='#Page_33'>33</a></span>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a></p> -<p class='line'>Bernadotte, Désirée (<span class='it'>née</span> Clary), <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_167'>167</a>-<a href='#Page_169'>169</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Berthier, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a></p> -<p class='line'>Bertrand, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a></p> -<p class='line'>Bessières, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_28'>28</a></span>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a></p> -<p class='line'>Blücher, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a></p> -<p class='line'>Borghese, Pauline (<span class='it'>née</span> Bonaparte), <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_114'>114</a>-<a href='#Page_128'>128</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Borodino, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a></p> -<p class='line'>Bourrienne, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a></p> -<p class='line'>Buenos Ayres, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Catherine of Westphalia, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a></p> -<p class='line'>Charles, Hippolyte, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a></p> -<p class='line'>Clausel, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_138'>138</a>-<a href='#Page_139'>139</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Cockburn, Admiral, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a></p> -<p class='line'>Confederation of the Rhine, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></p> -<p class='line'>Continental System, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a></p> -<p class='line'>Corneille, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>David, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p> -<p class='line'>Davout, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_67'>67</a>-<a href='#Page_79'>79</a></span>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></p> -<p class='line'>Dennewitz, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a></p> -<p class='line'>Denuelle, Eléonore, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_158'>158</a>-<a href='#Page_160'>160</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Dresden, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a></p> -<p class='line'>Dupont, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_198'>198</a>-<a href='#Page_199'>199</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Duroc, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Eckmühl, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a></p> -<p class='line'>Egypt, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></p> -<p class='line'>Elba, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></p> -<p class='line'>Elchingen, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p> -<p class='line'>Enghien, d’, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_202'>202</a>-<a href='#Page_204'>204</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Eugène de Beauharnais, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a></p> -<p class='line'>Erlon, d’, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_146'>146</a>-<a href='#Page_148'>148</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Eylau, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Fouché, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a></p> -<p class='line'>Fourès, Marguerite, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_153'>153</a>-<a href='#Page_155'>155</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Francis I., Emperor of Austria, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a></p> -<p class='line'>Friedland, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Genoa, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a></p> -<p class='line'>Goethe, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p> -<p class='line'>Gourgaud, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a></p> -<p class='line'>Grassini, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_155'>155</a>-<a href='#Page_156'>156</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Grouchy, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_145'>145</a>-<a href='#Page_146'>146</a></span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Hamburg, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></p> -<p class='line'>Hauser, Kaspar, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>-<a href='#Page_172'>172</a></p> -<p class='line'>Hortense Bonaparte, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Isabey, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Jena, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a></p> -<p class='line'>Jerome Bonaparte, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_106'>106</a>-<a href='#Page_113'>113</a></span>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a></p> -<p class='line'>Joseph Bonaparte, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_103'>103</a>-<a href='#Page_106'>106</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Josephine, Empress, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_35'>35</a>-<a href='#Page_46'>46</a></span>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></p> -<p class='line'>Jourdain, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></p> -<p class='line'>Junot, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href='#Page_144'>144</a></span>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a></p> -<p class='line'>Junot, Madame, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Katzbach, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a></p> -<p class='line'>Kellermann, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Lannes, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_30'>30</a></span>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a></p> -<p class='line'>Leclerc, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a></p> -<p class='line'>Lefebvre, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a></p> -<p class='line'>Leipzig, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a></p> -<p class='line'>Léon (Denuelle), <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_159'>159</a>-<a href='#Page_160'>160</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Letizia Bonaparte (Madame Mère), <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_129'>129</a>-<a href='#Page_132'>132</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Ligny, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_196'>196</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Louis XVIII., <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></p> -<p class='line'>Louis Bonaparte, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_101'>101</a>-<a href='#Page_103'>103</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Lowe, Sir Hudson, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>-<a href='#Page_235'>235</a></p> -<p class='line'>Lucien Bonaparte, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_97'>97</a>-<a href='#Page_101'>101</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Lützen, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Macdonald, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_33'>33</a></span>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></p> -<p class='line'>Mack, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></p> -<p class='line'>Maida, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p> -<p class='line'>Mallet Conspiracy, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a></p> -<p class='line'>Malo-Jaroslavetz, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a></p> -<p class='line'>Marbot, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a></p> -<p class='line'>Marengo, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></p> -<p class='line'>Marie Antoinette, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></p> -<p class='line'>Marie Louise, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_47'>47</a>-<a href='#Page_66'>66</a></span>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a></p> -<p class='line'>Marmont, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_30'>30</a></span>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a></p> -<p class='line'>Masséna, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page_85'>85</a></span>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a></p> -<p class='line'>Metternich, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a></p> -<p class='line'>Minden, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p> -<p class='line'>Montebello, Duchess of, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a></p> -<p class='line'>Moore, Sir John, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></p> -<p class='line'>Montholon, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a></p> -<p class='line'>Moreau, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a></p> -<p class='line'>Moscow, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a></p> -<p class='line'>Murat, Joachim, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>-<span class='bold'><a href='#Page_28'>28</a></span>, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>-<a href='#Page_125'>125</a></p> -<p class='line'>Murat, Caroline (<span class='it'>née</span> Bonaparte), <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_114'>114</a>-<a href='#Page_128'>128</a></span>, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Napier, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_239'>239</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Napoleon, I., <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_9'>9</a>-<a href='#Page_243'>243</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Napoleon II., <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></p> -<p class='line'>Napoleon Charles Bonaparte, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></p> -<p class='line'>Neipperg, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_64'>64</a>-<a href='#Page_66'>66</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Ney, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_29'>29</a></span>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Oman, Sir Charles, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></p> -<p class='line'>Ossian, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p> -<p class='line'>Oudinot, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Patterson-Bonaparte, Elizabeth, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a></p> -<p class='line'>Petre, F. L., <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></p> -<p class='line'>Pichegru, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_204'>204</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Pius VII., <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a></p> -<p class='line'>Poniatowski, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Rouget de l’Isle, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p> -<p class='line'>Rousseau, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>St. Helena, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>-<a href='#Page_235'>235</a></p> -<p class='line'>St. Cyr, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_33'>33</a>-<a href='#Page_34'>34</a></span>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></p> -<p class='line'>Salamanca, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a></p> -<p class='line'>Savary, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a></p> -<p class='line'>Schwartzenberg, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></p> -<p class='line'>Ségur, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a></p> -<p class='line'>Soissons, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></p> -<p class='line'>Soult, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_85'>85</a>-<a href='#Page_89'>89</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Staël, Mme. de, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p> -<p class='line'>Stéphanie de Beauharnais, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_170'>170</a>-<a href='#Page_172'>172</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Suchet, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_89'>89</a>-<a href='#Page_91'>91</a></span>, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a></p> -<p class='line'>Suvaroff, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Talleyrand, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a></p> -<p class='line'>Tallien, Mme., <a href='#Page_37'>37</a></p> -<p class='line'>Thiers, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a></p> -<p class='line'>Tilsit, Treaty of, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Ulm, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Vandamme, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_144'>144</a>-<a href='#Page_145'>145</a></span>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a></p> -<p class='line'>Verestchagin, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></p> -<p class='line'>Victor, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a></p> -<p class='line'>Villeneuve, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a></p> -<p class='line'>Vittoria, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a></p> -<p class='line'>Vimiero, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Wagram, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_212'>212</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Walewska, Marie de, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_160'>160</a>-<a href='#Page_165'>165</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Walewski, Alexander, <span class='bold'><a href='#Page_165'>165</a>-<a href='#Page_166'>166</a></span></p> -<p class='line'>Waterloo, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a></p> -<p class='line'>Wellington, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'>Zürich, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a></p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:10em;'> <!-- rend=';fs:.7em;' --> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'>PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE NORTHUMBERLAND PRESS LIMITED</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'>WATERLOO HOUSE, THORNTON STREET, NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE</p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:1.2em;'>TRANSCRIBER NOTES</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Misspelled words and printer errors have been corrected. -Where multiple spellings occur, majority use has been -employed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Punctuation has been maintained except where obvious -printer errors occur.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Some illustrations were moved to facilitate page layout.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<div style='display:block; 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