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diff --git a/old/69220-0.txt b/old/69220-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6fd7fab..0000000 --- a/old/69220-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22807 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the war in the Peninsula -and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5 -of 6, by William Francis Patrick Napier - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France - from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5 of 6 - -Author: William Francis Patrick Napier - -Release Date: October 24, 2022 [eBook #69220] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 5 OF 6 *** - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example 3^e or 106^{me}. - - There are only two Footnotes in the book. They have been placed at - the end of the book. The anchors are denoted by [1] and [2]. - - This is volume 5 of 6. Similar to volume 4, this volume had a date - (Year. Month) as a margin header on most pages. This information about - the chronology of the narrative has been preserved as a Sidenote to - the relevant paragraph on that page whenever the header date changed. - - The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. - - With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings - of names have not been changed. - - Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - Volume 1 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318 - Volume 2 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554 - Volume 3 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68187 - Volume 4 of this series can be found at - https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68536 - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND IN THE - - SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. - - BY - - W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. - - _COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, - MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES._ - - VOL. V. - - - TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED - ANSWERS TO SOME ATTACKS - IN - ROBINSON’S LIFE OF PICTON, AND IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW; - - WITH - COUNTER-REMARKS - TO - MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S REMARKS - UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME OF - THE HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. - - - LONDON: - THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. - - MDCCCXXXVI. - - - - - LONDON: - - MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS. - - - Notice Page i - - Answer to Robinson’s Life of Picton ii - - Answer to the Quarterly Review xxiv - - Counter-Remarks, &c. xlvii - - - BOOK XVII. - - CHAPTER I. - - Summary of the political state of affairs—Lord Wellesley - resigns—Mr. Perceval killed—New administration—Story of the - war resumed—Wellington’s precautionary measures described—He - relinquishes the design of invading Andalusia and resolves to - operate in the north—Reasons why—Surprize of Almaraz by general - Hill—False alarm given by sir William Erskine prevents Hill from - taking the fort of Mirabete—Wellington’s discontent—Difficult - moral position of English generals Page 1 - - - CHAP. II. - - Progress of the war in different parts of Spain—State of - Gallicia-French precautions and successes against the Partidas of - the north—Marmont’s arrangements in Castile—Maritime expedition - suggested by sir Howard Douglas—He stimulates the activity of the - northern Partidas—The curate Merino defeats some French near Aranda - de Duero—His cruelty to the prisoners—Mina’s activity—Harasses - the enemy in Arragon—Is surprized at Robres by general - Pannetier—Escapes with difficulty—Re-appears in the Rioja—Gains the - defiles of Navas Tolosa—Captures two great convoys—Is chased by - general Abbé and nearly crushed, whereby the Partidas in the north - are discouraged—Those in other parts become more enterprising—The - course of the Ebro from Tudela to Tortoza so infested by them that - the army of the Ebro is formed by drafts from Sachet’s forces - and placed under general Reille to repress them—Operations of - Palombini against the Partidas—He moves towards Madrid—Returns - to the Ebro—Is ordered to join the king’s army—Operations in - Arragon and Catalonia—The Catalonians are cut off from the - coast line—Eroles raises a new division in Talarn—Advances into - Arragon—Defeats general Bourke at Rhoda—Is driven into Catalonia - by Severoli—Decaen defeats Sarzfield and goes to Lerida—Lacy - concentrates in the mountains of Olot—Descends upon Mattaro—Flies - from thence disgracefully—Lamarque defeats Sarzfield—Lacy’s bad - conduct—Miserable state of Catalonia 23 - - - CHAP. III. - - Operations in Valencia and Murcia—Sachet’s able government of - Valencia—O’Donel organizes a new army in Murcia—Origin of the - Sicilian expedition to Spain—Secret intrigues against Napoleon in - Italy and other parts—Lord William Bentinck proposes to invade - Italy—Lord Wellington opposes it—The Russian admiral Tchtchagoff - projects a descent upon Italy—Vacillating conduct of the English - ministers productive of great mischief—Lord William Bentinck sweeps - the money-markets to the injury of lord Wellington’s operations—Sir - John Moore’s plan for Sicily rejected—His ability and foresight - proved by the ultimate result—Evil effects of bad government shewn - by examples 45 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura—Advantage of - lord Wellington’s position shewn—Soult’s plans vast but - well-considered—He designs to besiege Tarifa, Alicant, - and Carthagena, and march upon Lisbon—Restores the French - interest at the court of Morocco—English embassy to the - Moorish emperor fails—Soult bombards Cadiz, and menaces a - serious attack—Ballesteros, his rash conduct—He is defeated at - Bornos—Effect of his defeat upon the allies in Estremadura—Foy - succours the fort of Mirabete—Hill is reinforced—Drouet falls back - to Azagua—Followed by Hill—General Slade defeated by Lallemande in - a cavalry combat at Macquilla—Exploit of cornet Strenowitz—General - Barrois marches to reinforce Drouet by the road of St. Ollala—Hill - falls back to Albuera—His disinterested conduct 56 - - - CHAP. V. - - Political situation of France—Secret policy of the European - courts—Causes of the Russian war—Napoleon’s grandeur and - power—Scene on the Niemen—Design attributed to Napoleon of - concentrating the French armies behind the Ebro—No traces of - such an intention to be discovered—His proposals for peace - considered—Political state of England—Effects of the continental - system—Extravagance, harshness, and improvident conduct of - the English ministers—Dispute with America—Political state - of Spain—Intrigues of Carlotta—New scheme of mediation with - the colonies—Mr. Sydenham’s opinion of it—New constitution - adopted—Succession to the crown fixed—Abolition of the Inquisition - agitated—Discontent of the clergy and absolute-monarchy-men—Neglect - of the military affairs—Dangerous state of the country—Plot to - deliver up Ceuta—Foreign policy of Spain—Negociations of Bardaxi at - Stockholm—Fresh English subsidy—Plan of enlisting Spanish soldiers - in British regiments fails—The councillor of state Sobral offers - to carry off Ferdinand from Valençay but Ferdinand rejects his - offer—Joseph talks of assembling a cortes at Madrid, but secretly - negociates with that in the Isla 65 - - - CHAP. VI. - - Political state of Portugal—Internal condition not - improved—Government weak—Lord Strangford’s conduct condemned—Lord - Wellesley resolves to recall him and send lord Louvaine to Rio - Janeiro—Reasons why this did not take place—Lord Strangford’s - career checked by the fear of being removed—Lord Wellington - obtains full powers from the Brazils—Lord Castlereagh’s vigorous - interference—Death of Linhares at Rio Janeiro—Domingo Souza - succeeds him as chief minister but remains in London—Lord - Wellington’s moderation towards the Portuguese regency—His - embarrassing situation described—His opinion of the Spanish and - Portuguese public men—His great diligence and foresight aided - by the industry and vigour of Mr. Stuart supports the war—His - administrative views and plans described—Opposed by the regency—He - desires the prince regent’s return to Portugal without his - wife—Carlotta prepares to come without the prince—Is stopped—Mr. - Stuart proposes a military government but lord Wellington will not - consent—Great desertion from the Portuguese army in consequence of - their distressed state from the negligence of the government—Severe - examples do not check it—The character of the Portuguese troops - declines—Difficulty of procuring specie—Wellington’s resources - impaired by the shameful cupidity of English merchants at Lisbon - and Oporto—Proposal for a Portuguese bank made by Domingo Souza, - Mr. Vansittart, and Mr. Villiers—Lord Wellington ridicules it—He - permits a contraband trade to be carried on with Lisbon by Soult - for the sake of the resources it furnishes 83 - - - BOOK XVIII. - - CHAP. I. - - Numbers of the French in the Peninsula shewn—Joseph - commander-in-chief—His dissentions with the French generals—His - plans—Opposed by Soult, who recommends different operations and - refuses to obey the king—Lord Wellington’s plans described—His - numbers—Colonel Sturgeon skilfully repairs the bridge of - Alcantara—The advantage of this measure—The navigation of the - Tagus and the Douro improved and extended—Rash conduct of a - commissary on the Douro—Remarkable letter of lord Wellington - to lord Liverpool—Arrangements for securing the allies’ flanks - and operating against the enemy’s flanks described—Marmont’s - plans—His military character—He restores discipline to the army of - Portugal—His measures for that purpose and the state of the French - army described and compared with the state of the British army and - Wellington’s measures 100 - - - CHAP. II. - - Campaign of 1812—Wellington advances to the Tormes—Marmont - retires—The allies besiege the forts of Salamanca—General aspect - of affairs changes and becomes gloomy—The king concentrates - the army of the centre—Marmont returns to the Tormes and - cannonades the allies on the position of San Christoval—Various - skirmishes—Adventure of Mr. Mackay—Marmont retires to Monte - Rubia—Crosses the Tormes with a part of his army—Fine conduct - of general Bock’s German cavalry—Graham crosses the Tormes - and Marmont retires again to Monte Rubia—Observations on this - movement—Assault on San Vincente fails—Heroic death of general - Bowes—Siege suspended for want of ammunition—It is renewed—Cajetano - is stormed—San Vincente being on fire surrenders—Marmont retires - to the Duero followed by Wellington—The French rear-guard - suffers some loss between Rueda and Tordesillas—Positions - of the armies described—State of affairs in other parts - described—Procrastination of the Gallician army—General Bonet - abandons the Asturias—Coincidence of Wellington’s and Napoleon’s - views upon that subject—Sir Home Popham arrives with his squadron - on the coast of Biscay—His operations—Powerful effect of them upon - the campaign—Wellington and Marmont alike cautious of bringing on a - battle—Extreme difficulty and distress of Wellington’s situation 122 - - - CHAP. III. - - Bonet arrives in the French camp—Marmont passes the Duero—Combat - of Castrejon—Allies retire across the Guarena—Combat on that - river—Observations on the movements—Marmont turns Wellington’s - flank—Retreat to San Christoval—Marmont passes the Tormes—Battle of - Salamanca—Anecdote of Mrs. Dalbiac 147 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Clauzel passes the Tormes at Alba—Cavalry combat at La - Serna—Chauvel’s cavalry joins the French army—The king - reaches Blasco Sancho—Retires to Espinar on hearing of the - battle—Receives letters from Clauzel which induce him to march - on Segovia—Wellington drives Clauzel across the Duero—Takes - Valladolid—Brings Santocildes over the Duero—Marches upon - Cuellar—The king abandons Segovia and recrosses the Guadarama—State - of affairs in other parts of Spain—General Long defeats - Lallemand in Estremadura—Caffarelli is drawn to the coast by - Popham’s expedition—Wellington leaves Clinton at Cuellar and - passes the Guadarama—Cavalry combat at Majadahonda—The king - unites his army at Valdemoro—Miserable state of the French - convoy—Joseph passes the Tagus; hears of the arrival of the - Sicilian expedition at Alicant—Retreats upon Valencia instead of - Andalusia—Maupoint’s brigade succours the garrison of Cuenca, is - beaten at Utiel by Villa Campa—Wellington enters Madrid—The Retiro - surrenders—Empecinado takes Guadalaxara—Extraordinary journey of - colonel Fabvier—Napoleon hears of Marmont’s defeat—His generous - conduct towards that marshal—Receives the king’s report against - Soult—His magnanimity—Observations 182 - - - BOOK XIX. - - CHAP. I. - - State of the war—Eastern operations—Lacy’s bad conduct—French - army of the Ebro dissolved—Lacy’s secret agents blow up the - magazines in Lerida—He is afraid to storm the place—Calumniates - Sarzfield—Suchet comes to Reus—The hermitage of St. Dimas - surrendered to Decaen by colonel Green—The French general burns - the convent of Montserrat and marches to Lerida—General Maitland - with the Anglo-Sicilian army appears off Palamos—Sails for - Alicant—Reflections on this event—Operations in Murcia—O’Donel - defeated at Castalla—Maitland lands at Alicant—Suchet concentrates - his forces at Xativa—Entrenches a camp there—Maitland advances - to Alcoy—His difficulties—Returns to Alicant—The king’s army - arrives at Almanza—The remnant of Maupoint’s brigade arrives from - Cuenca—Suchet re-occupies Alcoy—O’Donel comes up to Yecla—Maitland - is reinforced from Sicily and entrenches a camp under the walls of - Alicant 213 - - - CHAP. II. - - Operations in Andalusia—The king orders Soult to abandon that - province—Soult urges the king to join him with the other - armies—Joseph reiterates the order to abandon Andalusia—Soult - sends a letter to the minister of war expressing his suspicions - that Joseph was about to make a separate peace with the allies—The - king intercepts this letter, and sends colonel Desprez to - Moscow, to represent Soult’s conduct to the emperor—Napoleon’s - magnanimity—Wellington anxiously watches Soult’s movements—Orders - Hill to fight Drouet, and directs general Cooke to attack the - French lines in front of the Isla de Leon—Ballesteros, pursued - by Leval and Villate, skirmishes at Coin—Enters Malaga—Soult’s - preparations to abandon Andalusia—Lines before the Isla de Leon - abandoned—Soult marches towards Grenada—Colonel Skerrit and - Cruz Murgeon land at Huelva—Attack the French rear-guard at - Seville—Drouet marches upon Huescar—Soult moving by the mountains - reaches Hellin, and effects his junction with the king and - Suchet—Maitland desires to return to Sicily—Wellington prevents - him—Wellington’s general plans considered—State of affairs - in Castile—Clauzel comes down to Valladolid with the French - army—Santo Cildes retires to Torrelobaton, and Clinton falls - back to Arevalo—Foy marches to carry off the French garrisons in - Leon—Astorga surrenders before his arrival—He marches to Zamora - and drives Sylveira into Portugal—Menaces Salamanca—Is recalled - by Clauzel—The Partidas get possession of the French posts on the - Biscay coast—Take the city of Bilbao—Reille abandons several posts - in Arragon—The northern provinces become ripe for insurrection 234 - - - CHAP. III. - - Wellington’s combinations described—Foolish arrangements of - the English ministers relative to the Spanish clothing—Want of - money—Political persecution in Madrid—Miserable state of that - city—Character of the Madrilenos—Wellington marches against - Clauzel—Device of the Portuguese regency to avoid supplying - their troops—Wellington enters Valladolid—Waits for Castaños—His - opinion of the Spaniards—Clauzel retreats to Burgos—His able - generalship—The allies enter Burgos, which is in danger of - destruction from the Partidas—Reflections upon the movements of - the two armies—Siege of the castle of Burgos 254 - - - CHAP. IV. - - State of the war in various parts of Spain—Joseph’s distress - for money—Massena declines the command of the army of - Portugal—Caffarelli joins that army—Reinforcements come from - France—Mischief occasioned by the English newspapers—Souham - takes the command—Operations of the Partidas—Hill reaches - Toledo—Souham advances to relieve the castle of Burgos—Skirmish - at Monasterio—Wellington takes a position of battle in front of - Burgos—Second skirmish—Wellington weak in artillery—Negligence - of the British government on that head—The relative situation - of the belligerents—Wellington offered the chief command of the - Spanish armies—His reasons for accepting it—Contumacious conduct - of Ballesteros—He is arrested and sent to Ceuta—Suchet and - Jourdan refuse the command of the army of the south—Soult reduces - Chinchilla—The king communicates with Souham—Hill communicates with - Wellington—Retreat from Burgos—Combat of Venta de Pozo—Drunkenness - at Torquemada—Combat on the Carion—Wellington retires behind the - Pisuerga—Disorders in the rear of the army—Souham skirmishes at the - bridge of Cabeçon—Wellington orders Hill to retreat from the Tagus - to the Adaja—Souham fails to force the bridges of Valladolid and - Simancas—The French captain Guingret swims the Duero and surprizes - the bridge of Tordesillas—Wellington retires behind the Duero—Makes - a rapid movement to gain a position in front of the bridge of - Tordesillas and destroys the bridges of Toro and Zamora, which - arrests the march of the French 280 - - - CHAP. V. - - The king and Soult advance from Valencia to the Tagus—General Hill - takes a position of battle—The French pass the Tagus—Skirmish at - the Puente Largo—Hill blows up the Retiro and abandons Madrid—Riot - in that city—Attachment of the Madrilenos towards the British - troops—The hostile armies pass the Guadarama—Souham restores the - bridge of Toro—Wellington retreats towards Salamanca and orders - Hill to retreat upon Alba de Tormes—The allies take a position - of battle behind the Tormes—The Spaniards at Salamanca display a - hatred of the British—Instances of their ferocity—Soult cannonades - the castle of Alba—The king reorganizes the French armies—Soult and - Jourdan propose different plans—Soult’s plan adopted—French pass - the Tormes—Wellington by a remarkable movement gains the Valmusa - river and retreats—Misconduct of the troops—Sir Edward Paget taken - prisoner—Combat on the Huebra—Anecdote—Retreat from thence to - Ciudad Rodrigo—The armies on both sides take winter cantonments 308 - - - CHAP. VI. - - Continuation of the Partizan warfare—General Lameth made governor - of Santona—Reille takes the command of the army of Portugal—Drouet, - count D’Erlon, commands that of the centre—Works of Astorga - destroyed by the Spaniards—Mina’s operations in Arragon—Villa - Campa’s operations—Empecinado and others enter Madrid—The duke - Del Parque enters La Mancha—Elio and Bassecour march to Albacete - and communicate with the Anglo-Sicilian army—The king enters - Madrid—Soult’s cavalry scour La Mancha—Suchet’s operations—General - Donkin menaces Denia—General W. Clinton takes the command of - the Anglo-Sicilian army—Suchet intrenches a camp at Xativa—The - Anglo-Sicilian army falls into disrepute—General Campbell takes - the command—Inactivity of the army—The Frayle surprises a convoy - of French artillery—Operations in Catalonia—Dissensions in that - province—Eroles and Codrington menace Taragona—Eroles surprises a - French detachment at Arbeça—Lacy threatens Mataro and Hostalrich - returns to Vich—Manso defeats a French detachment near Molino - del Rey—Decaen defeats the united Catalonian army and penetrates - to Vich—The Spanish divisions separate—Colonel Villamil attempts - to surprise San Felippe de Balaguer—Attacks it a second time - in concert with Codrington—The place succoured by the garrison - of Tortoza—Lacy suffers a French convoy to reach Barcelona, is - accused of treachery and displaced—The regular warfare in Catalonia - ceases—The Partizan warfare continues—England the real support of - the war 341 - - - CHAP. VII. - - General observations—Wellington reproaches the army—His censures - indiscriminate—Analysis of his campaign—Criticisms of Jomini - and others examined—Errors of execution—The French operations - analyzed—Sir John Moore’s retreat compared with lord - Wellington’s 357 - - - BOOK XX. - - CHAP. I. - - Political affairs—Their influence on the war—Napoleon’s invasion - of Russia—Its influence on the contest in the Peninsula—State - of feeling in England—Lord Wellesley charges the ministers and - especially Mr. Perceval with imbecility—His proofs thereof—Ability - and zeal of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart shewn—Absurd plans of - the count of Funchal—Mr. Villiers and Mr. Vansittart—The English - ministers propose to sell the Portuguese crown and church lands—The - folly and injustice of these, and other schemes, exposed by lord - Wellington—He goes to Cadiz—His reception there—New organization - of the Spanish armies—Wellington goes to Lisbon where he is - enthusiastically received—His departure from Cadiz the signal for - renewed dissensions—Carlotta’s intrigues—Decree to abolish the - Inquisition opposed by the clergy—The regency aid the clergy—Are - displaced by the Cortez—New regency appointed—The American party in - the Cortez adopt Carlotta’s cause—Fail from fear of the people—Many - bishops and church dignitaries are arrested and others fly into - Portugal—The pope’s nuncio Gravina opposes the cortez—His benefices - sequestered—He flies to Portugal—His intrigues there—Secret - overtures made to Joseph by some of the Spanish armies 379 - - - CHAP. II. - - Political state of Portugal—Wellington’s difficulties—Improper - conduct of some English ships of war—Piratical violence of a - Scotch merchantman—Disorders in the military system—Irritation of - the people—Misconduct of the magistrates—Wellington and Stuart - grapple with the disorders of the administration—The latter calls - for the interference of the British government—Wellington writes a - remarkable letter to the prince regent and requests him to return - to Portugal—Partial amendment—The efficiency of the army restored, - but the country remains in an unsettled state—The prince unable - to quit the Brazils—Carlotta prepares to come alone—Is stopped by - the interference of the British government—An auxiliary Russian - force is offered to lord Wellington by admiral Greig—The Russian - ambassador in London disavows the offer—The emperor Alexander - proposes to mediate between England and America—The emperor of - Austria offers to mediate for a general peace—Both offers are - refused 409 - - - CHAP. III. - - Napoleon’s embarrassed position—His wonderful activity—His designs - explained—The war in Spain becomes secondary—Many thousand old - soldiers withdrawn from the armies—The Partidas become more - disciplined and dangerous—New bands are raised in Biscay and - Guipuscoa and the insurrection of the northern provinces creeps - on—Napoleon orders the king to fix his quarters at Valladolid, to - menace Portugal, and to reinforce the army of the north—Joseph - complains of his generals, and especially of Soult—Napoleon’s - magnanimity—Joseph’s complaints not altogether without foundation 430 - - - CHAP. IV. - - Operations south of the Tagus—Eroles and Codrington seek to entrap - the governor of Taragona—They fail—Sarzfield and Villa Campa unite - but disperse at the approach of Pannetier and Severoli—Suchet’s - position—Great force of the allies in his front—The younger - Soult engages the Spanish cavalry in La Mancha—General Daricau - marches with a column towards Valencia—Receives a large convoy and - returns to La Mancha—Absurd rumours about the English army rife - in the French camp—Some of lord Wellington’s spies detected—Soult - is recalled—Gazan assumes the command of the army of the - south—Suchet’s position described—Sir John Murray takes the command - of the Anglo-Sicilian troops at Alicant—Attacks the French post at - Alcoy—His want of vigour—He projects a maritime attack on the city - of Valencia, but drops the design because lord William Bentinck - recals some of his troops—Remarks upon his proceedings—Suchet - surprises a Spanish division at Yecla, and then advances against - Murray—Takes a thousand Spanish prisoners in Villena—Murray takes - a position at Castalla—His advanced guard driven from Biar—Second - battle of Castalla—Remarks 446 - - - CHAP. V. - - Operations north of the Tagus—Position of the French - armies—Palombini marches from Madrid to join the army of the - north—Various combats take place with the Partidas—Foy fails - to surprise the British post at Bejar—Caffarelli demands - reinforcements—Joseph misconceives the emperor’s plans—Wellington’s - plans vindicated against French writers—Soult advises Joseph to - hold Madrid and the mountains of Avila—Indecision of the king—He - goes to Valladolid—Concentrates the French armies in Old Castile—A - division under Leval remains at Madrid—Reille sends reinforcements - to the army of the north—Various skirmishes with the Partidas—Leval - deceived by false rumours at Madrid—Joseph wishes to abandon that - capital—Northern insurrection—Operations of Caffarelli, Palombini, - Mendizabel, Longa, and Mina—Napoleon recals Caffarelli—Clauzel - takes the command of the army of the north—Assaults Castro but - fails—Palombini skirmishes with Mendizabel—Introduces a convoy into - Santona—Marches to succour Bilbao—His operations in Guipuscoa—The - insurrection gains strength—Clauzel marches into Navarre—Defeats - Mina in the valley of Roncal and pursues him into Arragon—Foy acts - on the coast—Takes Castro—Returns to Bilbao—Defeats the Biscayen - volunteers under Mugartegui at Villaro, and those of Guipuscoa - under Artola at Lequitio—The insurrectional junta flies—Bermeo and - Isaro are taken—Operations of the Partidas on the great line of - communication 470 - - - CHAP. VI. - - Wellington restores the discipline of the allied army—Relative - strength of the belligerent forces—Wellington’s plans - described—Lord W. Bentinck again proposes to invade - Italy—Wellington opposes it—The opening of the campaign delayed by - the weather—State of the French army—Its movements previous to the - opening of the campaign 503 - - - CHAP. VII. - - Dangerous discontent of the Portuguese army—Allayed by - Wellington—Noble conduct of the soldiers—The left wing of the - allies under general Graham marches through the Tras os Montes - to the Esla—The right wing under Wellington advances against - Salamanca—Combat there—The allies pass the Tormes—Wellington - goes in person to the Esla—Passage of that river—Cavalry combat - at Morales—The two wings of the allied army unite at Toro on the - Duero—Remarks on that event—Wellington marches in advance—Previous - movements of the French described—They pass the Carion and Pisuerga - in retreat—The allies pass the Carion in pursuit—Joseph takes - post in front of Burgos—Wellington turns the Pisuerga with his - left wing and attacks the enemy with his right wing—Combat on - the Hormaza—The French retreat behind Pancorbo and blow up the - castle of Burgos—Wellington crosses the Upper Ebro and turns the - French line of defence—Santander is adopted as a dépôt station - and the military establishments in Portugal are broken up—Joseph - changes his dispositions of defence—The allies advance—Combat of - Osma—Combat of St. Millan—Combat of Subijana Morillas—The French - armies concentrate in the basin of Vittoria behind the Zadora 520 - - - CHAP. VIII. - - Confused state of the French in the basin of Vittoria—Two convoys - are sent to the rear—The king takes up a new order of battle—The - Gallicians march to seize Orduña but are recalled—Graham marches - across the hills to Murguia—Relative strength and position - of the hostile armies—Battle of Vittoria—Joseph retreats by - Salvatierra—Wellington pursues him up the Borundia and Araquil - valleys—Sends Longa and Giron into Guipuscoa—Joseph halts at - Yrursun—Detaches the army of Portugal to the Bidassoa—Retreats - with the army of the centre and the army of the south to - Pampeluna—Wellington detaches Graham through the mountains by - the pass of St. Adrian into Guipuscoa and marches himself to - Pampeluna—Combat with the French rear-guard—Joseph retreats up - the valley of Roncevalles—General Foy rallies the French troops - in Guipuscoa and fights the Spaniards at Montdragon—Retreats to - Bergara and Villa Franca—Graham enters Guipuscoa—Combat on the - Orio river—Foy retires to Tolosa—Combat there—The French posts - on the sea-coast abandoned with exception of Santona and St. - Sebastian—Foy retires behind the Bidassoa—Clauzel advances towards - Vittoria—Retires to Logroño—Wellington endeavours to surround - him—He makes a forced march to Tudela—Is in great danger—Escapes - to Zaragoza—Halts there—Is deceived by Mina and finally marches - to Jacca—Gazan re-enters Spain and occupies the valley of - Bastan—O’Donel reduces the forts of Pancorbo—Hill drives Gazan - from the valley of Bastan—Observations 548 - - -LIST OF APPENDIX. - - No. I. - - Extracts of letters relating to the battle of Salamanca 585 - - - No. II. - - Copies of two despatches from the emperor Napoleon to the minister - at war relative to the duke of Ragusa 587 - - - No. III. - - Letter from the duke of Dalmatia to king Joseph, August 12, 1812 588 - - - No. IV. - - Letter from the duke of Dalmatia to the minister at war 590 - - - No. V. - - Letter from colonel Desprez to king Joseph, Paris, Sept. 22, - 1812 593 - - - No. VI. A. - - Confidential letter from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph, Paris, - Nov. 10, 1812 595 - - - No. VI. B. - - Letter from colonel Desprez to king Joseph, Paris, Jan, 3, 1813 596 - - - No. VII. - - Letter from Napoleon to the duc de Feltre, Ghiart, Sept. 2, 1812 600 - - - No. VIII. A. - - Extract. General Souham’s despatch to the minister at war 602 - - - No. VIII. B. - - Extracts. Two letters from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph 602 - - - No. IX. - - Extract. Letter from marshal Jourdan to colonel Napier 603 - - - No. X. - - Letter from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph, Jan. 29, 1813 605 - - - No. XI. - - Ditto ditto 606 - - - No. XII. - - Ditto ditto, Feb. 12, 1813 608 - - - No. XIII. - - Ditto ditto, Feb. 12, 1813 609 - - - No. XIV. - - Two ditto ditto, March 12 and 18, 1813 611 - - - No. XV. - - Letter from Joseph O’Donnel to general Donkin 614 - - - No. XVI. - - Letter from the marquis of Wellington to major-general Campbell 616 - - - No. XVII. - - Extract. Letter from the marquis of Wellington to lieutenant-general - sir John Murray, April 6, 1813 617 - - - No. XVIII. - - General states of the French army, April 15, May 15, 1812, and - March 15, 1813 618 - - - No. XIX. - - Especial state of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812; - loss of ditto 619 - - - No. XX. - - Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army, July, 1812 620 - - - No. XXI. - - Losses of the allies, July 18, 1812 621 - - - No. XXII. - - Strength of the allies at Vittoria 622 - - - - -LIST OF THE PLATES, - -_To be placed together at Page 582_ - - - No. 1. Explanatory Sketch of the Surprise of Almaraz, 1812. - - 2. Explanatory Sketch of the Sieges of the Forts and Operations - round Salamanca, 1812. - - 3. Battle of Salamanca, with a Sketch of Operations before and - after the Action. - - 4. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Burgos, 1812. - - 5. Sketch of the Retreat from Madrid and Burgos, 1812. - - 6. Explanatory Sketch of the Position of the Partidas and of - lord Wellington’s March from the Agueda to the Pyrenees, - 1813. - - 7. Battle of Castalla and Operations before the Action. - - 8. Battle of Vittoria, with Operations before and after the - Action. - - - - -NOTICE - -1º. In the present volume will be found a plan of the Peninsula on -a very small scale, yet sufficient to indicate the general range -of operations. A large map would be enormously expensive without -any correspondent advantages to the reader; and it would only be a -repetition of errors, because there are no materials for an accurate -plan. The small one now furnished, together with the sketches which -I have drawn and published with each volume, and which are more -accurate than might be supposed, will give a clear general notion of -the operations. Those who desire to have more detailed information -will find it in Lieutenant Godwyn’s fine atlas of the battles in the -Peninsula—a work undertaken by that officer with the sole view of -forming a record of the glorious actions of the British army. - -2º. Most of the manuscript authorities consulted for former volumes -have been also consulted for this volume, and in addition the -official correspondence of Lord William Bentinck; some notes by -Lord Hill; the journal and correspondence of sir Rufane Donkin; a -journal of Colonel Oglander, twenty-sixth regiment; a memoir by -sir George Gipps, royal engineers; and a variety of communications -by other officers. Lastly, authenticated copies of the official -journals and correspondence of most of the marshals and generals -who commanded armies in Spain. These were at my request supplied by -the French War-office with a prompt liberality indicative of that -military frankness and just pride which ought and does characterize -the officers of Napoleon’s army. The publication of this volume also -enables me with convenience to produce additional authorities for -former statements, while answering, as I now do, the attacks upon my -work which have appeared in the “Life of Sir Thomas Picton,” and in -the “Quarterly Review.” - - “Many there are that trouble me and persecute me; yet do I not - swerve from the testimonies,”—PSALM CXIX. - - -[Sidenote: Life of Picton, page 31.] - -[Sidenote: Page 325.] - -_Robinson’s Life of Picton._—This writer of an English general’s -life, is so entirely unacquainted with English military customs, that -he quotes a common order of the day, accrediting a new staff officer -to the army, as a remarkable testimony to that staff officer’s -talents. And he is so unacquainted with French military customs, -that, treating of the battle of Busaco, he places a French marshal, -Marmont, who by the way was not then even in Spain, at the head of -a _division_ of Ney’s corps. He dogmatises upon military movements -freely, and is yet so incapable of forming a right judgment upon the -materials within his reach, as to say, that sir John Moore should -not have retreated, because as he was able to beat the French at -Coruña, he could also have beaten them in the heart of Spain. Thus -setting aside the facts that at Coruña Moore had fifteen thousand -men to fight twenty thousand, and in the heart of Spain he had only -twenty-three thousand to fight more than three hundred thousand! - -And lest this display of incompetency should not be sufficient, he -affirms, that the same sir John Moore had, comparatively, greater -means at Sahagun to beat the enemy than Lord Wellington had in the -lines of Torres Vedras. Now those lines, which Wellington had been -fortifying for more than a year, offered three nearly impregnable -positions, defended by a hundred thousand men. There was a fortress, -that of St. Julian’s, and a fleet, close at hand as a final resource, -and only sixty thousand French commanded by Massena were in front. -But sir John Moore having only twenty-three thousand men at Sahagun, -had no lines, no fortifications for defence, and no time to form -them, he was nearly three hundred miles from his fleet, and Napoleon -in person had turned one hundred thousand men against him, while two -hundred thousand more remained in reserve! - -Any lengthened argument in opposition to a writer so totally -unqualified to treat of warlike affairs, would be a sinful waste of -words; but Mr. Robinson has been at pains to question the accuracy of -certain passages of my work, and with what justice the reader shall -now learn.[1] - -1º. _Combat on the Coa._—The substance of Mr. Robinson’s complaint -on this subject is, that I have imputed to general Picton, the -odious crime of refusing, from personal animosity, to support -general Craufurd;—that such a serious accusation should not be made -without ample proof;—that I cannot say whether Picton’s instructions -did not forbid him to aid Craufurd;—that the roads were so bad, -the distance so great, and the time so short, Picton could not -have aided him;—that my account of the action differs from general -Craufurd’s;—that I was only a lieutenant of the forty-third, and -consequently could know nothing of the matter;—that I have not -praised Picton—that he was a Roman hero and so forth. Finally it is -denied that Picton ever quarrelled with Craufurd at all; and that, so -far from having an altercation with him on the day of the action he -did not on that day even quit his own quarters at Pinhel. Something -also there is about general Cole’s refusing to quit Guarda. - -To all this I reply that I never did accuse general Picton of acting -from personal animosity, and neither the letter nor the spirit of my -statement will bear out such a meaning, which is a pure hallucination -of this author. That the light division was not supported is -notorious. The propriety of supporting it I have endeavoured to shew, -the cause why it was not so supported I have not attempted to divine; -yet it was neither the distance, nor the badness of the roads, nor -the want of time; for the action, which took place in July, lasted -from day-break until late in the evening, the roads, and there were -several, were good at that season, and the distance not more than -eight miles. - -It is quite true, as Mr. Robinson observes, that I cannot affirm of -my own knowledge whether the duke of Wellington forbade Picton to -succour Craufurd, but I can certainly affirm that he ordered him to -support him because it is so set down in his grace’s despatches, -volume 5th, pages 535 and 547; and it is not probable that this -order should have been rescinded and one of a contrary tendency -substituted, to meet an event, namely the action on the Coa, which -Craufurd had been forbidden to fight. Picton acted no doubt upon the -dictates of his judgment, but all men are not bound to approve of -that judgment; and as to the charge of faintly praising his military -talents, a point was forced by me in his favour, when I compared him -to general Craufurd of whose ability there was no question; more -could not be done in conscience, even under Mr. Robinson’s assurance -that he was a Roman hero. - -The exact object of Mr. Robinson’s reasoning upon the subject of -general Cole’s refusal to quit Guarda it is difficult to discover; -but the passage to which it relates, is the simple enunciation of -a fact, which is now repeated, namely, that general Cole being -requested by general Craufurd to come down with his whole division -to the Coa, refused, and that lord Wellington approved of that -refusal, though he ordered Cole to support Craufurd under certain -circumstances. Such however is Mr. Robinson’s desire to monopolize -all correctness, that he will not permit me to know any thing about -the action, though I was present, because, as he says, being only a -lieutenant, I could not know any thing about it. He is yet abundantly -satisfied with the accuracy of his own knowledge, although he was not -present, and was neither a captain nor lieutenant. I happened to be a -captain of seven years standing, but surely, though we should admit -all subalterns to be blind, like young puppies, and that rank in the -one case, as age in the other, is absolutely necessary to open their -eyes, it might still be asked, why I should not have been able, after -having obtained a rank which gave me the right of seeing, to gather -information from others as well as Mr. Robinson? Let us to the proof. - -In support of his views, he has produced, the rather vague testimony -of an anonymous officer, on general Picton’s staff, which he deems -conclusive as to the fact, that Picton never quarrelled with -Craufurd, that he did not even quit Pinhel on the day of the action, -and consequently could not have had any altercation with him on the -Coa. But the following letters from officers on Craufurd’s staff, not -anonymous, shew that Picton did all these things. In fine that Mr. -Robinson has undertaken a task for which he is not qualified. - - - _Testimony of lieutenant-colonel Shaw Kennedy, who was on general - Craufurd’s staff at the action of the Coa, July 24, 1810._ - - “_Manchester, 7th November, 1835._ - -“I have received your letter in which you mention ‘_Robinson’s Life -of Picton_;’ that work I have not seen. It surprises me that any -one should doubt that Picton and Craufurd met on the day the French -army invested Almeida in 1810. I was wounded previously, and did not -therefore witness their interview; but I consider it certain that -Picton and Craufurd did meet on the 24th July, 1810, on the high -ground on the left bank of the Coa during the progress of the action, -and that a brisk altercation took place between them. They were -primed and ready for such an altercation, as angry communications had -passed between them previously regarding the disposal of some sick -of the light division. I have heard Craufurd mention in joke his and -Picton’s testiness with each other, and I considered that he alluded -both to the quarrel as to the sick; and to that which occurred when -they met during the action at Almeida. - - “J. S. KENNEDY.” - -“_Colonel Napier, &c. &c. &c._” - - - _Testimony of colonel William Campbell, who was on general - Craufurd’s staff at the action on the Coa, July 24, 1810._ - - “_Esplanade, Dover, 13th Nov. 1835._ - -“Your letter from Freshford has not been many minutes in my hands; I -hasten to reply. General Picton _did_ come out of Pinhel on the day -of the Coa combat as you term it. It was in the afternoon of that day -when all the regiments were in retreat, and general Craufurd was with -his staff and others on the heights above, that, I think, on notice -being given of general Picton’s approach, general Craufurd turned -and moved to meet him. Slight was the converse, short the interview, -for upon Craufurd’s asking enquiringly, whether general Picton did -not consider it advisable to move out something from Pinhel in -demonstration of support, or to cover the light division, in terms -not bland, the general made it understood that ‘he should do no such -thing.’ This as you may suppose put an end to the meeting, further -than some violent rejoinder on the part of my much-loved friend, -and fiery looks returned! We went our several ways, general Picton, -I think, proceeding onwards a hundred yards to take a peep at the -bridge. This is my testimony. - - “Yours truly, - “WILLIAM CAMPBELL.” - -“COLONEL NAPIER, &C. &C. &C.” - - -2º. _Battle of Busaco._—Mr. Robinson upon the authority of one of -general Picton’s letters, has endeavoured to show that my description -of this battle is a mass of errors; but it shall be proved that -his criticism is so, and that general Picton’s letter is very bad -authority. - -In my work it is said that the allies resisted vigorously, yet -the French gained the summit of the ridge, and while the leading -battalions established themselves on the crowning rocks, others -wheeled to their right, intending to sweep the summit of the Sierra, -but were driven down again in a desperate charge made by the left of -the third division. - -Picton’s letter says, that the head of the enemy’s column got -possession of a rocky point on the crest of the position, and that -they were followed by the remainder of a large column which was -driven down in a desperate charge made by the left of the third -division. - -So far we are agreed. But Picton gives the merit of the charge to the -light companies of the seventy-fourth and eighty-eighth regiments, -and a wing of the forty-fifth aided by _the eighth Portuguese -regiment, under major Birmingham_, whereas, in the History the whole -merit is given to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth regiments. -Lord Wellington’s despatch gives the merit to the forty-fifth, and -eighty-eighth, aided by the eighth Portuguese regiment, _under -colonel Douglas_. The “_Reminiscences of a Subaltern_,” written by an -officer of the eighty-eighth regiment, and published in the United -Service Journal, in like manner, gives the merit to the eighty-eighth -and forty-fifth British regiments, and the _eighth Portuguese_. - -It will presently be seen why I took no notice of the share the -eighth Portuguese are said to have had in this brilliant achievement. -Meanwhile the reader will observe that Picton’s letter indicates -the _centre_ of his division as being forced by the French, and he -affirms that he drove them down again with his _left_ wing without -aid from the fifth division. But my statement makes both the _right_ -and _centre_ of his division to be forced, and gives the fifth -division, and especially colonel Cameron and the ninth British -regiment, a very large share in the glory, moreover I say that the -_eighth Portuguese was broken to pieces_. Mr. Robinson argues that -this must be wrong, for, says he, the eighth Portuguese _were not -broken_, and if the right of the third division had been forced, -the French would have encountered the fifth division. To this he -adds, with a confidence singularly rash, his scanty knowledge of -facts considered, that colonel Cameron and the ninth regiment would -doubtless have made as good a charge as I have described, “_only they -were not there_.” - -In reply, it is now affirmed distinctly and positively, that the -French did break the eighth Portuguese regiment, did gain the rocks -on the summit of the position, and on the _right_ of the third -division; did ensconce themselves in those rocks, and were going to -sweep the summit of the Sierra when the fifth division under general -Leith attacked them; and the ninth regiment led by colonel Cameron -did form under fire, as described, did charge, and did beat the enemy -out of those rocks; and if they had not done so, the third division, -then engaged with other troops, would have been in a very critical -situation. Not only is all this re-affirmed, but it shall be proved -by the most irrefragable testimony. It will then follow that the -History is accurate, that general Picton’s letter is inaccurate, and -the writer of his life incompetent to censure others. - -Mr. Robinson may notwithstanding choose to abide by the authority of -general Picton’s letter, which he “fortunately found amongst that -general’s manuscripts,” but which others less fortunate had found -in _print_ many years before; and he is the more likely to do so, -because he has asserted that if general Picton’s letters are false, -they are wilfully so, an assertion which it is impossible to assent -to. It would be hard indeed if a man’s veracity was to be called -in question because his letters, written in the hurry of service -gave inaccurate details of a battle. General Picton wrote what he -believed to be the fact, but to give any historical weight to his -letter on this occasion, in opposition to the testimony which shall -now be adduced against its accuracy, would be weakness. And with -the more reason it is rejected, because Mr. Robinson himself admits -that another letter, written by general Picton on this occasion to -the duke of Queensbury, was so inaccurate as to give general offence -to the army; and because his letters on two other occasions are as -incorrect as on this of Busaco. - -Thus writing of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, Picton says, “about -this time, namely, when the third division carried the main breach, -the light division which was rather late in their attack, also -succeeded in getting possession of the breach they were ordered to -attack.” Now it has been proved to demonstration, that the light -division carried the small breach, and were actually attacking the -flank of the French troops defending the great breach, when the third -division carried that point. This indeed is so certain, that Mr. -Uniack of the ninety-fifth, and others of the light division, were -destroyed on the ramparts close to the great breach by that very -explosion which was said to have killed general M’Kinnon; and some -have gone so far as to assert that it is doubtful if the great breach -would have been carried at all but for the flank attack of the light -division. - -Again, general Picton writing of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, says -“the light division under general Craufurd was rather _roughly -handled by the enemy’s cavalry_, and had that arm of the French army -been as daring and active upon this occasion, as they were when -following us to the lines of Torres Vedras, they would doubtless have -cut off the light division to a man.” - -Nevertheless as an eye-witness, and, being then a field-officer on -the staff, by Mr. Robinson’s rule entitled to see, I declare most -solemnly that the French cavalry, though they often menaced to -charge, never came within sure shot distance of the light division. -The latter, with the exception of the ninety-fifth rifles, who were -skirmishing in the wood of Pozo Velho, was formed by regiments in -three squares, flanking and protecting each other, they retired over -the plain leisurely without the loss of a man, without a sabre-wound -being received, without giving or receiving fire; they moved in the -most majestic manner secure in their discipline and strength, which -was such as would have defied all the cavalry that ever charged under -Tamerlane or Genghis. - -But it is time to give the proofs relative to Busaco, the reader -being requested to compare them with the description of that battle -in my History. - - - _Extracts from major-general sir John Cameron’s letters - to colonel Napier._ - - “_Government House, Devonport, Aug. 9th_, 1834. - -“—I am sorry to perceive in the recent publication of lord Beresford, -his ‘_Refutation of your justification of your third volume_,’ some -remarks on the battle of Busaco which disfigure, not intentionally I -should hope, the operations of the British brigade in major-general -Leith’s corps on that occasion, of which I, as commanding officer -of one of the regiments composing it, may perhaps be permitted to -know something. I shall however content myself at present with -giving you a detail of the operations of the British brigade in -major-general Leith’s _own words_, extracted from a document in -my possession, every syllable of which can be verified by many -distinguished officers now living, some of them actors in, all of -them eye-witnesses to the affair. - -“‘The ground where the British brigade was now moving, was behind -a chain of rocky eminences where it had appeared clearly, the -enemy was successfully pushing to establish himself and precluded -major-general Leith from seeing at that moment the progress the enemy -was making, but by the information of staff officers stationed on -purpose who communicated his direction and progress. Major-general -Leith moved the British brigade so as to endeavour to meet and -check the enemy when he had gained the ascendancy. At this time a -heavy fire of musketry was kept upon the height, the smoke of which -prevented a clear view of the state of things. When however the -rock forming the high part of the Sierra became visible, the enemy -appeared in full possession of it, and a French officer was in the -act of cheering with his hat off, while a continual fire was kept up -from thence and along the whole face of the Sierra, in a diagonal -direction towards the bottom, by the enemy ascending rapidly from -the successive columns formed for the attack, on a mass of soldiers -from the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments, who having been -severely pressed had given way and were rapidly retiring in complete -confusion and disorder. Major-general Leith on that occasion spoke -to Major Birmingham (who was on foot, having had his horse killed), -who stated that the fugitives were of the ninth Portuguese as well -as the eighth regiment, and that he had ineffectually tried to check -their retreat. Major-general Leith addressed and succeeded in -stopping them, and they cheered when he ordered them to be collected -and formed in the rear. They were passing as they retired diagonally -to the right of the ninth British regiment. The face of affairs in -this quarter now bore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been -the assailant having dispersed or driven every thing opposed to him -was in possession of the rocky eminence of the Sierra at this part -of major-general Picton’s position without a shot then being fired -at him. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general Leith resolved -instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered -the ninth British regiment, which had hitherto been moving rapidly -by its left in column in order to gain the most advantageous ground -for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the -greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness, under the fire of -the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky -eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for -the first time perceived the British brigade under him. Major-general -Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth regiment should have moved -on in rear of, and to the left of, the ninth British regiment, to -have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence which was quite -inaccessible towards the rear of the Sierra, while the ninth should -have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height; the royal -Scots to have been posted (as they were) in reserve. But the enemy -having driven every thing before him in that quarter afforded him -the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is -accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade -to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost -in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it -had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting -and frequently in double-quick time. The thirty-eighth regiment -was therefore directed to form also and support when major-general -Leith led the ninth regiment to attack the enemy on the rocky ridge, -which they did without filing a shot. That part which looks behind -the Sierra (as already stated) was inaccessible and afforded the -enemy the advantage of outflanking the ninth on the left as they -advanced, but the order, celerity, and coolness with which they -attacked panic-struck the enemy, who immediately gave way on being -charged with the bayonet, and the whole was driven down the face of -the Sierra in confusion and with immense loss, from a destructive -fire which the ninth regiment opened upon him as he fled with -precipitation after the charge.’ - -“I shall merely add two observations on what has been asserted in the -‘_Refutation_.’ - -“First with regard to the confusion and retreat of a portion of -the Portuguese troops, I certainly did not know at the moment what -Portuguese corps the fugitives were of, but after the action I -understood they were belonging to the eighth Portuguese; a very -considerable number of them were crossing the front of the British -column dispersed in sixes and sevens over the field just before -I wheeled the ninth regiment into line for the attack. I pushed -on a few yards to entreat them to keep out of our way, which -they understood and called out ‘_viva los Ingleses, valerosos -Portugueses_.’ - -“As regards any support which the Portuguese afforded the British -brigade in the pursuit, I beg to say that during the charge, while -leading the regiment in front of the centre, my horse was killed -under me, which for a moment retarded my own personal advance, and -on extricating myself from under him, I turned round and saw the -thirty-eighth regiment close up with us and the royal Scots appearing -over the ridge in support; but did not see any Portuguese join in the -pursuit, indeed it would have been imprudent in them to attempt such -a thing, for at the time a brisk cannonade was opened upon us from -the opposite side of the ravine. - -“This, my dear colonel, is, on my honour, an account of the -operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s corps at -Busaco. It will be satisfactory to you to know that the information -you received has been correct. The anonymous officer of the ninth -regiment I do not know. There were several very capable of furnishing -you with good information on the transactions of that day, not only -as regarded their own immediate corps, but those around them. Colonel -Waller I should consider excellent authority; that gallant officer -must have been an eye-witness to all that passed in the divisions -of Picton and Leith. I remember on our approach to the scene of -confusion he delivered me a message from general Picton, intended for -general Leith, at the time reconnoitring, to hasten our advance.” - - - “_Government House, Devonport, Aug. 21, 1834._ - -“——The fact really is that both the eighth and ninth Portuguese -regiments gave way that morning, and I am positive that I am not far -wrong in saying, that there were not of Portuguese troops within -my view, at the moment I wheeled the ninth regiment into line, one -hundred men prepared either for attack or defence. Sir James Douglas -partly admits that his wing was broken when he says that ‘if we were -at any time _broken_ it was from the too ardent wish of a corps of -boy recruits to close.’ Now it is perfectly clear that the wing of -the regiment under Major Birmingham fled, from what that officer said -to general Leith. Sir James Douglas states also that ‘no candid man -will deny that he supported the royals and ninth regiment, though -before that he says, that ‘by an oblique movement he joined in the -charge.’ I might safely declare on oath that the Portuguese never -shewed themselves beyond the ridge of the Sierra that morning. - - “Very faithfully yours, - “JOHN CAMERON.” - - -As these letters from general Cameron refer to some of marshal -Beresford’s errors, as well as Mr. Robinson’s, an extract from -a letter of colonel Thorne’s upon the same subject will not be -misplaced here. - - - _Colonel Thorne to colonel Napier._ - - “_Harborne Lodge, 28th Aug. 1834._ - -Extract.—“Viscount Beresford in the ‘_Refutation of your -Justification of your third volume_,’ has doubted the accuracy of the -strength of the third dragoon guards and fourth dragoons on the 20th -March 1811, as extracted by you from the journal which I lent to you. -As I felt confident I had not inserted any thing therein, which I -did not obtain from _official documents_, that were in my possession -at the time it was written, I have, since the perusal of the -‘Refutation,’ looked over some of my Peninsula papers, and I am happy -to say I have succeeded in finding amongst them, the monthly returns -of quarters of the division of cavalry commanded by brigadier-general -Long, dated Los Santos, April 20th, 1811, which was then sent to me -by the deputy assistant quarter-master general of that division, -and which I beg to enclose for your perusal, in order that you may -see the statement I have made of the strength of that force in my -journal _is to be relied upon, although his lordship insinuates to -the contrary_, and that it contains _something more than_ ‘_the -depositary of the rumours of a camp_.’” - - - _Extract from memorandum of the battle of Busaco, by colonel - Waller, assistant quarter-master-general to the second division._ - -“—The attack commenced on the right wing, consisting of Picton’s -division, by the enemy opening a fire of artillery upon the right of -the British which did but little injury, the range being too great to -prove effective. At this moment were seen the heads of the several -attacking columns, THREE, I THINK, in number, and deploying into -line with the most beautiful precision, celerity, and gallantry. - -“As they formed on the plateau they were cannonaded from our -position, and the regiment of Portuguese, either the eighth or the -_16th Infantry_, which were formed in advance in _front_ of the _74th -regiment_, threw in some volleys of musketry into the enemy’s columns -in a flank direction, but the regiment was quickly driven into the -position. - -“More _undaunted_ courage never was displayed by _French_ troops -than on _this_ occasion: it could not have been surpassed, for -their columns advanced in despite of a tremendous fire of grape and -musketry from our troops in position in the rocks, and overcoming all -opposition, although repeatedly charged by Lightburne’s brigade, or -rather by the whole of Picton’s division, they advanced, and fairly -drove the BRITISH RIGHT wing from the rocky part of the position. - -“_Being an eye-witness_ of this critical moment, and seeing that -unless the ground was quickly recovered _the right flank_ of -the army would _infallibly_ be turned, and the _great road_ to -Coimbra _unmasked_, seeing also that heavy columns of the enemy -were descending into the valley to operate by the _road_, and to -support the attack of the Sierra, and to cut off lord Wellington’s -communication with Coimbra, I instantly galloped off to the rear to -bring up general Hill’s corps to Picton’s support. Having proceeded -about _two_ miles along the upper edge and reverse side of the -Sierra, I fell in with the head of general Leith’s column moving -_left in front_, at the head of which was colonel Cameron’s brigade, -led by the ninth regiment. I immediately rode up to colonel Cameron, -and addressed him in an anxious tone as follows. - -“‘Pray, sir, who commands this brigade?’ ‘I do,’ replied the colonel, -‘I am colonel Cameron.’ - -“‘Then for God’s sake, sir, move off instantly at _double-quick_ with -your brigade to Picton’s support; not _one moment_ is to be lost, the -enemy in great force are already in possession of the _right of the -position_ on the Sierra and have driven Picton’s troops out of it. -Move on, and when the rear of your brigade has passed the Coimbra -road wheel into line, and you will embrace the point of attack.’ -Colonel Cameron did not hesitate _or balance_ an INSTANT, but giving -the word ‘double-quick’ to his brigade nobly led them to battle and -to victory. - -“The brave colonel attacked the enemy with such a gallant and -irresistible impetuosity, that after some time fighting he recovered -the ground which Picton had lost, inflicting _heavy slaughter_ on -the elite of the enemy’s troops. The ninth regiment behaved on -this occasion with conspicuous gallantry, as _indeed_ did ALL the -REGIMENTS engaged. Great numbers of the enemy had descended low -down in the rear of the position towards the Coimbra road, and were -killed; the whole position was thickly strewed with their killed and -wounded; amongst which _were many of our own troops_. The French were -the finest men I ever saw. I spoke to several of the wounded men, -light infantry and grenadiers, who were bewailing their unhappy fate -on being defeated, assuring me they were the heroes of Austerlitz who -had never before met with defeat! - - “ROBERT WALLER, _Lieut.-colonel_.” - - - _Extract of a letter from colonel Taylor, ninth regiment, to - colonel Napier._ - - “_Fernhill, near Evesham, 26th April, 1832._ - -“DEAR SIR, - -“I have just received a letter from colonel Shaw, in which he -quotes a passage from one of yours to him, expressive of your -wish, if necessary, to print a passage from a statement which -I made respecting the conduct of the ninth regiment at Busaco, -and in reference to which, I have alluded to the discomfiture of -the eighth Portuguese upon the same occasion. I do not exactly -recollect the terms I made use of to colonel Shaw (nor indeed the -shape which my communication wore) but, my object was to bring to -light the distinguished conduct of the ninth without any wish to, -unnecessarily, obscure laurels, which others wore, even at their -expense! - -“To account for the affair in question, I could not however well omit -to state, that it was in consequence of the overthrow of the eighth -Portuguese, that sir James Leith’s British brigade was called upon, -and it is remarkable, that at the time, there was a considerable -force of Portuguese (I think it was the old Lusitanian Legion which -had just been modelled into two battalions) _between_ Leith’s -British and where the eighth were being engaged, Leith pushed on his -brigade double-quick, column of sections left in front, past these -Portuguese, nor did he halt until he came in contact with the enemy -who had _crowned the heights_ and were firing from behind the rocks, -the ninth wheeled up into line, fired and charged, and all of the -eighth Portuguese that was to be seen, at least by me, a company -officer at the time, was some ten or a dozen men at _the outside_, -with their commanding officer, but he and they were amongst the very -foremost in the ranks of the ninth British. As an officer in the -ranks of course I could not see much of what was going on generally, -neither could I well have been mistaken as to what I did see, coming -almost within my very contact! Colonel Waller, now, I believe on the -Liverpool staff, was the officer who came to sir James Leith for -assistance, I presume from Picton. - - “Yours, &c. - “J. TAYLOR.” - - - _Second communication from major-general sir John - Cameron to colonel Napier._ - - _Stoke Devonport, Nov. 21st, 1835._ - -“MY DEAR COLONEL, - -“Some months ago I took the liberty of pointing out to you certain -mis-statements contained in a publication of lord Beresford -regarding the operations of the British brigade in major-general -Leith’s corps at the battle of Busaco, and as those mis-statements -are again brought before the public in Robinson’s Life of sir Thomas -Picton I am induced to trouble you with some remarks upon what is -therein advanced. A paragraph in major-general Picton’s letter to -lord Wellington, dated 10th November, 1810, which I first discovered -some years ago in the Appendix No. 12 of Jones’s War in Spain, &c. -&c. would appear to be the document upon which Mr. Robinson grounds -his contradiction of your statement of the conduct of the ninth -regiment at Busaco, but _that_ paragraph, which runs as follows, I -am bound to say is _not_ the truth. ‘Major-general Leith’s brigade -in consequence marched on, and arrived in time to _join_ the -five companies of the forty-fifth regiment under the honourable -lieutenant-colonel Meade and the eighth Portuguese regiment under -lieutenant-colonel Douglas in repulsing the enemy.’ This assertion -of major-general Picton is, I repeat, _not true_, for, in the first -place I did not see the forty-fifth regiment on that day, nor was -I at any period during the action near them or any other British -regiment to my left. In the second, as regards the eighth Portuguese -regiment, the ninth British did not most assuredly join _that_ corps -in its retrograde movement. That major-general Picton left his right -flank exposed, there can be no question, and had not assistance, and -_British_ assistance too, come up to his aid as it did I am inclined -to believe that sir Thomas would have cut a very different figure -in the despatch to what he did!! Having already given you a detail -of the defeat of the enemy’s column which was permitted to gain the -ascendency in considerable force on the right of the third division, -I beg leave to refer you to the gallant officers I mentioned in a -former letter, who were not only eye-witnesses to the charge made by -the ninth regiment but actually distinguished themselves in front of -the regiment at the side of their brave accomplished general during -that charge. I believe the whole of sir Rowland Hill’s division -from a bend in the Sierra could see the ninth in their pursuit of -the enemy, and though last not the least in importance, as a party -concerned, I may mention the present major-general sir James T. -Barns, who commanded the British brigade under major-general Leith, -(I omitted this gallant officer’s name in my former letter) as the -major-general took the entire command and from him alone I received -all orders during the action. - -“I have now done with Mr. Robinson and his work which was perhaps -hardly worth my notice. - - “I am, my dear Colonel, - “Very sincerely yours, - “J. CAMERON.” - - -Having now sufficiently exposed the weakness of Mr. Robinson’s attack -upon me, it would be well perhaps to say with sir J. Cameron “I have -done with his work,” but I am tempted to notice two points more. - -Treating of the storming of Badajos, Mr. Robinson says, - -“Near the appointed time while the men were waiting with increased -anxiety Picton with his staff came up. The troops fell in, all were -in a moment silent until the general in his calm and impressive -manner addressed a few words to each regiment. The signal was not -yet given, but the enemy by means of lighted carcasses discovered -the position of Picton’s soldiers; to delay longer would only have -been to expose his men unnecessarily; he therefore gave the word to -march.”——“Picton’s soldiers set up a loud shout and rushed forward -up the steep _to the ditch at the foot of the castle walls_.—General -Kempt who had thus far been with Picton at the head of the division -was here badly wounded and carried to the rear. Picton was therefore -left alone to conduct the assault.” - -Now strange to say Picton was not present when the signal was given, -and consequently could neither address his men in his “usual calm -impressive manner,” nor give them the word to march. There was no -ditch at the foot of the castle walls to rush up to, and, as the -following letter proves, general Kempt alone led the division to the -attack. - - - _Extract of a letter from lieutenant-general sir James - Kempt, K. C. B., master-general of the Ordnance, &c. &c._ - - _Pall Mall, 10th May, 1833._ - -“According to the first arrangement made by lord Wellington, my -brigade only of the third division was destined to attack the castle -by escalade. The two other brigades were to have attacked the bastion -adjoining the castle, and to open a communication with it. _On the -day, however, before the assault_ took place, this arrangement was -changed by lord Wellington, a French deserter from the castle (a -serjeant of sappers) gave information that no communication could be -established between the castle and the adjoining bastion, there being -(he stated) only one communication between the castle and the town, -and upon learning this, the whole of the third division were ordered -by lord Wellington to attack the castle. But as my brigade only was -originally destined for the service, and was to lead the attack, the -arrangements for the escalade were in a great measure confided to me -by general Picton. - -“The division had to _file_ across a very narrow bridge to the attack -under a fire from the castle and the troops in the covered way. It -was ordered to commence at ten o’clock, but by means of fire-balls -the formation of our troops at the head of the trench was discovered -by the French, who opened a heavy fire on them, and the attack was -commenced _from necessity_ nearly half an hour before the time -ordered. I was severely wounded in the foot on the glacis after -passing the Rivillas almost at the commencement of the attack _in the -trenches_, and met Picton coming to the front on my being carried to -the rear. If the attack had not commenced till the hour ordered, he, -I have no doubt, would have been on the spot to direct in person the -commencement of the operations. I have no _personal_ knowledge of -what took place afterwards, but I was informed that after surmounting -the most formidable difficulties, the escalade was effected by means -of _two_ ladders only in the first instance in the middle of the -night, and there can be no question that Picton was present in the -assault. In giving an account of this operation, pray bear in mind -that _he_ commanded the division, and to _him_ and the enthusiastic -valour and determination of the troops ought its success alone to be -attributed. - - “Yours, &c. - “JAMES KEMPT.” - -“_Colonel Napier, &c._” - - -The other point to which I would allude is the battle of Salamanca. -Mr. Robinson, with his baton of military criticism, belabours the -unfortunate Marmont unmercifully, and with an unhappy minuteness of -detail, first places general Foy’s troops on the _left_ of the French -army and then destroys them by the bayonets of the third division, -although the poor man and his unlucky soldiers were all the time -on the _right_ of the French army, and were never engaged with the -third division at all. This is however but a slight blemish for Mr. -Robinson’s book, and his competence to criticise Marmont’s movements -is no whit impaired thereby. I wish however to assure him that the -expression put into the mouth of the late sir Edward Pakenham is “_né -vero né ben trovato_.” Vulgar swaggering was no part of that amiable -man’s character, which was composed of as much gentleness, as much -generosity, as much frankness, and as much spirit as ever commingled -in a noble mind. Alas! that he should have fallen so soon and so -sadly!! His answer to lord Wellington, when the latter ordered him -to attack, was not, “I will, my lord, by God!” With the bearing of -a gallant gentleman who had resolved to win or perish, he replied, -“Yes, if you will give me one grasp of that conquering right hand.” -But these finer lines do not suit Mr. Robinson’s carving of a hero; -his manner is more after the coarse menacing idols of the South-Sea -Islands, than the delicate gracious forms of Greece. - -Advice to authors is generally thrown away, yet Mr. Robinson would do -well to rewrite his book with fewer inaccuracies, and fewer military -disquisitions, avoiding to swell its bulk with such long extracts -from my work, and remembering also that English commissaries are not -“_feræ naturæ_” to be hanged, or otherwise destroyed at the pleasure -of divisional generals. This will save him the trouble of attributing -to sir Thomas Picton all the standard jokes and smart sayings, for -the scaring of those gentry, which have been current ever since -the American war, and which have probably come down to us from the -Greeks. The reduction of bulk, which an attention to these matters -will produce, may be compensated by giving us more information of -Picton’s real services, towards which I contribute the following -information. Picton in his youth served as a marine, troops being -then used in that capacity, and it is believed he was in one of the -great naval victories. Mr. Robinson has not mentioned this, and it -would be well also, if he were to learn and set forth some of the -general’s generous actions towards the widows of officers who fell -under his command: they are to be discovered, and would do more -honour to his memory than a thousand blustering anecdotes. With these -changes and improvements, the life of sir Thomas Picton may perhaps, -in future, escape the equivocal compliment of the newspaper puffers, -namely, that it is “a military romance.” - -_Quarterly Review._—This is but a sorry attack to repel. “_Le jeu ne -vaut pas la chandelle_,” but “rats and mice and such small deer have -been Tom’s food for many a year.” - -The reviewer does not like my work, and he invokes the vinous -vagaries of Mr. Coleridge in aid of his own spleen. I do not like -his work, or Mr. Coleridge either, and I console myself with a maxim -of the late eccentric general Meadows, who being displeased to see -his officers wear their cocked hats awry, issued an order beginning -thus:—“All men have fancy, few have taste.” Let that pass. I am ready -to acknowledge real errors, and to give my authorities for disputed -facts. - -1º. I admit that the road which leads over the Pyrennees to Pampeluna -does not _unite_ at that town with the royal causeway; yet the error -was _ty_pographical, not _to_pographical, because the course of the -royal causeway was shewn, just before, to be through towns very -distant from Pampeluna. The true reading should be “_united with the -first by a branch road commencing at Pampeluna_.” - -2º. The reviewer says, the mountains round Madrid do not touch the -Tagus at both ends within the frontier of Spain, that river is not -the chord of their arc; neither are the heights of Palmela and -Almada near Lisbon one and the same. This is very true, although not -very important. I should have written the heights of Palmela _and_ -Almada, instead of the heights of Palmela _or_ Almada. But though the -mountains round Madrid do not to the westward, actually touch the -Tagus within the Spanish frontier, their shoots are scarcely three -miles from that river near Talavera, and my description was general, -being intended merely to shew that Madrid could not be approached -from the eastward or northward, except over one of the mountain -ranges, a fact not to be disputed. - -3º. It is hinted by the reviewer that lord Melville’s degrading -observation, namely, that “the worst men made the best soldiers,” -was picked by me out of general Foy’s historical fragment. Now, that -passage in my history was written many months before general Foy’s -work was published; and my authority was a very clear recollection -of lord Melville’s speech, as reported in the papers of the day. The -time was just before his impeachment for malversation. - -General Foy’s work seems a favourite authority with the reviewer, -and he treats general Thiebault’s work with disdain; yet both were -Frenchmen of eminence, and the ennobling patriotism of vituperation -might have been impartially exercised, the weakness of discrimination -avoided. However general Thiebault’s work, with some apparent -inaccuracies as to numbers, is written with great ability and -elegance, and is genuine, whereas general Foy’s history is not even -general Foy’s writing; colonel D’Esmenard in his recent translation -of the Prince of Peace’s memoirs has the following conclusive passage -upon that head. - -“_The illustrious general Foy undertook a history of the war in -Spain, his premature death prevented him from revising and purifying -his first sketch, he did me the honour to speak of it several times, -and even attached some value to my observations; the imperfect -manuscripts of this brilliant orator have been re-handled and re-made -by other hands. In this posthumous history, he has been gratuitously -provided with inaccurate and malignant assertions._” - -[Sidenote: See Memoirs of Manuel Godoy, translated by Colonel -D’Esmenard.] - -[Sidenote: See also London & Westminster Review No 1.] - -While upon this subject, it is right to do justice to Manuel Godoy, -Prince of the Peace. A sensual and corrupt man he was generally said -to be, and I called him so, without sufficient consideration of the -extreme exaggerations which the Spaniards always display in their -hatred. The prince has now defended himself; colonel D’Esmenard and -other persons well acquainted with the dissolute manners of the -Spanish capital, and having personal experience of Godoy’s character -and disposition, have testified that his social demeanour was decent -and reserved, and his disposition generous; wherefore I express my -regret at having ignorantly and unintentionally calumniated him. - -To return to the reviewer. He is continually observing that he does -not know my authority for such and such a fact, and therefore he -insinuates, that no such fact had place, thus making his ignorance -the measure of my accuracy. This logic seems to be akin to that of -the wild-beast showman, who declares that “the little negro boys tie -the ostrich bird’s leg to a tree, which fully accounts for the milk -in the cocoa-nuts.” I might reply generally as the late alderman -Coombe did to a certain baronet, who, in a dispute, was constantly -exclaiming, “I don’t know that, Mr. Alderman! I don’t know that!” -“Ah, sir George! all that you _don’t know_ would make a large book!” -However it will be less witty, but more conclusive to furnish at -least some of my authorities. - -1º. In opposition to the supposititious general Foy’s account of -Solano’s murder, and in support of my own history, I give the -authority of sir Hew Dalrymple, from whom the information was -obtained; a much better authority than Foy, because he was in close -correspondence with the insurgents of Seville at the time, and had an -active intelligent agent there. - -2º. Against the supposititious Foy’s authority as to the numbers of -the French army in June 1808, the authority of Napoleon’s imperial -returns is pleaded. From these returns my estimate of the French -forces in Spain during May 1808 was taken, and it is so stated in -my Appendix. The inconsistency of the reviewer himself may also be -noticed, for he marks my number as _exclusive_ of Junot’s army, and -yet _includes_ that army in what he calls Foy’s estimate! But Junot’s -army was more than 29,000 and not 24,000 as the supposititious Foy -has it, and that number taken from 116,000 which, though wrong, is -Foy’s estimate of the whole leaves less than 87,000. I said 80,000. -The difference is not great, yet my authority is the best, and the -reviewer feels that it is so, or he would also have adopted general -Foy’s numbers of the French at the combat of Roliça. In Foy’s history -they are set down as less than 2,500, in mine they are called 5,000. -He may be right, but it would not suit the reviewer to adopt a -_truth_ from a French writer. - -3º. On the negative proofs afforded 1º. by the absence of any quoted -voucher in my work, 2º. by the absence of any acknowledgement of such -a fact in general Anstruther’s manuscript journal, which journal -may or may not be garbled, the reviewer asserts that the English -ministers never contemplated the appointing of a military governor -for Cadiz. Against this, let the duke of Wellington’s authority be -pleaded, for in my note-book of conversations held with his grace -upon the subject of my history, the following passage occurs:— - -“The ministers were always wishing to occupy Cadiz, lord Wellington -thinks this a folly, Cadiz was rather a burthen to him, but either -general Spencer or general Anstruther was intended to command there, -thinks it was Anstruther, he came out with his appointment.” - -Now it is possible that as Acland’s arrival was also the subject of -conversation, his name was mentioned instead of Anstruther’s; and -it is also possible, as the note shows, that Spencer was the man, -but the main fact relative to the government could not have been -mistaken. To balance this, however, there undoubtedly is an error -as to the situation of general Anstruther’s brigade at the battle -of Vimiero. It appears by an extract from his journal, that it was -disposed, not, as the reviewer says, on the right of Fane’s brigade, -but at various places, part being on the right of Fane, part upon -his left, part held in reserve. The forty-third were on the left of -Fane, the fifty-second and ninety-seventh on his right, the ninth -in reserve, the error is therefore very trivial, being simply the -describing two regiments as of Fane’s brigade, when they were of -Anstruther’s without altering their position. What does the public -care whether it was a general called Fane, or a general called -Anstruther, who was on the right hand if the important points of the -action are correctly described? The fighting of the fifty-second and -ninety-seventh has indeed been but slightly noticed, in my history, -under the denomination of Fane’s right, whereas those regiments make -a good figure, and justly so, in Anstruther’s journal, because it -is the story of the brigade; but general history ought not to enter -into the details of regimental fighting, save where the effects are -decisive on the general result, as in the case of the fiftieth and -forty-third on this occasion. The whole loss of the ninety-seventh -and fifty-second together did not exceed sixty killed and wounded, -whereas the fiftieth alone lost ninety, and the forty-third one -hundred and eighteen. - -While on the subject of Anstruther’s brigade, it is right also to -admit another error, one of place; that is if it be true, as the -reviewer says, that Anstruther landed at Paymayo bay, and not at -Maceira bay. The distance between those places may be about five -miles, and the fact had no influence whatever on the operations; -nevertheless the error was not drawn from Mr. Southey’s history, -though I readily acknowledge I could not go to a more copious source -of error. With respect to the imputed mistake as to time, viz. the -day of Anstruther’s landing, it is set down in my first edition as -the 19th, wherefore the 18th in the third edition is simply a mistake -of the press! Alas! poor reviewer! - -But there are graver charges. I have maligned the worthy bishop of -Oporto; and ill-used the patriotic Gallician junta! Reader, the -bishop of Oporto and the patriarch of Lisbon are one and the same -person! Examine then my history and especially its appendix and judge -for yourself, whether the reviewer may not justly be addressed as -the pope was by Richard I. when he sent him the bishop of Beauvais’ -bloody suit of mail. “See now if this be thy son’s coat.” But the -junta! Why it is true that I said they glossed over the battle of Rio -Seco after the Spanish manner; that their policy was but a desire -to obtain money, and to avoid personal inconvenience; that they -gave sir Arthur Wellesley incorrect statements of the number of the -Portuguese and Spaniards at Oporto, and a more inaccurate estimate of -the French army under Junot. All this is true. It is true that I have -said it, true that they did it. The reviewer _says_ my statement is -a “gratuitous misrepresentation.” I will _prove_ that the reviewer’s -remark is a gratuitous impertinence. - -1º. The junta informed sir Arthur Wellesley, that Bessieres had -twenty thousand men in the battle, whereas he had but fifteen -thousand. - -2º. That Cuesta lost only two guns, whereas he lost eighteen. - -3º. That Bessieres lost seven thousand men and six guns, whereas he -lost only three hundred and fifty men, and no guns. - -4º. That the Spanish army had retired to Benevente as if it still -preserved its consistence, whereas Blake and Cuesta had quarrelled -and separated, all the magazines of the latter had been captured and -the whole country was at the mercy of the French. This was glossing -it over in the Spanish manner. - -Again the junta pretended that they desired the deliverance of -Portugal to enable them to unite with the southern provinces in -a general effort; but Mr. Stuart’s letters prove that they would -never unite at all with any other province, and that their aim was -to separate from Spain altogether and join Portugal. Their wish to -avoid personal inconvenience was notorious, it was the cause of -their refusal to let sir David Baird’s troops disembark, it was -apparent to all who had to deal with them, and it belongs to the -national character. Then their eagerness to obtain money, and their -unpatriotic use of it when obtained, has been so amply set forth in -various parts of my history that I need not do more than refer to -that, and to my quoted authorities, especially in the second chapters -of the 3d and 14th Books. Moreover the reviewer’s quotations belie -his comments, and like the slow-worm defined by Johnson “a blind -worm, a large viper, _venomous_, _not mortal_,” he is at once dull -and malignant. - -The junta told sir Arthur Wellesley that ten thousand Portuguese -troops were at Oporto, and that two thousand Spaniards, who had -marched the 15th, would be there on the 25th of July; yet when sir -Arthur arrived at Oporto, on the 25th, he found only fifteen hundred -Portuguese and three hundred Spaniards; the two thousand men said to -be in march had never moved and were not expected. Here then instead -of twelve thousand men, there were only eighteen hundred! At Coimbra -indeed eighty miles from Oporto, there were five thousand militia and -regulars, one-third of which were unarmed, and according to colonel -Browne’s letter, as given in the folio edition of the inquiry upon -the Cintra convention, there were also twelve hundred armed peasants -which the reviewer has magnified into twelve thousand. Thus without -dwelling on the difference of place, the difference between the true -numbers and the statements of the Gallician junta, was four thousand; -nor will it mend the matter if we admit the armed peasants to be -twelve thousand, for that would make a greater difference on the -other side. - -The junta estimated the French at fifteen thousand men, but the -embarkation returns of the number shipped after the convention gave -twenty-five thousand seven hundred and sixty, making a difference of -more than ten thousand men, exclusive of those who had fallen or been -captured in the battles of Vimiero and Roliça, and of those who had -died in hospital! Have I not a right to treat these as inaccurate -statements; and the reviewer’s remark as an impertinence? - -The reviewer speaking of the battle of Baylen scoffs at the -inconsistency of calling it an insignificant event and yet -attributing to it immense results. But my expression was, an -insignificant _action in itself_, which at once reconciles the -seeming contradiction, and this the writer who has no honest healthy -criticism, suppresses. My allusion to the disciplined battalions of -Valley Forge, as being the saviours of American independence, also -excites his morbid spleen, and assuming what is not true, namely, -that I selected that period as the time of the greatest improvement -in American discipline, he says, their soldiers there were few, as if -that bore at all upon the question. - -[Sidenote: See Stedman’s History, 4to. p. 285.] - -But my expression is _at_ Valley Forge not “_of_ Valley Forge.” -The allusion was used figuratively to shew that an armed peasantry -cannot resist regular troops, and Washington’s correspondence is -one continued enforcement of the principle, yet the expression may -be also taken literally. It was with the battalions _of_ Valley -Forge that Washington drew Howe to the Delawarre, and twice crossing -that river in winter, surprised the Germans at Trenton and beat the -British at Prince Town. It was with those battalions he made his -attacks at German’s-town; with those battalions he prevented Howe -from sending assistance to Burgoyne’s army, which was in consequence -captured. In fine, to use his own expression, “The British eagle’s -wings were spread, and with those battalions he clipped them.” The -American general, however, at one time occupied, close to Valley -Forge, a camp in the Jerseys, bearing the odd name of _Quibble_-town, -on which probably the reviewer’s eye was fixed. - -But notwithstanding Quibble-town, enthusiasm will not avail in -the long run against discipline. Is authority wanted? We have had -Napoleon’s and Washington’s, and now we have Wellington’s, for in -the fifth volume of his Despatches, p. 215, as compiled by colonel -Gurwood, will be found the following passage upon the arming of the -Spanish and Portuguese people. - -“Reflection and above all experience have shown me the exact extent -of this advantage in a military point of view, and I only beg that -those who have to contend with the French, will not be diverted from -the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular -bodies by any notion that the people when armed and arrayed, will -be of, I will not say any, but of much, use to them. The subject is -too large for discussion in a paper of this description, but I can -show hundreds of instances to prove the truth of as many reasons -why exertions of this description ought not to be relied on. At all -events no officer can calculate upon an operation to be performed -against the French by persons of this description, and I believe that -no officer will enter upon an operation against the French without -calculating his means most anxiously.” - -[Sidenote: See his evidence, Court of Inquiry on the Convention of -Cintra.] - -It is said that some officers of rank have furnished the reviewer’s -military criticisms, I can understand why, if the fact be true, -but it is difficult to believe that any officer would even for the -gratification of a contemptible jealousy, have lent himself to the -assertion that sir Arthur Wellesley could not have made a _forced -or a secret march_ from Vimiero to Mafra, because he was encumbered -with four hundred bullock-carts. Sir Arthur did certainly intend to -make that march, and he would as certainly not have attempted such a -flank movement _openly and deliberately_ while thus encumbered and -moving at the rate of two miles an hour, within a short distance of a -general having a more experienced army and an overwhelming cavalry. -The sneer is therefore directed more against sir Arthur Wellesley -than against me. - -This supposed officer of rank says that because the enemy had a -shorter road to move in retreat, his line of march could not even be -menaced, still less intercepted by his opponent moving on the longer -route! How then did Cæsar intercept Afranius and Petreius, Pompey’s -lieutenants, on the Sicoris? How Pompey himself at Dyrrachium? How -did Napoleon pass Beaulieu on the Po and gain Lodi? How did Massena -dislodge Wellington from Busaco? How did Marmont turn him on the -Guarena in 1812? How did Wellington himself turn the French on the -Douro and on the Ebro in 1813? And above all how did he propose -to turn Torres Vedras by the very march in question, seeing that -from Torres Vedras to Mafra is only twelve miles and from Vimiero -to Mafra is nineteen miles, the roads leading besides over a river -and through narrow ways and defiles? But who ever commended such -dangerous movements, if they were not masked or their success insured -by some peculiar circumstances, or by some stratagem? And what is -my speculation but a suggestion of this nature? “Under certain -circumstances,” said sir Arthur Wellesley at the enquiry, “an army -might have gained three hours’ start in such a march.” The argument -of the supposititious officer of rank is therefore a foolish sophism; -nor is that relative to sir John Moore’s moving upon Santarem, nor -the assertion that my plan was at variance with all sir Arthur -Wellesley’s objects, more respectable. - -My plan, as it is invidiously and falsely called, was simply a -reasoning upon the advantages of sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan, and -the calculation of days by the reviewer is mere mysticism. Sir -Arthur wished sir John Moore to go to Santarem, and if sir Arthur’s -recommendation had been followed, sir John Moore, who, instead -of taking five days as this writer would have him do, actually -disembarked the greatest part of his troops in the Mondego in half -a day, that is before one o’clock on the 22d, might have been at -Santarem the 27th even according to the reviewer’s scale of march, -ten miles a day! Was he to remain idle there, if the enemy did not -abandon Lisbon and the strong positions covering that city? If he -could stop Junot’s retreat either at Santarem or in the Alemtejo, a -cavalry country, he could surely as safely operate towards Saccavem, -a strong country. What was sir A. Wellesley’s observation on that -head? “If the march to Mafra had been made as I had ordered it on -the 21st of August in the morning, the position of Torres Vedras -would have been turned, and there was no position in the enemy’s -possession, excepting that in our front at Cabeça de Montechique -and those in rear of it. And I must observe to the court that if -sir John Moore’s corps had gone to Santarem as proposed as soon -as it disembarked in the Mondego, there would have been no great -safety in those positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in -our power to beat the French.” Lo! then, my plan is not at variance -with sir Arthur Wellesley’s object. But the whole of the reviewer’s -sophistry is directed, both as to this march and that to Mafra, not -against me, but through me against the duke of Wellington whom the -writer dare not attack openly; witness his cunning defence of that -“_wet-blanket_” counsel which stopped sir Arthur Wellesley’s pursuit -of Junot from the field of Vimiero. Officer of rank! Aye, it sounds -grandly! but it was a shrewd thing of Agesilaus when any one was -strongly recommended to him to ask “who will vouch for the voucher?” - -Passing now from the officer of rank, I affirm, notwithstanding Mr. -Southey’s “magnificent chapters” and sir Charles Vaughan’s “brief -and elegant work,” that the statement about Palafox and Zaragoza is -correct. My authority is well known to sir Charles Vaughan, and is -such as he is not likely to dispute; that gentleman will not, I feel -well assured, now guarantee the accuracy of the tales he was told at -Zaragoza. But my real offence is not the disparagement of Palafox, it -is the having spoiled some magnificent romances, present or to come; -for I remembered the Roman saying about the “Lying Greek fable,” and -endeavoured so to record the glorious feats of my countrymen, that -even our enemies should admit the facts. And they have hitherto done -so, with a magnanimity becoming brave men who are conscious of merit -in misfortune, thus putting to shame the grovelling spirit that would -make calumny and vituperation the test of patriotism. - - * * * * * - -Since writing the above a second article has appeared in the same -review, to which the only reply necessary, is the giving of more -proofs, that the passages of my history, contradicted by the -reviewer, are strictly accurate. And to begin, it is necessary to -inform him, that a man may be perfectly disciplined and a superb -soldier, and yet be a raw soldier as to real service; and further, -that staff officers may have been a long time in the English service, -and yet be quite inexperienced. Even a quarter-master-general of -an army has been known to commit all kinds of errors, and discover -negligence and ignorance of his duty, in his first campaigns, who -yet by dint of long practice became a very good officer in his line, -though perhaps not so great a general as he would pass himself off -for; for it was no ill saying of a Scotchman, that “some men, if -bought at the world’s price, might be profitably sold at their own.” -Now requesting the reader to observe that in the following quotations -the impugned passages of my history are first given, and are followed -by the authority, though not all the authority which might be adduced -in support of each fact, I shall proceed to expose the reviewer’s -fallacies. - -1º. History. “_Napoleon, accompanied by the dukes of Dalmatia and -Montebello, quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached -Vittoria in the evening._” - -The reviewer contradicts this on the authority of Savary’s Memoirs, -quoting twice the pages and volume, namely vol. iv. pages 12, 40, and -41. Now Savary is a writer so careless about dates, and small facts, -as to have made errors of a month as to time in affairs which he -conducted himself. Thus he says king Joseph abandoned Madrid on the -3d of July 1808, whereas it was on the 3d of August. He also says the -landing of sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal was made known to him, -before the council of war relative to the evacuation of Madrid was -held at that capital; but the council was held the 29th of July, and -sir Arthur did not land until the 1st of August! Savary is therefore -no authority on such points. But there is no such passage as the -reviewer quotes, in Savary’s work. The reader will look for it in -vain in pages 12, 40, and 41. It is neither in the fourth volume nor -in any other volume. However at page 8 of the second volume, second -part, he will find the following passage. “L’Empereur prit la route -d’Espagne avec toute son armée. Il arriva à Bayonne avec la rapidité -d’un trait, de même que de Bayonne à Vittoria. Il fit ce dernier -trajet à cheval _en deux courses_, de la première il alla à Tolosa -et de la seconde à Vittoria.” The words “deux courses” the reviewer -with his usual candour translates, “_the first day to Tolosa, the -second day to Vittoria_.” But notwithstanding this I repeat, that the -emperor made his journey in one day. My authority is the assurance -of a French officer of the general staff who was present, and if the -value of the fact were worth the pains, I could show that it was very -easy for Napoleon to do so, inasmuch as a private gentleman, the -correspondent of one of the newspapers, has recently performed the -same journey in fourteen hours. But my only object in noticing it at -all is to show the flagrant falseness of the reviewer. - -2º. History. “_Sir John Moore had to organize an army of raw -soldiers, and in a poor unsettled country just relieved from the -pressure of a harsh and griping enemy, he had to procure the -transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for -the conveyance of the officers’ baggage. Every branch of the -administration civil and military was composed of men zealous and -willing indeed, yet new to a service where no energy can prevent the -effects of inexperience being severely felt._” - -Authorities. Extracts from sir John Moore’s Journal and Letters. - -“I am equipping the troops here and moving them towards the frontier, -but I found the army without the least preparation, without any -precise information with respect to roads, and no arrangement -for feeding the troops upon their march.” “The army is without -equipments of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage -of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or any other -appendage to an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the -routes.”—“The commissariat has at its head Mr. Erskine, a gentleman -of great integrity and honour, and of considerable ability, but -neither he nor any of his officers have any experience of what an -army of this magnitude requires to put it in motion.”—“Every thing is -however going on with zeal; there is no want of that in an English -army, and though the difficulties are considerable, and we have to -move through a very impracticable country, I expect to be past the -frontier early in November.” - -Extract from a memoir by sir John Colborne, military secretary to sir -John Moore. - -“The heads of departments were all zeal, but they had but little -experience, and their means for supplying the wants of the army about -to enter on an active campaign were in many respects limited.” - -3º. History. “_One Sataro, the same person who has been already -mentioned as an agent of Junot’s in the negociations engaged -to supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract so -embarrassed the operations,” &c. &c._ - -Authority. Extract from sir John Colborne’s Memoir quoted above. - -“Sataro, a contractor at Lisbon, had agreed to supply the divisions -on the march through Portugal. He failed in his contract, and daily -complaints were transmitted to head-quarters of want of provisions -on this account. The divisions of generals Fraser and Beresford were -halted, and had it not been for the exertions of these generals and -of the Portuguese magistrates the army would have been long delayed.” - -4º. History. “_General Anstruther had unadvisedly halted the leading -columns in Almeida._” - -Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal. - -“Br.-general Anstruther, who took possession of Almeida from the -French, and who has been there ever since, and to whom I had written -to make preparations for the passage of the troops on this route -and Coimbra, has stopt them within the Portuguese frontier instead -of making them proceed as I had directed to Ciudad Rodrigo and -Salamanca.” - -5º. History. “_Sir John Moore did not hear of the total defeat and -dispersion of Belvedere’s Estremaduran army until a week after it -happened, and then only through one official channel._” That channel -was Mr. Stuart. Sir John had heard indeed that the Estremadurans had -been forced from Burgos, but nothing of their utter defeat and ruin: -the difference is cunningly overlooked by the reviewer. - -Authority. Extract of a letter from sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Nov. -16th, 1808. - -“I had last night the honour to receive your letter of the 13th, -together with letters of the 14th from Mr. Stuart and lord William -Bentinck.” “I did not know until I received Mr. Stuart’s letter that -the defeat of the Estremaduran army had been so complete.” - -Now that army was destroyed on the morning of the 10th, and here we -see that the intelligence of it did not reach sir John Moore till -the night of the 15th, which if not absolutely a whole week is near -enough to justify the expression. - -6º. History. “_Thousands of arms were stored up in the great towns._” - -Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s letter to Mr. Stuart. - -1st December, 1808. “At Zamora there are _three or four thousand_ -stand of arms, in other places _there may be more_. If they remain -collected in towns they will be taken by the enemy.” - -7º. History. “_Sir John Hope’s division was ordered to pass the Duero -at Tordesillas._” - -Authority. Extract of a letter from sir John Moore to sir David -Baird, 12th Dec. 1808. - -“Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the reserve and -general Beresford’s brigade, the rest of the troops from thence -are moving to the Duero, my quarters to-morrow will be at Alaejos, -_Hope’s at Tordesillas_.” - -Now it is true that on the 14th sir John Moore, writing from Alaejos -to sir David Baird, says that he had _then_ resolved to change his -direction, and instead of going to Valladolid should be at Toro -on the 15th with all the troops; but as Hope was to have been at -Tordesillas the same day that Moore was at Alaejos, namely on the -13th, he must have marched from thence to Toro; and where was the -danger? The cavalry of his division under general C. Stewart had -already surprized the French at Rueda, higher up the Duero, and it -was well known no infantry were nearer than the Carion. - -8º. History. “_Sir John Moore was not put in communication with any -person with whom he could communicate at all._” - -Authority. Extracts from sir John Moore’s letters and Journal, 19th -and 28th November. - -“I am not in communication with any of the Spanish generals, and -neither know their plans nor those of their government. No channel -of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of -the force or situation of the enemy, but what as a stranger I -picked up.”—“I am in communication with no one Spanish army, nor am -I acquainted with the intentions of the Spanish government or any -of its generals. Castaños with whom I was put in correspondence is -deprived of his command at the moment I might have expected to hear -from him, and La Romana, with whom I suppose I am now to correspond, -(for it has not been officially communicated to me,) is absent, God -knows where.” - -9º. History. “_Sir John’s first intention was to move upon -Valladolid, but at Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the prince -of Neufchatel was brought to head-quarters, and the contents were -important enough to change the direction of the march. Valderas was -given as the point of union with Baird._” - -Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal. - -“I marched on the 13th from Salamanca; head-quarters, Alaejos; -_there_ I saw an intercepted letter from Berthier, prince of -Neufchatel, to marshal Soult, duke of Dalmatia, which determined me -to unite the army without loss of time. I therefore moved on the 15th -to Toro instead of Valladolid. At _Valderas_ I was joined by sir -David Baird with two brigades.” - -10º. History. “_No assistance could be expected from Romana._”—“_He -did not destroy the bridge of Mansilla._”—“_Contrary to his promise -he pre-occupied Astorga, and when there proposed offensive plans of -an absurd nature_.” - -Authorities. 1º. Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Dec. 12th, 1808. - -“I have heard nothing from the marquis de la Romana in answer to -the letters I wrote to him on the 6th and 8th instants. _I am -thus disappointed of his co-operation or of knowing what plan he -proposes._” - -2º. Colonel Symes to sir David Baird, 14th Dec. - -“In the morning I waited on the marquis and pressed him as far as I -could with propriety on the subject of joining sir John Moore, to -which he evaded giving any more than general assurances.” - -3º. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal. - -“At two I received a letter from Romana, brought to me by his -aide-de-camp, stating that he had twenty-two thousand, (he only -brought up six thousand,) and would be happy to co-operate with me.” -“At Castro Nuevo sir D. Baird sent me a letter he had addressed -to him of rather a later date, stating that he was retiring into -the Gallicias. I sent his aide-de-camp back to him with a letter -requesting to know if such was his intention, but without expressing -either approbation or disapprobation. _In truth I placed no -dependance on him or his army._” - -4º. Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Astorga, 31st December. - -“I arrived here yesterday, when _contrary to his promise_ and to my -expectations I find the marquis de la Romana with a great part of his -troops.”—“He said to me in direct terms that had he known how things -were, he neither would have accepted the command nor have returned -to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements -which are _quite absurd_, and then returns to the helpless state -of his army.” “_He could not be persuaded to destroy the bridge at -Mansillas_, he posted some troops at it which were forced and taken -prisoners by the French on their march from Mayorga.” - -The reviewer must now be content to swallow his disgust at finding -Napoleon’s genius admired, Soult’s authority accepted, and Romana’s -military talents contemned in my History; these proofs of my accuracy -are more than enough, and instead of adding to them, an apology -is necessary for having taken so much notice of two articles only -remarkable for malevolent imbecility and systematic violation of -truth. But if the reader wishes to have a good standard of value, -let him throw away this silly fellow’s carpings, and look at the -duke of Wellington’s despatches as compiled by colonel Gurwood, 5th -and 6th volumes. He will there find that my opinions are generally -corroborated, never invalidated by the duke’s letters, and that while -no fact of consequence is left out by me, new light has been thrown -upon many events, the true bearings of which were unknown at the time -to the English general. Thus at page 337 of the despatches, lord -Wellington speaks in doubt about some obscure negociations of marshal -Victor, which I have shewn, book vii. chap. iii. to be a secret -intrigue for the treacherous surrender of Badajos. The proceedings -in Joseph’s council of war, related by me, and I am the first writer -who was ever informed of them, shew the real causes of the various -attacks made by the French at the battle of Talavera. I have shewn -also, and I am the first English writer who has shewn it, that the -French had in Spain one hundred thousand more men than the English -general knew of, that Soult brought down to the valley of the Tagus -after the fight of Talavera, a force which was stronger by more than -twenty thousand men than sir Arthur Wellesley estimated it to be; -and without this knowledge the imminence of the danger, which the -English army escaped by crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, cannot be -understood. - -[Sidenote: See Wellington’s Despatches, vol. v. p. 488, et passim.] - -Again, the means of correcting the error which Wellington fell into -in 1810 relative to Soult, who he supposed to have been at the head -of the second corps in Placentia when he was really at Seville, has -been furnished by me, insomuch as I have shewn that it was Mermet who -was at the head of that corps, and that Wellington was deceived by -the name of the younger Soult who commanded Mermet’s cavalry. - -Two facts only have been misstated in my history. - -1º. Treating of the conspiracy in Soult’s camp at Oporto, I said -that D’Argenton, to save his life, readily told all he knew of the -British, but _with respect to his accomplices, was immoveable_. - -2º. Treating of Cuesta’s conduct in the Talavera campaign I have -enumerated amongst his reasons for not fighting that it was Sunday. - -Now the duke of Wellington says D’Argenton did betray his -accomplices, and yet my information was drawn from authority only -second to the duke’s, viz. major-general sir James Douglas, who -conducted the interviews with D’Argenton, and was the suggester -and attendant of his journey to the British head-quarters. He was -probably deceived by that conspirator, but the following extract -from his narrative proves that the fact was not lightly stated in my -History. - -“D’Argenton was willing enough to save his life by revealing every -thing he knew about the English, and among other things assured -Soult it would be nineteen days before any serious attack could be -made upon Oporto; and there can be little doubt that Soult, giving -credit to this information, lost his formidable barrier of the -Douro by surprise. _As no threats on the part of the marshal could -induce D’Argenton to reveal the name of his accomplices_, he was -twice brought out to be shot and remanded in the expectation that -between hope and intimidation he might be led to a full confession. -On the morning of the attack he was hurried out of prison by the -gens-d’armes, and, no other conveyance for him being at hand, he was -placed upon a horse of his own, and that one the very best he had. -The gens-d’armes in their hurry did not perceive what he very soon -found out himself, that he was the best mounted man of the party, and -watching his opportunity he sprung his horse over a wall into the -fields, and made his escape to the English, who were following close.” - -For the second error so good a plea cannot be offered, and yet there -was authority for that also. The story was circulated, and generally -believed at the time, as being quite consonant with the temper of the -Spanish general; and it has since been repeated in a narrative of the -campaign of 1809, published by lord Munster. Nevertheless it appears -from colonel Gurwood’s compilation, 5th vol. page 343, that it is not -true. - - * * * * * - -Having thus disposed of the Quarterly Review I request the reader’s -attention to the following corrections of errors, as to facts, which -having lately reached me, are inserted here in preference to waiting -for a new edition of the volumes to which they refer. - -1º. _The storming of Badajos._ - -“General Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all -ruined, passed the bridge with a few hundred soldiers, and entered -San Cristoval, where they all surrendered the next morning to lord -Fitzroy Somerset.” - -_Correction by colonel Warre, assented to by lord Fitzroy Somerset._ - -“Lieut.-colonel Warre was the senior officer present at the -surrender, having joined lord Fitzroy Somerset (who was in search -of the governor and the missing part of the garrison) just as he -was collecting a few men wherewith to summon in his capacity of -aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, the tête-du-pont of San -Christoval.” - -2º. _Assault of Tarifa._ “The Spaniards and the forty-seventh British -regiment guarded the breach.” - -_Correction by sir Hugh Gough._ - -“The only part of the forty-seventh engaged during _the assault_ were -two companies under captain Livelesly, stationed on the east bastion -one hundred and fifty paces from the breach, and the Spaniards -were no where to be seen, except behind a pallisade in the street, -a considerable way from the breach. _The eighty-seventh, and the -eighty-seventh alone, defended the breach._ The two companies of -the forty-seventh, I before mentioned, and the two companies of -the rifles, which latter were stationed on my left but all under -my orders, did all that disciplined and brave troops could do in -support, and the two six-pounders, under lieut.-colonel Mitchel of -the artillery, most effectively did their duty while their fire could -tell, the immediate front of the breach from the great dip of the -ground not being under their range.” - -This correction renders it proper that I should give my authority for -saying the Spaniards were at the breach. - -Extract from a letter of sir Charles Smith, the engineer who defended -Tarifa, to colonel Napier. - -“The next great measure of opposition was to assign to the Spaniards -the defence of the breach. This would have been insupportable: the -able advocacy of lord Proby proved that it would be a positive insult -to the Spanish nation to deprive its troops of the honour, and all -my solemn remonstrances could produce, was to split the difference, -and take upon myself to determine which half of the breach should be -entrusted to our ally.” - -The discrepancy between sir Charles Smith’s and sir Hugh Gough’s -statement is however easily reconciled, being more apparent than -real. The Spaniards were _ordered_ to defend half the breach, but in -_fact_ did not appear there. - -To the above it is proper here to add a fact made known to me since -my fourth volume was published, and very honourable to major Henry -King, of the eighty-second regiment. Being commandant of the town -of Tarifa, a command distinct from the island, he was called to -a council of war on the 29th of December, and when most of those -present were for abandoning the place he gave in the following note, - -“I am decidedly of opinion that the defence of Tarifa will afford the -British garrison an opportunity of gaining eternal honour, and it -ought to be defended to the last extremity. - - “I. H. S. KING, - “_Commandant of Tarifa_.” - -3º. _Battle of Barosa._ “The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment -of Ciudad Real, and some guerilla cavalry, turned indeed without -orders coming up just as the action ceased, and it was expected that -colonel Whittingham, an Englishman, commanding a powerful body of -horse, would have done as much, but no stroke in aid of the British -was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry -did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the -eight hundred under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of -Ruffin’s division have rendered the defeat ruinous.”—History, vol. -iii. p. 448. - -Extract of a letter from sir Samford Whittingham. - -“I am free to confess that the statement of the historian of the -Peninsular War, as regards my conduct on the day of the battle of -Barosa, is just and correct; but I owe it to myself, to declare that -my conduct was the result of obedience to the repeated orders of -the general commanding in chief under whose command I acted. In the -given strength of the Spanish cavalry under my command on that day, -there is an error. The total number of the Spanish cavalry, at the -commencement of the expedition, is correctly stated; but so many -detachments had taken place by orders from head-quarters that I had -only one squadron of Spanish cavalry under my command on that day.” - - - - -COUNTER-REMARKS - -TO - -MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S - -REMARKS - -UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME OF HIS HISTORY -OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. - - - “The evil, that men do, lives after them.” - - - - -COUNTER-REMARKS, - -_&c. &c._ - - -In the fourth volume of my history of the Peninsular War I assailed -the public character of the late Mr. Perceval, his son has published -a defence of it, after having vainly endeavoured, in a private -correspondence, to convince me that my attack was unfounded. The -younger Mr. Perceval’s motive is to be respected, and had he confined -himself to argument and authority, it was my intention to have relied -on our correspondence, and left the subject matter in dispute to -the judgment of the public. But Mr. Perceval used expressions which -obliged me to seek a personal explanation, when I learned that he, -unable to see any difference between invective directed against the -public acts of a minister, and terms of insult addressed to a private -person, thinks he is entitled to use such expressions; and while he -emphatically “disavows all meaning or purpose of offence or insult,” -does yet offer most grievous insult, denying at the same time my -right of redress after the customary mode, and explicitly declining, -he says from principle, an appeal to any other weapon than the pen. - -It is not for me to impugn this principle in any case, still less in -that of a son defending the memory of his father; but it gives me -the right which I now assert, to disregard any verbal insult which -Mr. Perceval, intentionally or unintentionally, has offered to me -or may offer to me in future. When a gentleman relieves himself -from personal responsibility by the adoption of this principle, his -language can no longer convey insult to those who do not reject such -responsibility; and it would be as unmanly to use insulting terms -towards him in return as it would be to submit to them from a person -not so shielded. Henceforth therefore I hold Mr. Perceval’s language -to be innocuous, but for the support of my own accuracy, veracity, -and justice, as an historian, I offer these my “_Counter-Remarks_.” -They must of necessity lacerate Mr. Perceval’s feelings, but they -are, I believe, scrupulously cleared of any personal incivility, and -if any passage having that tendency has escaped me I thus apologize -before-hand. - -Mr. Perceval’s pamphlet is copious in declamatory expressions of his -own feelings; and it is also duly besprinkled with animadversions on -Napoleon’s vileness, the horrors of jacobinism, the wickedness of -democrats, the propriety of coercing the Irish, and such sour dogmas -of melancholy ultra-toryism. Of these I reck not. Assuredly I did -not write with any expectation of pleasing men of Mr. Perceval’s -political opinions and hence I shall let his general strictures pass, -without affixing my mark to them, and the more readily as I can -comprehend the necessity of ekeing out a scanty subject. But where -he has adduced specific argument and authority for his own peculiar -cause,—weak argument indeed, for it is his own, but strong authority, -for it is the duke of Wellington’s,—I will not decline discussion. -Let the most honoured come first. - -The Duke of Wellington, replying to a letter from Mr. Perceval, in -which the point at issue is most earnestly and movingly begged by the -latter, writes as follows:— - - _London, June 6, 1835._ - -DEAR SIR, - -I received last night your letter of the 5th. Notwithstanding my -great respect for Colonel Napier and his work, I have never read -a line of it; because I wished to avoid being led into a literary -controversy, which I should probably find more troublesome than the -operations which it is the design of the Colonel’s work to describe -and record. - -I have no knowledge therefore of what he has written of your father, -Mr. Spencer Perceval. Of this I am certain, that I never, whether -in public or in private, said one word of the ministers, or of any -minister who was employed in the conduct of the affairs of the public -during the war, excepting in praise of them;—that I have repeatedly -declared in public my obligations to them for the cordial support -and encouragement which I received from them; and I should have been -ungrateful and unjust indeed, if I had excepted Mr. Perceval, than -whom a more honest, zealous, and able minister never served the king. - -It is true that the army was in want of money, that is to say, -_specie_, during the war. Bank-notes could not be used abroad; and we -were obliged to pay for every thing in the currency of the country -which was the seat of the operations. It must not be forgotten, -however, that at that period the Bank was restricted from making its -payments in _specie_. That commodity became therefore exceedingly -scarce in England; and very frequently was not to be procured at -all. I believe, that from the commencement of the war in Spain up to -the period of the lamented death of Mr. Perceval, the difficulty in -procuring _specie_ was much greater than it was found to be from the -year 1812, to the end of the war; because at the former period all -intercourse with the Continent was suspended: in the latter, as soon -as the war in Russia commenced, the communication with the continent -was in some degree restored; and it became less difficult to procure -specie. - -But it is obvious that, from some cause or other, there was a want of -money in the army, as the pay of the troops was six months in arrear; -a circumstance which had never been heard of in a British army in -Europe: and large sums were due in different parts of the country for -supplies, means of transport, &c. &c. - -Upon other points referred to in your letter, I have really no -recollection of having made complaints. I am convinced that there was -no real ground for them; as I must repeat, that throughout the war, -I received from the king’s servants every encouragement and support -that they had in their power to give. - - Believe me, dear Sir, - Ever yours most faithfully, - WELLINGTON. - -_Dudley Montagu Perceval, Esq._ - - -This letter imports, if I rightly understand it, that any -complaints, by whomsoever preferred, against the ministers, and -especially against Mr. Perceval, during the war in the Peninsula, had -no real foundation. Nevertheless his Grace and others did make many, -and very bitter complaints, as the following extracts will prove. - - -No. 1. - -_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart, Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon._ - - “_Viseu, February 10th, 1810._ - -“I apprized Government more than two months ago of our probable want -of money, and of the necessity that we should be supplied, not only -with a large sum but with a regular sum monthly, equal in amount -to the increase of expense occasioned by the increased subsidy to -the Portuguese, and by the increase of our own army. _They have not -attended to either of these demands_, and I must write again. But I -wish you would mention the subject in your letter to lord Wellesley.” - - -No. 2. - - “_February 23d, 1810._ - -“It is obvious that the sums will fall short of those which _His -Majesty’s Government have engaged to supply_ to the Portuguese -government, but that _is the fault of His Majesty’s Government in -England, and they have been repeatedly informed that it was necessary -that they should send out money_. The funds for the expenses of the -British army are insufficient in the same proportion, and all that I -can do is to divide the deficiency in its due proportions between the -two bodies which are to be supported by the funds at our disposal.” - - -No. 3. - - “_March 1st, 1810._ - -“In respect to the 15,000 men in addition to those which Government -did propose to maintain in this country, I have only to say, that I -don’t care how many men they send here, _provided they will supply us -with proportionate means to feed and pay them_; but I suspect they -will fall short rather than exceed the thirty thousand men.” - - -No. 4. - - “_March 5th, 1810._ - -Mr. Stuart, speaking of the Portuguese emigrating, says, - -“_If the determination of ministers at home or events here bring -matters to that extremity._” - - -No. 5. - -_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart, in reference to Cadiz._ - - “_30th March, 1810._ - -“I don’t understand the arrangement which Government have made of -the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered them -as a part of the army, and from the arrangement which I made with -the Spanish government they cost us nothing but their pay, and all -the money procured by bills was applicable to the service in this -country. _The instructions to general Graham alter this entirely, -and they have even gone so far as to desire him to take measures to -supply the Spaniards with provisions from the Mediterranean, whereas -I had insisted that the Spaniards should feed our troops. The first -consequence of this arrangement will be that we shall have no more -money from Cadiz._ I had considered the troops at Cadiz so much -a part of my army that I had written to my brother to desire his -opinion whether, if the French withdrew from Cadiz, when they should -attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into Portugal, at least the -troops, which I had sent there. But I consider this now to be at an -end.” - - -No. 6. - -_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_1st April, 1810._ - -“I agree with you respecting the disposition of the people of Lisbon. -In fact all they wish for is to be saved from the French, and they -were riotous last winter _because they imagined, with some reason, -that we intended to abandon them_.”——“_The arrangement made by -Government for the command at Cadiz will totally ruin us in the way -of money._” - - -No. 7. - -_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_April 20th, 1810._ - -“_The state of opinions in England is very unfavourable to the -Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public or as -the opposition pretend to be, and they appear to be of opinion that -I am inclined to fight a desperate battle, which is to answer no -purpose. Their private letters are in some degree at variance with -their public instructions, and I have called for an explanation of -the former, which when it arrives will shew me more clearly what they -intend. The instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act -under them, although they throw upon me the whole responsibility for -bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till -it will be necessary to evacuate it. But it will not answer in these -times to receive private hints and opinions from ministers, which, if -attended to, would lead to an act directly contrary to the spirit, -and even to the letter of the public instructions; at the same time -that, if not attended to, the danger of the responsibility imposed by -the public instructions is increased tenfold._” - - -No. 8. - -_Ditto to Ditto._ - - “_May, 1810._ - -“It is impossible for Portugal to aid in feeding Cadiz. We have -neither money, nor provisions in this country, and the measures which -they are adopting to feed the people there will positively oblige us -to evacuate this country for want of money to support the army, and -to perform the king’s engagements, unless the Government in England -should enable us to remain by sending out large and regular supplies -of specie. I have written fully to Government upon this subject.” - - -No. 9. - -_General Graham to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_Isla, 22d May, 1810._ - -In reference to his command at Cadiz, says, “lord Liverpool has -decided the doubt by declaring this a part of lord Wellington’s -army, and saying it is the wish of Government that though I am second -in command to him I should be left here for the present.” “_This is -odd enough; I mean that it should not have been left to his judgement -to decide where I was to be employed; one would think he could judge -fully better according to circumstances than people in England._” - - -No. 10. - -_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_June 5, 1810._ - -“_This letter will shew you the difficulties under which we labour -for want of provisions and of money to buy them._” “_I am really -ashamed of writing to the government_ (Portuguese) upon this subject -(of the militia), feeling as I do that we owe them so much money -which we are unable to pay. According to my account the military -chest is now indebted to the chest of the aids nearly £400,000. At -the same time I have no money to pay the army, which is approaching -the end of the second month in arrears, and which ought to be paid -in advance. The bât and forage to the officers for March is still -due, and we are in debt every where.” “_The miserable and pitiful -want of money prevents me from doing many things which might and -ought to be done for the safety of the country._” “The corps ought -to be assembled and placed in their stations. But want of provisions -and money obliges me to leave them in winter-quarters till the last -moment. _Yet if any thing fails, I shall not be forgiven._” - - -No. 11. - -_Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellington._ - - “_June 9, 1810._ - -“I have received two letters from Government, the one relative to -licenses, the other containing a letter from Mr. Harrison of the -Treasury, addressed to colonel Bunbury, in which, after referring -to the different estimates both for the British and Portuguese, -and stating the sums at their disposal, _they not only conclude -that we have more than is absolutely necessary, but state specie to -be so scarce in England that we must not rely on further supplies -from home, and must content ourselves with such sums as come from -Gibraltar and Cadiz_,” &c. &c. - -“From hand to mouth we may perhaps make shift, taking care to pay the -Portuguese in kind and not in money, until the supplies, which the -Treasury say in three or four months will be ready, are forthcoming. -Government desire me to report to them any explanation which either -your lordship or myself may be able to communicate on the subject of -Mr. Harrison’s letter. As it principally relates to army finance, I -do not feel myself quite competent to risk an opinion in opposition -to what that gentleman has laid down. _I have, however, so often -and so strongly written to them the embarrassment we all labour -under, both respecting corn and money_, that there must be some -misconception, or some inaccuracy has taken place in calculations -which are so far invalidated by the fact, without obliging us to go -into the detail necessary to find out what part of the statement is -erroneous.” - - -No. 12. - -_Wellington to Stuart._ - - “_June, 1810._ - -“I received from the Secretary of State a copy of Mr. Hamilton’s -letter to colonel Bunbury, and we have completely refuted him. He -took an estimate made for September, October, and November, as the -rate of expense for eight months, without adverting to the alteration -of circumstances occasioned by change of position, increase of price, -of numbers, &c., _and then concluded upon his own statement, that we -ought to have money in hand, (having included in it by the bye some -sums which we had not received,) notwithstanding that our distress -had been complained of by every post, and I had particularly desired, -in December, that £200,000 might be sent out, and a sum monthly equal -in amount to the increased Portuguese subsidy_.” - - -No. 13. - -_Ditto to Ditto._ - - “_June, 1810._ - -“All our militia in these provinces [_Tras os Montes and Entre Minho -y Douro_] are disposable, and we might throw them upon the enemy’s -flank in advance in these quarters [_Leon_] and increase our means -of defence here and to the north of the Tagus very much indeed. _But -we cannot collect them as an army, nor move them without money and -magazines, and I am upon my last legs in regard to both._” - - -No. 14. - -_Wellington to Stuart._ - - “_November, 1810._ - -“_I have repeatedly written to government respecting the pecuniary -wants of Portugal, but hitherto without effect._” - - -No. 15. - -_Ditto to Ditto._ - - “_December 22._ - -“It is useless to expect more money from England, as the desire of -economy has overcome even the fears of the Ministers, _and they have -gone so far as to desire me to send home the transports in order to -save money_!” - - -No. 16. - -_Ditto to Ditto._ - - “_28th January, 1811._ - -“I think the Portuguese are still looking to assistance from England, -and I have written to the king’s Government strongly upon the subject -in their favour. But I _should deceive myself if I believed we shall -get any thing, and them if I were to tell them we should; they must, -therefore, look to their own resources_.” - - -No. 17. - -_Ditto to Ditto._ - -_In reference to the Portuguese intrigue against him._ - - “_18th February, 1811._ - -“I think also that they will be supported in the Brazils, and _I have -no reason to believe that I shall be supported in England_.” - - -No. 18. - -_Ditto to Ditto._ - - “_13th April, 1811._ - -“_If the Government choose to undertake large services and not -supply us with sufficient pecuniary means, and leave to me the -distribution of the means with which they do supply us, I must -exercise my own judgement upon the distribution for which I am to be -responsible._” - - -No. 19. - -_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_4th July, 1811._ - -“The pay of the British troops is now nearly two months in arrears, -instead of being paid one month in advance, according to his -majesty’s regulations. The muleteers, upon whose services the army -depends almost as much as upon those of the soldiers, are six -months in arrears; _there are now bills to a large amount drawn by -the commissioners in the country on the commissary at Lisbon still -remaining unpaid, by which delay the credit of the British army and -government is much impaired_, and you are aware of the pressing -demands of the Portuguese government for specie. There is but little -money in hand to be applied to the several services; _there is no -prospect that any will be sent from England, and the supplies derived -from the negociation of bills upon the treasury at Cadiz and Lisbon -have been gradually decreasing_.” - - -No. 20. - -_Lord Wellington to Lord Wellesley._ - - “_26th July, 1811._ - -“Although there are, I understand, provisions in Lisbon, in -sufficient quantities to last the inhabitants and army for a year, -about 12 or 14,000 Portuguese troops which I have on the right bank -of the Tagus are literally starving; even those in the cantonments -on the Tagus cannot get bread, because the government have not -money to pay for means of transport. _The soldiers in the hospitals -die because the government have not money to pay for the hospital -necessaries for them; and it is really disgusting to reflect upon the -detail of the distresses occasioned by the lamentable want of funds -to support the machine which we have put in motion._” - -“Either Great Britain is interested in maintaining the war in the -Peninsula, or she is not. If she is, there can be no doubt of the -expediency of making an effort to put in motion against the enemy -the largest force which the Peninsula can produce. The Spaniards -would not allow, I believe, of that active interference by us in -their affairs which might affect and ameliorate their circumstances, -_but that cannot be a reason for doing nothing_. Subsidies given -without stipulating for the performance of specific services would, -in my opinion, answer no purpose.” - - -No. 21. - -_Mr. Sydenham to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_27th September, 1811._ - -“I take great shame to myself for having neglected so long writing -to you, &c. but in truth I did not wish to write to you until I -could give you some notion of the result of my mission and the -measures which our government would have adopted in consequence of -the information and opinion which I brought with me from Portugal, -but _God knows how long I am to wait if I do not write to you until -I could give you the information which you must naturally be so -anxious to receive_. _From week to week I have anxiously expected -that something would be concluded, and I as regularly deferred -writing; however I am now so much in your debt that I am afraid -you will attribute my silence to inattention rather than to the -uncertainty and indecision of our further proceedings._ During the -ten days agreeable voyage in the Armide I arranged all the papers -of information which I had procured in Portugal, and I made out a -paper on which I expressed in plain and strong terms all I thought -regarding the state of affairs both in Portugal and Spain. These -papers, together with the notes which I procured from lord Wellington -and yourself, appeared to me to comprehend every thing which the -ministers could possibly require, both to form a deliberate opinion -upon every part of the subject and to shape their future measures. -The letters which I had written to lord Wellesley during my absence -from England, and which had been regularly submitted to the prince, -had prepared them for most of the opinions which I had to enforce -on my arrival. _Lord Wellesley perfectly coincided in all the -leading points_, and a short paper of proposals was prepared for -the consideration of the cabinet, supported by the most interesting -papers which I brought from Portugal.” - - -Then followed an abstract of the proposals, after which Mr. Sydenham -continues thus:— - -“I really conceived that all this would have been concluded in a -week, _but a month has elapsed, and nothing has yet been done_.” -“Campbell will be able to tell you that I have done every thing in -my power _to get people here to attend to their real interests in -Portugal_, and I have clamoured for money, money, money in every -office to which I have had access. To all my clamour and all my -arguments I have invariably received the same answer ‘that the thing -is impossible.’ The prince himself certainly appears to be _à la -hauteur des circonstances_, and has expressed his determination to -make every exertion to promote the good cause in the Peninsula. _Lord -Wellesley has a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest -extent, and is fully aware of the several measures which Great -Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of parties and -such the condition of the present government that I really despair -of witnessing any decided and adequate effort on our part to save -the Peninsula. The present feeling appears to be that we have done -mighty things, and all that is in our power; that the rest must be -left to all-bounteous Providence, and that if we do not succeed we -must console ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not -been so propitious as we deserved. This feeling you will allow is -wonderfully moral and Christian-like, but still nothing will be done -until we have a more vigorous military system, and a ministry capable -of directing the resources of the nation to something nobler than a -war of descents and embarkations._” “Nothing can be more satisfactory -than the state of affairs in the north; all that I am afraid of is -that we have not a ministry capable of taking advantage of so fine a -prospect.” - - -Mr. Sydenham’s statement of the opinions of Lord Wellesley at the -time of the negociations which ended in that lord’s retirement in -February, is as follows:— - -“1st. That Lord Wellesley was the only man in power who had a just -view of affairs in the Peninsula, or a military thought amongst them.” - -“2nd. That he did not agree with Perceval that they were to shut the -door against the Catholics, neither did he agree with Grenville that -they were to be conciliated by emancipation without securities.” - -“3rd. That with respect to the Peninsula, he rejected the notion that -we were to withdraw from the Peninsula to husband our resources at -home, _but he thought a great deal more both in men and money could -be done than the Percevals admitted, and he could no longer act under -Perceval with credit, or comfort, or use to the country_.” - - -No. 22. - -_Extract of a letter from Mr. Hamilton, Under-Secretary of State._ - - “_April 9th, 1810._ - -“I hope by next mail will be sent something more satisfactory and -useful than we have yet done by way of instructions, _but I am afraid -the late_ O. P. _riots have occupied all the thoughts of our great -men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget more -distant but not less interesting concerns_. With respect to the evils -you allude to as arising from the inefficiency of the Portuguese -government, the people here are by no means so satisfied of their -existence (to a great degree) as you who are on the spot. _Here we -judge only of the results, the details we read over, but being unable -to remedy, forget them the next day._” - - -No. 23. - -_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_6th May, 1812._ - -“In regard to money for the Portuguese government, I begged Mr. -Bisset to suggest to you, that if you were not satisfied with the -sum he was enabled to supply, you should make your complaint on -the subject to the king’s government. I am not the minister of -finance, nor is the commissary-general. _It is the duty of the -king’s ministers to provide supplies for the service, and not to -undertake a service for which they cannot provide adequate supplies -of money and every other requisite. They have thrown upon me a very -unpleasant task, in leaving to me to decide what proportion of the -money which comes into the hands of the commissary-general, shall be -applied to the service of the British army; and what shall be paid -to the king’s minister, in order to enable him to make good the -king’s engagements to the Portuguese government; and at the same time -that they have laid upon me this task, and have left me to carry on -the war as I could, they have by their orders cut off some of the -resources which I had._” - -“_The British army have not been paid for nearly three months. We owe -nearly a year’s hire to the muleteers of the army. We are in debt -for supplies in all parts of the country; and we are on the point of -failing in our payments for some supplies essentially necessary to -both armies, which cannot be procured excepting with ready money._” - - -No. 24. - -[Sidenote: Vol. iv. p. 178.] - -The following extracts are of a late date, but being retrospective, -and to the point, are proper to be inserted here. In 1813 lord -Castlereagh complained of some proceedings described in my history, -as having been adopted by lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, to feed -the army in 1810 and 1811, and his censure elicited the letters from -which these extracts are given. - - -No. 25. - -_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart._ - - “_3d May, 1813._ - -“I have read your letter, No. 2, 28th April, in which you have -enclosed some papers transmitted by lord Castlereagh, including a -letter from the Board of Trade in regard to the purchases of corn -made by your authority in concert with me, in Brazil, America, and -Egypt. When I see a letter from the Board of Trade, I am convinced -that the latter complaint originates with the jobbing British -merchants at Lisbon; and although _I am delighted to see the -Government turn their attention to the subject, as it will eventually -save me a great deal of trouble, I am quite convinced that if we -had not adopted, nearly three years ago, the system of measures now -disapproved of, not only would Lisbon and the army and this part of -the Peninsula have been starved; but if we had, according to the -suggestions of the commander-in-chief, and the Treasury, and the -Board of Trade, carried on transactions of a similar nature through -the sharks at Lisbon, above referred to, calling themselves British -merchants, the expense of the army crippled in its operations, and -depending upon those who, I verily believe, are the worst subjects -that his Majesty has; and enormous as that expense is, it would have -been very much increased._” - -“In regard to the particular subject under consideration, it is -obvious to me that the authorities in England have taken a very -confined view of the question.” - -“It appears to me to be extraordinary that when lord Castlereagh read -the statement that the commissary-general had in his stores a supply -of corn and flour to last 100,000 men for nine months, he should not -have adverted to the fact, that the greatest part of the Portuguese -subsidy, indeed all in the last year, but £600,000, was paid in kind, -and principally in corn, and that he should not have seen that a -supply for 100,000 men for nine months was not exorbitant under these -circumstances. Then the Government appears to me to have forgotten -all that passed on the particular subject of your purchases. _The -advantage derived from them in saving a starving people during the -scarcity of 1810-1811; in bringing large sums into the military chest -which otherwise would not have found their way there; and in positive -profit of money._”——“If all this be true, which I believe you have it -in your power to prove, I cannot understand why Government find fault -with these transactions, unless it is that they are betrayed into -disapprobation of them by merchants who are interested in their being -discontinued. _I admit that your time and mine would be much better -employed than in speculation of corn, &c. But when it is necessary -to carry on an extensive system of war with one-sixth of the money -in specie which would be necessary to carry it on, we must consider -questions and adopt measures of this sort, and we ought to have the -confidence and support of the Government in adopting them._ It is -only the other day that I recommended to my brother something of the -same kind to assist in paying the Spanish subsidy; and I have adopted -measures in respect to corn and other articles in Gallicia, with a -view to get a little money for the army in that quarter. _If these -measures were not adopted, not only would it be impossible to perform -the king’s engagement, but even to support our own army._” - - -_Mr. Stuart to Mr. Hamilton._ - - “_8th May._ - -“Though I thank you for the letter from the Admiralty contained -in yours of the 21st April, I propose rather to refer Government -to the communication of lord Wellington and the admiral, by whose -desire I originally adverted to the subject, than to continue my -representations of the consequences to be expected from a state of -things the navy department are not disposed to remedy. My private -letter to lord Castlereagh, enclosing lord Wellington’s observations -on the letter from the Treasury, will, I think, satisfy his lordship -that the arrangements which had been adopted for the supply of the -army and population of this country are of more importance than is -generally imagined. _I am indeed convinced that if they had been left -to private merchants, and that I had not taken the measures which are -condemned, the army must have embarked, and a famine must have taken -place._” - - -Now if these complaints thus made in the duke’s letters, written at -the time, were unfounded, his Grace’s present letter is, for so much, -a defence of Mr. Perceval; if they were not unfounded his present -letter is worth nothing, unless as a proof, that with him, the -memory of good is longer-lived than the memory of ill. But in either -supposition the complaints are of historical interest, as shewing the -difficulties, real or supposed, under which the general laboured. -They are also sound vouchers for my historical assertions, because -no man but the duke could have contradicted them; no man could have -doubted their accuracy on less authority than his own declaration; -and no man could have been so hardy as to put to him the direct -question of their correctness. - -Mr. Perceval objects to my quoting lord Wellesley’s manifesto, -because that nobleman expressed sorrow at its appearance, and denied -that he had composed it. But the very passage of lord Wellesley’s -speech on which Mr. Perceval relies, proves, that the sentiments and -opinions of the manifesto were really entertained by lord Wellesley, -who repudiates the style only, and regrets, not that the statement -appeared, but that it should have appeared at the moment when Mr. -Perceval had been killed. The expression of this very natural feeling -he, however, took care to guard from any mistake, by reasserting his -contempt for Mr. Perceval’s political character. Thus he identified -his opinions with those contained in the manifesto. And this view of -the matter is confirmed by those extracts which I have given from the -correspondence of Mr. Sydenham, no mean authority, for he was a man -of high honour and great capacity; and he was the confidential agent -employed by lord Wellesley, to ascertain and report upon the feelings -and views of lord Wellington, with respect to the war; and also upon -those obstacles to his success, which were daily arising, either from -the conduct of the ministers at home, or from the intrigues of their -diplomatists abroad. - -[Sidenote: See Extract. No. 15] - -[Sidenote: Do. No. 7.] - -[Sidenote: Do. No. 10.] - -[Sidenote: Do. No. 17.] - -Thus it appears that if lord Wellington’s complaints, as exhibited -in these extracts, were unfounded, they were at least so plausible -as to mislead Mr. Sydenham on the spot, and lord Wellesley at a -distance, and I may well be excused if they also deceived me. But -was I deceived? Am I to be condemned as an historian, because lord -Wellington, in the evening of his life, and in the ease and fulness -of his glory, generously forgets the crosses, and remembers only -the benefits of by-gone years? It may be said indeed, that his -difficulties were real, and yet the government not to blame, seeing -that it could not relieve them. To this I can oppose the ordering -away of the transports, on which, in case of failure, the safety -of the army depended! To this I can oppose the discrepancy between -the public and private instructions of the ministers! To this I can -oppose those most bitter passages, “_If any thing fails I shall not -be forgiven_,” and “_I have no reason to believe that I shall be -supported in England_.” - -I say I can oppose these passages from the duke’s letters, but I need -them not. Lord Wellesley, a man of acknowledged talent, practised -in governing, well acquainted with the resources of England, and -actually a member of the administration at the time, was placed in -a better position, to make a sound judgement than lord Wellington; -lord Wellesley, an ambitious man, delighting in power, and naturally -anxious to direct the political measures, while his brother wielded -the military strength of the state; lord Wellesley, tempted to keep -office by natural inclination, by actual possession, by every motive -that could stir ambition and soothe the whisperings of conscience, -actually quitted the cabinet - -_Because he could not prevail on Mr. Perceval to support the war as -it ought to be supported, and he could therefore no longer act under -him with credit, or comfort, or use to the country;_ - -_Because the war could be maintained on a far greater scale than Mr. -Perceval maintained it, and it was dishonest to the allies and unsafe -not to do it;_ - -_Because the cabinet, and he particularized Mr. Perceval as of a mean -capacity, had neither ability and knowledge to devise a good plan, -nor temper and discretion to adopt another’s plan._ - -Do I depend even upon this authority? No! In lord Wellington’s -letter, stress is laid upon the word _specie_, the want of which, it -is implied, was the only distress, because bank notes would not pass -on the continent; but several extracts speak of corn and hospital -stores, and the transport vessels ordered home were chiefly paid -in paper. Notes certainly would not pass on the continent, nor in -England neither, for their nominal value, and why? Because they were -not money; they were the signs of debt; the signs that the labour, -and property, and happiness, of unborn millions, were recklessly -forestalled, by bad ministers, to meet the exigency of the moment. -Now admitting, which I do not, that this exigency was real and -unavoidable; admitting, which I do not, that one generation has a -right to mortgage the labour and prosperity of another and unborn -generation, it still remains a question, whether a minister, only -empowered by a corrupt oligarchy, has such a right. And there can be -no excuse for a man who, while protesting that the country was unable -to support the war, as it ought to be supported, continued that war, -and thus proceeded to sink the nation in hopeless debt, and risk the -loss of her armies, and her honour, at the same time; there is no -excuse for that man who, while denying the ability of the country, to -support her troops abroad, did yet uphold all manner of corruption -and extravagance at home. - -There was no specie, because the fictitious ruinous incontrovertible -paper money system had driven it away, and who more forward than Mr. -Perceval to maintain and extend that system—the bane of the happiness -and morals of the country; a system which then gave power and riches -to evil men, but has since plunged thousands upon thousands into -ruin and misery; a system which, swinging like a pendulum between -high taxes and low prices, at every oscillation strikes down the -laborious part of the community, spreading desolation far and wide -and threatening to break up the very foundations of society. And why -did Mr. Perceval thus nourish the accursed thing? Was it that one bad -king might be placed on the throne of France; another on the throne -of Spain; a third on the throne of Naples? That Italy might be the -prey of the barbarian, or, last, not least, that the hateful power of -the English oligarchy, which he called social order and legitimate -rights, might be confirmed? But lo! his narrow capacity! what has -been the result? In the former countries insurrection, civil war, and -hostile invasion, followed by the free use of the axe and the cord, -the torture and the secret dungeon; and in England it would have -been the same, if her people, more powerful and enlightened in their -generation, had not torn the baleful oppression down, to be in due -time trampled to dust as it deserves. - -_Mr. Perceval was pre-eminently an “honest, zealous, and able servant -of the king!”_ - -[Sidenote: See Extract, No. 23.] - -To be the servant of the monarch is not then to be the servant of the -people. For if the country could not afford to support the war, as it -ought to be supported, without detriment to greater interests, the -war should have been given up; or the minister, who felt oppressed -by the difficulty, should have resigned his place to those who -thought differently. “_It is the duty of the king’s ministers to -provide supplies for the service, and not to undertake a service for -which they cannot provide adequate supplies of money and every other -requisite!_” These are the words of Wellington, and wise words they -are. Did Mr. Perceval act on this maxim? No! he suffered the war to -starve on “_one-sixth of the money necessary to keep it up_,” and -would neither withdraw from the contest, nor resign the conduct of -it to lord Wellesley, who, with a full knowledge of the subject, -declared himself able and willing to support it efficiently. Nay, -Mr. Perceval, while professing his inability to furnish Wellington -efficiently for one war in the Peninsula, was by his orders in -council, those complicated specimens of political insolence, folly, -and fraud, provoking a new and unjust war with America, which was -sure to render the supply of that in the Peninsula more difficult -than ever. - -[Sidenote: See Extract No. 20] - -But how could the real resources of the country for supplying the -war be known, until all possible economy was used in the expenditure -upon objects of less importance? Was there any economy used by Mr. -Perceval? Was not that the blooming period of places, pensions, -sinecures, and jobbing contracts? Did not the government and all -belonging thereto, then shout and revel in their extravagance? Did -not corruption the most extensive and the most sordid overspread the -land? Was not that the palmy state of the system which the indignant -nation has since risen in its moral strength to reform? Why did not -Mr. Perceval reduce the home and the colonial expenses, admit the -necessity of honest retrenchment, and then manfully call upon the -people of England to bear the real burthen of the war, because it was -necessary, and because their money was fairly expended to sustain -their honour and their true interests? This would have been the -conduct of an able, zealous, and faithful servant of the country; -and am I to be silenced by a phrase, when I charge with a narrow, -factious, and contemptible policy and a desire to keep himself in -power, the man, who supported and extended this system of corruption -at home, clinging to it as a child clings to its nurse, while the -armies of his country were languishing abroad for that assistance -which his pitiful genius could not perceive the means of providing, -and which, if he had been capable of seeing it, his more pitiful -system of administration would not have suffered him to furnish. -Profuseness and corruption marked Mr. Perceval’s government at home, -but the army withered for want abroad; the loan-contractors got fat -in London, but the soldiers in hospital died because there was no -money to provide for their necessities. The funds of the country -could not supply both, and so he directed his economy against the -troops, and reserved his extravagance to nourish the foul abuses at -home, and this is to be a pre-eminently “_honest, zealous, and able -servant of the king_!” - -[Sidenote: See further on, Second Extracts, No. 4.] - -[Sidenote: Ditto, No. 6] - -[Sidenote: See further on, Second Extracts, No. 7.] - -This was the man who projected to establish fortresses to awe London -and other great towns. This was the man who could not support the -war in Spain, but who did support the tithe war in Ireland, and -who persecuted the press of England with a ferocity that at last -defeated its own object. This was the man who called down vindictive -punishment on the head of the poor tinman, Hamlyn of Plymouth, -because, in his ignorant simplicity, he openly offered money to a -minister for a place; and this also was the man who sheltered himself -from investigation, under the vote of an unreformed House of Commons, -when Mr. Maddocks solemnly offered to prove at the bar, that he, -Mr. Perceval, had been privy to, and connived at a transaction, more -corrupt and far more mischievous and illegal in its aim than that -of the poor tinman. This is the Mr. Perceval who, after asserting, -with a view to obtain heavier punishment on Hamlyn, the distinguished -purity of the public men of his day, called for that heavy punishment -on Hamlyn for the sake of public justice, and yet took shelter -himself from that public justice under a vote of an unreformed house, -and suffered Mr. Ponsonby to defend that vote by the plea that such -foul transactions were as “_glaring as the sun at noon-day_.” And -this man is not to be called factious! - -Mr. Perceval the younger in his first letter to me says, “_the good -name of my father is the only inheritance he left to his children_.” -A melancholy inheritance indeed if it be so, and that he refers to -his public reputation. But I find that during his life the minister -Perceval had salaries to the amount of about eight thousand a-year, -and the reversion of a place worth twelve thousand a-year, then -enjoyed by his brother, lord Arden. And also I find that after his -death, his family received a grant of fifty thousand pounds, and -three thousand a-year from the public money. Nay, Mr. Perceval the -son, forgetting his former observation, partly founds his father’s -claim to reputation upon this large amount of money so given to his -family. Money and praise he says were profusely bestowed, money to -the family, praise to the father, wherefore Mr. Perceval must have -been an admirable minister! Admirable proof! - -[Sidenote: Ditto, No. 5] - -But was he praised and regretted by an admiring grateful people? -No! the people rejoiced at his death. Bonfires and illuminations -signalized their joy in the country, and in London many would have -rescued his murderer; a multitude even blessed him on the scaffold. -No! He was not praised by the English people, for they had felt -his heavy griping hand; nor by the people of Ireland, for they had -groaned under his harsh, his unmitigated bigotry. Who then praised -him? Why his coadjutors in evil, his colleagues in misrule; the -majority of a corrupt House of Commons, the nominees of the borough -faction in England, of the Orange faction in Ireland; those factions -by which he ruled and had his political being, by whose support, and -for whose corrupt interests he run his public “career of unmixed -evil,” unmixed, unless the extreme narrowness of his capacity, which -led him to push his horrid system forward too fast for its stability, -may be called a good. - -[Sidenote: See further on, Second Extracts, No. 7.] - -By the nominees of such factions, by men placed in the situation, but -without the conscience of Mr. Quentin Dick, Mr. Perceval was praised, -and the grant of money to his family was carried; but there were many -to oppose the grant even in that house of corruption. The grant was a -ministerial measure, and carried, as such, by the same means, and by -the same men, which, and who, had so long baffled the desire of the -nation for catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform. And yet -the people! emphatically, the people! have since wrung those measures -from the factions; aye! and the same people loathe the very memory of -the minister who would have denied both for ever, if it had been in -his power. - -“_Mr. Perceval’s bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but his -religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the -introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence._” - -This passage is, by the younger Mr. Perceval, pronounced to be -utterly untrue, because bark is only _one medicine_, and not -_medicines_; because there was no raging deadly general pestilence in -France at the time; and because the measure was only retaliation for -Napoleon’s Milan and Berlin decrees, a sort of war which even Quakers -might wink at. What the extent of a Quaker’s conscience on such -occasions may be I know not, since I have heard of one, who, while -professing his hatred of blood-shedding, told the mate of his ship -that if he did not port his helm, he would not run down his enemy’s -boat. But this I do know, that Napoleon’s decrees were retaliation -for our paper blockades; that both sides gave licenses for a traffic -in objects which were convenient to them, while they denied to -unoffending neutrals their natural rights of commerce; that to war -against hospitals is inhuman, unchristianlike, and uncivilized, and -that the avowal of the principle is more abhorrent than even the -act. The avowed principle in this case was to distress the enemy. It -was known that the French were in great want of bark, therefore it -was resolved they should not have it, unless Napoleon gave up his -great scheme of policy called the continental system. Now men do -not want Jesuit’s bark unless to cure disease, and to prevent them -from getting it, was literally to war against hospitals. It was no -metaphor of Mr. Whitbread’s, it was a plain truth. - -Oh! exclaims Mr. Perceval, there was no deadly raging general -pestilence! What then? Is not the principle the same? Must millions -suffer, must the earth be cumbered with carcasses, before the -christian statesman will deviate from his barbarous policy? Is a -momentary expediency to set aside the principle in such a case? Oh! -no! by no means! exclaims the pious minister Perceval. My policy is -just, and humane; fixed on immutable truths emanating directly from -true religion, and quite consonant to the christian dispensation; -the sick people shall have bark, I am far from wishing to prevent -them from getting bark. God forbid! I am not so inhuman. Yes, they -shall have bark, but their ruler must first submit to me. “Port -thy helm,” quoth the Quaker, “or thee wilt miss her, friend!” War -against hospitals! Oh! No! “I do not war against the hospital, I see -the black flag waving over it and I respect it; to be sure: I throw -my shells on to it continually, but that is not to hurt the sick, -it is only to make the governor capitulate.” And this is the pious -sophistry by which the christian Mr. Perceval is to be defended! - -But Mr. Cobbett was in favour of this measure! Listen to him! By all -means! Let us hear Mr. Cobbett; let us hear his “vigorous sentences,” -his opinions, his proofs, his arguments, the overflowings of his -“true English spirit and feeling” upon the subject of Mr. Perceval’s -administration. Yes! yes! I will listen to Mr. Cobbett, and what is -more, I will yield implicit belief to Mr. Cobbett, where I cannot, -with any feeling of truth, refute his arguments and assertions. - -Mr. Cobbett defended the Jesuit’s bark bill upon the avowed ground -that it was to assert our sovereignty of the seas, not our actual -power on that element, but our right to rule there as we listed. -That is to say, that the other people of the world were not to dare -traffic, not to dare move upon that high road of nations, not to -presume to push their commercial intercourse with each other, nay, -not even to communicate save under the controul and with the license -of England. Now, if we are endowed by Heaven with such a right, in -the name of all that is patriotic and English, let it be maintained. -Yet it seems a strange plea in justification of the christian Mr. -Perceval—it seems strange that he should be applauded for prohibiting -the use of bark to the sick people of Portugal and Spain, and France, -Holland, Flanders, Italy, and the Ionian islands, for to all these -countries the prohibition extended, on the ground of our right to -domineer on the wide sea; and that he should also be applauded for -declaiming against the cruelty, the ambition, the domineering spirit -of Napoleon. I suppose we were appointed by heaven to rule on the -ocean according to our caprice, and Napoleon had only the devil to -sanction his power over the continent. We were christians, “truly -British christians,” as the Tory phrase goes; and he was an infidel, -a Corsican infidel. Nevertheless we joined together, each under -our different dispensations, yes, we joined together, we agreed to -trample upon the rest of the world; and that trade, which we would -not allow to neutrals, we, by mutual licenses, carried on ourselves, -until it was discovered that the sick wanted bark, sorely wanted it; -then we, the truly British christians, prohibited that article. We -deprived the sick people of the succour of bark; and without any -imputation on our christianity, no doubt because the tenets of our -faith permit us to be merciless to our enemies, provided a quaker -winks at the act! Truly the logic, the justice, and the christianity -of this position, seem to be on a par. - -All sufferings lead to sickness, but we must make our enemies -suffer, if we wish to get the better of them, let them give up the -contest and their sufferings will cease: wherefore there is nothing -in this stopping of medicine. This is Mr. Cobbett’s argument, and -Mr. Cobbett’s words are adopted by Mr. Perceval’s son. To inflict -suffering on the enemy was then the object of the measure, and of -course the wider the suffering spread the more desirable the measure. -Now suffering of mind as well as of body must be here meant, because -the dead and dying are not those who can of themselves oblige the -government of a great nation to give up a war; it must be the dread -of such sufferings increasing, that disposes the great body of the -people to stop the career of their rulers. Let us then torture our -prisoners; let us destroy towns with all their inhabitants; burn -ships at sea with all their crews; carry off children and women, and -torment them until their friends offer peace to save them. Why do we -not? Is it because we dread retaliation? or because it is abhorrent -to the usages of christian nations? The former undoubtedly, if -the younger Mr. Perceval’s argument adopted from Cobbett is just; -the latter if there is such a thing as christian principle. That -principle once sacrificed to expediency, there is nothing to limit -the extent of cruelty in war. - -So much for Mr. Cobbett upon the Jesuit’s bark bill, but one swallow -does not make a summer; his “true English spirit and feeling” breaks -out on other occasions regarding Mr. Perceval’s policy, and there, -being quite unable to find any weakness in him, I am content to take -him as a guide. Something more, however, there is, to advance on the -subject of the Jesuit’s bark bill, ere I yield to the temptation of -enlivening my pages with Cobbett’s “vigorous sentences.” - -[Sidenote: Hansard’s Debates.] - -Mr. Wilberforce, no small name amongst religious men and no very -rigorous opponent of ministers, described this measure in the house, -as a bill “_which might add to the ferocity and unfeeling character -of the contest, but could not possibly put an end to the contest_.” - -Mr. Grattan said, “_we might refuse our Jesuit’s bark to the French -soldiers; we might inflict pains and penalties, by the acrimony of -our statutes, upon those who were saved from the severity of war; but -the calculation was contemptible_.” - -Mr. Whitbread characterized the bill as “_a most abominable measure -calculated to hold the country up to universal execration_. _It -united in itself detestable cruelty with absurd policy._” - -Lord Holland combatted the principle of the bill, which he said -“_would distress the women and children of Spain and Portugal more -than the enemy_.” - -Lord Grenville “_cautioned the house to look well at the -consideration they were to receive as the price of the honour, -justice, and humanity of the country_.” - -Then alluding to the speech of Lord Mulgrave (who, repudiating -the flimsy veil of the bill being merely a commercial regulation, -boldly avowed that it was an exercise of our right to resort to -whatever mode of warfare was adopted against us) Lord Grenville, I -say, observed, that such a doctrine did not a little surprise him. -“_If_,” said he, “_we are at war with the Red Indians, are we to -scalp our enemies because the Indians scalp our men? When Lyons -was attacked by Robespierre he directed his cannon more especially -against the hospital of that city than against any other part, the -destruction of it gave delight to his sanguinary inhuman disposition. -In adopting the present measure we endeavour to assimilate ourselves -to that monster of inhumanity, for what else is the bill but a cannon -directed against the hospitals on the continent._” - -[Sidenote: Hansard’s Debates.] - -But all this, says Mr. Perceval the younger, is but “declamatory -invective, the answered and refuted fallacies of a minister’s -opponents in debate.” And yet Mr. Perceval, who thus assumes that -all the opposition speeches were fallacies, does very complacently -quote lord Bathurst’s speech in defence of the measure, and thus, -in a most compendious manner, decides the question. Bellarmin says -yes! exclaimed an obscure Scotch preacher to his congregation, -Bellarmin says yes! but I say no! and Bellarmin being thus confuted, -we’ll proceed. Even so Mr. Perceval. But I am not to be confuted so -concisely as Bellarmin. Lord Erskine, after hearing lord Bathurst’s -explanation, maintained that “_the bill was contrary to the dictates -of religion and the principles of humanity_,” and this, he said, -he felt so strongly, that he was “resolved _to embody his opinion -in the shape of a protest that it might go down in a record to -posterity_.” It is also a fact not to be disregarded in this -case, that the bishops, who were constant in voting for all other -ministerial measures, wisely and religiously abstained from attending -the discussions of this bill. Lord Erskine was as good as his word, -eleven other lords joined him, and their protests contained the -following deliberate and solemn testimony against the bill. - -“Because _the Jesuit’s bark, the exportation of which is prohibited -by this bill_, has been found, by long experience, to be a specific -for many dangerous diseases which war has a tendency to spread and -exasperate; _and because to employ as an engine of war the privation -of the only remedy for some of the greatest sufferings which war is -capable of inflicting, is manifestly repugnant to the principles of -the Christian religion, contrary to humanity, and not to be justified -by any practice of civilised nations_. - -“Because _the means to which recourse has been hitherto had in war, -have no analogy to the barbarous enactments of this bill, inasmuch -as it is not even contended that the privations to be created by it, -have any tendency whatever to self-defence, or to compel the enemy -to a restoration of peace, the only legitimate object by which the -infliction of the calamities of war can in any manner be justified_.” - -Such was the religious, moral, and political character, given to -this bill of Mr. Perceval’s, by our own statesmen. Let us now hear -the yet more solemnly recorded opinion of the statesmen of another -nation upon Mr. Perceval’s orders in council, of which this formed a -part. In the American president’s message to Congress, the following -passages occur. - -“The government of Great Britain had already introduced into her -commerce during war, a system _which at once violating the rights of -other nations, and resting on a mass of perjury and forgery, unknown -to other times, was making an unfortunate progress, in undermining -those principles of morality and religion, which are the best -foundations of national happiness_.” - -One more testimony. Napoleon, whose authority, whatever Mr. Perceval -and men of his stamp may think, will always have a wonderful -influence; Napoleon, at St. Helena, declared, “that posterity would -more bitterly reproach Mr. Pitt for the hideous school he left behind -him, than for any of his own acts; _a school marked by its insolent -machiavelism, its profound immorality, its cold egotism, its contempt -for the well-being of men and the justice of things_.” Mr. Perceval -was an eminent champion of this hideous school, which we thus find -the leading men of England, France, and America, uniting to condemn. -And shall a musty Latin proverb protect such a politician from the -avenging page of history? The human mind is not to be so fettered. -Already the work of retribution is in progress. - -Mr. Perceval the younger, with something of fatuity, hath called up -Mr. Cobbett to testify to his father’s political merit. Commending -that rugged monitor of evil statesmen for his “_vigorous sentences_,” -for his “_real English spirit and feeling_,” he cannot now demur to -his authority; let him then read and reflect deeply on the following -passages from that eminent writer’s works, and he may perhaps -discover, that to defend his father’s political reputation with -success will prove a difficult and complicate task. If the passages -are painful to Mr. Perceval, if the lesson is severe, I am not to -blame. It is not I but himself who has called up the mighty seer, and -if the stern grim spirit, thus invoked, will not cease to speak until -all be told, it is not my fault. - - * * * * * - -[Sidenote: History of George IV.] - -EXTRACTS FROM MR. COBBETT’S WRITINGS. - -_Extract 1.—Of Mr. Perceval’s harshness._ - -“But there now came a man amongst them who soon surpassed all the -rest in power, as well as in impudence and insolence towards the -people. This was that Spencer Perceval of whose signal death we shall -have to speak by and bye. This man, a sharp lawyer, inured, from his -first days at the bar, to the carrying on of state prosecutions; a -sort of understrapper, in London, to the attorneys-general in London, -and frequently their deputy in the counties; a short, spare, pale -faced, hard, keen, sour-looking man, with a voice well suited to the -rest, with words in abundance at his command, with the industry of a -laborious attorney, with no knowledge of the great interest of the -nation, foreign or domestic, but with a thorough knowledge of those -means by which power is obtained and preserved in England, and with -no troublesome scruples as to the employment of those means. He had -been Solicitor General under Pitt up to 1801, and Attorney General -under Addington and Pitt up to February, 1806. This man became the -_adviser of the Princess_, during the period of the investigation -and correspondence of which we have just seen the history; and, as -we are now about to see, the power he obtained, by the means of that -office, _made him the Prime Minister of England to the day of his -death_, though no more fit for that office than any other barrister -in London, taken by tossing up or by ballot.” - - -_Extract 2.—Of Perceval’s illiberal, factious, and crooked policy._ - -“We have seen that the King was told that the _publication_” (the -publication of the Princess of Wales’s justification) “would take -place on _the Monday_. That Monday was _the 9th of March_. In this -difficulty what was to be done? The whig ministry, with their eyes -fixed on the _probable speedy succession of the Prince_, or at -least, _his accession to power_, the King having recently been in a -very shakey state; the whig ministry, with their eyes fixed on this -expected event, and not perceiving, as Perceval did, the power that -the _unpublished book_ (for ‘The Book’ it is now called) _would give -them with the Prince_ as well as with the King, the whig ministry -would not consent to the terms of the Princess, thinking, too, that -in spite of her anger and her threats, she would not throw away the -scabbard as towards the King. - -“In the meanwhile, however, Perceval, wholly unknown to the Whigs, -had got the book actually _printed_, and bound up _ready for -publication_, and it is clear that it was intended to be published -on the Monday named in the Princess’s letter; namely, on the _9th of -March_, unless prevented by the King’s _yielding to the wishes of -Perceval_. He did yield, that is to say, he resolved _to change his -ministers_! A _ground_ for doing this was however a difficulty to be -got over. To allege and promulgate the _true_ ground would never do; -for then the public would have cried aloud for the publication, which -contained matter so deeply scandalous to the King and all the Royal -family. Therefore _another ground_ was alleged; and herein we are -going to behold another and another important consequence, and other -national calamities proceeding from this dispute between the Prince -and his wife. This other ground that was chosen was the Catholic -Bill. The Whigs stood pledged to grant a bill for the further relief -of the Catholics. They had in September, 1806, _dissolved the -parliament_, though it was only _four years_ old, for the purpose of -securing a majority in the House of Commons; and into this new house, -which had met on the 19th of December, 1806, they had introduced the -Catholic Bill, by the hands of Mr. Grey (now become Lord Howick,) -with the _great and general approbation of the House_, and with a -clear understanding, that, notwithstanding all the cant and hypocrisy -that the foes of the Catholics had, at different times, played off -about the _conscientious scruples_ of the King, the King had now -explicitly and cheerfully _given his consent_ to the bringing in of -this bill. - -“The new ministry had nominally at its head _the late Duke of -Portland_; but Perceval, who was _Chancellor of the Exchequer_, was, -in fact, the master of the whole affair, co-operating, however, -cordially with Eldon, who now again became Chancellor. The moment -the dismission of the Whigs was resolved on, the other party set up -the cry of “No Popery.” The walls and houses, not only of London, -but of the country towns and villages, were covered with these -words, sometimes in chalk and sometimes in print; the clergy and -corporations were all in motion, even the cottages on the skirts of -the commons, and the forests heard fervent _blessings_ poured out -on the head of the _good old King_ for preserving the nation from a -rekindling of the “_fires in Smithfield_!” Never was delusion equal -to this! Never a people so deceived; never public credulity so great; -never hypocrisy so profound and so detestably malignant as that of -the deceivers! The mind shrinks back at the thought of an eternity -of suffering, even as the lot of the deliberate murderer; but if the -thought were to be endured, it would be as applicable to that awful -sentence awarded to hypocrisy like this.” - - -_Extract 3._ - -“The great and interesting question was, not whether the act (Regency -Act) were agreeable to the laws and constitution of the country -or not; not whether it was right or wrong thus to defer the full -exercise of the Royal authority for a year; _but whether limited -as the powers were, the Prince upon being invested with them, -would take his old friends and companions, the Whigs, to be his -ministers_.”—“Men in general unacquainted with the hidden motives -that were at work no more expected that Perceval and Eldon would -continue for one moment to be ministers under the Regent than they -expected the end of the world.” - -“But a very solid reason for not turning out PERCEVAL was found in -the power which he had with regard to the PRINCESS and the BOOK. He -had, as has been before observed, the power of bringing her forward, -and making her the triumphant rival of her husband. This power he had -completely in his hands, backed as he was by the indignant feelings -of an enterprizing, brave, and injured woman. But, it was necessary -for him to do something to keep this great and terrific power in his -own hands. If he lost the princess he lost his only prop; and, even -without losing her, if he lost the book, or rather, if the secrets -of the book escaped and became public, he then lost his power. It -was therefore of the greatest importance to him that nobody should -possess a copy of this book but _himself_! - -“The reader will now please to turn back to paragraph 73, which he -will find in chap. 11. He will there find that Perceval ousted the -Whigs by the means of the book, and not by the means of the catholic -question, as the hoodwinked nation were taught to believe. The book -had been purchased by Perceval himself; it had been printed, in a -considerable edition, by Mr. Edwards, printer, in the Strand; the -whole edition had been put into the hands of a bookseller; the day -of publication was named, that being the 9th of March, 1807; but on -the 7th of March, or thereabouts, the king determined upon turning -out the Whigs and taking in Perceval. Instantly PERCEVAL suppressed -THE BOOK; took the edition out of the hands of the booksellers, -thinking that he had every copy in his own possession. The story has -been in print about his having burned the books in the court yard -of his country house; but be this as it may, he certainly appears -to have thought that no one but himself had a copy of THE BOOK. -In this however he was deceived; for several copies of this book, -as many as four or five, at least, were in the hands of private -individuals.”—“To get at these copies advertisements appeared in -all the public papers, as soon as the Prince had determined to -keep Perceval as his minister. These advertisements plainly enough -described the contents of the book, and contained offers of high -prices for the book to such persons as might have a copy to dispose -of. In this manner the copies were bought up: one was sold for £300, -one or two for £500 each, one for £1000, and the last for £1500.” - - -_Extract 4.—Of Mr. Perceval’s harshness and illiberality._ - -—— ——“Thus Perceval really ruled the country in precisely what manner -he pleased. Whole troops of victims to the libel law were crammed -into jails, the corrupt part of the press was more audacious than -ever, and the other part of it (never very considerable) was reduced -nearly to silence. But human enjoyments of every description are of -uncertain duration: political power, when founded on force, is of a -nature still more mutable than human enjoyments in general; of which -observations this haughty and insolent Perceval was destined, in the -spring of 1812, to afford to the world a striking, a memorable, and -a most awful example. He had got possession of the highest office -in the state; by _his secret_, relative to the Princess and her -BOOK, had secured his influence with the Prince Regent for their -joint lives; he had bent the proud necks of the landlords to fine, -imprisonment, and transportation, if they attempted to make inroads -on his system to support the all-corrupting paper-money; the press -he had extinguished or had rendered the tool of his absolute will; -the most eminent amongst the writers who opposed him, Cobbett (the -author of this history,) Leigh and John Hunt, Finnerty, Drakard, -Lovel, together with many more, were closely shut up in jail, for -long terms, with heavy fines on their heads, and long bail at the -termination of their imprisonment. Not content with all this, he -meditated the complete subjugation of London to the control and -command of a military force. Not only did he meditate this, but had -the audacity to propose it to the parliament; and if his life had not -been taken in the evening of the 11th of May, 1812, he, that very -evening, was going to propose, in due form, a resolution for the -establishment of a permanent army to be stationed in Marybonne-park, -for the openly avowed purpose of _keeping the metropolis in awe_.” - - -_Extract 5.—Of Mr. Perceval’s unpopularity._ - -“Upon the news of the death of Perceval arriving at Nottingham, at -Leicester, at Truro, and indeed all over the country, demonstrations -of joy were shown by the ringing of bells, the making of bonfires, -and the like; and at Nottingham particularly, soldiers were called -out to disperse the people upon the occasion.”——“At the place of -execution, the prisoner (Bellingham) thanked God for having enabled -him to meet his fate with so much fortitude and resignation. At the -moment when the hangman was making the usual preparations; at the -moment that he was going out of the world, at the moment when he -was expecting every breath to be his last, his ears were saluted -with—_God bless you, God bless you, God Almighty bless you, God -Almighty bless you_! issuing from the lips of many thousands of -persons.”——“With regard to the fact of the offender going out of -the world amidst the blessings of the people, I, the author of this -history, can vouch for its truth, having been an eye and ear witness -of the awful and most memorable scene, standing, as I did, at the -window of that prison out of which he went to be executed, and into -which I had been put in consequence of a prosecution ordered by this -very Perceval, and the result of which prosecution was a sentence -to be imprisoned _two years_ amongst felons in Newgate, to pay _a -thousand pounds_ to the Prince Regent at the end of the two years, -and to be held in bonds for _seven years_ afterwards; all which was -executed upon me to the very letter, except that I rescued myself -from the society of the felons by a cost of twenty guineas a week, -for the _hundred and four weeks_; and all this I had to suffer for -having published a paragraph, in which I expressed my indignation -at the flogging of English local militiamen, at the town of Ely, -in England, _under a guard of Hanoverian bayonets_. From this -cause, I was placed in a situation to witness the execution of this -unfortunate man. The crowd was assembled in the open space just under -the window at which I stood. I saw the anxious looks, I saw the half -horrified countenances; I saw the mournful tears run down; and I -heard the unanimous blessings.” - -“The nation was grown heartily tired of the war; it despaired -of seeing an end to it without utter ruin to the country; the -expenditure was arrived at an amount that frightened even -loan-mongers and stock-jobbers; and the shock given to people’s -confidence by Perceval’s recent acts, which had proclaimed to the -whole world the fact of the depreciation of the paper-money; these -things made even the pretended exclusively loyal secretly rejoice at -his death, which they could not help hoping would lead to some very -material change in the managing of the affairs of the country.” - - -_Extract 6.—Of Mr. Hamlyn, the Tinman._ - -[Sidenote: Cobbett’s Register.] - -“I shall now address you, though it need not be much at length, upon -the subject of lord Castlereagh’s conduct. The business was brought -forward by lord Archibald Hamilton, who concluded his speech with -moving the following resolutions: ‘1º. That it appears to the House, -from the evidence on the table, that lord viscount Castlereagh, -in the year 1805, shortly after he had quitted the situation of -President of the Board of Control, and being a Privy Councillor and -Secretary of State, did place at the disposal of lord Clancarty, a -member of the same board, the nomination to a writership, in order -to facilitate his procuring a seat in Parliament. 2º. That it was -owing to a disagreement among the subordinate parties, that this -transaction did not take effect; and 3º., that by this conduct lord -Castlereagh had been guilty of a gross violation of his duty as a -servant of the Crown; an abuse of his patronage as President of the -Board of Control; and an attack upon the purity of that House.’” - -“Well, but what did the House agree to? Why, to this: ‘Resolved, -that it is the duty of this House to maintain a _jealous guard_ over -the _purity of election_; but considering that the attempt of lord -viscount Castlereagh to interfere in the election of a member _had -not been successful_, this House does not consider it necessary to -enter into any criminal proceedings against him.’” - -“Now, then, let us see what was done in the case of Philip Hamlyn, -the tinman of Plymouth, who offered a bribe to Mr. Addington, when -the latter was minister. The case was this: in the year 1802, Philip -Hamlyn, a tinman of Plymouth, wrote a letter to Mr. Henry Addington, -the first Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, -offering him the sum of £2000 to give him, Hamlyn, the place of Land -Surveyor of Customs at Plymouth. In consequence of this, a criminal -information was filed against the said Hamlyn, by _Mr. Spencer -Perceval_, who was then the King’s Attorney General, and who, in -pleading against the offender, asserted _the distinguished purity of -persons in power in the present day_. The tinman was found guilty; he -was sentenced to pay a fine of £100 to the King, and to be imprisoned -for three months. His business was ruined, and he himself died, in a -few months after his release from prison.” - -“Hamlyn confessed his guilt; he stated, in his affidavit, that he -sincerely repented of his crime; that he was forty years of age; that -his business was the sole means of supporting himself and family; -that a severe judgment might be the total ruin of himself and that -family; and that, therefore, he threw himself upon, and implored, -the mercy of his prosecutors and the Court. In reference to this, -Mr. Perceval, _the present Chancellor of the Exchequer_, observe, -said: ‘The circumstances which the defendant discloses, respecting -his own situation in life and of his family are all of them topics, -very well adapted to affect the private feelings of individuals, and -as far as that consideration goes, nothing further need be said; -but, there would have been no prosecution at all, in this case, upon -the ground of personal feeling; it was set on foot upon grounds of a -public nature, and the spirit in which the prosecution originated, -still remains; it is, therefore, submitted to your lordships, not on -a point of individual feeling, but of PUBLIC JUSTICE, in which case -your lordships will consider how far the affidavits ought to operate -in mitigation of punishment.’—“For lord Archibald Hamilton’s motion, -the speakers were, lord A. Hamilton, Mr. C. W. Wynn, lord Milton, -Mr. W. Smith, Mr. Grattan, Mr. Ponsonby, sir Francis Burdett, Mr. -Whitbread, and Mr. Tierney. _Against it_, lord Castlereagh himself, -lord Binning, Mr. Croker, Mr. PERCEVAL, (who prosecuted Hamlyn,) -Mr. Banks, Mr. G. Johnstone, Mr. H. Lascelles, Mr. Windham, and Mr. -Canning.” - - -_Extract 7.—Of Mr. Quentin Dick._ - -(On the 11th of May, 1809, Mr. Maddocks made a charge against Mr. -Perceval and lord Castlereagh, relative to the selling of a seat in -Parliament to Mr. Quentin Dick, and to the influence exercised with -Mr. Dick, as to his voting upon the recent important question.) Mr. -Maddocks in the course of his speech said:—“I affirm, then, that Mr. -Dick _purchased a seat in the House of Commons_ for the borough of -Cashel, through the agency of the Hon. Henry Wellesley, who acted -for, and on behalf of, the Treasury; that upon a _recent question_ of -the last importance, when Mr. Dick had determined to vote according -to his conscience, the noble lord, Castlereagh, did intimate to that -gentleman the necessity of either his _voting with the government, -or resigning his seat in that house_: and that Mr. Dick, sooner than -vote against principle, did make choice of the latter alternative, -and vacate his seat accordingly. To this transaction I charge the -right honourable gentleman, _Mr. Perceval, as being privy and having -connived at it_. This I will ENGAGE TO PROVE BY WITNESSES AT YOUR -BAR, if the House will give me leave to call them.” Mr. Perceval -argued against receiving the charge at all, putting it to the House, -“_whether_ AT SUCH A TIME _it would be wise to warrant such species -of charges as merely introductory to the agitation of the great -question of reform, he left it to the House to determine_: but as -far as he might be allowed to judge, he rather thought that it would -be more consistent with what was due from him to the House and to -the public, _if he_ FOR THE PRESENT _declined putting in the plea_ -(he could so conscientiously put in) _until that House had come to a -determination on the propriety of entertaining that charge or not_.” - -The House voted _not_ to entertain the charge, and Mr. Ponsonby and -others declared, in the course of the debate, that such transactions -ought not to be inquired into, because they “were notorious,” and had -become “as glaring as the noon-day sun.” - - -Now let the younger Mr. Perceval grapple with this historian and -public writer, whose opinions he has invoked, whose “_true English -spirit and feeling_” he has eulogised. Let him grapple with these -extracts from his works, which, however, are but a tithe of the -charges Mr. Cobbett has brought against his father. For my part, I -have given my proofs, and reasons, and authorities, and am entitled -to assert, that my public character of Mr. Perceval, the minister, -is, historically, “_fair, just, and true_.” - - - - -HISTORY - -OF THE - -WAR IN THE PENINSULA. - - - - -HISTORY - -OF THE - -PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -BOOK XVII. - - -CHAPTER I. - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -Great and surprising as the winter campaign had been, its importance -was not understood, and therefore not duly appreciated by the English -ministers. But the French generals saw with anxiety that lord -Wellington, having snapped the heavy links of the chain which bound -him to Lisbon, had acquired new bases of operation on the Guadiana, -the Agueda, and the Douro, that he could now choose his own field of -battle, and Spain would feel the tread of his conquering soldiers. -Those soldiers with the confidence inspired by repeated successes, -only demanded to be led forward, but their general had still to -encounter political obstacles, raised by the governments he served. - -In Spain, the leading men, neglecting the war at hand, were entirely -occupied with intrigues, with the pernicious project of reducing -their revolted colonies, or with their new constitution. In -Portugal, and in the Brazils, a jealous opposition to the general on -the part of the native authorities had kept pace with the military -successes. In England the cabinet, swayed by Mr. Perceval’s narrow -policy, was still vacillating between its desire to conquer and -its fear of the expense. There also the Whigs greedy of office and -dexterous in parliamentary politics, deafened the country with their -clamours, while the people, deceived by both parties as to the nature -of the war, and wondering how the French should keep the field at -all, were, in common with the ministers, still doubtful, if their -commander was truly a great man or an impostor. - -The struggle in the British cabinet having ended with the resignation -of lord Wellesley, the consequent predominance of the Perceval -faction, left small hopes of a successful termination to the contest -in the Peninsula. Wellington had, however, carefully abstained from -political intrigues, and his brother’s retirement, although a subject -of regret, did not affect his own personal position; he was the -General of England, untrammelled, undegraded by factious ties, and -responsible to his country only for his actions. The ministers might, -he said, relinquish or continue the war, they might supply his wants, -or defraud the hopes of the nation by their timorous economy, his -efforts must be proportioned to his means; if the latter were great, -so would be his actions, under any circumstances he would do his -best, yet he was well assured the people of England would not endure -to forego triumph at the call of a niggard parsimony. It was in this -temper that he had undertaken the siege of Badajos, in this temper -he had stormed it, and meanwhile political affairs in England were -brought to a crisis. - -Lord Wellesley had made no secret of Mr. Perceval’s mismanagement of -the war, and the public mind being unsettled, the Whigs were invited -by the Prince Regent, his year of restrictions having now expired, to -join a new administration. But the heads of that faction would not -share with Mr. Perceval, and he, master of the secrets relating to -the detestable persecution of the Princess of Wales, was too powerful -to be removed. However, on the 11th of May, Perceval was killed in -the house of Commons, and this act, which was a horrible crime, -but politically no misfortune either to England or the Peninsula, -produced other negociations, upon a more enlarged scheme with regard -both to parties and to the system of government. Personal feelings -again prevailed. Lord Liverpool would not unite with lord Wellesley, -the Grey and Grenville faction would not serve their country without -having the disposal of all the household offices, and lord Moira, -judging a discourtesy to the Prince Regent too high a price to pay -for their adhesion, refused that condition. The materials of a new -cabinet were therefore drawn from the dregs of the Tory faction, and -lord Liverpool became prime minister. - -It was unfortunate that a man of lord Wellesley’s vigorous talent -should have been rejected for lord Liverpool, but this remnant of -a party being too weak to domineer, proved less mischievous with -respect to the Peninsula than any of the preceding governments. -There was no direct personal interest opposed to lord Wellington’s -wishes, and the military policy of the cabinet yielding by degrees -to the attraction of his ascending genius, was finally absorbed -in its meridian splendour. Many practical improvements had also -been growing up in the official departments, especially in that of -war and colonies, where colonel Bunbury, the under-secretary, a -man experienced in the wants of an army on service, had reformed -the incredible disorders which pervaded that department during the -first years of the contest. The result of the political crisis was -therefore comparatively favourable to the war in the Peninsula, the -story of which shall now be resumed. - -It has been shewn how the danger of Gallicia, and the negligence of -the Portuguese and Spanish authorities with reference to Almeida and -Ciudad Rodrigo, stopped the invasion of Andalusia, and brought the -allies back to Beira. But if Wellington, pursuing his first plan, had -overthrown Soult on the banks of the Guadalquivir and destroyed the -French arsenal at Seville, his campaign would have ranked amongst -the most hardy and glorious that ever graced a general; and it is -no slight proof of the uncertainty of war, that combinations, so -extensive and judicious, should have been marred by the negligence -of a few secondary authorities, at points distant from the immediate -scenes of action. The English general had indeed under-estimated the -force opposed to him, both in the north and south; but the bravery -of the allied troops, aided by the moral power of their recent -successes, would have borne that error, and in all other particulars -his profound military judgment was manifest. - -Yet to obtain a true notion of his views, the various operations -which he had foreseen and provided against must be considered, -inasmuch as they shew the actual resources of the allies, the -difficulty of bringing them to bear with due concert, and the -propriety of looking to the general state of the war, previous to -each of Wellington’s great movements. For his calculations were -constantly dependent upon the ill-judged operations of men, over -whom he had little influence, and his successes, sudden, accidental, -snatched from the midst of conflicting political circumstances, were -as gems brought up from the turbulence of a whirlpool. - -Castaños was captain-general of Gallicia, as well as of Estremadura, -and when Ciudad Rodrigo fell, lord Wellington, expecting from his -friendly feeling some efficient aid, had counselled him upon all the -probable movements of the enemy during the siege of Badajos. - -First. He supposed Marmont might march into Estremadura, either with -or without the divisions of Souham and Bonnet. In either case, he -advised that Abadia should enter Leon, and, according to his means, -attack Astorga, Benavente, Zamora, and the other posts fortified -by the enemy in that kingdom; and that Carlos d’España, Sanchez, -Saornil, in fine all the partidas in Castile and the Asturias, and -even Mendizabel, who was then in the Montaña St. Ander, should come -to Abadia’s assistance. He promised also that the regular Portuguese -cavalry, under Silveira and Bacellar, should pass the Spanish -frontier. Thus a force of not less than twenty-five thousand men -would have been put in motion on the rear of Marmont, and a most -powerful diversion effected in aid of the siege of Badajos and the -invasion of Andalusia. - -The next operation considered, was that of an invasion of Gallicia, -by five divisions of the army of Portugal, the three other divisions, -and the cavalry, then in the valley of the Tagus and about Bejar, -being left to contend, in concert with Soult, for Badajos. To help -Abadia to meet such an attack, Bacellar and Silveira had orders to -harass the left flank and rear of the French, with both infantry and -cavalry, as much as the nature of the case would admit, regard being -had to the safety of their raw militia, and to their connection with -the right flank of the Gallician army, whose retreat was to be by -Orense. - -Thirdly. The French might invade Portugal north of the Douro. Abadia -was then to harass their right flank and rear, while the Portuguese -opposed them in front; and whether they fell on Gallicia or Portugal, -or Estremadura, Carlos d’España, and the Partidas, and Mendizabel, -would have an open field in Leon and Castile. - -Lastly, the operation which really happened was considered, and -to meet it lord Wellington’s arrangements were, as we have seen, -calculated to cover the magazines on the Douro, and the Mondego, and -to force the enemy to take the barren difficult line of country, -through Lower Beira, towards Castelo Branco, while Abadia and the -Guerilla chiefs entered Castile and Leon on his rear. Carlos d’España -had also been ordered to break down the bridges on the Yeltes, and -the Huebra, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, and that of Barba de Puerco -on the Agueda to the left of that fortress. Marmont would thus have -been delayed two days, and the magazines both at Castelo Branco and -Celorico saved by the near approach of the allied army. - -España did none of these things, neither did Abadia nor Mendizabel -operate in a manner to be felt by the enemy, and their remissness, -added to the other faults noticed in former observations, entirely -marred Wellington’s defensive plan in the north, and brought -him back to fight Marmont. And when that general had passed the -Agueda in retreat, the allied army wanting the provisions which -had been so foolishly sacrificed at Castelo Branco, was unable to -follow; the distant magazines on the Douro and the Mondego were -its only resource; then also it was found that Ciudad and Almeida -were in want, and before those places could be furnished, and the -intermediate magazines on the lines of communication restored, it was -too late to march against Andalusia. For the harvest which ripens -the beginning of June in that province and a fortnight later in -Estremadura, would have enabled the army of Portugal to follow the -allies march by march. - -Now Marmont, as Napoleon repeatedly told him, had only to watch lord -Wellington’s movements, and a temporary absence from Castile would -have cost him nothing of any consequence, because the army of the -north would have protected the great communication with France. The -advantages of greater means, and better arrangements for supply, -on which Wellington had calculated, would thus have been lost, and -moreover, the discontented state of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, -and the approach of a new battering train from France, rendered it -dangerous to move far from that fortress. The invasion of Andalusia, -judicious in April, would in the latter end of May have been a -false movement; and the more so that Castaños having, like his -predecessors, failed to bring forward the Gallician army, it was -again made painfully evident, that in critical circumstances no aid -could be obtained from that quarter. - -Such being the impediments to an invasion of Andalusia, it behoved -the English general to adopt some other scheme of offence more -suitable to the altered state of affairs. He considered that as the -harvest in Leon and Castile, that is to say, in the districts north -of the Gredos and Gata mountains, was much later than in Estremadura -and Andalusia, he should be enabled to preserve his commissariat -advantages over the French in the field for a longer period in the -north than in the south. And if he could strike a decisive blow -against Marmont, he would relieve Andalusia as securely as by a -direct attack, because Madrid would then fall, and Soult, being thus -cut off from his communications with France, would fear to be hemmed -in on all sides. Wherefore to make the duke of Ragusa fight a great -battle, to calculate the chances, and prepare the means of success, -became the immediate objects of lord Wellington’s thoughts. - -The French general might be forced to fight by a vigorous advance -into Castile, but a happy result depended upon the relative skill -of the generals, the number and goodness of the troops. Marmont’s -reputation was great, yet hitherto the essays had been in favour -of the Englishman’s talents. The British infantry was excellent, -the cavalry well horsed, and more numerous than it had ever been. -The French cavalry had been greatly reduced by drafts made for the -Russian contest, by the separation of the army of the north from -that of Portugal, and by frequent and harassing marches. Marmont -could indeed be reinforced with horsemen from the army of the centre, -and from the army of the north, but his own cavalry was weak, and -his artillery badly horsed, whereas the allies’ guns were well and -powerfully equipped. Every man in the British army expected victory, -and this was the time to seek it, because, without pitched battles -the French could never be dispossessed of Spain, and they were now -comparatively weaker than they had yet been, or were expected to -be; for such was the influence of Napoleon’s stupendous genius, -that his complete success in Russia, and return to the Peninsula -with overwhelming forces, was not doubted even by the British -commander. The time, therefore, being propitious, and the chances -favourable, it remained only to combine the primary and secondary -operations in such a manner, that the French army of Portugal, -should find itself isolated for so long as would enable the allies -to force it singly into a general action. If the combinations failed -to obtain that great result, the march of the French succouring -corps, would nevertheless relieve various parts of Spain, giving -fresh opportunities to the Spaniards to raise new obstacles, and it -is never to be lost sight of, that this principle was always the -base of Wellington’s plans. Ever, while he could secure his final -retreat into the strong holds of Portugal without a defeat, offensive -operations, beyond the frontiers, could not fail to hurt the French. - -To effect the isolating of Marmont’s army, the first condition was -to be as early in the field as the rainy season would permit, and -before the coming harvest enabled the other French armies to move -in large bodies. But Marmont could avail himself, successively, -of the lines of the Tormes and the Douro to protract the campaign -until the ripening of the harvest enabled reinforcements to join -him, and hence the security of the allies’ flanks and rear during -the operations, and of their retreat, if overpowered, was to be -previously looked to. Soult, burning to revenge the loss of Badajos, -might attack Hill with superior numbers, or detach a force across -the Tagus, which, in conjunction with the army of the centre, now -directed by Jourdan, could advance upon Portugal by the valley of the -Tagus, and so turn the right flank of the allied army in Castile. -Boats and magazines supplied from Toledo and Madrid, were already -being collected at the fort of Lugar Nueva, near Almaraz, and from -hence, as from a place of arms, the French could move upon Coria, -Placencia, and Castelo Branco, menacing Abrantes, Celorico, Ciudad -Rodrigo, and Almeida, while detachments from the army of the north -reinforced the army of Portugal. But to obviate this last danger -Wellington had planned one of those enterprizes, which as they are -successful, principally because of their exceeding boldness, are -beheld with astonishment when achieved, and are attributed to madness -when they fail. - - -SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ. - -For a clear understanding of this event, the reader must call to -mind, 1º. that the left bank of the Tagus, from Toledo to Almaraz, is -lined with rugged mountains, the ways through which, impracticable -for an army, are difficult even for small divisions; 2º. that from -Almaraz to the frontier of Portugal, the banks, although more open, -were still difficult, and the Tagus was only to be crossed at -certain points, to which bad roads leading through the mountains -descended. But from Almaraz to Alcantara, all the bridges had been -long ruined, and those of Arzobispo and Talavera, situated between -Almaraz and Toledo, were of little value, because of the ruggedness -of the mountains above spoken of. Soult’s pontoon equipage had been -captured in Badajos, and the only means of crossing the Tagus, -possessed by the French, from Toledo to the frontier of Portugal, was -a boat-bridge laid down at Almaraz by Marmont, and to secure which he -had constructed three strong forts and a bridge-head. - -The first of these forts, called Ragusa, was a magazine, containing -many stores and provisions, and it was, although not finished, -exceedingly strong, having a loopholed stone tower, twenty-five feet -high within, and being flanked without by a field-work near the -bridge. - -[Sidenote: Jones’s Sieges.] - -On the left bank of the Tagus the bridge had a fortified head of -masonry, which was again flanked by a redoubt, called Fort Napoleon, -placed on a height a little in advance. This redoubt, though -imperfectly constructed, inasmuch as a wide berm, in the middle of -the scarp, offered a landing place to troops escalading the rampart, -was yet strong because it contained a second interior defence or -retrenchment, with a loopholed stone tower, a ditch, draw-bridge, and -palisades. - -These two forts, and the bridge-head, were armed with eighteen guns, -and they were garrisoned by above a thousand men, which seemed -sufficient to insure the command of the river; but the mountains on -the left bank still precluded the passage of an army towards Lower -Estremadura, save by the royal road to Truxillo, which road, at -the distance of five miles from the river, passed over the rugged -Mirabete ridge, and to secure the summit of the mountain the -French had drawn another line of works, across the throat of the -pass. This line consisted of a large fortified house, connected by -smaller posts, with the ancient watch-tower of Mirabete, which itself -contained eight guns, and was surrounded by a rampart twelve feet -high. - -If all these works and a road, which Marmont, following the traces of -an ancient Roman way, was now opening across the Gredos mountains had -been finished, the communication of the French, although circuitous, -would have been very good and secure. Indeed Wellington fearing the -accomplishment, intended to have surprised the French at Almaraz -previous to the siege of Badajos, when the redoubts were far from -complete, but the Portuguese government neglected to furnish the -means of transporting the artillery from Lisbon, and he was baffled. -General Hill was now ordered to attempt it with a force of six -thousand men, including four hundred cavalry, two field brigades of -artillery, a pontoon equipage, and a battering train of six iron -twenty-four pound howitzers. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 1.] - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The enterprize at all times difficult was become one of extreme -delicacy. When the army was round Badajos, only the resistance of -the forts themselves was to be looked for; now Foy’s division of the -army of Portugal had returned to the valley of the Tagus, and was -in no manner fettered, and d’Armagnac, with troops from the army -of the centre, occupied Talavera. Drouet also was, with eight or -nine thousand men of the army of the south, at Hinojosa de Cordoba, -his cavalry was on the road to Medellin, he was nearer to Merida -than Hill was to Almaraz, he might intercept the latter’s retreat, -and the king’s orders were imperative that he should hang upon the -English army in Estremadura. Soult could also detach a corps from -Seville by St. Ollala to fall upon sir William Erskine, who was -posted with the cavalry and the remainder of Hill’s infantry, near -Almendralejo. However lord Wellington placed general Graham near -Portalegre, with the first and sixth divisions, and Cotton’s cavalry, -all of which had crossed the Tagus for the occasion, and thus -including Erskine’s corps, above twenty thousand men were ready to -protect Hill’s enterprize. - -Drouet by a rapid march might still interpose between Hill and -Erskine, and beat them in detail before Graham could support them, -wherefore the English general made many other arrangements to deceive -the enemy. First, he chose the moment of action when Soult having -sent detachments in various directions, to restore his communications -in Andalusia, had marched himself with a division to Cadiz, and was -consequently unfavourably placed for a sudden movement. Secondly, by -rumours adroitly spread, and by demonstrations with the Portuguese -militia of the Alemtejo, he caused the French to believe that ten -thousand men were moving down the Guadiana, towards the Niebla, -preparatory to the invasion of Andalusia, a notion upheld by the -assembling of so many troops under Graham, by the pushing of cavalry -parties towards the Morena, and by restoring the bridge at Merida, -with the avowed intention of sending Hill’s battering and pontoon -train, which had been formed at Elvas, to Almendralejo. Finally, -many exploring officers, taking the roads leading to the province -of Cordoba, made ostentatious inquiries about the French posts at -Belalcazar and other places, and thus every thing seemed to point at -Andalusia. - -The restoration of the bridge at Merida proving unexpectedly -difficult, cost a fortnight’s labour, for two arches having been -destroyed the opening was above sixty feet wide, and large timber was -scarce. Hill’s march was thus dangerously delayed, but on the 12th of -May, the repairs being effected and all else being ready, he quitted -Almendralejo, passed the Guadiana, at Merida, with near six thousand -men and twelve field-pieces, and joined his pontoons and battering -train. These last had come by the way of Montijo, and formed a -considerable convoy, nearly fifty country carts, besides the guns and -limber carriages, being employed to convey the pontoons, the ladders, -and the ammunition for the howitzers. - -[Sidenote: Foy’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -The 13th the armament reached the Burdalo river on the road to -Truxillo; the 14th it was at Villa Mesias; the 15th at Truxillo. -Meanwhile, to mislead the enemy on the right bank of the Tagus the -guerillas of the Guadalupe mountains made demonstrations at different -points between Almaraz and Arzobispo, as if they were seeking a place -to cast a bridge that Hill might join lord Wellington. General Foy -was deceived by these operations, and though his spies at Truxillo -had early informed him of the passage of the Guadiana by the allies, -they led him to believe that Hill had fifteen thousand men, and that -two brigades of cavalry were following in his rear; one report even -stated that thirty thousand men had entered Truxillo, whereas there -were less than six thousand of all arms. - -Hill having reached Jaraicejo early on the 16th, formed his troops -in three columns, and made a night march, intending to attack by -surprise and at the same moment, the tower of Mirabete, the fortified -house in the pass, and the forts at the bridge of Almaraz. The left -column, directed against the tower, was commanded by general Chowne. -The centre column, with the dragoons and the artillery, moved by the -royal road, under the command of general Long. The right column, -composed of the 50th, 71st, and 92d regiments, under the direction of -Hill in person, was intended to penetrate by the narrow and difficult -way of La Cueva, and Roman Gordo against the forts at the bridge. But -the day broke before any of the columns reached their destination, -and all hopes of a surprise were extinguished. This untoward -beginning was unavoidable on the part of the right and centre column, -because of the bad roads; but it would appear that some negligence -had retarded general Chowne’s column, and that the castle of Mirabete -might have been carried by assault before day-light. - -The difficulty, great before, was now much increased. An attentive -examination of the French defences convinced Hill that to reduce the -works in the pass, he must incur more loss than was justifiable, and -finish in such plight that he could not afterwards carry the forts at -the bridge, which were the chief objects of his expedition. Yet it -was only through the pass of Mirabete that the artillery could move -against the bridge. In this dilemma, after losing the 17th and part -of the 18th in fruitless attempts to discover some opening through -which to reach the valley of Almaraz with his guns, he resolved to -leave them on the Sierra with the centre column, and to make a -false attack upon the tower with general Chowne’s troops while he -himself, with the right column, secretly penetrated by the scarcely -practicable line of La Cueva and Roman Gordo to the bridge, intent, -with infantry alone, to storm works which were defended by eighteen -pieces of artillery and powerful garrisons! - -This resolution was even more hardy, and bold, than it appears -without a reference to the general state of affairs. Hill’s march -had been one of secrecy, amidst various divisions of the enemy; he -was four days’ journey distant from Merida, which was his first -point of retreat; he expected that Drouet would be reinforced, and -advance towards Medellin, and hence, whether defeated or victorious -at Almaraz, that his own retreat would be very dangerous; exceedingly -so if defeated, because his fine British troops could not be -repulsed with a small loss, and he should have to fall back through -a difficult country, with his best soldiers dispirited by failure, -and burthened with numbers of wounded men. Then harassed on one side -by Drouet, pursued by Foy and D’Armagnac on the other, he would have -been exposed to the greatest misfortunes, every slanderous tongue -would have been let loose on the rashness of attacking impregnable -forts, and a military career, hitherto so glorious, might have -terminated in shame. But general Hill being totally devoid of -interested ambition, was necessarily unshaken by such fears. - -The troops remained concealed in their position until the evening -of the 18th, and then the general, reinforcing his own column with -the 6th Portuguese regiment, a company of the 60th rifles, and the -artillery-men of the centre column, commenced the descent of the -valley. His design was to storm Fort Napoleon before day-light, and -the march was less than six miles, but his utmost efforts could -only bring the head of the troops to the fort, a little before -day-light, the rear was still distant, and it was doubtful if the -scaling-ladders, which had been cut in halves to thread the short -narrow turns in the precipitous descent, would serve for an assault. -Fortunately some small hills concealed the head of the column from -the enemy, and at that moment general Chowne commenced the false -attack on the castle of Mirabete. Pillars of white smoke rose on the -lofty brow of the Sierra, the heavy sound of artillery came rolling -over the valley, and the garrison of Fort Napoleon, crowding on the -ramparts, were anxiously gazing at these portentous signs of war, -when, quick and loud, a British shout broke on their ears, and the -gallant 50th regiment, aided by a wing of the 71st, came bounding -over the nearest hills. - -The French were surprised to see an enemy so close while the -Mirabete was still defended, yet they were not unprepared, for -a patrole of English cavalry had been seen from the fort on the -17th in the pass of Roman Gordo; and in the evening of the 18th a -woman of that village had carried very exact information of Hill’s -numbers and intentions to Lugar Nueva. This intelligence had caused -the commandant Aubert to march in the night with reinforcements -to Fort Napoleon, which was therefore defended by six companies, -including the 39th French and the voltigeurs of a foreign regiment. -These troops were ready to fight, and when the first shout was -heard, turning their heads, they, with a heavy fire of musketry and -artillery, smote the assailants in front, while the guns of Fort -Ragusa took them in flank from the opposite side of the river; in -a few moments, however, a rise of ground, at the distance of only -twenty yards from the ramparts, covered the British from the front -fire, and general Howard, in person, leading the foremost troops into -the ditch, commenced the escalade. The great breadth of the berm -kept off the ends of the shortened ladders from the parapet, but -the soldiers who first ascended, jumped on to the berm itself, and -drawing up the ladders planted them there, and thus, with a second -escalade, forced their way over the rampart; then, closely fighting, -friends and enemies went together into the retrenchment round the -stone tower. Colonel Aubert was wounded and taken, the tower was not -defended, and the garrison fled towards the bridge-head, but the -victorious troops would not be shaken off, and entered that work also -in one confused mass with the fugitives, who continued their flight -over the bridge itself. Still the British soldiers pushed their -headlong charge, slaying the hindmost, and they would have passed the -river if some of the boats had not been destroyed by stray shots from -the forts, which were now sharply cannonading each other, for the -artillery-men had turned the guns of Napoleon on Fort Ragusa. - -Many of the French leaped into the water and were drowned, but the -greatest part were made prisoners, and to the amazement of the -conquerors, the panic spread to the other side of the river; the -garrison of Fort Ragusa, although perfectly safe, abandoned that -fort also and fled with the others along the road to Naval Moral. -Some grenadiers of the 92d immediately swam over and brought back -several boats, with which the bridge was restored, and Fort Ragusa -was gained. The towers and other works were then destroyed, the -stores, ammunition, provisions, and boats were burned in the course -of the day, and in the night the troops returned to the Sierra above, -carrying with them the colours of the foreign regiment, and more than -two hundred and fifty prisoners, including a commandant and sixteen -other officers. The whole loss on the part of the British was about -one hundred and eighty men, and one officer of artillery was killed -by his own mine, placed for the destruction of the tower; but the -only officer slain in the actual assault was captain Candler, a brave -man, who fell while leading the grenadiers of the 50th on to the -rampart of Fort Napoleon. - -[Sidenote: Foy’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -This daring attack was executed with a decision similar to that with -which it had been planned. The first intention of general Hill was, -to have directed a part of his column against the bridge-head, and so -to have assailed both works together, but when the difficulties of -the road marred this project, he attacked the nearest work with the -leading troops, leaving the rear to follow as it could. This rapidity -was an essential cause of the success, for Foy hearing on the 17th -that the allies were at Truxillo, had ordered D’Armagnac to reinforce -Lugar Nueva with a battalion, which being at Naval Moral the 18th, -might have entered Fort Ragusa early in the morning of the 19th; but -instead of marching before day-break, this battalion did not move -until eleven o’clock, and meeting the fugitives on the road, caught -the panic and returned. - -The works at Mirabete being now cut off from the right bank of the -Tagus, general Hill was preparing to reduce them with his heavy -artillery, when a report, from sir William Erskine, caused him, in -conformity with his instructions, to commence a retreat on Merida, -leaving Mirabete blockaded by the guerillas of the neighbourhood. -It appeared that Soult, being at Chiclana, heard of the allies’ -march the 19th, and then only desired Drouet to make a diversion in -Estremadura without losing his communication with Andalusia; for he -did not perceive the true object of the enterprize, and thinking -he had to check a movement, which the king told him was made for -the purpose of reinforcing Wellington in the north, resolved to -enforce Hill’s stay in Estremadura. In this view he recalled his own -detachments from the Niebla, where they had just dispersed a body -of Spaniards at Castillejos, and then forming a large division at -Seville, he purposed to strengthen Drouet and enable him to fight -a battle. But that general, anticipating his orders, had pushed an -advanced guard of four thousand men to Dom Benito the 17th, and his -cavalry patroles passing the Guadiana on the 18th had scoured the -roads to Miajadas and Merida, while Lallemand’s dragoons drove back -the British outposts from Ribera, on the side of Zafra. - -Confused by these demonstrations, sir William Erskine immediately -reported to Graham, and to Hill, that Soult himself was in -Estremadura with his whole army, whereupon Graham came up to Badajos, -and Hill, fearful of being cut off, retired, as I have said, from -Mirabete on the 21st, and on the 26th reached Merida unmolested. -Drouet then withdrew his advanced guards, and Graham returned to -Castelo de Vide. Notwithstanding this error Wellington’s precautions -succeeded, for if Drouet had been aware of Hill’s real object, -instead of making demonstrations with a part of his force, he would -with the whole of his troops, more than ten thousand, have marched -rapidly from Medellin to fall on the allies as they issued out of the -passes of Truxillo, and before Erskine or Graham could come to their -aid; whereas acting on the supposition that the intention was to -cross the Tagus, his demonstrations merely hastened the retreat, and -saved Mirabete. To meet Hill in the right place, would, however, have -required very nice arrangements and great activity, as he could have -made his retreat by the road of Caceres as well as by that of Merida. - -Lord Wellington was greatly displeased that this false alarm, -given by Erskine, should have rendered the success incomplete; yet -he avoided any public expression of discontent, lest the enemy, -who had no apparent interest in preserving the post of Mirabete, -should be led to keep it, and so embarrass the allies when their -operations required a restoration of the bridge of Almaraz. To the -ministers however he complained, that his generals, stout in action, -personally, as the poorest soldiers, were commonly so overwhelmed -with the fear of responsibility when left to themselves, that the -slightest movement of the enemy deprived them of their judgment, and -they spread unnecessary alarm far and wide. But instead of expressing -his surprise, he should rather have reflected on the cause of this -weakness. Every British officer of rank knew, that without powerful -interest, his future prospects, and his reputation for past services, -would have withered together under the first blight of misfortune; -that a selfish government would instantly offer him up, a victim to a -misjudging public and a ribald press with whom success is the only -criterion of merit. English generals are and must be prodigal of -their blood to gain a reputation, but they are necessarily timid in -command, when a single failure, even without a fault, consigns them -to an old age of shame and misery. It is however undeniable that sir -William Erskine was not an able officer. - -On the other side the king was equally discontented with Soult, -whose refusal to reinforce Drouet, he thought had caused the loss of -Almaraz, and he affirmed that if Hill had been more enterprising, the -arsenal of Madrid might have fallen as well as the dépôt of Almaraz, -for he thought that general had brought up his whole corps instead of -a division only six thousand strong. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. April.] - -While the Anglo-British army was thus cleansing and strengthening -its position on the frontier of Portugal, the progress of the war -in other parts had not been so favourable to the common cause. It -has already been shewn that Gallicia, in the latter part of 1811, -suffered from discord, poverty, and ill success in the field; that -an extraordinary contribution imposed upon the province, had been -resisted by all classes, and especially at Coruña the seat of -Government; finally that the army torn by faction was become hateful -to the people. In this state of affairs Castaños having, at the -desire of lord Wellington, assumed the command, removed the seat of -Government to St. Jago, leaving the troops in the Bierzo under the -marquis of Portazgo. - -Prudent conduct and the personal influence of the new captain-general -soothed the bitterness of faction, and stopped, or at least checked -for the moment, many of the growing evils in Gallicia, and the -regency at Cadiz assigned an army of sixty thousand men for that -province. But the revenues were insufficient even to put the few -troops already under arms in motion, and Castaños, although desirous -to menace Astorga while Marmont was on the Agueda, could not, -out of twenty-two thousand men, bring even one division into the -field. Nevertheless, so strange a people are the Spaniards, that -a second expedition against the colonies, having with it all the -field-artillery just supplied by England, would have sailed from -Vigo but for the prompt interference of sir Howard Douglas. - -When Castaños saw the penury of his army, he as usual looked to -England for succour, at the same time, however, both he and the Junta -made unusual exertions to equip their troops, and the condition of -the soldiers was generally ameliorated. But it was upon the efforts -of the Partidas that the British agent chiefly relied. His system, -with respect to those bodies, has been before described, and it is -certain that under it, greater activity, more perfect combination, -more useful and better timed exertions, had marked their conduct, -and their efforts directed to the proper objects, were kept in some -subordination to the operations of the allies. This was however so -distasteful to the regular officers, and to the predominant faction, -always fearful of the priestly influence over the allies, that sir -Howard was offered the command of six thousand troops to detach him -from the Guerilla system; and the Partidas of the northern provinces -would now have been entirely suppressed, from mere jealousy, by the -general government, if lord Wellington and sir H. Wellesley had not -strenuously supported the views of Douglas which were based on the -following state of affairs. - -The French line of communication extending from Salamanca to Irun, -was never safe while the Gallician and Asturian forces, the English -squadrons, and the Partidas in the Montaña, in Biscay, in the Rioja, -and in the mountains of Burgos and Leon, menaced it from both sides. -The occupation of the Asturias, the constant presence of a division -in the Montaña, the employment of a corps to threaten Gallicia, and -the great strength of the army of the north, were all necessary -consequences of this weakness. But though the line of communication -was thus laboriously maintained, the lines of correspondence, in this -peculiar war of paramount importance, were, in despite of numerous -fortified posts, very insecure, and Napoleon was always stimulating -his generals to take advantage of each period of inactivity, on the -part of the British army, to put down the partidas. He observed, that -without English succours they could not remain in arms, that the -secret of their strength was to be found on the coast, and that all -the points, which favoured any intercourse with vessels, should be -fortified. And at this time so anxious was he for the security of his -correspondence, that he desired, if necessary, the whole army of the -north should be employed merely to scour the lines of communication. - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 6.] - -In accordance with these views, Santona, the most important point on -the coast, had been rendered a strong post in the summer of 1811, and -then Castro, Portagalete at the mouth of the Bilbao river, Bermeo, -Lesquito, and Guetaria, were by degrees fortified. This completed -the line eastward from Santander to St. Sebastian, and all churches, -convents, and strong houses, situated near the mouths of the creeks -and rivers between those places were entrenched. The partidas being -thus constantly intercepted, while attempting to reach the coast, -were nearly effaced in the latter end of 1811, and a considerable -part of the army of the north was, in consequence, rendered -disposable for the aid of the army of Portugal. But when Bonet, -because of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, evacuated the Asturias, the -French troops in the Montaña were again exposed to the enterprizes of -the seventh army, which had been immediately succoured by Douglas, -and which, including guerillas, was said to be twenty-three thousand -strong. Wherefore Napoleon had so early as March directed that the -Asturias should be re-occupied, and one of Bonet’s brigades, attached -to the army of the north, rejoined him in consequence; but the pass -of Pajares being choked with snow, Bonet, who was then on the Orbijo, -neglected this order until the approach of finer weather. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -In May, Marmont having returned from Portugal, the emperor’s order -was reiterated, and the French troops on the Orbijo, being augmented -to fifteen thousand drew the attention of the Gallicians to that -quarter, while Bonet, passing the mountains of Leon, with eight -thousand men, re-occupied Oviedo, Grado, and Gihon, and established -small posts communicating through the town of Leon, with the army of -Portugal. Thus a new military line was established which interrupted -the Gallicians’ communications with the partidas, the chain of -sea-port defences was continued to Gihon, a constant intercourse with -France was maintained, and those convoys came safely by water, which -otherwise would have had to travel by land escorted by many troops -and in constant danger. - -Meanwhile Marmont, having distributed his division in various parts -of Leon, was harassed by the partidas, especially Porlier’s, yet he -proceeded diligently with the fortifying of Toro and Zamora, on the -Douro, and converted three large convents at Salamanca into so many -forts capable of sustaining a regular siege; the works of Astorga and -Leon were likewise improved, and strong posts were established at -Benavente, La Baneza, Castro-Contrigo, and intermediate points. The -defensive lines of the Tormes and the Douro were thus strengthened -against the British general, and as four thousand men sufficed to -keep the Gallician forces of the Bierzo and Puebla Senabria in check, -the vast and fertile plains of Leon, called the _Tierras de Campos_, -were secured for the French, and their detachments chased the bands -from the open country. - -Sir Howard Douglas observing the success of the enemy in cutting off -the Partidas from the coast, and the advantage they derived from -the water communication; considering also that, if lord Wellington -should make any progress in the coming campaign, new lines of -communication with the sea would be desirable, proposed, that a -powerful squadron with a battalion of marines and a battery of -artillery, should be secretly prepared for a littoral warfare on the -Biscay coast. This suggestion was approved of, and sir Home Popham -was sent from England, in May, with an armament, well provided with -scaling-ladders, arms, clothing, and ammunition for the Partidas, and -all means to effect sudden disembarkations. But the ministers were -never able to see the war in its true point of view, they were always -desponding, or elated, and sanguine, beyond what reason warranted in -either case. Popham was ordered not only to infest the coast but, if -possible, to seize some point, and hold it permanently as an entrance -into Biscay, by which the French positions might be turned, if, as -in 1808, they were forced to adopt the line of the Ebro! Now at this -period three hundred thousand French soldiers were in the Peninsula, -one hundred and twenty thousand were in the northern provinces, and, -without reckoning the army of the centre which could also be turned -in that direction, nearly fifty thousand were expressly appropriated -to the protection of this very line of communication, on which a -thousand marines were to be permanently established, in expectation -of the enemy being driven over the Ebro by a campaign which was not -yet commenced! - -While Marmont was in Beira, the activity of the seventh army, and -of the Partidas, in the Montaña, was revived by the supplies which -sir Howard Douglas, taking the opportunity of Bonet’s absence, had -transmitted to them through the Asturian ports. The ferocity of the -leaders was remarkable. Mina’s conduct was said to be very revolting; -and on the 16th of April the curate Merino coming from the mountains -of Espinosa, to the forests between Aranda de Duero, and Hontorica -Valdearados, took several hundred prisoners, and hanged sixty of -them, in retaliation for three members of the local junta, who had -been put to death by the French; he executed the others also in the -proportion of ten for each of his own soldiers who had been shot by -the enemy. The ignorance and the excited passions of the Guerilla -chiefs, may be pleaded in mitigation of their proceedings, but to -the disgrace of England, these infamous executions by Merino were -recorded with complacency, in the newspapers, and met with no public -disapprobation. - -There are occasions, when retaliation, applied to men of rank, may -stop the progress of barbarity, yet the necessity should be clearly -shewn, and the exercise restricted to such narrow limits, that no -reasonable ground should be laid for counter-retaliation. Here, sixty -innocent persons were deliberately butchered to revenge the death -of three, and no proof offered that even those three were slain -contrary to the laws of war; and though it is not to be doubted -that the French committed many atrocities, some in wantonness, some -in revenge, such savage deeds as the curate’s are inexcusable. -What would have been said if Washington had hanged twenty English -gentlemen, of family, in return for the death of captain Handy; -or if sir Henry Clinton had caused twenty American officers, to -die, for the execution of André? Like atrocities are, however, the -inevitable consequence of a Guerilla system not subordinate to the -regular government of armies, and ultimately they recoil upon the -helpless people of the country, who cannot fly from their enemies. -When the French occupied a district, famine often ensued, because to -avoid distant forages they collected large stores of provisions from -a small extent of country, and thus the Guerilla system, while it -harassed the French, without starving them, both harassed and starved -the people. And many of the chiefs of bands, besides their robberies, -when they dared not otherwise revenge affronts or private feuds, -would slay some prisoners, or stragglers, so as to draw down the -vengeance of the French on an obnoxious village, or district. This in -return produced associations of the people, for self-defence in many -places, by which the enemy profited. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -Soon after this exploit a large convoy having marched from Burgos -towards France, Merino endeavoured to intercept it, and Mendizabel, -who notwithstanding his defeat by Bonet, had again gathered twelve -hundred cavalry, came from the Liebana, and occupied the heights -above Burgos. The French immediately placed their baggage and -followers in the castle, and recalled the convoy, whereupon the -Spaniards, dispersing in bands, destroyed the fortified posts of -correspondence, at Sasamon, and Gamonal, and then returned to the -Liebana. But Bonet had now re-occupied the Asturias, the remnant of -the Spanish force, in that quarter, fled to Mendizabel, and the whole -shifted as they could in the hills. Meanwhile Mina displayed great -energy. In February he repulsed an attack near Lodosa, and having -conveyed the prisoners taken at Huesca to the coast, returned to -Aragon and maintained a distant blockade of Zaragoza itself. In March -he advanced, with a detachment, to Pina, and captured one of Suchet’s -convoys going to Mequinenza; but having retired, with his booty, to -Robres, a village on the eastern slopes of the Sierra de Alcubierre, -he was there betrayed to general Pannetier, who with a brigade of the -army of the Ebro, came so suddenly upon him that he escaped death -with great difficulty. - -He reappeared in the Rioja, and although hotly chased by troops from -the army of the north, escaped without much loss, and, having five -thousand men, secretly gained the defiles of Navas Tolosa, behind -Vittoria, where on the 7th of April, he defeated with great loss a -Polish regiment, which was escorting the enormous convoy that had -escaped the curate and Mendizabel at Burgos. The booty consisted of -treasure, Spanish prisoners, baggage, followers of the army, and -officers retiring to France. All the Spanish prisoners, four hundred -in number, were released and joined Mina, and, it is said, that one -million of francs fell into his hands, besides the equipages, arms, -stores, and a quantity of church plate. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 6.] - -On the 28th he captured another convoy going from Valencia to France, -but general Abbé, who had been recently made governor of Navarre, -now directed combined movements from Pampeluna, Jacca, and Sangüesa, -against him. And so vigorously did this general, who I have heard -Mina declare to be the most formidable of all his opponents, urge on -the operations, that after a series of actions, on the 25th, 26th, -and 28th of May, the Spanish chief, in bad plight, and with the -utmost difficulty, escaped by Los Arcos to Guardia, in the Rioja. -Marshal Victor seized this opportunity to pass into France, with the -remains of the convoy shattered on the 7th, and all the bands in the -north were discouraged. However, Wellington’s successes, and the -confusion attending upon the departure of so many French troops for -the Russian war, gave a powerful stimulus to the partizan chiefs in -other directions. The Empecinado, ranging the mountains of Cuenca and -Guadalaxara, pushed his parties close to Madrid; Duran entered Soria, -and raised a contribution in the lower town; Villa Campa, Bassecour, -and Montijo, coming from the mountains of Albarracin, occupied Molino -and Orejuella, and invested Daroca; the Catalonian Gayan, taking -post in the vicinity of Belchite, made excursions to the very gates -of Zaragoza; the Frayle, haunting the mountains of Alcañiz and the -Sierra de Gudar, interrupted Suchet’s lines of communication by -Morella and Teruel, and along the right bank of the Ebro towards -Tortoza. Finally, Gay and Miralles infested the Garriga on the left -bank. - -It was to repress these bands that the army of the Ebro, containing -twenty thousand men, of whom more than sixteen thousand were under -arms, was formed by drafts from Suchet’s army, and given to general -Reille. That commander immediately repaired to Lerida, occupied Upper -Aragon with his own division, placed Severoli’s division between -Lerida and Zaragoza, and general Frere’s between Lerida, Barcelona, -and Taragona; but his fourth division, under Palombini, marched -direct from Valencia towards the districts of Soria and Calatayud, -to form the link of communication between Suchet and Caffarelli. -The latter now commanded the army of the north, but the imperial -guards, with the exception of one division, had quitted Spain, and -hence, including the government’s and the reserve of Monthion, this -army was reduced to forty-eight thousand under arms. The reserve at -Bayonne was therefore increased to five thousand men, and Palombini -was destined finally to reinforce Caffarelli, and even to march, if -required, to the aid of Marmont in Leon. However the events of the -war soon caused Reille to repair to Navarre, and broke up the army -of the Ebro, wherefore it will be clearer to trace the operations of -these divisions successively and separately, and in the order of the -provinces towards which they were at first directed. - -[Sidenote: February.] - -[Sidenote: March.] - -Palombini having left a brigade at the entrenched bridge of Teruel, -relieved Daroca on the 23d of February, and then deceiving Villa -Campa, Montijo, and Bassecour, who were waiting about the passes of -Toralva to fall on his rear-guard, turned them by the Xiloca, and -reached Calatayud. This effected, he fortified the convent of La -Peña, which, as its name signifies, was a rocky eminence, commanding -that city and forming a part of it. But on the 4th of March, having -placed his baggage and artillery in this post, under a guard of -three hundred men, he dispersed his troops to scour the country and -to collect provisions, and the partidas, seeing this, recommenced -operations. Villa Campa cut off two companies at Campillo on the 8th, -and made a fruitless attempt to destroy the Italian colonel Pisa -at Ateca. Five hundred men were sent against him, but he drew them -towards the mountains of Albarracin, and destroyed them at Pozonhonda -on the 28th; then marching another way, he drove the Italians from -their posts of communication as far as the town of Albarracin on the -road to Teruel, nor did he regain the mountains until Palombini came -up on his rear and killed some of his men. The Italian general then -changing his plan, concentrated his division on the plains of Hused, -where he suffered some privations, but remained unmolested until -the 14th of April, when he again marched to co-operate with Suchet -in a combined attempt to destroy Villa Campa. The Spanish chief -evaded both by passing over to the southern slopes of the Albarracin -mountains, and before the Italians could return to Hused, Gayan, in -concert with the alcalde of Calatayud, had exploded a plot against -the convent of La Peña. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -Some of the Italian officers, including the commandant, having rashly -accepted an invitation to a feast, were sitting at table, when Gayan -appeared on a neighbouring height; the guests were immediately -seized, and many armed citizens ran up to surprise the convent, and -sixty soldiers were made prisoners, or killed in the tumult below; -but the historian, Vacani, who had declined to attend the feast, -made a vigorous defence, and on the 1st of May general St. Pol -and colonel Schiazzetti, coming from Hused, and Daroca, raised the -siege. Schiazzetti marched in pursuit, and as his advanced guard was -surprised at Mochales by a deceit of the alcalde, he slew the latter, -whereupon the Spaniards killed the officers taken at the feast of -Calatayud. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -Gayan soon baffled his pursuers, and then moved by Medina Celi and -Soria to Navarre, thinking to surprise a money convoy going to -Burgos for the army of Portugal, but being followed on one side by -a detachment from Hused, and met on the other by Caffarelli, he -was driven again to the hills above Daroca. Here he renewed his -operations in concert with Villa Campa and the Empecinado, who came -up to Medina Celi, while Duran descended from the Moncayo hills, -and this menacing union of bands induced Reille, in May, to detach -general Paris, with a French regiment and a troop of hussars, to the -aid of Palombini. Paris moved by Calatayud, while Palombini briskly -interposing between Duran and Villa Campa, drove the one towards -Albarracin and the other towards Soria; and in June, after various -marches, the two French generals uniting, dislodged the Empecinado -from Siguenza, chasing him so sharply that his band dispersed and -fled to the Somosierra. - -[Sidenote: June.] - -During these operations, Mina was pressed by Abbé, but Duran entering -Tudela by surprise, destroyed the artillery parc, and carried off a -battering train of six guns. Palombini was only a few marches from -Madrid, and the king, alarmed by lord Wellington’s preparations for -opening the campaign, ordered him to join the army of the centre, but -these orders were intercepted, and the Italian general retraced his -steps, to pursue Duran. He soon recovered the guns taken at Tudela, -and drove the Spanish chief through the Rioja into the mountains -beyond the sources of the Duero; then collecting boats, he would have -passed the Ebro, for Caffarelli was on the Arga, with a division of -the army of the north, and a brigade had been sent by Reille to the -Aragon river with the view of destroying Mina. This chief, already -defeated by Abbé, was in great danger, when a duplicate of the king’s -orders having reached Palombini, he immediately recommenced his march -for the capital, which saved Mina. Caffarelli returned to Vittoria, -and the Italians reaching Madrid the 21st of July, became a part of -the army of the centre, having marched one hundred and fifty miles -in seven days without a halt. Returning now to the other divisions -of the army of the Ebro, it is to be observed, that their movements -being chiefly directed against the Catalans, belong to the relation -of that warfare. - - -OPERATIONS IN ARAGON AND CATALONIA. - -[Sidenote: See Vol. IV Book XV.] - -After the battle of Altafulla, the fall of Peniscola, and the arrival -of Reille’s first division on the Ebro, Decaen, who had succeeded -Macdonald in Upper Catalonia, spread his troops along the coast, with -a view to cut off the communication between the British navy and the -interior, where the Catalan army still held certain positions. - -[Sidenote: February.] - -Lamarque, with a division of five thousand men, first seized and -fortified Mataro, and then driving Milans from Blanes, occupied -the intermediate space, while detachments from Barcelona fortified -Moncada, Mongat, and Molino del Rey, thus securing the plain of -Barcelona on every side. - -The line from Blanes to Cadagués, including Canets, St. Filieu, -Palamos, and other ports, was strengthened, and placed under general -Bearman. - -General Clement was posted in the vicinity of Gerona, to guard the -interior French line of march from Hostalrich to Figueras. - -Tortoza, Mequinenza, and Taragona were garrisoned by detachments from -Severoli’s division, which was quartered between Zaragoza and Lerida, -and in communication with Bourke’s and Pannetier’s brigades of the -first division of the army of reserve. - -General Frere’s division was on the communication between Aragon and -Catalonia, and there was a division under general Quesnel, composed -partly of national guards, in the Cerdaña. Finally there was a -moveable reserve, of six or eight thousand men, with which Decaen -himself marched from place to place as occasion required; but the -supreme command of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia was with Suchet. - -The Catalans still possessed the strong holds of Cardona, Busa, Sceu -d’Urgel, and the Medas islands, and they had ten thousand men in -the field. Lacy was at Cardona with Sarzfield’s division, and some -irregular forces; colonel Green was organizing an experimental corps -at Montserrat, near which place Erolles was also quartered; Rovira -continued about the mountains of Olot; Juan Claros, who occupied -Arenis de Mar when the French were not there, was now about the -mountains of Hostalrich; Milans, Manso, and the Brigand Gros, being -driven from the coast line, kept the hills near Manreza; Gay and -Miralles were on the Ebro. But the communication with the coast being -cut off, all these chiefs were in want of provisions and stores, -and the French were forming new roads along the sea-line, beyond the -reach of the English ship guns. - -[Sidenote: Capt. Codrington’s papers, MSS.] - -Lacy thus debarred of all access to the coast, feeding his troops -with difficulty, and having a great number of prisoners and deserters -to maintain in Cardona, and Busa, because Coupigny refused to -receive them in the Balearic isles, Lacy, I say, disputing with the -Junta, and the generals, and abhorred by the people, in his spleen -desired captain Codrington to cannonade all the sea-coast towns in -the possession of the French, saying he would give the inhabitants -timely notice; but he did not do so, and when Codrington reluctantly -opened his broadsides upon Mataro, many of the people were slain. The -Catalans complained loudly of this cruel, injudicious operation, and -hating Lacy, affected Erolles more than ever, and the former sent him -with a few men to his native district of Talarn, ostensibly to raise -recruits, and make a diversion in Aragon, but really to deprive him -of his division and reduce his power. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -The distress in the Catalan army now became so great, that Sarzfield -was about to force his way to the coast, and embark his division to -commence a littoral warfare, when Erolles having quickly raised and -armed a new division entered Aragon, whereupon Sarzfield followed -him. The baron having entered the valley of Venasque, advanced to -Graus, menacing all the district between Fraga and Huesca; but those -places were occupied by detachments from Bourke’s brigade of the -army of the Ebro, and at this moment Severoli arrived from Valencia, -whereupon the Spaniards instead of falling back upon Venasque, -retired up the valley of the Isabena, to some heights above Roda, a -village on the confines of Aragon. - -Erolles had not more than a thousand regular infantry, three guns, -and two hundred cavalry, for he had left five hundred in the valley -of Venasque, and Bourke knowing this, and encouraged by the vicinity -of Severoli, followed hastily from Benavarre, with about two thousand -men of all arms, thinking Erolles would not stand before him. But -the latter’s position besides being very steep and rough in front, -was secured on both flanks by precipices, beyond which, on the -hills, all the partidas of the vicinity were gathered; he expected -aid also from Sarzfield, and was obliged to abide a battle or lose -the detachment left in the valley of Venasque. Bourke keeping two -battalions in reserve attacked with the third, but he met with a -stubborn opposition, and after a long skirmish, in which he lost a -hundred and fifty men, and Erolles a hundred, was beaten, and being -wounded himself, retreated to Monza, in great confusion. This combat -was very honorable to Erolles, but it was exposed to doubt and -ridicule, at the time, by the extravagance of his public despatch; -for he affirmed, that his soldiers finding their muskets too hot, had -made use of stones, and in this mixed mode of action had destroyed a -thousand of the enemy! - -[Sidenote: April.] - -Severoli now advanced, and Erolles being still unsupported by -Sarzfield, retired to Talarn, whereupon the Italian general returned -to Aragon. Meanwhile Lacy who had increased his forces, approached -Cervera, while Sarzfield, accused by Erolles of having treacherously -abandoned him, joined with Gay and Miralles, occupying the hills -about Taragona, and straitening that place for provisions. Milans -and Manso also uniting, captured a convoy at Arenis de Mar, and the -English squadron intercepted several vessels going to Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -[Sidenote: Capt. Codrington’s papers, MSS.] - -Decaen observing this fresh commotion came down from Gerona with -his reserve. He relieved Taragona on the 28th of April, and then -marched with three thousand men upon Lerida, but on the way, hearing -that Sarzfield was at Fuentes Rubino, near Villa Franca, he took the -road of Braffin and Santa Coloma instead of Momblanch, and suddenly -turning to his right defeated the Spanish general, and then continued -his march by Cervera towards Lerida. Lacy in great alarm immediately -abandoned Lower Catalonia and concentrated Manso’s, Milans’, Green’s, -and Sarzfield’s divisions, in the mountains of Olot, and as they -were reduced in numbers he reinforced them with select Somatenes, -called the Companies of Preferencia. After a time however seeing -that Decaen remained near Lerida, he marched rapidly against the -convent of Mataro, with five thousand men and with good hope, for the -garrison consisted of only five hundred, the works were not strong, -and captain Codrington, who had anchored off Mataro at Lacy’s desire, -lent some ship guns; but his sailors were forced to drag them to -the point of attack, because Lacy and Green had, in breach of their -promise, neglected to provide means of transport. - -The wall of the convent gave way in a few hours, but on the 5th, -Lacy, hearing that Decaen was coming to succour the place, broke -up the siege and buried the English guns without having any -communication with captain Codrington. The French found these guns -and carried them into the convent, yet Lacy, to cover his misconduct, -said in the official gazette, that they were safely re-embarked. - -[Sidenote: June.] - -After this disreputable transaction, Manso, who alone had behaved -well, retired with Milans to Vich, Lacy went to Cardona, the French -sent a large convoy into Barcelona, and the men of Erolles’ ancient -division were, to his great discontent, turned over to Sarzfield, -who took post near Molina del Rey, and remained there until the 5th -of June, when a detachment from Barcelona drove him to the Campo de -Taragona. On the 14th of the same month, Milans was defeated near -Vich by a detachment from the Ampurdan, and being chased for several -days suffered considerably. Lamarque followed Sarzfield into the -Campo and defeated him again on the 24th, near Villa Nueva de Sitjes, -and this time the Spanish general was wounded, yet made his way by -Santa Coloma de Querault and Calaf to Cardona where he rejoined Lacy. -Lamarque then joined Deacen in the plains of Lerida, where all the -French moveable forces were now assembled, with a view to gather the -harvest; a vital object to both parties, but it was attained by the -French. - -[Sidenote: Codrington’s papers, MSS.] - -This with Lacy’s flight from Mattaro, the several defeats of Milans, -and Sarzfield, and the discontent of Erolles, disturbed the whole -principality; and the general disquietude was augmented by the -increase of all the frauds and oppressions, which both the civil -and military authorities under Lacy, practised with impunity. Every -where there was a disinclination to serve in the regular army. The -Somatene argued, that while he should be an ill-used soldier, under -a bad general, his family would either become the victims of French -revenge or starve, because the pay of the regular troops was too -scanty, were it even fairly issued, for his own subsistence; whereas, -remaining at home, and keeping his arms, he could nourish his family -by his labour, defend it from straggling plunderers, and at the same -time always be ready to join the troops on great occasions. In some -districts the people, seeing that the army could not protect them, -refused to supply the partidas with food, unless upon contract not to -molest the French in their vicinity. The spirit of resistance would -have entirely failed, if lord Wellington’s successes at Ciudad and -Badajos, and the rumour that an English army was coming to Catalonia, -had not sustained the hopes of the people. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -Meanwhile the partidas in the north, being aided by Popham’s -expedition, obliged Reille to remove to Navarre, that Caffarelli -might turn his whole attention to the side of Biscay, and the -Montaña. Decaen then received charge of the Lower as well as of -the Upper Catalonia, which weakened his position; and at the same -time some confusion was produced, by the arrival of French prefects -and councillors of state, to organize a civil administration. This -measure, ostensibly to restrain military licentiousness, had probably -the ultimate object of preparing Catalonia for an union with France, -because the Catalans who have peculiar customs and a dialect of -their own, scarcely call themselves Spaniards. Although these events -embarrassed the French army, the progress of the invasion was visible -in the altered feelings, of the people whose enthusiasm was stifled -by the folly and corruption, with which their leaders aided the -active hostility of the French. - -[Sidenote: Codrington’s papers, MSS.] - -The troops were reduced in number, distressed for provisions, and -the soldiers deserted to the enemy, a thing till then unheard of in -Catalonia, nay, the junta having come down to the coast were like -to have been delivered up to the French, as a peace offering. The -latter passed, even singly, from one part to the other, and the -people of the sea-coast towns readily trafficked with the garrison -of Barcelona, when neither money nor threats could prevail on them -to supply the British squadron. Claros and Milans were charged with -conniving at this traffic, and of exacting money for the landing of -corn, when their own people and soldiers were starving. But to such a -degree was patriotism overlaid by the love of gain, that the colonial -produce, seized in Barcelona, and other parts, was sold, by the -enemy, to French merchants, and the latter undertook both to carry -it off, and pay with provisions on the spot, which they successfully -executed by means of Spanish vessels, corruptly licensed for the -occasion by Catalan authorities. - -Meanwhile the people generally accused the junta of extreme -indolence, and Lacy, of treachery; and tyranny because of his -arbitrary conduct in all things, but especially that after -proclaiming a general rising, he had disarmed the Somatenes, -and suppressed the independent bands. He had quarreled with the -British naval officers, was the avowed enemy of Erolles, the -secret calumniator of Sarzfield, and withal a man of no courage or -enterprize in the field. Nor was the story of his previous life, -calculated to check the bad opinion generally entertained of him. It -was said that, being originally a Spanish officer, he was banished, -for an intrigue, to the Canaries, from whence he deserted to the -French, and again deserted to his own countrymen, when the war of -independence broke out. - -Under this man, the frauds, which characterize the civil departments -of all armies in the field, became destructive, and the extent of -the mischief may be gathered from a single fact. Notwithstanding the -enormous supplies granted by England, the Catalans paid nearly three -millions sterling, for the expense of the war, besides contributions -in kind, and yet their soldiers were always distressed for clothing, -food, arms, and ammunition. - -[Sidenote: Codrington’s papers, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Codrington’s papers, MSS.] - -This amount of specie might excite doubt, were it not that here, as -in Portugal, the quantity of coin accumulated from the expenditure -of the armies and navies was immense. But gold is not always the -synonyme of power in war, or of happiness in peace. Nothing could be -more wretched than Catalonia. Individually the people were exposed -to all the licentiousness of war, collectively to the robberies, -and revenge, of both friends and enemies. When they attempted to -supply the British vessels, the French menaced them with death; when -they yielded to such threats, the English ships menaced them with -bombardment, and plunder. All the roads were infested with brigands, -and in the hills large bands of people, whose families and property -had been destroyed, watched for straggling Frenchmen and small -escorts, not to make war but to live on the booty; when this resource -failed they plundered their own countrymen. While the land was thus -harassed, the sea swarmed with privateers of all nations, differing -from pirates only in name; and that no link in the chain of infamy, -might be wanting, the merchants of Gibraltar, forced their smuggling -trade at the ports, with a shameless disregard for the rights of the -Spanish government. Catalonia seemed like some huge carcass, on which -all manner of ravenous beasts, all obscene birds, and all reptiles -had gathered to feed. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. April.] - -Suchet having recovered his health was again at the head of the -troops, but the king’s military authority was so irksome to him, that -he despatched an officer to represent the inconvenience of it to the -Emperor, previous to that monarch’s departure for Russia. The answer -in some degree restored his independence; he was desired to hold his -troops concentrated, and move them in the manner most conducive to -the interests of his own command. Hence, when Joseph, designing to -act against lord Wellington in Estremadura, demanded the aid of one -division, Suchet replied that he must then evacuate Valencia; and as -the natural line of retreat for the French armies would, during the -contemplated operations, be by the eastern provinces, it would be -better to abandon Andalusia first! an answer calculated to convince -Joseph that his authority in the field was still but a name. - -Suchet, from a natural disposition towards order, and because -his revenue from the fishery of the Albufera depended upon the -tranquillity of the province, took infinite pains to confirm his -power; and his mode of proceeding, at once prudent and firm, was -wonderfully successful. Valencia, although one of the smallest -provinces in Spain, and not naturally fertile, was, from the -industry of the inhabitants, one of the richest. Combining -manufactures with agriculture, it possessed great resources, but -they had been injured by the war, without having been applied to -its exigencies; and the people expected that a bloody vengeance -would be taken for Calvo’s murder of the French residents at -the commencement of the contest. Their fears were soon allayed: -discipline was strictly preserved, and Suchet, having suppressed -the taxes imposed by the Spanish government, substituted others, -which, being more equal, were less onerous. To protect the people -from oppression in the collection, he published in every corner -his demands, authorising resistance to contributions which were -not named in his list and demanded by the proper officers; and he -employed the native authorities, as he had done in Aragon. Thus, all -impolitic restrictions upon the industry and traffic of the country -being removed, the people found the government of the invaders less -oppressive than their own. - -Napoleon, in expectation of Suchet’s conquest, had however imposed -a war contribution, as a punishment for the death of the French -residents, so heavy, that his lieutenant imagined Valencia would be -quite unable to raise the sum; yet the emperor, who had calculated -the Valencians’ means by a comparison with those of Aragon, would -not rescind the order. And so exact was his judgement, that Suchet, -by accepting part payment, in kind, and giving a discount for -prompt liquidation, satisfied this impost in one year, without much -difficulty, and the current expenses of the army were provided for -besides; yet neither did the people suffer as in other provinces, -nor was their industry so cramped, nor their property so injured, -as under their own government. Valencia therefore remained tranquil, -and, by contrast, the mischief of negligence and disorder was made -manifest. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -The advantages derived from the conquest were even extended to the -province of Aragon, and to the court of Joseph, for the contributions -were diminished in the former, and large sums were remitted to the -latter to meet Napoleon’s grant of one-fifth of the war contributions -in favour of the intrusive government. This prosperous state of -French affairs in Valencia was established also in the face of -an enemy daily increasing in strength. For the regent, Abispal, -had given Blake’s command to his own brother Joseph O’Donel, who -collecting the remains of the armies of Murcia and Valencia, had -raised new levies, and during Suchet’s illness formed a fresh army -of twelve or fourteen thousand men in the neighbourhood of Alicant. -In the Balearic Isles also Roche and Whittingham’s divisions were -declared ready to take the field, and fifteen hundred British troops, -commanded by general Ross, arrived at Carthagena. To avoid the fever -there, these last remained on shipboard, and were thus more menacing -to the enemy than on shore, because they seemed to be only awaiting -the arrival of a new army, which the French knew to be coming from -Sicily to the eastern coast of Spain. And as the descent of this army -was the commencement of a remarkable episode in the history of the -Peninsular War, it is proper to give an exact account of its origin -and progress. - -Sir John Stuart had been succeeded, in Sicily, by lord William -Bentinck, a man of resolution, capacity, and spirit, just in his -actions, and abhorring oppression, but of a sanguine, impetuous -disposition. Being resolved to ameliorate the condition of the -Sicilian people, after surmounting many difficulties, he removed -the queen from power, vested the direction of affairs in the -crown prince, obtained from the barons a renunciation of their -feudal privileges, and caused a representative constitution to be -proclaimed. Believing then that the court was submissive because -it was silent; that the barons would adhere to his system, because -it gave them the useful power of legislation, in lieu of feudal -privileges alloyed by ruinous expenses and the degradation of -courtiers; because it gave them the dignity of independence at the -cost only of maintaining the rights of the people and restoring -the honour of their country:—believing thus, he judged that the -large British force hitherto kept in Sicily, as much to overawe the -court as to oppose the enemy, might be dispensed with; and that the -expected improvement of the Sicilian army, and the attachment of the -people to the new political system, would permit ten thousand men -to be employed in aid of lord Wellington, or in Italy. In January, -therefore, he wrote of these projects to the English ministers, and -sent his brother to lord Wellington to consult upon the best mode of -acting. - -Such an opportune offer to create a diversion on the left flank of -the French armies was eagerly accepted by Wellington, who immediately -sent engineers, artificers, and a battering train complete, to -aid the expected expedition. But lord William Bentinck was soon -made sensible, that in large communities working constitutions are -the offspring, and not the generators, of national feelings and -habits. They cannot be built like cities in the desert, nor cast, as -breakwaters, into the sea of public corruption, but gradually, and -as the insect rocks come up from the depths of the ocean, they must -arise, if they are to bear the storms of human passions. - -The Sicilian court opposed lord William with falsehood and intrigue, -the constitution was secretly thwarted by the barons, the Neapolitan -army, a body composed of foreigners of all nations, was diligently -augmented, with a view to overawe both the English and the people; -the revenues and the subsidy were alike misapplied, and the native -Sicilian army, despised and neglected, was incapable of service. -Finally, instead of going to Spain himself, with ten thousand good -troops, lord William could only send a subordinate general with six -thousand—British, Germans, Calabrese, Swiss, and Sicilians; the -British and Germans only, being either morally or militarily well -organised. To these, however, Roche’s and Whittingham’s levies, -represented to be twelve or fourteen thousand strong, were added, the -Spanish government having placed them at the disposition of general -Maitland, the commander of the expedition. Thus, in May, twenty -thousand men were supposed ready for a descent on Catalonia, to which -quarter lord Wellington recommended they should proceed. - -But now other objects were presented to lord William Bentinck’s -sanguine mind. The Austrian government, while treating with Napoleon, -was secretly encouraging insurrections in Italy, Croatia, Dalmatia, -the Venetian states, the Tyrol, and Switzerland. English, as well as -Austrian agents, were active to organise a vast conspiracy against -the French emperor, and there was a desire, especially on the part of -England, to create a kingdom for one of the Austrian archdukes. Murat -was discontented with France, the Montenegrins were in arms on the -Adriatic coast, and the prospect of a descent upon Italy in unison -with the wishes of the people, appeared so promising to lord William -Bentinck, that supposing himself to have a discretionary power, he -stopped the expedition to Catalonia, reasoning thus. - -“In Spain, only six thousand middling troops can be employed on -a secondary operation, and for a limited period, whereas twelve -thousand British soldiers, and six thousand men composing the -Neapolitan army of Sicily, can land in Italy, a grand theatre, -where success will most efficaciously assist Spain. The obnoxious -Neapolitan force being thus removed, the native Sicilian army can be -organised, and the new constitution established with more certainty.” -The time, also, he thought critical for Italy, not so for Spain, -which would suffer but a temporary deprivation, seeing that failure -in Italy would not preclude after aid to Spain. - -Impressed with these notions, which, it must be confessed, were both -plausible and grand, he permitted the expedition, already embarked, -to sail for Palma in Sardinia, and Mahon in Minorca, yet merely as a -blind, because, from those places, he could easily direct the troops -against Italy, and meanwhile they menaced the French in Spain. But -the conception of vast and daring enterprises, even the execution of -them up to a certain point, is not very uncommon, they fail only by -a little! that little is, however, the essence of genius, the phial -of wit, which, held to Orlando’s nostril, changed him from a frantic -giant to a perfect commander. - -It was in the consideration of such nice points of military policy -that lord Wellington’s solid judgement was always advantageously -displayed. Neither the greatness of this project nor the apparent -facility of execution weighed with him. He thought the recovery of -Italy by the power of the British arms would be a glorious, and -might be a feasible exploit, but it was only in prospect, Spain was -the better field, the war in the Peninsula existed; years had been -devoted to the establishment of a solid base there, and experience -had proved that the chance of victory was not imaginary. England -could not support two armies. The principle of concentration of -power on an important point was as applicable here as on a field of -battle, and although Italy might be the more vital point, it would -be advisable to continue the war already established in Spain: nay -it would be better to give up Spain, and direct the whole power of -England against Italy, rather than undertake double operations, on -such an extensive scale, at a moment when the means necessary to -sustain one were so scanty. - -The ministers, apparently convinced by this reasoning, forbad -lord William Bentinck to proceed, and they expressed their -discontent at his conduct. Nevertheless their former instructions -had unquestionably conferred on him a discretionary power to act -in Italy, and so completely had he been misled by their previous -despatches, that besides delaying the expedition to Spain, he had -placed twelve hundred men under admiral Fremantle, to assist the -Montenegrins. And he was actually entangled in a negotiation with -the Russian admiral, Greig, relative to the march of a Russian army; -a march planned, as it would appear, without the knowledge of the -Russian court, and which, from the wildness of its conception and the -mischief it would probably have effected, deserves notice. - -While the Russian war was still uncertain, admiral Tchtchagoff, who -commanded sixty thousand men on the Danube, proposed to march with -them, through Bosnia and the ancient Epirus, to the mouths of the -Cattaro, and, there embarking, to commence the impending contest with -France in Italy. He was, however, without resources, and expecting -to arrive in a starving and miserable condition on the Adriatic, -demanded, through admiral Greig, then commanding a squadron in the -Mediterranean, that lord William Bentinck should be ready to supply -him with fresh arms, ammunition, and provisions, and to aid him with -an auxiliary force. That nobleman saw at a glance the absurdity of -this scheme, but he was falsely informed that Tchtchagoff, trusting -to his good will, had already commenced the march; and thus he had -only to choose between aiding an ally, whose force, if it arrived -at all, and was supplied by England, would help his own project, or -permit it, to avoid perishing, to ravage Italy, and so change the -people of that country from secret friends into deadly enemies. It -would be foreign to this history to consider what effect the absence -of Tchtchagoff’s army during the Russian campaign would have had upon -Napoleon’s operations, but this was the very force whose march to the -Beresina afterwards obliged the emperor to abandon Smolensko, and -continue the retreat to Warsaw. - -It was in the midst of these affairs, that the English minister’s -imperative orders to look only to the coast of Spain arrived. The -negociation with the Russians was immediately stopped, the project of -landing in Italy was relinquished, and the expedition, already sent -to the Adriatic, was recalled. Meanwhile the descent on Catalonia -had been delayed, and as a knowledge of its destination, had reached -Suchet through the French minister of war, and through the rumours -rife amongst the Spaniards, all his preparations to meet it were -matured. Nor was this the only mischief produced by the English -minister’s want of clear views and decided system of policy. Lord -William Bentinck had been empowered to raise money on bills for his -own exigences, and being desirous to form a military chest for his -project in Italy, he had invaded lord Wellington’s money markets. -With infinite trouble and difficulty that general had just opened -a source of supply at the rate of five shillings and four-pence, -to five shillings and eight-pence the dollar, when lord William -Bentinck’s agents offering six shillings and eight-pence, swept four -millions from the markets, and thus, as shall be hereafter shewn, -seriously embarrassed lord Wellington’s operations in the field. - -This unhappy commencement of the Sicilian expedition led to other -errors, and its arrival on the coast of Spain, did not take place, -until after the campaign in Castile had commenced; but as its -proceedings connected the warfare of Valencia immediately with that -of Catalonia, and the whole with lord Wellington’s operations, they -cannot be properly treated of in this place. It is, however, worthy -of observation, how an illiberal and factious policy, inevitably -recoils upon its authors. - -In 1807 sir John Moore, with that sagacity and manliness which -distinguished his career through life, had informed the ministers, -that no hope of a successful attack on the French in Italy, could be -entertained while the British army upheld the tyrannical system of -the dissolute and treacherous Neapolitan court in Sicily. And as no -change for the better could be expected while the queen was allowed -to govern, he proposed, that the British cabinet should either -relinquish Sicily, or, assuming the entire controul of the island, -seize the queen and send her to her native Austria. This he judged -to be the first step necessary to render the large British army in -Sicily available for the field, because the Sicilian people could -then be justly governed, and thus only could the organization of -an effective native force attached to England, and fitted to offer -freedom to Italy be effected. - -He spoke not of constitutions but of justice to the people, and hence -his proposal was rejected as a matter of Jacobinism. Mr. Drummond, -the English plenipotentiary, even betrayed it to the queen, a woman -not without magnanimity, yet so capable of bloody deeds, that, in -1810, she secretly proposed to Napoleon the perpetration of a second -Sicilian vespers upon the English. The emperor, detesting such guilt, -only answered by throwing her agent into prison, yet the traces of -the conspiracy were detected by the British authorities in 1811; and -in 1812 lord William Bentinck was forced to seize the government, in -the manner before recommended by Moore, and did finally expel the -queen by force. But because these measures were not resorted to in -time, he was now, with an army of from twenty-five to thirty thousand -men, sixteen thousand of which were British, only able to detach a -mixed force of six thousand to aid lord Wellington. And at the same -time the oppression of Ireland required that sixty thousand fine -soldiers should remain idle at home, while France, with a Russian war -on hand, was able to over-match the allies in Spain. Bad government -is a scourge with a double thong! - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. April.] - -A short time previous to Hill’s enterprize against Almaraz, Soult, -after driving Ballesteros from the Ronda, and restoring the -communication with Grenada, sent three thousand men into the Niebla; -partly to interrupt the march of some Spaniards coming from Cadiz -to garrison Badajos, partly to menace Penne Villemur and Morillo, -who still lingered on the Odiel against the wishes of Wellington. -The French arguments were more effectual. Those generals immediately -filed along the frontier of Portugal towards Estremadura, they were -hastily followed by the Spanish troops sent from Cadiz, and the -militia of the Algarves were called out, to defend the Portuguese -frontier. Soult then remained on the defensive, for he expected the -advance of lord Wellington, which the approach of so many troops, the -seeming reluctance of the Spaniards to quit the Niebla, the landing -of fresh men from Cadiz at Ayamonte, and the false rumours purposely -set afloat by the British general seemed to render certain. Nor did -the surprize of Almaraz, which he thought to be aimed at the army of -the south and not against the army of Portugal, alter his views. - -The great advantage which lord Wellington had gained by the fall of -Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos was now very clearly illustrated; for, as -he could at will advance either against the north or the south or -the centre, the French generals in each quarter expected him, and -they were anxious that the others should regulate their movements -accordingly. None would help the other, and the secret plans of all -were paralyzed until it was seen on which side the thunderbolt would -fall. This was of most consequence in the south, for Soult’s plans -were vast, dangerous, and ripe for execution. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -After the fall of Badajos he judged it unwise to persevere in pushing -a head of troops, into Estremadura, while his rear and flanks were -exposed to attacks from Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Murcia; but it was -essential, he thought, to crush Ballesteros before his forces should -be increased, and this was not to be effected, while that general -could flee to Gibraltar on the one side, and Tarifa on the other. -Whereupon Soult had resolved first to reduce Tarifa, with a view to -the ruin of Ballesteros, and then to lay siege to Carthagena and -Alicant, and he only awaited the development of Wellington’s menacing -demonstrations against Andalusia to commence his own operations. -Great and difficult his plan was, yet profoundly calculated to -effect his main object, which was to establish his base so firmly in -Andalusia that, maugre the forces in Cadiz and the Isla, he might -safely enter upon and follow up regular offensive operations in -Estremadura and against Portugal, instead of the partial uncertain -expeditions hitherto adopted. In fine, he designed to make lord -Wellington feel that there was a powerful army within a few marches -of Lisbon. - -Thinking that Carthagena and Tarifa, and even Alicant must fall, -with the aid of Suchet, which he expected, or that the siege of the -first would bring down Hill’s corps, and all the disposable Spanish -troops to save it, he desired that the army of Portugal, and the -army of the centre, should operate so as to keep lord Wellington -employed north of the Tagus. He could then by himself carry on the -sieges he contemplated, and yet leave a force under Drouet on the -edge of Estremadura, strong enough to oblige Hill to operate in the -direction of Carthagena instead of Seville. And if this should happen -as he expected, he proposed suddenly to concentrate all his finely -organized and experienced troops, force on a general battle, and, -if victorious, the preparations being made before hand, to follow -up the blow by a rapid march upon Portugal, and so enter Lisbon; or -by bringing Wellington in all haste to the defence of that capital, -confine the war, while Napoleon was in Russia, to a corner of the -Peninsula. - -This great project was strictly in the spirit of the emperor’s -instructions. For that consummate commander had desired his -lieutenants to make lord Wellington feel that his enemies were not -passively defensive. He had urged them to press the allies close -on each flank, and he had endeavoured to make Marmont understand -that, although there was no object to be attained by entering the -north-east of Portugal, and fighting a general battle on ground -favourable to lord Wellington, it was contrary to all military -principles, to withdraw several days’ march from the allies’ -outposts, and by such a timid defensive system, to give the English -general the power of choosing when and where to strike. Now the loss -of Badajos, and the difficulty of maintaining a defensive war against -the increasing forces of the allies in the south of Andalusia, -rendered it extremely onerous for Soult to press Wellington’s flank -in Estremadura; and it was therefore a profound modification of the -emperor’s views, to urge the king and Marmont to active operation in -the north, while he besieged Tarifa and Carthagena, keeping his army -in mass ready for a sudden stroke in the field, if fortune brought -the occasion, and if otherwise, sure of fixing a solid base for -future operations against Portugal. - -The duke of Dalmatia wished to have commenced his operations by -the siege of Tarifa in May, when Wellington’s return to Beira had -relieved him from the fear of an immediate invasion of Andalusia, -but the failure of the harvest in 1811 and the continual movements -during the winter, had so reduced his magazines, both of provisions -and ammunition, that he could not undertake the operation until the -new harvest was ripe, and fresh convoys had replenished his exhausted -stores. His soldiers were already on short allowance, and famine -raged amongst the people of the country. Meanwhile his agents in -Morocco had so firmly re-established the French interests there, that -the emperor refused all supplies to the British, and even fitted out -a squadron to insure obedience to his orders. To counteract this -mischief, the Gibraltar merchant, Viali, who had been employed in the -early part of the war by sir Hew Dalrymple, was sent by sir Henry -Wellesley with a mission to the court of Fez, which failed, and it -was said from the intrigues of the notorious Charmilly who was then -at Tangier, and being connected by marriage with the English consul -there, unsuspected: indeed from a mean hatred to sir John Moore, -there were not wanting persons in power who endeavoured still to -uphold this man. - -So far every thing promised well for Soult’s plans, and he earnestly -demanded that all his detachments, and sufficient reinforcements, -together with artillery, officers, money, and convoys of ammunition -should be sent to him for the siege of Carthagena. Pending their -arrival, to divert the attention of the allies, he repaired to Port -St. Mary where the French had, from the circumstances of the war in -Estremadura, been a long time inactive. He brought down with him a -number of the Villantroy mortars, and having collected about thirty -gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, commenced a serious bombardment -of Cadiz on the 16th of May. While thus engaged, a sudden landing -from English vessels was effected on the Grenada coast, Almeria was -abandoned by the French, the people rose along the sea-line, and -general Frere, advancing from Murcia, entrenched himself in the -position of Venta de Bahul, on the eastern frontier of Grenada. He -was indeed surprised and beaten with loss, and the insurrection on -the coast was soon quelled, but these things delayed the march of the -reinforcements intended for Drouet; meanwhile Hill surprised Almaraz, -and Ballesteros, whose forces had subsisted during the winter and -spring, upon the stores of Gibraltar, advanced against Conroux’s -division then in observation at Bornos on the Guadalete. - -This Spanish general caused equal anxiety to Soult and to Wellington, -because his proceedings involved one of those intricate knots, by -which the important parts of both their operations were fastened. -Lord Wellington judged, that, while a large and increasing corps -which could be aided by a disembarkation of five or six thousand -men from the Isla de Leon, menaced the blockade of Cadiz and the -communications between Seville and Grenada, Soult must keep a -considerable body in observation, and consequently, Hill would -be a match for the French in Estremadura. But the efficacy of -this diversion, depended upon avoiding battles, seeing that if -Ballesteros’ army was crushed, the French, reinforced in Estremadura, -could drive Hill over the Tagus, which would inevitably bring -Wellington himself to his succour. Soult was for the same reason as -earnest to bring the Spanish general to action, as Wellington was -to prevent a battle, and Ballesteros, a man of infinite arrogance, -despised both. Having obtained money and supplies from Gibraltar to -replace the expenditure of his former excursion against Seville, he -marched with eight thousand men against Conroux, and that Frenchman, -aware of his intention, induced him, by an appearance of fear, to -attack an entrenched camp in a disorderly manner. On the 1st of June -the battle took place, and Conroux issuing forth unexpectedly killed -or took fifteen hundred Spaniards, and drove the rest to the hills, -from whence they retreated to San Roque. How this victory was felt in -Estremadura shall now be shewn. - -[Sidenote: June.] - -The loss of Almaraz had put all the French corps in movement. A -division of Marmont’s army crossed the Gredos mountains, to replace -Foy in the valley of the Tagus, and the latter general, passing that -river by the bridge of Arzobispo moved through the mountains of -Guadalupe, and succoured the garrison of Mirabete on the 26th of May. -When he retired the partidas of the Guadalupe renewed the blockade, -and Hill, now strongly reinforced by lord Wellington, advanced to -Zafra, whereupon Drouet, unable to meet him, fell back to Azagua. -Hill, wishing to protect the gathering of the harvest, then detached -Penne Villemur’s horsemen, from Llerena on the right flank, and -general Slade, with the third dragoon guards and the royals, from -Llera on the left flank; General Lallemande, having a like object, -came forward with two regiments of French dragoons, on the side of -Valencia de las Torres, whereupon Hill, hoping to cut him off, placed -Slade’s dragoons in a wood with directions to await further orders. -Slade hearing that Lallemand was so near, and no wise superior to -himself in numbers, forgot his orders, advanced and drove the French -cavalry with loss beyond the defile of Maquilla, a distance of eight -miles; and through the pass also the British rashly galloped in -pursuit, the general riding in the foremost ranks, and the supports -joining tumultuously in the charge. - -But in the plain beyond stood Lallemand with his reserves well in -hand. He broke the disorderly English mass thus rushing on him, -killed or wounded forty-eight men, pursued the rest for six miles, -recovered all his own prisoners, and took more than a hundred, -including two officers, from his adversary; and the like bitter -results will generally attend what is called “_dashing_” in war, -which in other words means courage without prudence. Two days after -this event the Austrian Strenowitz, whose exploits have been before -noticed, marched with fifty men of the same regiments, to fetch off -some of the English prisoners who had been left, by the French, under -a slender guard in the village of Maquilla. Eighty of the enemy met -him on the march, yet by fine management he overthrew him, and losing -only one man himself, killed many French, executed his mission, and -returned with an officer and twenty other prisoners. - -Such was the state of affairs, when the defeat of Ballesteros at -Bornoz, enabled Soult to reinforce Drouet, with Barois’s division -of infantry and two divisions of cavalry; they marched across the -Morena, but for reasons, to be hereafter mentioned, by the royal -road of St. Ollala, a line of direction which obliged Drouet to make -a flank march by his left towards Llerena to form his junction with -them. It was effected on the 18th, and the allies then fell back -gradually towards Albuera, where being joined by four Portuguese -regiments from Badajos, and by the fifth Spanish army, Hill formed a -line of battle furnishing twenty thousand infantry, two thousand five -hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns. - -Drouet had only twenty-one thousand men, of which three thousand were -cavalry, with eighteen pieces of artillery; the allies were therefore -the most numerous, but the French army was better composed, and -battle seemed inevitable, for both generals had discretionary orders. -However the French cavalry did not advance further than Almendralejo, -and Hill who had shewn himself so daring at Aroyo Molino and Almaraz, -now, with an uncommon mastery of ambition, refrained from an action -which promised him unbounded fame, simply because he was uncertain -whether the state of lord Wellington’s operations in Castile, then -in full progress, would warrant one. His recent exploits had been -so splendid that a great battle gained at this time would, with -the assistance of envious malice, have placed his reputation on a -level with Wellington’s. Yet he was habituated to command, and his -adversary’s talents were moderate, his forbearance must therefore be -taken as a proof of the purest patriotism. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -Early in July the French cavalry entered Almendralejo and Santa -Marta, cut off two hundred Spanish horsemen, and surprised a small -British cavalry post; Hill who had then received fresh instructions, -and was eager to fight, quickly drove them with loss from both -places. Drouet immediately concentrated his forces and retired to -La Granja, and was followed by the allies, but the account of the -transactions in Andalusia and Estremadura must be here closed, -because those which followed belong to the general combinations. And -as the causes of these last movements, and their effects upon the -general campaign, are of an intricate nature, to avoid confusion the -explanation of them is reserved for another place: meanwhile I will -endeavour to describe that political chaos, amidst which Wellington’s -army appeared as the ark amongst the meeting clouds and rising waters -of the deluge. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE. - - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -The unmatched power of Napoleon’s genius was now being displayed in a -wonderful manner. His interest, his inclination, and his expectation -were alike opposed to a war with Russia, but Alexander and himself, -each hoping that a menacing display of strength would reduce the -other to negotiation, advanced, step by step, until blows could no -longer be avoided. Napoleon, a man capable of sincere friendship, -had relied too much and too long on the existence of a like feeling -in the Russian emperor; and misled, perhaps, by the sentiment of -his own energy, did not sufficiently allow for the daring intrigues -of a court, where secret combinations of the nobles formed the real -governing power. - -That the cabinet of Petersburgh should be, more than ordinarily -subject to such combinations at this period, was the necessary -consequence of the greatness of the interests involved in the -treaties of Tilsit and Erfurth; the continental system had so deeply -injured the fortunes of the Russian noblemen, that their sovereign’s -authority in support of it was as nothing. During the Austrian war -of 1809, when Alexander was yet warm from Napoleon’s society at -Erfurth, the aid given to France was a mockery, and a desire to join -a northern confederation against Napoleon was even then scarcely -concealed at St. Petersburgh, where the French ambassador was coldly -treated. The royal family of Prussia were, it is true, at the same -time, mortified by a reception which inclined them to side with -France, against the wishes of their people and their ministers, but -in Russia, Romanzow alone was averse to choose that moment to declare -against Napoleon. And this was so certain that Austria, anticipating -the explosion, was only undecided whether the king of Prussia should -be punished or the people rewarded, whether she herself should -befriend or plunder the Prussian monarchy. - -At that time also, the Russian naval commander, in the Adriatic, -being ordered to sail to Ancona for the purpose of convoying -Marmont’s troops from Dalmatia to Italy, refused, on the plea -that his ships were not sea-worthy; yet secretly he informed the -governor of Trieste that they would be in excellent order to -assist an Austrian corps against the French! Admiral Tchtchagoff’s -strange project of marching upon Italy from Bucharest has been -already noticed, and it is remarkable that this expedition was to -be conducted upon popular principles, the interests of the Sicilian -court being to be made subservient to the wishes of the people. At a -later period, in 1812, admiral Grieg proposed to place an auxiliary -Russian army under either Wellington or lord William Bentinck, and it -was accepted; but when the Russian ambassador in London was applied -to upon the subject, he unequivocally declared that the emperor knew -nothing of the matter! - -With a court so situated, angry negotiations once commenced rendered -war inevitable, and the more especially that the Russian cabinet, -which had long determined on hostilities though undecided as to the -time of drawing the sword, was well aware of the secret designs and -proceedings of Austria in Italy, and of Murat’s discontent. The -Hollanders were known to desire independence, and the deep hatred -which the people of Prussia bore to the French was a matter of -notoriety. Bernadotte, who very early had resolved to cast down the -ladder by which he rose, was the secret adviser of these practices -against Napoleon’s power in Italy, and he was also in communication -with the Spaniards. Thus Napoleon, having a war in Spain which -required three hundred thousand men to keep in a balanced state, was -forced, by resistless circumstances, into another and more formidable -contest in the distant north, when the whole of Europe was prepared -to rise upon his lines of communication, and when his extensive -sea-frontier was exposed to the all-powerful navy of Great Britain. - -A conqueror’s march to Moscow, amidst such dangers, was a design -more vast, more hardy, more astounding than ever before entered the -imagination of man; yet it was achieved, and solely by the force -of his genius. For having organised two hundred thousand French -soldiers, as a pretorian guard, he stepped resolutely into the heart -of Germany, and monarchs and nations bent submissively before him; -secret hostility ceased, and, with the exception of Bernadotte, -the crowned and anointed plotters quitted their work to follow his -chariot-wheels. Dresden saw the ancient story of the King of Kings -renewed in his person; and the two hundred thousand French soldiers -arrived on the Niemen in company with two hundred thousand allies. -On that river four hundred thousand troops, I have seen the imperial -returns, were assembled by this wonderful man, all disciplined -warriors, and, notwithstanding their different, national feelings, -all proud of the unmatched genius of their leader. Yet, even in that -hour of dizzy elevation, Napoleon, deeply sensible of the inherent -weakness of a throne unhallowed by time, described by one emphatic -phrase the delicacy of his political situation. During the passage -of the Niemen, twelve thousand cuirassiers, whose burnished armour -flashed in the sun while their cries of salutation pealed in unison -with the thunder of the horses’ feet, were passing like a foaming -torrent towards the river, when Napoleon turned and thus addressed -Gouvion St. Cyr, whose republican principles were well known, - -“No monarch ever had such an army?” - -“No, sire.” - -“The French are a fine people; they deserve more liberty, and they -shall have it, but, St. Cyr, no liberty of the press! That army, -mighty as it is, could not resist the songs of Paris!” - -Such, then, was the nature of Napoleon’s power that success alone -could sustain it; success which depended as much upon others’ -exertions as upon his own stupendous genius, for Russia was far -distant from Spain. It is said, I know not upon what authority, that -he at one moment, had resolved to concentrate all the French troops -in the Peninsula behind the Ebro during this expedition to Russia, -but the capture of Blake’s force at Valencia changed his views. Of -this design there are no traces in the movements of his armies, nor -in the captured papers of the king, and there are some indications -of a contrary design; for at that period several foreign agents were -detected examining the lines of Torres Vedras, and on a Frenchman, -who killed himself when arrested in the Brazils, were found papers -proving a mission for the same object. Neither is it easy to discern -the advantage of thus crowding three hundred thousand men on a narrow -slip of ground, where they must have been fed from France, already -overburthened with the expenses of the Russian war; and this when -they were numerous enough, if rightly handled, to have maintained -themselves on the resources of Spain, and near the Portuguese -frontier for a year at least. - -To have given up all the Peninsula, west of the Ebro, would have -been productive of no benefit, save what might have accrued from -the jealousy which the Spaniards already displayed towards their -allies; but if that jealousy, as was probable, had forced the British -general away, he could have carried his army to Italy, or have formed -in Germany the nucleus of a great northern confederation on the -emperor’s rear. Portugal was therefore, in truth, the point of all -Europe in which the British strength was least dangerous to Napoleon -during the invasion of Russia; moreover, an immediate war with that -empire was not a certain event previous to the capture of Valencia. -Napoleon was undoubtedly anxious to avoid it while the Spanish -contest continued; yet, with a far-reaching European policy, in which -his English adversaries were deficient, he foresaw and desired to -check the growing strength of that fearful and wicked power which now -menaces the civilised world. - -The proposal for peace which he made to England before his departure -for the Niemen is another circumstance where his object seems to -have been misrepresented. It was called a device to reconcile the -French to the Russian war; but they were as eager for that war as he -could wish them to be, and it is more probable that it sprung from -a secret misgiving, a prophetic sentiment of the consequent power -of Russia, lifted, as she then would be towards universal tyranny, -by the very arm which he had raised to restrain her. The ostensible -ground of his quarrel with the emperor Alexander was the continental -system; yet, in this proposal for peace, he offered to acknowledge -the house of Braganza in Portugal, the house of Bourbon in Sicily, -and to withdraw his army from the Peninsula, if England would join -him in guaranteeing the crown of Spain to Joseph, together with a -constitution to be arranged by a national Cortes. This was a virtual -renunciation of the continental system for the sake of peace with -England; and a proposal which obviated the charge of aiming at -universal dominion, seeing that Austria, Spain, Portugal, and England -would have retained their full strength, and the limits of his empire -would have been fixed. The offer was made also at a time when the -emperor was certainly more powerful than he had ever yet been, when -Portugal was, by the avowal of Wellington himself, far from secure, -and Spain quite exhausted. At peace with England, Napoleon could -easily have restored the Polish nation, and Russia would have been -repressed. Now, Poland has fallen, and Russia stalks in the plenitude -of her barbarous tyranny. - -_Political state of England._—The new administration, despised by -the country, was not the less powerful in parliament; its domestic -proceedings were therefore characterised by all the corruption and -tyranny of Mr. Pitt’s system, without his redeeming genius. The press -was persecuted with malignant ferocity, and the government sought -to corrupt all that it could not trample upon. Repeated successes -had rendered the particular contest in the Peninsula popular with -the ardent spirits of the nation, and war-prices passed for glory -with the merchants, land-owners, and tradesmen; but as the price of -food augmented faster than the price of labour, the poorer people -suffered, they rejoiced, indeed, at their country’s triumphs because -the sound of victory is always pleasing to warlike ears, but they -were discontented. Meanwhile all thinking men, who were not biassed -by factions, or dazzled by military splendour, perceived in the -enormous expenses incurred to repress the democratic principle, -and in the consequent transfer of property, the sure foundation -of future reaction and revolution. The distresses of the working -classes had already produced partial insurrections, and the nation at -large was beginning to perceive that the governing powers, whether -representative or executive, were rapacious usurpers of the people’s -rights; a perception quickened by malignant prosecutions, by the -insolent extravagance with which the public money was lavished on -the family of Mr. Perceval, and by the general profusion at home, -while lord Wellesley declared that the war languished for want of -sustenance abroad. - -Napoleon’s continental system, although in the nature of a sumptuary -law, which the desires of men will never suffer to exist long in -vigour, was yet so efficient, that the British government was forced -to encourage, and protect, illicit trading, to the great detriment -of mercantile morality. The island of Heligoland was the chief point -of deposit for this commerce, and either by trading energy, or by -the connivance of continental governments, the emperor’s system was -continually baffled; nevertheless its effects will not quickly pass -away; it pressed sorely upon the manufacturers at the time, and by -giving rise to rival establishments on the continent, has awakened -in Germany a commercial spirit by no means favourable to England’s -manufacturing superiority. - -But ultimate consequences were never considered by the British -ministers; the immediate object was to procure money, and by -virtually making bank-notes a legal tender, they secured unlimited -means at home, through the medium of loans and taxes, which the -corruption of the parliament, insured to them, and which, by a -reaction, insured the corruption of the parliament. This resource -failed abroad. They could, and did, send to all the allies of -England, enormous supplies in kind, because to do so, was, in the -way of contracts, an essential part of the system of corruption at -home; a system aptly described, as bribing one-half of the nation -with the money of the other half, in order to misgovern both. Specie -was however only to be had in comparatively small quantities, and -at a premium so exorbitant, that even the most reckless politician -trembled for the ultimate consequences. - -The foreign policy of the government was very simple, namely, to -bribe all powers to wear down France. Hence to Russia every thing, -save specie, was granted; and hence also, amicable relations with -Sweden were immediately re-established, and the more readily that -this power had lent herself to the violation of the continental -system by permitting the entry of British goods at Stralsund; but -wherever wisdom, or skill, was required, the English minister’s -resources failed altogether. With respect to Sicily, Spain, and -Portugal, this truth was notorious; and to preserve the political -support of the trading interests at home, a degrading and deceitful -policy, quite opposed to the spirit of lord Wellington’s counsels, -was followed in regard to the revolted Spanish colonies. - -The short-sighted injustice of the system was however most glaring -with regard to the United States of America. Mutual complaints, -the dregs of the war of independence, had long characterised the -intercourse between the British and American governments, and these -discontents were turned into extreme hatred by the progress of the -war with France. The British government in 1806 proclaimed, contrary -to the law of nations, a blockade of the French coast, which could -not be enforced. Napoleon, in return, issued the celebrated decrees -of Berlin and Milan, which produced the no less celebrated orders in -council. The commerce of all neutrals was thus extinguished by the -arrogance of the belligerents; but the latter very soon finding that -their mutual convenience required some relaxation of mutual violence, -granted licenses to each other’s ships, and by this scandalous -evasion of their own policy, caused the whole of the evil to fall -upon the neutral, who was yet called the friend of both parties. - -[Sidenote: 18th June, 1812.] - -The Americans, unwilling to go to war with two such powerful states, -were yet resolved not to submit to the tyranny of either; but the -injustice of the English government was the most direct, and extended -in its operations, and it was rendered infinitely more bitter by the -violence used towards the seamen of the United States: not less than -six thousand sailors, it was said, were taken from merchant vessels -on the high seas, and forced to serve in the British men-of-war. -Wherefore, after first passing retaliatory, or rather warning acts, -called the non-intercourse, non-importation, and embargo acts, the -Americans finally declared war, at the moment when the British -government, alarmed at the consequences of their own injustice, had -just rescinded the orders in council. - -The immediate effects of these proceedings on the contest in the -Peninsula, shall be noticed in another place, but the ultimate -effects on England’s prosperity have not yet been unfolded. The -struggle prematurely told the secret of American strength, and it has -drawn the attention of the world to a people, who, notwithstanding -the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the most -horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile -spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous, do in their -general government uphold civil institutions, which have startled the -crazy despotisms of Europe. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -_Political state of Spain._—Bad government is more hurtful than -direct war; the ravages of the last are soon repaired, and the public -mind is often purified, and advanced, by the trial of adversity, but -the evils, springing from the former, seem interminable. In the Isla -de Leon the unseemly currents of folly, although less raging than -before, continued to break open new channels and yet abandoned none -of the old. The intrigues of the princess Carlotta were unremitted, -and though the danger of provoking the populace of Cadiz, restrained -and frightened her advocates in the Cortez, she opposed the English -diplomacy, with reiterated, and not quite unfounded accusations, that -the revolt of the colonies was being perfidiously fostered by Great -Britain:—a charge well calculated to lower the influence of England, -especially in regard to the scheme of mediation, which being revived -in April by lord Castlereagh, was received by the Spaniards with -outward coldness, and a secret resolution to reject it altogether; -nor were they in any want of reasons to justify their proceedings. - -This mediation had been commenced by lord Wellesley, when the quarrel -between the mother country and the colonies was yet capable of -adjustment; it was now renewed when it could not succeed. English -commissioners were appointed to carry it into execution, the duke of -Infantado was to join them on the part of Spain, and at first Mr. -Stuart was to have formed part of the commission, Mr. Sydenham being -to succeed him at Lisbon, but finally he remained in Portugal and Mr. -Sydenham was attached to the commission, whose composition he thus -described. - -“I do not understand a word of the Spanish language, I am -unacquainted with the Spanish character, I know very little of Old -Spain, and I am quite ignorant of the state of the colonies, yet I am -part of a commission composed of men of different professions, views, -habits, feelings, and opinions. The mediation proposed is at least a -year too late, it has been forced upon the government of Old Spain, -I have no confidence in the ministers who employ me, and I am fully -persuaded that they have not the slightest confidence in me.” - -The first essential object was to have Bardaxi’s secret article, -which required England to join Old Spain if the mediation failed, -withdrawn; but as this could not be done without the consent of -the Cortez, the publicity thus given would have ruined the credit -of the mediation with the colonists. Nor would the distrust of the -latter have been unfounded, for though lord Wellesley had offered -the guarantee of Great Britain to any arrangement made under her -mediation, his successors would not do so! - -“They empower us,” said Mr. Sydenham, “to negociate and sign a -treaty but will not guarantee the execution of it! My opinion is, -that the formal signature of a treaty by plenipotentiaries is in -itself a solemn guarantee, if there is good faith and fair dealing in -the transaction; and I believe that this opinion will be confirmed -by the authority of every writer on the law of nations. But this -is certainly not the doctrine of our present ministers, they make -a broad distinction between the ratification of a treaty and the -intention of seeing it duly observed.” - -The failure of such a scheme was inevitable. The Spaniards wanted -the commissioners to go first to the Caraccas, where the revolt -being full blown, nothing could be effected; the British government -insisted that they should go to Mexico, where the dispute had not -yet been pushed to extremities. After much useless diplomacy, which -continued until the end of the year, the negociation, as Mr. -Sydenham had predicted, proved abortive. - -In March the new constitution of Spain had been solemnly adopted, and -a decree settling the succession of the crown was promulgated. The -infant Francisco de Paula, the queen of Etruria, and their respective -descendants were excluded from the succession, which was to fall -first to the princess Carlotta if the infant don Carlos failed of -heirs, then to the hereditary princess of the Two Sicilies, and -so on, the empress of France and her descendants being especially -excluded. This exhibition of popular power, under the pretext of -baffling Napoleon’s schemes, struck at the principle of legitimacy. -And when the extraordinary Cortez decided that the ordinary Cortez, -which ought to assemble every year, should not be convoked until -October 1813, and thus secured to itself a tenure of power for two -years instead of one, the discontent increased both at Cadiz and -in the provinces, and a close connection was kept up between the -malcontents and the Portuguese government, which was then the strong -hold of arbitrary power in the Peninsula. - -The local junta of Estremadura adopted Carlotta’s claims, in their -whole extent, and communicated on the subject, at first secretly with -the Portuguese regency, and then more openly with Mr. Stuart. Their -scheme was to remove all the acting provincial authorities, and to -replace them with persons acknowledging Carlotta’s sovereignty; they -even declared that they would abide by the new constitution, only so -far as it acknowledged what they called legitimate power, in other -words, the princess was to be sole regent. Nevertheless this party -was not influenced by Carlotta’s intrigues, for they would not join -her agents in any outcry against the British; they acted upon the -simple principle of opposing the encroachments of democracy, and they -desired to know how England would view their proceedings. The other -provinces received the new constitution coldly, and the Biscayens -angrily rejected it as opposed to their ancient privileges. In this -state of public feeling, the abolition of the Inquisition, a design -now openly agitated, offered a point around which all the clergy, and -all that the clergy could influence, gathered against the Cortes, -which was also weakened by its own factions; yet the republicans -gained strength, and they were encouraged by the new constitution -established in Sicily, which also alarmed their opponents, and the -fear and distrust extended to the government of Portugal. - -However amidst all the varying subjects of interest the insane -project of reducing the colonies by force, remained a favourite -with all parties; nor was it in relation to the colonies only, that -these men, who were demanding aid from other nations, in the names -of freedom, justice, and humanity, proved themselves to be devoid of -those attributes themselves. “The humane object of the abolition of -the slave-trade has been frustrated,” said lord Castlereagh, “because -not only Spanish subjects but Spanish public officers and governors, -in various parts of the Spanish colonies, are instrumental to, and -accomplices in the crimes of the contraband slave-traders of Great -Britain and America, furnishing them with flags, papers, and solemn -documents to entitle them to the privileges of Spanish cruizers, and -to represent their property as Spanish.” - -With respect to the war in Spain itself, all manner of mischief -was abroad. The regular cavalry had been entirely destroyed, and -when, with the secret permission of their own government, some -distinguished Austrian officers, proffered their services to the -regency, to restore that arm, they were repelled. Nearly all the -field-artillery had been lost in action, the arsenals at Cadiz were -quite exhausted, and most of the heavy guns on the works of the Isla -were rendered unserviceable by constant and useless firing; the -stores of shot were diminished in an alarming manner, no sums were -appropriated to the support of the founderies, and when the British -artillery officers made formal representations of this dangerous -state of affairs, it only produced a demand of money from England -to put the founderies into activity. To crown the whole, Abadia, -recalled from Gallicia, at the express desire of sir Henry Wellesley -because of his bad conduct, was now made minister of war. - -In Ceuta, notwithstanding the presence of a small British force, -the Spanish garrison, the galley-slaves, and the prisoners of war -who were allowed to range at large, joined in a plan for delivering -that place to the Moors; not from a treacherous disposition in the -two first, but to save themselves from starving, a catastrophe which -was only staved off by frequent assistance from the magazines of -Gibraltar. Ceuta might have been easily acquired by England at this -period, in exchange for the debt due by Spain, and general Campbell -urged it to lord Liverpool, but he rejected the proposal, fearing to -awaken popular jealousy. The notion, however, came originally from -the people themselves, and that jealousy which lord Liverpool feared, -was already in full activity, being only another name for the -democratic spirit rising in opposition to the aristocratic principle -upon which England afforded her assistance to the Peninsula. - -The foreign policy of Spain was not less absurd than their home -policy, but it was necessarily contracted. Castro, the envoy at -Lisbon, who was agreeable both to the Portuguese and British -authorities, was removed, and Bardaxi, who was opposed to both, -substituted. This Bardaxi had been just before sent on a special -mission to Stockholm, to arrange a treaty with that court, and he -was referred to Russia for his answer, so completely subservient was -Bernadotte to the czar. One point however was characteristically -discussed by the Swedish prince and the Spanish envoy. Bardaxi -demanded assistance in troops, and Bernadotte in reply asked for a -subsidy, which was promised without hesitation, but security for the -payment being desired, the negociation instantly dropped! A treaty of -alliance was however concluded between Spain and Russia, in July, and -while Bardaxi was thus pretending to subsidize Sweden, the unceasing -solicitations of his own government had extorted from England a grant -of one million of money, together with arms and clothing for one -hundred thousand men, in return for which five thousand Spaniards -were to be enlisted for the British ranks. - -To raise Spanish corps had long been a favourite project with many -English officers, general Graham had deigned to offer his services, -and great advantages were anticipated by those who still believed -in Spanish heroism. Joseph was even disquieted, for the Catalans -had formally demanded such assistance, and a like feeling was now -expressed in other places, yet when it came to the proof only two or -three hundred starving Spaniards of the poorest condition enlisted; -they were recruited principally by the light division, were taught -with care and placed with English comrades, yet the experiment -failed, they did not make good soldiers. Meanwhile the regency -demanded and obtained from England, arms, clothing, and equipments -for ten thousand cavalry, though they had scarce five hundred regular -horsemen to arm at the time, and had just rejected the aid of the -Austrian officers in the organization of new corps. Thus the supplies -granted by Great Britain continued to be embezzled or wasted; and -with the exception of a trifling amelioration in the state of Carlos -d’Españas’ corps effected by the direct interposition of Wellington, -no public benefit seemed likely at first to accrue from the subsidy, -for every branch of administration in Spain, whether civil or -military, foreign or domestic, was cankered to the core. The public -mischief was become portentous. - -Ferdinand living in tranquillity at Valençay was so averse to -encounter any dangers for the recovery of his throne, that he -rejected all offers of assistance to escape. Kolli and the brothers -Sagas had been alike disregarded. The councellor Sobral, who while in -secret correspondence with the allies, had so long lived at Victor’s -head-quarters, and had travelled with that marshal to France, now -proposed to carry the prince off, and he also was baffled as his -predecessors had been. Ferdinand would listen to no proposal save -through Escoiquez, who lived at some distance, and Sobral who judged -this man one not to be trusted, immediately made his way to Lisbon, -fearful of being betrayed by the prince to whose succour he had come. - -Meanwhile Joseph was advancing towards the political conquest of -the country, and spoke with ostentation, of assembling a cortes -in his own interests; but this was to cover a secret intercourse -with the cortes in the Isla de Leon where his partizans called -“_Afrancesados_” were increasing: for many of the democratic party, -seeing that the gulf which separated them from the clergy, and -from England, could never be closed, and that the bad system of -government, deprived them of the people’s support, were willing to -treat with the intrusive monarch as one whose principles were more -in unison with their own. Joseph secretly offered to adopt the new -constitution, with some modifications, and as many of the cortes were -inclined to accept his terms, the British policy was on the eve of -suffering a signal defeat, when Wellington’s iron arm again fixed the -destiny of the Peninsula. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL. - - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -The internal condition of this country was not improved. The -government, composed of civilians, was unable, as well as unwilling -to stimulate the branches of administration connected with military -affairs, and the complaints of the army, reaching the Brazils, -drew reprimands from the prince; but instead of meeting the evil -with suitable laws, he only increased Beresford’s authority, which -was already sufficiently great. Thus while the foreigner’s power -augmented, the native authorities were degraded in the eyes of the -people; and as their influence to do good dwindled, their ill-will -increased, and their power of mischief was not lessened, because they -still formed the intermediate link between the military commander and -the subordinate authorities. Hence what with the passive patriotism -of the people, the abuses of the government, and the double dealing -at the Brazils, the extraordinary energy of lord Wellington and Mr. -Stuart was counterbalanced. - -The latter had foreseen that the regent’s concessions at the time -of Borel’s arrest would produce but a momentary effect in Portugal, -and all the intrigues at Rio Janeiro revived when lord Wellesley -disgusted with Perceval’s incapacity, had quitted the British -cabinet. But previous to that event, Mr. Sydenham, whose mission -to Portugal has been noticed, had so strongly represented the evil -effects of lord Strangford’s conduct, that lord Wellesley would have -immediately dismissed him, if Mr. Sydenham, who was offered the -situation, had not refused to profit from the effects of his own -report. It was then judged proper to send lord Louvaine with the -rank of ambassador, and he was to touch at Lisbon and consult with -lord Wellington whether to press the prince’s return to Portugal, or -insist upon a change in the regency; meanwhile a confidential agent, -despatched direct to Rio Janeiro, was to keep lord Strangford in the -strict line of his instructions until the ambassador arrived. - -But lord Louvaine was on bad terms with his uncle, the duke of -Northumberland, a zealous friend to lord Strangford; and for a -government, conducted on the principle of corruption, the discontent -of a nobleman, possessing powerful parliamentary influence, was -necessarily of more consequence than the success of the war in the -Peninsula. Ere a fit successor to lord Strangford could be found, -the prince regent of Portugal acceded to lord Wellington’s demands, -and it was then judged expedient to await the effect of this change -of policy. Meanwhile the dissensions, which led to the change of -ministry arose, and occupied the attention of the English cabinet to -the exclusion of all other affairs. Thus lord Strangford’s career -was for some time uncontrolled, yet after several severe rebukes -from lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, it was at last arrested, by a -conviction that his tenure of place depended upon their will. - -However, prior to this salutary check on the Brazilian intrigues, -lord Wellesley had so far intimidated the prince regent of Portugal, -that besides assenting to the reforms, he despatched Mr. DeLemos -from Rio Janeiro, furnished with authority for Beresford to act -despotically in all things connected with the administration of the -army. Moreover lord Wellington was empowered to dismiss Principal -Souza from the regency; and lord Castlereagh, following up his -predecessor’s policy on this head, insisted that all the obnoxious -members of the regency should be set aside and others appointed. -And these blows at the power of the Souza faction, were accompanied -by the death of Linhares, the head of the family, an event which -paralyzed the court of Rio Janeiro for a considerable time; -nevertheless the Souzas were still so strong, that Domingo Souza, now -Count of Funchal, was appointed prime minister, although he retained -his situation as ambassador to the English court, and continued to -reside in London. - -Lord Wellington, whose long experience of Indian intrigues rendered -him the fittest person possible to deal with the exactions, and -political cunning of a people who so much resemble Asiatics, now -opposed the removal of the obnoxious members from the regency. He -would not even dismiss the Principal Souza; for with a refined policy -he argued, that the opposition to his measures arose, as much from -the national, as from the individual character of the Portuguese -authorities, several of whom were under the displeasure of their -own court, and consequently dependent upon the British power, for -support against their enemies. There were amongst them also, persons -of great ability, and hence no beneficial change could be expected, -because the influence already gained would be lost with new men. -The latter would have the same faults, with less talent, and less -dependence on the British power, and the dismissed ministers would -become active enemies. The patriarch would go to Oporto, where his -power to do mischief would be greatly increased, and Principal Souza -would then be made patriarch. It was indeed very desirable to drive -this man, whose absurdity was so great as to create a suspicion of -insanity, from the regency, but he could neither be persuaded, nor -forced, to quit Portugal. His dismissal had been extorted from the -prince by the power of the British government, he would therefore -maintain his secret influence over the civil administration, he would -be considered a martyr to foreign influence, which would increase his -popularity, and his power would be augmented by the sanctity of his -character as patriarch. Very little advantage could then be derived -from a change, and any reform would be attributed to the English -influence, against which the numerous interests, involved in the -preservation of abuses, would instantly combine with active enmity. - -On the other hand, the government of Portugal had never yet laid -the real nature of the war fairly before the people. The latter -had been deceived, flattered, cajoled, their prowess in the field -extolled beyond reason, and the enemy spoken of contemptuously; but -the resources of the nation, which essentially consisted neither -in its armies, nor in its revenue, nor in its boasting, but in the -sacrificing of all interests to the prosecution of the contest, had -never been vigorously used to meet the emergencies of the war. The -regency had neither appealed to the patriotism of the population -nor yet enforced sacrifices, by measures, which were absolutely -necessary, because as the English general honestly observed, no -people would ever voluntarily bear such enormous, though necessary -burthens; strong laws and heavy penalties could alone insure -obedience. The Portuguese government relied upon England, and her -subsidies, and resisted all measures which could render their -natural resources more available. Their subordinates on the same -principle executed corruptly and vexatiously, or evaded, the military -regulations, and the chief supporters of all this mischief were the -Principal and his faction. - -Thus dragged by opposing forces, and environed with difficulties, -Wellington took a middle course. That is, he strove by reproaches -and by redoubled activity, to stimulate the patriotism of the -authorities; he desired the British ministers at Lisbon, and at Rio -Janeiro, to paint the dangerous state of Portugal in vivid colours, -and to urge the prince regent in the strongest manner, to enforce the -reform of those gross abuses, which in the taxes, in the customs, -in the general expenditure, and in the execution of orders by the -inferior magistrates, were withering the strength of the nation. -At the same time, amidst the turmoil of his duties in the field, -sometimes actually from the field of battle itself, he transmitted -memoirs upon the nature of these different evils, and the remedies -for them; memoirs which will attest to the latest posterity the -greatness and vigour of his capacity. - -These efforts, aided by the suspension of the subsidy, produced -partial reforms, yet the natural weakness of character and obstinacy -of the prince regent, were insurmountable obstacles to any general or -permanent cure; the first defect rendered him the tool of the court -intriguers, and the second was to be warily dealt with, lest some -dogged conduct should oblige Wellington to put his often repeated -threat, of abandoning the country, into execution. The success of the -contest was in fact of more importance to England, than to Portugal, -and this occult knot could neither be untied nor cut; the difficulty -could with appliances be lessened, but might not be swept away; hence -the British general involved in ceaseless disputes, and suffering -hourly mortifications, the least of which would have broken the -spirit of an ordinary man, had to struggle as he could to victory. - -Viewing the contest as one of life or death to Portugal, he desired -to make the whole political economy of the state a simple provision -for the war, and when thwarted, his reproaches were as bitter as -they were just; nevertheless, the men to whom they were addressed, -were not devoid of merit. In after times, while complaining that he -could find no persons of talent in Spain, he admitted that amongst -the Portuguese, Redondo possessed both probity and ability, that -Nogueira was a statesman of capacity equal to the discussion of -great questions, and that no sovereign in Europe had a better public -servant than Forjas. Even the restless Principal disinterestedly -prosecuted measures, for forcing the clergy to pay their just share -of the imposts. But greatness of mind, on great occasions, is a -rare quality. Most of the Portuguese considered the sacrifices -demanded, a sharper ill than submission, and it was impossible to -unite entire obedience to the will of the British authorities, with -an energetic, original spirit, in the native government. The Souza -faction was always violent and foolish; the milder opposition of the -three gentlemen, above mentioned, was excusable. Lord Wellington, a -foreigner, was serving his own country, pleasing his own government, -and forwarding his own fortune, final success was sure to send -him to England, resplendent with glory, and beyond the reach of -Portuguese ill-will. The native authorities had no such prospects. -Their exertions brought little of personal fame, they were disliked -by their own prince, hated by his favourites, and they feared to -excite the enmity of the people, by a vigour, which, being unpleasing -to their sovereign, would inevitably draw evil upon themselves; from -the French if the invasion succeeded, from their own court if the -independence of the country should be ultimately obtained. - -But thus much conceded, for the sake of justice, it is yet to -be affirmed, with truth, that the conduct of the Portuguese and -Brazilian governments was always unwise, often base. Notwithstanding -the prince’s concessions, it was scarcely possible to remedy any -abuses. The Lisbon government substituting evasive for active -opposition, baffled Wellington and Stuart, by proposing inadequate -laws, or by suffering the execution of effectual measures to be -neglected with impunity; and the treaty of commerce with England -always supplied them a source of dispute, partly from its natural -difficulties, partly from their own bad faith. The general’s labours -were thus multiplied not abated by his new powers, and in measuring -these labours, it is to be noted, so entirely did Portugal depend -upon England, that Wellington instead of drawing provisions for -his army from the country, in a manner fed the whole nation, and -was often forced to keep the army magazines low, that the people -might live. This is proved by the importation of rice, flour, beef, -and pork from America, which increased, each year of the war, in a -surprising manner, the price keeping pace with the quantity, while -the importation of dried fish, the ordinary food of the Portuguese, -decreased. - -[Sidenote: Pitkin’s Statistic Tables.] - -In 1808 the supply of flour and wheat, from New York, was sixty -thousand barrels. In 1811 six hundred thousand; in 1813, between -seven and eight hundred thousand. Ireland, England, Egypt, Barbary, -Sicily, the Brazils, parts of Spain, and even France, also -contributed to the consumption, which greatly exceeded the natural -means of Portugal; English treasure therefore either directly or -indirectly, furnished the nation as well as the armies. - -The peace revenue of Portugal, including the Brazils, the colonies, -and the islands, even in the most flourishing periods, had never -exceeded thirty-six millions of cruzada novas; but in 1811, although -Portugal alone raised twenty-five millions, this sum, added to -the British subsidy, fell very short of the actual expenditure; -yet economy was opposed by the local government, the prince was -continually creating useless offices for his favourites, and -encouraging law-suits and appeals to Rio Janeiro. The troops and -fortresses were neglected, although the military branches of expense -amounted to more than three-fourths of the whole receipts; and -though Mr. Stuart engaged that England either by treaty or tribute -would keep the Algerines quiet, he could not obtain the suppression -of the Portuguese navy, which always fled from the barbarians. It -was not until the middle of the year 1812, when admiral Berkeley, -whose proceedings had at times produced considerable inconvenience, -was recalled, that Mr. Stuart, with the aid of admiral Martin, who -succeeded Berkeley, without a seat in the regency, effected this -naval reform. - -The government, rather than adopt the measures suggested by -Wellington, such as keeping up the credit of the paper-money, by -regular payments of the interest, the fair and general collection of -the “_Decima_,” and the repression of abuses in the custom-house, in -the arsenal, and in the militia, always more costly than the line, -projected the issuing of fresh paper, and endeavoured, by unworthy -stock-jobbing schemes, to evade instead of meeting the difficulties -of the times. To check their folly the general withheld the subsidy, -and refused to receive their depreciated paper into the military -chest; but neither did this vigorous proceeding produce more than -a momentary return to honesty, and meanwhile, the working people -were so cruelly oppressed that they would not labour for the public, -except under the direction of British officers. Force alone could -overcome their repugnance and force was employed, not to forward -the defence of the country, but to meet particular interests and to -support abuses. Such also was the general baseness of the Fidalgos, -that even the charitable aid of money, received from England, was -shamefully and greedily claimed by the rich, who insisted, that it -was a donation to all and to be equally divided. - -Confusion and injustice prevailed every where, and Wellington’s -energies were squandered on vexatious details; at one time he was -remonstrating against the oppression of the working people, and -devising remedies for local abuses; at another superintending the -application of the English charities, and arranging the measures -necessary to revive agriculture in the devastated districts; at all -times endeavouring to reform the general administration, and in no -case was he supported. Never during the war did he find an appeal to -the patriotism of the Portuguese government answered frankly; never -did he propose a measure which was accepted without difficulties. -This opposition was at times carried to such a ridiculous extent, -that when some Portuguese nobles in the French service took refuge -with the curate Merino, and desired from their own government, a -promise of safety, to which they were really entitled, the regency -refused to give that assurance; nor would they publish an amnesty, -which the English general desired for the sake of justice and from -policy also, because valuable information as to the French army, -could have been thus obtained. The authorities would neither say yes! -nor no! and when general Pamplona applied to Wellington personally -for some assurance, the latter could only answer that in like cases -Mascarheñas had been hanged and Sabugal rewarded! - -To force a change in the whole spirit, and action of the government, -seemed to some, the only remedy for the distemperature of the -time; but this might have produced anarchy, and would have given -countenance to the democratic spirit, contrary to the general policy -of the British government. Wellington therefore desired rather to -have the prince regent at Lisbon, or the Azores, whence his authority -might, under the influence of England, be more directly used to -enforce salutary regulations; he however considered it essential -that Carlotta, whose intrigues were incessant, should not be with -him, and, she on the other hand, laboured to come back without the -prince, who was prevented from moving, by continued disturbances -in the Brazils. Mr. Stuart, then despairing of good, proposed the -establishment of a military government at once, but Wellington would -not agree, although the mischief afloat clogged every wheel of the -military machine. - -A law of king Sebastian, which obliged all gentlemen holding land to -take arms was now revived, but desertion, which had commenced with -the first appointment of British officers, increased; and so many -persons sailed away in British vessels of war, to evade military -service in their own country, that an edict was published to prevent -the practice. Beresford checked the desertion for a moment, by -condemning deserters to hard labour, and offering rewards to the -country people to deliver them up; yet griping want renewed the -evil at the commencement of the campaign, and the terrible severity -of condemning nineteen at once to death, did not repress it. The -cavalry, which had been at all times very inefficient, was now nearly -ruined, the men were become faint-hearted, the breed of horses almost -extinct, and shameful peculations amongst the officers increased the -mischief: one guilty colonel was broke and his uniform stripped from -his shoulders in the public square at Lisbon. However these examples -produced fear and astonishment rather than correction, the misery of -the troops continued, and the army, although by the care of Beresford -it was again augmented to more than thirty thousand men under arms, -declined in moral character and spirit. - -To govern armies in the field, is at all times a great and difficult -matter; and in this contest the operations were so intimately -connected with the civil administration of Portugal, Spain, and the -Brazils, and the contest, being one of principles, so affected the -policy of every nation of the civilised world, that unprecedented -difficulties sprung up in the way of the general, and the ordinary -frauds and embarrassments of war were greatly augmented. Napoleon’s -continental system joined to his financial measures, which were -quite opposed to debt and paper money, increased the pernicious -effects of the English bank restriction; specie was abundant in -France, but had nearly disappeared from England; it was only to be -obtained from abroad, and at an incredible expense. The few markets -left for British manufactures, and colonial produce, did not always -make returns in the articles necessary for the war, and gold, -absolutely indispensable in certain quantities, was only supplied, -and this entirely from the incapacity of the English ministers, in -the proportion of one-sixth of what was required, by an army which -professed to pay for every thing. Hence continual efforts, on the -part of the government, to force markets, hence a depreciation of -value both in goods and bills; hence also a continual struggle, on -the part of the general, to sustain a contest, dependant on the -fluctuation of such a precarious system. Dependant also it was upon -the prudence of three governments, one of which had just pushed its -colonies to rebellion, when the French armies were in possession -of four-fifths of the mother country; another was hourly raising up -obstacles to its own defence though the enemy had just been driven -from the capital; and the third was forcing a war with America, its -greatest and surest market, when by commerce alone it could hope to -sustain the struggle in the Peninsula. - -The failure of the preceding year’s harvest all over Europe had -rendered the supply of Portugal very difficult. Little grain was -to be obtained in any country of the north of Europe accessible to -the British, and the necessity of paying in hard money rendered -even that slight resource null. Sicily and Malta were thrown for -subsistence upon Africa, where colonial produce was indeed available -for commerce, yet the quantity of grain to be had there, was small, -and the capricious nature of the barbarians rendered the intercourse -precarious. In December 1811 there was only two months’ consumption -of corn in Portugal for the population, although the magazines of the -army contained more than three. To America therefore it was necessary -to look. Now in 1810 Mr. Stuart had given treasury bills to the -house of Sampayo for the purchase of American corn; but the disputes -between England and the United States, the depreciation of English -bills, from the quantity in the market, together with the expiration -of the American bank charter, had prevented Sampayo from completing -his commission, nevertheless, although the increasing bitterness of -the disputes with America discouraged a renewal of this plan, some -more bills were now given to the English minister at Washington, -with directions to purchase corn, and consign it to Sampayo, to -resell in Portugal as before, for the benefit of the military chest. -Other bills were also sent to the Brazils, to purchase rice, and -all the consuls in the Mediterranean were desired to encourage the -exportation of grain and the importation of colonial produce. In this -manner, despite of the English ministers’ incapacity, lord Wellington -found resources to feed the population, to recover some of the specie -expended by the army, and to maintain the war. But as the year -advanced, the Non-intercourse-Act of Congress, which had caused a -serious drain of specie from Portugal, was followed by an embargo for -ninety days, and then famine, which already afflicted parts of Spain, -menaced Portugal. - -Mr. Stuart knew of this embargo before the speculators did, and sent -his agents orders to buy up with hard cash, at a certain price, a -quantity of grain which had lately arrived at Gibraltar. He could -only forestall the speculators by a few days, the cost soon rose -beyond his means in specie, yet the new harvest being nearly ripe, -this prompt effort sufficed for the occasion, and happily so, for -the American declaration of war followed, and American privateers -were to take the place of American flour-ships. But as ruin seemed to -approach, Stuart’s energy redoubled. His agents seeking for grain in -all parts of the world, discovered that in the Brazils a sufficient -quantity might be obtained in exchange for English manufactures, to -secure Portugal from absolute famine; and to protect this traffic, -and to preserve that with the United States, he persuaded the regency -to declare the neutrality of Portugal, and to interdict the sale of -prizes within its waters. He also, at Wellington’s desire, besought -the English admiralty to reinforce the squadron in the Tagus, and -to keep cruisers at particular stations. Finally he pressed the -financial reforms in Portugal with the utmost vigour and with some -success. His efforts were, however, strangely counteracted from -quarters least expected. The English consul, in the Western Isles, -with incredible presumption, publicly excited the Islanders to war -with America, when Mr. Stuart’s efforts were directed to prevent -such a calamity; the Admiralty neglecting to station cruisers in the -proper places, left the American privateers free to range along the -Portuguese and African coast; and the cupidity of English merchants -broke down the credit of the English commissariat paper-money, which -was the chief medium of exchange on the immediate theatre of war. - -This paper had arisen from a simple military regulation. Lord -Wellington, on first assuming the command in 1809, found that all -persons, gave their own vouchers in payment for provisions, whereupon -he proclaimed, that none save commissaries should thus act; and that -all local accounts should be paid within one month, in ready money, -if it was in the chest, if not, with bills on the commissary-general. -These bills soon became numerous, because of the scarcity of specie, -yet their value did not sink, because they enabled those who had -really furnished supplies, to prove their debts without the trouble -of following the head-quarters; and they had an advantage over -receipts, inasmuch as they distinctly pointed out the person who was -to pay; they were also in accord with the customs of the country, for -the people were used to receive government bills. The possessors were -paid in rotation, whenever there was money; the small holders, who -were the real furnishers of the army first, the speculators last, a -regulation by which justice and the credit of the paper were alike -consulted. - -In 1812, this paper sunk twenty per cent., from the sordid practices -of English mercantile houses whose agents secretly depreciated its -credit and then purchased it; and in this dishonesty they were aided -by some of the commissariat, notwithstanding the vigilant probity -of the chief commissary. Sums, as low as ten pence, payable in -Lisbon, I have myself seen in the hands of poor country people on -the frontiers. By these infamous proceedings the poorer dealers were -ruined or forced to raise their prices, which hurt their sales and -contracted the markets to the detriment of the soldiers; and there -was much danger, that the people generally, would thus discover the -mode of getting cash for bills by submitting to high discounts, which -would soon have rendered the contest too costly to continue. But -the resources of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were not exhausted. -They contrived to preserve the neutrality of Portugal, and by means -of licenses continued to have importations of American flour, until -the end of the war; a very fine stroke of policy, for this flour was -paid for with English goods, and resold at a considerable profit for -specie which went to the military chest. They were less successful in -supporting the credit of the Portuguese government paper; bad faith, -and the necessities of the native commissariat, which now caused an -extraordinary issue, combined to lower its credit. - -The conde de Funchal, Mr. Villiers, and Mr. Vansittart proposed a -bank, and other schemes, such as a loan of one million and a half -from the English treasury, which shall be treated more at length -in another place. But lord Wellington ridiculing the fallacy of a -government, with revenues unequal to its expenditure, borrowing -from a government which was unable to find specie sufficient to -sustain the war, remarked, that the money could not be realised in -the Portuguese treasury, or it must be realised at the expense of -a military chest, whose hollow sound already mocked the soldiers’ -shout of victory. Again therefore he demanded the reform of abuses, -and offered to take all the responsibility and odium upon himself, -certain that the exigences of the war could be thus met, and the -most vexatious imposts upon the poor abolished; neither did he fail -to point out in detail the grounds of this conviction. His reasoning -made as little impression upon Funchal, as it had done upon Linhares; -money was no where to be had, and the general, after being forced to -become a trader himself, now tolerated, for the sake of the resources -it furnished, a contraband commerce, which he discovered Soult to -have established with English merchants at Lisbon, exchanging the -quicksilver of Almaden for colonial produce; and he was still to find -in his own personal resources, the means of beating the enemy, in -despite of the matchless follies of the governments he served. He did -so, but complained that it was a hard task. - - - - -BOOK XVIII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. May.] - -In the foregoing book, the political state of the belligerents, and -those great chains, which bound the war in the Peninsula to the -policy of the American as well as to the European nations, have been -shewn; the minor events of the war have also been narrated, and the -point where the decisive struggle was to be made has been indicated; -thus nought remains to tell, save the particular preparations of each -adverse general ere the noble armies were dashed together in the -shock of battle. - -Nearly three hundred thousand French still trampled upon Spain, -above two hundred and forty thousand were with the eagles, and so -successful had the plan of raising native soldiers proved, that forty -thousand Spaniards well organized marched under the king’s banners. - -In May the distribution of this immense army, which however according -to the French custom included officers and persons of all kinds -attached to the forces, was as follows:— - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 18] - -Seventy-six thousand, of which sixty thousand were with the eagles, -composed the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, under Suchet, and they -occupied Valencia, and the provinces whose name they bore. - -Forty-nine thousand men, of which thirty-eight thousand were with the -eagles, composed the army of the north, under Caffarelli, and were -distributed on the grand line of communication, from St. Sebastian to -Burgos; but of this army two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry -with artillery, were destined to reinforce Marmont. - -Nineteen thousand, of which seventeen thousand were with the eagles, -composed the army of the centre, occupying a variety of posts in a -circle round the capital, and having a division in La Mancha. - -Sixty-three thousand, of which fifty-six thousand were with the -eagles, composed the army of the south, under Soult, occupying -Andalusia and a part of Estremadura; but some of these troops were -detained in distant governments by other generals. - -The army of Portugal, under Marmont, consisted of seventy thousand -men, fifty-two thousand being with the eagles, and a reinforcement -of twelve thousand men were in march to join this army from France. -Marmont occupied Leon, part of Old Castile, and the Asturias, having -his front upon the Tormes, and a division watching Gallicia. - -The numerous Spanish _juramentados_ were principally employed in -Andalusia and with the army of the centre, and the experience of -Ocaña, of Badajos, and many other places, proved that for the -intrusive monarch, they fought with more vigour than their countrymen -did against him. - -[Sidenote: The King’s correspondence captured at Vittoria.] - -In March Joseph had been appointed commander-in-chief of all the -French armies, but the generals, as usual, resisted his authority. -Dorsenne denied it altogether, Caffarelli, who succeeded Dorsenne, -disputed even his civil power in the governments of the north, -Suchet evaded his orders, Marmont neglected them, and Soult firmly -opposed his injudicious military plans. The king was distressed -for money, and he complained that Marmont’s army had consumed or -plundered in three months, the whole resources of the province of -Toledo and the district of Talavera, whereby Madrid and the army -of the centre were famished. Marmont retorted by complaints of the -wasteful extravagance of the king’s military administration in the -capital. Thus dissensions were generated when the most absolute union -was required. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.] - -After the fall of Badajos Joseph judged that the allies would soon -move, either against Marmont in Castile, against himself by the -valley of the Tagus, or against Soult in Andalusia. In the first case -he designed to aid Marmont, with the divisions of the north, with -the army of the centre, and with fifteen thousand men to be drawn -from the army of the south. In the second case to draw the army of -Portugal and a portion of the army of the south into the valley of -the Tagus, while the divisions from the army of the north entered -Leon. In the third case, the half of Marmont’s army reinforced by -a division of the army of the centre, was to pass the Tagus at -Arzobispo and follow the allies. But the army of the centre was not -ready to take the field, and Wellington knew it, Marmont’s complaint -was just; waste and confusion prevailed at Madrid, and there was -so little military vigour that the Empecinado, with other partida -chiefs, pushed their excursions to the very gates of that capital. - -Joseph finally ordered Suchet to reinforce the army of the centre, -and then calling up the Italian division of Palombini from the army -of the Ebro, directed Soult to keep Drouet, with one-third of the -army of the south, so far advanced in Estremadura as to have direct -communication with general Trielhard in the valley of the Tagus; -and he especially ordered that Drouet should pass that river if -Hill passed it. It was necessary, he said, to follow the English -army, and fight it with advantage of numbers, to do which required -a strict co-operation of the three armies Drouet’s corps being the -pivot. Meanwhile Marmont and Soult being each convinced, that the -English general would invade their separate provinces, desired that -the king would so view the coming contest, and oblige the other to -regulate his movements thereby. The former complained, that having -to observe the Gallicians, and occupy the Asturias, his forces were -disseminated, and he asked for reinforcements to chase the partidas, -who impeded the gathering of provisions in Castile and Leon. But the -king, who over-rated the importance of Madrid, designed rather to -draw more troops round the capital; and he entirely disapproved of -Soult besieging Tarifa and Carthagena, arguing that if Drouet was not -ready to pass the Tagus, the whole of the allies could unite on the -right bank, and penetrate without opposition to the capital, or that -lord Wellington would concentrate to overwhelm Marmont. - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s correspondence captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -The duke of Dalmatia would not suffer Drouet to stir, and Joseph, -whose jealousy had been excited by the marshal’s power in Andalusia, -threatened to deprive him of his command. The inflexible duke replied -that the king had already virtually done so by sending orders direct -to Drouet, that he was ready to resign, but he would not commit a -gross military error. Drouet could scarcely arrive in time to help -Marmont, and would be too weak for the protection of Madrid, but -his absence would ruin Andalusia, because the allies whose force in -Estremadura was very considerable could in five marches reach Seville -and take it on the sixth; then communicating with the fleets at Cadiz -they would change their line of operations without loss, and unite -with thirty thousand other troops, British and Spanish, who were -at Gibraltar, in the Isla, in the Niebla, on the side of Murcia, -and under Ballesteros in the Ronda. A new army might also come from -the ocean, and Drouet, once beyond the Tagus could not return to -Andalusia in less than twelve days; Marmont could scarcely come there -in a month; the force under his own immediate command was spread all -over Andalusia, if collected it would not furnish thirty thousand -sabres and bayonets, exclusive of Drouet, and the evacuation of the -province would be unavoidable. - -The French misfortunes, he said, had invariably arisen from not -acting in large masses, and the army of Portugal, by spreading too -much to its right, would ruin this campaign as it had ruined the -preceding one. “Marmont should leave one or two divisions on the -Tormes, and place the rest of his army in position, on both sides of -the pass of Baños, the left near Placentia, and the right, extending -towards Somosierra, which could be occupied by a detachment. Lord -Wellington could not then advance by the valley of the Tagus without -lending his left flank; nor to the Tormes without lending his right -flank. Neither could he attack Marmont with effect, because the -latter could easily concentrate, and according to the nature of the -attack secure his retreat by the valley of the Tagus, or by the -province of Avila, while the two divisions on the Tormes reinforced -by two others from the army of the north would act on the allies’ -flank.” For these reasons Soult would not permit Drouet to quit -Estremadura, yet he promised to reinforce him and so to press Hill, -that Graham whom he supposed still at Portalegre, should be obliged -to bring up the first and sixth divisions. In fine he promised -that a powerful body of the allies should be forced to remain in -Estremadura, or Hill would be defeated and Badajos invested. This -dispute raged during May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile -the English general well acquainted from the intercepted letters -with these dissensions, made his arrangements, so as to confirm each -general in his own peculiar views. - -Soult was the more easily deceived, because he had obtained a -Gibraltar newspaper, in which, so negligent was the Portuguese -government, lord Wellington’s secret despatches to Forjas containing -an account of his army and of his first designs against the south -were printed, and it must be remembered that the plan of invading -Andalusia was only relinquished about the middle of May. Hill’s -exploit at Almaraz menaced the north and south alike, but that -general had adroitly spread a report, that his object was to -gain time for the invasion of Andalusia, and all Wellington’s -demonstrations were calculated to aid this artifice and impose upon -Soult. Graham indeed returned to Beira with the first and sixth -divisions and Cotton’s cavalry; but as Hill was at the same time -reinforced, and Graham’s march sudden and secret, the enemy were -again deceived in all quarters. For Marmont and the king, reckoning -the number of divisions, thought the bulk of the allies was in the -north, and did not discover that Hill’s corps had been nearly doubled -in numbers though his division seemed the same, while Soult not -immediately aware of Graham’s departure, found Hill more than a match -for Drouet, and still expected the allies in Andalusia. - -Drouet willing rather to obey the king than Soult, drew towards -Medellin in June, but Soult, as we have seen, sent the reinforcements -from Seville, by the road of Monasterio, and thus obliged him to -come back. Then followed those movements and counter-movements -in Estremadura, which have been already related, each side being -desirous of keeping a great number of their adversaries in that -province. Soult’s judgment was thus made manifest, for Drouet could -only have crossed the Tagus with peril to Andalusia, whereas, without -endangering that province, he now made such a powerful diversion for -Marmont, that Wellington’s army in the north was reduced below the -army of Portugal, and much below what the latter could be raised -to, by detachments from the armies of the north, and of the centre. -However in the beginning of June, while the French generals were -still disputing, lord Wellington’s dispositions were completed, he -had established at last an extensive system of gaining intelligence -all over Spain, and as his campaign was one which posterity will -delight to study, it is fitting to shew very exactly the foundation -on which the operations rested. - -His political and military reasons for seeking a battle have been -before shewn, but this design was always conditional; he would fight -on advantage, but he would risk nothing beyond the usual chances of -combat. While Portugal was his, every movement, which obliged the -enemy to concentrate was an advantage, and his operations were ever -in subservience to this vital condition. His whole force amounted -to nearly ninety thousand men, of which about six thousand were in -Cadiz, but the Walcheren expedition was still to be atoned for: the -sick were so numerous amongst the regiments which had served there, -that only thirty-two thousand or a little more than half of the -British soldiers, were under arms. This number, with twenty-four -thousand Portuguese, made fifty-six thousand sabres and bayonets in -the field; and it is to be remembered that now and at all times the -Portuguese infantry were mixed with the British either by brigades or -regiments; wherefore in speaking of English divisions in battle the -Portuguese battalions are always included, and it is to their praise, -that their fighting was such as to justify the use of the general -term. - -The troops were organized in the following manner. - -Two thousand cavalry and fifteen thousand infantry, with twenty-four -guns, were under Hill, who had also the aid of four garrison -Portuguese regiments, and of the fifth Spanish army. Twelve hundred -Portuguese cavalry were in the Tras Os Montes, under general D’Urban, -and about three thousand five hundred British cavalry and thirty-six -thousand infantry, with fifty-four guns, were under Wellington’s -immediate command, which was now enlarged by three thousand five -hundred Spaniards, infantry and cavalry, under Carlos D’España and -Julian Sanchez. - -The bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed to lengthen the French -lateral communications, and Wellington now ordered the bridge of -Alcantara to be repaired to shorten his own. The breach in that -stupendous structure was ninety feet wide, and one hundred and fifty -feet above the water line. Yet the fertile genius of colonel Sturgeon -furnished the means of passing this chasm, with heavy artillery, and -without the enemy being aware of the preparations made until the -moment of execution. In the arsenal of Elvas he secretly prepared a -net-work of strong ropes, after a fashion which permitted it to be -carried in parts, and with the beams, planking, and other materials -it was transported to Alcantara on seventeen carriages. Straining -beams were then fixed in the masonry, on each side of the broken -arch, cables were stretched across the chasm, the net-work was drawn -over, tarpaulin blinds were placed at each side, and the heaviest -guns passed in safety. This remarkable feat procured a new, and -short, internal line of communication, along good roads, while the -enemy, by the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, was thrown upon a -long external line, and very bad roads. - -Hill’s corps was thus suddenly brought a fortnight’s march nearer to -Wellington, than Drouet was to Marmont, if both marched as armies -with artillery; but there was still a heavy drag upon the English -general’s operations. He had drawn so largely upon Portugal for means -of transport, that agriculture was seriously embarrassed, and yet -his subsistence was not secured for more than a few marches beyond -the Agueda. To remedy this he set sailors and workmen to remove -obstructions in the Douro and the Tagus; the latter, which in Philip -the Second’s time had been navigable from Toledo to Lisbon, was -opened to Malpica, not far from Alcantara, and the Douro was opened -as high as Barca de Alba, below which it ceases to be a Spanish -river. The whole land transport of the interior of Portugal was thus -relieved; the magazines were brought up the Tagus, close to the -new line of communication by Alcantara, on one side; on the other, -the country vessels conveyed povisions to the mouth of the Douro, -and that river then served to within a short distance of Almeida, -Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca. Still danger was to be apprehended -from the American privateers along the coast, which the Admiralty -neglected; and the navigation of the Douro was suddenly suspended by -the overheated zeal of a commissary, who being thwarted by the delays -of the boatmen, issued, of his own authority, an edict, establishing -regulations, and pronouncing pains and penalties upon all those who -did not conform to them. The river was immediately abandoned by the -craft, and the government endeavoured by a formal protest, to give -political importance to this affair, which was peculiarly vexatious, -inasmuch as the boatmen were already so averse to passing the old -points of navigation, that very severe measures were necessary to -oblige them to do so. - -When this matter was arranged, Wellington had still to dread that -if his operations led him far into Spain, the subsistence of his -army would be insecure; for there were many objects of absolute -necessity, especially meat, which could not be procured except with -ready money, and not only was he unfurnished of specie, but his hopes -of obtaining it were nearly extinguished, by the sweep lord William -Bentinck had made in the Mediterranean money-market: moreover the -English ministers chose this period of difficulty to interfere, and -in an ignorant and injurious manner, with his mode of issuing bills -to supply his necessities. His resolution to advance could not be -shaken, yet before crossing the Agueda, having described his plan of -campaign to lord Liverpool, he finished in these remarkable words. - -“I am not insensible to losses and risks, nor am I blind to the -disadvantages under which I undertake this operation. My friends in -Castile, and I believe no officer ever had better, assure me that we -shall not want provisions even before the harvest will be reaped; -that there exist concealed granaries which shall be opened to us, -and that if we can pay for a part, credit will be given to us for -the remainder, and they have long given me hopes that we should be -able to borrow money in Castile upon British securities. In case we -should be able to maintain ourselves in Castile, the general action -and its results being delayed by the enemy’s manœuvres, which I -think not improbable, I have in contemplation other resources for -drawing supplies from the country, and I shall have at all events -our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. _But with all these -prospects I cannot reflect without shuddering upon the probability -that we shall be distressed; nor upon the consequences which may -result from our wanting money in the interior of Spain._” - -In the contemplated operations lord Wellington did not fail to look -both to his own and to his enemy’s flanks. His right was secured by -the destruction of the forts, the stores, and boats at Almaraz; for -the valley of the Tagus was exhausted of provisions, and full of -cross rivers which required a pontoon train to pass if the French -should menace Portugal seriously in that line: moreover he caused -the fortress of Monte Santos, which covered the Portuguese frontier -between the Tagus and Ciudad Rodrigo to be put into a state of -defence, and the restoration of Alcantara gave Hill the power of -quickly interfering. On the other side if Marmont, strengthened by -Caffarelli’s division, should operate strongly against the allies’ -left, a retreat was open either upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or across the -mountains into the valley of the Tagus. Such were his arrangements -for his own interior line of operations, and to menace his enemy’s -flanks his measures embraced the whole Peninsula. - -1º. He directed Silveira and D’Urban, who were on the frontier of -Tras os Montes, to file along the Douro, menace the enemy’s right -flank and rear, and form a link of connection with the Gallician -army, with which Castaños promised to besiege Astorga, as soon as -the Anglo-Portuguese should appear on the Tormes. Meanwhile sir -Home Popham’s expedition was to commence its operations, in concert -with the seventh Spanish army, on the coast of Biscay and so draw -Caffarelli’s divisions from the succour of Marmont. - -2º. To hinder Suchet from reinforcing the king, or making a movement -towards Andalusia, the Sicilian expedition was to menace Catalonia -and Valencia, in concert with the Murcian army. - -3º. To prevent Soult overwhelming Hill, Wellington trusted, 1º. to -the garrison of Gibraltar, and to the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish -troops, in the Isla de Leon; 2º. to insurrections in the kingdom of -Cordoba, where Echevaria going from Cadiz, by the way of Ayamonte, -with three hundred officers, was to organize the Partidas of that -district, as Mendizabel had done those of the northern parts; 3º. to -Ballesteros’s army, but he ever dreaded the rashness of this general, -who might be crushed in a moment, which would have endangered Hill -and rendered any success in the north nugatory. - -It was this fear of Ballesteros’s rashness that caused Wellington to -keep so strong a corps in Estremadura, and hence Soult’s resolution -to prevent Drouet from quitting Estremadura, even though Hill should -cross the Tagus, was wise and military. For though Drouet would -undoubtedly have given the king and Marmont a vast superiority in -Castile, the general advantage would have remained with Wellington. -Hill could at any time have misled Drouet by crossing the bridge of -Alcantara, and returning again, when Drouet had passed the bridge -of Toledo or Arzobispo. The French general’s march would then have -led to nothing, for either Hill could have joined Wellington, by -a shorter line, and Soult, wanting numbers, could not have taken -advantage of his absence from Estremadura; or Wellington could -have retired within the Portuguese frontier, rendering Drouet’s -movement to Castile a pure loss; or reinforcing Hill by the bridge of -Alcantara, he could have gained a fortnight’s march and overwhelmed -Soult in Andalusia. The great error of the king’s plan was that it -depended upon exact co-operation amongst persons who jealous of each -other were far from obedient to himself, and whose marches it was -scarcely possible to time justly; because the armies were separated -by a great extent of country and their lines of communication were -external long and difficult, while their enemy was acting on -internal short and easy lines. Moreover the French correspondence, -continually intercepted by the Partidas, was brought to Wellington, -and the knowledge thus gained by one side and lost by the other -caused the timely reinforcing of Hill in Estremadura, and the keeping -of Palombini’s Italian division from Madrid for three weeks; an event -which in the sequel proved of vital consequence, inasmuch as it -prevented the army of the centre moving until after the crisis of the -campaign had passed. - -Hill’s exploit at Almaraz, and the disorderly state of the army -of the centre, having in a manner isolated the army of Portugal, -the importance of Gallicia and the Asturias, with respect to the -projected operations of lord Wellington, was greatly increased. For -the Gallicians could either act in Castile upon the rear of Marmont, -and so weaken the line of defence on the Douro; or, marching through -the Asturias, spread insurrection along the coast to the Montaña de -Santander and there join the seventh army. Hence the necessity of -keeping Bonet in the Asturias, and watching the Gallician passes, was -become imperative, and Marmont, following Napoleon’s instructions, -had fortified the different posts in Castile, but his army was too -widely spread, and, as Soult observed, was extended to its right -instead of concentrating on the left near Baños. - -The duke of Ragusa had resolved to adopt the Tormes and Douro, as -his lines of defence, and never doubting that he was the object of -attack, watched the augmentation of Wellington’s forces and magazines -with the utmost anxiety. He had collected considerable magazines -himself, and the king had formed others for him at Talavera and -Segovia, yet he did not approach the Agueda, but continued to occupy -a vast extent of country for the convenience of feeding them until -June. When he heard of the restoration of the bridge of Alcantara, -and of magazines being formed at Caceres, he observed that the latter -would be on the left of the Guadiana if Andalusia were the object; -and although not well placed for an army acting against himself, were -admirably placed for an army which having fought in Castile should -afterwards operate against Madrid, because they could be transported -at once to the right of the Tagus by Alcantara, and could be secured -by removing the temporary restorations. Wherefore, judging that Hill -would immediately rejoin Wellington, to aid in the battle, that, with -a prophetic feeling he observed, would be fought near the Tormes, he -desired Caffarelli to put the divisions of the army of the north in -movement; and he prayed the king to have guns, and a pontoon train -sent from Madrid that Drouet might pass at Almaraz and join him by -the Puerto Pico. - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 3.] - -Joseph immediately renewed his orders to Soult, and to Caffarelli, -but he only sent two small boats to Almaraz; and Marmont, seeing -the allied army suddenly concentrated on the Agueda, recalled Foy -from the valley of the Tagus, and Bonet from the Asturias. His first -design was to assemble the army at Medina del Campo, Valladolid, -Valdesillas, Toro, Zamora, and Salamanca, leaving two battalions and -a brigade of dragoons at Benavente to observe the Gallicians. Thus -the bulk of the troops would line the Duero, while two divisions -formed an advanced guard, on the Tormes, and the whole could be -concentrated in five days. His ultimate object was to hold the Tormes -until Wellington’s whole army was on that river, then to assemble -his own troops on the Duero, and act so as to favour the defence of -the forts at Salamanca until reinforcements from the north should -enable him to drive the allies again within the Portuguese frontier; -and he warned Caffarelli that the forts could not hold out more than -fifteen days after they should be abandoned by the French army. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted French papers, MSS.] - -Marmont was a man to be feared. He possessed quickness of -apprehension and courage, moral and physical, scientific -acquirements, experience of war, and great facility in the moving -of troops; he was strong of body, in the flower of life, eager for -glory, and although neither a great nor a fortunate commander, such a -one as might bear the test of fire. His army was weak in cavalry but -admirably organized, for he had laboured with successful diligence, -to restore that discipline which had been so much shaken by the -misfortunes of Massena’s campaign, and by the unceasing operations -from the battle of Fuentes Onoro to the last retreat from Beira. -Upon this subject a digression must be allowed, because it has been -often affirmed, that the bad conduct of the French in the Peninsula, -was encouraged by their leaders, was unmatched in wickedness, and -peculiar to the nation. Such assertions springing from morbid -national antipathies it is the duty of the historian to correct. All -troops will behave ill, when ill-governed, but the best commanders -cannot at times prevent the perpetration of the most frightful -mischief; and this truth, so important to the welfare of nations, may -be proved with respect to the Peninsular war, by the avowal of the -generals on either side, and by their endeavours to arrest the evils -which they deplored. When Dorsenne returned from his expedition -against Gallicia, in the latter end of 1811, he reproached his -soldiers in the following terms. “The fields have been devastated and -houses have been burned; these excesses are unworthy of the French -soldier, they pierce the hearts of the most devoted and friendly of -the Spaniards, they are revolting to honest men, and embarrass the -provisioning of the army. The general-in-chief sees them with sorrow, -and orders; that besides a permanent court-martial, there shall be -at the head-quarters of each division, of every arm, a military -commission which shall try the following crimes, and on conviction, -sentence to death, without appeal; execution to be done on the spot, -in presence of the troops. - -“1º. Quitting a post to pillage. 2º. Desertion of all kinds. 3º. -Disobedience in face of the enemy. 4º. Insubordination of all kinds. -5º. Marauding of all kinds. 6º. Pillage of all kinds. - -“_All persons military or others, shall be considered as pillagers, -who quit their post or their ranks to enter houses, &c. or who use -violence to obtain from the inhabitants more than they are legally -entitled to._ - -“_All persons shall be considered deserters who shall be found -without a passport beyond the advanced posts, and frequent patroles -day and night shall be sent to arrest all persons beyond the -outposts._ - -“_Before the enemy when in camp or cantonments roll-calls shall take -place every hour, and all persons absent without leave twice running -shall be counted deserters and judged as such. The servants and -sutlers of the camp are amenable to this as well as the soldier._” - -This order Marmont, after reproaching his troops for like excesses, -renewed with the following additions. - -“_Considering that the disorders of the army have arrived at the -highest degree, and require the most vigorous measures of repression, -it is ordered,_ - -“1º. _All non-commissioned officers and soldiers found a quarter of -a league from their quarters, camp, or post without leave, shall be -judged pillagers and tried by the military commission._ - -“2º. _The gens-d’armes shall examine the baggage of all sutlers and -followers and shall seize all effects that appear to be pillaged, -and shall burn what will burn, and bring the gold and silver to the -paymaster-general under a ‘procès verbal,’ and all persons whose -effects have been seized as pillage to the amount of one hundred -livres shall be sent to the military commission, and on conviction -suffer death._ - -“3º. _All officers who shall not take proper measures to repress -disorders under their command shall be sent in arrest to -head-quarters there to be judged._” - -Then appointing the number of baggage animals to each company, upon -a scale which coincides in a remarkable manner with the allowances -in the British army, Marmont directed the overplus to be seized and -delivered, under a legal process, to the nearest villages, ordering -the provost-general to look to the execution each day, and report -thereon. Finally, he clothed the provost-general with all the powers -of the military commissions; and proof was soon given that his orders -were not mere threats, for two captains were arrested for trial, and -a soldier of the twenty-sixth regiment was condemned to death by one -of the provisional commissions for stealing church vessels. - -Such was the conduct of the French, and touching the conduct of the -English, lord Wellington, in the same month, wrote thus to lord -Liverpool. - -“_The outrages committed by the British soldiers, belonging to this -army, have become so enormous, and they have produced an effect on -the minds of the people of the country, so injurious to the cause, -and likely to be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request your -Lordship’s early attention to the subject. I am sensible that the -best measures to be adopted on this subject are those of prevention, -and I believe there are few officers who have paid more attention -to the subject than I have done, and I have been so far successful, -as that few outrages are committed by the soldiers who are with -their regiments, after the regiments have been a short time in this -country._” - -“_But in the extended system on which we are acting, small -detachments of soldiers must be marched long distances, through -the country, either as escorts, or returning from being escorts to -prisoners, or coming from hospitals, &c. and notwithstanding that -these detachments are never allowed to march, excepting under the -command of an officer or more, in proportion to its size, and that -every precaution is taken to provide for the regularity of their -subsistence, there is no instance of the march of one of these -detachments that outrages of every description are not committed, and -I am sorry to say with impunity._” - -“_The guard-rooms are therefore crowded with prisoners, and the -offences of which they have been guilty remain unpunished, to the -destruction of the discipline of the army, and to the injury of the -reputation of the country for justice. I have thought it proper to -lay these circumstances before your lordship. I am about to move the -army further forward into Spain, and I assure your lordship, that -I have not a friend in that country, who has not written to me in -dread of the consequences, which must result to the army, and to the -cause from a continuance of these disgraceful irregularities, which I -declare I have it not in my power to prevent._” - -To this should have been added, the insubordination, and the evil -passions, awakened by the unchecked plunder of Ciudad Rodrigo and -Badajos. But long had the English general complained of the bad -discipline of his army, and the following extracts, from a letter -dated a few months later, shew that his distrust at the present -time was not ill-founded. After observing that the constitutions of -the soldiers were so much shaken from disorders acquired by their -service at Walcheren, or by their own irregularities, that a British -army was almost a moving hospital, more than one-third or about -twenty thousand men being sick, or attending upon the sick, he thus -describes their conduct. - -“_The disorders which these soldiers have, are of a very trifling -description, they are considered to render them incapable of serving -with their regiments, but they certainly do not incapacitate them -from committing outrages of all descriptions on their passage through -the country, and in the last movements of the hospitals the soldiers -have not only plundered the inhabitants of their property, but the -hospital stores which moved with the hospitals, and have sold the -plunder. And all these outrages are committed with impunity, no proof -can be brought on oath before a court-martial that any individual -has committed an outrage, and the soldiers of the army are becoming -little better than a band of robbers._” “_I have carried the -establishment and authority of the provost-marshal as far as either -will go; there are at this moment not less than one provost-marshal, -and nineteen assistant provost-marshals, attached to the several -divisions of cavalry and infantry and to the hospital stations, to -preserve order, but this establishment is not sufficient, and I have -not the means of increasing it._” - -The principal remedies he proposed, were the admitting less rigorous -proof of guilt, before courts martial; the forming a military police, -_such as the French, and other armies possessed_; the enforcing more -attention on the part of the officers to their duties; the increasing -the pay and responsibility of the non-commissioned officers, and the -throwing upon them the chief care of the discipline. But in treating -this part of the subject he broached an opinion which can scarcely be -sustained even by his authority. Assuming, somewhat unjustly, that -the officers of his army were, from consciousness of like demerit, -generally too lenient in their sentences on each other for neglect -of duty, he says, “I am inclined to entertain the opinion that in -the British army duties of inspection and control over the conduct -and habits of the soldiers, the performance of which by somebody -is the only effectual check to disorder and all its consequences, -are imposed upon the subaltern officers of regiments, which duties -British officers, being of the class of gentlemen in society, and -being required to appear as such, have never performed _and which -they will never perform_. It is very necessary, however, that the -duties should be performed by somebody, and for this reason, and -having observed the advantage derived in the guards, from the -respectable body of non-commissioned officers in those regiments, -who perform all the duties required from subalterns in the marching -regiments, I had suggested to your lordship the expediency of -increasing the pay of the non-commissioned officers in the army.” - -Now it is a strange assumption, that a gentleman necessarily neglects -his duty to his country. When well taught, which was not always -the case, gentlemen by birth generally performed their duties in -the Peninsula more conscientiously than others, and the experience -of every commanding officer will bear out the assertion. If the -non-commissioned officers could do all the duties of subaltern -officers, why should the country bear the useless expense of the -latter? But in truth the system of the guards produced rather a -medium goodness, than a superior excellence; the system of sir -John Moore, founded upon the principle, that the officers should -thoroughly know, and be responsible for the discipline of their -soldiers, better bore the test of experience. All the British -regiments of the light division were formed in the camps of -Shorn-Cliff by that most accomplished commander; very many of the -other acknowledged good regiments of the army had been instructed -by him in Sicily; and wherever an officer, formed under Moore, -obtained a regiment, whether British or Portuguese, that regiment was -distinguished in this war for its discipline and enduring qualities; -courage was common to all. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -CAMPAIGN OF 1812. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. June.] - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 2.] - -On the 13th of June, the periodic rains having ceased, and the field -magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda and marched -towards the Tormes in four columns, one of which was composed of the -Spanish troops. The 16th he reached the Valmusa stream, within six -miles of Salamanca, and drove a French detachment across the Tormes. -All the bridges, save that of Salamanca which was defended by the -forts, had been destroyed, and there was a garrison in the castle of -Alba de Tormes, but the 17th the allies passed the river above and -below the town, by the deep fords of Santa Marta and Los Cantos, and -general Henry Clinton invested the forts the same day with the sixth -division. Marmont, with two divisions, and some cavalry, retired to -Fuente el Sauco, on the road of Toro, followed by an advanced guard -of the allies; Salamanca instantly became a scene of rejoicing, -the houses were illuminated, and the people shouting, singing, and -weeping for joy, gave Wellington their welcome while his army took a -position on the mountain of San Cristoval about five miles in advance. - - -SIEGE OF THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA. - -[Sidenote: Jones’s Sieges.] - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s despatches, MSS.] - -Four eighteen-pounders had followed the army from Almeida, three -twenty-four pound howitzers were furnished by the field-artillery, -and the battering train used by Hill at Almaraz, had passed the -bridge of Alcantara the 11th. These were the means of offence, but -the strength of the forts had been under-rated; they contained eight -hundred men, and it was said that thirteen convents and twenty-two -colleges had been destroyed in their construction. San Vincente, so -called from the large convent it enclosed, was the key-fort. Situated -on a perpendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes, and irregular in -form, but well flanked, it was separated by a deep ravine from the -other forts, which were called St. Cajetano and La Merced. These were -also on high ground, smaller than San Vincente, and of a square form, -but with bomb-proofs, and deep ditches, having perpendicular scarps -and counterscarps. - -In the night of the 17th colonel Burgoyne, the engineer directing the -siege, commenced a battery, for eight guns, at the distance of two -hundred and fifty yards from the main wall of Vincente, and as the -ruins of the destroyed convents rendered it impossible to excavate, -earth was brought from a distance; but the moon was up, the night -short, the enemy’s fire of musketry heavy, the workmen of the sixth -division were inexperienced, and at day-break the battery was still -imperfect. Meanwhile an attempt had been made to attach the miner -secretly to the counterscarp, and when the vigilance of a trained -dog baffled this design, the enemy’s picquet was driven in, and the -attempt openly made, yet it was rendered vain by a plunging fire from -the top of the convent. - -On the 18th eight hundred Germans, placed in the ruins, mastered all -the enemy’s fire save that from loop-holes, and colonel May, who -directed the artillery service, then placed two field-pieces on a -neighbouring convent, called San Bernardo, overlooking the fort, -however these guns could not silence the French artillery. - -In the night, the first battery was armed, covering for two -field-pieces as a counter-battery was raised a little to its right, -and a second breaching battery for two howitzers, was constructed on -the Cajetano side of the ravine. - -At day-break on the 19th seven guns opened, and at nine o’clock the -wall of the convent was cut away to the level of the counterscarp. -The second breaching battery, which saw lower down the scarp, then -commenced its fire; but the iron howitzers proved unmeet battering -ordnance, and the enemy’s musketry being entirely directed on this -point, because the first battery, to save ammunition, had ceased -firing, brought down a captain and more than twenty gunners. The -howitzers did not injure the wall, ammunition was scarce, and as the -enemy could easily cut off the breach in the night, the fire ceased. - -The 20th at mid-day, colonel Dickson arrived with the iron howitzers -from Elvas, and the second battery being then reinforced with -additional pieces, revived its fire, against a re-entering angle of -the convent a little beyond the former breach. The wall here was -soon broken through, and in an instant a huge cantle of the convent, -with its roof, went to the ground, crushing many of the garrison and -laying bare the inside of the building: carcasses were immediately -thrown into the opening, to burn the convent, but the enemy -undauntedly maintained their ground and extinguished the flames. A -lieutenant and fifteen gunners were lost this day, on the side of -the besiegers, and the ammunition being nearly gone, the attack was -suspended until fresh stores could come up from Almeida. - -During the progress of this siege, the general aspect of affairs had -materially changed on both sides. Lord Wellington had been deceived -as to the strength of the forts, and intercepted returns of the -armies of the south and of Portugal now shewed to him, that they also -were far stronger than he had expected; at the same time he heard of -Ballesteros’s defeat at Bornos, and of Slade’s unfortunate cavalry -action of Llera. He had calculated that Bonet would not quit the -Asturias, and that general was in full march for Leon, Caffarelli -also was preparing to reinforce Marmont, and thus the brilliant -prospect of the campaign was suddenly clouded. But on the other hand -Bonet had unexpectedly relinquished the Asturias after six days’ -occupation; three thousand Gallicians were in that province and in -communication with the seventh army, and the maritime expedition -under Popham had sailed for the coast of Biscay. - -Neither was the king’s situation agreeable. The Partidas intercepted -his despatches so surely, that it was the 19th ere Marmont’s letter -announcing Wellington’s advance, and saying that Hill also was in -march for the north reached Madrid. Soult detained Drouet, Suchet -refused to send more than one brigade towards Madrid, and Caffarelli, -disturbed that Palombini should march upon the capital instead of -Burgos, kept back the divisions promised to Marmont. Something was -however gained in vigour, for the king, no longer depending upon the -assistance of the distant armies, gave orders to blow up Mirabete -and abandon La Mancha on one side, and the forts of Somosierra and -Buitrago on the other, with a view to unite the army of the centre. - -A detachment of eight hundred men under colonel Noizet, employed -to destroy Buitrago, was attacked on his return by the Empecinado -with three thousand, but Noizet, an able officer, defeated him and -reached Madrid with little loss. Palombini’s march was then hastened, -and imperative orders directed Soult to send ten thousand men to -Toledo. The garrison of Segovia was reinforced to preserve one of the -communications with Marmont, that marshal was informed of Hill’s true -position, and the king advised him to give battle to Wellington, for -he supposed the latter to have only eighteen thousand English troops; -but he had twenty-four thousand, and had yet left Hill so strong that -he desired him to fight Drouet if occasion required. - -Meanwhile Marmont, who had remained in person at Fuente el Sauco, -united there, on the 20th, four divisions of infantry and a brigade -of cavalry, furnishing about twenty-five thousand men of all arms, -with which he marched to the succour of the forts. His approach -over an open country was descried at a considerable distance, and -a brigade of the fifth division was immediately called off from -the siege, the battering train was sent across the Tormes, and the -army, which was in bivouac on the Salamanca side of St. Christoval, -formed in order of battle on the top. This position of Christoval -was about four miles long, and rather concave, the ascent in front -steep, and tangled with hollow roads and stone enclosures, belonging -to the villages, but the summit was broad, even, and covered with -ripe corn; the right was flanked by the Upper Tormes, and the left -dipped into the country bordering the Lower Tormes, for in passing -Salamanca, that river makes a sweep round the back of the position. -The infantry, the heavy cavalry, and the guns crowned the summit -of the mountain, but the light cavalry fell back from the front to -the low country on the left, where there was a small stream and a -marshy flat. The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind the -left of the position; the village of Cabrerizos marked the extreme -right, though the hill still trended up the river. The villages of -Christoval, Castillanos, and Moresco, were nearly in a line, along -the foot of the heights in front, the last was somewhat within the -allies’ ground, and nothing could be stronger than the position, -which completely commanded all the country for many miles; but the -heat was excessive and there was neither shade, nor fuel to cook -with, nor water nearer than the Tormes. - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 3.] - -About five o’clock in the evening the enemy’s horsemen approached, -pointing towards the left of the position, as if to turn it by the -Lower Tormes, whereupon the British light cavalry made a short -forward movement and a partial charge took place; but the French -opened six guns, and the British retired to their own ground near -Monte Rubio and Villares. The light division which was held in -reserve, immediately closed towards the left of the position until -the French cavalry halted and then returned to the centre. Meanwhile -the main body of the enemy bore, in one dark volume, against the -right, and halting at the very foot of the position, sent a flight of -shells on to the lofty summit; nor did this fire cease until after -dark, when the French general, after driving back all the outposts, -obtained possession of Moresco, and established himself behind that -village and Castellanos within gun-shot of the allies. - -The English general slept that night on the ground, amongst the -troops, and at the first streak of light the armies were again under -arms. Nevertheless, though some signals were interchanged between -Marmont and the forts, both sides were quiet until towards evening, -when Wellington detached the sixty-eighth regiment from the line, -to drive the French from Moresco. This attack, made with vigour, -succeeded, but the troops being recalled just as day-light failed, a -body of French coming unperceived through the standing corn, broke -into the village as the British were collecting their posts from the -different avenues, and did considerable execution. In the skirmish an -officer of the sixty-eighth, named Mackay, being suddenly surrounded, -refused to surrender, and singly fighting against a multitude, -received more wounds than the human frame was thought capable of -sustaining, yet he still lives to shew his honourable scars. - -On the 22d three divisions, and a brigade of cavalry joined Marmont, -who having now nearly forty thousand men in hand, extended his left -and seized a part of the height in advance of the allies’ right wing, -from whence he could discern the whole of their order of battle, and -attack their right on even terms. However general Graham advancing -with the seventh division dislodged this French detachment with a -sharp skirmish before it could be formidably reinforced, and that -night Marmont withdrew from his dangerous position to some heights -about six miles in his rear. - -It was thought that the French general’s tempestuous advance to -Moresco with such an inferior force, on the evening of the 20th, -should have been his ruin. Lord Wellington saw clearly enough the -false position of his enemy, but he argued, that if Marmont came up -to fight, it was better to defend a very strong position, than to -descend and combat in the plain, seeing that the inferiority of force -was not such as to insure the result of the battle being decisive of -the campaign; and in case of failure, a retreat across the Tormes -would have been very difficult. To this may be added, that during the -first evening there was some confusion amongst the allies, before the -troops of the different nations could form their order of battle. -Moreover, as the descent of the mountain towards the enemy was by no -means easy, because of the walls and avenues, and the two villages, -which covered the French front, it is probable that Marmont, who had -plenty of guns and whose troops were in perfect order and extremely -ready of movement, could have evaded the action, until night. This -reasoning, however, will not hold good on the 21st. The allies, whose -infantry was a third more and their cavalry three times as numerous -and much better mounted than the French, might have been poured down -by all the roads passing over the position at day-break; then Marmont -turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, could never have made -his retreat to the Douro through the open country; but on the 22d, -when the French general had received his other divisions, the chances -were no longer the same. - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 3.] - -Marmont’s new position was skilfully chosen; one flank rested on -Cabeza Vellosa, the other at Huerta, the centre was at Aldea Rubia. -He thus refused his right and abandoned the road of Toro to the -allies, but he covered the road of Tordesillas, and commanded the -fort of Huerta with his left; and he could in a moment pass the -Tormes, and operate by the left bank to communicate with the forts. -Wellington made corresponding dispositions, closing up his left -towards Moresco, and pushing the light division along the salient -part of his position to Aldea Lengua, where it overhung a ford, which -was however scarcely practicable at this period. General Graham with -two divisions was placed at the fords of Santa Marta, and the heavy -German cavalry under general Bock crossed the Tormes to watch the -ford of Huerta. By this disposition the allies covered Salamanca, and -could operate on either side of the Tormes on a shorter line than the -French could operate. - -The 23d the two armies again remained tranquil, but at break of day -on the 24th some dropping pistol-shots, and now and then a shout, -came faintly from the mist which covered the lower ground beyond the -river; the heavy sound of artillery succeeded, and the hissing of the -bullets as they cut through the thickened atmosphere, plainly told -that the French were over the Tormes. After a time the fog cleared -up, and the German horsemen were seen in close and beautiful order, -retiring before twelve thousand French infantry, who in battle array -were marching steadily onwards. At intervals, twenty guns, ranged -in front, would start forwards and send their bullets whistling and -tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, while scattered parties of -light cavalry, scouting out, capped all the hills in succession, and -peering abroad, gave signals to the main body. Wellington immediately -sent Graham across the river by the fords of Santa Marta with the -first and seventh divisions and Le Marchant’s brigade of English -cavalry; then concentrating the rest of the army between Cabrerizos -and Moresco, he awaited the progress of Marmont’s operation. - -Bock continued his retreat in the same fine and equable order, -regardless alike of the cannonade and of the light horsemen on his -flanks, until the enemy’s scouts had gained a height above Calvarisa -Abaxo, from whence, at the distance of three miles, they for the -first time, perceived Graham’s twelve thousand men, and eighteen -guns, ranged on an order of battle, perpendicular to the Tormes. -From the same point also Wellington’s heavy columns were to be seen, -clustering on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the -light division was descried at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance -against the French troops left on the position of Aldea Rubia, or to -pass the river to the aid of Graham. This apparition made the French -general aware of his error, whereupon hastily facing about, and -repassing the Tormes he resumed his former ground. - -Wellington’s defensive dispositions on this occasion were very -skilful, but it would appear that unwilling to stir before the forts -fell, he had again refused the advantage of the moment; for it is -not to be supposed that he misjudged the occasion, since the whole -theatre of operation was distinctly seen from St. Christoval, and -he had passed many hours in earnest observation; his faculties were -indeed so fresh and vigorous, that after the day’s work he wrote -a detailed memoir upon the proposal for establishing a bank in -Portugal, treating that and other financial schemes in all their -bearings, with a master hand. Against the weight of his authority, -therefore, any criticism must be advanced. - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 2.] - -Marmont had the easiest passage over the Tormes, namely, that by the -ford of Huerta; the allies had the greatest number of passages and -the shortest line of operations. Hence if Graham had been ordered -vigorously to attack the French troops on the left bank, they must -have been driven upon the single ford of Huerta, if not reinforced -from the heights of Aldea Rubia. But the allies could also have been -reinforced by the fords of Santa Marta and those of Cabrerizos, -and even by that of Aldea Lengua, although it was not good at this -early season. A partial victory would then have been achieved, or a -general battle would have been brought on, when the French troops -would have been disadvantageously cooped up in the loop of the Tormes -and without means of escaping if defeated. Again, it is not easy to -see how the French general could have avoided a serious defeat if -Wellington had moved with all the troops on the right bank, against -the divisions left on the hill of Aldea Rubia; for the French army -would then have been separated, one part on the hither, one on the -further bank of the Tormes. It was said at the time that Marmont -hoped to draw the whole of the allies across the river, when he -would have seized the position of Christoval, raised the siege and -maintained the line of the Tormes. It may however be doubted that he -expected Wellington to commit so gross an error. It is more likely -that holding his own army to be the quickest of movement, his object -was to separate the allies’ force in the hopes of gaining some -partial advantage to enable him to communicate with his forts, which -were now in great danger. - -When the French retired to the heights at Aldea Rubia on the night -of the 23d, the heavy guns had been already brought to the right of -the Tormes, and a third battery, to breach San Cajetano, was armed -with four pieces, but the line of fire being oblique, the practice, -at four hundred and fifty yards, only beat down the parapet and -knocked away the palisades. Time was however of vital importance, -the escalade of that fort and La Merced was ordered, and the attack -commenced at ten o’clock, but in half an hour failed with a loss of -one hundred and twenty men and officers. The wounded were brought -off the next day under truce and the enemy had all the credit of the -fight, yet the death of general Bowes must ever be admired. That -gallant man, whose rank might have excused his leading so small a -force, being wounded early, was having his hurt dressed when he heard -that the troops were yielding, and returning to the combat fell. - -The siege was now perforce suspended for want of ammunition, and the -guns were sent across the river, but were immediately brought back -in consequence of Marmont having crossed to the left bank. Certain -works were meanwhile pushed forward to cut off the communication -between the forts and otherwise to straiten them, and the miner was -attached to the cliff on which La Merced stood. The final success was -not however influenced by these operations, and they need no further -notice. - -The 26th ammunition arrived from Almeida, the second and third -batteries were re-armed, the field-pieces were again placed in the -convent of San Bernardo, and the iron howitzers, throwing hot shot, -set the convent of San Vincente on fire in several places. The -garrison again extinguished the flames, and this balanced combat -continued during the night, but on the morning of the 27th the fire -of both batteries being redoubled, the convent of San Vincente -was in a blaze, the breach of San Cajetano was improved, a fresh -storming party assembled, and the white flag waved from Cajetano. A -negociation ensued, but lord Wellington, judging it an artifice to -gain time, gave orders for the assault; then the forts fell, for San -Cajetano scarcely fired a shot, and the flames raged so violently at -San Vincente that no opposition could be made. - -Seven hundred prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, provisions, -arms, and clothing, and a secure passage over the Tormes, were the -immediate fruits of this capture, which was not the less prized, that -the breaches were found to be more formidable than those at Ciudad -Rodrigo. The success of a storm would have been very doubtful if -the garrison could have gained time to extinguish the flames in the -convent of San Vincente, and as it was the allies had ninety killed; -their whole loss since the passage of the Tormes was nearly five -hundred men and officers, of which one hundred and sixty men with -fifty horses, fell outside Salamanca, the rest in the siege. - -[Sidenote: Confidential official reports, obtained from the French -War-office, MSS.] - -Marmont had allotted fifteen days as the term of resistance for -these forts, but from the facility with which San Vincente caught -fire, five would have been too many if ammunition had not failed. -His calculation was therefore false. He would however have fought on -the 23d, when his force was united, had he not on the 22d received -intelligence from Caffarelli, that a powerful body of infantry, with -twenty-two guns and all the cavalry of the north, were actually -in march to join him. It was this which induced him to occupy the -heights of Villa Rubia, on that day, to avoid a premature action, -but on the evening of the 26th the signals, from the forts, having -indicated that they could still hold out three days, Marmont, from -fresh intelligence, no longer expected Caffarelli’s troops, and -resolved to give battle on the 28th. The fall of the forts, which -was made known to him on the evening of the 27th, changed this -determination, the reasons for fighting on such disadvantageous -ground no longer existed, and hence, withdrawing his garrison from -the castle of Alba de Tormes, he retreated during the night towards -the Duero, by the roads of Tordesillas and Toro. - -Wellington ordered the works both at Alba and the forts of Salamanca -to be destroyed, and following the enemy by easy marches, encamped -on the Guarena the 30th. The next day he reached the Trabancos, -his advanced guard being at Nava del Rey. On the 2d he passed the -Zapardiel in two columns, the right marching by Medina del Campo, -the left following the advanced guard towards Rueda. From this place -the French rear-guard was cannonaded and driven upon the main body, -which was filing over the bridge of Tordesillas. Some were killed and -some made prisoners, not many, but there was great confusion, and a -heavy disaster would have befallen the French if the English general -had not been deceived by false information, that they had broken the -bridge the night before. For as he knew by intercepted letters that -Marmont intended to take a position near Tordesillas, this report -made him suppose the enemy was already over the Duero, and hence he -had spread his troops, and was not in sufficient force to attack -during the passage of the river. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 3.] - -Marmont, who had fortified posts at Zamora and Toro, and had -broken the bridges at those places and at Puente Duero and Tudela, -preserving only that of Tordesillas, now took a position on the -right of the Duero. His left was at Simancas on the Pisuerga, which -was unfordable, and the bridges at that place and Valladolid, were -commanded by fortified posts. His centre was at Tordesillas, and -very numerous, and his right was on some heights opposite to Pollos. -Wellington indeed caused the third division to seize the ford at the -last place which gave him a command of the river, because there was -a plain between it and the enemy’s heights, but the ford itself was -difficult and insufficient for passing the whole army. Head-quarters -were therefore fixed at Rueda, and the forces were disposed in a -compact form, the head placed in opposition to the ford of Pollos and -the bridge of Tordesillas, the rear occupying Medina del Campo and -other points on the Zapardiel and Trabancos rivers, ready to oppose -the enemy if he should break out from the Valladolid side. Marmont’s -line of defence, measured from Valladolid to Zamora, was sixty miles; -from Simancas to Toro above thirty, but the actual line of occupation -was not above twelve; the bend of the river gave him the chord, the -allies the arc, and the fords were few and difficult. The advantage -was therefore on the side of the enemy, but to understand the true -position of the contending generals it is necessary to know the -secondary coincident operations. - -While the armies were in presence at Salamanca, Silveira had filed -up the Duero, to the Esla river, menacing the French communications -with Benavente. D’Urban’s horsemen had passed the Duero below Zamora -on the 25th and cut off all intercourse between the French army and -that place; but when Marmont fell back from Aldea Rubia, D’Urban -recrossed the Duero at Fresno de la Ribera to avoid being crushed, -yet immediately afterwards advanced beyond Toro to Castromonte, -behind the right wing of the enemy’s new position. It was part of -Wellington’s plan, that Castaños, after establishing the siege -of Astorga, should come down by Benavente with the remainder of -his army, and place himself in communication with Silveira. This -operation, without disarranging the siege of Astorga, would have -placed twelve or fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and -artillery, behind the Esla, and with secure lines of retreat; -consequently able to check all the enemy’s foraging parties, and -reduce him to live upon his fixed magazines, which were scanty. The -usual Spanish procrastination defeated this plan. - -Castaños, by the help of the succours received from England, had -assembled fifteen thousand men at Ponteferada, under the command of -Santocildes, but he pretended that he had no battering guns until sir -Howard Douglas actually pointed them out in the arsenal of Ferrol, -and shewed him how to convey them to the frontier. Then Santocildes -moved, though slowly, and when Bonet’s retreat from the Asturias was -known, eleven thousand men invested Astorga, and four thousand others -marched to Benavente, but not until Marmont had called his detachment -in from that place. The Spanish battering train only reached Villa -Franca del Bierzo on the 1st of July. However the Guerilla chief, -Marquinez, appeared about Palencia, and the other Partidas of -Castile acting on a line from Leon to Segovia, intercepted Marmont’s -correspondence with the king. Thus the immense tract called the -_Campo de Tierras_ was secured for the subsistence of the Gallician -army; and to the surprise of the allies, who had so often heard of -the enemy’s terrible devastations that they expected to find Castile -a desert, those vast plains, and undulating hills, were covered with -ripe corn or fruitful vines, and the villages bore few marks of the -ravages of war. - -[Sidenote: King’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s despatches, MSS.] - -While the main body of the Gallicians was still at Ponte Ferrada, a -separate division had passed along the coast road into the Asturias, -and in concert with part of the seventh army had harassed Bonet’s -retreat from that kingdom; the French general indeed forced his way -by the eastern passes, and taking post the 30th of June at Reynosa -and Aguilar del Campo, chased the neighbouring bands away, but this -movement was one of the great errors of the campaign. Napoleon and -Wellington felt alike the importance of holding the Asturias at -this period. The one had ordered that they should be retained, the -other had calculated that such would be the case, and the judgment -of both was quickly made manifest. For the Gallicians, who would not -have dared to quit the Bierzo if Bonet had menaced their province by -Lugo, or by the shore line, invested Astorga the moment he quitted -the Asturias. And the Partidas of the north, who had been completely -depressed by Mina’s defeat, recovering courage, now moved towards the -coast, where Popham’s expedition, which had sailed on the 18th of -June from Coruña, soon appeared, a formidable spectacle, for there -were five sail of the line, with many frigates and brigs, in all -twenty ships of war. - -The port of Lesquito was immediately attacked on the sea-board by -this squadron, on the land side by the Pastor, and when captain -Bouverie got a gun up to breach the convent the Spanish chief -assaulted but was repulsed; however the garrison, two hundred and -fifty strong, surrendered to the squadron the 22d, and on the two -following days Bermeo and Plencia fell. The Partidas failed to -appear at Guetaria, but Castro and Portagalete, in the Bilbao river, -were attacked the 6th of July, in concert with Longa, and though -the latter was rebuffed at Bilbao the squadron took Castro. The -enemy recovered some of their posts on the 10th, and on the 19th -the attempt on Guetaria being renewed, Mina and Pastor came down to -co-operate, but a French column beat those chiefs, and drove the -British seamen to their vessels, with the loss of thirty men and two -guns. - -It was the opinion of general Carrol who accompanied this expedition, -that the plan of operations was ill-arranged, but the local successes -merit no attention, the great object of distracting the enemy was -obtained. Caffarelli heard at one and the same time, that Palombini’s -division had been called to Madrid; that Bonet had abandoned the -Asturias; that a Gallician division had entered that province; -that a powerful English fleet, containing troops, was on the coast, -and acting in concert with all the Partidas of the north; that the -seventh army was menacing Burgos, and that the whole country was in -commotion. Trembling for his own districts he instantly arrested the -march of the divisions destined for Marmont; and although the king, -who saw very clearly the real object of the maritime expedition, -reiterated the orders to march upon Segovia or Cuellar, with a view -to reinforce either the army of the centre or the army of Portugal, -Caffarelli delayed obedience until the 13th of July, and then sent -but eighteen hundred cavalry, with twenty guns. - -Thus Bonet’s movement which only brought a reinforcement of six -thousand infantry to Marmont, kept away Caffarelli’s reserves, which -were twelve thousand of all arms, uncovered the whole of the great -French line of communication, and caused the siege of Astorga to be -commenced. And while Bonet was in march by Palencia and Valladolid to -the position of Tordesillas, the king heard of Marmont’s retreat from -the Tormes, and that an English column menaced Arevalo; wherefore -not being ready to move with the army of the centre, and fearing for -Avila, he withdrew the garrison from that place, and thus lost his -direct line of correspondence with the army of Portugal, because -Segovia was environed by the Partidas. In this state of affairs -neither Wellington nor Marmont had reason to fight upon the Duero. -The latter because his position was so strong he could safely wait -for Bonet’s and Caffarelli’s troops, and meanwhile the king could -operate against the allies’ communications. The former because he -could not attack the French, except at great disadvantage; for -the fords of the Duero were little known, and that of Pollos was -very deep. To pass the river there, and form within gun-shot of -the enemy’s left, without other combinations, promised nothing but -defeat, and the staff officers, sent to examine the course of the -river, reported that the advantage of ground was entirely on the -enemy’s side, except at Castro Nuño, half-way between Pollos and Toro. - -While the enemy commanded the bridge at Tordesillas, no attempt to -force the passage of the river could be safe, seeing that Marmont -might fall on the allies’ front and rear if the operation was within -his reach; and if beyond his reach, that is to say near Zamora, he -could cut their communication with Ciudad Rodrigo and yet preserve -his own with Caffarelli and with the king. Wellington therefore -resolved to wait until the fords should become lower, or the -combined operations of the Gallicians and Partidas, should oblige -the enemy, either to detach men, or to dislodge altogether for want -of provisions. In this view he urged Santocildes to press the siege -of Astorga vigorously and to send every man he could spare down -the Esla; and an intercepted letter gave hopes that Astorga would -surrender on the 7th, yet this seems to have been a device to keep -the Gallicians in that quarter for it was in no danger. Santocildes, -expecting its fall, would not detach men, but the vicinity of -D’Urban’s cavalry, which remained at Castromonte, so incommoded -the French right, that Foy marched to drive them beyond the Esla. -General Pakenham however crossed the ford of Pollos, with some of -the third division, which quickly brought Foy back, and Marmont then -endeavoured to augment the number and efficiency of his cavalry, by -taking a thousand horses from the infantry officers and the sutlers. - -On the 8th Bonet arrived, and the French marshal immediately -extending his right to Toro, commenced repairing the bridge there. -Wellington, in like manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, yet -kept his centre still on the Trabancos, and his right at Rueda, with -posts near Tordesillas and the ford of Pollos. In this situation the -armies remained for some days. Generals Graham and Picton went to -England in bad health, and the principal powder magazine at Salamanca -exploded with hurt to many, but no other events worth recording -occurred. The weather was very fine, the country rich, and the troops -received their rations regularly; wine was so plentiful, that it was -hard to keep the soldiers sober; the caves of Rueda, either natural -or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were so immense -and so well stocked, that the drunkards of two armies failed to make -any very sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men of both sides -perished in that labyrinth, and on both sides also, the soldiers, -passing the Duero in groups, held amicable intercourse, conversing of -the battles that were yet to be fought; the camps on the banks of the -Duero seemed at times to belong to one army, so difficult is it to -make brave men hate each other. - -To the officers of the allies all looked prosperous, their only -anxiety was to receive the signal of battle, their only discontent, -that it was delayed; and many amongst them murmured that the French -had been permitted to retreat from Christoval. Had Wellington been -finally forced back to Portugal his reputation would have been -grievously assailed by his own people, for the majority, peering -through their misty politics, saw Paris in dim perspective, -and overlooked the enormous French armies that were close at -hand. Meanwhile their general’s mind was filled with care and -mortification, and all cross and evil circumstances seemed to combine -against him. - -The mediation for the Spanish colonies had just failed at Cadiz, -under such circumstances, as left no doubt that the English influence -was powerless and the French influence visibly increasing in the -Cortez. Soult had twenty-seven gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, -shells were cast day and night into the city, and the people were -alarmed; two thousand French had marched from Santa Mary to Seville, -apparently to reinforce Drouet in Estremadura; Echevaria had effected -nothing in the kingdom of Cordoba, and a French division was -assembling at Bornos, to attack Ballesteros, whose rashness, inviting -destruction, might alone put an end to the campaign in Leon and bring -Wellington back to the Tagus. In the north of Spain also affairs -appeared equally gloomy, Mina’s defeats, and their influence upon the -other Partidas, were positively known, but the effect of Popham’s -operations was unknown, or at least doubtful. Bonet’s division had -certainly arrived, and the Gallicians who had done nothing at Astorga -were already in want of ammunition. In Castile the activity of the -Partidas instead of increasing, had diminished after Wellington -crossed the Tormes, and the chiefs seemed inclined to leave the -burthen of the war entirely to their allies. Nor was this feeling -confined to them. It had been arranged, that new corps, especially -of cavalry, should be raised, as the enemy receded in this campaign, -and the necessary clothing and equipments, supplied by England, were -placed at the disposal of lord Wellington, who to avoid the burthen -of carriage had directed them to Coruña; yet now, when Leon and the -Asturias were in a manner recovered, no man would serve voluntarily. -There was great enthusiasm, in words, there had always been so, but -the fighting men were not increased, and even the _juramentados_, -many of whom deserted at this time from the king, well clothed and -soldier-like men, refused to enter the English ranks. - -Now also came the news that lord William Bentinck’s plans were -altered, and the intercepted despatches shewed that the king had -again ordered Drouet to pass the Tagus, but Soult’s resistance to -this order was not known. Wellington therefore at the same moment, -saw Marmont’s army increase, heard that the king’s army, reinforced -by Drouet, was on the point of taking the field; that the troops -from Sicily, upon whose operations he depended to keep all the army -of Aragon in the eastern part of Spain, and even to turn the king’s -attention that way, were to be sent to Italy; and that two millions -of dollars, which he hoped to have obtained at Gibraltar, had been -swept off by lord William Bentinck for this Italian expedition, -which thus at once deprived him of men and money! The latter was the -most serious blow, the promised remittances from England had not -arrived, and as the insufficiency of land-carriage rendered it nearly -impossible to feed the army even on the Duero, to venture further -into Spain without money would be akin to madness. From Gallicia, -where no credit was given, came the supply of meat, a stoppage there -would have made the war itself stop, and no greater error had been -committed by the enemy, than delaying to conquer Gallicia, which -could many times have been done. - -To meet the increasing exigences for money, the English general -had, for one resource, obtained a credit of half a million from the -Treasury to answer certain certificates, or notes of hand, which his -Spanish correspondents promised to get cashed; but of this resource -he was now suddenly deprived by the English ministers, who objected -to the irregular form of the certificates, because he, with his -usual sagacity, had adapted them to the habits of the people he was -to deal with. Meanwhile his troops were four, his staff six, his -muleteers nearly twelve months in arrears of pay, and he was in debt -every where, and for every thing. The Portuguese government had -become very clamorous for the subsidy, Mr. Stuart acknowledged that -their distress was very great, and the desertion from the Portuguese -army, which augmented in an alarming manner, and seemed rather to -be increased than repressed by severity, sufficiently proved their -misery. The personal resources of Wellington alone enabled the army -to maintain its forward position, for he had, to a certain extent, -carried his commercial speculations into Gallicia, as well as -Portugal; and he had persuaded the Spanish authorities in Castile -to give up a part of their revenue in kind to the army, receiving -bills on the British embassy at Cadiz in return. But the situation of -affairs may be best learned from the mouths of the generals. - -“The arrears of the army are certainly getting to an alarming pitch, -and if it is suffered to increase, we cannot go on: we have only here -two brigades of infantry, fed by our own commissariat, and we are -now reduced to one of them having barely bread for this day, and the -commissary has not a farthing of money. I know not how we shall get -on!” - -Such were Beresford’s words on the 8th of July, and on the 15th -Wellington wrote even more forcibly. - -“I have never,” said he, “been in such distress as at present, and -some serious misfortune must happen, if the government do not attend -seriously to the subject, and supply us regularly with money. The -arrears and distresses of the Portuguse government, are a joke -to ours, and if our credit was not better than theirs, we should -certainly starve. As it is, if we don’t find means to pay our bills -for butcher’s meat there will be an end to the war at once.” - -Thus stript as it were to the skin, the English general thought -once more to hide his nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when -Marmont, proud of his own unripened skill, and perhaps, from the -experience of San Cristoval, undervaluing his adversary’s tactics, -desirous also, it was said, to gain a victory without the presence -of a king, Marmont, pushed on by fate, madly broke the chain which -restrained his enemy’s strength. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. July.] - -When Wellington found by the intercepted letters, that the -king’s orders for Drouet to cross the Tagus, were reiterated, -and imperative, he directed Hill to detach troops, in the same -proportion. And as this reinforcement, coming by the way of -Alcantara, could reach the Duero as soon as Drouet could reach -Madrid, he hoped still to maintain the Tormes, if not the Duero, -notwithstanding the king’s power; for some money, long expected -from England, had at last arrived in Oporto, and he thought the -Gallicians, maugre their inertness, must soon be felt by the enemy. -Moreover the harvest on the ground, however abundant, could not long -feed the French multitudes, if Drouet and the king should together -join Marmont. Nevertheless, fearing the action of Joseph’s cavalry, -he ordered D’Urban’s horsemen to join the army on the Duero. But to -understand the remarkable movements which were now about to commence, -the reader must bear in mind, that the French army, from its peculiar -organization, could, while the ground harvest lasted, operate without -any regard to lines of communication; it had supports on all sides -and procured its food every where, for the troops were taught to reap -the standing corn, and grind it themselves if their cavalry could -not seize flour in the villages. This organization approaching the -ancient Roman military perfection, gave them great advantages; in -the field it baffled the irregular, and threw the regular force of -the allies, entirely upon the defensive; because when the flanks were -turned, a retreat only could save the communications, and the French -offered no point, for retaliation in kind. Wherefore, with a force -composed of four different nations, Wellington was to execute the -most difficult evolutions, in an open country, his chances of success -being to arise only from the casual errors of his adversary, who was -an able general, who knew the country perfectly, and was at the head -of an army, brave, excellently disciplined, and of one nation. The -game would have been quite unequal if the English general had not -been so strong in cavalry. - - -FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE DUERO. - -[Sidenote: See plan No. 3.] - -In the course of the 15th and 16th Marmont, who had previously made -several deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant -army between Toro and the Hornija river; and intercepted letters, -the reports of deserters, and the talk of the peasants had for -several days assigned the former place as his point of passage. On -the morning of the 16th the English exploring officers, passing the -Duero near Tordesillas, found only the garrison there, and in the -evening the reports stated, that two French divisions had already -passed the repaired bridge of Toro. Wellington united his centre and -left at Canizal on the Guarena during the night, intending to attack -those who had passed at Toro; but as he had still some doubts of -the enemy’s real object, he caused sir Stapleton Cotton to halt on -the Trabancos with the right wing, composed of the fourth and light -divisions and Anson’s cavalry. Meanwhile Marmont, recalling his -troops from the left bank of the Duero, returned to Tordesillas and -Pollos, passed that river at those points and occupied Nava del Rey, -where his whole army was concentrated in the evening of the 17th, -some of his divisions having marched above forty miles, and some -above fifty miles, without a halt. The English cavalry posts being -thus driven over the Trabancos, advice of the enemy’s movement was -sent to lord Wellington, but he was then near Toro, it was midnight -ere it reached him, and the troops, under Cotton, remained near -Castrejon behind the Trabancos during the night of the 17th without -orders, exposed, in a bad position, to the attack of the whole French -army. Wellington hastened to their aid in person, and he ordered -Bock’s, Le Marchant’s, and Alten’s brigades of cavalry, to follow him -to Alaejos, and the fifth division to take post at Torrecilla de la -Orden six miles in rear of Castrejon. - -At day-break Cotton’s outposts were again driven in by the enemy, and -the bulk of his cavalry with a troop of horse artillery immediately -formed in front of the two infantry divisions, which were drawn up, -the fourth division on the left, the light division on the right, but -at a considerable distance from each other and separated by a wide -ravine. The country was open and hilly, like the downs of England, -with here and there water-gulleys, dry hollows, and bold naked heads -of land, and behind the most prominent of these last, on the other -side of the Trabancos, lay the whole French army. Cotton however, -seeing only horsemen, pushed his cavalry again towards the river, -advancing cautiously by his right along some high table-land, and -his troops were soon lost to the view of the infantry, for the -morning fog was thick on the stream, and at first nothing could be -descried beyond. But very soon the deep tones of artillery shook -the ground, the sharp ring of musketry was heard in the mist, and -the forty-third regiment was hastily brought through Castrejon to -support the advancing cavalry; for besides the ravine which separated -the fourth from the light division, there was another ravine with a -marshy bottom, between the cavalry and infantry, and the village of -Castrejon was the only good point of passage. - -The cannonade now became heavy, and the spectacle surprisingly -beautiful, for the lighter smoke and mist, curling up in fantastic -pillars, formed a huge and glittering dome tinged of many colours by -the rising sun; and through the grosser vapour below, the restless -horsemen were seen or lost as the fume thickened from the rapid play -of the artillery, while the bluff head of land, beyond the Trabancos, -covered with French troops, appeared, by an optical deception close -at hand, dilated to the size of a mountain, and crowned with gigantic -soldiers, who were continually breaking off and sliding down into the -fight. Suddenly a dismounted cavalry officer stalked from the midst -of the smoke towards the line of infantry; his gait was peculiarly -rigid, and he appeared to hold a bloody handkerchief to his heart, -but that which seemed a cloth, was a broad and dreadful wound; a -bullet had entirely effaced the flesh from his left shoulder and -from his breast, and had carried away part of his ribs, his heart -was bared, and its movement plainly discerned. It was a piteous and -yet a noble sight, for his countenance though ghastly was firm, his -step scarcely indicated weakness, and his voice never faltered. This -unyielding man’s name was Williams; he died a short distance from the -field of battle, and it was said, in the arms of his son, a youth of -fourteen, who had followed his father to the Peninsula in hopes of -obtaining a commission, for they were not in affluent circumstances. - -General Cotton maintained this exposed position with skill and -resolution, from day-light until seven o’clock, at which time -Wellington arrived, in company with Beresford, and proceeded to -examine the enemy’s movements. The time was critical, and the two -English generals were like to have been slain together by a body -of French cavalry, not very numerous, which breaking away from the -multitude on the head of land beyond the Trabancos, came galloping -at full speed across the valley. It was for a moment thought they -were deserting, but with headlong course they mounted the table-land -on which Cotton’s left wing was posted, and drove a whole line -of British cavalry skirmishers back in confusion. The reserves -indeed soon came up from Alaejos, and these furious swordsmen being -scattered in all directions were in turn driven away or cut down, but -meanwhile thirty or forty, led by a noble officer, had brought up -their right shoulders, and came over the edge of the table-land above -the hollow which separated the British wings at the instant when -Wellington and Beresford arrived on the same slope. There were some -infantry picquets in the bottom, and higher up, near the French, were -two guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry which was disposed -in perfect order. When the French officer saw this squadron, he -reined in his horse with difficulty, and his troopers gathered in a -confused body round him as if to retreat. They seemed lost men, for -the British instantly charged, but with a shout the gallant fellows -soused down upon the squadron, and the latter turning, galloped -through the guns; then the whole mass, friends and enemies, went -like a whirlwind to the bottom, carrying away lord Wellington, and -the other generals, who with drawn swords and some difficulty, got -clear of the tumult. The French horsemen were now quite exhausted, -and a reserve squadron of heavy dragoons coming in cut most of them -to pieces; yet their invincible leader, assaulted by three enemies at -once, struck one dead from his horse, and with surprising exertions -saved himself from the others, though they rode hewing at him on each -side for a quarter of a mile. - -While this charge was being executed, Marmont, who had ascertained -that a part only of Wellington’s army was before him, crossed the -Trabancos in two columns, and passing by Alaejos, turned the left of -the allies, marching straight upon the Guarena. The British retired -by Torecilla de la Orden, the fifth division being in one column on -the left, the fourth division on the right as they retreated, and the -light division on an intermediate line and nearer to the enemy. The -cavalry were on the flanks and rear, the air was extremely sultry, -the dust rose in clouds, and the close order of the troops rendered -it very oppressive, but the military spectacle was exceedingly -strange and grand. For then were seen the hostile columns of -infantry, only half musket-shot from each other, marching impetuously -towards a common goal, the officers on each side pointing forwards -with their swords, or touching their caps, and waving their hands -in courtesy, while the German cavalry, huge men, on huge horses, -rode between in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision. -At times the loud tones of command, to hasten the march, were heard -passing from the front to the rear, and now and then the rushing -sound of bullets came sweeping over the columns whose violent pace -was continually accelerated. - -Thus moving for ten miles, yet keeping the most perfect order, both -parties approached the Guarena, and the enemy seeing that the light -division, although more in their power than the others, were yet -outstripping them in the march, increased the fire of their guns and -menaced an attack with infantry. But the German cavalry instantly -drew close round, the column plunged suddenly into a hollow dip of -ground on the left which offered the means of baffling the enemy’s -aim, and ten minutes after the head of the division was in the -stream of the Guarena between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth division -entered the river at the same time but higher up on the left, and the -fourth division passed it on the right. The soldiers of the light -division, tormented with thirst, yet long used to their enemy’s -mode of warfare, drunk as they marched, and the soldiers of the -fifth division stopped in the river for only a few moments, but on -the instant forty French guns gathered on the heights above sent a -tempest of bullets amongst them. So nicely timed was the operation. - -The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources which are united -below Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence, and Marmont, -hoping to carry it in the first confusion of the passage, and so -seize the table-land of Vallesa, had brought up all his artillery -to the front; and to distract the allies’ attention he had directed -Clausel to push the head of the right column over the river at -Castrillo, at the same time. But Wellington expecting him at Vallesa -from the first, had ordered the other divisions of his army, -originally assembled at Canizal, to cross one of the upper branches -of the river; and they reached the table-land of Vallesa, before -Marmont’s infantry, oppressed by the extreme heat and rapidity of the -march, could muster in strength to attempt the passage of the other -branch. Clausel, however, sent Carier’s brigade of cavalry across the -Guarena at Castrillo and supported it with a column of infantry; and -the fourth division had just gained the heights above Canizal, after -passing the stream, when Carier’s horsemen entered the valley on -their left, and the infantry in one column menaced their front. The -sedgy banks of the river would have been difficult to force in face -of an enemy, but Victor Alten though a very bold man in action, was -slow to seize an advantage, and suffered the French cavalry to cross -and form in considerable numbers without opposition; he assailed them -too late and by successive squadrons instead of by regiments, and -the result was unfavourable at first. The fourteenth and the German -hussars were hard-pressed, the third dragoons came up in support, but -they were immediately driven back again by the fire of some French -infantry, the fight waxed hot with the others, and many fell, but -finally general Carier was wounded and taken, and the French retired. -During this cavalry action the twenty-seventh and fortieth regiments -coming down the hill, broke the enemy’s infantry with an impetuous -bayonet charge, and Alten’s horsemen being then disengaged sabred -some of the fugitives. - -This combat cost the French who had advanced too far without support, -a general and five hundred soldiers; but Marmont, though baffled -at Vallesa, and beaten at Castrillo, concentrated his army at the -latter place in such a manner as to hold both banks of the Guarena. -Whereupon Wellington recalled his troops from Vallesa; and as the -whole loss of the allies during the previous operations was not more -than six hundred, nor that of the French more than eight hundred, and -that both sides were highly excited, the day still young, and the -positions although strong, open, and within cannon-shot, a battle was -expected. Marmont’s troops had however been marching for two days and -nights incessantly, and Wellington’s plan did not admit of fighting -unless forced to it in defence, or under such circumstances, as would -enable him to crush his opponent, and yet keep the field afterwards -against the king. - -By this series of signal operations, the French general had passed -a great river, taken the initiatory movement, surprised the right -wing of the allies, and pushed it back above ten miles. Yet these -advantages are to be traced to the peculiarities of the English -general’s situation which have been already noticed, and Wellington’s -tactical skill was manifested by the extricating of his troops from -their dangerous position at Castrejon without loss, and without -being forced to fight a battle. He however appears to have erred in -extending his troops to the right when he first reached the Duero, -for seeing that Marmont could at pleasure pass that river and turn -his flanks, he should have remained concentrated on the Guarena, -and only pushed cavalry posts to the line of the Duero above Toro. -Neither should he have risked his right wing so far from his main -body from the evening of the 16th to the morning of the 18th. He -could scarcely have brought it off without severe loss, if Marmont -had been stronger in cavalry, and instead of pushing forwards at once -to the Guarena had attacked him on the march. On the other hand the -security of the French general’s movements, from the Trabancos to -the Guarena, depended entirely on their rapidity; for as his columns -crossed the open country on a line parallel to the march of the -allies, a simple wheel by companies to the right would have formed -the latter in order of battle on his flank while the four divisions -already on the Guarena could have met them in front. - -But it was on the 16th that the French general failed in the most -glaring manner. His intent was, by menacing the communication with -Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the allies back, and strike -some decisive blow during their retreat. Now on the evening of the -16th he had passed the Duero at Toro, gained a day’s march, and -was then actually nearer to Salamanca than the allies were; and -had he persisted in his movement Wellington must have fought him -to disadvantage or have given up Salamanca, and passed the Tormes -at Huerta to regain the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This -advantage Marmont relinquished, to make a forced march of eighty -miles in forty-eight hours, and to risk the execution of a variety of -nice and difficult evolutions, in which he lost above a thousand men -by the sword or by fatigue, and finally found his adversary on the -18th still facing him in the very position which he had turned on the -evening of the 16th! - -On the 19th the armies maintained their respective ground in quiet -until the evening, when Marmont concentrated his troops in one mass -on his left near the village of Tarazona, and Wellington, fearing -for his right, again passed the second branch of the Guarena, at -Vallesa, and El Olmo, and took post on the table-land above those -villages. The light division, being in front, advanced to the edge of -the table-land, overlooking the enemy’s main body which was at rest -round the bivouac fires; yet the picquets would have been quietly -posted, if sir Stapleton Cotton coming up at the moment, had not -ordered captain Ross to turn his battery of six-pounders upon a group -of French officers. At the first shot the enemy seemed surprised, at -the second their gunners run to their pieces, and in a few moments -a reply from twelve eight-pounders shewed the folly of provoking a -useless combat. An artillery officer was wounded in the head, several -of the British soldiers fell in different parts of the line, one shot -swept away a whole section of Portuguese, and finally the division -was obliged to withdraw several hundred yards in a mortifying manner -to avoid a great and unnecessary effusion of blood. - -The allies being now formed in two lines on the table-land of Vallesa -offered a fair though not an easy field to the enemy; Wellington -expected a battle the next day, because the range of heights which -he occupied, trended backwards to the Tormes on the shortest line; -and as he had thrown a Spanish garrison into the castle of Alba -de Tormes, he thought Marmont could not turn his right, or if he -attempted it, that he would be shouldered off the Tormes at the ford -of Huerta. He was mistaken. The French general was more perfectly -acquainted with the ground and proved that he could move an army with -wonderful facility. - -On the 20th at day-break instead of crossing the Guarena to dispute -the high land of Vallesa, Marmont marched rapidly in several columns, -covered by a powerful rear-guard, up the river to Canta la Piedra, -and crossed the stream there, though the banks were difficult, before -any disposition could be made to oppose him. He thus turned the -right flank of the allies and gained a new range of hills trending -towards the Tormes, and parallel to those leading from Vallesa. -Wellington immediately made a corresponding movement. Then commenced -an evolution similar to that of the 18th, but on a greater scale -both as to numbers and length of way. The allies moving in two lines -of battle within musket-shot of the French endeavoured to gain upon -and cross their march at Cantalpino; the guns on both sides again -exchanged their rough salutations as the accidents of ground favoured -their play; and again the officers, like gallant gentlemen who bore -no malice and knew no fear, made their military recognitions, while -the horsemen on each side watched with eager eyes, for an opening to -charge; but the French general moving his army as one man along the -crest of the heights, preserved the lead he had taken, and made no -mistake. - -At Cantalpino it became evident that the allies were outflanked, -and all this time Marmont had so skilfully managed his troops that -he furnished no opportunity even for a partial attack. Wellington -therefore fell off a little and made towards the heights of Cabeça -Vellosa and Aldea Rubia, intending to halt there while the sixth -division and Alten’s cavalry, forcing their march, seized Aldea -Lengua and secured the position of Christoval. But he made no effort -to seize the ford of Huerta, for his own march had been long and the -French had passed over nearly twice as much ground, wherefore he -thought they would not attempt to reach the Tormes that day. However -when night approached, although his second line had got possession -of the heights of Vellosa, his first line was heaped up without -much order in the low ground between that place and Hornillos; the -French army crowned all the summit of the opposite hills, and their -fires, stretching in a half circle from Villaruela to Babila Fuente, -shewed that they commanded the ford of Huerta. They could even have -attacked the allies with great advantage had there been light for the -battle. The English general immediately ordered the bivouac fires to -be made, but filed the troops off in succession with the greatest -celerity towards Vellosa and Aldea Rubia, and during the movement -the Portuguese cavalry, coming in from the front, were mistaken for -French and lost some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognised. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.] - -Wellington was deeply disquieted at the unexpected result of this -day’s operations which had been entirely to the advantage of the -French general. Marmont had shewn himself perfectly acquainted with -the country, had outflanked and outmarched the allies, had gained -the command of the Tormes, and as his junction with the king’s -army was thus secured he might fight or wait for reinforcements -or continue his operations as it seemed good to himself. But the -scope of Wellington’s campaign was hourly being more restricted. His -reasons for avoiding a battle except at advantage, were stronger than -before, because Caffarelli’s cavalry was known to be in march, and -the army of the centre was on the point of taking the field; hence -though he should fight and gain a victory, unless it was decisive, -his object would not be advanced. That object was to deliver the -Peninsula, which could only be done by a long course of solid -operations incompatible with sudden and rash strokes unauthorized by -any thing but hope; wherefore yielding to the force of circumstances, -he prepared to return to Portugal and abide his time; yet with a -bitter spirit, which was not soothed by the recollection, that he -had refused the opportunity of fighting to advantage, exactly one -month before and upon the very hills he now occupied. Nevertheless -that stedfast temper, which then prevented him from seizing an -adventitious chance, would not now let him yield to fortune more than -she could ravish from him: he still hoped to give the lion’s stroke, -and resolved to cover Salamanca and the communication with Ciudad -Rodrigo to the last moment. A letter stating his inability to hold -his ground was however sent to Castaños, but it was intercepted by -Marmont, who exultingly pushed forwards without regard to the king’s -movements; and it is curious that Joseph afterwards imagined this to -have been a subtlety of Wellington’s to draw the French general into -a premature battle. - -On the 21st while the allies occupied the old position of Christoval, -the French threw a garrison into Alba de Tormes, from whence -the Spaniards had been withdrawn by Carlos D’España, without the -knowledge of the English general. Marmont then passed the Tormes, -by the fords between Alba and Huerta, and moving up the valley of -Machechuco encamped behind Calvariza Ariba, at the edge of a forest -which extended from the river to that place. Wellington also passed -the Tormes in the course of the evening by the bridges, and by -the fords of Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua; but the third division -and D’Urban’s cavalry remained on the right bank, and entrenched -themselves at Cabrerizos, lest the French, who had left a division on -the heights of Babila Fuente, should recross the Tormes in the night -and overwhelm them. - -It was late when the light division descended the rough side of the -Aldea Lengua mountain to cross the river, and the night came suddenly -down, with more than common darkness, for a storm, that common -precursor of a battle in the Peninsula, was at hand. Torrents of -rain deepened the ford, the water foamed and dashed with encreasing -violence, the thunder was frequent and deafening, and the lightning -passed in sheets of fire close over the column, or played upon the -points of the bayonets. One flash falling amongst the fifth dragoon -guards, near Santa Marta, killed many men and horses, while hundreds -of frightened animals breaking loose from their piquet ropes, and -galloping wildly about, were supposed to be the enemy’s cavalry -charging in the darkness, and indeed some of their patroles were at -hand; but to a military eye there was nothing more imposing than the -close and beautiful order in which the soldiers of that noble light -division, were seen by the fiery gleams to step from the river to -the bank and pursue their march amidst this astounding turmoil, -defying alike the storm and the enemy. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 3.] - -The position now taken by the allies was nearly the same as that -occupied by general Graham a month before, when the forts of -Salamanca were invested. The left wing rested in the low ground on -the Tormes, near Santa Marta, having a cavalry post in front towards -Calvariza de Abaxo. The right wing extended along a range of heights -which ended also in low ground, near the village of Arapiles, and -this line being perpendicular to the course of the Tormes from Huerta -to Salamanca, and parallel to its course from Alba to Huerta, covered -Salamanca. But the enemy extending his left along the edge of the -forest, still menaced the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; -and in the night advice came that general Chauvel, with near two -thousand of Caffarelli’s horsemen, and twenty guns, had actually -reached Pollos on the 20th, and would join Marmont the 22nd or 23rd. -Hence Wellington, feeling that he must now perforce retreat to Ciudad -Rodrigo, and fearing that the French cavalry thus reinforced would -hamper his movements, determined, unless the enemy attacked him, or -committed some flagrant fault, to retire before Chauvel’s horsemen -could arrive. - -At day-break on the 22nd, Marmont who had called the troops at Babila -Fuente over the Tormes, by the ford of Encina, brought Bonet’s and -Maucune’s divisions up from the forest and took possession of the -ridge of Calvariza de Ariba; he also occupied in advance of it a -wooded height on which was an old chapel called Nuestra Señora de la -Pena. But at a little distance from his left, and from the English -right, stood a pair of solitary hills, called the _Two Arapiles_, -about half cannon-shot from each other; steep and savagely rugged -they were, and the possession of them would have enabled the French -general to form his army across Wellington’s right, and thus bring -on a battle with every disadvantage to the allies, confined, as the -latter would have been, between the French army and the Tormes. These -hills were neglected by the English general until a staff officer, -who had observed the enemy’s detachments stealing towards them, first -informed Beresford, and afterwards Wellington of the fact. The former -thought it was of no consequence, but the latter immediately sent -the seventh Caçadores to seize the most distant of the rocks, and -then a combat occurred similar to that which happened between Cæsar -and Afranius at Lerida; for the French seeing the allies’ detachment -approaching, broke their own ranks, and running without order to the -encounter gained the first Arapiles and kept it, but were repulsed in -an endeavour to seize the second. This skirmish was followed by one -at Nuestra Señora de la Pena, which was also assailed by a detachment -of the seventh division, and so far successfully, that half that -height was gained; yet the enemy kept the other half, and Victor -Alten, flanking the attack with a squadron of German hussars, lost -some men and was himself wounded by a musket-shot. - -The result of the dispute for the Arapiles rendered a retreat -difficult to the allies during day-light; for though the rock -gained by the English was a fortress in the way of the French army, -Marmont, by extending his left, and by gathering a force behind his -own Arapiles, could still frame a dangerous battle and pounce upon -the allies during their movement. Wherefore Wellington immediately -extended his right into the low ground, placing the light companies -of the guards in the village of Arapiles, and the fourth division, -with exception of the twenty-seventh regiment, which remained at the -rock, on a gentle ridge behind them. The fifth and sixth divisions he -gathered in one mass upon the internal slope of the English Arapiles, -where from the hollow nature of the ground they were quite hidden -from the enemy; and during these movements a sharp cannonade was -exchanged from the tops of those frowning hills, on whose crowning -rocks the two generals sat like ravenous vultures watching for their -quarry. - -Marmont’s project was not yet developed; his troops coming from -Babila Fuente were still in the forest, and some miles off; he had -only two divisions close up, and the occupation of Calvariza Ariba, -and Nuestra Señora de la Pena, was a daring defensive measure to -cover the formation of his army. The occupation of the Arapiles was -however a start forward, for an advantage to be afterwards turned to -profit, and seemed to fix the operations on the left of the Tormes. -Wellington, therefore, brought up the first and the light divisions -to confront the enemy’s troops on the height of Calvariza Ariba; -and then calling the third division and D’Urban’s cavalry over the -river, by the fords of Santa Marta, he posted them in a wood near -Aldea Tejada, entirely refused to the enemy and unseen by him, yet -in a situation to secure the main road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Thus the -position of the allies was suddenly reversed; the left rested on the -English Arapiles, the right on Aldea Tejada; that which was the rear -became the front, and the interval between the third and the fourth -division was occupied by Bradford’s Portuguese infantry, by the -Spaniards, and by the British cavalry. - -This ground had several breaks and hollows, so that few of these -troops could be viewed by the enemy, and those which were, seemed, -both from their movement and from their position, to be pointing to -the Ciudad Rodrigo road as in retreat. The commissariat and baggage -had also been ordered to the rear, the dust of their march was -plainly to be seen many miles off, and hence there was nothing in the -relative position of the armies, save their proximity, to indicate -an approaching battle. Such a state of affairs could not last long. -About twelve o’clock Marmont, fearing that the important bearing of -the French Arapiles on Wellington’s retreat would induce the latter -to drive him thence, hastily brought up Foy’s and Ferey’s divisions -in support, placing, the first, with some guns, on a wooded height -between the Arapiles and Nuestra Señora de la Pena, the second, and -Boyer’s dragoons, behind Foy on the ridge of Calvariza de Ariba. Nor -was this fear ill-founded, for the English general, thinking that -he could not safely retreat in day-light without possessing both -Arapiles, had actually issued orders for the seventh division to -attack the French, but perceiving the approach of more troops, gave -counter-orders lest he should bring on the battle disadvantageously. -He judged it better to wait for new events, being certain that at -night he could make his retreat good, and wishing rather that Marmont -should attack him in his now strong position. - -The French troops coming from Babila Fuente had not yet reached -the edge of the forest, when Marmont, seeing that the allies would -not attack, and fearing that they would retreat before his own -dispositions were completed, ordered Thomieres’ division, covered by -fifty guns and supported by the light cavalry, to menace the Ciudad -Rodrigo road. He also hastened the march of his other divisions, -designing, when Wellington should move in opposition to Thomieres, -to fall upon him, by the village of Arapiles, with six divisions of -infantry and Boyer’s dragoons, which last, he now put in march to -take fresh ground on the left of the Arapiles rocks, leaving only one -regiment of cavalry, to guard Foy’s right flank at Calvariza. - -In these new circumstances, the positions of the two armies embraced -an oval basin formed by different ranges of hills, that rose like -an amphitheatre of which the Arapiles rocks might be considered -the door-posts. This basin was about a mile broad from north to -south, and more than two miles long from east to west. The northern -and western half-formed the allies’ position, which extended from -the English Arapiles on the left to Aldea Tejada on the right. The -eastern heights were held by the French right, and their left, -consisting of Thomieres’ division with the artillery and light -cavalry, was now moving along the southern side of the basin; but the -march was wide and loose, there was a long space between Thomieres’ -and the divisions, which, coming from the edge of the forest were -destined to form the centre, and there was a longer space between -him and the divisions about the Arapiles. Nevertheless, the mass of -artillery placed on his right flank was very imposing, and opened its -fire grandly, taking ground to the left by guns, in succession, as -the infantry moved on; and these last marched eagerly, continually -contracting their distance from the allies, and bringing up their -left shoulders as if to envelope Wellington’s position and embrace -it with fire. At this time also, Bonet’s troops, one regiment of -which held the French Arapiles, carried the village of that name, and -although soon driven from the greatest part of it again, maintained a -fierce struggle. - -Marmont’s first arrangements had occupied several hours, yet as they -gave no positive indication of his designs, Wellington ceasing to -watch him, had retired from the Arapiles. But at three o’clock, a -report reached him that the French left was in motion and pointing -towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road; then starting up he repaired to -the high ground, and observed their movements for some time, with -a stern contentment, for their left wing was entirely separated -from the centre. The fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the -stroke of a thunderbolt. A few orders issued from his lips like -the incantations of a wizard, and suddenly the dark mass of troops -which covered the English Arapiles, was seemingly possessed by some -mighty spirit, and rushing violently down the interior slope of the -mountain, entered the great basin amidst a storm of bullets which -seemed to shear away the whole surface of the earth over which the -soldiers moved. The fifth division instantly formed on the right of -the fourth, connecting the latter with Bradford’s Portuguese, who -hastened forward at the same time from the right of the army, and -the heavy cavalry galloping up on the right of Bradford, closed this -front of battle. The sixth and seventh divisions flanked on the right -by Anson’s light cavalry, which had now moved from the Arapiles, -were ranged at half cannon-shot in a second line, which was prolonged -by the Spaniards in the direction of the third division; and this -last, reinforced by two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, and by -D’Urban’s Portuguese horsemen, formed the extreme right of the army. -Behind all, on the highest ground, the first and light divisions and -Pack’s Portuguese were disposed in heavy masses as a reserve. - -When this grand disposition was completed, the third division and its -attendant horsemen, the whole formed in four columns and flanked on -the left by twelve guns, received orders to cross the enemy’s line of -march. The remainder of the first line, including the main body of -the cavalry was directed to advance whenever the attack of the third -division should be developed; and as the fourth division must in this -forward movement necessarily lend its flank to the enemy’s troops -stationed on the French Arapiles, Pack’s brigade was commanded to -assail that rock the moment the left of the British line should pass -it. Thus, after long coiling and winding, the armies came together, -and drawing up their huge trains like angry serpents mingled in -deadly strife. - - -BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. - -Marmont, from the top of the French Arapiles, saw the country beneath -him suddenly covered with enemies at a moment when he was in the act -of making a complicated evolution, and when, by the rash advance of -his left, his troops were separated into three parts, each at too -great a distance to assist the other, and those nearest the enemy -neither strong enough to hold their ground, nor aware of what they -had to encounter. The third division was, however, still hidden from -him by the western heights, and he hoped that the tempest of bullets -under which the British line was moving in the basin beneath, would -check it until he could bring up his reserve divisions, and by the -village of Arapiles fall on what was now the left of the allies’ -position. But even this, his only resource for saving the battle, -was weak, for on that point there were still the first and light -divisions and Pack’s brigade, forming a mass of twelve thousand -troops with thirty pieces of artillery; the village itself was well -disputed, and the English Arapiles rock stood out as a strong bastion -of defence. However, the French general, nothing daunted, despatched -officer after officer, some to hasten up the troops from the forest, -others to stop the progress of his left wing, and with a sanguine -expectation still looked for the victory until he saw Pakenham with -the third division shoot like a meteor across Thomieres’ path; then -pride and hope alike died within him, and desperately he was hurrying -in person to that fatal point, when an exploding shell stretched -him on the earth with a broken arm and two deep wounds in his side. -Confusion ensued and the troops distracted by ill-judged orders and -counter-orders knew not where to move, who to fight or who to avoid. - -It was about five o’clock when Pakenham fell upon Thomieres, and it -was at the instant when that general, the head of whose column had -gained an open isolated hill at the extremity of the southern range -of heights, expected to see the allies, in full retreat towards the -Ciudad Rodrigo road, closely followed by Marmont from the Arapiles. -The counter-stroke was terrible! Two batteries of artillery placed -on the summit of the western heights suddenly took his troops in -flank, and Pakenham’s massive columns supported by cavalry, were -coming on full in his front, while two-thirds of his own division, -lengthened out and unconnected, were still behind in a wood where -they could hear, but could not see the storm which was now bursting. -From the chief to the lowest soldier all felt that they were lost, -and in an instant Pakenham the most frank and gallant of men -commenced the battle. - -[Sidenote: Appendix I.] - -The British columns formed lines as they marched, and the French -gunners standing up manfully for the honour of their country, sent -showers of grape into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light -troops poured in a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main -body endeavoured to display a front. But bearing onwards through the -skirmishers with the might of a giant, Pakenham broke the half-formed -lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the -advancing supports; one only officer, with unyielding spirit, -remained by the artillery; standing alone he fired the last gun at -the distance of a few yards, but whether he lived or there died could -not be seen for the smoke. Some squadrons of light cavalry fell on -the right of the third division, but the fifth regiment repulsed -them, and then D’Urban’s Portuguese horsemen, reinforced by two -squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons under Felton Harvey, gained the -enemy’s flank. The Oporto regiment, led by the English Major Watson, -instantly charged the French infantry, yet vainly, Watson fell deeply -wounded and his men retired. - -Pakenham continued his tempestuous course against the remainder of -Thomieres’ troops, which were now arrayed on the wooded heights -behind the first hill, yet imperfectly, and offering two fronts the -one opposed to the third division and its attendant horsemen, the -other to the fifth division, to Bradford’s brigade and the main body -of cavalry and artillery, all of which were now moving in one great -line across the basin. Meanwhile Bonet’s troops having failed at the -village of Arapiles were sharply engaged with the fourth division, -Maucune kept his menacing position behind the French Arapiles, and -as Clauzel’s division had come up from the forest, the connection of -the centre and left was in some measure restored; two divisions were -however still in the rear, and Boyer’s dragoons were in march from -Calvariza Ariba. Thomieres had been killed, and Bonet, who succeeded -Marmont, had been disabled, hence more confusion; but the command of -the army devolved on Clauzel, and he was of a capacity to sustain -this terrible crisis. - -The fourth and fifth divisions, and Bradford’s brigade, were now -hotly engaged and steadily gaining ground; the heavy cavalry, -Anson’s light dragoons and Bull’s troop of artillery were advancing -at a trot on Pakenham’s left; and on that general’s right D’Urban’s -horsemen overlapped the enemy. Thus in less than half an hour, and -before an order of battle had even been formed by the French, their -commander-in-chief and two other generals had fallen, and the left of -their army was turned, thrown into confusion and enveloped. Clauzel’s -division had indeed joined Thomieres’, and a front had been spread on -the southern heights, but it was loose and unfit to resist; for the -troops were, some in double lines, some in columns, some in squares; -a powerful sun shone full in their eyes, the light soil, stirred up -by the trampling of men and horses, and driven forward by a breeze, -which arose in the west at the moment of attack, came full upon them -mingled with smoke in such stifling clouds, that scarcely able to -breathe and quite unable to see, their fire was given at random. - -In this situation, while Pakenham, bearing onward with a conquering -violence, was closing on their flank and the fifth division advancing -with a storm of fire on their front, the interval between the two -attacks was suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust, which -moving swiftly forward carried within its womb the trampling sound -of a charging multitude. As it passed the left of the third division -Le Marchant’s heavy horsemen flanked by Anson’s light cavalry, broke -forth from it at full speed, and the next instant twelve hundred -French infantry though formed in several lines were trampled down -with a terrible clamour and disturbance. Bewildered and blinded, they -cast away their arms and run through the openings of the British -squadrons stooping and demanding quarter, while the dragoons, big men -and on big horses, rode onwards smiting with their long glittering -swords in uncontroulable power, and the third division followed at -speed, shouting as the French masses fell in succession before this -dreadful charge. - -Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. Their own general, -Le Marchant, and many officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his -staff was at their head, and with ranks confused, and blended -together in one mass, still galloping forward they sustained from -a fresh column an irregular stream of fire which emptied a hundred -saddles; yet with fine courage, and downright force, the survivors -broke through this the third and strongest body of men that had -encountered them, and lord Edward Somerset, continuing his course at -the head of one squadron, with a happy perseverance captured five -guns. The French left was entirely broken, more than two thousand -prisoners were taken, the French light horsemen abandoned that part -of the field, and Thomieres’ division no longer existed as a military -body. Anson’s cavalry which had passed quite over the hill and had -suffered little in the charge, was now joined by D’Urban’s troopers, -and took the place of Le Marchant’s exhausted men; the heavy German -dragoons followed in reserve, and with the third and fifth divisions -and the guns, formed one formidable line, two miles in advance of -where Pakenham had first attacked; and that impetuous officer with -unmitigated strength still pressed forward spreading terror and -disorder on the enemy’s left. - -While these signal events, which occupied about forty minutes, were -passing on the allies’ right, a terrible battle raged in the centre. -For when the first shock of the third division had been observed from -the Arapiles, the fourth division, moving in a line with the fifth, -had passed the village of that name under a prodigious cannonade, and -vigourously driving Bonet’s troops backwards, step by step, to the -southern and eastern heights, obliged them to mingle with Clauzel’s -and with Thomieres’ broken remains. When the combatants had passed -the French Arapiles, which was about the time of Le Marchant’s -charge, Pack’s Portuguese assailed that rock, and the front of -battle was thus completely defined, because Foy’s division was now -exchanging a distant cannonade with the first and light divisions. -However Bonet’s troops, notwithstanding Marmont’s fall, and the loss -of their own general, fought strongly, and Clauzel made a surprising -effort, beyond all men’s expectations, to restore the battle. Already -a great change was visible. Ferey’s division drawn off from the -height of Calvaraza Ariba arrived in the centre behind Bonet’s men; -the light cavalry, Boyer’s dragoons, and two divisions of infantry, -from the forest, were also united there, and on this mass of fresh -men, Clauzel rallied the remnants of his own and Thomieres’ division. -Thus by an able movement, Sarrut’s, Brennier’s, and Ferey’s unbroken -troops, supported by the whole of the cavalry, were so disposed as to -cover the line of retreat to Alba de Tormes, while Maucune’s division -was still in mass behind the French Arapiles, and Foy’s remained -untouched on the right. - -But Clauzel, not content with having brought the separated part of -his army together and in a condition to effect a retreat, attempted -to stem the tide of victory in the very fulness of its strength and -roughness. His hopes were founded on a misfortune which had befallen -general Pack; for that officer ascending the French Arapiles in -one heavy column, had driven back the enemy’s skirmishers and was -within thirty yards of the summit, believing himself victorious, when -suddenly the French reserves leaped forward from the rocks upon his -front, and upon his left flank. The hostile masses closed, there was -a thick cloud of smoke, a shout, a stream of fire, and the side of -the hill was covered to the very bottom with the dead the wounded -and the flying Portuguese, who were scoffed at for this failure -without any justice; no troops could have withstood that crash upon -such steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at all -seems very questionable. The result went nigh to shake the whole -battle. For the fourth division had just then reached the southern -ridge of the basin, and one of the best regiments in the service was -actually on the summit when twelve hundred fresh adversaries, arrayed -on the reverse slope, charged up hill; and as the British fire was -straggling and ineffectual, because the soldiers were breathless -and disordered by the previous fighting, the French who came up -resolutely and without firing won the crest. They were even pursuing -down the other side when two regiments placed in line below, checked -them with a destructive volley. - -This vigorous counter-blow took place at the moment when Pack’s -defeat permitted Maucune, who was no longer in pain for the Arapiles -hill, to menace the left flank and rear of the fourth division, but -the left wing of the fortieth regiment immediately wheeled about -and with a rough charge cleared the rear. Maucune would not engage -himself more deeply at that time, but general Ferey’s troops pressed -vigorously against the front of the fourth division, and Brennier -did the same by the first line of the fifth division, Boyer’s -dragoons also came on rapidly, and the allies being outflanked and -over-matched lost ground. Fiercely and fast the French followed -and the fight once more raged in the basin below. General Cole had -before this fallen deeply wounded, and Leith had the same fortune, -but Beresford promptly drew Spry’s Portuguese brigade from the second -line of the fifth division and thus flanked the advancing columns -of the enemy; yet he also fell desperately wounded, and Boyer’s -dragoons then came freely into action because Anson’s cavalry had -been checked after Le Marchant’s charge by a heavy fire of artillery. - -The crisis of the battle had now arrived and the victory was for the -general who had the strongest reserves in hand. Wellington, who was -seen that day at every point of the field exactly when his presence -was most required, immediately brought up from the second line, the -sixth division, and its charge was rough, strong, and successful. -Nevertheless the struggle was no slight one. The men of general -Hulse’s brigade, which was on the left, went down by hundreds, and -the sixty-first and eleventh regiments won their way desperately and -through such a fire, as British soldiers only, can sustain. Some -of Boyer’s dragoons also breaking in between the fifth and sixth -divisions slew many men, and caused some disorder in the fifty-third; -but that brave regiment lost no ground, nor did Clauzel’s impetuous -counter-attack avail at any point, after the first burst, against -the steady courage of the allies. The southern ridge was regained, -the French general Menne was severely, and general Ferey, mortally -wounded, Clauzel himself was hurt, and the reserve of Boyer’s -dragoons coming on at a canter were met and broken by the fire of -Hulse’s noble brigade. Then the changing current of the fight once -more set for the British. The third division continued to outflank -the enemy’s left, Maucune abandoned the French Arapiles, Foy retired -from the ridge of Calvariza, and the allied host righting itself -as a gallant ship after a sudden gust, again bore onwards in blood -and gloom, for though the air, purified by the storm of the night -before, was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled -along the basin, and within it was the battle with all its sights and -sounds of terror. - -When the English general had thus restored the fight in the centre, -he directed the commander of the first division to push between -Foy and the rest of the French army, which would have rendered it -impossible for the latter to rally or escape; but this order was -not executed, and Foy’s and Maucune’s divisions were skilfully used -by Clauzel to protect the retreat. The first, posted on undulating -ground and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, covered the roads -to the fords of Huerta and Encina; the second, reinforced with -fifteen guns, was placed on a steep ridge in front of the forest, -covering the road to Alba de Tormes; and behind this ridge, the rest -of the army, then falling back in disorder before the third, fifth, -and sixth divisions, took refuge. Wellington immediately sent the -light division, formed in two lines and flanked by some squadrons of -dragoons, against Foy; and he supported them by the first division in -columns, flanked on the right by two brigades of the fourth division -which he had drawn off from the centre when the sixth division -restored the fight. The seventh division and the Spaniards followed -in reserve, the country was covered with troops, and a new army -seemed to have risen out of the earth. - -Foy throwing out a cloud of skirmishers retired slowly by wings, -turning and firing heavily from every rise of ground upon the light -division, which marched steadily forward without returning a shot, -save by its skirmishers; for three miles the march was under this -musketry, which was occasionally thickened by a cannonade, and yet -very few men were lost, because the French aim was baffled, partly -by the twilight, partly by the even order and rapid gliding of -the lines. But the French general Desgraviers was killed, and the -flanking brigades from the fourth division having now penetrated -between Maucune and Foy, it seemed difficult for the latter to -extricate his troops from the action; nevertheless he did it and -with great dexterity. For having increased his skirmishers on the -last defensible ridge, along the foot of which run a marshy stream, -he redoubled his fire of musketry, and made a menacing demonstration -with his horsemen just as the darkness fell; the British guns -immediately opened their fire, a squadron of dragoons galloped -forwards from the left, the infantry, crossing the marshy stream, -with an impetuous pace hastened to the summit of the hill, and a -rough shock seemed at hand, but there was no longer an enemy; the -main body of the French had gone into the thick forest on their own -left during the firing, and the skirmishers fled swiftly after, -covered by the smoke and by the darkness. - -Meanwhile Maucune maintained a noble battle. He was outflanked and -outnumbered, but the safety of the French army depended on his -courage; he knew it, and Pakenham, marking his bold demeanour, -advised Clinton, who was immediately in his front, not to assail him -until the third division should have turned his left. Nevertheless -the sixth division was soon plunged afresh into action under great -disadvanatge, for after being kept by its commander a long time -without reason, close under Maucune’s batteries which ploughed -heavily through the ranks, it was suddenly directed by a staff -officer to attack the hill. Assisted by a brigade of the fourth -division, the troops then rushed up, and in the darkness of the night -the fire shewed from afar how the battle went. On the side of the -British a sheet of flame was seen, sometimes advancing with an even -front, sometimes pricking forth in spear heads, now falling back -in waving lines, and anon darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the -apex of which often approached yet never gained the actual summit of -the mountain; but the French musketry, rapid as lightning, sparkled -along the brow of the height with unvarying fulness, and with -what destructive effects the dark gaps and changing shapes of the -adverse fire showed too plainly. Yet when Pakenham had again turned -the enemy’s left, and Foy’s division had glided into the forest, -Maucune’s task was completed, the effulgent crest of the ridge became -black and silent, and the whole French army vanished as it were in -the darkness. - -Meanwhile Wellington, who was with the leading regiment of the light -division, continued to advance towards the ford of Huerta leaving the -forest to his right, for he thought the Spanish garrison was still in -the castle of Alba de Tormes, and that the enemy must of necessity -be found in a confused mass at the fords. It was for this final -stroke that he had so skilfully strengthened his left wing, nor was -he diverted from his aim by marching through standing corn where no -enemy could have preceded him; nor by Foy’s retreat into the forest, -because it pointed towards the fords of Encina and Gonzalo, which -that general might be endeavouring to gain, and the right wing of the -allies would find him there. A squadron of French dragoons also burst -hastily from the forest in front of the advancing troops, soon after -dark, and firing their pistols passed at full gallop towards the ford -of Huerta, thus indicating great confusion in the defeated army, and -confirming the notion that its retreat was in that direction. Had the -castle of Alba been held, the French could not have carried off a -third of their army, nor would they have been in much better plight -if Carlos D’España, who soon discovered his error in withdrawing the -garrison, had informed Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed -it and suffered the colonel who had only obeyed his orders to be -censured; the left wing therefore continued their march to the ford -without meeting any enemy, and, the night being far spent, were there -halted; the right wing, exhausted by long fighting, had ceased to -pursue after the action with Maucune, and thus the French gained Alba -unmolested; but the action did not terminate without two remarkable -accidents. While riding close behind the forty-third regiment, -Wellington was struck in the thigh by a spent musket-ball, which -passed through his holster; and the night picquets had just been set -at Huerta, when sir Stapleton Cotton, who had gone to the ford and -returned a different road, was shot through the arm by a Portuguese -sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded. These were the last -events of this famous battle, in which the skill of the general was -worthily seconded by troops whose ardour may be appreciated by the -following anecdotes. - -Captain Brotherton of the fourteenth dragoons, fighting on the 18th -at the Guarena, amongst the foremost, as he was always wont to -do, had a sword thrust quite through his side, yet on the 22d he -was again on horseback, and being denied leave to remain in that -condition with his own regiment, secretly joined Pack’s Portuguese -in an undress, and was again hurt in the unfortunate charge at the -Arapiles. Such were the officers. A man of the forty-third, one by -no means distinguished above his comrades, was shot through the -middle of the thigh, and lost his shoes in passing the marshy stream; -but refusing to quit the fight, he limped under fire in rear of -his regiment, and with naked feet, and streaming of blood from his -wound, he marched for several miles over a country covered with sharp -stones. Such were the soldiers, and the devotion of a woman was not -wanting to the illustration of this great day. - -The wife of colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition -and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers, and -endured the privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude -which belongs only to her sex; and in this battle, forgetful of every -thing but that strong affection which had so long supported her, -she rode deep amidst the enemy’s fire, trembling yet irresistibly -impelled forwards by feelings more imperious than horror, more -piercing than the fear of death. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. July.] - -During the few hours of darkness, which succeeded the cessation -of the battle, Clauzel had with a wonderful diligence, passed the -Tormes by the narrow bridge of Alba and the fords below it, and at -day-light was in full retreat upon Peneranda, covered by an organized -rear-guard. Wellington also, having brought up the German dragoons -and Anson’s cavalry to the front, crossed the river with his left -wing at day-light, and moving up the stream, came about ten o’clock -upon the French rear which was winding without much order along -the Almar, a small stream at the foot of a height near the village -of La Serna. He launched his cavalry against them, and the French -squadrons, flying from Anson’s troopers towards their own left, -abandoned three battalions of infantry, who in separate columns were -making up a hollow slope on their right, hoping to gain the crest -of the heights before the cavalry could fall on. The two foremost -did reach the higher ground and there formed squares, general Foy -being in the one, and general Chemineau in the other; but the last -regiment when half-way up, seeing Bock’s dragoons galloping hard on, -faced about and being still in column commenced a disorderly fire. -The two squares already formed above, also plied their muskets with -far greater effect; and as the Germans, after crossing the Almar -stream, had to pass a turn of narrow road, and then to clear some -rough ground before they could range their squadrons on a charging -front, the troopers dropt fast under the fire. By two’s, by three’s, -by ten’s, by twenties they fell, but the rest keeping together, -surmounted the difficulties of the ground, and hurtling on the column -went clean through it; then the squares above retreated and several -hundred prisoners were made by these able and daring horsemen. - -This charge had been successful even to wonder, the joyous victors -standing in the midst of their captives and of thousands of admiring -friends seemed invincible; yet those who witnessed the scene, nay -the actors themselves remained with the conviction of this military -truth, that cavalry are not able to cope with veteran infantry save -by surprize. The hill of La Serna offered a frightful spectacle of -the power of the musket, that queen of weapons, and the track of -the Germans was marked by their huge bodies. A few minutes only -had the combat lasted and above a hundred had fallen; fifty-one -were killed outright; and in several places man and horse had died -simultaneously, and so suddenly, that falling together on their sides -they appeared still alive, the horse’s legs stretched out as in -movement, the rider’s feet in the stirrup, his bridle in hand, the -sword raised to strike, and the large hat fastened under the chin, -giving to the grim, but undistorted countenance, a supernatural and -terrible expression. - -When the French main body found their rear-guard attacked, they -turned to its succour, but seeing the light division coming up -recommenced the retreat and were followed to Nava de Sotroval. -Near that place Chauvel’s horsemen joined them from the Duero, and -covered the rear with such a resolute countenance that the allied -cavalry, reduced in numbers and fatigued with continual fighting, did -not choose to meddle again. Thus Clauzel carried his army clear off -without further loss, and with such celerity, that his head-quarters -were that night at Flores de Avila forty miles from the field of -battle. After remaining a few hours there he crossed the Zapardiel, -and would have halted the 24th, but the allied cavalry entered Cisla, -and the march was then continued to Arevalo. This was a wonderful -retreat, and the line was chosen with judgment, for Wellington -naturally expected the French army would have made for Tordesillas -instead of the Adaja. The pursuit was however somewhat slack, for -on the very night of the action, the British left wing, being -quite fresh, could have ascended the Tormes and reached the Almar -before day-light, or, passing at Huerta, have marched by Ventosa to -Peneranda; but the vigorous following of a beaten enemy was never -a prominent characteristic of Lord Wellington’s campaigns in the -Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 3.] - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.] - -The 25th the allied army halted on the Zapardiel, and Adaja rivers, -to let the commissariat, which had been sent to the rear the morning -of the battle, come up. Meanwhile the king having quitted Madrid -with fourteen thousand men on the 21st reached the Adaja and pushed -his cavalry towards Fontiveros; he was at Blasco Sancho the 24th, -within a few hours’ march of Arevalo, and consequently able to -effect a junction with Clauzel, yet he did not hurry his march, -for he knew only of the advance upon Salamanca not of the defeat, -and having sent many messengers to inform Marmont of his approach, -concluded that general would await his arrival. The next day he -received letters from the duke of Ragusa and Clauzel, dated Arevalo, -describing the battle, and telling him that the defeated army must -pass the Duero immediately to save the dépôt of Valladolid, and -to establish new communications with the army of the north. Those -generals promised however to halt behind that river, if possible, -until the king could receive reinforcements from Suchet and Soult. - -Joseph by a rapid movement upon Arevalo could still have effected -a junction, but he immediately made a forced march to Espinar, -leaving in Blasco Sancho two officers and twenty-seven troopers, who -were surprised and made prisoners on the evening of the 25th by a -corporal’s patrole; Clauzel at the same time marched upon Valladolid, -by Olmedo, thus abandoning Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas, with their -garrisons, to the allies. Wellington immediately brought Santo -Cildes, who was now upon the Esla with eight thousand Gallicians, -to the right bank of the Duero, across which river he communicated -by Castro Nuño with the left of the allies which was then upon the -Zapardiel. - -The 27th the British whose march had become more circumspect from the -vicinity of the king’s army entered Olmedo. At this place, general -Ferrey had died of his wounds, and the Spaniards tearing his body -from the grave were going to mutilate it, when the soldiers of the -light division who had so often fought against this brave man rescued -his corpse, re-made his grave and heaped rocks upon it for more -security, though with little need; for the Spaniards, with whom the -sentiment of honor is always strong when not stifled by the violence -of their passions, applauded the action. - -On the 26th Clauzel, finding the pursuit had slackened, sent Colonel -Fabvier to advise the king of it, and then sending his own right wing -across the Duero, by the ford near Boecillo, to cover the evacuation -of Valladolid, marched with the other wing towards the bridge of -Tudela; he remained however still on the left bank, in the hope that -Fabvier’s mission would bring the king back. Joseph who had already -passed the Puerta de Guadarama immediately repassed it without delay -and made a flank movement to Segovia, which he reached the 27th, and -pushed his cavalry to Santa Maria de Nieva. Here he remained until -the 31st expecting Clauzel would join him, for he resolved not to -quit his hold of the passes over the Guadarama, nor to abandon his -communication with Valencia and Andalusia. But Wellington brought -Santo Cildes over the Duero to the Zapardiel, and crossing the Eresma -and Ciga rivers himself, with the first and light divisions and the -cavalry, had obliged Clauzel to retire over the Duero in the night -of the 29th; and the next day the French general whose army was very -much discouraged, fearing that Wellington would gain Aranda and Lerma -while the Gallicians seized Dueñas and Torquemada, retreated in three -columns by the valleys of the Arlanza, the Duero and the Esquiva -towards Burgos. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s despatch.] - -The English general entered Valladolid amidst the rejoicings of the -people and there captured seventeen pieces of artillery, considerable -stores, and eight hundred sick and wounded men; three hundred other -prisoners were taken by the Partida chief Marquinez, and a large -French convoy intended for Andalusia returned to Burgos. While the -left wing of the allies pursued the enemy up the Arlanza, Wellington, -marching with the right wing against the king, reached Cuellar -the 1st of August; on the same day the garrison of Tordesillas -surrendered to the Gallicians, and Joseph having first dismantled -the castle of Segovia and raised a contribution of money and church -plate retreated through the Puerta de Guadarama, leaving a rear-guard -of cavalry which escaped by the Ildefonso pass on the approach of -the allied horsemen. Thus the army of the centre was irrevocably -separated from the army of Portugal, the operations against the -latter were terminated, and new combinations were made conformable to -the altered state of affairs; but to understand these it is necessary -to look at the transactions in other parts of the Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: See Chap. IV. Book XVIII.] - -[Sidenote: Intercepted correspondence.] - -In Estremadura, after Drouet’s retreat to Azagua, Hill placed a -strong division at Merida ready to cross the Tagus, but no military -event occurred until the 24th of July, when general Lallemand, with -three regiments of cavalry pushed back some Portuguese horsemen -from Ribera to Villa Franca. He was attacked in front by general -Long, while general Slade menaced his left, but he succeeded in -repassing the defile of Ribera; Long then turned him by both flanks, -and aided by Lefebre’s horse artillery, drove him with the loss of -fifty men and many horses upon Llera, a distance of twenty miles. -Drouet, desirous to retaliate, immediately executed a flank march -towards Merida, and Hill fearing for his detachments there made a -corresponding movement, whereupon the French general returned to -the Serena; but though he received positive orders from Soult to -give battle no action followed and the affairs of that part of the -Peninsula remained balanced. - -[Sidenote: August.] - -In Andalusia, Ballesteros surprised colonel Beauvais, at Ossuna, took -three hundred prisoners and destroyed the French dépôt there. After -this he moved against Malaga, and was opposed by general Laval in -front, while general Villatte, detached from the blockade of Cadiz, -cut off his retreat to San Roque. The road to Murcia was still open -to him, but his rashness, though of less consequence since the battle -of Salamanca, gave Wellington great disquietude, and the more so that -Joseph O’Donel had just sustained a serious defeat near Alicant. -This disaster, which shall be described in a more fitting place, was -however in some measure counterbalanced by the information, that the -revived expedition from Sicily had reached Majorca, where it had been -reinforced by Whittingham’s division, and by the stores and guns sent -from Portugal to Gibraltar. It was known also, that in the northern -provinces Popham’s armament had drawn all Caffarelli’s troops to the -coast, and although the littoral warfare was not followed up the -French were in confusion and the diversion complete. - -In Castile the siege of Astorga still lingered, but the division -of Santo Cildes, seven thousand strong, was in communication with -Wellington, Silveira’s militia were on the Duero, Clauzel had -retreated to Burgos, and the king joined by two thousand men from -Suchet’s army, could concentrate twenty thousand to dispute the -passes of the Guadarama. Hence Wellington, having nothing immediate -to fear from Soult, nor from the army of Portugal, nor from the army -of the north, nor from Suchet, menaced as that marshal was by the -Sicilian expedition, resolved to attack the king in preference to -following Clauzel. The latter general could not be pursued without -exposing Salamanca and the Gallicians to Joseph, who was strong in -cavalry; but the monarch could be assailed without risking much in -other quarters, seeing that Clauzel could not be very soon ready -to renew the campaign, and it was expected Castaños would reduce -Astorga in a few days which would give eight thousand additional -men to the field army. Moreover a strong British division could be -spared to co-operate with Santo Cildes, Silveira, and the Partidas, -in the watching of the beaten army of Portugal while Wellington gave -the king a blow in the field, or forced him to abandon Madrid; and -it appeared probable that the moral effect of regaining the capital -would excite the Spaniards’ energy every where, and would prevent -Soult from attacking Hill. If he did attack him, the allies by -choosing this line of operations, would be at hand to give succour. - -These reasons being weighed, Wellington posted general Clinton at -Cuellar with the sixth division, which he increased to eight thousand -men by the addition of some sickly regiments and by Anson’s cavalry; -Santo Cildes also was put in communication with him, and the Partidas -of Marquinez, Saornil, and El Principe agreed to act with Anson on -a prescribed plan. Thus exclusive of Silveira’s militia, and of the -Gallicians about Astorga, eighteen thousand men were left on the -Duero, and the English general was still able to march against Joseph -with twenty-eight thousand old troops, exclusive of Carlos D’España’s -Spaniards. He had also assurance from lord Castlereagh, that a -considerable sum in hard money, to be followed by other remittances, -had been sent from England, a circumstance of the utmost importance -because grain could be purchased in Spain at one-third the cost of -bringing it up from Portugal. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.] - -Meanwhile the king, who had regained Madrid, expecting to hear that -ten thousand of the army of the south were at Toledo, received -letters from Soult positively refusing to send that detachment; and -from Clausel, saying that the army of Portugal was in full retreat -to Burgos. This retreat he regarded as a breach of faith, because -Clausel had promised to hold the line of the Duero if Wellington -marched upon Madrid; but Joseph was unable to appreciate Wellington’s -military combinations; he did not perceive, that, taking advantage of -his central position, the English general, before he marched against -Madrid, had forced Clausel to abandon the Duero to seek some safe and -distant point to re-organize his army. Nor was the king’s perception -of his own situation much clearer. He had the choice of several lines -of operations; that is, he might defend the passes of the Guadarama -while his court and enormous convoys evacuated Madrid and marched -either upon Zaragoza, Valencia or Andalusia; or he might retire, army -and convoy together, in one of those directions. - -Rejecting the defence of the passes, lest the allies should then -march by their right to the Tagus, and so intercept his communication -with the south, he resolved to direct his march towards the Morena, -and he had from Segovia sent Soult orders to evacuate Andalusia and -meet him on the frontier of La Mancha; but to avoid the disgrace -of flying before a detachment, he occupied the Escurial mountain, -and placed his army across the roads leading from the passes of the -Guadarama to Madrid. While in this position Wellington’s advanced -guard, composed of D’Urban’s Portuguese a troop of horse artillery -and a battalion of infantry, passed the Guadarama, and the 10th -the whole army was over the mountains. Then the king, retaining -only eight thousand men in position, sent the rest of his troops to -protect the march of his court, which quitted Madrid the same day, -with two or three thousand carriages of different kinds and nearly -twenty thousand persons of all ages and sexes. - -The 11th D’Urban drove back Trielhard’s cavalry posts, and entered -Majadahonda, whilst some German infantry, Bock’s heavy cavalry, and -a troop of horse artillery, occupied Las Rozas about a mile in his -rear. In the evening, Trielhard, reinforced by Schiazzetti’s Italian -dragoons and the lancers of Berg, returned, whereupon D’Urban called -up the horse artillery and would have charged the enemy’s leading -squadrons, but the Portuguese cavalry fled. The artillery officer -thus abandoned, made a vigorous effort to save his guns, yet three -of them being overturned on the rough ground were taken, and the -victorious cavalry passed through Majadahonda in pursuit. The German -dragoons, although surprised in their quarters, mounted and stopped -the leading French squadrons until Schiazzetti’s Italians came up, -when the fight was like to end badly; but Ponsonby’s cavalry and -the seventh division arrived, and Trielhard immediately abandoned -Majadahonda, leaving the captured guns behind him, yet carrying away -prisoners, the Portuguese general Visconde de Barbacena, the colonel -of the German cavalry, and others of less rank. The whole loss of the -allies was above two hundred, and when the infantry passed through -Rozas, a few hours after the combat, the German dead were lying -thickly in the streets, many of them in their shirts and trousers, -and thus stretched across the sills of the doors, they furnished -proof at once of the suddenness of the action and of their own -bravery. Had the king been prepared to follow up this blow with his -whole force the allies must have suffered severely, for Wellington, -trusting to the advanced guard, had not kept his divisions very close -together. - -After this combat the king retired to Valdemoro where he met his -convoy from Madrid, and when the troops of the three different -nations forming his army thus came together, a horrible confusion -arose; the convoy was plundered, and the miserable people who -followed the court, were made a prey by the licentious soldiers. -Marshal Jourdan, a man at all times distinguished for the noblest -sentiments, immediately threw himself into the midst of the -disorderly troops, and aided by the other generals, with great -personal risk arrested the mischief, and succeeded in making the -multitude file over the bridge of Aranjues. The procession was -however lugubrious and shocking, for the military line of march was -broken by crowds of weeping women and children and by despairing men, -and courtiers of the highest rank were to be seen in full dress, -desperately struggling with savage soldiers for the possession of -even the animals on which they were endeavouring to save their -families. The cavalry of the allies could have driven the whole -before them into the Tagus, yet Lord Wellington did not molest them. -Either from ignorance of their situation, or what is more probable -compassionating their misery, and knowing that the troops by -abandoning the convoy could easily escape over the river, he would -not strike where the blow could only fall on helpless people without -affecting the military operations. Perhaps also he thought it wise to -leave Joseph the burthen of his court. - -In the evening of the 13th the whole multitude was over the Tagus, -the garrisons of Aranjues and Toledo joined the army, order was -restored, and the king received letters from Soult and Suchet. The -first named marshal opposed the evacuation of Andalusia; the second -gave notice, that the Sicilian expedition had landed at Alicant, and -that a considerable army was forming there. Then irritated by Soult -and alarmed for the safety of Suchet, the king relinquished his march -towards the Morena and commenced his retreat to Valencia. The 15th -the advanced guard moved with the sick and wounded, who were heaped -on country cars, and the main body of the convoy followed under -charge of the infantry, while the cavalry, spreading to the right and -left, endeavoured to collect provisions. But the people, remembering -the wanton devastation committed a few months before by Montbrun’s -troops, on their return from Alicant, fled with their property; and -as it was the hottest time of the year, and the deserted country was -sandy and without shade, this march, of one hundred and fifty miles -to Almanza, was one of continual suffering. The Partida chief Chaleco -hovered constantly on the flanks and rear, killing without mercy all -persons, civil or military, who straggled or sunk from exhaustion; -and while this disastrous journey was in progress, another misfortune -befel the French on the side of Requeña. For the hussars and infantry -belonging to Suchet’s army, having left Madrid to succour Cuenca -before the king returned from Segovia, carried off the garrison of -that place in despite of the Empecinado, and made for Valencia; -but Villa Campa crossing their march on the 25th of August, at the -passage of a river, near Utiel, took all their baggage, their guns, -and three hundred men. And after being driven away from Cuenca the -Empecinado invested Guadalaxara where the enemy had left a garrison -of seven hundred men. - -Wellington seeing that the king had crossed the Tagus in retreat -entered Madrid, a very memorable event were it only from the -affecting circumstances attending it. He, a foreigner and marching -at the head of a foreign army, was met and welcomed to the capital -of Spain by the whole remaining population. The multitude who before -that hour had never seen him, came forth to hail his approach, not -with feigned enthusiasm, not with acclamations extorted by the fear -of a conqueror’s power, nor yet excited by the natural proneness of -human nature to laud the successful, for there was no tumultuous -exultation; famine was amongst them, and long-endured misery had -subdued their spirits, but with tears, and every other sign of deep -emotion, they crowded around his horse, hung upon his stirrups, -touched his clothes, or throwing themselves upon the earth, blessed -him aloud as the friend of Spain. His triumph was as pure, and -glorious, as it was uncommon, and he felt it to be so. - -Madrid was however still disturbed by the presence of the enemy. The -Retiro contained enormous stores, twenty thousand stand of arms, more -than one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery, and the eagles of -two French regiments, and it had a garrison of two thousand fighting -men, besides invalids and followers, but its inherent weakness was -soon made manifest. The works consisted of an interior fort called -La China, with an exterior entrenchment; but the fort was too small, -the entrenchment too large, and the latter could be easily deprived -of water. In the lodgings of a French officer also was found an -order, directing the commandant to confine his real defence to the -fort, and accordingly, in the night of the 13th, being menaced, he -abandoned the entrenchment, and the next day accepted honourable -terms, because La China was so contracted and filled with combustible -buildings, that his fine troops would with only a little firing have -been smothered in the ruins; yet they were so dissatisfied that -many broke their arms and their commander was like to have fallen a -victim to their wrath. They were immediately sent to Portugal, and -French writers with too much truth assert, that the escort basely -robbed and murdered many of the prisoners. This disgraceful action -was perpetrated, either at Avila or on the frontier of Portugal, -wherefore the British troops, who furnished no escorts after the -first day’s march from Madrid, are guiltless. - -Coincident with the fall of the Retiro was that of Guadalaxara, -which surrendered to the Empecinado. This mode of wasting an army, -and its resources, was designated by Napoleon as the most glaring -and extraordinary of all the errors committed by the king and by -Marmont. And surely it was so. For including the garrisons of Toro, -Tordesillas, Zamora and Astorga, which were now blockaded, six -thousand men had been delivered, as it were bound, to the allies, -and with them, stores and equipments sufficient for a new army. -These forts had been designed by the emperor to resist the partidas, -but his lieutenants exposed them to the British army, and thus the -positive loss of men from the battle of Salamanca was doubled. - -Napoleon had notice of Marmont’s defeat as early as the 2d of -September, a week before the great battle of Borodino; the news was -carried by colonel Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in -one course, and having fought on the 22d of July at the Arapiles, -was wounded on the heights of Moskowa the 7th of September! However, -the duke of Ragusa, suffering alike in body and in mind, had excused -himself with so little strength, or clearness, that the emperor -contemptuously remarking, that the despatch contained more complicate -stuffing than a clock, desired his war minister to demand, why -Marmont had delivered battle without the orders of the king? why -he had not made his operations subservient to the general plan of -the campaign? why he broke from defensive into offensive operations -before the army of the centre joined him? why he would not even wait -two days for Chauvel’s cavalry, which he knew were close at hand? -“From personal vanity,” said the emperor, with seeming sternness, -“the duke of Ragusa has sacrificed the interests of his country, and -the good of my service, he is guilty of the crime of insubordination, -and is the author of all this misfortune.” - -[Sidenote: September] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, 4, 5, 6.] - -But Napoleon’s wrath so just, and apparently so dangerous, could not, -even in its first violence, overpower his early friendship. With a -kindness, the recollection of which must now pierce Marmont’s inmost -soul, twice, in the same letter, he desired that these questions -might not even be put to his unhappy lieutenant until his wounds -were cured and his health re-established. Nor was this generous -feeling shaken by the arrival of the king’s agent, colonel Desprez, -who reached Moscow the 18th of October, just after Murat had lost -a battle at the outposts and when all hopes of peace with Russia -were at an end. Joseph’s dispatches bitter against all the generals, -were especially so against Marmont and Soult; the former for having -lost the battle, the latter because of his resistance to the royal -plan. The recal of the duke of Dalmatia was demanded imperatively, -because he had written a letter to the emperor, extremely offensive -to the king; and it was also hinted, that Soult designed to make -himself king of Andalusia. Idle stories of that marshal’s ambition -seem always to have been resorted to, when his skilful plans were -beyond the military judgement of ordinary generals; but Marmont was -deeply sunk in culpable misfortune, and the king’s complaints against -him were not unjust. Napoleon had however then seen Wellington’s -dispatch, which was more favourable to the duke of Ragusa, than -Joseph’s report; for the latter was founded on a belief, that the -unfortunate general, knowing the army of the centre was close at -hand, would not wait for it; whereas the partidas had intercepted -so many of Joseph’s letters, it is doubtful if any reached Marmont -previous to the battle. It was in vain therefore, that Desprez -pressed the king’s discontent on the emperor; that great man, with -unerring sagacity, had already disentangled the truth, and Desprez -was thus roughly interrogated as to the conduct of his master. - -Why was not the army of the centre in the field a month sooner to -succour Marmont? Why was the emperor’s example, when, in a like case, -he marched from Madrid against sir John Moore, forgotten? Why, after -the battle, was not the Duero passed, and the beaten troops rallied -on the army of the centre? Why were the passes of the Guadarama so -early abandoned? Why was the Tagus crossed so soon? Finally, why were -the stores and gun-carriages in the Retiro not burnt, the eagles and -the garrison carried off? - -To these questions the king’s agent could only reply by excuses which -must have made the energetic emperor smile; but when, following his -instructions, Desprez harped upon Soult’s demeanour, his designs in -Andalusia, and still more upon the letter so personally offensive -to the king, and which shall be noticed hereafter, Napoleon replied -sharply, that he could not enter into such pitiful disputes while -he was at the head of five hundred thousand men and occupied with -such immense operations. With respect to Soult’s letter, he said he -knew his brother’s real feelings, but those who judged Joseph by his -language could only think with Soult, whose suspicions were natural -and partaken by the other generals; wherefore he would not, by -recalling him, deprive the armies in Spain of the only military head -they possessed. And then in ridicule of Soult’s supposed treachery, -he observed, that the king’s fears on that head must have subsided, -as the English newspapers said the duke of Dalmatia was evacuating -Andalusia, and he would of course unite with Suchet and with the army -of the centre to retake the offensive. - -The emperor, however, admitted all the evils arising from these -disputes between the generals and the king, but said that at such a -distance he could not give precise orders for their conduct. He had -foreseen the mischief he observed, and regretted more than ever that -Joseph had disregarded his counsel not to return to Spain in 1811, -and thus saying he closed the conversation, but this expression about -Joseph not returning to Spain is very remarkable. Napoleon spoke of -it as of a well known fact, yet Joseph’s letters shew that he not -only desired but repeatedly offered to resign the crown of Spain and -live a private man in France! Did the emperor mean that he wished -his brother to remain a crowned guest at Paris? or had some subtle -intriguers misrepresented the brothers to each other? The noblest -buildings are often defiled in secret by vile and creeping things. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. _Menace your enemy’s flanks, protect your own, and be ready to -concentrate on the important points_: - -These maxims contain the whole spirit of Napoleon’s instructions to -his generals, after Badajos was succoured in 1811. At that time he -ordered the army of Portugal to occupy the valley of the Tagus and -the passes of the Gredos mountains, in which position it covered -Madrid, and from thence it could readily march to aid either the army -of the south, or the army of the north. Dorsenne, who commanded the -latter, could bring twenty-six thousand men to Ciudad Rodrigo, and -Soult could bring a like number to Badajos, but Wellington could -not move against one or the other without having Marmont upon his -flank; he could not move against Marmont, without having the others -on both flanks, and he could not turn his opponent’s flanks save -from the ocean. If notwithstanding this combination he took Ciudad -Rodrigo and Badajos, it was by surprise, and because the French did -not concentrate on the important points, which proved indeed his -superiority to the executive general opposed to him but in no manner -affected the principle of Napoleon’s plan. - -Again, when the preparations for the Russian war had weakened the -army of the north, the emperor, giving Marmont two additional -divisions, ordered him to occupy Castile, not as a defensive -position, but as a central offensive one from whence he could keep -the Gallicians in check, and by prompt menacing movements, prevent -Wellington from commencing serious operations elsewhere. This plan -also had reference to the maxim respecting flanks. For Marmont was -forbidden to invade Portugal while Wellington was on the frontier -of Beira, that is when he could not assail him in flank; and he was -directed to guard the Asturias carefully as a protection to the great -line of communication with France; in May also he was rebuked for -having withdrawn Bonet from Oviedo, and for delaying to reoccupy the -Asturias when the incursion against Beira terminated. But neither -then nor afterwards did the duke of Ragusa comprehend the spirit -of the Emperor’s views, and that extraordinary man, whose piercing -sagacity seized every chance of war, was so disquieted by his -lieutenant’s want of perception, that all the pomp, and all the vast -political and military combinations of Dresden, could not put it from -his thoughts. - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. 2.] - -“Twice,” said he, “has the duke of Ragusa placed an interval of -thirty leagues between his army and the enemy, contrary to all the -rules of war; the English general goes where he will, the French -general loses the initial movements and is of no weight in the -affairs of Spain. Biscay and the north are exposed by the evacuation -of the Asturias; Santona and St. Sebastian are endangered, and -the guerillas communicate freely with the coast. If the duke of -Ragusa has not kept some bridges on the Agueda, he cannot know what -Wellington is about, and he will retire before light cavalry instead -of operating so as to make the English general concentrate his -whole army. The false direction already given to affairs by marshal -Marmont, makes it necessary that Caffarelli should keep a strong -corps always in hand; that the commander of the reserve, at Bayonne, -should look to the safety of St. Sebastian, holding three thousand -men always ready to march; finally that the provisional battalions, -and troops from the dépôts of the interior, should immediately -reinforce the reserve at Bayonne, be encamped on the Pyrennees, and -exercised and formed for service. _If Marmont’s oversights continue, -these troops will prevent the disasters from becoming extreme._” - -Napoleon was supernaturally gifted in warlike matters. It has been -recorded of Cæsar’s generalship, that he foretold the cohorts mixed -with his cavalry would be the cause of victory at Pharsalia. But this -letter was written by the French emperor on the 28th of May before -the allies were even collected on the Agueda, and when a hundred -thousand French troops were between the English general and Bayonne, -and yet its prescience was vindicated at Burgos in October! - -2º. To fulfil the conditions of the emperor’s design, Marmont should -have adopted Soult’s recommendation, that is, leaving one or two -divisions on the Tormes he should have encamped near Baños, and -pushed troops towards the upper Agueda to watch the movements of the -allies. Caffarelli’s divisions could then have joined those on the -Tormes, and thus Napoleon’s plan for 1811 would have been exactly -renewed; Madrid would have been covered, a junction with the king -would have been secured, Wellington could scarcely have moved beyond -the Agueda, and the disaster of Salamanca would have been avoided. - -The duke of Ragusa, apparently because he would not have the king -in his camp, run counter both to the emperor and to Soult. 1º. He -kept no troops on the Agueda, which might be excused on the ground -that the feeding of them there was beyond his means; but then he -did not concentrate behind the Tormes to sustain his forts, neither -did he abandon his forts, when he abandoned Salamanca, and thus -eight hundred men were sacrificed merely to secure the power of -concentrating behind the Duero. 2º. He adopted a line of operations -perpendicular to the allies’ front, instead of lying on their flank; -he abandoned sixty miles of country between the Tormes and the -Agueda, and he suffered Wellington to take the initial movements of -the campaign. 3º. He withdrew Bonet’s division from the Asturias, -whereby he lost Caffarelli’s support and realized the emperor’s -fears for the northern provinces. It is true that he regained the -initial power, by passing the Duero on the 18th, and had he deferred -the passage until the king was over the Guadarama, Wellington must -have gone back upon Portugal with some shew of dishonour if not great -loss. But if Castaños, instead of remaining with fifteen thousand -Gallicians, before Astorga, a weak place with a garrison of only -twelve hundred men, had blockaded it with three or four thousand, and -detached Santocildes with eleven or twelve thousand down the Esla to -co-operate with Silveira and D’Urban, sixteen thousand men would have -been acting upon Marmont’s right flank in June; and as Bonet did not -join until the 8th of July the line of the Duero would scarcely have -availed the French general. - -3º. The secret of Wellington’s success is to be found in the extent -of country occupied by the French armies, and the impediments to -their military communication. Portugal was an impregnable central -position, from whence the English general could rush out unexpectedly -against any point. This strong post was however of his own making, -he had chosen it, had fortified it, had defended it, he knew its -full value and possessed quickness and judgement to avail himself -of all its advantages; the battle of Salamanca was accidental in -itself, but the tree was planted to bear such fruit, and Wellington’s -profound combinations must be estimated from the general result. -He had only sixty thousand disposable troops, and above a hundred -thousand French were especially appointed to watch and controul him, -yet he passed the frontier, defeated forty-five thousand in a pitched -battle, and drove twenty thousand others from Madrid in the greatest -confusion, without risking a single strategic point, of importance -to his own operations. His campaign up to the conquest of Madrid was -therefore strictly in accord with the rules of art, although his -means and resources have been shewn to be precarious, shifting, and -uncertain. Indeed the want of money alone would have prevented him -from following up his victory if he had not persuaded the Spanish -authorities, in the Salamanca country, to yield him the revenues of -the government in kind under a promise of repayment at Cadiz. No -general was ever more entitled to the honours of victory. - -4º. The success of Wellington’s daring advance would seem to indicate -a fault in the French plan of invasion. The army of the south, -numerous, of approved valour and perfectly well commanded, was yet of -so little weight in this campaign as to prove that Andalusia was a -point pushed beyond the true line of operations. The conquest of that -province in 1811 was an enterprize of the king’s, on which he prided -himself, yet it seems never to have been much liked by Napoleon, -although he did not absolutely condemn it. The question was indeed a -very grave one. While the English general held Portugal, and while -Cadiz was unsubdued, Andalusia was a burthen, rather than a gain. It -would have answered better, either to have established communications -with France by the southern line of invasion, which would have -brought the enterprize within the rules of a methodical war, or to -have held the province partially by detachments, keeping the bulk -of the army of the south in Estremadura, and thus have strengthened -the northern line of invasion. For in Estremadura, Soult would have -covered the capital, and have been more strictly connected with -the army of the centre; and his powerful co-operation with Massena -in 1810 would probably have obliged the English general to quit -Portugal. The same result could doubtless have been obtained by -reinforcing the army of the south, with thirty or forty thousand men, -but it is questionable if Soult could have fed such a number; and in -favour of the invasion of Andalusia it may be observed, that Seville -was the great arsenal of Spain, that a formidable power might have -been established there by the English without abandoning Portugal, -that Cadiz would have compensated for the loss of Lisbon, and finally -that the English ministers were not at that time determined to defend -Portugal. - -5º. When the emperor declared that Soult possessed the only military -head in the Peninsula he referred to a proposition made by that -marshal which shall be noticed in the next chapter; but having regard -merely to the disputes between the duke of Dalmatia, Marmont, and -the king, Suchet’s talents not being in question, the justice of the -remark may be demonstrated. Napoleon always enforced with precept -and example, the vital military principle of concentration on the -important points; but the king and the marshals, though harping -continually upon this maxim, desired to follow it out, each in his -own sphere. Now to concentrate on a wrong point, is to hurt yourself -with your own sword, and as each French general desired to be strong, -the army at large was scattered instead of being concentrated. - -The failure of the campaign was, by the king, attributed to Soult’s -disobedience, inasmuch as the passage of the Tagus by Drouet would -have enabled the army of the centre to act, before Palombini’s -division arrived. But it has been shewn that Hill could have brought -Wellington an equal, or superior reinforcement, in less time, -whereby the latter could either have made head until the French -dispersed for want of provisions, or, by a rapid counter-movement, -he could have fallen upon Andalusia. And if the king had menaced -Ciudad Rodrigo in return it would have been no diversion, for he had -no battering train, still less could he have revenged himself by -marching on Lisbon, because Wellington would have overpowered Soult -and established a new base at Cadiz, before such an operation could -become dangerous to the capital of Portugal. Oporto might indeed -have been taken, yet Joseph would have hesitated to exchange Madrid -for that city. But the ten thousand men required of Soult by the -king, on the 19th of June, could have been at Madrid before August, -and thus the passes of the Guadarama could have been defended until -the army of Portugal was reorganized! Aye! but Hill could then have -entered the valley of the Tagus, or, being reinforced, could have -invaded Andalusia while Wellington kept the king’s army in check. -It would appear therefore that Joseph’s plan of operations, if all -its combinations had been exactly executed, might have prevented -Wellington’s progress on some points, but to effect this the French -must have been concentrated in large masses from distant places -without striking any decisive blow, which was the very pith and -marrow of the English general’s policy. Hence it follows that Soult -made the true and Joseph the false application of the principle of -concentration. - -6º. If the king had judged his position truly he would have early -merged the monarch in the general, exchanged the palace for the -tent; he would have held only the Retiro and a few fortified posts -in the vicinity of Madrid, he would have organized a good pontoon -train and established his magazines in Segovia, Avila, Toledo, and -Talavera; finally he would have kept his army constantly united in -the field, and exercised his soldiers, either by opening good roads -through the mountains, or in chasing the partidas, while Wellington -remained quiet. Thus acting, he would have been always ready to march -north or south, to succour any menaced point. By enforcing good order -and discipline in his own army, he would also have given a useful -example, and he could by vigilance and activity have ensured the -preponderance of force in the field on whichever side he marched. -He would thus have acquired the esteem of the French generals, and -obtained their willing obedience, and the Spaniards would more -readily have submitted to a warlike monarch. A weak man may safely -wear an inherited crown, it is of gold and the people support it; -but it requires the strength of a warrior to bear the weight of an -usurped diadem, it is of iron. - -7º. If Marmont and the king were at fault in the general plan of -operations, they were not less so in the particular tactics of the -campaign. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, Nos. 19, 20.] - -On the 18th of July the army of Portugal passed the Douro in advance. -On the 30th it repassed that river in retreat, having, in twelve -days, marched two hundred miles, fought three combats, and a general -battle. One field-marshal, seven generals, twelve thousand five -hundred men and officers had been killed, wounded, or taken; and two -eagles, besides those taken in the Retiro, several standards, twelve -guns, and eight carriages, exclusive of the artillery and stores -captured at Valladolid, fell into the victors’ hands. In the same -period, the allies marched one hundred and sixty miles, and had one -field-marshal, four generals, and somewhat less than six thousand -officers and soldiers killed or wounded. - -This comparison furnishes the proof of Wellington’s sagacity, when -he determined not to fight except at great advantage. The French -army, although surprised in the midst of an evolution and instantly -swept from the field, killed and wounded six thousand of the allies; -the eleventh and sixty-first regiments of the sixth division had -not together more than one hundred and sixty men and officers left -standing at the end of the battle; twice six thousand then would -have fallen in a more equal contest, the blow would have been less -decisive, and as Chauvel’s cavalry and the king’s army were both -at hand, a retreat into Portugal would probably have followed a -less perfect victory. Wherefore this battle ought not, and would -not have been fought, but for Marmont’s false movement on the 22d. -Yet it is certain that if Wellington had retired without fighting, -the murmurs of his army, already louder than was seemly, would have -been heard in England, and if an accidental shot had terminated his -career all would have terminated. The cortez, ripe for a change, -would have accepted the intrusive king, and the American war, just -declared against England, would have rendered the complicated affairs -of Portugal so extremely embarrassed that no new man could have -continued the contest. Then the cries of disappointed politicians -would have been raised. Wellington, it would have been said, -Wellington, desponding, and distrusting his brave troops, dared not -venture a battle on even terms, hence these misfortunes! His name -would have been made, as sir John Moore’s was, a butt for the malice -and falsehood of faction, and his military genius would have been -measured by the ignorance of his detractors. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, Nos. 19, 20.] - -8º. In the battle Marmont had about forty-two thousand sabres and -bayonets; Wellington who had received some detachments on the -19th had above forty-six thousand, but the excess was principally -Spanish. The French had seventy-four guns, the allies, including a -Spanish battery, had only sixty pieces. Thus, Marmont, over-matched -in cavalry and infantry, was superior in artillery, and the fight -would have been most bloody, if the generals had been equal, for -courage and strength were in even balance until Wellington’s genius -struck the beam. Scarcely can a fault be detected in his conduct. It -might indeed be asked why the cavalry reserves were not, after Le -Marchant’s charge, brought up closer to sustain the fourth, fifth, -and sixth divisions and to keep off Boyer’s dragoons, but it would -seem ill to cavil at an action which was described at the time by -a French officer, as the “_beating of forty thousand men in forty -minutes_.” - -9º. The battle of Salamanca remarkable in many points of view, was -not least so in this that it was the first decided victory gained by -the allies in the Peninsula. In former actions the French had been -repulsed, here they were driven headlong as it were before a mighty -wind, without help or stay, and the results were proportionate. -Joseph’s secret negociations with the Cortez were crushed, his -partizans in every part of the Peninsula were abashed, and the -sinking spirit of the Catalans was revived; the clamours of the -opposition in England were checked, the provisional government of -France was dismayed, the secret plots against the French in Germany -were resuscitated, and the shock, reaching even to Moscow, heaved and -shook the colossal structure of Napoleon’s power to its very base. - -Nevertheless Salamanca was as most great battles are, an accident; -an accident seized upon with astonishing vigour and quickness, but -still an accident. Even its results were accidental, for the French -could never have repassed the Tormes as an army, if Carlos D’España -had not withdrawn the garrison from Alba, and hidden the fact from -Wellington; and this circumstance alone would probably have led to -the ruin of the whole campaign, but for another of those chances, -which, recurring so frequently in war, render bad generals timid, -and make great generals trust their fortune under the most adverse -circumstances. This is easily shewn. Joseph was at Blasco Sancho -on the 24th, and notwithstanding his numerous cavalry, the army of -Portugal passed in retreat across his front at the distance of only a -few miles, without his knowledge; he thus missed one opportunity of -effecting his junction with Clauzel. On the 25th this junction could -still have been made at Arevalo, and Wellington, as if to mock the -king’s generalship, halted that day behind the Zapardiel; yet Joseph -retreated towards the Guadarama, wrathful that Clauzel made no effort -to join him, and forgetful that as a beaten and pursued army must -march, it was for him to join Clauzel. But the true cause of these -errors was the different inclinations of the generals. The king -wished to draw Clauzel to Madrid, Clauzel desired to have the king -behind the Duero, and if he had succeeded the probable result may be -thus traced. - -Clauzel during the first confusion wrote that only twenty thousand -men could be reorganised, but in this number he did not include the -stragglers and marauders who always take advantage of a defeat to -seek their own interest; a reference to the French loss proves that -there were nearly thirty thousand fighting men left, and in fact -Clauzel did in a fortnight reorganise twenty thousand infantry, two -thousand cavalry and fifty guns, besides gaining a knowledge of five -thousand stragglers and marauders. In fine no soldiers rally quicker -after a defeat, than the French, and hence as Joseph brought to -Blasco Sancho thirty guns and fourteen thousand men of which above -two thousand were horsemen, forty thousand infantry, and more than -six thousand cavalry with a powerful artillery, might then have been -rallied behind the Duero, exclusive of Caffarelli’s divisions. Nor -would Madrid have been meanwhile exposed to an insurrection, nor to -the operation of a weak detachment from Wellington’s army; for the -two thousand men, sent by Suchet, had arrived in that capital on the -30th, and there were in the several fortified points of the vicinity, -six or seven thousand other troops who could have been united at -the Retiro, to protect that dépôt and the families attached to the -intrusive court. - -Thus Wellington without committing any fault, would have found a more -powerful army than Marmont’s, again on the Duero, and capable of -renewing the former operations with the advantage of former errors as -warning beacons. But his own army would not have been so powerful -as before, for the reinforcements sent from England did not even -suffice to replace the current consumption of men; and neither the -fresh soldiers nor the old Walcheren regiments were able to sustain -the toil of the recent operations. Three thousand troops had joined -since the battle, yet the general decrease, including the killed and -wounded, was above eight thousand men, and the number of sick was -rapidly augmenting from the extreme heat. It may therefore be said -that if Marmont was stricken deeply by Wellington the king poisoned -the wound. The English general had fore-calculated all these superior -resources of the enemy, and it was only Marmont’s flagrant fault, on -the 22d, that could have wrung the battle from him; yet he fought -it as if his genius disdained such trial of its strength. I saw him -late in the evening of that great day, when the advancing flashes -of cannon and musketry, stretching as far as the eye could command, -shewed in the darkness how well the field was won; he was alone, -the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and -watchful, but his voice was calm, and even gentle. More than the -rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater warriors than -Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed only -to accept this glory, as an earnest of greater things. - - - - -BOOK XIX. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -As Wellington’s operations had now deeply affected the French affairs -in the distant provinces, it is necessary again to revert to the -general progress of the war, lest the true bearings of his military -policy should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, by clearing -all the centre of Spain, had reduced the invasion to its original -lines of operation. For Palombini’s division having joined the army -of the centre, the army of the Ebro was broken up; Caffarelli had -concentrated the scattered troops of the army of the north; and when -Clauzel had led back the vanquished army of Portugal to Burgos, the -whole French host was divided in two distinct parts, each having -a separate line of communication with France, and a circuitous, -uncertain, attenuated line of correspondence with each other by -Zaragoza instead of a sure and short one by Madrid. But Wellington -was also forced to divide his army in two parts, and though, by the -advantage of his central position, he retained the initial power, -both of movement and concentration, his lines of communication were -become long, and weak because the enemy was powerful at either flank. -Wherefore on his own simple strength in the centre of Spain he could -not rely, and the diversions he had projected against the enemy’s -rear and flanks became more important than ever. To these we must now -turn. - - -EASTERN OPERATIONS. - -[Sidenote: See Book XVII. Chap. II.] - -[Sidenote: Captain Addington’s correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: History of the conspiracies against the French army in -Catalonia, published at Barcelona, 1813.] - -It will be recollected that the narrative of Catalonian affairs -ceased at the moment when Decaen, after fortifying the coast line -and opening new roads beyond the reach of shot from the English -ships, was gathering the harvest of the interior. Lacy, inefficient -in the field and universally hated, was thus confined to the -mountain chain which separates the coast territory from the plains -of Lerida, and from the Cerdaña. The insurrectionary spirit of the -Catalonians was indeed only upheld by Wellington’s successes, and -by the hope of English succour from Sicily; for Lacy, devoted to -the republican party in Spain, had now been made captain-general -as well as commander-in-chief, and sought to keep down the people, -who were generally of the priestly and royal faction. He publicly -spoke of exciting a general insurrection, yet, in his intercourse -with the English naval officers, avowed his wish to repress the -patriotism of the Somatenes; he was not ashamed to boast of his -assassination plots, and received with honour, a man who had murdered -the aide-de-camp of Maurice Mathieu; he sowed dissentions amongst -his generals, intrigued against all of them in turn, and when Eroles -and Manso, who were the people’s favourites, raised any soldiers, he -transferred the latter as soon as they were organized to Sarzfield’s -division, at the same time calumniating that general to depress his -influence. He quarrelled incessantly with captain Codrington, and -had no desire to see an English force in Catalonia lest a general -insurrection should take place, for he feared that the multitude -once gathered and armed would drive him from the province and declare -for the opponents of the cortez. And in this view the constitution -itself, although emanating from the cortez, was long withheld from -the Catalans, lest the newly declared popular rights should interfere -with the arbitrary power of the chief. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -[Sidenote: See Book XVII. Chap. II.] - -Such was the state of the province when intelligence that the -Anglo-Sicilian expedition had arrived at Mahon, excited the hopes -of the Spaniards and the fears of the French. The coast then became -the great object of interest to both, and the Catalans again opened -a communication with the English fleet by Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and -endeavoured to collect the grain of the Campo de Taragona. Decaen, -coming to meet Suchet who had arrived at Reus with two thousand men, -drove the Catalans to the hills again; yet the Lerida district was -thus opened to the enterprises of Lacy, because it was at this period -that Reille had detached general Paris from Zaragoza to the aid of -Palombini; and that Severoli’s division was broken up to reinforce -the garrisons of Lerida, Taragona, Barcelona, and Zaragoza. But the -army of the Ebro being dissolved, Lacy resolved to march upon Lerida, -where he had engaged certain Spaniards in the French service to -explode the powder magazine when he should approach; and this odious -scheme, which necessarily involved the destruction of hundreds of his -own countrymen, was vainly opposed by Eroles and Sarzfield. - -[Sidenote: Sarzfield’s Vindication, MSS.] - -On the 12th of July, Eroles’ division, that general being absent, -was incorporated with Sarzfield’s and other troops at Guisona, -and the whole journeying day and night reached Tremp on the 13th. -Lacy having thus turned Lerida, would have resumed the march at -mid-day, intending to attack the next morning at dawn, but the men -were without food, and exhausted by fatigue, and fifteen hundred -had fallen behind. A council of war being then held, Sarzfield, -who thought the plot wild, would have returned, observing that all -communication with the sea was abandoned, and the harvests of the -Camps de Taragona and Valls being left to be gathered by the enemy, -the loss of the corn would seriously affect the whole principality. -Displeased at the remonstrance, Lacy immediately sent him back to -the plain of Urgel with some infantry and the cavalry, to keep the -garrison of Balaguer in check; but in the night of the 16th when -Sarzfield had reached the bridge of Alentorna on the Segre, fresh -orders caused him to return to Limiana on the Noguera. Meanwhile -Lacy himself had advanced by Agen towards Lerida, the explosion of -the magazine took place, many houses were thrown down, two hundred -inhabitants and one hundred and fifty soldiers were destroyed; two -bastions fell, and the place was laid open. - -[Sidenote: Captain Codrington’s Papers, MSS.] - -Henriod the governor, although ignorant of the vicinity of the -Spaniards, immediately manned the breaches, the garrison of Balaguer, -hearing the explosion marched to his succour, and when the Catalan -troops appeared, the citizens enraged by the destruction of their -habitations aided the French; Lacy then fled back to Tremp, bearing -the burthen of a crime which he had not feared to commit, but wanted -courage to turn to his country’s advantage. To lessen the odium -thus incurred, he insidiously attributed the failure to Sarzfield’s -disobedience; and as that general, to punish the people of Barbastro -for siding with the French and killing twenty of his men, had raised -a heavy contribution of money and corn in the district, he became so -hateful, that some time after, when he endeavoured to raise soldiers -in those parts, the people threw boiling water at him from the -windows as he passed. - -[Sidenote: Idem.] - -[Sidenote: Laffaille’s Campaigns in Catalonia.] - -Before this event Suchet had returned to Valencia, and Dacaen and -Maurice Mathieu marched against colonel Green, who was entrenched in -the hermitage of St. Dimas, one of the highest of the peaked rocks -overhanging the convent of Montserrat. Manso immediately raised -the Somatenes to aid Green, and as the latter had provisions the -inaccessible strength of his post seemed to defy capture; yet he -surrendered in twenty-four hours, and at a moment when the enemy, -despairing of success, were going to relinquish the attack. He -excused himself as being forced by his own people, but he signed the -capitulation. Decaen then set fire to the convent of Montserrat and -the flames seen for miles around was the signal that the warfare -on that holy mountain was finished. After this the French general -marched to Lerida to gather corn and Lacy again spread his troops in -the mountains. - -[Sidenote: Codrington’s Papers, MSS.] - -During his absence Eroles had secretly been preparing a general -insurrection to break out when the British army should arrive, and it -was supposed that his object was to effect a change in the government -of the province; for though Lacy himself again spoke of embodying -the Somatenes if arms were given to him by sir Edward Pellew, there -was really no scarcity of arms, the demand was a deceit to prevent -the muskets from being given to the people, and there was no levy. -Hence the discontent increased and a general desire for the arrival -of the British troops became prevalent; the miserable people turned -anxiously towards any quarter for aid, and this expression of -conscious helplessness was given in evidence by the Spanish chiefs, -and received as proof of enthusiasm by the English naval commanders, -who were more sanguine of success than experience would warrant. All -eyes were however directed towards the ocean, the French in fear, the -Catalans in hope; and the British armament did appear off Palamos, -but after three days, spread its sails again and steered for Alicant, -leaving the principality stupified with grief and disappointment. - -This unexpected event was the natural result of previous errors -on all sides, errors which invariably attend warlike proceedings -when not directed by a superior genius, and even then not always to -be avoided. It has been shewn how ministerial vacillation marred -lord William Bentinck’s first intention of landing in person with -ten or twelve thousand men on the Catalonian coast; and how after -much delay general Maitland had sailed to Palma with a division of -six thousand men, Calabrians, Sicilians and others, troops of no -likelihood save that some three thousand British and Germans were -amongst them. This force was afterwards joined by the transports -from Portugal having engineers and artillery officers on board, and -that honoured battering train which had shattered the gory walls -of Badajos. Wellington had great hopes of this expedition; he had -himself sketched the general plan of operations; and his own campaign -had been conceived in the expectation, that lord William Bentinck, a -general of high rank and reputation, with ten thousand good troops, -aided with at least as many Spanish soldiers, disciplined under the -two British officers Whittingham and Roche, would have early fallen -on Catalonia to the destruction of Suchet’s plans. And when this -his first hope was quashed, he still expected that a force would be -disembarked of strength, sufficient, in conjunction with the Catalan -army, to take Taragona. - -[Sidenote: August.] - -[Sidenote: Gen. Donkin’s papers, MSS.] - -Roche’s corps was most advanced in discipline, but the Spanish -government delayed to place it under general Maitland, and hence -it first sailed from the islands to Murcia, then returned without -orders, again repaired to Murcia, and at the moment of general -Maitland’s arrival off Palamos, was, under the command of Joseph -O’Donel, involved in a terrible catastrophe already alluded to and -hereafter to be particularly narrated. Whittingham’s levy remained, -but when inspected by the quarter-master general Donkin it was -found in a raw state, scarcely mustering four thousand effective -men, amongst which were many French deserters from the island of -Cabrera. The sumptuous clothing and equipments of Whittingham’s and -Roche’s men, their pay regularly supplied from the British subsidy, -and very much exceeding that of the other Spanish corps, excited -envy and dislike; there was no public inspection, no check upon -the expenditure, nor upon the delivery of the stores, and Roche’s -proceedings on this last head, whether justly or unjustly I know not, -were very generally and severely censured. Whittingham acknowledged -that he could not trust his people near the enemy without the aid of -British troops, and though the captain-general Coupigny desired their -departure, his opinion was against a descent in Catalonia. Maitland -hesitated, but sir Edward Pellew urged this descent so very strongly, -that he finally assented and reached Palamos with nine thousand -men of all nations on the 31st of July, yet in some confusion as to -the transport service, which the staff officers attributed to the -injudicious meddling of the naval chiefs. - -[Sidenote: Notes by general Maitland, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: General Donkin’s papers, MSS.] - -Maitland’s first care was to open a communication with the Spanish -commanders. Eroles came on board at once and vehemently and -unceasingly urged an immediate disembarkation, declaring that the -fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended upon it; the other -generals shewed less eagerness, and their accounts differed greatly -with respect to the relative means of the Catalans and the French. -Lacy estimated the enemy’s disposable troops at fifteen thousand, and -his own at seven thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and -even that number he said he could with difficulty feed or provide -with ammunition. Sarzfield judged the French to be, exclusive of -Suchet’s moveable column, eighteen thousand infantry and five -hundred cavalry; he thought it rash to invest Taragona with a less -force, and that a free and constant communication with the fleet -was absolutely essential in any operation. Eroles rated the enemy -at thirteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, including -Suchet’s column; but the reports of the deserters gave twenty-two -thousand infantry, exclusive of Suchet’s column and of the garrisons -and Miguelettes in the enemy’s service. - -No insurrection of the Somatenes had yet taken place, nor was there -any appearance that such an event would happen, as the French were -descried conducting convoys along the shore with small escorts, -and concentrating their troops for battle without molestation. The -engineers demanded from six to ten days to reduce Taragona after -investment, and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were then near Montserrat -with seven or eight thousand good troops, which number could be -doubled in a few days; the Catalans could not so soon unite and join -Maitland’s force, and there was a general, although apparently, -an unjust notion abroad, that Lacy was a Frenchman at heart. It -was feared also, that the Toulon fleet might come out and burn the -transports at their anchorage during the siege, and thus Wellington’s -battering train and even the safety of the army would be involved in -an enterprize promising little success. A full council of war was -unanimous not to land, and the reluctance of the people to rise, -attributed by captain Codrington to the machinations of traitors, -was visible; Maitland also was farther swayed by the generous and -just consideration, that as the Somatenes had not voluntarily taken -arms, it would be cruel to excite them to such a step, when a few -days might oblige him to abandon them to the vengeance of the enemy. -Wherefore as Palamos appeared too strong for a sudden assault, the -armament sailed towards Valencia with intent to attack that place, -after a project, furnished by the quarter-master general Donkin and -in unison with lord Wellington’s plan of operations; but Maitland, -during the voyage, changed his mind and proceeded at once to Alicant. - -[Sidenote: Captain Codrington’s papers, MSS.] - -The Catalans were not more displeased than the British naval -commanders at seeing the principality thus shaken off; yet the -judgment of the latter seems to have been swayed partly from -having given stronger hopes of assistance to the former than the -circumstances would rigorously warrant; partly from that confidence, -which inspired by continual success, is strength on their own -element, but rashness on shore. Captain Codrington, from the great -interest he took in the struggle, was peculiarly discontented; yet -his own description of the state of Catalonia at the time, shows -that his hopes rested more on some vague notions of the Somatenes’ -enthusiasm, than upon any facts which a general ought to calculate -upon. Lord Wellington indeed said, that he could see no reason -why the plan he had recommended, should not have been successful; -an observation made, however, when he was somewhat excited by the -prospect of having Suchet on his own hands, and probably under some -erroneous information. He had been deceived about the strength of -the forts at Salamanca, although close to them; and as he had only -just established a sure channel of intelligence in Catalonia, it was -probable that he was also deceived with respect to Taragona, which if -not strong in regular works was well provided and commanded by a very -bold active governor, and offered great resources in the facility of -making interior retrenchments. - -The force of the Catalans lord Wellington knew principally from -sir Edward Pellew, who had derived his information chiefly from -Eroles, who very much exaggerated it, and lessened the enemy’s power -in proportion. And general Maitland could scarcely be called a -commander-in-chief, for lord William Bentinck forbade him to risk the -loss of his division lest Sicily itself should thereby be endangered; -and to avoid mischief from the winter season, he was instructed to -quit the Spanish coast in the second week of September. Lord William -and lord Wellington were therefore not agreed in the object to be -attained. The first considered the diversion on the Spanish coast as -secondary to the wants of Sicily, whereas Wellington looked only to -the great interests at stake in the Peninsula, and thought Sicily in -no danger until the French should reinforce their army in Calabria. -He desired vigorous combined efforts of the military and naval -forces, to give a new aspect to the war in Catalonia, and his plan -was that Taragona should be attacked; if it fell the warfare he said -would be once more established on a good base in Catalonia; if it was -succoured by the concentration of the French troops, Valencia would -necessarily be weak, and the armament could then proceed to attack -that place, and if unsuccessful return to assail Taragona again. - -This was an excellent plan no doubt, but Napoleon never lost sight -of that great principle of war, so concisely expressed by Sertorius -when he told Pompey that a good general should look behind him rather -than before. The emperor acting on the proverb that fortune favours -the brave, often urged his lieutenants to dare desperately with a few -men in the front, but he invariably covered their communications with -heavy masses, and there is no instance of his plan of invasion being -shaken by a flank or rear attack, except where his instructions were -neglected. His armies made what are called points, in war, such as -Massena’s invasion of Portugal, Moncey’s attack on Valencia, Dupont’s -on Andalusia; but the general plan of operation was invariably -supported by heavy masses protecting the communications. Had his -instructions, sent from Dresden, been strictly obeyed, the walls of -Lerida and Taragona would have been destroyed, and only the citadels -of each occupied with small garrisons easily provisioned for a long -time. The field army would thus have been increased by at least -three thousand men, the moveable columns spared many harassing -marches, and Catalonia would have offered little temptation for a -descent. - -But notwithstanding this error of Suchet, Maitland’s troops were too -few, and too ill-composed to venture the investment of Taragona. The -imperial muster-rolls give more than eighty thousand men, including -Reille’s divisions at Zaragosa, for the armies of Aragon and -Catalonia, and twenty-seven thousand of the first and thirty-seven -thousand of the second, were actually under arms with the eagles; -wherefore to say that Decaen could have brought at once ten thousand -men to the succour of Taragona, and, by weakening his garrisons, as -many more in a very short time, is not to over-rate his power; and -this without counting Paris’ brigade, three thousand strong, which -belonged to Reille’s division and was disposable. Suchet had just -before come to Reus with two thousand select men of all arms, and as -O’Donel’s army had since been defeated near Alicant, he could have -returned with a still greater force to oppose Maitland. - -Now the English fleet was descried by the French off Palamos on the -evening of the 31st of July, although it did not anchor before the -1st of August; Decaen and Maurice Mathieu with some eight thousand -disposable men were then between Montserrat and Barcelona, that is -to say, only two marches from Taragona; Lamarque with from four to -five thousand, was between Palamos and Mataro, five marches from -Taragona; Quesnel with a like number was in the Cerdaña, being about -seven marches off; Suchet and Paris could have arrived in less -than eight days, and from the garrisons, and minor posts, smaller -succours might have been drawn; Tortoza alone could have furnished -two thousand. But Lacy’s division was at Vich, Sarzfield’s at Villa -Franca, Eroles’ divided between Montserrat and Urgel, Milan’s in -the Grao D’Olot, and they required five days even to assemble; when -united, they would not have exceeded seven thousand men, and with -their disputing, captious generals, would have been unfit to act -vigorously; nor could they have easily joined the allies without -fighting a battle in which their defeat would have been certain. - -Sarzfield judged that ten days at least were necessary to reduce -Taragona, and positively affirmed that the army must be entirely fed -from the fleet, as the country could scarcely supply the Catalonian -troops alone. Thus Maitland would have had to land his men, his -battering train and stores, and to form his investment, in the face -of Decaen’s power, or, following the rules of war, have defeated -that general first. But Decaen’s troops numerically equal, without -reckoning the garrison of Taragona two thousand strong, were in -composition vastly superior to the allies, seeing that only three -thousand British and German troops in Maitland’s army, were to be -at all depended upon in battle; neither does it appear that the -platforms, sand-bags, fascines and other materials, necessary for a -siege, were at this period prepared and on board the vessels. - -It is true Maitland would, if he had been able to resist Decaen at -first, which seems doubtful, have effected a great diversion, and -Wellington’s object would have been gained if a re-embarkation had -been secure; but the naval officers, having reference to the nature -of the coast, declared that a safe re-embarkation could not be -depended upon. The soundness of this opinion has indeed been disputed -by many seamen, well acquainted with the coast, who maintain, that -even in winter the Catalonian shore is remarkably safe and tranquil; -and that Cape Salou, a place in other respects admirably adapted for -a camp, affords a certain retreat, and facility of re-embarking on -one or other of its sides in all weather. However, to Maitland the -coast of Catalonia was represented as unsafe, and this view of the -question is also supported by very able seamen likewise acquainted -with that sea. - - -OPERATIONS IN MURCIA. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -The Anglo-Sicilian armament arrived at Alicant at a critical moment; -the Spanish cause was there going to ruin. Joseph O’Donel, brother -to the regent, had with great difficulty organized a new Murcian -army after Blake’s surrender at Valencia, and this army, based -upon Alicant and Carthagena, was independent of a division under -general Frere, which always hung about Baza, and Lorca, on the -frontier of Grenada, and communicated through the Alpuxaras with the -sea-coast. Both Suchet and Soult were paralyzed in some degree by -the neighbourhood of these armies, which holding a central position -were supported by fortresses, supplied by sea from Gibraltar to -Cadiz, and had their existence guaranteed by Wellington’s march into -Spain, by his victory of Salamanca, and by his general combinations. -For the two French commanders were forced to watch his movements, -and to support at the same time, the one a blockade of the Isla de -Leon, the other the fortresses in Catalonia; hence they were in no -condition to follow up the prolonged operations necessary to destroy -these Murcian armies, which were moreover supported by the arrival of -general Ross with British troops at Carthagena. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 6.] - -O’Donel had been joined by Roche in July, and Suchet, after detaching -Maupoint’s brigade towards Madrid, departed himself with two thousand -men for Catalonia, leaving general Harispe with not more than four -thousand men beyond the Xucar. General Ross immediately advised -O’Donel to attack him, and to distract his attention a large fleet, -with troops on board, which had originally sailed from Cadiz to -succour Ballesteros at Malaga, now appeared off the Valencian coast. -At the same time Bassecour and Villa Campa, being free to act in -consequence of Palombini’s and Maupoint’s departure for Madrid, came -down from their haunts in the mountains of Albaracyn upon the right -flank and rear of the French positions. Villa Campa penetrated to -Liria, and Bassecour to Cofrentes on the Xucar; but ere this attack -could take place, Suchet, with his usual celerity, returned from -Reus. At first he detached men against Villa Campa, but when he saw -the fleet, fearing it was the Sicilian armament, he recalled them -again, and sent for Paris’ brigade from Zaragoza, to act by Teruel -against Bassecour and Villa Campa. Then he concentrated his own -forces at Valencia, but a storm drove the fleet off the coast, and -meanwhile O’Donel’s operations brought on the - - -FIRST BATTLE OF CASTALLA. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 7.] - -Harispe’s posts were established at Biar, Castalla, and Onil on the -right; at Ibi and Alcoy on the left. This line was not more than one -march from Alicant. Colonel Mesclop, with a regiment of infantry -and some cuirassiers held Ibi, and was supported by Harispe himself -with a reserve at Alcoy. General Delort, with another regiment of -infantry, was at Castalla, having some cuirassiers at Onil on his -left, and a regiment of dragoons with three companies of foot at -Biar on his right. In this exposed situation the French awaited -O’Donel, who directed his principal force, consisting of six thousand -infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and eight guns, against Delort; -meanwhile Roche with three thousand men was to move through the -mountains of Xixona, so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with the -attack at Castalla. O’Donel hoped thus to cut the French line, and -during these operations, Bassecour, with two thousand men, was to -come down from Cofrentes to Villena, on the right flank of Delort. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s official correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -[Sidenote: Roche’s correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: General Delort’s official report] - -Roche, who marched in the night of the 19th, remained during the 20th -in the mountains, but the next night he threaded a difficult pass, -eight miles long, reached Ibi at day-break on the 21st, and sent -notice of his arrival to O’Donel; and when that general appeared in -front of Delort, the latter abandoned Castalla, which was situated -in the same valley as Ibi, and about five miles distant from it. -But he only retired skirmishing to a strong ridge behind that town, -which also extended behind Ibi; this secured his communication with -Mesclop, of whom he demanded succour, and at the same time he called -in his own cavalry and infantry from Onil and Biar. Mesclop, leaving -some infantry, two guns, and his cuirassiers, to defend Ibi and a -small fort on the hill behind it, marched at once towards Delort, and -thus Roche, finding only a few men before him, got possession of the -town after a sharp skirmish, yet he could not take the fort. - -[Sidenote: See Appendix, No. 15.] - -At first O’Donel who had advanced beyond Castalla, only skirmished -with and cannonaded the French in his front, for he had detached the -Spanish cavalry to operate by the plains of Villena, to turn the -enemy’s right and communicate with Bassecour. While expecting the -effects of this movement he was astonished to see the French dragoons -come trotting through the pass of Biar, on his left flank; they were -followed by some companies of infantry, and only separated from him -by a stream over which was a narrow bridge without parapets, and at -the same moment the cuirassiers appeared on the other side coming -from Onil. The Spanish cavalry had made no effort to interrupt this -march from Biar, nor to follow the French through the defile, nor any -effort whatever. In this difficulty O’Donel turned two guns against -the bridge and supported them with a battalion of infantry, but the -French dragoons observing this battalion to be unsteady, braved the -fire of the guns, and riding furiously over the bridge seized the -battery, and then dashed against and broke the infantry. Delort’s -line advanced at the same moment, the cuirassiers charged into the -town of Castalla, and the whole Spanish army fled outright. Several -hundred sought refuge in an old castle and there surrendered, and of -the others three thousand were killed, wounded, or taken, and yet the -victors had scarcely fifteen hundred men engaged, and did not lose -two hundred. O’Donel attributed his defeat to the disobedience and -inactivity of St. Estevan, who commanded his cavalry, but the great -fault was the placing that cavalry beyond the defile of Biar instead -of keeping it in hand for the battle. - -This part of the action being over, Mesclop, who had not taken -any share in it, was reinforced and returned to succour Ibi, to -which place also Harispe was now approaching from Alcoy; but Roche -favoured by the strength of the passes escaped, and reached Alicant -with little hurt, while the remains of O’Donel’s divisions, pursued -by the cavalry on the road of Jumilla, fled to the city of Murcia. -Bassecour who had advanced to Almanza was then driven back to his -mountain-haunts, where Villa Campa rejoined him. It was at this -moment that Maitland’s armament disembarked and the remnants of the -Spanish force rallied. The king, then flying from Madrid, immediately -changed the direction of his march from the Morena to Valencia, and -one more proof was given that it was England and not Spain which -resisted the French; for Alicant would have fallen, if not as an -immediate consequence of this defeat, yet surely when the king’s army -had joined Suchet. - -That general, who had heard of the battle of Salamanca, the -evacuation of Madrid and the approach of Joseph, and now saw a -fresh army springing up in his front, hastened to concentrate his -disposable force in the positions of San Felippe de Xativa and -Moxente which he entrenched, as well as the road to Almanza with -a view to secure his junction with the king. At the same time he -established a new bridge and bridge-head at Alberique in addition -to that at Alcira on the Xucar; and having called up Paris from -Teruel and Maupoint from Cuenca resolved to abide a battle, which the -slowness and vacillation of his adversaries gave him full time to -prepare for. - -[Sidenote: August.] - -Maitland arrived the 7th, and though his force was not all landed -before the 11th, the French were still scattered on various points, -and a vigorous commander would have found the means to drive them -over the Xucar, and perhaps from Valencia itself. However the British -general had scarcely set his foot on shore when the usual Spanish -vexations overwhelmed him. Three principal roads led towards the -enemy; one on the left, passed through Yecla and Fuente La Higuera, -and by it the remnant of O’Donel’s army was coming up from Murcia; -another passed through Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera, -and the third through Xixona, Alcoy, and Albayda. Now O’Donel, whose -existence as a general was redeemed by the appearance of Maitland, -instantly demanded from the latter a pledge, that he would draw -nothing either by purchase or requisition, save wine and straw, from -any of these lines, nor from the country between them. The English -general assented and instantly sunk under the difficulties thus -created. For his intention was to have attacked Harispe at Alcoy and -Ibi on the 13th or 14th, but he was only able to get one march from -Alicant as late as the 16th, he could not attack before the 18th, and -it was on that day, that Suchet concentrated his army at Xativa. The -delay had been a necessary consequence of the agreement with O’Donel. - -Maitland was without any habitude of command, his commissariat was -utterly inefficient, and his field-artillery had been so shamefully -ill-prepared in Sicily that it was nearly useless. He had hired mules -at a great expense for the transport of his guns, and of provisions, -from Alicant, but the owners of the mules soon declared they could -not fulfil their contract unless they were fed by the British, and -this O’Donel’s restrictions as to the roads prevented. Many of the -muleteers also, after receiving their money, deserted with both mules -and provisions; and on the first day’s march a convoy, with six days’ -supply, was attacked by an armed banditti called a guerilla, and the -convoy was plundered or dispersed and lost. - -Maitland suffering severely from illness, was disgusted at these -things, and fearing for the safety of his troops, would have retired -at once, and perhaps have re-embarked, if Suchet had not gone back to -Xativa; then however, he advanced to Elda, while Roche entered Alcoy; -yet both apparently without an object, for there was no intention -of fighting, and the next day Roche retired to Xixona and Maitland -retreated to Alicant. To cover this retreat general Donkin pushed -forward, with a detachment of Spanish and English cavalry, through -Sax, Ibi, and Alcoy, and giving out that an advanced guard of five -thousand British was close behind him, coasted all the French line, -captured a convoy at Olleria, and then returned through Alcoy. Suchet -kept close himself, in the camp of Xativa, but sent Harispe to meet -the king who was now near Almanza, and on the 25th the junction of -the two armies was effected; at the same time Maupoint, escaping -Villa Campa’s assault, arrived from Cuenca with the remnant of his -brigade. - -When the king’s troops arrived, Suchet pushed his outposts again -to Villena and Alcoy, but apparently occupied in providing for -Joseph’s army and court he neglected to press the allies, which he -might have done to their serious detriment. Meanwhile O’Donel who -had drawn off Frere’s division from Lorca came up to Yecla with five -or six thousand men, and Maitland reinforced with some detachments -from Sicily, commenced fortifying a camp outside Alicant; but his -health was quite broken, and he earnestly desired to resign, being -filled with anxiety at the near approach of Soult. That marshal had -abandoned Andalusia, and his manner of doing so shall be set forth in -the next chapter; for it was a great event, leading to great results, -and worthy of deep consideration by those who desire to know upon -what the fate of kingdoms may depend. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. August.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3.] - -Suchet found resources in Valencia to support the king’s court and -army, without augmenting the pressure on the inhabitants, and a -counter-stroke could have been made against the allies, if the French -commanders had been of one mind and had looked well to the state of -affairs; but Joseph exasperated by the previous opposition of the -generals, and troubled by the distresses of the numerous families -attached to his court, was only intent upon recovering Madrid as -soon as he could collect troops enough to give Wellington battle. -He had demanded from the French minister of war, money, stores, -and a reinforcement of forty thousand men, and he had imperatively -commanded Soult to abandon Andalusia; that clear-sighted commander, -could not however understand why the king, who had given him no -accurate details of Marmont’s misfortunes, or of his own operations, -should yet order him to abandon at once, all the results, and all -the interests, springing from three years’ possession of the south -of Spain. He thought it a great question not to be treated lightly, -and as his vast capacity enabled him to embrace the whole field of -operations, he concluded that rumour had exaggerated the catastrophe -at Salamanca and that the abandoning of Andalusia would be the ruin -of the French cause. - -[Sidenote: French correspondence taken at Vittoria, MSS.] - -“To march on Madrid,” he said, “would probably produce another -pitched battle, which should be carefully avoided, seeing that the -whole frame-work of the French invasion was disjointed, and no -resource would remain after a defeat. On the other hand, Andalusia, -which had hitherto been such a burthen to the invasion, now offered -means to remedy the present disasters, and to sacrifice that province -with all its resources, for the sake of regaining the capital of -Spain, appeared a folly. It was purchasing a town at the price of a -kingdom. Madrid was nothing in the emperor’s policy, though it might -be something for a king of Spain; yet Philip the Vth had thrice -lost it and preserved his throne. Why then should Joseph set such a -value upon that city? The battle of the Arapiles was merely a grand -duel which might be fought again with a different result; but to -abandon Andalusia with all its stores and establishments; to raise -the blockade of Cadiz; to sacrifice the guns, the equipments, the -hospitals and the magazines, and thus render null the labours of -three years, would be to make the battle of the Arapiles a prodigious -historical event, the effect of which would be felt all over Europe -and even in the new world. And how was this flight from Andalusia to -be safely effected? The army of the south had been able to hold in -check sixty thousand enemies disposed on a circuit round it, but the -moment it commenced its retreat towards Toledo those sixty thousand -men would unite to follow, and Wellington himself would be found on -the Tagus in its front. On that line then the army of the south could -not march, and a retreat through Murcia would be long and difficult. -But why retreat at all? Where,” exclaimed this able warrior, “where -is the harm though the allies should possess the centre of Spain?” - -“Your majesty,” he continued, “should collect the army of the centre, -the army of Aragon, and if possible, the army of Portugal, and you -should march upon Andalusia, even though to do so should involve the -abandonment of Valencia. If the army of Portugal comes with you, one -hundred and twenty thousand men will be close to Portugal; if it -cannot or will not come, let it remain, because while Burgos defends -itself, that army can keep on the right of the Ebro and the emperor -will take measures for its succour. Let Wellington then occupy Spain -from Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care to provide magazines, -stores, and places of arms in Andalusia; and the moment eighty -thousand French are assembled in that province the theatre of war is -changed! The English general must fall back to save Lisbon, the army -of Portugal may follow him to the Tagus, the line of communication -with France will be established by the eastern coast, the final -result of the campaign turns in our favour, and a decisive battle may -be delivered without fear at the gates of Lisbon. March then with -the army of the centre upon the Despenas Peros, unite all our forces -in Andalusia, and all will be well! Abandon that province and you -lose Spain! you will retire behind the Ebro and famine will drive -you thence before the emperor can, from the distant Russia, provide -a remedy; his affairs even in that country will suffer by the blow, -and America dismayed by our misfortunes will perhaps make peace with -England.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. 4.] - -Neither the king’s genius, nor his passions, would permit him to -understand the grandeur and vigour of this conception. To change even -simple lines of operation suddenly, is at all times a nice affair, -but thus to change the whole theatre of operations and regain the -initial movements after a defeat, belongs only to master spirits in -war. Now the emperor had recommended a concentration of force, and -Joseph would not understand this save as applied to the recovery of -Madrid; he was uneasy for the frontiers of France; as if Wellington -could possibly have invaded that country while a great army menaced -Lisbon; in fine he could see nothing but his lost capital on one -side, and a disobedient lieutenant on the other, and peremptorily -repeated his orders. Then Soult, knowing that his plan could only -be effected by union and rapidity, and dreading the responsibility -of further delay, took immediate steps to abandon Andalusia; but -mortified by this blighting of his fruitful genius, and stung with -anger at such a termination to all his political and military -labours, his feelings over-mastered his judgment. Instead of tracing -the king’s rigid counteraction of his scheme to the narrowness of -the monarch’s military genius, he judged it part of a design to -secure his own fortune at the expense of his brother, an action quite -foreign to Joseph’s honest and passionate nature. Wherefore making -known this opinion to six generals, who were sworn to secrecy, unless -interrogated by the Emperor, he wrote to the French minister of war -expressing his doubts of the king’s loyalty towards the emperor, and -founding them on the following facts. - -1º. That the extent of Marmont’s defeat had been made known to him -only by the reports of the enemy, and the king, after remaining for -twenty-three days, without sending any detailed information of the -operations in the north of Spain, although the armies were actively -engaged, had peremptorily ordered him to abandon Andalusia, saying it -was the only resource remaining for the French. To this opinion Soult -said he could not subscribe, yet being unable absolutely to disobey -the monarch, he was going to make a movement which must finally lead -to the loss of all the French conquests in Spain, seeing that it -would then be impossible to remain permanently on the Tagus, or even -in the Castiles. - -2º. This operation ruinous in itself was insisted upon at a time, -when the newspapers of Cadiz affirmed, that Joseph’s ambassador at -the court of Petersburgh, had joined the Prussian army in the field; -that Joseph himself had made secret overtures to the government in -the Isla de Leon; that Bernadotte, his brother-in-law, had made -a treaty with England and had demanded of the Cortez a guard of -Spaniards, a fact confirmed by information obtained through an -officer sent with a flag of truce to the English admiral; finally -that Moreau and Blucher were at Stockholm, and the aide-de-camp of -the former was in London. - -Reflecting upon all these circumstances he feared that the object -of the king’s false movements, might be to force the French army -over the Ebro, in the view of making an arrangement for Spain, -separate from France; fears, said the duke of Dalmatia, which may -be chimerical, but it is better in such a crisis to be too fearful -than too confident. This letter was sent by sea, and the vessel -having touched at Valencia at the moment of Joseph’s arrival there, -the despatch was opened, and it was then, in the first burst of his -anger, that the king despatched Desprez on that mission to Moscow, -the result of which has been already related. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -Soult’s proceedings though most offensive to the king and founded -in error, because Joseph’s letters, containing the information -required, were intercepted, not withheld, were prompted by zeal -for his master’s service and cannot be justly condemned, yet -Joseph’s indignation was natural and becoming. But the admiration -of reflecting men must ever be excited by the greatness of mind, -and the calm sagacity, with which Napoleon treated this thorny -affair. Neither the complaints of his brother, nor the hints of his -minister of war (for the duke of Feltre, a man of mean capacity -and of an intriguing disposition, countenanced Joseph’s expressed -suspicions that the duke of Dalmatia designed to make himself king -of Andalusia) could disturb the temper or judgment of the Emperor; -and it was then, struck with the vigour of the plan for concentrating -the army in Andalusia, he called Soult the only military head in -Spain. Nor was Wellington inattentive of that general’s movements, -he knew his talents, and could foresee and appreciate the importance -of the project he had proposed. Anxiously he watched his reluctant -motions, and while apparently enjoying his own triumph amidst the -feasts and rejoicings of Madrid, his eye was fixed on Seville; the -balls and bull-fights of the capital cloaked both the skill and the -apprehensions of the consummate general. - -Before the allies had crossed the Guadarama, Hill had been directed -to hold his army in hand, close to Drouet, and ready to move into the -valley of the Tagus, if that general should hasten to the succour -of the king. But when Joseph’s retreat upon Valencia was known, -Hill received orders to fight Drouet, and even to follow him into -Andalusia; at the same time general Cooke was directed to prepare an -attack, even though it should be an open assault on the French lines -before Cadiz, while Ballesteros operated on the flank from Gibraltar. -By these means Wellington hoped to keep Soult from sending any -succour to the king, and even to force him out of Andalusia without -the necessity of marching there himself; yet if these measures -failed, he was resolved to take twenty thousand men from Madrid and -uniting with Hill drive the French from that province. - -Previous to the sending of these instructions, Laval and Villatte had -pursued Ballesteros to Malaga, which place, after a skirmish at Coin, -he entered, and was in such danger of capture, that the maritime -expedition already noticed was detached from Cadiz, by sea, to carry -him off. However the news of the battle of Salamanca having arrested -the French movements, the Spanish general regained San Roque, and the -fleet went on to Valencia. Meanwhile Soult, hoping the king would -transfer the seat of war to Andalusia had caused Drouet to shew a -bold front against Hill, extending from the Serena to Monasterio, and -to send scouting parties towards Merida; and large magazines were -formed at Cordoba, a central point, equally suited for an advance by -Estremadura, a march to La Mancha, or a retreat by Grenada. Wherefore -Hill, who had not then received his orders to advance, remained on -the defensive; nor would Wellington stir from Madrid, although his -presence was urgently called for on the Duero, until he was satisfied -that the duke of Dalmatia meant to abandon Andalusia. The king, as -we have seen, finally forced this measure upon the marshal; but the -execution required very extensive arrangements, for the quarters were -distant, the convoys immense, the enemies numerous, the line of march -wild, and the journey long. And it was most important to present the -imposing appearance of a great and regular military movement and not -the disgraceful scene of a confused flight. - -The distant minor posts, in the Condado de Niebla and other places, -were first called in, and then the lines before the Isla were -abandoned; for Soult, in obedience to the king’s first order, -designed to move upon La Mancha, and it was only by accident, and -indirectly, that he heard of Joseph’s retreat to Valencia. At -the same time he discovered that Drouet, who had received direct -orders from the king, was going to Toledo, and it was not without -difficulty, and only through the medium of his brother, who commanded -Drouet’s cavalry, that he could prevent that destructive isolated -movement. Murcia then became the line of retreat but every thing was -hurried, because the works before the Isla were already broken up -in the view of retreating towards La Mancha, and the troops were in -march for Seville although the safe assembling of the army at Grenada -required another arrangement. - -On the 25th of August a thousand guns, stores in proportion, and -all the immense works of Chiclana, St. Maria, and the Trocadero, -were destroyed. Thus the long blockade of the Isla de Leon was -broken up at the moment when the bombardment of Cadiz had become -very serious, when the opposition to English influence was taking a -dangerous direction, when the French intrigues were nearly ripe, -the cortez becoming alienated from the cause of Ferdinand and the -church; finally when the executive government was weaker than ever, -because the count of Abispal, the only active person in the regency, -had resigned, disgusted that his brother had been superseded by Elio -and censured in the cortez for the defeat at Castalla. This siege -or rather defence of Cadiz, for it was never, strictly speaking, -besieged, was a curious episode in the war. Whether the Spaniards -would or would not have effectually defended it without the aid of -British troops is a matter of speculation; but it is certain that -notwithstanding Graham’s glorious action at Barrosa, Cadiz was always -a heavy burthen upon Lord Wellington; the forces, there employed, -would have done better service under his immediate command, and many -severe financial difficulties to say nothing of political crosses -would have been spared. - -In the night of the 26th Soult quitting Seville, commenced his march -by Ossuna and Antequera, towards Grenada; but now Wellington’s -orders had set all the allied troops of Andalusia and Estremadura in -motion. Hill advanced against Drouet; Ballesteros moved by the Ronda -mountains to hang on the retiring enemy’s flanks; the expedition -sent by sea to succour him, returned from Valencia; colonel Skerrit -and Cruz Murgeon disembarked with four thousand English and Spanish -troops, at Huelva, and marching upon St. Lucar Mayor, drove the -enemy from thence, on the 24th. The 27th they fell upon the French -rear-guard at Seville, and the suburb of Triana, the bridge, and the -streets beyond, were soon carried, by the English guards and Downie’s -legion. Two hundred prisoners, several guns and many stores were -taken, but Downie himself was wounded and made prisoner, and treated -very harshly, because the populace rising in aid of the allies had -mutilated the French soldiers who fell into their hands. Scarcely -was Seville taken, when seven thousand French infantry came up from -Chiclana, but thinking all Hill’s troops were before them, instead of -attacking Skerrit hastily followed their own army, leaving the allies -masters of the city. But this attack though successful, was isolated -and contrary to lord Wellington’s desire. A direct and vigorous -assault upon the lines of Chiclana by the whole of the Anglo-Spanish -garrison was his plan, and such an assault, when the French were -abandoning their works there, would have been a far heavier blow to -Soult. - -[Sidenote: September] - -That commander was now too strong to be meddled with. He issued eight -days’ bread to his army, marched very leisurely, picked up on his -route the garrisons and troops who came into him at Antequera, from -the Ronda and from the coast; and at Grenada he halted eleven days -to give Drouet time to join him, for the latter quitting Estremadura -the 25th by the Cordova passes, was marching by Jaen to Huescar. -Ballesteros had harassed the march, but the French general had, -with an insignificant loss, united seventy-two guns and forty-five -thousand soldiers under arms, of which six thousand were cavalry. -He was however still in the midst of enemies. On his left flank -was Hill; on his right flank was Ballesteros; Wellington himself -might come down by the Despenas Perros; the Murcians were in his -front, Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon behind him, and he was clogged with -enormous convoys; his sick and maimed men alone amounted to nearly -nine thousand; his Spanish soldiers were deserting daily, and it -was necessary to provide for several hundreds of Spanish families -who were attached to the French interests. To march upon the city -of Murcia was the direct, and the best route for Valencia; but the -yellow fever raged there and at Carthagena; moreover, Don S. Bracco, -the English consul at Murcia, a resolute man, declared his resolution -to inundate the country if the French advanced. Wherefore again -issuing eight days’ bread Soult marched by the mountain ways leading -from Huescar to Cehejin, and Calasparra, and then moving by Hellin, -gained Almanza on the great road to Madrid, his flank being covered -by a detachment from Suchet’s army which skirmished with Maitland’s -advanced posts at San Vicente close to Alicant. At Hellin he met the -advanced guard of the army of Aragon, and on the 3rd of October the -military junction of all the French forces was effected. - -[Sidenote: October.] - -The task was thus completed, and in a manner worthy of so great -a commander. For it must be recollected that besides the drawing -together of the different divisions, the march itself was three -hundred miles, great part through mountain roads, and the population -was every where hostile. General Hill had menaced him with -twenty-five thousand men, including Morillo and Penne Villemur’s -forces; Ballesteros, reinforced from Cadiz, and by the deserters, -had nearly twenty thousand; there were fourteen thousand soldiers -still in the Isla; Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon had four thousand, and -the Partidas were in all parts numerous: yet from the midst of these -multitudes the duke of Dalmatia carried off his army his convoys and -his sick without any disaster. In this manner Andalusia, which had -once been saved by the indirect influence of a single march, made -by Moore from Salamanca, was, such is the complexity of war, after -three years’ subjection, recovered by the indirect effect of a single -battle delivered by Wellington close to the same city. - -During these transactions Maitland’s proceedings had been anxiously -watched by Wellington; for though the recovery of Andalusia was, both -politically and militarily, a great gain, the result, he saw, must -necessarily be hurtful to the ultimate success of his campaign by -bringing together such powerful forces. He still thought that regular -operations would not so effectually occupy Suchet, as a littoral -warfare, yet he was contented that Maitland should try his own plan, -and he advised that general to march by the coast, and have constant -communication with the fleet, referring to his own campaign against -Junot in 1808 as an example to be followed. But, the coast roads were -difficult, the access for the fleet uncertain; and though the same -obstacles, and the latter perhaps in a greater degree, had occurred -in Portugal, the different constitution of the armies, and still -more of the generals, was an insuperable bar to a like proceeding in -Valencia. - -General Maitland only desired to quit his command, and the more so -that the time appointed by lord William Bentinck for the return of -the troops to Sicily was approaching. The moment was critical, but -Wellington without hesitation forbade their departure, and even -asked the ministers to place them under his own command. Meanwhile -with the utmost gentleness and delicacy, he showed to Maitland, -who was a man of high honour, courage, and feeling, although -inexperienced in command, and now heavily oppressed with illness, -that his situation was by no means dangerous;—that the entrenched -camp of Alicant might be safely defended,—that he was comparatively -better off than Wellington himself had been when in the lines of -Torres Vedras, and that it was even desirable that the enemy should -attack him on such strong ground, because the Spaniards when joined -with English soldiers in a secure position would certainly fight. He -also desired that Carthagena should be well looked to by general Ross -lest Soult should turn aside to surprise it. Then taking advantage -of Elio’s fear of Soult he drew him with the army that had been -O’Donel’s towards Madrid and so got some controul over his operations. - -If the English general had been well furnished with money at this -time, and if the yellow fever had not raged in Murcia, it is probable -he would have followed Joseph rapidly, and rallying all the scattered -Spanish forces, and the Sicilian armament on his own army, have -endeavoured to crush the king and Suchet before Soult could arrive; -or he might have formed a junction with Hill at Despenas Perros and -so have fallen on Soult himself, during his march, although such an -operation would have endangered his line of communication on the -Duero. But these obstacles induced him to avoid operations in the -south, which would have involved him in new and immense combinations, -until he had secured his northern line of operations by the capture -of Burgos, meaning then with his whole army united to attack the -enemy in the south. - -However he could not stir from Madrid until he was certain that -Soult would relinquish Andalusia, and this was not made clear before -Cordoba was abandoned. Then Hill was ordered to advance on Zalamea de -la Serena, where he commanded equally, the passes leading to Cordoba -in front, those leading to La Mancha on the left, and those leading -by Truxillo to the Tagus in the rear; so that he could at pleasure -either join Wellington, follow Drouet towards Grenada, or interpose -between Soult and Madrid, if he should turn towards the Despenas -Perros: meanwhile Skerrit’s troops were marching to join him, and the -rest of the Anglo-Portuguese garrison of Cadiz sailed to Lisbon, with -intent to join Wellington by the regular line of operations. - -[Sidenote: August.] - -During these transactions the affairs in Old Castile had become -greatly deranged, for where Wellington was not, the French warfare -generally assumed a severe and menacing aspect. Castaños had, -in person, conducted the siege of Astorga, after the battle of -Salamanca, yet with so little vigour, that it appeared rather a -blockade than a siege. The forts at Toro and Zamora had also been -invested, the first by the Partidas, the second by Silveira’s -militia, who with great spirit had passed their own frontier, -although well aware that they could not be legally compelled to do -so. Thus all the French garrisons abandoned by Clauzel’s retreat were -endangered, and though the slow progress of the Spaniards before -Astorga was infinitely disgraceful to their military prowess, final -success seemed certain. - -General H. Clinton was at Cuellar, Santo Cildes occupied Valladolid, -Anson’s cavalry was in the valley of the Esqueva, and the front -looked fair enough. But in the rear the line of communication, as far -as the frontier of Portugal, was in great disorder; the discipline -of the army was deteriorating rapidly, and excesses were committed -on all the routes. A detachment of Portuguese, not more than a -thousand strong, either instigated by want or by their hatred of the -Spaniards, had perpetrated such enormities on their march from Pinhel -to Salamanca, that as an example, five were executed and many others -severely punished by stripes, yet even this did not check the growing -evil, the origin of which may be partly traced to the license at -the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, but principally to the -sufferings of the soldiers. - -All the hospitals in the rear were crowded, and Salamanca itself, -in which there were six thousand sick and wounded, besides French -prisoners, was the very abode of misery. The soldiers endured much -during the first two or three days after the battle, and the inferior -officers’ sufferings were still more heavy and protracted. They had -no money, and many sold their horses and other property to sustain -life; some actually died of want, and though Wellington, hearing of -this, gave orders that they should be supplied from the purveyor’s -stores in the same manner as the soldiers, the relief came late. -It is a common, yet erroneous notion, that the English system of -hospitals in the Peninsula was admirable, and that the French -hospitals were neglected. Strenuous and unceasing exertions were -made by lord Wellington and the chiefs of the medical staff to form -good hospital establishments, but the want of money, and still more -the want of previous institutions, foiled their utmost efforts. Now -there was no point of warfare which more engaged Napoleon’s attention -than the care of his sick and wounded; and he being monarch as well -as general, furnished his hospitals with all things requisite, even -with luxuries. Under his fostering care also, baron Larrey justly -celebrated, were it for this alone, organized the establishment -called the hospital “_Ambulance_;” that is to say, waggons of a -peculiar construction, well horsed, served by men trained and -incorporated as soldiers, and subject to a strict discipline. -Rewarded for their courage and devotion like other soldiers they -were always at hand, and whether in action or on a march, ready to -pick up, to salve, and to carry off wounded men; and the astonishing -rapidity with which the fallen French soldiers disappeared from a -field of battle attested the excellence of the institution. - -But in the British army, the carrying off the wounded, depended, -partly upon the casual assistance of a weak waggon train, very -badly disciplined, furnishing only three waggons to a division, and -not originally appropriated to that service; partly upon the spare -commissariat animals, but principally upon the resources of the -country, whether of bullock-carts, mules, or donkeys, and hence the -most doleful scenes after a battle, or when an hospital was to be -evacuated. The increasing numbers of the sick and wounded as the -war enlarged, also pressed on the limited number of regular medical -officers, and Wellington complained, that when he demanded more, the -military medical board in London neglected his demands, and thwarted -his arrangements. Shoals of hospital mates and students were indeed -sent out, and they arrived for the most part ignorant alike of war, -and their own profession; while a heterogeneous mass of purveyors -and their subordinates, acting without any military organization or -effectual superintendence, continually bade defiance to the exertions -of those medical officers, and they were many, whose experience, -zeal, and talents would, with a good institution to work upon, have -rendered this branch of the service most distinguished. Nay, many -even of the well-educated surgeons sent out were for some time of -little use, for superior professional skill is of little value in -comparison of experience in military arrangement; where one soldier -dies from the want of a delicate operation, hundreds perish from -the absence of military arrangement. War tries the strength of the -military frame-work; it is in peace that the frame-work itself must -be formed, otherwise barbarians would be the leading soldiers of the -world; a perfect army can only be made by civil institutions, and -those, rightly considered, would tend to confine the horrors of war -to the field of battle, which would be the next best thing to the -perfection of civilization that would prevent war altogether. - -[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Foy’s correspondence, MSS.] - -Such was the state of affairs on the allies’ line of communication, -when, on the 14th of August, Clauzel suddenly came down the -Pisuerga. Anson’s cavalry immediately recrossed the Duero at Tudela, -Santo Cildes, following Wellington’s instructions, fell back to -Torrelobaton, and on the 18th the French assembled at Valladolid to -the number of twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and -fifty guns well provided with ammunition. Five thousand stragglers, -who in the confusion of defeat had fled to Burgos and Vittoria, were -also collected and in march to join. Clauzel’s design was to be at -hand when Joseph, reinforced from the south, should drive Wellington -from Madrid, for he thought the latter must then retire by Avila, -and the Valle de Ambles, and he purposed to gain the mountains of -Avila himself, and harass the English general’s flank. Meanwhile Foy -proposed with two divisions of infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, -to succour the garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Astorga, and Clauzel -consented, though he appears to have been somewhat fearful of this -dangerous experiment, and did not believe Astorga was so near its -fall. - -[Sidenote: Foy’s correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s papers, MSS.] - -Foy wished to march on the 15th by Placentia, yet he was not -dispatched until the evening of the 17th, and then by the line of -Toro, the garrison of which place he carried off in passing. The -19th he sabred some of the Spanish rear-guard at Castro Gonzalo, -on the Esla; the 20th, at three o’clock in the evening, he reached -La Baneza, but was mortified to learn, that Castaños, by an artful -negociation had, the day before, persuaded the garrison of Astorga, -twelve hundred good troops, to surrender, although there was no -breach, and the siege was actually being raised at the time. The -Gallicians being safe in their mountains, the French general -turned to the left, and marched upon Carvajales, hoping to enclose -Silveira’s militia, between the Duero and the Esla, and sweep them -off in his course; then relieving Zamora, he purposed to penetrate -to Salamanca, and seize the trophies of the Arapiles. And this -would infallibly have happened, but for the judicious activity of -sir Howard Douglas, who, divining Foy’s object, sent Silveira with -timeful notice into Portugal; yet so critical was the movement -that Foy’s cavalry skirmished with the Portuguese rear-guard near -Constantin at day-break on the 24th. The 25th the French entered -Zamora, but Wellington was now in movement upon Arevalo, and Clauzel -recalled Foy at the moment when his infantry were actually in march -upon Salamanca to seize the trophies, and his cavalry was moving by -Ledesma, to break up the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. - -That Foy was thus able to disturb the line of communication was -certainly Clinton’s error. Wellington left eighteen thousand men, -exclusive of the troops besieging Astorga, to protect his flank and -rear, and he had a right to think it enough, because he momentarily -expected Astorga to fall, and the French army, a beaten one, was then -in full retreat. It is true none of the French garrisons yielded -before Clauzel returned, but Clinton alone had eight thousand good -troops, and might with the aid of Santo Cildes and the partidas, have -baffled the French; he might even have menaced Valladolid, after -Foy’s departure, which would have certainly brought that general -back. And if he dared not venture so much, he should, following -his instructions, have regulated his movements along the left of -the Duero, so as to be always in a condition to protect Salamanca; -that is, he should have gone to Olmedo when Clauzel first occupied -Valladolid, but he retired to Arevalo, which enabled Foy to advance. - -The mere escape of the garrisons, from Toro and Zamora, was by the -English general thought no misfortune. It would have cost him a long -march and two sieges in the hottest season to have reduced them, -which, in the actual state of affairs, was more than they were -worth; yet, to use his own words, “_it was not very encouraging to -find, that the best Spanish army was unable to stand before the -remains of Marmont’s beaten troops; that in more than two months, -it had been unable even to breach Astorga, and that all important -operations must still be performed by the British troops_.” The -Spaniards, now in the fifth year of the war, were still in the state -described by sir John Moore, “_without an army, without a government, -without a general!_” - -While these events were passing in Castile Popham’s armament remained -on the Biscay coast, and the partidas thus encouraged became so -active, that with exception of Santona and Gueteria, all the -littoral posts were abandoned by Caffarelli; Porlier, Renovalles, -and Mendizabel, the nominal commanders of all the bands, immediately -took possession of Castro, Santander, and even of Bilbao, and though -general Rouget came from Vittoria to recover the last, he was after -some sharp fighting obliged to retire again to Durango. Meanwhile -Reille, deluded by a rumour that Wellington was marching through the -centre of Spain upon Zaragoza, abandoned several important outposts, -Aragon, hitherto so tranquil, became unquiet, and all the northern -provinces were ripe for insurrection. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. August.] - -While the various military combinations, described in the foregoing -chapter, were thickening, Wellington, as we have seen, remained in -Madrid, apparently inactive, but really watching the fitting moment -to push his operations, and consolidate his success in the north, -preparatory to the execution of his designs in the south. The result -was involved in a mixed question, of time, and of combinations -dependant upon his central position, and upon the activity of the -partidas in cutting off all correspondence between the French armies. -His mode of paralyzing Suchet’s and Caffarelli’s armies, by the -Sicilian armament in the east and Popham’s armament in the north, has -been already described, but his internal combinations, to oppose the -united forces of Soult and the king, were still more important and -extensive. - -When it was certain that Soult had actually abandoned Andalusia, -Hill was directed upon Toledo, by the bridge of Almaraz, and colonel -Sturgeon’s genius had rendered that stupendous ruin, although more -lofty than Alcantara, passable for artillery. Elio also was induced -to bring the army of Murcia to the same quarter, and Ballesteros was -desired to take post on the mountain of Alcaraz, and look to the -fortress of Chinchilla, which, situated at the confines of Murcia -and La Mancha, and perched on a rugged isolated hill in a vast -plain, was peculiarly strong both from construction and site, and it -was the knot of all the great lines of communication. The partizan -corps of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, were desired -to enter La Mancha, and thus, as Hill could bring up above twenty -thousand men, and as the third, fourth, and light divisions, two -brigades of cavalry, and Carlos D’España’s troops, were to remain -near Madrid, whilst the rest of the army marched into Old Castile, -above sixty thousand men, thirty thousand being excellent troops and -well commanded, would have been assembled, with the fortified post of -Chinchilla in front, before Soult could unite with the king. - -The British troops at Carthagena were directed, when Soult should -have passed that city, to leave only small garrisons in the forts -there, and join the army at Alicant, which with the reinforcements -from Sicily, would then be sixteen thousand strong, seven thousand -being British troops. While this force was at Alicant Wellington -judged that the French could not bring more than fifty thousand -against Madrid without risking the loss of Valencia itself. Not that -he expected the heterogeneous mass he had collected could resist on -a fair field the veteran and powerfully constituted army which would -finally be opposed to them; but he calculated that ere the French -generals could act seriously, the rivers would be full, and Hill -could then hold his ground, sufficiently long to enable the army to -come back from Burgos. Indeed he had little doubt of reducing that -place, and being again on the Tagus in time to take the initial -movements himself. - -Meanwhile the allies had several lines of operation. - -Ballasteros from the mountains of Alcaraz, could harass the flanks of -the advancing French, and when they passed, could unite with Maitland -to overpower Suchet. - -Hill could retire if pressed, by Madrid, or by Toledo, and could -either gain the passes of the Guadarama or the valley of the Tagus. - -Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecour, and the Empecinado could act by Cuenca -and Requeña against Suchet, or against Madrid if the French followed -Hill obstinately; or they could join Ballesteros. And besides all -these forces, there were ten or twelve thousand new Spanish levies in -the Isla waiting for clothing and arms which under the recent treaty -were to come from England. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -To lord Wellington, the English ministers had nominally confided the -distribution of these succours, but following their usual vicious -manner of doing business, they also gave Mr. Stuart a controul over -it, without Wellington’s knowledge, and hence the stores, expected -by the latter at Lisbon or Cadiz, were by Stuart unwittingly -directed to Coruña, with which place the English general had no -secure communication; moreover there were very few Spanish levies -there, and no confidential person to superintend the delivery of -them. Other political crosses, which shall be noticed in due time, -he also met with, but it will suffice here to say that the want of -money was an evil now become intolerable. The army was many months in -arrears; those officers who went to the rear sick suffered the most -cruel privations, and those who remained in Madrid, tempted by the -pleasures of the capital, obtained some dollars at an exorbitant -premium from a money-broker, and it was grievously suspected that his -means resulted from the nefarious proceedings of an under commissary; -but the soldiers, equally tempted, having no such resource, plundered -the stores of the Retiro. In fine, discipline became relaxed -throughout the army, and the troops kept in the field were gloomy, -envying those who remained at Madrid. - -[Sidenote: September] - -That city exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and desolation. When it -was first entered a violent, cruel, and unjust persecution of those -who were called “_Afrancesados_,” was commenced, and continued, until -the English general interfered, and as an example made no distinction -in his invitations to the palace feasts. Truly it was not necessary -to increase the sufferings of the miserable people, for though the -markets were full of provisions, there was no money wherewith to -buy; and though the houses were full of rich furniture, there were -neither purchasers nor lenders; even noble families secretly sought -charity that they might live. At night the groans, and stifled cries -of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead -bodies, cast into the streets, shewed why those cries had ceased. -The calm resignation with which these terrible sufferings were borne -was a distinctive mark of the national character; not many begged, -none complained, there was no violence, no reproaches, very few -thefts; the allies lost a few animals, nothing more, and these were -generally thought to be taken by robbers from the country. But with -this patient endurance of calamity the “_Madrileños_” discovered a -deep and unaffected gratitude for kindness received at the hands of -the British officers who contributed, not much for they had it not, -but, enough of money to form soup charities by which hundreds were -succoured. It was the third division, and I believe the forty-fifth -regiment which set the example, and surely this is not the least of -the many honourable distinctions those brave men have earned. - -Wellington desirous of obtaining shelter from the extreme heat for -his troops, had early sent four divisions and the cavalry, to the -Escurial and St. Ildefonso, from whence they could join Hill by the -valley of the Tagus, or Clinton by Arevalo; but when he knew that the -king’s retreat upon Valencia was decided, that Soult had abandoned -Cordoba, and that Clinton was falling back before Clauzel, he ordered -the first, fifth, and seventh divisions, Pack’s and Bradford’s -Portuguese brigades, Ponsonby’s light horsemen, and the heavy German -cavalry, to move rapidly upon Arevalo, and on the 1st of September -quitted Madrid himself to take the command. Yet his army had been so -diminished by sickness that only twenty-one thousand men, including -three thousand cavalry, were assembled in that town, and he had great -difficulty to feed the Portuguese soldiers, who were also very ill -equipped. - -The regency instead of transmitting money and stores to supply -their troops, endeavoured to throw off the burthen entirely by an -ingenious device; for having always had a running account with the -Spanish government, they now made a treaty, by which the Spaniards -were to feed the Portuguese troops, and check off the expense on -the national account which was then in favour of the Portuguese; -that is, the soldiers were to starve under the sanction of this -treaty, because the Spaniards could not feed their own men, and -would not, if they could, have fed the Portuguese. Neither could -the latter take provisions from the country, because Wellington -demanded the resources of the valleys of the Duero and Pisuerga for -the English soldiers, as a set-off against the money advanced by -sir Henry Wellesley to the Spanish regency at Cadiz. Wherefore to -force the Portuguese regency from this shameful expedient he stopped -the payments of their subsidy from the chest of aids. Then the old -discontents and disputes revived and acquired new force; the regency -became more intractable than ever, and the whole military system of -Portugal was like to fall to pieces. - -On the 4th the allies quitted Arevalo, the 6th they passed the Duero -by the ford above Puente de Duero, the 7th they entered Valladolid, -and meanwhile the Gallicians, who had returned to the Esla, when Foy -retreated, were ordered to join the Anglo-Portuguese army. Clauzel -abandoned Valladolid in the night of the 6th, and though closely -followed by Ponsonby’s cavalry, crossed the Pisuerga and destroyed -the bridge of Berecal on that river. The 8th the allies halted, for -rest, and to await the arrival of Castaños; but seldom during this -war did a Spanish general deviate into activity; and Wellington -observed that in his whole intercourse with that people, from the -beginning of the revolution to that moment, he had not met with an -able Spaniard, while amongst the Portuguese he had found several. The -Gallicians came not, and the French retreated slowly up the beautiful -Pisuerga and Arlanzan valleys, which, in denial of the stories -about French devastation, were carefully cultivated and filled to -repletion with corn, wine, and oil. - -Nor were they deficient in military strength. Off the high road, on -both sides, ditches and rivulets impeded the troops, while cross -ridges continually furnished strong parallel positions flanked by -the lofty hills on either side. In these valleys Clauzel baffled his -great adversary in the most surprising manner. Each day he offered -battle, but on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in -front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, but -chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, -which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, -made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the -enemy, yet each day darkness fell ere they were completed, and the -morning’s sun always saw Clauzel again in position. At Cigales and -Dueñas, in the Pisuerga valley; at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, -Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzan, the -French general thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the -16th, by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino. - -But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred cavalry, and -eight guns, had now joined the allies, and Wellington would have -attacked frankly on the 17th, had not Clauzel, alike wary and -skilful, observed the increased numbers and retired in the night -to Frandovinez; his rear-guard was however next day pushed sharply -back to the heights of Burgos, and in the following night he -passed through that town leaving behind him large stores of grain. -Caffarelli who had come down to place the castle of Burgos in a state -of defence, now joined him, and the two generals retreated upon -Briviesca, where they were immediately reinforced by that reserve -which, with such an extraordinary foresight, the emperor had directed -to be assembled and exercised on the Pyrennees, in anticipation of -Marmont’s disaster. The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion, -for the garrison of the castle had set fire to some houses impeding -the defence of the fortress, the conflagration spread widely, and -the Partidas who were already gathered like wolves round a carcass, -entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness, and not -unused to scenes of war, thus describes their proceedings, “What with -the flames and the plundering of the Guerillas, who are as bad as -Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay hordes, I was afraid -Burgos would be entirely destroyed, but order was at length restored -by the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava.” - -The series of beautiful movements executed by Clauzel, merit every -praise, but it may be questioned if the English general’s marches -were in the true direction, or made in good time; for though -Clinton’s retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not absolutely -dictate the line of operations. Wellington had expected Clauzel’s -advance to Valladolid; it was therefore no surprise, and on the -26th of August, Foy was still at Zamora. At that period the English -general might have had his army, Clinton’s troops excepted, at -Segovia; and as the distance from thence to Valladolid, is rather -less than from Valladolid to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former, -Clinton advancing at the same time, might have separated Clauzel from -Foy. Again, Wellington might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de -Duero and Lerma, that road being as short as by Valladolid; he might -also have brought forward the third, or the light division, by the -Somosierra, from Madrid, and directed Clinton and the Spaniards to -close upon the French rear. He would thus have turned the valleys -of the Pisuerga and the Arlanzan, and could from Aranda, or Lerma, -have fallen upon Clauzel while in march. That general having Clinton -and the Gallicians on his rear, and Wellington, reinforced by the -divisions from Madrid, on his front or flank, would then have had to -fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. In fine the object -was to crush Clauzel, and this should have been effected though -Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is however -probable that want of money and means of transport decided the line -of operations, for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, -and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid was from hand to -mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal. - - -SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS. - -[Sidenote: Colonel Jones’s Sieges, 2nd edit.] - -Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides -artillery-men, in this place, and general Dubreton the governor, was -of such courage and skill that he surpassed even the hopes of his -sanguine and warlike countryman. The castle and its works enclosed -a rugged hill, between which and the river, the city of Burgos was -situated. An old wall with a new parapet and flanks constructed -by the French offered the first line of defence; the second line, -which was within the other, was earthen, of the nature of a field -retrenchment and well palisaded; the third line was similarly -constructed and contained the two most elevated points of the hill, -on one of which was an entrenched building called the White Church, -and on the other the ancient keep of the castle; this last was the -highest point, and was not only entrenched but surmounted with a -heavy casemated work called the Napoleon battery. Thus there were -five separate enclosures. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 4.] - -The Napoleon battery commanded every thing around it, save to the -north, where at the distance of three hundred yards there was a -second height scarcely less elevated than that of the fortress. It -was called the Hill of San Michael, and was defended by a large -horn-work with a hard sloping scarp twenty-five, and a counterscarp -ten feet high. This outwork was unfinished and only closed by strong -palisades, but it was under the fire of the Napoleon battery, was -well flanked by the castle defences, and covered in front by slight -entrenchments for the out picquets. The French had already mounted -nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, and six mortars or howitzers -in the fortress, and as the reserve artillery and stores of the army -of Portugal were also deposited there, they could increase their -armament. - - -FIRST ASSAULT. - -The batteries so completely commanded all the bridges and fords -over the Arlanzan that two days elapsed ere the allies could cross; -but on the 19th the passage of the river being effected above the -town, by the first division, major Somers Cocks, supported by Pack’s -Portuguese, drove in the French outposts on the hill of San Michael. -In the night, the same troops, reinforced with the forty-second -regiment, stormed the horn-work. The conflict was murderous. For -though the ladders were fairly placed by the bearers of them, the -storming column, which, covered by a firing party, marched against -the front, was beaten with great loss, and the attack would have -failed if the gallant leader of the seventy-ninth had not meanwhile -forced an entrance by the gorge. The garrison was thus actually -cut off, but Cocks, though followed by the second battalion of the -forty-second regiment, was not closely supported, and the French -being still five hundred strong, broke through his men and escaped. -This assault gave room for censure, the troops complained of each -other, and the loss was above four hundred, while that of the enemy -was less than one hundred and fifty. - -Wellington was now enabled to examine the defences of the castle. He -found them feeble and incomplete, and yet his means were so scant -that he had slender hopes of success, and relied more upon the -enemy’s weakness than upon his own power. It was however said that -water was scarce with the garrison and that their provision magazines -could be burned, wherefore encouraged by this information he adopted -the following plan of attack. - -Twelve thousand men composing the first and sixth divisions and the -two Portuguese brigades, were to undertake the works; the rest of the -troops, about twenty thousand, exclusive of the Partidas, were to -form the covering army. - -The trenches were to be opened from the suburb of San Pedro, and a -parallel formed in the direction of the hill of San Michael. - -[Sidenote: Jones’s Sieges.] - -A battery for five guns was to be established close to the right of -the captured horn-work. - -A sap was to be pushed from the parallel as near the first wall as -possible, without being seen into from the upper works, and from -thence the engineer was to proceed by gallery and mine. - -When the first mine should be completed, the battery on the hill -of San Michael was to open against the second line of defence, and -the assault was to be given on the first line. If a lodgement was -formed, the approaches were to be continued against the second line, -and the battery on San Michael was to be turned against the third -line, in front of the White Church, because the defences there were -exceedingly weak. Meanwhile a trench for musketry was to be dug along -the brow of San Michael, and a concealed battery was to be prepared -within the horn-work itself, with a view to the final attack of the -Napoleon battery. - -The head-quarters were fixed at Villa Toro, colonel Burgoyne -conducted the operations of the engineers, colonel Robe and -colonel Dickson those of the artillery, which consisted of three -eighteen-pounders, and the five iron twenty-four-pound howitzers used -at the siege of the Salamanca forts; and it was with regard to these -slender means, rather than the defects of the fortress, that the line -of attack was chosen. - -When the horn-work fell a lodgement had been immediately commenced -in the interior, and it was continued vigorously, although under a -destructive fire from the Napoleon battery, because the besiegers -feared the enemy would at day-light endeavour to retake the work by -the gorge; good cover was, however, obtained in the night, and the -first battery was also begun. - -The 21st the garrison mounted several fresh field-guns, and at night -kept up a heavy fire of grape, and shells, on the workmen who were -digging the musketry trench in front of the first battery. - -The 22d the fire of the besieged was redoubled, but the besiegers -worked with little loss, and their musketeers galled the enemy. In -the night the first battery was armed with two eighteen-pounders and -three howitzers, and the secret battery within the horn-work was -commenced; but lord Wellington, deviating from his first plan, now -resolved to try an escalade against the first line of defence. He -selected a point half-way between the suburb of San Pedro and the -horn-work, and at midnight four hundred men provided with ladders -were secretly posted, in a hollow road, fifty yards from the wall, -which was from twenty-three to twenty-five feet high but had no -flanks; this was the main column, and a Portuguese battalion was also -assembled in the town of Burgos to make a combined flank attack on -that side. - - -SECOND ASSAULT. - -[Sidenote: Lord Wellesley’s speech, House of Lords, 12th March 1813.] - -The storm was commenced by the Portuguese, but they were repelled -by the fire of the common guard alone, and the principal escalading -party which was composed of detachments from different regiments -under major Lawrie 79th regiment, though acting with more courage, -had as little success. The ladders were indeed placed, and the -troops entered the ditch, yet all together, and confusedly; Lawrie -was killed and the bravest soldiers who first mounted the ladders -were bayonetted; combustible missiles were then thrown down in great -abundance, and after a quarter of an hour’s resistance, the men gave -way, leaving half their number behind. The wounded were brought off -the next day under a truce. It is said that on the body of one of the -officers killed the French found a complete plan of the siege, and it -is certain that this disastrous attempt, which delayed the regular -progress of the siege for two days, increased the enemy’s courage, -and produced a bad effect upon the allied troops, some of whom were -already dispirited by the attack on the horn-work. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 4.] - -The original plan being now resumed, the hollow way from whence the -escaladers had advanced, and which at only fifty yards’ distance -run along the front of defence, was converted into a parallel, and -connected with the suburb of San Pedro. The trenches were made deep -and narrow to secure them from the plunging shot of the castle, and -musketeers were also planted to keep down the enemy’s fire; but -heavy rains incommoded the troops, and though the allied marksmen -got the mastery over those of the French immediately in their front, -the latter, having a raised and palisaded work on their own right -which in some measure flanked the approaches, killed so many of the -besiegers that the latter were finally withdrawn. - -In the night a flying sap was commenced, from the right of the -parallel, and was pushed within twenty yards of the enemy’s first -line of defence; but the directing engineer was killed, and with him -many men, for the French plied their musketry sharply, and rolled -large shells down the steep side of the hill. The head of the sap -was indeed so commanded as it approached the wall, that a six-feet -trench, added to the height of the gabion above, scarcely protected -the workmen, wherefore the gallery of the mine was opened, and -worked as rapidly as the inexperience of the miners, who were merely -volunteers from the line, would permit. - -The concealed battery within the horn-work of San Michael being now -completed, two eighteen-pounders were removed from the first battery -to arm it, and they were replaced by two iron howitzers, which opened -upon the advanced palisade below, to drive the French marksmen from -that point; but after firing one hundred and forty rounds without -success this project was relinquished, and ammunition was so scarce -that the soldiers were paid to collect the enemy’s bullets. - -This day also a zigzag was commenced in front of the first battery -and down the face of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry -trench to overlook the enemy’s defences below; and though the workmen -were exposed to the whole fire of the castle, at the distance of two -hundred yards, and were knocked down fast, the work went steadily on. - -On the 26th the gallery of the mine was advanced eighteen feet, -and the soil was found favourable, but the men in passing the sap, -were hit fast by the French marksmen, and an assistant engineer -was killed. In the night the parallel was prolonged on the right -within twenty yards of the enemy’s ramparts, with a view to a second -gallery and mine, and musketeers were planted there to oppose the -enemy’s marksmen and to protect the sap; at the same time the zigzag -on the hill of San Michael was continued, and the musket trench there -was completed under cover of gabions, and with little loss, although -the whole fire of the castle was concentrated on the spot. - -The 27th the French were seen strengthening their second line, and -they had already cut a step, along the edge of the counterscarp, -for a covered way, and had palisaded the communication. Meanwhile -the besiegers finished the musketry trench on the right of their -parallel, and opened the gallery for the second mine; but the first -mine went on slowly, the men in the sap were galled and disturbed, -by stones, grenades, and small shells, which the French threw into -the trenches by hand; and the artillery fire also knocked over the -gabions of the musketry trench, on San Michael, so fast, that the -troops were withdrawn during the day. - -In the night a trench of communication forming a second parallel -behind the first was begun and nearly completed from the hill of San -Michael towards the suburb of San Pedro, and the musketry trench on -the hill was deepened. - -The 28th an attempt was made to perfect this new parallel of -communication, but the French fire was heavy, and the shells, which -passed over, came rolling down the hill again into the trench, so the -work was deferred until night and was then perfected. The back roll -of the shells continued indeed to gall the troops, but the whole of -this trench, that in front of the horn-work above, and that on the -right of the parallel below, were filled with men whose fire was -incessant. Moreover the first mine was now completed and loaded -with more than a thousand weight of powder, the gallery was strongly -tamped for fifteen feet with bags of clay, and all being ready for -the explosion Wellington ordered the - - -THIRD ASSAULT. - -At midnight the hollow road, fifty yards from the mine, was lined -with troops to fire on the defences, and three hundred men, composing -the storming party, were assembled there, attended by others who -carried tools and materials to secure the lodgement when the breach -should be carried. The mine was then exploded, the wall fell, and an -officer with twenty men rushed forward to the assault. The effect -of the explosion was not so great as it ought to have been, yet it -brought the wall down, the enemy was stupified, and the forlorn hope, -consisting of a sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit -of the breach, and there stood until the French, recovering, drove -them down pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the officer and the -twenty men, who were to have been followed by a party of fifty, and -these by the remainder of the stormers, missed the breach in the -dark, and finding the wall unbroken, returned, and reported that -there was no breach. The main body immediately regained the trenches, -and before the sergeant and his men returned with streaming wounds to -tell their tale, the enemy was reinforced; and such was the scarcity -of ammunition that no artillery practice could be directed against -the breach, during the night; hence the French were enabled to raise -a parapet behind it and to place obstacles on the ascent which -deterred the besiegers from renewing the assault at day-light. - -This failure arose from the darkness of the night, and the want of -a conducting engineer, for out of four regular officers, of that -branch, engaged in the siege, one had been killed, one badly wounded, -and one was sick, wherefore the remaining one was necessarily -reserved for the conducting of the works. The aspect of affairs -was gloomy. Twelve days had elapsed since the siege commenced, one -assault had succeeded, two had failed, twelve hundred men had been -killed, or wounded, little progress had been made, and the troops -generally shewed symptoms of despondency, especially the Portuguese, -who seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was relaxed, -the soldiers wasted ammunition, and the work in the trenches was -avoided or neglected both by officers and men; insubordination was -gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued, the guards only -being noticed as presenting an honourable exception. - -[Sidenote: October.] - -In this state it was essential to make some change in the operations, -and as the French marksmen, in the advanced palisadoed work below, -were now become so expert that every thing which could be seen from -thence was hit, the howitzer battery on San Michael was reinforced -with a French eight-pounder, by the aid of which this mischievous -post was at last demolished. At the same time the gallery of the -second mine was pushed forward, and a new breaching battery for three -guns was constructed behind it, so close to the enemy’s defences that -the latter screened the work from the artillery fire of their upper -fortress; but the parapet of the battery was only made musket-proof -because the besieged had no guns on the lower line of this front. - -In the night the three eighteen-pounders were brought from the hill -of San Michael without being discovered, and at day-light, though a -very galling fire of muskets thinned the workmen, they persevered -until nine o’clock when the battery was finished and armed. But at -that moment the watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down from the -upper works, and with a low charge threw shells into the battery; -then making a hole through a flank wall, he thrust out a light -gun which sent its bullets whizzing through the thin parapet at -every round, and at the same time his marksmen plied their shot -so sharply that the allies were driven from their pieces without -firing a shot. More French cannon were now brought from the upper -works, the defences of the battery were quite demolished, two of the -gun-carriages were disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the -eighteen-pounders, and the muzzle of another was split. And it was -in vain that the besiegers’ marksmen, aided by some officers who -considered themselves good shots, endeavoured to quell the enemy’s -fire, the French being on a height were too well covered and remained -masters of the fight. - -In the night a second and more solid battery was formed at a point -a little to the left of the ruined one, but at day-light the French -observed it; and their fire plunging from above made the parapet fly -off so rapidly, that the English general relinquished his intention -and returned to his galleries and mines, and to his breaching -battery on the hill of San Michael. The two guns still serviceable -were therefore removed towards the upper battery to beat down a -retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach. It was -intended to have placed them on this new position in the night of -the 3d, but the weather was very wet and stormy, and the workmen, -those of the guards only excepted, abandoned the trenches; hence at -day-light the guns were still short of their destination and nothing -more could be done until the following night. - -On the 4th, at nine o’clock in the morning, the two -eighteen-pounders, and three iron howitzers, again opened from San -Michael’s, and at four o’clock in the evening, the old breach being -cleared of all incumbrances, and the second mine being strongly -tamped for explosion, a double assault was ordered. The second -battalion of the twenty-fourth British regiment, commanded by captain -Hedderwick was selected for this operation, and was formed in the -hollow way, having one advanced party, under Mr. Holmes, pushed -forward as close to the new mine as it was safe to be, and a second -party under Mr. Frazer in like manner pushed towards the old breach. - - -FOURTH ASSAULT. - -At five o’clock the mine was exploded with a terrific effect, sending -many of the French up into the air and breaking down one hundred -feet of the wall, the next instant Holmes and his brave men went -rushing through the smoke and crumbling ruins, and Frazer, as quick -and brave as his brother officer, was already fighting with the -defenders on the summit of the old breach. The supports followed -closely, and in a few minutes both points were carried with a loss -to the assailants of thirty-seven killed and two hundred wounded, -seven of the latter being officers and amongst them the conducting -engineer. During the night lodgements were formed, in advance of the -old, and on the ruins of the new breach, yet very imperfectly, and -under a heavy destructive fire from the upper defences. But this -happy attack revived the spirits of the army, vessels with powder -were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by land from -Ciudad Rodrigo, and as a supply of ammunition sent by sir Home Popham -had already reached the camp, from Santander, the howitzers continued -to knock away the palisades in the ditch, and the battery on San -Michael’s was directed to open a third breach at a point where the -first French line of defence was joined to the second line. - -This promising state of affairs was of short duration. - -On the 5th, at five o’clock in the evening, while the working parties -were extending the lodgements, three hundred French came swiftly -down the hill, and sweeping away the labourers and guards from the -trenches, killed or wounded a hundred and fifty men, got possession -of the old breach, destroyed the works, and carried off all the -tools. However in the night the allies repaired the damage and -pushed saps from each flank to meet in the centre near the second -French line, and to serve as a parallel to check future sallies. -Meanwhile the howitzers on the San Michael continued their fire, yet -ineffectually, against the palisades; the breaching battery in the -horn-work also opened, but it was badly constructed, and the guns -being unable to see the wall sufficiently low, soon ceased to speak, -the embrasures were therefore masked. On the other hand the besieged -were unable, from the steepness of the castle-hill, to depress their -guns sufficiently to bear on the lodgement at the breaches in the -first line, but their musquetry was destructive, and they rolled down -large shells to retard the approaches towards the second line. - -On the 7th the besiegers had got so close to the wall below that -the howitzers above could no longer play without danger to the -workmen, wherefore two French field-pieces, taken in the horn-work, -were substituted and did good service. The breaching battery on San -Michael’s being altered, also renewed its fire, and at five o’clock -had beaten down fifty feet from the parapet of the second line; but -the enemy’s return was heavy, and another eighteen-pounder lost a -trunnion. However in the night block-carriages with supports for the -broken trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns were enabled to -recommence their fire yet with low charges. But a constant rain had -now filled the trenches, the communications were injured, the workmen -were negligent, the approaches to the second line went on slowly, and -again Dubreton came thundering down from the upper ground, driving -the guards and workmen from the new parallel at the lodgements, -levelling all the works, carrying off all the tools, and killing or -wounding two hundred men. Colonel Cocks, promoted for his gallant -conduct at the storming of San Michael, restored the fight, and -repulsed the French, but he fell dead on the ground he had recovered. -He was a young man of a modest demeanour, brave, thoughtful, and -enterprising, and he lived and died a good soldier. - -After this severe check the approaches to the second line were -abandoned, and the trenches were extended so as to embrace the whole -of the fronts attacked; the battery on San Michael had meantime -formed a practicable breach twenty-five feet wide, and the parallel, -at the old breach of the first line, was prolonged by zigzags on -the left towards this new breach, while a trench was opened to -enable marksmen to fire upon the latter at thirty yards distance. -Nevertheless another assault could not be risked because the great -expenditure of powder had again exhausted the magazines, and without -a new supply, the troops might have found themselves without -ammunition in front of the French army which was now gathering head -near Briviesca. Heated shot were however thrown at the White Church -with a view to burn the magazines; and the miners were directed to -drive a gallery, on the other side of the castle, against the church -of San Roman, a building pushed out a little beyond the French -external line of defence on the side of the city. - -[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 4.] - -On the 10th, when the besiegers’ ammunition was nearly all gone, a -fresh supply arrived from Santander, but no effect had been produced -upon the White Church, and Dubreton had strengthened his works to -meet the assault; he had also isolated the new breach on one flank by -a strong stockade extending at right angles from the second to the -third line of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery had obliged -the besiegers again to withdraw their battering guns within the -horn-work, and the attempt to burn the White Church was relinquished, -but the gallery against San Roman was continued. In this state things -remained for several days with little change, save that the French, -maugre the musketry from the nearest zigzag trench, had scarped -eight feet at the top of the new breach and formed a small trench at -the back. - -On the 15th the battery in the horn-work was again armed, and the -guns pointed to breach the wall of the Napoleon battery; they were -however over-matched and silenced in three-quarters of an hour, and -the embrasures were once more altered, that the guns might bear on -the breach in the second line. Some slight works and counter-works -were also made on different points, but the besiegers were -principally occupied repairing the mischief done by the rain, and -in pushing the gallery under San Roman, where the French were now -distinctly heard talking in the church, wherefore the mine there was -formed and loaded with nine hundred pounds of powder. - -On the 17th the battery of the horn-work being renewed, the fire of -the eighteen-pounders cleared away the enemy’s temporary defences -at the breach, the howitzers damaged the rampart on each side, and -a small mine was sprung on the extreme right of the lower parallel, -with a view to take possession of a cavalier or mound which the -French had raised there, and from which they had killed many men -in the trenches; it was successful, and a lodgement was effected, -but the enemy soon returned in force and obliged the besiegers to -abandon it again. However on the 18th the new breach was rendered -practicable, and Wellington ordered it to be stormed. The explosion -of the mine under San Roman was to be the signal; that church was -also to be assaulted; and at the same time a third detachment was to -escalade the works in front of the ancient breach and thus connect -the attacks. - - -FIFTH ASSAULT. - -At half-past four o’clock the springing of the mine at San Roman -broke down a terrace in front of that building, yet with little -injury to the church itself; the latter was, however, resolutely -attacked by colonel Browne, at the head of some Spanish and -Portuguese troops, and though the enemy sprung a countermine which -brought the building down, the assailants lodged themselves in -the ruins. Meanwhile two hundred of the foot-guards, with strong -supports, poured through the old breach in the first line, and -escaladed the second line, beyond which in the open ground between -the second and third lines, they were encountered by the French, and -a sharp musketry fight commenced. At the same time a like number of -the German legion, under major Wurmb, similarly supported, stormed -the new breach, on the left of the guards, so vigourously, that it -was carried in a moment, and some men, mounting the hill above, -actually gained the third line. Unhappily at neither of these -assaults did the supports follow closely, and the Germans being -cramped on their left by the enemy’s stockade, extended by their -right towards the guards, and at that critical moment Dubreton, who -held his reserves well in hand, came dashing like a torrent from -the upper ground, and in an instant cleared the breaches. Wurmb and -many other brave men fell, and then the French, gathering round the -guards, who were still unsupported, forced them beyond the outer -line. More than two hundred men and officers were killed or wounded -in this combat, and the next night the enemy recovered San Roman by a -sally. - -The siege was thus virtually terminated, for though the French were -beaten out of St. Roman again, and a gallery was opened from that -church against the second line; and though two twenty-four pounders, -sent from Santander, by sir Home Popham, had passed Reynosa on their -way to Burgos, these were mere demonstrations. It is now time to -narrate the different contemporary events which obliged the English -general, with a victorious army, to abandon the siege of a third-rate -fortress, strong in nothing but the skill and bravery of the governor -and his gallant soldiers. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. October.] - -When king Joseph retreated to Valencia he earnestly demanded -a reinforcement of forty thousand men, from France, and, more -earnestly, money. Three millions of francs he obtained from Suchet, -yet his distress was greater even than that of the allies, and -Wellington at one time supposed that this alone would drive the -French from the Peninsula. The Anglo-Portuguese soldiers had not -received pay for six months, but the French armies of the south, of -the centre, and of Portugal, were a whole year behind-hand; and the -salaries of the ministers, and civil servants of the court, were two -years in arrears. Suchet’s army, the only one which depended entirely -on the country, was by that marshal’s excellent management regularly -paid, and the effect on its discipline was conformable; his troops -refrained from plunder themselves, and repressed some excesses of -Joseph’s and Soult’s soldiers so vigorously, as to come to blows -in defence of the inhabitants. And thus it will ever be, since -paid soldiers only may be kept under discipline. Soldiers without -money must become robbers. Napoleon knew the king’s necessity to be -extreme, but the war with Russia had so absorbed the resources of -France, that little money, and only twenty thousand men, principally -conscripts, could be sent to Spain. - -[Sidenote: Letter from the duke of Feltre to king Joseph, 4th Oct. -1812, MSS.] - -The army of Portugal, at the moment when the siege of the castle -commenced, had been quartered between Vittoria and Burgos; that -is to say, at Pancorbo and along the Ebro as far as Logroña, an -advanced guard only remaining at Briviesca; on this line they were -recruited and reorganized, and Massena was appointed with full powers -to command in the northern provinces. A fine opportunity to revenge -his own retreat from Torres Vedras, was thus furnished to the old -warrior; but whether he doubted the issue of affairs, or was really -tamed by age, he pleaded illness, and sent general Souham to the -army of Portugal. Then arose contentions, for Marmont had designated -Clauzel as the fittest to lead, Massena insisted that Souham was the -abler general, and the king desired to appoint Drouet. Clauzel’s -abilities were certainly not inferior to those of any French general, -and to more perfect acquaintance with the theatre of war, he added -a better knowledge of the enemy he had to contend with; he was also -more known to his own soldiers, and had gained their confidence by -his recent operations, no mean considerations in such a matter. -However, Souham was appointed. - -[Sidenote: Official report of general Souham, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Duke of Feltre’s correspondence, MSS.] - -Caffarelli anxious to succour the castle of Burgos, which belonged -to his command, had united at Vittoria a thousand cavalry, sixteen -guns, and eight thousand infantry, of which three thousand were of -the young guard. The army of Portugal, reinforced from France with -twelve thousand men, had thirty-five thousand present under arms, -reorganized in six divisions, and by Clauzel’s care, its former -excellent discipline had been restored. Thus forty-four thousand good -troops were, in the beginning of October, ready to succour the castle -of Burgos; but the generals, although anxious to effect that object, -awaited, first the arrival of Souham, and then news from the king, -with whose operations it was essential to combine their own. They had -no direct tidings from him because the lines of correspondence were -so circuitous, and so beset by the Partidas, that the most speedy as -well as certain mode of communication, was through the minister of -war at Paris; and that functionary found the information, best suited -to his purpose, in the English newspapers. For the latter, while -deceiving the British public by accounts of battles which were never -fought, victories which were never gained, enthusiasm and vigour -which never existed, did, with most accurate assiduity, enlighten the -enemy upon the numbers, situation, movements, and reinforcements of -the allies. - -[Sidenote: Souham’s official correspondence, MSS.] - -Souham arrived the 3rd of October with the last of the reinforcements -from France, but he imagined that lord Wellington had sixty thousand -troops around Burgos, exclusive of the Partidas, and that three -divisions were marching from Madrid to his aid; whereas none were -coming from that capital, and little more than thirty thousand were -present under arms round Burgos, eleven thousand being Gallicians -scarcely so good as the Partidas. Wellington’s real strength was -in his Anglo-Portuguese, then not twenty thousand, for besides -those killed or wounded at the siege, the sick had gone to the rear -faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached regiments and -escorts were, indeed, about Segovia, and other points north of the -Guadarama, and a reinforcement of five thousand men had been sent -from England in September; but the former belonged to Hill’s army, -and of the latter, the lifeguards and blues had gone to Lisbon. Hence -a regiment of foot-guards, and some detachments for the line, in all -about three thousand, were the only available force in the rear. - -During the first part of the siege, the English general seeing the -French scattered along the Ebro, and only reinforced by conscripts, -did not fear any interruption, and the less so, that sir Home Popham -was again menacing the coast line. Even now, when the French were -beginning to concentrate their troops, he cared little for them, -and was resolved to give battle; for he thought that Popham and -the guerillas would keep Caffarelli employed, and he felt himself -a match for the army of Portugal. Nor were the Partidas inactive -on any point, and their successes though small in themselves, were -exceedingly harassing to the enemy. - -Mina having obtained two or three thousand stand of English arms -had re-entered Aragon and domineered on the left bank of the Ebro, -while Duran, with four thousand men, operated uncontrolled on the -right bank. The Empecinado, Villacampa, and Bassecour descended from -Cuenca, the first against Requeña, the others against Albacete. -The Frayle interrupted the communications between Valencia and -Tortoza. Saornil, Cuesta, Firmin, and others, were in La Mancha and -Estremadura, Juan Palarea, called the Medico, was near Segovia, and -though Marquinez had been murdered by one of his own men, his partida -and that of Julian Sanchez acted as regular troops with Wellington’s -army. Meanwhile sir Home Popham, in conjunction with Mendizabel, -Porlier, and Renovales, who had gathered all the minor partidas under -their banners, assailed Gueteria; but unsuccessfully; for on the 30th -of September, the Spanish chiefs were driven away, and Popham lost -some guns which had been landed. About the same time the Empecinado -being defeated at Requeña, retired to Cuenca, yet he failed not from -thence to infest the French quarters. - -Duran, when Soria was abandoned, fell upon Calatayud, but was -defeated by Severoli, who withdrew the garrison. Then the Spanish -chief attacked the castle of Almunia, which was only one march from -Zaragoza, and when Severoli succoured this place also, and dismantled -the castle, Duran attacked Borja between Tudela and Zaragoza, and -took it before Severoli could come up. Thus Zaragoza was gradually -deprived of its outposts, on the right of the Ebro; on the left, Mina -hovered close to the gates, and his lieutenant, Chaplangara, meeting, -near Ayerbe, with three hundred Italians, killed forty, and would -have destroyed the whole but for the timely succour of some mounted -gens-d’armes. At last Reille being undeceived as to Wellington’s -march, restored the smaller posts which he had abandoned, and Suchet -ordered the castle of Almunia to be refitted, but during these -events, Bassecour and Villa Campa united to infest Joseph’s quarters -about Albacete. - -Soult’s march from Andalusia and his junction with the king, has -been described; but while he was yet at Grenada, Hill, leaving three -Portuguese regiments of infantry and one of cavalry at Almendralejo -and Truxillo, to protect his line of supply, had marched to cross -the Tagus at Almaraz, and Arzobispo. He entered Toledo the 28th of -September, and the same day Elio took a small French garrison left in -Consuegra. Hill soon after occupied a line from Toledo to Aranjuez, -where he was joined by the fourth division, Victor Alten’s cavalry, -and the detachments quartered about Ildefonsos and Segovia. On the -8th, hearing of Soult’s arrival at Hellin, he pushed his cavalry -to Belmonte on the San Clemente road, and here in La Mancha as in -Old Castile the stories of French devastation were belied by the -abundance of provisions. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8, B.] - -Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado now united on the road -leading from Cuenca to Valencia, while the Medico and other chiefs -gathered in the Toledo mountains. In this manner the allies extended -from Toledo on the right, by Belmonte, Cuenca, and Calatayud to near -Jacca on the left, and were in military communication with the coast; -for Caffarelli’s disposable force was now concentrated to relieve -Burgos, and Mina had free intercourse with Mendizabal and Renovales, -and with Popham’s fleet. But the French line of correspondence -between the armies in the eastern and northern provinces, was -so interrupted that the English newspapers became their surest, -quickest, and most accurate channels of intelligence. - -[Sidenote: Duke of Feltre’s official correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: General Souham’s official correspondence, MSS.] - -Souham, who over-rated the force of his adversary, and feared a -defeat as being himself the only barrier left between Wellington -and France, was at first so far from meditating an advance, that -he expected and dreaded an attack from the allies; and as the want -of provisions would not let him concentrate his army permanently -near Monasterio, his dispositions were made to fight on the Ebro. -The minister of war had even desired him to detach a division -against the partidas. But when by the English newspapers, and other -information sent from Paris, he learned that Soult was in march from -Grenada,—that the king intended to move upon Madrid,—that no English -troops had left that capital to join Wellington,—that the army of -the latter was not very numerous, and that the castle of Burgos was -sorely pressed, he called up Caffarelli’s troops from Vittoria, -concentrated his own at Briviesca and resolved to raise the siege. - -On the 13th a skirmish took place on the stream beyond Monasterio, -where captain Perse of the sixteenth dragoons was twice forced -from the bridge and twice recovered it in the most gallant manner, -maintaining his post until colonel F. Ponsonby, who commanded the -reserves, arrived. Ponsonby and Perse were both wounded, and this -demonstration was followed by various others until the evening of the -18th, when the whole French army was united, and the advanced guard -captured a picquet of the Brunswickers which contrary to orders had -remained in St. Olalla. This sudden movement apparently prevented -Wellington from occupying the position of Monasterio, his outposts -fell back on the 19th to Quintanapala and Olmos, and on the ridges -behind those places he drew up his army in order of battle. The right -was at Ibeas on the Arlanzan; the centre at Riobena and Majarradas -on the main road behind Olmos; the left was thrown back near Soto -Palaccio, and rested on a small river. - -The 20th, Maucune, with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, -drove the allies from Quintanapala, but Olmos was successfully -defended by the Chasseurs Brittaniques, and Maucune, having no -supports, was immediately outflanked on the right and forced back -to Monasterio, by two divisions under sir Edward Paget. There were -now in position, including Pack’s Portuguese, which blockaded -the castle, about thirty-three thousand men under arms, namely, -twenty-one thousand Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, eleven -thousand Gallicians, and the horsemen of Marquinez and Julian -Sanchez. Thus, there were four thousand troopers, but only two -thousand six hundred of these were British and German, and the -Spanish horsemen regular or irregular, could scarcely be counted -in the line of battle. The number of guns and howitzers was only -forty-two, including twelve Spanish pieces, extremely ill equipped -and scant of ammunition. - -[Sidenote: Official state of the army given to Massena, MSS.] - -Lord Wellington had long felt the want of artillery and had sent -a memoir upon the subject, to the British government, in the -beginning of the year, yet his ordnance establishment had not been -augmented, hence his difficulties during the siege; and in the field, -instead of ninety British and Portuguese cannon, which was the just -complement for his army, he had now only fifty serviceable pieces, -of which twenty-four were with general Hill; and all were British, -for the Portuguese artillery had from the abuses and the poverty -of their government entirely melted away. Now the French had, as I -have before stated, forty-four thousand men, of which nearly five -thousand were cavalry, and they had more than sixty guns, a matter -of no small importance; for besides the actual power of artillery -in an action, soldiers are excited when the noise is greatest on -their side. Wellington stood, therefore, at disadvantage in numbers, -composition, and real strength. In his rear was the castle, and the -river Arlanzan, the fords and bridges of which were commanded by the -guns of the fortress; his generals of division, Paget excepted, were -not of any marked ability, his troops were somewhat desponding, and -deteriorated in discipline. His situation was therefore dangerous, -and critical; a victory could scarcely be expected, and a defeat -would have been destructive; he should not have provoked a battle, -nor would he have done so had he known that Caffarelli’s troops were -united to Souham’s. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8. A.] - -On the other hand, Souham should by all means have forced on an -action, because his ground was strong, his retreat open, his -army powerful and compact, his soldiers full of confidence, his -lieutenants Clauzel, Maucune, and Foy, men of distinguished talents, -able to second, and able to succeed him in the chief command. The -chances of victory and the profit to be derived were great, the -chances of defeat, and the dangers to be incurred comparatively -small. And it was thus indeed that he judged the matter himself, for -Maucune’s advance was intended to be the prelude to a great battle, -and the English general, as we have seen, was willing to stand the -trial. But generals are not absolute masters of events, and as the -extraneous influence which restrained both sides, on this occasion, -came from afar, it was fitting to show how, in war, movements, -distant, and apparently unconnected with those immediately under a -general’s eye, will break his measures, and make him appear undecided -or foolish when in truth he is both wise and firm. - -While Wellington was still engaged with the siege, the cortez made -him commander of all the Spanish armies. He had before refused this -responsible situation, but the circumstances were now changed, for -the Spaniards, having lost nearly all their cavalry and guns in the -course of the war, could not safely act, except in connexion with the -Anglo-Portuguese forces, and it was absolutely necessary that one -head should direct. The English general therefore demanded leave of -his own government to accept the offer, although he observed, that -the Spanish troops were not at all improved in their discipline, -their equipments, or their military spirit; but he thought that -conjoined with the British they might behave well, and so escape any -more of those terrible disasters which had heretofore overwhelmed -the country and nearly brought the war to a conclusion. He was -willing to save the dignity of the Spanish government, by leaving it -a certain body of men wherewith to operate after its own plans; but -that he might exercise his own power efficiently, and to the profit -of the troops under himself, he desired that the English government -would vigorously insist upon the strict application of the subsidy -to the payment of the Spanish soldiers acting with the British army, -otherwise the care of the Spanish troops, he said, would only cramp -his own operations. - -In his reply to the Cortez, his acceptance of the offer was rendered -dependent upon the assent of his own government; and he was careful -to guard himself from a danger, not unlikely to arise, namely, -that the Cortez, when he should finally accept the offer, would in -virtue of that acceptance assume the right of directing the whole -operations of the war. The intermediate want of power to move the -Spanish armies, he judged of little consequence, because hitherto his -suggestions having been cheerfully attended to by the Spanish chiefs, -he had no reason to expect any change in that particular, but there -he was grievously mistaken. - -Previous to this offer the Spanish government had, at his desire, -directed Ballesteros to cross the Morena, and place himself at -Alcaraz and in support of the Chinchilla fort, where joined by Cruz -Murgeon, by Elio, and by the Partidas, he would have had a corps of -thirty thousand men, would have been supported by Hill’s army, and, -having the mountains behind him for a retreat, could have safely -menaced the enemy’s flank, and delayed the march against Madrid or at -least have obliged the king to leave a strong corps of observation -to watch him. But Ballesteros, swelling with arrogant folly, never -moved from Grenada, and when he found that Wellington was created -generalissimo, he published a manifesto appealing to the Spanish -pride against the degradation of serving under a foreigner; he thus -sacrificed to his own spleen the welfare of his country, and with -a result he little expected; for while he judged himself a man to -sway the destinies of Spain, he suddenly found himself a criminal -and nothing more. The Cortez caused him to be arrested in the midst -of his soldiers, who, indifferent to his fate, suffered him to be -sent a prisoner to Ceuta. The count of Abisbal was then declared -captain-general of Andalusia, and the duke del Parque was appointed -to command Ballesteros’ army, which general Verues immediately led by -Jaen towards La Mancha, but Soult was then on the Tormes. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6. A.] - -That marshal united with the king on the 3d of October. His troops -required rest, his numerous sick were to be sent to the Valencian -hospitals, and his first interview with Joseph was of a warm nature, -for each had his griefs and passions to declare. Finally the monarch -yielded to the superior mental power of his opponent and resolved to -profit from his great military capacity, yet reluctantly and more -from prudence than liking; for the duke of Feltre, minister of war at -Paris, although secretly an enemy of Soult, and either believing, or -pretending to believe in the foolish charges of disorderly ambition -made against that commander, opposed any decided exercise of the -king’s authority until the emperor’s will was known: yet this would -not have restrained the king if the marshals Jourdan and Suchet had -not each declined accepting the duke of Dalmatia’s command when -Joseph offered it to them. - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Soult’s first operation was to reduce Chinchilla, a well-constructed -fort, which, being in the midst of his quarters, commanded the great -roads so as to oblige his army to move under its fire or avoid it by -circuitous routes. A vigorous defence was expected, but on the 6th it -fell, after a few hours’ attack; for a thunder-storm suddenly arising -in a clear sky had discharged itself upon the fort, and killed the -governor and many other persons, whereupon the garrison, influenced, -it is said, by a superstitious fear, surrendered. This was the first -bitter fruit of Ballesteros’ disobedience, for neither could Soult -have taken Chinchilla, nor scattered his troops, as he did, at -Albacete, Almanza, Yecla, and Hellin, if thirty thousand Spaniards -had been posted between Alcaraz and Chinchilla, and supported by -thirty thousand Anglo-Portuguese at Toledo under Hill. These extended -quarters were however essential for the feeding of the French -general’s numbers, and now, covered by the fort of Chinchilla, his -troops were well lodged, his great convoys of sick and maimed men, -his Spanish families, and other impediments, safely and leisurely -sent to Valencia, while his cavalry scouring the country of La Mancha -in advance, obliged Bassecour and Villa Campa to fall back upon -Cuenca. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8. A.] - -The detail of the operations which followed, belongs to another -place. It will suffice to say here, that the king, being at the -head of more than seventy thousand men, was enabled without risking -Valencia to advance towards the Tagus, having previously sent -Souham a specific order to combine his movements in co-operation -but strictly to avoid fighting. General Hill also finding himself -threatened by such powerful forces, and reduced by Ballesteros’ -defection to a simple defence of the Tagus, at a moment when that -river was becoming fordable in all places, gave notice of his -situation to lord Wellington. Joseph’s letter was dispatched on the -1st, and six others followed in succession day by day, yet the last -carried by colonel Lucotte, an officer of the royal staff, first -reached Souham; the advantages derived from the allies’ central -position, and from the Partidas, were here made manifest; for Hill’s -letter, though only dispatched the 17th, reached Wellington at the -same moment that Joseph’s reached Souham. The latter general was thus -forced to relinquish his design of fighting on the 20th; nevertheless -having but four days’ provisions left, he designed when those should -be consumed, to attack notwithstanding the king’s prohibition, -if Wellington should still confront him. But the English general -considering that his own army, already in a very critical situation, -would be quite isolated if the king should, as was most probable, -force the allies from the Tagus, now resolved, though with a bitter -pang, to raise the siege and retreat so far as would enable him to -secure his junction with Hill. - -While the armies were in presence some fighting had taken place -at Burgos, Dubreton had again obtained possession of the ruins of -the church of San Roman and was driven away next morning; and now -in pursuance of Wellington’s determination to retreat, mines of -destruction were formed in the horn-work by the besiegers, and the -guns and stores were removed from the batteries to the parc at Villa -Toro. But the greatest part of the draught animals had been sent to -Reynosa, to meet the powder and artillery coming from Santander, -and hence, the eighteen-pounders could not be carried off, nor, -from some error, were the mines of destruction exploded. The rest -of the stores and the howitzers were put in march by the road of -Villaton and Frandovinez for Celada del Camino. Thus the siege was -raised, after five assaults, several sallies and thirty-three days of -investment, during which the besiegers lost more than two thousand -men and the besieged six hundred in killed or wounded; the latter had -also suffered severely, from continual labour, want of water, and bad -weather, for the fortress was too small to afford shelter for the -garrison and the greater part bivouacked between the lines of defence. - - -RETREAT FROM BURGOS. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 5.] - -This operation was commenced on the night of the 21st by a measure -of great nicety and boldness, for the road, divaricating at Gamonal, -led by Villatoro to the bridge of Villaton on the one hand, and the -bridge of Burgos on the other, and Wellington chose the latter, which -was the shortest, though it passed the Arlanzan river close under the -guns of the castle. The army quitted the position after dark without -being observed, and having the artillery-wheels muffled with straw, -defiled over the bridge of Burgos with such silence and celerity, -that Dubreton, watchful and suspicious as he was, knew nothing -of their march until the Partidas, failing in nerve, commenced -galloping; then he poured a destructive fire down, but soon lost the -range. By this delicate operation the infantry gained Cellada del -Camino and Hormillas that night, but the light cavalry halted at -Estepar and the bridge of Villa Baniel. Souham, who did not discover -the retreat until late in the evening of the 22d, was therefore fain -to follow, and by a forced march, to overtake the allies, whereas, -if Wellington to avoid the fire of the castle had gone by Villaton, -and Frandovinez, the French might have forestalled him at Cellada del -Camino. - -The 23d the infantry renewing their march crossed the Pisuerga, at -Cordovillas, and Torquemada, a little above and below its junction -with the Arlanzan; but while the main body made this long march, -the French having passed Burgos in the night of the 22d, vigorously -attacked the allies’ rear-guard. This was composed of the cavalry -and some horse artillery, commanded by Norman Ramsay and Major -Downman; of two battalions of Germans under Colin Halket; and of the -Partidas of Marquinez and Sanchez, the latter being on the left of -the Arlanzan and the whole under the command of sir Stapleton Cotton. -The piquets of light cavalry were vigorously driven from the bridge -of Baniel as early as seven o’clock in the morning; but they rallied -upon their reserves and gained the Hormaza stream which was disputed -for some time, and a charge made by captain Perse of the sixteenth -dragoons, was of distinguished bravery. However the French cavalry -finally forced the passage and the British retiring behind Cellada -Camino took post in a large plain. On their left was a range of hills -the summit of which was occupied by the Partida of Marquinez, and on -their right was the Arlanzan, beyond which Julian Sanchez was posted. -Across the middle of the plain run a marshy rivulet cutting the main -road, and only passable by a little bridge near a house called the -Venta de Pozo, and half-way between this stream and Cellada there -was a broad ditch with a second bridge in front of a small village. -Cotton immediately retired over the marshy stream, leaving Anson’s -horsemen and Halket’s infantry as a rear-guard beyond the ditch; and -Anson to cover his own passage of that obstacle left the eleventh -dragoons and the guns at Cellada Camino, which was situated on a -gentle eminence. - - -COMBAT OF VENTA DE POZO. - -When the French approached Cellada, major Money of the eleventh, who -was in advance, galloping out from the left of the village at the -head of two squadrons, overturned their leading horsemen, and the -artillery plied them briskly with shot, but the main body advancing -at a trot along the road soon outflanked the British, and obliged -Money’s squadrons to rejoin the rest of the regiment while the guns -went on beyond the bridge of Venta de Pozo. Meanwhile the French -general Curto with a brigade of hussars ascended the hills on the -left, and being followed by Boyer’s dragoons, put Marquinez’ Partida -to flight; but a deep ravine run along the foot of these hills, next -the plain, it could only be passed at certain places, and towards -the first of these the Partidas galloped, closely chased by the -hussars, at the moment when the leading French squadrons on the plain -were forming in front of Cellada to attack the eleventh regiment. -The latter charged and drove the first line upon the second, but -then both lines coming forward together, the British were pushed -precipitately to the ditch, and got over by the bridge with some -difficulty, though with little loss, being covered by the fire of -Halket’s infantry which was in the little village behind the bridge. - -The left flank of this new line was already turned by the hussars -on the hills, wherefore Anson fell back covered by the sixteenth -dragoons, and in good order, with design to cross the second bridge -at Venta de Pozo; during this movement Marquinez’ Partida came -pouring down from the hills in full flight, closely pursued by the -French hussars, who mixed with the fugitives, and the whole mass -fell upon the flank of the sixteenth dragoons; and at the same -moment, these last were also charged by the enemy’s dragoons, who -had followed them over the ditch. The commander of the Partida was -wounded, colonel Pelly with another officer, and thirty men of the -sixteenth, fell into the enemy’s hands, and all were driven in -confusion upon the reserves. But while the French were reforming -their scattered squadrons after this charge, Anson got his people -over the bridge of Venta de Pozo and drew up beyond the rivulet and -to the left of the road, on which Halket’s battalions and the guns -had already taken post, and the heavy German cavalry, an imposing -mass, stood in line on the right, and farther in the rear than the -artillery. - -Hitherto the action had been sustained by the cavalry of the army of -Portugal, but now Caffarelli’s horsemen consisting of the lancers of -Berg, the fifteenth dragoons and some squadrons of “_gens-d’armes_,” -all fresh men, came down in line to the rivulet, and finding it -impassable, with a quick and daring decision wheeled to their right, -and despite of the heavy pounding of the artillery, trotted over the -bridge, and again formed line, in opposition to the German dragoons, -having the stream in their rear. The position was dangerous but -they were full of mettle, and though the Germans, who had let too -many come over, charged with a rough shock and broke the right, the -French left had the advantage and the others rallied; then a close -and furious sword contest had place, but the “_gens-d’armes_” fought -so fiercely, that the Germans, maugre their size and courage, lost -ground and finally gave way in disorder. The French followed on the -spur with shrill and eager cries, and Anson’s brigade which was thus -outflanked and threatened on both sides, fell back also, but not -happily, for Boyer’s dragoons having continued their march by the -hills to the village of Balbaces there crossed the ravine and came -thundering in on the left. Then the British ranks were broken, the -regiments got intermixed, and all went to the rear in confusion; -finally however the Germans, having extricated themselves from their -pursuers turned and formed a fresh line on the left of the road, and -the others rallied upon them. - -The “_gens-d’armes_” and lancers, who had suffered severely from the -artillery, as well as in the sword-fight, now halted, but Boyer’s -dragoons forming ten squadrons, again came to the charge, and with -the more confidence that the allies’ ranks appeared still confused -and wavering. When within a hundred yards, the German officers -rode gallantly out to fight, and their men followed a short way, -but the enemy was too powerful, disorder and tumult again ensued, -the swiftness of the English horses alone prevented a terrible -catastrophe, and though some favourable ground enabled the line to -reform once more, it was only to be again broken. However Wellington, -who was present, had placed Halket’s infantry and the guns in a -position to cover the cavalry, and they remained tranquil until the -enemy, in full pursuit after the last charge, came galloping down and -lent their left flank to the infantry; then the power of this arm was -made manifest; a tempest of bullets emptied the French saddles by -scores, and their hitherto victorious horsemen after three fruitless -attempts to charge, each weaker than the other, reined up and drew -off to the hills, the British cavalry covered by the infantry made -good their retreat to Quintana la Puente near the Pisuerga, and the -bivouacs of the enemy were established at Villadrigo. The loss in -this combat was very considerable on both sides, the French suffered -most, but they took a colonel and seventy other prisoners, and they -had before the fight, also captured a small commissariat store near -Burgos. - -While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness and -insubordination, the usual concomitants of an English retreat, were -exhibited at Torquemada, where the well-stored wine-vaults became -the prey of the soldiery: it is said, that twelve thousand men -were to be seen at one time in a state of helpless inebriety. This -commencement was bad, and the English general, who had now retreated -some fifty miles, seeing the enemy so hot and menacing in pursuit, -judged it fitting to check his course; for though the arrangements -were surprisingly well combined, the means of transport were so -scanty and the weather so bad, that the convoys of sick and wounded -were still on the wrong side of the Duero. Wherefore, having with a -short march crossed the Carion river on the 24th at its confluence -with the Pisuerga, he turned and halted behind it. - -Here he was joined by a regiment of the guards, and by detachments -coming from Coruña, and his position extending from Villa Muriel -to Dueñas below the meeting of the waters, was strong. The troops -occupied a range of hills, lofty, yet descending with an easy sweep -to the Carion; that river covered the front, and the Pisuerga did the -same by the right wing. A detachment had been left to destroy the -bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga; colonel Campbell with a battalion -of the royals was sent to aid the Spaniards in destroying the -bridges at Palencia; and in Wellington’s immediate front some houses -and convents beyond the rivers, furnished good posts to cover the -destruction of the bridges of Muriel and San Isidro on the Carion, -and that of Dueñas on the Pisuerga. - -Souham excited by his success on the 23d followed from Villadrigo -early on the 24th, and having cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada -passed the Pisuerga. He immediately directed Foy’s division upon -Palencia, and ordered Maucune with the advanced guard to pursue the -allies to the bridges of Baños, Isidro, and Muriel; but he halted -himself at Magoz, and, if fame does not lie, because the number of -French drunkards at Torquemada were even more numerous than those of -the British army. - - -COMBAT ON THE CARION. - -Before the enemy appeared, the summits of the hills were crowned by -the allies, all the bridges were mined and that of San Isidro was -strongly protected by a convent which was filled with troops. The -left of the position was equally strong, yet general Oswald, who had -just arrived from England and taken the command of the fifth division -on the instant, overlooked the advantages to be derived from the dry -bed of a canal with high banks, which, on his side, run parallel -with the Carion, and he had not occupied the village of Muriel in -sufficient strength. In this state of affairs Foy reached Palencia, -where, according to some French writers, a treacherous attempt was -made under cover of a parley, to kill him; he however drove the -allies with some loss from the town and in such haste that all the -bridges were abandoned in a perfect condition, and the French cavalry -crossing the river and spreading abroad gathered up both baggage and -prisoners. - -This untoward event obliged Wellington to throw back his left, -composed of the fifth division and the Spaniards, at Muriel, thus -offering two fronts, the one facing Palencia, the other the Carion. -Oswald’s error then became manifest; for Maucune having dispersed -the eighth caçadores who were defending a ford between Muriel and -San Isidro, fell with a strong body of infantry and guns upon the -allies at Muriel, and this at the moment when the mine having been -exploded, the party covering the bridge were passing the broken -arch by means of ladders. The play of the mine which was effectual, -checked the advance of the French for an instant, but suddenly -a horseman darting out at full speed from the column, rode down -under a flight of bullets, to the bridge, calling out that he was a -deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm made by the explosion, -and then violently checking his foaming horse, held up his hands, -exclaiming that he was a lost man, and with hurried accents asked if -there was no ford near. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one a -little way off and the gallant fellow having looked earnestly for a -few moments as if to fix the exact point, wheeled his horse round, -kissed his hand in derision, and bending over his saddle-bow dashed -back to his own comrades, amidst showers of shot, and shouts of -laughter from both sides. The next moment Maucune’s column covered -by a concentrated fire of guns passed the river at the ford thus -discovered, made some prisoners in the village, and lined the dry bed -of the canal. - -Lord Wellington who came up at this instant immediately turned some -guns upon the enemy and desired that the village and canal might be -retaken; Oswald thought that they could not be held, yet Wellington, -whose retreat was endangered by the presence of the enemy on that -side of the river was peremptory; he ordered one brigade under -general Barnes to attack the main body, while another brigade under -general Pringle, cleared the canal, and he strengthened the left with -the Spanish troops and Brunswickers. A very sharp fire of artillery -and musquetry ensued, and the allies suffered some loss, especially -by cannon-shot which from the other side of the river plumped into -the reserves. The Spaniards, unequal to any regular movement, got -into confusion, and were falling back, when their fiery countryman -Miguel Alava, running to their head, with exhortation and example, -for though wounded he would not retire, urged them forward to the -fight; finally the enemy was driven over the river, the village was -re-occupied in force, and the canal was lined by the allied troops. -During these events at Villa Muriel, other troops attempted without -success to seize the bridge of San Isidro, and the mine was exploded; -but they were more fortunate at the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga, -for the mine there failed, and the French cavalry galloping over, -made both the working and covering party prisoners. - -The strength of the position was now sapped, for Souham could -assemble his army on the allies’ left, by Palencia, and force them to -an action with their back upon the Pisuerga, or he could pass that -river on his own left, and forestall them on the Duero at Tudela. If -Wellington pushed his army over the Pisuerga by the bridge of Duenas, -Souham, having the initial movement, might be first on the ground, -and could attack the heads of the allied columns while Foy’s division -came down on the rear. If Wellington, by a rapid movement along the -right bank of the Pisuerga, endeavoured to cross at Cabezon, which -was the next bridge in his rear, and so gain the Duero, Souham by -moving along the left bank, might fall upon him while in march to -the Duero, and hampered between that river the Pisuerga and the -Esquevilla. An action under such circumstances would have been -formidable, and the English general once cut off from the Duero must -have retired through Valladolid and Simancas to Tordesillas, or Toro, -giving up his communications with Hill. In this critical state of -affairs Wellington made no delay. He kept good watch upon the left -of the Pisuerga, and knowing that the ground there was rugged, and -the roads narrow and bad, while on the right bank they were good and -wide, sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, and withdrawing -the troops before day-break on the 26th, made a clean march of -sixteen miles to Cabezon, where he passed to the left of the Pisuerga -and barricaded and mined the bridge. Then sending a detachment to -hold the bridge of Tudela on the Duero behind him, he caused the -seventh division, under lord Dalhousie, to secure the bridges of -Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. His retreat behind the Duero, -which river was now in full water, being thus assured, he again -halted, partly because the ground was favourable, partly to give the -commissary-general Kennedy time for some indispensible arrangements. - -This functionary, who had gone to England sick in the latter end of -1811, and had returned to the army only the day before the siege of -Burgos was raised, in passing from Lisbon by Badajoz to Madrid, and -thence to Burgos, discovered that the inexperience of the gentleman -who conducted the department during his absence had been productive -of some serious errors. The magazines established between Lisbon and -Badajos, and from thence by Almaraz to the valley of the Tagus, for -the supply of the army in Madrid, had not been removed again when -the retreat commenced, and Soult would have found them full, if -his march had been made rapidly on that side; on the other hand the -magazines on the line of operations, between Lisbon and Salamanca, -were nearly empty. Kennedy had therefore the double task on hand to -remove the magazines from the south side of the Tagus, and to bring -up stores upon the line of the present retreat; and his dispositions -were not yet completed when Wellington desired him to take measures -for the removal of the sick and wounded, and every other incumbrance, -from Salamanca, promising to hold his actual position on the Pisuerga -until the operation was effected. Now there was sufficient means of -transport for the occasion, but the negligence of many medical and -escorting officers, conducting the convoys of sick to the rear, and -the consequent bad conduct of the soldiers, for where the officers -are careless the soldiers will be licentious, produced the worst -effects. Such outrages were perpetrated on the inhabitants along the -whole line of march that terror was every where predominant, and the -ill-used drivers and muleteers deserted, some with, some without -their cattle, by hundreds. Hence Kennedy’s operation in some measure -failed, the greatest distress was incurred, and the commissariat -lost nearly the whole of the animals and carriages employed; the -villages were abandoned, and the under-commissaries were bewildered, -or paralyzed, by the terrible disorder thus spread along the line of -communication. - -Souham having repaired the bridges on the Carion, resumed the pursuit -on the 26th, by the right of the Pisuerga, being deterred probably -from moving to the left bank, by the rugged nature of the ground, and -by the king’s orders not to risk a serious action. In the morning -of the 27th his whole army was collected in front of Cabezon, but he -contented himself with a cannonade and a display of his force; the -former cost the allies colonel Robe of the artillery, a practised -officer and a worthy man; the latter enabled the English general, -for the first time, to discover the numbers he had to contend with, -and they convinced him that he could hold neither the Pisuerga -nor the Duero permanently. However his object being to gain time, -he held his position, and when the French, leaving a division in -front of Cabezon, extended their right, by Cigales and Valladolid, -to Simancas, he caused the bridges at the two latter places to be -destroyed in succession. - -Congratulating himself that he had not fought in front of Burgos with -so powerful an army, Wellington now resolved to retire behind the -Duero and finally, if pressed, behind the Tormes. But as the troops -on the Tagus would then be exposed to a flank attack, similar to -that which the siege of Burgos had been raised to avoid on his own -part; and as this would be more certain if any ill fortune befell -the troops on the Duero, he ordered Hill to relinquish the defence -of the Tagus at once and retreat, giving him a discretion as to the -line, but desiring him, if possible, to come by the Guadarama passes; -for he designed, if all went well, to unite on the Adaja river in a -central position, intending to keep Souham in check with a part of -his army, and with the remainder to fall upon Soult. - -[Sidenote: See plan 5.] - -On the 28th Souham, still extending his right, with a view to -dislodge the allies by turning their left, endeavoured to force -the bridges at Valladolid and Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that -of Tordesillas on the Duero. The first was easily defended by the -main body of the seventh division, but Halket, an able officer, -finding the French strong and eager at the second, destroyed it, and -detached the regiment of Brunswick Oels to ruin that of Tordesillas. -It was done in time, and a tower behind the ruins was occupied by -a detachment, while the remainder of the Brunswickers took post -in a pine-wood at some distance. The French arrived and seemed -for some time at a loss, but very soon sixty French officers and -non-commissioned officers, headed by captain Guingret, a daring man, -formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, and then plunged -into the water, holding their swords with their teeth, and swimming -and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a cannonade, -they thus crossed this great river, though it was in full and strong -water, and the weather very cold, and having reached the other side, -naked as they were, stormed the tower. The Brunswick regiment then -abandoned its position, and these gallant soldiers remained masters -of the bridge. - -Wellington having heard of the attack at Simancas, and having seen -the whole French army in march to its right along the hill beyond -the Pisuerga on the evening of the 28th, destroyed the bridges at -Valladolid and Cabeçon, and crossed the Duero at Tudela and Puente de -Duero on the 29th, but scarcely had he effected this operation when -intelligence of Guingret’s splendid action at Tordesillas reached -him. With the instant decision of a great captain he marched by his -left, and having reached the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas -on the 30th, fronted the enemy and forbad further progress on that -point; the bridge was indeed already repaired by the French, but -Souham’s main body had not yet arrived, and Wellington’s menacing -position was too significant to be misunderstood. The bridges of Toro -and Zamora were now destroyed by detachments, and though the French, -spreading along the river bank, commenced repairing the former, the -junction with Hill’s army was insured; and the English general, -judging that the bridge of Toro could not be restored for several -days, even hoped to maintain the line of the Duero permanently, -because he expected that Hill, of whose operations it is now time to -speak, would be on the Adaja by the 3d of November. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS—RETREAT FROM MADRID. - - -[Sidenote: 1812. October.] - -[Sidenote: See Plan 6.] - -King Joseph’s first intention was to unite a great part of Suchet’s -forces as well as Soult’s with his own, and Soult, probably -influenced by a false report that Ballesteros had actually reached La -Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted, observing that Valencia -must be defended against the increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian -and Spanish armies at Alicant, and the more so that, until the French -army could cross the Tagus and open a new line of communication with -Zaragoza, Valencia would be the only base for the king’s operations. -Joseph then resolved to incorporate a portion of the army of the -south with the army of the centre, giving the command to Drouet, who -was to move by the road of Cuenca and Tarancon towards the Tagus; but -this arrangement, which seems to have been dictated by a desire to -advance Drouet’s authority, was displeasing to Soult. He urged that -his army, so powerfully constituted, physically and morally, as to -be the best in the Peninsula, owed its excellence to its peculiar -organization and it would be dangerous to break that up. Nor was -there any good reason for this change; for if Joseph only wished to -have a strong body of troops on the Cuenca road, the army of the -centre could be reinforced with one or two divisions, and the whole -could unite again on the Tagus without injury to the army of the -south. It would however be better, he said, to incorporate the army -of the centre with the army of the south and march altogether by the -road of San Clemente, leaving only a few troops on the Cuenca road, -who might be reinforced by Suchet. But if the king’s plan arose from -a desire to march in person with a large body he could do so with -greater dignity by joining the army of the south, which was to act on -the main line of operations. Joseph’s reply was a peremptory order to -obey or retire to France, and Drouet marched to Cuenca. - -[Sidenote: Imperial muster-rolls, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Official papers from the Bureau de la Guerre, MSS.] - -Soult’s army furnished thirty-five thousand infantry, six thousand -excellent cavalry under arms with seventy-two guns, making with the -artillery-men a total of forty-six thousand veteran combatants. -The army of the centre including the king’s guards furnished about -twelve thousand, of which two thousand were good cavalry with twelve -guns. Thus fifty-eight thousand fighting men, eight thousand being -cavalry, with eighty-four pieces of artillery, were put in motion -to drive Hill from the Tagus. Joseph’s project was to pass that -river, and operate against Wellington’s rear, if he should continue -the siege of Burgos; but if he concentrated on the Tagus, Souham -was in like manner to operate on his rear by Aranda de Duero, and -the Somosierra, sending detachments towards Guadalaxara to be met -by other detachments, coming from the king through Sacedon. Finally -if Wellington, as indeed happened, should abandon both Burgos and -Madrid, the united French forces were to drive him into Portugal. -The conveying of Soult’s convoys of sick men to Valencia and other -difficulties, retarded the commencement of operations to the -king’s great discontent, and meanwhile he became very uneasy for -his supplies, because the people of La Mancha, still remembering -Montbrun’s devastations, were flying with their beasts and grain, and -from frequent repetition, were become exceedingly expert in evading -the researches of the foragers. Such however is the advantage of -discipline and order, that while La Mancha was thus desolated from -fear, confidence and tranquillity reigned in Valencia. - -However on the 18th of October Joseph marched from Requeña upon -Cuenca, where he found Drouet with a division of Soult’s infantry -and some cavalry. He then proceeded to Tarancon, which was the only -artillery road, on that side, leading to the Tagus, and during this -time Soult marched by San Clemente upon Ocaña and Aranjuez. General -Hill immediately sent that notice to Lord Wellington which caused -the retreat, from Burgos, but he was in no fear of the enemy, for -he had withdrawn all his outposts and united his whole force behind -the Tagus. His right was at Toledo, his left at Fuente Dueñas, and -there were Spanish and Portuguese troops in the valley of the Tagus -extending as far as Talavera. The Tagus was however fordable, from -its junction with the Jarama near Aranjuez, upwards; and moreover, -this part of the line, weak from its extent, could not easily be -supported, and the troops guarding it, would have been too distant -from the point of action if the French should operate against Toledo. -Hill therefore drew his left behind the Tajuna which is a branch -of the Jarama, and running nearly parallel to the Tagus. His right -occupied very strong ground from Añover to Toledo, he destroyed the -bridges at Aranjuez, and securing that below the confluence of the -Jarama and Henares, called the Puente Larga, threw one of boats over -the former river a little above Bayona. The light division and Elio’s -troops forming the extreme left were directed to march upon Arganda, -and the head-quarters were fixed at Cienpozuelos. - -The bulk of the troops were thus held in hand, ready to move to any -menaced point, and as Skerrit’s brigade had just arrived from Cadiz, -there was, including the Spanish regulars, forty thousand men in -line, and a multitude of partidas were hovering about. The lateral -communications were easy and the scouts passing over the bridge of -Toledo covered all the country beyond the Tagus. In this state of -affairs the bridges at each end of the line furnished the means of -sallying upon the flanks of any force attacking the front; the French -must have made several marches to force the right, and on the left -the Jarama with its marshy banks, and its many confluents, offered -several positions, to interpose between the enemy and Madrid. - -[Sidenote: Soult’s official correspondence with the king, MSS.] - -Drouet passed the Tagus the 29th at the abandoned fords of Fuente -Dueñas and Villa Maurique, and the king, with his guards, repaired to -Zarza de la Cruz. Meanwhile Soult whose divisions were coming fast -up to Ocaña, restored the bridge of Aranjuez, and passed the Tagus -also with his advanced guard. On the 30th he attacked general Cole -who commanded at the Puente Larga with several regiments and some -guns, but though the mines failed and the French attempted to carry -the bridge with the bayonet they were vigorously repulsed by the -forty-seventh under Colonel Skerrit. After a heavy cannonade and a -sharp musketry which cost the allies sixty men, Soult relinquished -the attempt and awaited the arrival of his main body. Had the Puente -Larga been forced, the fourth division which was at Añover would have -been cut off from Madrid, but the weather being thick and rainy, -Soult could not discover what supporting force was on the high land -of Valdemoro behind the bridge and was afraid to push forward too -fast. - -The king discontented with this cautious mode of proceeding now -designed to operate by Toledo, but during the night the Puente -Larga was abandoned, and Soult, being still in doubt of Hill’s real -object, advised Joseph to unite the army of the centre at Arganda and -Chinchon, throwing bridges for retreat at Villa Maurique and Fuente -Dueñas as a precaution in case a battle should take place. Hill’s -movement was however a decided retreat, which would have commenced -twenty-four hours sooner but for the failure of the mines and the -combat at the Puente Larga. Wellington’s orders had reached him at -the moment when Soult first appeared on the Tagus, and the affair was -so sudden, that the light division, which had just come from Alcala -to Arganda to close the left of the position, was obliged, without -halting, to return again in the night, the total journey being nearly -forty miles. - -Wellington, foreseeing that it might be difficult for Hill to obey -his instructions, had given him a discretionary power to retire -either by the valley of the Tagus, or by the Guadarama; and a -position taken up in the former, on the flank of the enemy, would -have prevented the king from passing the Guadarama, and at the -same time have covered Lisbon; whereas a retreat by the Guadarama -exposed Lisbon. Hill, thinking the valley of the Tagus, in that -advanced season, would not support the French army, and knowing -Wellington to be pressed by superior forces in the north, chose the -Guadarama. Wherefore, burning his pontoons, and causing La China -and the stores remaining there to be destroyed in the night of the -30th, he retreated by different roads, and united his army on the -31st of October near Majadahonda. Meanwhile the magazines along the -line of communication to Badajos were, as I have already noticed, in -danger if the enemy had detached troops to seize them, neither were -the removal and destruction of the stores in Madrid effected without -disorders of a singular nature. - -The municipality had demanded all the provision remaining there as -if they wanted them for the enemy, and when this was refused, they -excited a mob to attack the magazines; some firing even took place, -and the assistance of the fourth division was required to restore -order; a portion of wheat was finally given to the poorest of the -people, and Madrid was abandoned. It was affecting to see the earnest -and true friendship of the population. Men and women, and children, -crowded around the troops bewailing their departure. They moved with -them in one vast mass, for more than two miles, and left their houses -empty at the very instant when the French cavalry scouts were at the -gates on the other side. This emotion was distinct from political -feeling, because there was a very strong French party in Madrid; and -amongst the causes of wailing the return of the plundering and cruel -partidas, unchecked by the presence of the British, was very loudly -proclaimed. The “Madrileños” have been stigmatized as a savage -and faithless people, the British army found them patient, gentle, -generous, and loyal; nor is this fact to be disputed, because of the -riot which occurred in the destruction of the magazines, for the -provisions had been obtained by requisition from the country around -Madrid, under an agreement with the Spanish government to pay at the -end of the war; and it was natural for the people, excited as they -were by the authorities, to endeavour to get their own flour back, -rather than have it destroyed when they were starving. - -With the Anglo-Portuguese troops marched Penne Villemur, Morillo, and -Carlos D’España, and it was Wellington’s wish that Elio, Bassecour, -and Villa Campa should now throw themselves into the valley of the -Tagus, and crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, join Ballesteros’s army, -now under Virues. A great body of men, including the Portuguese -regiments left by Hill in Estremadura, would thus have been placed on -the flank of any French army marching upon Lisbon, and if the enemy -neglected this line, the Spaniards could operate against Madrid or -against Suchet at pleasure. Elio, however, being cut off from Hill by -the French advance, remained at the bridge of Auñion, near Sacedon, -and was there joined by Villa Campa and the Empecinado. - -Soult now brought up his army as quickly as possible to Valdemoro, -and his information, as to Hill’s real force, was becoming more -distinct; but there was also a rumour that Wellington was close at -hand with three British divisions, and the French general’s movements -were consequently cautious, lest he should find himself suddenly -engaged in battle before his whole force was collected, for his rear -was still at Ocaña, and the army of the centre had not yet passed -the Tajuña. This disposition of his troops was probably intentional -to prevent the king from fighting, for Soult did not think this a -fitting time for a great battle unless upon great advantage. In the -disjointed state of their affairs, a defeat would have been more -injurious to the French than a victory would have been beneficial; -the former would have lost Spain, the latter would not have gained -Portugal. - -[Sidenote: November.] - -On the 1st of November, the bulk of Soult’s army being assembled at -Getafé, he sent scouting parties in all directions to feel for the -allies, and to ascertain the direction of their march; the next day -the army of the centre and that of the south were reunited not far -from Madrid, but Hill was then in full retreat for the Guadarama -covered by a powerful rear-guard under general Cole. - -The 3d Soult pursued the allies, and the king entering Madrid, placed -a garrison in the Retiro for the protection of his court and of the -Spanish families attached to his cause; this was a sensible relief, -for hitherto in one great convoy they had impeded the movements of -the army of the centre. On the 4th Joseph rejoined Soult at the -Guadarama with his guards, which always moved as a separate body; but -he had left Palombini beyond the Tagus near Tarancon to scour the -roads on the side of Cuenca, and some dragoons being sent towards -Huete were surprised by the partidas, and lost forty men, whereupon -Palombini rejoined the army. - -[Sidenote: See Plans 3 and 5.] - -General Hill was moving upon Arevalo, slowly followed by the French, -when fresh orders from Wellington, founded on new combinations, -changed the direction of his march. Souham had repaired the bridge -of Toro on the 4th, several days sooner than the English general -had expected, and thus when he was keenly watching for the arrival -of Hill on the Adaja, that he might suddenly join him and attack -Soult, his designs were again baffled; for he dared not make such a -movement lest Souham, possessing both Toro and Tordesillas, should -fall upon his rear; neither could he bring up Hill to the Duero -and attack Souham, because he had no means to pass that river, and -meanwhile Soult moving by Fontiveros would reach the Tormes. Seeing -then that his combinations had failed, and his central position no -longer available, either for offence or defence, he directed Hill to -gain Alba de Tormes at once by the road of Fontiveros, and on the 6th -he fell back himself, from his position in front of Tordesillas, by -Naval del Rey and Pituega to the heights of San Christoval. - -Joseph, thinking to prevent Hill’s junction with Wellington, had -gained Arevalo by the Segovia road on the 5th and 6th; the 8th -Souham’s scouts were met with at Medina del Campo, and for the first -time, since he had quitted Valencia, the king obtained news of the -army of Portugal. One hundred thousand combatants, of which above -twelve thousand were cavalry, with a hundred and thirty pieces of -artillery, were thus assembled on those plains over which, three -months before, Marmont had marched with so much confidence to his own -destruction. Soult then expelled from Andalusia by Marmont’s defeat, -was now, after having made half the circuit of the Peninsula, come -to drive into Portugal, that very army whose victory had driven him -from the south; and thus, as Wellington had foreseen and foretold, -the acquisition of Andalusia, politically important and useful to -the cause, proved injurious to himself at the moment, insomuch as the -French had concentrated a mighty power, from which it required both -skill and fortune to escape. Meanwhile the Spanish armies let loose -by this union of all the French troops, kept aloof, or coming to aid, -were found a burthen, rather than a help. - -[Sidenote: Joseph’s correspondence, MSS.] - -On the 7th Hill’s main body passed the Tormes, at Alba, and the -bridge there was mined; the light division and Long’s cavalry -remained on the right bank during the night but the next day the -former also crossed the river. Wellington himself was in the position -of San Christoval, and it is curious, that the king, even at this -late period, was doubtful if Ballesteros’s troops had or had not -joined the allied army at Avila. Wellington also was still uncertain -of the real numbers of the enemy, but he was desirous to maintain the -line of the Tormes permanently, and to give his troops repose. He had -made a retreat of two hundred miles; Hill had made one of the same -distance besides his march from Estremadura; Skerrit’s people had -come from Cadiz, and the whole army required rest, for the soldiers, -especially those who besieged Burgos, had been in the field, with -scarcely an interval of repose, since January; they were bare-footed, -and their equipments were spoiled, the cavalry were becoming weak, -their horses were out of condition, and the discipline of all was -failing. - -The excesses committed on the retreat from Burgos have already been -touched upon, and during the first day’s march from the Tagus to -Madrid, some of general Hill’s men had not behaved better. Five -hundred of the rear-guard under Cole, chiefly of one regiment, -finding the inhabitants had fled according to their custom whichever -side was approaching, broke open the houses, plundered and got drunk. -A multitude were left in the cellars of Valdemoro, and two hundred -and fifty fell into the hands of the enemy. The rest of the retreat -being unmolested, was made with more regularity, but the excesses -still committed by some of the soldiers were glaring and furnished -proof that the moral conduct of a general cannot be fairly judged -by following in the wake of a retreating army. On this occasion -there was no want of provisions, no hardships to exasperate the men, -and yet I the author of this history, counted on the first day’s -march from Madrid, seventeen bodies of murdered peasants; by whom -killed, or for what, whether by English, or Germans, by Spaniards, or -Portuguese, whether in dispute, in robbery, or in wanton villainy, -I know not, but their bodies were in the ditches, and a shallow -observer might thence have drawn the most foul and false conclusions -against the English general and nation. - -Another notable thing was the discontent of the veteran troops with -the arrangements of the staff officers. For the assembling of the -sick men, at the place and time prescribed to form the convoys, was -punctually attended to by the regimental officers; not so by the -others, nor by the commissaries who had charge to provide the means -of transport; hence delay and great suffering to the sick and the -wearing out of the healthy men’s strength by waiting with their packs -on for the negligent. And when the light division was left on the -right bank of the Tormes to cover the passage at Alba, a prudent -order that all baggage or other impediments, should pass rapidly -over the narrow bridge at that place without halting at all on the -enemy’s side, was, by those charged with the execution, so rigorously -interpreted, as to deprive the light division of their ration -bullocks and flour mules, at the very moment of distribution; and -the tired soldiers, thus absurdly denied their food, had the farther -mortification to see a string of commissariat carts deliberately -passing their post many hours afterwards. All regimental officers -know that the anger and discontent thus created is one of the surest -means of ruining the discipline of an army, and it is in these -particulars that the value of a good and experienced staff is found. - -Lord Wellington’s position extended from Christoval to Aldea Lengua -on the right bank of the Tormes, and on the left of that river, to -the bridge of Alba, where the castle which was on the right bank was -garrisoned by Howard’s brigade of the second division. Hamilton’s -Portuguese were on the left bank as a reserve for Howard; the -remainder of the second division watched the fords of Huerta and -Enciña, and behind them in second line the third and fourth divisions -occupied the heights of Calvariza de Ariba. The light division and -the Spanish infantry entered Salamanca, the cavalry were disposed -beyond the Tormes, covering all the front, and thus posted, the -English general desired to bring affairs to the decision of a battle. -For the heights of Christoval were strong and compact, the position -of the Arapiles on the other side of the Tormes was glorious as well -as strong, and the bridge of Salamanca, and the fords furnished the -power of concentrating on either side of that river by a shorter line -than the enemy could move upon. - -But while Wellington prepared for a battle, he also looked to a -retreat. His sick were sent to the rear, small convoys of provisions -were ordered up from Ciudad Rodrigo to certain halting places between -that place and Salamanca; the overplus of ammunition in the latter -town was destroyed daily by small explosions, and large stores of -clothing, of arms and accoutrements, were delivered to the Spanish -troops, who were thus completely furnished; one hour after the -English general had the mortification to see them selling their -equipments even under his own windows. Indeed Salamanca presented -an extraordinary scene, and the Spaniards, civil and military, -began to evince hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt or -perpetrate murder, and one act of peculiar atrocity merits notice. A -horse, led by an English soldier, being frightened, backed against -a Spanish officer commanding at a gate, he caused the soldier to -be dragged into his guard-house and there bayonetted him in cold -blood, and no redress could be had for this or other crimes, save -by counter-violence, which was not long withheld. A Spanish officer -while wantonly stabbing at a rifleman was shot dead by the latter; -and a British volunteer slew a Spanish officer at the head of his own -regiment in a sword-fight, the troops of both nations looking on, but -here there was nothing dishonourable on either side. - -The civil authorities, not less savage, were more insolent than -the military, treating every English person with an intolerable -arrogance. Even the prince of Orange was like to have lost his -life; for upon remonstrating about quarters with the sitting junta, -they ordered one of their guards to kill him; and he would have -been killed had not Mr. Steele of the forty-third, a bold athletic -person, felled the man before he could stab; yet both the prince and -his defender were obliged to fly instantly to avoid the soldier’s -comrades. The exasperation caused by these things was leading to -serious mischief when the enemy’s movements gave another direction to -the soldiers’ passions. - -On the 9th Long’s cavalry had been driven in upon Alba, and on the -10th Soult opened a concentrated fire of eighteen guns against that -place. The castle, which crowned a bare and rocky knoll, had been -hastily entrenched, and furnished scarcely any shelter from this -tempest; for two hours the garrison could only reply with musketry, -but finally it was aided by the fire of four pieces from the left -bank of the river, and the post was defended until dark, with such -vigour that the enemy dared not venture on an assault. During the -night general Hamilton reinforced the garrison, repaired the damaged -walls, and formed barricades, but the next morning after a short -cannonade, and some musketry firing the enemy withdrew. This combat -cost the allies above a hundred men. - -On the 11th the king coming up from Medina del Campo reorganized his -army. That is, he united the army of the centre with the army of the -south, placing the whole under Soult, and he removed Souham from the -command of the army of Portugal to make way for Drouet. Caffarelli -had before this returned to Burgos, with his divisions and guns, and -as Souham, besides his losses and stragglers, had placed garrisons in -Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Valladolid; and as the king also, had -left a garrison in the Retiro, scarcely ninety thousand combatants -of all arms were assembled on the Tormes; but twelve thousand were -cavalry, nearly all were veteran troops, and they had at least one -hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power could -not remain idle, for the country was exhausted of provisions, the -soldiers were already wanting bread, and the king, eager enough -for battle, for he was of a brave spirit and had something of his -brother’s greatness of soul, sought counsel how to deliver it with -most advantage. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -Jourdan with a martial fire unquenched by age, was for bringing -affairs to a crisis by the boldest and shortest mode. He had observed -that Wellington’s position was composed of three parts, namely, the -right at Alba; the centre at Calvariza Ariba; the left, separated -from the centre by the Tormes, at San Christoval; the whole distance -being about fifteen miles. Now the Tormes was still fordable in many -places above Salamanca, and hence he proposed to assemble the French -army in the night, pass the river at day-break, by the fords between -Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and so make a concentrated attack upon -Calvariza de Ariba, which would force Wellington to a decisive battle. - -[Sidenote: French Official correspondence, MSS.] - -Soult opposed this project, he objected to attacking Wellington in a -position which he was so well acquainted with, which he might have -fortified, and where the army must fight its way, even from the -fords, to gain room for an order of battle. He proposed instead, to -move by the left to certain fords, three in number, between Exéme and -Galisancho, some seven or eight miles above Alba de Tormes. They were -easy in themselves, he said, and well suited from the conformation of -the banks, for forcing a passage if it should be disputed; and by -making a slight circuit the troops in march could not be seen by the -enemy. Passing there, the French army would gain two marches upon the -allies, would be placed upon their flank and rear, and could fight -on ground chosen by its own generals, instead of delivering battle -on ground chosen by the enemy; or it could force on an action in a -new position whence the allies could with difficulty retire in the -event of disaster. Wellington must then fight to disadvantage, or -retire hastily, sacrificing part of his army to save the rest; and -the effect, whether militarily or politically, would be the same as -if he was beaten by a front attack. Jourdan replied, that this was -prudent, and might be successful if Wellington accepted battle, but -that general could not thereby be forced to fight, which was the -great object; he would have time to retreat before the French could -reach the line of his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, and it was -even supposed by some generals that he would retreat to Almeida at -once by San Felices and Barba de Puerco. - -[Sidenote: Letter to the king, MS.] - -Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of the Arapiles in -detail, and the former, though he urged his own plan, offered -to yield if the king was so inclined. Jourdan’s proposition was -supported by all the generals of the army of Portugal, except -Clausel who leaned to Soult’s opinion; but as that marshal commanded -two-thirds of the army, while Jourdan had no ostensible command, the -question was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor is it easy -to determine which was right, for though Jourdan’s reasons were very -strong, and the result did not bear out Soult’s views, we shall find -the failure was only in the execution. Nevertheless it would seem -so great an army and so confident, for the French soldiers eagerly -demanded a battle, should have grappled in the shortest way; a just -and rapid development of Jourdan’s plan would probably have cut off -Hamilton’s Portuguese and the brigade in the castle of Alba, from -Calvariza Ariba. - -[Sidenote: Letter to lord Liverpool, MS.] - -On the other hand, Wellington, who was so well acquainted with his -ground, desired a battle on either side of the Tormes; his hope was -indeed to prevent the passage of that river until the rains rendered -it unfordable, and thus force the French to retire from want of -provisions, or engage him on the position of Christoval; yet he also -courted a fight on the Arapiles, those rocky monuments of his former -victory. He had sixty-eight thousand combatants under arms, fifty-two -thousand of which, including four thousand British cavalry, were -Anglo-Portuguese, and he had nearly seventy guns. This force he had -so disposed, that besides Hamilton’s Portuguese, three divisions -guarded the fords, which were moreover defended by entrenchments, -and the whole army might have been united in good time upon the -strong ridges of Calvariza Ariba, and on the two Arapiles, where the -superiority of fifteen thousand men would scarcely have availed the -French. A defeat would only have sent the allies to Portugal, whereas -a victory would have taken them once more to Madrid. To draw in -Hamilton’s Portuguese, and the troops from Alba, in time, would have -been the vital point; but as the French, if they did not surprise the -allies, must have fought their way up from the river, this danger -might have proved less than could have been supposed at first view. -In fine the general was Wellington and he knew his ground. - - -FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TORMES. RETREAT TO CIUDAD RODRIGO. - -Soult’s plan being adopted, the troops in the distant quarters were -brought up; the army of Portugal was directed to make frequent -demonstrations against Christoval, Aldea Lengua, and the fords -between Huerta and Alba; the road over the hills to the Galisancho -fords was repaired, and two trestle-bridges were constructed for the -passage of the artillery. The design was to push over the united -armies of the centre and the south, by these fords; and if this -operation should oblige the allies to withdraw from Alba de Tormes, -the army of Portugal was to pass by the bridge at that place and by -the fords, and assail Wellington’s rear; but if the allies maintained -Alba, Drouet was to follow Soult at Galisancho. - -At day-break on the 14th the bridges were thrown, the cavalry and -infantry passed by the fords, the allies’ outposts were driven back, -and Soult took a position at Mozarbes, having the road from Alba to -Tamames, under his left flank. Meanwhile Wellington remained too -confidently in Salamanca, and when the first report informed him -that the enemy were over the Tormes, made the caustic observation, -that he would not recommend it to some of them. Soon, however, the -concurrent testimony of many reports convinced him of his mistake, -he galloped to the Arapiles, and having ascertained the direction of -Soult’s march drew off the second division, the cavalry, and some -guns to attack the head of the French column. The fourth division and -Hamilton’s Portuguese remained at Alba, to protect this movement; the -third division secured the Arapiles rocks until the troops from San -Christoval should arrive; and Wellington was still so confident to -drive the French back over the Tormes, that the bulk of the troops -did not quit San Christoval that day. Nevertheless when he reached -Mozarbes, he found the French, already assembled there, too strong to -be seriously meddled with. However under cover of a cannonade, which -kept off their cavalry, he examined their position, which extended -from Mozarbes to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Utiero, and it was -so good that the evil was without remedy; wherefore drawing off the -troops from Alba, and destroying the bridge, he left three hundred -Spaniards in the castle, with orders, if the army retired the next -day, to abandon the place and save themselves as they best could. - -During the night and the following morning the allied army was -united in the position of the Arapiles, and Wellington still hoped -the French would give battle there; yet he placed the first division -at Aldea Tejada, on the Junguen stream, to secure that passage in -case Soult should finally oblige him to choose between Salamanca and -Ciudad Rodrigo. Meantime the army of Portugal finding the bridge -of Alba broken, and the castle occupied, crossed the Tormes at -Galisancho, and moved up to the ridge of Señora de Utiera; Soult, -who had commenced fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left at the same -time to the height of Señora de la Buena, near the Ciudad Rodrigo -road, yet slowly because the ground was heavy, deep, and the many -sources of the Junguen and the Valmusa streams were fast filling from -the rain and impeded his march. This evolution was nearly the same -as that practised by the duke of Ragusa at the battle of Salamanca; -but it was made on a wider circle, by a second range of heights -enclosing as it were those by which the duke of Ragusa moved on that -day, and consequently, beyond the reach of such a sudden attack and -catastrophe. The result in each case was remarkable. Marmont closing -with a short quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, received a -buffet that broke his pinions, and spoiled his flight. Soult, a wary -kite, sailing slowly and with a wide wheel to seize a helpless prey, -lost it altogether. - -About two o’clock lord Wellington, feeling himself too weak to -attack, and seeing the French cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo -road, judged the king’s design was to establish a fortified head -of cantonments at Mozarbes, and then operate against the allies’ -communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; wherefore suddenly casting his -army into three columns, he crossed the Junguen, and then covering -his left flank with his cavalry and guns, defiled, in order of -battle, before the enemy at little more than cannon-shot. With a -wonderful boldness and facility, and good fortune also, for there was -a thick fog and a heavy rain which rendered the bye-ways and fields, -by which the enemy moved, nearly impassable, while the allies had the -use of the high roads, he carried his whole army in one mass quite -round the French left: thus he gained the Valmusa river, where he -halted for the night, in the rear of those who had been threatening -him in front, only a few hours before. This exploit was certainly -surprising, but it was not creditable to the generalship on either -side; for first it may be asked why the English commander, having -somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his -position, waited so long on the Arapiles as to render this dangerous -movement necessary, a movement which a combination of bad roads, bad -weather, and want of vigour on the other side, rendered possible and -no more. - -It has been said, that the only drawback to the duke of Dalmatia’s -genius, is his want of promptness to strike at the decisive moment. -It is certainly a great thing to fight a great battle; and against -such a general as Wellington, and such troops as the British, a man -may well be excused, if he thinks twice, ere he puts his life and -fame, and the lives and fame of thousands of his countrymen, the weal -or woe of nations, upon the hazard of an event, which may be decided -by the existence of a ditch five feet wide, or the single blunder -of a single fool, or the confusion of a coward, or by any other -circumstance however trivial. To make such a throw for such a stake -is no light matter. It is no mean consideration, that the praise or -the hatred of nations, universal glory or universal, perhaps eternal -contempt, waits on an action, the object of which may be more safely -gained by other means, for in war there is infinite variety. But in -this case it is impossible not to perceive, that the French general -vacillated after the passage of the river, purposely perhaps to avoid -an action, since, as I have before shown, he thought it unwise, in -the disjointed state of the French affairs and without any fixed -base or reserves in case of defeat, to fight a decisive battle. Nor -do I blame this prudence, for though it be certain that he who would -be great in war must be daring, to set all upon one throw belongs -only to an irresponsible chief, not to a lieutenant whose task is -but a portion of the general plan; neither is it wise, in monarch -or general, to fight when all may be lost by defeat, unless all may -be won by victory. However, the king, more unfettered than Soult, -desired a battle, and with an army so good and numerous, the latter’s -prudence seems misplaced; he should have grappled with his enemy, -and, once engaged at any point, Wellington could not have continued -his retreat, especially with the Spaniards, who were incapable of -dexterous movements. - -On the 16th the allies retired by the three roads which lead across -the Matilla stream, through Tamames, San Munos, and Martin del Rio, -to Ciudad Rodrigo; the light division and the cavalry closed the -rear, and the country was a forest, penetrable in all directions. -The army bivouacked in the evening behind the Matilla stream; but -though this march was not more than twelve miles, the stragglers -were numerous, for the soldiers meeting with vast herds of swine, -quitted their colours by hundreds to shoot them, and such a rolling -musketry echoed through the forest, that Wellington at first thought -the enemy was upon him. It was in vain that the staff officers rode -about to stop this disgraceful practice, which had indeed commenced -the evening before; it was in vain that Wellington himself caused -two offenders to be hanged, the hungry soldiers still broke from the -columns, the property of whole districts was swept away in a few -hours, and the army was in some degree placed at the mercy of the -enemy. The latter however were contented to glean the stragglers, of -whom they captured two thousand, and did not press the rear until -evening near Matilla where their lancers fell on, but were soon -checked by the light companies of the twenty-eighth, and afterwards -charged by the fourteenth dragoons. - -The 17th presented a different yet a not less curious scene. During -the night the cavalry immediately in front of the light division, -had, for some unknown reason, filed off by the flanks to the rear -without giving any intimation to the infantry, who, trusting to the -horsemen, had thrown out their picquets at a very short distance in -front. At day-break, while the soldiers were rolling their blankets -and putting on their accoutrements, some strange horsemen were seen -in the rear of the bivouac and were at first taken for Spaniards, but -very soon their cautious movements and vivacity of gestures, shewed -them to be French; the troops stood to arms, and in good time, for -five hundred yards in front, the wood opened on to a large plain -on which, in place of the British cavalry, eight thousand French -horsemen were discovered advancing in one solid mass, yet carelessly -and without suspecting the vicinity of the British. The division was -immediately formed in columns, a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons -and one of the German hussars came hastily up from the rear, Julian -Sanchez’ cavalry appeared in small parties on the right flank, and -every precaution was taken to secure the retreat. This checked the -enemy, but as the infantry fell back, the French though fearing to -approach their heavy masses in the wood, sent many squadrons to the -right and left, some of which rode on the flanks near enough to bandy -wit, in the Spanish tongue, with the British soldiers, who marched -without firing. Very soon however the signs of mischief became -visible, the road was strewed with baggage, and the bât-men came -running in for protection, some wounded, some without arms, and all -breathless as just escaped from a surprise. The thickness of the -forest had enabled the French horsemen to pass along unperceived on -the flanks of the line of march, and, as opportunity offered, they -galloped from side to side, sweeping away the baggage and sabring the -conductors and guards; they had even menaced one of the columns but -were checked by the fire of the artillery. In one of these charges -general Paget was carried off, as it were from the midst of his own -men, and it might have been Wellington’s fortune, for he also was -continually riding between the columns and without an escort. However -the main body of the army soon passed the Huebra river and took post -behind it, the right at Tamames, the left near Boadilla, the centre -at San Munoz, Buena Barba, and Gallego de Huebra. - -When the light division arrived at the edge of the table-land, which -overhangs the fords at the last-named place, the French cavalry -suddenly thickened, and the sharp whistle of musket-bullets with the -splintering of branches on the left showed that their infantry were -also up. Soult in the hope of forestalling the allies at Tamames, -had pushed his columns towards that place, by a road leading from -Salamanca through Vecinos, but finding Hill’s troops in his front -turned short to his right in hopes to cut off the rear-guard, which -led to the - - -COMBAT OF THE HUEBRA. - -The English and German cavalry, warned by the musketry, crossed the -fords in time, and the light division should have followed without -delay; because the forest ended on the edge of the table-land, and -the descent from thence to the river, about eight hundred yards, -was open and smooth, and the fords of the Huebra were deep. Instead -of taking the troops down quickly, an order, more respectful to the -enemy’s cavalry than to his infantry, was given to form squares. -The officers looked at each other in amazement but at that moment -Wellington fortunately appeared, and under his directions the -battalions instantly glided off to the fords, leaving four companies -of the forty-third and one of the riflemen to cover the passage. -These companies, spreading as skirmishers, were immediately assailed -in front and on both flanks, and with such a fire that it was evident -a large force was before them; moreover a driving rain and mist -prevented them from seeing their adversaries, and being pressed -closer each moment, they gathered by degrees at the edge of the -wood, where they maintained their ground for a quarter of an hour, -then seeing the division was beyond the river, they swiftly cleared -the open slope of the hill, and passed the fords under a very sharp -musketry. Only twenty-seven soldiers fell, for the tempest, beating -in the Frenchmen’s faces, baffled their aim, and Ross’s guns, playing -from the low ground with grape, checked the pursuit, but the deep -bellowing of thirty pieces of heavy French artillery showed how -critically timed was the passage. - -The banks of the Huebra were steep and broken, but the enemy spread -his infantry to the right and left along the edge of the forest, -making demonstrations on every side, and there were several fords -to be guarded; the fifty-second and the Portuguese defended those -below, Ross’s guns supported by the riflemen and the forty-third -defended those above, and behind the right of the light division, -on higher ground was the seventh division. The second division, -Hamilton’s Portuguese, and a brigade of cavalry, were in front of -Tamames, and thus the bulk of the army was massed on the right, -hugging the Pena de Francia, and covering the roads leading to -Ciudad, as well as those leading to the passes of the Gata hills. - -In this situation one brisk attempt made to force the fords guarded -by the fifty-second, was vigorously repulsed by that regiment, but -the skirmishing, and the cannonade, which never slackened, continued -until dark; and heavily the French artillery played upon the light -and seventh divisions. The former, forced to keep near the fords, -and in column, lest a sudden rush of cavalry should carry off the -guns on the flat ground, were plunged into at every round, yet -suffered little loss, because the clayey soil, saturated with rain, -swallowed the shot and smothered the shells; but it was a matter of -astonishment to see the seventh division kept on open and harder -ground by its commander, and in one huge mass tempting the havoc of -this fire for hours, when a hundred yards in its rear the rise of the -hill, and the thick forest, would have entirely covered it without in -any manner weakening the position. - -On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before day-light, and the -English general was anxious about the result, because the position -of the Huebra, though good for defence, was difficult to remove from -at this season; the roads were hollow and narrow, and led up a steep -bank to a table-land, which was open, flat, marshy, and scored with -water gullies; and from the overflowing of one of the streams the -principal road was impassable a mile in rear of the position; hence -to bring the columns off in time, without jostling, and if possible -without being attacked, required a nice management. All the baggage -and stores had marched in the night, with orders not to halt until -they reached the high lands near Ciudad Rodrigo, but if the preceding -days had produced some strange occurrences, the 18th was not less -fertile in them. - -[Sidenote: Vol. I.] - -In a former part of this work it has been observed, that even the -confirmed reputation of lord Wellington could not protect him from -the vanity and presumption of subordinate officers. The allusion -fixes here. Knowing that the most direct road was impassable, he -had directed the divisions by another road, longer, and apparently -more difficult; this seemed such an extraordinary proceeding to -some general officers, that, after consulting together, they deemed -their commander unfit to conduct the army, and led their troops -by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! Meanwhile -Wellington, who had, before day-light, placed himself at an important -point on his own road, waited impatiently for the arrival of the -leading division until dawn, and then suspecting something of what -had happened, galloped to the other road and found the would-be -commanders, stopped by that flood which his arrangements had been -made to avoid. The insubordination, and the danger to the whole -army, were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was so severe -and well timed, the humiliation so complete, and so deeply felt, -that, with one proud sarcastic observation, indicating contempt more -than anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his forces -safely. However some confusion and great danger still attended the -operation, for even on this road one water-gully was so deep that -the light division, which covered the rear, could only pass it man -by man over a felled tree, and it was fortunate that Soult unable to -feed his troops a day longer, stopped on the Huebra with his main -body and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. Thus the allies retired -unmolested, but whether from necessity, or from negligence in the -subordinates, the means of transport were too scanty for the removal -of the wounded men, most of whom were hurt by cannon-shot; many were -left behind, and as the enemy never passed the Huebra at this point, -those miserable creatures perished by a horrible and lingering death. - -The marshy plains, over which the army was now marching, exhausted -the strength of the wearied soldiers, thousands straggled, the -depredations on the herds of swine were repeated, and the temper of -the army, generally, prognosticated the greatest misfortunes if the -retreat should be continued. This was however the last day of trial, -for towards evening the weather cleared up, the hills near Ciudad -Rodrigo afforded dry bivouacs and fuel, the distribution of good -rations restored the strength and spirits of the men, and the next -day Ciudad Rodrigo and the neighbouring villages were occupied in -tranquillity. The cavalry was then sent out to the forest, and being -aided by Julian Sanchez’ Partidas, brought in from a thousand to -fifteen hundred stragglers who must otherwise have perished. During -these events Joseph occupied Salamanca, but colonel Miranda, the -Spanish officer left at Alba de Tormes, held that place until the -27th and then carried off his garrison in the night. - -[Sidenote: See Appendix, No. 9.] - -Thus ended the retreat from Burgos. The French gathered a good -spoil of baggage; what the loss of the allies, in men, was, cannot -be exactly determined, because no Spanish returns were ever seen. -An approximation may however be easily made. According to the -muster-rolls, the Anglo-Portuguese under Wellington, had about one -thousand men killed, wounded, and missing between the 21st and 29th -of October, which was the period of their crossing the Duero, but -this only refers to loss in action; Hill’s loss between the Tagus -and the Tormes was, including stragglers, about four hundred, and -the defence of the castle of Alba de Tormes cost one hundred. Now if -the Spanish regulars, and Partidas, marching with the two armies, be -reckoned to have lost a thousand, which considering their want of -discipline is not exaggerated, the whole loss, previous to the French -passage of the Tormes, will amount perhaps to three thousand men. But -the loss between the Tormes and the Agueda was certainly greater, -for nearly three hundred were killed and wounded at the Huebra, -many stragglers died in the woods, and we have marshal Jourdan’s -testimony, that the prisoners, Spanish Portuguese and English, -brought into Salamanca up to the 20th November, were three thousand -five hundred and twenty. The whole loss of the double retreat cannot -therefore be set down at less than nine thousand including the cost -of men in the siege of Burgos. - -I have been the more precise on this point, because some French -writers have spoken of ten thousand being taken between the Tormes -and the Agueda, and general Souham estimated the previous loss, -including the siege of Burgos, at seven thousand. But the king in his -despatches called the whole loss twelve thousand, including therein -the garrison of Chinchilla, and he observed that if the generals of -cavalry, Soult and Tilley, had followed the allies vigorously from -Salamanca, the loss would have been much greater. Certainly the -army was so little pressed that none would have supposed the French -horsemen were numerous. On the other hand English authors have most -unaccountably reduced the British loss to as many hundreds. - -Although the French halted on the Huebra, the English general kept -his troops together behind the Agueda, because Soult retired with -the troops under his immediate command to Los Santos on the Upper -Tormes, thus pointing towards the pass of Baños, and it was rumoured -he designed to march that way, with a view to invade Portugal by the -valley of the Tagus. Wellington disbelieved this rumour, but he could -not disregard it, because nearly all his channels of intelligence -had been suddenly dried up by a tyrannical and foolish decree of -the Cortez, which obliged every man to justify himself for having -remained in a district occupied by the enemy, and hence to avoid -persecution, those who used to transmit information, fled from their -homes. Hill’s division was therefore moved to the right as far as -Robledo, to cover the pass of Perales, the rest of the troops were -ready to follow, and Penne Villemur, leading the fifth Spanish army -over the Gata mountains occupied Coria. - -[Sidenote: December.] - -Joseph, after hesitating whether he should leave the army of the -south, or the army of Portugal in Castile, finally ordered the -head-quarters of the latter to be fixed at Valladolid, and of the -former at Toledo; the one to maintain the country between the Tormes -and the Esla, the other to occupy La Mancha with its left, the valley -of the Tagus, as far as the Tietar, with its centre, and Avila with -its right. The army of the centre went to Segovia, where the king -joined it with his guards, and when these movements, which took -place in December, were known, Wellington placed his army also in -winter-quarters. - -The fifth Spanish army crossing the Tagus at Alcantara entered -Estremadura. - -Hill’s division occupied Coria, and Placentia, and held the town of -Bejar by a detachment. - -Two divisions were quartered on a second line behind Hill about -Castelo Branco, and in the Upper Beira. - -The light division remained on the Agueda, and the rest of the -infantry were distributed along the Duero from Lamego downwards. - -The Portuguese cavalry were placed in Moncorvo, and the British -cavalry, with the exception of Victor Alten’s brigade which was -attached to the light division, occupied the valley of the Mondego. - -Carlos D’España’s troops garrisoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and the -Gallicians marched through the Tras os Montes to their own country. - -In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were easily fed, because -the improved navigation of the Tagus, the Douro, and the Mondego, -furnished water carriage close to all their cantonments; moreover -the army could be quickly collected on either frontier, for the -front line of communication from Estremadura passed by the bridge of -Alcantara to Coria, and from thence through the pass of Perales to -the Agueda. The second line run by Penamacor and Guinaldo, and both -were direct; but the post of Bejar, although necessary to secure -Hill’s quarters from a surprise, was itself exposed. - -The French also had double and direct communications across the -Gredos mountains. On their first line they restored a Roman road -leading from Horcajada, on the Upper Tormes, by the Puerto de Pico -to Monbeltran, and from thence to Talavera. To ease their second -line they finished a road, begun the year before by Marmont, leading -from Avila, by the convent of Guisando and Escalona to Toledo. But -these communications though direct, were in winter so difficult, that -general Laval crossing the mountains from Avila was forced to harness -forty horses to a carriage; moreover Wellington having the interior -and shorter lines, was in a more menacing position for offence, and a -more easy position for defence; wherefore, though he had ordered all -boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and other points where -the great roads came down to the Tagus, the French, as anxious to -prevent him from passing that river, as he was to prevent them, sent -parties to destroy what had been overlooked. Each feared that the -other would move, and yet neither wished to continue the campagin, -Wellington, because his troops wanted rest, more than one-third being -in the hospitals! the French because they could not feed their men -and had to refix their general base of operations, broken up and -deranged as it was by the Guerillas. - -The English general was however most at his ease. He knew that the -best French officers thought it useless to continue the contest -in Spain, unless the British army was first mastered, Soult’s -intercepted letters showed him how that general desired to fix the -war in Portugal, and there was now a most powerful force on the -frontier of that kingdom. But on the other hand Badajos, Ciudad -Rodrigo, and Almeida blocked the principal entrances, and though the -two former were very ill provided by the Spaniards, they were in -little danger because the last campaign had deprived the French of -all their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines, in Andalusia, Almaraz, -Madrid, Salamanca, and Valladolid; and it was nearly impossible for -them to make any impression upon Portugal, until new establishments -were formed. Wherefore Wellington did not fear to spread his troops -in good and tranquil quarters, to receive reinforcements, restore -their equipments, and recover their health and strength. - -This advantage was not reciprocal. The secondary warfare which the -French sustained, and which it is now time again to notice, would -have been sufficient to establish the military reputation of any -nation before Napoleon’s exploits had raised the standard of military -glory. For when disembarrassed of their most formidable enemy, they -were still obliged to chase the Partidas, to form sieges, to recover -and restore the posts they had lost by concentrating their armies, to -send moveable columns by long winter marches over a vast extent of -country for food, fighting for what they got, and living hard because -the magazines filled from the fertile districts were of necessity -reserved for the field operations against Wellington. Certainly -it was a great and terrible war they had in hand, and good and -formidable soldiers they were to sustain it so long and so manfully -amidst the many errors of their generals. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -CONTINUATION OF THE PARTIZAN WARFARE. - - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -In the north, while Souham was gathering in front of Wellington, some -of Mendizabel’s bands blockaded Santona by land, and Popham, after -his failure at Gueteria blockaded it by sea. It was not very well -provisioned, but Napoleon, always watchful, had sent an especial -governor, general Lameth, and a chosen engineer, general D’Abadie, -from Paris to complete the works. By their activity a hundred and -twenty pieces of cannon were soon mounted, and they had including the -crew of a corvette a garrison of eighteen hundred men. Lameth who was -obliged to fight his way into the place in September, also formed -an armed flotilla, with which, when the English squadron was driven -off the port by gales of wind, he made frequent captures. Meanwhile -Mendizabel surprised the garrison of Briviesca, Longa captured a -large convoy with its escort, near Burgos, and all the bands had -visibly increased in numbers and boldness. - -When Caffarelli returned from the Duero, Reille took the command -of the army of Portugal, Drouet assumed that of the army of the -centre, and Souham being thus cast off returned to France. The army -of Portugal was then widely spread over the country. Avila was -occupied, Sarrut took possession of Leon, the bands of Marquinez and -Salazar were beaten, and Foy marching to seize Astorga, surprised and -captured ninety men employed to dismantle that fortress; but above -twenty breaches had already been opened and the place ceased to be of -any importance. Meanwhile Caffarelli troubled by the care of a number -of convoys, one of which under general Frimont, although strongly -escorted, and having two pieces of cannon, fell into Longa’s hands -the 30th of November, was unable to commence active operations until -the 29th of December. Then his detachments chased the bands from -Bilbao, while he marched himself to succour and provision Santona -and Gueteria, and to re-establish his other posts along the coasts; -but while he was near Santona the Spaniards attacked St. Domingo in -Navarre, and invested Logroña. - -Sir Home Popham had suddenly quitted the Bay of Biscay with his -squadron, leaving a few vessels to continue the littoral warfare, -which enabled Caffarelli to succour Santona; important events -followed but the account of them must be deferred as belonging -to the transactions of 1813. Meanwhile tracing the mere chain of -Guerilla operations from Biscay to the other parts, we find Abbé, who -commanded in Pampeluna, Severoli who guarded the right of the Ebro, -and Paris who had returned from Valencia to Zaragoza, continually and -at times successfully attacked in the latter end of 1812; for after -Chaplangarra’s exploit near Jacca, Mina intercepted all communication -with France, and on the 22d of November surprised and drove back to -Zaragoza with loss a very large convoy. Then he besieged the castle -of Huesca, and when a considerable force, coming from Zaragoza, -forced him to desist, he reappeared at Barbastro. Finally in a -severe action fought on the heights of Señora del Poya, towards the -end of December, his troops were dispersed by Colonel Colbert, yet -the French lost seventy men, and in a few weeks Mina took the field -again, with forces more numerous than he had ever before commanded. - -About this time Villa Campa, who had entrenched himself near Segorbé -to harass Suchet’s rear, was driven from thence by general Panetier, -but being afterwards joined by Gayan, they invested the castle of -Daroca with three thousand men. Severoli marching from Zaragoza -succoured the place, yet Villa Campa reassembled his whole force -near Carineña behind Severoli who was forced to fight his way home -to Zaragoza. The Spaniards reappeared at Almunia, and on the 22nd -of December, another battle was fought, when Villa Campa being -defeated with considerable slaughter retired to New Castile, and -there soon repaired his losses. Meanwhile, in the centre of Spain, -Elio, Bassecour, and Empecinado, having waited until the great French -armies passed in pursuit of Hill came down upon Madrid. Wellington, -when at Salamanca, expected that this movement would call off some -troops from the Tormes, but the only effect was to cause the garrison -left by Joseph to follow the great army, which it rejoined, between -the Duero and the Tormes, with a great encumbrance of civil servants -and families. The Partidas then entered the city and committed great -excesses, treating the people as enemies. - -Soult and Joseph had been earnest with Suchet to send a strong -division by Cuenca as a protection for Madrid, and that marshal did -move in person with a considerable body of troops as far as Requeña -on the 28th of November, but being in fear for his line towards -Alicant soon returned to Valencia in a state of indecision, leaving -only one brigade at Requeña. He had been reinforced by three thousand -fresh men from Catalonia, yet he would not undertake any operation -until he knew something of the king’s progress, and at Requeña he -had gained no intelligence even of the passage of the Tagus. The -Spaniards being thus uncontrolled gathered in all directions. - -The duke del Parque advanced with Ballesteros’ army to Villa Nueva de -los Infantes, on the La Mancha side of the Sierra Morena, his cavalry -entered the plains and some new levies from Grenada, came to Alcaraz -on his right. Elio and Bassecour, leaving Madrid to the Partidas, -marched to Albacete, without hindrance from Suchet, and re-opened -the communication with Alicant; hence exclusive of the Sicilian -army, nearly thirty thousand regular Spanish troops were said to be -assembled on the borders of Murcia, and six thousand new levies came -to Cordoba as a reserve. However on the 3d of December, Joseph at the -head of his guards and the army of the centre, drove all the Partidas -from the capital, and re-occupied Guadalaxara and the neighbouring -posts; Soult entered Toledo and his cavalry advanced towards Del -Parque, who immediately recrossed the Morena, and then the French -horsemen swept La Mancha to gather contributions and to fill the -magazines at Toledo. - -By these operations, Del Parque, now joined by the Grenadan troops -from Alcaraz, was separated from Elio, and Suchet was relieved from -a danger which he had dreaded too much, and by his own inaction -contributed to increase. It is true he had all the sick men -belonging to the king’s and to Soult’s army on his hands, but he -had also many effective men of those armies; and though the yellow -fever had shewn itself in some of his hospitals, and though he was -also very uneasy for the security of his base in Aragon, where the -Partida warfare was reviving, yet, with a disposable force of fifteen -thousand infantry, and a fine division of cavalry, he should not -have permitted Elio to pass his flank in the manner he did. He was -afraid of the Sicilian army which had indeed a great influence on -all the preceding operations, for it is certain that Suchet would -otherwise have detached troops to Madrid by the Cuenca road, and -then Soult would probably have sought a battle between the Tagus and -the Guadarama mountains; but this influence arose entirely from the -position of the Alicant army, not from its operations, which were -feeble and vacillating. - -Maitland had resigned in the beginning of October, and his successor -Mackenzie immediately pushed out some troops to the front, and -there was a slight descent upon Xabea by the navy, but the general -remained without plan or object, the only signs of vitality being a -fruitless demonstration against the castle of Denia, where general -Donkin disembarked on the 4th of October with a detachment of the -eighty-first regiment. The walls had been represented as weak, but -they were found to be high and strong, and the garrison had been -unexpectedly doubled that morning, hence no attack took place, and -in the evening a second reinforcement arrived, whereupon the British -re-embarked. However the water was so full of pointed rocks that it -was only by great exertions lieutenant Penruddocke of the Fame could -pull in the boats, and the soldiers wading and fighting, got on -board with little loss indeed but in confusion. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s official correspondence, MS.] - -Soon after this, general William Clinton came from Sicily to take the -command, and Wellington who was then before Burgos, thinking Suchet -would weaken his army to help the king, recommended an attempt upon -the city of Valencia either by a coast attack or by a land operation, -warning Clinton however to avoid an action in a cavalry country. -This was not very difficult, because the land was generally rocky -and mountainous, but Clinton would not stir without first having -possession of the citadel of Alicant, and thus all things fell into -disorder and weakness. For the jealous Spanish governor would not -suffer the British to hold even a gate of the town, nay, he sent Elio -a large convoy of clothing and other stores with an escort of only -twenty men, that he might retain two of that general’s battalions -to resist the attempt which he believed or pretended to believe -Clinton would make on the citadel. Meanwhile that general, leaving -Whittingham and Roche at Alcoy and Xixona, drew in his other troops -from the posts previously occupied in front by Mackenzie; he feared -Suchet’s cavalry, but the marshal, estimating the allied armies at -more than fifty thousand men, would undertake no serious enterprize -while ignorant of the king’s progress against lord Wellington. He -however diligently strengthened his camp at St. Felipe de Xativa, -threw another bridge over the Xucar, entrenched the passes in his -front, covered Denia with a detachment, obliged Whittingham to -abandon Alcoy, dismantled the extensive walls of Valencia, and -fortified a citadel there. - -[Sidenote: General Donkin’s correspondence, MS.] - -It was in this state of affairs that Elio came down to Albacete, -and priding himself upon the dexterity with which he had avoided the -French armies, proposed to Clinton a combined attack upon Suchet. -Elio greatly exaggerated his own numbers, and giving out that Del -Parque’s force was under his command, pretended that he could bring -forty thousand men into the field, four thousand being cavalry. -But the two Spanish armies if united would scarcely have produced -twenty thousand really effective infantry; moreover Del Parque, a -sickly unwieldy person, was extremely incapable, his soldiers were -discontented and mutinous, and he had no intention of moving beyond -Alcaraz. - -[Sidenote: Official correspondence of the duke of Feltre, MS.] - -With such allies it was undoubtedly difficult for the English general -to co-operate, yet it would seem, something considerable might have -been effected while Suchet was at Requeña, even before Elio arrived, -and more surely after that general had reached Albacete. Clinton -had then twelve thousand men, of which five thousand were British: -there was a fleet to aid his operations, and the Spanish infantry -under Elio were certainly ten thousand. Nothing was done, and it -was because nothing was attempted, that Napoleon, who watched this -quarter closely, assured Suchet, that however difficult his position -was from the extent of country he had to keep in tranquillity, the -enemy in his front was not really formidable. Events justified this -observation. The French works were soon completed and the British -army fell into such disrepute, that the Spaniards with sarcastic -malice affirmed it was to be put under Elio to make it useful. - -[Sidenote: General Donkin’s correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.] - -Meanwhile Roche’s and Whittingham’s division continued to excite -the utmost jealousy in the other Spanish troops, who asked, very -reasonably, what they did to merit such advantages? England paid and -clothed them and the Spaniards were bound to feed them; they did not -do so, and Canga Arguelles, the intendant of the province, asserted -that he had twice provided magazines for them in Alicant, which were -twice plundered by the governor; and yet it is certain that the other -Spanish troops were far worse off than these divisions. But on every -side intrigues, discontent, vacillation, and weakness were visible, -and again it was shewn that if England was the stay of the Peninsula, -it was Wellington alone who supported the war. - -On the 22d of November the obstinacy of the governor being at last -overcome he gave up the citadel of Alicant to the British, yet no -offensive operations followed, though Suchet on the 26th drove -Roche’s troops out of Alcoy with loss, and defeated the Spanish -cavalry at Yecla. However on the 2d of December, general Campbell -arriving from Sicily, with four thousand men, principally British, -assumed the command, making the fourth general-in-chief in the same -number of months. His presence, the strong reinforcement he brought, -and the intelligence that lord William Bentinck was to follow -with another reinforcement, again raised the public expectation, -and Elio immediately proposed that the British should occupy the -enemy on the Lower Xucar, while the Spaniards crossing that river -attacked Requeña. However general Campbell after making some feeble -demonstrations declared he would await lord William Bentinck’s -arrival. Then the Spanish general, who had hitherto abstained from -any disputes with the British, became extremely discontented, and -dispersed his army for subsistence. On the other hand the English -general complained that Elio had abandoned him. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17, 18.] - -Suchet expecting Campbell to advance had withdrawn his outposts to -concentrate at Xativa, but when he found him as inactive as his -predecessors and saw the Spanish troops scattered, he surprised one -Spanish post at Onteniente, another in Ibi, and re-occupied all his -former offensive positions in front of Alicant. Soult’s detachments -were now also felt in La Mancha, wherefore Elio retired into Murcia, -and Del Parque, as we have seen, went over the Morena. Thus the storm -which had menaced the French disappeared entirely, for Campbell, -following his instructions, refused rations to Whittingham’s corps -and desired it to separate for the sake of subsistence; and as the -rest of the Spanish troops were actually starving, no danger was to -be apprehended from them: nay, Habert marched up to Alicant, killed -and wounded some men almost under the walls, and the Anglo-Italian -soldiers deserted to him by whole companies when opportunity offered. - -[Sidenote: Suchet, official correspondence with the king, MSS.] - -Suchet did as he pleased towards his front but he was unquiet for -his rear, for besides the operations of Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran -and Mina in Aragon, the Frayle and other partida chiefs continually -vexed his communications with Tortoza. Fifty men had been surprised -and destroyed near Segorbe the 22d of November, by Villa Campa; and -general Panetier, who was sent against that chief, though he took -and destroyed his entrenched camp was unable to bring him to action -or to prevent him from going to Aragon, and attacking Daroca as I -have before shown. Meanwhile the Frayle surprised and destroyed -an ordnance convoy, took several guns and four hundred horses, and -killed in cold blood after the action above a hundred artillery-men -and officers. A moveable column being immediately despatched against -him, destroyed his dépôts and many of his men, but the Frayle himself -escaped and soon reappeared upon the communications. The loss of this -convoy was the first disgrace of the kind which had befallen the army -of Aragon, and to use Suchet’s expression a battle would have cost -him less. - -[Sidenote: Captain Codrington’s papers, MS.] - -Nor were the Spaniards quite inactive in Catalonia, although the -departure of general Maitland had so dispirited them that the regular -warfare was upon the point of ceasing altogether. The active army -was indeed stated to be twenty thousand strong, and the tercios of -reserve forty-five thousand; yet a column of nine hundred French -controuled the sea-line and cut off all supplies landed for the -interior. Lacy who remained about Vich with seven thousand men -affirmed that he could not feed his army on the coast, but captain -Codrington says that nineteen feluccas laden with flour had in two -nights only, landed their cargoes between Mattaro and Barcelona for -the supply of the latter city, and that these and many other ventures -of the same kind might have been captured without difficulty; that -Claros and Milans continued corruptly to connive at the passage of -French convoys; that the rich merchants of Mattaro and Arens invited -the enemy to protect their contraband convoys going to France, and -yet accused him publicly of interrupting their lawful trade when in -fact he was only disturbing a treasonable commerce, carried on so -openly that he was forced to declare a blockade of the whole coast. -A plot to deliver up the Medas islands was also discovered, and when -Lacy was pressed to call out the Somatenes, a favorite project with -the English naval officers, he objected that he could scarcely feed -and provide ammunition for the regular troops. He also observed -that the general efforts of that nature hitherto made, and under -more favourable circumstances, had produced only a waste of life, -of treasure, of provisions, of ammunition and of arms, and now the -French possessed all the strong places. - -At this time so bitter were the party dissensions that sir Edward -Pellew anticipated the ruin of the principality from that cause -alone. Lacy, Sarzfield, Eroles and captain Codrington, continued -their old disputes, and Sarzfield who was then in Aragon had also -quarrelled with Mina; Lacy made a formal requisition to have -Codrington recalled, the junta of Catalonia made a like demand to -the regency respecting Lacy, and meanwhile such was the misery of -the soldiers that the officers of one regiment actually begged at -the doors of private houses to obtain old clothing for their men, -and even this poor succour was denied. A few feeble isolated efforts -by some of the partizan generals, were the only signs of war when -Wellington’s victory at Salamanca again raised the spirit of the -province. Then also for the first time the new constitution adopted -by the cortez was proclaimed in Catalonia, the junta of that province -was suppressed, Eroles the people’s favorite obtained greater powers, -and was even flattered with the hope of becoming captain-general, for -the regency had agreed at last to recal Lacy. In fine the aspect of -affairs changed and many thousand English muskets and other weapons -were by sir Edward Pellew, given to the partizans as well as to the -regular troops which enabled them to receive cartridges from the -ships instead of the loose powder formerly demanded on account of the -difference in the bore of the Spanish muskets. The effect of these -happy coincidences was soon displayed. Eroles who had raised a new -division of three thousand men, contrived in concert with Codrington, -a combined movement in September against Taragona. Marching in the -night of the 27th from Reus to the mouth of the Francoli he was met -by the boats of the squadron and having repulsed a sally from the -fortress, drove some Catalans in the French service, from the ruins -of the Olivo, while the boats swept the mole, taking five vessels. -After this affair Eroles encamped on the hill separating Lerida, -Taragona, and Tortoza, meaning to intercept the communication between -those places and to keep up an intercourse with the fleet, now the -more necessary because Lacy had lost this advantage eastward of -Barcelona. While thus posted he heard that a French detachment had -come from Lerida to Arbeça, wherefore making a forced march over the -mountains he surprised and destroyed the greatest part on the 2d of -October, and then returned to his former quarters. - -[Sidenote: October.] - -Meanwhile Lacy embarked scaling-ladders and battering guns on board -the English ships, and made a pompous movement against Mattaro with -his whole force, yet at the moment of execution changed his plan and -attempted to surprise Hostalrich, but he let this design be known, -and as the enemy prepared to succour the place, he returned to Vich -without doing any thing. During these operations Manso defeated two -hundred French near Molino del Rey, gained some advantages over one -Pelligri, a French miguelette partizan, and captured some French -boats at Mattaro after Lacy’s departure. However Sarzfield’s mission -to raise an army in Aragon had failed, and Decaen desiring to check -the reviving spirit of the Catalans, made a combined movement against -Vich in the latter end of October. Lacy immediately drew Eroles, -Manso, and Milans towards that point, and thus the fertile country -about Reus was again resigned to the French, the intercourse with -the fleet totally lost, and the garrison of Taragona, which had -been greatly straitened by the previous operations of Eroles, was -relieved. Yet the defence of Vich was not secured, for on the 3d -of November one division of the French forced the main body of the -Spaniards, under Lacy and Milans, at the passes of Puig Gracioso and -Congosto, and though the other divisions were less successful against -Eroles and Manso, at St. Filieu de Codenas, Decaen reached Vich the -4th. The Catalans, who had lost altogether above five hundred men, -then separated; Lacy went to the hills near Momblanch, Milans and -Rovira towards Olot, and Manso to Montserrat. - -Eroles returned to Reus, and was like to have surprised the Col de -Balaguer, for he sent a detachment under colonel Villamil, dressed in -Italian uniforms which had been taken by Rovira in Figueras, and his -men were actually admitted within the palisade of the fort before the -garrison perceived the deceit. A lieutenant with sixteen men placed -outside were taken, and this loss was magnified so much to Eroles -that he ordered Villamil to make a more regular attack. To aid him -Codrington brought up the Blake, and landed some marines, yet no -impression was made on the garrison, and the allies retired on the -17th at the approach of two thousand men sent from Tortoza. Eroles -and Manso then vainly united near Manresa to oppose Decaen, who, -coming down from Vich, forced his way to Reus, seized a vast quantity -of corn, supplied Taragona, and then marched to Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: November.] - -[Sidenote: Captain Codrington’s correspondence, MSS.] - -These operations indisputably proved that there was no real power of -resistance in the Catalan army, but as an absurd notion prevailed -that Soult, Suchet, and Joseph were coming with their armies in one -body, to France, through Catalonia, Lacy endeavoured to cover his -inactivity by pretending a design to raise a large force in Aragon, -with which to watch this retreat, and to act as a flanking corps to -lord Wellington, who was believed to be then approaching Zaragoza. -Such rumours served to amuse the Catalans for a short time, but the -sense of their real weakness soon returned. In December Bertoletti, -the governor of Taragona, marched upon Reus, and defeated some -hundred men who had reassembled there; and at the same time a French -convoy for Barcelona, escorted by three thousand men, passed safely -in the face of six thousand Catalan soldiers, who were desirous to -attack but were prevented by Lacy. - -The anger of the people and of the troops also, on this occasion was -loudly expressed, Lacy was openly accused of treachery, and was soon -after recalled. However, Eroles who had come to Cape Salou to obtain -succour from the squadron for his suffering soldiers, acknowledged -that the resources of Catalonia were worn out, the spirit of the -people broken by Lacy’s misconduct, and the army, reduced to less -than seven thousand men, naked and famishing. Affairs were so bad, -that expecting to be made captain-general he was reluctant to accept -that office, and the regular warfare was in fact extinguished, for -Sarzfield was now acting as a partizan on the Ebro. Nevertheless the -French were greatly dismayed at the disasters in Russia; their force -was weakened by the drafts made to fill up the ranks of Napoleon’s -new army; and the war of the partidas continued, especially along the -banks of the Ebro, where Sarzfield, at the head of Eroles’ ancient -division, which he had carried with him out of Catalonia, acted in -concert with Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Frayle, Pendencia, and -other chiefs, who were busy upon Suchet’s communication between -Tortoza and Valencia. - -Aragon being now unquiet, and Navarre and Biscay in a state of -insurrection, the French forces in the interior of Spain were -absolutely invested. Their front was opposed by regular armies, their -flanks annoyed by the British squadrons, and their rear, from the -Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, plagued and stung by this chain -of partidas and insurrections. And England was the cause of all -this. England was the real deliverer of the Peninsula. It was her -succours thrown into Biscay that had excited the new insurrection -in the northern provinces, and enabled Mina and the other chiefs to -enter Aragon, while Wellington drew the great masses of the French -towards Portugal. It was that insurrection, so forced on, which, -notwithstanding the cessation of the regular warfare in Catalonia, -gave life and activity to the partidas of the south. It was the army -from Sicily which, though badly commanded, by occupying the attention -of Suchet in front, obliged him to keep his forces together instead -of hunting down the bands on his communications. In fine, it was the -troops of England who had shocked the enemy’s front of battle, the -fleets of England which had menaced his flanks with disembarkations, -the money and stores of England which had supported the partidas. -Every part of the Peninsula was pervaded by her influence, or her -warriors, and a trembling sense of insecurity was communicated to the -French wherever their armies were not united in masses. - -Such then were the various military events of the year 1812, and -the English general taking a view of the whole, judged that however -anxious the French might be to invade Portugal, they would be content -during the winter to gather provisions and wait for reinforcements -from France wherewith to strike a decisive blow at his army. But -those reinforcements never came. Napoleon, unconquered of man, had -been vanquished by the elements. The fires and the snows of Moscow -combined, had shattered his strength, and in confessed madness, -nations and rulers rejoiced, that an enterprize, at once the -grandest, the most provident, the most beneficial, ever attempted by -a warrior-statesman, had been foiled: they rejoiced that Napoleon -had failed to re-establish unhappy Poland as a barrier against the -most formidable and brutal, the most swinish tyranny, that has ever -menaced and disgraced European civilization. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. - - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -Lord Wellington exasperated by the conduct of the army and by the -many crossings he had experienced during the campaign, had no sooner -taken his winter-quarters, than he gave vent to his indignation in -a circular letter, addressed to the superior officers, which, being -ill-received by the army at the time, has been frequently referred -to since with angry denunciations of its injustice. In substance -it declared, “that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign -_in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed or ever read of in -any army_, and this without any disaster, any unusual privation or -hardship save that of inclement weather; that the officers had, from -the first, lost all command over their men, and hence excesses, -outrages of all kinds, and inexcusable losses had occurred; that no -army had ever made shorter marches in retreat, or had longer rests; -no army had ever been so little pressed by a pursuing enemy, and that -the true cause of this unhappy state of affairs was to be found in -the habitual neglect of duty by the regimental officers.” - -These severe reproaches were generally deserved, and only partially -unjust; yet the statements, on which they were founded, were in some -particulars unintentionally inaccurate, especially as regarded the -retreat from Salamanca. The marches, though short as to distance, -after quitting the Tormes, were long as to time, and it is the -time an English soldier bears his burthen, for like the ancient -Roman he carries the load of an ass, that crushes his strength. Some -regiments had come from Cadiz without halting, and as long garrison -duty had weakened their bodies, both their constitutions and their -inexperience were too heavily taxed. The line of march from Salamanca -was through a flooded, and flat, clayey country, not much easier to -the allies than the marshes of the Arnus were to Hannibal’s army; -and mounted officers, as that great general well knew when he placed -the Carthaginian cavalry to keep up the Gallic rear, never judge -correctly of a foot-soldier’s exertions; they measure his strength -by their horses’ powers. On this occasion the troops, stepping -ankle-deep in clay, mid-leg in water, lost their shoes, and with -strained sinews heavily made their way, and withal they had but two -rations in five days. - -Wellington thought otherwise, for he knew not that the commissariat -stores, which he had ordered up, did not arrive regularly because -of the extreme fatigue of the animals who carried them; and those -that did arrive were not available for the troops, because, as the -rear of an army, and especially a retreating army, is at once the -birth-place and the recipient of false reports, the subordinate -commissaries and conductors of the temporary dépôts, alarmed with -rumours that the enemy’s cavalry had forestalled the allies on the -march, carried off or destroyed the field-stores: hence the soldiers -were actually feeding on acorns when their commander supposed them -to be in the receipt of good rations. The destruction of the swine -may be therefore, in some measure, palliated; but there is neither -palliation nor excuse to be offered for the excesses and outrages -committed on the inhabitants, nor for many officers’ habitual -inattention to their duty, of which the general justly complained. -Certainly the most intolerable disorders had marked the retreat, -and great part of the sufferings of the army arose from these and -previous disorders, for it is too common with soldiers, first to -break up the arrangements of their general by want of discipline, and -then to complain of the misery which those arrangements were designed -to obviate. Nevertheless Wellington’s circular was not strictly -just, because it excepted none from blame, though in conversation he -admitted the reproach did not apply to the light division nor to the -guards. - -With respect to the former the proof of its discipline was easy -though Wellington had not said so much in its favour; for how -could those troops be upbraided, who held together so closely -with their colours, that, exclusive of those killed in action, -they did not leave thirty men behind. Never did the extraordinary -vigour and excellence of their discipline merit praise more than -in this retreat. But it seems to be a drawback to the greatness -of lord Wellington’s character, that while capable of repressing -insubordination, either by firmness or dexterity as the case may -require, capable also of magnanimously disregarding, or dangerously -resenting injuries, his praises and his censures are bestowed -indiscriminately, or so directed as to acquire partizans and personal -friends rather than the attachment of the multitude. He did not make -the hard-working military crowd feel that their honest unobtrusive -exertions were appreciated. In this he differs not from many other -great generals and statesmen, but he thereby fails to influence -masses, and his genius falls short of that sublime flight by which -Hannibal in ancient, and Napoleon in modern times, commanded the -admiration of the world. Nevertheless it is only by a comparison -with such great men that he can be measured, nor will any slight -examination of his exploits suffice to convey a true notion of his -intellectual power and resources. Let this campaign be taken as an -example. - -It must be evident that it in no manner bears out the character of -an easy and triumphant march, which English writers have given to -it. Nothing happened according to the original plan. The general’s -operations were one continual struggle to overcome obstacles, -occasioned by the enemy’s numbers, the insubordination of his own -troops, the slowness, incapacity, and unfaithful conduct of the -Spanish commanders, the want of money, and the active folly of the -different governments he served. For first his design was to menace -the French in Spain so as to bring their forces upon him from other -parts, and then to retire into Portugal, again to issue forth when -want should cause them to disperse. He was not without hopes indeed -to strike a decisive blow, yet he was content, if the occasion came -not, to wear out the French by continual marching, and he trusted -that the frequent opportunities thus given to the Spaniards would -finally urge them to a general effort. But he found his enemy, from -the first, too powerful for him, even without drawing succour from -distant parts, and he would have fallen back at once, were it not for -Marmont’s rashness. Nor would the victory of the Arapiles itself have -produced any proportionate effect but for the errors of the king, and -his rejection of Soult’s advice. Those errors caused the evacuation -of Andalusia, yet it was only to concentrate an overwhelming force -with which the French finally drove the victors back to Portugal. - -Again, Wellington designed to finish his campaign in the southern -provinces, and circumstances obliged him to remain in the northern -provinces. He would have taken Burgos and he could not; he would -have rested longer on the Carrion, and his flanks were turned by the -bridges of Palencia and Baños; he would have rested behind the Douro, -to profit of his central position, but the bridge at Tordesillas -was ravished from him, and the sudden reparation of that at Toro, -obliged him to retire. He would have united with Hill on the Adaja, -and he could only unite with him behind the Tormes; and on this last -river also he desired either to take his winter quarters, or to have -delivered a great battle with a view to regain Madrid, and he could -do neither. Finally he endeavoured to make an orderly and an easy -retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and his army was like to have dissolved -altogether. And yet in all these varying circumstances, his sagacity -as to the general course of the war, his promptness in taking -advantage of particular opportunities, was conspicuous. These are the -distinguishing characteristics of real genius. - -Passing over as already sufficiently illustrated that master-stroke, -the battle of Salamanca, the reader would do well to mark, how this -great commander did, after that event, separate the king’s army from -Marmont’s, forcing the one to retreat upon Burgos, and driving the -other from Madrid; how he thus broke up the French combinations, so -that many weeks were of necessity required to reunite a power capable -of disturbing him in the field; how he posted Clinton’s division and -the Gallicians, to repress any light excursion by the beaten army of -Portugal; how, foreseeing Soult’s plan to establish a new base of -operations in Andalusia, he was prepared, by a sudden descent from -Madrid, to drive Soult himself from that province; how promptly, -when the siege of Burgos failed, and his combinations were ruined by -the fault of others, how promptly I say, he commenced his retreat, -sacrificing all his high-wrought expectation of triumph in a campaign -which he burned to finish, and otherwise would have finished, even -with more splendour than it had commenced. - -If Burgos, a mean fortress of the lowest order, had fallen early, the -world would have seen a noble stroke. For the Gallicians, aided by a -weak division of Wellington’s army, and by the British reinforcements -making up from Coruña, would, covered by Burgos, have sufficed to -keep the army of Portugal in check, while Popham’s armament would -have fomented a general insurrection of the northern provinces. -Meanwhile Wellington, gathering forty-five thousand Anglo-Portuguese, -and fifteen thousand Spaniards, on the Tagus, would have marched -towards Murcia; Ballesteros’ army, and the sixteen thousand men -composing the Alicant army, would there have joined him, and with a -hundred thousand soldiers he would have delivered such a battle to -the united French armies, if indeed they could have united, as would -have shaken all Europe with its martial clangor. To exchange this -glorious vision, for the cold desolate reality of a dangerous winter -retreat was, for Wellington, but a momentary mental struggle, and it -was simultaneous with that daring conception, the passage of the -bridge of Burgos under the fire of the castle. - -Let him be traced now in retreat. Pursued by a superior army and -seeing his cavalry defeated, he turned as a savage lion at the -Carrion, nor would he have removed so quickly from that lair, if the -bridges at Palencia and Baños had been destroyed according to his -order. Neither is his cool self-possession to be overlooked; for -when both his flanks were thus exposed, instead of falling back in -a hurried manner to the Duero, he judged exactly the value of the -rugged ground on the left bank of the Pisuerga, in opposition to the -double advantage obtained by the enemy at Palencia and Baños; nor did -the difficulty which Souham and Caffarelli, independent commanders -and neither of them accustomed to move large armies, would find in -suddenly changing their line of operations escape him. His march -to Cabeçon and his position on the left of the Pisuerga was not a -retreat, it was the shift of a practised captain. - -When forced to withdraw Hill from the Tagus, he, on the instant, -formed a new combination to fight that great battle on the Adaja -which he had intended to deliver near the Guadalaviar; and though -the splendid exploit of captain Guingret, at Tordesillas, baffled -this intent, he, in return, baffled Souham by that ready stroke of -generalship, the posting of his whole army in front of Rueda, thus -forbidding a passage by the restored bridge. Finally, if he could -not maintain the line of the Duero, nor that of the Tormes, it was -because rivers can never be permanently defended against superior -forces, and yet he did not quit the last without a splendid tactical -illustration. I mean that surprising movement from the Arapiles to -the Valmusa, a movement made not in confusion and half flight, but in -close order of battle, his columns ready for action, his artillery -and cavalry skirmishing, passing the Junguen without disorder, filing -along the front of and winding into the rear of a most powerful -French army, the largest ever collected in one mass in the Peninsula, -an army having twice as many guns as the allies, and twelve thousand -able horsemen to boot. And all these great and skilful actions were -executed by lord Wellington with an army composed of different -nations; soldiers, fierce indeed, and valiant, terrible in battle, -but characterised by himself, as more deficient in good discipline -than any army of which he had ever read! - -Men engaged only in civil affairs and especially book-men are apt -to undervalue military genius, talking as if simple bravery were -the highest qualification of a general; and they have another -mode of appeasing an inward sense of inferiority, namely, to -attribute the successes of a great captain, to the prudence of -some discreet adviser, who in secret rules the general, amends his -errors, and leaves him all the glory. Thus Napoleon had Berthier, -Wellington has sir George Murray! but in this, the most skilful, -if not the most glorious of Wellington’s campaigns, sir George -Murray was not present, and the staff of the army was governed by -three young lieutenant-colonels, namely, lord Fitzroy Somerset, -Waters, and Delancey; for though sir Willoughby Gordon joined the -army as quarter-master-general after the battle of Salamanca, he -was inexperienced, and some bodily suffering impeded his personal -exertions. - -Such then were the principal points of skill displayed by Wellington; -yet so vast and intricate an art is war, that the apophthegm of -Turenne will always be found applicable: “_he who has made no -mistakes in war, has seldom made war_.” Some military writers, -amongst them the celebrated Jomini, blame the English general, that -with a conquering army, and an insurgent nation at his beck, he -should in three months after his victory have attempted nothing more -than the unsuccessful siege of Burgos. This censure is not entirely -unfounded; the king certainly escaped very easily from Madrid; yet -there are many points to be argued ere the question can be decided. -The want of money, a want progressively increasing, had become almost -intolerable. Wellington’s army was partly fed from Ciudad Rodrigo, -partly from the valley of the Pisuerga, Hill’s troops were fed from -Lisbon; the Portuguese in their own country, and the Spaniards every -where, lived as the French did, by requisition; but the British -professed to avoid that mode of subsistence, and they made it a -national boast to all Europe that they did so; the movements of the -army were therefore always subservient to this principle, and must -be judged accordingly, because want of money was with them want of -motion. - -Now four modes of operation were open to Wellington. - -1º. _After the victory of Salamanca to follow the king to Valencia, -unite with the Alicant army, and, having thus separated Soult from -Joseph and Suchet, to act according to events._ - -To have thus moved at once, without money, into Valencia, or Murcia, -new countries where he had no assured connexions, and which were -scarcely able to feed the French armies, would have exposed him to -great difficulties; and he must have made extensive arrangements with -the fleet ere he could have acted vigorously, if, as was probable, -the French concentrated all their forces behind the Guadalaviar. -Meanwhile the distance between the main allied army and those troops -necessarily left in the north, being considered, the latter must -have been strengthened at the expense of those in the south, unless -the army of Portugal joined the king, and then Wellington would have -been quite over-matched in Valencia; that is, if Soult also joined -the king, and if not he would have placed the English general between -two fires. If a force was not left in the north the army of Portugal -would have had open field, either to march to the king’s assistance -by Zaragoza, or to have relieved Astorga, seized Salamanca, recovered -the prisoners and the trophies of the Arapiles, and destroyed all -the great lines of magazines and dépôts even to the Tagus. Moreover, -the yellow fever raged in Murcia, and this would have compelled the -English general to depend upon the contracted base of operations -offered by Alicant, because the advance of Clauzel would have -rendered it impossible to keep it on the Tagus. Time, therefore, -was required to arrange the means of operating in this manner, and -meanwhile the army was not unwisely turned another way. - -2º. _To march directly against Soult in Andalusia._ - -This project Wellington was prepared to execute, when the king’s -orders rendered it unnecessary, but if Joseph had adopted Soult’s -plan a grand field for the display of military art would have -been opened. The king going by the Despenas Peros, and having the -advantage of time in the march, could have joined Soult, with the -army of the centre, before the English general could have joined -Hill. The sixty thousand combatants thus united could have kept -the field until Suchet had also joined; but they could scarcely -have maintained the blockade of Cadiz also, and hence the error of -Wellington seems to have been, that he did not make an effort to -overtake the king, either upon or beyond the Tagus; for the army of -the centre would certainly have joined Soult by the Despenas Peros, -if Maitland had not that moment landed at Alicant. - -3º. _To follow the army of Portugal after the victory of Salamanca._ - -The reasons for moving upon Madrid instead of adopting this line of -operations having been already shewn in former observations, need -not be here repeated, yet it may be added that the destruction of -the great arsenal and dépôt of the Retiro was no small object with -reference to the safety of Portugal. - -4º. _The plan which was actually followed._ - -The English general’s stay in the capital was unavoidable, seeing -that to observe the development of the French operations in the -south was of such importance. It only remains therefore to trace -him after he quitted Madrid. Now the choice of his line of march by -Valladolid certainly appears common-place, and deficient in vigour, -but it was probably decided by the want of money, and of means of -transport; to which may be added the desire to bring the Gallicians -forward, which he could only attain by putting himself in actual -military communication with them, and covering their advance. Yet -this will not excuse the feeble pursuit of Clauzel’s retreating army -up the valley of the Pisuerga. The Spaniards would not the less -have come up if that general had been defeated, nor would the want -of their assistance have been much felt in the action. Considerable -loss would, no doubt, have been suffered by the Anglo-Portuguese, -and they could ill bear it, but the result of a victory would have -amply repaid the damage received; for the time gained by Clauzel -was employed by Caffarelli to strengthen the castle of Burgos, -which contained the greatest French dépôt in this part of Spain. -A victory therefore would have entirely disarranged the enemy’s -means of defence in the north, and would have sent the twice-broken -and defeated army of Portugal, behind the Ebro; then neither the -conscript reinforcements, nor the junction of Caffarelli’s troops, -would have enabled Clauzel, with all his activity and talent, to -re-appear in the field before Burgos would have fallen. But that -fortress would most probably have fallen at once, in which case the -English general might have returned to the Tagus, and perhaps in time -to have met Soult as he issued forth from the mountains in his march -from Andalusia. - -It may be objected, that as Burgos did not yield, it would not have -yielded under any circumstances without a vigorous defence. This is -not so certain, the effect of a defeat would have been very different -from the effect of such a splendid operation as Clauzel’s retreat; -and it appears also, that the prolonged defence of the castle may be -traced to some errors of detail in the attack, as well as to want -of sufficient artillery means. In respect of the great features of -the campaign, it may be assumed that Wellington’s judgement on the -spot, and with a full knowledge both of his own and his adversaries’ -situations, is of more weight than that of critics, however able -and acute, who knew nothing of his difficulties. But in the details -there was something of error exceedingly strange. It is said, I -believe truly, that sir Howard Douglas being consulted, objected to -the proceeding by gallery and mine against an outward, a middle, -and an inward line of defence, as likely to involve a succession of -tedious and difficult enterprizes, which even if successful, would -still leave the White Church, and the upper castle or keep, to be -carried;—that this castle, besides other artillery armament, was -surmounted by a powerful battery of heavy guns, bearing directly -upon the face of the horn-work of San Michael, the only point from -which it could be breached, and until it was breached, the governor, -a gallant man, would certainly not surrender. It could not however -be breached without a larger battering train than the allies -possessed, and would not, as he supposed, be effected by mines; -wherefore proposing to take the guns from two frigates, then lying at -Santander, he proffered to bring them up in time. - -In this reasoning lord Wellington partly acquiesced, but his hopes -of success were principally founded on the scarcity of water in the -castle, and upon the facility of burning the provision magazines; nor -was he without hope that his fortune would carry him through, even -with the scanty means he possessed. Towards the end of the siege, -however, he did resort, though too late, to the plan of getting guns -up from Santander. But while sir Howard Douglas thus counselled him -on the spot, sir Edward Pakenham, then in Madrid, assured the author -of this history, at the time, that he also, foreseeing the artillery -means were too scanty, had proposed to send by the Somosierra twelve -fine Russian battering guns, then in the Retiro; and he pledged -himself to procure, by an appeal to the officers in the capital, -animals sufficient to transport them and their ammunition to Burgos -in a few days. The offer was not accepted. - -[Sidenote: Souham’s Official Correspondence, MSS.] - -Something also may be objected to the field operations, as connected -with the siege; for it is the rule, although not an absolute one, -that the enemy’s active army should first be beaten, or driven beyond -some strong line, such as a river, or chain of mountains, before a -siege is commenced. Now if Wellington had masked the castle after the -horn-work was carried on the 19th, and had then followed Clauzel, -the French generals, opposed to him, admit, that they would have -gone over the Ebro, perhaps even to Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In -that case all the minor dépôts must have been broken up, and the -reorganization of the army of Portugal retarded at least a month; -before that time, the guns from Santander would have arrived and the -castle of Burgos would have fallen. In Souham’s secret despatches, it -is said, of course on the authority of spies, that Castaños urged an -advance beyond Burgos instead of a siege; of this I know nothing, but -it is not unlikely, because to advance continually, and to surround -an enemy, constituted, with Spanish generals, the whole art of war. -Howbeit on this occasion, the advice, if given, was not unreasonable; -and it needed scarcely even to delay the siege while the covering -army advanced, because one division of infantry might have come up -from Madrid, still leaving two of the finest in the army, and a -brigade of cavalry, at that capital, which was sufficient, seeing -that Hill was coming up to Toledo, that Ballesteros’ disobedience was -then unknown, and that the king was in no condition to advance before -Soult arrived. - -The last point to which it is fitting to advert, was the stopping -too long on the Tormes in hopes of fighting in the position of the -Arapiles. It was a stirring thought indeed for a great mind, and the -error was brilliantly redeemed, but the remedy does not efface the -original fault; and this subject leads to a consideration, of some -speculative interest, namely, why Wellington, desirous as he was to -keep the line of the Tormes, and knowing with what difficulty the -French fed their large army, did not order every thing in his rear to -take refuge in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and entrench himself on -St. Christoval and in Salamanca. Thus posted with a bridge-head on -the left bank that he might operate on either side of the Tormes, he -might have waited until famine obliged the enemy to separate, which -would have been in a very few days; but perhaps the answer would be -that the Spaniards had left Ciudad Rodrigo in a defenceless state. - -Turning now to the French side we shall find that they also committed -errors. - -Souham’s pursuit after the cavalry combat at Vente de Pozo was -feeble. Wellington, speaking of his own army, said, “no troops were -ever less pressed by an enemy.” The king’s orders were however -positive not to fight, and as the English general continually -offered Souham battle in strong positions, the man had no power to -do mischief. Soult’s pursuit of Hill, which was also remarkably -cautious, arose from other motives. He was not desirous of a battle, -and until the Guadarama was passed, Hill had the larger force, for -then only was the whole French army united. The duke of Dalmatia -wished to have marched in one great mass through La Mancha, leaving -only a small corps, or a detachment of Suchet’s army, on the Cuenca -road; but the king united the whole of the army of the centre, his -own guards and seven thousand men of the army of the south, on the -Cuenca line, and there were no good cross communications except -by Taracon. Soult therefore advanced towards the Tagus with only -thirty-five thousand men, and from commissariat difficulties and -other obstacles, he was obliged to move by divisions, which followed -each other at considerable distances; when his advanced guard was at -Valdemoro, his rear-guard not having reached Ocaña was two marches -distant. The danger of this movement is evident. Hill might have -turned and driven him over the Tagus; or if his orders had permitted -him to act offensively at first, he might, after leaving a small -corps on the Upper Tagus, to watch the king, have passed that river -at Toledo, and without abandoning his line of operations by the -valley of the Tagus, have attacked Soult while on the march towards -Ocaña. The latter in despite of his numerous cavalry must then have -fallen back to concentrate his forces, and this would have deranged -the whole campaign. - -The duke of Dalmatia, who thought Ballesteros was with Hill, -naturally feared to press his adversary under such a vicious -disposition of the French army, neither could that disposition be -changed during the operation, because of the want of good cross -roads, and because Souham had been taught that the king would meet -him on the side of Guadalaxara. In fine Soult had learned to respect -his adversaries, and with the prudence of a man whose mental grasp -embraced the whole machinery of the war, he avoided a doubtful battle -where a defeat would, from the unsettled state of the French affairs, -have lost the whole Peninsula. Wellington had Portugal to fall back -upon, but the French armies must have gone behind the Ebro. - -These seem to be the leading points of interest in this campaign, but -it will not be uninteresting to mark the close affinities between -Wellington’s retreat and that of sir John Moore. This last-named -general marched from Portugal into the north of Spain, with the -political view of saving Andalusia, by drawing on himself the -French power, having before-hand declared that he expected to be -overwhelmed. In like manner Wellington moved into the same country, -to deliver Andalusia, and thus drew on himself the whole power of -the enemy; like Moore declaring also before-hand, that the political -object being gained, his own military position would be endangered. -Both succeeded, and both were, as they had foretold, overwhelmed by -superior forces. Moore was to have been aided by Romana’s Spanish -army, but he found it a burthen; so also Wellington was impeded, not -assisted, by the Gallicians, and both generals were without money. - -Moore having approached Soult, and menaced Burgos, was forced to -retreat, because Napoleon moved from Madrid on his right flank and -towards his rear. Wellington having actually besieged Burgos was -obliged to raise the siege and retire, lest the king, coming through -Madrid, should pass his right flank and get into his rear. Moore was -only followed by Soult to the Esla, Wellington was only followed -by Souham to the Duero. The one general looked to the mountains of -Gallicia for positions which he could maintain, but the apathy of the -Spanish people, in the south, permitted Napoleon to bring up such -an overwhelming force that this plan could not be sustained; the -other general had the same notion with respect to the Duero, and the -defection of Ballesteros enabled the king to bring up such a power -that further retreat became necessary. - -Moore’s soldiers at the commencement of the operation evinced want of -discipline, they committed great excesses at Valderas, and disgraced -themselves by their inebriety at Bembibre and Villa Franca. In -like manner Wellington’s soldiers broke the bonds of discipline, -disgraced themselves by drunkenness at Torquemada and on the retreat -from the Puente Larga to Madrid; and they committed excesses every -where. Moore stopped behind the Esla river to check the enemy, to -restore order, and to enable his commissariat to remove the stores; -Wellington stopped behind the Carrion for exactly the same purposes. -The one general was immediately turned on his left, because the -bridge of Mancilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceschi; the other -general was also turned on his left, because the bridge of Palencia -was abandoned unbroken to Foy. - -Moore’s retreat was little short of three hundred miles; Wellington’s -was nearly as long, and both were in the winter season. The first -halted at Benevente, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo; the last halted -at Duenas, at Cabeçon, Tordesillas, and Salamanca. The principal -loss sustained by the one, was in the last marches between Lugo and -Coruña; so also the principal loss sustained by the other, was in -the last marches between the Tormes and the Agueda. Some of Moore’s -generals murmured against his proceedings, some of Wellington’s -generals, as we have seen, went further; the first were checked -by a reprimand, the second were humbled by a sarcasm. Finally -both generals reproached their armies with want of discipline, -both attributed it to the negligence of the officers generally, -and in both cases the justice of the reproaches was proved by the -exceptions. The reserve and the foot-guards in Moore’s campaign, -the light division and the foot-guards in Wellington’s, gave signal -proof, that it was negligence of discipline, not hardships, though -the latter were severe in both armies, that caused the losses. Not -that I would be understood to say that those regiments only preserved -order; it is certain that many others were eminently well conducted, -but those were the troops named as exceptions at the time. - -Such were the resemblances of these two retreats. The differences -were, that Moore had only twenty-three thousand men in the first -part of his retreat, and only nineteen thousand in the latter part, -whereas Wellington had thirty-three thousand in the first part of his -retreat, and sixty-eight thousand men in the latter part. Moore’s -army were all of one nation and young soldiers, Wellington’s were of -different nations but they were veterans. The first marched through -mountains, where the weather was infinitely more inclement than in -the plains, over which the second moved, and until he reached the -Esla, Moore’s flank was quite exposed, whereas Wellington’s flank -was covered by Hill’s army until he gained the Tormes. Wellington -with veteran troops was opposed to Souham, to Soult, to the king, and -to Jourdan, men not according in their views, and their whole army, -when united, did not exceed the allies by more than twenty thousand -men. Moore with young soldiers was at first opposed to four times, -and latterly to three times his own numbers, for it is remarkable, -that the French army assembled at Astorga was above eighty thousand, -including ten thousand cavalry, which is nearly the same as the -number assembled against Wellington on the Tormes; but Moore had -little more than twenty thousand men to oppose to this overwhelming -mass, and Wellington had nearly seventy thousand. The Partidas -abounded at the time of Wellington’s retreat, they were unknown at -the time of Moore’s retreat, and this general was confronted by -Napoleon, who, despotic in command, was also unrivalled in skill, -in genius, and in vigour. Wellington’s army was not pressed by the -enemy, and he made short marches, yet he lost more stragglers than -Moore, who was vigorously pressed, made long marches, and could -only secure an embarkation by delivering a battle, in which he died -most honourably. His character was immediately vilified. Wellington -was relieved from his pursuers by the operation of famine, and had -therefore no occasion to deliver a battle, but he also was vilified -at the time, with equal injustice; and if he had then died it would -have been with equal malice. His subsequent successes, his great name -and power, have imposed silence upon his detractors, or converted -censure into praise, for it is the nature of mankind, especially of -the ignorant, to cling to fortune. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8, A.] - -Moore attributed his difficulties to the apathy of the Spaniards; -his friends charged them on the incapacity of the English government. -Wellington attributed his ultimate failure to the defection of -Ballesteros; his brother, in the House of Lords, charged it on the -previous contracted policy of Perceval’s government, which had -crippled the general’s means; and certainly Wellington’s reasoning, -relative to Ballesteros, was not quite sound. That general, he -said, might either have forced Soult to take the circuitous route -of Valencia, Requeña, and Cuenca, or leave a strong corps in -observation, and then Hill might have detached men to the north. He -even calculated upon Ballesteros being able to stop both Soult and -Souham, altogether; for as the latter’s operations were prescribed -by the king, and dependent upon his proceedings, Wellington judged -that he would have remained tranquil if Joseph had not advanced. -This was the error. Souham’s despatches clearly shew, that the -king’s instructions checked, instead of forwarding his movements; -and that it was his intention to have delivered battle at the end -of four days, without regard to the king’s orders; and such was -his force, that Wellington admitted his own inability to keep the -field. Ballesteros’ defection therefore cannot be pleaded in bar of -all further investigation; but whatever failures there were, and -however imposing the height to which the English general’s reputation -has since attained, this campaign, including the sieges of Ciudad -Rodrigo, Badajos, the forts of Salamanca, and of Burgos, the assault -of Almaraz, and the battle of Salamanca, will probably be considered -his finest illustration of the art of war. Waterloo may be called -a more glorious exploit because of the great man who was there -vanquished; Assye may be deemed a more wonderful action, one indeed -to be compared with the victory which Lucullus gained over Tygranes, -but Salamanca will always be referred to as the most skilful of -Wellington’s battles. - - - - -BOOK XX. - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: 1812.] - -While the armies were striving, the political affairs had become -exceedingly complicated and unsteady. Their workings were little -known or observed by the public, but the evils of bad government in -England, Spain, and Portugal, the incongruous alliance of bigoted -aristocracy with awakened democracy, and the inevitable growth -of national jealousies as external danger seemed to recede, were -becoming so powerful, that if relief had not been obtained from -extraneous events, even the vigour of Wellington must have sunk under -the pressure. The secret causes of disturbance shall now be laid -bare, and it will then be seen that the catastrophe of Napoleon’s -Russian campaign was absolutely necessary to the final success of -the British arms in the Peninsula. I speak not of the physical -power which, if his host had not withered on the snowy wastes of -Muscovy, the emperor could have poured into Spain, but of those moral -obstacles, which, springing up on every side, corrupted the very -life-blood of the war. - -If Russia owed her safety in some degree to the contest in the -Peninsula, it is undoubted that the fate of the Peninsula was in -return, decided on the plains of Russia; for had the French veterans -who there perished, returned victorious, the war could have been -maintained for years in Spain, with all its waste of treasures and -of blood, to the absolute ruin of England, even though her army -might have been victorious in every battle. Yet who shall say with -certainty what termination any war will ever have? Who shall prophecy -of an art always varying, and of such intricacy that its secrets seem -beyond the reach of human intellect? What vast preparations, what -astonishing combinations were involved in the plan, what vigour and -ability displayed in the execution of Napoleon’s march to Moscow! And -yet when the winter came, only four days sooner than he expected, the -giant’s scheme seemed a thing for children to laugh at! - -Nevertheless the political grandeur of that expedition will not -be hereafter judged from the wild triumph of his enemies, nor its -military merits from the declamation which has hitherto passed as the -history of the wondrous, though unfortunate enterprise. It will not -be the puerilities of Labaume, of Segur, and their imitators, nor -even that splendid military and political essay of general Jomini, -called the “_Life of Napoleon_,” which posterity will accept as the -measure of a general, who carried four hundred thousand men across -the Niemen, and a hundred and sixty thousand men to Moscow. And with -such a military providence, with such a vigilance, so disposing his -reserves, so guarding his flanks, so guiding his masses, that while -constantly victorious in front, no post was lost in his rear, no -convoy failed, no courier was stopped, not even a letter was missing: -the communication with his capital was as regular and certain as -if that immense march had been but a summer excursion of pleasure! -However it failed, and its failure was the safety of the Peninsula. - -In England the retreat from Burgos was viewed with the alarm and -anger which always accompanies the disappointment of high-raised -public expectation; the people had been taught to believe the French -weak and dispirited, they saw them so strong and daring, that even -victory could not enable the allies to make a permanent stand beyond -the frontiers of Portugal. Hence arose murmurs, and a growing -distrust as to the ultimate result, which would not have failed to -overturn the war faction, if the retreat of the French from Moscow, -the defection of Prussia, and the strange unlooked-for spectacle of -Napoleon vanquished, had not come in happy time as a counterpoise. - -When the parliament met, lord Wellesley undertook, and did very -clearly show, that if the successes in the early part of the year had -not been, by his brother, pushed to the extent expected, and had been -followed by important reverses, the causes were clearly to be traced -to the imbecile administration of Mr. Perceval and his coadjutors, -whose policy he truly characterized as having in it “_nothing regular -but confusion_.” With a very accurate knowledge of facts he discussed -the military question, and maintained that twelve thousand infantry -and three thousand cavalry, added to the army in the beginning of -the year, would have rendered the campaign decisive, because the -Russian contest, the incapacity of Joseph, and the dissentions of the -French generals in Spain, had produced the most favourable crisis -for striking a vital blow at the enemy’s power. The cabinet were -aware of this, and in good time, but though there were abundance of -soldiers idling at home, when the welfare of the state required their -presence in the Peninsula, nay, although the ministers had actually -sent within five thousand as many men as were necessary, they had, -with the imbecility which marked all their proceedings, so contrived, -that few or none should reach the theatre of war until the time for -success had passed away. Then touching upon the financial question, -with a rude hand he tore to pieces the minister’s pitiful pretexts, -that the want of specie had necessarily put bounds to their efforts, -and that the general himself did not complain. “No!” exclaimed lord -Wellesley, “he does not complain because it is the sacred duty of -a soldier not to complain. But he does not say that with greater -means he could not do greater things, and his country will not be -satisfied if these means are withheld by men, who having assumed the -direction of affairs in such a crisis, have only incapacity to plead -in extenuation of their failures.” - -This stern accuser was himself fresh from the ministry, versed in -state matters, and of unquestionable talents; he was well acquainted -with the actual resources and difficulties of the moment; he was -sincere in his opinions because he had abandoned office rather than -be a party to such a miserable mismanagement of England’s power; he -was in fine no mean authority against his former colleagues, even -though the facts did not so clearly bear him out in his views. - -[Sidenote: Wellington’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -That England possessed the troops and that they were wanted by -Wellington is undeniable. Even in September there were still between -fifty and sixty thousand soldiers present under arms at home, and -that any additional force could have been fed in Portugal is equally -beyond doubt, because the reserve magazines contained provisions for -one hundred thousand men for nine months. The only question then -was the possibility of procuring enough of specie to purchase those -supplies which could not be had on credit. Lord Wellington had indeed -made the campaign almost without specie, and a small additional force -would certainly not have overwhelmed his resources; but setting -this argument aside, what efforts, what ability, what order, what -arrangements were made by the government to overcome the difficulties -of the time? Was there less extravagance in the public offices, the -public works, public salaries, public contracts? The very snuff-boxes -and services of plate given to diplomatists, the gorgeous furniture -of palaces, nay the gaudy trappings wasted on Whittingham’s, Roche’s, -and Downie’s divisions, would almost have furnished the wants of the -additional troops demanded by lord Wellesley. Where were all the -millions lavished in subsidies to the Spaniards, where the millions -which South America had transmitted to Cadiz, where those sums -spent by the soldiers during the war? Real money had indeed nearly -disappeared from England, and a base paper had usurped its place; but -gold had not disappeared from the world, and an able ministry would -have found it. These men only knew how to squander. - -[Sidenote: Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The subsidy granted to Portugal was paid by the commercial -speculation of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, speculations which -also fed the army, saved the whole population of Portugal from -famine, and prevented the war from stopping in 1811; and yet so -little were the ministers capable even of understanding, much less -of making such arrangements, that they now rebuked their general for -having adopted them and after their own imbecile manner insisted upon -a new mode of providing supplies. Every movement they made proved -their incapacity. They had permitted lord William Bentinck to engage -in the scheme of invading Italy when additional troops were wanted in -Portugal; and they suffered him to bid, in the money-market, against -lord Wellington, and thus sweep away two millions of dollars at an -exorbitant premium, for a chimera, when the war in the Peninsula was -upon the point of stopping altogether in default of that very money -which Wellington could have otherwise procured—nay, had actually been -promised at a reasonable cost. Nor was this the full measure of their -folly. - -Lord Wellesley affirmed, and they were unable to deny the fact, that -dollars might have been obtained from South America to any amount, -if the government would have consented to pay the market-price for -them; they would not do it, and yet afterwards sought to purchase the -same dollars at a higher rate in the European markets. He told them, -and they could not deny it, that they had empowered five different -agents, to purchase dollars for five different services, without any -controlling head; that these independent agents were bidding against -each other in every money-market, and the restrictions as to the -price were exactly in the inverse proportion to the importance of -the service: the agent for the troops in Malta was permitted to offer -the highest price, lord Wellington was restricted to the lowest. And -besides this folly lord Wellesley shewed that they had, under their -licensing system, permitted French vessels to bring French goods, -silks and gloves, to England, and to carry bullion away in return. -Napoleon thus paid his army in Spain with the very coin which should -have subsisted the English troops. - -Incapable however as the ministers were of making the simplest -arrangements; neglecting, as they did, the most obvious means of -supplying the wants of the army; incapable even, as we have seen, -of sending out a few bales of clothing and arms for the Spaniards -without producing the utmost confusion, they were heedless of the -counsels of their general, prompt to listen to every intriguing -adviser, and ready to plunge into the most absurd and complicated -measures, to relieve that distress which their own want of ability -had produced. When the war with the United States broke out, a war -provoked by themselves, they suffered the Admiralty, contrary to -the wishes of Mr. Stuart, to reduce the naval force at Lisbon, and -to neglect Wellington’s express recommendation as to the stationing -of ships for the protection of the merchantmen bringing flour and -stores to Portugal. Thus the American privateers, being unmolested, -run down the coast of Africa, intercepted the provision trade from -the Brazils, which was one of the principal resources of the army, -and then, emboldened by impunity, infested the coast of Portugal, -captured fourteen ships loaded with flour off the Douro, and a large -vessel in the very mouth of the Tagus. These things happened also -when the ministers were censuring and interfering with the general’s -commercial transactions, and seeking to throw the feeding of his -soldiers into the hands of British speculators; as if the supply of -an army was like that of a common market! never considering that -they thus made it the merchant’s interest to starve the troops with -a view to increase profits; never considering that it was by that -very commerce, which they were putting an end to, that the general -had paid the Portuguese subsidy for them, and had furnished his own -military chest with specie, when their administrative capacity was -quite unequal to the task. - -Never was a government better served than the British government was -by lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart. With abilities, vigilance, and -industry seldom equalled, they had made themselves masters of all -that related to the Portuguese policy, whether foreign or domestic, -military, or civil, or judicial. They knew all the causes of -mischief, they had faithfully represented them both to the Portuguese -and British governments, and had moreover devised effectual remedies. -But the former met them with the most vexatious opposition, and the -latter, neglecting their advice, lent themselves to those foolish -financial schemes which I have before touched upon as emanating from -Mr. Villiers, Mr. Vansittart, and the count of Funchal. The first -had been deficient as an ambassador and statesman, the second was -universally derided as a financier, and the third, from his long -residence in London, knew very little of the state of Portugal, -had derived that little from the information of his brother, the -restless Principal Souza, and in all his schemes had reference only -to his own intrigues in the Brazils. Their plans were necessarily -absurd. Funchal revived the old project of an English loan, and in -concert with his coadjutors desired to establish a bank after the -manner of the English institution; and they likewise advanced a -number of minor details and propositions, most of which had been -before suggested by Principal Souza and rejected by lord Wellington, -and all of which went to evade, not to remedy the evils. Finally they -devised, and the English cabinet actually entertained the plan, of -selling the crown and church property of Portugal. This spoliation -of the Catholic church was to be effected by commissioners, one of -whom was to be Mr. Sydenham, an Englishman and a Protestant; and as -it was judged that the pope would not readily yield his consent, -they resolved to apply to his nuncio, who being in their power they -expected to find more pliable. - -Having thus provided for the financial difficulties of Portugal, -the ministers turned their attention to the supply of the British -army, and in the same spirit concocted what they called a modified -system of requisitions after the manner of the French armies! Their -speeches, their manifestoes, their whole scheme of policy, which -in the working had nearly crushed the liberties of England and had -plunged the whole world into war; that policy whose aim and scope -was, they said, to support established religion, the rights of -monarchs, and the independence of nations, was now disregarded or -forgotten. Yes, these men, to remove difficulties caused by their -own incapacity and negligence, were ready to adopt all that they -had before condemned and reviled in the French; they were eager to -meddle, and in the most offensive manner, with the catholic religion, -by getting from the nuncio, who was in their power, what they could -not get from the pope voluntarily; they were ready to interfere with -the rights of the Portuguese crown by selling its property, and -finally they would have adopted that system of requisitions which -they had so often denounced as rendering the very name of France -abhorrent to the world. - -All these schemes were duly transmitted to lord Wellington and to Mr. -Stuart, and the former had, in the field, to unravel the intricacies, -to detect the fallacies, and to combat the wild speculations of men, -who, in profound ignorance of facts, were giving a loose to their -imaginations on such complicated questions of state. It was while -preparing to fight Marmont that he had to expose the futility of -relying upon a loan; it was on the heights of San Christoval, on -the field of battle itself, that he demonstrated the absurdity of -attempting to establish a Portuguese bank; it was in the trenches of -Burgos that he dissected Funchal’s and Villiers’s schemes of finance, -and exposed the folly of attempting the sale of church property; it -was at the termination of the retreat that with a mixture of rebuke -and reasoning he quelled the proposal to live by forced requisitions; -and on each occasion he shewed himself as well acquainted with these -subjects as he was with the mechanism of armies. - -Reform abuses, raise your actual taxes with vigour and impartiality, -pay your present debt before you contract a new one, was his constant -reply to the propositions for loans. And when the English ministers -pressed the other plans, which, besides the bank, included a -recoinage of dollars into cruzados, in other words the depreciation -of the silver standard, he with an unsparing hand laid their folly -bare. The military and political state of Portugal he said was such -that no man in his senses, whether native or foreigner, would place -his capital where he could not withdraw it at a moment’s notice. When -Massena invaded that country unreasonable despondency had prevailed -amongst the ministers, and now they seemed to have a confidence as -wild as their former fear; but he who knew the real state of affairs; -he who knew the persons that were expected to advance money; he who -knew the relative forces of the contending armies, the advantages and -disadvantages attending each; he who knew the absolute weakness of -the Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, could only laugh at the -notion that the capitalists would take gold out of their own chests -to lodge it in the chests of the bank and eventually in those of the -Portuguese treasury, a treasury deservedly without credit. The French -armies opposed to him in the field (he was then on San Christoval) -were, he said, just double his own strength, and a serious accident -to Ballesteros, a rash general with a bad army, would oblige the -Anglo-Portuguese force to retire into Portugal and the prospects of -the campaign would vanish; and this argument left out of the question -any accident which might happen to himself or general Hill. Portugal -would, he hoped, be saved but its security was not such as these -visionaries would represent it. - -But they had proposed also a British security, in jewels, for the -capital of their bank, and their reasonings on this head were -equally fallacious. This security was to be supported by collecting -the duties on wines, exported from Portugal to England, and yet -they had not even ascertained whether the existence of these -duties was conformable to the treaty with England. Then came the -former question. Would Great Britain guarantee the capital of the -subscribers whether Portugal was lost or saved? If the country should -be lost, the new possessors would understand the levying the duties -upon wines as well as the old; would England make her drinkers of -port pay two duties, the one for the benefit of the bank capitalists, -the other for the benefit of the French conquerors? If all these -difficulties could be got over, a bank would be the most efficacious -mode in which England could use her credit for the benefit of -Portugal; but all the other plans proposed were mere spendthrift -schemes to defray the expenses of the war, and if the English -government could descend to entertain them they would fail, because -the real obstacle, scarcity of specie, would remain. - -A nation desirous of establishing public credit should begin, he -said, by acquiring a revenue equal to its fixed expenditure, and must -manifest an inclination to be honest by performing its engagements -with respect to public debts. This maxim he had constantly enforced -to the Portuguese government, and if they had minded it, instead of -trusting to the fallacious hope of getting loans in England, the -deficiency of their revenue would have been made up, without imposing -new taxes, and even with the repeal of many which were oppressive -and unjust. The fair and honest collection of taxes, which ought to -exist, would have been sufficient. For after protracted and unsparing -exertions, and by refusing to accept their paper money on any other -condition in his commissariat transactions, he had at last forced -the Portuguese authorities to pay the interest of that paper and of -their exchequer bills, called “_Apolocies grandes_,” and the effect -had been to increase the resources of the government though the -government had even in the execution evinced its corruption. Then -showing in detail how this benefit had been produced he traced the -mischief created by men whom he called the _sharks_ of Lisbon and -other great towns, meaning speculators, principally Englishmen, whose -nefarious cupidity led them to cry down the credit of the army-bills, -and then purchase them, to the injury of the public and of the poor -people who furnished the supplies. - -A plan of recoining the Spanish dollars and so gaining eight in -the hundred of pure silver which they contained above that of the -Portuguese cruzado, he treated as a fraud, and a useless one. In -Lisbon, where the cruzado was current, some gain might perhaps be -made; but it was not even there certain, and foreigners, Englishmen -and Americans, from whom the great supplies were purchased, would -immediately add to their prices in proportion to the deterioration -of the coin. Moreover the operations and expenditure of the army -were not confined to Lisbon, nor even to Portugal, and the cruzado -would not pass for its nominal value in Spain; thus instead of an -advantage, the greatest inconvenience would result from a scheme at -the best unworthy of the British government. In fine the reform of -abuses, the discontinuance of useless expenses, economy and energy -were the only remedies. - -Such was his reasoning but it had little effect on his persecutors; -for when his best men were falling by hundreds, his brightest visions -of glory fading on the smoky walls of Burgos, he was again forced -to examine and refute anew, voluminous plans of Portuguese finance, -concocted by Funchal and Villiers, with notes by Vansittart. All -the old schemes of the Principal Souza, which had been so often -before analyzed and rejected as impracticable, were revived with the -addition of a mixed Anglo-Portuguese commission for the sale of the -crown and church lands. And these projects were accompanied with -complaints that frauds had been practised on the custom-house, and -violence used towards the inhabitants by the British commissaries, -and it was insinuated such misconduct had been the real cause of the -financial distresses of Portugal. The patient industry of genius was -never more severely taxed. - -Wellington began by repelling the charges of exactions and frauds, -as applied to the army; he showed that to reform the custom-house -so as to prevent frauds, had been his unceasing recommendation to -the Portuguese government; that he had as repeatedly, and in detail, -shewed the government, how to remedy the evils they complained of, -how to increase their customs, how to levy their taxes, how in fine -to arrange their whole financial system in a manner that would have -rendered their revenues equal to their expenses, and without that -oppression and injustice which they were in the habit of practising; -for the extortions and violence complained of, were not perpetrated -by the English but by the Portuguese commissariat, and yet the troops -of that nation were starving. Having exposed Funchal’s ignorance -of financial facts in detail, and challenged him to the proof of -the charges against the British army, he entered deeply into the -consideration of the great question of the sale of the crown and -church lands, which it had been proposed to substitute for that -economy and reform of abuses which he so long, so often, and so -vainly had pressed upon the regency. The proposal was not quite new. -“I have already,” he observed, “had before me a proposition for the -sale or rather transfer, to the creditors of the ‘_Junta de Viveres_’ -of crown lands; but these were the uncultivated lands in Alemtejo, -and I pointed out to the government the great improbability that any -body would take such lands in payment, and the injury that would be -done to the public credit by making the scheme public if not likely -to be successful. My opinion is that there is nobody in Portugal -possessed of capital who entertains, or who ought to entertain, -such an opinion of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, as to lay -out his money in the purchase of crown lands. The loss of a battle, -not in the Peninsula even, but elsewhere, would expose his estate -to confiscation, or at all events to ruin by a fresh incursion of -the enemy. Even if any man could believe that Portugal is secure -against the invasion of the enemy, and his estate and person against -the ‘_violence, exactions, and frauds_’ (these were Funchal’s words -respecting the allied army) of the enemy, he is not, during the -existence of the war, according to the Conde de Funchal’s notion, -exempt from those evils from his own countrymen and their allies. Try -this experiment, offer the estates of the crown for sale, and it will -be seen whether I have formed a correct judgment on this subject.” -Then running with a rapid hand over many minor though intricate -fallacies for raising the value of the Portuguese paper-money, he -thus treated the great question of the church lands. - -First, as in the case of crown lands, there would be no purchasers, -and as nothing could render the measure palatable to the clergy, the -influence of the church would be exerted against the allies, instead -of being, as hitherto, strongly exerted in their favour. It would be -useless if the experiment of the crown lands succeeded, and if that -failed the sale of church lands could not succeed; but the attempt -would alienate the good wishes of a very powerful party in Spain, as -well as in Portugal. Moreover if it should succeed, and be honestly -carried into execution, it would entail a burthen on the finances of -five in the hundred, on the purchase-money, for the support of the -ecclesiastical owners of the estates. The best mode of obtaining for -the state eventually the benefit of the church property, would be to -prevent the monasteries and nunneries from receiving novices, and -thus, in the course of time, the pope might be brought to consent -to the sale of the estates, or the nation might assume possession -when the ecclesiastical corporations thus became extinct. He however -thought that it was no disadvantage to Spain or Portugal, that large -portions of land should be held by the church. The bishops and monks -were the only proprietors who lived on their estates, and spent -the revenues amongst the labourers by whom those revenues had been -produced; and until the habits of the new landed proprietors changed, -the transfer of the property in land from the clergy to the laymen -would be a misfortune. - -This memoir, sent from the trenches of Burgos, quashed Funchal’s -projects; but that intriguer’s object was not so much to remove -financial difficulties, as to get rid of his brother’s opponents in -the regency by exciting powerful interests against them; wherefore -failing in this proposal, he ordered Redondo, now marquis of Borba, -the minister of finance, to repair to the Brazils, intending to -supply his place with one of his own faction. Wellington and Stuart -were at this time doggedly opposed by Borba, but as the credit of the -Portuguese treasury was supported by his character for probity, they -forbade him to obey the order, and represented the matter so forcibly -to the prince regent, that Funchal was severely reprimanded for his -audacity. - -It was amidst these vexations that Wellington made his retreat, and -in such destitution that he declared all former distress for money -had been slight in comparison of his present misery. So low were -the resources, that British naval stores had been trucked for corn -in Egypt; and the English ministers, finding that Russia, intent -upon pushing her successes, was gathering specie from all quarters, -desired Mr. Stuart to prevent the English and American captains of -merchant vessels from carrying coin away from Lisbon; a remedial -measure, indicating their total ignorance of the nature of commerce. -It was not attempted to be enforced. Then also they transmitted their -plan of supplying the English army by requisitions on the country, a -plan the particulars of which may be best gathered from the answers -to it. - -Mr. Stuart, firm in opposition, shortly observed that it was by -avoiding and reprobating such a system, although pursued alike by the -natives and by the enemy, that the British character, and credit, -had been established so firmly as to be of the greatest use in the -operations of the war. Wellington entered more deeply into the -subject. - -Nothing, he said, could be procured from the country in the mode -proposed by the ministers’ memoir, unless resort was also had to -the French mode of enforcing their requisitions. The proceedings -of the French armies were misunderstood. It was not true, as -supposed in the memoir, that the French never paid for supplies. -They levied contributions where money was to be had, and with this -paid for provisions in other parts; and when requisitions for money -or clothing were made, they were taken on account of the regular -contributions due to the government. They were indeed heavier than -even an usurping government was entitled to demand, still it was a -regular government account, and it was obvious the British army could -not have recourse to a similar plan without depriving its allies of -their own legitimate resources. - -The requisitions were enforced by a system of terror. A magistrate -was ordered to provide for the troops, and was told that the latter -would, in case of failure, take the provisions and punish the village -or district in a variety of ways. Now were it expedient to follow -this mode of requisition there must be two armies, one to fight -the enemy and one to enforce the requisitions, for the Spaniards -would never submit to such proceedings without the use of force. -The conscription gave the French armies a more moral description of -soldiers, but even if this second army was provided, the British -troops could not be trusted to inflict an exact measure of punishment -on a disobedient village, they would plunder it as well as the -others readily enough, but their principal object would be to get -at and drink as much liquor as they could, and then to destroy as -much valuable property as should fall in their way; meanwhile the -objects of their mission, the bringing of supplies to the army and -the infliction of an exact measure of punishment on the magistrates -or district would not be accomplished at all. Moreover the holders -of supplies in Spain being unused to commercial habits, would regard -payment for these requisitions by bills of any description, to be -rather worse than the mode of contribution followed by the French, -and would resist it as forcibly. And upon such a nice point did the -war hang, that if they accepted the bills, and were once to discover -the mode of procuring cash for them by discounting high, it would -be the most fatal blow possible to the credit and resources of the -British army in the Peninsula. The war would then soon cease. - -The memoir asserted that sir John Moore had been well furnished -with money, and that nevertheless the Spaniards would not give him -provisions; and this fact was urged as an argument for enforcing -requisitions. But the assertion that Moore was furnished with money, -which was itself the index to the ministers’ incapacity, Wellington -told them was not true. “Moore,” he said, “had been even worse -furnished than himself; that general had borrowed a little, a very -little money at Salamanca, but he had no regular supply for the -military chest until the army had nearly reached Coruña; and the -Spaniards were not very wrong in their reluctance to meet his wants, -for the debts of his army were still unpaid in the latter end of -1812.” In fine there was no mode by which supplies could be procured -from the country without payment on the spot, or soon after the -transaction, except by prevailing on the Spanish government to give -the English army a part of the government contributions, and a part -of the revenues of the royal domains, to be received from the people -in kind at a reasonable rate. This had been already done by himself -in the province of Salamanca with success, and the same system might -be extended to other provinces in proportion as the legitimate -government was re-established. But this only met a part of the evil, -it would indeed give some supplies, cheaper than they could otherwise -be procured, yet they must afterwards be paid for at Cadiz in specie, -and thus less money would come into the military chest, which, as -before noticed, was only supported by the mercantile speculations of -the general. - -Such were the discussions forced upon Wellington when all his -faculties were demanded on the field of battle, and such was the -hardiness of his intellect to sustain the additional labour. Such -also were the men calling themselves statesmen who then wielded the -vast resources of Great Britain. The expenditure of that country for -the year 1812, was above one hundred millions, the ministers who -controuled it, were yet so ignorant of the elementary principles of -finance, as to throw upon their general, even amidst the clangor -and tumult of battle, the task of exposing such fallacies. And to -reduce these persons from the magnitude of statesmen to their natural -smallness of intriguing debaters is called political prejudice! But -though power may enable men to trample upon reason for a time with -impunity, they cannot escape her ultimate vengeance, she reassumes -her sway and history delivers them to the justice of posterity. - -Perverse as the proceedings of the English ministers were, those -of the Portuguese and Spanish governments were not less vexatious; -and at this time the temper of the Spanish rulers was of infinite -importance because of the misfortunes which had befallen the French -emperor. The opportunity given to strike a decisive blow at his -power in the Peninsula demanded an early and vigorous campaign in -Spain, and the experience of 1812 had taught Wellington, that no -aid could be derived from the Spaniards unless a change was made -in their military system. Hence the moment he was assured that the -French armies had taken winter-quarters, he resolved before all other -matters, in person to urge upon the Cortez the necessity of giving -him the real as well as the nominal command of their troops, seeing -that without an immediate reformation the Spanish armies could not -take the field in due season. - -During the past campaign, and especially after the Conde de Abispal, -indignant at the censure passed in the Cortez on his brother’s -conduct at Castalla, had resigned, the weakness of the Spanish -government had become daily more deplorable; nothing was done to -ameliorate the military system; an extreme jealousy raged between the -Cortez and the regency; and when the former offered lord Wellington -the command of their armies, Mr. Wellesley advised him to accept it, -not so much in the hope of effecting any beneficial change, as to -offer a point upon which the Spaniards who were still true to the -English alliance and to the aristocratic cause might rally in case of -reverse. The disobedience of Ballesteros had been indeed promptly -punished; but the vigour of the Cortez on that occasion, was more the -result of offended pride than any consideration of sound policy, and -the retreat of the allies into Portugal was the signal for a renewal -of those dangerous intrigues, which the battle of Salamanca had -arrested without crushing. - -Lord Wellington reached Cadiz on the 18th of December, he was -received without enthusiasm, yet with due honour, and his presence -seemed agreeable both to the Cortes and to the people; the passions -which actuated the different parties in the state subsided for the -moment, and the ascendency of his genius was so strongly felt, that -he was heard with patience, even when in private he strongly urged -the leading men to turn their attention entirely to the war, to place -in abeyance their factious disputes and above all things not to put -down the inquisition lest they should drive the powerful church party -into the arms of the enemy. His exhortation upon this last point, -had indeed no effect save to encourage the Serviles to look more -to England, yet it did not prevent the Cortez yielding to him the -entire controul of fifty thousand men which were to be paid from the -English subsidy; they promised also that the commanders should not be -removed, nor any change made in the organization or destination of -such troops without his consent. - -A fresh organization of the Spanish forces now had place. They were -divided into four armies and two reserves. - -The Catalans formed the first army. - -Elio’s troops including the divisions of Duran, Bassecour, and Villa -Campa, received the name of the second army. - -The forces in the Morena, formerly under Ballesteros, were -constituted the third army, under Del Parque. - -The troops of Estremadura, Leon, Gallicia, and the Asturias, -including Morillo’s, Penne Villemur’s, Downie’s, and Carlos -d’España’s separate divisions, were called the fourth army, and -given to Castaños, whose appointment to Catalonia was cancelled, and -his former dignity of captain-general in Estremadura and Gallicia -restored. The Partidas of Longa, Mina, Porlier, and the other chiefs -in the northern provinces were afterwards united to this army as -separate divisions. - -The conde d’Abispal, made captain-general of Andalusia, commanded -the first reserve, and Lacy recalled from Catalonia, where he was -replaced by Copons, was ordered to form a second reserve in the -neighbourhood of San Roque. Such were the new dispositions, but when -Wellington had completed this important negociation with the Spanish -government some inactivity was for the first time discovered in his -own proceedings. His stay was a little prolonged without apparent -reason, and it was whispered that if he resembled Cæsar, Cadiz could -produce a Cleopatra; but whether true or not, he soon returned to -the army, first however visiting Lisbon where he was greeted with -extraordinary honours, and the most unbounded enthusiasm, especially -by the people. - -His departure from Cadiz was the signal for all the political -dissentions to break out with more violence than before; the -dissentions of the liberals and serviles became more rancorous, and -the executive was always on the side of the latter, the majority of -the cortez on the side of the former; neither enjoyed the confidence -of the people nor of the allies, and the intrigues of Carlotta, which -never ceased, advanced towards their completion. A strong inclination -to make her sole regent was manifested, and sir Henry Wellesley, -tired of fruitless opposition remained neuter, with the approbation -of his brother. One of the principal causes of this feeling for -Carlotta, was the violence she had shewn against the insurgents of -Buenos Ayres, and another was the disgust given to the merchants of -Cadiz, by certain diplomatic measures which lord Strangford had held -with that revolted state. The agents of the princess represented the -policy of England towards the Spanish colonies as a smuggling policy, -and not without truth, for the advice of lord Wellington upon that -subject had been unheeded. Lord Castlereagh had indeed offerred a new -mediation scheme, whereby the old commission was to proceed under the -Spanish restriction of not touching at Mexico, to which country a -new mission composed of Spaniards was to proceed, accompanied by an -English agent without any ostensible character. This proposal however -ended as the others had done, and the Spanish jealousy of England -increased. - -[Sidenote: 1813. March.] - -In the beginning of the year 1813, Carlotta’s cause ably and -diligently served by Pedro Souza, had gained a number of adherents -even amongst the liberals in the cortez. She was ready to sacrifice -even the rights of her posterity, and as she promised to maintain all -ancient abuses, the clergy and the serviles were in no manner averse -to her success. Meanwhile the decree to abolish the inquisition -which was become the great test of political party, passed on the -7th of March, and the regency were ordered to have it read in the -churches. The clergy of Cadiz resisted the order, and intimated -their refusal through the medium of a public letter, and the regency -encouraged them by removing the governor of Cadiz, admiral Valdez, -a known liberal and opponent of the inquisition, appointing in his -stead general Alos, a warm advocate for that horrid institution. But -in the vindication of official power the Spaniards are generally -prompt and decided. On the 8th Augustin Arguelles moved, and it was -instantly carried, that the sessions of the extraordinary cortez -should be declared permanent, with a view to measures worthy of the -nation, and to prevent the evils with which the state was menaced by -the opposition of the regency and the clergy to the cortes. A decree -was then proposed for suppressing the actual regency, and replacing -it with a provisional government to be composed of the three eldest -councillors of state. This being conformable to the constitution, was -carried by a majority of eighty-six to fifty-eight, while another -proposition, that two members of the cortez, publicly elected, -should be added to the regency, was rejected as an innovation, by -seventy-two against sixty-six. The councillors Pedro Agar, Gabriel -Ciscar, and the cardinal Bourbon, archbishop of Toledo, were -immediately installed as regents. - -A committee which had been appointed to consider of the best means of -improving a system of government felt by all parties to be imperfect, -now recommended that the cardinal archbishop, who was of the blood -royal, should be president of the regency, leaving Carlotta’s claims -unnoticed, and as Ciscar and Agar had been formerly removed from the -regency for incapacity, it was generally supposed that the intention -was to make the archbishop in fact sole regent. Very soon however -Carlotta’s influence was again felt, for a dispute having arisen in -the cortez between what were called the Americans and the Liberals, -about the annual Acapulco-ship, the former to the number of twenty -joined the party of the princess, and it was resolved that Ruiez -Pedron, a distinguished opponent of the inquisition, should propose -her as the head of the regency. They were almost sure of a majority, -when the scheme transpired, and the people, who liked her not, -became so furious that her partizans were afraid to speak. Then the -opposite side, fearing her power, proposed on the instant that the -provisional regency should be made permanent which was carried. Thus, -chance rather than choice ruling, an old prelate and two imbecile -councillors were entrusted with the government, and the intrigues -and rancour of the different parties exploded more frequently as the -pressure from above became slight. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -More than all others the clergy were, as might be expected, violent -and daring, yet the Cortez was not to be frightened. Four canons -of the cathedrals were arrested in May, and orders were issued to -arrest the archbishop of St. Jago and many bishops, because of a -pastoral letter they had published against the abolition of the -inquisition; for according to the habits of their craft of all sects, -they deemed religion trampled under foot when the power of levying -money and spilling blood was denied to ministers professing the -faith of Christ. Nor amidst these broils did the English influence -fail to suffer; the democratic spirit advanced hastily, the Cadiz -press teemed with writings, intended to excite the people against -the ultimate designs of the English cabinet, and every effort was -made to raise a hatred of the British general and his troops. These -efforts were not founded entirely on falsehoods, and were far -from being unsuccessful, because the eager desire to preserve the -inquisition displayed by lord Wellington and his brother, although -arising from military considerations, was too much in accord with the -known tendency of the English cabinet’s policy, not to excite the -suspicions of the whole liberal party. - -The bishops of Logroño, Mondonedo, Astorga, Lugo, and Salamanca, and -the archbishop of St. Jago were arrested, but several bishops escaped -into Portugal, and were there protected as martyrs to the cause of -legitimacy and despotism. The bishop of Orense and the ex-regent -Lardizabal had before fled, the latter to Algarve, the former to -the Tras os Montes, from whence he kept up an active intercourse -with Gallicia, and the Cortez were far from popular there; indeed -the flight of the bishops created great irritation in every part -of Spain, for the liberal party of the Cortez was stronger in the -Isla than in other parts, and by a curious anomaly the officers and -soldiers all over Spain were generally their partizans while the -people were generally the partizans of the clergy. Nevertheless the -seeds of freedom, though carelessly sown by the French on one side, -and by the Cortez on the other, took deep root, and have since sprung -up into strong plants in due time to burgeon and bear fruit. - -When the bishops fled from Spain, Gravina, the pope’s Nuncio assumed -such a tone of hostility, that notwithstanding the good offices of -sir Henry Wellesley, which were for some time successful in screening -him from the vengeance of the Cortez, the latter, encouraged by -the English newspapers, finally dismissed him and sequestered his -benefices. He also took refuge in Portugal, and like the rest of -the expelled clergy, sought by all means to render the proceedings -of the Cortez odious in Spain. He formed a strict alliance with the -Portuguese nuncio, Vicente Machiechi, and working together with great -activity, they interfered, not with the concerns of Spain only, but -with the Catholics in the British army, and even extended their -intrigues to Ireland. Hence, as just and honest government had never -formed any part of the English policy towards that country, alarm -pervaded the cabinet, and the nuncio, protected when opposed to the -Cortez, was now considered a very troublesome and indiscreet person. - -Such a state of feud could not last long without producing a crisis, -and one of a most formidable and decisive nature was really at -hand. Already many persons in the Cortez held secret intercourse -with Joseph, in the view of acknowledging his dynasty, on condition -that he would accede to the general policy of the Cortez in civil -government; that monarch had as we have seen organized a large native -force, and the coasts of Spain and Portugal swarmed with French -privateers manned with Spanish seamen. The victory at Salamanca had -withered these resources for the moment, but Wellington’s failure at -Burgos and retreat into Portugal again revived them, and at the same -time gave a heavy shock to public confidence in the power of England, -a shock which nothing but the misfortunes of Napoleon in Russia -could have prevented from being fatal. - -The Emperor indeed with that wonderful intellectual activity and -energy which made him the foremost man of the world, had raised a -fresh army and prepared once more to march into the heart of Germany, -yet to do this he was forced to withdraw such numbers of old soldiers -from Spain that the French army could no longer hope permanently to -act on the offensive. This stayed the Peninsula cause upon the very -brink of a precipice, for in that very curious, useful, and authentic -work, called “_Bourrienne and his errors_,” it appears that early in -1813, the ever factious Conde de Montijo, then a general in Elio’s -army, had secretly made proposals to pass over, with the forces under -his command, to the king; and soon afterwards the whole army of Del -Parque, having advanced into La Mancha, made offers of the same -nature. - -They were actually in negociation with Joseph, when the emperor’s -orders obliged the French army to abandon Madrid, and take up the -line of the Duero. Then the Spaniards advertised of the French -weakness, feared to continue their negociations, Wellington soon -afterwards advanced, and as this feeling in favour of the intrusive -monarch was certainly not general, the resistance to the invaders -revived with the successes of the British general. But if instead -of diminishing his forces, Napoleon, victorious in Russia, had -strengthened them, this defection would certainly have taken place, -and would probably have been followed by others. The king at the -head of a Spanish army would then have reconquered Andalusia, -Wellington would have been confined to the defence of Portugal, and -it is scarcely to be supposed that England would have purchased the -independence of that country with her own permanent ruin. - -This conspiracy is not related by me with entire confidence, because -no trace of the transaction is to be found in the correspondence of -the king taken at Vittoria. Nevertheless there are abundant proofs -that the work called “_Bourrienne and his errors_,” inasmuch as it -relates to Joseph’s transactions in Spain, is accurately compiled -from that monarch’s correspondence. Many of his papers taken at -Vittoria were lost or abstracted at the time, and as in a case -involving so many persons’ lives, he would probably have destroyed -the proofs of a conspiracy which had failed, there seems little -reason to doubt that the general fact is correct. Napoleon also in -his memoirs, speaks of secret negociations with the Cortez about this -time, and his testimony is corroborated by the correspondence of the -British embassy at Cadiz, and by the continued intrigues against the -British influence. The next chapter will show that the policy of -Spain was not the only source of uneasiness to Lord Wellington. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -Nothing could be more complicated than the political state of -Portugal with reference to the situation of the English general. -His object, as I have repeatedly shown, was to bring the whole -resources of the country to bear on the war, but to effect this he -had to run counter to the habits and customs, both of the people -and of the government; to detect the intrigues of the subordinate -authorities as well as those of the higher powers; to oppose the -violence of factious men in the local government, and what was still -more difficult, to stimulate the sluggish apathy and to combat the -often honest obstinacy of those who were not factious. These things -he was to effect without the power of recompensing or chastising, -and even while forced to support those who merited rebuke, against -the still more formidable intriguers of the court of Brazil; for the -best men of Portugal actually formed the local government, and he was -not foiled so much by the men as by the sluggish system which was -national, and although dull for good purposes, vivacious enough for -mischief. The dread of ultimate personal consequences attached, not -to neglect of the war but to any vigorous exertions in support of it. - -The proceedings of the court of Rio Janeiro were not less -mischievous, for there the personal intrigues fostered by the -peculiar disposition of the English envoy, by the weak yet dogged -habits of the prince, and by the meddling nature and violent -passions of the princess Carlotta, stifled all great national views. -There also the power of the Souza’s, a family deficient neither -in activity nor in talent, was predominant, and the object of all -was to stimulate the government in Portugal against the English -general’s military policy. To this he could, and had opposed, as we -have seen, the power of the English government, with some effect at -different times, but that resource was a dangerous one and only to -be resorted to in extreme circumstances. Hence when to all these -things is added a continual struggle with the knavery of merchants -of all nations, his difficulties must be admitted, his indomitable -vigour, his patience and his extraordinary mental resources admired, -and the whole scene must be considered as one of the most curious and -instructive lessons in the study of nations. - -Wellington was not simply a general who with greater or less means, -was to plan his military operations leaving to others the care of -settling the political difficulties which might arise. He had, -coincident with his military duties, to regenerate a whole people, -to force them against the current of their prejudices and usages -on a dangerous and painful course; he had to teach at once the -populace and the government, to infuse spirit and order without the -aid of rewards or punishments, to excite enthusiasm through the -medium of corrupt oppressive institutions, and far from making any -revolutionary appeal to suppress all tendency towards that resource -of great minds on the like occasions. Thus only could he maintain an -army at all, and as it was beyond the power of man to continue such -a struggle for any length of time he was more than ever anxious to -gather strength for a decisive blow, which the enemy’s situation now -rendered possible, that he might free himself from the critical and -anomalous relation in which he stood towards Portugal. - -It may indeed be wondered that he so long bore up against the -encreasing pressure of these distracting affairs, and certain it is -that more than once he was like to yield, and would have yielded -if fortune had not offered him certain happy military chances, and -yet such as few but himself could have profited from. In 1810, on -the ridge of Busaco, and in the lines, the military success was -rather over the Portuguese government than the enemy. At Santarem -in 1811 the glory of arms scarcely compensated for the destitution -of the troops. At Fuentes Onoro and on the Caya, after the second -unsuccessful siege of Badajos, the Portuguese army had nearly -dissolved; and the astonishing sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos -in 1812, were necessary to save the cause from dying of inanition -and despair. Even then the early deliverance of Andalusia was -frustrated, and time, more valuable than gold or life, in war, was -lost, the enemy became the strongest in the field, and in despite of -the victory of Salamanca, the bad effects of the English general’s -political situation were felt in the repulse from Burgos, and in the -double retreat from that place and from Madrid. Accumulated mischiefs -were now to be encountered in Portugal. - -It has been shown how obstinately the regency opposed Wellington’s -plans of financial reform, how they disputed and complained upon -every circumstance, whether serious or trivial on which a complaint -could be founded; for thinking Portugal no longer in danger they -were tired of their British allies, and had no desire to aid nor -indeed any wish to see Spain delivered from her difficulties. They -designed therefore to harass the English general, hoping either to -drive him away altogether, or to force him, and, through him, his -government, to grant them loans or new subsidies. But Wellington knew -that Portugal could, and he was resolved it should find resources -within itself, wherefore, after the battle of Salamanca, when they -demanded a fresh subsidy he would not listen to them; and when they -adopted that scheme which I have already exposed, of feeding, or -rather starving their troops, through the medium of a treaty with -the Spanish government, he checked the shameful and absurd plan, by -applying a part of the money in the chest of aids intended for the -civil service to the relief of the Portuguese troops. Yet the regency -did not entirely fail in their object inasmuch as many persons -dependent upon the subsidy were thus deprived of their payments, and -their complaints hurt the British credit, and reduced the British -influence with the people whose faithful attachment to the alliance -no intrigues had hitherto been able to shake. - -Into every branch of government, however minute, the regency now -infused their own captious and discontented spirit. They complained -falsely that general Campbell had insulted the nation by turning -some Portuguese residents publicly out of Gibraltar in company with -Jews and Moors; they refused the wheat which was delivered to them -by lord Wellington in lieu of their subsidy, saying it was not fit -for food notwithstanding that the English troops were then living -upon parcels of the same grain, that their own troops were glad to -get it, and that no other was to be had. When a wooden jetty was to -be thrown in the Tagus for the convenience of landing stores, they -supported one Caldas, a rich proprietor, in his refusal to permit the -trees, wanted for the purpose, to be felled, alledging the rights -of property, although he was to be paid largely, and although they -had themselves then, and always, disregarded the rights of property, -especially when poor men were concerned, seizing upon whatever was -required either for the public service, or for the support of their -own irregularities, without any payment at all and in shameful -violation both of law and humanity. - -The commercial treaty, and the proceedings of the Oporto wine -company, an oppressive corporation unfair in all its dealings, -irresponsible, established in violation of that treaty, and supported -without regard either to the interests of the prince regent or his -British allies, furnished them with continual subjects for disputes, -and nothing was too absurd or too gross for their interference. Under -the management of Mr. Stuart who had vigorously enforced Wellington’s -plans, their paper money had obtained a reasonable and encreasing -circulation, and their custom-house resources had encreased, the -expenses of their navy and of their arsenal had in some degree been -reduced; and it was made evident that an extensive and vigorous -application of the same principles would enable them to overcome -all their financial difficulties; but there were too many personal -interests, too much shameful profit made under the abuses to permit -such a reform. The naval establishment instead of being entirely -transferred, as Wellington desired, to the Brazils, was continued -in the Tagus, and with it the arsenal as its natural appendage. The -infamous Junta de Viveres had been suppressed by the prince regent, -yet the government under the false pretext of paying its debts still -disbursed above ten thousand pounds a month in salaries to men whose -offices had been formally abolished. - -About this time also the opening of the Spanish ports in those -provinces from whence the enemy had been driven, deprived Lisbon of a -monopoly of trade enjoyed for the last three years, and the regency -observing the consequent diminution of revenue, with inexpressible -effrontery insisted that the grain, imported by Wellington, by which -their army and their nation had been saved from famine, and by -which their own subsidy had been provided, should enter the public -warehouses under specific regulations and pay duty for so doing. So -tenaciously did they hold to this point that Wellington was forced to -menace a formal appeal to the English cabinet, for he knew that the -subordinate officers of the government, knavish in the extreme, would -have sold the secrets of the army magazines to the speculators; and -the latter, in whose hands the furnishing of the army would under the -new plan of the English ministers be placed, being thus accurately -instructed of its resources would have regulated their supplies with -great nicety so as to have famished the soldiers, and paralyzed the -operations at the greatest possible expense. - -But the supply of the army under any system was now becoming -extremely precarious, for besides the activity of the American -privateers English ships of war used, at times, to capture the -vessels secretly employed in bringing provision under licenses from -Mr. Stuart and Mr. Forster. Nay the captain of a Scotch merchant -vessel engaged in the same trade and having no letter of marque, had -the piratical insolence to seize in the very mouth of the Tagus, -and under the Portuguese batteries, an American vessel sailing -under a license from Mr. Forster, and to carry her into Greenock, -thus violating at once the license of the English minister, the -independence of Portugal, and the general law of nations. Alarm -immediately spread far and wide amongst the American traders, the -indignation of the Portuguese government was strongly and justly -excited, and the matter became extremely embarrassing, because no -measure of punishment could be inflicted without exposing the secret -of a system which had been the principal support of the army. However -the Congress soon passed an act forbidding neutrals to ship flour in -the American ports, and this blow, chiefly aimed at the Portuguese -ships, following upon the non-importation act, and being combined -with the illegal violence of the English vessels, nearly dried up -this source of supply, and threw the army principally upon the Brazil -trade, which by the negligence of the Admiralty was, as I have before -noticed, exposed to the enterprize of the United States’ privateers. - -During Wellington’s absence in Spain the military administration of -Portugal was necessarily in the hands of the regency and all the -ancient abuses were fast reviving. The army in the field received no -succours, the field-artillery had entirely disappeared, the cavalry -was in the worst condition, the infantry was reduced in numbers, the -equipments of those who remained were scarcely fit for service, and -the spirit of the men had waned from enthusiasm to despondency. There -was no money in the military chest, no recruits in the dépôts, and -the transport service was neglected altogether. Beresford’s severity -had failed to check desertion, because want, the parent of crimes, -had proved too strong for fear; the country swarmed with robbers, -and as no fault civil or military was punished by the regency, every -where knaves triumphed over the welfare of the nation. - -Meanwhile all persons whose indolence or timidity led them to fly -from the active defence of their country to the Brazils, were there -received and cherished as martyrs to their personal affections for -the prince; they were lauded for their opposition to the regency, -and were called victims to the injustice of Beresford, and to the -encroachments of the English officers. This mischief was accompanied -by another of greater moment, for the prince continually permitted -officers possessing family interest to retire from active service -retaining their pay and rank, thus offering a premium for bad men to -enter the army with the intent of quitting it in this disgraceful -manner. Multitudes did so, promotion became rapid, the nobility whose -influence over the poor classes was very great, and might have been -beneficially employed in keeping up the zeal of the men, disappeared -rapidly from the regiments, and the foul stream of knaves and cowards -thus continually pouring through the military ranks destroyed all -cohesion and tainted every thing as it passed. - -Interests of the same nature, prevailing with the regency, polluted -the civil administration. The rich and powerful inhabitants, -especially those of the great cities, were suffered to evade the -taxes and to disobey the regulations for drawing forth the resources -of the country in the military service; and during Wellington’s -absence in Spain, the English under-commissaries, and that retinue -of villains which invariably gather on the rear of armies, being in -some measure freed from the immediate dread of his vigilance and -vigour, violated all the regulations in the most daring manner. The -poor husbandmen were cruelly oppressed, their farming animals were -constantly carried off to supply food for the army, and agriculture -was thus stricken at the root; the breed of horned cattle and of -horses had rapidly and alarmingly decreased, and butcher’s meat was -scarcely to be procured even for the troops who remained in Portugal. - -These irregularities, joined to the gross misconduct of the -military detachments and convoys of sick men, on all the lines of -communication, not only produced great irritation in the country but -offered the means for malevolent and factious persons to assail the -character and intentions of the English general; every where writings -and stories were circulated against the troops, the real outrages -were exaggerated, others were invented and the drift of all was to -render Wellington, and the English, odious to the nation at large. -Nor was this scheme confined to Portugal alone, agents were also -busy to the same purpose in London, and when the enthusiasm, which -Wellington’s presence at Lisbon had created amongst the people, was -known at Cadiz, the press there teemed with abuse. Divers agents of -the democratic party in Spain came to Lisbon to aid the Portuguese -malcontents, writings were circulated accusing Wellington of an -intention to subjugate the Peninsula for his own ambitious views, -and, as consistency is never regarded on such occasions, it was -diligently insinuated that he encouraged the excesses of his troops -out of personal hatred to the Portuguese people; the old baseness -of sending virulent anonymous letters to the English general was -also revived. In fine the republican spirit was extending beyond -the bounds of Spain, and the Portuguese regency, terrified at its -approach, appealed to Mr. Stuart for the assistance of England -to check its formidable progress. Neither were they wanting to -themselves. They forbade the Portuguese newspapers to admit any -observations on the political events in Spain, they checked the -introduction of Spanish democratic publications, they ordered their -diplomatists at Cadiz to encourage writings of an opposite tendency, -and to support the election of deputies who were known for their -love of despotism. This last measure was however baffled by the -motion of Arguelles, already mentioned, which rendered the old Cortez -permanent; and Mr. Stuart, judging the time unfavourable, advised the -Portuguese government to reserve the exertion of its power against -the democrats, until the military success which the state of the -continent, and the weakness of the French troops in Spain, promised, -should enable the victors to put down such doctrines with effect; -advice which was not unmeaning as I shall have occasion hereafter to -show. - -All these malignant efforts Wellington viewed with indifference. -“Every leading man,” he said, “was sure to be accused of criminal -personal ambition, and, if he was conscious of the charge being -false, the accusation did no harm.” Nevertheless his position -was thereby rendered more difficult, and these intrigues were -accompanied by other mischiefs of long standing and springing from -a different source, but even of a more serious character, for the -spirit of captious discontent had reached the inferior magistracy, -who endeavoured to excite the people against the military generally. -Complaints came in from all quarters of outrages on the part of the -troops, some too true, but many of them false, or frivolous; and -when the English general ordered courts-martial for the trial of the -accused, the magistrates refused to attend as witnesses, because -Portuguese custom rendered such an attendance degrading, and by -Portuguese law a magistrate’s written testimony was efficient in -courts-martial. Wellington in vain assured them that English law -would not suffer him to punish men upon such testimony; in vain he -pointed out the mischief which must infallibly overwhelm the country -if the soldiers discovered they might thus do evil with impunity. He -offered to send in each case, lists of Portuguese witnesses required -that they might be summoned by the native authorities, but nothing -could overcome the obstinacy of the magistrates; they answered that -his method was insolent; and with a sullen malignity they continued -to accumulate charges against the troops, to refuse attendance in the -courts, and to call the soldiers, their own as well as the British, -“licensed spoliators of the community.” - -For a time the generous nature of the poor people, resisted all -these combining causes of discontent; neither real injuries nor -the exaggerations, nor the falsehoods of those who attempted to -stir up wrath, produced any visible effect upon the great bulk of -the population; yet by degrees affection for the British cooled, -and Wellington expressed his fears that a civil war would commence -between the Portuguese people on the one hand, and the troops of both -nations on the other. Wherefore his activity was redoubled to draw, -while he could still controul affairs, all the military strength to a -head, and to make such an irruption into Spain as would establish a -new base of operations beyond the power of such fatal dissensions. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -These matters were sufficiently vexatious and alarming, but what made -him tremble, was, the course, which the misconduct of the Portuguese -government, and the incapacity of the English cabinet, had forced -upon the native furnishers of the supplies. Those persons, coming -in the winter to Lisbon to have their bills on the military chest -paid, could get no money, and in their distress had sold the bills to -speculators, the Portuguese holders, at a discount of fifteen, the -Spanish holders at a discount of forty in the hundred. The credit -of the chest immediately fell, prices rose in proportion, and as no -military enterprize could carry the army beyond the flight of this -harpy, and no revenues could satisfy its craving, the contest must -have ceased, if Mr. Stuart had not found a momentary and partial -remedy, by publicly guaranteeing the payment of the bills and -granting interest until they could be taken up. The expense was thus -augmented, but the increase fell far short of the enhanced cost of -the supplies which had already resulted even from this restricted -practice of the bill-holders, and of two evils the least was chosen. -It may seem strange that such transactions should belong to the -history of the military operations in the Peninsula, that it should -be the general’s instead of the minister’s task, to encounter such -evils, and to find the remedy. Such however was the nature of the -war, and no adequate notion of lord Wellington’s vigorous capacity -and Herculean labours can be formed, without an intimate knowledge of -the financial and political difficulties which oppressed him, and of -which this work has necessarily only given an outline. - -The disorders of the Portuguese military system had brought Beresford -back to Lisbon while the siege of Burgos was still in progress, and -now, under Wellington’s direction, he strained every nerve to restore -the army to its former efficient state. To recruit the regiments of -the line he disbanded all the militia men fit for service, replacing -them with fathers of families; to restore the field-artillery, he -embodied all the garrison artillery-men, calling out the ordenança -gunners to man the fortresses and coast-batteries; the worst -cavalry regiments he reduced to render the best more efficient, -but several circumstances prevented this arm from attaining any -excellence in Portugal. Meanwhile Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart -strenuously grappled with the disorders of the civil administration -and their efforts produced an immediate and considerable increase -of revenue. But though the regency could not deny this beneficial -effect, though they could not deny the existence of the evils which -they were urged to remedy, though they admitted that the reform of -their custom-house system was still incomplete, that their useless -navy consumed large sums which were wanted for the army, and that -the taxes especially the “_Decima_,” were partially collected, and -unproductive, because the rich people in the great towns, who had -benefited largely by the war, escaped the imposts which the poor -people in the country, who had suffered most from the war, paid; -though they acknowledged that while the soldiers’ hire was in -arrears, the transport service neglected, and all persons, having -just claims upon the government, suffering severe privations, the -tax-gatherers were allowed to keep a month’s tribute in their hands -even in the districts close to the enemy; though all these things -were admitted, the regency would not alter their system, and Borba, -the minister of finance, combatted Wellington’s plans in detail -with such unusual obstinacy, that it became evident nothing could -be obtained save by external pressure. Wherefore as the season -for military operations approached, Mr. Stuart called upon lord -Castlereagh to bring the power of England to bear at once upon the -court of Rio Janeiro; and Wellington, driven to extremity, sent -the Portuguese prince-regent one of those clear, powerful, and -nervous statements, which left those to whom they were addressed, -no alternative but submission, or an acknowledgement that sense and -justice were to be disregarded. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -“I call your highness’s attention,” he said, “to the state of your -troops and of all your establishments; the army of operations has -been unpaid since September, the garrisons since June, the militia -since February 1812. The transport service has never been regularly -paid, and has received nothing since June. To these evils I have in -vain called the attention of the local government, and I am now going -to open a new campaign, with troops to whom greater arrears of pay -are due than when the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy -from Great Britain, granted especially for the maintenance of those -troops, has been regularly and exactly furnished; and although it has -been proved that the revenue for the last three months has exceeded, -by a third, any former quarter. The honour of your highness’s arms, -the cause of your allies, is thus seriously affected, and the uniform -refusal of the governors of the kingdom to attend to any one of the -measures which I have recommended, either for permanent or temporal -relief, has at last obliged me to go as a complainant into your royal -highness’s presence, for here I cannot prevail against the influence -of the chief of the treasury. - -“I have recommended the entire reform of the customs system, but it -has only been partially carried into effect. I have advised a method -of actually and really collecting the taxes, and of making the rich -merchants, and capitalists, pay the tenth of their annual profits -as an extraordinary contribution for the war. I declare that no -person knows better than I do, the sacrifices and the sufferings of -your people, for there is no one for the last four years has lived -so much amongst those people; but it is a fact, sir, that the great -cities, and even some of the smallest places, have gained by the -war and the mercantile class has enriched itself; there are divers -persons in Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. Now your -government is, both from remote and recent circumstances, unable to -draw resources from the capitalists by loans; it can only draw upon -them by taxes. It is not denied that the regular tributes nor the -extraordinary imposts on the mercantile profits are evaded; it is not -denied that the measures I have proposed, vigorously carried into -execution, would furnish the government with pecuniary resources, -and it remains for that government to inform your highness, why they -have neither enforced my plans, nor any others which the necessity -of the times calls for. They fear to become unpopular, but such is -the knowledge I have of the people’s good sense and loyalty, such my -zeal for the cause, that I have offered to become responsible for the -happy issue, and to take upon myself all the odium of enforcing my -own measures. I have offered in vain! - -“Never was a sovereign in the world so ill served as your highness -has been by the ‘_Junta de Viveres_,’ and I zealously forwarded your -interests when I obtained its abolition; and yet, under a false -pretext of debt, the government still disburse fifty millions of reis -monthly on account of that board. It has left a debt undoubtedly, -and it is of importance to pay it, although not at this moment; but -let the government state in detail how these fifty millions, granted -monthly, have been applied; let them say if all the accounts have -been called in and liquidated? who has enforced the operation? to -what does the debt amount? has it been classified? how much is really -still due to those who have received instalments? finally, have these -millions been applied to the payment of salaries instead of debt? -But were it convenient now to pay the debt, it cannot be denied that -to pay the army which is to defend the country, to protect it from -the sweeping destructive hand of the enemy, is of more pressing -importance; the troops will be neither able nor willing to fight if -they are not paid.” - -Then touching upon the abuse of permitting the tax-gatherers to hold -a month’s taxes in their hands, and upon the opposition he met with -from the regency, he continued, - -“I assure your royal highness that I give my advice to the governor -of the kingdom actuated solely by an earnest zeal for your service -without any personal interest. I can have none relative to Portugal, -and none with regard to individuals, for I have no private relation -with, and scarcely am acquainted with those who direct, or would wish -to direct your affairs. Those reforms recommended by me, and which -have at last been partially effected in the custom-house, in the -arsenal, in the navy, in the payment of the interest of the national -debt, in the formation of a military chest, have succeeded, and I may -therefore say that the other measures I propose would have similar -results. I am ready to allow that I may deceive myself on this point, -but certainly they are suggested by a desire for the good of your -service; hence in the most earnest and decided manner, I express my -ardent wish, and it is common to all your faithful servants, that -you will return to the kingdom, and take charge yourself of the -government.” - -These vigorous measures to bring the regency to terms succeeded only -partially. In May they promulgated a new system for the collection -of taxes which relieved the financial pressure on the army for the -moment, but which did not at all content Wellington, because it was -made to square with old habits and prejudices, and thus left the -roots of all the evils alive and vigorous. Every moment furnished -new proofs of the hopelessness of regenerating a nation through the -medium of a corrupted government; and a variety of circumstances, -more or less serious, continued to embarrass the march of public -affairs. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -In the Madeiras the authorities vexatiously prevented the English -money agents from exporting specie, and their conduct was approved -of at Rio Janeiro. At Bisao, in Africa, the troops had mutinied for -want of pay, and in the Cape de Verde Islands disturbances arose -from the over-exaction of taxes; for when the people were weak, the -regency were vigorous; pliant only to the powerful. These commotions -were trifling and soon ended of themselves, yet expeditions were -sent against the offenders in both places, and the troops thus -employed immediately committed far worse excesses, and did more -mischief than that which they were sent to suppress. At the same -time several French frigates finding the coast of Africa unguarded, -cruized successfully against the Brazil trade, and aided the American -privateers to contract the already too straitened resources of the -army. - -Amidst all these difficulties however the extraordinary exertions of -the British officers had restored the numbers, discipline, and spirit -of the Portuguese army. Twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers were -again under arms and ready to commence the campaign, although the -national discontent was daily increasing; and indeed the very feeling -of security created by the appearance of such an army rendered the -citizens at large less willing to bear the inconveniences of the war. -Distant danger never affects the multitude, and the billetting of -troops, who, from long habits of war, little regarded the rights of -the citizens in comparison with their own necessities, being combined -with requisitions, and with a recruiting system becoming every year -more irksome, formed an aggregate of inconveniences intolerable to -men who desired ease and no longer dreaded to find an enemy on their -hearth-stones. The powerful classes were naturally more affected -than the poorer classes, because of their indolent habits; but their -impatience was aggravated because they had generally been debarred of -the highest situations, or supplanted, by the British interference in -the affairs of the country, and, unlike those of Spain, the nobles -of Portugal had lost little or none of their hereditary influence. -Discontent was thus extended widely, and moreover the old dread of -French power was entirely gone; unlimited confidence in the strength -and resources of England had succeeded; and this confidence, to use -the words of Mr. Stuart, “being opposed to the irregularities which -have been practised by individuals, and to the difference of manners, -and of religion, placed the British in the singular position of a -class whose exertions were necessary for the country, but who, for -the above reasons, were in every other respect as distinct from -the natives as persons with whom, from some criminal cause, it was -necessary to suspend communication.”—Hence he judged that the return -of the prince-regent would be a proper epoch for the British to -retire from all situations in Portugal not strictly military, for -if any thing should delay that event, the time was approaching when -the success of the army and the tranquillity of the country would -render it necessary to yield to the first manifestations of national -feeling. In fine, notwithstanding the great benefits conferred upon -the Portuguese by the British, the latter were, and it will always be -so on the like occasions, regarded by the upper classes as a captain -regards galley-slaves, their strength was required to speed the -vessel, but they were feared and hated. - -The prince-regent did not return to Portugal according to -Wellington’s advice, but Carlotta immediately prepared to come -alone; orders were given to furnish her apartments in the different -palaces, and her valuable effects had actually arrived. Ill health -was the pretext for the voyage, but the real object was to be near -Spain to forward her views upon the government there; for intent -upon mischief, indefatigable and of a violence approaching insanity, -she had sold even her plate and jewels to raise money wherewith to -corrupt the leading members of the cortez, and was resolved, if that -should not promise success, to distribute the money amongst the -Spanish partidas, and so create a powerful military support for her -schemes. Fortunately the prince dreading the intriguing advisers of -his wife would not suffer her to quit Rio Janeiro until the wish -of the British cabinet upon the subject was known, and that was so -decidedly adverse, that it was thought better to do without the -prince himself than to have him accompanied by Carlotta; so they both -remained in the Brazils, and this formidable cloud passed away, yet -left no sunshine on the land. - -It was at this period that the offer of a Russian auxiliary force, -before alluded to, being made to Wellington by admiral Grieg, was -accepted by him to the amount of fifteen thousand men, and yet was -not fulfilled because the Russian ambassador in London declared -that the emperor knew nothing of it! Alexander however proposed to -mediate in the dispute between Great Britain and America, but the -English ministers, while lauding him as a paragon of magnanimity -and justice, in regard to the war against Napoleon, remembered the -armed neutrality and quadruple alliance, and wisely declined trusting -England’s maritime pretensions to his faithless grasping policy. -Neither would they listen to Austria, who at this time, whether with -good faith or merely as a cloak I know not, desired to mediate a -general peace. However, amidst this political confusion the progress -of the military preparations was visible; and contemporary with -the Portuguese, the Spanish troops under Wellington’s influence -and providence acquired more consistence than they had ever before -possessed; a mighty power was in arms; but the flood of war with -which the English general finally poured into Spain, and the channels -by which he directed the overwhelming torrent, must be reserved for -another place. It is now time to treat of the political situation of -king Joseph, and to resume the narrative of that secondary warfare -which occupied the French armies while Wellington was uninterruptedly -as far as the enemy were concerned, reorganizing his power. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -In war it is not so much the positive strength, as the relative -situations of the hostile parties, which gives the victory. Joseph’s -position, thus judged, was one of great weakness, principally because -he was incapable of combining the materials at his disposal, or of -wielding them when combined by others. France had been suddenly -thrown by her failure in Russia, into a new and embarrassing -attitude, more embarrassing even than it appeared to her enemies, -or than her robust warlike proportions, nourished by twelve years -of victory, indicated. Napoleon, the most indefatigable and active -of mankind, turned his enemy’s ignorance on this head to profit; -for scarcely was it known that he had reached Paris by that wise, -that rapid journey, from Smorghoni, which, baffling all his enemies’ -hopes, left them only the power of foolish abuse; scarcely I say, -was his arrival at Paris known to the world, than a new and enormous -army, the constituent parts of which he had with his usual foresight -created while yet in the midst of victory, was in march from all -parts to unite in the heart of Germany. - -On this magical rapidity he rested his hopes to support the tottering -fabric of his empire; but well aware of the critical state of his -affairs, his design was, while presenting a menacing front on every -side, so to conduct his operations that if he failed in his first -stroke, he might still contract his system gradually and without any -violent concussion. And good reason for hope he had. His military -power was rather broken and divided than lessened, for it is certain -that the number of men employed in 1813 was infinitely greater than -in 1812; in the latter four hundred thousand, but in the former more -than seven hundred thousand men, and twelve hundred field-pieces were -engaged on different points, exclusive of the armies in Spain. Then -on the Vistula, on the Oder, on the Elbe, he had powerful fortresses, -and numerous garrisons, or rather armies, of strength and goodness -to re-establish his ascendancy in Europe, if he could reunite them -in one system by placing a new host victoriously in the centre of -Germany. And thus also he could renew the adhesive qualities of -those allies, who still clung to him though evidently feeling the -attraction of his enemies’ success. - -But this was a gigantic contest, for his enemies, by deceiving their -subjects with false promises of liberty, had brought whole nations -against him. More than eight hundred thousand men were in arms in -Germany alone; secret societies were in full activity all over the -continent; and in France a conspiracy was commenced by men who -desired rather to see their country a prey to foreigners and degraded -with a Bourbon king, than have it independent and glorious under -Napoleon. Wherefore that great monarch had now to make application, -on an immense scale, of the maxim which prescribes a skilful -offensive as the best defence, and he had to sustain two systems of -operation not always compatible; the one depending upon moral force -to hold the vast fabric of his former policy together, the other to -meet the actual exigencies of the war. The first was infinitely more -important than the last, and as Germany and France were the proper -theatres for its display, the Spanish contest sunk at once from -a principal into an accessary war. Yet this delicate conjuncture -of affairs made it of vital importance, that Napoleon should have -constant and rapid intelligence from Spain, because the ascendancy, -which he yet maintained over the world by his astounding genius, -might have been broken down in a moment if Wellington, overstepping -the ordinary rules of military art, had suddenly abandoned the -Peninsula, and thrown his army, or a part of it into France. For then -would have been deranged all the emperor’s calculations; then would -the defection of all his allies have ensued; then would he have been -obliged to concentrate both his new forces and his Spanish troops for -the defence of his own country, abandoning all his fortresses and his -still vast though scattered veteran armies in Germany and Poland, to -the unrestrained efforts of his enemies beyond the Rhine. Nothing -could have been more destructive to Napoleon’s moral power, than to -have an insult offered and commotions raised on his own threshold at -the moment when he was assuming the front of a conqueror in Germany. - -To obviate this danger or to meet it, alike required that the armies -in the Peninsula should adopt a new and vigorous system, under which, -relinquishing all real permanent offensive movements, they should -yet appear to be daring and enterprising, even while they prepared -to abandon their former conquests. But the emperor wanted old -officers and non-commissioned officers, and experienced soldiers, -to give consistency to the young levies with which he was preparing -to take the field, and he could only supply this want by drawing -from the veterans of the Peninsula; wherefore he resolved to recal -the division of the young guard, and with it many thousand men and -officers of the line most remarkable for courage and conduct. In lieu -he sent the reserve at Bayonne into Spain, replacing it with another, -which was again to be replaced in May by further levies; and besides -this succour, twenty thousand conscripts were appropriated for the -Peninsula. - -The armies thus weakened in numbers, and considerably so during the -transit of the troops, were also in quality greatly deteriorated, and -at a very critical time, for not only was Wellington being powerfully -reinforced, but the audacity, the spirit, the organization, the -discipline, and the numbers of the Partidas, were greatly increased -by English supplies, liberally, and now usefully dealt out. And -the guerilla operations in the northern parts, being combined with -the British naval squadrons, had, during the absence of the French -armies, employed to drive the allies back to Portugal, aroused -anew the spirit of insurrection in Navarre and Biscay; a spirit -exacerbated by some recent gross abuses of military authority -perpetrated by some of the French local commanders. - -[Sidenote: Duke of Feltre’s official correspondence, MSS.] - -The position of the invading armies was indeed become more -complicated than ever. They had only been relieved from the -crushing pressure of lord Wellington’s grand operations to struggle -in the meshes of the Guerilla and insurrectional warfare of the -Spaniards. Nor was the importance of these now to be measured by -former efforts. The Partida chiefs had become more experienced -and more docile to the suggestions of the British chief; they had -free communication with, and were constantly supplied with arms, -ammunition, and money from the squadrons on the coast; they possessed -several fortified posts and harbours, their bands were swelling to -the size of armies, and their military knowledge of the country and -of the French system of invasion was more matured; their own dépôts -were better hidden, and they could, and at times did, bear the shock -of battle on nearly equal terms. Finally, new and large bands of -another and far more respectable and influential nature, were formed -or forming both in Navarre and Biscay, where insurrectional juntas -were organized, and where men of the best families had enrolled -numerous volunteers from the villages and towns. - -These volunteers were well and willingly supplied by the country, -and of course not obnoxious, like the Partidas, from their -rapine and violence. In Biscay alone several battalions of this -description, each mustering a thousand men, were in the field, and -the communication with France was so completely interrupted, that -the French minister of war only heard that Joseph had received his -dispatches of the 4th of January, on the 18th of March, and then -through the medium of Suchet! The contributions could no longer be -collected, the magazines could not be filled, the fortresses were -endangered, the armies had no base of operations, the insurrection -was spreading to Aragon, and the bands of the interior were also -increasing in numbers and activity. The French armies, sorely pressed -for provisions, were widely disseminated, and every where occupied, -and each general was averse either to concentrate his own forces -or to aid his neighbour. In fine the problem of the operations was -become extremely complicated, and Napoleon only seems to have seized -the true solution. - -When informed by Caffarelli of the state of affairs in the north, he -thus wrote to the king, “Hold Madrid only as a point of observation; -fix your quarters not as monarch, but as general of the French forces -at Valladolid; concentrate the armies of the south, of the centre, -and of Portugal around you; the allies will not and indeed cannot -make any serious offensive movement for several months; wherefore it -is your business to profit from their forced inactivity, to put down -the insurrection in the northern provinces, to free the communication -with France, and to re-establish a good base of operations before -the commencement of another campaign, that the French army may be in -condition to fight the allies if the latter advance towards France.” -Very important indeed did Napoleon deem this object, and so earnest -was he to have constant and rapid intelligence from his armies in -the Peninsula, that the couriers and their escorts were directed to -be dispatched twice a week, travelling day and night at the rate -of a league an hour. He commanded also that the army of the north -should be reinforced even by the whole army of Portugal, if it was -necessary to effect the immediate pacification of Biscay and Navarre; -and while this pacification was in progress, Joseph was to hold the -rest of his forces in a position offensive towards Portugal, making -Wellington feel that his whole power was required on the frontier, -and that neither his main body nor even any considerable detachment -could safely embark to disturb France. In short that he must cover -Lisbon strongly, and on the frontier, or expect to see the French -army menacing that capital. These instructions well understood, and -vigorously executed, would certainly have put down the insurrection -in the rear of the king’s position, and the spring would have seen -that monarch at the head of ninety thousand men, having their retreat -upon France clear of all impediments, and consequently free to fight -the allies on the Tormes, the Duero, the Pisuerga, and the Ebro; and -with several supporting fortresses in a good state. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.] - -Joseph was quite unable to view the matter in this common-sense -point of view. He could not make his kingly notions subservient -to military science, nor his military movements subservient to an -enlarged policy. Neither did he perceive that his beneficent notions -of government were misplaced amidst the din of arms. Napoleon’s -orders were imperative, but the principle of them, Joseph could -not previously conceive himself nor execute the details after his -brother’s conception. He was not even acquainted with the true state -of the northern provinces, nor would he at first credit it when -told to him. Hence while his thoughts were intent upon his Spanish -political projects, and the secret negociations with Del Parque’s -army, the northern partidas and insurgents became masters of all his -lines of communication in the north; the Emperor’s orders dispatched -early in January, and reiterated week after week, only reached the -king in the end of February; their execution did not take place -until the end of March, and then imperfectly. The time thus lost was -irreparable; and yet as the emperor reproachfully observed, the -bulletin which revealed the extent of his disasters in Russia might -alone have taught the king what to do. - -Joseph was nearly as immoveable in his resolutions as his brother, -the firmness of the one being however founded upon extraordinary -sagacity, and of the other upon the want of that quality. Regarding -opposition to his views as the result of a disloyal malevolence, -he judged the refractory generals to be enemies to the emperor, as -well as to himself. Reille, Caffarelli, Suchet, alike incurred his -displeasure, and the duke of Feltre French minister of war also, -because of a letter in which, evidently by the orders of the emperor, -he rebuked the king for having removed Souham from the command of the -army of Portugal. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.] - -Feltre’s style, addressed to a monarch was very offensive, and Joseph -attributed it to the influence of Soult, for his hatred of the latter -was violent and implacable even to absurdity. “The duke of Dalmatia -or himself,” he wrote to the Emperor, “must quit Spain. At Valencia -he had forgotten his own injuries, he had suppressed his just -indignation, and instead of sending marshal Soult to France had given -him the direction of the operations against the allies, but it was in -the hope that shame for the past combined with his avidity for glory, -would urge him to extraordinary exertions; nothing of the kind had -happened; Soult was a man not to be trusted. Restless, intriguing, -ambitious, he would sacrifice every thing to his own advancement, -and possessed just that sort of talent which would lead him to mount -a scaffold when he thought he was ascending the steps of a throne, -because he would want the courage to strike when the crisis arrived.” -He acquitted him, he said, with a coarse sarcasm, “of treachery at -the passage of the Tormes, because there fear alone operated to -prevent him from bringing the allies to a decisive action, but he was -nevertheless treacherous to the emperor, and his proceedings in Spain -were probably connected with the conspiracy of Malet at Paris.” - -Such was the language with which Joseph in his anger assailed one of -the greatest commanders and most faithful servants of his brother; -and such the greetings which awaited Napoleon on his arrival at Paris -after the disasters of Russia. In the most calm and prosperous state -of affairs, coming from this source, the charges might well have -excited the jealous wrath of the strongest mind; but in the actual -crisis, when the emperor had just lost his great army, and found the -smoking embers of a suppressed conspiracy at his very palace-gates, -when his friends were failing, and his enemies accumulating, it -seemed scarcely possible that these accusations should not have -proved the ruin of Soult. Yet they did not even ruffle the temper of -Napoleon. Magnanimous as he was sagacious, he smiled at the weakness -of Joseph, and though he removed Soult from Spain, because the feud -between him and the king would not permit them to serve beneficially -together, it was only to make him the commander of the imperial -guard; and that no mark of his confidence might be wanting, he -afterwards chose him, from amongst all his generals, to retrieve the -affairs of the Peninsula when Joseph was driven from that country, an -event the immediate causes of which were now being laid. - -It has been already shown, that when Wellington took his -winter-quarters, the French armies occupied a line stretching from -the sea-coast at Valencia to the foot of the Gallician mountains. In -these positions Suchet on the extreme left was opposed by the allies -at Alicant. Soult, commanding the centre, had his head-quarters at -Toledo, with one detachment at the foot of the Sierra Morena to -watch the army of Del Parque, and two others in the valley of the -Tagus. Of these last one was at Talavera and one on the Tietar. The -first observed Morillo and Penne Villemur, who from Estremadura -were constantly advancing towards the bridges on the Tagus, and -menacing the rear of the French detachment which was on the Tietar -in observation of general Hill then at Coria. Soult’s advanced post -in the valley of the Tagus communicated by the Gredos mountains with -Avila, where Foy’s division of the army of Portugal was posted partly -for the sake of food, partly to watch Bejar and the Upper Tormes, -because the allies, possessing the pass of Bejar, might have suddenly -united north of the mountains, and breaking the French line have -fallen on Madrid. - -On the right of Foy, the remainder of the army of Portugal occupied -Salamanca, Ledesma, and Alba on the Lower Tormes; Valladolid, Toro, -and Tordesillas on the Duero; Benevente, Leon, and other points on -the Esla, Astorga being, as I have before observed, dismantled by the -Spaniards. Behind the right of this great line, the army of the north -had retaken its old positions, and the army of the centre was fixed -as before in and around Madrid, its operations being bounded on the -right bank of the Tagus by the mountains which invest that capital, -and on the left bank of the Tagus by the districts of Aranjuez, -Tarancon, and Cuenca. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.] - -Joseph while disposing his troops in this manner, issued a royal -regulation marking the extent of country which each army was to -forage, requiring at the same time a certain and considerable -revenue to be collected by his Spanish civil authorities for the -support of his court. The subsistence of the French armies was -thus made secondary to the revenue of the crown, and he would have -had the soldiers in a time of war, of insurrectional war, yield to -the authority of the Spanish civilians; an absurdity heightened by -the peculiarly active, vigorous, and prompt military method of the -French, as contrasted with the dilatory improvident promise-breaking -and visionary system of the Spaniards. Hence scarcely was the royal -regulation issued when the generals broke through it in a variety of -ways, and the king was, as usual, involved in the most acrimonious -disputes with all the emperor’s lieutenants. If he ordered one -commander to detach troops to the assistance of another commander, he -was told that he should rather send additional troops to the first. -If he reprimanded a general for raising contributions contrary to -the regulations, he was answered that the soldiers were starving -and must be fed. At all times also the authority of the prefects -and intendants was disregarded by all the generals; and this was in -pursuance of Napoleon’s order; for that monarch continually reminded -his brother, that as the war was carried on by the French armies -their interests were paramount; that the king of Spain could have no -authority over them, and must never use his military authority as -lieutenant of the empire, in aid of his kingly views, for with those -the French soldiers could have nothing to do; their welfare could -not be confided to Spanish ministers whose capacity was by no means -apparent and of whose fidelity the emperor had no security. - -Nothing could be clearer or wiser than these instructions, but -Joseph would not see this distinction between his military and his -monarchical duties, and continually defended his conduct by reference -to what he owed his subjects as king of Spain. His sentiments, -explained with great force of feeling, and great beneficence of -design, were worthy of all praise if viewed abstractedly, but totally -inapplicable to the real state of affairs, because the Spaniards were -not his faithful and attached subjects, they were his inveterate -enemies; and it was quite impossible to unite the vigour of a war -of conquest with the soft and benevolent government of a paternal -monarch. Thus one constant error vitiated all the king’s political -proceedings, an error apparently arising from an inability to view -his situation as a whole instead of by parts, for his military -operations were vitiated in the same manner. - -As a man of state and of war he seems to have been acute, courageous, -and industrious, with respect to any single feature presented for his -consideration, but always unable to look steadily on the whole and -consequently always working in the dark. Men of his character being -conscious of the merit of labour and good intentions, are commonly -obstinate; and those qualities, which render them so useful under -the direction of an able chief, lead only to mischief when they -become chiefs themselves. For in matters of great moment, and in war -especially, it is not the actual importance but the comparative -importance of the operations which should determine the choice -of measures; and when all are very important this choice demands -judgment of the highest kind, judgment which no man ever possessed -more largely than Napoleon, and which Joseph did not possess at all. - -He was never able to comprehend the instructions of his brother, and -never would accept the advice of those commanders whose capacity -approached in some degree to that of the emperor. When he found that -every general complained of insufficient means, instead of combining -their forces so as to press with the principal mass against the most -important point, he disputed with each, and turned to demand from -the emperor additional succours for all; at the same time unwisely -repeating and urging his own schemes upon a man so infinitely his -superior in intellect. The insurrection in the northern provinces he -treated not as a military but a political question, attributing it -to the anger of the people at seeing the ancient supreme council of -Navarre unceremoniously dismissed and some of the members imprisoned -by a French general, a cause very inadequate to the effect. Neither -was his judgment truer with respect to the fitness of time. He -proposed, if a continuation of the Russian war should prevent the -emperor from sending more men to Spain, to make Burgos the royal -residence, to transport there the archives, and all that constituted -a capital; then to have all the provinces behind the Ebro, Catalonia -excepted, governed by himself through the medium of his Spanish -ministers and as a country at peace, while those beyond the Ebro -should be given up to the generals as a country at war. - -In this state his civil administration would he said remedy the evils -inflicted by the armies, would conciliate the people by keeping all -the Spanish families and authorities in safety and comfort, would -draw all those who favoured his cause from all parts of Spain, and -would encourage the display of that attachment to his person which he -believed so many Spaniards to entertain. And while he declared the -violence and injustice of the French armies to be the sole cause of -the protracted resistance of the Spaniards, a declaration false in -fact, that violence being only one of many causes, he was continually -urging the propriety of beating the English first and then pacifying -the people by just and benevolent measures. As if it were possible, -off-hand, to beat Wellington and his veterans, embedded as they were -in the strong country of Portugal, and having British fleets with -troops and succours of all kinds, hovering on the flanks of the -French, and feeding and sustaining the insurrection of the Spaniards -in their rear. - -Napoleon was quite as willing and anxious as Joseph could be to drive -the English from the Peninsula, and to tranquillize the people by a -regular government; but with a more profound knowledge of war, of -politics and of human nature, he judged that the first could only -be done by a methodical combination, in unison with that rule of -art which prescribes the establishment and security of the base of -operations, security which could not be obtained if the benevolent -but weak and visionary schemes of the king, were to supersede -military vigour in the field. The emperor laughed in scorn when -his brother assured him that the Peninsulars with all their fiery -passions, their fanaticism and their ignorance, would receive an -equable government as a benefit from the hands of an intrusive -monarch before they had lost all hope of resistance by arms. - -Yet it is not to be concluded that Joseph was totally devoid of -grounds for his opinions; he was surrounded by difficulties and -deeply affected by the misery which he witnessed, his Spanish -ministers were earnest and importunate, and many of the French -generals gave him but too much reason to complain of their violence. -The length and mutations of the war had certainly created a large -party willing enough to obtain tranquillity at the price of -submission, while others were, as we have seen, not indisposed, if he -would hold the crown on their terms, to accept his dynasty, as one -essentially springing from democracy, in preference to the despotic, -base, and superstitious family which the nation was called upon to -uphold. It was not unnatural therefore for Joseph to desire to retain -his capital while the negociations with Del Parque’s army were still -in existence, it was not strange that he should be displeased with -Soult after reading that marshal’s honest but offensive letter, and -certainly it was highly creditable to his character as a man and as a -king that he would not silently suffer his subjects to be oppressed -by the generals. - -“I am in distress for money,” he often exclaimed to Napoleon, “such -distress as no king ever endured before, my plate is sold, and on -state occasions the appearance of magnificence is supported by false -metal. My ministers and household are actually starving, misery is -on every face, and men, otherwise willing, are thus deterred from -joining a king so little able to support them. My revenue is seized -by the generals for the supply of their troops, and I cannot as a -king of Spain without dishonour partake of the resources thus torn -by rapine from my subjects whom I have sworn to protect; I cannot -in fine be at once king of Spain and general of the French; let me -resign both and live peaceably in France. Your majesty does not know -what scenes are enacted, you will shudder to hear that men formerly -rich and devoted to our cause have been driven out of Zaragoza and -denied even a ration of food. The marquis Cavallero, a councillor of -state, minister of justice, and known personally to your majesty, -has been thus used. He has been seen actually begging for a piece of -bread!” - -[Sidenote: Jourdan’s Official correspondence, MSS.] - -If this Caballero was the old minister to Charles the IVth, no -misery was too great a punishment for his tyrannical rule under -that monarch, yet it was not from the hands of the French it should -have come; and Joseph’s distress for money must certainly have been -great, since that brave and honest man Jourdan, a marshal of France, -major-general of the armies, and a personal favourite of the king’s, -complained that the non-payment of his appointments had reduced -him to absolute penury, and after borrowing until his credit was -exhausted he could with difficulty procure subsistence. It is now -time to describe the secondary operations of the war, but as these -were spread over two-thirds of Spain, and were simultaneous, to avoid -complexity it will be necessary to class them under two great heads, -namely those which took place north and those which took place south -of the Tagus. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE TAGUS. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. February.] - -In December 1812 general Copons had been appointed captain-general -of Catalonia instead of Eroles, but his arrival was delayed and the -province was not relieved from Lacy’s mischievous sway until February -1813, when Eroles, taking the temporary command, re-established the -head-quarters at Vich. The French, being then unmolested, save by the -English ships, passed an enormous convoy to France, but Eroles was -not long idle. Through the medium of a double spy, he sent a forged -letter to the governor of Taragona, desiring him to detach men to -Villa Nueva de Sitjes, with carts to transport some stores; at the -same time he gave out that he was himself going to the Cerdaña, which -brought the French moveable column to that quarter, and then, Eroles, -Manso, and Villamil, making forced marches from different points, -reached Torre dem barra where they met the British squadron. The -intention was to cut off the French detachment on its march to Villa -Nueva and then to attack Taragona, but fortune rules in war; the -governor received a letter from Maurice Mathieu of a different tenor -from the forged letter, and with all haste regaining his fortress -balked this well-contrived plan. - -Sarzfield, at enmity with Eroles, was now combining his operations -with Villa Campa, and they menaced Alcanitz in Aragon; but general -Pannetier who had remained at Teruel to watch Villa Campa, and to -protect Suchet’s communications, immediately marched to Daroca, -Severoli came from Zaragoza to the same point, and the Spaniards, -alarmed by their junction, dispersed. Sarzfield returned to -Catalonia, Bassecour and the Empecinado remained near Cuenca, and -Villa Campa as usual hung upon the southern skirts of the Albaracyn -mountain, ready to pounce down on the Ebro or on the Guadalquivir -side as advantage might offer. Meanwhile Suchet was by no means -at ease. The successes in Catalonia did not enable him to draw -reinforcements from thence, because Napoleon, true to his principle -of securing the base of operations, forbad him to weaken the army -there, and Montmarie’s brigade was detached from Valencia to preserve -the communication between Saguntum and Tortoza. But Aragon which was -Suchet’s place of arms and principal magazine, being infested by -Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and Sarzfield, was becoming -daily more unquiet, wherefore Pannetier’s brigade remained between -Segorbé and Daroca to aid Severoli. Thus although the two armies of -Aragon and Catalonia mustered more than seventy thousand men, that -of Aragon alone having forty thousand, with fifty field-pieces, -Suchet could not fight with more than sixteen thousand infantry, -two thousand cavalry and perhaps thirty guns beyond the Xucar. His -right flank was always liable to be turned by Requeña, his left by -the sea which was entirely at his adversary’s command, and his front -was menaced by fifty thousand men, of which three thousand might be -cavalry with fifty pieces of artillery. - -The component parts of the allied force were the Anglo-Sicilians -which, including Whittingham’s and Roche’s divisions, furnished -eighteen thousand soldiers. Elio’s army furnishing twelve thousand -exclusive of the divisions of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the -Empecinado, which, though detached, belonged to him. Del Parque’s -army reinforced by new levies from Andalusia, and on paper twenty -thousand. Numerically this was a formidable power if it had -been directed in mass against Suchet; but on his right the duke -of Dalmatia, whose head-quarters were at Toledo, sent forward -detachments which occupied the army of Del Parque; moreover the -secret negociations for the defection of the latter were now in -full activity, and from the army of the centre a column was sent -towards Cuenca to draw Bassecour and the Empecinado from Suchet’s -right flank; but those chiefs had five thousand men, and in return -continually harassed the army of the centre. - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -On the side of the Morena and Murcia, Soult’s operations were -confined to skirmishes and foraging parties. Early in January his -brother, seeking to open a communication with Suchet by Albacete, -defeated some of Elio’s cavalry with the loss of fifty men, and -pursued them until they rallied on their main body, under Freyre; -the latter offered battle with nine hundred horsemen in front of -the defile leading to Albacete; but Soult, disliking his appearance -turned off to the right, and passing through Villa Nueva de los -Infantes joined a French post established in Valdepeña at the foot -of the Morena, where some skirmishes had also taken place with Del -Parque’s cavalry. The elder Soult thus learned, that Freyre, with two -thousand five hundred horsemen, covered all the roads leading from La -Mancha, to Valencia and Murcia; that Elio’s infantry was at Tobara -and Hellin, Del Parque’s head-quarters at Jaen; that the passes of -the Morena were guarded, and magazines formed at Andujar, Linares, -and Cordoba, while on the other side of La Mancha, the Empecinado had -come to Hinojoso with fifteen hundred horsemen, and the column sent -from the army of the centre was afraid to encounter him. - -These dispositions, and the strength of the Spaniards, not only -prevented the younger Soult from penetrating into Murcia, but delayed -the march of a column, under general Daricau, destined to communicate -with Suchet, and bring up the detachments baggage and stores, which -the armies of the south and centre had left at Valencia. The scouting -parties of both sides now met at different points, and on the 27th -of January, a sharp cavalry fight happened at El Corral, in which -the French commander was killed, and the Spaniards, though far the -most numerous, defeated. Meanwhile Daricau, whose column had been -reinforced, reached Utiel, opened the communication with Suchet by -Requeña, cut off some small parties of the enemy, and then continuing -his march received a great convoy, consisting of two thousand -fighting men, six hundred travellers, and the stores and baggage -belonging to Soult’s and the king’s armies. This convoy had marched -for Madrid by the way of Zaragoza, but was recalled when Daricau -arrived, and under his escort, aided by a detachment of Suchet’s army -placed at Yniesta, it reached Todelo in the latter end of February -safely, though Villa Campa came down to the Cabriel River, to trouble -the march. - -During these different operations numerous absurd and contradictory -reports, principally originating in the Spanish and English -newspapers, obtained credit in the French armies, such as, that sir -Henry Wellesley and Infantado had seized the government at Cadiz; -that Clinton, by an intrigue, had got possession of Alicant; that -Ballesteros had shewn Wellington secret orders from the cortez not -to acknowledge him as generalissimo, or even as a grandee; that -the cortez had removed the regency because the latter permitted -Wellington to appoint intendants and other officers to the Spanish -provinces; that Hill had devastated the frontier and retired -to Lisbon though forcibly opposed by Morillo; that a nephew of -Ballesteros had raised the standard of revolt; that Wellington was -advancing, and that troops had been embarked at Lisbon for a maritime -expedition, with other stories of a like nature, which seem to have -disturbed all the French generals save Soult, whose information as -to the real state of affairs continued to be sure and accurate. He -also at this time detected four or five of Wellington’s emissaries, -amongst them, was a Portuguese officer on his own staff; a man called -Piloti, who served and betrayed both sides; and an amazon called -Francisca de la Fuerte, who, though only twenty-two years old, had -already commanded a partida of sixty men with some success, and was -now a spy. But in the latter end of February the duke of Dalmatia was -recalled, and the command of his army fell to Gazan, whose movements -belong rather to the operations north of the Tagus. Wherefore turning -to Suchet, I shall proceed to give an exact notion of his resources -and of the nature of the country where his operations were conducted. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 6.] - -The city of Valencia, though nominally the seat of his power, was -not so. He had razed all the defences constructed by the Spaniards, -confining his hold to the old walls and to a small fortified post -within the town sufficient to resist a sudden attack, and capable of -keeping the population in awe; his real place of arms was Saguntum, -and between that and Tortoza he had two fortresses, namely, Oropesa -and Peniscola; he had also another line of communication, but for -infantry only, through Morella, a fortified post, to Mequinenza. -Besides these lines there were roads both from Valencia and Saguntum, -leading through Segorbé to Teruel a fortified post, and from thence -to Zaragoza by Daroca another fortified post. These roads were -eastward of the Guadalaviar, and westward of that river Suchet had -a line of retreat from Valencia to Madrid by Requeña, which was -also a fortified post. Now if the whole of the French general’s -command be looked to, his forces were very numerous, but that command -was wide, and in the field his army was, as I have before shewn, -not very numerous. Valencia was in fact a point made on hostile -ground which, now that the French were generally on the defensive, -was only maintained with a view of imposing upon the allies and -drawing forth the resources of the country as long as circumstances -would permit. The proper line for covering Valencia and the rich -country immediately around it was on the Xucar, or rather beyond -it, at San Felippe de Xativa and Moxente, where a double range of -mountains afforded strong defensive positions, barring the principal -roads leading to Valencia. On this position Suchet had formed his -entrenched camp, much talked of at the time, but slighter than fame -represented it; the real strength was in the natural formation of the -ground. - -[Sidenote: February.] - -[Sidenote: See Plan 7.] - -Beyond his left flank the coast road was blocked by the castle of -Denia, but his right could be turned from Yecla and Almanza, through -Cofrentes and Requeña, and he was forced to keep strict watch and -strong detachments always towards the defile of Almanza, lest Elio’s -army and Del Parque’s should march that way. This entrenched camp was -Suchet’s permanent position of defence, but there were reasons why -he should endeavour to keep his troops generally more advanced; the -country in his front was full of fertile plains, or rather coves, -within the hills, which run in nearly parallel ranges, and are -remarkably rocky and precipitous, enclosing the plains like walls, -and it was of great importance who should command their resources. -Hence as the principal point in Suchet’s front was the large and -flourishing town of Alcoy, he occupied it, and from thence threw -off smaller bodies to Biar, Castalla, Ibi, and Onil, which were on -the same strong ridge as the position covering the cove of Alcoy. -On his right there was another plain in which Fuente La Higuera, -Villena, and Yecla were delineated at opposite points of a triangle, -and as this plain and the smaller valleys ministered to Suchet’s -wants because of his superior cavalry, the subsistence of the French -troops was eased, while the cantonments and foraging districts of the -Sicilian army were contracted: the outposts of the allied army were -in fact confined to a fourth and fifth parallel range of mountains -covering the towns of Elda, Tibi, Xixona, and Villa Joyosa which was -on the sea-coast. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16, 17.] - -Suchet thus assumed an insulting superiority over an army more -numerous than his own, but outward appearances are deceitful in -war; the French general was really the strongest, because want, -ignorance, dissention, and even treachery, were in his adversary’s -camps. Del Parque’s army remained behind the Morena, Elio’s was at -Tobarra and Hellin, and of the Anglo-Sicilian army, the British -only were available in the hour of danger, and they were few. When -general Campbell quarrelled with Elio the latter retired for a time -towards Murcia, but after Wellington’s journey to Cadiz he again came -forward, and his cavalry entering La Mancha skirmished with general -Soult’s and communicating with Bassecour and the Empecinado delayed -the progress of Daricau towards Valencia. Meanwhile general Campbell -remained quiet, in expectation that lord William Bentinck would come -with more troops to Alicant, but in February fresh troubles broke -out in Sicily, and in the latter end of that month sir John Murray -arriving, assumed the command. Thus in a few months, five chiefs with -different views and prejudices successively came to the command, -and the army was still unorganized and unequipped for vigorous -service. The Sicilians, Calabrese, and French belonging to it were -eager to desert, one Italian regiment had been broken for misconduct -by general Maitland, the British and Germans were humiliated in -spirit by the part they were made to enact, and the Spaniards under -Whittingham and Roche were starving; for Wellington knowing by -experience how the Spanish government, though receiving a subsidy, -would, if permitted, throw the feeding of their troops entirely upon -the British, forbade their being supplied from the British stores, -and the Spanish intendants neglected them. - -[Sidenote: General Donkin’s papers.] - -Murray’s first care was to improve the equipment of his troops, and -with the aid of Elio he soon put them in a better condition. The two -armies together furnished thirty thousand effective men, of which -about three thousand were cavalry, and they had thirty-seven guns, -yet very inadequately horsed, and Whittingham’s and Elio’s cavalry -were from want of forage nearly unfit for duty. The transport mules -were hired at an enormous price, the expense being at the rate of one -hundred and thirty thousand pounds annually, and yet the supply was -bad, for here as in all other parts of Spain, corruption and misuse -of authority prevailed. The rich sent their fine animals to Alicant -for sanctuary and bribed the Alcaldes, the mules of the poor alone -were pressed, the army was ill provided, and yet the country was -harassed. In this state it was necessary to do something, and as the -distress of Whittingham and Roche’s troops could not be removed, save -by enlarging their cantonments, Murray after some hesitation resolved -to drive the French from the mountains in his front, and he designed, -as the first step, to surprise fifteen hundred men which they had -placed in Alcoy. Now five roads led towards the French positions. 1º. -On the left the great road from Alicant passing through Monforte, -Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera, where it joins the -great road from Valencia to Madrid, which runs through Almanza. This -way turned both the ridges occupied by the armies. 2º. A good road -leading by Tibi to Castalla, from whence it sent off two branches, -on the left hand, one leading to Sax, the other through the pass of -Biar to Villena; two other branches on the right hand went, the one -through Ibi to Alcoy, the other through Onil to the same place. 3º. -The road from Alicant to Xixona, a bad road, leading over the very -steep rugged ridge of that name to Alcoy. At Xixona also there was a -narrow way on the right hand, through the mountains to Alcoy, which -was followed by Roche when he attacked that place in the first battle -of Castalla. 4º. A carriage-road running along the sea-coast as far -as Villa Joyosa, from whence a narrow mountain-way leads to the -village of Consentayna, situated in the cove of Alcoy and behind that -town. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -On the 6th of March the allied troops moved in four columns, one -on the left by Elda, to watch the great Madrid road; one on the -right composed of Spanish troops under colonel Campbell, from Villa -Joyosa, to get to Consentayna behind Alcoy; a third, under lord -Frederick Bentinck, issuing by Ibi, was to turn the French right; -the fourth was to march from Xixona straight against Alcoy, and to -pursue the remainder of Habert’s division, which was behind that -town. Lord Frederick Bentinck attacked in due time, but as colonel -Campbell did not appear the surprise failed, and when the French -saw the main body winding down the Sierra in front of Alcoy, they -retired, pursued by general Donkin with the second battalion of the -twenty-seventh regiment. The head of lord Frederick Bentinck’s column -was already engaged, but the rear had not arrived, and the whole of -Habert’s division was soon concentrated a mile beyond Alcoy, and -there offered battle; yet sir John Murray, instead of pushing briskly -forward, halted, and it was not until several demands for support -had reached him, that he detached the fifty-eighth to the assistance -of the troops engaged, who had lost about forty men, chiefly of the -twenty-seventh. Habert, fearing to be cut off by Consentayna, and -seeing the fifty-eighth coming on, retreated, and the allies occupied -Alcoy, which greatly relieved their quarters; but the want of vigour -displayed by sir John Murray when he had gained Alcoy did not escape -the notice of the troops. - -[Sidenote: Plan 7.] - -After this affair the armies remained quiet until the 15th, when -Whittingham forced the French posts with some loss from Albayda, and -general Donkin, taking two battalions and some dragoons from Ibi, -drove back their outposts from Rocayrente and Alsafara, villages -situated beyond the range bounding the plain of Alcoy. He repassed -the hills higher up with the dragoons and a company of the grenadiers -of twenty-seventh, under captain Waldron, and returned by the main -road to Alcoy, having in his course met a French battalion, through -which the gallant Waldron broke with his grenadiers. Meanwhile -sir John Murray, after much vacillation, at one time resolving to -advance, at another to retreat, thinking it impossible first to -force Suchet’s entrenched camp, and then his second line behind the -Xucar, a difficult river with muddy banks, believing also that the -French general had his principal magazines at Valencia, conceived -the idea of seizing the latter by a maritime expedition. He judged -that the garrison which he estimated at eight hundred infantry, and -one thousand cavalry, would be unable to resist, and that the town -once taken the inhabitants would rise; Suchet could not then detach -men enough to quell them without exposing himself to defeat on -the Xucar, and if he moved with all his force he could be closely -followed by the allies and driven upon Requeña. In this view he made -fresh dispositions. - -On the 18th Roche’s division reinforced by some troops from Elio’s -army and by a British grenadier battalion, was selected for the -maritime attack, and the rest of the army was concentrated on -the left at Castalla with the exception of Whittingham’s troops -which remained at Alcoy, for Suchet was said to be advancing, and -Murray resolved to fight him. But to form a plan and to execute it -vigorously, were with sir John Murray very different things. Although -far from an incapable officer in the cabinet, he shewed none of the -qualities of a commander in the field. His indecision was remarkable. -On the morning of the 18th he resolved to fight in front of Castalla, -and in the evening he assumed a weaker position behind that town, -abandoning the command of a road, running from Ibi in rear of Alcoy, -by which Whittingham might have been cut off. And when the strong -remonstrances of his quarter-master general induced him to relinquish -this ground, he adopted a third position, neither so strong as the -first nor so defective as the last. - -In this manner affairs wore on until the 26th, when Roche’s division -and the grenadier battalion marched to Alicant to embark, with -orders, if they failed at Valencia, to seize and fortify Cullera at -the mouth of the Xucar; and if this also failed to besiege Denia. -But now the foolish ministerial arrangements about the Sicilian -army worked out their natural result. Lord Wellington, though he -was permitted to retain the Anglo-Sicilian army in Spain beyond the -period lord William Bentinck had assigned for its stay, had not the -full command given to him; he was clogged with reference to the -state of Sicily, until the middle of March, and this new arrangement -was still unknown to lord William Bentinck and to sir John Murray. -Thus there were at this time, in fact, three commanding officers; -Wellington for the general operations, Murray for the particular -operations, and lord William Bentinck still empowered to increase or -diminish the troops, and even upon emergency to withdraw the whole. -And now in consequence of the continued dissentions in Sicily, the -king of that country having suddenly resumed the government, lord -William did recal two thousand of Murray’s best troops, and amongst -them the grenadier battalion intended to attack Valencia. That -enterprize instantly fell to the ground. - -[Sidenote: Appendix to Phillipart’s Military Calendar.] - -Upon this event sir John Murray, or some person writing under his -authority, makes the following observations. “The most careful -combination could not have selected a moment when the danger of such -authority was more clearly demonstrated, more severely felt. Had -these orders been received a very short time before, the allied army -would not have been committed in active operations; had they reached -sir John Murray a week later, there is every reason to believe that -the whole country from Alicant to Valencia would have passed under -the authority of the allied army, and that marshal Suchet cut off -from his magazines in that province, and in Aragon, would have been -compelled to retire through a mountainous and barren country on -Madrid. But the order of lord William Bentinck was peremptory, and -the allied army which even before was scarcely balanced, was now so -inferior to the enemy that it became an indispensible necessity -to adopt a system strongly defensive, and all hope of a brilliant -commencement of the campaign vanished.” - -Upon this curious passage it is necessary to remark, 1º. that -Suchet’s great magazines were not at Valencia but at Saguntum; 2º. -that from the castle of Denia the fleet would have been descried, -and the strong garrison of Saguntum could have reinforced the troops -in Valencia; Montmarie’s brigade also would soon have come up from -Oropesa. These were doubtless contingencies not much to be regarded -in bar of such an enterprize, but Suchet would by no means have -been forced to retire by Requeña upon Madrid, he would have retired -to Liria, the road to which steered more than five miles clear of -Valencia. He could have kept that city in check while passing, in -despite of sir John Murray, and at Liria he would have been again -in his natural position, that is to say, in full command of his -principal lines of communication. Moreover, however disagreeable to -Suchet personally it might have been to be forced back upon Madrid, -that event would have been extremely detrimental to the general -cause, as tending to reinforce the king against Wellington. But the -singular part of the passage quoted, is the assertion that the delay -of a week in lord William Bentinck’s order would have ensured such a -noble stroke against the French army. Now lord William Bentinck only -required the troops to proceed in the first instance to Mahon; what a -dull flagging spirit then was his, who dared not delay obedience to -such an order even for a week! - -[Sidenote: April.] - -[Sidenote: General Donkin’s Papers, MSS.] - -The recalled troops embarked for Sicily on the 5th of April, and -Suchet alarmed at the offensive position of the allies, which he -attributed to the general state of affairs, because the king’s march -to Castile permitted all the Spanish armies of Andalusia to reinforce -Elio, resolved to strike first, and with the greater avidity because -Elio had pushed general Mijares with an advanced guard of three -or four thousand men to Yecla where they were quite unsupported. -This movement had been concerted in March, with Murray who was to -occupy Villena, and be prepared to fall upon the French left, if the -Spaniards were attacked at Yecla; and in return the Spaniards were -to fall on the French right if Murray was attacked. Elio however -neglected to strengthen his division at Yecla with cavalry, which -he had promised to do, nor did Murray occupy Villena in force; -nevertheless Mijares remained at Yecla, Elio with the main body -occupied Hellin, and the cavalry were posted on the side of Albacete, -until the departure of the troops for Sicily. Roche then joined the -army at Castalla, and Elio’s main body occupied Elda and Sax to cover -the main road from Madrid to Alicant. - -On the night of the 11th Suchet having by a forced march assembled -sixteen battalions of infantry, ten squadrons of cavalry, and twelve -pieces of artillery at Fuente la Higuera, marched straight upon -Caudete, while Harispe’s division by a cross road endeavoured to -surprise the Spaniards at Yecla. The latter retired fighting towards -Jumilla by the hills, but the French artillery and skirmishers -followed close, and at last the Spaniards being pierced in the -centre, one part broke and fled, and the other part after some -farther resistance surrendered. Two hundred were killed, and fifteen -hundred prisoners, including wounded, fell into the hands of the -victors, who lost about eighty men and officers. - -Suchet’s movement on Fuente la Higuera was known in the night of the -10th at Castalla, where all the Anglo-Sicilian army was in position, -because Whittingham had come from Alcoy, leaving only a detachment -on that side. Hence while Harispe was defeating Mijares at Yecla, -Suchet in person remained at Caudete with two divisions and the heavy -cavalry in order of battle, lest Murray should advance by Biar and -Villena. The latter town, possessing an old wall and a castle, was -occupied by the regiment of Velez-Malaga, a thousand strong, and in -the course of the day Murray also came up with the allied cavalry and -a brigade of infantry. Here he was joined by Elio, without troops, -and when towards evening Harispe’s fight being over and the prisoners -secured, Suchet advanced, Murray retired with the cavalry through the -pass of Biar leaving his infantry, under colonel Adam, in front of -that defile. He wished also to draw the Spanish garrison from Villena -but Elio would not suffer it, and yet during the night, repenting of -his obstinacy, came to Castalla entreating Murray to carry off that -battalion. It was too late, Suchet had broken the gates of the town -the evening before, and the castle with the best equipped and finest -regiment in the Spanish army had already surrendered. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 7.] - -Murray’s final position was about three miles from the pass of Biar. -His left, composed of Whittingham’s Spaniards, was entrenched on a -rugged sierra ending abruptly above Castalla, which, with its old -castle crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, closed the right of that -wing and was occupied in strength by Mackenzie’s division. - -A space between Whittingham’s troops and the town was left on the -sierra for the advanced guard, then in the pass of Biar; Castalla -itself, covered by the castle, was prepared for defence, and the -principal approaches were commanded by strong batteries, for Murray -had concentrated nearly all his guns at this point. The cavalry was -partly behind partly in front of the town on an extensive plain which -was interspersed with olive plantations. - -The right wing, composed of Clinton’s division and Roche’s Spaniards, -was on comparatively low ground, and extended to the rear at right -angles with the centre, but well covered by a “_barranco_” or bed of -a torrent, the precipitous sides of which were, in some places, one -hundred feet deep. - -Suchet could approach this position, either through the pass of Biar, -or turning that defile, by the way of Sax; but the last road was -supposed to be occupied by Elio’s army, and as troops coming by it -must make a flank march along the front of the position, it was not a -favourable line of attack; moreover the allies, being in possession -of the defiles of Biar, and of Alcoy, might have gained the Xucar, -either by Fuentes de la Higuera or by Alcoy, seeing that Alicant, -which was their base, was safe, and the remnants of Elio’s army could -easily have got away. Murray’s army was however scarcely active -enough for such an operation, and Suchet advanced very cautiously, as -it behoved him to do, for the ground between Castalla and Biar was -just such as a prompt opponent would desire for a decisive blow. - -The advanced guard, in the pass of Biar, about two thousand five -hundred men was composed of two Italian regiments and a battalion -of the twenty-seventh British; two companies of German riflemen, -a troop of foreign hussars and six guns, four of which were -mountain-pieces. The ground was very strong and difficult but at two -o’clock in the afternoon the French, having concentrated in front -of the pass, their skirmishers swarmed up the steep rocks on either -flank, with a surprising vigour and agility, and when they had gained -the summit, the supporting columns advanced. Then the allies who had -fought with resolution for about two hours abandoned the pass with -the loss of two guns and about thirty prisoners, retreating however -in good order to the main position, for they were not followed -beyond the mouth of the defile. The next day, that is the 13th about -one o’clock, the French cavalry, issuing cautiously from the pass, -extended to the left in the plain as far as Onil, and they were -followed by the infantry who immediately occupied a low ridge about -a mile in front of the allies’ left; the cavalry then gained ground -to the front, and closing towards the right of the allies menaced the -road to Ibi and Alcoy. - -Murray had only occupied his ground the night before, but he had -studied it and entrenched it in parts. His right wing was quite -refused, and so well covered by the barranco that nearly all the -troops could have been employed as a reserve to the left wing, which -was also very strongly posted and presented a front about two miles -in extent. But notwithstanding the impregnable strength of the ground -the English general shrunk from the contest, and while the head of -the French column was advancing from the defile of Biar, thrice he -gave his quarter-master general orders to put the army in retreat, -and the last time so peremptorily, that obedience must have ensued -if at that moment the firing between the picquets and the French -light troops had not begun. - - -BATTLE OF CASTALLA. - -Suchet’s dispositions were made slowly and as if he also had not made -up his mind to fight, but a crooked jut of the sierra, springing from -about the middle of the ridge, hid from him all the British troops, -and two-thirds of the whole army, hence his first movement was to -send a column towards Castalla, to turn this jut of the sierra and -discover the conditions of the position. Meanwhile he formed two -strong columns immediately opposite the left wing, and his cavalry, -displaying a formidable line in the plain closed gradually towards -the barranco. The French general however soon discovered that the -right of the allies was unattackable. Wherefore retaining his reserve -on the low ridge in front of the left wing, and still holding the -exploring column of infantry near Castalla, to protect his flank -against any sally from that point, he opened his artillery against -the centre and right wing of the allies, and forming several columns -of attack commenced the action against the allies’ left on both sides -of the jut before spoken of. - -The ascent in front of Whittingham’s post, being very rugged and -steep, and the upper parts entrenched, the battle there resolved -itself at once into a fight of light troops, in which the Spaniards -maintained their ground with resolution; but on the other side of -the jut, the French mounted the heights, slowly indeed and with many -skirmishers, yet so firmly, that it was evident nothing but good -fighting would send them down again. Their light troops spread -over the whole face of the Sierra, and here and there attaining -the summit were partially driven down again by the Anglo-Italian -troops; but where the main body came upon the second battalion of -the twenty-seventh there was a terrible crash. For the ground having -an abrupt declination near the top enabled the French to form a line -under cover, close to the British, who were lying down waiting for -orders to charge; and while the former were unfolding their masses -a grenadier officer, advancing alone, challenged the captain of -the twenty-seventh grenadiers to single combat. Waldron an agile -vigorous Irishman and of boiling courage instantly sprung forward, -the hostile lines looked on without firing a shot, the swords of -the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman’s head was cleft -in twain, and the next instant the twenty-seventh jumping up with a -deafening shout, fired a deadly volley, at half pistol-shot distance, -and then charged with such a shock that, maugre their bravery and -numbers, the enemy’s soldiers were overthrown and the side of the -Sierra was covered with the killed and wounded. In Murray’s despatch -this exploit was erroneously attributed to colonel Adam, but it was -ordered and conducted by colonel Reeves alone. - -The French general seeing his principal column thus overthrown, -and at every other point having the worst of the fight, made two -secondary attacks to cover the rallying of the defeated columns, but -these also failing, his army was separated in three parts, namely -the beaten troops which were in great confusion, the reserve on the -minor heights from whence the attacking columns had advanced, and -the cavalry, which being far on the left in the plain, was also -separated from the point of action by the bed of the torrent, a -bridge over which was commanded by the allies. A vigorous sally from -Castalla and a general advance would have obliged the French reserves -to fall back upon Biar in confusion before the cavalry could come to -their assistance, and the victory might have been thus completed; but -Murray, who had remained during the whole action behind Castalla, -gave the French full time to rally all their forces and retire in -order towards the pass of Biar. Then gradually passing out by the -right of the town, with a tedious pedantic movement, he changed his -front, forming two lines across the valley, keeping his left at the -foot of the heights, and extending his right, covered by the cavalry, -towards the Sierra of Onil. Meanwhile Mackenzie moving out by the -left of Castalla with three British, and one German battalion, and -eight guns followed the enemy more rapidly. - -Suchet had by this time plunged into the pass with his infantry -cavalry and tumbrils in one mass, leaving a rear-guard of three -battalions with eight guns to cover the passage; but these being -pressed by Mackenzie, and heavily cannonaded, were soon forced to -form lines and offer battle, answering gun for gun. The French -soldiers were heavily crushed by the English shot, the clatter of -musketry was beginning, and one well-directed vigorous charge, -would have overturned and driven the French in a confused mass upon -the other troops then wedged in the narrow defile; but Mackenzie’s -movement had been made by the order of the quarter-master-general -Donkin, without Murray’s knowledge, and the latter instead of -supporting it strongly, sent repeated orders to withdraw the troops -already engaged, and in despite of all remonstrance caused them to -fall back on the main body, when victory was in their grasp. Suchet -thus relieved at a most critical moment immediately occupied a -position across the defile with his flanks on the heights, and though -Murray finally sent some light companies to attack his left the -effort was feeble and produced no result; he retained his position -and in the night retired to Fuente de la Higuera. - -On the 14th Murray marched to Alcoy where a small part of -Whittingham’s forces had remained in observation of a French -detachment left to hold the pass of Albayda, and through this pass he -proposed to intercept the retreat of Suchet, but his movements were -slow, his arrangements bad, and the army became so disordered, that -he halted the 15th at Alcoy. A feeble demonstration on the following -days towards Albayda terminated his operations. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s official despatch to the king, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -[Sidenote: Murray’s despatch.] - -In this battle of Castalla, the allies had, including Roche’s -division, about seventeen thousand of all arms, and the French about -fifteen thousand. Suchet says that the action was brought on, against -his wish, by the impetuosity of his light troops, and that he lost -only eight hundred men; his statement is confirmed by Vacani the -Italian historian. Sir John Murray affirms that it was a pitched -battle and that the French lost above three thousand men. The reader -may choose between these accounts. In favour of Suchet’s version -it may be remarked that neither the place, nor the time, nor the -mode of attack, was such as might be expected from his talents and -experience in war, if he had really intended a pitched battle; and -though the action was strongly contested on the principal point, it -is scarcely possible that so many as three thousand men could have -been killed and wounded. And yet eight hundred seems too few, because -the loss of the victorious troops with all advantages of ground, was -more than six hundred. One thing is however certain that if Suchet -lost three thousand men, which would have been at least a fourth -of his infantry, he must have been so disabled, so crippled, that -what with the narrow defile of Biar in the rear, and the distance -of his cavalry in the plain, to have escaped at all was extremely -discreditable to Murray’s generalship. An able commander having a -superior force, and the allies were certainly the most numerous, -would never have suffered the pass of Biar to be forced on the 12th, -or if it were forced, he would have had his army well in hand behind -it, ready to fall upon the head of the French column as it issued -into the low ground. - -Suchet violated several of the most important maxims of art. For -without an adequate object, he fought a battle, having a defile in -his rear, and on ground where his cavalry, in which he was superior, -could not act. Neither the general state of the French affairs, nor -the particular circumstances, invited a decisive offensive movement -at the time, wherefore the French general should have been contented -with his first successes against the Spaniards, and against Colonel -Adam, unless some palpable advantage had been offered to him by -Murray. But the latter’s position was very strong indeed, and the -French army was in imminent danger, cooped up between the pass of -Biar and the allied troops; and this danger would have been increased -if Elio had executed a movement which Murray had proposed to him in -the night of the 12th, namely, to push troops into the mountains from -Sax, which would have strengthened Whittingham’s left and menaced the -right flank of the enemy. Elio disregarded this request, and during -the whole of the operations the two armies were unconnected, and -acting without concert, although only a few miles distant from each -other. This might have been avoided if they had previously put the -castle and town of Villena in a good state of defence, and occupied -the pass of Biar in force behind it. The two armies would then have -been secure of a junction in advance, and the plain of Villena would -have been commanded. To the courage of the troops belongs all the -merit of the success obtained, there was no generalship, and hence -though much blood was spilt no profit was derived from victory. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE TAGUS. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. April.] - -On this side as in the south, one part of the French fronted lord -Wellington’s forces, while the rest warred with the Partidas, watched -the English fleets on the coast, and endeavoured to maintain a free -intercourse with France; but the extent of country was greater, the -lines of communication longer, the war altogether more difficult, and -the various operations more dissevered. - -Four distinct bodies acted north of the Tagus. - -1º. The army of Portugal, composed of six divisions under Reille, -observing the allies from behind the Tormes; the Gallicians from -behind the Esla. - -2º. That part of the army of the south which, posted in the valley of -the Tagus, observed Hill from behind the Tietar, and the Spaniards of -Estremadura from behind the Tagus. - -3º. The army of the north, under Caffarelli, whose business was to -watch the English squadrons in the Bay of Biscay, to scour the great -line of communication with France, and to protect the fortresses of -Navarre and Biscay. - -4º. The army of the centre, under count D’Erlon whose task was to -fight the Partidas in the central part of Spain, to cover Madrid and -to connect the other armies by means of moveable columns radiating -from that capital. Now if the reader will follow the operations of -these armies in the order of their importance and will mark their -bearing on the main action of the campaign, he will be led gradually -to understand how it was, that in 1813, the French, although -apparently in their full strength, were suddenly, irremediably and as -it were by a whirlwind, swept from the Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -[Sidenote: Vacani.] - -The army of the centre was composed of Darmagnac’s and Barrois’ -French divisions, of Palombini’s Italians, Casa Palacio’s Spaniards, -Trielhard’s cavalry, and the king’s French guards. It has been -already shewn how, marching from the Tormes, it drove the Empecinado -and Bassecour from the capital; but in passing the Guadarama one -hundred and fifty men were frozen to death, a catastrophe produced -by the rash use of ardent spirits. Palombini immediately occupied -Alcala, and, having foraged the country towards Guadalaxara, brought -in a large convoy of provisions to the capital. He would then have -gone to Zaragoza to receive the recruits and stores which had arrived -from Italy for his division, but Caffarelli was at this time so -pressed that the Italian division finally marched to his succour, not -by the direct road, such was the state of the northern provinces, but -by the circuitous route of Valladolid and Burgos. The king’s guards -then replaced the Italians at Alcala, and excursions were commenced -on every side against the Partidas, which being now recruited and -taught by French deserters were become exceedingly wary and fought -obstinately. - -On the 8th of January, Espert, governor of Segovia, beat Saornil not -far from Cuellar. - -On the 3d of February, general Vichery, marching upon Medina Celi, -routed a regiment of horse called the volunteers of Madrid, and took -six hundred prisoners. The Empecinado with two thousand infantry and -a thousand cavalry intercepted him on his return, but Vichery beat -him with considerable slaughter, and made the retreat good with a -loss of only seventy men. However the Guerilla chief being reinforced -by Saornil and Abril, still kept the hills about Guadalaxara, and -when D’Erlon sent fresh troops against him, he attacked a detachment -under colonel Prieur, killed twenty men, took the baggage and -recovered a heavy contribution. - -During these operations the troops in the valley of the Tagus were -continually harassed, especially by a chief called Cuesta who was -sometimes in the Guadalupe mountains, sometimes on the Tietar, -sometimes in the Vera de Placentia, and he was supported at times -on the side of the Guadalupe by Morillo and Penne Villemur. The -French were however most troubled by Hill’s vicinity, for that -general’s successful enterprises had made a profound impression, and -the slightest change of his quarters, or even the appearance of an -English uniform beyond the line of cantonments caused a concentration -of French troops as expecting one of his sudden blows. - -Nor was the army of Portugal tranquil. The Gallicians menaced it from -Puebla Senabria and the gorges of the Bierzo; Silveira from the Tras -os Montes; the mountains separating Leon from the Asturias were full -of bands; Wellington was on the Agueda; and Hill, moving from Coria -by the pass of Bejar might make a sudden incursion towards Avila. -Finally the communication with the army of the north was to be kept -up, and on every side the Partidas were enterprising, especially the -horsemen in the plains of Leon. Reille however did not fail to war -down these last. - -Early in January Foy, returning from Astorga to relieve general -Leval, then at Avila, killed some of Marquinez’ cavalry in San Pedro, -and more of them at Mota la Toro; and on the 15th of that month the -French captain Mathis killed or took four hundred of the same Partida -at Valderas. A convoy of Guerilla stores coming from the Asturias -was intercepted by general Boyer’s detachments, and one Florian, a -celebrated Spanish Partizan in the French service, destroyed the -band of Garido, in the Avila district. The same Florian on the 1st -of February defeated the Medico and another inferior chief, and soon -after, passing the Tormes, captured some Spanish dragoons who had -come out of Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 1st of March he crushed the band -of Tonto and at the same time captain Mathis, acting on the side of -the Carrion river, again surprised Marquinez’ band at Melgar Abaxo, -and that Partida, reduced to two hundred men under two inferior -chiefs called Tobar and Marcos, ceased to be formidable. - -Previous to this some Gallician troops having advanced to Castro -Gonzalo on the Esla, were attacked by Boyer who beat them through -Benevente with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and then -driving the Spanish garrison from Puebla Senabria, raised -contributions with a rigour and ferocity said to be habitual to him. -His detachments afterwards penetrating into the Asturias, menaced -Oviedo, and vexed the country in despite of Porlier and Barceña who -were in that province. General Foy also having fixed his quarters at -Avila, feeling uneasy as to Hill’s intentions, had endeavoured on -the 20th of February to surprise Bejar with the view of ascertaining -if any large body was collected behind it, but he was vigorously -repulsed by the fiftieth regiment and sixth caçadores under the -command of colonel Harrison. However this attack and the movements -of Florian beyond the Tormes, induced Lord Wellington to bring up -another division to the Agueda, which, by a reaction, caused the -French to believe the allies were ready to advance. - -During these events Caffarelli vainly urged Reille to send him -reinforcements, the insurrection in the north gained strength, and -the communications were entirely intercepted until Palombini, driving -away Mendizabal and Longa from Burgos, enabled the great convoy and -all Napoleon’s despatches, which had been long accumulating there, to -reach Madrid in the latter end of February. Joseph then reluctantly -prepared to abandon his capital and concentrate the armies in -Castile, but he neglected those essential ingredients of the -emperor’s plan, rapidity and boldness. By the first Napoleon proposed -to gain time for the suppression of the insurrection in the northern -provinces. By the second to impose upon Lord Wellington and keep him -on the defensive. Joseph did neither, he was slow and assumed the -defensive himself, and he and the other French generals expected -to be attacked, for they had not fathomed the English general’s -political difficulties; and French writers since, misconceiving the -character of his warfare, have attributed to slowness in the man -what was really the long-reaching policy of a great commander. The -allied army was not so lithe as the French army; the latter carried -on occasion ten days’ provisions on the soldiers’ backs, or it lived -upon the country, and was in respect of its organization and customs -a superior military machine; the former never carried more than -three days’ provisions, never lived upon the country, avoided the -principle of making the war support the war, payed or promised to pay -for every thing, and often carried in its marches even the corn for -its cavalry. The difference of this organization resulting from the -difference of policy between the two nations, was a complete bar to -any great and sudden excursion on the part of the British general and -must always be considered in judging his operations. - -It is true that if Wellington had then passed the Upper Tormes with -a considerable force, drawing Hill to him through Bejar, and moving -rapidly by Avila, he might have broken in upon the defensive system -of the king and beat his armies in detail, and much the French -feared such a blow, which would have been quite in the manner of -Napoleon. But Wellington’s views were directed by other than mere -military principles. Thus striking, he was not certain that his blow -would be decisive, his Portuguese forces would have been ruined, his -British soldiers seriously injured by the attempt, and the resources -of France would have repaired the loss of the enemy, sooner than -he could have recovered the weakness which must necessarily have -followed such an unseasonable exertion. His plan was to bring a great -and enduring power early into the field, for like Phocion he desired -to have an army fitted for a long race and would not start on the -short course. - -Joseph though he conceived the probability and dreaded the effect -of such a sudden attack, could by no means conceive the spirit of -his brother’s plans. It was in vain that Napoleon, while admitting -the bad moral effect of abandoning the capital, pointed out the -difference between flying from it and making a forward movement -at the head of an army; the king even maintained that Madrid was -a better military centre of operations than Valladolid, because -it had lines of communication by Segovia, Aranda de Duero, and -Zaragoza; nothing could be more unmilitary, unless he was prepared to -march direct upon Lisbon if the allies marched upon the Duero. His -extreme reluctance to quit Madrid induced slowness, but the actual -position of his troops at the moment likewise presented obstacles to -the immediate execution of the emperor’s orders; for as Daricau’s -division had not returned from Valencia, the French outposts towards -the Morena could not be withdrawn, nor could the army of the centre -march upon Valladolid until the army of the south relieved it at -Madrid. Moreover Soult’s counsels had troubled the king’s judgment; -for that marshal agreeing that to abandon Madrid at that time was -to abandon Spain, offered a project for reconciling the possession -of the capital with the emperor’s views. This was to place the -army of Portugal, and the army of the south, in position along the -slopes of the Avila mountains, and on the Upper Tormes menacing -Ciudad Rodrigo, while the king with the army of the centre remained -at Madrid in reserve. In this situation he said they would be an -over-match for any force the allies could bring into the field, and -the latter could not move either by the valley of the Tagus or upon -the Duero without exposing themselves to a flank attack. - -The king objected that such a force could only be fed in that -country by the utter ruin of the people, which he would not consent -to; but he was deceived by his ministers; the comfortable state -of the houses, the immense plains of standing corn seen by the -allies in their march from the Esla to the Carrion proved that the -people were not much impoverished. Soult, well acquainted with the -resources of the country and a better and more practised master of -such operations, looked to the military question rather than to the -king’s conciliatory policy, and positively affirmed that the armies -could be subsisted; yet it does not appear that he had taken into -his consideration how the insurrection in the northern provinces was -to be suppressed, which was the principal object of Napoleon’s plan. -He no doubt expected that the emperor would, from France send troops -for that purpose, but Napoleon knowing the true state of his affairs -foresaw that all the resources of France would be required in another -quarter. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan’s Official correspondence, MSS.] - -Hatred and suspicion would have made Joseph reject any plan suggested -by Soult, and the more so that the latter now declared the armies -could exist without assistance in money from France; yet his mind -was evidently unsettled by that marshal’s proposal, and by the -coincidence of his ideas as to holding Madrid, for even when the -armies were in movement towards the northern parts, he vacillated -in his resolutions, at one time thinking to stay at Madrid, at -another to march with the army of the centre to Burgos, instead of -Valladolid. However upon the 18th of March he quitted the capital -leaving the Spanish ministers Angulo and Almenara to govern there -in conjunction with Gazan. The army of the south then moved in two -columns, one under Couroux across the Gredos mountains to Avila, the -other under Gazan upon Madrid to relieve the army of the centre, -which immediately marched to Aranda de Duero and Lerma, with orders -to settle at Burgos. Meanwhile Villatte’s division and all the -outposts withdrawn from La Mancha remained on the Alberche, and the -army of the south was thus concentrated between that river, Madrid, -and Avila. - -North of the Tagus the troops were unmolested, save by the bands -during these movements, which were not completed before April, but in -La Mancha the retiring French posts had been followed by Del Parque’s -advanced guard under Cruz Murgeon, as far as Yebenes, and at the -bridge of Algobar the French cavalry checked the Spanish horsemen -so roughly, that Cruz Murgeon retired again towards the Morena. At -the same time on the Cuenca side, the Empecinado having attempted to -cut off a party of French cavalry, escorting the marquis of Salices -to collect his rents previous to quitting Madrid, was defeated with -the loss of seventy troopers. Meanwhile the great dépôt at Madrid -being partly removed, general Villatte marched upon Salamanca and -Gazan fixed his head-quarters at Arevalo. The army of the south was -thus cantoned between the Tormes, the Duero, and the Adaja, with -exception of six chosen regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, -in all about ten thousand men; these remained at Madrid under Leval, -who was ordered to push advanced guards to Toledo, and the Alberche, -lest the allies should suddenly march that way and turn the left of -the French army. But beyond the Alberche there were roads leading -from the valley of the Tagus over the Gredos mountains into the rear -of the advanced positions which the French had on the Upper Tormes, -wherefore these last were now withdrawn from Pedrahita and Puente -Congosto. - -In proportion as the troops arrived in Castile Reille sent men to -the army of the north, and contracting his cantonments, concentrated -his remaining forces about Medina de Rio Seco with his cavalry on -the Esla. But the men recalled by the emperor were now in full -march, the French were in a state of great confusion, the people -urged by Wellington’s emissaries and expecting great events every -where showed their dislike by withholding provisions, and the -Partida warfare became as lively in the interior as on the coast, -yet with worse fortune. Captain Giordano, a Spaniard of Joseph’s -guard killed one hundred and fifty of Saornil’s people near Arevalo, -and the indefatigable Florian defeated Morales’ band, seized a -dépôt in the valley of the Tietar, beat the Medico there, and then -crossing the Gredos mountains, destroyed near Segovia on the 28th -the band of Purchas; the king’s Spanish guards also crushed some -smaller Partidas, and Renovales with his whole staff was captured -at Carvajales and carried to Valladolid. Meanwhile the Empecinado -gained the hills above Sepulveda and joining with Merino obliged the -people of the Segovia district, to abandon their houses and refuse -the supplies demanded by the army of the centre. When D’Armagnac -and Cassagne marched against them, Merino returned to his northern -haunts, the Empecinado to the Tagus, and D’Erlon then removed his -head-quarters to Cuellar. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -[Sidenote: French Papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -During April Leval was very much disturbed, and gave false alarms, -which extending to Valladolid caused an unseasonable concentration of -the troops and D’Erlon abandoned Cuellar and Sepulveda. Del Parque -and the Empecinado were said to have established the bridge of -Aranjuez, Elio to be advancing in La Mancha, Hill to be in the valley -of the Tagus and moving by Mombeltran with the intention of seizing -the passes of the Guadarama. All of this was false. It was the -Empecinado and Abuelo who were at Aranjuez, the Partidas of Firmin, -Cuesta, Rivero, and El Medico who were collecting at Arzobispo, to -mask the march of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, and of -the reserve from Andalusia; it was the prince of Anglona who was -advancing in La Mancha to cover the movement of Del Parque upon -Murcia. When disabused of his error, Leval easily drove away the -Empecinado who had advanced to Alcala; afterwards chasing Firmin -from Valdemoro into the valley of the Tagus, he re-established his -advanced posts in Toledo and on the Alberche, and scoured the whole -country around. But Joseph himself was anxious to abandon Madrid -altogether, and was only restrained by the emperor’s orders and by -the hope of still gathering some contributions there to support -his court at Valladolid. With reluctance also he had obeyed his -brother’s reiterated orders to bring the army of the centre over the -Duero to replace the detached divisions of the army of Portugal. -He wished D’Erlon rather than Reille, to reinforce the north, and -nothing could more clearly show how entirely the subtle spirit of -Napoleon’s instructions had escaped his perception. It was necessary -that Madrid should be held, to watch the valley of the Tagus and -if necessary to enable the French armies to fall back on Zaragoza, -but principally to give force to the moral effect of the offensive -movement towards Portugal. It was equally important and for the same -reason, that the army of Portugal instead of the army of the centre -should furnish reinforcements for the north. - -In the contracted positions which the armies now occupied, the -difficulty of subsisting was increased, and each general was -dissatisfied with his district, disputes multiplied, and the court -clashed with the army at every turn. Leval also inveighed against -the conduct of the Spanish ministers and minor authorities left at -Madrid, as being hurtful to both troops and people, and no doubt -justly, since it appears to have been precisely like that of the -Portuguese and Spanish authorities on the other side towards the -allies. Joseph’s letters to his brother became daily more bitter. -Napoleon’s regulations for the support of the troops were at -variance with his, and when the king’s budget shewed a deficit of -many millions, the emperor so little regarded it that he reduced -the French subsidy to two millions per month, and strictly forbad -the application of the money to any other purpose than the pay of -the soldiers. When Joseph asked, how he was to find resources? -his brother with a just sarcasm on his political and military -blindness, desired him to seek what was necessary in those provinces -of the north which were rich enough to nourish the Partidas and the -insurrectional juntas. The king thus pushed to the wall prevailed -upon Gazan secretly to lend him fifty thousand francs, for the -support of his court, from the chest of the army of the south; but -with the other generals he could by no means agree, and instead of -the vigour and vigilance necessary to meet the coming campaign there -was weakness, disunion, and ill blood. - -All the movements and arrangements for concentrating the French -forces, as made by Joseph, displeased Napoleon. The manner in which -the army of the centre stole away from Madrid by the road of Lerma -was, he said, only calculated to expose his real views and draw -the allies upon the French before the communication with France -was restored. But more than all his indignation was aroused by the -conduct of the king after the concentration. The French armies -were held on the defensive and the allies might without fear for -Portugal embark troops to invade France, whereas a bold and confident -offensive movement sustained by the formation of a battering train at -Burgos, as if to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, would have imposed upon the -English general, secured France from the danger of such an insult, -and would at the same time have masked the necessary measures for -suppressing the insurrection in the northern provinces. To quell -that insurrection was of vital importance, but from the various -circumstances already noticed it had now existed for seven months, -five of which, the king, although at the head of ninety thousand -men, and uninterrupted by Wellington, had wasted unprofitably, having -done no more than chase a few inferior bands of the interior while -this formidable warfare was consolidating in his rear; and while his -great adversary was organizing the most powerful army which had yet -taken the field in his front. It is thus kingdoms are lost. I shall -now trace the progress of the northern insurrection so unaccountably -neglected by the king, and to the last misunderstood by him; for -when Wellington was actually in movement; when the dispersed French -corps were rushing and crowding to the rear to avoid the ponderous -mass which the English general was pushing forward; even then, the -king, who had done every thing possible to render defeat certain, -was urging upon Napoleon the propriety of first beating the allies -and afterwards reducing the insurrection by the establishment of a -Spanish civil government beyond the Ebro! - - -NORTHERN INSURRECTION. - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -It has been already shewn how the old Partidas had been strengthened -and new corps organized on a better footing in Biscay and Navarre; -how in the latter end of 1812 Caffarelli marched to succour Santona, -and how Longa taking advantage of his absence captured a convoy -near Burgos while other bands menaced Logroño. All the littoral -posts, with the exception of Santona and Gueteria were then in the -possession of the Spaniards, and Mendizabel made an attempt on Bilbao -the 6th of January. Repulsed by general Rouget he rejoined Longa and -together they captured the little fort of Salinas de Anara, near the -Ebro, and that of Cuba in the Bureba, while the bands of Logroño -invested Domingo Calçada in the Rioja. On the 26th of January, -Caffarelli, having returned from Santona, detached Vandermaesen and -Dubreton to drive the Spaniards from Santander, and they seized many -stores there, but neglected to make any movement to aid Santona which -was again blockaded by the Partidas; meanwhile the convoy with all -the emperor’s despatches was stopped at Burgos. Palombini re-opened -the communications and enabled the convoy to reach Madrid, but his -division did not muster more than three thousand men, and various -detachments belonging to the other armies were now in march to the -interior of Spain. The regiments recalled to France from all parts -were also in full movement, together with many convoys and escorts -for the marshals and generals quitting the Peninsula; thus the army -of the north was reduced, as its duties increased, and the young -French soldiers died fast of a peculiar malady which especially -attacked them in small garrisons. Meanwhile the Spaniards’ forces -increased. In February Mendizabel and Longa were again in the -Bureba intercepting the communication between Burgos and Bilbao, -and they menaced Pancorbo and Briviesca. This brought Caffarelli -from Vittoria and Palombini from Burgos. The latter surprised by -Longa, lost many men near Poza de Sal, and only saved himself by his -courage and firmness yet he finally drove the Spaniards away. But -now Mina returning from Aragon after his unsuccessful action near -Huesca surprized and burned the castle of Fuenterrabia in a most -daring manner on the 11th of March, after which, having assembled -five thousand men in Guipuscoa, he obtained guns from the English -fleet at Motrico, invested Villa Real within a few leagues of -Vittoria, and repulsed six hundred men who came to relieve the -fort. This brought Caffarelli back from Pancorbo. Mina then raised -the siege, and Palombini marching into the Rioja, succoured the -garrison of San Domingo Calçada and drove the Partidas towards -Soria. The communication with Logroño was thus re-opened, and the -Italians passing the Ebro marched by Vittoria towards Bilbao where -they arrived the 21st of February; but the gens-d’armes and imperial -guards immediately moved from Bilbao to France, Caffarelli went with -them, and the Spanish chiefs remained masters of Navarre and Biscay. -The people now refused war contributions both in money and kind, the -harvest was not ripe, and the distress of the French increased in -an alarming manner because the weather enabled the English fleets -to keep upon the coast and intercept all supplies from France by -sea. The communications were all broken; in front by Longa who was -again at the defile of Pancorbo; in the rear by Mina who was in the -hills of Arlaban; on the left by a collection of bands at Caroncal -in Navarre. Abbé, governor of Pampeluna severely checked these -last, but Mina soon restored affairs; for leaving the volunteers of -Guipuscoa to watch the defiles of Arlaban, he assembled all the bands -in Navarre, destroyed the bridges leading to Taffalla from Pampeluna -and from Puente la Reyna, and though Abbé twice attacked him, he got -stronger, and bringing up two English guns from the coast besieged -Taffalla. - -[Sidenote: February.] - -Napoleon, discontented with Caffarelli’s mode of conducting the -war, now gave Clauzel the command in the north, with discretionary -power to draw as many troops from the army of Portugal as he judged -necessary. He was to correspond directly with the emperor to avoid -loss of time, but was to obey the king in all things not clashing -with Napoleon’s orders, which contained a complete review of what -had passed and what was necessary to be done. “The Partidas,” the -emperor said, “were strong, organized, exercised, and seconded by -the exaltation of spirit which the battle of Salamanca had produced. -The insurrectional juntas had been revived, the posts on the coast -abandoned by the French and seized by the Spaniards gave free -intercourse with the English; the bands enjoyed all the resources -of the country, and the system of warfare hitherto followed had -favoured their progress. Instead of forestalling their enterprises -the French had waited for their attacks, and contrived to be always -behind the event; they obeyed the enemy’s impulsion and the troops -were fatigued without gaining their object. Clauzel was to adopt -a contrary system, he was to attack suddenly, pursue rapidly, and -combine his movements with reference to the features of the country. -A few good strokes against the Spaniards’ magazines, hospitals, -or dépôts of arms would inevitably trouble their operations, and -after one or two military successes some political measures would -suffice to disperse the authorities, disorganise the insurrection, -and bring the young men who had been enrolled by force back to their -homes. All the generals recommended, and the emperor approved of -the construction of block-houses on well-chosen points, especially -where many roads met; the forests would furnish the materials -cheaply, and these posts should support each other and form chains -of communication. With respect to the greater fortresses, Pampeluna -and Santona were the most important, and the enemy knew it, for Mina -was intent to famish the first and the English squadron to get hold -of the second. To supply Pampeluna it was only necessary to clear the -communications, the country around being rich and fertile. Santona -required combinations. The emperor wished to supply it by sea from -Bayonne and St. Sebastian, but the French marine officers would never -attempt the passage, even with favourable winds and when the English -squadron were away, unless all the intermediate ports were occupied -by the land forces. - -“Six months before, these ports had been in the hands of the French, -but Caffarelli had lightly abandoned them, leaving the field open -to the insurgents in his rear while he marched with Souham against -Wellington. Since that period the English and Spaniards held them. -For four months the emperor had unceasingly ordered the retaking of -Bermeo and Castro, but whether from the difficulty of the operations -or the necessity of answering more pressing calls, no effort had been -made to obey, and the fine season now permitted the English ships to -aid in the defence. Castro was said to be strongly fortified by the -English, no wonder, Caffarelli had given them sufficient time, and -they knew its value. In one month every post on the coast from the -mouth of the Bidassoa to St. Ander should be again re-occupied by -the French, and St. Ander itself should be garrisoned strongly. And -simultaneous with the coast operations should be Clauzel’s attack on -Mina in Navarre and the chasing of the Partidas in the interior of -Biscay. The administration of the country also demanded reform, and -still more the organization and discipline of the army of the north -should be attended to. It was the pith and marrow of the French power -in Spain, all would fail if that failed, whereas if the north was -strong, its administration sound, its fortresses well provided and -its state tranquil, no irreparable misfortune could happen in any -other part.” - -Clauzel assumed the command on the 22d of February, Abbé was then -confined to Pampeluna, Mina, master of Navarre, was besieging -Taffalla; Pastor, Longa, Campillo, Merino and others ranged through -Biscay and Castile unmolested; and the spirit of the country was so -changed that fathers now sent their sons to join Partidas which had -hitherto been composed of robbers and deserters. Clauzel demanded a -reinforcement of twenty thousand men from the army of Portugal, but -Joseph was still in Madrid and proposed to send D’Erlon with the army -of the centre instead, an arrangement to which Clauzel would not -accede. Twenty thousand troops were, he said, wanted beyond the Ebro. -Two independent chiefs, himself and D’Erlon, could not act together; -and if the latter was only to remain quiet at Burgos his army would -devour the resources without aiding the operations of the army of -the north. The king might choose another commander, but the troops -required must be sent. Joseph changed his plan, yet it was the end of -March before Reille’s divisions moved, three upon Navarre, and one -upon Burgos. Meanwhile Clauzel repaired with some troops to Bilbao, -where general Rouget had eight hundred men in garrison besides -Palombini’s Italians. - -[Sidenote: March.] - -This place was in a manner blockaded by the Partidas. The Pastor -with three thousand men was on the right of the Durango river, in -the hills of Guernica, and Navarnis, between Bilbao and the fort -of Bermeo. Mendizabal with from eight to ten thousand men was on -the left of the Durango in the mountains, menacing at once Santoña -and Bilbao and protecting Castro. However the French had a strong -garrison in the town of Durango, the construction of new works -round Bilbao was in progress, and on the 22d of March Clauzel -moved with the Italians and a French regiment to assault Castro. -Campillo and Mendizabel immediately appeared from different sides -and the garrison made a sally; the Spaniards after some sharp -fighting regained the high valleys in disorder, and the design of -escalading Castro was resumed, but again interrupted by the return -of Mendizabel to Trucios, only seven miles from the French camp, -and by intelligence that the Pastor with the volunteers of Biscay -and Guipuscoa was menacing Bilbao. Clauzel immediately marched with -the French regiments to the latter place, leaving Palombini to -oppose Mendizabel. Finding all safe at Bilbao, he sent Rouget with -two French battalions to reinforce the Italians, who then drove -Mendizabel from Trucios into the hills about Valmaceda. It being now -necessary to attack Castro in form, Palombini occupied the heights -of Ojeba and Ramales, from whence he communicated with the garrison -of Santona, introduced a convoy of money and fresh provisions there, -received ammunition in return, and directed the governor Lameth to -prepare a battering train of six pieces for the siege. This done, the -Italians who had lost many men returned hastily to Bilbao, for the -Pastor was again menacing that city. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -On the evening of the 31st Palombini marched against this new -enemy and finding him too strong retreated, but being promised a -reinforcement of two regiments from Durango he returned; Pastor was -then with three thousand men in position at Navarnis, Palombini gave -him battle on the 3d and was defeated with the loss of eighty men, -but on the 5th being joined by the French regiments from Durango -he beat the Spaniards. They dispersed and while some collected in -the same positions behind him, and others under Pastor gained the -interior, one column retired by the coast towards the Deba on the -side of St. Sebastian. Palombini eagerly pursued these last, because -he expected troops from that fortress to line the Deba, and hoped -thus to surround the Spaniards, but the English squadron was at -Lequitio and carried them off. Pastor meanwhile descending the Deba -drove the French from that river to the very walls of St. Sebastian, -and Palombini was forced to make for Bergara on the road to Vittoria. - -At Bergara he left his wounded men with a garrison to protect -them, and returning on the 9th of April attacked the volunteers of -Guipuscoa at Ascoytia; repulsed in this attempt he retired again -towards Bergara, and soon after took charge of a convoy of artillery -going from St. Sebastian for the siege of Castro. Meanwhile Bilbao -was in great danger, for the volunteers of Biscay coming from the -Arlaban, made on the 10th a false attack at a bridge two miles above -the entrenched camp, while Tapia, Dos Pelos, and Campillo fell on -seriously from the side of Valmaceda. Mendizabel, who commanded, did -not combine his movements well and was repulsed by Rouget although -with difficulty; the noise of the action reached Palombini who -hastened his march, and having deposited his convoy, followed the -volunteers of Biscay to Guernica and drove them upon Bermeo where -they got on board the English vessels. - -During these events Clauzel was at Vittoria arranging the general -plan of operations. Mina had on the 1st of April defeated one of -his columns near Lerin with the loss of five or six hundred men. -The four divisions sent from the army of Portugal, together with -some unattached regiments furnished, according to Reille, the -twenty thousand men demanded, yet only seventeen thousand reached -Clauzel; and as the unattached regiments merely replaced a like -number belonging to the other armies, and now recalled from the -north, the French general found his expected reinforcements dwindled -to thirteen thousand. Hence notwithstanding Palombini’s activity, -the insurrection was in the beginning of April more formidable than -ever; the line of correspondence from Torquemada to Burgos was quite -unprotected for want of troops, neither was the line from Burgos -to Irun so well guarded that couriers could pass without powerful -escorts, nor always then. The fortifications of the castle of Burgos -were to have been improved, but there was no money to pay for the -works, the French, in default of transport, could not collect -provisions for the magazines ordered to be formed there by the king, -and two generals, La Martiniere and Rey, were disputing for the -command. Nearly forty thousand irregular Spanish troops were in the -field. The garrison of Taffalla, five hundred strong, had yielded -to Mina, and that chief, in concert with Duran, Amor, Tabueca, the -militia men of Logroña, and some minor guerillas occupied both sides -of the Ebro, between Calahora, Logroño, Santa Cruz de Campero, and -Guardia. They could in one day unite eighteen thousand infantry and a -thousand horsemen. Mendizabel, Longa, Campillo, Herrera, El Pastor, -and the volunteers of Biscay, Guipuscoa, and Alava, in all about -sixteen thousand, were on the coast acting in conjunction with the -English squadrons, Santander, Castro, and Bermeo were still in their -hands, and maritime expeditions were preparing at Coruña and in the -Asturias. - -This Partizan war thus presented three distinct branches, that of -Navarre, that of the coast, and that on the lines of communication. -The last alone required above fifteen thousand men; namely ten -thousand from Irun to Burgos, and the line between Tolosa and -Pampeluna, which was destroyed, required fifteen hundred to restore -it, while four thousand were necessary between Mondragon and Bilbao, -comprising the garrison of the latter place; even then no post would -be safe from a sudden attack. Nearly all the army of the north was -appropriated to the garrisons and lines of communication, but the -divisions of Abbé and Vandermaesen could be used on the side of -Pampeluna, and there were besides, disposable, Palombini’s Italians -and the divisions sent by Reille. But one of these, Sarrut’s, was -still in march, and all the sick of the armies in Castile were now -pouring into Navarre, when, from the loss of the contributions, -there was no money to provide assistance for them. Clauzel had -however ameliorated both the civil and the military administrations, -improved the works of Gueteria, commenced the construction of -block-houses between Irun and Vittoria, and as we have seen had -shaken the bands about Bilbao. Now dividing his forces he destined -Palombini to besiege Castro, ordering Foy and Sarrut’s divisions when -the latter should arrive, to cover the operation and to oppose any -disembarkation. - -The field force thus appropriated, together with the troops in -Bilbao under Rouget, was about ten thousand men, and in the middle -of April, Clauzel, beating Mina from Taffalla and Estella, assembled -the remainder of the active army, composed of Taupin and Barbout’s -divisions of the army of Portugal, Vandermaesen’s and Abbé’s -divisions of the army of the north, in all about thirteen thousand -men, at Puenta La Reyna in Navarre. He urged general L’Huillier, -who commanded the reserve at Bayonne, to reinforce St. Sebastian -and Gueteria and to push forward his troops of observation into the -valley of Bastan, and he also gave the commandant of Zaragoza notice -of his arrival, that he might watch Mina on that side. From Puente -la Reyna he made some excursions but he lost men uselessly, for the -Spaniards would only fight at advantage, and to hunt Mina without -first barring all his passages of flight was to destroy the French -soldiers by fatigue. And here the king’s delay was most seriously -felt because the winter season, when, the tops of the mountains -being covered with snow, the Partidas could only move along the -ordinary roads, was most favourable for the French operations, and -it had passed away. Clauzel despairing to effect any thing with so -few troops was even going to separate his forces and march to the -coast, when in May Mina, who had taken post in the valley of Ronçal, -furnished an occasion which did not escape the French general. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -On the 13th Abbé’s and Vandermaesen’s divisions and the cavalry -entered that valley at once by the upper and lower parts, and -suddenly closing upon the Guerilla chief killed and wounded a -thousand of his men and dispersed the rest; one part fled by the -mountains to Navarquez, on the side of Sanguessa, with the wounded -whom they dropped at different places in care of the country people. -Chaplangarra, Cruchaga, and Carena, Mina’s lieutenants, went off, -each with a column, in the opposite direction and by different routes -to the valley of the Aragon, they passed that river at St. Gilla, and -made their way towards the sacred mountain of La Pena near Jaeca. The -French cavalry following them by Villa Real, entered that town the -14th on one side, while Mina with twelve men entered it on the other, -but he escaped to Martes where another ineffectual attempt was made -to surprise him. Abbé’s columns then descended the smaller valleys -leading towards the upper valley of the Aragon, while Vandermaesen’s -infantry and the cavalry entered the lower part of the same valley, -and the former approaching Jacca sent his wounded men there and got -fresh ammunition. - -Meanwhile Mina and the insurgent junta making a push to regain -Navarre by the left of the Aragon river were like to have been taken, -but again escaped towards the valley of the Gallego, whither also the -greater part of their troops now sought refuge. Clauzel was careful -not to force them over that river, lest they should remain there -and intercept the communication from Zaragoza by Jacca, which was -the only free line the French now possessed and too far removed from -Clauzel’s true theatre of operations to be watched. Abbé therefore -returned to Roncal in search of the Spanish dépôts, and Vandermaesen -entered Sos at one end just as Mina, who had now one hundred and -fifty horsemen and was always intent upon regaining Navarre, passed -out at the other; the light cavalry pursuing overtook him at Sos -Fuentes and he fled to Carcastillo, but there unexpectedly meeting -some of his own squadrons which had wandered over the mountains after -the action at Roncal, he gave battle, was defeated with the loss of -fifty men and fled once more to Aragon, whereupon the insurrectional -junta dispersed, and dissentions arose between Mina and the minor -chiefs under his command. Clauzel anxious to increase this discord -sent troops into all the valleys to seek out the Spanish dépôts -and to attack their scattered men, and he was well served by the -Aragonese, for Suchet’s wise administration was still proof against -the insurrectional juntas. - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -During these events four battalions left by Mina at Santa Cruz de -Campero in the Amescoas, were chased by Taupin, who had remained at -Estella when the other divisions marched up the valley of Roncal. -Mina, however, reassembled at Barbastro in Aragon a strong column, -crowds of deserters from the other Spanish armies were daily -increasing his power, and so completely had he organized Navarre that -the presence of a single soldier of his in a village sufficed to -have any courier without a strong escort stopped. Many bands also -were still in the Rioja, and two French regiments rashly foraging -towards Lerim were nearly all destroyed. In fine the losses were -well balanced, and Clauzel demanded more troops, especially cavalry, -to scour the Rioja. Nevertheless the dispersion of Mina’s troops -lowered the reputation of that chief, and the French general taking -up his quarters in Pampeluna so improved this advantage by address, -that many townships withdrew from the insurrection, and recalling -their young men from the bands commenced the formation of eight free -Spanish companies to serve on the French side. Corps of this sort -were raised with so much facility in every part of Spain, that it -would seem nations, as well as individuals, have an idiosyncrasy, and -in these changeable warriors we again see the Mandonius and Indibilis -of ancient days. - -Joseph, urged by Clauzel, now sent Maucune’s division and some -light cavalry of the army of Portugal, to occupy Pampleiga, Burgos, -and Briviesca, and to protect the great communication, which the -diverging direction of Clauzel’s double operations had again exposed -to the partidas. Meanwhile the French troops had not been less -successful in Biscay than in Navarre. Foy reached Bilbao the 24th of -April, and finding all things there ready for the siege of Castro -marched to Santona to hasten the preparations at that place, and he -attempted also to surprise the chiefs Campillo and Herrera in the -hills above Santona, but was worsted in the combat. The two battering -trains then endeavoured to proceed from Bilbao and Santona by sea to -Castro, but the English vessels, coming to the mouth of the Durango, -stopped those at Bilbao, and obliged them to proceed by land, but -thus gave an opportunity for those at Santona to make the sea-run in -safety. - - -SIEGE OF CASTRO. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -This place situated on a promontory was garrisoned by twelve hundred -men, under the command of Don Pedro Alvarez, three English sloops -of war commanded by the captains Bloye, Bremen, and Tayler, were at -hand, some gun-boats were in the harbour, and twenty-seven guns were -mounted on the works. An outward wall with towers, extended from -sea to sea on the low neck which connected the promontory with the -main land; this line of defence was strengthened by some fortified -convents, behind it came the town, and behind the town at the -extremity of the promontory stood the castle. - -On the 4th of May, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, took post at different -points to cover the siege; the Italian general St. Paul invested the -place; the engineer Vacani conducted the works, having twelve guns -at his disposal. The defence was lively and vigorous, and captain -Tayler with great labour landed a heavy ship-gun on a rocky island -to the right of the town, looking from the sea, which he worked with -effect against the French counter-batteries. On the 11th a second -gun was mounted on this island, but that day the breaching batteries -opened, and in a few hours broke the wall while the counter-batteries -set fire to some houses with shells, wherefore the English guns were -removed from the island. The assault was then ordered but delayed -by a sudden accident, for a foraging party having been sent into -the hills, came flying back, pursued by a column of Spaniards which -had passed unperceived through the positions of the French; and the -besiegers were for some time in confusion as thinking the covering -army had been beaten; however they soon recovered, and the assault -and escalade took place in the night. - -The attack was rapid and fierce, the walls were carried, and the -garrison driven through the town to the castle which was maintained -by two companies, while the flying troops got on board the English -vessels; finally the Italians stormed the castle, but every gun -had been destroyed, and the two companies safely rejoined their -countrymen on board the ships. The English had ten seamen wounded, -the Spaniards lost about a hundred and eighty, and the remainder -were immediately conveyed to Bermeo from whence they marched inland -to join Longa. The besiegers lost only fifty men killed and wounded, -and the Italian soldiers committed great excesses, setting fire -to the town in many places. Foy and Sarrut, separating after the -siege, marched, the former through the district of Incartaciones to -Bilbao defeating a battalion of Biscay volunteers on his route; the -latter to Orduña with the design of destroying Longa; but that chief -crossed the Ebro at Puente Lara, and finding the additional troops -sent by Joseph were beginning to arrive in the vicinity of Burgos, -recrossed the river, and after a long chase escaped in the mountains -of Espinosa. Sarrut having captured a few gun-carriages and one of -Longa’s forest dépôts of ammunition, returned towards Bilbao, and -Foy immediately marched from that place against the two remaining -battalions of Biscay volunteers, which under the chiefs Mugartegui -and Artola were now at Villaro and Guernica. - -These battalions, each a thousand strong, raised by conscription, and -officered from the best families, were the champions of Biscay; but -though brave and well-equipped, the difficulty of crushing them and -the volunteers of Guipuscoa, was not great, because neither would -leave their own peculiar provinces. The third battalion had been -already dispersed in the district of Incartaciones, and Foy having -in the night of the 29th combined the march of several columns to -surround Villaro, fell at day-break upon Mugartegui’s battalion -and dispersed it with the loss of all its baggage. Two hundred of -the volunteers immediately returned to their homes, and the French -general marched rapidly, through Durango, against Artola, who was at -Guernica. The Italians who were still at Bilbao, immediately turned -Guernica on the west by Mungia, while a French column turned it -eastward by Marquinez; then Artola fled to Lequitio, but the column -from Marquinez, coming over the mountain, fell upon his right flank -just as he was defiling by a narrow way along the sea-coast. Artola -himself escaped, but two hundred Biscayens were killed or drowned, -more than three hundred with twenty-seven officers were taken, and -two companies which formed his rear-guard dispersed in the mountains, -and some men finding a few boats rowed to an English vessel. The -perfect success of this action, which did not cost the French a -man killed or wounded, was attributed to the talents and vigour of -captain Guinget, the daring officer who won the passage of the Douro -at Tordesillas in Wellington’s retreat from Burgos. - -When the three battalions of Biscay were thus disposed of, all their -magazines, hospitals, and dépôts fell into Foy’s hands, the junta -dispersed, the privateers quitted the coast for Santander, Pastor -abandoned Guipuscoa, and the Italians recovered Bermeo from which the -garrison fled to the English ships. They also destroyed the works -of the little island of Isaro, which being situated three thousand -yards from the shore, and having no access to the summit, save by -a staircase cut in the rock, was deemed impregnable, and used as -a dépôt for the English stores; but this was the last memorable -exploit of Palombini’s division in the north. That general himself -had already gone to Italy to join Napoleon’s reserves, and his -troops being ordered to march by Aragon to join Suchet, were in -movement, when new events caused them to remain in Guipuscoa, with -the reputation of being brave and active but ferocious soldiers, -barbarous and devastating, differing little from their Roman -ancestors. - -It has been already observed that, during these double operations -of the French on the coast and in Navarre, the partidas had fallen -upon the line of communication with France, thus working out the -third branch of the insurrectional warfare. Their success went nigh -to balance all their losses on each flank. For Mendizabel settled -with Longa’s partida upon the line between Burgos and Miranda de -Ebro; the volunteers of Alava and Biscay, and part of Pastor’s bands -concentrated on the mountains of Arlaban above the defiles of Salinas -and Descarga; Merino and Salazar came up from the country between -the Ebro and the Duero; and the three battalions left by Mina in the -Amescoa, after escaping from Taupin, reassembled close to Vittoria. -Every convoy and every courier’s escort was attacked at one or other -of these points without hindering Mendizabel from making sudden -descents towards the coast when occasion offered. Thus, on the 11th -of April, as we have seen, he attacked Bilbao. On the 25th of April -Longa, who had four thousand men and several guns, was repulsed at -Armiñion, between Miranda and Trevino, by some of the drafted men -going to France; but on the 3d of May at the same place Longa met and -obliged a large convoy, coming from Castile with an escort of eight -hundred men, to return to Miranda, and even cannonaded that place -on the 5th. Thouvenot the commandant of the government, immediately -detached twelve hundred men and three guns from Vittoria to relieve -the convoy; but then Mina’s battalions endeavoured to escalade -Salvatierra, and they were repulsed with difficulty. Meanwhile the -volunteers of Alava gathered above the pass of Salinas to intercept -the rescued convoy, and finding that the latter would not stir -from Vittoria, they went on the 10th to aid in a fresh attack on -Salvatierra; being again repulsed they returned to the Arlaban, where -they captured a courier with a strong escort in the pass of Descarga -near Villa Real. A French regiment sent to succour Salvatierra -finally drove these volunteers towards Bilbao where, as we have seen, -Foy routed them, but Longa continued to infest the post of Armiñion -until Sarrut arriving from the siege of Castro chased him also. - -[Sidenote: June.] - -Notwithstanding these successes Clauzel, whose troops were worn -out with fatigue, declared that it would require fifty thousand -men and three months’ time to quell the insurrection entirely. And -Napoleon more discontented than ever with the king, complained that -the happy enterprizes of Clauzel, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, had -brought no safety to his couriers and convoys; that his orders about -the posts and the infantry escorts had been neglected; that the -reinforcements sent to the north from Castile had gone slowly and in -succession instead of at once; finally that the cautious movement -of concentration by the other armies was inexcusable, since the -inaction of the allies, their distance, their want of transport, -their ordinary and even timid circumspection in any operation out of -the ordinary course, enabled the French to act in the most convenient -manner. The growing dissentions between the English and the -Spaniards, the journey of Wellington to Cadiz, and the changes in his -army, were, he said, all favourable circumstances for the French, but -the king had taken no advantage of them; the insurrection continued, -and the object of interest was now changed. Joseph defended himself -with more vehemence than reason against these charges, but Wellington -soon vindicated Napoleon’s judgement, and the voice of controversy -was smothered by the din of battle, for the English general was again -abroad in his strength, and the clang of his arms resounded through -the Peninsula. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -While the French power in Spain was being disorganized by the various -circumstances related in the former chapter, Lord Wellington’s -diligence and energy had reorganized the allied army with greater -strength than before. Large reinforcements, especially of cavalry, -had come out from England. The efficiency and the spirit of the -Portuguese had been restored in a surprizing manner, and discipline -had been vindicated, in both services, with a rough but salutary -hand; rank had not screened offenders; some had been arrested, -some tried, some dismissed for breach of duty; the negligent were -terrified, the zealous encouraged; in short every department was -reformed with vigour, and it was full time. Confidential officers -commissioned to detect abuses in the general hospitals and dépôts, -those asylums for malingerers, discovered and drove so many skulkers -to their duty, that the second division alone recovered six hundred -bayonets in one month; and this salutary scouring was rendered more -efficient by the establishment of both permanent, and ambulent -regimental hospitals, a wise measure, and founded on a principle -which cannot be too widely extended; for it is certain that as the -character of a battalion depends on its fitness for service, a moral -force will always be brought to bear upon the execution of orders -under regimental controul which it is in vain to look for elsewhere. - -The Douro had been rendered navigable as high up as Castillo de Alva -above the confluence of the Agueda; a pontoon train of thirty-five -pieces had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction had -been built to repair the great loss of mules during the retreat -from Burgos, and a recruit of these animals was also obtained by -emissaries who purchased them with English merchandize, even at -Madrid, under the beards of the enemy, and at the very time when -Clauzel was unable for want of transport to fill the magazines of -Burgos. The ponderous iron camp-kettles of the soldiers had been laid -aside for lighter vessels carried by men, the mules being destined -to carry tents instead; it is, however, doubtful if these tents were -really useful on a march in wet weather, because when soaked they -became too heavy for the animal, and seldom arrived in time for use -at the end of a march. Their greatest advantage was found when the -soldiers halted for a few days. Beside these amendments many other -changes and improvements had taken place, and the Anglo-Portuguese -troops conscious of a superior organization, were more proudly -confident than ever, while the French were again depressed by -intelligence of the defection of the Prussians following on the -disasters in Russia. Nor had the English general failed to amend -the condition of those Spanish troops which the Cortez had placed -at his disposal. By a strict and jealous watch over the application -of the subsidy he had kept them clothed and fed during the winter, -and now reaped the benefit by having several powerful bodies fit -to act in conjunction with his own forces. Wherefore being thus -prepared he was anxious to strike, anxious to forestall the effects -of his Portuguese political difficulties as well as to keep pace with -Napoleon’s efforts in Germany, and his army was ready to take the -field in April, but he could not concentrate before the green forage -was fit for use, and deferred the execution of his plan until May. -What that plan was and what the means for executing it shall now be -shewn. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 18.] - -The relative strength of the contending armies in the Peninsula -was no longer in favour of the French. Their force which at the -termination of Wellington’s retreat into Portugal was above two -hundred and sixty thousand men and thirty-two thousand horses, two -hundred and sixteen thousand being present with the eagles, was -by the loss in subsequent operations, and by drafts for the army -in Germany reduced in March, 1813, to two hundred and thirty-one -thousand men and twenty-nine thousand horses. Thirty thousand of -these were in hospital, and only one hundred and ninety-seven -thousand men, including the reserve at Bayonne, were present with -the eagles. Of this number sixty-eight thousand including sick, were -in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. The remainder with the exception -of the ten thousand left at Madrid, were distributed on the northern -line of communication, from the Tormes to Bayonne, and it has been -already shewn how scattered and how occupied. - -But Wellington had so well used the five months’ cessation of active -operations that nearly two hundred thousand allied troops were ready -to take the field, and on each flank there was a British fleet, now a -more effective aid than before, because the French lines of retreat -run parallel to, and near the sea-coast on each side of Spain, and -every part opened by the advance of the allies would furnish a fresh -dépôt for the subsistence of their armies. This mass of troops was -composed in the following manner. - -The first army under Copons nominally ten thousand, really about six -thousand strong, was in Catalonia. - -The second army under Elio was in Murcia about twenty thousand, -including the divisions of Villa Campa, Bassecour, Duran, and -Empecinado. - -The Anglo-Sicilian army under Murray, near Alicant, about sixteen -thousand. - -The third army under Del Parque, in the Morena about twelve thousand. - -The first army of reserve under the Conde d’Abispal, in Andalusia, -about fifteen thousand. - -The fourth army, under Castaños, which included the Spanish divisions -in Estremadura, Julian Sanchez’ Partida and the Gallicians under -Giron, the Asturians under Porlier and Barceña, together with the -Partidas of Longa and Mina, likewise belonged to this army and were -mustered amongst its divisions. This army was computed at forty -thousand men, to which may be added the minor bands and volunteers in -various parts. - -Lastly there was the noble Anglo-Portuguese army which now furnished -more than seventy thousand fighting men, with ninety pieces of -artillery; and the real difference between the French and the -allies was greater than the apparent difference. The French returns -included officers, sergeants, drummers, artillery-men, engineers, and -waggoners, whereas the allies’ numbers were all sabres and bayonets. -Moreover this statement of the French number was on the 15th of -March, and as there were drafts made by Napoleon after that period, -and as Clauzel and Foy’s losses, and the reserves at Bayonne must be -deducted, it would be probably more correct to assume that the whole -number of sabres and bayonets in June, was not more than one hundred -and sixty thousand, of which one hundred and ten thousand were on the -northern line of invasion. - -The campaign of 1812 had taught the English general the strength of -the French lines of defence, especially on the Duero, which they had -since entrenched in different parts, and most of the bridges over -it, he had himself destroyed in his retreat. But for many reasons it -was not advisable to operate in the central provinces of Spain. The -country there was exhausted, the lines of supply would be longer and -more exposed, the army further removed from the sea, the Gallicians -could not be easily brought down to co-operate, the services of the -northern Partidas would not be so advantageous, and the ultimate -result would be less decisive than operations against the great -line of communication with France; wherefore against the northern -provinces he had early resolved to direct his attack and had well -considered how to evade those lines which he could scarcely hope to -force. - -All the enemy’s defences on the Lower Duero could be turned by a -movement on the right, across the Upper Tormes, and from thence -skirting the mountains towards the Upper Duero; but that line -although most consonant to the rules of art, because the army would -thus be kept in one mass, led through a very difficult and wasted -country, the direct aid of the Gallicians must have been dispensed -with, and moreover it was there the French looked for the allies. -Hence Wellington resolved not to operate by his right, and with great -skill and dexterity, he had by the disposition of his troops in -winter-quarters, by false reports and false movements masked his real -intentions. For the gathering of the Partidas in the valley of the -Tagus, the demonstrations made in Estremadura and La Mancha by Penne -Villemur, Morillo and Del Parque’s army, together with the presence -of Hill at Coria, that general’s hold of the passes of Bejar, and the -magazines formed there, all intimated a design of moving either by -the valley of the Tagus or by the district of Avila; and the great -magazines collected at Celerico, Viseu, Penamacor, Almeida, and -Ciudad Rodrigo, in no manner belied the other indications. But half -the army widely cantoned in the interior of Portugal, apparently for -the sake of subsistence or health, was really so placed as to be in -the direction of the true line of operations which was by the left -through the Tras os Montes. - -Wellington’s plan was to pass the Duero, within the Portuguese -frontier, with a part of his army; to ascend the right bank of that -river towards Zamora, and then crossing the Esla, to unite with the -Gallician forces, while the remainder of the army, advancing from the -Agueda, forced the passage of the Tormes. By this great movement, -which he hoped to effect so suddenly that the king would not have -time to concentrate the French armies in opposition, the front of the -allies would be changed to their right, the Duero and the Pisuerga -would be turned, and the enemy forced in confusion over the Carion. -Then with his powerful army well in hand the English general could -march in advance without fear, strong enough to fight and strong -enough to turn the right flank of any position which the French might -take up; and with this advantage also, that at each step he would -gain additional help by the junction of the irregular Spanish forces -until he gave his hand to the insurgents in Biscay, and every port -opened would furnish him a new dépôt and magazines. - -But in executing this movement the army would necessarily be divided -into three separate divisions each too weak to beat the whole French -force singly; the march of the centre division by the Tras os Montes, -upon the nice execution of which the concentration of the whole -depended, would be through an extremely difficult and mountainous -country, and there were three great rivers to pass. The operation -was therefore one of extreme delicacy requiring nice and extensive -arrangements; yet there was not much danger to be apprehended from -failure; because as each separate corps had a strong country to -retire upon, the probable extent of the mischief would only be the -loss of time, and the disadvantage of pursuing other operations when -the harvest being ripe the French could easily keep in masses. The -secret then was to hide the true plan as long as possible, to gain -some marches for the centre corps, and by all means to keep the -French so scattered and occupied by minor combinations, that they -should be unable to assemble in time to profit from their central -positions. Now the bridge equipage being prepared at Abrantes in the -interior of Portugal was unknown, and gave no intimation of the real -design, for the bullocks which drew it came with cars from Spain to -Lamego and from thence went down to Abrantes; the free navigation of -the Douro up to the Agueda was more conducive to a movement by the -right, and it furnished abundance of large boats wherewith to pass -that river without creating any suspicion from their presence; the -wide cantonments of the allies permitted various changes of quarters -under the pretence of sickness, and the troops thus gradually closed -upon the Douro, within the Portuguese frontier, unobserved of the -enemy who was likewise deceived by many reports purposely spread -abroad. The menacing head which Hill, and the Spaniards in southern -Estremadura and Andalusia, carried towards the valley of the Tagus -and towards the Avila district, also contributed to draw the enemy’s -attention away from the true point of danger; but more than all other -things the vigorous excitement of the insurrection in the north -occupied the French, scattered their forces, and rendered the success -of the English general’s plan nearly certain. - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -Neither did lord Wellington fail to give ample employment to Suchet’s -forces, for his wings were spread for a long flight even to the -Pyrennees, and he had no desire to find that marshal’s army joined -with the other French forces on the Ebro. The lynx eyes of Napoleon -had scanned this point of war also, and both the king and Clauzel -had received orders to establish the shortest and most certain line -of correspondence possible with Suchet, because the emperor’s plan -contemplated the arrival of the army of Aragon in the north, but -Wellington furnished a task for it elsewhere. Sir John Murray as we -have seen, had just repulsed the French at Castalla, and general -Frere’s cavalry had joined the Andalusian reserve under Abispal, -but Elio with the third army remained near Alicant and Wellington -destined Del Parque’s army to join him. This with the Anglo-Sicilian -army made more than fifty thousand men, including the divisions of -Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and other partizans always lying -on Suchet’s right flank and rear. Now with such a force, or even half -this number of good troops, the simplest plan would have been to -turn Suchet’s right flank and bring him to action with his back to -the sea; but the Spanish armies were not efficient for such work and -Wellington’s instructions were adapted to the actual circumstances. -To win the open part of the kingdom, to obtain a permanent footing -on the coast beyond the Ebro, and to force the enemy from the lower -line of that river by acting in conjunction with the Catalans, these -were the three objects which Wellington proposed to reach and in the -following manner. Murray was to sail against Taragona, to save it -Suchet would have to weaken his army in Valencia; Elio and Del Parque -might then seize that kingdom. If Taragona fell, good. If the French -proved too strong, Murray could return instantly by sea, and secure -possession of the country gained by the Spanish generals. These last -were however to remain strictly on the defensive until Murray’s -operations drew Suchet away, for they were not able to fight alone, -and above all things it was necessary to avoid a defeat which would -leave the French general free to move to the aid of the king. - -The force necessary to attack Taragona Wellington judged at ten -thousand, and if Murray could not embark that number there was -another mode of operating. Some Spanish divisions, to go by sea, -were then to reinforce Copons in Catalonia and enable him to hold -the country between Taragona, Tortoza, and Lerida; meanwhile Murray -and Elio were to advance against Suchet in front, and Del Parque -in conjunction with the Portuguese troops to turn his right flank -by Requeña; and this operation was to be repeated until the allies -communicated with Copons by their left, the partizans advancing in -proportion and cutting off all communication with the northern parts -of Spain. Thus in either case Suchet would be kept away from the -Upper Ebro, and there was no reason to expect any interruption from -that quarter. - -But Wellington was not aware that the infantry of the army of -Portugal were beyond the Ebro; the spies deceived by the multitude -of detachments passing in and out of the Peninsula supposed the -divisions which reinforced Clauzel to be fresh conscripts from -France; the arrangements for the opening of the campaign were -therefore made in the expectation of meeting a very powerful force -in Leon. Hence Freire’s cavalry, and the Andalusian reserve under -the Conde de Abispal, received orders to march upon Almaraz, to -pass the Tagus there by a pontoon bridge which was established -for them, and then crossing the Gredos by Bejar or Mombeltran, to -march upon Valladolid while the Partidas of that quarter should -harass the march of Leval from Madrid. Meanwhile the Spanish troops -in Estremadura were to join those forces on the Agueda which were -destined to force the passage of the Tormes. The Gallicians under -Giron were to come down to the Esla, and unite with the corps -destined to pass that river and turn the line of the Duero. Thus -seventy thousand Portuguese and British, eight thousand Spaniards -from Estremadura, and twelve thousand Gallicians, that is to say, -ninety thousand fighting men would be suddenly placed on a new front, -and marching abreast against the surprised and separated masses of -the enemy would drive them refluent to the Pyrennees. A grand design -and grandly it was executed! For high in heart and strong of hand -Wellington’s veterans marched to the encounter, the glories of twelve -victories played about their bayonets, and he the leader so proud -and confident, that in passing the stream which marks the frontier -of Spain, he rose in his stirrups and waving his hand cried out -“Farewell Portugal!” - -But while straining every nerve, and eager to strike, as well to -escape from the Portuguese politics as to keep pace with Napoleon’s -efforts in Germany, the English general was mortified by having again -to discuss the question of a descent on Italy. Lord William Bentinck -had relinquished his views upon that country with great reluctance, -and now, thinking affairs more favourable than ever, again proposed -to land at Naples, and put forward the duke of Orleans or the -arch-duke Francis. He urged in favour of this project the weak state -of Murat’s kingdom, the favourable disposition of the inhabitants, -the offer of fifteen thousand auxiliary Russians made by admiral -Grieg, the shock which would be given to Napoleon’s power, and the -more effectual diversion in favour of Spain. He supported his opinion -by an intercepted letter of the queen of Naples to Napoleon, and by -other authentic documents, and thus, at the moment of execution, -Wellington’s vast plans were to be disarranged to meet a new scheme -of war which he had already discussed and disapproved of, and which, -however promising in itself, would inevitably divide the power of -England and weaken the operations in both countries. - -His reply was decisive. His opinion on the state of affairs in -Sicily was, he said, not changed, by the intercepted letters, as -Murat evidently thought himself strong enough to attack the allies. -Lord William Bentinck should not land in Italy with less than forty -thousand men of all arms perfectly equipped, since that army would -have to depend upon its own means and to overcome all opposition -before it could expect the people to aid or even to cease to oppose -it. The information stated that the people looked for protection from -the French and they preferred England to Austria. There could be no -doubt of this, the Austrians would demand provisions and money and -would insist upon governing them in return, whereas the English would -as elsewhere defray their own expenses and probably give a subsidy in -addition. The south of Italy was possibly for many reasons the best -place next to the Spanish Peninsula for the operations of a British -army, and it remained for the government to choose whether they would -adopt an attack on the former upon such a scale as he had alluded to. -But of one thing they might be certain, that if it were commenced on -a smaller scale, or with any other intention than to persevere to the -last, and by raising, feeding, and clothing armies of the natives, -the plan would fail and the troops would re-embark with loss and -disgrace. - -[Sidenote: April.] - -This remonstrance at last fixed the wavering judgment of the -ministers, and Wellington was enabled to proceed with his own plans. -He designed to open the campaign in the beginning of May, and as the -green forage was well advanced, on the 21st of April, he directed -Murray, Del Parque, Elio, and Copons to commence their operations -on the eastern coast; Abispal and Freire were already in march and -expected at Almaraz on the 24th; the Spanish divisions of Estremadura -had come up to the Coa, and the divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese -force were gradually closing to the front. But heavy rains broke -up the roads, and the cumbrous pontoon train being damaged, on its -way from the interior, did not reach Sabugal before the 13th and -was not repaired before the 15th. Thus the opening of the campaign -was delayed, yet the check proved of little consequence, for on the -French side nothing was prepared to meet the danger. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -Napoleon had urged the king to send his heavy baggage and stores to -the rear and to fix his hospitals and dépôts at Burgos, Vittoria, -Pampeluna, Tolosa, and San Sebastian. In neglect of this the -impediments remained with the armies, the sick were poured along the -communications, and in disorder thrown upon Clauzel at the moment -when that general was scarcely able to make head against the northern -insurrection. - -Napoleon had early and clearly fixed the king’s authority as -generalissimo and forbad him to exercise his monarchical authority -towards the French armies. Joseph was at this moment in high dispute -with all his generals upon those very points. - -Napoleon had directed the king to enlarge and strengthen the works of -Burgos castle and to form magazines in that place, and at Santona, -for the use of the armies in the field. At this time no magazines -had been formed at either place, and although a commencement had been -made to strengthen the castle of Burgos, it was not yet capable of -sustaining four hours’ bombardment and offered no support for the -armies. - -Napoleon had desired that a more secure and shorter line of -correspondence than that by Zaragoza should be established with -Suchet; for his plan embraced though it did not prescribe the march -of that general upon Zarogoza, and he had warned the king repeatedly -how dangerous it would be to have Suchet isolated and unconnected -with the northern operations. Nevertheless the line of correspondence -remained the same and the allies possessed the means of excising -Suchet’s army from the operations in the north. - -Napoleon had long and earnestly urged the king to put down the -northern insurrection in time to make head against the allies on -the Tormes. Now when the English general was ready to act, that -insurrection was in full activity, and all the army of the north and -the greatest part of the army of Portugal was employed to suppress it -instead of being on the lower Duero. - -Napoleon had clearly explained to the king the necessity of keeping -his troops concentrated towards the Tormes in an offensive position, -and he had desired that Madrid might be held in such a manner that it -could be abandoned in a moment. The campaign was now being opened, -the French armies were scattered, Leval was encumbered at Madrid, -with a part of the civil administration, with large stores and parcs -of artillery, and with the care of families attached to Joseph’s -court, while the other generals were stretching their imaginations -to devise which of the several projects open to him Wellington -would adopt. Would he force the passage of the Tormes and the Duero -with his whole army, and thus turn the French right? Would he march -straight upon Madrid either by the district of Avila or by the valley -of the Tagus or by both; and would he then operate against the north, -or upon Zaragoza, or towards the south in co-operation with the -Anglo-Sicilians? Every thing was vague, uncertain, confused. - -The generals complained that the king’s conduct was not military, and -Napoleon told him if he would command an army he must give himself -up entirely to it, thinking of nothing else; but Joseph was always -demanding gold when he should have trusted to iron. His skill was -unequal to the arrangements and combinations for taking an initiatory -and offensive position, and he could neither discover nor force his -adversary to show his real design. Hence the French armies were -thrown upon a timid defensive system, and every movement of the -allies necessarily produced alarm, and the dislocation of troops -without an object. The march of Del Parque’s army towards Alcaraz, -and that of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, towards the -Agueda, in the latter end of April were judged to be the commencement -of a general movement against Madrid, because the first was covered -by the advance of some cavalry into La Mancha, and the second by the -concentration of the Partidas, in the valley of the Tagus. Thus the -whole French army was shaken by the demonstration of a few horsemen, -for when Leval took the alarm, Gazan marched towards the Guadarama -with three divisions, and D’Erlon gathered the army of the centre -around Segovia. - -Early in May a fifth division of the army of Portugal was employed -on the line of communication at Pampliega, Burgos, and Briviesca, -and Reille remained at Valladolid with only one division of infantry -and his guns, his cavalry being on the Esla. D’Erlon was then at -Segovia and Gazan at Arevalo, Conroux’s division was at Avila, and -Leval still at Madrid with outposts at Toledo. The king who was at -Valladolid could not therefore concentrate more than thirty-five -thousand infantry on the Duero. He had indeed nine thousand -excellent cavalry and one hundred pieces of artillery, but with such -dispositions to concentrate for a battle in advance was not to be -thought of, and the first decided movement of the allies was sure to -roll his scattered forces back in confusion. The lines of the Tormes -and the Duero were effaced from the system of operations. - -About the middle of May, D’Armagnac’s division of the army of the -centre came to Valladolid, Villatte’s division of the army of the -south reinforced by some cavalry occupied the line of the Tormes from -Alba to Ledesma. Daricau’s, Digeon’s, and D’Armagnac’s divisions were -at Zamora, Toro, and other places on both sides of the Duero, and -Reille’s cavalry was still on the Esla. The front of the French was -thus defined by these rivers, for the left was covered by the Tormes, -the centre by the Duero, the right by the Esla. Gazan’s head-quarters -were at Arevalo, D’Erlon’s at Segovia, and the point of concentration -was at Valladolid; but Conroux was at Avila, and Leval being still -at Madrid was thrown entirely out of the circle of operations. At -this moment Wellington entered upon what has been in England called, -not very appropriately, the march to Vittoria. That march was but one -portion of the action. The concentration of the army on the banks of -the Duero was the commencement, the movement towards the Ebro and -the passage of that river was the middle, the battle of Vittoria was -the catastrophe, and the crowning of the Pyrennees the end of the -splendid drama. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -[Sidenote: 1813.] - -In the latter part of April the Spanish troops from Estremadura being -assembled on the Tormes near Almada, Carlos d’España’s division -moved to Miranda del Castanar, and every thing was ready to open -the campaign when an unexpected and formidable danger menacing ruin -arose. Some specie sent from England had enabled the general to pay -up the British soldiers’ arrears to November 1812, but the Portuguese -troops were still neglected by their government, a whole year’s pay -was due to them, a suspicion that a systematic difference in this -respect was to be established, pervaded their minds, and at the same -time many regiments which had been raised for a limited period and -whose term of service was now expired, murmured for their discharge, -which could not be legally refused. The moment was critical, but -Wellington applied suitable remedies. He immediately threatened to -intercept the British subsidy for the payment of the troops which -brought the Portuguese regency to its senses, and he then made an -appeal to the honour and patriotism of the Portuguese soldiers whose -time had expired. Such an appeal is never made in vain to the poorer -classes of any nation; one and all those brave men remained in the -service notwithstanding the shameful treatment they had endured -from their government. This noble emotion would seem to prove that -Beresford, whose system of military reform was chiefly founded upon -severity, might have better attained his object in another manner; -but harshness is the essence of the aristocratic principle of -government, and the marshal only moved in the straight path marked -out for him by the policy of the day. - -[Sidenote: May.] - -[Sidenote: French correspondence, MSS.] - -When this dangerous affair was terminated Castaños returned to -Gallicia, and the British cavalry, of the left wing, which had -wintered about the Mondego crossed the Duero, some at Oporto some -near Lamego, and entered the Tras os Montes. The Portuguese cavalry -had been already quartered all the winter in that province, and the -enemy supposed that Sylveira would as formerly advance from Braganza -to connect the Gallicians with the allies. But Sylveira was then -commanding an infantry division on the Agueda, and a very different -power was menacing the French on the side of Braganza. For about -the middle of May the cavalry were followed by many divisions of -infantry, and by the pontoon equipage, thus forming with the horsemen -and artillery a mass of more than forty thousand men under general -Graham. The infantry and guns being rapidly placed on the right -of the Duero by means of large boats assembled between Lamego and -Castelo de Alva, near the mouth of the Agueda, marched in several -columns towards the lower Esla; the cavalry moved down to the same -point by Braganza. - -On the 20th Hill came to Bejar with the second division, and on -the 22d of May, Graham being well advanced, Wellington quitted his -head-quarters at Freneda and put his right wing in motion towards -the Tormes. It consisted of five divisions of Anglo-Portuguese and -Spanish infantry, and five brigades of cavalry, including Julian -Sanchez’ horsemen, the whole forming with the artillery a mass of -from twenty-five to thirty thousand men. The right under general -Hill moved from Bejar upon Alba de Tormes, the left under Wellington -himself by Matilla upon Salamanca. - -On the 24th Villatte withdrew his detachment from Ledesma, and on the -26th at ten o’clock in the morning the heads of the allied columns -with admirable concert appeared on all the different routes leading -to the Tormes. Morillo’s and Long’s cavalry menaced Alba, Hill coming -from Tamames bent towards the fords above Salamanca, and Wellington -coming from Matilla marched straight against that city. - -Villatte, a good officer, barricaded the bridge and the streets, -sent his baggage to the rear, called in his detachment from Alba, -and being resolved to discover the real force of his enemy waited -for their approaching masses on the heights above the ford of Santa -Marta. Too long he waited, for the ground on the left side of the -river had enabled Wellington to conceal the movements, and already -Fane’s horsemen with six guns were passing the ford at Santa Marta in -Villatte’s rear, while Victor Alten’s cavalry removed the barricades -on the bridge and pushed through the town to attack him in front. -The French general being thus suddenly pressed gained the heights of -Cabrerizos, marching towards Babila Fuente, before Fane got over the -river; but he had still to pass the defiles of Aldea Lengua and was -overtaken by both columns of cavalry. - -The guns opening upon the French squares killed thirty or forty men, -and the English horsemen charged, but horsemen are no match for such -infantry whose courage and discipline nothing could quell; they fell -before the round shot, and nearly one hundred died in the ranks -without a wound, from the intolerable heat, yet the cavalry made no -impression on those dauntless soldiers, and in the face of thirty -thousand enemies they made their way to Babila Fuente where they were -joined by general Lefol with the troops from Alba, and finally the -whole disappeared from the sight of their admiring and applauding -opponents. Nevertheless two hundred had sunk dead in the ranks, a -like number unable to keep up were made prisoners, and a leading gun -having been overturned in the defile of Aldea Lengua, six others were -retarded and the whole fell in the allies’ hands together with their -tumbrils. - -The line of the Tormes being thus gained the allied troops were on -the 27th and 28th pushed forward with their left towards Miranda and -Zamora, and their right towards Toro; so placed the latter covered -the communications with Ciudad Rodrigo while the former approached -the point on the Duero where it was proposed to throw the bridge for -communication with Graham’s corps. This done Wellington left general -Hill in command, and went off suddenly, for he was uneasy about his -combinations on the Esla. On the 29th he passed the Duero at Miranda, -by means of a basket slung on a rope which was stretched from rock -to rock, the river foaming several hundred feet below. The 30th he -reached Carvajales. - -Graham had met with many difficulties in his march through the -rugged Tras os Montes, and though the troops were now close to the -Esla stretching from Carvajales to Tabara, and their left was in -communication with the Gallicians who were coming down to Benevente, -the combination had been in some measure thwarted by the difficulty -of crossing the Esla. The general combination required that river -to be passed on the 29th, at which time the right wing, continuing -its march from the Tormes without halting, could have been close to -Zamora, and the passage of the Duero would have been insured. The -French armies would then have been entirely surprised and separated, -and some of their divisions overtaken and beaten. They were indeed -still ignorant that a whole army was on the Esla, but the opposite -bank of that river was watched by picquets of cavalry and infantry, -the stream was full and rapid, the banks steep, the fords hard to -find, difficult, and deep, with stony beds, and the alarm had spread -from the Tormes through all the cantonments. - -At day-break on the 31st some squadrons of hussars, with infantry -holding by their stirrups, entered the stream at the ford of -Almendra, and at the same time Graham approached the right bank -with all his forces. A French picquet of thirty men was surprised -in the village of Villa Perdrices by the hussars, the pontoons were -immediately laid down, and the columns commenced passing, but several -men, even of the cavalry, had been drowned at the fords. - -[Sidenote: June.] - -On the 1st of June, while the rear was still on the Esla, the head -of the allies entered Zamora which the French evacuated after -destroying the bridge. They retired upon Toro, and the next day -having destroyed the bridge there also, they again fell back, but -their rear-guard was overtaken near the village of Morales by the -hussar brigade under colonel Grant. Their horsemen immediately passed -a bridge and swamp under a cannonade, and then facing about in two -lines, gave battle, whereupon major Roberts with the tenth regiment, -supported by the fifteenth, broke both the lines with one charge and -pursued them for two miles, and they lost above two hundred men, but -finally rallied on the infantry reserves. - -The junction of the allies’ wings on the Duero was now secure, for -that river was fordable, and Wellington had also, in anticipation of -failure on one point, made arrangements for forming a boat-bridge -below the confluence of the Esla; and he could also throw his -pontoons without difficulty at Toro, and even in advance, because -Julian Sanchez had surprised a cavalry picquet at Castronuño on the -left bank, and driven the French outposts from the fords of Pollos. -But the enemy’s columns were concentrating, it might be for a battle, -wherefore the English general halted the 3d to bring the Gallicians -in conjunction on his left, and to close up his own rear which -had been retarded by the difficulty of passing the Esla. The two -divisions of his right wing, namely, the second and light division, -passed the Duero on the morning of the 3rd, the artillery and baggage -by a ford, the infantry at the bridge of Toro, which was ingeniously -repaired by the lieutenant of engineers Pringle, who dropped ladders -at each side of the broken arch, and then laid planks from one to the -other just above the water level. Thus the English general mastered -the line of the Duero, and those who understand war may say whether -it was an effort worthy of the man and his army. - -Let them trace all the combinations, follow the movement of Graham’s -columns, some of which marched one hundred and fifty, some more than -two hundred and fifty miles, through the wild districts of the Tras -os Montes. Through those regions, held to be nearly impracticable -even for small corps, forty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, -artillery, and pontoons, had been carried and placed as if by a -supernatural power upon the Esla, before the enemy knew even that -they were in movement! Was it fortune or skill that presided? Not -fortune, for the difficulties were such that Graham arrived later -on the Esla than Wellington intended, and yet so soon, that the -enemy could make no advantage of the delay. For had the king even -concentrated his troops behind the Esla on the 31st, the Gallicians -would still have been at Benevente and reinforced by Penne Villemur’s -cavalry which had marched with Graham’s corps, and the Asturians -would have been at Leon on the Upper Esla which was fordable. Then -the final passage of that river could have been effected by a -repetition of the same combinations on a smaller scale, because the -king’s army would not have been numerous enough to defend the Duero -against Hill, the Lower Esla against Wellington, and the Upper Esla -against the Spaniards at the same time. Wellington had also, as we -have seen, prepared the means of bringing Hill’s corps or any part of -it over the Duero below the confluence of the Esla, and all these -combinations, these surprising exertions had been made merely to gain -a fair field of battle. - -But if Napoleon’s instructions had been ably worked out by the king -during the winter, this great movement could not have succeeded, for -the insurrection in the north would have been crushed in time, or -at least so far quelled, that sixty thousand French infantry, ten -thousand cavalry, and one hundred pieces of artillery would have been -disposable, and such a force held in an offensive position on the -Tormes would probably have obliged Wellington to adopt a different -plan of campaign. If concentrated between the Duero and the Esla it -would have baffled him on that river, because operations which would -have been effectual against thirty-five thousand infantry would have -been powerless against sixty thousand. Joseph indeed complained -that he could not put down the insurrection in the north, that he -could not feed such large armies, that a thousand obstacles arose on -every side which he could not overcome, in fine that he could not -execute his brother’s instructions. They could have been executed -notwithstanding. Activity, the taking time by the forelock, would -have quelled the insurrection; and for the feeding of the troops, -the boundless plains called the “_Tierras de Campos_,” where the -armies were now operating, were covered with the ripening harvest; -the only difficulty was to subsist that part of the French army not -engaged in the northern provinces during the winter. Joseph could not -find the means though Soult told him they were at hand, because the -difficulties of his situation overpowered him; they would not have -overpowered Napoleon, but the difference between a common general -and a great captain is immense, the one is victorious when the other -is defeated. - -The field was now clear for the shock of battle, but the forces on -either side were unequally matched. Wellington had ninety thousand -men, with more than one hundred pieces of artillery. Twelve thousand -were cavalry, and the British and Portuguese present with the -colours, were, including serjeants and drummers, above seventy -thousand sabres and bayonets; the rest of the army was Spanish. -Besides this mass there were the irregulars on the wings, Sanchez’ -horsemen, a thousand strong, on the right beyond the Duero; Porlier, -Barceña, Salazar and Manzo on the left between the Upper Esla and the -Carion. Saornil had moved upon Avila, the Empecinado was hovering -about Leval. Finally the reserve of Andalusia had crossed the Tagus -at Almaraz on the 30th, and numerous minor bands were swarming round -as it advanced. On the other hand though the French could collect -nine or ten thousand horsemen and one hundred guns, their infantry -was less than half the number of the allies, being only thirty-five -thousand strong exclusive of Leval. Hence the way to victory was -open, and on the 4th Wellington marched forward with a conquering -violence. - -[Sidenote: French Official correspondence, MSS.] - -The intrusive monarch was in no condition to stem or to evade a -torrent of war, the depth and violence of which he was even now -ignorant of, and a slight sketch of his previous operations will shew -that all his dispositions were made in the dark and only calculated -to bring him into trouble. Early in May he would have marched the -army of the centre to the Upper Duero when Leval’s reports checked -the movement. On the 15th of that month a spy sent to Bejar by -D’Erlon, brought intelligence that a great number of country carts -had been collected there and at Placentia, to follow the troops in -a march upon Talavera, but after two days were sent back to their -villages; that fifty mules had been purchased at Bejar and sent -to Ciudad Rodrigo; that about the same time the first and fourth -divisions and the German cavalry had moved from the interior towards -the frontier, saying they were going, the first to Zamora, and the -last to Fuente Guinaldo; that many troops were already gathered at -Ciudad Rodrigo under Wellington and Castaños; that the divisions at -Coria and Placentia were expected there, the reserves of Andalusia -were in movement, and the pass of Baños which had been before -retrenched and broken up was now repaired; that the English soldiers -were paid their arrears, and every body said a grand movement would -commence on the 12th. All this was extremely accurate, but with the -exception of the march to Zamora, which seemed to be only a blind, -the information obtained indicated the principal movement as against -the Tormes, and threw no light upon the English general’s real design. - -On the other flank Reille’s cavalry under Boyer, having made an -exploring sweep round by Astorga, La Baneza and Benevente, brought -intelligence that a Gallician expedition was embarking for America, -that another was to follow, and that several English divisions were -also embarking in Portugal. The 23d of May a report from the same -quarter gave notice that Salazar and Manzo were with seven hundred -horsemen on the Upper Esla, that Porlier was coming from the Asturias -to join them with two thousand five hundred men, and Giron with six -thousand Gallicians had reached Astorga; but it was uncertain if -Sylveira’s cavalry would come from Braganza to connect the left of -the English with the Gallicians as it had done the year before. - -Thus on the 24th of May the French were still entirely in the dark -with respect to Graham’s movement, and although it was known the -26th at Valladolid, that Wellington had troops in the country beyond -the Esla, it was not considered a decisive movement because the -head-quarters were still at Freneda. However on the 29th Reille -united his cavalry at Valderas, passed the Esla, entered Benevente -and sent patroles towards Tobara and Carvajales; from their reports -and other sources he understood the whole allied army was on the -Esla, and as his detachments were closely followed by the British -scouting parties, he recrossed the Esla and broke the bridge of -Castro Gonzalo, leaving his light horsemen to watch it. But the delay -in the passage of the Esla, after Graham had reached Carvajales, made -Reille doubt both the strength of the allies and their inclination -to cross that river. He expected the main attack on the Tormes, -and proposed in conjunction with Daricau’s infantry, and Digeon’s -dragoons, then at Toro and Zamora, to defend the Duero and the Lower -Esla, leaving the Gallicians, whose force he despised, to pass the -Upper Esla at their peril. - -D’Armagnac’s division was now at Rio Seco, and Maucune’s division, -which had been spread along the road to Burgos, was ordered to -concentrate at Palencia on the Carion, but meanwhile Gazan on the -other flank of the French position was equally deceived by the -movements of the English general. The 7th of May he heard from the -Tormes that the allies’ preparations indicated a movement towards -that river. Leval wrote from Madrid that he had abandoned Toledo -because fifteen thousand English and ten thousand Spaniards were to -advance by the valley of the Tagus, that rations had been ordered at -Escalona for Long’s English cavalry, and that magazines were formed -at Bejar. At the same time from a third quarter came news that three -divisions would pass the Duero to join the Gallicians and march upon -Valladolid. - -Gazan rightly judging that the magazines at Bejar were to supply -Hill and the Spaniards, in their movement to join Wellington, -expected at first that the whole would operate by the Esla, but on -the 14th fresh reports changed this opinion; he then judged Hill -would advance by the Puente Congosto upon Avila, to cut Leval off -from the army, while Wellington attacked Salamanca. On the 24th -however his doubts vanished. Villatte told him that Wellington was -over the Agueda, Graham over the Lower Douro, and at the same time -Daricau, writing from Zamora, told him that Graham’s cavalry had -already reached Alcanizas, only one march from the Esla. Conroux was -instantly directed to march from Avila to Arevalo, Tilly to move -with the cavalry of the army of the south, from Madrigal towards the -Trabancos, Daricau to send a brigade to Toro, and Leval to come over -the Guadarama pass and join D’Erlon at Segovia. - -On the 26th, Gazan thinking Wellington slow and crediting a report -that he was sick and travelling in a carriage, relapsed into doubt. -He now judged the passage of the Agueda a feint, thought the allies’ -operations would be in mass towards the Esla, and was positively -assured by his emissaries that Hill would move by the Puente Congosto -against Segovia. However on the 27th he heard of the passage of -the Tormes and of Villatte’s retreat, whereupon evacuating Arevalo -he fixed his head-quarters at Rueda, and directed Conroux who was -marching upon Arevalo, and so hastily that he left a moveable column -behind him on the Upper Tormes, to come to the Trabancos. - -Gazan at first designed to take post behind that river but there was -no good position there, and the 28th he rallied Conroux’s, Rey’s, -and Villatte’s infantry and Tilly’s cavalry behind the Zapardiel. -Daricau’s division was meanwhile concentrated at Toro, and Digeon’s -at Zamora; a bridge-head was commenced at Tordesillas, which was -the point of retreat, and guards were placed at Pollos where the -fords of the Duero were very low though as yet impracticable. These -movements were made in tranquillity, for Hill had no desire by -driving the French over the Duero to increase the number of their -troops on the Esla. However on the 30th Gazan, hearing that Hill was -advancing and that the troops on the Esla were likely to attempt the -passage of that river, crossed the Duero in the night and took post -at Tordesillas, intending to concentrate the whole army of the south -on the right of that river; but Leval, though he had quitted Madrid -on the 27th, was not yet arrived and a large artillery convoy, the -ministers and Spanish families, and the pictures from the palace of -Madrid were likewise on the road from that capital by the Segovia -passes. - -At this time the army of Portugal and D’Armagnac’s division was -extended from the Esla to the Carion, the king’s guards were at -Valladolid, and D’Erlon was in march to the Puente Duero, from -Segovia and Sepulveda, yet slowly and apparently not aware of the -crisis. Meanwhile the passage of the Esla had been effected, and -hence if that river had been crossed at the time fore-calculated by -Wellington, and a rapid push made upon Placentia and Valladolid, -while Hill marched upon Rueda, the whole French army might have been -caught in what Napoleon calls “_flagrante delicto_” and destroyed. -And even now it would seem that Wellington could have profited more -by marching, than by halting at Toro on the 3d, for though Leval’s -troops and part of the army of the centre were then between the -Puente Duero and Valladolid, D’Erlon had left a large division at -Tudela de Duero to protect the arrival of the convoy from Madrid, -which had not yet crossed the Duero; another great convoy was -still on the left bank of the lower Pisuerga, and the parcs of the -armies of Portugal and of the south were waiting on the right bank -of that river, until the first convoy had passed over the Carion. -Nevertheless it was prudent to gather well to a head first, and the -general combinations had been so profoundly made that the evil day -for the French was only deferred. - -On the 30th Joseph’s design was to oppose Wellington’s principal -force with the army of the south, while the army of the centre held -the rest in check, the army of Portugal to aid either as the case -might be; and such was his infatuation as to his real position, -that even now, from the Duero, he was pressing upon his brother the -immediate establishment of a civil Spanish administration for the -provinces behind the Ebro, as the only remedy for the insurrection, -and for the rendering of the army of the north disposable. He even -demanded an order from the emperor to draw Clauzel’s troops away from -the Ebro, that he might drive the allies back to the Coa, and take -the long-urged offensive position towards Portugal, Napoleon being -then at Dresden and Wellington on the Duero! - -On the 2d when the allies had passed the Esla, the king, who -expected them at Toro the 1st, became disturbed to find his front -unmolested, and concluded, as he had received no letter from Reille, -that Wellington had cut his communication, turned his right, and was -marching towards the Carion. His alarm was considerable and with -reason, but in the evening of the 2d he heard from Reille, who had -retired unmolested to Rio Seco and there rallied D’Armagnac’s troops, -but Maucune’s division was still in march from different parts to -concentrate at Palencia. The halt of the 3d was therefore to the -profit of the French, for during that time they received the Madrid -convoy and insured the concentration of all their troops, recovering -even Conroux’s moveable column which joined Leval near Olmedo. They -also destroyed the bridges of Tudela and Puente Duero on the Duero, -and that of Simancas and Cabeçon on the Pisuerga, and they passed -their convoys over the Carion, directing them, under escort of Casa -Palacios’ Spanish division, upon Burgos. - -The army of the south now moved upon Torrelobaton and Penaflor, the -army of the centre upon Duenas, the army of Portugal upon Palencia; -and the spirits of all were raised by intelligence of the emperor’s -victory at Lutzen, and by a report that the Toulon fleet had made -a successful descent on Sicily. It would appear that Napoleon -certainly contemplated an attack upon that island, and lord William -Bentinck thought it would be successful, but it was prevented by -Murat’s discontent, who instead of attacking fell off from Napoleon -and opened a negociation with the British. - -The 4th Wellington moved in advance, his bridge of communication -was established at Pollos, and considerable stores of ammunition -were formed at Valladolid; some had also been taken at Zamora, and -the cavalry flankers captured large magazines of grain at Arevalo. -Towards the Carion the allies marched rapidly by parallel roads, and -in compact order, the Gallicians on the extreme left, Morillo and -Julian Sanchez on the extreme right, and the English general expected -the enemy would make a stand behind that river, but the report of the -prisoners and the hasty movement of the French columns soon convinced -him that they were in full retreat for Burgos. On the 6th all the -French armies were over the Carion, Reille had even reached Palencia -on the 4th and there rallied Maucune’s division, and a brigade of -light cavalry which had been employed on the communications. - -Although the king’s force was now about fifty-five thousand fighting -men, exclusive of his Spanish division, which was escorting the -convoys and baggage, he did not judge the Carion a good position -and retired behind the upper Pisuerga, desiring if possible to -give battle there. He sent Jourdan to examine the state of Burgos -castle, and expedited fresh letters, for he had already written from -Valladolid on the 27th and 30th of May, to Foy, Sarrut, and Clauzel, -calling them towards the plains of Burgos; and others to Suchet -directing him to march immediately upon Zaragoza and hoping he was -already on his way there; but Suchet was then engaged in Catalonia, -Clauzel’s troops were on the borders of Aragon, Foy and Palombini’s -Italians were on the coast of Guipuscoa, and Sarrut’s division was -pursuing Longa in the Montaña. - -Joseph was still unacquainted with his enemy. Higher than seventy or -eighty thousand he did not estimate the allied forces, and he was -desirous of fighting them on the elevated plains of Burgos. But more -than one hundred thousand men were before and around him. For all the -Partidas of the Asturias and the Montaña were drawing together on -his right, Julian Sanchez and the Partidas of Castile were closing -on his left, and Abispal with the reserve and Frere’s cavalry had -already passed the Gredos mountains and were in full march for -Valladolid. Nevertheless the king was sanguine of success if he could -rally Clauzel’s and Foy’s divisions in time, and his despatches -to the former were frequent and urgent. Come with the infantry of -the army of Portugal! Come with the army of the north and we shall -drive the allies over the Duero! Such was his cry to Clauzel, and -again he urged his political schemes upon his brother; but he was -not a statesman to advise Napoleon nor a general to contend with -Wellington, his was not the military genius, nor were his the -arrangements that could recover the initiatory movement at such a -crisis and against such an adversary. - -While the king was on the Pisuerga he received Jourdan’s report. -The castle of Burgos was untenable, there were no magazines of -provisions, the new works were quite unfinished, and they commanded -the old which were unable to hold out a day; of Clauzel’s and Foy’s -divisions nothing had been heard. It was resolved to retire behind -the Ebro. All the French outposts in the Bureba and Montaña were -immediately withdrawn, and the great dépôt of Burgos was evacuated -upon Vittoria, which was thus encumbered with the artillery dépôts of -Madrid, of Valladolid, and of Burgos, and with the baggage and stores -of so many armies and so many fugitive families; and at this moment -also arrived from France a convoy of treasure which had long waited -for escort at Bayonne. - -Meanwhile the tide of war flowed onwards with terrible power. The -allies had crossed the Carion on the 7th, and Joseph quitting -Torquemada had retired by the high road to Burgos with his left wing -composed of the army of the south and centre, while Reille with -that of Portugal forming the right wing moved by Castro Xerez. But -Wellington following hard, and conducting his operations continually -on the same principle, pushed his left wing and the Gallicians along -bye-roads, and passed the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th, and 10th. -Having thus turned the line of the Pisuerga entirely, and outflanked -Reille, he made a short journey the 11th and halted the 12th with his -left wing, for he had outmarched his supplies, and had to arrange -the farther feeding of his troops in a country wide of his line of -communication. Nevertheless he pushed his right wing under general -Hill along the main road to Burgos, resolved to make the French -yield the castle or fight for the possession, and meanwhile Julian -Sanchez acting beyond the Arlanzan cut off small posts and straggling -detachments. - -Reille had regained the great road to Burgos on the 9th, and was -strongly posted behind the Hormaza stream, his right near Hormillas, -his left on the Arlanzan, barring the way to Burgos; the other two -armies were in reserve behind Estepar, and in this situation they had -remained for three days and were again cheered by intelligence of -Napoleon’s victory at Bautzen and the consequent armistice. But on -the 12th Wellington’s columns came up and the light division preceded -by Grant’s hussars and Ponsonby’s dragoons, immediately turned the -French right, while the rest of the troops attacked the whole range -of heights from Hormillas to Estepar. Reille, whose object was to -make the allies shew their force, seeing their horsemen in rear of -his right flank while his front was so strongly menaced, made for the -bridge of Baniel on the Arlanzan; then Gardiner’s horse artillery -raked his columns, and captain Milles of the fourteenth dragoons -charging, took some prisoners and one of his guns which had been -disabled. Meanwhile the right of the allies pressing forward towards -the bridge of Baniel endeavoured to cut off the retreat, but the -French repelled the minor attacks with the utmost firmness, bore the -fire of the artillery without shrinking, and evading the serious -attacks by their rapid yet orderly movement, finally passed the river -with a loss of only thirty men killed and a few taken. - -The three French armies being now covered by the Urbel and Arlanzan -rivers, which were swelled by the rain, could not be easily attacked, -and the stores of Burgos were removed; but in the night Joseph -again retreated along the high road by Briviesca to Pancorbo, into -which place he threw a garrison of six hundred men. The castle of -Burgos was prepared also for destruction, and whether from hurry, or -negligence, or want of skill, the mines exploded outwards, and at the -very moment when a column of infantry was defiling under the castle. -Several streets were laid in ruins, thousands of shells and other -combustibles which had been left in the place were ignited and driven -upwards with a horrible crash, the hills rocked above the devoted -column, and a shower of iron, timber, and stony fragments falling on -it, in an instant destroyed more than three hundred men! Fewer deaths -might have sufficed to determine the crisis of a great battle! - -But such an art is war! So fearful is the consequence of error, so -terrible the responsibility of a general. Strongly and wisely did -Napoleon speak when he told Joseph, that if he would command, he must -give himself up entirely to the business, labouring day and night, -thinking of nothing else. Here was a noble army driven like sheep -before prowling wolves, yet in every action the inferior generals had -been prompt and skilful, the soldiers brave, ready and daring, firm -and obedient in the most trying circumstances of battle. Infantry, -artillery, and cavalry, all were excellent and numerous, and the -country strong and favourable for defence; but that soul of armies, -the mind of a great commander was wanting, and the Esla, the Tormes, -the Duero, the Carion, the Pisuerga, the Arlanzan, seemed to be -dried up, the rocks, the mountains, the deep ravines to be levelled. -Clauzel’s strong positions, Dubreton’s thundering castle, had -disappeared like a dream, and sixty thousand veteran soldiers though -willing to fight at every step, were hurried with all the tumult and -confusion of defeat across the Ebro. Nor was that barrier found of -more avail to mitigate the rushing violence of their formidable enemy. - -Joseph having possession of the impregnable rocks, and the defile -and forts of Pancorbo, now thought he could safely await for his -reinforcements, and extended his wings for the sake of subsistence. -On the 16th D’Erlon marched to Aro on the left, leaving small -posts of communication between that place and Miranda, and sending -detachments towards Domingo Calçada to watch the road leading from -Burgos to Logroño. Gazan remained in the centre with a strong -advanced guard beyond Pancorbo, for as the king’s hope was to retake -the offensive, he retained the power of issuing beyond the defiles, -and his scouting parties were pushed forward towards Briviesca in -front, to Zerezo on the left and to Poya do Sal on the right. The -rest of the army of the south was cantoned by divisions as far as -Armiñion behind the Ebro, and Reille, who had occupied Busto marched -to Espejo, also behind the Ebro and on the great road to Bilbao. -There being joined by Sarrut’s division from Orduña he took post, -placing Maucune at Frias, Sarrut at Osma, and La Martiniere at -Espejo; guarding also the Puente Lara, and sending strong scouting -parties towards Medina de Pomar and Villarcayo on one side and -towards Orduña on the other. - -While these movements were in progress, all the encumbrances of -the armies were assembled in the basin of Vittoria, and many small -garrisons of the army of the north came in; for Clauzel having -received the king’s first letter on the 15th of June had stopped the -pursuit of Mina, and proceeded to gather up his scattered columns, -intending to move by the way of Logroño to the Ebro. He had with -him Taupin’s and Barbout’s divisions of the army of Portugal, but -after providing for his garrisons, only five thousand men of the -army of the north were disposable, so that he could not bring more -than fourteen thousand men to aid the king; nevertheless the latter -confident in the strength of his front was still buoyant with the -hope of assembling an army powerful enough to retake the offensive. -His dream was short-lived. - -The 13th, while the echoes of the explosion at Burgos were still -ringing in the hills, Wellington’s whole army was in motion by -its left towards the country about the sources of the Ebro. The -Gallicians moved from Aguilar de Campo high up on the Pisuerga, -Graham with the British left wing moved from Villa Diego, and in -one march reaching the river, passed it on the 14th at the bridges -of Rocamunde and San Martin. The centre of the army followed on the -15th, and the same day the right wing under Hill marched through the -Bureba and crossed at the Puente Arenas. This general movement was -masked by the cavalry and by the Spanish irregulars who infested the -rear of the French on the roads to Briviesca and Domingo Calçada, -and the allies being thus suddenly placed between the sources of the -Ebro and the great mountains of Reynosa, cut the French entirely -off from the sea-coast. All the ports except Santona and Bilbao, -were immediately evacuated by the enemy; Santona was invested -by Mendizabel, Porlier, Barceña, and Campillo, and the English -vessels entered Sant Andero, where a dépôt and hospital station was -established, because the royal road from thence through Reynosa to -Burgos furnished a free communication with the army. This single -blow severed the connection of the English force with Portugal. That -country was cast off by the army as a heavy tender is cast from its -towing rope, and all the British military establishments were broken -up and transferred by sea to the coast of Biscay. - -The English general had now his choice of two modes of action. The -one to march bodily down the left bank of the Ebro, and fall upon the -enemy wherever he could meet with them; the other to advance, still -turning the king’s right, and by entering Guipuscoa, to place the -army on the great communication with France, while the fleet keeping -pace with this movement furnished fresh dépôts at Bilbao and other -ports. The first plan was a delicate and uncertain operation, because -of the many narrow and dangerous defiles which were to be passed, -but the second which could scarcely be contravened, was secure even -if the first should fail; both were compatible to a certain point, -inasmuch as to gain the great road leading from Burgos by Orduña to -Bilbao, was a good step for either, and failing in that the road -leading by Valmaceda to Bilbao was still in reserve. Wherefore with -an eagle’s sweep Wellington brought his left wing round, and pouring -his numerous columns through all the deep narrow valleys and rugged -defiles descended towards the great road of Bilbao between Frias -and Orduña. At Modina de Pomar a central point, he left the sixth -division to guard his stores and supplies, but the march of the -other divisions was unmitigated; neither the winter gullies nor the -ravines, nor the precipitate passes amongst the rocks, retarded the -march even of the artillery; where horses could not draw men hauled, -and when the wheels would not roll the guns were let down or lifted -up with ropes; and strongly did the rough veteran infantry work their -way through those wild but beautiful regions; six days they toiled -unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by the junction of Longa’s -division and all the smaller bands which came trickling from the -mountains, they burst like raging streams from every defile, and went -foaming into the basin of Vittoria. - -[Sidenote: General Thouvenot’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan’s correspondence, MSS.] - -During this time many reports reached the French, some absurdly -exaggerated, as that Wellington had one hundred and ninety thousand -men, but all indicating more or less distinctly the true line and -direction of his march. As early as the 15th Jourdan had warned -Joseph that the allies would probably turn his right, and as the -reports of Maucune’s scouts told of the presence of English troops, -that day, on the side of Puente Arenas, he pressed the king to send -the army of Portugal to Valmaceda, and to close the other armies -towards the same quarter. Joseph yielded so far, that Reille was -ordered to concentrate his troops at Osma on the morning of the -18th, with the view of gaining Valmaceda by Orduña, if it was still -possible; if not he was to descend rapidly from Lodio upon Bilbao, -and to rally Foy’s division and the garrisons of Biscay upon the army -of Portugal. At the same time Gazan was directed to send a division -of infantry and a regiment of dragoons from the army of the south, to -relieve Reille’s troops at Puente Lara and Espejo, but no general and -decided dispositions were made. - -[Sidenote: Official Journal of the chief of the staff, General Boyer, -MSS.] - -Reille immediately ordered Maucune to quit Frias, and join him at -Osma with his division, yet having some fears for his safety gave -him the choice of coming by the direct road across the hills, or -by the circuitous route of Puente Lara. Maucune started late in -the night of the 17th by the direct road, and when Reille himself -reached Osma, with La Martiniere’s and Sarrut’s divisions, on the -morning of the 18th, he found a strong English column issuing from -the defiles in his front, and the head of it was already at Barbarena -in possession of the high road to Orduña. This was general Graham -with the first, third, and fifth divisions, and a considerable body -of cavalry. The French general who had about eight thousand infantry -and fourteen guns, at first made a demonstration with Sarrut’s -division in the view of forcing the British to shew their whole -force, and a sharp skirmish and heavy cannonade ensued, wherein -fifty men fell on the side of the allies, above a hundred on that of -the enemy. But at half-past two o’clock, Maucune had not arrived, -and beyond the mountains, on the left of the French, the sound of a -battle arose which seemed to advance along the valley of Boveda into -the rear of Osma; Reille, suspecting what had happened, instantly -retired fighting, towards Espejo, where the mouths of the valleys -opened on each other, and from that of Boveda, and the hills on the -left, Maucune’s troops rushed forth begrimed with dust and powder, -breathless, and broken into confused masses. - -That general, proverbially daring, marched over the Araçena ridge -instead of going by the Puente Lara, and his leading brigade, after -clearing the defiles, had halted on the bank of a rivulet near the -village of San Millan in the valley of Boveda. In this situation, -without planting picquets, they were waiting for their other brigade -and the baggage, when suddenly the light division which had been -moving by a line parallel with Graham’s march, appeared on some -rising ground in their front; the surprise was equal on both sides, -but the British riflemen instantly dashed down the hill with loud -cries and a bickering fire, the fifty-second followed in support, -and the French retreated fighting as they best could. The rest of -the English regiments having remained in reserve, were watching this -combat and thinking all their enemies were before them, when the -second French brigade, followed by the baggage, came hastily out from -a narrow cleft in some perpendicular rocks on the right hand. A very -confused action now commenced, for the reserve scrambled over some -rough intervening ground to attack this new enemy, and the French to -avoid them made for a hill a little way in their front, whereupon the -fifty-second, whose rear was thus menaced, wheeled round and running -at full speed up the hill met them on the summit. However, the French -soldiers without losing their presence of mind threw off their -packs, and half flying, half fighting, escaped along the side of the -mountains towards Miranda, while the first brigade still retreating -on the road towards Espejo were pursued by the riflemen. Meanwhile -the sumpter animals being affrighted, run wildly about the rocks with -a wonderful clamour, and though the escort huddled together fought -desperately, all the baggage became the spoil of the victors, and -four hundred of the French fell or were taken; the rest, thanks to -their unyielding resolution and activity, escaped, though pursued -through the mountains by some Spanish irregulars, and Reille being -still pressed by Graham then retreated behind Salinas de Añara. - -A knowledge of these events reached the king that night, yet neither -Reille nor the few prisoners he had made could account for more than -six Anglo-Portuguese divisions at the defiles; hence as no troops -had been felt on the great road from Burgos, it was judged that Hill -was marching with the others by Valmaceda into Guipuscoa, to menace -the great communication with France. However it was clear that six -divisions were concentrated on the right and rear of the French -armies, and no time was to be lost in extricating the latter from -its critical situation; wherefore Gazan and D’Erlon marched in the -night to unite at Armiñon, a central point behind the Zadora river, -up the left bank of which it was necessary to file in order to gain -the basin of Vittoria. But the latter could only be entered, at that -side, through the pass of Puebla de Arganzan which was two miles -long, and so narrow as scarcely to furnish room for the great road; -Reille therefore, to cover this dangerous movement, fell back during -the night to Subijana Morillas, on the Bayas river. His orders were -to dispute the ground vigorously, for by that route Wellington could -enter the basin before Gazan, and D’Erlon could thread the pass of -Puebla; he could also send a corps from Frias to attack their rear on -the Miranda side, while they were engaged in the defile. One of these -things by all means he should have endeavoured to accomplish, but -the troops had made very long marches on the 18th, and it was dark -before the fourth division had reached Espejo. D’Erlon and Gazan, -therefore, united at Armiñon without difficulty about ten o’clock in -the morning of the 19th, and immediately commenced the passage of the -defile of Puebla, and the head of their column appeared on the other -side at the moment when Wellington was driving Reille back upon the -Zadora. - -The allies had reached Bayas before mid-day of the 19th, and if they -could have forced the passage at once, the armies of the centre and -of the south would have been cut off from Vittoria and destroyed; -but the army of Portugal was strongly posted, the front covered by -the river, the right by the village of Subijana de Morillas, which -was occupied as a bridge-head, and the left secured by some very -rugged heights opposite the village of Pobes. This position was -turned by the light division while the fourth division attacked it -in front, and after a skirmish in which about eighty of the French -fell, Reille was forced over the Zadora; but the army of the centre -had then passed the defile of Puebla and was in position behind that -river, the army of the south was coming rapidly into second line, the -crisis had passed, the combat ceased, and the allies pitched their -tents on the Bayas. The French armies now formed three lines behind -the Zadora, and the king hearing that Clauzel was at Logroño, eleven -leagues distant, expedited orders to him to march upon Vittoria; -general Foy also, who was in march for Bilbao, was directed to halt -at Durango, to rally all the garrisons of Biscay and Guipuscoa there, -and then to come down on Vittoria. These orders were received too -late. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -[Sidenote: 1813. June.] - -The basin into which the king had now poured all his troops, his -parcs, convoys, and encumbrances of every kind, was about eight -miles broad by ten in length, Vittoria being at the further end. -The river Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after passing very -near that town, runs towards the Ebro with many windings and divides -the basin unequally, the largest portion being on the right bank. A -traveller coming from Miranda by the royal Madrid road, would enter -the basin by the pass of Puebla, through which the Zadora flows -between two very high and rough mountain ridges, the one on his right -hand being called the heights of Puebla, that on his left hand the -heights of Morillas. The road leads up the left bank of the river, -and on emerging from the pass, on the left hand at the distance of -about six miles would be seen the village of Subijana de Morillas, -furnishing that opening into the basin which Reille defended while -the other armies passed the defile of Puebla. The spires of Vittoria -would appear about eight miles distant, and from that town the road -to Logroño goes off on the right hand, the road to Bilbao by Murgia -and Orduña on the left hand crossing the Zadora at a bridge near the -village of Ariaga; further on, the roads to Estella and to Pampeluna -branch off on the right, a road to Durango on the left, and between -them the royal causeway leads over the great Arlaban ridge into the -mountains of Guipuscoa by the formidable defiles of Salinas. But of -all these roads, though several were practicable for guns, especially -that to Pampeluna, the royal causeway alone could suffice for the -retreat of such an encumbered army. And as the allies were behind the -hills forming the basin on the right bank of the Zadora, their line -being parallel to the great causeway, it followed that by prolonging -their left they would infallibly cut off the French from that route. - -Joseph felt the danger and his first thought was to march by Salinas -to Durango, with a view to cover his communications with France, and -to rally Foy’s troops and the garrisons of Guipuscoa and Biscay. -But in that rough country, neither his artillery nor his cavalry, -on which he greatly depended, though the cavalry and artillery of -the allies were scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist, and he -would have to send them into France; and if pressed by Wellington -in front and surrounded by all the bands in a mountainous region, -favourable for those irregulars, he could not long remain in Spain. -It was then proposed if forced from the basin of Vittoria, to retire -by Salvatierra to Pampeluna and bring Suchet’s army up to Zaragoza; -but Joseph feared thus to lose the great communication with France, -because the Spanish regular army, aided by all the bands, could -seize Tolosa while Wellington operated against him on the side of -Navarre. It was replied that troops detached from the army of the -north and from that of Portugal might oppose them; still the king -hesitated, for though the road to Pampeluna was called practicable -for wheels, it required something more for the enormous mass of guns -and carriages of all kinds now heaped around Vittoria. - -One large convoy had already marched on the 19th by the royal -causeway for France, another, still larger was to move on the 21st -under escort of Maucune’s division; the fighting men in front of the -enemy were thus diminished and yet the plain was still covered with -artillery parcs and equipages of all kinds, and Joseph shut up in the -basin of Vittoria, vacillating and infirm of purpose, continued to -waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary’s movements. Hence -on the 19th nothing was done, but the 20th some infantry and cavalry -of the army of Portugal passed the Zadora to feel for the allies -towards Murguia, and being encountered by Longa’s Spaniards at the -distance of six miles, after some successful skirmishing recrossed -the Zadora with the loss of twenty men. On the 21st at three o’clock -in the morning Maucune’s division, more than three thousand good -soldiers, marched with the second convoy, and the king took up a new -line of battle. - -[Sidenote: See plan 8.] - -Reille’s army reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry, -and by Digeon’s division of dragoons from the army of the south, -now formed the extreme right, having to defend the passage of the -Zadora, where the Bilbao and Durango roads crossed it by the bridges -of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga. The French division defended the bridge; -the Franco-Spanish brigade was pushed forward to Durana on the royal -road, and was supported by a French battalion and a brigade of light -horsemen; Digeon’s dragoons and a second brigade of light cavalry -were in reserve behind the Zadora, near Zuazo de Alava and Hermandad. -The centre of the king’s army, distant six or eight miles from -Gamara, following the course of the Zadora, was on another front, -because the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the heights of -Margarita descends to the defile of Puebla, nearly at right angles -with its previous course. Here covered by the river and on an easy -open range of heights, for the basin of Vittoria is broken by a -variety of ground, Gazan’s right extended from the royal road to an -isolated hill in front of the village of Margarita. His centre was -astride the royal road, in front of the village of Arinez; his left -occupied more rugged ground, being placed behind Subijana de Alava -on the roots of the Puebla mountain facing the defile of that name, -and to cover this wing a brigade under general Maransin was posted on -the Puebla mountain. D’Erlon’s army was in second line. The principal -mass of the cavalry with many guns, and the king’s guards formed a -reserve, behind the centre, about the village of Gomecha, and fifty -pieces of artillery were massed in the front, pointing to the bridges -of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and Nanclares. - -While the king was making conjectures, Wellington was making various -dispositions for the different operations which might occur. He knew -that the Andalusian reserve would be at Burgos in a few days, and -thinking that Joseph would not fight on the Zadora, detached Giron -with the Gallicians on the 19th to seize Orduña. Graham’s corps was -at first destined to follow Giron but finally penetrated through -difficult mountain ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from -Bilbao and menacing his communications with France. However the rear -of the army had been so much scattered in the previous marches that -Wellington halted on the 20th to rally his columns, and taking that -opportunity to examine the position of the French armies, observed -that they seemed steadfast to fight; whereupon immediately changing -his own dispositions, he gave Graham fresh orders and hastily -recalled Giron from Orduña. - -The long expected battle was now at hand, and on neither side were -the numbers and courage of the troops of mean account. The allies had -lost about two hundred killed and wounded in the previous operations, -and the sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, was left -at Medina de Pomar; hence only sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese -sabres and bayonets, with ninety pieces of cannon, were actually -in the field, but the Spanish auxiliaries were above twenty -thousand, and the whole army, including serjeants and artillery-men, -exceeded eighty thousand combatants. For the French side, as the -regular muster-roll of their troops was lost with the battle, an -approximation to their strength must suffice. The number killed and -taken in different combats, from the Esla and Tormes to the Zadora, -was about two thousand men, and some five thousand had marched to -France with the two convoys. On the other hand Sarrut’s division, -the garrison of Vittoria, and the many smaller posts relinquished by -the army of the north, had increased the king’s forces, and hence, -by a comparison with former returns, it would appear, that in the -gross, about seventy thousand men were present. Wherefore deducting -the officers, the artillery-men, sappers, miners, and non-combatants, -which are always borne on the French muster-rolls, the sabres and -bayonets would scarcely reach sixty thousand, but in the number and -size of their guns the French had the advantage. - -The defects of the king’s position were apparent both in the general -arrangement and in the details. His best line of retreat was on the -prolongation of his right flank, which being at Gamara Mayor, close -to Vittoria, was too distant to be supported by the main body of the -army; and yet the safety of the latter depended upon the preservation -of Reille’s position. Instead of having the rear clear, and the field -of battle free, many thousand carriages and impediments of all kinds -were heaped about Vittoria, blocking all the roads, and creating -confusion amongst the artillery parcs. Maransin’s brigade placed -on the heights above Puebla was isolated and too weak to hold that -ground. The centre indeed occupied an easy range of hills, its front -was open, with a slope to the river, and powerful batteries seemed to -bar all access by the bridges; nevertheless many of the guns being -pushed with an advanced post into a deep loop of the Zadora, were -within musket-shot of a wood on the right bank, which was steep and -rugged, so that the allies found good cover close to the river. - -There were seven bridges within the scheme of the operations, namely, -the bridge of La Puebla on the French left beyond the defile; the -bridge of Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava and the French end of -the defile of Puebla; then three bridges which, placed around the -deep loop of the river before mentioned, opened altogether upon the -right of the French centre, that of Mendoza being highest up the -stream, that of Vellodas lowest down the stream, and that of Tres -Puentes in the centre; lastly the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga -on the Upper Zadora, opposite Vittoria, which were guarded by Reille, -completed the number, and none of the seven were either broken or -entrenched. - -Wellington having well observed these things formed his army for -three distinct battles. - -Sir Thomas Graham moving from Murguia, by the Bilbao road, was to -fall on Reille, and if possible to force the passage of the river -at Gamara Mayor and Ariaga; by this movement the French would be -completely turned and the greatest part of their forces shut up -between the Puebla mountains on one side and the Zadora on the other. -The first and fifth Anglo-Portuguese divisions, Bradford’s and -Pack’s independent Portuguese brigades, Longa’s Spanish division, -and Anson’s and Bock’s cavalry, in all near twenty thousand men -with eighteen pieces of cannon, were destined for this attack, and -Giron’s Gallicians, recalled from Orduña, came up by a forced march -in support. - -Sir Rowland Hill was to attack the enemy’s left, and his corps, also -about twenty thousand strong, was composed of Morillo’s Spaniards, -Sylveira’s Portuguese, and the second British division together with -some cavalry and guns. It was collected on the southern slope of the -ridge of Morillas, between the Bayas and the Lower Zadora, pointing -to the village of Puebla, and was destined to force the passage of -the river at that point, to assail the French troops on the heights -beyond, to thread the defile of La Puebla and to enter the basin of -Vittoria, thus turning and menacing all the French left and securing -the passage of the Zadora at the bridge of Nanclares. - -The centre attack, directed by Wellington in person, consisted -of the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry, -the great mass of the artillery, the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s -Portuguese horsemen, in all nearly thirty thousand combatants. They -were encamped along the Bayas from Subijana Morillas to Ulivarre, -and had only to march across the ridges which formed the basin of -Vittoria on that side, to come down to their different points of -attack on the Zadora, that is to say, the bridges of Mendoza, Tres -Puentes, Villodas and Nanclares. But so rugged was the country and -the communications between the different columns so difficult, that -no exact concert could be expected and each general of division was -in some degree master of his movements. - - -BATTLE OF VITTORIA. - -At day-break on the 21st the weather being rainy, with a thick -vapour, the troops moved from their camps on the Bayas, and the -centre of the army, advancing by columns from the right and left -of the line, passed the ridges in front, and entering the basin of -Vittoria slowly approached the Zadora. The left-hand column pointed -to Mendoza, the right-hand column skirted the ridge of Morillas on -the other side of which Hill was marching, and that general, having -seized the village of Puebla about ten o’clock, commenced passing the -river there. Morillo’s Spaniards led and their first brigade moving -on a bye way assailed the mountain to the right of the great road; -the ascent was so steep that the soldiers appeared to climb rather -than to walk up, and the second Spanish brigade, being to connect -the first with the British troops below, ascended only half-way; -little or no opposition was made until the first brigade was near -the summit when a sharp skirmishing commenced, and Morillo was -wounded but would not quit the field; his second brigade joined him, -and the French, feeling the importance of the height, reinforced -Maransin with a fresh regiment. Then Hill succoured Morillo with the -seventy-first regiment, and a battalion of light infantry, both under -colonel Cadogan, yet the fight was doubtful, for though the British -secured the summit, and gained ground along the side of the mountain, -Cadogan, a brave officer and of high promise, fell, and Gazan calling -Villatte’s division from behind Ariñez, sent it to the succour of -his side; and so strongly did these troops fight that the battle -remained stationary, the allies being scarcely able to hold their -ground. Hill however again sent fresh troops to their assistance, -and with the remainder of his corps passing the Zadora, threaded the -long defile of Puebla and fiercely issuing forth on the other side -won the village of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan’s line; he -thus connected his own right with the troops on the mountain, and -maintained this forward position in despite of the enemy’s vigorous -efforts to dislodge him. - -Meanwhile Wellington had brought the fourth and light divisions, the -heavy cavalry, the hussars and D’Urban’s Portuguese horsemen, from -Subijana Morillas, and Montevite, down by Olabarre to the Zadora. -The fourth division was placed opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the -light division opposite the bridge of Villodas, both well covered by -rugged ground and woods; and the light division was so close to the -water, that their skirmishers could with ease have killed the French -gunners of the advanced post in the loop of the river at Villodas. -The weather had cleared up, and when Hill’s battle began, the -riflemen of the light division, spreading along the bank, exchanged a -biting fire with the enemy’s skirmishers, but no serious effort was -made, because the third and seventh divisions, meeting with rough -ground, had not reached their point of attack; and it would have been -imprudent to push the fourth division and the cavalry over the bridge -of Nanclares, and thus crowd a great body of troops in front of the -Puebla defile before the other divisions were ready to attack the -right and centre of the enemy. - -While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington that the bridge -of Tres Puentes on the left of the light division, was unguarded, -and offered to guide the troops over it. Kempt’s brigade of the -light division was instantly directed towards this point, and being -concealed by some rocks from the French, and well led by the brave -peasant, they passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a -steep curving rise of ground, and halted close under the crest on -the enemy’s side of the river, being then actually behind the king’s -advanced post, and within a few hundred yards of his line of battle. -Some French cavalry immediately approached and two round shots were -fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose -courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted; but as -no movement of attack was made, Kempt called the fifteenth hussars -over the river, and they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge -one by one, horseman after horseman, and still the French remained -torpid, shewing that there was an army there but no general. - -It was now one o’clock, Hill’s assault on the village of Subijana -de Alava was developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up -the Zadora on the enemy’s extreme right, being followed by the dull -sound of distant guns shewed that Graham’s attack had also commenced. -Then the king finding both his flanks in danger caused his reserve -about Gomecha to file off towards Vittoria, and gave Gazan orders to -retire by successive masses with the army of the south. But at that -moment the third and seventh divisions having reached their ground -were seen moving rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza, the enemy’s -artillery opened upon them, a body of cavalry drew near the bridge, -and the French light troops which were very strong there commenced -a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the French cannon -from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt’s forward position -was instantly made manifest; for colonel Andrew Barnard springing -forward, led the riflemen of the light division, in the most daring -manner, between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light -troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely that the -English artillery-men, thinking his darkly clothed troops were -enemies, played upon both alike. - -This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass -the bridge of Mendoza without opposition; the other brigade forded -the river higher up, and the seventh division and Vandeleur’s brigade -of the light division followed. The French advanced post immediately -abandoned the ground in front of Villodas, and the battle which had -before somewhat slackened revived with extreme violence. Hill pressed -the enemy harder, the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, -the smoke and sound of Graham’s attack became more distinct, and -the banks of the Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. However -the French, weakened in the centre by the draft made of Villatte’s -division and having their confidence shaken by the king’s order -to retreat, were in evident perplexity, and no regular retrograde -movement could be made, the allies were too close. - -The seventh division, and Colville’s brigade of the third division -which had forded the river, formed the left of the British, and they -were immediately engaged with the French right in front of Margarita -and Hermandad. Almost at the same time lord Wellington, seeing the -hill in front of Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal of -Villatte’s troops, carried Picton and the rest of the third division -in close columns of regiments at a running pace diagonally across -the front of both armies towards that central point; this attack -was headed by Barnard’s riflemen, and followed by the remainder of -Kempt’s brigade and the hussars, but the other brigade of the light -division acted in support of the seventh division. At the same time -general Cole advanced with the fourth division from the bridge of -Nanclares, and the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, also passing the -river, galloped up, squadron after squadron, into the plain ground -between Cole’s right and Hill’s left. - -The French thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for -retreat, threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, and fifty -pieces of artillery played with astonishing activity. To answer this -fire Wellington brought over several brigades of British guns, and -both sides were shrouded by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under -cover of which the French retired by degrees to the second range of -heights, in front of Gomecha, on which their reserve had been posted, -but they still held the village of Arinez on the main road. Picton’s -troops headed by the riflemen, plunged into that village amidst a -heavy fire of muskets and artillery, and in an instant three guns -were captured; but the post was important, fresh French troops came -down, and for some time the smoke and dust and clamour, the flashing -of the fire-arms, and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed -with the thundering of the guns, were terrible, yet finally the -British troops issued forth victorious on the other side. During this -conflict the seventh division, reinforced by Vandeleur’s brigade of -the light division, was heavily raked by a battery at the village of -Margarita, until the fifty-second regiment, led by colonel Gibbs, -with an impetuous charge drove the French guns away and carried the -village, and at the same time the eighty-seventh under colonel Gough -won the village of Hermandad. Then the whole advanced fighting on -the left of Picton’s attack, and on the right hand of that general -the fourth division also made way, though more slowly because of the -rugged ground. - -When Picton and Kempt’s brigades had carried the village of Arinez -and gained the main road, the French troops near Subijana de Alava -were turned, and being hard-pressed on their front, and on their -left flank by the troops on the summit of the mountain, fell back -for two miles in a disordered mass, striving to regain the great -line of retreat to Vittoria. It was thought that some cavalry -launched against them at the moment would have totally disorganized -the whole French battle and secured several thousand prisoners, -but this was not done, the confused multitude shooting ahead of -the advancing British lines recovered order, and as the ground was -exceedingly diversified, being in some places wooded, in others open, -here covered with high corn, there broken by ditches vineyards and -hamlets, the action for six miles resolved itself into a running -fight and cannonade, the dust and smoke and tumult of which filled -all the basin, passing onwards towards Vittoria. - -Many guns were taken as the army advanced, and at six o’clock -the French reached the last defensible height, one mile in front -of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the city stood, -and beyond the city, thousands of carriages and animals and -non-combatants, men women and children, were crowding together, in -all the madness of terror, and as the English shot went booming over -head the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, -while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no -hope, no stay for army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation. -However the courage of the French soldier was not yet quelled, -Reille on whom every thing now depended, maintained his post on the -Upper Zadora, and the armies of the south and centre drawing up on -their last heights, between the villages of Ali and Armentia, made -their muskets flash like lightning, while more than eighty pieces -of artillery, massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar, -that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with fire and smoke, -amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen, -bounding with a frantic energy. - -This terrible cannonade and musketry kept the allies in check, and -scarcely could the third division, which was still the foremost and -bore the brunt of this storm, maintain its advanced position. Again -the battle became stationary, and the French generals had commenced -drawing off their infantry in succession from the right wing, when -suddenly the fourth division rushing forward carried the hill on -the French left, and the heights were at once abandoned. It was at -this very moment that Joseph, finding the royal road so completely -blocked by carriages that the artillery could not pass, indicated -the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat, and the army went -off in a confused yet compact body on that side, leaving Vittoria on -its left. The British infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry -galloped through the town to intercept the new line of retreat, which -was through a marsh, but this road also was choked with carriages -and fugitive people, while on each side there were deep drains. Thus -all became disorder and mischief, the guns were left on the edge -of the marsh, the artillery-men and drivers fled with the horses, -and, breaking through the miserable multitude, the vanquished troops -went off by Metauco towards Salvatierra; however their cavalry still -covered the retreat with some vigour, and many of those generous -horsemen were seen taking up children and women to carry off from the -dreadful scene. - -The result of the last attack had placed Reille, of whose battle it -is now time to treat, in great danger. His advanced troops under -Sarrut had been placed at the village of Aranguis, and they also -occupied some heights on their right which covered both the bridges -of Ariaga and Gamara Mayor, but they had been driven from both the -village and the height a little after twelve o’clock, by general -Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham’s column, consisting of the -fifth division, Longa’s Spaniards, and Pack’s Portuguese. Longa then -seized Gamara Menor on the Durango road, while another detachment -gained the royal road still further on the left, and forced the -Franco-Spaniards to retire from Durana. Thus the first blow on this -side had deprived the king of his best line of retreat and confined -him to the road of Pampeluna. However Sarrut recrossed the river in -good order and a new disposition was made by Reille. One of Sarrut’s -brigades defended the bridge of Ariaga and the village of Abechuco -beyond it; the other was in reserve, equally supporting Sarrut and La -Martiniere who defended the bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village -of that name beyond the river. Digeon’s dragoons were formed behind -the village of Ariaga, and Reille’s own dragoons being called up from -Hermandad and Zuazo, took post behind the bridge of Gamara; a brigade -of light cavalry was placed on the extreme right to sustain the -Franco-Spanish troops, which were now on the Upper Zadora in front of -Betonio, and the remainder of the light cavalry under general Curto -was on the French left extending down the Zadora between Ariaga and -Govea. - -Oswald commenced the attack at Gamara with some guns and Robinson’s -brigade of the fifth division. Longa’s Spaniards were to have led and -at an early hour when Gamara was feebly occupied, but they did not -stir, and the village was meanwhile reinforced. However Robinson’s -brigade being formed in three columns made the assault at a running -pace. At first the fire of artillery and musketry was so heavy that -the British troops stopped and commenced firing also, and the -three columns got intermixed, yet encouraged by their officers, -and especially by the example of general Robinson an inexperienced -man but of a high and daring spirit, they renewed the charge, -broke through the village and even crossed the bridge. One gun was -captured, and the passage seemed to be won, when Reille suddenly -turned twelve pieces upon the village, and La Martiniere rallying his -division under cover of this cannonade, retook the bridge; it was -with difficulty the allied troops could even hold the village until -they were reinforced. Then a second British brigade came down, and, -the royals leading, the bridge was again carried, but again these -new troops were driven back in the same manner as the others had -been. Thus the bridge remained forbidden ground. Graham had meanwhile -attacked the village of Abechuco which covered the bridge of Ariaga, -and it was carried at once by colonel Halkett’s Germans, who were -supported by Bradford’s Portuguese and by the fire of twelve guns; -yet here as at Gamara the French maintained the bridge, and at both -places the troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal -fire of artillery and small arms. - -Reille, though considerably inferior in numbers, continued to -interdict the passage of the river, until the tumult of Wellington’s -battle, coming up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part -of the British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut’s rear. -Digeon’s dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment, and some -time before, Reille, seeing the retrograde movement of the king, -had formed a reserve of infantry under general Fririon at Betonia -which now proved his safety. For Sarrut was killed at the bridge -of Ariaga, and general Menne the next in command, could scarcely -draw off his troops while Digeon’s dragoons held the British cavalry -at point, but with the aid of Fririon’s reserve Reille covered the -movement and rallied all his troops at Betonio. He had now to make -head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from -Ariaga from Durana and from Vittoria, yet he fought his way to -Metauco on the Salvatierra road covering the general retreat with -some degree of order. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, -and neither the resolute demeanour of the French cavalry, which -was covered on the flanks by some light troops and made several -vigorous charges, nor the night, which now fell, could stop their -victorious career until the flying masses of the enemy had cleared -all obstacles, and passing Metauco got beyond the reach of further -injury. Thus ended the battle of Vittoria; the French escaped indeed -with comparatively little loss of men, but to use Gazan’s words, -“they lost all their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure, -all their stores, all their papers, so that no man could prove how -much pay was due to him; generals and subordinate officers alike -were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of them were -barefooted.” - -Never was an army more hardly used by its commander, for the soldiers -were not half beaten, and never was a victory more complete. The -trophies were innumerable. The French carried off but two pieces -of artillery from the battle. Jourdan’s baton of command, a stand -of colours, one hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred -of which had been used in the fight, all the parcs and dépôts from -Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure, -every thing fell into the hands of the victors. The loss in men -did not however exceed six thousand, exclusive of some hundreds of -prisoners; the loss of the allies was nearly as great, the gross -numbers being five thousand one hundred and seventy-six, killed -wounded and missing. Of these one thousand and forty-nine were -Portuguese and five hundred and fifty-three were Spanish; hence the -loss of the English was more than double that of the Portuguese and -Spaniards together, and yet both fought well, and especially the -Portuguese, but British troops are the soldiers of battle. Marshal -Jourdan’s baton was taken by the eighty-seventh regiment, and the -spoil was immense; but to such extent was plunder carried principally -by the followers and non-combatants, for with some exceptions the -fighting troops may be said to have marched upon gold and silver -without stooping to pick it up, that of five millions and a half of -dollars indicated by the French accounts to be in the money-chests, -not one dollar came to the public, and Wellington sent fifteen -officers with power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing -the Ebro and the Duero in hopes to recover the sums so shamefully -carried off. Neither was this disgraceful conduct confined to -ignorant and vulgar people. Some officers were seen mixed up with the -mob and contending for the disgraceful gain. - -[Sidenote: Jones’s Sieges.] - -On the 22d the allies followed the retreating enemy, and Giron and -Longa entered Guipuscoa, by the royal road, in pursuit of the convoy -which had moved under Maucune on the morning of the battle; the heavy -cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese remained at Vittoria, and general -Pakenham with the sixth division came up from Medina Pomar; the -remainder of the army pursued Joseph towards Pampeluna, for he had -continued his retreat up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. -The weather was rainy, the roads heavy, and the French rear-guard -having neither time nor materials to destroy the bridges set fire to -the villages behind them to delay the pursuit. At five o’clock in -the morning of the 22d Reille had rallied his two divisions and all -his cavalry in front of Salvatierra, where he halted until he was -assured that all the French had passed, and then continued his march -to Huerta in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles from the field of -battle. Joseph was that day at Yrursun, a town, situated behind one -of the sources of the Arga, and from which roads branched off to -Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa and St. Esteban on the other. -At this place he remained all the 23d sending orders to different -points on the French frontier to prepare provisions and succours for -his suffering army, and he directed Reille to proceed rapidly by -St. Estevan to the Bidassoa with the infantry, six hundred select -cavalry, the artillery-men and horses of the army of Portugal; -meanwhile Gazan’s and D’Erlon’s army marched upon Pampeluna intending -to cross the frontier at St. Jean Pied de Port. Joseph reached -Pampeluna the 24th, but the army bivouacked on the glacis of the -fortress, and in such a state of destitution and insubordination that -the governor would not suffer them to enter the town. The magazines -were indeed reduced very low by Mina’s long blockade, and some -writers assert that it was even proposed to blow up the works and -abandon the place; however by great exertions additional provisions -were obtained from the vicinity, the garrison was encreased to -three thousand men, and the army marched towards France leaving a -rear-guard at a strong pass about two leagues off. - -The 23d Wellington having detached Graham’s corps to Guipuscoa by the -pass of Adrian, left the fifth division at Salvatierra, and pursued -the king with the rest of the army. - -On the 24th the light division and Victor Alten’s cavalry came -up with the French rear-guard; two battalions of the riflemen -immediately pushed the infantry back though the pass, and then Ross’s -horse artillery galloping forward, killed several men and dismounted -one of the only two pieces of cannon carried off from Vittoria. - -The 25th the enemy covered by the fortress of Pampeluna went up the -valley of Roncevalles. He was followed by the light division which -turned the town as far as Vilalba, and he was harassed by the Spanish -irregular troops now swarming on every side. - -Meanwhile Foy and Clauzel were placed in very difficult positions. -The former had reached Bergara the 21st, and the garrison of Bilbao -and the Italian division of St. Paul, formerly Palombini’s, had -reached Durango; the first convoy from Vittoria was that day at -Bergara, and Maucune was with the second at Montdragon. The 22d the -garrison of Castro went off to Santona; the same day the fugitives -from the battle spread such an alarm through the country that the -forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, which commanded the passes -into Guipuscoa were abandoned, and Longa and Giron penetrated them -without hindrance. - -Foy who had only one battalion of his division in hand, immediately -rallied the fugitive garrisons, and marching upon Montdragon, made -some prisoners and acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he -ordered the convoy to move day and night, towards France; the troops -at Durango to march upon Bergara, and the troops from all the other -posts to unite at Tolosa, to which place the artillery, baggage, -and sick men were now hastening from every side; and to cover their -concentration Foy, reinforcing himself with Maucune’s troops, gave -battle to Giron and Longa, though three times his numbers, at -Montdragon; the Spaniards had the advantage and the French fell back, -yet slowly and fighting, to Bergara, but they lost two hundred and -fifty men and six guns. - -[Sidenote: Graham’s despatch.] - -[Sidenote: General Boyer’s official Journal, MSS.] - -On the 23d Foy marched to Villa Real de Guipuscoa, and that evening -the head of Graham’s column having crossed the Mutiol mountain by -the pass of Adrian, descended upon Segura. It was then as near to -Tolosa as Foy was, and the latter’s situation became critical; yet -such were the difficulties of passing the mountain, that it was late -on the 24th ere Graham, who had then only collected Anson’s light -cavalry, two Portuguese brigades of infantry, and Halket’s Germans, -could move towards Villa Franca. The Italians and Maucune’s divisions -which composed the French rear, were just entering Villa Franca as -Graham came in sight, and to cover that town they took post at the -village of Veasaya on the right bank of the Orio river. Halket’s -Germans, aided by Pack’s Portuguese, immediately drove Maucune’s -people from the village with the loss of two hundred men, and -Bradford’s brigade having engaged the Italians on the French right, -killed or wounded eighty, yet the Italians claimed the advantage; and -the whole position was so strong, that Graham had recourse to flank -operations, whereupon Foy retired to Tolosa. Giron and Longa now came -up by the great road, and Mendizabel, having quitted the blockade of -Santona, arrived at Aspeytia on the Deba. - -The 25th Foy again offered battle in front of Tolosa, but Graham -turned his left with Longa’s division and Mendizabel turned his right -from Aspeytia; while they were in march, colonel Williams, with -the grenadiers of the first regiment and three companies of Pack’s -Portuguese, dislodged him from an advantageous hill in front, and the -fight was then purposely prolonged by skirmishing, until six o’clock -in the evening, when the Spaniards having reached their destination -on the flanks, a general attack was made on all sides. The French -being cannonaded on the causeway, and strongly pushed by the infantry -in front, while Longa with equal vigour drove their left from the -heights, were soon forced beyond Tolosa on the flanks; but that town -was strongly entrenched as a field-post and they maintained it until -Graham brought up his guns and bursting one of the gates opened a -passage for his troops; nevertheless Foy profiting from the darkness -made his retreat good with a loss of only four hundred men killed and -wounded, and some prisoners who were taken by Mendizabel and Longa. -These actions were very severe; the loss of the Spaniards was not -known, but the Anglo-Portuguese had more than four hundred killed and -wounded in the two days’ operations, and Graham himself was hurt. - -The 26th and 27th the allies halted to hear of lord Wellington’s -progress, the enemy’s convoys entered France in safety, and Foy -occupied a position between Tolosa and Ernani behind the Anezo. His -force was now encreased by the successive arrival of the smaller -garrisons to sixteen thousand bayonets, four hundred sabres, and ten -pieces of artillery, and the 28th he threw a garrison of two thousand -six hundred good troops into St. Sebastian and passed the Urumia. -The 29th he passed the Oyarsun, and halted the 30th, leaving a small -garrison at Passages, which however surrendered the next day to Longa. - -On the 1st of July the garrison of Gueteria escaped by sea to St. -Sebastian, and Foy passed the Bidassoa, his rear-guard fighting with -Giron’s Gallicians; but Reille’s troops were now at Vera and Viriatu, -they had received ammunition and artillery from Bayonne, and thus -twenty-five thousand men of the army of Portugal occupied a defensive -line from Vera to the bridge of Behobie, the approaches to which -last were defended by a block-house. Graham immediately invested St. -Sebastian, and Giron concentrating the fire of his own artillery and -that of a British battery upon the block-house of Behobie obliged the -French to blow it up and destroy the bridge. - -While these events were passing in Guipuscoa, Clauzel was in more -imminent danger. On the evening of the 22d he had approached the -field of battle at the head of fourteen thousand men, by a way which -falls into the Estella road, at Aracete and not far from Salvatierra. -Pakenham with the sixth division was then at Vittoria, and the French -general, learning the state of affairs soon retired to Logroño, where -he halted until the evening of the 25th. This delay was like to have -proved fatal, for on that day, Wellington who before thought he was -at Tudela, discovered his real position, and leaving general Hill -with the second division to form the siege of Pampeluna, marched -himself by Tafalla with two brigades of light cavalry and the third, -fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry. The fifth and sixth -divisions and the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese marched -at the same time from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon Logroño; and -Mina also, who had now collected all his scattered battalions near -Estella, and was there joined by Julian Sanchez’ cavalry, followed -hard on Clauzel’s rear. - -[Sidenote: July.] - -The French general moving by Calahorra, reached Tudela on the evening -of the 27th, and thinking that by this forced march of sixty miles in -forty hours with scarcely a halt, he had outstripped all pursuers, -would have made for France by Olite and Tafalla. Wellington was -already in possession of those places expecting him, but an alcalde -gave Clauzel notice of the danger, whereupon recrossing the Ebro he -marched upon Zaragoza in all haste, and arriving the 1st of July, -took post on the Gallego, gave out that he would there wait until -Suchet, or the king, if the latter retook the offensive, should come -up. Wellington immediately made a flank movement to his own left as -far as Caseda, and could still with an exertion have intercepted -Clauzel by the route of Jacca, but he feared to drive him back upon -Suchet and contented himself with letting Mina press the French -general. That chief acted with great ability; for he took three -hundred prisoners, and having every where declared that the whole -allied army were close at hand in pursuit he imposed upon Clauzel, -who, being thus deceived, destroyed some of his artillery and heavy -baggage, and leaving the rest at Zaragoza retired to Jacca. - -During this time Joseph, not being pressed, had sent the army of the -south again into Spain to take possession of the valley of Bastan, -which was very fertile and full of strong positions. But O’Donnel, -count of Abispal, had now reduced the forts at Pancorbo, partly by -capitulation, partly by force, and was marching towards Pampeluna; -wherefore general Hill, without abandoning the siege of that place, -moved two British and two Portuguese brigades into the valley of -Bastan, and on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, vigorously driving Gazan -from all his positions, cleared the valley with a loss of only one -hundred and twenty men. The whole line of the Spanish frontier from -Ronscevalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa river was thus occupied by -the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and St. Sebastian were invested. -Joseph’s reign was over, the crown had fallen from his head, and -after years of toils, and combats which had been rather admired than -understood, the English general, emerging from the chaos of the -Peninsula struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrennees a recognised -conqueror. On those lofty pinnacles the clangor of his trumpets -pealed clear and loud, and the splendour of his genius appeared as a -flaming beacon to warring nations. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence, MSS.] - -1º. In this campaign of six weeks, Wellington, with one hundred -thousand men, marched six hundred miles, passed six great rivers, -gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove a -hundred and twenty thousand veteran troops from Spain. This immense -result could not have been attained if Joseph had followed Napoleon’s -instructions; Wellington could not then have turned the line of -the Duero. It could not have been attained if Joseph had acted -with ordinary skill after the line of the Duero was passed. Time -was to him most precious, yet when contrary to his expectations he -had concentrated his scattered armies behind the Carion, he made -no effort to delay his enemy on that river. He judged it an unfit -position, that is, unfit for a great battle; but he could have -obliged Wellington to lose a day there, perhaps two or three, and -behind the Upper Pisuerga he might have saved a day or two more. -Reille who was with the army of Portugal on the right of the king’s -line complained that he could find no officers of that army who -knew the Pisuerga sufficiently to place the troops in position; the -king then had cause to remember Napoleon’s dictum, namely, that “to -command an army well a general must think of nothing else.” For why -was the course of the Pisuerga unknown when the king’s head-quarters -had been for several months within a day’s journey of it? - -2º. The Carion and the Pisuerga being given up, the country about the -Hormaza was occupied and the three French armies were in mass between -that stream and Burgos; yet Wellington’s right wing only, that is -to say, only twenty-three thousand infantry, and three brigades of -cavalry, drove Reille’s troops over the Arlanzan, and the castle of -Burgos was abandoned. This was on the 12th, the three French armies, -not less than fifty thousand fighting men, had been in position -since the 9th, and the king’s letters prove that he desired to -fight in that country, which was favourable for all arms. Nothing -then could be more opportune than Wellington’s advance on the 12th, -because a retrograde defensive system is unsuited to French soldiers, -whose impatient courage leads them always to attack, and the news -of Napoleon’s victory at Bautzen had just arrived to excite their -ardour. Wherefore Joseph should have retaken the offensive on the -12th at the moment when Wellington approached the Hormaza, and as the -left and centre of the allies were at Villa Diego and Castroxerez, -the greatest part at the former, that is to say, one march distant, -the twenty-six thousand men immediately under Wellington, would -probably have been forced back over the Pisuerga, and the king would -have gained time for Sarrut, Foy and Clauzel to join him. Did the -English general then owe his success to fortune, to his adversary’s -fault rather than to his own skill? Not so. He had judged the -king’s military capacity, he had seen the haste, the confusion, the -trouble of the enemy, and knowing well the moral power of rapidity -and boldness in such circumstances, had acted, daringly indeed, but -wisely, for such daring is admirable, it is the highest part of war. - -3º. The manner in which Wellington turned the line of the Ebro was a -fine strategic illustration. It was by no means certain of success, -yet failure would have still left great advantages. He was certain of -gaining Santander and fixing a new base of operations on the coast, -and he would still have had the power of continually turning the -king’s right by operating between him and the coast; the errors of -his adversary only gave him additional advantages which he expected, -and seized with promptness. But if Joseph, instead of spreading his -army from Espejo on his right to the Logroño road on his left, had -kept only cavalry on the latter route and on the main road in front -of Pancorbo; if he had massed his army to his right pivoting upon -Miranda, or Frias, and had scoured all the roads towards the sources -of the Ebro with the utmost diligence, the allies could never have -passed the defiles and descended upon Vittoria. They would have -marched then by Valmaceda upon Bilbao, but Joseph could by the road -of Orduña have met them there, and with his force increased by Foy’s -and Sarrut’s divisions and the Italians. Meanwhile Clauzel would have -come down to Vittoria, and the heaped convoys could have made their -way to France in safety. - -4º. Having finally resolved to fight at Vittoria, the king should, -on the 19th and 20th, have broken some of the bridges on the Zadora, -and covered others with field-works to enable him to sally forth upon -the attacking army; he should have entrenched the defile of Puebla, -and occupied the heights above in strength; his position on the Lower -Zadora would then have been formidable. But his greatest fault was -in the choice of his line of operation. His reasons for avoiding -Guipuscoa were valid, his true line was on the other side, down the -Ebro. Zaragoza should have been his base, since Aragon was fertile -and more friendly than any other province of Spain. It is true that -by taking this new line of operations he would have abandoned Foy; -but that general, reinforced with the reserve from Bayonne, would -have had twenty thousand men and the fortress of St. Sebastian as a -support, and Wellington must have left a strong corps of observation -to watch him. The king’s army would have been immediately increased -by Clauzel’s troops, and ultimately by Suchet’s, which would have -given him one hundred thousand men to oppose the allied army, -weakened as that would have been by the detachment left to watch -Foy. And there were political reasons, to be told hereafter, for the -reader must not imagine Wellington had got thus far without such -trammels, which would have probably rendered this plan so efficacious -as to oblige the British army to abandon Spain altogether. Then new -combinations would have been made all over Europe which it is useless -to speculate upon. - -5º. In the battle the operations of the French, with the exception of -Reille’s defence of the bridges of Gamara and Ariaga, were a series -of errors, the most extraordinary being the suffering Kempt’s brigade -of the light division, and the hussars, to pass the bridge of Tres -Puentes and establish themselves close to the king’s line of battle, -and upon the flank of his advanced posts at the bridges of Mendoza -and Villodas. It is quite clear from this alone that he decided upon -retreating the moment Graham’s attack commenced against his right -flank, and his position was therefore in his own view untenable. -The fitting thing then was to have occupied the heights of Puebla -strongly, but to have placed the bulk of his infantry by corps, in -succession, the right refused, towards Vittoria, while his cavalry -and guns watched the bridges and the mouth of the Puebla defile; in -this situation he could have succoured Reille, or marched to his -front, according to circumstances, and his retreat would have been -secure. - -[Sidenote: See Wellington’s despatch.] - -6º. The enormous fault of heaping up the baggage and convoys and -parcs behind Vittoria requires no comment, but the king added another -and more extraordinary error, namely the remaining to the last moment -undecided as to his line of retreat. Nothing but misfortunes could -attend upon such bad dispositions; and that the catastrophe was -not more terrible is owing entirely to an error which Wellington -and Graham seem alike to have fallen into, namely, that Reille had -two divisions in reserve behind the bridges on the Upper Zadora. -They knew not that Maucune’s division had marched with the convoy, -and thought Clauzel had only one division of the army of Portugal -with him, whereas he had two, Taupin’s and Barbout’s. Reille’s -reserves were composed not of divisions but of brigades drawn from -La Martiniere’s and Sarrut’s divisions, which were defending the -bridges; and his whole force, including the French-Spaniards who were -driven back from Durana, did not exceed ten thousand infantry and two -thousand five hundred cavalry. Now Graham had, exclusive of Giron’s -Gallicians, nearly twenty thousand of all arms, and it is said that -the river might have been passed both above and below the points of -attack; it is certain also that Longa’s delay gave the French time -to occupy Gamara Mayor in force, which was not the case at first. -Had the passage been won in time, very few of the French army could -have escaped from the field; but the truth is Reille fought most -vigorously. - -[Sidenote: Despatch.] - -7º. As the third and seventh divisions did not come to the point -of attack at the time calculated upon, the battle was probably not -fought after the original conception of lord Wellington; it is likely -that his first project was to force the passage of the bridges, to -break the right centre of the enemy from Arinez to Margarita, and -then to envelope the left centre with the second, fourth, and light -divisions and the cavalry, while the third and seventh divisions -pursued the others. But notwithstanding the unavoidable delay, which -gave the French time to commence their retreat, it is not easy to -understand how Gazan’s left escaped from Subijana de Alava, seeing -that when Picton broke the centre at Arinez, he was considerably -nearer to Vittoria than the French left, which was cut off from the -main road and assailed in front by Hill and Cole. The having no -cavalry in hand to launch at this time and point of the battle has -been already noticed; lord Wellington says, that the country was -generally unfavourable for the action of that arm, and it is certain -that neither side used it with much effect at any period of the -battle; nevertheless there are always some suitable openings, some -happy moments to make a charge, and this seems to have been one which -was neglected. - -8º. Picton’s sudden rush from the bridge of Tres Puentes to the -village of Arinez, with one brigade, has been much praised, and -certainly nothing could be more prompt and daring, but the merit of -the conception belongs to the general in chief, who directed it in -person. It was suggested to him by the denuded state of the hill in -front of that village, and viewed as a stroke for the occasion it is -to be admired. Yet it had its disadvantages. For the brigade which -thus crossed a part of the front of both armies to place itself in -advance, not only drew a flank fire from the enemy, but was exposed -if the French cavalry had been prompt and daring, to a charge in -flank; it also prevented the advance of the other troops in their -proper arrangement, and thus crowded the centre for the rest of the -action. However these sudden movements cannot be judged by rules, -they are good or bad according to the result. This was entirely -successful, and the hill thus carried was called the Englishmen’s -hill, not, as some recent writers have supposed, in commemoration -of a victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of a disaster -which there befel a part of his army. His battle was fought between -Navarrette and Najera, many leagues from Vittoria, and beyond the -Ebro; but on this hill the two gallant knights sir Thomas and sir -William Felton took post with two hundred companions, and being -surrounded by Don Tello with six thousand, all died or were taken -after a long, desperate, and heroic resistance. - -9º. It has been observed by French writers, and the opinion has been -also entertained by many English officers, that after the battle -Wellington should have passed the frontier in mass, and marched upon -Bayonne instead of chasing Clauzel and Foy on the right and left; -and if, as the same authors assert, Bayonne was not in a state of -defence and must have fallen, there can be little question that the -criticism is just, because the fugitive French army having lost -all its guns and being without musket ammunition, could not have -faced its pursuers for a moment. But if Bayonne had resisted, and -it was impossible for Wellington to suspect its real condition, -much mischief might have accrued from such a hasty advance. Foy and -Clauzel coming down upon the field of Vittoria would have driven away -if they did not destroy the sixth division; they would have recovered -all the trophies; the king’s army returning by Jacca into Aragon, -would have reorganized itself from Suchet’s dépôts, and that marshal -was actually coming up with his army from Valencia; little would then -have been gained by the battle. This question can however be more -profitably discussed when the great events which followed the battle -of Vittoria have been described. - - - - -[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 1. - - Explanatory Sketch - _of the_ - SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ. - May 1812. - _The Scene of Action Enlarged._] - -[Illustration: _Vol. 5. Nº. 2._ - - _Explanatory_ - Sketch - _of the_ - Sieges of the Fort - _and_ Operations, _round_ - SALAMANCA. - 1812.] - -[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 3. - - Battle of - SALAMANCA, - with - SKETCH of OPERATIONS - before and after the - Action.] - -[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 4. - - _Explanatory_ - Sketch - _of the_ - SIEGE OF BURGOS. - 1812.] - -[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 5. - - Sketch of the Retreat - _from_ Madrid _and_ - Burgos. - 1812.] - -[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 6. - - Explanatory Sketch - _of the_ - POSITION OF THE PARTIDAS. - And of Lord Wellington’s March from the - AGUEDA to the PYRENEES. - 1813.] - -[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 7. - - Battle of Castalla - _and operations_ - before the Action.] - -[Illustration: Vol. 5. Nº. 8. - - Battle of - VITTORIA, - _with the_ - Operations - _before and after_ - The Action.] - - - - -APPENDIX. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - -No. I. - -The following extracts of letters are published to avoid any future -cavils upon the points they refer to, and also to shew how difficult -it is for the historian to obtain certain and accurate details, when -eye-witnesses, having no wish to mislead, differ so much. - - -BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. - -_Extract of a memoir by sir Charles Dalbiac, who was one of Le -Marchant’s brigade of heavy cavalry._ - -“Throughout these charges upon the enemy, _the heavy brigade was -unsupported by any other portion of the cavalry whatever_; but was -followed, as rapidly as it was possible for infantry to follow, by -the third division which had so gloriously led the attack in the -first instance and had so effectually turned the enemy’s extreme -left.” - - -_Extract from a memoir by colonel Money, who was one of general -Anson’s brigade of light cavalry._ - -“The third division moved to the right, and _the cavalry, Le -Marchand’s and Anson’s_, were ordered to charge as soon as the -tirailleurs of the third division began to ascend the right flank -of the hill.”—“The rapid movement of the cavalry which now began -to gallop, and the third division pressing them (the French), they -run into the wood, which separated them from the army; _we_ (Anson’s -light cavalry) _charged them under a heavy fire of musketry and -artillery from another height_; near two thousand threw down their -arms in different parts of the wood, and we continued our charge -through the wood until our brigade came into an open plain of -ploughed fields, where the dust was so great we could see nothing, -and halted; when it cleared away, we found ourselves within three -hundred yards of a large body of French infantry and artillery, -formed on the declivity of a hill. A tremendous battle was heard on -the other side, which prevented the enemy from perceiving us. At last -they opened a fire of musketry and grape-shot, and we retired in good -order and without any loss.” - - -_Extract of a letter from sir Henry Watson, commanding the first -regiment of Portuguese cavalry under general D’Urban._ - -“When Marmont, at the battle of Salamanca, advanced his left, lord -Wellington ordered down the reserve, of which the first and tenth -Portuguese cavalry and two squadrons of the British cavalry under -captain Townsend, now lieutenant-colonel Townsend, formed a part -under sir B. D’Urban. The cavalry was pushed forward in contiguous -columns, and were protected from the enemy by a small rising ground, -which, as soon as I had passed, I was ordered to wheel up, and -charge the front in line. _The enemy had formed a square_, and gave -us a volley as we advanced, the eleventh and fourteenth remained en -potence. _In this charge we completely succeeded_, and the enemy -appeared panic-struck, and made no attempt to prevent our cutting -and thrusting at them in all directions until the moment I was about -to withdraw; then a soldier, at not more than six or eight paces, -levelled his musquet at me, and shot me through the shoulder, which -knocked me off my horse, where I continued to lie till the whole of -our infantry had passed over.” - - -_Extract from a letter of colonel Townsend, 14th Dragoons._ - -“At the battle of Salamanca I perfectly recollect seeing D’Urban’s -cavalry advance up the hill, and charge the French infantry. _They -were repulsed_, and left Watson (now sir Henry), who led his -regiment, the first Portuguese, badly wounded on the field.”—“_I am -almost positive the French were not in square, but in line, waiting -to receive the attack of the leading brigade of the third division_, -which gallantly carried every thing before it.” - - -No. II. - -_Copies de deux dépêches de l’empereur au ministre de la guerre -relatives au duc de Raguse._ - - _Dresde, le 28 Mai, 1812._ - - MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE, - -Je vous renvois la correspondance d’Espagne. Ecrivez au duc de Raguse -que c’est le roi qui doit lui donner des directions, que je suppose -qu’il s’est retiré devant lord Wellington selon les règles de la -guerre, en l’obligéant à se masser, et non en se reployant devant sa -cavalerie légère; qu’il aura conservé des têtes de pont sur l’Agueda, -ce qui peut seul lui permettre d’avoir des nouvelles de l’ennemi tous -les jours, et de le tenir en respect. Que si au contraire il a mis -trente lieues d’intervalle entre lui et l’ennemi, comme il l’a déjà -fait deux fois contre tous les principes de la guerre, il laisse le -général Anglais maître de se porter où il veut, il perd constamment -l’initiative, et n’est plus d’aucun poids dans les affaires -d’Espagne, que la Biscaye et le nord sont dans des dispositions -facheuses par les suites de l’évacuation des Asturias par la division -Bonnet, que la réoccupation de cette province n’a pas encore eu lieu, -que le nord est exposé à de grands malheurs, que Santona et St. -Sebastian sont compromis, que les libres communications des guerillas -avec la Galice et les Asturies par la mer les rendront formidables, -que s’il ne fait pas réoccuper promptement les Asturies, sa position -ne peut s’ameliorer. - -Recommandez au général Caffarelli de réunir davantage ses troupes, et -d’avoir toujours une colonne dans la main. - -Ecrivez au général L’Huillier d’avoir l’œil sur St. Sebastian, et -d’avoir toujours 3000 hommes dans la main pour les diriger sur cette -place si elle avoit besoin d’être secourue. - -En général pour parer à la mauvaise manœuvre et à la mauvaise -direction que le duc de Raguse donne à nos affaires il est nécessaire -d’avoir beaucoup de monde à Bayonne. Activez la marche du 3^e et du -106^{me} et de la 5^e demi brigade provisoire sur cette place. Tenez -y deux généraux de brigade afin que le général L’Huillier puisse -toujours disposer des forces pour être en mesure d’agir selon les -circonstances. - -Réunissez un millier d’hommes des dépôts de cavalerie de l’armée -d’Espagne, et dirigez les en régimens de marche sur Bayonne. - -Prescrivez au général L’Huillier de tenir ses troupes dans la vallée -de Bastan, à Bayonne, St. Jean de Luz, et Irun, en les munissant -bien, les barraquant, les exerçant, et les formant. Ce sera au moyen -de cette ressource que si le due de Raguse continue à faire des -bévues on pourra empêcher le mal de devenir extrême. - - Sur ce, je prie Dieu, &c. - (Signé) NAPOLEON. - -[_For second despatch, see_ Appendix No. VII.] - - -No. III. - -_Lettre de M. le duc de Dalmatie au roi._ - - _Seville, 12 Août, 1812._ - -Je n’avais reçu aucune nouvelle de V. M. depuis les lettres qu’elle -m’a fait l’honneur m’écrire des 6 et 7 Juillet dernier. Enfin -je viens de récevoir celle datée de Segovie le 29 du même mois. -Les rapports publiés par les ennemis m’avaient déjà instruit des -évènemens survenus en Castille lesquels étaient naturellement -exagérés; V. M. a bien voulu en quelque sorte fixer à ce sujet mes -idées. Je déplore les pertes que l’armée de Portugal a éprouvées. -Dans l’etât ou étaient les affaires d’Espagne une bataille ne devait -se donner qu’à la dernière extrémité, mais tout n’est pas perdu. V. -M. après m’avoir communiqué les dispositions qu’elle a faites depuis -le 6 (date de la dernière lettre) au 19 Juillet m’ordonne comme une -ressource d’évacuer l’Andalousie et de me diriger sur Tolêde. Je ne -puis dissimuler que cette disposition me parait fort extraordinaire. -J’étais loin de penser que V. M. s’y serait déterminée. Le sort de -l’Espagne est-il done décidé? V. M. veut elle sacrifier le royaume -à la capitale? et a-t-elle la certitude de la conserver en prenant -ce parti? Enfin l’évacuation de l’Andalousie et ma marche sur Tolêde -sont elles l’unique ressource qui nous reste? Je vais me préparer -à cette disposition que je regarde comme des plus funestes pour -l’honneur des armes impériales, le bien du service de l’empereur -et l’intérêt de V. M. dans l’espoir qu’avant qu’elle s’exécute V. -M. l’aura changée ou modifiée suivant les propositions que j’ai eu -l’honneur de lui faire le 19 Juillet, le 8 de ce mois, et par M. le -colonel Desprez. - -J’ai l’honneur d’adresser à votre Majesté triplicata de ma lettre du -8 de ce mois. En me référant aux observations et propositions qu’elle -renferme, si V. M. ne prend pas des dispositions en conséquence, -je considére que l’évacuation de toute l’Espagne est decidée, car -il faut que V. M. se persuade que du moment que mon mouvement sera -commencé je serai suivi par soixante mille ennemis lesquels ne me -donneront pas le tems ni la liberté de prendre la direction que V. -M. m’indique et qui se réuniront à ceux qui ont penétré en Castille -et m’empécheront de séjourner sur le Tage encore moins d’arriver à -Madrid. Il n’y a qu’un moyen pour rétablir les affaires: que V. M. -vienne en Andalousie et qu’elle y améne toutes les troupes de l’armée -du centre, de l’armée de Portugal, de l’armée d’Arragon auxquelles -ses ordres pourront parvenir, quand bien même tout le royaume de -Valence devrait être évacué. Qu’importe à V. M. de conserver Madrid -si elle perd le royaume? Philippe V. en sortit trois fois et y rentra -en souverain. Du moment que nous aurons 70 ou 80 mille Français -réunis dans le midi de l’Espagne, le théâtre de la guerre est changé; -l’armée de Portugal se trouve dégagée et elle peut se reporter -successivement jusqu’au Tage. D’ailleurs ce serait sans inconvénient -qu’elle gardât Burgos et la rive gauche de l’Ebre et que tout -l’espace compris entre elle et le Sierra Morena fut à la disposition -des ennemis jusqu’à ce que des renforts vinssent de France et que -l’empereur eût pu prendre des dispositions. Le sacrifice une fois -fait il n’y a plus de moyen d’y remédier. Les armées impériales en -Espagne repassent l’Ebre d’ou peut-être la famine les chassera, -les affaires de l’empereur dans le nord de l’Europe peuvent s’en -ressentir, l’Amerique qui vient de déclarer la guerre à l’Angleterre -fera peut-être la paix. V. M. a sans doute refléchi à toutes les -conséquences d’un pareil changement; la perte momentanée de Madrid et -des Castilles est nulle pour la politique de l’empereur, elle peut -se réparer en plus ou moins de tems. La perte d’une bataille par -l’armée de Portugal n’est qu’un grand duel qui se répare également, -mais la perte de l’Andalousie et la levée du siége de Cadiz sont des -évènemens dont les effets seront ressentis dans toute l’Europe et -dans le nouveau monde. Enfin en fidèle sujet de l’empereur je dois -déclarer à V. M. que je ne crois pas les affaires d’Espagne assez -désespérées pour prendre un parti aussi violent. J’entrevois encore -du remède si V. M. veut prendre les dispositions que j’ai proposées; -tout en me préparant à l’exécution de ses ordres je me permets de lui -demander de nouvelles instructions. J’ai surtout l’honneur de prier -V. M. d’ordonner que les communications de l’Andalousie avec Toléde -soient rétablies et quelque évènement qui survienne de vouloir bien -faire prendre à l’armée du centre, la direction de Despeña Perros -ou d’Almaden pour se joindre à l’armée du midi. Alors je reponds de -tout, et j’exécuterai les dispositions que j’ai enoncées dans ma -lettre du 8 de ce mois. - - Je, &c. &c. &c. - - -No. IV. - -_Lettre de M. le maréchal due de Dalmatie à M. le Ministre de la -guerre à Paris._ - - MONSIEUR LE DUC, - -Toute communication de l’Andalousie avec la France étant interrompue -et n’ayant rien réçu depuis les premiers jours de Mai; depuis un mois -le roi ayant même retiré les troupes qui étoient dans la Manche et -ne pouvant communiquer avec Madrid, j’entreprens de faire parvenir -mes rapports à votre excellence par la voie de mer. Si le bâtiment -que je fais à cet effet partir de Malaga peut arriver à Marseille, -l’empereur sera plutôt instruit de ce qui se passe dans le midi de -l’Espagne et de la position de son armée. - -A ce sujet j’ai l’honneur d’adresser à votre excellence copie des -derniers rapports que j’ai faits au roi, lesquels contiennent les -représentations que j’ai cru devoir soumettre à sa majesté pour le -bien du service de l’empereur, la conservation des conquêtes et -l’honneur des armées impériales. - -Je ne suis instruit des malheurs que l’armée de Portugal a éprouvés -que par les bruits populaires et les rapports de l’ennemi; car le -roi en m’écrivant le 29 Juillet de Ségovie ne m’en a donné aucun -détail. Je dois donc m’imaginer que les pertes que nous avons faites -en Castile sont beaucoup exagérées et j’en tire la conséquence que -les affaires de l’empereur en Espagne ne sont pas aussi desespérées -que le roi parait en être persuadé. Cependant sa majesté après être -resté 23 jours sans m’écrire, lorsque les ennemis étoient on plein -mouvement et que sa majesté se portoit avec 14,000 hommes de l’armée -du centre à la rencontre du duc de Raguse qui sans l’attendre s’etoit -engagé precipitamment et éprouvait une défaite; le roi dis-je en -me faisant part le 29 Juillet de ses mouvemens me donna l’ordre -formel d’évacuer l’Andalousie et me diriger sur Tolede, et il me dit -expressément que c’est l’unique ressource qui nous reste. - -Je suis loin de partager l’avis de sa majesté, je crois fermement -qu’il est possible de mieux faire et que tout peut s’arranger en -attendant que d’après les ordres de l’empereur V. E. ait pû mettre -les armées qui sont dans le nord de l’Espagne à même de reprendre les -opérations, ainsi que j’en fais la proposition à sa majesté dans les -lettres dont je mets ci-joint copies. Mais mon devoir est d’obéïr -et je me chargerais d’une trop grande responsibilité si j’éludais -l’exécution de l’ordre formel d’évacuer que le roi m’a donné. - -Je vais donc me préparer à exécuter cette disposition que je regarde -comme funeste, puisqu’elle me force à livrer aux ennemis des places -de guerre susceptibles d’une bonne défense tout aprovisionnées, les -établissemens et un matériel d’artillerie immense et de laisser dans -les hôpitaux beaucoup de malades que leur situation et le manque de -transport ne permettent point d’emmener. Je ne ferai cependant mon -mouvement que progressivement et je ne négligerai aucun soin pour -qu’il ne reste en arrière rien de ce qui peut être utile à l’armée. - -Je ne puis encore assurer que je ne ferai ce mouvement par Tolede, -car du moment qu’il sera entrepris je serai suivi par 60,000 ennemis -qui se joindront aux divisions que lord Wellington aura déjà portées -sur le Tage. Ainsi il est possible que je me dirige par Murcie sur -Valence suivant ce que j’apprendrai ou les nouveaux ordres que je -recevrai du roi. - -Dans cet état de choses, je ne puis dissimuler à V. E. que je regarde -l’évacuation de l’Espagne au moins jusqu’à l’Ebre comme décidée du -moment que le roi m’ordonna d’évacuer l’Andalousie et de me diriger -sur Toléde, car il est bien certain qu’il ne sera pas possible de -rester en position sur le Tage ni dans les Castilles et que dès-lors -les conquêtes des armes impériales en Espagne dont l’empereur avait -ordonné la conservation, sont sacrifiées. - -A ce sujet je ne puis me défendre de réflechir sur d’autres évènemens -qui se passent. J’ai lu dans les journaux de Cadiz, que l’ambassadeur -du roi en Russie avait joint l’armée Russe, que le roi avait fait -des insinuations au gouvernement insurgent de Cadiz, que la Suéde -avait fait un traité avec l’Angleterre, et que le prince héréditaire -avait demandé à la regence de Cadiz 250 Espagnols pour sa garde -personelle. (Avant hier un parlementaire que le général Semélé avait -envoyé à l’escadre Anglaise pour réclamer des prisonniers resta -pendant quelques instans à bord de l’amiral, lequel lui montra une -frégate, qui, dit il, est destinée a porter en Angleterre et ensuite -en Suéde les 250 Espagnols que le prince Bernadotte demande pour sa -garde personelle.) Enfin j’ai vu dans les mêmes journaux que Moreau -et Blucher étaient arrivés à Stockholm, et que Rapatel, aide-de-camp -de Moreau, était à Londres. Je ne tire aucune conséquence de tous -ces faits, mais j’en serai plus attentif. Cependant j’ai cru devoir -déposer mes craintes entre les mains de six généraux de l’armée, -après avoir exigé d’eux le serment qu’ils ne révéleront ce que je -leur ai dit qu’à l’empereur lui-même ou aux personnes que S. M. aura -specialement déléguées pour en reçevoir la déclaration, si auparavant -je ne puis moi-même en rendre compte. Il est pourtant de mon devoir -de manifester à V. E. que je crains que le bût de toutes les fausses -dispositions que l’on a prises et celui des intrigues qui ont lieu ne -soient de forcer les armées impériales qui sont en Espagne à repasser -au moins l’Ebre et ensuite de présenter cet évènement comme l’unique -ressource (expression du roi, lettre du 20 Juillet) dans l’espérance -d’en profiter par quelque arrangement. - -Mes craintes sont peut-être mal fondées, mais en pareille situation -il vaut mieux les pousser à l’extremité que d’être négligent, -d’autant plus que ces craintes et ma sollicitude tournent au bien du -service de l’empereur et à la sureté de l’armée dont le commandement -m’est confié. - -J’ai l’honneur de prier V. E. de vouloir bien si ma lettre lui -parvient, la mettre le plutôt possible sous les yeux de l’empereur et -d’assurer S. M. que moi et son armée du midi serons toujours dignes -de sa suprême confiance. Je désire bien vivement que V. E. puisse me -faire savoir que mes dépêches lui sont parvenues et surtout recevoir -par elle les ordres de sa majesté. - - J’ai l’honneur, &c. - (Signé) DALMATIE. - -_Seville, 12 Août, 1812._ - - -No. V. - - SIRE, - -Je suis arrivé à Paris hier 21 du courant. Je me suis sur le champ -présenté chez le ministre de la guerre et je lui ai remis la lettre -de V. M. ainsi que celles de M. le maréchal Jourdan. S. E. m’a -questionné sur les affaires d’Espagne, mais sans me demander mes -dépêches pour l’empereur. Elle m’a, suivant les intentions de V. M., -pourvu des ordres dont j’ai besoin pour poursuivre ma route avec -célérité. - -Ce matin le ministre m’a fait appeler et j’ai eu avec lui une longue -conférence. Il m’a pressé de m’expliquer avec franchise sur ce que -j’avais pu remarquer pendant mon séjour en Andalousie, m’a témoigné -quelque inquiétude sur l’influence que pouvoit exercer le maréchal -tant sur l’armée que sur les autorités civiles. Il a rappelé les -intrigues de Portugal et a conclu en me disant qu’il dépouillait -devant moi le caractère de ministre pour causer avec un homme de -votre confiance, et que les services que vous lui aviez rendus à -l’époque de sa disgrâce devaient être pour V. M. une garantie du -désir qu’il avait d’agir suivant ses intentions. Quelque franches -que m’aient parus ces ouvertures, je n’ai pas cru devoir parler de -la partie la plus délicate de ma mission. J’ai seulement répondu que -l’armée du midi serait toujours celle de l’empereur, que lorsque S. -M. enverrait ses ordres déterminés, elle serait obéie, et que tout -ce que j’avais entendu en Andalousie ne me laissait à ce sujet aucun -doute. Au reste ma conversation avec le duc de Feltre m’a prouvé -qu’aucune lettre de la nature de celle dont je suis porteur ne lui -etait encore parvenue et cela est pour ma mission une circonstance -favorable. - -J’ai causé avec S. E. de la résistance que les chefs de l’armée -française en Espagne avaient toujours opposée aux ordres de V. -M. Il a declaré que tous avaient été mis sous vos ordres et sans -aucune restriction, qu’avant son départ l’empereur avait témoigné -son étonnement sur les doutes que manifestaient à cet égard les -lettres de V. M. et qu’il avait ordonné que l’on fit connaître ses -intentions d’une manière encore plus positive. J’ai cité la lettre ou -le maréchal Suchet s’autorise d’une phrase du Prince de Neufchatel, -celles du général Dorsenne et du général Caffarelli, il parait que -tous les obstacles qui pouvaient entraver l’exécution de vos ordres -ont été levés par des instructions adressées postérieurement aux -généraux en chef. Quant à la désobeissance formelle du maréchal -Soult S. E. a dit d’abord que V. M. avait le droit de lui ôter -le commandement, mais elle est convenue ensuite qu’une démarche -semblable ne pouvait être faite que par l’ordre exprès de l’empereur. - -Le ministre est aussi entré dans quelques détails sur les affaires -militaires, les ordres donnés par V. M. et par le maréchal Jourdan -aux diverses époques de la campagne, ont eu, m’a-t-il dit, -l’approbation générale et ce qu’a écrit l’empereur depuis qu’il a -appris la bataille de Salamanque prouve qu’il donne entièrement droit -à V. M. l’opinion publique à cet égard est encore plus prononcée que -celle des hommes en place, et je ne puis exprimer à V. M. avec quelle -rigueur sont jugés en France les maréchaux Soult et Marmont. - -Le duc de Feltre m’a parlé du mouvement sur Blasco Sancho. Peut-être -a-t-il dit, l’empereur reprochera un peu d’hésitation; exécuté deux -jours plutôt il aurait produit les plus heureux effets. V. M. se -rappelle que j’avais prévu cette objection et je ne serai point -embarrassé pour y répondre. - -S. E. a cru que j’allais auprès de l’empereur pour solliciter de -nouveaux renforts; elle m’a dit que la guerre de Russie avait jusqu’à -présent absorbé tous les moyens, qu’il était loin de pouvoir envoyer -les troupes sur lesquelles paraissait compter M. le maréchal Jourdan, -que l’on pourrait seulement pourvoir à la perte matérielle faite par -l’armée de Portugal, il parait que les nouvelles troupes envoyées en -Espagne ne s’élélvent pas au-delà de vingt mille hommes, au reste la -grande victoire remportée par l’empereur fera probablement prendre -des dispositions plus favorables aux affaires de la Peninsule. - -Le duc de Feltre à reçu des nouvelles du général Clauzel. Ce général -annonce que l’armée anglaise marche vers le nord, que lord Wellington -s’est de sa personne porté vers le Duero, que l’armée de Portugal -s’est ralliée, que ses pertes sont beaucoup moindres qu’on ne l’avait -cru, que le général Foy avait fait un mouvement pour délivrer Astorga -et Tordesillas, mais que déja ces deux places s’étaient rendues -que l’on pourrait accuser de faiblesse les deux gouverneurs et que -peut-être la conduite de celui de Tordesillas devait être jugée plus -sévèrement encore. - -J’ai parlé au ministre de la position embarrassante dans laquelle -me mettait le décret du 26 Août, il a répondu que je pouvais sans -inconvénient me présenter à l’empereur avec les décorations du grade -que m’a donné V. M. que ce n’était point contre les officiers à -votre service que le décret avait été dirigé et qu’il serait modifié -en leur faveur. - -J’ai l’honneur de prévenir V. M. que je partirai ce soir de Paris, -je poursuivrai sans m’arrêter ma route jusqu’au quartier général de -l’empereur. - -J’ai l’honneur de mettre aux pieds de V. M. l’hommage de mon profond -respect et de mon entier dévouement. - - (Signé) LE COLONEL DESPRES. - -_Paris, 22 Septembre, 1812._ - - -No. VI. A. - -_Lettre confidentielle écrite au roi par monsieur le duc de Feltre._ - - _Paris, 10 Novembre, 1812._ - - SIRE, - -La lettre chiffrée que V. M. m’a écrite de Requeña le 18 Octobre, -m’est parvenue il y a quelques jours, et je l’ai sur le champ -transmise à l’empereur qui ne la recevra toute fois que 19 jours -après le départ de cette même lettre de Paris. A la distance ou -l’empereur se trouve de sa capitale, il est des choses sur lesquelles -la politique force à fermer les yeux: du moins momentanement. Si la -conduite de monsieur le marechal duc de Dalmatie est équivoque et -cauteleuse; si ses démarches présentent le même aspect que celles -qu’il paroît avoir faites et qui ont précédé l’abandon du Portugal -après la prise d’Oporto, il viendra un moment ou l’empereur pourra -l’en punir s’il le juge convenable, et peut-être est-il moins -dangereux où il est qu’il ne le serait ici où quelques factieux ont -pu du sein même des prisons qui les renfermaient méditer en l’absence -de l’empereur, une révolution contre l’empereur et sa dynastie, -et presque l’exécuter, le 2 et 3 Octobre dernier. Je pense donc, -sire, qu’il est prudent de ne pas pousser à bout le maréchal duc de -Dalmatie tout en contrariant sous main les démarches ambitieuses -qu’il pourrait tenter, et en s’assurant de la fidelité des principaux -officiers de l’armée du midi envers l’empereur et même de celle des -Espagnols qu’il traine à sa suite. L’arme du ridicule qu’il est -facile de manier en cette occasion suffira, ce me semble, pour -déjouer ses coupables projets s’ils existent, et le ramener à son -devoir, sauf à faire prendre par la suite des précautions pour qu’il -ne s’en écarte jamais. - -Quoiqu’il en soit je suis incontestablement dans la nécessité -d’attendre les ordres de l’empereur sur le contenu de la lettre de -V. M. datée de Requeña le 18 Oct. Elle voit par la présente que je -partage ses sentimens sur l’objet dont elle traite; je viens d’être -assez heureux pour donner à l’empereur et a sa famille de nouvelles -preuves de ma fidelité et de mon attachement, et je suis assuré que -si V. M. connaît les détails de ma conduite le 2 et 3 Octobre, elle -la trouvera conforme aux sentimens que je me suis fait un plaisir de -lui exprimer en faveur de l’empereur et de sa famille au moment ou -j’ai pris congé de V. M. à Luneville il y a quelques années, &c. &c. - - -_Note._—It is only necessary to add to this letter that -notwithstanding the duke of Feltre’s professions of attachment he was -soon afterwards one of the most zealous courtiers of the Bourbons and -the most bitter enemy of the emperor. - -The constancy with which the duke of Dalmatia served that great man -is well known. - - -No. VI. B. - -_Colonel Desprez to the King._ - - _Paris, 3 Janvier, 1813._ - - SIRE, - -J’ai eu l’honneur d’annoncer à V. M. mon arrivée à Paris. Mais -j’ai dû en me servant de la voie de l’estafette user d’une extrême -discrétion. La reine m’ayant conseillé de vous écrire avec quelque -détail et ayant daigné m’offrir de faire partir ma lettre par le -premier courier qu’elle expédierait, j’en profite pour rendre -compte à V. M. de ma mission et lui faire connaître une partie des -évènements dont j’ai été témoin. - -Je suis arrivé à Moscou le 18 Octobre au soir. L’empereur venait -d’apprendre que l’avant garde commandée par le roi de Naples -avait été attaquée et forcée à la retraite avec une partie de son -artillerie. Déja le départ était résolu et les troupes se mettaient -en mouvement. On m’annonça à S. M. qui répondit d’abord d’une manière -peu favorable. Cependant au milieu de la nuit on me fit appeler. Je -remis à l’empereur les dépêches dont V. M. m’avait chargé, et sans -les ouvrir, il me questionna sur leur contenu. Puis il fit sur les -opérations de la campagne une partie des objections qu’avait prévues -V. M. - -Il dit que le mouvement en faveur de l’armée de Portugal avait été -commencé trop tard, qu’il aurait pu être fait un mois plutôt, que -lui-même avait daté la conduite à tenir dans cette circonstance -lorsqu’en 1808 il avait sans hésiter quitté Madrid pour marcher aux -Anglais qui s’étaient avancés jusqu’à Valladolid. Je répondis que V. -M. s’était mise en marche peu d’heures après la division Palombini, -qu’elle avait dû attendre cette division pour conduire vers l’armée -de Portugal un renfort tel que le succès ne pût être douteux; qu’elle -avait d’autant moins cru devoir précipiter son mouvement, que M. le -maréchal Marmont avait écrit plusieurs fois qu’il se croyait trop -faible pour lutter seul contre l’armée Anglaise, que ce maréchal -avait été maître du tems, qu’il n’avait point été battu dans sa -position sur le Duero, mais bien sur un champ de bataille dans lequel -rien ne l’avait forcé de s’engager. L’empereur prétendit ensuite que -V. M. après avoir appris la perte de la bataille de Salamanque aurait -dû se porter sur le Duero et rallier l’armée de Portugal. Je rappelai -alors le mouvement fait du Guadarama vers Ségovie et la position -critique dans laquelle vous avez laissé la duc de Raguse qui avait -lui-même propose ce mouvement. L’empereur dit qu’il connaissait très -bien tous les reproches qu’à cet égard on pouvait faire au maréchal -Marmont. Il ajouta que l’armée du centre ayant fait sa retraite sur -Madrid elle aurait du garder plus longtems les défilés du Guadarama, -qu’on avait trop tôt passé le Tage, que du moins ce mouvement ayant -été resolu, il fallait ne point laisser de garnison au Retiro, -briser tous les affuts, emporter les aigles et bruler les effets -d’habillement; qu’il n’avait jamais considéré ce poste que comme -propre à contenir la population de Madrid, que l’ennemi étant maître -de la campagne, on devait l’abandonner et que de toutes les fautes de -la campagne c’était celle qu’il avait le moins conçue. Je répondis à -cette objection ainsi que j’en étais convenu avec V. M. L’empereur -en venant ensuite à la lettre du duc de Dalmatie me dit qu’elle -lui était déja parvenue par une autre voie, mais qu’il n’y avait -attaché aucune importance; que le maréchal Soult s’était trompé, -qu’il ne pouvait s’occuper de semblables _pauvretés_ dans un moment -où il _était à la tête de cinq cent mille hommes et faisait des -choses immenses_. Ce sont ses expressions, qu’au reste les soupçons -du duc de Dalmatie ne l’étonnaient que faiblement; que beaucoup de -généraux de l’armée d’Espagne les partageaient et pensaient que -V. M. préférait l’Espagne à la France; qu’il savait parfaitement -qu’elle avait le cœur françois mais que ceux qui la jugeaient par -ses discours devaient avoir une autre opinion. Il ajouta que le -maréchal Soult était la seule tête militaire qu’il eut en Espagne, -qu’il ne pouvait l’en retirer sans compromettre l’armée, que -d’ailleurs il devait être parfaitement tranquille sur ses intentions -puisqu’il venait d’apprendre par les journaux anglais qu’il évacuait -l’Andalousie et se réunissait aux armées du centre et d’Aragon, que -cette réunion opérée on devait être assez en force pour reprendre -l’offensive; que d’ailleurs il n’avait point d’ordres à envoyer, -qu’il ne savait point en donner de si loin, qu’il ne se dissimulait -point l’étendue du mal et qu’il regrettait plus que jamais que V. -M. n’ait point suivi le conseil qu’il lui avait donné de ne pas -retourner en Espagne; qu’il était inutile que je repartisse, que -je resterai à l’armée ou l’on m’emploieroit. J’insistai alors pour -être renvoyé à V. M. d’une manière qui parut faire sur l’empereur -quelque impression, et il finit par me dire que je serai expédié mais -que je ne pouvais l’être dans ce moment, qu’ayant besoin de repos -je resterais à Moscou, et que puisque j’étais officier du génie, -je serais chargé de diriger sous les ordres du duc de Trevise les -travaux et la défense du Kremlin. Je reçus en consequence un ordre -écrit du Prince de Neufchatel. Lorsqu’après l’entière évacuation de -Moscou le corps de M. le M. Mortier eut rejoint l’armée, je demandai -et j’obtins d’y rester attaché jusqu’à ce que je fusse expédié. Je -craignais que si je restais au quartier général on ne m’y désignât -des fonctions qui seraient un nouvel obstacle à mon retour. Je -pensai que peut-être on éviterait d’envoyer à V. M. un témoin des -évènements qui se passaient, et je préférai attendre qu’une occasion -favorable se présentât. Etant arrivé à Wilna peu de tems après -le départ de l’empereur, je demandai au duc de Bassano, et il me -donna l’autorisation de venir attendre des ordres à Paris. J’ai eu -l’honneur d’annoncer à V. M. dans un autre lettre que l’altération de -ma santé me forçait à suspendre mon retour en Espagne. - -L’armée au moment où je la quittai était dans la plus affreuse -détresse. Depuis longtems déjà la désorganisation et les pertes -étaient effrayantes, l’artillerie et la cavalerie n’existaient plus. -Tous les corps étaient confondus. Les soldats marchaient pêle-mêle -et ne songaient qu’à prolonger machinalement leur existence; quoique -l’ennemi fut sur nos flancs, chaque jour des milliers d’hommes isolés -se répandaient dans les villages voisins de la route et tombaient -dans les mains des Cosaques. Cependant quelque grand que soit le -nombre des prisonniers, celui des morts l’est incomparablement -davantage. Il est impossible de peindre jusqu’à quel point la -disette s’est fait sentir pendant plus d’un mois; il n’y eut point -de distributions; les chevaux morts étaient la seule ressource, et -bien souvent les maréchaux mêmes manquaient de pain. La rigueur -du climat rendait la disette plus meurtrière, chaque nuit nous -laissions au bivouac plusieurs centaines de morts. Je crois pouvoir -sans exagérer porter à cent mille le nombre qu’on a perdu ainsi, -et peindre avec assez de vérité la situation des choses en disant -que l’armée est morte: la jeune garde qui faisait partie du corps -auquel j’étais attaché était forte de 8000 hommes lorsque nous avons -quitté Moscou, à Wilna elle en comptait à peine quatre cents. Tous -les autres corps d’armée sont réduits dans la même proportion, et la -retraite ayant dû se prolonger au-delà du Niemen, je suis convaincu -que vingt mille hommes n’auront pas atteints la Vistule. On croyait -à l’armée que beaucoup de soldats avaient pris les devants et qu’ils -se rallieraient lorsqu’on pourrait suspendre le mouvement rétrograde. -Je me suis assuré du contraire; à cinq lieues du quartier général, -je ne rencontrai plus d’hommes isolés et je connus bien alors la -profondeur de la plaie. Une phrase pourrait donner à V. M. une idée -de l’état des choses, depuis le passage du Niemen un corps de 800 -Napolitains, le seul corps qui eût conservé quelque consistance, -faisait l’arrière garde d’une armée française, forte naguère de trois -cents mille hommes. Il est impossible d’exprimer jusqu’à quel point -le désordre était contagieux; les corps réunis des ducs de Bellune et -de Reggio comptaient 30,000 hommes au passage de la Beresina, deux -jours après ils étaient dissous comme le reste de l’armée. Envoyer -des renforts c’était augmenter les pertes et l’on reconnut enfin -qu’il fallait empêcher les troupes neuves de se mettre en contact -avec cette multitude en désordre à laquelle on ne peut plus donner -le nom d’armée. Le roi de Naples disait hautement qu’en lui laissant -le commandement l’empereur avait exigé le plus grand sacrifice qu’il -pût attendre de son dévouement. Les forces physiques et morales du -prince de Neufchâtel étaient entièrement épuisées. Si maintenant -V. M. me demandait quel doit être le terme du mouvement rétrograde, -je lui répondrais que l’ennemi est maître de le fixer. Je ne crois -pas que les Prussiens fassent de grands efforts pour défendre -leur territoire. M. de Narbonne que j’ai vu à Berlin et qui était -chargé de lettres de l’empereur pour le roi de Prusse, m’a dit que -les dispositions de ce prince et de son premier ministre étaient -favorables, mais il ne se dissimulait pas que celles de la nation ne -sont pas les mêmes. Déjà plusieurs rixes s’étaient engagées entre les -habitans de Berlin et des soldats de la garnison française; et en -traversant la Prusse j’ai eu lieu de m’assurer que l’on ne pouvait -guère compter sur cette alliée de nouvelle date. - -Il parait aussi que dans l’armée autrichienne les officiers -déclamaient publiquement contre la guerre. - -Quel triste que soit ce tableau, je crois l’avoir peint sans -exagération et l’avoir observé de sang froid. Mon opinion sur -l’étendue du mal est la même que lorsque j’étais plus voisin du -théâtre. - - -No. VII. - - _Ghiart, le 2 Septembre, 1812._ - - MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE, - -J’ai reçu le rapport du duc de Raguse sur la bataille du 22. Il -est impossible de rien lire de plus insignifiant: il y a plus de -fatras et plus de rouages que dans une horloge, et pas un mot qui -fasse connaître l’état réel des choses. Voici ma manière de voir sur -cette affaire, et la conduite que vous devez tenir. Vous attendrez -que le duc de Raguse soit arrivé, qu’il soit remis de sa blessure, -et à-peu-près entièrement rétabli. Vous lui demanderez alors de -répondre catégoriquement à ces questions. Pourquoi a-t-il livré -bataille sans les ordres de son général-en-chef? Pourquoi n’a-t-il -pas pris des ordres sur le parti qu’il devoit suivre, subordonné -au systême général sur mes armées d’Espagne? Il y a là _un crime -d’insubordination_ qui est la cause de tous les malheurs de cette -affaire, et quand même il n’eut pas été dans l’obligation de se -mettre en communication avec son général-en-chef pour exécuter les -ordres qu’il en recevrait, comment a-t-il pu sortir de sa défensive -sur le Duero, lorsque, sans un grand effort d’imagination, il étoit -facile de concevoir qu’il pouvoit être secourn par l’arrivée de -la division de dragons, d’une trentaine de pièces de canon, et de -plus de 15 mille hommes de troupes Françaises que le roi avoit dans -la main? Et comment pouvoit il sortir de la défensive pour prendre -l’offensive sans attendre la réunion et le secours d’un corps de 15 à -17 mille hommes? - -Le roi avoit ordonné à l’armée du nord d’envoyer sa cavalerie à son -secours; elle étoit en marche. Le duc de Raguse ne pouvoit l’ignorer, -puisque cette cavalerie est arrivée le soir de la bataille. De -Salamanque à Burgos il y a bien des marches. Pourquoi n’a-t-il pas -retardé de deux jours pour avoir le secours de cette cavalerie, -qui lui étoit si importante? Il faudroit avoir une explication sur -les raisons qui ont porté le duc de Raguse à ne pas attendre les -ordres de son général-en-chef pour livrer bataille sans attendre les -renforts que le roi, comme commandant supérieur de mes armées en -Espagne, pouvoit retirer de l’armée du centre, de l’armée de Valence -et de l’Andalousie. Le seul fonds de l’armée du centre fournissoit -15 mille hommes de pied, et 2500 chevaux, lesquels pouvoient être -rendus dans le même temps que le duc de Raguse faisoit battre son -corps, et en prenant dans ses deux armées, le roi pouvoit lui amener -40 mille hommes. Enfin le duc de Raguse sachant que 1500 chevaux -étoient partis de Burgos pour le rejoindre, comment ne les a-t-il pas -attendus? - -En faisant coincider ces deux circonstances d’avoir pris l’offensive -sans l’ordre de son général-en-chef et de ne pas avoir retardé -la bataille de deux jours pour ne pas recevoir 15,000 hommes -d’infanterie que lui amenoit le roi, et 1500 chevaux de l’armée du -nord, on est fondé à penser que ce maréchal a craint que le roi ne -participe au succès de la bataille, et qu’il a sacrifié à la vanité -la gloire de la patrie et l’avantage de mon service. - -Donnez ordre aux généraux divisionnaires d’envoyer les états de leurs -pertes. Il est intolérable qu’on rende des comptes faux et qu’on me -dissimule la vérité. - -Prescrivez au général Clausel, qui commande l’armée, d’envoyer la -situation avant et après la bataille. Demandez également aux chefs de -corps des situations exactes. Finalement, vous ferez connoître au duc -de Raguse en temps opportun combien je suis indigné de la conduite -inexplicable qu’il a tenue, en n’attendant pas deux jours que les -secours de l’armée du centre et de l’armée du nord le rejoignissent. -J’attends avec impatience l’arrivée du général aide-de-camp du roi -pour avoir des renseignemens précis. Ce qu’il a écrit no signifie pas -grande chose. - - (Signé) NAPOLEON. - - -No. VIII. A. - -_Extract from general Souham’s despatch to the minister of war, -Briviesca, 2d October, 1812._ - -Par votre lettre du 6 Octobre vous m’annoncez que le duc de Dalmatie -venait de réunir son armée à Grenade et à Jaen, et que le roi alloit -se mettre incessamment en communication avec ce maréchal pour marcher -de concert sur Madrid. En consequence de ces mouvemens je resolus -de marcher à la rencontre de l’ennemi, et de le forcer à lever le -siège de Burgos. Le 18 toute mon armée se mit en mouvement sur trois -colonnes, et le 19 elle occupait les positions ainsi qu’il suit. -La droite à Termino, le centre sur les hauteurs de Monasterio, et -la gauche à Villa Escuso la Solano et Villa Escuso la Sombria. -La journée du 20 devait être celle du combat, lorsque je reçus à -l’instant, à deux heures du matin, par un aide-de-camp, une lettre -de S. M. C. qui m’ordonne de ne point engager d’affaire générale, et -d’attendre que par ses manœuvres lord Wellington soit forcé d’évacuer -sa position de Burgos; ainsi il me faut renoncer à tous mes projets, -et non sans un violent chagrin, car je puis assurer V. E. que mon -armée était parfaitement disposée, et que j’aurais pu combattre -l’ennemi avec avantage. Cependant l’armée n’a des vivres que pour -quatre jours, et à cette epoque, si lord Wellington n’est point en -retraite, je serai forcé de l’attaquer. J’entrevois moins de peril de -marcher en avant que de rétrograder. Dans un instant où le moral du -soldat commence à se raffermir tout mouvement en arrière produit le -plus mauvais effet. - - (Signé) COMTE SOUHAM. - - -No. VIII. B. - -_Extracts from two letters written by the duke of Feltre to King -Joseph, dated Paris, 8th Oct. and 19th Nov., 1812._ - -On one of the letters is the following note, in pencil, by the duke -of Wellington. “_Advantage of English newspapers._” - - -“Sire,—J’ai l’honneur d’adresser ci-joint à votre majesté quelques -extraits des journaux Anglais les plus récents dont j’ai choisi ce -qui pourrait être de quelque intérêt dans les circonstances actuels.” - - -“Sire,—J’ai l’honneur d’adresser ci-joint à V. M. plusieurs extraits -des journaux Anglais contenant quelques faits utiles ou intéressans à -connaître.” - - -These extracts taken from the Courier, Morning Post, Times, Alfred, -Statesman, and Morning Chronicle, contained minute details upon -the numbers, situation, and destination of the Sicilian, Spanish, -and Anglo-Portuguese armies, and the most exact account of the -reinforcements sent from England. In fine a complete system of -intelligence for the enemy. - - -No. IX. - -_Extract of a letter from marshal Jourdan to colonel Napier._ - - _Soisy sous Etiole, 14 Janvier, 1829._ - -Le 10 Novembre, 1812. Les armées du midi, du Portugal, et du centre -se trouvaient réunies sur la Tormes. Vous connaissez la position -qu’occupait l’armée des alliés. Cette position ayant été bien -reconnue, dans la journée du 11, par le roi, accompagné du duc de -Dalmatie, de plusieurs généraux, et de moi, je proposai de passer la -Tormes, guéable prèsque partout entre Villa-Gonzala et Huerta, et de -nous porter rapidement sur Calvarissa de Ariba, qui se trouvait au -centre de la ligne des ennemis. J’esperais que lord Wellington ne -pourrait éviter la bataille; et j’étais d’avis que nous devions faire -tous nos efforts pour le forcer à l’accepter; me flattant qu’avec une -armée de 80 milles hommes, dont 10 milles de cavalerie et 120 pièces -de canon,[2] nous étions en état de remporter un brilliant succès, -sur le même champ de bataille où quelques mois avant nous avions -essuyé un revers. - -Le duc de Dalmatie, n’étant pas de mon avis, proposa d’aller passer -la Tormes, à des guès qu’il avait reconnus à deux lieues au-dessus -d’Alba; ce parti était sans doute plus prudent; mais il avoit, -suivant moi, l’inconvenient que je voulais éviter, c’est-à-dire, -qu’il laissait à nos adversaires la facilité de se retirer sans -combattre. Cependant comme je n’étais revêtu d’aucun commandement, -tandis que le duc de Dalmatie avait sous ses ordres les deux tiers -de l’armée, le roi jugea convenable d’adopter son plan, et lui en -confia l’exécution; vous en connaissez le résultat: il fut tel que je -l’avais prévu. - -Permettez moi, Monsieur, d’ajouter une reflexion; Il me semble que -lord Wellington decidé à battre en retraite, aurait dû commencer -à l’opérer le 14ème jour, où nous franchîmes la Tormes. En ne se -mettant en mouvement que le 15, il se trouva dans la nécessité de -défiler devant nous pendant une partie de la journée; et sans les -mauvais tems, et surtout sans beaucoup trop de circonspection de -notre côté il eût peut-être couru quelque danger. - -On a publié que pendant leur retraite les alliés ne perdirent que 50 -ou 60 tués, 150 blessés, 170 prisonniers. Il est, cependant, certain -que le nombre de prisonniers Anglais, Portugais, et Espagnols, -conduits au quartier général à Salamanque, étoit, le 20 Novembre, de -3520. - - -The justice of the marshal’s opinion as to lord Wellington having -staid too long on the Tormes is confirmed by the following note of a -conversation held with the duke of Wellington on the subject. - -“Lord Wellington would have fought the French on the old position of -the Arapiles in 1812 notwithstanding their superior numbers, but he -staid too long at Salamanca.” - - -No. X. - -_The duke of Feltre, minister of war, to the king of Spain._ - - _Paris, le 29 Janvier, 1813._ - - SIRE, - -J’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire à V. M. le 4 de ce mois pour lui faire -connaître les intentions de l’empereur au sujet des affaires -d’Espagne, et la necessité de transporter le quartier général de -Madrid à Valladolid. Cette dépêche a été expédiée par duplicate et -triplicate, et j’ignore encore si elle est parvenue à V. M. Depuis -sa dépêche de Madrid du 4 Decembre je suis privé de ses lettres, -et ce long silence me prouve que les communications de Madrid à -Vittoria restent constamment _interceptées_. Il est vrai que les -opérations du général Caffarelli qui s’est porté avec toutes ses -troupes disponsibles sur la côte de Biscaye pour dégager Santona -fortement menacé par l’ennemi et parcourir la côte, a donné aux -bandes de la Castille une facilité entière d’intercepter la route -de Burgos à Vittoria. Les dernières nouvelles que je reçois à -l’instant de l’armée de Portugal sont du 5 Janvier. A cette époque -tout y était tranquille, mais je vois toujours la même difficulté -pour communiquer. Cet état de choses rend toujours plus nécessaire -de s’occuper très sérieusement et très instamment de balayer les -provinces du nord, et de les délivrer enfin de ces bandes qui -ont augmentés en forces et en consistance à un point qui exige -indispensablement toute notre attention et tous nos efforts. Cette -pensée a tellement attire l’attention de l’empereur que S. M. I. m’a -réitéré quatre fois successivement l’ordre exprès de renouveller -encore l’expression de ses intentions que j’ai déjà adressée à V. M. -par ma lettre du 4 Janvier pour l’engager à revenir à Valladolid, à -garder Madrid par une division seulement, et à concentrer ses forces -de manière à pouvoir envoyer des troupes de l’armée de Portugal vers -le nord, en Navarre, et en Biscaye, afin de délivrer ces provinces, -et d’y rétablir la tranquillité. Le général Reille également frappé -de l’état des choses dans le nord de l’Espagne a bien compris la -nécessité de prendre un parti decisif à cet égard. Il m’a transmis -à cette occasion la lettre qu’il a eu l’honneur d’écrire à V. M. -le 13 Octobre dernier, et j’ai vu qu’il lui a présenté un tableau -frappant et vrai de la situation des affaires qui vient entièrement à -l’appui de ma dépêche du 4 courant. Quant à l’occupation de Madrid, -l’empereur m’ordonne de mettre sous les yeux de V. M. le danger -qu’il y aurait dans l’état actuel des affaires de vouloir occuper -cette capitale comme point central, et d’y avoir encore des hôpitaux -et établissemens qu’il faudrait abandonner à l’ennemi au premier -mouvement prononcé qu’il ferait vers le nord. Cette considération -seule doit l’emporter sur toute autre, et je n’y ajouterai que -le dernier mot de l’empereur à ce sujet; c’est que toutes les -convenances dans la position de l’Europe veulent que V. M. occupe -Valladolid, et pacifie le nord. Le premier objet rempli facilitera -beaucoup le second, et pour y contribuer par tous les moyens comme -pour économiser un tems précieux, et mettre à profit l’inaction des -Anglais, je transmets directement aux généraux commandant en chef -les armées du nord et de Portugal, les ordres de l’Empereur pour que -leur exécution ne souffre aucun retard, et que ceux de V. M. pour -appuyer et consolider leurs opérations n’éprouvent ni lenteur ni -difficulté lorsqu’ils parviendront à ces généraux. Je joins ici copie -de mes lettres, sur lesquelles j’ai toujours reservé les ordres que -V. M. jugera à-propos de donner pour l’entière exécution de ceux de -l’empereur. Ma lettre était terminée lorsqu’un aide-de-camp de M. le -maréchal Jourdan est arrivé avec plusieurs dépêches, dont la dernière -est du 24 Decembre. J’ai eu soin de les mettre sous les yeux de -l’empereur, mais leur contenu ne saurait rien changer aux intentions -de S. M. I. et ne peut que confirmer les observations qui se trouvent -dans ma lettre. J’aurai l’honneur d’écrire encore à V. M. par le -retour de l’officier porteur des dépêches de M. le maréchal Jourdan. -Je suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté, le très humble et très -obéïssant serviteur, - - Le ministre de la guerre, - DUC DE FELTRE. - - -No. XI. - -_The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain._ - - SIRE, - -Depuis la lettre que j’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire à votre majesté le -29 Janvier, l’empereur, après avoir pris connoissance des dépêches -apportées par l’aide-de-camp de monsieur le maréchal Jourdan, me -charge encore de réitérer son intention formelle et déjà deux fois -transmise à votre majesté, qu’elle porte son quartier général à -Valladolid afin de pouvoir s’occuper efficacement de soumettre et -pacifier le nord; par une conséquence nécessaire de ce changement, -Madrid ne doit être occupé que par l’extremité de la gauche de -manière à ne plus faire partie essentielle de la position générale -et à pouvoir être abandonné sans inconvénient, au cas qu’il -soit nécessaire de se réunir sur un autre point. Cette nouvelle -disposition procure à votre majesté les moyens de faire réfluer -des forces considérables dans le nord et jusqu’à l’Arragon pour -y détruire les rassemblemens qui existent, occuper en force tous -les points importans, interdire l’accès des côtes aux Anglais, et -opérer la soumission entière du pays. Il est donc d’une importance -extrême pour parvenir à ce bût, de profiter de l’inaction des -Anglais, qui permet en ce moment l’emploi de tous nos moyens contre -les insurgés et doit amener promptement leur entière destruction, -si les opérations entreprises pour cette effet sont conduites avec -l’activité, l’energie et la suite qu’elles exigent. Votre majesté -a pu se convaincre par la longue et constante interruption des -communications autant que par les rapports qui lui sont parvenus de -toute l’étendue du mal, et de la nécessité d’y porter remède. On ne -peut donc mettre en doute son empressement à remplir les intentions -de l’empereur sur ces points importans des changemens, qui ont eu -lieu pour le commandement en chef des armées du midi, du nord, et -de Portugal, me font espérer que votre majesté n’éprouvera plus de -difficultés pour l’exécution de ses ordres et que tout marchera -au même bût sans contradiction, et sans obstacle. Ces nouvelles -dispositions me dispensent de répondre à différentes observations -contenues dans les lettres de votre majesté, et m’engagent à attendre -qu’elle me fasse connoître les résultats des changemens ordonnés par -l’empereur. Je ne dois pas oublier de prévenir votre majesté d’un -ordre que sa majesté impériale m’a chargé de transmettre directement -à monsieur le général Reille pour lui faire envoyer une division -de son armée en Navarre dont la situation exige impérieusement des -secours prompts et efficaces. Cette disposition ne peut contrarier -aucune de celles que votre majesté sera dans le cas d’ordonner -à l’armée de Portugal pour concourir au même bût et amener la -soumission des provinces du nord de l’Espagne. - - Je suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté - Le très humble et très obéïssant serviteur - Le Ministre de la Guerre, - DUC DE FELTRE. - - -No. XII. - -_Duke of Feltre to the king of Spain._ - - _Paris, le 12 Fevrier, (No. 2.) 1813._ - - SIRE, - -Par ma lettre de ce jour No. 1, j’ai eu l’honneur de faire connaître -à V. M. les intentions de l’empereur sur les opérations à suivre en -Espagne. La présente aura pour bût de répondre plus particulièrement -à la lettre dont V. M. m’a honoré en date du 8 Janvier et que j’ai -eu soin de mettre sous les yeux de l’empereur. Les plaintes qu’elle -contient sur la conduite du maréchal duc de Dalmatie et du général -Caffarelli deviennent aujourd’hui sans objet par l’éloignement de -ces deux généraux en chef. Je dois cependant prévenir V. M. qu’ayant -fait connaître au général Caffarelli qu’on se plaignait à Madrid de -ne point recevoir de comptes de l’armée du nord, ce général me répond -sous la date du 27 Janvier qu’il a eu l’honneur de rendre à V. M. -des comptes extrêmement frequens, qu’il lui a envoyé la situation de -l’armée et des doubles des rapports qui me sont adressés. La général -Caffarelli ajoute qu’il avait demandé à V. M. d’ordonner que deux -divisions de l’armée de Portugal vinssent appuyer les opérations -de l’armée du nord, et il pense que ces lettres se seront croisées -avec les dépêches de Madrid parceque les courriers out éprouvé -beaucoup de retard, mais il y a lieu de présumer que tout ce qui a -été adressé de l’armée du nord a du parvenir à Madrid avant la fin -de Janvier. V. M. réitère dans sa lettre du 8 Janvier ses demandes -relativement aux besoins de l’armée. Toutes ont été mises sous les -yeux de l’empereur. S. M. I. m’ordonne de répondre au sujet des fonds -dont la demande se retrouve dans plusieurs dépêches précédentes que -l’argent nécessaire aux armées d’Espagne se serait trouvé dans ces -riches et fertiles provinces dévastées par les bandes et par les -juntes insurrectionelles, qu’en s’occupant avec l’activité et la -vigueur convenables pour rétablir l’ordre et la tranquillité, on y -gagnera toutes les ressources qu’elles peuvent encore offrir, et que -le tems ramènera dans toute leur étendue. C’est donc un motif de -plus pour V. M. d’employer tous les moyens dont elle dispose pour -mettre fin à cette guerre interne qui trouble le repos des habitans -paisibles, ruine le pays, fatigue nos armées et les prive de tous les -avantages qu’elles trouveraient dans l’occupation tranquille de ces -belles contrées. L’Arragon et la Navarre aujourd’hui sous les loix de -Mina alimentent de leurs productions et de leur revenus cette lutte -désastreuse, il est tems de mettre un terme à cet état de choses -et de faire rentrer dans les mains du gouvernement légitime les -ressources d’un pays florissant lorsqu’il est paisible, mais qui ne -servent aujourd’hui qu’à son détriment. - -Je suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté, le très humble et très -obéïssant serviteur, - - Le ministre de la guerre, - DUC DE FELTRE. - - -No. XIII. - -_The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain._ - - _Paris, le 12 Fevrier, 1813._ - - SIRE, - -J’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire trois fois à V. M. dans le courant de -Janvier, pour lui transmettre les intentions de l’empereur sur la -conduite des affaires en Espagne, et j’ai eu soin de faire expedier -toutes mes dépêches au moins par triplicata, tellement que je puis et -dois espérer aujourd’hui qu’elles sont parvenues à leur destination. -Je reçois en ce moment le dup^{ta} d’une lettre de V. M. en date du 8 -Janvier, dont le primata n’est point arrivé et j’y vois une nouvelle -preuve de la difficulté toujours subsistante de communication, les -inconveniens de cet état de choses deviennent plus sensibles dans -les circonstances actuelles, où il étoit d’une haute importance que -les ordres de l’empereur reçussent une prompte exécution. S. M. I. -pénétrée de cette idée, attend avec une véritable impatience de -savoir ce qui s’est opéré à Madrid, d’après ses instructions, et -cette attente, journellement deçue lui fait craindre qu’on n’ait -perdu un temps précieux, les Anglais étant depuis plus de deux mois -dans l’impuissance de rien faire. L’empereur espère du moins que -lorsque V. M. aura eu connaisance du 29^{me} bulletin, elle aura été -frappée de la nécessité de se mettre promptement en communication -avec la France et de l’assurer par tous les moyens possibles. On -ne peut parvenir à ce bût qu’en faisant refluer successivement les -forces dont V. M. peut disposer sur la ligne de communication de -Valladolid à Bayonne, et en portant en outre des forces suffisantes -en Navarre et en Aragon pour combattre avec avantage et détruire les -bandes qui dévastent ces provinces. - -L’armée de Portugal combinée avec celle du nord est bien suffisante -pour remplir cet objet tandis que les armées du centre et du midi, -occupant Salamanque et Valladolid, présentent assez de forces pour -tenir les Anglais en échec en attendant les évènements. L’empereur -m’ordonne de réitérer à V. M. que l’occupation de _Valladolid_ comme -quartier général et résidence pour la personne, est un préliminaire -indispensable, à toute operation. C’est de-là qu’il faut diriger sur -la route de Burgos et successivement sur tous les points convenables -les forces disponibles qui doivent renforcer ou seconder l’armée -du nord. Madrid et même Valence ne peuvent être considérés dans ce -systême que comme des points à occuper par l’extremité gauche de -la ligne, et nullement comme lieux à maintenir exclusivement par -une concentration de forces. Valladolid et Salamanque deviennent -aujourd’hui les points essentiels entre lesquels doivent être -réparties des forces prêtes à prendre l’offensive contre les Anglais -et à faire échouer leurs projets. L’empereur est instruit qu’ils se -renforcent en Portugal, et qu’ils paraissent avoir le double projet -ou de pousser en Espagne ou de partir du port de Lisbonne pour faire -une expédition de 25 mille hommes, partie Anglais partie Espagnols, -sur un point quelconque des côtes de France pendant que la lutte -sera engagée dans le nord. Pour empêcher l’exécution de ce plan il -faut être toujours en mésure de se porter en avant et ménacer de -marcher sur Lisbonne ou de conquerir le Portugal. En même tems il -faut conserver des communications aussi sûres que faciles avec la -France pour être promptement instruits de tout ce qui s’y passe, et -le seul moyen d’y parvenir est d’employer le tems ou les Anglais -sont dans l’inaction pour pacifier la Biscaye et la Navarre comme -j’ai eu soin de le faire connaître à V. M. dans mes précédentes. La -sollicitude de l’empereur pour les affaires d’Espagne lui ayant fait -réitérer à plusieurs reprises et reproduire sous toutes les formes -ses intentions à cet égard je ne puis achever mieux de les remplir -qu’en récapitulant les idées principales que j’ai eu l’ordre de faire -connaître à V. M. Occuper Valladolid et Salamanque, employer avec la -plus grande activité possible tous les moyens de pacifier la Navarre -et l’Aragon, maintenir des communications très rapides et très sûres -avec la France, rester toujours en mésure de prendre l’offensive au -besoin, voilà ce que l’empereur me prescrit de faire considérer à V. -M. comme instruction générale pour toute la campagne et qui doit -faire la base de ses operations. J’ai à peine besoin d’ajouter que -si les armées Françaises en Espagne restaient oisives et laissaient -les Anglais maîtres de faire des expeditions sur nos côtes, la -tranquillité de la France serait compromise et la décadence de nos -affaires en Espagne en serait l’infaillible résultat, Je suis avec -respect, - - Sire, de votre majesté, - le très humble et très obéïssant serviteur - Le Ministre de la Guerre, - DUC DE FELTRE. - - -No. XIV. - -_The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain._ - - _Paris, le 12 Mars, 1813._ - - SIRE, - -La difficulté toujours subsistante des communications a apporté -dans ma correspondance avec V. M. des retards considérables et de -longues interruptions dont les résultats ne peuvent être que très -préjudiciables au service de l’empereur. Depuis plus de deux mois -j’expédie sans cesse et par tous les moyens possibles ordre sur -ordre pour faire exécuter les dispositions prescrites par S. M. I. -et je n’ai aucune certitude que ces ordres soient parvenus à leur -destination. L’empereur extrêmement mécontent de cet état de choses -renouvelle sans cesse l’injonction la plus précise de le faire -cesser, et j’ignore encore en ce moment si les mouvemens prescrits -se préparent ou s’exécutent, mais je vois toujours d’avantage que -si des ordres relatifs à cette mesure doivent partir de Madrid cela -entrainerait une grande perte de tems. L’empereur en a été frappé, -Il devient donc tout-à-fait indispensable de s’écarter un moment de -la voie ordinaire et des dispositions par lesquelles tout devroit -emaner de V. M. au moins pour ce qui concerne le nord et l’armée de -Portugal. Je prends pour cet effet le parti d’adresser directement -aux généraux commandant de ces armées les ordres d’exécution qui -dans d’autres circonstances devraient leur parvenir de Madrid, et -j’ai l’honneur d’adresser ci-joint à V. M. copies des lettres que -j’ai écrites au général Reille et au général Clauzel pour déterminer -enfin l’arrivée des renforts absolument nécessaires pour soumettre -l’Aragon, la Navarre et la Biscaye; les details contenus dans ma -lettre au général Clauzel me dispensent de m’étendre d’avantage -sur cet objet important. V. M. y verra surtout qu’en prescrivant -l’exécution prompte et entière des ordres de l’empereur j’ai toujours -reservé l’exercise de l’autorité supérieure remise entre les mains -de V. M. et qu’elle conserve également la direction ultérieure des -opérations des qu’elle pourra les conduire par elle-même. - -Toutes mes précédentes dépêches sont d’allieurs assez précises sur ce -point pour ne de laisser pas doute à cet egard. - - -_The duke of Feltre to the king._ - - _Paris, 18 Mars, 1813._ - - SIRE, - -Parmi les lettres dont V.M. m’a honoré, la plus récente de celles -qui me sont parvenues jusqu’à ce jour est du 1 Fevrier, et je vois -qu’à cette epoque V. M. n’avait point encore reçu celle que j’ai -eu l’honneur de lui adresser par ordre de l’empereur le 4 Janvier -pour l’engager à transferer son quartier général à Valladolid. Cette -disposition a été renouvellée dans toutes mes dépêches postérieures -sous les dates de 14, 29 Janvier, 3, 12, 25 Fevrier, 1, 11 et 12 -Mars, sans avoir eu jusqu’à present de certitude que mes lettres -fussent arrivées à leur destination. Enfin une lettre de M. le -duc d’Albufera en date 4 Mars me transmit copie de celle que V. -M. lui a adressée le 23 Fevrier pour le prevenir que ma lettre du -4 Janvier est arrivée à Madrid, et qu’on s’y préparait à exécuter -les dispositions prescrites par l’empereur. Ainsi c’est de Valence -que j’ai reçu la première nouvelle positive à cet égard, et cette -circonstance qui dévoile entièrement nôtre situation dans le nord -d’Espagne est une nouvelle preuve de l’extrême urgence des mesures -prescrites par l’empereur et de tout le mal que d’inexplicables -retards ont causé. S. M. I. vient à cette occasion de me réitérer -l’injonction de faire sentir à V. M. la fausse direction qu’ont prise -les affaires d’Espagne par le peu de soin qu’on a apporté à maintenir -les communications avec les frontières. L’empereur est etonné qu’on -ait si peu compris à Madrid l’extrême importance de conserver des -communications sûres et rapides avec la France. Le defaut constant -de nouvelles était un avertissement assez clair et assez positif de -l’impuissance ou se trouvait l’armée du nord de proteger la route de -Madrid à Bayonne. L’état des affaires dans le nord de l’Europe devait -plus que jamais faire sentir la nécessité de recevoir des nouvelles -de Paris et de prendre enfin des mesures décisives pour ne pas rester -si longuement dans un état d’isolement et d’ignorance absolu sur les -vues et l’intention de l’empereur. V. M. avoit trois armées à sa -disposition pour rétablir les communications avec l’armée du nord, et -l’on ne voit pas un mouvement de l’armée de Portugal ou de celle du -centre qui soit approprié aux circonstances, tandis que l’inaction -des Anglais permettait de profiter de notre supériorité pour chasser -les bandes, nettoyer la route, assurer la tranquillité dans le pays. -L’empereur m’a ordonné de faire connaître sa façon de penser sur cet -objet au général Reille, auquel j’ai adressé directement les ordres -de S. M. I. pour les forces qu’il a dû mettre sans retard sous les -ordres du général Clauzel ainsi que j’ai eu l’honneur d’en prévenir -V. M. par mes lettres du 29 Janvier, 3 Fevrier et 12 Mars. En effet -les circonstances rendent cette mesure d’une extrême urgence. -L’inaction où l’on est resté pendant l’hiver a encouragé et propagé -l’insurrection. Elle s’etend maintenant de la Biscaye, en Catalogne, -et l’Aragon exige, pour ainsi dire, le même emploi des forces pour -la pacifier, que la Biscaye et la Navarre. Il est donc de la plus -haute importance que V. M. etende ses soins sur l’Aragon comme sur -les autres provinces du nord de l’Espagne, et les évènemens qui se -préparent rendront ce soin toujours plus nécessaire. D’un côte toutes -les bandes chassées de la Biscaye et de la Navarre se trouveront -bientôt forcées à refluer dans l’Aragon, et d’autre part l’évacuation -de Cuenca, par résultat du mouvement général des armées du centre et -du midi priverait le général Suchet de toute communication avec V. M. -dans un moment ou les ennemis se renforcent devant lui d’une manière -assez _inquiétante_. Il est donc très important de se procurer une -autre ligne de communication avec Valence et cette ligne ne peut -s’établir que par l’Aragon. C’est à votre majesté qu’il appartient -de donner à cet égard les ordres nécessaires. Il suffira sans doute -de lui avoir fait connaître l’état de choses et la position du -maréchal Suchet pour lui faire prendre les déterminations que les -circonstances rendraient les plus convenables. Il me tarde beaucoup -d’apprendre enfin de V. M. elle-même l’exécution des ordres de -l’empereur et de pouvoir satisfaire sur ce point la juste impatience -de S. M. I. - - -No. XV. - -_Joseph O’Donnel to general Donkin._ - - _Malaga, the 6th December, 1812._ - - DEAR SIR, - -The letter you did me the honour to adress to me on the 6th of -September has been mislaid all this long time on account of my being -separated from the armie since the moment I gave up the command -of it, and it was only last night I had the pleasure of receiving -it. I feel a great comfort in seingh an officer of your reputation -affected so kindly with the sorrows which so unlucky as undeservedly -(I believe) fell upon me as a consequence of my shamefull defaite -at Castalla. But I beg to be excused if I continue this letter in -French. I kno you understand it very well and I can not explain -my toughts so well in English. Je crois, M. le général, que tout -militaire, instruit des faits, et à la vue du malheureux champ de -bataille de Castalla, ou du plan qui le représente, doit faire le -même raisonement que vous avez fait, à moins qu’il ne soit épris -des petites passions et des prejugés qui ne dominent que trop -souvent les hommes. Je crois l’avoir demontré à l’evidence dans mon -rapport officiel au gouvernement (que vous devez avoir vu imprimmé) -accompagné de la carte des environs et des copies de toutes les -ordres que je donnai la veille du combat. J’aurois certainement été -vainquer si l’officier qui commandoit les 760 chevaux, avec deux -pièces de 8 à mon aile gauche eut obéi mes ordres, on eut seulement -tâché de se laisser voir de loin par la cavallerie enemie, qui au -nombre de 400 chevaux étoit stationée dans le village de Viar; -mais point du tout, cet officier, au lieu de se trouver sur Viar -au point du jour de la bataille, pour tenir en échec la cavallerie -ennemie, pour la battre s’il en trouvoit une occasion probable, ou -pour la suivre en tout cas, et l’empêcher de tomber sur Castalla -impunément, comme il lui était très expressément ordonné par des -ordres écrites qu’il avoue, cet officier alla se cacher derriére -Villena, et quoiqu’il entendit le canon de Castalla, et qu’il fut -instruit de la marche des dragons de Viar par la route d’Onil, il -resta tranquilement en position de l’autre côté de Villena jusqu’à -passé huit heures du matin. Nous étions déjà battus, et trois -malheureux bataillons hachés en pièces (quoi-qu’ayant repoussé la -première charge) quand M. le brigadier Santistevan se mit en marche -de Villena pour venir à mon secours. Jugez done, Mons. le général, si -j’ay pû empêcher ce désastre. Cependant, le public, qui ne peut juger -que par les resultats, se dechaina d’abord contre moi, et je ne m’en -plains pas, car cela étoit fort naturel; c’est un malheur attaché -à notre profession, et que les généraux Espagnols doivent resentir -sur touts les autres, puisqu’ils font la guerre sans resources, et -manquant de tout contre un ennimi aguerri qui ne manque de rien; mais -je me plains des _Cortes_ de la nation, je me plains de ces pères -de la patrie, qui sachant que j’avois demandé moimême à être jugé -par un conseille de guerre, out cependant donné le ton à l’opinion -publique se rependant en invectives contre moi, et même contre mon -frère le régent, avant de scavoir si je suis en effet coupable. Après -un pareile traitement, et dans l’etât de misère et de détresse où -se trouvent nos armées, ou trouvera t’on de généraux qui veuillent -exposer leur honneur, et en accepter le commandement? Quant à moi je -servirai ma patrie par devoir et par inclination jusqu’au dernier -soupir, mais je n’accepterai jamais aucun commandement, supposant -qu’il me fut offert. Les informations que l’on prend relativement -à l’affaire en question ne sont pas encore finies, car tout va -doucement chez nous. J’en attends le resultat ici avec l’aveu du -gouvernement, et aussitôt que l’on aura prononcé en justice j’irai -me présenter comme simple volontaire dans une de nos armées si l’on -ne veut pas m’employer dans ma calité de général subalterne. Je vous -ay trop ennuyé de mes peines; c’est que j’en ay le cœur navré, et -que votre bonté m’a excité à m’en soulager en vous les racontant. -Il me reste encore un espoir flatteur, c’est le jugement de touts -mes camarades qui out vû de près mes dispositions à l’affaire de -Castalla, et les efforts que j’avois fait pendant sept mois, luttant -toujours contre la detresse et le désordre, pour préparer à la -victoire une armée qui étoit tout-à-fait nulle quand je fus obligé -a en prendre, malgré moi, le commandement. Je m’estimerai heureux, -Monsieur le général, de mériter aussi le sufrage d’un officier aussi -distingué que vous l’êtes, et je vous prie d’agréer le temoignage du -sincère attachement de votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur, - - JOSEF O’DONELL. - - _Monsieur le général Donkin_, - &c. &c. - - -No. XVI. - - _Freneda, February 15th, 1813._ - - SIR, - -I have received your letter of the 12th instant, regarding the -conduct of the second Italian regiment, and I entirely concur in all -the measures you have adopted, and applaud the decision and firmness -of your conduct. I am prepared likewise to approve of whatever you -shall determine upon deliberation regarding the future state of the -men of the regiment, whether to be formed into a regiment again, or -not; or if so formed, whether to be kept as part of the army or sent -back to Sicily. - -The foreign troops are so much addicted to desertion that they are -very unfit for our armies, of which they necessarily form too large -a proportion to the native troops. The evil is aggravated by the -practice which prevails of enlisting prisoners as well as deserters, -and Frenchmen as well as other foreigners, notwithstanding the -repeated orders of government upon the subject. The consequence is -therefore that a foreign regiment cannot be placed in a situation -in which the soldiers can desert from it, that they do not go off -in hundreds; and in the Peninsula they convey to the enemy the only -intelligence which he can acquire. - -With this knowledge I seldom if ever use the foreign British troops -of this army on the duty of outposts; and whatever you may determine -regarding the second Italian regiment, I recommend the same practice -to your consideration. - -There is nothing new on this side of the Peninsula. The armies are -nearly in the stations which they took up in the end of November. - - I have the honour to be, - Sir, - Your most obedient Servant, - WELLINGTON. - - _Major-General Campbell, - &c. &c. &c._ - - -No. XVII. - -_Extract of a letter from the marquis of Wellington to -lieutenant-general sir John Murray, dated Freneda, April 6th, 1813._ - -“In regard to feeding the Spanish troops in Spain, I have invariably -set my face against it and have never consented to it or done it, -even for a day in any instance. My reasons are, first that it -entails upon Great Britain an expense which the country is unable -to bear; secondly, that it entails upon the department of the army -which undertakes it a detail of business, and a burthen in respect -to transport, and other means to which the departments if formed -upon any moderate scale must be quite unequal; thirdly, I know -from experience that if we don’t interfere, the Spanish troops, -particularly if paid as yours are, and in limited numbers, will not -want food in any part of Spain, whereas the best and most experienced -of our departments would not be able to draw from the country -resources for them. I have already consented to the formation of a -magazine for the use of general Whittingham and general Roche’s corps -for a certain number of days, if it should be found necessary to -give them assistance of this description. I can go no farther, and -I earnestly recommend to you if you give assistance to all, to give -over a magazine to last a given time, but not to take upon yourself -to supply the Spanish troops engaged in operations. If, however, you -should notwithstanding this recommendation take upon yourself to give -such supplies, I must object, as commander-in-chief of the Spanish -army, to your giving more than bread to the troops who receive pay, -as that is positively contrary to the regulations and customs of the -Spanish army. I recommend to you also to attend with caution to the -demands of both general Whittingham and general Roche, and to observe -that in proportion as you will comply with their demands, demands -will be made upon you by general Elio and others, and you will -involve yourself in a scale of expense and difficulty, which will -cramp all your operations, and which is quite inconsistent with the -views of government on the eastern coast of the Peninsula.” - - -No. XVIII. - -General state of the French army, April 15, 1812. - -Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls. - - Present under Arms. Detached. Hosp. Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Horses. - Armée de - - Midi 55,797 11,014 2,498 700 6,065 64,360 11,714 - Centre 19,148 3,993 144 51 624 19,916 4,044 - Portugal 56,937 8,108 4,394 2,278 7,706 69,037 10,386 - Ebre 16,830 1,873 21 6 3,425 20,276 1,879 - Arragon 14,786 3,269 2,695 658 1,467 18,948 3,927 - Catalogne 28,924 1,259 1,163 49 5,540 35,627 1,308 - Nord 48,232 7,074 1,309 72 8,677 58,276 7,213 - ------------------------------------------------------- - Total 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,614 33,504 286,440 40,471 - Reserve de - Bayonne 4,038 157 36 35 865 4,939 192 - ------------------------------------------------------- - General Total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 291,370 40,663 - ------------------------------------------------------- - - Civic guards - attached to - the army of - the south. 6,497 1,655 ” ” 258 6,755 1,497 - Troupes - Espagnols. 33,952 525 ” ” ” 33,952 525 - ------------------------------------------------------ - Total Espagnols 40,449 2,180 ” ” 258 40,707 2,022 - ------------------------------------------------------ - - -General state, May 15, 1812. - - Present under Arms. Detached. Hosp. Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Cav. Art. - Armée de - Midi 56,031 12,101 2,787 660 4,652 63,470 7,311 4,340 - Centre 17,395 4,208 158 37 766 19,203 3,332 420 - Portugal 52,618 7,244 9,750 1,538 8,332 70,700 4,481 3,448 - Arragon 27,218 4,768 4,458 605 3,701 35,377 2,976 1,980 - Catalonia 33,677 1,577 1,844 267 6,009 41,530 1,376 279 - Nord 38,771 6,031 2,560 271 7,767 49,098 4,443 1,163 - ------------------------------------------------------------ - Total 225,710 35,929 21,557 3,378 31,227 279,378 23,919 11,630 - Old Reserve - at Bayonne 3,894 221 1,642 ” 964 6,500 207 ” - New Reserve - at Bayonne 2,598 116 3,176 ” 5 5,769 103 ” - ------------------------------------------------------------ - General 232,202 36,266 26,375 3,378 32,196 291,647 24,229 11,630 - Total ------------------------------------------------------------ - - -General state of the French Armies, March 15, 1813. - - Present under Arms. Detached. Hosp. Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Cav. Train. - Armée de - Midi 36,605 6,602 2,060 1,617 7,144 45,809 8,650 2,601 - Centre 16,227 1,966 940 76 2,401 19,568 2,790 451 - Portugal 34,825 3,654 157 ” 7,731 42,713 6,726 2,149 - Arragon 36,315 3,852 55 ” 2,442 38,812 6,123 1,799 - Catalonia 27,323 1,109 110 ” 2,013 29,446 1,884 635 - Nord 40,476 1,978 41 ” 8,030 48,547 3,171 830 - Reserve de - Bayonne 5,877 55 80 ” 634 6,591 78 21 - ---------------------------------------------------------- - Total 197,648 19,216 3,443 1,693 30,395 231,486 29,422 8,486 - ---------------------------------------------------------- - -The operations and misfortunes of the French prevented any general -states being sent home between the 15th of March and the 15th of -August, when a new organization of the armies took place; but the -numbers given in the narrative of this History are the result of -calculations founded on the comparison of a variety of documents, and -are believed to be a very close approximation to the real strength of -the armies. - - -No. XIX. - -Especial state of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812. - -Head-quarters, Tordesillas. - - - Present under arms. Detached. Hosp. Total. Horses. - Men. Horses Men. Horses. Men. Cav. Train. - 1st - Division Foy 5,138 ” 319 ” 516 5,973 ” ” - 2d do. Clausel 7,405 ” 678 ” 613 8,696 ” ” - 3d do. Ferey 5,547 ” 12 ” 926 6,485 ” ” - 4th do. Sarrut 5,056 ” 214 ” 862 6,132 ” ” - 5th do. Maucune 5,269 ” 588 ” 1,513 7,370 ” ” - 6th do. Brennier 5,021 ” 124 ” 720 5,865 ” ” - 7th do. Thomieres 6,352 61 ” ” 1,905 8,257 61 ” - 8th do. Bonnet 6,681 139 66 ” 685 7,432 139 ” - Light - Cavalry, Curto 1,386 1,398 1,073 324 246 2,705 1,722 ” - 3 escadrons - Dragoons Boyer 1,389 1,378 479 358 86 1,954 1,736 ” - Artillery 3,612 2,339 513 258 220 4,345 347 2,148 - Genie 414 9 67 7 84 565 ” 12 - Equipage 955 1,107 51 44 242 1,251 ” 1,084 - Gendarmes et - Infirmerie 325 75 ” ” 15 340 54 ” - -------------------------------------------------- - Total 54,550 6,506 4,184 991 8,633 67,370 4,059 3,244 - -------------------------------------------------- - -From these 54,550 men, present under arms, must be deducted the -artillery, engineers, equipages, and garrisons, the officers and -sergeants, and the losses sustained between the siege of the forts -and the battle of Salamanca, the result will be about 42,000 sabres -and bayonets in the battle. - - Reinforcements en marche de l’armée du nord 1,370 - Do. de Bayonne 12,676 - - _Note._—These troops did not join before the battle of Salamanca. - - -Artillery of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812, Materiel. - - { Poid et calibre. Nombre. - { Canon de 12 lbs. 2 } - Bouches { 8 do. 20 } Total des canons - a feu { 4 do. 33 } 60 - { 3 do. 5 } - { - { Obusiers de 6 pouces 11 } Total des obusiers - { Ditto de 4 pouces 3 lignes 3 } 14 - -- - Total 74 - - { These guns - Venant de l’armée du nord 8 { arrived after - { the battle. - -- - 82 - - -Total loss of the army of Portugal from 10th July to 10th of August, -1812, including the battle of Salamanca. Extracted from the Imperial -Muster-rolls. - - Tués. Blessés. - - { Duke de Raguse ” 1 - { General Clauzel ” 1 - Officiers { General Bonnet ” 1 - superieurs { General Ferrey 1 ” - { General Thomieres 1 ” - { General Desgravier Bertholet 1 ” - General Carrie ” 1 Prisonnier. - General Menne ” 1 - Aide-de-camp du Colonel Richemont ” 1 - duc de Raguse - Le Clerc de Montpree 1 ” - Darel ” 1 - ------------- - Total Tués 4 Blessés 7 - ------------- - - Officiers inferieurs et soldats. Tués ou Pris. Blessés. Traineurs. - Officiers 162 232 ” - Soldats 3,867 7,529 645 - ----------------------------- - Grande Total 4,029 7,761 645 - ----------------------------- - - Officiers et Soldats 12,435 - Chevaux 1,190 - Canons 12 - Deux aigles de 22eme et 101eme Regt. de ligne. - - -No. XX. - -Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army under Lord Viscount Wellington, -on the morning of the 22d of July, 1812. Extracted from the original -morning state. - -_Note._—The numbers are exclusive of officers, sergeants, trumpeters, -artillery-men, and staff, shewing merely the sabres and bayonets in -the field. - - British cavalry, - one division, present under arms 3,314 men 3,388 horses. - British infantry, - seven divisions do. 22,067 ” ” ” - ------------------------- - Total British 25,381 - - D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, - three regiments, about 1,500 These troops not in the state - Portuguese infantry, - seven divisions, and two - independent brigades 16,017 - ------------------------------ - 17,517 - ------ - Total Anglo-Portuguese 42,898 - - Carlos d’Espana’s Spanish division, about 3,000 - Julian Sanchez’ cavalry 500 - ------------------ - 3,500 - ------ - Sabres and bayonets 46,398 - ------ - - -No. of British, German, Portuguese, and Spanish guns at the battle of -Salamanca. - - Weight of calibre. Number of guns. - - British horse artillery 6 lbs. 18 - Foot do. 9 lbs. 12 - Do. do. 12 lbs. 12 - German do. 9 lbs. 6 - Portuguese and British - brigaded together 24 lb. howitzers 6 - -- - 54 - One Spanish battery 6 - -- - General total 60 pieces. - - -No. XXI. - -Official report of the loss of the allies on the Trabancos and -Guarena rivers, 18th July, 1812. - - Officers. Sergeants. Rank and file. Horses. Men. - { 3 3 56 59 Killed } - British { 16 7 274 65 Wounded } - { ” ” 27 21 Missing } - } 543 - { 1 2 31 ” Killed } - Portuguese { 6 3 87 ” Wounded } - { ” ” 27 ” Missing } - ------------------------------------- - Total 26 15 502 145 - ------------------------------------- - - -Loss of the allies in the battle of Salamanca. - - { 28 24 336 96 Killed } - British {188 136 2,400 120 Wounded } - { ” ” 74 37 Missing } - } 5,224 - { 13 4 287 18 Killed } - Portuguese { 74 42 1,436 13 Wounded } - { 1 1 180 7 Missing } - ———————————————————— - Total 304 207 4,713 291 - ———————————————————— - - -Loss of the German cavalry on the Almar Stream, July 23. - - Men and Officers. Horses. - 117 117 117 - - -The British loss by infantry divisions and cavalry brigades. - - { Le Marchant’s brigade, lost Men and officers 105 } - Cavalry { Anson’s do. do. do. 5 } - { Vr. Alten’s do. do. do. 31 } - - { 1st Division General Campbell lost Men and officers 69 } - { 3d do. General Pakenham do. do. 456 } - { 4th do. General Cole do. do. 537 } - Infantry { 5th do. General Leith do. do. 464 } - { 6th do. General Clinton do. do. 1,198 } - { 7th do. General S. Hope do. do. 119 } - { Light do. General C. Alten do. do. 29 } - - Artillery General Framingham do. do. 14 - ----- - 3,027 - ----- - - -No. XXII. - -Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army at Vittoria. Extracted from the -morning state of the 19th June, 1813. - - Total. - Present under arms. On command. Present. On command. - - British Cavalry 7,791 851 - Portuguese do. 1,452 225 - --------------------- - Total cavalry 9,243 1,076 - - British infantry 33,658 1,771 - Portuguese do. 23,905 1,038 - --------------------- - Total infantry 57,563 2,809 - ---------------- - - Sabres and bayonets 66,806 3,885 - - Deduct the 6th division - left at Medina de Pomar 6,320 - ---------------- - Sabres and bayonets 60,486 - - Spanish Auxiliaries. - { Morillo’s division about 3,000 - Infantry { Giron’s do. do. 12,000 - { Carlos - { Carlos d’Espagna’s do. do. 3,000 - { Longa’s do. do. 3,300 - Penne Villemur do. 1,000 - Cavalry Julian Sanchez do. 1,000 - 23,000 - ------------ - Grand Total 83,486 - ------------ - - -No. of Anglo-Portuguese guns at the battle of Vittoria. - -COLONEL A. DICKSON commanding. - - British horse artillery 9 lbs. 45 - Do. do. 6 lbs. 30 - Do. do. 5½ inch howitzers 15 - -- - Total 90 - -No Spanish guns set down in the return. Number unknown. - - -END OF VOL. V. - - -MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] In a recent number of the “Quarterly Review,” the writer of an -article upon the correspondence of Louis the XVIII. quotes me as -saying that Massena had _one hundred and thirty-five thousand men_ -under his orders, as if he had invaded Portugal with an army of that -amount, whereas I have expressly said that he invaded Portugal with -_sixty-five thousand_, the rest being extended as far as Biscay. The -assertion of the Reviewer is therefore essentially false with the -appearance of truth. The same writer, while rebuking the Editor of -the Correspondence for ignorance, asserts, that the battle of Busaco -was fought between the 9th of October and the 5th of November! It was -fought on the 27th of September. - -Another writer in the same No. treating of Professor Drumann’s work, -speaks of “_following_ an impulse which is from _behind_,” a figure -of speech which must appear singularly felicitous to those who -have watched a puppy dog chasing his own tail; but your Quarterly -Reviewers are your only men for accuracy of fact and expression! - -[2] These numbers are somewhat below those I have assigned to the -French army; my calculation was made from the imperial muster-rolls, -but the difference may be easily accounted for by the length of time -which elapsed when marshal Jourdan wrote this letter. His numbers are -evidently from memory, and probably he did not mean to include the -king’s guards and Spaniards. - - - - - * * * * * - - PUBLISHED BY - T. AND W. BOONE, - 29, _New Bond-street_. - - - A REPLY TO - LORD STRANGFORD’S “OBSERVATIONS” - ON SOME PASSAGES IN - COLONEL NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE WAR - IN THE PENINSULA. - - BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B. - Second Edition, 8vo. price 1s. - - * * * * * - - A REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS, - - PARTICULARLY TO - “_STRICTURES ON COLONEL NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE - WAR IN THE PENINSULA_:” - - Together with - OBSERVATIONS ILLUSTRATING SIR JOHN MOORE’S CAMPAIGNS. - - BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B. - - 8vo. price 2s. - - * * * * * - - COL. NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS - THIRD VOLUME, - - FORMING A - SEQUEL TO HIS REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS, - AND CONTAINING SOME - _NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO_ - THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA. - - 8vo. price 1s. 6d. - - * * * * * - - A LETTER TO - GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD, - - BEING AN ANSWER TO - HIS LORDSHIP’S ASSUMED REFUTATION OF - _COLONEL NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME_. - - BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B. - - In 8vo. price 1s. 6d. - - * * * * * - - COUNTER-REMARKS TO - MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S - REMARKS - - UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME - OF HIS HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. - - In 8vo. price 1s. 6d. - - * * * * * - - In the Press, in one vol. 8vo. - - REMARKS ON MILITARY LAW - AND THE - PUNISHMENT OF FLOGGING. - - BY - COLONEL CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, C.B. - - * * * * * - - COLONIZATION; - PARTICULARLY - IN SOUTHERN AUSTRALIA: - - WITH SOME REMARKS ON - SMALL FARMS AND OVER POPULATION. - - BY COLONEL CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, C.B. - Author of “The Colonies; particularly the Ionian Islands.” - - In One vol. 8vo. price 9_s._ boards. - -“We earnestly recommend the book to all who feel an interest in the -welfare of the people.”—_Sun._ - - * * * * * - - In One Volume, post 8vo. price 10_s._ 6_d._ - - RANDOM SHOTS - FROM A RIFLEMAN. - - BY - CAPTAIN JOHN KINCAID, FIRST BATTALION, - _Author of “Adventures in the Rifle Brigade.”_ - -“It is one of the most pithy, witty, soldier-like, and pleasant books -in existence.”—_United Service Journal._ - -“The present volume is to the full as pleasant, and, what is still -more strange, as original as the last. Criticism would become a -sinecure if many such volumes were written: all left for us is to -admire and recommend.”—_New Monthly Magazine._ - -“If you have military adventures to relate, take pen in hand, and -relate them in the pleasant, cheerful, and agreeable manner, in which -John Kincaid, the prince of adjutants and good fellows, relates -his. Read his _Random Shots_, in order to give you an idea of such -matters, for few there are who have seen more shots fired than the -gallant captain of the rifles.”—_Fraser’s Magazine._ - -“The present volume is likely to add to his reputation. It -is a useful appendix to the larger works of Napier and other -military commentators. It is never dull, tedious, technical, or -intricate.”—_Times._ - -“Those who have read Captain Kincaid’s Adventures in the Rifle -Brigade will seize this volume with avidity, and having dashed -through it, will lay it down with only one feeling of regret—that it -is not longer.”—_News._ - -“His book is full of genuine humour, without one particle of the -trickery sometimes resorted to for the purpose of supplying the place -of wit.”—_Sun._ - -“This is a most racy, spiritedly sketchy performance.”—_Court -Journal._ - - * * * * * - - In Two Volumes, post 8vo. price 21_s._ - - ADMIRAL NAPIER’S - ACCOUNT OF THE - WAR IN PORTUGAL - - BETWEEN - DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL, - WITH PLANS OF HIS ACTION OFF - CAPE ST. VINCENT. - -“An excellent and spirit-stirring book—plain, honest, and -straightforward—the very stuff of which the web of history alone -should be composed. This is indeed an honest, fair, and impartial -history.”—_Morning Chronicle._ - -“In spirit and in keeping, from beginning to end, Admiral Napier’s -‘War in Portugal’ is the happiest picture we could conceive of the -hero of the battle off Cape St. Vincent—its especial excellence -consisting in a regardless bluntness of manner and language that is -quite admirable and delightful.”—_Monthly Review._ - -“His work will create a fresh interest in events, which, before -reading, we thought impossible.”—_Naval and Military Gazette._ - -“It is Cæsar’s Commentaries in the first person.”—_Spectator._ - -“Candid to a degree, and sincere as a sailor’s will. This is the very -stuff of which history should be composed.”—_Bell’s Messenger._ - -“If Admiral Napier be not distinguished by the common-place -facilities of authorship, he possesses the higher qualities of truth, -discretion, and clear-sightedness, in no slight degree.”—_Atlas._ - -“In speaking of himself and his deeds, he has hit the just and -difficult medium—shewing his real feelings, yet steering clear of -affected modesty on the one hand, and of overweening modesty on the -other.”—_Tait’s Magazine._ - -“This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant -author figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of -Napier.”—_News._ - - * * * * * - - In foolscap 8vo. price 1_s._ - - THE NURSERY GOVERNESS; - - BY ELIZABETH NAPIER, - - Published after her Death by her Husband, Col. C. J. Napier, C.B. - -“Hear the instructions of thy father, and forsake not the law of thy -mother.”—_Proverbs_, ch. i. v. 8. - -“This is an admirable little book.”—_True Sun._ - -“The excellent instructions laid down by Mrs. Napier will, we have -no doubt, prove a ‘rich legacy’ not only to her own children, but to -those in many a nursery.”—_Liverpool Chronicle._ - -“Not only the nursery-governess, but the mother and daughter, -especially in the higher walks of life, may read it with -advantage.”—_Atlas._ - -“We are so convinced of its utility, that we would strongly recommend -it to the diligent study of every female who has the care of a -family, either as a mother or governess.”—_Sun._ - - * * * * * - - In One Volume, post 8vo. price 10_s._ 6_d._ boards, - - NARRATIVE OF - EVENTS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - And of the ATTACK ON NEW ORLEANS, in 1814 & 1815. - - By CAPT. I. H. COOKE, 43d Regt. - -“This clever and fearless account of the attack on New Orleans is -penned by one of the ‘occupation;’ whose soldier-like view and keen -observation during the period of the stirring events he so well -relates, has enabled him to bring before the public the ablest -account that has yet been given of that ill-fated and disgraceful -expedition, and also to rescue the troops who were employed on it -from those degrading reflections which have hitherto unjustly been -insinuated against them.”—_Gentleman’s Magazine._ - -“We wish earnestly to call the attention of military men to -the campaign before New Orleans. It is fraught with a fearful -interest, and fixes upon the mind reflections of almost every hue. -Captain Cooke’s relation is vivid; every evolution is made as -clear to the eye as if we had been present, and the remarks, we -think, are eminently judicious. The book must be generally read,” -&c.—_Metropolitan._ - -“It is full of good feeling, and it abounds with sketches of the -service.”—_Sunday Herald._ - - * * * * * - - SKETCHES IN SPAIN, - - During the Years 1829-30-31 and 32; - -Containing Notices of some Districts very little known; of the Manners of - the People, Government, Recent Changes, Commerce, Fine Arts, - and Natural History. - - BY CAPTAIN S. E. COOK, R.N. K.T.S. F.G.S. - - Two vol. 8vo. price 21_s._ - -“Volumes of great value and attraction; we would say, in a word, they -afford us the most complete account of Spain in every respect which -has issued from the press.”—_Literary Gazette._ - -“The value of the book is in its matter and its facts. If written -upon any country it would have been useful, but treating of one -like Spain, about which we know almost nothing, but of which it is -desirable to know so much, Captain Cook’s Sketches must be considered -an acquisition to the library.”—_Spectator._ - -“These volumes comprise every point worthy of notice, and the whole -is so interspersed with lively adventure and description; so imbued -with a kindly spirit of good-nature, courting and acknowledging -attention, as to render it attractive reading.”—_United Service -Gazette._ - -“No one could either pretend to write or converse upon this country -without preparing himself by a previous perusal of this instructive -work.”—_Metropolitan._ - - * * * * * - - Just Published, in post 8vo. price 5s. - - RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS - -Relative of the Duties of Troops composing the advanced Corps of the Army, - - BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL I. LEACH, C.B. - Late of the Rifle Brigade. - Author of “Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier.” - - * * * * * - - THE HISTORY - OF THE - KING’S GERMAN LEGION, - - FROM THE PERIOD OF ITS ORGANIZATION IN 1803, TO THAT OF ITS - DISSOLUTION IN 1816. - - _Compiled from Manuscript Documents._ - - By N. LUDLOW BEAMISH, ESQ. F.R.S. late Major unattached. - -Vol. I. 8vo. with coloured plates; price 20_s._ boards; to be completed in - two volumes. - -“The work is not like others we could name—a mere compilation from -newspapers and magazines. Major Beamish has left no source of -information unexplored; and the access he obtained to manuscript -journals has enabled him to intersperse his general narrative -with interesting personal anecdotes, that render this volume as -delightful for those who read for amusement, as those who read for -profit.”—_Athenæum._ - -“We are altogether much pleased with the volume, and heartily -recommend it to the British public.”—_Literary Gazette._ - - * * * * * - - MEMOIR - - BY - GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, BART. - - OF HIS - PROCEEDINGS AS CONNECTED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN, - AND THE - COMMENCEMENT OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. - - In one vol. 8vo. price 9_s._ boards. - -“These volumes, the work of a gentleman of high and varied -accomplishments, whose opportunities of observation have been -unusually extensive and well-improved, will command and repay -attention. They contain by far the best account of Spain which has -yet issued from the press.”—_United Service Gazette._ - - * * * * * - - AN ESSAY ON THE - PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF - MILITARY BRIDGES, - - AND THE PASSAGE OF RIVERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. - - BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART. - - K.S.C., D.C.L., F.R.S., &c. &c. - - The Second Edition, containing much additional Matter and Plates, - 8vo. price 20_s._ boards. - - * * * * * - - In 8vo. price 2_s._ - - PRUSSIA IN 1833; - - ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF PRUSSIA, AND HER CIVIL INSTITUTIONS. - - Translated from the French by M. de Chambray. With an Appendix by - General de Caraman. - -“We would recommend to military readers in general, and especially to -the authorities who have the destiny of the army in their hands, an -attentive perusal of this work. The public will learn from it that -the army in Prussia, hitherto supposed to be the worst paid force, -is, in fact, better dealt with than is the case ‘_with the best paid -army in Europe_.’”—_United Service Journal._ - - * * * * * - - _In the Press_, - - THE CAMPAIGNS OF DON PEDRO - IN PORTUGAL, - - From the Landing of the Constitutional Army to the Convention of - Evora Monte, and subsequent Disbanding of the Armies. - - BY GENERAL ANTHONY BACON. - - * * * * * - - Immediately will be Published, in one vol. 8vo. - - THE ADVENTURES OF - CAPTAIN JOHN PATTERSON, - OF THE 50th, OR QUEEN’S OWN REGIMENT. - -_With Notices of the Officers and of the Regiment from 1807 to 1821._ - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, - when a predominant preference was found in the original book. - - Some occurrences of upper-case titles (such as Lord, Sir, General) - have been made lower-case for consistency. - - To save space in the wide tables in Appendix Notes XVIII and XIX, - the headings ‘Hospital.’ ‘Cavalry.’ and ‘Artillery.’ have been - abbreviated to ‘Hosp.’ ‘Cav.’ and ‘Art.’. - - In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, - incorrect grammar, spelling and accents have been left unchanged. - - In notes XVIII-XXII of the Appendix some of the printed totals - are incorrect; these have been left as printed. - - Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, - and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. - - Pg iii: The anchor for the first Footnote was missing; it has been - placed at the end of the paragraph “... shall now learn.” - Pg vii: ‘2º.’ inserted in front of ‘_Battle of Busaco._’. - Pg xlii: ‘have been mistated’ replaced by ‘have been misstated’. - Pg lxiv: ‘for tho letter’ replaced by ‘for the letter’. - Pg lxxiv: ‘be here meaned’ replaced by ‘be here meant’. - Pg lxxv: ‘Holland combated’ replaced by ‘Holland combatted’. - Pg lxxvii: ‘in underminig those’ replaced by ‘in undermining those’. - Pg 20: ‘Castello’ replaced by ‘Castelo’. Also on pg 338 and pg 521. - Pg 37: ‘instead of faling’ replaced by ‘instead of falling’. - Pg 72: ‘to war down’ replaced by ‘to wear down’. - Pg 100: ‘Appendix No. 1, Section 1.’ replaced by ‘Appendix No. 18.’. - Pg 139: ‘on the sea-bord’ replaced by ‘on the sea-board’. - Pg 165: ‘Ciudad Rodigo road’ replaced by ‘Ciudad Rodrigo road’. - Pg 196: ‘from Valladodid in’ replaced by ‘from Valladolid in’. - Pg 205: ‘the disputes betwen’ replaced by ‘the disputes between’. - Pg 214: ‘the aid-de-camp of’ replaced by ‘the aide-de-camp of’. - Pg 216: In the Sidenote: ‘Sarsfield’ replaced by ‘Sarzfield’. - Pg 228: In the Sidenote: ‘official re-’ replaced by ‘official report’. - Pg 238: ‘the aid-du-camp of’ replaced by ‘the aide-de-camp of’. - Pg 267: ‘and pallisaded work’ replaced by ‘and palisaded work’. - Pg 283: ‘army of Porugal’ replaced by ‘army of Portugal’. - Pg 293: ‘had place at’ replaced by ‘had taken place at’. - Pg 318: ‘wanton villany’ replaced by ‘wanton villainy’. - Pg 340: ‘the last compaign’ replaced by ‘the last campaign’. - Pg 398: ‘the militaay chest’ replaced by ‘the military chest’. - Pg 399: ‘the preceedings of’ replaced by ‘the proceedings of’. - Pg 405: ‘partisans of the’ replaced by ‘partizans of the’. - Pg 418: ‘the Englsh general’ replaced by ‘the English general’. - Pg 419: ‘court-martials for’ replaced by ‘courts-martial for’. - Pg 426: ‘the multidude, and’ replaced by ‘the multitude, and’. - Pg 499: ‘Bilbao, immedately’ replaced by ‘Bilbao, immediately’. - Pg 564: ‘retrogade movement’ replaced by ‘retrograde movement’. - Pg 575: ‘defensive sytem is’ replaced by ‘defensive system is’. - Pg 619: ‘Portugal, Jnne 15’ replaced by ‘Portugal, June 15’. - Pg 620: ‘Prisoner’ replaced by ‘Prisonnier’. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 5 OF 6 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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