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| author | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-01-25 01:54:44 -0800 |
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| committer | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-01-25 01:54:44 -0800 |
| commit | 6d706e2c730305e369fb308fb7eac80efc31a4ec (patch) | |
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diff --git a/old/69220-h/69220-h.htm b/old/69220-h/69220-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index 84e2df4..0000000 --- a/old/69220-h/69220-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30061 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> -<head> - <meta charset="UTF-8" /> - <title> - History of the war in the Peninsula, Vol. 5 of 6, by W. F. P. Napier—A Project Gutenberg eBook - </title> - <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover" /> - <style> /* <![CDATA[ */ - -body { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - - h1,h2,h3,h4 { - text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ - clear: both; - margin-top: 1.5em; - margin-bottom: 1em; - word-spacing: 0.2em; - letter-spacing: 0.1em; - line-height: 1em; - font-weight: normal; -} - -h1 {font-size: 160%; line-height: 2em; margin-bottom: .5em;} -h2 {font-size: 130%; line-height: 1.7em; letter-spacing: 0.1em;} -h3 {font-size: 110%;} -h4 {font-size: 80%; margin-top: 2em;} - -p { - margin-top: .51em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .49em; - text-indent: 1em; -} - -.p1 {margin-top: 1em;} -.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} -.p3 {margin-top: 3em;} -.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} -.p10 {margin-top: 10em;} - -.p4b {margin-bottom: 4em;} - -.negin1 {padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1em; text-align: justify;} -.in6 {text-indent: 6em; text-align: justify;} - -.noindent {text-indent: 0em;} - -div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} -h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} - -x-ebookmaker-drop, .x-ebookmaker-drop {} - -.pfs150 {font-size: 150%; 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- padding: .25em; - border: solid thin;} - -.center {text-align: center; text-indent: 0em;} - -.right {text-align: right; margin-right: 1em;} -.rt {text-align: right; margin-right: 1em; margin-bottom: -.7em;} - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} -.allsmcap {font-variant: small-caps; text-transform: lowercase;} - -sup {font-size: 60%;} -sub {font-size: 60%;} - -.lsp {letter-spacing: 0.1em;} -.lsp2 {letter-spacing: 0.2em;} -.lsp3 {letter-spacing: 0.3em;} -.lht {line-height: 2em;} - - -.caption {font-weight: normal; font-size: 70%; - padding-bottom: 0.50em;} - - -/* Images */ - -img { - border: none; - max-width: 100%; - height: auto; -} - -img.w100 {width: 100%;} - - -.figcenter { - margin: auto; - text-align: center; - page-break-inside: avoid; - max-width: 100%;} - - -/* Footnotes */ -.footnotes {border: dashed 1px; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 3em; - padding-bottom: 1em;} - -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 90%;} -.footnote p {text-indent: 0em;} -.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: none; -} - - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.5em; - margin-bottom:5em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; } - -.transnote p {text-indent: 0em;} - - -/* custom cover (cover.jpg) */ -.customcover {visibility: hidden; display: none;} -.x-ebookmaker .customcover {visibility: visible; display: block;} - -/* Illustration classes */ -.illowp100 {width: 100%;} -.illowp50 {width: 50%;} - - /* ]]> */ </style> -</head> -<body> -<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5 of 6, by William Francis Patrick Napier</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5 of 6</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: William Francis Patrick Napier</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: October 24, 2022 [eBook #69220]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 5 OF 6 ***</div> - - -<div class="transnote"> -<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p> - -<p>There are only two Footnotes in the book. They have been placed at -the end of the book. The anchors are denoted by <span class="fnanchor">[1]</span> and <span class="fnanchor">[2]</span>.</p> - -<p class="customcover">The cover image was created by the transcriber -and is placed in the public domain.</p> - -<p>This is volume 5 of 6. Similar to volume 4, this volume had a date -(Year. Month) as a margin header on most pages. This information about -the chronology of the narrative has been preserved as a Sidenote to -the relevant paragraph on that page whenever the header date changed.</p> - -<p>With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings -of names have not been changed.</p> - -<p>Some minor changes to the text are noted at the <a href="#TN">end of the book.</a> -<span class="screenonly">These are indicated by a <ins class="corr">dashed blue</ins> underline.</span></p> - -<p> -<span class="pad3">Volume 1 of this series can be found at</span><br /> -<span class="pad6"><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67318</a></span><br /> -<span class="pad3">Volume 2 of this series can be found at</span><br /> -<span class="pad6"><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67554</a></span><br /> -<span class="pad3">Volume 3 of this series can be found at</span><br /> -<span class="pad6"><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68187">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68187</a></span><br /> -<span class="pad3">Volume 4 of this series can be found at</span><br /> -<span class="pad6"><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68536">https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68536</a></span><br /> -</p> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> - -<h1> -<span class="lsp2 bold">HISTORY</span><br /> -<span class="fs50">OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="fs120">WAR IN THE PENINSULA</span></h1> -</div> - -<p class="pfs80">AND IN THE</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs120">SOUTH OF FRANCE,</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs90">FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">BY</p> - -<p class="pfs135">W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.</p> - -<p class="pfs70 lht"><em>COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT,<br /> -MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 pfs120">VOL. V.</p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED</p> -<p class="pfs90">ANSWERS TO SOME ATTACKS</p> -<p class="pfs70">IN</p> -<p class="pfs80">ROBINSON’S LIFE OF PICTON, <span class="allsmcap">AND IN</span> THE QUARTERLY REVIEW;</p> -<p class="p1 pfs70">WITH</p> -<p class="pfs100">COUNTER-REMARKS</p> -<p class="pfs70">TO</p> -<p class="pfs90">MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S REMARKS</p> -<p class="p1 pfs70">UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME OF -THE HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.</p> - -<hr class="r30" /> - -<p class="p1 pfs100">LONDON:</p> -<p class="pfs90">THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.</p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p class="pfs70 lsp">MDCCCXXXVI.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<p class="p10 pfs80">LONDON:</p> - -<p class="pfs70">MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="TABLE_OF_CONTENTS">TABLE OF CONTENTS.</h2> -</div> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><a href="#NOTICE">Notice</a></td> -<td class="tdrb">Page i</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><a href="#Robinson">Answer to Robinson’s Life of Picton</a></td> -<td class="tdrb">ii</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><a href="#Quarterly">Answer to the Quarterly Review</a></td> -<td class="tdrb">xxiv</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><a href="#COUNTER-REMARKS">Counter-Remarks, &c.</a></td> -<td class="tdrb">xlvii</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs150" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XVII">BOOK XVII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVII_I">CHAPTER I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Summary of the political state of affairs—Lord Wellesley resigns—Mr. Perceval killed—New administration—Story of the war - resumed—Wellington’s precautionary measures described—He relinquishes the design of invading Andalusia and resolves to - operate in the north—Reasons why—Surprize of Almaraz by general Hill—False alarm given by sir William Erskine prevents - Hill from taking the fort of Mirabete—Wellington’s discontent—Difficult moral position of English generals</td> -<td class="tdrb">Page 1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVII_II">CHAP. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Progress of the war in different parts of Spain—State of Gallicia-French precautions and successes against the Partidas of - the north—Marmont’s arrangements in Castile—Maritime expedition suggested by sir Howard Douglas—He stimulates the activity - of the northern Partidas—The curate Merino defeats some French near Aranda de Duero—His cruelty to the prisoners—Mina’s - activity—Harasses the enemy in Arragon—Is surprized at Robres by general Pannetier—Escapes with difficulty—Re-appears in - the Rioja—Gains the defiles of Navas Tolosa—Captures two great convoys—Is chased by general Abbé and nearly crushed, whereby - the Partidas in the north are discouraged—Those in other parts become more enterprising—The course of the Ebro from Tudela - to Tortoza so infested by them that the army of the Ebro is formed by drafts from Sachet’s forces and placed under general - Reille to repress them—Operations of Palombini against the Partidas—He moves towards Madrid—Returns to the Ebro—Is ordered - to join the king’s army—Operations in Arragon and Catalonia—The Catalonians are cut off from the coast line—Eroles raises a - new division in Talarn—Advances into Arragon—Defeats general Bourke at Rhoda—Is driven into Catalonia by Severoli—Decaen - defeats Sarzfield and goes to Lerida—Lacy concentrates in the mountains of Olot—Descends upon Mattaro—Flies from thence - disgracefully—Lamarque defeats Sarzfield—Lacy’s bad conduct—Miserable state of Catalonia</td> -<td class="tdrb">23</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVII_III">CHAP. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations in Valencia and Murcia—Sachet’s able government of Valencia—O’Donel organizes a new army in Murcia—Origin of - the Sicilian expedition to Spain—Secret intrigues against Napoleon in Italy and other parts—Lord William Bentinck proposes - to invade Italy—Lord Wellington opposes it—The Russian admiral Tchtchagoff projects a descent upon Italy—Vacillating - conduct of the English ministers productive of great mischief—Lord William Bentinck sweeps the money-markets to the injury - of lord Wellington’s operations—Sir John Moore’s plan for Sicily rejected—His ability and foresight proved by the ultimate - result—Evil effects of bad government shewn by examples</td> -<td class="tdrb">45</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVII_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura—Advantage of lord Wellington’s position shewn—Soult’s plans vast but - well-considered—He designs to besiege Tarifa, Alicant, and Carthagena, and march upon Lisbon—Restores the French interest - at the court of Morocco—English embassy to the Moorish emperor fails—Soult bombards Cadiz, and menaces a serious - attack—Ballesteros, his rash conduct—He is defeated at Bornos—Effect of his defeat upon the allies in Estremadura—Foy - succours the fort of Mirabete—Hill is reinforced—Drouet falls back to Azagua—Followed by Hill—General Slade defeated by - Lallemande in a cavalry combat at Macquilla—Exploit of cornet Strenowitz—General Barrois marches to reinforce Drouet by - the road of St. Ollala—Hill falls back to Albuera—His disinterested conduct</td> -<td class="tdrb">56</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVII_V">CHAP. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Political situation of France—Secret policy of the European courts—Causes of the Russian war—Napoleon’s grandeur and - power—Scene on the Niemen—Design attributed to Napoleon of concentrating the French armies behind the Ebro—No traces of - such an intention to be discovered—His proposals for peace considered—Political state of England—Effects of the continental - system—Extravagance, harshness, and improvident conduct of the English ministers—Dispute with America—Political state of - Spain—Intrigues of Carlotta—New scheme of mediation with the colonies—Mr. Sydenham’s opinion of it—New constitution - adopted—Succession to the crown fixed—Abolition of the Inquisition agitated—Discontent of the clergy and - absolute-monarchy-men—Neglect of the military affairs—Dangerous state of the country—Plot to deliver up Ceuta—Foreign - policy of Spain—Negociations of Bardaxi at Stockholm—Fresh English subsidy—Plan of enlisting Spanish soldiers in British - regiments fails—The councillor of state Sobral offers to carry off Ferdinand from Valençay but Ferdinand rejects his - offer—Joseph talks of assembling a cortes at Madrid, but secretly negociates with that in the Isla</td> -<td class="tdrb">65</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVII_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Political state of Portugal—Internal condition not improved—Government weak—Lord Strangford’s conduct condemned—Lord - Wellesley resolves to recall him and send lord Louvaine to Rio Janeiro—Reasons why this did not take place—Lord - Strangford’s career checked by the fear of being removed—Lord Wellington obtains full powers from the Brazils—Lord - Castlereagh’s vigorous interference—Death of Linhares at Rio Janeiro—Domingo Souza succeeds him as chief minister but - remains in London—Lord Wellington’s moderation towards the Portuguese regency—His embarrassing situation described—His - opinion of the Spanish and Portuguese public men—His great diligence and foresight aided by the industry and vigour of - Mr. Stuart supports the war—His administrative views and plans described—Opposed by the regency—He desires the prince - regent’s return to Portugal without his wife—Carlotta prepares to come without the prince—Is stopped—Mr. Stuart proposes - a military government but lord Wellington will not consent—Great desertion from the Portuguese army in consequence of - their distressed state from the negligence of the government—Severe examples do not check it—The character of the - Portuguese troops declines—Difficulty of procuring specie—Wellington’s resources impaired by the shameful cupidity of - English merchants at Lisbon and Oporto—Proposal for a Portuguese bank made by Domingo Souza, Mr. Vansittart, and Mr. - Villiers—Lord Wellington ridicules it—He permits a contraband trade to be carried on with Lisbon by Soult for the sake - of the resources it furnishes</td> -<td class="tdrb">83</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs150" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XVIII">BOOK XVIII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVIII_I">CHAP. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Numbers of the French in the Peninsula shewn—Joseph commander-in-chief—His dissentions with the French generals—His - plans—Opposed by Soult, who recommends different operations and refuses to obey the king—Lord Wellington’s plans - described—His numbers—Colonel Sturgeon skilfully repairs the bridge of Alcantara—The advantage of this measure—The - navigation of the Tagus and the Douro improved and extended—Rash conduct of a commissary on the Douro—Remarkable letter - of lord Wellington to lord Liverpool—Arrangements for securing the allies’ flanks and operating against the enemy’s - flanks described—Marmont’s plans—His military character—He restores discipline to the army of Portugal—His measures for - that purpose and the state of the French army described and compared with the state of the British army and Wellington’s - measures</td> -<td class="tdrb">100</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVIII_II">CHAP. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Campaign of 1812—Wellington advances to the Tormes—Marmont retires—The allies besiege the forts of Salamanca—General - aspect of affairs changes and becomes gloomy—The king concentrates the army of the centre—Marmont returns to the Tormes - and cannonades the allies on the position of San Christoval—Various skirmishes—Adventure of Mr. Mackay—Marmont retires to - Monte Rubia—Crosses the Tormes with a part of his army—Fine conduct of general Bock’s German cavalry—Graham crosses the - Tormes and Marmont retires again to Monte Rubia—Observations on this movement—Assault on San Vincente fails—Heroic death - of general Bowes—Siege suspended for want of ammunition—It is renewed—Cajetano is stormed—San Vincente being on fire - surrenders—Marmont retires to the Duero followed by Wellington—The French rear-guard suffers some loss between Rueda and - Tordesillas—Positions of the armies described—State of affairs in other parts described—Procrastination of the Gallician - army—General Bonet abandons the Asturias—Coincidence of Wellington’s and Napoleon’s views upon that subject—Sir Home - Popham arrives with his squadron on the coast of Biscay—His operations—Powerful effect of them upon the campaign—Wellington - and Marmont alike cautious of bringing on a battle—Extreme difficulty and distress of Wellington’s situation</td> -<td class="tdrb">122</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVIII_III">CHAP. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Bonet arrives in the French camp—Marmont passes the Duero—Combat of Castrejon—Allies retire across the Guarena—Combat on - that river—Observations on the movements—Marmont turns Wellington’s flank—Retreat to San Christoval—Marmont passes the - Tormes—Battle of Salamanca—Anecdote of Mrs. Dalbiac</td> -<td class="tdrb">147</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXVIII_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Clauzel passes the Tormes at Alba—Cavalry combat at La Serna—Chauvel’s cavalry joins the French army—The king reaches - Blasco Sancho—Retires to Espinar on hearing of the battle—Receives letters from Clauzel which induce him to march on - Segovia—Wellington drives Clauzel across the Duero—Takes Valladolid—Brings Santocildes over the Duero—Marches upon - Cuellar—The king abandons Segovia and recrosses the Guadarama—State of affairs in other parts of Spain—General Long - defeats Lallemand in Estremadura—Caffarelli is drawn to the coast by Popham’s expedition—Wellington leaves Clinton at - Cuellar and passes the Guadarama—Cavalry combat at Majadahonda—The king unites his army at Valdemoro—Miserable state of - the French convoy—Joseph passes the Tagus; hears of the arrival of the Sicilian expedition at Alicant—Retreats upon - Valencia instead of Andalusia—Maupoint’s brigade succours the garrison of Cuenca, is beaten at Utiel by Villa - Campa—Wellington enters Madrid—The Retiro surrenders—Empecinado takes Guadalaxara—Extraordinary journey of colonel - Fabvier—Napoleon hears of Marmont’s defeat—His generous conduct towards that marshal—Receives the king’s report against - Soult—His magnanimity—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">182</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs150" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XIX">BOOK XIX.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXIX_I">CHAP. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">State of the war—Eastern operations—Lacy’s bad conduct—French army of the Ebro dissolved—Lacy’s secret agents blow up the - magazines in Lerida—He is afraid to storm the place—Calumniates Sarzfield—Suchet comes to Reus—The hermitage of St. Dimas - surrendered to Decaen by colonel Green—The French general burns the convent of Montserrat and marches to Lerida—General - Maitland with the Anglo-Sicilian army appears off Palamos—Sails for Alicant—Reflections on this event—Operations in - Murcia—O’Donel defeated at Castalla—Maitland lands at Alicant—Suchet concentrates his forces at Xativa—Entrenches a camp - there—Maitland advances to Alcoy—His difficulties—Returns to Alicant—The king’s army arrives at Almanza—The remnant of - Maupoint’s brigade arrives from Cuenca—Suchet re-occupies Alcoy—O’Donel comes up to Yecla—Maitland is reinforced from - Sicily and entrenches a camp under the walls of Alicant</td> -<td class="tdrb">213</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXIX_II">CHAP. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations in Andalusia—The king orders Soult to abandon that province—Soult urges the king to join him with the other - armies—Joseph reiterates the order to abandon Andalusia—Soult sends a letter to the minister of war expressing his - suspicions that Joseph was about to make a separate peace with the allies—The king intercepts this letter, and sends - colonel Desprez to Moscow, to represent Soult’s conduct to the emperor—Napoleon’s magnanimity—Wellington anxiously - watches Soult’s movements—Orders Hill to fight Drouet, and directs general Cooke to attack the French lines in front of - the Isla de Leon—Ballesteros, pursued by Leval and Villate, skirmishes at Coin—Enters Malaga—Soult’s preparations to - abandon Andalusia—Lines before the Isla de Leon abandoned—Soult marches towards Grenada—Colonel Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon - land at Huelva—Attack the French rear-guard at Seville—Drouet marches upon Huescar—Soult moving by the mountains reaches - Hellin, and effects his junction with the king and Suchet—Maitland desires to return to Sicily—Wellington prevents - him—Wellington’s general plans considered—State of affairs in Castile—Clauzel comes down to Valladolid with the French - army—Santo Cildes retires to Torrelobaton, and Clinton falls back to Arevalo—Foy marches to carry off the French garrisons - in Leon—Astorga surrenders before his arrival—He marches to Zamora and drives Sylveira into Portugal—Menaces Salamanca—Is - recalled by Clauzel—The Partidas get possession of the French posts on the Biscay coast—Take the city of Bilbao—Reille - abandons several posts in Arragon—The northern provinces become ripe for insurrection</td> -<td class="tdrb">234</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXIX_III">CHAP. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Wellington’s combinations described—Foolish arrangements of the English ministers relative to the Spanish clothing—Want of - money—Political persecution in Madrid—Miserable state of that city—Character of the Madrilenos—Wellington marches against - Clauzel—Device of the Portuguese regency to avoid supplying their troops—Wellington enters Valladolid—Waits for - Castaños—His opinion of the Spaniards—Clauzel retreats to Burgos—His able generalship—The allies enter Burgos, which is in - danger of destruction from the Partidas—Reflections upon the movements of the two armies—Siege of the castle of Burgos</td> -<td class="tdrb">254</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXIX_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">State of the war in various parts of Spain—Joseph’s distress for money—Massena declines the command of the army of - Portugal—Caffarelli joins that army—Reinforcements come from France—Mischief occasioned by the English newspapers—Souham - takes the command—Operations of the Partidas—Hill reaches Toledo—Souham advances to relieve the castle of Burgos—Skirmish - at Monasterio—Wellington takes a position of battle in front of Burgos—Second skirmish—Wellington weak in - artillery—Negligence of the British government on that head—The relative situation of the belligerents—Wellington offered - the chief command of the Spanish armies—His reasons for accepting it—Contumacious conduct of Ballesteros—He is arrested - and sent to Ceuta—Suchet and Jourdan refuse the command of the army of the south—Soult reduces Chinchilla—The king - communicates with Souham—Hill communicates with Wellington—Retreat from Burgos—Combat of Venta de Pozo—Drunkenness at - Torquemada—Combat on the Carion—Wellington retires behind the Pisuerga—Disorders in the rear of the army—Souham skirmishes - at the bridge of Cabeçon—Wellington orders Hill to retreat from the Tagus to the Adaja—Souham fails to force the bridges - of Valladolid and Simancas—The French captain Guingret swims the Duero and surprizes the bridge of Tordesillas—Wellington - retires behind the Duero—Makes a rapid movement to gain a position in front of the bridge of Tordesillas and destroys the - bridges of Toro and Zamora, which arrests the march of the French</td> -<td class="tdrb">280</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXIX_V">CHAP. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">The king and Soult advance from Valencia to the Tagus—General Hill takes a position of battle—The French pass the - Tagus—Skirmish at the Puente Largo—Hill blows up the Retiro and abandons Madrid—Riot in that city—Attachment of the - Madrilenos towards the British troops—The hostile armies pass the Guadarama—Souham restores the bridge of Toro—Wellington - retreats towards Salamanca and orders Hill to retreat upon Alba de Tormes—The allies take a position of battle behind the - Tormes—The Spaniards at Salamanca display a hatred of the British—Instances of their ferocity—Soult cannonades the castle - of Alba—The king reorganizes the French armies—Soult and Jourdan propose different plans—Soult’s plan adopted—French pass - the Tormes—Wellington by a remarkable movement gains the Valmusa river and retreats—Misconduct of the troops—Sir Edward - Paget taken prisoner—Combat on the Huebra—Anecdote—Retreat from thence to Ciudad Rodrigo—The armies on both sides take - winter cantonments</td> -<td class="tdrb">308</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXIX_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Continuation of the Partizan warfare—General Lameth made governor of Santona—Reille takes the command of the army of - Portugal—Drouet, count D’Erlon, commands that of the centre—Works of Astorga destroyed by the Spaniards—Mina’s operations - in Arragon—Villa Campa’s operations—Empecinado and others enter Madrid—The duke Del Parque enters La Mancha—Elio and - Bassecour march to Albacete and communicate with the Anglo-Sicilian army—The king enters Madrid—Soult’s cavalry scour - La Mancha—Suchet’s operations—General Donkin menaces Denia—General W. Clinton takes the command of the Anglo-Sicilian - army—Suchet intrenches a camp at Xativa—The Anglo-Sicilian army falls into disrepute—General Campbell takes the - command—Inactivity of the army—The Frayle surprises a convoy of French artillery—Operations in Catalonia—Dissensions in - that province—Eroles and Codrington menace Taragona—Eroles surprises a French detachment at Arbeça—Lacy threatens Mataro - and Hostalrich returns to Vich—Manso defeats a French detachment near Molino del Rey—Decaen defeats the united Catalonian - army and penetrates to Vich—The Spanish divisions separate—Colonel Villamil attempts to surprise San Felippe de - Balaguer—Attacks it a second time in concert with Codrington—The place succoured by the garrison of Tortoza—Lacy suffers - a French convoy to reach Barcelona, is accused of treachery and displaced—The regular warfare in Catalonia ceases—The - Partizan warfare continues—England the real support of the war</td> -<td class="tdrb">341</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXIX_VII">CHAP. VII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">General observations—Wellington reproaches the army—His censures indiscriminate—Analysis of his campaign—Criticisms of - Jomini and others examined—Errors of execution—The French operations analyzed—Sir John Moore’s retreat compared with - lord Wellington’s</td> -<td class="tdrb">357</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs150" colspan="2"><a href="#BOOK_XX">BOOK XX.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXX_I">CHAP. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Political affairs—Their influence on the war—Napoleon’s invasion of Russia—Its influence on the contest in the - Peninsula—State of feeling in England—Lord Wellesley charges the ministers and especially Mr. Perceval with imbecility—His - proofs thereof—Ability and zeal of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart shewn—Absurd plans of the count of Funchal—Mr. Villiers - and Mr. Vansittart—The English ministers propose to sell the Portuguese crown and church lands—The folly and injustice of - these, and other schemes, exposed by lord Wellington—He goes to Cadiz—His reception there—New organization of the Spanish - armies—Wellington goes to Lisbon where he is enthusiastically received—His departure from Cadiz the signal for renewed - dissensions—Carlotta’s intrigues—Decree to abolish the Inquisition opposed by the clergy—The regency aid the clergy—Are - displaced by the Cortez—New regency appointed—The American party in the Cortez adopt Carlotta’s cause—Fail from fear of - the people—Many bishops and church dignitaries are arrested and others fly into Portugal—The pope’s nuncio Gravina opposes - the cortez—His benefices sequestered—He flies to Portugal—His intrigues there—Secret overtures made to Joseph by some of - the Spanish armies</td> -<td class="tdrb">379</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXX_II">CHAP. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Political state of Portugal—Wellington’s difficulties—Improper conduct of some English ships of war—Piratical violence of - a Scotch merchantman—Disorders in the military system—Irritation of the people—Misconduct of the magistrates—Wellington - and Stuart grapple with the disorders of the administration—The latter calls for the interference of the British - government—Wellington writes a remarkable letter to the prince regent and requests him to return to Portugal—Partial - amendment—The efficiency of the army restored, but the country remains in an unsettled state—The prince unable to quit - the Brazils—Carlotta prepares to come alone—Is stopped by the interference of the British government—An auxiliary Russian - force is offered to lord Wellington by admiral Greig—The Russian ambassador in London disavows the offer—The emperor - Alexander proposes to mediate between England and America—The emperor of Austria offers to mediate for a general peace—Both - offers are refused</td> -<td class="tdrb">409</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXX_III">CHAP. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Napoleon’s embarrassed position—His wonderful activity—His designs explained—The war in Spain becomes secondary—Many - thousand old soldiers withdrawn from the armies—The Partidas become more disciplined and dangerous—New bands are raised - in Biscay and Guipuscoa and the insurrection of the northern provinces creeps on—Napoleon orders the king to fix his - quarters at Valladolid, to menace Portugal, and to reinforce the army of the north—Joseph complains of his generals, and - especially of Soult—Napoleon’s magnanimity—Joseph’s complaints not altogether without foundation</td> -<td class="tdrb">430</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXX_IV">CHAP. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations south of the Tagus—Eroles and Codrington seek to entrap the governor of Taragona—They fail—Sarzfield and Villa - Campa unite but disperse at the approach of Pannetier and Severoli—Suchet’s position—Great force of the allies in his - front—The younger Soult engages the Spanish cavalry in La Mancha—General Daricau marches with a column towards - Valencia—Receives a large convoy and returns to La Mancha—Absurd rumours about the English army rife in the French - camp—Some of lord Wellington’s spies detected—Soult is recalled—Gazan assumes the command of the army of the south—Suchet’s - position described—Sir John Murray takes the command of the Anglo-Sicilian troops at Alicant—Attacks the French post at - Alcoy—His want of vigour—He projects a maritime attack on the city of Valencia, but drops the design because lord William - Bentinck recals some of his troops—Remarks upon his proceedings—Suchet surprises a Spanish division at Yecla, and then - advances against Murray—Takes a thousand Spanish prisoners in Villena—Murray takes a position at Castalla—His advanced - guard driven from Biar—Second battle of Castalla—Remarks</td> -<td class="tdrb">446</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXX_V">CHAP. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations north of the Tagus—Position of the French armies—Palombini marches from Madrid to join the army of the - north—Various combats take place with the Partidas—Foy fails to surprise the British post at Bejar—Caffarelli demands - reinforcements—Joseph misconceives the emperor’s plans—Wellington’s plans vindicated against French writers—Soult advises - Joseph to hold Madrid and the mountains of Avila—Indecision of the king—He goes to Valladolid—Concentrates the French - armies in Old Castile—A division under Leval remains at Madrid—Reille sends reinforcements to the army of the north—Various - skirmishes with the Partidas—Leval deceived by false rumours at Madrid—Joseph wishes to abandon that capital—Northern - insurrection—Operations of Caffarelli, Palombini, Mendizabel, Longa, and Mina—Napoleon recals Caffarelli—Clauzel takes - the command of the army of the north—Assaults Castro but fails—Palombini skirmishes with Mendizabel—Introduces a convoy - into Santona—Marches to succour Bilbao—His operations in Guipuscoa—The insurrection gains strength—Clauzel marches into - Navarre—Defeats Mina in the valley of Roncal and pursues him into Arragon—Foy acts on the coast—Takes Castro—Returns to - Bilbao—Defeats the Biscayen volunteers under Mugartegui at Villaro, and those of Guipuscoa under Artola at Lequitio—The - insurrectional junta flies—Bermeo and Isaro are taken—Operations of the Partidas on the great line of communication</td> -<td class="tdrb">470</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXX_VI">CHAP. VI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Wellington restores the discipline of the allied army—Relative strength of the belligerent forces—Wellington’s plans - described—Lord W. Bentinck again proposes to invade Italy—Wellington opposes it—The opening of the campaign delayed by the - weather—State of the French army—Its movements previous to the opening of the campaign</td> -<td class="tdrb">503</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXX_VII">CHAP. VII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Dangerous discontent of the Portuguese army—Allayed by Wellington—Noble conduct of the soldiers—The left wing of the - allies under general Graham marches through the Tras os Montes to the Esla—The right wing under Wellington advances - against Salamanca—Combat there—The allies pass the Tormes—Wellington goes in person to the Esla—Passage of that - river—Cavalry combat at Morales—The two wings of the allied army unite at Toro on the Duero—Remarks on that - event—Wellington marches in advance—Previous movements of the French described—They pass the Carion and Pisuerga in - retreat—The allies pass the Carion in pursuit—Joseph takes post in front of Burgos—Wellington turns the Pisuerga with his - left wing and attacks the enemy with his right wing—Combat on the Hormaza—The French retreat behind Pancorbo and blow up - the castle of Burgos—Wellington crosses the Upper Ebro and turns the French line of defence—Santander is adopted as a - dépôt station and the military establishments in Portugal are broken up—Joseph changes his dispositions of defence—The - allies advance—Combat of Osma—Combat of St. Millan—Combat of Subijana Morillas—The French armies concentrate in the basin - of Vittoria behind the Zadora</td> -<td class="tdrb">520</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx fs120 lsp" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_BXX_VIII">CHAP. VIII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Confused state of the French in the basin of Vittoria—Two convoys are sent to the rear—The king takes up a new order of - battle—The Gallicians march to seize Orduña but are recalled—Graham marches across the hills to Murguia—Relative strength - and position of the hostile armies—Battle of Vittoria—Joseph retreats by Salvatierra—Wellington pursues him up the Borundia - and Araquil valleys—Sends Longa and Giron into Guipuscoa—Joseph halts at Yrursun—Detaches the army of Portugal to the - Bidassoa—Retreats with the army of the centre and the army of the south to Pampeluna—Wellington detaches Graham through - the mountains by the pass of St. Adrian into Guipuscoa and marches himself to Pampeluna—Combat with the French - rear-guard—Joseph retreats up the valley of Roncevalles—General Foy rallies the French troops in Guipuscoa and fights the - Spaniards at Montdragon—Retreats to Bergara and Villa Franca—Graham enters Guipuscoa—Combat on the Orio river—Foy retires - to Tolosa—Combat there—The French posts on the sea-coast abandoned with exception of Santona and St. Sebastian—Foy retires - behind the Bidassoa—Clauzel advances towards Vittoria—Retires to Logroño—Wellington endeavours to surround him—He makes a - forced march to Tudela—Is in great danger—Escapes to Zaragoza—Halts there—Is deceived by Mina and finally marches to - Jacca—Gazan re-enters Spain and occupies the valley of Bastan—O’Donel reduces the forts of Pancorbo—Hill drives Gazan from - the valley of Bastan—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb">548</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_APPENDIX">LIST OF APPENDIX.</h2> -</div> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_I">No. I.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts of letters relating to the battle of Salamanca</td> -<td class="tdrb">585</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_II">No. II.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Copies of two despatches from the emperor Napoleon to the minister at war relative to the duke of Ragusa</td> -<td class="tdrb">587</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_III">No. III.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Letter from the duke of Dalmatia to king Joseph, August 12, 1812</td> -<td class="tdrb">588</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_IV">No. IV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Letter from the duke of Dalmatia to the minister at war</td> -<td class="tdrb">590</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_V">No. V.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Letter from colonel Desprez to king Joseph, Paris, Sept. 22, 1812</td> -<td class="tdrb">593</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_VI_A">No. VI. A.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Confidential letter from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph, Paris, Nov. 10, 1812</td> -<td class="tdrb">595</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_VI_B">No. VI. B.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Letter from colonel Desprez to king Joseph, Paris, Jan, 3, 1813</td> -<td class="tdrb">596</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_VII">No. VII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Letter from Napoleon to the duc de Feltre, Ghiart, Sept. 2, 1812</td> -<td class="tdrb">600</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_VIII_A">No. VIII. A.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extract. General Souham’s despatch to the minister at war</td> -<td class="tdrb">602</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_VIII_B">No. VIII. B.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts. Two letters from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph</td> -<td class="tdrb">602</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_IX">No. IX.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extract. Letter from marshal Jourdan to colonel Napier</td> -<td class="tdrb">603</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_X">No. X.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Letter from the duc de Feltre to king Joseph, Jan. 29, 1813</td> -<td class="tdrb">605</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XI">No. XI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto       ditto</td> -<td class="tdrb">606</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XII">No. XII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto       ditto, Feb. 12, 1813</td> -<td class="tdrb">608</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XIII">No. XIII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto       ditto, Feb. 12, 1813</td> -<td class="tdrb">609</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XIV">No. XIV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Two ditto       ditto, March 12 and 18, 1813</td> -<td class="tdrb">611</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XV">No. XV.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Letter from Joseph O’Donnel to general Donkin</td> -<td class="tdrb">614</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XVI">No. XVI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Letter from the marquis of Wellington to major-general Campbell</td> -<td class="tdrb">616</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XVII">No. XVII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Extract. Letter from the marquis of Wellington to lieutenant-general sir John Murray, April 6, 1813</td> -<td class="tdrb">617</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XVIII">No. XVIII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">General states of the French army, April 15, May 15, 1812, and March 15, 1813</td> -<td class="tdrb">618</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XIX">No. XIX.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Especial state of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812; loss of ditto</td> -<td class="tdrb">619</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XX">No. XX.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army, July, 1812</td> -<td class="tdrb">620</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XXI">No. XXI.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Losses of the allies, July 18, 1812</td> -<td class="tdrb">621</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdcx" colspan="2"><a href="#NO_XXII">No. XXII.</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Strength of the allies at Vittoria</td> -<td class="tdrb">622</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_THE_PLATES">LIST OF THE PLATES,</h2> -</div> - -<p class="pfs80"><em>To be placed together at <a href="#i_b_581fp_1">Page 582</a></em></p> - -<table class="autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdly">No.</td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_581fp_1">1.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Surprise of Almaraz, 1812.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdly"></td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_581fp_2">2.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Sieges of the Forts and Operations round Salamanca, 1812.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdly"></td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_581fp_3">3.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Battle of Salamanca, with a Sketch of Operations before and after the Action.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdly"></td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_581fp_4">4.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Burgos, 1812.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdly"></td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_581fp_5">5.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Sketch of the Retreat from Madrid and Burgos, 1812.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdly"></td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_581fp_6">6.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Explanatory Sketch of the Position of the Partidas and of lord Wellington’s March from the Agueda to the Pyrenees, 1813.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdly"></td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_581fp_7">7.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Battle of Castalla and Operations before the Action.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdly"></td> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_581fp_8">8.</a></td> -<td class="tdly">Battle of Vittoria, with Operations before and after the Action.</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_i"></a>[Pg i]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="NOTICE"><span class="lsp3">NOTICE</span></h2> -</div> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p>1º. In the present volume will be found a plan of the -Peninsula on a very small scale, yet sufficient to indicate -the general range of operations. A large map would be -enormously expensive without any correspondent advantages -to the reader; and it would only be a repetition of -errors, because there are no materials for an accurate plan. -The small one now furnished, together with the sketches -which I have drawn and published with each volume, and -which are more accurate than might be supposed, will give -a clear general notion of the operations. Those who desire -to have more detailed information will find it in Lieutenant -Godwyn’s fine atlas of the battles in the Peninsula—a -work undertaken by that officer with the sole view of -forming a record of the glorious actions of the British -army.</p> - -<p>2º. Most of the manuscript authorities consulted for -former volumes have been also consulted for this volume, -and in addition the official correspondence of Lord William -Bentinck; some notes by Lord Hill; the journal and correspondence -of sir Rufane Donkin; a journal of Colonel -Oglander, twenty-sixth regiment; a memoir by sir George -Gipps, royal engineers; and a variety of communications -by other officers. Lastly, authenticated copies of the official<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ii"></a>[ii]</span> -journals and correspondence of most of the marshals and -generals who commanded armies in Spain. These were -at my request supplied by the French War-office with -a prompt liberality indicative of that military frankness -and just pride which ought and does characterize the -officers of Napoleon’s army. The publication of this -volume also enables me with convenience to produce additional -authorities for former statements, while answering, -as I now do, the attacks upon my work which have appeared -in the “Life of Sir Thomas Picton,” and in the -“Quarterly Review.”</p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p class="fs80">“Many there are that trouble me and persecute me; yet do I not swerve -from the testimonies,”—<span class="smcap">Psalm cxix.</span></p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p id="Robinson"><cite>Robinson’s Life of Picton.</cite>—This writer of an English -general’s life, is so entirely unacquainted with English -military customs, that he quotes a common order of the<span class="sidenote">Life of Picton, page 31.</span> -day, accrediting a new staff officer to the army, as a -remarkable testimony to that staff officer’s talents. And -he is so unacquainted with French military customs, that, -treating of the battle of Busaco, he places a French marshal, -Marmont, who by the way was not then even in<span class="sidenote">Page 325.</span> -Spain, at the head of a <em>division</em> of Ney’s corps. He dogmatises -upon military movements freely, and is yet so incapable -of forming a right judgment upon the materials -within his reach, as to say, that sir John Moore should not -have retreated, because as he was able to beat the French -at Coruña, he could also have beaten them in the heart of -Spain. Thus setting aside the facts that at Coruña Moore -had fifteen thousand men to fight twenty thousand, and in -the heart of Spain he had only twenty-three thousand to -fight more than three hundred thousand!</p> - -<p>And lest this display of incompetency should not be sufficient, -he affirms, that the same sir John Moore had, comparatively, -greater means at Sahagun to beat the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iii"></a>[iii]</span> -than Lord Wellington had in the lines of Torres Vedras. -Now those lines, which Wellington had been fortifying for -more than a year, offered three nearly impregnable positions, -defended by a hundred thousand men. There was a -fortress, that of St. Julian’s, and a fleet, close at hand as -a final resource, and only sixty thousand French commanded -by Massena were in front. But sir John Moore -having only twenty-three thousand men at Sahagun, had -no lines, no fortifications for defence, and no time to form -them, he was nearly three hundred miles from his fleet, -and Napoleon in person had turned one hundred thousand -men against him, while two hundred thousand more remained -in reserve!</p> - -<p>Any lengthened argument in opposition to a writer so -totally unqualified to treat of warlike affairs, would be a -sinful waste of words; but Mr. Robinson has been at -pains to question the accuracy of certain passages of my -work, and with what justice the reader shall now learn.<ins class="corr" id="tn-iii" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: this anchor was missing"> -<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></ins></p> - -<p>1º. <em>Combat on the Coa.</em>—The substance of Mr. Robinson’s -complaint on this subject is, that I have imputed to -general Picton, the odious crime of refusing, from personal -animosity, to support general Craufurd;—that such a -serious accusation should not be made without ample -proof;—that I cannot say whether Picton’s instructions did -not forbid him to aid Craufurd;—that the roads were so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iv"></a>[iv]</span> -bad, the distance so great, and the time so short, Picton -could not have aided him;—that my account of the action -differs from general Craufurd’s;—that I was only a lieutenant -of the forty-third, and consequently could know -nothing of the matter;—that I have not praised Picton—that -he was a Roman hero and so forth. Finally it is denied -that Picton ever quarrelled with Craufurd at all; and -that, so far from having an altercation with him on the day -of the action he did not on that day even quit his own -quarters at Pinhel. Something also there is about general -Cole’s refusing to quit Guarda.</p> - -<p>To all this I reply that I never did accuse general -Picton of acting from personal animosity, and neither the -letter nor the spirit of my statement will bear out such a -meaning, which is a pure hallucination of this author. -That the light division was not supported is notorious. The -propriety of supporting it I have endeavoured to shew, -the cause why it was not so supported I have not attempted -to divine; yet it was neither the distance, nor the badness -of the roads, nor the want of time; for the action, which -took place in July, lasted from day-break until late in the -evening, the roads, and there were several, were good at -that season, and the distance not more than eight miles.</p> - -<p>It is quite true, as Mr. Robinson observes, that I cannot -affirm of my own knowledge whether the duke of Wellington -forbade Picton to succour Craufurd, but I can certainly -affirm that he ordered him to support him because it -is so set down in his grace’s despatches, volume 5th, pages -535 and 547; and it is not probable that this order should -have been rescinded and one of a contrary tendency substituted, -to meet an event, namely the action on the Coa, -which Craufurd had been forbidden to fight. Picton acted -no doubt upon the dictates of his judgment, but all men are -not bound to approve of that judgment; and as to the -charge of faintly praising his military talents, a point was -forced by me in his favour, when I compared him to general -Craufurd of whose ability there was no question; more<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v"></a>[v]</span> -could not be done in conscience, even under Mr. Robinson’s -assurance that he was a Roman hero.</p> - -<p>The exact object of Mr. Robinson’s reasoning upon the -subject of general Cole’s refusal to quit Guarda it is -difficult to discover; but the passage to which it relates, is -the simple enunciation of a fact, which is now repeated, -namely, that general Cole being requested by general -Craufurd to come down with his whole division to the Coa, -refused, and that lord Wellington approved of that refusal, -though he ordered Cole to support Craufurd under certain -circumstances. Such however is Mr. Robinson’s desire to -monopolize all correctness, that he will not permit me to -know any thing about the action, though I was present, because, -as he says, being only a lieutenant, I could not -know any thing about it. He is yet abundantly satisfied -with the accuracy of his own knowledge, although he was -not present, and was neither a captain nor lieutenant. I -happened to be a captain of seven years standing, but -surely, though we should admit all subalterns to be blind, -like young puppies, and that rank in the one case, as age -in the other, is absolutely necessary to open their eyes, -it might still be asked, why I should not have been able, -after having obtained a rank which gave me the right of -seeing, to gather information from others as well as Mr. -Robinson? Let us to the proof.</p> - -<p>In support of his views, he has produced, the rather -vague testimony of an anonymous officer, on general -Picton’s staff, which he deems conclusive as to the fact, -that Picton never quarrelled with Craufurd, that he did -not even quit Pinhel on the day of the action, and consequently -could not have had any altercation with him on -the Coa. But the following letters from officers on Craufurd’s -staff, not anonymous, shew that Picton did all these -things. In fine that Mr. Robinson has undertaken a task -for which he is not qualified.</p> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi"></a>[vi]</span></p> - -<p class="p1 negin1"><em>Testimony of lieutenant-colonel Shaw Kennedy, who was -on general Craufurd’s staff at the action of the Coa, -July 24, 1810.</em></p> - -<p class="right"> -“<em>Manchester, 7th November, 1835.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I have received your letter in which you mention -‘<cite>Robinson’s Life of Picton</cite>;’ that work I have not seen. -It surprises me that any one should doubt that Picton -and Craufurd met on the day the French army invested -Almeida in 1810. I was wounded previously, and did not -therefore witness their interview; but I consider it certain -that Picton and Craufurd did meet on the 24th July, -1810, on the high ground on the left bank of the Coa -during the progress of the action, and that a brisk altercation -took place between them. They were primed and -ready for such an altercation, as angry communications -had passed between them previously regarding the disposal -of some sick of the light division. I have heard -Craufurd mention in joke his and Picton’s testiness with -each other, and I considered that he alluded both to the -quarrel as to the sick; and to that which occurred when -they met during the action at Almeida.</p> - -<p class="right"> -“<span class="smcap">J. S. Kennedy.</span>”<br /> -</p> - -<p>“<em>Colonel Napier, &c. &c. &c.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p1 negin1"><em>Testimony of colonel William Campbell, who was on general -Craufurd’s staff at the action on the Coa, July 24, -1810.</em></p> - -<p class="right"> -“<em>Esplanade, Dover, 13th Nov. 1835.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“Your letter from Freshford has not been many minutes -in my hands; I hasten to reply. General Picton <em>did</em> -come out of Pinhel on the day of the Coa combat as you -term it. It was in the afternoon of that day when all the -regiments were in retreat, and general Craufurd was with -his staff and others on the heights above, that, I think, on -notice being given of general Picton’s approach, general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii"></a>[vii]</span> -Craufurd turned and moved to meet him. Slight was the -converse, short the interview, for upon Craufurd’s asking -enquiringly, whether general Picton did not consider it -advisable to move out something from Pinhel in demonstration -of support, or to cover the light division, in terms -not bland, the general made it understood that ‘he should -do no such thing.’ This as you may suppose put an end -to the meeting, further than some violent rejoinder on the -part of my much-loved friend, and fiery looks returned! -We went our several ways, general Picton, I think, proceeding -onwards a hundred yards to take a peep at the -bridge. This is my testimony.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span style="margin-right: 7.5em;">“Yours truly,</span><br /> -“<span class="smcap">William Campbell</span>.”<br /> -</p> - -<p>“<span class="smcap">Colonel Napier, &c. &c. &c.</span>”</p> - - -<p class="p1"><ins class="corr" id="tn-vii" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: '2º.' was missing"> -2º.</ins> <em>Battle of Busaco.</em>—Mr. Robinson upon the authority of -one of general Picton’s letters, has endeavoured to show -that my description of this battle is a mass of errors; but -it shall be proved that his criticism is so, and that general -Picton’s letter is very bad authority.</p> - -<p>In my work it is said that the allies resisted vigorously, -yet the French gained the summit of the ridge, and while -the leading battalions established themselves on the crowning -rocks, others wheeled to their right, intending to sweep -the summit of the Sierra, but were driven down again in a -desperate charge made by the left of the third division.</p> - -<p>Picton’s letter says, that the head of the enemy’s column -got possession of a rocky point on the crest of the position, -and that they were followed by the remainder of a large -column which was driven down in a desperate charge made -by the left of the third division.</p> - -<p>So far we are agreed. But Picton gives the merit of -the charge to the light companies of the seventy-fourth -and eighty-eighth regiments, and a wing of the forty-fifth -aided by <em>the eighth Portuguese regiment, under major Birmingham</em>, -whereas, in the History the whole merit is given<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii"></a>[viii]</span> -to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth regiments. Lord Wellington’s -despatch gives the merit to the forty-fifth, and -eighty-eighth, aided by the eighth Portuguese regiment, -<em>under colonel Douglas</em>. The “<cite>Reminiscences of a Subaltern</cite>,” -written by an officer of the eighty-eighth regiment, and -published in the United Service Journal, in like manner, -gives the merit to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth British -regiments, and the <em>eighth Portuguese</em>.</p> - -<p>It will presently be seen why I took no notice of the -share the eighth Portuguese are said to have had in this -brilliant achievement. Meanwhile the reader will observe -that Picton’s letter indicates the <em>centre</em> of his division as -being forced by the French, and he affirms that he drove -them down again with his <em>left</em> wing without aid from the -fifth division. But my statement makes both the <em>right</em> -and <em>centre</em> of his division to be forced, and gives the fifth -division, and especially colonel Cameron and the ninth -British regiment, a very large share in the glory, moreover -I say that the <em>eighth Portuguese was broken to pieces</em>. Mr. -Robinson argues that this must be wrong, for, says he, -the eighth Portuguese <em>were not broken</em>, and if the right of -the third division had been forced, the French would have -encountered the fifth division. To this he adds, with a -confidence singularly rash, his scanty knowledge of facts -considered, that colonel Cameron and the ninth regiment -would doubtless have made as good a charge as I have -described, “<em>only they were not there</em>.”</p> - -<p>In reply, it is now affirmed distinctly and positively, that -the French did break the eighth Portuguese regiment, did -gain the rocks on the summit of the position, and on the -<em>right</em> of the third division; did ensconce themselves in those -rocks, and were going to sweep the summit of the Sierra -when the fifth division under general Leith attacked -them; and the ninth regiment led by colonel Cameron did -form under fire, as described, did charge, and did beat the -enemy out of those rocks; and if they had not done so, -the third division, then engaged with other troops, would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix"></a>[ix]</span> -have been in a very critical situation. Not only is all this -re-affirmed, but it shall be proved by the most irrefragable -testimony. It will then follow that the History is accurate, -that general Picton’s letter is inaccurate, and the writer -of his life incompetent to censure others.</p> - -<p>Mr. Robinson may notwithstanding choose to abide by -the authority of general Picton’s letter, which he “fortunately -found amongst that general’s manuscripts,” but -which others less fortunate had found in <em>print</em> many years -before; and he is the more likely to do so, because he has -asserted that if general Picton’s letters are false, they are -wilfully so, an assertion which it is impossible to assent to. -It would be hard indeed if a man’s veracity was to be -called in question because his letters, written in the hurry -of service gave inaccurate details of a battle. General -Picton wrote what he believed to be the fact, but to give -any historical weight to his letter on this occasion, in -opposition to the testimony which shall now be adduced -against its accuracy, would be weakness. And with the -more reason it is rejected, because Mr. Robinson himself -admits that another letter, written by general Picton on -this occasion to the duke of Queensbury, was so inaccurate -as to give general offence to the army; and because his -letters on two other occasions are as incorrect as on this of -Busaco.</p> - -<p>Thus writing of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, Picton -says, “about this time, namely, when the third division -carried the main breach, the light division which was -rather late in their attack, also succeeded in getting -possession of the breach they were ordered to attack.” -Now it has been proved to demonstration, that the light -division carried the small breach, and were actually attacking -the flank of the French troops defending the great -breach, when the third division carried that point. This -indeed is so certain, that Mr. Uniack of the ninety-fifth, and -others of the light division, were destroyed on the ramparts -close to the great breach by that very explosion which was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x"></a>[x]</span> -said to have killed general M’Kinnon; and some have gone -so far as to assert that it is doubtful if the great breach -would have been carried at all but for the flank attack of -the light division.</p> - -<p>Again, general Picton writing of the battle of Fuentes -Onoro, says “the light division under general Craufurd -was rather <em>roughly handled by the enemy’s cavalry</em>, and -had that arm of the French army been as daring and -active upon this occasion, as they were when following us -to the lines of Torres Vedras, they would doubtless have -cut off the light division to a man.”</p> - -<p>Nevertheless as an eye-witness, and, being then a field-officer -on the staff, by Mr. Robinson’s rule entitled to see, -I declare most solemnly that the French cavalry, though -they often menaced to charge, never came within sure -shot distance of the light division. The latter, with the -exception of the ninety-fifth rifles, who were skirmishing -in the wood of Pozo Velho, was formed by regiments in -three squares, flanking and protecting each other, they -retired over the plain leisurely without the loss of a man, -without a sabre-wound being received, without giving or -receiving fire; they moved in the most majestic manner -secure in their discipline and strength, which was such -as would have defied all the cavalry that ever charged -under Tamerlane or Genghis.</p> - -<p>But it is time to give the proofs relative to Busaco, the -reader being requested to compare them with the description -of that battle in my History.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"> -<em>Extracts from major-general sir John Cameron’s letters</em><br /> -<em>to colonel Napier.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p class="right"> -“<em>Government House, Devonport, Aug. 9th</em>, 1834.<br /> -</p> - -<p>“—I am sorry to perceive in the recent publication of -lord Beresford, his ‘<cite>Refutation of your justification of -your third volume</cite>,’ some remarks on the battle of Busaco -which disfigure, not intentionally I should hope, the operations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi"></a>[xi]</span> -of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s -corps on that occasion, of which I, as commanding officer -of one of the regiments composing it, may perhaps be permitted -to know something. I shall however content myself -at present with giving you a detail of the operations of the -British brigade in major-general Leith’s <em>own words</em>, extracted -from a document in my possession, every syllable -of which can be verified by many distinguished officers now -living, some of them actors in, all of them eye-witnesses to -the affair.</p> - -<p>“‘The ground where the British brigade was now moving, -was behind a chain of rocky eminences where it had -appeared clearly, the enemy was successfully pushing to -establish himself and precluded major-general Leith from -seeing at that moment the progress the enemy was making, -but by the information of staff officers stationed on purpose -who communicated his direction and progress. Major-general -Leith moved the British brigade so as to endeavour -to meet and check the enemy when he had gained the -ascendancy. At this time a heavy fire of musketry was -kept upon the height, the smoke of which prevented a clear -view of the state of things. When however the rock -forming the high part of the Sierra became visible, the -enemy appeared in full possession of it, and a French -officer was in the act of cheering with his hat off, while a -continual fire was kept up from thence and along the whole -face of the Sierra, in a diagonal direction towards the bottom, -by the enemy ascending rapidly from the successive -columns formed for the attack, on a mass of soldiers from -the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments, who having been -severely pressed had given way and were rapidly retiring -in complete confusion and disorder. Major-general Leith -on that occasion spoke to Major Birmingham (who was on -foot, having had his horse killed), who stated that the fugitives -were of the ninth Portuguese as well as the eighth -regiment, and that he had ineffectually tried to check -their retreat. Major-general Leith addressed and succeeded<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii"></a>[xii]</span> -in stopping them, and they cheered when he -ordered them to be collected and formed in the rear. They -were passing as they retired diagonally to the right of the -ninth British regiment. The face of affairs in this quarter -now bore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been -the assailant having dispersed or driven every thing opposed -to him was in possession of the rocky eminence of the Sierra -at this part of major-general Picton’s position without a -shot then being fired at him. Not a moment was to be -lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack -the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the -ninth British regiment, which had hitherto been moving -rapidly by its left in column in order to gain the most -advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the -line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, -and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had -just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence -which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for -the first time perceived the British brigade under him. -Major-general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth -regiment should have moved on in rear of, and to the left -of, the ninth British regiment, to have turned the enemy -beyond the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible -towards the rear of the Sierra, while the ninth should have -gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height; the royal -Scots to have been posted (as they were) in reserve. But -the enemy having driven every thing before him in that -quarter afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of -the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was -possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, -although not a moment had been lost in marching -to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had -made a rapid movement of more than two miles without -halting and frequently in double-quick time. The thirty-eighth -regiment was therefore directed to form also and -support when major-general Leith led the ninth regiment -to attack the enemy on the rocky ridge, which they did<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiii"></a>[xiii]</span> -without filing a shot. That part which looks behind the -Sierra (as already stated) was inaccessible and afforded -the enemy the advantage of outflanking the ninth on the -left as they advanced, but the order, celerity, and coolness -with which they attacked panic-struck the enemy, who -immediately gave way on being charged with the bayonet, -and the whole was driven down the face of the Sierra in -confusion and with immense loss, from a destructive fire -which the ninth regiment opened upon him as he fled with -precipitation after the charge.’</p> - -<p>“I shall merely add two observations on what has been -asserted in the ‘<cite>Refutation</cite>.’</p> - -<p>“First with regard to the confusion and retreat of a portion -of the Portuguese troops, I certainly did not know at -the moment what Portuguese corps the fugitives were of, -but after the action I understood they were belonging to -the eighth Portuguese; a very considerable number of -them were crossing the front of the British column dispersed -in sixes and sevens over the field just before I -wheeled the ninth regiment into line for the attack. I -pushed on a few yards to entreat them to keep out of our -way, which they understood and called out ‘<i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">viva los -Ingleses, valerosos Portugueses</i>.’</p> - -<p>“As regards any support which the Portuguese afforded -the British brigade in the pursuit, I beg to say that during -the charge, while leading the regiment in front of the -centre, my horse was killed under me, which for a moment -retarded my own personal advance, and on extricating -myself from under him, I turned round and saw the thirty-eighth -regiment close up with us and the royal Scots -appearing over the ridge in support; but did not see any -Portuguese join in the pursuit, indeed it would have been -imprudent in them to attempt such a thing, for at the time -a brisk cannonade was opened upon us from the opposite -side of the ravine.</p> - -<p>“This, my dear colonel, is, on my honour, an account of -the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv"></a>[xiv]</span> -corps at Busaco. It will be satisfactory to you to know that -the information you received has been correct. The anonymous -officer of the ninth regiment I do not know. There -were several very capable of furnishing you with good information -on the transactions of that day, not only as -regarded their own immediate corps, but those around -them. Colonel Waller I should consider excellent authority; -that gallant officer must have been an eye-witness to -all that passed in the divisions of Picton and Leith. I -remember on our approach to the scene of confusion he -delivered me a message from general Picton, intended -for general Leith, at the time reconnoitring, to hasten our -advance.”</p> - - -<p class="right"> -“<em>Government House, Devonport, Aug. 21, 1834.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“——The fact really is that both the eighth and ninth -Portuguese regiments gave way that morning, and I am -positive that I am not far wrong in saying, that there were -not of Portuguese troops within my view, at the moment I -wheeled the ninth regiment into line, one hundred men -prepared either for attack or defence. Sir James Douglas -partly admits that his wing was broken when he says that -‘if we were at any time <em>broken</em> it was from the too ardent -wish of a corps of boy recruits to close.’ Now it is perfectly -clear that the wing of the regiment under Major -Birmingham fled, from what that officer said to general -Leith. Sir James Douglas states also that ‘no candid -man will deny that he supported the royals and ninth -regiment, though before that he says, that ‘by an oblique -movement he joined in the charge.’ I might safely -declare on oath that the Portuguese never shewed themselves -beyond the ridge of the Sierra that morning.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span style="margin-right: 4em;">“Very faithfully yours,</span><br /> -“<span class="smcap">John Cameron</span>.”<br /> -</p> - - -<p>As these letters from general Cameron refer to some of -marshal Beresford’s errors, as well as Mr. Robinson’s, an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xv"></a>[xv]</span> -extract from a letter of colonel Thorne’s upon the same -subject will not be misplaced here.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"> -<em>Colonel Thorne to colonel Napier.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p class="right"> -“<em>Harborne Lodge, 28th Aug. 1834.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>Extract.—“Viscount Beresford in the ‘<cite>Refutation of -your Justification of your third volume</cite>,’ has doubted the -accuracy of the strength of the third dragoon guards and -fourth dragoons on the 20th March 1811, as extracted by -you from the journal which I lent to you. As I felt confident -I had not inserted any thing therein, which I did not -obtain from <em>official documents</em>, that were in my possession -at the time it was written, I have, since the perusal of the -‘Refutation,’ looked over some of my Peninsula papers, -and I am happy to say I have succeeded in finding -amongst them, the monthly returns of quarters of the -division of cavalry commanded by brigadier-general -Long, dated Los Santos, April 20th, 1811, which was -then sent to me by the deputy assistant quarter-master -general of that division, and which I beg to enclose for -your perusal, in order that you may see the statement I -have made of the strength of that force in my journal <em>is to -be relied upon, although his lordship insinuates to the contrary</em>, -and that it contains <em>something more than</em> ‘<em>the depositary -of the rumours of a camp</em>.’”</p> - - -<p class="p1 negin1"><em>Extract from memorandum of the battle of Busaco, by -colonel Waller, assistant quarter-master-general to the -second division.</em></p> - -<p>“—The attack commenced on the right wing, consisting -of Picton’s division, by the enemy opening a fire of artillery -upon the right of the British which did but little injury, -the range being too great to prove effective. At this -moment were seen the heads of the several attacking columns, -<span class="smcap">three, I think</span>, in number, and deploying into<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvi"></a>[xvi]</span> -line with the most beautiful precision, celerity, and gallantry.</p> - -<p>“As they formed on the plateau they were cannonaded -from our position, and the regiment of Portuguese, either -the eighth or the <em>16th Infantry</em>, which were formed in advance -in <em>front</em> of the <em>74th regiment</em>, threw in some volleys -of musketry into the enemy’s columns in a flank direction, -but the regiment was quickly driven into the position.</p> - -<p>“More <em>undaunted</em> courage never was displayed by <em>French</em> -troops than on <em>this</em> occasion: it could not have been surpassed, -for their columns advanced in despite of a tremendous -fire of grape and musketry from our troops in -position in the rocks, and overcoming all opposition, -although repeatedly charged by Lightburne’s brigade, or -rather by the whole of Picton’s division, they advanced, and -fairly drove the <span class="smcap">British right</span> wing from the rocky part -of the position.</p> - -<p>“<em>Being an eye-witness</em> of this critical moment, and -seeing that unless the ground was quickly recovered <em>the -right flank</em> of the army would <em>infallibly</em> be turned, and -the <em>great road</em> to Coimbra <em>unmasked</em>, seeing also that -heavy columns of the enemy were descending into the -valley to operate by the <em>road</em>, and to support the attack of -the Sierra, and to cut off lord Wellington’s communication -with Coimbra, I instantly galloped off to the rear to bring -up general Hill’s corps to Picton’s support. Having proceeded -about <em>two</em> miles along the upper edge and reverse -side of the Sierra, I fell in with the head of general -Leith’s column moving <em>left in front</em>, at the head of which -was colonel Cameron’s brigade, led by the ninth regiment. -I immediately rode up to colonel Cameron, and addressed -him in an anxious tone as follows.</p> - -<p>“‘Pray, sir, who commands this brigade?’ ‘I do,’ -replied the colonel, ‘I am colonel Cameron.’</p> - -<p>“‘Then for God’s sake, sir, move off instantly at <em>double-quick</em> -with your brigade to Picton’s support; not <em>one -moment</em> is to be lost, the enemy in great force are already<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvii"></a>[xvii]</span> -in possession of the <em>right of the position</em> on the Sierra and -have driven Picton’s troops out of it. Move on, and when -the rear of your brigade has passed the Coimbra road -wheel into line, and you will embrace the point of attack.’ -Colonel Cameron did not hesitate <em>or balance</em> an <span class="allsmcap">INSTANT</span>, -but giving the word ‘double-quick’ to his brigade nobly -led them to battle and to victory.</p> - -<p>“The brave colonel attacked the enemy with such a -gallant and irresistible impetuosity, that after some time -fighting he recovered the ground which Picton had lost, -inflicting <em>heavy slaughter</em> on the elite of the enemy’s -troops. The ninth regiment behaved on this occasion with -conspicuous gallantry, as <em>indeed</em> did <span class="allsmcap">ALL</span> the <span class="allsmcap">REGIMENTS</span> -engaged. Great numbers of the enemy had descended -low down in the rear of the position towards the Coimbra -road, and were killed; the whole position was thickly -strewed with their killed and wounded; amongst which <em>were -many of our own troops</em>. The French were the finest men -I ever saw. I spoke to several of the wounded men, -light infantry and grenadiers, who were bewailing their -unhappy fate on being defeated, assuring me they were the -heroes of Austerlitz who had never before met with -defeat!</p> - -<p class="right"> -“<span class="smcap">Robert Waller</span>, <em>Lieut.-colonel</em>.”<br /> -</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"> -<em>Extract of a letter from colonel Taylor, ninth regiment, to</em><br /> -<em>colonel Napier.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p class="right"> -“<em>Fernhill, near Evesham, 26th April, 1832.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“<span class="smcap">Dear Sir</span>,</p> - -<p>“I have just received a letter from colonel Shaw, in which -he quotes a passage from one of yours to him, expressive -of your wish, if necessary, to print a passage from a statement -which I made respecting the conduct of the ninth -regiment at Busaco, and in reference to which, I have -alluded to the discomfiture of the eighth Portuguese upon -the same occasion. I do not exactly recollect the terms I -made use of to colonel Shaw (nor indeed the shape which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xviii"></a>[xviii]</span> -my communication wore) but, my object was to bring to -light the distinguished conduct of the ninth without any -wish to, unnecessarily, obscure laurels, which others wore, -even at their expense!</p> - -<p>“To account for the affair in question, I could not however -well omit to state, that it was in consequence of the -overthrow of the eighth Portuguese, that sir James Leith’s -British brigade was called upon, and it is remarkable, that -at the time, there was a considerable force of Portuguese -(I think it was the old Lusitanian Legion which had -just been modelled into two battalions) <em>between</em> Leith’s -British and where the eighth were being engaged, Leith -pushed on his brigade double-quick, column of sections left -in front, past these Portuguese, nor did he halt until he -came in contact with the enemy who had <em>crowned the -heights</em> and were firing from behind the rocks, the ninth -wheeled up into line, fired and charged, and all of the -eighth Portuguese that was to be seen, at least by me, a -company officer at the time, was some ten or a dozen men -at <em>the outside</em>, with their commanding officer, but he and -they were amongst the very foremost in the ranks of the -ninth British. As an officer in the ranks of course I could -not see much of what was going on generally, neither could -I well have been mistaken as to what I did see, coming -almost within my very contact! Colonel Waller, now, I -believe on the Liverpool staff, was the officer who came to -sir James Leith for assistance, I presume from Picton.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span style="margin-right: 7.5em;">“Yours, &c.</span><br /> -“<span class="smcap">J. Taylor</span>.”<br /> -</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"> -<em>Second communication from major-general sir John</em><br /> -<em>Cameron to colonel Napier.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p class="right"> -<em>Stoke Devonport, Nov. 21st, 1835.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“<span class="smcap">My dear colonel</span>,</p> - -<p>“Some months ago I took the liberty of pointing out to -you certain mis-statements contained in a publication of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xix"></a>[xix]</span> -lord Beresford regarding the operations of the British -brigade in major-general Leith’s corps at the battle of -Busaco, and as those mis-statements are again brought -before the public in Robinson’s Life of sir Thomas Picton I -am induced to trouble you with some remarks upon what -is therein advanced. A paragraph in major-general -Picton’s letter to lord Wellington, dated 10th November, -1810, which I first discovered some years ago in the -Appendix No. 12 of Jones’s War in Spain, &c. &c. would -appear to be the document upon which Mr. Robinson -grounds his contradiction of your statement of the conduct -of the ninth regiment at Busaco, but <em>that</em> paragraph, which -runs as follows, I am bound to say is <em>not</em> the truth. ‘Major-general -Leith’s brigade in consequence marched on, and -arrived in time to <em>join</em> the five companies of the forty-fifth -regiment under the honourable lieutenant-colonel Meade -and the eighth Portuguese regiment under lieutenant-colonel -Douglas in repulsing the enemy.’ This assertion -of major-general Picton is, I repeat, <em>not true</em>, for, in the -first place I did not see the forty-fifth regiment on that day, -nor was I at any period during the action near them or -any other British regiment to my left. In the second, as -regards the eighth Portuguese regiment, the ninth British -did not most assuredly join <em>that</em> corps in its retrograde -movement. That major-general Picton left his right flank -exposed, there can be no question, and had not assistance, -and <em>British</em> assistance too, come up to his aid as it did I am -inclined to believe that sir Thomas would have cut a very -different figure in the despatch to what he did!! Having -already given you a detail of the defeat of the enemy’s -column which was permitted to gain the ascendency in -considerable force on the right of the third division, I beg -leave to refer you to the gallant officers I mentioned in a -former letter, who were not only eye-witnesses to the -charge made by the ninth regiment but actually distinguished -themselves in front of the regiment at the side -of their brave accomplished general during that charge.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xx"></a>[xx]</span> -I believe the whole of sir Rowland Hill’s division from a -bend in the Sierra could see the ninth in their pursuit of -the enemy, and though last not the least in importance, as -a party concerned, I may mention the present major-general -sir James T. Barns, who commanded the British -brigade under major-general Leith, (I omitted this gallant -officer’s name in my former letter) as the major-general -took the entire command and from him alone I received -all orders during the action.</p> - -<p>“I have now done with Mr. Robinson and his work -which was perhaps hardly worth my notice.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span style="margin-right: 5.5em;">“I am, my dear Colonel,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-right: 4em;">“Very sincerely yours,</span><br /> -“<span class="smcap">J. Cameron</span>.”<br /> -</p> - - -<p class="p1">Having now sufficiently exposed the weakness of Mr. -Robinson’s attack upon me, it would be well perhaps to -say with sir J. Cameron “I have done with his work,” -but I am tempted to notice two points more.</p> - -<p>Treating of the storming of Badajos, Mr. Robinson says,</p> - -<p>“Near the appointed time while the men were waiting -with increased anxiety Picton with his staff came up. The -troops fell in, all were in a moment silent until the general -in his calm and impressive manner addressed a few words -to each regiment. The signal was not yet given, but the -enemy by means of lighted carcasses discovered the position -of Picton’s soldiers; to delay longer would only have -been to expose his men unnecessarily; he therefore gave -the word to march.”——“Picton’s soldiers set up a loud -shout and rushed forward up the steep <em>to the ditch at the -foot of the castle walls</em>.—General Kempt who had thus far -been with Picton at the head of the division was here -badly wounded and carried to the rear. Picton was -therefore left alone to conduct the assault.”</p> - -<p>Now strange to say Picton was not present when the -signal was given, and consequently could neither address -his men in his “usual calm impressive manner,” nor give<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxi"></a>[xxi]</span> -them the word to march. There was no ditch at the foot -of the castle walls to rush up to, and, as the following letter -proves, general Kempt alone led the division to the attack.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"> -<em>Extract of a letter from lieutenant-general sir James</em><br /> -<em>Kempt, K. C. B., master-general of the Ordnance, &c. &c.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p class="right"> -<em>Pall Mall, 10th May, 1833.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“According to the first arrangement made by lord -Wellington, my brigade only of the third division was -destined to attack the castle by escalade. The two other -brigades were to have attacked the bastion adjoining the -castle, and to open a communication with it. <em>On the day, -however, before the assault</em> took place, this arrangement -was changed by lord Wellington, a French deserter from -the castle (a serjeant of sappers) gave information that no -communication could be established between the castle -and the adjoining bastion, there being (he stated) only one -communication between the castle and the town, and upon -learning this, the whole of the third division were ordered -by lord Wellington to attack the castle. But as my brigade -only was originally destined for the service, and was to -lead the attack, the arrangements for the escalade were in -a great measure confided to me by general Picton.</p> - -<p>“The division had to <em>file</em> across a very narrow bridge to -the attack under a fire from the castle and the troops in -the covered way. It was ordered to commence at ten -o’clock, but by means of fire-balls the formation of our -troops at the head of the trench was discovered by the -French, who opened a heavy fire on them, and the attack -was commenced <em>from necessity</em> nearly half an hour before -the time ordered. I was severely wounded in the foot on -the glacis after passing the Rivillas almost at the commencement -of the attack <em>in the trenches</em>, and met Picton -coming to the front on my being carried to the rear. If -the attack had not commenced till the hour ordered, he, I -have no doubt, would have been on the spot to direct in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxii"></a>[xxii]</span> -person the commencement of the operations. I have no -<em>personal</em> knowledge of what took place afterwards, but I -was informed that after surmounting the most formidable -difficulties, the escalade was effected by means of <em>two</em> -ladders only in the first instance in the middle of the -night, and there can be no question that Picton was -present in the assault. In giving an account of this -operation, pray bear in mind that <em>he</em> commanded the -division, and to <em>him</em> and the enthusiastic valour and determination -of the troops ought its success alone to be -attributed.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span style="margin-right: 10em;">“Yours, &c.</span><br /> -“<span class="smcap">James Kempt</span>.”<br /> -</p> - -<p>“<em>Colonel Napier, &c.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p1">The other point to which I would allude is the battle of -Salamanca. Mr. Robinson, with his baton of military -criticism, belabours the unfortunate Marmont unmercifully, -and with an unhappy minuteness of detail, first places -general Foy’s troops on the <em>left</em> of the French army and -then destroys them by the bayonets of the third division, -although the poor man and his unlucky soldiers were all -the time on the <em>right</em> of the French army, and were never -engaged with the third division at all. This is however -but a slight blemish for Mr. Robinson’s book, and his -competence to criticise Marmont’s movements is no whit -impaired thereby. I wish however to assure him that the -expression put into the mouth of the late sir Edward -Pakenham is “<i lang="it" xml:lang="it">né vero né ben trovato</i>.” Vulgar swaggering -was no part of that amiable man’s character, which was -composed of as much gentleness, as much generosity, as -much frankness, and as much spirit as ever commingled in -a noble mind. Alas! that he should have fallen so soon -and so sadly!! His answer to lord Wellington, when the -latter ordered him to attack, was not, “I will, my lord, by -God!” With the bearing of a gallant gentleman who had -resolved to win or perish, he replied, “Yes, if you will<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxiii"></a>[xxiii]</span> -give me one grasp of that conquering right hand.” But -these finer lines do not suit Mr. Robinson’s carving of a -hero; his manner is more after the coarse menacing idols -of the South-Sea Islands, than the delicate gracious forms -of Greece.</p> - -<p>Advice to authors is generally thrown away, yet Mr. -Robinson would do well to rewrite his book with fewer -inaccuracies, and fewer military disquisitions, avoiding to -swell its bulk with such long extracts from my work, and -remembering also that English commissaries are not “<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">feræ -naturæ</i>” to be hanged, or otherwise destroyed at the pleasure -of divisional generals. This will save him the trouble of -attributing to sir Thomas Picton all the standard jokes -and smart sayings, for the scaring of those gentry, which -have been current ever since the American war, and which -have probably come down to us from the Greeks. The -reduction of bulk, which an attention to these matters will -produce, may be compensated by giving us more information -of Picton’s real services, towards which I contribute -the following information. Picton in his youth served as a -marine, troops being then used in that capacity, and it is -believed he was in one of the great naval victories. Mr. Robinson -has not mentioned this, and it would be well also, if -he were to learn and set forth some of the general’s generous -actions towards the widows of officers who fell under -his command: they are to be discovered, and would do -more honour to his memory than a thousand blustering -anecdotes. With these changes and improvements, the -life of sir Thomas Picton may perhaps, in future, escape -the equivocal compliment of the newspaper puffers, namely, -that it is “a military romance.”</p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxiv"></a>[xxiv]</span></p> - -<p class="p1" id="Quarterly"><cite>Quarterly Review.</cite>—This is but a sorry attack to repel. -“<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle</i>,” but “rats and mice -and such small deer have been Tom’s food for many a -year.”</p> - -<p>The reviewer does not like my work, and he invokes -the vinous vagaries of Mr. Coleridge in aid of his own -spleen. I do not like his work, or Mr. Coleridge either, -and I console myself with a maxim of the late eccentric -general Meadows, who being displeased to see his officers -wear their cocked hats awry, issued an order beginning -thus:—“All men have fancy, few have taste.” Let that -pass. I am ready to acknowledge real errors, and to -give my authorities for disputed facts.</p> - -<p>1º. I admit that the road which leads over the Pyrennees -to Pampeluna does not <em>unite</em> at that town with the -royal causeway; yet the error was <em>ty</em>pographical, not -<em>to</em>pographical, because the course of the royal causeway -was shewn, just before, to be through towns very distant -from Pampeluna. The true reading should be “<em>united -with the first by a branch road commencing at Pampeluna</em>.”</p> - -<p>2º. The reviewer says, the mountains round Madrid -do not touch the Tagus at both ends within the frontier of -Spain, that river is not the chord of their arc; neither -are the heights of Palmela and Almada near Lisbon one -and the same. This is very true, although not very important. -I should have written the heights of Palmela -<em>and</em> Almada, instead of the heights of Palmela <em>or</em> Almada. -But though the mountains round Madrid do not -to the westward, actually touch the Tagus within the -Spanish frontier, their shoots are scarcely three miles from -that river near Talavera, and my description was general, -being intended merely to shew that Madrid could not be -approached from the eastward or northward, except over -one of the mountain ranges, a fact not to be disputed.</p> - -<p>3º. It is hinted by the reviewer that lord Melville’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxv"></a>[xxv]</span> -degrading observation, namely, that “the worst men -made the best soldiers,” was picked by me out of general -Foy’s historical fragment. Now, that passage in my -history was written many months before general Foy’s -work was published; and my authority was a very clear -recollection of lord Melville’s speech, as reported in the -papers of the day. The time was just before his impeachment -for malversation.</p> - -<p>General Foy’s work seems a favourite authority with -the reviewer, and he treats general Thiebault’s work with -disdain; yet both were Frenchmen of eminence, and the -ennobling patriotism of vituperation might have been impartially -exercised, the weakness of discrimination avoided. -However general Thiebault’s work, with some apparent -inaccuracies as to numbers, is written with great ability -and elegance, and is genuine, whereas general Foy’s -history is not even general Foy’s writing; colonel D’Esmenard -in his recent translation of the Prince of Peace’s -memoirs has the following conclusive passage upon that -head.</p> - -<p>“<em>The illustrious general Foy undertook a history of -the war in Spain, his premature death prevented him from -revising and purifying his first sketch, he did me the -honour to speak of it several times, and even attached -some value to my observations; the imperfect manuscripts -of this brilliant orator have been re-handled and re-made -by other hands. In this posthumous history, he has been -gratuitously provided with inaccurate and malignant assertions.</em>”</p> - -<p>While upon this subject, it is right to do justice to -Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace. A sensual and -corrupt man he was generally said to be, and I called<span class="sidenote">See Memoirs of Manuel Godoy, translated by Colonel D’Esmenard.</span> -him so, without sufficient consideration of the extreme -exaggerations which the Spaniards always display in their -hatred. The prince has now defended himself; colonel -D’Esmenard and other persons well acquainted with the -dissolute manners of the Spanish capital, and having personal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxvi"></a>[xxvi]</span> -experience of Godoy’s character and disposition,<span class="sidenote">See also London & Westminster Review No 1.</span> -have testified that his social demeanour was decent and -reserved, and his disposition generous; wherefore I express -my regret at having ignorantly and unintentionally -calumniated him.</p> - -<p>To return to the reviewer. He is continually observing -that he does not know my authority for such and such a -fact, and therefore he insinuates, that no such fact had -place, thus making his ignorance the measure of my -accuracy. This logic seems to be akin to that of the -wild-beast showman, who declares that “the little negro -boys tie the ostrich bird’s leg to a tree, which fully accounts -for the milk in the cocoa-nuts.” I might reply -generally as the late alderman Coombe did to a certain -baronet, who, in a dispute, was constantly exclaiming, -“I don’t know that, Mr. Alderman! I don’t know that!” -“Ah, sir George! all that you <em>don’t know</em> would make -a large book!” However it will be less witty, but more -conclusive to furnish at least some of my authorities.</p> - -<p>1º. In opposition to the supposititious general Foy’s -account of Solano’s murder, and in support of my own -history, I give the authority of sir Hew Dalrymple, from -whom the information was obtained; a much better authority -than Foy, because he was in close correspondence -with the insurgents of Seville at the time, and had an -active intelligent agent there.</p> - -<p>2º. Against the supposititious Foy’s authority as to the -numbers of the French army in June 1808, the authority -of Napoleon’s imperial returns is pleaded. From these -returns my estimate of the French forces in Spain during -May 1808 was taken, and it is so stated in my <a href="#NO_XVIII">Appendix.</a> -The inconsistency of the reviewer himself may -also be noticed, for he marks my number as <em>exclusive</em> of -Junot’s army, and yet <em>includes</em> that army in what he calls -Foy’s estimate! But Junot’s army was more than 29,000 -and not 24,000 as the supposititious Foy has it, and that -number taken from 116,000 which, though wrong, is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxvii"></a>[xxvii]</span> -Foy’s estimate of the whole leaves less than 87,000. I -said 80,000. The difference is not great, yet my authority -is the best, and the reviewer feels that it is so, -or he would also have adopted general Foy’s numbers -of the French at the combat of Roliça. In Foy’s -history they are set down as less than 2,500, in mine -they are called 5,000. He may be right, but it would -not suit the reviewer to adopt a <em>truth</em> from a French -writer.</p> - -<p>3º. On the negative proofs afforded 1º. by the absence -of any quoted voucher in my work, 2º. by the absence of -any acknowledgement of such a fact in general Anstruther’s -manuscript journal, which journal may or may not -be garbled, the reviewer asserts that the English ministers -never contemplated the appointing of a military governor -for Cadiz. Against this, let the duke of Wellington’s -authority be pleaded, for in my note-book of conversations -held with his grace upon the subject of my history, -the following passage occurs:—</p> - -<p>“The ministers were always wishing to occupy Cadiz, -lord Wellington thinks this a folly, Cadiz was rather a -burthen to him, but either general Spencer or general -Anstruther was intended to command there, thinks it was -Anstruther, he came out with his appointment.”</p> - -<p>Now it is possible that as Acland’s arrival was also the -subject of conversation, his name was mentioned instead -of Anstruther’s; and it is also possible, as the note shows, -that Spencer was the man, but the main fact relative to -the government could not have been mistaken. To balance -this, however, there undoubtedly is an error as to the -situation of general Anstruther’s brigade at the battle of -Vimiero. It appears by an extract from his journal, that -it was disposed, not, as the reviewer says, on the right of -Fane’s brigade, but at various places, part being on the -right of Fane, part upon his left, part held in reserve. -The forty-third were on the left of Fane, the fifty-second -and ninety-seventh on his right, the ninth in reserve, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxviii"></a>[xxviii]</span> -error is therefore very trivial, being simply the describing -two regiments as of Fane’s brigade, when they were of -Anstruther’s without altering their position. What does -the public care whether it was a general called Fane, or a -general called Anstruther, who was on the right hand if -the important points of the action are correctly described? -The fighting of the fifty-second and ninety-seventh has -indeed been but slightly noticed, in my history, under -the denomination of Fane’s right, whereas those regiments -make a good figure, and justly so, in Anstruther’s journal, -because it is the story of the brigade; but general history -ought not to enter into the details of regimental fighting, -save where the effects are decisive on the general result, -as in the case of the fiftieth and forty-third on this occasion. -The whole loss of the ninety-seventh and fifty-second -together did not exceed sixty killed and wounded, -whereas the fiftieth alone lost ninety, and the forty-third -one hundred and eighteen.</p> - -<p>While on the subject of Anstruther’s brigade, it is right -also to admit another error, one of place; that is if it be -true, as the reviewer says, that Anstruther landed at -Paymayo bay, and not at Maceira bay. The distance -between those places may be about five miles, and the -fact had no influence whatever on the operations; nevertheless -the error was not drawn from Mr. Southey’s history, -though I readily acknowledge I could not go to a -more copious source of error. With respect to the imputed -mistake as to time, viz. the day of Anstruther’s -landing, it is set down in my first edition as the 19th, -wherefore the 18th in the third edition is simply a mistake -of the press! Alas! poor reviewer!</p> - -<p>But there are graver charges. I have maligned the -worthy bishop of Oporto; and ill-used the patriotic -Gallician junta! Reader, the bishop of Oporto and the -patriarch of Lisbon are one and the same person! Examine -then my history and especially its appendix and -judge for yourself, whether the reviewer may not justly be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxix"></a>[xxix]</span> -addressed as the pope was by Richard I. when he sent -him the bishop of Beauvais’ bloody suit of mail. “See -now if this be thy son’s coat.” But the junta! Why it -is true that I said they glossed over the battle of Rio Seco -after the Spanish manner; that their policy was but a -desire to obtain money, and to avoid personal inconvenience; -that they gave sir Arthur Wellesley incorrect -statements of the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards -at Oporto, and a more inaccurate estimate of the French -army under Junot. All this is true. It is true that I have -said it, true that they did it. The reviewer <em>says</em> my -statement is a “gratuitous misrepresentation.” I will <em>prove</em> -that the reviewer’s remark is a gratuitous impertinence.</p> - -<p>1º. The junta informed sir Arthur Wellesley, that -Bessieres had twenty thousand men in the battle, whereas -he had but fifteen thousand.</p> - -<p>2º. That Cuesta lost only two guns, whereas he lost -eighteen.</p> - -<p>3º. That Bessieres lost seven thousand men and six -guns, whereas he lost only three hundred and fifty men, -and no guns.</p> - -<p>4º. That the Spanish army had retired to Benevente as -if it still preserved its consistence, whereas Blake and -Cuesta had quarrelled and separated, all the magazines -of the latter had been captured and the whole country -was at the mercy of the French. This was glossing it -over in the Spanish manner.</p> - -<p>Again the junta pretended that they desired the deliverance -of Portugal to enable them to unite with the -southern provinces in a general effort; but Mr. Stuart’s -letters prove that they would never unite at all with any -other province, and that their aim was to separate from -Spain altogether and join Portugal. Their wish to avoid -personal inconvenience was notorious, it was the cause of -their refusal to let sir David Baird’s troops disembark, it -was apparent to all who had to deal with them, and it -belongs to the national character. Then their eagerness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxx"></a>[xxx]</span> -to obtain money, and their unpatriotic use of it when -obtained, has been so amply set forth in various parts of -my history that I need not do more than refer to that, and -to my quoted authorities, especially in the second chapters -of the 3d and 14th Books. Moreover the reviewer’s -quotations belie his comments, and like the slow-worm -defined by Johnson “a blind worm, a large viper, <em>venomous</em>, -<em>not mortal</em>,” he is at once dull and malignant.</p> - -<p>The junta told sir Arthur Wellesley that ten thousand -Portuguese troops were at Oporto, and that two thousand -Spaniards, who had marched the 15th, would be there on -the 25th of July; yet when sir Arthur arrived at Oporto, -on the 25th, he found only fifteen hundred Portuguese -and three hundred Spaniards; the two thousand men said -to be in march had never moved and were not expected. -Here then instead of twelve thousand men, there were -only eighteen hundred! At Coimbra indeed eighty -miles from Oporto, there were five thousand militia and -regulars, one-third of which were unarmed, and according -to colonel Browne’s letter, as given in the folio edition -of the inquiry upon the Cintra convention, there were also -twelve hundred armed peasants which the reviewer has -magnified into twelve thousand. Thus without dwelling -on the difference of place, the difference between the true -numbers and the statements of the Gallician junta, was -four thousand; nor will it mend the matter if we admit -the armed peasants to be twelve thousand, for that would -make a greater difference on the other side.</p> - -<p>The junta estimated the French at fifteen thousand men, -but the embarkation returns of the number shipped after -the convention gave twenty-five thousand seven hundred and -sixty, making a difference of more than ten thousand men, -exclusive of those who had fallen or been captured in the -battles of Vimiero and Roliça, and of those who had died in -hospital! Have I not a right to treat these as inaccurate -statements; and the reviewer’s remark as an impertinence?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxi"></a>[xxxi]</span></p> - -<p>The reviewer speaking of the battle of Baylen scoffs at -the inconsistency of calling it an insignificant event and -yet attributing to it immense results. But my expression -was, an insignificant <em>action in itself</em>, which at once reconciles -the seeming contradiction, and this the writer who -has no honest healthy criticism, suppresses. My allusion -to the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, as being the -saviours of American independence, also excites his -morbid spleen, and assuming what is not true, namely, -that I selected that period as the time of the greatest -improvement in American discipline, he says, their soldiers -there were few, as if that bore at all upon the -question.</p> - -<p>But my expression is <em>at</em> Valley Forge not “<em>of</em> Valley -Forge.” The allusion was used figuratively to shew that -an armed peasantry cannot resist regular troops, and Washington’s -correspondence is one continued enforcement of -the principle, yet the expression may be also taken literally. -It was with the battalions <em>of</em> Valley Forge that -Washington drew Howe to the Delawarre, and twice -crossing that river in winter, surprised the Germans at -Trenton and beat the British at Prince Town. It was -with those battalions he made his attacks at German’s-town; -with those battalions he prevented Howe from -sending assistance to Burgoyne’s army, which was in -consequence captured. In fine, to use his own expression, -“The British eagle’s wings were spread, and with those -battalions he clipped them.” The American general,<span class="sidenote">See Stedman’s History, 4to. p. 285.</span> -however, at one time occupied, close to Valley Forge, a -camp in the Jerseys, bearing the odd name of <em>Quibble</em>-town, -on which probably the reviewer’s eye was fixed.</p> - -<p>But notwithstanding Quibble-town, enthusiasm will not -avail in the long run against discipline. Is authority -wanted? We have had Napoleon’s and Washington’s, -and now we have Wellington’s, for in the fifth volume of -his Despatches, p. 215, as compiled by colonel Gurwood,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxii"></a>[xxxii]</span> -will be found the following passage upon the arming of the -Spanish and Portuguese people.</p> - -<p>“Reflection and above all experience have shown me -the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of -view, and I only beg that those who have to contend with -the French, will not be diverted from the business of -raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies by -any notion that the people when armed and arrayed, will -be of, I will not say any, but of much, use to them. -The subject is too large for discussion in a paper of this -description, but I can show hundreds of instances to prove -the truth of as many reasons why exertions of this description -ought not to be relied on. At all events no officer -can calculate upon an operation to be performed against -the French by persons of this description, and I believe -that no officer will enter upon an operation against the -French without calculating his means most anxiously.”</p> - -<p>It is said that some officers of rank have furnished the -reviewer’s military criticisms, I can understand why, if the -fact be true, but it is difficult to believe that any officer -would even for the gratification of a contemptible jealousy, -have lent himself to the assertion that sir Arthur Wellesley -could not have made a <em>forced or a secret march</em> from -Vimiero to Mafra, because he was encumbered with four -hundred bullock-carts. Sir Arthur did certainly intend to<span class="sidenote">See his evidence, Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra.</span> -make that march, and he would as certainly not have -attempted such a flank movement <em>openly and deliberately</em> -while thus encumbered and moving at the rate of two -miles an hour, within a short distance of a general having -a more experienced army and an overwhelming cavalry. -The sneer is therefore directed more against sir Arthur -Wellesley than against me.</p> - -<p>This supposed officer of rank says that because the -enemy had a shorter road to move in retreat, his line of -march could not even be menaced, still less intercepted by -his opponent moving on the longer route! How then did<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxiii"></a>[xxxiii]</span> -Cæsar intercept Afranius and Petreius, Pompey’s lieutenants, -on the Sicoris? How Pompey himself at Dyrrachium? -How did Napoleon pass Beaulieu on the Po and -gain Lodi? How did Massena dislodge Wellington from -Busaco? How did Marmont turn him on the Guarena in -1812? How did Wellington himself turn the French on -the Douro and on the Ebro in 1813? And above all how -did he propose to turn Torres Vedras by the very march -in question, seeing that from Torres Vedras to Mafra is -only twelve miles and from Vimiero to Mafra is nineteen -miles, the roads leading besides over a river and through -narrow ways and defiles? But who ever commended -such dangerous movements, if they were not masked or -their success insured by some peculiar circumstances, or -by some stratagem? And what is my speculation but a -suggestion of this nature? “Under certain circumstances,” -said sir Arthur Wellesley at the enquiry, “an -army might have gained three hours’ start in such a -march.” The argument of the supposititious officer of -rank is therefore a foolish sophism; nor is that relative to -sir John Moore’s moving upon Santarem, nor the assertion -that my plan was at variance with all sir Arthur Wellesley’s -objects, more respectable.</p> - -<p>My plan, as it is invidiously and falsely called, was -simply a reasoning upon the advantages of sir Arthur -Wellesley’s plan, and the calculation of days by the -reviewer is mere mysticism. Sir Arthur wished sir John -Moore to go to Santarem, and if sir Arthur’s recommendation -had been followed, sir John Moore, who, instead of -taking five days as this writer would have him do, actually -disembarked the greatest part of his troops in the Mondego -in half a day, that is before one o’clock on the 22d, -might have been at Santarem the 27th even according to -the reviewer’s scale of march, ten miles a day! Was he -to remain idle there, if the enemy did not abandon Lisbon -and the strong positions covering that city? If he could -stop Junot’s retreat either at Santarem or in the Alemtejo,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxiv"></a>[xxxiv]</span> -a cavalry country, he could surely as safely operate towards -Saccavem, a strong country. What was sir A. -Wellesley’s observation on that head? “If the march to -Mafra had been made as I had ordered it on the 21st of -August in the morning, the position of Torres Vedras -would have been turned, and there was no position in the -enemy’s possession, excepting that in our front at Cabeça -de Montechique and those in rear of it. And I must -observe to the court that if sir John Moore’s corps had -gone to Santarem as proposed as soon as it disembarked -in the Mondego, there would have been no great safety in -those positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in our -power to beat the French.” Lo! then, my plan is not at -variance with sir Arthur Wellesley’s object. But the -whole of the reviewer’s sophistry is directed, both as to -this march and that to Mafra, not against me, but through -me against the duke of Wellington whom the writer dare -not attack openly; witness his cunning defence of that -“<em>wet-blanket</em>” counsel which stopped sir Arthur Wellesley’s -pursuit of Junot from the field of Vimiero. Officer -of rank! Aye, it sounds grandly! but it was a shrewd -thing of Agesilaus when any one was strongly recommended -to him to ask “who will vouch for the voucher?”</p> - -<p>Passing now from the officer of rank, I affirm, notwithstanding -Mr. Southey’s “magnificent chapters” and sir -Charles Vaughan’s “brief and elegant work,” that the -statement about Palafox and Zaragoza is correct. My -authority is well known to sir Charles Vaughan, and is -such as he is not likely to dispute; that gentleman will not, -I feel well assured, now guarantee the accuracy of the -tales he was told at Zaragoza. But my real offence is not -the disparagement of Palafox, it is the having spoiled some -magnificent romances, present or to come; for I remembered -the Roman saying about the “Lying Greek fable,” -and endeavoured so to record the glorious feats of my -countrymen, that even our enemies should admit the facts. -And they have hitherto done so, with a magnanimity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxv"></a>[xxxv]</span> -becoming brave men who are conscious of merit in misfortune, -thus putting to shame the grovelling spirit that would -make calumny and vituperation the test of patriotism.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Since writing the above a second article has appeared in -the same review, to which the only reply necessary, is the -giving of more proofs, that the passages of my history, -contradicted by the reviewer, are strictly accurate. And to -begin, it is necessary to inform him, that a man may be -perfectly disciplined and a superb soldier, and yet be a -raw soldier as to real service; and further, that staff -officers may have been a long time in the English service, -and yet be quite inexperienced. Even a quarter-master-general -of an army has been known to commit all kinds of -errors, and discover negligence and ignorance of his duty, -in his first campaigns, who yet by dint of long practice -became a very good officer in his line, though perhaps not -so great a general as he would pass himself off for; for it -was no ill saying of a Scotchman, that “some men, if -bought at the world’s price, might be profitably sold at -their own.” Now requesting the reader to observe that -in the following quotations the impugned passages of my -history are first given, and are followed by the authority, -though not all the authority which might be adduced in -support of each fact, I shall proceed to expose the reviewer’s -fallacies.</p> - -<p>1º. History. “<em>Napoleon, accompanied by the dukes of -Dalmatia and Montebello, quitted Bayonne the morning of -the 8th, and reached Vittoria in the evening.</em>”</p> - -<p>The reviewer contradicts this on the authority of Savary’s -Memoirs, quoting twice the pages and volume, namely -vol. iv. pages 12, 40, and 41. Now Savary is a writer so -careless about dates, and small facts, as to have made -errors of a month as to time in affairs which he conducted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxvi"></a>[xxxvi]</span> -himself. Thus he says king Joseph abandoned Madrid on -the 3d of July 1808, whereas it was on the 3d of August. -He also says the landing of sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal -was made known to him, before the council of war -relative to the evacuation of Madrid was held at that capital; -but the council was held the 29th of July, and sir -Arthur did not land until the 1st of August! Savary is -therefore no authority on such points. But there is no -such passage as the reviewer quotes, in Savary’s work. -The reader will look for it in vain in pages 12, 40, and 41. -It is neither in the fourth volume nor in any other volume. -However at page 8 of the second volume, second part, he will -find the following passage. “<span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">L’Empereur prit la route -d’Espagne avec toute son armée. Il arriva à Bayonne avec -la rapidité d’un trait, de même que de Bayonne à Vittoria. -Il fit ce dernier trajet à cheval <em>en deux courses</em>, de la -première il alla à Tolosa et de la seconde à Vittoria.</span>” The -words “<span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">deux courses</span>” the reviewer with his usual candour -translates, “<em>the first day to Tolosa, the second day to Vittoria</em>.” -But notwithstanding this I repeat, that the emperor -made his journey in one day. My authority is the -assurance of a French officer of the general staff who was -present, and if the value of the fact were worth the pains, -I could show that it was very easy for Napoleon to do so, -inasmuch as a private gentleman, the correspondent of one -of the newspapers, has recently performed the same journey -in fourteen hours. But my only object in noticing it at all -is to show the flagrant falseness of the reviewer.</p> - -<p>2º. History. “<em>Sir John Moore had to organize an -army of raw soldiers, and in a poor unsettled country just -relieved from the pressure of a harsh and griping enemy, he -had to procure the transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, -and even for the conveyance of the officers’ baggage. -Every branch of the administration civil and military was -composed of men zealous and willing indeed, yet new to a -service where no energy can prevent the effects of inexperience -being severely felt.</em>”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxvii"></a>[xxxvii]</span></p> - -<p class="p1">Authorities. Extracts from sir John Moore’s Journal -and Letters.</p> - -<p>“I am equipping the troops here and moving them -towards the frontier, but I found the army without the -least preparation, without any precise information with -respect to roads, and no arrangement for feeding the -troops upon their march.” “The army is without equipments -of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage -of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or -any other appendage to an army, and not a magazine is -formed on any of the routes.”—“The commissariat has at -its head Mr. Erskine, a gentleman of great integrity and -honour, and of considerable ability, but neither he nor any -of his officers have any experience of what an army of this -magnitude requires to put it in motion.”—“Every thing is -however going on with zeal; there is no want of that in an -English army, and though the difficulties are considerable, -and we have to move through a very impracticable country, -I expect to be past the frontier early in November.”</p> - -<p>Extract from a memoir by sir John Colborne, military -secretary to sir John Moore.</p> - -<p>“The heads of departments were all zeal, but they had -but little experience, and their means for supplying the -wants of the army about to enter on an active campaign -were in many respects limited.”</p> - -<p>3º. History. “<em>One Sataro, the same person who has -been already mentioned as an agent of Junot’s in the negociations -engaged to supply the army, but dishonestly failing -in his contract so embarrassed the operations,” &c. &c.</em></p> - -<p>Authority. Extract from sir John Colborne’s Memoir -quoted above.</p> - -<p>“Sataro, a contractor at Lisbon, had agreed to supply -the divisions on the march through Portugal. He failed -in his contract, and daily complaints were transmitted to -head-quarters of want of provisions on this account. The -divisions of generals Fraser and Beresford were halted, and -had it not been for the exertions of these generals and of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxviii"></a>[xxxviii]</span> -the Portuguese magistrates the army would have been -long delayed.”</p> - -<p>4º. History. “<em>General Anstruther had unadvisedly -halted the leading columns in Almeida.</em>”</p> - -<p>Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal.</p> - -<p>“Br.-general Anstruther, who took possession of Almeida -from the French, and who has been there ever since, and -to whom I had written to make preparations for the passage -of the troops on this route and Coimbra, has stopt -them within the Portuguese frontier instead of making -them proceed as I had directed to Ciudad Rodrigo and -Salamanca.”</p> - -<p>5º. History. “<em>Sir John Moore did not hear of the -total defeat and dispersion of Belvedere’s Estremaduran -army until a week after it happened, and then only through -one official channel.</em>” That channel was Mr. Stuart. Sir -John had heard indeed that the Estremadurans had been -forced from Burgos, but nothing of their utter defeat and -ruin: the difference is cunningly overlooked by the reviewer.</p> - -<p>Authority. Extract of a letter from sir John Moore to -Mr. Frere, Nov. 16th, 1808.</p> - -<p>“I had last night the honour to receive your letter of -the 13th, together with letters of the 14th from Mr. Stuart -and lord William Bentinck.” “I did not know until I -received Mr. Stuart’s letter that the defeat of the Estremaduran -army had been so complete.”</p> - -<p>Now that army was destroyed on the morning of the -10th, and here we see that the intelligence of it did not -reach sir John Moore till the night of the 15th, which if -not absolutely a whole week is near enough to justify the -expression.</p> - -<p>6º. History. “<em>Thousands of arms were stored up in the -great towns.</em>”</p> - -<p>Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s letter to -Mr. Stuart.</p> - -<p>1st December, 1808. “At Zamora there are <em>three or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xxxix"></a>[xxxix]</span> -four thousand</em> stand of arms, in other places <em>there may be -more</em>. If they remain collected in towns they will be taken -by the enemy.”</p> - -<p>7º. History. “<em>Sir John Hope’s division was ordered to -pass the Duero at Tordesillas.</em>”</p> - -<p>Authority. Extract of a letter from sir John Moore to -sir David Baird, 12th Dec. 1808.</p> - -<p>“Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the -reserve and general Beresford’s brigade, the rest of the -troops from thence are moving to the Duero, my quarters -to-morrow will be at Alaejos, <em>Hope’s at Tordesillas</em>.”</p> - -<p>Now it is true that on the 14th sir John Moore, writing -from Alaejos to sir David Baird, says that he had <em>then</em> -resolved to change his direction, and instead of going to -Valladolid should be at Toro on the 15th with all the -troops; but as Hope was to have been at Tordesillas the -same day that Moore was at Alaejos, namely on the 13th, -he must have marched from thence to Toro; and where -was the danger? The cavalry of his division under general -C. Stewart had already surprized the French at Rueda, -higher up the Duero, and it was well known no infantry -were nearer than the Carion.</p> - -<p>8º. History. “<em>Sir John Moore was not put in communication -with any person with whom he could communicate -at all.</em>”</p> - -<p>Authority. Extracts from sir John Moore’s letters and -Journal, 19th and 28th November.</p> - -<p>“I am not in communication with any of the Spanish -generals, and neither know their plans nor those of their -government. No channel of information has been opened -to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation -of the enemy, but what as a stranger I picked up.”—“I -am in communication with no one Spanish army, nor am I -acquainted with the intentions of the Spanish government -or any of its generals. Castaños with whom I was put in -correspondence is deprived of his command at the moment -I might have expected to hear from him, and La Romana,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xl"></a>[xl]</span> -with whom I suppose I am now to correspond, (for it has -not been officially communicated to me,) is absent, God -knows where.”</p> - -<p>9º. History. “<em>Sir John’s first intention was to move -upon Valladolid, but at Alaejos an intercepted despatch of -the prince of Neufchatel was brought to head-quarters, and -the contents were important enough to change the direction -of the march. Valderas was given as the point of union -with Baird.</em>”</p> - -<p>Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal.</p> - -<p>“I marched on the 13th from Salamanca; head-quarters, -Alaejos; <em>there</em> I saw an intercepted letter from -Berthier, prince of Neufchatel, to marshal Soult, duke of -Dalmatia, which determined me to unite the army without -loss of time. I therefore moved on the 15th to Toro instead -of Valladolid. At <em>Valderas</em> I was joined by sir -David Baird with two brigades.”</p> - -<p>10º. History. “<em>No assistance could be expected from -Romana.</em>”—“<em>He did not destroy the bridge of Mansilla.</em>”—“<em>Contrary -to his promise he pre-occupied Astorga, and -when there proposed offensive plans of an absurd nature</em>.”</p> - -<p>Authorities. 1º. Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Dec. -12th, 1808.</p> - -<p>“I have heard nothing from the marquis de la Romana -in answer to the letters I wrote to him on the 6th and 8th -instants. <em>I am thus disappointed of his co-operation or of -knowing what plan he proposes.</em>”</p> - -<p>2º. Colonel Symes to sir David Baird, 14th Dec.</p> - -<p>“In the morning I waited on the marquis and pressed -him as far as I could with propriety on the subject of joining -sir John Moore, to which he evaded giving any more -than general assurances.”</p> - -<p>3º. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal.</p> - -<p>“At two I received a letter from Romana, brought to -me by his aide-de-camp, stating that he had twenty-two -thousand, (he only brought up six thousand,) and would -be happy to co-operate with me.” “At Castro Nuevo sir<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xli"></a>[xli]</span> -D. Baird sent me a letter he had addressed to him of -rather a later date, stating that he was retiring into the -Gallicias. I sent his aide-de-camp back to him with a -letter requesting to know if such was his intention, but -without expressing either approbation or disapprobation. -<em>In truth I placed no dependance on him or his army.</em>”</p> - -<p>4º. Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Astorga, 31st -December.</p> - -<p>“I arrived here yesterday, when <em>contrary to his promise</em> -and to my expectations I find the marquis de la Romana -with a great part of his troops.”—“He said to me in direct -terms that had he known how things were, he neither -would have accepted the command nor have returned to -Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and -movements which are <em>quite absurd</em>, and then returns to the -helpless state of his army.” “<em>He could not be persuaded -to destroy the bridge at Mansillas</em>, he posted some troops -at it which were forced and taken prisoners by the French -on their march from Mayorga.”</p> - -<p>The reviewer must now be content to swallow his disgust -at finding Napoleon’s genius admired, Soult’s authority -accepted, and Romana’s military talents contemned in my -History; these proofs of my accuracy are more than enough, -and instead of adding to them, an apology is necessary for -having taken so much notice of two articles only remarkable -for malevolent imbecility and systematic violation of -truth. But if the reader wishes to have a good standard -of value, let him throw away this silly fellow’s carpings, -and look at the duke of Wellington’s despatches as compiled -by colonel Gurwood, 5th and 6th volumes. He will -there find that my opinions are generally corroborated, -never invalidated by the duke’s letters, and that while no -fact of consequence is left out by me, new light has been -thrown upon many events, the true bearings of which were -unknown at the time to the English general. Thus at -page 337 of the despatches, lord Wellington speaks in -doubt about some obscure negociations of marshal Victor,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlii"></a>[xlii]</span> -which I have shewn, book vii. chap. iii. to be a secret -intrigue for the treacherous surrender of Badajos. The -proceedings in Joseph’s council of war, related by me, and -I am the first writer who was ever informed of them, shew -the real causes of the various attacks made by the French -at the battle of Talavera. I have shewn also, and I am -the first English writer who has shewn it, that the -French had in Spain one hundred thousand more men -than the English general knew of, that Soult brought -down to the valley of the Tagus after the fight of Talavera, -a force which was stronger by more than twenty thousand -men than sir Arthur Wellesley estimated it to be; and -without this knowledge the imminence of the danger, -which the English army escaped by crossing the bridge of -Arzobispo, cannot be understood.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">See Wellington’s Despatches, vol. v. p. 488, et passim.</span> -Again, the means of correcting the error which Wellington -fell into in 1810 relative to Soult, who he supposed to -have been at the head of the second corps in Placentia -when he was really at Seville, has been furnished by me, -insomuch as I have shewn that it was Mermet who was at -the head of that corps, and that Wellington was deceived -by the name of the younger Soult who commanded Mermet’s -cavalry.</p> - -<p>Two facts only <ins class="corr" id="tn-xlii" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'have been mistated'"> -have been misstated</ins> in my history.</p> - -<p>1º. Treating of the conspiracy in Soult’s camp at -Oporto, I said that D’Argenton, to save his life, readily -told all he knew of the British, but <em>with respect to his -accomplices, was immoveable</em>.</p> - -<p>2º. Treating of Cuesta’s conduct in the Talavera campaign -I have enumerated amongst his reasons for not -fighting that it was Sunday.</p> - -<p>Now the duke of Wellington says D’Argenton did betray -his accomplices, and yet my information was drawn -from authority only second to the duke’s, viz. major-general -sir James Douglas, who conducted the interviews with -D’Argenton, and was the suggester and attendant of his -journey to the British head-quarters. He was probably<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xliii"></a>[xliii]</span> -deceived by that conspirator, but the following extract -from his narrative proves that the fact was not lightly -stated in my History.</p> - -<p>“D’Argenton was willing enough to save his life by -revealing every thing he knew about the English, and -among other things assured Soult it would be nineteen -days before any serious attack could be made upon Oporto; -and there can be little doubt that Soult, giving credit to -this information, lost his formidable barrier of the Douro -by surprise. <em>As no threats on the part of the marshal -could induce D’Argenton to reveal the name of his accomplices</em>, -he was twice brought out to be shot and remanded -in the expectation that between hope and intimidation he -might be led to a full confession. On the morning -of the attack he was hurried out of prison by the -gens-d’armes, and, no other conveyance for him being at -hand, he was placed upon a horse of his own, and that -one the very best he had. The gens-d’armes in their hurry -did not perceive what he very soon found out himself, that -he was the best mounted man of the party, and watching -his opportunity he sprung his horse over a wall into the -fields, and made his escape to the English, who were following -close.”</p> - -<p>For the second error so good a plea cannot be offered, -and yet there was authority for that also. The story was -circulated, and generally believed at the time, as being -quite consonant with the temper of the Spanish general; -and it has since been repeated in a narrative of the campaign -of 1809, published by lord Munster. Nevertheless it -appears from colonel Gurwood’s compilation, 5th vol. -page 343, that it is not true.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Having thus disposed of the Quarterly Review I request -the reader’s attention to the following corrections of errors, -as to facts, which having lately reached me, are inserted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xliv"></a>[xliv]</span> -here in preference to waiting for a new edition of the -volumes to which they refer.</p> - -<p>1º. <em>The storming of Badajos.</em></p> - -<p>“General Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, -seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a few hundred -soldiers, and entered San Cristoval, where they all surrendered -the next morning to lord Fitzroy Somerset.”</p> - -<p><em>Correction by colonel Warre, assented to by lord Fitzroy -Somerset.</em></p> - -<p>“Lieut.-colonel Warre was the senior officer present at -the surrender, having joined lord Fitzroy Somerset (who -was in search of the governor and the missing part of the -garrison) just as he was collecting a few men wherewith to -summon in his capacity of aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, -the tête-du-pont of San Christoval.”</p> - -<p>2º. <em>Assault of Tarifa.</em> “The Spaniards and the forty-seventh -British regiment guarded the breach.”</p> - -<p><em>Correction by sir Hugh Gough.</em></p> - -<p>“The only part of the forty-seventh engaged during <em>the -assault</em> were two companies under captain Livelesly, stationed -on the east bastion one hundred and fifty paces -from the breach, and the Spaniards were no where to -be seen, except behind a pallisade in the street, a considerable -way from the breach. <em>The eighty-seventh, and the -eighty-seventh alone, defended the breach.</em> The two companies -of the forty-seventh, I before mentioned, and the -two companies of the rifles, which latter were stationed -on my left but all under my orders, did all that disciplined -and brave troops could do in support, and the two six-pounders, -under lieut.-colonel Mitchel of the artillery, -most effectively did their duty while their fire could tell, -the immediate front of the breach from the great dip of the -ground not being under their range.”</p> - -<p>This correction renders it proper that I should give my -authority for saying the Spaniards were at the breach.</p> - -<p>Extract from a letter of sir Charles Smith, the engineer -who defended Tarifa, to colonel Napier.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlv"></a>[xlv]</span></p> - -<p>“The next great measure of opposition was to assign -to the Spaniards the defence of the breach. This would -have been insupportable: the able advocacy of lord Proby -proved that it would be a positive insult to the Spanish -nation to deprive its troops of the honour, and all my -solemn remonstrances could produce, was to split the difference, -and take upon myself to determine which half of -the breach should be entrusted to our ally.”</p> - -<p>The discrepancy between sir Charles Smith’s and sir -Hugh Gough’s statement is however easily reconciled, -being more apparent than real. The Spaniards were -<em>ordered</em> to defend half the breach, but in <em>fact</em> did not -appear there.</p> - -<p>To the above it is proper here to add a fact made known -to me since my fourth volume was published, and very -honourable to major Henry King, of the eighty-second -regiment. Being commandant of the town of Tarifa, a -command distinct from the island, he was called to a -council of war on the 29th of December, and when most -of those present were for abandoning the place he gave -in the following note,</p> - -<p>“I am decidedly of opinion that the defence of Tarifa -will afford the British garrison an opportunity of gaining -eternal honour, and it ought to be defended to the last -extremity.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span style="margin-right: 3em;">“<span class="smcap">I. H. S. King</span>,</span><br /> -“<span class="fs80"><em>Commandant of Tarifa</em>.</span>”<br /> -</p> - -<p>3º. <em>Battle of Barosa.</em> “The Spanish Walloon guards, -the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some guerilla cavalry, -turned indeed without orders coming up just as the action -ceased, and it was expected that colonel Whittingham, an -Englishman, commanding a powerful body of horse, would -have done as much, but no stroke in aid of the British -was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the -French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, -and it is evident that the eight hundred under Whittingham<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlvi"></a>[xlvi]</span> -might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin’s division -have rendered the defeat ruinous.”—History, vol. iii. -p. 448.</p> - -<p>Extract of a letter from sir Samford Whittingham.</p> - -<p>“I am free to confess that the statement of the historian -of the Peninsular War, as regards my conduct on the day -of the battle of Barosa, is just and correct; but I owe it -to myself, to declare that my conduct was the result of -obedience to the repeated orders of the general commanding -in chief under whose command I acted. In the -given strength of the Spanish cavalry under my command -on that day, there is an error. The total number of the -Spanish cavalry, at the commencement of the expedition, -is correctly stated; but so many detachments had taken -place by orders from head-quarters that I had only one -squadron of Spanish cavalry under my command on that -day.”</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="p4 nobreak" id="COUNTER-REMARKS">COUNTER-REMARKS</h2> -</div> - -<p class="p2 pfs90">TO</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs120">MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs135">REMARKS</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs80">UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH<br /> -VOLUME OF HIS HISTORY OF THE<br /> -PENINSULAR WAR.</p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p class="p2 pfs80">“The evil, that men do, lives after them.”</p> - - -<hr class="p4 chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xlix"></a>[xlix]</span></p> - -<p class="p2 pfs120 lsp2">COUNTER-REMARKS,</p> - -<p class="pfs100"><em>&c. &c.</em></p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - - -<p class="noindent">In the fourth volume of my history of the Peninsular War -I assailed the public character of the late Mr. Perceval, -his son has published a defence of it, after having -vainly endeavoured, in a private correspondence, to convince -me that my attack was unfounded. The younger -Mr. Perceval’s motive is to be respected, and had he confined -himself to argument and authority, it was my intention -to have relied on our correspondence, and left the -subject matter in dispute to the judgment of the public. -But Mr. Perceval used expressions which obliged me to -seek a personal explanation, when I learned that he, unable -to see any difference between invective directed against -the public acts of a minister, and terms of insult addressed -to a private person, thinks he is entitled to use such expressions; -and while he emphatically “disavows all meaning -or purpose of offence or insult,” does yet offer most grievous -insult, denying at the same time my right of redress after -the customary mode, and explicitly declining, he says from -principle, an appeal to any other weapon than the pen.</p> - -<p>It is not for me to impugn this principle in any case, -still less in that of a son defending the memory of his -father; but it gives me the right which I now assert, to -disregard any verbal insult which Mr. Perceval, intentionally -or unintentionally, has offered to me or may offer to -me in future. When a gentleman relieves himself from -personal responsibility by the adoption of this principle, his -language can no longer convey insult to those who do not -reject such responsibility; and it would be as unmanly to -use insulting terms towards him in return as it would be to -submit to them from a person not so shielded. Henceforth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_l"></a>[l]</span> -therefore I hold Mr. Perceval’s language to be innocuous, -but for the support of my own accuracy, veracity, -and justice, as an historian, I offer these my “<em>Counter-Remarks</em>.” -They must of necessity lacerate Mr. Perceval’s -feelings, but they are, I believe, scrupulously cleared -of any personal incivility, and if any passage having that -tendency has escaped me I thus apologize before-hand.</p> - -<p>Mr. Perceval’s pamphlet is copious in declamatory expressions -of his own feelings; and it is also duly besprinkled -with animadversions on Napoleon’s vileness, the horrors -of jacobinism, the wickedness of democrats, the propriety -of coercing the Irish, and such sour dogmas of melancholy -ultra-toryism. Of these I reck not. Assuredly I did not -write with any expectation of pleasing men of Mr. Perceval’s -political opinions and hence I shall let his general -strictures pass, without affixing my mark to them, and the -more readily as I can comprehend the necessity of ekeing -out a scanty subject. But where he has adduced specific -argument and authority for his own peculiar cause,—weak -argument indeed, for it is his own, but strong authority, -for it is the duke of Wellington’s,—I will not decline discussion. -Let the most honoured come first.</p> - -<p>The Duke of Wellington, replying to a letter from Mr. -Perceval, in which the point at issue is most earnestly and -movingly begged by the latter, writes as follows:—</p> - - - <div class="letterquot"> - -<p class="p2 right fs80"><em>London, June 6, 1835.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Dear Sir</span>,</p> - -<p class="in6">I received last night your letter of the 5th. -Notwithstanding my great respect for Colonel Napier and his -work, I have never read a line of it; because I wished to avoid -being led into a literary controversy, which I should probably find -more troublesome than the operations which it is the design of the -Colonel’s work to describe and record.</p> - -<p>I have no knowledge therefore of what he has written of your -father, Mr. Spencer Perceval. Of this I am certain, that I never, -whether in public or in private, said one word of the ministers, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_li"></a>[li]</span> -of any minister who was employed in the conduct of the affairs -of the public during the war, excepting in praise of them;—that -I have repeatedly declared in public my obligations to them for -the cordial support and encouragement which I received from -them; and I should have been ungrateful and unjust indeed, if -I had excepted Mr. Perceval, than whom a more honest, zealous, -and able minister never served the king.</p> - -<p>It is true that the army was in want of money, that is to say, -<em>specie</em>, during the war. Bank-notes could not be used abroad; -and we were obliged to pay for every thing in the currency of the -country which was the seat of the operations. It must not be -forgotten, however, that at that period the Bank was restricted -from making its payments in <em>specie</em>. That commodity became -therefore exceedingly scarce in England; and very frequently -was not to be procured at all. I believe, that from the commencement -of the war in Spain up to the period of the lamented -death of Mr. Perceval, the difficulty in procuring <em>specie</em> was -much greater than it was found to be from the year 1812, to the -end of the war; because at the former period all intercourse -with the Continent was suspended: in the latter, as soon as the -war in Russia commenced, the communication with the continent -was in some degree restored; and it became less difficult to procure -specie.</p> - -<p>But it is obvious that, from some cause or other, there was a -want of money in the army, as the pay of the troops was six -months in arrear; a circumstance which had never been heard of -in a British army in Europe: and large sums were due in different -parts of the country for supplies, means of transport, &c. &c.</p> - -<p>Upon other points referred to in your letter, I have really no -recollection of having made complaints. I am convinced that -there was no real ground for them; as I must repeat, that throughout -the war, I received from the king’s servants every encouragement -and support that they had in their power to give.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span style="margin-right: 8em;">Believe me, dear Sir,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-right: 3em;">Ever yours most faithfully,</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Wellington</span>.<br /> -</p> - -<p class="fs80"><em>Dudley Montagu Perceval, Esq.</em></p> - </div> - -<p class="p2">This letter imports, if I rightly understand it, that any<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lii"></a>[lii]</span> -complaints, by whomsoever preferred, against the ministers, -and especially against Mr. Perceval, during the war in the -Peninsula, had no real foundation. Nevertheless his Grace -and others did make many, and very bitter complaints, -as the following extracts will prove.</p> - - - <div class="letterquot"> - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_1">No. 1.</p> - -<p><em>Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart, Minister Plenipotentiary at -Lisbon.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>Viseu, February 10th, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I apprized Government more than two months ago of our -probable want of money, and of the necessity that we should be -supplied, not only with a large sum but with a regular sum -monthly, equal in amount to the increase of expense occasioned -by the increased subsidy to the Portuguese, and by the increase -of our own army. <em>They have not attended to either of these -demands</em>, and I must write again. But I wish you would mention -the subject in your letter to lord Wellesley.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_2">No. 2.</p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>February 23d, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“It is obvious that the sums will fall short of those which -<em>His Majesty’s Government have engaged to supply</em> to the -Portuguese government, but that <em>is the fault of His Majesty’s -Government in England, and they have been repeatedly informed -that it was necessary that they should send out money</em>. -The funds for the expenses of the British army are insufficient in -the same proportion, and all that I can do is to divide the deficiency -in its due proportions between the two bodies which are to be supported -by the funds at our disposal.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_3">No. 3.</p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>March 1st, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“In respect to the 15,000 men in addition to those which -Government did propose to maintain in this country, I have only -to say, that I don’t care how many men they send here, <em>provided -they will supply us with proportionate means to feed -and pay them</em>; but I suspect they will fall short rather than -exceed the thirty thousand men.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_liii"></a>[liii]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_4">No. 4.</p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>March 5th, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>Mr. Stuart, speaking of the Portuguese emigrating, says,</p> - -<p>“<em>If the determination of ministers at home or events here -bring matters to that extremity.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_5">No. 5.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart, in reference to Cadiz.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>30th March, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I don’t understand the arrangement which Government have -made of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered -them as a part of the army, and from the arrangement -which I made with the Spanish government they cost us nothing -but their pay, and all the money procured by bills was applicable -to the service in this country. <em>The instructions to general -Graham alter this entirely, and they have even gone so far as -to desire him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with -provisions from the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted -that the Spaniards should feed our troops. The first consequence -of this arrangement will be that we shall have no -more money from Cadiz.</em> I had considered the troops at Cadiz -so much a part of my army that I had written to my brother to -desire his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from Cadiz, -when they should attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into -Portugal, at least the troops, which I had sent there. But I consider -this now to be at an end.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_6">No. 6.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>1st April, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I agree with you respecting the disposition of the people of -Lisbon. In fact all they wish for is to be saved from the French, -and they were riotous last winter <em>because they imagined, with -some reason, that we intended to abandon them</em>.”——“<em>The -arrangement made by Government for the command at Cadiz -will totally ruin us in the way of money.</em>”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_liv"></a>[liv]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_7">No. 7.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>April 20th, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“<em>The state of opinions in England is very unfavourable to -the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the -public or as the opposition pretend to be, and they appear to -be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle, -which is to answer no purpose. Their private letters are in -some degree at variance with their public instructions, and -I have called for an explanation of the former, which when -it arrives will shew me more clearly what they intend. The -instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under -them, although they throw upon me the whole responsibility -for bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the -Peninsula till it will be necessary to evacuate it. But it will -not answer in these times to receive private hints and opinions -from ministers, which, if attended to, would lead to an act -directly contrary to the spirit, and even to the letter of the -public instructions; at the same time that, if not attended to, -the danger of the responsibility imposed by the public instructions -is increased tenfold.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_8">No. 8.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>May, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“It is impossible for Portugal to aid in feeding Cadiz. We -have neither money, nor provisions in this country, and the measures -which they are adopting to feed the people there will positively -oblige us to evacuate this country for want of money to support the -army, and to perform the king’s engagements, unless the Government -in England should enable us to remain by sending out large -and regular supplies of specie. I have written fully to Government -upon this subject.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_9">No. 9.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>General Graham to Mr. Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>Isla, 22d May, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>In reference to his command at Cadiz, says, “lord Liverpool -has decided the doubt by declaring this a part of lord Wellington’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lv"></a>[lv]</span> -army, and saying it is the wish of Government that though I am -second in command to him I should be left here for the present.” -“<em>This is odd enough; I mean that it should not have been -left to his judgement to decide where I was to be employed; -one would think he could judge fully better according to circumstances -than people in England.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_10">No. 10.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>June 5, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“<em>This letter will shew you the difficulties under which we -labour for want of provisions and of money to buy them.</em>” -“<em>I am really ashamed of writing to the government</em> (Portuguese) -upon this subject (of the militia), feeling as I do that we -owe them so much money which we are unable to pay. According -to my account the military chest is now indebted to the chest of -the aids nearly £400,000. At the same time I have no money -to pay the army, which is approaching the end of the second -month in arrears, and which ought to be paid in advance. The -bât and forage to the officers for March is still due, and we are -in debt every where.” “<em>The miserable and pitiful want of -money prevents me from doing many things which might and -ought to be done for the safety of the country.</em>” “The corps -ought to be assembled and placed in their stations. But want of -provisions and money obliges me to leave them in winter-quarters -till the last moment. <em>Yet if any thing fails, I shall not be -forgiven.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_11">No. 11.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellington.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>June 9, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I have received two letters from Government, the one relative -to licenses, the other containing a letter from Mr. Harrison -of the Treasury, addressed to colonel Bunbury, in which, after -referring to the different estimates both for the British and Portuguese, -and stating the sums at their disposal, <em>they not only -conclude that we have more than is absolutely necessary, but -state specie to be so scarce in England that we must not rely -on further supplies from home, and must content ourselves with -such sums as come from Gibraltar and Cadiz</em>,” &c. &c.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lvi"></a>[lvi]</span></p> - -<p>“From hand to mouth we may perhaps make shift, taking care -to pay the Portuguese in kind and not in money, until the -supplies, which the Treasury say in three or four months will be -ready, are forthcoming. Government desire me to report to them -any explanation which either your lordship or myself may be able -to communicate on the subject of Mr. Harrison’s letter. As it -principally relates to army finance, I do not feel myself quite -competent to risk an opinion in opposition to what that gentleman -has laid down. <em>I have, however, so often and so strongly -written to them the embarrassment we all labour under, both -respecting corn and money</em>, that there must be some misconception, -or some inaccuracy has taken place in calculations -which are so far invalidated by the fact, without obliging us to -go into the detail necessary to find out what part of the statement -is erroneous.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_12">No. 12.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Wellington to Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>June, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I received from the Secretary of State a copy of Mr. Hamilton’s -letter to colonel Bunbury, and we have completely refuted -him. He took an estimate made for September, October, and -November, as the rate of expense for eight months, without adverting -to the alteration of circumstances occasioned by change -of position, increase of price, of numbers, &c., <em>and then concluded -upon his own statement, that we ought to have money -in hand, (having included in it by the bye some sums which -we had not received,) notwithstanding that our distress had -been complained of by every post, and I had particularly -desired, in December, that £200,000 might be sent out, and -a sum monthly equal in amount to the increased Portuguese -subsidy</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_13">No. 13.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>June, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“All our militia in these provinces [<i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">Tras os Montes and -Entre Minho y Douro</i>] are disposable, and we might throw -them upon the enemy’s flank in advance in these quarters [<em>Leon</em>]<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lvii"></a>[lvii]</span> -and increase our means of defence here and to the north of the -Tagus very much indeed. <em>But we cannot collect them as an -army, nor move them without money and magazines, and I am -upon my last legs in regard to both.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_14">No. 14.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Wellington to Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>November, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“<em>I have repeatedly written to government respecting the -pecuniary wants of Portugal, but hitherto without effect.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_15">No. 15.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>December 22.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“It is useless to expect more money from England, as the -desire of economy has overcome even the fears of the Ministers, -<em>and they have gone so far as to desire me to send home the -transports in order to save money</em>!”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_16">No. 16.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>28th January, 1811.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I think the Portuguese are still looking to assistance from -England, and I have written to the king’s Government strongly -upon the subject in their favour. But I <em>should deceive myself -if I believed we shall get any thing, and them if I were to -tell them we should; they must, therefore, look to their own -resources</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_17">No. 17.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p> - -<p class="center"><em>In reference to the Portuguese intrigue against him.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>18th February, 1811.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I think also that they will be supported in the Brazils, -and <em>I have no reason to believe that I shall be supported in -England</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_18">No. 18.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Ditto to Ditto.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>13th April, 1811.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“<em>If the Government choose to undertake large services and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lviii"></a>[lviii]</span> -not supply us with sufficient pecuniary means, and leave to -me the distribution of the means with which they do supply -us, I must exercise my own judgement upon the distribution -for which I am to be responsible.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_19">No. 19.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>4th July, 1811.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“The pay of the British troops is now nearly two months in -arrears, instead of being paid one month in advance, according to -his majesty’s regulations. The muleteers, upon whose services -the army depends almost as much as upon those of the soldiers, -are six months in arrears; <em>there are now bills to a large amount -drawn by the commissioners in the country on the commissary -at Lisbon still remaining unpaid, by which delay the credit of -the British army and government is much impaired</em>, and you -are aware of the pressing demands of the Portuguese government -for specie. There is but little money in hand to be applied to the -several services; <em>there is no prospect that any will be sent from -England, and the supplies derived from the negociation of bills -upon the treasury at Cadiz and Lisbon have been gradually -decreasing</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_20">No. 20.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Lord Wellington to Lord Wellesley.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>26th July, 1811.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“Although there are, I understand, provisions in Lisbon, in -sufficient quantities to last the inhabitants and army for a year, -about 12 or 14,000 Portuguese troops which I have on the right -bank of the Tagus are literally starving; even those in the cantonments -on the Tagus cannot get bread, because the government -have not money to pay for means of transport. <em>The soldiers in -the hospitals die because the government have not money to -pay for the hospital necessaries for them; and it is really -disgusting to reflect upon the detail of the distresses occasioned -by the lamentable want of funds to support the machine which -we have put in motion.</em>”</p> - -<p>“Either Great Britain is interested in maintaining the war in -the Peninsula, or she is not. If she is, there can be no doubt of -the expediency of making an effort to put in motion against the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lix"></a>[lix]</span> -enemy the largest force which the Peninsula can produce. The -Spaniards would not allow, I believe, of that active interference -by us in their affairs which might affect and ameliorate their circumstances, -<em>but that cannot be a reason for doing nothing</em>. -Subsidies given without stipulating for the performance of specific -services would, in my opinion, answer no purpose.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_21">No. 21.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Mr. Sydenham to Mr. Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>27th September, 1811.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I take great shame to myself for having neglected so long -writing to you, &c. but in truth I did not wish to write to you -until I could give you some notion of the result of my mission -and the measures which our government would have adopted in -consequence of the information and opinion which I brought with -me from Portugal, but <em>God knows how long I am to wait if I -do not write to you until I could give you the information -which you must naturally be so anxious to receive</em>. <em>From -week to week I have anxiously expected that something would -be concluded, and I as regularly deferred writing; however I -am now so much in your debt that I am afraid you will attribute -my silence to inattention rather than to the uncertainty -and indecision of our further proceedings.</em> During the ten -days agreeable voyage in the Armide I arranged all the papers of -information which I had procured in Portugal, and I made out a -paper on which I expressed in plain and strong terms all I thought -regarding the state of affairs both in Portugal and Spain. These -papers, together with the notes which I procured from lord Wellington -and yourself, appeared to me to comprehend every thing -which the ministers could possibly require, both to form a deliberate -opinion upon every part of the subject and to shape their -future measures. The letters which I had written to lord Wellesley -during my absence from England, and which had been -regularly submitted to the prince, had prepared them for most of -the opinions which I had to enforce on my arrival. <em>Lord Wellesley -perfectly coincided in all the leading points</em>, and a short -paper of proposals was prepared for the consideration of the -cabinet, supported by the most interesting papers which I brought -from Portugal.”</p> - </div> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lx"></a>[lx]</span></p> - -<p>Then followed an abstract of the proposals, after which -Mr. Sydenham continues thus:—</p> - - <div class="letterquot"> - -<p>“I really conceived that all this would have been concluded -in a week, <em>but a month has elapsed, and nothing has yet been -done</em>.” “Campbell will be able to tell you that I have done every -thing in my power <em>to get people here to attend to their real -interests in Portugal</em>, and I have clamoured for money, money, -money in every office to which I have had access. To all my -clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the -same answer ‘that the thing is impossible.’ The prince himself -certainly appears to be <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">à la hauteur des circonstances</i>, and -has expressed his determination to make every exertion to -promote the good cause in the Peninsula. <em>Lord Wellesley has -a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, -and is fully aware of the several measures which Great -Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of -parties and such the condition of the present government that -I really despair of witnessing any decided and adequate -effort on our part to save the Peninsula. The present feeling -appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all that -is in our power; that the rest must be left to all-bounteous -Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console -ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not been so -propitious as we deserved. This feeling you will allow is -wonderfully moral and Christian-like, but still nothing will -be done until we have a more vigorous military system, and -a ministry capable of directing the resources of the nation -to something nobler than a war of descents and embarkations.</em>” -“Nothing can be more satisfactory than the state of affairs in -the north; all that I am afraid of is that we have not a ministry -capable of taking advantage of so fine a prospect.”</p> - </div> - - -<p>Mr. Sydenham’s statement of the opinions of Lord -Wellesley at the time of the negociations which ended -in that lord’s retirement in February, is as follows:—</p> - - <div class="letterquot"> - -<p>“1st. That Lord Wellesley was the only man in power who -had a just view of affairs in the Peninsula, or a military thought -amongst them.”</p> - -<p>“2nd. That he did not agree with Perceval that they were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxi"></a>[lxi]</span> -to shut the door against the Catholics, neither did he agree with -Grenville that they were to be conciliated by emancipation without -securities.”</p> - -<p>“3rd. That with respect to the Peninsula, he rejected the -notion that we were to withdraw from the Peninsula to husband -our resources at home, <em>but he thought a great deal more both -in men and money could be done than the Percevals admitted, -and he could no longer act under Perceval with credit, or -comfort, or use to the country</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_22">No. 22.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Extract of a letter from Mr. Hamilton, Under-Secretary -of State.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>April 9th, 1810.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I hope by next mail will be sent something more satisfactory -and useful than we have yet done by way of instructions, <em>but -I am afraid the late</em> O. P. <em>riots have occupied all the thoughts -of our great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of -them, forget more distant but not less interesting concerns</em>. -With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the -inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are -by no means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) -as you who are on the spot. <em>Here we judge only of the results, -the details we read over, but being unable to remedy, forget -them the next day.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_23">No. 23.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>6th May, 1812.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“In regard to money for the Portuguese government, I -begged Mr. Bisset to suggest to you, that if you were not satisfied -with the sum he was enabled to supply, you should make your -complaint on the subject to the king’s government. I am not the -minister of finance, nor is the commissary-general. <em>It is the -duty of the king’s ministers to provide supplies for the service, -and not to undertake a service for which they cannot provide -adequate supplies of money and every other requisite. They -have thrown upon me a very unpleasant task, in leaving to me -to decide what proportion of the money which comes into the -hands of the commissary-general, shall be applied to the -service of the British army; and what shall be paid to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxii"></a>[lxii]</span> -king’s minister, in order to enable him to make good the king’s -engagements to the Portuguese government; and at the same -time that they have laid upon me this task, and have left me to -carry on the war as I could, they have by their orders cut off -some of the resources which I had.</em>”</p> - -<p>“<em>The British army have not been paid for nearly three -months. We owe nearly a year’s hire to the muleteers of the -army. We are in debt for supplies in all parts of the country; -and we are on the point of failing in our payments for some -supplies essentially necessary to both armies, which cannot be -procured excepting with ready money.</em>”</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_24">No. 24.</p> - -<p>The following extracts are of a late date, but being -retrospective, and to the point, are proper to be inserted -here. In 1813 lord Castlereagh complained of some proceedings<span class="sidenote">Vol. iv. p. 178.</span> -described in my history, as having been adopted -by lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, to feed the army in -1810 and 1811, and his censure elicited the letters from -which these extracts are given.</p> - - - <div class="letterquot"> - -<p class="p2 center" id="EX_25">No. 25.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>3d May, 1813.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“I have read your letter, No. 2, 28th April, in which you -have enclosed some papers transmitted by lord Castlereagh, including -a letter from the Board of Trade in regard to the purchases -of corn made by your authority in concert with me, in -Brazil, America, and Egypt. When I see a letter from the -Board of Trade, I am convinced that the latter complaint originates -with the jobbing British merchants at Lisbon; and although <em>I am -delighted to see the Government turn their attention to the -subject, as it will eventually save me a great deal of trouble, -I am quite convinced that if we had not adopted, nearly three -years ago, the system of measures now disapproved of, not -only would Lisbon and the army and this part of the Peninsula -have been starved; but if we had, according to the suggestions -of the commander-in-chief, and the Treasury, and the -Board of Trade, carried on transactions of a similar nature -through the sharks at Lisbon, above referred to, calling<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxiii"></a>[lxiii]</span> -themselves British merchants, the expense of the army -crippled in its operations, and depending upon those who, I -verily believe, are the worst subjects that his Majesty has; -and enormous as that expense is, it would have been very much -increased.</em>”</p> - -<p>“In regard to the particular subject under consideration, it is -obvious to me that the authorities in England have taken a very -confined view of the question.”</p> - -<p>“It appears to me to be extraordinary that when lord Castlereagh -read the statement that the commissary-general had in his -stores a supply of corn and flour to last 100,000 men for nine -months, he should not have adverted to the fact, that the greatest -part of the Portuguese subsidy, indeed all in the last year, but -£600,000, was paid in kind, and principally in corn, and that he -should not have seen that a supply for 100,000 men for nine -months was not exorbitant under these circumstances. Then the -Government appears to me to have forgotten all that passed on -the particular subject of your purchases. <em>The advantage derived -from them in saving a starving people during the scarcity -of 1810-1811; in bringing large sums into the military chest -which otherwise would not have found their way there; and -in positive profit of money.</em>”——“If all this be true, which I -believe you have it in your power to prove, I cannot understand -why Government find fault with these transactions, unless it is -that they are betrayed into disapprobation of them by merchants -who are interested in their being discontinued. <em>I admit that -your time and mine would be much better employed than in -speculation of corn, &c. But when it is necessary to carry on -an extensive system of war with one-sixth of the money in -specie which would be necessary to carry it on, we must consider -questions and adopt measures of this sort, and we ought -to have the confidence and support of the Government in adopting -them.</em> It is only the other day that I recommended to my -brother something of the same kind to assist in paying the Spanish -subsidy; and I have adopted measures in respect to corn and -other articles in Gallicia, with a view to get a little money for the -army in that quarter. <em>If these measures were not adopted, not -only would it be impossible to perform the king’s engagement, -but even to support our own army.</em>”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxiv"></a>[lxiv]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 center"><em>Mr. Stuart to Mr. Hamilton.</em></p> - -<p class="right fs80"> -“<em>8th May.</em><br /> -</p> - -<p>“Though I thank you <ins class="corr" id="tn-lxiv" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'for tho letter'"> -for the letter</ins> from the Admiralty contained -in yours of the 21st April, I propose rather to refer Government -to the communication of lord Wellington and the admiral, -by whose desire I originally adverted to the subject, than to continue -my representations of the consequences to be expected from -a state of things the navy department are not disposed to remedy. -My private letter to lord Castlereagh, enclosing lord Wellington’s -observations on the letter from the Treasury, will, I think, satisfy -his lordship that the arrangements which had been adopted for the -supply of the army and population of this country are of more -importance than is generally imagined. <em>I am indeed convinced -that if they had been left to private merchants, and that I had -not taken the measures which are condemned, the army must -have embarked, and a famine must have taken place.</em>”</p> - </div> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p>Now if these complaints thus made in the duke’s letters, -written at the time, were unfounded, his Grace’s present -letter is, for so much, a defence of Mr. Perceval; if they -were not unfounded his present letter is worth nothing, -unless as a proof, that with him, the memory of good is -longer-lived than the memory of ill. But in either supposition -the complaints are of historical interest, as shewing -the difficulties, real or supposed, under which the general -laboured. They are also sound vouchers for my historical -assertions, because no man but the duke could have contradicted -them; no man could have doubted their accuracy -on less authority than his own declaration; and no man -could have been so hardy as to put to him the direct question -of their correctness.</p> - -<p>Mr. Perceval objects to my quoting lord Wellesley’s -manifesto, because that nobleman expressed sorrow at its -appearance, and denied that he had composed it. But -the very passage of lord Wellesley’s speech on which Mr. -Perceval relies, proves, that the sentiments and opinions -of the manifesto were really entertained by lord Wellesley, -who repudiates the style only, and regrets, not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxv"></a>[lxv]</span> -that the statement appeared, but that it should have -appeared at the moment when Mr. Perceval had been -killed. The expression of this very natural feeling -he, however, took care to guard from any mistake, by reasserting -his contempt for Mr. Perceval’s political character. -Thus he identified his opinions with those contained -in the manifesto. And this view of the matter is confirmed -by those extracts which I have given from the correspondence -of Mr. Sydenham, no mean authority, for he was a -man of high honour and great capacity; and he was the -confidential agent employed by lord Wellesley, to ascertain -and report upon the feelings and views of lord Wellington, -with respect to the war; and also upon those obstacles -to his success, which were daily arising, either from the -conduct of the ministers at home, or from the intrigues of -their diplomatists abroad.</p> - -<p>Thus it appears that if lord Wellington’s complaints, as -exhibited in these extracts, were unfounded, they were at -least so plausible as to mislead Mr. Sydenham on the spot, -and lord Wellesley at a distance, and I may well be excused -if they also deceived me. But was I deceived? Am -I to be condemned as an historian, because lord Wellington, -in the evening of his life, and in the ease and fulness -of his glory, generously forgets the crosses, and remembers -only the benefits of by-gone years? It may be said indeed, -that his difficulties were real, and yet the government not -to blame, seeing that it could not relieve them. To this I<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#EX_15">Extract. No. 15</a></span> -can oppose the ordering away of the transports, on which, -in case of failure, the safety of the army depended! To<span class="sidenote"><a href="#EX_7">Do. No. 7.</a></span> -this I can oppose the discrepancy between the public and -private instructions of the ministers! To this I can oppose -those most bitter passages, “<em>If any thing fails I shall<span class="sidenote"><a href="#EX_10">Do. No. 10.</a></span> -not be forgiven</em>,” and “<em>I have no reason to believe that I<span class="sidenote"><a href="#EX_17">Do. No. 17.</a></span> -shall be supported in England</em>.”</p> - -<p>I say I can oppose these passages from the duke’s letters, -but I need them not. Lord Wellesley, a man of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxvi"></a>[lxvi]</span> -acknowledged talent, practised in governing, well acquainted -with the resources of England, and actually a -member of the administration at the time, was placed in -a better position, to make a sound judgement than lord -Wellington; lord Wellesley, an ambitious man, delighting -in power, and naturally anxious to direct the political -measures, while his brother wielded the military strength -of the state; lord Wellesley, tempted to keep office by -natural inclination, by actual possession, by every motive -that could stir ambition and soothe the whisperings of conscience, -actually quitted the cabinet</p> - -<p><em>Because he could not prevail on Mr. Perceval to support -the war as it ought to be supported, and he could therefore -no longer act under him with credit, or comfort, or use to -the country;</em></p> - -<p><em>Because the war could be maintained on a far greater -scale than Mr. Perceval maintained it, and it was dishonest -to the allies and unsafe not to do it;</em></p> - -<p><em>Because the cabinet, and he particularized Mr. Perceval -as of a mean capacity, had neither ability and -knowledge to devise a good plan, nor temper and discretion -to adopt another’s plan.</em></p> - -<p>Do I depend even upon this authority? No! In lord -Wellington’s letter, stress is laid upon the word <em>specie</em>, -the want of which, it is implied, was the only distress, because -bank notes would not pass on the continent; but -several extracts speak of corn and hospital stores, and the -transport vessels ordered home were chiefly paid in paper. -Notes certainly would not pass on the continent, nor in -England neither, for their nominal value, and why? Because -they were not money; they were the signs of debt; -the signs that the labour, and property, and happiness, of -unborn millions, were recklessly forestalled, by bad ministers, -to meet the exigency of the moment. Now admitting, -which I do not, that this exigency was real -and unavoidable; admitting, which I do not, that one -generation has a right to mortgage the labour and prosperity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxvii"></a>[lxvii]</span> -of another and unborn generation, it still remains a -question, whether a minister, only empowered by a corrupt -oligarchy, has such a right. And there can be no -excuse for a man who, while protesting that the country -was unable to support the war, as it ought to be supported, -continued that war, and thus proceeded to sink the nation -in hopeless debt, and risk the loss of her armies, and her -honour, at the same time; there is no excuse for that -man who, while denying the ability of the country, to -support her troops abroad, did yet uphold all manner of -corruption and extravagance at home.</p> - -<p>There was no specie, because the fictitious ruinous -incontrovertible paper money system had driven it away, -and who more forward than Mr. Perceval to maintain and -extend that system—the bane of the happiness and morals -of the country; a system which then gave power and -riches to evil men, but has since plunged thousands upon -thousands into ruin and misery; a system which, swinging -like a pendulum between high taxes and low prices, at -every oscillation strikes down the laborious part of the -community, spreading desolation far and wide and threatening -to break up the very foundations of society. And -why did Mr. Perceval thus nourish the accursed thing? -Was it that one bad king might be placed on the throne -of France; another on the throne of Spain; a third on -the throne of Naples? That Italy might be the prey of -the barbarian, or, last, not least, that the hateful power -of the English oligarchy, which he called social order and -legitimate rights, might be confirmed? But lo! his narrow -capacity! what has been the result? In the former -countries insurrection, civil war, and hostile invasion, -followed by the free use of the axe and the cord, the -torture and the secret dungeon; and in England it would -have been the same, if her people, more powerful and -enlightened in their generation, had not torn the baleful -oppression down, to be in due time trampled to dust as it -deserves.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxviii"></a>[lxviii]</span></p> - -<p><em>Mr. Perceval was pre-eminently an “honest, zealous, -and able servant of the king!”</em></p> - -<p>To be the servant of the monarch is not then to be the -servant of the people. For if the country could not -afford to support the war, as it ought to be supported, -without detriment to greater interests, the war should have -been given up; or the minister, who felt oppressed by -the difficulty, should have resigned his place to those who -thought differently. “<em>It is the duty of the king’s ministers<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#EX_23">Extract, No. 23.</a></span> -to provide supplies for the service, and not to undertake -a service for which they cannot provide adequate -supplies of money and every other requisite!</em>” These are -the words of Wellington, and wise words they are. Did -Mr. Perceval act on this maxim? No! he suffered the -war to starve on “<em>one-sixth of the money necessary to -keep it up</em>,” and would neither withdraw from the contest, -nor resign the conduct of it to lord Wellesley, who, with -a full knowledge of the subject, declared himself able and -willing to support it efficiently. Nay, Mr. Perceval, while -professing his inability to furnish Wellington efficiently -for one war in the Peninsula, was by his orders in council, -those complicated specimens of political insolence, folly, -and fraud, provoking a new and unjust war with America, -which was sure to render the supply of that in the Peninsula -more difficult than ever.</p> - -<p>But how could the real resources of the country for -supplying the war be known, until all possible economy -was used in the expenditure upon objects of less importance? -Was there any economy used by Mr. Perceval? -Was not that the blooming period of places, pensions, -sinecures, and jobbing contracts? Did not the government -and all belonging thereto, then shout and revel in their -extravagance? Did not corruption the most extensive -and the most sordid overspread the land? Was not that -the palmy state of the system which the indignant nation -has since risen in its moral strength to reform? Why did -not Mr. Perceval reduce the home and the colonial<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxix"></a>[lxix]</span> -expenses, admit the necessity of honest retrenchment, -and then manfully call upon the people of England to bear -the real burthen of the war, because it was necessary, and -because their money was fairly expended to sustain their -honour and their true interests? This would have been -the conduct of an able, zealous, and faithful servant of -the country; and am I to be silenced by a phrase, when -I charge with a narrow, factious, and contemptible policy -and a desire to keep himself in power, the man, who supported -and extended this system of corruption at home, -clinging to it as a child clings to its nurse, while the armies -of his country were languishing abroad for that assistance -which his pitiful genius could not perceive the means of -providing, and which, if he had been capable of seeing it, -his more pitiful system of administration would not have -suffered him to furnish. Profuseness and corruption -marked Mr. Perceval’s government at home, but the army -withered for want abroad; the loan-contractors got fat<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#EX_20">Extract No. 20</a></span> -in London, but the soldiers in hospital died because there -was no money to provide for their necessities. The funds -of the country could not supply both, and so he directed -his economy against the troops, and reserved his extravagance -to nourish the foul abuses at home, and this is to -be a pre-eminently “<em>honest, zealous, and able servant of -the king</em>!”</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">See further on, Second <a href="#CORB_EX_4">Extracts, No. 4.</a></span> -This was the man who projected to establish fortresses -to awe London and other great towns. This was the man -who could not support the war in Spain, but who did -support the tithe war in Ireland, and who persecuted the -press of England with a ferocity that at last defeated its -own object. This was the man who called down vindictive<span class="sidenote"><a href="#CORB_EX_6">Ditto, No. 6</a></span> -punishment on the head of the poor tinman, Hamlyn of -Plymouth, because, in his ignorant simplicity, he openly -offered money to a minister for a place; and this also was -the man who sheltered himself from investigation, under -the vote of an unreformed House of Commons, when -Mr. Maddocks solemnly offered to prove at the bar, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxx"></a>[lxx]</span> -he, Mr. Perceval, had been privy to, and connived at a -transaction, more corrupt and far more mischievous and -illegal in its aim than that of the poor tinman. This is -the Mr. Perceval who, after asserting, with a view to obtain -heavier punishment on Hamlyn, the distinguished purity<span class="sidenote">See further on, Second <a href="#CORB_EX_7">Extracts, No. 7.</a></span> -of the public men of his day, called for that heavy punishment -on Hamlyn for the sake of public justice, and yet took -shelter himself from that public justice under a vote of an -unreformed house, and suffered Mr. Ponsonby to defend -that vote by the plea that such foul transactions were as -“<em>glaring as the sun at noon-day</em>.” And this man is not -to be called factious!</p> - -<p>Mr. Perceval the younger in his first letter to me says, -“<em>the good name of my father is the only inheritance he -left to his children</em>.” A melancholy inheritance indeed if -it be so, and that he refers to his public reputation. But -I find that during his life the minister Perceval had salaries -to the amount of about eight thousand a-year, and the reversion -of a place worth twelve thousand a-year, then enjoyed -by his brother, lord Arden. And also I find that after his -death, his family received a grant of fifty thousand pounds, -and three thousand a-year from the public money. Nay, -Mr. Perceval the son, forgetting his former observation, -partly founds his father’s claim to reputation upon this large -amount of money so given to his family. Money and -praise he says were profusely bestowed, money to the -family, praise to the father, wherefore Mr. Perceval must -have been an admirable minister! Admirable proof!</p> - -<p>But was he praised and regretted by an admiring grateful -people? No! the people rejoiced at his death. Bonfires -and illuminations signalized their joy in the country, -and in London many would have rescued his murderer; a<span class="sidenote"><a href="#CORB_EX_5">Ditto, No. 5</a></span> -multitude even blessed him on the scaffold. No! He -was not praised by the English people, for they had felt his -heavy griping hand; nor by the people of Ireland, for they -had groaned under his harsh, his unmitigated bigotry. -Who then praised him? Why his coadjutors in evil, his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxi"></a>[lxxi]</span> -colleagues in misrule; the majority of a corrupt House of -Commons, the nominees of the borough faction in England, -of the Orange faction in Ireland; those factions by which -he ruled and had his political being, by whose support, and -for whose corrupt interests he run his public “career of -unmixed evil,” unmixed, unless the extreme narrowness of -his capacity, which led him to push his horrid system -forward too fast for its stability, may be called a good.</p> - -<p>By the nominees of such factions, by men placed in the -situation, but without the conscience of Mr. Quentin Dick,<span class="sidenote">See further on, Second <a href="#CORB_EX_7">Extracts, No. 7.</a></span> -Mr. Perceval was praised, and the grant of money to his -family was carried; but there were many to oppose the -grant even in that house of corruption. The grant was a -ministerial measure, and carried, as such, by the same -means, and by the same men, which, and who, had so long -baffled the desire of the nation for catholic emancipation -and parliamentary reform. And yet the people! emphatically, -the people! have since wrung those measures from -the factions; aye! and the same people loathe the very -memory of the minister who would have denied both for -ever, if it had been in his power.</p> - -<p>“<em>Mr. Perceval’s bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, -but his religion did not deter him from passing a law to -prevent the introduction of medicines into France during a -pestilence.</em>”</p> - -<p>This passage is, by the younger Mr. Perceval, pronounced -to be utterly untrue, because bark is only <em>one -medicine</em>, and not <em>medicines</em>; because there was no raging -deadly general pestilence in France at the time; and because -the measure was only retaliation for Napoleon’s -Milan and Berlin decrees, a sort of war which even -Quakers might wink at. What the extent of a Quaker’s conscience -on such occasions may be I know not, since I have -heard of one, who, while professing his hatred of blood-shedding, -told the mate of his ship that if he did not port -his helm, he would not run down his enemy’s boat. But -this I do know, that Napoleon’s decrees were retaliation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxii"></a>[lxxii]</span> -for our paper blockades; that both sides gave licenses for -a traffic in objects which were convenient to them, while -they denied to unoffending neutrals their natural rights of -commerce; that to war against hospitals is inhuman, unchristianlike, -and uncivilized, and that the avowal of the -principle is more abhorrent than even the act. The avowed -principle in this case was to distress the enemy. It was -known that the French were in great want of bark, therefore -it was resolved they should not have it, unless Napoleon -gave up his great scheme of policy called the continental -system. Now men do not want Jesuit’s bark unless -to cure disease, and to prevent them from getting it, was -literally to war against hospitals. It was no metaphor of -Mr. Whitbread’s, it was a plain truth.</p> - -<p>Oh! exclaims Mr. Perceval, there was no deadly raging -general pestilence! What then? Is not the principle the -same? Must millions suffer, must the earth be cumbered -with carcasses, before the christian statesman will deviate -from his barbarous policy? Is a momentary expediency to -set aside the principle in such a case? Oh! no! by no means! -exclaims the pious minister Perceval. My policy is just, and -humane; fixed on immutable truths emanating directly from -true religion, and quite consonant to the christian dispensation; -the sick people shall have bark, I am far from wishing -to prevent them from getting bark. God forbid! I am not so -inhuman. Yes, they shall have bark, but their ruler must first -submit to me. “Port thy helm,” quoth the Quaker, “or -thee wilt miss her, friend!” War against hospitals! Oh! -No! “I do not war against the hospital, I see the black flag -waving over it and I respect it; to be sure: I throw my -shells on to it continually, but that is not to hurt the sick, -it is only to make the governor capitulate.” And this is the -pious sophistry by which the christian Mr. Perceval is to be -defended!</p> - -<p>But Mr. Cobbett was in favour of this measure! Listen -to him! By all means! Let us hear Mr. Cobbett; let -us hear his “vigorous sentences,” his opinions, his proofs,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxiii"></a>[lxxiii]</span> -his arguments, the overflowings of his “true English spirit -and feeling” upon the subject of Mr. Perceval’s administration. -Yes! yes! I will listen to Mr. Cobbett, and what -is more, I will yield implicit belief to Mr. Cobbett, where -I cannot, with any feeling of truth, refute his arguments -and assertions.</p> - -<p>Mr. Cobbett defended the Jesuit’s bark bill upon the -avowed ground that it was to assert our sovereignty of the -seas, not our actual power on that element, but our right to -rule there as we listed. That is to say, that the other people -of the world were not to dare traffic, not to dare move upon -that high road of nations, not to presume to push their commercial -intercourse with each other, nay, not even to communicate -save under the controul and with the license of -England. Now, if we are endowed by Heaven with such -a right, in the name of all that is patriotic and English, let -it be maintained. Yet it seems a strange plea in justification -of the christian Mr. Perceval—it seems strange that -he should be applauded for prohibiting the use of bark to -the sick people of Portugal and Spain, and France, Holland, -Flanders, Italy, and the Ionian islands, for to all -these countries the prohibition extended, on the ground of -our right to domineer on the wide sea; and that he should -also be applauded for declaiming against the cruelty, the -ambition, the domineering spirit of Napoleon. I suppose -we were appointed by heaven to rule on the ocean according -to our caprice, and Napoleon had only the devil -to sanction his power over the continent. We were christians, -“truly British christians,” as the Tory phrase goes; -and he was an infidel, a Corsican infidel. Nevertheless we -joined together, each under our different dispensations, -yes, we joined together, we agreed to trample upon the -rest of the world; and that trade, which we would not allow -to neutrals, we, by mutual licenses, carried on ourselves, -until it was discovered that the sick wanted bark, sorely -wanted it; then we, the truly British christians, prohibited -that article. We deprived the sick people of the succour<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxiv"></a>[lxxiv]</span> -of bark; and without any imputation on our christianity, no -doubt because the tenets of our faith permit us to be merciless -to our enemies, provided a quaker winks at the act! -Truly the logic, the justice, and the christianity of this -position, seem to be on a par.</p> - -<p>All sufferings lead to sickness, but we must make our -enemies suffer, if we wish to get the better of them, let -them give up the contest and their sufferings will cease: -wherefore there is nothing in this stopping of medicine. -This is Mr. Cobbett’s argument, and Mr. Cobbett’s words -are adopted by Mr. Perceval’s son. To inflict suffering on -the enemy was then the object of the measure, and of course -the wider the suffering spread the more desirable the measure. -Now suffering of mind as well as of body must <ins class="corr" id="tn-lxxiv" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'be here meaned'"> -be here meant</ins>, because the dead and dying are not those who can -of themselves oblige the government of a great nation to give -up a war; it must be the dread of such sufferings increasing, -that disposes the great body of the people to stop the career -of their rulers. Let us then torture our prisoners; let us -destroy towns with all their inhabitants; burn ships at sea -with all their crews; carry off children and women, and -torment them until their friends offer peace to save them. -Why do we not? Is it because we dread retaliation? or -because it is abhorrent to the usages of christian nations? -The former undoubtedly, if the younger Mr. Perceval’s -argument adopted from Cobbett is just; the latter if there -is such a thing as christian principle. That principle once -sacrificed to expediency, there is nothing to limit the extent -of cruelty in war.</p> - -<p>So much for Mr. Cobbett upon the Jesuit’s bark bill, but -one swallow does not make a summer; his “true English -spirit and feeling” breaks out on other occasions regarding -Mr. Perceval’s policy, and there, being quite unable to find -any weakness in him, I am content to take him as a guide. -Something more, however, there is, to advance on the subject -of the Jesuit’s bark bill, ere I yield to the temptation of -enlivening my pages with Cobbett’s “vigorous sentences.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxv"></a>[lxxv]</span></p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">Hansard’s Debates.</span> -Mr. Wilberforce, no small name amongst religious men -and no very rigorous opponent of ministers, described this -measure in the house, as a bill “<em>which might add to the -ferocity and unfeeling character of the contest, but could -not possibly put an end to the contest</em>.”</p> - -<p>Mr. Grattan said, “<em>we might refuse our Jesuit’s bark to -the French soldiers; we might inflict pains and penalties, by -the acrimony of our statutes, upon those who were saved from -the severity of war; but the calculation was contemptible</em>.”</p> - -<p>Mr. Whitbread characterized the bill as “<em>a most abominable -measure calculated to hold the country up to universal -execration</em>. <em>It united in itself detestable cruelty with -absurd policy.</em>”</p> - -<p>Lord <ins class="corr" id="tn-lxxv" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Holland combated'"> -Holland combatted</ins> the principle of the bill, which -he said “<em>would distress the women and children of Spain -and Portugal more than the enemy</em>.”</p> - -<p>Lord Grenville “<em>cautioned the house to look well at the -consideration they were to receive as the price of the -honour, justice, and humanity of the country</em>.”</p> - -<p>Then alluding to the speech of Lord Mulgrave (who, -repudiating the flimsy veil of the bill being merely a commercial -regulation, boldly avowed that it was an exercise of -our right to resort to whatever mode of warfare was adopted -against us) Lord Grenville, I say, observed, that such a -doctrine did not a little surprise him. “<em>If</em>,” said he, -“<em>we are at war with the Red Indians, are we to scalp our -enemies because the Indians scalp our men? When Lyons -was attacked by Robespierre he directed his cannon more -especially against the hospital of that city than against -any other part, the destruction of it gave delight to his -sanguinary inhuman disposition. In adopting the present -measure we endeavour to assimilate ourselves to that monster -of inhumanity, for what else is the bill but a cannon -directed against the hospitals on the continent.</em>”</p> - -<p>But all this, says Mr. Perceval the younger, is but -“declamatory invective, the answered and refuted fallacies -of a minister’s opponents in debate.” And yet Mr.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxvi"></a>[lxxvi]</span> -Perceval, who thus assumes that all the opposition speeches -were fallacies, does very complacently quote lord Bathurst’s -speech in defence of the measure, and thus, in a most -compendious manner, decides the question. Bellarmin -says yes! exclaimed an obscure Scotch preacher to his -congregation, Bellarmin says yes! but I say no! and Bellarmin -being thus confuted, we’ll proceed. Even so Mr. -Perceval. But I am not to be confuted so concisely as -Bellarmin. Lord Erskine, after hearing lord Bathurst’s -explanation, maintained that “<em>the bill was contrary to -the dictates of religion and the principles of humanity</em>,” -and this, he said, he felt so strongly, that he was “resolved -<em>to embody his opinion in the shape of a protest -that it might go down in a record to posterity</em>.” It is<span class="sidenote">Hansard’s Debates.</span> -also a fact not to be disregarded in this case, that the -bishops, who were constant in voting for all other ministerial -measures, wisely and religiously abstained from -attending the discussions of this bill. Lord Erskine was -as good as his word, eleven other lords joined him, and -their protests contained the following deliberate and solemn -testimony against the bill.</p> - -<p>“Because <em>the Jesuit’s bark, the exportation of which -is prohibited by this bill</em>, has been found, by long experience, -to be a specific for many dangerous diseases which -war has a tendency to spread and exasperate; <em>and because -to employ as an engine of war the privation of the only -remedy for some of the greatest sufferings which war is -capable of inflicting, is manifestly repugnant to the principles -of the Christian religion, contrary to humanity, and -not to be justified by any practice of civilised nations</em>.</p> - -<p>“Because <em>the means to which recourse has been hitherto -had in war, have no analogy to the barbarous enactments -of this bill, inasmuch as it is not even contended that the -privations to be created by it, have any tendency whatever -to self-defence, or to compel the enemy to a restoration of -peace, the only legitimate object by which the infliction of -the calamities of war can in any manner be justified</em>.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxvii"></a>[lxxvii]</span></p> - -<p>Such was the religious, moral, and political character, -given to this bill of Mr. Perceval’s, by our own statesmen. -Let us now hear the yet more solemnly recorded opinion -of the statesmen of another nation upon Mr. Perceval’s -orders in council, of which this formed a part. In the -American president’s message to Congress, the following -passages occur.</p> - -<p>“The government of Great Britain had already introduced -into her commerce during war, a system <em>which at -once violating the rights of other nations, and resting on -a mass of perjury and forgery, unknown to other times, -was making an unfortunate progress, <ins class="corr" id="tn-lxxvii" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'in underminig those'"> -in undermining those</ins> principles of morality and religion, which are the best -foundations of national happiness</em>.”</p> - -<p>One more testimony. Napoleon, whose authority, whatever -Mr. Perceval and men of his stamp may think, will -always have a wonderful influence; Napoleon, at St. -Helena, declared, “that posterity would more bitterly -reproach Mr. Pitt for the hideous school he left behind -him, than for any of his own acts; <em>a school marked by its -insolent machiavelism, its profound immorality, its cold -egotism, its contempt for the well-being of men and the -justice of things</em>.” Mr. Perceval was an eminent champion -of this hideous school, which we thus find the leading men -of England, France, and America, uniting to condemn. -And shall a musty Latin proverb protect such a politician -from the avenging page of history? The human mind is -not to be so fettered. Already the work of retribution is -in progress.</p> - -<p>Mr. Perceval the younger, with something of fatuity, -hath called up Mr. Cobbett to testify to his father’s -political merit. Commending that rugged monitor of evil -statesmen for his “<em>vigorous sentences</em>,” for his “<em>real -English spirit and feeling</em>,” he cannot now demur to his -authority; let him then read and reflect deeply on the following -passages from that eminent writer’s works, and he -may perhaps discover, that to defend his father’s political<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxviii"></a>[lxxviii]</span> -reputation with success will prove a difficult and complicate -task. If the passages are painful to Mr. Perceval, if the -lesson is severe, I am not to blame. It is not I but -himself who has called up the mighty seer, and if the stern -grim spirit, thus invoked, will not cease to speak until all -be told, it is not my fault.</p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - - - <div class="letterquot"> - -<p class="p1 center">EXTRACTS FROM MR. COBBETT’S WRITINGS.<span class="sidenote">History of George IV.</span></p> - -<p class="p1 center" id="CORB_EX_1"><em>Extract 1.—Of Mr. Perceval’s harshness.</em></p> - -<p>“But there now came a man amongst them who soon surpassed -all the rest in power, as well as in impudence and insolence -towards the people. This was that Spencer Perceval of whose -signal death we shall have to speak by and bye. This man, a -sharp lawyer, inured, from his first days at the bar, to the -carrying on of state prosecutions; a sort of understrapper, in -London, to the attorneys-general in London, and frequently their -deputy in the counties; a short, spare, pale faced, hard, keen, -sour-looking man, with a voice well suited to the rest, with words -in abundance at his command, with the industry of a laborious -attorney, with no knowledge of the great interest of the nation, -foreign or domestic, but with a thorough knowledge of those -means by which power is obtained and preserved in England, and -with no troublesome scruples as to the employment of those -means. He had been Solicitor General under Pitt up to 1801, -and Attorney General under Addington and Pitt up to February, -1806. This man became the <em>adviser of the Princess</em>, during -the period of the investigation and correspondence of which we -have just seen the history; and, as we are now about to see, the -power he obtained, by the means of that office, <em>made him the -Prime Minister of England to the day of his death</em>, though -no more fit for that office than any other barrister in London, taken -by tossing up or by ballot.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="CORB_EX_2"><em>Extract 2.—Of Perceval’s illiberal, factious, and crooked -policy.</em></p> - -<p>“We have seen that the King was told that the <em>publication</em>” -(the publication of the Princess of Wales’s justification) “would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxix"></a>[lxxix]</span> -take place on <em>the Monday</em>. That Monday was <em>the 9th of March</em>. -In this difficulty what was to be done? The whig ministry, with -their eyes fixed on the <em>probable speedy succession of the Prince</em>, -or at least, <em>his accession to power</em>, the King having recently -been in a very shakey state; the whig ministry, with their eyes -fixed on this expected event, and not perceiving, as Perceval did, -the power that the <em>unpublished book</em> (for ‘The Book’ it is now -called) <em>would give them with the Prince</em> as well as with the -King, the whig ministry would not consent to the terms of the -Princess, thinking, too, that in spite of her anger and her -threats, she would not throw away the scabbard as towards the -King.</p> - -<p>“In the meanwhile, however, Perceval, wholly unknown to the -Whigs, had got the book actually <em>printed</em>, and bound up <em>ready -for publication</em>, and it is clear that it was intended to be published -on the Monday named in the Princess’s letter; namely, on -the <em>9th of March</em>, unless prevented by the King’s <em>yielding to -the wishes of Perceval</em>. He did yield, that is to say, he resolved -<em>to change his ministers</em>! A <em>ground</em> for doing this was however -a difficulty to be got over. To allege and promulgate the <em>true</em> -ground would never do; for then the public would have cried -aloud for the publication, which contained matter so deeply scandalous -to the King and all the Royal family. Therefore <em>another -ground</em> was alleged; and herein we are going to behold another -and another important consequence, and other national calamities -proceeding from this dispute between the Prince and his wife. -This other ground that was chosen was the Catholic Bill. The -Whigs stood pledged to grant a bill for the further relief of the -Catholics. They had in September, 1806, <em>dissolved the parliament</em>, -though it was only <em>four years</em> old, for the purpose of -securing a majority in the House of Commons; and into this new -house, which had met on the 19th of December, 1806, they had -introduced the Catholic Bill, by the hands of Mr. Grey (now -become Lord Howick,) with the <em>great and general approbation -of the House</em>, and with a clear understanding, that, notwithstanding -all the cant and hypocrisy that the foes of the Catholics -had, at different times, played off about the <em>conscientious scruples</em> -of the King, the King had now explicitly and cheerfully -<em>given his consent</em> to the bringing in of this bill.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxx"></a>[lxxx]</span></p> - -<p>“The new ministry had nominally at its head <em>the late Duke of -Portland</em>; but Perceval, who was <em>Chancellor of the Exchequer</em>, -was, in fact, the master of the whole affair, co-operating, however, -cordially with Eldon, who now again became Chancellor. -The moment the dismission of the Whigs was resolved on, the -other party set up the cry of “No Popery.” The walls and -houses, not only of London, but of the country towns and villages, -were covered with these words, sometimes in chalk and sometimes -in print; the clergy and corporations were all in motion, even the -cottages on the skirts of the commons, and the forests heard -fervent <em>blessings</em> poured out on the head of the <em>good old King</em> -for preserving the nation from a rekindling of the “<em>fires in -Smithfield</em>!” Never was delusion equal to this! Never a people -so deceived; never public credulity so great; never hypocrisy so -profound and so detestably malignant as that of the deceivers! -The mind shrinks back at the thought of an eternity of suffering, -even as the lot of the deliberate murderer; but if the thought -were to be endured, it would be as applicable to that awful sentence -awarded to hypocrisy like this.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="CORB_EX_3"><em>Extract 3.</em></p> - -<p>“The great and interesting question was, not whether the act -(Regency Act) were agreeable to the laws and constitution of the -country or not; not whether it was right or wrong thus to defer -the full exercise of the Royal authority for a year; <em>but whether -limited as the powers were, the Prince upon being invested -with them, would take his old friends and companions, the -Whigs, to be his ministers</em>.”—“Men in general unacquainted -with the hidden motives that were at work no more expected that -Perceval and Eldon would continue for one moment to be ministers -under the Regent than they expected the end of the world.”</p> - -<p>“But a very solid reason for not turning out <span class="smcap">Perceval</span> was -found in the power which he had with regard to the <span class="smcap">Princess</span> -and the BOOK. He had, as has been before observed, the power -of bringing her forward, and making her the triumphant rival of -her husband. This power he had completely in his hands, backed -as he was by the indignant feelings of an enterprizing, brave, and -injured woman. But, it was necessary for him to do something<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxi"></a>[lxxxi]</span> -to keep this great and terrific power in his own hands. If he lost -the princess he lost his only prop; and, even without losing her, -if he lost the book, or rather, if the secrets of the book escaped -and became public, he then lost his power. It was therefore of -the greatest importance to him that nobody should possess a copy -of this book but <em>himself</em>!</p> - -<p>“The reader will now please to turn back to paragraph 73, -which he will find in chap. 11. He will there find that Perceval -ousted the Whigs by the means of the book, and not by the -means of the catholic question, as the hoodwinked nation were -taught to believe. The book had been purchased by Perceval -himself; it had been printed, in a considerable edition, by Mr. -Edwards, printer, in the Strand; the whole edition had been -put into the hands of a bookseller; the day of publication was -named, that being the 9th of March, 1807; but on the 7th of -March, or thereabouts, the king determined upon turning out -the Whigs and taking in Perceval. Instantly <span class="smcap">Perceval</span> suppressed -THE BOOK; took the edition out of the hands of the -booksellers, thinking that he had every copy in his own possession. -The story has been in print about his having burned -the books in the court yard of his country house; but be this as -it may, he certainly appears to have thought that no one but -himself had a copy of THE BOOK. In this however he was -deceived; for several copies of this book, as many as four or five, -at least, were in the hands of private individuals.”—“To get at -these copies advertisements appeared in all the public papers, as -soon as the Prince had determined to keep Perceval as his minister. -These advertisements plainly enough described the contents -of the book, and contained offers of high prices for the book to -such persons as might have a copy to dispose of. In this manner -the copies were bought up: one was sold for £300, one or two for -£500 each, one for £1000, and the last for £1500.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="CORB_EX_4"><em>Extract 4.—Of Mr. Perceval’s harshness and illiberality.</em></p> - -<p>—— ——“Thus Perceval really ruled the country in precisely -what manner he pleased. Whole troops of victims to the libel -law were crammed into jails, the corrupt part of the press was -more audacious than ever, and the other part of it (never very -considerable) was reduced nearly to silence. But human enjoyments<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxii"></a>[lxxxii]</span> -of every description are of uncertain duration: political -power, when founded on force, is of a nature still more mutable -than human enjoyments in general; of which observations this -haughty and insolent Perceval was destined, in the spring of -1812, to afford to the world a striking, a memorable, and a most -awful example. He had got possession of the highest office in -the state; by <em>his secret</em>, relative to the Princess and her BOOK, -had secured his influence with the Prince Regent for their joint -lives; he had bent the proud necks of the landlords to fine, imprisonment, -and transportation, if they attempted to make inroads -on his system to support the all-corrupting paper-money; the -press he had extinguished or had rendered the tool of his absolute -will; the most eminent amongst the writers who opposed him, -Cobbett (the author of this history,) Leigh and John Hunt, -Finnerty, Drakard, Lovel, together with many more, were closely -shut up in jail, for long terms, with heavy fines on their heads, -and long bail at the termination of their imprisonment. Not content -with all this, he meditated the complete subjugation of -London to the control and command of a military force. Not -only did he meditate this, but had the audacity to propose it to -the parliament; and if his life had not been taken in the evening -of the 11th of May, 1812, he, that very evening, was going to -propose, in due form, a resolution for the establishment of a permanent -army to be stationed in Marybonne-park, for the openly -avowed purpose of <em>keeping the metropolis in awe</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="CORB_EX_5"><em>Extract 5.—Of Mr. Perceval’s unpopularity.</em></p> - -<p>“Upon the news of the death of Perceval arriving at Nottingham, -at Leicester, at Truro, and indeed all over the country, -demonstrations of joy were shown by the ringing of bells, the -making of bonfires, and the like; and at Nottingham particularly, -soldiers were called out to disperse the people upon the occasion.”——“At -the place of execution, the prisoner (Bellingham) -thanked God for having enabled him to meet his fate with so much -fortitude and resignation. At the moment when the hangman -was making the usual preparations; at the moment that he was -going out of the world, at the moment when he was expecting -every breath to be his last, his ears were saluted with—<em>God bless -you, God bless you, God Almighty bless you, God Almighty<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxiii"></a>[lxxxiii]</span> -bless you</em>! issuing from the lips of many thousands of persons.”——“With -regard to the fact of the offender going out of the -world amidst the blessings of the people, I, the author of this -history, can vouch for its truth, having been an eye and ear witness -of the awful and most memorable scene, standing, as I did, -at the window of that prison out of which he went to be executed, -and into which I had been put in consequence of a prosecution -ordered by this very Perceval, and the result of which prosecution -was a sentence to be imprisoned <em>two years</em> amongst felons in -Newgate, to pay <em>a thousand pounds</em> to the Prince Regent at the -end of the two years, and to be held in bonds for <em>seven years</em> -afterwards; all which was executed upon me to the very letter, -except that I rescued myself from the society of the felons by a -cost of twenty guineas a week, for the <em>hundred and four weeks</em>; -and all this I had to suffer for having published a paragraph, in -which I expressed my indignation at the flogging of English local -militiamen, at the town of Ely, in England, <em>under a guard of -Hanoverian bayonets</em>. From this cause, I was placed in a -situation to witness the execution of this unfortunate man. The -crowd was assembled in the open space just under the window at -which I stood. I saw the anxious looks, I saw the half horrified -countenances; I saw the mournful tears run down; and I heard -the unanimous blessings.”</p> - -<p>“The nation was grown heartily tired of the war; it despaired -of seeing an end to it without utter ruin to the country; the expenditure -was arrived at an amount that frightened even loan-mongers -and stock-jobbers; and the shock given to people’s confidence -by Perceval’s recent acts, which had proclaimed to the -whole world the fact of the depreciation of the paper-money; -these things made even the pretended exclusively loyal secretly -rejoice at his death, which they could not help hoping would lead -to some very material change in the managing of the affairs of the -country.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="CORB_EX_6"><em>Extract 6.—Of Mr. Hamlyn, the Tinman.</em></p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">Cobbett’s Register.</span> -“I shall now address you, though it need not be much at -length, upon the subject of lord Castlereagh’s conduct. The -business was brought forward by lord Archibald Hamilton, who -concluded his speech with moving the following resolutions: ‘1º.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxiv"></a>[lxxxiv]</span> -That it appears to the House, from the evidence on the table, -that lord viscount Castlereagh, in the year 1805, shortly after he -had quitted the situation of President of the Board of Control, -and being a Privy Councillor and Secretary of State, did place -at the disposal of lord Clancarty, a member of the same board, -the nomination to a writership, in order to facilitate his procuring -a seat in Parliament. 2º. That it was owing to a disagreement -among the subordinate parties, that this transaction did not take -effect; and 3º., that by this conduct lord Castlereagh had been -guilty of a gross violation of his duty as a servant of the Crown; -an abuse of his patronage as President of the Board of Control; -and an attack upon the purity of that House.’”</p> - -<p>“Well, but what did the House agree to? Why, to this: -‘Resolved, that it is the duty of this House to maintain a <em>jealous -guard</em> over the <em>purity of election</em>; but considering that the -attempt of lord viscount Castlereagh to interfere in the election of -a member <em>had not been successful</em>, this House does not consider -it necessary to enter into any criminal proceedings against him.’”</p> - -<p>“Now, then, let us see what was done in the case of Philip -Hamlyn, the tinman of Plymouth, who offered a bribe to Mr. -Addington, when the latter was minister. The case was this: in -the year 1802, Philip Hamlyn, a tinman of Plymouth, wrote a -letter to Mr. Henry Addington, the first Lord of the Treasury and -Chancellor of the Exchequer, offering him the sum of £2000 to -give him, Hamlyn, the place of Land Surveyor of Customs at -Plymouth. In consequence of this, a criminal information was -filed against the said Hamlyn, by <em>Mr. Spencer Perceval</em>, who was -then the King’s Attorney General, and who, in pleading against -the offender, asserted <em>the distinguished purity of persons in -power in the present day</em>. The tinman was found guilty; he -was sentenced to pay a fine of £100 to the King, and to be -imprisoned for three months. His business was ruined, and he -himself died, in a few months after his release from prison.”</p> - -<p>“Hamlyn confessed his guilt; he stated, in his affidavit, that -he sincerely repented of his crime; that he was forty years -of age; that his business was the sole means of supporting -himself and family; that a severe judgment might be the -total ruin of himself and that family; and that, therefore, he -threw himself upon, and implored, the mercy of his prosecutors<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxv"></a>[lxxxv]</span> -and the Court. In reference to this, Mr. Perceval, <em>the present -Chancellor of the Exchequer</em>, observe, said: ‘The circumstances -which the defendant discloses, respecting his own situation -in life and of his family are all of them topics, very well -adapted to affect the private feelings of individuals, and as far as -that consideration goes, nothing further need be said; but, there -would have been no prosecution at all, in this case, upon the -ground of personal feeling; it was set on foot upon grounds of a -public nature, and the spirit in which the prosecution originated, -still remains; it is, therefore, submitted to your lordships, not on -a point of individual feeling, but of <span class="allsmcap">PUBLIC JUSTICE</span>, in which -case your lordships will consider how far the affidavits ought -to operate in mitigation of punishment.’—“For lord Archibald -Hamilton’s motion, the speakers were, lord A. Hamilton, Mr. -C. W. Wynn, lord Milton, Mr. W. Smith, Mr. Grattan, Mr. -Ponsonby, sir Francis Burdett, Mr. Whitbread, and Mr. Tierney. -<em>Against it</em>, lord Castlereagh himself, lord Binning, Mr. Croker, -Mr. <span class="smcap">Perceval</span>, (who prosecuted Hamlyn,) Mr. Banks, Mr. -G. Johnstone, Mr. H. Lascelles, Mr. Windham, and Mr. -Canning.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 center" id="CORB_EX_7"><em>Extract 7.—Of Mr. Quentin Dick.</em></p> - -<p>(On the 11th of May, 1809, Mr. Maddocks made a charge against -Mr. Perceval and lord Castlereagh, relative to the selling of a seat -in Parliament to Mr. Quentin Dick, and to the influence exercised -with Mr. Dick, as to his voting upon the recent important question.) -Mr. Maddocks in the course of his speech said:—“I affirm, -then, that Mr. Dick <em>purchased a seat in the House of Commons</em> for -the borough of Cashel, through the agency of the Hon. Henry Wellesley, -who acted for, and on behalf of, the Treasury; that upon a -<em>recent question</em> of the last importance, when Mr. Dick had determined -to vote according to his conscience, the noble lord, Castlereagh, -did intimate to that gentleman the necessity of either his -<em>voting with the government, or resigning his seat in that house</em>: -and that Mr. Dick, sooner than vote against principle, did make -choice of the latter alternative, and vacate his seat accordingly. -To this transaction I charge the right honourable gentleman, <em>Mr. -Perceval, as being privy and having connived at it</em>. This I -will <span class="allsmcap">ENGAGE TO PROVE BY WITNESSES AT YOUR BAR</span>, if the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_lxxxvi"></a>[lxxxvi]</span> -House will give me leave to call them.” Mr. Perceval argued -against receiving the charge at all, putting it to the House, -“<em>whether</em> <span class="allsmcap">AT SUCH A TIME</span> <em>it would be wise to warrant such -species of charges as merely introductory to the agitation of -the great question of reform, he left it to the House to determine</em>: -but as far as he might be allowed to judge, he rather -thought that it would be more consistent with what was due from -him to the House and to the public, <em>if he</em> <span class="allsmcap">FOR THE PRESENT</span> -<em>declined putting in the plea</em> (he could so conscientiously put in) -<em>until that House had come to a determination on the propriety -of entertaining that charge or not</em>.”</p> - -<p>The House voted <em>not</em> to entertain the charge, and Mr. Ponsonby -and others declared, in the course of the debate, that such transactions -ought not to be inquired into, because they “were notorious,” -and had become “as glaring as the noon-day sun.”</p> - </div> - - -<p class="p2">Now let the younger Mr. Perceval grapple with this -historian and public writer, whose opinions he has invoked, -whose “<em>true English spirit and feeling</em>” he has eulogised. -Let him grapple with these extracts from his works, which, -however, are but a tithe of the charges Mr. Cobbett has -brought against his father. For my part, I have given my -proofs, and reasons, and authorities, and am entitled to -assert, that my public character of Mr. Perceval, the -minister, is, historically, “<em>fair, just, and true</em>.”</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p4 pfs150 lsp3">HISTORY</p> -<p class="p2 pfs60">OF THE</p> -<p class="p1 pfs150 p4b">WAR IN THE PENINSULA.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1"></a>[Pg 1]</span></p> - -<p class="p1 pfs150 lsp3">HISTORY</p> -<p class="p2 pfs70">OF THE</p> -<p class="p1 pfs150">PENINSULAR WAR.</p> - -<hr class="r30" /> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XVII">BOOK XVII.</h2> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812.</span> -Great and surprising as the winter campaign had -been, its importance was not understood, and therefore -not duly appreciated by the English ministers. -But the French generals saw with anxiety that lord -Wellington, having snapped the heavy links of the -chain which bound him to Lisbon, had acquired -new bases of operation on the Guadiana, the -Agueda, and the Douro, that he could now choose -his own field of battle, and Spain would feel the -tread of his conquering soldiers. Those soldiers with -the confidence inspired by repeated successes, only -demanded to be led forward, but their general had -still to encounter political obstacles, raised by the -governments he served.</p> - -<p>In Spain, the leading men, neglecting the war at -hand, were entirely occupied with intrigues, with -the pernicious project of reducing their revolted -colonies, or with their new constitution. In Portugal,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2"></a>[2]</span> -and in the Brazils, a jealous opposition to -the general on the part of the native authorities had -kept pace with the military successes. In England -the cabinet, swayed by Mr. Perceval’s narrow -policy, was still vacillating between its desire to -conquer and its fear of the expense. There also -the Whigs greedy of office and dexterous in parliamentary -politics, deafened the country with their -clamours, while the people, deceived by both parties -as to the nature of the war, and wondering -how the French should keep the field at all, were, -in common with the ministers, still doubtful, if their -commander was truly a great man or an impostor.</p> - -<p>The struggle in the British cabinet having ended -with the resignation of lord Wellesley, the consequent -predominance of the Perceval faction, left small -hopes of a successful termination to the contest in -the Peninsula. Wellington had, however, carefully -abstained from political intrigues, and his brother’s -retirement, although a subject of regret, did not affect -his own personal position; he was the General of -England, untrammelled, undegraded by factious ties, -and responsible to his country only for his actions. -The ministers might, he said, relinquish or continue -the war, they might supply his wants, or defraud -the hopes of the nation by their timorous economy, -his efforts must be proportioned to his means; if -the latter were great, so would be his actions, -under any circumstances he would do his best, yet -he was well assured the people of England would -not endure to forego triumph at the call of a niggard -parsimony. It was in this temper that he had -undertaken the siege of Badajos, in this temper he -had stormed it, and meanwhile political affairs in -England were brought to a crisis.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3"></a>[3]</span></p> - -<p>Lord Wellesley had made no secret of Mr. Perceval’s -mismanagement of the war, and the public -mind being unsettled, the Whigs were invited by the -Prince Regent, his year of restrictions having now -expired, to join a new administration. But the -heads of that faction would not share with Mr. -Perceval, and he, master of the secrets relating to -the detestable persecution of the Princess of Wales, -was too powerful to be removed. However, on the -11th of May, Perceval was killed in the house of -Commons, and this act, which was a horrible -crime, but politically no misfortune either to -England or the Peninsula, produced other negociations, -upon a more enlarged scheme with regard -both to parties and to the system of government. -Personal feelings again prevailed. Lord Liverpool -would not unite with lord Wellesley, the Grey and -Grenville faction would not serve their country -without having the disposal of all the household -offices, and lord Moira, judging a discourtesy to -the Prince Regent too high a price to pay for their -adhesion, refused that condition. The materials of -a new cabinet were therefore drawn from the dregs -of the Tory faction, and lord Liverpool became -prime minister.</p> - -<p>It was unfortunate that a man of lord Wellesley’s -vigorous talent should have been rejected for lord -Liverpool, but this remnant of a party being too -weak to domineer, proved less mischievous with -respect to the Peninsula than any of the preceding -governments. There was no direct personal interest -opposed to lord Wellington’s wishes, and the -military policy of the cabinet yielding by degrees -to the attraction of his ascending genius, was finally -absorbed in its meridian splendour. Many practical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4"></a>[4]</span> -improvements had also been growing up in -the official departments, especially in that of war -and colonies, where colonel Bunbury, the under-secretary, -a man experienced in the wants of an -army on service, had reformed the incredible disorders -which pervaded that department during the -first years of the contest. The result of the political -crisis was therefore comparatively favourable -to the war in the Peninsula, the story of which -shall now be resumed.</p> - -<p>It has been shewn how the danger of Gallicia, -and the negligence of the Portuguese and Spanish -authorities with reference to Almeida and Ciudad -Rodrigo, stopped the invasion of Andalusia, and -brought the allies back to Beira. But if Wellington, -pursuing his first plan, had overthrown Soult on -the banks of the Guadalquivir and destroyed the -French arsenal at Seville, his campaign would have -ranked amongst the most hardy and glorious that -ever graced a general; and it is no slight proof of -the uncertainty of war, that combinations, so extensive -and judicious, should have been marred by the -negligence of a few secondary authorities, at points -distant from the immediate scenes of action. The -English general had indeed under-estimated the -force opposed to him, both in the north and south; -but the bravery of the allied troops, aided by the -moral power of their recent successes, would have -borne that error, and in all other particulars his -profound military judgment was manifest.</p> - -<p>Yet to obtain a true notion of his views, the various -operations which he had foreseen and provided -against must be considered, inasmuch as they shew -the actual resources of the allies, the difficulty of -bringing them to bear with due concert, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5"></a>[5]</span> -propriety of looking to the general state of the war, -previous to each of Wellington’s great movements. -For his calculations were constantly dependent upon -the ill-judged operations of men, over whom he had -little influence, and his successes, sudden, accidental, -snatched from the midst of conflicting political -circumstances, were as gems brought up from the -turbulence of a whirlpool.</p> - -<p>Castaños was captain-general of Gallicia, as well -as of Estremadura, and when Ciudad Rodrigo fell, lord -Wellington, expecting from his friendly feeling some -efficient aid, had counselled him upon all the probable -movements of the enemy during the siege of -Badajos.</p> - -<p>First. He supposed Marmont might march into -Estremadura, either with or without the divisions -of Souham and Bonnet. In either case, he advised -that Abadia should enter Leon, and, according to -his means, attack Astorga, Benavente, Zamora, and -the other posts fortified by the enemy in that kingdom; -and that Carlos d’España, Sanchez, Saornil, -in fine all the partidas in Castile and the Asturias, -and even Mendizabel, who was then in the Montaña -St. Ander, should come to Abadia’s assistance. He -promised also that the regular Portuguese cavalry, -under Silveira and Bacellar, should pass the Spanish -frontier. Thus a force of not less than twenty-five -thousand men would have been put in motion on -the rear of Marmont, and a most powerful diversion -effected in aid of the siege of Badajos and the -invasion of Andalusia.</p> - -<p>The next operation considered, was that of an -invasion of Gallicia, by five divisions of the army -of Portugal, the three other divisions, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6"></a>[6]</span> -cavalry, then in the valley of the Tagus and about -Bejar, being left to contend, in concert with Soult, -for Badajos. To help Abadia to meet such an -attack, Bacellar and Silveira had orders to harass -the left flank and rear of the French, with both -infantry and cavalry, as much as the nature of the -case would admit, regard being had to the safety -of their raw militia, and to their connection with the -right flank of the Gallician army, whose retreat was -to be by Orense.</p> - -<p>Thirdly. The French might invade Portugal north -of the Douro. Abadia was then to harass their -right flank and rear, while the Portuguese opposed -them in front; and whether they fell on Gallicia -or Portugal, or Estremadura, Carlos d’España, and -the Partidas, and Mendizabel, would have an open -field in Leon and Castile.</p> - -<p>Lastly, the operation which really happened was -considered, and to meet it lord Wellington’s arrangements -were, as we have seen, calculated to -cover the magazines on the Douro, and the Mondego, -and to force the enemy to take the barren -difficult line of country, through Lower Beira, towards -Castelo Branco, while Abadia and the Guerilla -chiefs entered Castile and Leon on his rear. -Carlos d’España had also been ordered to break -down the bridges on the Yeltes, and the Huebra, in -front of Ciudad Rodrigo, and that of Barba de -Puerco on the Agueda to the left of that fortress. -Marmont would thus have been delayed two days, -and the magazines both at Castelo Branco and Celorico -saved by the near approach of the allied army.</p> - -<p>España did none of these things, neither did -Abadia nor Mendizabel operate in a manner to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7"></a>[7]</span> -felt by the enemy, and their remissness, added to -the other faults noticed in former observations, entirely -marred Wellington’s defensive plan in the -north, and brought him back to fight Marmont. -And when that general had passed the Agueda in -retreat, the allied army wanting the provisions -which had been so foolishly sacrificed at Castelo -Branco, was unable to follow; the distant magazines -on the Douro and the Mondego were its only -resource; then also it was found that Ciudad and -Almeida were in want, and before those places -could be furnished, and the intermediate magazines -on the lines of communication restored, it was too -late to march against Andalusia. For the harvest -which ripens the beginning of June in that province -and a fortnight later in Estremadura, would -have enabled the army of Portugal to follow the -allies march by march.</p> - -<p>Now Marmont, as Napoleon repeatedly told him, -had only to watch lord Wellington’s movements, -and a temporary absence from Castile would have -cost him nothing of any consequence, because the -army of the north would have protected the great -communication with France. The advantages of -greater means, and better arrangements for supply, -on which Wellington had calculated, would thus -have been lost, and moreover, the discontented state -of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the approach -of a new battering train from France, rendered it dangerous -to move far from that fortress. The invasion -of Andalusia, judicious in April, would in the latter -end of May have been a false movement; and the -more so that Castaños having, like his predecessors, -failed to bring forward the Gallician army, it was -again made painfully evident, that in critical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8"></a>[8]</span> -circumstances no aid could be obtained from that -quarter.</p> - -<p>Such being the impediments to an invasion of -Andalusia, it behoved the English general to adopt -some other scheme of offence more suitable to the -altered state of affairs. He considered that as the -harvest in Leon and Castile, that is to say, in the -districts north of the Gredos and Gata mountains, -was much later than in Estremadura and Andalusia, -he should be enabled to preserve his commissariat -advantages over the French in the field for a -longer period in the north than in the south. And -if he could strike a decisive blow against Marmont, -he would relieve Andalusia as securely as by a -direct attack, because Madrid would then fall, and -Soult, being thus cut off from his communications -with France, would fear to be hemmed in on all -sides. Wherefore to make the duke of Ragusa -fight a great battle, to calculate the chances, and -prepare the means of success, became the immediate -objects of lord Wellington’s thoughts.</p> - -<p>The French general might be forced to fight by -a vigorous advance into Castile, but a happy result -depended upon the relative skill of the generals, -the number and goodness of the troops. Marmont’s -reputation was great, yet hitherto the essays -had been in favour of the Englishman’s talents. -The British infantry was excellent, the cavalry well -horsed, and more numerous than it had ever been. -The French cavalry had been greatly reduced by -drafts made for the Russian contest, by the separation -of the army of the north from that of Portugal, -and by frequent and harassing marches. Marmont -could indeed be reinforced with horsemen from the -army of the centre, and from the army of the north,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9"></a>[9]</span> -but his own cavalry was weak, and his artillery -badly horsed, whereas the allies’ guns were well -and powerfully equipped. Every man in the British -army expected victory, and this was the time to -seek it, because, without pitched battles the French -could never be dispossessed of Spain, and they -were now comparatively weaker than they had -yet been, or were expected to be; for such was -the influence of Napoleon’s stupendous genius, -that his complete success in Russia, and return -to the Peninsula with overwhelming forces, was -not doubted even by the British commander. -The time, therefore, being propitious, and the -chances favourable, it remained only to combine -the primary and secondary operations in such a -manner, that the French army of Portugal, should -find itself isolated for so long as would enable the -allies to force it singly into a general action. If the -combinations failed to obtain that great result, the -march of the French succouring corps, would nevertheless -relieve various parts of Spain, giving -fresh opportunities to the Spaniards to raise new -obstacles, and it is never to be lost sight of, that -this principle was always the base of Wellington’s -plans. Ever, while he could secure his final -retreat into the strong holds of Portugal without -a defeat, offensive operations, beyond the frontiers, -could not fail to hurt the French.</p> - -<p>To effect the isolating of Marmont’s army, the -first condition was to be as early in the field as the -rainy season would permit, and before the coming -harvest enabled the other French armies to move in -large bodies. But Marmont could avail himself, -successively, of the lines of the Tormes and the -Douro to protract the campaign until the ripening<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10"></a>[10]</span> -of the harvest enabled reinforcements to join him, -and hence the security of the allies’ flanks and rear -during the operations, and of their retreat, if overpowered, -was to be previously looked to. Soult, -burning to revenge the loss of Badajos, might attack -Hill with superior numbers, or detach a force across -the Tagus, which, in conjunction with the army of -the centre, now directed by Jourdan, could advance -upon Portugal by the valley of the Tagus, and so -turn the right flank of the allied army in Castile. -Boats and magazines supplied from Toledo and -Madrid, were already being collected at the fort of -Lugar Nueva, near Almaraz, and from hence, as -from a place of arms, the French could move upon -Coria, Placencia, and Castelo Branco, menacing -Abrantes, Celorico, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida, -while detachments from the army of the north reinforced -the army of Portugal. But to obviate this -last danger Wellington had planned one of those -enterprizes, which as they are successful, principally -because of their exceeding boldness, are beheld -with astonishment when achieved, and are -attributed to madness when they fail.</p> - - -<h4>SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ.</h4> - -<p>For a clear understanding of this event, the -reader must call to mind, 1º. that the left bank of -the Tagus, from Toledo to Almaraz, is lined with -rugged mountains, the ways through which, impracticable -for an army, are difficult even for small -divisions; 2º. that from Almaraz to the frontier of -Portugal, the banks, although more open, were still -difficult, and the Tagus was only to be crossed at -certain points, to which bad roads leading through -the mountains descended. But from Almaraz to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11"></a>[11]</span> -Alcantara, all the bridges had been long ruined, -and those of Arzobispo and Talavera, situated between -Almaraz and Toledo, were of little value, -because of the ruggedness of the mountains above -spoken of. Soult’s pontoon equipage had been captured -in Badajos, and the only means of crossing -the Tagus, possessed by the French, from Toledo to -the frontier of Portugal, was a boat-bridge laid -down at Almaraz by Marmont, and to secure which -he had constructed three strong forts and a bridge-head.</p> - -<p>The first of these forts, called Ragusa, was a -magazine, containing many stores and provisions, -and it was, although not finished, exceedingly -strong, having a loopholed stone tower, twenty-five -feet high within, and being flanked without by a -field-work near the bridge.</p> - -<p>On the left bank of the Tagus the bridge had a -fortified head of masonry, which was again flanked -by a redoubt, called Fort Napoleon, placed on a -height a little in advance. This redoubt, though<span class="sidenote">Jones’s Sieges.</span> -imperfectly constructed, inasmuch as a wide berm, -in the middle of the scarp, offered a landing place -to troops escalading the rampart, was yet strong -because it contained a second interior defence or -retrenchment, with a loopholed stone tower, a ditch, -draw-bridge, and palisades.</p> - -<p>These two forts, and the bridge-head, were armed -with eighteen guns, and they were garrisoned by above -a thousand men, which seemed sufficient to insure -the command of the river; but the mountains on -the left bank still precluded the passage of an army -towards Lower Estremadura, save by the royal road -to Truxillo, which road, at the distance of five miles -from the river, passed over the rugged Mirabete<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12"></a>[12]</span> -ridge, and to secure the summit of the mountain -the French had drawn another line of works, -across the throat of the pass. This line consisted -of a large fortified house, connected by -smaller posts, with the ancient watch-tower of -Mirabete, which itself contained eight guns, and -was surrounded by a rampart twelve feet high.</p> - -<p>If all these works and a road, which Marmont, following -the traces of an ancient Roman way, was -now opening across the Gredos mountains had been -finished, the communication of the French, although -circuitous, would have been very good and secure. -Indeed Wellington fearing the accomplishment, intended -to have surprised the French at Almaraz -previous to the siege of Badajos, when the redoubts -were far from complete, but the Portuguese government -neglected to furnish the means of transporting -the artillery from Lisbon, and he was baffled. -General Hill was now ordered to attempt it -with a force of six thousand men, including four -hundred cavalry, two field brigades of artillery, a -pontoon equipage, and a battering train of six iron -twenty-four pound howitzers.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -The enterprize at all times difficult was become -one of extreme delicacy. When the army was -round Badajos, only the resistance of the forts themselves -was to be looked for; now Foy’s division of -the army of Portugal had returned to the valley of -the Tagus, and was in no manner fettered, and -d’Armagnac, with troops from the army of the centre, -occupied Talavera. Drouet also was, with eight or -nine thousand men of the army of the south, at -Hinojosa de Cordoba, his cavalry was on the road<span class="sidenote9">See Plan, No. 1.</span> -to Medellin, he was nearer to Merida than -Hill was to Almaraz, he might intercept the latter’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13"></a>[13]</span> -retreat, and the king’s orders were imperative that -he should hang upon the English army in Estremadura. -Soult could also detach a corps from<span class="sidenote">Joseph’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -Seville by St. Ollala to fall upon sir William Erskine, -who was posted with the cavalry and the -remainder of Hill’s infantry, near Almendralejo. -However lord Wellington placed general Graham -near Portalegre, with the first and sixth divisions, -and Cotton’s cavalry, all of which had crossed the -Tagus for the occasion, and thus including Erskine’s -corps, above twenty thousand men were ready to -protect Hill’s enterprize.</p> - -<p>Drouet by a rapid march might still interpose -between Hill and Erskine, and beat them in detail -before Graham could support them, wherefore the -English general made many other arrangements to -deceive the enemy. First, he chose the moment of -action when Soult having sent detachments in various -directions, to restore his communications in Andalusia, -had marched himself with a division to Cadiz, -and was consequently unfavourably placed for a -sudden movement. Secondly, by rumours adroitly -spread, and by demonstrations with the Portuguese -militia of the Alemtejo, he caused the French to -believe that ten thousand men were moving down -the Guadiana, towards the Niebla, preparatory to the -invasion of Andalusia, a notion upheld by the assembling -of so many troops under Graham, by the pushing -of cavalry parties towards the Morena, and by restoring -the bridge at Merida, with the avowed intention -of sending Hill’s battering and pontoon train, -which had been formed at Elvas, to Almendralejo. -Finally, many exploring officers, taking the roads -leading to the province of Cordoba, made ostentatious -inquiries about the French posts at Belalcazar<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14"></a>[14]</span> -and other places, and thus every thing seemed to -point at Andalusia.</p> - -<p>The restoration of the bridge at Merida proving -unexpectedly difficult, cost a fortnight’s labour, -for two arches having been destroyed the opening -was above sixty feet wide, and large timber -was scarce. Hill’s march was thus dangerously -delayed, but on the 12th of May, the repairs -being effected and all else being ready, he quitted -Almendralejo, passed the Guadiana, at Merida, -with near six thousand men and twelve field-pieces, -and joined his pontoons and battering train. These -last had come by the way of Montijo, and formed -a considerable convoy, nearly fifty country carts, -besides the guns and limber carriages, being employed -to convey the pontoons, the ladders, and -the ammunition for the howitzers.</p> - -<p>The 13th the armament reached the Burdalo -river on the road to Truxillo; the 14th it was -at Villa Mesias; the 15th at Truxillo. Meanwhile, -to mislead the enemy on the right bank of the -Tagus the guerillas of the Guadalupe mountains -made demonstrations at different points between -Almaraz and Arzobispo, as if they were seeking -a place to cast a bridge that Hill might join lord -Wellington. General Foy was deceived by these -operations, and though his spies at Truxillo had -early informed him of the passage of the Guadiana -by the allies, they led him to believe that Hill<span class="sidenote">Foy’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -had fifteen thousand men, and that two brigades -of cavalry were following in his rear; one report -even stated that thirty thousand men had entered -Truxillo, whereas there were less than six thousand -of all arms.</p> - -<p>Hill having reached Jaraicejo early on the 16th,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15"></a>[15]</span> -formed his troops in three columns, and made a -night march, intending to attack by surprise and -at the same moment, the tower of Mirabete, the -fortified house in the pass, and the forts at the -bridge of Almaraz. The left column, directed -against the tower, was commanded by general -Chowne. The centre column, with the dragoons -and the artillery, moved by the royal road, -under the command of general Long. The right -column, composed of the 50th, 71st, and 92d -regiments, under the direction of Hill in person, -was intended to penetrate by the narrow and -difficult way of La Cueva, and Roman Gordo -against the forts at the bridge. But the day broke -before any of the columns reached their destination, -and all hopes of a surprise were extinguished. -This untoward beginning was unavoidable on -the part of the right and centre column, because -of the bad roads; but it would appear that some -negligence had retarded general Chowne’s column, -and that the castle of Mirabete might have been -carried by assault before day-light.</p> - -<p>The difficulty, great before, was now much increased. -An attentive examination of the French defences -convinced Hill that to reduce the works in the -pass, he must incur more loss than was justifiable, -and finish in such plight that he could not afterwards -carry the forts at the bridge, which were the -chief objects of his expedition. Yet it was only -through the pass of Mirabete that the artillery -could move against the bridge. In this dilemma, -after losing the 17th and part of the 18th in -fruitless attempts to discover some opening through -which to reach the valley of Almaraz with his guns, -he resolved to leave them on the Sierra with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16"></a>[16]</span> -centre column, and to make a false attack upon -the tower with general Chowne’s troops while he -himself, with the right column, secretly penetrated -by the scarcely practicable line of La Cueva and -Roman Gordo to the bridge, intent, with infantry -alone, to storm works which were defended by -eighteen pieces of artillery and powerful garrisons!</p> - -<p>This resolution was even more hardy, and bold, -than it appears without a reference to the general -state of affairs. Hill’s march had been one of -secrecy, amidst various divisions of the enemy; -he was four days’ journey distant from Merida, -which was his first point of retreat; he expected -that Drouet would be reinforced, and advance -towards Medellin, and hence, whether defeated or -victorious at Almaraz, that his own retreat would -be very dangerous; exceedingly so if defeated, -because his fine British troops could not be repulsed -with a small loss, and he should have to fall back -through a difficult country, with his best soldiers -dispirited by failure, and burthened with numbers -of wounded men. Then harassed on one -side by Drouet, pursued by Foy and D’Armagnac -on the other, he would have been exposed to the -greatest misfortunes, every slanderous tongue would -have been let loose on the rashness of attacking -impregnable forts, and a military career, hitherto -so glorious, might have terminated in shame. But -general Hill being totally devoid of interested -ambition, was necessarily unshaken by such fears.</p> - -<p>The troops remained concealed in their position -until the evening of the 18th, and then the general, -reinforcing his own column with the 6th Portuguese -regiment, a company of the 60th rifles, and the -artillery-men of the centre column, commenced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17"></a>[17]</span> -the descent of the valley. His design was to storm -Fort Napoleon before day-light, and the march was -less than six miles, but his utmost efforts could -only bring the head of the troops to the fort, a -little before day-light, the rear was still distant, -and it was doubtful if the scaling-ladders, which -had been cut in halves to thread the short narrow -turns in the precipitous descent, would serve for an -assault. Fortunately some small hills concealed -the head of the column from the enemy, and at that -moment general Chowne commenced the false attack -on the castle of Mirabete. Pillars of white smoke -rose on the lofty brow of the Sierra, the heavy -sound of artillery came rolling over the valley, -and the garrison of Fort Napoleon, crowding on -the ramparts, were anxiously gazing at these portentous -signs of war, when, quick and loud, a -British shout broke on their ears, and the gallant -50th regiment, aided by a wing of the 71st, came -bounding over the nearest hills.</p> - -<p>The French were surprised to see an enemy so -close while the Mirabete was still defended, yet -they were not unprepared, for a patrole of English -cavalry had been seen from the fort on the 17th -in the pass of Roman Gordo; and in the evening -of the 18th a woman of that village had carried -very exact information of Hill’s numbers and intentions -to Lugar Nueva. This intelligence had caused -the commandant Aubert to march in the night with -reinforcements to Fort Napoleon, which was therefore -defended by six companies, including the 39th -French and the voltigeurs of a foreign regiment. -These troops were ready to fight, and when the -first shout was heard, turning their heads, they, -with a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, smote<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18"></a>[18]</span> -the assailants in front, while the guns of Fort -Ragusa took them in flank from the opposite side -of the river; in a few moments, however, a rise -of ground, at the distance of only twenty yards -from the ramparts, covered the British from the -front fire, and general Howard, in person, leading -the foremost troops into the ditch, commenced the -escalade. The great breadth of the berm kept -off the ends of the shortened ladders from the -parapet, but the soldiers who first ascended, jumped -on to the berm itself, and drawing up the ladders -planted them there, and thus, with a second -escalade, forced their way over the rampart; then, -closely fighting, friends and enemies went together -into the retrenchment round the stone tower. Colonel -Aubert was wounded and taken, the tower was -not defended, and the garrison fled towards the -bridge-head, but the victorious troops would not -be shaken off, and entered that work also in one -confused mass with the fugitives, who continued -their flight over the bridge itself. Still the British -soldiers pushed their headlong charge, slaying the -hindmost, and they would have passed the river if -some of the boats had not been destroyed by stray -shots from the forts, which were now sharply cannonading -each other, for the artillery-men had turned -the guns of Napoleon on Fort Ragusa.</p> - -<p>Many of the French leaped into the water and -were drowned, but the greatest part were made -prisoners, and to the amazement of the conquerors, -the panic spread to the other side of the river; -the garrison of Fort Ragusa, although perfectly -safe, abandoned that fort also and fled with the -others along the road to Naval Moral. Some -grenadiers of the 92d immediately swam over and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19"></a>[19]</span> -brought back several boats, with which the bridge -was restored, and Fort Ragusa was gained. The -towers and other works were then destroyed, -the stores, ammunition, provisions, and boats -were burned in the course of the day, and in the -night the troops returned to the Sierra above, -carrying with them the colours of the foreign -regiment, and more than two hundred and fifty -prisoners, including a commandant and sixteen -other officers. The whole loss on the part of the -British was about one hundred and eighty men, and -one officer of artillery was killed by his own mine, -placed for the destruction of the tower; but the only -officer slain in the actual assault was captain Candler, -a brave man, who fell while leading the grenadiers -of the 50th on to the rampart of Fort Napoleon.</p> - -<p>This daring attack was executed with a decision -similar to that with which it had been planned. -The first intention of general Hill was, to have -directed a part of his column against the bridge-head, -and so to have assailed both works together, -but when the difficulties of the road marred this -project, he attacked the nearest work with the leading -troops, leaving the rear to follow as it could. -This rapidity was an essential cause of the success, -for Foy hearing on the 17th that the allies were -at Truxillo, had ordered D’Armagnac to reinforce -Lugar Nueva with a battalion, which being at Naval<span class="sidenote">Foy’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -Moral the 18th, might have entered Fort Ragusa early -in the morning of the 19th; but instead of marching -before day-break, this battalion did not move -until eleven o’clock, and meeting the fugitives on -the road, caught the panic and returned.</p> - -<p>The works at Mirabete being now cut off from -the right bank of the Tagus, general Hill was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20"></a>[20]</span> -preparing to reduce them with his heavy artillery, -when a report, from sir William Erskine, caused -him, in conformity with his instructions, to commence -a retreat on Merida, leaving Mirabete blockaded -by the guerillas of the neighbourhood. It appeared -that Soult, being at Chiclana, heard of the allies’ -march the 19th, and then only desired Drouet to make -a diversion in Estremadura without losing his communication -with Andalusia; for he did not perceive -the true object of the enterprize, and thinking he -had to check a movement, which the king told him -was made for the purpose of reinforcing Wellington -in the north, resolved to enforce Hill’s stay -in Estremadura. In this view he recalled his own -detachments from the Niebla, where they had just -dispersed a body of Spaniards at Castillejos, and -then forming a large division at Seville, he purposed -to strengthen Drouet and enable him to fight -a battle. But that general, anticipating his orders, -had pushed an advanced guard of four thousand -men to Dom Benito the 17th, and his cavalry -patroles passing the Guadiana on the 18th had -scoured the roads to Miajadas and Merida, while -Lallemand’s dragoons drove back the British outposts -from Ribera, on the side of Zafra.</p> - -<p>Confused by these demonstrations, sir William -Erskine immediately reported to Graham, and to -Hill, that Soult himself was in Estremadura with -his whole army, whereupon Graham came up to -Badajos, and Hill, fearful of being cut off, retired, as -I have said, from Mirabete on the 21st, and on the -26th reached Merida unmolested. Drouet then withdrew -his advanced guards, and Graham returned to -<ins class="corr" id="tn-20" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Castello'"> -Castelo</ins> de Vide. Notwithstanding this error Wellington’s -precautions succeeded, for if Drouet had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21"></a>[21]</span> -been aware of Hill’s real object, instead of making -demonstrations with a part of his force, he would -with the whole of his troops, more than ten thousand, -have marched rapidly from Medellin to fall on -the allies as they issued out of the passes of Truxillo, -and before Erskine or Graham could come to their -aid; whereas acting on the supposition that the intention -was to cross the Tagus, his demonstrations -merely hastened the retreat, and saved Mirabete. -To meet Hill in the right place, would, however, -have required very nice arrangements and great -activity, as he could have made his retreat by the -road of Caceres as well as by that of Merida.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington was greatly displeased that this -false alarm, given by Erskine, should have rendered -the success incomplete; yet he avoided any public -expression of discontent, lest the enemy, who -had no apparent interest in preserving the post of -Mirabete, should be led to keep it, and so embarrass -the allies when their operations required a -restoration of the bridge of Almaraz. To the ministers -however he complained, that his generals, stout -in action, personally, as the poorest soldiers, were -commonly so overwhelmed with the fear of responsibility -when left to themselves, that the slightest -movement of the enemy deprived them of their -judgment, and they spread unnecessary alarm far -and wide. But instead of expressing his surprise, -he should rather have reflected on the cause of this -weakness. Every British officer of rank knew, that -without powerful interest, his future prospects, and -his reputation for past services, would have withered -together under the first blight of misfortune; that -a selfish government would instantly offer him up, a -victim to a misjudging public and a ribald press<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22"></a>[22]</span> -with whom success is the only criterion of merit. -English generals are and must be prodigal of their -blood to gain a reputation, but they are necessarily -timid in command, when a single failure, even without -a fault, consigns them to an old age of shame -and misery. It is however undeniable that sir -William Erskine was not an able officer.</p> - -<p>On the other side the king was equally discontented -with Soult, whose refusal to reinforce Drouet, -he thought had caused the loss of Almaraz, and he -affirmed that if Hill had been more enterprising, -the arsenal of Madrid might have fallen as well as -the dépôt of Almaraz, for he thought that general -had brought up his whole corps instead of a division -only six thousand strong.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23"></a>[23]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. April.</span> -While the Anglo-British army was thus cleansing -and strengthening its position on the frontier of -Portugal, the progress of the war in other parts had -not been so favourable to the common cause. It -has already been shewn that Gallicia, in the latter -part of 1811, suffered from discord, poverty, and ill -success in the field; that an extraordinary contribution -imposed upon the province, had been resisted -by all classes, and especially at Coruña the -seat of Government; finally that the army torn by -faction was become hateful to the people. In this -state of affairs Castaños having, at the desire of -lord Wellington, assumed the command, removed -the seat of Government to St. Jago, leaving the -troops in the Bierzo under the marquis of Portazgo.</p> - -<p>Prudent conduct and the personal influence of the -new captain-general soothed the bitterness of faction, -and stopped, or at least checked for the moment, -many of the growing evils in Gallicia, and -the regency at Cadiz assigned an army of sixty -thousand men for that province. But the revenues -were insufficient even to put the few troops already -under arms in motion, and Castaños, although desirous -to menace Astorga while Marmont was on -the Agueda, could not, out of twenty-two thousand -men, bring even one division into the field. Nevertheless, -so strange a people are the Spaniards, that -a second expedition against the colonies, having -with it all the field-artillery just supplied by England,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24"></a>[24]</span> -would have sailed from Vigo but for the prompt -interference of sir Howard Douglas.</p> - -<p>When Castaños saw the penury of his army, he -as usual looked to England for succour, at the same -time, however, both he and the Junta made unusual -exertions to equip their troops, and the condition -of the soldiers was generally ameliorated. But it -was upon the efforts of the Partidas that the British -agent chiefly relied. His system, with respect to -those bodies, has been before described, and it is -certain that under it, greater activity, more perfect -combination, more useful and better timed exertions, -had marked their conduct, and their efforts -directed to the proper objects, were kept in some -subordination to the operations of the allies. This -was however so distasteful to the regular officers, -and to the predominant faction, always fearful of -the priestly influence over the allies, that sir Howard -was offered the command of six thousand troops to -detach him from the Guerilla system; and the Partidas -of the northern provinces would now have -been entirely suppressed, from mere jealousy, by -the general government, if lord Wellington and sir -H. Wellesley had not strenuously supported the -views of Douglas which were based on the following -state of affairs.</p> - -<p>The French line of communication extending -from Salamanca to Irun, was never safe while the -Gallician and Asturian forces, the English squadrons, -and the Partidas in the Montaña, in Biscay, -in the Rioja, and in the mountains of Burgos and -Leon, menaced it from both sides. The occupation -of the Asturias, the constant presence of a division -in the Montaña, the employment of a corps to -threaten Gallicia, and the great strength of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25"></a>[25]</span> -army of the north, were all necessary consequences -of this weakness. But though the line of communication -was thus laboriously maintained, the lines -of correspondence, in this peculiar war of paramount -importance, were, in despite of numerous fortified -posts, very insecure, and Napoleon was always -stimulating his generals to take advantage of each -period of inactivity, on the part of the British army, -to put down the partidas. He observed, that without -English succours they could not remain in -arms, that the secret of their strength was to be -found on the coast, and that all the points, which -favoured any intercourse with vessels, should be -fortified. And at this time so anxious was he for the -security of his correspondence, that he desired, if necessary, -the whole army of the north should be employed -merely to scour the lines of communication.</p> - -<p>In accordance with these views, Santona, the -most important point on the coast, had been rendered -a strong post in the summer of 1811, and<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_6">Plan, No. 6.</a></span> -then Castro, Portagalete at the mouth of the Bilbao -river, Bermeo, Lesquito, and Guetaria, were by -degrees fortified. This completed the line eastward -from Santander to St. Sebastian, and all churches, -convents, and strong houses, situated near the mouths -of the creeks and rivers between those places were -entrenched. The partidas being thus constantly intercepted, -while attempting to reach the coast, were -nearly effaced in the latter end of 1811, and a considerable -part of the army of the north was, in consequence, -rendered disposable for the aid of the army -of Portugal. But when Bonet, because of the -siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, evacuated the Asturias, -the French troops in the Montaña were again exposed -to the enterprizes of the seventh army, which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26"></a>[26]</span> -had been immediately succoured by Douglas, and -which, including guerillas, was said to be twenty-three -thousand strong. Wherefore Napoleon had -so early as March directed that the Asturias should -be re-occupied, and one of Bonet’s brigades, attached -to the army of the north, rejoined him in consequence; -but the pass of Pajares being choked with -snow, Bonet, who was then on the Orbijo, neglected -this order until the approach of finer weather.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -In May, Marmont having returned from Portugal, -the emperor’s order was reiterated, and the French -troops on the Orbijo, being augmented to fifteen -thousand drew the attention of the Gallicians to that -quarter, while Bonet, passing the mountains of Leon, -with eight thousand men, re-occupied Oviedo, -Grado, and Gihon, and established small posts -communicating through the town of Leon, with the -army of Portugal. Thus a new military line was -established which interrupted the Gallicians’ communications -with the partidas, the chain of sea-port -defences was continued to Gihon, a constant intercourse -with France was maintained, and those convoys -came safely by water, which otherwise would -have had to travel by land escorted by many troops -and in constant danger.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Marmont, having distributed his division -in various parts of Leon, was harassed by the -partidas, especially Porlier’s, yet he proceeded diligently -with the fortifying of Toro and Zamora, on -the Douro, and converted three large convents at -Salamanca into so many forts capable of sustaining -a regular siege; the works of Astorga and Leon -were likewise improved, and strong posts were established -at Benavente, La Baneza, Castro-Contrigo, -and intermediate points. The defensive lines of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27"></a>[27]</span> -Tormes and the Douro were thus strengthened -against the British general, and as four thousand -men sufficed to keep the Gallician forces of the -Bierzo and Puebla Senabria in check, the vast and -fertile plains of Leon, called the <em>Tierras de Campos</em>, -were secured for the French, and their detachments -chased the bands from the open country.</p> - -<p>Sir Howard Douglas observing the success of the -enemy in cutting off the Partidas from the coast, -and the advantage they derived from the water -communication; considering also that, if lord Wellington -should make any progress in the coming -campaign, new lines of communication with the -sea would be desirable, proposed, that a powerful -squadron with a battalion of marines and a battery -of artillery, should be secretly prepared for a littoral -warfare on the Biscay coast. This suggestion -was approved of, and sir Home Popham was sent -from England, in May, with an armament, well -provided with scaling-ladders, arms, clothing, and -ammunition for the Partidas, and all means to effect -sudden disembarkations. But the ministers were -never able to see the war in its true point of view, -they were always desponding, or elated, and sanguine, -beyond what reason warranted in either case. -Popham was ordered not only to infest the coast -but, if possible, to seize some point, and hold it -permanently as an entrance into Biscay, by which -the French positions might be turned, if, as in 1808, -they were forced to adopt the line of the Ebro! -Now at this period three hundred thousand French -soldiers were in the Peninsula, one hundred and -twenty thousand were in the northern provinces, -and, without reckoning the army of the centre -which could also be turned in that direction, nearly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28"></a>[28]</span> -fifty thousand were expressly appropriated to the -protection of this very line of communication, on -which a thousand marines were to be permanently -established, in expectation of the enemy being driven -over the Ebro by a campaign which was not yet -commenced!</p> - -<p>While Marmont was in Beira, the activity of the -seventh army, and of the Partidas, in the Montaña, -was revived by the supplies which sir Howard -Douglas, taking the opportunity of Bonet’s absence, -had transmitted to them through the Asturian -ports. The ferocity of the leaders was remarkable. -Mina’s conduct was said to be very revolting; -and on the 16th of April the curate Merino -coming from the mountains of Espinosa, to the -forests between Aranda de Duero, and Hontorica -Valdearados, took several hundred prisoners, and -hanged sixty of them, in retaliation for three members -of the local junta, who had been put to death -by the French; he executed the others also in the -proportion of ten for each of his own soldiers who -had been shot by the enemy. The ignorance and -the excited passions of the Guerilla chiefs, may -be pleaded in mitigation of their proceedings, but -to the disgrace of England, these infamous executions -by Merino were recorded with complacency, -in the newspapers, and met with no public disapprobation.</p> - -<p>There are occasions, when retaliation, applied to -men of rank, may stop the progress of barbarity, yet -the necessity should be clearly shewn, and the exercise -restricted to such narrow limits, that no reasonable -ground should be laid for counter-retaliation. -Here, sixty innocent persons were deliberately -butchered to revenge the death of three, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29"></a>[29]</span> -no proof offered that even those three were slain contrary -to the laws of war; and though it is not to be -doubted that the French committed many atrocities, -some in wantonness, some in revenge, such -savage deeds as the curate’s are inexcusable. What -would have been said if Washington had hanged -twenty English gentlemen, of family, in return for -the death of captain Handy; or if sir Henry Clinton -had caused twenty American officers, to die, -for the execution of André? Like atrocities are, -however, the inevitable consequence of a Guerilla -system not subordinate to the regular government -of armies, and ultimately they recoil upon the -helpless people of the country, who cannot fly -from their enemies. When the French occupied a -district, famine often ensued, because to avoid distant -forages they collected large stores of provisions -from a small extent of country, and thus -the Guerilla system, while it harassed the French, -without starving them, both harassed and starved -the people. And many of the chiefs of bands, -besides their robberies, when they dared not otherwise -revenge affronts or private feuds, would slay -some prisoners, or stragglers, so as to draw down -the vengeance of the French on an obnoxious -village, or district. This in return produced associations -of the people, for self-defence in many -places, by which the enemy profited.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -Soon after this exploit a large convoy having -marched from Burgos towards France, Merino -endeavoured to intercept it, and Mendizabel, who -notwithstanding his defeat by Bonet, had again -gathered twelve hundred cavalry, came from the -Liebana, and occupied the heights above Burgos. -The French immediately placed their baggage and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30"></a>[30]</span> -followers in the castle, and recalled the convoy, -whereupon the Spaniards, dispersing in bands, -destroyed the fortified posts of correspondence, -at Sasamon, and Gamonal, and then returned to -the Liebana. But Bonet had now re-occupied the -Asturias, the remnant of the Spanish force, in that -quarter, fled to Mendizabel, and the whole shifted -as they could in the hills. Meanwhile Mina displayed -great energy. In February he repulsed an -attack near Lodosa, and having conveyed the prisoners -taken at Huesca to the coast, returned to -Aragon and maintained a distant blockade of Zaragoza -itself. In March he advanced, with a detachment, -to Pina, and captured one of Suchet’s convoys -going to Mequinenza; but having retired, with his -booty, to Robres, a village on the eastern slopes of -the Sierra de Alcubierre, he was there betrayed to -general Pannetier, who with a brigade of the -army of the Ebro, came so suddenly upon him -that he escaped death with great difficulty.</p> - -<p>He reappeared in the Rioja, and although hotly -chased by troops from the army of the north, -escaped without much loss, and, having five thousand -men, secretly gained the defiles of Navas -Tolosa, behind Vittoria, where on the 7th of April, -he defeated with great loss a Polish regiment, -which was escorting the enormous convoy that had -escaped the curate and Mendizabel at Burgos. -The booty consisted of treasure, Spanish prisoners, -baggage, followers of the army, and officers retiring -to France. All the Spanish prisoners, four -hundred in number, were released and joined Mina, -and, it is said, that one million of francs fell into -his hands, besides the equipages, arms, stores, and -a quantity of church plate.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31"></a>[31]</span></p> - -<p>On the 28th he captured another convoy going -from Valencia to France, but general Abbé, who -had been recently made governor of Navarre, now -directed combined movements from Pampeluna, -Jacca, and Sangüesa, against him. And so vigorously -did this general, who I have heard Mina -declare to be the most formidable of all his opponents, -urge on the operations, that after a series -of actions, on the 25th, 26th, and 28th of May, -the Spanish chief, in bad plight, and with the -utmost difficulty, escaped by Los Arcos to Guardia, -in the Rioja. Marshal Victor seized this opportunity -to pass into France, with the remains of<span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -the convoy shattered on the 7th, and all the -bands in the north were discouraged. However, -Wellington’s successes, and the confusion attending -upon the departure of so many French troops for -the Russian war, gave a powerful stimulus to the -partizan chiefs in other directions. The Empecinado, -ranging the mountains of Cuenca and -Guadalaxara, pushed his parties close to Madrid; -Duran entered Soria, and raised a contribution in -the lower town; Villa Campa, Bassecour, and -Montijo, coming from the mountains of Albarracin, -occupied Molino and Orejuella, and invested Daroca; -the Catalonian Gayan, taking post in the -vicinity of Belchite, made excursions to the very<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_6">Plan, No. 6.</a></span> -gates of Zaragoza; the Frayle, haunting the mountains -of Alcañiz and the Sierra de Gudar, interrupted -Suchet’s lines of communication by Morella -and Teruel, and along the right bank of the Ebro -towards Tortoza. Finally, Gay and Miralles infested -the Garriga on the left bank.</p> - -<p>It was to repress these bands that the army of -the Ebro, containing twenty thousand men, of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32"></a>[32]</span> -whom more than sixteen thousand were under arms, -was formed by drafts from Suchet’s army, and -given to general Reille. That commander immediately -repaired to Lerida, occupied Upper Aragon -with his own division, placed Severoli’s division -between Lerida and Zaragoza, and general Frere’s -between Lerida, Barcelona, and Taragona; but his -fourth division, under Palombini, marched direct -from Valencia towards the districts of Soria and -Calatayud, to form the link of communication -between Suchet and Caffarelli. The latter now commanded -the army of the north, but the imperial -guards, with the exception of one division, had -quitted Spain, and hence, including the government’s -and the reserve of Monthion, this army -was reduced to forty-eight thousand under arms. -The reserve at Bayonne was therefore increased -to five thousand men, and Palombini was destined -finally to reinforce Caffarelli, and even to march, if -required, to the aid of Marmont in Leon. However -the events of the war soon caused Reille to -repair to Navarre, and broke up the army of the -Ebro, wherefore it will be clearer to trace the operations -of these divisions successively and separately, -and in the order of the provinces towards -which they were at first directed.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">February.</span> -Palombini having left a brigade at the entrenched -bridge of Teruel, relieved Daroca on the 23d of -February, and then deceiving Villa Campa, Montijo, -and Bassecour, who were waiting about the passes -of Toralva to fall on his rear-guard, turned them -by the Xiloca, and reached Calatayud. This -effected, he fortified the convent of La Peña, -which, as its name signifies, was a rocky eminence, -commanding that city and forming a part of it.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33"></a>[33]</span> -But on the 4th of March, having placed his<span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -baggage and artillery in this post, under a guard -of three hundred men, he dispersed his troops -to scour the country and to collect provisions, -and the partidas, seeing this, recommenced operations. -Villa Campa cut off two companies at -Campillo on the 8th, and made a fruitless attempt -to destroy the Italian colonel Pisa at Ateca. Five -hundred men were sent against him, but he drew -them towards the mountains of Albarracin, and -destroyed them at Pozonhonda on the 28th; -then marching another way, he drove the Italians -from their posts of communication as far as the -town of Albarracin on the road to Teruel, nor -did he regain the mountains until Palombini -came up on his rear and killed some of his men. -The Italian general then changing his plan, -concentrated his division on the plains of Hused, -where he suffered some privations, but remained -unmolested until the 14th of April, when he again -marched to co-operate with Suchet in a combined -attempt to destroy Villa Campa. The Spanish -chief evaded both by passing over to the southern -slopes of the Albarracin mountains, and before -the Italians could return to Hused, Gayan, in -concert with the alcalde of Calatayud, had exploded -a plot against the convent of La Peña.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -Some of the Italian officers, including the commandant, -having rashly accepted an invitation to a -feast, were sitting at table, when Gayan appeared on -a neighbouring height; the guests were immediately -seized, and many armed citizens ran up to surprise -the convent, and sixty soldiers were made prisoners, -or killed in the tumult below; but the historian, -Vacani, who had declined to attend the feast, made<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34"></a>[34]</span> -a vigorous defence, and on the 1st of May general -St. Pol and colonel Schiazzetti, coming from Hused, -and Daroca, raised the siege. Schiazzetti marched -in pursuit, and as his advanced guard was surprised -at Mochales by a deceit of the alcalde, he -slew the latter, whereupon the Spaniards killed the -officers taken at the feast of Calatayud.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -Gayan soon baffled his pursuers, and then moved -by Medina Celi and Soria to Navarre, thinking to -surprise a money convoy going to Burgos for the -army of Portugal, but being followed on one side -by a detachment from Hused, and met on the -other by Caffarelli, he was driven again to the hills -above Daroca. Here he renewed his operations -in concert with Villa Campa and the Empecinado, -who came up to Medina Celi, while Duran descended -from the Moncayo hills, and this menacing -union of bands induced Reille, in May, to detach -general Paris, with a French regiment and a troop -of hussars, to the aid of Palombini. Paris moved -by Calatayud, while Palombini briskly interposing -between Duran and Villa Campa, drove the one -towards Albarracin and the other towards Soria; -and in June, after various marches, the two French -generals uniting, dislodged the Empecinado from -Siguenza, chasing him so sharply that his band -dispersed and fled to the Somosierra.</p> - -<p>During these operations, Mina was pressed by Abbé, -but Duran entering Tudela by surprise, destroyed -the artillery parc, and carried off a battering train of -six guns. Palombini was only a few marches from -Madrid, and the king, alarmed by lord Wellington’s -preparations for opening the campaign, ordered him -to join the army of the centre, but these orders -were intercepted, and the Italian general retraced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35"></a>[35]</span> -his steps, to pursue Duran. He soon recovered the<span class="sidenote7">June.</span> -guns taken at Tudela, and drove the Spanish chief -through the Rioja into the mountains beyond the -sources of the Duero; then collecting boats, he -would have passed the Ebro, for Caffarelli was -on the Arga, with a division of the army of the -north, and a brigade had been sent by Reille to -the Aragon river with the view of destroying -Mina. This chief, already defeated by Abbé, was -in great danger, when a duplicate of the king’s orders -having reached Palombini, he immediately recommenced -his march for the capital, which saved Mina. -Caffarelli returned to Vittoria, and the Italians -reaching Madrid the 21st of July, became a part -of the army of the centre, having marched one hundred -and fifty miles in seven days without a halt. -Returning now to the other divisions of the army -of the Ebro, it is to be observed, that their movements -being chiefly directed against the Catalans, -belong to the relation of that warfare.</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN ARAGON AND CATALONIA.</h4> - -<p><span class="sidenote">See Vol. IV Book XV.</span> -After the battle of Altafulla, the fall of Peniscola, -and the arrival of Reille’s first division on -the Ebro, Decaen, who had succeeded Macdonald -in Upper Catalonia, spread his troops along the -coast, with a view to cut off the communication -between the British navy and the interior, where -the Catalan army still held certain positions.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">February.</span> -Lamarque, with a division of five thousand men, -first seized and fortified Mataro, and then driving -Milans from Blanes, occupied the intermediate -space, while detachments from Barcelona fortified -Moncada, Mongat, and Molino del Rey, thus -securing the plain of Barcelona on every side.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36"></a>[36]</span></p> - -<p>The line from Blanes to Cadagués, including -Canets, St. Filieu, Palamos, and other ports, was -strengthened, and placed under general Bearman.</p> - -<p>General Clement was posted in the vicinity of -Gerona, to guard the interior French line of march -from Hostalrich to Figueras.</p> - -<p>Tortoza, Mequinenza, and Taragona were garrisoned -by detachments from Severoli’s division, -which was quartered between Zaragoza and Lerida, -and in communication with Bourke’s and Pannetier’s -brigades of the first division of the army of reserve.</p> - -<p>General Frere’s division was on the communication -between Aragon and Catalonia, and there was -a division under general Quesnel, composed partly -of national guards, in the Cerdaña. Finally there -was a moveable reserve, of six or eight thousand -men, with which Decaen himself marched from -place to place as occasion required; but the supreme -command of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia -was with Suchet.</p> - -<p>The Catalans still possessed the strong holds of -Cardona, Busa, Sceu d’Urgel, and the Medas -islands, and they had ten thousand men in the -field. Lacy was at Cardona with Sarzfield’s division, -and some irregular forces; colonel Green was -organizing an experimental corps at Montserrat, -near which place Erolles was also quartered; Rovira -continued about the mountains of Olot; Juan Claros, -who occupied Arenis de Mar when the French were -not there, was now about the mountains of Hostalrich; -Milans, Manso, and the Brigand Gros, being -driven from the coast line, kept the hills near -Manreza; Gay and Miralles were on the Ebro. -But the communication with the coast being cut off, -all these chiefs were in want of provisions and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37"></a>[37]</span> -stores, and the French were forming new roads -along the sea-line, beyond the reach of the English -ship guns.</p> - -<p>Lacy thus debarred of all access to the coast, -feeding his troops with difficulty, and having a -great number of prisoners and deserters to maintain -in Cardona, and Busa, because Coupigny -refused to receive them in the Balearic isles, Lacy, -I say, disputing with the Junta, and the generals, -and abhorred by the people, in his spleen desired -captain Codrington to cannonade all the sea-coast -towns in the possession of the French, saying he -would give the inhabitants timely notice; but he -did not do so, and when Codrington reluctantly -opened his broadsides upon Mataro, many of the -people were slain. The Catalans complained -loudly of this cruel, injudicious operation, and hating<span class="sidenote">Capt. Codrington’s papers, MSS.</span> -Lacy, affected Erolles more than ever, and -the former sent him with a few men to his -native district of Talarn, ostensibly to raise recruits, -and make a diversion in Aragon, but really -to deprive him of his division and reduce his -power.</p> - -<p>The distress in the Catalan army now became so -great, that Sarzfield was about to force his way to -the coast, and embark his division to commence -a littoral warfare, when Erolles having quickly<span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -raised and armed a new division entered Aragon, -whereupon Sarzfield followed him. The baron -having entered the valley of Venasque, advanced -to Graus, menacing all the district between Fraga -and Huesca; but those places were occupied by -detachments from Bourke’s brigade of the army of -the Ebro, and at this moment Severoli arrived from -Valencia, whereupon the Spaniards <ins class="corr" id="tn-37" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'instead of faling'"> -instead of falling</ins><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38"></a>[38]</span> -back upon Venasque, retired up the valley of -the Isabena, to some heights above Roda, a village -on the confines of Aragon.</p> - -<p>Erolles had not more than a thousand regular -infantry, three guns, and two hundred cavalry, for -he had left five hundred in the valley of Venasque, -and Bourke knowing this, and encouraged by the -vicinity of Severoli, followed hastily from Benavarre, -with about two thousand men of all arms, -thinking Erolles would not stand before him. -But the latter’s position besides being very steep -and rough in front, was secured on both flanks by -precipices, beyond which, on the hills, all the -partidas of the vicinity were gathered; he expected -aid also from Sarzfield, and was obliged to abide a -battle or lose the detachment left in the valley of -Venasque. Bourke keeping two battalions in reserve -attacked with the third, but he met with a -stubborn opposition, and after a long skirmish, in -which he lost a hundred and fifty men, and Erolles -a hundred, was beaten, and being wounded himself, -retreated to Monza, in great confusion. -This combat was very honorable to Erolles, but -it was exposed to doubt and ridicule, at the time, -by the extravagance of his public despatch; for he -affirmed, that his soldiers finding their muskets too -hot, had made use of stones, and in this mixed -mode of action had destroyed a thousand of the -enemy!</p> - -<p>Severoli now advanced, and Erolles being still unsupported -by Sarzfield, retired to Talarn, whereupon -the Italian general returned to Aragon. Meanwhile -Lacy who had increased his forces, approached -Cervera, while Sarzfield, accused by Erolles of -having treacherously abandoned him, joined with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39"></a>[39]</span> -Gay and Miralles, occupying the hills about Taragona, -and straitening that place for provisions. -Milans and Manso also uniting, captured a convoy<span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -at Arenis de Mar, and the English squadron intercepted -several vessels going to Barcelona.</p> - -<p>Decaen observing this fresh commotion came -down from Gerona with his reserve. He relieved -Taragona on the 28th of April, and then marched -with three thousand men upon Lerida, but on the -way, hearing that Sarzfield was at Fuentes Rubino, -near Villa Franca, he took the road of Braffin and -Santa Coloma instead of Momblanch, and suddenly -turning to his right defeated the Spanish general, -and then continued his march by Cervera towards -Lerida. Lacy in great alarm immediately abandoned<span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -Lower Catalonia and concentrated Manso’s, -Milans’, Green’s, and Sarzfield’s divisions, in the -mountains of Olot, and as they were reduced in -numbers he reinforced them with select Somatenes, -called the Companies of Preferencia. After a time -however seeing that Decaen remained near Lerida, -he marched rapidly against the convent of Mataro, -with five thousand men and with good hope, for the -garrison consisted of only five hundred, the works -were not strong, and captain Codrington, who had -anchored off Mataro at Lacy’s desire, lent some<span class="sidenote">Capt. Codrington’s papers, MSS.</span> -ship guns; but his sailors were forced to drag them -to the point of attack, because Lacy and Green had, -in breach of their promise, neglected to provide -means of transport.</p> - -<p>The wall of the convent gave way in a few hours, -but on the 5th, Lacy, hearing that Decaen was -coming to succour the place, broke up the siege -and buried the English guns without having any -communication with captain Codrington. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40"></a>[40]</span> -French found these guns and carried them into the -convent, yet Lacy, to cover his misconduct, said in -the official gazette, that they were safely re-embarked.</p> - -<p>After this disreputable transaction, Manso, who -alone had behaved well, retired with Milans to -Vich, Lacy went to Cardona, the French sent a -large convoy into Barcelona, and the men of -Erolles’ ancient division were, to his great discontent, -turned over to Sarzfield, who took post -near Molina del Rey, and remained there until the<span class="sidenote7">June.</span> -5th of June, when a detachment from Barcelona -drove him to the Campo de Taragona. On the -14th of the same month, Milans was defeated near -Vich by a detachment from the Ampurdan, and -being chased for several days suffered considerably. -Lamarque followed Sarzfield into the Campo and -defeated him again on the 24th, near Villa Nueva -de Sitjes, and this time the Spanish general was -wounded, yet made his way by Santa Coloma de -Querault and Calaf to Cardona where he rejoined -Lacy. Lamarque then joined Deacen in the plains -of Lerida, where all the French moveable forces -were now assembled, with a view to gather the -harvest; a vital object to both parties, but it was -attained by the French.</p> - -<p>This with Lacy’s flight from Mattaro, the several -defeats of Milans, and Sarzfield, and the discontent -of Erolles, disturbed the whole principality; -and the general disquietude was augmented -by the increase of all the frauds and -oppressions, which both the civil and military -authorities under Lacy, practised with impunity. -Every where there was a disinclination to serve in -the regular army. The Somatene argued, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41"></a>[41]</span> -while he should be an ill-used soldier, under a bad -general, his family would either become the victims -of French revenge or starve, because the pay of -the regular troops was too scanty, were it even -fairly issued, for his own subsistence; whereas, -remaining at home, and keeping his arms, he could -nourish his family by his labour, defend it from -straggling plunderers, and at the same time always -be ready to join the troops on great occasions. In -some districts the people, seeing that the army<span class="sidenote">Codrington’s papers, MSS.</span> -could not protect them, refused to supply the partidas -with food, unless upon contract not to molest -the French in their vicinity. The spirit of resistance -would have entirely failed, if lord Wellington’s -successes at Ciudad and Badajos, and -the rumour that an English army was coming to -Catalonia, had not sustained the hopes of the -people.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -Meanwhile the partidas in the north, being aided -by Popham’s expedition, obliged Reille to remove -to Navarre, that Caffarelli might turn his whole -attention to the side of Biscay, and the Montaña. -Decaen then received charge of the Lower as well -as of the Upper Catalonia, which weakened his -position; and at the same time some confusion was -produced, by the arrival of French prefects and -councillors of state, to organize a civil administration. -This measure, ostensibly to restrain military -licentiousness, had probably the ultimate object of -preparing Catalonia for an union with France, -because the Catalans who have peculiar customs -and a dialect of their own, scarcely call themselves -Spaniards. Although these events embarrassed -the French army, the progress of the invasion was -visible in the altered feelings, of the people whose<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42"></a>[42]</span> -enthusiasm was stifled by the folly and corruption, -with which their leaders aided the active hostility -of the French.</p> - -<p>The troops were reduced in number, distressed for -provisions, and the soldiers deserted to the enemy, -a thing till then unheard of in Catalonia, nay, the -junta having come down to the coast were like to -have been delivered up to the French, as a peace -offering. The latter passed, even singly, from -one part to the other, and the people of the sea-coast<span class="sidenote">Codrington’s papers, MSS.</span> -towns readily trafficked with the garrison of -Barcelona, when neither money nor threats could -prevail on them to supply the British squadron. -Claros and Milans were charged with conniving at -this traffic, and of exacting money for the landing -of corn, when their own people and soldiers were -starving. But to such a degree was patriotism -overlaid by the love of gain, that the colonial produce, -seized in Barcelona, and other parts, was -sold, by the enemy, to French merchants, and the -latter undertook both to carry it off, and pay with -provisions on the spot, which they successfully -executed by means of Spanish vessels, corruptly -licensed for the occasion by Catalan authorities.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the people generally accused the -junta of extreme indolence, and Lacy, of treachery; -and tyranny because of his arbitrary conduct in -all things, but especially that after proclaiming a -general rising, he had disarmed the Somatenes, -and suppressed the independent bands. He had -quarreled with the British naval officers, was the -avowed enemy of Erolles, the secret calumniator -of Sarzfield, and withal a man of no courage or -enterprize in the field. Nor was the story of his -previous life, calculated to check the bad opinion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43"></a>[43]</span> -generally entertained of him. It was said that, -being originally a Spanish officer, he was banished, -for an intrigue, to the Canaries, from whence he -deserted to the French, and again deserted to his -own countrymen, when the war of independence -broke out.</p> - -<p>Under this man, the frauds, which characterize -the civil departments of all armies in the field, -became destructive, and the extent of the mischief -may be gathered from a single fact. Notwithstanding -the enormous supplies granted by England, -the Catalans paid nearly three millions sterling, -for the expense of the war, besides contributions -in kind, and yet their soldiers were -always distressed for clothing, food, arms, and -ammunition.</p> - -<p>This amount of specie might excite doubt, were -it not that here, as in Portugal, the quantity of -coin accumulated from the expenditure of the -armies and navies was immense. But gold is not -always the synonyme of power in war, or of happiness -in peace. Nothing could be more wretched -than Catalonia. Individually the people were exposed -to all the licentiousness of war, collectively -to the robberies, and revenge, of both friends and -enemies. When they attempted to supply the<span class="sidenote">Codrington’s papers, MSS.</span> -British vessels, the French menaced them with -death; when they yielded to such threats, the -English ships menaced them with bombardment, -and plunder. All the roads were infested with -brigands, and in the hills large bands of people, -whose families and property had been destroyed, -watched for straggling Frenchmen and small -escorts, not to make war but to live on the booty; -when this resource failed they plundered their own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44"></a>[44]</span> -countrymen. While the land was thus harassed, -the sea swarmed with privateers of all nations, -differing from pirates only in name; and that no -link in the chain of infamy, might be wanting,<span class="sidenote">Codrington’s papers, MSS.</span> -the merchants of Gibraltar, forced their smuggling -trade at the ports, with a shameless disregard for -the rights of the Spanish government. Catalonia -seemed like some huge carcass, on which all manner -of ravenous beasts, all obscene birds, and all -reptiles had gathered to feed.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45"></a>[45]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVII_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. April.</span> -Suchet having recovered his health was again at -the head of the troops, but the king’s military authority -was so irksome to him, that he despatched an -officer to represent the inconvenience of it to the -Emperor, previous to that monarch’s departure for -Russia. The answer in some degree restored his -independence; he was desired to hold his troops -concentrated, and move them in the manner most -conducive to the interests of his own command. -Hence, when Joseph, designing to act against lord -Wellington in Estremadura, demanded the aid of -one division, Suchet replied that he must then -evacuate Valencia; and as the natural line of retreat -for the French armies would, during the -contemplated operations, be by the eastern provinces, -it would be better to abandon Andalusia -first! an answer calculated to convince Joseph that -his authority in the field was still but a name.</p> - -<p>Suchet, from a natural disposition towards order, -and because his revenue from the fishery of the -Albufera depended upon the tranquillity of the -province, took infinite pains to confirm his power; -and his mode of proceeding, at once prudent and -firm, was wonderfully successful. Valencia, although -one of the smallest provinces in Spain, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46"></a>[46]</span> -not naturally fertile, was, from the industry of the -inhabitants, one of the richest. Combining manufactures -with agriculture, it possessed great resources, -but they had been injured by the war, -without having been applied to its exigencies; and -the people expected that a bloody vengeance would -be taken for Calvo’s murder of the French residents at -the commencement of the contest. Their fears were -soon allayed: discipline was strictly preserved, and -Suchet, having suppressed the taxes imposed by -the Spanish government, substituted others, which, -being more equal, were less onerous. To protect -the people from oppression in the collection, he -published in every corner his demands, authorising -resistance to contributions which were not named -in his list and demanded by the proper officers; -and he employed the native authorities, as he had -done in Aragon. Thus, all impolitic restrictions -upon the industry and traffic of the country being -removed, the people found the government of the -invaders less oppressive than their own.</p> - -<p>Napoleon, in expectation of Suchet’s conquest, had -however imposed a war contribution, as a punishment -for the death of the French residents, so heavy, -that his lieutenant imagined Valencia would be -quite unable to raise the sum; yet the emperor, -who had calculated the Valencians’ means by a -comparison with those of Aragon, would not rescind -the order. And so exact was his judgement, that -Suchet, by accepting part payment, in kind, and -giving a discount for prompt liquidation, satisfied -this impost in one year, without much difficulty, and -the current expenses of the army were provided for -besides; yet neither did the people suffer as in other -provinces, nor was their industry so cramped, nor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47"></a>[47]</span> -their property so injured, as under their own -government. Valencia therefore remained tranquil, -and, by contrast, the mischief of negligence and -disorder was made manifest.</p> - -<p>The advantages derived from the conquest were -even extended to the province of Aragon, and to -the court of Joseph, for the contributions were -diminished in the former, and large sums were -remitted to the latter to meet Napoleon’s grant of -one-fifth of the war contributions in favour of the -intrusive government. This prosperous state of<span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -French affairs in Valencia was established also in the -face of an enemy daily increasing in strength. For -the regent, Abispal, had given Blake’s command -to his own brother Joseph O’Donel, who collecting -the remains of the armies of Murcia and Valencia, -had raised new levies, and during Suchet’s illness -formed a fresh army of twelve or fourteen thousand -men in the neighbourhood of Alicant. In the -Balearic Isles also Roche and Whittingham’s divisions -were declared ready to take the field, and -fifteen hundred British troops, commanded by -general Ross, arrived at Carthagena. To avoid -the fever there, these last remained on shipboard, -and were thus more menacing to the enemy than -on shore, because they seemed to be only awaiting -the arrival of a new army, which the French knew -to be coming from Sicily to the eastern coast of -Spain. And as the descent of this army was the -commencement of a remarkable episode in the -history of the Peninsular War, it is proper to give -an exact account of its origin and progress.</p> - -<p>Sir John Stuart had been succeeded, in Sicily, -by lord William Bentinck, a man of resolution, -capacity, and spirit, just in his actions, and abhorring<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48"></a>[48]</span> -oppression, but of a sanguine, impetuous -disposition. Being resolved to ameliorate the condition -of the Sicilian people, after surmounting -many difficulties, he removed the queen from -power, vested the direction of affairs in the crown -prince, obtained from the barons a renunciation of -their feudal privileges, and caused a representative -constitution to be proclaimed. Believing then that -the court was submissive because it was silent; -that the barons would adhere to his system, because -it gave them the useful power of legislation, in lieu -of feudal privileges alloyed by ruinous expenses -and the degradation of courtiers; because it gave -them the dignity of independence at the cost only -of maintaining the rights of the people and restoring -the honour of their country:—believing -thus, he judged that the large British force hitherto -kept in Sicily, as much to overawe the court as -to oppose the enemy, might be dispensed with; -and that the expected improvement of the Sicilian -army, and the attachment of the people to the new -political system, would permit ten thousand men -to be employed in aid of lord Wellington, or in -Italy. In January, therefore, he wrote of these -projects to the English ministers, and sent his -brother to lord Wellington to consult upon the best -mode of acting.</p> - -<p>Such an opportune offer to create a diversion on -the left flank of the French armies was eagerly -accepted by Wellington, who immediately sent -engineers, artificers, and a battering train complete, -to aid the expected expedition. But lord William -Bentinck was soon made sensible, that in large communities -working constitutions are the offspring, and -not the generators, of national feelings and habits.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49"></a>[49]</span> -They cannot be built like cities in the desert, nor -cast, as breakwaters, into the sea of public corruption, -but gradually, and as the insect rocks come up -from the depths of the ocean, they must arise, if -they are to bear the storms of human passions.</p> - -<p>The Sicilian court opposed lord William with -falsehood and intrigue, the constitution was secretly -thwarted by the barons, the Neapolitan -army, a body composed of foreigners of all nations, -was diligently augmented, with a view to overawe -both the English and the people; the revenues and -the subsidy were alike misapplied, and the native -Sicilian army, despised and neglected, was incapable -of service. Finally, instead of going to -Spain himself, with ten thousand good troops, lord -William could only send a subordinate general -with six thousand—British, Germans, Calabrese, -Swiss, and Sicilians; the British and Germans -only, being either morally or militarily well organised. -To these, however, Roche’s and Whittingham’s -levies, represented to be twelve or fourteen -thousand strong, were added, the Spanish -government having placed them at the disposition -of general Maitland, the commander of the expedition. -Thus, in May, twenty thousand men were -supposed ready for a descent on Catalonia, to -which quarter lord Wellington recommended they -should proceed.</p> - -<p>But now other objects were presented to lord -William Bentinck’s sanguine mind. The Austrian -government, while treating with Napoleon, was -secretly encouraging insurrections in Italy, Croatia, -Dalmatia, the Venetian states, the Tyrol, and -Switzerland. English, as well as Austrian agents, -were active to organise a vast conspiracy against<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50"></a>[50]</span> -the French emperor, and there was a desire, especially -on the part of England, to create a kingdom -for one of the Austrian archdukes. Murat -was discontented with France, the Montenegrins -were in arms on the Adriatic coast, and the prospect -of a descent upon Italy in unison with the wishes -of the people, appeared so promising to lord -William Bentinck, that supposing himself to have -a discretionary power, he stopped the expedition -to Catalonia, reasoning thus.</p> - -<p>“In Spain, only six thousand middling troops can -be employed on a secondary operation, and for a limited -period, whereas twelve thousand British soldiers, -and six thousand men composing the Neapolitan -army of Sicily, can land in Italy, a grand theatre, -where success will most efficaciously assist Spain. -The obnoxious Neapolitan force being thus removed, -the native Sicilian army can be organised, and the -new constitution established with more certainty.” -The time, also, he thought critical for Italy, not -so for Spain, which would suffer but a temporary -deprivation, seeing that failure in Italy would not -preclude after aid to Spain.</p> - -<p>Impressed with these notions, which, it must -be confessed, were both plausible and grand, he -permitted the expedition, already embarked, to sail -for Palma in Sardinia, and Mahon in Minorca, yet -merely as a blind, because, from those places, he -could easily direct the troops against Italy, and -meanwhile they menaced the French in Spain. -But the conception of vast and daring enterprises, -even the execution of them up to a certain point, -is not very uncommon, they fail only by a little! -that little is, however, the essence of genius, the -phial of wit, which, held to Orlando’s nostril,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51"></a>[51]</span> -changed him from a frantic giant to a perfect -commander.</p> - -<p>It was in the consideration of such nice points -of military policy that lord Wellington’s solid -judgement was always advantageously displayed. -Neither the greatness of this project nor the apparent -facility of execution weighed with him. He -thought the recovery of Italy by the power of the -British arms would be a glorious, and might be -a feasible exploit, but it was only in prospect, -Spain was the better field, the war in the Peninsula -existed; years had been devoted to the establishment -of a solid base there, and experience -had proved that the chance of victory was not -imaginary. England could not support two armies. -The principle of concentration of power on an important -point was as applicable here as on a field -of battle, and although Italy might be the more -vital point, it would be advisable to continue the -war already established in Spain: nay it would -be better to give up Spain, and direct the whole -power of England against Italy, rather than undertake -double operations, on such an extensive -scale, at a moment when the means necessary to -sustain one were so scanty.</p> - -<p>The ministers, apparently convinced by this -reasoning, forbad lord William Bentinck to proceed, -and they expressed their discontent at his conduct. -Nevertheless their former instructions had unquestionably -conferred on him a discretionary power -to act in Italy, and so completely had he been -misled by their previous despatches, that besides -delaying the expedition to Spain, he had placed -twelve hundred men under admiral Fremantle, to -assist the Montenegrins. And he was actually<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52"></a>[52]</span> -entangled in a negotiation with the Russian admiral, -Greig, relative to the march of a Russian army; -a march planned, as it would appear, without the -knowledge of the Russian court, and which, from -the wildness of its conception and the mischief it -would probably have effected, deserves notice.</p> - -<p>While the Russian war was still uncertain, admiral -Tchtchagoff, who commanded sixty thousand -men on the Danube, proposed to march with them, -through Bosnia and the ancient Epirus, to the -mouths of the Cattaro, and, there embarking, to -commence the impending contest with France in -Italy. He was, however, without resources, and -expecting to arrive in a starving and miserable -condition on the Adriatic, demanded, through -admiral Greig, then commanding a squadron in -the Mediterranean, that lord William Bentinck -should be ready to supply him with fresh arms, -ammunition, and provisions, and to aid him with -an auxiliary force. That nobleman saw at a glance -the absurdity of this scheme, but he was falsely -informed that Tchtchagoff, trusting to his good will, -had already commenced the march; and thus he -had only to choose between aiding an ally, whose -force, if it arrived at all, and was supplied by -England, would help his own project, or permit -it, to avoid perishing, to ravage Italy, and so change -the people of that country from secret friends into -deadly enemies. It would be foreign to this history -to consider what effect the absence of Tchtchagoff’s -army during the Russian campaign would have -had upon Napoleon’s operations, but this was the -very force whose march to the Beresina afterwards -obliged the emperor to abandon Smolensko, and -continue the retreat to Warsaw.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53"></a>[53]</span></p> - -<p>It was in the midst of these affairs, that the -English minister’s imperative orders to look only to -the coast of Spain arrived. The negociation with -the Russians was immediately stopped, the project -of landing in Italy was relinquished, and the expedition, -already sent to the Adriatic, was recalled. -Meanwhile the descent on Catalonia had been delayed, -and as a knowledge of its destination, had -reached Suchet through the French minister of war, -and through the rumours rife amongst the Spaniards, -all his preparations to meet it were matured. Nor -was this the only mischief produced by the -English minister’s want of clear views and decided -system of policy. Lord William Bentinck had -been empowered to raise money on bills for his -own exigences, and being desirous to form a military -chest for his project in Italy, he had invaded -lord Wellington’s money markets. With infinite -trouble and difficulty that general had just opened -a source of supply at the rate of five shillings and -four-pence, to five shillings and eight-pence the -dollar, when lord William Bentinck’s agents offering -six shillings and eight-pence, swept four millions -from the markets, and thus, as shall be hereafter -shewn, seriously embarrassed lord Wellington’s -operations in the field.</p> - -<p>This unhappy commencement of the Sicilian expedition -led to other errors, and its arrival on the -coast of Spain, did not take place, until after the -campaign in Castile had commenced; but as its proceedings -connected the warfare of Valencia immediately -with that of Catalonia, and the whole with -lord Wellington’s operations, they cannot be properly -treated of in this place. It is, however, worthy of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54"></a>[54]</span> -observation, how an illiberal and factious policy, -inevitably recoils upon its authors.</p> - -<p>In 1807 sir John Moore, with that sagacity and -manliness which distinguished his career through -life, had informed the ministers, that no hope of a -successful attack on the French in Italy, could be -entertained while the British army upheld the tyrannical -system of the dissolute and treacherous -Neapolitan court in Sicily. And as no change for -the better could be expected while the queen was -allowed to govern, he proposed, that the British -cabinet should either relinquish Sicily, or, assuming -the entire controul of the island, seize the queen -and send her to her native Austria. This he judged -to be the first step necessary to render the large -British army in Sicily available for the field, -because the Sicilian people could then be justly -governed, and thus only could the organization of -an effective native force attached to England, and -fitted to offer freedom to Italy be effected.</p> - -<p>He spoke not of constitutions but of justice to the -people, and hence his proposal was rejected as a -matter of Jacobinism. Mr. Drummond, the English -plenipotentiary, even betrayed it to the queen, -a woman not without magnanimity, yet so capable -of bloody deeds, that, in 1810, she secretly proposed -to Napoleon the perpetration of a second -Sicilian vespers upon the English. The emperor, -detesting such guilt, only answered by throwing -her agent into prison, yet the traces of the conspiracy -were detected by the British authorities in -1811; and in 1812 lord William Bentinck was -forced to seize the government, in the manner -before recommended by Moore, and did finally<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55"></a>[55]</span> -expel the queen by force. But because these measures -were not resorted to in time, he was now, -with an army of from twenty-five to thirty thousand -men, sixteen thousand of which were British, -only able to detach a mixed force of six thousand -to aid lord Wellington. And at the same time the -oppression of Ireland required that sixty thousand -fine soldiers should remain idle at home, while -France, with a Russian war on hand, was able to -over-match the allies in Spain. Bad government is -a scourge with a double thong!</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56"></a>[56]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. April.</span> -A short time previous to Hill’s enterprize against -Almaraz, Soult, after driving Ballesteros from the -Ronda, and restoring the communication with -Grenada, sent three thousand men into the Niebla; -partly to interrupt the march of some Spaniards -coming from Cadiz to garrison Badajos, partly to -menace Penne Villemur and Morillo, who still -lingered on the Odiel against the wishes of Wellington. -The French arguments were more effectual. -Those generals immediately filed along the -frontier of Portugal towards Estremadura, they -were hastily followed by the Spanish troops sent -from Cadiz, and the militia of the Algarves were -called out, to defend the Portuguese frontier. -Soult then remained on the defensive, for he expected -the advance of lord Wellington, which the -approach of so many troops, the seeming reluctance -of the Spaniards to quit the Niebla, the -landing of fresh men from Cadiz at Ayamonte, and -the false rumours purposely set afloat by the British -general seemed to render certain. Nor did the -surprize of Almaraz, which he thought to be -aimed at the army of the south and not against the -army of Portugal, alter his views.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57"></a>[57]</span></p> - -<p>The great advantage which lord Wellington had -gained by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos -was now very clearly illustrated; for, as he could -at will advance either against the north or the south -or the centre, the French generals in each quarter -expected him, and they were anxious that the -others should regulate their movements accordingly. -None would help the other, and the secret plans -of all were paralyzed until it was seen on which -side the thunderbolt would fall. This was of most -consequence in the south, for Soult’s plans were -vast, dangerous, and ripe for execution.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -After the fall of Badajos he judged it unwise to -persevere in pushing a head of troops, into Estremadura, -while his rear and flanks were exposed to -attacks from Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Murcia; but it -was essential, he thought, to crush Ballesteros -before his forces should be increased, and this was -not to be effected, while that general could flee to -Gibraltar on the one side, and Tarifa on the other. -Whereupon Soult had resolved first to reduce -Tarifa, with a view to the ruin of Ballesteros, and -then to lay siege to Carthagena and Alicant, and -he only awaited the development of Wellington’s -menacing demonstrations against Andalusia to commence -his own operations. Great and difficult his -plan was, yet profoundly calculated to effect his -main object, which was to establish his base so -firmly in Andalusia that, maugre the forces in Cadiz -and the Isla, he might safely enter upon and follow -up regular offensive operations in Estremadura and -against Portugal, instead of the partial uncertain -expeditions hitherto adopted. In fine, he designed -to make lord Wellington feel that there was a -powerful army within a few marches of Lisbon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58"></a>[58]</span></p> - -<p>Thinking that Carthagena and Tarifa, and even -Alicant must fall, with the aid of Suchet, which he -expected, or that the siege of the first would bring -down Hill’s corps, and all the disposable Spanish -troops to save it, he desired that the army of -Portugal, and the army of the centre, should -operate so as to keep lord Wellington employed -north of the Tagus. He could then by himself -carry on the sieges he contemplated, and yet leave -a force under Drouet on the edge of Estremadura, -strong enough to oblige Hill to operate in the -direction of Carthagena instead of Seville. And -if this should happen as he expected, he proposed -suddenly to concentrate all his finely organized and -experienced troops, force on a general battle, and, -if victorious, the preparations being made before -hand, to follow up the blow by a rapid march -upon Portugal, and so enter Lisbon; or by bringing -Wellington in all haste to the defence of that -capital, confine the war, while Napoleon was in -Russia, to a corner of the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>This great project was strictly in the spirit of -the emperor’s instructions. For that consummate -commander had desired his lieutenants to make -lord Wellington feel that his enemies were not -passively defensive. He had urged them to press -the allies close on each flank, and he had endeavoured -to make Marmont understand that, although -there was no object to be attained by entering the -north-east of Portugal, and fighting a general -battle on ground favourable to lord Wellington, -it was contrary to all military principles, to withdraw -several days’ march from the allies’ outposts, -and by such a timid defensive system, to give the -English general the power of choosing when<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59"></a>[59]</span> -and where to strike. Now the loss of Badajos, -and the difficulty of maintaining a defensive war -against the increasing forces of the allies in the -south of Andalusia, rendered it extremely onerous -for Soult to press Wellington’s flank in Estremadura; -and it was therefore a profound modification -of the emperor’s views, to urge the king and Marmont -to active operation in the north, while he -besieged Tarifa and Carthagena, keeping his army -in mass ready for a sudden stroke in the field, -if fortune brought the occasion, and if otherwise, -sure of fixing a solid base for future operations -against Portugal.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia wished to have commenced -his operations by the siege of Tarifa in May, when -Wellington’s return to Beira had relieved him from -the fear of an immediate invasion of Andalusia, but -the failure of the harvest in 1811 and the continual -movements during the winter, had so reduced his -magazines, both of provisions and ammunition, that -he could not undertake the operation until the new -harvest was ripe, and fresh convoys had replenished -his exhausted stores. His soldiers were already on -short allowance, and famine raged amongst the -people of the country. Meanwhile his agents in -Morocco had so firmly re-established the French -interests there, that the emperor refused all supplies -to the British, and even fitted out a squadron to -insure obedience to his orders. To counteract this -mischief, the Gibraltar merchant, Viali, who had -been employed in the early part of the war by sir -Hew Dalrymple, was sent by sir Henry Wellesley -with a mission to the court of Fez, which failed, -and it was said from the intrigues of the notorious -Charmilly who was then at Tangier, and being connected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60"></a>[60]</span> -by marriage with the English consul there, -unsuspected: indeed from a mean hatred to sir -John Moore, there were not wanting persons in -power who endeavoured still to uphold this man.</p> - -<p>So far every thing promised well for Soult’s plans, -and he earnestly demanded that all his detachments, -and sufficient reinforcements, together with artillery, -officers, money, and convoys of ammunition -should be sent to him for the siege of Carthagena. -Pending their arrival, to divert the attention of the -allies, he repaired to Port St. Mary where the -French had, from the circumstances of the war -in Estremadura, been a long time inactive. He -brought down with him a number of the Villantroy -mortars, and having collected about thirty gun-boats -in the Trocadero canal, commenced a serious -bombardment of Cadiz on the 16th of May. While -thus engaged, a sudden landing from English -vessels was effected on the Grenada coast, Almeria -was abandoned by the French, the people rose along -the sea-line, and general Frere, advancing from -Murcia, entrenched himself in the position of Venta -de Bahul, on the eastern frontier of Grenada. He -was indeed surprised and beaten with loss, and the -insurrection on the coast was soon quelled, but -these things delayed the march of the reinforcements -intended for Drouet; meanwhile Hill surprised -Almaraz, and Ballesteros, whose forces had subsisted -during the winter and spring, upon the stores of -Gibraltar, advanced against Conroux’s division then -in observation at Bornos on the Guadalete.</p> - -<p>This Spanish general caused equal anxiety to -Soult and to Wellington, because his proceedings -involved one of those intricate knots, by which the -important parts of both their operations were fastened.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61"></a>[61]</span> -Lord Wellington judged, that, while a large -and increasing corps which could be aided by a -disembarkation of five or six thousand men from -the Isla de Leon, menaced the blockade of Cadiz -and the communications between Seville and Grenada, -Soult must keep a considerable body in observation, -and consequently, Hill would be a match -for the French in Estremadura. But the efficacy -of this diversion, depended upon avoiding battles, -seeing that if Ballesteros’ army was crushed, the -French, reinforced in Estremadura, could drive Hill -over the Tagus, which would inevitably bring Wellington -himself to his succour. Soult was for the -same reason as earnest to bring the Spanish general -to action, as Wellington was to prevent a battle, and -Ballesteros, a man of infinite arrogance, despised -both. Having obtained money and supplies from -Gibraltar to replace the expenditure of his former -excursion against Seville, he marched with eight -thousand men against Conroux, and that Frenchman, -aware of his intention, induced him, by an appearance -of fear, to attack an entrenched camp in a -disorderly manner. On the 1st of June the battle -took place, and Conroux issuing forth unexpectedly -killed or took fifteen hundred Spaniards, and -drove the rest to the hills, from whence they retreated -to San Roque. How this victory was felt -in Estremadura shall now be shewn.</p> - -<p>The loss of Almaraz had put all the French -corps in movement. A division of Marmont’s army -crossed the Gredos mountains, to replace Foy in -the valley of the Tagus, and the latter general, -passing that river by the bridge of Arzobispo moved -through the mountains of Guadalupe, and succoured -the garrison of Mirabete on the 26th of May. When<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62"></a>[62]</span> -he retired the partidas of the Guadalupe renewed -the blockade, and Hill, now strongly reinforced by<span class="sidenote7">June.</span> -lord Wellington, advanced to Zafra, whereupon -Drouet, unable to meet him, fell back to Azagua. -Hill, wishing to protect the gathering of the harvest, -then detached Penne Villemur’s horsemen, -from Llerena on the right flank, and general Slade, -with the third dragoon guards and the royals, -from Llera on the left flank; General Lallemande, -having a like object, came forward with two regiments -of French dragoons, on the side of Valencia -de las Torres, whereupon Hill, hoping to cut him off, -placed Slade’s dragoons in a wood with directions -to await further orders. Slade hearing that -Lallemand was so near, and no wise superior to -himself in numbers, forgot his orders, advanced -and drove the French cavalry with loss beyond the -defile of Maquilla, a distance of eight miles; and -through the pass also the British rashly galloped in -pursuit, the general riding in the foremost ranks, -and the supports joining tumultuously in the charge.</p> - -<p>But in the plain beyond stood Lallemand with -his reserves well in hand. He broke the disorderly -English mass thus rushing on him, killed or wounded -forty-eight men, pursued the rest for six miles, -recovered all his own prisoners, and took more than -a hundred, including two officers, from his adversary; -and the like bitter results will generally attend -what is called “<em>dashing</em>” in war, which in other -words means courage without prudence. Two days -after this event the Austrian Strenowitz, whose exploits -have been before noticed, marched with fifty -men of the same regiments, to fetch off some of the -English prisoners who had been left, by the French, -under a slender guard in the village of Maquilla.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63"></a>[63]</span> -Eighty of the enemy met him on the march, yet by -fine management he overthrew him, and losing only -one man himself, killed many French, executed his -mission, and returned with an officer and twenty -other prisoners.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs, when the defeat of -Ballesteros at Bornoz, enabled Soult to reinforce -Drouet, with Barois’s division of infantry and two -divisions of cavalry; they marched across the -Morena, but for reasons, to be hereafter mentioned, -by the royal road of St. Ollala, a line of direction -which obliged Drouet to make a flank march by his -left towards Llerena to form his junction with them. -It was effected on the 18th, and the allies then fell -back gradually towards Albuera, where being -joined by four Portuguese regiments from Badajos, -and by the fifth Spanish army, Hill formed a line -of battle furnishing twenty thousand infantry, two -thousand five hundred cavalry, and twenty-four -guns.</p> - -<p>Drouet had only twenty-one thousand men, of -which three thousand were cavalry, with eighteen -pieces of artillery; the allies were therefore the -most numerous, but the French army was better -composed, and battle seemed inevitable, for both -generals had discretionary orders. However the -French cavalry did not advance further than Almendralejo, -and Hill who had shewn himself so daring -at Aroyo Molino and Almaraz, now, with an uncommon -mastery of ambition, refrained from an -action which promised him unbounded fame, simply -because he was uncertain whether the state of lord -Wellington’s operations in Castile, then in full progress, -would warrant one. His recent exploits had -been so splendid that a great battle gained at this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64"></a>[64]</span> -time would, with the assistance of envious malice, -have placed his reputation on a level with Wellington’s. -Yet he was habituated to command, and his -adversary’s talents were moderate, his forbearance -must therefore be taken as a proof of the purest -patriotism.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -Early in July the French cavalry entered Almendralejo -and Santa Marta, cut off two hundred -Spanish horsemen, and surprised a small British -cavalry post; Hill who had then received fresh -instructions, and was eager to fight, quickly drove -them with loss from both places. Drouet immediately -concentrated his forces and retired to La -Granja, and was followed by the allies, but the -account of the transactions in Andalusia and Estremadura -must be here closed, because those which -followed belong to the general combinations. And -as the causes of these last movements, and their -effects upon the general campaign, are of an intricate -nature, to avoid confusion the explanation of -them is reserved for another place: meanwhile I -will endeavour to describe that political chaos, -amidst which Wellington’s army appeared as the -ark amongst the meeting clouds and rising waters -of the deluge.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65"></a>[65]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVII_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812.</span> -The unmatched power of Napoleon’s genius was -now being displayed in a wonderful manner. His -interest, his inclination, and his expectation were -alike opposed to a war with Russia, but Alexander -and himself, each hoping that a menacing display -of strength would reduce the other to negotiation, -advanced, step by step, until blows could no longer -be avoided. Napoleon, a man capable of sincere -friendship, had relied too much and too long on -the existence of a like feeling in the Russian emperor; -and misled, perhaps, by the sentiment of -his own energy, did not sufficiently allow for the -daring intrigues of a court, where secret combinations -of the nobles formed the real governing -power.</p> - -<p>That the cabinet of Petersburgh should be, more -than ordinarily subject to such combinations at -this period, was the necessary consequence of the -greatness of the interests involved in the treaties -of Tilsit and Erfurth; the continental system -had so deeply injured the fortunes of the Russian -noblemen, that their sovereign’s authority in support -of it was as nothing. During the Austrian war -of 1809, when Alexander was yet warm from -Napoleon’s society at Erfurth, the aid given to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66"></a>[66]</span> -France was a mockery, and a desire to join a northern -confederation against Napoleon was even then -scarcely concealed at St. Petersburgh, where the -French ambassador was coldly treated. The royal -family of Prussia were, it is true, at the same time, -mortified by a reception which inclined them to side -with France, against the wishes of their people and -their ministers, but in Russia, Romanzow alone -was averse to choose that moment to declare against -Napoleon. And this was so certain that Austria, -anticipating the explosion, was only undecided -whether the king of Prussia should be punished -or the people rewarded, whether she herself should -befriend or plunder the Prussian monarchy.</p> - -<p>At that time also, the Russian naval commander, -in the Adriatic, being ordered to sail to Ancona -for the purpose of convoying Marmont’s troops -from Dalmatia to Italy, refused, on the plea -that his ships were not sea-worthy; yet secretly -he informed the governor of Trieste that they -would be in excellent order to assist an Austrian -corps against the French! Admiral Tchtchagoff’s -strange project of marching upon Italy from -Bucharest has been already noticed, and it is -remarkable that this expedition was to be conducted -upon popular principles, the interests of the Sicilian -court being to be made subservient to the wishes -of the people. At a later period, in 1812, admiral -Grieg proposed to place an auxiliary Russian army -under either Wellington or lord William Bentinck, -and it was accepted; but when the Russian ambassador -in London was applied to upon the subject, -he unequivocally declared that the emperor knew -nothing of the matter!</p> - -<p>With a court so situated, angry negotiations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67"></a>[67]</span> -once commenced rendered war inevitable, and the -more especially that the Russian cabinet, which had -long determined on hostilities though undecided -as to the time of drawing the sword, was well -aware of the secret designs and proceedings of -Austria in Italy, and of Murat’s discontent. The -Hollanders were known to desire independence, -and the deep hatred which the people of Prussia -bore to the French was a matter of notoriety. -Bernadotte, who very early had resolved to cast -down the ladder by which he rose, was the secret -adviser of these practices against Napoleon’s power -in Italy, and he was also in communication with -the Spaniards. Thus Napoleon, having a war in -Spain which required three hundred thousand -men to keep in a balanced state, was forced, by -resistless circumstances, into another and more -formidable contest in the distant north, when the -whole of Europe was prepared to rise upon his -lines of communication, and when his extensive -sea-frontier was exposed to the all-powerful navy -of Great Britain.</p> - -<p>A conqueror’s march to Moscow, amidst such -dangers, was a design more vast, more hardy, more -astounding than ever before entered the imagination -of man; yet it was achieved, and solely by the force -of his genius. For having organised two hundred -thousand French soldiers, as a pretorian guard, he -stepped resolutely into the heart of Germany, and -monarchs and nations bent submissively before him; -secret hostility ceased, and, with the exception of -Bernadotte, the crowned and anointed plotters quitted -their work to follow his chariot-wheels. Dresden -saw the ancient story of the King of Kings renewed -in his person; and the two hundred thousand French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68"></a>[68]</span> -soldiers arrived on the Niemen in company with -two hundred thousand allies. On that river four -hundred thousand troops, I have seen the imperial -returns, were assembled by this wonderful man, all -disciplined warriors, and, notwithstanding their -different, national feelings, all proud of the unmatched -genius of their leader. Yet, even in that -hour of dizzy elevation, Napoleon, deeply sensible -of the inherent weakness of a throne unhallowed -by time, described by one emphatic phrase the delicacy -of his political situation. During the passage -of the Niemen, twelve thousand cuirassiers, whose -burnished armour flashed in the sun while their -cries of salutation pealed in unison with the -thunder of the horses’ feet, were passing like a -foaming torrent towards the river, when Napoleon -turned and thus addressed Gouvion St. Cyr, whose -republican principles were well known,</p> - -<p>“No monarch ever had such an army?”</p> - -<p>“No, sire.”</p> - -<p>“The French are a fine people; they deserve -more liberty, and they shall have it, but, St. Cyr, -no liberty of the press! That army, mighty as it -is, could not resist the songs of Paris!”</p> - -<p>Such, then, was the nature of Napoleon’s power -that success alone could sustain it; success which -depended as much upon others’ exertions as upon -his own stupendous genius, for Russia was far -distant from Spain. It is said, I know not upon -what authority, that he at one moment, had resolved -to concentrate all the French troops in the Peninsula -behind the Ebro during this expedition to Russia, -but the capture of Blake’s force at Valencia changed -his views. Of this design there are no traces in -the movements of his armies, nor in the captured<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69"></a>[69]</span> -papers of the king, and there are some indications -of a contrary design; for at that period several -foreign agents were detected examining the lines -of Torres Vedras, and on a Frenchman, who killed -himself when arrested in the Brazils, were found -papers proving a mission for the same object. -Neither is it easy to discern the advantage of -thus crowding three hundred thousand men on a -narrow slip of ground, where they must have been -fed from France, already overburthened with the -expenses of the Russian war; and this when they -were numerous enough, if rightly handled, to have -maintained themselves on the resources of Spain, -and near the Portuguese frontier for a year at least.</p> - -<p>To have given up all the Peninsula, west of the -Ebro, would have been productive of no benefit, -save what might have accrued from the jealousy -which the Spaniards already displayed towards their -allies; but if that jealousy, as was probable, had -forced the British general away, he could have -carried his army to Italy, or have formed in Germany -the nucleus of a great northern confederation -on the emperor’s rear. Portugal was therefore, in -truth, the point of all Europe in which the British -strength was least dangerous to Napoleon during -the invasion of Russia; moreover, an immediate -war with that empire was not a certain event -previous to the capture of Valencia. Napoleon -was undoubtedly anxious to avoid it while the -Spanish contest continued; yet, with a far-reaching -European policy, in which his English adversaries -were deficient, he foresaw and desired to check -the growing strength of that fearful and wicked -power which now menaces the civilised world.</p> - -<p>The proposal for peace which he made to England<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70"></a>[70]</span> -before his departure for the Niemen is another -circumstance where his object seems to have been -misrepresented. It was called a device to reconcile -the French to the Russian war; but they were -as eager for that war as he could wish them to be, -and it is more probable that it sprung from a secret -misgiving, a prophetic sentiment of the consequent -power of Russia, lifted, as she then would be -towards universal tyranny, by the very arm which -he had raised to restrain her. The ostensible -ground of his quarrel with the emperor Alexander -was the continental system; yet, in this proposal -for peace, he offered to acknowledge the house of -Braganza in Portugal, the house of Bourbon in -Sicily, and to withdraw his army from the Peninsula, -if England would join him in guaranteeing the crown -of Spain to Joseph, together with a constitution to -be arranged by a national Cortes. This was a -virtual renunciation of the continental system for the -sake of peace with England; and a proposal which -obviated the charge of aiming at universal dominion, -seeing that Austria, Spain, Portugal, and England -would have retained their full strength, and the -limits of his empire would have been fixed. The -offer was made also at a time when the emperor -was certainly more powerful than he had ever yet -been, when Portugal was, by the avowal of Wellington -himself, far from secure, and Spain quite -exhausted. At peace with England, Napoleon -could easily have restored the Polish nation, and -Russia would have been repressed. Now, Poland -has fallen, and Russia stalks in the plenitude of -her barbarous tyranny.</p> - -<p><em>Political state of England.</em>—The new administration, -despised by the country, was not the less<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71"></a>[71]</span> -powerful in parliament; its domestic proceedings -were therefore characterised by all the corruption -and tyranny of Mr. Pitt’s system, without his redeeming -genius. The press was persecuted with -malignant ferocity, and the government sought to -corrupt all that it could not trample upon. Repeated -successes had rendered the particular contest -in the Peninsula popular with the ardent spirits of -the nation, and war-prices passed for glory with -the merchants, land-owners, and tradesmen; but -as the price of food augmented faster than the -price of labour, the poorer people suffered, they -rejoiced, indeed, at their country’s triumphs because -the sound of victory is always pleasing to warlike -ears, but they were discontented. Meanwhile all -thinking men, who were not biassed by factions, -or dazzled by military splendour, perceived in the -enormous expenses incurred to repress the democratic -principle, and in the consequent transfer of -property, the sure foundation of future reaction and -revolution. The distresses of the working classes -had already produced partial insurrections, and the -nation at large was beginning to perceive that -the governing powers, whether representative or -executive, were rapacious usurpers of the people’s -rights; a perception quickened by malignant prosecutions, -by the insolent extravagance with which -the public money was lavished on the family of -Mr. Perceval, and by the general profusion at -home, while lord Wellesley declared that the war -languished for want of sustenance abroad.</p> - -<p>Napoleon’s continental system, although in the -nature of a sumptuary law, which the desires of -men will never suffer to exist long in vigour, was -yet so efficient, that the British government was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72"></a>[72]</span> -forced to encourage, and protect, illicit trading, -to the great detriment of mercantile morality. -The island of Heligoland was the chief point of -deposit for this commerce, and either by trading -energy, or by the connivance of continental governments, -the emperor’s system was continually baffled; -nevertheless its effects will not quickly pass away; -it pressed sorely upon the manufacturers at the -time, and by giving rise to rival establishments on -the continent, has awakened in Germany a commercial -spirit by no means favourable to England’s -manufacturing superiority.</p> - -<p>But ultimate consequences were never considered -by the British ministers; the immediate object was -to procure money, and by virtually making bank-notes -a legal tender, they secured unlimited means -at home, through the medium of loans and taxes, -which the corruption of the parliament, insured to -them, and which, by a reaction, insured the corruption -of the parliament. This resource failed abroad. -They could, and did, send to all the allies of England, -enormous supplies in kind, because to do so, -was, in the way of contracts, an essential part of the -system of corruption at home; a system aptly described, -as bribing one-half of the nation with the -money of the other half, in order to misgovern -both. Specie was however only to be had in comparatively -small quantities, and at a premium -so exorbitant, that even the most reckless politician -trembled for the ultimate consequences.</p> - -<p>The foreign policy of the government was very -simple, namely, to bribe all powers <ins class="corr" id="tn-72" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'to war down'"> -to wear down</ins> France. Hence to Russia every thing, save specie, -was granted; and hence also, amicable relations -with Sweden were immediately re-established, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73"></a>[73]</span> -the more readily that this power had lent herself -to the violation of the continental system by permitting -the entry of British goods at Stralsund; -but wherever wisdom, or skill, was required, -the English minister’s resources failed altogether. -With respect to Sicily, Spain, and Portugal, this -truth was notorious; and to preserve the political -support of the trading interests at home, a degrading -and deceitful policy, quite opposed to the -spirit of lord Wellington’s counsels, was followed -in regard to the revolted Spanish colonies.</p> - -<p>The short-sighted injustice of the system was however -most glaring with regard to the United States -of America. Mutual complaints, the dregs of the -war of independence, had long characterised the intercourse -between the British and American governments, -and these discontents were turned into extreme -hatred by the progress of the war with France. -The British government in 1806 proclaimed, contrary -to the law of nations, a blockade of the -French coast, which could not be enforced. Napoleon, -in return, issued the celebrated decrees of -Berlin and Milan, which produced the no less celebrated -orders in council. The commerce of all -neutrals was thus extinguished by the arrogance -of the belligerents; but the latter very soon finding -that their mutual convenience required some relaxation -of mutual violence, granted licenses to -each other’s ships, and by this scandalous evasion -of their own policy, caused the whole of the evil -to fall upon the neutral, who was yet called the -friend of both parties.</p> - -<p>The Americans, unwilling to go to war with two -such powerful states, were yet resolved not to submit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74"></a>[74]</span> -to the tyranny of either; but the injustice of -the English government was the most direct, and -extended in its operations, and it was rendered -infinitely more bitter by the violence used towards -the seamen of the United States: not less than six -thousand sailors, it was said, were taken from merchant -vessels on the high seas, and forced to serve -in the British men-of-war. Wherefore, after first<span class="sidenote">18th June, 1812.</span> -passing retaliatory, or rather warning acts, called the -non-intercourse, non-importation, and embargo acts, -the Americans finally declared war, at the moment -when the British government, alarmed at the consequences -of their own injustice, had just rescinded -the orders in council.</p> - -<p>The immediate effects of these proceedings on -the contest in the Peninsula, shall be noticed in -another place, but the ultimate effects on England’s -prosperity have not yet been unfolded. -The struggle prematurely told the secret of -American strength, and it has drawn the attention -of the world to a people, who, notwithstanding -the curse of black slavery which clings to them, -adding the most horrible ferocity to the peculiar -baseness of their mercantile spirit, and rendering -their republican vanity ridiculous, do in their -general government uphold civil institutions, which -have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe.</p> - -<p><em>Political state of Spain.</em>—Bad government is more -hurtful than direct war; the ravages of the last are -soon repaired, and the public mind is often purified, -and advanced, by the trial of adversity, but the -evils, springing from the former, seem interminable. -In the Isla de Leon the unseemly currents of folly, -although less raging than before, continued to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75"></a>[75]</span> -break open new channels and yet abandoned none -of the old. The intrigues of the princess Carlotta -were unremitted, and though the danger of provoking -the populace of Cadiz, restrained and -frightened her advocates in the Cortez, she opposed -the English diplomacy, with reiterated, and -not quite unfounded accusations, that the revolt -of the colonies was being perfidiously fostered -by Great Britain:—a charge well calculated to -lower the influence of England, especially in -regard to the scheme of mediation, which being<span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -revived in April by lord Castlereagh, was received -by the Spaniards with outward coldness, -and a secret resolution to reject it altogether; nor -were they in any want of reasons to justify their -proceedings.</p> - -<p>This mediation had been commenced by lord -Wellesley, when the quarrel between the mother -country and the colonies was yet capable of -adjustment; it was now renewed when it could -not succeed. English commissioners were appointed -to carry it into execution, the duke of Infantado -was to join them on the part of Spain, and -at first Mr. Stuart was to have formed part of the -commission, Mr. Sydenham being to succeed him -at Lisbon, but finally he remained in Portugal and -Mr. Sydenham was attached to the commission, -whose composition he thus described.</p> - -<p>“I do not understand a word of the Spanish -language, I am unacquainted with the Spanish -character, I know very little of Old Spain, and -I am quite ignorant of the state of the colonies, -yet I am part of a commission composed of men -of different professions, views, habits, feelings, and -opinions. The mediation proposed is at least a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76"></a>[76]</span> -year too late, it has been forced upon the government -of Old Spain, I have no confidence in the -ministers who employ me, and I am fully persuaded -that they have not the slightest confidence -in me.”</p> - -<p>The first essential object was to have Bardaxi’s -secret article, which required England to join Old -Spain if the mediation failed, withdrawn; but as -this could not be done without the consent of the -Cortez, the publicity thus given would have ruined -the credit of the mediation with the colonists. -Nor would the distrust of the latter have been unfounded, -for though lord Wellesley had offered the -guarantee of Great Britain to any arrangement -made under her mediation, his successors would -not do so!</p> - -<p>“They empower us,” said Mr. Sydenham, “to -negociate and sign a treaty but will not guarantee -the execution of it! My opinion is, that the -formal signature of a treaty by plenipotentiaries is -in itself a solemn guarantee, if there is good faith -and fair dealing in the transaction; and I believe -that this opinion will be confirmed by the authority -of every writer on the law of nations. But this is -certainly not the doctrine of our present ministers, -they make a broad distinction between the ratification -of a treaty and the intention of seeing it -duly observed.”</p> - -<p>The failure of such a scheme was inevitable. -The Spaniards wanted the commissioners to go first -to the Caraccas, where the revolt being full blown, -nothing could be effected; the British government -insisted that they should go to Mexico, where the -dispute had not yet been pushed to extremities. -After much useless diplomacy, which continued<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77"></a>[77]</span> -until the end of the year, the negociation, as Mr. -Sydenham had predicted, proved abortive.</p> - -<p>In March the new constitution of Spain had been -solemnly adopted, and a decree settling the succession -of the crown was promulgated. The infant -Francisco de Paula, the queen of Etruria, and -their respective descendants were excluded from -the succession, which was to fall first to the princess -Carlotta if the infant don Carlos failed of -heirs, then to the hereditary princess of the Two -Sicilies, and so on, the empress of France and her -descendants being especially excluded. This exhibition -of popular power, under the pretext of -baffling Napoleon’s schemes, struck at the principle -of legitimacy. And when the extraordinary -Cortez decided that the ordinary Cortez, which -ought to assemble every year, should not be convoked -until October 1813, and thus secured to -itself a tenure of power for two years instead of -one, the discontent increased both at Cadiz and in -the provinces, and a close connection was kept up -between the malcontents and the Portuguese government, -which was then the strong hold of arbitrary -power in the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>The local junta of Estremadura adopted Carlotta’s -claims, in their whole extent, and communicated on -the subject, at first secretly with the Portuguese -regency, and then more openly with Mr. Stuart. -Their scheme was to remove all the acting provincial -authorities, and to replace them with persons -acknowledging Carlotta’s sovereignty; they even -declared that they would abide by the new constitution, -only so far as it acknowledged what they -called legitimate power, in other words, the princess -was to be sole regent. Nevertheless this party<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78"></a>[78]</span> -was not influenced by Carlotta’s intrigues, for they -would not join her agents in any outcry against the -British; they acted upon the simple principle of -opposing the encroachments of democracy, and they -desired to know how England would view their -proceedings. The other provinces received the -new constitution coldly, and the Biscayens angrily -rejected it as opposed to their ancient privileges. -In this state of public feeling, the abolition of the -Inquisition, a design now openly agitated, offered a -point around which all the clergy, and all that the -clergy could influence, gathered against the Cortes, -which was also weakened by its own factions; yet -the republicans gained strength, and they were encouraged -by the new constitution established in -Sicily, which also alarmed their opponents, and -the fear and distrust extended to the government -of Portugal.</p> - -<p>However amidst all the varying subjects of interest -the insane project of reducing the colonies -by force, remained a favourite with all parties; nor -was it in relation to the colonies only, that these -men, who were demanding aid from other nations, -in the names of freedom, justice, and humanity, -proved themselves to be devoid of those attributes -themselves. “The humane object of the abolition -of the slave-trade has been frustrated,” said lord -Castlereagh, “because not only Spanish subjects -but Spanish public officers and governors, in various -parts of the Spanish colonies, are instrumental to, -and accomplices in the crimes of the contraband -slave-traders of Great Britain and America, furnishing -them with flags, papers, and solemn documents -to entitle them to the privileges of Spanish cruizers, -and to represent their property as Spanish.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79"></a>[79]</span></p> - -<p>With respect to the war in Spain itself, all manner -of mischief was abroad. The regular cavalry -had been entirely destroyed, and when, with the -secret permission of their own government, some -distinguished Austrian officers, proffered their services -to the regency, to restore that arm, they were -repelled. Nearly all the field-artillery had been -lost in action, the arsenals at Cadiz were quite exhausted, -and most of the heavy guns on the works -of the Isla were rendered unserviceable by constant -and useless firing; the stores of shot were diminished -in an alarming manner, no sums were appropriated -to the support of the founderies, and when -the British artillery officers made formal representations -of this dangerous state of affairs, it only produced -a demand of money from England to put the -founderies into activity. To crown the whole, -Abadia, recalled from Gallicia, at the express desire -of sir Henry Wellesley because of his bad conduct, -was now made minister of war.</p> - -<p>In Ceuta, notwithstanding the presence of a small -British force, the Spanish garrison, the galley-slaves, -and the prisoners of war who were allowed to range -at large, joined in a plan for delivering that place -to the Moors; not from a treacherous disposition in -the two first, but to save themselves from starving, -a catastrophe which was only staved off by frequent -assistance from the magazines of Gibraltar. Ceuta -might have been easily acquired by England -at this period, in exchange for the debt due by -Spain, and general Campbell urged it to lord Liverpool, -but he rejected the proposal, fearing to awaken -popular jealousy. The notion, however, came originally -from the people themselves, and that jealousy -which lord Liverpool feared, was already in full<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80"></a>[80]</span> -activity, being only another name for the democratic -spirit rising in opposition to the aristocratic principle -upon which England afforded her assistance to -the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>The foreign policy of Spain was not less absurd -than their home policy, but it was necessarily contracted. -Castro, the envoy at Lisbon, who was -agreeable both to the Portuguese and British authorities, -was removed, and Bardaxi, who was opposed -to both, substituted. This Bardaxi had been just -before sent on a special mission to Stockholm, to -arrange a treaty with that court, and he was referred -to Russia for his answer, so completely subservient -was Bernadotte to the czar. One point however -was characteristically discussed by the Swedish -prince and the Spanish envoy. Bardaxi demanded -assistance in troops, and Bernadotte in reply asked -for a subsidy, which was promised without hesitation, -but security for the payment being desired, -the negociation instantly dropped! A treaty of -alliance was however concluded between Spain and -Russia, in July, and while Bardaxi was thus pretending -to subsidize Sweden, the unceasing solicitations -of his own government had extorted from -England a grant of one million of money, together -with arms and clothing for one hundred thousand -men, in return for which five thousand Spaniards -were to be enlisted for the British ranks.</p> - -<p>To raise Spanish corps had long been a favourite -project with many English officers, general Graham -had deigned to offer his services, and great advantages -were anticipated by those who still believed -in Spanish heroism. Joseph was even disquieted, -for the Catalans had formally demanded -such assistance, and a like feeling was now expressed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81"></a>[81]</span> -in other places, yet when it came to the -proof only two or three hundred starving Spaniards -of the poorest condition enlisted; they were recruited -principally by the light division, were taught -with care and placed with English comrades, yet the -experiment failed, they did not make good soldiers. -Meanwhile the regency demanded and obtained -from England, arms, clothing, and equipments for -ten thousand cavalry, though they had scarce five -hundred regular horsemen to arm at the time, and had -just rejected the aid of the Austrian officers in the organization -of new corps. Thus the supplies granted -by Great Britain continued to be embezzled or -wasted; and with the exception of a trifling amelioration -in the state of Carlos d’Españas’ corps effected -by the direct interposition of Wellington, no public -benefit seemed likely at first to accrue from the -subsidy, for every branch of administration in Spain, -whether civil or military, foreign or domestic, was -cankered to the core. The public mischief was become -portentous.</p> - -<p>Ferdinand living in tranquillity at Valençay was -so averse to encounter any dangers for the recovery -of his throne, that he rejected all offers of assistance -to escape. Kolli and the brothers Sagas had been -alike disregarded. The councellor Sobral, who -while in secret correspondence with the allies, had -so long lived at Victor’s head-quarters, and had -travelled with that marshal to France, now proposed -to carry the prince off, and he also was baffled as -his predecessors had been. Ferdinand would listen -to no proposal save through Escoiquez, who lived -at some distance, and Sobral who judged this man -one not to be trusted, immediately made his way to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82"></a>[82]</span> -Lisbon, fearful of being betrayed by the prince to -whose succour he had come.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Joseph was advancing towards the -political conquest of the country, and spoke with -ostentation, of assembling a cortes in his own interests; -but this was to cover a secret intercourse with -the cortes in the Isla de Leon where his partizans -called “<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">Afrancesados</i>” were increasing: for many -of the democratic party, seeing that the gulf which -separated them from the clergy, and from England, -could never be closed, and that the bad system of -government, deprived them of the people’s support, -were willing to treat with the intrusive monarch -as one whose principles were more in unison with -their own. Joseph secretly offered to adopt the -new constitution, with some modifications, and as -many of the cortes were inclined to accept his terms, -the British policy was on the eve of suffering a -signal defeat, when Wellington’s iron arm again -fixed the destiny of the Peninsula.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83"></a>[83]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVII_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812.</span> -The internal condition of this country was not improved. -The government, composed of civilians, -was unable, as well as unwilling to stimulate the -branches of administration connected with military -affairs, and the complaints of the army, reaching -the Brazils, drew reprimands from the prince; -but instead of meeting the evil with suitable laws, -he only increased Beresford’s authority, which was -already sufficiently great. Thus while the foreigner’s -power augmented, the native authorities were -degraded in the eyes of the people; and as their -influence to do good dwindled, their ill-will increased, -and their power of mischief was not lessened, -because they still formed the intermediate link -between the military commander and the subordinate -authorities. Hence what with the passive patriotism -of the people, the abuses of the government, -and the double dealing at the Brazils, the extraordinary -energy of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart -was counterbalanced.</p> - -<p>The latter had foreseen that the regent’s concessions -at the time of Borel’s arrest would produce -but a momentary effect in Portugal, and all -the intrigues at Rio Janeiro revived when lord -Wellesley disgusted with Perceval’s incapacity, -had quitted the British cabinet. But previous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84"></a>[84]</span> -to that event, Mr. Sydenham, whose mission to -Portugal has been noticed, had so strongly represented -the evil effects of lord Strangford’s conduct, -that lord Wellesley would have immediately dismissed -him, if Mr. Sydenham, who was offered the -situation, had not refused to profit from the effects -of his own report. It was then judged proper to -send lord Louvaine with the rank of ambassador, -and he was to touch at Lisbon and consult with -lord Wellington whether to press the prince’s return -to Portugal, or insist upon a change in the regency; -meanwhile a confidential agent, despatched direct -to Rio Janeiro, was to keep lord Strangford in the -strict line of his instructions until the ambassador -arrived.</p> - -<p>But lord Louvaine was on bad terms with his -uncle, the duke of Northumberland, a zealous friend -to lord Strangford; and for a government, conducted -on the principle of corruption, the discontent of a -nobleman, possessing powerful parliamentary influence, -was necessarily of more consequence than the -success of the war in the Peninsula. Ere a fit -successor to lord Strangford could be found, the -prince regent of Portugal acceded to lord Wellington’s -demands, and it was then judged expedient to -await the effect of this change of policy. Meanwhile -the dissensions, which led to the change of -ministry arose, and occupied the attention of the -English cabinet to the exclusion of all other affairs. -Thus lord Strangford’s career was for some time -uncontrolled, yet after several severe rebukes from -lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, it was at last -arrested, by a conviction that his tenure of place -depended upon their will.</p> - -<p>However, prior to this salutary check on the Brazilian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85"></a>[85]</span> -intrigues, lord Wellesley had so far intimidated -the prince regent of Portugal, that besides assenting -to the reforms, he despatched Mr. DeLemos from Rio -Janeiro, furnished with authority for Beresford to -act despotically in all things connected with the -administration of the army. Moreover lord Wellington -was empowered to dismiss Principal Souza -from the regency; and lord Castlereagh, following -up his predecessor’s policy on this head, insisted -that all the obnoxious members of the regency -should be set aside and others appointed. And these -blows at the power of the Souza faction, were accompanied -by the death of Linhares, the head of -the family, an event which paralyzed the court of -Rio Janeiro for a considerable time; nevertheless -the Souzas were still so strong, that Domingo Souza, -now Count of Funchal, was appointed prime minister, -although he retained his situation as ambassador -to the English court, and continued to reside in -London.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington, whose long experience of Indian -intrigues rendered him the fittest person possible to -deal with the exactions, and political cunning of a -people who so much resemble Asiatics, now opposed -the removal of the obnoxious members from the -regency. He would not even dismiss the Principal -Souza; for with a refined policy he argued, that the -opposition to his measures arose, as much from the -national, as from the individual character of the -Portuguese authorities, several of whom were under -the displeasure of their own court, and consequently -dependent upon the British power, for support -against their enemies. There were amongst them -also, persons of great ability, and hence no beneficial -change could be expected, because the influence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86"></a>[86]</span> -already gained would be lost with new men. -The latter would have the same faults, with less -talent, and less dependence on the British power, -and the dismissed ministers would become active -enemies. The patriarch would go to Oporto, where -his power to do mischief would be greatly increased, -and Principal Souza would then be made patriarch. -It was indeed very desirable to drive this man, -whose absurdity was so great as to create a suspicion -of insanity, from the regency, but he could -neither be persuaded, nor forced, to quit Portugal. -His dismissal had been extorted from the prince by -the power of the British government, he would -therefore maintain his secret influence over the civil -administration, he would be considered a martyr to -foreign influence, which would increase his popularity, -and his power would be augmented by the -sanctity of his character as patriarch. Very little -advantage could then be derived from a change, -and any reform would be attributed to the English -influence, against which the numerous interests, -involved in the preservation of abuses, would instantly -combine with active enmity.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the government of Portugal had -never yet laid the real nature of the war fairly before -the people. The latter had been deceived, flattered, -cajoled, their prowess in the field extolled beyond -reason, and the enemy spoken of contemptuously; -but the resources of the nation, which essentially -consisted neither in its armies, nor in its revenue, -nor in its boasting, but in the sacrificing of all interests -to the prosecution of the contest, had never -been vigorously used to meet the emergencies of -the war. The regency had neither appealed to the -patriotism of the population nor yet enforced sacrifices,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87"></a>[87]</span> -by measures, which were absolutely necessary, -because as the English general honestly observed, -no people would ever voluntarily bear such -enormous, though necessary burthens; strong laws -and heavy penalties could alone insure obedience. -The Portuguese government relied upon England, -and her subsidies, and resisted all measures which -could render their natural resources more available. -Their subordinates on the same principle executed -corruptly and vexatiously, or evaded, the military -regulations, and the chief supporters of all this mischief -were the Principal and his faction.</p> - -<p>Thus dragged by opposing forces, and environed -with difficulties, Wellington took a middle course. -That is, he strove by reproaches and by redoubled -activity, to stimulate the patriotism of the authorities; -he desired the British ministers at Lisbon, and -at Rio Janeiro, to paint the dangerous state of Portugal -in vivid colours, and to urge the prince regent -in the strongest manner, to enforce the reform of -those gross abuses, which in the taxes, in the customs, -in the general expenditure, and in the execution -of orders by the inferior magistrates, were -withering the strength of the nation. At the same -time, amidst the turmoil of his duties in the field, -sometimes actually from the field of battle itself, he -transmitted memoirs upon the nature of these different -evils, and the remedies for them; memoirs which -will attest to the latest posterity the greatness and -vigour of his capacity.</p> - -<p>These efforts, aided by the suspension of the -subsidy, produced partial reforms, yet the natural -weakness of character and obstinacy of the prince -regent, were insurmountable obstacles to any general -or permanent cure; the first defect rendered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88"></a>[88]</span> -him the tool of the court intriguers, and the second -was to be warily dealt with, lest some dogged conduct -should oblige Wellington to put his often repeated -threat, of abandoning the country, into execution. -The success of the contest was in fact of -more importance to England, than to Portugal, and -this occult knot could neither be untied nor cut; -the difficulty could with appliances be lessened, -but might not be swept away; hence the British -general involved in ceaseless disputes, and suffering -hourly mortifications, the least of which would have -broken the spirit of an ordinary man, had to struggle -as he could to victory.</p> - -<p>Viewing the contest as one of life or death to -Portugal, he desired to make the whole political -economy of the state a simple provision for the -war, and when thwarted, his reproaches were as -bitter as they were just; nevertheless, the men to -whom they were addressed, were not devoid of -merit. In after times, while complaining that he -could find no persons of talent in Spain, he admitted -that amongst the Portuguese, Redondo possessed -both probity and ability, that Nogueira was a statesman -of capacity equal to the discussion of great -questions, and that no sovereign in Europe had a -better public servant than Forjas. Even the restless -Principal disinterestedly prosecuted measures, -for forcing the clergy to pay their just share of the -imposts. But greatness of mind, on great occasions, -is a rare quality. Most of the Portuguese considered -the sacrifices demanded, a sharper ill than submission, -and it was impossible to unite entire obedience -to the will of the British authorities, with an -energetic, original spirit, in the native government. -The Souza faction was always violent and foolish;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89"></a>[89]</span> -the milder opposition of the three gentlemen, above -mentioned, was excusable. Lord Wellington, a -foreigner, was serving his own country, pleasing his -own government, and forwarding his own fortune, -final success was sure to send him to England, resplendent -with glory, and beyond the reach of Portuguese -ill-will. The native authorities had no -such prospects. Their exertions brought little of -personal fame, they were disliked by their own -prince, hated by his favourites, and they feared to -excite the enmity of the people, by a vigour, which, -being unpleasing to their sovereign, would inevitably -draw evil upon themselves; from the French if -the invasion succeeded, from their own court if the -independence of the country should be ultimately -obtained.</p> - -<p>But thus much conceded, for the sake of justice, -it is yet to be affirmed, with truth, that the conduct -of the Portuguese and Brazilian governments was -always unwise, often base. Notwithstanding the -prince’s concessions, it was scarcely possible to remedy -any abuses. The Lisbon government substituting -evasive for active opposition, baffled Wellington -and Stuart, by proposing inadequate laws, -or by suffering the execution of effectual measures -to be neglected with impunity; and the treaty of -commerce with England always supplied them a -source of dispute, partly from its natural difficulties, -partly from their own bad faith. The general’s -labours were thus multiplied not abated by his new -powers, and in measuring these labours, it is to be -noted, so entirely did Portugal depend upon England, -that Wellington instead of drawing provisions -for his army from the country, in a manner fed the -whole nation, and was often forced to keep the army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90"></a>[90]</span> -magazines low, that the people might live. This is -proved by the importation of rice, flour, beef, and -pork from America, which increased, each year of -the war, in a surprising manner, the price keeping -pace with the quantity, while the importation of -dried fish, the ordinary food of the Portuguese, decreased.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">Pitkin’s Statistic Tables.</span> -In 1808 the supply of flour and wheat, from New -York, was sixty thousand barrels. In 1811 six -hundred thousand; in 1813, between seven and -eight hundred thousand. Ireland, England, Egypt, -Barbary, Sicily, the Brazils, parts of Spain, and -even France, also contributed to the consumption, -which greatly exceeded the natural means of Portugal; -English treasure therefore either directly or -indirectly, furnished the nation as well as the -armies.</p> - -<p>The peace revenue of Portugal, including the -Brazils, the colonies, and the islands, even in the -most flourishing periods, had never exceeded thirty-six -millions of cruzada novas; but in 1811, although -Portugal alone raised twenty-five millions, this sum, -added to the British subsidy, fell very short of the actual -expenditure; yet economy was opposed by the local -government, the prince was continually creating -useless offices for his favourites, and encouraging -law-suits and appeals to Rio Janeiro. The troops -and fortresses were neglected, although the military -branches of expense amounted to more than three-fourths -of the whole receipts; and though Mr. -Stuart engaged that England either by treaty or -tribute would keep the Algerines quiet, he could -not obtain the suppression of the Portuguese navy, -which always fled from the barbarians. It was not -until the middle of the year 1812, when admiral<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91"></a>[91]</span> -Berkeley, whose proceedings had at times produced -considerable inconvenience, was recalled, that Mr. -Stuart, with the aid of admiral Martin, who succeeded -Berkeley, without a seat in the regency, -effected this naval reform.</p> - -<p>The government, rather than adopt the measures -suggested by Wellington, such as keeping up the -credit of the paper-money, by regular payments -of the interest, the fair and general collection of -the “<em>Decima</em>,” and the repression of abuses in -the custom-house, in the arsenal, and in the militia, -always more costly than the line, projected the -issuing of fresh paper, and endeavoured, by unworthy -stock-jobbing schemes, to evade instead of -meeting the difficulties of the times. To check -their folly the general withheld the subsidy, and -refused to receive their depreciated paper into the -military chest; but neither did this vigorous proceeding -produce more than a momentary return -to honesty, and meanwhile, the working people -were so cruelly oppressed that they would not -labour for the public, except under the direction -of British officers. Force alone could overcome -their repugnance and force was employed, not to -forward the defence of the country, but to meet -particular interests and to support abuses. Such -also was the general baseness of the Fidalgos, that -even the charitable aid of money, received from -England, was shamefully and greedily claimed -by the rich, who insisted, that it was a donation -to all and to be equally divided.</p> - -<p>Confusion and injustice prevailed every where, -and Wellington’s energies were squandered on -vexatious details; at one time he was remonstrating -against the oppression of the working people, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92"></a>[92]</span> -devising remedies for local abuses; at another -superintending the application of the English -charities, and arranging the measures necessary to -revive agriculture in the devastated districts; at -all times endeavouring to reform the general administration, -and in no case was he supported. Never -during the war did he find an appeal to the patriotism -of the Portuguese government answered frankly; -never did he propose a measure which was accepted -without difficulties. This opposition was at times -carried to such a ridiculous extent, that when some -Portuguese nobles in the French service took refuge -with the curate Merino, and desired from their -own government, a promise of safety, to which -they were really entitled, the regency refused to -give that assurance; nor would they publish an -amnesty, which the English general desired for -the sake of justice and from policy also, because -valuable information as to the French army, could -have been thus obtained. The authorities would -neither say yes! nor no! and when general Pamplona -applied to Wellington personally for some -assurance, the latter could only answer that in -like cases Mascarheñas had been hanged and -Sabugal rewarded!</p> - -<p>To force a change in the whole spirit, and action -of the government, seemed to some, the only remedy -for the distemperature of the time; but this -might have produced anarchy, and would have -given countenance to the democratic spirit, contrary -to the general policy of the British government. -Wellington therefore desired rather to have -the prince regent at Lisbon, or the Azores, whence -his authority might, under the influence of England, -be more directly used to enforce salutary<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93"></a>[93]</span> -regulations; he however considered it essential that -Carlotta, whose intrigues were incessant, should -not be with him, and, she on the other hand, -laboured to come back without the prince, who -was prevented from moving, by continued disturbances -in the Brazils. Mr. Stuart, then despairing -of good, proposed the establishment of a military -government at once, but Wellington would not -agree, although the mischief afloat clogged every -wheel of the military machine.</p> - -<p>A law of king Sebastian, which obliged all -gentlemen holding land to take arms was now -revived, but desertion, which had commenced with -the first appointment of British officers, increased; -and so many persons sailed away in British vessels -of war, to evade military service in their own -country, that an edict was published to prevent -the practice. Beresford checked the desertion for -a moment, by condemning deserters to hard labour, -and offering rewards to the country people to -deliver them up; yet griping want renewed the -evil at the commencement of the campaign, and -the terrible severity of condemning nineteen at -once to death, did not repress it. The cavalry, -which had been at all times very inefficient, was -now nearly ruined, the men were become faint-hearted, -the breed of horses almost extinct, and -shameful peculations amongst the officers increased -the mischief: one guilty colonel was broke and his -uniform stripped from his shoulders in the public -square at Lisbon. However these examples produced -fear and astonishment rather than correction, -the misery of the troops continued, and the army, -although by the care of Beresford it was again<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94"></a>[94]</span> -augmented to more than thirty thousand men under -arms, declined in moral character and spirit.</p> - -<p>To govern armies in the field, is at all times -a great and difficult matter; and in this contest -the operations were so intimately connected with -the civil administration of Portugal, Spain, and -the Brazils, and the contest, being one of principles, -so affected the policy of every nation of -the civilised world, that unprecedented difficulties -sprung up in the way of the general, and the -ordinary frauds and embarrassments of war were -greatly augmented. Napoleon’s continental system -joined to his financial measures, which were quite -opposed to debt and paper money, increased the -pernicious effects of the English bank restriction; -specie was abundant in France, but had nearly -disappeared from England; it was only to be -obtained from abroad, and at an incredible expense. -The few markets left for British manufactures, and -colonial produce, did not always make returns in -the articles necessary for the war, and gold, absolutely -indispensable in certain quantities, was only -supplied, and this entirely from the incapacity of -the English ministers, in the proportion of one-sixth -of what was required, by an army which -professed to pay for every thing. Hence continual -efforts, on the part of the government, to force -markets, hence a depreciation of value both in -goods and bills; hence also a continual struggle, -on the part of the general, to sustain a contest, -dependant on the fluctuation of such a precarious -system. Dependant also it was upon the prudence -of three governments, one of which had just pushed -its colonies to rebellion, when the French armies<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95"></a>[95]</span> -were in possession of four-fifths of the mother -country; another was hourly raising up obstacles -to its own defence though the enemy had just been -driven from the capital; and the third was forcing a -war with America, its greatest and surest market, -when by commerce alone it could hope to sustain -the struggle in the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>The failure of the preceding year’s harvest all -over Europe had rendered the supply of Portugal -very difficult. Little grain was to be obtained in -any country of the north of Europe accessible to the -British, and the necessity of paying in hard money -rendered even that slight resource null. Sicily and -Malta were thrown for subsistence upon Africa, -where colonial produce was indeed available for -commerce, yet the quantity of grain to be had -there, was small, and the capricious nature of the -barbarians rendered the intercourse precarious. In -December 1811 there was only two months’ consumption -of corn in Portugal for the population, -although the magazines of the army contained -more than three. To America therefore it was -necessary to look. Now in 1810 Mr. Stuart had -given treasury bills to the house of Sampayo for -the purchase of American corn; but the disputes -between England and the United States, the depreciation -of English bills, from the quantity in -the market, together with the expiration of the -American bank charter, had prevented Sampayo -from completing his commission, nevertheless, although -the increasing bitterness of the disputes -with America discouraged a renewal of this plan, -some more bills were now given to the English -minister at Washington, with directions to purchase -corn, and consign it to Sampayo, to resell in Portugal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96"></a>[96]</span> -as before, for the benefit of the military chest. Other -bills were also sent to the Brazils, to purchase rice, -and all the consuls in the Mediterranean were desired -to encourage the exportation of grain and the -importation of colonial produce. In this manner, -despite of the English ministers’ incapacity, lord -Wellington found resources to feed the population, -to recover some of the specie expended by the -army, and to maintain the war. But as the year -advanced, the Non-intercourse-Act of Congress, -which had caused a serious drain of specie from -Portugal, was followed by an embargo for ninety -days, and then famine, which already afflicted parts -of Spain, menaced Portugal.</p> - -<p>Mr. Stuart knew of this embargo before the -speculators did, and sent his agents orders to buy -up with hard cash, at a certain price, a quantity -of grain which had lately arrived at Gibraltar. -He could only forestall the speculators by a few -days, the cost soon rose beyond his means in specie, -yet the new harvest being nearly ripe, this -prompt effort sufficed for the occasion, and happily -so, for the American declaration of war followed, -and American privateers were to take the place of -American flour-ships. But as ruin seemed to approach, -Stuart’s energy redoubled. His agents -seeking for grain in all parts of the world, discovered -that in the Brazils a sufficient quantity -might be obtained in exchange for English manufactures, -to secure Portugal from absolute famine; -and to protect this traffic, and to preserve that with -the United States, he persuaded the regency to declare -the neutrality of Portugal, and to interdict the -sale of prizes within its waters. He also, at Wellington’s -desire, besought the English admiralty<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97"></a>[97]</span> -to reinforce the squadron in the Tagus, and to -keep cruisers at particular stations. Finally he -pressed the financial reforms in Portugal with the -utmost vigour and with some success. His efforts -were, however, strangely counteracted from quarters -least expected. The English consul, in the Western -Isles, with incredible presumption, publicly excited -the Islanders to war with America, when Mr. Stuart’s -efforts were directed to prevent such a calamity; -the Admiralty neglecting to station cruisers in the -proper places, left the American privateers free -to range along the Portuguese and African coast; -and the cupidity of English merchants broke down -the credit of the English commissariat paper-money, -which was the chief medium of exchange on the -immediate theatre of war.</p> - -<p>This paper had arisen from a simple military -regulation. Lord Wellington, on first assuming -the command in 1809, found that all persons, gave -their own vouchers in payment for provisions, -whereupon he proclaimed, that none save commissaries -should thus act; and that all local accounts -should be paid within one month, in ready -money, if it was in the chest, if not, with bills -on the commissary-general. These bills soon became -numerous, because of the scarcity of specie, -yet their value did not sink, because they enabled -those who had really furnished supplies, to prove -their debts without the trouble of following the -head-quarters; and they had an advantage over -receipts, inasmuch as they distinctly pointed out -the person who was to pay; they were also in -accord with the customs of the country, for the -people were used to receive government bills. The -possessors were paid in rotation, whenever there<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98"></a>[98]</span> -was money; the small holders, who were the real -furnishers of the army first, the speculators last, a -regulation by which justice and the credit of the -paper were alike consulted.</p> - -<p>In 1812, this paper sunk twenty per cent., from -the sordid practices of English mercantile houses -whose agents secretly depreciated its credit and -then purchased it; and in this dishonesty they -were aided by some of the commissariat, notwithstanding -the vigilant probity of the chief commissary. -Sums, as low as ten pence, payable in -Lisbon, I have myself seen in the hands of poor -country people on the frontiers. By these infamous -proceedings the poorer dealers were ruined or forced -to raise their prices, which hurt their sales and -contracted the markets to the detriment of the -soldiers; and there was much danger, that the -people generally, would thus discover the mode -of getting cash for bills by submitting to high -discounts, which would soon have rendered the -contest too costly to continue. But the resources -of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were not exhausted. -They contrived to preserve the neutrality -of Portugal, and by means of licenses continued -to have importations of American flour, until the -end of the war; a very fine stroke of policy, for -this flour was paid for with English goods, and -resold at a considerable profit for specie which -went to the military chest. They were less successful -in supporting the credit of the Portuguese -government paper; bad faith, and the necessities -of the native commissariat, which now caused an -extraordinary issue, combined to lower its credit.</p> - -<p>The conde de Funchal, Mr. Villiers, and Mr. Vansittart -proposed a bank, and other schemes, such<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99"></a>[99]</span> -as a loan of one million and a half from the English -treasury, which shall be treated more at length in -another place. But lord Wellington ridiculing the -fallacy of a government, with revenues unequal to its -expenditure, borrowing from a government which -was unable to find specie sufficient to sustain the -war, remarked, that the money could not be realised -in the Portuguese treasury, or it must be realised at -the expense of a military chest, whose hollow sound -already mocked the soldiers’ shout of victory. -Again therefore he demanded the reform of abuses, -and offered to take all the responsibility and odium -upon himself, certain that the exigences of the -war could be thus met, and the most vexatious -imposts upon the poor abolished; neither did he -fail to point out in detail the grounds of this conviction. -His reasoning made as little impression -upon Funchal, as it had done upon Linhares; -money was no where to be had, and the general, -after being forced to become a trader himself, now -tolerated, for the sake of the resources it furnished, -a contraband commerce, which he discovered Soult -to have established with English merchants at -Lisbon, exchanging the quicksilver of Almaden -for colonial produce; and he was still to find in -his own personal resources, the means of beating -the enemy, in despite of the matchless follies of -the governments he served. He did so, but complained -that it was a hard task.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100"></a>[100]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XVIII">BOOK XVIII.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVIII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. May.</span> -In the foregoing book, the political state of the -belligerents, and those great chains, which bound -the war in the Peninsula to the policy of the American -as well as to the European nations, have been -shewn; the minor events of the war have also been -narrated, and the point where the decisive struggle -was to be made has been indicated; thus nought -remains to tell, save the particular preparations of -each adverse general ere the noble armies were -dashed together in the shock of battle.</p> - -<p>Nearly three hundred thousand French still trampled -upon Spain, above two hundred and forty -thousand were with the eagles, and so successful -had the plan of raising native soldiers proved, that -forty thousand Spaniards well organized marched -under the king’s banners.</p> - -<p>In May the distribution of this immense army, -which however according to the French custom included -officers and persons of all kinds attached to -the forces, was as follows:—</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_XVIII"><ins class="corr" id="tn-100" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Appendix No. 1, Section 1.'"> -Appendix, No. 18.</ins></a></span> -Seventy-six thousand, of which sixty thousand -were with the eagles, composed the armies of Catalonia -and Aragon, under Suchet, and they occupied -Valencia, and the provinces whose name they bore.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101"></a>[101]</span></p> - -<p>Forty-nine thousand men, of which thirty-eight -thousand were with the eagles, composed the army -of the north, under Caffarelli, and were distributed -on the grand line of communication, from St. Sebastian -to Burgos; but of this army two divisions of -infantry and one of cavalry with artillery, were -destined to reinforce Marmont.</p> - -<p>Nineteen thousand, of which seventeen thousand -were with the eagles, composed the army of the -centre, occupying a variety of posts in a circle -round the capital, and having a division in La -Mancha.</p> - -<p>Sixty-three thousand, of which fifty-six thousand -were with the eagles, composed the army of the -south, under Soult, occupying Andalusia and a part -of Estremadura; but some of these troops were detained -in distant governments by other generals.</p> - -<p>The army of Portugal, under Marmont, consisted -of seventy thousand men, fifty-two thousand being -with the eagles, and a reinforcement of twelve thousand -men were in march to join this army from -France. Marmont occupied Leon, part of Old -Castile, and the Asturias, having his front upon the -Tormes, and a division watching Gallicia.</p> - -<p>The numerous Spanish <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">juramentados</i> were principally -employed in Andalusia and with the army of -the centre, and the experience of Ocaña, of Badajos, -and many other places, proved that for the intrusive -monarch, they fought with more vigour than their -countrymen did against him.</p> - -<p>In March Joseph had been appointed commander-in-chief -of all the French armies, but the generals, -as usual, resisted his authority. Dorsenne denied -it altogether, Caffarelli, who succeeded Dorsenne, -disputed even his civil power in the governments of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102"></a>[102]</span> -the north, Suchet evaded his orders, Marmont neglected -them, and Soult firmly opposed his injudicious -military plans. The king was distressed for<span class="sidenote">The King’s correspondence captured at Vittoria.</span> -money, and he complained that Marmont’s army -had consumed or plundered in three months, the -whole resources of the province of Toledo and the -district of Talavera, whereby Madrid and the army -of the centre were famished. Marmont retorted by -complaints of the wasteful extravagance of the -king’s military administration in the capital. Thus -dissensions were generated when the most absolute -union was required.</p> - -<p>After the fall of Badajos Joseph judged that the -allies would soon move, either against Marmont in -Castile, against himself by the valley of the Tagus, -or against Soult in Andalusia. In the first case he<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -designed to aid Marmont, with the divisions of the -north, with the army of the centre, and with fifteen -thousand men to be drawn from the army of the -south. In the second case to draw the army of -Portugal and a portion of the army of the south -into the valley of the Tagus, while the divisions -from the army of the north entered Leon. In the -third case, the half of Marmont’s army reinforced by -a division of the army of the centre, was to pass the -Tagus at Arzobispo and follow the allies. But the -army of the centre was not ready to take the field, -and Wellington knew it, Marmont’s complaint was -just; waste and confusion prevailed at Madrid, and -there was so little military vigour that the Empecinado, -with other partida chiefs, pushed their excursions -to the very gates of that capital.</p> - -<p>Joseph finally ordered Suchet to reinforce the army -of the centre, and then calling up the Italian division -of Palombini from the army of the Ebro, directed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103"></a>[103]</span> -Soult to keep Drouet, with one-third of the army of -the south, so far advanced in Estremadura as to -have direct communication with general Trielhard -in the valley of the Tagus; and he especially ordered -that Drouet should pass that river if Hill -passed it. It was necessary, he said, to follow the -English army, and fight it with advantage of numbers, -to do which required a strict co-operation of -the three armies Drouet’s corps being the pivot. -Meanwhile Marmont and Soult being each convinced, -that the English general would invade their -separate provinces, desired that the king would so -view the coming contest, and oblige the other to -regulate his movements thereby. The former complained, -that having to observe the Gallicians, and -occupy the Asturias, his forces were disseminated, -and he asked for reinforcements to chase the partidas, -who impeded the gathering of provisions in -Castile and Leon. But the king, who over-rated the -importance of Madrid, designed rather to draw more -troops round the capital; and he entirely disapproved -of Soult besieging Tarifa and Carthagena, -arguing that if Drouet was not ready to pass the -Tagus, the whole of the allies could unite on the -right bank, and penetrate without opposition to the -capital, or that lord Wellington would concentrate -to overwhelm Marmont.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia would not suffer Drouet to -stir, and Joseph, whose jealousy had been excited -by the marshal’s power in Andalusia, threatened to -deprive him of his command. The inflexible duke<span class="sidenote">Joseph’s correspondence captured at Vittoria, MSS.</span> -replied that the king had already virtually done so -by sending orders direct to Drouet, that he was -ready to resign, but he would not commit a gross -military error. Drouet could scarcely arrive in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104"></a>[104]</span> -time to help Marmont, and would be too weak for -the protection of Madrid, but his absence would -ruin Andalusia, because the allies whose force in -Estremadura was very considerable could in five -marches reach Seville and take it on the sixth; -then communicating with the fleets at Cadiz they -would change their line of operations without loss, -and unite with thirty thousand other troops, British -and Spanish, who were at Gibraltar, in the Isla, in -the Niebla, on the side of Murcia, and under Ballesteros -in the Ronda. A new army might also come -from the ocean, and Drouet, once beyond the Tagus -could not return to Andalusia in less than twelve -days; Marmont could scarcely come there in a -month; the force under his own immediate command -was spread all over Andalusia, if collected it -would not furnish thirty thousand sabres and bayonets, -exclusive of Drouet, and the evacuation of the -province would be unavoidable.</p> - -<p>The French misfortunes, he said, had invariably -arisen from not acting in large masses, and the -army of Portugal, by spreading too much to its -right, would ruin this campaign as it had ruined -the preceding one. “Marmont should leave one or -two divisions on the Tormes, and place the rest of -his army in position, on both sides of the pass of -Baños, the left near Placentia, and the right, extending -towards Somosierra, which could be occupied -by a detachment. Lord Wellington could not -then advance by the valley of the Tagus without -lending his left flank; nor to the Tormes without -lending his right flank. Neither could he attack -Marmont with effect, because the latter could easily -concentrate, and according to the nature of the -attack secure his retreat by the valley of the Tagus,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105"></a>[105]</span> -or by the province of Avila, while the two divisions -on the Tormes reinforced by two others from the -army of the north would act on the allies’ flank.” -For these reasons Soult would not permit Drouet to -quit Estremadura, yet he promised to reinforce him -and so to press Hill, that Graham whom he supposed -still at Portalegre, should be obliged to bring -up the first and sixth divisions. In fine he promised -that a powerful body of the allies should be -forced to remain in Estremadura, or Hill would be -defeated and Badajos invested. This dispute raged -during May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile -the English general well acquainted from -the intercepted letters with these dissensions, made -his arrangements, so as to confirm each general in -his own peculiar views.</p> - -<p>Soult was the more easily deceived, because he had -obtained a Gibraltar newspaper, in which, so negligent -was the Portuguese government, lord Wellington’s -secret despatches to Forjas containing an account -of his army and of his first designs against -the south were printed, and it must be remembered -that the plan of invading Andalusia was only relinquished -about the middle of May. Hill’s exploit -at Almaraz menaced the north and south alike, but -that general had adroitly spread a report, that his -object was to gain time for the invasion of Andalusia, -and all Wellington’s demonstrations were calculated -to aid this artifice and impose upon Soult. -Graham indeed returned to Beira with the first and -sixth divisions and Cotton’s cavalry; but as Hill -was at the same time reinforced, and Graham’s -march sudden and secret, the enemy were again -deceived in all quarters. For Marmont and the -king, reckoning the number of divisions, thought<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106"></a>[106]</span> -the bulk of the allies was in the north, and did not -discover that Hill’s corps had been nearly doubled -in numbers though his division seemed the same, -while Soult not immediately aware of Graham’s departure, -found Hill more than a match for Drouet, -and still expected the allies in Andalusia.</p> - -<p>Drouet willing rather to obey the king than -Soult, drew towards Medellin in June, but Soult, as -we have seen, sent the reinforcements from Seville, -by the road of Monasterio, and thus obliged him to -come back. Then followed those movements and -counter-movements in Estremadura, which have -been already related, each side being desirous of -keeping a great number of their adversaries in that -province. Soult’s judgment was thus made manifest, -for Drouet could only have crossed the Tagus -with peril to Andalusia, whereas, without endangering -that province, he now made such a powerful -diversion for Marmont, that Wellington’s army in -the north was reduced below the army of Portugal, -and much below what the latter could be raised to, -by detachments from the armies of the north, and -of the centre. However in the beginning of June, -while the French generals were still disputing, lord -Wellington’s dispositions were completed, he had -established at last an extensive system of gaining -intelligence all over Spain, and as his campaign -was one which posterity will delight to study, it is -fitting to shew very exactly the foundation on which -the operations rested.</p> - -<p>His political and military reasons for seeking a -battle have been before shewn, but this design was -always conditional; he would fight on advantage, -but he would risk nothing beyond the usual chances -of combat. While Portugal was his, every movement,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107"></a>[107]</span> -which obliged the enemy to concentrate was an advantage, -and his operations were ever in subservience -to this vital condition. His whole force -amounted to nearly ninety thousand men, of which -about six thousand were in Cadiz, but the Walcheren -expedition was still to be atoned for: the sick -were so numerous amongst the regiments which had -served there, that only thirty-two thousand or a -little more than half of the British soldiers, were -under arms. This number, with twenty-four thousand -Portuguese, made fifty-six thousand sabres -and bayonets in the field; and it is to be remembered -that now and at all times the Portuguese infantry -were mixed with the British either by -brigades or regiments; wherefore in speaking of -English divisions in battle the Portuguese battalions -are always included, and it is to their praise, that -their fighting was such as to justify the use of the -general term.</p> - -<p>The troops were organized in the following -manner.</p> - -<p>Two thousand cavalry and fifteen thousand infantry, -with twenty-four guns, were under Hill, who -had also the aid of four garrison Portuguese regiments, -and of the fifth Spanish army. Twelve -hundred Portuguese cavalry were in the Tras Os -Montes, under general D’Urban, and about three -thousand five hundred British cavalry and thirty-six -thousand infantry, with fifty-four guns, were -under Wellington’s immediate command, which was -now enlarged by three thousand five hundred Spaniards, -infantry and cavalry, under Carlos D’España -and Julian Sanchez.</p> - -<p>The bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed to -lengthen the French lateral communications, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108"></a>[108]</span> -Wellington now ordered the bridge of Alcantara -to be repaired to shorten his own. The breach -in that stupendous structure was ninety feet wide, -and one hundred and fifty feet above the water line. -Yet the fertile genius of colonel Sturgeon furnished -the means of passing this chasm, with heavy artillery, -and without the enemy being aware of the -preparations made until the moment of execution. -In the arsenal of Elvas he secretly prepared a net-work -of strong ropes, after a fashion which permitted -it to be carried in parts, and with the beams, -planking, and other materials it was transported -to Alcantara on seventeen carriages. Straining -beams were then fixed in the masonry, on each -side of the broken arch, cables were stretched across -the chasm, the net-work was drawn over, tarpaulin -blinds were placed at each side, and the heaviest -guns passed in safety. This remarkable feat procured -a new, and short, internal line of communication, -along good roads, while the enemy, by the -destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, was thrown -upon a long external line, and very bad roads.</p> - -<p>Hill’s corps was thus suddenly brought a fortnight’s -march nearer to Wellington, than Drouet -was to Marmont, if both marched as armies with -artillery; but there was still a heavy drag upon -the English general’s operations. He had drawn -so largely upon Portugal for means of transport, -that agriculture was seriously embarrassed, and -yet his subsistence was not secured for more than -a few marches beyond the Agueda. To remedy -this he set sailors and workmen to remove obstructions -in the Douro and the Tagus; the latter, -which in Philip the Second’s time had been navigable -from Toledo to Lisbon, was opened to Malpica,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109"></a>[109]</span> -not far from Alcantara, and the Douro was -opened as high as Barca de Alba, below which -it ceases to be a Spanish river. The whole land -transport of the interior of Portugal was thus relieved; -the magazines were brought up the Tagus, -close to the new line of communication by Alcantara, -on one side; on the other, the country vessels -conveyed povisions to the mouth of the Douro, and -that river then served to within a short distance -of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca. Still -danger was to be apprehended from the American -privateers along the coast, which the Admiralty -neglected; and the navigation of the Douro was -suddenly suspended by the overheated zeal of a -commissary, who being thwarted by the delays -of the boatmen, issued, of his own authority, an -edict, establishing regulations, and pronouncing -pains and penalties upon all those who did not -conform to them. The river was immediately -abandoned by the craft, and the government endeavoured -by a formal protest, to give political -importance to this affair, which was peculiarly -vexatious, inasmuch as the boatmen were already -so averse to passing the old points of navigation, -that very severe measures were necessary to oblige -them to do so.</p> - -<p>When this matter was arranged, Wellington had -still to dread that if his operations led him far into -Spain, the subsistence of his army would be insecure; -for there were many objects of absolute -necessity, especially meat, which could not be -procured except with ready money, and not only -was he unfurnished of specie, but his hopes of -obtaining it were nearly extinguished, by the sweep -lord William Bentinck had made in the Mediterranean<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110"></a>[110]</span> -money-market: moreover the English ministers -chose this period of difficulty to interfere, and in -an ignorant and injurious manner, with his mode -of issuing bills to supply his necessities. His -resolution to advance could not be shaken, yet -before crossing the Agueda, having described his -plan of campaign to lord Liverpool, he finished in -these remarkable words.</p> - -<p>“I am not insensible to losses and risks, nor -am I blind to the disadvantages under which I -undertake this operation. My friends in Castile, and -I believe no officer ever had better, assure me that -we shall not want provisions even before the harvest -will be reaped; that there exist concealed granaries -which shall be opened to us, and that if we can -pay for a part, credit will be given to us for the -remainder, and they have long given me hopes that -we should be able to borrow money in Castile -upon British securities. In case we should be -able to maintain ourselves in Castile, the general -action and its results being delayed by the enemy’s -manœuvres, which I think not improbable, I have -in contemplation other resources for drawing supplies -from the country, and I shall have at all -events our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad -Rodrigo. <em>But with all these prospects I cannot -reflect without shuddering upon the probability that -we shall be distressed; nor upon the consequences -which may result from our wanting money in the -interior of Spain.</em>”</p> - -<p>In the contemplated operations lord Wellington -did not fail to look both to his own and to his -enemy’s flanks. His right was secured by the -destruction of the forts, the stores, and boats at -Almaraz; for the valley of the Tagus was exhausted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111"></a>[111]</span> -of provisions, and full of cross rivers which required -a pontoon train to pass if the French should -menace Portugal seriously in that line: moreover -he caused the fortress of Monte Santos, which -covered the Portuguese frontier between the Tagus -and Ciudad Rodrigo to be put into a state of -defence, and the restoration of Alcantara gave Hill -the power of quickly interfering. On the other -side if Marmont, strengthened by Caffarelli’s -division, should operate strongly against the allies’ -left, a retreat was open either upon Ciudad Rodrigo, -or across the mountains into the valley of the Tagus. -Such were his arrangements for his own interior -line of operations, and to menace his enemy’s flanks -his measures embraced the whole Peninsula.</p> - -<p>1º. He directed Silveira and D’Urban, who were -on the frontier of Tras os Montes, to file along the -Douro, menace the enemy’s right flank and rear, -and form a link of connection with the Gallician -army, with which Castaños promised to besiege -Astorga, as soon as the Anglo-Portuguese should -appear on the Tormes. Meanwhile sir Home Popham’s -expedition was to commence its operations, -in concert with the seventh Spanish army, on the -coast of Biscay and so draw Caffarelli’s divisions -from the succour of Marmont.</p> - -<p>2º. To hinder Suchet from reinforcing the king, -or making a movement towards Andalusia, the Sicilian -expedition was to menace Catalonia and Valencia, -in concert with the Murcian army.</p> - -<p>3º. To prevent Soult overwhelming Hill, Wellington -trusted, 1º. to the garrison of Gibraltar, and -to the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish troops, in the -Isla de Leon; 2º. to insurrections in the kingdom -of Cordoba, where Echevaria going from Cadiz, by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112"></a>[112]</span> -the way of Ayamonte, with three hundred officers, -was to organize the Partidas of that district, as -Mendizabel had done those of the northern parts; -3º. to Ballesteros’s army, but he ever dreaded the -rashness of this general, who might be crushed in a -moment, which would have endangered Hill and -rendered any success in the north nugatory.</p> - -<p>It was this fear of Ballesteros’s rashness that -caused Wellington to keep so strong a corps in -Estremadura, and hence Soult’s resolution to prevent -Drouet from quitting Estremadura, even though -Hill should cross the Tagus, was wise and military. -For though Drouet would undoubtedly have given -the king and Marmont a vast superiority in Castile, -the general advantage would have remained with -Wellington. Hill could at any time have misled -Drouet by crossing the bridge of Alcantara, and returning -again, when Drouet had passed the bridge -of Toledo or Arzobispo. The French general’s -march would then have led to nothing, for either -Hill could have joined Wellington, by a shorter -line, and Soult, wanting numbers, could not have -taken advantage of his absence from Estremadura; -or Wellington could have retired within the Portuguese -frontier, rendering Drouet’s movement to -Castile a pure loss; or reinforcing Hill by the -bridge of Alcantara, he could have gained a fortnight’s -march and overwhelmed Soult in Andalusia. -The great error of the king’s plan was that it depended -upon exact co-operation amongst persons -who jealous of each other were far from obedient to -himself, and whose marches it was scarcely possible -to time justly; because the armies were separated -by a great extent of country and their lines of -communication were external long and difficult,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113"></a>[113]</span> -while their enemy was acting on internal short and -easy lines. Moreover the French correspondence, -continually intercepted by the Partidas, was brought -to Wellington, and the knowledge thus gained by -one side and lost by the other caused the timely -reinforcing of Hill in Estremadura, and the keeping -of Palombini’s Italian division from Madrid for -three weeks; an event which in the sequel proved -of vital consequence, inasmuch as it prevented the -army of the centre moving until after the crisis of -the campaign had passed.</p> - -<p>Hill’s exploit at Almaraz, and the disorderly state -of the army of the centre, having in a manner isolated -the army of Portugal, the importance of Gallicia -and the Asturias, with respect to the projected operations -of lord Wellington, was greatly increased. -For the Gallicians could either act in Castile upon -the rear of Marmont, and so weaken the line of defence -on the Douro; or, marching through the -Asturias, spread insurrection along the coast to the -Montaña de Santander and there join the seventh -army. Hence the necessity of keeping Bonet in -the Asturias, and watching the Gallician passes, -was become imperative, and Marmont, following -Napoleon’s instructions, had fortified the different -posts in Castile, but his army was too widely spread, -and, as Soult observed, was extended to its right -instead of concentrating on the left near Baños.</p> - -<p>The duke of Ragusa had resolved to adopt the -Tormes and Douro, as his lines of defence, and never -doubting that he was the object of attack, watched -the augmentation of Wellington’s forces and magazines -with the utmost anxiety. He had collected considerable -magazines himself, and the king had formed -others for him at Talavera and Segovia, yet he did<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114"></a>[114]</span> -not approach the Agueda, but continued to occupy -a vast extent of country for the convenience of feeding -them until June. When he heard of the restoration -of the bridge of Alcantara, and of magazines -being formed at Caceres, he observed that the latter -would be on the left of the Guadiana if Andalusia -were the object; and although not well placed for -an army acting against himself, were admirably -placed for an army which having fought in -Castile should afterwards operate against Madrid, -because they could be transported at once to the -right of the Tagus by Alcantara, and could be -secured by removing the temporary restorations. -Wherefore, judging that Hill would immediately -rejoin Wellington, to aid in the battle, that, with -a prophetic feeling he observed, would be fought -near the Tormes, he desired Caffarelli to put the -divisions of the army of the north in movement; and -he prayed the king to have guns, and a pontoon -train sent from Madrid that Drouet might pass at -Almaraz and join him by the Puerto Pico.</p> - -<p>Joseph immediately renewed his orders to Soult, -and to Caffarelli, but he only sent two small boats -to Almaraz; and Marmont, seeing the allied army -suddenly concentrated on the Agueda, recalled Foy -from the valley of the Tagus, and Bonet from the -Asturias. His first design was to assemble the army<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_3">Plan, No. 3.</a></span> -at Medina del Campo, Valladolid, Valdesillas, Toro, -Zamora, and Salamanca, leaving two battalions and -a brigade of dragoons at Benavente to observe the -Gallicians. Thus the bulk of the troops would line -the Duero, while two divisions formed an advanced -guard, on the Tormes, and the whole could be concentrated -in five days. His ultimate object was to -hold the Tormes until Wellington’s whole army was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115"></a>[115]</span> -on that river, then to assemble his own troops on the -Duero, and act so as to favour the defence of the forts -at Salamanca until reinforcements from the north -should enable him to drive the allies again within -the Portuguese frontier; and he warned Caffarelli -that the forts could not hold out more than fifteen -days after they should be abandoned by the French -army.</p> - -<p>Marmont was a man to be feared. He possessed -quickness of apprehension and courage, moral and -physical, scientific acquirements, experience of -war, and great facility in the moving of troops; he -was strong of body, in the flower of life, eager for -glory, and although neither a great nor a fortunate -commander, such a one as might bear the test of -fire. His army was weak in cavalry but admirably -organized, for he had laboured with successful diligence, -to restore that discipline which had been so -much shaken by the misfortunes of Massena’s campaign, -and by the unceasing operations from the -battle of Fuentes Onoro to the last retreat from Beira. -Upon this subject a digression must be allowed, because -it has been often affirmed, that the bad conduct -of the French in the Peninsula, was encouraged by -their leaders, was unmatched in wickedness, and peculiar -to the nation. Such assertions springing from -morbid national antipathies it is the duty of the historian -to correct. All troops will behave ill, when ill-governed, -but the best commanders cannot at times -prevent the perpetration of the most frightful mischief; -and this truth, so important to the welfare of -nations, may be proved with respect to the Peninsular -war, by the avowal of the generals on either side, and -by their endeavours to arrest the evils which they deplored. -When Dorsenne returned from his expedition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116"></a>[116]</span> -against Gallicia, in the latter end of 1811, he reproached -his soldiers in the following terms. “The<span class="sidenote">Intercepted French papers, MSS.</span> -fields have been devastated and houses have been -burned; these excesses are unworthy of the French -soldier, they pierce the hearts of the most devoted -and friendly of the Spaniards, they are revolting to -honest men, and embarrass the provisioning of the -army. The general-in-chief sees them with sorrow, -and orders; that besides a permanent court-martial, -there shall be at the head-quarters of each division, -of every arm, a military commission which shall -try the following crimes, and on conviction, sentence -to death, without appeal; execution to be done on -the spot, in presence of the troops.</p> - -<p>“1º. Quitting a post to pillage. 2º. Desertion -of all kinds. 3º. Disobedience in face of the enemy. -4º. Insubordination of all kinds. 5º. Marauding of -all kinds. 6º. Pillage of all kinds.</p> - -<p>“<em>All persons military or others, shall be considered -as pillagers, who quit their post or their ranks to enter -houses, &c. or who use violence to obtain from the inhabitants -more than they are legally entitled to.</em></p> - -<p>“<em>All persons shall be considered deserters who -shall be found without a passport beyond the advanced -posts, and frequent patroles day and night shall be sent -to arrest all persons beyond the outposts.</em></p> - -<p>“<em>Before the enemy when in camp or cantonments -roll-calls shall take place every hour, and all persons -absent without leave twice running shall be counted -deserters and judged as such. The servants and sutlers -of the camp are amenable to this as well as the -soldier.</em>”</p> - -<p>This order Marmont, after reproaching his troops -for like excesses, renewed with the following additions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117"></a>[117]</span></p> - -<p>“<em>Considering that the disorders of the army have -arrived at the highest degree, and require the most -vigorous measures of repression, it is ordered,</em></p> - -<p>“1º. <em>All non-commissioned officers and soldiers -found a quarter of a league from their quarters, camp, -or post without leave, shall be judged pillagers and tried -by the military commission.</em></p> - -<p>“2º. <em>The gens-d’armes shall examine the baggage -of all sutlers and followers and shall seize all effects -that appear to be pillaged, and shall burn what will -burn, and bring the gold and silver to the paymaster-general -under a ‘<span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">procès verbal</span>,’ and all persons -whose effects have been seized as pillage to the amount -of one hundred livres shall be sent to the military -commission, and on conviction suffer death.</em></p> - -<p>“3º. <em>All officers who shall not take proper measures -to repress disorders under their command shall -be sent in arrest to head-quarters there to be judged.</em>”</p> - -<p>Then appointing the number of baggage animals -to each company, upon a scale which coincides in a -remarkable manner with the allowances in the -British army, Marmont directed the overplus to be -seized and delivered, under a legal process, to the -nearest villages, ordering the provost-general to -look to the execution each day, and report thereon. -Finally, he clothed the provost-general with all the -powers of the military commissions; and proof was -soon given that his orders were not mere threats, -for two captains were arrested for trial, and a soldier -of the twenty-sixth regiment was condemned to -death by one of the provisional commissions for -stealing church vessels.</p> - -<p>Such was the conduct of the French, and touching -the conduct of the English, lord Wellington, in -the same month, wrote thus to lord Liverpool.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118"></a>[118]</span></p> - -<p>“<em>The outrages committed by the British soldiers, -belonging to this army, have become so enormous, and -they have produced an effect on the minds of the people -of the country, so injurious to the cause, and likely to -be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request -your Lordship’s early attention to the subject. I am -sensible that the best measures to be adopted on this -subject are those of prevention, and I believe there -are few officers who have paid more attention to the -subject than I have done, and I have been so far successful, -as that few outrages are committed by the -soldiers who are with their regiments, after the regiments -have been a short time in this country.</em>”</p> - -<p>“<em>But in the extended system on which we are acting, -small detachments of soldiers must be marched -long distances, through the country, either as escorts, -or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or -coming from hospitals, &c. and notwithstanding that -these detachments are never allowed to march, excepting -under the command of an officer or more, in proportion -to its size, and that every precaution is taken -to provide for the regularity of their subsistence, -there is no instance of the march of one of these -detachments that outrages of every description are not -committed, and I am sorry to say with impunity.</em>”</p> - -<p>“<em>The guard-rooms are therefore crowded with -prisoners, and the offences of which they have been -guilty remain unpunished, to the destruction of the -discipline of the army, and to the injury of the reputation -of the country for justice. I have thought it -proper to lay these circumstances before your lordship. -I am about to move the army further forward -into Spain, and I assure your lordship, that I have -not a friend in that country, who has not written to -me in dread of the consequences, which must result to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119"></a>[119]</span> -the army, and to the cause from a continuance of -these disgraceful irregularities, which I declare I -have it not in my power to prevent.</em>”</p> - -<p>To this should have been added, the insubordination, -and the evil passions, awakened by the unchecked -plunder of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos. -But long had the English general complained of -the bad discipline of his army, and the following -extracts, from a letter dated a few months later, -shew that his distrust at the present time was not -ill-founded. After observing that the constitutions -of the soldiers were so much shaken from disorders -acquired by their service at Walcheren, or by their -own irregularities, that a British army was almost a -moving hospital, more than one-third or about -twenty thousand men being sick, or attending upon -the sick, he thus describes their conduct.</p> - -<p>“<em>The disorders which these soldiers have, are of a -very trifling description, they are considered to render -them incapable of serving with their regiments, but -they certainly do not incapacitate them from committing -outrages of all descriptions on their passage -through the country, and in the last movements of the -hospitals the soldiers have not only plundered the inhabitants -of their property, but the hospital stores -which moved with the hospitals, and have sold the -plunder. And all these outrages are committed with -impunity, no proof can be brought on oath before a -court-martial that any individual has committed an -outrage, and the soldiers of the army are becoming -little better than a band of robbers.</em>” “<em>I have carried -the establishment and authority of the provost-marshal -as far as either will go; there are at this -moment not less than one provost-marshal, and nineteen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120"></a>[120]</span> -assistant provost-marshals, attached to the several -divisions of cavalry and infantry and to the hospital -stations, to preserve order, but this establishment is -not sufficient, and I have not the means of increasing -it.</em>”</p> - -<p>The principal remedies he proposed, were the -admitting less rigorous proof of guilt, before courts -martial; the forming a military police, <em>such as the -French, and other armies possessed</em>; the enforcing -more attention on the part of the officers to their -duties; the increasing the pay and responsibility of -the non-commissioned officers, and the throwing -upon them the chief care of the discipline. But in -treating this part of the subject he broached an -opinion which can scarcely be sustained even by -his authority. Assuming, somewhat unjustly, that -the officers of his army were, from consciousness of -like demerit, generally too lenient in their sentences -on each other for neglect of duty, he says, “I am -inclined to entertain the opinion that in the British -army duties of inspection and control over the conduct -and habits of the soldiers, the performance of -which by somebody is the only effectual check to -disorder and all its consequences, are imposed upon -the subaltern officers of regiments, which duties -British officers, being of the class of gentlemen in -society, and being required to appear as such, have -never performed <em>and which they will never perform</em>. -It is very necessary, however, that the duties should -be performed by somebody, and for this reason, and -having observed the advantage derived in the -guards, from the respectable body of non-commissioned -officers in those regiments, who perform all -the duties required from subalterns in the marching<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121"></a>[121]</span> -regiments, I had suggested to your lordship the expediency -of increasing the pay of the non-commissioned -officers in the army.”</p> - -<p>Now it is a strange assumption, that a gentleman -necessarily neglects his duty to his country. When -well taught, which was not always the case, gentlemen -by birth generally performed their duties in -the Peninsula more conscientiously than others, -and the experience of every commanding officer -will bear out the assertion. If the non-commissioned -officers could do all the duties of subaltern -officers, why should the country bear the useless -expense of the latter? But in truth the system of -the guards produced rather a medium goodness, -than a superior excellence; the system of sir John -Moore, founded upon the principle, that the officers -should thoroughly know, and be responsible for the -discipline of their soldiers, better bore the test of -experience. All the British regiments of the light -division were formed in the camps of Shorn-Cliff -by that most accomplished commander; very many -of the other acknowledged good regiments of the -army had been instructed by him in Sicily; and -wherever an officer, formed under Moore, obtained -a regiment, whether British or Portuguese, that -regiment was distinguished in this war for its discipline -and enduring qualities; courage was common -to all.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122"></a>[122]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVIII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>CAMPAIGN OF 1812.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. June.</span> -On the 13th of June, the periodic rains having -ceased, and the field magazines being completed, -Wellington passed the Agueda and marched towards -the Tormes in four columns, one of which was composed -of the Spanish troops. The 16th he reached -the Valmusa stream, within six miles of Salamanca, -and drove a French detachment across the Tormes. -All the bridges, save that of Salamanca which was -defended by the forts, had been destroyed, and -there was a garrison in the castle of Alba de Tormes, -but the 17th the allies passed the river above and -below the town, by the deep fords of Santa Marta -and Los Cantos, and general Henry Clinton invested -the forts the same day with the sixth division. -Marmont, with two divisions, and some cavalry, -retired to Fuente el Sauco, on the road of Toro, followed -by an advanced guard of the allies; Salamanca<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_2">Plan, No. 2.</a></span> -instantly became a scene of rejoicing, the -houses were illuminated, and the people shouting, -singing, and weeping for joy, gave Wellington their -welcome while his army took a position on the -mountain of San Cristoval about five miles in advance.</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA.</h4> - -<p><span class="sidenote">Jones’s Sieges.</span> -Four eighteen-pounders had followed the army -from Almeida, three twenty-four pound howitzers -were furnished by the field-artillery, and the battering<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123"></a>[123]</span> -train used by Hill at Almaraz, had passed the -bridge of Alcantara the 11th. These were the<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s despatches, MSS.</span> -means of offence, but the strength of the forts had -been under-rated; they contained eight hundred -men, and it was said that thirteen convents and -twenty-two colleges had been destroyed in their -construction. San Vincente, so called from the large -convent it enclosed, was the key-fort. Situated on -a perpendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes, and -irregular in form, but well flanked, it was separated -by a deep ravine from the other forts, which -were called St. Cajetano and La Merced. These -were also on high ground, smaller than San Vincente, -and of a square form, but with bomb-proofs, -and deep ditches, having perpendicular scarps and -counterscarps.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 17th colonel Burgoyne, the -engineer directing the siege, commenced a battery, -for eight guns, at the distance of two hundred and -fifty yards from the main wall of Vincente, and as -the ruins of the destroyed convents rendered it -impossible to excavate, earth was brought from a -distance; but the moon was up, the night short, -the enemy’s fire of musketry heavy, the workmen -of the sixth division were inexperienced, and at -day-break the battery was still imperfect. Meanwhile -an attempt had been made to attach the miner -secretly to the counterscarp, and when the vigilance -of a trained dog baffled this design, the enemy’s -picquet was driven in, and the attempt openly -made, yet it was rendered vain by a plunging fire -from the top of the convent.</p> - -<p>On the 18th eight hundred Germans, placed in -the ruins, mastered all the enemy’s fire save that -from loop-holes, and colonel May, who directed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124"></a>[124]</span> -the artillery service, then placed two field-pieces -on a neighbouring convent, called San Bernardo, -overlooking the fort, however these guns could not -silence the French artillery.</p> - -<p>In the night, the first battery was armed, covering -for two field-pieces as a counter-battery was raised -a little to its right, and a second breaching battery -for two howitzers, was constructed on the Cajetano -side of the ravine.</p> - -<p>At day-break on the 19th seven guns opened, -and at nine o’clock the wall of the convent was -cut away to the level of the counterscarp. The -second breaching battery, which saw lower down -the scarp, then commenced its fire; but the iron -howitzers proved unmeet battering ordnance, and -the enemy’s musketry being entirely directed on -this point, because the first battery, to save ammunition, -had ceased firing, brought down a captain -and more than twenty gunners. The howitzers -did not injure the wall, ammunition was scarce, -and as the enemy could easily cut off the breach -in the night, the fire ceased.</p> - -<p>The 20th at mid-day, colonel Dickson arrived -with the iron howitzers from Elvas, and the second -battery being then reinforced with additional pieces, -revived its fire, against a re-entering angle of the -convent a little beyond the former breach. The -wall here was soon broken through, and in an -instant a huge cantle of the convent, with its roof, -went to the ground, crushing many of the garrison -and laying bare the inside of the building: carcasses -were immediately thrown into the opening, to burn -the convent, but the enemy undauntedly maintained -their ground and extinguished the flames. A -lieutenant and fifteen gunners were lost this day,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125"></a>[125]</span> -on the side of the besiegers, and the ammunition -being nearly gone, the attack was suspended until -fresh stores could come up from Almeida.</p> - -<p>During the progress of this siege, the general -aspect of affairs had materially changed on both -sides. Lord Wellington had been deceived as to -the strength of the forts, and intercepted returns -of the armies of the south and of Portugal now -shewed to him, that they also were far stronger -than he had expected; at the same time he heard -of Ballesteros’s defeat at Bornos, and of Slade’s -unfortunate cavalry action of Llera. He had calculated -that Bonet would not quit the Asturias, and -that general was in full march for Leon, Caffarelli -also was preparing to reinforce Marmont, and thus the -brilliant prospect of the campaign was suddenly -clouded. But on the other hand Bonet had unexpectedly -relinquished the Asturias after six days’ -occupation; three thousand Gallicians were in that -province and in communication with the seventh -army, and the maritime expedition under Popham -had sailed for the coast of Biscay.</p> - -<p>Neither was the king’s situation agreeable. The -Partidas intercepted his despatches so surely, that -it was the 19th ere Marmont’s letter announcing -Wellington’s advance, and saying that Hill also -was in march for the north reached Madrid. Soult -detained Drouet, Suchet refused to send more than -one brigade towards Madrid, and Caffarelli, disturbed -that Palombini should march upon the -capital instead of Burgos, kept back the divisions -promised to Marmont. Something was however -gained in vigour, for the king, no longer depending -upon the assistance of the distant armies, gave -orders to blow up Mirabete and abandon La Mancha<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126"></a>[126]</span> -on one side, and the forts of Somosierra and Buitrago -on the other, with a view to unite the army of the -centre.</p> - -<p>A detachment of eight hundred men under -colonel Noizet, employed to destroy Buitrago, was -attacked on his return by the Empecinado with -three thousand, but Noizet, an able officer, defeated -him and reached Madrid with little loss. -Palombini’s march was then hastened, and imperative -orders directed Soult to send ten thousand men to -Toledo. The garrison of Segovia was reinforced -to preserve one of the communications with -Marmont, that marshal was informed of Hill’s true -position, and the king advised him to give battle -to Wellington, for he supposed the latter to have -only eighteen thousand English troops; but he had -twenty-four thousand, and had yet left Hill so -strong that he desired him to fight Drouet if occasion -required.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Marmont, who had remained in person -at Fuente el Sauco, united there, on the 20th, four -divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, -furnishing about twenty-five thousand men of all -arms, with which he marched to the succour of -the forts. His approach over an open country was -descried at a considerable distance, and a brigade -of the fifth division was immediately called off from -the siege, the battering train was sent across the -Tormes, and the army, which was in bivouac on the -Salamanca side of St. Christoval, formed in order -of battle on the top. This position of Christoval -was about four miles long, and rather concave, the -ascent in front steep, and tangled with hollow roads -and stone enclosures, belonging to the villages, but -the summit was broad, even, and covered with ripe<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127"></a>[127]</span> -corn; the right was flanked by the Upper Tormes, -and the left dipped into the country bordering the -Lower Tormes, for in passing Salamanca, that river -makes a sweep round the back of the position. The -infantry, the heavy cavalry, and the guns crowned -the summit of the mountain, but the light cavalry -fell back from the front to the low country on the left, -where there was a small stream and a marshy flat. -The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind -the left of the position; the village of Cabrerizos -marked the extreme right, though the hill still -trended up the river. The villages of Christoval, -Castillanos, and Moresco, were nearly in a line, -along the foot of the heights in front, the last was -somewhat within the allies’ ground, and nothing -could be stronger than the position, which completely -commanded all the country for many miles; -but the heat was excessive and there was neither -shade, nor fuel to cook with, nor water nearer than -the Tormes.</p> - -<p>About five o’clock in the evening the enemy’s -horsemen approached, pointing towards the left of -the position, as if to turn it by the Lower Tormes, -whereupon the British light cavalry made a short -forward movement and a partial charge took place; -but the French opened six guns, and the British -retired to their own ground near Monte Rubio and -Villares. The light division which was held in -reserve, immediately closed towards the left of the -position until the French cavalry halted and then<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_3">Plan, No. 3.</a></span> -returned to the centre. Meanwhile the main body -of the enemy bore, in one dark volume, against -the right, and halting at the very foot of the position, -sent a flight of shells on to the lofty summit; -nor did this fire cease until after dark, when the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128"></a>[128]</span> -French general, after driving back all the outposts, -obtained possession of Moresco, and established -himself behind that village and Castellanos within -gun-shot of the allies.</p> - -<p>The English general slept that night on the -ground, amongst the troops, and at the first streak -of light the armies were again under arms. Nevertheless, -though some signals were interchanged -between Marmont and the forts, both sides were -quiet until towards evening, when Wellington -detached the sixty-eighth regiment from the line, to -drive the French from Moresco. This attack, made -with vigour, succeeded, but the troops being recalled -just as day-light failed, a body of French coming -unperceived through the standing corn, broke into -the village as the British were collecting their -posts from the different avenues, and did considerable -execution. In the skirmish an officer of the -sixty-eighth, named Mackay, being suddenly surrounded, -refused to surrender, and singly fighting -against a multitude, received more wounds than -the human frame was thought capable of sustaining, -yet he still lives to shew his honourable scars.</p> - -<p>On the 22d three divisions, and a brigade of -cavalry joined Marmont, who having now nearly -forty thousand men in hand, extended his left and -seized a part of the height in advance of the allies’ -right wing, from whence he could discern the -whole of their order of battle, and attack their -right on even terms. However general Graham -advancing with the seventh division dislodged this -French detachment with a sharp skirmish before it -could be formidably reinforced, and that night -Marmont withdrew from his dangerous position to -some heights about six miles in his rear.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129"></a>[129]</span></p> - -<p>It was thought that the French general’s tempestuous -advance to Moresco with such an inferior -force, on the evening of the 20th, should -have been his ruin. Lord Wellington saw clearly -enough the false position of his enemy, but he -argued, that if Marmont came up to fight, it was -better to defend a very strong position, than to -descend and combat in the plain, seeing that the -inferiority of force was not such as to insure the -result of the battle being decisive of the campaign; -and in case of failure, a retreat across the Tormes -would have been very difficult. To this may be -added, that during the first evening there was some -confusion amongst the allies, before the troops of -the different nations could form their order of battle. -Moreover, as the descent of the mountain towards -the enemy was by no means easy, because of the -walls and avenues, and the two villages, which -covered the French front, it is probable that -Marmont, who had plenty of guns and whose -troops were in perfect order and extremely ready -of movement, could have evaded the action, until -night. This reasoning, however, will not hold -good on the 21st. The allies, whose infantry -was a third more and their cavalry three times -as numerous and much better mounted than the -French, might have been poured down by all the -roads passing over the position at day-break; then -Marmont turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, -could never have made his retreat to -the Douro through the open country; but on the -22d, when the French general had received his -other divisions, the chances were no longer the -same.</p> - -<p>Marmont’s new position was skilfully chosen;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130"></a>[130]</span> -one flank rested on Cabeza Vellosa, the other at Huerta, -the centre was at Aldea Rubia. He thus refused<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_3">Plan, No. 3.</a></span> -his right and abandoned the road of Toro to the -allies, but he covered the road of Tordesillas, and -commanded the fort of Huerta with his left; and -he could in a moment pass the Tormes, and operate -by the left bank to communicate with the forts. -Wellington made corresponding dispositions, closing -up his left towards Moresco, and pushing the light -division along the salient part of his position to Aldea -Lengua, where it overhung a ford, which was however -scarcely practicable at this period. General -Graham with two divisions was placed at the fords -of Santa Marta, and the heavy German cavalry -under general Bock crossed the Tormes to watch -the ford of Huerta. By this disposition the allies -covered Salamanca, and could operate on either -side of the Tormes on a shorter line than the -French could operate.</p> - -<p>The 23d the two armies again remained tranquil, -but at break of day on the 24th some dropping -pistol-shots, and now and then a shout, came -faintly from the mist which covered the lower -ground beyond the river; the heavy sound of -artillery succeeded, and the hissing of the bullets -as they cut through the thickened atmosphere, -plainly told that the French were over the Tormes. -After a time the fog cleared up, and the German -horsemen were seen in close and beautiful order, -retiring before twelve thousand French infantry, -who in battle array were marching steadily onwards. -At intervals, twenty guns, ranged in front, -would start forwards and send their bullets whistling -and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, -while scattered parties of light cavalry, scouting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131"></a>[131]</span> -out, capped all the hills in succession, and peering -abroad, gave signals to the main body. Wellington -immediately sent Graham across the river -by the fords of Santa Marta with the first and seventh -divisions and Le Marchant’s brigade of English -cavalry; then concentrating the rest of the army -between Cabrerizos and Moresco, he awaited the -progress of Marmont’s operation.</p> - -<p>Bock continued his retreat in the same fine and -equable order, regardless alike of the cannonade -and of the light horsemen on his flanks, until the -enemy’s scouts had gained a height above Calvarisa -Abaxo, from whence, at the distance of three miles, -they for the first time, perceived Graham’s twelve -thousand men, and eighteen guns, ranged on an -order of battle, perpendicular to the Tormes. -From the same point also Wellington’s heavy -columns were to be seen, clustering on the height -above the fords of Santa Marta, and the light -division was descried at Aldea Lengua, ready -either to advance against the French troops left -on the position of Aldea Rubia, or to pass the river -to the aid of Graham. This apparition made the -French general aware of his error, whereupon hastily -facing about, and repassing the Tormes he -resumed his former ground.</p> - -<p>Wellington’s defensive dispositions on this occasion -were very skilful, but it would appear that -unwilling to stir before the forts fell, he had again -refused the advantage of the moment; for it is not to -be supposed that he misjudged the occasion, since the -whole theatre of operation was distinctly seen from -St. Christoval, and he had passed many hours in earnest -observation; his faculties were indeed so fresh -and vigorous, that after the day’s work he wrote a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132"></a>[132]</span> -detailed memoir upon the proposal for establishing -a bank in Portugal, treating that and other financial -schemes in all their bearings, with a master hand. -Against the weight of his authority, therefore, any -criticism must be advanced.</p> - -<p>Marmont had the easiest passage over the Tormes, -namely, that by the ford of Huerta; the allies had -the greatest number of passages and the shortest -line of operations. Hence if Graham had been -ordered vigorously to attack the French troops on -the left bank, they must have been driven upon -the single ford of Huerta, if not reinforced from -the heights of Aldea Rubia. But the allies could<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_2">Plan, No. 2.</a></span> -also have been reinforced by the fords of Santa -Marta and those of Cabrerizos, and even by that -of Aldea Lengua, although it was not good at -this early season. A partial victory would then -have been achieved, or a general battle would have -been brought on, when the French troops would -have been disadvantageously cooped up in the -loop of the Tormes and without means of escaping -if defeated. Again, it is not easy to see how the -French general could have avoided a serious defeat -if Wellington had moved with all the troops on -the right bank, against the divisions left on the hill -of Aldea Rubia; for the French army would then -have been separated, one part on the hither, one on -the further bank of the Tormes. It was said at the -time that Marmont hoped to draw the whole -of the allies across the river, when he would -have seized the position of Christoval, raised the -siege and maintained the line of the Tormes. It may -however be doubted that he expected Wellington -to commit so gross an error. It is more likely that -holding his own army to be the quickest of movement,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133"></a>[133]</span> -his object was to separate the allies’ force -in the hopes of gaining some partial advantage to -enable him to communicate with his forts, which -were now in great danger.</p> - -<p>When the French retired to the heights at Aldea -Rubia on the night of the 23d, the heavy guns -had been already brought to the right of the Tormes, -and a third battery, to breach San Cajetano, was -armed with four pieces, but the line of fire being -oblique, the practice, at four hundred and fifty -yards, only beat down the parapet and knocked -away the palisades. Time was however of vital -importance, the escalade of that fort and La Merced -was ordered, and the attack commenced at ten -o’clock, but in half an hour failed with a loss -of one hundred and twenty men and officers. The -wounded were brought off the next day under -truce and the enemy had all the credit of the fight, -yet the death of general Bowes must ever be admired. -That gallant man, whose rank might have -excused his leading so small a force, being wounded -early, was having his hurt dressed when he heard -that the troops were yielding, and returning to the -combat fell.</p> - -<p>The siege was now perforce suspended for want -of ammunition, and the guns were sent across the -river, but were immediately brought back in consequence -of Marmont having crossed to the left -bank. Certain works were meanwhile pushed forward -to cut off the communication between the -forts and otherwise to straiten them, and the miner -was attached to the cliff on which La Merced stood. -The final success was not however influenced by -these operations, and they need no further notice.</p> - -<p>The 26th ammunition arrived from Almeida, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134"></a>[134]</span> -second and third batteries were re-armed, the field-pieces -were again placed in the convent of San -Bernardo, and the iron howitzers, throwing hot -shot, set the convent of San Vincente on fire in -several places. The garrison again extinguished -the flames, and this balanced combat continued -during the night, but on the morning of the 27th -the fire of both batteries being redoubled, the -convent of San Vincente was in a blaze, the breach -of San Cajetano was improved, a fresh storming -party assembled, and the white flag waved from -Cajetano. A negociation ensued, but lord Wellington, -judging it an artifice to gain time, gave orders for -the assault; then the forts fell, for San Cajetano -scarcely fired a shot, and the flames raged so -violently at San Vincente that no opposition could -be made.</p> - -<p>Seven hundred prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, -provisions, arms, and clothing, and a secure -passage over the Tormes, were the immediate fruits -of this capture, which was not the less prized, that -the breaches were found to be more formidable -than those at Ciudad Rodrigo. The success of a -storm would have been very doubtful if the garrison -could have gained time to extinguish the flames in -the convent of San Vincente, and as it was the allies -had ninety killed; their whole loss since the passage -of the Tormes was nearly five hundred men and -officers, of which one hundred and sixty men with -fifty horses, fell outside Salamanca, the rest in the -siege.</p> - -<p>Marmont had allotted fifteen days as the term -of resistance for these forts, but from the facility -with which San Vincente caught fire, five would -have been too many if ammunition had not failed.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135"></a>[135]</span> -His calculation was therefore false. He would -however have fought on the 23d, when his force -was united, had he not on the 22d received intelligence -from Caffarelli, that a powerful body of -infantry, with twenty-two guns and all the cavalry -of the north, were actually in march to join him. -It was this which induced him to occupy the -heights of Villa Rubia, on that day, to avoid a<span class="sidenote">Confidential official reports, obtained from the French War-office, MSS.</span> -premature action, but on the evening of the 26th -the signals, from the forts, having indicated that -they could still hold out three days, Marmont, from -fresh intelligence, no longer expected Caffarelli’s -troops, and resolved to give battle on the 28th. -The fall of the forts, which was made known to -him on the evening of the 27th, changed this determination, -the reasons for fighting on such disadvantageous -ground no longer existed, and hence, -withdrawing his garrison from the castle of Alba -de Tormes, he retreated during the night towards -the Duero, by the roads of Tordesillas and Toro.</p> - -<p>Wellington ordered the works both at Alba and -the forts of Salamanca to be destroyed, and following -the enemy by easy marches, encamped on the -Guarena the 30th. The next day he reached -the Trabancos, his advanced guard being at Nava -del Rey. On the 2d he passed the Zapardiel in -two columns, the right marching by Medina del -Campo, the left following the advanced guard -towards Rueda. From this place the French rear-guard -was cannonaded and driven upon the main -body, which was filing over the bridge of Tordesillas. -Some were killed and some made prisoners, not -many, but there was great confusion, and a heavy -disaster would have befallen the French if the -English general had not been deceived by false<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136"></a>[136]</span> -information, that they had broken the bridge the -night before. For as he knew by intercepted -letters that Marmont intended to take a position -near Tordesillas, this report made him suppose -the enemy was already over the Duero, and hence -he had spread his troops, and was not in sufficient -force to attack during the passage of the river.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -Marmont, who had fortified posts at Zamora and<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_3">Plan, No. 3.</a></span> -Toro, and had broken the bridges at those places -and at Puente Duero and Tudela, preserving only -that of Tordesillas, now took a position on the -right of the Duero. His left was at Simancas -on the Pisuerga, which was unfordable, and the -bridges at that place and Valladolid, were commanded -by fortified posts. His centre was at -Tordesillas, and very numerous, and his right was -on some heights opposite to Pollos. Wellington -indeed caused the third division to seize the ford -at the last place which gave him a command of -the river, because there was a plain between it -and the enemy’s heights, but the ford itself was -difficult and insufficient for passing the whole army. -Head-quarters were therefore fixed at Rueda, and -the forces were disposed in a compact form, the -head placed in opposition to the ford of Pollos -and the bridge of Tordesillas, the rear occupying -Medina del Campo and other points on the Zapardiel -and Trabancos rivers, ready to oppose the -enemy if he should break out from the Valladolid -side. Marmont’s line of defence, measured from -Valladolid to Zamora, was sixty miles; from Simancas -to Toro above thirty, but the actual line of occupation -was not above twelve; the bend of the river -gave him the chord, the allies the arc, and the -fords were few and difficult. The advantage was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137"></a>[137]</span> -therefore on the side of the enemy, but to understand -the true position of the contending generals -it is necessary to know the secondary coincident -operations.</p> - -<p>While the armies were in presence at Salamanca, -Silveira had filed up the Duero, to the Esla river, -menacing the French communications with Benavente. -D’Urban’s horsemen had passed the Duero -below Zamora on the 25th and cut off all intercourse -between the French army and that place; but when -Marmont fell back from Aldea Rubia, D’Urban recrossed -the Duero at Fresno de la Ribera to avoid -being crushed, yet immediately afterwards advanced -beyond Toro to Castromonte, behind the right wing -of the enemy’s new position. It was part of Wellington’s -plan, that Castaños, after establishing the -siege of Astorga, should come down by Benavente -with the remainder of his army, and place himself in -communication with Silveira. This operation, without -disarranging the siege of Astorga, would have -placed twelve or fifteen thousand men, infantry, -cavalry, and artillery, behind the Esla, and with -secure lines of retreat; consequently able to check -all the enemy’s foraging parties, and reduce him -to live upon his fixed magazines, which were -scanty. The usual Spanish procrastination defeated -this plan.</p> - -<p>Castaños, by the help of the succours received -from England, had assembled fifteen thousand men -at Ponteferada, under the command of Santocildes, -but he pretended that he had no battering guns -until sir Howard Douglas actually pointed them -out in the arsenal of Ferrol, and shewed him how -to convey them to the frontier. Then Santocildes -moved, though slowly, and when Bonet’s retreat<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138"></a>[138]</span> -from the Asturias was known, eleven thousand men -invested Astorga, and four thousand others marched -to Benavente, but not until Marmont had called -his detachment in from that place. The Spanish -battering train only reached Villa Franca del Bierzo -on the 1st of July. However the Guerilla chief, -Marquinez, appeared about Palencia, and the other -Partidas of Castile acting on a line from Leon to -Segovia, intercepted Marmont’s correspondence with -the king. Thus the immense tract called the -<em>Campo de Tierras</em> was secured for the subsistence -of the Gallician army; and to the surprise of the -allies, who had so often heard of the enemy’s -terrible devastations that they expected to find -Castile a desert, those vast plains, and undulating -hills, were covered with ripe corn or fruitful vines, -and the villages bore few marks of the ravages -of war.</p> - -<p>While the main body of the Gallicians was still -at Ponte Ferrada, a separate division had passed -along the coast road into the Asturias, and in concert -with part of the seventh army had harassed -Bonet’s retreat from that kingdom; the French -general indeed forced his way by the eastern passes, -and taking post the 30th of June at Reynosa and -Aguilar del Campo, chased the neighbouring bands -away, but this movement was one of the great -errors of the campaign. Napoleon and Wellington<span class="sidenote">King’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.</span> -felt alike the importance of holding the Asturias at -this period. The one had ordered that they should -be retained, the other had calculated that such<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s despatches, MSS.</span> -would be the case, and the judgment of both was -quickly made manifest. For the Gallicians, who -would not have dared to quit the Bierzo if Bonet -had menaced their province by Lugo, or by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139"></a>[139]</span> -shore line, invested Astorga the moment he quitted -the Asturias. And the Partidas of the north, who -had been completely depressed by Mina’s defeat, -recovering courage, now moved towards the coast, -where Popham’s expedition, which had sailed on -the 18th of June from Coruña, soon appeared, a -formidable spectacle, for there were five sail of the -line, with many frigates and brigs, in all twenty -ships of war.</p> - -<p>The port of Lesquito was immediately attacked -<ins class="corr" id="tn-139" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'on the sea-bord'"> -on the sea-board</ins> by this squadron, on the land side by -the Pastor, and when captain Bouverie got a gun up -to breach the convent the Spanish chief assaulted -but was repulsed; however the garrison, two hundred -and fifty strong, surrendered to the squadron the 22d, -and on the two following days Bermeo and Plencia -fell. The Partidas failed to appear at Guetaria, but -Castro and Portagalete, in the Bilbao river, were -attacked the 6th of July, in concert with Longa, and -though the latter was rebuffed at Bilbao the squadron -took Castro. The enemy recovered some of -their posts on the 10th, and on the 19th the attempt -on Guetaria being renewed, Mina and Pastor -came down to co-operate, but a French column -beat those chiefs, and drove the British seamen -to their vessels, with the loss of thirty men and -two guns.</p> - -<p>It was the opinion of general Carrol who accompanied -this expedition, that the plan of operations -was ill-arranged, but the local successes merit no -attention, the great object of distracting the enemy -was obtained. Caffarelli heard at one and the same -time, that Palombini’s division had been called to -Madrid; that Bonet had abandoned the Asturias; -that a Gallician division had entered that province;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140"></a>[140]</span> -that a powerful English fleet, containing troops, -was on the coast, and acting in concert with all the -Partidas of the north; that the seventh army was -menacing Burgos, and that the whole country was -in commotion. Trembling for his own districts he -instantly arrested the march of the divisions destined -for Marmont; and although the king, who saw -very clearly the real object of the maritime expedition, -reiterated the orders to march upon Segovia or -Cuellar, with a view to reinforce either the army of -the centre or the army of Portugal, Caffarelli delayed -obedience until the 13th of July, and then -sent but eighteen hundred cavalry, with twenty -guns.</p> - -<p>Thus Bonet’s movement which only brought a -reinforcement of six thousand infantry to Marmont, -kept away Caffarelli’s reserves, which were twelve -thousand of all arms, uncovered the whole of the -great French line of communication, and caused the -siege of Astorga to be commenced. And while Bonet -was in march by Palencia and Valladolid to the -position of Tordesillas, the king heard of Marmont’s -retreat from the Tormes, and that an English column -menaced Arevalo; wherefore not being ready to move -with the army of the centre, and fearing for Avila, -he withdrew the garrison from that place, and thus -lost his direct line of correspondence with the army -of Portugal, because Segovia was environed by the -Partidas. In this state of affairs neither Wellington -nor Marmont had reason to fight upon the -Duero. The latter because his position was so -strong he could safely wait for Bonet’s and Caffarelli’s -troops, and meanwhile the king could operate against -the allies’ communications. The former because he -could not attack the French, except at great disadvantage;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141"></a>[141]</span> -for the fords of the Duero were little -known, and that of Pollos was very deep. To pass -the river there, and form within gun-shot of the -enemy’s left, without other combinations, promised -nothing but defeat, and the staff officers, sent to -examine the course of the river, reported that the -advantage of ground was entirely on the enemy’s -side, except at Castro Nuño, half-way between -Pollos and Toro.</p> - -<p>While the enemy commanded the bridge at Tordesillas, -no attempt to force the passage of the river -could be safe, seeing that Marmont might fall on -the allies’ front and rear if the operation was within -his reach; and if beyond his reach, that is to say -near Zamora, he could cut their communication -with Ciudad Rodrigo and yet preserve his own with -Caffarelli and with the king. Wellington therefore -resolved to wait until the fords should become lower, -or the combined operations of the Gallicians and -Partidas, should oblige the enemy, either to detach -men, or to dislodge altogether for want of provisions. -In this view he urged Santocildes to press -the siege of Astorga vigorously and to send every -man he could spare down the Esla; and an intercepted -letter gave hopes that Astorga would surrender -on the 7th, yet this seems to have been a -device to keep the Gallicians in that quarter for it -was in no danger. Santocildes, expecting its fall, -would not detach men, but the vicinity of D’Urban’s -cavalry, which remained at Castromonte, so incommoded -the French right, that Foy marched to drive -them beyond the Esla. General Pakenham however -crossed the ford of Pollos, with some of the -third division, which quickly brought Foy back, and -Marmont then endeavoured to augment the number<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142"></a>[142]</span> -and efficiency of his cavalry, by taking a thousand -horses from the infantry officers and the sutlers.</p> - -<p>On the 8th Bonet arrived, and the French marshal -immediately extending his right to Toro, commenced -repairing the bridge there. Wellington, in -like manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, yet -kept his centre still on the Trabancos, and his right -at Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas and the ford -of Pollos. In this situation the armies remained for -some days. Generals Graham and Picton went to -England in bad health, and the principal powder -magazine at Salamanca exploded with hurt to -many, but no other events worth recording occurred. -The weather was very fine, the country rich, and -the troops received their rations regularly; wine -was so plentiful, that it was hard to keep the soldiers -sober; the caves of Rueda, either natural or -cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were -so immense and so well stocked, that the drunkards -of two armies failed to make any very sensible -diminution in the quantity. Many men of both -sides perished in that labyrinth, and on both sides -also, the soldiers, passing the Duero in groups, held -amicable intercourse, conversing of the battles that -were yet to be fought; the camps on the banks of -the Duero seemed at times to belong to one army, -so difficult is it to make brave men hate each other.</p> - -<p>To the officers of the allies all looked prosperous, -their only anxiety was to receive the signal of -battle, their only discontent, that it was delayed; -and many amongst them murmured that the French -had been permitted to retreat from Christoval. Had -Wellington been finally forced back to Portugal his -reputation would have been grievously assailed by -his own people, for the majority, peering through<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143"></a>[143]</span> -their misty politics, saw Paris in dim perspective, -and overlooked the enormous French armies that -were close at hand. Meanwhile their general’s -mind was filled with care and mortification, and all -cross and evil circumstances seemed to combine -against him.</p> - -<p>The mediation for the Spanish colonies had just -failed at Cadiz, under such circumstances, as left -no doubt that the English influence was powerless -and the French influence visibly increasing in the -Cortez. Soult had twenty-seven gun-boats in the -Trocadero canal, shells were cast day and night into -the city, and the people were alarmed; two thousand -French had marched from Santa Mary to -Seville, apparently to reinforce Drouet in Estremadura; -Echevaria had effected nothing in the kingdom -of Cordoba, and a French division was assembling -at Bornos, to attack Ballesteros, whose -rashness, inviting destruction, might alone put an -end to the campaign in Leon and bring Wellington -back to the Tagus. In the north of Spain also -affairs appeared equally gloomy, Mina’s defeats, -and their influence upon the other Partidas, were -positively known, but the effect of Popham’s operations -was unknown, or at least doubtful. Bonet’s -division had certainly arrived, and the Gallicians -who had done nothing at Astorga were already in -want of ammunition. In Castile the activity of the -Partidas instead of increasing, had diminished after -Wellington crossed the Tormes, and the chiefs -seemed inclined to leave the burthen of the war entirely -to their allies. Nor was this feeling confined -to them. It had been arranged, that new corps, -especially of cavalry, should be raised, as the enemy -receded in this campaign, and the necessary clothing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144"></a>[144]</span> -and equipments, supplied by England, were placed -at the disposal of lord Wellington, who to avoid the -burthen of carriage had directed them to Coruña; -yet now, when Leon and the Asturias were in a -manner recovered, no man would serve voluntarily. -There was great enthusiasm, in words, there had -always been so, but the fighting men were not increased, -and even the <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">juramentados</i>, many of whom -deserted at this time from the king, well clothed -and soldier-like men, refused to enter the English -ranks.</p> - -<p>Now also came the news that lord William Bentinck’s -plans were altered, and the intercepted despatches -shewed that the king had again ordered -Drouet to pass the Tagus, but Soult’s resistance to -this order was not known. Wellington therefore at -the same moment, saw Marmont’s army increase, -heard that the king’s army, reinforced by Drouet, -was on the point of taking the field; that the troops -from Sicily, upon whose operations he depended to -keep all the army of Aragon in the eastern part of -Spain, and even to turn the king’s attention that -way, were to be sent to Italy; and that two millions -of dollars, which he hoped to have obtained at -Gibraltar, had been swept off by lord William Bentinck -for this Italian expedition, which thus at once -deprived him of men and money! The latter was -the most serious blow, the promised remittances -from England had not arrived, and as the insufficiency -of land-carriage rendered it nearly impossible -to feed the army even on the Duero, to venture -further into Spain without money would be akin to -madness. From Gallicia, where no credit was -given, came the supply of meat, a stoppage there -would have made the war itself stop, and no greater<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145"></a>[145]</span> -error had been committed by the enemy, than delaying -to conquer Gallicia, which could many times -have been done.</p> - -<p>To meet the increasing exigences for money, the -English general had, for one resource, obtained a -credit of half a million from the Treasury to answer -certain certificates, or notes of hand, which his -Spanish correspondents promised to get cashed; but -of this resource he was now suddenly deprived by -the English ministers, who objected to the irregular -form of the certificates, because he, with his usual -sagacity, had adapted them to the habits of the -people he was to deal with. Meanwhile his troops -were four, his staff six, his muleteers nearly twelve -months in arrears of pay, and he was in debt every -where, and for every thing. The Portuguese -government had become very clamorous for the -subsidy, Mr. Stuart acknowledged that their distress -was very great, and the desertion from the Portuguese -army, which augmented in an alarming manner, -and seemed rather to be increased than repressed -by severity, sufficiently proved their misery. -The personal resources of Wellington alone enabled -the army to maintain its forward position, for he -had, to a certain extent, carried his commercial speculations -into Gallicia, as well as Portugal; and he -had persuaded the Spanish authorities in Castile to -give up a part of their revenue in kind to the army, -receiving bills on the British embassy at Cadiz in -return. But the situation of affairs may be best -learned from the mouths of the generals.</p> - -<p>“The arrears of the army are certainly getting -to an alarming pitch, and if it is suffered to increase, -we cannot go on: we have only here two brigades -of infantry, fed by our own commissariat, and we<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146"></a>[146]</span> -are now reduced to one of them having barely bread -for this day, and the commissary has not a farthing -of money. I know not how we shall get on!”</p> - -<p>Such were Beresford’s words on the 8th of July, -and on the 15th Wellington wrote even more forcibly.</p> - -<p>“I have never,” said he, “been in such distress -as at present, and some serious misfortune must -happen, if the government do not attend seriously -to the subject, and supply us regularly with money. -The arrears and distresses of the Portuguse government, -are a joke to ours, and if our credit was not -better than theirs, we should certainly starve. As -it is, if we don’t find means to pay our bills for -butcher’s meat there will be an end to the war at -once.”</p> - -<p>Thus stript as it were to the skin, the English -general thought once more to hide his nakedness in -the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont, proud -of his own unripened skill, and perhaps, from the -experience of San Cristoval, undervaluing his adversary’s -tactics, desirous also, it was said, to gain -a victory without the presence of a king, Marmont, -pushed on by fate, madly broke the chain which -restrained his enemy’s strength.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147"></a>[147]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVIII_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. July.</span> -When Wellington found by the intercepted letters, -that the king’s orders for Drouet to cross the Tagus, -were reiterated, and imperative, he directed Hill to -detach troops, in the same proportion. And as this -reinforcement, coming by the way of Alcantara, -could reach the Duero as soon as Drouet could -reach Madrid, he hoped still to maintain the Tormes, -if not the Duero, notwithstanding the king’s power; -for some money, long expected from England, had -at last arrived in Oporto, and he thought the Gallicians, -maugre their inertness, must soon be felt by -the enemy. Moreover the harvest on the ground, -however abundant, could not long feed the French -multitudes, if Drouet and the king should together -join Marmont. Nevertheless, fearing the action of -Joseph’s cavalry, he ordered D’Urban’s horsemen to -join the army on the Duero. But to understand the -remarkable movements which were now about to commence, -the reader must bear in mind, that the French -army, from its peculiar organization, could, while the -ground harvest lasted, operate without any regard -to lines of communication; it had supports on all -sides and procured its food every where, for the -troops were taught to reap the standing corn, and -grind it themselves if their cavalry could not seize -flour in the villages. This organization approaching -the ancient Roman military perfection, gave them<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148"></a>[148]</span> -great advantages; in the field it baffled the irregular, -and threw the regular force of the allies, -entirely upon the defensive; because when the -flanks were turned, a retreat only could save the -communications, and the French offered no point, -for retaliation in kind. Wherefore, with a force -composed of four different nations, Wellington was -to execute the most difficult evolutions, in an open -country, his chances of success being to arise only -from the casual errors of his adversary, who was an -able general, who knew the country perfectly, and -was at the head of an army, brave, excellently disciplined, -and of one nation. The game would have -been quite unequal if the English general had not -been so strong in cavalry.</p> - - -<h4>FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE DUERO.</h4> - -<p>In the course of the 15th and 16th Marmont, -who had previously made several deceptive movements, -concentrated his beautiful and gallant army -between Toro and the Hornija river; and intercepted -letters, the reports of deserters, and the talk -of the peasants had for several days assigned the -former place as his point of passage. On the morning -of the 16th the English exploring officers, passing -the Duero near Tordesillas, found only the -garrison there, and in the evening the reports -stated, that two French divisions had already -passed the repaired bridge of Toro. Wellington -united his centre and left at Canizal on the Guarena -during the night, intending to attack those -who had passed at Toro; but as he had still some -doubts of the enemy’s real object, he caused sir -Stapleton Cotton to halt on the Trabancos with the -right wing, composed of the fourth and light divisions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149"></a>[149]</span> -and Anson’s cavalry. Meanwhile Marmont, -recalling his troops from the left bank of the Duero, -returned to Tordesillas and Pollos, passed that river -at those points and occupied Nava del Rey, where -his whole army was concentrated in the evening of -the 17th, some of his divisions having marched -above forty miles, and some above fifty miles, without -a halt. The English cavalry posts being thus -driven over the Trabancos, advice of the enemy’s -movement was sent to lord Wellington, but he was -then near Toro, it was midnight ere it reached -him, and the troops, under Cotton, remained near -Castrejon behind the Trabancos during the night<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_3">plan No. 3.</a></span> -of the 17th without orders, exposed, in a bad -position, to the attack of the whole French army. -Wellington hastened to their aid in person, and he -ordered Bock’s, Le Marchant’s, and Alten’s brigades -of cavalry, to follow him to Alaejos, and the fifth -division to take post at Torrecilla de la Orden six -miles in rear of Castrejon.</p> - -<p>At day-break Cotton’s outposts were again driven -in by the enemy, and the bulk of his cavalry with a -troop of horse artillery immediately formed in front -of the two infantry divisions, which were drawn up, -the fourth division on the left, the light division on -the right, but at a considerable distance from each -other and separated by a wide ravine. The country -was open and hilly, like the downs of England, with -here and there water-gulleys, dry hollows, and bold -naked heads of land, and behind the most prominent -of these last, on the other side of the Trabancos, lay -the whole French army. Cotton however, seeing -only horsemen, pushed his cavalry again towards the -river, advancing cautiously by his right along some -high table-land, and his troops were soon lost to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150"></a>[150]</span> -view of the infantry, for the morning fog was thick -on the stream, and at first nothing could be descried -beyond. But very soon the deep tones of artillery -shook the ground, the sharp ring of musketry was -heard in the mist, and the forty-third regiment was -hastily brought through Castrejon to support the -advancing cavalry; for besides the ravine which -separated the fourth from the light division, there -was another ravine with a marshy bottom, between -the cavalry and infantry, and the village of -Castrejon was the only good point of passage.</p> - -<p>The cannonade now became heavy, and the spectacle -surprisingly beautiful, for the lighter smoke -and mist, curling up in fantastic pillars, formed a -huge and glittering dome tinged of many colours -by the rising sun; and through the grosser vapour -below, the restless horsemen were seen or lost as -the fume thickened from the rapid play of the -artillery, while the bluff head of land, beyond the -Trabancos, covered with French troops, appeared, -by an optical deception close at hand, dilated to -the size of a mountain, and crowned with gigantic -soldiers, who were continually breaking off and -sliding down into the fight. Suddenly a dismounted -cavalry officer stalked from the midst of -the smoke towards the line of infantry; his gait -was peculiarly rigid, and he appeared to hold a -bloody handkerchief to his heart, but that which -seemed a cloth, was a broad and dreadful wound; -a bullet had entirely effaced the flesh from his left -shoulder and from his breast, and had carried away -part of his ribs, his heart was bared, and its movement -plainly discerned. It was a piteous and yet -a noble sight, for his countenance though ghastly -was firm, his step scarcely indicated weakness, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151"></a>[151]</span> -his voice never faltered. This unyielding man’s -name was Williams; he died a short distance from -the field of battle, and it was said, in the arms -of his son, a youth of fourteen, who had followed -his father to the Peninsula in hopes of obtaining a -commission, for they were not in affluent circumstances.</p> - -<p>General Cotton maintained this exposed position -with skill and resolution, from day-light until seven -o’clock, at which time Wellington arrived, in company -with Beresford, and proceeded to examine the -enemy’s movements. The time was critical, and -the two English generals were like to have been -slain together by a body of French cavalry, not very -numerous, which breaking away from the multitude -on the head of land beyond the Trabancos, came -galloping at full speed across the valley. It was -for a moment thought they were deserting, but -with headlong course they mounted the table-land -on which Cotton’s left wing was posted, and drove -a whole line of British cavalry skirmishers back in -confusion. The reserves indeed soon came up from -Alaejos, and these furious swordsmen being scattered -in all directions were in turn driven away or cut -down, but meanwhile thirty or forty, led by a noble -officer, had brought up their right shoulders, and -came over the edge of the table-land above the hollow -which separated the British wings at the instant -when Wellington and Beresford arrived on the same -slope. There were some infantry picquets in the -bottom, and higher up, near the French, were two -guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry which -was disposed in perfect order. When the French -officer saw this squadron, he reined in his horse -with difficulty, and his troopers gathered in a confused<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152"></a>[152]</span> -body round him as if to retreat. They -seemed lost men, for the British instantly charged, -but with a shout the gallant fellows soused down -upon the squadron, and the latter turning, galloped -through the guns; then the whole mass, -friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind to the -bottom, carrying away lord Wellington, and the other -generals, who with drawn swords and some difficulty, -got clear of the tumult. The French horsemen were -now quite exhausted, and a reserve squadron of -heavy dragoons coming in cut most of them to -pieces; yet their invincible leader, assaulted by three -enemies at once, struck one dead from his horse, and -with surprising exertions saved himself from the -others, though they rode hewing at him on each -side for a quarter of a mile.</p> - -<p>While this charge was being executed, Marmont, -who had ascertained that a part only of Wellington’s -army was before him, crossed the Trabancos -in two columns, and passing by Alaejos, -turned the left of the allies, marching straight upon -the Guarena. The British retired by Torecilla de -la Orden, the fifth division being in one column on -the left, the fourth division on the right as they -retreated, and the light division on an intermediate -line and nearer to the enemy. The cavalry were -on the flanks and rear, the air was extremely -sultry, the dust rose in clouds, and the close order -of the troops rendered it very oppressive, but -the military spectacle was exceedingly strange and -grand. For then were seen the hostile columns of -infantry, only half musket-shot from each other, -marching impetuously towards a common goal, -the officers on each side pointing forwards with -their swords, or touching their caps, and waving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153"></a>[153]</span> -their hands in courtesy, while the German cavalry, -huge men, on huge horses, rode between in a close -compact body as if to prevent a collision. At times -the loud tones of command, to hasten the march, -were heard passing from the front to the rear, and -now and then the rushing sound of bullets came -sweeping over the columns whose violent pace was -continually accelerated.</p> - -<p>Thus moving for ten miles, yet keeping the most -perfect order, both parties approached the Guarena, -and the enemy seeing that the light division, although -more in their power than the others, were -yet outstripping them in the march, increased the -fire of their guns and menaced an attack with infantry. -But the German cavalry instantly drew close -round, the column plunged suddenly into a hollow -dip of ground on the left which offered the means of -baffling the enemy’s aim, and ten minutes after the -head of the division was in the stream of the Guarena -between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth division -entered the river at the same time but higher -up on the left, and the fourth division passed it on -the right. The soldiers of the light division, tormented -with thirst, yet long used to their enemy’s -mode of warfare, drunk as they marched, and the -soldiers of the fifth division stopped in the river for -only a few moments, but on the instant forty French -guns gathered on the heights above sent a tempest -of bullets amongst them. So nicely timed was the -operation.</p> - -<p>The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources -which are united below Castrillo, offered a very -strong line of defence, and Marmont, hoping to -carry it in the first confusion of the passage, and so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154"></a>[154]</span> -seize the table-land of Vallesa, had brought up all -his artillery to the front; and to distract the allies’ -attention he had directed Clausel to push the head -of the right column over the river at Castrillo, at -the same time. But Wellington expecting him at -Vallesa from the first, had ordered the other divisions -of his army, originally assembled at Canizal, -to cross one of the upper branches of the river; -and they reached the table-land of Vallesa, before -Marmont’s infantry, oppressed by the extreme heat -and rapidity of the march, could muster in strength to -attempt the passage of the other branch. Clausel, -however, sent Carier’s brigade of cavalry across -the Guarena at Castrillo and supported it with a -column of infantry; and the fourth division had just -gained the heights above Canizal, after passing -the stream, when Carier’s horsemen entered the -valley on their left, and the infantry in one column -menaced their front. The sedgy banks of the river -would have been difficult to force in face of an -enemy, but Victor Alten though a very bold man in -action, was slow to seize an advantage, and suffered -the French cavalry to cross and form in considerable -numbers without opposition; he assailed them -too late and by successive squadrons instead of by -regiments, and the result was unfavourable at first. -The fourteenth and the German hussars were hard-pressed, -the third dragoons came up in support, but -they were immediately driven back again by the -fire of some French infantry, the fight waxed hot -with the others, and many fell, but finally general -Carier was wounded and taken, and the French retired. -During this cavalry action the twenty-seventh -and fortieth regiments coming down the hill, broke<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155"></a>[155]</span> -the enemy’s infantry with an impetuous bayonet -charge, and Alten’s horsemen being then disengaged -sabred some of the fugitives.</p> - -<p>This combat cost the French who had advanced -too far without support, a general and five hundred -soldiers; but Marmont, though baffled at Vallesa, -and beaten at Castrillo, concentrated his army at the -latter place in such a manner as to hold both banks -of the Guarena. Whereupon Wellington recalled his -troops from Vallesa; and as the whole loss of the -allies during the previous operations was not more -than six hundred, nor that of the French more than -eight hundred, and that both sides were highly -excited, the day still young, and the positions -although strong, open, and within cannon-shot, a -battle was expected. Marmont’s troops had however -been marching for two days and nights incessantly, -and Wellington’s plan did not admit of fighting -unless forced to it in defence, or under such circumstances, -as would enable him to crush his -opponent, and yet keep the field afterwards against -the king.</p> - -<p>By this series of signal operations, the French -general had passed a great river, taken the initiatory -movement, surprised the right wing of the -allies, and pushed it back above ten miles. Yet -these advantages are to be traced to the peculiarities -of the English general’s situation which have -been already noticed, and Wellington’s tactical -skill was manifested by the extricating of his -troops from their dangerous position at Castrejon -without loss, and without being forced to fight a battle. -He however appears to have erred in extending -his troops to the right when he first reached the -Duero, for seeing that Marmont could at pleasure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156"></a>[156]</span> -pass that river and turn his flanks, he should have -remained concentrated on the Guarena, and only -pushed cavalry posts to the line of the Duero above -Toro. Neither should he have risked his right -wing so far from his main body from the evening -of the 16th to the morning of the 18th. He could -scarcely have brought it off without severe loss, if -Marmont had been stronger in cavalry, and instead -of pushing forwards at once to the Guarena had -attacked him on the march. On the other hand the -security of the French general’s movements, from -the Trabancos to the Guarena, depended entirely on -their rapidity; for as his columns crossed the open -country on a line parallel to the march of the allies, -a simple wheel by companies to the right -would have formed the latter in order of battle on -his flank while the four divisions already on the -Guarena could have met them in front.</p> - -<p>But it was on the 16th that the French general -failed in the most glaring manner. His intent was, -by menacing the communication with Salamanca -and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the allies back, and -strike some decisive blow during their retreat. -Now on the evening of the 16th he had passed the -Duero at Toro, gained a day’s march, and was -then actually nearer to Salamanca than the allies -were; and had he persisted in his movement Wellington -must have fought him to disadvantage or have -given up Salamanca, and passed the Tormes at -Huerta to regain the communication with Ciudad -Rodrigo. This advantage Marmont relinquished, -to make a forced march of eighty miles in forty-eight -hours, and to risk the execution of a variety of -nice and difficult evolutions, in which he lost -above a thousand men by the sword or by fatigue,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157"></a>[157]</span> -and finally found his adversary on the 18th still -facing him in the very position which he had -turned on the evening of the 16th!</p> - -<p>On the 19th the armies maintained their respective -ground in quiet until the evening, when -Marmont concentrated his troops in one mass on -his left near the village of Tarazona, and Wellington, -fearing for his right, again passed the second -branch of the Guarena, at Vallesa, and El Olmo, -and took post on the table-land above those villages. -The light division, being in front, advanced to the -edge of the table-land, overlooking the enemy’s -main body which was at rest round the bivouac -fires; yet the picquets would have been quietly -posted, if sir Stapleton Cotton coming up at the -moment, had not ordered captain Ross to turn his -battery of six-pounders upon a group of French -officers. At the first shot the enemy seemed surprised, -at the second their gunners run to their -pieces, and in a few moments a reply from twelve -eight-pounders shewed the folly of provoking a -useless combat. An artillery officer was wounded -in the head, several of the British soldiers fell in -different parts of the line, one shot swept away a -whole section of Portuguese, and finally the division -was obliged to withdraw several hundred yards in a -mortifying manner to avoid a great and unnecessary -effusion of blood.</p> - -<p>The allies being now formed in two lines on the -table-land of Vallesa offered a fair though not an -easy field to the enemy; Wellington expected a -battle the next day, because the range of heights -which he occupied, trended backwards to the -Tormes on the shortest line; and as he had thrown -a Spanish garrison into the castle of Alba de<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158"></a>[158]</span> -Tormes, he thought Marmont could not turn his -right, or if he attempted it, that he would be -shouldered off the Tormes at the ford of Huerta. He -was mistaken. The French general was more perfectly -acquainted with the ground and proved that -he could move an army with wonderful facility.</p> - -<p>On the 20th at day-break instead of crossing -the Guarena to dispute the high land of Vallesa, -Marmont marched rapidly in several columns, covered -by a powerful rear-guard, up the river to -Canta la Piedra, and crossed the stream there, though -the banks were difficult, before any disposition -could be made to oppose him. He thus turned the -right flank of the allies and gained a new range of -hills trending towards the Tormes, and parallel to -those leading from Vallesa. Wellington immediately -made a corresponding movement. Then commenced -an evolution similar to that of the 18th, but -on a greater scale both as to numbers and length of -way. The allies moving in two lines of battle -within musket-shot of the French endeavoured to -gain upon and cross their march at Cantalpino; -the guns on both sides again exchanged their -rough salutations as the accidents of ground favoured -their play; and again the officers, like gallant -gentlemen who bore no malice and knew no -fear, made their military recognitions, while the -horsemen on each side watched with eager eyes, for -an opening to charge; but the French general -moving his army as one man along the crest of the -heights, preserved the lead he had taken, and made -no mistake.</p> - -<p>At Cantalpino it became evident that the allies -were outflanked, and all this time Marmont had so -skilfully managed his troops that he furnished no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159"></a>[159]</span> -opportunity even for a partial attack. Wellington -therefore fell off a little and made towards the -heights of Cabeça Vellosa and Aldea Rubia, -intending to halt there while the sixth division and -Alten’s cavalry, forcing their march, seized Aldea -Lengua and secured the position of Christoval. -But he made no effort to seize the ford of Huerta, -for his own march had been long and the French -had passed over nearly twice as much ground, -wherefore he thought they would not attempt to -reach the Tormes that day. However when night -approached, although his second line had got possession -of the heights of Vellosa, his first line was -heaped up without much order in the low ground -between that place and Hornillos; the French -army crowned all the summit of the opposite hills, -and their fires, stretching in a half circle from Villaruela -to Babila Fuente, shewed that they commanded -the ford of Huerta. They could even have -attacked the allies with great advantage had there -been light for the battle. The English general immediately -ordered the bivouac fires to be made, but -filed the troops off in succession with the greatest -celerity towards Vellosa and Aldea Rubia, and during -the movement the Portuguese cavalry, coming in -from the front, were mistaken for French and lost -some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognised.</p> - -<p>Wellington was deeply disquieted at the unexpected -result of this day’s operations which had -been entirely to the advantage of the French general. -Marmont had shewn himself perfectly acquainted -with the country, had outflanked and outmarched -the allies, had gained the command of the -Tormes, and as his junction with the king’s army -was thus secured he might fight or wait for reinforcements<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160"></a>[160]</span> -or continue his operations as it seemed -good to himself. But the scope of Wellington’s -campaign was hourly being more restricted. His -reasons for avoiding a battle except at advantage, -were stronger than before, because Caffarelli’s cavalry -was known to be in march, and the army of the -centre was on the point of taking the field; hence -though he should fight and gain a victory, unless it -was decisive, his object would not be advanced. -That object was to deliver the Peninsula, which -could only be done by a long course of solid operations -incompatible with sudden and rash strokes -unauthorized by any thing but hope; wherefore -yielding to the force of circumstances, he prepared -to return to Portugal and abide his time; yet with -a bitter spirit, which was not soothed by the recollection, -that he had refused the opportunity of -fighting to advantage, exactly one month before -and upon the very hills he now occupied. Nevertheless -that stedfast temper, which then prevented -him from seizing an adventitious chance, would -not now let him yield to fortune more than she -could ravish from him: he still hoped to give the -lion’s stroke, and resolved to cover Salamanca and -the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo to the -last moment. A letter stating his inability to hold -his ground was however sent to Castaños, but it -was intercepted by Marmont, who exultingly -pushed forwards without regard to the king’s movements; -and it is curious that Joseph afterwards<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -imagined this to have been a subtlety of Wellington’s -to draw the French general into a premature -battle.</p> - -<p>On the 21st while the allies occupied the old -position of Christoval, the French threw a garrison<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161"></a>[161]</span> -into Alba de Tormes, from whence the Spaniards -had been withdrawn by Carlos D’España, without -the knowledge of the English general. Marmont -then passed the Tormes, by the fords between Alba -and Huerta, and moving up the valley of Machechuco -encamped behind Calvariza Ariba, at the -edge of a forest which extended from the river to -that place. Wellington also passed the Tormes in -the course of the evening by the bridges, and by the -fords of Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua; but the -third division and D’Urban’s cavalry remained on the -right bank, and entrenched themselves at Cabrerizos, -lest the French, who had left a division on the -heights of Babila Fuente, should recross the Tormes -in the night and overwhelm them.</p> - -<p>It was late when the light division descended the -rough side of the Aldea Lengua mountain to cross -the river, and the night came suddenly down, -with more than common darkness, for a storm, that -common precursor of a battle in the Peninsula, was -at hand. Torrents of rain deepened the ford, the -water foamed and dashed with encreasing violence, -the thunder was frequent and deafening, and the -lightning passed in sheets of fire close over the -column, or played upon the points of the bayonets. -One flash falling amongst the fifth dragoon guards, -near Santa Marta, killed many men and horses, -while hundreds of frightened animals breaking -loose from their piquet ropes, and galloping wildly -about, were supposed to be the enemy’s cavalry -charging in the darkness, and indeed some of their -patroles were at hand; but to a military eye there -was nothing more imposing than the close and -beautiful order in which the soldiers of that noble -light division, were seen by the fiery gleams to step<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162"></a>[162]</span> -from the river to the bank and pursue their march -amidst this astounding turmoil, defying alike the -storm and the enemy.</p> - -<p>The position now taken by the allies was nearly -the same as that occupied by general Graham a -month before, when the forts of Salamanca were -invested. The left wing rested in the low ground -on the Tormes, near Santa Marta, having a cavalry -post in front towards Calvariza de Abaxo. The -right wing extended along a range of heights which -ended also in low ground, near the village of Arapiles, -and this line being perpendicular to the -course of the Tormes from Huerta to Salamanca, -and parallel to its course from Alba to Huerta, -covered Salamanca. But the enemy extending his -left along the edge of the forest, still menaced the<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_3">Plan 3.</a></span> -line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and -in the night advice came that general Chauvel, -with near two thousand of Caffarelli’s horsemen, -and twenty guns, had actually reached Pollos on the -20th, and would join Marmont the 22nd or 23rd. -Hence Wellington, feeling that he must now perforce -retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and fearing that -the French cavalry thus reinforced would hamper -his movements, determined, unless the enemy attacked -him, or committed some flagrant fault, to -retire before Chauvel’s horsemen could arrive.</p> - -<p>At day-break on the 22nd, Marmont who had -called the troops at Babila Fuente over the Tormes, -by the ford of Encina, brought Bonet’s and Maucune’s -divisions up from the forest and took possession -of the ridge of Calvariza de Ariba; he also -occupied in advance of it a wooded height on which -was an old chapel called Nuestra Señora de la Pena. -But at a little distance from his left, and from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163"></a>[163]</span> -English right, stood a pair of solitary hills, called -the <em>Two Arapiles</em>, about half cannon-shot from each -other; steep and savagely rugged they were, and -the possession of them would have enabled the -French general to form his army across Wellington’s -right, and thus bring on a battle with every disadvantage -to the allies, confined, as the latter would -have been, between the French army and the -Tormes. These hills were neglected by the English -general until a staff officer, who had observed the -enemy’s detachments stealing towards them, first informed -Beresford, and afterwards Wellington of the -fact. The former thought it was of no consequence, -but the latter immediately sent the seventh Caçadores -to seize the most distant of the rocks, and then a combat -occurred similar to that which happened between -Cæsar and Afranius at Lerida; for the French seeing -the allies’ detachment approaching, broke their -own ranks, and running without order to the encounter -gained the first Arapiles and kept it, but -were repulsed in an endeavour to seize the second. -This skirmish was followed by one at Nuestra -Señora de la Pena, which was also assailed by a -detachment of the seventh division, and so far successfully, -that half that height was gained; yet the -enemy kept the other half, and Victor Alten, flanking -the attack with a squadron of German hussars, -lost some men and was himself wounded by a -musket-shot.</p> - -<p>The result of the dispute for the Arapiles -rendered a retreat difficult to the allies during day-light; -for though the rock gained by the English -was a fortress in the way of the French army, -Marmont, by extending his left, and by gathering a -force behind his own Arapiles, could still frame a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164"></a>[164]</span> -dangerous battle and pounce upon the allies during -their movement. Wherefore Wellington immediately -extended his right into the low ground, placing -the light companies of the guards in the village of -Arapiles, and the fourth division, with exception of -the twenty-seventh regiment, which remained at the -rock, on a gentle ridge behind them. The fifth and -sixth divisions he gathered in one mass upon the internal -slope of the English Arapiles, where from the -hollow nature of the ground they were quite hidden -from the enemy; and during these movements a -sharp cannonade was exchanged from the tops of -those frowning hills, on whose crowning rocks the -two generals sat like ravenous vultures watching -for their quarry.</p> - -<p>Marmont’s project was not yet developed; his -troops coming from Babila Fuente were still in the -forest, and some miles off; he had only two divisions -close up, and the occupation of Calvariza Ariba, -and Nuestra Señora de la Pena, was a daring -defensive measure to cover the formation of his -army. The occupation of the Arapiles was however -a start forward, for an advantage to be afterwards -turned to profit, and seemed to fix the operations -on the left of the Tormes. Wellington, therefore, -brought up the first and the light divisions to confront -the enemy’s troops on the height of Calvariza Ariba; -and then calling the third division and D’Urban’s -cavalry over the river, by the fords of Santa Marta, -he posted them in a wood near Aldea Tejada, -entirely refused to the enemy and unseen by him, -yet in a situation to secure the main road to Ciudad -Rodrigo. Thus the position of the allies was suddenly -reversed; the left rested on the English -Arapiles, the right on Aldea Tejada; that which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165"></a>[165]</span> -was the rear became the front, and the interval between -the third and the fourth division was occupied -by Bradford’s Portuguese infantry, by the -Spaniards, and by the British cavalry.</p> - -<p>This ground had several breaks and hollows, so -that few of these troops could be viewed by the -enemy, and those which were, seemed, both from -their movement and from their position, to be -pointing to the <ins class="corr" id="tn-165" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Ciudad Rodigo road'"> -Ciudad Rodrigo road</ins> as in retreat. -The commissariat and baggage had also been -ordered to the rear, the dust of their march was -plainly to be seen many miles off, and hence -there was nothing in the relative position of the -armies, save their proximity, to indicate an approaching -battle. Such a state of affairs could not -last long. About twelve o’clock Marmont, fearing -that the important bearing of the French Arapiles on -Wellington’s retreat would induce the latter to drive -him thence, hastily brought up Foy’s and Ferey’s -divisions in support, placing, the first, with some -guns, on a wooded height between the Arapiles -and Nuestra Señora de la Pena, the second, and -Boyer’s dragoons, behind Foy on the ridge of Calvariza -de Ariba. Nor was this fear ill-founded, for -the English general, thinking that he could not -safely retreat in day-light without possessing both -Arapiles, had actually issued orders for the seventh -division to attack the French, but perceiving the -approach of more troops, gave counter-orders lest -he should bring on the battle disadvantageously. -He judged it better to wait for new events, being -certain that at night he could make his retreat good, -and wishing rather that Marmont should attack him -in his now strong position.</p> - -<p>The French troops coming from Babila Fuente<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166"></a>[166]</span> -had not yet reached the edge of the forest, when -Marmont, seeing that the allies would not attack, -and fearing that they would retreat before his own -dispositions were completed, ordered Thomieres’ -division, covered by fifty guns and supported by the -light cavalry, to menace the Ciudad Rodrigo road. -He also hastened the march of his other divisions, -designing, when Wellington should move in opposition -to Thomieres, to fall upon him, by the village -of Arapiles, with six divisions of infantry and -Boyer’s dragoons, which last, he now put in march -to take fresh ground on the left of the Arapiles -rocks, leaving only one regiment of cavalry, to guard -Foy’s right flank at Calvariza.</p> - -<p>In these new circumstances, the positions of the -two armies embraced an oval basin formed by -different ranges of hills, that rose like an amphitheatre -of which the Arapiles rocks might be considered -the door-posts. This basin was about -a mile broad from north to south, and more than -two miles long from east to west. The northern -and western half-formed the allies’ position, which -extended from the English Arapiles on the left -to Aldea Tejada on the right. The eastern heights -were held by the French right, and their left, consisting -of Thomieres’ division with the artillery and -light cavalry, was now moving along the southern -side of the basin; but the march was wide and -loose, there was a long space between Thomieres’ -and the divisions, which, coming from the edge of -the forest were destined to form the centre, and -there was a longer space between him and the divisions -about the Arapiles. Nevertheless, the mass -of artillery placed on his right flank was very imposing, -and opened its fire grandly, taking ground<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167"></a>[167]</span> -to the left by guns, in succession, as the infantry -moved on; and these last marched eagerly, -continually contracting their distance from the -allies, and bringing up their left shoulders as if to -envelope Wellington’s position and embrace it with -fire. At this time also, Bonet’s troops, one regiment -of which held the French Arapiles, carried the village -of that name, and although soon driven from the -greatest part of it again, maintained a fierce struggle.</p> - -<p>Marmont’s first arrangements had occupied several -hours, yet as they gave no positive indication -of his designs, Wellington ceasing to watch -him, had retired from the Arapiles. But at three -o’clock, a report reached him that the French left -was in motion and pointing towards the Ciudad -Rodrigo road; then starting up he repaired to the -high ground, and observed their movements for some -time, with a stern contentment, for their left wing -was entirely separated from the centre. The fault -was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a -thunderbolt. A few orders issued from his lips -like the incantations of a wizard, and suddenly the -dark mass of troops which covered the English -Arapiles, was seemingly possessed by some mighty -spirit, and rushing violently down the interior slope -of the mountain, entered the great basin amidst a -storm of bullets which seemed to shear away the -whole surface of the earth over which the soldiers -moved. The fifth division instantly formed on the -right of the fourth, connecting the latter with -Bradford’s Portuguese, who hastened forward at the -same time from the right of the army, and the heavy -cavalry galloping up on the right of Bradford, closed -this front of battle. The sixth and seventh divisions -flanked on the right by Anson’s light cavalry, which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168"></a>[168]</span> -had now moved from the Arapiles, were ranged at half -cannon-shot in a second line, which was prolonged by -the Spaniards in the direction of the third division; -and this last, reinforced by two squadrons of the -fourteenth dragoons, and by D’Urban’s Portuguese -horsemen, formed the extreme right of the army. -Behind all, on the highest ground, the first and -light divisions and Pack’s Portuguese were disposed -in heavy masses as a reserve.</p> - -<p>When this grand disposition was completed, the -third division and its attendant horsemen, the whole -formed in four columns and flanked on the left by -twelve guns, received orders to cross the enemy’s -line of march. The remainder of the first line, -including the main body of the cavalry was directed -to advance whenever the attack of the third division -should be developed; and as the fourth division must -in this forward movement necessarily lend its flank -to the enemy’s troops stationed on the French -Arapiles, Pack’s brigade was commanded to assail -that rock the moment the left of the British line -should pass it. Thus, after long coiling and winding, -the armies came together, and drawing up their -huge trains like angry serpents mingled in deadly -strife.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.</h4> - -<p>Marmont, from the top of the French Arapiles, -saw the country beneath him suddenly covered with -enemies at a moment when he was in the act of -making a complicated evolution, and when, by the -rash advance of his left, his troops were separated -into three parts, each at too great a distance to -assist the other, and those nearest the enemy neither -strong enough to hold their ground, nor aware of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169"></a>[169]</span> -what they had to encounter. The third division -was, however, still hidden from him by the western -heights, and he hoped that the tempest of bullets -under which the British line was moving in the -basin beneath, would check it until he could bring -up his reserve divisions, and by the village of -Arapiles fall on what was now the left of the -allies’ position. But even this, his only resource -for saving the battle, was weak, for on that point -there were still the first and light divisions and -Pack’s brigade, forming a mass of twelve thousand -troops with thirty pieces of artillery; the village -itself was well disputed, and the English Arapiles -rock stood out as a strong bastion of defence. -However, the French general, nothing daunted, despatched -officer after officer, some to hasten up the -troops from the forest, others to stop the progress of -his left wing, and with a sanguine expectation still -looked for the victory until he saw Pakenham with -the third division shoot like a meteor across Thomieres’ -path; then pride and hope alike died within -him, and desperately he was hurrying in person to -that fatal point, when an exploding shell stretched -him on the earth with a broken arm and two deep -wounds in his side. Confusion ensued and the -troops distracted by ill-judged orders and counter-orders -knew not where to move, who to fight or -who to avoid.</p> - -<p>It was about five o’clock when Pakenham fell -upon Thomieres, and it was at the instant when that -general, the head of whose column had gained an -open isolated hill at the extremity of the southern -range of heights, expected to see the allies, in full -retreat towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, closely -followed by Marmont from the Arapiles. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170"></a>[170]</span> -counter-stroke was terrible! Two batteries of artillery -placed on the summit of the western heights -suddenly took his troops in flank, and Pakenham’s -massive columns supported by cavalry, were coming -on full in his front, while two-thirds of his own -division, lengthened out and unconnected, were still -behind in a wood where they could hear, but could -not see the storm which was now bursting. From -the chief to the lowest soldier all felt that they were -lost, and in an instant Pakenham the most frank and -gallant of men commenced the battle.</p> - -<p>The British columns formed lines as they -marched, and the French gunners standing up manfully -for the honour of their country, sent showers of -grape into the advancing masses, while a crowd of -light troops poured in a fire of musketry, under -cover of which the main body endeavoured to display -a front. But bearing onwards through the -skirmishers with the might of a giant, Pakenham -broke the half-formed lines into fragments, and sent -the whole in confusion upon the advancing supports; -one only officer, with unyielding spirit, remained by -the artillery; standing alone he fired the last gun at -the distance of a few yards, but whether he lived -or there died could not be seen for the smoke. -Some squadrons of light cavalry fell on the right -of the third division, but the fifth regiment repulsed -them, and then D’Urban’s Portuguese horsemen, reinforced -by two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons -under Felton Harvey, gained the enemy’s flank. The -Oporto regiment, led by the English Major Watson,<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_I">Appendix I.</a></span> -instantly charged the French infantry, yet vainly, -Watson fell deeply wounded and his men retired.</p> - -<p>Pakenham continued his tempestuous course -against the remainder of Thomieres’ troops, which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171"></a>[171]</span> -were now arrayed on the wooded heights behind -the first hill, yet imperfectly, and offering two -fronts the one opposed to the third division and its -attendant horsemen, the other to the fifth division, to -Bradford’s brigade and the main body of cavalry -and artillery, all of which were now moving in one -great line across the basin. Meanwhile Bonet’s -troops having failed at the village of Arapiles were -sharply engaged with the fourth division, Maucune -kept his menacing position behind the French -Arapiles, and as Clauzel’s division had come up -from the forest, the connection of the centre and left -was in some measure restored; two divisions were -however still in the rear, and Boyer’s dragoons were -in march from Calvariza Ariba. Thomieres had been -killed, and Bonet, who succeeded Marmont, had -been disabled, hence more confusion; but the command -of the army devolved on Clauzel, and he was -of a capacity to sustain this terrible crisis.</p> - -<p>The fourth and fifth divisions, and Bradford’s brigade, -were now hotly engaged and steadily gaining -ground; the heavy cavalry, Anson’s light dragoons -and Bull’s troop of artillery were advancing at a -trot on Pakenham’s left; and on that general’s right -D’Urban’s horsemen overlapped the enemy. Thus -in less than half an hour, and before an order of -battle had even been formed by the French, their -commander-in-chief and two other generals had -fallen, and the left of their army was turned, thrown -into confusion and enveloped. Clauzel’s division -had indeed joined Thomieres’, and a front had been -spread on the southern heights, but it was loose and -unfit to resist; for the troops were, some in double -lines, some in columns, some in squares; a powerful -sun shone full in their eyes, the light soil, stirred up<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172"></a>[172]</span> -by the trampling of men and horses, and driven forward -by a breeze, which arose in the west at the -moment of attack, came full upon them mingled -with smoke in such stifling clouds, that scarcely -able to breathe and quite unable to see, their fire -was given at random.</p> - -<p>In this situation, while Pakenham, bearing onward -with a conquering violence, was closing on their -flank and the fifth division advancing with a storm -of fire on their front, the interval between the two -attacks was suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of -dust, which moving swiftly forward carried within -its womb the trampling sound of a charging multitude. -As it passed the left of the third division -Le Marchant’s heavy horsemen flanked by Anson’s -light cavalry, broke forth from it at full speed, and -the next instant twelve hundred French infantry -though formed in several lines were trampled down -with a terrible clamour and disturbance. Bewildered -and blinded, they cast away their arms -and run through the openings of the British squadrons -stooping and demanding quarter, while the dragoons, -big men and on big horses, rode onwards -smiting with their long glittering swords in uncontroulable -power, and the third division followed at -speed, shouting as the French masses fell in succession -before this dreadful charge.</p> - -<p>Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. -Their own general, Le Marchant, and many officers -had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff was at their -head, and with ranks confused, and blended together -in one mass, still galloping forward they -sustained from a fresh column an irregular stream -of fire which emptied a hundred saddles; yet -with fine courage, and downright force, the survivors<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173"></a>[173]</span> -broke through this the third and strongest -body of men that had encountered them, and lord -Edward Somerset, continuing his course at the -head of one squadron, with a happy perseverance -captured five guns. The French left was entirely -broken, more than two thousand prisoners were -taken, the French light horsemen abandoned that -part of the field, and Thomieres’ division no longer -existed as a military body. Anson’s cavalry which -had passed quite over the hill and had suffered -little in the charge, was now joined by D’Urban’s -troopers, and took the place of Le Marchant’s exhausted -men; the heavy German dragoons followed -in reserve, and with the third and fifth divisions and -the guns, formed one formidable line, two miles in -advance of where Pakenham had first attacked; and -that impetuous officer with unmitigated strength -still pressed forward spreading terror and disorder -on the enemy’s left.</p> - -<p>While these signal events, which occupied about -forty minutes, were passing on the allies’ right, a -terrible battle raged in the centre. For when the -first shock of the third division had been observed -from the Arapiles, the fourth division, moving in a -line with the fifth, had passed the village of that -name under a prodigious cannonade, and vigourously -driving Bonet’s troops backwards, step by -step, to the southern and eastern heights, obliged -them to mingle with Clauzel’s and with Thomieres’ -broken remains. When the combatants had passed -the French Arapiles, which was about the time of -Le Marchant’s charge, Pack’s Portuguese assailed -that rock, and the front of battle was thus completely -defined, because Foy’s division was now exchanging -a distant cannonade with the first and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174"></a>[174]</span> -light divisions. However Bonet’s troops, notwithstanding -Marmont’s fall, and the loss of their own -general, fought strongly, and Clauzel made a surprising -effort, beyond all men’s expectations, to -restore the battle. Already a great change was -visible. Ferey’s division drawn off from the height -of Calvaraza Ariba arrived in the centre behind -Bonet’s men; the light cavalry, Boyer’s dragoons, -and two divisions of infantry, from the forest, were -also united there, and on this mass of fresh men, -Clauzel rallied the remnants of his own and Thomieres’ -division. Thus by an able movement, -Sarrut’s, Brennier’s, and Ferey’s unbroken troops, -supported by the whole of the cavalry, were so -disposed as to cover the line of retreat to Alba de -Tormes, while Maucune’s division was still in mass -behind the French Arapiles, and Foy’s remained -untouched on the right.</p> - -<p>But Clauzel, not content with having brought -the separated part of his army together and in a -condition to effect a retreat, attempted to stem the -tide of victory in the very fulness of its strength -and roughness. His hopes were founded on a misfortune -which had befallen general Pack; for that -officer ascending the French Arapiles in one heavy -column, had driven back the enemy’s skirmishers -and was within thirty yards of the summit, believing -himself victorious, when suddenly the French -reserves leaped forward from the rocks upon his -front, and upon his left flank. The hostile masses -closed, there was a thick cloud of smoke, a shout, -a stream of fire, and the side of the hill was covered -to the very bottom with the dead the wounded -and the flying Portuguese, who were scoffed at for -this failure without any justice; no troops could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175"></a>[175]</span> -have withstood that crash upon such steep ground, -and the propriety of attacking the hill at all seems -very questionable. The result went nigh to shake -the whole battle. For the fourth division had just -then reached the southern ridge of the basin, and -one of the best regiments in the service was actually -on the summit when twelve hundred fresh adversaries, -arrayed on the reverse slope, charged up -hill; and as the British fire was straggling and -ineffectual, because the soldiers were breathless -and disordered by the previous fighting, the -French who came up resolutely and without firing -won the crest. They were even pursuing -down the other side when two regiments placed -in line below, checked them with a destructive -volley.</p> - -<p>This vigorous counter-blow took place at the -moment when Pack’s defeat permitted Maucune, -who was no longer in pain for the Arapiles hill, to -menace the left flank and rear of the fourth division, -but the left wing of the fortieth regiment immediately -wheeled about and with a rough charge -cleared the rear. Maucune would not engage himself -more deeply at that time, but general Ferey’s -troops pressed vigorously against the front of the -fourth division, and Brennier did the same by the first -line of the fifth division, Boyer’s dragoons also came -on rapidly, and the allies being outflanked and over-matched -lost ground. Fiercely and fast the French -followed and the fight once more raged in the -basin below. General Cole had before this fallen -deeply wounded, and Leith had the same fortune, -but Beresford promptly drew Spry’s Portuguese -brigade from the second line of the fifth division -and thus flanked the advancing columns of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176"></a>[176]</span> -enemy; yet he also fell desperately wounded, and -Boyer’s dragoons then came freely into action because -Anson’s cavalry had been checked after Le -Marchant’s charge by a heavy fire of artillery.</p> - -<p>The crisis of the battle had now arrived and the -victory was for the general who had the strongest -reserves in hand. Wellington, who was seen that -day at every point of the field exactly when his -presence was most required, immediately brought -up from the second line, the sixth division, and its -charge was rough, strong, and successful. Nevertheless -the struggle was no slight one. The men -of general Hulse’s brigade, which was on the left, -went down by hundreds, and the sixty-first and -eleventh regiments won their way desperately and -through such a fire, as British soldiers only, can -sustain. Some of Boyer’s dragoons also breaking in -between the fifth and sixth divisions slew many -men, and caused some disorder in the fifty-third; -but that brave regiment lost no ground, nor did -Clauzel’s impetuous counter-attack avail at any -point, after the first burst, against the steady courage -of the allies. The southern ridge was regained, -the French general Menne was severely, and general -Ferey, mortally wounded, Clauzel himself was -hurt, and the reserve of Boyer’s dragoons coming -on at a canter were met and broken by the fire of -Hulse’s noble brigade. Then the changing current -of the fight once more set for the British. The -third division continued to outflank the enemy’s left, -Maucune abandoned the French Arapiles, Foy retired -from the ridge of Calvariza, and the allied -host righting itself as a gallant ship after a sudden -gust, again bore onwards in blood and gloom, for -though the air, purified by the storm of the night<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177"></a>[177]</span> -before, was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of -smoke and dust rolled along the basin, and within -it was the battle with all its sights and sounds -of terror.</p> - -<p>When the English general had thus restored the -fight in the centre, he directed the commander of -the first division to push between Foy and the rest -of the French army, which would have rendered it -impossible for the latter to rally or escape; but this -order was not executed, and Foy’s and Maucune’s -divisions were skilfully used by Clauzel to protect -the retreat. The first, posted on undulating ground -and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, covered -the roads to the fords of Huerta and Encina; the -second, reinforced with fifteen guns, was placed -on a steep ridge in front of the forest, covering the -road to Alba de Tormes; and behind this ridge, -the rest of the army, then falling back in disorder -before the third, fifth, and sixth divisions, took -refuge. Wellington immediately sent the light division, -formed in two lines and flanked by some -squadrons of dragoons, against Foy; and he supported -them by the first division in columns, flanked -on the right by two brigades of the fourth division -which he had drawn off from the centre when the -sixth division restored the fight. The seventh division -and the Spaniards followed in reserve, the country -was covered with troops, and a new army seemed -to have risen out of the earth.</p> - -<p>Foy throwing out a cloud of skirmishers retired -slowly by wings, turning and firing heavily from every -rise of ground upon the light division, which marched -steadily forward without returning a shot, save by its -skirmishers; for three miles the march was under this -musketry, which was occasionally thickened by a cannonade,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178"></a>[178]</span> -and yet very few men were lost, because -the French aim was baffled, partly by the twilight, -partly by the even order and rapid gliding of the -lines. But the French general Desgraviers was -killed, and the flanking brigades from the fourth division -having now penetrated between Maucune and -Foy, it seemed difficult for the latter to extricate his -troops from the action; nevertheless he did it and -with great dexterity. For having increased his skirmishers -on the last defensible ridge, along the foot -of which run a marshy stream, he redoubled his fire -of musketry, and made a menacing demonstration -with his horsemen just as the darkness fell; the -British guns immediately opened their fire, a squadron -of dragoons galloped forwards from the left, -the infantry, crossing the marshy stream, with an -impetuous pace hastened to the summit of the hill, -and a rough shock seemed at hand, but there -was no longer an enemy; the main body of the -French had gone into the thick forest on their own -left during the firing, and the skirmishers fled -swiftly after, covered by the smoke and by the -darkness.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Maucune maintained a noble battle. -He was outflanked and outnumbered, but the safety -of the French army depended on his courage; he -knew it, and Pakenham, marking his bold demeanour, -advised Clinton, who was immediately in his -front, not to assail him until the third division -should have turned his left. Nevertheless the sixth -division was soon plunged afresh into action under -great disadvanatge, for after being kept by its -commander a long time without reason, close -under Maucune’s batteries which ploughed heavily -through the ranks, it was suddenly directed by a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179"></a>[179]</span> -staff officer to attack the hill. Assisted by a brigade -of the fourth division, the troops then rushed up, and -in the darkness of the night the fire shewed from afar -how the battle went. On the side of the British a -sheet of flame was seen, sometimes advancing with -an even front, sometimes pricking forth in spear -heads, now falling back in waving lines, and anon -darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the apex of -which often approached yet never gained the actual -summit of the mountain; but the French musketry, -rapid as lightning, sparkled along the brow of the -height with unvarying fulness, and with what destructive -effects the dark gaps and changing shapes of -the adverse fire showed too plainly. Yet when Pakenham -had again turned the enemy’s left, and Foy’s -division had glided into the forest, Maucune’s task -was completed, the effulgent crest of the ridge became -black and silent, and the whole French army -vanished as it were in the darkness.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Wellington, who was with the leading -regiment of the light division, continued to advance -towards the ford of Huerta leaving the forest to his -right, for he thought the Spanish garrison was still -in the castle of Alba de Tormes, and that the enemy -must of necessity be found in a confused mass at -the fords. It was for this final stroke that he had -so skilfully strengthened his left wing, nor was he -diverted from his aim by marching through standing -corn where no enemy could have preceded him; -nor by Foy’s retreat into the forest, because it pointed -towards the fords of Encina and Gonzalo, which -that general might be endeavouring to gain, -and the right wing of the allies would find -him there. A squadron of French dragoons also -burst hastily from the forest in front of the advancing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180"></a>[180]</span> -troops, soon after dark, and firing their pistols -passed at full gallop towards the ford of Huerta, -thus indicating great confusion in the defeated -army, and confirming the notion that its retreat was -in that direction. Had the castle of Alba been -held, the French could not have carried off a third -of their army, nor would they have been in much -better plight if Carlos D’España, who soon discovered -his error in withdrawing the garrison, had -informed Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed -it and suffered the colonel who had only obeyed -his orders to be censured; the left wing therefore -continued their march to the ford without meeting -any enemy, and, the night being far spent, were -there halted; the right wing, exhausted by long -fighting, had ceased to pursue after the action with -Maucune, and thus the French gained Alba unmolested; -but the action did not terminate without -two remarkable accidents. While riding close behind -the forty-third regiment, Wellington was struck -in the thigh by a spent musket-ball, which passed -through his holster; and the night picquets had -just been set at Huerta, when sir Stapleton Cotton, -who had gone to the ford and returned a different -road, was shot through the arm by a Portuguese -sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded. -These were the last events of this famous battle, in -which the skill of the general was worthily seconded -by troops whose ardour may be appreciated by the -following anecdotes.</p> - -<p>Captain Brotherton of the fourteenth dragoons, -fighting on the 18th at the Guarena, amongst -the foremost, as he was always wont to do, had a -sword thrust quite through his side, yet on the 22d he -was again on horseback, and being denied leave to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181"></a>[181]</span> -remain in that condition with his own regiment, -secretly joined Pack’s Portuguese in an undress, -and was again hurt in the unfortunate charge at the -Arapiles. Such were the officers. A man of the -forty-third, one by no means distinguished above -his comrades, was shot through the middle of the -thigh, and lost his shoes in passing the marshy -stream; but refusing to quit the fight, he limped -under fire in rear of his regiment, and with naked -feet, and streaming of blood from his wound, he -marched for several miles over a country covered -with sharp stones. Such were the soldiers, and -the devotion of a woman was not wanting to the -illustration of this great day.</p> - -<p>The wife of colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a -gentle disposition and possessing a very delicate -frame, had braved the dangers, and endured the -privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude -which belongs only to her sex; and in this -battle, forgetful of every thing but that strong -affection which had so long supported her, she -rode deep amidst the enemy’s fire, trembling yet -irresistibly impelled forwards by feelings more imperious -than horror, more piercing than the fear of -death.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182"></a>[182]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXVIII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. July.</span> -During the few hours of darkness, which succeeded -the cessation of the battle, Clauzel had with -a wonderful diligence, passed the Tormes by the -narrow bridge of Alba and the fords below it, and -at day-light was in full retreat upon Peneranda, -covered by an organized rear-guard. Wellington -also, having brought up the German dragoons and -Anson’s cavalry to the front, crossed the river with -his left wing at day-light, and moving up the -stream, came about ten o’clock upon the French -rear which was winding without much order along -the Almar, a small stream at the foot of a height -near the village of La Serna. He launched his -cavalry against them, and the French squadrons, -flying from Anson’s troopers towards their own left, -abandoned three battalions of infantry, who in separate -columns were making up a hollow slope on -their right, hoping to gain the crest of the heights -before the cavalry could fall on. The two foremost -did reach the higher ground and there formed -squares, general Foy being in the one, and general -Chemineau in the other; but the last regiment -when half-way up, seeing Bock’s dragoons galloping -hard on, faced about and being still in column -commenced a disorderly fire. The two squares already -formed above, also plied their muskets with -far greater effect; and as the Germans, after crossing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183"></a>[183]</span> -the Almar stream, had to pass a turn of narrow -road, and then to clear some rough ground before -they could range their squadrons on a charging -front, the troopers dropt fast under the fire. -By two’s, by three’s, by ten’s, by twenties they -fell, but the rest keeping together, surmounted -the difficulties of the ground, and hurtling on the -column went clean through it; then the squares -above retreated and several hundred prisoners were -made by these able and daring horsemen.</p> - -<p>This charge had been successful even to wonder, -the joyous victors standing in the midst of -their captives and of thousands of admiring friends -seemed invincible; yet those who witnessed the -scene, nay the actors themselves remained with the -conviction of this military truth, that cavalry are -not able to cope with veteran infantry save by surprize. -The hill of La Serna offered a frightful -spectacle of the power of the musket, that queen of -weapons, and the track of the Germans was marked -by their huge bodies. A few minutes only had the -combat lasted and above a hundred had fallen; -fifty-one were killed outright; and in several places -man and horse had died simultaneously, and so suddenly, -that falling together on their sides they -appeared still alive, the horse’s legs stretched out as -in movement, the rider’s feet in the stirrup, his -bridle in hand, the sword raised to strike, and the -large hat fastened under the chin, giving to the -grim, but undistorted countenance, a supernatural -and terrible expression.</p> - -<p>When the French main body found their rear-guard -attacked, they turned to its succour, but -seeing the light division coming up recommenced -the retreat and were followed to Nava de Sotroval.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184"></a>[184]</span> -Near that place Chauvel’s horsemen joined them -from the Duero, and covered the rear with such a -resolute countenance that the allied cavalry, reduced -in numbers and fatigued with continual -fighting, did not choose to meddle again. Thus -Clauzel carried his army clear off without further -loss, and with such celerity, that his head-quarters -were that night at Flores de Avila forty miles from -the field of battle. After remaining a few hours -there he crossed the Zapardiel, and would have -halted the 24th, but the allied cavalry entered -Cisla, and the march was then continued to Arevalo. -This was a wonderful retreat, and the line was -chosen with judgment, for Wellington naturally -expected the French army would have made for -Tordesillas instead of the Adaja. The pursuit was -however somewhat slack, for on the very night -of the action, the British left wing, being quite -fresh, could have ascended the Tormes and reached -the Almar before day-light, or, passing at Huerta, -have marched by Ventosa to Peneranda; but the vigorous -following of a beaten enemy was never a -prominent characteristic of Lord Wellington’s campaigns -in the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>The 25th the allied army halted on the Zapardiel, -and Adaja rivers, to let the commissariat, which -had been sent to the rear the morning of the battle, -come up. Meanwhile the king having quitted -Madrid with fourteen thousand men on the 21st -reached the Adaja and pushed his cavalry towards<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_3">Plan 3.</a></span> -Fontiveros; he was at Blasco Sancho the 24th, -within a few hours’ march of Arevalo, and consequently -able to effect a junction with Clauzel, yet -he did not hurry his march, for he knew only of -the advance upon Salamanca not of the defeat, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185"></a>[185]</span> -having sent many messengers to inform Marmont of -his approach, concluded that general would await -his arrival. The next day he received letters from<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -the duke of Ragusa and Clauzel, dated Arevalo, -describing the battle, and telling him that the defeated -army must pass the Duero immediately to -save the dépôt of Valladolid, and to establish new -communications with the army of the north. Those -generals promised however to halt behind that river, -if possible, until the king could receive reinforcements -from Suchet and Soult.</p> - -<p>Joseph by a rapid movement upon Arevalo could -still have effected a junction, but he immediately -made a forced march to Espinar, leaving in Blasco -Sancho two officers and twenty-seven troopers, who -were surprised and made prisoners on the evening -of the 25th by a corporal’s patrole; Clauzel at the -same time marched upon Valladolid, by Olmedo, -thus abandoning Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas, -with their garrisons, to the allies. Wellington immediately -brought Santo Cildes, who was now upon -the Esla with eight thousand Gallicians, to the right -bank of the Duero, across which river he communicated -by Castro Nuño with the left of the allies -which was then upon the Zapardiel.</p> - -<p>The 27th the British whose march had become -more circumspect from the vicinity of the king’s -army entered Olmedo. At this place, general -Ferrey had died of his wounds, and the Spaniards -tearing his body from the grave were going to mutilate -it, when the soldiers of the light division who -had so often fought against this brave man rescued -his corpse, re-made his grave and heaped rocks upon -it for more security, though with little need; for the -Spaniards, with whom the sentiment of honor is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186"></a>[186]</span> -always strong when not stifled by the violence of -their passions, applauded the action.</p> - -<p>On the 26th Clauzel, finding the pursuit had -slackened, sent Colonel Fabvier to advise the king -of it, and then sending his own right wing across -the Duero, by the ford near Boecillo, to cover the -evacuation of Valladolid, marched with the other -wing towards the bridge of Tudela; he remained -however still on the left bank, in the hope that Fabvier’s -mission would bring the king back. Joseph -who had already passed the Puerta de Guadarama -immediately repassed it without delay and made -a flank movement to Segovia, which he reached the -27th, and pushed his cavalry to Santa Maria de -Nieva. Here he remained until the 31st expecting -Clauzel would join him, for he resolved not to quit -his hold of the passes over the Guadarama, nor to -abandon his communication with Valencia and Andalusia. -But Wellington brought Santo Cildes -over the Duero to the Zapardiel, and crossing the -Eresma and Ciga rivers himself, with the first and -light divisions and the cavalry, had obliged Clauzel -to retire over the Duero in the night of the 29th; -and the next day the French general whose army was -very much discouraged, fearing that Wellington -would gain Aranda and Lerma while the Gallicians -seized Dueñas and Torquemada, retreated in three -columns by the valleys of the Arlanza, the Duero -and the Esquiva towards Burgos.</p> - -<p>The English general entered Valladolid amidst -the rejoicings of the people and there captured -seventeen pieces of artillery, considerable stores, -and eight hundred sick and wounded men; three -hundred other prisoners were taken by the Partida -chief Marquinez, and a large French convoy intended<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187"></a>[187]</span> -for Andalusia returned to Burgos. While the left -wing of the allies pursued the enemy up the Arlanza, -Wellington, marching with the right wing -against the king, reached Cuellar the 1st of August; -on the same day the garrison of Tordesillas surrendered -to the Gallicians, and Joseph having first -dismantled the castle of Segovia and raised a -contribution of money and church plate retreated<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s despatch.</span> -through the Puerta de Guadarama, leaving a -rear-guard of cavalry which escaped by the Ildefonso -pass on the approach of the allied horsemen. -Thus the army of the centre was irrevocably separated -from the army of Portugal, the operations -against the latter were terminated, and new combinations -were made conformable to the altered state -of affairs; but to understand these it is necessary -to look at the transactions in other parts of the -Peninsula.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">See <a href="#CHAPTER_BXVIII_IV">Chap. IV. Book XVIII.</a></span> -In Estremadura, after Drouet’s retreat to Azagua, -Hill placed a strong division at Merida ready to -cross the Tagus, but no military event occurred -until the 24th of July, when general Lallemand, -with three regiments of cavalry pushed back -some Portuguese horsemen from Ribera to Villa -Franca. He was attacked in front by general Long, -while general Slade menaced his left, but he succeeded -in repassing the defile of Ribera; Long then -turned him by both flanks, and aided by Lefebre’s -horse artillery, drove him with the loss of fifty -men and many horses upon Llera, a distance of -twenty miles. Drouet, desirous to retaliate, immediately -executed a flank march towards Merida, -and Hill fearing for his detachments there made a -corresponding movement, whereupon the French general<span class="sidenote">Intercepted correspondence.</span> -returned to the Serena; but though he received<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188"></a>[188]</span> -positive orders from Soult to give battle no action -followed and the affairs of that part of the Peninsula -remained balanced.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">August.</span> -In Andalusia, Ballesteros surprised colonel Beauvais, -at Ossuna, took three hundred prisoners and -destroyed the French dépôt there. After this he -moved against Malaga, and was opposed by general -Laval in front, while general Villatte, detached -from the blockade of Cadiz, cut off his retreat to -San Roque. The road to Murcia was still open to -him, but his rashness, though of less consequence -since the battle of Salamanca, gave Wellington -great disquietude, and the more so that Joseph -O’Donel had just sustained a serious defeat near Alicant. -This disaster, which shall be described in a -more fitting place, was however in some measure -counterbalanced by the information, that the revived -expedition from Sicily had reached Majorca, -where it had been reinforced by Whittingham’s division, -and by the stores and guns sent from Portugal -to Gibraltar. It was known also, that in the -northern provinces Popham’s armament had drawn -all Caffarelli’s troops to the coast, and although the -littoral warfare was not followed up the French -were in confusion and the diversion complete.</p> - -<p>In Castile the siege of Astorga still lingered, -but the division of Santo Cildes, seven thousand -strong, was in communication with Wellington, -Silveira’s militia were on the Duero, Clauzel had -retreated to Burgos, and the king joined by two -thousand men from Suchet’s army, could concentrate -twenty thousand to dispute the passes of the -Guadarama. Hence Wellington, having nothing -immediate to fear from Soult, nor from the army -of Portugal, nor from the army of the north, nor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189"></a>[189]</span> -from Suchet, menaced as that marshal was by the -Sicilian expedition, resolved to attack the king in -preference to following Clauzel. The latter general -could not be pursued without exposing Salamanca -and the Gallicians to Joseph, who was strong in -cavalry; but the monarch could be assailed without -risking much in other quarters, seeing that Clauzel -could not be very soon ready to renew the campaign, -and it was expected Castaños would reduce Astorga -in a few days which would give eight thousand additional -men to the field army. Moreover a strong -British division could be spared to co-operate with -Santo Cildes, Silveira, and the Partidas, in the watching -of the beaten army of Portugal while Wellington -gave the king a blow in the field, or forced him to -abandon Madrid; and it appeared probable that the -moral effect of regaining the capital would excite -the Spaniards’ energy every where, and would prevent -Soult from attacking Hill. If he did attack -him, the allies by choosing this line of operations, -would be at hand to give succour.</p> - -<p>These reasons being weighed, Wellington posted -general Clinton at Cuellar with the sixth division, -which he increased to eight thousand men by the -addition of some sickly regiments and by Anson’s -cavalry; Santo Cildes also was put in communication -with him, and the Partidas of Marquinez, Saornil, -and El Principe agreed to act with Anson on a -prescribed plan. Thus exclusive of Silveira’s militia, -and of the Gallicians about Astorga, eighteen -thousand men were left on the Duero, and the English -general was still able to march against Joseph -with twenty-eight thousand old troops, exclusive of -Carlos D’España’s Spaniards. He had also assurance -from lord Castlereagh, that a considerable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190"></a>[190]</span> -sum in hard money, to be followed by other remittances, -had been sent from England, a circumstance -of the utmost importance because grain -could be purchased in Spain at one-third the cost -of bringing it up from Portugal.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the king, who had regained Madrid, -expecting to hear that ten thousand of the army -of the south were at Toledo, received letters from -Soult positively refusing to send that detachment; -and from Clausel, saying that the army of Portugal -was in full retreat to Burgos. This retreat he<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -regarded as a breach of faith, because Clausel had -promised to hold the line of the Duero if Wellington -marched upon Madrid; but Joseph was unable -to appreciate Wellington’s military combinations; -he did not perceive, that, taking advantage of his -central position, the English general, before he -marched against Madrid, had forced Clausel to -abandon the Duero to seek some safe and distant -point to re-organize his army. Nor was the king’s -perception of his own situation much clearer. He -had the choice of several lines of operations; that -is, he might defend the passes of the Guadarama -while his court and enormous convoys evacuated -Madrid and marched either upon Zaragoza, Valencia -or Andalusia; or he might retire, army and -convoy together, in one of those directions.</p> - -<p>Rejecting the defence of the passes, lest the -allies should then march by their right to the Tagus, -and so intercept his communication with the south, -he resolved to direct his march towards the Morena, -and he had from Segovia sent Soult orders to -evacuate Andalusia and meet him on the frontier -of La Mancha; but to avoid the disgrace of flying -before a detachment, he occupied the Escurial<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191"></a>[191]</span> -mountain, and placed his army across the roads -leading from the passes of the Guadarama to Madrid. -While in this position Wellington’s advanced -guard, composed of D’Urban’s Portuguese a troop -of horse artillery and a battalion of infantry, passed -the Guadarama, and the 10th the whole army was -over the mountains. Then the king, retaining -only eight thousand men in position, sent the rest of -his troops to protect the march of his court, which -quitted Madrid the same day, with two or three -thousand carriages of different kinds and nearly -twenty thousand persons of all ages and sexes.</p> - -<p>The 11th D’Urban drove back Trielhard’s cavalry -posts, and entered Majadahonda, whilst some German -infantry, Bock’s heavy cavalry, and a troop of -horse artillery, occupied Las Rozas about a mile -in his rear. In the evening, Trielhard, reinforced -by Schiazzetti’s Italian dragoons and the lancers of -Berg, returned, whereupon D’Urban called up the -horse artillery and would have charged the enemy’s -leading squadrons, but the Portuguese cavalry fled. -The artillery officer thus abandoned, made a vigorous -effort to save his guns, yet three of them being -overturned on the rough ground were taken, and the -victorious cavalry passed through Majadahonda in -pursuit. The German dragoons, although surprised -in their quarters, mounted and stopped the leading -French squadrons until Schiazzetti’s Italians came -up, when the fight was like to end badly; but Ponsonby’s -cavalry and the seventh division arrived, and -Trielhard immediately abandoned Majadahonda, -leaving the captured guns behind him, yet carrying -away prisoners, the Portuguese general Visconde de -Barbacena, the colonel of the German cavalry, and -others of less rank. The whole loss of the allies<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192"></a>[192]</span> -was above two hundred, and when the infantry -passed through Rozas, a few hours after the combat, -the German dead were lying thickly in the streets, -many of them in their shirts and trousers, and thus -stretched across the sills of the doors, they furnished -proof at once of the suddenness of the action and of -their own bravery. Had the king been prepared to -follow up this blow with his whole force the allies -must have suffered severely, for Wellington, trusting -to the advanced guard, had not kept his divisions -very close together.</p> - -<p>After this combat the king retired to Valdemoro -where he met his convoy from Madrid, and when -the troops of the three different nations forming his -army thus came together, a horrible confusion -arose; the convoy was plundered, and the miserable -people who followed the court, were made a prey -by the licentious soldiers. Marshal Jourdan, a man -at all times distinguished for the noblest sentiments, -immediately threw himself into the midst of the -disorderly troops, and aided by the other generals, -with great personal risk arrested the mischief, and -succeeded in making the multitude file over the -bridge of Aranjues. The procession was however -lugubrious and shocking, for the military line of -march was broken by crowds of weeping women -and children and by despairing men, and courtiers -of the highest rank were to be seen in full dress, -desperately struggling with savage soldiers for the -possession of even the animals on which they were -endeavouring to save their families. The cavalry -of the allies could have driven the whole before -them into the Tagus, yet Lord Wellington did not -molest them. Either from ignorance of their situation, -or what is more probable compassionating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193"></a>[193]</span> -their misery, and knowing that the troops by abandoning -the convoy could easily escape over the -river, he would not strike where the blow could -only fall on helpless people without affecting the -military operations. Perhaps also he thought it -wise to leave Joseph the burthen of his court.</p> - -<p>In the evening of the 13th the whole multitude -was over the Tagus, the garrisons of Aranjues and -Toledo joined the army, order was restored, and the -king received letters from Soult and Suchet. The -first named marshal opposed the evacuation of Andalusia; -the second gave notice, that the Sicilian -expedition had landed at Alicant, and that a considerable -army was forming there. Then irritated -by Soult and alarmed for the safety of Suchet, the -king relinquished his march towards the Morena -and commenced his retreat to Valencia. The 15th -the advanced guard moved with the sick and -wounded, who were heaped on country cars, and -the main body of the convoy followed under charge -of the infantry, while the cavalry, spreading to the -right and left, endeavoured to collect provisions. -But the people, remembering the wanton devastation -committed a few months before by Montbrun’s -troops, on their return from Alicant, fled with their -property; and as it was the hottest time of the year, -and the deserted country was sandy and without -shade, this march, of one hundred and fifty miles to -Almanza, was one of continual suffering. The Partida -chief Chaleco hovered constantly on the flanks -and rear, killing without mercy all persons, civil or -military, who straggled or sunk from exhaustion; -and while this disastrous journey was in progress, -another misfortune befel the French on the side of -Requeña. For the hussars and infantry belonging to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194"></a>[194]</span> -Suchet’s army, having left Madrid to succour Cuenca -before the king returned from Segovia, carried off -the garrison of that place in despite of the Empecinado, -and made for Valencia; but Villa Campa -crossing their march on the 25th of August, at the -passage of a river, near Utiel, took all their baggage, -their guns, and three hundred men. And -after being driven away from Cuenca the Empecinado -invested Guadalaxara where the enemy had -left a garrison of seven hundred men.</p> - -<p>Wellington seeing that the king had crossed the -Tagus in retreat entered Madrid, a very memorable -event were it only from the affecting circumstances -attending it. He, a foreigner and marching at the -head of a foreign army, was met and welcomed to -the capital of Spain by the whole remaining population. -The multitude who before that hour had -never seen him, came forth to hail his approach, -not with feigned enthusiasm, not with acclamations -extorted by the fear of a conqueror’s power, nor yet -excited by the natural proneness of human nature -to laud the successful, for there was no tumultuous -exultation; famine was amongst them, and long-endured -misery had subdued their spirits, but -with tears, and every other sign of deep emotion, -they crowded around his horse, hung upon his stirrups, -touched his clothes, or throwing themselves -upon the earth, blessed him aloud as the friend of -Spain. His triumph was as pure, and glorious, as -it was uncommon, and he felt it to be so.</p> - -<p>Madrid was however still disturbed by the presence -of the enemy. The Retiro contained enormous -stores, twenty thousand stand of arms, more -than one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery, and -the eagles of two French regiments, and it had a garrison<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195"></a>[195]</span> -of two thousand fighting men, besides invalids -and followers, but its inherent weakness was soon -made manifest. The works consisted of an interior -fort called La China, with an exterior entrenchment; -but the fort was too small, the entrenchment -too large, and the latter could be easily deprived of -water. In the lodgings of a French officer also was -found an order, directing the commandant to confine -his real defence to the fort, and accordingly, in -the night of the 13th, being menaced, he abandoned -the entrenchment, and the next day accepted honourable -terms, because La China was so contracted -and filled with combustible buildings, that his fine -troops would with only a little firing have been -smothered in the ruins; yet they were so dissatisfied -that many broke their arms and their commander -was like to have fallen a victim to their wrath. -They were immediately sent to Portugal, and French -writers with too much truth assert, that the escort -basely robbed and murdered many of the prisoners. -This disgraceful action was perpetrated, either at -Avila or on the frontier of Portugal, wherefore the -British troops, who furnished no escorts after the -first day’s march from Madrid, are guiltless.</p> - -<p>Coincident with the fall of the Retiro was -that of Guadalaxara, which surrendered to the -Empecinado. This mode of wasting an army, and -its resources, was designated by Napoleon as the -most glaring and extraordinary of all the errors -committed by the king and by Marmont. And -surely it was so. For including the garrisons of -Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora and Astorga, which were -now blockaded, six thousand men had been delivered, -as it were bound, to the allies, and with -them, stores and equipments sufficient for a new<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196"></a>[196]</span> -army. These forts had been designed by the -emperor to resist the partidas, but his lieutenants -exposed them to the British army, and thus the -positive loss of men from the battle of Salamanca -was doubled.</p> - -<p>Napoleon had notice of Marmont’s defeat as early -as the 2d of September, a week before the great -battle of Borodino; the news was carried by colonel -Fabvier, who made the journey <ins class="corr" id="tn-196" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'from Valladodid in'"> -from Valladolid in</ins> one course, and having fought on the 22d of July -at the Arapiles, was wounded on the heights of -Moskowa the 7th of September! However, the -duke of Ragusa, suffering alike in body and in -mind, had excused himself with so little strength, -or clearness, that the emperor contemptuously remarking, -that the despatch contained more complicate -stuffing than a clock, desired his war minister -to demand, why Marmont had delivered battle -without the orders of the king? why he had not -made his operations subservient to the general -plan of the campaign? why he broke from defensive -into offensive operations before the army of the -centre joined him? why he would not even wait two -days for Chauvel’s cavalry, which he knew were -close at hand? “From personal vanity,” said the -emperor, with seeming sternness, “the duke of -Ragusa has sacrificed the interests of his country, -and the good of my service, he is guilty of the -crime of insubordination, and is the author of all -this misfortune.”</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote9">September</span> -But Napoleon’s wrath so just, and apparently so -dangerous, could not, even in its first violence, -overpower his early friendship. With a kindness, -the recollection of which must now pierce Marmont’s -inmost soul, twice, in the same letter, he desired<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197"></a>[197]</span> -that these questions might not even be put to his -unhappy lieutenant until his wounds were cured -and his health re-established. Nor was this generous -feeling shaken by the arrival of the king’s -agent, colonel Desprez, who reached Moscow the -18th of October, just after Murat had lost a battle -at the outposts and when all hopes of peace with -Russia were at an end. Joseph’s dispatches bitter<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_IV">Appendix, 4,</a> <a href="#NO_V">5,</a> <a href="#NO_VI_A">6.</a></span> -against all the generals, were especially so against -Marmont and Soult; the former for having lost the -battle, the latter because of his resistance to the -royal plan. The recal of the duke of Dalmatia -was demanded imperatively, because he had written -a letter to the emperor, extremely offensive to the -king; and it was also hinted, that Soult designed to -make himself king of Andalusia. Idle stories of that -marshal’s ambition seem always to have been resorted -to, when his skilful plans were beyond the military -judgement of ordinary generals; but Marmont was -deeply sunk in culpable misfortune, and the king’s -complaints against him were not unjust. Napoleon -had however then seen Wellington’s dispatch, -which was more favourable to the duke of Ragusa, -than Joseph’s report; for the latter was founded on -a belief, that the unfortunate general, knowing the -army of the centre was close at hand, would not -wait for it; whereas the partidas had intercepted -so many of Joseph’s letters, it is doubtful if any -reached Marmont previous to the battle. It was in -vain therefore, that Desprez pressed the king’s -discontent on the emperor; that great man, with -unerring sagacity, had already disentangled the -truth, and Desprez was thus roughly interrogated as -to the conduct of his master.</p> - -<p>Why was not the army of the centre in the field<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198"></a>[198]</span> -a month sooner to succour Marmont? Why was -the emperor’s example, when, in a like case, he -marched from Madrid against sir John Moore, -forgotten? Why, after the battle, was not the -Duero passed, and the beaten troops rallied on the -army of the centre? Why were the passes of the -Guadarama so early abandoned? Why was the -Tagus crossed so soon? Finally, why were the -stores and gun-carriages in the Retiro not burnt, -the eagles and the garrison carried off?</p> - -<p>To these questions the king’s agent could only -reply by excuses which must have made the energetic -emperor smile; but when, following his instructions, -Desprez harped upon Soult’s demeanour, his designs -in Andalusia, and still more upon the letter so personally -offensive to the king, and which shall be -noticed hereafter, Napoleon replied sharply, that he -could not enter into such pitiful disputes while he -was at the head of five hundred thousand men -and occupied with such immense operations. With -respect to Soult’s letter, he said he knew his brother’s -real feelings, but those who judged Joseph by -his language could only think with Soult, whose -suspicions were natural and partaken by the other -generals; wherefore he would not, by recalling -him, deprive the armies in Spain of the only military -head they possessed. And then in ridicule of -Soult’s supposed treachery, he observed, that the -king’s fears on that head must have subsided, as the -English newspapers said the duke of Dalmatia was -evacuating Andalusia, and he would of course unite -with Suchet and with the army of the centre to -retake the offensive.</p> - -<p>The emperor, however, admitted all the evils -arising from these disputes between the generals and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199"></a>[199]</span> -the king, but said that at such a distance he could not -give precise orders for their conduct. He had foreseen -the mischief he observed, and regretted more -than ever that Joseph had disregarded his counsel -not to return to Spain in 1811, and thus saying he -closed the conversation, but this expression about -Joseph not returning to Spain is very remarkable. -Napoleon spoke of it as of a well known -fact, yet Joseph’s letters shew that he not only -desired but repeatedly offered to resign the crown -of Spain and live a private man in France! Did -the emperor mean that he wished his brother to -remain a crowned guest at Paris? or had some -subtle intriguers misrepresented the brothers to each -other? The noblest buildings are often defiled in -secret by vile and creeping things.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. <em>Menace your enemy’s flanks, protect your -own, and be ready to concentrate on the important -points</em>:</p> - -<p>These maxims contain the whole spirit of Napoleon’s -instructions to his generals, after Badajos -was succoured in 1811. At that time he ordered the -army of Portugal to occupy the valley of the Tagus -and the passes of the Gredos mountains, in which -position it covered Madrid, and from thence it -could readily march to aid either the army of the -south, or the army of the north. Dorsenne, who -commanded the latter, could bring twenty-six thousand -men to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult could -bring a like number to Badajos, but Wellington<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200"></a>[200]</span> -could not move against one or the other without -having Marmont upon his flank; he could not -move against Marmont, without having the others -on both flanks, and he could not turn his opponent’s -flanks save from the ocean. If notwithstanding -this combination he took Ciudad Rodrigo and -Badajos, it was by surprise, and because the -French did not concentrate on the important -points, which proved indeed his superiority to the -executive general opposed to him but in no manner -affected the principle of Napoleon’s plan.</p> - -<p>Again, when the preparations for the Russian -war had weakened the army of the north, the -emperor, giving Marmont two additional divisions, -ordered him to occupy Castile, not as a defensive -position, but as a central offensive one from whence -he could keep the Gallicians in check, and by -prompt menacing movements, prevent Wellington -from commencing serious operations elsewhere. -This plan also had reference to the maxim respecting -flanks. For Marmont was forbidden to -invade Portugal while Wellington was on the -frontier of Beira, that is when he could not assail -him in flank; and he was directed to guard the -Asturias carefully as a protection to the great line -of communication with France; in May also he -was rebuked for having withdrawn Bonet from -Oviedo, and for delaying to reoccupy the Asturias -when the incursion against Beira terminated. But -neither then nor afterwards did the duke of Ragusa -comprehend the spirit of the Emperor’s views, and -that extraordinary man, whose piercing sagacity -seized every chance of war, was so disquieted by -his lieutenant’s want of perception, that all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201"></a>[201]</span> -pomp, and all the vast political and military combinations -of Dresden, could not put it from his -thoughts.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_II">Appendix No. 2.</a></span> -“Twice,” said he, “has the duke of Ragusa -placed an interval of thirty leagues between his -army and the enemy, contrary to all the rules of -war; the English general goes where he will, the -French general loses the initial movements and is -of no weight in the affairs of Spain. Biscay and -the north are exposed by the evacuation of the -Asturias; Santona and St. Sebastian are endangered, -and the guerillas communicate freely with -the coast. If the duke of Ragusa has not kept -some bridges on the Agueda, he cannot know what -Wellington is about, and he will retire before light -cavalry instead of operating so as to make the -English general concentrate his whole army. The -false direction already given to affairs by marshal -Marmont, makes it necessary that Caffarelli should -keep a strong corps always in hand; that the commander -of the reserve, at Bayonne, should look to -the safety of St. Sebastian, holding three thousand -men always ready to march; finally that the provisional -battalions, and troops from the dépôts of -the interior, should immediately reinforce the reserve -at Bayonne, be encamped on the Pyrennees, -and exercised and formed for service. <em>If Marmont’s -oversights continue, these troops will prevent -the disasters from becoming extreme.</em>”</p> - -<p>Napoleon was supernaturally gifted in warlike -matters. It has been recorded of Cæsar’s generalship, -that he foretold the cohorts mixed with his -cavalry would be the cause of victory at Pharsalia. -But this letter was written by the French emperor -on the 28th of May before the allies were even<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202"></a>[202]</span> -collected on the Agueda, and when a hundred -thousand French troops were between the English -general and Bayonne, and yet its prescience was -vindicated at Burgos in October!</p> - -<p>2º. To fulfil the conditions of the emperor’s -design, Marmont should have adopted Soult’s recommendation, -that is, leaving one or two divisions -on the Tormes he should have encamped near -Baños, and pushed troops towards the upper -Agueda to watch the movements of the allies. -Caffarelli’s divisions could then have joined those -on the Tormes, and thus Napoleon’s plan for 1811 -would have been exactly renewed; Madrid would -have been covered, a junction with the king would -have been secured, Wellington could scarcely have -moved beyond the Agueda, and the disaster of -Salamanca would have been avoided.</p> - -<p>The duke of Ragusa, apparently because he -would not have the king in his camp, run counter -both to the emperor and to Soult. 1º. He kept no -troops on the Agueda, which might be excused -on the ground that the feeding of them there was -beyond his means; but then he did not concentrate -behind the Tormes to sustain his forts, neither did -he abandon his forts, when he abandoned Salamanca, -and thus eight hundred men were sacrificed -merely to secure the power of concentrating behind -the Duero. 2º. He adopted a line of operations -perpendicular to the allies’ front, instead of -lying on their flank; he abandoned sixty miles of -country between the Tormes and the Agueda, and -he suffered Wellington to take the initial movements -of the campaign. 3º. He withdrew Bonet’s -division from the Asturias, whereby he lost Caffarelli’s -support and realized the emperor’s fears<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203"></a>[203]</span> -for the northern provinces. It is true that he regained -the initial power, by passing the Duero on -the 18th, and had he deferred the passage until the -king was over the Guadarama, Wellington must -have gone back upon Portugal with some shew of -dishonour if not great loss. But if Castaños, instead -of remaining with fifteen thousand Gallicians, -before Astorga, a weak place with a garrison of -only twelve hundred men, had blockaded it with -three or four thousand, and detached Santocildes -with eleven or twelve thousand down the Esla to -co-operate with Silveira and D’Urban, sixteen thousand -men would have been acting upon Marmont’s -right flank in June; and as Bonet did not join until -the 8th of July the line of the Duero would -scarcely have availed the French general.</p> - -<p>3º. The secret of Wellington’s success is to be -found in the extent of country occupied by the -French armies, and the impediments to their military -communication. Portugal was an impregnable -central position, from whence the English -general could rush out unexpectedly against any -point. This strong post was however of his own -making, he had chosen it, had fortified it, had -defended it, he knew its full value and possessed -quickness and judgement to avail himself of all -its advantages; the battle of Salamanca was accidental -in itself, but the tree was planted to bear -such fruit, and Wellington’s profound combinations -must be estimated from the general result. He -had only sixty thousand disposable troops, and -above a hundred thousand French were especially -appointed to watch and controul him, yet he passed -the frontier, defeated forty-five thousand in a -pitched battle, and drove twenty thousand others<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204"></a>[204]</span> -from Madrid in the greatest confusion, without -risking a single strategic point, of importance to -his own operations. His campaign up to the conquest -of Madrid was therefore strictly in accord -with the rules of art, although his means and resources -have been shewn to be precarious, shifting, -and uncertain. Indeed the want of money alone -would have prevented him from following up his -victory if he had not persuaded the Spanish authorities, -in the Salamanca country, to yield him the -revenues of the government in kind under a promise -of repayment at Cadiz. No general was ever -more entitled to the honours of victory.</p> - -<p>4º. The success of Wellington’s daring advance -would seem to indicate a fault in the French plan -of invasion. The army of the south, numerous, of -approved valour and perfectly well commanded, was -yet of so little weight in this campaign as to prove -that Andalusia was a point pushed beyond the true -line of operations. The conquest of that province -in 1811 was an enterprize of the king’s, on which -he prided himself, yet it seems never to have been -much liked by Napoleon, although he did not absolutely -condemn it. The question was indeed a -very grave one. While the English general held -Portugal, and while Cadiz was unsubdued, Andalusia -was a burthen, rather than a gain. It would -have answered better, either to have established -communications with France by the southern line -of invasion, which would have brought the enterprize -within the rules of a methodical war, or to -have held the province partially by detachments, -keeping the bulk of the army of the south in Estremadura, -and thus have strengthened the northern -line of invasion. For in Estremadura, Soult would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205"></a>[205]</span> -have covered the capital, and have been more strictly -connected with the army of the centre; and his -powerful co-operation with Massena in 1810 would -probably have obliged the English general to quit -Portugal. The same result could doubtless have -been obtained by reinforcing the army of the south, -with thirty or forty thousand men, but it is questionable -if Soult could have fed such a number; -and in favour of the invasion of Andalusia it may -be observed, that Seville was the great arsenal of -Spain, that a formidable power might have been -established there by the English without abandoning -Portugal, that Cadiz would have compensated -for the loss of Lisbon, and finally that the English -ministers were not at that time determined to defend -Portugal.</p> - -<p>5º. When the emperor declared that Soult possessed -the only military head in the Peninsula he referred -to a proposition made by that marshal which -shall be noticed in the next chapter; but having -regard merely to <ins class="corr" id="tn-205" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the disputes betwen'"> -the disputes between</ins> the duke of -Dalmatia, Marmont, and the king, Suchet’s talents -not being in question, the justice of the remark -may be demonstrated. Napoleon always enforced -with precept and example, the vital military principle -of concentration on the important points; but -the king and the marshals, though harping continually -upon this maxim, desired to follow it out, each -in his own sphere. Now to concentrate on a wrong -point, is to hurt yourself with your own sword, -and as each French general desired to be strong, -the army at large was scattered instead of being -concentrated.</p> - -<p>The failure of the campaign was, by the king, -attributed to Soult’s disobedience, inasmuch as the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206"></a>[206]</span> -passage of the Tagus by Drouet would have enabled -the army of the centre to act, before Palombini’s -division arrived. But it has been shewn that -Hill could have brought Wellington an equal, or -superior reinforcement, in less time, whereby the -latter could either have made head until the French -dispersed for want of provisions, or, by a rapid -counter-movement, he could have fallen upon Andalusia. -And if the king had menaced Ciudad Rodrigo -in return it would have been no diversion, for -he had no battering train, still less could he have -revenged himself by marching on Lisbon, because -Wellington would have overpowered Soult and -established a new base at Cadiz, before such an -operation could become dangerous to the capital of -Portugal. Oporto might indeed have been taken, -yet Joseph would have hesitated to exchange Madrid -for that city. But the ten thousand men -required of Soult by the king, on the 19th of June, -could have been at Madrid before August, and thus -the passes of the Guadarama could have been defended -until the army of Portugal was reorganized! -Aye! but Hill could then have entered the valley of -the Tagus, or, being reinforced, could have invaded -Andalusia while Wellington kept the king’s army in -check. It would appear therefore that Joseph’s -plan of operations, if all its combinations had been -exactly executed, might have prevented Wellington’s -progress on some points, but to effect this the -French must have been concentrated in large -masses from distant places without striking any -decisive blow, which was the very pith and marrow -of the English general’s policy. Hence it follows -that Soult made the true and Joseph the false application -of the principle of concentration.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207"></a>[207]</span></p> - -<p>6º. If the king had judged his position truly he -would have early merged the monarch in the general, -exchanged the palace for the tent; he would -have held only the Retiro and a few fortified posts -in the vicinity of Madrid, he would have organized -a good pontoon train and established his magazines -in Segovia, Avila, Toledo, and Talavera; finally he -would have kept his army constantly united in the -field, and exercised his soldiers, either by opening -good roads through the mountains, or in chasing -the partidas, while Wellington remained quiet. -Thus acting, he would have been always ready to -march north or south, to succour any menaced -point. By enforcing good order and discipline in -his own army, he would also have given a useful -example, and he could by vigilance and activity -have ensured the preponderance of force in the -field on whichever side he marched. He would -thus have acquired the esteem of the French generals, -and obtained their willing obedience, and -the Spaniards would more readily have submitted -to a warlike monarch. A weak man may safely -wear an inherited crown, it is of gold and the people -support it; but it requires the strength of a warrior -to bear the weight of an usurped diadem, it is of -iron.</p> - -<p>7º. If Marmont and the king were at fault in the -general plan of operations, they were not less so in -the particular tactics of the campaign.</p> - -<p>On the 18th of July the army of Portugal passed -the Douro in advance. On the 30th it repassed that -river in retreat, having, in twelve days, marched -two hundred miles, fought three combats, and a general -battle. One field-marshal, seven generals,<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_XIX">Appendix, Nos. 19</a>, <a href="#NO_XX">20.</a></span> -twelve thousand five hundred men and officers had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208"></a>[208]</span> -been killed, wounded, or taken; and two eagles, -besides those taken in the Retiro, several standards, -twelve guns, and eight carriages, exclusive of the -artillery and stores captured at Valladolid, fell into -the victors’ hands. In the same period, the allies -marched one hundred and sixty miles, and had one -field-marshal, four generals, and somewhat less than -six thousand officers and soldiers killed or wounded.</p> - -<p>This comparison furnishes the proof of Wellington’s -sagacity, when he determined not to fight -except at great advantage. The French army, -although surprised in the midst of an evolution and -instantly swept from the field, killed and wounded -six thousand of the allies; the eleventh and sixty-first -regiments of the sixth division had not together -more than one hundred and sixty men and officers -left standing at the end of the battle; twice six -thousand then would have fallen in a more equal -contest, the blow would have been less decisive, -and as Chauvel’s cavalry and the king’s army were -both at hand, a retreat into Portugal would probably -have followed a less perfect victory. Wherefore -this battle ought not, and would not have been -fought, but for Marmont’s false movement on the -22d. Yet it is certain that if Wellington had -retired without fighting, the murmurs of his army, -already louder than was seemly, would have been -heard in England, and if an accidental shot had terminated -his career all would have terminated. The -cortez, ripe for a change, would have accepted the -intrusive king, and the American war, just declared -against England, would have rendered the complicated -affairs of Portugal so extremely embarrassed -that no new man could have continued the contest. -Then the cries of disappointed politicians would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209"></a>[209]</span> -have been raised. Wellington, it would have been -said, Wellington, desponding, and distrusting his -brave troops, dared not venture a battle on even -terms, hence these misfortunes! His name would -have been made, as sir John Moore’s was, a butt for -the malice and falsehood of faction, and his military -genius would have been measured by the ignorance -of his detractors.</p> - -<p>8º. In the battle Marmont had about forty-two -thousand sabres and bayonets; Wellington who had -received some detachments on the 19th had above -forty-six thousand, but the excess was principally<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_XIX">Appendix, Nos. 19</a>, <a href="#NO_XX">20.</a></span> -Spanish. The French had seventy-four guns, the -allies, including a Spanish battery, had only sixty -pieces. Thus, Marmont, over-matched in cavalry -and infantry, was superior in artillery, and the fight -would have been most bloody, if the generals had -been equal, for courage and strength were in even -balance until Wellington’s genius struck the beam. -Scarcely can a fault be detected in his conduct. It -might indeed be asked why the cavalry reserves -were not, after Le Marchant’s charge, brought up -closer to sustain the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions -and to keep off Boyer’s dragoons, but it would seem -ill to cavil at an action which was described at the -time by a French officer, as the “<em>beating of forty -thousand men in forty minutes</em>.”</p> - -<p>9º. The battle of Salamanca remarkable in many -points of view, was not least so in this that it was -the first decided victory gained by the allies in the -Peninsula. In former actions the French had been -repulsed, here they were driven headlong as it were -before a mighty wind, without help or stay, and the -results were proportionate. Joseph’s secret negociations -with the Cortez were crushed, his partizans<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210"></a>[210]</span> -in every part of the Peninsula were abashed, and -the sinking spirit of the Catalans was revived; the -clamours of the opposition in England were checked, -the provisional government of France was dismayed, -the secret plots against the French in Germany were -resuscitated, and the shock, reaching even to Moscow, -heaved and shook the colossal structure of Napoleon’s -power to its very base.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless Salamanca was as most great battles -are, an accident; an accident seized upon with -astonishing vigour and quickness, but still an accident. -Even its results were accidental, for the -French could never have repassed the Tormes as an -army, if Carlos D’España had not withdrawn the -garrison from Alba, and hidden the fact from Wellington; -and this circumstance alone would probably -have led to the ruin of the whole campaign, but -for another of those chances, which, recurring so -frequently in war, render bad generals timid, and -make great generals trust their fortune under the -most adverse circumstances. This is easily shewn. -Joseph was at Blasco Sancho on the 24th, and notwithstanding -his numerous cavalry, the army of -Portugal passed in retreat across his front at the -distance of only a few miles, without his knowledge; -he thus missed one opportunity of effecting his junction -with Clauzel. On the 25th this junction could -still have been made at Arevalo, and Wellington, as -if to mock the king’s generalship, halted that day -behind the Zapardiel; yet Joseph retreated towards -the Guadarama, wrathful that Clauzel made no -effort to join him, and forgetful that as a beaten -and pursued army must march, it was for him to -join Clauzel. But the true cause of these errors -was the different inclinations of the generals. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211"></a>[211]</span> -king wished to draw Clauzel to Madrid, Clauzel -desired to have the king behind the Duero, and if -he had succeeded the probable result may be thus -traced.</p> - -<p>Clauzel during the first confusion wrote that only -twenty thousand men could be reorganised, but in -this number he did not include the stragglers and -marauders who always take advantage of a defeat -to seek their own interest; a reference to the French -loss proves that there were nearly thirty thousand -fighting men left, and in fact Clauzel did in a fortnight -reorganise twenty thousand infantry, two -thousand cavalry and fifty guns, besides gaining a -knowledge of five thousand stragglers and marauders. -In fine no soldiers rally quicker after a defeat, -than the French, and hence as Joseph brought to -Blasco Sancho thirty guns and fourteen thousand -men of which above two thousand were horsemen, -forty thousand infantry, and more than six thousand -cavalry with a powerful artillery, might then have -been rallied behind the Duero, exclusive of Caffarelli’s -divisions. Nor would Madrid have been -meanwhile exposed to an insurrection, nor to the -operation of a weak detachment from Wellington’s -army; for the two thousand men, sent by Suchet, -had arrived in that capital on the 30th, and there -were in the several fortified points of the vicinity, -six or seven thousand other troops who could have -been united at the Retiro, to protect that dépôt and -the families attached to the intrusive court.</p> - -<p>Thus Wellington without committing any fault, -would have found a more powerful army than Marmont’s, -again on the Duero, and capable of renewing -the former operations with the advantage of former -errors as warning beacons. But his own army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212"></a>[212]</span> -would not have been so powerful as before, for the -reinforcements sent from England did not even -suffice to replace the current consumption of men; -and neither the fresh soldiers nor the old Walcheren -regiments were able to sustain the toil of the recent -operations. Three thousand troops had joined since -the battle, yet the general decrease, including the -killed and wounded, was above eight thousand men, -and the number of sick was rapidly augmenting from -the extreme heat. It may therefore be said that if -Marmont was stricken deeply by Wellington the -king poisoned the wound. The English general -had fore-calculated all these superior resources of -the enemy, and it was only Marmont’s flagrant -fault, on the 22d, that could have wrung the battle -from him; yet he fought it as if his genius disdained -such trial of its strength. I saw him late in the -evening of that great day, when the advancing -flashes of cannon and musketry, stretching as far -as the eye could command, shewed in the darkness -how well the field was won; he was alone, the -flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes -were eager and watchful, but his voice was calm, -and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, -since he had defeated greater warriors -than Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient -pride he seemed only to accept this glory, as -an earnest of greater things.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213"></a>[213]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XIX">BOOK XIX.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXIX_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812.</span> -As Wellington’s operations had now deeply affected -the French affairs in the distant provinces, it is -necessary again to revert to the general progress of -the war, lest the true bearings of his military policy -should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, -by clearing all the centre of Spain, had reduced -the invasion to its original lines of operation. For -Palombini’s division having joined the army of the -centre, the army of the Ebro was broken up; Caffarelli -had concentrated the scattered troops of the -army of the north; and when Clauzel had led back -the vanquished army of Portugal to Burgos, the -whole French host was divided in two distinct parts, -each having a separate line of communication with -France, and a circuitous, uncertain, attenuated line -of correspondence with each other by Zaragoza -instead of a sure and short one by Madrid. But -Wellington was also forced to divide his army in -two parts, and though, by the advantage of his -central position, he retained the initial power, both -of movement and concentration, his lines of communication -were become long, and weak because the -enemy was powerful at either flank. Wherefore on -his own simple strength in the centre of Spain he -could not rely, and the diversions he had projected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214"></a>[214]</span> -against the enemy’s rear and flanks became more important -than ever. To these we must now turn.</p> - - -<h4>EASTERN OPERATIONS.</h4> - -<p><span class="sidenote">See <a href="#CHAPTER_BXVII_II">Book XVII. Chap. II.</a></span> -It will be recollected that the narrative of Catalonian -affairs ceased at the moment when Decaen, -after fortifying the coast line and opening new -roads beyond the reach of shot from the English -ships, was gathering the harvest of the interior. -Lacy, inefficient in the field and universally hated, -was thus confined to the mountain chain which -separates the coast territory from the plains of -Lerida, and from the Cerdaña. The insurrectionary<span class="sidenote">Captain Addington’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -spirit of the Catalonians was indeed only upheld by -Wellington’s successes, and by the hope of English -succour from Sicily; for Lacy, devoted to the republican -party in Spain, had now been made captain-general -as well as commander-in-chief, and sought -to keep down the people, who were generally of the -priestly and royal faction. He publicly spoke of -exciting a general insurrection, yet, in his intercourse -with the English naval officers, avowed his wish to -repress the patriotism of the Somatenes; he was -not ashamed to boast of his assassination plots, and -<span class="sidenote">History of the conspiracies against the French army in Catalonia, published at Barcelona, 1813.</span> -received with honour, a man who had murdered <ins class="corr" id="tn-214" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the aid-de-camp of'"> -the aide-de-camp of</ins> Maurice Mathieu; he sowed dissentions -amongst his generals, intrigued against all -of them in turn, and when Eroles and Manso, who -were the people’s favourites, raised any soldiers, he -transferred the latter as soon as they were organized -to Sarzfield’s division, at the same time calumniating -that general to depress his influence. He quarrelled -incessantly with captain Codrington, and had no -desire to see an English force in Catalonia lest a -general insurrection should take place, for he feared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215"></a>[215]</span> -that the multitude once gathered and armed would -drive him from the province and declare for the opponents -of the cortez. And in this view the constitution -itself, although emanating from the cortez, -was long withheld from the Catalans, lest the newly -declared popular rights should interfere with the -arbitrary power of the chief.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -Such was the state of the province when intelligence -that the Anglo-Sicilian expedition had arrived -at Mahon, excited the hopes of the Spaniards and -the fears of the French. The coast then became the -great object of interest to both, and the Catalans -again opened a communication with the English -fleet by Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and endeavoured -to collect the grain of the Campo de Taragona. -Decaen, coming to meet Suchet who had arrived at -Reus with two thousand men, drove the Catalans to -the hills again; yet the Lerida district was thus -opened to the enterprises of Lacy, because it was at -this period that Reille had detached general Paris<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#CHAPTER_BXVII_II">Book XVII. Chap. II.</a></span> -from Zaragoza to the aid of Palombini; and that -Severoli’s division was broken up to reinforce the -garrisons of Lerida, Taragona, Barcelona, and -Zaragoza. But the army of the Ebro being dissolved, -Lacy resolved to march upon Lerida, where -he had engaged certain Spaniards in the French -service to explode the powder magazine when he -should approach; and this odious scheme, which -necessarily involved the destruction of hundreds of -his own countrymen, was vainly opposed by Eroles -and Sarzfield.</p> - -<p>On the 12th of July, Eroles’ division, that general -being absent, was incorporated with Sarzfield’s and -other troops at Guisona, and the whole journeying -day and night reached Tremp on the 13th. Lacy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216"></a>[216]</span> -having thus turned Lerida, would have resumed the -march at mid-day, intending to attack the next -morning at dawn, but the men were without food, -and exhausted by fatigue, and fifteen hundred had -fallen behind. A council of war being then held, -Sarzfield, who thought the plot wild, would have -returned, observing that all communication with the -sea was abandoned, and the harvests of the Camps -de Taragona and Valls being left to be gathered by<span class="sidenote"><ins class="corr" id="tn-216" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Sarsfield'"> -Sarzfield</ins>’s Vindication, MSS.</span> -the enemy, the loss of the corn would seriously -affect the whole principality. Displeased at the -remonstrance, Lacy immediately sent him back -to the plain of Urgel with some infantry and the -cavalry, to keep the garrison of Balaguer in check; -but in the night of the 16th when Sarzfield had -reached the bridge of Alentorna on the Segre, fresh -orders caused him to return to Limiana on the -Noguera. Meanwhile Lacy himself had advanced -by Agen towards Lerida, the explosion of the -magazine took place, many houses were thrown -down, two hundred inhabitants and one hundred -and fifty soldiers were destroyed; two bastions fell, -and the place was laid open.</p> - -<p>Henriod the governor, although ignorant of the -vicinity of the Spaniards, immediately manned the -breaches, the garrison of Balaguer, hearing the -explosion marched to his succour, and when the -Catalan troops appeared, the citizens enraged by -the destruction of their habitations aided the -French; Lacy then fled back to Tremp, bearing -the burthen of a crime which he had not feared -to commit, but wanted courage to turn to his -country’s advantage. To lessen the odium thus -incurred, he insidiously attributed the failure to -Sarzfield’s disobedience; and as that general, to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217"></a>[217]</span> -punish the people of Barbastro for siding with the -French and killing twenty of his men, had raised<span class="sidenote">Captain Codrington’s Papers, MSS.</span> -a heavy contribution of money and corn in the -district, he became so hateful, that some time after, -when he endeavoured to raise soldiers in those parts, -the people threw boiling water at him from the -windows as he passed.</p> - -<p>Before this event Suchet had returned to Valencia, -and Dacaen and Maurice Mathieu marched against -colonel Green, who was entrenched in the hermitage<span class="sidenote">Idem.</span> -of St. Dimas, one of the highest of the -peaked rocks overhanging the convent of Montserrat. -Manso immediately raised the Somatenes<span class="sidenote">Laffaille’s Campaigns in Catalonia.</span> -to aid Green, and as the latter had provisions the -inaccessible strength of his post seemed to defy -capture; yet he surrendered in twenty-four hours, -and at a moment when the enemy, despairing of -success, were going to relinquish the attack. He -excused himself as being forced by his own people, -but he signed the capitulation. Decaen then set -fire to the convent of Montserrat and the flames -seen for miles around was the signal that the -warfare on that holy mountain was finished. -After this the French general marched to Lerida -to gather corn and Lacy again spread his troops -in the mountains.</p> - -<p>During his absence Eroles had secretly been -preparing a general insurrection to break out when -the British army should arrive, and it was supposed -that his object was to effect a change in the government -of the province; for though Lacy himself -again spoke of embodying the Somatenes if -arms were given to him by sir Edward Pellew,<span class="sidenote">Codrington’s Papers, MSS.</span> -there was really no scarcity of arms, the demand -was a deceit to prevent the muskets from being -given to the people, and there was no levy. Hence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218"></a>[218]</span> -the discontent increased and a general desire for -the arrival of the British troops became prevalent; -the miserable people turned anxiously towards -any quarter for aid, and this expression of -conscious helplessness was given in evidence by -the Spanish chiefs, and received as proof of enthusiasm -by the English naval commanders, who -were more sanguine of success than experience -would warrant. All eyes were however directed -towards the ocean, the French in fear, the Catalans -in hope; and the British armament did appear off -Palamos, but after three days, spread its sails -again and steered for Alicant, leaving the principality -stupified with grief and disappointment.</p> - -<p>This unexpected event was the natural result of -previous errors on all sides, errors which invariably -attend warlike proceedings when not directed by -a superior genius, and even then not always to be -avoided. It has been shewn how ministerial vacillation -marred lord William Bentinck’s first intention -of landing in person with ten or twelve thousand -men on the Catalonian coast; and how after -much delay general Maitland had sailed to Palma -with a division of six thousand men, Calabrians, -Sicilians and others, troops of no likelihood save -that some three thousand British and Germans were -amongst them. This force was afterwards joined -by the transports from Portugal having engineers -and artillery officers on board, and that honoured -battering train which had shattered the gory walls of -Badajos. Wellington had great hopes of this expedition; -he had himself sketched the general plan -of operations; and his own campaign had been conceived -in the expectation, that lord William Bentinck, -a general of high rank and reputation, with -ten thousand good troops, aided with at least as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219"></a>[219]</span> -many Spanish soldiers, disciplined under the two -British officers Whittingham and Roche, would -have early fallen on Catalonia to the destruction of -Suchet’s plans. And when this his first hope was -quashed, he still expected that a force would be -disembarked of strength, sufficient, in conjunction -with the Catalan army, to take Taragona.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">August.</span> -Roche’s corps was most advanced in discipline, -but the Spanish government delayed to place it under -general Maitland, and hence it first sailed from -the islands to Murcia, then returned without orders, -again repaired to Murcia, and at the moment of -general Maitland’s arrival off Palamos, was, under -the command of Joseph O’Donel, involved in a -terrible catastrophe already alluded to and hereafter -to be particularly narrated. Whittingham’s levy<span class="sidenote">Gen. Donkin’s papers, MSS.</span> -remained, but when inspected by the quarter-master -general Donkin it was found in a raw state, -scarcely mustering four thousand effective men, -amongst which were many French deserters from -the island of Cabrera. The sumptuous clothing -and equipments of Whittingham’s and Roche’s -men, their pay regularly supplied from the British -subsidy, and very much exceeding that of the -other Spanish corps, excited envy and dislike; -there was no public inspection, no check upon the -expenditure, nor upon the delivery of the stores, and -Roche’s proceedings on this last head, whether justly -or unjustly I know not, were very generally and -severely censured. Whittingham acknowledged -that he could not trust his people near the enemy -without the aid of British troops, and though the -captain-general Coupigny desired their departure, -his opinion was against a descent in Catalonia. -Maitland hesitated, but sir Edward Pellew urged -this descent so very strongly, that he finally assented<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220"></a>[220]</span> -and reached Palamos with nine thousand men of -all nations on the 31st of July, yet in some confusion -as to the transport service, which the staff -officers attributed to the injudicious meddling of -the naval chiefs.</p> - -<p>Maitland’s first care was to open a communication -with the Spanish commanders. Eroles came -on board at once and vehemently and unceasingly -urged an immediate disembarkation, declaring that -the fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended -upon it; the other generals shewed less<span class="sidenote">Notes by general Maitland, MSS.</span> -eagerness, and their accounts differed greatly with -respect to the relative means of the Catalans and -the French. Lacy estimated the enemy’s disposable<span class="sidenote">General Donkin’s papers, MSS.</span> -troops at fifteen thousand, and his own at seven -thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and -even that number he said he could with difficulty -feed or provide with ammunition. Sarzfield judged -the French to be, exclusive of Suchet’s moveable -column, eighteen thousand infantry and five hundred -cavalry; he thought it rash to invest Taragona -with a less force, and that a free and constant communication -with the fleet was absolutely essential -in any operation. Eroles rated the enemy at thirteen -thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, -including Suchet’s column; but the reports of the -deserters gave twenty-two thousand infantry, exclusive -of Suchet’s column and of the garrisons and -Miguelettes in the enemy’s service.</p> - -<p>No insurrection of the Somatenes had yet taken -place, nor was there any appearance that such an -event would happen, as the French were descried -conducting convoys along the shore with small -escorts, and concentrating their troops for battle -without molestation. The engineers demanded from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221"></a>[221]</span> -six to ten days to reduce Taragona after investment, -and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were then near -Montserrat with seven or eight thousand good -troops, which number could be doubled in a few -days; the Catalans could not so soon unite and -join Maitland’s force, and there was a general, -although apparently, an unjust notion abroad, that -Lacy was a Frenchman at heart. It was feared -also, that the Toulon fleet might come out and burn -the transports at their anchorage during the siege, -and thus Wellington’s battering train and even the -safety of the army would be involved in an enterprize -promising little success. A full council of war -was unanimous not to land, and the reluctance of -the people to rise, attributed by captain Codrington -to the machinations of traitors, was visible; Maitland -also was farther swayed by the generous and just -consideration, that as the Somatenes had not voluntarily -taken arms, it would be cruel to excite them -to such a step, when a few days might oblige him -to abandon them to the vengeance of the enemy. -Wherefore as Palamos appeared too strong for a -sudden assault, the armament sailed towards Valencia -with intent to attack that place, after a project, furnished -by the quarter-master general Donkin and -in unison with lord Wellington’s plan of operations; -but Maitland, during the voyage, changed his mind -and proceeded at once to Alicant.</p> - -<p>The Catalans were not more displeased than the -British naval commanders at seeing the principality -thus shaken off; yet the judgment of the latter -seems to have been swayed partly from having -given stronger hopes of assistance to the former -than the circumstances would rigorously warrant; -partly from that confidence, which inspired by continual<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222"></a>[222]</span> -success, is strength on their own element, -but rashness on shore. Captain Codrington, from<span class="sidenote">Captain Codrington’s papers, MSS.</span> -the great interest he took in the struggle, was -peculiarly discontented; yet his own description of -the state of Catalonia at the time, shows that his -hopes rested more on some vague notions of the -Somatenes’ enthusiasm, than upon any facts which -a general ought to calculate upon. Lord Wellington -indeed said, that he could see no reason why the -plan he had recommended, should not have been -successful; an observation made, however, when he -was somewhat excited by the prospect of having -Suchet on his own hands, and probably under some -erroneous information. He had been deceived about -the strength of the forts at Salamanca, although -close to them; and as he had only just established -a sure channel of intelligence in Catalonia, it was -probable that he was also deceived with respect to -Taragona, which if not strong in regular works was -well provided and commanded by a very bold active -governor, and offered great resources in the facility -of making interior retrenchments.</p> - -<p>The force of the Catalans lord Wellington knew -principally from sir Edward Pellew, who had derived -his information chiefly from Eroles, who very much -exaggerated it, and lessened the enemy’s power in -proportion. And general Maitland could scarcely be -called a commander-in-chief, for lord William Bentinck -forbade him to risk the loss of his division lest -Sicily itself should thereby be endangered; and to -avoid mischief from the winter season, he was instructed -to quit the Spanish coast in the second week -of September. Lord William and lord Wellington -were therefore not agreed in the object to be attained. -The first considered the diversion on the Spanish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223"></a>[223]</span> -coast as secondary to the wants of Sicily, whereas -Wellington looked only to the great interests at -stake in the Peninsula, and thought Sicily in no -danger until the French should reinforce their army -in Calabria. He desired vigorous combined efforts -of the military and naval forces, to give a new aspect -to the war in Catalonia, and his plan was that -Taragona should be attacked; if it fell the warfare -he said would be once more established on a good -base in Catalonia; if it was succoured by the concentration -of the French troops, Valencia would -necessarily be weak, and the armament could then -proceed to attack that place, and if unsuccessful -return to assail Taragona again.</p> - -<p>This was an excellent plan no doubt, but Napoleon -never lost sight of that great principle of war, -so concisely expressed by Sertorius when he told -Pompey that a good general should look behind -him rather than before. The emperor acting on the -proverb that fortune favours the brave, often urged -his lieutenants to dare desperately with a few men -in the front, but he invariably covered their communications -with heavy masses, and there is no -instance of his plan of invasion being shaken by a -flank or rear attack, except where his instructions -were neglected. His armies made what are called -points, in war, such as Massena’s invasion of Portugal, -Moncey’s attack on Valencia, Dupont’s on -Andalusia; but the general plan of operation was -invariably supported by heavy masses protecting -the communications. Had his instructions, sent -from Dresden, been strictly obeyed, the walls of -Lerida and Taragona would have been destroyed, -and only the citadels of each occupied with small -garrisons easily provisioned for a long time. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224"></a>[224]</span> -field army would thus have been increased by at -least three thousand men, the moveable columns -spared many harassing marches, and Catalonia -would have offered little temptation for a descent.</p> - -<p>But notwithstanding this error of Suchet, Maitland’s -troops were too few, and too ill-composed to -venture the investment of Taragona. The imperial -muster-rolls give more than eighty thousand men, -including Reille’s divisions at Zaragosa, for the -armies of Aragon and Catalonia, and twenty-seven -thousand of the first and thirty-seven thousand of -the second, were actually under arms with the -eagles; wherefore to say that Decaen could have -brought at once ten thousand men to the succour of -Taragona, and, by weakening his garrisons, as many -more in a very short time, is not to over-rate his -power; and this without counting Paris’ brigade, -three thousand strong, which belonged to Reille’s -division and was disposable. Suchet had just before -come to Reus with two thousand select men of all -arms, and as O’Donel’s army had since been defeated -near Alicant, he could have returned with a still -greater force to oppose Maitland.</p> - -<p>Now the English fleet was descried by the French -off Palamos on the evening of the 31st of July, -although it did not anchor before the 1st of August; -Decaen and Maurice Mathieu with some eight -thousand disposable men were then between Montserrat -and Barcelona, that is to say, only two -marches from Taragona; Lamarque with from four -to five thousand, was between Palamos and Mataro, -five marches from Taragona; Quesnel with a like -number was in the Cerdaña, being about seven -marches off; Suchet and Paris could have arrived -in less than eight days, and from the garrisons, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225"></a>[225]</span> -minor posts, smaller succours might have been -drawn; Tortoza alone could have furnished two -thousand. But Lacy’s division was at Vich, Sarzfield’s -at Villa Franca, Eroles’ divided between -Montserrat and Urgel, Milan’s in the Grao D’Olot, -and they required five days even to assemble; when -united, they would not have exceeded seven thousand -men, and with their disputing, captious generals, -would have been unfit to act vigorously; nor could -they have easily joined the allies without fighting -a battle in which their defeat would have been -certain.</p> - -<p>Sarzfield judged that ten days at least were -necessary to reduce Taragona, and positively affirmed -that the army must be entirely fed from the fleet, -as the country could scarcely supply the Catalonian -troops alone. Thus Maitland would have had to -land his men, his battering train and stores, and -to form his investment, in the face of Decaen’s -power, or, following the rules of war, have defeated -that general first. But Decaen’s troops numerically -equal, without reckoning the garrison of Taragona -two thousand strong, were in composition vastly -superior to the allies, seeing that only three thousand -British and German troops in Maitland’s army, -were to be at all depended upon in battle; neither -does it appear that the platforms, sand-bags, fascines -and other materials, necessary for a siege, were at -this period prepared and on board the vessels.</p> - -<p>It is true Maitland would, if he had been able to -resist Decaen at first, which seems doubtful, have -effected a great diversion, and Wellington’s object -would have been gained if a re-embarkation had -been secure; but the naval officers, having reference -to the nature of the coast, declared that a safe re-embarkation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226"></a>[226]</span> -could not be depended upon. The -soundness of this opinion has indeed been disputed -by many seamen, well acquainted with the coast, -who maintain, that even in winter the Catalonian -shore is remarkably safe and tranquil; and that -Cape Salou, a place in other respects admirably -adapted for a camp, affords a certain retreat, and -facility of re-embarking on one or other of its -sides in all weather. However, to Maitland the -coast of Catalonia was represented as unsafe, and -this view of the question is also supported by very -able seamen likewise acquainted with that sea.</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN MURCIA.</h4> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -The Anglo-Sicilian armament arrived at Alicant -at a critical moment; the Spanish cause was there -going to ruin. Joseph O’Donel, brother to the -regent, had with great difficulty organized a new -Murcian army after Blake’s surrender at Valencia, and -this army, based upon Alicant and Carthagena, was -independent of a division under general Frere, -which always hung about Baza, and Lorca, on the -frontier of Grenada, and communicated through the -Alpuxaras with the sea-coast. Both Suchet and -Soult were paralyzed in some degree by the neighbourhood -of these armies, which holding a central -position were supported by fortresses, supplied by -sea from Gibraltar to Cadiz, and had their existence -guaranteed by Wellington’s march into Spain, by his -victory of Salamanca, and by his general combinations. -For the two French commanders were forced -to watch his movements, and to support at the same -time, the one a blockade of the Isla de Leon, the -other the fortresses in Catalonia; hence they were -in no condition to follow up the prolonged operations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227"></a>[227]</span> -necessary to destroy these Murcian armies, -which were moreover supported by the arrival of -general Ross with British troops at Carthagena.</p> - -<p>O’Donel had been joined by Roche in July, and -Suchet, after detaching Maupoint’s brigade towards -Madrid, departed himself with two thousand men -for Catalonia, leaving general Harispe with not more -than four thousand men beyond the Xucar. General -Ross immediately advised O’Donel to attack him, -and to distract his attention a large fleet, with -troops on board, which had originally sailed from -Cadiz to succour Ballesteros at Malaga, now -appeared off the Valencian coast. At the same -time Bassecour and Villa Campa, being free to act -in consequence of Palombini’s and Maupoint’s departure -for Madrid, came down from their haunts -in the mountains of Albaracyn upon the right flank<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_6">Plan 6.</a></span> -and rear of the French positions. Villa Campa -penetrated to Liria, and Bassecour to Cofrentes on -the Xucar; but ere this attack could take place, -Suchet, with his usual celerity, returned from Reus. -At first he detached men against Villa Campa, but -when he saw the fleet, fearing it was the Sicilian -armament, he recalled them again, and sent for -Paris’ brigade from Zaragoza, to act by Teruel -against Bassecour and Villa Campa. Then he concentrated -his own forces at Valencia, but a storm -drove the fleet off the coast, and meanwhile -O’Donel’s operations brought on the</p> - - -<h4>FIRST BATTLE OF CASTALLA.</h4> - -<p>Harispe’s posts were established at Biar, Castalla, -and Onil on the right; at Ibi and Alcoy on the -left. This line was not more than one march from -Alicant. Colonel Mesclop, with a regiment of infantry<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228"></a>[228]</span> -and some cuirassiers held Ibi, and was supported -by Harispe himself with a reserve at Alcoy. -General Delort, with another regiment of infantry, -was at Castalla, having some cuirassiers at Onil on -his left, and a regiment of dragoons with three -companies of foot at Biar on his right. In this exposed -situation the French awaited O’Donel, who -directed his principal force, consisting of six thousand -infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and eight -guns, against Delort; meanwhile Roche with three<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_7">Plan 7.</a></span> -thousand men was to move through the mountains -of Xixona, so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with -the attack at Castalla. O’Donel hoped thus to cut the -French line, and during these operations, Bassecour, -with two thousand men, was to come down from -Cofrentes to Villena, on the right flank of Delort.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">Suchet’s official correspondence, MSS.</span> -Roche, who marched in the night of the 19th, -remained during the 20th in the mountains, but the -next night he threaded a difficult pass, eight miles -long, reached Ibi at day-break on the 21st, and sent<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span> -notice of his arrival to O’Donel; and when that -general appeared in front of Delort, the latter abandoned<span class="sidenote">Roche’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -Castalla, which was situated in the same -valley as Ibi, and about five miles distant from it. -But he only retired skirmishing to a strong ridge -<span class="sidenote">General Delort’s <ins class="corr" id="tn-228" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'official re-'"> official report</ins></span> -behind that town, which also extended behind -Ibi; this secured his communication with Mesclop, -of whom he demanded succour, and at the same -time he called in his own cavalry and infantry from -Onil and Biar. Mesclop, leaving some infantry, -two guns, and his cuirassiers, to defend Ibi and a -small fort on the hill behind it, marched at once -towards Delort, and thus Roche, finding only a few -men before him, got possession of the town after a -sharp skirmish, yet he could not take the fort.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229"></a>[229]</span></p> - -<p>At first O’Donel who had advanced beyond -Castalla, only skirmished with and cannonaded the -French in his front, for he had detached the Spanish -cavalry to operate by the plains of Villena, to turn -the enemy’s right and communicate with Bassecour. -While expecting the effects of this movement he -was astonished to see the French dragoons come -trotting through the pass of Biar, on his left flank; -they were followed by some companies of infantry, -and only separated from him by a stream over which -was a narrow bridge without parapets, and at the -same moment the cuirassiers appeared on the other -side coming from Onil. The Spanish cavalry -had made no effort to interrupt this march from -Biar, nor to follow the French through the defile,<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#NO_XV">Appendix, No. 15.</a></span> -nor any effort whatever. In this difficulty -O’Donel turned two guns against the bridge and -supported them with a battalion of infantry, but the -French dragoons observing this battalion to be unsteady, -braved the fire of the guns, and riding -furiously over the bridge seized the battery, and -then dashed against and broke the infantry. Delort’s -line advanced at the same moment, the cuirassiers -charged into the town of Castalla, and the whole -Spanish army fled outright. Several hundred sought -refuge in an old castle and there surrendered, and of -the others three thousand were killed, wounded, or -taken, and yet the victors had scarcely fifteen hundred -men engaged, and did not lose two hundred. -O’Donel attributed his defeat to the disobedience -and inactivity of St. Estevan, who commanded his -cavalry, but the great fault was the placing that -cavalry beyond the defile of Biar instead of keeping -it in hand for the battle.</p> - -<p>This part of the action being over, Mesclop, who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230"></a>[230]</span> -had not taken any share in it, was reinforced and -returned to succour Ibi, to which place also Harispe -was now approaching from Alcoy; but Roche -favoured by the strength of the passes escaped, and -reached Alicant with little hurt, while the remains -of O’Donel’s divisions, pursued by the cavalry on -the road of Jumilla, fled to the city of Murcia. -Bassecour who had advanced to Almanza was then -driven back to his mountain-haunts, where Villa -Campa rejoined him. It was at this moment that -Maitland’s armament disembarked and the remnants -of the Spanish force rallied. The king, then flying -from Madrid, immediately changed the direction of -his march from the Morena to Valencia, and one -more proof was given that it was England and not -Spain which resisted the French; for Alicant would -have fallen, if not as an immediate consequence of -this defeat, yet surely when the king’s army had -joined Suchet.</p> - -<p>That general, who had heard of the battle of Salamanca, -the evacuation of Madrid and the approach -of Joseph, and now saw a fresh army springing up -in his front, hastened to concentrate his disposable -force in the positions of San Felippe de Xativa and -Moxente which he entrenched, as well as the road -to Almanza with a view to secure his junction with -the king. At the same time he established a new -bridge and bridge-head at Alberique in addition to -that at Alcira on the Xucar; and having called up -Paris from Teruel and Maupoint from Cuenca resolved -to abide a battle, which the slowness and -vacillation of his adversaries gave him full time to -prepare for.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">August.</span> -Maitland arrived the 7th, and though his force was -not all landed before the 11th, the French were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231"></a>[231]</span> -still scattered on various points, and a vigorous -commander would have found the means to drive -them over the Xucar, and perhaps from Valencia -itself. However the British general had scarcely set -his foot on shore when the usual Spanish vexations -overwhelmed him. Three principal roads led towards -the enemy; one on the left, passed through -Yecla and Fuente La Higuera, and by it the remnant -of O’Donel’s army was coming up from Murcia; -another passed through Elda, Sax, Villena, and -Fuente de la Higuera, and the third through Xixona, -Alcoy, and Albayda. Now O’Donel, whose existence -as a general was redeemed by the appearance -of Maitland, instantly demanded from the latter a -pledge, that he would draw nothing either by purchase -or requisition, save wine and straw, from -any of these lines, nor from the country between -them. The English general assented and instantly -sunk under the difficulties thus created. For his -intention was to have attacked Harispe at Alcoy -and Ibi on the 13th or 14th, but he was only -able to get one march from Alicant as late as the -16th, he could not attack before the 18th, and it -was on that day, that Suchet concentrated his army -at Xativa. The delay had been a necessary consequence -of the agreement with O’Donel.</p> - -<p>Maitland was without any habitude of command, -his commissariat was utterly inefficient, and his -field-artillery had been so shamefully ill-prepared -in Sicily that it was nearly useless. He had hired -mules at a great expense for the transport of his -guns, and of provisions, from Alicant, but the owners -of the mules soon declared they could not fulfil -their contract unless they were fed by the British, -and this O’Donel’s restrictions as to the roads prevented.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232"></a>[232]</span> -Many of the muleteers also, after receiving -their money, deserted with both mules and provisions; -and on the first day’s march a convoy, with -six days’ supply, was attacked by an armed banditti -called a guerilla, and the convoy was plundered or -dispersed and lost.</p> - -<p>Maitland suffering severely from illness, was disgusted -at these things, and fearing for the safety -of his troops, would have retired at once, and -perhaps have re-embarked, if Suchet had not gone -back to Xativa; then however, he advanced to -Elda, while Roche entered Alcoy; yet both apparently -without an object, for there was no intention -of fighting, and the next day Roche retired to -Xixona and Maitland retreated to Alicant. To -cover this retreat general Donkin pushed forward, -with a detachment of Spanish and English cavalry, -through Sax, Ibi, and Alcoy, and giving -out that an advanced guard of five thousand British -was close behind him, coasted all the French line, -captured a convoy at Olleria, and then returned -through Alcoy. Suchet kept close himself, in the -camp of Xativa, but sent Harispe to meet the king -who was now near Almanza, and on the 25th the -junction of the two armies was effected; at the -same time Maupoint, escaping Villa Campa’s assault, -arrived from Cuenca with the remnant of -his brigade.</p> - -<p>When the king’s troops arrived, Suchet pushed -his outposts again to Villena and Alcoy, but apparently -occupied in providing for Joseph’s army and -court he neglected to press the allies, which he -might have done to their serious detriment. Meanwhile -O’Donel who had drawn off Frere’s division -from Lorca came up to Yecla with five or six thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233"></a>[233]</span> -men, and Maitland reinforced with some -detachments from Sicily, commenced fortifying a -camp outside Alicant; but his health was quite -broken, and he earnestly desired to resign, being -filled with anxiety at the near approach of Soult. -That marshal had abandoned Andalusia, and his -manner of doing so shall be set forth in the next -chapter; for it was a great event, leading to great -results, and worthy of deep consideration by those -who desire to know upon what the fate of kingdoms -may depend.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234"></a>[234]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXIX_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. August.</span> -Suchet found resources in Valencia to support the -king’s court and army, without augmenting the -pressure on the inhabitants, and a counter-stroke -could have been made against the allies, if the -French commanders had been of one mind and -had looked well to the state of affairs; but Joseph -exasperated by the previous opposition of the generals, -and troubled by the distresses of the numerous -families attached to his court, was only intent -upon recovering Madrid as soon as he could collect -troops enough to give Wellington battle. He had -demanded from the French minister of war, money, -stores, and a reinforcement of forty thousand men, -and he had imperatively commanded Soult to -abandon Andalusia; that clear-sighted commander,<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_III">Appendix, No. 3.</a></span> -could not however understand why the king, who -had given him no accurate details of Marmont’s -misfortunes, or of his own operations, should yet -order him to abandon at once, all the results, and -all the interests, springing from three years’ possession -of the south of Spain. He thought it a great -question not to be treated lightly, and as his vast -capacity enabled him to embrace the whole field of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235"></a>[235]</span> -operations, he concluded that rumour had exaggerated -the catastrophe at Salamanca and that the -abandoning of Andalusia would be the ruin of the -French cause.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">French correspondence taken at Vittoria, MSS.</span> -“To march on Madrid,” he said, “would probably -produce another pitched battle, which should be -carefully avoided, seeing that the whole frame-work -of the French invasion was disjointed, and -no resource would remain after a defeat. On the -other hand, Andalusia, which had hitherto been -such a burthen to the invasion, now offered means -to remedy the present disasters, and to sacrifice that -province with all its resources, for the sake of -regaining the capital of Spain, appeared a folly. -It was purchasing a town at the price of a kingdom. -Madrid was nothing in the emperor’s policy, -though it might be something for a king of Spain; -yet Philip the Vth had thrice lost it and preserved his -throne. Why then should Joseph set such a value -upon that city? The battle of the Arapiles was -merely a grand duel which might be fought again -with a different result; but to abandon Andalusia -with all its stores and establishments; to raise the -blockade of Cadiz; to sacrifice the guns, the -equipments, the hospitals and the magazines, and -thus render null the labours of three years, would be -to make the battle of the Arapiles a prodigious historical -event, the effect of which would be felt all over -Europe and even in the new world. And how was -this flight from Andalusia to be safely effected? The -army of the south had been able to hold in check -sixty thousand enemies disposed on a circuit round -it, but the moment it commenced its retreat towards -Toledo those sixty thousand men would unite to -follow, and Wellington himself would be found on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236"></a>[236]</span> -the Tagus in its front. On that line then the army -of the south could not march, and a retreat through -Murcia would be long and difficult. But why retreat -at all? Where,” exclaimed this able warrior, -“where is the harm though the allies should possess -the centre of Spain?”</p> - -<p>“Your majesty,” he continued, “should collect the -army of the centre, the army of Aragon, and if possible, -the army of Portugal, and you should march -upon Andalusia, even though to do so should involve -the abandonment of Valencia. If the army of Portugal -comes with you, one hundred and twenty thousand -men will be close to Portugal; if it cannot or -will not come, let it remain, because while Burgos -defends itself, that army can keep on the right of the -Ebro and the emperor will take measures for its -succour. Let Wellington then occupy Spain from -Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care to provide -magazines, stores, and places of arms in Andalusia; -and the moment eighty thousand French are assembled -in that province the theatre of war is changed! -The English general must fall back to save Lisbon, -the army of Portugal may follow him to the Tagus, -the line of communication with France will be -established by the eastern coast, the final result of -the campaign turns in our favour, and a decisive -battle may be delivered without fear at the gates -of Lisbon. March then with the army of the -centre upon the Despenas Peros, unite all our forces -in Andalusia, and all will be well! Abandon that -province and you lose Spain! you will retire behind -the Ebro and famine will drive you thence before -the emperor can, from the distant Russia, provide -a remedy; his affairs even in that country will suffer -by the blow, and America dismayed by our misfortunes -will perhaps make peace with England.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237"></a>[237]</span></p> - -<p>Neither the king’s genius, nor his passions, -would permit him to understand the grandeur and -vigour of this conception. To change even simple -lines of operation suddenly, is at all times a nice -affair, but thus to change the whole theatre of operations -and regain the initial movements after a -defeat, belongs only to master spirits in war. Now -the emperor had recommended a concentration of -force, and Joseph would not understand this save as -applied to the recovery of Madrid; he was uneasy -for the frontiers of France; as if Wellington could -possibly have invaded that country while a great -army menaced Lisbon; in fine he could see nothing -but his lost capital on one side, and a disobedient -lieutenant on the other, and peremptorily repeated -his orders. Then Soult, knowing that his plan -could only be effected by union and rapidity, -and dreading the responsibility of further delay, -took immediate steps to abandon Andalusia; but -mortified by this blighting of his fruitful genius, -and stung with anger at such a termination to all -his political and military labours, his feelings over-mastered -his judgment. Instead of tracing the -king’s rigid counteraction of his scheme to the narrowness -of the monarch’s military genius, he judged -it part of a design to secure his own fortune at the -expense of his brother, an action quite foreign to -Joseph’s honest and passionate nature. Wherefore -making known this opinion to six generals, who -were sworn to secrecy, unless interrogated by the -Emperor, he wrote to the French minister of war<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_IV">Appendix No. 4.</a></span> -expressing his doubts of the king’s loyalty towards -the emperor, and founding them on the following -facts.</p> - -<p>1º. That the extent of Marmont’s defeat had -been made known to him only by the reports of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238"></a>[238]</span> -enemy, and the king, after remaining for twenty-three -days, without sending any detailed information -of the operations in the north of Spain, -although the armies were actively engaged, had -peremptorily ordered him to abandon Andalusia, -saying it was the only resource remaining for the -French. To this opinion Soult said he could not -subscribe, yet being unable absolutely to disobey -the monarch, he was going to make a movement -which must finally lead to the loss of all the -French conquests in Spain, seeing that it would -then be impossible to remain permanently on the -Tagus, or even in the Castiles.</p> - -<p>2º. This operation ruinous in itself was insisted -upon at a time, when the newspapers of Cadiz -affirmed, that Joseph’s ambassador at the court of -Petersburgh, had joined the Prussian army in the -field; that Joseph himself had made secret overtures -to the government in the Isla de Leon; that -Bernadotte, his brother-in-law, had made a treaty -with England and had demanded of the Cortez a -guard of Spaniards, a fact confirmed by information -obtained through an officer sent with a flag of truce -to the English admiral; finally that Moreau and -Blucher were at Stockholm, and <ins class="corr" id="tn-238" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the aid-du-camp of'"> -the aide-de-camp of</ins> the former was in London.</p> - -<p>Reflecting upon all these circumstances he feared -that the object of the king’s false movements, might -be to force the French army over the Ebro, in the -view of making an arrangement for Spain, separate -from France; fears, said the duke of Dalmatia, -which may be chimerical, but it is better in such a -crisis to be too fearful than too confident. This -letter was sent by sea, and the vessel having touched -at Valencia at the moment of Joseph’s arrival there, -the despatch was opened, and it was then, in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239"></a>[239]</span> -first burst of his anger, that the king despatched -Desprez on that mission to Moscow, the result of -which has been already related.</p> - -<p>Soult’s proceedings though most offensive to the -king and founded in error, because Joseph’s letters, -containing the information required, were intercepted, -not withheld, were prompted by zeal for his -master’s service and cannot be justly condemned, yet -Joseph’s indignation was natural and becoming. -But the admiration of reflecting men must ever -be excited by the greatness of mind, and the calm -sagacity, with which Napoleon treated this thorny -affair. Neither the complaints of his brother, nor -the hints of his minister of war (for the duke of -Feltre, a man of mean capacity and of an intriguing -disposition, countenanced Joseph’s expressed suspicions<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_V">Appendix, No. 5.</a></span> -that the duke of Dalmatia designed to make -himself king of Andalusia) could disturb the temper -or judgment of the Emperor; and it was then, -struck with the vigour of the plan for concentrating -the army in Andalusia, he called Soult the only -military head in Spain. Nor was Wellington inattentive -of that general’s movements, he knew his -talents, and could foresee and appreciate the importance -of the project he had proposed. Anxiously -he watched his reluctant motions, and while apparently -enjoying his own triumph amidst the -feasts and rejoicings of Madrid, his eye was fixed -on Seville; the balls and bull-fights of the capital -cloaked both the skill and the apprehensions of the -consummate general.</p> - -<p>Before the allies had crossed the Guadarama, -Hill had been directed to hold his army in hand, -close to Drouet, and ready to move into the valley -of the Tagus, if that general should hasten to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240"></a>[240]</span> -succour of the king. But when Joseph’s retreat -upon Valencia was known, Hill received orders to -fight Drouet, and even to follow him into Andalusia; -at the same time general Cooke was directed to -prepare an attack, even though it should be an -open assault on the French lines before Cadiz, while -Ballesteros operated on the flank from Gibraltar. -By these means Wellington hoped to keep Soult -from sending any succour to the king, and even to -force him out of Andalusia without the necessity of -marching there himself; yet if these measures -failed, he was resolved to take twenty thousand -men from Madrid and uniting with Hill drive -the French from that province.</p> - -<p>Previous to the sending of these instructions, -Laval and Villatte had pursued Ballesteros to Malaga, -which place, after a skirmish at Coin, he entered, -and was in such danger of capture, that the maritime -expedition already noticed was detached from Cadiz, -by sea, to carry him off. However the news of the -battle of Salamanca having arrested the French -movements, the Spanish general regained San Roque, -and the fleet went on to Valencia. Meanwhile Soult, -hoping the king would transfer the seat of war to -Andalusia had caused Drouet to shew a bold front -against Hill, extending from the Serena to Monasterio, -and to send scouting parties towards Merida; -and large magazines were formed at Cordoba, -a central point, equally suited for an advance by -Estremadura, a march to La Mancha, or a retreat by -Grenada. Wherefore Hill, who had not then received -his orders to advance, remained on the defensive; -nor would Wellington stir from Madrid, although -his presence was urgently called for on the Duero, -until he was satisfied that the duke of Dalmatia<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241"></a>[241]</span> -meant to abandon Andalusia. The king, as we -have seen, finally forced this measure upon the -marshal; but the execution required very extensive -arrangements, for the quarters were distant, the -convoys immense, the enemies numerous, the line -of march wild, and the journey long. And it was -most important to present the imposing appearance -of a great and regular military movement and not -the disgraceful scene of a confused flight.</p> - -<p>The distant minor posts, in the Condado de Niebla -and other places, were first called in, and then the -lines before the Isla were abandoned; for Soult, -in obedience to the king’s first order, designed to -move upon La Mancha, and it was only by accident, -and indirectly, that he heard of Joseph’s retreat -to Valencia. At the same time he discovered that -Drouet, who had received direct orders from the -king, was going to Toledo, and it was not without -difficulty, and only through the medium of his brother, -who commanded Drouet’s cavalry, that he could -prevent that destructive isolated movement. Murcia -then became the line of retreat but every thing was -hurried, because the works before the Isla were -already broken up in the view of retreating towards -La Mancha, and the troops were in march for Seville -although the safe assembling of the army at Grenada -required another arrangement.</p> - -<p>On the 25th of August a thousand guns, stores in -proportion, and all the immense works of Chiclana, -St. Maria, and the Trocadero, were destroyed. -Thus the long blockade of the Isla de Leon was -broken up at the moment when the bombardment of -Cadiz had become very serious, when the opposition -to English influence was taking a dangerous direction, -when the French intrigues were nearly ripe,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242"></a>[242]</span> -the cortez becoming alienated from the cause of -Ferdinand and the church; finally when the executive -government was weaker than ever, because the -count of Abispal, the only active person in the -regency, had resigned, disgusted that his brother -had been superseded by Elio and censured in the -cortez for the defeat at Castalla. This siege or -rather defence of Cadiz, for it was never, strictly -speaking, besieged, was a curious episode in the -war. Whether the Spaniards would or would not -have effectually defended it without the aid of -British troops is a matter of speculation; but it -is certain that notwithstanding Graham’s glorious -action at Barrosa, Cadiz was always a heavy burthen -upon Lord Wellington; the forces, there employed, -would have done better service under his immediate -command, and many severe financial difficulties to -say nothing of political crosses would have been -spared.</p> - -<p>In the night of the 26th Soult quitting Seville, -commenced his march by Ossuna and Antequera, -towards Grenada; but now Wellington’s orders had -set all the allied troops of Andalusia and Estremadura -in motion. Hill advanced against Drouet; -Ballesteros moved by the Ronda mountains to hang -on the retiring enemy’s flanks; the expedition sent -by sea to succour him, returned from Valencia; -colonel Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon disembarked -with four thousand English and Spanish troops, at -Huelva, and marching upon St. Lucar Mayor, drove -the enemy from thence, on the 24th. The 27th -they fell upon the French rear-guard at Seville, -and the suburb of Triana, the bridge, and the streets -beyond, were soon carried, by the English guards -and Downie’s legion. Two hundred prisoners,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243"></a>[243]</span> -several guns and many stores were taken, but -Downie himself was wounded and made prisoner, -and treated very harshly, because the populace rising -in aid of the allies had mutilated the French soldiers -who fell into their hands. Scarcely was Seville taken, -when seven thousand French infantry came up from -Chiclana, but thinking all Hill’s troops were before -them, instead of attacking Skerrit hastily followed -their own army, leaving the allies masters of the city. -But this attack though successful, was isolated and -contrary to lord Wellington’s desire. A direct and -vigorous assault upon the lines of Chiclana by the -whole of the Anglo-Spanish garrison was his plan, -and such an assault, when the French were abandoning -their works there, would have been a far -heavier blow to Soult.</p> - -<p>That commander was now too strong to be meddled -with. He issued eight days’ bread to his army, -marched very leisurely, picked up on his route the -garrisons and troops who came into him at Antequera, -from the Ronda and from the coast; and at Grenada -he halted eleven days to give Drouet time to join him, -for the latter quitting Estremadura the 25th by the -Cordova passes, was marching by Jaen to Huescar. -Ballesteros had harassed the march, but the French -general had, with an insignificant loss, united seventy-two -guns and forty-five thousand soldiers -under arms, of which six thousand were cavalry. -He was however still in the midst of enemies. -On his left flank was Hill; on his right flank -was Ballesteros; Wellington himself might come -down by the Despenas Perros; the Murcians were -in his front, Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon behind him, -and he was clogged with enormous convoys; his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244"></a>[244]</span> -sick and maimed men alone amounted to nearly -nine thousand; his Spanish soldiers were deserting -daily, and it was necessary to provide for several -hundreds of Spanish families who were attached -to the French interests. To march upon the city -of Murcia was the direct, and the best route for -Valencia; but the yellow fever raged there and at -Carthagena; moreover, Don S. Bracco, the English -consul at Murcia, a resolute man, declared -his resolution to inundate the country if the -French advanced. Wherefore again issuing eight<span class="sidenote9">September</span> -days’ bread Soult marched by the mountain ways -leading from Huescar to Cehejin, and Calasparra, -and then moving by Hellin, gained Almanza on -the great road to Madrid, his flank being covered -by a detachment from Suchet’s army which skirmished -with Maitland’s advanced posts at San -Vicente close to Alicant. At Hellin he met the -advanced guard of the army of Aragon, and on -the 3rd of October the military junction of all the -French forces was effected.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">October.</span> -The task was thus completed, and in a manner -worthy of so great a commander. For it must be -recollected that besides the drawing together of the -different divisions, the march itself was three hundred -miles, great part through mountain roads, and -the population was every where hostile. General -Hill had menaced him with twenty-five thousand -men, including Morillo and Penne Villemur’s forces; -Ballesteros, reinforced from Cadiz, and by the deserters, -had nearly twenty thousand; there were -fourteen thousand soldiers still in the Isla; Skerrit -and Cruz Murgeon had four thousand, and the -Partidas were in all parts numerous: yet from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245"></a>[245]</span> -midst of these multitudes the duke of Dalmatia -carried off his army his convoys and his sick -without any disaster. In this manner Andalusia, -which had once been saved by the indirect influence -of a single march, made by Moore from -Salamanca, was, such is the complexity of war, -after three years’ subjection, recovered by the indirect -effect of a single battle delivered by Wellington -close to the same city.</p> - -<p>During these transactions Maitland’s proceedings -had been anxiously watched by Wellington; for -though the recovery of Andalusia was, both politically -and militarily, a great gain, the result, he saw, must -necessarily be hurtful to the ultimate success of his -campaign by bringing together such powerful forces. -He still thought that regular operations would not -so effectually occupy Suchet, as a littoral warfare, -yet he was contented that Maitland should try his -own plan, and he advised that general to march -by the coast, and have constant communication -with the fleet, referring to his own campaign -against Junot in 1808 as an example to be followed. -But, the coast roads were difficult, the -access for the fleet uncertain; and though the same -obstacles, and the latter perhaps in a greater degree, -had occurred in Portugal, the different constitution -of the armies, and still more of the generals, -was an insuperable bar to a like proceeding in -Valencia.</p> - -<p>General Maitland only desired to quit his command, -and the more so that the time appointed by -lord William Bentinck for the return of the troops -to Sicily was approaching. The moment was critical, -but Wellington without hesitation forbade<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246"></a>[246]</span> -their departure, and even asked the ministers to -place them under his own command. Meanwhile -with the utmost gentleness and delicacy, he showed -to Maitland, who was a man of high honour, courage, -and feeling, although inexperienced in command, -and now heavily oppressed with illness, -that his situation was by no means dangerous;—that -the entrenched camp of Alicant might be -safely defended,—that he was comparatively better -off than Wellington himself had been when in the -lines of Torres Vedras, and that it was even desirable -that the enemy should attack him on such -strong ground, because the Spaniards when joined -with English soldiers in a secure position would -certainly fight. He also desired that Carthagena -should be well looked to by general Ross lest Soult -should turn aside to surprise it. Then taking advantage -of Elio’s fear of Soult he drew him with -the army that had been O’Donel’s towards Madrid -and so got some controul over his operations.</p> - -<p>If the English general had been well furnished -with money at this time, and if the yellow fever -had not raged in Murcia, it is probable he would -have followed Joseph rapidly, and rallying all the -scattered Spanish forces, and the Sicilian armament -on his own army, have endeavoured to crush -the king and Suchet before Soult could arrive; or -he might have formed a junction with Hill at Despenas -Perros and so have fallen on Soult himself, -during his march, although such an operation would -have endangered his line of communication on the -Duero. But these obstacles induced him to avoid -operations in the south, which would have involved -him in new and immense combinations, until he had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247"></a>[247]</span> -secured his northern line of operations by the capture -of Burgos, meaning then with his whole army -united to attack the enemy in the south.</p> - -<p>However he could not stir from Madrid until he -was certain that Soult would relinquish Andalusia, -and this was not made clear before Cordoba was -abandoned. Then Hill was ordered to advance on -Zalamea de la Serena, where he commanded equally, -the passes leading to Cordoba in front, those leading -to La Mancha on the left, and those leading by -Truxillo to the Tagus in the rear; so that he could -at pleasure either join Wellington, follow Drouet -towards Grenada, or interpose between Soult and -Madrid, if he should turn towards the Despenas -Perros: meanwhile Skerrit’s troops were marching -to join him, and the rest of the Anglo-Portuguese -garrison of Cadiz sailed to Lisbon, with intent to -join Wellington by the regular line of operations.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">August.</span> -During these transactions the affairs in Old -Castile had become greatly deranged, for where -Wellington was not, the French warfare generally -assumed a severe and menacing aspect. Castaños -had, in person, conducted the siege of Astorga, after -the battle of Salamanca, yet with so little vigour, -that it appeared rather a blockade than a siege. -The forts at Toro and Zamora had also been -invested, the first by the Partidas, the second by Silveira’s -militia, who with great spirit had passed their -own frontier, although well aware that they could -not be legally compelled to do so. Thus all the -French garrisons abandoned by Clauzel’s retreat -were endangered, and though the slow progress of -the Spaniards before Astorga was infinitely disgraceful -to their military prowess, final success -seemed certain.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248"></a>[248]</span></p> - -<p>General H. Clinton was at Cuellar, Santo Cildes -occupied Valladolid, Anson’s cavalry was in the -valley of the Esqueva, and the front looked fair -enough. But in the rear the line of communication, -as far as the frontier of Portugal, was in great disorder; -the discipline of the army was deteriorating -rapidly, and excesses were committed on all the -routes. A detachment of Portuguese, not more -than a thousand strong, either instigated by want -or by their hatred of the Spaniards, had perpetrated -such enormities on their march from Pinhel to -Salamanca, that as an example, five were executed -and many others severely punished by stripes, yet -even this did not check the growing evil, the origin -of which may be partly traced to the license at the -storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, but -principally to the sufferings of the soldiers.</p> - -<p>All the hospitals in the rear were crowded, and Salamanca -itself, in which there were six thousand sick -and wounded, besides French prisoners, was the very -abode of misery. The soldiers endured much during -the first two or three days after the battle, and the inferior -officers’ sufferings were still more heavy and -protracted. They had no money, and many sold their -horses and other property to sustain life; some actually -died of want, and though Wellington, hearing of this, -gave orders that they should be supplied from the -purveyor’s stores in the same manner as the soldiers, -the relief came late. It is a common, yet erroneous -notion, that the English system of hospitals in -the Peninsula was admirable, and that the French -hospitals were neglected. Strenuous and unceasing -exertions were made by lord Wellington and the -chiefs of the medical staff to form good hospital -establishments, but the want of money, and still<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249"></a>[249]</span> -more the want of previous institutions, foiled their -utmost efforts. Now there was no point of warfare -which more engaged Napoleon’s attention than the -care of his sick and wounded; and he being monarch -as well as general, furnished his hospitals with all -things requisite, even with luxuries. Under his -fostering care also, baron Larrey justly celebrated, -were it for this alone, organized the establishment -called the hospital “<em>Ambulance</em>;” that is to say, -waggons of a peculiar construction, well horsed, -served by men trained and incorporated as soldiers, -and subject to a strict discipline. Rewarded for their -courage and devotion like other soldiers they were -always at hand, and whether in action or on a march, -ready to pick up, to salve, and to carry off wounded -men; and the astonishing rapidity with which the -fallen French soldiers disappeared from a field of -battle attested the excellence of the institution.</p> - -<p>But in the British army, the carrying off the -wounded, depended, partly upon the casual assistance -of a weak waggon train, very badly disciplined, -furnishing only three waggons to a division, and not -originally appropriated to that service; partly upon -the spare commissariat animals, but principally upon -the resources of the country, whether of bullock-carts, -mules, or donkeys, and hence the most doleful -scenes after a battle, or when an hospital was to be -evacuated. The increasing numbers of the sick -and wounded as the war enlarged, also pressed on -the limited number of regular medical officers, -and Wellington complained, that when he demanded -more, the military medical board in London -neglected his demands, and thwarted his arrangements. -Shoals of hospital mates and students -were indeed sent out, and they arrived for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250"></a>[250]</span> -most part ignorant alike of war, and their own profession; -while a heterogeneous mass of purveyors -and their subordinates, acting without any military -organization or effectual superintendence, continually -bade defiance to the exertions of those medical -officers, and they were many, whose experience, -zeal, and talents would, with a good institution to -work upon, have rendered this branch of the service -most distinguished. Nay, many even of the well-educated -surgeons sent out were for some time of -little use, for superior professional skill is of little -value in comparison of experience in military -arrangement; where one soldier dies from the want -of a delicate operation, hundreds perish from the -absence of military arrangement. War tries the -strength of the military frame-work; it is in peace -that the frame-work itself must be formed, otherwise -barbarians would be the leading soldiers of -the world; a perfect army can only be made by -civil institutions, and those, rightly considered, -would tend to confine the horrors of war to the field -of battle, which would be the next best thing to the -perfection of civilization that would prevent war -altogether.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs on the allies’ line of -communication, when, on the 14th of August, Clauzel -suddenly came down the Pisuerga. Anson’s -cavalry immediately recrossed the Duero at Tudela, -Santo Cildes, following Wellington’s instructions, -fell back to Torrelobaton, and on the 18th the -French assembled at Valladolid to the number of<span class="sidenote">Clauzel’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, -and fifty guns well provided with ammunition. Five -thousand stragglers, who in the confusion of defeat -had fled to Burgos and Vittoria, were also collected<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251"></a>[251]</span> -and in march to join. Clauzel’s design was to be -at hand when Joseph, reinforced from the south, -should drive Wellington from Madrid, for he -thought the latter must then retire by Avila, and -the Valle de Ambles, and he purposed to gain -the mountains of Avila himself, and harass the -English general’s flank. Meanwhile Foy proposed -with two divisions of infantry and sixteen hundred<span class="sidenote">Foy’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -cavalry, to succour the garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and -Astorga, and Clauzel consented, though he appears -to have been somewhat fearful of this dangerous experiment, -and did not believe Astorga was so near -its fall.</p> - -<p>Foy wished to march on the 15th by Placentia, -yet he was not dispatched until the evening of the -17th, and then by the line of Toro, the garrison of -which place he carried off in passing. The 19th -he sabred some of the Spanish rear-guard at Castro -Gonzalo, on the Esla; the 20th, at three o’clock -in the evening, he reached La Baneza, but was -mortified to learn, that Castaños, by an artful -negociation had, the day before, persuaded the -garrison of Astorga, twelve hundred good troops, -to surrender, although there was no breach, and the -siege was actually being raised at the time. The -Gallicians being safe in their mountains, the French -general turned to the left, and marched upon Carvajales, -hoping to enclose Silveira’s militia, between -the Duero and the Esla, and sweep them off in his<span class="sidenote">Foy’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -course; then relieving Zamora, he purposed to penetrate -to Salamanca, and seize the trophies of the Arapiles. -And this would infallibly have happened, but<span class="sidenote">Sir H. Douglas’s papers, MSS.</span> -for the judicious activity of sir Howard Douglas, who, -divining Foy’s object, sent Silveira with timeful notice -into Portugal; yet so critical was the movement that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252"></a>[252]</span> -Foy’s cavalry skirmished with the Portuguese rear-guard -near Constantin at day-break on the 24th. -The 25th the French entered Zamora, but Wellington -was now in movement upon Arevalo, and -Clauzel recalled Foy at the moment when his infantry -were actually in march upon Salamanca to -seize the trophies, and his cavalry was moving by -Ledesma, to break up the line of communication -with Ciudad Rodrigo.</p> - -<p>That Foy was thus able to disturb the line of -communication was certainly Clinton’s error. Wellington -left eighteen thousand men, exclusive of -the troops besieging Astorga, to protect his flank and -rear, and he had a right to think it enough, because -he momentarily expected Astorga to fall, and the -French army, a beaten one, was then in full retreat. -It is true none of the French garrisons yielded before -Clauzel returned, but Clinton alone had eight -thousand good troops, and might with the aid of -Santo Cildes and the partidas, have baffled the -French; he might even have menaced Valladolid, -after Foy’s departure, which would have certainly -brought that general back. And if he dared not -venture so much, he should, following his instructions, -have regulated his movements along the left -of the Duero, so as to be always in a condition to -protect Salamanca; that is, he should have gone to -Olmedo when Clauzel first occupied Valladolid, -but he retired to Arevalo, which enabled Foy to -advance.</p> - -<p>The mere escape of the garrisons, from Toro and -Zamora, was by the English general thought no -misfortune. It would have cost him a long march -and two sieges in the hottest season to have reduced -them, which, in the actual state of affairs, was more<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253"></a>[253]</span> -than they were worth; yet, to use his own words, -“<em>it was not very encouraging to find, that the best -Spanish army was unable to stand before the remains -of Marmont’s beaten troops; that in more than two -months, it had been unable even to breach Astorga, -and that all important operations must still be performed -by the British troops</em>.” The Spaniards, -now in the fifth year of the war, were still in the -state described by sir John Moore, “<em>without an -army, without a government, without a general!</em>”</p> - -<p>While these events were passing in Castile -Popham’s armament remained on the Biscay coast, -and the partidas thus encouraged became so active, -that with exception of Santona and Gueteria, all the -littoral posts were abandoned by Caffarelli; Porlier, -Renovalles, and Mendizabel, the nominal commanders -of all the bands, immediately took possession -of Castro, Santander, and even of Bilbao, and though -general Rouget came from Vittoria to recover the -last, he was after some sharp fighting obliged to -retire again to Durango. Meanwhile Reille, deluded -by a rumour that Wellington was marching -through the centre of Spain upon Zaragoza, abandoned -several important outposts, Aragon, hitherto -so tranquil, became unquiet, and all the northern -provinces were ripe for insurrection.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254"></a>[254]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXIX_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. August.</span> -While the various military combinations, described -in the foregoing chapter, were thickening, Wellington, -as we have seen, remained in Madrid, apparently -inactive, but really watching the fitting -moment to push his operations, and consolidate -his success in the north, preparatory to the execution -of his designs in the south. The result was -involved in a mixed question, of time, and of combinations -dependant upon his central position, and -upon the activity of the partidas in cutting off all correspondence -between the French armies. His mode -of paralyzing Suchet’s and Caffarelli’s armies, by -the Sicilian armament in the east and Popham’s -armament in the north, has been already described, -but his internal combinations, to oppose the united -forces of Soult and the king, were still more important -and extensive.</p> - -<p>When it was certain that Soult had actually abandoned -Andalusia, Hill was directed upon Toledo, by -the bridge of Almaraz, and colonel Sturgeon’s genius -had rendered that stupendous ruin, although more -lofty than Alcantara, passable for artillery. Elio -also was induced to bring the army of Murcia to the -same quarter, and Ballesteros was desired to take -post on the mountain of Alcaraz, and look to the -fortress of Chinchilla, which, situated at the confines<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255"></a>[255]</span> -of Murcia and La Mancha, and perched on a rugged -isolated hill in a vast plain, was peculiarly strong -both from construction and site, and it was the knot -of all the great lines of communication. The partizan -corps of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, -were desired to enter La Mancha, and thus, -as Hill could bring up above twenty thousand men, -and as the third, fourth, and light divisions, two -brigades of cavalry, and Carlos D’España’s troops, -were to remain near Madrid, whilst the rest of the -army marched into Old Castile, above sixty thousand -men, thirty thousand being excellent troops -and well commanded, would have been assembled, -with the fortified post of Chinchilla in front, before -Soult could unite with the king.</p> - -<p>The British troops at Carthagena were directed, -when Soult should have passed that city, to leave -only small garrisons in the forts there, and join the -army at Alicant, which with the reinforcements -from Sicily, would then be sixteen thousand strong, -seven thousand being British troops. While this -force was at Alicant Wellington judged that the -French could not bring more than fifty thousand -against Madrid without risking the loss of Valencia -itself. Not that he expected the heterogeneous -mass he had collected could resist on a fair field -the veteran and powerfully constituted army which -would finally be opposed to them; but he calculated -that ere the French generals could act seriously, the -rivers would be full, and Hill could then hold his -ground, sufficiently long to enable the army to -come back from Burgos. Indeed he had little -doubt of reducing that place, and being again on -the Tagus in time to take the initial movements -himself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256"></a>[256]</span></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the allies had several lines of operation.</p> - -<p>Ballasteros from the mountains of Alcaraz, could -harass the flanks of the advancing French, and -when they passed, could unite with Maitland to -overpower Suchet.</p> - -<p>Hill could retire if pressed, by Madrid, or by -Toledo, and could either gain the passes of the -Guadarama or the valley of the Tagus.</p> - -<p>Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecour, and the Empecinado -could act by Cuenca and Requeña against -Suchet, or against Madrid if the French followed -Hill obstinately; or they could join Ballesteros. -And besides all these forces, there were ten or twelve -thousand new Spanish levies in the Isla waiting for -clothing and arms which under the recent treaty -were to come from England.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -To lord Wellington, the English ministers had -nominally confided the distribution of these succours, -but following their usual vicious manner of -doing business, they also gave Mr. Stuart a controul -over it, without Wellington’s knowledge, and -hence the stores, expected by the latter at Lisbon -or Cadiz, were by Stuart unwittingly directed to -Coruña, with which place the English general had -no secure communication; moreover there were -very few Spanish levies there, and no confidential -person to superintend the delivery of them. Other -political crosses, which shall be noticed in due -time, he also met with, but it will suffice here to -say that the want of money was an evil now become -intolerable. The army was many months in -arrears; those officers who went to the rear sick -suffered the most cruel privations, and those who -remained in Madrid, tempted by the pleasures of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257"></a>[257]</span> -the capital, obtained some dollars at an exorbitant -premium from a money-broker, and it was -grievously suspected that his means resulted from -the nefarious proceedings of an under commissary; -but the soldiers, equally tempted, having no such -resource, plundered the stores of the Retiro. In -fine, discipline became relaxed throughout the -army, and the troops kept in the field were gloomy, -envying those who remained at Madrid.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote9">September</span> -That city exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and -desolation. When it was first entered a violent, -cruel, and unjust persecution of those who were -called “<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">Afrancesados</i>,” was commenced, and continued, -until the English general interfered, and as -an example made no distinction in his invitations -to the palace feasts. Truly it was not necessary to -increase the sufferings of the miserable people, -for though the markets were full of provisions, -there was no money wherewith to buy; and though -the houses were full of rich furniture, there were -neither purchasers nor lenders; even noble families -secretly sought charity that they might live. At -night the groans, and stifled cries of famishing -people were heard, and every morning emaciated -dead bodies, cast into the streets, shewed why those -cries had ceased. The calm resignation with which -these terrible sufferings were borne was a distinctive -mark of the national character; not many begged, -none complained, there was no violence, no reproaches, -very few thefts; the allies lost a few -animals, nothing more, and these were generally -thought to be taken by robbers from the country. -But with this patient endurance of calamity the -“<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">Madrileños</i>” discovered a deep and unaffected -gratitude for kindness received at the hands of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258"></a>[258]</span> -British officers who contributed, not much for they -had it not, but, enough of money to form soup charities -by which hundreds were succoured. It was -the third division, and I believe the forty-fifth regiment -which set the example, and surely this is not -the least of the many honourable distinctions those -brave men have earned.</p> - -<p>Wellington desirous of obtaining shelter from the -extreme heat for his troops, had early sent four -divisions and the cavalry, to the Escurial and St. -Ildefonso, from whence they could join Hill by the -valley of the Tagus, or Clinton by Arevalo; but -when he knew that the king’s retreat upon Valencia -was decided, that Soult had abandoned Cordoba, -and that Clinton was falling back before Clauzel, -he ordered the first, fifth, and seventh divisions, -Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese brigades, Ponsonby’s -light horsemen, and the heavy German -cavalry, to move rapidly upon Arevalo, and on the -1st of September quitted Madrid himself to take -the command. Yet his army had been so diminished -by sickness that only twenty-one thousand -men, including three thousand cavalry, were assembled -in that town, and he had great difficulty -to feed the Portuguese soldiers, who were also very -ill equipped.</p> - -<p>The regency instead of transmitting money and -stores to supply their troops, endeavoured to throw -off the burthen entirely by an ingenious device; -for having always had a running account with the -Spanish government, they now made a treaty, by -which the Spaniards were to feed the Portuguese -troops, and check off the expense on the national -account which was then in favour of the Portuguese; -that is, the soldiers were to starve under the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259"></a>[259]</span> -sanction of this treaty, because the Spaniards could -not feed their own men, and would not, if they -could, have fed the Portuguese. Neither could -the latter take provisions from the country, because -Wellington demanded the resources of the valleys -of the Duero and Pisuerga for the English soldiers, -as a set-off against the money advanced by sir -Henry Wellesley to the Spanish regency at Cadiz. -Wherefore to force the Portuguese regency from -this shameful expedient he stopped the payments -of their subsidy from the chest of aids. Then the -old discontents and disputes revived and acquired -new force; the regency became more intractable -than ever, and the whole military system of Portugal -was like to fall to pieces.</p> - -<p>On the 4th the allies quitted Arevalo, the 6th -they passed the Duero by the ford above Puente de -Duero, the 7th they entered Valladolid, and meanwhile -the Gallicians, who had returned to the Esla, -when Foy retreated, were ordered to join the -Anglo-Portuguese army. Clauzel abandoned Valladolid -in the night of the 6th, and though closely -followed by Ponsonby’s cavalry, crossed the Pisuerga -and destroyed the bridge of Berecal on that river. -The 8th the allies halted, for rest, and to await -the arrival of Castaños; but seldom during this -war did a Spanish general deviate into activity; -and Wellington observed that in his whole intercourse -with that people, from the beginning of the -revolution to that moment, he had not met with an -able Spaniard, while amongst the Portuguese he -had found several. The Gallicians came not, and -the French retreated slowly up the beautiful -Pisuerga and Arlanzan valleys, which, in denial -of the stories about French devastation, were carefully<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260"></a>[260]</span> -cultivated and filled to repletion with corn, -wine, and oil.</p> - -<p>Nor were they deficient in military strength. -Off the high road, on both sides, ditches and rivulets -impeded the troops, while cross ridges continually -furnished strong parallel positions flanked -by the lofty hills on either side. In these valleys -Clauzel baffled his great adversary in the most surprising -manner. Each day he offered battle, but -on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail -in front, partly because he momentarily expected -the Gallicians up, but chiefly because of -the declining state of his own army from sickness, -which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations -in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. -By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet -each day darkness fell ere they were completed, and -the morning’s sun always saw Clauzel again in -position. At Cigales and Dueñas, in the Pisuerga -valley; at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, -Vallejera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzan, -the French general thus offered battle, and -finally covered Burgos on the 16th, by taking the -strong position of Cellada del Camino.</p> - -<p>But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred -cavalry, and eight guns, had now joined the -allies, and Wellington would have attacked frankly -on the 17th, had not Clauzel, alike wary and skilful, -observed the increased numbers and retired in the -night to Frandovinez; his rear-guard was however -next day pushed sharply back to the heights of -Burgos, and in the following night he passed through -that town leaving behind him large stores of grain. -Caffarelli who had come down to place the castle of -Burgos in a state of defence, now joined him, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261"></a>[261]</span> -the two generals retreated upon Briviesca, where -they were immediately reinforced by that reserve -which, with such an extraordinary foresight, the -emperor had directed to be assembled and exercised -on the Pyrennees, in anticipation of Marmont’s -disaster. The allies entered Burgos amidst great -confusion, for the garrison of the castle had set fire -to some houses impeding the defence of the fortress, -the conflagration spread widely, and the Partidas -who were already gathered like wolves round a carcass, -entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, -an eye-witness, and not unused to scenes of war, thus -describes their proceedings, “What with the flames -and the plundering of the Guerillas, who are as -bad as Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or -Zagatay hordes, I was afraid Burgos would be -entirely destroyed, but order was at length restored -by the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava.”</p> - -<p>The series of beautiful movements executed by -Clauzel, merit every praise, but it may be questioned -if the English general’s marches were in the -true direction, or made in good time; for though -Clinton’s retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not -absolutely dictate the line of operations. Wellington -had expected Clauzel’s advance to Valladolid; it -was therefore no surprise, and on the 26th of August, -Foy was still at Zamora. At that period the English -general might have had his army, Clinton’s troops -excepted, at Segovia; and as the distance from -thence to Valladolid, is rather less than from Valladolid -to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former, -Clinton advancing at the same time, might have -separated Clauzel from Foy. Again, Wellington -might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262"></a>[262]</span> -Duero and Lerma, that road being as short as by -Valladolid; he might also have brought forward -the third, or the light division, by the Somosierra, -from Madrid, and directed Clinton and the Spaniards -to close upon the French rear. He would -thus have turned the valleys of the Pisuerga and -the Arlanzan, and could from Aranda, or Lerma, -have fallen upon Clauzel while in march. That -general having Clinton and the Gallicians on his rear, -and Wellington, reinforced by the divisions from -Madrid, on his front or flank, would then have had -to fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. -In fine the object was to crush Clauzel, and this -should have been effected though Madrid had been -entirely abandoned to secure success. It is however -probable that want of money and means of -transport decided the line of operations, for the -route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, -and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid -was from hand to mouth, or painfully supported by -convoys from Portugal.</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.</h4> - -<p>Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, -besides artillery-men, in this place, and general -Dubreton the governor, was of such courage and skill -that he surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine -and warlike countryman. The castle and its works -enclosed a rugged hill, between which and the -river, the city of Burgos was situated. An old -wall with a new parapet and flanks constructed<span class="sidenote">Colonel Jones’s Sieges, 2nd edit.</span> -by the French offered the first line of defence; -the second line, which was within the other, was -earthen, of the nature of a field retrenchment and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263"></a>[263]</span> -well palisaded; the third line was similarly constructed -and contained the two most elevated -points of the hill, on one of which was an entrenched -building called the White Church, and on -the other the ancient keep of the castle; this last -was the highest point, and was not only entrenched -but surmounted with a heavy casemated work called -the Napoleon battery. Thus there were five separate -enclosures.</p> - -<p>The Napoleon battery commanded every thing -around it, save to the north, where at the distance -of three hundred yards there was a second height -scarcely less elevated than that of the fortress. -It was called the Hill of San Michael, and was -defended by a large horn-work with a hard sloping -scarp twenty-five, and a counterscarp ten feet -high. This outwork was unfinished and only closed<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_4">Plan 4.</a></span> -by strong palisades, but it was under the fire of -the Napoleon battery, was well flanked by the -castle defences, and covered in front by slight -entrenchments for the out picquets. The French -had already mounted nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, -and six mortars or howitzers in the fortress, -and as the reserve artillery and stores of the army -of Portugal were also deposited there, they could -increase their armament.</p> - - -<h4>FIRST ASSAULT.</h4> - -<p>The batteries so completely commanded all -the bridges and fords over the Arlanzan that two -days elapsed ere the allies could cross; but -on the 19th the passage of the river being -effected above the town, by the first division, -major Somers Cocks, supported by Pack’s Portuguese,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264"></a>[264]</span> -drove in the French outposts on the hill -of San Michael. In the night, the same troops, -reinforced with the forty-second regiment, stormed -the horn-work. The conflict was murderous. For -though the ladders were fairly placed by the bearers -of them, the storming column, which, covered -by a firing party, marched against the front, was -beaten with great loss, and the attack would have -failed if the gallant leader of the seventy-ninth -had not meanwhile forced an entrance by the -gorge. The garrison was thus actually cut off, -but Cocks, though followed by the second battalion -of the forty-second regiment, was not closely -supported, and the French being still five hundred -strong, broke through his men and escaped. This -assault gave room for censure, the troops complained -of each other, and the loss was above four -hundred, while that of the enemy was less than -one hundred and fifty.</p> - -<p>Wellington was now enabled to examine the -defences of the castle. He found them feeble and -incomplete, and yet his means were so scant that -he had slender hopes of success, and relied more -upon the enemy’s weakness than upon his own -power. It was however said that water was scarce -with the garrison and that their provision magazines -could be burned, wherefore encouraged by this information -he adopted the following plan of attack.</p> - -<p>Twelve thousand men composing the first and -sixth divisions and the two Portuguese brigades, -were to undertake the works; the rest of the -troops, about twenty thousand, exclusive of the -Partidas, were to form the covering army.</p> - -<p>The trenches were to be opened from the suburb<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265"></a>[265]</span> -of San Pedro, and a parallel formed in the direction -of the hill of San Michael.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">Jones’s Sieges.</span> -A battery for five guns was to be established -close to the right of the captured horn-work.</p> - -<p>A sap was to be pushed from the parallel as near -the first wall as possible, without being seen into -from the upper works, and from thence the engineer -was to proceed by gallery and mine.</p> - -<p>When the first mine should be completed, the -battery on the hill of San Michael was to open -against the second line of defence, and the -assault was to be given on the first line. If a -lodgement was formed, the approaches were to be -continued against the second line, and the battery -on San Michael was to be turned against the third -line, in front of the White Church, because the -defences there were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile -a trench for musketry was to be dug along -the brow of San Michael, and a concealed battery -was to be prepared within the horn-work itself, -with a view to the final attack of the Napoleon -battery.</p> - -<p>The head-quarters were fixed at Villa Toro, -colonel Burgoyne conducted the operations of the -engineers, colonel Robe and colonel Dickson those -of the artillery, which consisted of three eighteen-pounders, -and the five iron twenty-four-pound -howitzers used at the siege of the Salamanca forts; -and it was with regard to these slender means, -rather than the defects of the fortress, that the line -of attack was chosen.</p> - -<p>When the horn-work fell a lodgement had been -immediately commenced in the interior, and it was -continued vigorously, although under a destructive<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266"></a>[266]</span> -fire from the Napoleon battery, because the besiegers -feared the enemy would at day-light endeavour -to retake the work by the gorge; good -cover was, however, obtained in the night, and the -first battery was also begun.</p> - -<p>The 21st the garrison mounted several fresh -field-guns, and at night kept up a heavy fire of -grape, and shells, on the workmen who were digging -the musketry trench in front of the first -battery.</p> - -<p>The 22d the fire of the besieged was redoubled, -but the besiegers worked with little loss, and their -musketeers galled the enemy. In the night the -first battery was armed with two eighteen-pounders -and three howitzers, and the secret battery within -the horn-work was commenced; but lord Wellington, -deviating from his first plan, now resolved -to try an escalade against the first line of defence. -He selected a point half-way between the suburb -of San Pedro and the horn-work, and at midnight -four hundred men provided with ladders were -secretly posted, in a hollow road, fifty yards from -the wall, which was from twenty-three to twenty-five -feet high but had no flanks; this was the -main column, and a Portuguese battalion was also -assembled in the town of Burgos to make a combined -flank attack on that side.</p> - - -<h4>SECOND ASSAULT.</h4> - -<p>The storm was commenced by the Portuguese, -but they were repelled by the fire of the common -guard alone, and the principal escalading party -which was composed of detachments from different -regiments under major Lawrie 79th regiment,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267"></a>[267]</span> -though acting with more courage, had as little -success. The ladders were indeed placed, and the -troops entered the ditch, yet all together, and confusedly; -Lawrie was killed and the bravest soldiers -who first mounted the ladders were bayonetted; -combustible missiles were then thrown down in -great abundance, and after a quarter of an hour’s -resistance, the men gave way, leaving half their -number behind. The wounded were brought off<span class="sidenote">Lord Wellesley’s speech, House of Lords, 12th March 1813.</span> -the next day under a truce. It is said that on the -body of one of the officers killed the French found -a complete plan of the siege, and it is certain that -this disastrous attempt, which delayed the regular -progress of the siege for two days, increased the -enemy’s courage, and produced a bad effect upon -the allied troops, some of whom were already dispirited -by the attack on the horn-work.</p> - -<p>The original plan being now resumed, the hollow -way from whence the escaladers had advanced, -and which at only fifty yards’ distance run along -the front of defence, was converted into a parallel, -and connected with the suburb of San Pedro. -The trenches were made deep and narrow to secure -them from the plunging shot of the castle, and -musketeers were also planted to keep down the -enemy’s fire; but heavy rains incommoded the -troops, and though the allied marksmen got the -mastery over those of the French immediately in -their front, the latter, having a raised <ins class="corr" id="tn-267" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'and pallisaded work'"> -and palisaded work</ins> on their own right which in some<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_4">Plan 4.</a></span> -measure flanked the approaches, killed so many of -the besiegers that the latter were finally withdrawn.</p> - -<p>In the night a flying sap was commenced, from -the right of the parallel, and was pushed within<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268"></a>[268]</span> -twenty yards of the enemy’s first line of defence; -but the directing engineer was killed, and with him -many men, for the French plied their musketry -sharply, and rolled large shells down the steep -side of the hill. The head of the sap was indeed -so commanded as it approached the wall, that a six-feet -trench, added to the height of the gabion -above, scarcely protected the workmen, wherefore -the gallery of the mine was opened, and worked -as rapidly as the inexperience of the miners, who -were merely volunteers from the line, would permit.</p> - -<p>The concealed battery within the horn-work of -San Michael being now completed, two eighteen-pounders -were removed from the first battery to -arm it, and they were replaced by two iron howitzers, -which opened upon the advanced palisade -below, to drive the French marksmen from that -point; but after firing one hundred and forty -rounds without success this project was relinquished, -and ammunition was so scarce that the -soldiers were paid to collect the enemy’s bullets.</p> - -<p>This day also a zigzag was commenced in front -of the first battery and down the face of San Michael, -to obtain footing for a musketry trench to overlook -the enemy’s defences below; and though the workmen -were exposed to the whole fire of the castle, -at the distance of two hundred yards, and were -knocked down fast, the work went steadily on.</p> - -<p>On the 26th the gallery of the mine was advanced -eighteen feet, and the soil was found favourable, -but the men in passing the sap, were hit -fast by the French marksmen, and an assistant -engineer was killed. In the night the parallel was -prolonged on the right within twenty yards of the -enemy’s ramparts, with a view to a second gallery<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269"></a>[269]</span> -and mine, and musketeers were planted there to -oppose the enemy’s marksmen and to protect the -sap; at the same time the zigzag on the hill of -San Michael was continued, and the musket trench -there was completed under cover of gabions, and -with little loss, although the whole fire of the -castle was concentrated on the spot.</p> - -<p>The 27th the French were seen strengthening -their second line, and they had already cut a step, -along the edge of the counterscarp, for a covered -way, and had palisaded the communication. Meanwhile -the besiegers finished the musketry trench on -the right of their parallel, and opened the gallery -for the second mine; but the first mine went on -slowly, the men in the sap were galled and disturbed, -by stones, grenades, and small shells, -which the French threw into the trenches by hand; -and the artillery fire also knocked over the gabions -of the musketry trench, on San Michael, so fast, -that the troops were withdrawn during the day.</p> - -<p>In the night a trench of communication forming -a second parallel behind the first was begun and -nearly completed from the hill of San Michael -towards the suburb of San Pedro, and the musketry -trench on the hill was deepened.</p> - -<p>The 28th an attempt was made to perfect this -new parallel of communication, but the French -fire was heavy, and the shells, which passed over, -came rolling down the hill again into the trench, so -the work was deferred until night and was then -perfected. The back roll of the shells continued -indeed to gall the troops, but the whole of this -trench, that in front of the horn-work above, and -that on the right of the parallel below, were filled -with men whose fire was incessant. Moreover<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270"></a>[270]</span> -the first mine was now completed and loaded -with more than a thousand weight of powder, the -gallery was strongly tamped for fifteen feet with -bags of clay, and all being ready for the explosion -Wellington ordered the</p> - - -<h4>THIRD ASSAULT.</h4> - -<p>At midnight the hollow road, fifty yards from -the mine, was lined with troops to fire on the defences, -and three hundred men, composing the -storming party, were assembled there, attended by -others who carried tools and materials to secure the -lodgement when the breach should be carried. The -mine was then exploded, the wall fell, and an -officer with twenty men rushed forward to the -assault. The effect of the explosion was not so -great as it ought to have been, yet it brought the -wall down, the enemy was stupified, and the forlorn -hope, consisting of a sergeant and four daring -soldiers, gained the summit of the breach, and -there stood until the French, recovering, drove them -down pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the -officer and the twenty men, who were to have been -followed by a party of fifty, and these by the remainder -of the stormers, missed the breach in the -dark, and finding the wall unbroken, returned, and -reported that there was no breach. The main body -immediately regained the trenches, and before the -sergeant and his men returned with streaming -wounds to tell their tale, the enemy was reinforced; -and such was the scarcity of ammunition that no -artillery practice could be directed against the -breach, during the night; hence the French were -enabled to raise a parapet behind it and to place<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271"></a>[271]</span> -obstacles on the ascent which deterred the besiegers -from renewing the assault at day-light.</p> - -<p>This failure arose from the darkness of the night, -and the want of a conducting engineer, for out of -four regular officers, of that branch, engaged in the -siege, one had been killed, one badly wounded, and -one was sick, wherefore the remaining one was -necessarily reserved for the conducting of the -works. The aspect of affairs was gloomy. Twelve -days had elapsed since the siege commenced, one -assault had succeeded, two had failed, twelve -hundred men had been killed, or wounded, little -progress had been made, and the troops generally -shewed symptoms of despondency, especially the -Portuguese, who seemed to be losing their ancient -spirit. Discipline was relaxed, the soldiers wasted -ammunition, and the work in the trenches was -avoided or neglected both by officers and men; -insubordination was gaining ground, and reproachful -orders were issued, the guards only being -noticed as presenting an honourable exception.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">October.</span> -In this state it was essential to make some change -in the operations, and as the French marksmen, in -the advanced palisadoed work below, were now -become so expert that every thing which could be -seen from thence was hit, the howitzer battery on -San Michael was reinforced with a French eight-pounder, -by the aid of which this mischievous -post was at last demolished. At the same time the -gallery of the second mine was pushed forward, -and a new breaching battery for three guns was -constructed behind it, so close to the enemy’s defences -that the latter screened the work from the -artillery fire of their upper fortress; but the parapet -of the battery was only made musket-proof because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272"></a>[272]</span> -the besieged had no guns on the lower line of this -front.</p> - -<p>In the night the three eighteen-pounders were -brought from the hill of San Michael without being -discovered, and at day-light, though a very galling -fire of muskets thinned the workmen, they persevered -until nine o’clock when the battery was -finished and armed. But at that moment the -watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down from -the upper works, and with a low charge threw -shells into the battery; then making a hole through -a flank wall, he thrust out a light gun which sent -its bullets whizzing through the thin parapet at -every round, and at the same time his marksmen -plied their shot so sharply that the allies were driven -from their pieces without firing a shot. More -French cannon were now brought from the upper -works, the defences of the battery were quite demolished, -two of the gun-carriages were disabled, -a trunnion was knocked off one of the eighteen-pounders, -and the muzzle of another was split. -And it was in vain that the besiegers’ marksmen, -aided by some officers who considered themselves -good shots, endeavoured to quell the enemy’s fire, -the French being on a height were too well covered -and remained masters of the fight.</p> - -<p>In the night a second and more solid battery -was formed at a point a little to the left of the -ruined one, but at day-light the French observed it; -and their fire plunging from above made the parapet -fly off so rapidly, that the English general -relinquished his intention and returned to his -galleries and mines, and to his breaching battery -on the hill of San Michael. The two guns still -serviceable were therefore removed towards the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273"></a>[273]</span> -upper battery to beat down a retrenchment formed -by the French behind the old breach. It was intended -to have placed them on this new position in -the night of the 3d, but the weather was very wet -and stormy, and the workmen, those of the guards -only excepted, abandoned the trenches; hence at -day-light the guns were still short of their destination -and nothing more could be done until the -following night.</p> - -<p>On the 4th, at nine o’clock in the morning, the -two eighteen-pounders, and three iron howitzers, -again opened from San Michael’s, and at four o’clock -in the evening, the old breach being cleared of -all incumbrances, and the second mine being -strongly tamped for explosion, a double assault was -ordered. The second battalion of the twenty-fourth -British regiment, commanded by captain Hedderwick -was selected for this operation, and was formed -in the hollow way, having one advanced party, -under Mr. Holmes, pushed forward as close to the -new mine as it was safe to be, and a second party -under Mr. Frazer in like manner pushed towards -the old breach.</p> - - -<h4>FOURTH ASSAULT.</h4> - -<p>At five o’clock the mine was exploded with a -terrific effect, sending many of the French up into -the air and breaking down one hundred feet of the -wall, the next instant Holmes and his brave men -went rushing through the smoke and crumbling -ruins, and Frazer, as quick and brave as his -brother officer, was already fighting with the -defenders on the summit of the old breach. The -supports followed closely, and in a few minutes -both points were carried with a loss to the assailants<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274"></a>[274]</span> -of thirty-seven killed and two hundred -wounded, seven of the latter being officers and -amongst them the conducting engineer. During the -night lodgements were formed, in advance of the -old, and on the ruins of the new breach, yet very -imperfectly, and under a heavy destructive fire -from the upper defences. But this happy attack -revived the spirits of the army, vessels with powder -were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was -expected by land from Ciudad Rodrigo, and as a -supply of ammunition sent by sir Home Popham -had already reached the camp, from Santander, the -howitzers continued to knock away the palisades in -the ditch, and the battery on San Michael’s was -directed to open a third breach at a point where -the first French line of defence was joined to the -second line.</p> - -<p>This promising state of affairs was of short duration.</p> - -<p>On the 5th, at five o’clock in the evening, while -the working parties were extending the lodgements, -three hundred French came swiftly down the hill, -and sweeping away the labourers and guards from -the trenches, killed or wounded a hundred and fifty -men, got possession of the old breach, destroyed the -works, and carried off all the tools. However in -the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed -saps from each flank to meet in the centre near the -second French line, and to serve as a parallel to -check future sallies. Meanwhile the howitzers on -the San Michael continued their fire, yet ineffectually, -against the palisades; the breaching battery -in the horn-work also opened, but it was badly -constructed, and the guns being unable to see the -wall sufficiently low, soon ceased to speak, the embrasures -were therefore masked. On the other hand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275"></a>[275]</span> -the besieged were unable, from the steepness of the -castle-hill, to depress their guns sufficiently to bear -on the lodgement at the breaches in the first line, -but their musquetry was destructive, and they rolled -down large shells to retard the approaches towards -the second line.</p> - -<p>On the 7th the besiegers had got so close to -the wall below that the howitzers above could no -longer play without danger to the workmen, wherefore -two French field-pieces, taken in the horn-work, -were substituted and did good service. The breaching -battery on San Michael’s being altered, also renewed -its fire, and at five o’clock had beaten down -fifty feet from the parapet of the second line; but the -enemy’s return was heavy, and another eighteen-pounder -lost a trunnion. However in the night block-carriages -with supports for the broken trunnions -were provided, and the disabled guns were enabled -to recommence their fire yet with low charges. But -a constant rain had now filled the trenches, the -communications were injured, the workmen were -negligent, the approaches to the second line went -on slowly, and again Dubreton came thundering -down from the upper ground, driving the guards -and workmen from the new parallel at the lodgements, -levelling all the works, carrying off all the -tools, and killing or wounding two hundred men. -Colonel Cocks, promoted for his gallant conduct at -the storming of San Michael, restored the fight, and -repulsed the French, but he fell dead on the ground -he had recovered. He was a young man of a modest -demeanour, brave, thoughtful, and enterprising, -and he lived and died a good soldier.</p> - -<p>After this severe check the approaches to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276"></a>[276]</span> -second line were abandoned, and the trenches were -extended so as to embrace the whole of the fronts -attacked; the battery on San Michael had meantime -formed a practicable breach twenty-five feet wide, -and the parallel, at the old breach of the first line, -was prolonged by zigzags on the left towards this new -breach, while a trench was opened to enable marksmen -to fire upon the latter at thirty yards distance. -Nevertheless another assault could not be risked -because the great expenditure of powder had again -exhausted the magazines, and without a new supply, -the troops might have found themselves without -ammunition in front of the French army which -was now gathering head near Briviesca. Heated -shot were however thrown at the White Church with -a view to burn the magazines; and the miners were -directed to drive a gallery, on the other side of the -castle, against the church of San Roman, a building -pushed out a little beyond the French external line -of defence on the side of the city.</p> - -<p>On the 10th, when the besiegers’ ammunition was -nearly all gone, a fresh supply arrived from Santander, -but no effect had been produced upon the White -Church, and Dubreton had strengthened his works to -meet the assault; he had also isolated the new breach<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_4">Plan, No. 4.</a></span> -on one flank by a strong stockade extending at right -angles from the second to the third line of defence. -The fire from the Napoleon battery had obliged the -besiegers again to withdraw their battering guns -within the horn-work, and the attempt to burn the -White Church was relinquished, but the gallery -against San Roman was continued. In this state -things remained for several days with little change, -save that the French, maugre the musketry from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277"></a>[277]</span> -the nearest zigzag trench, had scarped eight feet at -the top of the new breach and formed a small trench -at the back.</p> - -<p>On the 15th the battery in the horn-work was -again armed, and the guns pointed to breach the -wall of the Napoleon battery; they were however -over-matched and silenced in three-quarters of an -hour, and the embrasures were once more altered, -that the guns might bear on the breach in the -second line. Some slight works and counter-works -were also made on different points, but the besiegers -were principally occupied repairing the mischief -done by the rain, and in pushing the gallery under -San Roman, where the French were now distinctly -heard talking in the church, wherefore the mine -there was formed and loaded with nine hundred -pounds of powder.</p> - -<p>On the 17th the battery of the horn-work being -renewed, the fire of the eighteen-pounders cleared -away the enemy’s temporary defences at the breach, -the howitzers damaged the rampart on each side, -and a small mine was sprung on the extreme right -of the lower parallel, with a view to take possession -of a cavalier or mound which the French had raised -there, and from which they had killed many men -in the trenches; it was successful, and a lodgement -was effected, but the enemy soon returned in force -and obliged the besiegers to abandon it again. However -on the 18th the new breach was rendered practicable, -and Wellington ordered it to be stormed. -The explosion of the mine under San Roman was to -be the signal; that church was also to be assaulted; -and at the same time a third detachment was to -escalade the works in front of the ancient breach -and thus connect the attacks.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278"></a>[278]</span></p> - - -<h4>FIFTH ASSAULT.</h4> - -<p>At half-past four o’clock the springing of the -mine at San Roman broke down a terrace in front -of that building, yet with little injury to the church -itself; the latter was, however, resolutely attacked -by colonel Browne, at the head of some Spanish and -Portuguese troops, and though the enemy sprung a -countermine which brought the building down, the -assailants lodged themselves in the ruins. Meanwhile -two hundred of the foot-guards, with strong -supports, poured through the old breach in the first -line, and escaladed the second line, beyond which -in the open ground between the second and third -lines, they were encountered by the French, and a -sharp musketry fight commenced. At the same -time a like number of the German legion, under -major Wurmb, similarly supported, stormed the -new breach, on the left of the guards, so vigourously, -that it was carried in a moment, and some -men, mounting the hill above, actually gained the -third line. Unhappily at neither of these assaults -did the supports follow closely, and the Germans -being cramped on their left by the enemy’s stockade, -extended by their right towards the guards, and at -that critical moment Dubreton, who held his reserves -well in hand, came dashing like a torrent -from the upper ground, and in an instant cleared -the breaches. Wurmb and many other brave men -fell, and then the French, gathering round the -guards, who were still unsupported, forced them -beyond the outer line. More than two hundred men -and officers were killed or wounded in this combat, -and the next night the enemy recovered San Roman -by a sally.</p> - -<p>The siege was thus virtually terminated, for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279"></a>[279]</span> -though the French were beaten out of St. Roman -again, and a gallery was opened from that church -against the second line; and though two twenty-four -pounders, sent from Santander, by sir Home -Popham, had passed Reynosa on their way to -Burgos, these were mere demonstrations. It is -now time to narrate the different contemporary -events which obliged the English general, with a -victorious army, to abandon the siege of a third-rate -fortress, strong in nothing but the skill and -bravery of the governor and his gallant soldiers.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280"></a>[280]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXIX_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. October.</span> -When king Joseph retreated to Valencia he earnestly -demanded a reinforcement of forty thousand -men, from France, and, more earnestly, money. Three -millions of francs he obtained from Suchet, yet his -distress was greater even than that of the allies, and -Wellington at one time supposed that this alone would -drive the French from the Peninsula. The Anglo-Portuguese -soldiers had not received pay for six -months, but the French armies of the south, of the -centre, and of Portugal, were a whole year behind-hand; -and the salaries of the ministers, and civil -servants of the court, were two years in arrears. -Suchet’s army, the only one which depended entirely -on the country, was by that marshal’s excellent -management regularly paid, and the effect on its discipline -was conformable; his troops refrained from -plunder themselves, and repressed some excesses -of Joseph’s and Soult’s soldiers so vigorously, -as to come to blows in defence of the inhabitants. -And thus it will ever be, since paid soldiers only -may be kept under discipline. Soldiers without -money must become robbers. Napoleon knew the -king’s necessity to be extreme, but the war with -Russia had so absorbed the resources of France, -that little money, and only twenty thousand men, -principally conscripts, could be sent to Spain.</p> - -<p>The army of Portugal, at the moment when the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281"></a>[281]</span> -siege of the castle commenced, had been quartered -between Vittoria and Burgos; that is to say, at Pancorbo -and along the Ebro as far as Logroña, an advanced -guard only remaining at Briviesca; on this -line they were recruited and reorganized, and Massena -was appointed with full powers to command in -the northern provinces. A fine opportunity to revenge -his own retreat from Torres Vedras, was thus furnished -to the old warrior; but whether he doubted -the issue of affairs, or was really tamed by age, he -pleaded illness, and sent general Souham to the -army of Portugal. Then arose contentions, for -Marmont had designated Clauzel as the fittest to -lead, Massena insisted that Souham was the abler -general, and the king desired to appoint Drouet. -Clauzel’s abilities were certainly not inferior to -those of any French general, and to more perfect<span class="sidenote">Letter from the duke of Feltre to king Joseph, 4th Oct. 1812, MSS.</span> -acquaintance with the theatre of war, he added a -better knowledge of the enemy he had to contend -with; he was also more known to his own soldiers, -and had gained their confidence by his recent operations, -no mean considerations in such a matter. -However, Souham was appointed.</p> - -<p>Caffarelli anxious to succour the castle of Burgos, -which belonged to his command, had united at Vittoria -a thousand cavalry, sixteen guns, and eight thousand -infantry, of which three thousand were of the -young guard. The army of Portugal, reinforced from -France with twelve thousand men, had thirty-five -thousand present under arms, reorganized in six -divisions, and by Clauzel’s care, its former excellent -discipline had been restored. Thus forty-four<span class="sidenote">Official report of general Souham, MSS.</span> -thousand good troops were, in the beginning of -October, ready to succour the castle of Burgos; -but the generals, although anxious to effect that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282"></a>[282]</span> -object, awaited, first the arrival of Souham, and then -news from the king, with whose operations it was -essential to combine their own. They had no direct -tidings from him because the lines of correspondence -were so circuitous, and so beset by the Partidas, that -the most speedy as well as certain mode of communication, -was through the minister of war at -Paris; and that functionary found the information, -best suited to his purpose, in the English newspapers. -For the latter, while deceiving the British<span class="sidenote">Duke of Feltre’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -public by accounts of battles which were never -fought, victories which were never gained, enthusiasm -and vigour which never existed, did, with most -accurate assiduity, enlighten the enemy upon the -numbers, situation, movements, and reinforcements -of the allies.</p> - -<p>Souham arrived the 3rd of October with the last -of the reinforcements from France, but he imagined -that lord Wellington had sixty thousand troops<span class="sidenote">Souham’s official correspondence, MSS.</span> -around Burgos, exclusive of the Partidas, and that -three divisions were marching from Madrid to his -aid; whereas none were coming from that capital, -and little more than thirty thousand were present -under arms round Burgos, eleven thousand being -Gallicians scarcely so good as the Partidas. Wellington’s -real strength was in his Anglo-Portuguese, -then not twenty thousand, for besides those killed or -wounded at the siege, the sick had gone to the rear -faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached -regiments and escorts were, indeed, about -Segovia, and other points north of the Guadarama, -and a reinforcement of five thousand men had been -sent from England in September; but the former -belonged to Hill’s army, and of the latter, the lifeguards -and blues had gone to Lisbon. Hence a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283"></a>[283]</span> -regiment of foot-guards, and some detachments for -the line, in all about three thousand, were the only -available force in the rear.</p> - -<p>During the first part of the siege, the English -general seeing the French scattered along the Ebro, -and only reinforced by conscripts, did not fear any -interruption, and the less so, that sir Home Popham -was again menacing the coast line. Even now, -when the French were beginning to concentrate their -troops, he cared little for them, and was resolved -to give battle; for he thought that Popham and the -guerillas would keep Caffarelli employed, and he -felt himself a match for the <ins class="corr" id="tn-283" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'army of Porugal'"> -army of Portugal</ins>. Nor were the Partidas inactive on any point, and their -successes though small in themselves, were exceedingly -harassing to the enemy.</p> - -<p>Mina having obtained two or three thousand -stand of English arms had re-entered Aragon -and domineered on the left bank of the Ebro, -while Duran, with four thousand men, operated -uncontrolled on the right bank. The Empecinado, -Villacampa, and Bassecour descended from Cuenca, -the first against Requeña, the others against Albacete. -The Frayle interrupted the communications -between Valencia and Tortoza. Saornil, -Cuesta, Firmin, and others, were in La Mancha -and Estremadura, Juan Palarea, called the Medico, -was near Segovia, and though Marquinez had been -murdered by one of his own men, his partida and -that of Julian Sanchez acted as regular troops with -Wellington’s army. Meanwhile sir Home Popham, -in conjunction with Mendizabel, Porlier, and Renovales, -who had gathered all the minor partidas -under their banners, assailed Gueteria; but unsuccessfully; -for on the 30th of September, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284"></a>[284]</span> -Spanish chiefs were driven away, and Popham -lost some guns which had been landed. About -the same time the Empecinado being defeated at -Requeña, retired to Cuenca, yet he failed not from -thence to infest the French quarters.</p> - -<p>Duran, when Soria was abandoned, fell upon -Calatayud, but was defeated by Severoli, who withdrew -the garrison. Then the Spanish chief attacked -the castle of Almunia, which was only one -march from Zaragoza, and when Severoli succoured -this place also, and dismantled the castle, -Duran attacked Borja between Tudela and Zaragoza, -and took it before Severoli could come up. -Thus Zaragoza was gradually deprived of its -outposts, on the right of the Ebro; on the left, -Mina hovered close to the gates, and his lieutenant, -Chaplangara, meeting, near Ayerbe, with three -hundred Italians, killed forty, and would have -destroyed the whole but for the timely succour of -some mounted gens-d’armes. At last Reille being -undeceived as to Wellington’s march, restored the -smaller posts which he had abandoned, and Suchet -ordered the castle of Almunia to be refitted, but -during these events, Bassecour and Villa Campa -united to infest Joseph’s quarters about Albacete.</p> - -<p>Soult’s march from Andalusia and his junction -with the king, has been described; but while he -was yet at Grenada, Hill, leaving three Portuguese -regiments of infantry and one of cavalry at Almendralejo -and Truxillo, to protect his line of supply, -had marched to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, and -Arzobispo. He entered Toledo the 28th of September, -and the same day Elio took a small French -garrison left in Consuegra. Hill soon after occupied -a line from Toledo to Aranjuez, where he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285"></a>[285]</span> -was joined by the fourth division, Victor Alten’s -cavalry, and the detachments quartered about Ildefonsos -and Segovia. On the 8th, hearing of Soult’s -arrival at Hellin, he pushed his cavalry to Belmonte -on the San Clemente road, and here in La Mancha -as in Old Castile the stories of French devastation -were belied by the abundance of provisions.</p> - -<p>Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado -now united on the road leading from Cuenca to -Valencia, while the Medico and other chiefs gathered -in the Toledo mountains. In this manner -the allies extended from Toledo on the right, by -Belmonte, Cuenca, and Calatayud to near Jacca on -the left, and were in military communication with -the coast; for Caffarelli’s disposable force was now -concentrated to relieve Burgos, and Mina had free -intercourse with Mendizabal and Renovales, and -with Popham’s fleet. But the French line of correspondence -between the armies in the eastern and<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_VIII_B">Appendix, No. 8, B.</a></span> -northern provinces, was so interrupted that the -English newspapers became their surest, quickest, -and most accurate channels of intelligence.</p> - -<p>Souham, who over-rated the force of his adversary, -and feared a defeat as being himself the only -barrier left between Wellington and France, was -at first so far from meditating an advance, that he -expected and dreaded an attack from the allies; -and as the want of provisions would not let him -concentrate his army permanently near Monasterio, -his dispositions were made to fight on the Ebro.<span class="sidenote">Duke of Feltre’s official correspondence, MSS.</span> -The minister of war had even desired him to -detach a division against the partidas. But when -by the English newspapers, and other information -sent from Paris, he learned that Soult was in march -from Grenada,—that the king intended to move<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286"></a>[286]</span> -upon Madrid,—that no English troops had left that -capital to join Wellington,—that the army of the -latter was not very numerous, and that the castle<span class="sidenote">General Souham’s official correspondence, MSS.</span> -of Burgos was sorely pressed, he called up Caffarelli’s -troops from Vittoria, concentrated his own at -Briviesca and resolved to raise the siege.</p> - -<p>On the 13th a skirmish took place on the stream -beyond Monasterio, where captain Perse of the sixteenth -dragoons was twice forced from the bridge -and twice recovered it in the most gallant manner, -maintaining his post until colonel F. Ponsonby, who -commanded the reserves, arrived. Ponsonby and -Perse were both wounded, and this demonstration -was followed by various others until the evening -of the 18th, when the whole French army was -united, and the advanced guard captured a picquet -of the Brunswickers which contrary to orders had -remained in St. Olalla. This sudden movement -apparently prevented Wellington from occupying -the position of Monasterio, his outposts fell back -on the 19th to Quintanapala and Olmos, and on -the ridges behind those places he drew up his army -in order of battle. The right was at Ibeas on the -Arlanzan; the centre at Riobena and Majarradas on -the main road behind Olmos; the left was thrown -back near Soto Palaccio, and rested on a small -river.</p> - -<p>The 20th, Maucune, with two divisions of infantry -and one of cavalry, drove the allies from -Quintanapala, but Olmos was successfully defended -by the Chasseurs Brittaniques, and Maucune, having -no supports, was immediately outflanked on -the right and forced back to Monasterio, by two -divisions under sir Edward Paget. There were -now in position, including Pack’s Portuguese, which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287"></a>[287]</span> -blockaded the castle, about thirty-three thousand -men under arms, namely, twenty-one thousand -Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, eleven thousand -Gallicians, and the horsemen of Marquinez and -Julian Sanchez. Thus, there were four thousand -troopers, but only two thousand six hundred of -these were British and German, and the Spanish -horsemen regular or irregular, could scarcely be -counted in the line of battle. The number of guns -and howitzers was only forty-two, including twelve -Spanish pieces, extremely ill equipped and scant -of ammunition.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington had long felt the want of artillery -and had sent a memoir upon the subject, to the -British government, in the beginning of the year, -yet his ordnance establishment had not been augmented, -hence his difficulties during the siege; -and in the field, instead of ninety British and Portuguese -cannon, which was the just complement for -his army, he had now only fifty serviceable pieces, -of which twenty-four were with general Hill; and -all were British, for the Portuguese artillery had -from the abuses and the poverty of their government -entirely melted away. Now the French had,<span class="sidenote">Official state of the army given to Massena, MSS.</span> -as I have before stated, forty-four thousand men, -of which nearly five thousand were cavalry, and -they had more than sixty guns, a matter of no -small importance; for besides the actual power of -artillery in an action, soldiers are excited when the -noise is greatest on their side. Wellington stood, -therefore, at disadvantage in numbers, composition, -and real strength. In his rear was the castle, and -the river Arlanzan, the fords and bridges of which -were commanded by the guns of the fortress; his -generals of division, Paget excepted, were not of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288"></a>[288]</span> -any marked ability, his troops were somewhat desponding, -and deteriorated in discipline. His situation -was therefore dangerous, and critical; a -victory could scarcely be expected, and a defeat -would have been destructive; he should not have -provoked a battle, nor would he have done so had -he known that Caffarelli’s troops were united to -Souham’s.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Souham should by all means -have forced on an action, because his ground was -strong, his retreat open, his army powerful and -compact, his soldiers full of confidence, his lieutenants -Clauzel, Maucune, and Foy, men of distinguished -talents, able to second, and able to succeed -him in the chief command. The chances of victory -and the profit to be derived were great, the -chances of defeat, and the dangers to be incurred -comparatively small. And it was thus indeed that -he judged the matter himself, for Maucune’s advance -was intended to be the prelude to a great<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_VIII_A">Appendix, No. 8. A.</a></span> -battle, and the English general, as we have seen, -was willing to stand the trial. But generals are not -absolute masters of events, and as the extraneous -influence which restrained both sides, on this -occasion, came from afar, it was fitting to show how, -in war, movements, distant, and apparently unconnected -with those immediately under a general’s -eye, will break his measures, and make him appear -undecided or foolish when in truth he is both wise -and firm.</p> - -<p>While Wellington was still engaged with the -siege, the cortez made him commander of all the -Spanish armies. He had before refused this responsible -situation, but the circumstances were now -changed, for the Spaniards, having lost nearly all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289"></a>[289]</span> -their cavalry and guns in the course of the war, -could not safely act, except in connexion with the -Anglo-Portuguese forces, and it was absolutely -necessary that one head should direct. The English -general therefore demanded leave of his own government -to accept the offer, although he observed, -that the Spanish troops were not at all improved in -their discipline, their equipments, or their military -spirit; but he thought that conjoined with the -British they might behave well, and so escape -any more of those terrible disasters which had heretofore -overwhelmed the country and nearly brought -the war to a conclusion. He was willing to save -the dignity of the Spanish government, by leaving -it a certain body of men wherewith to operate after -its own plans; but that he might exercise his own -power efficiently, and to the profit of the troops -under himself, he desired that the English government -would vigorously insist upon the strict application -of the subsidy to the payment of the Spanish -soldiers acting with the British army, otherwise -the care of the Spanish troops, he said, would only -cramp his own operations.</p> - -<p>In his reply to the Cortez, his acceptance of the -offer was rendered dependent upon the assent of -his own government; and he was careful to guard -himself from a danger, not unlikely to arise, namely, -that the Cortez, when he should finally accept the -offer, would in virtue of that acceptance assume -the right of directing the whole operations of the -war. The intermediate want of power to move the -Spanish armies, he judged of little consequence, -because hitherto his suggestions having been cheerfully -attended to by the Spanish chiefs, he had no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290"></a>[290]</span> -reason to expect any change in that particular, but -there he was grievously mistaken.</p> - -<p>Previous to this offer the Spanish government -had, at his desire, directed Ballesteros to cross the -Morena, and place himself at Alcaraz and in support -of the Chinchilla fort, where joined by Cruz -Murgeon, by Elio, and by the Partidas, he would -have had a corps of thirty thousand men, would -have been supported by Hill’s army, and, having -the mountains behind him for a retreat, could have -safely menaced the enemy’s flank, and delayed the -march against Madrid or at least have obliged the -king to leave a strong corps of observation to watch -him. But Ballesteros, swelling with arrogant folly, -never moved from Grenada, and when he found -that Wellington was created generalissimo, he published -a manifesto appealing to the Spanish pride -against the degradation of serving under a foreigner; -he thus sacrificed to his own spleen the welfare of -his country, and with a result he little expected; -for while he judged himself a man to sway the -destinies of Spain, he suddenly found himself a -criminal and nothing more. The Cortez caused -him to be arrested in the midst of his soldiers, who, -indifferent to his fate, suffered him to be sent a -prisoner to Ceuta. The count of Abisbal was then -declared captain-general of Andalusia, and the -duke del Parque was appointed to command Ballesteros’ -army, which general Verues immediately led -by Jaen towards La Mancha, but Soult was then -on the Tormes.</p> - -<p>That marshal united with the king on the 3d of -October. His troops required rest, his numerous -sick were to be sent to the Valencian hospitals, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_291"></a>[291]</span> -his first interview with Joseph was of a warm -nature, for each had his griefs and passions to declare. -Finally the monarch yielded to the superior -mental power of his opponent and resolved to -profit from his great military capacity, yet reluctantly -and more from prudence than liking; for the -duke of Feltre, minister of war at Paris, although<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_VI_A">Appendix, No. 6. A.</a></span> -secretly an enemy of Soult, and either believing, or -pretending to believe in the foolish charges of disorderly -ambition made against that commander, opposed -any decided exercise of the king’s authority -until the emperor’s will was known: yet this would -not have restrained the king if the marshals Jourdan -and Suchet had not each declined accepting the -duke of Dalmatia’s command when Joseph offered -it to them.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">Joseph’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -Soult’s first operation was to reduce Chinchilla, -a well-constructed fort, which, being in the midst -of his quarters, commanded the great roads so as to -oblige his army to move under its fire or avoid it -by circuitous routes. A vigorous defence was -expected, but on the 6th it fell, after a few hours’ -attack; for a thunder-storm suddenly arising in a -clear sky had discharged itself upon the fort, and -killed the governor and many other persons, whereupon -the garrison, influenced, it is said, by a superstitious -fear, surrendered. This was the first bitter -fruit of Ballesteros’ disobedience, for neither could -Soult have taken Chinchilla, nor scattered his troops, -as he did, at Albacete, Almanza, Yecla, and Hellin, -if thirty thousand Spaniards had been posted between -Alcaraz and Chinchilla, and supported by -thirty thousand Anglo-Portuguese at Toledo under -Hill. These extended quarters were however essential -for the feeding of the French general’s numbers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292"></a>[292]</span> -and now, covered by the fort of Chinchilla, -his troops were well lodged, his great convoys of -sick and maimed men, his Spanish families, and -other impediments, safely and leisurely sent to -Valencia, while his cavalry scouring the country of -La Mancha in advance, obliged Bassecour and Villa -Campa to fall back upon Cuenca.</p> - -<p>The detail of the operations which followed, belongs -to another place. It will suffice to say here, -that the king, being at the head of more than seventy -thousand men, was enabled without risking Valencia -to advance towards the Tagus, having previously -sent Souham a specific order to combine his movements -in co-operation but strictly to avoid fighting. -General Hill also finding himself threatened by such -powerful forces, and reduced by Ballesteros’ defection -to a simple defence of the Tagus, at a moment -when that river was becoming fordable in all places, -gave notice of his situation to lord Wellington. -Joseph’s letter was dispatched on the 1st, and six -others followed in succession day by day, yet the last -carried by colonel Lucotte, an officer of the royal staff, -first reached Souham; the advantages derived from -the allies’ central position, and from the Partidas, -were here made manifest; for Hill’s letter, though -only dispatched the 17th, reached Wellington at -the same moment that Joseph’s reached Souham. -The latter general was thus forced to relinquish his<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_VIII_A">Appendix, No. 8. A.</a></span> -design of fighting on the 20th; nevertheless having -but four days’ provisions left, he designed when -those should be consumed, to attack notwithstanding -the king’s prohibition, if Wellington should still confront -him. But the English general considering that -his own army, already in a very critical situation, -would be quite isolated if the king should, as was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293"></a>[293]</span> -most probable, force the allies from the Tagus, now -resolved, though with a bitter pang, to raise the -siege and retreat so far as would enable him to secure -his junction with Hill.</p> - -<p>While the armies were in presence some fighting -<ins class="corr" id="tn-293" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'had place at'"> -had taken place at</ins> Burgos, Dubreton had again obtained -possession of the ruins of the church of San Roman -and was driven away next morning; and now in -pursuance of Wellington’s determination to retreat, -mines of destruction were formed in the horn-work -by the besiegers, and the guns and stores were removed -from the batteries to the parc at Villa Toro. -But the greatest part of the draught animals had -been sent to Reynosa, to meet the powder and artillery -coming from Santander, and hence, the eighteen-pounders -could not be carried off, nor, from some -error, were the mines of destruction exploded. -The rest of the stores and the howitzers were put -in march by the road of Villaton and Frandovinez -for Celada del Camino. Thus the siege was raised, -after five assaults, several sallies and thirty-three -days of investment, during which the besiegers -lost more than two thousand men and the besieged -six hundred in killed or wounded; the latter had -also suffered severely, from continual labour, want of -water, and bad weather, for the fortress was too -small to afford shelter for the garrison and the -greater part bivouacked between the lines of defence.</p> - - -<h4>RETREAT FROM BURGOS.</h4> - -<p>This operation was commenced on the night of -the 21st by a measure of great nicety and boldness, -for the road, divaricating at Gamonal, led by<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_5">Plan 5.</a></span> -Villatoro to the bridge of Villaton on the one hand,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294"></a>[294]</span> -and the bridge of Burgos on the other, and Wellington -chose the latter, which was the shortest, -though it passed the Arlanzan river close under the -guns of the castle. The army quitted the position -after dark without being observed, and having the -artillery-wheels muffled with straw, defiled over -the bridge of Burgos with such silence and celerity, -that Dubreton, watchful and suspicious as he -was, knew nothing of their march until the Partidas, -failing in nerve, commenced galloping; then -he poured a destructive fire down, but soon lost -the range. By this delicate operation the infantry -gained Cellada del Camino and Hormillas that -night, but the light cavalry halted at Estepar and -the bridge of Villa Baniel. Souham, who did not -discover the retreat until late in the evening of the -22d, was therefore fain to follow, and by a forced -march, to overtake the allies, whereas, if Wellington -to avoid the fire of the castle had gone by Villaton, -and Frandovinez, the French might have -forestalled him at Cellada del Camino.</p> - -<p>The 23d the infantry renewing their march -crossed the Pisuerga, at Cordovillas, and Torquemada, -a little above and below its junction with -the Arlanzan; but while the main body made this -long march, the French having passed Burgos in -the night of the 22d, vigorously attacked the allies’ -rear-guard. This was composed of the cavalry and -some horse artillery, commanded by Norman Ramsay -and Major Downman; of two battalions of -Germans under Colin Halket; and of the Partidas -of Marquinez and Sanchez, the latter being on the -left of the Arlanzan and the whole under the command -of sir Stapleton Cotton. The piquets of -light cavalry were vigorously driven from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295"></a>[295]</span> -bridge of Baniel as early as seven o’clock in the -morning; but they rallied upon their reserves and -gained the Hormaza stream which was disputed for -some time, and a charge made by captain Perse of -the sixteenth dragoons, was of distinguished bravery. -However the French cavalry finally forced the -passage and the British retiring behind Cellada -Camino took post in a large plain. On their left -was a range of hills the summit of which was occupied -by the Partida of Marquinez, and on their right -was the Arlanzan, beyond which Julian Sanchez -was posted. Across the middle of the plain run -a marshy rivulet cutting the main road, and only -passable by a little bridge near a house called the -Venta de Pozo, and half-way between this stream -and Cellada there was a broad ditch with a second -bridge in front of a small village. Cotton immediately -retired over the marshy stream, leaving Anson’s -horsemen and Halket’s infantry as a rear-guard beyond -the ditch; and Anson to cover his own passage -of that obstacle left the eleventh dragoons and the -guns at Cellada Camino, which was situated on a -gentle eminence.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF VENTA DE POZO.</h4> - -<p>When the French approached Cellada, major -Money of the eleventh, who was in advance, galloping -out from the left of the village at the head -of two squadrons, overturned their leading horsemen, -and the artillery plied them briskly with shot, -but the main body advancing at a trot along the road -soon outflanked the British, and obliged Money’s -squadrons to rejoin the rest of the regiment while -the guns went on beyond the bridge of Venta de -Pozo. Meanwhile the French general Curto with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296"></a>[296]</span> -a brigade of hussars ascended the hills on the left, -and being followed by Boyer’s dragoons, put Marquinez’ -Partida to flight; but a deep ravine run -along the foot of these hills, next the plain, it could -only be passed at certain places, and towards the first -of these the Partidas galloped, closely chased by -the hussars, at the moment when the leading French -squadrons on the plain were forming in front of -Cellada to attack the eleventh regiment. The latter -charged and drove the first line upon the second, -but then both lines coming forward together, the -British were pushed precipitately to the ditch, and -got over by the bridge with some difficulty, though -with little loss, being covered by the fire of Halket’s -infantry which was in the little village behind -the bridge.</p> - -<p>The left flank of this new line was already turned -by the hussars on the hills, wherefore Anson fell back -covered by the sixteenth dragoons, and in good order, -with design to cross the second bridge at -Venta de Pozo; during this movement Marquinez’ -Partida came pouring down from the hills in full -flight, closely pursued by the French hussars, who -mixed with the fugitives, and the whole mass fell -upon the flank of the sixteenth dragoons; and at -the same moment, these last were also charged by -the enemy’s dragoons, who had followed them over -the ditch. The commander of the Partida was -wounded, colonel Pelly with another officer, and -thirty men of the sixteenth, fell into the enemy’s -hands, and all were driven in confusion upon the -reserves. But while the French were reforming -their scattered squadrons after this charge, Anson -got his people over the bridge of Venta de Pozo -and drew up beyond the rivulet and to the left<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297"></a>[297]</span> -of the road, on which Halket’s battalions and the -guns had already taken post, and the heavy German -cavalry, an imposing mass, stood in line on -the right, and farther in the rear than the artillery.</p> - -<p>Hitherto the action had been sustained by the -cavalry of the army of Portugal, but now Caffarelli’s -horsemen consisting of the lancers of Berg, -the fifteenth dragoons and some squadrons of “<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">gens-d’armes</i>,” -all fresh men, came down in line to the -rivulet, and finding it impassable, with a quick -and daring decision wheeled to their right, and -despite of the heavy pounding of the artillery, -trotted over the bridge, and again formed line, in -opposition to the German dragoons, having the -stream in their rear. The position was dangerous -but they were full of mettle, and though the Germans, -who had let too many come over, charged -with a rough shock and broke the right, the French -left had the advantage and the others rallied; then -a close and furious sword contest had place, but -the “<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">gens-d’armes</i>” fought so fiercely, that the -Germans, maugre their size and courage, lost -ground and finally gave way in disorder. The -French followed on the spur with shrill and eager -cries, and Anson’s brigade which was thus outflanked -and threatened on both sides, fell back also, -but not happily, for Boyer’s dragoons having continued -their march by the hills to the village of Balbaces -there crossed the ravine and came thundering -in on the left. Then the British ranks were broken, -the regiments got intermixed, and all went to the -rear in confusion; finally however the Germans, -having extricated themselves from their pursuers -turned and formed a fresh line on the left of the -road, and the others rallied upon them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298"></a>[298]</span></p> - -<p>The “<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">gens-d’armes</i>” and lancers, who had -suffered severely from the artillery, as well as in -the sword-fight, now halted, but Boyer’s dragoons -forming ten squadrons, again came to the charge, -and with the more confidence that the allies’ ranks -appeared still confused and wavering. When within -a hundred yards, the German officers rode gallantly -out to fight, and their men followed a short -way, but the enemy was too powerful, disorder and -tumult again ensued, the swiftness of the English -horses alone prevented a terrible catastrophe, and -though some favourable ground enabled the line -to reform once more, it was only to be again -broken. However Wellington, who was present, -had placed Halket’s infantry and the guns in a position -to cover the cavalry, and they remained tranquil -until the enemy, in full pursuit after the last -charge, came galloping down and lent their -left flank to the infantry; then the power of this -arm was made manifest; a tempest of bullets emptied -the French saddles by scores, and their hitherto -victorious horsemen after three fruitless attempts to -charge, each weaker than the other, reined up and -drew off to the hills, the British cavalry covered -by the infantry made good their retreat to Quintana -la Puente near the Pisuerga, and the bivouacs -of the enemy were established at Villadrigo. The -loss in this combat was very considerable on both -sides, the French suffered most, but they took -a colonel and seventy other prisoners, and they had -before the fight, also captured a small commissariat -store near Burgos.</p> - -<p>While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness -and insubordination, the usual concomitants -of an English retreat, were exhibited at Torquemada,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299"></a>[299]</span> -where the well-stored wine-vaults became the -prey of the soldiery: it is said, that twelve thousand -men were to be seen at one time in a state of -helpless inebriety. This commencement was bad, -and the English general, who had now retreated -some fifty miles, seeing the enemy so hot and menacing -in pursuit, judged it fitting to check his course; -for though the arrangements were surprisingly well -combined, the means of transport were so scanty and -the weather so bad, that the convoys of sick and -wounded were still on the wrong side of the Duero. -Wherefore, having with a short march crossed the -Carion river on the 24th at its confluence with the -Pisuerga, he turned and halted behind it.</p> - -<p>Here he was joined by a regiment of the guards, -and by detachments coming from Coruña, and -his position extending from Villa Muriel to Dueñas -below the meeting of the waters, was strong. -The troops occupied a range of hills, lofty, yet descending -with an easy sweep to the Carion; that -river covered the front, and the Pisuerga did the same -by the right wing. A detachment had been left to destroy -the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga; colonel -Campbell with a battalion of the royals was sent to aid -the Spaniards in destroying the bridges at Palencia; -and in Wellington’s immediate front some houses -and convents beyond the rivers, furnished good -posts to cover the destruction of the bridges of -Muriel and San Isidro on the Carion, and that of -Dueñas on the Pisuerga.</p> - -<p>Souham excited by his success on the 23d followed -from Villadrigo early on the 24th, and having -cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada passed -the Pisuerga. He immediately directed Foy’s division -upon Palencia, and ordered Maucune with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300"></a>[300]</span> -advanced guard to pursue the allies to the bridges -of Baños, Isidro, and Muriel; but he halted himself -at Magoz, and, if fame does not lie, because the number -of French drunkards at Torquemada were even -more numerous than those of the British army.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT ON THE CARION.</h4> - -<p>Before the enemy appeared, the summits of the -hills were crowned by the allies, all the bridges -were mined and that of San Isidro was strongly -protected by a convent which was filled with troops. -The left of the position was equally strong, yet -general Oswald, who had just arrived from England -and taken the command of the fifth division on the -instant, overlooked the advantages to be derived -from the dry bed of a canal with high banks, -which, on his side, run parallel with the Carion, -and he had not occupied the village of Muriel in -sufficient strength. In this state of affairs Foy -reached Palencia, where, according to some French -writers, a treacherous attempt was made under cover -of a parley, to kill him; he however drove the allies -with some loss from the town and in such haste -that all the bridges were abandoned in a perfect -condition, and the French cavalry crossing the river -and spreading abroad gathered up both baggage -and prisoners.</p> - -<p>This untoward event obliged Wellington to throw -back his left, composed of the fifth division and the -Spaniards, at Muriel, thus offering two fronts, the -one facing Palencia, the other the Carion. Oswald’s -error then became manifest; for Maucune having dispersed -the eighth caçadores who were defending a ford -between Muriel and San Isidro, fell with a strong<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301"></a>[301]</span> -body of infantry and guns upon the allies at Muriel, -and this at the moment when the mine having been -exploded, the party covering the bridge were passing -the broken arch by means of ladders. The -play of the mine which was effectual, checked -the advance of the French for an instant, but -suddenly a horseman darting out at full speed -from the column, rode down under a flight of -bullets, to the bridge, calling out that he was a -deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm made -by the explosion, and then violently checking his -foaming horse, held up his hands, exclaiming -that he was a lost man, and with hurried accents -asked if there was no ford near. The good-natured -soldiers pointed to one a little way off and -the gallant fellow having looked earnestly for a few -moments as if to fix the exact point, wheeled his -horse round, kissed his hand in derision, and bending -over his saddle-bow dashed back to his own -comrades, amidst showers of shot, and shouts of -laughter from both sides. The next moment -Maucune’s column covered by a concentrated fire -of guns passed the river at the ford thus discovered, -made some prisoners in the village, and -lined the dry bed of the canal.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington who came up at this instant immediately -turned some guns upon the enemy and desired -that the village and canal might be retaken; Oswald -thought that they could not be held, yet Wellington, -whose retreat was endangered by the presence of the -enemy on that side of the river was peremptory; he -ordered one brigade under general Barnes to attack -the main body, while another brigade under general -Pringle, cleared the canal, and he strengthened the -left with the Spanish troops and Brunswickers. A<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302"></a>[302]</span> -very sharp fire of artillery and musquetry ensued, -and the allies suffered some loss, especially by cannon-shot -which from the other side of the river -plumped into the reserves. The Spaniards, unequal -to any regular movement, got into confusion, and -were falling back, when their fiery countryman -Miguel Alava, running to their head, with exhortation -and example, for though wounded he would -not retire, urged them forward to the fight; finally -the enemy was driven over the river, the village -was re-occupied in force, and the canal was -lined by the allied troops. During these events at -Villa Muriel, other troops attempted without success -to seize the bridge of San Isidro, and the mine -was exploded; but they were more fortunate at -the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga, for the mine -there failed, and the French cavalry galloping -over, made both the working and covering party -prisoners.</p> - -<p>The strength of the position was now sapped, -for Souham could assemble his army on the allies’ -left, by Palencia, and force them to an action with -their back upon the Pisuerga, or he could pass that -river on his own left, and forestall them on the -Duero at Tudela. If Wellington pushed his army -over the Pisuerga by the bridge of Duenas, Souham, -having the initial movement, might be first on the -ground, and could attack the heads of the allied columns -while Foy’s division came down on the rear. If -Wellington, by a rapid movement along the right -bank of the Pisuerga, endeavoured to cross at -Cabezon, which was the next bridge in his rear, and -so gain the Duero, Souham by moving along the -left bank, might fall upon him while in march to -the Duero, and hampered between that river the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303"></a>[303]</span> -Pisuerga and the Esquevilla. An action under -such circumstances would have been formidable, -and the English general once cut off from the Duero -must have retired through Valladolid and Simancas -to Tordesillas, or Toro, giving up his communications -with Hill. In this critical state of affairs -Wellington made no delay. He kept good watch -upon the left of the Pisuerga, and knowing that the -ground there was rugged, and the roads narrow and -bad, while on the right bank they were good and -wide, sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, -and withdrawing the troops before day-break on -the 26th, made a clean march of sixteen miles to -Cabezon, where he passed to the left of the Pisuerga -and barricaded and mined the bridge. Then -sending a detachment to hold the bridge of Tudela -on the Duero behind him, he caused the seventh -division, under lord Dalhousie, to secure the bridges -of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. His retreat -behind the Duero, which river was now in full -water, being thus assured, he again halted, partly -because the ground was favourable, partly to give -the commissary-general Kennedy time for some indispensible -arrangements.</p> - -<p>This functionary, who had gone to England sick -in the latter end of 1811, and had returned to the -army only the day before the siege of Burgos was -raised, in passing from Lisbon by Badajoz to Madrid, -and thence to Burgos, discovered that the inexperience -of the gentleman who conducted the department -during his absence had been productive of some -serious errors. The magazines established between -Lisbon and Badajos, and from thence by Almaraz to -the valley of the Tagus, for the supply of the army -in Madrid, had not been removed again when the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304"></a>[304]</span> -retreat commenced, and Soult would have found -them full, if his march had been made rapidly on -that side; on the other hand the magazines on the -line of operations, between Lisbon and Salamanca, -were nearly empty. Kennedy had therefore the -double task on hand to remove the magazines from -the south side of the Tagus, and to bring up stores -upon the line of the present retreat; and his dispositions -were not yet completed when Wellington -desired him to take measures for the removal of the -sick and wounded, and every other incumbrance, -from Salamanca, promising to hold his actual position -on the Pisuerga until the operation was effected. Now -there was sufficient means of transport for the -occasion, but the negligence of many medical and -escorting officers, conducting the convoys of sick to -the rear, and the consequent bad conduct of the -soldiers, for where the officers are careless the -soldiers will be licentious, produced the worst effects. -Such outrages were perpetrated on the inhabitants -along the whole line of march that terror was every -where predominant, and the ill-used drivers and muleteers -deserted, some with, some without their cattle, -by hundreds. Hence Kennedy’s operation in some -measure failed, the greatest distress was incurred, -and the commissariat lost nearly the whole of the -animals and carriages employed; the villages were -abandoned, and the under-commissaries were bewildered, -or paralyzed, by the terrible disorder thus -spread along the line of communication.</p> - -<p>Souham having repaired the bridges on the -Carion, resumed the pursuit on the 26th, by the -right of the Pisuerga, being deterred probably from -moving to the left bank, by the rugged nature of the -ground, and by the king’s orders not to risk a serious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305"></a>[305]</span> -action. In the morning of the 27th his whole army -was collected in front of Cabezon, but he contented -himself with a cannonade and a display of his -force; the former cost the allies colonel Robe of the -artillery, a practised officer and a worthy man; the -latter enabled the English general, for the first -time, to discover the numbers he had to contend -with, and they convinced him that he could hold -neither the Pisuerga nor the Duero permanently. -However his object being to gain time, he held his -position, and when the French, leaving a division in -front of Cabezon, extended their right, by Cigales -and Valladolid, to Simancas, he caused the bridges at -the two latter places to be destroyed in succession.</p> - -<p>Congratulating himself that he had not fought -in front of Burgos with so powerful an army, -Wellington now resolved to retire behind the Duero -and finally, if pressed, behind the Tormes. But -as the troops on the Tagus would then be exposed -to a flank attack, similar to that which the -siege of Burgos had been raised to avoid on his -own part; and as this would be more certain if any -ill fortune befell the troops on the Duero, he ordered -Hill to relinquish the defence of the Tagus -at once and retreat, giving him a discretion as to -the line, but desiring him, if possible, to come by -the Guadarama passes; for he designed, if all went -well, to unite on the Adaja river in a central position, -intending to keep Souham in check with a -part of his army, and with the remainder to fall -upon Soult.</p> - -<p>On the 28th Souham, still extending his right, -with a view to dislodge the allies by turning their -left, endeavoured to force the bridges at Valladolid<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_5">plan 5.</a></span> -and Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_306"></a>[306]</span> -on the Duero. The first was easily defended -by the main body of the seventh division, but -Halket, an able officer, finding the French strong -and eager at the second, destroyed it, and detached -the regiment of Brunswick Oels to ruin that of -Tordesillas. It was done in time, and a tower behind -the ruins was occupied by a detachment, while -the remainder of the Brunswickers took post in a -pine-wood at some distance. The French arrived -and seemed for some time at a loss, but very soon -sixty French officers and non-commissioned officers, -headed by captain Guingret, a daring man, formed -a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, and -then plunged into the water, holding their swords -with their teeth, and swimming and pushing their -raft before them. Under protection of a cannonade, -they thus crossed this great river, though -it was in full and strong water, and the weather -very cold, and having reached the other side, naked -as they were, stormed the tower. The Brunswick -regiment then abandoned its position, and these -gallant soldiers remained masters of the bridge.</p> - -<p>Wellington having heard of the attack at Simancas, -and having seen the whole French army in march -to its right along the hill beyond the Pisuerga on -the evening of the 28th, destroyed the bridges at -Valladolid and Cabeçon, and crossed the Duero at -Tudela and Puente de Duero on the 29th, but -scarcely had he effected this operation when intelligence -of Guingret’s splendid action at Tordesillas -reached him. With the instant decision of a great -captain he marched by his left, and having reached -the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas on the -30th, fronted the enemy and forbad further progress -on that point; the bridge was indeed already<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307"></a>[307]</span> -repaired by the French, but Souham’s main body -had not yet arrived, and Wellington’s menacing -position was too significant to be misunderstood. -The bridges of Toro and Zamora were now destroyed -by detachments, and though the French, -spreading along the river bank, commenced repairing -the former, the junction with Hill’s army was -insured; and the English general, judging that the -bridge of Toro could not be restored for several -days, even hoped to maintain the line of the Duero -permanently, because he expected that Hill, of -whose operations it is now time to speak, would be -on the Adaja by the 3d of November.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308"></a>[308]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXIX_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS—RETREAT FROM MADRID.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812. October.</span> -King Joseph’s first intention was to unite a great<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_6">Plan 6.</a></span> -part of Suchet’s forces as well as Soult’s with his -own, and Soult, probably influenced by a false report -that Ballesteros had actually reached La -Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted, observing -that Valencia must be defended against the -increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish -armies at Alicant, and the more so that, until the -French army could cross the Tagus and open a new -line of communication with Zaragoza, Valencia -would be the only base for the king’s operations. -Joseph then resolved to incorporate a portion of the -army of the south with the army of the centre, -giving the command to Drouet, who was to move -by the road of Cuenca and Tarancon towards the -Tagus; but this arrangement, which seems to have -been dictated by a desire to advance Drouet’s authority, -was displeasing to Soult. He urged that -his army, so powerfully constituted, physically and -morally, as to be the best in the Peninsula, owed -its excellence to its peculiar organization and it -would be dangerous to break that up. Nor was -there any good reason for this change; for if -Joseph only wished to have a strong body of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309"></a>[309]</span> -troops on the Cuenca road, the army of the centre -could be reinforced with one or two divisions, and -the whole could unite again on the Tagus without -injury to the army of the south. It would however -be better, he said, to incorporate the army of the -centre with the army of the south and march altogether -by the road of San Clemente, leaving only a -few troops on the Cuenca road, who might be reinforced -by Suchet. But if the king’s plan arose -from a desire to march in person with a large body -he could do so with greater dignity by joining the -army of the south, which was to act on the main -line of operations. Joseph’s reply was a peremptory -order to obey or retire to France, and Drouet -marched to Cuenca.</p> - -<p>Soult’s army furnished thirty-five thousand infantry, -six thousand excellent cavalry under arms with seventy-two<span class="sidenote">Imperial muster-rolls, MSS.</span> -guns, making with the artillery-men a total -of forty-six thousand veteran combatants. The army -of the centre including the king’s guards furnished -about twelve thousand, of which two thousand were -good cavalry with twelve guns. Thus fifty-eight<span class="sidenote">Joseph’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -thousand fighting men, eight thousand being cavalry, -with eighty-four pieces of artillery, were put in motion -to drive Hill from the Tagus. Joseph’s project -was to pass that river, and operate against Wellington’s -rear, if he should continue the siege of Burgos; -but if he concentrated on the Tagus, Souham -was in like manner to operate on his rear by Aranda<span class="sidenote">Official papers from the Bureau de la Guerre, MSS.</span> -de Duero, and the Somosierra, sending detachments -towards Guadalaxara to be met by other detachments, -coming from the king through Sacedon. -Finally if Wellington, as indeed happened, should -abandon both Burgos and Madrid, the united -French forces were to drive him into Portugal.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_310"></a>[310]</span> -The conveying of Soult’s convoys of sick men to -Valencia and other difficulties, retarded the commencement -of operations to the king’s great discontent, -and meanwhile he became very uneasy for his -supplies, because the people of La Mancha, still -remembering Montbrun’s devastations, were flying -with their beasts and grain, and from frequent repetition, -were become exceedingly expert in evading -the researches of the foragers. Such however -is the advantage of discipline and order, that while -La Mancha was thus desolated from fear, confidence -and tranquillity reigned in Valencia.</p> - -<p>However on the 18th of October Joseph marched -from Requeña upon Cuenca, where he found Drouet -with a division of Soult’s infantry and some cavalry. -He then proceeded to Tarancon, which was the -only artillery road, on that side, leading to the -Tagus, and during this time Soult marched by San -Clemente upon Ocaña and Aranjuez. General Hill -immediately sent that notice to Lord Wellington -which caused the retreat, from Burgos, but he was -in no fear of the enemy, for he had withdrawn all -his outposts and united his whole force behind the -Tagus. His right was at Toledo, his left at Fuente -Dueñas, and there were Spanish and Portuguese -troops in the valley of the Tagus extending as far as -Talavera. The Tagus was however fordable, from its -junction with the Jarama near Aranjuez, upwards; -and moreover, this part of the line, weak from its -extent, could not easily be supported, and the troops -guarding it, would have been too distant from the -point of action if the French should operate against -Toledo. Hill therefore drew his left behind the Tajuna -which is a branch of the Jarama, and running -nearly parallel to the Tagus. His right occupied<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_311"></a>[311]</span> -very strong ground from Añover to Toledo, he destroyed -the bridges at Aranjuez, and securing that -below the confluence of the Jarama and Henares, -called the Puente Larga, threw one of boats over -the former river a little above Bayona. The light -division and Elio’s troops forming the extreme left -were directed to march upon Arganda, and the head-quarters -were fixed at Cienpozuelos.</p> - -<p>The bulk of the troops were thus held in hand, -ready to move to any menaced point, and as Skerrit’s -brigade had just arrived from Cadiz, there was, -including the Spanish regulars, forty thousand men -in line, and a multitude of partidas were hovering -about. The lateral communications were easy and -the scouts passing over the bridge of Toledo covered -all the country beyond the Tagus. In this state of -affairs the bridges at each end of the line furnished -the means of sallying upon the flanks of any force -attacking the front; the French must have made -several marches to force the right, and on the left -the Jarama with its marshy banks, and its many -confluents, offered several positions, to interpose between -the enemy and Madrid.</p> - -<p>Drouet passed the Tagus the 29th at the abandoned -fords of Fuente Dueñas and Villa Maurique, -and the king, with his guards, repaired to Zarza de la -Cruz. Meanwhile Soult whose divisions were coming -fast up to Ocaña, restored the bridge of Aranjuez, -and passed the Tagus also with his advanced guard. -On the 30th he attacked general Cole who commanded -at the Puente Larga with several regiments -and some guns, but though the mines failed and -the French attempted to carry the bridge with the -bayonet they were vigorously repulsed by the forty-seventh -under Colonel Skerrit. After a heavy cannonade<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_312"></a>[312]</span> -and a sharp musketry which cost the allies -sixty men, Soult relinquished the attempt and -awaited the arrival of his main body. Had the Puente -Larga been forced, the fourth division which was at<span class="sidenote">Soult’s official correspondence with the king, MSS.</span> -Añover would have been cut off from Madrid, but -the weather being thick and rainy, Soult could not -discover what supporting force was on the high -land of Valdemoro behind the bridge and was -afraid to push forward too fast.</p> - -<p>The king discontented with this cautious mode of -proceeding now designed to operate by Toledo, but -during the night the Puente Larga was abandoned, -and Soult, being still in doubt of Hill’s real object, -advised Joseph to unite the army of the centre at -Arganda and Chinchon, throwing bridges for retreat -at Villa Maurique and Fuente Dueñas as a precaution -in case a battle should take place. Hill’s -movement was however a decided retreat, which -would have commenced twenty-four hours sooner -but for the failure of the mines and the combat at -the Puente Larga. Wellington’s orders had reached -him at the moment when Soult first appeared on the -Tagus, and the affair was so sudden, that the light -division, which had just come from Alcala to Arganda -to close the left of the position, was obliged, -without halting, to return again in the night, the -total journey being nearly forty miles.</p> - -<p>Wellington, foreseeing that it might be difficult -for Hill to obey his instructions, had given him a -discretionary power to retire either by the valley -of the Tagus, or by the Guadarama; and a position -taken up in the former, on the flank of the enemy, -would have prevented the king from passing the -Guadarama, and at the same time have covered -Lisbon; whereas a retreat by the Guadarama exposed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_313"></a>[313]</span> -Lisbon. Hill, thinking the valley of the -Tagus, in that advanced season, would not support -the French army, and knowing Wellington to be -pressed by superior forces in the north, chose the -Guadarama. Wherefore, burning his pontoons, and -causing La China and the stores remaining there to -be destroyed in the night of the 30th, he retreated -by different roads, and united his army on the 31st -of October near Majadahonda. Meanwhile the -magazines along the line of communication to -Badajos were, as I have already noticed, in danger -if the enemy had detached troops to seize them, -neither were the removal and destruction of the -stores in Madrid effected without disorders of a -singular nature.</p> - -<p>The municipality had demanded all the provision -remaining there as if they wanted them for the enemy, -and when this was refused, they excited a mob to -attack the magazines; some firing even took place, -and the assistance of the fourth division was required -to restore order; a portion of wheat was finally -given to the poorest of the people, and Madrid was -abandoned. It was affecting to see the earnest -and true friendship of the population. Men and -women, and children, crowded around the troops -bewailing their departure. They moved with them -in one vast mass, for more than two miles, and left -their houses empty at the very instant when the -French cavalry scouts were at the gates on the other -side. This emotion was distinct from political feeling, -because there was a very strong French party -in Madrid; and amongst the causes of wailing the -return of the plundering and cruel partidas, unchecked -by the presence of the British, was very -loudly proclaimed. The “Madrileños” have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_314"></a>[314]</span> -stigmatized as a savage and faithless people, the -British army found them patient, gentle, generous, -and loyal; nor is this fact to be disputed, because -of the riot which occurred in the destruction of the -magazines, for the provisions had been obtained by -requisition from the country around Madrid, under -an agreement with the Spanish government to pay -at the end of the war; and it was natural for the -people, excited as they were by the authorities, to -endeavour to get their own flour back, rather than -have it destroyed when they were starving.</p> - -<p>With the Anglo-Portuguese troops marched -Penne Villemur, Morillo, and Carlos D’España, and -it was Wellington’s wish that Elio, Bassecour, and -Villa Campa should now throw themselves into the -valley of the Tagus, and crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, -join Ballesteros’s army, now under Virues. -A great body of men, including the Portuguese -regiments left by Hill in Estremadura, would thus -have been placed on the flank of any French army -marching upon Lisbon, and if the enemy neglected -this line, the Spaniards could operate against Madrid -or against Suchet at pleasure. Elio, however, being -cut off from Hill by the French advance, remained -at the bridge of Auñion, near Sacedon, and was -there joined by Villa Campa and the Empecinado.</p> - -<p>Soult now brought up his army as quickly as -possible to Valdemoro, and his information, as to -Hill’s real force, was becoming more distinct; but -there was also a rumour that Wellington was close -at hand with three British divisions, and the French -general’s movements were consequently cautious, lest -he should find himself suddenly engaged in battle -before his whole force was collected, for his rear -was still at Ocaña, and the army of the centre had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_315"></a>[315]</span> -not yet passed the Tajuña. This disposition of his -troops was probably intentional to prevent the king -from fighting, for Soult did not think this a fitting -time for a great battle unless upon great advantage. -In the disjointed state of their affairs, a defeat -would have been more injurious to the French than -a victory would have been beneficial; the former -would have lost Spain, the latter would not have -gained Portugal.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote9">November.</span> -On the 1st of November, the bulk of Soult’s -army being assembled at Getafé, he sent scouting -parties in all directions to feel for the allies, and -to ascertain the direction of their march; the next -day the army of the centre and that of the south -were reunited not far from Madrid, but Hill was -then in full retreat for the Guadarama covered by -a powerful rear-guard under general Cole.</p> - -<p>The 3d Soult pursued the allies, and the king -entering Madrid, placed a garrison in the Retiro -for the protection of his court and of the Spanish -families attached to his cause; this was a sensible -relief, for hitherto in one great convoy they had impeded -the movements of the army of the centre. -On the 4th Joseph rejoined Soult at the Guadarama -with his guards, which always moved as a separate -body; but he had left Palombini beyond the Tagus -near Tarancon to scour the roads on the side of -Cuenca, and some dragoons being sent towards -Huete were surprised by the partidas, and lost -forty men, whereupon Palombini rejoined the army.</p> - -<p>General Hill was moving upon Arevalo, slowly -followed by the French, when fresh orders from -Wellington, founded on new combinations, changed -the direction of his march. Souham had repaired -the bridge of Toro on the 4th, several days sooner<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_316"></a>[316]</span> -than the English general had expected, and thus -when he was keenly watching for the arrival of -Hill on the Adaja, that he might suddenly join -him and attack Soult, his designs were again -baffled; for he dared not make such a movement -lest Souham, possessing both Toro and Tordesillas, -should fall upon his rear; neither could he bring -up Hill to the Duero and attack Souham, because -he had no means to pass that river, and meanwhile -Soult moving by Fontiveros would reach the -Tormes. Seeing then that his combinations had -failed, and his central position no longer available, -either for offence or defence, he directed Hill to -gain Alba de Tormes at once by the road of<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_3">Plans 3</a> and <a href="#i_b_581fp_5">5.</a></span> -Fontiveros, and on the 6th he fell back himself, -from his position in front of Tordesillas, by Naval -del Rey and Pituega to the heights of San Christoval.</p> - -<p>Joseph, thinking to prevent Hill’s junction with -Wellington, had gained Arevalo by the Segovia -road on the 5th and 6th; the 8th Souham’s scouts -were met with at Medina del Campo, and for the -first time, since he had quitted Valencia, the king -obtained news of the army of Portugal. One hundred -thousand combatants, of which above twelve -thousand were cavalry, with a hundred and thirty -pieces of artillery, were thus assembled on those -plains over which, three months before, Marmont -had marched with so much confidence to his own -destruction. Soult then expelled from Andalusia by -Marmont’s defeat, was now, after having made half -the circuit of the Peninsula, come to drive into -Portugal, that very army whose victory had driven -him from the south; and thus, as Wellington had -foreseen and foretold, the acquisition of Andalusia,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_317"></a>[317]</span> -politically important and useful to the cause, proved -injurious to himself at the moment, insomuch as the -French had concentrated a mighty power, from -which it required both skill and fortune to escape. -Meanwhile the Spanish armies let loose by this -union of all the French troops, kept aloof, or coming -to aid, were found a burthen, rather than a help.</p> - -<p>On the 7th Hill’s main body passed the Tormes, -at Alba, and the bridge there was mined; the -light division and Long’s cavalry remained on the -right bank during the night but the next day the -former also crossed the river. Wellington himself -was in the position of San Christoval, and it is -curious, that the king, even at this late period,<span class="sidenote">Joseph’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -was doubtful if Ballesteros’s troops had or had not -joined the allied army at Avila. Wellington also -was still uncertain of the real numbers of the enemy, -but he was desirous to maintain the line of the -Tormes permanently, and to give his troops repose. -He had made a retreat of two hundred miles; Hill -had made one of the same distance besides his -march from Estremadura; Skerrit’s people had -come from Cadiz, and the whole army required -rest, for the soldiers, especially those who besieged -Burgos, had been in the field, with scarcely an -interval of repose, since January; they were bare-footed, -and their equipments were spoiled, the -cavalry were becoming weak, their horses were out -of condition, and the discipline of all was failing.</p> - -<p>The excesses committed on the retreat from -Burgos have already been touched upon, and during -the first day’s march from the Tagus to Madrid, -some of general Hill’s men had not behaved better. -Five hundred of the rear-guard under Cole, chiefly -of one regiment, finding the inhabitants had fled<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_318"></a>[318]</span> -according to their custom whichever side was approaching, -broke open the houses, plundered and -got drunk. A multitude were left in the cellars of -Valdemoro, and two hundred and fifty fell into the -hands of the enemy. The rest of the retreat being -unmolested, was made with more regularity, but -the excesses still committed by some of the soldiers -were glaring and furnished proof that the moral -conduct of a general cannot be fairly judged by -following in the wake of a retreating army. On -this occasion there was no want of provisions, no -hardships to exasperate the men, and yet I the -author of this history, counted on the first day’s -march from Madrid, seventeen bodies of murdered -peasants; by whom killed, or for what, whether by -English, or Germans, by Spaniards, or Portuguese, -whether in dispute, in robbery, or in <ins class="corr" id="tn-318" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'wanton villany'"> -wanton villainy</ins>, I know not, but their bodies were in the -ditches, and a shallow observer might thence have -drawn the most foul and false conclusions against -the English general and nation.</p> - -<p>Another notable thing was the discontent of the -veteran troops with the arrangements of the staff -officers. For the assembling of the sick men, at the -place and time prescribed to form the convoys, -was punctually attended to by the regimental officers; -not so by the others, nor by the commissaries -who had charge to provide the means of transport; -hence delay and great suffering to the sick and the -wearing out of the healthy men’s strength by waiting -with their packs on for the negligent. And -when the light division was left on the right bank -of the Tormes to cover the passage at Alba, a prudent -order that all baggage or other impediments, -should pass rapidly over the narrow bridge at that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_319"></a>[319]</span> -place without halting at all on the enemy’s side, -was, by those charged with the execution, so rigorously -interpreted, as to deprive the light division -of their ration bullocks and flour mules, at the -very moment of distribution; and the tired soldiers, -thus absurdly denied their food, had the farther -mortification to see a string of commissariat carts -deliberately passing their post many hours afterwards. -All regimental officers know that the anger -and discontent thus created is one of the surest -means of ruining the discipline of an army, and it -is in these particulars that the value of a good and -experienced staff is found.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington’s position extended from Christoval -to Aldea Lengua on the right bank of the -Tormes, and on the left of that river, to the bridge -of Alba, where the castle which was on the right -bank was garrisoned by Howard’s brigade of the -second division. Hamilton’s Portuguese were on -the left bank as a reserve for Howard; the remainder -of the second division watched the fords -of Huerta and Enciña, and behind them in second -line the third and fourth divisions occupied the -heights of Calvariza de Ariba. The light division -and the Spanish infantry entered Salamanca, the -cavalry were disposed beyond the Tormes, covering -all the front, and thus posted, the English general -desired to bring affairs to the decision of a battle. -For the heights of Christoval were strong and -compact, the position of the Arapiles on the other -side of the Tormes was glorious as well as strong, -and the bridge of Salamanca, and the fords furnished -the power of concentrating on either side of -that river by a shorter line than the enemy could -move upon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_320"></a>[320]</span></p> - -<p>But while Wellington prepared for a battle, he -also looked to a retreat. His sick were sent to the -rear, small convoys of provisions were ordered -up from Ciudad Rodrigo to certain halting places -between that place and Salamanca; the overplus -of ammunition in the latter town was destroyed -daily by small explosions, and large stores of -clothing, of arms and accoutrements, were delivered -to the Spanish troops, who were thus completely -furnished; one hour after the English -general had the mortification to see them selling -their equipments even under his own windows. -Indeed Salamanca presented an extraordinary scene, -and the Spaniards, civil and military, began to -evince hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt -or perpetrate murder, and one act of peculiar -atrocity merits notice. A horse, led by an English -soldier, being frightened, backed against a Spanish -officer commanding at a gate, he caused the soldier -to be dragged into his guard-house and there -bayonetted him in cold blood, and no redress could -be had for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence, -which was not long withheld. A Spanish -officer while wantonly stabbing at a rifleman was -shot dead by the latter; and a British volunteer -slew a Spanish officer at the head of his own regiment -in a sword-fight, the troops of both nations -looking on, but here there was nothing dishonourable -on either side.</p> - -<p>The civil authorities, not less savage, were more -insolent than the military, treating every English -person with an intolerable arrogance. Even the -prince of Orange was like to have lost his life; -for upon remonstrating about quarters with the -sitting junta, they ordered one of their guards to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_321"></a>[321]</span> -kill him; and he would have been killed had -not Mr. Steele of the forty-third, a bold athletic -person, felled the man before he could stab; yet -both the prince and his defender were obliged to -fly instantly to avoid the soldier’s comrades. The -exasperation caused by these things was leading to -serious mischief when the enemy’s movements gave -another direction to the soldiers’ passions.</p> - -<p>On the 9th Long’s cavalry had been driven in -upon Alba, and on the 10th Soult opened a concentrated -fire of eighteen guns against that place. The -castle, which crowned a bare and rocky knoll, had -been hastily entrenched, and furnished scarcely any -shelter from this tempest; for two hours the garrison -could only reply with musketry, but finally -it was aided by the fire of four pieces from the left -bank of the river, and the post was defended until -dark, with such vigour that the enemy dared not -venture on an assault. During the night general -Hamilton reinforced the garrison, repaired the damaged -walls, and formed barricades, but the next -morning after a short cannonade, and some musketry -firing the enemy withdrew. This combat cost -the allies above a hundred men.</p> - -<p>On the 11th the king coming up from Medina del -Campo reorganized his army. That is, he united the -army of the centre with the army of the south, placing -the whole under Soult, and he removed Souham from -the command of the army of Portugal to make way -for Drouet. Caffarelli had before this returned to -Burgos, with his divisions and guns, and as Souham, -besides his losses and stragglers, had placed garrisons -in Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Valladolid; -and as the king also, had left a garrison in the -Retiro, scarcely ninety thousand combatants of all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_322"></a>[322]</span> -arms were assembled on the Tormes; but twelve -thousand were cavalry, nearly all were veteran -troops, and they had at least one hundred and -twenty pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power -could not remain idle, for the country was exhausted -of provisions, the soldiers were already wanting -bread, and the king, eager enough for battle, for he -was of a brave spirit and had something of his -brother’s greatness of soul, sought counsel how to -deliver it with most advantage.</p> - -<p>Jourdan with a martial fire unquenched by age, -was for bringing affairs to a crisis by the boldest -and shortest mode. He had observed that Wellington’s -position was composed of three parts, namely,<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_IX">Appendix, No. 9.</a></span> -the right at Alba; the centre at Calvariza Ariba; -the left, separated from the centre by the Tormes, -at San Christoval; the whole distance being about -fifteen miles. Now the Tormes was still fordable -in many places above Salamanca, and hence he -proposed to assemble the French army in the night, -pass the river at day-break, by the fords between -Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and so make a concentrated -attack upon Calvariza de Ariba, which would -force Wellington to a decisive battle.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">French Official correspondence, MSS.</span> -Soult opposed this project, he objected to attacking -Wellington in a position which he was so well -acquainted with, which he might have fortified, and -where the army must fight its way, even from the -fords, to gain room for an order of battle. He proposed -instead, to move by the left to certain fords, -three in number, between Exéme and Galisancho, -some seven or eight miles above Alba de Tormes. -They were easy in themselves, he said, and well -suited from the conformation of the banks, for -forcing a passage if it should be disputed; and by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_323"></a>[323]</span> -making a slight circuit the troops in march could -not be seen by the enemy. Passing there, the -French army would gain two marches upon the -allies, would be placed upon their flank and rear, -and could fight on ground chosen by its own generals, -instead of delivering battle on ground chosen -by the enemy; or it could force on an action in a -new position whence the allies could with difficulty -retire in the event of disaster. Wellington must -then fight to disadvantage, or retire hastily, sacrificing -part of his army to save the rest; and the -effect, whether militarily or politically, would be the -same as if he was beaten by a front attack. Jourdan -replied, that this was prudent, and might be successful -if Wellington accepted battle, but that -general could not thereby be forced to fight, -which was the great object; he would have time to -retreat before the French could reach the line of -his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, and it -was even supposed by some generals that he would -retreat to Almeida at once by San Felices and Barba -de Puerco.</p> - -<p>Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of -the Arapiles in detail, and the former, though he<span class="sidenote">Letter to the king, MS.</span> -urged his own plan, offered to yield if the king was -so inclined. Jourdan’s proposition was supported -by all the generals of the army of Portugal, except -Clausel who leaned to Soult’s opinion; but as that -marshal commanded two-thirds of the army, while -Jourdan had no ostensible command, the question -was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor -is it easy to determine which was right, for though -Jourdan’s reasons were very strong, and the result -did not bear out Soult’s views, we shall find the -failure was only in the execution. Nevertheless it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_324"></a>[324]</span> -would seem so great an army and so confident, for -the French soldiers eagerly demanded a battle, -should have grappled in the shortest way; a just -and rapid development of Jourdan’s plan would probably -have cut off Hamilton’s Portuguese and the brigade -in the castle of Alba, from Calvariza Ariba.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Wellington, who was so well -acquainted with his ground, desired a battle on either -side of the Tormes; his hope was indeed to prevent -the passage of that river until the rains rendered -it unfordable, and thus force the French to retire -from want of provisions, or engage him on the position -of Christoval; yet he also courted a fight on -the Arapiles, those rocky monuments of his former -victory. He had sixty-eight thousand combatants -under arms, fifty-two thousand of which, including<span class="sidenote">Letter to lord Liverpool, MS.</span> -four thousand British cavalry, were Anglo-Portuguese, -and he had nearly seventy guns. This force -he had so disposed, that besides Hamilton’s Portuguese, -three divisions guarded the fords, which -were moreover defended by entrenchments, and the -whole army might have been united in good time -upon the strong ridges of Calvariza Ariba, and on -the two Arapiles, where the superiority of fifteen -thousand men would scarcely have availed the -French. A defeat would only have sent the allies -to Portugal, whereas a victory would have taken -them once more to Madrid. To draw in Hamilton’s -Portuguese, and the troops from Alba, in time, -would have been the vital point; but as the French, -if they did not surprise the allies, must have fought -their way up from the river, this danger might -have proved less than could have been supposed -at first view. In fine the general was Wellington -and he knew his ground.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_325"></a>[325]</span></p> - - -<h4>FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TORMES. RETREAT -TO CIUDAD RODRIGO.</h4> - -<p>Soult’s plan being adopted, the troops in the -distant quarters were brought up; the army of -Portugal was directed to make frequent demonstrations -against Christoval, Aldea Lengua, and the -fords between Huerta and Alba; the road over the -hills to the Galisancho fords was repaired, and two -trestle-bridges were constructed for the passage of -the artillery. The design was to push over the -united armies of the centre and the south, by these -fords; and if this operation should oblige the allies -to withdraw from Alba de Tormes, the army of -Portugal was to pass by the bridge at that place -and by the fords, and assail Wellington’s rear; but -if the allies maintained Alba, Drouet was to follow -Soult at Galisancho.</p> - -<p>At day-break on the 14th the bridges were thrown, -the cavalry and infantry passed by the fords, the -allies’ outposts were driven back, and Soult took a -position at Mozarbes, having the road from Alba to -Tamames, under his left flank. Meanwhile Wellington -remained too confidently in Salamanca, -and when the first report informed him that the -enemy were over the Tormes, made the caustic -observation, that he would not recommend it to -some of them. Soon, however, the concurrent -testimony of many reports convinced him of his -mistake, he galloped to the Arapiles, and having -ascertained the direction of Soult’s march drew off -the second division, the cavalry, and some guns -to attack the head of the French column. The -fourth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese remained -at Alba, to protect this movement; the third<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_326"></a>[326]</span> -division secured the Arapiles rocks until the troops -from San Christoval should arrive; and Wellington -was still so confident to drive the French back over -the Tormes, that the bulk of the troops did not -quit San Christoval that day. Nevertheless when -he reached Mozarbes, he found the French, already -assembled there, too strong to be seriously meddled -with. However under cover of a cannonade, which -kept off their cavalry, he examined their position, -which extended from Mozarbes to the heights of -Nuestra Señora de Utiero, and it was so good that -the evil was without remedy; wherefore drawing off -the troops from Alba, and destroying the bridge, -he left three hundred Spaniards in the castle, -with orders, if the army retired the next day, to -abandon the place and save themselves as they -best could.</p> - -<p>During the night and the following morning the -allied army was united in the position of the Arapiles, -and Wellington still hoped the French would -give battle there; yet he placed the first division -at Aldea Tejada, on the Junguen stream, to secure -that passage in case Soult should finally oblige him -to choose between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. -Meantime the army of Portugal finding the bridge -of Alba broken, and the castle occupied, crossed -the Tormes at Galisancho, and moved up to the -ridge of Señora de Utiera; Soult, who had commenced -fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left at the -same time to the height of Señora de la Buena, near -the Ciudad Rodrigo road, yet slowly because the -ground was heavy, deep, and the many sources of -the Junguen and the Valmusa streams were fast -filling from the rain and impeded his march. -This evolution was nearly the same as that practised<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_327"></a>[327]</span> -by the duke of Ragusa at the battle of Salamanca; -but it was made on a wider circle, by a -second range of heights enclosing as it were those -by which the duke of Ragusa moved on that day, -and consequently, beyond the reach of such a -sudden attack and catastrophe. The result in each -case was remarkable. Marmont closing with a short -quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, received a -buffet that broke his pinions, and spoiled his flight. -Soult, a wary kite, sailing slowly and with a wide -wheel to seize a helpless prey, lost it altogether.</p> - -<p>About two o’clock lord Wellington, feeling himself -too weak to attack, and seeing the French -cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, -judged the king’s design was to establish a fortified -head of cantonments at Mozarbes, and then -operate against the allies’ communication with -Ciudad Rodrigo; wherefore suddenly casting his -army into three columns, he crossed the Junguen, -and then covering his left flank with his cavalry -and guns, defiled, in order of battle, before the -enemy at little more than cannon-shot. With a -wonderful boldness and facility, and good fortune -also, for there was a thick fog and a heavy rain -which rendered the bye-ways and fields, by which -the enemy moved, nearly impassable, while the -allies had the use of the high roads, he carried his -whole army in one mass quite round the French left: -thus he gained the Valmusa river, where he halted -for the night, in the rear of those who had been -threatening him in front, only a few hours before. -This exploit was certainly surprising, but it was -not creditable to the generalship on either side; for -first it may be asked why the English commander, -having somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_328"></a>[328]</span> -the Tormes and turn his position, waited so long -on the Arapiles as to render this dangerous movement -necessary, a movement which a combination -of bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigour on -the other side, rendered possible and no more.</p> - -<p>It has been said, that the only drawback to the -duke of Dalmatia’s genius, is his want of promptness -to strike at the decisive moment. It is certainly -a great thing to fight a great battle; and -against such a general as Wellington, and such -troops as the British, a man may well be excused, -if he thinks twice, ere he puts his life and fame, -and the lives and fame of thousands of his countrymen, -the weal or woe of nations, upon the hazard -of an event, which may be decided by the existence -of a ditch five feet wide, or the single -blunder of a single fool, or the confusion of a -coward, or by any other circumstance however -trivial. To make such a throw for such a stake is -no light matter. It is no mean consideration, that -the praise or the hatred of nations, universal glory -or universal, perhaps eternal contempt, waits on -an action, the object of which may be more safely -gained by other means, for in war there is infinite -variety. But in this case it is impossible not to -perceive, that the French general vacillated after -the passage of the river, purposely perhaps to -avoid an action, since, as I have before shown, he -thought it unwise, in the disjointed state of the -French affairs and without any fixed base or reserves -in case of defeat, to fight a decisive battle. -Nor do I blame this prudence, for though it be -certain that he who would be great in war must be -daring, to set all upon one throw belongs only to -an irresponsible chief, not to a lieutenant whose<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_329"></a>[329]</span> -task is but a portion of the general plan; neither -is it wise, in monarch or general, to fight when -all may be lost by defeat, unless all may be won -by victory. However, the king, more unfettered -than Soult, desired a battle, and with an army so -good and numerous, the latter’s prudence seems -misplaced; he should have grappled with his -enemy, and, once engaged at any point, Wellington -could not have continued his retreat, especially -with the Spaniards, who were incapable of dexterous -movements.</p> - -<p>On the 16th the allies retired by the three roads -which lead across the Matilla stream, through Tamames, -San Munos, and Martin del Rio, to Ciudad -Rodrigo; the light division and the cavalry closed -the rear, and the country was a forest, penetrable in -all directions. The army bivouacked in the evening -behind the Matilla stream; but though this march -was not more than twelve miles, the stragglers were -numerous, for the soldiers meeting with vast herds -of swine, quitted their colours by hundreds to shoot -them, and such a rolling musketry echoed through -the forest, that Wellington at first thought the -enemy was upon him. It was in vain that the staff -officers rode about to stop this disgraceful practice, -which had indeed commenced the evening before; -it was in vain that Wellington himself caused two -offenders to be hanged, the hungry soldiers still -broke from the columns, the property of whole districts -was swept away in a few hours, and the -army was in some degree placed at the mercy of -the enemy. The latter however were contented to -glean the stragglers, of whom they captured two -thousand, and did not press the rear until evening -near Matilla where their lancers fell on, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_330"></a>[330]</span> -were soon checked by the light companies of the -twenty-eighth, and afterwards charged by the fourteenth -dragoons.</p> - -<p>The 17th presented a different yet a not less -curious scene. During the night the cavalry -immediately in front of the light division, had, for -some unknown reason, filed off by the flanks to the -rear without giving any intimation to the infantry, -who, trusting to the horsemen, had thrown out their -picquets at a very short distance in front. At day-break, -while the soldiers were rolling their blankets -and putting on their accoutrements, some strange -horsemen were seen in the rear of the bivouac and -were at first taken for Spaniards, but very soon -their cautious movements and vivacity of gestures, -shewed them to be French; the troops stood to -arms, and in good time, for five hundred yards in -front, the wood opened on to a large plain on which, -in place of the British cavalry, eight thousand -French horsemen were discovered advancing in one -solid mass, yet carelessly and without suspecting -the vicinity of the British. The division was immediately -formed in columns, a squadron of the fourteenth -dragoons and one of the German hussars -came hastily up from the rear, Julian Sanchez’ -cavalry appeared in small parties on the right flank, -and every precaution was taken to secure the retreat. -This checked the enemy, but as the infantry fell -back, the French though fearing to approach their -heavy masses in the wood, sent many squadrons -to the right and left, some of which rode on -the flanks near enough to bandy wit, in the -Spanish tongue, with the British soldiers, who -marched without firing. Very soon however the -signs of mischief became visible, the road was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_331"></a>[331]</span> -strewed with baggage, and the bât-men came running -in for protection, some wounded, some without -arms, and all breathless as just escaped from a -surprise. The thickness of the forest had enabled -the French horsemen to pass along unperceived on -the flanks of the line of march, and, as opportunity -offered, they galloped from side to side, sweeping -away the baggage and sabring the conductors and -guards; they had even menaced one of the columns -but were checked by the fire of the artillery. In one -of these charges general Paget was carried off, as it -were from the midst of his own men, and it might -have been Wellington’s fortune, for he also was -continually riding between the columns and without -an escort. However the main body of the army -soon passed the Huebra river and took post behind -it, the right at Tamames, the left near Boadilla, -the centre at San Munoz, Buena Barba, and -Gallego de Huebra.</p> - -<p>When the light division arrived at the edge of -the table-land, which overhangs the fords at the -last-named place, the French cavalry suddenly -thickened, and the sharp whistle of musket-bullets -with the splintering of branches on the left showed -that their infantry were also up. Soult in the -hope of forestalling the allies at Tamames, had -pushed his columns towards that place, by a road -leading from Salamanca through Vecinos, but finding -Hill’s troops in his front turned short to his right -in hopes to cut off the rear-guard, which led to the</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF THE HUEBRA.</h4> - -<p>The English and German cavalry, warned by the -musketry, crossed the fords in time, and the light<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_332"></a>[332]</span> -division should have followed without delay; because -the forest ended on the edge of the table-land, and the -descent from thence to the river, about eight hundred -yards, was open and smooth, and the fords of the Huebra -were deep. Instead of taking the troops down -quickly, an order, more respectful to the enemy’s cavalry -than to his infantry, was given to form squares. -The officers looked at each other in amazement but at -that moment Wellington fortunately appeared, and -under his directions the battalions instantly glided off -to the fords, leaving four companies of the forty-third -and one of the riflemen to cover the passage. These -companies, spreading as skirmishers, were immediately -assailed in front and on both flanks, and -with such a fire that it was evident a large force -was before them; moreover a driving rain and mist -prevented them from seeing their adversaries, and -being pressed closer each moment, they gathered by -degrees at the edge of the wood, where they maintained -their ground for a quarter of an hour, then -seeing the division was beyond the river, they -swiftly cleared the open slope of the hill, and -passed the fords under a very sharp musketry. -Only twenty-seven soldiers fell, for the tempest, -beating in the Frenchmen’s faces, baffled their -aim, and Ross’s guns, playing from the low -ground with grape, checked the pursuit, but the -deep bellowing of thirty pieces of heavy French -artillery showed how critically timed was the -passage.</p> - -<p>The banks of the Huebra were steep and broken, -but the enemy spread his infantry to the right and -left along the edge of the forest, making demonstrations -on every side, and there were several fords -to be guarded; the fifty-second and the Portuguese<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_333"></a>[333]</span> -defended those below, Ross’s guns supported by the -riflemen and the forty-third defended those above, -and behind the right of the light division, on higher -ground was the seventh division. The second division, -Hamilton’s Portuguese, and a brigade of -cavalry, were in front of Tamames, and thus the -bulk of the army was massed on the right, hugging -the Pena de Francia, and covering the roads leading -to Ciudad, as well as those leading to the passes -of the Gata hills.</p> - -<p>In this situation one brisk attempt made to force -the fords guarded by the fifty-second, was vigorously -repulsed by that regiment, but the skirmishing, -and the cannonade, which never slackened, continued -until dark; and heavily the French artillery -played upon the light and seventh divisions. -The former, forced to keep near the fords, and in -column, lest a sudden rush of cavalry should carry -off the guns on the flat ground, were plunged into -at every round, yet suffered little loss, because the -clayey soil, saturated with rain, swallowed the shot -and smothered the shells; but it was a matter of -astonishment to see the seventh division kept on -open and harder ground by its commander, and in -one huge mass tempting the havoc of this fire for -hours, when a hundred yards in its rear the rise of -the hill, and the thick forest, would have entirely -covered it without in any manner weakening the -position.</p> - -<p>On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before -day-light, and the English general was anxious -about the result, because the position of the Huebra, -though good for defence, was difficult to remove from -at this season; the roads were hollow and narrow, -and led up a steep bank to a table-land, which was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_334"></a>[334]</span> -open, flat, marshy, and scored with water gullies; -and from the overflowing of one of the streams the -principal road was impassable a mile in rear of the -position; hence to bring the columns off in time, -without jostling, and if possible without being -attacked, required a nice management. All the -baggage and stores had marched in the night, with -orders not to halt until they reached the high lands -near Ciudad Rodrigo, but if the preceding days -had produced some strange occurrences, the 18th -was not less fertile in them.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">Vol. I.</span> -In a former part of this work it has been observed, -that even the confirmed reputation of lord Wellington -could not protect him from the vanity and presumption -of subordinate officers. The allusion -fixes here. Knowing that the most direct road was -impassable, he had directed the divisions by another -road, longer, and apparently more difficult; this -seemed such an extraordinary proceeding to some -general officers, that, after consulting together, they -deemed their commander unfit to conduct the army, -and led their troops by what appeared to them the -fittest line of retreat! Meanwhile Wellington, who -had, before day-light, placed himself at an important -point on his own road, waited impatiently -for the arrival of the leading division until dawn, and -then suspecting something of what had happened, -galloped to the other road and found the would-be -commanders, stopped by that flood which his -arrangements had been made to avoid. The insubordination, -and the danger to the whole army, -were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was -so severe and well timed, the humiliation so complete, -and so deeply felt, that, with one proud sarcastic -observation, indicating contempt more than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_335"></a>[335]</span> -anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his -forces safely. However some confusion and great -danger still attended the operation, for even on -this road one water-gully was so deep that the -light division, which covered the rear, could only -pass it man by man over a felled tree, and it was -fortunate that Soult unable to feed his troops a -day longer, stopped on the Huebra with his main -body and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. -Thus the allies retired unmolested, but whether -from necessity, or from negligence in the subordinates, -the means of transport were too scanty for -the removal of the wounded men, most of whom -were hurt by cannon-shot; many were left behind, -and as the enemy never passed the Huebra at this -point, those miserable creatures perished by a horrible -and lingering death.</p> - -<p>The marshy plains, over which the army was -now marching, exhausted the strength of the -wearied soldiers, thousands straggled, the depredations -on the herds of swine were repeated, and -the temper of the army, generally, prognosticated -the greatest misfortunes if the retreat should be -continued. This was however the last day of trial, -for towards evening the weather cleared up, the -hills near Ciudad Rodrigo afforded dry bivouacs -and fuel, the distribution of good rations restored -the strength and spirits of the men, and the next -day Ciudad Rodrigo and the neighbouring villages -were occupied in tranquillity. The cavalry was -then sent out to the forest, and being aided by -Julian Sanchez’ Partidas, brought in from a thousand -to fifteen hundred stragglers who must otherwise -have perished. During these events Joseph -occupied Salamanca, but colonel Miranda, the Spanish -officer left at Alba de Tormes, held that place<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_336"></a>[336]</span> -until the 27th and then carried off his garrison in -the night.</p> - -<p>Thus ended the retreat from Burgos. The -French gathered a good spoil of baggage; what -the loss of the allies, in men, was, cannot be -exactly determined, because no Spanish returns -were ever seen. An approximation may however be -easily made. According to the muster-rolls, the -Anglo-Portuguese under Wellington, had about -one thousand men killed, wounded, and missing -between the 21st and 29th of October, which was -the period of their crossing the Duero, but this -only refers to loss in action; Hill’s loss between -the Tagus and the Tormes was, including stragglers, -about four hundred, and the defence of the -castle of Alba de Tormes cost one hundred. Now -if the Spanish regulars, and Partidas, marching -with the two armies, be reckoned to have lost a -thousand, which considering their want of discipline -is not exaggerated, the whole loss, previous -to the French passage of the Tormes, will amount -perhaps to three thousand men. But the loss -between the Tormes and the Agueda was certainly -greater, for nearly three hundred were killed and<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#NO_IX">Appendix, No. 9.</a></span> -wounded at the Huebra, many stragglers died in -the woods, and we have marshal Jourdan’s testimony, -that the prisoners, Spanish Portuguese and -English, brought into Salamanca up to the 20th -November, were three thousand five hundred and -twenty. The whole loss of the double retreat cannot -therefore be set down at less than nine thousand -including the cost of men in the siege of Burgos.</p> - -<p>I have been the more precise on this point, because -some French writers have spoken of ten -thousand being taken between the Tormes and the -Agueda, and general Souham estimated the previous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_337"></a>[337]</span> -loss, including the siege of Burgos, at seven -thousand. But the king in his despatches called -the whole loss twelve thousand, including therein -the garrison of Chinchilla, and he observed that if -the generals of cavalry, Soult and Tilley, had followed -the allies vigorously from Salamanca, the -loss would have been much greater. Certainly the -army was so little pressed that none would have -supposed the French horsemen were numerous. -On the other hand English authors have most unaccountably -reduced the British loss to as many -hundreds.</p> - -<p>Although the French halted on the Huebra, the -English general kept his troops together behind -the Agueda, because Soult retired with the troops -under his immediate command to Los Santos on the -Upper Tormes, thus pointing towards the pass of -Baños, and it was rumoured he designed to march -that way, with a view to invade Portugal by the -valley of the Tagus. Wellington disbelieved this -rumour, but he could not disregard it, because -nearly all his channels of intelligence had been -suddenly dried up by a tyrannical and foolish -decree of the Cortez, which obliged every man to -justify himself for having remained in a district -occupied by the enemy, and hence to avoid persecution, -those who used to transmit information, fled -from their homes. Hill’s division was therefore -moved to the right as far as Robledo, to cover the -pass of Perales, the rest of the troops were ready to -follow, and Penne Villemur, leading the fifth Spanish -army over the Gata mountains occupied Coria.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote9">December.</span> -Joseph, after hesitating whether he should leave -the army of the south, or the army of Portugal in -Castile, finally ordered the head-quarters of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_338"></a>[338]</span> -latter to be fixed at Valladolid, and of the former -at Toledo; the one to maintain the country between -the Tormes and the Esla, the other to occupy La -Mancha with its left, the valley of the Tagus, as -far as the Tietar, with its centre, and Avila with its -right. The army of the centre went to Segovia, -where the king joined it with his guards, and when -these movements, which took place in December, -were known, Wellington placed his army also in -winter-quarters.</p> - -<p>The fifth Spanish army crossing the Tagus at -Alcantara entered Estremadura.</p> - -<p>Hill’s division occupied Coria, and Placentia, -and held the town of Bejar by a detachment.</p> - -<p>Two divisions were quartered on a second line -behind Hill about Castelo Branco, and in the -Upper Beira.</p> - -<p>The light division remained on the Agueda, and -the rest of the infantry were distributed along the -Duero from Lamego downwards.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese cavalry were placed in Moncorvo, -and the British cavalry, with the exception -of Victor Alten’s brigade which was attached to the -light division, occupied the valley of the Mondego.</p> - -<p>Carlos D’España’s troops garrisoned Ciudad -Rodrigo, and the Gallicians marched through the -Tras os Montes to their own country.</p> - -<p>In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were -easily fed, because the improved navigation of the -Tagus, the Douro, and the Mondego, furnished -water carriage close to all their cantonments; moreover -the army could be quickly collected on either -frontier, for the front line of communication from -Estremadura passed by the bridge of Alcantara to -Coria, and from thence through the pass of Perales<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_339"></a>[339]</span> -to the Agueda. The second line run by Penamacor -and Guinaldo, and both were direct; but the -post of Bejar, although necessary to secure Hill’s -quarters from a surprise, was itself exposed.</p> - -<p>The French also had double and direct communications -across the Gredos mountains. On their -first line they restored a Roman road leading from -Horcajada, on the Upper Tormes, by the Puerto de -Pico to Monbeltran, and from thence to Talavera. -To ease their second line they finished a road, begun -the year before by Marmont, leading from Avila, -by the convent of Guisando and Escalona to Toledo. -But these communications though direct, were in -winter so difficult, that general Laval crossing the -mountains from Avila was forced to harness forty -horses to a carriage; moreover Wellington having -the interior and shorter lines, was in a more menacing -position for offence, and a more easy position -for defence; wherefore, though he had ordered all -boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and -other points where the great roads came down to -the Tagus, the French, as anxious to prevent him -from passing that river, as he was to prevent them, -sent parties to destroy what had been overlooked. -Each feared that the other would move, and yet -neither wished to continue the campagin, Wellington, -because his troops wanted rest, more than one-third -being in the hospitals! the French because -they could not feed their men and had to refix their -general base of operations, broken up and deranged -as it was by the Guerillas.</p> - -<p>The English general was however most at his -ease. He knew that the best French officers -thought it useless to continue the contest in Spain, -unless the British army was first mastered, Soult’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_340"></a>[340]</span> -intercepted letters showed him how that general desired -to fix the war in Portugal, and there was now a -most powerful force on the frontier of that kingdom. -But on the other hand Badajos, Ciudad Rodrigo, -and Almeida blocked the principal entrances, and -though the two former were very ill provided -by the Spaniards, they were in little danger because -<ins class="corr" id="tn-340" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the last compaign'"> -the last campaign</ins> had deprived the French of all -their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines, in Andalusia, -Almaraz, Madrid, Salamanca, and Valladolid; -and it was nearly impossible for them to make any -impression upon Portugal, until new establishments -were formed. Wherefore Wellington did not fear -to spread his troops in good and tranquil quarters, -to receive reinforcements, restore their equipments, -and recover their health and strength.</p> - -<p>This advantage was not reciprocal. The secondary -warfare which the French sustained, and which -it is now time again to notice, would have been -sufficient to establish the military reputation of -any nation before Napoleon’s exploits had raised the -standard of military glory. For when disembarrassed -of their most formidable enemy, they were still -obliged to chase the Partidas, to form sieges, to recover -and restore the posts they had lost by concentrating -their armies, to send moveable columns -by long winter marches over a vast extent of country -for food, fighting for what they got, and living -hard because the magazines filled from the fertile -districts were of necessity reserved for the field -operations against Wellington. Certainly it was a -great and terrible war they had in hand, and good -and formidable soldiers they were to sustain it so -long and so manfully amidst the many errors of their -generals.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_341"></a>[341]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXIX_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>CONTINUATION OF THE PARTIZAN WARFARE.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812.</span> -In the north, while Souham was gathering in front -of Wellington, some of Mendizabel’s bands blockaded -Santona by land, and Popham, after his failure -at Gueteria blockaded it by sea. It was not very -well provisioned, but Napoleon, always watchful, -had sent an especial governor, general Lameth, and -a chosen engineer, general D’Abadie, from Paris -to complete the works. By their activity a hundred -and twenty pieces of cannon were soon mounted, -and they had including the crew of a corvette a garrison -of eighteen hundred men. Lameth who was -obliged to fight his way into the place in September, -also formed an armed flotilla, with which, when the -English squadron was driven off the port by gales -of wind, he made frequent captures. Meanwhile -Mendizabel surprised the garrison of Briviesca, -Longa captured a large convoy with its escort, near -Burgos, and all the bands had visibly increased in -numbers and boldness.</p> - -<p>When Caffarelli returned from the Duero, Reille -took the command of the army of Portugal, Drouet -assumed that of the army of the centre, and Souham -being thus cast off returned to France. The -army of Portugal was then widely spread over -the country. Avila was occupied, Sarrut took -possession of Leon, the bands of Marquinez and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_342"></a>[342]</span> -Salazar were beaten, and Foy marching to seize -Astorga, surprised and captured ninety men employed -to dismantle that fortress; but above twenty -breaches had already been opened and the place -ceased to be of any importance. Meanwhile Caffarelli -troubled by the care of a number of convoys, one -of which under general Frimont, although strongly -escorted, and having two pieces of cannon, fell into -Longa’s hands the 30th of November, was unable -to commence active operations until the 29th of -December. Then his detachments chased the bands -from Bilbao, while he marched himself to succour -and provision Santona and Gueteria, and to re-establish -his other posts along the coasts; but while -he was near Santona the Spaniards attacked St. -Domingo in Navarre, and invested Logroña.</p> - -<p>Sir Home Popham had suddenly quitted the Bay -of Biscay with his squadron, leaving a few vessels to -continue the littoral warfare, which enabled Caffarelli -to succour Santona; important events followed -but the account of them must be deferred as belonging -to the transactions of 1813. Meanwhile tracing -the mere chain of Guerilla operations from -Biscay to the other parts, we find Abbé, who -commanded in Pampeluna, Severoli who guarded -the right of the Ebro, and Paris who had returned -from Valencia to Zaragoza, continually and at times -successfully attacked in the latter end of 1812; for -after Chaplangarra’s exploit near Jacca, Mina intercepted -all communication with France, and on the -22d of November surprised and drove back to Zaragoza -with loss a very large convoy. Then he besieged -the castle of Huesca, and when a considerable -force, coming from Zaragoza, forced him to desist, -he reappeared at Barbastro. Finally in a severe<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_343"></a>[343]</span> -action fought on the heights of Señora del Poya, -towards the end of December, his troops were dispersed -by Colonel Colbert, yet the French lost -seventy men, and in a few weeks Mina took the -field again, with forces more numerous than he had -ever before commanded.</p> - -<p>About this time Villa Campa, who had entrenched -himself near Segorbé to harass Suchet’s rear, was -driven from thence by general Panetier, but being -afterwards joined by Gayan, they invested the castle -of Daroca with three thousand men. Severoli marching -from Zaragoza succoured the place, yet Villa -Campa reassembled his whole force near Carineña -behind Severoli who was forced to fight his way home -to Zaragoza. The Spaniards reappeared at Almunia, -and on the 22nd of December, another battle was -fought, when Villa Campa being defeated with considerable -slaughter retired to New Castile, and there -soon repaired his losses. Meanwhile, in the centre -of Spain, Elio, Bassecour, and Empecinado, having -waited until the great French armies passed in pursuit -of Hill came down upon Madrid. Wellington, -when at Salamanca, expected that this movement -would call off some troops from the Tormes, but the -only effect was to cause the garrison left by Joseph to -follow the great army, which it rejoined, between the -Duero and the Tormes, with a great encumbrance -of civil servants and families. The Partidas then -entered the city and committed great excesses, treating -the people as enemies.</p> - -<p>Soult and Joseph had been earnest with Suchet to -send a strong division by Cuenca as a protection for -Madrid, and that marshal did move in person with -a considerable body of troops as far as Requeña on -the 28th of November, but being in fear for his line<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_344"></a>[344]</span> -towards Alicant soon returned to Valencia in a state -of indecision, leaving only one brigade at Requeña. -He had been reinforced by three thousand fresh men -from Catalonia, yet he would not undertake any -operation until he knew something of the king’s -progress, and at Requeña he had gained no intelligence -even of the passage of the Tagus. The -Spaniards being thus uncontrolled gathered in all -directions.</p> - -<p>The duke del Parque advanced with Ballesteros’ -army to Villa Nueva de los Infantes, on the La -Mancha side of the Sierra Morena, his cavalry entered -the plains and some new levies from Grenada, -came to Alcaraz on his right. Elio and Bassecour, -leaving Madrid to the Partidas, marched to Albacete, -without hindrance from Suchet, and re-opened -the communication with Alicant; hence exclusive -of the Sicilian army, nearly thirty thousand -regular Spanish troops were said to be assembled -on the borders of Murcia, and six thousand -new levies came to Cordoba as a reserve. However -on the 3d of December, Joseph at the head of his -guards and the army of the centre, drove all the -Partidas from the capital, and re-occupied Guadalaxara -and the neighbouring posts; Soult entered -Toledo and his cavalry advanced towards Del -Parque, who immediately recrossed the Morena, -and then the French horsemen swept La Mancha to -gather contributions and to fill the magazines at -Toledo.</p> - -<p>By these operations, Del Parque, now joined by -the Grenadan troops from Alcaraz, was separated -from Elio, and Suchet was relieved from a danger -which he had dreaded too much, and by his own -inaction contributed to increase. It is true he had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_345"></a>[345]</span> -all the sick men belonging to the king’s and to Soult’s -army on his hands, but he had also many effective -men of those armies; and though the yellow fever had -shewn itself in some of his hospitals, and though he -was also very uneasy for the security of his base in -Aragon, where the Partida warfare was reviving, -yet, with a disposable force of fifteen thousand infantry, -and a fine division of cavalry, he should not -have permitted Elio to pass his flank in the manner -he did. He was afraid of the Sicilian army which -had indeed a great influence on all the preceding -operations, for it is certain that Suchet would otherwise -have detached troops to Madrid by the Cuenca -road, and then Soult would probably have sought -a battle between the Tagus and the Guadarama -mountains; but this influence arose entirely from -the position of the Alicant army, not from its operations, -which were feeble and vacillating.</p> - -<p>Maitland had resigned in the beginning of -October, and his successor Mackenzie immediately -pushed out some troops to the front, and there was -a slight descent upon Xabea by the navy, but the -general remained without plan or object, the only -signs of vitality being a fruitless demonstration -against the castle of Denia, where general Donkin -disembarked on the 4th of October with a detachment -of the eighty-first regiment. The walls had -been represented as weak, but they were found to -be high and strong, and the garrison had been unexpectedly -doubled that morning, hence no attack -took place, and in the evening a second reinforcement -arrived, whereupon the British re-embarked. -However the water was so full of pointed rocks that -it was only by great exertions lieutenant Penruddocke -of the Fame could pull in the boats, and the soldiers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_346"></a>[346]</span> -wading and fighting, got on board with little loss -indeed but in confusion.</p> - -<p>Soon after this, general William Clinton came -from Sicily to take the command, and Wellington -who was then before Burgos, thinking Suchet would -weaken his army to help the king, recommended an -attempt upon the city of Valencia either by a coast -attack or by a land operation, warning Clinton -however to avoid an action in a cavalry country. -This was not very difficult, because the land -was generally rocky and mountainous, but Clinton -would not stir without first having possession of the -citadel of Alicant, and thus all things fell into disorder -and weakness. For the jealous Spanish governor -would not suffer the British to hold even a gate -of the town, nay, he sent Elio a large convoy of -clothing and other stores with an escort of only -twenty men, that he might retain two of that general’s -battalions to resist the attempt which he believed -or pretended to believe Clinton would make -on the citadel. Meanwhile that general, leaving -Whittingham and Roche at Alcoy and Xixona, -drew in his other troops from the posts previously -occupied in front by Mackenzie; he feared Suchet’s -cavalry, but the marshal, estimating the allied<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s official correspondence, MS.</span> -armies at more than fifty thousand men, would -undertake no serious enterprize while ignorant -of the king’s progress against lord Wellington. -He however diligently strengthened his camp at -St. Felipe de Xativa, threw another bridge over the -Xucar, entrenched the passes in his front, covered -Denia with a detachment, obliged Whittingham to -abandon Alcoy, dismantled the extensive walls of -Valencia, and fortified a citadel there.</p> - -<p>It was in this state of affairs that Elio came down<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_347"></a>[347]</span> -to Albacete, and priding himself upon the dexterity -with which he had avoided the French armies, proposed -to Clinton a combined attack upon Suchet. -Elio greatly exaggerated his own numbers, and -giving out that Del Parque’s force was under his command, -pretended that he could bring forty thousand -men into the field, four thousand being cavalry. -But the two Spanish armies if united would scarcely<span class="sidenote">General Donkin’s correspondence, MS.</span> -have produced twenty thousand really effective infantry; -moreover Del Parque, a sickly unwieldy -person, was extremely incapable, his soldiers were -discontented and mutinous, and he had no intention -of moving beyond Alcaraz.</p> - -<p>With such allies it was undoubtedly difficult for -the English general to co-operate, yet it would seem, -something considerable might have been effected -while Suchet was at Requeña, even before Elio -arrived, and more surely after that general had -reached Albacete. Clinton had then twelve thousand -men, of which five thousand were British: -there was a fleet to aid his operations, and the -Spanish infantry under Elio were certainly ten -thousand. Nothing was done, and it was because -nothing was attempted, that Napoleon, who watched -this quarter closely, assured Suchet, that however<span class="sidenote">Official correspondence of the duke of Feltre, MS.</span> -difficult his position was from the extent of country -he had to keep in tranquillity, the enemy in his -front was not really formidable. Events justified -this observation. The French works were soon -completed and the British army fell into such disrepute, -that the Spaniards with sarcastic malice -affirmed it was to be put under Elio to make it useful.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">General Donkin’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -Meanwhile Roche’s and Whittingham’s division -continued to excite the utmost jealousy in the other<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_348"></a>[348]</span> -Spanish troops, who asked, very reasonably, what -they did to merit such advantages? England paid<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_XVII">Appendix, No. 17.</a></span> -and clothed them and the Spaniards were bound -to feed them; they did not do so, and Canga -Arguelles, the intendant of the province, asserted -that he had twice provided magazines for them in -Alicant, which were twice plundered by the governor; -and yet it is certain that the other Spanish -troops were far worse off than these divisions. But -on every side intrigues, discontent, vacillation, and -weakness were visible, and again it was shewn that -if England was the stay of the Peninsula, it was -Wellington alone who supported the war.</p> - -<p>On the 22d of November the obstinacy of the governor -being at last overcome he gave up the citadel -of Alicant to the British, yet no offensive operations -followed, though Suchet on the 26th drove Roche’s -troops out of Alcoy with loss, and defeated the -Spanish cavalry at Yecla. However on the 2d of -December, general Campbell arriving from Sicily, -with four thousand men, principally British, assumed -the command, making the fourth general-in-chief -in the same number of months. His presence, -the strong reinforcement he brought, and the intelligence -that lord William Bentinck was to follow -with another reinforcement, again raised the public -expectation, and Elio immediately proposed that the -British should occupy the enemy on the Lower -Xucar, while the Spaniards crossing that river attacked -Requeña. However general Campbell after -making some feeble demonstrations declared he -would await lord William Bentinck’s arrival. Then -the Spanish general, who had hitherto abstained -from any disputes with the British, became extremely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_349"></a>[349]</span> -discontented, and dispersed his army for -subsistence. On the other hand the English general -complained that Elio had abandoned him.</p> - -<p>Suchet expecting Campbell to advance had -withdrawn his outposts to concentrate at Xativa, -but when he found him as inactive as his predecessors -and saw the Spanish troops scattered, he surprised -one Spanish post at Onteniente, another in Ibi, -and re-occupied all his former offensive positions in -front of Alicant. Soult’s detachments were now -also felt in La Mancha, wherefore Elio retired into -Murcia, and Del Parque, as we have seen, went -over the Morena. Thus the storm which had menaced -the French disappeared entirely, for Campbell,<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_XVII">Appendix, No. 17</a>, <a href="#NO_XVIII">18.</a></span> -following his instructions, refused rations to -Whittingham’s corps and desired it to separate for -the sake of subsistence; and as the rest of the -Spanish troops were actually starving, no danger -was to be apprehended from them: nay, Habert -marched up to Alicant, killed and wounded some -men almost under the walls, and the Anglo-Italian -soldiers deserted to him by whole companies when -opportunity offered.</p> - -<p>Suchet did as he pleased towards his front but he -was unquiet for his rear, for besides the operations -of Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran and Mina in Aragon, -the Frayle and other partida chiefs continually -vexed his communications with Tortoza. Fifty men -had been surprised and destroyed near Segorbe the -22d of November, by Villa Campa; and general -Panetier, who was sent against that chief, though -he took and destroyed his entrenched camp was -unable to bring him to action or to prevent him -from going to Aragon, and attacking Daroca as I -have before shown. Meanwhile the Frayle surprised<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_350"></a>[350]</span> -and destroyed an ordnance convoy, took -several guns and four hundred horses, and killed in -cold blood after the action above a hundred artillery-men -and officers. A moveable column being immediately -despatched against him, destroyed his dépôts -and many of his men, but the Frayle himself escaped -and soon reappeared upon the communications. -The loss of this convoy was the first disgrace of -the kind which had befallen the army of Aragon,<span class="sidenote">Suchet, official correspondence with the king, MSS.</span> -and to use Suchet’s expression a battle would have -cost him less.</p> - -<p>Nor were the Spaniards quite inactive in Catalonia, -although the departure of general Maitland -had so dispirited them that the regular warfare -was upon the point of ceasing altogether. The<span class="sidenote">Captain Codrington’s papers, MS.</span> -active army was indeed stated to be twenty thousand -strong, and the tercios of reserve forty-five thousand; -yet a column of nine hundred French controuled -the sea-line and cut off all supplies landed -for the interior. Lacy who remained about Vich -with seven thousand men affirmed that he could not -feed his army on the coast, but captain Codrington -says that nineteen feluccas laden with flour had in -two nights only, landed their cargoes between Mattaro -and Barcelona for the supply of the latter city, -and that these and many other ventures of the same -kind might have been captured without difficulty; -that Claros and Milans continued corruptly to connive -at the passage of French convoys; that the rich -merchants of Mattaro and Arens invited the enemy -to protect their contraband convoys going to France, -and yet accused him publicly of interrupting their -lawful trade when in fact he was only disturbing a -treasonable commerce, carried on so openly that he -was forced to declare a blockade of the whole coast.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_351"></a>[351]</span> -A plot to deliver up the Medas islands was also -discovered, and when Lacy was pressed to call out -the Somatenes, a favorite project with the English -naval officers, he objected that he could scarcely -feed and provide ammunition for the regular troops. -He also observed that the general efforts of that nature -hitherto made, and under more favourable circumstances, -had produced only a waste of life, of -treasure, of provisions, of ammunition and of arms, -and now the French possessed all the strong places.</p> - -<p>At this time so bitter were the party dissensions -that sir Edward Pellew anticipated the ruin of the -principality from that cause alone. Lacy, Sarzfield, -Eroles and captain Codrington, continued -their old disputes, and Sarzfield who was then in -Aragon had also quarrelled with Mina; Lacy made -a formal requisition to have Codrington recalled, -the junta of Catalonia made a like demand to the -regency respecting Lacy, and meanwhile such was -the misery of the soldiers that the officers of one -regiment actually begged at the doors of private -houses to obtain old clothing for their men, and even -this poor succour was denied. A few feeble isolated -efforts by some of the partizan generals, were -the only signs of war when Wellington’s victory at -Salamanca again raised the spirit of the province. -Then also for the first time the new constitution -adopted by the cortez was proclaimed in Catalonia, -the junta of that province was suppressed, Eroles -the people’s favorite obtained greater powers, and -was even flattered with the hope of becoming captain-general, -for the regency had agreed at last to -recal Lacy. In fine the aspect of affairs changed -and many thousand English muskets and other -weapons were by sir Edward Pellew, given to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_352"></a>[352]</span> -partizans as well as to the regular troops which -enabled them to receive cartridges from the ships -instead of the loose powder formerly demanded on -account of the difference in the bore of the Spanish -muskets. The effect of these happy coincidences -was soon displayed. Eroles who had raised a new -division of three thousand men, contrived in concert -with Codrington, a combined movement in September -against Taragona. Marching in the night of -the 27th from Reus to the mouth of the Francoli he -was met by the boats of the squadron and having -repulsed a sally from the fortress, drove some Catalans -in the French service, from the ruins of the -Olivo, while the boats swept the mole, taking five -vessels. After this affair Eroles encamped on the -hill separating Lerida, Taragona, and Tortoza, meaning -to intercept the communication between those -places and to keep up an intercourse with the fleet, -now the more necessary because Lacy had lost this -advantage eastward of Barcelona. While thus -posted he heard that a French detachment had -come from Lerida to Arbeça, wherefore making a -forced march over the mountains he surprised and -destroyed the greatest part on the 2d of October, -and then returned to his former quarters.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">October.</span> -Meanwhile Lacy embarked scaling-ladders and battering -guns on board the English ships, and made a -pompous movement against Mattaro with his whole -force, yet at the moment of execution changed -his plan and attempted to surprise Hostalrich, but -he let this design be known, and as the enemy -prepared to succour the place, he returned to Vich -without doing any thing. During these operations -Manso defeated two hundred French near Molino -del Rey, gained some advantages over one Pelligri,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_353"></a>[353]</span> -a French miguelette partizan, and captured some -French boats at Mattaro after Lacy’s departure. -However Sarzfield’s mission to raise an army in Aragon -had failed, and Decaen desiring to check the -reviving spirit of the Catalans, made a combined -movement against Vich in the latter end of October. -Lacy immediately drew Eroles, Manso, and Milans -towards that point, and thus the fertile country about -Reus was again resigned to the French, the intercourse -with the fleet totally lost, and the garrison of -Taragona, which had been greatly straitened by the -previous operations of Eroles, was relieved. Yet -the defence of Vich was not secured, for on the -3d of November one division of the French forced -the main body of the Spaniards, under Lacy and -Milans, at the passes of Puig Gracioso and Congosto, -and though the other divisions were less successful -against Eroles and Manso, at St. Filieu de Codenas, -Decaen reached Vich the 4th. The Catalans, who -had lost altogether above five hundred men, then -separated; Lacy went to the hills near Momblanch, -Milans and Rovira towards Olot, and Manso to -Montserrat.</p> - -<p>Eroles returned to Reus, and was like to have surprised -the Col de Balaguer, for he sent a detachment -under colonel Villamil, dressed in Italian uniforms -which had been taken by Rovira in Figueras, and -his men were actually admitted within the palisade -of the fort before the garrison perceived the deceit. -A lieutenant with sixteen men placed outside were -taken, and this loss was magnified so much to Eroles -that he ordered Villamil to make a more regular attack. -To aid him Codrington brought up the Blake, -and landed some marines, yet no impression was -made on the garrison, and the allies retired on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_354"></a>[354]</span> -17th at the approach of two thousand men sent from -Tortoza. Eroles and Manso then vainly united near -Manresa to oppose Decaen, who, coming down from -Vich, forced his way to Reus, seized a vast quantity -of corn, supplied Taragona, and then marched to -Barcelona.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote9">November.</span> -These operations indisputably proved that there -was no real power of resistance in the Catalan army, -but as an absurd notion prevailed that Soult, Suchet, -and Joseph were coming with their armies in one<span class="sidenote">Captain Codrington’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -body, to France, through Catalonia, Lacy endeavoured -to cover his inactivity by pretending a design to -raise a large force in Aragon, with which to watch -this retreat, and to act as a flanking corps to lord -Wellington, who was believed to be then approaching -Zaragoza. Such rumours served to amuse the -Catalans for a short time, but the sense of their -real weakness soon returned. In December Bertoletti, -the governor of Taragona, marched upon Reus, -and defeated some hundred men who had reassembled -there; and at the same time a French convoy -for Barcelona, escorted by three thousand men, -passed safely in the face of six thousand Catalan -soldiers, who were desirous to attack but were prevented -by Lacy.</p> - -<p>The anger of the people and of the troops also, on -this occasion was loudly expressed, Lacy was openly -accused of treachery, and was soon after recalled. -However, Eroles who had come to Cape Salou to -obtain succour from the squadron for his suffering -soldiers, acknowledged that the resources of Catalonia -were worn out, the spirit of the people broken -by Lacy’s misconduct, and the army, reduced to -less than seven thousand men, naked and famishing. -Affairs were so bad, that expecting to be made<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_355"></a>[355]</span> -captain-general he was reluctant to accept that -office, and the regular warfare was in fact extinguished, -for Sarzfield was now acting as a partizan -on the Ebro. Nevertheless the French were greatly -dismayed at the disasters in Russia; their force was -weakened by the drafts made to fill up the ranks of -Napoleon’s new army; and the war of the partidas -continued, especially along the banks of the Ebro, -where Sarzfield, at the head of Eroles’ ancient -division, which he had carried with him out of -Catalonia, acted in concert with Mina, Duran, -Villa Campa, the Frayle, Pendencia, and other -chiefs, who were busy upon Suchet’s communication -between Tortoza and Valencia.</p> - -<p>Aragon being now unquiet, and Navarre and -Biscay in a state of insurrection, the French forces -in the interior of Spain were absolutely invested. -Their front was opposed by regular armies, their -flanks annoyed by the British squadrons, and their -rear, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, -plagued and stung by this chain of partidas and -insurrections. And England was the cause of all -this. England was the real deliverer of the Peninsula. -It was her succours thrown into Biscay that -had excited the new insurrection in the northern -provinces, and enabled Mina and the other chiefs -to enter Aragon, while Wellington drew the great -masses of the French towards Portugal. It was -that insurrection, so forced on, which, notwithstanding -the cessation of the regular warfare in Catalonia, -gave life and activity to the partidas of the -south. It was the army from Sicily which, though -badly commanded, by occupying the attention of -Suchet in front, obliged him to keep his forces -together instead of hunting down the bands on his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_356"></a>[356]</span> -communications. In fine, it was the troops of -England who had shocked the enemy’s front of -battle, the fleets of England which had menaced -his flanks with disembarkations, the money and -stores of England which had supported the partidas. -Every part of the Peninsula was pervaded -by her influence, or her warriors, and a trembling -sense of insecurity was communicated to the French -wherever their armies were not united in masses.</p> - -<p>Such then were the various military events of the -year 1812, and the English general taking a view of -the whole, judged that however anxious the French -might be to invade Portugal, they would be content -during the winter to gather provisions and wait for -reinforcements from France wherewith to strike a -decisive blow at his army. But those reinforcements -never came. Napoleon, unconquered of man, -had been vanquished by the elements. The fires -and the snows of Moscow combined, had shattered -his strength, and in confessed madness, nations and -rulers rejoiced, that an enterprize, at once the -grandest, the most provident, the most beneficial, -ever attempted by a warrior-statesman, had been -foiled: they rejoiced that Napoleon had failed to -re-establish unhappy Poland as a barrier against the -most formidable and brutal, the most swinish tyranny, -that has ever menaced and disgraced European -civilization.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_357"></a>[357]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXIX_VII">CHAPTER VII.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812.</span> -Lord Wellington exasperated by the conduct of -the army and by the many crossings he had experienced -during the campaign, had no sooner taken -his winter-quarters, than he gave vent to his indignation -in a circular letter, addressed to the superior -officers, which, being ill-received by the army at -the time, has been frequently referred to since with -angry denunciations of its injustice. In substance it -declared, “that discipline had deteriorated during -the campaign <em>in a greater degree than he had ever -witnessed or ever read of in any army</em>, and this without -any disaster, any unusual privation or hardship -save that of inclement weather; that the officers -had, from the first, lost all command over their men, -and hence excesses, outrages of all kinds, and inexcusable -losses had occurred; that no army had ever -made shorter marches in retreat, or had longer -rests; no army had ever been so little pressed by a -pursuing enemy, and that the true cause of this -unhappy state of affairs was to be found in the -habitual neglect of duty by the regimental officers.”</p> - -<p>These severe reproaches were generally deserved, -and only partially unjust; yet the statements, on -which they were founded, were in some particulars -unintentionally inaccurate, especially as regarded -the retreat from Salamanca. The marches, though -short as to distance, after quitting the Tormes, were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_358"></a>[358]</span> -long as to time, and it is the time an English soldier -bears his burthen, for like the ancient Roman he -carries the load of an ass, that crushes his strength. -Some regiments had come from Cadiz without -halting, and as long garrison duty had weakened -their bodies, both their constitutions and their inexperience -were too heavily taxed. The line of march -from Salamanca was through a flooded, and flat, -clayey country, not much easier to the allies than -the marshes of the Arnus were to Hannibal’s army; -and mounted officers, as that great general well knew -when he placed the Carthaginian cavalry to keep -up the Gallic rear, never judge correctly of a foot-soldier’s -exertions; they measure his strength by -their horses’ powers. On this occasion the troops, -stepping ankle-deep in clay, mid-leg in water, lost -their shoes, and with strained sinews heavily made -their way, and withal they had but two rations in -five days.</p> - -<p>Wellington thought otherwise, for he knew not -that the commissariat stores, which he had ordered -up, did not arrive regularly because of the extreme -fatigue of the animals who carried them; and those -that did arrive were not available for the troops, -because, as the rear of an army, and especially a -retreating army, is at once the birth-place and the -recipient of false reports, the subordinate commissaries -and conductors of the temporary dépôts, -alarmed with rumours that the enemy’s cavalry had -forestalled the allies on the march, carried off -or destroyed the field-stores: hence the soldiers -were actually feeding on acorns when their commander -supposed them to be in the receipt of good -rations. The destruction of the swine may be -therefore, in some measure, palliated; but there is -neither palliation nor excuse to be offered for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_359"></a>[359]</span> -excesses and outrages committed on the inhabitants, -nor for many officers’ habitual inattention to their -duty, of which the general justly complained. Certainly -the most intolerable disorders had marked -the retreat, and great part of the sufferings of the -army arose from these and previous disorders, for it -is too common with soldiers, first to break up the -arrangements of their general by want of discipline, -and then to complain of the misery which those -arrangements were designed to obviate. Nevertheless -Wellington’s circular was not strictly just, because -it excepted none from blame, though in conversation -he admitted the reproach did not apply to -the light division nor to the guards.</p> - -<p>With respect to the former the proof of its discipline -was easy though Wellington had not said so -much in its favour; for how could those troops -be upbraided, who held together so closely with -their colours, that, exclusive of those killed in action, -they did not leave thirty men behind. Never -did the extraordinary vigour and excellence of their -discipline merit praise more than in this retreat. -But it seems to be a drawback to the greatness of -lord Wellington’s character, that while capable of -repressing insubordination, either by firmness or -dexterity as the case may require, capable also of -magnanimously disregarding, or dangerously resenting -injuries, his praises and his censures are -bestowed indiscriminately, or so directed as to acquire -partizans and personal friends rather than the -attachment of the multitude. He did not make the -hard-working military crowd feel that their honest -unobtrusive exertions were appreciated. In this -he differs not from many other great generals and -statesmen, but he thereby fails to influence masses,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_360"></a>[360]</span> -and his genius falls short of that sublime flight by -which Hannibal in ancient, and Napoleon in modern -times, commanded the admiration of the world. -Nevertheless it is only by a comparison with such -great men that he can be measured, nor will any -slight examination of his exploits suffice to convey -a true notion of his intellectual power and resources. -Let this campaign be taken as an example.</p> - -<p>It must be evident that it in no manner bears out -the character of an easy and triumphant march, -which English writers have given to it. Nothing -happened according to the original plan. The -general’s operations were one continual struggle to -overcome obstacles, occasioned by the enemy’s -numbers, the insubordination of his own troops, the -slowness, incapacity, and unfaithful conduct of the -Spanish commanders, the want of money, and the -active folly of the different governments he served. -For first his design was to menace the French in -Spain so as to bring their forces upon him from -other parts, and then to retire into Portugal, again -to issue forth when want should cause them to disperse. -He was not without hopes indeed to strike -a decisive blow, yet he was content, if the occasion -came not, to wear out the French by continual -marching, and he trusted that the frequent opportunities -thus given to the Spaniards would finally -urge them to a general effort. But he found his -enemy, from the first, too powerful for him, even -without drawing succour from distant parts, and he -would have fallen back at once, were it not for -Marmont’s rashness. Nor would the victory of the -Arapiles itself have produced any proportionate -effect but for the errors of the king, and his rejection -of Soult’s advice. Those errors caused the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_361"></a>[361]</span> -evacuation of Andalusia, yet it was only to concentrate -an overwhelming force with which the French -finally drove the victors back to Portugal.</p> - -<p>Again, Wellington designed to finish his campaign -in the southern provinces, and circumstances -obliged him to remain in the northern provinces. -He would have taken Burgos and he could not; he -would have rested longer on the Carrion, and his flanks -were turned by the bridges of Palencia and Baños; -he would have rested behind the Douro, to profit of -his central position, but the bridge at Tordesillas -was ravished from him, and the sudden reparation -of that at Toro, obliged him to retire. He would -have united with Hill on the Adaja, and he could -only unite with him behind the Tormes; and on this -last river also he desired either to take his winter -quarters, or to have delivered a great battle with a -view to regain Madrid, and he could do neither. -Finally he endeavoured to make an orderly and an -easy retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and his army was -like to have dissolved altogether. And yet in all -these varying circumstances, his sagacity as to the -general course of the war, his promptness in taking -advantage of particular opportunities, was conspicuous. -These are the distinguishing characteristics -of real genius.</p> - -<p>Passing over as already sufficiently illustrated -that master-stroke, the battle of Salamanca, the -reader would do well to mark, how this great commander -did, after that event, separate the king’s -army from Marmont’s, forcing the one to retreat -upon Burgos, and driving the other from Madrid; -how he thus broke up the French combinations, so -that many weeks were of necessity required to -reunite a power capable of disturbing him in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_362"></a>[362]</span> -field; how he posted Clinton’s division and the -Gallicians, to repress any light excursion by the -beaten army of Portugal; how, foreseeing Soult’s -plan to establish a new base of operations in Andalusia, -he was prepared, by a sudden descent from -Madrid, to drive Soult himself from that province; -how promptly, when the siege of Burgos failed, -and his combinations were ruined by the fault of -others, how promptly I say, he commenced his -retreat, sacrificing all his high-wrought expectation -of triumph in a campaign which he burned to -finish, and otherwise would have finished, even -with more splendour than it had commenced.</p> - -<p>If Burgos, a mean fortress of the lowest order, -had fallen early, the world would have seen a -noble stroke. For the Gallicians, aided by a weak -division of Wellington’s army, and by the British -reinforcements making up from Coruña, would, -covered by Burgos, have sufficed to keep the army -of Portugal in check, while Popham’s armament -would have fomented a general insurrection of the -northern provinces. Meanwhile Wellington, gathering -forty-five thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and -fifteen thousand Spaniards, on the Tagus, would -have marched towards Murcia; Ballesteros’ army, -and the sixteen thousand men composing the Alicant -army, would there have joined him, and with -a hundred thousand soldiers he would have delivered -such a battle to the united French armies, -if indeed they could have united, as would have -shaken all Europe with its martial clangor. To -exchange this glorious vision, for the cold desolate -reality of a dangerous winter retreat was, for Wellington, -but a momentary mental struggle, and it -was simultaneous with that daring conception, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_363"></a>[363]</span> -passage of the bridge of Burgos under the fire of -the castle.</p> - -<p>Let him be traced now in retreat. Pursued by a -superior army and seeing his cavalry defeated, he -turned as a savage lion at the Carrion, nor would -he have removed so quickly from that lair, if the -bridges at Palencia and Baños had been destroyed -according to his order. Neither is his cool self-possession -to be overlooked; for when both his -flanks were thus exposed, instead of falling back -in a hurried manner to the Duero, he judged exactly -the value of the rugged ground on the left -bank of the Pisuerga, in opposition to the double -advantage obtained by the enemy at Palencia and -Baños; nor did the difficulty which Souham and -Caffarelli, independent commanders and neither of -them accustomed to move large armies, would find -in suddenly changing their line of operations escape -him. His march to Cabeçon and his position -on the left of the Pisuerga was not a retreat, it -was the shift of a practised captain.</p> - -<p>When forced to withdraw Hill from the Tagus, -he, on the instant, formed a new combination to -fight that great battle on the Adaja which he had -intended to deliver near the Guadalaviar; and -though the splendid exploit of captain Guingret, at -Tordesillas, baffled this intent, he, in return, baffled -Souham by that ready stroke of generalship, the -posting of his whole army in front of Rueda, -thus forbidding a passage by the restored bridge. -Finally, if he could not maintain the line of the -Duero, nor that of the Tormes, it was because rivers -can never be permanently defended against superior -forces, and yet he did not quit the last without -a splendid tactical illustration. I mean that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_364"></a>[364]</span> -surprising movement from the Arapiles to the Valmusa, -a movement made not in confusion and half -flight, but in close order of battle, his columns -ready for action, his artillery and cavalry skirmishing, -passing the Junguen without disorder, filing -along the front of and winding into the rear of -a most powerful French army, the largest ever collected -in one mass in the Peninsula, an army -having twice as many guns as the allies, and twelve -thousand able horsemen to boot. And all these -great and skilful actions were executed by lord -Wellington with an army composed of different -nations; soldiers, fierce indeed, and valiant, terrible -in battle, but characterised by himself, as more -deficient in good discipline than any army of which -he had ever read!</p> - -<p>Men engaged only in civil affairs and especially -book-men are apt to undervalue military genius, -talking as if simple bravery were the highest qualification -of a general; and they have another -mode of appeasing an inward sense of inferiority, -namely, to attribute the successes of a great captain, -to the prudence of some discreet adviser, who -in secret rules the general, amends his errors, and -leaves him all the glory. Thus Napoleon had -Berthier, Wellington has sir George Murray! but -in this, the most skilful, if not the most glorious of -Wellington’s campaigns, sir George Murray was -not present, and the staff of the army was governed -by three young lieutenant-colonels, namely, lord -Fitzroy Somerset, Waters, and Delancey; for though -sir Willoughby Gordon joined the army as quarter-master-general -after the battle of Salamanca, he -was inexperienced, and some bodily suffering impeded -his personal exertions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_365"></a>[365]</span></p> - -<p>Such then were the principal points of skill displayed -by Wellington; yet so vast and intricate an -art is war, that the apophthegm of Turenne will -always be found applicable: “<em>he who has made no -mistakes in war, has seldom made war</em>.” Some -military writers, amongst them the celebrated -Jomini, blame the English general, that with a -conquering army, and an insurgent nation at his -beck, he should in three months after his victory -have attempted nothing more than the unsuccessful -siege of Burgos. This censure is not entirely -unfounded; the king certainly escaped very easily -from Madrid; yet there are many points to be -argued ere the question can be decided. The want -of money, a want progressively increasing, had -become almost intolerable. Wellington’s army was -partly fed from Ciudad Rodrigo, partly from the -valley of the Pisuerga, Hill’s troops were fed from -Lisbon; the Portuguese in their own country, and -the Spaniards every where, lived as the French did, -by requisition; but the British professed to avoid -that mode of subsistence, and they made it a -national boast to all Europe that they did so; the -movements of the army were therefore always subservient -to this principle, and must be judged accordingly, -because want of money was with them -want of motion.</p> - -<p>Now four modes of operation were open to -Wellington.</p> - -<p>1º. <em>After the victory of Salamanca to follow the -king to Valencia, unite with the Alicant army, and, -having thus separated Soult from Joseph and Suchet, -to act according to events.</em></p> - -<p>To have thus moved at once, without money, into -Valencia, or Murcia, new countries where he had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_366"></a>[366]</span> -no assured connexions, and which were scarcely able -to feed the French armies, would have exposed him -to great difficulties; and he must have made extensive -arrangements with the fleet ere he could have -acted vigorously, if, as was probable, the French -concentrated all their forces behind the Guadalaviar. -Meanwhile the distance between the main allied army -and those troops necessarily left in the north, being -considered, the latter must have been strengthened -at the expense of those in the south, unless the army -of Portugal joined the king, and then Wellington -would have been quite over-matched in Valencia; -that is, if Soult also joined the king, and if not he -would have placed the English general between -two fires. If a force was not left in the north the -army of Portugal would have had open field, either -to march to the king’s assistance by Zaragoza, or -to have relieved Astorga, seized Salamanca, recovered -the prisoners and the trophies of the Arapiles, -and destroyed all the great lines of magazines and -dépôts even to the Tagus. Moreover, the yellow -fever raged in Murcia, and this would have compelled -the English general to depend upon the -contracted base of operations offered by Alicant, -because the advance of Clauzel would have rendered -it impossible to keep it on the Tagus. Time, therefore, -was required to arrange the means of operating -in this manner, and meanwhile the army was not -unwisely turned another way.</p> - -<p>2º. <em>To march directly against Soult in Andalusia.</em></p> - -<p>This project Wellington was prepared to execute, -when the king’s orders rendered it unnecessary, -but if Joseph had adopted Soult’s plan a grand -field for the display of military art would have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_367"></a>[367]</span> -opened. The king going by the Despenas Peros, -and having the advantage of time in the march, -could have joined Soult, with the army of the centre, -before the English general could have joined -Hill. The sixty thousand combatants thus united -could have kept the field until Suchet had also -joined; but they could scarcely have maintained -the blockade of Cadiz also, and hence the error -of Wellington seems to have been, that he did -not make an effort to overtake the king, either -upon or beyond the Tagus; for the army of the -centre would certainly have joined Soult by the -Despenas Peros, if Maitland had not that moment -landed at Alicant.</p> - -<p>3º. <em>To follow the army of Portugal after the victory -of Salamanca.</em></p> - -<p>The reasons for moving upon Madrid instead of -adopting this line of operations having been already -shewn in former observations, need not be here -repeated, yet it may be added that the destruction -of the great arsenal and dépôt of the Retiro was no -small object with reference to the safety of Portugal.</p> - -<p>4º. <em>The plan which was actually followed.</em></p> - -<p>The English general’s stay in the capital was -unavoidable, seeing that to observe the development -of the French operations in the south was of such -importance. It only remains therefore to trace -him after he quitted Madrid. Now the choice of -his line of march by Valladolid certainly appears -common-place, and deficient in vigour, but it was -probably decided by the want of money, and of means -of transport; to which may be added the desire to -bring the Gallicians forward, which he could only -attain by putting himself in actual military communication -with them, and covering their advance.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_368"></a>[368]</span> -Yet this will not excuse the feeble pursuit of Clauzel’s -retreating army up the valley of the Pisuerga. -The Spaniards would not the less have come up if -that general had been defeated, nor would the want -of their assistance have been much felt in the action. -Considerable loss would, no doubt, have been suffered -by the Anglo-Portuguese, and they could ill -bear it, but the result of a victory would have amply -repaid the damage received; for the time gained by -Clauzel was employed by Caffarelli to strengthen -the castle of Burgos, which contained the greatest -French dépôt in this part of Spain. A victory -therefore would have entirely disarranged the -enemy’s means of defence in the north, and would -have sent the twice-broken and defeated army of -Portugal, behind the Ebro; then neither the conscript -reinforcements, nor the junction of Caffarelli’s -troops, would have enabled Clauzel, with all his -activity and talent, to re-appear in the field before -Burgos would have fallen. But that fortress would -most probably have fallen at once, in which case -the English general might have returned to the -Tagus, and perhaps in time to have met Soult as he -issued forth from the mountains in his march from -Andalusia.</p> - -<p>It may be objected, that as Burgos did not yield, -it would not have yielded under any circumstances -without a vigorous defence. This is not so certain, -the effect of a defeat would have been very different -from the effect of such a splendid operation as -Clauzel’s retreat; and it appears also, that the prolonged -defence of the castle may be traced to some -errors of detail in the attack, as well as to want of -sufficient artillery means. In respect of the great -features of the campaign, it may be assumed that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_369"></a>[369]</span> -Wellington’s judgement on the spot, and with a full -knowledge both of his own and his adversaries’ situations, -is of more weight than that of critics, however -able and acute, who knew nothing of his difficulties. -But in the details there was something of error exceedingly -strange. It is said, I believe truly, that -sir Howard Douglas being consulted, objected to -the proceeding by gallery and mine against an outward, -a middle, and an inward line of defence, as -likely to involve a succession of tedious and difficult -enterprizes, which even if successful, would still -leave the White Church, and the upper castle or -keep, to be carried;—that this castle, besides other -artillery armament, was surmounted by a powerful -battery of heavy guns, bearing directly upon the -face of the horn-work of San Michael, the only point -from which it could be breached, and until it was -breached, the governor, a gallant man, would certainly -not surrender. It could not however be -breached without a larger battering train than the -allies possessed, and would not, as he supposed, be -effected by mines; wherefore proposing to take the -guns from two frigates, then lying at Santander, he -proffered to bring them up in time.</p> - -<p>In this reasoning lord Wellington partly acquiesced, -but his hopes of success were principally founded -on the scarcity of water in the castle, and upon the -facility of burning the provision magazines; nor was -he without hope that his fortune would carry him -through, even with the scanty means he possessed. -Towards the end of the siege, however, he did -resort, though too late, to the plan of getting guns -up from Santander. But while sir Howard Douglas -thus counselled him on the spot, sir Edward -Pakenham, then in Madrid, assured the author of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_370"></a>[370]</span> -this history, at the time, that he also, foreseeing the -artillery means were too scanty, had proposed to -send by the Somosierra twelve fine Russian battering -guns, then in the Retiro; and he pledged himself -to procure, by an appeal to the officers in the -capital, animals sufficient to transport them and their -ammunition to Burgos in a few days. The offer -was not accepted.</p> - -<p>Something also may be objected to the field -operations, as connected with the siege; for it is -the rule, although not an absolute one, that the -enemy’s active army should first be beaten, or -driven beyond some strong line, such as a river, or -chain of mountains, before a siege is commenced. -Now if Wellington had masked the castle after the -horn-work was carried on the 19th, and had then -followed Clauzel, the French generals, opposed to<span class="sidenote">Souham’s Official Correspondence, MSS.</span> -him, admit, that they would have gone over the -Ebro, perhaps even to Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. -In that case all the minor dépôts must have -been broken up, and the reorganization of the -army of Portugal retarded at least a month; before -that time, the guns from Santander would have arrived -and the castle of Burgos would have fallen. -In Souham’s secret despatches, it is said, of course -on the authority of spies, that Castaños urged an -advance beyond Burgos instead of a siege; of this -I know nothing, but it is not unlikely, because to -advance continually, and to surround an enemy, constituted, -with Spanish generals, the whole art of -war. Howbeit on this occasion, the advice, if -given, was not unreasonable; and it needed -scarcely even to delay the siege while the covering -army advanced, because one division of infantry -might have come up from Madrid, still leaving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_371"></a>[371]</span> -two of the finest in the army, and a brigade of cavalry, -at that capital, which was sufficient, seeing -that Hill was coming up to Toledo, that Ballesteros’ -disobedience was then unknown, and that the king -was in no condition to advance before Soult arrived.</p> - -<p>The last point to which it is fitting to advert, was -the stopping too long on the Tormes in hopes of -fighting in the position of the Arapiles. It was a -stirring thought indeed for a great mind, and the -error was brilliantly redeemed, but the remedy does -not efface the original fault; and this subject leads -to a consideration, of some speculative interest, -namely, why Wellington, desirous as he was to -keep the line of the Tormes, and knowing with -what difficulty the French fed their large army, did -not order every thing in his rear to take refuge in -Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and entrench himself -on St. Christoval and in Salamanca. Thus -posted with a bridge-head on the left bank that he -might operate on either side of the Tormes, he -might have waited until famine obliged the enemy -to separate, which would have been in a very few -days; but perhaps the answer would be that the -Spaniards had left Ciudad Rodrigo in a defenceless -state.</p> - -<p>Turning now to the French side we shall find that -they also committed errors.</p> - -<p>Souham’s pursuit after the cavalry combat at -Vente de Pozo was feeble. Wellington, speaking -of his own army, said, “no troops were ever less -pressed by an enemy.” The king’s orders were -however positive not to fight, and as the English -general continually offered Souham battle -in strong positions, the man had no power to do -mischief. Soult’s pursuit of Hill, which was also<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_372"></a>[372]</span> -remarkably cautious, arose from other motives. -He was not desirous of a battle, and until the -Guadarama was passed, Hill had the larger force, -for then only was the whole French army united. -The duke of Dalmatia wished to have marched in -one great mass through La Mancha, leaving only a -small corps, or a detachment of Suchet’s army, on -the Cuenca road; but the king united the whole of -the army of the centre, his own guards and seven -thousand men of the army of the south, on the -Cuenca line, and there were no good cross communications -except by Taracon. Soult therefore advanced -towards the Tagus with only thirty-five thousand -men, and from commissariat difficulties and -other obstacles, he was obliged to move by divisions, -which followed each other at considerable distances; -when his advanced guard was at Valdemoro, his rear-guard -not having reached Ocaña was two marches -distant. The danger of this movement is evident. -Hill might have turned and driven him over the -Tagus; or if his orders had permitted him to act -offensively at first, he might, after leaving a small -corps on the Upper Tagus, to watch the king, have -passed that river at Toledo, and without abandoning -his line of operations by the valley of the Tagus, -have attacked Soult while on the march towards -Ocaña. The latter in despite of his numerous cavalry -must then have fallen back to concentrate his forces, -and this would have deranged the whole campaign.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia, who thought Ballesteros -was with Hill, naturally feared to press his adversary -under such a vicious disposition of the French -army, neither could that disposition be changed -during the operation, because of the want of good -cross roads, and because Souham had been taught<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_373"></a>[373]</span> -that the king would meet him on the side of Guadalaxara. -In fine Soult had learned to respect his -adversaries, and with the prudence of a man whose -mental grasp embraced the whole machinery of the -war, he avoided a doubtful battle where a defeat -would, from the unsettled state of the French -affairs, have lost the whole Peninsula. Wellington -had Portugal to fall back upon, but the French -armies must have gone behind the Ebro.</p> - -<p>These seem to be the leading points of interest -in this campaign, but it will not be uninteresting -to mark the close affinities between Wellington’s retreat -and that of sir John Moore. This last-named -general marched from Portugal into the north of -Spain, with the political view of saving Andalusia, -by drawing on himself the French power, having -before-hand declared that he expected to be overwhelmed. -In like manner Wellington moved into -the same country, to deliver Andalusia, and thus -drew on himself the whole power of the enemy; -like Moore declaring also before-hand, that the political -object being gained, his own military position -would be endangered. Both succeeded, and -both were, as they had foretold, overwhelmed by -superior forces. Moore was to have been aided by -Romana’s Spanish army, but he found it a burthen; -so also Wellington was impeded, not assisted, by the -Gallicians, and both generals were without money.</p> - -<p>Moore having approached Soult, and menaced -Burgos, was forced to retreat, because Napoleon -moved from Madrid on his right flank and towards -his rear. Wellington having actually besieged Burgos -was obliged to raise the siege and retire, lest the -king, coming through Madrid, should pass his right -flank and get into his rear. Moore was only followed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_374"></a>[374]</span> -by Soult to the Esla, Wellington was only followed -by Souham to the Duero. The one general looked -to the mountains of Gallicia for positions which he -could maintain, but the apathy of the Spanish people, -in the south, permitted Napoleon to bring up -such an overwhelming force that this plan could -not be sustained; the other general had the same -notion with respect to the Duero, and the defection -of Ballesteros enabled the king to bring up such a -power that further retreat became necessary.</p> - -<p>Moore’s soldiers at the commencement of the operation -evinced want of discipline, they committed -great excesses at Valderas, and disgraced themselves -by their inebriety at Bembibre and Villa -Franca. In like manner Wellington’s soldiers -broke the bonds of discipline, disgraced themselves -by drunkenness at Torquemada and on the -retreat from the Puente Larga to Madrid; and they -committed excesses every where. Moore stopped -behind the Esla river to check the enemy, to restore -order, and to enable his commissariat to remove -the stores; Wellington stopped behind the Carrion -for exactly the same purposes. The one general -was immediately turned on his left, because the -bridge of Mancilla was abandoned unbroken to -Franceschi; the other general was also turned on his -left, because the bridge of Palencia was abandoned -unbroken to Foy.</p> - -<p>Moore’s retreat was little short of three hundred -miles; Wellington’s was nearly as long, and both -were in the winter season. The first halted at -Benevente, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo; the last -halted at Duenas, at Cabeçon, Tordesillas, and -Salamanca. The principal loss sustained by the -one, was in the last marches between Lugo and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_375"></a>[375]</span> -Coruña; so also the principal loss sustained by the -other, was in the last marches between the Tormes -and the Agueda. Some of Moore’s generals murmured -against his proceedings, some of Wellington’s -generals, as we have seen, went further; the first -were checked by a reprimand, the second were -humbled by a sarcasm. Finally both generals -reproached their armies with want of discipline, -both attributed it to the negligence of the officers -generally, and in both cases the justice of the -reproaches was proved by the exceptions. The -reserve and the foot-guards in Moore’s campaign, -the light division and the foot-guards in Wellington’s, -gave signal proof, that it was negligence of -discipline, not hardships, though the latter were -severe in both armies, that caused the losses. Not -that I would be understood to say that those -regiments only preserved order; it is certain that -many others were eminently well conducted, but -those were the troops named as exceptions at the -time.</p> - -<p>Such were the resemblances of these two retreats. -The differences were, that Moore had only twenty-three -thousand men in the first part of his retreat, -and only nineteen thousand in the latter part, -whereas Wellington had thirty-three thousand in -the first part of his retreat, and sixty-eight thousand -men in the latter part. Moore’s army were all of one -nation and young soldiers, Wellington’s were of different -nations but they were veterans. The first -marched through mountains, where the weather was -infinitely more inclement than in the plains, over -which the second moved, and until he reached the -Esla, Moore’s flank was quite exposed, whereas -Wellington’s flank was covered by Hill’s army until<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_376"></a>[376]</span> -he gained the Tormes. Wellington with veteran -troops was opposed to Souham, to Soult, to the king, -and to Jourdan, men not according in their views, -and their whole army, when united, did not exceed -the allies by more than twenty thousand men. Moore -with young soldiers was at first opposed to four times, -and latterly to three times his own numbers, for it is -remarkable, that the French army assembled at Astorga -was above eighty thousand, including ten thousand -cavalry, which is nearly the same as the number assembled -against Wellington on the Tormes; but Moore -had little more than twenty thousand men to oppose -to this overwhelming mass, and Wellington had -nearly seventy thousand. The Partidas abounded at -the time of Wellington’s retreat, they were unknown -at the time of Moore’s retreat, and this general was -confronted by Napoleon, who, despotic in command, -was also unrivalled in skill, in genius, and in vigour. -Wellington’s army was not pressed by the enemy, -and he made short marches, yet he lost more stragglers -than Moore, who was vigorously pressed, -made long marches, and could only secure an -embarkation by delivering a battle, in which he -died most honourably. His character was immediately -vilified. Wellington was relieved from his -pursuers by the operation of famine, and had therefore -no occasion to deliver a battle, but he also was -vilified at the time, with equal injustice; and if he -had then died it would have been with equal malice. -His subsequent successes, his great name and power, -have imposed silence upon his detractors, or converted -censure into praise, for it is the nature of -mankind, especially of the ignorant, to cling to -fortune.</p> - -<p>Moore attributed his difficulties to the apathy of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_377"></a>[377]</span> -the Spaniards; his friends charged them on the -incapacity of the English government. Wellington -attributed his ultimate failure to the defection of -Ballesteros; his brother, in the House of Lords, -charged it on the previous contracted policy of -Perceval’s government, which had crippled the -general’s means; and certainly Wellington’s reasoning, -relative to Ballesteros, was not quite sound. -That general, he said, might either have forced -Soult to take the circuitous route of Valencia, -Requeña, and Cuenca, or leave a strong corps in -observation, and then Hill might have detached -men to the north. He even calculated upon Ballesteros -being able to stop both Soult and Souham, -altogether; for as the latter’s operations were prescribed -by the king, and dependent upon his proceedings, -Wellington judged that he would have -remained tranquil if Joseph had not advanced. -This was the error. Souham’s despatches<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_VIII_A">Appendix, No. 8, A.</a></span> -clearly shew, that the king’s instructions checked, -instead of forwarding his movements; and that -it was his intention to have delivered battle -at the end of four days, without regard to the -king’s orders; and such was his force, that Wellington -admitted his own inability to keep the field. -Ballesteros’ defection therefore cannot be pleaded -in bar of all further investigation; but whatever -failures there were, and however imposing the -height to which the English general’s reputation -has since attained, this campaign, including the -sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, the forts of -Salamanca, and of Burgos, the assault of Almaraz, -and the battle of Salamanca, will probably be considered -his finest illustration of the art of war.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_378"></a>[378]</span> -Waterloo may be called a more glorious exploit -because of the great man who was there vanquished; -Assye may be deemed a more wonderful action, one -indeed to be compared with the victory which -Lucullus gained over Tygranes, but Salamanca -will always be referred to as the most skilful of -Wellington’s battles.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_379"></a>[379]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_XX">BOOK XX.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXX_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1812.</span> -While the armies were striving, the political -affairs had become exceedingly complicated and -unsteady. Their workings were little known or -observed by the public, but the evils of bad government -in England, Spain, and Portugal, the incongruous -alliance of bigoted aristocracy with awakened -democracy, and the inevitable growth of national -jealousies as external danger seemed to recede, -were becoming so powerful, that if relief had not -been obtained from extraneous events, even the -vigour of Wellington must have sunk under the -pressure. The secret causes of disturbance shall -now be laid bare, and it will then be seen that the -catastrophe of Napoleon’s Russian campaign was -absolutely necessary to the final success of the -British arms in the Peninsula. I speak not of the -physical power which, if his host had not withered -on the snowy wastes of Muscovy, the emperor could -have poured into Spain, but of those moral obstacles, -which, springing up on every side, corrupted -the very life-blood of the war.</p> - -<p>If Russia owed her safety in some degree to the -contest in the Peninsula, it is undoubted that the -fate of the Peninsula was in return, decided on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_380"></a>[380]</span> -the plains of Russia; for had the French veterans -who there perished, returned victorious, the war -could have been maintained for years in Spain, -with all its waste of treasures and of blood, to -the absolute ruin of England, even though her -army might have been victorious in every battle. -Yet who shall say with certainty what termination -any war will ever have? Who shall prophecy of -an art always varying, and of such intricacy that -its secrets seem beyond the reach of human intellect? -What vast preparations, what astonishing -combinations were involved in the plan, what vigour -and ability displayed in the execution of Napoleon’s -march to Moscow! And yet when the winter -came, only four days sooner than he expected, -the giant’s scheme seemed a thing for children to -laugh at!</p> - -<p>Nevertheless the political grandeur of that expedition -will not be hereafter judged from the wild -triumph of his enemies, nor its military merits from -the declamation which has hitherto passed as the -history of the wondrous, though unfortunate enterprise. -It will not be the puerilities of Labaume, -of Segur, and their imitators, nor even that splendid -military and political essay of general Jomini, called -the “<cite>Life of Napoleon</cite>,” which posterity will accept -as the measure of a general, who carried four -hundred thousand men across the Niemen, and a -hundred and sixty thousand men to Moscow. And -with such a military providence, with such a vigilance, -so disposing his reserves, so guarding his -flanks, so guiding his masses, that while constantly -victorious in front, no post was lost in his rear, no -convoy failed, no courier was stopped, not even a -letter was missing: the communication with his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_381"></a>[381]</span> -capital was as regular and certain as if that immense -march had been but a summer excursion of -pleasure! However it failed, and its failure was -the safety of the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>In England the retreat from Burgos was viewed -with the alarm and anger which always accompanies -the disappointment of high-raised public -expectation; the people had been taught to believe -the French weak and dispirited, they saw them so -strong and daring, that even victory could not -enable the allies to make a permanent stand beyond -the frontiers of Portugal. Hence arose murmurs, -and a growing distrust as to the ultimate -result, which would not have failed to overturn the -war faction, if the retreat of the French from Moscow, -the defection of Prussia, and the strange unlooked-for -spectacle of Napoleon vanquished, had -not come in happy time as a counterpoise.</p> - -<p>When the parliament met, lord Wellesley undertook, -and did very clearly show, that if the -successes in the early part of the year had not -been, by his brother, pushed to the extent expected, -and had been followed by important reverses, -the causes were clearly to be traced to the imbecile -administration of Mr. Perceval and his coadjutors, -whose policy he truly characterized as having in it -“<em>nothing regular but confusion</em>.” With a very accurate -knowledge of facts he discussed the military -question, and maintained that twelve thousand infantry -and three thousand cavalry, added to the -army in the beginning of the year, would have -rendered the campaign decisive, because the -Russian contest, the incapacity of Joseph, and the -dissentions of the French generals in Spain, had -produced the most favourable crisis for striking a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_382"></a>[382]</span> -vital blow at the enemy’s power. The cabinet were -aware of this, and in good time, but though there -were abundance of soldiers idling at home, when -the welfare of the state required their presence in -the Peninsula, nay, although the ministers had actually -sent within five thousand as many men as -were necessary, they had, with the imbecility which -marked all their proceedings, so contrived, that -few or none should reach the theatre of war until -the time for success had passed away. Then touching -upon the financial question, with a rude hand -he tore to pieces the minister’s pitiful pretexts, that -the want of specie had necessarily put bounds to -their efforts, and that the general himself did not -complain. “No!” exclaimed lord Wellesley, “he -does not complain because it is the sacred duty of -a soldier not to complain. But he does not say -that with greater means he could not do greater -things, and his country will not be satisfied if these -means are withheld by men, who having assumed -the direction of affairs in such a crisis, have -only incapacity to plead in extenuation of their -failures.”</p> - -<p>This stern accuser was himself fresh from the -ministry, versed in state matters, and of unquestionable -talents; he was well acquainted with the -actual resources and difficulties of the moment; he -was sincere in his opinions because he had abandoned -office rather than be a party to such a -miserable mismanagement of England’s power; he -was in fine no mean authority against his former -colleagues, even though the facts did not so clearly -bear him out in his views.</p> - -<p>That England possessed the troops and that they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_383"></a>[383]</span> -were wanted by Wellington is undeniable. Even in -September there were still between fifty and sixty -thousand soldiers present under arms at home, and -that any additional force could have been fed in -Portugal is equally beyond doubt, because the reserve -magazines contained provisions for one hundred -thousand men for nine months. The only question<span class="sidenote">Wellington’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -then was the possibility of procuring enough of specie -to purchase those supplies which could not be had -on credit. Lord Wellington had indeed made the -campaign almost without specie, and a small additional -force would certainly not have overwhelmed -his resources; but setting this argument aside, what -efforts, what ability, what order, what arrangements -were made by the government to overcome -the difficulties of the time? Was there less extravagance -in the public offices, the public works, -public salaries, public contracts? The very snuff-boxes -and services of plate given to diplomatists, -the gorgeous furniture of palaces, nay the gaudy -trappings wasted on Whittingham’s, Roche’s, and -Downie’s divisions, would almost have furnished the -wants of the additional troops demanded by lord -Wellesley. Where were all the millions lavished -in subsidies to the Spaniards, where the millions -which South America had transmitted to Cadiz, -where those sums spent by the soldiers during the -war? Real money had indeed nearly disappeared -from England, and a base paper had usurped its -place; but gold had not disappeared from the -world, and an able ministry would have found it. -These men only knew how to squander.</p> - -<p>The subsidy granted to Portugal was paid by -the commercial speculation of lord Wellington<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_384"></a>[384]</span> -and Mr. Stuart, speculations which also fed the<span class="sidenote">Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -army, saved the whole population of Portugal from -famine, and prevented the war from stopping in -1811; and yet so little were the ministers capable -even of understanding, much less of making such -arrangements, that they now rebuked their general -for having adopted them and after their own imbecile -manner insisted upon a new mode of providing -supplies. Every movement they made -proved their incapacity. They had permitted lord -William Bentinck to engage in the scheme of invading -Italy when additional troops were wanted -in Portugal; and they suffered him to bid, in the -money-market, against lord Wellington, and thus -sweep away two millions of dollars at an exorbitant -premium, for a chimera, when the war in the -Peninsula was upon the point of stopping altogether -in default of that very money which Wellington -could have otherwise procured—nay, had -actually been promised at a reasonable cost. Nor -was this the full measure of their folly.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellesley affirmed, and they were unable to -deny the fact, that dollars might have been obtained -from South America to any amount, if the government -would have consented to pay the market-price -for them; they would not do it, and yet afterwards -sought to purchase the same dollars at a higher -rate in the European markets. He told them, and -they could not deny it, that they had empowered -five different agents, to purchase dollars for five different -services, without any controlling head; that -these independent agents were bidding against each -other in every money-market, and the restrictions -as to the price were exactly in the inverse proportion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_385"></a>[385]</span> -to the importance of the service: the agent -for the troops in Malta was permitted to offer the -highest price, lord Wellington was restricted to -the lowest. And besides this folly lord Wellesley -shewed that they had, under their licensing system, -permitted French vessels to bring French goods, -silks and gloves, to England, and to carry bullion -away in return. Napoleon thus paid his army in -Spain with the very coin which should have subsisted -the English troops.</p> - -<p>Incapable however as the ministers were of -making the simplest arrangements; neglecting, as -they did, the most obvious means of supplying the -wants of the army; incapable even, as we have -seen, of sending out a few bales of clothing and -arms for the Spaniards without producing the utmost -confusion, they were heedless of the counsels -of their general, prompt to listen to every intriguing -adviser, and ready to plunge into the most absurd -and complicated measures, to relieve that distress -which their own want of ability had produced. -When the war with the United States broke out, a -war provoked by themselves, they suffered the -Admiralty, contrary to the wishes of Mr. Stuart, to -reduce the naval force at Lisbon, and to neglect -Wellington’s express recommendation as to the stationing -of ships for the protection of the merchantmen -bringing flour and stores to Portugal. Thus -the American privateers, being unmolested, run down -the coast of Africa, intercepted the provision trade -from the Brazils, which was one of the principal resources -of the army, and then, emboldened by impunity, -infested the coast of Portugal, captured -fourteen ships loaded with flour off the Douro, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_386"></a>[386]</span> -a large vessel in the very mouth of the Tagus. -These things happened also when the ministers -were censuring and interfering with the general’s -commercial transactions, and seeking to throw the -feeding of his soldiers into the hands of British -speculators; as if the supply of an army was like -that of a common market! never considering that -they thus made it the merchant’s interest to starve -the troops with a view to increase profits; never -considering that it was by that very commerce, -which they were putting an end to, that the general -had paid the Portuguese subsidy for them, and had -furnished his own military chest with specie, when -their administrative capacity was quite unequal to -the task.</p> - -<p>Never was a government better served than the -British government was by lord Wellington and -Mr. Stuart. With abilities, vigilance, and industry -seldom equalled, they had made themselves masters -of all that related to the Portuguese policy, whether -foreign or domestic, military, or civil, or judicial. -They knew all the causes of mischief, they had -faithfully represented them both to the Portuguese -and British governments, and had moreover devised -effectual remedies. But the former met them with -the most vexatious opposition, and the latter, neglecting -their advice, lent themselves to those foolish -financial schemes which I have before touched upon -as emanating from Mr. Villiers, Mr. Vansittart, and -the count of Funchal. The first had been deficient -as an ambassador and statesman, the second was -universally derided as a financier, and the third, -from his long residence in London, knew very little -of the state of Portugal, had derived that little from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_387"></a>[387]</span> -the information of his brother, the restless Principal -Souza, and in all his schemes had reference only to -his own intrigues in the Brazils. Their plans were -necessarily absurd. Funchal revived the old project -of an English loan, and in concert with his coadjutors -desired to establish a bank after the manner of the -English institution; and they likewise advanced a -number of minor details and propositions, most of -which had been before suggested by Principal -Souza and rejected by lord Wellington, and all of -which went to evade, not to remedy the evils. Finally -they devised, and the English cabinet actually entertained -the plan, of selling the crown and church property -of Portugal. This spoliation of the Catholic -church was to be effected by commissioners, one of -whom was to be Mr. Sydenham, an Englishman and -a Protestant; and as it was judged that the pope -would not readily yield his consent, they resolved -to apply to his nuncio, who being in their power -they expected to find more pliable.</p> - -<p>Having thus provided for the financial difficulties -of Portugal, the ministers turned their attention to -the supply of the British army, and in the same -spirit concocted what they called a modified system -of requisitions after the manner of the French -armies! Their speeches, their manifestoes, their -whole scheme of policy, which in the working had -nearly crushed the liberties of England and had -plunged the whole world into war; that policy -whose aim and scope was, they said, to support -established religion, the rights of monarchs, and the -independence of nations, was now disregarded or -forgotten. Yes, these men, to remove difficulties -caused by their own incapacity and negligence, -were ready to adopt all that they had before condemned<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_388"></a>[388]</span> -and reviled in the French; they were eager -to meddle, and in the most offensive manner, with -the catholic religion, by getting from the nuncio, -who was in their power, what they could not get -from the pope voluntarily; they were ready to interfere -with the rights of the Portuguese crown by -selling its property, and finally they would have -adopted that system of requisitions which they had -so often denounced as rendering the very name of -France abhorrent to the world.</p> - -<p>All these schemes were duly transmitted to lord -Wellington and to Mr. Stuart, and the former had, -in the field, to unravel the intricacies, to detect the -fallacies, and to combat the wild speculations of -men, who, in profound ignorance of facts, were -giving a loose to their imaginations on such complicated -questions of state. It was while preparing -to fight Marmont that he had to expose the futility -of relying upon a loan; it was on the heights of -San Christoval, on the field of battle itself, that he -demonstrated the absurdity of attempting to establish -a Portuguese bank; it was in the trenches of -Burgos that he dissected Funchal’s and Villiers’s -schemes of finance, and exposed the folly of attempting -the sale of church property; it was at the termination -of the retreat that with a mixture of rebuke -and reasoning he quelled the proposal to live -by forced requisitions; and on each occasion he -shewed himself as well acquainted with these subjects -as he was with the mechanism of armies.</p> - -<p>Reform abuses, raise your actual taxes with -vigour and impartiality, pay your present debt -before you contract a new one, was his constant -reply to the propositions for loans. And when the -English ministers pressed the other plans, which,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_389"></a>[389]</span> -besides the bank, included a recoinage of dollars -into cruzados, in other words the depreciation of -the silver standard, he with an unsparing hand laid -their folly bare. The military and political state of -Portugal he said was such that no man in his senses, -whether native or foreigner, would place his capital -where he could not withdraw it at a moment’s -notice. When Massena invaded that country unreasonable -despondency had prevailed amongst the -ministers, and now they seemed to have a confidence -as wild as their former fear; but he who -knew the real state of affairs; he who knew the -persons that were expected to advance money; he -who knew the relative forces of the contending -armies, the advantages and disadvantages attending -each; he who knew the absolute weakness of the -Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, could only -laugh at the notion that the capitalists would take -gold out of their own chests to lodge it in the chests -of the bank and eventually in those of the Portuguese -treasury, a treasury deservedly without credit. -The French armies opposed to him in the field (he -was then on San Christoval) were, he said, just -double his own strength, and a serious accident to -Ballesteros, a rash general with a bad army, would -oblige the Anglo-Portuguese force to retire into -Portugal and the prospects of the campaign would -vanish; and this argument left out of the question -any accident which might happen to himself or -general Hill. Portugal would, he hoped, be saved -but its security was not such as these visionaries -would represent it.</p> - -<p>But they had proposed also a British security, -in jewels, for the capital of their bank, and their -reasonings on this head were equally fallacious.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_390"></a>[390]</span> -This security was to be supported by collecting the -duties on wines, exported from Portugal to England, -and yet they had not even ascertained whether -the existence of these duties was conformable -to the treaty with England. Then came the former -question. Would Great Britain guarantee the capital -of the subscribers whether Portugal was lost or -saved? If the country should be lost, the new -possessors would understand the levying the duties -upon wines as well as the old; would England -make her drinkers of port pay two duties, the one -for the benefit of the bank capitalists, the other for -the benefit of the French conquerors? If all these -difficulties could be got over, a bank would be the -most efficacious mode in which England could use -her credit for the benefit of Portugal; but all the -other plans proposed were mere spendthrift schemes -to defray the expenses of the war, and if the English -government could descend to entertain them -they would fail, because the real obstacle, scarcity -of specie, would remain.</p> - -<p>A nation desirous of establishing public credit -should begin, he said, by acquiring a revenue equal -to its fixed expenditure, and must manifest an inclination -to be honest by performing its engagements -with respect to public debts. This maxim -he had constantly enforced to the Portuguese government, -and if they had minded it, instead of -trusting to the fallacious hope of getting loans in -England, the deficiency of their revenue would have -been made up, without imposing new taxes, and -even with the repeal of many which were oppressive -and unjust. The fair and honest collection of -taxes, which ought to exist, would have been sufficient. -For after protracted and unsparing exertions,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_391"></a>[391]</span> -and by refusing to accept their paper money on any -other condition in his commissariat transactions, he -had at last forced the Portuguese authorities to pay -the interest of that paper and of their exchequer -bills, called “<i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">Apolocies grandes</i>,” and the effect had -been to increase the resources of the government -though the government had even in the execution -evinced its corruption. Then showing in detail how -this benefit had been produced he traced the mischief -created by men whom he called the <em>sharks</em> of -Lisbon and other great towns, meaning speculators, -principally Englishmen, whose nefarious cupidity -led them to cry down the credit of the -army-bills, and then purchase them, to the injury -of the public and of the poor people who furnished -the supplies.</p> - -<p>A plan of recoining the Spanish dollars and so -gaining eight in the hundred of pure silver which -they contained above that of the Portuguese cruzado, -he treated as a fraud, and a useless one. In -Lisbon, where the cruzado was current, some gain -might perhaps be made; but it was not even there -certain, and foreigners, Englishmen and Americans, -from whom the great supplies were purchased, -would immediately add to their prices in proportion -to the deterioration of the coin. Moreover the -operations and expenditure of the army were not -confined to Lisbon, nor even to Portugal, and the -cruzado would not pass for its nominal value in -Spain; thus instead of an advantage, the greatest inconvenience -would result from a scheme at the best -unworthy of the British government. In fine the -reform of abuses, the discontinuance of useless expenses, -economy and energy were the only remedies.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_392"></a>[392]</span></p> - -<p>Such was his reasoning but it had little effect on -his persecutors; for when his best men were falling -by hundreds, his brightest visions of glory fading -on the smoky walls of Burgos, he was again -forced to examine and refute anew, voluminous -plans of Portuguese finance, concocted by Funchal -and Villiers, with notes by Vansittart. All the old -schemes of the Principal Souza, which had been so -often before analyzed and rejected as impracticable, -were revived with the addition of a mixed Anglo-Portuguese -commission for the sale of the crown and -church lands. And these projects were accompanied -with complaints that frauds had been practised on -the custom-house, and violence used towards the inhabitants -by the British commissaries, and it was insinuated -such misconduct had been the real cause of -the financial distresses of Portugal. The patient -industry of genius was never more severely taxed.</p> - -<p>Wellington began by repelling the charges of -exactions and frauds, as applied to the army; he -showed that to reform the custom-house so as to -prevent frauds, had been his unceasing recommendation -to the Portuguese government; that he had -as repeatedly, and in detail, shewed the government, -how to remedy the evils they complained of, how -to increase their customs, how to levy their taxes, -how in fine to arrange their whole financial system in -a manner that would have rendered their revenues -equal to their expenses, and without that oppression -and injustice which they were in the habit of practising; -for the extortions and violence complained -of, were not perpetrated by the English but by the -Portuguese commissariat, and yet the troops of that -nation were starving. Having exposed Funchal’s -ignorance of financial facts in detail, and challenged<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_393"></a>[393]</span> -him to the proof of the charges against the British -army, he entered deeply into the consideration of -the great question of the sale of the crown and church -lands, which it had been proposed to substitute for -that economy and reform of abuses which he so -long, so often, and so vainly had pressed upon the -regency. The proposal was not quite new. “I have -already,” he observed, “had before me a proposition -for the sale or rather transfer, to the creditors of the -‘<em>Junta de Viveres</em>’ of crown lands; but these were -the uncultivated lands in Alemtejo, and I pointed -out to the government the great improbability -that any body would take such lands in payment, -and the injury that would be done to the public -credit by making the scheme public if not likely to -be successful. My opinion is that there is nobody -in Portugal possessed of capital who entertains, or -who ought to entertain, such an opinion of the state -of affairs in the Peninsula, as to lay out his money -in the purchase of crown lands. The loss of a battle, -not in the Peninsula even, but elsewhere, would -expose his estate to confiscation, or at all events to -ruin by a fresh incursion of the enemy. Even if -any man could believe that Portugal is secure -against the invasion of the enemy, and his estate -and person against the ‘<em>violence, exactions, and -frauds</em>’ (these were Funchal’s words respecting the -allied army) of the enemy, he is not, during the -existence of the war, according to the Conde de -Funchal’s notion, exempt from those evils from his -own countrymen and their allies. Try this experiment, -offer the estates of the crown for sale, and it -will be seen whether I have formed a correct judgment -on this subject.” Then running with a rapid -hand over many minor though intricate fallacies<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_394"></a>[394]</span> -for raising the value of the Portuguese paper-money, -he thus treated the great question of the -church lands.</p> - -<p>First, as in the case of crown lands, there would -be no purchasers, and as nothing could render the -measure palatable to the clergy, the influence of -the church would be exerted against the allies, -instead of being, as hitherto, strongly exerted in -their favour. It would be useless if the experiment -of the crown lands succeeded, and if that failed the -sale of church lands could not succeed; but the -attempt would alienate the good wishes of a very -powerful party in Spain, as well as in Portugal. -Moreover if it should succeed, and be honestly -carried into execution, it would entail a burthen on -the finances of five in the hundred, on the purchase-money, -for the support of the ecclesiastical owners -of the estates. The best mode of obtaining for the -state eventually the benefit of the church property, -would be to prevent the monasteries and nunneries -from receiving novices, and thus, in the course of -time, the pope might be brought to consent to the sale -of the estates, or the nation might assume possession -when the ecclesiastical corporations thus became extinct. -He however thought that it was no disadvantage -to Spain or Portugal, that large portions -of land should be held by the church. The bishops -and monks were the only proprietors who lived on -their estates, and spent the revenues amongst the -labourers by whom those revenues had been produced; -and until the habits of the new landed -proprietors changed, the transfer of the property in -land from the clergy to the laymen would be a -misfortune.</p> - -<p>This memoir, sent from the trenches of Burgos,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_395"></a>[395]</span> -quashed Funchal’s projects; but that intriguer’s -object was not so much to remove financial difficulties, -as to get rid of his brother’s opponents in -the regency by exciting powerful interests against -them; wherefore failing in this proposal, he ordered -Redondo, now marquis of Borba, the minister of -finance, to repair to the Brazils, intending to supply -his place with one of his own faction. Wellington -and Stuart were at this time doggedly opposed by -Borba, but as the credit of the Portuguese treasury -was supported by his character for probity, they -forbade him to obey the order, and represented -the matter so forcibly to the prince regent, that -Funchal was severely reprimanded for his audacity.</p> - -<p>It was amidst these vexations that Wellington -made his retreat, and in such destitution that he -declared all former distress for money had been -slight in comparison of his present misery. So -low were the resources, that British naval stores -had been trucked for corn in Egypt; and the English -ministers, finding that Russia, intent upon pushing -her successes, was gathering specie from all quarters, -desired Mr. Stuart to prevent the English and -American captains of merchant vessels from carrying -coin away from Lisbon; a remedial measure, -indicating their total ignorance of the nature of -commerce. It was not attempted to be enforced. -Then also they transmitted their plan of supplying -the English army by requisitions on the country, -a plan the particulars of which may be best gathered -from the answers to it.</p> - -<p>Mr. Stuart, firm in opposition, shortly observed -that it was by avoiding and reprobating such a -system, although pursued alike by the natives and -by the enemy, that the British character, and credit,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_396"></a>[396]</span> -had been established so firmly as to be of the -greatest use in the operations of the war. Wellington -entered more deeply into the subject.</p> - -<p>Nothing, he said, could be procured from the -country in the mode proposed by the ministers’ -memoir, unless resort was also had to the French -mode of enforcing their requisitions. The proceedings -of the French armies were misunderstood. -It was not true, as supposed in the memoir, that -the French never paid for supplies. They levied -contributions where money was to be had, and with -this paid for provisions in other parts; and when -requisitions for money or clothing were made, -they were taken on account of the regular contributions -due to the government. They were indeed -heavier than even an usurping government was -entitled to demand, still it was a regular government -account, and it was obvious the British army -could not have recourse to a similar plan without -depriving its allies of their own legitimate -resources.</p> - -<p>The requisitions were enforced by a system of -terror. A magistrate was ordered to provide for -the troops, and was told that the latter would, in -case of failure, take the provisions and punish the -village or district in a variety of ways. Now were -it expedient to follow this mode of requisition there -must be two armies, one to fight the enemy and -one to enforce the requisitions, for the Spaniards -would never submit to such proceedings without -the use of force. The conscription gave the French -armies a more moral description of soldiers, but -even if this second army was provided, the British -troops could not be trusted to inflict an exact -measure of punishment on a disobedient village,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_397"></a>[397]</span> -they would plunder it as well as the others readily -enough, but their principal object would be to get -at and drink as much liquor as they could, and then -to destroy as much valuable property as should fall -in their way; meanwhile the objects of their mission, -the bringing of supplies to the army and the -infliction of an exact measure of punishment on the -magistrates or district would not be accomplished at -all. Moreover the holders of supplies in Spain being -unused to commercial habits, would regard payment -for these requisitions by bills of any description, -to be rather worse than the mode of contribution -followed by the French, and would resist it as forcibly. -And upon such a nice point did the war -hang, that if they accepted the bills, and were once -to discover the mode of procuring cash for them by -discounting high, it would be the most fatal blow -possible to the credit and resources of the British -army in the Peninsula. The war would then soon -cease.</p> - -<p>The memoir asserted that sir John Moore had -been well furnished with money, and that nevertheless -the Spaniards would not give him provisions; -and this fact was urged as an argument for enforcing -requisitions. But the assertion that Moore was -furnished with money, which was itself the index to -the ministers’ incapacity, Wellington told them was -not true. “Moore,” he said, “had been even worse -furnished than himself; that general had borrowed -a little, a very little money at Salamanca, but he had -no regular supply for the military chest until the -army had nearly reached Coruña; and the Spaniards -were not very wrong in their reluctance to meet his -wants, for the debts of his army were still unpaid in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_398"></a>[398]</span> -the latter end of 1812.” In fine there was no mode -by which supplies could be procured from the -country without payment on the spot, or soon after -the transaction, except by prevailing on the Spanish -government to give the English army a part of the -government contributions, and a part of the revenues -of the royal domains, to be received from the people -in kind at a reasonable rate. This had been already -done by himself in the province of Salamanca with -success, and the same system might be extended to -other provinces in proportion as the legitimate -government was re-established. But this only met -a part of the evil, it would indeed give some supplies, -cheaper than they could otherwise be procured, yet -they must afterwards be paid for at Cadiz in specie, -and thus less money would come into <ins class="corr" id="tn-398" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the militaay chest'"> -the military chest</ins>, which, as before noticed, was only supported -by the mercantile speculations of the general.</p> - -<p>Such were the discussions forced upon Wellington -when all his faculties were demanded on the -field of battle, and such was the hardiness of his -intellect to sustain the additional labour. Such also -were the men calling themselves statesmen who then -wielded the vast resources of Great Britain. The -expenditure of that country for the year 1812, was -above one hundred millions, the ministers who -controuled it, were yet so ignorant of the elementary -principles of finance, as to throw upon their general, -even amidst the clangor and tumult of battle, the task -of exposing such fallacies. And to reduce these persons -from the magnitude of statesmen to their natural -smallness of intriguing debaters is called political -prejudice! But though power may enable men to -trample upon reason for a time with impunity, they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_399"></a>[399]</span> -cannot escape her ultimate vengeance, she reassumes -her sway and history delivers them to the justice of -posterity.</p> - -<p>Perverse as <ins class="corr" id="tn-399" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the preceedings of'"> -the proceedings of</ins> the English ministers -were, those of the Portuguese and Spanish -governments were not less vexatious; and at this time -the temper of the Spanish rulers was of infinite importance -because of the misfortunes which had -befallen the French emperor. The opportunity -given to strike a decisive blow at his power in the -Peninsula demanded an early and vigorous campaign -in Spain, and the experience of 1812 had -taught Wellington, that no aid could be derived -from the Spaniards unless a change was made in their -military system. Hence the moment he was assured -that the French armies had taken winter-quarters, he -resolved before all other matters, in person to urge -upon the Cortez the necessity of giving him the real as -well as the nominal command of their troops, seeing -that without an immediate reformation the Spanish -armies could not take the field in due season.</p> - -<p>During the past campaign, and especially after -the Conde de Abispal, indignant at the censure -passed in the Cortez on his brother’s conduct at -Castalla, had resigned, the weakness of the Spanish -government had become daily more deplorable; -nothing was done to ameliorate the military system; -an extreme jealousy raged between the Cortez and -the regency; and when the former offered lord -Wellington the command of their armies, Mr. -Wellesley advised him to accept it, not so much in -the hope of effecting any beneficial change, as to -offer a point upon which the Spaniards who were -still true to the English alliance and to the aristocratic -cause might rally in case of reverse. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_400"></a>[400]</span> -disobedience of Ballesteros had been indeed promptly -punished; but the vigour of the Cortez on that occasion, -was more the result of offended pride than -any consideration of sound policy, and the retreat of -the allies into Portugal was the signal for a renewal -of those dangerous intrigues, which the battle of -Salamanca had arrested without crushing.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellington reached Cadiz on the 18th of -December, he was received without enthusiasm, yet -with due honour, and his presence seemed agreeable -both to the Cortes and to the people; the passions -which actuated the different parties in the state -subsided for the moment, and the ascendency of his -genius was so strongly felt, that he was heard with -patience, even when in private he strongly urged the -leading men to turn their attention entirely to the -war, to place in abeyance their factious disputes -and above all things not to put down the inquisition -lest they should drive the powerful church party -into the arms of the enemy. His exhortation upon -this last point, had indeed no effect save to encourage -the Serviles to look more to England, yet it -did not prevent the Cortez yielding to him the -entire controul of fifty thousand men which were to -be paid from the English subsidy; they promised also -that the commanders should not be removed, nor any -change made in the organization or destination of -such troops without his consent.</p> - -<p>A fresh organization of the Spanish forces now -had place. They were divided into four armies -and two reserves.</p> - -<p>The Catalans formed the first army.</p> - -<p>Elio’s troops including the divisions of Duran, -Bassecour, and Villa Campa, received the name of -the second army.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_401"></a>[401]</span></p> - -<p>The forces in the Morena, formerly under Ballesteros, -were constituted the third army, under Del -Parque.</p> - -<p>The troops of Estremadura, Leon, Gallicia, and -the Asturias, including Morillo’s, Penne Villemur’s, -Downie’s, and Carlos d’España’s separate divisions, -were called the fourth army, and given to Castaños, -whose appointment to Catalonia was cancelled, and -his former dignity of captain-general in Estremadura -and Gallicia restored. The Partidas of Longa, -Mina, Porlier, and the other chiefs in the northern -provinces were afterwards united to this army as -separate divisions.</p> - -<p>The conde d’Abispal, made captain-general of -Andalusia, commanded the first reserve, and Lacy -recalled from Catalonia, where he was replaced by -Copons, was ordered to form a second reserve in the -neighbourhood of San Roque. Such were the new -dispositions, but when Wellington had completed -this important negociation with the Spanish government -some inactivity was for the first time discovered -in his own proceedings. His stay was a little prolonged -without apparent reason, and it was whispered -that if he resembled Cæsar, Cadiz could -produce a Cleopatra; but whether true or not, he -soon returned to the army, first however visiting -Lisbon where he was greeted with extraordinary -honours, and the most unbounded enthusiasm, especially -by the people.</p> - -<p>His departure from Cadiz was the signal for all -the political dissentions to break out with more violence -than before; the dissentions of the liberals -and serviles became more rancorous, and the executive -was always on the side of the latter, the -majority of the cortez on the side of the former;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_402"></a>[402]</span> -neither enjoyed the confidence of the people nor of -the allies, and the intrigues of Carlotta, which never -ceased, advanced towards their completion. A -strong inclination to make her sole regent was -manifested, and sir Henry Wellesley, tired of fruitless -opposition remained neuter, with the approbation -of his brother. One of the principal causes -of this feeling for Carlotta, was the violence she -had shewn against the insurgents of Buenos Ayres, -and another was the disgust given to the merchants -of Cadiz, by certain diplomatic measures which -lord Strangford had held with that revolted state. -The agents of the princess represented the policy -of England towards the Spanish colonies as a -smuggling policy, and not without truth, for the -advice of lord Wellington upon that subject had -been unheeded. Lord Castlereagh had indeed offerred -a new mediation scheme, whereby the old -commission was to proceed under the Spanish restriction -of not touching at Mexico, to which -country a new mission composed of Spaniards -was to proceed, accompanied by an English agent -without any ostensible character. This proposal -however ended as the others had done, and the -Spanish jealousy of England increased.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote9">1813. March.</span> -In the beginning of the year 1813, Carlotta’s -cause ably and diligently served by Pedro Souza, -had gained a number of adherents even amongst the -liberals in the cortez. She was ready to sacrifice -even the rights of her posterity, and as she promised -to maintain all ancient abuses, the clergy -and the serviles were in no manner averse to her -success. Meanwhile the decree to abolish the inquisition -which was become the great test of political -party, passed on the 7th of March, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_403"></a>[403]</span> -regency were ordered to have it read in the -churches. The clergy of Cadiz resisted the order, -and intimated their refusal through the medium -of a public letter, and the regency encouraged -them by removing the governor of Cadiz, admiral -Valdez, a known liberal and opponent of the -inquisition, appointing in his stead general Alos, -a warm advocate for that horrid institution. But -in the vindication of official power the Spaniards -are generally prompt and decided. On the 8th Augustin -Arguelles moved, and it was instantly carried, -that the sessions of the extraordinary cortez should be -declared permanent, with a view to measures worthy -of the nation, and to prevent the evils with which -the state was menaced by the opposition of the -regency and the clergy to the cortes. A decree -was then proposed for suppressing the actual regency, -and replacing it with a provisional government -to be composed of the three eldest councillors -of state. This being conformable to the constitution, -was carried by a majority of eighty-six to -fifty-eight, while another proposition, that two members -of the cortez, publicly elected, should be added -to the regency, was rejected as an innovation, by -seventy-two against sixty-six. The councillors -Pedro Agar, Gabriel Ciscar, and the cardinal -Bourbon, archbishop of Toledo, were immediately -installed as regents.</p> - -<p>A committee which had been appointed to consider -of the best means of improving a system of -government felt by all parties to be imperfect, now -recommended that the cardinal archbishop, who -was of the blood royal, should be president of the -regency, leaving Carlotta’s claims unnoticed, and as -Ciscar and Agar had been formerly removed from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_404"></a>[404]</span> -the regency for incapacity, it was generally supposed -that the intention was to make the archbishop -in fact sole regent. Very soon however -Carlotta’s influence was again felt, for a dispute -having arisen in the cortez between what were -called the Americans and the Liberals, about the -annual Acapulco-ship, the former to the number of -twenty joined the party of the princess, and it -was resolved that Ruiez Pedron, a distinguished -opponent of the inquisition, should propose her as -the head of the regency. They were almost sure -of a majority, when the scheme transpired, and -the people, who liked her not, became so furious -that her partizans were afraid to speak. Then the -opposite side, fearing her power, proposed on the -instant that the provisional regency should be made -permanent which was carried. Thus, chance rather -than choice ruling, an old prelate and two imbecile -councillors were entrusted with the government, -and the intrigues and rancour of the different -parties exploded more frequently as the pressure -from above became slight.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -More than all others the clergy were, as might -be expected, violent and daring, yet the Cortez -was not to be frightened. Four canons of the -cathedrals were arrested in May, and orders were -issued to arrest the archbishop of St. Jago and -many bishops, because of a pastoral letter they had -published against the abolition of the inquisition; -for according to the habits of their craft of all -sects, they deemed religion trampled under foot -when the power of levying money and spilling -blood was denied to ministers professing the faith -of Christ. Nor amidst these broils did the English -influence fail to suffer; the democratic spirit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_405"></a>[405]</span> -advanced hastily, the Cadiz press teemed with -writings, intended to excite the people against the -ultimate designs of the English cabinet, and every -effort was made to raise a hatred of the British -general and his troops. These efforts were not -founded entirely on falsehoods, and were far from -being unsuccessful, because the eager desire to -preserve the inquisition displayed by lord Wellington -and his brother, although arising from military -considerations, was too much in accord with the -known tendency of the English cabinet’s policy, not -to excite the suspicions of the whole liberal party.</p> - -<p>The bishops of Logroño, Mondonedo, Astorga, -Lugo, and Salamanca, and the archbishop of St. -Jago were arrested, but several bishops escaped -into Portugal, and were there protected as martyrs -to the cause of legitimacy and despotism. The -bishop of Orense and the ex-regent Lardizabal had -before fled, the latter to Algarve, the former to the -Tras os Montes, from whence he kept up an active -intercourse with Gallicia, and the Cortez were far -from popular there; indeed the flight of the bishops -created great irritation in every part of Spain, for -the liberal party of the Cortez was stronger in the -Isla than in other parts, and by a curious anomaly -the officers and soldiers all over Spain were generally -their partizans while the people were generally -the <ins class="corr" id="tn-405" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'partisans of the'"> -partizans of the</ins> clergy. Nevertheless the -seeds of freedom, though carelessly sown by the -French on one side, and by the Cortez on the other, -took deep root, and have since sprung up into -strong plants in due time to burgeon and bear -fruit.</p> - -<p>When the bishops fled from Spain, Gravina, the -pope’s Nuncio assumed such a tone of hostility,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_406"></a>[406]</span> -that notwithstanding the good offices of sir Henry -Wellesley, which were for some time successful in -screening him from the vengeance of the Cortez, -the latter, encouraged by the English newspapers, -finally dismissed him and sequestered his benefices. -He also took refuge in Portugal, and like the rest -of the expelled clergy, sought by all means to -render the proceedings of the Cortez odious in -Spain. He formed a strict alliance with the Portuguese -nuncio, Vicente Machiechi, and working -together with great activity, they interfered, not -with the concerns of Spain only, but with the -Catholics in the British army, and even extended -their intrigues to Ireland. Hence, as just and -honest government had never formed any part of -the English policy towards that country, alarm -pervaded the cabinet, and the nuncio, protected -when opposed to the Cortez, was now considered a -very troublesome and indiscreet person.</p> - -<p>Such a state of feud could not last long without -producing a crisis, and one of a most formidable -and decisive nature was really at hand. Already -many persons in the Cortez held secret intercourse -with Joseph, in the view of acknowledging -his dynasty, on condition that he would accede to the -general policy of the Cortez in civil government; -that monarch had as we have seen organized a -large native force, and the coasts of Spain and -Portugal swarmed with French privateers manned -with Spanish seamen. The victory at Salamanca -had withered these resources for the moment, but -Wellington’s failure at Burgos and retreat into Portugal -again revived them, and at the same time -gave a heavy shock to public confidence in the -power of England, a shock which nothing but the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_407"></a>[407]</span> -misfortunes of Napoleon in Russia could have prevented -from being fatal.</p> - -<p>The Emperor indeed with that wonderful intellectual -activity and energy which made him the -foremost man of the world, had raised a fresh army -and prepared once more to march into the heart of -Germany, yet to do this he was forced to withdraw -such numbers of old soldiers from Spain that the -French army could no longer hope permanently to -act on the offensive. This stayed the Peninsula -cause upon the very brink of a precipice, for in -that very curious, useful, and authentic work, called -“<em>Bourrienne and his errors</em>,” it appears that early -in 1813, the ever factious Conde de Montijo, then -a general in Elio’s army, had secretly made proposals -to pass over, with the forces under his command, -to the king; and soon afterwards the whole -army of Del Parque, having advanced into La -Mancha, made offers of the same nature.</p> - -<p>They were actually in negociation with Joseph, -when the emperor’s orders obliged the French -army to abandon Madrid, and take up the line of -the Duero. Then the Spaniards advertised of the -French weakness, feared to continue their negociations, -Wellington soon afterwards advanced, and -as this feeling in favour of the intrusive monarch -was certainly not general, the resistance to the -invaders revived with the successes of the British -general. But if instead of diminishing his forces, -Napoleon, victorious in Russia, had strengthened -them, this defection would certainly have taken -place, and would probably have been followed by -others. The king at the head of a Spanish army -would then have reconquered Andalusia, Wellington -would have been confined to the defence of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_408"></a>[408]</span> -Portugal, and it is scarcely to be supposed that -England would have purchased the independence -of that country with her own permanent ruin.</p> - -<p>This conspiracy is not related by me with entire -confidence, because no trace of the transaction is to -be found in the correspondence of the king taken -at Vittoria. Nevertheless there are abundant proofs -that the work called “<em>Bourrienne and his errors</em>,” -inasmuch as it relates to Joseph’s transactions in -Spain, is accurately compiled from that monarch’s -correspondence. Many of his papers taken at Vittoria -were lost or abstracted at the time, and as in -a case involving so many persons’ lives, he would -probably have destroyed the proofs of a conspiracy -which had failed, there seems little reason to doubt -that the general fact is correct. Napoleon also in -his memoirs, speaks of secret negociations with the -Cortez about this time, and his testimony is corroborated -by the correspondence of the British embassy -at Cadiz, and by the continued intrigues -against the British influence. The next chapter -will show that the policy of Spain was not the only -source of uneasiness to Lord Wellington.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_409"></a>[409]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXX_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -Nothing could be more complicated than the -political state of Portugal with reference to the -situation of the English general. His object, as I -have repeatedly shown, was to bring the whole -resources of the country to bear on the war, but to -effect this he had to run counter to the habits and -customs, both of the people and of the government; -to detect the intrigues of the subordinate -authorities as well as those of the higher powers; to -oppose the violence of factious men in the local -government, and what was still more difficult, to -stimulate the sluggish apathy and to combat the -often honest obstinacy of those who were not factious. -These things he was to effect without the -power of recompensing or chastising, and even -while forced to support those who merited rebuke, -against the still more formidable intriguers of the -court of Brazil; for the best men of Portugal actually -formed the local government, and he was not -foiled so much by the men as by the sluggish system -which was national, and although dull for good -purposes, vivacious enough for mischief. The -dread of ultimate personal consequences attached, -not to neglect of the war but to any vigorous -exertions in support of it.</p> - -<p>The proceedings of the court of Rio Janeiro were -not less mischievous, for there the personal intrigues<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_410"></a>[410]</span> -fostered by the peculiar disposition of the English -envoy, by the weak yet dogged habits of the -prince, and by the meddling nature and violent -passions of the princess Carlotta, stifled all great -national views. There also the power of the Souza’s, -a family deficient neither in activity nor in -talent, was predominant, and the object of all was -to stimulate the government in Portugal against the -English general’s military policy. To this he could, -and had opposed, as we have seen, the power of -the English government, with some effect at different -times, but that resource was a dangerous one -and only to be resorted to in extreme circumstances. -Hence when to all these things is added a continual -struggle with the knavery of merchants of all nations, -his difficulties must be admitted, his indomitable -vigour, his patience and his extraordinary -mental resources admired, and the whole scene -must be considered as one of the most curious and -instructive lessons in the study of nations.</p> - -<p>Wellington was not simply a general who with -greater or less means, was to plan his military operations -leaving to others the care of settling the -political difficulties which might arise. He had, -coincident with his military duties, to regenerate a -whole people, to force them against the current of -their prejudices and usages on a dangerous and -painful course; he had to teach at once the populace -and the government, to infuse spirit and order -without the aid of rewards or punishments, to -excite enthusiasm through the medium of corrupt -oppressive institutions, and far from making any -revolutionary appeal to suppress all tendency towards -that resource of great minds on the like -occasions. Thus only could he maintain an army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_411"></a>[411]</span> -at all, and as it was beyond the power of man to -continue such a struggle for any length of time -he was more than ever anxious to gather strength -for a decisive blow, which the enemy’s situation -now rendered possible, that he might free himself -from the critical and anomalous relation in -which he stood towards Portugal.</p> - -<p>It may indeed be wondered that he so long -bore up against the encreasing pressure of these -distracting affairs, and certain it is that more than -once he was like to yield, and would have yielded -if fortune had not offered him certain happy military -chances, and yet such as few but himself could -have profited from. In 1810, on the ridge of -Busaco, and in the lines, the military success was -rather over the Portuguese government than the -enemy. At Santarem in 1811 the glory of arms -scarcely compensated for the destitution of the -troops. At Fuentes Onoro and on the Caya, after -the second unsuccessful siege of Badajos, the Portuguese -army had nearly dissolved; and the astonishing -sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos in -1812, were necessary to save the cause from dying -of inanition and despair. Even then the early -deliverance of Andalusia was frustrated, and time, -more valuable than gold or life, in war, was lost, -the enemy became the strongest in the field, and -in despite of the victory of Salamanca, the bad -effects of the English general’s political situation -were felt in the repulse from Burgos, and in the -double retreat from that place and from Madrid. -Accumulated mischiefs were now to be encountered -in Portugal.</p> - -<p>It has been shown how obstinately the regency -opposed Wellington’s plans of financial reform, how<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_412"></a>[412]</span> -they disputed and complained upon every circumstance, -whether serious or trivial on which a complaint -could be founded; for thinking Portugal no -longer in danger they were tired of their British -allies, and had no desire to aid nor indeed any wish -to see Spain delivered from her difficulties. They -designed therefore to harass the English general, -hoping either to drive him away altogether, or to -force him, and, through him, his government, to -grant them loans or new subsidies. But Wellington -knew that Portugal could, and he was resolved -it should find resources within itself, wherefore, -after the battle of Salamanca, when they demanded -a fresh subsidy he would not listen to them; and -when they adopted that scheme which I have -already exposed, of feeding, or rather starving their -troops, through the medium of a treaty with the -Spanish government, he checked the shameful and -absurd plan, by applying a part of the money in -the chest of aids intended for the civil service to -the relief of the Portuguese troops. Yet the regency -did not entirely fail in their object inasmuch -as many persons dependent upon the subsidy were -thus deprived of their payments, and their complaints -hurt the British credit, and reduced the -British influence with the people whose faithful -attachment to the alliance no intrigues had hitherto -been able to shake.</p> - -<p>Into every branch of government, however minute, -the regency now infused their own captious -and discontented spirit. They complained falsely -that general Campbell had insulted the nation by -turning some Portuguese residents publicly out of -Gibraltar in company with Jews and Moors; they -refused the wheat which was delivered to them by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_413"></a>[413]</span> -lord Wellington in lieu of their subsidy, saying it -was not fit for food notwithstanding that the English -troops were then living upon parcels of the -same grain, that their own troops were glad to get -it, and that no other was to be had. When a -wooden jetty was to be thrown in the Tagus for -the convenience of landing stores, they supported -one Caldas, a rich proprietor, in his refusal to permit -the trees, wanted for the purpose, to be felled, -alledging the rights of property, although he was to -be paid largely, and although they had themselves -then, and always, disregarded the rights of property, -especially when poor men were concerned, seizing -upon whatever was required either for the public -service, or for the support of their own irregularities, -without any payment at all and in shameful violation -both of law and humanity.</p> - -<p>The commercial treaty, and the proceedings of the -Oporto wine company, an oppressive corporation -unfair in all its dealings, irresponsible, established -in violation of that treaty, and supported without -regard either to the interests of the prince regent -or his British allies, furnished them with continual -subjects for disputes, and nothing was too absurd -or too gross for their interference. Under the management -of Mr. Stuart who had vigorously enforced -Wellington’s plans, their paper money had obtained -a reasonable and encreasing circulation, and their -custom-house resources had encreased, the expenses -of their navy and of their arsenal had in some -degree been reduced; and it was made evident that -an extensive and vigorous application of the same -principles would enable them to overcome all their -financial difficulties; but there were too many personal -interests, too much shameful profit made<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_414"></a>[414]</span> -under the abuses to permit such a reform. The -naval establishment instead of being entirely transferred, -as Wellington desired, to the Brazils, was -continued in the Tagus, and with it the arsenal as -its natural appendage. The infamous Junta de -Viveres had been suppressed by the prince regent, -yet the government under the false pretext of paying -its debts still disbursed above ten thousand -pounds a month in salaries to men whose offices -had been formally abolished.</p> - -<p>About this time also the opening of the Spanish -ports in those provinces from whence the enemy had -been driven, deprived Lisbon of a monopoly of trade -enjoyed for the last three years, and the regency observing -the consequent diminution of revenue, with -inexpressible effrontery insisted that the grain, imported -by Wellington, by which their army and -their nation had been saved from famine, and by -which their own subsidy had been provided, should -enter the public warehouses under specific regulations -and pay duty for so doing. So tenaciously -did they hold to this point that Wellington was -forced to menace a formal appeal to the English -cabinet, for he knew that the subordinate officers -of the government, knavish in the extreme, would -have sold the secrets of the army magazines to the -speculators; and the latter, in whose hands the furnishing -of the army would under the new plan of -the English ministers be placed, being thus accurately -instructed of its resources would have regulated their -supplies with great nicety so as to have famished -the soldiers, and paralyzed the operations at the -greatest possible expense.</p> - -<p>But the supply of the army under any system -was now becoming extremely precarious, for besides<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_415"></a>[415]</span> -the activity of the American privateers English -ships of war used, at times, to capture the vessels -secretly employed in bringing provision under -licenses from Mr. Stuart and Mr. Forster. Nay -the captain of a Scotch merchant vessel engaged -in the same trade and having no letter of marque, -had the piratical insolence to seize in the very -mouth of the Tagus, and under the Portuguese -batteries, an American vessel sailing under a license -from Mr. Forster, and to carry her into Greenock, -thus violating at once the license of the English -minister, the independence of Portugal, and the -general law of nations. Alarm immediately spread -far and wide amongst the American traders, the -indignation of the Portuguese government was -strongly and justly excited, and the matter became -extremely embarrassing, because no measure of -punishment could be inflicted without exposing the -secret of a system which had been the principal -support of the army. However the Congress soon -passed an act forbidding neutrals to ship flour in -the American ports, and this blow, chiefly aimed -at the Portuguese ships, following upon the non-importation -act, and being combined with the illegal -violence of the English vessels, nearly dried up -this source of supply, and threw the army principally -upon the Brazil trade, which by the negligence -of the Admiralty was, as I have before -noticed, exposed to the enterprize of the United -States’ privateers.</p> - -<p>During Wellington’s absence in Spain the military -administration of Portugal was necessarily in -the hands of the regency and all the ancient abuses -were fast reviving. The army in the field received -no succours, the field-artillery had entirely disappeared,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_416"></a>[416]</span> -the cavalry was in the worst condition, the -infantry was reduced in numbers, the equipments -of those who remained were scarcely fit for service, -and the spirit of the men had waned from enthusiasm -to despondency. There was no money in the -military chest, no recruits in the dépôts, and the -transport service was neglected altogether. Beresford’s -severity had failed to check desertion, because -want, the parent of crimes, had proved too strong -for fear; the country swarmed with robbers, and -as no fault civil or military was punished by the -regency, every where knaves triumphed over the -welfare of the nation.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile all persons whose indolence or timidity -led them to fly from the active defence of -their country to the Brazils, were there received -and cherished as martyrs to their personal affections -for the prince; they were lauded for their opposition -to the regency, and were called victims to -the injustice of Beresford, and to the encroachments -of the English officers. This mischief was accompanied -by another of greater moment, for the prince -continually permitted officers possessing family interest -to retire from active service retaining their -pay and rank, thus offering a premium for bad -men to enter the army with the intent of quitting it -in this disgraceful manner. Multitudes did so, promotion -became rapid, the nobility whose influence -over the poor classes was very great, and might -have been beneficially employed in keeping up the -zeal of the men, disappeared rapidly from the regiments, -and the foul stream of knaves and cowards -thus continually pouring through the military ranks -destroyed all cohesion and tainted every thing as it -passed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_417"></a>[417]</span></p> - -<p>Interests of the same nature, prevailing with the -regency, polluted the civil administration. The rich -and powerful inhabitants, especially those of the -great cities, were suffered to evade the taxes and to -disobey the regulations for drawing forth the resources -of the country in the military service; and -during Wellington’s absence in Spain, the English -under-commissaries, and that retinue of villains -which invariably gather on the rear of armies, being -in some measure freed from the immediate dread -of his vigilance and vigour, violated all the regulations -in the most daring manner. The poor -husbandmen were cruelly oppressed, their farming -animals were constantly carried off to supply food -for the army, and agriculture was thus stricken at -the root; the breed of horned cattle and of horses -had rapidly and alarmingly decreased, and butcher’s -meat was scarcely to be procured even for -the troops who remained in Portugal.</p> - -<p>These irregularities, joined to the gross misconduct -of the military detachments and convoys of -sick men, on all the lines of communication, not -only produced great irritation in the country but -offered the means for malevolent and factious persons -to assail the character and intentions of the -English general; every where writings and stories -were circulated against the troops, the real outrages -were exaggerated, others were invented and -the drift of all was to render Wellington, and the -English, odious to the nation at large. Nor was -this scheme confined to Portugal alone, agents were -also busy to the same purpose in London, and when -the enthusiasm, which Wellington’s presence at -Lisbon had created amongst the people, was known -at Cadiz, the press there teemed with abuse. Divers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_418"></a>[418]</span> -agents of the democratic party in Spain came -to Lisbon to aid the Portuguese malcontents, writings -were circulated accusing Wellington of an -intention to subjugate the Peninsula for his own -ambitious views, and, as consistency is never regarded -on such occasions, it was diligently insinuated -that he encouraged the excesses of his troops -out of personal hatred to the Portuguese people; -the old baseness of sending virulent anonymous -letters to <ins class="corr" id="tn-418" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the Englsh general'"> -the English general</ins> was also revived. In -fine the republican spirit was extending beyond the -bounds of Spain, and the Portuguese regency, terrified -at its approach, appealed to Mr. Stuart for the -assistance of England to check its formidable progress. -Neither were they wanting to themselves. -They forbade the Portuguese newspapers to admit -any observations on the political events in Spain, they -checked the introduction of Spanish democratic -publications, they ordered their diplomatists at -Cadiz to encourage writings of an opposite tendency, -and to support the election of deputies who -were known for their love of despotism. This last -measure was however baffled by the motion of Arguelles, -already mentioned, which rendered the -old Cortez permanent; and Mr. Stuart, judging the -time unfavourable, advised the Portuguese government -to reserve the exertion of its power against -the democrats, until the military success which the -state of the continent, and the weakness of the -French troops in Spain, promised, should enable -the victors to put down such doctrines with effect; -advice which was not unmeaning as I shall have -occasion hereafter to show.</p> - -<p>All these malignant efforts Wellington viewed -with indifference. “Every leading man,” he said,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_419"></a>[419]</span> -“was sure to be accused of criminal personal ambition, -and, if he was conscious of the charge being -false, the accusation did no harm.” Nevertheless -his position was thereby rendered more difficult, and -these intrigues were accompanied by other mischiefs -of long standing and springing from a different -source, but even of a more serious character, for -the spirit of captious discontent had reached the inferior -magistracy, who endeavoured to excite the -people against the military generally. Complaints -came in from all quarters of outrages on the part of -the troops, some too true, but many of them false, -or frivolous; and when the English general ordered -<ins class="corr" id="tn-419" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'court-martials for'"> -courts-martial for</ins> the trial of the accused, the magistrates -refused to attend as witnesses, because -Portuguese custom rendered such an attendance -degrading, and by Portuguese law a magistrate’s -written testimony was efficient in courts-martial. -Wellington in vain assured them that English law -would not suffer him to punish men upon such testimony; -in vain he pointed out the mischief which -must infallibly overwhelm the country if the soldiers -discovered they might thus do evil with impunity. -He offered to send in each case, lists of -Portuguese witnesses required that they might be -summoned by the native authorities, but nothing -could overcome the obstinacy of the magistrates; -they answered that his method was insolent; and -with a sullen malignity they continued to accumulate -charges against the troops, to refuse attendance in -the courts, and to call the soldiers, their own as -well as the British, “licensed spoliators of the -community.”</p> - -<p>For a time the generous nature of the poor people,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_420"></a>[420]</span> -resisted all these combining causes of discontent; -neither real injuries nor the exaggerations, nor -the falsehoods of those who attempted to stir up -wrath, produced any visible effect upon the great -bulk of the population; yet by degrees affection -for the British cooled, and Wellington expressed -his fears that a civil war would commence between -the Portuguese people on the one hand, and the -troops of both nations on the other. Wherefore -his activity was redoubled to draw, while he could -still controul affairs, all the military strength to a -head, and to make such an irruption into Spain as -would establish a new base of operations beyond -the power of such fatal dissensions.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -These matters were sufficiently vexatious and -alarming, but what made him tremble, was, the -course, which the misconduct of the Portuguese -government, and the incapacity of the English -cabinet, had forced upon the native furnishers of -the supplies. Those persons, coming in the winter -to Lisbon to have their bills on the military chest -paid, could get no money, and in their distress had -sold the bills to speculators, the Portuguese holders, -at a discount of fifteen, the Spanish holders -at a discount of forty in the hundred. The credit -of the chest immediately fell, prices rose in proportion, -and as no military enterprize could carry -the army beyond the flight of this harpy, and no -revenues could satisfy its craving, the contest must -have ceased, if Mr. Stuart had not found a momentary -and partial remedy, by publicly guaranteeing -the payment of the bills and granting interest until -they could be taken up. The expense was thus augmented, -but the increase fell far short of the enhanced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_421"></a>[421]</span> -cost of the supplies which had already -resulted even from this restricted practice of the -bill-holders, and of two evils the least was chosen. -It may seem strange that such transactions should -belong to the history of the military operations in -the Peninsula, that it should be the general’s instead -of the minister’s task, to encounter such -evils, and to find the remedy. Such however was -the nature of the war, and no adequate notion of -lord Wellington’s vigorous capacity and Herculean -labours can be formed, without an intimate knowledge -of the financial and political difficulties which -oppressed him, and of which this work has necessarily -only given an outline.</p> - -<p>The disorders of the Portuguese military system -had brought Beresford back to Lisbon while the -siege of Burgos was still in progress, and now, -under Wellington’s direction, he strained every -nerve to restore the army to its former efficient state. -To recruit the regiments of the line he disbanded -all the militia men fit for service, replacing them -with fathers of families; to restore the field-artillery, -he embodied all the garrison artillery-men, -calling out the ordenança gunners to man the fortresses -and coast-batteries; the worst cavalry regiments -he reduced to render the best more efficient, -but several circumstances prevented this arm from -attaining any excellence in Portugal. Meanwhile -Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart strenuously grappled -with the disorders of the civil administration and -their efforts produced an immediate and considerable -increase of revenue. But though the regency -could not deny this beneficial effect, though they -could not deny the existence of the evils which -they were urged to remedy, though they admitted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_422"></a>[422]</span> -that the reform of their custom-house system was -still incomplete, that their useless navy consumed -large sums which were wanted for the army, and -that the taxes especially the “<em>Decima</em>,” were partially -collected, and unproductive, because the rich -people in the great towns, who had benefited -largely by the war, escaped the imposts which the -poor people in the country, who had suffered most -from the war, paid; though they acknowledged that -while the soldiers’ hire was in arrears, the transport -service neglected, and all persons, having just -claims upon the government, suffering severe privations, -the tax-gatherers were allowed to keep a -month’s tribute in their hands even in the districts -close to the enemy; though all these things were -admitted, the regency would not alter their system, -and Borba, the minister of finance, combatted Wellington’s -plans in detail with such unusual obstinacy, -that it became evident nothing could be obtained -save by external pressure. Wherefore as the -season for military operations approached, Mr. -Stuart called upon lord Castlereagh to bring the -power of England to bear at once upon the court -of Rio Janeiro; and Wellington, driven to extremity, -sent the Portuguese prince-regent one of those -clear, powerful, and nervous statements, which left -those to whom they were addressed, no alternative -but submission, or an acknowledgement that sense -and justice were to be disregarded.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -“I call your highness’s attention,” he said, “to -the state of your troops and of all your establishments; -the army of operations has been unpaid -since September, the garrisons since June, the -militia since February 1812. The transport service -has never been regularly paid, and has received<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_423"></a>[423]</span> -nothing since June. To these evils I have in vain -called the attention of the local government, and I -am now going to open a new campaign, with troops -to whom greater arrears of pay are due than when -the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy -from Great Britain, granted especially for the maintenance -of those troops, has been regularly and -exactly furnished; and although it has been proved -that the revenue for the last three months has -exceeded, by a third, any former quarter. The -honour of your highness’s arms, the cause of your -allies, is thus seriously affected, and the uniform -refusal of the governors of the kingdom to attend -to any one of the measures which I have -recommended, either for permanent or temporal -relief, has at last obliged me to go as a complainant -into your royal highness’s presence, for -here I cannot prevail against the influence of the -chief of the treasury.</p> - -<p>“I have recommended the entire reform of the customs -system, but it has only been partially carried -into effect. I have advised a method of actually and -really collecting the taxes, and of making the rich -merchants, and capitalists, pay the tenth of their annual -profits as an extraordinary contribution for the -war. I declare that no person knows better than I -do, the sacrifices and the sufferings of your people, -for there is no one for the last four years has lived -so much amongst those people; but it is a fact, sir, -that the great cities, and even some of the smallest -places, have gained by the war and the mercantile -class has enriched itself; there are divers persons -in Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense -sums. Now your government is, both from remote -and recent circumstances, unable to draw resources<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_424"></a>[424]</span> -from the capitalists by loans; it can only draw -upon them by taxes. It is not denied that the -regular tributes nor the extraordinary imposts on -the mercantile profits are evaded; it is not denied -that the measures I have proposed, vigorously -carried into execution, would furnish the government -with pecuniary resources, and it remains for -that government to inform your highness, why they -have neither enforced my plans, nor any others -which the necessity of the times calls for. They -fear to become unpopular, but such is the knowledge -I have of the people’s good sense and loyalty, -such my zeal for the cause, that I have offered to -become responsible for the happy issue, and to take -upon myself all the odium of enforcing my own -measures. I have offered in vain!</p> - -<p>“Never was a sovereign in the world so ill served -as your highness has been by the ‘<em>Junta de Viveres</em>,’ -and I zealously forwarded your interests when I -obtained its abolition; and yet, under a false pretext -of debt, the government still disburse fifty -millions of reis monthly on account of that board. -It has left a debt undoubtedly, and it is of importance -to pay it, although not at this moment; but -let the government state in detail how these fifty -millions, granted monthly, have been applied; let -them say if all the accounts have been called in -and liquidated? who has enforced the operation? to -what does the debt amount? has it been classified? -how much is really still due to those who have -received instalments? finally, have these millions -been applied to the payment of salaries instead of -debt? But were it convenient now to pay the debt, -it cannot be denied that to pay the army which is -to defend the country, to protect it from the sweeping<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_425"></a>[425]</span> -destructive hand of the enemy, is of more -pressing importance; the troops will be neither -able nor willing to fight if they are not paid.”</p> - -<p>Then touching upon the abuse of permitting the -tax-gatherers to hold a month’s taxes in their hands, -and upon the opposition he met with from the -regency, he continued,</p> - -<p>“I assure your royal highness that I give my -advice to the governor of the kingdom actuated -solely by an earnest zeal for your service without any -personal interest. I can have none relative to Portugal, -and none with regard to individuals, for I -have no private relation with, and scarcely am acquainted -with those who direct, or would wish to -direct your affairs. Those reforms recommended -by me, and which have at last been partially -effected in the custom-house, in the arsenal, in the -navy, in the payment of the interest of the national -debt, in the formation of a military chest, have succeeded, -and I may therefore say that the other -measures I propose would have similar results. I -am ready to allow that I may deceive myself on -this point, but certainly they are suggested by a -desire for the good of your service; hence in the -most earnest and decided manner, I express my -ardent wish, and it is common to all your faithful -servants, that you will return to the kingdom, and -take charge yourself of the government.”</p> - -<p>These vigorous measures to bring the regency to -terms succeeded only partially. In May they promulgated -a new system for the collection of taxes -which relieved the financial pressure on the army -for the moment, but which did not at all content -Wellington, because it was made to square with -old habits and prejudices, and thus left the roots of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_426"></a>[426]</span> -all the evils alive and vigorous. Every moment -furnished new proofs of the hopelessness of regenerating -a nation through the medium of a corrupted -government; and a variety of circumstances, -more or less serious, continued to embarrass the -march of public affairs.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -In the Madeiras the authorities vexatiously prevented -the English money agents from exporting -specie, and their conduct was approved of at Rio -Janeiro. At Bisao, in Africa, the troops had mutinied -for want of pay, and in the Cape de Verde -Islands disturbances arose from the over-exaction -of taxes; for when the people were weak, the -regency were vigorous; pliant only to the powerful. -These commotions were trifling and soon -ended of themselves, yet expeditions were sent -against the offenders in both places, and the troops -thus employed immediately committed far worse -excesses, and did more mischief than that which -they were sent to suppress. At the same time -several French frigates finding the coast of Africa -unguarded, cruized successfully against the Brazil -trade, and aided the American privateers to contract -the already too straitened resources of the army.</p> - -<p>Amidst all these difficulties however the extraordinary -exertions of the British officers had restored -the numbers, discipline, and spirit of the Portuguese -army. Twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers -were again under arms and ready to commence the -campaign, although the national discontent was -daily increasing; and indeed the very feeling of -security created by the appearance of such an army -rendered the citizens at large less willing to bear -the inconveniences of the war. Distant danger -never affects <ins class="corr" id="tn-426" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the multidude, and'"> -the multitude, and</ins> the billetting of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_427"></a>[427]</span> -troops, who, from long habits of war, little regarded -the rights of the citizens in comparison with their -own necessities, being combined with requisitions, -and with a recruiting system becoming every year -more irksome, formed an aggregate of inconveniences -intolerable to men who desired ease and no -longer dreaded to find an enemy on their hearth-stones. -The powerful classes were naturally more -affected than the poorer classes, because of their -indolent habits; but their impatience was aggravated -because they had generally been debarred of -the highest situations, or supplanted, by the British -interference in the affairs of the country, and, -unlike those of Spain, the nobles of Portugal had -lost little or none of their hereditary influence. -Discontent was thus extended widely, and moreover -the old dread of French power was entirely gone; -unlimited confidence in the strength and resources -of England had succeeded; and this confidence, to -use the words of Mr. Stuart, “being opposed to the -irregularities which have been practised by individuals, -and to the difference of manners, and of -religion, placed the British in the singular position -of a class whose exertions were necessary for the -country, but who, for the above reasons, were in -every other respect as distinct from the natives as -persons with whom, from some criminal cause, it -was necessary to suspend communication.”—Hence -he judged that the return of the prince-regent -would be a proper epoch for the British to retire -from all situations in Portugal not strictly military, -for if any thing should delay that event, the time -was approaching when the success of the army and -the tranquillity of the country would render it necessary -to yield to the first manifestations of national<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_428"></a>[428]</span> -feeling. In fine, notwithstanding the great benefits -conferred upon the Portuguese by the British, the -latter were, and it will always be so on the like occasions, -regarded by the upper classes as a captain -regards galley-slaves, their strength was required to -speed the vessel, but they were feared and hated.</p> - -<p>The prince-regent did not return to Portugal -according to Wellington’s advice, but Carlotta immediately -prepared to come alone; orders were -given to furnish her apartments in the different -palaces, and her valuable effects had actually -arrived. Ill health was the pretext for the voyage, -but the real object was to be near Spain to forward -her views upon the government there; for intent upon -mischief, indefatigable and of a violence approaching -insanity, she had sold even her plate and jewels -to raise money wherewith to corrupt the leading -members of the cortez, and was resolved, if that -should not promise success, to distribute the money -amongst the Spanish partidas, and so create a -powerful military support for her schemes. Fortunately -the prince dreading the intriguing advisers -of his wife would not suffer her to quit Rio Janeiro -until the wish of the British cabinet upon the -subject was known, and that was so decidedly adverse, -that it was thought better to do without the -prince himself than to have him accompanied by -Carlotta; so they both remained in the Brazils, and -this formidable cloud passed away, yet left no sunshine -on the land.</p> - -<p>It was at this period that the offer of a Russian -auxiliary force, before alluded to, being made to -Wellington by admiral Grieg, was accepted by him -to the amount of fifteen thousand men, and yet was -not fulfilled because the Russian ambassador in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_429"></a>[429]</span> -London declared that the emperor knew nothing -of it! Alexander however proposed to mediate in -the dispute between Great Britain and America, -but the English ministers, while lauding him as a -paragon of magnanimity and justice, in regard to -the war against Napoleon, remembered the armed -neutrality and quadruple alliance, and wisely declined -trusting England’s maritime pretensions to -his faithless grasping policy. Neither would they -listen to Austria, who at this time, whether with -good faith or merely as a cloak I know not, desired -to mediate a general peace. However, amidst this -political confusion the progress of the military -preparations was visible; and contemporary with -the Portuguese, the Spanish troops under Wellington’s -influence and providence acquired more consistence -than they had ever before possessed; a -mighty power was in arms; but the flood of war -with which the English general finally poured -into Spain, and the channels by which he directed -the overwhelming torrent, must be reserved for -another place. It is now time to treat of the -political situation of king Joseph, and to resume the -narrative of that secondary warfare which occupied -the French armies while Wellington was uninterruptedly -as far as the enemy were concerned, reorganizing -his power.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_430"></a>[430]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXX_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -In war it is not so much the positive strength, as -the relative situations of the hostile parties, which -gives the victory. Joseph’s position, thus judged, -was one of great weakness, principally because he -was incapable of combining the materials at his -disposal, or of wielding them when combined by -others. France had been suddenly thrown by her -failure in Russia, into a new and embarrassing attitude, -more embarrassing even than it appeared to -her enemies, or than her robust warlike proportions, -nourished by twelve years of victory, indicated. -Napoleon, the most indefatigable and active -of mankind, turned his enemy’s ignorance on this -head to profit; for scarcely was it known that he -had reached Paris by that wise, that rapid journey, -from Smorghoni, which, baffling all his enemies’ -hopes, left them only the power of foolish abuse; -scarcely I say, was his arrival at Paris known to the -world, than a new and enormous army, the constituent -parts of which he had with his usual foresight -created while yet in the midst of victory, was -in march from all parts to unite in the heart of -Germany.</p> - -<p>On this magical rapidity he rested his hopes to -support the tottering fabric of his empire; but well -aware of the critical state of his affairs, his design -was, while presenting a menacing front on every<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_431"></a>[431]</span> -side, so to conduct his operations that if he failed -in his first stroke, he might still contract his system -gradually and without any violent concussion. And -good reason for hope he had. His military power -was rather broken and divided than lessened, for it -is certain that the number of men employed in -1813 was infinitely greater than in 1812; in the -latter four hundred thousand, but in the former -more than seven hundred thousand men, and twelve -hundred field-pieces were engaged on different -points, exclusive of the armies in Spain. Then on -the Vistula, on the Oder, on the Elbe, he had -powerful fortresses, and numerous garrisons, or -rather armies, of strength and goodness to re-establish -his ascendancy in Europe, if he could reunite -them in one system by placing a new host victoriously -in the centre of Germany. And thus also -he could renew the adhesive qualities of those -allies, who still clung to him though evidently -feeling the attraction of his enemies’ success.</p> - -<p>But this was a gigantic contest, for his enemies, -by deceiving their subjects with false promises of -liberty, had brought whole nations against him. -More than eight hundred thousand men were in -arms in Germany alone; secret societies were in -full activity all over the continent; and in France a -conspiracy was commenced by men who desired -rather to see their country a prey to foreigners and -degraded with a Bourbon king, than have it independent -and glorious under Napoleon. Wherefore -that great monarch had now to make application, -on an immense scale, of the maxim which -prescribes a skilful offensive as the best defence, -and he had to sustain two systems of operation not -always compatible; the one depending upon moral<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_432"></a>[432]</span> -force to hold the vast fabric of his former policy -together, the other to meet the actual exigencies of -the war. The first was infinitely more important -than the last, and as Germany and France were -the proper theatres for its display, the Spanish -contest sunk at once from a principal into an accessary -war. Yet this delicate conjuncture of -affairs made it of vital importance, that Napoleon -should have constant and rapid intelligence from -Spain, because the ascendancy, which he yet maintained -over the world by his astounding genius, -might have been broken down in a moment if -Wellington, overstepping the ordinary rules of -military art, had suddenly abandoned the Peninsula, -and thrown his army, or a part of it into France. -For then would have been deranged all the emperor’s -calculations; then would the defection of all -his allies have ensued; then would he have been -obliged to concentrate both his new forces and his -Spanish troops for the defence of his own country, -abandoning all his fortresses and his still vast -though scattered veteran armies in Germany and -Poland, to the unrestrained efforts of his enemies -beyond the Rhine. Nothing could have been more -destructive to Napoleon’s moral power, than to -have an insult offered and commotions raised on -his own threshold at the moment when he was -assuming the front of a conqueror in Germany.</p> - -<p>To obviate this danger or to meet it, alike required -that the armies in the Peninsula should -adopt a new and vigorous system, under which, -relinquishing all real permanent offensive movements, -they should yet appear to be daring and -enterprising, even while they prepared to abandon -their former conquests. But the emperor wanted old<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_433"></a>[433]</span> -officers and non-commissioned officers, and experienced -soldiers, to give consistency to the young -levies with which he was preparing to take the -field, and he could only supply this want by drawing -from the veterans of the Peninsula; wherefore -he resolved to recal the division of the young -guard, and with it many thousand men and officers -of the line most remarkable for courage and conduct. -In lieu he sent the reserve at Bayonne into -Spain, replacing it with another, which was again -to be replaced in May by further levies; and besides -this succour, twenty thousand conscripts were -appropriated for the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>The armies thus weakened in numbers, and considerably -so during the transit of the troops, were -also in quality greatly deteriorated, and at a very -critical time, for not only was Wellington being -powerfully reinforced, but the audacity, the spirit, -the organization, the discipline, and the numbers of -the Partidas, were greatly increased by English -supplies, liberally, and now usefully dealt out. And -the guerilla operations in the northern parts, being -combined with the British naval squadrons, had, -during the absence of the French armies, employed -to drive the allies back to Portugal, aroused anew -the spirit of insurrection in Navarre and Biscay; a -spirit exacerbated by some recent gross abuses of -military authority perpetrated by some of the French -local commanders.</p> - -<p>The position of the invading armies was indeed -become more complicated than ever. They had -only been relieved from the crushing pressure of -lord Wellington’s grand operations to struggle in -the meshes of the Guerilla and insurrectional warfare -of the Spaniards. Nor was the importance of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_434"></a>[434]</span> -these now to be measured by former efforts. The -Partida chiefs had become more experienced and -more docile to the suggestions of the British chief; -they had free communication with, and were constantly -supplied with arms, ammunition, and money -from the squadrons on the coast; they possessed -several fortified posts and harbours, their bands<span class="sidenote">Duke of Feltre’s official correspondence, MSS.</span> -were swelling to the size of armies, and their military -knowledge of the country and of the French -system of invasion was more matured; their own -dépôts were better hidden, and they could, and at -times did, bear the shock of battle on nearly equal -terms. Finally, new and large bands of another -and far more respectable and influential nature, -were formed or forming both in Navarre and Biscay, -where insurrectional juntas were organized, and -where men of the best families had enrolled numerous -volunteers from the villages and towns.</p> - -<p>These volunteers were well and willingly supplied -by the country, and of course not obnoxious, like -the Partidas, from their rapine and violence. In -Biscay alone several battalions of this description, -each mustering a thousand men, were in the field, -and the communication with France was so completely -interrupted, that the French minister of war -only heard that Joseph had received his dispatches -of the 4th of January, on the 18th of March, and -then through the medium of Suchet! The contributions -could no longer be collected, the magazines -could not be filled, the fortresses were endangered, -the armies had no base of operations, the insurrection -was spreading to Aragon, and the bands -of the interior were also increasing in numbers -and activity. The French armies, sorely pressed -for provisions, were widely disseminated, and every<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_435"></a>[435]</span> -where occupied, and each general was averse either -to concentrate his own forces or to aid his neighbour. -In fine the problem of the operations was -become extremely complicated, and Napoleon only -seems to have seized the true solution.</p> - -<p>When informed by Caffarelli of the state of -affairs in the north, he thus wrote to the king, -“Hold Madrid only as a point of observation; fix -your quarters not as monarch, but as general of the -French forces at Valladolid; concentrate the armies -of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal around -you; the allies will not and indeed cannot make -any serious offensive movement for several months; -wherefore it is your business to profit from their -forced inactivity, to put down the insurrection in -the northern provinces, to free the communication -with France, and to re-establish a good base of -operations before the commencement of another -campaign, that the French army may be in condition -to fight the allies if the latter advance towards -France.” Very important indeed did Napoleon -deem this object, and so earnest was he to -have constant and rapid intelligence from his -armies in the Peninsula, that the couriers and -their escorts were directed to be dispatched twice -a week, travelling day and night at the rate of a -league an hour. He commanded also that the -army of the north should be reinforced even by -the whole army of Portugal, if it was necessary -to effect the immediate pacification of Biscay and -Navarre; and while this pacification was in progress, -Joseph was to hold the rest of his forces -in a position offensive towards Portugal, making -Wellington feel that his whole power was required -on the frontier, and that neither his main body nor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_436"></a>[436]</span> -even any considerable detachment could safely embark -to disturb France. In short that he must -cover Lisbon strongly, and on the frontier, or expect -to see the French army menacing that capital. -These instructions well understood, and vigorously -executed, would certainly have put down -the insurrection in the rear of the king’s position, -and the spring would have seen that monarch at -the head of ninety thousand men, having their retreat -upon France clear of all impediments, and consequently -free to fight the allies on the Tormes, the -Duero, the Pisuerga, and the Ebro; and with several -supporting fortresses in a good state.</p> - -<p>Joseph was quite unable to view the matter in this -common-sense point of view. He could not make his -kingly notions subservient to military science, nor his -military movements subservient to an enlarged policy. -Neither did he perceive that his beneficent notions -of government were misplaced amidst the din of -arms. Napoleon’s orders were imperative, but the -principle of them, Joseph could not previously -conceive himself nor execute the details after his -brother’s conception. He was not even acquainted -with the true state of the northern provinces, nor<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -would he at first credit it when told to him. Hence -while his thoughts were intent upon his Spanish -political projects, and the secret negociations with -Del Parque’s army, the northern partidas and insurgents -became masters of all his lines of communication -in the north; the Emperor’s orders -dispatched early in January, and reiterated week -after week, only reached the king in the end of -February; their execution did not take place until -the end of March, and then imperfectly. The time -thus lost was irreparable; and yet as the emperor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_437"></a>[437]</span> -reproachfully observed, the bulletin which revealed -the extent of his disasters in Russia might alone -have taught the king what to do.</p> - -<p>Joseph was nearly as immoveable in his resolutions -as his brother, the firmness of the one being -however founded upon extraordinary sagacity, and -of the other upon the want of that quality. Regarding -opposition to his views as the result of a -disloyal malevolence, he judged the refractory generals -to be enemies to the emperor, as well as to -himself. Reille, Caffarelli, Suchet, alike incurred -his displeasure, and the duke of Feltre French -minister of war also, because of a letter in which, -evidently by the orders of the emperor, he rebuked -the king for having removed Souham from the -command of the army of Portugal.</p> - -<p>Feltre’s style, addressed to a monarch was very -offensive, and Joseph attributed it to the influence -of Soult, for his hatred of the latter was violent -and implacable even to absurdity. “The duke of<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -Dalmatia or himself,” he wrote to the Emperor, -“must quit Spain. At Valencia he had forgotten -his own injuries, he had suppressed his just indignation, -and instead of sending marshal Soult to -France had given him the direction of the operations -against the allies, but it was in the hope that -shame for the past combined with his avidity for -glory, would urge him to extraordinary exertions; -nothing of the kind had happened; Soult was a -man not to be trusted. Restless, intriguing, ambitious, -he would sacrifice every thing to his own -advancement, and possessed just that sort of talent -which would lead him to mount a scaffold when he -thought he was ascending the steps of a throne,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_438"></a>[438]</span> -because he would want the courage to strike when -the crisis arrived.” He acquitted him, he said, -with a coarse sarcasm, “of treachery at the passage -of the Tormes, because there fear alone operated -to prevent him from bringing the allies to a decisive -action, but he was nevertheless treacherous to the -emperor, and his proceedings in Spain were probably -connected with the conspiracy of Malet at Paris.”</p> - -<p>Such was the language with which Joseph in his -anger assailed one of the greatest commanders and -most faithful servants of his brother; and such the -greetings which awaited Napoleon on his arrival at -Paris after the disasters of Russia. In the most -calm and prosperous state of affairs, coming from -this source, the charges might well have excited -the jealous wrath of the strongest mind; but in the -actual crisis, when the emperor had just lost his -great army, and found the smoking embers of a -suppressed conspiracy at his very palace-gates, -when his friends were failing, and his enemies accumulating, -it seemed scarcely possible that these -accusations should not have proved the ruin of -Soult. Yet they did not even ruffle the temper of -Napoleon. Magnanimous as he was sagacious, -he smiled at the weakness of Joseph, and though -he removed Soult from Spain, because the feud -between him and the king would not permit them -to serve beneficially together, it was only to make -him the commander of the imperial guard; and -that no mark of his confidence might be wanting, -he afterwards chose him, from amongst all his generals, -to retrieve the affairs of the Peninsula when -Joseph was driven from that country, an event the -immediate causes of which were now being laid.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_439"></a>[439]</span></p> - -<p>It has been already shown, that when Wellington -took his winter-quarters, the French armies occupied -a line stretching from the sea-coast at Valencia to -the foot of the Gallician mountains. In these positions -Suchet on the extreme left was opposed by -the allies at Alicant. Soult, commanding the centre, -had his head-quarters at Toledo, with one detachment -at the foot of the Sierra Morena to watch -the army of Del Parque, and two others in the valley -of the Tagus. Of these last one was at Talavera -and one on the Tietar. The first observed -Morillo and Penne Villemur, who from Estremadura -were constantly advancing towards the -bridges on the Tagus, and menacing the rear of the -French detachment which was on the Tietar in observation -of general Hill then at Coria. Soult’s -advanced post in the valley of the Tagus communicated -by the Gredos mountains with Avila, where -Foy’s division of the army of Portugal was posted -partly for the sake of food, partly to watch Bejar -and the Upper Tormes, because the allies, possessing -the pass of Bejar, might have suddenly united -north of the mountains, and breaking the French -line have fallen on Madrid.</p> - -<p>On the right of Foy, the remainder of the army -of Portugal occupied Salamanca, Ledesma, and Alba -on the Lower Tormes; Valladolid, Toro, and Tordesillas -on the Duero; Benevente, Leon, and other -points on the Esla, Astorga being, as I have before -observed, dismantled by the Spaniards. Behind -the right of this great line, the army of the north -had retaken its old positions, and the army of the -centre was fixed as before in and around Madrid, -its operations being bounded on the right bank of -the Tagus by the mountains which invest that capital,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_440"></a>[440]</span> -and on the left bank of the Tagus by the districts -of Aranjuez, Tarancon, and Cuenca.</p> - -<p>Joseph while disposing his troops in this manner, -issued a royal regulation marking the extent of -country which each army was to forage, requiring -at the same time a certain and considerable -revenue to be collected by his Spanish civil authorities -for the support of his court. The subsistence -of the French armies was thus made secondary to -the revenue of the crown, and he would have had -the soldiers in a time of war, of insurrectional -war, yield to the authority of the Spanish civilians; -an absurdity heightened by the peculiarly -active, vigorous, and prompt military method of the -French, as contrasted with the dilatory improvident -promise-breaking and visionary system of the Spaniards. -Hence scarcely was the royal regulation<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -issued when the generals broke through it in a -variety of ways, and the king was, as usual, involved -in the most acrimonious disputes with all -the emperor’s lieutenants. If he ordered one commander -to detach troops to the assistance of another -commander, he was told that he should rather send -additional troops to the first. If he reprimanded -a general for raising contributions contrary to the -regulations, he was answered that the soldiers were -starving and must be fed. At all times also the -authority of the prefects and intendants was disregarded -by all the generals; and this was in pursuance -of Napoleon’s order; for that monarch continually -reminded his brother, that as the war was -carried on by the French armies their interests were -paramount; that the king of Spain could have no -authority over them, and must never use his military -authority as lieutenant of the empire, in aid<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_441"></a>[441]</span> -of his kingly views, for with those the French soldiers -could have nothing to do; their welfare could -not be confided to Spanish ministers whose capacity -was by no means apparent and of whose fidelity the -emperor had no security.</p> - -<p>Nothing could be clearer or wiser than these -instructions, but Joseph would not see this distinction -between his military and his monarchical -duties, and continually defended his conduct by -reference to what he owed his subjects as king of -Spain. His sentiments, explained with great force -of feeling, and great beneficence of design, were -worthy of all praise if viewed abstractedly, but -totally inapplicable to the real state of affairs, -because the Spaniards were not his faithful and -attached subjects, they were his inveterate enemies; -and it was quite impossible to unite the vigour of a -war of conquest with the soft and benevolent government -of a paternal monarch. Thus one constant -error vitiated all the king’s political proceedings, an -error apparently arising from an inability to view his -situation as a whole instead of by parts, for his military -operations were vitiated in the same manner.</p> - -<p>As a man of state and of war he seems to have -been acute, courageous, and industrious, with respect -to any single feature presented for his consideration, -but always unable to look steadily on -the whole and consequently always working in the -dark. Men of his character being conscious of the -merit of labour and good intentions, are commonly -obstinate; and those qualities, which render them -so useful under the direction of an able chief, lead -only to mischief when they become chiefs themselves. -For in matters of great moment, and in -war especially, it is not the actual importance but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_442"></a>[442]</span> -the comparative importance of the operations which -should determine the choice of measures; and when -all are very important this choice demands judgment -of the highest kind, judgment which no man -ever possessed more largely than Napoleon, and -which Joseph did not possess at all.</p> - -<p>He was never able to comprehend the instructions -of his brother, and never would accept the -advice of those commanders whose capacity approached -in some degree to that of the emperor. -When he found that every general complained of -insufficient means, instead of combining their forces -so as to press with the principal mass against the -most important point, he disputed with each, and -turned to demand from the emperor additional succours -for all; at the same time unwisely repeating -and urging his own schemes upon a man so infinitely -his superior in intellect. The insurrection -in the northern provinces he treated not as a military -but a political question, attributing it to the -anger of the people at seeing the ancient supreme -council of Navarre unceremoniously dismissed and -some of the members imprisoned by a French -general, a cause very inadequate to the effect. -Neither was his judgment truer with respect to the -fitness of time. He proposed, if a continuation -of the Russian war should prevent the emperor -from sending more men to Spain, to make Burgos -the royal residence, to transport there the archives, -and all that constituted a capital; then to have all -the provinces behind the Ebro, Catalonia excepted, -governed by himself through the medium of his -Spanish ministers and as a country at peace, while -those beyond the Ebro should be given up to the -generals as a country at war.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_443"></a>[443]</span></p> - -<p>In this state his civil administration would he -said remedy the evils inflicted by the armies, would -conciliate the people by keeping all the Spanish -families and authorities in safety and comfort, -would draw all those who favoured his cause from -all parts of Spain, and would encourage the display -of that attachment to his person which he believed -so many Spaniards to entertain. And while he declared -the violence and injustice of the French -armies to be the sole cause of the protracted resistance -of the Spaniards, a declaration false in -fact, that violence being only one of many causes, -he was continually urging the propriety of beating -the English first and then pacifying the people by -just and benevolent measures. As if it were possible, -off-hand, to beat Wellington and his veterans, -embedded as they were in the strong country of -Portugal, and having British fleets with troops and -succours of all kinds, hovering on the flanks of the -French, and feeding and sustaining the insurrection -of the Spaniards in their rear.</p> - -<p>Napoleon was quite as willing and anxious as -Joseph could be to drive the English from the Peninsula, -and to tranquillize the people by a regular -government; but with a more profound knowledge -of war, of politics and of human nature, he judged -that the first could only be done by a methodical -combination, in unison with that rule of art which -prescribes the establishment and security of the -base of operations, security which could not be -obtained if the benevolent but weak and visionary -schemes of the king, were to supersede military -vigour in the field. The emperor laughed in scorn -when his brother assured him that the Peninsulars -with all their fiery passions, their fanaticism and their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_444"></a>[444]</span> -ignorance, would receive an equable government -as a benefit from the hands of an intrusive monarch -before they had lost all hope of resistance by arms.</p> - -<p>Yet it is not to be concluded that Joseph was totally -devoid of grounds for his opinions; he was -surrounded by difficulties and deeply affected by -the misery which he witnessed, his Spanish ministers -were earnest and importunate, and many of the -French generals gave him but too much reason to -complain of their violence. The length and mutations -of the war had certainly created a large party -willing enough to obtain tranquillity at the price -of submission, while others were, as we have seen, -not indisposed, if he would hold the crown on their -terms, to accept his dynasty, as one essentially -springing from democracy, in preference to the -despotic, base, and superstitious family which the -nation was called upon to uphold. It was not unnatural -therefore for Joseph to desire to retain his -capital while the negociations with Del Parque’s -army were still in existence, it was not strange that -he should be displeased with Soult after reading -that marshal’s honest but offensive letter, and certainly -it was highly creditable to his character as a -man and as a king that he would not silently suffer -his subjects to be oppressed by the generals.</p> - -<p>“I am in distress for money,” he often exclaimed -to Napoleon, “such distress as no king ever endured -before, my plate is sold, and on state occasions the -appearance of magnificence is supported by false -metal. My ministers and household are actually -starving, misery is on every face, and men, otherwise -willing, are thus deterred from joining a king so -little able to support them. My revenue is seized -by the generals for the supply of their troops, and I<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_445"></a>[445]</span> -cannot as a king of Spain without dishonour partake -of the resources thus torn by rapine from my -subjects whom I have sworn to protect; I cannot -in fine be at once king of Spain and general of the -French; let me resign both and live peaceably in -France. Your majesty does not know what scenes -are enacted, you will shudder to hear that men -formerly rich and devoted to our cause have been -driven out of Zaragoza and denied even a ration of -food. The marquis Cavallero, a councillor of state, -minister of justice, and known personally to your -majesty, has been thus used. He has been seen actually -begging for a piece of bread!”</p> - -<p>If this Caballero was the old minister to Charles -the IVth, no misery was too great a punishment -for his tyrannical rule under that monarch, yet it -was not from the hands of the French it should -have come; and Joseph’s distress for money must -certainly have been great, since that brave and -honest man Jourdan, a marshal of France, major-general -of the armies, and a personal favourite of -the king’s, complained that the non-payment of his<span class="sidenote">Jourdan’s Official correspondence, MSS.</span> -appointments had reduced him to absolute penury, -and after borrowing until his credit was exhausted -he could with difficulty procure subsistence. It is -now time to describe the secondary operations of -the war, but as these were spread over two-thirds of -Spain, and were simultaneous, to avoid complexity -it will be necessary to class them under two great -heads, namely those which took place north and -those which took place south of the Tagus.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_446"></a>[446]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXX_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE TAGUS.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote9">1813. February.</span> -In December 1812 general Copons had been appointed -captain-general of Catalonia instead of -Eroles, but his arrival was delayed and the province -was not relieved from Lacy’s mischievous sway until -February 1813, when Eroles, taking the temporary -command, re-established the head-quarters at Vich. -The French, being then unmolested, save by the English -ships, passed an enormous convoy to France, -but Eroles was not long idle. Through the medium -of a double spy, he sent a forged letter to the governor -of Taragona, desiring him to detach men to -Villa Nueva de Sitjes, with carts to transport some -stores; at the same time he gave out that he was -himself going to the Cerdaña, which brought the -French moveable column to that quarter, and then, -Eroles, Manso, and Villamil, making forced marches -from different points, reached Torre dem barra -where they met the British squadron. The intention -was to cut off the French detachment on its -march to Villa Nueva and then to attack Taragona, -but fortune rules in war; the governor received a -letter from Maurice Mathieu of a different tenor -from the forged letter, and with all haste regaining -his fortress balked this well-contrived plan.</p> - -<p>Sarzfield, at enmity with Eroles, was now combining -his operations with Villa Campa, and they -menaced Alcanitz in Aragon; but general Pannetier<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_447"></a>[447]</span> -who had remained at Teruel to watch Villa -Campa, and to protect Suchet’s communications, -immediately marched to Daroca, Severoli came -from Zaragoza to the same point, and the Spaniards, -alarmed by their junction, dispersed. Sarzfield returned -to Catalonia, Bassecour and the Empecinado -remained near Cuenca, and Villa Campa as usual -hung upon the southern skirts of the Albaracyn -mountain, ready to pounce down on the Ebro or on -the Guadalquivir side as advantage might offer. -Meanwhile Suchet was by no means at ease. The -successes in Catalonia did not enable him to draw -reinforcements from thence, because Napoleon, true -to his principle of securing the base of operations, -forbad him to weaken the army there, and Montmarie’s -brigade was detached from Valencia to preserve -the communication between Saguntum and Tortoza. -But Aragon which was Suchet’s place of arms -and principal magazine, being infested by Mina, -Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and Sarzfield, -was becoming daily more unquiet, wherefore Pannetier’s -brigade remained between Segorbé and -Daroca to aid Severoli. Thus although the two -armies of Aragon and Catalonia mustered more -than seventy thousand men, that of Aragon alone -having forty thousand, with fifty field-pieces, Suchet -could not fight with more than sixteen thousand -infantry, two thousand cavalry and perhaps -thirty guns beyond the Xucar. His right flank -was always liable to be turned by Requeña, his left -by the sea which was entirely at his adversary’s -command, and his front was menaced by fifty thousand -men, of which three thousand might be cavalry -with fifty pieces of artillery.</p> - -<p>The component parts of the allied force were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_448"></a>[448]</span> -the Anglo-Sicilians which, including Whittingham’s -and Roche’s divisions, furnished eighteen -thousand soldiers. Elio’s army furnishing twelve -thousand exclusive of the divisions of Bassecour, -Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, which, though -detached, belonged to him. Del Parque’s army -reinforced by new levies from Andalusia, and on -paper twenty thousand. Numerically this was a -formidable power if it had been directed in mass -against Suchet; but on his right the duke of -Dalmatia, whose head-quarters were at Toledo, -sent forward detachments which occupied the army -of Del Parque; moreover the secret negociations -for the defection of the latter were now in full activity, -and from the army of the centre a column -was sent towards Cuenca to draw Bassecour and the -Empecinado from Suchet’s right flank; but those -chiefs had five thousand men, and in return continually -harassed the army of the centre.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -On the side of the Morena and Murcia, Soult’s -operations were confined to skirmishes and foraging -parties. Early in January his brother, seeking to -open a communication with Suchet by Albacete, -defeated some of Elio’s cavalry with the loss of fifty -men, and pursued them until they rallied on their -main body, under Freyre; the latter offered battle -with nine hundred horsemen in front of the defile -leading to Albacete; but Soult, disliking his appearance -turned off to the right, and passing through -Villa Nueva de los Infantes joined a French post -established in Valdepeña at the foot of the Morena, -where some skirmishes had also taken place with -Del Parque’s cavalry. The elder Soult thus learned, -that Freyre, with two thousand five hundred horsemen, -covered all the roads leading from La Mancha,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_449"></a>[449]</span> -to Valencia and Murcia; that Elio’s infantry was at -Tobara and Hellin, Del Parque’s head-quarters at -Jaen; that the passes of the Morena were guarded, -and magazines formed at Andujar, Linares, and -Cordoba, while on the other side of La Mancha, -the Empecinado had come to Hinojoso with fifteen -hundred horsemen, and the column sent from the -army of the centre was afraid to encounter him.</p> - -<p>These dispositions, and the strength of the Spaniards, -not only prevented the younger Soult from -penetrating into Murcia, but delayed the march of a -column, under general Daricau, destined to communicate -with Suchet, and bring up the detachments -baggage and stores, which the armies of the -south and centre had left at Valencia. The scouting -parties of both sides now met at different -points, and on the 27th of January, a sharp cavalry -fight happened at El Corral, in which the French -commander was killed, and the Spaniards, though -far the most numerous, defeated. Meanwhile Daricau, -whose column had been reinforced, reached -Utiel, opened the communication with Suchet by -Requeña, cut off some small parties of the enemy, -and then continuing his march received a great -convoy, consisting of two thousand fighting men, -six hundred travellers, and the stores and baggage -belonging to Soult’s and the king’s armies. This -convoy had marched for Madrid by the way of -Zaragoza, but was recalled when Daricau arrived, -and under his escort, aided by a detachment of -Suchet’s army placed at Yniesta, it reached Todelo -in the latter end of February safely, though Villa -Campa came down to the Cabriel River, to trouble -the march.</p> - -<p>During these different operations numerous absurd<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_450"></a>[450]</span> -and contradictory reports, principally originating -in the Spanish and English newspapers, obtained -credit in the French armies, such as, that sir Henry -Wellesley and Infantado had seized the government -at Cadiz; that Clinton, by an intrigue, had -got possession of Alicant; that Ballesteros had -shewn Wellington secret orders from the cortez not -to acknowledge him as generalissimo, or even as a -grandee; that the cortez had removed the regency -because the latter permitted Wellington to appoint -intendants and other officers to the Spanish provinces; -that Hill had devastated the frontier and -retired to Lisbon though forcibly opposed by Morillo; -that a nephew of Ballesteros had raised the -standard of revolt; that Wellington was advancing, -and that troops had been embarked at Lisbon for a -maritime expedition, with other stories of a like -nature, which seem to have disturbed all the French -generals save Soult, whose information as to the -real state of affairs continued to be sure and accurate. -He also at this time detected four or five -of Wellington’s emissaries, amongst them, was a -Portuguese officer on his own staff; a man called -Piloti, who served and betrayed both sides; and an -amazon called Francisca de la Fuerte, who, though -only twenty-two years old, had already commanded -a partida of sixty men with some success, and was -now a spy. But in the latter end of February the -duke of Dalmatia was recalled, and the command of -his army fell to Gazan, whose movements belong -rather to the operations north of the Tagus. -Wherefore turning to Suchet, I shall proceed to -give an exact notion of his resources and of the -nature of the country where his operations were -conducted.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_451"></a>[451]</span></p> - -<p>The city of Valencia, though nominally the seat of -his power, was not so. He had razed all the defences -constructed by the Spaniards, confining his hold to -the old walls and to a small fortified post within the -town sufficient to resist a sudden attack, and capable -of keeping the population in awe; his real place -of arms was Saguntum, and between that and -Tortoza he had two fortresses, namely, Oropesa -and Peniscola; he had also another line of communication, -but for infantry only, through Morella, -a fortified post, to Mequinenza. Besides these -lines there were roads both from Valencia and -Saguntum, leading through Segorbé to Teruel a -fortified post, and from thence to Zaragoza by Daroca<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_6">Plan 6.</a></span> -another fortified post. These roads were eastward -of the Guadalaviar, and westward of that river -Suchet had a line of retreat from Valencia to Madrid -by Requeña, which was also a fortified post. Now if -the whole of the French general’s command be looked -to, his forces were very numerous, but that command -was wide, and in the field his army was, as I have -before shewn, not very numerous. Valencia was -in fact a point made on hostile ground which, now -that the French were generally on the defensive, -was only maintained with a view of imposing upon -the allies and drawing forth the resources of the -country as long as circumstances would permit. -The proper line for covering Valencia and the rich -country immediately around it was on the Xucar, or -rather beyond it, at San Felippe de Xativa and -Moxente, where a double range of mountains afforded -strong defensive positions, barring the principal -roads leading to Valencia. On this position -Suchet had formed his entrenched camp, much<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_452"></a>[452]</span> -talked of at the time, but slighter than fame represented -it; the real strength was in the natural formation -of the ground.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">February.</span> -Beyond his left flank the coast road was blocked -by the castle of Denia, but his right could be turned<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_7">Plan 7.</a></span> -from Yecla and Almanza, through Cofrentes and -Requeña, and he was forced to keep strict watch -and strong detachments always towards the defile of -Almanza, lest Elio’s army and Del Parque’s should -march that way. This entrenched camp was Suchet’s -permanent position of defence, but there were reasons -why he should endeavour to keep his troops -generally more advanced; the country in his front -was full of fertile plains, or rather coves, within the -hills, which run in nearly parallel ranges, and are -remarkably rocky and precipitous, enclosing the -plains like walls, and it was of great importance -who should command their resources. Hence as -the principal point in Suchet’s front was the large -and flourishing town of Alcoy, he occupied it, and -from thence threw off smaller bodies to Biar, Castalla, -Ibi, and Onil, which were on the same strong ridge -as the position covering the cove of Alcoy. On his -right there was another plain in which Fuente La -Higuera, Villena, and Yecla were delineated at opposite -points of a triangle, and as this plain and the -smaller valleys ministered to Suchet’s wants because -of his superior cavalry, the subsistence of the French -troops was eased, while the cantonments and foraging -districts of the Sicilian army were contracted: the -outposts of the allied army were in fact confined -to a fourth and fifth parallel range of mountains -covering the towns of Elda, Tibi, Xixona, and Villa -Joyosa which was on the sea-coast.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_453"></a>[453]</span></p> - -<p>Suchet thus assumed an insulting superiority over -an army more numerous than his own, but outward -appearances are deceitful in war; the French -general was really the strongest, because want, -ignorance, dissention, and even treachery, were in -his adversary’s camps. Del Parque’s army remained -behind the Morena, Elio’s was at Tobarra -and Hellin, and of the Anglo-Sicilian army, the -British only were available in the hour of danger, -and they were few. When general Campbell quarrelled -with Elio the latter retired for a time towards -Murcia, but after Wellington’s journey to Cadiz -he again came forward, and his cavalry entering La -Mancha skirmished with general Soult’s and communicating -with Bassecour and the Empecinado -delayed the progress of Daricau towards Valencia. -Meanwhile general Campbell remained quiet, in expectation -that lord William Bentinck would come -with more troops to Alicant, but in February fresh -troubles broke out in Sicily, and in the latter end of -that month sir John Murray arriving, assumed the -command. Thus in a few months, five chiefs with -different views and prejudices successively came to -the command, and the army was still unorganized -and unequipped for vigorous service. The Sicilians, -Calabrese, and French belonging to it were eager -to desert, one Italian regiment had been broken for -misconduct by general Maitland, the British and -Germans were humiliated in spirit by the part they<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_XVI">Appendix, No. 16</a>, <a href="#NO_XVII">17.</a></span> -were made to enact, and the Spaniards under Whittingham -and Roche were starving; for Wellington -knowing by experience how the Spanish government, -though receiving a subsidy, would, if permitted, -throw the feeding of their troops entirely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_454"></a>[454]</span> -upon the British, forbade their being supplied from -the British stores, and the Spanish intendants neglected -them.</p> - -<p>Murray’s first care was to improve the equipment -of his troops, and with the aid of Elio he soon put -them in a better condition. The two armies together -furnished thirty thousand effective men, of -which about three thousand were cavalry, and they -had thirty-seven guns, yet very inadequately horsed, -and Whittingham’s and Elio’s cavalry were from -want of forage nearly unfit for duty. The transport -mules were hired at an enormous price, the expense -being at the rate of one hundred and thirty thousand -pounds annually, and yet the supply was bad, for<span class="sidenote">General Donkin’s papers.</span> -here as in all other parts of Spain, corruption and -misuse of authority prevailed. The rich sent their -fine animals to Alicant for sanctuary and bribed the -Alcaldes, the mules of the poor alone were pressed, -the army was ill provided, and yet the country was -harassed. In this state it was necessary to do something, -and as the distress of Whittingham and -Roche’s troops could not be removed, save by enlarging -their cantonments, Murray after some hesitation -resolved to drive the French from the mountains in -his front, and he designed, as the first step, to surprise -fifteen hundred men which they had placed in Alcoy. -Now five roads led towards the French positions. -1º. On the left the great road from Alicant passing -through Monforte, Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente -de la Higuera, where it joins the great road from -Valencia to Madrid, which runs through Almanza. -This way turned both the ridges occupied by the -armies. 2º. A good road leading by Tibi to Castalla, -from whence it sent off two branches, on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_455"></a>[455]</span> -left hand, one leading to Sax, the other through the -pass of Biar to Villena; two other branches on the -right hand went, the one through Ibi to Alcoy, the -other through Onil to the same place. 3º. The road -from Alicant to Xixona, a bad road, leading over the -very steep rugged ridge of that name to Alcoy. At -Xixona also there was a narrow way on the right -hand, through the mountains to Alcoy, which was -followed by Roche when he attacked that place in -the first battle of Castalla. 4º. A carriage-road -running along the sea-coast as far as Villa Joyosa, -from whence a narrow mountain-way leads to the -village of Consentayna, situated in the cove of -Alcoy and behind that town.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -On the 6th of March the allied troops moved in -four columns, one on the left by Elda, to watch the -great Madrid road; one on the right composed of -Spanish troops under colonel Campbell, from Villa -Joyosa, to get to Consentayna behind Alcoy; a -third, under lord Frederick Bentinck, issuing by -Ibi, was to turn the French right; the fourth -was to march from Xixona straight against Alcoy, -and to pursue the remainder of Habert’s division, -which was behind that town. Lord Frederick -Bentinck attacked in due time, but as colonel -Campbell did not appear the surprise failed, and -when the French saw the main body winding down -the Sierra in front of Alcoy, they retired, pursued by -general Donkin with the second battalion of the -twenty-seventh regiment. The head of lord Frederick -Bentinck’s column was already engaged, but -the rear had not arrived, and the whole of Habert’s -division was soon concentrated a mile beyond Alcoy, -and there offered battle; yet sir John Murray, instead -of pushing briskly forward, halted, and it was not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_456"></a>[456]</span> -until several demands for support had reached him, -that he detached the fifty-eighth to the assistance -of the troops engaged, who had lost about forty men, -chiefly of the twenty-seventh. Habert, fearing -to be cut off by Consentayna, and seeing the fifty-eighth -coming on, retreated, and the allies occupied -Alcoy, which greatly relieved their quarters; but -the want of vigour displayed by sir John Murray -when he had gained Alcoy did not escape the -notice of the troops.</p> - -<p>After this affair the armies remained quiet until -the 15th, when Whittingham forced the French -posts with some loss from Albayda, and general -Donkin, taking two battalions and some dragoons -from Ibi, drove back their outposts from Rocayrente -and Alsafara, villages situated beyond the range<span class="sidenote7">Plan 7.</span> -bounding the plain of Alcoy. He repassed the hills -higher up with the dragoons and a company of the -grenadiers of twenty-seventh, under captain Waldron, -and returned by the main road to Alcoy, having in -his course met a French battalion, through which the -gallant Waldron broke with his grenadiers. Meanwhile -sir John Murray, after much vacillation, at one -time resolving to advance, at another to retreat, thinking -it impossible first to force Suchet’s entrenched -camp, and then his second line behind the Xucar, a -difficult river with muddy banks, believing also that -the French general had his principal magazines at -Valencia, conceived the idea of seizing the latter by -a maritime expedition. He judged that the garrison -which he estimated at eight hundred infantry, -and one thousand cavalry, would be unable to resist, -and that the town once taken the inhabitants would -rise; Suchet could not then detach men enough to -quell them without exposing himself to defeat on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_457"></a>[457]</span> -Xucar, and if he moved with all his force he could -be closely followed by the allies and driven upon -Requeña. In this view he made fresh dispositions.</p> - -<p>On the 18th Roche’s division reinforced by some -troops from Elio’s army and by a British grenadier -battalion, was selected for the maritime attack, and -the rest of the army was concentrated on the left at -Castalla with the exception of Whittingham’s troops -which remained at Alcoy, for Suchet was said to be -advancing, and Murray resolved to fight him. But -to form a plan and to execute it vigorously, were -with sir John Murray very different things. Although -far from an incapable officer in the cabinet, -he shewed none of the qualities of a commander in -the field. His indecision was remarkable. On the -morning of the 18th he resolved to fight in front -of Castalla, and in the evening he assumed a weaker -position behind that town, abandoning the command -of a road, running from Ibi in rear of Alcoy, by -which Whittingham might have been cut off. And -when the strong remonstrances of his quarter-master -general induced him to relinquish this ground, he -adopted a third position, neither so strong as the -first nor so defective as the last.</p> - -<p>In this manner affairs wore on until the 26th, -when Roche’s division and the grenadier battalion -marched to Alicant to embark, with orders, if they -failed at Valencia, to seize and fortify Cullera at -the mouth of the Xucar; and if this also failed to -besiege Denia. But now the foolish ministerial -arrangements about the Sicilian army worked out -their natural result. Lord Wellington, though he -was permitted to retain the Anglo-Sicilian army in -Spain beyond the period lord William Bentinck -had assigned for its stay, had not the full command<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_458"></a>[458]</span> -given to him; he was clogged with reference -to the state of Sicily, until the middle of March, -and this new arrangement was still unknown to lord -William Bentinck and to sir John Murray. Thus -there were at this time, in fact, three commanding -officers; Wellington for the general operations, -Murray for the particular operations, and lord William -Bentinck still empowered to increase or diminish -the troops, and even upon emergency to -withdraw the whole. And now in consequence of -the continued dissentions in Sicily, the king of that -country having suddenly resumed the government, -lord William did recal two thousand of Murray’s -best troops, and amongst them the grenadier battalion -intended to attack Valencia. That enterprize -instantly fell to the ground.</p> - -<p>Upon this event sir John Murray, or some person -writing under his authority, makes the following -observations. “The most careful combination could<span class="sidenote">Appendix to Phillipart’s Military Calendar.</span> -not have selected a moment when the danger of -such authority was more clearly demonstrated, more -severely felt. Had these orders been received a -very short time before, the allied army would not -have been committed in active operations; had they -reached sir John Murray a week later, there is -every reason to believe that the whole country from -Alicant to Valencia would have passed under the -authority of the allied army, and that marshal -Suchet cut off from his magazines in that province, -and in Aragon, would have been compelled to retire -through a mountainous and barren country on -Madrid. But the order of lord William Bentinck -was peremptory, and the allied army which even -before was scarcely balanced, was now so inferior -to the enemy that it became an indispensible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_459"></a>[459]</span> -necessity to adopt a system strongly defensive, and -all hope of a brilliant commencement of the campaign -vanished.”</p> - -<p>Upon this curious passage it is necessary to remark, -1º. that Suchet’s great magazines were not -at Valencia but at Saguntum; 2º. that from the -castle of Denia the fleet would have been descried, -and the strong garrison of Saguntum could have reinforced -the troops in Valencia; Montmarie’s brigade -also would soon have come up from Oropesa. -These were doubtless contingencies not much to be -regarded in bar of such an enterprize, but Suchet -would by no means have been forced to retire by -Requeña upon Madrid, he would have retired to -Liria, the road to which steered more than five miles -clear of Valencia. He could have kept that city in -check while passing, in despite of sir John Murray, -and at Liria he would have been again in his natural -position, that is to say, in full command of his -principal lines of communication. Moreover, however -disagreeable to Suchet personally it might have -been to be forced back upon Madrid, that event -would have been extremely detrimental to the general -cause, as tending to reinforce the king against -Wellington. But the singular part of the passage -quoted, is the assertion that the delay of a week in -lord William Bentinck’s order would have ensured -such a noble stroke against the French army. Now -lord William Bentinck only required the troops to -proceed in the first instance to Mahon; what a -dull flagging spirit then was his, who dared not -delay obedience to such an order even for a week!</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -The recalled troops embarked for Sicily on the -5th of April, and Suchet alarmed at the offensive<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_460"></a>[460]</span> -position of the allies, which he attributed to the -general state of affairs, because the king’s march to -Castile permitted all the Spanish armies of Andalusia -to reinforce Elio, resolved to strike first, and -with the greater avidity because Elio had pushed -general Mijares with an advanced guard of three -or four thousand men to Yecla where they were -quite unsupported. This movement had been concerted -in March, with Murray who was to occupy -Villena, and be prepared to fall upon the French -left, if the Spaniards were attacked at Yecla; and -in return the Spaniards were to fall on the French -right if Murray was attacked. Elio however neglected -to strengthen his division at Yecla with<span class="sidenote">General Donkin’s Papers, MSS.</span> -cavalry, which he had promised to do, nor did -Murray occupy Villena in force; nevertheless Mijares -remained at Yecla, Elio with the main body -occupied Hellin, and the cavalry were posted on -the side of Albacete, until the departure of the -troops for Sicily. Roche then joined the army at -Castalla, and Elio’s main body occupied Elda and -Sax to cover the main road from Madrid to Alicant.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 11th Suchet having by a -forced march assembled sixteen battalions of infantry, -ten squadrons of cavalry, and twelve pieces -of artillery at Fuente la Higuera, marched straight -upon Caudete, while Harispe’s division by a cross -road endeavoured to surprise the Spaniards at Yecla. -The latter retired fighting towards Jumilla by -the hills, but the French artillery and skirmishers -followed close, and at last the Spaniards being -pierced in the centre, one part broke and fled, and -the other part after some farther resistance surrendered. -Two hundred were killed, and fifteen hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_461"></a>[461]</span> -prisoners, including wounded, fell into the -hands of the victors, who lost about eighty men -and officers.</p> - -<p>Suchet’s movement on Fuente la Higuera was -known in the night of the 10th at Castalla, where -all the Anglo-Sicilian army was in position, because -Whittingham had come from Alcoy, leaving only a -detachment on that side. Hence while Harispe -was defeating Mijares at Yecla, Suchet in person -remained at Caudete with two divisions and the -heavy cavalry in order of battle, lest Murray -should advance by Biar and Villena. The latter -town, possessing an old wall and a castle, was occupied -by the regiment of Velez-Malaga, a thousand -strong, and in the course of the day Murray also -came up with the allied cavalry and a brigade of -infantry. Here he was joined by Elio, without -troops, and when towards evening Harispe’s fight -being over and the prisoners secured, Suchet advanced, -Murray retired with the cavalry through -the pass of Biar leaving his infantry, under colonel -Adam, in front of that defile. He wished also to draw -the Spanish garrison from Villena but Elio would -not suffer it, and yet during the night, repenting of -his obstinacy, came to Castalla entreating Murray to -carry off that battalion. It was too late, Suchet had -broken the gates of the town the evening before, and -the castle with the best equipped and finest regiment -in the Spanish army had already surrendered.</p> - -<p>Murray’s final position was about three miles from -the pass of Biar. His left, composed of Whittingham’s -Spaniards, was entrenched on a rugged sierra -ending abruptly above Castalla, which, with its<span class="sidenote9">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_7">Plan 7.</a></span> -old castle crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, -closed the right of that wing and was occupied in -strength by Mackenzie’s division.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_462"></a>[462]</span></p> - -<p>A space between Whittingham’s troops and the -town was left on the sierra for the advanced guard, -then in the pass of Biar; Castalla itself, covered -by the castle, was prepared for defence, and the -principal approaches were commanded by strong -batteries, for Murray had concentrated nearly all -his guns at this point. The cavalry was partly -behind partly in front of the town on an extensive -plain which was interspersed with olive -plantations.</p> - -<p>The right wing, composed of Clinton’s division -and Roche’s Spaniards, was on comparatively low -ground, and extended to the rear at right angles -with the centre, but well covered by a “<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">barranco</i>” or -bed of a torrent, the precipitous sides of which -were, in some places, one hundred feet deep.</p> - -<p>Suchet could approach this position, either -through the pass of Biar, or turning that defile, -by the way of Sax; but the last road was supposed -to be occupied by Elio’s army, and as troops -coming by it must make a flank march along the -front of the position, it was not a favourable line of -attack; moreover the allies, being in possession of -the defiles of Biar, and of Alcoy, might have -gained the Xucar, either by Fuentes de la Higuera -or by Alcoy, seeing that Alicant, which was their -base, was safe, and the remnants of Elio’s army -could easily have got away. Murray’s army was -however scarcely active enough for such an operation, -and Suchet advanced very cautiously, as it -behoved him to do, for the ground between Castalla -and Biar was just such as a prompt opponent -would desire for a decisive blow.</p> - -<p>The advanced guard, in the pass of Biar, about -two thousand five hundred men was composed of -two Italian regiments and a battalion of the twenty-seventh<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_463"></a>[463]</span> -British; two companies of German riflemen, -a troop of foreign hussars and six guns, four -of which were mountain-pieces. The ground was -very strong and difficult but at two o’clock in the -afternoon the French, having concentrated in front -of the pass, their skirmishers swarmed up the steep -rocks on either flank, with a surprising vigour and -agility, and when they had gained the summit, the -supporting columns advanced. Then the allies who -had fought with resolution for about two hours -abandoned the pass with the loss of two guns and -about thirty prisoners, retreating however in good -order to the main position, for they were not followed -beyond the mouth of the defile. The next day, -that is the 13th about one o’clock, the French cavalry, -issuing cautiously from the pass, extended -to the left in the plain as far as Onil, and they -were followed by the infantry who immediately -occupied a low ridge about a mile in front of the -allies’ left; the cavalry then gained ground to the -front, and closing towards the right of the allies -menaced the road to Ibi and Alcoy.</p> - -<p>Murray had only occupied his ground the night -before, but he had studied it and entrenched it in -parts. His right wing was quite refused, and so -well covered by the barranco that nearly all the -troops could have been employed as a reserve to -the left wing, which was also very strongly posted -and presented a front about two miles in extent. -But notwithstanding the impregnable strength of -the ground the English general shrunk from the -contest, and while the head of the French column -was advancing from the defile of Biar, thrice he -gave his quarter-master general orders to put the -army in retreat, and the last time so peremptorily,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_464"></a>[464]</span> -that obedience must have ensued if at that moment -the firing between the picquets and the French -light troops had not begun.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF CASTALLA.</h4> - -<p>Suchet’s dispositions were made slowly and as if -he also had not made up his mind to fight, but a -crooked jut of the sierra, springing from about the -middle of the ridge, hid from him all the British -troops, and two-thirds of the whole army, hence -his first movement was to send a column towards -Castalla, to turn this jut of the sierra and discover -the conditions of the position. Meanwhile he -formed two strong columns immediately opposite -the left wing, and his cavalry, displaying a formidable -line in the plain closed gradually towards the -barranco. The French general however soon discovered -that the right of the allies was unattackable. -Wherefore retaining his reserve on the low -ridge in front of the left wing, and still holding the -exploring column of infantry near Castalla, to protect -his flank against any sally from that point, he -opened his artillery against the centre and right -wing of the allies, and forming several columns of -attack commenced the action against the allies’ left -on both sides of the jut before spoken of.</p> - -<p>The ascent in front of Whittingham’s post, being -very rugged and steep, and the upper parts entrenched, -the battle there resolved itself at once -into a fight of light troops, in which the Spaniards -maintained their ground with resolution; but on -the other side of the jut, the French mounted the -heights, slowly indeed and with many skirmishers, -yet so firmly, that it was evident nothing but good -fighting would send them down again. Their light<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_465"></a>[465]</span> -troops spread over the whole face of the Sierra, -and here and there attaining the summit were partially -driven down again by the Anglo-Italian -troops; but where the main body came upon the -second battalion of the twenty-seventh there was a -terrible crash. For the ground having an abrupt declination -near the top enabled the French to form a -line under cover, close to the British, who were lying -down waiting for orders to charge; and while the -former were unfolding their masses a grenadier -officer, advancing alone, challenged the captain -of the twenty-seventh grenadiers to single combat. -Waldron an agile vigorous Irishman and of boiling -courage instantly sprung forward, the hostile lines -looked on without firing a shot, the swords of -the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman’s -head was cleft in twain, and the next instant the -twenty-seventh jumping up with a deafening shout, -fired a deadly volley, at half pistol-shot distance, -and then charged with such a shock that, maugre -their bravery and numbers, the enemy’s soldiers -were overthrown and the side of the Sierra was -covered with the killed and wounded. In Murray’s -despatch this exploit was erroneously attributed to -colonel Adam, but it was ordered and conducted -by colonel Reeves alone.</p> - -<p>The French general seeing his principal column -thus overthrown, and at every other point having -the worst of the fight, made two secondary attacks -to cover the rallying of the defeated columns, but -these also failing, his army was separated in three -parts, namely the beaten troops which were in -great confusion, the reserve on the minor heights -from whence the attacking columns had advanced, -and the cavalry, which being far on the left in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_466"></a>[466]</span> -plain, was also separated from the point of action -by the bed of the torrent, a bridge over which was -commanded by the allies. A vigorous sally from -Castalla and a general advance would have obliged -the French reserves to fall back upon Biar in confusion -before the cavalry could come to their assistance, -and the victory might have been thus -completed; but Murray, who had remained during -the whole action behind Castalla, gave the French -full time to rally all their forces and retire in order -towards the pass of Biar. Then gradually passing -out by the right of the town, with a tedious pedantic -movement, he changed his front, forming two -lines across the valley, keeping his left at the foot of -the heights, and extending his right, covered by the -cavalry, towards the Sierra of Onil. Meanwhile -Mackenzie moving out by the left of Castalla with -three British, and one German battalion, and eight -guns followed the enemy more rapidly.</p> - -<p>Suchet had by this time plunged into the pass -with his infantry cavalry and tumbrils in one mass, -leaving a rear-guard of three battalions with eight -guns to cover the passage; but these being pressed -by Mackenzie, and heavily cannonaded, were soon -forced to form lines and offer battle, answering gun -for gun. The French soldiers were heavily crushed -by the English shot, the clatter of musketry was -beginning, and one well-directed vigorous charge, -would have overturned and driven the French -in a confused mass upon the other troops then -wedged in the narrow defile; but Mackenzie’s -movement had been made by the order of the -quarter-master-general Donkin, without Murray’s -knowledge, and the latter instead of supporting it -strongly, sent repeated orders to withdraw the troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_467"></a>[467]</span> -already engaged, and in despite of all remonstrance -caused them to fall back on the main body, when -victory was in their grasp. Suchet thus relieved at -a most critical moment immediately occupied a -position across the defile with his flanks on the -heights, and though Murray finally sent some light -companies to attack his left the effort was feeble -and produced no result; he retained his position -and in the night retired to Fuente de la Higuera.</p> - -<p>On the 14th Murray marched to Alcoy where a -small part of Whittingham’s forces had remained -in observation of a French detachment left to hold -the pass of Albayda, and through this pass he proposed -to intercept the retreat of Suchet, but his -movements were slow, his arrangements bad, and -the army became so disordered, that he halted the -15th at Alcoy. A feeble demonstration on the -following days towards Albayda terminated his -operations.</p> - -<p>In this battle of Castalla, the allies had, including -Roche’s division, about seventeen thousand of -all arms, and the French about fifteen thousand.<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s official despatch to the king, MSS.</span> -Suchet says that the action was brought on, against -his wish, by the impetuosity of his light troops, and -that he lost only eight hundred men; his statement<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span> -is confirmed by Vacani the Italian historian. -Sir John Murray affirms that it was a pitched battle<span class="sidenote">Murray’s despatch.</span> -and that the French lost above three thousand men. -The reader may choose between these accounts. In -favour of Suchet’s version it may be remarked that -neither the place, nor the time, nor the mode of -attack, was such as might be expected from his -talents and experience in war, if he had really -intended a pitched battle; and though the action -was strongly contested on the principal point, it is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_468"></a>[468]</span> -scarcely possible that so many as three thousand -men could have been killed and wounded. And -yet eight hundred seems too few, because the -loss of the victorious troops with all advantages -of ground, was more than six hundred. One -thing is however certain that if Suchet lost three -thousand men, which would have been at least a -fourth of his infantry, he must have been so disabled, -so crippled, that what with the narrow -defile of Biar in the rear, and the distance of his -cavalry in the plain, to have escaped at all was -extremely discreditable to Murray’s generalship. -An able commander having a superior force, and -the allies were certainly the most numerous, would -never have suffered the pass of Biar to be forced -on the 12th, or if it were forced, he would have -had his army well in hand behind it, ready to fall -upon the head of the French column as it issued -into the low ground.</p> - -<p>Suchet violated several of the most important -maxims of art. For without an adequate object, he -fought a battle, having a defile in his rear, and on -ground where his cavalry, in which he was superior, -could not act. Neither the general state of the -French affairs, nor the particular circumstances, -invited a decisive offensive movement at the time, -wherefore the French general should have been contented -with his first successes against the Spaniards, -and against Colonel Adam, unless some palpable -advantage had been offered to him by Murray. But -the latter’s position was very strong indeed, and -the French army was in imminent danger, cooped -up between the pass of Biar and the allied -troops; and this danger would have been increased -if Elio had executed a movement which Murray<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_469"></a>[469]</span> -had proposed to him in the night of the 12th, -namely, to push troops into the mountains from -Sax, which would have strengthened Whittingham’s -left and menaced the right flank of the enemy. -Elio disregarded this request, and during the -whole of the operations the two armies were unconnected, -and acting without concert, although -only a few miles distant from each other. This -might have been avoided if they had previously -put the castle and town of Villena in a good -state of defence, and occupied the pass of Biar -in force behind it. The two armies would then -have been secure of a junction in advance, and the -plain of Villena would have been commanded. To -the courage of the troops belongs all the merit of -the success obtained, there was no generalship, and -hence though much blood was spilt no profit was -derived from victory.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_470"></a>[470]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXX_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE TAGUS.</h4> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1813. April.</span> -On this side as in the south, one part of the French -fronted lord Wellington’s forces, while the rest -warred with the Partidas, watched the English -fleets on the coast, and endeavoured to maintain a -free intercourse with France; but the extent of -country was greater, the lines of communication -longer, the war altogether more difficult, and the -various operations more dissevered.</p> - -<p>Four distinct bodies acted north of the Tagus.</p> - -<p>1º. The army of Portugal, composed of six -divisions under Reille, observing the allies from -behind the Tormes; the Gallicians from behind the -Esla.</p> - -<p>2º. That part of the army of the south which, -posted in the valley of the Tagus, observed Hill -from behind the Tietar, and the Spaniards of Estremadura -from behind the Tagus.</p> - -<p>3º. The army of the north, under Caffarelli, -whose business was to watch the English squadrons -in the Bay of Biscay, to scour the great line of -communication with France, and to protect the -fortresses of Navarre and Biscay.</p> - -<p>4º. The army of the centre, under count D’Erlon -whose task was to fight the Partidas in the central<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_471"></a>[471]</span> -part of Spain, to cover Madrid and to connect the -other armies by means of moveable columns radiating -from that capital. Now if the reader will -follow the operations of these armies in the order -of their importance and will mark their bearing on -the main action of the campaign, he will be led -gradually to understand how it was, that in 1813, -the French, although apparently in their full -strength, were suddenly, irremediably and as it -were by a whirlwind, swept from the Peninsula.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -The army of the centre was composed of Darmagnac’s -and Barrois’ French divisions, of Palombini’s -Italians, Casa Palacio’s Spaniards, Trielhard’s -cavalry, and the king’s French guards. It has been -already shewn how, marching from the Tormes, it -drove the Empecinado and Bassecour from the -capital; but in passing the Guadarama one hundred<span class="sidenote">Vacani.</span> -and fifty men were frozen to death, a catastrophe -produced by the rash use of ardent spirits. Palombini -immediately occupied Alcala, and, having -foraged the country towards Guadalaxara, brought -in a large convoy of provisions to the capital. He -would then have gone to Zaragoza to receive the -recruits and stores which had arrived from Italy for -his division, but Caffarelli was at this time so -pressed that the Italian division finally marched to -his succour, not by the direct road, such was the -state of the northern provinces, but by the circuitous -route of Valladolid and Burgos. The king’s -guards then replaced the Italians at Alcala, and -excursions were commenced on every side against -the Partidas, which being now recruited and taught -by French deserters were become exceedingly wary -and fought obstinately.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_472"></a>[472]</span></p> - -<p>On the 8th of January, Espert, governor of -Segovia, beat Saornil not far from Cuellar.</p> - -<p>On the 3d of February, general Vichery, marching -upon Medina Celi, routed a regiment of horse -called the volunteers of Madrid, and took six hundred -prisoners. The Empecinado with two thousand -infantry and a thousand cavalry intercepted -him on his return, but Vichery beat him with considerable -slaughter, and made the retreat good -with a loss of only seventy men. However the -Guerilla chief being reinforced by Saornil and -Abril, still kept the hills about Guadalaxara, and -when D’Erlon sent fresh troops against him, he -attacked a detachment under colonel Prieur, killed -twenty men, took the baggage and recovered a -heavy contribution.</p> - -<p>During these operations the troops in the valley of -the Tagus were continually harassed, especially by a -chief called Cuesta who was sometimes in the Guadalupe -mountains, sometimes on the Tietar, sometimes -in the Vera de Placentia, and he was supported -at times on the side of the Guadalupe by Morillo and -Penne Villemur. The French were however most -troubled by Hill’s vicinity, for that general’s successful -enterprises had made a profound impression, -and the slightest change of his quarters, or -even the appearance of an English uniform beyond -the line of cantonments caused a concentration of -French troops as expecting one of his sudden -blows.</p> - -<p>Nor was the army of Portugal tranquil. The -Gallicians menaced it from Puebla Senabria and -the gorges of the Bierzo; Silveira from the Tras -os Montes; the mountains separating Leon from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_473"></a>[473]</span> -Asturias were full of bands; Wellington was on the -Agueda; and Hill, moving from Coria by the pass -of Bejar might make a sudden incursion towards -Avila. Finally the communication with the army -of the north was to be kept up, and on every side -the Partidas were enterprising, especially the horsemen -in the plains of Leon. Reille however did -not fail to war down these last.</p> - -<p>Early in January Foy, returning from Astorga -to relieve general Leval, then at Avila, killed some -of Marquinez’ cavalry in San Pedro, and more of -them at Mota la Toro; and on the 15th of that -month the French captain Mathis killed or took -four hundred of the same Partida at Valderas. -A convoy of Guerilla stores coming from the Asturias -was intercepted by general Boyer’s detachments, -and one Florian, a celebrated Spanish Partizan -in the French service, destroyed the band of -Garido, in the Avila district. The same Florian -on the 1st of February defeated the Medico and -another inferior chief, and soon after, passing the -Tormes, captured some Spanish dragoons who had -come out of Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 1st of -March he crushed the band of Tonto and at the same -time captain Mathis, acting on the side of the Carrion -river, again surprised Marquinez’ band at Melgar -Abaxo, and that Partida, reduced to two hundred -men under two inferior chiefs called Tobar -and Marcos, ceased to be formidable.</p> - -<p>Previous to this some Gallician troops having -advanced to Castro Gonzalo on the Esla, were attacked -by Boyer who beat them through Benevente -with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and -then driving the Spanish garrison from Puebla -Senabria, raised contributions with a rigour and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_474"></a>[474]</span> -ferocity said to be habitual to him. His detachments -afterwards penetrating into the Asturias, -menaced Oviedo, and vexed the country in despite -of Porlier and Barceña who were in that province. -General Foy also having fixed his quarters at Avila, -feeling uneasy as to Hill’s intentions, had endeavoured -on the 20th of February to surprise Bejar -with the view of ascertaining if any large body was -collected behind it, but he was vigorously repulsed -by the fiftieth regiment and sixth caçadores under the -command of colonel Harrison. However this attack -and the movements of Florian beyond the Tormes, -induced Lord Wellington to bring up another -division to the Agueda, which, by a reaction, caused -the French to believe the allies were ready to -advance.</p> - -<p>During these events Caffarelli vainly urged -Reille to send him reinforcements, the insurrection -in the north gained strength, and the communications -were entirely intercepted until Palombini, -driving away Mendizabal and Longa from Burgos, -enabled the great convoy and all Napoleon’s despatches, -which had been long accumulating there, -to reach Madrid in the latter end of February. -Joseph then reluctantly prepared to abandon his -capital and concentrate the armies in Castile, but -he neglected those essential ingredients of the -emperor’s plan, rapidity and boldness. By the -first Napoleon proposed to gain time for the suppression -of the insurrection in the northern provinces. -By the second to impose upon Lord -Wellington and keep him on the defensive. Joseph -did neither, he was slow and assumed the defensive -himself, and he and the other French generals expected -to be attacked, for they had not fathomed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_475"></a>[475]</span> -the English general’s political difficulties; and -French writers since, misconceiving the character -of his warfare, have attributed to slowness in the -man what was really the long-reaching policy of a -great commander. The allied army was not so lithe -as the French army; the latter carried on occasion -ten days’ provisions on the soldiers’ backs, or it -lived upon the country, and was in respect of its -organization and customs a superior military machine; -the former never carried more than three -days’ provisions, never lived upon the country, -avoided the principle of making the war support -the war, payed or promised to pay for every thing, -and often carried in its marches even the corn for -its cavalry. The difference of this organization -resulting from the difference of policy between the -two nations, was a complete bar to any great and -sudden excursion on the part of the British general -and must always be considered in judging his -operations.</p> - -<p>It is true that if Wellington had then passed -the Upper Tormes with a considerable force, -drawing Hill to him through Bejar, and moving -rapidly by Avila, he might have broken in upon -the defensive system of the king and beat his -armies in detail, and much the French feared such -a blow, which would have been quite in the manner -of Napoleon. But Wellington’s views were directed -by other than mere military principles. -Thus striking, he was not certain that his blow -would be decisive, his Portuguese forces would -have been ruined, his British soldiers seriously -injured by the attempt, and the resources of France -would have repaired the loss of the enemy, sooner -than he could have recovered the weakness which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_476"></a>[476]</span> -must necessarily have followed such an unseasonable -exertion. His plan was to bring a great and -enduring power early into the field, for like Phocion -he desired to have an army fitted for a long -race and would not start on the short course.</p> - -<p>Joseph though he conceived the probability and -dreaded the effect of such a sudden attack, could -by no means conceive the spirit of his brother’s -plans. It was in vain that Napoleon, while admitting -the bad moral effect of abandoning the capital, -pointed out the difference between flying from it -and making a forward movement at the head of an -army; the king even maintained that Madrid was a -better military centre of operations than Valladolid, -because it had lines of communication by Segovia, -Aranda de Duero, and Zaragoza; nothing could -be more unmilitary, unless he was prepared to -march direct upon Lisbon if the allies marched -upon the Duero. His extreme reluctance to quit -Madrid induced slowness, but the actual position -of his troops at the moment likewise presented -obstacles to the immediate execution of the emperor’s -orders; for as Daricau’s division had not -returned from Valencia, the French outposts towards -the Morena could not be withdrawn, nor -could the army of the centre march upon Valladolid -until the army of the south relieved it at Madrid. -Moreover Soult’s counsels had troubled the king’s -judgment; for that marshal agreeing that to abandon -Madrid at that time was to abandon Spain, -offered a project for reconciling the possession of -the capital with the emperor’s views. This was to -place the army of Portugal, and the army of the -south, in position along the slopes of the Avila -mountains, and on the Upper Tormes menacing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_477"></a>[477]</span> -Ciudad Rodrigo, while the king with the army of -the centre remained at Madrid in reserve. In this -situation he said they would be an over-match for -any force the allies could bring into the field, and -the latter could not move either by the valley of -the Tagus or upon the Duero without exposing -themselves to a flank attack.</p> - -<p>The king objected that such a force could only -be fed in that country by the utter ruin of the -people, which he would not consent to; but he -was deceived by his ministers; the comfortable -state of the houses, the immense plains of standing -corn seen by the allies in their march from the -Esla to the Carrion proved that the people were -not much impoverished. Soult, well acquainted -with the resources of the country and a better and -more practised master of such operations, looked to -the military question rather than to the king’s conciliatory -policy, and positively affirmed that the -armies could be subsisted; yet it does not appear -that he had taken into his consideration how the -insurrection in the northern provinces was to be -suppressed, which was the principal object of -Napoleon’s plan. He no doubt expected that the -emperor would, from France send troops for that -purpose, but Napoleon knowing the true state of -his affairs foresaw that all the resources of France -would be required in another quarter.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -Hatred and suspicion would have made Joseph -reject any plan suggested by Soult, and the more -so that the latter now declared the armies could -exist without assistance in money from France; yet -his mind was evidently unsettled by that marshal’s -proposal, and by the coincidence of his ideas as -to holding Madrid, for even when the armies were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_478"></a>[478]</span> -in movement towards the northern parts, he vacillated -in his resolutions, at one time thinking to<span class="sidenote">Marshal Jourdan’s Official correspondence, MSS.</span> -stay at Madrid, at another to march with the army -of the centre to Burgos, instead of Valladolid. -However upon the 18th of March he quitted the -capital leaving the Spanish ministers Angulo and -Almenara to govern there in conjunction with -Gazan. The army of the south then moved in two -columns, one under Couroux across the Gredos -mountains to Avila, the other under Gazan upon -Madrid to relieve the army of the centre, which -immediately marched to Aranda de Duero and -Lerma, with orders to settle at Burgos. Meanwhile -Villatte’s division and all the outposts withdrawn -from La Mancha remained on the Alberche, and -the army of the south was thus concentrated between -that river, Madrid, and Avila.</p> - -<p>North of the Tagus the troops were unmolested, -save by the bands during these movements, which -were not completed before April, but in La Mancha -the retiring French posts had been followed by Del -Parque’s advanced guard under Cruz Murgeon, as -far as Yebenes, and at the bridge of Algobar the -French cavalry checked the Spanish horsemen so -roughly, that Cruz Murgeon retired again towards -the Morena. At the same time on the Cuenca side, -the Empecinado having attempted to cut off a party -of French cavalry, escorting the marquis of Salices -to collect his rents previous to quitting Madrid, was -defeated with the loss of seventy troopers. Meanwhile -the great dépôt at Madrid being partly removed, -general Villatte marched upon Salamanca -and Gazan fixed his head-quarters at Arevalo. The -army of the south was thus cantoned between the -Tormes, the Duero, and the Adaja, with exception<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_479"></a>[479]</span> -of six chosen regiments of infantry and four -of cavalry, in all about ten thousand men; these -remained at Madrid under Leval, who was ordered -to push advanced guards to Toledo, and the -Alberche, lest the allies should suddenly march -that way and turn the left of the French army. -But beyond the Alberche there were roads leading -from the valley of the Tagus over the Gredos mountains -into the rear of the advanced positions which -the French had on the Upper Tormes, wherefore -these last were now withdrawn from Pedrahita and -Puente Congosto.</p> - -<p>In proportion as the troops arrived in Castile -Reille sent men to the army of the north, and contracting -his cantonments, concentrated his remaining -forces about Medina de Rio Seco with his cavalry -on the Esla. But the men recalled by the emperor -were now in full march, the French were in a -state of great confusion, the people urged by Wellington’s -emissaries and expecting great events -every where showed their dislike by withholding -provisions, and the Partida warfare became as -lively in the interior as on the coast, yet with -worse fortune. Captain Giordano, a Spaniard of -Joseph’s guard killed one hundred and fifty of -Saornil’s people near Arevalo, and the indefatigable -Florian defeated Morales’ band, seized a dépôt in -the valley of the Tietar, beat the Medico there, -and then crossing the Gredos mountains, destroyed -near Segovia on the 28th the band of Purchas; -the king’s Spanish guards also crushed some -smaller Partidas, and Renovales with his whole staff -was captured at Carvajales and carried to Valladolid. -Meanwhile the Empecinado gained the -hills above Sepulveda and joining with Merino<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_480"></a>[480]</span> -obliged the people of the Segovia district, to abandon -their houses and refuse the supplies demanded -by the army of the centre. When D’Armagnac -and Cassagne marched against them, Merino returned -to his northern haunts, the Empecinado to -the Tagus, and D’Erlon then removed his head-quarters -to Cuellar.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -During April Leval was very much disturbed, -and gave false alarms, which extending to Valladolid -caused an unseasonable concentration of the -troops and D’Erlon abandoned Cuellar and Sepulveda. -Del Parque and the Empecinado were said<span class="sidenote">French Papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.</span> -to have established the bridge of Aranjuez, Elio -to be advancing in La Mancha, Hill to be in the -valley of the Tagus and moving by Mombeltran -with the intention of seizing the passes of the -Guadarama. All of this was false. It was the -Empecinado and Abuelo who were at Aranjuez, -the Partidas of Firmin, Cuesta, Rivero, and El -Medico who were collecting at Arzobispo, to mask -the march of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, -and of the reserve from Andalusia; it was -the prince of Anglona who was advancing in La -Mancha to cover the movement of Del Parque -upon Murcia. When disabused of his error, Leval -easily drove away the Empecinado who had advanced -to Alcala; afterwards chasing Firmin from -Valdemoro into the valley of the Tagus, he re-established -his advanced posts in Toledo and on the -Alberche, and scoured the whole country around. -But Joseph himself was anxious to abandon Madrid -altogether, and was only restrained by the emperor’s -orders and by the hope of still gathering some -contributions there to support his court at Valladolid. -With reluctance also he had obeyed his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_481"></a>[481]</span> -brother’s reiterated orders to bring the army of the -centre over the Duero to replace the detached divisions -of the army of Portugal. He wished D’Erlon -rather than Reille, to reinforce the north, and nothing -could more clearly show how entirely the -subtle spirit of Napoleon’s instructions had escaped -his perception. It was necessary that Madrid should -be held, to watch the valley of the Tagus and if -necessary to enable the French armies to fall back -on Zaragoza, but principally to give force to the -moral effect of the offensive movement towards -Portugal. It was equally important and for the -same reason, that the army of Portugal instead of -the army of the centre should furnish reinforcements -for the north.</p> - -<p>In the contracted positions which the armies -now occupied, the difficulty of subsisting was -increased, and each general was dissatisfied with -his district, disputes multiplied, and the court -clashed with the army at every turn. Leval also -inveighed against the conduct of the Spanish -ministers and minor authorities left at Madrid, as -being hurtful to both troops and people, and no -doubt justly, since it appears to have been precisely -like that of the Portuguese and Spanish authorities -on the other side towards the allies. Joseph’s -letters to his brother became daily more bitter. -Napoleon’s regulations for the support of the troops -were at variance with his, and when the king’s -budget shewed a deficit of many millions, the -emperor so little regarded it that he reduced the -French subsidy to two millions per month, and -strictly forbad the application of the money to any -other purpose than the pay of the soldiers. When -Joseph asked, how he was to find resources? his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_482"></a>[482]</span> -brother with a just sarcasm on his political and -military blindness, desired him to seek what was -necessary in those provinces of the north which -were rich enough to nourish the Partidas and the -insurrectional juntas. The king thus pushed to the -wall prevailed upon Gazan secretly to lend him fifty -thousand francs, for the support of his court, from -the chest of the army of the south; but with the -other generals he could by no means agree, and -instead of the vigour and vigilance necessary to -meet the coming campaign there was weakness, -disunion, and ill blood.</p> - -<p>All the movements and arrangements for concentrating -the French forces, as made by Joseph, -displeased Napoleon. The manner in which the -army of the centre stole away from Madrid by the -road of Lerma was, he said, only calculated to -expose his real views and draw the allies upon the -French before the communication with France was -restored. But more than all his indignation was -aroused by the conduct of the king after the concentration. -The French armies were held on the -defensive and the allies might without fear for Portugal -embark troops to invade France, whereas a -bold and confident offensive movement sustained -by the formation of a battering train at Burgos, as -if to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, would have imposed -upon the English general, secured France from the -danger of such an insult, and would at the same -time have masked the necessary measures for suppressing -the insurrection in the northern provinces. -To quell that insurrection was of vital importance, -but from the various circumstances already noticed -it had now existed for seven months, five of which, -the king, although at the head of ninety thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_483"></a>[483]</span> -men, and uninterrupted by Wellington, had wasted -unprofitably, having done no more than chase a few -inferior bands of the interior while this formidable -warfare was consolidating in his rear; and while -his great adversary was organizing the most powerful -army which had yet taken the field in his front. -It is thus kingdoms are lost. I shall now trace the -progress of the northern insurrection so unaccountably -neglected by the king, and to the last misunderstood -by him; for when Wellington was actually -in movement; when the dispersed French corps -were rushing and crowding to the rear to avoid the -ponderous mass which the English general was -pushing forward; even then, the king, who had -done every thing possible to render defeat certain, -was urging upon Napoleon the propriety of first -beating the allies and afterwards reducing the insurrection -by the establishment of a Spanish civil -government beyond the Ebro!</p> - - -<h4>NORTHERN INSURRECTION.</h4> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -It has been already shewn how the old Partidas -had been strengthened and new corps organized on -a better footing in Biscay and Navarre; how in -the latter end of 1812 Caffarelli marched to succour -Santona, and how Longa taking advantage of his -absence captured a convoy near Burgos while other -bands menaced Logroño. All the littoral posts, with -the exception of Santona and Gueteria were then -in the possession of the Spaniards, and Mendizabel -made an attempt on Bilbao the 6th of January. -Repulsed by general Rouget he rejoined Longa and -together they captured the little fort of Salinas de -Anara, near the Ebro, and that of Cuba in the -Bureba, while the bands of Logroño invested Domingo<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_484"></a>[484]</span> -Calçada in the Rioja. On the 26th of -January, Caffarelli, having returned from Santona, -detached Vandermaesen and Dubreton to drive the -Spaniards from Santander, and they seized many -stores there, but neglected to make any movement -to aid Santona which was again blockaded by the -Partidas; meanwhile the convoy with all the emperor’s -despatches was stopped at Burgos. Palombini -re-opened the communications and enabled -the convoy to reach Madrid, but his division did -not muster more than three thousand men, and -various detachments belonging to the other armies -were now in march to the interior of Spain. The -regiments recalled to France from all parts were -also in full movement, together with many convoys -and escorts for the marshals and generals quitting -the Peninsula; thus the army of the north was -reduced, as its duties increased, and the young -French soldiers died fast of a peculiar malady which -especially attacked them in small garrisons. Meanwhile -the Spaniards’ forces increased. In February -Mendizabel and Longa were again in the Bureba -intercepting the communication between Burgos and -Bilbao, and they menaced Pancorbo and Briviesca. -This brought Caffarelli from Vittoria and Palombini -from Burgos. The latter surprised by Longa, lost -many men near Poza de Sal, and only saved himself -by his courage and firmness yet he finally drove -the Spaniards away. But now Mina returning -from Aragon after his unsuccessful action near -Huesca surprized and burned the castle of Fuenterrabia -in a most daring manner on the 11th of March, -after which, having assembled five thousand men in -Guipuscoa, he obtained guns from the English fleet -at Motrico, invested Villa Real within a few leagues<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_485"></a>[485]</span> -of Vittoria, and repulsed six hundred men who -came to relieve the fort. This brought Caffarelli -back from Pancorbo. Mina then raised the siege, -and Palombini marching into the Rioja, succoured -the garrison of San Domingo Calçada and drove the -Partidas towards Soria. The communication with -Logroño was thus re-opened, and the Italians passing -the Ebro marched by Vittoria towards Bilbao -where they arrived the 21st of February; but the -gens-d’armes and imperial guards immediately -moved from Bilbao to France, Caffarelli went with -them, and the Spanish chiefs remained masters of -Navarre and Biscay. The people now refused war -contributions both in money and kind, the harvest -was not ripe, and the distress of the French increased -in an alarming manner because the weather enabled -the English fleets to keep upon the coast and intercept -all supplies from France by sea. The communications -were all broken; in front by Longa who -was again at the defile of Pancorbo; in the rear -by Mina who was in the hills of Arlaban; on the -left by a collection of bands at Caroncal in Navarre. -Abbé, governor of Pampeluna severely checked -these last, but Mina soon restored affairs; for leaving -the volunteers of Guipuscoa to watch the defiles of -Arlaban, he assembled all the bands in Navarre, -destroyed the bridges leading to Taffalla from Pampeluna -and from Puente la Reyna, and though -Abbé twice attacked him, he got stronger, and -bringing up two English guns from the coast -besieged Taffalla.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote9">February.</span>Napoleon, discontented with Caffarelli’s mode of -conducting the war, now gave Clauzel the command -in the north, with discretionary power to draw as -many troops from the army of Portugal as he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_486"></a>[486]</span> -judged necessary. He was to correspond directly -with the emperor to avoid loss of time, but was -to obey the king in all things not clashing with -Napoleon’s orders, which contained a complete -review of what had passed and what was necessary -to be done. “The Partidas,” the emperor -said, “were strong, organized, exercised, and seconded -by the exaltation of spirit which the battle -of Salamanca had produced. The insurrectional -juntas had been revived, the posts on the coast -abandoned by the French and seized by the Spaniards -gave free intercourse with the English; the bands -enjoyed all the resources of the country, and the -system of warfare hitherto followed had favoured -their progress. Instead of forestalling their enterprises -the French had waited for their attacks, and -contrived to be always behind the event; they -obeyed the enemy’s impulsion and the troops were -fatigued without gaining their object. Clauzel was -to adopt a contrary system, he was to attack suddenly, -pursue rapidly, and combine his movements -with reference to the features of the country. A few -good strokes against the Spaniards’ magazines, hospitals, -or dépôts of arms would inevitably trouble -their operations, and after one or two military successes -some political measures would suffice to -disperse the authorities, disorganise the insurrection, -and bring the young men who had been -enrolled by force back to their homes. All the -generals recommended, and the emperor approved -of the construction of block-houses on well-chosen -points, especially where many roads met; the -forests would furnish the materials cheaply, and -these posts should support each other and form -chains of communication. With respect to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_487"></a>[487]</span> -greater fortresses, Pampeluna and Santona were -the most important, and the enemy knew it, for -Mina was intent to famish the first and the English -squadron to get hold of the second. To supply -Pampeluna it was only necessary to clear the communications, -the country around being rich and -fertile. Santona required combinations. The emperor -wished to supply it by sea from Bayonne -and St. Sebastian, but the French marine officers -would never attempt the passage, even with favourable -winds and when the English squadron were -away, unless all the intermediate ports were occupied -by the land forces.</p> - -<p>“Six months before, these ports had been in the -hands of the French, but Caffarelli had lightly -abandoned them, leaving the field open to the -insurgents in his rear while he marched with -Souham against Wellington. Since that period -the English and Spaniards held them. For four -months the emperor had unceasingly ordered the -retaking of Bermeo and Castro, but whether from -the difficulty of the operations or the necessity of -answering more pressing calls, no effort had been -made to obey, and the fine season now permitted -the English ships to aid in the defence. Castro -was said to be strongly fortified by the English, -no wonder, Caffarelli had given them sufficient -time, and they knew its value. In one month -every post on the coast from the mouth of the -Bidassoa to St. Ander should be again re-occupied -by the French, and St. Ander itself should be -garrisoned strongly. And simultaneous with the -coast operations should be Clauzel’s attack on Mina -in Navarre and the chasing of the Partidas in the -interior of Biscay. The administration of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_488"></a>[488]</span> -country also demanded reform, and still more -the organization and discipline of the army of the -north should be attended to. It was the pith and -marrow of the French power in Spain, all would -fail if that failed, whereas if the north was strong, -its administration sound, its fortresses well provided -and its state tranquil, no irreparable misfortune -could happen in any other part.”</p> - -<p>Clauzel assumed the command on the 22d of -February, Abbé was then confined to Pampeluna, -Mina, master of Navarre, was besieging Taffalla; -Pastor, Longa, Campillo, Merino and others ranged -through Biscay and Castile unmolested; and the -spirit of the country was so changed that fathers -now sent their sons to join Partidas which had -hitherto been composed of robbers and deserters. -Clauzel demanded a reinforcement of twenty thousand -men from the army of Portugal, but Joseph -was still in Madrid and proposed to send D’Erlon -with the army of the centre instead, an arrangement -to which Clauzel would not accede. Twenty -thousand troops were, he said, wanted beyond -the Ebro. Two independent chiefs, himself and -D’Erlon, could not act together; and if the latter -was only to remain quiet at Burgos his army would -devour the resources without aiding the operations -of the army of the north. The king might choose -another commander, but the troops required must -be sent. Joseph changed his plan, yet it was the -end of March before Reille’s divisions moved, three -upon Navarre, and one upon Burgos. Meanwhile -Clauzel repaired with some troops to Bilbao, where -general Rouget had eight hundred men in garrison -besides Palombini’s Italians.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">March.</span> -This place was in a manner blockaded by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_489"></a>[489]</span> -Partidas. The Pastor with three thousand men -was on the right of the Durango river, in the hills -of Guernica, and Navarnis, between Bilbao and the -fort of Bermeo. Mendizabal with from eight to -ten thousand men was on the left of the Durango -in the mountains, menacing at once Santoña and -Bilbao and protecting Castro. However the French -had a strong garrison in the town of Durango, the -construction of new works round Bilbao was in -progress, and on the 22d of March Clauzel moved -with the Italians and a French regiment to assault -Castro. Campillo and Mendizabel immediately -appeared from different sides and the garrison made -a sally; the Spaniards after some sharp fighting -regained the high valleys in disorder, and the -design of escalading Castro was resumed, but -again interrupted by the return of Mendizabel to -Trucios, only seven miles from the French camp, -and by intelligence that the Pastor with the volunteers -of Biscay and Guipuscoa was menacing -Bilbao. Clauzel immediately marched with the -French regiments to the latter place, leaving -Palombini to oppose Mendizabel. Finding all safe -at Bilbao, he sent Rouget with two French battalions -to reinforce the Italians, who then drove -Mendizabel from Trucios into the hills about Valmaceda. -It being now necessary to attack Castro -in form, Palombini occupied the heights of Ojeba -and Ramales, from whence he communicated with -the garrison of Santona, introduced a convoy of -money and fresh provisions there, received ammunition -in return, and directed the governor Lameth -to prepare a battering train of six pieces for the -siege. This done, the Italians who had lost many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_490"></a>[490]</span> -men returned hastily to Bilbao, for the Pastor was -again menacing that city.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -On the evening of the 31st Palombini marched -against this new enemy and finding him too strong -retreated, but being promised a reinforcement of -two regiments from Durango he returned; Pastor -was then with three thousand men in position at -Navarnis, Palombini gave him battle on the 3d and -was defeated with the loss of eighty men, but on -the 5th being joined by the French regiments from -Durango he beat the Spaniards. They dispersed -and while some collected in the same positions -behind him, and others under Pastor gained the -interior, one column retired by the coast towards -the Deba on the side of St. Sebastian. Palombini -eagerly pursued these last, because he expected -troops from that fortress to line the Deba, and -hoped thus to surround the Spaniards, but the -English squadron was at Lequitio and carried them -off. Pastor meanwhile descending the Deba drove -the French from that river to the very walls of -St. Sebastian, and Palombini was forced to make -for Bergara on the road to Vittoria.</p> - -<p>At Bergara he left his wounded men with a -garrison to protect them, and returning on the -9th of April attacked the volunteers of Guipuscoa -at Ascoytia; repulsed in this attempt he retired -again towards Bergara, and soon after took charge -of a convoy of artillery going from St. Sebastian -for the siege of Castro. Meanwhile Bilbao was -in great danger, for the volunteers of Biscay coming -from the Arlaban, made on the 10th a false attack -at a bridge two miles above the entrenched camp, -while Tapia, Dos Pelos, and Campillo fell on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_491"></a>[491]</span> -seriously from the side of Valmaceda. Mendizabel, -who commanded, did not combine his movements -well and was repulsed by Rouget although with -difficulty; the noise of the action reached Palombini -who hastened his march, and having deposited -his convoy, followed the volunteers of Biscay to -Guernica and drove them upon Bermeo where -they got on board the English vessels.</p> - -<p>During these events Clauzel was at Vittoria -arranging the general plan of operations. Mina -had on the 1st of April defeated one of his columns -near Lerin with the loss of five or six hundred -men. The four divisions sent from the army of -Portugal, together with some unattached regiments -furnished, according to Reille, the twenty thousand -men demanded, yet only seventeen thousand reached -Clauzel; and as the unattached regiments merely -replaced a like number belonging to the other -armies, and now recalled from the north, the -French general found his expected reinforcements -dwindled to thirteen thousand. Hence notwithstanding -Palombini’s activity, the insurrection was -in the beginning of April more formidable than -ever; the line of correspondence from Torquemada -to Burgos was quite unprotected for want of -troops, neither was the line from Burgos to Irun -so well guarded that couriers could pass without -powerful escorts, nor always then. The fortifications -of the castle of Burgos were to have been -improved, but there was no money to pay for the -works, the French, in default of transport, could -not collect provisions for the magazines ordered -to be formed there by the king, and two generals, -La Martiniere and Rey, were disputing for the -command. Nearly forty thousand irregular Spanish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_492"></a>[492]</span> -troops were in the field. The garrison of Taffalla, -five hundred strong, had yielded to Mina, and that -chief, in concert with Duran, Amor, Tabueca, the -militia men of Logroña, and some minor guerillas -occupied both sides of the Ebro, between Calahora, -Logroño, Santa Cruz de Campero, and Guardia. -They could in one day unite eighteen thousand -infantry and a thousand horsemen. Mendizabel, -Longa, Campillo, Herrera, El Pastor, and the -volunteers of Biscay, Guipuscoa, and Alava, in -all about sixteen thousand, were on the coast -acting in conjunction with the English squadrons, -Santander, Castro, and Bermeo were still in their -hands, and maritime expeditions were preparing at -Coruña and in the Asturias.</p> - -<p>This Partizan war thus presented three distinct -branches, that of Navarre, that of the coast, and -that on the lines of communication. The last -alone required above fifteen thousand men; namely -ten thousand from Irun to Burgos, and the line -between Tolosa and Pampeluna, which was destroyed, -required fifteen hundred to restore it, -while four thousand were necessary between Mondragon -and Bilbao, comprising the garrison of the -latter place; even then no post would be safe -from a sudden attack. Nearly all the army of the -north was appropriated to the garrisons and lines -of communication, but the divisions of Abbé and -Vandermaesen could be used on the side of Pampeluna, -and there were besides, disposable, Palombini’s -Italians and the divisions sent by Reille. -But one of these, Sarrut’s, was still in march, and -all the sick of the armies in Castile were now -pouring into Navarre, when, from the loss of the -contributions, there was no money to provide assistance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_493"></a>[493]</span> -for them. Clauzel had however ameliorated -both the civil and the military administrations, -improved the works of Gueteria, commenced the -construction of block-houses between Irun and -Vittoria, and as we have seen had shaken the -bands about Bilbao. Now dividing his forces he -destined Palombini to besiege Castro, ordering -Foy and Sarrut’s divisions when the latter should -arrive, to cover the operation and to oppose any -disembarkation.</p> - -<p>The field force thus appropriated, together with -the troops in Bilbao under Rouget, was about -ten thousand men, and in the middle of April, -Clauzel, beating Mina from Taffalla and Estella, -assembled the remainder of the active army, composed -of Taupin and Barbout’s divisions of the -army of Portugal, Vandermaesen’s and Abbé’s divisions -of the army of the north, in all about thirteen -thousand men, at Puenta La Reyna in Navarre. He -urged general L’Huillier, who commanded the reserve -at Bayonne, to reinforce St. Sebastian and Gueteria -and to push forward his troops of observation into -the valley of Bastan, and he also gave the commandant -of Zaragoza notice of his arrival, that -he might watch Mina on that side. From Puente -la Reyna he made some excursions but he lost men -uselessly, for the Spaniards would only fight at -advantage, and to hunt Mina without first barring -all his passages of flight was to destroy the French -soldiers by fatigue. And here the king’s delay was -most seriously felt because the winter season, when, -the tops of the mountains being covered with snow, -the Partidas could only move along the ordinary -roads, was most favourable for the French operations, -and it had passed away. Clauzel despairing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_494"></a>[494]</span> -to effect any thing with so few troops was even -going to separate his forces and march to the coast, -when in May Mina, who had taken post in the -valley of Ronçal, furnished an occasion which -did not escape the French general.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -On the 13th Abbé’s and Vandermaesen’s divisions -and the cavalry entered that valley at once by the -upper and lower parts, and suddenly closing upon -the Guerilla chief killed and wounded a thousand -of his men and dispersed the rest; one part fled -by the mountains to Navarquez, on the side of -Sanguessa, with the wounded whom they dropped -at different places in care of the country people. -Chaplangarra, Cruchaga, and Carena, Mina’s -lieutenants, went off, each with a column, in the -opposite direction and by different routes to the -valley of the Aragon, they passed that river at -St. Gilla, and made their way towards the sacred -mountain of La Pena near Jaeca. The French cavalry -following them by Villa Real, entered that -town the 14th on one side, while Mina with twelve -men entered it on the other, but he escaped to -Martes where another ineffectual attempt was made -to surprise him. Abbé’s columns then descended -the smaller valleys leading towards the upper valley -of the Aragon, while Vandermaesen’s infantry and the -cavalry entered the lower part of the same valley, -and the former approaching Jacca sent his wounded -men there and got fresh ammunition.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Mina and the insurgent junta making -a push to regain Navarre by the left of the Aragon -river were like to have been taken, but again -escaped towards the valley of the Gallego, whither -also the greater part of their troops now sought -refuge. Clauzel was careful not to force them over<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_495"></a>[495]</span> -that river, lest they should remain there and intercept -the communication from Zaragoza by Jacca, -which was the only free line the French now possessed -and too far removed from Clauzel’s true -theatre of operations to be watched. Abbé therefore -returned to Roncal in search of the Spanish -dépôts, and Vandermaesen entered Sos at one end -just as Mina, who had now one hundred and fifty -horsemen and was always intent upon regaining -Navarre, passed out at the other; the light cavalry -pursuing overtook him at Sos Fuentes and he fled -to Carcastillo, but there unexpectedly meeting some -of his own squadrons which had wandered over -the mountains after the action at Roncal, he gave -battle, was defeated with the loss of fifty men and -fled once more to Aragon, whereupon the insurrectional -junta dispersed, and dissentions arose -between Mina and the minor chiefs under his command. -Clauzel anxious to increase this discord sent -troops into all the valleys to seek out the Spanish -dépôts and to attack their scattered men, and he was -well served by the Aragonese, for Suchet’s wise administration -was still proof against the insurrectional -juntas.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -During these events four battalions left by Mina -at Santa Cruz de Campero in the Amescoas, were -chased by Taupin, who had remained at Estella -when the other divisions marched up the valley of -Roncal. Mina, however, reassembled at Barbastro -in Aragon a strong column, crowds of deserters -from the other Spanish armies were daily increasing -his power, and so completely had he -organized Navarre that the presence of a single -soldier of his in a village sufficed to have any -courier without a strong escort stopped. Many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_496"></a>[496]</span> -bands also were still in the Rioja, and two French -regiments rashly foraging towards Lerim were -nearly all destroyed. In fine the losses were well -balanced, and Clauzel demanded more troops, -especially cavalry, to scour the Rioja. Nevertheless -the dispersion of Mina’s troops lowered the -reputation of that chief, and the French general -taking up his quarters in Pampeluna so improved -this advantage by address, that many townships -withdrew from the insurrection, and recalling their -young men from the bands commenced the formation -of eight free Spanish companies to serve -on the French side. Corps of this sort were raised -with so much facility in every part of Spain, that -it would seem nations, as well as individuals, -have an idiosyncrasy, and in these changeable -warriors we again see the Mandonius and Indibilis -of ancient days.</p> - -<p>Joseph, urged by Clauzel, now sent Maucune’s -division and some light cavalry of the army of -Portugal, to occupy Pampleiga, Burgos, and -Briviesca, and to protect the great communication, -which the diverging direction of Clauzel’s -double operations had again exposed to the partidas. -Meanwhile the French troops had not -been less successful in Biscay than in Navarre. -Foy reached Bilbao the 24th of April, and finding -all things there ready for the siege of Castro -marched to Santona to hasten the preparations at -that place, and he attempted also to surprise the -chiefs Campillo and Herrera in the hills above -Santona, but was worsted in the combat. The two -battering trains then endeavoured to proceed from -Bilbao and Santona by sea to Castro, but the English -vessels, coming to the mouth of the Durango,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_497"></a>[497]</span> -stopped those at Bilbao, and obliged them to proceed -by land, but thus gave an opportunity for those -at Santona to make the sea-run in safety.</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF CASTRO.</h4> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -This place situated on a promontory was garrisoned -by twelve hundred men, under the command -of Don Pedro Alvarez, three English -sloops of war commanded by the captains Bloye, -Bremen, and Tayler, were at hand, some gun-boats -were in the harbour, and twenty-seven guns -were mounted on the works. An outward wall -with towers, extended from sea to sea on the low -neck which connected the promontory with the -main land; this line of defence was strengthened by -some fortified convents, behind it came the town, -and behind the town at the extremity of the promontory -stood the castle.</p> - -<p>On the 4th of May, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, -took post at different points to cover the siege; -the Italian general St. Paul invested the place; -the engineer Vacani conducted the works, having -twelve guns at his disposal. The defence was -lively and vigorous, and captain Tayler with -great labour landed a heavy ship-gun on a rocky -island to the right of the town, looking from the sea, -which he worked with effect against the French -counter-batteries. On the 11th a second gun was -mounted on this island, but that day the breaching -batteries opened, and in a few hours broke the -wall while the counter-batteries set fire to some -houses with shells, wherefore the English guns were -removed from the island. The assault was then -ordered but delayed by a sudden accident, for a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_498"></a>[498]</span> -foraging party having been sent into the hills, came -flying back, pursued by a column of Spaniards -which had passed unperceived through the positions -of the French; and the besiegers were for some -time in confusion as thinking the covering army -had been beaten; however they soon recovered, -and the assault and escalade took place in the -night.</p> - -<p>The attack was rapid and fierce, the walls were -carried, and the garrison driven through the town -to the castle which was maintained by two companies, -while the flying troops got on board the -English vessels; finally the Italians stormed the -castle, but every gun had been destroyed, and the -two companies safely rejoined their countrymen on -board the ships. The English had ten seamen -wounded, the Spaniards lost about a hundred and -eighty, and the remainder were immediately conveyed -to Bermeo from whence they marched inland -to join Longa. The besiegers lost only fifty men -killed and wounded, and the Italian soldiers committed -great excesses, setting fire to the town in -many places. Foy and Sarrut, separating after the -siege, marched, the former through the district of -Incartaciones to Bilbao defeating a battalion of -Biscay volunteers on his route; the latter to Orduña -with the design of destroying Longa; but that -chief crossed the Ebro at Puente Lara, and finding -the additional troops sent by Joseph were beginning -to arrive in the vicinity of Burgos, recrossed -the river, and after a long chase escaped in the -mountains of Espinosa. Sarrut having captured a -few gun-carriages and one of Longa’s forest dépôts -of ammunition, returned towards Bilbao, and -Foy immediately marched from that place against<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_499"></a>[499]</span> -the two remaining battalions of Biscay volunteers, -which under the chiefs Mugartegui and Artola -were now at Villaro and Guernica.</p> - -<p>These battalions, each a thousand strong, raised -by conscription, and officered from the best families, -were the champions of Biscay; but though brave and -well-equipped, the difficulty of crushing them and -the volunteers of Guipuscoa, was not great, because -neither would leave their own peculiar provinces. -The third battalion had been already dispersed -in the district of Incartaciones, and Foy -having in the night of the 29th combined the march -of several columns to surround Villaro, fell at day-break -upon Mugartegui’s battalion and dispersed it -with the loss of all its baggage. Two hundred of -the volunteers immediately returned to their homes, -and the French general marched rapidly, through -Durango, against Artola, who was at Guernica. The -Italians who were still at <ins class="corr" id="tn-499" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Bilbao, immedately'"> -Bilbao, immediately</ins> turned Guernica on the west by Mungia, while a French -column turned it eastward by Marquinez; then -Artola fled to Lequitio, but the column from Marquinez, -coming over the mountain, fell upon his -right flank just as he was defiling by a narrow -way along the sea-coast. Artola himself escaped, -but two hundred Biscayens were killed or drowned, -more than three hundred with twenty-seven officers -were taken, and two companies which formed his -rear-guard dispersed in the mountains, and some -men finding a few boats rowed to an English vessel. -The perfect success of this action, which did not -cost the French a man killed or wounded, was -attributed to the talents and vigour of captain -Guinget, the daring officer who won the passage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_500"></a>[500]</span> -of the Douro at Tordesillas in Wellington’s retreat -from Burgos.</p> - -<p>When the three battalions of Biscay were thus -disposed of, all their magazines, hospitals, and -dépôts fell into Foy’s hands, the junta dispersed, -the privateers quitted the coast for Santander, -Pastor abandoned Guipuscoa, and the Italians -recovered Bermeo from which the garrison fled to -the English ships. They also destroyed the works -of the little island of Isaro, which being situated -three thousand yards from the shore, and -having no access to the summit, save by a staircase -cut in the rock, was deemed impregnable, -and used as a dépôt for the English stores; but -this was the last memorable exploit of Palombini’s -division in the north. That general himself had -already gone to Italy to join Napoleon’s reserves, -and his troops being ordered to march by Aragon -to join Suchet, were in movement, when new events -caused them to remain in Guipuscoa, with the reputation -of being brave and active but ferocious soldiers, -barbarous and devastating, differing little from -their Roman ancestors.</p> - -<p>It has been already observed that, during these -double operations of the French on the coast and -in Navarre, the partidas had fallen upon the line of -communication with France, thus working out the -third branch of the insurrectional warfare. Their -success went nigh to balance all their losses on -each flank. For Mendizabel settled with Longa’s -partida upon the line between Burgos and Miranda -de Ebro; the volunteers of Alava and Biscay, and -part of Pastor’s bands concentrated on the mountains -of Arlaban above the defiles of Salinas and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_501"></a>[501]</span> -Descarga; Merino and Salazar came up from the -country between the Ebro and the Duero; and the -three battalions left by Mina in the Amescoa, after -escaping from Taupin, reassembled close to Vittoria. -Every convoy and every courier’s escort was attacked -at one or other of these points without -hindering Mendizabel from making sudden descents -towards the coast when occasion offered. -Thus, on the 11th of April, as we have seen, he -attacked Bilbao. On the 25th of April Longa, -who had four thousand men and several guns, was -repulsed at Armiñion, between Miranda and Trevino, -by some of the drafted men going to France; but -on the 3d of May at the same place Longa met and -obliged a large convoy, coming from Castile with -an escort of eight hundred men, to return to Miranda, -and even cannonaded that place on the 5th. -Thouvenot the commandant of the government, -immediately detached twelve hundred men and -three guns from Vittoria to relieve the convoy; but -then Mina’s battalions endeavoured to escalade -Salvatierra, and they were repulsed with difficulty. -Meanwhile the volunteers of Alava gathered above -the pass of Salinas to intercept the rescued convoy, -and finding that the latter would not stir from Vittoria, -they went on the 10th to aid in a fresh attack on -Salvatierra; being again repulsed they returned to -the Arlaban, where they captured a courier with a -strong escort in the pass of Descarga near Villa -Real. A French regiment sent to succour Salvatierra -finally drove these volunteers towards Bilbao -where, as we have seen, Foy routed them, but -Longa continued to infest the post of Armiñion -until Sarrut arriving from the siege of Castro -chased him also.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_502"></a>[502]</span></p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">June.</span> -Notwithstanding these successes Clauzel, whose -troops were worn out with fatigue, declared that -it would require fifty thousand men and three -months’ time to quell the insurrection entirely. -And Napoleon more discontented than ever with -the king, complained that the happy enterprizes of -Clauzel, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, had brought -no safety to his couriers and convoys; that his -orders about the posts and the infantry escorts had -been neglected; that the reinforcements sent to the -north from Castile had gone slowly and in succession -instead of at once; finally that the cautious -movement of concentration by the other armies -was inexcusable, since the inaction of the allies, -their distance, their want of transport, their ordinary -and even timid circumspection in any operation -out of the ordinary course, enabled the -French to act in the most convenient manner. -The growing dissentions between the English and -the Spaniards, the journey of Wellington to Cadiz, -and the changes in his army, were, he said, all -favourable circumstances for the French, but the -king had taken no advantage of them; the insurrection -continued, and the object of interest was -now changed. Joseph defended himself with more -vehemence than reason against these charges, but -Wellington soon vindicated Napoleon’s judgement, -and the voice of controversy was smothered by -the din of battle, for the English general was again -abroad in his strength, and the clang of his arms -resounded through the Peninsula.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_503"></a>[503]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXX_VI">CHAPTER VI.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -While the French power in Spain was being disorganized -by the various circumstances related in -the former chapter, Lord Wellington’s diligence -and energy had reorganized the allied army with -greater strength than before. Large reinforcements, -especially of cavalry, had come out from -England. The efficiency and the spirit of the -Portuguese had been restored in a surprizing manner, -and discipline had been vindicated, in both -services, with a rough but salutary hand; rank -had not screened offenders; some had been arrested, -some tried, some dismissed for breach of -duty; the negligent were terrified, the zealous encouraged; -in short every department was reformed with -vigour, and it was full time. Confidential officers -commissioned to detect abuses in the general hospitals -and dépôts, those asylums for malingerers, -discovered and drove so many skulkers to their -duty, that the second division alone recovered six -hundred bayonets in one month; and this salutary -scouring was rendered more efficient by the establishment -of both permanent, and ambulent regimental -hospitals, a wise measure, and founded on -a principle which cannot be too widely extended; -for it is certain that as the character of a battalion -depends on its fitness for service, a moral force -will always be brought to bear upon the execution<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_504"></a>[504]</span> -of orders under regimental controul which it is in -vain to look for elsewhere.</p> - -<p>The Douro had been rendered navigable as high -up as Castillo de Alva above the confluence of the -Agueda; a pontoon train of thirty-five pieces -had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction -had been built to repair the great loss of mules -during the retreat from Burgos, and a recruit of -these animals was also obtained by emissaries -who purchased them with English merchandize, -even at Madrid, under the beards of the enemy, and -at the very time when Clauzel was unable for want -of transport to fill the magazines of Burgos. The -ponderous iron camp-kettles of the soldiers had -been laid aside for lighter vessels carried by men, -the mules being destined to carry tents instead; -it is, however, doubtful if these tents were really -useful on a march in wet weather, because when -soaked they became too heavy for the animal, and -seldom arrived in time for use at the end of a -march. Their greatest advantage was found when -the soldiers halted for a few days. Beside these -amendments many other changes and improvements -had taken place, and the Anglo-Portuguese troops -conscious of a superior organization, were more -proudly confident than ever, while the French were -again depressed by intelligence of the defection -of the Prussians following on the disasters in Russia. -Nor had the English general failed to amend -the condition of those Spanish troops which the -Cortez had placed at his disposal. By a strict and -jealous watch over the application of the subsidy -he had kept them clothed and fed during the -winter, and now reaped the benefit by having -several powerful bodies fit to act in conjunction<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_505"></a>[505]</span> -with his own forces. Wherefore being thus prepared -he was anxious to strike, anxious to forestall the -effects of his Portuguese political difficulties as well -as to keep pace with Napoleon’s efforts in Germany, -and his army was ready to take the field in April, -but he could not concentrate before the green -forage was fit for use, and deferred the execution of -his plan until May. What that plan was and what -the means for executing it shall now be shewn.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -The relative strength of the contending armies -in the Peninsula was no longer in favour of the -French. Their force which at the termination of -Wellington’s retreat into Portugal was above two -hundred and sixty thousand men and thirty-two -thousand horses, two hundred and sixteen thousand<span class="sidenote"><a href="#NO_XVIII">Appendix, No. 18.</a></span> -being present with the eagles, was by -the loss in subsequent operations, and by drafts -for the army in Germany reduced in March, 1813, -to two hundred and thirty-one thousand men and -twenty-nine thousand horses. Thirty thousand of -these were in hospital, and only one hundred and -ninety-seven thousand men, including the reserve -at Bayonne, were present with the eagles. Of -this number sixty-eight thousand including sick, -were in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. The -remainder with the exception of the ten thousand -left at Madrid, were distributed on the northern -line of communication, from the Tormes to Bayonne, -and it has been already shewn how scattered and -how occupied.</p> - -<p>But Wellington had so well used the five months’ -cessation of active operations that nearly two hundred -thousand allied troops were ready to take the -field, and on each flank there was a British fleet, -now a more effective aid than before, because the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_506"></a>[506]</span> -French lines of retreat run parallel to, and near the -sea-coast on each side of Spain, and every part -opened by the advance of the allies would furnish -a fresh dépôt for the subsistence of their armies. -This mass of troops was composed in the following -manner.</p> - -<p>The first army under Copons nominally ten -thousand, really about six thousand strong, was -in Catalonia.</p> - -<p>The second army under Elio was in Murcia -about twenty thousand, including the divisions of -Villa Campa, Bassecour, Duran, and Empecinado.</p> - -<p>The Anglo-Sicilian army under Murray, near -Alicant, about sixteen thousand.</p> - -<p>The third army under Del Parque, in the Morena -about twelve thousand.</p> - -<p>The first army of reserve under the Conde d’Abispal, -in Andalusia, about fifteen thousand.</p> - -<p>The fourth army, under Castaños, which included -the Spanish divisions in Estremadura, Julian Sanchez’ -Partida and the Gallicians under Giron, the -Asturians under Porlier and Barceña, together with -the Partidas of Longa and Mina, likewise belonged -to this army and were mustered amongst its divisions. -This army was computed at forty thousand -men, to which may be added the minor bands and -volunteers in various parts.</p> - -<p>Lastly there was the noble Anglo-Portuguese -army which now furnished more than seventy thousand -fighting men, with ninety pieces of artillery; -and the real difference between the French and -the allies was greater than the apparent difference. -The French returns included officers, -sergeants, drummers, artillery-men, engineers, and -waggoners, whereas the allies’ numbers were all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_507"></a>[507]</span> -sabres and bayonets. Moreover this statement of -the French number was on the 15th of March, and -as there were drafts made by Napoleon after that -period, and as Clauzel and Foy’s losses, and the -reserves at Bayonne must be deducted, it would be -probably more correct to assume that the whole -number of sabres and bayonets in June, was not -more than one hundred and sixty thousand, of -which one hundred and ten thousand were on the -northern line of invasion.</p> - -<p>The campaign of 1812 had taught the English -general the strength of the French lines of defence, -especially on the Duero, which they had since entrenched -in different parts, and most of the bridges -over it, he had himself destroyed in his retreat. -But for many reasons it was not advisable to -operate in the central provinces of Spain. The -country there was exhausted, the lines of supply -would be longer and more exposed, the army further -removed from the sea, the Gallicians could not -be easily brought down to co-operate, the services -of the northern Partidas would not be so advantageous, -and the ultimate result would be less decisive -than operations against the great line of communication -with France; wherefore against the northern -provinces he had early resolved to direct his attack -and had well considered how to evade those lines -which he could scarcely hope to force.</p> - -<p>All the enemy’s defences on the Lower Duero -could be turned by a movement on the right, across -the Upper Tormes, and from thence skirting the -mountains towards the Upper Duero; but that line -although most consonant to the rules of art, because -the army would thus be kept in one mass, led -through a very difficult and wasted country, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_508"></a>[508]</span> -direct aid of the Gallicians must have been dispensed -with, and moreover it was there the French -looked for the allies. Hence Wellington resolved -not to operate by his right, and with great skill and -dexterity, he had by the disposition of his troops in -winter-quarters, by false reports and false movements -masked his real intentions. For the gathering -of the Partidas in the valley of the Tagus, the -demonstrations made in Estremadura and La Mancha -by Penne Villemur, Morillo and Del Parque’s army, -together with the presence of Hill at Coria, that general’s -hold of the passes of Bejar, and the magazines -formed there, all intimated a design of moving -either by the valley of the Tagus or by the district -of Avila; and the great magazines collected at -Celerico, Viseu, Penamacor, Almeida, and Ciudad -Rodrigo, in no manner belied the other indications. -But half the army widely cantoned in the interior -of Portugal, apparently for the sake of subsistence -or health, was really so placed as to be in the -direction of the true line of operations which was -by the left through the Tras os Montes.</p> - -<p>Wellington’s plan was to pass the Duero, within -the Portuguese frontier, with a part of his army; to -ascend the right bank of that river towards Zamora, -and then crossing the Esla, to unite with the -Gallician forces, while the remainder of the army, -advancing from the Agueda, forced the passage of -the Tormes. By this great movement, which he -hoped to effect so suddenly that the king would -not have time to concentrate the French armies in -opposition, the front of the allies would be changed -to their right, the Duero and the Pisuerga would -be turned, and the enemy forced in confusion over -the Carion. Then with his powerful army well in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_509"></a>[509]</span> -hand the English general could march in advance -without fear, strong enough to fight and strong -enough to turn the right flank of any position -which the French might take up; and with this advantage -also, that at each step he would gain additional -help by the junction of the irregular Spanish -forces until he gave his hand to the insurgents in -Biscay, and every port opened would furnish him a -new dépôt and magazines.</p> - -<p>But in executing this movement the army would -necessarily be divided into three separate divisions -each too weak to beat the whole French force -singly; the march of the centre division by the -Tras os Montes, upon the nice execution of which -the concentration of the whole depended, would -be through an extremely difficult and mountainous -country, and there were three great rivers to pass. -The operation was therefore one of extreme delicacy -requiring nice and extensive arrangements; -yet there was not much danger to be apprehended -from failure; because as each separate corps had -a strong country to retire upon, the probable -extent of the mischief would only be the loss of -time, and the disadvantage of pursuing other operations -when the harvest being ripe the French -could easily keep in masses. The secret then was -to hide the true plan as long as possible, to gain -some marches for the centre corps, and by all -means to keep the French so scattered and occupied -by minor combinations, that they should be unable -to assemble in time to profit from their central -positions. Now the bridge equipage being prepared -at Abrantes in the interior of Portugal was -unknown, and gave no intimation of the real design, -for the bullocks which drew it came with cars from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_510"></a>[510]</span> -Spain to Lamego and from thence went down to -Abrantes; the free navigation of the Douro up to -the Agueda was more conducive to a movement by -the right, and it furnished abundance of large boats -wherewith to pass that river without creating any -suspicion from their presence; the wide cantonments -of the allies permitted various changes of -quarters under the pretence of sickness, and the -troops thus gradually closed upon the Douro, within -the Portuguese frontier, unobserved of the enemy -who was likewise deceived by many reports purposely -spread abroad. The menacing head which -Hill, and the Spaniards in southern Estremadura -and Andalusia, carried towards the valley of the -Tagus and towards the Avila district, also contributed -to draw the enemy’s attention away from the -true point of danger; but more than all other things -the vigorous excitement of the insurrection in the -north occupied the French, scattered their forces, -and rendered the success of the English general’s -plan nearly certain.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -Neither did lord Wellington fail to give ample -employment to Suchet’s forces, for his wings were -spread for a long flight even to the Pyrennees, and -he had no desire to find that marshal’s army joined -with the other French forces on the Ebro. The -lynx eyes of Napoleon had scanned this point of -war also, and both the king and Clauzel had received -orders to establish the shortest and most -certain line of correspondence possible with Suchet, -because the emperor’s plan contemplated the arrival -of the army of Aragon in the north, but Wellington -furnished a task for it elsewhere. Sir John Murray -as we have seen, had just repulsed the French at -Castalla, and general Frere’s cavalry had joined the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_511"></a>[511]</span> -Andalusian reserve under Abispal, but Elio with the -third army remained near Alicant and Wellington -destined Del Parque’s army to join him. This -with the Anglo-Sicilian army made more than fifty -thousand men, including the divisions of Duran, -Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and other partizans -always lying on Suchet’s right flank and rear. Now -with such a force, or even half this number of -good troops, the simplest plan would have been to -turn Suchet’s right flank and bring him to action -with his back to the sea; but the Spanish armies -were not efficient for such work and Wellington’s -instructions were adapted to the actual circumstances. -To win the open part of the kingdom, to -obtain a permanent footing on the coast beyond the -Ebro, and to force the enemy from the lower line -of that river by acting in conjunction with the -Catalans, these were the three objects which Wellington -proposed to reach and in the following manner. -Murray was to sail against Taragona, to save it -Suchet would have to weaken his army in Valencia; -Elio and Del Parque might then seize that kingdom. -If Taragona fell, good. If the French proved too -strong, Murray could return instantly by sea, and -secure possession of the country gained by the -Spanish generals. These last were however to -remain strictly on the defensive until Murray’s -operations drew Suchet away, for they were not -able to fight alone, and above all things it was -necessary to avoid a defeat which would leave the -French general free to move to the aid of the -king.</p> - -<p>The force necessary to attack Taragona Wellington -judged at ten thousand, and if Murray could -not embark that number there was another mode of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_512"></a>[512]</span> -operating. Some Spanish divisions, to go by sea, -were then to reinforce Copons in Catalonia and -enable him to hold the country between Taragona, -Tortoza, and Lerida; meanwhile Murray and Elio -were to advance against Suchet in front, and Del -Parque in conjunction with the Portuguese troops -to turn his right flank by Requeña; and this operation -was to be repeated until the allies communicated -with Copons by their left, the partizans advancing -in proportion and cutting off all communication -with the northern parts of Spain. Thus -in either case Suchet would be kept away from the -Upper Ebro, and there was no reason to expect any -interruption from that quarter.</p> - -<p>But Wellington was not aware that the infantry of -the army of Portugal were beyond the Ebro; the spies -deceived by the multitude of detachments passing -in and out of the Peninsula supposed the divisions -which reinforced Clauzel to be fresh conscripts from -France; the arrangements for the opening of the -campaign were therefore made in the expectation -of meeting a very powerful force in Leon. Hence -Freire’s cavalry, and the Andalusian reserve -under the Conde de Abispal, received orders to -march upon Almaraz, to pass the Tagus there by a -pontoon bridge which was established for them, -and then crossing the Gredos by Bejar or Mombeltran, -to march upon Valladolid while the Partidas -of that quarter should harass the march of Leval -from Madrid. Meanwhile the Spanish troops in -Estremadura were to join those forces on the -Agueda which were destined to force the passage -of the Tormes. The Gallicians under Giron were -to come down to the Esla, and unite with the -corps destined to pass that river and turn the line<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_513"></a>[513]</span> -of the Duero. Thus seventy thousand Portuguese -and British, eight thousand Spaniards from Estremadura, -and twelve thousand Gallicians, that is -to say, ninety thousand fighting men would be -suddenly placed on a new front, and marching -abreast against the surprised and separated masses -of the enemy would drive them refluent to the -Pyrennees. A grand design and grandly it was -executed! For high in heart and strong of hand -Wellington’s veterans marched to the encounter, -the glories of twelve victories played about their -bayonets, and he the leader so proud and confident, -that in passing the stream which marks the frontier -of Spain, he rose in his stirrups and waving his -hand cried out “Farewell Portugal!”</p> - -<p>But while straining every nerve, and eager to -strike, as well to escape from the Portuguese politics -as to keep pace with Napoleon’s efforts in Germany, -the English general was mortified by having again -to discuss the question of a descent on Italy. Lord -William Bentinck had relinquished his views upon -that country with great reluctance, and now, thinking -affairs more favourable than ever, again proposed -to land at Naples, and put forward the duke -of Orleans or the arch-duke Francis. He urged in -favour of this project the weak state of Murat’s -kingdom, the favourable disposition of the inhabitants, -the offer of fifteen thousand auxiliary Russians -made by admiral Grieg, the shock which would be -given to Napoleon’s power, and the more effectual -diversion in favour of Spain. He supported his -opinion by an intercepted letter of the queen of -Naples to Napoleon, and by other authentic documents, -and thus, at the moment of execution, -Wellington’s vast plans were to be disarranged to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_514"></a>[514]</span> -meet a new scheme of war which he had already -discussed and disapproved of, and which, however -promising in itself, would inevitably divide the -power of England and weaken the operations in -both countries.</p> - -<p>His reply was decisive. His opinion on the state -of affairs in Sicily was, he said, not changed, by -the intercepted letters, as Murat evidently thought -himself strong enough to attack the allies. Lord -William Bentinck should not land in Italy with less -than forty thousand men of all arms perfectly -equipped, since that army would have to depend -upon its own means and to overcome all opposition -before it could expect the people to aid or even to -cease to oppose it. The information stated that -the people looked for protection from the French -and they preferred England to Austria. There -could be no doubt of this, the Austrians would -demand provisions and money and would insist -upon governing them in return, whereas the English -would as elsewhere defray their own expenses -and probably give a subsidy in addition. The -south of Italy was possibly for many reasons the -best place next to the Spanish Peninsula for the -operations of a British army, and it remained for the -government to choose whether they would adopt -an attack on the former upon such a scale as he had -alluded to. But of one thing they might be certain, -that if it were commenced on a smaller scale, or with -any other intention than to persevere to the last, -and by raising, feeding, and clothing armies of the -natives, the plan would fail and the troops would -re-embark with loss and disgrace.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">April.</span> -This remonstrance at last fixed the wavering -judgment of the ministers, and Wellington was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_515"></a>[515]</span> -enabled to proceed with his own plans. He designed -to open the campaign in the beginning of -May, and as the green forage was well advanced, on -the 21st of April, he directed Murray, Del Parque, -Elio, and Copons to commence their operations on -the eastern coast; Abispal and Freire were already -in march and expected at Almaraz on the 24th; -the Spanish divisions of Estremadura had come up -to the Coa, and the divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese -force were gradually closing to the front. -But heavy rains broke up the roads, and the cumbrous -pontoon train being damaged, on its way -from the interior, did not reach Sabugal before the -13th and was not repaired before the 15th. Thus -the opening of the campaign was delayed, yet the -check proved of little consequence, for on the -French side nothing was prepared to meet the -danger.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -Napoleon had urged the king to send his heavy -baggage and stores to the rear and to fix his hospitals -and dépôts at Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, -Tolosa, and San Sebastian. In neglect of this the -impediments remained with the armies, the sick -were poured along the communications, and in -disorder thrown upon Clauzel at the moment when -that general was scarcely able to make head against -the northern insurrection.</p> - -<p>Napoleon had early and clearly fixed the king’s -authority as generalissimo and forbad him to exercise -his monarchical authority towards the French -armies. Joseph was at this moment in high dispute -with all his generals upon those very points.</p> - -<p>Napoleon had directed the king to enlarge and -strengthen the works of Burgos castle and to form -magazines in that place, and at Santona, for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_516"></a>[516]</span> -use of the armies in the field. At this time no -magazines had been formed at either place, and -although a commencement had been made to -strengthen the castle of Burgos, it was not yet -capable of sustaining four hours’ bombardment and -offered no support for the armies.</p> - -<p>Napoleon had desired that a more secure and -shorter line of correspondence than that by Zaragoza -should be established with Suchet; for his -plan embraced though it did not prescribe the -march of that general upon Zarogoza, and he had -warned the king repeatedly how dangerous it -would be to have Suchet isolated and unconnected -with the northern operations. Nevertheless the -line of correspondence remained the same and the -allies possessed the means of excising Suchet’s -army from the operations in the north.</p> - -<p>Napoleon had long and earnestly urged the king -to put down the northern insurrection in time to -make head against the allies on the Tormes. Now -when the English general was ready to act, that -insurrection was in full activity, and all the army -of the north and the greatest part of the army of -Portugal was employed to suppress it instead of -being on the lower Duero.</p> - -<p>Napoleon had clearly explained to the king the -necessity of keeping his troops concentrated towards -the Tormes in an offensive position, and he -had desired that Madrid might be held in such a -manner that it could be abandoned in a moment. -The campaign was now being opened, the French -armies were scattered, Leval was encumbered at -Madrid, with a part of the civil administration, -with large stores and parcs of artillery, and with -the care of families attached to Joseph’s court,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_517"></a>[517]</span> -while the other generals were stretching their -imaginations to devise which of the several projects -open to him Wellington would adopt. Would -he force the passage of the Tormes and the Duero -with his whole army, and thus turn the French -right? Would he march straight upon Madrid -either by the district of Avila or by the valley of -the Tagus or by both; and would he then operate -against the north, or upon Zaragoza, or towards -the south in co-operation with the Anglo-Sicilians? -Every thing was vague, uncertain, confused.</p> - -<p>The generals complained that the king’s conduct -was not military, and Napoleon told him if he -would command an army he must give himself up -entirely to it, thinking of nothing else; but Joseph -was always demanding gold when he should have -trusted to iron. His skill was unequal to the arrangements -and combinations for taking an initiatory -and offensive position, and he could neither discover -nor force his adversary to show his real -design. Hence the French armies were thrown -upon a timid defensive system, and every movement -of the allies necessarily produced alarm, and the -dislocation of troops without an object. The -march of Del Parque’s army towards Alcaraz, and -that of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, -towards the Agueda, in the latter end of April -were judged to be the commencement of a general -movement against Madrid, because the first was -covered by the advance of some cavalry into La -Mancha, and the second by the concentration of the -Partidas, in the valley of the Tagus. Thus the -whole French army was shaken by the demonstration -of a few horsemen, for when Leval took the -alarm, Gazan marched towards the Guadarama<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_518"></a>[518]</span> -with three divisions, and D’Erlon gathered the -army of the centre around Segovia.</p> - -<p>Early in May a fifth division of the army of -Portugal was employed on the line of communication -at Pampliega, Burgos, and Briviesca, and -Reille remained at Valladolid with only one division -of infantry and his guns, his cavalry being on the -Esla. D’Erlon was then at Segovia and Gazan at -Arevalo, Conroux’s division was at Avila, and Leval -still at Madrid with outposts at Toledo. The king -who was at Valladolid could not therefore concentrate -more than thirty-five thousand infantry on the -Duero. He had indeed nine thousand excellent cavalry -and one hundred pieces of artillery, but with -such dispositions to concentrate for a battle in -advance was not to be thought of, and the first -decided movement of the allies was sure to roll -his scattered forces back in confusion. The lines -of the Tormes and the Duero were effaced from -the system of operations.</p> - -<p>About the middle of May, D’Armagnac’s division -of the army of the centre came to Valladolid, -Villatte’s division of the army of the south reinforced -by some cavalry occupied the line of the -Tormes from Alba to Ledesma. Daricau’s, Digeon’s, -and D’Armagnac’s divisions were at Zamora, -Toro, and other places on both sides of the Duero, -and Reille’s cavalry was still on the Esla. The -front of the French was thus defined by these -rivers, for the left was covered by the Tormes, the -centre by the Duero, the right by the Esla. Gazan’s -head-quarters were at Arevalo, D’Erlon’s at -Segovia, and the point of concentration was at -Valladolid; but Conroux was at Avila, and Leval -being still at Madrid was thrown entirely out of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_519"></a>[519]</span> -the circle of operations. At this moment Wellington -entered upon what has been in England called, not -very appropriately, the march to Vittoria. That -march was but one portion of the action. The concentration -of the army on the banks of the Duero -was the commencement, the movement towards the -Ebro and the passage of that river was the middle, -the battle of Vittoria was the catastrophe, and the -crowning of the Pyrennees the end of the splendid -drama.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_520"></a>[520]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXX_VII">CHAPTER VII.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1813.</span> -In the latter part of April the Spanish troops from -Estremadura being assembled on the Tormes near -Almada, Carlos d’España’s division moved to -Miranda del Castanar, and every thing was ready to -open the campaign when an unexpected and formidable -danger menacing ruin arose. Some specie -sent from England had enabled the general to pay -up the British soldiers’ arrears to November 1812, -but the Portuguese troops were still neglected by -their government, a whole year’s pay was due -to them, a suspicion that a systematic difference -in this respect was to be established, pervaded -their minds, and at the same time many regiments -which had been raised for a limited period and -whose term of service was now expired, murmured -for their discharge, which could not be legally refused. -The moment was critical, but Wellington -applied suitable remedies. He immediately threatened -to intercept the British subsidy for the payment -of the troops which brought the Portuguese regency -to its senses, and he then made an appeal to the -honour and patriotism of the Portuguese soldiers -whose time had expired. Such an appeal is never -made in vain to the poorer classes of any nation; -one and all those brave men remained in the service -notwithstanding the shameful treatment they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_521"></a>[521]</span> -had endured from their government. This noble -emotion would seem to prove that Beresford, whose -system of military reform was chiefly founded upon -severity, might have better attained his object in -another manner; but harshness is the essence of -the aristocratic principle of government, and the -marshal only moved in the straight path marked -out for him by the policy of the day.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">May.</span> -When this dangerous affair was terminated Castaños -returned to Gallicia, and the British cavalry, -of the left wing, which had wintered about the -Mondego crossed the Duero, some at Oporto some -near Lamego, and entered the Tras os Montes. -The Portuguese cavalry had been already quartered<span class="sidenote">French correspondence, MSS.</span> -all the winter in that province, and the enemy supposed -that Sylveira would as formerly advance from -Braganza to connect the Gallicians with the allies. -But Sylveira was then commanding an infantry -division on the Agueda, and a very different power -was menacing the French on the side of Braganza. -For about the middle of May the cavalry were followed -by many divisions of infantry, and by the -pontoon equipage, thus forming with the horsemen -and artillery a mass of more than forty thousand -men under general Graham. The infantry and -guns being rapidly placed on the right of the -Duero by means of large boats assembled between -Lamego and Castelo de Alva, near the mouth of -the Agueda, marched in several columns towards -the lower Esla; the cavalry moved down to the -same point by Braganza.</p> - -<p>On the 20th Hill came to Bejar with the second -division, and on the 22d of May, Graham being -well advanced, Wellington quitted his head-quarters -at Freneda and put his right wing in motion towards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_522"></a>[522]</span> -the Tormes. It consisted of five divisions of -Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish infantry, and five -brigades of cavalry, including Julian Sanchez’ -horsemen, the whole forming with the artillery a -mass of from twenty-five to thirty thousand men. -The right under general Hill moved from Bejar -upon Alba de Tormes, the left under Wellington -himself by Matilla upon Salamanca.</p> - -<p>On the 24th Villatte withdrew his detachment -from Ledesma, and on the 26th at ten o’clock in -the morning the heads of the allied columns with -admirable concert appeared on all the different -routes leading to the Tormes. Morillo’s and Long’s -cavalry menaced Alba, Hill coming from Tamames -bent towards the fords above Salamanca, and Wellington -coming from Matilla marched straight -against that city.</p> - -<p>Villatte, a good officer, barricaded the bridge -and the streets, sent his baggage to the rear, -called in his detachment from Alba, and being -resolved to discover the real force of his enemy -waited for their approaching masses on the heights -above the ford of Santa Marta. Too long he -waited, for the ground on the left side of the river -had enabled Wellington to conceal the movements, -and already Fane’s horsemen with six guns were -passing the ford at Santa Marta in Villatte’s rear, -while Victor Alten’s cavalry removed the barricades -on the bridge and pushed through the town to attack -him in front. The French general being thus suddenly -pressed gained the heights of Cabrerizos, -marching towards Babila Fuente, before Fane got -over the river; but he had still to pass the defiles -of Aldea Lengua and was overtaken by both -columns of cavalry.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_523"></a>[523]</span></p> - -<p>The guns opening upon the French squares -killed thirty or forty men, and the English horsemen -charged, but horsemen are no match for such -infantry whose courage and discipline nothing -could quell; they fell before the round shot, and -nearly one hundred died in the ranks without a -wound, from the intolerable heat, yet the cavalry -made no impression on those dauntless soldiers, -and in the face of thirty thousand enemies they -made their way to Babila Fuente where they were -joined by general Lefol with the troops from Alba, -and finally the whole disappeared from the sight of -their admiring and applauding opponents. Nevertheless -two hundred had sunk dead in the ranks, a -like number unable to keep up were made prisoners, -and a leading gun having been overturned -in the defile of Aldea Lengua, six others were -retarded and the whole fell in the allies’ hands -together with their tumbrils.</p> - -<p>The line of the Tormes being thus gained the -allied troops were on the 27th and 28th pushed -forward with their left towards Miranda and Zamora, -and their right towards Toro; so placed the -latter covered the communications with Ciudad -Rodrigo while the former approached the point on -the Duero where it was proposed to throw the -bridge for communication with Graham’s corps. -This done Wellington left general Hill in command, -and went off suddenly, for he was uneasy about -his combinations on the Esla. On the 29th he -passed the Duero at Miranda, by means of a basket -slung on a rope which was stretched from rock to -rock, the river foaming several hundred feet below. -The 30th he reached Carvajales.</p> - -<p>Graham had met with many difficulties in his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_524"></a>[524]</span> -march through the rugged Tras os Montes, and -though the troops were now close to the Esla -stretching from Carvajales to Tabara, and their -left was in communication with the Gallicians who -were coming down to Benevente, the combination -had been in some measure thwarted by the difficulty -of crossing the Esla. The general combination -required that river to be passed on the 29th, -at which time the right wing, continuing its march -from the Tormes without halting, could have been -close to Zamora, and the passage of the Duero -would have been insured. The French armies -would then have been entirely surprised and separated, -and some of their divisions overtaken and -beaten. They were indeed still ignorant that a -whole army was on the Esla, but the opposite -bank of that river was watched by picquets of -cavalry and infantry, the stream was full and rapid, -the banks steep, the fords hard to find, difficult, -and deep, with stony beds, and the alarm had -spread from the Tormes through all the cantonments.</p> - -<p>At day-break on the 31st some squadrons of hussars, -with infantry holding by their stirrups, entered -the stream at the ford of Almendra, and at the same -time Graham approached the right bank with all -his forces. A French picquet of thirty men was -surprised in the village of Villa Perdrices by the -hussars, the pontoons were immediately laid down, -and the columns commenced passing, but several -men, even of the cavalry, had been drowned at the -fords.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">June.</span> -On the 1st of June, while the rear was still on -the Esla, the head of the allies entered Zamora -which the French evacuated after destroying the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_525"></a>[525]</span> -bridge. They retired upon Toro, and the next day -having destroyed the bridge there also, they again -fell back, but their rear-guard was overtaken near -the village of Morales by the hussar brigade under -colonel Grant. Their horsemen immediately passed -a bridge and swamp under a cannonade, and then -facing about in two lines, gave battle, whereupon -major Roberts with the tenth regiment, supported -by the fifteenth, broke both the lines with one -charge and pursued them for two miles, and they -lost above two hundred men, but finally rallied on -the infantry reserves.</p> - -<p>The junction of the allies’ wings on the Duero -was now secure, for that river was fordable, and -Wellington had also, in anticipation of failure on -one point, made arrangements for forming a boat-bridge -below the confluence of the Esla; and he -could also throw his pontoons without difficulty at -Toro, and even in advance, because Julian Sanchez -had surprised a cavalry picquet at Castronuño on -the left bank, and driven the French outposts from -the fords of Pollos. But the enemy’s columns were -concentrating, it might be for a battle, wherefore -the English general halted the 3d to bring the -Gallicians in conjunction on his left, and to close -up his own rear which had been retarded by the -difficulty of passing the Esla. The two divisions -of his right wing, namely, the second and light -division, passed the Duero on the morning of the -3rd, the artillery and baggage by a ford, the infantry -at the bridge of Toro, which was ingeniously -repaired by the lieutenant of engineers Pringle, who -dropped ladders at each side of the broken arch, and -then laid planks from one to the other just above the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_526"></a>[526]</span> -water level. Thus the English general mastered -the line of the Duero, and those who understand -war may say whether it was an effort worthy of the -man and his army.</p> - -<p>Let them trace all the combinations, follow the -movement of Graham’s columns, some of which -marched one hundred and fifty, some more than -two hundred and fifty miles, through the wild -districts of the Tras os Montes. Through those -regions, held to be nearly impracticable even for -small corps, forty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, -artillery, and pontoons, had been carried and -placed as if by a supernatural power upon the -Esla, before the enemy knew even that they were -in movement! Was it fortune or skill that presided? -Not fortune, for the difficulties were such -that Graham arrived later on the Esla than Wellington -intended, and yet so soon, that the enemy -could make no advantage of the delay. For had -the king even concentrated his troops behind the -Esla on the 31st, the Gallicians would still have been -at Benevente and reinforced by Penne Villemur’s -cavalry which had marched with Graham’s corps, -and the Asturians would have been at Leon on the -Upper Esla which was fordable. Then the final -passage of that river could have been effected by a -repetition of the same combinations on a smaller -scale, because the king’s army would not have -been numerous enough to defend the Duero against -Hill, the Lower Esla against Wellington, and the -Upper Esla against the Spaniards at the same time. -Wellington had also, as we have seen, prepared -the means of bringing Hill’s corps or any part of -it over the Duero below the confluence of the Esla,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_527"></a>[527]</span> -and all these combinations, these surprising exertions -had been made merely to gain a fair field of -battle.</p> - -<p>But if Napoleon’s instructions had been ably -worked out by the king during the winter, this -great movement could not have succeeded, for the -insurrection in the north would have been crushed -in time, or at least so far quelled, that sixty thousand -French infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and -one hundred pieces of artillery would have been -disposable, and such a force held in an offensive -position on the Tormes would probably have obliged -Wellington to adopt a different plan of campaign. -If concentrated between the Duero and the Esla -it would have baffled him on that river, because -operations which would have been effectual against -thirty-five thousand infantry would have been powerless -against sixty thousand. Joseph indeed complained -that he could not put down the insurrection -in the north, that he could not feed such large -armies, that a thousand obstacles arose on every -side which he could not overcome, in fine that he -could not execute his brother’s instructions. They -could have been executed notwithstanding. Activity, -the taking time by the forelock, would have -quelled the insurrection; and for the feeding of the -troops, the boundless plains called the “<em>Tierras -de Campos</em>,” where the armies were now operating, -were covered with the ripening harvest; the only -difficulty was to subsist that part of the French -army not engaged in the northern provinces during -the winter. Joseph could not find the means -though Soult told him they were at hand, because -the difficulties of his situation overpowered him; -they would not have overpowered Napoleon, but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_528"></a>[528]</span> -the difference between a common general and a -great captain is immense, the one is victorious -when the other is defeated.</p> - -<p>The field was now clear for the shock of battle, -but the forces on either side were unequally -matched. Wellington had ninety thousand men, -with more than one hundred pieces of artillery. -Twelve thousand were cavalry, and the British and -Portuguese present with the colours, were, including -serjeants and drummers, above seventy thousand -sabres and bayonets; the rest of the army was -Spanish. Besides this mass there were the irregulars -on the wings, Sanchez’ horsemen, a thousand -strong, on the right beyond the Duero; Porlier, -Barceña, Salazar and Manzo on the left between -the Upper Esla and the Carion. Saornil had moved -upon Avila, the Empecinado was hovering about -Leval. Finally the reserve of Andalusia had crossed -the Tagus at Almaraz on the 30th, and numerous -minor bands were swarming round as it advanced. -On the other hand though the French could collect -nine or ten thousand horsemen and one hundred -guns, their infantry was less than half the number -of the allies, being only thirty-five thousand strong -exclusive of Leval. Hence the way to victory was -open, and on the 4th Wellington marched forward -with a conquering violence.</p> - -<p>The intrusive monarch was in no condition to -stem or to evade a torrent of war, the depth and -violence of which he was even now ignorant of, -and a slight sketch of his previous operations will<span class="sidenote">French Official correspondence, MSS.</span> -shew that all his dispositions were made in the -dark and only calculated to bring him into trouble. -Early in May he would have marched the army of -the centre to the Upper Duero when Leval’s reports<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_529"></a>[529]</span> -checked the movement. On the 15th of that -month a spy sent to Bejar by D’Erlon, brought -intelligence that a great number of country carts -had been collected there and at Placentia, to follow -the troops in a march upon Talavera, but after -two days were sent back to their villages; that fifty -mules had been purchased at Bejar and sent to -Ciudad Rodrigo; that about the same time the first -and fourth divisions and the German cavalry had -moved from the interior towards the frontier, saying -they were going, the first to Zamora, and the last -to Fuente Guinaldo; that many troops were already -gathered at Ciudad Rodrigo under Wellington and -Castaños; that the divisions at Coria and Placentia -were expected there, the reserves of Andalusia were -in movement, and the pass of Baños which had -been before retrenched and broken up was now -repaired; that the English soldiers were paid their -arrears, and every body said a grand movement -would commence on the 12th. All this was extremely -accurate, but with the exception of the -march to Zamora, which seemed to be only a blind, -the information obtained indicated the principal -movement as against the Tormes, and threw no light -upon the English general’s real design.</p> - -<p>On the other flank Reille’s cavalry under Boyer, -having made an exploring sweep round by Astorga, -La Baneza and Benevente, brought intelligence that -a Gallician expedition was embarking for America, -that another was to follow, and that several English -divisions were also embarking in Portugal. The -23d of May a report from the same quarter gave -notice that Salazar and Manzo were with seven -hundred horsemen on the Upper Esla, that Porlier -was coming from the Asturias to join them with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_530"></a>[530]</span> -two thousand five hundred men, and Giron with -six thousand Gallicians had reached Astorga; but -it was uncertain if Sylveira’s cavalry would come -from Braganza to connect the left of the English -with the Gallicians as it had done the year before.</p> - -<p>Thus on the 24th of May the French were still -entirely in the dark with respect to Graham’s movement, -and although it was known the 26th at Valladolid, -that Wellington had troops in the country -beyond the Esla, it was not considered a decisive -movement because the head-quarters were still at -Freneda. However on the 29th Reille united his -cavalry at Valderas, passed the Esla, entered Benevente -and sent patroles towards Tobara and Carvajales; -from their reports and other sources he -understood the whole allied army was on the Esla, -and as his detachments were closely followed by -the British scouting parties, he recrossed the Esla -and broke the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, leaving -his light horsemen to watch it. But the delay in -the passage of the Esla, after Graham had reached -Carvajales, made Reille doubt both the strength of -the allies and their inclination to cross that river. -He expected the main attack on the Tormes, and -proposed in conjunction with Daricau’s infantry, -and Digeon’s dragoons, then at Toro and Zamora, -to defend the Duero and the Lower Esla, leaving -the Gallicians, whose force he despised, to pass -the Upper Esla at their peril.</p> - -<p>D’Armagnac’s division was now at Rio Seco, and -Maucune’s division, which had been spread along -the road to Burgos, was ordered to concentrate at -Palencia on the Carion, but meanwhile Gazan on -the other flank of the French position was equally -deceived by the movements of the English general.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_531"></a>[531]</span> -The 7th of May he heard from the Tormes that the -allies’ preparations indicated a movement towards -that river. Leval wrote from Madrid that he had -abandoned Toledo because fifteen thousand English -and ten thousand Spaniards were to advance by the -valley of the Tagus, that rations had been ordered -at Escalona for Long’s English cavalry, and that -magazines were formed at Bejar. At the same -time from a third quarter came news that three -divisions would pass the Duero to join the Gallicians -and march upon Valladolid.</p> - -<p>Gazan rightly judging that the magazines at -Bejar were to supply Hill and the Spaniards, in -their movement to join Wellington, expected at -first that the whole would operate by the Esla, -but on the 14th fresh reports changed this opinion; -he then judged Hill would advance by the Puente -Congosto upon Avila, to cut Leval off from the -army, while Wellington attacked Salamanca. On -the 24th however his doubts vanished. Villatte -told him that Wellington was over the Agueda, -Graham over the Lower Douro, and at the same -time Daricau, writing from Zamora, told him that -Graham’s cavalry had already reached Alcanizas, -only one march from the Esla. Conroux was instantly -directed to march from Avila to Arevalo, -Tilly to move with the cavalry of the army of the -south, from Madrigal towards the Trabancos, Daricau -to send a brigade to Toro, and Leval to come -over the Guadarama pass and join D’Erlon at -Segovia.</p> - -<p>On the 26th, Gazan thinking Wellington slow and -crediting a report that he was sick and travelling -in a carriage, relapsed into doubt. He now judged -the passage of the Agueda a feint, thought the allies’<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_532"></a>[532]</span> -operations would be in mass towards the Esla, and -was positively assured by his emissaries that -Hill would move by the Puente Congosto against -Segovia. However on the 27th he heard of the -passage of the Tormes and of Villatte’s retreat, -whereupon evacuating Arevalo he fixed his head-quarters -at Rueda, and directed Conroux who was -marching upon Arevalo, and so hastily that he -left a moveable column behind him on the Upper -Tormes, to come to the Trabancos.</p> - -<p>Gazan at first designed to take post behind that -river but there was no good position there, and the -28th he rallied Conroux’s, Rey’s, and Villatte’s infantry -and Tilly’s cavalry behind the Zapardiel. -Daricau’s division was meanwhile concentrated at -Toro, and Digeon’s at Zamora; a bridge-head was -commenced at Tordesillas, which was the point of -retreat, and guards were placed at Pollos where the -fords of the Duero were very low though as yet impracticable. -These movements were made in tranquillity, -for Hill had no desire by driving the French -over the Duero to increase the number of their -troops on the Esla. However on the 30th Gazan, -hearing that Hill was advancing and that the troops -on the Esla were likely to attempt the passage of that -river, crossed the Duero in the night and took post -at Tordesillas, intending to concentrate the whole -army of the south on the right of that river; but -Leval, though he had quitted Madrid on the 27th, -was not yet arrived and a large artillery convoy, -the ministers and Spanish families, and the pictures -from the palace of Madrid were likewise on the -road from that capital by the Segovia passes.</p> - -<p>At this time the army of Portugal and D’Armagnac’s -division was extended from the Esla to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_533"></a>[533]</span> -Carion, the king’s guards were at Valladolid, and -D’Erlon was in march to the Puente Duero, from -Segovia and Sepulveda, yet slowly and apparently -not aware of the crisis. Meanwhile the passage -of the Esla had been effected, and hence if that -river had been crossed at the time fore-calculated -by Wellington, and a rapid push made upon Placentia -and Valladolid, while Hill marched upon -Rueda, the whole French army might have been -caught in what Napoleon calls “<i lang="la" xml:lang="la">flagrante delicto</i>” -and destroyed. And even now it would seem that -Wellington could have profited more by marching, -than by halting at Toro on the 3d, for though -Leval’s troops and part of the army of the centre -were then between the Puente Duero and Valladolid, -D’Erlon had left a large division at Tudela -de Duero to protect the arrival of the convoy from -Madrid, which had not yet crossed the Duero; -another great convoy was still on the left bank of -the lower Pisuerga, and the parcs of the armies of -Portugal and of the south were waiting on the -right bank of that river, until the first convoy had -passed over the Carion. Nevertheless it was prudent -to gather well to a head first, and the general -combinations had been so profoundly made that the -evil day for the French was only deferred.</p> - -<p>On the 30th Joseph’s design was to oppose Wellington’s -principal force with the army of the south, -while the army of the centre held the rest in -check, the army of Portugal to aid either as the case -might be; and such was his infatuation as to his -real position, that even now, from the Duero, he was -pressing upon his brother the immediate establishment -of a civil Spanish administration for the provinces -behind the Ebro, as the only remedy for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_534"></a>[534]</span> -insurrection, and for the rendering of the army of -the north disposable. He even demanded an order -from the emperor to draw Clauzel’s troops away -from the Ebro, that he might drive the allies back -to the Coa, and take the long-urged offensive position -towards Portugal, Napoleon being then at -Dresden and Wellington on the Duero!</p> - -<p>On the 2d when the allies had passed the Esla, -the king, who expected them at Toro the 1st, -became disturbed to find his front unmolested, and -concluded, as he had received no letter from Reille, -that Wellington had cut his communication, turned -his right, and was marching towards the Carion. -His alarm was considerable and with reason, but in -the evening of the 2d he heard from Reille, who -had retired unmolested to Rio Seco and there rallied -D’Armagnac’s troops, but Maucune’s division was -still in march from different parts to concentrate at -Palencia. The halt of the 3d was therefore to the -profit of the French, for during that time they -received the Madrid convoy and insured the concentration -of all their troops, recovering even Conroux’s -moveable column which joined Leval near -Olmedo. They also destroyed the bridges of Tudela -and Puente Duero on the Duero, and that of -Simancas and Cabeçon on the Pisuerga, and they -passed their convoys over the Carion, directing -them, under escort of Casa Palacios’ Spanish division, -upon Burgos.</p> - -<p>The army of the south now moved upon Torrelobaton -and Penaflor, the army of the centre upon -Duenas, the army of Portugal upon Palencia; and -the spirits of all were raised by intelligence of the -emperor’s victory at Lutzen, and by a report that -the Toulon fleet had made a successful descent on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_535"></a>[535]</span> -Sicily. It would appear that Napoleon certainly -contemplated an attack upon that island, and lord -William Bentinck thought it would be successful, -but it was prevented by Murat’s discontent, who -instead of attacking fell off from Napoleon and -opened a negociation with the British.</p> - -<p>The 4th Wellington moved in advance, his -bridge of communication was established at Pollos, -and considerable stores of ammunition were formed -at Valladolid; some had also been taken at Zamora, -and the cavalry flankers captured large magazines -of grain at Arevalo. Towards the Carion the -allies marched rapidly by parallel roads, and in -compact order, the Gallicians on the extreme left, -Morillo and Julian Sanchez on the extreme right, -and the English general expected the enemy would -make a stand behind that river, but the report of -the prisoners and the hasty movement of the French -columns soon convinced him that they were in full -retreat for Burgos. On the 6th all the French -armies were over the Carion, Reille had even -reached Palencia on the 4th and there rallied -Maucune’s division, and a brigade of light cavalry -which had been employed on the communications.</p> - -<p>Although the king’s force was now about fifty-five -thousand fighting men, exclusive of his Spanish division, -which was escorting the convoys and baggage, -he did not judge the Carion a good position -and retired behind the upper Pisuerga, desiring if -possible to give battle there. He sent Jourdan to -examine the state of Burgos castle, and expedited -fresh letters, for he had already written from Valladolid -on the 27th and 30th of May, to Foy, Sarrut, -and Clauzel, calling them towards the plains of -Burgos; and others to Suchet directing him to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_536"></a>[536]</span> -march immediately upon Zaragoza and hoping he -was already on his way there; but Suchet was then -engaged in Catalonia, Clauzel’s troops were on the -borders of Aragon, Foy and Palombini’s Italians -were on the coast of Guipuscoa, and Sarrut’s -division was pursuing Longa in the Montaña.</p> - -<p>Joseph was still unacquainted with his enemy. -Higher than seventy or eighty thousand he did not -estimate the allied forces, and he was desirous of -fighting them on the elevated plains of Burgos. But -more than one hundred thousand men were before -and around him. For all the Partidas of the Asturias -and the Montaña were drawing together on his -right, Julian Sanchez and the Partidas of Castile -were closing on his left, and Abispal with the -reserve and Frere’s cavalry had already passed the -Gredos mountains and were in full march for Valladolid. -Nevertheless the king was sanguine of -success if he could rally Clauzel’s and Foy’s divisions -in time, and his despatches to the former were -frequent and urgent. Come with the infantry of -the army of Portugal! Come with the army of -the north and we shall drive the allies over the -Duero! Such was his cry to Clauzel, and again he -urged his political schemes upon his brother; but -he was not a statesman to advise Napoleon nor a -general to contend with Wellington, his was not -the military genius, nor were his the arrangements -that could recover the initiatory movement at such -a crisis and against such an adversary.</p> - -<p>While the king was on the Pisuerga he received -Jourdan’s report. The castle of Burgos was untenable, -there were no magazines of provisions, -the new works were quite unfinished, and they -commanded the old which were unable to hold<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_537"></a>[537]</span> -out a day; of Clauzel’s and Foy’s divisions nothing -had been heard. It was resolved to retire -behind the Ebro. All the French outposts in the -Bureba and Montaña were immediately withdrawn, -and the great dépôt of Burgos was evacuated upon -Vittoria, which was thus encumbered with the artillery -dépôts of Madrid, of Valladolid, and of -Burgos, and with the baggage and stores of so -many armies and so many fugitive families; and -at this moment also arrived from France a convoy -of treasure which had long waited for escort at -Bayonne.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the tide of war flowed onwards with -terrible power. The allies had crossed the Carion -on the 7th, and Joseph quitting Torquemada had -retired by the high road to Burgos with his left -wing composed of the army of the south and -centre, while Reille with that of Portugal forming -the right wing moved by Castro Xerez. But Wellington -following hard, and conducting his operations -continually on the same principle, pushed his -left wing and the Gallicians along bye-roads, and -passed the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th, and -10th. Having thus turned the line of the Pisuerga -entirely, and outflanked Reille, he made a short -journey the 11th and halted the 12th with his left -wing, for he had outmarched his supplies, and -had to arrange the farther feeding of his troops in -a country wide of his line of communication. -Nevertheless he pushed his right wing under -general Hill along the main road to Burgos, resolved -to make the French yield the castle or fight -for the possession, and meanwhile Julian Sanchez -acting beyond the Arlanzan cut off small posts -and straggling detachments.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_538"></a>[538]</span></p> - -<p>Reille had regained the great road to Burgos on -the 9th, and was strongly posted behind the Hormaza -stream, his right near Hormillas, his left on -the Arlanzan, barring the way to Burgos; the other -two armies were in reserve behind Estepar, and in -this situation they had remained for three days and -were again cheered by intelligence of Napoleon’s -victory at Bautzen and the consequent armistice. -But on the 12th Wellington’s columns came up -and the light division preceded by Grant’s hussars -and Ponsonby’s dragoons, immediately turned the -French right, while the rest of the troops attacked -the whole range of heights from Hormillas to -Estepar. Reille, whose object was to make the -allies shew their force, seeing their horsemen in -rear of his right flank while his front was so -strongly menaced, made for the bridge of Baniel -on the Arlanzan; then Gardiner’s horse artillery -raked his columns, and captain Milles of the fourteenth -dragoons charging, took some prisoners and -one of his guns which had been disabled. Meanwhile -the right of the allies pressing forward towards the -bridge of Baniel endeavoured to cut off the retreat, -but the French repelled the minor attacks with the -utmost firmness, bore the fire of the artillery without -shrinking, and evading the serious attacks by -their rapid yet orderly movement, finally passed -the river with a loss of only thirty men killed and -a few taken.</p> - -<p>The three French armies being now covered by the -Urbel and Arlanzan rivers, which were swelled by -the rain, could not be easily attacked, and the stores -of Burgos were removed; but in the night Joseph -again retreated along the high road by Briviesca -to Pancorbo, into which place he threw a garrison<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_539"></a>[539]</span> -of six hundred men. The castle of Burgos was prepared -also for destruction, and whether from hurry, -or negligence, or want of skill, the mines exploded -outwards, and at the very moment when a column -of infantry was defiling under the castle. Several -streets were laid in ruins, thousands of shells and -other combustibles which had been left in the place -were ignited and driven upwards with a horrible -crash, the hills rocked above the devoted column, -and a shower of iron, timber, and stony fragments -falling on it, in an instant destroyed more than three -hundred men! Fewer deaths might have sufficed -to determine the crisis of a great battle!</p> - -<p>But such an art is war! So fearful is the consequence -of error, so terrible the responsibility of -a general. Strongly and wisely did Napoleon speak -when he told Joseph, that if he would command, -he must give himself up entirely to the business, -labouring day and night, thinking of nothing else. -Here was a noble army driven like sheep before -prowling wolves, yet in every action the inferior -generals had been prompt and skilful, the soldiers -brave, ready and daring, firm and obedient in the -most trying circumstances of battle. Infantry, -artillery, and cavalry, all were excellent and numerous, -and the country strong and favourable for -defence; but that soul of armies, the mind of a -great commander was wanting, and the Esla, the -Tormes, the Duero, the Carion, the Pisuerga, the -Arlanzan, seemed to be dried up, the rocks, the -mountains, the deep ravines to be levelled. Clauzel’s -strong positions, Dubreton’s thundering castle, -had disappeared like a dream, and sixty thousand -veteran soldiers though willing to fight at every -step, were hurried with all the tumult and confusion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_540"></a>[540]</span> -of defeat across the Ebro. Nor was that -barrier found of more avail to mitigate the rushing -violence of their formidable enemy.</p> - -<p>Joseph having possession of the impregnable -rocks, and the defile and forts of Pancorbo, now -thought he could safely await for his reinforcements, -and extended his wings for the sake of -subsistence. On the 16th D’Erlon marched to Aro -on the left, leaving small posts of communication -between that place and Miranda, and sending detachments -towards Domingo Calçada to watch the -road leading from Burgos to Logroño. Gazan -remained in the centre with a strong advanced -guard beyond Pancorbo, for as the king’s hope -was to retake the offensive, he retained the power -of issuing beyond the defiles, and his scouting -parties were pushed forward towards Briviesca in -front, to Zerezo on the left and to Poya do Sal on -the right. The rest of the army of the south was -cantoned by divisions as far as Armiñion behind -the Ebro, and Reille, who had occupied Busto -marched to Espejo, also behind the Ebro and on -the great road to Bilbao. There being joined by -Sarrut’s division from Orduña he took post, placing -Maucune at Frias, Sarrut at Osma, and La Martiniere -at Espejo; guarding also the Puente Lara, -and sending strong scouting parties towards Medina -de Pomar and Villarcayo on one side and -towards Orduña on the other.</p> - -<p>While these movements were in progress, all the -encumbrances of the armies were assembled in the -basin of Vittoria, and many small garrisons of the -army of the north came in; for Clauzel having -received the king’s first letter on the 15th of June -had stopped the pursuit of Mina, and proceeded<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_541"></a>[541]</span> -to gather up his scattered columns, intending to -move by the way of Logroño to the Ebro. He -had with him Taupin’s and Barbout’s divisions of -the army of Portugal, but after providing for his -garrisons, only five thousand men of the army of -the north were disposable, so that he could not -bring more than fourteen thousand men to aid -the king; nevertheless the latter confident in the -strength of his front was still buoyant with the hope -of assembling an army powerful enough to retake the -offensive. His dream was short-lived.</p> - -<p>The 13th, while the echoes of the explosion at -Burgos were still ringing in the hills, Wellington’s -whole army was in motion by its left towards the -country about the sources of the Ebro. The Gallicians -moved from Aguilar de Campo high up on -the Pisuerga, Graham with the British left wing -moved from Villa Diego, and in one march -reaching the river, passed it on the 14th at the -bridges of Rocamunde and San Martin. The -centre of the army followed on the 15th, and the -same day the right wing under Hill marched -through the Bureba and crossed at the Puente -Arenas. This general movement was masked by -the cavalry and by the Spanish irregulars who infested -the rear of the French on the roads to Briviesca -and Domingo Calçada, and the allies being -thus suddenly placed between the sources of the -Ebro and the great mountains of Reynosa, cut -the French entirely off from the sea-coast. All the -ports except Santona and Bilbao, were immediately -evacuated by the enemy; Santona was invested by -Mendizabel, Porlier, Barceña, and Campillo, and -the English vessels entered Sant Andero, where a -dépôt and hospital station was established, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_542"></a>[542]</span> -the royal road from thence through Reynosa to -Burgos furnished a free communication with the -army. This single blow severed the connection -of the English force with Portugal. That country -was cast off by the army as a heavy tender is cast -from its towing rope, and all the British military -establishments were broken up and transferred by -sea to the coast of Biscay.</p> - -<p>The English general had now his choice of two -modes of action. The one to march bodily down -the left bank of the Ebro, and fall upon the enemy -wherever he could meet with them; the other to -advance, still turning the king’s right, and by -entering Guipuscoa, to place the army on the great -communication with France, while the fleet keeping -pace with this movement furnished fresh dépôts -at Bilbao and other ports. The first plan was a -delicate and uncertain operation, because of the -many narrow and dangerous defiles which were to -be passed, but the second which could scarcely be -contravened, was secure even if the first should -fail; both were compatible to a certain point, -inasmuch as to gain the great road leading from -Burgos by Orduña to Bilbao, was a good step for -either, and failing in that the road leading by Valmaceda -to Bilbao was still in reserve. Wherefore -with an eagle’s sweep Wellington brought his left -wing round, and pouring his numerous columns -through all the deep narrow valleys and rugged -defiles descended towards the great road of Bilbao -between Frias and Orduña. At Modina de Pomar -a central point, he left the sixth division to guard -his stores and supplies, but the march of the other -divisions was unmitigated; neither the winter -gullies nor the ravines, nor the precipitate passes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_543"></a>[543]</span> -amongst the rocks, retarded the march even of the -artillery; where horses could not draw men hauled, -and when the wheels would not roll the guns were -let down or lifted up with ropes; and strongly did -the rough veteran infantry work their way through -those wild but beautiful regions; six days they -toiled unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by the -junction of Longa’s division and all the smaller -bands which came trickling from the mountains, -they burst like raging streams from every defile, -and went foaming into the basin of Vittoria.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote">General Thouvenot’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -During this time many reports reached the -French, some absurdly exaggerated, as that Wellington -had one hundred and ninety thousand men, -but all indicating more or less distinctly the true -line and direction of his march. As early as the<span class="sidenote">Marshal Jourdan’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -15th Jourdan had warned Joseph that the allies -would probably turn his right, and as the reports -of Maucune’s scouts told of the presence of English -troops, that day, on the side of Puente Arenas, -he pressed the king to send the army of Portugal to -Valmaceda, and to close the other armies towards -the same quarter. Joseph yielded so far, that Reille -was ordered to concentrate his troops at Osma on -the morning of the 18th, with the view of gaining -Valmaceda by Orduña, if it was still possible; if -not he was to descend rapidly from Lodio upon -Bilbao, and to rally Foy’s division and the garrisons -of Biscay upon the army of Portugal. At the -same time Gazan was directed to send a division -of infantry and a regiment of dragoons from the -army of the south, to relieve Reille’s troops at -Puente Lara and Espejo, but no general and decided -dispositions were made.</p> - -<p>Reille immediately ordered Maucune to quit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_544"></a>[544]</span> -Frias, and join him at Osma with his division, yet -having some fears for his safety gave him the choice -of coming by the direct road across the hills, or -by the circuitous route of Puente Lara. Maucune -started late in the night of the 17th by the direct -road, and when Reille himself reached Osma, -with La Martiniere’s and Sarrut’s divisions, on the -morning of the 18th, he found a strong English -column issuing from the defiles in his front, and -the head of it was already at Barbarena in possession -of the high road to Orduña. This was -general Graham with the first, third, and fifth divisions, -and a considerable body of cavalry. The -French general who had about eight thousand infantry -and fourteen guns, at first made a demonstration -with Sarrut’s division in the view of forcing the British<span class="sidenote">Official Journal of the chief of the staff, General Boyer, MSS.</span> -to shew their whole force, and a sharp skirmish -and heavy cannonade ensued, wherein fifty men -fell on the side of the allies, above a hundred on -that of the enemy. But at half-past two o’clock, -Maucune had not arrived, and beyond the mountains, -on the left of the French, the sound of a battle -arose which seemed to advance along the valley -of Boveda into the rear of Osma; Reille, suspecting -what had happened, instantly retired -fighting, towards Espejo, where the mouths of the -valleys opened on each other, and from that of -Boveda, and the hills on the left, Maucune’s troops -rushed forth begrimed with dust and powder, -breathless, and broken into confused masses.</p> - -<p>That general, proverbially daring, marched -over the Araçena ridge instead of going by the -Puente Lara, and his leading brigade, after clearing -the defiles, had halted on the bank of a rivulet -near the village of San Millan in the valley of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_545"></a>[545]</span> -Boveda. In this situation, without planting picquets, -they were waiting for their other brigade and -the baggage, when suddenly the light division -which had been moving by a line parallel with -Graham’s march, appeared on some rising ground -in their front; the surprise was equal on both sides, -but the British riflemen instantly dashed down the hill -with loud cries and a bickering fire, the fifty-second -followed in support, and the French retreated fighting -as they best could. The rest of the English -regiments having remained in reserve, were watching -this combat and thinking all their enemies were before -them, when the second French brigade, followed -by the baggage, came hastily out from a narrow -cleft in some perpendicular rocks on the right hand. -A very confused action now commenced, for the -reserve scrambled over some rough intervening -ground to attack this new enemy, and the French -to avoid them made for a hill a little way in their -front, whereupon the fifty-second, whose rear -was thus menaced, wheeled round and running at -full speed up the hill met them on the summit. -However, the French soldiers without losing their -presence of mind threw off their packs, and half -flying, half fighting, escaped along the side of the -mountains towards Miranda, while the first brigade -still retreating on the road towards Espejo -were pursued by the riflemen. Meanwhile the -sumpter animals being affrighted, run wildly about -the rocks with a wonderful clamour, and though the -escort huddled together fought desperately, all the -baggage became the spoil of the victors, and four -hundred of the French fell or were taken; the -rest, thanks to their unyielding resolution and -activity, escaped, though pursued through the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_546"></a>[546]</span> -mountains by some Spanish irregulars, and Reille -being still pressed by Graham then retreated behind -Salinas de Añara.</p> - -<p>A knowledge of these events reached the king -that night, yet neither Reille nor the few prisoners -he had made could account for more than six -Anglo-Portuguese divisions at the defiles; hence as -no troops had been felt on the great road from -Burgos, it was judged that Hill was marching with -the others by Valmaceda into Guipuscoa, to menace -the great communication with France. However -it was clear that six divisions were concentrated -on the right and rear of the French armies, -and no time was to be lost in extricating the latter -from its critical situation; wherefore Gazan and -D’Erlon marched in the night to unite at Armiñon, -a central point behind the Zadora river, up the left -bank of which it was necessary to file in order to -gain the basin of Vittoria. But the latter could only -be entered, at that side, through the pass of Puebla de -Arganzan which was two miles long, and so narrow -as scarcely to furnish room for the great road; Reille -therefore, to cover this dangerous movement, fell -back during the night to Subijana Morillas, on the -Bayas river. His orders were to dispute the -ground vigorously, for by that route Wellington -could enter the basin before Gazan, and D’Erlon -could thread the pass of Puebla; he could also -send a corps from Frias to attack their rear on the -Miranda side, while they were engaged in the -defile. One of these things by all means he -should have endeavoured to accomplish, but the -troops had made very long marches on the 18th, -and it was dark before the fourth division had -reached Espejo. D’Erlon and Gazan, therefore,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_547"></a>[547]</span> -united at Armiñon without difficulty about ten -o’clock in the morning of the 19th, and immediately -commenced the passage of the defile of -Puebla, and the head of their column appeared on -the other side at the moment when Wellington was -driving Reille back upon the Zadora.</p> - -<p>The allies had reached Bayas before mid-day of -the 19th, and if they could have forced the passage -at once, the armies of the centre and of the -south would have been cut off from Vittoria and -destroyed; but the army of Portugal was strongly -posted, the front covered by the river, the right by -the village of Subijana de Morillas, which was -occupied as a bridge-head, and the left secured by -some very rugged heights opposite the village of -Pobes. This position was turned by the light -division while the fourth division attacked it in -front, and after a skirmish in which about eighty -of the French fell, Reille was forced over the -Zadora; but the army of the centre had then passed -the defile of Puebla and was in position behind -that river, the army of the south was coming -rapidly into second line, the crisis had passed, -the combat ceased, and the allies pitched their -tents on the Bayas. The French armies now formed -three lines behind the Zadora, and the king hearing -that Clauzel was at Logroño, eleven leagues -distant, expedited orders to him to march upon -Vittoria; general Foy also, who was in march for -Bilbao, was directed to halt at Durango, to rally all -the garrisons of Biscay and Guipuscoa there, and -then to come down on Vittoria. These orders were -received too late.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_548"></a>[548]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BXX_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</h3> -</div> - - -<p class="noindent"><span class="sidenote7">1813. June.</span> -The basin into which the king had now poured -all his troops, his parcs, convoys, and encumbrances -of every kind, was about eight miles broad by ten -in length, Vittoria being at the further end. The -river Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after -passing very near that town, runs towards the -Ebro with many windings and divides the basin -unequally, the largest portion being on the right -bank. A traveller coming from Miranda by the -royal Madrid road, would enter the basin by the -pass of Puebla, through which the Zadora flows -between two very high and rough mountain ridges, -the one on his right hand being called the heights -of Puebla, that on his left hand the heights of -Morillas. The road leads up the left bank of the -river, and on emerging from the pass, on the left -hand at the distance of about six miles would be seen -the village of Subijana de Morillas, furnishing that -opening into the basin which Reille defended while -the other armies passed the defile of Puebla. The -spires of Vittoria would appear about eight miles -distant, and from that town the road to Logroño -goes off on the right hand, the road to Bilbao by -Murgia and Orduña on the left hand crossing the -Zadora at a bridge near the village of Ariaga; -further on, the roads to Estella and to Pampeluna -branch off on the right, a road to Durango on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_549"></a>[549]</span> -left, and between them the royal causeway leads -over the great Arlaban ridge into the mountains of -Guipuscoa by the formidable defiles of Salinas. -But of all these roads, though several were practicable -for guns, especially that to Pampeluna, the -royal causeway alone could suffice for the retreat -of such an encumbered army. And as the allies -were behind the hills forming the basin on the -right bank of the Zadora, their line being parallel -to the great causeway, it followed that by prolonging -their left they would infallibly cut off the -French from that route.</p> - -<p>Joseph felt the danger and his first thought was -to march by Salinas to Durango, with a view to -cover his communications with France, and to rally -Foy’s troops and the garrisons of Guipuscoa and -Biscay. But in that rough country, neither his artillery -nor his cavalry, on which he greatly depended, -though the cavalry and artillery of the allies were -scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist, and -he would have to send them into France; and if -pressed by Wellington in front and surrounded by -all the bands in a mountainous region, favourable -for those irregulars, he could not long remain in -Spain. It was then proposed if forced from the -basin of Vittoria, to retire by Salvatierra to Pampeluna -and bring Suchet’s army up to Zaragoza; -but Joseph feared thus to lose the great communication -with France, because the Spanish regular -army, aided by all the bands, could seize Tolosa -while Wellington operated against him on the side -of Navarre. It was replied that troops detached -from the army of the north and from that of Portugal -might oppose them; still the king hesitated, -for though the road to Pampeluna was called<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_550"></a>[550]</span> -practicable for wheels, it required something more -for the enormous mass of guns and carriages of all -kinds now heaped around Vittoria.</p> - -<p>One large convoy had already marched on the -19th by the royal causeway for France, another, -still larger was to move on the 21st under escort of -Maucune’s division; the fighting men in front of the -enemy were thus diminished and yet the plain was -still covered with artillery parcs and equipages of all -kinds, and Joseph shut up in the basin of Vittoria, -vacillating and infirm of purpose, continued to -waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary’s -movements. Hence on the 19th nothing was done, -but the 20th some infantry and cavalry of the army -of Portugal passed the Zadora to feel for the allies -towards Murguia, and being encountered by Longa’s -Spaniards at the distance of six miles, after some -successful skirmishing recrossed the Zadora with the -loss of twenty men. On the 21st at three o’clock -in the morning Maucune’s division, more than three -thousand good soldiers, marched with the second -convoy, and the king took up a new line of battle.</p> - -<p>Reille’s army reinforced by a Franco-Spanish -brigade of infantry, and by Digeon’s division of -dragoons from the army of the south, now formed -the extreme right, having to defend the passage of -the Zadora, where the Bilbao and Durango roads -crossed it by the bridges of Gamara Mayor and -Ariaga. The French division defended the bridge; -the Franco-Spanish brigade was pushed forward to<span class="sidenote">See <a href="#i_b_581fp_8">plan 8.</a></span> -Durana on the royal road, and was supported by a -French battalion and a brigade of light horsemen; -Digeon’s dragoons and a second brigade of light -cavalry were in reserve behind the Zadora, near -Zuazo de Alava and Hermandad. The centre of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_551"></a>[551]</span> -the king’s army, distant six or eight miles from -Gamara, following the course of the Zadora, was on -another front, because the stream, turning suddenly -to the left round the heights of Margarita descends -to the defile of Puebla, nearly at right angles with -its previous course. Here covered by the river and -on an easy open range of heights, for the basin of -Vittoria is broken by a variety of ground, Gazan’s -right extended from the royal road to an isolated -hill in front of the village of Margarita. His -centre was astride the royal road, in front of the -village of Arinez; his left occupied more rugged -ground, being placed behind Subijana de Alava -on the roots of the Puebla mountain facing the -defile of that name, and to cover this wing a -brigade under general Maransin was posted on the -Puebla mountain. D’Erlon’s army was in second -line. The principal mass of the cavalry with many -guns, and the king’s guards formed a reserve, -behind the centre, about the village of Gomecha, -and fifty pieces of artillery were massed in the front, -pointing to the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, -Villodas, and Nanclares.</p> - -<p>While the king was making conjectures, Wellington -was making various dispositions for the -different operations which might occur. He knew -that the Andalusian reserve would be at Burgos -in a few days, and thinking that Joseph would not -fight on the Zadora, detached Giron with the Gallicians -on the 19th to seize Orduña. Graham’s -corps was at first destined to follow Giron but -finally penetrated through difficult mountain ways to -Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from Bilbao -and menacing his communications with France. -However the rear of the army had been so much<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_552"></a>[552]</span> -scattered in the previous marches that Wellington -halted on the 20th to rally his columns, and taking -that opportunity to examine the position of the -French armies, observed that they seemed steadfast -to fight; whereupon immediately changing his own -dispositions, he gave Graham fresh orders and -hastily recalled Giron from Orduña.</p> - -<p>The long expected battle was now at hand, and -on neither side were the numbers and courage of the -troops of mean account. The allies had lost about -two hundred killed and wounded in the previous -operations, and the sixth division, six thousand five -hundred strong, was left at Medina de Pomar; hence -only sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese sabres and -bayonets, with ninety pieces of cannon, were actually -in the field, but the Spanish auxiliaries were above -twenty thousand, and the whole army, including -serjeants and artillery-men, exceeded eighty thousand -combatants. For the French side, as the -regular muster-roll of their troops was lost with -the battle, an approximation to their strength must -suffice. The number killed and taken in different -combats, from the Esla and Tormes to the Zadora, -was about two thousand men, and some five thousand -had marched to France with the two convoys. -On the other hand Sarrut’s division, the garrison -of Vittoria, and the many smaller posts relinquished -by the army of the north, had increased the king’s -forces, and hence, by a comparison with former -returns, it would appear, that in the gross, about -seventy thousand men were present. Wherefore -deducting the officers, the artillery-men, sappers, -miners, and non-combatants, which are always borne -on the French muster-rolls, the sabres and bayonets -would scarcely reach sixty thousand, but in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_553"></a>[553]</span> -number and size of their guns the French had the -advantage.</p> - -<p>The defects of the king’s position were apparent -both in the general arrangement and in the details. -His best line of retreat was on the prolongation of -his right flank, which being at Gamara Mayor, -close to Vittoria, was too distant to be supported -by the main body of the army; and yet the safety -of the latter depended upon the preservation of -Reille’s position. Instead of having the rear clear, -and the field of battle free, many thousand carriages -and impediments of all kinds were heaped about -Vittoria, blocking all the roads, and creating confusion -amongst the artillery parcs. Maransin’s -brigade placed on the heights above Puebla was -isolated and too weak to hold that ground. The -centre indeed occupied an easy range of hills, its -front was open, with a slope to the river, and -powerful batteries seemed to bar all access by the -bridges; nevertheless many of the guns being -pushed with an advanced post into a deep loop of -the Zadora, were within musket-shot of a wood on -the right bank, which was steep and rugged, so -that the allies found good cover close to the river.</p> - -<p>There were seven bridges within the scheme of -the operations, namely, the bridge of La Puebla -on the French left beyond the defile; the bridge of -Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava and the French -end of the defile of Puebla; then three bridges -which, placed around the deep loop of the river -before mentioned, opened altogether upon the -right of the French centre, that of Mendoza being -highest up the stream, that of Vellodas lowest down -the stream, and that of Tres Puentes in the centre; -lastly the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_554"></a>[554]</span> -on the Upper Zadora, opposite Vittoria, which were -guarded by Reille, completed the number, and none -of the seven were either broken or entrenched.</p> - -<p>Wellington having well observed these things -formed his army for three distinct battles.</p> - -<p>Sir Thomas Graham moving from Murguia, by -the Bilbao road, was to fall on Reille, and if possible -to force the passage of the river at Gamara Mayor -and Ariaga; by this movement the French would be -completely turned and the greatest part of their -forces shut up between the Puebla mountains on one -side and the Zadora on the other. The first and fifth -Anglo-Portuguese divisions, Bradford’s and Pack’s -independent Portuguese brigades, Longa’s Spanish -division, and Anson’s and Bock’s cavalry, in all -near twenty thousand men with eighteen pieces of -cannon, were destined for this attack, and Giron’s -Gallicians, recalled from Orduña, came up by a -forced march in support.</p> - -<p>Sir Rowland Hill was to attack the enemy’s left, -and his corps, also about twenty thousand strong, -was composed of Morillo’s Spaniards, Sylveira’s -Portuguese, and the second British division together -with some cavalry and guns. It was collected -on the southern slope of the ridge of Morillas, -between the Bayas and the Lower Zadora, -pointing to the village of Puebla, and was destined -to force the passage of the river at that point, to -assail the French troops on the heights beyond, to -thread the defile of La Puebla and to enter the -basin of Vittoria, thus turning and menacing all -the French left and securing the passage of the -Zadora at the bridge of Nanclares.</p> - -<p>The centre attack, directed by Wellington in -person, consisted of the third, fourth, seventh,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_555"></a>[555]</span> -and light divisions of infantry, the great mass of -the artillery, the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese -horsemen, in all nearly thirty thousand -combatants. They were encamped along the Bayas -from Subijana Morillas to Ulivarre, and had -only to march across the ridges which formed the -basin of Vittoria on that side, to come down to -their different points of attack on the Zadora, that -is to say, the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, -Villodas and Nanclares. But so rugged was the -country and the communications between the different -columns so difficult, that no exact concert could -be expected and each general of division was in -some degree master of his movements.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF VITTORIA.</h4> - -<p>At day-break on the 21st the weather being -rainy, with a thick vapour, the troops moved from -their camps on the Bayas, and the centre of the -army, advancing by columns from the right and -left of the line, passed the ridges in front, and entering -the basin of Vittoria slowly approached the -Zadora. The left-hand column pointed to Mendoza, -the right-hand column skirted the ridge of Morillas -on the other side of which Hill was marching, and -that general, having seized the village of Puebla -about ten o’clock, commenced passing the river -there. Morillo’s Spaniards led and their first -brigade moving on a bye way assailed the mountain -to the right of the great road; the ascent was so steep -that the soldiers appeared to climb rather than to -walk up, and the second Spanish brigade, being to -connect the first with the British troops below, -ascended only half-way; little or no opposition was -made until the first brigade was near the summit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_556"></a>[556]</span> -when a sharp skirmishing commenced, and Morillo -was wounded but would not quit the field; his -second brigade joined him, and the French, feeling -the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin -with a fresh regiment. Then Hill succoured Morillo -with the seventy-first regiment, and a battalion of -light infantry, both under colonel Cadogan, yet -the fight was doubtful, for though the British -secured the summit, and gained ground along the -side of the mountain, Cadogan, a brave officer and -of high promise, fell, and Gazan calling Villatte’s -division from behind Ariñez, sent it to the succour -of his side; and so strongly did these troops fight -that the battle remained stationary, the allies being -scarcely able to hold their ground. Hill however -again sent fresh troops to their assistance, and with the -remainder of his corps passing the Zadora, threaded -the long defile of Puebla and fiercely issuing forth -on the other side won the village of Subijana de -Alava in front of Gazan’s line; he thus connected -his own right with the troops on the mountain, and -maintained this forward position in despite of the -enemy’s vigorous efforts to dislodge him.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Wellington had brought the fourth and -light divisions, the heavy cavalry, the hussars and -D’Urban’s Portuguese horsemen, from Subijana -Morillas, and Montevite, down by Olabarre to the -Zadora. The fourth division was placed opposite -the bridge of Nanclares, the light division opposite -the bridge of Villodas, both well covered by rugged -ground and woods; and the light division was so -close to the water, that their skirmishers could with -ease have killed the French gunners of the advanced -post in the loop of the river at Villodas. The -weather had cleared up, and when Hill’s battle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_557"></a>[557]</span> -began, the riflemen of the light division, spreading -along the bank, exchanged a biting fire with the -enemy’s skirmishers, but no serious effort was made, -because the third and seventh divisions, meeting -with rough ground, had not reached their point -of attack; and it would have been imprudent to -push the fourth division and the cavalry over the -bridge of Nanclares, and thus crowd a great body -of troops in front of the Puebla defile before the -other divisions were ready to attack the right and -centre of the enemy.</p> - -<p>While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told -Wellington that the bridge of Tres Puentes on the -left of the light division, was unguarded, and -offered to guide the troops over it. Kempt’s -brigade of the light division was instantly directed -towards this point, and being concealed by some -rocks from the French, and well led by the brave -peasant, they passed the narrow bridge at a running -pace, mounted a steep curving rise of ground, and -halted close under the crest on the enemy’s side of -the river, being then actually behind the king’s -advanced post, and within a few hundred yards of -his line of battle. Some French cavalry immediately -approached and two round shots were fired by the -enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose -courage and intelligence the allies were so much -indebted; but as no movement of attack was made, -Kempt called the fifteenth hussars over the river, -and they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow -bridge one by one, horseman after horseman, and -still the French remained torpid, shewing that there -was an army there but no general.</p> - -<p>It was now one o’clock, Hill’s assault on the -village of Subijana de Alava was developed, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_558"></a>[558]</span> -a curling smoke, faintly seen far up the Zadora on -the enemy’s extreme right, being followed by the -dull sound of distant guns shewed that Graham’s -attack had also commenced. Then the king finding -both his flanks in danger caused his reserve about -Gomecha to file off towards Vittoria, and gave -Gazan orders to retire by successive masses with -the army of the south. But at that moment the -third and seventh divisions having reached their -ground were seen moving rapidly down to the -bridge of Mendoza, the enemy’s artillery opened -upon them, a body of cavalry drew near the bridge, -and the French light troops which were very strong -there commenced a vigorous musketry. Some -British guns replied to the French cannon from the -opposite bank, and the value of Kempt’s forward -position was instantly made manifest; for colonel -Andrew Barnard springing forward, led the riflemen -of the light division, in the most daring -manner, between the French cavalry and the river, -taking their light troops and gunners in flank, and -engaging them so closely that the English artillery-men, -thinking his darkly clothed troops were -enemies, played upon both alike.</p> - -<p>This singular attack enabled a brigade of the -third division to pass the bridge of Mendoza without -opposition; the other brigade forded the -river higher up, and the seventh division and Vandeleur’s -brigade of the light division followed. -The French advanced post immediately abandoned -the ground in front of Villodas, and the battle -which had before somewhat slackened revived with -extreme violence. Hill pressed the enemy harder, -the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, -the smoke and sound of Graham’s attack became<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_559"></a>[559]</span> -more distinct, and the banks of the Zadora presented -a continuous line of fire. However the French, -weakened in the centre by the draft made of Villatte’s -division and having their confidence shaken -by the king’s order to retreat, were in evident perplexity, -and no regular retrograde movement could -be made, the allies were too close.</p> - -<p>The seventh division, and Colville’s brigade of -the third division which had forded the river, -formed the left of the British, and they were immediately -engaged with the French right in front -of Margarita and Hermandad. Almost at the same -time lord Wellington, seeing the hill in front of -Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal -of Villatte’s troops, carried Picton and the rest of -the third division in close columns of regiments at -a running pace diagonally across the front of both -armies towards that central point; this attack was -headed by Barnard’s riflemen, and followed by the -remainder of Kempt’s brigade and the hussars, but -the other brigade of the light division acted in -support of the seventh division. At the same -time general Cole advanced with the fourth division -from the bridge of Nanclares, and the heavy -cavalry, a splendid body, also passing the river, -galloped up, squadron after squadron, into the -plain ground between Cole’s right and Hill’s left.</p> - -<p>The French thus caught in the midst of their -dispositions for retreat, threw out a prodigious -number of skirmishers, and fifty pieces of artillery -played with astonishing activity. To answer this -fire Wellington brought over several brigades of -British guns, and both sides were shrouded by a -dense cloud of smoke and dust, under cover of -which the French retired by degrees to the second<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_560"></a>[560]</span> -range of heights, in front of Gomecha, on which -their reserve had been posted, but they still held -the village of Arinez on the main road. Picton’s -troops headed by the riflemen, plunged into -that village amidst a heavy fire of muskets and -artillery, and in an instant three guns were captured; -but the post was important, fresh French -troops came down, and for some time the smoke -and dust and clamour, the flashing of the fire-arms, -and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed -with the thundering of the guns, were terrible, -yet finally the British troops issued forth victorious -on the other side. During this conflict the seventh -division, reinforced by Vandeleur’s brigade of the -light division, was heavily raked by a battery at -the village of Margarita, until the fifty-second -regiment, led by colonel Gibbs, with an impetuous -charge drove the French guns away and carried -the village, and at the same time the eighty-seventh -under colonel Gough won the village of Hermandad. -Then the whole advanced fighting on the -left of Picton’s attack, and on the right hand of that -general the fourth division also made way, though -more slowly because of the rugged ground.</p> - -<p>When Picton and Kempt’s brigades had carried -the village of Arinez and gained the main road, -the French troops near Subijana de Alava were -turned, and being hard-pressed on their front, and -on their left flank by the troops on the summit of -the mountain, fell back for two miles in a disordered -mass, striving to regain the great line of retreat -to Vittoria. It was thought that some cavalry -launched against them at the moment would have -totally disorganized the whole French battle and -secured several thousand prisoners, but this was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_561"></a>[561]</span> -not done, the confused multitude shooting ahead -of the advancing British lines recovered order, -and as the ground was exceedingly diversified, -being in some places wooded, in others open, here -covered with high corn, there broken by ditches -vineyards and hamlets, the action for six miles resolved -itself into a running fight and cannonade, -the dust and smoke and tumult of which filled all -the basin, passing onwards towards Vittoria.</p> - -<p>Many guns were taken as the army advanced, -and at six o’clock the French reached the last defensible -height, one mile in front of Vittoria. -Behind them was the plain in which the city -stood, and beyond the city, thousands of carriages -and animals and non-combatants, men women and -children, were crowding together, in all the madness -of terror, and as the English shot went booming over -head the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive -movement, while a dull and horrid sound of -distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay for -army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation. -However the courage of the French soldier was -not yet quelled, Reille on whom every thing now -depended, maintained his post on the Upper Zadora, -and the armies of the south and centre drawing up -on their last heights, between the villages of Ali -and Armentia, made their muskets flash like lightning, -while more than eighty pieces of artillery, -massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar, -that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed -with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures -of the French gunners were seen, bounding with -a frantic energy.</p> - -<p>This terrible cannonade and musketry kept the -allies in check, and scarcely could the third division,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_562"></a>[562]</span> -which was still the foremost and bore the -brunt of this storm, maintain its advanced position. -Again the battle became stationary, and the French -generals had commenced drawing off their infantry -in succession from the right wing, when suddenly -the fourth division rushing forward carried the hill -on the French left, and the heights were at once -abandoned. It was at this very moment that Joseph, -finding the royal road so completely blocked by carriages -that the artillery could not pass, indicated -the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat, and the -army went off in a confused yet compact body on -that side, leaving Vittoria on its left. The British -infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped -through the town to intercept the new line of -retreat, which was through a marsh, but this road -also was choked with carriages and fugitive people, -while on each side there were deep drains. Thus -all became disorder and mischief, the guns were -left on the edge of the marsh, the artillery-men -and drivers fled with the horses, and, breaking -through the miserable multitude, the vanquished -troops went off by Metauco towards Salvatierra; -however their cavalry still covered the retreat with -some vigour, and many of those generous horsemen -were seen taking up children and women to carry -off from the dreadful scene.</p> - -<p>The result of the last attack had placed Reille, of -whose battle it is now time to treat, in great -danger. His advanced troops under Sarrut had been -placed at the village of Aranguis, and they also -occupied some heights on their right which covered -both the bridges of Ariaga and Gamara Mayor, -but they had been driven from both the village and -the height a little after twelve o’clock, by general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_563"></a>[563]</span> -Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham’s -column, consisting of the fifth division, Longa’s -Spaniards, and Pack’s Portuguese. Longa then -seized Gamara Menor on the Durango road, while -another detachment gained the royal road still -further on the left, and forced the Franco-Spaniards -to retire from Durana. Thus the first blow on this -side had deprived the king of his best line of retreat -and confined him to the road of Pampeluna. However -Sarrut recrossed the river in good order and -a new disposition was made by Reille. One of -Sarrut’s brigades defended the bridge of Ariaga -and the village of Abechuco beyond it; the other -was in reserve, equally supporting Sarrut and La -Martiniere who defended the bridge of Gamara -Mayor and the village of that name beyond the -river. Digeon’s dragoons were formed behind the -village of Ariaga, and Reille’s own dragoons being -called up from Hermandad and Zuazo, took post -behind the bridge of Gamara; a brigade of light -cavalry was placed on the extreme right to sustain -the Franco-Spanish troops, which were now on the -Upper Zadora in front of Betonio, and the remainder -of the light cavalry under general Curto was on the -French left extending down the Zadora between -Ariaga and Govea.</p> - -<p>Oswald commenced the attack at Gamara with -some guns and Robinson’s brigade of the fifth -division. Longa’s Spaniards were to have led and -at an early hour when Gamara was feebly occupied, -but they did not stir, and the village was -meanwhile reinforced. However Robinson’s brigade -being formed in three columns made the assault -at a running pace. At first the fire of artillery -and musketry was so heavy that the British troops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_564"></a>[564]</span> -stopped and commenced firing also, and the three -columns got intermixed, yet encouraged by their -officers, and especially by the example of general -Robinson an inexperienced man but of a high and -daring spirit, they renewed the charge, broke -through the village and even crossed the bridge. -One gun was captured, and the passage seemed to -be won, when Reille suddenly turned twelve pieces -upon the village, and La Martiniere rallying his -division under cover of this cannonade, retook the -bridge; it was with difficulty the allied troops could -even hold the village until they were reinforced. -Then a second British brigade came down, and, -the royals leading, the bridge was again carried, but -again these new troops were driven back in the same -manner as the others had been. Thus the bridge -remained forbidden ground. Graham had meanwhile -attacked the village of Abechuco which -covered the bridge of Ariaga, and it was carried at -once by colonel Halkett’s Germans, who were supported -by Bradford’s Portuguese and by the fire -of twelve guns; yet here as at Gamara the French -maintained the bridge, and at both places the -troops on each side remained stationary under a -reciprocal fire of artillery and small arms.</p> - -<p>Reille, though considerably inferior in numbers, -continued to interdict the passage of the river, until -the tumult of Wellington’s battle, coming up the Zadora, -reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the British -horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut’s rear. -Digeon’s dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the -moment, and some time before, Reille, seeing the <ins class="corr" id="tn-564" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'retrogade movement'"> -retrograde movement</ins> of the king, had formed a reserve of -infantry under general Fririon at Betonia which -now proved his safety. For Sarrut was killed at the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_565"></a>[565]</span> -bridge of Ariaga, and general Menne the next in -command, could scarcely draw off his troops while -Digeon’s dragoons held the British cavalry at -point, but with the aid of Fririon’s reserve Reille -covered the movement and rallied all his troops at -Betonio. He had now to make head on several -sides, because the allies were coming down from -Ariaga from Durana and from Vittoria, yet he -fought his way to Metauco on the Salvatierra road -covering the general retreat with some degree of -order. Vehemently and closely did the British -pursue, and neither the resolute demeanour of the -French cavalry, which was covered on the flanks -by some light troops and made several vigorous -charges, nor the night, which now fell, could stop -their victorious career until the flying masses of the -enemy had cleared all obstacles, and passing Metauco -got beyond the reach of further injury. -Thus ended the battle of Vittoria; the French -escaped indeed with comparatively little loss of -men, but to use Gazan’s words, “they lost all -their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure, -all their stores, all their papers, so that no man -could prove how much pay was due to him; -generals and subordinate officers alike were reduced -to the clothes on their backs, and most of -them were barefooted.”</p> - -<p>Never was an army more hardly used by its -commander, for the soldiers were not half beaten, -and never was a victory more complete. The trophies -were innumerable. The French carried off -but two pieces of artillery from the battle. Jourdan’s -baton of command, a stand of colours, one -hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred -of which had been used in the fight, all the -parcs and dépôts from Madrid, Valladolid, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_566"></a>[566]</span> -Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure, every -thing fell into the hands of the victors. The loss -in men did not however exceed six thousand, -exclusive of some hundreds of prisoners; the -loss of the allies was nearly as great, the gross -numbers being five thousand one hundred and -seventy-six, killed wounded and missing. Of -these one thousand and forty-nine were Portuguese -and five hundred and fifty-three were Spanish; -hence the loss of the English was more than double -that of the Portuguese and Spaniards together, -and yet both fought well, and especially the Portuguese, -but British troops are the soldiers of -battle. Marshal Jourdan’s baton was taken by the -eighty-seventh regiment, and the spoil was immense; -but to such extent was plunder carried -principally by the followers and non-combatants, -for with some exceptions the fighting troops may -be said to have marched upon gold and silver without -stooping to pick it up, that of five millions and -a half of dollars indicated by the French accounts -to be in the money-chests, not one dollar came to -the public, and Wellington sent fifteen officers with -power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing -the Ebro and the Duero in hopes to recover the -sums so shamefully carried off. Neither was this -disgraceful conduct confined to ignorant and vulgar -people. Some officers were seen mixed up with the -mob and contending for the disgraceful gain.</p> - -<p>On the 22d the allies followed the retreating -enemy, and Giron and Longa entered Guipuscoa, -by the royal road, in pursuit of the convoy which -had moved under Maucune on the morning of the -battle; the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese -remained at Vittoria, and general Pakenham with -the sixth division came up from Medina Pomar;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_567"></a>[567]</span> -the remainder of the army pursued Joseph towards -Pampeluna, for he had continued his retreat up -the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. The -weather was rainy, the roads heavy, and the French -rear-guard having neither time nor materials to -destroy the bridges set fire to the villages behind -them to delay the pursuit. At five o’clock in the -morning of the 22d Reille had rallied his two -divisions and all his cavalry in front of Salvatierra, -where he halted until he was assured that all the -French had passed, and then continued his march -to Huerta in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles -from the field of battle. Joseph was that day at -Yrursun, a town, situated behind one of the sources -of the Arga, and from which roads branched off to -Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa and St. -Esteban on the other. At this place he remained -all the 23d sending orders to different points on -the French frontier to prepare provisions and succours -for his suffering army, and he directed Reille -to proceed rapidly by St. Estevan to the Bidassoa -with the infantry, six hundred select cavalry, the -artillery-men and horses of the army of Portugal; -meanwhile Gazan’s and D’Erlon’s army -marched upon Pampeluna intending to cross the -frontier at St. Jean Pied de Port. Joseph reached -Pampeluna the 24th, but the army bivouacked on -the glacis of the fortress, and in such a state of destitution -and insubordination that the governor would -not suffer them to enter the town. The magazines -were indeed reduced very low by Mina’s long<span class="sidenote">Jones’s Sieges.</span> -blockade, and some writers assert that it was even -proposed to blow up the works and abandon the -place; however by great exertions additional provisions -were obtained from the vicinity, the garrison<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_568"></a>[568]</span> -was encreased to three thousand men, and the -army marched towards France leaving a rear-guard -at a strong pass about two leagues off.</p> - -<p>The 23d Wellington having detached Graham’s -corps to Guipuscoa by the pass of Adrian, left the -fifth division at Salvatierra, and pursued the king -with the rest of the army.</p> - -<p>On the 24th the light division and Victor Alten’s -cavalry came up with the French rear-guard; two -battalions of the riflemen immediately pushed the -infantry back though the pass, and then Ross’s -horse artillery galloping forward, killed several -men and dismounted one of the only two pieces -of cannon carried off from Vittoria.</p> - -<p>The 25th the enemy covered by the fortress of -Pampeluna went up the valley of Roncevalles. -He was followed by the light division which turned -the town as far as Vilalba, and he was harassed by -the Spanish irregular troops now swarming on -every side.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Foy and Clauzel were placed in very -difficult positions. The former had reached Bergara -the 21st, and the garrison of Bilbao and the -Italian division of St. Paul, formerly Palombini’s, -had reached Durango; the first convoy from Vittoria -was that day at Bergara, and Maucune was -with the second at Montdragon. The 22d the garrison -of Castro went off to Santona; the same day -the fugitives from the battle spread such an alarm -through the country that the forts of Arlaban, -Montdragon, and Salinas, which commanded the -passes into Guipuscoa were abandoned, and Longa -and Giron penetrated them without hindrance.</p> - -<p>Foy who had only one battalion of his division -in hand, immediately rallied the fugitive garrisons,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_569"></a>[569]</span> -and marching upon Montdragon, made some prisoners -and acquired exact intelligence of the battle. -Then he ordered the convoy to move day and night, -towards France; the troops at Durango to march -upon Bergara, and the troops from all the other posts -to unite at Tolosa, to which place the artillery, baggage, -and sick men were now hastening from every -side; and to cover their concentration Foy, reinforcing -himself with Maucune’s troops, gave battle to -Giron and Longa, though three times his numbers, -at Montdragon; the Spaniards had the advantage -and the French fell back, yet slowly and fighting, -to Bergara, but they lost two hundred and fifty men -and six guns.</p> - -<p>On the 23d Foy marched to Villa Real de Guipuscoa, -and that evening the head of Graham’s -column having crossed the Mutiol mountain by the -pass of Adrian, descended upon Segura. It was then -as near to Tolosa as Foy was, and the latter’s situation -became critical; yet such were the difficulties -of passing the mountain, that it was late on the -24th ere Graham, who had then only collected -Anson’s light cavalry, two Portuguese brigades of -infantry, and Halket’s Germans, could move towards -Villa Franca. The Italians and Maucune’s -divisions which composed the French rear, were -just entering Villa Franca as Graham came in sight, -and to cover that town they took post at the village -of Veasaya on the right bank of the Orio river. -Halket’s Germans, aided by Pack’s Portuguese, immediately -drove Maucune’s people from the village<span class="sidenote">Graham’s despatch.</span> -with the loss of two hundred men, and Bradford’s brigade -having engaged the Italians on the French right,<span class="sidenote">General Boyer’s official Journal, MSS.</span> -killed or wounded eighty, yet the Italians claimed -the advantage; and the whole position was so<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_570"></a>[570]</span> -strong, that Graham had recourse to flank operations, -whereupon Foy retired to Tolosa. Giron -and Longa now came up by the great road, and -Mendizabel, having quitted the blockade of Santona, -arrived at Aspeytia on the Deba.</p> - -<p>The 25th Foy again offered battle in front of Tolosa, -but Graham turned his left with Longa’s division -and Mendizabel turned his right from Aspeytia; -while they were in march, colonel Williams, with -the grenadiers of the first regiment and three companies -of Pack’s Portuguese, dislodged him from an -advantageous hill in front, and the fight was then -purposely prolonged by skirmishing, until six -o’clock in the evening, when the Spaniards having -reached their destination on the flanks, a general -attack was made on all sides. The French being -cannonaded on the causeway, and strongly pushed -by the infantry in front, while Longa with equal -vigour drove their left from the heights, were soon -forced beyond Tolosa on the flanks; but that town -was strongly entrenched as a field-post and they -maintained it until Graham brought up his guns -and bursting one of the gates opened a passage -for his troops; nevertheless Foy profiting from the -darkness made his retreat good with a loss of only -four hundred men killed and wounded, and some -prisoners who were taken by Mendizabel and -Longa. These actions were very severe; the loss -of the Spaniards was not known, but the Anglo-Portuguese -had more than four hundred killed and -wounded in the two days’ operations, and Graham -himself was hurt.</p> - -<p>The 26th and 27th the allies halted to hear of -lord Wellington’s progress, the enemy’s convoys -entered France in safety, and Foy occupied a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_571"></a>[571]</span> -position between Tolosa and Ernani behind the -Anezo. His force was now encreased by the -successive arrival of the smaller garrisons to sixteen -thousand bayonets, four hundred sabres, and -ten pieces of artillery, and the 28th he threw a -garrison of two thousand six hundred good troops -into St. Sebastian and passed the Urumia. The -29th he passed the Oyarsun, and halted the 30th, -leaving a small garrison at Passages, which however -surrendered the next day to Longa.</p> - -<p>On the 1st of July the garrison of Gueteria -escaped by sea to St. Sebastian, and Foy passed -the Bidassoa, his rear-guard fighting with Giron’s -Gallicians; but Reille’s troops were now at Vera -and Viriatu, they had received ammunition and -artillery from Bayonne, and thus twenty-five thousand -men of the army of Portugal occupied a -defensive line from Vera to the bridge of Behobie, -the approaches to which last were defended by a -block-house. Graham immediately invested St. -Sebastian, and Giron concentrating the fire of his -own artillery and that of a British battery upon -the block-house of Behobie obliged the French to -blow it up and destroy the bridge.</p> - -<p>While these events were passing in Guipuscoa, -Clauzel was in more imminent danger. On the -evening of the 22d he had approached the field -of battle at the head of fourteen thousand men, by -a way which falls into the Estella road, at Aracete -and not far from Salvatierra. Pakenham with the -sixth division was then at Vittoria, and the French -general, learning the state of affairs soon retired to -Logroño, where he halted until the evening of the -25th. This delay was like to have proved fatal, -for on that day, Wellington who before thought he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_572"></a>[572]</span> -was at Tudela, discovered his real position, and -leaving general Hill with the second division -to form the siege of Pampeluna, marched himself -by Tafalla with two brigades of light cavalry and -the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of -infantry. The fifth and sixth divisions and the -heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese marched -at the same time from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon -Logroño; and Mina also, who had now collected -all his scattered battalions near Estella, and was -there joined by Julian Sanchez’ cavalry, followed -hard on Clauzel’s rear.</p> - -<p><span class="sidenote7">July.</span> -The French general moving by Calahorra, reached -Tudela on the evening of the 27th, and thinking -that by this forced march of sixty miles in forty -hours with scarcely a halt, he had outstripped all -pursuers, would have made for France by Olite -and Tafalla. Wellington was already in possession -of those places expecting him, but an alcalde -gave Clauzel notice of the danger, whereupon -recrossing the Ebro he marched upon Zaragoza in -all haste, and arriving the 1st of July, took post -on the Gallego, gave out that he would there wait -until Suchet, or the king, if the latter retook the -offensive, should come up. Wellington immediately -made a flank movement to his own left as -far as Caseda, and could still with an exertion -have intercepted Clauzel by the route of Jacca, -but he feared to drive him back upon Suchet and -contented himself with letting Mina press the -French general. That chief acted with great ability; -for he took three hundred prisoners, and having -every where declared that the whole allied army were -close at hand in pursuit he imposed upon Clauzel, -who, being thus deceived, destroyed some of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_573"></a>[573]</span> -artillery and heavy baggage, and leaving the rest -at Zaragoza retired to Jacca.</p> - -<p>During this time Joseph, not being pressed, had -sent the army of the south again into Spain to take -possession of the valley of Bastan, which was -very fertile and full of strong positions. But -O’Donnel, count of Abispal, had now reduced the -forts at Pancorbo, partly by capitulation, partly -by force, and was marching towards Pampeluna; -wherefore general Hill, without abandoning the -siege of that place, moved two British and two Portuguese -brigades into the valley of Bastan, and on -the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, vigorously driving Gazan -from all his positions, cleared the valley with a -loss of only one hundred and twenty men. The -whole line of the Spanish frontier from Ronscevalles -to the mouth of the Bidassoa river was thus occupied -by the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and St. -Sebastian were invested. Joseph’s reign was over, -the crown had fallen from his head, and after -years of toils, and combats which had been rather -admired than understood, the English general, -emerging from the chaos of the Peninsula struggle, -stood on the summit of the Pyrennees a recognised -conqueror. On those lofty pinnacles the clangor -of his trumpets pealed clear and loud, and the -splendour of his genius appeared as a flaming beacon -to warring nations.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. In this campaign of six weeks, Wellington, -with one hundred thousand men, marched six hundred -miles, passed six great rivers, gained one -decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_574"></a>[574]</span> -a hundred and twenty thousand veteran troops from -Spain. This immense result could not have been -attained if Joseph had followed Napoleon’s instructions; -Wellington could not then have turned -the line of the Duero. It could not have been -attained if Joseph had acted with ordinary skill -after the line of the Duero was passed. Time was -to him most precious, yet when contrary to his -expectations he had concentrated his scattered -armies behind the Carion, he made no effort to -delay his enemy on that river. He judged it an -unfit position, that is, unfit for a great battle; but -he could have obliged Wellington to lose a day -there, perhaps two or three, and behind the Upper -Pisuerga he might have saved a day or two more. -Reille who was with the army of Portugal on the -right of the king’s line complained that he could -find no officers of that army who knew the Pisuerga<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence, MSS.</span> -sufficiently to place the troops in position; the -king then had cause to remember Napoleon’s -dictum, namely, that “to command an army well -a general must think of nothing else.” For why -was the course of the Pisuerga unknown when the -king’s head-quarters had been for several months -within a day’s journey of it?</p> - -<p>2º. The Carion and the Pisuerga being given up, -the country about the Hormaza was occupied and -the three French armies were in mass between that -stream and Burgos; yet Wellington’s right wing -only, that is to say, only twenty-three thousand infantry, -and three brigades of cavalry, drove Reille’s -troops over the Arlanzan, and the castle of Burgos -was abandoned. This was on the 12th, the three -French armies, not less than fifty thousand fighting -men, had been in position since the 9th, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_575"></a>[575]</span> -king’s letters prove that he desired to fight in -that country, which was favourable for all arms. -Nothing then could be more opportune than Wellington’s -advance on the 12th, because a retrograde -<ins class="corr" id="tn-575" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'defensive sytem is'"> -defensive system is</ins> unsuited to French soldiers, -whose impatient courage leads them always to -attack, and the news of Napoleon’s victory at -Bautzen had just arrived to excite their ardour. -Wherefore Joseph should have retaken the offensive -on the 12th at the moment when Wellington approached -the Hormaza, and as the left and centre -of the allies were at Villa Diego and Castroxerez, -the greatest part at the former, that is to say, one -march distant, the twenty-six thousand men immediately -under Wellington, would probably have -been forced back over the Pisuerga, and the king -would have gained time for Sarrut, Foy and Clauzel -to join him. Did the English general then owe his -success to fortune, to his adversary’s fault rather -than to his own skill? Not so. He had judged -the king’s military capacity, he had seen the haste, -the confusion, the trouble of the enemy, and knowing -well the moral power of rapidity and boldness -in such circumstances, had acted, daringly indeed, -but wisely, for such daring is admirable, it is the -highest part of war.</p> - -<p>3º. The manner in which Wellington turned the -line of the Ebro was a fine strategic illustration. -It was by no means certain of success, yet failure -would have still left great advantages. He was -certain of gaining Santander and fixing a new base -of operations on the coast, and he would still have -had the power of continually turning the king’s -right by operating between him and the coast; -the errors of his adversary only gave him additional<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_576"></a>[576]</span> -advantages which he expected, and seized with -promptness. But if Joseph, instead of spreading -his army from Espejo on his right to the Logroño -road on his left, had kept only cavalry on the latter -route and on the main road in front of Pancorbo; -if he had massed his army to his right pivoting -upon Miranda, or Frias, and had scoured all the roads -towards the sources of the Ebro with the utmost -diligence, the allies could never have passed the -defiles and descended upon Vittoria. They would -have marched then by Valmaceda upon Bilbao, -but Joseph could by the road of Orduña have met -them there, and with his force increased by Foy’s -and Sarrut’s divisions and the Italians. Meanwhile -Clauzel would have come down to Vittoria, and -the heaped convoys could have made their way to -France in safety.</p> - -<p>4º. Having finally resolved to fight at Vittoria, -the king should, on the 19th and 20th, have broken -some of the bridges on the Zadora, and covered -others with field-works to enable him to sally -forth upon the attacking army; he should have -entrenched the defile of Puebla, and occupied the -heights above in strength; his position on the -Lower Zadora would then have been formidable. -But his greatest fault was in the choice of his line -of operation. His reasons for avoiding Guipuscoa -were valid, his true line was on the other side, -down the Ebro. Zaragoza should have been his -base, since Aragon was fertile and more friendly -than any other province of Spain. It is true that -by taking this new line of operations he would -have abandoned Foy; but that general, reinforced -with the reserve from Bayonne, would have had -twenty thousand men and the fortress of St. Sebastian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_577"></a>[577]</span> -as a support, and Wellington must have left a -strong corps of observation to watch him. The -king’s army would have been immediately increased -by Clauzel’s troops, and ultimately by Suchet’s, which -would have given him one hundred thousand men -to oppose the allied army, weakened as that would -have been by the detachment left to watch Foy. -And there were political reasons, to be told hereafter, -for the reader must not imagine Wellington -had got thus far without such trammels, which -would have probably rendered this plan so efficacious -as to oblige the British army to abandon -Spain altogether. Then new combinations would -have been made all over Europe which it is useless -to speculate upon.</p> - -<p>5º. In the battle the operations of the French, -with the exception of Reille’s defence of the -bridges of Gamara and Ariaga, were a series of -errors, the most extraordinary being the suffering -Kempt’s brigade of the light division, and the -hussars, to pass the bridge of Tres Puentes and -establish themselves close to the king’s line of -battle, and upon the flank of his advanced posts at -the bridges of Mendoza and Villodas. It is quite -clear from this alone that he decided upon retreating -the moment Graham’s attack commenced -against his right flank, and his position was therefore -in his own view untenable. The fitting thing -then was to have occupied the heights of Puebla -strongly, but to have placed the bulk of his infantry -by corps, in succession, the right refused, -towards Vittoria, while his cavalry and guns -watched the bridges and the mouth of the Puebla -defile; in this situation he could have succoured -Reille, or marched to his front, according to circumstances,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_578"></a>[578]</span> -and his retreat would have been -secure.</p> - -<p>6º. The enormous fault of heaping up the -baggage and convoys and parcs behind Vittoria -requires no comment, but the king added another -and more extraordinary error, namely the remaining -to the last moment undecided as to his line of retreat. -Nothing but misfortunes could attend upon such -bad dispositions; and that the catastrophe was not -more terrible is owing entirely to an error which<span class="sidenote">See Wellington’s despatch.</span> -Wellington and Graham seem alike to have fallen -into, namely, that Reille had two divisions in reserve -behind the bridges on the Upper Zadora. -They knew not that Maucune’s division had marched -with the convoy, and thought Clauzel had only -one division of the army of Portugal with him, -whereas he had two, Taupin’s and Barbout’s. -Reille’s reserves were composed not of divisions -but of brigades drawn from La Martiniere’s and -Sarrut’s divisions, which were defending the -bridges; and his whole force, including the -French-Spaniards who were driven back from -Durana, did not exceed ten thousand infantry and -two thousand five hundred cavalry. Now Graham -had, exclusive of Giron’s Gallicians, nearly twenty -thousand of all arms, and it is said that the river -might have been passed both above and below the -points of attack; it is certain also that Longa’s -delay gave the French time to occupy Gamara -Mayor in force, which was not the case at first. -Had the passage been won in time, very few of -the French army could have escaped from the -field; but the truth is Reille fought most vigorously.</p> - -<p>7º. As the third and seventh divisions did not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_579"></a>[579]</span> -come to the point of attack at the time calculated -upon, the battle was probably not fought after the -original conception of lord Wellington; it is likely -that his first project was to force the passage of the -bridges, to break the right centre of the enemy -from Arinez to Margarita, and then to envelope the -left centre with the second, fourth, and light divisions -and the cavalry, while the third and seventh -divisions pursued the others. But notwithstanding -the unavoidable delay, which gave the French -time to commence their retreat, it is not easy to -understand how Gazan’s left escaped from Subijana -de Alava, seeing that when Picton broke the centre -at Arinez, he was considerably nearer to Vittoria -than the French left, which was cut off from the -main road and assailed in front by Hill and Cole. -The having no cavalry in hand to launch at this -time and point of the battle has been already -noticed; lord Wellington says, that the country<span class="sidenote">Despatch.</span> -was generally unfavourable for the action of that -arm, and it is certain that neither side used it -with much effect at any period of the battle; -nevertheless there are always some suitable openings, -some happy moments to make a charge, and -this seems to have been one which was -neglected.</p> - -<p>8º. Picton’s sudden rush from the bridge of -Tres Puentes to the village of Arinez, with one -brigade, has been much praised, and certainly -nothing could be more prompt and daring, but the -merit of the conception belongs to the general in -chief, who directed it in person. It was suggested -to him by the denuded state of the hill in front -of that village, and viewed as a stroke for the occasion -it is to be admired. Yet it had its disadvantages.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_580"></a>[580]</span> -For the brigade which thus crossed a part -of the front of both armies to place itself in advance, -not only drew a flank fire from the enemy, -but was exposed if the French cavalry had been -prompt and daring, to a charge in flank; it also -prevented the advance of the other troops in their -proper arrangement, and thus crowded the centre -for the rest of the action. However these sudden -movements cannot be judged by rules, they are -good or bad according to the result. This was -entirely successful, and the hill thus carried was -called the Englishmen’s hill, not, as some recent -writers have supposed, in commemoration of a -victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of -a disaster which there befel a part of his army. -His battle was fought between Navarrette and -Najera, many leagues from Vittoria, and beyond -the Ebro; but on this hill the two gallant knights -sir Thomas and sir William Felton took post with -two hundred companions, and being surrounded -by Don Tello with six thousand, all died or were -taken after a long, desperate, and heroic resistance.</p> - -<p>9º. It has been observed by French writers, and -the opinion has been also entertained by many -English officers, that after the battle Wellington -should have passed the frontier in mass, and -marched upon Bayonne instead of chasing Clauzel -and Foy on the right and left; and if, as the -same authors assert, Bayonne was not in a state -of defence and must have fallen, there can be little -question that the criticism is just, because the -fugitive French army having lost all its guns and -being without musket ammunition, could not have -faced its pursuers for a moment. But if Bayonne<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_581"></a>[581]</span> -had resisted, and it was impossible for Wellington -to suspect its real condition, much mischief might -have accrued from such a hasty advance. Foy -and Clauzel coming down upon the field of Vittoria -would have driven away if they did not destroy -the sixth division; they would have recovered -all the trophies; the king’s army returning by -Jacca into Aragon, would have reorganized itself -from Suchet’s dépôts, and that marshal was actually -coming up with his army from Valencia; -little would then have been gained by the battle. -This question can however be more profitably discussed -when the great events which followed the -battle of Vittoria have been described.</p> - - -<div class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_581fp_1" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60 right">Vol. 5. Nº. 1.</p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_581fp_1.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_581fp_1-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<div class="caption"> -Explanatory Sketch<br /> -<em>of the</em><br /> -<span class="smcap">SURPRISE of ALMARAZ</span>.<br /> -May 1812.<br /> -<em>The Scene of Action Enlarged.</em> -</div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_581fp_2" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60 right">Vol. 5. Nº. 2.</p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_581fp_2.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_581fp_2-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<div class="caption"> -<em>Explanatory</em><br /> -Sketch<br /> -<em>of the</em><br /> -Sieges of the Fort<br /> -<em>and</em> Operations, <em>round</em><br /> -SALAMANCA.<br /> -1812. -</div> -</div> - - -<div class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_581fp_3" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60 right">Vol. 5. Nº. 3.</p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_581fp_3.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_581fp_3-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<div class="caption"> -Battle of<br /> -SALAMANCA,<br /> -with<br /> -SKETCH of OPERATIONS<br /> -before and after the<br /> -Action. -</div> -</div> - - -<div class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_581fp_4" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60 right">Vol. 5. Nº. 4.</p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_581fp_4.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_581fp_4-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<div class="caption"> -<em>Explanatory</em><br /> -Sketch<br /> -<em>of the</em><br /> -<span class="smcap">SIEGE of BURGOS</span>.<br /> -1812. -</div> -</div> - - -<div class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_581fp_5" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60 right">Vol. 5. Nº. 5.</p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_581fp_5.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_581fp_5-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<div class="caption"> -Sketch of the Retreat<br /> -<em>from</em> Madrid <em>and</em><br /> -Burgos.<br /> -1812. -</div> -</div> - - -<div class="figcenter illowp100" id="i_b_581fp_6" style="max-width: 35em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60 right">Vol. 5. Nº. 6.</p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_581fp_6.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_581fp_6-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<div class="caption"> -Explanatory Sketch<br /> -<em>of the</em><br /> -POSITION OF THE PARTIDAS.<br /> -And of Lord Wellington’s March from the<br /> -AGUEDA to the PYRENEES.<br /> -1813. -</div> -</div> - - -<div class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_581fp_7" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60 right">Vol. 5. Nº. 7.</p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_581fp_7.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_581fp_7-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<div class="caption"> -Battle of Castalla<br /> -<em>and operations</em><br /> -before the Action. -</div> -</div> - - -<div class="figcenter illowp50" id="i_b_581fp_8" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<p class="p2 fs60 right">Vol. 5. Nº. 8.</p> - <div class="bbox"> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_581fp_8.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_581fp_8-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - </div> -<div class="caption"> -Battle of<br /> -VITTORIA,<br /> -<em>with the</em><br /> -Operations<br /> -<em>before and after</em><br /> -The Action. -</div> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_582"></a>[582]</span><br /> - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_583"></a>[583]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p2 pfs150">APPENDIX.</p> - - -<hr class="p4 chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_584"></a>[584]</span><br /> - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_585"></a>[585]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX.</h2> - -<hr class="r10" /> - - -<h3 class="p2" id="NO_I">No. I.</h3> - -<p class="noindent">The following extracts of letters are published to avoid any -future cavils upon the points they refer to, and also to shew how -difficult it is for the historian to obtain certain and accurate details, -when eye-witnesses, having no wish to mislead, differ so much.</p> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p class="p2 pfs80">BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract of a memoir by sir Charles Dalbiac, who was one of -Le Marchant’s brigade of heavy cavalry.</em></p> - -<p>“Throughout these charges upon the enemy, <em>the heavy brigade -was unsupported by any other portion of the cavalry -whatever</em>; but was followed, as rapidly as it was possible for -infantry to follow, by the third division which had so gloriously -led the attack in the first instance and had so effectually turned -the enemy’s extreme left.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from a memoir by colonel Money, who was one of -general Anson’s brigade of light cavalry.</em></p> - -<p>“The third division moved to the right, and <em>the cavalry, Le -Marchand’s and Anson’s</em>, were ordered to charge as soon as the -tirailleurs of the third division began to ascend the right flank of -the hill.”—“The rapid movement of the cavalry which now began<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_586"></a>[586]</span> -to gallop, and the third division pressing them (the French), they -run into the wood, which separated them from the army; <em>we</em> -(Anson’s light cavalry) <em>charged them under a heavy fire of -musketry and artillery from another height</em>; near two thousand -threw down their arms in different parts of the wood, and we -continued our charge through the wood until our brigade came -into an open plain of ploughed fields, where the dust was so great -we could see nothing, and halted; when it cleared away, we -found ourselves within three hundred yards of a large body of -French infantry and artillery, formed on the declivity of a hill. -A tremendous battle was heard on the other side, which prevented -the enemy from perceiving us. At last they opened a fire of -musketry and grape-shot, and we retired in good order and without -any loss.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract of a letter from sir Henry Watson, commanding -the first regiment of Portuguese cavalry under general -D’Urban.</em></p> - -<p>“When Marmont, at the battle of Salamanca, advanced his -left, lord Wellington ordered down the reserve, of which the -first and tenth Portuguese cavalry and two squadrons of the -British cavalry under captain Townsend, now lieutenant-colonel -Townsend, formed a part under sir B. D’Urban. The cavalry -was pushed forward in contiguous columns, and were protected -from the enemy by a small rising ground, which, as soon as I -had passed, I was ordered to wheel up, and charge the front in -line. <em>The enemy had formed a square</em>, and gave us a volley as -we advanced, the eleventh and fourteenth remained en potence. -<em>In this charge we completely succeeded</em>, and the enemy appeared -panic-struck, and made no attempt to prevent our cutting and -thrusting at them in all directions until the moment I was about -to withdraw; then a soldier, at not more than six or eight paces, -levelled his musquet at me, and shot me through the shoulder, -which knocked me off my horse, where I continued to lie till the -whole of our infantry had passed over.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from a letter of colonel Townsend, 14th Dragoons.</em></p> - -<p>“At the battle of Salamanca I perfectly recollect seeing -D’Urban’s cavalry advance up the hill, and charge the French -infantry. <em>They were repulsed</em>, and left Watson (now sir Henry), -who led his regiment, the first Portuguese, badly wounded on the -field.”—“<em>I am almost positive the French were not in square,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_587"></a>[587]</span> -but in line, waiting to receive the attack of the leading brigade -of the third division</em>, which gallantly carried every thing before -it.”</p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_II">No. II.</h3> - -<p class="center"><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Copies de deux dépêches de l’empereur au ministre de la guerre -relatives au duc de Raguse.</i></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Dresde, le 28 Mai, 1812.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="smcap pad2">Monsieur le duc de Feltre,</p> - -<p>Je vous renvois la correspondance d’Espagne. Ecrivez au duc -de Raguse que c’est le roi qui doit lui donner des directions, que -je suppose qu’il s’est retiré devant lord Wellington selon les règles -de la guerre, en l’obligéant à se masser, et non en se reployant -devant sa cavalerie légère; qu’il aura conservé des têtes de pont -sur l’Agueda, ce qui peut seul lui permettre d’avoir des nouvelles -de l’ennemi tous les jours, et de le tenir en respect. Que si au -contraire il a mis trente lieues d’intervalle entre lui et l’ennemi, -comme il l’a déjà fait deux fois contre tous les principes de la -guerre, il laisse le général Anglais maître de se porter où il veut, -il perd constamment l’initiative, et n’est plus d’aucun poids dans -les affaires d’Espagne, que la Biscaye et le nord sont dans des -dispositions facheuses par les suites de l’évacuation des Asturias -par la division Bonnet, que la réoccupation de cette province n’a -pas encore eu lieu, que le nord est exposé à de grands malheurs, -que Santona et St. Sebastian sont compromis, que les libres communications -des guerillas avec la Galice et les Asturies par la mer -les rendront formidables, que s’il ne fait pas réoccuper promptement -les Asturies, sa position ne peut s’ameliorer.</p> - -<p>Recommandez au général Caffarelli de réunir davantage ses -troupes, et d’avoir toujours une colonne dans la main.</p> - -<p>Ecrivez au général L’Huillier d’avoir l’œil sur St. Sebastian, et -d’avoir toujours 3000 hommes dans la main pour les diriger sur -cette place si elle avoit besoin d’être secourue.</p> - -<p>En général pour parer à la mauvaise manœuvre et à la mauvaise -direction que le duc de Raguse donne à nos affaires il est nécessaire -d’avoir beaucoup de monde à Bayonne. Activez la marche -<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_588"></a>[588]</span>du 3<sup>e</sup> et du 106<sup>me</sup> et de la 5<sup>e</sup> demi brigade provisoire sur cette -place. Tenez y deux généraux de brigade afin que le général -L’Huillier puisse toujours disposer des forces pour être en mesure -d’agir selon les circonstances.</p> - -<p>Réunissez un millier d’hommes des dépôts de cavalerie de l’armée -d’Espagne, et dirigez les en régimens de marche sur Bayonne.</p> - -<p>Prescrivez au général L’Huillier de tenir ses troupes dans la -vallée de Bastan, à Bayonne, St. Jean de Luz, et Irun, en les -munissant bien, les barraquant, les exerçant, et les formant. Ce -sera au moyen de cette ressource que si le due de Raguse continue -à faire des bévues on pourra empêcher le mal de devenir -extrême.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr6">Sur ce, je prie Dieu, &c.</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="pad4 smcap">Napoleon</span>.</p> - </div> - -<p class="p1 center">[<em>For second despatch, see</em> <a href="#NO_VII">Appendix No. VII.</a>]</p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_III">No. III.</h3> - -<p class="center"><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Lettre de M. le duc de Dalmatie au roi.</i></p> - -<p class="p1 right"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Seville, 12 Août, 1812.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>Je n’avais reçu aucune nouvelle de V. M. depuis les lettres -qu’elle m’a fait l’honneur m’écrire des 6 et 7 Juillet dernier. -Enfin je viens de récevoir celle datée de Segovie le 29 du même -mois. Les rapports publiés par les ennemis m’avaient déjà instruit -des évènemens survenus en Castille lesquels étaient naturellement -exagérés; V. M. a bien voulu en quelque sorte fixer à ce sujet -mes idées. Je déplore les pertes que l’armée de Portugal a -éprouvées. Dans l’etât ou étaient les affaires d’Espagne une -bataille ne devait se donner qu’à la dernière extrémité, mais tout -n’est pas perdu. V. M. après m’avoir communiqué les dispositions -qu’elle a faites depuis le 6 (date de la dernière lettre) au 19 Juillet -m’ordonne comme une ressource d’évacuer l’Andalousie et de me -diriger sur Tolêde. Je ne puis dissimuler que cette disposition -me parait fort extraordinaire. J’étais loin de penser que V. M. -s’y serait déterminée. Le sort de l’Espagne est-il done décidé? -V. M. veut elle sacrifier le royaume à la capitale? et a-t-elle la -certitude de la conserver en prenant ce parti? Enfin l’évacuation -de l’Andalousie et ma marche sur Tolêde sont elles l’unique -ressource qui nous reste? Je vais me préparer à cette disposition -que je regarde comme des plus funestes pour l’honneur des armes -impériales, le bien du service de l’empereur et l’intérêt de V. M.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_589"></a>[589]</span> -dans l’espoir qu’avant qu’elle s’exécute V. M. l’aura changée ou -modifiée suivant les propositions que j’ai eu l’honneur de lui faire -le 19 Juillet, le 8 de ce mois, et par M. le colonel Desprez.</p> - -<p>J’ai l’honneur d’adresser à votre Majesté triplicata de ma lettre -du 8 de ce mois. En me référant aux observations et propositions -qu’elle renferme, si V. M. ne prend pas des dispositions en conséquence, -je considére que l’évacuation de toute l’Espagne est -decidée, car il faut que V. M. se persuade que du moment que -mon mouvement sera commencé je serai suivi par soixante mille -ennemis lesquels ne me donneront pas le tems ni la liberté de -prendre la direction que V. M. m’indique et qui se réuniront à ceux -qui ont penétré en Castille et m’empécheront de séjourner sur le -Tage encore moins d’arriver à Madrid. Il n’y a qu’un moyen -pour rétablir les affaires: que V. M. vienne en Andalousie et qu’elle -y améne toutes les troupes de l’armée du centre, de l’armée de -Portugal, de l’armée d’Arragon auxquelles ses ordres pourront -parvenir, quand bien même tout le royaume de Valence devrait -être évacué. Qu’importe à V. M. de conserver Madrid si elle -perd le royaume? Philippe V. en sortit trois fois et y rentra en -souverain. Du moment que nous aurons 70 ou 80 mille Français -réunis dans le midi de l’Espagne, le théâtre de la guerre est changé; -l’armée de Portugal se trouve dégagée et elle peut se reporter -successivement jusqu’au Tage. D’ailleurs ce serait sans inconvénient -qu’elle gardât Burgos et la rive gauche de l’Ebre et que -tout l’espace compris entre elle et le Sierra Morena fut à la disposition -des ennemis jusqu’à ce que des renforts vinssent de France -et que l’empereur eût pu prendre des dispositions. Le sacrifice une -fois fait il n’y a plus de moyen d’y remédier. Les armées impériales -en Espagne repassent l’Ebre d’ou peut-être la famine les chassera, -les affaires de l’empereur dans le nord de l’Europe peuvent s’en -ressentir, l’Amerique qui vient de déclarer la guerre à l’Angleterre -fera peut-être la paix. V. M. a sans doute refléchi à toutes les -conséquences d’un pareil changement; la perte momentanée de -Madrid et des Castilles est nulle pour la politique de l’empereur, -elle peut se réparer en plus ou moins de tems. La perte d’une -bataille par l’armée de Portugal n’est qu’un grand duel qui se -répare également, mais la perte de l’Andalousie et la levée du siége -de Cadiz sont des évènemens dont les effets seront ressentis dans -toute l’Europe et dans le nouveau monde. Enfin en fidèle sujet -de l’empereur je dois déclarer à V. M. que je ne crois pas les -affaires d’Espagne assez désespérées pour prendre un parti aussi -violent. J’entrevois encore du remède si V. M. veut prendre les<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_590"></a>[590]</span> -dispositions que j’ai proposées; tout en me préparant à l’exécution -de ses ordres je me permets de lui demander de nouvelles -instructions. J’ai surtout l’honneur de prier V. M. d’ordonner -que les communications de l’Andalousie avec Toléde soient rétablies -et quelque évènement qui survienne de vouloir bien faire prendre à -l’armée du centre, la direction de Despeña Perros ou d’Almaden -pour se joindre à l’armée du midi. Alors je reponds de tout, et -j’exécuterai les dispositions que j’ai enoncées dans ma lettre du 8 -de ce mois.</p> - -<p class="center">Je, &c. &c. &c.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_IV">No. IV.</h3> - -<p class="center"><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Lettre de M. le maréchal due de Dalmatie à M. le Ministre -de la guerre à Paris.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="smcap pad2">Monsieur le Duc</span>,</p> - -<p>Toute communication de l’Andalousie avec la France étant -interrompue et n’ayant rien réçu depuis les premiers jours de -Mai; depuis un mois le roi ayant même retiré les troupes qui -étoient dans la Manche et ne pouvant communiquer avec Madrid, -j’entreprens de faire parvenir mes rapports à votre excellence par -la voie de mer. Si le bâtiment que je fais à cet effet partir de -Malaga peut arriver à Marseille, l’empereur sera plutôt instruit -de ce qui se passe dans le midi de l’Espagne et de la position de -son armée.</p> - -<p>A ce sujet j’ai l’honneur d’adresser à votre excellence copie -des derniers rapports que j’ai faits au roi, lesquels contiennent les -représentations que j’ai cru devoir soumettre à sa majesté pour le -bien du service de l’empereur, la conservation des conquêtes et -l’honneur des armées impériales.</p> - -<p>Je ne suis instruit des malheurs que l’armée de Portugal a -éprouvés que par les bruits populaires et les rapports de l’ennemi; -car le roi en m’écrivant le 29 Juillet de Ségovie ne m’en a donné -aucun détail. Je dois donc m’imaginer que les pertes que nous -avons faites en Castile sont beaucoup exagérées et j’en tire la conséquence -que les affaires de l’empereur en Espagne ne sont pas -aussi desespérées que le roi parait en être persuadé. Cependant -sa majesté après être resté 23 jours sans m’écrire, lorsque les ennemis<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_591"></a>[591]</span> -étoient on plein mouvement et que sa majesté se portoit -avec 14,000 hommes de l’armée du centre à la rencontre du duc -de Raguse qui sans l’attendre s’etoit engagé precipitamment et -éprouvait une défaite; le roi dis-je en me faisant part le 29 Juillet -de ses mouvemens me donna l’ordre formel d’évacuer l’Andalousie -et me diriger sur Tolede, et il me dit expressément que c’est -l’unique ressource qui nous reste.</p> - -<p>Je suis loin de partager l’avis de sa majesté, je crois fermement -qu’il est possible de mieux faire et que tout peut s’arranger en -attendant que d’après les ordres de l’empereur V. E. ait pû -mettre les armées qui sont dans le nord de l’Espagne à même de -reprendre les opérations, ainsi que j’en fais la proposition à sa majesté -dans les lettres dont je mets ci-joint copies. Mais mon -devoir est d’obéïr et je me chargerais d’une trop grande responsibilité -si j’éludais l’exécution de l’ordre formel d’évacuer que le -roi m’a donné.</p> - -<p>Je vais donc me préparer à exécuter cette disposition que -je regarde comme funeste, puisqu’elle me force à livrer aux -ennemis des places de guerre susceptibles d’une bonne défense -tout aprovisionnées, les établissemens et un matériel d’artillerie -immense et de laisser dans les hôpitaux beaucoup de malades que -leur situation et le manque de transport ne permettent point -d’emmener. Je ne ferai cependant mon mouvement que progressivement -et je ne négligerai aucun soin pour qu’il ne reste -en arrière rien de ce qui peut être utile à l’armée.</p> - -<p>Je ne puis encore assurer que je ne ferai ce mouvement par -Tolede, car du moment qu’il sera entrepris je serai suivi par -60,000 ennemis qui se joindront aux divisions que lord Wellington -aura déjà portées sur le Tage. Ainsi il est possible que -je me dirige par Murcie sur Valence suivant ce que j’apprendrai -ou les nouveaux ordres que je recevrai du roi.</p> - -<p>Dans cet état de choses, je ne puis dissimuler à V. E. que je -regarde l’évacuation de l’Espagne au moins jusqu’à l’Ebre comme -décidée du moment que le roi m’ordonna d’évacuer l’Andalousie et -de me diriger sur Toléde, car il est bien certain qu’il ne sera pas -possible de rester en position sur le Tage ni dans les Castilles et -que dès-lors les conquêtes des armes impériales en Espagne dont -l’empereur avait ordonné la conservation, sont sacrifiées.</p> - -<p>A ce sujet je ne puis me défendre de réflechir sur d’autres -évènemens qui se passent. J’ai lu dans les journaux de Cadiz, -que l’ambassadeur du roi en Russie avait joint l’armée Russe, -que le roi avait fait des insinuations au gouvernement insurgent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_592"></a>[592]</span> -de Cadiz, que la Suéde avait fait un traité avec l’Angleterre, et -que le prince héréditaire avait demandé à la regence de Cadiz -250 Espagnols pour sa garde personelle. (Avant hier un parlementaire -que le général Semélé avait envoyé à l’escadre Anglaise -pour réclamer des prisonniers resta pendant quelques instans à -bord de l’amiral, lequel lui montra une frégate, qui, dit il, est -destinée a porter en Angleterre et ensuite en Suéde les 250 Espagnols -que le prince Bernadotte demande pour sa garde personelle.) -Enfin j’ai vu dans les mêmes journaux que Moreau et -Blucher étaient arrivés à Stockholm, et que Rapatel, aide-de-camp -de Moreau, était à Londres. Je ne tire aucune conséquence -de tous ces faits, mais j’en serai plus attentif. Cependant j’ai -cru devoir déposer mes craintes entre les mains de six généraux -de l’armée, après avoir exigé d’eux le serment qu’ils ne révéleront -ce que je leur ai dit qu’à l’empereur lui-même ou aux personnes que -S. M. aura specialement déléguées pour en reçevoir la déclaration, -si auparavant je ne puis moi-même en rendre compte. Il est -pourtant de mon devoir de manifester à V. E. que je crains que -le bût de toutes les fausses dispositions que l’on a prises et celui -des intrigues qui ont lieu ne soient de forcer les armées impériales -qui sont en Espagne à repasser au moins l’Ebre et ensuite de présenter -cet évènement comme l’unique ressource (expression du roi, -lettre du 20 Juillet) dans l’espérance d’en profiter par quelque -arrangement.</p> - -<p>Mes craintes sont peut-être mal fondées, mais en pareille situation -il vaut mieux les pousser à l’extremité que d’être négligent, -d’autant plus que ces craintes et ma sollicitude tournent au bien -du service de l’empereur et à la sureté de l’armée dont le commandement -m’est confié.</p> - -<p>J’ai l’honneur de prier V. E. de vouloir bien si ma lettre lui -parvient, la mettre le plutôt possible sous les yeux de l’empereur -et d’assurer S. M. que moi et son armée du midi serons toujours -dignes de sa suprême confiance. Je désire bien vivement que -V. E. puisse me faire savoir que mes dépêches lui sont parvenues -et surtout recevoir par elle les ordres de sa majesté.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">J’ai l’honneur, &c.</span><br /> -(Signé) <span class="pad4 smcap">Dalmatie</span>.</p> - </div> - -<p><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Seville, 12 Août, 1812.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_593"></a>[593]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_V">No. V.</h3> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="smcap pad2">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>Je suis arrivé à Paris hier 21 du courant. Je me suis sur le -champ présenté chez le ministre de la guerre et je lui ai remis la -lettre de V. M. ainsi que celles de M. le maréchal Jourdan. S. E. -m’a questionné sur les affaires d’Espagne, mais sans me demander -mes dépêches pour l’empereur. Elle m’a, suivant les intentions -de V. M., pourvu des ordres dont j’ai besoin pour poursuivre ma -route avec célérité.</p> - -<p>Ce matin le ministre m’a fait appeler et j’ai eu avec lui une -longue conférence. Il m’a pressé de m’expliquer avec franchise -sur ce que j’avais pu remarquer pendant mon séjour en Andalousie, -m’a témoigné quelque inquiétude sur l’influence que pouvoit exercer -le maréchal tant sur l’armée que sur les autorités civiles. Il a rappelé -les intrigues de Portugal et a conclu en me disant qu’il dépouillait -devant moi le caractère de ministre pour causer avec un homme -de votre confiance, et que les services que vous lui aviez rendus -à l’époque de sa disgrâce devaient être pour V. M. une garantie -du désir qu’il avait d’agir suivant ses intentions. Quelque franches -que m’aient parus ces ouvertures, je n’ai pas cru devoir parler de -la partie la plus délicate de ma mission. J’ai seulement répondu -que l’armée du midi serait toujours celle de l’empereur, que -lorsque S. M. enverrait ses ordres déterminés, elle serait obéie, -et que tout ce que j’avais entendu en Andalousie ne me laissait -à ce sujet aucun doute. Au reste ma conversation avec le duc de -Feltre m’a prouvé qu’aucune lettre de la nature de celle dont je -suis porteur ne lui etait encore parvenue et cela est pour ma -mission une circonstance favorable.</p> - -<p>J’ai causé avec S. E. de la résistance que les chefs de l’armée -française en Espagne avaient toujours opposée aux ordres de -V. M. Il a declaré que tous avaient été mis sous vos ordres et -sans aucune restriction, qu’avant son départ l’empereur avait -témoigné son étonnement sur les doutes que manifestaient à cet -égard les lettres de V. M. et qu’il avait ordonné que l’on fit connaître -ses intentions d’une manière encore plus positive. J’ai cité -la lettre ou le maréchal Suchet s’autorise d’une phrase du Prince de -Neufchatel, celles du général Dorsenne et du général Caffarelli, il -parait que tous les obstacles qui pouvaient entraver l’exécution de vos -ordres ont été levés par des instructions adressées postérieurement<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_594"></a>[594]</span> -aux généraux en chef. Quant à la désobeissance formelle du -maréchal Soult S. E. a dit d’abord que V. M. avait le droit de lui ôter -le commandement, mais elle est convenue ensuite qu’une démarche -semblable ne pouvait être faite que par l’ordre exprès de l’empereur.</p> - -<p>Le ministre est aussi entré dans quelques détails sur les affaires -militaires, les ordres donnés par V. M. et par le maréchal Jourdan -aux diverses époques de la campagne, ont eu, m’a-t-il dit, l’approbation -générale et ce qu’a écrit l’empereur depuis qu’il a appris la -bataille de Salamanque prouve qu’il donne entièrement droit à V. M. -l’opinion publique à cet égard est encore plus prononcée que celle -des hommes en place, et je ne puis exprimer à V. M. avec -quelle rigueur sont jugés en France les maréchaux Soult et Marmont.</p> - -<p>Le duc de Feltre m’a parlé du mouvement sur Blasco Sancho. -Peut-être a-t-il dit, l’empereur reprochera un peu d’hésitation; -exécuté deux jours plutôt il aurait produit les plus heureux effets. -V. M. se rappelle que j’avais prévu cette objection et je ne serai -point embarrassé pour y répondre.</p> - -<p>S. E. a cru que j’allais auprès de l’empereur pour solliciter de -nouveaux renforts; elle m’a dit que la guerre de Russie avait -jusqu’à présent absorbé tous les moyens, qu’il était loin de pouvoir -envoyer les troupes sur lesquelles paraissait compter M. le maréchal -Jourdan, que l’on pourrait seulement pourvoir à la perte matérielle -faite par l’armée de Portugal, il parait que les nouvelles troupes -envoyées en Espagne ne s’élélvent pas au-delà de vingt mille -hommes, au reste la grande victoire remportée par l’empereur fera -probablement prendre des dispositions plus favorables aux affaires -de la Peninsule.</p> - -<p>Le duc de Feltre à reçu des nouvelles du général Clauzel. -Ce général annonce que l’armée anglaise marche vers le nord, -que lord Wellington s’est de sa personne porté vers le Duero, que -l’armée de Portugal s’est ralliée, que ses pertes sont beaucoup -moindres qu’on ne l’avait cru, que le général Foy avait fait un -mouvement pour délivrer Astorga et Tordesillas, mais que déja ces -deux places s’étaient rendues que l’on pourrait accuser de faiblesse -les deux gouverneurs et que peut-être la conduite de celui de -Tordesillas devait être jugée plus sévèrement encore.</p> - -<p>J’ai parlé au ministre de la position embarrassante dans laquelle -me mettait le décret du 26 Août, il a répondu que je pouvais sans -inconvénient me présenter à l’empereur avec les décorations du -grade que m’a donné V. M. que ce n’était point contre les officiers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_595"></a>[595]</span> -à votre service que le décret avait été dirigé et qu’il serait modifié -en leur faveur.</p> - -<p>J’ai l’honneur de prévenir V. M. que je partirai ce soir de Paris, -je poursuivrai sans m’arrêter ma route jusqu’au quartier général -de l’empereur.</p> - -<p>J’ai l’honneur de mettre aux pieds de V. M. l’hommage de mon -profond respect et de mon entier dévouement.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="pad4 smcap">Le Colonel Despres</span>.</p> - </div> - -<p><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Paris, 22 Septembre, 1812.</i></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_VI_A">No. VI. A.</h3> - -<p class="center"><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Lettre confidentielle écrite au roi par monsieur le duc de -Feltre.</i></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Paris, 10 Novembre, 1812.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="smcap pad2">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>La lettre chiffrée que V. M. m’a écrite de Requeña le 18 -Octobre, m’est parvenue il y a quelques jours, et je l’ai sur le -champ transmise à l’empereur qui ne la recevra toute fois que -19 jours après le départ de cette même lettre de Paris. A la -distance ou l’empereur se trouve de sa capitale, il est des choses -sur lesquelles la politique force à fermer les yeux: du moins -momentanement. Si la conduite de monsieur le marechal duc -de Dalmatie est équivoque et cauteleuse; si ses démarches présentent -le même aspect que celles qu’il paroît avoir faites et qui -ont précédé l’abandon du Portugal après la prise d’Oporto, il -viendra un moment ou l’empereur pourra l’en punir s’il le juge -convenable, et peut-être est-il moins dangereux où il est qu’il ne -le serait ici où quelques factieux ont pu du sein même des prisons -qui les renfermaient méditer en l’absence de l’empereur, une révolution -contre l’empereur et sa dynastie, et presque l’exécuter, -le 2 et 3 Octobre dernier. Je pense donc, sire, qu’il est prudent -de ne pas pousser à bout le maréchal duc de Dalmatie tout en contrariant -sous main les démarches ambitieuses qu’il pourrait tenter, -et en s’assurant de la fidelité des principaux officiers de l’armée du -midi envers l’empereur et même de celle des Espagnols qu’il -traine à sa suite. L’arme du ridicule qu’il est facile de manier<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_596"></a>[596]</span> -en cette occasion suffira, ce me semble, pour déjouer ses coupables -projets s’ils existent, et le ramener à son devoir, sauf à faire -prendre par la suite des précautions pour qu’il ne s’en écarte -jamais.</p> - -<p>Quoiqu’il en soit je suis incontestablement dans la nécessité -d’attendre les ordres de l’empereur sur le contenu de la lettre de -V. M. datée de Requeña le 18 Oct. Elle voit par la présente que -je partage ses sentimens sur l’objet dont elle traite; je viens -d’être assez heureux pour donner à l’empereur et a sa famille -de nouvelles preuves de ma fidelité et de mon attachement, et je -suis assuré que si V. M. connaît les détails de ma conduite le -2 et 3 Octobre, elle la trouvera conforme aux sentimens que je -me suis fait un plaisir de lui exprimer en faveur de l’empereur et -de sa famille au moment ou j’ai pris congé de V. M. à Luneville il -y a quelques années, &c. &c.</p> - </div> - - -<p class="fs90"><em>Note.</em>—It is only necessary to add to this letter that notwithstanding -the duke of Feltre’s professions of attachment he was -soon afterwards one of the most zealous courtiers of the Bourbons -and the most bitter enemy of the emperor.</p> - -<p class="fs90">The constancy with which the duke of Dalmatia served that -great man is well known.</p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_VI_B">No. VI. B.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>Colonel Desprez to the King.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Paris, 3 Janvier, 1813.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>J’ai eu l’honneur d’annoncer à V. M. mon arrivée à Paris. -Mais j’ai dû en me servant de la voie de l’estafette user d’une -extrême discrétion. La reine m’ayant conseillé de vous écrire -avec quelque détail et ayant daigné m’offrir de faire partir ma lettre -par le premier courier qu’elle expédierait, j’en profite pour -rendre compte à V. M. de ma mission et lui faire connaître une -partie des évènements dont j’ai été témoin.</p> - -<p>Je suis arrivé à Moscou le 18 Octobre au soir. L’empereur -venait d’apprendre que l’avant garde commandée par le roi de<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_597"></a>[597]</span> -Naples avait été attaquée et forcée à la retraite avec une partie de -son artillerie. Déja le départ était résolu et les troupes se mettaient -en mouvement. On m’annonça à S. M. qui répondit -d’abord d’une manière peu favorable. Cependant au milieu de la -nuit on me fit appeler. Je remis à l’empereur les dépêches dont -V. M. m’avait chargé, et sans les ouvrir, il me questionna sur -leur contenu. Puis il fit sur les opérations de la campagne une -partie des objections qu’avait prévues V. M.</p> - -<p>Il dit que le mouvement en faveur de l’armée de Portugal avait -été commencé trop tard, qu’il aurait pu être fait un mois plutôt, -que lui-même avait daté la conduite à tenir dans cette circonstance -lorsqu’en 1808 il avait sans hésiter quitté Madrid pour marcher -aux Anglais qui s’étaient avancés jusqu’à Valladolid. Je répondis -que V. M. s’était mise en marche peu d’heures après la division -Palombini, qu’elle avait dû attendre cette division pour conduire -vers l’armée de Portugal un renfort tel que le succès ne -pût être douteux; qu’elle avait d’autant moins cru devoir -précipiter son mouvement, que M. le maréchal Marmont avait écrit -plusieurs fois qu’il se croyait trop faible pour lutter seul contre -l’armée Anglaise, que ce maréchal avait été maître du tems, -qu’il n’avait point été battu dans sa position sur le Duero, mais -bien sur un champ de bataille dans lequel rien ne l’avait forcé de -s’engager. L’empereur prétendit ensuite que V. M. après avoir -appris la perte de la bataille de Salamanque aurait dû se porter -sur le Duero et rallier l’armée de Portugal. Je rappelai alors le -mouvement fait du Guadarama vers Ségovie et la position critique -dans laquelle vous avez laissé la duc de Raguse qui avait lui-même -propose ce mouvement. L’empereur dit qu’il connaissait très bien -tous les reproches qu’à cet égard on pouvait faire au maréchal -Marmont. Il ajouta que l’armée du centre ayant fait sa retraite -sur Madrid elle aurait du garder plus longtems les défilés du -Guadarama, qu’on avait trop tôt passé le Tage, que du moins ce -mouvement ayant été resolu, il fallait ne point laisser de garnison -au Retiro, briser tous les affuts, emporter les aigles et bruler les -effets d’habillement; qu’il n’avait jamais considéré ce poste que -comme propre à contenir la population de Madrid, que l’ennemi -étant maître de la campagne, on devait l’abandonner et que de -toutes les fautes de la campagne c’était celle qu’il avait le moins -conçue. Je répondis à cette objection ainsi que j’en étais convenu -avec V. M. L’empereur en venant ensuite à la lettre du duc -de Dalmatie me dit qu’elle lui était déja parvenue par une autre -voie, mais qu’il n’y avait attaché aucune importance; que le<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_598"></a>[598]</span> -maréchal Soult s’était trompé, qu’il ne pouvait s’occuper de semblables -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">pauvretés</i> dans un moment où il <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">était à la tête de cinq -cent mille hommes et faisait des choses immenses</i>. Ce sont ses -expressions, qu’au reste les soupçons du duc de Dalmatie ne l’étonnaient -que faiblement; que beaucoup de généraux de l’armée -d’Espagne les partageaient et pensaient que V. M. préférait -l’Espagne à la France; qu’il savait parfaitement qu’elle avait le -cœur françois mais que ceux qui la jugeaient par ses discours -devaient avoir une autre opinion. Il ajouta que le maréchal -Soult était la seule tête militaire qu’il eut en Espagne, qu’il -ne pouvait l’en retirer sans compromettre l’armée, que d’ailleurs -il devait être parfaitement tranquille sur ses intentions -puisqu’il venait d’apprendre par les journaux anglais qu’il -évacuait l’Andalousie et se réunissait aux armées du centre et -d’Aragon, que cette réunion opérée on devait être assez en force -pour reprendre l’offensive; que d’ailleurs il n’avait point d’ordres -à envoyer, qu’il ne savait point en donner de si loin, qu’il ne se -dissimulait point l’étendue du mal et qu’il regrettait plus que -jamais que V. M. n’ait point suivi le conseil qu’il lui avait donné -de ne pas retourner en Espagne; qu’il était inutile que je repartisse, -que je resterai à l’armée ou l’on m’emploieroit. J’insistai -alors pour être renvoyé à V. M. d’une manière qui parut faire -sur l’empereur quelque impression, et il finit par me dire que je -serai expédié mais que je ne pouvais l’être dans ce moment, -qu’ayant besoin de repos je resterais à Moscou, et que puisque -j’étais officier du génie, je serais chargé de diriger sous les ordres -du duc de Trevise les travaux et la défense du Kremlin. Je -reçus en consequence un ordre écrit du Prince de Neufchatel. -Lorsqu’après l’entière évacuation de Moscou le corps de M. le M. -Mortier eut rejoint l’armée, je demandai et j’obtins d’y rester -attaché jusqu’à ce que je fusse expédié. Je craignais que si je -restais au quartier général on ne m’y désignât des fonctions qui -seraient un nouvel obstacle à mon retour. Je pensai que peut-être -on éviterait d’envoyer à V. M. un témoin des évènements qui se -passaient, et je préférai attendre qu’une occasion favorable se présentât. -Etant arrivé à Wilna peu de tems après le départ de -l’empereur, je demandai au duc de Bassano, et il me donna -l’autorisation de venir attendre des ordres à Paris. J’ai eu l’honneur -d’annoncer à V. M. dans un autre lettre que l’altération de -ma santé me forçait à suspendre mon retour en Espagne.</p> - -<p>L’armée au moment où je la quittai était dans la plus affreuse -détresse. Depuis longtems déjà la désorganisation et les pertes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_599"></a>[599]</span> -étaient effrayantes, l’artillerie et la cavalerie n’existaient plus. -Tous les corps étaient confondus. Les soldats marchaient pêle-mêle -et ne songaient qu’à prolonger machinalement leur existence; -quoique l’ennemi fut sur nos flancs, chaque jour des -milliers d’hommes isolés se répandaient dans les villages voisins -de la route et tombaient dans les mains des Cosaques. Cependant -quelque grand que soit le nombre des prisonniers, celui des morts -l’est incomparablement davantage. Il est impossible de peindre -jusqu’à quel point la disette s’est fait sentir pendant plus d’un -mois; il n’y eut point de distributions; les chevaux morts étaient -la seule ressource, et bien souvent les maréchaux mêmes manquaient -de pain. La rigueur du climat rendait la disette plus meurtrière, -chaque nuit nous laissions au bivouac plusieurs centaines de morts. -Je crois pouvoir sans exagérer porter à cent mille le nombre qu’on -a perdu ainsi, et peindre avec assez de vérité la situation des -choses en disant que l’armée est morte: la jeune garde qui faisait -partie du corps auquel j’étais attaché était forte de 8000 hommes -lorsque nous avons quitté Moscou, à Wilna elle en comptait à -peine quatre cents. Tous les autres corps d’armée sont réduits -dans la même proportion, et la retraite ayant dû se prolonger au-delà -du Niemen, je suis convaincu que vingt mille hommes -n’auront pas atteints la Vistule. On croyait à l’armée que beaucoup -de soldats avaient pris les devants et qu’ils se rallieraient -lorsqu’on pourrait suspendre le mouvement rétrograde. Je me -suis assuré du contraire; à cinq lieues du quartier général, je ne -rencontrai plus d’hommes isolés et je connus bien alors la profondeur -de la plaie. Une phrase pourrait donner à V. M. une idée -de l’état des choses, depuis le passage du Niemen un corps de -800 Napolitains, le seul corps qui eût conservé quelque consistance, -faisait l’arrière garde d’une armée française, forte naguère -de trois cents mille hommes. Il est impossible d’exprimer -jusqu’à quel point le désordre était contagieux; les corps réunis -des ducs de Bellune et de Reggio comptaient 30,000 hommes -au passage de la Beresina, deux jours après ils étaient dissous -comme le reste de l’armée. Envoyer des renforts c’était augmenter -les pertes et l’on reconnut enfin qu’il fallait empêcher les -troupes neuves de se mettre en contact avec cette multitude en -désordre à laquelle on ne peut plus donner le nom d’armée. Le -roi de Naples disait hautement qu’en lui laissant le commandement -l’empereur avait exigé le plus grand sacrifice qu’il pût -attendre de son dévouement. Les forces physiques et morales -du prince de Neufchâtel étaient entièrement épuisées. Si maintenant<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_600"></a>[600]</span> -V. M. me demandait quel doit être le terme du mouvement -rétrograde, je lui répondrais que l’ennemi est maître de le -fixer. Je ne crois pas que les Prussiens fassent de grands efforts -pour défendre leur territoire. M. de Narbonne que j’ai vu à -Berlin et qui était chargé de lettres de l’empereur pour le roi de -Prusse, m’a dit que les dispositions de ce prince et de son premier -ministre étaient favorables, mais il ne se dissimulait pas que celles -de la nation ne sont pas les mêmes. Déjà plusieurs rixes s’étaient -engagées entre les habitans de Berlin et des soldats de la garnison -française; et en traversant la Prusse j’ai eu lieu de m’assurer -que l’on ne pouvait guère compter sur cette alliée de nouvelle -date.</p> - -<p>Il parait aussi que dans l’armée autrichienne les officiers déclamaient -publiquement contre la guerre.</p> - -<p>Quel triste que soit ce tableau, je crois l’avoir peint sans exagération -et l’avoir observé de sang froid. Mon opinion sur l’étendue -du mal est la même que lorsque j’étais plus voisin du théâtre.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_VII">No. VII.</h3> - -<p class="p1 rt"><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Ghiart, le 2 Septembre, 1812.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Monsieur le duc de feltre</span>,</p> - -<p>J’ai reçu le rapport du duc de Raguse sur la bataille du 22. Il -est impossible de rien lire de plus insignifiant: il y a plus de -fatras et plus de rouages que dans une horloge, et pas un mot qui -fasse connaître l’état réel des choses. Voici ma manière de voir -sur cette affaire, et la conduite que vous devez tenir. Vous -attendrez que le duc de Raguse soit arrivé, qu’il soit remis de sa -blessure, et à-peu-près entièrement rétabli. Vous lui demanderez -alors de répondre catégoriquement à ces questions. Pourquoi -a-t-il livré bataille sans les ordres de son général-en-chef? Pourquoi -n’a-t-il pas pris des ordres sur le parti qu’il devoit suivre, -subordonné au systême général sur mes armées d’Espagne? Il -y a là <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">un crime d’insubordination</i> qui est la cause de tous les malheurs -de cette affaire, et quand même il n’eut pas été dans l’obligation -de se mettre en communication avec son général-en-chef -pour exécuter les ordres qu’il en recevrait, comment a-t-il pu -sortir de sa défensive sur le Duero, lorsque, sans un grand effort -d’imagination, il étoit facile de concevoir qu’il pouvoit être secourn<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_601"></a>[601]</span> -par l’arrivée de la division de dragons, d’une trentaine de pièces de -canon, et de plus de 15 mille hommes de troupes Françaises que -le roi avoit dans la main? Et comment pouvoit il sortir de la -défensive pour prendre l’offensive sans attendre la réunion et le -secours d’un corps de 15 à 17 mille hommes?</p> - -<p>Le roi avoit ordonné à l’armée du nord d’envoyer sa cavalerie -à son secours; elle étoit en marche. Le duc de Raguse ne -pouvoit l’ignorer, puisque cette cavalerie est arrivée le soir de la -bataille. De Salamanque à Burgos il y a bien des marches. -Pourquoi n’a-t-il pas retardé de deux jours pour avoir le secours -de cette cavalerie, qui lui étoit si importante? Il faudroit avoir -une explication sur les raisons qui ont porté le duc de Raguse à -ne pas attendre les ordres de son général-en-chef pour livrer -bataille sans attendre les renforts que le roi, comme commandant -supérieur de mes armées en Espagne, pouvoit retirer de l’armée -du centre, de l’armée de Valence et de l’Andalousie. Le seul -fonds de l’armée du centre fournissoit 15 mille hommes de pied, -et 2500 chevaux, lesquels pouvoient être rendus dans le même -temps que le duc de Raguse faisoit battre son corps, et en prenant -dans ses deux armées, le roi pouvoit lui amener 40 mille hommes. -Enfin le duc de Raguse sachant que 1500 chevaux étoient partis -de Burgos pour le rejoindre, comment ne les a-t-il pas attendus?</p> - -<p>En faisant coincider ces deux circonstances d’avoir pris l’offensive -sans l’ordre de son général-en-chef et de ne pas avoir retardé -la bataille de deux jours pour ne pas recevoir 15,000 hommes -d’infanterie que lui amenoit le roi, et 1500 chevaux de l’armée du -nord, on est fondé à penser que ce maréchal a craint que le roi -ne participe au succès de la bataille, et qu’il a sacrifié à la vanité -la gloire de la patrie et l’avantage de mon service.</p> - -<p>Donnez ordre aux généraux divisionnaires d’envoyer les états -de leurs pertes. Il est intolérable qu’on rende des comptes faux et -qu’on me dissimule la vérité.</p> - -<p>Prescrivez au général Clausel, qui commande l’armée, d’envoyer -la situation avant et après la bataille. Demandez également -aux chefs de corps des situations exactes. Finalement, vous -ferez connoître au duc de Raguse en temps opportun combien je -suis indigné de la conduite inexplicable qu’il a tenue, en n’attendant -pas deux jours que les secours de l’armée du centre et de -l’armée du nord le rejoignissent. J’attends avec impatience l’arrivée -du général aide-de-camp du roi pour avoir des renseignemens -précis. Ce qu’il a écrit no signifie pas grande chose.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="pad4 smcap">Napoleon.</span></p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_602"></a>[602]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_VIII_A">No. VIII. A.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>Extract from general Souham’s despatch to the minister of -war, Briviesca, 2d October, 1812.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>Par votre lettre du 6 Octobre vous m’annoncez que le duc de -Dalmatie venait de réunir son armée à Grenade et à Jaen, et que -le roi alloit se mettre incessamment en communication avec ce -maréchal pour marcher de concert sur Madrid. En consequence -de ces mouvemens je resolus de marcher à la rencontre de l’ennemi, -et de le forcer à lever le siège de Burgos. Le 18 toute mon armée -se mit en mouvement sur trois colonnes, et le 19 elle occupait les -positions ainsi qu’il suit. La droite à Termino, le centre sur -les hauteurs de Monasterio, et la gauche à Villa Escuso la -Solano et Villa Escuso la Sombria. La journée du 20 devait être -celle du combat, lorsque je reçus à l’instant, à deux heures du -matin, par un aide-de-camp, une lettre de S. M. C. qui m’ordonne -de ne point engager d’affaire générale, et d’attendre que par ses -manœuvres lord Wellington soit forcé d’évacuer sa position de -Burgos; ainsi il me faut renoncer à tous mes projets, et non sans -un violent chagrin, car je puis assurer V. E. que mon armée -était parfaitement disposée, et que j’aurais pu combattre l’ennemi -avec avantage. Cependant l’armée n’a des vivres que pour -quatre jours, et à cette epoque, si lord Wellington n’est point en -retraite, je serai forcé de l’attaquer. J’entrevois moins de peril de -marcher en avant que de rétrograder. Dans un instant où le -moral du soldat commence à se raffermir tout mouvement en -arrière produit le plus mauvais effet.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signé) <span class="pad4 smcap">Comte Souham.</span></p> - </div> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_VIII_B">No. VIII. B.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>Extracts from two letters written by the duke of Feltre to -King Joseph, dated Paris, 8th Oct. and 19th Nov., 1812.</em></p> - -<p class="fs90">On one of the letters is the following note, in pencil, by the -duke of Wellington. “<em>Advantage of English newspapers.</em>”</p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p class="p1">“Sire,—J’ai l’honneur d’adresser ci-joint à votre majesté<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_603"></a>[603]</span> -quelques extraits des journaux Anglais les plus récents dont j’ai -choisi ce qui pourrait être de quelque intérêt dans les circonstances -actuels.”</p> - -<p class="p1">“Sire,—J’ai l’honneur d’adresser ci-joint à V. M. plusieurs -extraits des journaux Anglais contenant quelques faits utiles ou -intéressans à connaître.”</p> - </div> - -<p class="fs90">These extracts taken from the Courier, Morning Post, Times, -Alfred, Statesman, and Morning Chronicle, contained minute -details upon the numbers, situation, and destination of the Sicilian, -Spanish, and Anglo-Portuguese armies, and the most exact -account of the reinforcements sent from England. In fine a -complete system of intelligence for the enemy.</p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_IX">No. IX.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>Extract of a letter from marshal Jourdan to colonel Napier.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 right"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Soisy sous Etiole, 14 Janvier, 1829.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>Le 10 Novembre, 1812. Les armées du midi, du Portugal, -et du centre se trouvaient réunies sur la Tormes. Vous connaissez -la position qu’occupait l’armée des alliés. Cette position -ayant été bien reconnue, dans la journée du 11, par le roi, -accompagné du duc de Dalmatie, de plusieurs généraux, et de moi, -je proposai de passer la Tormes, guéable prèsque partout entre -Villa-Gonzala et Huerta, et de nous porter rapidement sur -Calvarissa de Ariba, qui se trouvait au centre de la ligne des -ennemis. J’esperais que lord Wellington ne pourrait éviter la -bataille; et j’étais d’avis que nous devions faire tous nos efforts -pour le forcer à l’accepter; me flattant qu’avec une armée de 80 -milles hommes, dont 10 milles de cavalerie et 120 pièces de -canon,<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> nous étions en état de remporter un brilliant succès, sur -le même champ de bataille où quelques mois avant nous avions -essuyé un revers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_604"></a>[604]</span></p> - -<p>Le duc de Dalmatie, n’étant pas de mon avis, proposa d’aller -passer la Tormes, à des guès qu’il avait reconnus à deux lieues -au-dessus d’Alba; ce parti était sans doute plus prudent; mais il -avoit, suivant moi, l’inconvenient que je voulais éviter, c’est-à-dire, -qu’il laissait à nos adversaires la facilité de se retirer sans -combattre. Cependant comme je n’étais revêtu d’aucun commandement, -tandis que le duc de Dalmatie avait sous ses ordres -les deux tiers de l’armée, le roi jugea convenable d’adopter son -plan, et lui en confia l’exécution; vous en connaissez le résultat: -il fut tel que je l’avais prévu.</p> - -<p>Permettez moi, Monsieur, d’ajouter une reflexion; Il me semble -que lord Wellington decidé à battre en retraite, aurait dû commencer -à l’opérer le 14ème jour, où nous franchîmes la Tormes. -En ne se mettant en mouvement que le 15, il se trouva dans la -nécessité de défiler devant nous pendant une partie de la journée; -et sans les mauvais tems, et surtout sans beaucoup trop de circonspection -de notre côté il eût peut-être couru quelque danger.</p> - -<p>On a publié que pendant leur retraite les alliés ne perdirent que -50 ou 60 tués, 150 blessés, 170 prisonniers. Il est, cependant, -certain que le nombre de prisonniers Anglais, Portugais, et -Espagnols, conduits au quartier général à Salamanque, étoit, le -20 Novembre, de 3520.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<p class="fs90">The justice of the marshal’s opinion as to lord Wellington -having staid too long on the Tormes is confirmed by the following -note of a conversation held with the duke of Wellington on the -subject.</p> - -<p class="fs90">“Lord Wellington would have fought the French on the old -position of the Arapiles in 1812 notwithstanding their superior -numbers, but he staid too long at Salamanca.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_605"></a>[605]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_X">No. X.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>The duke of Feltre, minister of war, to the king of Spain.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Paris, le 29 Janvier, 1813.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>J’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire à V. M. le 4 de ce mois pour lui -faire connaître les intentions de l’empereur au sujet des affaires -d’Espagne, et la necessité de transporter le quartier général de -Madrid à Valladolid. Cette dépêche a été expédiée par duplicate -et triplicate, et j’ignore encore si elle est parvenue à V. M. -Depuis sa dépêche de Madrid du 4 Decembre je suis privé de ses -lettres, et ce long silence me prouve que les communications de -Madrid à Vittoria restent constamment <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">interceptées</i>. Il est vrai -que les opérations du général Caffarelli qui s’est porté avec toutes -ses troupes disponsibles sur la côte de Biscaye pour dégager Santona -fortement menacé par l’ennemi et parcourir la côte, a donné aux -bandes de la Castille une facilité entière d’intercepter la route de -Burgos à Vittoria. Les dernières nouvelles que je reçois à l’instant -de l’armée de Portugal sont du 5 Janvier. A cette époque -tout y était tranquille, mais je vois toujours la même difficulté pour -communiquer. Cet état de choses rend toujours plus nécessaire de -s’occuper très sérieusement et très instamment de balayer les provinces -du nord, et de les délivrer enfin de ces bandes qui ont -augmentés en forces et en consistance à un point qui exige indispensablement -toute notre attention et tous nos efforts. Cette -pensée a tellement attire l’attention de l’empereur que S. M. I. -m’a réitéré quatre fois successivement l’ordre exprès de renouveller -encore l’expression de ses intentions que j’ai déjà adressée -à V. M. par ma lettre du 4 Janvier pour l’engager à revenir à -Valladolid, à garder Madrid par une division seulement, et à -concentrer ses forces de manière à pouvoir envoyer des troupes de -l’armée de Portugal vers le nord, en Navarre, et en Biscaye, afin -de délivrer ces provinces, et d’y rétablir la tranquillité. Le général -Reille également frappé de l’état des choses dans le nord de -l’Espagne a bien compris la nécessité de prendre un parti decisif -à cet égard. Il m’a transmis à cette occasion la lettre qu’il a eu -l’honneur d’écrire à V. M. le 13 Octobre dernier, et j’ai vu qu’il -lui a présenté un tableau frappant et vrai de la situation des -affaires qui vient entièrement à l’appui de ma dépêche du 4 courant.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_606"></a>[606]</span> -Quant à l’occupation de Madrid, l’empereur m’ordonne -de mettre sous les yeux de V. M. le danger qu’il y aurait dans -l’état actuel des affaires de vouloir occuper cette capitale comme -point central, et d’y avoir encore des hôpitaux et établissemens -qu’il faudrait abandonner à l’ennemi au premier mouvement prononcé -qu’il ferait vers le nord. Cette considération seule doit -l’emporter sur toute autre, et je n’y ajouterai que le dernier mot -de l’empereur à ce sujet; c’est que toutes les convenances dans -la position de l’Europe veulent que V. M. occupe Valladolid, et -pacifie le nord. Le premier objet rempli facilitera beaucoup le -second, et pour y contribuer par tous les moyens comme pour -économiser un tems précieux, et mettre à profit l’inaction des -Anglais, je transmets directement aux généraux commandant -en chef les armées du nord et de Portugal, les ordres de l’Empereur -pour que leur exécution ne souffre aucun retard, et que -ceux de V. M. pour appuyer et consolider leurs opérations n’éprouvent -ni lenteur ni difficulté lorsqu’ils parviendront à ces -généraux. Je joins ici copie de mes lettres, sur lesquelles j’ai -toujours reservé les ordres que V. M. jugera à-propos de donner -pour l’entière exécution de ceux de l’empereur. Ma lettre était -terminée lorsqu’un aide-de-camp de M. le maréchal Jourdan est -arrivé avec plusieurs dépêches, dont la dernière est du 24 Decembre. -J’ai eu soin de les mettre sous les yeux de l’empereur, -mais leur contenu ne saurait rien changer aux intentions de S. M. I. -et ne peut que confirmer les observations qui se trouvent dans ma -lettre. J’aurai l’honneur d’écrire encore à V. M. par le retour -de l’officier porteur des dépêches de M. le maréchal Jourdan. Je -suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté, le très humble et très -obéïssant serviteur,</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr6">Le ministre de la guerre,</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Duc de Feltre</span>.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XI">No. XI.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>Depuis la lettre que j’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire à votre majesté le -29 Janvier, l’empereur, après avoir pris connoissance des dépêches -apportées par l’aide-de-camp de monsieur le maréchal Jourdan, me<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_607"></a>[607]</span> -charge encore de réitérer son intention formelle et déjà deux fois -transmise à votre majesté, qu’elle porte son quartier général à -Valladolid afin de pouvoir s’occuper efficacement de soumettre et -pacifier le nord; par une conséquence nécessaire de ce changement, -Madrid ne doit être occupé que par l’extremité de la gauche -de manière à ne plus faire partie essentielle de la position générale -et à pouvoir être abandonné sans inconvénient, au cas qu’il -soit nécessaire de se réunir sur un autre point. Cette nouvelle disposition -procure à votre majesté les moyens de faire réfluer des -forces considérables dans le nord et jusqu’à l’Arragon pour y -détruire les rassemblemens qui existent, occuper en force tous les -points importans, interdire l’accès des côtes aux Anglais, et opérer -la soumission entière du pays. Il est donc d’une importance extrême -pour parvenir à ce bût, de profiter de l’inaction des Anglais, -qui permet en ce moment l’emploi de tous nos moyens contre les -insurgés et doit amener promptement leur entière destruction, si -les opérations entreprises pour cette effet sont conduites avec -l’activité, l’energie et la suite qu’elles exigent. Votre majesté a -pu se convaincre par la longue et constante interruption des communications -autant que par les rapports qui lui sont parvenus de -toute l’étendue du mal, et de la nécessité d’y porter remède. On -ne peut donc mettre en doute son empressement à remplir les intentions -de l’empereur sur ces points importans des changemens, -qui ont eu lieu pour le commandement en chef des armées du -midi, du nord, et de Portugal, me font espérer que votre majesté -n’éprouvera plus de difficultés pour l’exécution de ses ordres et que -tout marchera au même bût sans contradiction, et sans obstacle. -Ces nouvelles dispositions me dispensent de répondre à différentes -observations contenues dans les lettres de votre majesté, et m’engagent -à attendre qu’elle me fasse connoître les résultats des -changemens ordonnés par l’empereur. Je ne dois pas oublier de -prévenir votre majesté d’un ordre que sa majesté impériale m’a -chargé de transmettre directement à monsieur le général Reille -pour lui faire envoyer une division de son armée en Navarre dont -la situation exige impérieusement des secours prompts et efficaces. -Cette disposition ne peut contrarier aucune de celles que votre majesté -sera dans le cas d’ordonner à l’armée de Portugal pour concourir -au même bût et amener la soumission des provinces du -nord de l’Espagne.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">Je suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté</span><br /> -<span class="padr2">Le très humble et très obéïssant serviteur</span><br /> -<span class="padr6">Le Ministre de la Guerre,</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Duc de Feltre</span>.</p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_608"></a>[608]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XII">No. XII.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>Duke of Feltre to the king of Spain.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Paris, le 12 Fevrier, (No. 2.) 1813.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>Par ma lettre de ce jour No. 1, j’ai eu l’honneur de faire connaître -à V. M. les intentions de l’empereur sur les opérations à -suivre en Espagne. La présente aura pour bût de répondre plus particulièrement -à la lettre dont V. M. m’a honoré en date du 8 -Janvier et que j’ai eu soin de mettre sous les yeux de l’empereur. -Les plaintes qu’elle contient sur la conduite du maréchal duc de -Dalmatie et du général Caffarelli deviennent aujourd’hui sans -objet par l’éloignement de ces deux généraux en chef. Je dois -cependant prévenir V. M. qu’ayant fait connaître au général Caffarelli -qu’on se plaignait à Madrid de ne point recevoir de comptes -de l’armée du nord, ce général me répond sous la date du 27 -Janvier qu’il a eu l’honneur de rendre à V. M. des comptes -extrêmement frequens, qu’il lui a envoyé la situation de l’armée et -des doubles des rapports qui me sont adressés. La général Caffarelli -ajoute qu’il avait demandé à V. M. d’ordonner que deux -divisions de l’armée de Portugal vinssent appuyer les opérations -de l’armée du nord, et il pense que ces lettres se seront croisées -avec les dépêches de Madrid parceque les courriers out éprouvé -beaucoup de retard, mais il y a lieu de présumer que tout ce qui a -été adressé de l’armée du nord a du parvenir à Madrid avant la -fin de Janvier. V. M. réitère dans sa lettre du 8 Janvier ses -demandes relativement aux besoins de l’armée. Toutes ont été -mises sous les yeux de l’empereur. S. M. I. m’ordonne de répondre -au sujet des fonds dont la demande se retrouve dans plusieurs -dépêches précédentes que l’argent nécessaire aux armées -d’Espagne se serait trouvé dans ces riches et fertiles provinces -dévastées par les bandes et par les juntes insurrectionelles, qu’en -s’occupant avec l’activité et la vigueur convenables pour rétablir -l’ordre et la tranquillité, on y gagnera toutes les ressources qu’elles -peuvent encore offrir, et que le tems ramènera dans toute leur -étendue. C’est donc un motif de plus pour V. M. d’employer -tous les moyens dont elle dispose pour mettre fin à cette guerre -interne qui trouble le repos des habitans paisibles, ruine le pays, -fatigue nos armées et les prive de tous les avantages qu’elles -trouveraient dans l’occupation tranquille de ces belles contrées. -L’Arragon et la Navarre aujourd’hui sous les loix de Mina alimentent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_609"></a>[609]</span> -de leurs productions et de leur revenus cette lutte désastreuse, -il est tems de mettre un terme à cet état de choses et de -faire rentrer dans les mains du gouvernement légitime les ressources -d’un pays florissant lorsqu’il est paisible, mais qui ne -servent aujourd’hui qu’à son détriment.</p> - -<p>Je suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté, le très humble et -très obéïssant serviteur,</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr6">Le ministre de la guerre,</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Duc de Feltre</span>.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XIII">No. XIII.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Paris, le 12 Fevrier, 1813.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>J’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire trois fois à V. M. dans le courant de -Janvier, pour lui transmettre les intentions de l’empereur sur la -conduite des affaires en Espagne, et j’ai eu soin de faire expedier -toutes mes dépêches au moins par triplicata, tellement que je puis -et dois espérer aujourd’hui qu’elles sont parvenues à leur destination. -Je reçois en ce moment le dup<sup>ta</sup> d’une lettre de V. M. -en date du 8 Janvier, dont le primata n’est point arrivé et j’y -vois une nouvelle preuve de la difficulté toujours subsistante de -communication, les inconveniens de cet état de choses deviennent -plus sensibles dans les circonstances actuelles, où il étoit -d’une haute importance que les ordres de l’empereur reçussent -une prompte exécution. S. M. I. pénétrée de cette idée, attend -avec une véritable impatience de savoir ce qui s’est opéré à Madrid, -d’après ses instructions, et cette attente, journellement deçue -lui fait craindre qu’on n’ait perdu un temps précieux, les Anglais -étant depuis plus de deux mois dans l’impuissance de rien faire. -L’empereur espère du moins que lorsque V. M. aura eu connaisance -du 29<sup>me</sup> bulletin, elle aura été frappée de la nécessité de se -mettre promptement en communication avec la France et de -l’assurer par tous les moyens possibles. On ne peut parvenir à -ce bût qu’en faisant refluer successivement les forces dont -V. M. peut disposer sur la ligne de communication de Valladolid à -Bayonne, et en portant en outre des forces suffisantes en Navarre<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_610"></a>[610]</span> -et en Aragon pour combattre avec avantage et détruire les bandes -qui dévastent ces provinces.</p> - -<p>L’armée de Portugal combinée avec celle du nord est bien suffisante -pour remplir cet objet tandis que les armées du centre et -du midi, occupant Salamanque et Valladolid, présentent assez de -forces pour tenir les Anglais en échec en attendant les évènements. -L’empereur m’ordonne de réitérer à V. M. que l’occupation -de <em>Valladolid</em> comme quartier général et résidence pour la -personne, est un préliminaire indispensable, à toute operation. -C’est de-là qu’il faut diriger sur la route de Burgos et successivement -sur tous les points convenables les forces disponibles qui -doivent renforcer ou seconder l’armée du nord. Madrid et -même Valence ne peuvent être considérés dans ce systême que -comme des points à occuper par l’extremité gauche de la ligne, et -nullement comme lieux à maintenir exclusivement par une concentration -de forces. Valladolid et Salamanque deviennent -aujourd’hui les points essentiels entre lesquels doivent être réparties -des forces prêtes à prendre l’offensive contre les Anglais et -à faire échouer leurs projets. L’empereur est instruit qu’ils se -renforcent en Portugal, et qu’ils paraissent avoir le double projet -ou de pousser en Espagne ou de partir du port de Lisbonne pour -faire une expédition de 25 mille hommes, partie Anglais partie -Espagnols, sur un point quelconque des côtes de France pendant -que la lutte sera engagée dans le nord. Pour empêcher l’exécution -de ce plan il faut être toujours en mésure de se porter en -avant et ménacer de marcher sur Lisbonne ou de conquerir le -Portugal. En même tems il faut conserver des communications -aussi sûres que faciles avec la France pour être promptement instruits -de tout ce qui s’y passe, et le seul moyen d’y parvenir est -d’employer le tems ou les Anglais sont dans l’inaction pour pacifier -la Biscaye et la Navarre comme j’ai eu soin de le faire connaître -à V. M. dans mes précédentes. La sollicitude de l’empereur -pour les affaires d’Espagne lui ayant fait réitérer à plusieurs -reprises et reproduire sous toutes les formes ses intentions à cet -égard je ne puis achever mieux de les remplir qu’en récapitulant -les idées principales que j’ai eu l’ordre de faire connaître à V. M. -Occuper Valladolid et Salamanque, employer avec la plus grande -activité possible tous les moyens de pacifier la Navarre et l’Aragon, -maintenir des communications très rapides et très sûres avec la -France, rester toujours en mésure de prendre l’offensive au besoin, -voilà ce que l’empereur me prescrit de faire considérer à V. M. -comme instruction générale pour toute la campagne et qui doit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_611"></a>[611]</span> -faire la base de ses operations. J’ai à peine besoin d’ajouter que -si les armées Françaises en Espagne restaient oisives et laissaient -les Anglais maîtres de faire des expeditions sur nos côtes, la tranquillité -de la France serait compromise et la décadence de nos -affaires en Espagne en serait l’infaillible résultat, Je suis avec -respect,</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr6">Sire, de votre majesté,</span><br /> -<span class="padr4">le très humble et très obéïssant serviteur</span><br /> -<span class="padr2">Le Ministre de la Guerre,</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Duc de Feltre</span>.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XIV">No. XIV.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Paris, le 12 Mars, 1813.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>La difficulté toujours subsistante des communications a apporté -dans ma correspondance avec V. M. des retards considérables et -de longues interruptions dont les résultats ne peuvent être que très -préjudiciables au service de l’empereur. Depuis plus de deux -mois j’expédie sans cesse et par tous les moyens possibles ordre -sur ordre pour faire exécuter les dispositions prescrites par -S. M. I. et je n’ai aucune certitude que ces ordres soient parvenus -à leur destination. L’empereur extrêmement mécontent de cet -état de choses renouvelle sans cesse l’injonction la plus précise de -le faire cesser, et j’ignore encore en ce moment si les mouvemens -prescrits se préparent ou s’exécutent, mais je vois toujours d’avantage -que si des ordres relatifs à cette mesure doivent partir de -Madrid cela entrainerait une grande perte de tems. L’empereur en -a été frappé, Il devient donc tout-à-fait indispensable de s’écarter -un moment de la voie ordinaire et des dispositions par lesquelles -tout devroit emaner de V. M. au moins pour ce qui concerne le -nord et l’armée de Portugal. Je prends pour cet effet le parti -d’adresser directement aux généraux commandant de ces armées -les ordres d’exécution qui dans d’autres circonstances devraient -leur parvenir de Madrid, et j’ai l’honneur d’adresser ci-joint à -V. M. copies des lettres que j’ai écrites au général Reille et au -général Clauzel pour déterminer enfin l’arrivée des renforts absolument<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_612"></a>[612]</span> -nécessaires pour soumettre l’Aragon, la Navarre et la -Biscaye; les details contenus dans ma lettre au général Clauzel -me dispensent de m’étendre d’avantage sur cet objet important. -V. M. y verra surtout qu’en prescrivant l’exécution prompte et -entière des ordres de l’empereur j’ai toujours reservé l’exercise de -l’autorité supérieure remise entre les mains de V. M. et qu’elle -conserve également la direction ultérieure des opérations des -qu’elle pourra les conduire par elle-même.</p> - -<p>Toutes mes précédentes dépêches sont d’allieurs assez précises -sur ce point pour ne de laisser pas doute à cet egard.</p> - </div> - -<hr class="r20" /> - -<p class="p2 center"><em>The duke of Feltre to the king.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Paris, 18 Mars, 1813.</i></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Sire</span>,</p> - -<p>Parmi les lettres dont V.M. m’a honoré, la plus récente de celles -qui me sont parvenues jusqu’à ce jour est du 1 Fevrier, et je vois -qu’à cette epoque V. M. n’avait point encore reçu celle que j’ai -eu l’honneur de lui adresser par ordre de l’empereur le 4 Janvier -pour l’engager à transferer son quartier général à Valladolid. -Cette disposition a été renouvellée dans toutes mes dépêches postérieures -sous les dates de 14, 29 Janvier, 3, 12, 25 Fevrier, -1, 11 et 12 Mars, sans avoir eu jusqu’à present de certitude que -mes lettres fussent arrivées à leur destination. Enfin une lettre de -M. le duc d’Albufera en date 4 Mars me transmit copie de celle -que V. M. lui a adressée le 23 Fevrier pour le prevenir que -ma lettre du 4 Janvier est arrivée à Madrid, et qu’on s’y préparait -à exécuter les dispositions prescrites par l’empereur. Ainsi c’est -de Valence que j’ai reçu la première nouvelle positive à cet égard, -et cette circonstance qui dévoile entièrement nôtre situation dans -le nord d’Espagne est une nouvelle preuve de l’extrême urgence -des mesures prescrites par l’empereur et de tout le mal que d’inexplicables -retards ont causé. S. M. I. vient à cette occasion de -me réitérer l’injonction de faire sentir à V. M. la fausse direction -qu’ont prise les affaires d’Espagne par le peu de soin qu’on a -apporté à maintenir les communications avec les frontières. L’empereur -est etonné qu’on ait si peu compris à Madrid l’extrême -importance de conserver des communications sûres et rapides avec<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_613"></a>[613]</span> -la France. Le defaut constant de nouvelles était un avertissement -assez clair et assez positif de l’impuissance ou se trouvait -l’armée du nord de proteger la route de Madrid à Bayonne. -L’état des affaires dans le nord de l’Europe devait plus que jamais -faire sentir la nécessité de recevoir des nouvelles de Paris et de -prendre enfin des mesures décisives pour ne pas rester si longuement -dans un état d’isolement et d’ignorance absolu sur les vues -et l’intention de l’empereur. V. M. avoit trois armées à sa disposition -pour rétablir les communications avec l’armée du nord, et -l’on ne voit pas un mouvement de l’armée de Portugal ou de celle -du centre qui soit approprié aux circonstances, tandis que l’inaction -des Anglais permettait de profiter de notre supériorité pour -chasser les bandes, nettoyer la route, assurer la tranquillité dans -le pays. L’empereur m’a ordonné de faire connaître sa façon de -penser sur cet objet au général Reille, auquel j’ai adressé directement -les ordres de S. M. I. pour les forces qu’il a dû mettre -sans retard sous les ordres du général Clauzel ainsi que j’ai eu l’honneur -d’en prévenir V. M. par mes lettres du 29 Janvier, 3 Fevrier -et 12 Mars. En effet les circonstances rendent cette mesure d’une -extrême urgence. L’inaction où l’on est resté pendant l’hiver a -encouragé et propagé l’insurrection. Elle s’etend maintenant de la -Biscaye, en Catalogne, et l’Aragon exige, pour ainsi dire, le même -emploi des forces pour la pacifier, que la Biscaye et la Navarre. -Il est donc de la plus haute importance que V. M. etende ses soins -sur l’Aragon comme sur les autres provinces du nord de l’Espagne, -et les évènemens qui se préparent rendront ce soin toujours plus -nécessaire. D’un côte toutes les bandes chassées de la Biscaye -et de la Navarre se trouveront bientôt forcées à refluer dans l’Aragon, -et d’autre part l’évacuation de Cuenca, par résultat du mouvement -général des armées du centre et du midi priverait le général -Suchet de toute communication avec V. M. dans un moment ou -les ennemis se renforcent devant lui d’une manière assez <em>inquiétante</em>. -Il est donc très important de se procurer une autre ligne -de communication avec Valence et cette ligne ne peut s’établir -que par l’Aragon. C’est à votre majesté qu’il appartient de donner -à cet égard les ordres nécessaires. Il suffira sans doute de lui -avoir fait connaître l’état de choses et la position du maréchal -Suchet pour lui faire prendre les déterminations que les circonstances -rendraient les plus convenables. Il me tarde beaucoup -d’apprendre enfin de V. M. elle-même l’exécution des ordres de -l’empereur et de pouvoir satisfaire sur ce point la juste impatience -de S. M. I.</p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_614"></a>[614]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XV">No. XV.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>Joseph O’Donnel to general Donkin.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<em>Malaga, the 6th December, 1812.</em></p> - -<p><span class="pad2 allsmcap">DEAR SIR</span>,</p> - -<p>The letter you did me the honour to adress to me on the 6th -of September has been mislaid all this long time on account of -my being separated from the armie since the moment I gave up the -command of it, and it was only last night I had the pleasure of -receiving it. I feel a great comfort in seingh an officer of your -reputation affected so kindly with the sorrows which so unlucky -as undeservedly (I believe) fell upon me as a consequence of my -shamefull defaite at Castalla. But I beg to be excused if I continue -this letter in French. I kno you understand it very well -and I can not explain my toughts so well in English. <span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Je crois, M. le -général, que tout militaire, instruit des faits, et à la vue du malheureux -champ de bataille de Castalla, ou du plan qui le représente, -doit faire le même raisonement que vous avez fait, à moins qu’il ne -soit épris des petites passions et des prejugés qui ne dominent que -trop souvent les hommes. Je crois l’avoir demontré à l’evidence -dans mon rapport officiel au gouvernement (que vous devez avoir -vu imprimmé) accompagné de la carte des environs et des copies -de toutes les ordres que je donnai la veille du combat. J’aurois -certainement été vainquer si l’officier qui commandoit les 760 -chevaux, avec deux pièces de 8 à mon aile gauche eut obéi mes -ordres, on eut seulement tâché de se laisser voir de loin par la -cavallerie enemie, qui au nombre de 400 chevaux étoit stationée -dans le village de Viar; mais point du tout, cet officier, au lieu -de se trouver sur Viar au point du jour de la bataille, pour tenir -en échec la cavallerie ennemie, pour la battre s’il en trouvoit une -occasion probable, ou pour la suivre en tout cas, et l’empêcher de -tomber sur Castalla impunément, comme il lui était très expressément -ordonné par des ordres écrites qu’il avoue, cet officier alla se -cacher derriére Villena, et quoiqu’il entendit le canon de Castalla, -et qu’il fut instruit de la marche des dragons de Viar par la route -d’Onil, il resta tranquilement en position de l’autre côté de -Villena jusqu’à passé huit heures du matin. Nous étions déjà -battus, et trois malheureux bataillons hachés en pièces (quoi-qu’ayant -repoussé la première charge) quand M. le brigadier<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_615"></a>[615]</span> -Santistevan se mit en marche de Villena pour venir à mon -secours. Jugez done, Mons. le général, si j’ay pû empêcher ce -désastre. Cependant, le public, qui ne peut juger que par les resultats, -se dechaina d’abord contre moi, et je ne m’en plains pas, -car cela étoit fort naturel; c’est un malheur attaché à notre profession, -et que les généraux Espagnols doivent resentir sur touts -les autres, puisqu’ils font la guerre sans resources, et manquant -de tout contre un ennimi aguerri qui ne manque de rien; mais je -me plains des <em>Cortes</em> de la nation, je me plains de ces pères de la -patrie, qui sachant que j’avois demandé moimême à être jugé par -un conseille de guerre, out cependant donné le ton à l’opinion -publique se rependant en invectives contre moi, et même contre mon -frère le régent, avant de scavoir si je suis en effet coupable. Après -un pareile traitement, et dans l’etât de misère et de détresse où se -trouvent nos armées, ou trouvera t’on de généraux qui veuillent -exposer leur honneur, et en accepter le commandement? Quant à -moi je servirai ma patrie par devoir et par inclination jusqu’au -dernier soupir, mais je n’accepterai jamais aucun commandement, -supposant qu’il me fut offert. Les informations que l’on prend -relativement à l’affaire en question ne sont pas encore finies, car -tout va doucement chez nous. J’en attends le resultat ici avec -l’aveu du gouvernement, et aussitôt que l’on aura prononcé en -justice j’irai me présenter comme simple volontaire dans une de -nos armées si l’on ne veut pas m’employer dans ma calité de général -subalterne. Je vous ay trop ennuyé de mes peines; c’est que j’en -ay le cœur navré, et que votre bonté m’a excité à m’en soulager -en vous les racontant. Il me reste encore un espoir flatteur, c’est -le jugement de touts mes camarades qui out vû de près mes dispositions -à l’affaire de Castalla, et les efforts que j’avois fait pendant -sept mois, luttant toujours contre la detresse et le désordre, pour -préparer à la victoire une armée qui étoit tout-à-fait nulle quand -je fus obligé a en prendre, malgré moi, le commandement. Je -m’estimerai heureux, Monsieur le général, de mériter aussi le -sufrage d’un officier aussi distingué que vous l’êtes, et je vous prie -d’agréer le temoignage du sincère attachement de votre très humble -et très obéissant serviteur,</span></p> - -<p class="rt"> -<span class="smcap">Josef O’Donell</span>.</p> - -<p><i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Monsieur le général Donkin</i>,<br /> -<span class="pad6">&c. &c.</span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_616"></a>[616]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XVI">No. XVI.</h3> - -<p class="p1 rt"> -<em>Freneda, February 15th, 1813.</em></p> - -<p><span class="pad2 smcap">Sir</span>,</p> - -<p>I have received your letter of the 12th instant, regarding the -conduct of the second Italian regiment, and I entirely concur in -all the measures you have adopted, and applaud the decision and -firmness of your conduct. I am prepared likewise to approve of -whatever you shall determine upon deliberation regarding the -future state of the men of the regiment, whether to be formed -into a regiment again, or not; or if so formed, whether to be kept -as part of the army or sent back to Sicily.</p> - -<p>The foreign troops are so much addicted to desertion that they -are very unfit for our armies, of which they necessarily form too -large a proportion to the native troops. The evil is aggravated by -the practice which prevails of enlisting prisoners as well as deserters, -and Frenchmen as well as other foreigners, notwithstanding -the repeated orders of government upon the subject. The -consequence is therefore that a foreign regiment cannot be placed -in a situation in which the soldiers can desert from it, that they -do not go off in hundreds; and in the Peninsula they convey to -the enemy the only intelligence which he can acquire.</p> - -<p>With this knowledge I seldom if ever use the foreign British -troops of this army on the duty of outposts; and whatever you may -determine regarding the second Italian regiment, I recommend the -same practice to your consideration.</p> - -<p>There is nothing new on this side of the Peninsula. The -armies are nearly in the stations which they took up in the end of -November.</p> - -<p class="rt"> -<span class="padr6">I have the honour to be,</span><br /> -<span class="padr13">Sir,</span><br /> -<span class="padr2">Your most obedient Servant,</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Wellington</span>.</p> - -<p><em>Major-General Campbell,<br /> -<span class="pad4">&c. &c. &c.</span></em></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_617"></a>[617]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XVII">No. XVII.</h3> - -<p class="center"><em>Extract of a letter from the marquis of Wellington to lieutenant-general -sir John Murray, dated Freneda, April 6th, -1813.</em></p> - -<p>“In regard to feeding the Spanish troops in Spain, I have invariably -set my face against it and have never consented to it or -done it, even for a day in any instance. My reasons are, first -that it entails upon Great Britain an expense which the country -is unable to bear; secondly, that it entails upon the department -of the army which undertakes it a detail of business, and a burthen -in respect to transport, and other means to which the departments -if formed upon any moderate scale must be quite unequal; -thirdly, I know from experience that if we don’t interfere, the -Spanish troops, particularly if paid as yours are, and in limited -numbers, will not want food in any part of Spain, whereas the -best and most experienced of our departments would not be able -to draw from the country resources for them. I have already -consented to the formation of a magazine for the use of general -Whittingham and general Roche’s corps for a certain number of -days, if it should be found necessary to give them assistance of -this description. I can go no farther, and I earnestly recommend -to you if you give assistance to all, to give over a magazine to -last a given time, but not to take upon yourself to supply the -Spanish troops engaged in operations. If, however, you should -notwithstanding this recommendation take upon yourself to give -such supplies, I must object, as commander-in-chief of the -Spanish army, to your giving more than bread to the troops who -receive pay, as that is positively contrary to the regulations and -customs of the Spanish army. I recommend to you also to attend -with caution to the demands of both general Whittingham -and general Roche, and to observe that in proportion as you will -comply with their demands, demands will be made upon you by -general Elio and others, and you will involve yourself in a scale of -expense and difficulty, which will cramp all your operations, and -which is quite inconsistent with the views of government on the -eastern coast of the Peninsula.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_618"></a>[618]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XVIII">No. XVIII.</h3> - -<p class="pfs90">General state of the French army, April 15, 1812.</p> - -<p class="pfs90">Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="3">Present under Arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Armée de</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Midi</td> -<td class="tdr">55,797</td> -<td class="tdr">11,014</td> -<td class="tdr">2,498</td> -<td class="tdr">700</td> -<td class="tdr">6,065</td> -<td class="tdr">64,360</td> -<td class="tdr">11,714</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Centre</td> -<td class="tdr">19,148</td> -<td class="tdr">3,993</td> -<td class="tdr">144</td> -<td class="tdr">51</td> -<td class="tdr">624</td> -<td class="tdr">19,916</td> -<td class="tdr">4,044</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Portugal</td> -<td class="tdr">56,937</td> -<td class="tdr">8,108</td> -<td class="tdr">4,394</td> -<td class="tdr">2,278</td> -<td class="tdr">7,706</td> -<td class="tdr">69,037</td> -<td class="tdr">10,386</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Ebre</td> -<td class="tdr">16,830</td> -<td class="tdr">1,873</td> -<td class="tdr">21</td> -<td class="tdr">6</td> -<td class="tdr">3,425</td> -<td class="tdr">20,276</td> -<td class="tdr">1,879</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Arragon</td> -<td class="tdr">14,786</td> -<td class="tdr">3,269</td> -<td class="tdr">2,695</td> -<td class="tdr">658</td> -<td class="tdr">1,467</td> -<td class="tdr">18,948</td> -<td class="tdr">3,927</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Catalogne</td> -<td class="tdr">28,924</td> -<td class="tdr">1,259</td> -<td class="tdr">1,163</td> -<td class="tdr">49</td> -<td class="tdr">5,540</td> -<td class="tdr">35,627</td> -<td class="tdr">1,308</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Nord</td> -<td class="tdrb">48,232</td> -<td class="tdrb">7,074</td> -<td class="tdrb">1,309</td> -<td class="tdr">72</td> -<td class="tdr">8,677</td> -<td class="tdr">58,276</td> -<td class="tdr">7,213</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">240,654</td> -<td class="tdr">36,590</td> -<td class="tdr">12,224</td> -<td class="tdr">3,614</td> -<td class="tdr">33,504</td> -<td class="tdr">286,440</td> -<td class="tdr">40,471</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Reserve de Bayonne</td> -<td class="tdr">4,038</td> -<td class="tdr">157</td> -<td class="tdr">36</td> -<td class="tdr">35</td> -<td class="tdr">865</td> -<td class="tdr">4,939</td> -<td class="tdr">192</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">General Total</td> -<td class="tdr">244,692</td> -<td class="tdr">36,747</td> -<td class="tdr">12,260</td> -<td class="tdr">3,849</td> -<td class="tdr">34,369</td> -<td class="tdr">291,370</td> -<td class="tdr">40,663</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Civic guards attached to the army of the south.</td> -<td class="tdr">6,497</td> -<td class="tdr">1,655</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">258</td> -<td class="tdr">6,755</td> -<td class="tdr">1,497</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Troupes Espagnols.</td> -<td class="tdr">33,952</td> -<td class="tdr">525</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">33,952</td> -<td class="tdr">525</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total Espagnols</td> -<td class="tdr">40,449</td> -<td class="tdr">2,180</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">258</td> -<td class="tdr">40,707</td> -<td class="tdr">2,022</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="7"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs90">General state, May 15, 1812.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="3">Present under Arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Armée de</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdr">Art.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Midi</td> -<td class="tdr">56,031</td> -<td class="tdr">12,101</td> -<td class="tdr">2,787</td> -<td class="tdr">660</td> -<td class="tdr">4,652</td> -<td class="tdr">63,470</td> -<td class="tdr">7,311</td> -<td class="tdr">4,340</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Centre</td> -<td class="tdr">17,395</td> -<td class="tdr">4,208</td> -<td class="tdr">158</td> -<td class="tdr">37</td> -<td class="tdr">766</td> -<td class="tdr">19,203</td> -<td class="tdr">3,332</td> -<td class="tdr">420</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Portugal</td> -<td class="tdr">52,618</td> -<td class="tdr">7,244</td> -<td class="tdr">9,750</td> -<td class="tdr">1,538</td> -<td class="tdr">8,332</td> -<td class="tdr">70,700</td> -<td class="tdr">4,481</td> -<td class="tdr">3,448</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Arragon</td> -<td class="tdr">27,218</td> -<td class="tdr">4,768</td> -<td class="tdr">4,458</td> -<td class="tdr">605</td> -<td class="tdr">3,701</td> -<td class="tdr">35,377</td> -<td class="tdr">2,976</td> -<td class="tdr">1,980</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Catalonia</td> -<td class="tdr">33,677</td> -<td class="tdr">1,577</td> -<td class="tdr">1,844</td> -<td class="tdr">267</td> -<td class="tdr">6,009</td> -<td class="tdr">41,530</td> -<td class="tdr">1,376</td> -<td class="tdr">279</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Nord</td> -<td class="tdr">38,771</td> -<td class="tdr">6,031</td> -<td class="tdr">2,560</td> -<td class="tdr">271</td> -<td class="tdr">7,767</td> -<td class="tdr">49,098</td> -<td class="tdr">4,443</td> -<td class="tdr">1,163</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">225,710</td> -<td class="tdr">35,929</td> -<td class="tdr">21,557</td> -<td class="tdr">3,378</td> -<td class="tdr">31,227</td> -<td class="tdr">279,378</td> -<td class="tdr">23,919</td> -<td class="tdr">11,630</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Old Reserve at Bayonne</td> -<td class="tdr">3,894</td> -<td class="tdr">221</td> -<td class="tdr">1,642</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">964</td> -<td class="tdr">6,500</td> -<td class="tdr">207</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">New Reserve at Bayonne</td> -<td class="tdr">2,598</td> -<td class="tdr">116</td> -<td class="tdr">3,176</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">5</td> -<td class="tdr">5,769</td> -<td class="tdr">103</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad2">General Total</td> -<td class="tdr">232,202</td> -<td class="tdr">36,266</td> -<td class="tdr">26,375</td> -<td class="tdr">3,378</td> -<td class="tdr">32,196</td> -<td class="tdr">291,647</td> -<td class="tdr">24,229</td> -<td class="tdr">11,630</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs90">General state of the French Armies, March 15, 1813.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="3">Present under Arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Armée de</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdr">Train.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Midi</td> -<td class="tdr">36,605</td> -<td class="tdr">6,602</td> -<td class="tdr">2,060</td> -<td class="tdr">1,617</td> -<td class="tdr">7,144</td> -<td class="tdr">45,809</td> -<td class="tdr">8,650</td> -<td class="tdr">2,601</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Centre</td> -<td class="tdr">16,227</td> -<td class="tdr">1,966</td> -<td class="tdr">940</td> -<td class="tdr">76</td> -<td class="tdr">2,401</td> -<td class="tdr">19,568</td> -<td class="tdr">2,790</td> -<td class="tdr">451</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Portugal</td> -<td class="tdr">34,825</td> -<td class="tdr">3,654</td> -<td class="tdr">157</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">7,731</td> -<td class="tdr">42,713</td> -<td class="tdr">6,726</td> -<td class="tdr">2,149</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Arragon</td> -<td class="tdr">36,315</td> -<td class="tdr">3,852</td> -<td class="tdr">55</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">2,442</td> -<td class="tdr">38,812</td> -<td class="tdr">6,123</td> -<td class="tdr">1,799</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Catalonia</td> -<td class="tdr">27,323</td> -<td class="tdr">1,109</td> -<td class="tdr">110</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">2,013</td> -<td class="tdr">29,446</td> -<td class="tdr">1,884</td> -<td class="tdr">635</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Nord</td> -<td class="tdr">40,476</td> -<td class="tdr">1,978</td> -<td class="tdr">41</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">8,030</td> -<td class="tdr">48,547</td> -<td class="tdr">3,171</td> -<td class="tdr">830</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Reserve de Bayonne</td> -<td class="tdr">5,877</td> -<td class="tdr">55</td> -<td class="tdr">80</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">634</td> -<td class="tdr">6,591</td> -<td class="tdr">78</td> -<td class="tdr">21</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">197,648</td> -<td class="tdr">19,216</td> -<td class="tdr">3,443</td> -<td class="tdr">1,693</td> -<td class="tdr">30,395</td> -<td class="tdr">231,486</td> -<td class="tdr">29,422</td> -<td class="tdr">8,486</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 fs80">The operations and misfortunes of the French prevented any general -states being sent home between the 15th of March and the 15th of August, -when a new organization of the armies took place; but the numbers -given in the narrative of this History are the result of calculations -founded on the comparison of a variety of documents, and are believed to -be a very close approximation to the real strength of the armies.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_619"></a>[619]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XIX">No. XIX.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs90">Especial state of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs90">Head-quarters, Tordesillas.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="5">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hosp.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="4">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cav.</td> -<td class="tdr">Train.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1st</td> -<td class="tdl">Division</td> -<td class="tdl">Foy</td> -<td class="tdr">5,138</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">319</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">516</td> -<td class="tdr">5,973</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2d</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">Clausel</td> -<td class="tdr">7,405</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">678</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">613</td> -<td class="tdr">8,696</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3d</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">Ferey</td> -<td class="tdr">5,547</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">12</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">926</td> -<td class="tdr">6,485</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">4th</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">Sarrut</td> -<td class="tdr">5,056</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">214</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">862</td> -<td class="tdr">6,132</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">5th</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">Maucune</td> -<td class="tdr">5,269</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">588</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,513</td> -<td class="tdr">7,370</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">6th</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">Brennier</td> -<td class="tdr">5,021</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">124</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">720</td> -<td class="tdr">5,865</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">7th</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">Thomieres</td> -<td class="tdr">6,352</td> -<td class="tdr">61</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,905</td> -<td class="tdr">8,257</td> -<td class="tdr">61</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">8th</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">Bonnet</td> -<td class="tdr">6,681</td> -<td class="tdr">139</td> -<td class="tdr">66</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">685</td> -<td class="tdr">7,432</td> -<td class="tdr">139</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Light Cavalry, 3 escadrons</td> -<td class="tdl">Curto</td> -<td class="tdr">1,386</td> -<td class="tdr">1,398</td> -<td class="tdr">1,073</td> -<td class="tdr">324</td> -<td class="tdr">246</td> -<td class="tdr">2,705</td> -<td class="tdr">1,722</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Dragoons</td> -<td class="tdl">Boyer</td> -<td class="tdr">1,389</td> -<td class="tdr">1,378</td> -<td class="tdr">479</td> -<td class="tdr">358</td> -<td class="tdr">86</td> -<td class="tdr">1,954</td> -<td class="tdr">1,736</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">Artillery</td> -<td class="tdr">3,612</td> -<td class="tdr">2,339</td> -<td class="tdr">513</td> -<td class="tdr">258</td> -<td class="tdr">220</td> -<td class="tdr">4,345</td> -<td class="tdr">347</td> -<td class="tdr">2,148</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">Genie</td> -<td class="tdr">414</td> -<td class="tdr">9</td> -<td class="tdr">67</td> -<td class="tdr">7</td> -<td class="tdr">84</td> -<td class="tdr">565</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">12</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">Equipage</td> -<td class="tdr">955</td> -<td class="tdr">1,107</td> -<td class="tdr">51</td> -<td class="tdr">44</td> -<td class="tdr">242</td> -<td class="tdr">1,251</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">1,084</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Gendarmes et Infirmerie</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">325</td> -<td class="tdr">75</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -<td class="tdr">15</td> -<td class="tdr">340</td> -<td class="tdr">54</td> -<td class="tdr">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3" colspan="3">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">54,550</td> -<td class="tdr">6,506</td> -<td class="tdr">4,184</td> -<td class="tdr">991</td> -<td class="tdr">8,633</td> -<td class="tdr">67,370</td> -<td class="tdr">4,059</td> -<td class="tdr">3,244</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="bb" colspan="8"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 fs90">From these 54,550 men, present under arms, must be deducted the -artillery, engineers, equipages, and garrisons, the officers and sergeants, -and the losses sustained between the siege of the forts and the battle of -Salamanca, the result will be about 42,000 sabres and bayonets in the -battle.</p> - -<table class="p2 autotable fs80"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Reinforcements en marche de l’armée du nord</td> -<td class="tdr">1,370</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Do. <span class="pad4">de Bayonne</span></td> -<td class="tdr"><span class="pad4"> </span>12,676</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 fs90"><em>Note.</em>—These troops did not join before the battle of Salamanca.</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs90">Artillery of the army of <ins class="corr" id="tn-619" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Portugal, Jnne 15'"> -Portugal, June 15</ins>, 1812, Materiel.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl wd40">Poid et calibre.</td> -<td class="tdr">Nombre.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">Canon de 12 lbs.</td> -<td class="tdr">2</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Bouches</td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl pad6">8 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">20</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdl">Total des</td> -<td class="tdr">60</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">a feu</td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl pad6">4 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">33</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">canons</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl pad6">3 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">5</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">Obusiers de 6 pouces</td> -<td class="tdr">11</td> -<td class="tdl">  }</td> -<td class="tdl">Total des</td> -<td class="tdr">14</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">Ditto de 4 pouces 3 lignes</td> -<td class="tdr">3</td> -<td class="tdl">  }</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">obusiers</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="9"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl pad6">Total</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr bt">74</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4"><span class="pad2">Venant de l’armée du nord</span><br /> -<span class="fs80">( These guns arrived after the battle. )</span></td> -<td class="tdr bb">8</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr bb">82</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_620"></a>[620]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - -<p class="p2 pfs90">Total loss of the army of Portugal from 10th July to 10th of August, -1812, including the battle of Salamanca. Extracted from the Imperial -Muster-rolls.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Tués.</td> -<td class="tdc">Blessés.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">Duke de Raguse</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">General Clauzel</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Officiers superieurs</td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">General Bonnet</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">General Ferrey</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">General Thomieres</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdl">General Desgravier Bertholet</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl">General Carrie</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdl"><ins class="corr" id="tn-620" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Prisoner'"> -Prisonnier</ins>.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl">General Menne</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Aide-de-camp du duc de Raguse</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl">Colonel Richemont</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl">Le Clerc de Montpree</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl">Darel</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">1</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl pad4">Total</td> -<td class="tdc bt bb">Tués 4</td> -<td class="tdl bt bb" colspan="2">  Blessés 7</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<table class="p2 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Officiers inferieurs et soldats.</td> -<td class="tdr">Tués ou Pris.</td> -<td class="tdr">Blessés.</td> -<td class="tdr">Traineurs.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Officiers</td> -<td class="tdrp wd20">162</td> -<td class="tdrp wd20">232</td> -<td class="tdrp wd20">”  </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Soldats</td> -<td class="tdrp">3,867</td> -<td class="tdrp">7,529</td> -<td class="tdrp">645</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Grande Total</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">4,029</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">7,761</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">645</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<table class="p2 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl wd50">Officiers et Soldats</td> -<td class="tdr">12,435</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Chevaux</td> -<td class="tdr">1,190</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Canons</td> -<td class="tdr">12</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Deux aigles de 22eme et 101eme Regt. de ligne.</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XX">No. XX.</h3> - -<p class="pfs90">Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army under Lord Viscount Wellington, -on the morning of the 22d of July, 1812. Extracted from the original -morning state.</p> - -<p class="fs80"><em>Note.</em>—The numbers are exclusive of officers, sergeants, trumpeters, -artillery-men, and staff, shewing merely the sabres and bayonets in the -field.</p> - -<table class="p2 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British cavalry, one division,</td> -<td class="tdc">present under arms</td> -<td class="tdr">3,314</td> -<td class="tdl">men</td> -<td class="tdl">3,388</td> -<td class="tdl">horses.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British infantry, seven divisions</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">22,067</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Total British</td> -<td class="tdr bt"></td> -<td class="tdl bt"></td> -<td class="tdl bt"></td> -<td class="tdl bt"></td> -<td class="tdr">25,381</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, three<br />regiments, about</td> -<td class="tdr">1,500</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4">These troops not in the state</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Portuguese infantry, seven divisions,<br />and two independent brigades</td> -<td class="tdr bb">16,017</td> -<td class="tdr bb"></td> -<td class="tdr bb"></td> -<td class="tdr bb"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr bb">17,517</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="7"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="4">Total Anglo-Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdr">42,898</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="7"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Carlos d’Espana’s Spanish division, about</td> -<td class="tdr">3,000</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Julian Sanchez’ cavalry</td> -<td class="tdr bb">500</td> -<td class="tdr bb"></td> -<td class="tdr bb"></td> -<td class="tdr bb"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr bb">3,500</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="7"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl pad3" colspan="4">Sabres and bayonets</td> -<td class="tdr bb">46,398</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_621"></a>[621]</span></p> - - -<p class="p3 pfs90">No. of British, German, Portuguese, and Spanish guns at the battle of -Salamanca.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Weight of calibre.</td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Number of guns.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British horse artillery</td> -<td class="tdr">6 lbs.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">      18</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Foot <span class="pad2">do.</span></td> -<td class="tdr">9 lbs.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">12</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad4">Do. <span class="pad2">do.</span></td> -<td class="tdr">12 lbs.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">12</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">German <span class="pad3">do.</span></td> -<td class="tdr">9 lbs.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">6</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese and British brigaded together</td> -<td class="tdr" colspan="3">24 lb. howitzers       6</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr bt">54</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">One Spanish battery</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr bb">6</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad10" colspan="2">General total</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr bb">60</td> -<td class="tdl">pieces.</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XXI">No. XXI.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs90">Official report of the loss of the allies on the Trabancos and Guarena -rivers, 18th July, 1812.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Officers.</td> -<td class="tdr">Sergeants.</td> -<td class="tdr">Rank and file.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">3</td> -<td class="tdrp">3</td> -<td class="tdrp">56</td> -<td class="tdrp">59</td> -<td class="tdl">Killed</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British</td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">16</td> -<td class="tdrp">7</td> -<td class="tdrp">274</td> -<td class="tdrp">65</td> -<td class="tdl">Wounded</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdrp">27</td> -<td class="tdrp">21</td> -<td class="tdl">Missing</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="7"></td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdl">  543</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">1</td> -<td class="tdrp">2</td> -<td class="tdrp">31</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdl">Killed</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">6</td> -<td class="tdrp">3</td> -<td class="tdrp">87</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdl">Wounded</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdrp">27</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdl">Missing</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Total</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">26</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">15</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">502</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">145</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="9"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="9">Loss of the allies in the battle of Salamanca.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="9"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">28</td> -<td class="tdrp">24</td> -<td class="tdrp">336</td> -<td class="tdrp">96</td> -<td class="tdl">Killed</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British</td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">188</td> -<td class="tdrp">136</td> -<td class="tdrp">2,400</td> -<td class="tdrp">120</td> -<td class="tdl">Wounded</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdrp">”</td> -<td class="tdrp">74</td> -<td class="tdrp">37</td> -<td class="tdl">Missing</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="7"></td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdl">5,224</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">13</td> -<td class="tdrp">4</td> -<td class="tdrp">287</td> -<td class="tdrp">18</td> -<td class="tdl">Killed</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese</td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">74</td> -<td class="tdrp">42</td> -<td class="tdrp">1,436</td> -<td class="tdrp">13</td> -<td class="tdl">Wounded</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">{</td> -<td class="tdrp">1</td> -<td class="tdrp">1</td> -<td class="tdrp">180</td> -<td class="tdrp">7</td> -<td class="tdl">Missing</td> -<td class="tdc">}</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Total</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">304</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">207</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">4,713</td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">291</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="9"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs120" colspan="9">Loss of the German cavalry on the Almar Stream, July 23.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="9"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Men and Officers.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp" colspan="2">117</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrp">117</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">  117</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p2 pfs90">The British loss by infantry divisions and cavalry brigades.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl pad3" colspan="3">{ Le Marchant’s brigade,</td> -<td class="tdc">lost</td> -<td class="tdc">  Men and officers</td> -<td class="tdr">105</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl pad3" colspan="3">{ Anson’s <span class="pad4">do.</span></td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">5</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl pad3" colspan="3">{ Vr. Alten’s <span class="pad3">do.</span></td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">31</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="8"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">{ 1st Division</td> -<td class="tdl">General Campbell</td> -<td class="tdc">lost</td> -<td class="tdc">  Men and officers</td> -<td class="tdr">69</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ 3d</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">General Pakenham</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">456</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ 4th</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">General Cole</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">537</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">{ 5th</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">General Leith</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">464</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ 6th</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">General Clinton</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">1,198</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ 7th</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">General S. Hope</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">119</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Light</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">General C. Alten</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">29</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl pad3" colspan="2">Artillery</td> -<td class="tdl">General Framingham</td> -<td class="tdl">do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdr">14</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="7"></td> -<td class="tdl bt bb">3,027</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_622"></a>[622]</span></p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<h3 id="NO_XXII">No. XXII.</h3> - -<p class="p1 pfs90">Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army at Vittoria. Extracted from the -morning state of the 19th June, 1813.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc">On command.</td> -<td class="tdc">Present.</td> -<td class="tdc">On command.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdrqq">7,791</td> -<td class="tdrq">851</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese do.</td> -<td class="tdrqq">1,452</td> -<td class="tdrq">225</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Total cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl bt"></td> -<td class="tdl bt"></td> -<td class="tdrp">9,243</td> -<td class="tdrp">1,076</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">British infantry</td> -<td class="tdrqq">33,658</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,771</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Portuguese do.</td> -<td class="tdrqq">23,905</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,038</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3">Total infantry</td> -<td class="tdl bt"></td> -<td class="tdl bt"></td> -<td class="tdrp">57,563</td> -<td class="tdrp">2,809</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl pad6" colspan="2">Sabres and bayonets</td> -<td class="tdrp bt">66,806</td> -<td class="tdrp bt">3,885</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad3" colspan="3">Deduct the 6th division left at Medina de Pomar</td> -<td class="tdrp">6,320</td> -<td class="tdrp"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl pad6" colspan="2">Sabres and bayonets</td> -<td class="tdrp bt">60,486</td> -<td class="tdrp bt"></td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="5"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl pad3">Spanish Auxiliaries.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Morillo’s division</td> -<td class="tdr">about 3,000</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Giron’s     do.</td> -<td class="tdr">do. 12,000</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Carlos d’Espagna’s  do.</td> -<td class="tdr">do.   3,000</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Longa’s    do.</td> -<td class="tdr">do.   3,300</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">Penne Villemur</td> -<td class="tdr">do.   1,000</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Julian Sanchez</td> -<td class="tdr">do.   1,000</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdrp">23,000</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Grand Total</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdrp bt bb">83,486</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p3 pfs90">No. of Anglo-Portuguese guns at the battle of Vittoria.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs90"><span class="smcap">Colonel A. Dickson</span> commanding.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs70"> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">British horse artillery</td> -<td class="tdl">9 lbs.</td> -<td class="tdr">45</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">6 lbs.</td> -<td class="tdr">30</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Do.</td> -<td class="tdc">do.</td> -<td class="tdl">5½ inch howitzers</td> -<td class="tdr">15</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl pad2">Total</td> -<td class="tdr bt bb">90</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="4">No Spanish guns set down in the return. Number unknown.</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p class="p4 pfs80">END OF VOL. V.</p> - -<p class="p4 pfs70">MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h2>FOOTNOTES:</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> In a recent number of the “Quarterly Review,” the writer of an article -upon the correspondence of Louis the XVIII. quotes me as saying that Massena -had <em>one hundred and thirty-five thousand men</em> under his orders, as if he had invaded -Portugal with an army of that amount, whereas I have expressly said -that he invaded Portugal with <em>sixty-five thousand</em>, the rest being extended as far -as Biscay. The assertion of the Reviewer is therefore essentially false with the -appearance of truth. The same writer, while rebuking the Editor of the Correspondence -for ignorance, asserts, that the battle of Busaco was fought between -the 9th of October and the 5th of November! It was fought on the 27th of -September.</p> - -<p>Another writer in the same No. treating of Professor Drumann’s work, -speaks of “<em>following</em> an impulse which is from <em>behind</em>,” a figure of speech -which must appear singularly felicitous to those who have watched a puppy dog -chasing his own tail; but your Quarterly Reviewers are your only men for accuracy -of fact and expression!</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> These numbers are somewhat below those I have assigned to the French -army; my calculation was made from the imperial muster-rolls, but the difference -may be easily accounted for by the length of time which elapsed when -marshal Jourdan wrote this letter. His numbers are evidently from memory, and -probably he did not mean to include the king’s guards and Spaniards.</p> - -</div> -</div> - - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">PUBLISHED BY</span><br /> -<span class="pfs120 lsp2 smcap">T. and W. BOONE</span>,<br /> -<span class="pfs80">29, <em>New Bond-street</em>.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="r30" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs90 lsp2">A REPLY TO</span><br /> -<span class="pfs120">LORD STRANGFORD’S “OBSERVATIONS”</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">ON SOME PASSAGES IN</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">COLONEL NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE WAR</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70 lsp2">IN THE PENINSULA.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs100">BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80">Second Edition, 8vo. price 1s.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs100">A REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">PARTICULARLY TO</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">“<em>STRICTURES ON COLONEL NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE</em></span><br /> -<span class="pfs70"><em>WAR IN THE PENINSULA</em>:”</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Together with</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">OBSERVATIONS ILLUSTRATING SIR JOHN MOORE’S CAMPAIGNS.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80">BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">8vo. price 2s.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs100">COL. NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS</span><br /> -<span class="pfs100">THIRD VOLUME,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">FORMING A</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90">SEQUEL TO HIS REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">AND CONTAINING SOME</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70"><em>NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO</em></span><br /> -<span class="pfs80">THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs90">A LETTER TO</span><br /> -<span class="pfs100">GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">BEING AN ANSWER TO</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90">HIS LORDSHIP’S ASSUMED REFUTATION OF</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70"><em>COLONEL NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME</em>.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">BY COLONEL NAPIER, C.B.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">In 8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs100">COUNTER-REMARKS TO</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lsp2">MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S</span><br /> -<span class="pfs120 lsp2">REMARKS</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">OF HIS HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">In 8vo. price 1s. 6d.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">In the Press, in one vol. 8vo.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs100">REMARKS ON MILITARY LAW</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">AND THE</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lsp3">PUNISHMENT OF FLOGGING.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">BY</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80">COLONEL CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, C.B.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs120 lsp2">COLONIZATION;</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">PARTICULARLY</span><br /> -<span class="pfs100 lsp2">IN SOUTHERN AUSTRALIA:</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">WITH SOME REMARKS ON</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80">SMALL FARMS AND OVER POPULATION.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 smcap">By COLONEL CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, C.B.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Author of “The Colonies; particularly the Ionian Islands.”</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">In One vol. 8vo. price 9<em>s.</em> boards.</span><br /> -</p> - -<p class="fs70">“We earnestly recommend the book to all who feel an interest in the -welfare of the people.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">In One Volume, post 8vo. price 10<em>s.</em> 6<em>d.</em></span><br /> -<span class="pfs135 lsp3">RANDOM SHOTS</span><br /> -<span class="pfs120 lsp">FROM A RIFLEMAN.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">BY</span><br /> -<span class="pfs100">CAPTAIN JOHN KINCAID, <span class="smcap">First Battalion</span>,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70"><cite>Author of “Adventures in the Rifle Brigade.”</cite></span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="fs70"> -<p>“It is one of the most pithy, witty, soldier-like, and pleasant books -in existence.”—<cite>United Service Journal.</cite></p> - -<p>“The present volume is to the full as pleasant, and, what is still more -strange, as original as the last. Criticism would become a sinecure if -many such volumes were written: all left for us is to admire and recommend.”—<cite>New -Monthly Magazine.</cite></p> - -<p>“If you have military adventures to relate, take pen in hand, and -relate them in the pleasant, cheerful, and agreeable manner, in which -John Kincaid, the prince of adjutants and good fellows, relates his. -Read his <cite>Random Shots</cite>, in order to give you an idea of such matters, -for few there are who have seen more shots fired than the gallant captain -of the rifles.”—<cite>Fraser’s Magazine.</cite></p> - -<p>“The present volume is likely to add to his reputation. It is a useful -appendix to the larger works of Napier and other military commentators. -It is never dull, tedious, technical, or intricate.”—<cite>Times.</cite></p> - -<p>“Those who have read Captain Kincaid’s Adventures in the Rifle -Brigade will seize this volume with avidity, and having dashed through -it, will lay it down with only one feeling of regret—that it is not longer.”—<cite>News.</cite></p> - -<p>“His book is full of genuine humour, without one particle of the -trickery sometimes resorted to for the purpose of supplying the place of -wit.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p> - -<p>“This is a most racy, spiritedly sketchy performance.”—<cite>Court Journal.</cite></p> -</div> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">In Two Volumes, post 8vo. price 21<em>s.</em></span><br /> -<span class="pfs100 lsp3">ADMIRAL NAPIER’S</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">ACCOUNT OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="pfs120 lsp2">WAR IN PORTUGAL</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">BETWEEN</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lsp2">DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">WITH PLANS OF HIS ACTION OFF</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80">CAPE ST. VINCENT.</span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="fs70"> -<p>“An excellent and spirit-stirring book—plain, honest, and straightforward—the -very stuff of which the web of history alone should be -composed. This is indeed an honest, fair, and impartial history.”—<cite>Morning -Chronicle.</cite></p> - -<p>“In spirit and in keeping, from beginning to end, Admiral Napier’s -‘War in Portugal’ is the happiest picture we could conceive of the hero -of the battle off Cape St. Vincent—its especial excellence consisting in a -regardless bluntness of manner and language that is quite admirable and -delightful.”—<cite>Monthly Review.</cite></p> - -<p>“His work will create a fresh interest in events, which, before reading, -we thought impossible.”—<cite>Naval and Military Gazette.</cite></p> - -<p>“It is Cæsar’s Commentaries in the first person.”—<cite>Spectator.</cite></p> - -<p>“Candid to a degree, and sincere as a sailor’s will. This is the very -stuff of which history should be composed.”—<cite>Bell’s Messenger.</cite></p> - -<p>“If Admiral Napier be not distinguished by the common-place facilities -of authorship, he possesses the higher qualities of truth, discretion, -and clear-sightedness, in no slight degree.”—<cite>Atlas.</cite></p> - -<p>“In speaking of himself and his deeds, he has hit the just and -difficult medium—shewing his real feelings, yet steering clear of affected -modesty on the one hand, and of overweening modesty on the other.”—<cite>Tait’s -Magazine.</cite></p> - -<p>“This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant -author figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of Napier.”—<cite>News.</cite></p> -</div> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">In foolscap 8vo. price 1<em>s.</em></span><br /> -<span class="pfs120">THE NURSERY GOVERNESS;</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lht"><span class="smcap">By ELIZABETH NAPIER</span>,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Published after her Death by her Husband, Col. C. J. Napier, C.B.</span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="fs70"> -<p>“Hear the instructions of thy father, and forsake not the law of thy -mother.”—<em>Proverbs</em>, ch. i. v. 8.</p> - -<p>“This is an admirable little book.”—<cite>True Sun.</cite></p> - -<p>“The excellent instructions laid down by Mrs. Napier will, we have -no doubt, prove a ‘rich legacy’ not only to her own children, but to those -in many a nursery.”—<cite>Liverpool Chronicle.</cite></p> - -<p>“Not only the nursery-governess, but the mother and daughter, -especially in the higher walks of life, may read it with advantage.”—<cite>Atlas.</cite></p> - -<p>“We are so convinced of its utility, that we would strongly recommend -it to the diligent study of every female who has the care of a family, -either as a mother or governess.”—<cite>Sun.</cite></p> -</div> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">In One Volume, post 8vo. price 10<em>s.</em> 6<em>d.</em> boards,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lht">NARRATIVE OF</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lht">EVENTS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80 lht">And of the ATTACK ON NEW ORLEANS, in 1814 & 1815.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lht">By CAPT. I. H. COOKE, 43d Regt.</span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="fs70"> -<p>“This clever and fearless account of the attack on New Orleans is -penned by one of the ‘occupation;’ whose soldier-like view and keen -observation during the period of the stirring events he so well relates, -has enabled him to bring before the public the ablest account that has -yet been given of that ill-fated and disgraceful expedition, and also to -rescue the troops who were employed on it from those degrading reflections -which have hitherto unjustly been insinuated against them.”—<cite>Gentleman’s -Magazine.</cite></p> - -<p>“We wish earnestly to call the attention of military men to the campaign -before New Orleans. It is fraught with a fearful interest, and -fixes upon the mind reflections of almost every hue. Captain Cooke’s -relation is vivid; every evolution is made as clear to the eye as if we -had been present, and the remarks, we think, are eminently judicious. -The book must be generally read,” &c.—<cite>Metropolitan.</cite></p> - -<p>“It is full of good feeling, and it abounds with sketches of the service.”—<cite>Sunday -Herald.</cite></p> -</div> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs120 lsp3">SKETCHES IN SPAIN,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70 lht">During the Years 1829-30-31 and 32;</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Containing Notices of some Districts very little known; of the Manners of -the People, Government, Recent Changes, Commerce, Fine Arts, -and Natural History.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lht">BY CAPTAIN S. E. COOK, R.N. K.T.S. F.G.S.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Two vol. 8vo. price 21<em>s.</em></span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="fs70"> -<p>“Volumes of great value and attraction; we would say, in a word, -they afford us the most complete account of Spain in every respect which -has issued from the press.”—<cite>Literary Gazette.</cite></p> - -<p>“The value of the book is in its matter and its facts. If written upon -any country it would have been useful, but treating of one like Spain, -about which we know almost nothing, but of which it is desirable to -know so much, Captain Cook’s Sketches must be considered an acquisition -to the library.”—<cite>Spectator.</cite></p> - -<p>“These volumes comprise every point worthy of notice, and the whole -is so interspersed with lively adventure and description; so imbued with -a kindly spirit of good-nature, courting and acknowledging attention, as -to render it attractive reading.”—<cite>United Service Gazette.</cite></p> - -<p>“No one could either pretend to write or converse upon this country -without preparing himself by a previous perusal of this instructive -work.”—<cite>Metropolitan.</cite></p> -</div> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">Just Published, in post 8vo. price 5s.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90">RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Relative of the Duties of Troops composing the advanced Corps of the Army,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80"><span class="smcap">By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL I. LEACH</span>, C.B.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Late of the Rifle Brigade.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Author of “Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier.”</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs90">THE HISTORY</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="pfs120 lsp2">KING’S GERMAN LEGION,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">FROM THE PERIOD OF ITS ORGANIZATION IN 1803, TO THAT OF ITS -DISSOLUTION IN 1816.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70"><em>Compiled from Manuscript Documents.</em></span><br /> -<span class="pfs80">By N. LUDLOW BEAMISH, <span class="smcap">Esq.</span> F.R.S. late Major unattached.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Vol. I. 8vo. with coloured plates; price 20<em>s.</em> boards; to be completed in -two volumes.</span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="fs70"> -<p>“The work is not like others we could name—a mere compilation -from newspapers and magazines. Major Beamish has left no source of -information unexplored; and the access he obtained to manuscript journals -has enabled him to intersperse his general narrative with interesting -personal anecdotes, that render this volume as delightful for those who -read for amusement, as those who read for profit.”—<cite>Athenæum.</cite></p> - -<p>“We are altogether much pleased with the volume, and heartily recommend -it to the British public.”—<cite>Literary Gazette.</cite></p> -</div> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs80">MEMOIR</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">BY</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80 lsp2">GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, BART.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">OF HIS<br /> -PROCEEDINGS AS CONNECTED WITH THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN,<br /> -AND THE</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80 lsp2">COMMENCEMENT OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">In one vol. 8vo. price 9<em>s.</em> boards.</span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="fs70"> -<p>“These volumes, the work of a gentleman of high and varied accomplishments, -whose opportunities of observation have been unusually -extensive and well-improved, will command and repay attention. They -contain by far the best account of Spain which has yet issued from the -press.”—<cite>United Service Gazette.</cite></p> -</div> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs90">AN ESSAY ON THE</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80 lht">PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION OF</span><br /> -<span class="pfs100 lsp2 lht">MILITARY BRIDGES,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">AND THE PASSAGE OF RIVERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs80 lht">BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">K.S.C., D.C.L., F.R.S., &c. &c.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">The Second Edition, containing much additional Matter and Plates,<br /> -8vo. price 20<em>s.</em> boards.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">In 8vo. price 2<em>s.</em></span><br /> -<span class="pfs120 lht">PRUSSIA IN 1833;</span><br /> -<span class="pfs60">ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF PRUSSIA, AND HER CIVIL INSTITUTIONS.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">Translated from the French by M. de Chambray. With an Appendix by<br /> -General de Caraman.</span><br /> -</p> - -<div class="fs70"> -<p>“We would recommend to military readers in general, and especially -to the authorities who have the destiny of the army in their hands, an -attentive perusal of this work. The public will learn from it that the -army in Prussia, hitherto supposed to be the worst paid force, is, in fact, -better dealt with than is the case ‘<em>with the best paid army in Europe</em>.’”—<cite>United -Service Journal.</cite></p> -</div> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70"><em>In the Press</em>,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs100 lht">THE CAMPAIGNS OF DON PEDRO</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lht">IN PORTUGAL,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">From the Landing of the Constitutional Army to the Convention of<br /> -Evora Monte, and subsequent Disbanding of the Armies.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 smcap lht">By GENERAL ANTHONY BACON.</span><br /> -</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span class="pfs70">Immediately will be Published, in one vol. 8vo.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs90 lht">THE ADVENTURES OF</span><br /> -<span class="pfs120 lsp2 lht">CAPTAIN JOHN PATTERSON,</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70">OF THE 50th, OR QUEEN’S OWN REGIMENT.</span><br /> -<span class="pfs70"><em>With Notices of the Officers and of the Regiment from 1807 to 1821.</em></span><br /> -</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<div class="p4 transnote"> -<a id="TN"></a> -<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p> - -<p>Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been -corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within -the text and consultation of external sources.</p> - -<p>Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, -when a predominant preference was found in the original book.</p> - -<p>Some occurrences of upper-case titles (such as Lord, Sir, General) -have been made lower-case for consistency.</p> - -<p>To save space in the wide tables in Appendix Notes XVIII and XIX, -the headings ‘Hospital.’ ‘Cavalry.’ and ‘Artillery.’ have been -abbreviated to ‘Hosp.’ ‘Cav.’ and ‘Art.’.</p> - -<p>To save space in a table in Note XIX the sentence ‘These guns arrived after the battle.’ -has been moved from the right of the number ‘8’ to the left of it.</p> - -<p>In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, -incorrect grammar, spelling and accents have been left unchanged.</p> - -<p>In notes XVIII-XXII of the Appendix some of the printed totals -are incorrect; these have been left as printed.</p> - -<p>Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, -and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.</p> - -<p> -<a href="#tn-iii">Pg iii:</a> The anchor for the first Footnote was missing; it has been -placed at the end of the paragraph “... shall now learn.”<br /> -<a href="#tn-vii">Pg vii:</a> ‘2º.’ inserted in front of ‘<em>Battle of Busaco.</em>’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-xlii">Pg xlii:</a> ‘have been mistated’ replaced by ‘have been misstated’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-lxiv">Pg lxiv:</a> ‘for tho letter’ replaced by ‘for the letter’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-lxxiv">Pg lxxiv:</a> ‘be here meaned’ replaced by ‘be here meant’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-lxxv">Pg lxxv:</a> ‘Holland combated’ replaced by ‘Holland combatted’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-lxxvii">Pg lxxvii:</a> ‘in underminig those’ replaced by ‘in undermining those’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-20">Pg 20:</a> ‘Castello’ replaced by ‘Castelo’. Also on pg 338 and pg 521.<br /> -<a href="#tn-37">Pg 37:</a> ‘instead of faling’ replaced by ‘instead of falling’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-72">Pg 72:</a> ‘to war down’ replaced by ‘to wear down’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-100">Pg 100:</a> ‘Appendix No. 1, Section 1.’ replaced by ‘Appendix No. 18.’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-139">Pg 139:</a> ‘on the sea-bord’ replaced by ‘on the sea-board’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-165">Pg 165:</a> ‘Ciudad Rodigo road’ replaced by ‘Ciudad Rodrigo road’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-196">Pg 196:</a> ‘from Valladodid in’ replaced by ‘from Valladolid in’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-205">Pg 205:</a> ‘the disputes betwen’ replaced by ‘the disputes between’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-214">Pg 214:</a> ‘the aid-de-camp of’ replaced by ‘the aide-de-camp of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-216">Pg 216:</a> In the Sidenote: ‘Sarsfield’ replaced by ‘Sarzfield’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-228">Pg 228:</a> In the Sidenote: ‘official re-’ replaced by ‘official report’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-238">Pg 238:</a> ‘the aid-du-camp of’ replaced by ‘the aide-de-camp of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-267">Pg 267:</a> ‘and pallisaded work’ replaced by ‘and palisaded work’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-283">Pg 283:</a> ‘army of Porugal’ replaced by ‘army of Portugal’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-293">Pg 293:</a> ‘had place at’ replaced by ‘had taken place at’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-318">Pg 318:</a> ‘wanton villany’ replaced by ‘wanton villainy’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-340">Pg 340:</a> ‘the last compaign’ replaced by ‘the last campaign’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-398">Pg 398:</a> ‘the militaay chest’ replaced by ‘the military chest’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-399">Pg 399:</a> ‘the preceedings of’ replaced by ‘the proceedings of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-405">Pg 405:</a> ‘partisans of the’ replaced by ‘partizans of the’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-418">Pg 418:</a> ‘the Englsh general’ replaced by ‘the English general’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-419">Pg 419:</a> ‘court-martials for’ replaced by ‘courts-martial for’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-426">Pg 426:</a> ‘the multidude, and’ replaced by ‘the multitude, and’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-499">Pg 499:</a> ‘Bilbao, immedately’ replaced by ‘Bilbao, immediately’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-564">Pg 564:</a> ‘retrogade movement’ replaced by ‘retrograde movement’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-575">Pg 575:</a> ‘defensive sytem is’ replaced by ‘defensive system is’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-619">Pg 619:</a> ‘Portugal, Jnne 15’ replaced by ‘Portugal, June 15’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-620">Pg 620:</a> ‘Prisoner’ replaced by ‘Prisonnier’.<br /> -</p> -</div> - - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 5 OF 6 ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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