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diff --git a/6920-h/6920-h.htm b/6920-h/6920-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2415776 --- /dev/null +++ b/6920-h/6920-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,6970 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus</title> +<link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> +<style type="text/css"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify; } + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +h3 {font-size: 130%; margin-top: 1em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.letter {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +p.right {text-align: right; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.footnote {font-size: 90%; + text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +sup { vertical-align: top; font-size: 0.6em; } + +div.fig { display:block; + margin:0 auto; + text-align:center; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em;} + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> + +</head> + +<body> + +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Marcus Aurelius Antoninus</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: November 1, 2004 [eBook #6920]<br /> +[Most recently updated: November 24, 2022]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Robert Nield, Tom Allen, Charles Franks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS ***</div> + +<div class="fig" style="width:55%;"> +<img src="images/cover.jpg" style="width:100%;" alt="[Illustration]" /> +</div> + +<h1>The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus</h1> + +<h4>LONG’S TRANSLATION</h4> + +<h4>EDITED BY EDWIN GINN</h4> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style=""> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">PREFACE</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">THE THOUGHTS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> GENERAL INDEX</td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p> +[TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE: All the footnotes have been moved to the end of the text. +I have also relabeled the book headings; [I., II., … XI.] has been changed to +[BOOK I., BOOK II., … BOOK XI.] at the start of each Section. I have also added +a “1.” before the first “thought” in each BOOK.] +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>PREFACE.</h2> + +<p> +Perhaps some may question the wisdom of putting out the Thoughts of Marcus +Aurelius Antoninus to be used as a Reader by children in the schools. It may +appear to them better suited to the mature mind. The principle, however, that +has governed us in selecting reading for the young has been to secure the best +that we could find in all ages for grown-up people. The milk and water diet +provided for “my dear children” is not especially complimentary to them. They +like to be treated like little men and women, capable of appreciating a good +thing. One finds in this royal philosopher a rare generosity, sweetness and +humility, qualities alike suited to all ages. +</p> + +<p> +Adopting the philosopher’s robe at twelve, he remains a student all his life. +The precepts that he would give for the government of others, he has practised +upon himself. In his time, as in ours, there were good physicians for the mind +and body, who could make wise prescriptions for the government of their +neighbors, but were unable to apply them to themselves. The faults of our +fellows are so numerous and so easy to cure that one is readily tempted to +become the physician, while our own faults are so few and so unimportant that +it is hardly worth while to give any attention to them. Hence we have a +multitude of physicians for humanity in general, and a scarcity of individual +healers. +</p> + +<p> +It was the doctrine of Marcus Aurelius that most of the ills of life come to us +from our own imagination, that it was not in the power of others seriously to +interfere with the calm, temperate life of an individual, and that when a +fellow being did anything to us that seemed unjust he was acting in ignorance, +and that instead of stirring up anger within us it should stir our pity for +him. Oftentimes by careful self-examination we should find that the fault was +more our own than that of our fellow, and our sufferings were rather from our +own opinions than from anything real. The circle of man’s knowledge is very +limited, and the largest circles do not wholly include the smallest. They are +intersecting and the segment common to any two is very small. Whatever lies +outside this space does not exist for both. Hence arise innumerable contests. +The man having the largest intelligence ought to be very generous to the other. +Being thankful that he has been blessed in so many ways, he should do all in +his power to enlighten his less favored fellow, rather than be angry with him +on account of his misfortune. Is he not sufficiently punished in being denied +the light? +</p> + +<p> +Assisting his uncle in the government of the great Roman Empire at seventeen, +it was his aim constantly to restrain the power of the strong and to assist the +weak. He studied the laws of his country, not for wisdom alone, but that he +might make them more beneficial to his people. All his life he tried to bring +his fellows to a higher level, and to think charitably of each other. Occupying +himself a palace he lived simply, like other men. It was his greatest delight +to retire to his country home and there, dwelling among his books, to meditate +upon the great problems of life. He claimed that a man’s life should be valued +according to the value of the things to which he gave his attention. If his +whole thought was given to clothing, feeding and housing himself comfortably, +he should be valued like other well-housed and well-fed animals. He would, +however, derive the greatest pleasure and benefit in this life by acting in +accordance with reason, which demands of every human being that his highest +faculties should govern all the rest, and that each should see to it that he +treated his fellow kindly and generously and that if he could not assist him to +a higher level he should at least not stand in his way. When he speaks of the +shortness of time and the value of fame, riches and power, for which men strive +in this world, he speaks not from the standpoint of one who would wish to +obtain these things, but as a Roman emperor enjoying the highest honors that +man might expect to attain in this world. He certainly was in a position to +speak intelligently concerning these matters, and his opinions ought to have +weight with the coming generations. Children may not prefer to read such +thoughts; perhaps the majority of children do not prefer the Bible to other +books. Still, we all think it is well for them to be obliged to read it. +Perhaps requiring the use of such literature in the schools might be as +valuable as the adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing of interminable +numbers, the memorizing of all the capes, bays and rivers in the world, and the +dates of all the battles that have occurred since the creation of man. We +should strive to stimulate the thinking powers of children, leading them to +form wise judgments concerning the important things of life, without catering +too much to their own wishes at an age when they cannot form an intelligent +opinion of what is best for themselves. +</p> + +<p> +At our first reading of the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, we marked +many sentences that appeared to us specially good; in the second, twice as many +more. Where all is good it is hard to emphasize, but we will cite just one of +his reflections, as illustrating the trend of his mind: “I have often +wondered,” he says, “how it is that every man loves himself more than all the +rest of men, and yet sets less value on his own opinion of himself than on the +opinion of others.” +</p> + +<p> +We have given Long’s translation of the Thoughts complete, as published by +Messrs. Little, Brown & Co., but we have omitted some unimportant portions +of the biography and philosophy in the interest of space and economy. We have +also given the philosophy in a supplement, thinking it better that it should +come after the Thoughts themselves. We shall issue a pocket edition on very +thin paper for the convenience of such as wish to make a special study of the +work. We also propose to issue a similar edition of the writings of Epictetus. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +EDWIN GINN. +</p> + +<p class="letter"> +January 20, 1893. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.</h2> + +<p> +M. Antoninus, the son of Annius Verus and Domitia Calvilla, was born at Rome, +A.D. 121. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius married Faustina, the sister of Annius +Verus, and was consequently the uncle of M. Antoninus. When Hadrian adopted +Antoninus Pius and declared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus Pius +adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus and M. Antoninus, generally called M. +Aurelius Antoninus. +</p> + +<p> +The youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (I. 17) that he had +good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, +good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. He had the happy fortune to +witness the example of his uncle and adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, and he +has recorded in his work (I. 16; VI. 30) the virtues of this excellent man and +prudent ruler. Like many young Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied +rhetoric. There are letters extant showing the great affection of the pupil for +the master, and the master’s great hopes of his industrious pupil. +</p> + +<p> +When he was eleven years old he assumed the dress of philosophers, something +plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most laborious, abstemious +life, even so far as to injure his health. He abandoned poetry and rhetoric for +philosophy, and attached himself to the sect of the Stoics. But he did not +neglect the study of law, which was a useful preparation for the high place +which he was designed to fill. We must suppose that he learned the Roman +discipline of arms, which was a necessary part of the education of a man who +afterwards led his troops to battle against a warlike race. +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his teachers, and the +obligations which he owed to each of them. The way in which he speaks of what +he learned from them might seem to savor of vanity or self- praise, if we look +carelessly at the way in which he has expressed himself; but if anyone draws +this conclusion, he will be mistaken. Antoninus means to commemorate the merits +of his several teachers, what they taught, and what a pupil might learn from +them. Besides, this book, like the eleven other books, was for his own use; and +if we may trust the note at the end of the first book, it was written during +one of M. Antoninus’ campaigns against the Quadi, at a time when the +commemoration of the virtues of his illustrious teachers might remind him of +their lessons and the practical uses which he might derive from them. +</p> + +<p> +Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chaeroneia, a grandson of +Plutarch. What he learned from this excellent man is told by himself (I. 9). +His favorite teacher was Rusticus (I. 7), a philosopher, and also a man of +practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was the adviser of Antoninus +after he became emperor. Young men who are destined for high places are not +often fortunate in those who are about them, their companions and teachers; and +I do not know any example of a young prince having had an education which can +be compared with that of M. Antoninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by +their acquirements and their character will hardly be collected again; and as +to the pupil, we have not had one like him since. +</p> + +<p> +Hadrian died in July, A.D. 138, and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius. M. +Antoninus married Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably about +A.D. 146, for he had a daughter born in A.D. 147. He received from his adoptive +father the title of Caesar, and was associated with him in the administration +of the state. The father and the adopted son lived together in perfect +friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a dutiful son, and the emperor Pius +loved and esteemed him. +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus Pius died A.D. 161. The Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to +take the sole administration of the empire, but he associated with himself the +other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally called L. +Verus. Thus Rome for the first time had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man +of pleasure, and unworthy of his station. Antoninus however bore with him, and +it is said that Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague the respect due +to his character. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner lived together in +peace, and their alliance was strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for +wife his daughter Lucilla. +</p> + +<p> +The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian war, in which Verus was +sent to command; but he did nothing, and the success that was obtained by the +Romans in Armenia and on the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his generals. This +Parthian war ended in A.D. 165. Aurelius and Verus had a triumph (A.D. 166) for +the victories in the East. A pestilence followed, which carried off great +numbers in Rome and Italy, and spread to the west of Europe. +</p> + +<p> +The north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people beyond the Alps from +the borders of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic. These barbarians +attempted to break into Italy, as the Germanic nations had attempted near three +hundred years before; and the rest of the life of Antoninus, with some +intervals, was employed in driving back the invaders. In A.D. 169 Verus +suddenly died, and Antoninus administered the state alone. +</p> + +<p> +During the German wars Antoninus resided for three years on the Danube at +Carnuntum. The Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia and almost destroyed in +their retreat across the Danube; and in A.D. 174 the emperor gained a great +victory over the Quadi. +</p> + +<p> +In A.D. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and skilful Roman commander who was at +the head of the troops in Asia, revolted and declared himself Augustus. But +Cassius was assassinated by some of his officers, and so the rebellion came to +an end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his treatment of the family and the +partisans of Cassius; and his letter to the Senate, in which he recommends +mercy, is extant. +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus set out for the East on hearing of Cassius’ revolt. Though he appears +to have returned to Rome in A.D. 174, he went back to prosecute the war against +the Germans, and it is probable that he marched direct to the East from the +German war. His wife Faustina, who accompanied him into Asia, died suddenly at +the foot of the Taurus, to the great grief of her husband. Capitolinus, who has +written the life of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius accuse the empress of +scandalous infidelity to her husband and of abominable lewdness. But +Capitolinus says that Antoninus either knew it not or pretended not to know it. +Nothing is so common as such malicious reports in all ages, and the history of +imperial Rome is full of them. Antoninus loved his wife, and he says that she +was “obedient, affectionate, and simple.” The same scandal had been spread +about Faustina’s mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was +perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says after her death in a +letter to Fronto that he would rather have lived in exile with his wife than in +his palace at Rome without her. There are not many men who would give their +wives a better character than these two emperors. Capitolinus wrote in the time +of Diocletian. He may have intended to tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble +biographer. Dion Cassius, the most malignant of historians, always reports and +perhaps he believed any scandal against anybody. +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and on his return to Italy +through Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. It was the +practice of the emperor to conform to the established rites of the age, and to +perform religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We cannot conclude from this +that he was a superstitious man, though we might perhaps do so if his book did +not show that he was not. But this is only one among many instances that a +ruler’s public acts do not always prove his real opinions. A prudent governor +will not roughly oppose even the superstitions of his people; and though he may +wish that they were wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by +offending their prejudices. +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph, perhaps for some German +victories, A.D. 176. In the following year Commodus was associated with his +father in the empire, and took the name of Augustus. This year A.D. 177 is +memorable in ecclesiastical history. Attalus and others were put to death at +Lyon for their adherence to the Christian religion. The evidence of this +persecution is a letter preserved by Eusebius. It contains a very particular +description of the tortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, and it +states that while the persecution was going on, Attalus, a Christian and a +Roman citizen, was loudly demanded by the populace and brought into the +amphitheatre; but the governor ordered him to be reserved, with the rest who +were in prison, until he had received instructions from the emperor. Many had +been tortured before the governor thought of applying to Antoninus. The +imperial rescript, says the letter, was that the Christians should be punished, +but if they would deny their faith, they must be released. On this the work +began again. The Christians who were Roman citizens were beheaded; the rest +were exposed to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre. +</p> + +<p> +The war on the northern frontier appears to have been uninterrupted during the +visit of Antoninus to the East, and on his return the emperor again left Rome +to oppose the barbarians. The Germanic people were defeated in a great battle +A.D. 179. During this campaign the emperor was seized with some contagious +malady, of which he died in the camp, A.D. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of his +age. His son Commodus was with him. The body, or the ashes probably, of the +emperor were carried to Rome, and he received the honor of deification. Those +who could afford it had his statue or bust; and when Capitolinus wrote, many +people still had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or household +deities. He was in a manner made a saint. Commodus erected to the memory of his +father the Antonine column which is now in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. The +bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft commemorate the +victories of Antoninus over the Marcomanni and the Quadi, and the miraculous +shower of rain which refreshed the Roman soldiers and discomfited their +enemies. The statue of Antoninus was placed on the capital of the column, but +it was removed at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put in +the place by Pope Sixtus the fifth. +</p> + +<p> +In order to form a proper notion of the condition of the Christians under M. +Antoninus we must go back to Trajan’s time. When the younger Pliny was governor +of Bithynia, the Christians were numerous in those parts, and the worshippers +of the old religion were falling off. The temples were deserted, the festivals +neglected, and there were no purchasers of victims for sacrifice. Those who +were interested in the maintenance of the old religion thus found that their +profits were in danger. Christians of both sexes and of all ages were brought +before the governor, who did not know what to do with them. He could come to no +other conclusion than this, that those who confessed to be Christians and +persevered in their religion ought to be punished; if for nothing else, for +their invincible obstinacy. He found no crimes proved against the Christians, +and he could only characterize their religion as a depraved and extravagant +superstition, which might be stopped if the people were allowed the opportunity +of recanting. Pliny wrote this in a letter to Trajan. He asked for the +emperor’s directions, because he did not know what to do. He remarks that he +had never been engaged in judicial inquiries about the Christians, and that +accordingly he did not know what to inquire about or how far to inquire and +punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to examine into a man’s +profession of Christianity and to punish him for it. Trajan’s rescript is +extant. He approved of the governor’s judgment in the matter, but he said that +no search must be made after the Christians; if a man was charged with the new +religion and convicted, he must not be punished if he affirmed that he was not +a Christian and confirmed his denial by showing his reverence to the heathen +gods. He added that no notice must be taken of anonymous informations, for such +things were of bad example. Trajan was a mild and sensible man; and both +motives of mercy and policy probably also induced him to take as little notice +of the Christians as he could, to let them live in quiet if it were possible. +Trajan’s rescript is the first legislative act of the head of the Roman state +with reference to Christianity, which is known to us. It does not appear that +the Christians were further disturbed under his reign. +</p> + +<p> +In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possible for the Roman government to +overlook the great increase of the Christians and the hostility of the common +sort to them. If the governors in the provinces were willing to let them alone, +they could not resist the fanaticism of the heathen community, who looked on +the Christians as atheists. The Jews too, who were settled all over the Roman +Empire, were as hostile to the Christians as the Gentiles were. With the time +of Hadrian begin the Christian Apologies, which show plainly what the popular +feeling towards the Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius +Fundanus, the Proconsul of Asia, which stands at the end of Justin’s first +Apology, instructs the governor that innocent people must not be troubled, and +false accusers must not be allowed to extort money from them; the charges +against the Christians must be made in due form, and no attention must be paid +to popular clamors; when Christians were regularly prosecuted and convicted of +illegal acts, they must be punished according to their deserts; and false +accusers also must be punished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published +rescripts to the same effect. The terms of Hadrian’s rescript seem very +favorable to the Christians; but if we understand it in this sense, that they +were only to be punished like other people for illegal acts, it would have had +no meaning, for that could have been done without asking the emperor’s advice. +The real purpose of the rescript is that Christians must be punished if they +persisted in their belief, and would not prove their renunciation of it by +acknowledging the heathen religion. +</p> + +<p> +In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the old and the new belief +was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen religion urged those in +authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions of the Christian faith. +Melito in his Apology to M. Antoninus represents the Christians of Asia as +persecuted under new imperial orders. Shameless informers, he says, men who +were greedy after the property of others, used these orders as a means of +robbing those who were doing no harm. He doubts if a just emperor could have +ordered anything so unjust; and if the last order was really not from the +emperor, the Christians entreat him not to give them up to their enemies. We +conclude from this that there were at least imperial rescripts or constitutions +of M. Antoninus which were made the foundation of these persecutions. The fact +of being a Christian was now a crime and punished, unless the accused denied +their religion. Then come the persecutions at Smyrna, which some modern critics +place in A.D. 167, ten years before the persecution of Lyon. The governors of +the provinces under M. Antoninus might have found enough even in Trajan’s +rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, and the fanaticism of the +people would drive them to persecution, even if they were unwilling. But +besides the fact of the Christians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we +must not forget that they plainly maintained that all the heathen religions +were false. The Christians thus declared war against the heathen rites, and it +is hardly necessary to observe that this was a declaration of hostility against +the Roman government, which tolerated all the various forms of superstition +that existed in the empire, and could not consistently tolerate another +religion, which declared that all the rest were false and all the splendid +ceremonies of the empire only a worship of devils. +</p> + +<p> +If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman emperors +attempted to check the new religion; how they enforced their principle of +finally punishing Christians, simply as Christians, which Justin in his Apology +affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that he tells the truth; how far +popular clamor and riots went in this matter, and how far many fanatical and +ignorant Christians—for there were many such—contributed to excite the +fanaticism on the other side and to imbitter the quarrel between the Roman +government and the new religion. Our extant ecclesiastical histories are +manifestly falsified, and what truth they contain is grossly exaggerated; but +the fact is certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the heathen populations +were in open hostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus’ rule men +were put to death because they were Christians. Eusebius, in the preface to his +fifth book, remarks that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus’ reign, in some +parts of the world, the persecution of the Christians became more violent, and +that it proceeded from the populace in the cities; and he adds, in his usual +style of exaggeration, that we may infer from what took place in a single +nation that myriads of martyrs were made in the habitable earth. The nation +which he alludes to is Gallia; and he then proceeds to give the letter of the +churches of Vienna and Lugdunum. It is probable that he has assigned the true +cause of the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, and that both +governors and emperor had a great deal of trouble with these disturbances. How +far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceedings we do not know, for the +historical records of his reign are very defective. He did not make the rule +against the Christians, for Trajan did that; and if we admit that he would have +been willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm that it was in his +power, for it would be a great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the +unlimited authority which some modern sovereigns have had. His power was +limited by certain constitutional forms, by the Senate, and by the precedents +of his predecessors. We cannot admit that such a man was an active persecutor, +for there is no evidence that he was, though it is certain that he had no good +opinion of the Christians, as appears from his own words. But he knew nothing +of them except their hostility to the Roman religion, and he probably thought +that they were dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the professions false or +true of some of the Apologists. So much I have said, because it would be unfair +not to state all that can be urged against a man whom his contemporaries and +subsequent ages venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. If I admitted +the genuineness of some documents, he would be altogether clear from the charge +of even allowing any persecutions; but as I seek the truth and am sure that +they are false, I leave him to bear whatever blame is his due. I add that it is +quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any of his ethical principles from +a religion of which he knew nothing. +</p> + +<p> +There is no doubt that the Emperor’s Reflections—or his Meditations, as they +are generally named—is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks of himself, +his family, and his teachers; and in other books he mentions himself. +</p> + +<p> +It is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or reflections as the +occasions arose; and since they were intended for his own use, it is no +improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy behind him written with his +own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent a man would use the labor of a +transcriber for such a purpose, and expose his most secret thoughts to any +other eye. He may have also intended the book for his son Commodus, who however +had no taste for his father’s philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed is in +Simplicius’ Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was not a +Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a time when +Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really religious man, and he +concludes his commentary with a prayer to the Deity which no Christian could +improve. From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of about nine hundred +years, the Stoic philosophy formed the characters of some of the best and +greatest men. A man’s greatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar +believe, nor yet in his intellectual capacity, which is often associated with +the meanest moral character, the most abject servility to those in high places, +and arrogance to the poor and lowly; but a man’s true greatness lies in the +consciousness of an honest purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of +himself and everything else, on frequent self-examination, and a steady +obedience to the rule which he knows to be right, without troubling himself, as +the emperor says he should not, about what others may think or say, or whether +they do or do not do that which he thinks and says and does. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>THE THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.</h2> + +<h2>BOOK I.</h2> + +<p> +1. From my grandfather Verus [I learned] good morals and the government of my +temper. +</p> + +<p> +2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a manly +character. +</p> + +<p> +3. From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from evil +deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in my way of +living, far removed from the habits of the rich. +</p> + +<p> +4. From my great-grandfather, not to have frequented public schools, and to +have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things a man should +spend liberally. +</p> + +<p> +5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party at the +games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or the Scutarius +at the gladiators’ fights; from him too I learned endurance of labor, and to +want little, and to work with my own hands, and not to meddle with other +people’s affairs, and not to be ready to listen to slander. +</p> + +<p> +6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to give +credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about incantations and +the driving away of daemons and such things; and not to breed quails [for +fighting], nor to give myself up passionately to such things; and to endure +freedom of speech; and to have become intimate with philosophy; and to have +been a hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have +written dialogues in my youth; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and +whatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline. +</p> + +<p> +7. From Rusticus I received the impression that my character required +improvement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray to +sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to delivering +little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man who practices +much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to make a display; and to +abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing; and not to walk about in +the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other things of the kind; and to write +my letters with simplicity, like the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa +to my mother; and with respect to those who have offended me by words, or done +me wrong, to be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they +have shown a readiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not to be +satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily to give my +assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him for being +acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated to me out of +his own collection. +</p> + +<p> +8. From Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness of +purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to reason; +and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a +child, and in long illness; and to see clearly in a living example that the +same man can be both most resolute and yielding, and not peevish in giving his +instruction; and to have had before my eyes a man who clearly considered his +experience and his skill in expounding philosophical principles as the smallest +of his merits; and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are +esteemed favors, without being either humbled by them or letting them pass +unnoticed. +</p> + +<p> +9. From Sextus, a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family governed +in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably to nature; and gravity +without affectation, and to look carefully after the interests of friends, and +to tolerate ignorant persons, and those who form opinions without +consideration: he had the power of readily accommodating himself to all, so +that intercourse with him was more agreeable than any flattery; and at the same +time he was most highly venerated by those who associated with him: and he had +the faculty both of discovering and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical +way, the principles necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other +passion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most affectionate; and he +could express approbation without noisy display, and he possessed much +knowledge without ostentation. +</p> + +<p> +10. From Alexander the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and not in a +reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or solecistic or +strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce the very expression +which ought to have been used, and in the way of answer or giving confirmation, +or joining in an inquiry about the thing itself, not about the word, or by some +other fit suggestion. +</p> + +<p> +11. From Fronto I learned to observe what envy and duplicity and hypocrisy are +in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are called Patricians are +rather deficient in paternal affection. +</p> + +<p> +12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity to say to +any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; nor continually to +excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation to those with whom we +live, by alleging urgent occupations. +</p> + +<p> +13. From Catulus, not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault, even if he +should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him to his usual +disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as it is reported of +Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children truly. +</p> + +<p> +14. From my brother Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to love +justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, +Brutus; and from him I received the idea of a polity in which there is the same +law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal +freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of +all the freedom of the governed; I learned from him also consistency and +undeviating steadiness in my regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do +good, and to give to others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe +that I am loved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of his +opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends had no +need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was quite plain. +</p> + +<p> +15. From Maximus I learned self-government, and not to be led aside by +anything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness; and a +just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and dignity, and to do what +was set before me without complaining. I observed that everybody believed that +he thought as he spoke, and that in all that he did he never had any bad +intention; and he never showed amazement and surprise, and was never in a +hurry, and never put off doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did +he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever +passionate or suspicious. He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was +ready to forgive, and was free from all falsehood; and he presented the +appearance of a man who could not be diverted from right, rather than of a man +who had been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever think that he +was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better man. He had +also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way. +</p> + +<p> +16. In my father I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable resolution in +the things which he had determined after due deliberation; and no vain-glory in +those things which men call honors; and a love of labor and perseverance; and a +readiness to listen to those who had anything to propose for the common weal; +and undeviating firmness in giving to every man according to his deserts; and a +knowledge derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action and for +remission. And I observed that he had overcome all passion for boys; and he +considered himself no more than any other citizen; and he released his friends +from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him of necessity when he went +abroad, and those who had failed to accompany him, by reason of any urgent +circumstances, always found him the same. I observed, too, his habit of careful +inquiry in all matters of deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never +stopped his investigation through being satisfied with appearances which first +present themselves; and that his disposition was to keep his friends, and not +to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his affection; and to be +satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to foresee things a long way off, +and to provide for the smallest without display; and to check immediately +popular applause and all flattery; and to be ever watchful over the things +which were necessary for the administration of the empire, and to be a good +manager of the expenditure, and patiently to endure the blame which he got for +such conduct; and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods, nor +did he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering the +populace; but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, and never any mean +thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the things which conduce in any +way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune gives an abundant supply, he +used without arrogance and without excusing himself; so that when he had them, +he enjoyed them without affectation, and when he had them not, he did not want +them. No one could ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a +[home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant; but every one acknowledged him to be a +man ripe, perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and other men’s +affairs. Besides this, he honored those who were true philosophers, and he did +not reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily led +by them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made himself agreeable +without any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care of his body’s +health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to +personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but so that through his own +attention he very seldom stood in need of the physician’s art or of medicine or +external applications. He was most ready to give without envy to those who +possessed any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the +law or of morals, or of anything else; and he gave them his help, that each +might enjoy reputation according to his deserts; and he always acted +conformably to the institutions of his country, without showing any affectation +of doing so. Further, he was not fond of change nor unsteady, but he loved to +stay in the same places, and to employ himself about the same things; and after +his paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and vigorous to his usual +occupations. His secrets were not many, but very few and very rare, and these +only about public matters; and he showed prudence and economy in the exhibition +of the public spectacles and the construction of public buildings, his +donations to the people, and in such things, for he was a man who looked to +what ought to be done, not to the reputation which is got by a man’s acts. He +did not take the bath at unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building +houses, nor curious about what he ate, nor about the texture and color of his +clothes, nor about the beauty of his slaves.<a href="#fn1" +name="fnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> His dress came from Lorium, his villa on the +coast, and from Lanuvium generally.<a href="#fn2" +name="fnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> We know how he behaved to the toll-collector +at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was all his behavior. There was in +him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may say, anything +carried to the sweating point; but he examined all things severally, as if he +had abundance of time, and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and +consistently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded of Socrates, +that he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those things which many +are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy without excess. But to be strong +enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the other is the mark of a man +who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he showed in the illness of +Maximus. +</p> + +<p> +17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good parents, a +good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly +everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into any +offence against any of them, though I had a disposition which, if opportunity +had offered, might have led me to do something of this kind; but, through their +favor, there never was such a concurrence of circumstances as put me to the +trial. Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with +my grandfather’s concubine, and that I preserved the flower of my youth, and +that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper season, but even +deferred the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and a father who was able to +take away all pride from me, and to bring me to the knowledge that it is +possible for a man to live in a palace without wanting either guards or +embroidered dresses, or torches and statues, and such-like show; but that it is +in such a man’s power to bring himself very near to the fashion of a private +person, without being for this reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss +in action, with respect to the things which must be done for the public +interest in a manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a +brother, who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance over +myself, and who at the same time pleased me by his respect and affection; that +my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body; that I did not make more +proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies, in which I should +perhaps have been completely engaged, if I had seen that I was making progress +in them; that I made haste to place those who brought me up in the station of +honor, which they seemed to desire, without putting them off with hope of my +doing it some other time after, because they were then still young; that I knew +Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions +about living according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, so +far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and inspirations, +nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to nature, though I still +fall short of it through my own fault, and through not observing the +admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct instructions; that +my body has held out so long in such a kind of life; that I never touched +either Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after having fallen into amatory +passions, I was cured, and though I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I +never did anything of which I had occasion to repent; that, though it was my +mother’s fate to die young, she spent the last years of her life with me; that, +whenever I wished to help any man in his need, or on any other occasion, I was +never told that I had not the means of doing it; and that to myself the same +necessity never happened, to receive anything from another; that I have such a +wife, so obedient, and so affectionate, and so simple; that I had abundance of +good masters for my children; and that remedies have been shown to me by +dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting and giddiness …; and that, when +I had an inclination to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any +sophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers [of histories], or in the +resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself about the investigation of +appearances in the heavens; for all these things require the help of the gods +and fortune. +</p> + +<p> +Among the Quadi at the Granua.<a href="#fn3" name="fnref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK II.</h2> + +<p> +Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody, the +ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to +them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. But I who have seen +the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, +and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not [only] of the +same blood or seed, but that it participates in [the same] intelligence and +[the same] portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, +for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor +hate him. For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like +eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one +another, then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to +be vexed and to turn away. +</p> + +<p> +2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the ruling +part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it is not allowed; but +as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh; it is blood and bones and a +network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath also, what +kind of a thing it is; air, and not always the same, but every moment sent out +and again sucked in. The third, then, is the ruling part, consider thus: Thou +art an old man; no longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the +strings like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either dissatisfied +with thy present lot, or shrink from the future. +</p> + +<p> +3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. That which is from fortune +is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and involution with the +things which are ordered by providence. From thence all things flow; and there +is besides necessity, and that which is for the advantage of the whole +universe, of which thou art a part. But that is good for every part of nature +which the nature of the whole brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. +Now the universe is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so by the +changes of things compounded of the elements. Let these principles be enough +for thee; let them always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after +books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from thy +heart thankful to the gods. +</p> + +<p> +4. Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how often +thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not use it. Thou +must now at last perceive of what universe thou art now a part, and of what +administrator of the universe thy existence is an efflux, and that a limit of +time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds +from thy mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it will never return. +</p> + +<p> +5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast in +hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and freedom, +and justice, and to give thyself relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt +give thyself relief if thou dost every act of thy life as if it were the last, +laying aside all carelessness and passionate aversion from the commands of +reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and discontent with the portion which +has been given to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man +lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the +existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing more +from him who observes these things. +</p> + +<p> +6. Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt no longer +have the opportunity of honoring thyself. Every man’s life is sufficient. But +thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences not itself, but places thy +felicity in the souls of others. +</p> + +<p> +7. Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give thyself time +to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled around. But then thou +must also avoid being carried about the other way; for those too are triflers +who have wearied themselves in life by their activity, and yet have no object +to which to direct every movement, and, in a word, all their thoughts. +</p> + +<p> +8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom been +seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements of their own +minds must of necessity be unhappy. +</p> + +<p> +9. This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole, and +what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind of a part it +is of what kind of a whole, and that there is no one who hinders thee from +always doing and saying the things which are according to the nature of which +thou art a part. +</p> + +<p> +10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts—such a comparison as one would +make in accordance with the common notions of mankind—says, like a true +philosopher, that the offences which are committed through desire are more +blamable than those which are committed through anger. For he who is excited by +anger seems to turn away from reason with a certain pain and unconscious +contraction; but he who offends through desire, being overpowered by pleasure, +seems to be in a manner more intemperate and more womanish in his offences. +Rightly, then, and in a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence +which is committed with pleasure is more blamable than that which is committed +with pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first +wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other is moved by +his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing something by desire. +</p> + +<p> +11. Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment, +regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among men, if +there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve +thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about +human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid +of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, +and they have put all the means in man’s power to enable him not to fall into +real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have +provided for this also, that it should be altogether in a man’s power not to +fall into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man’s +life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the +power to guard against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature +of the universe has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so +great a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good and +evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death +certainly, and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,—all these things +equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better +nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil. +</p> + +<p> +12. How quickly all things disappear,—in the universe the bodies themselves, +but in time the remembrance of them. What is the nature of all sensible things, +and particularly those which attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify by +pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame; how worthless, and contemptible, and +sordid, and perishable, and dead they are,—all this it is the part of the +intellectual faculty to observe. To observe too who these are whose opinions +and voices give reputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at +it in itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their +parts all the things which present themselves to the imagination in it, he will +then consider it to be nothing else than an operation of nature; and if any one +is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This, however, is not only +an operation of nature, but it is also a thing which conduces to the purposes +of nature. To observe too how man comes near to the Deity, and by what part of +him, and when this part of man is so disposed (VI. 28). +</p> + +<p> +13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a round, +and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says, and seeks by +conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbors, without perceiving that it is +sufficient to attend to the daemon within him, and to reverence it sincerely. +And reverence of the daemon consists in keeping it pure from passion and +thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction with what comes from gods and men. For the +things from the gods merit veneration for their excellence; and the things from +men should be dear to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, +they move our pity by reason of men’s ignorance of good and bad; this defect +being not less than that which deprives us of the power of distinguishing +things that are white and black. +</p> + +<p> +14. Though thou shouldest be going to live three thousand years, and as many +times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any other life than +this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this which he now loses. The +longest and shortest are thus brought to the same. For the present is the same +to all, though that which perishes is not the same; and so that which is lost +appears to be a mere moment. For a man cannot lose either the past or the +future: for what a man has not, how can any one take this from him? These two +things then thou must bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are +of like forms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference +whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years, or two hundred, +or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver and he who will die +soonest lose just the same. For the present is the only thing of which a man +can be deprived, if it is true that this is the only thing which he has, and +that a man cannot lose a thing if he has it not. +</p> + +<p> +15. Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus is +manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man receives what +may be got out of it as far as it is true. +</p> + +<p> +16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an +abscess, and, as it were, a tumor on the universe, so far as it can. For to be +vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in +some part of which the natures of all other things are contained. In the next +place, the soul does violence to itself when it turns away from any man, or +even moves towards him with the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of +those who are angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when +it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and +does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act +of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does anything +thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being right that even the +smallest things be done with reference to an end; and the end of rational +animals is to follow the reason and the law of the most ancient city and +polity. +</p> + +<p> +17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the +perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, +and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of +judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a +stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapor, and life is a +warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and after—fame is oblivion. What then is that +which is able to conduct a man? One thing, and only one, philosophy. But this +consists in keeping the daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, +superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet +falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man’s doing or not +doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is +allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; +and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else +than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is compounded. +But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing +into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and +dissolution of all the elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is +evil which is according to nature. +</p> + +<p> +This in Carnuntum. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK III.</h2> + +<p> +1. We ought to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away and a +smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken into the +account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite uncertain whether the +understanding will still continue sufficient for the comprehension of things, +and retain the power of contemplation which strives to acquire the knowledge of +the divine and the human. For if he shall begin to fall into dotage, +perspiration and nutrition and imagination and appetite, and whatever else +there is of the kind, will not fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, +and filling up the measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, +and considering whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever else of +the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason,—all this is already +extinguished. We must make haste, then, not only because we are daily nearer to +death, but also because the conception of things and the understanding of them +cease first. +</p> + +<p> +2. We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the things +which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing and +attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts are split at the +surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain fashion contrary +to the purpose of the baker’s art, are beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar +way excite a desire for eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape +open; and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to +rottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending +down, and the lion’s eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild +boars, and many other things,—though they are far from being beautiful if a man +should examine them severally,—still, because they are consequent upon the +things which are formed by nature, help to adorn them, and they please the +mind; so that if a man should have a feeling and deeper insight with respect to +the things which are produced in the universe, there is hardly one of those +which follow by way of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a manner +disposed so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real gaping jaws +of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which painters and sculptors +show by imitation; and in an old woman and an old man he will be able to see a +certain maturity and comeliness; and the attractive loveliness of young persons +he will be able to look on with chaste eyes; and many such things will present +themselves, not pleasing to every man, but to him only who has become truly +familiar with Nature and her works. +</p> + +<p> +3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, himself fell sick and died. The +Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them too. Alexander +and Pompeius and Caius Caesar, after so often completely destroying whole +cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten thousands of cavalry and +infantry, themselves too at last departed from life. Heraclitus, after so many +speculations on the conflagration of the universe, was filled with water +internally and died smeared all over with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; +and other lice killed Socrates. What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou +hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out. If indeed to another +life, there is no want of gods, not even there; but if to a state without +sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave +to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves it is superior: +for the one is intelligence and deity; the other is earth and corruption. +</p> + +<p> +4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others, when thou +dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility. For thou losest +the opportunity of doing something else when thou hast such thoughts as +these,—What is such a person doing, and why, and what is he saying, and what is +he thinking of, and what is he contriving, and whatever else of the kind makes +us wander away from the observation of our own ruling power. We ought then to +check in the series of our thoughts everything that is without a purpose and +useless, but most of all the over-curious feeling and the malignant; and a man +should use himself to think of those things only about which if one should +suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? with perfect openness thou +mightest immediately answer, This or That; so that from thy words it should be +plain that everything in thee is simple and benevolent, and such as befits a +social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts about pleasure or sensual +enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or envy and suspicion, or anything else +for which thou wouldst blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in thy +mind. For the man who is such, and no longer delays being among the number of +the best, is like a priest and minister of the gods, using too the [deity] +which is planted within him, which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure, +unharmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in +the noblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered by any passion, dyed deep with +justice, accepting with all his soul everything which happens and is assigned +to him as his portion; and not often, nor yet without great necessity and for +the general interest, imagining what another says, or does, or thinks. For it +is only what belongs to himself that he makes the matter for his activity; and +he constantly thinks of that which is allotted to himself out of the sum total +of things, and he makes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own +portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to each man is carried along +with him and carries him along with it. And he remembers also that every +rational animal is his kinsman, and that to care for all men is according to +man’s nature; and a man should hold on to the opinion not of all, but of those +only who confessedly live according to nature. But as to those who live not so, +he always bears in mind what kind of men they are both at home and from home, +both by night and by day, and what they are, and with what men they live an +impure life. Accordingly, he does not value at all the praise which comes from +such men, since they are not even satisfied with themselves. +</p> + +<p> +5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest, nor +without due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied ornament set +off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many words, or busy about too many +things. And further, let the deity which is in thee be the guardian of a living +being, manly and of ripe age, and engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and +a ruler, who has taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons +him from life, and ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any man’s +testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not external help nor the tranquillity +which others give. A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect by others. +</p> + +<p> +6. If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth, +temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own mind’s +self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do according to right +reason, and in the condition that is assigned to thee without thy own choice; +if, I say, thou seest anything better than is, turn to it with all thy soul, +and enjoy that which thou hast found to be the best. But if nothing appears to +be better than the Deity which is planted in thee, which has subjected to +itself all thy appetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as +Socrates said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has +submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou findest everything +else smaller and of less value than this, give place to nothing else, for if +thou dost once diverge and incline to it, thou wilt no longer without +distraction be able to give the preference to that good thing which is thy +proper possession and thy own; for it is not right that anything of any other +kind, such as praise from the many, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should +come into competition with that which is rationally and politically [or +practically] good. All these things, even though they may seem to adapt +themselves [to the better things] in a small degree, obtain the superiority all +at once, and carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the +better, and hold to it.—But that which is useful is the better.—Well, then, if +it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it; but if it is only useful +to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain thy judgment without arrogance: only +take care that thou makest the inquiry by a sure method. +</p> + +<p> +7. Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel thee to +break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to suspect, to +curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything which needs walls and curtains: +for he who has preferred to everything else his own intelligence and daemon and +the worship of its excellence, acts no tragic part, does not groan, will not +need either solitude or much company; and, what is chief of all, he will live +without either pursuing or flying from [death]; but whether for a longer or a +shorter time he shall have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares not at all: +for even if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he were +going to do anything else which can be done with decency and order; taking care +of this only all through life, that his thoughts turn not away from anything +which belongs to an intelligent animal and a member of a civil community. +</p> + +<p> +8. In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no corrupt +matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his life incomplete +when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor who leaves the stage before +ending and finishing the play. Besides, there is in him nothing servile, nor +affected, nor too closely bound [to other things], nor yet detached [from other +things], nothing worthy of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. +</p> + +<p> +9. Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it entirely +depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any opinion inconsistent +with nature and the constitution of the rational animal. And this faculty +promises freedom from hasty judgment, and friendship towards men, and obedience +to the gods. +</p> + +<p> +10. Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few; and +besides, bear in mind that every man lives only this present time, which is an +indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is either past or it is +uncertain. Short then is the time which every man lives, and small the nook of +the earth where he lives; and short too the longest posthumous fame, and even +this only continued by a succession of poor human beings, who will very soon +die, and who know not even themselves, much less him who died long ago. +</p> + +<p> +11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added: Make for +thyself a definition or description of the thing which is presented to thee, so +as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its +nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the +names of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be +resolved. For nothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to be able to +examine methodically and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, +and always to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of +universe this is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what +value everything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to +man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities are like +families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and how long it is +the nature of this thing to endure which now makes an impression on me, and +what virtue I have need of with respect to it, such as gentleness, manliness, +truth, fidelity, simplicity, contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every +occasion a man should say: This comes from god; and this is according to the +apportionment and spinning of the thread of destiny, and such-like coincidence +and chance; and this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, +one who knows not, however, what is according to his nature. But I know; for +this reason I behave towards him according to the natural law of fellowship +with benevolence and justice. At the same time, however, in things indifferent +I attempt to ascertain the value of each. +</p> + +<p> +12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right reason +seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to distract thee, +but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be bound to give it back +immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but +satisfied with thy present activity according to nature, and with heroic truth +in every word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is +no man who is able to prevent this. +</p> + +<p> +13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases +which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles ready for the +understanding of things divine and human, and for doing everything, even the +smallest, with a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human to +one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man +without at the same time having a reference to things divine; nor the contrary. +</p> + +<p> +14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own memoirs, nor +the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the selections from books +which thou wast reserving for thy old age. Hasten then to the end which thou +hast before thee, and, throwing away idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou +carest at all for thyself, while it is in thy power. +</p> + +<p> +15. They know not how many things are signified by the words stealing, sowing, +buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this is not effected +by the eyes, but by another kind of vision. +</p> + +<p> +16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the soul +appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the impressions of forms +by means of appearances belongs even to animals; to be pulled by the strings of +desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have made themselves into +women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero: and to have the intelligence that guides +to the things which appear suitable belongs also to those who do not believe in +the gods, and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds when they +have shut the doors. If then everything else is common to all that I have +mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased +and content with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him; and +not to defile the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a +crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, following it obediently as a god, +neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to +justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest, and +contented life, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from +the way which leads to the end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, +tranquil, ready to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to +his lot. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK IV.</h2> + +<p> +1. That which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so affected with +respect to the events which happen, that it always easily adapts itself to that +which is possible and is presented to it. For it requires no definite material, +but it moves towards its purpose, under certain conditions, however; and it +makes a material for itself out of that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of +what falls into it, by which a small light would have been extinguished: but +when the fire is strong, it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is +heaped on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material. +</p> + +<p> +2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according to the +perfect principles of art. +</p> + +<p> +3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores, and +mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. But this is +altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is in thy power +whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere either with more +quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man retire than into his own soul, +particularly when he has within him such thoughts that by looking into them he +is immediately in perfect tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is +nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to +thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and +fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to +cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all discontent +with the things to which thou returnest. For with what art thou discontented? +With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that rational +animals exist for one another, and that to endure is a part of justice, and +that men do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many already, after mutual +enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to +ashes; and be quiet at last.—But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which +is assigned to thee out of the universe.—Recall to thy recollection this +alternative; either there is providence or atoms [fortuitous concurrence of +things]; or remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world +is a kind of political community [and be quiet at last].—But perhaps corporeal +things will still fasten upon thee.—Consider then further that the mind mingles +not with the breath, whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn +itself apart and discovered its own power, and think also of all that thou hast +heard and assented to about pain and pleasure [and be quiet at last].—But +perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment thee.—See how soon +everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side of +[the present], and the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness and want +of judgment in those who pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the +space within which it is circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the whole +earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few +are there in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee. +</p> + +<p> +This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy own, +and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look at +things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the +things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be these, which +are two. One is that things do not touch the soul, for they are external and +remain immovable; but our perturbations come only from the opinion which is +within. The other is that all these things which thou seest, change immediately +and will no longer be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these changes +thou hast already witnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion. +</p> + +<p> +4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we +are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which +commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common +law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members +of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. +For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole +human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community +comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity +for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to +me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that +which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that +which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the +intellectual part comes from some source. +</p> + +<p> +5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; composition out of the +same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and altogether not a thing of +which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary to [the nature of] a +reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason of our constitution. +</p> + +<p> +6. It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it is a +matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will not allow the +fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind, that within a very +short time both thou and he will be dead; and soon not even your names will be +left behind. +</p> + +<p> +7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, “I have +been harmed.” Take away the complaint, “I have been harmed,” and the harm is +taken away. +</p> + +<p> +8. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make his +life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from within. +</p> + +<p> +9. The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been compelled to do +this. +</p> + +<p> +10. Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou +observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with respect +to the continuity of the series of things, but with respect to what is just, +and as if it were done by one who assigns to each thing its value. Observe then +as thou hast begun; and whatever thou dost, do it in conjunction with this, the +being good, and in the sense in which a man is properly understood to be good. +Keep to this in every action. +</p> + +<p> +11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong, or +such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in truth. +</p> + +<p> +12. A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one to do only +whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may suggest for the +use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who +sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But this change of opinion +must proceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what is just or of common +advantage, and the like, not because it appears pleasant or brings reputation. +</p> + +<p> +13. Hast thou reason? I have.—Why then dost not thou use it? For if this does +its own work, what else dost thou wish? +</p> + +<p> +14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which produced +thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal principle by +transmutation. +</p> + +<p> +15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before, another +falls after; but it makes no difference. +</p> + +<p> +16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a beast +and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the worship of reason. +</p> + +<p> +17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death hangs +over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good. +</p> + +<p> +18. How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his neighbor says +or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that it may be just and +pure; or, as Agathon says, look not round at the depraved morals of others, but +run straight along the line without deviating from it. +</p> + +<p> +19. He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider that +every one of those who remember him will himself also die very soon; then again +also they who have succeeded them, until the whole remembrance shall have been +extinguished as it is transmitted through men who foolishly admire and perish. +But suppose that those who will remember are even immortal, and that the +remembrance will be immortal, what then is this to thee? And I say not what is +it to the dead, but what is it to the living. What is praise, except indeed so +far as it has a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift +of nature, clinging to something else…. +</p> + +<p> +20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and +terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither worse then +nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this also of the things +which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material things and +works of art. That which is really beautiful has no need of anything; not more +than law, not more than truth, not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of +these things is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is +such a thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is not praised? or +gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub? +</p> + +<p> +21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from +eternity?—But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have been +buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these bodies after a +certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution make room for +other dead bodies, so the souls which are removed into the air after subsisting +for some time are transmuted and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being +received into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way make +room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there. And this is the answer +which a man might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we +must not only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also of +the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other animals. For +what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those +who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth receives them by reason of the +changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the transformations into the aerial +or the fiery element. +</p> + +<p> +What is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The division into that +which is material and that which is the cause of form [the formal]. +</p> + +<p> +22. Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to justice, and +on the occasion of every impression maintain the faculty of comprehension [or +understanding]. +</p> + +<p> +23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O Universe. +Nothing for me is too early or too late, which is in due time for thee. +Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature: from thee are all +things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return. The poet says, Dear +city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say, Dear city of Zeus? +</p> + +<p> +24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou wouldst be +tranquil.—But consider if it would not be better to say, Do what is necessary, +and whatever the reason of the animal which is naturally social requires, and +as it requires. For this brings not only the tranquillity which comes from +doing well, but also that which comes from doing few things. For the greatest +part of what we say and do being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will +have more leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly, on every occasion a man +should ask himself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should +take away not only unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts, for thus +superfluous acts will not follow after. +</p> + +<p> +25. Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is +satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own just +acts and benevolent disposition. +</p> + +<p> +26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb thyself. +Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? It is to himself that he +does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee? Well: out of the universe from +the beginning everything which happens has been apportioned and spun out to +thee. In a word, thy life is short. Thou must turn to profit the present by the +aid of reason and justice. Be sober in thy relaxation. +</p> + +<p> +27. Either it is a well-arranged universe<a href="#fn4" +name="fnref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> or a chaos huddled together, but still a +universe. But can a certain order subsist in thee, and disorder in the All? And +this too when all things are so separated and diffused and sympathetic. +</p> + +<p> +28. A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character, bestial, +childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyrannical. +</p> + +<p> +29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, no +less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it. He is a +runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the +understanding; he is poor, who has need of another, and has not from himself +all things which are useful for life. He is an abscess on the universe who +withdraws and separates himself from the reason of our common nature through +being displeased with the things which happen, for the same nature produces +this, and has produced thee too: he is a piece rent asunder from the state, who +tears his own soul from that of reasonable animals, which is one. +</p> + +<p> +30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a book: +here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I abide by +reason—and I do not get the means of living out of my learning, and I abide [by +my reason]. +</p> + +<p> +31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be content +with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has intrusted to the +gods with his whole soul all that he has, making thyself neither the tyrant nor +the slave of any man. +</p> + +<p> +32. Consider for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all these +things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, warring, feasting, +trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, +suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die, grumbling about the present, +loving, heaping up treasure, desiring consulship, kingly power. Well, then, +that life of these people no longer exists at all. Again, remove to the times +of Trajan. Again, all is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view +also the other epochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after +great efforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou +shouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting themselves +about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance with their proper +constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be content with it. And herein +it is necessary to remember that the attention given to everything has its +proper value and proportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou +appliest thyself to smaller matters no further than is fit. +</p> + +<p> +33. The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also the +names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner antiquated, Camillus, +Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after also Scipio and Cato, then +Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. For all things soon pass away and +become a mere tale, and complete oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of +those who have shone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have +breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to +conclude the matter, what is even an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What +then is that about which we ought to employ our serious pains? This one thing, +thoughts just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a disposition +which gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing from +a principle and source of the same kind. +</p> + +<p> +34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of the fates], allowing her to +spin thy thread into whatever thing she pleases. +</p> + +<p> +35. Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that which is +remembered. +</p> + +<p> +36. Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and accustom +thyself to consider that the nature of the universe loves nothing so much as to +change the things which are and to make new things like them. For everything +that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But thou art +thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth or into a womb: but this +is a very vulgar notion. +</p> + +<p> +37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from +perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor +kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in acting +justly. +</p> + +<p> +38. Examine men’s ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind of +things they avoid, and what kind they pursue. +</p> + +<p> +39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of another; +nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. Where is it +then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the power of forming +opinions about evils. Let this power then not form [such] opinions, and all is +well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor body, is cut, burnt, filled +with matter and rottenness, nevertheless let the part which forms opinions +about these things be quiet; that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad +or good which can happen equally to the bad man and the good. For that which +happens equally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives +according to nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary to nature. +</p> + +<p> +40. Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance +and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to one perception, the +perception of this one living being; and how all things act with one movement; +and how all things are the co-operating causes of all things which exist; +observe too the continuous spinning of the thread and the contexture of the +web. +</p> + +<p> +41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to say (I. +C. 19). +</p> + +<p> +42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things to +subsist in consequence of change. +</p> + +<p> +43. Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a violent +stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and another +comes in its place, and this will be carried away too. +</p> + +<p> +44. Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose in +spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and calumny, +and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes them. +</p> + +<p> +45. In the series of things, those which follow are always aptly fitted to +those which have gone before: for this series is not like a mere enumeration of +disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence, but it is a rational +connection: and as all existing things are arranged together harmoniously, so +the things which come into existence exhibit no mere succession, but a certain +wonderful relationship (VI. 38; VII. 9; VII. 75, note). +</p> + +<p> +46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth is to +become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the death of air is +to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him who forgets whither the way +leads, and that men quarrel with that with which they are most constantly in +communion, the reason which governs the universe; and the things which they +daily meet with seem to them strange: and consider that we ought not to act and +speak as if we were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and +that we ought not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act +and speak as we have been taught. +</p> + +<p> +47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or certainly on the day +after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was on the third day or +on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest degree mean- spirited; for how +small is the difference. So think it no great thing to die after as many years +as thou canst name rather than to-morrow. +</p> + +<p> +48. Think continually how many physicians are dead after often contracting +their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers after predicting with +great pretensions the deaths of others; and how many philosophers after endless +discourses on death or immortality; how many heroes after killing thousands; +and how many tyrants who have used their power over men’s lives with terrible +insolence, as if they were immortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so +to speak, Helice and Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to +the reckoning all whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after +burying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him; and all this in +a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral and worthless human +things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy or +ashes. Pass then through this little space of time conformably to nature, and +end thy journey in content, just as an olive falls off when it is ripe, +blessing nature who produced it, and thanking the tree on which it grew. +</p> + +<p> +49. Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break, but it +stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it. +</p> + +<p> +Unhappy am I because this has happened to me? Not so, but happy am I, though +this has happened to me, because I continue free from pain, neither crushed by +the present nor fearing the future. For such a thing as this might have +happened to every man; but every man would not have continued free from pain on +such an occasion. Why then is that rather a misfortune than this a good +fortune? And dost thou in all cases call that a man’s misfortune which is not a +deviation from man’s nature? And does a thing seem to thee to be a deviation +from man’s nature, when it is not contrary to the will of man’s nature? Well, +thou knowest the will of nature. Will then this which has happened prevent thee +from being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against inconsiderate +opinions and falsehood; will it prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, and +everything else, by the presence of which man’s nature obtains all that is its +own? Remember too on every occasion which leads thee to vexation to apply this +principle: not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good +fortune. +</p> + +<p> +50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death, to pass +in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more then have they +gained than those who have died early? Certainly they lie in their tombs +somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any one else like +them, who have carried out many to be buried, and then were carried out +themselves. Altogether the interval is small [between birth and death]; and +consider with how much trouble, and in company with what sort of people, and in +what a feeble body this interval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider +life a thing of any value. For look to the immensity of time behind thee, and +to the time which is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity +then what is the difference between him who lives three days and him who lives +three generations? +</p> + +<p> +51. Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural: accordingly +say and do everything in conformity with the soundest reason. For such a +purpose frees a man from trouble, and warfare, and all artifice and +ostentatious display. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK V.</h2> + +<p> +1. In the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be present,—I +am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am +going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the +world? Or have I been made for this, to lie in the bed-clothes and keep myself +warm?—But this is more pleasant.—Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, +and not at all for action or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the +little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order +their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the work of a +human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which is according to thy +nature?—But it is necessary to take rest also.—It is necessary. However, Nature +has fixed bounds to this too: she has fixed bounds to eating and drinking, and +yet thou goest beyond these bounds, beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts +it is not so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not +thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But +those who love their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them +unwashed and without food; but thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner +values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of money +values his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And such men, when +they have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither to eat nor to sleep +rather than to perfect the things which they care for. But are the acts which +concern society more vile in thy eyes and less worthy of thy labor? +</p> + +<p> +2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is +troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquillity. +</p> + +<p> +3. Judge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit for thee; +and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any people nor by their +words, but if a thing is good to be done or said, do not consider it unworthy +of thee. For those persons have their peculiar leading principle and follow +their peculiar movement; which things do not thou regard, but go straight on, +following thy own nature and the common nature; and the way of both is one. +</p> + +<p> +4. I go through the things which happen according to nature until I shall fall +and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of which I daily draw +it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my father collected the seed, +and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk; out of which during so many +years I have been supplied with food and drink; which bears me when I tread on +it and abuse it for so many purposes. +</p> + +<p> +5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.—Be it so: but +there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not formed for +them by nature. Show those qualities then which are altogether in thy power, +sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure, contentment with +thy portion and with few things, benevolence, frankness, no love of +superfluity, freedom from trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many +qualities thou art immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of +natural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily +below the mark? or art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by +nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with thy +poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to be so +restless in thy mind? No, by the gods; but thou mightest have been delivered +from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged with being +rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must exert thyself about this also, +not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy dulness. +</p> + +<p> +6. One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it down to +his account as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do this, but still in +his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he has done. +A third in a manner does not even know what he has done, but he is like a vine +which has produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has once +produced its proper fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has +tracked the game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a +good act, does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to +another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.—Must a +man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing +it?—Yes.—But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what a man is +doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social animal to +perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed to wish that his +social partner also should perceive it.—It is true what thou sayest, but thou +dost not rightly understand what is now said: and for this reason thou wilt +become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are misled by a +certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of +what is said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act. +</p> + +<p> +7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the ploughed +fields of the Athenians and on the plains.—In truth we ought not to pray at +all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion. +</p> + +<p> +8. Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius prescribed to +this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or going without shoes, so +we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of the universe +prescribed to this man disease, or mutilation, or loss, or anything else of the +kind. For in the first case Prescribed means something like this: he prescribed +this for this man as a thing adapted to procure health; and in the second case +it means, That which happens to [or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for +him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things +are suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the +pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in some +kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony]. And as the +universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as it is, so out of all +existing causes necessity [destiny] is made up to be such a cause as it is. And +even those who are completely ignorant understand what I mean; for they say, It +[necessity, destiny] brought this to such a person.—This then was brought and +this was prescribed to him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those +which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his +prescriptions are disagreeable, but we, accept them in the hope of health. Let +the perfecting and accomplishment of the things which the common nature judges +to be good, be judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. And so +accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagreeable, because it leads +to this, to the health of the universe and to the prosperity and felicity of +Zeus [the universe]. For he would not have brought on any man what he has +brought, if it were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of +anything, whatever it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that +which is directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with +that which happens to thee, the one, because it was done for thee and +prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from the +most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the other, because even that +which comes severally to every man is to the power which administers the +universe a cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. +For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything +whatever from the conjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the +causes. And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art +dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way. +</p> + +<p> +9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost not +succeed in doing everything according to right principles, but when thou hast +failed, return back again, and be content if the greater part of what thou dost +is consistent with man’s nature, and love this to which thou returnest; and do +not return to philosophy as if she were a master, but act like those who have +sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, +or drenching with water. For thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou +wilt repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only the things which +thy nature requires; but thou wouldst have something else which is not +according to nature.—It may be objected, Why, what is more agreeable than this +[which I am doing]?—But is not this the very reason why pleasure deceives us? +And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, equanimity, piety, are not +more agreeable. For what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou +thinkest of the security and the happy course of all things which depend on the +faculty of understanding and knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +10. Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to +philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether +unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult to +understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man who never +changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves, and consider how +short-lived they are and worthless, and that they may be in the possession of a +filthy wretch or a robber. Then turn to the morals of those who live with thee, +and it is hardly possible to endure even the most agreeable of them, to say +nothing of a man being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and +dirt, and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion +and of things moved, what there is worth being highly prized, or even an object +of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is a man’s duty to +comfort himself, and to wait for the natural dissolution, and not to be vexed +at the delay, but to rest in these principles only: the one, that nothing will +happen to me which is not conformable to the nature of the universe; and the +other, that it is in my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon: for +there is no man who will compel me to this. +</p> + +<p> +11. About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must ask +myself this question, and inquire, What have I now in this part of me which +they call the ruling principle? and whose soul have I now,—that of a child, or +of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a domestic animal, +or of a wild beast? +</p> + +<p> +12. What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may learn +even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things as being really +good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not after +having first conceived these endure to listen to anything which should not be +in harmony with what is really good. But if a man has first conceived as good +the things which appear to the many to be good, he will listen and readily +receive as very applicable that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even +the many perceive the difference. For were it not so, this saying would not +offend and would not be rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when +it is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as said +fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and think those things +to be good, to which after their first conception in the mind the words of the +comic writer might be aptly applied,—that he who has them, through pure +abundance has not a place to ease himself in. +</p> + +<p> +13. I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them will +perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence out of +non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change into some part +of the universe, and that again will change into another part of the universe, +and so on forever. And by consequence of such a change I too exist, and those +who begot me, and so on forever in the other direction. For nothing hinders us +from saying so, even if the universe is administered according to definite +periods [of revolution]. +</p> + +<p> +14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are sufficient +for themselves and for their own works. They move then from a first principle +which is their own, and they make their way to the end which is proposed to +them; and this is the reason why such acts are named Catorthoseis or right +acts, which word signifies that they proceed by the right road. +</p> + +<p> +15. None of these things ought to be called a man’s which do not belong to a +man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man’s nature promise +them, nor are they the means of man’s nature attaining its end. Neither then +does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which aids to the +accomplishment of this end, and that which aids towards this end is that which +is good. Besides, if any of these things did belong to man, it would not be +right for a man to despise them and to set himself against them; nor would a +man be worthy of praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor would +he who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were +good. But now the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other +things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more +patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better man. +</p> + +<p> +16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character of thy +mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a continuous +series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where a man can live, +there he can also live well. But he must live in a palace; well then, he can +also live well in a palace. And again, consider that for whatever purpose each +thing has been constituted, for this it has been constituted, and towards this +it is carried; and its end is in that towards which it is carried; and where +the end is, there also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now the +good for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are made for society has +been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior exists for the sake of the +superior? But the things which have life are superior to those which have not +life, and of those which have life the superior are those which have reason. +</p> + +<p> +17. To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that the bad +should not do something of this kind. +</p> + +<p> +18. Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear. The +same things happen to another, and either because he does not see that they +have happened, or because he would show a great spirit, he is firm and remains +unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit should be stronger than +wisdom. +</p> + +<p> +19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor have +they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul: but the soul +turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgments it may think proper to +make, such it makes for itself the things which present themselves to it. +</p> + +<p> +20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do good to +men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves obstacles to my +proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which are indifferent, no less +than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is true that these may impede my +action, but they are no impediments to my effects and disposition, which have +the power of acting conditionally and changing: for the mind converts and +changes every hindrance to its activity into an aid; and so that which is a +hindrance is made a furtherance to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the +road helps us on this road. +</p> + +<p> +21. Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that which makes +use of all things and directs all things. And in like manner also reverence +that which is best in thyself; and this is of the same kind as that. For in +thyself also, that which makes use of everything else is this, and thy life is +directed by this. +</p> + +<p> +22. That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen. In the +case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the state is not harmed by +this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must not be angry +with him who does harm to the state. Show him where his error is. +</p> + +<p> +23. Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and disappear, both +the things which are and the things which are produced. For substance is like a +river in a continual flow, and the activities of things are in constant change, +and the causes work in infinite varieties; and there is hardly anything which +stands still. And consider this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of +the past and of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a +fool who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes himself +miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time. +</p> + +<p> +24. Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small portion; +and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible interval has been +assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by destiny, and how small a part +of it thou art. +</p> + +<p> +25. Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own disposition, +his own activity. I now have what the universal nature wills me to have; and I +do what my nature now wills me to do. +</p> + +<p> +26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the +movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it not unite +with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those affects to their +parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that other +sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is all one, then thou must not +strive to resist the sensation, for it is natural: but let not the ruling part +of itself add to the sensation the opinion that it is either good or bad. +</p> + +<p> +27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to +them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and +that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for +his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man’s +understanding and reason. +</p> + +<p> +28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? art thou angry with him whose +mouth smells foul? What good will this anger do thee? He has such a mouth, he +has such armpits: it is necessary that such an emanation must come from such +things; but the man has reason, it will be said, and he is able, if he takes +pains, to discover wherein he offends; I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well +then, and thou hast reason: by thy rational faculty stir up his rational +faculty; show him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure +him, and there is no need of anger. +</p> + +<p> +29. As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out, … so it is in thy power +to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out of life, yet so +as if them wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why dost +thou think that this is any trouble? But so long as nothing of the kind drives +me out, I remain, am free, and no man shall hinder me from doing what I choose; +and I choose to do what is according to the nature of the rational and social +animal. +</p> + +<p> +30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made the +inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the superior to +one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, co-ordinated, and assigned to +everything its proper portion, and has brought together into concord with one +another the things which are the best. +</p> + +<p> +31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren, +children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, +kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such +a way that this may be said of thee,— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Never has wronged a man in deed or word.” +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +And call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through, and how +many things thou hast been able to endure and that the history of thy life is +now complete and thy service is ended; and how many beautiful things thou hast +seen; and how many pleasures and pains thou hast despised; and how many things +called honorable thou hast spurned; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast +shown a kind disposition. +</p> + +<p> +32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and +knowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows beginning +and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance, and through all +time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the universe. +</p> + +<p> +33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a name or +not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things which are much +valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and [like] little dogs biting +one another, and little children quarrelling, laughing, and then straightway +weeping. But fidelity and modesty and justice and truth are fled +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth.<br/> + HESIOD, <i>Works, etc</i>. v. 197. +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +What then is there which still detains thee here, if the objects of sense are +easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of perception are dull and +easily receive false impressions, and the poor soul itself is an exhalation +from blood? But to have good repute amid such a world as this is an empty +thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tranquillity for thy end, whether it is +extinction or removal to another state? And until that time comes, what is +sufficient? Why, what else than to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do +good to men, and to practice tolerance and self-restraint; but as to everything +which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this +is neither thine nor in thy power. +</p> + +<p> +34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou canst go +by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These two things are +common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man, and to the soul of every +rational being: not to be hindered by another; and to hold good to consist in +the disposition to justice and the practice of it, and in this to let thy +desire find its termination. +</p> + +<p> +35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness, and the +common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it, and what is the harm to +the common weal? +</p> + +<p> +36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of things, but +give help [to all] according to thy ability and their fitness; and if they +should have sustained loss in matters which are indifferent, do not imagine +this to be a damage; for it is a bad habit. But as the old man, when he went +away, asked back his foster-child’s top, remembering that it was a top, so do +thou in this case also. +</p> + +<p> +When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what these +things are?—Yes; but they are objects of great concern to these people—wilt +thou too then be made a fool for these things? I was once a fortunate man, but +I lost it, I know not how.—But fortunate means that a man has assigned to +himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is good disposition of the soul, +good emotions, good actions. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK VI.</h2> + +<p> +1. The substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the reason +which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it has no malice, +nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed by it. But all things +are made and perfected according to this reason. +</p> + +<p> +2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if thou art +doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with sleep; and +whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing something else. +For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we die: it is sufficient +then in this act also to do well what we have in hand (vi. 22, 28). +</p> + +<p> +3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its value +escape thee. +</p> + +<p> +4. All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to vapor, +if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed. +</p> + +<p> +5. The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what it +does, and on what material it works. +</p> + +<p> +6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like [the wrong- doer]. +</p> + +<p> +7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one social act to +another social act, thinking of God. +</p> + +<p> +8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and while it +makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes everything +which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills. +</p> + +<p> +9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is +accomplished; for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature that +each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally comprehends this, +or a nature which is comprehended within this nature, or a nature external and +independent of this (XL 1; VI. 40; VIII. 50). +</p> + +<p> +10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of things, and +a dispersion, or it is unity and order and providence. If then it is the +former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous combination of things and such +a disorder? and why do I care about anything else than how I shall at last +become earth? and why am I disturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will +happen whatever I do? But if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I +am firm, and I trust in him who governs (IV. 27). +</p> + +<p> +11. When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in a manner, +quickly return to thyself, and do not continue out of tune longer than the +compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery over the harmony by +continually recurring to it. +</p> + +<p> +12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou wouldst be +dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly return to thy +mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to thee stepmother and mother: +return to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through whom what thou +meetest with in the court appears to thee tolerable, and thou appearest +tolerable in the court. +</p> + +<p> +13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the impression +that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of +a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little grape-juice, and this +purple robe some sheep’s wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish: such then +are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, +and so we see what kind of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to +act all through life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of +our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and +strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show is a +wonderful perverter of the reason, and when thou art most sure that thou art +employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it cheats thee most. +Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself. +</p> + +<p> +14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to objects of +the most general kind, those which are held together by cohesion or natural +organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives. But those which +are admired by men, who are a little more reasonable, are referred to the +things which are held together by a living principle, as flocks, herds. Those +which are admired by men who are still more instructed are the things which are +held together by a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so +far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply +rational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who values a +rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life, regards nothing +else except this; and above all things he keeps his soul in a condition and in +an activity comformable to reason and social life, and he co-operates to this +end with those who are of the same kind as himself. +</p> + +<p> +15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out of it; +and of that which is coming into existence part is already extinguished. +Motions and changes are continually renewing the world, just as the +uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite duration of ages. +In this flowing stream then, on which there is no abiding, what is there of the +things which hurry by on which a man would set a high price? It would be just +as if a man should fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it +has already passed out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of +every man, like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For +such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we +do every moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory power, which +thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day before, to give it back +to the element from which thou didst first draw it. +</p> + +<p> +16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor +respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving of +impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved by desires as puppets +by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being nourished by food; for this is +just like the act of separating and parting with the useless part of our food. +What then is worth being valued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. +Neither must we value the clapping of tongues; for the praise which comes from +the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this +worthless thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing? This, in my +opinion: to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper +constitution, to which end both all employments and arts lead. For every art +aims at this, that the thing which has been made should be adapted to the work +for which it has been made; and both the vine planter who looks after the vine, +and the horsebreaker, and he who trains the dog, seek this end. But the +education and the teaching of youth aim at something. In this then is the value +of the education and the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek +anything else. Wilt thou not cease to value many other things too? Then thou +wilt be neither free, nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without +passion. For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of +those who can take away those things, and plot against those who have that +which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be altogether in a state of +perturbation who wants any of these things; and besides, he must often find +fault with the gods. But to reverence and honor thy own mind will make thee +content with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in agreement with the +gods, that is, praising all that they give and have ordered. +</p> + +<p> +17. Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the motion +of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine, and advancing by a +way hardly observed, it goes happily on its road. +</p> + +<p> +18. How strangely men act! They will not praise those who are living at the +same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised by +posterity, by those whom they have never seen or ever will see, this they set +much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou shouldst be grieved +because those who have lived before thee did not praise thee. +</p> + +<p> +19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think that it +is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man and conformable to +his nature, think that this can be attained by thyself too. +</p> + +<p> +20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with his nails, +and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we neither show +any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as +a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on our guard against him, not however as +an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. Something +like this let thy behavior be in all the other parts of life; let us overlook +many things in those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in +our power, as I said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor +hatred. +</p> + +<p> +21. If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or act +rightly, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth, by which no man was ever +injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance. +</p> + +<p> +22. I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either things +without life, or things without reason, or things that have rambled and know +not the way. +</p> + +<p> +23. As to the animals which have no reason, and generally all things and +objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make use of them +with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human beings, as they have +reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all occasions call on the gods, and +do not perplex thyself about the length of time in which thou shalt do this; +for even three hours so spent are sufficient. +</p> + +<p> +24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the same +state; for either they were received among the same seminal principles of the +universe, or they were alike dispersed among the atoms. +</p> + +<p> +25. Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in each of +us,—things which concern the body and things which concern the soul: and so +thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all things which come into +existence in that which is the one and all, which we call Cosmos, exist in it +at the same time. +</p> + +<p> +26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name Antoninus is +written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter each letter? What +then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on with +composure and number every letter? Just so then in this life also remember that +every duty is made up of certain parts. These it is thy duty to observe, and +without being disturbed or showing anger towards those who are angry with thee +to go on thy way and finish that which is set before thee. +</p> + +<p> +27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which appear to +them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet in a manner thou +dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed because they do wrong. For +they are certainly moved towards things because they suppose them to be +suitable to their nature and profitable to them.—But it is not so.—Teach them +then, and show them without being angry. +</p> + +<p> +28. Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the +pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive +movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh (II. 12). +</p> + +<p> +29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life, when thy +body does not give way. +</p> + +<p> +30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not dyed with +this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, good, pure, +serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the gods, +kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to continue to be such +as philosophy wished to make thee. Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is +life. There is only one fruit of this terrene life,—a pious disposition and +social acts. Do everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy +in every act which was conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things, +and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness, and his +disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things; and how he would +never let anything pass without having first most carefully examined it and +clearly understood it; and how he bore with those who blamed him unjustly +without blaming them in return; how he did nothing in a hurry; and how he +listened not to calumnies, and how exact an examiner of manners and actions he +was; and not given to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a +sophist; and with how little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, +food, servants; and how laborious and patient; and how he was able on account +of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening; and his firmness and uniformity +in his friendships; and how he tolerated freedom of speech in those who opposed +his opinions; and the pleasure that he had when any man showed him anything +better; and how religious he was without superstition. Imitate all this, that +thou mayest have as good a conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had. +</p> + +<p> +31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou hast roused +thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only dreams which troubled +thee, now in thy waking hours look at these [the things about thee] as thou +didst look at those [the dreams]. +</p> + +<p> +32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all things +are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But to the +understanding those things only are indifferent which are not the works of its +own activity. But whatever things are the works of its own activity, all these +are in its power. And of these however only those which are done with reference +to the present; for as to the future and the past activities of the mind, even +these are for the present indifferent. +</p> + +<p> +33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor that of the foot is contrary to +nature, so long as the foot does the foot’s work and the hand the hand’s. So +then neither to a man as a man is his labor contrary to nature, so long as it +does the things of a man. But if the labor is not contrary to his nature, +neither is it an evil to him. +</p> + +<p> +34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants. +</p> + +<p> +35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up to a +certain point to those who are not skilled in their craft,—nevertheless they +cling to the reason [the principles] of their art, and do not endure to depart +from it? Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more +respect to the reason [the principles] of their own arts than man to his own +reason, which is common to him and the gods? +</p> + +<p> +36. Asia, Europe, are corners of the universe; all the sea a drop in the +universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time is a point +in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable. All things come +from thence, from that universal ruling power either directly preceding or by +way of sequence. And accordingly the lion’s gaping jaws, and that which is +poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of +the grand and beautiful. Do not then imagine that they are of another kind from +that which thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all +(VII. 75). +</p> + +<p> +37. He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which has +taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time without +end; for all things are of one kin and of one form. +</p> + +<p> +38. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe and their +relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated with one +another, and all in this way are friendly to one another; for one thing comes +in order after another, and this is by virtue of the active movement and mutual +conspiration and the unity of the substance (ix. 1). +</p> + +<p> +39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and the men +among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it truly +[sincerely]. +</p> + +<p> +40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been made, +is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the things which are held +together by nature there is within, and there abides in, them the power which +made them; wherefore the more is it fit to reverence this power, and to think, +that, if thou dost live and act according to its will, everything in thee is in +conformity to intelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which +belong to it are in conformity to intelligence. +</p> + +<p> +41. Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt suppose to +be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such a bad thing +befall thee, or the loss of such a good thing, thou wilt not blame the gods, +and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune or the loss, or +those who are suspected of being likely to be the cause; and indeed we do much +injustice because we make a difference between these things [because we do not +regard these things as indifferent]. But if we judge only those things which +are in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding +fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man. +</p> + +<p> +42. We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and +others without knowing what they do; as men also when they are asleep, of whom +it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are laborers and co-operators in +the things which take place in the universe. But men co-operate after different +fashions: and even those co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what +happens and those who try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had +need even of such men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among +what kind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will +certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some part of +the co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to one end. But be not thou +such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus +speaks of. +</p> + +<p> +43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius the work +of the Fruit-bearer [the earth]? And how is it with respect to each of the +stars, are they not different and yet they work together to the same end? +</p> + +<p> +44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must happen +to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity +without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire +towards that? for what advantage would result to them from this or to the +whole, which is the special object of their providence? But if they have not +determined about me individually, they have certainly determined about the +whole at least, and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general +arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if +they determine about nothing,—which it is wicked to believe, or if we do +believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them, nor do +anything else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us,—but if +however the gods determine about none of the things which concern us, I am able +to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and +that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and +nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far +as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The +things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. +</p> + +<p> +45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the universal: +this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general +truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is +profitable also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the +common sense as said of things of the middle kind [neither good nor bad]. +</p> + +<p> +46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the +continual sight of the same things, and the uniformity make the spectacle +wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things above, below, are the +same and from the same. How long then? +</p> + +<p> +47. Think continually that all kinds of men and men of all kinds of pursuits +and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion +and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. +To that place then we must remove, where there are so many great orators, and +so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of +former days, and so many generals after them, and tyrants; besides these, +Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great +minds, lovers of labor, versatile, confident, mockers even of the perishable +and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all +these consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm then is this to +them; and what to those whose names are altogether unknown? One thing here is +worth a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent +disposition even to liars and unjust men. +</p> + +<p> +48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those who +live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of another, +and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality of a fourth. For +nothing delights so much as the examples of the virtues, when they are +exhibited in the morals of those who live with us and present themselves in +abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we must keep them before us. +</p> + +<p> +49. Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest only so many +litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou must live only +so many years and not more; for as thou art satisfied with the amount of +substance which has been assigned to thee, so be content with the time. +</p> + +<p> +50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even against their will, when +the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by using force +stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and tranquillity, and at the +same time employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some other virtue; and +remember that thy attempt was with a reservation [conditionally], that thou +didst not desire to do impossibilities. What then didst thou desire?—Some such +effort as this.—But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast +moved are [not] accomplished. +</p> + +<p> +51. He who loves fame considers another man’s activity to be his own good; and +he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has understanding +considers his own acts to be his own good. +</p> + +<p> +52. It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be +disturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power to form our +judgments. +</p> + +<p> +53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and as +much as it is possible, be in the speaker’s mind. +</p> + +<p> +54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the bee. +</p> + +<p> +55. If sailors abused the helmsman, or the sick the doctor, would they listen +to anybody else; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of those in the +ship, or the doctor the health of those whom he attends? +</p> + +<p> +56. How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone out of +it. +</p> + +<p> +57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad dogs water +causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine thing. Why then am I +angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has less power than the bile in the +jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog? +</p> + +<p> +58. No man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy own +nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the universal +nature. +</p> + +<p> +59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what +objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all things, and how +many it has covered already. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK VII.</h2> + +<p> +1. What is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the occasion +of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is that which thou hast +often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the same things, with which +the old histories are filled, those of the middle ages and those of our own +day; with which cities and houses are filled now. There is nothing new: all +things are both familiar and short-lived. +</p> + +<p> +2. How can our principles become dead, unless the impression [thoughts] which +correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy power continuously to fan +these thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion about anything which I +ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed? The things which are external to +my mind have no relation at all to my mind.—Let this be the state of thy +affects, and thou standest erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at +things again as thou didst use to look at them; for in this consists the +recovery of thy life. +</p> + +<p> +3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep, herds, +exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread into +fishponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings about of frightened +little mice, puppets pulled by strings—[all alike]. It is thy duty then in the +midst of such things to show good humor and not a proud air; to understand +however that every man is worth just so much as the things are worth about +which he busies himself. +</p> + +<p> +4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement thou +must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see immediately to +what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully what is the thing +signified. +</p> + +<p> +5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient, I use +it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature. But if it is +not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and give way to him who is +able to do it better, unless there be some reason why I ought not to do so; or +I do it as well as I can, taking to help me the man who with the aid of my +ruling principle can do what is now fit and useful for the general good. For +whatsoever either by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to +this only, to that which is useful and well suited to society. +</p> + +<p> +6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to oblivion; and +how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long been dead. +</p> + +<p> +7. Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty like a +soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou canst not mount +up on the battlements alone, but with the help of another it is possible? +</p> + +<p> +8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if it shall +be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou usest for present +things. +</p> + +<p> +9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there +is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been +co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe [order]. For there is +one universe made up of all things, and one god who pervades all things, and +one substance, and one law, [one] common reason in all intelligent animals, and +one truth; if indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are of +the same stock and participate in the same reason. +</p> + +<p> +10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole; and +everything formal [causal] is very soon taken back into the universal reason; +and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed in time. +</p> + +<p> +11. To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and according to +reason. +</p> + +<p> +12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (III. 5). +</p> + +<p> +13. Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in one, so +it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have been constituted +for one co-operation. And the perception of this will be more apparent to thee +if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member of the system of rational +beings. But if thou sayest that thou art a part, thou dost not yet love men +from thy heart; beneficence does not yet delight thee for its own sake; thou +still dost it barely as a thing of propriety, and not yet as doing good to +thyself. +</p> + +<p> +14. Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the effects +of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain, if they choose. +But I, unless I think that what has happened is an evil, am not injured. And it +is in my power not to think so. +</p> + +<p> +15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be good; just as if the gold, or the +emerald, or the purple were always saying this, Whatever any one does or says, +I must be emerald and keep my color. +</p> + +<p> +16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not frighten +itself or cause itself pain. But if any one else can frighten or pain it, let +him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own opinion turn itself into +such ways. Let the body itself take care, if it can, that it suffer nothing, +and let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is subject to +fear, to pain, which has completely the power of forming an opinion about these +things, will suffer nothing, for it will never deviate into such a judgment. +The leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for +itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if it +does not disturb and impede itself. +</p> + +<p> +17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then art +thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by the gods, as thou +didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come according to thy old +fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away. +</p> + +<p> +18. Is any man afraid of change? Why, what can take place without change? What +then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal nature? And canst thou +take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change? and canst thou be nourished, +unless the food undergoes a change? And can anything else that is useful be +accomplished without change? Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to +change is just the same, and equally necessary for the universal nature? +</p> + +<p> +19. Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all bodies are +carried, being by their nature united with and co-operating with the whole, as +the parts of our body with one another. How many a Chrysippus, how many a +Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already swallowed up! And let the same +thought occur to thee with reference to every man and thing (V. 23; VI. 15). +</p> + +<p> +20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the +constitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, or +what it does not allow now. +</p> + +<p> +21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness of thee +by all. +</p> + +<p> +22. It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this happens, if +when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, and that they do +wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will +die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done thee no harm, for he has not +made thy ruling faculty worse than it was before. +</p> + +<p> +23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were wax, now +moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the material for a +tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each of these things +subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to be +broken up, just as there was none in its being fastened together (VIII. 50). +</p> + +<p> +24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often assumed,<a +href="#fn5" name="fnref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> the result is that all comeliness +dies away, and at last is so completely extinguished that it cannot be again +lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to +reason. For if even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is +there for living any longer? +</p> + +<p> +25. Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things which thou +seest, and out of their substance will make other things, and again other +things from the substance of them, in order that the world may be ever new +(XII. 23). +</p> + +<p> +26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion +about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt +pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either thou thyself +thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or another thing of the same +kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But if thou dost not think such things +to be good or evil, thou wilt more readily be well disposed to him who is in +error. +</p> + +<p> +27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but of the +things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly they would +have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the same time, however, take care +that thou dost not through being so pleased with them accustom thyself to +overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them. +</p> + +<p> +28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this nature, +that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so secures +tranquillity. +</p> + +<p> +29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine thyself +to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or to another. +Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal] and the material. +Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by a man stay there where +the wrong was done (VIII. 29). +</p> + +<p> +30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter into the +things that are doing and the things which do them (VII. 4). +</p> + +<p> +31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty, and with indifference towards +the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. Follow God. The +poet says that law rules all—And it is enough to remember that law rules all. +</p> + +<p> +32. About death: whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms, or +annihilation, it is either extinction or change. +</p> + +<p> +33. About pain: the pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that which +lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own tranquillity by +retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not made worse. But the parts +which are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give their opinion about it. +</p> + +<p> +34. About fame: look at the minds [of those who seek fame], observe what they +are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things they pursue. +And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one another hide the former +sands, so in life the events which go before are soon covered by those which +come after. +</p> + +<p> +35. From Plato: The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of all time +and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to think that human +life is anything great? It is not possible, he said.—Such a man then will think +that death also is no evil.—Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +36. From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused. +</p> + +<p> +37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to regulate and +compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not to be regulated and +composed by itself. +</p> + +<p> +38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, For they care nought about it. +</p> + +<p> +39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. +</p> + +<p> +40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn. One man is born; another +dies. +</p> + +<p> +41. If gods care not for me and for my children, There is a reason for it. +</p> + +<p> +42. For the good is with me, and the just. +</p> + +<p> +43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion. +</p> + +<p> +44. From Plato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is this: +Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good for anything at +all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and should not rather look to +this only in all that he does, whether he is doing what is just or unjust, and +the works of a good or bad man. +</p> + +<p> +45. For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has placed himself +thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by a commander, there in +my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the +reckoning, either death or anything else, before the baseness [of deserting his +post]. +</p> + +<p> +46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good is not +something different from saving and being saved; for as to a man living such or +such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider if this is not a thing +to be dismissed from the thoughts: and there must be no love of life: but as to +these matters a man must intrust them to the Deity and believe what the women +say, that no man can escape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best +live the time that he has to live. +</p> + +<p> +47. Look around at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going along with +them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one another, for +such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene life. +</p> + +<p> +48. This is a fine saying of Plato: That he who is discoursing about men should +look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some higher place; should +look at them in their assemblies, armies, agricultural labors, marriages, +treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert places, +various nations of barbarians, feasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of all +things and an orderly combination of contraries. +</p> + +<p> +49. Consider the past,—such great changes of political supremacies; thou mayest +foresee also the things which will be. For they will certainly be of like form, +and it is not possible that they should deviate from the order of the things +which take place now; accordingly to have contemplated human life for forty +years is the same as to have contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what +more wilt thou see? +</p> + +<p> +50. +</p> + +<p class="letter"> +That which has grown from the earth to the earth,<br/> +But that which has sprung from heavenly seed,<br/> +Back to the heavenly realms returns. +</p> + +<p> +This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or a +similar dispersion of the unsentient elements. +</p> + +<p> +51. +</p> + +<p class="letter"> +With food and drinks and cunning magic arts<br/> +Turning the channel’s course to ’scape from death.<br/> +The breeze which heaven has sent<br/> +We must endure, and toil without complaining. +</p> + +<p> +52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not more +social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that happens, nor +more considerate with respect to the faults of his neighbors. +</p> + +<p> +53. Where any work can be clone conformably to the reason which is common to +gods and men, there we have nothing to fear; for where we are able to get +profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds according to +our constitution, there no harm is to be suspected. +</p> + +<p> +54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce in thy +present condition, and to behave justly to those who are about thee, and to +exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them +without being well examined. +</p> + +<p> +55. Do not look around thee to discover other men’s ruling principles, but look +straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the universal nature through +the things which happen to thee, and thy own nature through the acts which must +be done by thee. But every being ought to do that which is according to its +constitution; and all other things have been constituted for the sake of +rational beings, just as among irrational things the inferior for the sake of +the superior, but the rational for the sake of one another. +</p> + +<p> +The prime principle then in man’s constitution is the social. And the second is +not to yield to the persuasions of the body,—for it is the peculiar office of +the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be +overpowered either by the motion of the senses or of the appetites, for both +are animal; but the intelligent motion claims superiority, and does not permit +itself to be overpowered by the others. And with good reason, for it is formed +by nature to use all of them. The third thing in the rational constitution is +freedom from error and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding +fast to these things go straight on, and it has what is its own. +</p> + +<p> +56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to the +present time; and live according to nature the remainder which is allowed thee. +</p> + +<p> +57. Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of thy +destiny. For what is more suitable? +</p> + +<p> +58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the same +things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as strange things, +and found fault with them: and now where are they? Nowhere. Why then dost thou +too choose to act in the same way; and why dost thou not leave these agitations +which are foreign to nature to those who cause them and those who are moved by +them; and why art thou not altogether intent upon the right way of making use +of the things which happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they +will be a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and resolve +to be a good man in every act which thou dost: and remember…. +</p> + +<p> +59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble up, if +thou wilt ever dig. +</p> + +<p> +60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in motion +or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining in it the +expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be required also in the +whole body. But all these things should be observed without affectation. +</p> + +<p> +61. The art of life is more like the wrestler’s art than the dancer’s, in +respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which are +sudden and unexpected. +</p> + +<p> +62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to have, +and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt neither blame those +who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest +to the sources of their opinions and appetites. +</p> + +<p> +63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of truth; +consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and temperance and +benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most necessary to bear this +constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards all. +</p> + +<p> +64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonor in it, +nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does not damage the +intelligence either so far as the intelligence is rational or so far as it is +social. Indeed in the case of most pains let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, +that pain is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that +it has its limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and +remember this too, that we do not perceive that many things which are +disagreeable to us are the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the +being scorched by heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art +discontented about any of these things, say to thyself that thou art yielding +to pain. +</p> + +<p> +65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman as they feel towards men. +</p> + +<p> +66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to Socrates? For +it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death, and disputed more +skilfully with the Sophists, and passed the night in the cold with more +endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, he considered it +more noble to refuse, and that he walked in a swaggering way in the +streets—though as to this fact one may have great doubts if it was true. But we +ought to inquire what kind of a soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he +was able to be content with being just towards men and pious towards the gods, +neither idly vexed on account of men’s villainy, nor yet making himself a slave +to any man’s ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his +share out of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his +understanding to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh. +</p> + +<p> +67. Nature has not so mingled [the intelligence] with the composition of the +body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing thyself and of +bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own; for it is very +possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as such by no one. Always bear +this in mind; and another thing too, that very little indeed is necessary for +living a happy life. And because thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician +and skilled in the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason renounce the +hope of being both free and modest, and social and obedient to God. +</p> + +<p> +68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest +tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as much as +they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members of this kneaded +matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the mind in the midst of +all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity and in a just judgment of all +surrounding things and in a ready use of the objects which are presented to it, +so that the judgment may say to the thing which falls under its observation: +This thou art in substance [reality], though in men’s opinion thou mayest +appear to be of a different kind; and the use shall say to that which falls +under the hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me that which +presents itself is always a material for virtue both rational and political, +and in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs to man or God. For +everything which happens has a relationship either to God or man, and is +neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt matter to work on. +</p> + +<p> +69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every day as +the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor playing the +hypocrite. +</p> + +<p> +70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a time they +must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of them bad; and +besides this, they also take care of them in all ways. But thou, who art +destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the bad, and this too +when thou art one of them? +</p> + +<p> +71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness, which +is indeed possible, but to fly from other men’s badness, which is impossible. +</p> + +<p> +72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be neither +intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to itself. +</p> + +<p> +73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost thou +still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the +reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return? +</p> + +<p> +74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act +according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by doing +it to others. +</p> + +<p> +75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either everything +that takes place comes by way of consequence or [continuity]; or even the chief +things towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own movement +are governed by no rational principle. If this is remembered, it will make thee +more tranquil in many things (vi. 44; ix. 28). +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK VIII.</h2> + +<p> +1. This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty fame, that +it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, or at least +thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher; but both to many others +and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. Thou hast fallen +into disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation +of a philosopher; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly +seen where the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem [to +others], and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as +thy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract +thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having found +happiness anywhere,—not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor +in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing what man’s nature +requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has principles from which come +his affects and his acts. What principles? Those which relate to good and bad: +the belief that there is nothing good for man which does not make him just, +temperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad which does not do the +contrary to what has been mentioned. +</p> + +<p> +2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect to me? +Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone. What more +do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an intelligent living being, +and a social being, and one who is under the same law with God? +</p> + +<p> +3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with Diogenes +and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with things, and their +causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling principles of these men were +the same [or conformable to their pursuits]. But as to the others, how many +things had they to care for, and to how many things were they slaves! +</p> + +<p> +4. [Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even though thou +shouldst burst. +</p> + +<p> +5. This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are according to +the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody and +nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In the next place, having fixed thy eyes +steadily on thy business look at it, and at the same time remembering that it +is thy duty to be a good man, and what man’s nature demands, do that without +turning aside; and speak as it seems to thee most just, only let it be with a +good disposition and with modesty and without hypocrisy. +</p> + +<p> +6. The nature of the universal has this work to do,—to remove to that place the +things which are in this, to change them, to take them away hence, and to carry +them there. All things are change, yet we need not fear anything new. All +things are familiar [to us]; but the distribution of them still remains the +same. +</p> + +<p> +7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well; and a +rational nature goes on its way well when in its thoughts it assents to nothing +false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements to social acts only, and +when it confines its desires and aversions to the things which are in its +power, and when it is satisfied with everything that is assigned to it by the +common nature. For of this common nature every particular nature is a part, as +the nature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in the +plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not perception or +reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of man is part of a nature +which is not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and just, since it +gives to everything in equal portions and according to its worth, times, +substance, cause [form], activity and incident. But examine, not to discover +that any one thing compared with any other single thing is equal in all +respects, but by taking all the parts together of one thing and comparing them +with all the parts together of another. +</p> + +<p> +8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure [or +ability] to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure and +pain: thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame, and not to be vexed at +stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care for them. +</p> + +<p> +9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or with +thy own (V. 16). +</p> + +<p> +10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something useful; +but that which is good must be something useful, and the perfect good man +should look after it. But no such man would ever repent of having refused any +sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor useful. +</p> + +<p> +11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution! What is its +substance and material? And what its causal nature [or form]? And what is it +doing in the world? And how long does it subsist? +</p> + +<p> +12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is according +to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform social acts, but +sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But that which is according to +each individual’s nature is also more peculiarly its own, and more suitable to +its nature, and indeed also more agreeable (V. 1). +</p> + +<p> +13. Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every impression on +the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of Dialectic. +</p> + +<p> +14. Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What opinions +has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to pleasure and pain and +the causes of each, and with respect to fame and ignominy, death and life, he +has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing wonderful or strange to me if +he does such and such things; and I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to +do so. +</p> + +<p> +15. Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree produces +figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and such things of +which it is productive; and for the physician and the helmsman it is a shame to +be surprised if a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfavorable. +</p> + +<p> +16. Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects thy +error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy error. For it is +thy own, the activity which is exerted according to thy own movement and +judgment, and indeed according to thy own understanding too. +</p> + +<p> +17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? but if it is in the +power of another, whom dost thou blame,—the atoms [chance] or the gods? Both +are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct [that which is +the cause]; but if thou canst not do this, correct at least the thing itself; +but if thou canst not do even this, of what use is it to thee to find fault? +for nothing should be done without a purpose. +</p> + +<p> +18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays here, it +also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are elements +of the universe and of thyself. And these too change, and they murmur not. +</p> + +<p> +19. Everything exists for some end,—a horse, a vine. Why dost thou wonder? Even +the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of the gods will say the +same. For what purpose then art thou,—to enjoy pleasure? See if common sense +allows this. +</p> + +<p> +20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the +beginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball. What +good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or +even to have fallen? and what good is it to the bubble while it holds together, +or what harm when it is burst? The same may be said of a light also. +</p> + +<p> +21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is; and when +it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is diseased. +</p> + +<p> +Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer and the +remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the world; and not even here +do all agree, no, not any one with himself: and the whole earth too is a point. +</p> + +<p> +22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion or an +act or a word. Thou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest rather to become +good to-morrow than to be good to-day. +</p> + +<p> +23. Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of mankind. Does +anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and the source of +all things, from which all that happens is derived. +</p> + +<p> +24. Such as bathing appears to thee,—oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water, all things +disgusting,—so is every part of life and everything. +</p> + +<p> +25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus die, and +then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and then Epitynchanus died. +Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is everything. Celer +saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And those sharp-witted men, either +seers or men inflated with pride, where are they,—for instance the sharp-witted +men, Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like +them? All ephemeral, dead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even +for a short time, and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others +have disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little +compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be +extinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere. +</p> + +<p> +26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it is a +proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise the movements +of the senses, to form a just judgment of plausible appearances, and to take a +survey of the nature of the universe and of the things which happen in it. +</p> + +<p> +27. There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one to the +body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from which all things +come to all; and the third to those who live with thee. +</p> + +<p> +28. Pain is either an evil to the body—then let the body say what it thinks of +it—or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to maintain its own +serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain is an evil. For every +judgment and movement and desire and aversion is within, and no evil ascends so +high. +</p> + +<p> +29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: Now it is in my power +to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any perturbation at all; but +looking at all things I see what is their nature, and I use each according to +its value.—Remember this power which thou hast from nature. +</p> + +<p> +30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be, +appropriately, not with any affectation: use plain discourse. +</p> + +<p> +31. Augustus’ court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, +kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius, Maecenas, physicians, and sacrificing +priests,—the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest, not considering the +death of a single man [but of a whole race], as of the Pompeii; and that which +is inscribed on the tombs,—The last of his race. Then consider what trouble +those before them have had that they might leave a successor; and then, that of +necessity some one must be the last. Again, here consider the death of a whole +race. +</p> + +<p> +32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if every act +does its duty as far as is possible, be content; and no one is able to hinder +thee so that each act shall not do its duty.—But something external will stand +in the way.—Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly and soberly and +considerately.—But perhaps some other active power will be hindered.—Well, but +by acquiescing in the hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to +that which is allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before +thee in place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to +this ordering of which we are speaking. +</p> + +<p> +33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance; and be ready to let it +go. +</p> + +<p> +34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying anywhere +apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as he +can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself from others, +or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached thyself from the +natural unity,—for thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou hast cut +thyself off,—yet here there is this beautiful provision, that it is in thy +power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after it +has been separated and cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the +kindness by which he has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not +to be separated at all from the universal; and when he has been separated, he +has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a part. +</p> + +<p> +35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being all the +other powers that it has, so we have received from it this power also. For as +the universal nature converts and fixes in its predestined place everything +which stands in the way and opposes it, and makes such things a part of itself, +so also the rational animal is able to make every hindrance its own material, +and to use it for such purposes as it may have designed. +</p> + +<p> +36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not thy +thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou mayest expect to +befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself, What is there in this which is +intolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt be ashamed to confess. In the next +place remember that neither the future nor the past pains thee, but only the +present. But this is reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, +and chidest thy mind if it is unable to hold out against even this. +</p> + +<p> +37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus? Does Chaurias or +Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? That would be ridiculous. Well, suppose +they did sit there, would the dead be conscious of it? and if the dead were +conscious would they be pleased? and if they were pleased, would that make them +immortal? Was it not in the order of destiny that these persons too should +first become old women and old men and then die? What then would those do after +these were dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag. +</p> + +<p> +38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, says the philosopher. +</p> + +<p> +39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed +to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, and that +is temperance. +</p> + +<p> +40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give thee pain, +thou thyself standest in perfect security.—Who is this self?—The reason.—But I +am not reason.—Be it so. Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But if +any other part of thee suffers, let it have its own opinion about itself (VII. +16). +</p> + +<p> +41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal nature. +Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the animal nature. +And something else also is equally an impediment and an evil to the +constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the intelligence +is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these things then to thyself. +Does pain or sensuous pleasure effect thee? The senses will look to that. Has +any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts towards an object? If indeed thou wast +making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or without any reservation], +certainly this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But +if thou takest [into consideration] the usual course of things, thou hast not +yet been injured nor even impeded. The things however which are proper to the +understanding no other man is used to impede, for neither fire, nor iron, nor +tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any way. When it has been made a sphere, it +continues a sphere (XI, 12). +</p> + +<p> +42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never +intentionally given pain even to another. +</p> + +<p> +43. Different things delight different people; but it is my delight to keep the +ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from any of +the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome +eyes and using everything according to its value. +</p> + +<p> +44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who rather +pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the men of after time will be +exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both are mortal. And what +is it in any way to thee if these men of after time utter this or that sound, +or have this or that opinion about thee? +</p> + +<p> +45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my divine part +tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act conformably to its proper +constitution. Is this [change of place] sufficient reason why my soul should be +unhappy and worse then it was, depressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? and +what wilt thou find which is sufficient reason for this? +</p> + +<p> +46. Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to an ox +which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine which is not +according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a +stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is usual and natural, why +shouldst thou complain? For the common nature brings nothing which may not be +borne by thee. +</p> + +<p> +47. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that +disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe +out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition gives thee pain, +who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion? And even if thou art pained +because thou art not doing some particular thing which seems to thee to be +right, why dost thou not rather act than complain?—But some insuperable +obstacle is in the way?—Do not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being +done depends not on thee.—But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be +done.—Take thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in +full activity, and well pleased too with the things which are obstacles. +</p> + +<p> +48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected it is +satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not choose to do, even +if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it be when it forms a judgment +about anything aided by reason and deliberately? Therefore the mind which is +free from passions is a citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he +can fly for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen +this is an ignorant man; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge +is unhappy. +</p> + +<p> +49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report. Suppose +that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of thee. +This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured, that has not been +reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see; but that he is in danger, I do +not see. Thus then always abide by the first appearances, and add nothing +thyself from within, and then nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something +like a man who knows everything that happens in the world. +</p> + +<p> +50. A cucumber is bitter—Throw it away.—There are briers in the road—Turn +aside from them.—This is enough. Do not add, And why were such things made in +the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with nature, +as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter and shoemaker if thou didst find +fault because thou seest in their workshop shavings and cuttings from the +things which they make. And yet they have places into which they can throw +these shavings and cuttings, and the universal nature has no external space; +but the wondrous part of her art is that though she has circumscribed herself, +everything within her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless +she changes into herself, and again makes other new things from these very +same, so that she requires neither substance from without nor wants a place +into which she may cast that which decays. She is content then with her own +space, and her own matter, and her own art. +</p> + +<p> +51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without method, +nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul inward contention +nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure. +</p> + +<p> +Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then can these +things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, just? For +instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure spring, and curse it, the +spring never ceases sending up potable water; and if he should cast clay into +it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and wash them out, and will not be +at all polluted. How then shalt thou possess a perpetual fountain [and not a +mere well]? By forming thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with contentment, +simplicity, and modesty. +</p> + +<p> +52. He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is. And he +who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not know who he is, +nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one of these things could +not even say for what purpose he exists himself. What then dost thou think of +him who [avoids or] seeks the praise of those who applaud, of men who know not +either where they are or who they are? +</p> + +<p> +53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice every hour? +Wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please himself? Does a man +please himself who repents of nearly everything that he does? +</p> + +<p> +54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which +surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the +intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power is no less +diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is willing to draw it +to him than the aerial power for him who is able to respire it. +</p> + +<p> +55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and particularly +the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him +who has it in his power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose. +</p> + +<p> +56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbor is just as indifferent as +his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made especially for the sake of +one another, still the ruling power of each of us has its own office, for +otherwise my neighbor’s wickedness would be my harm, which God has not willed +in order that my unhappiness may not depend on another. +</p> + +<p> +57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it is +diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension: Accordingly +its rays are called Extensions because they are extended. But one may judge +what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun’s light passing through a +narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is extended in a right line, and as +it were is divided when it meets with any solid body which stands in the way +and intercepts the air beyond; but there the light remains fixed and does not +glide or fall off. Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffusion of the +understanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it +should make no violent or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in +its way; nor yet fall down, but be fixed, and enlighten that which receives it. +For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it. +</p> + +<p> +58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different kind +of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thou feel any +harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of sensation, thou wilt be a +different kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to live. +</p> + +<p> +59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with them. +</p> + +<p> +60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed, both +when it exercises caution and when it is employed about inquiry, moves straight +onward not the less, and to its object. +</p> + +<p> +61. Enter into every man’s ruling faculty; and also let every other man enter +into thine. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK IX.</h2> + +<p> +1. He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made +rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to +their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her +will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. And he too who +lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity; for the universal nature is the +nature of things that are; and things that are have a relation to all things +that come into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth, +and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies +intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; +and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the +universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the +nature of the world; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself to that +which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from nature through the +neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And +indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of +impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal +nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to +their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and +possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their +share and the things which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain +will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the +world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain +from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things +towards which the universal nature is equally affected,—for it would not have +made both, unless it was equally affected towards both,—towards these they who +wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. +With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or honor and +dishonor, which the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally +affected is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal nature +employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to those who are +produced in continuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a +certain original movement of Providence, according to which it moved from a +certain beginning to this ordering of things, having conceived certain +principles of the things which were to be, and having determined powers +productive of beings and of changes and of such like successions (VII. 75). +</p> + +<p> +2. It would be a man’s happiest lot to depart from mankind without having had +any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. However, to breathe out +one’s life when a man has had enough of these things is the next best voyage, +as the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide with vice, and has not +experience yet induced thee to fly from this pestilence? For the destruction of +the understanding is a pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption +and change of this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a +pestilence of animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence +of men so far as they are men. +</p> + +<p> +3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is one of +those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young and to grow old, +and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have teeth and beard and gray +hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and all the other +natural operations which the seasons of thy life bring, such also is +dissolution. This, then, is consistent with the character of a reflecting +man,—to be neither careless nor impatient nor contemptuous with respect to +death, but to wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now +waitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy wife’s womb, so be +ready for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. But if thou +requirest also a vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt +be made best reconciled to death by observing the objects from which thou art +going to be removed, and the morals of those with whom thy soul will no longer +be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty +to care for them and to bear with them gently; and yet to remember that thy +departure will not be from men who have the same principles as thyself. For +this is the only thing, if there be any, which could draw us the contrary way +and attach us to life,—to be permitted to live with those who have the same +principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how great is the trouble arising +from the discordance of those who live together, so that thou mayest say, Come +quick, O death, lest perchance I, too, should forget myself. +</p> + +<p> +4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly acts +unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad. +</p> + +<p> +5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he who does +a certain thing. +</p> + +<p> +6. Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct +directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with +everything which happens—that is enough. +</p> + +<p> +7. Wipe out imagination: check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the ruling +faculty in its own power. +</p> + +<p> +8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but among +reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as there is one +earth of all things which are of an earthy nature, and we see by one light, and +breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision and all that have +life. +</p> + +<p> +9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all move +towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything which is +earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid flows together, and +everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, so that they require +something to keep them asunder, and the application of force. Fire indeed moves +upwards on account of the elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled +together with all the fire which is here, that even every substance which is +somewhat dry is easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that +which is a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly, then, everything also which +participates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner towards that +which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more. For so much as it is +superior in comparison with all other things, in the same degree also is it +more ready to mingle with and to be fused with that which is akin to it. +Accordingly among animals devoid of reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of +cattle, and the nurture of young birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in +animals there are souls, and that power which brings them together is seen to +exert itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has been +observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there +are political communities and friendships, and families and meetings of people; +and in wars, treaties, and armistices. But in the things which are still +superior, even though they are separated from one another, unity in a manner +exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree is able to +produce a sympathy even in things which are separated. See, then, what now +takes place; for only intelligent animals have now forgotten this mutual desire +and inclination, and in them alone the property of flowing together is not +seen. But still, though men strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and +held by it, for their nature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see what I +say, if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything earthy which +comes in contact with no earthy thing, than a man altogether separated from +other men. +</p> + +<p> +10. Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper seasons each +produces it. But and if usage has especially fixed these terms to the vine and +like things, this is nothing. Reason produces fruit both for all and for +itself, and there are produced from it other things of the same kind as reason +itself. +</p> + +<p> +11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if thou canst +not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose. And the gods, +too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some purposes they even help them +to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind they are. And it is in thy power +also; or say, who hinders thee? +</p> + +<p> +12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be pitied or +admired: but direct thy will to one thing only,—to put thyself in motion and to +check thyself, as the social reason requires. +</p> + +<p> +13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all +trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions. +</p> + +<p> +14. All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in time, and +worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in the time of those +whom we have buried. +</p> + +<p> +15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither knowing aught +of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it, then, which does judge +about them? The ruling faculty. +</p> + +<p> +16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the evil and the good of the rational +social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity but in +activity. +</p> + +<p> +17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down, nor +indeed any good to have been carried up (VIII. 20). +</p> + +<p> +18. Penetrate inwards into men’s leading principles, and thou wilt see what +judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of themselves. +</p> + +<p> +19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation and in +a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too. +</p> + +<p> +20. It is thy duty to leave another man’s wrongful act there where it is (VII. +29; IX. 38). +</p> + +<p> +21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and in a +sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the consideration of +thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in +these also every change was a death. Is this anything to fear? Turn thy +thoughts now to thy life under thy grandfather, then to thy life under thy +mother, then to thy life under thy father; and as thou findest many other +differences and changes and terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to +fear? In like manner, then, neither are the termination and cessation and +change of thy whole life a thing to be afraid of. +</p> + +<p> +22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe and +that of thy neighbor: thy own that thou mayst make it just; and that of the +universe, that thou mayst remember of what thou art a part; and that of thy +neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he has acted ignorantly or with +knowledge, and that thou mayst also consider that his ruling faculty is akin to +thine. +</p> + +<p> +23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let every act +of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of thine then has no +reference either immediately or remotely to a social end, this tears asunder +thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and it is of the nature of a mutiny, +just as when in a popular assembly a man acting by himself stands apart from +the general agreement. +</p> + +<p> +24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits carrying +about dead bodies [such is everything]; and so what is exhibited in the +representation of the mansions of the dead strikes our eyes more clearly. +</p> + +<p> +25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it altogether +from its material part, and then contemplate it; then determine the time, the +longest which a thing of this peculiar form is naturally made to endure. +</p> + +<p> +26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented with thy +ruling faculty when it does the things which it is constituted by nature to do. +But enough [of this]. +</p> + +<p> +27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee anything +injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and see what kind of +men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no reason to take any trouble +that these men may have this or that opinion about thee. However, thou must be +well disposed towards them, for by nature they are friends. And the gods too +aid them in all ways, by dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those +things on which they set a value. +</p> + +<p> +28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down from age +to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in motion for every +separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content with that which is the +result of its activity: or it puts itself in motion once, and everything else +comes by way of sequence in a manner; or indivisible elements are the origin of +all things.—In a word, if there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do +not thou also be governed by it (VI. 44; VII. 75). +</p> + +<p> +Soon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change, and the +things also which result from change will continue to change forever, and these +again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes and transformations which +follow one another like wave after wave and their rapidity, he will despise +everything which is perishable (XII. 21). +</p> + +<p> +29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything along +with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are engaged in matters +political, and, as they suppose, are playing the philosopher! All drivellers. +Well then, man: do what nature now requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in +thy power, and do not look about thee to see if any one will observe it; nor +yet expect Plato’s Republic: but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, +and consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men’s +opinions? and without a change of opinions what else is there than the slavery +of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell me of Alexander +and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves shall judge whether +they discovered what the common nature required, and trained themselves +accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to +imitate them. Simple and modest is the work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to +insolence and pride. +</p> + +<p> +30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their countless +solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and calms, and the +differences among those who are born, who live together, and die. And consider, +too, the life lived by others in olden time, and the life of those who will +live after thee, and the life now lived among barbarous nations, and how many +know not even thy name, and how many will soon forget it, and how they who +perhaps now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a +posthumous name is of any value, nor reputation, nor anything else. +</p> + +<p> +31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things which +come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the things done by +virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action +terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature. +</p> + +<p> +32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those which +disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt then gain for +thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe in thy mind, and by +contemplating the eternity of time, and observing the rapid change of every +several thing, how short is the time from birth to dissolution, and the +illimitable time before birth as well as the equally boundless time after +dissolution! +</p> + +<p> +33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been spectators +of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who dies at the extremest +old age will be brought into the same condition with him who died prematurely. +</p> + +<p> +34. What are these men’s leading principles, and about what kind of things are +they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and honor? Imagine that +thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When they think that they do harm by +their blame or good by their praise, what an idea! +</p> + +<p> +35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights in +change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and from eternity +have been done in like form, and will be such to time without end. What, then, +dost thou say,—that all things have been and all things always will be bad, and +that no power has ever been found in so many gods to rectify these things, but +the world has been condemned to be bound in never ceasing evil (IV. 45; VII. +88)? +</p> + +<p> +36. The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything: water, +dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities of the earth; and +gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only bits of hair; and purple +dye, blood; and everything else is of the same kind. And that which is of the +nature of breath is also another thing of the same kind, changing from this to +that. +</p> + +<p> +37. Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why art thou +disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is it the form of +the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it. But besides these there +is nothing. Towards the gods then, now become at last more simple and better. +It is the same whether we examine these things for a hundred years or three. +</p> + +<p> +38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has not done +wrong. +</p> + +<p> +39. Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come together as +in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what is done for the +benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and nothing else than mixture +and dispersion. Why, then, art thou disturbed? Say to the ruling faculty, Art +thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become +a beast, dost thou herd and feed with the rest? +</p> + +<p> +40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they have no +power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why dost thou not +pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things which +thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things which thou desirest, or not +being pained at anything, rather than pray that any of these things should not +happen or happen? for certainly if they can co-operate with men, they can +co-operate for these purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed +them in thy power. Well, then, is it not better to use what is in thy power +like a free man than to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy +power? And who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the things +which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray for such things, and thou wilt +see. One man prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that woman? Do thou +pray thus: How shall I not desire to lie with her? Another prays thus: How +shall I be released from this? Another prays: How shall I not desire to be +released? Another thus: How shall I not lose my little son? Thou thus: How +shall I not be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see +what comes. +</p> + +<p> +41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my bodily +sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those who visited me; +but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as before, keeping to this +main point, how the mind, while participating in such movements as go on in the +poor flesh, shall be free from perturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor +did I, he says, give the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, +as if they were doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. +Do, then, the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any +other circumstances; for never to desert philosophy in any events that may +befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant man or with one +unacquainted with nature, is a principle of all schools of philosophy; but to +be intent only on that which thou art now doing and on the instrument by which +thou dost it. +</p> + +<p> +42. When thou art offended with any man’s shameless conduct, immediately ask +thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men should not be in the world? +It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is impossible. For this man also +is one of those shameless men who must of necessity be in the world. Let the +same considerations be present to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the +faithless man, and of every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time +that thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men +should not exist, thou wilt become more kindly disposed towards every one +individually. It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion +arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful act. +For she has given to man, as an antidote against the stupid man, mildness, and +against another kind of man some other power. And in all cases it is possible +for thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray; for every man who +errs misses his object and is gone astray. Besides, wherein hast thou been +injured? For thou wilt find that no one among those against whom thou art +irritated has done anything by which thy mind could be made worse; but that +which is evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only in the mind. And what +harm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been instructed +does the acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou shouldst not rather +blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man to err in such a way. +For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely +that he would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed +that he has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man as faithless or +ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou +didst trust that a man who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or +when conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in +such way as to have received from thy very act all the profit. For what more +dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? art thou not content that +thou hast done something comformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be +paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, or the feet +for walking. For as these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by +working according to their several constitutions obtain what is their own; so +also as man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done +anything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common interest, he +has acted conformably to his constitution, and he gets what is his own. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK X.</h2> + +<p> +1. Wilt thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and naked, more +manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou never enjoy an +affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never be full and without a +want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring anything, either +animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasures? nor yet desiring time +wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or +society of men with whom thou mayest live in harmony? but wilt thou be +satisfied with thy present condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, +and wilt thou convince thyself that thou hast everything, and that it comes +from the gods, that everything is well for thee, and will be well whatever +shall please them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation of the +perfect living being, the good and just and beautiful, which generates and +holds together all things, and contains and embraces all things which are +dissolved for the production of other like things? Wilt thou never be such that +thou shalt so dwell in community with gods and men as neither to find fault +with them at all, nor to be condemned by them? +</p> + +<p> +2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by nature +only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art a living +being, shall not be made worse by it. And next thou must observe what thy +nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And all this thou mayest +allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a rational animal, shall not +be made worse by it. But the rational animal is consequently also a political +[social] animal. Use these rules, then, and trouble thyself about nothing else. +</p> + +<p> +3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art formed by +nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to bear it. If, then, it +happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not +complain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. But if it +happens in such wise as thou art not formed by nature to bear it, do not +complain, for it will perish after it has consumed thee. Remember, however, +that thou art formed by nature to bear everything, with respect to which it +depends on thy own opinion to make it endurable and tolerable, by thinking that +it is either thy interest or thy duty to do this. +</p> + +<p> +4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error. But if +thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. +</p> + +<p> +5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity; and +the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being, +and of that which is incident to it (III. II; IV. 26). +</p> + +<p> +6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or nature [is a system], let +this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by +nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the +same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall +be discontented with none of the things which are assigned to me out of the +whole; for nothing is injurious to the part if it is for the advantage of the +whole. For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all +natures indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has +this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any external cause +to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering, then, that I am a part +of such a whole, I shall be content with everything that happens. And inasmuch +as I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind +with myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to +the things which are of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my +efforts to the common interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if +these things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayest +observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action +which is advantageous to his fellow citizens, and is content with whatever the +state may assign to him. +</p> + +<p> +7. The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally comprehended +in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this be understood in this +sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is naturally both an evil and +a necessity for the parts, the whole would not continue to exist in a good +condition, the parts being subject to change and constituted so as to perish in +various ways, For whether did Nature herself design to do evil to the things +which are parts of herself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity +fall into evil, or have such results happened without her knowing it? Both +these suppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man should even drop the +term Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these things as +natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time that the +parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and at the same time +to be surprised or vexed as if something were happening contrary to nature, +particularly as the dissolution of things is into those things of which each +thing is composed. For there is either a dispersion of the elements out of +which everything has been compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy +and from the airy to the aerial, so that these parts are taken back into the +universal reason, whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or +renewed by eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part +belongs to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its +accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the food and +the air which is inspired. This, then, which has received [the accretion], +changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. Hut suppose that this [which +thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very much with that other part, which +has the peculiar quality [of change], this is nothing in fact in the way of +objection to what is said. +</p> + +<p> +8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a man of +equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change these names; +and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. And remember that the +term Rational was intended to signify a discriminating attention to every +several thing, and freedom from negligence; and that Equanimity is the +voluntary acceptance of the things which are assigned to thee by the common +nature; and that Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part above the +pleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh, and above that poor thing +called fame, and death, and all such things. If, then, thou maintainest thyself +in the possession of these names, without desiring to be called by these names +by others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter on another life. For to +continue to be such as thou hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and +defiled in such a life, is the character of a very stupid man and one over-fond +of his life, and like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts who, though +covered with wounds and gore, still entreat to be kept to the following day, +though they will be exposed in the same state to the same claws and bites. +Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few names: and if thou art +able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to certain islands of the +Happy. But if thou shalt perceive that thou fallest out of them and dost not +maintain thy hold, go courageously into some nook where thou shalt maintain +them, or even depart at once from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and +freedom and modesty, after doing this one [laudable] thing at least in thy +life, to have gone out of it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of +these names, it will greatly help thee if thou rememberest the gods, and that +they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be made like +themselves; and if thou rememberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a +fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what does the +work of a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a man is a man. +</p> + +<p> +9. Mimi, war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out those holy +principles of thine. How many things without studying nature dost thou imagine, +and how many dost thou neglect? But it is thy duty so to look on and so to do +everything, that at the same time the power of dealing with circumstances is +perfected, and the contemplative faculty is exercised, and the confidence which +comes from the knowledge of each several thing is maintained without showing +it, but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when gravity, +and when the knowledge of every several thing, both what it is in substance, +and what place it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist, and +of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, and who are able +both to give it and take it away? +</p> + +<p> +10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has caught +a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a net, and another +when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has taken bears, and another +when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these robbers, if thou examinest their +opinions? +</p> + +<p> +11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into one +another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about this part [of +philosophy]. For nothing is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a man +has put off the body, and as he sees that he must, no one knows how soon, go +away from among men and leave everything here, he gives himself up entirely to +just doing in all his actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns +himself to the universal nature. But as to what any man shall say or think +about him or do against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself +contented with these two things,—with acting justly in what he now does, and +being satisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he lays aside all +distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else than to accomplish the +straight course through the law, and by accomplishing the straight course to +follow God. +</p> + +<p> +12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to inquire +what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this way content, without +turning back: but if thou dost not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. +But if any other things oppose thee, go on according to thy powers with due +consideration, keeping to that which appears to be just. For it is best to +reach this object, and if thou dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting +this. He who follows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the +same time, and also cheerful and collected. +</p> + +<p> +13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep whether it will make +any difference to thee if another does what is just and right. It will make no +difference (VI. 32; VIII. 55). +</p> + +<p> +Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant airs in +bestowing their praise or blame on others are such as they are at bed and at +board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, and what they avoid, and what +they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not with hands and feet, but +with their most valuable part, by means of which there is produced, when a man +chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good daemon [happiness] (VII. 17)? +</p> + +<p> +14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is instructed +and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou wilt. And he says +this not proudly, but obediently, and well pleased with her. +</p> + +<p> +15. Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a mountain. +For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here, if he lives +everywhere in the world as in a state [political community]. Let men see, let +them know a real man who lives according to nature. If they cannot endure him, +let them kill him. For that is better than to live thus [as men do]. +</p> + +<p> +16. No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought to be, +but be such. +</p> + +<p> +17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of substance, and +consider that all individual things as to substance are a grain of a fig, and +as to time the turning of a gimlet. +</p> + +<p> +18. Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in +dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or that +everything is so constituted by nature as to die. +</p> + +<p> +19. Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating, easing +themselves, and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when they are +imperious and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their elevated place. But a +short time ago to how many they were slaves and for what things; and after a +little time consider in what a condition they will be. +</p> + +<p> +20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature brings to +each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings it. +</p> + +<p> +21. “The earth loves the shower”; and “the solemn ether loves”; and the +universe loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the universe, +that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that “this or that loves +[is wont] to be produced”? +</p> + +<p> +22. Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it, or thou +art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying and hast +discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is nothing. Be of good +cheer, then. +</p> + +<p> +23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like any +other; and that all things here are the same with things on the top of a +mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be. For thou wilt +find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a city as in a +shepherd’s fold on a mountain. [The three last words are omitted in the +translation.] +</p> + +<p> +24. What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of what nature am I now making it? +and for what purpose am I now using it? is it void of understanding? is it +loosed and rent asunder from social life? is it melted into and mixed with the +poor flesh so as to move together with it? +</p> + +<p> +25. He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master, and he +who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or angry or afraid, +is dissatisfied because something has been or is or shall be of the things +which are appointed by him who rules all things, and he is Law and assigns to +every man what is fit. He then who fears or is grieved or is angry is a +runaway. +</p> + +<p> +26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause takes +it, and labors on it and makes a child. What a thing from such a material! +Again, the child passes food down through the throat, and then another cause +takes it and makes perception and motion, and in fine, life and strength and +other things; how many and how strange! Observe then the things which are +produced in such a hidden way, and see the power just as we see the power which +carries things downwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less +plainly (VII. 75). +</p> + +<p> +27. Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time past also +were; and consider that they will be the same again. And place before thy eyes +entire dramas and stages of the same form, whatever thou hast learned from thy +experience or from older history; for example, the whole court of Hadrianus, +and the whole court of Antoninus, and the whole court of Philippus, Alexander, +Croesus; for all those were such dramas as we see now, only with different +actors. +</p> + +<p> +28. Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be like a +pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams. +</p> + +<p> +Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in which +we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it given to +follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on +all. +</p> + +<p> +29. Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, pause and ask +thyself if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of this. +</p> + +<p> +30. When thou art offended at any man’s fault, forthwith turn to thyself and +reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for example, in thinking +that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit of reputation, and the like. +For by attending to this thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, if this +consideration also is added, that the man is compelled: for what else could he +do? or, if thou art able, take away from him the compulsion. +</p> + +<p> +31. When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic, think of either Eutyches or +Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or Silvanus, and +when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, and when thou hast seen +Xenophon, think of Crito or Severus, and when thou hast looked on thyself, +think of any other Caesar, and in the case of every one do in like manner. Then +let this thought be in thy mind, Where then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody +knows where. For thus continuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and +nothing at all; especially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has +once changed will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But thou, +in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And why art thou not content to +pass through this short time in an orderly way? What matter and opportunity +[for thy activity] art thou avoiding? For what else are all these things, +except exercises for the reason, when it has viewed carefully and by +examination into their nature the things which happen in life? Persevere then +until thou shalt have made these things thy own, as the stomach which is +strengthened makes all things its own, as the blazing fire makes flame and +brightness out of everything that is thrown into it. +</p> + +<p> +32. Let it not be in any man’s power to say truly of thee that thou art not +simple or that thou art not good; but let him be a liar whoever shall think +anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether in thy power. For who +is he that shall hinder thee from being good and simple? Do thou only determine +to live no longer unless thou shalt be such. For neither does reason allow +[thee to live], if thou art not such. +</p> + +<p> +33. What is that which as to this material [our life] can be done or said in +the way most conformable to reason? For whatever this may be, it is in thy +power to do it or to say it, and do not make excuses that thou art hindered. +Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a condition that, what +luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such shall be to thee, in the matter +which is subjected and presented to thee, the doing of the things which are +conformable to man’s constitution; for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment +everything which it is in his power to do according to his own nature. And it +is in his power everywhere. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move +everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to anything +else which is governed by nature or an irrational soul, for the things which +check them and stand in the way are many. But intelligence and reason are able +to go through everything that opposes them, and in such manner as they are +formed by nature and as they choose. Place before thy eyes this facility with +which the reason will be carried through all things, as fire upwards, as a +stone downwards, as a cylinder down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing +further. For all other obstacles either affect the body only, which is a dead +thing; or, except through opinion and the yielding of the reason itself, they +do not crush nor do any harm of any kind; for if they did, he who felt it would +immediately become bad. Now, in the case of all things which have a certain +constitution, whatever harm may happen to any of them, that which is so +affected becomes consequently worse; but in the like case, a man becomes both +better, if one may say so, and more worthy of praise by making a right use of +these accidents. And finally remember that nothing harms him who is really a +citizen, which does not harm the state; nor yet does anything harm the state, +which does not harm law [order]; and of these things which are called +misfortunes not one harms law. What then does not harm law does not harm either +state or citizen. +</p> + +<p> +34. To him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest precept is +sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he should be free from +grief and fear. For example,— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground—<br/> +So is the race of men.” +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +Leaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, are they who cry out as if +they were worthy of credit and bestow their praise, or on the contrary curse, +or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves, in like manner, are those who shall +receive and transmit a man’s fame to after-times. For all such things as these +“are produced in the season of spring,” as the poet says; then the wind casts +them down; then the forest produces other leaves in their places. But a brief +existence is common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all +things as if they would be eternal. A little time, and thou shalt close thy +eyes; and him who has attended thee to thy grave another will soon lament. +</p> + +<p> +35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I wish for +green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And the healthy +hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all that can be heard and +smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be with respect to all food just as +the mill with respect to all things which it is formed to grind. And +accordingly the healthy understanding ought to be prepared for everything which +happens; but that which says, Let my dear children live, and let all men praise +whatever I may do, is an eye which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek +for soft things. +</p> + +<p> +36. There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when he is +dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen. Suppose that he was a +good and wise man, will there not be at last some one to say to himself, Let us +at last breathe freely, being relieved from this schoolmaster? It is true that +he was harsh to none of us, but I perceived that he tacitly condemns us.—This +is what is said of a good man. But in our own case how many other things are +there for which there are many who wish to get rid of us. Thou wilt consider +this, then, when thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly by +reflecting thus: I am going away from such a life, in which even my associates +in behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared, themselves wish me +to depart, hoping perchance to get some little advantage by it. Why then should +a man cling to a longer stay here? Do not however for this reason go away less +kindly disposed to them, but preserving thy own character, and friendly and +benevolent and mild, and on the other hand not as if thou wast torn away; but +as when a man dies a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated from the +body, such also ought thy departure from men to be, for nature united thee to +them and associated thee. But does she now dissolve the union? Well, I am +separated as from kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without +compulsion; for this, too, is one of the things according to nature. +</p> + +<p> +37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything being done +by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is this man doing this? +But begin with thyself, and examine thyself first. +</p> + +<p> +38. Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is hidden +within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if one may so say, +is man. In contemplating thyself never include the vessel which surrounds thee +and these instruments which are attached about it. For they are like to an axe, +differing only in this, that they grow to the body. For indeed there is no more +use in these parts without the cause which moves and checks them than in the +weaver’s shuttle, and the writer’s pen, and the driver’s whip. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK XI.</h2> + +<p> +1. These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, analyses +itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which it bears itself +enjoys,—for the fruits of plants and that in animals which corresponds to +fruits others enjoy,—it obtains its own end, wherever the limit of life may be +fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and in such like things, where the whole +action is incomplete if anything cuts it short; but in every part, and +where-ever it may be stopped, it makes what has been set before it full and +complete, so that it can say, I have what is my own. And further it traverses +the whole universe, and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it +extends itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the +periodical renovation of all things, and it comprehends that those who come +after us will see nothing new, nor have those before us seen anything more, but +in a manner he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding at all, has +seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things which have been and +all that will be. This too is a property of the rational soul, love of one’s +neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to value nothing more than itself, which +is also the property of Law. Thus then right reason differs not at all from the +reason of justice. +</p> + +<p> +2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the pancratium, +if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its several sounds, and +ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by this; for thou wilt be +prevented by shame from confessing it: and in the matter of dancing, if at each +movement and attitude thou wilt do the same; and the like also in the matter of +the pancratium. In all things, then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, +remember to apply thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come +to value them little: and apply this rule also to thy whole life. +</p> + +<p> +3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be separated +from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or continue to +exist; but so that this readiness comes from a man’s own judgment, not from +mere obstinacy, as with the Christians, but considerately and with dignity and +in a way to persuade another, without tragic show. +</p> + +<p> +4. Have I done something for the general interest? Well then I have had my +reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop [doing such +good]. +</p> + +<p> +5. What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well except by +general principles, some about the nature of the universe, and others about the +proper constitution of man? +</p> + +<p> +6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding men of +the things which happen to them, and that it is according to nature for things +to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with what is shown on the stage, +you should not be troubled with that which takes place on the larger stage. For +you see that these things must be accomplished thus, and that even they bear +them who cry out, “O Cithaeron.” And, indeed, some things are said well by the +dramatic writers, of which kind is the following especially:— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Me and my children if the gods neglect,<br/> +This has its reason too.” +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +And again,— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“We must not chafe and fret at that which happens.” +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +And,— +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Life’s harvest reap like the wheat’s fruitful ear.” +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +And other things of the same kind. +</p> + +<p> +After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial freedom of +speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in reminding men to +beware of insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes used to take from these +writers. +</p> + +<p> +But as to the middle comedy, which came next, observe what it was, and again, +for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually sank down into a +mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said even by these writers, +everybody knows: but the whole plan of such poetry and dramaturgy, to what end +does it look? +</p> + +<p> +7. How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life so well +suited for philosophizing as this in which thou now happenest to be. +</p> + +<p> +8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut off from +the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from another man has +fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a branch, another cuts it +off; but a man by his own act separates himself from his neighbor when he hates +him and turns away from him, and he does not know that he has at the same time +cut himself off from the whole social system. Yet he has this privilege +certainly from Zeus, who framed society, for it is in our power to grow again +to that which is near to us, and again to become a part which helps to make up +the whole. However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes it +difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and to be +restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from the first +grew together with the tree, and has continued to have one life with it, is not +like that which after being cut off is then ingrafted, for this is something +like what the gardeners mean when they say that it grows with the rest of the +tree, but that it has not the same mind with it. +</p> + +<p> +9. As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding according to +right reason will not be able to turn thee aside from thy proper action, so +neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent feelings towards them, but be +on thy guard equally in both matters, not only in the matter of steady judgment +and action, but also in the matter of gentleness to those who try to hinder or +otherwise trouble thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as +well as to be diverted from thy course of action and to give way through fear; +for both are equally deserters from their post,—the man who does it through +fear, and the man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman and a +friend. +</p> + +<p> +10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate the +natures of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most perfect and +the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of the skill of art. +Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of the superior; therefore the +universal nature does so too. And, indeed, hence is the origin of justice, and +in justice the other virtues have their foundation: for justice will not be +observed, if we either care for middle things [things indifferent], or are +easily deceived and careless and changeable (V. 16, 30; VII. 55). +</p> + +<p> +11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of which +disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy judgment about +them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either +pursuing or avoiding. +</p> + +<p> +12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure when it is neither +extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed nor sinks +down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees the truth,—the truth of all +things and the truth that is in itself (VIII. 41, 45; XII. 3). +</p> + +<p> +13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But I will +look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything deserving of +contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I will be mild and +benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even him his mistake, not +reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but nobly and +honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the +interior [parts] ought to be such, and a man ought to be seen by the gods +neither dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to +thee, if thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art +satisfied with that which at this moment is suitable to the nature of the +universe, since thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what is +for the common advantage may be done in some way? +</p> + +<p> +14. Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to raise +themselves above one another, and crouch before one another. +</p> + +<p> +15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal with +thee in a fair way!—What art thou doing, man? There is no occasion to give this +notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly written +on the forehead. Such as a man’s character is, he immediately shows it in his +eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith reads everything in the eyes of +lovers. The man who is honest and good ought to be exactly like a man who +smells strong, so that the bystander as soon as he comes near him must smell +whether he choose or not. But the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked +stick. Nothing is more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false +friendship]. Avoid this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show +all these things in the eyes, and there is no mistaking. +</p> + +<p> +16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be +indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be indifferent, if it +looks on each of these things separately and all together, and if it remembers +that not one of them produces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to us; +but these things remain immovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the +judgments about them, and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in +our power not to write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these +judgments have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and +if we remember also that such attention will only be for a short time, and then +life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in doing this? +For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in them and they will be +easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek what is conformable to thy own +nature, and strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation; for every man +is allowed to seek his own good. +</p> + +<p> +17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and into what +it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has changed, and that +it will sustain no harm. +</p> + +<p> +18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my relation to +men, and that we are made for one another; and in another respect I was made to +be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. But examine +the matter from first principles, from this: If all things are not mere atoms, +it is nature which orders all things: if this is so, the inferior things exist +for the sake of the superior, and these for the sake of one another (II. 1; IX. +39; V. 16; III. 4). +</p> + +<p> +Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so forth: and +particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions they are; and as to +their acts, consider with what pride they do what they do (VIII. 14; IX. 34). +</p> + +<p> +Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be displeased: but +if they do not right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and in +ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is +it unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man according to his +deserts. Accordingly men are pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, +and greedy, and in a word wrong-doers to their neighbors (VII. 62, 63; II. 1; +VII. 26; VIII. 29). +</p> + +<p> +Fourth, consider that thou also dost many things wrong, and that thou art a man +like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain faults, still thou hast +the disposition to commit them, though either through cowardice, or concern +about reputation, or some such mean motive, thou dost abstain from such faults +(I. 17). +</p> + +<p> +Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are doing wrong +or not, for many things are done with a certain reference to circumstances. And +in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable him to pass a correct +judgment on another man’s acts (IX. 38; IV. 51). +</p> + +<p> +Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man’s life is only a +moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead (VII. 58; IV. 48). +</p> + +<p> +Seventh, that it is not men’s acts which disturb us, for those acts have their +foundation in men’s ruling principles, but it is our own opinions which disturb +us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment about an +act as if it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone. How then shall I +take away these opinions? By reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings +shame on thee: for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must +of necessity do many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else (V. +25; VII. 16). +</p> + +<p> +Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and vexation +caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we are angry and +vexed (IV. 39, 49; VII. 24). +</p> + +<p> +Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine, and not +an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most violent man do to +thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as +opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly correctest his +errors at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my +child: we are constituted by nature for something else: I shall certainly not +be injured, but thou art injuring thyself, my child.—And show him with gentle +tact and by general principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as +he does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And thou +must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, but +affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and not as if thou wert +lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may admire, but either when he is +alone, and if others are present….<a href="#fn6" name="fnref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p> +Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift from the +Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But thou must equally +avoid flattering men and being vexed at them, for both are unsocial and lead to +harm. And let this truth be present to thee in the excitement of anger, that to +be moved by passion is not manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are +more agreeable to human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who +possesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the +man who is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in +which a man’s mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree +also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain is a characteristic of +weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he who yields to +anger, both are wounded and both submit. +</p> + +<p> +But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the [Muses, +Apollo], and it is this,—that to expect bad men not to do wrong is madness, for +he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to allow men to behave so to +others, and to expect them not to do thee any wrong, is irrational and +tyrannical. +</p> + +<p> +19. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty against which +thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast detected them, +thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each occasion thus: This thought is not +necessary: this tends to destroy social union: this which thou art going to say +comes not from the real thoughts; for thou shouldst consider it among the most +absurd of things for a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth +is when thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of +the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less +honorable and to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross pleasures (IV. +24; II. 16). +</p> + +<p> +20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee, though +by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to the disposition +of the universe they are overpowered here in the compound mass [the body]. And +also the whole of the earthy part in thee and the watery, though their tendency +is downward, still are raised up and occupy a position which is not their +natural one. In this manner then the elemental parts obey the universal; for +when they have been fixed in any place, perforce they remain there until again +the universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then strange +that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and discontented with its +own place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those things which are +comformable to its nature: still it does not submit, but is carried in the +opposite direction. For the movement towards injustice and intemperance and to +anger and grief and fear is nothing else than the act of one who deviates from +nature. And also when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that +happens, then too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety and +reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these qualities also +are comprehended under the generic term of contentment with the constitution of +things, and indeed they are prior to acts of justice. +</p> + +<p> +21. He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be one and +the same all through his life. But what I have said is not enough, unless this +also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there is not the same +opinion about all the things which in some way or other are considered by the +majority to be good, but only about some certain things, that is, things which +concern the common interest, so also ought we to propose to ourselves an object +which shall be of a common kind [social] and political. For he who directs all +his own efforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will +always be the same. +</p> + +<p> +22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm and +trepidation of the town mouse.<a href="#fn7" name="fnref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p> +23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of +Lamiae,—bugbears to frighten children. +</p> + +<p> +24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in the +shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere. +</p> + +<p> +25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him, saying, It is +because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that is, I would not +receive a favor and then be unable to return it. +</p> + +<p> +26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] there was this precept, constantly to +think of some one of the men of former times who practised virtue. +</p> + +<p> +27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we may be +reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things and in the same +manner perform their work, and also be reminded of their purity and nudity. For +there is no veil over a star. +</p> + +<p> +28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin, after +Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates said to his +friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when they saw him +dressed thus. +</p> + +<p> +29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down rules for +others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself. Much more is +this so in life. +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee. +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +31. And my heart laughed within.<br/> + <i>Odyssey</i>, IX. 413. +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.<br/> + HESIOD, <i>Works and Days</i>, 184. +</p> + +<p> +33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman’s act: such is he who looks for +his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, III. 24, 87). +</p> + +<p> +34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to himself, +“To-morrow perchance thou wilt die.”—But those are words of bad omen.—“No word +is a word of bad omen,” said Epictetus, “which expresses any work of nature; or +if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen to speak of the ears of corn being +reaped” (Epictetus, III. 24, 88). +</p> + +<p> +35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape all are changes, not into +nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus, III. 24). +</p> + +<p> +36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus III. 22, 105). +</p> + +<p> +37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with respect to +giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be careful that they +be made with regard to circumstances, that they be consistent with social +interests, that they have regard to the value of the object; and as to sensual +desire, he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion], +he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our +power. +</p> + +<p> +38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but about being +mad or not. +</p> + +<p> +39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or +irrational?—souls of rational men.—Of what rational men, sound or +unsound?—Sound.—Why then do you not seek for them?—Because we have them.—Why +then do you fight and quarrel? +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>BOOK XII.</h2> + +<p> +1. All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous road thou +canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this means, if +thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the future to providence, +and direct the present only conformably to piety and justice. Conformably to +piety, that thou mayest be content with the lot which is assigned to thee, for +nature designed it for thee and thee for it. Conformably to justice, that thou +mayest always speak the truth freely and without disguise, and do the things +which are agreeable to law and according to the worth of each. And let neither +another man’s wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the +sensations of the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part +will look to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be near +to thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy ruling +faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid not because +thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear never to have begun +to live according to nature,—then thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe +which hast produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a stranger in thy native +land, and to wonder at things which happen daily as if they were something +unexpected, and not to be dependent on this or that. +</p> + +<p> +2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the material +vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual part alone he +touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived from himself +into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt rid +thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not the poor flesh which +envelops him, surely will not trouble himself by looking after raiment and +dwelling and fame and such like externals and show. +</p> + +<p> +3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a little +breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, so far as it is +thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore +if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, whatever +others do or say, and whatever thou hast done or said thyself, and whatever +future things trouble thee because they may happen, and whatever in the body +which envelops thee or in the breath [life], which is by nature associated with +the body, is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the +external circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power +exempt from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is +just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt separate, I +say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached to it by the +impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of time that is past, +and wilt make thyself like Empedocles’ sphere, +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“All round and in its joyous rest reposing”; +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is, the +present,—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which remains for +thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient +to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee] (II. 13, 17; III. 5, 6; XI. +12). +</p> + +<p> +4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more than all +the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of himself than on +the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher should present himself +to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to design nothing which he would +not express as soon as he conceived it, he could not endure it even for a +single day. So much more respect have we to what our neighbors shall think of +us than to what we shall think of ourselves. +</p> + +<p> +5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well and +benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men, and very +good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion with the +divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have been most +intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should never exist again, +but should be completely extinguished? +</p> + +<p> +But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods +would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be possible; and if it +were according to nature, nature would have had it so. But because it is not +so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have been +so: for thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with +the Deity; and we should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most +excellent and most just; but if this is so, they would not have allowed +anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and +irrationally. +</p> + +<p> +6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of accomplishing. +For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all other things for want of +practice, holds the bridle more vigorously than the right hand; for it has been +practised in this. +</p> + +<p> +7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be when he is +overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the boundless abyss of +time past and future, the feebleness of all matter. +</p> + +<p> +8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their +coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure is, +and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his uneasiness; how no man +is hindered by another; that everything is opinion. +</p> + +<p> +9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the pancratiast, not +like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which he uses and is +killed; but the other always has his hand, and needs to do nothing else than +use it. +</p> + +<p> +10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form, and +purpose. +</p> + +<p> +11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and to +accept all that God may give him. +</p> + +<p> +12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought to blame +neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or involuntarily, +nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we should +blame nobody (II. 11, 12, 13; VII. 62; VIII. 17, 18). +</p> + +<p> +13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at anything which +happens in life. +</p> + +<p> +14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind +providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director (IV. 27). +If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou resist? But if there is +a providence which allows itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy of the +help of the divinity. But if there is a confusion without a governor, be +content that in such a tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling +intelligence. And even if the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the +poor flesh, the poor breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it +will not carry away. +</p> + +<p> +15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendor until it is +extinguished; and shall the truth which is in thee and justice and temperance +be extinguished [before thy death]? +</p> + +<p> +16. When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong [say], How +then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done wrong, how do +I know that he has not condemned himself? And so this is like tearing his own +face. Consider that he who would not have the bad man do wrong, is like the man +who would not have the fig-tree bear juice in the figs, and infants cry, and +the horse neigh, and whatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man do +who has such a character? If then thou art irritable, cure this man’s +disposition. +</p> + +<p> +17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it. [For +let thy efforts be—] +</p> + +<p> +18. In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for thee an +appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the material, the +purpose, and the time within which it must end. +</p> + +<p> +19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more divine +than the things which cause the various effects, and as it were pull thee by +the strings. What is there now in my mind,—is it fear, or suspicion, or desire, +or anything of the kind (V. 11)? +</p> + +<p> +20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second, make thy +acts refer to nothing else than to a social end. +</p> + +<p> +21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will any of +the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are now living. For +all things are formed by nature to change and be turned and to perish, in order +that other things in continuous succession may exist (IX. 28). +</p> + +<p> +22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away +then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who has doubled the +promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay. +</p> + +<p> +23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its proper +time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done this act, does +he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act has ceased. In like manner +then the whole which consists of all the acts, which is our life, if it cease +at its proper time, suffers no evil for this reason, that it has ceased; nor he +who has terminated this series at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. +But the proper time and the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the +peculiar nature of man, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose +parts the whole universe continues ever young and perfect. And everything which +is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the +termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it shameful, +since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to the general +interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable, and profitable to and +congruent with the universal. For thus too he is moved by the Deity who is +moved in the same manner with the Deity, and moved towards the same things in +his mind. +</p> + +<p> +24. These three principles thou must have in readiness: In the things which +thou dost do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as Justice +herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee from without, +consider that it happens either by chance or according to providence, and thou +must neither blame chance nor accuse providence. Second, consider what every +being is from the seed to the time of its receiving a soul, and from the +reception of a soul to the giving back of the same, and of what things every +being is compounded, and into what things it is resolved. Third, if thou +shouldst suddenly be raised up above the earth, and shouldst look down on human +things, and observe the variety of them how great it is, and at the same time +also shouldst see at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell all +around in the air and the ether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be +raised up, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and shortness of +duration. Are these things to be proud of? +</p> + +<p> +25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from casting it +away? +</p> + +<p> +26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this, that all +things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten this, that a +man’s wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou hast forgotten this, +that everything which happens, always happened so and will happen so, and now +happens so everywhere; forgotten this too, how close is the kinship between a +man and the whole human race, for it is a community, not of a little blood or +seed, but of intelligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that every man’s +intelligence is a god and is an efflux of the Deity; and forgotten this, that +nothing is a man’s own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came +from the Deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou +hast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses only this. +</p> + +<p> +27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained greatly +about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the greatest fame or +misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then think where are they all +now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a tale. And let there be present to +thy mind also everything of this sort, how Fabius Catullinus lived in the +country, and Lucius Lupus in his gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius +at Capreae, and Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the +eager pursuit of anything conjoined with pride; and how worthless everything is +after which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it is for a +man in the opportunities presented to him to show himself just, temperate, +obedient to the gods, and to do this with all simplicity: for the pride which +is proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable of all. +</p> + +<p> +28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou +comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the first +place, they may be seen even with the eyes;<a href="#fn8" +name="fnref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> in the second place, neither have I seen even +my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what +I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, +and I venerate them. +</p> + +<p> +29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what it is +itself, that is its material, what the formal part; with all thy soul to do +justice and to say the truth. What remains, except to enjoy life by joining one +good thing to another so as not to leave even the smallest intervals between? +</p> + +<p> +30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls, +mountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance, though it +is distributed among countless bodies which have their several qualities. There +is one soul, though it is distributed among infinite natures and individual +circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one intelligent soul, though it +seems to be divided. Now in the things which have been mentioned, all the other +parts, such as those which are air and matter, are without sensation and have +no fellowship: and yet even these parts the intelligent principle holds +together and the gravitation towards the same. But intellect in a peculiar +manner tends to that which is of the same kin, and combines with it, and the +feeling for communion is not interrupted. +</p> + +<p> +31. What dost thou wish,—to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to have +sensation, movement, growth, and then again to cease to grow, to use thy +speech, to think? What is there of all these things which seems to thee worth +desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all these things, turn to +that which remains, which is to follow reason and God. But it is inconsistent +with honoring reason and God to be troubled because by death a man will be +deprived of the other things. +</p> + +<p> +32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned to +every man, for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! And how small a +part of the whole substance; and how small a part of the universal soul; and on +what a small clod of the whole earth thou creepest! Reflecting on all this, +consider nothing to be great, except to act as thy nature leads thee, and to +endure that which the common nature brings. +</p> + +<p> +33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in this. But +everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or not, is only +lifeless ashes and smoke. +</p> + +<p> +34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death, that even +those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still have despised it. +</p> + +<p> +35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to whom it +is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts conformable to right +reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether he contemplates the world +for a longer or a shorter time,—for this man neither is death a terrible thing +(II. 7; VI. 23; X. 20; XII. 23). +</p> + +<p> +36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world]; what +difference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]? for that +which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the hardship then, +if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, but +nature, who brought thee into it? the same as if a praetor who has employed an +actor dismisses him from the stage.—“But I have not finished the five acts, but +only three of them.”—Thou sayest well, but in life the three acts are the whole +drama; for what shall be a complete drama is determined by him who was once the +cause of its composition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of +neither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is satisfied. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.</h2> + +<p> +It has been said that the Stoic philosophy first showed its real value when it +passed from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his successors were well +suited to the gravity and practical good sense of the Romans; and even in the +Republican period we have an example of a man, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the +life of a Stoic and died consistently with the opinions which he professed. He +was a man, says Cicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from conviction; not +for the purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make his life +conformable to the Stoic precepts. In the wretched times from the death of +Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic philosophy +which could console and support the followers of the old religion under +imperial tyranny and amidst universal corruption. There were even then noble +minds that could dare and endure, sustained by a good conscience and an +elevated idea of the purposes of man’s existence. Such were Paetus Thrasca, +Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C. Musonius Rufus, and the poets Persius and +Juvenal, whose energetic language and manly thoughts may be as instructive to +us now as they might have been to their contemporaries. Persius died under +Nero’s bloody reign; but Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant +Domitian and to see the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian. His best +precepts are derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced in his finest +verses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language. +</p> + +<p> +The best two expounders of the later Stoical philosophy were a Greek slave and +a Roman emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to Rome, we know not +how, but he was there the slave and afterwards the freedman of his unworthy +master, Epaphroditus. Like other great teachers he wrote nothing, and we are +indebted to his grateful pupil Arrian for what we have of Epictetus’ +discourses. Arrian wrote eight books of the discourses of Epictetus, of which +only four remain and some fragments. We have also from Arrian’s hand the small +Enchiridion or Manual of the chief precepts of Epictetus. There is a valuable +commentary on the Enchiridion by Simplicius, who lived in the time of the +emperor Justinian. +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus in his first book (I. 7), in which he gratefully commemorates his +obligations to his teachers, says that he was made acquainted by Junius +Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, whom he mentions also in other +passages (IV. 41; XI 34, 36). Indeed, the doctrines of Epictetus and Antoninus +are the same, and Epictetus is the best authority for the explanation of the +philosophical language of Antoninus and the exposition of his opinions. But the +method of the two philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed +himself to his hearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple +manner. Antoninus wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in short, +unconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure.<a href="#fn9" name="fnref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p> +The want of arrangement in the original and of connection among the numerous +paragraphs, the corruption of the text, the obscurity of the language and the +style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in the writer’s own ideas,—besides +all this, there is occasionally an apparent contradiction in the emperor’s +thoughts, as if his principles were sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes +clouded his mind. A man who leads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is +not disturbed at home and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep +his mind at ease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not +been tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might turn out to +be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude realities of human +existence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations from men who have not worked +and suffered may be read, but they will be forgotten. No religion, no Ethical +philosophy is worth anything, if the teacher has not lived the “life of an +apostle,” and been ready to die “the death of a martyr.” “Not in passivity (the +passive affects) but in activity lie the evil and the good of the rational +social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in +activity” (IX. 16). The emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his +youth he followed a laborious discipline, and though his high station placed +him above all want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately as +the poorest philosopher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that he always +had the little that he wanted and he was content with it, as he had been with +his servile station. But Antoninus after his accession to the empire sat on an +uneasy seat. He had the administration of an empire which extended from the +Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold mountains of Scotland to the hot sands +of Africa; and we may imagine, though we cannot know it by experience, what +must be the trials, the troubles, the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has +the world’s business on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he can, +and the certain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which he +wishes. +</p> + +<p> +In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, general corruption, and with the +weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily comprehend that +Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to support him. The best and the +bravest men have moments of doubt and of weakness; but if they are the best and +the bravest, they rise again from their depression by recurring to first +principles, as Antoninus does. The emperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, +and St. James in his Epistle is of the same mind; that the world is full of +envious, jealous, malignant people, and a man might be well content to get out +of it. He has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he holds most +firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they are evidence of +the struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men had to maintain against +the hard realities of his daily life. A poor remark it is which I have seen +somewhere, and made in a disparaging way, that the emperor’s reflections show +that he had need of consolation and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to +meet his death. True that he did need comfort and support, and we see how he +found it. He constantly recurs to his fundamental principle that the universe +is wisely ordered, that every man is a part of it and must conform to that +order which he cannot change, that whatever the Deity has done is good, that +all mankind are a man’s brethren, that he must love and cherish them and try to +make them better, even those who would do him harm. This is his conclusion (II. +17): “What then is that which is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, +Philosophy. But this consists in keeping the divinity within a man free from +violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a +purpose nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another +man’s doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens and +all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he +himself came; and finally waiting for death with a cheerful mind as being +nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is +compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each +continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about +the change and dissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it is according +to nature; and nothing is evil that is according to nature.” +</p> + +<p> +The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature of the Universe, of its +government, and of the relation of man’s nature to both. He names the universe +(VI. 1), “the universal substance,” and he adds that “reason” governs the +universe. He also (VI. 9) uses the terms “universal nature” or “nature of the +universe.” He (VI. 25) calls the universe “the one and all, which we name +Cosmos or Order.” If he ever seems to use these general terms as significant of +the All, of all that man can in any way conceive to exist, he still on other +occasions plainly distinguishes between Matter, Material things, and Cause, +Origin, Reason. This is conformable to Zeno’s doctrine that there are two +original principles of all things, that which acts and that which is acted +upon. That which is acted on is the formless matter: that which acts is the +reason, God, who is eternal and operates through all matter, and produces all +things. So Antoninus (V. 32) speaks of the reason which pervades all substance, +and through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the universe. +God is eternal, and Matter is eternal. It is God who gives form to matter, but +he is not said to have created matter. According to this view, which is as old +as Anaxagoras, God and matter exist independently, but God governs matter. This +doctrine is simply the expression of the fact of the existence both of matter +and of God. The Stoics did not perplex themselves with the insoluble question +of the origin and nature of matter. Antoninus also assumes a beginning of +things, as we now know them; but his language is sometimes very obscure. +</p> + +<p> +Matter consists of elemental parts of which all material objects are made. But +nothing is permanent in form. The nature of the universe, according to +Antoninus’ expression (IV. 36), “loves nothing so much as to change the things +which are, and to make new things like them. For everything that exists is in a +manner the seed of that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds +which are cast into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar +notion.” All things then are in a constant flux and change: some things are +dissolved into the elements, others come in their places; and so the “whole +universe continues ever young and perfect.” +</p> + +<p> +When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call +gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their +resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their generation, +growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death, we observe a regular +sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of experience present and past, +so far as we know the past, is fixed and invariable. But if this is not so, if +the order and sequence of phenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in +the course of an infinite progression,—and such change is conceivable,—we have +not discovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and sequence +of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved according to its very +nature, that is, according to its fixed order, some variation of what we now +call the Order or Nature of Things. It is also conceivable that such changes +have taken place,—changes in the order of things, as we are compelled by the +imperfection of language to call them, but which are no changes; and further it +is certain that our knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as +for instance the phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever +must be imperfect. +</p> + +<p> +We do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than when we +speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use the terms cause +and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct meaning to them, distinct +enough at least to prevent all misunderstanding. But the case is different when +we speak of causes and effects as of Things. All that we know is phenomena, as +the Greeks called them, or appearances which follow one another in a regular +order, as we conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon should fail in the +series, we conceive that there must either be an interruption of the series, or +that something else will appear after the phenomenon which has failed to +appear, and will occupy the vacant place; and so the series in its progression +may be modified or totally changed. Cause and effect then mean nothing in the +sequence of natural phenomena beyond what I have said; and the real cause, or +the transcendent cause, as some would call it, of each successive phenomenon is +in that which is the cause of all things which are, which have been, and which +will be forever. Thus the word Creation may have a real sense if we consider it +as the first, if we can conceive a first, in the present order of natural +phenomena; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all things at a certain time, +followed by a quiescence of the first cause, and an abandonment of all +sequences of Phenomena to the laws of Nature, or to the other words that people +may use, is absolutely absurd. +</p> + +<p> +Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power or an intellectual power, or +that he has such a power, in whatever way he conceives that he has it,—for I +wish simply to state a fact,—from this power which he has in himself, he is +led, as Antoninus says, to believe that there is a greater power, which, as the +old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole universe as the intellect pervades man. +</p> + +<p> +God exists then, but what do we know of his nature? Antoninus says that the +soul of man is an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like animals, but we +have reason, intelligence, as the gods. Animals have life and what we call +instincts or natural principles of action: but the rational animal man alone +has a rational, intelligent soul. Antoninus insists on this continually: God is +in man, and so we must constantly attend to the divinity within us, for it is +only in this way that we can have any knowledge of the nature of God. The human +soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, and the soul alone has any +communication with the Deity; for as he says (XII. 2): “With his intellectual +part alone God touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived +from himself into these bodies.” In fact he says that which is hidden within a +man is life, that is the man himself. All the rest is vesture, covering, +organs, instrument, which the living man, the real man, uses for the purpose of +his present existence. The air is universally diffused for him who is able to +respire; and so for him who is willing to partake of it the intelligent power, +which holds within it all things, is diffused as wide and free as the air +(VIII. 54). It is by living a divine life that man approaches to a knowledge of +the divinity. It is by following the divinity within, as Antoninus calls it, +that man comes nearest to the Deity, the supreme good; for man can never attain +to perfect agreement with his internal guide. “Live with the gods. And he does +live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied +with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all the daemon wishes, +which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, and a portion of +himself. And this daemon is every man’s understanding and reason” (V. 27). +</p> + +<p> +There is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior faculty +which if it is exercised rules all the rest. A man must reverence only his +ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we must reverence that which is +supreme in the universe, so we must reverence that which is supreme in +ourselves; and this is that which is of like kind with that which is supreme in +the universe (V. 21). +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus speaks of a man’s condemnation of himself when the diviner part +within him has been overpowered and yields to the less honorable and to the +perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures. +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus did not view God and the material universe as the same, any more than +he viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has no speculations on the +absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his fashion to waste his time on what +man cannot understand. He was satisfied that God exists, that he governs all +things, that man can only have an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he +must attain this imperfect knowledge by reverencing the divinity which is +within him, and keeping it pure. +</p> + +<p> +From all that has been said, it follows that the universe is administered by +the Providence of God and that all things are wisely ordered. There are +passages in which Antoninus expresses doubts, or states different possible +theories of the constitution and government of the universe; but he always +recurs to his fundamental principle; that if we admit the existence of a deity, +we must also admit that he orders all things wisely and well (IV. 27; VI. 1; +IX. 28; XII. 5). +</p> + +<p> +But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what we call +evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is evil in the world, +we use the expression which I have used, “what we call evil,” we have partly +anticipated the emperor’s answer. We see and feel and know imperfectly very few +things in the few years that we live, and all the knowledge and all the +experience of all the human race is positive ignorance of the whole, which is +infinite. Now, as our reason teaches us that everything is in some way related +to and connected with every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the +universe of things is a contradiction; for if the whole comes from and is +governed by an intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it +which tends to the evil or destruction of the whole (VII. 55; X. 6). +</p> + +<p> +Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We might +imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and yet the whole +would still subsist “ever young and perfect.” +</p> + +<p> +All things, all forms, are dissolved and new forms appear. All living things +undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an evil, then all +change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, +for he suffers both in and by his body and by his intelligent part. Men suffer +also from one another, and perhaps the largest part of human suffering comes to +man from those whom he calls his brothers. Antoninus says, (VIII. 55) +“Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and particularly, +the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him +who has it in his power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose.” The +first part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole can +sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the Stoic +principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our power. What +wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But this is an admission +that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does evil, and if others +can endure the wrong, still there is evil in the wrong- doer. Antoninus (XI. +18) gives many excellent precepts with respect to wrongs and injuries, and his +precepts are practical. He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his +lessons may be just as useful to him who denies the being and the government of +God as to him who believes in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus to +the objections which may be made to the existence and providence of God because +of the moral disorder and suffering which are in the world, except this answer +which he makes in reply to the supposition that even the best men may be +extinguished by death. He says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought to +have been otherwise, the gods would have ordered it otherwise (XII. 5). His +conviction of the wisdom which we may observe in the government of the world is +too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities in the order of +things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who would conclude from +them against the being and government of God conclude too hastily. We all admit +that there is an order in the material world, a constitution, a system, a +relation of parts to one another and a fitness of the whole for something. So +in the constitution of plants and of animals there is an order, a fitness for +some end. Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and the end, +as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the plant, or the animal +sometimes perishes before it has passed through all its changes and done all +its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish +early and for others to do all their uses and leave successors to take their +place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual and moral constitution fit for +certain uses, and on the whole man performs these uses, dies, and leaves other +men in his place. So society exists, and a social state is manifestly the +natural state of man,—the state for which his nature fits him, and society +amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders still subsists; and perhaps we +may say that the history of the past and our present knowledge give us a +reasonable hope that its disorders will diminish, and that order, its governing +principle may be more firmly established. As order then, a fixed order, we may +say, subject to deviations real or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the +whole nature of things, that which we call disorder or evil, as it seems to us, +does not in any way alter the fact of the general constitution of things having +a nature or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the existence of disorder +that order is not the rule, for the existence of order both physical and moral +is proved by daily experience and all past experience. We cannot conceive how +the order of the universe is maintained: we cannot even conceive how our own +life from day to day is continued, nor how we perform the simplest movements of +the body, nor how we grow and think and act, though we know many of the +conditions which are necessary for all these functions. Knowing nothing then of +the unseen power which acts in ourselves except by what is done, we know +nothing of the power which acts through what we call all time and all space; +but seeing that there is a nature or fixed order in all things known to us, it +is conformable to the nature of our minds to believe that this universal Nature +has a cause which operates continually, and that we are totally unable to +speculate on the reason of any of those disorders or evils which we perceive. +This I believe is the answer which may be collected from all that Antoninus has +said. +</p> + +<p> +The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam that Zeus has two +casks, one filled with good things, and the other with bad, and that he gives +to men out of each according to his pleasure; and so we must be content, for we +cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the Greek commentators asks how must we +reconcile this doctrine with what we find in the first book of the Odyssey, +where the king of the gods says, “Men say that evil comes to them from us, but +they bring it on themselves through their own folly.” The answer is plain +enough even to the Greek commentator. The poets make both Achilles and Zeus +speak appropriately to their several characters. Indeed, Zeus says plainly that +men do attribute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it falsely, for they +are the cause of their own sorrows. +</p> + +<p> +Epictetus in his Enchiridion makes short work of the question of evil. He says, +“As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so neither does the +nature of evil exist in the universe.” This will appear obscure enough to those +who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but he always knows what he is talking +about. We do not set up a mark in order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, +whose existence Epictetus assumes, has not ordered all things so that his +purpose shall fail. Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the nature of +evil, as he expresses it, does not exist; that is, evil is not a part of the +constitution or nature of things. If there were a principle of evil in the +constitution of things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius argues, but +evil would be good. +</p> + +<p> +One passage more will conclude this matter. It contains all that the emperor +could say: “To go from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be +afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do +not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to +live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence? But in truth they do +exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the means in +man’s power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if +there was anything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should +be altogether in a man’s power not to fall into it. But that which does not +make a man worse, how can it make a man’s life worse? But neither through +ignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the power to guard against or +correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has +overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either +through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen +indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly and life, honor +and dishonor, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to good and +bad men, being things which make us neither better nor worse. Therefore they +are neither good nor evil.” +</p> + +<p> +The Ethical part of Antoninus’ Philosophy follows from his general principles. +The end of all his philosophy is to live conformably to Nature, both a man’s +own nature and the nature of the universe. Bishop Butler has explained what the +Greek philosophers meant when they spoke of living according to Nature, and he +says that when it is explained, as he has explained it and as they understood +it, it is, “a manner of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and +distinct, strictly just and true.” To live according to Nature is to live +according to a man’s whole nature, not according to a part of it, and to +reverence the divinity within him as the governor of all his actions. “To the +rational animal the same act is according to nature and according to reason.” +That which is done contrary to reason is also an act contrary to nature, to the +whole nature, though it is certainly conformable to some part of man’s nature, +or it could not be done. Man is made for action, not for idleness or pleasure. +As plants and animals do the uses of their nature, so man must do his (V. 1). +</p> + +<p> +Man must also live conformably to the universal nature, conformably to the +nature of all things of which he is one; and as a citizen of a political +community he must direct his life and actions with reference to those among +whom, and for whom, among other purposes, he lives. A man must not retire into +solitude and cut himself off from his fellow-men. He must be ever active to do +his part in the great whole. All men are his kin, not only in blood, but still +more by participating in the same intelligence and by being a portion of the +same divinity. A man cannot really be injured by his brethren, for no act of +theirs can make him bad, and he must not be angry with them nor hate them: “For +we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the +rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary +to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away” +(II. 1). +</p> + +<p> +Further he says: “Take pleasure in one thing, and rest in it in passing from +one social act to another social act, thinking of God” (VI. 7). Again: “Love +mankind. Follow God” (VI. 31). It is the characteristic of the rational soul +for a man to love his neighbor (XI. 1). Antoninus teaches in various passages +the forgiveness of injuries, and we know that he also practiced what he taught. +Bishop Butler remarks that “this divine precept to forgive injuries and to love +our enemies, though to be met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a peculiar +sense a precept of Christianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than +on any other single virtue.” The practise of this precept is the most difficult +of all virtues. Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid towards following +it. When we are injured, we feel anger and resentment, and the feeling is +natural, just, and useful for the conservation of society. It is useful that +wrong-doers should feel the natural consequences of their actions, among which +is the disapprobation of society and the resentment of him who is wronged. But +revenge, in the proper sense of that word, must not be practiced. “The best way +of avenging thyself,” says the emperor, “is not to become like, the wrongdoer.” +It is plain by this that he does not mean that we should in any case practise +revenge; but he says to those who talk of revenging wrongs, “Be not like him +who has done the wrong. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately +consider with what opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou +hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry” (VII. +26). Antoninus would not deny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of +anger and resentment, for this is implied in the recommendation to reflect on +the nature of the man’s mind who has done the wrong, and then you will have +pity instead of resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. Paul’s advice to +be angry and sin not; which, as Butler well explains it, is not a +recommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a natural passion, +but it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us into sin. In short the +emperor’s doctrine about wrongful acts is this: wrong-doers do not know what +good and bad are: they offend out of ignorance, and in the sense of the Stoics +this is true. Though this kind of ignorance will never be admitted as a legal +excuse, and ought not to be admitted as a full excuse in any way by society, +there may be grievous injuries, such as it is in a man’s power to forgive +without harm to society; and if he forgives because he sees that his enemies +know not what they do, he is acting in the spirit of the sublime prayer, +“Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.” +</p> + +<p> +The emperor’s moral philosophy was not a feeble, narrow system, which teaches a +man to look directly to his own happiness, though a man’s happiness or +tranquillity is indirectly promoted by living as he ought to do. A man must +live conformably to the universal nature, which means, as the emperor explains +it in many passages, that a man’s actions must be conformable to his true +relations to all other human beings, both as a citizen of a political community +and as a member of the whole human family. This implies, and he often expresses +it in the most forcible language, that a man’s words and action, so far as they +affect others, must be measured by a fixed rule, which is their consistency +with the conservation and the interests of the particular society of which he +is a member, and of the whole human race. To live conformably to such a rule, a +man must use his rational faculties in order to discern clearly the +consequences and full effect of all his actions and of the actions of others: +he must not live a life of contemplation and reflection only, though he must +often retire within himself to calm and purify his soul by thought, but he must +mingle in the work of man and be a fellow-laborer for the general good. +</p> + +<p> +A man should have an object or purpose in life, that he may direct all his +energies to it; of course a good object (II. 7). He who has not one object or +purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all through his life (XI. 21). +Bacon has a remark to the same effect, on the best means of “reducing of the +mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the electing and propounding unto a +man’s self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable +sort within his compass to attain.” He is a happy man who has been wise enough +to do this when he was young and has had the opportunities; but the emperor +seeing well that a man cannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages +himself to do it when he can, and not to let life slip away before he has +begun. He who can propose to himself good and virtuous ends of life, and be +true to them, cannot fail to live conformably to his own interest and the +universal interest, for in the nature of things they are one. If a thing is not +good for the hive, it is not good for the bee (VI. 54). +</p> + +<p> +One passage may end this matter. “If the gods have determined about me and +about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is +not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, +why should they have any desire towards that? For what advantage would result +to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of their +providence? But if they have not determined about me individually, they have +certainly determined about the whole at least; and the things which happen by +way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and +to be content with them. But if they determine about nothing—which it is wicked +to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear +by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present and lived +with us; but if however the gods determine about none of the things which +concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that +which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his +own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city +and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is +the world.” +</p> + +<p> +It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to state the emperor’s opinions on +all the ways in which a man may profitably use his understanding towards +perfecting himself in practical virtue. The passages to this purpose are in all +parts of his book, but as they are in no order or connection, a man must use +the book a long time before he will find out all that is in it. A few words may +be added here. If we analyze all other things, we find how insufficient they +are for human life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is +indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot be +considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult to explain +the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in such a way as to +prevent cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more consists of parts than man’s +intelligence does; and yet we speak of various intellectual faculties as a +convenient way of expressing the various powers which man’s intellect shows by +his works. In the same way we may speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, +in a practical sense, for the purpose of showing what particular virtues we +ought to practise in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as +much as man’s nature is capable of. +</p> + +<p> +The prime principle in man’s constitution is social. The next in order is not +to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not conformable to the +rational principle, which must govern. The third is freedom from error and from +deception. “Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go +straight on and it has what is its own” (VII. 53). The emperor selects justice +as the virtue which is the basis of all the rest (X. 11), and this had been +said long before his time. +</p> + +<p> +It is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice as a +disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in conformity to this +disposition; but experience shows that men’s notions about justice are as +confused as their actions are inconsistent with the true notion of justice. The +emperor’s notion of justice is clear enough, but not practical enough for all +mankind. “Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things +which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the things done +by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action +terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature” (IX. +31). In another place (IX. 1) he says that “he who acts unjustly acts +impiously,” which follows of course from all that he says in various places. He +insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a means to virtue, which no +doubt it is: for lying even in indifferent things weakens the understanding; +and lying maliciously is as great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, +viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, and viewed with respect to +consequences. He couples the notion of justice with action. A man must not +pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head, but he must +exhibit his justice in act. +</p> + +<p> +The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things beautiful and some ugly, +and as they are beautiful so they are good, and as they are ugly so they are +evil, or bad (II. 1). All these things, good and evil, are in our power, +absolutely some of the stricter Stoics would say; in a manner only, as those +who would not depart altogether from common sense would say; practically they +are to a great degree in the power of some persons and in some circumstances, +but in a small degree only in other persons and in other circumstances. The +Stoics maintain man’s free will as to the things which are in his power; for as +to the things which are out of his power, free will terminating in action is of +course excluded by the very terms of the expression. I hardly know if we can +discover exactly Antoninus’ notion of the free will of man, nor is the question +worth the inquiry. What he does mean and does say is intelligible. All the +things which are not in our power are indifferent: they are neither good nor +bad, morally. Such are life, health, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and +death. Life and death are all men’s portion. Health, wealth, power, disease, +and poverty happen to men, indifferently to the good and to the bad; to those +who live according to nature and to those who do not. “Life,” says the emperor, +“is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and after fame is oblivion” (II. 17). +After speaking of those men who have disturbed the world and then died, and of +the death of philosophers such as Heraclitus, and Democritus, who was destroyed +by lice, and of Socrates whom other lice (his enemies) destroyed, he says: +“What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art +come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, +not even there. But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held +by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which is as much +inferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is intelligence and +Deity; the other is earth and corruption” (III. 3). It is not death that a man +should fear, but he should fear never beginning to live according to nature +(XII. 1). Every man should live in such a way as to discharge his duty, and to +trouble himself about nothing else. He should live such a life that he shall +always be ready for death, and shall depart content when the summons comes. For +what is death? “A cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the +pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive +movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh” (VI. 28). Death is +such as generation is, a mystery of nature (IV. 5). In another passage (IX. 3), +the exact meaning of which is perhaps doubtful, he speaks of the child which +leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at death leaves its envelope. +</p> + +<p> +Antoninus’ opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed. His doctrine +of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does not perish +absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish. The opinion is at +least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides; what comes from earth +goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven, the divinity, returns to him +who gave it. But I find nothing clear in Antoninus as to the notion of the man +existing after death so as to be conscious of his sameness with that soul which +occupied his vessel of clay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and +finally to have rested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best, +and consistent with the university of things. +</p> + +<p> +Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine, which some +Stoics practiced,—the anticipating the regular course of nature by a man’s own +act. The reader will find some passages in which this is touched on, and he may +make of them what he can. But there are passages in which the emperor +encourages himself to wait for the end patiently and with tranquillity; and +certainly it is consistent with all his best teaching that a man should bear +all that falls to his lot and do useful acts as long as he lives. He should not +therefore abridge the time of his usefulness by his own act. +</p> + +<p> +Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic’s life. There is no rule of life +contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own happiness. Many men +think that they are seeking happiness when they are only seeking the +gratification of some particular passion, the strongest that they have. The end +of a man is, as already explained, to live conformably to nature, and he will +thus obtain happiness, tranquillity of mind, and contentment (III. 12; VIII 2). +As a means of living conformably to nature he must study the four chief +virtues, each of which has its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge of good +and evil; justice, or the giving to every man his due; fortitude, or the +enduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which is moderation in all things. +By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic obtained all that he wished or +expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, and he was satisfied with that. +</p> + +<p> +Epictetus and Antoninus both by precept and example labored to improve +themselves and others; and if we discover imperfections in their teaching, we +must still honor these great men who attempted to show that there is in man’s +nature and in the constitution of things sufficient reason for living a +virtuous life. It is difficult enough to live as we ought to live, difficult +even for any man to live in such a way as to satisfy himself, if he exercises +only in a moderate degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own +conduct; and if all men cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals and +religion, it is at least worth while to give them good reasons for as much as +they can be persuaded to accept. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>FOOTNOTES:</h2> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn1"></a> <a href="#fnref1">[1]</a> +This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is uncertain. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn2"></a> <a href="#fnref2">[2]</a> +Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there Antoninus was brought +up, and he died there. This also is corrupt. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn3"></a> <a href="#fnref3">[3]</a> +This is corrupt. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn4"></a> <a href="#fnref4">[4]</a> +Antoninus here uses the word κόσμος both in the +sense of the Universe and of Order; and it is difficult to express his meaning. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn5"></a> <a href="#fnref5">[5]</a> +This is corrupt. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn6"></a> <a href="#fnref6">[6]</a> +It appears that there is a defect in the text here. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn7"></a> <a href="#fnref7">[7]</a> +The story is told by Horace in his Satires and by others since, but not better. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn8"></a> <a href="#fnref8">[8]</a> +“Seen even with the eyes.” It is supposed that this may be explained by the +Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or living being (IV. 40), and that +the celestial bodies are gods (VIII. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know +that the gods exist, as he afterwards states it, because we see what they do; +as we know that man has intellectual powers, because we see what he does, and +in no other way do we know it. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn9"></a> <a href="#fnref9">[9]</a> +The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy,—Physic, Ethic, and Logic (VIII. +13). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of Citium, the +founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysippus; but these philosophers placed the +three divisions in the following order,—Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears, +however, that this division was made before Zeno’s time, and acknowledged by +Plato, as Cicero remarks. Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in the +narrower sense of that word.<br/> + Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions, and made six,—Dialectic +and Rhetoric, comprised in Logic; Ethic and Politic; Physic and Theology. This +division was merely for practical use, for all Philosophy is one. Even among +the earliest Stoics Logic, or Dialectic, does not occupy the same place as in +Plato: it is considered only as an instrument which is to be used for the other +divisions of Philosophy. An exposition of the earlier Stoic doctrines and of +their modifications would require a volume. My object is to explain only the +opinions of Antoninus, so far as they can be collected from his book.<br/> + According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology go together, +or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of the nature of the Deity, +so far as man can understand the Deity, and of his government of the universe. +This division or subdivision is not formally adopted by Antoninus, for, as +already observed, there is no method in his book; but it is virtually contained +in it.<br/> + Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the principles +of morals and the study of the constitution of civil society; and undoubtedly +he did well in subdividing Ethic into two parts, Ethic in the narrower sense +and Politic; for though the two are intimately connected, they are also very +distinct, and many questions can only be properly discussed by carefully +observing the distinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. His subject is +Ethic, and Ethic in its practical application to his own conduct in life as a +man and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his doctrines about man’s +nature, the Universal Nature, and the relation of every man to everything else. +It is therefore intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, or the nature +of Things, and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. He advises us to +examine well all the impressions on our minds and to form a right judgment of +them, to make just conclusions, and to inquire into the meaning of words, and +so far to apply Dialectic; but he has no attempt at any exposition of +Dialectic, and his philosophy is in substance purely moral and practical. He +says, “Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every Impression +on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of Dialectic”: +which is only another way of telling us to examine the impression in every +possible way. In another passage (III. 11) he says, “To the aids which have +been mentioned, let this one still be added: make for thyself a definition or +description of the object which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly +what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete +entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of +which it has been compounded, and into which it will be resolved.” Such an +examination implies a use of Dialectic, which Antoninus accordingly employed as +a means towards establishing his Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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