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+The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
+most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
+whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
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+using this eBook.
+
+Title: The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus
+
+Author: Marcus Aurelius Antoninus
+
+Release Date: November 1, 2004 [eBook #6920]
+[Most recently updated: November 24, 2022]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+Produced by: Robert Nield, Tom Allen, Charles Franks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team
+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS ***
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+
+
+
+The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus
+
+
+
+
+LONG’S TRANSLATION
+
+EDITED BY EDWIN GINN
+
+
+
+
+Contents
+
+ PREFACE
+ BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
+ THE THOUGHTS
+ PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS
+ GENERAL INDEX
+
+
+
+
+[TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE: All the footnotes have been moved to the end of
+the text. I have also relabeled the book headings; [I., II., … XI.] has
+been changed to [BOOK I., BOOK II., … BOOK XI.] at the start of each
+Section. I have also added a “1.” before the first “thought” in each
+BOOK.]
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+Perhaps some may question the wisdom of putting out the Thoughts of
+Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to be used as a Reader by children in the
+schools. It may appear to them better suited to the mature mind. The
+principle, however, that has governed us in selecting reading for the
+young has been to secure the best that we could find in all ages for
+grown-up people. The milk and water diet provided for “my dear
+children” is not especially complimentary to them. They like to be
+treated like little men and women, capable of appreciating a good
+thing. One finds in this royal philosopher a rare generosity, sweetness
+and humility, qualities alike suited to all ages.
+
+Adopting the philosopher’s robe at twelve, he remains a student all his
+life. The precepts that he would give for the government of others, he
+has practised upon himself. In his time, as in ours, there were good
+physicians for the mind and body, who could make wise prescriptions for
+the government of their neighbors, but were unable to apply them to
+themselves. The faults of our fellows are so numerous and so easy to
+cure that one is readily tempted to become the physician, while our own
+faults are so few and so unimportant that it is hardly worth while to
+give any attention to them. Hence we have a multitude of physicians for
+humanity in general, and a scarcity of individual healers.
+
+It was the doctrine of Marcus Aurelius that most of the ills of life
+come to us from our own imagination, that it was not in the power of
+others seriously to interfere with the calm, temperate life of an
+individual, and that when a fellow being did anything to us that seemed
+unjust he was acting in ignorance, and that instead of stirring up
+anger within us it should stir our pity for him. Oftentimes by careful
+self-examination we should find that the fault was more our own than
+that of our fellow, and our sufferings were rather from our own
+opinions than from anything real. The circle of man’s knowledge is very
+limited, and the largest circles do not wholly include the smallest.
+They are intersecting and the segment common to any two is very small.
+Whatever lies outside this space does not exist for both. Hence arise
+innumerable contests. The man having the largest intelligence ought to
+be very generous to the other. Being thankful that he has been blessed
+in so many ways, he should do all in his power to enlighten his less
+favored fellow, rather than be angry with him on account of his
+misfortune. Is he not sufficiently punished in being denied the light?
+
+Assisting his uncle in the government of the great Roman Empire at
+seventeen, it was his aim constantly to restrain the power of the
+strong and to assist the weak. He studied the laws of his country, not
+for wisdom alone, but that he might make them more beneficial to his
+people. All his life he tried to bring his fellows to a higher level,
+and to think charitably of each other. Occupying himself a palace he
+lived simply, like other men. It was his greatest delight to retire to
+his country home and there, dwelling among his books, to meditate upon
+the great problems of life. He claimed that a man’s life should be
+valued according to the value of the things to which he gave his
+attention. If his whole thought was given to clothing, feeding and
+housing himself comfortably, he should be valued like other well-housed
+and well-fed animals. He would, however, derive the greatest pleasure
+and benefit in this life by acting in accordance with reason, which
+demands of every human being that his highest faculties should govern
+all the rest, and that each should see to it that he treated his fellow
+kindly and generously and that if he could not assist him to a higher
+level he should at least not stand in his way. When he speaks of the
+shortness of time and the value of fame, riches and power, for which
+men strive in this world, he speaks not from the standpoint of one who
+would wish to obtain these things, but as a Roman emperor enjoying the
+highest honors that man might expect to attain in this world. He
+certainly was in a position to speak intelligently concerning these
+matters, and his opinions ought to have weight with the coming
+generations. Children may not prefer to read such thoughts; perhaps the
+majority of children do not prefer the Bible to other books. Still, we
+all think it is well for them to be obliged to read it. Perhaps
+requiring the use of such literature in the schools might be as
+valuable as the adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing of
+interminable numbers, the memorizing of all the capes, bays and rivers
+in the world, and the dates of all the battles that have occurred since
+the creation of man. We should strive to stimulate the thinking powers
+of children, leading them to form wise judgments concerning the
+important things of life, without catering too much to their own wishes
+at an age when they cannot form an intelligent opinion of what is best
+for themselves.
+
+At our first reading of the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, we
+marked many sentences that appeared to us specially good; in the
+second, twice as many more. Where all is good it is hard to emphasize,
+but we will cite just one of his reflections, as illustrating the trend
+of his mind: “I have often wondered,” he says, “how it is that every
+man loves himself more than all the rest of men, and yet sets less
+value on his own opinion of himself than on the opinion of others.”
+
+We have given Long’s translation of the Thoughts complete, as published
+by Messrs. Little, Brown & Co., but we have omitted some unimportant
+portions of the biography and philosophy in the interest of space and
+economy. We have also given the philosophy in a supplement, thinking it
+better that it should come after the Thoughts themselves. We shall
+issue a pocket edition on very thin paper for the convenience of such
+as wish to make a special study of the work. We also propose to issue a
+similar edition of the writings of Epictetus.
+
+EDWIN GINN.
+
+
+January 20, 1893.
+
+
+
+
+BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.
+
+
+M. Antoninus, the son of Annius Verus and Domitia Calvilla, was born at
+Rome, A.D. 121. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius married Faustina, the
+sister of Annius Verus, and was consequently the uncle of M. Antoninus.
+When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and declared him his successor in
+the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus and M.
+Antoninus, generally called M. Aurelius Antoninus.
+
+The youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (I. 17)
+that he had good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good
+teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything
+good. He had the happy fortune to witness the example of his uncle and
+adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his work (I.
+16; VI. 30) the virtues of this excellent man and prudent ruler. Like
+many young Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric.
+There are letters extant showing the great affection of the pupil for
+the master, and the master’s great hopes of his industrious pupil.
+
+When he was eleven years old he assumed the dress of philosophers,
+something plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most
+laborious, abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health. He
+abandoned poetry and rhetoric for philosophy, and attached himself to
+the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the study of law, which
+was a useful preparation for the high place which he was designed to
+fill. We must suppose that he learned the Roman discipline of arms,
+which was a necessary part of the education of a man who afterwards led
+his troops to battle against a warlike race.
+
+Antoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his teachers, and
+the obligations which he owed to each of them. The way in which he
+speaks of what he learned from them might seem to savor of vanity or
+self- praise, if we look carelessly at the way in which he has
+expressed himself; but if anyone draws this conclusion, he will be
+mistaken. Antoninus means to commemorate the merits of his several
+teachers, what they taught, and what a pupil might learn from them.
+Besides, this book, like the eleven other books, was for his own use;
+and if we may trust the note at the end of the first book, it was
+written during one of M. Antoninus’ campaigns against the Quadi, at a
+time when the commemoration of the virtues of his illustrious teachers
+might remind him of their lessons and the practical uses which he might
+derive from them.
+
+Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chaeroneia, a grandson
+of Plutarch. What he learned from this excellent man is told by himself
+(I. 9). His favorite teacher was Rusticus (I. 7), a philosopher, and
+also a man of practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was the
+adviser of Antoninus after he became emperor. Young men who are
+destined for high places are not often fortunate in those who are about
+them, their companions and teachers; and I do not know any example of a
+young prince having had an education which can be compared with that of
+M. Antoninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by their
+acquirements and their character will hardly be collected again; and as
+to the pupil, we have not had one like him since.
+
+Hadrian died in July, A.D. 138, and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius. M.
+Antoninus married Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably
+about A.D. 146, for he had a daughter born in A.D. 147. He received
+from his adoptive father the title of Caesar, and was associated with
+him in the administration of the state. The father and the adopted son
+lived together in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a
+dutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed him.
+
+Antoninus Pius died A.D. 161. The Senate, it is said, urged M.
+Antoninus to take the sole administration of the empire, but he
+associated with himself the other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius
+Commodus, who is generally called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first
+time had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure, and
+unworthy of his station. Antoninus however bore with him, and it is
+said that Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague the respect
+due to his character. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner lived
+together in peace, and their alliance was strengthened by Antoninus
+giving to Verus for wife his daughter Lucilla.
+
+The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian war, in which
+Verus was sent to command; but he did nothing, and the success that was
+obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on the Euphrates and Tigris was
+due to his generals. This Parthian war ended in A.D. 165. Aurelius and
+Verus had a triumph (A.D. 166) for the victories in the East. A
+pestilence followed, which carried off great numbers in Rome and Italy,
+and spread to the west of Europe.
+
+The north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people beyond the
+Alps from the borders of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic.
+These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as the Germanic nations
+had attempted near three hundred years before; and the rest of the life
+of Antoninus, with some intervals, was employed in driving back the
+invaders. In A.D. 169 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered
+the state alone.
+
+During the German wars Antoninus resided for three years on the Danube
+at Carnuntum. The Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia and almost
+destroyed in their retreat across the Danube; and in A.D. 174 the
+emperor gained a great victory over the Quadi.
+
+In A.D. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and skilful Roman commander who
+was at the head of the troops in Asia, revolted and declared himself
+Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some of his officers, and so
+the rebellion came to an end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his
+treatment of the family and the partisans of Cassius; and his letter to
+the Senate, in which he recommends mercy, is extant.
+
+Antoninus set out for the East on hearing of Cassius’ revolt. Though he
+appears to have returned to Rome in A.D. 174, he went back to prosecute
+the war against the Germans, and it is probable that he marched direct
+to the East from the German war. His wife Faustina, who accompanied him
+into Asia, died suddenly at the foot of the Taurus, to the great grief
+of her husband. Capitolinus, who has written the life of Antoninus, and
+also Dion Cassius accuse the empress of scandalous infidelity to her
+husband and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus says that Antoninus
+either knew it not or pretended not to know it. Nothing is so common as
+such malicious reports in all ages, and the history of imperial Rome is
+full of them. Antoninus loved his wife, and he says that she was
+“obedient, affectionate, and simple.” The same scandal had been spread
+about Faustina’s mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was
+perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says after her death
+in a letter to Fronto that he would rather have lived in exile with his
+wife than in his palace at Rome without her. There are not many men who
+would give their wives a better character than these two emperors.
+Capitolinus wrote in the time of Diocletian. He may have intended to
+tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biographer. Dion Cassius, the
+most malignant of historians, always reports and perhaps he believed
+any scandal against anybody.
+
+Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and on his return
+to Italy through Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries.
+It was the practice of the emperor to conform to the established rites
+of the age, and to perform religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We
+cannot conclude from this that he was a superstitious man, though we
+might perhaps do so if his book did not show that he was not. But this
+is only one among many instances that a ruler’s public acts do not
+always prove his real opinions. A prudent governor will not roughly
+oppose even the superstitions of his people; and though he may wish
+that they were wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by
+offending their prejudices.
+
+Antoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph, perhaps for
+some German victories, A.D. 176. In the following year Commodus was
+associated with his father in the empire, and took the name of
+Augustus. This year A.D. 177 is memorable in ecclesiastical history.
+Attalus and others were put to death at Lyon for their adherence to the
+Christian religion. The evidence of this persecution is a letter
+preserved by Eusebius. It contains a very particular description of the
+tortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, and it states that
+while the persecution was going on, Attalus, a Christian and a Roman
+citizen, was loudly demanded by the populace and brought into the
+amphitheatre; but the governor ordered him to be reserved, with the
+rest who were in prison, until he had received instructions from the
+emperor. Many had been tortured before the governor thought of applying
+to Antoninus. The imperial rescript, says the letter, was that the
+Christians should be punished, but if they would deny their faith, they
+must be released. On this the work began again. The Christians who were
+Roman citizens were beheaded; the rest were exposed to the wild beasts
+in the amphitheatre.
+
+The war on the northern frontier appears to have been uninterrupted
+during the visit of Antoninus to the East, and on his return the
+emperor again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The Germanic people
+were defeated in a great battle A.D. 179. During this campaign the
+emperor was seized with some contagious malady, of which he died in the
+camp, A.D. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. His son Commodus
+was with him. The body, or the ashes probably, of the emperor were
+carried to Rome, and he received the honor of deification. Those who
+could afford it had his statue or bust; and when Capitolinus wrote,
+many people still had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or
+household deities. He was in a manner made a saint. Commodus erected to
+the memory of his father the Antonine column which is now in the Piazza
+Colonna at Rome. The bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral line
+round the shaft commemorate the victories of Antoninus over the
+Marcomanni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower of rain which
+refreshed the Roman soldiers and discomfited their enemies. The statue
+of Antoninus was placed on the capital of the column, but it was
+removed at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put
+in the place by Pope Sixtus the fifth.
+
+In order to form a proper notion of the condition of the Christians
+under M. Antoninus we must go back to Trajan’s time. When the younger
+Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the Christians were numerous in those
+parts, and the worshippers of the old religion were falling off. The
+temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, and there were no
+purchasers of victims for sacrifice. Those who were interested in the
+maintenance of the old religion thus found that their profits were in
+danger. Christians of both sexes and of all ages were brought before
+the governor, who did not know what to do with them. He could come to
+no other conclusion than this, that those who confessed to be
+Christians and persevered in their religion ought to be punished; if
+for nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. He found no crimes
+proved against the Christians, and he could only characterize their
+religion as a depraved and extravagant superstition, which might be
+stopped if the people were allowed the opportunity of recanting. Pliny
+wrote this in a letter to Trajan. He asked for the emperor’s
+directions, because he did not know what to do. He remarks that he had
+never been engaged in judicial inquiries about the Christians, and that
+accordingly he did not know what to inquire about or how far to inquire
+and punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to examine into a
+man’s profession of Christianity and to punish him for it. Trajan’s
+rescript is extant. He approved of the governor’s judgment in the
+matter, but he said that no search must be made after the Christians;
+if a man was charged with the new religion and convicted, he must not
+be punished if he affirmed that he was not a Christian and confirmed
+his denial by showing his reverence to the heathen gods. He added that
+no notice must be taken of anonymous informations, for such things were
+of bad example. Trajan was a mild and sensible man; and both motives of
+mercy and policy probably also induced him to take as little notice of
+the Christians as he could, to let them live in quiet if it were
+possible. Trajan’s rescript is the first legislative act of the head of
+the Roman state with reference to Christianity, which is known to us.
+It does not appear that the Christians were further disturbed under his
+reign.
+
+In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possible for the Roman
+government to overlook the great increase of the Christians and the
+hostility of the common sort to them. If the governors in the provinces
+were willing to let them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism of
+the heathen community, who looked on the Christians as atheists. The
+Jews too, who were settled all over the Roman Empire, were as hostile
+to the Christians as the Gentiles were. With the time of Hadrian begin
+the Christian Apologies, which show plainly what the popular feeling
+towards the Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius
+Fundanus, the Proconsul of Asia, which stands at the end of Justin’s
+first Apology, instructs the governor that innocent people must not be
+troubled, and false accusers must not be allowed to extort money from
+them; the charges against the Christians must be made in due form, and
+no attention must be paid to popular clamors; when Christians were
+regularly prosecuted and convicted of illegal acts, they must be
+punished according to their deserts; and false accusers also must be
+punished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published rescripts to the
+same effect. The terms of Hadrian’s rescript seem very favorable to the
+Christians; but if we understand it in this sense, that they were only
+to be punished like other people for illegal acts, it would have had no
+meaning, for that could have been done without asking the emperor’s
+advice. The real purpose of the rescript is that Christians must be
+punished if they persisted in their belief, and would not prove their
+renunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen religion.
+
+In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the old and the new
+belief was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen religion
+urged those in authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions
+of the Christian faith. Melito in his Apology to M. Antoninus
+represents the Christians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial
+orders. Shameless informers, he says, men who were greedy after the
+property of others, used these orders as a means of robbing those who
+were doing no harm. He doubts if a just emperor could have ordered
+anything so unjust; and if the last order was really not from the
+emperor, the Christians entreat him not to give them up to their
+enemies. We conclude from this that there were at least imperial
+rescripts or constitutions of M. Antoninus which were made the
+foundation of these persecutions. The fact of being a Christian was now
+a crime and punished, unless the accused denied their religion. Then
+come the persecutions at Smyrna, which some modern critics place in
+A.D. 167, ten years before the persecution of Lyon. The governors of
+the provinces under M. Antoninus might have found enough even in
+Trajan’s rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, and the
+fanaticism of the people would drive them to persecution, even if they
+were unwilling. But besides the fact of the Christians rejecting all
+the heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that they plainly maintained
+that all the heathen religions were false. The Christians thus declared
+war against the heathen rites, and it is hardly necessary to observe
+that this was a declaration of hostility against the Roman government,
+which tolerated all the various forms of superstition that existed in
+the empire, and could not consistently tolerate another religion, which
+declared that all the rest were false and all the splendid ceremonies
+of the empire only a worship of devils.
+
+If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman
+emperors attempted to check the new religion; how they enforced their
+principle of finally punishing Christians, simply as Christians, which
+Justin in his Apology affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that
+he tells the truth; how far popular clamor and riots went in this
+matter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant Christians—for there
+were many such—contributed to excite the fanaticism on the other side
+and to imbitter the quarrel between the Roman government and the new
+religion. Our extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified,
+and what truth they contain is grossly exaggerated; but the fact is
+certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the heathen populations were
+in open hostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus’ rule men
+were put to death because they were Christians. Eusebius, in the
+preface to his fifth book, remarks that in the seventeenth year of
+Antoninus’ reign, in some parts of the world, the persecution of the
+Christians became more violent, and that it proceeded from the populace
+in the cities; and he adds, in his usual style of exaggeration, that we
+may infer from what took place in a single nation that myriads of
+martyrs were made in the habitable earth. The nation which he alludes
+to is Gallia; and he then proceeds to give the letter of the churches
+of Vienna and Lugdunum. It is probable that he has assigned the true
+cause of the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, and that
+both governors and emperor had a great deal of trouble with these
+disturbances. How far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceedings
+we do not know, for the historical records of his reign are very
+defective. He did not make the rule against the Christians, for Trajan
+did that; and if we admit that he would have been willing to let the
+Christians alone, we cannot affirm that it was in his power, for it
+would be a great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the unlimited
+authority which some modern sovereigns have had. His power was limited
+by certain constitutional forms, by the Senate, and by the precedents
+of his predecessors. We cannot admit that such a man was an active
+persecutor, for there is no evidence that he was, though it is certain
+that he had no good opinion of the Christians, as appears from his own
+words. But he knew nothing of them except their hostility to the Roman
+religion, and he probably thought that they were dangerous to the
+state, notwithstanding the professions false or true of some of the
+Apologists. So much I have said, because it would be unfair not to
+state all that can be urged against a man whom his contemporaries and
+subsequent ages venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. If I
+admitted the genuineness of some documents, he would be altogether
+clear from the charge of even allowing any persecutions; but as I seek
+the truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him to bear whatever
+blame is his due. I add that it is quite certain that Antoninus did not
+derive any of his ethical principles from a religion of which he knew
+nothing.
+
+There is no doubt that the Emperor’s Reflections—or his Meditations, as
+they are generally named—is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks
+of himself, his family, and his teachers; and in other books he
+mentions himself.
+
+It is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or reflections as
+the occasions arose; and since they were intended for his own use, it
+is no improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy behind him
+written with his own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent a man
+would use the labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and expose his
+most secret thoughts to any other eye. He may have also intended the
+book for his son Commodus, who however had no taste for his father’s
+philosophy.
+
+The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed is in
+Simplicius’ Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was
+not a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a
+time when Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really
+religious man, and he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the
+Deity which no Christian could improve. From the time of Zeno to
+Simplicius, a period of about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy
+formed the characters of some of the best and greatest men. A man’s
+greatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, nor
+yet in his intellectual capacity, which is often associated with the
+meanest moral character, the most abject servility to those in high
+places, and arrogance to the poor and lowly; but a man’s true greatness
+lies in the consciousness of an honest purpose in life, founded on a
+just estimate of himself and everything else, on frequent
+self-examination, and a steady obedience to the rule which he knows to
+be right, without troubling himself, as the emperor says he should not,
+about what others may think or say, or whether they do or do not do
+that which he thinks and says and does.
+
+
+
+
+THE THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+
+1. From my grandfather Verus [I learned] good morals and the government
+of my temper.
+
+2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a
+manly character.
+
+3. From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from
+evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in my
+way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.
+
+4. From my great-grandfather, not to have frequented public schools,
+and to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things
+a man should spend liberally.
+
+5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party
+at the games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or
+the Scutarius at the gladiators’ fights; from him too I learned
+endurance of labor, and to want little, and to work with my own hands,
+and not to meddle with other people’s affairs, and not to be ready to
+listen to slander.
+
+6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to
+give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about
+incantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and not
+to breed quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up passionately to
+such things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become
+intimate with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius,
+then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my
+youth; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of
+the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline.
+
+7. From Rusticus I received the impression that my character required
+improvement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray
+to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to
+delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a
+man who practices much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to
+make a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine
+writing; and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to
+do other things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity,
+like the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and
+with respect to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong,
+to be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they
+have shown a readiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not
+to be satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily
+to give my assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him
+for being acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he
+communicated to me out of his own collection.
+
+8. From Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness
+of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except
+to reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion
+of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see clearly in a
+living example that the same man can be both most resolute and
+yielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had
+before my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his
+skill in expounding philosophical principles as the smallest of his
+merits; and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are
+esteemed favors, without being either humbled by them or letting them
+pass unnoticed.
+
+9. From Sextus, a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family
+governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably to
+nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after
+the interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those
+who form opinions without consideration: he had the power of readily
+accommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was more
+agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly
+venerated by those who associated with him: and he had the faculty both
+of discovering and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical way, the
+principles necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other
+passion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most
+affectionate; and he could express approbation without noisy display,
+and he possessed much knowledge without ostentation.
+
+10. From Alexander the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and
+not in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or
+solecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce
+the very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way of
+answer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing
+itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion.
+
+11. From Fronto I learned to observe what envy and duplicity and
+hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are
+called Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection.
+
+12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity
+to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; nor
+continually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation to
+those with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations.
+
+13. From Catulus, not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault, even
+if he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him to
+his usual disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as it
+is reported of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children truly.
+
+14. From my brother Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to
+love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius,
+Cato, Dion, Brutus; and from him I received the idea of a polity in
+which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard
+to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly
+government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed; I
+learned from him also consistency and undeviating steadiness in my
+regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to give to
+others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I am
+loved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of his
+opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends
+had no need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was
+quite plain.
+
+15. From Maximus I learned self-government, and not to be led aside by
+anything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness;
+and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and dignity,
+and to do what was set before me without complaining. I observed that
+everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that in all that he
+did he never had any bad intention; and he never showed amazement and
+surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off doing a thing,
+nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his
+vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious.
+He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready to forgive,
+and was free from all falsehood; and he presented the appearance of a
+man who could not be diverted from right, rather than of a man who had
+been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever think that he
+was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better man.
+He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way.
+
+16. In my father I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable
+resolution in the things which he had determined after due
+deliberation; and no vain-glory in those things which men call honors;
+and a love of labor and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to
+those who had anything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating
+firmness in giving to every man according to his deserts; and a
+knowledge derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action
+and for remission. And I observed that he had overcome all passion for
+boys; and he considered himself no more than any other citizen; and he
+released his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend
+him of necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to
+accompany him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him
+the same. I observed, too, his habit of careful inquiry in all matters
+of deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never stopped his
+investigation through being satisfied with appearances which first
+present themselves; and that his disposition was to keep his friends,
+and not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his
+affection; and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to
+foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without
+display; and to check immediately popular applause and all flattery;
+and to be ever watchful over the things which were necessary for the
+administration of the empire, and to be a good manager of the
+expenditure, and patiently to endure the blame which he got for such
+conduct; and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods, nor
+did he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering
+the populace; but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, and
+never any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the things
+which conduce in any way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune
+gives an abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without
+excusing himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed them without
+affectation, and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one
+could ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a [home-bred]
+flippant slave or a pedant; but every one acknowledged him to be a man
+ripe, perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and other men’s
+affairs. Besides this, he honored those who were true philosophers, and
+he did not reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was
+he easily led by them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made
+himself agreeable without any offensive affectation. He took a
+reasonable care of his body’s health, not as one who was greatly
+attached to life, nor out of regard to personal appearance, nor yet in
+a careless way, but so that through his own attention he very seldom
+stood in need of the physician’s art or of medicine or external
+applications. He was most ready to give without envy to those who
+possessed any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or
+knowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything else; and he gave
+them his help, that each might enjoy reputation according to his
+deserts; and he always acted conformably to the institutions of his
+country, without showing any affectation of doing so. Further, he was
+not fond of change nor unsteady, but he loved to stay in the same
+places, and to employ himself about the same things; and after his
+paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and vigorous to his
+usual occupations. His secrets were not many, but very few and very
+rare, and these only about public matters; and he showed prudence and
+economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles and the construction
+of public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such things,
+for he was a man who looked to what ought to be done, not to the
+reputation which is got by a man’s acts. He did not take the bath at
+unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious
+about what he ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes, nor
+about the beauty of his slaves.[1] His dress came from Lorium, his
+villa on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally.[2] We know how he
+behaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and
+such was all his behavior. There was in him nothing harsh, nor
+implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the
+sweating point; but he examined all things severally, as if he had
+abundance of time, and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously
+and consistently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded of
+Socrates, that he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those
+things which many are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy
+without excess. But to be strong enough both to bear the one and to be
+sober in the other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and
+invincible soul, such as he showed in the illness of Maximus.
+
+17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good
+parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen
+and friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that
+I was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a
+disposition which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do
+something of this kind; but, through their favor, there never was such
+a concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I am
+thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with my
+grandfather’s concubine, and that I preserved the flower of my youth,
+and that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper season,
+but even deferred the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and a
+father who was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me to
+the knowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without
+wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues,
+and such-like show; but that it is in such a man’s power to bring
+himself very near to the fashion of a private person, without being for
+this reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with
+respect to the things which must be done for the public interest in a
+manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a
+brother, who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance
+over myself, and who at the same time pleased me by his respect and
+affection; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body;
+that I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other
+studies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I
+had seen that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to place
+those who brought me up in the station of honor, which they seemed to
+desire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some other
+time after, because they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius,
+Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions about
+living according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that,
+so far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and
+inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to
+nature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault, and
+through not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost
+say, their direct instructions; that my body has held out so long in
+such a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or
+Theodotus, and that, after having fallen into amatory passions, I was
+cured, and though I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I never did
+anything of which I had occasion to repent; that, though it was my
+mother’s fate to die young, she spent the last years of her life with
+me; that, whenever I wished to help any man in his need, or on any
+other occasion, I was never told that I had not the means of doing it;
+and that to myself the same necessity never happened, to receive
+anything from another; that I have such a wife, so obedient, and so
+affectionate, and so simple; that I had abundance of good masters for
+my children; and that remedies have been shown to me by dreams, both
+others, and against bloodspitting and giddiness …; and that, when I had
+an inclination to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any
+sophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers [of histories], or
+in the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself about the
+investigation of appearances in the heavens; for all these things
+require the help of the gods and fortune.
+
+Among the Quadi at the Granua.[3]
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+
+Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody,
+the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these
+things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and
+evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful,
+and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong,
+that it is akin to me, not [only] of the same blood or seed, but that
+it participates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of
+the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can
+fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate
+him. For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like
+eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one
+another, then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one
+another to be vexed and to turn away.
+
+2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the
+ruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it is
+not allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh; it is
+blood and bones and a network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and
+arteries. See the breath also, what kind of a thing it is; air, and not
+always the same, but every moment sent out and again sucked in. The
+third, then, is the ruling part, consider thus: Thou art an old man; no
+longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a
+puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either dissatisfied with thy
+present lot, or shrink from the future.
+
+3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. That which is from
+fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and
+involution with the things which are ordered by providence. From thence
+all things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is for
+the advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that
+is good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole brings,
+and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe is preserved,
+as by the changes of the elements so by the changes of things
+compounded of the elements. Let these principles be enough for thee;
+let them always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after
+books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and
+from thy heart thankful to the gods.
+
+4. Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how
+often thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not
+use it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art now a
+part, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is an
+efflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost
+not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou
+wilt go, and it will never return.
+
+5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou
+hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection,
+and freedom, and justice, and to give thyself relief from all other
+thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief if thou dost every act of
+thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and
+passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and
+self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to
+thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold
+of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the
+existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing
+more from him who observes these things.
+
+6. Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt no
+longer have the opportunity of honoring thyself. Every man’s life is
+sufficient. But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences
+not itself, but places thy felicity in the souls of others.
+
+7. Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give
+thyself time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled
+around. But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other
+way; for those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by
+their activity, and yet have no object to which to direct every
+movement, and, in a word, all their thoughts.
+
+8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has
+seldom been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the
+movements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.
+
+9. This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole,
+and what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind
+of a part it is of what kind of a whole, and that there is no one who
+hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are
+according to the nature of which thou art a part.
+
+10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts—such a comparison as
+one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind—says,
+like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through
+desire are more blamable than those which are committed through anger.
+For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a
+certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through
+desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more
+intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly, then, and in a
+way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed
+with pleasure is more blamable than that which is committed with pain;
+and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first
+wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other is
+moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing
+something by desire.
+
+11. Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very
+moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from
+among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the
+gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or
+if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live
+in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence? But in truth they
+do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the
+means in man’s power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as
+to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for
+this also, that it should be altogether in a man’s power not to fall
+into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a
+man’s life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having the
+knowledge but not the power to guard against or correct these things,
+is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them; nor
+is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want
+of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen
+indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and
+life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,—all these things equally
+happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better
+nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.
+
+12. How quickly all things disappear,—in the universe the bodies
+themselves, but in time the remembrance of them. What is the nature of
+all sensible things, and particularly those which attract with the bait
+of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame;
+how worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead
+they are,—all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to
+observe. To observe too who these are whose opinions and voices give
+reputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in
+itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their
+parts all the things which present themselves to the imagination in it,
+he will then consider it to be nothing else than an operation of
+nature; and if any one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a
+child. This, however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is
+also a thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too
+how man comes near to the Deity, and by what part of him, and when this
+part of man is so disposed (VI. 28).
+
+13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a
+round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says,
+and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbors, without
+perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him,
+and to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in
+keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction
+with what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit
+veneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be dear
+to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, they move
+our pity by reason of men’s ignorance of good and bad; this defect
+being not less than that which deprives us of the power of
+distinguishing things that are white and black.
+
+14. Though thou shouldest be going to live three thousand years, and as
+many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any
+other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this
+which he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the
+same. For the present is the same to all, though that which perishes is
+not the same; and so that which is lost appears to be a mere moment.
+For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a man has
+not, how can any one take this from him? These two things then thou
+must bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are of like
+forms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference
+whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years, or two
+hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver
+and he who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present is the
+only thing of which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this is
+the only thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he
+has it not.
+
+15. Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic
+Monimus is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a
+man receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.
+
+16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it
+becomes an abscess, and, as it were, a tumor on the universe, so far as
+it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of
+ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other
+things are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to
+itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with
+the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are
+angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is
+overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and
+does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows
+any act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does
+anything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being
+right that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end;
+and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of
+the most ancient city and polity.
+
+17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux,
+and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject
+to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and
+fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything
+which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is
+a dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and
+after—fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a
+man? One thing, and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping
+the daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to
+pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely
+and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man’s doing or not
+doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that
+is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he
+himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as
+being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every
+living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements
+themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man
+have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the
+elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is
+according to nature.
+
+This in Carnuntum.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+
+1. We ought to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away
+and a smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken
+into the account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite
+uncertain whether the understanding will still continue sufficient for
+the comprehension of things, and retain the power of contemplation
+which strives to acquire the knowledge of the divine and the human. For
+if he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition and
+imagination and appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will
+not fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the
+measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and
+considering whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever
+else of the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason,—all this is
+already extinguished. We must make haste, then, not only because we are
+daily nearer to death, but also because the conception of things and
+the understanding of them cease first.
+
+2. We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the
+things which are produced according to nature contain something
+pleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts
+are split at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a
+certain fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker’s art, are
+beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for
+eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in
+the ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to rottenness
+adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down,
+and the lion’s eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of
+wild boars, and many other things,—though they are far from being
+beautiful if a man should examine them severally,—still, because they
+are consequent upon the things which are formed by nature, help to
+adorn them, and they please the mind; so that if a man should have a
+feeling and deeper insight with respect to the things which are
+produced in the universe, there is hardly one of those which follow by
+way of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a manner
+disposed so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real
+gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which
+painters and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old woman and an
+old man he will be able to see a certain maturity and comeliness; and
+the attractive loveliness of young persons he will be able to look on
+with chaste eyes; and many such things will present themselves, not
+pleasing to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar
+with Nature and her works.
+
+3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, himself fell sick and died.
+The Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them
+too. Alexander and Pompeius and Caius Caesar, after so often completely
+destroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten
+thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from
+life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the conflagration of
+the universe, was filled with water internally and died smeared all
+over with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and other lice killed
+Socrates. What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the
+voyage, thou art come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life,
+there is no want of gods, not even there; but if to a state without
+sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures, and to be
+a slave to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves
+it is superior: for the one is intelligence and deity; the other is
+earth and corruption.
+
+4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others,
+when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility.
+For thou losest the opportunity of doing something else when thou hast
+such thoughts as these,—What is such a person doing, and why, and what
+is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving,
+and whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from the observation
+of our own ruling power. We ought then to check in the series of our
+thoughts everything that is without a purpose and useless, but most of
+all the over-curious feeling and the malignant; and a man should use
+himself to think of those things only about which if one should
+suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? with perfect openness
+thou mightest immediately answer, This or That; so that from thy words
+it should be plain that everything in thee is simple and benevolent,
+and such as befits a social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts
+about pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or
+envy and suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst blush if
+thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man who is
+such, and no longer delays being among the number of the best, is like
+a priest and minister of the gods, using too the [deity] which is
+planted within him, which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure,
+unharmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a
+fighter in the noblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered by any
+passion, dyed deep with justice, accepting with all his soul everything
+which happens and is assigned to him as his portion; and not often, nor
+yet without great necessity and for the general interest, imagining
+what another says, or does, or thinks. For it is only what belongs to
+himself that he makes the matter for his activity; and he constantly
+thinks of that which is allotted to himself out of the sum total of
+things, and he makes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his
+own portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to each man is
+carried along with him and carries him along with it. And he remembers
+also that every rational animal is his kinsman, and that to care for
+all men is according to man’s nature; and a man should hold on to the
+opinion not of all, but of those only who confessedly live according to
+nature. But as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind what
+kind of men they are both at home and from home, both by night and by
+day, and what they are, and with what men they live an impure life.
+Accordingly, he does not value at all the praise which comes from such
+men, since they are not even satisfied with themselves.
+
+5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest,
+nor without due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied
+ornament set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many words,
+or busy about too many things. And further, let the deity which is in
+thee be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and
+engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken
+his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life,
+and ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any man’s
+testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not external help nor the
+tranquillity which others give. A man then must stand erect, not be
+kept erect by others.
+
+6. If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth,
+temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own
+mind’s self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do
+according to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to
+thee without thy own choice; if, I say, thou seest anything better than
+is, turn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found
+to be the best. But if nothing appears to be better than the Deity
+which is planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy
+appetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates
+said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has
+submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou findest
+everything else smaller and of less value than this, give place to
+nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge and incline to it, thou
+wilt no longer without distraction be able to give the preference to
+that good thing which is thy proper possession and thy own; for it is
+not right that anything of any other kind, such as praise from the
+many, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competition
+with that which is rationally and politically [or practically] good.
+All these things, even though they may seem to adapt themselves [to the
+better things] in a small degree, obtain the superiority all at once,
+and carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the
+better, and hold to it.—But that which is useful is the better.—Well,
+then, if it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it; but if
+it is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain thy
+judgment without arrogance: only take care that thou makest the inquiry
+by a sure method.
+
+7. Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel
+thee to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man,
+to suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything which
+needs walls and curtains: for he who has preferred to everything else
+his own intelligence and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts
+no tragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much
+company; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either
+pursuing or flying from [death]; but whether for a longer or a shorter
+time he shall have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares not at all:
+for even if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he
+were going to do anything else which can be done with decency and
+order; taking care of this only all through life, that his thoughts
+turn not away from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and
+a member of a civil community.
+
+8. In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no
+corrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his
+life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor who
+leaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there
+is in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound [to
+other things], nor yet detached [from other things], nothing worthy of
+blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.
+
+9. Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it
+entirely depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any
+opinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the rational
+animal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty judgment, and
+friendship towards men, and obedience to the gods.
+
+10. Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few;
+and besides, bear in mind that every man lives only this present time,
+which is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is
+either past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man
+lives, and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too
+the longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a
+succession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know
+not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.
+
+11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:
+Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is
+presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is
+in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell
+thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has
+been compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so
+productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically
+and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always
+to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe
+this is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value
+everything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to
+man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities
+are like families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and
+how long it is the nature of this thing to endure which now makes an
+impression on me, and what virtue I have need of with respect to it,
+such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity,
+contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a man should
+say: This comes from god; and this is according to the apportionment
+and spinning of the thread of destiny, and such-like coincidence and
+chance; and this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and
+partner, one who knows not, however, what is according to his nature.
+But I know; for this reason I behave towards him according to the
+natural law of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At the same
+time, however, in things indifferent I attempt to ascertain the value
+of each.
+
+12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right
+reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to
+distract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be
+bound to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting
+nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity
+according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound
+which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is
+able to prevent this.
+
+13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for
+cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles
+ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing
+everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which
+unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do
+anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a
+reference to things divine; nor the contrary.
+
+14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own
+memoirs, nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the
+selections from books which thou wast reserving for thy old age. Hasten
+then to the end which thou hast before thee, and, throwing away idle
+hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while it
+is in thy power.
+
+15. They know not how many things are signified by the words stealing,
+sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this
+is not effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision.
+
+16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the
+soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the
+impressions of forms by means of appearances belongs even to animals;
+to be pulled by the strings of desire belongs both to wild beasts and
+to men who have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a
+Nero: and to have the intelligence that guides to the things which
+appear suitable belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods,
+and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds when they have
+shut the doors. If then everything else is common to all that I have
+mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be
+pleased and content with what happens, and with the thread which is
+spun for him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his
+breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it
+tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying anything
+contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if
+all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest, and contented
+life, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from
+the way which leads to the end of life, to which a man ought to come
+pure, tranquil, ready to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly
+reconciled to his lot.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IV.
+
+
+1. That which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so
+affected with respect to the events which happen, that it always easily
+adapts itself to that which is possible and is presented to it. For it
+requires no definite material, but it moves towards its purpose, under
+certain conditions, however; and it makes a material for itself out of
+that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by
+which a small light would have been extinguished: but when the fire is
+strong, it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on
+it, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.
+
+2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according
+to the perfect principles of art.
+
+3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores,
+and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much.
+But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is
+in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For
+nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man
+retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such
+thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect
+tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than the
+good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this
+retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and
+fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be
+sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free
+from all discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with
+what art thou discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind
+this conclusion, that rational animals exist for one another, and that
+to endure is a part of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily;
+and consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred,
+and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet
+at last.—But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned
+to thee out of the universe.—Recall to thy recollection this
+alternative; either there is providence or atoms [fortuitous
+concurrence of things]; or remember the arguments by which it has been
+proved that the world is a kind of political community [and be quiet at
+last].—But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon
+thee.—Consider then further that the mind mingles not with the breath,
+whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart
+and discovered its own power, and think also of all that thou hast
+heard and assented to about pain and pleasure [and be quiet at
+last].—But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment
+thee.—See how soon everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of
+infinite time on each side of [the present], and the emptiness of
+applause, and the changeableness and want of judgment in those who
+pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space within which it
+is circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the whole earth is a
+point, and how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are
+there in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee.
+
+This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy
+own, and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and
+look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal.
+But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let
+there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the
+soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our perturbations
+come only from the opinion which is within. The other is that all these
+things which thou seest, change immediately and will no longer be; and
+constantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou hast already
+witnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion.
+
+4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of
+which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is
+the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is
+so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens;
+if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is
+so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common
+political community will any one say that the whole human race are
+members? And from thence, from this common political community comes
+also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our
+capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a
+portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from
+another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar
+source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also
+returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from
+some source.
+
+5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; composition out
+of the same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and altogether
+not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary
+to [the nature of] a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason
+of our constitution.
+
+6. It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it
+is a matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will not
+allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind,
+that within a very short time both thou and he will be dead; and soon
+not even your names will be left behind.
+
+7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint,
+“I have been harmed.” Take away the complaint, “I have been harmed,”
+and the harm is taken away.
+
+8. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make
+his life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from
+within.
+
+9. The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been compelled
+to do this.
+
+10. Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou
+observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with
+respect to the continuity of the series of things, but with respect to
+what is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns to each thing
+its value. Observe then as thou hast begun; and whatever thou dost, do
+it in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense in which
+a man is properly understood to be good. Keep to this in every action.
+
+11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee
+wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are
+in truth.
+
+12. A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one to
+do only whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may
+suggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there
+is any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion.
+But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion,
+as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, not because it
+appears pleasant or brings reputation.
+
+13. Hast thou reason? I have.—Why then dost not thou use it? For if
+this does its own work, what else dost thou wish?
+
+14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which
+produced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal
+principle by transmutation.
+
+15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before,
+another falls after; but it makes no difference.
+
+16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now
+a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the
+worship of reason.
+
+17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death
+hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good.
+
+18. How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his
+neighbor says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that
+it may be just and pure; or, as Agathon says, look not round at the
+depraved morals of others, but run straight along the line without
+deviating from it.
+
+19. He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider
+that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very
+soon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole
+remembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through
+men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will
+remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal,
+what then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the dead, but
+what is it to the living. What is praise, except indeed so far as it
+has a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of
+nature, clinging to something else….
+
+20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself,
+and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither
+worse then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this
+also of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for
+example, material things and works of art. That which is really
+beautiful has no need of anything; not more than law, not more than
+truth, not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things is
+beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a
+thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is not praised? or
+gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub?
+
+21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from
+eternity?—But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have
+been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these
+bodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their
+dissolution make room for other dead bodies, so the souls which are
+removed into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted and
+diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal
+intelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh
+souls which come to dwell there. And this is the answer which a man
+might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must
+not only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also
+of the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other
+animals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in
+the bodies of those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth
+receives them by reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood,
+and the transformations into the aerial or the fiery element.
+
+What is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The division
+into that which is material and that which is the cause of form [the
+formal].
+
+22. Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to
+justice, and on the occasion of every impression maintain the faculty
+of comprehension [or understanding].
+
+23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O
+Universe. Nothing for me is too early or too late, which is in due time
+for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature:
+from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things
+return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say,
+Dear city of Zeus?
+
+24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou
+wouldst be tranquil.—But consider if it would not be better to say, Do
+what is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is
+naturally social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only
+the tranquillity which comes from doing well, but also that which comes
+from doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do
+being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure
+and less uneasiness. Accordingly, on every occasion a man should ask
+himself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should take
+away not only unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts, for thus
+superfluous acts will not follow after.
+
+25. Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is
+satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own
+just acts and benevolent disposition.
+
+26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb
+thyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? It is to
+himself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee? Well:
+out of the universe from the beginning everything which happens has
+been apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short.
+Thou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason and justice.
+Be sober in thy relaxation.
+
+27. Either it is a well-arranged universe[4] or a chaos huddled
+together, but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in
+thee, and disorder in the All? And this too when all things are so
+separated and diffused and sympathetic.
+
+28. A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character,
+bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent,
+tyrannical.
+
+29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in
+it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it.
+He is a runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who shuts
+the eyes of the understanding; he is poor, who has need of another, and
+has not from himself all things which are useful for life. He is an
+abscess on the universe who withdraws and separates himself from the
+reason of our common nature through being displeased with the things
+which happen, for the same nature produces this, and has produced thee
+too: he is a piece rent asunder from the state, who tears his own soul
+from that of reasonable animals, which is one.
+
+30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a
+book: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I
+abide by reason—and I do not get the means of living out of my
+learning, and I abide [by my reason].
+
+31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be
+content with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has
+intrusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making
+thyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man.
+
+32. Consider for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all
+these things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying,
+warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering,
+obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die,
+grumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring
+consulship, kingly power. Well, then, that life of these people no
+longer exists at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all
+is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other
+epochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after great
+efforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou
+shouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting
+themselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance
+with their proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be
+content with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the
+attention given to everything has its proper value and proportion. For
+thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to smaller
+matters no further than is fit.
+
+33. The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also
+the names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner
+antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after
+also Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus.
+For all things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete
+oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a
+wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their
+breath, they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the
+matter, what is even an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then
+is that about which we ought to employ our serious pains? This one
+thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a
+disposition which gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as
+usual, as flowing from a principle and source of the same kind.
+
+34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of the fates], allowing
+her to spin thy thread into whatever thing she pleases.
+
+35. Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that
+which is remembered.
+
+36. Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and
+accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the universe loves
+nothing so much as to change the things which are and to make new
+things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of
+that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast
+into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.
+
+37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from
+perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things,
+nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in
+acting justly.
+
+38. Examine men’s ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind
+of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.
+
+39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of
+another; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering.
+Where is it then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the
+power of forming opinions about evils. Let this power then not form
+[such] opinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it,
+the poor body, is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness,
+nevertheless let the part which forms opinions about these things be
+quiet; that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good which
+can happen equally to the bad man and the good. For that which happens
+equally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives
+according to nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary to
+nature.
+
+40. Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one
+substance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to
+one perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all
+things act with one movement; and how all things are the co-operating
+causes of all things which exist; observe too the continuous spinning
+of the thread and the contexture of the web.
+
+41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to
+say (I. C. 19).
+
+42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things
+to subsist in consequence of change.
+
+43. Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a
+violent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried
+away, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away
+too.
+
+44. Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose
+in spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and
+calumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes them.
+
+45. In the series of things, those which follow are always aptly fitted
+to those which have gone before: for this series is not like a mere
+enumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence,
+but it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are
+arranged together harmoniously, so the things which come into existence
+exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonderful relationship (VI.
+38; VII. 9; VII. 75, note).
+
+46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth
+is to become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the
+death of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him who
+forgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that with
+which they are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs
+the universe; and the things which they daily meet with seem to them
+strange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if we were
+asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that we ought
+not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and
+speak as we have been taught.
+
+47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or certainly on
+the day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was on
+the third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest degree
+mean- spirited; for how small is the difference. So think it no great
+thing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather than
+to-morrow.
+
+48. Think continually how many physicians are dead after often
+contracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers
+after predicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how
+many philosophers after endless discourses on death or immortality; how
+many heroes after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used
+their power over men’s lives with terrible insolence, as if they were
+immortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice
+and Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to the
+reckoning all whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after
+burying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him; and all
+this in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral and
+worthless human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus,
+to-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through this little space
+of time conformably to nature, and end thy journey in content, just as
+an olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it,
+and thanking the tree on which it grew.
+
+49. Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break,
+but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.
+
+Unhappy am I because this has happened to me? Not so, but happy am I,
+though this has happened to me, because I continue free from pain,
+neither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a thing
+as this might have happened to every man; but every man would not have
+continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is that rather a
+misfortune than this a good fortune? And dost thou in all cases call
+that a man’s misfortune which is not a deviation from man’s nature? And
+does a thing seem to thee to be a deviation from man’s nature, when it
+is not contrary to the will of man’s nature? Well, thou knowest the
+will of nature. Will then this which has happened prevent thee from
+being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against
+inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; will it prevent thee from having
+modesty, freedom, and everything else, by the presence of which man’s
+nature obtains all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion
+which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle: not that this is
+a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune.
+
+50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death,
+to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more
+then have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly they
+lie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus,
+Lepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out many to be
+buried, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the interval
+is small [between birth and death]; and consider with how much trouble,
+and in company with what sort of people, and in what a feeble body this
+interval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider life a thing of
+any value. For look to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the
+time which is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity
+then what is the difference between him who lives three days and him
+who lives three generations?
+
+51. Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural:
+accordingly say and do everything in conformity with the soundest
+reason. For such a purpose frees a man from trouble, and warfare, and
+all artifice and ostentatious display.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK V.
+
+
+1. In the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be
+present,—I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I
+dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for
+which I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to
+lie in the bed-clothes and keep myself warm?—But this is more
+pleasant.—Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for
+action or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the little
+birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order
+their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the
+work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which is
+according to thy nature?—But it is necessary to take rest also.—It is
+necessary. However, Nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has fixed
+bounds to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds,
+beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou
+stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for
+if thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those who
+love their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them unwashed
+and without food; but thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner
+values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of
+money values his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And
+such men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither
+to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the things which they care
+for. But are the acts which concern society more vile in thy eyes and
+less worthy of thy labor?
+
+2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is
+troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquillity.
+
+3. Judge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit
+for thee; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any
+people nor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or said,
+do not consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have their
+peculiar leading principle and follow their peculiar movement; which
+things do not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own nature
+and the common nature; and the way of both is one.
+
+4. I go through the things which happen according to nature until I
+shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of
+which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my
+father collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the
+milk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food
+and drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many
+purposes.
+
+5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.—Be it so:
+but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not
+formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which are
+altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor,
+aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things,
+benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling,
+magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately
+able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and
+unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark? or
+art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to
+murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with thy
+poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to
+be so restless in thy mind? No, by the gods; but thou mightest have
+been delivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst
+be charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must
+exert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking
+pleasure in thy dulness.
+
+6. One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it
+down to his account as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do
+this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and
+he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what
+he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks
+for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a
+horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a bee when
+it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act, does not
+call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another act, as
+a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.—Must a man then
+be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing
+it?—Yes.—But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what a
+man is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social
+animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed to
+wish that his social partner also should perceive it.—It is true what
+thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now said: and
+for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before,
+for even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt
+choose to understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for
+this reason thou wilt omit any social act.
+
+7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the
+ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains.—In truth we ought
+not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble
+fashion.
+
+8. Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius
+prescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or
+going without shoes, so we must understand it when it is said, That the
+nature of the universe prescribed to this man disease, or mutilation,
+or loss, or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed
+means something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing
+adapted to procure health; and in the second case it means, That which
+happens to [or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably
+to his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are
+suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the
+pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in
+some kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony].
+And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as
+it is, so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] is made up to
+be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant
+understand what I mean; for they say, It [necessity, destiny] brought
+this to such a person.—This then was brought and this was prescribed to
+him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those which
+Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his
+prescriptions are disagreeable, but we, accept them in the hope of
+health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things which the
+common nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the same
+kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even if it
+seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the
+universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For
+he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it were
+not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever
+it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which is
+directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with
+that which happens to thee, the one, because it was done for thee and
+prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally
+from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the other,
+because even that which comes severally to every man is to the power
+which administers the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, nay
+even of its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is
+mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction
+and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost
+cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and
+in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.
+
+9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost
+not succeed in doing everything according to right principles, but when
+thou hast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater part
+of what thou dost is consistent with man’s nature, and love this to
+which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if she were a
+master, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge
+and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. For
+thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou wilt repose in it. And
+remember that philosophy requires only the things which thy nature
+requires; but thou wouldst have something else which is not according
+to nature.—It may be objected, Why, what is more agreeable than this
+[which I am doing]?—But is not this the very reason why pleasure
+deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity,
+equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable
+than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy
+course of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding and
+knowledge?
+
+10. Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to
+philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether
+unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult
+to understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man
+who never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves,
+and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they may
+be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a robber. Then turn to the
+morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly possible to endure
+even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being hardly
+able to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt, and in so
+constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of
+things moved, what there is worth being highly prized, or even an
+object of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is
+a man’s duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the natural
+dissolution, and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these
+principles only: the one, that nothing will happen to me which is not
+conformable to the nature of the universe; and the other, that it is in
+my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon: for there is no
+man who will compel me to this.
+
+11. About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must
+ask myself this question, and inquire, What have I now in this part of
+me which they call the ruling principle? and whose soul have I
+now,—that of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a
+tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?
+
+12. What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may
+learn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things as
+being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he
+would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to
+anything which should not be in harmony with what is really good. But
+if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to the
+many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable
+that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the many perceive
+the difference. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and
+would not be rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it
+is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as
+said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and think
+those things to be good, to which after their first conception in the
+mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied,—that he who
+has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in.
+
+13. I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them
+will perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence
+out of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change
+into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another
+part of the universe, and so on forever. And by consequence of such a
+change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on forever in the
+other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the
+universe is administered according to definite periods [of revolution].
+
+14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are
+sufficient for themselves and for their own works. They move then from
+a first principle which is their own, and they make their way to the
+end which is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are
+named Catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they
+proceed by the right road.
+
+15. None of these things ought to be called a man’s which do not belong
+to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man’s nature
+promise them, nor are they the means of man’s nature attaining its end.
+Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that
+which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids
+towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things
+did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and
+to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who
+showed that he did not want these things, nor would he who stinted
+himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good. But
+now the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other
+things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more
+patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better
+man.
+
+16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character
+of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a
+continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where a
+man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a
+palace; well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again,
+consider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for
+this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried; and its
+end is in that towards which it is carried; and where the end is, there
+also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now the good for the
+reasonable animal is society; for that we are made for society has been
+shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior exists for the sake of
+the superior? But the things which have life are superior to those
+which have not life, and of those which have life the superior are
+those which have reason.
+
+17. To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that
+the bad should not do something of this kind.
+
+18. Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to
+bear. The same things happen to another, and either because he does not
+see that they have happened, or because he would show a great spirit,
+he is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and
+conceit should be stronger than wisdom.
+
+19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor
+have they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul:
+but the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgments it
+may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which
+present themselves to it.
+
+20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do
+good to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves
+obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which
+are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it
+is true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments to
+my effects and disposition, which have the power of acting
+conditionally and changing: for the mind converts and changes every
+hindrance to its activity into an aid; and so that which is a hindrance
+is made a furtherance to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the
+road helps us on this road.
+
+21. Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that
+which makes use of all things and directs all things. And in like
+manner also reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the
+same kind as that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of
+everything else is this, and thy life is directed by this.
+
+22. That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen.
+In the case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the state
+is not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed,
+thou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him
+where his error is.
+
+23. Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and
+disappear, both the things which are and the things which are produced.
+For substance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities
+of things are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite
+varieties; and there is hardly anything which stands still. And
+consider this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past
+and of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a
+fool who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes
+himself miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time.
+
+24. Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small
+portion; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible
+interval has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by
+destiny, and how small a part of it thou art.
+
+25. Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own
+disposition, his own activity. I now have what the universal nature
+wills me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.
+
+26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by
+the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it
+not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those
+affects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by
+virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is
+all one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is
+natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation the
+opinion that it is either good or bad.
+
+27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly
+shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is
+assigned to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which
+Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of
+himself. And this is every man’s understanding and reason.
+
+28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? art thou angry with
+him whose mouth smells foul? What good will this anger do thee? He has
+such a mouth, he has such armpits: it is necessary that such an
+emanation must come from such things; but the man has reason, it will
+be said, and he is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein he
+offends; I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast
+reason: by thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him
+his error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and
+there is no need of anger.
+
+29. As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out, … so it is in thy
+power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out of
+life, yet so as if them wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky, and
+I quit it. Why dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so long as
+nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man shall
+hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do what is
+according to the nature of the rational and social animal.
+
+30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made
+the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the
+superior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated,
+co-ordinated, and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has
+brought together into concord with one another the things which are the
+best.
+
+31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren,
+children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy
+friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto
+behaved to all in such a way that this may be said of thee,—
+
+“Never has wronged a man in deed or word.”
+
+
+And call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through,
+and how many things thou hast been able to endure and that the history
+of thy life is now complete and thy service is ended; and how many
+beautiful things thou hast seen; and how many pleasures and pains thou
+hast despised; and how many things called honorable thou hast spurned;
+and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposition.
+
+32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and
+knowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows
+beginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance,
+and through all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the
+universe.
+
+33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a
+name or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things
+which are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and
+[like] little dogs biting one another, and little children quarrelling,
+laughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and
+justice and truth are fled
+
+Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth.
+          HESIOD, _Works, etc_. v. 197.
+
+
+What then is there which still detains thee here, if the objects of
+sense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of
+perception are dull and easily receive false impressions, and the poor
+soul itself is an exhalation from blood? But to have good repute amid
+such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in
+tranquillity for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to
+another state? And until that time comes, what is sufficient? Why, what
+else than to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do good to men,
+and to practice tolerance and self-restraint; but as to everything
+which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember
+that this is neither thine nor in thy power.
+
+34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou
+canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These
+two things are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man,
+and to the soul of every rational being: not to be hindered by another;
+and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the
+practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination.
+
+35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness,
+and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it, and
+what is the harm to the common weal?
+
+36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of
+things, but give help [to all] according to thy ability and their
+fitness; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are
+indifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage; for it is a bad habit.
+But as the old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child’s
+top, remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.
+
+When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what
+these things are?—Yes; but they are objects of great concern to these
+people—wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things? I was once a
+fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.—But fortunate means that
+a man has assigned to himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is
+good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK VI.
+
+
+1. The substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the
+reason which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it
+has no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed
+by it. But all things are made and perfected according to this reason.
+
+2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if
+thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with
+sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing
+something else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we
+die: it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in
+hand (vi. 22, 28).
+
+3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its
+value escape thee.
+
+4. All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to
+vapor, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed.
+
+5. The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what
+it does, and on what material it works.
+
+6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like [the wrong-
+doer].
+
+7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one
+social act to another social act, thinking of God.
+
+8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and
+while it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also
+makes everything which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills.
+
+9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is
+accomplished; for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature
+that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally
+comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature,
+or a nature external and independent of this (XL 1; VI. 40; VIII. 50).
+
+10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of
+things, and a dispersion, or it is unity and order and providence. If
+then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous
+combination of things and such a disorder? and why do I care about
+anything else than how I shall at last become earth? and why am I
+disturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do?
+But if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I
+trust in him who governs (IV. 27).
+
+11. When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in a
+manner, quickly return to thyself, and do not continue out of tune
+longer than the compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery over
+the harmony by continually recurring to it.
+
+12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou
+wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst
+constantly return to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to
+thee stepmother and mother: return to philosophy frequently and repose
+in her, through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to
+thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court.
+
+13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the
+impression that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead
+body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a
+little grape-juice, and this purple robe some sheep’s wool dyed with
+the blood of a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they
+reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind
+of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through
+life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our
+approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness
+and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward
+show is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and when thou art most
+sure that thou art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then
+that it cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates
+himself.
+
+14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to
+objects of the most general kind, those which are held together by
+cohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees,
+vines, olives. But those which are admired by men, who are a little
+more reasonable, are referred to the things which are held together by
+a living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men
+who are still more instructed are the things which are held together by
+a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as
+it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or
+simply rational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who
+values a rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life,
+regards nothing else except this; and above all things he keeps his
+soul in a condition and in an activity comformable to reason and social
+life, and he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same
+kind as himself.
+
+15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying
+out of it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already
+extinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world,
+just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the
+infinite duration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there
+is no abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a
+man would set a high price? It would be just as if a man should fall in
+love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already passed
+out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man,
+like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For
+such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back,
+which we do every moment, just the same is it with the whole
+respiratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and
+the day before, to give it back to the element from which thou didst
+first draw it.
+
+16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor
+respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the
+receiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved
+by desires as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being
+nourished by food; for this is just like the act of separating and
+parting with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being
+valued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we
+value the clapping of tongues; for the praise which comes from the many
+is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this
+worthless thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing? This,
+in my opinion: to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to
+thy proper constitution, to which end both all employments and arts
+lead. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made
+should be adapted to the work for which it has been made; and both the
+vine planter who looks after the vine, and the horsebreaker, and he who
+trains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the teaching of
+youth aim at something. In this then is the value of the education and
+the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else.
+Wilt thou not cease to value many other things too? Then thou wilt be
+neither free, nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without
+passion. For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious
+of those who can take away those things, and plot against those who
+have that which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be
+altogether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these things;
+and besides, he must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence
+and honor thy own mind will make thee content with thyself, and in
+harmony with society, and in agreement with the gods, that is, praising
+all that they give and have ordered.
+
+17. Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the
+motion of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine, and
+advancing by a way hardly observed, it goes happily on its road.
+
+18. How strangely men act! They will not praise those who are living at
+the same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised
+by posterity, by those whom they have never seen or ever will see, this
+they set much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou
+shouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not
+praise thee.
+
+19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think
+that it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man and
+conformable to his nature, think that this can be attained by thyself
+too.
+
+20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with
+his nails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well,
+we neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we
+suspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on our
+guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but
+we quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behavior be
+in all the other parts of life; let us overlook many things in those
+who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I
+said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred.
+
+21. If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think
+or act rightly, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth, by which no
+man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and
+ignorance.
+
+22. I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either
+things without life, or things without reason, or things that have
+rambled and know not the way.
+
+23. As to the animals which have no reason, and generally all things
+and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make
+use of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human
+beings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all
+occasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length
+of time in which thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent are
+sufficient.
+
+24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the
+same state; for either they were received among the same seminal
+principles of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the
+atoms.
+
+25. Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in
+each of us,—things which concern the body and things which concern the
+soul: and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all
+things which come into existence in that which is the one and all,
+which we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time.
+
+26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name
+Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter
+each letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt
+thou not go on with composure and number every letter? Just so then in
+this life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts.
+These it is thy duty to observe, and without being disturbed or showing
+anger towards those who are angry with thee to go on thy way and finish
+that which is set before thee.
+
+27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which
+appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet
+in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed
+because they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things
+because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable
+to them.—But it is not so.—Teach them then, and show them without being
+angry.
+
+28. Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of
+the pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the
+discursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh
+(II. 12).
+
+29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life,
+when thy body does not give way.
+
+30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not
+dyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple,
+good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a
+worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper
+acts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee.
+Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one
+fruit of this terrene life,—a pious disposition and social acts. Do
+everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every
+act which was conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things,
+and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness,
+and his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things;
+and how he would never let anything pass without having first most
+carefully examined it and clearly understood it; and how he bore with
+those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in return; how he
+did nothing in a hurry; and how he listened not to calumnies, and how
+exact an examiner of manners and actions he was; and not given to
+reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how
+little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants;
+and how laborious and patient; and how he was able on account of his
+sparing diet to hold out to the evening; and his firmness and
+uniformity in his friendships; and how he tolerated freedom of speech
+in those who opposed his opinions; and the pleasure that he had when
+any man showed him anything better; and how religious he was without
+superstition. Imitate all this, that thou mayest have as good a
+conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had.
+
+31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou
+hast roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only
+dreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these [the
+things about thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams].
+
+32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all
+things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But
+to the understanding those things only are indifferent which are not
+the works of its own activity. But whatever things are the works of its
+own activity, all these are in its power. And of these however only
+those which are done with reference to the present; for as to the
+future and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the
+present indifferent.
+
+33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor that of the foot is
+contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot’s work and the
+hand the hand’s. So then neither to a man as a man is his labor
+contrary to nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the
+labor is not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him.
+
+34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides,
+tyrants.
+
+35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up
+to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their
+craft,—nevertheless they cling to the reason [the principles] of their
+art, and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the
+architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason [the
+principles] of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is
+common to him and the gods?
+
+36. Asia, Europe, are corners of the universe; all the sea a drop in
+the universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time
+is a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable.
+All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either
+directly preceding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion’s
+gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a
+thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful. Do not
+then imagine that they are of another kind from that which thou dost
+venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all (VII. 75).
+
+37. He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which
+has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time
+without end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.
+
+38. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe
+and their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are
+implicated with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one
+another; for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by
+virtue of the active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of
+the substance (ix. 1).
+
+39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and
+the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it
+truly [sincerely].
+
+40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has
+been made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the
+things which are held together by nature there is within, and there
+abides in, them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit
+to reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act
+according to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to
+intelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which belong to
+it are in conformity to intelligence.
+
+41. Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt
+suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if
+such a bad thing befall thee, or the loss of such a good thing, thou
+wilt not blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of
+the misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely
+to be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice because we make a
+difference between these things [because we do not regard these things
+as indifferent]. But if we judge only those things which are in our
+power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding
+fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.
+
+42. We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and
+design, and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they
+are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are
+laborers and co-operators in the things which take place in the
+universe. But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those
+co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who
+try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of
+such men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what
+kind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will
+certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some
+part of the co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to one end.
+But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the
+play, which Chrysippus speaks of.
+
+43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius
+the work of the Fruit-bearer [the earth]? And how is it with respect to
+each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together to
+the same end?
+
+44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which
+must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even
+to imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why
+should they have any desire towards that? for what advantage would
+result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object
+of their providence? But if they have not determined about me
+individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least,
+and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general
+arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with
+them. But if they determine about nothing,—which it is wicked to
+believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor
+swear by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were
+present and lived with us,—but if however the gods determine about none
+of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself,
+and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is useful to
+every man which is conformable to his own constitution and nature. But
+my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I
+am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The
+things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me.
+
+45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the
+universal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this
+also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is
+profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word
+profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the
+middle kind [neither good nor bad].
+
+46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the
+continual sight of the same things, and the uniformity make the
+spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things
+above, below, are the same and from the same. How long then?
+
+47. Think continually that all kinds of men and men of all kinds of
+pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down
+even to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to
+the other kinds [of men]. To that place then we must remove, where
+there are so many great orators, and so many noble philosophers,
+Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so
+many generals after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus,
+Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great
+minds, lovers of labor, versatile, confident, mockers even of the
+perishable and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like
+him. As to all these consider that they have long been in the dust.
+What harm then is this to them; and what to those whose names are
+altogether unknown? One thing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy
+life in truth and justice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars
+and unjust men.
+
+48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those
+who live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty
+of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality
+of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the
+virtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with
+us and present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible.
+Wherefore we must keep them before us.
+
+49. Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest only so
+many litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou
+must live only so many years and not more; for as thou art satisfied
+with the amount of substance which has been assigned to thee, so be
+content with the time.
+
+50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even against their will,
+when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by
+using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and
+tranquillity, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the
+exercise of some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a
+reservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do
+impossibilities. What then didst thou desire?—Some such effort as
+this.—But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast
+moved are [not] accomplished.
+
+51. He who loves fame considers another man’s activity to be his own
+good; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has
+understanding considers his own acts to be his own good.
+
+52. It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be
+disturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power to
+form our judgments.
+
+53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another,
+and as much as it is possible, be in the speaker’s mind.
+
+54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the
+bee.
+
+55. If sailors abused the helmsman, or the sick the doctor, would they
+listen to anybody else; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of
+those in the ship, or the doctor the health of those whom he attends?
+
+56. How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone
+out of it.
+
+57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad
+dogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine
+thing. Why then am I angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has
+less power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is
+bitten by a mad dog?
+
+58. No man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy
+own nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the
+universal nature.
+
+59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what
+objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all things,
+and how many it has covered already.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK VII.
+
+
+1. What is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the
+occasion of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is that
+which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the
+same things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the
+middle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and houses are
+filled now. There is nothing new: all things are both familiar and
+short-lived.
+
+2. How can our principles become dead, unless the impression [thoughts]
+which correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy power
+continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that
+opinion about anything which I ought to have. If I can, why am I
+disturbed? The things which are external to my mind have no relation at
+all to my mind.—Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou standest
+erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as
+thou didst use to look at them; for in this consists the recovery of
+thy life.
+
+3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep,
+herds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of
+bread into fishponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings
+about of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings—[all alike].
+It is thy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humor and
+not a proud air; to understand however that every man is worth just so
+much as the things are worth about which he busies himself.
+
+4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement
+thou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see
+immediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully
+what is the thing signified.
+
+5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient,
+I use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature.
+But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and
+give way to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some
+reason why I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as I can, taking to
+help me the man who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is
+now fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either by
+myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to
+that which is useful and well suited to society.
+
+6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to
+oblivion; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long
+been dead.
+
+7. Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty
+like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou
+canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of
+another it is possible?
+
+8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if
+it shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou
+usest for present things.
+
+9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy;
+and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For
+things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same
+universe [order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and
+one god who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, [one]
+common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed
+there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same
+stock and participate in the same reason.
+
+10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole;
+and everything formal [causal] is very soon taken back into the
+universal reason; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed
+in time.
+
+11. To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and
+according to reason.
+
+12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (III. 5).
+
+13. Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in
+one, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have
+been constituted for one co-operation. And the perception of this will
+be more apparent to thee if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a
+member of the system of rational beings. But if thou sayest that thou
+art a part, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart; beneficence does
+not yet delight thee for its own sake; thou still dost it barely as a
+thing of propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself.
+
+14. Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the
+effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain, if
+they choose. But I, unless I think that what has happened is an evil,
+am not injured. And it is in my power not to think so.
+
+15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be good; just as if the gold,
+or the emerald, or the purple were always saying this, Whatever any one
+does or says, I must be emerald and keep my color.
+
+16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not
+frighten itself or cause itself pain. But if any one else can frighten
+or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own
+opinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if
+it can, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But
+the soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has
+completely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will
+suffer nothing, for it will never deviate into such a judgment. The
+leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for
+itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded,
+if it does not disturb and impede itself.
+
+17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then
+art thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by the
+gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come
+according to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away.
+
+18. Is any man afraid of change? Why, what can take place without
+change? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal
+nature? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change?
+and canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And
+can anything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost
+thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and
+equally necessary for the universal nature?
+
+19. Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all
+bodies are carried, being by their nature united with and co-operating
+with the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a
+Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already
+swallowed up! And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to
+every man and thing (V. 23; VI. 15).
+
+20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the
+constitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not
+allow, or what it does not allow now.
+
+21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness
+of thee by all.
+
+22. It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this
+happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen,
+and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that
+soon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done
+thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was
+before.
+
+23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were
+wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the
+material for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each
+of these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship
+for the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its being
+fastened together (VIII. 50).
+
+24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often
+assumed,[5] the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is
+so completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all.
+Try to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. For
+if even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is
+there for living any longer?
+
+25. Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things which
+thou seest, and out of their substance will make other things, and
+again other things from the substance of them, in order that the world
+may be ever new (XII. 23).
+
+26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what
+opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen
+this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For
+either thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or
+another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But
+if thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more
+readily be well disposed to him who is in error.
+
+27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but
+of the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how
+eagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the
+same time, however, take care that thou dost not through being so
+pleased with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be
+disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them.
+
+28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this
+nature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and
+so secures tranquillity.
+
+29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine
+thyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or
+to another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal]
+and the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done
+by a man stay there where the wrong was done (VIII. 29).
+
+30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter
+into the things that are doing and the things which do them (VII. 4).
+
+31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty, and with indifference
+towards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind.
+Follow God. The poet says that law rules all—And it is enough to
+remember that law rules all.
+
+32. About death: whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into
+atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change.
+
+33. About pain: the pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that
+which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own
+tranquillity by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not
+made worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they
+can, give their opinion about it.
+
+34. About fame: look at the minds [of those who seek fame], observe
+what they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of
+things they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one
+another hide the former sands, so in life the events which go before
+are soon covered by those which come after.
+
+35. From Plato: The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of
+all time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to
+think that human life is anything great? It is not possible, he
+said.—Such a man then will think that death also is no evil.—Certainly
+not.
+
+36. From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused.
+
+37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to
+regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not
+to be regulated and composed by itself.
+
+38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, For they care nought
+about it.
+
+39. To the immortal gods and us give joy.
+
+40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn. One man is born;
+another dies.
+
+41. If gods care not for me and for my children, There is a reason for
+it.
+
+42. For the good is with me, and the just.
+
+43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion.
+
+44. From Plato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is
+this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good for
+anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and
+should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is
+doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or bad man.
+
+45. For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has placed
+himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by a
+commander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the
+hazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything
+else, before the baseness [of deserting his post].
+
+46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good
+is not something different from saving and being saved; for as to a man
+living such or such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider
+if this is not a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts: and there
+must be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must intrust
+them to the Deity and believe what the women say, that no man can
+escape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live the
+time that he has to live.
+
+47. Look around at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going
+along with them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements
+into one another, for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene
+life.
+
+48. This is a fine saying of Plato: That he who is discoursing about
+men should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some
+higher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies,
+agricultural labors, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the
+courts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians,
+feasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly
+combination of contraries.
+
+49. Consider the past,—such great changes of political supremacies;
+thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will
+certainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should
+deviate from the order of the things which take place now; accordingly
+to have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have
+contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?
+
+50.
+
+That which has grown from the earth to the earth,
+But that which has sprung from heavenly seed,
+Back to the heavenly realms returns.
+
+
+This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or
+a similar dispersion of the unsentient elements.
+
+51.
+
+With food and drinks and cunning magic arts
+Turning the channel’s course to ’scape from death.
+The breeze which heaven has sent
+We must endure, and toil without complaining.
+
+
+52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not
+more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that
+happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his
+neighbors.
+
+53. Where any work can be clone conformably to the reason which is
+common to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear; for where we are
+able to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and
+proceeds according to our constitution, there no harm is to be
+suspected.
+
+54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce
+in thy present condition, and to behave justly to those who are about
+thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing
+shall steal into them without being well examined.
+
+55. Do not look around thee to discover other men’s ruling principles,
+but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the
+universal nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own
+nature through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being
+ought to do that which is according to its constitution; and all other
+things have been constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as
+among irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but
+the rational for the sake of one another.
+
+The prime principle then in man’s constitution is the social. And the
+second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body,—for it is the
+peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe
+itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses
+or of the appetites, for both are animal; but the intelligent motion
+claims superiority, and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the
+others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of
+them. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom from
+error and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to
+these things go straight on, and it has what is its own.
+
+56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to
+the present time; and live according to nature the remainder which is
+allowed thee.
+
+57. Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of
+thy destiny. For what is more suitable?
+
+58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the
+same things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as
+strange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they?
+Nowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way; and why
+dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature to
+those who cause them and those who are moved by them; and why art thou
+not altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things
+which happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they will
+be a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and
+resolve to be a good man in every act which thou dost: and remember….
+
+59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever
+bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig.
+
+60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in
+motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining
+in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be
+required also in the whole body. But all these things should be
+observed without affectation.
+
+61. The art of life is more like the wrestler’s art than the dancer’s,
+in respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets
+which are sudden and unexpected.
+
+62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to
+have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt
+neither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their
+approbation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and
+appetites.
+
+63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of
+truth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and
+temperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most
+necessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more
+gentle towards all.
+
+64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no
+dishonor in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for
+it does not damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence
+is rational or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains
+let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable
+nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if
+thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that
+we do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are
+the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched
+by heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented
+about any of these things, say to thyself that thou art yielding to
+pain.
+
+65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman as they feel towards men.
+
+66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to
+Socrates? For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death,
+and disputed more skilfully with the Sophists, and passed the night in
+the cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon
+of Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked
+in a swaggering way in the streets—though as to this fact one may have
+great doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire what kind of a
+soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content
+with being just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly
+vexed on account of men’s villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to
+any man’s ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his
+share out of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor
+allowing his understanding to sympathize with the affects of the
+miserable flesh.
+
+67. Nature has not so mingled [the intelligence] with the composition
+of the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing
+thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy
+own; for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as
+such by no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too, that
+very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because
+thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the
+knowledge of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being
+both free and modest, and social and obedient to God.
+
+68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest
+tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as
+much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members
+of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders
+the mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in
+tranquillity and in a just judgment of all surrounding things and in a
+ready use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the
+judgment may say to the thing which falls under its observation: This
+thou art in substance [reality], though in men’s opinion thou mayest
+appear to be of a different kind; and the use shall say to that which
+falls under the hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me
+that which presents itself is always a material for virtue both
+rational and political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, which
+belongs to man or God. For everything which happens has a relationship
+either to God or man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but
+usual and apt matter to work on.
+
+69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing
+every day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor
+torpid nor playing the hypocrite.
+
+70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a
+time they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of
+them bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways.
+But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring
+the bad, and this too when thou art one of them?
+
+71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness,
+which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men’s badness, which is
+impossible.
+
+72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be
+neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to
+itself.
+
+73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why
+dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do,
+either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a
+return?
+
+74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to
+act according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is
+useful by doing it to others.
+
+75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either
+everything that takes place comes by way of consequence or
+[continuity]; or even the chief things towards which the ruling power
+of the universe directs its own movement are governed by no rational
+principle. If this is remembered, it will make thee more tranquil in
+many things (vi. 44; ix. 28).
+
+
+
+
+BOOK VIII.
+
+
+1. This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty
+fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy
+life, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher;
+but both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far
+from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no
+longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy
+plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the
+matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem [to others],
+and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as
+thy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else
+distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without
+having found happiness anywhere,—not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor
+in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In
+doing what man’s nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he
+has principles from which come his affects and his acts. What
+principles? Those which relate to good and bad: the belief that there
+is nothing good for man which does not make him just, temperate, manly,
+free; and that there is nothing bad which does not do the contrary to
+what has been mentioned.
+
+2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect
+to me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is
+gone. What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an
+intelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the
+same law with God?
+
+3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with
+Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with
+things, and their causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling
+principles of these men were the same [or conformable to their
+pursuits]. But as to the others, how many things had they to care for,
+and to how many things were they slaves!
+
+4. [Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even
+though thou shouldst burst.
+
+5. This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are
+according to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou
+wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In the next
+place, having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and
+at the same time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and
+what man’s nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as
+it seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and
+with modesty and without hypocrisy.
+
+6. The nature of the universal has this work to do,—to remove to that
+place the things which are in this, to change them, to take them away
+hence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not
+fear anything new. All things are familiar [to us]; but the
+distribution of them still remains the same.
+
+7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well;
+and a rational nature goes on its way well when in its thoughts it
+assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its
+movements to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and
+aversions to the things which are in its power, and when it is
+satisfied with everything that is assigned to it by the common nature.
+For of this common nature every particular nature is a part, as the
+nature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in
+the plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not
+perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of
+man is part of a nature which is not subject to impediments, and is
+intelligent and just, since it gives to everything in equal portions
+and according to its worth, times, substance, cause [form], activity
+and incident. But examine, not to discover that any one thing compared
+with any other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all
+the parts together of one thing and comparing them with all the parts
+together of another.
+
+8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure
+[or ability] to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to
+pleasure and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame,
+and not to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care
+for them.
+
+9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or
+with thy own (V. 16).
+
+10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something
+useful; but that which is good must be something useful, and the
+perfect good man should look after it. But no such man would ever
+repent of having refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither
+good nor useful.
+
+11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution! What is
+its substance and material? And what its causal nature [or form]? And
+what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?
+
+12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is
+according to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform
+social acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But
+that which is according to each individual’s nature is also more
+peculiarly its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also
+more agreeable (V. 1).
+
+13. Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every
+impression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic,
+and of Dialectic.
+
+14. Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What
+opinions has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to
+pleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and
+ignominy, death and life, he has such and such opinions, it will seem
+nothing wonderful or strange to me if he does such and such things; and
+I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.
+
+15. Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree
+produces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and
+such things of which it is productive; and for the physician and the
+helmsman it is a shame to be surprised if a man has a fever, or if the
+wind is unfavorable.
+
+16. Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects
+thy error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy
+error. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according to
+thy own movement and judgment, and indeed according to thy own
+understanding too.
+
+17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? but if it is
+in the power of another, whom dost thou blame,—the atoms [chance] or
+the gods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst,
+correct [that which is the cause]; but if thou canst not do this,
+correct at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this,
+of what use is it to thee to find fault? for nothing should be done
+without a purpose.
+
+18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays
+here, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts,
+which are elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too
+change, and they murmur not.
+
+19. Everything exists for some end,—a horse, a vine. Why dost thou
+wonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of
+the gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou,—to enjoy
+pleasure? See if common sense allows this.
+
+20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the
+beginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball.
+What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to
+come down, or even to have fallen? and what good is it to the bubble
+while it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may be
+said of a light also.
+
+21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is;
+and when it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it
+is diseased.
+
+Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer
+and the remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the world;
+and not even here do all agree, no, not any one with himself: and the
+whole earth too is a point.
+
+22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion
+or an act or a word. Thou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest
+rather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day.
+
+23. Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of mankind.
+Does anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and
+the source of all things, from which all that happens is derived.
+
+24. Such as bathing appears to thee,—oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water,
+all things disgusting,—so is every part of life and everything.
+
+25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus
+die, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and then
+Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died.
+Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And
+those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where
+are they,—for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the
+Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like them? All ephemeral, dead
+long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short time,
+and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others have
+disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little
+compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be
+extinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere.
+
+26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it
+is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise
+the movements of the senses, to form a just judgment of plausible
+appearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and of
+the things which happen in it.
+
+27. There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one
+to the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from
+which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with
+thee.
+
+28. Pain is either an evil to the body—then let the body say what it
+thinks of it—or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to
+maintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain
+is an evil. For every judgment and movement and desire and aversion is
+within, and no evil ascends so high.
+
+29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: Now it is in
+my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any
+perturbation at all; but looking at all things I see what is their
+nature, and I use each according to its value.—Remember this power
+which thou hast from nature.
+
+30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be,
+appropriately, not with any affectation: use plain discourse.
+
+31. Augustus’ court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister,
+Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius, Maecenas, physicians, and
+sacrificing priests,—the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest,
+not considering the death of a single man [but of a whole race], as of
+the Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs,—The last of his
+race. Then consider what trouble those before them have had that they
+might leave a successor; and then, that of necessity some one must be
+the last. Again, here consider the death of a whole race.
+
+32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if
+every act does its duty as far as is possible, be content; and no one
+is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.—But
+something external will stand in the way.—Nothing will stand in the way
+of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.—But perhaps some
+other active power will be hindered.—Well, but by acquiescing in the
+hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is
+allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee
+in place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to
+this ordering of which we are speaking.
+
+33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance; and be ready to
+let it go.
+
+34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying
+anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself,
+as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates
+himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast
+detached thyself from the natural unity,—for thou wast made by nature a
+part, but now thou hast cut thyself off,—yet here there is this
+beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself.
+God has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and
+cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness by which
+he has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be
+separated at all from the universal; and when he has been separated, he
+has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a
+part.
+
+35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being
+all the other powers that it has, so we have received from it this
+power also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its
+predestined place everything which stands in the way and opposes it,
+and makes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is
+able to make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such
+purposes as it may have designed.
+
+36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let
+not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou
+mayest expect to befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself, What
+is there in this which is intolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt
+be ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that neither the
+future nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is
+reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest
+thy mind if it is unable to hold out against even this.
+
+37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus? Does
+Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? That would be
+ridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be
+conscious of it? and if the dead were conscious would they be pleased?
+and if they were pleased, would that make them immortal? Was it not in
+the order of destiny that these persons too should first become old
+women and old men and then die? What then would those do after these
+were dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag.
+
+38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, says the
+philosopher.
+
+39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is
+opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of
+pleasure, and that is temperance.
+
+40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give
+thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security.—Who is this
+self?—The reason.—But I am not reason.—Be it so. Let then the reason
+itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let
+it have its own opinion about itself (VII. 16).
+
+41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal
+nature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the
+animal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an
+evil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance
+to the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all
+these things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure effect
+thee? The senses will look to that. Has any obstacle opposed thee in
+thy efforts towards an object? If indeed thou wast making this effort
+absolutely [unconditionally, or without any reservation], certainly
+this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But
+if thou takest [into consideration] the usual course of things, thou
+hast not yet been injured nor even impeded. The things however which
+are proper to the understanding no other man is used to impede, for
+neither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any way.
+When it has been made a sphere, it continues a sphere (XI, 12).
+
+42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never
+intentionally given pain even to another.
+
+43. Different things delight different people; but it is my delight to
+keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man
+or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and
+receiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to its
+value.
+
+44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who
+rather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the men of after
+time will be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both
+are mortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after
+time utter this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about thee?
+
+45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my
+divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act
+conformably to its proper constitution. Is this [change of place]
+sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse then it was,
+depressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find
+which is sufficient reason for this?
+
+46. Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to
+an ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine
+which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is
+not proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is
+usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common nature
+brings nothing which may not be borne by thee.
+
+47. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that
+disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to
+wipe out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition
+gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion? And even
+if thou art pained because thou art not doing some particular thing
+which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act than
+complain?—But some insuperable obstacle is in the way?—Do not be
+grieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on
+thee.—But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be done.—Take
+thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in
+full activity, and well pleased too with the things which are
+obstacles.
+
+48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected
+it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not
+choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it
+be when it forms a judgment about anything aided by reason and
+deliberately? Therefore the mind which is free from passions is a
+citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge
+and for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an
+ignorant man; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge is
+unhappy.
+
+49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report.
+Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks
+ill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured,
+that has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see; but
+that he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first
+appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing
+happens to thee. Or rather add something like a man who knows
+everything that happens in the world.
+
+50. A cucumber is bitter—Throw it away.—There are briers in the
+road—Turn aside from them.—This is enough. Do not add, And why were
+such things made in the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who
+is acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter
+and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their
+workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And yet
+they have places into which they can throw these shavings and cuttings,
+and the universal nature has no external space; but the wondrous part
+of her art is that though she has circumscribed herself, everything
+within her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she
+changes into herself, and again makes other new things from these very
+same, so that she requires neither substance from without nor wants a
+place into which she may cast that which decays. She is content then
+with her own space, and her own matter, and her own art.
+
+51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without
+method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul
+inward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to
+have no leisure.
+
+Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then
+can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise,
+sober, just? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure
+spring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water;
+and if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse
+them and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt
+thou possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well]? By forming
+thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with contentment, simplicity, and
+modesty.
+
+52. He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is.
+And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not
+know who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one
+of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself.
+What then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the praise of
+those who applaud, of men who know not either where they are or who
+they are?
+
+53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice
+every hour? Wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please
+himself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything
+that he does?
+
+54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which
+surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with
+the intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power
+is no less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is
+willing to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to
+respire it.
+
+55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and
+particularly the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is
+only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it as
+soon as he shall choose.
+
+56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbor is just as
+indifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made
+especially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each
+of us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbor’s wickedness would
+be my harm, which God has not willed in order that my unhappiness may
+not depend on another.
+
+57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it
+is diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension:
+Accordingly its rays are called Extensions because they are extended.
+But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the
+sun’s light passing through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for
+it is extended in a right line, and as it were is divided when it meets
+with any solid body which stands in the way and intercepts the air
+beyond; but there the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall
+off. Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffusion of the
+understanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an
+extension, and it should make no violent or impetuous collision with
+the obstacles which are in its way; nor yet fall down, but be fixed,
+and enlighten that which receives it. For a body will deprive itself of
+the illumination, if it does not admit it.
+
+58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a
+different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation,
+neither wilt thou feel any harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind
+of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou
+wilt not cease to live.
+
+59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with
+them.
+
+60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind
+indeed, both when it exercises caution and when it is employed about
+inquiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object.
+
+61. Enter into every man’s ruling faculty; and also let every other man
+enter into thine.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK IX.
+
+
+1. He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature
+has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one
+another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one
+another, he who transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety
+towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety
+to the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things
+that are; and things that are have a relation to all things that come
+into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth, and
+is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies
+intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by
+deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at
+variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the
+order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he fights
+against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth,
+for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he
+is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he who
+pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of
+impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the
+universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the
+good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the
+enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure,
+but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain.
+And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of
+some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is
+impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice,
+and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards
+which the universal nature is equally affected,—for it would not have
+made both, unless it was equally affected towards both,—towards these
+they who wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and
+equally affected. With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death
+and life, or honor and dishonor, which the universal nature employs
+equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting
+impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs them equally,
+instead of saying that they happen alike to those who are produced in
+continuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a
+certain original movement of Providence, according to which it moved
+from a certain beginning to this ordering of things, having conceived
+certain principles of the things which were to be, and having
+determined powers productive of beings and of changes and of such like
+successions (VII. 75).
+
+2. It would be a man’s happiest lot to depart from mankind without
+having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride.
+However, to breathe out one’s life when a man has had enough of these
+things is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined
+to abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from
+this pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a
+pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and change of
+this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence
+of animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence of
+men so far as they are men.
+
+3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is
+one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young
+and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have
+teeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to
+bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of
+thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent
+with the character of a reflecting man,—to be neither careless nor
+impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as
+one of the operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when
+the child shall come out of thy wife’s womb, so be ready for the time
+when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. But if thou requirest
+also a vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be
+made best reconciled to death by observing the objects from which thou
+art going to be removed, and the morals of those with whom thy soul
+will no longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with
+men, but it is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently;
+and yet to remember that thy departure will not be from men who have
+the same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be
+any, which could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life,—to be
+permitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves.
+But now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the
+discordance of those who live together, so that thou mayest say, Come
+quick, O death, lest perchance I, too, should forget myself.
+
+4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly
+acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.
+
+5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he
+who does a certain thing.
+
+6. Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present
+conduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of
+contentment with everything which happens—that is enough.
+
+7. Wipe out imagination: check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the
+ruling faculty in its own power.
+
+8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but
+among reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as
+there is one earth of all things which are of an earthy nature, and we
+see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty
+of vision and all that have life.
+
+9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all
+move towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything
+which is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid
+flows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the
+same, so that they require something to keep them asunder, and the
+application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the
+elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the
+fire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat dry is
+easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is
+a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly, then, everything also which
+participates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner
+towards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more.
+For so much as it is superior in comparison with all other things, in
+the same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused
+with that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid of
+reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of
+young birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in animals there are
+souls, and that power which brings them together is seen to exert
+itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has been
+observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals
+there are political communities and friendships, and families and
+meetings of people; and in wars, treaties, and armistices. But in the
+things which are still superior, even though they are separated from
+one another, unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent
+to the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which
+are separated. See, then, what now takes place; for only intelligent
+animals have now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and in
+them alone the property of flowing together is not seen. But still,
+though men strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held by
+it, for their nature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see what I
+say, if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything
+earthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing, than a man
+altogether separated from other men.
+
+10. Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper
+seasons each produces it. But and if usage has especially fixed these
+terms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces
+fruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other
+things of the same kind as reason itself.
+
+11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if
+thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this
+purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some
+purposes they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind
+they are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee?
+
+12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be
+pitied or admired: but direct thy will to one thing only,—to put
+thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires.
+
+13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all
+trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions.
+
+14. All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in
+time, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in
+the time of those whom we have buried.
+
+15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither
+knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it,
+then, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty.
+
+16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the evil and the good of the
+rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in
+passivity but in activity.
+
+17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down,
+nor indeed any good to have been carried up (VIII. 20).
+
+18. Penetrate inwards into men’s leading principles, and thou wilt see
+what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of
+themselves.
+
+19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous
+mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole
+universe too.
+
+20. It is thy duty to leave another man’s wrongful act there where it
+is (VII. 29; IX. 38).
+
+21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and
+in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the
+consideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy
+manhood, thy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is
+this anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy
+grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under
+thy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and
+terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner,
+then, neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole
+life a thing to be afraid of.
+
+22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe
+and that of thy neighbor: thy own that thou mayst make it just; and
+that of the universe, that thou mayst remember of what thou art a part;
+and that of thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he has acted
+ignorantly or with knowledge, and that thou mayst also consider that
+his ruling faculty is akin to thine.
+
+23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let
+every act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of
+thine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social
+end, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and
+it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a
+man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement.
+
+24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits
+carrying about dead bodies [such is everything]; and so what is
+exhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead strikes our
+eyes more clearly.
+
+25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it
+altogether from its material part, and then contemplate it; then
+determine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is
+naturally made to endure.
+
+26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented
+with thy ruling faculty when it does the things which it is constituted
+by nature to do. But enough [of this].
+
+27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee
+anything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and
+see what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no
+reason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion
+about thee. However, thou must be well disposed towards them, for by
+nature they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by
+dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on which they
+set a value.
+
+28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down
+from age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in
+motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content
+with that which is the result of its activity: or it puts itself in
+motion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence in a manner;
+or indivisible elements are the origin of all things.—In a word, if
+there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou also be
+governed by it (VI. 44; VII. 75).
+
+Soon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change, and
+the things also which result from change will continue to change
+forever, and these again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes
+and transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and
+their rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable (XII.
+21).
+
+29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything
+along with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are
+engaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the
+philosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what nature now
+requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look
+about thee to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato’s
+Republic: but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and
+consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men’s
+opinions? and without a change of opinions what else is there than the
+slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell
+me of Alexander and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They
+themselves shall judge whether they discovered what the common nature
+required, and trained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like
+tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and
+modest is the work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence and
+pride.
+
+30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their
+countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms
+and calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live
+together, and die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in olden
+time, and the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now
+lived among barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and
+how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising
+thee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name is
+of any value, nor reputation, nor anything else.
+
+31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things
+which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the
+things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be
+movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is
+according to thy nature.
+
+32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those
+which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt
+then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe
+in thy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and observing
+the rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from
+birth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well as
+the equally boundless time after dissolution!
+
+33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been
+spectators of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who
+dies at the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition
+with him who died prematurely.
+
+34. What are these men’s leading principles, and about what kind of
+things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and
+honor? Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When they
+think that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an
+idea!
+
+35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights
+in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and
+from eternity have been done in like form, and will be such to time
+without end. What, then, dost thou say,—that all things have been and
+all things always will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in
+so many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned
+to be bound in never ceasing evil (IV. 45; VII. 88)?
+
+36. The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything:
+water, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities of
+the earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only bits
+of hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything else is of the same
+kind. And that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing
+of the same kind, changing from this to that.
+
+37. Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why
+art thou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is
+it the form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it.
+But besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods then, now become
+at last more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine these
+things for a hundred years or three.
+
+38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has
+not done wrong.
+
+39. Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come
+together as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what
+is done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and
+nothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou
+disturbed? Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou
+corrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast,
+dost thou herd and feed with the rest?
+
+40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they
+have no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why
+dost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any
+of the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things
+which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray
+that any of these things should not happen or happen? for certainly if
+they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these purposes.
+But perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed them in thy power. Well,
+then, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man than
+to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who
+has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the things which are
+in our power? Begin, then, to pray for such things, and thou wilt see.
+One man prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that woman? Do thou
+pray thus: How shall I not desire to lie with her? Another prays thus:
+How shall I be released from this? Another prays: How shall I not
+desire to be released? Another thus: How shall I not lose my little
+son? Thou thus: How shall I not be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn
+thy prayers this way, and see what comes.
+
+41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my
+bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those
+who visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as
+before, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while participating
+in such movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from
+perturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give
+the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they
+were doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do,
+then, the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in
+any other circumstances; for never to desert philosophy in any events
+that may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant
+man or with one unacquainted with nature, is a principle of all schools
+of philosophy; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing
+and on the instrument by which thou dost it.
+
+42. When thou art offended with any man’s shameless conduct,
+immediately ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men
+should not be in the world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require
+what is impossible. For this man also is one of those shameless men who
+must of necessity be in the world. Let the same considerations be
+present to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man,
+and of every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that
+thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men
+should not exist, thou wilt become more kindly disposed towards every
+one individually. It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately when
+the occasion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to
+every wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote against
+the stupid man, mildness, and against another kind of man some other
+power. And in all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teaching
+the man who is gone astray; for every man who errs misses his object
+and is gone astray. Besides, wherein hast thou been injured? For thou
+wilt find that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has
+done anything by which thy mind could be made worse; but that which is
+evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only in the mind. And what
+harm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been
+instructed does the acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou
+shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a
+man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason
+to suppose that it was likely that he would commit this error, and yet
+thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he has erred. But most of all
+when thou blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself.
+For the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that a
+man who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or when
+conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in
+such way as to have received from thy very act all the profit. For what
+more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? art thou not
+content that thou hast done something comformable to thy nature, and
+dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a
+recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these members
+are formed for a particular purpose, and by working according to their
+several constitutions obtain what is their own; so also as man is
+formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done anything
+benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common interest, he has
+acted conformably to his constitution, and he gets what is his own.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK X.
+
+
+1. Wilt thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and
+naked, more manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou
+never enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never
+be full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor
+desiring anything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of
+pleasures? nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer
+enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom
+thou mayest live in harmony? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy
+present condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt
+thou convince thyself that thou hast everything, and that it comes from
+the gods, that everything is well for thee, and will be well whatever
+shall please them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation of
+the perfect living being, the good and just and beautiful, which
+generates and holds together all things, and contains and embraces all
+things which are dissolved for the production of other like things?
+Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in community with gods
+and men as neither to find fault with them at all, nor to be condemned
+by them?
+
+2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by
+nature only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou
+art a living being, shall not be made worse by it. And next thou must
+observe what thy nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And
+all this thou mayest allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a
+rational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal
+is consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these rules,
+then, and trouble thyself about nothing else.
+
+3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art
+formed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to
+bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by
+nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by
+nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not
+formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after
+it has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature
+to bear everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion
+to make it endurable and tolerable, by thinking that it is either thy
+interest or thy duty to do this.
+
+4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error.
+But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself.
+
+5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all
+eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the
+thread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it (III. II; IV.
+26).
+
+6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or nature [is a
+system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole
+which is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related
+to the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering
+this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the
+things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is
+injurious to the part if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the
+whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures
+indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has
+this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any
+external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering,
+then, that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with
+everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately
+related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do
+nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which
+are of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to
+the common interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these
+things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayest
+observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of
+action which is advantageous to his fellow citizens, and is content
+with whatever the state may assign to him.
+
+7. The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally
+comprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this be
+understood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is
+naturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would
+not continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to
+change and constituted so as to perish in various ways, For whether did
+Nature herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of
+herself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity fall into
+evil, or have such results happened without her knowing it? Both these
+suppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man should even drop the
+term Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these things
+as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time
+that the parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and
+at the same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were
+happening contrary to nature, particularly as the dissolution of things
+is into those things of which each thing is composed. For there is
+either a dispersion of the elements out of which everything has been
+compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy
+to the aerial, so that these parts are taken back into the universal
+reason, whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed
+by eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part
+belongs to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its
+accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the
+food and the air which is inspired. This, then, which has received [the
+accretion], changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. Hut
+suppose that this [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very
+much with that other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change],
+this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.
+
+8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a
+man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change
+these names; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them.
+And remember that the term Rational was intended to signify a
+discriminating attention to every several thing, and freedom from
+negligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the
+things which are assigned to thee by the common nature; and that
+Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part above the
+pleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh, and above that poor
+thing called fame, and death, and all such things. If, then, thou
+maintainest thyself in the possession of these names, without desiring
+to be called by these names by others, thou wilt be another person and
+wilt enter on another life. For to continue to be such as thou hast
+hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is
+the character of a very stupid man and one over-fond of his life, and
+like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts who, though covered
+with wounds and gore, still entreat to be kept to the following day,
+though they will be exposed in the same state to the same claws and
+bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few names: and
+if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to
+certain islands of the Happy. But if thou shalt perceive that thou
+fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously
+into some nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once
+from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and freedom and modesty,
+after doing this one [laudable] thing at least in thy life, to have
+gone out of it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of these
+names, it will greatly help thee if thou rememberest the gods, and that
+they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be
+made like themselves; and if thou rememberest that what does the work
+of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog is a
+dog, and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, and that what does
+the work of a man is a man.
+
+9. Mimi, war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out those
+holy principles of thine. How many things without studying nature dost
+thou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect? But it is thy duty so to
+look on and so to do everything, that at the same time the power of
+dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative faculty
+is exercised, and the confidence which comes from the knowledge of each
+several thing is maintained without showing it, but yet not concealed.
+For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when gravity, and when the
+knowledge of every several thing, both what it is in substance, and
+what place it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist,
+and of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, and who
+are able both to give it and take it away?
+
+10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has
+caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a
+net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has
+taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these
+robbers, if thou examinest their opinions?
+
+11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into
+one another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about
+this part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so much adapted to produce
+magnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he
+must, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave
+everything here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his
+actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns himself to the
+universal nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him
+or do against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself contented
+with these two things,—with acting justly in what he now does, and
+being satisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he lays aside all
+distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else than to
+accomplish the straight course through the law, and by accomplishing
+the straight course to follow God.
+
+12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to
+inquire what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this way
+content, without turning back: but if thou dost not see clear, stop and
+take the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on
+according to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that which
+appears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou
+dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows reason
+in all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also
+cheerful and collected.
+
+13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep whether it
+will make any difference to thee if another does what is just and
+right. It will make no difference (VI. 32; VIII. 55).
+
+Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant airs
+in bestowing their praise or blame on others are such as they are at
+bed and at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, and what
+they avoid, and what they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob,
+not with hands and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of
+which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth,
+law, a good daemon [happiness] (VII. 17)?
+
+14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is
+instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou
+wilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently, and well pleased
+with her.
+
+15. Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a
+mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here,
+if he lives everywhere in the world as in a state [political
+community]. Let men see, let them know a real man who lives according
+to nature. If they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is
+better than to live thus [as men do].
+
+16. No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought
+to be, but be such.
+
+17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of
+substance, and consider that all individual things as to substance are
+a grain of a fig, and as to time the turning of a gimlet.
+
+18. Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in
+dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or dispersion,
+or that everything is so constituted by nature as to die.
+
+19. Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating,
+easing themselves, and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when
+they are imperious and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their
+elevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves and
+for what things; and after a little time consider in what a condition
+they will be.
+
+20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature
+brings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings
+it.
+
+21. “The earth loves the shower”; and “the solemn ether loves”; and the
+universe loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the
+universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that
+“this or that loves [is wont] to be produced”?
+
+22. Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it,
+or thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying
+and hast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is
+nothing. Be of good cheer, then.
+
+23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like
+any other; and that all things here are the same with things on the top
+of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be.
+For thou wilt find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a
+city as in a shepherd’s fold on a mountain. [The three last words are
+omitted in the translation.]
+
+24. What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of what nature am I now
+making it? and for what purpose am I now using it? is it void of
+understanding? is it loosed and rent asunder from social life? is it
+melted into and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move together with
+it?
+
+25. He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master,
+and he who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or
+angry or afraid, is dissatisfied because something has been or is or
+shall be of the things which are appointed by him who rules all things,
+and he is Law and assigns to every man what is fit. He then who fears
+or is grieved or is angry is a runaway.
+
+26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause
+takes it, and labors on it and makes a child. What a thing from such a
+material! Again, the child passes food down through the throat, and
+then another cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and in
+fine, life and strength and other things; how many and how strange!
+Observe then the things which are produced in such a hidden way, and
+see the power just as we see the power which carries things downwards
+and upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less plainly (VII. 75).
+
+27. Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time
+past also were; and consider that they will be the same again. And
+place before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the same form,
+whatever thou hast learned from thy experience or from older history;
+for example, the whole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of
+Antoninus, and the whole court of Philippus, Alexander, Croesus; for
+all those were such dramas as we see now, only with different actors.
+
+28. Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be
+like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams.
+
+Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in
+which we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it
+given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a
+necessity imposed on all.
+
+29. Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, pause and
+ask thyself if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of
+this.
+
+30. When thou art offended at any man’s fault, forthwith turn to
+thyself and reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for
+example, in thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit
+of reputation, and the like. For by attending to this thou wilt quickly
+forget thy anger, if this consideration also is added, that the man is
+compelled: for what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away
+from him the compulsion.
+
+31. When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic, think of either Eutyches
+or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or
+Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, and
+when thou hast seen Xenophon, think of Crito or Severus, and when thou
+hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the case of
+every one do in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind,
+Where then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows where. For thus
+continuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and nothing at
+all; especially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has once
+changed will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But
+thou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And why art thou
+not content to pass through this short time in an orderly way? What
+matter and opportunity [for thy activity] art thou avoiding? For what
+else are all these things, except exercises for the reason, when it has
+viewed carefully and by examination into their nature the things which
+happen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have made these things
+thy own, as the stomach which is strengthened makes all things its own,
+as the blazing fire makes flame and brightness out of everything that
+is thrown into it.
+
+32. Let it not be in any man’s power to say truly of thee that thou art
+not simple or that thou art not good; but let him be a liar whoever
+shall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether in
+thy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from being good and
+simple? Do thou only determine to live no longer unless thou shalt be
+such. For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if thou art not
+such.
+
+33. What is that which as to this material [our life] can be done or
+said in the way most conformable to reason? For whatever this may be,
+it is in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not make excuses that
+thou art hindered. Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in
+such a condition that, what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such
+shall be to thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented to
+thee, the doing of the things which are conformable to man’s
+constitution; for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment everything
+which it is in his power to do according to his own nature. And it is
+in his power everywhere. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move
+everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to
+anything else which is governed by nature or an irrational soul, for
+the things which check them and stand in the way are many. But
+intelligence and reason are able to go through everything that opposes
+them, and in such manner as they are formed by nature and as they
+choose. Place before thy eyes this facility with which the reason will
+be carried through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone downwards,
+as a cylinder down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing further.
+For all other obstacles either affect the body only, which is a dead
+thing; or, except through opinion and the yielding of the reason
+itself, they do not crush nor do any harm of any kind; for if they did,
+he who felt it would immediately become bad. Now, in the case of all
+things which have a certain constitution, whatever harm may happen to
+any of them, that which is so affected becomes consequently worse; but
+in the like case, a man becomes both better, if one may say so, and
+more worthy of praise by making a right use of these accidents. And
+finally remember that nothing harms him who is really a citizen, which
+does not harm the state; nor yet does anything harm the state, which
+does not harm law [order]; and of these things which are called
+misfortunes not one harms law. What then does not harm law does not
+harm either state or citizen.
+
+34. To him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest
+precept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he
+should be free from grief and fear. For example,—
+
+“Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground—
+So is the race of men.”
+
+
+Leaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, are they who cry out
+as if they were worthy of credit and bestow their praise, or on the
+contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves, in like
+manner, are those who shall receive and transmit a man’s fame to
+after-times. For all such things as these “are produced in the season
+of spring,” as the poet says; then the wind casts them down; then the
+forest produces other leaves in their places. But a brief existence is
+common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all things as
+if they would be eternal. A little time, and thou shalt close thy eyes;
+and him who has attended thee to thy grave another will soon lament.
+
+35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I
+wish for green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And
+the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all that
+can be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be with
+respect to all food just as the mill with respect to all things which
+it is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding ought
+to be prepared for everything which happens; but that which says, Let
+my dear children live, and let all men praise whatever I may do, is an
+eye which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek for soft things.
+
+36. There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when he
+is dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen. Suppose
+that he was a good and wise man, will there not be at last some one to
+say to himself, Let us at last breathe freely, being relieved from this
+schoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I
+perceived that he tacitly condemns us.—This is what is said of a good
+man. But in our own case how many other things are there for which
+there are many who wish to get rid of us. Thou wilt consider this,
+then, when thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly by
+reflecting thus: I am going away from such a life, in which even my
+associates in behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared,
+themselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some little
+advantage by it. Why then should a man cling to a longer stay here? Do
+not however for this reason go away less kindly disposed to them, but
+preserving thy own character, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and
+on the other hand not as if thou wast torn away; but as when a man dies
+a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated from the body, such
+also ought thy departure from men to be, for nature united thee to them
+and associated thee. But does she now dissolve the union? Well, I am
+separated as from kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without
+compulsion; for this, too, is one of the things according to nature.
+
+37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything
+being done by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is
+this man doing this? But begin with thyself, and examine thyself first.
+
+38. Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is
+hidden within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if
+one may so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never include the
+vessel which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached
+about it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this, that
+they grow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts
+without the cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver’s
+shuttle, and the writer’s pen, and the driver’s whip.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK XI.
+
+
+1. These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself,
+analyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which
+it bears itself enjoys,—for the fruits of plants and that in animals
+which corresponds to fruits others enjoy,—it obtains its own end,
+wherever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a
+play and in such like things, where the whole action is incomplete if
+anything cuts it short; but in every part, and where-ever it may be
+stopped, it makes what has been set before it full and complete, so
+that it can say, I have what is my own. And further it traverses the
+whole universe, and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and
+it extends itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and
+comprehends the periodical renovation of all things, and it comprehends
+that those who come after us will see nothing new, nor have those
+before us seen anything more, but in a manner he who is forty years
+old, if he has any understanding at all, has seen by virtue of the
+uniformity that prevails all things which have been and all that will
+be. This too is a property of the rational soul, love of one’s
+neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to value nothing more than itself,
+which is also the property of Law. Thus then right reason differs not
+at all from the reason of justice.
+
+2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the
+pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its
+several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by
+this; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in
+the matter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do
+the same; and the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all
+things, then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply
+thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to value
+them little: and apply this rule also to thy whole life.
+
+3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be
+separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or
+dispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a
+man’s own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,
+but considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another,
+without tragic show.
+
+4. Have I done something for the general interest? Well then I have had
+my reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop
+[doing such good].
+
+5. What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well
+except by general principles, some about the nature of the universe,
+and others about the proper constitution of man?
+
+6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding
+men of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to
+nature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with
+what is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which
+takes place on the larger stage. For you see that these things must be
+accomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out, “O
+Cithaeron.” And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic
+writers, of which kind is the following especially:—
+
+“Me and my children if the gods neglect,
+This has its reason too.”
+
+
+And again,—
+
+“We must not chafe and fret at that which happens.”
+
+
+And,—
+
+“Life’s harvest reap like the wheat’s fruitful ear.”
+
+
+And other things of the same kind.
+
+After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial
+freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in
+reminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes
+used to take from these writers.
+
+But as to the middle comedy, which came next, observe what it was, and
+again, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually
+sank down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said
+even by these writers, everybody knows: but the whole plan of such
+poetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look?
+
+7. How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life
+so well suited for philosophizing as this in which thou now happenest
+to be.
+
+8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut
+off from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from
+another man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a
+branch, another cuts it off; but a man by his own act separates himself
+from his neighbor when he hates him and turns away from him, and he
+does not know that he has at the same time cut himself off from the
+whole social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly from Zeus, who
+framed society, for it is in our power to grow again to that which is
+near to us, and again to become a part which helps to make up the
+whole. However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes
+it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and
+to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from
+the first grew together with the tree, and has continued to have one
+life with it, is not like that which after being cut off is then
+ingrafted, for this is something like what the gardeners mean when they
+say that it grows with the rest of the tree, but that it has not the
+same mind with it.
+
+9. As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding
+according to right reason will not be able to turn thee aside from thy
+proper action, so neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent
+feelings towards them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not
+only in the matter of steady judgment and action, but also in the
+matter of gentleness to those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble
+thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to
+be diverted from thy course of action and to give way through fear; for
+both are equally deserters from their post,—the man who does it through
+fear, and the man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman
+and a friend.
+
+10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate
+the natures of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most
+perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of
+the skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of
+the superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed,
+hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have
+their foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we either care
+for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and
+careless and changeable (V. 16, 30; VII. 55).
+
+11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of
+which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy
+judgment about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou
+wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.
+
+12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure when it is
+neither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor
+dispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees
+the truth,—the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself
+(VIII. 41, 45; XII. 3).
+
+13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But
+I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything
+deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I
+will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even
+him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my
+endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless
+indeed he only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such,
+and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with
+anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now
+doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that
+which at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since
+thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what is for the
+common advantage may be done in some way?
+
+14. Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to
+raise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.
+
+15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal
+with thee in a fair way!—What art thou doing, man? There is no occasion
+to give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought
+to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man’s character is, he
+immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith
+reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good
+ought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander
+as soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose or not. But
+the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick. Nothing is more
+disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this
+most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these things
+in the eyes, and there is no mistaking.
+
+16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be
+indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be
+indifferent, if it looks on each of these things separately and all
+together, and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an
+opinion about itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain
+immovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the judgments about them,
+and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not
+to write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these judgments
+have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if
+we remember also that such attention will only be for a short time, and
+then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in
+doing this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in
+them and they will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek
+what is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even if
+it bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek his own good.
+
+17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and
+into what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has
+changed, and that it will sustain no harm.
+
+18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my
+relation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another
+respect I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a
+bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from
+this: If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all
+things: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the
+superior, and these for the sake of one another (II. 1; IX. 39; V. 16;
+III. 4).
+
+Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so
+forth: and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions
+they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what
+they do (VIII. 14; IX. 34).
+
+Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be
+displeased: but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so
+involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly
+deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power
+of behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are
+pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a
+word wrong-doers to their neighbors (VII. 62, 63; II. 1; VII. 26; VIII.
+29).
+
+Fourth, consider that thou also dost many things wrong, and that thou
+art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain
+faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either
+through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean
+motive, thou dost abstain from such faults (I. 17).
+
+Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are
+doing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference
+to circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable
+him to pass a correct judgment on another man’s acts (IX. 38; IV. 51).
+
+Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man’s life is
+only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead (VII.
+58; IV. 48).
+
+Seventh, that it is not men’s acts which disturb us, for those acts
+have their foundation in men’s ruling principles, but it is our own
+opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve
+to dismiss thy judgment about an act as if it were something grievous,
+and thy anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By
+reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for
+unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity
+do many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else (V. 25;
+VII. 16).
+
+Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and
+vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we
+are angry and vexed (IV. 39, 49; VII. 24).
+
+Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine,
+and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most
+violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition
+towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him
+and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to
+do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature
+for something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art
+injuring thyself, my child.—And show him with gentle tact and by
+general principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he
+does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And
+thou must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of
+reproach, but affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and
+not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may
+admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are present….[6]
+
+Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift
+from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But
+thou must equally avoid flattering men and being vexed at them, for
+both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to
+thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not
+manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to
+human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses these
+qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who
+is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in
+which a man’s mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same
+degree also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain is a
+characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain
+and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both submit.
+
+But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the
+[Muses, Apollo], and it is this,—that to expect bad men not to do wrong
+is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to
+allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any
+wrong, is irrational and tyrannical.
+
+19. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty
+against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou
+hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each
+occasion thus: This thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy
+social union: this which thou art going to say comes not from the real
+thoughts; for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things
+for a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when
+thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of
+the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less
+honorable and to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross
+pleasures (IV. 24; II. 16).
+
+20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee,
+though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to
+the disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the
+compound mass [the body]. And also the whole of the earthy part in thee
+and the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up
+and occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner
+then the elemental parts obey the universal; for when they have been
+fixed in any place, perforce they remain there until again the
+universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then
+strange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and
+discontented with its own place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but
+only those things which are comformable to its nature: still it does
+not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For the movement
+towards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is
+nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. And also
+when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that happens,
+then too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety and
+reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these
+qualities also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment
+with the constitution of things, and indeed they are prior to acts of
+justice.
+
+21. He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be
+one and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not
+enough, unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as
+there is not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or
+other are considered by the majority to be good, but only about some
+certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so
+also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a
+common kind [social] and political. For he who directs all his own
+efforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will
+always be the same.
+
+22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm
+and trepidation of the town mouse.[7]
+
+23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of
+Lamiae,—bugbears to frighten children.
+
+24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in
+the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.
+
+25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him, saying,
+It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that is, I
+would not receive a favor and then be unable to return it.
+
+26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] there was this precept,
+constantly to think of some one of the men of former times who
+practised virtue.
+
+27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we
+may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things
+and in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of
+their purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.
+
+28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin,
+after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates
+said to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when
+they saw him dressed thus.
+
+29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down
+rules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules
+thyself. Much more is this so in life.
+
+30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.
+
+
+31. And my heart laughed within.
+     _Odyssey_, IX. 413.
+
+
+32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.
+     HESIOD, _Works and Days_, 184.
+
+
+33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman’s act: such is he who
+looks for his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, III. 24,
+87).
+
+34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to
+himself, “To-morrow perchance thou wilt die.”—But those are words of
+bad omen.—“No word is a word of bad omen,” said Epictetus, “which
+expresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad
+omen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped” (Epictetus, III. 24,
+88).
+
+35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape all are changes,
+not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus,
+III. 24).
+
+36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus III. 22, 105).
+
+37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with
+respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must
+be careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be
+consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of
+the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away
+from it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with
+respect to any of the things which are not in our power.
+
+38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but
+about being mad or not.
+
+39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or
+irrational?—souls of rational men.—Of what rational men, sound or
+unsound?—Sound.—Why then do you not seek for them?—Because we have
+them.—Why then do you fight and quarrel?
+
+
+
+
+BOOK XII.
+
+
+1. All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous
+road thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And
+this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the
+future to providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety
+and justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayest be content with the
+lot which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee
+for it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayest always speak the truth
+freely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to
+law and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man’s
+wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations
+of the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will
+look to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be
+near to thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect
+only thy ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt
+be afraid not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou
+shalt fear never to have begun to live according to nature,—then thou
+wilt be a man worthy of the universe which hast produced thee, and thou
+wilt cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things
+which happen daily as if they were something unexpected, and not to be
+dependent on this or that.
+
+2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the
+material vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual
+part alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been
+derived from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself
+to do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who
+regards not the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble
+himself by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like
+externals and show.
+
+3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a
+little breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine,
+so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is
+properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is,
+from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou
+hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee
+because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee
+or in the breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body,
+is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external
+circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt
+from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is
+just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt
+separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached
+to it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and
+of time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles’ sphere,
+
+“All round and in its joyous rest reposing”;
+
+
+and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is,
+the present,—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which
+remains for thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations,
+nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee]
+(II. 13, 17; III. 5, 6; XI. 12).
+
+4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more
+than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of
+himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher
+should present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to
+design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it,
+he could not endure it even for a single day. So much more respect have
+we to what our neighbors shall think of us than to what we shall think
+of ourselves.
+
+5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well
+and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some
+men, and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most
+communion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious
+observances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have
+once died should never exist again, but should be completely
+extinguished?
+
+But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise,
+the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be
+possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it
+so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou
+convinced that it ought not to have been so: for thou seest even of
+thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity; and we
+should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent
+and most just; but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything
+in the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and
+irrationally.
+
+6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of
+accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all
+other things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously
+than the right hand; for it has been practised in this.
+
+7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be
+when he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the
+boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.
+
+8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their
+coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what
+pleasure is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his
+uneasiness; how no man is hindered by another; that everything is
+opinion.
+
+9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the
+pancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the
+sword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand,
+and needs to do nothing else than use it.
+
+10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form,
+and purpose.
+
+11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve,
+and to accept all that God may give him.
+
+12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought
+to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or
+involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily.
+Consequently we should blame nobody (II. 11, 12, 13; VII. 62; VIII. 17,
+18).
+
+13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at
+anything which happens in life.
+
+14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind
+providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director
+(IV. 27). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou
+resist? But if there is a providence which allows itself to be
+propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if
+there is a confusion without a governor, be content that in such a
+tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if
+the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor
+breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not
+carry away.
+
+15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendor until
+it is extinguished; and shall the truth which is in thee and justice
+and temperance be extinguished [before thy death]?
+
+16. When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong [say],
+How then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done
+wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? And so this is
+like tearing his own face. Consider that he who would not have the bad
+man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree bear
+juice in the figs, and infants cry, and the horse neigh, and whatever
+else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such a
+character? If then thou art irritable, cure this man’s disposition.
+
+17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it.
+[For let thy efforts be—]
+
+18. In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for
+thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the
+material, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.
+
+19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more
+divine than the things which cause the various effects, and as it were
+pull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind,—is it fear, or
+suspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind (V. 11)?
+
+20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second,
+make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.
+
+21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will
+any of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are
+now living. For all things are formed by nature to change and be turned
+and to perish, in order that other things in continuous succession may
+exist (IX. 28).
+
+22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power.
+Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who
+has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and
+a waveless bay.
+
+23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its
+proper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done
+this act, does he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act has
+ceased. In like manner then the whole which consists of all the acts,
+which is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for
+this reason, that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series
+at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and
+the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of
+man, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts the
+whole universe continues ever young and perfect. And everything which
+is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the
+termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it
+shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to
+the general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable, and
+profitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is
+moved by the Deity who is moved in the same manner with the Deity, and
+moved towards the same things in his mind.
+
+24. These three principles thou must have in readiness: In the things
+which thou dost do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as
+Justice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee
+from without, consider that it happens either by chance or according to
+providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence.
+Second, consider what every being is from the seed to the time of its
+receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving back
+of the same, and of what things every being is compounded, and into
+what things it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised
+up above the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, and observe
+the variety of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst
+see at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell all around
+in the air and the ether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be
+raised up, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and
+shortness of duration. Are these things to be proud of?
+
+25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from
+casting it away?
+
+26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this,
+that all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten
+this, that a man’s wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou
+hast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened so
+and will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this too,
+how close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, for it
+is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence. And
+thou hast forgotten this too, that every man’s intelligence is a god
+and is an efflux of the Deity; and forgotten this, that nothing is a
+man’s own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came from
+the Deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou
+hast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses
+only this.
+
+27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained
+greatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the
+greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then
+think where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a
+tale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this
+sort, how Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in
+his gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and
+Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the eager
+pursuit of anything conjoined with pride; and how worthless everything
+is after which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it
+is for a man in the opportunities presented to him to show himself
+just, temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all
+simplicity: for the pride which is proud of its want of pride is the
+most intolerable of all.
+
+28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou
+comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the
+first place, they may be seen even with the eyes;[8] in the second
+place, neither have I seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus
+then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of
+their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate
+them.
+
+29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what
+it is itself, that is its material, what the formal part; with all thy
+soul to do justice and to say the truth. What remains, except to enjoy
+life by joining one good thing to another so as not to leave even the
+smallest intervals between?
+
+30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls,
+mountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance,
+though it is distributed among countless bodies which have their
+several qualities. There is one soul, though it is distributed among
+infinite natures and individual circumscriptions [or individuals].
+There is one intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in
+the things which have been mentioned, all the other parts, such as
+those which are air and matter, are without sensation and have no
+fellowship: and yet even these parts the intelligent principle holds
+together and the gravitation towards the same. But intellect in a
+peculiar manner tends to that which is of the same kin, and combines
+with it, and the feeling for communion is not interrupted.
+
+31. What dost thou wish,—to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to
+have sensation, movement, growth, and then again to cease to grow, to
+use thy speech, to think? What is there of all these things which seems
+to thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all
+these things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and
+God. But it is inconsistent with honoring reason and God to be troubled
+because by death a man will be deprived of the other things.
+
+32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned
+to every man, for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! And how
+small a part of the whole substance; and how small a part of the
+universal soul; and on what a small clod of the whole earth thou
+creepest! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except
+to act as thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common
+nature brings.
+
+33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in
+this. But everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or
+not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke.
+
+34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death,
+that even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still
+have despised it.
+
+35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to
+whom it is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts
+conformable to right reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether
+he contemplates the world for a longer or a shorter time,—for this man
+neither is death a terrible thing (II. 7; VI. 23; X. 20; XII. 23).
+
+36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world]; what
+difference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]? for
+that which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the
+hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away
+from the state, but nature, who brought thee into it? the same as if a
+praetor who has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage.—“But I
+have not finished the five acts, but only three of them.”—Thou sayest
+well, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; for what shall be
+a complete drama is determined by him who was once the cause of its
+composition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of
+neither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is
+satisfied.
+
+
+
+
+THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.
+
+
+It has been said that the Stoic philosophy first showed its real value
+when it passed from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his
+successors were well suited to the gravity and practical good sense of
+the Romans; and even in the Republican period we have an example of a
+man, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died
+consistently with the opinions which he professed. He was a man, says
+Cicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from conviction; not for the
+purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make his life
+conformable to the Stoic precepts. In the wretched times from the death
+of Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic
+philosophy which could console and support the followers of the old
+religion under imperial tyranny and amidst universal corruption. There
+were even then noble minds that could dare and endure, sustained by a
+good conscience and an elevated idea of the purposes of man’s
+existence. Such were Paetus Thrasca, Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C.
+Musonius Rufus, and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic
+language and manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they
+might have been to their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero’s
+bloody reign; but Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant
+Domitian and to see the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian. His
+best precepts are derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced
+in his finest verses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language.
+
+The best two expounders of the later Stoical philosophy were a Greek
+slave and a Roman emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to
+Rome, we know not how, but he was there the slave and afterwards the
+freedman of his unworthy master, Epaphroditus. Like other great
+teachers he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to his grateful pupil
+Arrian for what we have of Epictetus’ discourses. Arrian wrote eight
+books of the discourses of Epictetus, of which only four remain and
+some fragments. We have also from Arrian’s hand the small Enchiridion
+or Manual of the chief precepts of Epictetus. There is a valuable
+commentary on the Enchiridion by Simplicius, who lived in the time of
+the emperor Justinian.
+
+Antoninus in his first book (I. 7), in which he gratefully commemorates
+his obligations to his teachers, says that he was made acquainted by
+Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, whom he mentions also
+in other passages (IV. 41; XI 34, 36). Indeed, the doctrines of
+Epictetus and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the best
+authority for the explanation of the philosophical language of
+Antoninus and the exposition of his opinions. But the method of the two
+philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed himself to his
+hearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple manner.
+Antoninus wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in short,
+unconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure.[9]
+
+The want of arrangement in the original and of connection among the
+numerous paragraphs, the corruption of the text, the obscurity of the
+language and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in the
+writer’s own ideas,—besides all this, there is occasionally an apparent
+contradiction in the emperor’s thoughts, as if his principles were
+sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man who
+leads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed at
+home and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep his mind
+at ease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not
+been tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might
+turn out to be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude
+realities of human existence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations
+from men who have not worked and suffered may be read, but they will be
+forgotten. No religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the
+teacher has not lived the “life of an apostle,” and been ready to die
+“the death of a martyr.” “Not in passivity (the passive affects) but in
+activity lie the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just
+as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity” (IX.
+16). The emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his youth he
+followed a laborious discipline, and though his high station placed him
+above all want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately
+as the poorest philosopher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that
+he always had the little that he wanted and he was content with it, as
+he had been with his servile station. But Antoninus after his accession
+to the empire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an
+empire which extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold
+mountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa; and we may imagine,
+though we cannot know it by experience, what must be the trials, the
+troubles, the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has the world’s
+business on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he can, and
+the certain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which he
+wishes.
+
+In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, general corruption, and
+with the weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily
+comprehend that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to
+support him. The best and the bravest men have moments of doubt and of
+weakness; but if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again
+from their depression by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus
+does. The emperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in
+his Epistle is of the same mind; that the world is full of envious,
+jealous, malignant people, and a man might be well content to get out
+of it. He has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he
+holds most firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they
+are evidence of the struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men
+had to maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor
+remark it is which I have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging
+way, that the emperor’s reflections show that he had need of
+consolation and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet his
+death. True that he did need comfort and support, and we see how he
+found it. He constantly recurs to his fundamental principle that the
+universe is wisely ordered, that every man is a part of it and must
+conform to that order which he cannot change, that whatever the Deity
+has done is good, that all mankind are a man’s brethren, that he must
+love and cherish them and try to make them better, even those who would
+do him harm. This is his conclusion (II. 17): “What then is that which
+is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, Philosophy. But this
+consists in keeping the divinity within a man free from violence and
+unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a
+purpose nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of
+another man’s doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all
+that happens and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever
+it is, from whence he himself came; and finally waiting for death with
+a cheerful mind as being nothing else than a dissolution of the
+elements of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no
+harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into
+another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and
+dissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it is according to
+nature; and nothing is evil that is according to nature.”
+
+The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature of the Universe,
+of its government, and of the relation of man’s nature to both. He
+names the universe (VI. 1), “the universal substance,” and he adds that
+“reason” governs the universe. He also (VI. 9) uses the terms
+“universal nature” or “nature of the universe.” He (VI. 25) calls the
+universe “the one and all, which we name Cosmos or Order.” If he ever
+seems to use these general terms as significant of the All, of all that
+man can in any way conceive to exist, he still on other occasions
+plainly distinguishes between Matter, Material things, and Cause,
+Origin, Reason. This is conformable to Zeno’s doctrine that there are
+two original principles of all things, that which acts and that which
+is acted upon. That which is acted on is the formless matter: that
+which acts is the reason, God, who is eternal and operates through all
+matter, and produces all things. So Antoninus (V. 32) speaks of the
+reason which pervades all substance, and through all time by fixed
+periods (revolutions) administers the universe. God is eternal, and
+Matter is eternal. It is God who gives form to matter, but he is not
+said to have created matter. According to this view, which is as old as
+Anaxagoras, God and matter exist independently, but God governs matter.
+This doctrine is simply the expression of the fact of the existence
+both of matter and of God. The Stoics did not perplex themselves with
+the insoluble question of the origin and nature of matter. Antoninus
+also assumes a beginning of things, as we now know them; but his
+language is sometimes very obscure.
+
+Matter consists of elemental parts of which all material objects are
+made. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature of the universe,
+according to Antoninus’ expression (IV. 36), “loves nothing so much as
+to change the things which are, and to make new things like them. For
+everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be.
+But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth or
+into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.” All things then are in
+a constant flux and change: some things are dissolved into the
+elements, others come in their places; and so the “whole universe
+continues ever young and perfect.”
+
+When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call
+gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their
+resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their
+generation, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death,
+we observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of
+experience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and
+invariable. But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of
+phenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of an
+infinite progression,—and such change is conceivable,—we have not
+discovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and
+sequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved
+according to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order,
+some variation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things. It is
+also conceivable that such changes have taken place,—changes in the
+order of things, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to
+call them, but which are no changes; and further it is certain that our
+knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for instance
+the phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever must
+be imperfect.
+
+We do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than
+when we speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use
+the terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct
+meaning to them, distinct enough at least to prevent all
+misunderstanding. But the case is different when we speak of causes and
+effects as of Things. All that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks
+called them, or appearances which follow one another in a regular
+order, as we conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon should fail in
+the series, we conceive that there must either be an interruption of
+the series, or that something else will appear after the phenomenon
+which has failed to appear, and will occupy the vacant place; and so
+the series in its progression may be modified or totally changed. Cause
+and effect then mean nothing in the sequence of natural phenomena
+beyond what I have said; and the real cause, or the transcendent cause,
+as some would call it, of each successive phenomenon is in that which
+is the cause of all things which are, which have been, and which will
+be forever. Thus the word Creation may have a real sense if we consider
+it as the first, if we can conceive a first, in the present order of
+natural phenomena; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all things at
+a certain time, followed by a quiescence of the first cause, and an
+abandonment of all sequences of Phenomena to the laws of Nature, or to
+the other words that people may use, is absolutely absurd.
+
+Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power or an intellectual
+power, or that he has such a power, in whatever way he conceives that
+he has it,—for I wish simply to state a fact,—from this power which he
+has in himself, he is led, as Antoninus says, to believe that there is
+a greater power, which, as the old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole
+universe as the intellect pervades man.
+
+God exists then, but what do we know of his nature? Antoninus says that
+the soul of man is an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like
+animals, but we have reason, intelligence, as the gods. Animals have
+life and what we call instincts or natural principles of action: but
+the rational animal man alone has a rational, intelligent soul.
+Antoninus insists on this continually: God is in man, and so we must
+constantly attend to the divinity within us, for it is only in this way
+that we can have any knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is
+in a sense a portion of the divinity, and the soul alone has any
+communication with the Deity; for as he says (XII. 2): “With his
+intellectual part alone God touches the intelligence only which has
+flowed and been derived from himself into these bodies.” In fact he
+says that which is hidden within a man is life, that is the man
+himself. All the rest is vesture, covering, organs, instrument, which
+the living man, the real man, uses for the purpose of his present
+existence. The air is universally diffused for him who is able to
+respire; and so for him who is willing to partake of it the intelligent
+power, which holds within it all things, is diffused as wide and free
+as the air (VIII. 54). It is by living a divine life that man
+approaches to a knowledge of the divinity. It is by following the
+divinity within, as Antoninus calls it, that man comes nearest to the
+Deity, the supreme good; for man can never attain to perfect agreement
+with his internal guide. “Live with the gods. And he does live with the
+gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with
+that which is assigned to him, and that it does all the daemon wishes,
+which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, and a
+portion of himself. And this daemon is every man’s understanding and
+reason” (V. 27).
+
+There is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior
+faculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. A man must
+reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we
+must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must
+reverence that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is that which is
+of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe (V. 21).
+
+Antoninus speaks of a man’s condemnation of himself when the diviner
+part within him has been overpowered and yields to the less honorable
+and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures.
+
+Antoninus did not view God and the material universe as the same, any
+more than he viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has no
+speculations on the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his
+fashion to waste his time on what man cannot understand. He was
+satisfied that God exists, that he governs all things, that man can
+only have an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this
+imperfect knowledge by reverencing the divinity which is within him,
+and keeping it pure.
+
+From all that has been said, it follows that the universe is
+administered by the Providence of God and that all things are wisely
+ordered. There are passages in which Antoninus expresses doubts, or
+states different possible theories of the constitution and government
+of the universe; but he always recurs to his fundamental principle;
+that if we admit the existence of a deity, we must also admit that he
+orders all things wisely and well (IV. 27; VI. 1; IX. 28; XII. 5).
+
+But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what
+we call evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is
+evil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, “what we
+call evil,” we have partly anticipated the emperor’s answer. We see and
+feel and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we
+live, and all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human
+race is positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now, as our
+reason teaches us that everything is in some way related to and
+connected with every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the
+universe of things is a contradiction; for if the whole comes from and
+is governed by an intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive
+anything in it which tends to the evil or destruction of the whole
+(VII. 55; X. 6).
+
+Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We
+might imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and
+yet the whole would still subsist “ever young and perfect.”
+
+All things, all forms, are dissolved and new forms appear. All living
+things undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an
+evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and
+man suffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by
+his intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the
+largest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom he calls
+his brothers. Antoninus says, (VIII. 55) “Generally, wickedness does no
+harm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness [of one
+man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in
+his power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose.” The first
+part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole
+can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the
+Stoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our
+power. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But
+this is an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does
+wrong does evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is
+evil in the wrong- doer. Antoninus (XI. 18) gives many excellent
+precepts with respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are
+practical. He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons
+may be just as useful to him who denies the being and the government of
+God as to him who believes in both. There is no direct answer in
+Antoninus to the objections which may be made to the existence and
+providence of God because of the moral disorder and suffering which are
+in the world, except this answer which he makes in reply to the
+supposition that even the best men may be extinguished by death. He
+says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought to have been
+otherwise, the gods would have ordered it otherwise (XII. 5). His
+conviction of the wisdom which we may observe in the government of the
+world is too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities in
+the order of things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and those
+who would conclude from them against the being and government of God
+conclude too hastily. We all admit that there is an order in the
+material world, a constitution, a system, a relation of parts to one
+another and a fitness of the whole for something. So in the
+constitution of plants and of animals there is an order, a fitness for
+some end. Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and
+the end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the plant, or
+the animal sometimes perishes before it has passed through all its
+changes and done all its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a
+fixed order, for some to perish early and for others to do all their
+uses and leave successors to take their place. So man has a corporeal
+and intellectual and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and on
+the whole man performs these uses, dies, and leaves other men in his
+place. So society exists, and a social state is manifestly the natural
+state of man,—the state for which his nature fits him, and society
+amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders still subsists; and
+perhaps we may say that the history of the past and our present
+knowledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will diminish,
+and that order, its governing principle may be more firmly established.
+As order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to deviations real or
+apparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole nature of things, that
+which we call disorder or evil, as it seems to us, does not in any way
+alter the fact of the general constitution of things having a nature or
+fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the existence of disorder that
+order is not the rule, for the existence of order both physical and
+moral is proved by daily experience and all past experience. We cannot
+conceive how the order of the universe is maintained: we cannot even
+conceive how our own life from day to day is continued, nor how we
+perform the simplest movements of the body, nor how we grow and think
+and act, though we know many of the conditions which are necessary for
+all these functions. Knowing nothing then of the unseen power which
+acts in ourselves except by what is done, we know nothing of the power
+which acts through what we call all time and all space; but seeing that
+there is a nature or fixed order in all things known to us, it is
+conformable to the nature of our minds to believe that this universal
+Nature has a cause which operates continually, and that we are totally
+unable to speculate on the reason of any of those disorders or evils
+which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which may be collected
+from all that Antoninus has said.
+
+The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam that Zeus
+has two casks, one filled with good things, and the other with bad, and
+that he gives to men out of each according to his pleasure; and so we
+must be content, for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the Greek
+commentators asks how must we reconcile this doctrine with what we find
+in the first book of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, “Men
+say that evil comes to them from us, but they bring it on themselves
+through their own folly.” The answer is plain enough even to the Greek
+commentator. The poets make both Achilles and Zeus speak appropriately
+to their several characters. Indeed, Zeus says plainly that men do
+attribute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it falsely, for
+they are the cause of their own sorrows.
+
+Epictetus in his Enchiridion makes short work of the question of evil.
+He says, “As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so
+neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe.” This will
+appear obscure enough to those who are not acquainted with Epictetus,
+but he always knows what he is talking about. We do not set up a mark
+in order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, whose existence
+Epictetus assumes, has not ordered all things so that his purpose shall
+fail. Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the nature of evil,
+as he expresses it, does not exist; that is, evil is not a part of the
+constitution or nature of things. If there were a principle of evil in
+the constitution of things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius
+argues, but evil would be good.
+
+One passage more will conclude this matter. It contains all that the
+emperor could say: “To go from among men, if there are gods, is not a
+thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but
+if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human
+affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or
+devoid of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for
+human things, and they have put all the means in man’s power to enable
+him not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was
+anything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should
+be altogether in a man’s power not to fall into it. But that which does
+not make a man worse, how can it make a man’s life worse? But neither
+through ignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the power to guard
+against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the
+universe has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so
+great a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that
+good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad.
+But death certainly and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,
+all these things equally happen to good and bad men, being things which
+make us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor
+evil.”
+
+The Ethical part of Antoninus’ Philosophy follows from his general
+principles. The end of all his philosophy is to live conformably to
+Nature, both a man’s own nature and the nature of the universe. Bishop
+Butler has explained what the Greek philosophers meant when they spoke
+of living according to Nature, and he says that when it is explained,
+as he has explained it and as they understood it, it is, “a manner of
+speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly
+just and true.” To live according to Nature is to live according to a
+man’s whole nature, not according to a part of it, and to reverence the
+divinity within him as the governor of all his actions. “To the
+rational animal the same act is according to nature and according to
+reason.” That which is done contrary to reason is also an act contrary
+to nature, to the whole nature, though it is certainly conformable to
+some part of man’s nature, or it could not be done. Man is made for
+action, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses
+of their nature, so man must do his (V. 1).
+
+Man must also live conformably to the universal nature, conformably to
+the nature of all things of which he is one; and as a citizen of a
+political community he must direct his life and actions with reference
+to those among whom, and for whom, among other purposes, he lives. A
+man must not retire into solitude and cut himself off from his
+fellow-men. He must be ever active to do his part in the great whole.
+All men are his kin, not only in blood, but still more by participating
+in the same intelligence and by being a portion of the same divinity. A
+man cannot really be injured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can
+make him bad, and he must not be angry with them nor hate them: “For we
+are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like
+the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then
+is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed
+and to turn away” (II. 1).
+
+Further he says: “Take pleasure in one thing, and rest in it in passing
+from one social act to another social act, thinking of God” (VI. 7).
+Again: “Love mankind. Follow God” (VI. 31). It is the characteristic of
+the rational soul for a man to love his neighbor (XI. 1). Antoninus
+teaches in various passages the forgiveness of injuries, and we know
+that he also practiced what he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that “this
+divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though to
+be met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept
+of Christianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any
+other single virtue.” The practise of this precept is the most
+difficult of all virtues. Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid
+towards following it. When we are injured, we feel anger and
+resentment, and the feeling is natural, just, and useful for the
+conservation of society. It is useful that wrong-doers should feel the
+natural consequences of their actions, among which is the
+disapprobation of society and the resentment of him who is wronged. But
+revenge, in the proper sense of that word, must not be practiced. “The
+best way of avenging thyself,” says the emperor, “is not to become
+like, the wrongdoer.” It is plain by this that he does not mean that we
+should in any case practise revenge; but he says to those who talk of
+revenging wrongs, “Be not like him who has done the wrong. When a man
+has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about
+good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt
+pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry” (VII. 26). Antoninus
+would not deny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of anger and
+resentment, for this is implied in the recommendation to reflect on the
+nature of the man’s mind who has done the wrong, and then you will have
+pity instead of resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. Paul’s
+advice to be angry and sin not; which, as Butler well explains it, is
+not a recommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a
+natural passion, but it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us
+into sin. In short the emperor’s doctrine about wrongful acts is this:
+wrong-doers do not know what good and bad are: they offend out of
+ignorance, and in the sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this
+kind of ignorance will never be admitted as a legal excuse, and ought
+not to be admitted as a full excuse in any way by society, there may be
+grievous injuries, such as it is in a man’s power to forgive without
+harm to society; and if he forgives because he sees that his enemies
+know not what they do, he is acting in the spirit of the sublime
+prayer, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.”
+
+The emperor’s moral philosophy was not a feeble, narrow system, which
+teaches a man to look directly to his own happiness, though a man’s
+happiness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by living as he ought
+to do. A man must live conformably to the universal nature, which
+means, as the emperor explains it in many passages, that a man’s
+actions must be conformable to his true relations to all other human
+beings, both as a citizen of a political community and as a member of
+the whole human family. This implies, and he often expresses it in the
+most forcible language, that a man’s words and action, so far as they
+affect others, must be measured by a fixed rule, which is their
+consistency with the conservation and the interests of the particular
+society of which he is a member, and of the whole human race. To live
+conformably to such a rule, a man must use his rational faculties in
+order to discern clearly the consequences and full effect of all his
+actions and of the actions of others: he must not live a life of
+contemplation and reflection only, though he must often retire within
+himself to calm and purify his soul by thought, but he must mingle in
+the work of man and be a fellow-laborer for the general good.
+
+A man should have an object or purpose in life, that he may direct all
+his energies to it; of course a good object (II. 7). He who has not one
+object or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all through his
+life (XI. 21). Bacon has a remark to the same effect, on the best means
+of “reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the
+electing and propounding unto a man’s self good and virtuous ends of
+his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to
+attain.” He is a happy man who has been wise enough to do this when he
+was young and has had the opportunities; but the emperor seeing well
+that a man cannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages himself to
+do it when he can, and not to let life slip away before he has begun.
+He who can propose to himself good and virtuous ends of life, and be
+true to them, cannot fail to live conformably to his own interest and
+the universal interest, for in the nature of things they are one. If a
+thing is not good for the hive, it is not good for the bee (VI. 54).
+
+One passage may end this matter. “If the gods have determined about me
+and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined
+well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought;
+and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that?
+For what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole,
+which is the special object of their providence? But if they have not
+determined about me individually, they have certainly determined about
+the whole at least; and the things which happen by way of sequence in
+this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be
+content with them. But if they determine about nothing—which it is
+wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor
+pray nor swear by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods
+were present and lived with us; but if however the gods determine about
+none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about
+myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is
+useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and
+nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country,
+so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the
+world.”
+
+It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to state the emperor’s
+opinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably use his
+understanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. The
+passages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they are
+in no order or connection, a man must use the book a long time before
+he will find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If
+we analyze all other things, we find how insufficient they are for
+human life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is
+indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot
+be considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult
+to explain the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in
+such a way as to prevent cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more
+consists of parts than man’s intelligence does; and yet we speak of
+various intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the
+various powers which man’s intellect shows by his works. In the same
+way we may speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical
+sense, for the purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to
+practise in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as
+much as man’s nature is capable of.
+
+The prime principle in man’s constitution is social. The next in order
+is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not
+conformable to the rational principle, which must govern. The third is
+freedom from error and from deception. “Let then the ruling principle
+holding fast to these things go straight on and it has what is its own”
+(VII. 53). The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the basis
+of all the rest (X. 11), and this had been said long before his time.
+
+It is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice
+as a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in
+conformity to this disposition; but experience shows that men’s notions
+about justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with
+the true notion of justice. The emperor’s notion of justice is clear
+enough, but not practical enough for all mankind. “Let there be freedom
+from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the
+external cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue
+of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action
+terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy
+nature” (IX. 31). In another place (IX. 1) he says that “he who acts
+unjustly acts impiously,” which follows of course from all that he says
+in various places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and
+as a means to virtue, which no doubt it is: for lying even in
+indifferent things weakens the understanding; and lying maliciously is
+as great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as
+showing an habitual disposition, and viewed with respect to
+consequences. He couples the notion of justice with action. A man must
+not pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head,
+but he must exhibit his justice in act.
+
+The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things beautiful and
+some ugly, and as they are beautiful so they are good, and as they are
+ugly so they are evil, or bad (II. 1). All these things, good and evil,
+are in our power, absolutely some of the stricter Stoics would say; in
+a manner only, as those who would not depart altogether from common
+sense would say; practically they are to a great degree in the power of
+some persons and in some circumstances, but in a small degree only in
+other persons and in other circumstances. The Stoics maintain man’s
+free will as to the things which are in his power; for as to the things
+which are out of his power, free will terminating in action is of
+course excluded by the very terms of the expression. I hardly know if
+we can discover exactly Antoninus’ notion of the free will of man, nor
+is the question worth the inquiry. What he does mean and does say is
+intelligible. All the things which are not in our power are
+indifferent: they are neither good nor bad, morally. Such are life,
+health, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and death. Life and death are
+all men’s portion. Health, wealth, power, disease, and poverty happen
+to men, indifferently to the good and to the bad; to those who live
+according to nature and to those who do not. “Life,” says the emperor,
+“is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and after fame is oblivion”
+(II. 17). After speaking of those men who have disturbed the world and
+then died, and of the death of philosophers such as Heraclitus, and
+Democritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of Socrates whom other lice
+(his enemies) destroyed, he says: “What means all this? Thou hast
+embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out.
+If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there.
+But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by
+pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which is as much
+inferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is
+intelligence and Deity; the other is earth and corruption” (III. 3). It
+is not death that a man should fear, but he should fear never beginning
+to live according to nature (XII. 1). Every man should live in such a
+way as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself about nothing
+else. He should live such a life that he shall always be ready for
+death, and shall depart content when the summons comes. For what is
+death? “A cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the
+pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive
+movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh” (VI. 28).
+Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature (IV. 5). In another
+passage (IX. 3), the exact meaning of which is perhaps doubtful, he
+speaks of the child which leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at
+death leaves its envelope.
+
+Antoninus’ opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed. His
+doctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does
+not perish absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish. The
+opinion is at least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides;
+what comes from earth goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven,
+the divinity, returns to him who gave it. But I find nothing clear in
+Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death so as to be
+conscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his vessel of
+clay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to have
+rested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best, and
+consistent with the university of things.
+
+Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine,
+which some Stoics practiced,—the anticipating the regular course of
+nature by a man’s own act. The reader will find some passages in which
+this is touched on, and he may make of them what he can. But there are
+passages in which the emperor encourages himself to wait for the end
+patiently and with tranquillity; and certainly it is consistent with
+all his best teaching that a man should bear all that falls to his lot
+and do useful acts as long as he lives. He should not therefore abridge
+the time of his usefulness by his own act.
+
+Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic’s life. There is no rule
+of life contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own
+happiness. Many men think that they are seeking happiness when they are
+only seeking the gratification of some particular passion, the
+strongest that they have. The end of a man is, as already explained, to
+live conformably to nature, and he will thus obtain happiness,
+tranquillity of mind, and contentment (III. 12; VIII 2). As a means of
+living conformably to nature he must study the four chief virtues, each
+of which has its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge of good and
+evil; justice, or the giving to every man his due; fortitude, or the
+enduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which is moderation in all
+things. By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic obtained all
+that he wished or expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, and he
+was satisfied with that.
+
+Epictetus and Antoninus both by precept and example labored to improve
+themselves and others; and if we discover imperfections in their
+teaching, we must still honor these great men who attempted to show
+that there is in man’s nature and in the constitution of things
+sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult enough to
+live as we ought to live, difficult even for any man to live in such a
+way as to satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate degree
+the power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own conduct; and if all
+men cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals and religion, it
+is at least worth while to give them good reasons for as much as they
+can be persuaded to accept.
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+
+ [1] This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is uncertain.
+
+ [2] Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there Antoninus
+ was brought up, and he died there. This also is corrupt.
+
+ [3] This is corrupt.
+
+ [4] Antoninus here uses the word κόσμος both in the sense of the
+ Universe and of Order; and it is difficult to express his meaning.
+
+ [5] This is corrupt.
+
+ [6] It appears that there is a defect in the text here.
+
+ [7] The story is told by Horace in his Satires and by others since,
+ but not better.
+
+ [8] “Seen even with the eyes.” It is supposed that this may be
+ explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or living
+ being (IV. 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods (VIII. 19). But
+ the emperor may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he
+ afterwards states it, because we see what they do; as we know that man
+ has intellectual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other
+ way do we know it.
+
+ [9] The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy,—Physic, Ethic, and
+ Logic (VIII. 13). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by
+ Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysippus; but
+ these philosophers placed the three divisions in the following
+ order,—Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this division
+ was made before Zeno’s time, and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero
+ remarks. Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in the narrower
+ sense of that word.
+    Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions, and made
+    six,—Dialectic and Rhetoric, comprised in Logic; Ethic and Politic;
+    Physic and Theology. This division was merely for practical use,
+    for all Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic, or
+    Dialectic, does not occupy the same place as in Plato: it is
+    considered only as an instrument which is to be used for the other
+    divisions of Philosophy. An exposition of the earlier Stoic
+    doctrines and of their modifications would require a volume. My
+    object is to explain only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as they
+    can be collected from his book.
+    According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology go
+    together, or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of
+    the nature of the Deity, so far as man can understand the Deity,
+    and of his government of the universe. This division or subdivision
+    is not formally adopted by Antoninus, for, as already observed,
+    there is no method in his book; but it is virtually contained in
+    it.
+    Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the
+    principles of morals and the study of the constitution of civil
+    society; and undoubtedly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two
+    parts, Ethic in the narrower sense and Politic; for though the two
+    are intimately connected, they are also very distinct, and many
+    questions can only be properly discussed by carefully observing the
+    distinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. His subject is
+    Ethic, and Ethic in its practical application to his own conduct in
+    life as a man and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his
+    doctrines about man’s nature, the Universal Nature, and the
+    relation of every man to everything else. It is therefore
+    intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, or the nature of
+    Things, and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. He advises
+    us to examine well all the impressions on our minds and to form a
+    right judgment of them, to make just conclusions, and to inquire
+    into the meaning of words, and so far to apply Dialectic; but he
+    has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic, and his philosophy
+    is in substance purely moral and practical. He says, “Constantly
+    and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every Impression on the
+    soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of
+    Dialectic”: which is only another way of telling us to examine the
+    impression in every possible way. In another passage (III. 11) he
+    says, “To the aids which have been mentioned, let this one still be
+    added: make for thyself a definition or description of the object
+    which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a
+    thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete
+    entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the
+    things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be
+    resolved.” Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, which
+    Antoninus accordingly employed as a means towards establishing his
+    Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles.
+
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS ***
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