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Parker</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: History of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, at Santiago</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: John H. Parker</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: February 7, 2003 [eBook #6888]<br /> +[Most recently updated: October 9, 2020]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Paul Hollander, Juliet Sutherland, Charles Franks and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team.</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GATLINGS AT SANTIAGO ***</div> + +<div class="fig" style="width:55%;"> +<img src="images/cover.jpg" style="width:100%;" alt="[Illustration]" /> +</div> + +<h1>History of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, at Santiago</h1> + +<h4>With a Few Unvarnished Truths Concerning that Expedition.</h4> + +<h2>by John H. Parker</h2> + +<p class="center"> +1st Lieut. 13th Inf. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +(Late) Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment,<br/> +Fifth Army Corps, at Santiago. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus01"></a> +<img src="images/01.jpg" width="462" height="600" alt="Illustration: +Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th US Infantry, Late Commanding Gatling Guns at Santiago." /> +<p class="caption">Lieut. John H. Parker,<br />13th US Infantry,<br /> +Late Commanding Gatling Guns at Santiago.</p> +</div> + +<h4>DEDICATION.</h4> + +<p class="center"> +To the Enlisted Members of the Detachment, Who, by Their Devotion,<br/> +Courage and Endurance, Made Its Success Possible, this Volume is<br/> +Dedicated as a Token of Esteem by the Author. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style=""> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap00">PREFACE</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">CHAPTER I. L’envoi.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">CHAPTER II. Inception Of The Scheme.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">CHAPTER III. The Ordnance Dépôt.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">CHAPTER IV. The Voyage And Disembarkation.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap05">CHAPTER V. The March.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap06">CHAPTER VI. The Battery In Camp Wheeler.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap07">CHAPTER VII. The Battle.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap08">CHAPTER VIII. Tactical Analysis Of The Battles At Santiago.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap09">CHAPTER IX. The Volunteers.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap10">CHAPTER X. The Sufferings Of The Fifth Army Corps.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap11">CHAPTER XI. The Cause.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap12">CHAPTER XII. Home Again.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap13">Appendix I.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap14">Appendix II.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap15">Appendix III.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap16">Index.</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<p> +The photographic illustrations in this work are due to the courage and kindness +of Mr. John N. Weigle, of Gettysburg, Pa. This young man was first sergeant of +the Gatling Gun Detachment, and took with him a large supply of material. It +was his delight to photograph everything that occurred, and his pleasure to +furnish a set of photographs for the use of the author. Mr. Weigle was +recommended for a commission in the Regular Army of the United States, for his +extreme gallantry in action, and is a magnificent type of the American youth. +The thanks of the author are tendered to him for the photographic illustrations +so generously supplied. +</p> + +<h2>ILLUSTRATIONS</h2> + +<table summary="" style=""> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus01">Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th US Infantry, Late Commanding Gatling Guns at Santiago.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus02">Map—Santiago and Surrounding Area.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus03">Skirmish Drill at Tampa.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus04">Skirmish Drill at Tampa.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus05">Field Bakery.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus06">Awaiting Turn to Embark.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus07">Baiquiri.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus08">The “Hornet.”</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus09">Waiting.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus10">Wrecked Locomotives and Machine Shops at Baiquiri.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus11">The Landing.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus12">Pack Train.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus13">Calvary Picket Line.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus14">San Juan Hill.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus15">Cuban Soldiers as They Were.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus16">Wagon Train.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus17">Gatling Battery under Artillery Fire at El Poso.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus18">Gatling Gun on Firing-Line July 1st. (Taken under fire by Sergeant Weigle).</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus19">Fort Roosevelt.</a></td> +</tr> + + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus20">Sergeant Greene’s Gun at Fort Roosevelt.</a></td> +</tr> + + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus21">Skirmish Line in Battle.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus22">Fort Roosevelt.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus23">A Fighting Cuban, and Where He Fought.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus24">Map—Siege Lines at Santiago.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus25">Gatling Camp and Bomb-Proofs at Fort Roosevelt.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus26">Tree Between Lines Showing Bullet Holes. This Tree Grew on Low Ground.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus27">Spanish Block-House.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus28">Spanish Fort of Three-Inch Guns.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus29">Tentage in Cuba.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus30">After the Rain.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus31">Native Industry.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus32">Charge on San Juan Hill.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus33">Gatlings at Baiquiri Just Before Starting For the Front.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus34">Cuban Cart used by Gatling Gun Detachment, Priv. J. Shiffer Driving.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus35">Tiffany at his Gun in the Trench.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus36">Relics of the Battle. 1. Range Table of 16-cm. Gun in +Spanish Fort, Silenced by Gatlings July 1, ’98. 2. Rear Sight of same +Gun. 3. Fuse picked up by J. Shiffer July 1. 4. Remington Cartridge used by the +Spanish Volunteers, the so-called “Explosive” Brass-covered Bullet. +5. Piece of Coral dug up in the Trenches. 6. Spanish Spurs.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus37">Cieba Tree, under Which General Toral Surrendered.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus38">Undergrowth in Cuba.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus39">Cuban Residence.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#illus40">“Reina Mercedes” Sunk by the “Iowa” near Mouth of Harbor of Santiago.</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap00"></a>PREFACE.</h2> + +<p> +On the morning of July 1st, the dismounted cavalry, including my regiment, +stormed Kettle Hill, driving the Spaniards from their trenches. After taking +the crest, I made the men under me turn and begin volley-firing at the San Juan +Blockhouse and intrenchments against which Hawkins’ and Kent’s +Infantry were advancing. While thus firing, there suddenly smote on our ears a +peculiar drumming sound. One or two of the men cried out, “The Spanish +machine guns!” but, after listening a moment, I leaped to my feet and +called, “It’s the Gatlings, men! It’s our Gatlings!” +Immediately the troopers began to cheer lustily, for the sound was most +inspiring. Whenever the drumming stopped, it was only to open again a little +nearer the front. Our artillery, using black powder, had not been able to stand +within range of the Spanish rifles, but it was perfectly evident that the +Gatlings were troubled by no such consideration, for they were advancing all +the while. +</p> + +<p> +Soon the infantry took San Juan Hill, and, after one false start, we in turn +rushed the next line of block-houses and intrenchments, and then swung to the +left and took the chain of hills immediately fronting Santiago. Here I found +myself on the extreme front, in command of the fragments of all six regiments +of the cavalry division. I received orders to halt where I was, but to hold the +hill at all hazards. The Spaniards were heavily reinforced and they opened a +tremendous fire upon us from their batteries and trenches. We laid down just +behind the gentle crest of the hill, firing as we got the chance, but, for the +most part, taking the fire without responding. As the afternoon wore on, +however, the Spaniards became bolder, and made an attack upon the position. +They did not push it home, but they did advance, their firing being redoubled. +We at once ran forward to the crest and opened on them, and, as we did so, the +unmistakable drumming of the Gatlings opened abreast of us, to our right, and +the men cheered again. As soon as the attack was definitely repulsed, I +strolled over to find out about the Gatlings, and there I found Lieut. Parker +with two of his guns right on our left, abreast of our men, who at that time +were closer to the Spaniards than any others. +</p> + +<p> +From thence on, Parker’s Gatlings were our inseparable companions +throughout the siege. They were right up at the front. When we dug our +trenches, he took off the wheels of his guns and put them in the trenches. His +men and ours slept in the same bomb-proofs and shared with one another whenever +either side got a supply of beans or coffee and sugar. At no hour of the day or +night was Parker anywhere but where we wished him to be, in the event of an +attack. If a troop of my regiment was sent off to guard some road or some break +in the lines, we were almost certain to get Parker to send a Gatling along, +and, whether the change was made by day or by night, the Gatling went. +Sometimes we took the initiative and started to quell the fire of the Spanish +trenches; sometimes they opened upon us; but, at whatever hour of the +twenty-four the fighting began, the drumming of the Gatlings was soon heard +through the cracking of our own carbines. +</p> + +<p> +I have had too little experience to make my judgment final; but certainly, if I +were to command either a regiment or a brigade, whether of cavalry or infantry, +I would try to get a Gatling battery—under a good man—with me. I +feel sure that the greatest possible assistance would be rendered, under almost +all circumstances, by such a Gatling battery, if well handled; for I believe +that it could be pushed fairly to the front of the firing-line. At any rate, +this is the way that Lieut. Parker used his battery when he went into action at +San Juan, and when he kept it in the trenches beside the Rough Riders before +Santiago. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +<i>Theodore Roosevelt.</i> +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus02"></a> +<a href="images/02.jpg"> +<img src="images/02.jpg" width="700" height="522" alt="Illustration: +Map—Santiago and Surrounding Area." /></a> +<p class="caption">Map—Santiago and Surrounding Area.</p> +</div> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>CHAPTER I.<br /> +L’ENVOI.</h2> + +<p> +The history of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, is to a certain +extent the history of the Santiago campaign. The detachment was organized on +the spur of the moment, to utilize material which would otherwise have been +useless, and was with the Fifth Corps in all the campaign. It participated in +all the fighting of that campaign, except the fight at La Guasimas, and was +disbanded upon the return of the Fifth Corps to Montauk. Whatever hardships +were endured by the Fifth Corps were shared by this detachment; whatever +dangers were faced by the Fifth Corps were faced by it also; where the hottest +fighting occurred this detachment went in and stayed; and at the surrender it +was paraded, to use the words of General Shafter, “Upon that portion of +the line which it occupied so promptly and defended so well.” +</p> + +<p> +But this memoir is not intended as a history of that campaign nor of the Fifth +Corps. The author has not the data available to cover so large a field, nor the +ability to do justice to the courage, fortitude, and endurance so heroically +displayed by that gallant army. That story will be written by abler pens, and +will be the wonder of the world when it is told. +</p> + +<p> +This story is that of an experiment. It is told to lay before the general +public, as well as the military critic, the work of a little detachment of +thirty-seven men, armed with an untried weapon, organized in the short space of +four days preceding July 1, 1898, and which without proper equipment, adequate +instruction, or previous training, in the face of discouragements and sneers, +and in spite of obstacles enough to make the mere retrospect sickening, still +achieved for itself a warm place in the hearts of all true soldiers, and +covered itself with glory upon the hardest fought battle-field of the +Hispano-American War. +</p> + +<p> +This story is to commemorate the gallantry of the enlisted men who helped to +make history and revolutionize tactics at Santiago. It will tell of the heroism +of the plain American Regular, who, without hope of preferment or possibility +of reward, boldly undertook to confute the erroneous theories of military +compilers, who, without originality or reason, have unblushingly cribbed the +labored efforts of foreign officers, and foisted these compilations of +second-hand opinions upon the American Army as military text-books of authority +and weight. These literary soldiers declared, following the lead of their +foreign guides, that “The value of machine guns on the battle-field is +doubtful,” and that “Their offensive value is probably very +small.” They also agreed, with most touching unanimity, that “A +direct assault upon a fortified position, occupied by good, unshaken infantry, +armed with the modern rifle and plentifully supplied with ammunition is sure to +fail, unless made by overwhelming numbers and prepared by strong and accurate +fire by artillery.” +</p> + +<p> +These servile imitators of foreign pen soldiers were destined to see all their +pet theories exploded by the grim old mountain puma from California and his +brave Fifth Corps. They were to learn, so far as they are capable of learning, +that the American Regular makes tactics as he needs them; that the rules of war +established by pen soldiers do not form the basis of actual operations in the +field; that theories must go to the wall before the stern logic of irrefutable +facts; and that deductions based on the drill-made automatons of European +armies are not applicable to an army composed of American Volunteer Regulars, +led by our trained officers. +</p> + +<p> +We shall see that an army destitute of cavalry, and hence without +“eyes”; not supported by artillery; in the most difficult country +over which soldiers ever operated, and without maps or reconnaissance—in +twenty days shut up and captured an army of twice its own effective strength, +in a strongly fortified city, with better served and more numerous artillery. +</p> + +<p> +We shall find that when the “sledge” was not at hand, American +ingenuity was able to use the “mallet” instead, making light +machine guns perform all the function of artillery, and dispensing altogether, +so far as any practical results were concerned, with that expensive and much +overrated arm; that the Regular private is capable of meeting all demands upon +his intelligence, and that the American non. com. is the superior of foreign +officers. +</p> + +<p> +It is also hoped to place before the intelligent American public some correct +ideas of the new arm which was tried thoroughly at Santiago for the first time +in the history of the world. The machine gun is the latest practical product of +American inventive genius applied to war. The first form of this weapon tried, +the mitrailleuse, was not very successful. It failed, not on account of faults +of construction, or imperfect mechanism, but because its proper tactical +employment had not been thought out by the French army. Since that time machine +guns have been greatly improved, but no one has succeeded in making their great +value appreciated by military authorities. The failures of the French brought +the gun into disfavor, and created a prejudice against its employment. +</p> + +<p> +The Artillery of the world, which poses in every country as an <i>élite</i> +body of scientific fighters, and is often found on the battle-field to be an +aggregation of abstruse theorists, were jealous and contemptuous. They said, +“See how easily the artillery knocked out machine guns at +Gravelotte.” The Cavalry of the world, famous everywhere for an +<i>esprit-du-corps</i> which looks haughtily down on all other arms of the +service, were too deeply absorbed in the merits of saber vs. revolver, and in +the proper length of their spectacular plumes, to give a second thought to this +new, untried, and therefore worthless weapon. The world’s Infantry, +resting upon the assumption that it is the backbone of all armies, and the only +real, reliable fighting body under all conditions, left the consideration of +these vague dreams of mechanical destructiveness to lunatics, cranks, and +philanthropists. +</p> + +<p> +In our own country the Ordnance Department, which is the trial court before +which all military inventions must appear, scouted the idea of usefulness of +machine guns even after war was declared, and adhered to the view that machine +guns, in the very nature of things, could never be useful except in the defense +of fortified positions; that they never could be brought up on the battlefield, +nor used if they were brought up. This view was that of a prominent young +officer of that department who wrote a report on the subject, and it seemed to +express the views of the department. +</p> + +<p> +This view must have been that of our War Department, for it did not even +acknowledge the receipt of drawings and specifications for a machine gun +carriage, offered freely to the Government as a gift by the inventor six months +before the war, together with the first correct tactical outline of the proper +use of machine guns ever filed in any War Office in the world. This invention +was designed to facilitate the use of the machine gun by making its advance +with the skirmish line possible on the offensive, and was recommended by the +whole staff of the Infantry and Cavalry School as a meritorious device, worthy +of trial. The discussion filed with the invention pointed out, for the first +time, the correct tactical employment of the weapon, and staked the military +reputation and ability of the author and inventor on the correctness of his +views. +</p> + +<p> +From these facts it may be gathered that there was required a certain degree of +originality and energy to get together and organize a machine gun battery for +the Santiago campaign. +</p> + +<p> +The project was conceived and executed. The service rendered by this battery +has forever set at rest the question of the proper tactical use of the machine +gun arm, both on the offensive and defensive. These things are now beyond the +realm of theory. They are a demonstrated problem. The solution is universally +acknowledged to be correct. +</p> + +<p> +This is the history of that detachment. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>CHAPTER II.<br /> +INCEPTION.</h2> + +<p> +From the 26th of April until the 6th of June, Tampa and Port Tampa were the +military centers of greatest interest in the United States. Troops were rushed +into these places on special trains and camped on available sites, pending the +organization of a proposed expedition to—somewhere. Supplies of every +description came pouring in on long trains of express and freight cars; mounted +officers and orderlies ploughed their rushing way through great heaps and dunes +of ever-shifting sand, leaving behind them stifling clouds of scintillating +particles, which filtered through every conceivable crevice and made the effort +to breathe a suffocating nightmare. Over all the tumultuous scene a torrid sun +beat down from a cloudless sky, while its scorching rays, reflected from the +fierce sand under foot, produced a heat so intolerable that even the tropical +vegetation looked withered and dying. In this climate officers and men, +gathered mostly from Northern posts, were to “acclimate” themselves +for a tropical campaign—somewhere. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus03"></a> +<img src="images/03.jpg" width="600" height="381" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Skirmish Drill at Tampa.</p> +</div> + +<p> +They never encountered as deadly a heat, nor a more pernicious climate, in Cuba +nor in Porto Rico, than that of southern Florida. Its first effect upon men +just emerging from a bracing Northern winter was akin to prostration. Then +began to follow a decided tendency to languor; after this one was liable to +sudden attacks of bowel troubles. The deadly malaria began to insidiously +prepare the way for a hospital cot; the patient lost flesh, relish of food +became a reminiscence, and an hour’s exertion in the sun was enough to +put a man on his back for the rest of the day. Exposure to the direct action of +the sun’s rays was frequently followed by nausea, a slight chill, and +then a high fever. The doctors subsequently called this “thermal +fever,” which is suspected to be a high-sounding name calculated to cover +up a very dense ignorance of the nature of the disease, because no one ever +obtained any relief from it from them. Recurrence of the exposure brought +recurrence of the fever, and, if persisted in, finally produced a severe +illness. +</p> + +<p> +One reason for this was that the troops continued to wear the winter clothing +they had worn on their arrival. The promised “khaki” did not +materialize. Some regiments drew the brown canvas fatigue uniform, but the only +use made of it was to put the white blanket-roll through the legs of the +trousers, thereby adding to the weight of the roll, without perceptible benefit +to the soldier. +</p> + +<p> +Such a climate, under such surroundings, was not conducive to original thought, +prolonged exertion, or sustained study. Everybody felt “mean” and +was eager for a change. Nobody wanted to listen to any new schemes. The highest +ambition seemed to be to get out of it to somewhere with just as little delay +and exertion as possible. It was at this juncture that the plan of organizing a +Gatling gun battery was conceived, and the attempt to obtain authority began. +</p> + +<p> +The Gatling gun is one of the two machine guns adopted in the land service of +the United States. Not to enter into a technical description, but merely to +convey a general idea of its working and uses, it may be described as follows: +</p> + +<p> +The gun is a cluster of rifle barrels, without stocks, arranged around a rod, +and parallel to it. Each barrel has its own lock or bolt, and the whole cluster +can be made to revolve by turning a crank. The bolts are all covered in a brass +case at the breech, and the machine is loaded by means of a vertical groove in +which cartridges are placed, twenty at a time, and from which they fall into +the receivers one at a time. As the cluster of barrels revolves each one is +fired at the lowest point, and reloaded as it completes the revolution. The gun +is mounted on a wye-shaped trunnion; the lower end of the wye passes down into +a socket in the axle. The gun is pointed by a lever just as one points a garden +hose or sprinkler, with the advantage that the gun can be clamped at any +instant, and will then continue to sprinkle its drops of death over the same +row of plants until the clamps are released. The axle is hollow and will hold +about a thousand cartridges. It is horizontal, and on its ends are heavy +Archibald wheels. There is also a heavy hollow trail, in which tools and +additional ammunition can be stored. The limber resembles that used by the +Artillery, and is capable of carrying about 9600 rounds of cartridges. The +whole gun, thus mounted, can be drawn by two mules, and worked to good +advantage by from six to eight men. It is built of various calibers, and can +fire from 300 to 900 shots per minute. The guns used by the Gatling Gun +Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, were built by the Colt’s Arms Co., were the +latest improved model, long ten-barrel gun, and fired the Krag-Jorgenson +ammunition used by the Regular Army. +</p> + +<p> +The attempt to obtain authority to organize a machine gun battery met with many +discouragements and repeated failures. No one seemed to have thought anything +about the subject, and Tampa was not a good place nor climate in which to +indulge in that form of exercise, apparently. Perhaps the climate was one +reason why so little thinking was done, and everything went “at sixes and +sevens.” +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus04"></a> +<img src="images/04.jpg" width="600" height="382" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Skirmish Drill at Tampa.</p> +</div> + +<p> +The officer who had conceived the scheme was a young man, too. He was only a +second lieutenant (“Second lieutenants are fit for nothing except to take +reveille”), and had never, so far as his military superiors knew, heard +the whistle of a hostile bullet. He had made no brilliant record at the +Academy, had never distinguished himself in the service, and was not +anybody’s “pet.” He was, apparently, a safe man to ignore or +snub if occasion or bad temper made it desirable to ignore or snub somebody, +and, above all, had no political friends who would be offended thereby. +</p> + +<p> +“Politics” cut quite a figure in Tampa in some respects. An officer +who was known to be a personal friend of Senator Somebody, or protege of this +or that great man, was regarded with considerable awe and reverence by the +common herd. It was ludicrous to see the weight attached to the crumbs of +wisdom that fell from the friends of the friends of somebody. They shone only +by a reflected light, it is true; but nobody there at Tampa had a lamp of his +own, except the few who had won renown in the Civil War, and reflected light +was better than none at all. A very young and green second lieutenant who was +able to boast that he had declined to be a major in a certain State was at once +an oracle to other lieutenants—and to some who were not lieutenants. The +policy which governed these appointments was not so well understood at that +date in the campaign as it is now. +</p> + +<p> +When the court of a reigning favorite was established at the Tampa Bay Hotel as +a brigadier, and people began to get themselves a little settled into the idea +that they knew who was in command, they were suddenly disillusioned by the +appointment of another and senior brigadier to the command. They settled down +to get acquainted with the new authority, and were just beginning to find out +who was who, when the telegraph flashed the news that the deposed potentate had +been made a major-general, and, of course, was now in command. The thing was +becoming interesting. Bets began to be made as to which would come in ahead +under the wire. The other also became a major-general. Then came a period of +uncertainty, because the question of rank hinged upon some obscure and musty +record of forgotten service some thirty-four years before. From these facts +will be apparent the difficulty under which a subordinate labored in trying to +create anything. +</p> + +<p> +It is hardly worth while in any case of that sort to waste time with +subordinates. The projector of an enterprise had better go straight to the one +who has the necessary authority to order what is wanted; if access to him can +be had, and he can be brought to recognize the merits of the plan—that +settles it; if not—that also settles it. In either case the matter +becomes a settled thing, and one knows what to depend upon. +</p> + +<p> +But who was the man to see there at Tampa? Nobody knew. +</p> + +<p> +The first officer approached was the one in direct line of superiority, Col. A. +T. Smith, 13th Infantry. The idea was to ascertain his views and try to obtain +from him a favorable endorsement upon a written plan to be submitted through +military channels to the commanding general at Tampa. Perhaps it was the deadly +climate; for the reply to a request for a few minutes’ audience on the +subject of machine guns was very gruff and curt: “I don’t want to +hear anything about it. I don’t believe in it, and I don’t feel +like hearing it. If you want to see me about this subject, come to me in office +hours.” That settled it. Any effort to get a written plan through would +have to carry the weight of official disapproval from the start, and even a +“shavey” knows that disapproval at the start is enough to kill a +paper in the official routine. +</p> + +<p> +The next officers approached were Major William Auman and Capt. H. Cavanaugh, +of the 13th Infantry, who were asked for advice. These two officers, both of +whom rendered very distinguished services on the battle-field, listened with +interest and were convinced. Their advice was: “Get your plan in tangible +shape, typewritten, showing just what you propose; then go straight to the +commanding general himself. If he listens to you, he will be the responsible +party, and will have waived the informality; if he will not receive you, no +harm is done.” +</p> + +<p> +This advice was followed and the following plan prepared: +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Scheme for Organization of Division Galling Gun Detachment.</i> +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Material:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“Three guns with limbers and caissons; 28 horses and 16 saddles; 6 sets +double harness, wheel, and 6 lead; 1 escort wagon, team and driver; and 100,000 +rounds, .30 cal. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Personnel:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“One first lieutenant, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 clerk, 1 cook, and 35 +enlisted men selected for their intelligence, activity, and daring; volunteers, +if possible to be obtained, as the service will be hazardous. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Equipment:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“Officer: Revolver, saber, or machete, and field-glass. +</p> + +<p> +“Enlisted men: Revolver and knife. +</p> + +<p> +“Fifty rounds to be carried on person for revolver, and 50 in ordnance +train. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Camp Equipage:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“Four conical wall-tents, 2 ‘A’ wall-tents, and the ordinary +cooking outfit for a company of 41 men. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Organization:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“In the discretion of the detachment commander, subject to approval of +division commander; probably as follows, subject to modifications by +experience: +</p> + +<p> +“Three detachments under a sergeant. A detachment to be composed of 1 +gunner and 7 men. The gunner should be a corporal. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Administration:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“The Division Gatling Gun Detachment to be subject only to the orders of +the division commander, or higher authority. Its members are carried on +‘d. s.’ in their respective organizations. Its commander exercises +over it the same authority as a company commander, and keeps the same records. +Returns, reports, and other business are transacted as in company, except that +the detachment commander reports directly to and receives orders directly from +Division Headquarters. The detachment is not subject to ordinary guard or +fatigue. When used as part of a guard, whole detachments go with their pieces. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Instruction:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“The organization is purely experimental; hence the greatest possible +latitude must be allowed the detachment commander, and he should be held +accountable for the results. He should not be subjected to the orders or +interference of any subordinates, however able, who have made no special study +of the tactical use or instruction for machine guns, and who may not have faith +in the experiment. It will be useless to expect efficiency of the proposed +organization unless this liberty be accorded its organizer. The field is a new +one, not yet well discussed by even the text-writers. Organization and +instruction must be largely experimental, subject to change as the result of +experience; but no change from the plans of the organizer should be made except +for good and sufficient reasons. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Tactical Employment:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“This organization is expected to develop: +</p> + +<p> +“(<i>a</i>) The fire-action of good infantry. +</p> + +<p> +“(<i>b</i>) The mobility of cavalry. +</p> + +<p> +“Its qualities, therefore, must be rapidity and accuracy, both of fire +and movement. +</p> + +<p> +“Its employment on the defensive is obvious. On the offensive it is +expected to be useful with advance guards, rear guards, outposts, raids, and in +battle. The last use, novel as it is, will be most important of all. The flanks +of the division can be secured by this organization, relieving reserves of this +duty; it will give a stiffening to the line of support, and at every opportune +occasion will be pushed into action on the firing line. The <i>moral effect</i> +of its presence will be very great; it will be able to render valuable +assistance by its fire (over the charging line) in many cases. Last, but very +important, the occupation of a captured line by this organization at once will +supply a powerful, concentrated, and controlled fire, either to repulse a +counter-charge or to fire on a discomfited, retiring enemy. Being a horsed +organization, it can arrive at the critical point at the vital moment when, the +defender’s first line having been thrust out, our line being +disorganized, a counter-charge by the enemy would be most effective, or +controlled fire by our own troops on him would be most useful. +</p> + +<p> +“It is urged that this last use of machine guns is one of the most +important functions, and one which has been overlooked by writers and +tacticians. +</p> + +<p> +“There is one vital limitation upon the proposed organization; viz., it +must not be pitted against artillery. +</p> + +<p> +“It is urgently suggested that this organization can be perfected here +and now without difficulty, while it will be very difficult to perfect after +the forward movement has begun. Horses and harness can be easily procured at +Tampa; there will be no difficulty if some energetic officer be authorized to +proceed with the work, and directed to attend to the details. +</p> + +<p> +“Believing earnestly in the utility of the proposed organization, which +will convert useless impedimenta into a fourth arm, and realizing the dangerous +nature of the proposed service, I respectfully offer my services to carry these +plans into effect. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>John H. Parker</i>,<br /> +“2d Lieut. 13th Infty.” +</p> + +<p> +With this plan well digested and with many a plausible argument in its favor +all thought out, Col. Arthur McArthur, assistant adjutant-general to Gen. Wade, +who was at that moment in command, was approached. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus05"></a> +<img src="images/05.jpg" width="600" height="381" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Field Bakery.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Col. McArthur was a very busy man. He was also a very business-like man, and +one of handsome appearance, easy access, and pleasant address. He sandwiched in +a fifteen-minute interview between two pressing engagements, and manifested +both interest and approval. But nothing could be done at that time. “Come +again a week from to-day,” said he, “and I will try to obtain you a +hearing before one who can do what you wish by a single word. I believe in your +scheme and will help you if I can.” The week rolled by and a change of +commanding generals occurred. Gen. Wade was ordered away, taking McArthur with +him, and no progress had been made. It was discouraging. +</p> + +<p> +The next step in the plan was by lucky accident. Lieutenant (now Lieut.-Col.) +John T. Thompson, Ordnance Department, who was in charge of the Ordnance Depot +at Tampa, accidentally met the would-be machine-gun man, and was promptly +buttonholed over a dish of ice cream. Thompson was himself a young man and a +student. His department placed an insuperable obstacle in the way of himself +carrying out a plan which he, also, had conceived, and he was keen to see the +idea, which he fully believed in, demonstrated on the battle-field. He had, +moreover, as ordnance officer, just received an invoice of fifteen Gatling +guns, complete, of the latest model, and he had access to the commanding +general by virtue of being a member of his staff. By reason of the terrible +rush of overwork, he needed an assistant, and it seemed practicable to try to +kill two birds with one stone. But all he said was, “I believe in the +idea; I have long advocated it. It may be possible for me to get you your +opportunity, and it may not. If so, you will hear from the matter.” +</p> + +<p> +The attempt to get the thing going had been apparently abandoned, when, utterly +without notice, the regimental commander received orders per letter, from +Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, which resulted in the following orders: +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Headquarters 13th Infantry, in the Field,<br/> +“Tampa, Fla., May 27, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>Special Orders No. 22:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“Pursuant to instructions contained in letter from Headquarters 5th +Army Corps, May 26, 1898, +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +2d Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Sergeant Alois Weischaar, Company A,<br/> +Sergeant William Eyder, Company G,<br/> +Private Lewis Kastner, Company A.<br/> +Private Joe Seman, Company B,<br/> +Private Abram Greenberg, Company C.<br/> +Private Joseph Hoft, Company D,<br/> +Private O’Connor L. Jones, Company D,<br/> +Private Louis Misiak, Company E,<br/> +Private George C. Murray, Company F,<br/> +Private John Bremer, Company G,<br/> +Private Fred H. Chase, Company H,<br/> +Private Martin Pyne, Company H, +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +will report to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, ordnance officer, for duty in connection +with the Gatling Gun Battery. +</p> + +<p> +“These men will be fully equipped, with the exception of rifle, bayonet, +scabbard, and blanket-bag, and will be rationed to include May 31, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“By order of Colonel Smith. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>M. McFarland</i>,<br /> +“1st Lieut. 13th Infty., Adjutant.” +</p> + +<p> +These men were selected by their company commanders. It is not known whether +the selections were made with a view to special fitness or not. They had no +notice that the detail was to be anything but a transient character; in fact, +one company commander actually detailed the cook of his private mess, and was +intensely disgusted when he found that the detail was to be permanent or +semi-permanent. The men were sent fully armed and equipped; carrying rifles, +knapsacks, etc., and marched down to the Ordnance Depot for instructions. These +instructions were to return to camp, turn in their rifles, bayonets, +cartridges, belts, and knapsacks, and return early the following morning +equipped with blanket-roll complete, haversack, and canteen. Each man, after +full explanation of the hazardous duty, was given a chance to withdraw, but all +volunteered to stay. +</p> + +<p> +The instructions were obeyed, and the Gatling Gun Detachment was born—a +pigmy. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus06"></a> +<img src="images/06.jpg" width="600" height="385" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Awaiting Turn to Embark.</p> +</div> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>CHAPTER III.<br /> +THE ORDNANCE DÉPÔT.</h2> + +<p> +The Ordnance Dépôt at Tampa was located on Lafayette Street, at the end of the +bridge over the river, next to the Tampa Bay Hotel. The river washed the sides +of the building, which was occupied by the Tampa Athletic Club, and had +formerly been used as a club-house. There were two stories and a basement. The +basement was nearly on a level with the river, the main floor on a level with +the bridge, and there was also a spacious upper floor. The main floor was used +for storage of light articles of ordnance; the basement for heavy articles and +ammunition. Hundreds of thousands of rounds of rifle and revolver ball +cartridges, thousands of rounds of Hotchkiss fixed ammunition, and many +hundreds of pounds of powder charges for field artillery and mortars were here +stored. Miscellaneous assortments were daily coming in, generally without any +mark on the box by which to learn what were the contents. The name of the +arsenal, if from an arsenal, was usually stamped on the seal; generally there +was no mark whatever to designate the origin or contents of the many boxes +which came from ordinary posts. The invoices came from a week to ten days +behind or in advance of the arrival of the boxes, and there was not the +slightest clue to be gained from them. Consequently those who had to check up +invoices and prepare for issues were at their wits’ end to keep things +straight. A requisition for so many articles would come in, duly approved; +unless the boxes containing these articles happened to have been unpacked, it +was uncertain whether they were on hand or not. No wholesale merchant of any +sense would ship out boxes of goods without some indication of their contents; +but that was exactly what was done from all over the country to the Ordnance +Dépôt at Tampa. +</p> + +<p> +The upper floor consisted of one large room. A rope railing was placed around +it to preserve clear space around the desks. There were several of these for +the ordnance officer and the various clerks. A chief clerk, an assistant clerk, +a stenographer, and two ordnance sergeants looked after the red tape. An +overseer with four subordinates and a gang of negro stevedores attended to +loading and unloading boxes, storing them, counting out articles for issue or +receipt, and such other duties as they were called on to perform. There was an +old janitor named McGee, a veteran of the Civil War, whose business it was to +look after the sweeping and keep the floors clean. +</p> + +<p> +Four guns in their original boxes were issued to the detachment on the 27th of +May. They were new, and apparently had never been assembled. On assembling them +it was found that the parts had been constructed with such +“scientific” accuracy that the use of a mallet was necessary. The +binder-box on the pointing lever was so tight that in attempting to depress the +muzzle of the gun it was possible to lift the trail off the ground before the +binder-box would slide on the lever. The axis-pin had to be driven in and out +with an axe, using a block of wood, of course, to prevent battering. A truly +pretty state of affairs for a gun the value of which depends on the ease with +which it can be pointed in any direction. +</p> + +<p> +Inquiry after the war at the factory where the guns are made disclosed the fact +that these parts are rigidly tested by a gauge by the Government inspectors, +and that looseness is regarded as a fatal defect. Even play of half a hundredth +of an inch is enough to insure the rejection of a piece. The very first thing +done by the Gatling Gun Detachment, upon assembling these guns, was to obtain a +set of armorers’ tools and to file away these parts by hand until the aim +of the piece could be changed by the touch of a feather. The detachment was +ordered to rely upon the friction clutches for steadiness of aim, when +necessary, and not upon the tight fit of the parts. It was ordered that there +must be no doubt whatever of easy, perfectly free manipulation at any and all +times, even if the pointing lever should become rusted. This precaution proved +on July 1st to have been of great value. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus07"></a> +<img src="images/07.jpg" width="600" height="381" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Baiquiri.</p> +</div> + +<p> +The instruction of the detachment began immediately, and consisted, at first, +of unpacking, mounting, dismounting, and repacking the guns. The four guns were +mounted and a drill held each time in the loading and firing of the piece. This +system of instruction was continued until the detachment was ordered on board +ship on the 6th of June. During this instruction members of the detachment were +designated by name to fall out, and the remainder of the detachment required to +execute all the maneuvers of the piece as before. In fact, this instruction was +carried to such a point that one man alone was required to load, aim, and fire +the gun at designated objects without any assistance. +</p> + +<p> +The detachment at once assumed the position of an independent command. It +reported directly to Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, commanding the 5th Corps, in +everything so far as its duties with Gatling guns were concerned, was regarded +as an independent command, kept its own records in the same manner as a +company, obtained cooking utensils from the quartermaster and ran its own mess, +and furnished its own guard. This status, that of a separate command, continued +until the detachment was finally disbanded at Montauk. +</p> + +<p> +On the 27th of May the detachment commander was summoned to Gen. +Wheeler’s headquarters and there requested to explain to the general in +person his plans for organizing a Gatling gun detachment. Gen. Wheeler had just +assumed command of all the Cavalry belonging to the 5th Army Corps. His +headquarters, instead of being in a suite of rooms in the palatial Tampa Bay +Hotel, where all the other general officers had their headquarters, were +located about half a mile from the hotel in a treeless pasture. The cavalry +guidon floating from a lance-head was the only indication of headquarters, and +the half-dozen “A” tents in an irregular line gave no sign that one +of the most distinguished generals in the world had here his headquarters in +the field. +</p> + +<p> +The general was easily accessible. The first thing that impressed one of him +was his extraordinary quickness. His eye seemed to take in everything within +sight of him at a single glance, and to read one’s thoughts before the +tongue could give expression to them. He grasped ideas when they were only half +uttered and immediately drew deductions from mere statements of simple facts, +the result of years of careful study. These deductions, which Gen. Wheeler drew +instantly, were in every case correct, and showed a keener and more correct +appreciation of the proper tactical employment of machine guns than was shown +by any other officer of the 5th Corps. The result of the interview with the +general was that a scheme for the organization of a tactical unit to be +composed of three Gatling guns and to be employed with the cavalry division, +was drawn up on the spot, under Gen. Wheeler’s personal direction, and +was submitted by him to Gen. Shafter, with the request that authority be +granted for the organization of this command for the purpose indicated. +</p> + +<p> +In the application Gen. Wheeler stated that he believed that such a battery of +machine guns, if properly handled, could go anywhere that cavalry could go, +could take the place of infantry supports, could dash up and hold any ground or +advantageous position that a body of cavalry might seize, could be thrown out +to one flank of the enemy and assist in his demoralization in preparation for +the cavalry charge, and would be of particular service in case the enemy +attempted to form infantry squares, which were at that time supposed to be the +main part of the Spanish tactics of battle. This application was disapproved. +</p> + +<p> +On the 30th of May, Gen. Lee sent for the detachment commander for an interview +on the subject of Gatling guns. Gen. Lee was at this time quartered at the +Tampa Bay Hotel, and was engaged in the organization of the 7th Army Corps. It +was supposed that the 7th Corps was designed for the Havana campaign, and it +was believed that the attack upon Havana would begin at a very early date. The +result of the interview with Gen. Lee was that he directed a scheme for the +organization of a tactical unit to be composed of 9 guns, 3 batteries of 3 guns +each, to be prepared for service with the 7th Army Corps. +</p> + +<p> +It was desired that this organization be a volunteer organization, and the +application was therefore made for authority from the President, under that law +of Congress authorizing the employment of special troops. Col. Guild, well and +favorably known from his connection with the Massachusetts National Guard, was +prepared to furnish a volunteer organization already in existence, well drilled +and already officered, composed of the flower of the youth of Massachusetts, +very largely of college graduates, who had already been communicated with on +the subject, and who were even at that time expecting momentarily a telegram +calling them to this duty. Nothing resulted from this effort. +</p> + +<p> +Meantime the drill instruction of the little detachment continued. Its members +had acquired a considerable degree of proficiency in the mechanical handling of +their guns, and were beginning to appreciate the destructive possibilities of +their weapon. They were enjoying a degree of liberty which they had not found +in their regimental camp, because when not on duty they were free to come and +go at will, when and where they pleased. The hours for instruction were +designated in the morning and in the cool of the afternoon, leaving the middle +of the day and the evening for the men’s own recreation. The result of +this system of treatment was that <i>esprit-du-corps</i> began to be developed +in the detachment. They began to feel that they were a special organization, +expected to do special work, and that they were receiving very special +treatment. They began to be proud of being members of the Gatling Gun +Detachment, to take greater interest in the work, and when on the first of June +they received their monthly pay not a single member of the detachment committed +any excesses in consequence of this unusual degree of freedom. No one was +intoxicated. No one was absent without permission. +</p> + +<p> +The detachment had not been at the Ordnance Depot very long before an +opportunity occurred for some of its members to exhibit those qualities which +made the success of the battery so conspicuous on the battle-field afterward. +The detachment commander had been detailed by verbal orders on the first of +June in charge of the issues of ordnance property to the Santiago expedition. +This was in addition to his duties with the Gatling guns. The work would +commence about 6 o’clock in the morning, and from that time until dark +there was a continual stream of wagons carrying away stores such as rifles, +haversacks, meat ration cans, tin cups, and all the articles needed by troops +in the field during a campaign. The ammunition which was issued to the troops +at this time was drawn at the same place. +</p> + +<p> +When wagons arrived to receive issues, stevedores were directed to count out +the different articles under the direction of an overseer, and these piles of +articles were verified by the officer in charge of the issues. The stevedores +then loaded them on the wagons which were to haul them to the different camps. +Receipts in duplicate were always taken and invoices in duplicate were always +given, in the name, of course, of Lieut. John T. Thompson, who was responsible +for the stores. +</p> + +<p> +On the 4th of June issues were being made of rifle-ball cartridges. These +cartridges came packed in boxes of 1000 rounds each, and each box weighed 78 +pounds. A great quantity of it was stored in the basement, where there was also +a considerable quantity of fixed Hotchkiss ammunition, as well as several +thousand rounds of powder charges in boxes. The Hotchkiss ammunition, which +comes with projectile and powder both set in a brass case, is bad ammunition to +pack; for, no matter how carefully it is handled, there is almost always some +leakage of powder from the cartridge case, thus causing a certain amount of +loose powder to sift into the box in which it is packed. +</p> + +<p> +About half past 11 o’clock on this morning a negro stevedore accidentally +dropped a box of rifle ammunition near a pile of Hotchkiss fixed, and the next +instant the laborers saw smoke ascending toward the ceiling of the basement. +They yelled “Fire! fire!” at the top of their voices, and everybody +in the basement at once made a rush for the two doors. It was a panic. The +danger was imminent. The smoke curled up to the ceiling and then curled down +again, and the excited, panic-stricken faces of the negroes as they rushed +through the door made an awful picture of human terror. People on the outside +of the building began to shout “Fire!” +</p> + +<p> +At this juncture McGee, the old janitor, who had just reached the door, cried +out, “Lieutenant, there is a box in here on fire!” speaking to +Lieut. Parker, who was verifying issues just outside the door. The lieutenant +replied, “Let’s throw it into the river,” and dashed toward +the box through the door, pushing the excited negroes to each side in order to +assist McGee, who had instantly started for the box. When Lieut. Parker reached +the box, he found that McGee had already taken it up, and was staggering under +its weight. He placed one arm around McGee’s shoulder and with the other +assisted him to support the box, from which the smoke was still ascending, and +the two rushed for the door, throwing the whole momentum of their weight and +speed against the crowd of frightened negroes, who were falling over each other +in their panic-stricken efforts to escape. Priv. Greenberg, of the 13th +Infantry, a member of the Gatling Gun Detachment, who was the sentinel on post +at the time, saw the two men coming with the box, and with great presence of +mind added his own weight with a rapid rush to the shock they had produced, +thus enabling them to break their way through the dense throng at the door. It +was only the work of an instant to then throw the box in the river, where it +sank in the water and for a moment the blue smoke continued to bubble up from +the box, which lay clearly visible on the bed of the river, the water being +only about two feet deep at this point, which was, however, enough to entirely +cover the box and thus extinguish the fire. At the outcry of +“Fire!” Lieut. H. L. Kinnison, of the 25th Infantry, who was +waiting outside of the basement with a wagon, started in at the other door, and +Serg. Weischaar, acting first sergeant of the Gatling Gun Detachment, started +for water. Just as the two men emerged from the door carrying the box, Lieut. +Kinnison reached the spot where the fire had originated, and Serg. Weischaar +appeared with two buckets of water. He and Lieut. Kinnison at once flooded the +floor, seized a woolen cloth which happened to be near, and wetted down the +boxes of Hotchkiss ammunition as a measure of precaution. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus08"></a> +<img src="images/08.jpg" width="600" height="378" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">The “Hornet.”</p> +</div> + +<p> +McGee, the hero of this episode, is an old veteran of the Civil War, having +served three years in the Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry during the war, and +five years in the Regular Army after the war. He has never drawn a pension nor +applied for one, although he suffers considerably from disease and wounds +contracted and received during the war, and certainly should be rewarded by a +grateful government for his conspicuous heroism. The explosion of this magazine +would have brought the whole expedition to a standstill, besides inflicting +tremendous destruction of property and frightful loss of life. +</p> + +<p> +The same day the Artillery of the army began to draw its material for the +campaign, and for a period of thirty-nine hours there was no rest for anybody +connected with the issue of ordnance stores. It was at this time that the lack +of intelligent marking and packing of the boxes was keenly felt. The greatest +difficulty was experienced in selecting, from the mass of stores in the depot, +the stores that were required by the Artillery. It was especially difficult +during the work by night, when the only light that could possibly be allowed +was a single lantern, on account of the danger of fire. +</p> + +<p> +At the close of this thirty-nine hours of arduous duty, the officer in command +of the Gatling Gun Detachment learned that orders had been issued for the +embarkation of the 5th Army Corps at Port Tampa, and that no reference had been +made to the Gatling Gun Detachment in these orders. He at once sought Lieut. +Thompson, who could offer no light on the omission, but said, “I have +orders to send at once to the <i>Cherokee</i> 521,000 rounds of rifle-ball +cartridges and all the revolver ammunition on hand. This is the reserve +ammunition of the 5th Army Corps. I will send you in charge of this ammunition +and you will see it to its destination. You may take an escort or not, as you +please. The ammunition is to go on the 4 o’clock train and you must make +all the arrangements in regard to it. Get box-cars, haul the ammunition over +there and put it in the cars, see that it goes on that train, and as soon as it +arrives at Port Tampa, see that it is properly put on board the +<i>Cherokee</i>.” +</p> + +<p> +In order to fully understand the situation of the Gatling Gun Detachment at +this juncture, the following correspondence on the subject is necessary: +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Office of Ordnance Officer,<br/> +“Lafayette Street, West of Bridge,<br/> +“Tampa, Fla., June 3, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>The Assistant Adjutant-General, 5th Army Corps, Tampa, Florida:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“Sir,—Replying to your letter of June 1,1898, in reference to +Gatling Gun Detachment, I have the honor to submit the following report: +</p> + +<p> +Guns, men, and equipment required for a 4-gun detachment: +</p> + +<pre> +Guns. Serg. Corp. Priv.<br/> +Total required: 4 5 4 28 +On hand: 4 2 0 10 +Required: 3 4 18 +</pre> + +<p> +The gun crews thus organized will give most effective service for the +detachment. +</p> + +<p> +Ammunition: Each limber carries 9,840 rounds cal. .30. Four limbers, 27,360; +necessary reserve, 32,640; total, 60,000. +</p> + +<p> +Tentage: Two conical wall-tents for enlisted men; one ‘A’ wall-tent +for officer. +</p> + +<p> +Camp equipage, in addition to that on hand in Gatling Gun Detachment: one +buzzacot, small; four mess-pans, one dish-pan, one coffee-mill. +</p> + +<p> +Blanket-roll complete; revolver with 50 rounds per man; waist-belts and +entrenching-knives. +</p> + +<p> +“It is recommended that Priv. Butz, ‘G’ Co., 13th Infantry, +Corp. Robert S. Smith, ‘C’ Co., 13th Infantry, and Serg. Weigle, +9th Infantry, be members of the detachment; and that detachment be taken from +9th Infantry, which has some well-instructed men. +</p> + +<p> +“It is further recommended that the detachment be fully horsed as soon as +practicable, and that the whole be placed under the command of Lieut. John H. +Parker, 13th Infantry, as acting captain. +</p> + +<p> +“I recommend that I be authorized to issue the 4 Gatling guns and parts +to him. +</p> + +<p> +“The details should carry the rations prescribed in General Orders 5th, +May 31, 1898, 5th Army Corps. Very respectfully, +</p> + +<p class="right"> +(Signed) “<i>Jno. T. Thompson</i>,<br /> +“1st Lieut., Ord. Dept, U. S. A.” +</p> + +<p> +This letter, prepared by Lieut. Parker and signed by Lieut. Thompson, was +endorsed as follows: +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>First Endorsement.</i> +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Headquarters 5th Army Corps,<br /> +“Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“Respectfully returned to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, Ordnance Officer. +</p> + +<p> +“If Lieut. Parker, in charge of the detachment as at present constituted, +can make the arrangements suggested within, he may take action; but, in view of +the limited time remaining, it is thought the detachment already organized will +answer. +</p> + +<p> +“By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>E. J. McClernand</i>,<br/> +“Assistant Adjutant-General.” +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Second Endorsement.</i> +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Office of the Ordnance Officer,<br/> +“Lafayette Street Bridge,<br/> +“Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“Respectfully referred to Lieut. John H. Parker for his information. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>Jno. T. Thompson</i>,<br /> +“1st Lieut., Ordnance Dept, U. S. A.” +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus09"></a> +<img src="images/09.jpg" width="600" height="379" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Waiting.</p> +</div> + +<p> +It will be seen from the first endorsement that a certain amount of discretion +was left to the detachment commander. He was authorized to take action if he +could make the arrangements suggested within. Lieut. Thompson had authorized an +escort for the reserve ammunition, if it was considered necessary. The +detachment commander resolved to take action by using his whole detachment as +an escort, putting it on board the <i>Cherokee</i>, with the reserve +ammunition, and accompanying it to its destination—in Cuba, trusting to +the future to enable him to complete the detachment according to the first +endorsement. +</p> + +<p> +It was now 11 o’clock in the forenoon. Between that time and 4 +o’clock it was necessary to obtain two freight cars, have them placed +upon the siding at a convenient point, have more than twenty wagon-loads of +ammunition, camp equipage, etc., placed in these cars, have the four guns with +their limbers placed on board, and, more difficult than all the rest, go +through the necessary red tape at the quartermaster’s office in order to +get the two cars moved to Port Tampa. It was all accomplished. +</p> + +<p> +The general freight agent was bluffed into believing that unless the two cars +were instantly set where they were wanted his whole railroad would be tied up. +The quartermaster was hypnotized and dropped formality, putting all the clerks +to work upon papers and making out the necessary bill of lading, invoices, +etc., in time to catch the 4 o’clock train. He also issued the necessary +transportation for the officer and men of the detachment from Tampa to Port +Tampa, accepting the first endorsement above as sufficient orders for that +purpose. +</p> + +<p> +One member of the detachment, Priv. Murray, had been very ill with what we +afterward learned to call the Cuban fever, and, while apparently convalescent, +was entirely too weak to accompany the detachment. He was a splendid fellow, +and the tears rolled down his emaciated face when he was told he must remain +behind. He was furnished with a descriptive list and a letter was written to +the chief surgeon of the Division Hospital, requesting him to send an ambulance +immediately for the sick man. One member of the detachment carried this letter +to Tampa Heights, and so sharp was the work of getting away that this man had +to board a moving train as it was pulling out to keep from getting left; but +Priv. Murray was taken to the hospital and cared for, and Priv. Bremer did not +get left. +</p> + +<p> +The detachment reached Port Tampa about sundown, and Maj. Cushing, who had +charge of the loading of the transports, at once authorized the cars to be set +alongside the <i>Cherokee</i>. The ammunition, guns, camp equipage, men, and +all were promptly put aboard. The training in packing and unpacking the guns +was the only thing which enabled the work to be done in the limited time +allotted. Not so much as a ten-penny nail belonging to the detachment was left +behind. +</p> + +<p> +During the night the troops that were to occupy the <i>Cherokee</i> came on +board, and it was found the next morning that five or six tons of regimental +baggage had been piled on top of the guns, making it practically impossible to +disembark, even if such a movement should be ordered. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus10"></a> +<img src="images/10.jpg" width="600" height="376" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Wrecked Locomotives and Machine Shops at Baiquiri.</p> +</div> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>CHAPTER IV.<br /> +THE VOYAGE AND DISEMBARKATION.</h2> + +<p> +It seemed that the work had been accomplished none too soon, for on the morning +of June 7th orders came to the <i>Cherokee</i> to leave the slip and proceed +down the bay. There were on board at this time, beside the little Gatling Gun +Detachment, the 17th Infantry, under command of Col. Haskell, and a battalion +of the 12th Infantry, under command of Col. Comba, who was the senior officer +on board. The ship was frightfully crowded. The berth deck and lower deck had +been arranged for the accommodation of the men by nailing rows of two 2x4 +scantlings just far enough apart to leave room for a man to lie down, and +fastening three tiers of bunks to these scantlings. The men were packed in +these bunks like sardines in a box. The ventilation was conspicuous by its +absence, the heat below deck was frightful and the misery entailed by such +accommodations was beyond description. But the men were very cheerful, and, +being allowed the privilege of the upper deck, very little in the way of +complaint was heard. Everybody was anxious to be off. The hope most frequently +expressed was for a quick passage and a sharp, swift campaign. It was easily +foreseen by the officers on board the ship that a long sojourn on shipboard +under such conditions would have a very bad effect on the men. +</p> + +<p> +The ship dropped down the bay to the quarantine station, starting about noon, +and there lay to, waiting, as was supposed, for the remainder of the fleet. +Suddenly, about 8 p. m., one of the torpedo cruisers came tearing down the bay +under full steam, and we heard the message sounded through the megaphone: +“Return to port. Three Spanish cruisers within three hours’ sail of +the offing.” It was a thrilling moment. Officers and men were lounging, +taking, as they supposed, their last view of the American shores, without a +suspicion of present danger, when they were rapidly brought to a realizing +sense that “war is hell,” by a notice that the enemy was upon them. +Whether they were in danger or not, the danger was deadly real and imminent to +them at the time. +</p> + +<p> +The <i>Cherokee</i> had been anchored pretty well inside. She immediately got +up steam and went out to warn other vessels farther out in the offing, and then +made safely for the harbor. Officers and men behaved with perfect coolness. It +was hopeless to attempt to escape by concealment, so Col. Comba ordered out the +band of the 17th Infantry and the good ship fled up the bay, in momentary +expectation of a smashing shot from the enemy, to the strains of +“There’ll be a hot time.” What little excitement there was +displayed itself in a feverish searching of the bay with field-glasses for +signs of the enemy. The older officers, upon whom the responsibility was +resting, sat upon the quarter-deck, smoking their pipes and discussing the +situation. The captains quietly moved about, assigning stations to their +companies, in case of attack, with the view of trying the effect of the modern +rifle upon the armored sides of a Spanish man-of-war, and two of the younger +officers took advantage of the catchy air which the band was playing to dance a +two-step on the quarter-deck. So the evening wore away. The moon went down. The +myriad little stars came out, twinkling in the deep blue sky, and at last both +officers and men, tired of looking for an enemy who was never to appear, turned +in for such sleep as they could get, leaving a small guard on deck to keep a +lookout. When they awoke next morning, the ship was in the deepest part of the +nearest slip, moored fast by her guy-ropes to the dock. Thus ended the first +engagement with the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +From the 8th until the 13th, the <i>Cherokee</i> lay at anchor in the slip. She +was relieved on the 10th of about 200 men, thus slightly lightening her +overcrowded condition. In the meantime, this overcrowded condition of the ship +had led to some discussion as to who could best be moved on board some other +ship, with some prospect that the Gatling Gun Detachment might be disturbed. +The situation was not at all satisfactory. With four guns, no mules, no +harness, no authority, and only twelve men, the Gatling Gun Detachment did not +appear to be in a very fair way toward inflicting much damage upon the enemy. +So on the 11th of June the detachment commander visited Gen. Shafter at his +headquarters, determined to bring the matter to an issue, definitely, one way +or the other. This was the first time he had met the general, and, under the +circumstances, the manner of his reception appeared to be doubtful. +</p> + +<p> +Gen. Shafter is a big man. This is not noticed at first glance. He is above the +average height, but his corpulent figure does not indicate that he is full five +feet nine inches in height, because his girth is of like proportion. His hands +are big; his arm is big; his head is big. The occiput is especially full, and +the width of head just over the ears is noticeable. There is plenty of room for +the organs of combativeness. One would think he is probably a lover of +children; during this interview he patted the head of an inquisitive dog, which +evidently belonged somewhere on board the flag-ship, and which strayed into the +room. His eyes are big, very full and very keen. As you enter he says curtly, +“Take a seat.” He waits, looking down, for you to state your +business, then suddenly fixes you with a piercing glance, and goes to the heart +of the subject by one incisive sentence, which leaves no more to be said. This +description is a general type of several interviews with him. On this occasion +the general inquired concerning the facts, looking keenly, searchingly, and +meditatively at the detachment commander. The machine gun man was “on +trial.” Then the general broke the silence by one short question, +“What do you want?” and the reply was in kind, “Twenty men, +general, with the privilege of selecting them.” The general suggested the +advisability of taking a complete organization; to which was replied, +“That at this late hour in the expedition it is imperative to have +selected men in order to perform the required duty; that men taken at random, +as would be the case in a complete organization such as a company, would not be +likely to have the required characteristics.” The general tersely +remarked, “You may have them. Make out your list, name any man in the +corps that you want, and hand the list to me. I will send the men to +you.” The trial was over, and the Machine Gun Detachment was a settled +fact. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly on the following day Special Orders No. 16 were issued, as follows: +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Extract.</i> +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Headquarters 5th Army Corps,<br /> +“On Board S. S. <i>Segurança</i>,<br /> +“Tampa Bay, Fla., June 11, 1898. +</p> + +<p class="letter"> +“<i>Special Orders, No.</i> 16: +</p> + +<p class="center"> + * * * * * +</p> + +<p> +“4. The following named enlisted men are detailed for duty with the +Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th Army Corps, and will report at once to 2d Lieut. +John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, commanding the detachment for duty: +</p> + +<p> +“9th Infantry: Sergeant Weigle. +</p> + +<p> +“12th Infantry: Privates Voelker, Company A; Anderson, Lauer, and +Timberly, Company C; Prazak, Company E. +</p> + +<p> +“13th Infantry: Sergeant Green, Company H; Corporals Stiegerwald, Company +A; Doyle, Smith, and Rose, Company C; Privates Corey and Power, Company A; +Barts, Company E; and Schmadt, Company G. +</p> + +<p> +“17th Infantry: Privates Merryman and Schulze, Company A; McDonald, +Company B; Elkins, Dellett, and McGoin, Company D; Click, Needle, Shiffer, and +Sine, Company E. +</p> + +<p> +“Each of the soldiers will report equipped as follows: Blanket-roll +complete, haversack and contents, canteen, waist-belt of leather, +hunting-knife, and revolver, and they will be rationed with ten days’ +travel rations. Descriptive lists of these men will be sent to the commanding +officer of the detachment. +</p> + +<p class="center"> + * * * * * +</p> + +<p> +“By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. +</p> + +<p> +“Official. <i>J. D. Miley, E. J. McClernand</i>,<br /> +“Aide. Asst. Adj.-Gen.” +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Headquarters 5th Army Corps,<br /> +“On Board S. S. <i>Segurança</i>,<br /> +“Tampa Bay, June 11, 1898. +</p> + +<p class="letter"> +“<i>Special Orders, No.</i> 16: +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Extract.</i> +</p> + +<p class="center"> + * * * * * +</p> + +<p> +“5. 2d Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, commanding the Gatling Gun +Detachment, 5th Army Corps, is authorized to make the usual requisitions for +supplies. +</p> + +<p class="center"> + * * * * * +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Official. <i>J. D. Miley, E. J. McClernand</i>,<br/> +“Aide. Asst. Adj.-Gen.” +</p> + +<p> +The organization was thus perfected by a single stroke of the general’s +pen on the 11th of June, theoretically; practically it was the 14th of June +before the details from the 12th and 17th Infantry reported, and when they did, +instead of being equipped as directed, they carried rifles with 100 rounds of +ammunition. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus11"></a> +<img src="images/11.jpg" width="600" height="385" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">The Landing.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Serg. Weigle, of the 9th Infantry, who reported at the same time, carried a +revolver. On the 14th a wigwag message was received from the 13th Infantry, +inquiring whether the detail was desired to report at once or not, to which the +reply was sent that it was desired to report at the earliest possible moment. +It did not report. +</p> + +<p> +The detachment was at once organized as well as possible for the trip on board +the transport, and the guns brought up from the hold of the ship and mounted in +such a way that they would be ready for instant use. It was not known but that +the detachment might have to participate in a naval engagement, and the value +of machine guns in the navy has long been demonstrated. At any rate, it was +determined to be ready to give a warm reception to any torpedo vessel which +might attempt to attack the <i>Cherokee</i>. One object of getting the guns up +was to give instruction to the new men who reported on the 14th. Sergt. Weigle +was well instructed in the use of Gatling guns, but none of the other members +of the detachment had ever received any instruction, and had been selected +rather on the ground of their superior intelligence and courage than on any +special knowledge of machine guns. They were given a drill each day in loading +and firing the piece, during the time they remained on board the transport, +when the weather permitted. +</p> + +<p> +The condition of the troops on board the transport was miserable. The following +extract from a letter written at that time will convey some idea of the +crowded, ill-ventilated condition of the vessel: +</p> + +<p> +“We have now been on board the transport a week, and are getting into a +frame of mind suitable for desperate work. If you can imagine 1000 men crowded +into space needed for 500, and then kept there without room to stand or move or +sit for seven days, under a tropical sun, in foul holds utterly without +ventilation (just imagine it!), endured without a single murmur or complaint, +not stoically, but patiently and intelligently, while every officer on board is +kicking as hard and as often as possible for the relief of his men, then you +will have some idea of the situation. The men are very patient, but they know +someone has blundered. Talk about the heroism of the Light Brigade! It is +nothing to the heroism that goes cheerfully and uncomplainingly into the Black +Hole of Calcutta (there is nothing else that will compare with these +transports), all because it is duty. When will the people appreciate the +heroism of the Regular Army?” +</p> + +<p> +This was the actual condition of affairs on board the <i>Cherokee</i> up to the +time of leaving port on the 14th of June, and it was modified only by the +hoisting of wind-sails, after we got under way. These were not very efficient +and there were only two of them, so very little relief was given to the +overcrowded berth-deck. Most of the men spent their time on the upper deck, and +one whole company was quartered there. At night, after 8 o’clock, Col. +Comba authorized the men to sleep on deck, and there was always a rush, when +the ship’s bell struck the hour, for good places on the quarter-deck. The +only thing that made the voyage endurable was the good weather which prevailed. +This prevented seasickness, to a certain extent. +</p> + +<p> +The squadron reached Santiago de Cuba, and after tacking about for several +days, either for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, or of waiting a decision +as to the landing-place, finally approached Baiquiri, which had been selected +for the landing. The troops on the <i>Cherokee</i> began to land on the 23d of +June, the battalion of the 12th Infantry going first. This was followed by the +17th Infantry, and upon its departure the captain of the <i>Cherokee</i> put to +sea. The reason for this maneuver is not known. The orders issued by Gen. +Shafter in regard to the landing were that the Gatling Gun Detachment should +accompany Gen. Lawton’s Division. This movement of the <i>Cherokee</i> +completely blocked the landing of the Gatling guns. The ship’s captain +was finally induced to put back into the bay and speak to the <i>Segurança</i>, +and Gen. Shafter directed that the detachment should be taken off the next +morning. +</p> + +<p> +An effort was made, therefore, to obtain the use of a lighter which was not at +that time in use, but the Commissary Department refused to yield the boat, and +it remained until 11 o’clock the next morning tied up to the wharf with +half a load of commissaries on board before it became available, and then was +seized by the Quartermaster’s Department. An effort was then made to +obtain the use of three pontoons, belonging to the Engineer Department, which +had been drawn up to the shore and were of no use to anybody. The young +engineer officer in charge of these boats, a premature graduate of the class of +’98, was “afraid the boats might get smashed in the surf,” +and could not consent without seeing Col. Derby. Col. Derby could not be found. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus12"></a> +<img src="images/12.jpg" width="600" height="380" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Pack Train.</p> +</div> + +<p> +A wigwag came from Gen. Shafter, asking whether the Gatling guns had been +landed. The reply, “No; may I use pontoons?” was answered at once, +“Use pontoons, and get off immediately.” On returning to shore with +a party to work the pontoons, the party was stopped in the act of launching the +first boat by Gen. Sumner, and ordered to proceed to the <i>Cherokee</i>, take +her out into the offing, and order another to take her place to unload. +Protesting against this action, and informing Gen. Sumner of the urgent orders +for the Gatling guns to disembark at once, that officer inquired the opinion of +the prematurely graduated engineer as to the practicability of using the +pontoons, and this experienced young man again expressed the fear that the +boats might be injured in the surf. To the detachment commander’s +indignant exclamation, “What the h— were these boats made for, if +they are not to be used and smashed?” Gen. Sumner responded by a +peremptory order to warp the <i>Cherokee</i> out from the pier and send the +other vessels in. The order was obeyed, and all the circumstances reported to +Gen. Shafter the same evening, with the expression of the opinion that if the +general wanted the Gatling guns landed, he would have to attend to it +personally, because the Gatling gun commander did not have sufficient rank to +accomplish it in the face of all these obstacles. Early on the morning of June +25th, therefore, Gen. Shafter sent peremptory orders to the lighter to lay +alongside the <i>Cherokee</i>, take the Gatling guns and detachment on board, +and land them on the dock. The transfer began at 8 o’clock in the +morning, Gen. Shafter coming out in person in his steam launch to see that his +order was executed. By 11 o’clock the guns, carriages, 30,000 rounds of +ammunition, four sets of double harness, and the detachment were on board the +lighter. This had been accomplished a mile outside in the offing, with the +vessel rolling and pitching in the trough of the sea and on the crest of the +gigantic rollers in so violent a manner that it was almost impossible for men +to stand on their feet, much less handle such heavy material as guns and +ammunition. The lighter was warped to the pier at 11 o’clock, and the +general tied his steam launch alongside to see that it was not disturbed until +the debarkation was completed. At 1 o’clock everything was ashore, and, +in compliance with the general’s instructions, the best mules in the +corral were taken, and as they were led away from the corral-gate, a fat, +sleek, black streaked, long-eared specimen, which had been selected for a +saddle-mule, set up a cheerful “Aw! hee haw! haw!” which produced a +burst of laughter and cheering from the members of the detachment and the +soldiers in the vicinity. It was a cheerful omen. These Missouri mules were +capable of pulling anything loose at both ends, and four experienced drivers +had been selected from the detachment who were capable of riding anything that +walked on four feet, or driving anything from an Arab courser to a pair of +Shetland ponies. +</p> + +<p> +Priv. J. Shiffer had been selected as corral boss of the detachment. The most +picturesque figure, the most boyish member, and as brave a soldier as ever +shouldered a musket; broad of shoulder, stout of limb, full of joke, as +cheerful as a ray of sunlight, this man was the incarnation of courage and +devotion. He loved a mule. He was proud of the job. With the instinct of a true +teamster, he had snapped up the best pair of mules in the whole corral and was +out before the detachment commander had selected a single mule. This team was +as black as Shiffer’s shoes and as strong as a pair of elephants. They +were worked harder than any other team in the 5th Army Corps, and when they +were turned in to the quartermaster in August, they were as fat, as sleek, as +strong, and as hardy as on the day they were taken from the corral in Baiquiri. +The other three teamsters were like unto the first. They were all handy men. +They were as capable of fighting or aiming a gun as of driving a team. Any one +of the four could take a team of mules up a mountain-side or down a vertical +precipice in perfect safety. They could do the impossible with a team of mules, +and they had to do it before the detachment reached the firing-line. The +success of the battery was to depend to a very large degree upon the coolness, +good judgment, and perfect bravery of these four teamsters. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus13"></a> +<img src="images/13.jpg" width="600" height="378" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Calvary Picket Line.</p> +</div> + +<p> +It should be noted that the use of mules was an experiment. The +“scientific” branch of service has always held that the proper +animal to draw a field-piece is the horse. They expatiate with great delight +upon the almost human intelligence and sagacity of that noble animal; upon his +courage “when he snuffeth the battle afar,” and upon the undaunted +spirit with which he rushes upon the enemy, and assists his master to work the +destruction of his foes. The Artillery claims that mules are entirely too +stubborn, too cowardly, and too hard to manage for the purpose of their arm of +the service. It was also an experiment to use two mules per gun. The Engineer +Department had reported that the road to the front was impassable for wheeled +vehicles, and even the general had apparently thought that four mules per gun +would be necessary. The necessity of economizing mules, and the opinion of the +detachment commander that two mules per gun would be sufficient, had led to the +issue of that number. Those who despise the army mule for the purposes of field +artillery know very little of the capacity of this equine product of Missouri +when properly handled. It was demonstrated that two mules can pull a Gatling +gun with 10,000 rounds of ammunition, loaded down with rations and forage, +where eight horses are required to draw a field-piece; and that mules are +equally as easy to manage under fire as horses. +</p> + +<p> +The landing was completed and the detachment organized at 3 p. m., having +rations, forage, and ammunition complete. There was no tentage, except the +shelter-halves which some of the men had brought with them. Capt. Henry +Marcotte, retired, the correspondent of the <i>Army and Navy Journal</i>, +requested permission to accompany the detachment, which was granted, and soon +all were <i>en route</i> for the front, entrusted with the task of opening the +way for wheeled transportation and of demonstrating the practicability of the +road for army wagons and field artillery. +</p> + +<p> +For the first mile the road was excellent. It lay through one of the most +fertile parts of the most fertile island in the world. A little stream +trickling along the side of the road furnished plenty of water for both men and +animals. At the end of the mile the detachment found a steep hill to descend. +The Ordnance Department, which designed and built the carriage for the Gatling +guns, had never foreseen the necessity for a brake, and it was therefore +necessary to cut down bushes from the roadside and fasten the rear wheels by +placing a stout pole between the spokes and over the trail of the piece. This +locked the wheels, and the guns were thus enabled to slide down the steep hill +without danger of a runaway. From this point the road became a narrow defile. +The rank jungle closed in upon the trail, the long barbed leaves of the Spanish +bayonet hung across and lacerated the legs of the mules until the blood +trickled down to the hoofs; the boughs of the trees hung down over it so that +even the men on foot had to stoop to pass under them, and the tortuous path +winding in and out amid the dense tropical undergrowth made it impossible to +see in places more than twenty-five or thirty yards ahead at a time. +</p> + +<p> +The advance guard, consisting of all the members of one gun crew, had been +organized at once upon starting, and this guard moved along the road about two +hundred and fifty yards in advance of the detachment, scouting every path +vigilantly to the right and left, and keeping a constant, careful lookout to +the front. Their orders were, in case of encountering the enemy, to scatter in +the underbrush, open fire with magazines, so as to produce the impression upon +the enemy that there was a large force, and then slowly fall back upon the +battery. The plan was, upon the first alarm, to bring the two leading guns into +battery upon the road, with the fourth gun ready to be opened to either flank, +while the gun crew of the third gun, which formed the advance guard, were to +act as infantry support to the battery. It was hoped that the enemy would +follow the advance guard as it retreated, and it was believed that the Gatling +gun battery could take care of two or three regiments of Spaniards without help +if necessary. +</p> + +<p> +This form for the march had been adopted as the result of mature reflection. +The general had offered a cavalry escort of two troops, and Gen. Sumner had +rather urged the use of an escort, but it was desired to demonstrate that a +battery of machine guns, properly manned and equipped, is capable of +independent action, and does not need the assistance of either arm of the +service. In fact, the Gatling gun men would have been rather pleased than not +to have had a brush with the enemy without the assistance of either infantry or +cavalry. But it was not to be. +</p> + +<p> +The march was continued until darkness fell over the landscape, and the battery +arrived at a beautiful camping-place about one mile east of Siboney, where a +break in the water-pipe near the railroad track gave an ample supply of +excellent water, and a ruined plantation, now overgrown with luxuriant +sugar-cane, provided ample forage for the mules. The two troops of cavalry, +which had been offered and refused as an escort, had reached this camping-place +some time before, so that the wearied members of the detachment found pleasant +camp-fires already throwing their weird lights and shadows over the drooping +branches of the royal palm. +</p> + +<p> +Here, in the midst of the jungle, they pitched their first camp in Cuba. The +condition of the mules was duly looked to, their shoulders washed down with +strong salty water, their feet carefully examined, and the animals then +tethered to graze their fill on the succulent sugar-cane, after having had a +bountiful supply of oats. Meantime the camp cooks had a kettle full of coffee +simmering, and canned roast beef warming over the fire, and after a hearty meal +the tired men stretched themselves upon the ground, with no canopy except the +stars and only one sentinel over the camp, and slept more soundly than they had +on board the tossing <i>Cherokee</i>. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap05"></a>CHAPTER V.<br /> +THE MARCH.</h2> + +<p> +At early dawn the battery arose, and, after a quick breakfast, resumed the +march. Some half-mile farther on they passed a battery of light artillery which +had preceded them on the road by some nine hours, and which had camped at this +point awaiting forage. At Siboney the detachment stopped to look after the +detail from the 13th Infantry, which had not yet reported. The detachment +commander sought out the regimental adjutant, who referred him to the +regimental commander, Col. Worth. This colonel was at first reluctant to allow +the men to go, but, on being informed of the necessity for them, and after +inquiring about the orders on the subject, he directed the detail to report +immediately. All the members of this detail reported at once, except Corp. +Rose, who had been left by his company commander on board ship. +</p> + +<p> +The road from Siboney to the front was not known. There was no one in camp who +even knew its general direction. Application was therefore made to Gen. +Castillo, who was in command of a body of Cubans at Siboney, for a guide. After +a great deal of gesticulation, much excited talk between the general and +members of his staff, and numerous messengers had been dispatched hither and +thither upon this important and very difficult business, a Cuban officer was +sent with instructions to furnish a guide who could conduct the detachment to +Gen. Wheeler’s headquarters at the front. In the course of some twenty +minutes, a dirty slouchy, swarthy, lousy-looking vagabond was pointed out as +the desired guide, and was said to know every by-path and trail between Siboney +and Santiago. He was told to go with the detachment to Gen. Wheeler’s +headquarters and then return, and the detachment commander started for his +command followed by his sable guide. Passing through a group of these brave +Cuban heroes, he lost sight of his redoubtable guide for an instant, and has +never since found that gentleman. +</p> + +<p> +It would be just as well to add a description of the patriotic Cuban as he was +found by the Gatling Gun Detachment during their campaign in behalf of Cuban +independence, in the name of humanity; and this description, it is thought, +tallies with the experience of all officers in the expedition. +</p> + +<p> +The valiant Cuban! He strikes you first by his color. It ranges from chocolate +yellow through all the shades to deepest black with kinky hair; but you never +by any chance see a white Cuban, except the fat, sleek, well-groomed, superbly +mounted ones in “khaki,” who loaf around headquarters with +high-ranking shoulder-straps. These are all imported from the United States. +They comprise the few wealthy ones of Spanish descent, who are renegade to +their own nativity, and are appealing to the good people of the United States +to establish them in their status of master of peons without any overlord who +can exact his tithes for the privilege. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus14"></a> +<img src="images/14.jpg" width="600" height="383" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">San Juan Hill.</p> +</div> + +<p> +The next thing you notice is the furtive look of the thief. No one has ever yet +had a chance to look one of these chocolate-colored Cubans straight in the eye. +They sneak along. Their gait has in it something of that of the Apache, the +same soft moccasined tread, noiseless and always stealthy. Your impressions as +to their honesty can be instantly confirmed. Leave anything loose, from a heavy +winter overcoat, which no one could possibly use in Cuba, to—oh well, +anything—and any Cuban in sight will take great pleasure in dispelling +any false impressions that honesty is a native virtue. +</p> + +<p> +Next you notice that he is dirty. His wife does sometimes make a faint attempt +at personal cleanliness; this is evident, because in one bright instance a +white dress was seen on a native woman, that had been washed sometime in her +history. But as to his lordship, the proud male citizen of Cuba libre, you +would utterly and bitterly insult him by the intimation that a man of his +dignity ought ever to bathe, put on clean clothes, or even wash his hands. He +is not merely dirty, he is filthy. He is infested with things that crawl and +creep, often visibly, over his half-naked body, and he is so accustomed to it +that he does not even scratch. +</p> + +<p> +Next you observe the intense pride of this Cuban libre. It is manifested the +very first time you suggest anything like manual labor—he is incapable of +any other—even for such purposes as camp sanitation, carrying rations, or +for any other purpose. His manly chest swells with pride and he exclaims in +accents of wounded dignity, “Yo soy soldado!” Still his pride does +not by any chance get him knowingly under fire. At El Poso some of him did get +under fire from artillery, accidentally, and it took a strong provost guard to +keep him there. If he ever got under fire again there was no officer on the +firing-line who knew it. +</p> + +<p> +He is a treacherous, lying cowardly, thieving, worthless, half-breed mongrel; +born of a mongrel spawn of Europe, crossed upon the fetiches of darkest Africa +and aboriginal America. He is no more capable of self-government than the +Hottentots that roam the wilds of Africa or the Bushmen of Australia. He can +not be trusted like the Indian, will not work like a negro, and will not fight +like a Spaniard; but he will lie like a Castilian with polished suavity, and he +will stab you in the dark or in the back with all the dexterity of a renegade +graduate of Carlisle. +</p> + +<p> +Providence has reserved a fairer future for this noble country than to be +possessed by this horde of tatterdemalions. Under the impetus of American +energy and capital, governed by a firm military hand with even justice, it will +blossom as the rose; and, in the course of three or four generations, even the +Cuban may be brought to appreciate the virtues of cleanliness, temperance, +industry, and honesty. +</p> + +<p> +Our good roads ended at Siboney, and from there on to Gen. Wheeler’s +headquarters was some of the worst road ever traveled. Part of it lay through +deep valleys, where the sun was visible scarcely more than an hour at noontime, +and the wet, fetid soil was tramped into a muck of malarial slime under foot of +the mules and men. The jungle became ranker, the Spanish bayonets longer and +their barbs sharper in these low bottom jangles. The larger undergrowth closed +in more sharply on the trail, and its boughs overhung so much in some places +that it became necessary to cut them away with axes in order to pass. +</p> + +<p> +These guns were the first wheeled vehicles that had ever disturbed the solitude +of this portion of Cuba. The chocolate-colored natives of Cuba sneak; the white +native of Cuba, when he travels at all, goes on horseback. He very seldom +travels in Cuba at all, because he is not often there. Consequently the roads +in Cuba, as a rule, are merely small paths sufficient for the native to walk +along, and they carry the machete in order to open a path if necessary. These +low places in the valleys were full of miasmatic odors, yellow fever, agues, +and all the ills that usually pertain to the West Indian climate. +</p> + +<p> +At other places the road ran along the tops of the foot-hills from one to two +hundred feet higher than the bottom of these valleys. Here the country was much +more open. The path was usually wide enough for the guns to move with +comparative ease. Sometimes one wagon could pass another easily. These parts of +the road were usually more or less strewn with boulders. The road was rarely +level and frequently the upland parts were washed out. Sometimes it was only +the boulder-clad bottom of a ravine; again the water would have washed out the +gully on one side so deep as to threaten overturning the guns. The portions of +the road between the valleys and the top of these foot-hills were the worst +places the detachment had to pass. These ascents and descents were nearly +always steep. While not at all difficult for the man upon horseback or for the +man on foot, they were frequently almost too steep for draft, and they were +always washed out. In places it was necessary to stop and fill up these +washouts by shoveling earth and stone into the places before the detachment +could pass. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus15"></a> +<img src="images/15.jpg" width="600" height="388" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Cuban Soldiers as They Were.</p> +</div> + +<p> +On one of these occasions, while heaving rock to fill up a bad washout, Priv. +Jones was stung by a scorpion. Jones did not know what had bitten him, and +described it as a little black thing about as long as his finger. Fortunately +there was a small supply of whisky with the detachment, and this remedy was +applied to Jones internally. Some soldier in the detachment suggested that a +quid of tobacco externally would be beneficial, so this also was done. It was +not a dressing favorable to an aseptic condition of the wound, perhaps, nor was +there anything in the quid of tobacco calculated to withdraw the poison or +neutralize its effects, so the doctors may characterize this as a very foolish +proceeding; but country people skilled in simples and herb remedies might tell +some of these ultra scientific surgeons that the application of a quid of +tobacco or of a leaf of tobacco to the sting of a wasp or the bite of a spider, +or even the sting of a scorpion, is nearly always attended by beneficial +results. In fact, when Jones was stung there was a surgeon, a medical officer, +who turned up even before Jones was treated with the whisky cure, and, upon +receiving Jones’ explanation that he had been heaving rock and had been +bitten on the end of the finger by a little black thing, and after hearing the +remarks of the men that it was very probably a scorpion sting, this medical +officer very sagely diagnosed the accident to that effect, but was unable to +prescribe any remedy because he had not brought along his emergency case. This +medical officer, with his two attendant hospital satellites, had left both +litter and emergency case upon the transport. +</p> + +<p> +The ordinary line officer or soldier who is somewhat accustomed to carrying +weights and does not require a hospital drill to teach him to carry a wounded +comrade a few yards, looks with a certain degree of envy upon the possession of +a hospital litter with its convenient straps for weight-carrying, and would +consider this a very convenient means for carrying a pack. This litter is +designed to enable two men, hospital attendants or band men, to pick up a +wounded soldier weighing some 160 or 180 pounds and carry him from fifty yards +to a mile if necessary, to a dressing-station or hospital shack. The medical +field-case No. 1 weighs about sixty pounds filled, and field-case No. 2 weighs +about forty pounds. These two cases contain all the medicines necessary to run +a division hospital; the case of emergency instruments does not weigh above ten +or twelve pounds, and would not be a burden for a child to carry. It is +therefore difficult for the small-minded officer of the line to see why the +Medical Department was unable to have these medicines up at the front. They had +the same means of locomotion provided for the other soldiers, by Nature, and +they had, moreover, no particular necessity for all rushing to the extreme +front. On the contrary, they had from the 23d of June, when the landing began, +at Baiquiri, until the 1st of July, to accomplish a distance of less than +twenty miles; and it would seem reasonable that they might have had their +medicine-cases up where they were needed by that time. +</p> + +<p> +These gentlemen pose as the most learned, expert, scientific, highly trained +body of medical men in the world. They are undoubtedly as well trained, as +highly educated, and as thoroughly proficient as the medical officers of any +army in the world. A summons of an ordinary practitioner would bring with him +his saddle-bags of medicines; no physician in the city would pretend to answer +even an ambulance call without having a few simple remedies—in other +words, an emergency case; but it was an exception, and a very rare exception at +that, to find a medical officer who took the trouble to carry anything upon his +aristocratic back on that march to the front. +</p> + +<p> +A conversation overheard between two medical officers on board a transport just +before landing may serve to partially explain the state of affairs. Said +surgeon No. 1 to surgeon No. 2, “We are going to land this morning; are +you going to carry your field-case?” To which surgeon No. 2 indignantly +replied, “No, I’m not a pack-mule!” Surgeon No. 1 again +inquired, “Are you going to make your hospital men carry it?” To +which surgeon No. 2 replied, “No; my men are not beasts of burden.” +Both of these medical officers went ashore; one of them had his field case +carried; the other did not. Both of them were up at the firing-line, both did +good service in rendering first aid. Both of them worked heroically, both +seemed deeply touched by the suffering they were compelled to witness, and both +contracted the climatic fever. But in the absence of medicines the role of the +surgeon can be taken by the private soldier who has been instructed in first +aid to the injured; for in the absence of medical cases and surgical +instruments the first-aid packet is the only available source of relief, and +these first-aid packets were carried by the private soldier, not by the Medical +Department. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus16"></a> +<img src="images/16.jpg" width="600" height="380" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Wagon Train.</p> +</div> + +<p> +A little less “theory,” a little less “science,” a +little less tendency to dwell on the “officer” part of the +business, with a little more devotion to the duty of relieving suffering +humanity—in short, a little less insistence upon “rank,” +would have vastly improved the medical service of the United States Army in the +field at this time. +</p> + +<p> +These remarks do not apply to the heroes like Ebert, Thorpe, Brewer, Kennedy, +Warren, and a few others, who fearlessly exposed their lives upon the very +firing-line. These men are the very “salt of the earth.” The escape +of even a “frazzle” of the 5th Corps was due to their superhuman +energy and exertions. They did much to redeem the good name of their corps and +to alleviate suffering. +</p> + +<p> +But Priv. Jones recovered from the sting of the scorpion. In fact, soldiers +were heard to exclaim that they would be glad to find a scorpion when they saw +the character of the remedy applied in Jones’ case. +</p> + +<p> +The detachment left Siboney about 10 o’clock in the morning and tramped +steadily along the road up hill and down until 12; then, upon finding a +convenient place, it halted for dinner. The mules were unharnessed, coffee +prepared, and, just as the detachment was about to begin this noonday meal, two +of the peripatetic newspaper fraternity joined, <i>en route</i> to the rear. +The ubiquitous correspondent had for the first time discovered the Gatling Gun +Detachment, and they thought it was Artillery. +</p> + +<p> +One of these gentlemen was a long, slim, frayed-out specimen of humanity, with +a wearied and expressive droop of the shoulders; the other was a short, stout, +florid, rotund individual, and his “too, too solid flesh” was in +the very visible act of melting. The newspaper gentlemen were invited to +participate in the noonday meal, and, with some gentle urging, consented. It +was only after the meal was over that it was learned that this was the first +square meal these men had had in over forty-eight hours. They had been with +Gen. Wheeler at La Guasimas, had rejoined Wheeler after reporting that fight, +in hopes of making another “scoop,” and were now on their way to +Siboney, hoping to buy some provisions. Poor devils! They had worked for a +“scoop” at La Guasimas; they had gone up on the firing-line and had +sent back authentic accounts of that little skirmish; but they did not make the +“scoop.” The “scoop” was made by newspaper men who had +remained on board the transports, and who took the excited account of a member +of the command who had come back delirious with excitement, crazed with fear, +trembling as though he had a congestive chill—who, in fact, had come back +faster than he had gone to the front, and in his excited condition had told the +story of an ambuscade; that Wheeler, Wood, and Roosevelt were all dead; that +the enemy was as thick as the barbs on the Spanish bayonet; and that he, only +he, had escaped to tell the tale. This was the account of the battle that got +back to the newspapers in the form of a “scoop,” and it was nothing +more nor less than the excited imagination of the only coward who at that time +or ever afterwards was a member of the famous Rough Riders. He was consequently +returned to civil life prematurely. +</p> + +<p> +The newspaper correspondent in Cuba was of a distinguished type. You recognized +him immediately. He was utterly fearless; he delighted in getting up on the +firing-line—that is, a few of him did. Among these few might be mentioned +Marshall, and Davis, and Remington, and Marcotte, and King, and some half-dozen +others; but there was another type of newspaper correspondent in Cuba, who hung +around from two miles and a half to three miles in rear of the firing-line, and +never by any possibility got closer to the enemy than that. The members of this +guild of the newspaper fraternity were necessarily nearer the cable office than +their more daring comrades; in fact, there were a few who were known to have +been eight or nine miles nearer to the cable office during battles, and those +correspondents were the ones who made the great “scoop” in the New +York papers, by which a regiment that laid down and skulked in the woods, or +ran wildly to the rear, was made to do all the fighting on the first day of +July. This latter class of journalists were a menace to the army, a disgrace to +their profession, and a blot upon humanity. Even the Cubans were ashamed of +them. +</p> + +<p> +The detachment resumed the march at half past 1, and encountered some very +difficult road, difficult because it needed repairs. The most difficult places +were the ascents and descents of the hills, and in nearly every case fifteen or +twenty minutes’ careful investigation was able to discover a means of +getting around the worst places in the road. When it was not practicable to go +around, J. Shiffer and his three fellow-teamsters would take a twist of their +hands in the manes of their long-eared chargers, and apparently lift them down, +or up, as the case might be, always landing on their feet and always safely. It +was merely a question of good driving and will to go through. The worst places +were repaired by the detachment before these reckless attempts at +precipice-scaling were made. At one place there was a detachment of the 24th +Infantry engaged in an alleged effort to repair the road. They did not seem to +work with much vim. Chaplain Springer, having in the morning exhorted them to +repentance and a better life and to doing good works unto their brethren, the +enemy, was engaged at this point in the afternoon, it being Sunday, in a +practical demonstration of what he considered good works. In other words, the +chaplain, whose religious enthusiasm no one doubts, was engaged in heaving +rocks with his own hands to show these colored soldiers how they ought to make +good road, and he was doing “good works.” +</p> + +<p> +It is but a just tribute to Chaplains Springer and Swift, of the Regulars, to +say that they were conspicuous in the hour of danger at the point of greatest +peril. In the fearless discharge of their holy office, they faced all the +dangers of battle; nor did they neglect the care of the body while ministering +to the spiritual needs of the soldiers. Springer, for example, collected wood +and made coffee for all on the firing-line, within 400 yards of the block-house +at El Caney; and Swift was equally conspicuous in relieving suffering, binding +up wounds, and caring for the sick. There were probably others equally as +daring; but the author knows of the deeds of these men, and desires to pay a +tribute of respect to them. Chaplains of this stamp are always listened to with +respectful attention when they express their views of the true course of life +to obtain a blessed hereafter. They were in very sharp contrast to the +long-visaged clerical gentlemen who were so much in evidence at Tampa, and who +never got within 500 miles of danger. +</p> + +<p> +The detachment safely passed all the bad places and obstacles in the road, +arriving at Gen. Wheeler’s headquarters about half past 4 o’clock, +and reported. It was assigned a position between the advance outposts and +directed to dispose of its guns in such a manner as to sweep the hills on which +these outposts were placed. High hills to the right at a distance of about 2000 +yards were supposed to be infested by the enemy, and a blockhouse which stood +out against the sky-line was thought to contain a Spanish detachment. A high +hill to the left at a distance of about 1000 yards had not yet been explored, +and it was thought probable that some of the enemy was concealed on this hill +also. The detachment commander was directed to report, after posting his +battery, in which duty he was assisted by Col. Dorst, to Gen. Chaffee, who had +charge of the outposts. The General inquired what the battery consisted of, and +upon being informed that “It consists of four Gatling guns, posted so as +to command the neighboring hills,” remarked in a very contemptuous +manner, “You can’t command anything.” Gen. Chaffee +subsequently had reason to revise his opinion, if not to regret the expression +of it. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap06"></a>CHAPTER VI.<br /> +THE BATTERY IN CAMP WHEELER.</h2> + +<p> +At this point in the history of the detachment, it would be well to give some +account of the reasoning which led to its formation and the personnel of the +detachment. +</p> + +<p> +Since the days of ’65 the armies of the civilized world have adopted a +rifle whose effective range is more than twice as great as that used in the +Civil War. Very able discussions have been made upon the theoretical changes of +the battle-field thus brought about, but no proper conclusion had been reached. +It was acknowledged by all text-book writers that the artillery arm of the +service would find much greater difficulty in operating at short ranges, and +that assaults upon fortified positions would be much more difficult in the +future. But only Gen. Williston, of the United States Artillery, had ever taken +the advanced ground that in a machine gun arm would be found a valuable +auxiliary as a result of these changed conditions. This theory of Gen. +Williston’s was published in the <i>Journal of the Military Service +Institute</i> in the spring of ’86, but never went, so far as Gen. +Williston was concerned, beyond a mere theory; nor had the detachment commander +ever heard of Gen. Williston’s article until after the battle of +Santiago. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus17"></a> +<img src="images/17.jpg" width="600" height="380" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Gatling Battery under Artillery Fire at El Poso.</p> +</div> + +<p> +A study of the science of tactics—not merely drill regulations, but +tactics in the broader sense of maneuvering bodies of troops upon the +battle-field—had led Lieut. Parker to the conclusion that the artillery +arm of the service had been moved back upon the battle-field to ranges not less +than 1500 yards. This not because of lack of courage on the part of the +Artillery, but as an inherent defect in any arm of the service which depends +upon draft to reach an effective position. It was not believed that animals +could live at a shorter range in anything like open country. The problem of +supporting an infantry charge by some sort of fire immediately became the great +tactical problem of the battle-field. Admitting that the assault of a fortified +position has become much more difficult than formerly, the necessity of +artillery support, or its equivalent in some kind of fire, became +correspondingly more important, while under the conditions it became doubly +more difficult to bring up this support in the form of artillery fire. +</p> + +<p> +The solution of this problem, then, was the principal difficulty of the modern +battle-field; and yet, strange to say, the curtailed usefulness of artillery +does not seem to have suggested itself to anybody else in the service previous +to the first day of July. This problem had been made the subject of special +study by him for several years, and had led to the conclusion that some form of +machine gun must be adopted to take the place of artillery from 1500 yards +down. This in turn led to the study of machine guns. The different forms in use +in the different armies of the world had been considered, and it was found that +there was none in any service properly mounted for the particular use desired. +All of them required the service of animals as pack-mules, or for draft, while +the very conditions of the problem required a gun to be so mounted that the use +of animals could be dispensed with. +</p> + +<p> +The Maxim gun has been reduced in weight to about 60 pounds, and is furnished +with a tripod weighing about the same; but this is too heavy, and the supply of +ammunition at once becomes a critical question. The Colt’s automatic +rapid-fire gun has been reduced to 40 pounds, with a tripod of equal weight, +but here again the same difficulty presents itself. The soldier is capable of +carrying only a limited amount of weight; and with his already too heavy pack, +his three days’ rations, together with the heat, fatigue and excitement +of battle, it did not appear possible for any tripod-mounted gun to be +effectively used. +</p> + +<p> +The problem therefore resolved itself into the question of carriages: A +carriage capable of carrying any form of machine gun using small-caliber +ammunition, capable of being moved anywhere by draft, capable of being +dismantled and carried on a pack-mule, and, above, all, capable of being moved +by hand; required also some device for getting the requisite amount of +ammunition up to the firing-line. A carriage and ammunition cart was invented +fulfilling all these conditions and the invention was presented to the +adjutant-general of the army for consideration, accompanied by a discussion of +the proper tactical use of the gun so mounted. This discussion, in part, was as +follows: +</p> + +<p> +“It is claimed for this carriage that a machine gun mounted on it can be +carried with a firing-line of infantry on the offensive, over almost any kind +of ground, into the decisive zone of rifle fire and to the lodgment in the +enemy’s line, if one is made. +</p> + +<p> +“On broken ground the piece can be moved forward by draft under cover of +sheltering features of the terrain to a position so near the enemy that, under +cover of its fire, an infantry line can effect a lodgment, after which the +piece can be rushed forward by a sudden dash. +</p> + +<p> +“The machine gun, mounted on this carriage, is especially adapted for +service with the reserve of a battalion on the offensive, acting either alone +or in regiment. Its use will enable the commander to reduce the reserve, +thereby increasing the strength of the fighting-line, and yet his flanks will +be better protected than formerly, while he will still have a more powerful +reserve. If the fighting-line be driven back, the machine guns will establish a +point of resistance on which the line can rally, and from which it can not be +driven, unless the machine guns be annihilated by artillery fire. +</p> + +<p> +“In case of counter-charge by the enemy, the superior weight and +intensity of its fire will shake the enemy and so demoralize him that, in all +probability, a return counter-charge will result in his complete discomfiture. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus18"></a> +<img src="images/18.jpg" width="600" height="380" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Gatling Gun on Firing-Line July 1st.<br />(Taken under fire by +Sergeant Weigle.)</p> +</div> + +<p> +“Retiring troops as rear guards have in this weapon <i>par excellence</i> +the weapon for a swift and sharp return with the power of rapidly withdrawing. +If the enemy can by any means be enticed within its range, he will certainly +suffer great losses. If he cannot be brought in range, his distance will be +rather respectful.” +</p> + +<p> +This discussion as presented was entirely and absolutely original with the +author and the result of his own unaided researches on the subject. It will be +seen in the account of the battle how accurately the conditions there laid down +were fulfilled. +</p> + +<p> +But the carriage in use by the Gatling Gun Detachment was not the one proposed +to the War Department. That carriage has not, as yet, been built, nor has the +War Department in any way recognized the invention or even acknowledged the +receipt of the communication and drawings. +</p> + +<p> +The problem, therefore, confronting the Gatling Gun Detachment was to +demonstrate the above uses of the machine gun, taking the obsolete artillery +carriage drawn by mules, and endeavor to get the guns into action by draft. The +<i>personnel</i> of the detachment alone accounts for their success. They got +the guns up on the firing-line, not because of any superiority of the carriage +over that in use by the artillery, for there was none; not because of aid +rendered by other arms of the service, for they actually went into battle as +far as 100 yards in advance of the infantry skirmishers; but because the +Gatling Gun Detachment was there for the purpose of getting into the fight and +was determined to give the guns a trial. +</p> + +<p> +In the first place, all the members of the Gatling Gun Detachment were members +of the Regular Army. All but three of them were natives of the United States, +and those three were American citizens. Every man in the detachment had been +selected by the detachment commander, or had voluntarily undertaken to perform +this duty, realizing and believing that it was an extremely hazardous duty. +Every member of the detachment possessed a common-school education, and some of +them were well educated. All of them were men of exceptionally good character +and sober habits. The drivers were Privs. Shiffer, Correll, Merryman, and +Chase. The description formerly given of Shiffer applies, with slight +modifications, to all the four. The first sergeant, Weigle, a native of +Gettysburg, a soldier of eight years’ experience in the Regular Army, a +man of fine natural ability and good educational attainments, was worthy to +command any company in the United States Army. Thoroughly well instructed in +the mechanism of Gatling guns, of exceptionally cheerful and buoyant +disposition, he was an ideal first sergeant for any organization. Steigerwald, +acting chief of gun No. 1, was of German birth, well educated. He had chosen +the military profession for the love of it; he was a man of wonderfully fine +physique, a “dead sure” shot, and one who hardly understood the +meaning of the word “fatigue.” He was ambitious, he was an ardent +believer in the Gatling gun, and he was determined to win a commission on the +battle-field. +</p> + +<p> +Corporal Doyle was a magnificent type of the old-time Regular—one of the +kind that composed the army before Proctorism tried to convert it into a +Sunday-school. In former days Doyle had been a drinking man; but the common +opinion as expressed by his company officers even in those days was, “I +would rather have Doyle, drunk, than any other non-commissioned officer, sober; +because Doyle never gets too drunk to attend to duty.” Two years before +this Doyle had quit drinking, and the only drawback to this most excellent +noncommissioned officer had been removed. He was a thorough disciplinarian; one +of the kind that takes no back talk; one who is prone to using the butt end of +a musket as a persuader, if necessary; and Doyle was thoroughly devoted to the +detachment commander. Corp. Smith was another of the same stamp. Corp. Smith +loved poker. In fact, his <i>sobriquet</i> was “Poker Smith.” He +was one of the kind of poker-players who would “see” a $5 bet on a +pair of deuces, raise it to $25, and generally rake in the “pot.” +It was Corp. Smith who thought in this Gatling gun deal he was holding a pair +of deuces, because he didn’t take much stock in Gatling guns, but he was +a firm believer in his commanding officer and was prepared to +“bluff” the Dons to the limit of the game. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus19"></a> +<img src="images/19.jpg" width="600" height="378" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Fort Roosevelt.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Sergeants Ryder and Weischaar were splendid types of the American Regular +non-commissioned officer, alert, respectful, attentive to duty, resolute, +unflinching, determined, magnificent soldiers. Serg. Green was a young man, +only twenty-three, the idolized son of his parents, in the army because he +loved it; enthusiastic over his gun, and fully determined to “pot” +every Spaniard in sight. Corp. Rose was like unto him. They were eager for +nothing so much as a chance to get into action, and equally determined to stay +there. The privates of the detachment were like unto the noncommissioned +officers. They had volunteered for this duty from a love of adventure, a desire +to win recognition, or from their personal attachment to the commanding +officer; and there was not a man who was not willing to follow him into the +“mouth of hell” if necessary. The gunners were expert shots with +the rifle. Numbers 1 and 2, who turned the crank and fed the gun, respectively, +were selected for their dexterity and coolness; the drivers, for their skill in +handling mules; and each of the other members of the detachment was placed on +that duty which he seemed best fitted to perform. +</p> + +<p> +The roll of the detachment and its organization as it went into battle on the +first day of July are subjoined: +</p> + +<p> +<i>Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps.</i> +</p> + +<p> +Commanding Officer, John H. Parker, first lieutenant, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Acting First Sergeant, Alois Weischaar, sergeant, Co. A, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Acting Quartermaster Sergeant, William Eyder, Co. G, 13th Infantry. +</p> + +<p> +Gun No. 1:<br/> +Acting Chief and Gunner, Charles C. Steigerwald, corporal, Co. A,<br/> +13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 1, Private Voelker, Co. A, 12th Infantry.<br/> +No. 2, Private Elkins, Co. D, 17th Infantry.<br/> +No. 3, Private Schmandt, Co. G, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 4, Private Needles, Co. E, 17th Infantry.<br/> +No. 5, Private Click, Co. E, 17th Infantry.<br/> +No. 6, Private Jones, Co. D, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Driver, Private Shiffer, Co. E, 17th Infantry. +</p> + +<p> +Gun No. 2:<br/> +Chief, Sergeant William Ryder, Co. G, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Gunner, Corporal Geo. N. Rose, Co. C, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 1, Private Seaman, Co. B, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 2, Private Kastner, Co. A, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 3, Private Pyne, Co. H, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 4, Private Schulze, Co. A, 17th Infantry.<br/> +No. 5, Private Barts, Co. E, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Driver, Private Correll, Co. C, 12th Infantry. +</p> + +<p> +Gun No. 3:<br/> +Chief, Sergeant Newton A. Green, Co. H, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Gunner, Corporal Matthew Doyle, Co. C, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 1, Private Anderson, Co. C, 12th Infantry.<br/> +No. 2, Private Sine, Co. E, 17th Infantry.<br/> +No. 3, Private Lauer, Co. C, 12th Infantry.<br/> +No. 4, Private Dellett, Co. D, 17th Infantry.<br/> +No. 5, Private Cory, Co. A, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 6, Private Greenberg, Co. G, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Driver, Private Merryman, Co. A, 17th Infantry. +</p> + +<p> +Gun No. 4:<br/> +Chief, Sergeant John N. Weigle, Co. L, 9th Infantry.<br/> +Gunner, Corporal Robert S. Smith, Co. C, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 1, Private McGoin, Co. D, 17th Infantry.<br/> +No. 2, Private Misiak, Co. E, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 3, Private Power, Co. A, 13th Infantry.<br/> +No. 4, Private McDonald, Co. B, 17th Infantry.<br/> +No. 5, Private Prazak, Co. E, 12th Infantry.<br/> +Driver, Private Chase, Co. H, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Cook, Private Hoft, Co. D, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Assistant cook, Private Bremer, Co. G, 13th Infantry.<br/> +Absent, sick, Private Murray, Co. F, 13th Infantry, at Tampa. +</p> + +<p> +Sergeant Weigle was subsequently appointed first sergeant of Co. L., 9th +Infantry, and of the Gatling Gun Detachment, vice Weischaar, relieved at his +own request. +</p> + +<p> +Another element which contributed much to the success of the detachment was the +presence with it of Captain Marcotte. This excellent officer had served with +great distinction in the Civil War, having been promoted from a private in the +ranks through all of the grades up to a captaincy, for meritorious conduct in +battle, and having failed of higher grades only because he was too badly shot +to pieces to continue with the Army. He joined the detachment on the 25th of +June, and his valuable advice was always at the disposal not merely of the +commander, but of any member of the detachment who wished to consult him. He +had spent seventeen years in the Cuban climate and was thoroughly familiar with +all the conditions under which we were laboring. He contributed not a little, +by his presence, his example, and his precept, to the final success of the +organization. When the battery went under fire, Marcotte was with it. It was +the first time most of the members had passed through this ordeal, but who +could run, or even feel nervous, with this gray-haired man skipping about from +point to point and taking notes of the engagement as coolly as though he were +sitting in the shade of a tree sipping lime-juice cocktails, a mile from +danger. +</p> + +<p> +Such was the <i>personnel</i> of the detachment. It lay in Camp Wheeler, which +was only about a mile and a half from El Poso, where the first engagement +occurred on the first of July, until that morning. The mules were daily +harnessed up and drilled in maneuvering the pieces, and the members of the +detachment experimentally posted in different positions in order to get the +most effective service. +</p> + +<p> +On the 27th, Serg. Green was sent back to Siboney with orders to bring Corp. +Rose or his body. He brought Corp. Rose, and the corporal was very glad to be +brought. +</p> + +<p> +The mules were fed with oats and on the juicy sugar-cane. It is worthy of +mention that no other organization at the front had oats. A feed or two of oats +was given to Gen. Wheeler and Col. Dorst for their horses; it was the first +time their horses had tasted oats since leaving the transports, and was +probably the last time until after the surrender. Furthermore, the Gatling Gun +Detachment had “grub.” Of course, it was “short” on +potatoes, onions, and vegetables generally; these luxuries were not to be well +known again until it returned to the United States; but it did have hardtack, +bacon, canned roast beef, sugar, and coffee, having drawn all the rations it +could carry before leaving Baiquiri, and was the only organization which had as +much as twenty-four hours’ rations. Gen. Hawkins and his whole brigade +were living from hand to mouth, one meal at a time. The same was true of Gen. +Wheeler and the whole cavalry division, and they were depending for that one +meal upon the pack-mule train. On the 30th of June a complete set of muster- +and pay-rolls, was prepared for the detachment, and it was duly mustered in the +usual form and manner. It was the only organization at the front of which a +formal muster was made, and was the only one there which had muster- and +pay-rolls. +</p> + +<p> +It rained on the 29th and 30th of June. Not such rains as the people of the +United States are familiar with, but Cuban rains. It was like standing under a +barrel full of water and having the bottom knocked out. These rains caused the +rifles and carbines of the army to rust, and some quickwitted captain bethought +himself to beg oil from the Gatling Gun Detachment. He got it. Another, and +another, and still another begged for oil; then regiments began to beg for oil; +and finally application was made for oil for a whole brigade. This led to the +following correspondence: +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Camp Six Miles from Santiago, “29th June, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>The Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division, Present:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“Sir,—I have the honor to inform you that I have learned that some +of the rifles in this command are badly in need of oil, and that in some +companies there is no oil to use on them. These facts I learned through +requests to me for oil. +</p> + +<p> +“I therefore report to you that my men found at Altares (the second +landing-place) and reported to me four (4) barrels of lard oil and three (3) +barrels of cylinder oil, in an old oil-house near the machine shops. +</p> + +<p> +“If this be procured and issued, it will save the rifles and carbines +from rust. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Very respectfully,<br /> +“<i>John H. Parker</i>,<br /> +“Lt. Comdg. G. G. Detachment, 5th Corps.” +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>First Endorsement.</i> +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Headquarters Cavalry Division,<br/> +“Camp 6 miles east of Santiago de Cuba,<br/> +“June 29, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“Respectfully referred to the adjutant-general, 6th Army Corps. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>Jos. Wheeler</i>,<br/> +“Major-General U. S. Vols., Comdg.” +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Second Endorsement.</i> +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Headquarters 5th Corps,<br/> +“June 29, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“Return. Lt. Parker will send a man back tomorrow to obtain the necessary +oil. +</p> + +<p> +“By command of Gen. Shafter. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>E. J. McClernand</i>,<br/> +“A. A. G.” +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Third Endorsement.</i> +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Headquarters Cavalry Division,<br/> +“June 29, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“Return Lt. Parker. Attention invited to the foregoing endorsement. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>J. H. Dorst</i>,<br/> +“Lieutenant-Colonel.” +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Fourth Endorsement.</i> +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“June 30, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“<i>The Quartermaster, Altares, Cuba:</i> +</p> + +<p> +“Please furnish to Sergeant Green of my detachment transportation for two +(2) barrels of oil. He will show you an order from Gen. Shafter, and the matter +is urgent. The soldiers must have this oil at once, as their rifles are rusting +badly. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>John H. Parker</i>,<br/> +“Lt. Comdg. Gatling Gun Detach.” +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus20"></a> +<img src="images/20.jpg" width="600" height="379" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Sergeant Greene’s Gun at Fort Roosevelt.</p> +</div> + +<p> +The quartermaster furnished the transportation and two barrels of oil were duly +forwarded to the front and placed in charge of brigade quartermasters at +different points, with orders to distribute out one quart to each company. This +oil, perhaps, had some bearing upon the condition of the rifles in the fight +following. +</p> + +<p> +On the 27th of June, Captain Marcotte and the detachment commander made a +reconnaissance of a high hill to the left of Camp Wheeler, and, having gained +the top, reconnoitered the city of Santiago and its surrounding defenses with a +powerful glass, and as a result reported to Gen. Wheeler that the key of +Santiago was the Morro mesa, a promontory or tableland overlooking the city on +the east side at a distance of about a mile and a half and not at that time +occupied by the enemy, with the proposition that a detail of a half-dozen men +from the detachment should make a rush and capture this plateau, and hold it +until the guns could be brought up. The general could not authorize the +proposed undertaking, as it would have endangered the safety of his army, +perhaps by leading to a premature engagement. By the time a sufficient +reconnaissance had been made and convinced everybody of the value of this plan, +the mesa had been strongly occupied by the enemy. It is still believed that the +occupation of this height was practicable on the 27th of June, and thought, if +it had been authorized, the Gatlings could have occupied and held this position +against all the Spaniards in the city of Santiago. A glance at the map will +show the extreme tactical importance of this position. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap07"></a>CHAPTER VII.<br /> +THE BATTLE.</h2> + +<p> +On the 30th day of June, General Shafter pitched his camp about half a mile in +advance of Camp Wheeler in a valley, and about five o’clock in the +afternoon communicated the plan of battle to the division commanders and to the +commander of the Gatling Gun Detachment. +</p> + +<p> +Reconnaissance had developed the fact that the enemy occupied the village of El +Caney, and that their first line of works surrounded the city of Santiago at a +distance of about a mile, crowning a semicircular ridge. Between the position +occupied by the general’s camp and this ridge, a distance of about two +and one-half miles, flowed the Aguadores and San Juan rivers, and about one +mile from the San Juan River, on the east side, was a ruined plantation and +mission house, called El Poso. Midway between El Caney and the Spanish position +was a large handsome mansion, called the Du Cuorot house, standing in the midst +of a large plantation and owned by a Frenchman, which both sides had agreed to +respect as neutral property. The general plan of the battle as given to these +officers on the 30th of June was for one division of the army (Lawton’s), +assisted by one battery of artillery (Capron’s), to make an attack at +daybreak upon the village of El Caney, and drive the enemy out of it. Another +division (Kent’s) was to make an attack upon the semicircular ridge of +hills south of El Caney as soon as Lawton was well committed to the fight, both +for the purpose of preventing reinforcements from going to El Caney and to +develop the enemy’s strength. It was expected that Lawton would capture +El Caney about eight or nine o’clock in the morning, and pursue the +retreating enemy, by the way of the Du Cuorot house, toward Santiago. This +movement would cause Lawton to execute, roughly, a left wheel, and it was +intended that in executing this maneuver Kent’s right should join, or +nearly join, Lawton’s left, after which the whole line was to move +forward according to the developments of the fight. Kent’s attack was to +be supported by Grimes’ Battery from El Poso. The Gatling Gun Detachment +was to move at daylight on the morning of July 1st, take position at El Poso +sheltered by the hill, in support of Grimes’ Battery, and there await +orders. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus21"></a> +<img src="images/21.jpg" width="600" height="377" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Skirmish Line in Battle.</p> +</div> + +<p> +This outline of the battle, as laid down by Gen. Shafter on the 30th day of +June, was eventually carried out to the letter; its successful operation shut +up a superior force in the city of Santiago, and compelled the surrender of the +city. +</p> + +<p> +Perhaps no better comment can be made upon the generalship of the corps +commander, no higher compliment be paid, than the mere statement that he was +able, fifteen hours before a shot was fired in the battle, to prescribe the +movements of the different organizations of his command, and to outline the +plan of battle as it was finally carried out, with a degree of precision which +can be fully appreciated only by those to whom the plan was communicated in +advance. In spite of slight changes, made necessary by local failures and +unforeseen circumstances; in spite of the very poor cooperation of the +artillery arm; in spite of the absence of cavalry, which made good +reconnaissance practically impossible; in spite of the fact that he was +operating against a superior force in strong intrenchments—the plan of +battle thus laid down was finally carried out with perfect success in every +detail. +</p> + +<p> +The Gatling Gun Detachment was assembled at six o’clock, and so much of +the plan of battle was explained to them as it was proper to give out, with +orders that breakfast was to be prepared by four o’clock and the +detachment be ready to move at 4:30. The plans were heard with careful +attention by the men, and the wisdom of giving to them some idea of the work +they were expected to do was fully vindicated on the following day, when they +were compelled to lie nearly three hours under a dropping fire, waiting for +“Lawton to become well engaged,” after which the detachment moved +forward, without a man missing, with the utmost steadiness and coolness, to the +attack. +</p> + +<p> +There was no nervousness displayed by the men. They knew their work was cut out +for them, and each man was eager to play his part in the great drama of the +morrow. There was no excited talk indulged in. None of the buzz of preparation +nor the hum of anticipation which to the civilian mind should precede a +desperate battle, but three or four members of the detachment took out their +soldiers’ hand-books and wrote in them their last will and testament, +requesting their commander to witness the same and act as executor. The courage +evinced by these men was not of that brutal order which ignores danger, but of +the moral quality which, fully realizing that somebody must get hurt, quietly +resolves to face whatever may happen in the performance of the full measure of +duty. +</p> + +<p> +At four o’clock the guard aroused the members of the detachment quietly, +and each man found a good hearty breakfast waiting for him, consisting of +hardtack, coffee, condensed milk, sugar, bacon, canned roast beef, and some +canned fruit, which had been obtained somehow and was opened upon this +occasion. It was the last square meal they were to have for several days. At +half past four the camp equipage had all been packed upon the guns in such a +manner as not to interfere with their instantly getting into action, and the +battery started for the front. +</p> + +<p> +The road to El Poso was very good and the mules trotted merrily along, preceded +and followed by infantry also bound for the front. The Cubans, too, were in +evidence; an irregular, struggling mob of undisciplined barbarians, vociferous, +clamorous, noisy, turbulent, excited. Presently the Cubans and infantry in +front of the battery halted and it passed beyond them, immediately throwing out +the crew of the third gun in front as an advance guard. It reached El Poso at +six o’clock, at which time there were no other soldiers there. The +battery took position as directed, under cover in rear of the hill and to the +right front of the El Poso house. The camp equipage and blanket-rolls, were +removed and piled neatly upon the ground, and Priv. Hoft was detailed to guard +them, as well as one of the spare mules. About half past seven o’clock +Grimes’ Battery arrived, and Col. McClernand, the assistant +adjutant-general of the corps. The battery of artillery halted upon the hill +near the Gatlings, while its commander, the adjutant-general, the <i>Army and +Navy Journal</i> correspondent, and the Gatling gun man climbed to the top of +the hill to reconnoiter the enemy. They were accompanied by several +<i>attachés</i> and a battalion of newspaper correspondents. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus22"></a> +<img src="images/22.jpg" width="600" height="383" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Fort Roosevelt.</p> +</div> + +<p> +To the southwest, at a distance of about 3,000 yards, the city of Santiago lay +slumbering in the morning sun. The chain of hills which surrounded the city, +lying between it and our position, was crowned with rank tropical verdure, and +gave no indications of military fortifications. There was no sign of life, a +gentle land breeze swayed the tops of the royal palms, and the little birds +flitted from bough to bough caroling their morning songs as though no such +events were impending as the bombardment of a city and the death of 400 gallant +soldiers. The gentle ripple of the creek, lapping over its pebbly bed at the +foot of the hill, was distinctly audible. +</p> + +<p> +The artillery officers produced their range-finders and made a scientific guess +at the distance from the hill to a red brick building in the northern edge of +Santiago. This guess was 2600 yards. They signalled to the lead piece of +Grimes’ Light Battery to ascend the hill. It was delayed for a moment +while picks and shovels were plied upon the top of the hill to make slight +emplacements for the guns, and at last, at ten minutes before eight +o’clock, the first piece started the difficult ascent. The drivers stood +up in their stirrups and lashed their horses and shouted; the horses plunged +and reared and jumped. The piece stuck half way up the hill. The leaders were +turned slightly to the right to give new direction and another attempt was +made—ten yards gained. The leaders were swung to the left, men and +officers standing near by added their shouts and blows from sticks. A tall +artillery officer, whose red stripes were conspicuous, jumped up and down and +swore; the team gave a few more jumps, then they wheeled the gun by a left +about, with its muzzle pointing toward the city. It was quickly unlimbered and +run to its place. +</p> + +<p> +The second piece started up the hill. The drivers of this piece sat quietly in +their saddles, and, with a cluck, started up the hill at a walk. The tall +artillery officer shouted, and a driver muttered under his breath, +“Damned fool!” Regardless of the orders to rush their horses, the +drivers of this piece continued to walk up the hill. At the steepest part of +the hill, they rose slightly in their stirrups, as one man, and applied the +spur to the lead horses, and, at the same time, a lash of the quirt to the off +horses of the team. The horses sprang forward, and in an instant the second +piece was in battery. The third and fourth pieces were taken up in the same +manner as the second. +</p> + +<p> +The pieces were loaded; a party of newspaper correspondents produced their lead +pencils and pads, and began to take notes; the little birds continued to sing. +The Gatling Gun man, the Army and Navy Journal man, and the assistant +adjutant-general stepped to the windward a few yards to be clear of the smoke. +The range was given by the battery commander—2600 yards; the objective +was named, a small, almost indistinguishable redoubt, below the hospital about +300 yards. The cannoneers braced themselves, No. 3 stretched the lanyard taut +on his piece, and Grimes remarked, in a conversational tone, “Let her +go.” +</p> + +<p> +The report of the field-piece burst with startling suddenness upon the quiet +summer morning, and a dense cloud of grayish-colored smoke spurted from the +muzzle of the gun. Everybody involuntarily jumped, the sound was so startling, +although expected. The piece recoiled eight or ten feet, and the gunners jumped +to the wheels and ran it forward again into battery. Field-glasses were glued +upon the vicinity of the brick hospital. There was a puff of white smoke and an +exclamation, “A trifle too long!” The second piece was aimed and +fired. There was no response. The third, and fourth, and fifth, with like +results. It was like firing a salute on the Fourth of July. There was no +indication of any danger whatever; laugh and jest were beginning to go round. +</p> + +<p> +Suddenly a dull boom was heard from somewhere, the exact direction could not be +located. The next thing was a shrill whistle overhead, and then a most +startling report. The first Spanish shell exploded about twenty feet above the +surface of the ground, and about twenty yards in rear of the crest of the hill. +It exploded in the midst of our brave Cuban contingents, killed one and wounded +several. The valiant sons of Cuba libre took to their heels, and most of the +newspaper correspondents did likewise. The members of Grimes’ Battery, +who were not needed at the guns, were sent back to the caissons, and another +round of shrapnel was sent in reply. Again a hurtling sound rent the air; again +there was the fierce crack of a Spanish shell in our immediate vicinity, and, +on looking around to see where this shell struck, it was observed that it had +burst over the Gatling battery. Luckily, it had gone six or eight feet beyond +the battery before exploding. A fragment of the shell had struck Priv. Bremer +upon the hand, producing quite a severe contusion. The Missouri mules stamped +the ground impatiently; one of them uttered the characteristic exclamation of +his race, “Aw! hee! aw! hee! aw!” and the members of the detachment +burst into a merry peal of hearty laughter. It was evident that this detachment +was not going to run, and it was equally evident that the Missouri mules would +stand fire. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus23"></a> +<img src="images/23.jpg" width="600" height="377" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">A Fighting Cuban, and Where He Fought.</p> +</div> + + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus24"></a> +<img src="images/24.jpg" width="700" height="558" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Map—Siege Lines at Santiago.</p> +</div> + +<p> +A third shell whistled over the hill. This one burst fairly over Grimes’ +third piece, killed the cannoneer, and wounded several men. +</p> + +<p> +The members of the detachment were now directed to lie down under their guns +and limbers, except the drivers, who declined to do so, and still stood at the +heads of their mules. Priv. Hoft, disdaining to take cover, shouldered his +rifle and walked up and down, sentry fashion, over the pile of camp equipage. +</p> + +<p> +Serg. Weigle, who had brought along a small portable camera, with a large +supply of film-rolls, requested permission to photograph the next shot fired by +Grimes’ Battery. It was granted. He climbed to the top of the hill, +stepped off to the left of the battery, and calmly focused his camera. Grimes +fired another salute, and Weigle secured a good picture. A Spanish shell came +whistling over the hill; Weigle, judging where it would burst from previous +observations, focused his camera, and secured a picture of the burst. He then +rejoined his detachment, and photographed it as it stood. He seemed chiefly +worried for fear he would not get a picture of everything that happened. +</p> + +<p> +The artillery duel continued for some twenty minutes. The infantry began to +pass on, to the front. Grimes no longer needed the support of the Gatling guns, +because he now had an infantry support in front of him, and was firing over +their heads. Col. McClernand sent orders to the detachment to move to the rear, +out of range. The order was obeyed. +</p> + +<p> +Private Hoft, with the instinct of a true soldier, continued to tramp back and +forth guarding the pile of camp equipage. The battery moved to the rear at a +gentle trot, and, as it turned down the hill into the first ford by the El Poso +house, a Spanish shell whistled over the head of Private Shiffer, who was +leading the way, and burst just beyond his off mule. Shiffer didn’t duck +and nobody was hurt. Providence was taking care of this experiment. Corporal +Doyle and two other members of the detachment got lost, and wandered off among +the crowd of Cubans, but soon found the battery and rejoined. Orders were given +that as soon as the battery was out of range, it should halt and face to the +front, at the side of the road. +</p> + +<p> +The battery halted about half a mile to the rear, and the 13th Infantry passed +it here, on their way to the front. The comments bestowed were not calculated +to soothe the ruffled feelings of people who had been ordered to retreat. +“I told you so.” “Why don’t you go to the front?” +“Going to begin firing here?” “Is this the place where you +shoot?” “Is this all there is of it?” “I knew they +would not get into the fight.” “Watch them hang around the +rear.” “Going to start in raising bananas back here, John +Henry?” “What do you think of machine guns now?” and similar +remarks, of a witty but exasperating nature, greeted the detachment, from both +officers and men, as the regiment passed on its way to the front. The only +thing that could be done was to endure it, in the hope of getting a chance to +make a retort later in the day. +</p> + +<p> +About nine o’clock, the artillery firing ceased, and the Gatling Gun +Battery returned to El Poso. Grimes’ guns were still up on the hill, but +there were no cannoneers; they had ceased to fire, and had left their guns. Two +or three dead men were lying on the side of the hill; wounded men were limping +around with bandages. Cubans were again passing to the front. These fellows +were trying to reach El Caney. They never got into the fight. They did reach +the vicinity of El Caney, and the Spanish fired one volley at them. The Cubans +set up a great howl, accompanied by vociferous gesticulations—and then +“skedaddled.” +</p> + +<p> +During all this time the sound of firing had been heard toward El Caney. It had +been opened up there about half an hour before Grimes first spoke at El Poso. +The fire in this direction sounded like ranging fire, a shot every two or three +minutes, and it was supposed that Capron was trying to locate the enemy. The +sharp crack of musketry was heard on our front, it swelled and became +continuous. It was evident that quite a fight was going on at El Caney, which +was to our right about one mile and to our front perhaps half a mile. +Kent’s Division kept pushing forward on the El Poso road. Col. McClernand +was asked for instructions for the Gatling Gun Detachment. He replied, +“Find the 71st New York, and go in with them, if you can. If this is not +practicable, find the best place you can, and make the best use of your guns +that you can.” These were the only instructions received by the Gatling +Gun Detachment until one o’clock. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus25"></a> +<img src="images/25.jpg" width="600" height="380" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Gatling Camp and Bomb-Proofs at Fort Roosevelt.</p> +</div> + +<p> +The Gatling Gun Detachment moved forward about half a mile. They found the 71st +New York lying down by the side of the road, partially blocking it. Troops +passing them toward the front were compelled to break into columns of twos, +because the road was crowded by the 71st. The colonel and his adjutant were +sought and found, and informed of the detachment’s instructions. +Information was requested as to when and where the 71st was going into the +fight. It appeared that they had a vague idea that they were going in on the +left center of the left wing. Lawton’s Division at El Caney will be +considered the right wing; Kent’s Division and Wheeler’s Division +the left wing of the army at San Juan. The 71st did not seem to know when it +was going to move toward the front, nor just where it was going; and there was +no apparent effort being made to get further down the road to the front. +Wheeler’s Division was also pressing forward on the road, dismounted +cavalrymen, with no arms in their hands except their carbines without bayonets. +With these same carbines these men were, a little later, to storm the +intrenchments, manned by picked and veteran soldiers, who knew how to die at +their posts. +</p> + +<p> +With Wheeler’s Division were the Rough Riders, the most unique +aggregation of fighting men ever gathered together in any army. There were +cowboys, bankers, brokers, merchants, city clubmen, and society dudes; +commanded by a doctor, second in command a literary politician; but every man +determined to get into the fight. About three-quarters of a mile in advance was +the first ford, the ford of the Aguadores River; beyond this a quarter of a +mile was another ford, the ford of the San Juan. The road forked about two +hundred yards east of the Aguadores ford, turning sharply to the left. Down the +road from El Poso crept the military balloon, it halted near this +fork—“Balloon Fork.” Two officers were in its basket, six or +eight hundred feet above the surface of the ground, observing the movements of +the troops and the disposition of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +The sharp crackle of the musketry began in front, and still the Gatling Gun +Detachment lay beside the road with the 71st, waiting, swearing, broiling, +stewing in their own perspiration, mad with thirst, and crazed with the fever +of the battle. The colonel of the 71st was again approached, to ascertain +whether he was now going to the front, but still there were no signs of any +indication to move forward. So the long-eared steed was mounted and the ford of +the Aguadores reconnoitered. The bullets were zipping through the rank tropical +jungle. Two or three men were hit. Those who moved forward were going single +file, crouching low, at a dog trot. There was no evidence of hesitation or fear +here. Some of the “Brunettes” passed, their blue shirts unbuttoned, +corded veins protruding as they slightly raised their heads to look forward, +great drops of perspiration rolling down their sleek, shiny, black skins. There +was a level spot, slightly open, beyond the ford of the Aguadores, which +offered a place for going into battery; from this place the enemy’s works +on San Juan were visible, a faint streak along the crest of the hill illumined +from time to time by the flash of Mausers. +</p> + +<p> +On return to the battery, there were no signs of being able to enter the action +with the gallant 71st, and, acting under the second clause of the instructions, +the Gatling battery was moved forward at a gallop. Major Sharpe, a mounted +member of Gen. Shafter’s staff, helped to open a way through this +regiment to enable the guns to pass. The reception of the battery by these +valiant men was very different from that so recently given by the 13th +Regulars. “Give ’em hell, boys!” “Let ’er go, +Gallagher!” “Goin’ to let the woodpeckers go +off?”—and cheer after cheer went up as the battery passed through. +Vain efforts were made to check this vociferous clamor, which was plainly +audible to the enemy, less than 1500 yards away. The bullets of the enemy began +to drop lower. The cheering had furnished them the clew they needed. They had +located our position, and the 71st atoned for this thoughtlessness by the loss +of nearly eighty men, as it lay cowering in the underbrush near Balloon Fork. +</p> + +<p> +Just before reaching the Aguadores ford, the battery was met by Col. Derby, who +had been observing the disposition of the troops, from the balloon, and had +afterward ridden to the front on horseback. The colonel was riding along, to +push the infantry forward in position from the rear, as coolly as if on the +parade-ground. A blade of grass had gotten twisted around a button of his +uniform and hung down like a buttonhole bouquet over his breast. There was a +genial smile on his handsome face as he inquired, “Where are you +going?” and, on being informed of the orders of the detachment and of the +intention to put the battery into action, he replied, “The infantry are +not deployed enough to take advantage of your fire. I would advise that you +wait a short time. I will send you word when the time comes.” The advice +was acted upon, the guns were turned out by the side of the road, and the men +directed to lie down. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus26"></a> +<img src="images/26.jpg" width="600" height="378" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Tree Between Lines Showing Bullet Holes. This Tree Grew on +Low Ground.</p> +</div> + +<p> +During the gallop to the front they had been compelled to run to keep up, there +not being sufficient accommodation for them to all go mounted on the guns. They +were panting heavily, and they obeyed the order and crept under the guns, +taking advantage of such little shade as was offered. Troops continued to pass +to the front. The crackle of musketry gradually extended to the right and to +the left, showing that the deployment was being completed. More men were hit, +but no complaints or groans were heard. A ball struck a limber-chest; a man +lying on his face in the road, during a momentary pause of one of the +companies, was perforated from head to foot: he never moved—just +continued to lie there; the flies began to buzz around the spot and settle on +the clotted blood, that poured out from the fractured skull, in the dust of the +road. Down at the ford, some twenty-five or thirty yards in advance, men were +being hit continually. +</p> + +<p> +Shots came down from the trees around. The sharpshooters of the Spanish forces, +who had been up in the trees during the artillery duel, and beyond whom our +advance had swept, fully believing that they would be murdered if captured, +expecting no quarter, were recklessly shooting at everything in sight. They +made a special target of every man who wore any indication of rank. Some of our +heaviest losses during the day, especially among commissioned officers, were +caused by these sharpshooters. They shot indiscriminately at wounded, at +hospital nurses, at medical officers wearing the red cross, and at fighting men +going to the front. +</p> + +<p> +The firing became too warm, and the Gatling battery was moved back about fifty +yards, again halted, and faced to the front. It was now nearly one +o’clock. The members of the detachment had picked up their haversacks on +leaving El Poso, and now began to nibble pieces of hardtack. A bullet broke a +piece of hardtack which a man was lifting to his mouth; without even stopping +in the act of lifting it to his mouth, he ate the piece, with a jest. +</p> + +<p> +Suddenly the clatter of hoofs was heard from the front. Lieut. Miley dashed up +and said, “Gen. Shafter directs that you give one piece to me, and take +the other three beyond the ford, where the dynamite gun is, find some position, +and go into action.” Sergeant Weigle’s gun was placed at +Miley’s disposal, and the other pieces dashed forward at a dead run, led +by the musical mule who uttered his characteristic exclamation as he dashed +through the ford of the Aguadores. +</p> + +<p> +The place formerly selected for going into action had been again twice +reconnoitered during the wait, and a better place had been found about thirty +yards beyond the ford of the San Juan River. The dynamite gun had stuck in the +ford of the Aguadores; a shell had got jammed in it. The Gatlings were +compelled to go around it. They dashed through the intervening space, across +the San Juan ford, and up on the opening beyond. The position for the battery, +partially hidden from the view of the enemy by a small clump of underbrush, was +indicated. The right piece, Serg. Green’s, was compelled to go into +action in the middle of the road, and in plain sight of the enemy. While the +pieces were being unlimbered, which was only the work of an instant, an inquiry +was made of Captain Boughton, of the 3d Cavalry, whose troop had just reached +this point, as to the position of our troops and of the enemy, with the further +remark that the battery had been under fire since eight o’clock, and had +not seen a Spaniard. “I can show you plenty of Spaniards,” replied +Boughton, and, raising his hand, pointed toward the San Juan blockhouse and the +ridge in its vicinity, sweeping his hand toward the right. It was enough. +Before his hand had fallen to his side, the pieces were musically singing. +</p> + +<p> +Corp. Steigerwald turned and asked, “What is the range, sir?” To +which was instantly replied, “Block-house, 600 yards; the ridge to the +right, 800 yards,” and Steigerwald’s piece was grinding 500 shots a +minute within a quarter of a second, playing upon the San Juan block-house. +Serg. Green took 800 yards, and began to send his compliments to the ridge +beyond the block-house. In an instant Priv. Sine, at Green’s gun, who was +feeding, fell backward dead. At the same instant Priv. Kastner fell out. Sine +was shot through the heart, Kastner through the head and neck. At this time +Ryder’s gun began to talk. It spoke very voluble and eloquent orations, +which, although not delivered in the Spanish language, were well understood by +our friends, the enemy, upon the hill. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus27"></a> +<img src="images/27.jpg" width="600" height="378" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Spanish Block-House.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Serg. Green, at the right gun, had run back for ammunition, and Corp. Doyle, +when Sine fell, seized the pointing lever, and was coolly turning the crank +while he sighted the gun at the same time. He was for the moment the only +member of the detachment left at the piece, but was given assistance, and a +moment later Green arrived and began to feed the gun. +</p> + +<p> +Steigerwald was short-handed. Some of his men had been sun-struck during the +run, and he, too, was compelled to work his gun with only one assistant. Then +some of those who had been unable to keep up arrived at the battery and began +to render assistance. Priv. Van Vaningham, who had gotten lost from his own +command, began to pass ammunition. Priv. Merryman, who was holding his team +back in the river, was impressed by a doctor to help carry wounded men, and +Priv. Burkley, another man lost from his command, stepped into Merryman’s +place. Priv. Chase left his team, seeing the piece short-handed, and began to +pass ammunition. The mules merely wagged their ears backward and forward and +stamped on account of the flies. +</p> + +<p> +All these changes were accomplished, and the pieces had not even ceased fire. +Doyle had fed about 100 rounds, alone. Capt. Landis, of the 1st Cavalry, +arrived just at this time, and volunteered to assist in observing the effect of +the fire. He stood fearlessly out in the middle of the road, just to the right +of Green’s piece, in the very best position for observation, but, at the +same time, a most conspicuous target for the enemy, and observed the effect of +the Gatling fire, as though he were at target practice, reporting the same, +continually, to the battery commander. +</p> + +<p> +For the first two minutes the enemy seemed dazed, then suddenly a perfect hell +of leaden hail swept through the foliage. The only thing that saved the battery +from absolute destruction was that the enemy’s shots were a little high. +As it was, many of them struck the ground between the guns, and several hit the +pieces. Three members of the detachment were slightly hurt. One mule was shot +through the ear. He sang the usual song of the mule, shook his head, and was +suddenly hit again on the fore leg. He plunged a little, but Priv. Shiffer +patted him on the head and he became quiet. A bullet passed by Shiffer’s +head, so close that he felt the wind fan his whiskers, and buried itself in the +saddle on the same mule. This sudden concentration of the enemy’s fire +lasted about two minutes. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the detachment heard a wild cheer start on the left and +gradually sweep around to the left and right, until in every direction, +sounding high above the din of battle and the crackling of the Mausers, even +above the rattle of the Gatling guns, was heard the yell of recognition from +our own troops. There was, for an instant, a furious fusillade on our right and +left, and in a few moments the whole line of our troops had risen and were +moving forward to the San Juan ridge. While moving forward, they necessarily +almost ceased to fire, but the fire of the Gatlings continued, deadly and +accurate. A troop of the 10th Cavalry, from our right and rear, came up, part +of the squadron commanded by Col. Baldwin. Some of this troop did not +understand the Gatling gun drama, and were in the act of firing a volley into +our backs, when Lieut. Smith, who was to so heroically lose his life within ten +minutes afterward, sprang out in front of the excited troopers, and, with tears +in his eyes, implored them not to fire, that these were “our own +Gatlings.” They did not fire in our direction, but they did give a most +thrilling and welcome cheer, as the squadron swept forward by our right. Col. +Baldwin ran up, and shouted that he would place two troops in support of the +battery as long as they were needed. It was the first time the battery had ever +had a support of any kind. +</p> + +<p> +After a couple of minutes, the enemy’s fire perceptibly slackened. It was +evident they were seeking cover from our fire in the bottom of their ditches, +and our fire at this time was being made chiefly from the Gatling battery. This +cessation of fire on the part of the enemy lasted about two minutes, and then +the Gatling gunners observed the Spaniards climbing from their trenches. Until +that time the Gatling battery had been worked with dogged persistency and grim +silence, but from that moment every member of the battery yelled at the top of +his voice until the command “Cease firing” was given. Groups of the +enemy, as they climbed from their trenches, were caught by the fire of the +guns, and were seen to melt away like a lump of salt in a glass of water. +Bodies the size of a company would practically disappear an instant after a gun +had been turned upon them. +</p> + +<p> +This flight of the enemy from their trenches had been caused by the fact that +the charging line had cut through the barb-wire fences at the foot of the hill, +and had started up the slope. The Spaniards were unable to stay with their +heads above the trenches to fire at the charging-line, because of the missiles +of death poured in by the machine guns; and to remain there awaiting the charge +was certain death. They did not have the nerve to wait for the cold steel. They +were demoralized because they had been compelled to seek the bottom of their +trenches. American troops would have awaited the charge, knowing that the +machine gun fire must cease before contact could occur, but the Spaniards +forgot this in their excitement, and made the fatal mistake of running. +</p> + +<p> +The Gatlings had the range to perfection. Capt. Boughton, who was one of the +first officers upon the hill, stated, on the 1st of September at Montauk, that +he visited a portion of the Spanish trenches immediately upon arriving at the +crest, and that the trenches which he inspected were literally filled with +writhing, squirming, tangled masses of dead and wounded Spaniards, and that the +edge of the trenches was covered with wounded and dead Spaniards, who had been +shot in the act of climbing out. This execution was done mainly by the machine +guns, because the infantry and cavalry were not firing much when it was done; +they were running up the hill to the charge. +</p> + +<p> +Colonel Egbert, who commanded the 6th Infantry, states, in his official report, +that when his regiment reached the sharp incline near the top of the hill they +were brought to a standstill because the Gatling bullets were striking along +the crest. The officers of the 13th Infantry state the same thing. It was +Lieut. Ferguson, of the 13th, who when the troops had climbed as high as +possible under the leaden canopy which the Gatlings made to cover their charge, +waved his white handkerchief as a signal to cease firing. At the same moment +Landis exclaimed, “Better stop; our men are climbing the hill now.” +A shrill whistle gave the signal “Cease firing,” and the Gatling +Gun Battery, to a man, rose to their feet and gazed with absorbing interest as +the long, thin, blue line swept forward and crowned the crest of the hill. An +instant later an American flag floated proudly from the San Juan block-house; +then the roar of musketry and the volley of rifles indicated that the fleeing +enemy was receiving warm messengers as he ran down the hill toward his second +line of intrenchments. +</p> + +<p> +The next immediate duty confronting the detachment was to take stock of losses +and to occupy the captured position in case of necessity. +</p> + +<p> +Private Sine had been killed and Private Kastner was supposed to be mortally +wounded. Private Elkins fell exhausted just as the Stars and Stripes were run +up on the block-house. He had been knocked down by the pole of a limber, which +struck him over the kidneys, but had continued to feed his gun until the very +last. He was utterly exhausted. Sergeant Green had been wounded slightly in the +foot, but not enough to disable him. Private Bremer had been hit early in the +morning by the fragment of a shell on the hand. One or two other members had +been merely touched, grazed by balls. Private Greenberg had been overcome by +the heat. Merryman, one of the teamsters, as stated before, had been seized to +carry wounded. Private Lauer was missing and Dellett sunstruck. Private Hoft +had joined the battery on hearing it go into action, and it was necessary to +send someone back as guard over the camp equipage. A volunteer was called for, +and it was with the utmost difficulty that a member of the detachment, Private +Pyne, was induced to take this duty. He shot four Spanish sharpshooters, who +were shooting at our wounded and our medical officers, out of trees near El +Poso, during the remainder of the day. Private Chase had sprained his back so +badly as to be unable to ride a mule; and two places were vacant for drivers. +It was necessary to instantly supply this deficiency. Private Burkley, 16th +Infantry, who had assisted in passing ammunition during the firing, volunteered +to drive one of the teams, and Private Correll the other. Private Raymond, 6th +Cavalry, and Private Van Vaningham, of the same regiment, also joined the +detachment at this point, being separated from their own commands. +</p> + +<p> +The pieces were limbered up as soon as these dispositions could be made, except +Sergeant Ryder’s gun, which had bent the pintle-pin and consequently +could not be limbered quickly. The other two pieces and the limber belonging to +Ryder’s gun were moved forward on a run to the captured position on the +San Juan ridge, gun crews riding or following as best they could. Both pieces +went into action on the right of the road. A limber was then sent back for +Ryder’s gun, and it was brought up, Priv. Shiffer performing this duty +under a perfect hail of dropping fire. In advancing from the position at the +ford to the captured position it was necessary to cut three barb-wire fences. +The members of the detachment behaved with the utmost coolness, all working +together to remove these obstructions, and not a man sought shelter, although a +dropping fire was striking around the detachment, from some source. Where this +fire came from it was impossible to tell; but it did not come from the enemy. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus28"></a> +<img src="images/28.jpg" width="600" height="396" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Spanish Fort of Three-Inch Guns.</p> +</div> + +<p> +The two pieces which first reached the top of the hill were halted under +shelter of the crest, while the ground above was reconnoitered. It was +instantly observed that the enemy was coming back for a counter-charge. +Accordingly the pieces were immediately run to the top of the hill, the +drivers, Shiffer and Correll, riding boldly up and executing a left-about on +the skirmish line, where the skirmishers were lying down. The pieces were +unlimbered and instantly put into action at point-blank range, the skirmishers +giving way to the right and left to make way for the guns. The enemy was less +than 300 yards away, and apparently bent on recovering the position. +</p> + +<p> +The fire immediately became very hot. A skirmisher, who had thought to gain a +little cover by lying down beside the wheel of the right gun (Green’s), +was shot through the arm. “I knowed it,” he growled; “I might +have knowed that if I got near that durned gun, I’d get potted.” He +rolled down behind the crest; a soldier produced an emergency packet, staunched +the blood, and the wounded soldier, finding no bones broken, returned to the +firing-line and resumed his work. The enemy, at this part of the line, began to +waver and again broke toward his second line of intrenchments. +</p> + +<p> +Just at this moment, Lieut. Traub came up and shouted, “Gen. Wood orders +you to send one or two of your guns over to help Roosevelt.” The order to +move the guns was disregarded, but Traub pointed out the enemy, which was +menacing Col. Roosevelt’s position, and insisted. About 600 yards to the +right, oblique from the position of the guns and perhaps 200 yards, or less, in +front of the salient occupied by Col. Roosevelt and the 3d Cavalry (afterward +called Fort Roosevelt), there was a group of about 400 of the enemy, apparently +endeavoring to charge the position. There was no time to notify the second +piece. Serg. Green’s gun was instantly turned upon this group, at +point-blank elevation. The group melted away. Capt. Marcotte states that, after +the surrender, some Spanish officers, whom he met, and who were members of this +group, described this to him, stating that the enemy seen at this point was a +body of about 600 escaping from El Caney; that they were struck at this point +by machine gun fire so effectively that only forty of them ever got back to +Santiago; the rest were killed. +</p> + +<p> +Serg. Green’s gun, already heated to a red heat by the continuous firing +of the day, had been worked to its extreme limit of rapidity while firing at +this body of the enemy, and on ceasing to fire, several cartridges exploded in +the gun before they could be withdrawn. A ball lodged in one barrel from one of +these explosions, and this piece was drawn down out of action just as the piece +which had been left at the ford returned. Subsequently the disabled piece was +sent back to the ford, with the idea that that would be a safer place to +overhaul it than immediately in rear of the firing-line. The piece remained at +the ford until the night of the 3d of July, when it was brought up to the +battery, then at Fort Roosevelt, and on the 4th was finally overhauled and put +into action. This led to the impression, on the part of some of the command, +that one of the Gatlings had been blown up, which was not true. The gun was not +injured, except that one barrel could not be used during the remainder of the +fighting, but the gun was used on the morning of the 4th, and during the whole +of the engagement on the 10th and 11th, as well as on outpost duty, using nine +barrels instead of ten. +</p> + +<p> +Following this repulse of the enemy, which occurred about 4:30 p. m., there was +a lull in the firing. Advantage was taken of this to visit Col. +Roosevelt’s position and inspect the line of battle. Upon reaching the +salient, Col. Roosevelt was seen walking up and down behind his line, +encouraging his men, while a group of them was held, just in the rear of the +crest, in charge of Maj. Jenkins, to support the firing-line if necessary. On +the right of the Rough Riders, the 3d Cavalry were in the fight, and Capt. +Boughton was again encountered. +</p> + +<p> +The firing suddenly began again, and it was remarkable to observe the coolness +with which these two officers sauntered up and down the line, utterly +regardless of the bullets, which were cutting the grass in every direction. +There were no soft places on this part of the hill. The enemy’s +sharpshooters, up in high trees, were able to see every point of the crest, and +were dropping their shots accurately behind it at all points. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus29"></a> +<img src="images/29.jpg" width="600" height="390" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Tentage in Cuba.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Just at this moment, Serg. Weigle came up with his gun. Serg. Weigle had had a +hard time. His gun had been taken, under direction of Lieut. Miley, to a point +near the San Juan farm-house, and pulled to the top of the hill. Weigle, whose +only idea of a battle, at this time, was a chance to shoot, had been, to his +intense disgust, restrained from opening fire. Then the piece had been taken +down from the hill and around to the left of the line, where Lieut. +Miley’s duty as aide had carried him, to observe the progress of the +battle, and Weigle had been again denied the privilege of “potting” +a Spaniard. He was the most disgusted man in the American Army; he was furious; +he was white-hot; he was so mad that the tears rolled down his cheeks, as he +reported with a soldierly salute, “Sir, Serg. Weigle reports, with his +gun. Lieut. Miley did not allow me to open fire. I would like to have +orders.” +</p> + +<p> +In spite of the critical condition of the engagement, it was extremely +ludicrous; but the reopening of the fire at this moment presented an +opportunity to accommodate the sergeant to his heart’s content. He was +directed to run his piece up on the firing-line, report to the officer in +charge thereof, and go into action as soon as he pleased. Within thirty seconds +he was getting his coveted opportunity. He fired until his gun became +accidentally jammed, pulled it down behind the crest of the hill and removed +the defective cartridge, returned it and repeated this operation, actually +bringing the gun down three times, and returning it into action, doing very +effective work, and all the time displaying the utmost coolness and good +judgment. A sharpshooter began to make a target of Weigle’s gun, and +“potted” a couple of men belonging to the cavalry near it. This +made Weigle so mad that he turned the gun, for a moment, upon the tree in which +the sharp-shooter was concealed. That sharpshooter never shot again. Finally, +Weigle’s gun got so hot, and he himself so cool, that he concluded the +piece was too warm for further firing. So he ran it down behind the hill, and +ran his detachment back on the hill with rifles, and, during the remainder of +the evening, the members of this crew practiced with “long Toms” +upon the Spanish soldiers. +</p> + +<p> +On returning to the other two pieces near the road, they were moved to another +position, on the other side of the road. This precaution was judicious in order +to conceal the pieces, or change their position, because the enemy had pretty +thoroughly located them in the previous brush, and it was rather dangerous to +remain at that place. It was now nearly sundown. Scarcely had the pieces opened +at this new position, when a battery of the enemy’s artillery, located +near the hospital, began to fire at them. There was a heavy gun, which made a +deep rumbling sound, and this sound was supplemented by the sharp crack of a +field-piece. A shell came whistling overhead and exploded within thirty yards +of the battery, just beyond it. Another one came, and this time the +enemy’s artillery was located. Quick as a flash, the two Gatlings were +turned upon the enemy’s guns at the 2000-yard range. Another shell came +whistling along and exploded about ten feet overhead and twenty feet in rear of +the battery. It tore up the grass in rear of the battery. After this engagement +was over, Priv. Shiffer picked up the still hot fuse of this last shell. It was +a large brass combination fuse, and set at eight seconds, which justified the +estimated range. This third shell was the last one the enemy was able to fire +from these pieces. The powerful field-glasses which were used in locating the +battery revealed the fact that as soon as the Gatling guns were turned on it, +the Spanish gunners ran away from their pieces. The big gun turned out to be a +16-centimeter converted bronze piece, mounted on a pintle in barbette, rifled +and using smokeless powder. It was also found that they were firing four 3-inch +field-pieces of a similar character in this battery, as well as two mountain +guns. +</p> + +<p> +It is claimed that this is the first time in the history of land fighting that +a battery of heavy guns was ever put out of action by machine-gun fire. This +battery of the Spanish was never afterward able to get into action. Their +pieces, which had been loaded for the fourth shot, were found on the 18th of +July, still loaded, and a Spanish officer gave the information that they had +lost more than forty men trying to work that battery, since the 1st of July. +This is accounted for by the fact that this Spanish battery was made the +subject of critical observation by the Gatling Gun Detachment from this time +on. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus30"></a> +<img src="images/30.jpg" width="600" height="379" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">After the Rain.</p> +</div> + +<p> +During this last engagement it had been necessary to obtain more men to assist +in carrying ammunition, and Capt. Ayers, of the 10th Cavalry, had furnished a +detail, consisting of Serg. Graham and Privates Smith and Taylor, Troop E, 10th +Cavalry. These colored soldiers proved to be excellent. They remained with the +battery until the end of the fighting on the 17th, and were in every respect +the peers of any soldier in the detachment. Serg. Graham was recommended for a +medal of honor. Privates Smith and Taylor did as good service, were as willing, +as obedient, as prompt, and as energetic in the discharge of their duties as +any commanding officer could wish to have. It is a great pleasure to be able to +give this testimony to the merits of our colored troopers, and to say, in +addition, that no soldiers ever fought better than the “Brunettes” +of the 9th and 10th Cavalry, who fought from the 3d of July until the 12th, +near or with the Gatlings. +</p> + +<p> +After the firing at the ford had ceased, Capt. Marcotte had returned to El Poso +to investigate the movements of our artillery. These were then, and have +remained, one of those inscrutable and mysterious phenomena of a battle; +incomprehensible to the ordinary layman, and capable of being understood only +by “scientific” soldiers. The charge upon the San Juan ridge was +practically unsupported by artillery. No American shells had struck the San +Juan block-house; none had struck or burst in its vicinity; not even a moral +effect by our artillery had assisted in the assault. So Marcotte had gone to +investigate the artillery arm. He returned at sundown, and brought the +information that our baggage was safe at El Poso; that Private Pyne, still +alive and unhurt, had been doing good work against the enemy’s +sharpshooters; and, better than all this, had brought back with him a canteen +of water from the San Juan River and a pocket full of hardtack. He poured out +his hardtack, and it was equally distributed among the members of the +detachment, each man’s share amounting to two pieces. Each man was also +given a sup of water from the canteen, and this constituted their only supper +on that night, as they had been compelled to throw away everything to keep up +with the guns. Having disposed of that, exhausted Nature could do no more; they +lay down in the mud where they stood, and slept so soundly that even the firing +which occurred that night did not arouse them from their slumbers. They were +not disturbed until Best’s Battery began to occupy this hill about four +o’clock in the morning. They were then aroused and the Gatling guns were +drawn down, and the whole battery moved to the salient occupied by the Rough +Riders, because their position was at that time closest to the enemy, and, as +was determined by the previous day’s reconnaissance, offered a chance to +enfilade several of the enemy’s trenches with machine gun fire. +</p> + +<p> +To dispose of the subject of artillery, it may be said that Best’s +Battery and some other artillery occupied the ground vacated by the Gatlings on +the morning of July 2d, fired four shots, and then withdrew with more haste +than dignity. They remarked, “This is the hottest fire to which artillery +has been subjected in modern times,” and lit out to find a cooler place. +They found it—so far in rear that their fire was almost equally dangerous +to friends and foes on account of the close proximity of the two firing-lines. +The obvious conclusion is that machine guns can live at close ranges, where +artillery can not stay. There is no better light artillery in the world than +that which had to withdraw from San Juan block-house and its vicinity, on the +morning of July 2d. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap08"></a>CHAPTER VIII.<br /> +TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLES AT SANTIAGO.</h2> + +<p> +The situation of affairs on the night of the 1st of July was rather critical. +The plan which the general had laid down had been delayed in execution at El +Caney, while the impetuousity of the troops had precipitated an unexpected +rapidity of movement at San Juan. Capron’s Battery had opened at El Caney +about half past seven o’clock, with badly aimed and ill-directed fire, +which did very little damage to the enemy. The troops engaged in this part of +the battle were pushed forward until, by about eleven o’clock, they had +become pretty thoroughly deployed around the vicinity of Las Guamas Creek. They +had also extended slightly to the right and to the left toward the Du Cuorot +house. The Spanish forts obstinately held out, and the handful of Spanish +soldiers in El Caney and vicinity stubbornly resisted the attack made by our +troops. +</p> + +<p> +About nine o’clock, Hamilton’s right piece, No. 3 of Capron’s +Battery, succeeded in planting a shell directly in the old stone fort, which +knocked a hole in the masonry; but, just at this juncture, the battery was +ordered to cease firing at the blockhouse, and to shell the enemy’s +trenches. The enemy forthwith utilized the hole made in the wall by the shell +as a loop-hole, and continued to fire through it until the fort was taken by +the infantry assault at about half-past four o’clock. No worse commentary +than this could possibly be made upon the tactical handling of this battery of +artillery, because, having obtained perfectly the range of the enemy’s +stronghold, it was simply asinine not to knock that block-house to pieces +immediately. +</p> + +<p> +So Lawton’s Division had remained in front of El Caney, held by about +1000 Spaniards, while the shadows crept from the west to the north, from the +north to the northeast, and from the northeast toward the east. It was coming +toward night before the artillery was finally turned loose. One corner and the +roof of this block-house were knocked off, but even then the artillery was so +poorly handled that the enemy had to be dislodged from this block-house by +hand-to-hand fighting, A single Hotchkiss gun, properly handled, should have +converted it into ruins in thirty minutes. +</p> + +<p> +While these events were transpiring, Kent and Wheeler, constituting the left +wing of the army, had moved forward on the El Poso road, parallel to the +Aguadores River, as far as the San Juan had captured the San Juan farm-house, +and had gradually deployed to the right and to the left along the San Juan +River. About one o’clock their line had swept forward and had captured +the first ridge between the San Juan and the city of Santiago, the “San +Juan ridge,” driving the enemy on this portion of the field into their +last trenches. But the right flank of this wing was entirely unsupported, and +the road by the way of Fort Canosa to San Juan, passing by the portion of the +line subsequently occupied by the dynamite gun, marked the extreme position of +the right of this wing of the army. The enemy was already well toward its +right, and had the excellent El Caney road to move upon. He was thoroughly +familiar with the country, while the troops composing this wing were exhausted +by the charge. This wing had no reserve that the firing-line knew of, and, as a +matter of fact, had none except two battalions of the 71st New York, which had +not got into battle, and which were scattered along the road from the San Juan +River to Siboney. +</p> + +<p> +The position occupied by the left wing of the army was a strong natural +position, but had no protection for the right flank. In this, Lawton’s +Division did not execute the part of the battle assigned to it. Thus the +officers on the San Juan ridge, who knew anything about the plan of the battle, +were constantly directing their gaze, at every lull in the fighting, toward El +Caney, and to the right of Gen. Wood’s position, but there were no +indications of the approach of Gen. Lawton. +</p> + +<p> +Returning now to the right wing: the San Juan block-house and the ridge in its +vicinity having been captured, a glance at the map will show that the retreat +of the Spanish forces at El Caney was in imminent danger of being cut off. This +capture occurred at 1:23-1/2 p. m. The Spanish commander at El Caney had been +killed about noon, his men had suffered heavily, and the new commanding officer +discovered that his retreat by the El Caney road was threatened. The only other +line of retreat was by way of the San Miguel and Cuabitas roads. The Spanish +forces at El Caney were also running low in their ammunition, and it was +therefore decided to withdraw. Portions of the Spanish troops did withdraw, +some by way of the El Caney road toward Santiago; the remainder, some 350 or +400, were crushed in the final charge upon El Caney, between 4 and 4:30 +o’clock. +</p> + +<p> +Gen. Lawton’s Division then proceeded down the El Caney road to Santa +Cruz, passing by way of the masonry bridge. This was about dusk. The division +marched in columns of fours, with the artillery in front in column of sections, +and without even an advance guard thrown out. The artillery had passed the +masonry bridge and had nearly reached the Santa Cruz farm-house, when the order +was given to halt. The division halted in the road and began to cook supper. +Fires were kindled, and coffee put on to boil. Suddenly, a few shots came +scattering over the ridge and dropped in among the troops. A messenger was sent +back to Gen. Shafter to inform him that further advance in this direction was +not practicable, as the enemy had been encountered in force. The position this +division was destined, in the beginning, to occupy was within less than 300 +yards of where it halted. There was no large body of Spanish troops in that +portion of the field. The whole valley between that ridge and Santiago had been +swept by machine gun fire during the afternoon. It is possible that there might +hare been a few Spanish pickets on the ridge, but this is not believed to be +probable. There was some firing about this time from the Spanish trenches near +Fort Canosa, at the 13th Infantry upon the hill where the dynamite gun was +subsequently placed. A glance at the map will show that these shots, having +passed over the hill, would drop in the vicinity of the masonry bridge and the +Santa Cruz farm-house. This was the firing that alarmed Lawton’s Division +and caused the report mentioned to be sent back to General Shafter. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus31"></a> +<img src="images/31.jpg" width="600" height="386" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Native Industry.</p> +</div> + +<p> +This statement of the conditions has been necessary in order to understand why +the counter-march was made by Lawton’s Division. The position at El Caney +had ceased to be of any importance as soon as the San Juan block-house and +ridge were taken; any Spanish troops remaining at El Caney were necessarily +victims. But it was vitally important to hold the position gained by the left +wing. The appearance of a heavy force of the enemy in front of the masonry +bridge could signify only one thing, and that was that the left wing, with its +right flank in the air, was liable to be doubled up at any moment by a heavy +force of the enemy striking it upon that flank. Further, that Gen. Lawton, with +this column advancing on the El Caney road as before explained, was liable to +be struck at the head of his column and similarly doubled up. The enemy would +thus interpose between the two wings of the army, cutting Lawton off, and +probably defeating the army in detail, unless something be done immediately. +</p> + +<p> +Of course, it is known now that this operation of the enemy was never probable +for an instant; but that was the status of affairs at midnight on July 1st, as +then reported to the commanding general. +</p> + +<p> +Lawton was, therefore, ordered to withdraw, by way of the El Caney road, back +to Gen. Shafter’s headquarters in rear of El Poso, from which position +his division was rushed forward on the El Poso road to San Juan on the 2d of +July. His men were marched almost all night, almost all day the next day, and +were well-nigh utterly exhausted when they reached a position in rear of the +right flank of the left wing. It was supposed, up to this time, at +headquarters, that the information on which this marching was ordered was +correct. +</p> + +<p> +During the time that Lawton had been countermarching from Santa Cruz, back by +way of El Poso, there had been, as before stated, no reserve for the left wing. +The independent division of Gen. Bates had been ordered to the front as rapidly +as possible. Part of it had reached the vicinity of El Poso, and from there one +or two of the regiments had participated in the fight, late on July 1st; but +nobody on the firing line knew anything about Bates’ independent division +at this time, and it was too much exhausted to be useful as a reserve. The +morning of the 2d it was used to extend the lines. It is therefore evident, now +that the history of the battle is understood, that the Gatling guns were the +only effective reserve which the left wing of the army had during the night of +July 1st and all day on the 2d. +</p> + +<p> +Acting on this belief, the Gatling Gun Battery was placed in reserve, in the +rear of Fort Roosevelt, on the morning of July 2d, and was held there in +reserve all day on July the 2d and 3d. The pieces were placed within twenty +yards of the firing-line, just below the crest of the hill. The feed-guides +were filled, and the gun crews lay down beside their pieces. The battery was +ready to either support the firing-line against a charge, or protect its flank +against a turning movement. But it was not considered necessary or desirable to +run the pieces up on the firing-line in the open, and participate in the +trench-firing, which was the only fighting done on July 2d and 3d. It was +considered that the battery was too valuable as a reserve to sacrifice any of +its men uselessly. Some very well-meaning officers urged that the battery be +rushed up on the hill and put into action, but this was stubbornly refused, +under the third clause of the instructions given on the 1st of July, “to +make the best use of the guns possible.” Gen. Wood and Col. Roosevelt +were consulted, and they concurred with the above views, and the battery +remained in reserve. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus32"></a> +<img src="images/32.jpg" width="600" height="410" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Charge on San Juan Hill.</p> +</div> + +<p> +On the morning of the 2d of July a handsome young soldier, in the uniform of a +Rough Rider, approached the battery commander, saluted, and said, “Col. +Roosevelt directs me to report to you with my two guns.” Inquiry elicited +the fact that the young trooper was Serg. William Tiffany, that he had command +of two Colt’s automatic rapid-fire guns, with a crew consisting of Corp. +Stevens and six men, and that he had 4,000 rounds of 7-millimeter ammunition. +Four thousand was not a very large supply for two guns which could fire at the +rate of 500 shots each per minute. Fortunately, the Gatling Gun Detachment had +found time, on the 1st of July, to collect about 10,000 rounds of Mauser +ammunition in the captured trenches, and a comparison of the Mauser with the +7-millimeter ammunition at once disclosed the fact that it was precisely the +same ammunition which Tiffany had brought along for his guns. The problem of +ammunition supply for Tiffany’s guns was solved. He now had 14,000 +rounds, and his guns became a very powerful reinforcement at this point. +</p> + +<p> +Serg. Tiffany and his men had carried these guns from Siboney to the +firing-line upon their backs. How they got the four boxes of ammunition through +they themselves could hardly tell. The firing was too heavy to mount the +tripods in the trenches during the daytime, so placing the guns was deferred +until night. For some reason it was not practicable to place the tripods on the +night of the 2d, and they were finally placed on the night of the 3d; Serg. +Tiffany, with two of his men, aiding in digging the emplacements. +</p> + +<p> +While digging, suddenly a burst of firing broke out, and it was believed by +many that a serious night attack had been made. During the firing, Capt. Ayers, +of the 10th Cavalry, and Col. Roosevelt again displayed those characteristics +of fearless bravery which so endeared these two gallant officers to their men. +Some of the troops in the trenches had begun to fire wildly. In fact, all the +firing was done wild; there was no sense in any of it; there was no occasion +for it. Intent listening to the enemy’s fire made it absolutely certain +that their firing never approached nearer our lines. There may have been some +small body seeking to explore the road, but there was no indication of any +attack in force. At any rate, Roosevelt and Ayers determined to stop the firing +of our line, and suddenly, above the din of battle, these two officers could be +heard, tramping up and down the trench in front of their men, haranguing, +commanding, ridiculing their men for shooting in the dark. Ayers told his men +that they were no better than the Cubans, upon which the burly black troopers +burst into a loud guffaw, and then stopped firing altogether. Roosevelt told +his men that he was ashamed of them. He was ashamed to see them firing valuable +ammunition into the darkness of the night, aiming at nothing; that he thought +cowboys were men who shot only when they could see the “whites of the +other fellow’s eyes.” They also stopped firing. The enemy’s +bullets continued to whiz by for a few minutes, and they too ceased firing, and +everybody began to laugh at everybody else. Tiffany had joined the two officers +in their walk up and down, exposing himself with the utmost coolness. He and +his men now succeeded in placing his guns in the trench, and, from that time +until the end of the fight, they could hardly be induced to leave them long +enough to eat; they didn’t leave them to sleep—they slept in the +trench by the guns. +</p> + +<p> +About one o’clock on the 3d there was a lull in the firing, during which +a flag of truce was sent with a communication to General Toral, notifying him +that a bombardment would follow unless he surrendered. The firing was resumed +and continued until about half past twelve on the 4th of July, at which time +another flag of truce went up, and there was no more firing until the 10th of +July at about three o’clock. Troops, however, were compelled to lie on +their arms; the relief was constantly in the trenches, and the nervous strain +was even worse than the actual dangers of battle. +</p> + +<p> +Negotiations for capitulation having failed, firing was resumed about three +o’clock on the 10th, and continued until one o’clock on the 11th of +July. In this firing all four of the Gatling guns were used; Tiffany’s +guns and the dynamite gun under Serg. Borrowe participated. Three of the +Gatling guns had been placed in the trench on the night of July 3d. The wheels +were taken off and laid on the ground in the rear of the pieces; sand-bag +revetments were built up in front of the guns, and each crew divided into two +reliefs. One relief was required to be constantly at the gun and always ready +for instant action. The fourth gun, the one that had been temporarily disabled, +was repaired on the 4th, thoroughly cleaned, and placed in reserve behind the +crest of the hill. On the 4th of July, Serg. Borrowe had been directed to obey +any instructions given him by the Gatling gun commander, and the dynamite gun +had been placed in position to cooperate with the battery of machine guns. +There were now, therefore, seven pieces in the battery. It was the most +powerful and unique battery ever used in battle. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus33"></a> +<img src="images/33.jpg" width="600" height="381" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Gatlings at Baiquiri Just Before Starting For the Front.</p> +</div> + +<p> +The Sims-Dudley pneumatic dynamite gun throws a Whitehead torpedo, carrying a +charge of four and one-half pounds of explosive gelatine; the effective force +of this charge is equal to that of nine pounds of dynamite, No. 1. The charge +explodes, on striking, by means of a percussion fuse, and steadiness of flight +is secured by means of a vane. The propelling force is a charge of seven ounces +of smokeless powder. The gun is pointed in the same manner as a mortar, and +fired in the same manner as a field-piece. During the 10th and 11th +considerable attention was devoted to the tactical cooperation of the guns +composing this unique battery. +</p> + +<p> +The plan adopted was for the dynamite gun to throw a shell toward a designated +point. Upon the explosion of this shell the Spanish soldiers invariably exposed +themselves, and were immediately assailed by machine gun fire. Occasionally a +dynamite shell would fall with sufficient accuracy to do efficient work on its +own account. On the afternoon of the 10th a dynamite shell fell in a long +trench near Fort Canosa, clearing out the trench. The Spanish survivors were +cut down almost to a man by the machine gun fire, and the Spanish troops were +unable to occupy this trench until the following morning, when the operation +was repeated, practically destroying the usefulness of this trench during the +whole fight. Capt. Duncan, of the 21st Infantry, states that this relieved his +battalion of an enfilading fire, and was a valuable service to them. Another +dynamite shell, on the afternoon of the 10th, fell into a Spanish battery of +artillery, near the brick hospital, and completely destroyed the battery, which +consisted of two 3-inch guns. In all, about a dozen dynamite shells were thrown +with some degree of accuracy, and with good effect. +</p> + +<p> +The fourth Gatling gun, which had been held in reserve, was used during the +afternoon of July 10th, and all day on the 11th, to pour a vertical fire upon +the city of Santiago, beyond that portion that was visible to the American +troops. Perhaps 6,000 or 7,000 shots were thus dropped into the heart of the +city, making the streets unsafe, communication difficult, and striking terror +to the hearts of the Spanish troops who were held there in reserve. Gen. Toral, +in his official statement to his own government, specifically mentions this +fire as one of his principal reasons for surrender. +</p> + +<p> +On the afternoon of the 10th and during the 11th of July a battery of mortars, +under command of Capt. Ennis, posted about half a mile to the right of the +machine gun battery, threw a few shells at the enemy’s intrenchments. +There were four of these mortars in action and they were placed behind the +ridge in a perfectly safe position. They threw, perhaps, twenty-five shells all +told. The first eight or ten failed to explode for the reason that the fuses +had not been punched. Finally, Capt. Ennis discovered that his shells were not +exploding, and, on inquiry, found that there was no fuse-punch in the battery. +He succeeded in finding a brad-awl, which, luckily, some member of the battery +had in his pocket, and showed a sergeant how to punch the fuse with a brad-awl. +After this the mortar shells exploded all right. None of this fire, however, +was directed at the city; it was directed at the trenches of the enemy, and not +over eight or ten of the shells fell with any precision. The mortar fire was +effective in the sense that it tended to demoralize the enemy, but its material +effect was very small. +</p> + +<p> +There was no firing of field-pieces during all this time of which any account +is necessary. The field-pieces were even less useful during this time than they +were on the 1st of July, if such a thing could be possible. +</p> + +<p> +On the night of the 4th of July the reserve Gatling gun was posted to command +the Fort Canosa road, in support of a picket on that road, and from that time +until the surrender this piece was posted there every night. The members, +therefore, of this detachment did practically double duty. This was the gun in +charge of Sergts. Weischaar and Ryder, referred to in the official report. +Luckily, it was not fired, but there can be no doubt of the immense value it +would have had if its use had been necessary. +</p> + +<p> +Summing up the use of machine guns from the 2d to the 11th of July, inclusive, +it may be said that they demonstrated the use of the arm as a tactical reserve +and an auxiliary to an outpost, and that, in combination with a dynamite gun, +they demonstrated that a new arm of the service had been formed which can live +at closer range to the enemy, and do far more effective work, than artillery. +Nor is this all to be considered. It should be remembered that a field-piece +throws a shell which breaks into 273 fragments. The machine gun throws 1000 +shots, and each of these shots is aimed with absolute precision. Therefore, at +any effective range, the machine gun is far superior to a field-piece against +anything except material obstacles. Of course the machine guns will not do to +batter down stone walls, nor to destroy block-houses. It had already been +demonstrated on the 1st of July that “machine guns can go forward with +the charging-line to the lodgment in the enemy’s position,” and +that “their presence on the field of battle, with a supply of ammunition +for ten minutes, is a decisive factor in the engagement.” +</p> + +<p> +These were the principal points claimed for the machine gun in the discussion +of the subject on the 1st of January. The use of the machine gun for advance +and rear guards was not demonstrated at Santiago, for the reason that no +opportunity was presented. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap09"></a>CHAPTER IX.<br /> +THE VOLUNTEERS.</h2> + +<p> +The white flag went up at one o’clock on the 11th, and this was the end +of the fighting at Santiago. The Rough Riders had been moved from the hill at +Fort Roosevelt to a position west of the El Caney road, and one of the Gatling +guns had been sent with them. This gun was brought back on the 17th after the +surrender. Various other movements of troops occurred before the 17th, which +had been decided upon by the generals as the last day of grace. Gen. Toral had +been notified that one o’clock on the 17th was the time for either the +surrender or the signal for the assault. The hour approached, and still the +Spaniard attempted to delay. The orders for the assault were issued. The troops +lay in the trenches with their fingers on the triggers. Gen. Randolph had come +and pushed the artillery into better positions. The pieces were loaded and the +gunners stood with their lanyards in their hands. The ammunition-boxes were +opened. The nervous tension of the line was terrific. The troops on the extreme +right and left, designated for the assault, were only waiting the word to dash +forward upon the intrenchments of the enemy. Then suddenly from Gen. +Wheeler’s headquarters a mounted officer was seen spurring eastward along +the crest. He was waving his hat over his head. His horse gathered speed, and +the foam began to fly from his flanks and nostrils, and as Capt. McKittrick +passed he called, “No cheering, please; the city and province of Santiago +have surrendered.” +</p> + +<p> +The members of the Gatling Gun Detachment walked to the top of the hill, and, +facing toward the gallant enemy who had so valiantly defended the foredoomed +city, silently took off their hats. +</p> + +<p> +All along the line the reception of the glorious news was marked by comments +upon the gallant defense which had been made. There was no demonstration which +could have hurt the feelings of so magnificent a foe. Five minutes after the +surrender the American trench was lined by American troops on our side and +Spanish troops on the other. The Spanish troops brought bottles of mescal, +aguardiente, and wine. Our troops carried hardtack and canned roast beef. These +recent foes began at once to exchange the necessaries of life and souvenirs of +the siege of Santiago. They fraternized as all brave men do after the battle. A +few Cubans skulked around the rear of our line, despised by both sides. +</p> + +<p> +The next day witnessed the formal surrender of the city. At twelve +o’clock, the preliminary formalities having been complied with, the 9th +Infantry and a battalion of the 13th Infantry, the two regiments which had been +adjudged first honors in the assault, were ready as an escort to raise the flag +in the heart of the city. All of the other regiments were formed upon the +ground which they occupied during the siege. As the second-hands of our watches +showed the minute of twelve, noon, a field-piece burst upon the stillness of +the sultry day, and the band began the strains of “The Star-spangled +Banner.” Every hat was taken off, and an instant later, efforts to +restrain it being ineffectual, six miles of solid cheering encompassed the +latest American city. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus34"></a> +<img src="images/34.jpg" width="600" height="384" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Cuban Cart used by Gatling Gun Detachment, Priv. J. Shiffer Driving.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Grizzled old soldiers, scarred with wounds from Indian wars, and gay recruits +who had arrived too late to join in the fighting, gray-haired generals and +athletic young subalterns, all forgot propriety and the silence usually +enjoined in ranks and joined in that tremendous yell. From over on the right of +the El Caney road we could hear the “Rah! rah! rah!” of Harvard and +the “Rah! rah! rah!” of Yale, mingled with the cowboy yell of the +Indian Territory. From the ranks of the Regulars came the old Southern yell, +mingled with the Northern cheer. The most thrilling and dramatic moment of the +Spanish-American War had passed into history. +</p> + +<p> +The troops settled themselves down to wait for developments, and while they +waited, opportunities were presented for the first time to make observations of +the personnel of this heterogeneous army. +</p> + +<p> +The American Regular is a type of his own, and no description of him is +necessary. He was the fighting strength of the 5th Corps. Only three Volunteer +regiments participated in the charges of July 1st-the 71st New York, the 2d +Massachusetts, and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. +</p> + +<p> +The Volunteers presented many different types: some good, some otherwise. There +should be no sympathy with that servile truckling to popular sentiment which +speaks of our brave Volunteers indiscriminately, as if they were all good and +all equally well instructed. There were Volunteers who were the equals of the +Regulars in fighting and in leadership. And there were some who should have +been at home pulling on a nursing-bottle or attending a kindergarten. To praise +them indiscriminately creates a false impression on the public, and works a +rank injustice toward those who were really good and efficient in the service. +It does even worse than that: it fosters the popular idea that all there is to +do to make soldiers is to take so many laborers, clerks, hod-carriers, or +farmers, and put on them uniforms, arm them with rifles, and call them +“gallant Volunteers”! Out upon such an insane delusion! +</p> + +<p> +Fighting is a scientific trade. It would be no more absurd to give an idiot a +tambourine and call him a musician—he would be an idiot all the same. So +with the clerk, the laborer, the hod-carrier, the teacher; he remains the same +in spite of all the polished arms, resplendent uniforms, and pompous titles +bestowed upon him. He remains just what he was before, until he learns his new +trade and becomes a soldier by the acquisition of the necessary knowledge and +experience to practice his new calling. +</p> + +<p> +It is one of the duties of trained officers to tell these homely truths to the +people who have not made a study of the matter, in order that they who foot the +bills may understand what they pay for and why they do it. And it is equally +the duty of the citizen who has no knowledge of the subject to give a fair +hearing to such statements, and, if he finds them correct after due +investigation, to translate the information thus imparted into such laws as +will in future supply an army composed of soldiers who can fight, instead of a +herd of ignorant incompetents who die like rotten sheep within half an +hour’s ride by rail of their own homes. +</p> + +<p> +These remarks can be illustrated by observations in Cuba. +</p> + +<p> +For example, the 34th Michigan pitched its camp on the hill at Fort Roosevelt +on the 2d of August. They were in an awful condition. A man had died in one +company the day before, and there had not been enough able-bodied men in the +company to bury him. A detail had to be made from another company to dig the +grave. More than fifty per cent of the regiment were sick, and the remainder +were far from well. At this time, more than two weeks after the surrender, they +were still cooking individually. Within fifteen minutes after their arrival +they were overrunning the Gatling gun camp, picking up the firewood which had +been gathered by the detachment for cooking purposes. An attempt to stop this +marauding was received with jeers. A green-looking Wolverine at once began to +make catcalls, and was ably seconded by his comrades. Sentinels were then +posted over the Gatling gun camp, with orders to keep the Michiganders out; +they abused the sentinels in the same manner, and their officers made no effort +to restrain them. It became necessary to make a personal matter of it, which +was promptly done, and one Wolverine was thereafter respectful—so +respectful, in fact, that he jumped to attention and took off his hat to even +the privates of the detachment. +</p> + +<p> +The regiment took a delicate revenge. They had dug neither latrines nor sinks. +Up to this time they used the surface of the camp-ground over their own camp +for this purpose. They now took possession of a trench within twenty yards of +the battery’s tents. The nuisance was intolerable, and was reported to +their brigade headquarters. No attention was paid to the report. Twelve hours +later it was again reported, with the same result. Twelve hours after this it +was a third time reported, with the same result. In the meantime not a single +shovelful of dirt had been thrown on the trench and an odor arose from it which +was not exactly like the perfume of “Araby the blest.” +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus35"></a> +<img src="images/35.jpg" width="600" height="380" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Tiffany at his Gun in the Trench.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Forty-five hours after the arrival of the regiment notice was served upon the +brigade commander thereof that, unless the nuisance was abated immediately, a +sentinel would be placed over the offending ditch and notice would be given to +General Bates, the division commander, requesting the action of an inspector; +notice was further served that if any resistance were made, four Gatling guns +would be turned loose upon the 34th Michigan and the regiment swept off the +face of the hill and into Santiago Bay for a much-needed bath. It was enough. +Officers and men ran instantly for spades and proceeded to fill up the trench. +Report was then made to Gen. Bates, the division commander, of the offense and +action had thereon, with the information that the Gatling gun commander awaited +to answer any complaints. An investigation was immediately made, with the +result that such action was sustained. +</p> + +<p> +There were some ignorant Volunteers at Santiago, but of all the willful +violation of all the laws of sanitation, camp hygiene, and health ever seen, +these particular Volunteers did the most outrageous things. They threw their +kitchen refuse out on the ground anywhere; half of the time they did not visit +the sink at all, but used the surface of the ground anywhere instead; and they +continued these offenses at Montauk Point. They raked over an abandoned camp of +the Spanish prisoners on their arrival at Fort Roosevelt, and appropriated all +the cast-off articles they could find, using the <i>débris</i> for bedding. +This surgeon, a “family doctor” from the pine woods in northern +Michigan, did not seem to regard these matters as of any importance. His +attention was called to them, but he took no action. In short, there was no law +of health which these people did not utterly ignore, no excess dangerous to +health which they did not commit. Three-fourths of them were too sick for duty, +and the rest looked like living skeletons. They fairly wallowed in their own +filth—and cursed the climate of Cuba on account of their sickness. +</p> + +<p> +In sharp contrast to the 34th Michigan was the 1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry, the +Rough Riders. This was an organization the peer of any in the Regular Army in +morale, in fighting, and in every quality that goes to make up a fine body of +soldiers. They were picked men; all classes were shown in that organization. +The tennis champion was a private, the champion oarsman of Harvard a corporal. +On the 2d of July a stock-broker of Wall Street who can sign his check for +$3,000,000 was seen haggling with a cow-puncher from the Indian Territory over +a piece of hardtack. Both were privates and both were fine soldiers. The whole +regiment was just such a medley, but fought like Regulars, and endured like +Spartans. They hung on like bull-dogs, and charged like demons. They were as +strict about the camp police as Regular Army surgeons, and as punctilious about +saluting as a K. O. on “official relations.” Withal, they were a +clean-mouthed, clean-clad, clean-camped lot of gentlemen, each in his way, from +the “Hello, pard!” of the cowboy to the frozen stare of the +monocled dude from Broadway. And they fought—like Regulars; there is no +other just comparison. Roosevelt said: “They are the 11th Cavalry.” +He found enthusiastic endorsers of this remark in every Regular who saw them +fight. They were the finest body of Volunteers who ever wore uniform, and they +were stamped indelibly with the personality of Theodore Roosevelt. Pushing, +aggressive, resolute, tenacious, but self-contained, cool, and restrained, they +represented the very best type of what the Volunteer ought to be—but +often was not. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus36"></a> +<img src="images/36.jpg" width="600" height="380" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Relics of the Battle. 1. Range Table of 16-cm. Gun in +Spanish Fort, Silenced by Gatlings July 1, ’98. 2. Rear Sight of same +Gun. 3. Fuse picked up by J. Shiffer July 1. 4. Remington Cartridge used by the +Spanish Volunteers, the so-called “Explosive” Brass-covered Bullet. +5. Piece of Coral dug up in the Trenches. 6. Spanish Spurs.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Above them all, however, shone out three types. +</p> + +<p> +Theodore Roosevelt. He needs no eulogy from my pen. He has done everything, and +in each occupation has been conspicuously successful. He is, however, a born +soldier. His virile frame contains the vigorous mind, the keen intellect, the +cool judgment, and the unswerving, never-hesitating courage of the natural +soldier. He is affable and courteous, or stern and scathing, as circumstances +demand. One instant genial smiles overspread his expressive countenance, +whereon the faintest emotion writes its legend with instantaneous and +responsive touch; the next, on occasion, a Jove-like sternness settles on his +face, and, with a facility of expression bewildering to less gifted tongues, +scathing invective, cutting sarcasm, or bitter irony impress upon an offender +the gravity of a breach of discipline. Withal, he is modest. He appreciates his +own power, but there is no undue display of that appreciation, no vainglorious +boasting over achievements which read like a fairy-tale. Fittest to lead or +follow, idol of every true soldier. Who, that knows him as those who fought +beside him, does not wish to see him at the head of that army and that nation +of which he is the brightest ornament in every position, civil, military, or +political? +</p> + +<p> +Woodbury Kane—social leader, Fortune’s favorite, aristocratic, +refined, cultured, wealthy, <i>haut ton de haut ton</i>, and <i>sabreur sans +peur et sans reproche</i>—how shall I paint him to you as I learned to +know him in those dreadful, delightful seventeen days in which we lived only +from instant to instant, and every man unconsciously bared his soul to his +comrades because he could not help it? +</p> + +<p> +A gentleman—he always looked that in the fullest sense of the word. Well +groomed; in those days when our bed was a mud-puddle and our canopy the stars, +when the music which lulled us to sleep was the hum of the Mauser bullets and +the vicious popping of the Remingtons, when water to drink had to be brought at +the peril of life for every mouthful, Kane turned up every morning clean-shaved +and neatly groomed, shoes duly polished, neat khaki, fitting like a glove and +brushed to perfection, nails polished, and hair parted as nicely as if he were +dressed by his valet in his New York apartments. How did he do it? We never +knew. He kept no servant; he took his regular turn in the ditches, in the mud, +or torrid sun, or smothering rain. No night alarm came that did not find Kane +first to spring to the trench—and yet he did it, somehow. The courteous +phrases of politest speech fell ever from his ready lips, as easily as they +would have done in the <i>boudoir</i> of any belle in the metropolis. The +shrieking of a shell or tingling hiss of a sharpshooter’s close-aimed +bullet never came so near as to interrupt whatever polished expression of +thanks, regret, or comment he might be uttering. And it was the real thing, +too. The gentle heart was there. No man was readier to bind a wound or aid a +sun-struck soldier in the ranks; none more ready to deny himself a comfort or a +luxury to help a more needy comrade. A braver man, a surer or more reliable +officer, never trod in shoe-leather. A grand example to our pessimistic, +socialistic friends and cheap demagogues of the sterling worth and noble, +chivalric character of a “society man of wealth.” He is a living +type of <i>“Bel à faire peur,”</i> without the idiotic +sentimentality of that maudlin hero, and with all his other characteristics. +</p> + +<p> +Greenway and Tiffany. The one a Harvard football-player, just out, plunging +into the great game of war with all the zest he formerly found in the great +college game. The other the petted son of wealthy parents, also a college +graduate, and the idolized <i>fiancé</i> of his childhood’s sweetheart. +Equally ready for fight or fun, they were the finest type of youthful manhood +to be found. Endowed by Nature with every gift, educated at the best of +colleges, bred in the best of society, ready to enter upon the most desirable +of careers, they threw all upon the altar of country’s love. They entered +battle as one might go to a game or begin a play. All of unbounded zeal, +youthful enthusiasm, restless energy, keen enjoyment—everything seemed to +be equally acceptable to them, and no discomfort ever assumed any guise other +than that of a novel and untried sensation. +</p> + +<p> +They are the type of our young manhood—our representative American +youth—as Roosevelt is of its vigorous manhood. They are the salt of the +earth, and Kane—is both salt and spice. All were comrades in arms, types +of American manhood unspoiled by Fortune’s favors, capable of anything +and everything. Such men mould the destiny of this great nation, and in their +hands it is safe. +</p> + +<p> +But neither of these two regiments is a fair type of the Volunteers; they are +the two extremes. For a type, take the 1st Illinois. They were a Chicago +regiment with fifteen years’ service, and they enlisted in a body to a +man. They reached the firing line on the 10th and participated in the fight +with two battalions, with distinguished gallantry. The third battalion was +detailed on the necessary but unpleasant duty of caring for the yellow fever +hospital at Siboney. These city-bred Volunteers peeled off their coats, buried +yellow fever corpses, policed the hospital and hospital grounds, and nursed the +victims of the scourge. They did not utter a complaint nor ask for a +“soft” detail; they did their duty as they found it. Another +battalion was detailed immediately after the surrender to guard the Spanish +prisoners. This most thankless duty was performed by them with fidelity and +care. The commander of the battalion and half his officers were proficient in +the Spanish language as a part of their preparation for the campaign, and they +soon established cordial relations with the prisoners they were set to guard. +It was a trying duty, but they performed it faithfully. Sickness visited this +battalion, and sometimes guard duty had to be performed with only one day off, +but they never whimpered. The other battalion was detailed after the surrender +to do stevedore work at the commissary dépot. The slender clerks and +soft-handed city men slung boxes of hardtack and sacks of bacon and barrels of +coffee, and performed manual labor with all the faithfulness that would be +expected of men accustomed to such work, and with never a complaint. The +sanitary measures of this regiment were perfect, and they bore themselves like +Regulars. It is now recognized that this is a compliment to any Volunteer +organization. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap10"></a>CHAPTER X.<br /> +THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS.</h2> + +<p> +In such a campaign as that of Santiago, a certain amount of suffering is +inevitable. In such a climate as that of southern Cuba, a certain amount of +disease is unavoidable. In the very hot-bed of yellow fever and malaria, no +army could hope to escape without contracting these diseases; and in a campaign +conducted with the marvelous celerity of the one at Santiago, some difficulty +in forwarding supplies must necessarily be encountered. +</p> + +<p> +The root of all our difficulties lay in the fact that the commanding general +had under him supply departments whose officers reported to heads of bureaus +not under control of the corps commander. This caused unnecessary delays in +obtaining supplies, entailed confusion in their distribution, and led to +suffering beyond what was necessarily the result of the climate and the +campaign. +</p> + +<p> +A brief description of the method of obtaining supplies will make this point +more clear. When a given article was wanted, whether it was soap, quinine, +tentage, or transportation, a requisition upon the chief of the proper bureau +at Washington had to be made, with full statement of the reasons for the +request; this requisition had to be approved by all intermediate commanders and +go through military channels to the chief of the bureau, who might or might not +be convinced of the necessity for the article wanted. His action being endorsed +thereon, the requisition returned through the same devious route, and possibly +might be followed in course of time, either by invoices from some distant +purchasing agent of the required articles, or by directions of the bureau chief +to make further explanations. The usual length of time allowed for an official +communication through military channels, in time of peace at home, from any +regimental headquarters to Washington and return, is from ten to thirty days. +Here was the first cause of suffering. +</p> + +<p> +If the heads of the supply departments in the field, beginning at Tampa, could +have acted promptly upon the orders of their respective commanding officers, +without the action of any other authority, unnecessary delay would have been +avoided. +</p> + +<p> +To illustrate this point: The Gatling Gun Detachment was ordered to be equipped +with revolvers upon reporting to the detachment commander, and this order was +issued on the 11th of June, before sailing from Port Tampa. They did not so +report, and it devolved upon the detachment commander to make requisition for +the necessary equipment. This was done, but no revolvers arrived. The invoices +for revolvers reached the detachment commander on the 15th of September, at +Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he was then, on leave of absence, sick, ten +days after the detachment was disbanded. +</p> + +<p> +This is an extreme case, but the same difficulty was experienced in obtaining +supplies of all descriptions. It was, therefore, very difficult for a +quartermaster, a commissary, a medical officer, or any other officer whose duty +it was to obtain supplies, to have the same when emergency demanded it. The +necessity for supplies could not always be foreseen, the quantity desired could +not always be estimated for with precision, and it followed that sometimes +there was a deficiency when the articles were needed. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus37"></a> +<img src="images/37.jpg" width="600" height="362" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Cieba Tree, under Which General Toral Surrendered.</p> +</div> + +<p> +Again, the transportation of the 5th Army Corps could not be made available at +first to carry supplies up from the landing-place. The troops had drawn travel +rations, which lasted them until they disembarked. The first supply problem, +upon landing, was that of issuing rations; and, at the moment when every +available boat was engaged in carrying troops ashore, it became necessary to +put rations ashore also. The exigency demanded the speedy disembarkation of the +greatest possible number of men. The fight of La Guasimas emphasized the +necessity of getting men to the front. It was no time to delay the movement of +troops for the purpose of waiting on wagons, tentage, or rations. The safety of +the expedition, the fate of the whole campaign, depended upon energetic and +rapid movement to the front. Consequently regiments were put forth with only +such amounts of rations and tentage as they could carry upon their backs. It +will be readily seen that this amount was very limited, and the only tentage +possible was the shelter tent. +</p> + +<p> +There were 118 wagons in the hold of the Cherokee, but it was not practicable +to delay the disembarkation of the corps and hazard the fate of the whole +campaign by utilizing the only wharf and all the boats two or three days to +land these wagons. By the time they could be taken off, the rains had made the +roads almost impassable, and they could not all be used. It was therefore a +daily struggle to get enough rations forward to feed the fighting-line from day +to day. Greatly to the credit of those who performed the duty, it can be said +that, with rare exceptions, all the soldiers of the 5th Army Corps had every +day, when they could possibly cook the same, hardtack and bacon, roast beef, +and coffee. This much was accomplished in the face of insurmountable obstacles +by the heroic exertions of the pack-train. When the 1st of July arrived, and +the battle began, it was ordered that all soldiers carry three days’ +rations. The heat was intense, the fight exceedingly hot, and marching through +the jungle extremely difficult. The consequence was that the soldiers threw +aside all impedimenta in order to fight more effectively, and, of course, the +rations went with the blankets and the overcoats. The man who held on to a +canteen and haversack was fortunate; very many abandoned the haversack, and a +considerable number abandoned everything except rifle and ammunition. That was +what won the fight; but it made hungry men, and it caused men to sleep on the +wet ground under the open sky, without blankets or tentage. The pack-train +continued its magnificent work. During the fighting it had to bring ammunition. +The men were supposed to have three days’ rations. As soon as the +deficiency became known to the higher officials, the pack-train began to bring +food. Commissary depots were established immediately in rear of the +firing-line, and issues of hardtack, bacon, and coffee, which were about the +only components of the ration that could be brought forward in sufficient +quantities, were made without formality or red tape. It was almost impossible +to get a sufficient quantity of even these components to the front. Sometimes +the ration was a little short. Bacon and hardtack for seventeen consecutive +days, after three weeks of travel ration, do not form the most appetizing diet +in the world. The exposure consequent upon the fighting and lack of tentage had +its inevitable result in sickness. +</p> + +<p> +The same difficulties which had beset the quartermaster and commissary +departments were also encountered by the surgeons. Hospital accommodations were +scanty, the quantity of medicines available was very limited, the number of +wounded men disproportionately large, and, when sickness was added to the +wounds, the small number of surgeons available at the front were not able to +give the individual attention and scientific treatment which forms a part of +our admirable medical system in time of peace. There were only three or four +ambulances available until after the 11th of July. A considerable number of the +surgeons were on duty at the general hospitals far in the rear; the number at +the front was not sufficient to attend to all the duties which devolved upon +them. This deplorable condition reacted, causing a greater amount of illness. +To add to this difficulty, the Volunteers began to suffer excessively from the +results of their own ignorance and carelessness; and when the yellow fever +scourge was added to all the other difficulties which beset the 5th Corps, the +outlook became gloomy. +</p> + +<p> +The attempt has been made in the foregoing exposition of the conditions at +Santiago to represent fairly the difficulties under which all parts of the army +labored. The fact remains, nevertheless, that there was an appalling amount of +suffering due to causes which might have been foreseen and which were easily +preventable. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus38"></a> +<img src="images/38.jpg" width="600" height="379" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Undergrowth in Cuba.</p> +</div> + +<p> +On the 18th day of July the transports entered the harbor of Santiago. From +that day forward there was unlimited wharfage at disposal, and there were +excellent macadamized roads leading to all parts of the command. The fall of +Santiago had been foreseen more than a week, and if there was not a sufficient +quantity of wagons present on board the ships, there had been ample time to +make telegraphic requisition for them to Washington. Up to the surrender, the +suffering from sickness had been exceedingly light. There was something +stimulating about the nervous strain and excitement of the time which kept the +men up to their work; but the inadequacy of the medical supplies on hand had +been amply demonstrated by the 10th. and it had become fully apparent that the +medical corps was unable to handle the number of patients on hand. The previous +remark about the practicability of telegraphing to headquarters for additional +force applies to this department also. +</p> + +<p> +The principal sufferings after the surrender were due to four causes: first, +improper clothes; second, improper food; third, lack of shelter; fourth, lack +of proper medical attention. +</p> + +<p> +In regard to clothing and these other necessaries, it should be borne in mind +that the corps which went to Santiago was virtually the Regular Army. Every +regiment which went to Tampa went there ready for service. Its equipment was +just as complete on the 26th of April as it was on the 6th of June. There +should have been no problems to solve in regard to them—and yet there +were many. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>First—Clothing.</i> +</p> + +<p> +The troops wore the same clothing to Cuba they had brought from Sheridan, +Assinniboine, and Sherman. They wore winter clothing for their service in the +torrid zone, and those who received summer clothing at all received it late in +August, just in time to return to the bracing breezes of Montauk Point, where, +in their enfeebled condition, winter clothing would have been more suitable. It +did not require a professor of hygiene to foresee that the winter clothing used +in northern Michigan would not be suitable for campaigning in southern Cuba in +July; or that summer clothing suitable for southern Cuba would be too light for +men returning to the northern part of Long Island. Is it to be concluded that +it was impossible to obtain summer clothing for 18,000 men between the 26th of +April and the 6th of June? +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Second—Improper Food.</i> +</p> + +<p> +Most of the troops were embarked upon the transports by the 10th of June. Their +food on transport consisted of the travel ration: canned roast beef, canned +baked beans, canned tomatoes, and hardtack, with coffee, were the components. +They subsisted upon this food, imprisoned in fetid holds of foul transports, +unfit for the proper transportation of convicts, until the 25th day of June, +when they disembarked. On drawing rations for the field it was found that the +field ration would be of the same components, with the addition of bacon and +minus the baked beans and tomatoes. During the emergency, up to include the +18th day of July, this was the ration. Occasionally a few cans of tomatoes +found their way to camp, but rarely. The ration was always short, such as it +was, but this the soldiers could have endured and did endure without a murmur. +</p> + +<p> +But on the 18th of July, with unlimited wharfage at a distance of two miles and +a half, with excellent roads, and with abundance of transportation (see Gen. +Shafter’s Official Report), and with surrender foreknown for a sufficient +length of time to have brought any quantity of vegetables from New York City, +the ration continued to be bacon, canned beef, hardtack, and coffee. Finally, +about the 25th of July, small amounts of soft bread began to be doled out, and +an occasional issue of frozen fresh beef was made. It was soon demonstrated +that not sufficient fresh beef could be made available. The vegetables which +had been brought had nearly all spoiled on the transports. Hundreds of barrels +of potatoes and onions were unloaded upon the docks and were so badly decayed +as to make them useless. These vegetables had been drifting about the Caribbean +Sea and upon the Atlantic Ocean since the 9th and 10th of June. Occasionally it +was practicable to get a quarter or a half ration of potatoes and half of the +usual allowance of canned tomatoes, but that was all. +</p> + +<p> +It did not require a professor of hygienic dietetics to predict that men fed in +the tropics upon a diet suited to the icy shores of Greenland would become ill, +especially when they were clad in a manner suited to the climate of Labrador. +Are we to conclude that it was impossible to get rice, beans, canned fruits, +canned corn, and other vegetables to take the place of potatoes and onions? +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus39"></a> +<img src="images/39.jpg" width="600" height="423" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Cuban Residence.</p> +</div> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Third—Lack of Shelter.</i> +</p> + +<p> +The allowance of tentage was prescribed for each regiment. Granted that it was +impossible to get tentage up until after the surrender; yet it should have been +practicable to forward tentage over two and one-half miles of macadamized +roads. Yet whole regiments remained without tentage until they embarked for the +United States. The 13th Infantry did not get tentage until the 5th of August. +The 20th Infantry and the 3d Infantry obtained a portion of their tentage about +the same time, but a large part of these regiments remained under shelter tents +until they reembarked. The 1st Illinois and the 34th Michigan remained in +shelter tents until the 15th of August, at which time the author embarked for +the United States. These regiments are fair examples. +</p> + +<p> +The Gatling Gun Detachment was provided with shelter-halves and remained under +them until the 10th of August. Repeated applications for proper tentage were +made, accompanied by medical certificates that the issue of tentage was +imperatively necessary for the health of the command. Endorsements thereon by +the chief quartermaster of the 5th Corps as late as the 5th of August show that +there was no available tentage for issue. Application was made to the +regimental commander, 13th Infantry, for a portion of regimental tentage for +the detachment of the 13th Infantry; but, in spite of the fact that the reduced +regiment had on hand all the canvas prescribed for the full regiment, none +could be obtained for the detachment. The detachment commander was entirely +without tentage from the 25th of June until the 5th of August—forty-five +days in the rainy season in Cuba, exposed to the torrid sun by day, to chilling +dews by night, and the drenching rains of the afternoon, without shelter from +any inclemencies of the weather, and this in spite of repeated applications to +proper authorities for the suitable allowance of tentage. Is it any wonder that +men grew sick, and that death stalked broadcast through the camp of the 5th +Corps, under these conditions? +</p> + +<p class="center"> +<i>Fourth—Lack of Proper Medical Attendance.</i> +</p> + +<p> +The surgeons who were at the front with the firing-line worked heroically, but +were burdened beyond their physical powers. Owing to the foregoing causes, +great numbers of men became ill as soon as the strain and tension of the battle +were relieved. It was not uncommon to find twenty or twenty-five per cent of a +command on the sick-report, and in some cases the sick-list went as high as +fifty per cent. There were no well men in the 5th Army Corps. Those who refused +to go on the sick-report were, nevertheless, sick. The author has yet to find a +single member of the expedition who did not suffer from the climatic fever. The +surgeons themselves were not exempt, and the very limited supply of doctors was +speedily decreased by sickness. Were there no doctors in the United States who +were willing to come to Cuba? +</p> + +<p> +Up to the 25th of July the supply of medicines was very deficient. There was +never a sufficient supply of ambulances. The accommodations in the hospitals +were even worse than those on the firing-line. A sick soldier on the +firing-line could always find some comrade who would cut green boughs or gather +grass for a bed, but the one who went to the hospital had to lie on the ground. +The supply of hospital cots was ridiculously inadequate, and this condition did +not improve. +</p> + +<p> +The difficulty of obtaining adequate medical attendance may be illustrated by +the case of Priv. Fred C. Elkins, of the 17th Infantry, member of the Gatling +Gun Detachment. Priv. Elkins had been hurt in the fight on the 1st of July and +had been sent to the hospital. He found the accommodations so wretched that he +feigned improvement and returned to his detachment. He remained with the +detachment until the 14th of July, improving so far as his injury was +concerned, but contracted the climatic fever. During this time he was +prescribed for twice by the assistant surgeon with the Rough Riders, Dr. +Thorpe, previous to the time this regiment was moved westward on the +firing-line. His condition became worse, and on the 12th of July Dr. Brewer, +1st lieutenant and assistant surgeon with the 10th Cavalry, was called upon to +examine him. This surgeon had then under treatment over 100 cases pertaining to +his proper command, and was himself ill, but he readily came and inspected the +patient. He promised to send medicines for him, but in the rush of overwork +forgot to do so, and on the 13th of July he was again summoned. This time he +sent a hospital attendant to take the patient’s temperature, which was +104°. No medicines were sent. On the 14th of July the patient became delirious. +The detachment commander went in person to request the same surgeon to attend +to the case, he being the only one available at that time. The hospital +attendant was again ordered to take the temperature. At the end of an hour even +this had been neglected. The hospital man was sick, and had been without sleep +for fifty hours. Priv. Elkins was put upon a board and carried to +Brewer’s tent, with his descriptive list in his pocket. The surgeon was +told the name of the patient and the facts that he was related to a +distinguished family and had been recommended for a commission for gallantry +upon the field of battle. Dr. Brewer was himself suffering at the time, with a +temperature of 103°, but he rose from his own sick-bed and administered +remedies which relieved the patient. The following day, the third of his +illness, Dr. Brewer was found to be suffering from yellow fever, and was +carried back to the yellow fever hospital at Siboney along with Priv. Elkins. +He had been sick all the time, but had done his best. Priv. Elkins improved +sufficiently to write a letter to his commanding officer from the hospital at +Siboney, on the 25th of July, which reached that officer at Fort Leavenworth, +Kansas, on the 12th day of September. In spite of the fact that the patient was +furnished with descriptive list, and was specially commended to the care of the +surgeon as a soldier marked for extreme gallantry, all trace of him had been +lost; and although two private detectives were searching for him a month, no +further clew had been found to his whereabouts or fate as late as the 1st of +October. Even if his descriptive list had not been furnished with this man, the +fact that he was alive and rational enough on the 25th day of July to write a +letter concerning his approaching discharge should have made it easy for some +record of his case to have been kept. +</p> + +<p> +But this one isolated case sinks into insignificance beside the condition in +which some of the sick were left by commands returning to the United States. +All cases of yellow fever suspects were left behind, and in the mad scramble to +embark for the return voyage many of these were left without proper attention +or supplies. +</p> + +<p> +Gen. Kent’s Division had left by the 11th of August. The following +extract from a letter dated Santiago de Cuba, August 12, 1898, will convey some +idea of the condition in which the sick of this division were left: +</p> + +<p> +“Yesterday Gen. Kent’s Division left for Montauk, and they left +behind 350 sick, many of them too ill to care for themselves. This humane +country, of course, left ample care for them? There was left one surgeon, one +steward, and one case of medicines. Many of these men are too ill to rise. They +are ‘suspected’ of having yellow fever. They are suffering from +Cuban malaria, and many of them from diarrhea. There was not left a single +bed-pan for this battalion of bed-ridden, suffering humanity, nor any well men +to nurse the sick. There was not even left any to cook food for them. Those +left by the 9th Infantry had to bribe marauding, pilfering Cubans, with a part +of their rations, to carry food to the camp of the 13th, where there were a few +less ill, to get it cooked. +</p> + +<p> +“They are too sick to dig sinks; some are delirious. When the poor +emaciated wrecks of manhood have to obey the calls of Nature, they must either +wallow in their own filth or stagger a few paces from their wet beds on the +slimy soil to deposit more germs of disease and death on the surface already +reeking with ghastly, joint-racking rheums. +</p> + +<p> +“There were left less than fifty cots for these 350 sick men—men +compelled by sheer weakness to lie on the ground which will soon lie on them, +if enough strong men are left by that time to cover them mercifully over with +the loathsome, reeking vegetable detritus which passes here for soil, and which +is so fairly animate that you can see every spadeful of it writhe and wriggle +as you throw it over the rotting hour-dead shell of what was a free American +citizen and a Chevalier Bayard. +</p> + +<p> +“When the last man and wagon of the flying division disappeared over the +hill toward health and home, a despairing wail went up from the doomed 350 left +in this condition of indescribable horror. ‘We are abandoned to +die!’ they cried; ‘we are deserted by our own comrades in the hour +of danger and left to helplessly perish!’ +</p> + +<p> +“These men are those who fought the climate, hunger, and the enemy on the +battle-field which has shed so much undying glory on the American arms. They +are the men who have accomplished unheard-of feats of endurance and performed +incredible feats of valor on the same ground—not for Cuba, but at the +call of duty. They are citizens. They are brave soldiers who have done their +full duty because it was duty.” +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus40"></a> +<img src="images/40.jpg" width="600" height="377" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">Santiago Street Scene</p> +</div> + +<p> +The mail facilities were wretched. Cords of mail were stacked up at Siboney for +weeks; and although there was more transportation on hand than could be used, +the officer detailed to attend to the mail business of the corps, Lieut. +Saville, of the 10th Infantry, could not succeed in securing a wagon to haul +this mail to the front. Since the corps returned to the United States a dozen +letters have reached the author which have chased him by way of Santiago and +Montauk, since dates between the 1st and 20th of July, inclusive. The person to +whom these letters were addressed was well known to every officer and employee +in the corps, and if the mail addressed to one so well known could go astray in +this manner, what could an unknown private expect? This may seem like a little +hardship, but to men in the weakened and enfeebled condition of the survivors +of the 5th Corps a letter from home was both food and medicine. Scores of men +who are to-day rotting in Cuban graves died of nostalgia, and might have lived +if they had received the letters from home which were sent to them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap11"></a>CHAPTER XI.<br /> +THE CAUSE.</h2> + +<p> +The causes of these conditions are not far to seek. The United States has not +had an army since 1866. There has been no such a thing as a brigade, a +division, or a corps. There has been no opportunity to study and practice on a +large scale, in a practical way, the problems of organization and supply. The +Army has been administered as a unit, and the usual routine of business +gradually became such that not a wheel could be turned nor a nail driven in any +of the supply departments without express permission, previously obtained from +the bureau chief in Washington. The same remarks apply equally to all the other +staff departments. The administration had become a bureaucracy because the +whole Army for thirty years had been administered as one body, without the +subdivisions into organizations which are inevitable in war-time and in larger +bodies. +</p> + +<p> +War became a reality with great suddenness. Those who have grown gray in the +service, and whose capacity, honesty, and industry had never been and can not +be impeached, found themselves confronted with the problem of handling nearly +three hundred thousand men, without authority to change the system of supply +and transportation. The minutest acts of officers of these departments are +regulated by laws of Congress, enacted with a view of the small regular force +in time of peace, and with no provisions for modifications in war. In +authorizing the formation of large volunteer armies, Congress did not authorize +any change in the system of administration or make any emergency provision. As +before, every detail of supply and transportation had to be authorized from the +central head. +</p> + +<p> +The administrative bureaus were handicapped to some extent by incompetent and +ignorant members. Late in the campaign it was learned that the way to a +“soft snap” was through the Capitol, and some came in that way who +would certainly never have entered the Army in any other. +</p> + +<p> +There were alleged staff officers who had tried to enter the service through +the regular channels and who had failed, either by lack of ability or bad +conduct, to keep up with the pace set by classmates at the Academy; there were +others who were known as failures in civil life and as the “black +sheep” of eminent families; and there were some who must have been +utterly unknown before the war, as they will be afterward. +</p> + +<p> +How these persons ever obtained places high above deserving officers of +capacity and experience is a question which cries aloud for exposure—but +in a good many cases they did. Indeed, it is to be observed that, for that +matter, the next register of the Army will show a great many more promotions +into the Volunteer service, of officers who never heard a hostile bullet during +the war, who never left the United States at all, than it will of deserving +officers who bore the heat and burden of the march and the battle. +</p> + +<div class="fig" style="width:100%;"> +<a name="illus41"></a> +<img src="images/41.jpg" width="600" height="381" alt="[Illustration: ]" /> +<p class="caption">“Reina Mercedes” Sunk by the “Iowa” +near Mouth of Harbor of Santiago.</p> +</div> + +<p> +The most discouraging thing about it all to a line officer is that this same +register will afford no means of determining who did the service and who did +the “baby act.” Lieut. Blank will be borne thereon as major and +subsequently colonel of the Steenth Volunteers (which never left the State +rendezvous, probably) during the war with Spain; Lieut. Blank No. 2 will be +carried on the same book as second lieutenant, —— Infantry, during +the same war. The gentle reader will at once “spot” the man who was +so highly promoted as a gallant fellow who distinguished himself upon the +bloody field; the other will be set down as the man who did nothing and +deserved nothing. +</p> + +<p> +Yet—the ones who went received no promotion, and those who staid behind +and by their careless incompetence permitted camps amid the peaceful scenes of +homes and plenty to become the hot-beds of fever and disease—these are +the ones borne as field and other officers of the Volunteers. +</p> + +<p> +To illustrate some of the material with big titles sent to “assist” +in running the staff departments, two incidents will suffice. +</p> + +<p> +On the 11th of June, at a certain headquarters, it was desired to send a +message, demanding reply, to each transport. A gray-haired officer turned to +another and said, “Whom shall we send with this? Will So-and-so +do?” naming one of the before-mentioned civil appointments. “For +heaven’s sake, no! He would tie up the whole business. Send an +orderly,” was the reply. The orderly, an enlisted man of the Regulars, +was sent. The officer thus adjudged less competent to carry a message than a +private soldier was perhaps actuated by a high sense of duty; but he filled a +place which should have been occupied by an experienced and able +officer—no, he did not fill it, but he prevented such a man from doing +so. +</p> + +<p> +The second incident was related by an officer on a transport bound for home. +Say his name was—oh well, Smith. +</p> + +<p> +Smith went, on the 20th of July, to a certain headquarters in the field on +business. Those who could have attended to it were absent, but there was one of +the recent arrivals, a high-ranking aide, there, and he, sorry for +Smith’s worn-out look of hunger, heat, and thirst, asked if he would have +a drink. Smith, expecting at the best a canteen of San Juan River water, said +he was a little dry. +</p> + +<p> +The newly-arrived clapped his hands, and, at the summons, a colored waiter in +spotless white duck appeared. “Waitah, take this gentleman’s +ordah,” said the host. Smith, greatly astonished, asked what could be +had, and was yet more astonished to learn that he could be served with Canadian +or domestic whisky, claret, champagne, or sherry. Much bewildered, and utterly +forgetting the awful dangers of liquor in the tropics, he called for Canadian +Club. When it came, on a napkin-covered tray, he looked for water, and was +about to use some from a bucket full of ice which he at that moment espied. +“Aw! hold on,” exclaimed the host; “we nevah use that, +don’t y’ know, except to cool the apollinaris. Waitah, bring the +gentleman a bottle of apollinaris to wash down his liquor.” +</p> + +<p> +Within half a mile were soldiers and officers lying sick in hospital on the +ground, eating hardtack and bacon, and drinking San Juan straight, because +hospital supplies and rations could not be got to the front! +</p> + +<p> +It was this same officer who explained that he approached his headquarters +“by rushes,” upon his arrival, for fear the enemy would see him and +consider this reinforcement a violation of the truce. +</p> + +<p> +These are two examples of some of the able assistants from civil life who were +sent to help feed, clothe, and transport the 5th Corps. +</p> + +<p> +With such assistants, is it any wonder that, under such extraordinary +circumstances as those encountered in Cuba, a system designed for peace and +25,000 men weakened in some respects when the attempt was made to apply it to +300,000 in time of war? +</p> + +<p> +The great wonder is that it did the work as well as it did. And this was due to +the superhuman exertions of the chief officers of the supply departments and +their experienced assistants. These men knew no rest. They were untiring and +zealous. On their own responsibility they cut the red tape to the very smallest +limit. Instead of the regular returns and requisitions, the merest form of +lead-pencil memorandum was sufficient to obtain the necessary supplies, +whenever they were available. This much was absolutely necessary, for these +officers were personally responsible for every dollar’s worth of supplies +and had to protect themselves in some degree. As it is now, many of them will +find it years before their accounts are finally settled, unless some provision +be made by law for their relief. This disregard of routine was essential; but +how much to be desired is a system suited to the exigencies of the service, +both in peace and war! +</p> + +<p> +There is a lesson to be learned from these experiences, and it is this: The +commanding officer of any army organization should not be hampered in the +matter of supplies by having to obtain the approval or disapproval of a junior +in rank, in a distant bureau, who knows nothing about the circumstances. In +other words, the system which causes the staff departments of the United States +Army to regard a civilian as their head, and makes them virtually independent +of their line commanders, is an utterly vicious system. If an officer is +competent to command an organization, he should be considered competent to look +after the details of its administration, and should be held responsible, not +only for its serviceable condition at all times, but for the care of its +property and for all the other details connected with its service. +</p> + +<p> +The quartermaster, or commissary, or other officer of a supply department +should not know any authority on earth higher or other than the officer in +command of the force he is to serve, except those in the line above such chief, +and then only when such orders come through his chief. +</p> + +<p> +The commanding officer having ordered supplies to be procured, there should be +no question whatever in regard to their being furnished. They should come at +once and without fail. If they were not necessary, hold him responsible. +</p> + +<p> +This theory of administration eliminates the bureaucracy which has insidiously +crept upon the Army, and relegates to their proper position the supply +departments. +</p> + +<p> +The General Staff proper has a higher field of usefulness than the mere +problems of supply. Its business is to care for the organization, mobilization, +and strategic disposition of all the forces, both naval and military, of the +United States. Its head should be the President, and the two divisions should +be under the general commanding the Army and the admiral commanding the Navy. +The remainder of this staff should be composed of a small but select personnel, +and should limit its duties exclusively to those set forth above. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap12"></a>CHAPTER XII.<br /> +THE VOYAGE HOME AND THE END OF THE GATLING GUN DETACHMENT.</h2> + +<p> +The detachment received permission on the 10th of August to use any standing +tentage which it could find, and it was thoroughly under shelter an hour after +this permission was received. The climate of Cuba was not so disagreeable when +one could look at it through the door of a tent, but we were not destined to +enjoy our tentage very long. On the 15th, at two o’clock, orders were +received to go on board the <i>Leona</i> at Santiago, bound for Montauk Point, +and at half-past five o’clock men, guns, and equipment were duly stowed +for the voyage home. +</p> + +<p> +It was much more agreeable than the one to Cuba, The transport was not crowded, +the men had excellent hammocks, which could be rolled up during the day, thus +leaving the whole berth deck for exercise and ventilation, and the <i>Leona</i> +was a much better vessel than the <i>Cherokee</i>. +</p> + +<p> +The detachment finally disembarked at Montauk Point on the 23d, passed through +the usual detention camp, and was assigned a camping-place. It was disbanded +per instructions from headquarters, Montauk Point, on the 5th of September, the +members of the detachment returning to their respective regiments, well +satisfied with the work they had done and with each other. +</p> + +<p> +In concluding this memoir the author desires to pay a personal tribute of +admiration and respect to the brave men composing the detachment, both +individually and collectively. Some of them have figured more prominently in +these pages than others, but there was not a man in the detachment who was not +worthy to be called the highest term that can be applied to any man—a +brave American soldier. +</p> + +<p> +The End. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap13"></a>APPENDIX I.</h2> + +<p class="right"> +Headquarters U. S. Troops,<br /> +Santiago de Cuba, July 19, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +<i>General Orders No. 26.</i> +</p> + +<p> +The successful accomplishment of the campaign against Santiago de Cuba, +resulting in its downfall and surrender of Spanish forces, the capture of large +military stores, together with the destruction of the entire Spanish fleet in +the harbor, which, upon the investment of the city, was forced to leave, is one +of which the Army can well be proud. +</p> + +<p> +This has been accomplished through the heroic deeds of the Army and its +officers and men. The major-general commanding offers his sincere thanks for +their endurance of hardships heretofore unknown in the American Army. +</p> + +<p> +The work you have accomplished may well appeal to the pride of your countrymen +and has been rivaled upon but few occasions in the world’s history. +Landing upon an unknown coast, you faced dangers in disembarking and overcame +obstacles that even in looking back upon seem insurmountable. Seizing, with the +assistance of the Navy, the towns of Baiquiri and Siboney, you pushed boldly +forth, gallantly driving back the enemy’s outposts in the vicinity of La +Guasimas, and completed the concentration of the army near Sevilla, within +sight of the Spanish stronghold at Santiago de Cuba. The outlook from Sevilla +was one that might have appalled the stoutest heart. Behind you ran a narrow +road made well-nigh impassable by rains, while to the front you looked upon +high foot-hills covered with a dense tropical growth, which could only be +traversed by bridle-paths terminating within range of the enemy’s guns. +Nothing daunted, you responded eagerly to the order to close upon the foe, and, +attacking at El Caney and San Juan, drove him from work to work until he took +refuge within his last and strongest entrenchment immediately surrounding the +city. Despite the fierce glare of a Southern sun and rains that fell in +torrents, you valiantly withstood his attempts to drive you from the position +your valor had won, holding in your vise-like grip the army opposed to you. +After seventeen days of battle and siege, you were rewarded by the surrender of +nearly 24,000 prisoners, 12,000 being those in your immediate front, the others +scattered in the various towns of eastern Cuba, freeing completely the eastern +part of the island from Spanish troops. +</p> + +<p> +This was not done without great sacrifices. The death of 230 gallant soldiers +and the wounding of 1,284 others shows but too plainly the fierce contest in +which you were engaged. The few reported missing are undoubtedly among the +dead, as no prisoners were taken. For those who have fallen in battle, with you +the commanding general sorrows, and with you will ever cherish their memory. +Their devotion to duty sets a high example of courage and patriotism to our +fellow-countrymen. All who have participated in the campaign, battle, and siege +of Santiago de Cuba will recall with pride the grand deeds accomplished, and +will hold one another dear for having shared great suffering, hardships, and +triumphs together. +</p> + +<p> +All may well feel proud to inscribe on their banners the name of<br/> +Santiago de Cuba. +</p> + +<p> +By command of Major-General Shafter. +</p> + +<p> +Official: <i>John B. Miley, E. J. McClernand,</i><br /> +Aide. Asst. Adj.-Gen. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap14"></a>APPENDIX II.</h2> + +<p class="center"> +<i>The Santiago Campaign.</i> +</p> + +<p> +Report of Major-General Wm. R. Shafter, Commanding. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +September 13, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +Sir,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the campaign +which terminated in the fall of Santiago de Cuba and the adjacent territory, +and the establishment of the military government therein. +</p> + +<p> +The expedition was undertaken in compliance with telegraphic instructions of +May 30, 1898, from Headquarters of the Army, in which it was stated: +</p> + +<p> +“Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have been +seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at +Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet.” +</p> + +<p> +On this date there were a large number of transports in Port Tampa Bay, which +had been collected for the purpose of an expedition which it had been +previously contemplated I should command, and for such other emergencies as +might arise. Orders were immediately given for loading aboard those transports +the necessary subsistence and quartermaster supplies, and for the embarkation +of the authorized number of troops and their material. General Orders No. 5, +from these headquarters, indicate the organizations it was at first proposed to +take. +</p> + +<p> +The order is as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Headquarters 5th Army Corps,<br/> +“Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“G. O. 5. +</p> + +<p> +“The following troops will hold themselves in readiness to move +immediately on board transports upon notification from these headquarters: +</p> + +<p> +“1. The 5th Army Corps. +</p> + +<p> +“2. The Battalion of Engineers. +</p> + +<p> +“3. The detachment of the Signal Corps. +</p> + +<p> +“4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the commanding general +of the cavalry division, in accordance with instructions previously given. +</p> + +<p> +“5. Four batteries of light artillery, to be commanded by a major, to be +selected by the commanding officer of the light artillery brigade. +</p> + +<p> +“6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, to be selected by the commanding +officer of the siege artillery battalion, with eight (8) guns and eight (8) +field mortars. +</p> + +<p> +“7. The Battalion of Engineers, the infantry and cavalry will be supplied +with 500 rounds of ammunition per man. +</p> + +<p> +“8. All troops will carry, in addition to the fourteen (14) days’ +field rations now on hand, ten (10) days’ travel rations. +</p> + +<p> +“9. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage as prescribed in G. O. +54, A. G. O., c. s., will be taken. +</p> + +<p> +“10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 8 of this order, +the chief commissary will provide sixty (60) days’ field rations for the +entire command. +</p> + +<p> +“11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be stored, carefully +piled and covered, will be left in camp in charge of a commissioned officer, to +be selected by the regimental commander. Where there are no recruits available, +the necessary guard only will be left. +</p> + +<p> +“12. Travel rations will be drawn at once by the several commands, as +indicated in paragraph 8. +</p> + +<p> +“By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>E. J. McClernand,</i><br /> +“A. A. G.” +</p> + +<p> +This order was afterwards changed to include twelve squadrons of cavalry, all +of which were dismounted because of lack of transportation for the animals, and +because it was believed, from the best sources of information obtainable, that +mounted cavalry could not operate efficiently in the neighborhood of Santiago. +This was found subsequently to be correct. +</p> + +<p> +The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa for embarking the troops and the large +amount of supplies required were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it was +not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as I hoped and desired. +</p> + +<p> +On the evening of June 7th I received orders to sail without delay, but not +with less than 10,000 men. +</p> + +<p> +The orders referred to caused one division, composed of Volunteer troops, +commanded by Brig.-Gen. Snyder, and which it had been intended to include in my +command, to be left behind. I was joined, however, by Brig.-Gen. Bates, who had +already arrived on transports from Mobile, Ala., with the 3d and 20th Infantry +and one squadron of the 2d Cavalry with their horses, the latter being the only +mounted troops in my command. +</p> + +<p> +After some of them had already reached the lower bay, telegraphic instructions +were received from the honorable Secretary of War, directing that the sailing +of the expedition be delayed, waiting further orders. This delay was occasioned +by the Navy reporting that a Spanish war vessel had been sighted in the +Nicholas Channel. The ships in the lower bay were immediately recalled. On the +next day, in compliance with instructions from the adjutant-general of the +Army, the necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the full +capacity of the transports, and the expedition sailed on June 14th with 815 +officers and 16,072 enlisted men. +</p> + +<p> +The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. The health of the +command remained remarkably good, notwithstanding the fact that the +conveniences on many of the transports, in the nature of sleeping +accommodations, space for exercise, closet accommodations, etc., were not all +that could have been desired. While commenting upon this subject, it is +appropriate to add that the opinion was general throughout the Army that the +travel ration should include tomatoes, beginning with the first day, and that a +small quantity of canned fruit would prove to be a most welcome addition while +traveling at sea in the tropics. If the future policy of our Government +requires much transportation for the military forces by sea, definite +arrangements should be determined upon to provide the necessary hammock +accommodations for sleeping. Hammocks interfere immeasurably less than bunks +with the proper ventilation of the ships and during the day can be easily +removed, thus greatly increasing space for exercise; moreover, they greatly +diminish the danger of fire. +</p> + +<p> +While passing along the north coast of Cuba one of the two barges we had in tow +broke away during the night, and was not recovered. This loss proved to be very +serious, for it delayed and embarrassed the disembarkation of the army. On the +morning of June 20th we arrived off Guantanamo Bay, and about noon reached the +vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came on board my headquarters +transport. It was arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban +general (Garcia) at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west of the Morro. +During the interview Gen. Garcia offered the services of his troops, comprising +about 4,000 men in the vicinity of Aserraderos and about 500, under Gen. +Castillo, at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Baiquiri. I +accepted his offer, impressing it upon him that I could exercise no military +control over him except, such as he would concede, and as long as he served +under me I would furnish him rations and ammunition. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3>DISEMBARKATION IN CUBA.</h3> + +<p> +Ever since the receipt of my orders I had made a study of the terrain +surrounding Santiago, gathering information mainly from the former residents of +the city, several of whom were on the transports with me. At this interview all +the possible points of attack were for the last time carefully weighed, and +then, for the information and guidance of Admiral Sampson and Gen. Garcia, I +outlined the plan of campaign, which was as follows: +</p> + +<p> +With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, the disembarkation was to +commence on the morning of the 22d at Baiquiri; on the 21st 500 insurgent +troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the +force already there to 1,000 men. This force, under Gen. Castillo, was to +attack the Spanish force at Baiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. +This movement was successfully made. To mislead the enemy as to the real point +of our intended landing, I requested Gen. Garcia to send a small force (about +500 men), under Gen. Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabanas, situated on +the coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and where +it was reported the enemy had several men intrenched, and from which a trail +leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago. +</p> + +<p> +I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several of his warships, with a number +of my transports, opposite this town, for the purpose of making a show of +disembarking there. +</p> + +<p> +In addition, I asked the admiral to cause a bombardment to be made at Cabanas +and also at the forts around the Morro and at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney, +and Baiquiri. The troops under Gen. Garcia remaining at Aserraderos were to be +transferred to Baiquiri or Siboney on the 24th. This was successfully +accomplished at Siboney. +</p> + +<p> +These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from the east over a +narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from +Baiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter. +This, in my judgment, was the only feasible plan, and subsequent information +and results confirmed my judgment. +</p> + +<p> +On the morning of the 22d the Army commenced to disembark at Baiquiri. The +following general order indicates the manner in which the troops left the +transports and the amount of supplies carried immediately with them: +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“Headquarters 5th Army Corps,<br /> +“On board S. S. <i>Segurança</i>,<br /> +“At Sea, June 20, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“G. O. 18. +</p> + +<p class="center"> +(Extract.) +</p> + +<p> +“1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders, +troops will disembark in the following order: +</p> + +<p> +“First—The 2d Division, 5th Corps (Lawton’s). The Gatling +Gun<br/> +Detachment will accompany this division. +</p> + +<p> +“Second—Gen. Bates’ Brigade. This brigade will form as a +reserve to the 2d Division, 5th Corps. +</p> + +<p> +“Third—The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler’s). +</p> + +<p> +“Fourth—The 1st Division, 5th Corps (Kent’s). +</p> + +<p> +“Fifth—The squadron of the 2d Cavalry (Rafferty’s). +</p> + +<p> +“Sixth—If the enemy in force vigorously resist the landing, the +light artillery, or a part of it, will be disembarked by the battalion +commander, and brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If no serious +opposition be offered this artillery will be unloaded after the mounted +squadron. +</p> + +<p> +“2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket-roll (with +shelter-tent and poncho), three days’ field rations (with coffee, +ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. Additional +ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking +utensils will be left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one +non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company. +</p> + +<p> +“3. All persons not immediately on duty with and constituting a part of +the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs will remain aboard ship +until the landing be accomplished, and until notified they can land. +</p> + +<p> +“4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all small +boats and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark the troops in +the order indicated in paragraph 1. +</p> + +<p> +“5. The ordnance officer—2d Lieut. Brooke, 4th Infantry—will +put on shore at once 100 rounds of ammunition per man, and have it ready for +distribution on the firing-line. +</p> + +<p> +“6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men with the +crushing effect a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All +officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution their +men to fire only when they can be see the enemy. +</p> + +<p> + * * * * * +</p> + +<p> +“By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. +</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<i>E. J. McClernand</i>,<br /> +“A. A. G.” +</p> + +<p> +The small boats belonging to the Navy and the transports, together with a +number of steam launches, furnished by the Navy, were brought alongside and +loaded with troops as prescribed in the order just quoted. When Gen. +Lawton’s Division was fairly loaded in the small boats, the latter were +towed in long lines by the steam launches toward the shore. The sea was +somewhat rough, but by the exercise of caution and good judgment the beach was +reached and the troops disembarked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a +possible attack upon the part of any Spaniards who might have been hidden in +the adjacent block-houses and woods, the Navy opened a furious cannonade on +these places while the troops were moving toward the shore. It was learned +afterward that the Spanish garrison had retired in the direction of Siboney +soon after daylight. +</p> + +<p> +By night about 6,000 troops were on shore. Gen. Lawton was ordered to push down +a strong force to seize and hold Siboney. +</p> + +<p> +On the 23d the disembarkation was continued and about 6,000 more men landed. +Early on this date Gen. Lawton’s advance reached Siboney, the Spanish +garrison of about 600 men retiring as he came up, and offering no opposition +except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of the Cuban troops pursued +the retreating Spaniards and skirmished with them. During the afternoon of this +date the disembarkation of Kent’s Division was commenced at Siboney, +which enabled me to establish a base eight miles nearer Santiago and to +continue the unloading of troops and supplies at both points. +</p> + +<p> +The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the 23d and 24th, and +by the evening of the 24th the disembarkation of my command was practically +completed. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3>PREPARING FOR THE ADVANCE.</h3> + +<p> +The orders for June 24th contemplated Gen. Lawton’s Division taking a +strong defensive position a short distance from Siboney, on the road to +Santiago; Kent’s Division was to be held near Santiago, where he +disembarked; Bates’ Brigade was to take position in support of Lawton, +while Wheeler’s Division was to be somewhat to the rear on the road from +Siboney to Baiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situation until the +troops and transportation were disembarked and a reasonable quantity of +necessary supplies landed. Gen. Young’s Brigade, however, passed beyond +Lawton on the night of the 23d-24th, thus taking the advance, and on the +morning of the latter date became engaged with a Spanish force intrenched in a +strong position at La Guasima, a point on the Santiago road about three miles +from Siboney. Gen. Young’s force consisted of one squadron of the 1st +Cavalry, one of the 10th Cavalry, and two of the 1st United States Volunteer +Cavalry; in all, 964 officers and men. +</p> + +<p> +The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field with +considerable loss. Our own loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, 6 officers and +46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 killed and 27 +wounded. The engagement had an inspiring effect upon our men and doubtless +correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them +that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under a heavy fire +delivered from intrenchments. Gen. Wheeler, division commander, was present +during the engagement and reports that our troops, officers and men, fought +with the greatest gallantry. His report is attached, marked “A.” +This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front on which to +encamp our troops. +</p> + +<p> +My efforts to unload transportation and subsistence stores, so that we might +have several days’ rations on shore, were continued during the remainder +of the month. In this work I was ably seconded by Lieut.-Col. Charles F. +Humphrey, deputy Q. M. G., U. S. A., chief quartermaster, and Col. John F. +Weston, A. O. G. S., chief commissary; hut, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, +it was difficult to land supplies in excess of those required daily to feed the +men and animals, and the loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken away +during the voyage, as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent by +Quartermaster’s Department was greatly felt. Indeed, the lack of steam +launches, lighters, scows, and wharves can only be appreciated by those who +were on the ground directing the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was +not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place +on shore three days’ supplies In excess of those required for the daily +consumption. +</p> + +<p> +After the engagement at La Guasima, and before the end of the month, the army, +including Gen. Garcia’s command, which had been brought on transports to +Siboney from Aserraderos, was mostly concentrated at Sevilla, with the +exception of the necessary detachments at Baiquiri and Siboney. +</p> + +<p> +On June 30th I reconnoitered the country about Santiago and made my plan of +attack. From a high hill, from which the city was in plain view, I could see +the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads were very poor, +and, indeed, little better than bridle-paths until the San Juan River and El +Caney were reached. +</p> + +<p> +The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great importance +to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for +a strong outpost that might be used to assail the right flank of any force +operating against San Juan Hill. +</p> + +<p> +In view of this, I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney with one +division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing +by the El Pozo house, and as a diversion to direct a small force against +Aguadores, from Siboney along the railroad by the sea, with a view of +attracting the attention of the Spaniards in the latter direction and of +preventing them from attacking our left flank. +</p> + +<p> +During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders and explained to them +my general plan of battle. Lawton’s Division, assisted by Capron’s +Light Battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon toward El Caney, to +begin the attack there early the next morning. After carrying El Caney, Lawton +was to move by the El Caney road toward Santiago, and take position on the +right of the line. Wheeler’s Division of dismounted cavalry, and +Kent’s Division of infantry, were directed on the Santiago road, the head +of the column resting near El Pozo, toward which heights Grimes’ Battery +moved on the afternoon of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early +the next morning, and at the proper time prepare the way for the advance of +Wheeler and Kent, on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point was to be delayed +until Lawton’s guns were heard at El Caney and his infantry fire showed +he had become well engaged. +</p> + +<p> +The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted to cutting out and +repairing the roads, and other necessary preparations for battle. These +preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but we were in a sickly +climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road, which +the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was entertained that a +storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us +from our base of supplies; and, lastly, it was reported that Gen. Pando, with +8,000 reinforcements for the enemy, was <i>en route</i> from Manzanillo, and +might be expected in a few days. Under these conditions, I determined to give +battle without delay. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3>THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY.</h3> + +<p> +Early on the morning of July 1st, Lawton was in position around El Caney, +Chaffee’s Brigade on the right, across the Guantanamo road, Miles’ +Brigade in the center, and Ludlow’s on the left. The duty of cutting off +the enemy’s retreat along the Santiago road was assigned to the latter +brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6:15 a. m. The battle here soon +became general, and was hotly contested. The enemy’s position was +naturally strong, and was rendered more so by block-houses, a stone fort, and +intrenchments cut in solid rock, and the loop-holing of a solidly built stone +church. The opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been +anticipated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right of the main line +during the day, as had been intended. After the battle had continued for some +time, Bates’ Brigade of two regiments reached my headquarters from +Siboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance if necessary. +He did so, and was put in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle +continued with varying intensity during most of the day and until the place was +carried by assault about 4:30 p. m. As the Spaniards endeavored to retreat +along the Santiago road, Ludlow’s position enabled him to do very +effective work, and to practically cut off all retreat in that direction. +</p> + +<p> +After the battle at El Caney was well opened, and the sound of the small-arm +fire caused us to believe that Lawton was driving the enemy before him, I +directed Grimes’ Battery to open fire from the heights of El Pozo on the +San Juan block-house, which could be seen situated in the enemy’s +intrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire was +effective, and the enemy could be seen running away from the vicinity of the +block-house. The artillery fire from El Pozo was soon returned by the +enemy’s artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill, and their +first shells killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used smokeless +powder, it was very difficult to locate the position of their pieces, while, on +the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the +position of our battery. +</p> + +<p> +At this time the cavalry division, under Gen. Sumner, which was lying concealed +in the general vicinity of the El Pozo house, was ordered forward with +directions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the right of the Santiago +side, while Kent’s Division was to follow closely in its rear and deploy +to the left. +</p> + +<p> +These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road was so +narrow as to render it impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at +all points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as to preclude +the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It naturally resulted that the +progress made was slow, and the long-range rifles of the enemy’s infantry +killed and wounded a number of our men while marching along this road, and +before there was any opportunity to return this fire. At this time Generals +Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all possible haste and place +their troops in position to engage the enemy. Gen. Kent, with this end in view, +forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the +narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the +formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan +the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieut.-Col. Derby of my staff, +who had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This information he +furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right-hand road, +while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left. +</p> + +<p> +Gen. Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cavalry division, who had been +ill, came forward during the morning, and later returned to duty and rendered +most gallant and efficient service during the remainder of the day. +</p> + +<p> +After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the right with a view of +connecting with Lawton’s left, when he could come up, and with their left +resting near the Santiago road. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime Kent’s Division, with the exception of two regiments of +Hawkins’ Brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from +the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both trails, but more +especially the one to the left, and, crossing the creek, formed for attack in +front of San Juan Hill. During the formation the 2d Brigade suffered severely. +While personally superintending this movement, its gallant commander, Col. +Wikoff, was killed. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut.-Col. +Worth, 13th Infantry, who was soon severely wounded, and next upon Lieut.-Col. +Liscum, 24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the terrible +fire of the enemy, and the command of the brigade then devolved upon +Lieut.-Col. Ewers, 9th Infantry. +</p> + +<p> +While the formation just described was taking place, Gen. Kent took measures to +hurry forward his rear brigade. The 10th and 2d Infantry were ordered to +follow. Wikoff’s Brigade, while the 21st was sent on the right-hand road +to support the 1st Brigade, under Gen. Hawkins, who had crossed the stream and +formed on the right of the division. The 2d and 10th Infantry, Col. E. P. +Pearson commanding, moved forward in good order on the left of the division, +passed over a green knoll, and drove the enemy back toward his trenches. +</p> + +<p> +After completing their formation under a destructive fire, and advancing a +short distance, both divisions found in their front a wide bottom, in which had +been placed a barbed-wire entanglement, and beyond which there was a high hill, +along the crest of which the enemy was strongly posted. Nothing daunted, these +gallant men pushed on to drive the enemy from his chosen position, both +divisions losing heavily. In this assault Col. Hamilton, Lieuts. Smith and +Shipp were killed, and Col. Carroll, Lieuts. Thayer and Myer, all in the +cavalry, were wounded. +</p> + +<p> +Great credit is due to Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself between +his regiments, urged them on by voice and bugle calls to the attack so +brilliantly executed. +</p> + +<p> +In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the gallant regimental +commanders and their heroic men, for, while the generals indicated the +formations and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid bravery of +the subordinate officers and men that planted our colors on the crest of San +Juan Hill and drove the enemy from his trenches and block-houses, thus gaining +a position which sealed the fate of Santiago. +</p> + +<p> +<i>In this action on this part of the field most efficient service was rendered +by Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, and the Gatling Gun Detachment under +his command. The fighting continued at intervals until nightfall, but our men +held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so much blood and +toil.</i> +</p> + +<p> +I am greatly indebted to Gen. Wheeler, who, as previously stated, returned from +the sick-list to duty during the afternoon. His cheerfulness and aggressiveness +made itself felt on this part of the battle-field, and the information he +furnished to me at various stages of the battle proved to be most useful. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3>THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.</h3> + +<p> +My own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heat of the +day before, which prevented me from participating as actively in the battle as +I desired; but from a high hill near my headquarters I had a general view of +the battle-field, extending from El Caney on the right to the left of our lines +on San Juan Hill. His staff officers were stationed at various points on the +field, rendering frequent reports, and through them, by the means of orderlies +and the telephone, I was enabled to transmit my orders. During the afternoon I +visited the position of Grimes’ Battery on the heights of El Pozo, and +saw Sumner and Kent in firm possession of San Juan Hill, which I directed +should be intrenched during the night. My engineer officer, Lieut.-Col. Derby, +collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and during the night trenches +of very considerable strength were constructed. +</p> + +<p> +During the afternoon, Maj. Dillenback, by my order, brought forward the two +remaining batteries of his battalion and put them in position at El Pozo, to +the left of Grimes. Later in the afternoon all three batteries were moved +forward to positions near the firing-line, but the nature of the country and +the intensity of the enemy’s small-arm fire was such that no substantial +results were gained by our artillery in the new positions. The batteries were +intrenched during the night. Gen. Duffield, with the 33d Michigan, attacked +Aguadores, as ordered, but was unable to accomplish more than to detain the +Spaniards in that vicinity. +</p> + +<p> +After the brilliant and important victory gained at El Caney, Lawton started +his tried troops, who had been fighting all day and marching much of the night +before, to connect with the right of the cavalry division. Night came on before +this movement could be accomplished. In the darkness the enemy’s pickets +were encountered, and the division commander, being uncertain of the ground and +as to what might be in his front, halted his command and reported the situation +to me. This information was received about 12:30 a. m., and I directed Gen. +Lawton to return by my headquarters and the El Pozo house as the only certain +way of gaining his new position. +</p> + +<p> +This was done, and the division took position on the right of the cavalry early +next morning; Chaffee’s Brigade arriving first, about half-past seven, +and the other brigades before noon. +</p> + +<p> +On the night of July 1st, I ordered Gen. Duffield, at Siboney, to send forward +the 34th Michigan and the 9th Massachusetts. Both of which had just arrived +from the United States. These regiments reached the front the next morning. The +34th was placed in rear of Kent, and the 9th was assigned to Bates, who placed +it on his left. +</p> + +<p> +Soon after daylight on July 2d the enemy opened battle, but because of the +intrenchments made during the night, the approach of Lawton’s Division, +and the presence of Bates’ Brigade, which had taken position during the +night on Kent’s left, little apprehension was felt as to our ability to +repel the Spaniards. +</p> + +<p> +It is proper here to state that Gen. Bates and his brigade had performed most +arduous and efficient service, having marched much of the night of June +30th-July 1st, and a good part of the latter day, during which he also +participated in the battle of El Caney, after which he proceeded, by way of El +Pozo, to the left of the line at San Juan, reaching his new position about +midnight. +</p> + +<p> +All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less fury, but such of our +troops as were in position at daylight held their ground, and Lawton gained a +strong and commanding position on the right. +</p> + +<p> +About 10 p. m. the enemy made a vigorous assault to break through my lines, but +he was repulsed at all points. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3>SUMMONING THE ENEMY TO SURRENDER.</h3> + +<p> +On the morning of the 3d the battle was renewed, but the enemy seemed to have +expended his energy in the assault of the previous night, and the firing along +the lines was desultory until stopped by my sending the following letter within +the Spanish lines: +</p> + +<p> +“Headquarters U. S. Forces, near San Juan River,<br/> +“July 3, 1898—8:30 a. m. +</p> + +<p> +“Sir,—I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago +de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all the women and +children, that they should leave the city before 10 o’clock to-morrow +morning. +</p> + +<p> +“Very respectfully, your obedient servant, +</p> + +<p> +“<i>William R. Shafter</i>,<br /> +“Maj.-Gen. U. S. Vols.<br /> +“The Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba.” +</p> + +<p> +To this letter I received the following reply: +</p> + +<p> +“Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“His Excellency the General Commanding Forces of the United States, near +San Juan River: +</p> + +<p> +“Sir,—I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-day, +written at 8:30 a. m. and received at 1 p. m., demanding the surrender of this +city, or, in the contrary case, announcing to me that you will bombard this +city, and that I advise the foreigners, women and children, that they must +leave the city before 10 o’clock to-morrow morning. +</p> + +<p> +“It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that +I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your +message. +</p> + +<p> +“Very respectfully, <i>José Toral</i>,<br /> +“Commander-in-Chief 4th Corps.” +</p> + +<p> +Several of the foreign consuls came into my lines and asked that the time given +for them—the women and children—to depart from the city be extended +until 10 o’clock on July 5th. This induced me to write a second letter, +as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Santiago de Cuba, July 3d, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +“Sir,—In consideration of a request of the consular officers in +your city for further delay in carrying out my intentions to fire on the city, +and in the interests of the poor women and children who will suffer very +greatly by their hasty and enforced departure from the city, I have the honor +to announce that I will delay such action, solely in their interests, until +noon of the 5th, provided that during the interim your forces make no +demonstration whatever upon those of my own. +</p> + +<p> +“I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, +</p> + +<p> +“<i>William R Shafter</i>,<br /> +“Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.<br /> +“The Commanding General, Spanish Forces.” +</p> + +<p> +My first message went under a flag of truce at 12:42 p.m. I was of the opinion +that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, and I thought this +result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand +they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon this presumption, I +determined to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who +were able to bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles +not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. +This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the +wounded Spanish privates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines under +the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with +honors, and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish prisoners +produced a good impression on their comrades. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3>OPERATIONS AFTER SANTIAGO—OUR LOSSES.</h3> + +<p> +The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically terminated the battle +of Santiago; all that occurred after this time may properly be treated under +the head of the siege which followed. After deducting the detachments required +at Siboney and Baiquiri to render those depots secure from attack, +organizations held to protect our flanks, others acting as escorts and guards +to light batteries, the members of the Hospital Corps, guards left in charge of +blanket-rolls which the intense heat caused the men to cast aside before +entering battle, orderlies, etc., it is doubtful if we had more than 12,000 men +on the firing-line on July 1, when the battle was fiercest and when the +important and strong positions of El Caney and San Juan were captured. +</p> + +<p> +A few Cubans assisted in the attack at El Caney, and fought valiantly, but +their numbers were too small to materially change the strength, as indicated +above. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our own; they fought +obstinately in strong and intrenched positions, and the results obtained +clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the company officers and men, and +the benefits derived from the careful training and instruction given in the +company in the recent years in rifle practice and other battle exercises. Our +losses in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers +and 1,203 men wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported +later. +</p> + +<p> +The arrival of Gen. Escario on the night of July 2d, and his entrance into the +city was not anticipated, for although it was known, as previously stated, that +Gen. Pando had left Manzanillo with reinforcements for the garrison of +Santiago, it was not believed his troops could arrive so soon. Gen. Garcia, +with between 4,000 and 5,000 Cubans, was intrusted with the duty of watching +for and intercepting the reinforcement expected. This, however, he failed to +do, and Escario passed into the city along on my extreme right and near the +bay. Up to this time I had been unable to complete investment of the town with +my own men; but to prevent any more reinforcements coming in or the enemy +escaping. I extended my lines as rapidly as possible to the extreme right, and +completed the investment of the place, leaving Gen. Garcia’s forces in +the rear of my right flank to scout the country for any approaching Spanish +reinforcements, a duty which his forces were very competent to perform. +</p> + +<p> +It had been reported that 8,000 Spanish troops had left Holquin for<br/> +Santiago. It was also known that there was a considerable force at San<br/> +Luis, twenty miles to the north. +</p> + +<p> +In the battle of Santiago the Spanish navy endeavored to shell our troops on +the extreme right, but the latter were concealed by the inequalities of the +ground, and the shells did little, if any, harm. Their naval forces also +assisted in the trenches, having 1,000 on shore, and I am informed they +sustained considerable loss; among others, Admiral Cervera’s +chief-of-staff was killed. Being convinced that the city would fall, Admiral +Cervera determined to put to sea, informing the French consul it was better to +die fighting than to sink his ships. The news of the great naval victory which +followed was enthusiastically received by the Army. +</p> + +<p> +The information of our naval victory was transmitted under flag of truce to the +Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4th, and the suggestion again made that +he surrender to save needless effusion of blood. +</p> + +<p> +On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into +the harbor the city would surrender without any further sacrifice of life. +Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was temporarily absent, but that +in his (Watson’s) opinion the Navy should not enter the harbor. +</p> + +<p> +In the meanwhile letters passing between Gen. Toral and myself caused the +cessation of hostilities to continue. Each army, however, continued to +strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinion the Spaniards would +surrender without much more fighting, and on July 6th called Gen. Toral’s +attention to the changed conditions, and at his request gave him time to +consult his home government. This he did, asking that the British consul, with +the employees of the cable company, be permitted to return from El Caney to the +city. This I granted. +</p> + +<p> +The strength of the enemy’s position was such I did not wish to assault +if it could be avoided. +</p> + +<p> +An examination of the enemy’s works, made after the surrender, fully +justifies the wisdom of the course adopted. The intrenchments could only have +been carried with very great loss of life, probably with not less than 6,000 +killed and wounded. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3>NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL TORAL.</h3> + +<p> +On July 8th Gen. Toral offered to march out of the city with arms and baggage, +provided he would not be molested before reaching Holquin, and to surrender to +the American forces the territory then occupied by him. I replied that while I +would submit his proposition to my home government. I did not think it would be +accepted. +</p> + +<p> +In the meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson that when the Army +again engaged the enemy the Navy would assist by shelling the city from ships +stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes. +</p> + +<p> +On July 10th the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia arrived and were +placed on the line to the right of the Cavalry division. This enabled me to +push Lawton farther to the right and to practically command the Cobre road. +</p> + +<p> +On the afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken off at 4 p.m., +and I determined to open with four batteries of artillery and went forward in +person to the trenches to give the necessary orders, but the enemy anticipated +us by opening fire with his artillery a few minutes after the hour stated. His +batteries were apparently silenced before night, while ours continued playing +upon his trenches until dark. During this firing the Navy fired from Aguadores, +most of the shells falling in the city. There was also some small arms firing. +On this afternoon and the next morning, we lost Capt. Charles W. Rowell, 2d +Infantry, and one man killed, and Lieut. Lutz, 2d Infantry, and ten men +wounded. +</p> + +<p> +On the morning of July 11th the bombardment by the Navy and my field guns was +renewed, and continued until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to the +Adjutant General of the Army that the right of Ludlow’s brigade of +Lawton’s division rested on the bay. Thus our hold upon the enemy was +complete. +</p> + +<p> +At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the city was again +demanded. The firing ceased, and was not again renewed. By this date the +sickness in the Army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of exposure in +the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the +dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was becoming +so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege to an end, but in common with most +of the officers of the Army, I did not think an assault would be justifiable, +especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in their preliminary +propositions to surrender. +</p> + +<p> +On July 11th I wrote to General Toral as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“With the largely increased forces which have come to me and the fact +that I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting +that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of Santiago and of +your excellency’s army. I am authorized to state that should your +excellency so desire, the Government of the United States will transport the +entire command of your excellency to Spain.” +</p> + +<p> +General Toral replied that he had communicated my proposition to his<br/> +General-in-Chief, General Blanco. +</p> + +<p> +July 12th I informed the Spanish commander that Major General Miles, +Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, had just arrived in my camp, and +requested him to grant us a personal interview on the following day. He replied +he would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on the 13th, and I +informed him his surrender only could be considered, and that as he was without +hope of escape he had no right to continue the fight. +</p> + +<p> +On the 14th another interview took place, during which General Toral agreed to +surrender, upon the basis of his army, the 4th Army Corps, being returned to +Spain, the capitulation embracing all of Eastern Cuba, east of a line passing +from Aserraderos, on the south, to Sagua de Tanamo, on the north, via Palma, +Soriano. It was agreed Commissioners should meet during the afternoon to +definitely arrange the terms of surrender, and I appointed Major Generals +Wheeler and Lawton and Lieutenant Miley to represent the United States. +</p> + +<p> +The Spanish Commissioners raised many points, and were especially desirous of +retaining their arms. The discussion lasted until late at night and was renewed +at 9:30 o’clock next morning. The terms of surrender finally agreed upon +included about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in the +surrendered district. +</p> + +<p> +It was arranged that the formal surrender should take place between the lines +on the morning of July 17th, each army being represented by 100 armed men. At +the time appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon, with my general +officers, staff, and 100 troopers of the 2d Cavalry, under Captain Brett. +General Toral also arrived with a number of his officers and 100 infantry. We +met midway between the representatives of our two Armies, and the Spanish +commander formally consummated the surrender of the city and the 24,000 troops +in Santiago and the surrendered district. +</p> + +<p> +After this ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, and at 12 +o’clock, noon, the American flag was raised over the Governor’s +palace with appropriate ceremonies. +</p> + +<p> +The 9th Infantry immediately took possession of the city and perfect order was +maintained. The surrender included a small gunboat and about 200 seamen, +together with five merchant ships in the harbor. One of these vessels, the +Mexico, had been used as a war vessel, and had four guns mounted on it. +</p> + +<p> +In taking charge of the civil government, all officials who were willing to +serve were retained in office, and the established order of government was +preserved as far as consistent with the necessities of military rule. +</p> + +<p> +I soon found the number of officials was excessive, and I greatly reduced the +list, and some departments were entirely abolished. +</p> + +<p> +A collector of customs, Mr. Donaldson, arrived soon after the surrender, and, +due to his energy and efficiency, this department was soon working +satisfactorily. The total receipts had, up to my departure, been $102,000. +</p> + +<p> +On August 4th I received orders to begin the embarkation of my command and ship +them to Montauk Point Long Island, New York. The movement continued without +interruption until August 25th, when I sailed for Montauk with the last troops +in my command, turning over the command of the district to Major General +Lawton. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3>DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE CAMPAIGN.</h3> + +<p> +Before closing my report I wish to dwell upon the natural obstacles I had to +encounter and which no foresight could have overcome or obviated. The rocky and +precipitous coast afforded no sheltered landing places, the roads were mere +bridle-paths, the effect of the tropical sun and rains upon the unacclimated +troops was deadly, and a dread of strange and unknown diseases had its effect +on the Army. +</p> + +<p> +At Baiquiri the landing of the troops and stores was made a small wooden wharf, +which the Spaniards tried to burn, but unsuccessfully, and the animals were +pushed into the water and guided to a sandy beach about 200 yards in extent. At +Siboney the landing was made on the beach and at a small wharf erected by the +engineers. +</p> + +<p> +I had neither the time nor the men to spare to construct permanent wharves. +</p> + +<p> +In spite of the fact that I had nearly 1,000 men continuously at work on the +roads, they were at times impassable for wagons. +</p> + +<p> +The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to prevent +the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the command had to +be depended upon for the victualing of my Army, as well as the 20,000 refugees, +who could not in the interests of humanity be left to starve while we had +rations. +</p> + +<p> +Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack trains. +</p> + +<p> +After the great physical strain and exposure of July 1st and 2d, the malarial +and other fevers began to rapidly advance throughout the command, and on July +4th the yellow fever appeared at Siboney. Though efforts were made to keep this +fact from the Army, it soon became known. +</p> + +<p> +The supply of Quartermaster and Commissary stores during the campaign was +abundant, and notwithstanding the difficulties in landing and transporting the +ration, the troops on the firing line were at all times supplied with its +coarser components, namely, of bread, meat, sugar, and coffee. +</p> + +<p> +There was no lack of transportation, for at no time up to the surrender could +all the wagons I had be used. +</p> + +<p> +In reference to the sick and wounded, I have to say that they received every +attention that was possible to give them. The medical officers, without +exception, worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was no +greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. It would have been better if we +had had more ambulances, but as many were taken as was thought necessary, +judging from previous campaigns. +</p> + +<p> +The discipline of the command was superb, and I wish to invite attention to the +fact that not an officer was brought to trial by court martial, and, as far as +I know, no enlisted men. This speaks volumes for an Army of this size and in a +campaign of such duration. +</p> + +<p> +In conclusion, I desire to express to the members of my staff my thanks for +their efficient performance of all the duties required of them, and the good +judgment and bravery displayed on all occasions when demanded. +</p> + +<p> +I submit the following recommendations for promotion, which I earnestly desire +to see made. It is a very little reward to give them for their devotion and +fearless exposure of their lives in their country’s cause: +</p> + +<p> +E. J. McClernand, Lieutenant Colonel and Adjutant General, U. S. A., to be +brevetted Colonel for gallantry in the face of the enemy on the 1st and 2d of +July, and to be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and meritorious +service throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Geo. McC. Derby, Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers, U. S. V., to be brevetted +Colonel for hazardous service on July 1st and 2d in reconnoitering the +enemy’s lines, and to be brevetted Brigadier General for hazardous and +meritorious service in ascending, under a hot fire, in a war balloon on July +1st, thus gaining valuable information. +</p> + +<p> +J. D. Miley, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector General, U. S. A., to be +brevetted Colonel for conspicuous gallantry in the battle of San Juan on July +1st, and to be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and meritorious service +throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +R. H. Noble, Major and Adjutant General, U. S. V., to be brevetted Lieutenant +Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +J. J. Astor, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector General, U. S. V., to be +brevetted Colonel for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +B. F. Pope, Lieutenant Colonel and Surgeon, U. S. V., to be brevetted<br/> +Colonel for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Maj. S. W. Groesbeck, Judge Advocate, U. S. A., to be brevetted Lieutenant +Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Charles F. Humphrey, Lieutenant Colonel, Quartermaster’s Department, to +be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and meritorious service throughout +the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +John F. Weston, Colonel and Assistant Commissary General of Subsistence, Chief +Commissary, to be brevetted Brigadier General for meritorious service +throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +C. G. Starr, Major and Inspector General, U. S. V., to be brevetted Lieutenant +Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Leon Roudiez, Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V., to be brevetted Lieutenant +Colonel for faithful and meritorious conduct throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +H. J. Gallagher, Major and Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., to be brevetted +Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout the +campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Capt. Brice, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., to be brevetted<br/> +Major for faithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +E. H. Plummer, Captain, U. S. A., A. D. C., to be brevetted Major for faithful +and meritorious service throughout the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +J. C. Gilmore, Jr., Captain and Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. V., to be +brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +W. H. McKittrick, Captain and Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. V., to be +brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +Capt. Johnson, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., to be brevetted<br/> +Major for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign. +</p> + +<p> +I wish to invite special attention to Dr. G. Goodfellow, of New York, who +accompanied me throughout the campaign and performed much professional service +as well as duties as Volunteer aid. I recommend him for favorable consideration +of the War Department. +</p> + +<p> +Mr. G. F. Hawkins, of New York, also accompanied me as Volunteer aid, and I +recommend him for favorable consideration of the War Department for faithful +and important services rendered. +</p> + +<p> +My thanks are due to Admiral Sampson and Captain Goodrich, U. S. N., for their +efficient aid in disembarking my Army. Without their assistance it would have +been impossible to have landed in the time I did. +</p> + +<p> +I also express my warmest thanks to division, brigade, and regimental +commanders, without exception, for their earnest efforts in carrying out my +wishes and for the good judgment they invariably displayed in handling their +troops. +</p> + +<p> +The reports of the division commanders are attached hereto, and those of the +brigade and regimental commanders forwarded herewith, and attention +respectfully invited to them. Very respectfully, +</p> + +<p> +<i>Wm. R. Shafter</i>,<br/> +Major-General, United States Volunteers,<br/> +Commanding United States Forces in Cuba. +</p> + +<p> +Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap15"></a>APPENDIX III.</h2> + +<p class="right"> +Bivouac, near Santiago, Cuba,<br /> +July 23, 1898. +</p> + +<p> +<i>The Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.</i> +</p> + +<p> +Sir,—In compliance with orders I have the honor to submit the following +report of my command, the Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th Army Corps, covering its +operations down to the present date: +</p> + +<p> +1. Organization.—Pursuant to instructions from Gen. Shafter I was given +a detail of two sergeants and ten men on the 26th of May, 1898, from the 13th +Infantry, then in camp near Tampa, Fla., and directed to report to 1st Lieut. +John T. Thompson, O. D., ordinance officer, Tampa, “for duty with Gatling +guns.” I was placed in charge of four guns, model 1895, cal. 30, and at +once began the instruction of the detachment. On June 1st I received verbal +instruction to assist Lieut. Thompson in his work at the ordinance depot, and +performed this duty in addition to my duties with the guns until June 6, 1898, +superintending issues to the expedition (5th Corps) then fitting out for Cuba. +</p> + +<p> +On June 6th I took my men and guns aboard the transport Cherokee, and on June +11th, per special orders No. 16 of that date, my detail was increased to +thirty-seven men, all told, of whom one was left sick in hospital at Tampa. +About twelve of these did not join me, however, until after debarkation at +Baiquiri, Cuba. On June 25th I received verbal instructions from Gen. Shafter +to disembark at once, select the necessary number of mules (two per gun), and +get to the front as soon as possible, reporting on my arrival there to Gen. +Wheeler, then in command of all the troops at the front. I was unable to obtain +any tentage for myself, and had only shelter-tents for my men. +</p> + +<p> +I was joined on June 25th by Capt. Henry Marcotte, 17th Infantry, retired, +regularly authorized correspondent of the Army and Navy Journal, who has been +with me ever since, enduring all the vicissitudes of the season with Spartan +fortitude, although equally destitute of cover as myself and 60 years of age. I +desire to express here officially and fully, my sincere gratitude for the +kindness which permitted him to accompany my command, and the great +appreciation of the valuable advice and assistance which he has given +continually. His large experience of war, his clear head and good judgment have +always been at hand to aid, and his cool example to myself and my men under +fire did much to steady us and keep us up to our work when we were first called +on to face that ordeal. +</p> + +<p> +All of the detachments, who had not previously joined me, did so on June 26th, +on which day I reached the extreme front and reported to Gen. Wheeler. The guns +were posted in a position to sweep the neighboring hills toward the enemy, and +I went into camp, remaining there until the morning of July 1st. +</p> + +<p> +Summing up the organization, it should be stated here that the detachment was +organized at the first, and has ever since remained an independent command, +receiving its orders directly from the corps commander. It has had its own +records, returns, rolls, etc., and has been rationed separately all the time, +and is composed of men selected by myself from various regiments. +</p> + +<p> +2. The Battery in Action.—On the morning of July 1st, I broke camp at +4:30 a.m., and pursuant to instructions from Gen. Shafter, proceeded to El +Poso, placing my battery, as I shall henceforth call it, in support behind the +position taken by a battery of artillery. I took this position about 6 a.m., +and soon after the artillery arrived, went on to battery and opened fire at +Santiago, the range being 2,600 yards. After some time the enemy replied with a +well-directed fire, the second shell bursting directly over my battery in rear +of artillery. Neither my men nor mules showed any signs of disturbance, and we +remained in our perilous position nearly twenty minutes, the enemy’s +shells bursting all around us, until ordered to the rear by the chief-of-staff. +The battery went to the rear under fire quietly until out of range, and +remained there until the artillery fire ceased, at about 9 a.m. Private Hoft, +Company D, 13th Infantry, a member of the detachment who had been detailed to +guard the camp equipage at El Poso, remained at his post during the whole of +the artillery fight, and deserves great credit therefor, his battery having +been ordered to the rear. At 9 a.m. I returned to El Poso, and there received +the following instructions from Col. McClernand, A. A. G., 5th Corps: +“Find the 71st N. Y. V. and go on with them, if you can. If this is not +practical, find the best position you can, and use your guns to the best +advantage.” Pursuant to these instructions, I went forward about a +half-mile and found the 71st N. Y. V. halting to learn what their instructions +were. I could get no clear idea of what they were going to do, but waited about +fifteen minutes in their rear to find out. Meantime troops continually passed +us toward the front. Then, about 10:15, firing began in front. I rode forward +alone along the rode, which was a narrow defile through the jungle, and found +that about a half-mile in front was a creek, upon the crossing of which the +enemy’s fire seemed concentrated. In front of this crossing seemed to be +a level plain of about 400 to 800 yards, beyond which was a semi-circular ridge +crowned with Spanish trenches from which the Spanish fire seemed to come. Men +were being hit continually at this place (the ford), but it seemed to me to be +a good place to work my battery effectively. +</p> + +<p> +I rode back, finding the Seventy-first still lying beside the road without any +apparent intention of moving. I determined to leave them and go into action. +Taking a gallop I moved the battery forward nearly to the ford (about 150 +yards), where I met Col. Derby of Gen. Shafter’s staff, who informed me +that the troops were not yet sufficiently deployed to take advantage of my +fire, and advised me to wait. The bullets were cutting through all around, and, +as we learned afterward, the enemy’s sharpshooters were actually in the +woods near us, up in tall trees, picking off officers and men. It should be +stated here that the sudden increase of the enemy’s fire at this time was +caused by a wild cheering set up by the 71st N. Y. V., as the battery passed +them on its way to the front. The cheering located our position for the enemy +and drew his fire. Many a brave soldier who had gone to the front was put +forever beyond the possibility of cheering by this outburst of ignorant +enthusiasm. +</p> + +<p> +I acted on Col. Derby’s advice, and he promised to send me word when the +moment for proper action came. This was necessary, as I knew only part of the +plan of battle and might have jeopardized other parts of prematurely exposing +our strength at this point. The gun crews lay down under their guns and +steadily remained at this posts. The fire finally grew so hot that I moved +about 100 yards back. This was about 12, noon. At 1 p. m., or about that time, +I received a message sent by Col. Derby, I think, as follows: “Gen. +Shafter directs that you give one of your guns to Lieut. Miley, take the others +forward beyond the ford where the dynamite gun is, and go into action at the +best point you can find.” I obeyed the order, giving Lieut. Miley +Sergeant Weigle’s gun and crew and moving the rest forward at a gallop to +the point beyond the ford, which I had already selected as a good place. The +battery opened with three guns simultaneously at ranges of 600 to 800 yards at +1:15 p. m. The enemy at first concentrated his fire upon us, but soon weakened +and in five minutes was clambering from his trenches and running to the rear. +We fired as rapidly as possible upon the groups thus presented until I saw a +white handkerchief waved by some one of my own regiment, the 13th Infantry, and +at the same moment Capt. Landis, 1st Cavalry, who had voluntarily assisted me +throughout, said: “Better stop; our own men are climbing up the +ridge.” I ordered the fire to cease at 1:23 1/2 p.m., and a moment later +saw our own troops occupy the crest of the hill. The firing had been, continued +by the battery until our own troops were within 150 yards of the enemy’s +trench, a fact made possible by the steep slope of the hill upon which the +enemy had been. +</p> + +<p> +At the time when my battery went into action I had no support, and the position +I took was at least 100 yards in front of any of our troops along this part of +the line. About the time I ceased firing Lieut.-Col. Baldwin, 10th Cavalry, put +two troops in support of my battery. +</p> + +<p> +I have advanced in a letter to the Adjutant General from Fort Leavenworth, +dated January 1st, 1898, the theory that such guns as these can be used +offensively. The conditions of this assault were favorable, the morale of my +men superb, and the use made of the guns followed the theory therein set forth +with the exactness of a mathematical demonstration. The infantry and cavalry +had been pounding away for two hours on these positions; in eight and one-half +minutes after the Gatlings opened the works were ours. Inspired by the friendly +rattle of the machine guns, our own troops rose to the charge; while the enemy +amazed by our sudden and tremendous increase of fire, first diverted his fire +to my battery, and then, unable to withstand the hail of bullets, augmented by +the moral effect of our battery fire and the charging line, broke madly from +his safe trenches and was mercilessly cut by fire from these guns during his +flight. +</p> + +<p> +I at once limbered up and took stock of my losses. One man was killed, one +badly wounded, one mule hit twice, but not much injured, and several men were +missing. +</p> + +<p> +Suddenly the fire was resumed at the front. I moved my three pieces forward +again at a gallop, and went into action on the skirmish line on top of the +captured position, with two pieces to the right and one to the left of the main +road from El Poso to Santiago. I was compelled to make the skirmishers give way +to the right and left in order to get room for my guns on the firing-line, and +to impress stragglers to carry ammunition. Capt. Ayres, 10th Cavalry, gave me a +detail of one sergeant and two privates, all of whom did fine service. It +seemed to me that the enemy was trying to retake the position. About 4 to 4:14 +p. m. I saw a body, apparently about 400, of the enemy to the right front of my +position, apparently in front of the position occupied by Lieut.-Col. Roosevelt +with the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. I turned a Gatling gun on them, using 600-yard +range, and they disappeared. Soon after the firing sensibly slackened. +</p> + +<p> +In the rapid fire on this last body of the enemy I had overheated one piece, +and it went temporarily out of action. I went over to Col. Roosevelt’s +position, about a quarter of a mile to the right of a salient, and +reconnoitered. While there Sergeant Weigle reported to me with his piece, +informing me that Lieut. Miley had not put it into action, and asked for +instructions. This was about the hour of 5 p. m., and the fire became warmer at +that moment. I directed Sergeant Weigle to run his piece up on the firing-line +and to report to the officer in charge thereof. He did so and went into action +at once. Col. Roosevelt, who was and remained present, informs me that the gun +was very effectively used. I rejoined my other two guns and put both of them on +the line at the left of the El Poso road. At sundown the enemy made a sharp +attack, and all three of my guns were effectively used. During the fight a +battery in the city opened on my two guns, firing 16 cm. shells. I at once +turned my guns on it and kept up so warm a fire that the cannoneers left their +battery and did not return. In all they had fired three shells at us, all of +which broke just over or beyond the battery. I secured the fuse of one, still +warm, and after the surrender visited the battery which had fired at us and +examined the gun. It is a 16 cm. (6.2992 inches) bronze rifle gun in barbette +on a pintle. This is probably the first time in land fighting that such a piece +was ever silenced by machine-gun fire. The range I used was 2,000 yards +(estimated). +</p> + +<p> +The guns were used during the remainder of the fighting in the trenches. I took +off the wheels and put the guns on the carriages in emplacements, erecting a +sandbag parapet in front as cover during the night of July 4th. The disabled +gun was brought up and repaired, subsequently participating in the fighting. +The dynamite gun, under Sergeant Borrowe, 1st Volunteer Cavalry, cooperated +with the battery thus formed, and the whole battery, including the two Colt +automatic rapid-fire guns under Lieut. Tiffany, 1st United States Volunteer +Cavalry, did good work in all the subsequent fighting. I supplied about eight +thousand rounds of captured Mauser cartridges to Tiffany, which had been +captured by my battery, and which he used effectively in his Colt’s guns. +I had a strong fire directed upon a battery of seven pieces of the +enemy’s artillery at a distance of 1,500 yards in front every time any +attempt was made to use this battery. The result was that only three shots were +fired from these guns after July 4th. I visited this battery after the +surrender and found every gun in working order, the 16 cm. gun being actually +loaded. As no organization, except my battery, of which I had general +direction, had such orders, so far as I can learn, the conclusion is that this +battery of machine guns kept out of action seven pieces of the enemy’s +artillery by making it too warm for his gunners to stay in their batteries. +</p> + +<p> +I have made certain recommendations in hasty reports for gallantry, which I +personally witnessed. They were as follows: +</p> + +<p> +Capt. J. R. F. Landis, 1st Cavalry, medal of honor. Volunteered to assist +observation of fire July 1st, and rendered great service at imminent peril of +his life made necessary in order to render such service. +</p> + +<p> +Sergeant John N. Weigle, 9th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant U. S. Army (regulars). For +conspicuous daring, intelligence, and coolness in action, July 1st. +</p> + +<p> +Corporal Charles C. Steigenwald, 13th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant U. S. Army +(regulars). For coolness and judgment in keeping his gun in action with only +one man to help on July 1st. +</p> + +<p> +Private Fred C. Elkins, 17th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant United States Volunteers. +For conspicuous daring and courage in action. Although wounded, he remained at +his post until he fell from exhaustion, July 1st. +</p> + +<p> +Corporal Matthew Doyle, 13th Infantry, medal of honor. Conspicuous gallantry +and coolness in action. When, two men had been shot down by his side he +continued to work his gun effectively alone until assistance arrived, July 1st. +</p> + +<p> +Sergt. Green, Company H, 13th Infantry, medal of honor. Conspicuous coolness +and steadiness in handling his piece under hot fire, July 1st. +</p> + +<p> +Sergt. John Graham, 10th Cavalry, medal of honor. Conspicuous coolness and +steadiness under fire, July 1st. +</p> + +<p> +Sergt. Weischaar, Company A, 13th Infantry, certificate of merit. Particularly +meritorious steadiness, night of July 6th. Being put on outpost duty with a +Gatling gun in time of truce, and having been alarmed by a sentinel, whose duty +it was to warn him of the enemy’s approach, he coolly reserved his fire +for personal investigation and prevented a violation of the truce. +</p> + +<p> +Sergt. Ryder, Company G, 13th Infantry, certificate of merit. Particularly +meritorious steadiness, night of July 6th. Being on outpost duty with a Gatling +gun in time of truce, and having been alarmed by a sentinel, whose duty it was +to warn him of the enemy’s approach, he coolly held his fire for personal +investigation and prevented a violation of the truce. +</p> + +<p> +In making these recommendations, I have limited myself to those which I +personally observed. If I recommended for every deserving act, there is not a +man in my whole detachment who has not deserved a certificate of merit. They +were selected in the beginning from an army corps for what I knew of them, and +they have abundantly justified my confidence in them. With a less efficient +personnel it would have been absolutely impossible to organize, equip and +instruct the first battery of Gatling guns ever used in the history of war, in +the short space of time allotted me, and put it in efficient fighting shape. +They fought their guns on the skirmish line and in advance of it, standing +boldly up to do it when the skirmishers themselves lay down close for cover. My +loss, as footed up on the night of July 1st, was 33 1-3 per cent, killed, +wounded, and missing. The efficiency of the work of my guns was attested to me +by numerous Spanish officers and prisoners. Their favorite expression was: +“It was terrible when your guns opened, always. They went b-r-r-r-r, like +a lawn mower cutting the grass over our trenches. We could not stick a finger +up when you fired without getting it cut off—so!” +</p> + +<p> +The work of this experimental battery proves that in this weapon we have a new +arm supplementary to infantry and cavalry, independent of both as one arm is of +another, and more nearly capable of independent action than any other arm of +the service. It is equally demonstrated that this new arm is entirely different +from artillery in its functions, and can live where the latter is compelled to +retire. +</p> + +<p> +It should, therefore, be organized as a separate arm. I have, at the request of +General Wheeler, drawn up a scheme of such an organization and submitted it to +him. +</p> + +<p> +Experience shows me that the carriage is too heavy. I can only renew the +representations contained in my letter of January 1, 1898, to the Adjutant +General, accompanying drawing, etc., of my proposed carriage for machine guns. +I would now, based on experience, modify my theory of organization as then +proposed, and would make several changes in the model of carriage then proposed +without departing from the general principles. +</p> + +<p> +If any expression of such views is desired, I shall be very glad to submit them +when called upon by the War Department to do so. +</p> + +<p> +Very respectfully, +</p> + +<p> +<i>John H. Parker</i>,<br /> +2d Lieut., 13th Infantry, Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th Corps. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap16"></a>INDEX.</h2> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER I. +</p> + +<p> +L’ENVOI. +</p> + +<p> +Record of the Detachment<br /> +The New Arm of the Service +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER II. +</p> + +<p> +INCEPTION OF THE SCHEME. +</p> + +<p> +Conditions at Tampa<br/> +Florida Climate and its Effects<br/> +Description of the Gatling Gun<br/> +Difficulties Encountered<br/> +Politics at Tampa<br/> +First Efforts to obtain Authority<br/> +Original Plan of Organization<br/> +Tactical Employment of Machine Guns<br/> +A Lucky Accident<br/> +The First Detail +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER III. +</p> + +<p> +THE ORDNANCE DEPOT. +</p> + +<p> +Defects in the Guns<br/> +Instruction of the Detachment<br/> +Status of the Detachment<br/> +Interview with General Wheeler<br/> +General Wheeler’s Views<br/> +Interview with General Lee<br/> +Issues of Ordnance<br/> +Fire in the Magazine<br/> +Embarkation +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER IV. +</p> + +<p> +THE VOYAGE AND DISEMBARKATION. +</p> + +<p> +A Night Alarm on Transport<br/> +Decisive Interview with General Shafter<br/> +The Official Authority at Last<br/> +Condition of Transports<br/> +Disembarkation<br/> +Private J. Shiffer—Corral Boss<br/> +The Missouri Mule<br/> +The First March +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER V. +</p> + +<p> +THE MARCH. +</p> + +<p> +The 13th Infantry Detail<br/> +The Cuban Guide<br/> +The Cuban as He Is<br/> +Roads in Cuba<br/> +Private Jones and the Scorpion<br/> +The Medical Department<br/> +The Newspaper Fraternity<br/> +Chaplain Springer<br/> +Arrival at the Front +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER VI. +</p> + +<p> +THE BATTERY IN CAMP WHEELER. +</p> + +<p> +Theory and Practice of Artillery and Machine Gun<br/> +The Problem Presented to this Detachment<br/> +Personnel of the Detachment<br/> +Roster on July 1st<br/> +Captain Marcotte<br/> +Oil for an Army<br/> +Futile Plans +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER VII. +</p> + +<p> +THE BATTLE. +</p> + +<p> +The Plan of Battle by General Shafter<br/> +Did General Shafter Capture Santiago? HE DID<br/> +The Night Before the Battle<br/> +El Poso<br/> +The Final Instructions<br/> +The 71st New York<br/> +Waiting for the Decisive Moment<br/> +In Action at Last<br/> +The Killed and Wounded<br/> +On the Skirmish Line<br/> +Reconnaissance<br/> +Weigle Gets His Opportunity<br/> +The Gatlings Knock out a Heavy Battery<br/> +The Brunettes<br/> +The Artillery +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER VIII. +</p> + +<p> +TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLES AT SANTIAGO. +</p> + +<p> +El Caney<br/> +San Juan<br/> +Movements of Lawton’s Division<br/> +The Gatlings as a Tactical Reserve<br/> +Sergeant William Tiffany<br/> +The Night Alarm<br/> +The Dynamite Gun<br/> +The Mortar Battery<br/> +Summary of Tactical Deductions on use of Machine Guns as<br/> +Demonstrated in Battle +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER IX. +</p> + +<p> +THE VOLUNTEERS. +</p> + +<p> +The Surrender<br/> +General Observations upon the Volunteers<br/> +The 34th Michigan<br/> +The Rough Riders<br/> +The 1st Illinois +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER X. +</p> + +<p> +THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS. +</p> + +<p> +The Difficulties of the Campaign<br/> +Unnecessary Sufferings; the Causes<br/> +The Case of Private Elkins<br/> +The Sick Left by Kent’s Division<br/> +Some Staff—and Some Others<br/> +The Lesson to be Derived<br/> +The General Staff—Proper +</p> + +<p class="center"> +CHAPTER XI. +</p> + +<p> +HOME AGAIN. +</p> + +<p> +The Home Voyage<br/> +The End of the Detachment +</p> + +<p> +APPENDIX I +</p> + +<p> +APPENDIX II +</p> + +<p> +APPENDIX III +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GATLINGS AT SANTIAGO ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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